Ties That Bind?
Confronting Value Conflict in Community Policing

by

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Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy

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ABSTRACT

Autonomy has become the villain in many debates about government bureaucracies, and reformers have increasingly urged public agencies to build stronger ties with the outside world. These relationships can make organizations more effective and improve their legitimacy, but they also create new challenges for practice that research has not yet fully explored. In this study, based on a comparative analysis of eleven diverse case studies in policing, I describe the problems and dilemmas that working in partnership entails, and how effective practitioners overcome them. I argue that the central problems of building and sustaining partnerships involve conflict over values: Different social institutions advance different social values, and when the partners who cling to them try to collaborate, conflict flares up at the point of contact. In policing, a small number of conflicts appear recurrently in four different types of partnerships: In community ties, these conflicts involve the relative importance of soft crime, the proper level of police authority, and the tension between equity and the interests of individual neighborhoods; in business ties, they center on the private sector's responsibility for social impacts; in political ties, they involve fights about money, mistakes, and responsiveness; and in interagency ties, they concern the relative importance of crime control compared with other goals of public policy, and the proper ordering of organizational domains.

In some views, conflicts like these are unavoidable, and calls for "partnerships" among organizations are futile. But these cases suggest that many effective police practitioners have been able to overcome them in two ways. First, they employ strategies of institutional change (like appealing to an existing value to institutionalize a new one) to shift their priorities or those of their partners. They thereby close the normative gap that divides them, putting their partnerships on less-contentious ground. Second, some police departments have developed a capacity to attend to competing values in the manner of Isaiah Berlin's fox: Instead of subordinating all but one value in a dilemma, their practitioners have a moral humility and a penchant for "incompletely-theorized agreements" that makes them effective in a world of value pluralism.

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Many people have contributed to this dissertation in many ways. My first debt is to the hundreds of public servants and community activists who helped me to understand how they cope with what often looked like impossible jobs. By its nature an academic study like this one will make ungrateful distinctions, pointing out that some of these committed people had more success than others, and even that the way they approached their jobs explains part of the difference. But I hope I can convince them of my admiration for their efforts, and that my disagreement is not with them but with certain ideas that are circulating in policing circles—which while eminently plausible may sometimes be incomplete. I hope also that they will excuse me where I have failed to grasp what they tried to teach me.

Academically, I am indebted to many colleagues at the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at MIT and the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. The three members of my committee deserve first thanks: Martin Rein, my committee chair, has an ability almost unique among academic advisors to struggle with his student's ideas rather than impose his own. His feedback on innumerable inchoate and downright inaccurate ideas improved the dissertation more than anyone can know. Langley Keyes kept me focused on public safety and practice throughout my time at MIT, and my first introduction to many of the issues I discuss here came during work I did with him in public housing. He was also instrumental in helping me to integrate the overall argument of the thesis. Finally, Mark Moore helped me to locate my subject in the study of public management, and working with him gave me the benefit of his deep knowledge of that field. Most important, his conceptual clarity helped me to understand my subject better than I otherwise would have.

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CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

In policing as in many areas of public administration, the views about how organizations

should operate are changing. Reformers since the progressive era have admonished police to listen

only to the laws, their profession, and their agencies' established ways of working, pushing for a

bureaucratic model of organization that put a premium on autonomy.[1] But while the progressives

had faith that professional wisdom exercised within a framework of rules could produce fair,

effective, and precise organizations, today's reformers express growing doubts (Moore 1994).

Agencies are especially taken to task for being unresponsive to their customers and the

community, unaccountable to political oversight, and even incapable of working effectively with

each other. Many of the dominant proposals for reform reverse these critiques, calling for public-

private partnerships, community involvement, interagency coordination, and a renewed dialogue

with elected officials (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Kettl 1996; O'Toole 1997; Moore 1995; *cf.* also

Frieden and Sagalyn 1989; Evans 1996; Cohen and Rogers 1992). Where progressives saw the

route to effectiveness and accountability in autonomy, today's reformers are more likely to see it in

partnerships.

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[1] To be sure, accountability required public oversight. But the progressives felt that this need could be met impersonally from above, through the clearly-stated policies that elected officials set out in advance—like the

These ideas are especially obvious in policing, where the newly-dominant model of "community policing" has put a premium on partnerships. In the past police departments sought to work autonomously, trying to isolate themselves from "politics" and to monopolize the task of crime control. But advocates of community policing exhort city police departments to forswear their autonomy and collaborate with practically everyone: Community groups and institutions, property owners, agencies of city government, other police and security forces, elected officials, businesses, and so on (*e.g.* Eck 1990; Friedman 1994). Through these relationships, reformers argue, police will be able to improve their legitimacy and effectiveness by making their operations more transparent and by leveraging outside help. While community policing also encompasses other innovations like problem-solving (Goldstein 1990), the development of partnerships clearly lies at its core (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy 1990).

While the ideal of community partnerships is clear, it is less clear how police can get there—a confusion that shows up in the mixed results these efforts have had. Although some agencies have built successful partnerships with dramatic results, superficial change and even outright failure seem to be the norm. For example, in reference to community partnerships, one author writing in an important recent review of experience with community policing concluded that "successes in this regard are modest and that community policing initiatives have so far failed to tap the great wellspring of 'community' believed to lie waiting for the proper catalyst. . . . community policing by and large remains a unilateral action on the part of the police." (Buerger 1994: 270). More quantitatively, a recent Urban Institute survey of nearly 1,600 U.S. police agencies found that on average, respondents were much further along in developing capacities for

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laws agencies are directed to uphold, the budget that authorizes their expenditures, and the employment regulations that govern their staffing decisions (Lowi 1979).

problem-solving and prevention (other key elements of community policing) than they were in developing community partnerships (Roth and Johnson 1997).

It is not that the ideal has proven totally unfeasible, but rather that it is less obvious how to realize it than most reform programs suggest. Any work situation involves its characteristic difficulties, and when the nature of work changes—as it has in both policing and in public administration as a whole—, the nature of those difficulties and the strategies necessary to cope with them must also change (Rein 1983). So far, however, research has not helped front-line workers confront these changes. In fact, studies of community policing have focused so heavily on impacts that they simply have not offered much discussion about implementation failures, like failures to build partnerships in the first place. The few relevant studies that do exist tend to treat partnering as self-evident, recounting stories of places that are close to unique in their very *attempt* to engage the community or city agencies, and exhorting others simply to follow suit. While there is some recognition that the work is difficult, there is little substantive guidance about how to confront that difficulty. For example, the literature has often described the difficulties of reaching disenfranchised communities, but it concludes simply that police must try harder in these cases, spending ever more time, energy, and resources organizing apathetic communities, persistently hosting ill-attended meetings, and so on. This brute force reasoning—where failure stems from incompetence, bad timing, or weak efforts—is a sure sign of subject in search of a theory.

To be fair, policing literature has developed some advice for practitioners trying to build partnerships, arguing that police departments need to undertake several technical administrative reforms (like decentralization and certain strategies of personnel assignment) in order to make partnerships work. But given the deep obstacles that partnerships face, which I will discuss below, some of this advice can seem naïve, and in any case it is not well-substantiated. For example, the policing literature has usefully recommended that departments create "beat integrity," or quasi-

permanent assignments that give officers time to build relationships in their communities. But this strategy cannot be the whole story: Departments with varying assignment systems have had similar experiences building partnerships, and departments with identical systems have had widely divergent experiences. Beat integrity is neither necessary nor sufficient for partnership-building.

Such criticisms abound where reform is preached in the public service, for the field regularly talks back with complaints that the reformers have told them *what* to do, but not how to do it (*cf.* Walters 1992). In the case of community policing, the question we need to answer is how the practice of policing and police management must change in order to make these newly-valued partnerships real. The widespread problems in the field suggest that many police have not yet learned how to manage the challenges their new mode of working entails, and understanding how they can do so is a major outstanding issue in community policing, as it is in public management more generally.

To make real headway on this question, I believe that we must take our guidance from the field, aiming to understand the nature of practice among those who build partnerships successfully and how it differs from the practice of those who face more difficulty. Doing so means enlisting the help of practitioners themselves, each of whom "reveals to the reflective researcher the ways of thinking that he brings to his practice" (Schön 1983: 323). I will develop this grounded analysis with the help of eleven case studies described in Chapter 2, but it cannot take place without a prior theoretical framework—one that guides research to the core dynamics at issue (Paige 1998; Burawoy 1998).

In my view, those dynamics revolve around value conflict between institutions. Police and the groups they aim to partner with represent different social functions in the service of different social values, and their attempts to collaborate expose fundamental tensions. As a result, the key challenge practitioners face in developing partnerships involves managing the tensions of value

pluralism, and effective practitioners are distinguished by their ability to engage multiple and competing aims.[2] This study attempts to explicate that ability and demonstrate how it enables partnerships.

First, however, I use the remainder of this chapter to give a preview of the analysis and describe the theory that guided it. In particular, I lay out a preliminary sense of what I mean by the central concepts of partnerships, value pluralism, and style of practice (though of course it is the qualitative analysis itself that must develop these concepts fully) (Ragin 1994; Weiss 1994; Glaser and Strauss 1967). Section 1 briefly describes the ideal of partnerships in community policing, setting out a framework for distinguishing "successful" partnerships from "unsuccessful" ones. The remaining sections then set out a theory of practice designed to explain these differences—a theory, in other words, of what police have to do and what tools they need to use in order to forge partnerships effectively. In section 2, I explain in more detail my contention that different organizations are committed to different social values and that this value pluralism can undermine partnerships. In section 3, I argue that a particular style of practice—consisting of a set of managerial tools and a certain type of temperament—can successfully forestall this possibility by reducing the scope and impact of value conflict across partners.

1. The Nature of Partnerships

The notion of a "partnership" is sufficiently imprecise that it is not always easy to know if one exists in a particular case, but it is important at least to try to be conceptually clear about the

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[2] This, in other words, is how I answer the question of what problems and dilemmas the development of partnerships create, and how the most effective practitioners manage them: Managing partnerships involves managing value pluralism. My empirical analysis elaborates and substantiates this basic idea. This is an entirely traditional type of answer produced by qualitative analysis; *cf.* for example, Charles Ragin's
(footnote continued on next page)

matter. The study I have proposed demands some way to distinguish success from failure—at the very least in order know which cases to examine for clues about good and bad practice. Police and their partners often have an intuitive sense of whether or not they have successfully built a partnership, and it is possible to use their understanding as a starting point in this analysis. In this way, one can develop the concept of "partnership" empirically by trying to unpack what this sense consists of in each case (*cf.* Whyte 1993). But in order to give some idea of what evidence to look for in this process, it may be helpful to suggest a preliminary idea of what "partnerships" are.

Partnerships involve broad, long-term relationships between police and the sorts of outside groups I have already listed. They are important because police themselves do not control many resources they need—from information, to legitimacy, to specific types of authority (such as the authority a landlord but not a police officer has to evict a troublesome tenant). Policing has always recognized this dependence, of course: For example, the 911 system became an important organizational device for harnessing the community's ability to scan the environment for police-related problems; referrals enabled police to send cases to other agencies for their action; and a few highly-structured programs for police-community interaction (police athletic leagues, DARE programs, citizen police academies) provided means of bolstering police legitimacy in the face of flagging support. But with the growing popularity of community policing, a different model of police-community relationships has emerged under the rubric of "community partnerships." In contrast to single-purpose windows on the world like 911, referrals, and athletic leagues, partnerships are relationships where each side offers up many or even most of its respective resources in order to tackle some community problem together.

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description of how one qualitative study of flight attendants concluded that their work consisted of "emotion work" (Ragin 1994: 89).

This open-ended, multifaceted aspect of partnerships is their defining characteristic: The degree to which it is in evidence determines how much of a "partnership" a given relationship is. Thus, where community members *only* use meetings to voice complaints about neighborhood problems, we feel that something is missing (some have denigrated such meetings as "911 sessions").[3] In an ideal partnership, community members raise problems, but they also offer solutions and advance them in a variety of ways: Among other things, they take direct action, they "cheerlead" for police in city government, and of course they act as officers' "eyes and ears"(*cf.* Buerger 1994; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Rosenbaum 1988). This diversity of roles is precisely the point of partnerships, which involve broad, open-ended relationships between institutions that allow each side to benefit from a wide range of resources controlled by the other.[4] This broad

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[3] (Chicago Community Policing Consortium 1995: 26). Consider an example from the cases I will be discussing, coincidentally also from Chicago: In the city's beat 714, residents do show up to the police-sponsored beat meetings to raise problems. But it seems that is *all* they do, and that is a major reason why police are disappointed with the relationship. In neighboring beat 715, by contrast, community resident Jamesetta Harris did raise problems for the police. But the partnership only truly blossomed both in her eyes and the eyes of the police when she took on many other roles: Organizing other residents to turn out to police meetings; spearheading neighborhood "clean-ups"; collecting detailed information for police about nearby drug activity; exercising political pressure to get the city to tear down a neighborhood drug house; even setting up a "scarecrow" statue of the Virgin Mary on a major site of drug-dealing—and the list could easily be expanded. Despite the fact that the case does not describe substantial community involvement from *other* neighborhood residents, the 715 story comes off as a success: The partnership is evaluated not primarily by how many people participate, but what they do in the relationship. The two are related, of course, since Harris's own organizing enabled her to deliver some resources that police needed—such as the broad support needed to stage a neighborhood-wide cleanup, and the legitimacy needed to pressure city government to condemn buildings or designate the neighborhood as a "model block." But the important fact is that in beat 715, police and Harris opened up a channel of communication that enabled them to collaborate on many fronts, while in 714, residents did little but voice their concerns.

[4] More precisely, a partnership is not so much the actual cooperation that happens along these many fronts but rather the potential for it to happen. Compare the thoughts of Eugene Bardach on a similar question: "It is the potential to engage in collaborative activities rather than the activities themselves that is what we really care about when we talk about interagency collaboration" (Bardach 1998: 20). Bardach goes on to disaggregate this capacity usefully into objective and subjective components: The first involves formal agreements and explicit assignments of resources and accountability; the second involves the expectation that partners will be available and competent to work on collaborative tasks. I agree with Bardach's characterization but did not use it explicitly to evaluate partnerships, since his book came to my attention only after I had written and analyzed my cases.

scope distinguishes partnerships from more one-dimensional relationships of the sort captured by terms like "exchanges" or "encounters." The progressives' high esteem for autonomy foreclosed all but the latter. But the newer themes of "responsiveness" and "accountability" have made partnerships a viable option, even if police must place limits on particular relationships because of their allegiance to the broader public (as discussed below).

2. Partnerships and Value Pluralism

This broad cooperation makes serious demands for each side to conform to the core attitudes of the other, so that partnerships require a degree of mutual understanding and respect that less holistic relationships do not entail.[5] An adolescent male who feels that the police harass people his age may still call 911 when someone steals his stereo, and he very likely will if someone robs him (Hawkins 1973). But he is less likely to show up week after week to problem-solving meetings: In his eyes, the police are too distant from his basic values for there to be any overarching, common goal for them to work towards; and if he tries, he may constantly find himself on the other side of the issues from the police. Because it effectively puts everything (or at least many things) on the table, a partnership demands an unusual degree of mutual understanding and common goals. Indeed, in successful police-community partnerships, police and community representatives come to form cooperative teams that are jointly focused on solving the same sets of problems.

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[5] More formally, partnerships do not involve "standardized actions" in Eugene Litwak and Lydia Hylton's (1961) sense, the way that 911 and referrals do. That is why the demand for some degree of shared values—which Litwak and Hylton call a "deviant" solution to the problems of interorganizational relations, in that it tends to lead to organizational mergers and the like—plays such an important role in the development of partnerships.

Some basic observations about interorganizational relations suggest that achieving this state is not at all trivial. The fundamental problem in realizing it can be stated succinctly: Police and their would-be partners do not always value the same or even compatible things, and there are often good (though not immutable) reasons why that is the case. Neighborhood groups bespeak a commitment to quality-of-life in distinct residential areas; landlords to the exchange and (perhaps) improvement of residential properties; service agencies to the welfare of their clients; and the courts to doing justice and the protection of individual rights. These values may have some overlap with the complicated mix of aims that shape the police mandate, but they are not identical to them. When the partners who cling to them try to work in collaboration with the police, conflict may flare up at the point of contact. Consider a few of the most persistent conflicts in more detail.

Community groups tend to raise concerns about disorder in their neighborhoods, but police have traditionally seen their job as fighting serious crime; thus they often alienate community partners by failing to take their low-level concerns seriously. As New York City Police Commissioner Howard Safir recently wrote, "As most police commanders can attest, the issues complained of most vocally by community residents are usually quality-of-life conditions, and the failure to address them is perhaps the greatest source of community criticism. The result is public apathy, pessimism, and cynicism. Nevertheless, in the New York City Police Department, as in many other police agencies, most officers felt that these petty offenses were not worth the time and effort it took to enforce them" (Safir 1997: 33). The question of community partnerships is not simply "should police work with communities?" It is instead a more substantive and contentious

one: "Should police shift resources from crime-fighting to disorder maintenance."[6] In every

community partnership they consider building, police must revisit this question.

As police work with other agencies, the problem may be even more severe: For example,

police tend to turn to institutions like schools, social work agencies, and parole boards to find

additional levers of social control (Kennedy 1997); but the enforcement role they propose is often

distasteful to agencies that see themselves as agents of development and rehabilitation. Similar

conflicts even plague would-be partnerships in the criminal justice arena, where Herbert Packer

(1968) long ago articulated the conflicting frames at play: A "due process" model whose

imperative is protecting the rights of the accused, and a "crime control" model aimed primarily at

incarcerating offenders. Recognizing that "due process" tends to be the mantra of the judiciary

and the defense, and that police and prosecutors tend to take a "crime control" tack, it is not

surprising that recent police efforts to build partnerships with the legal community have succeeded

almost entirely in the world of prosecutors. The example is extreme, perhaps obvious, and

possibly overdrawn. But it illustrates the central point clearly: Different institutions are driven by

different and often competing values, so that not all "partnerships" are possible without serious

meditation on those values. Institutions like the courts are *supposed to* act as a check on the police

(at least in our current understanding); it is not surprising that they resist collaborating with them.

Often the conflict is indirect, in the sense that police undermine their ability to work with

one group by aligning themselves too closely with the aims and values of another.[7] For example,

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[6] The pantheonic status of Wilson and Kelling's (1982) "broken windows" thesis is entirely consistent with this point: By synthesizing the two formerly opposing values (arguing that disorder maintenance *is* crime control), the broken windows theory has opened up space for new collaborations between police and communities, at least in those departments where police have accepted the broken windows thesis. I will elaborate on this point in chapter 3.

[7] Indeed, the school of network theory associated with Harrison White has long argued that social roles and the values that seem to underlie them are enforced and even constituted by networks of relationships (*e.g.,*

in some housing developments, tenant organizations and property management have antagonistic

relationships, and police undermine their ability to work with one group by working too closely

with the other. Even more commonly, police departments' existing relationships with informants

often jeopardize their new relationships with the "legitimate" community: As patrol officers try to

forge partnerships with community groups and individuals, they get complaints about the

community's troublemakers. But when the troublemakers turn out to be informants, the officer

faces a dilemma: To satisfy the community means to alienate the informant, and vice versa.[8]

Considering the police relationship to its political environment reveals new dilemmas. As

Elizabeth Reuss-Ianni (1983) pointed out in her compelling study of the NYPD, when police

management attempts to build strong relations with its political overseers, it may alienate officers

(who think management has "sold out") and make them more defensive in their relations with the

public: High-level partnerships may undermine low-level ones. Indeed, the reverse might happen

as well: In order to build strong relations with neighborhood groups, police may need to

decentralize authority. But having done so, police managers may no longer be able to control their

officers as precisely as city hall wants them to. Low-level ties undermine high-level ones.

Cultural Diversity and the Division of Labor

All of these examples suggest that in the values dominating policing and in the existing

networks that enforce those values are sedimented significant obstacles to developing new

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Lorrain and White 1977). To *be* the police and to value the things important to the police cosmology may in fact be to have a certain set of relationships. Consider also Fritz Heider's celebrated "balance theory," in which the postulate that a friend of a friend should be a friend has the same status as the postulate that a friend of a favored cause should be a friend (Heider 1958).

[8]The police-informant tie also has the potential to sour relationships with other law enforcement agencies, as the FBI's ties to alleged mob bosses James Bulger and Steven Flemmi apparently did for its ties to many Massachusetts law enforcement agencies.

partnerships. Indeed, sociologists have long held that different social organs (to use Durkheim's somewhat inelegant terminology) are committed to fundamentally different social values and processes, and that they cannot be combined arbitrarily. For example, sociologists Eugene Litwak and Lydia Hylton argue that society locates different social functions in different organizations precisely because the values they protect cannot be reconciled with one another—only by segregating them can we pursue all of them simultaneously (Litwak and Hylton 1961).

The idea that each organization protects a distinctive value system is admittedly imprecise, and I will return to it below. But the basic problem seems to be that organizations have trouble paying equal attention to two competing values, tending instead to subordinate one value in favor of another (Likwak and Hylton give the example of police-run newspapers in totalitarian states, which tend to sacrifice free expression to security concerns). In theory an organization might develop some systematic rule for trade-offs between different aims, and it might remain open to examining the dilemmas their competition creates. But in practice most organizations pledge allegiance to a relatively coherent group of values, without much room for dissent,[9] and they develop norms of action, beliefs about how the world works, and specific practices that tend to support them. As a result, the most promising way for society to pursue competing values is to segregate them into different organizational structures (the way, for example, that newspapers emphatically separate advertising from news departments so that financial interests do not pollute

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[9] For example, Argyris and Schön (1978) describe the forces of organizational life that suppress the consideration of dilemmas; Philip Selznick analyzes the "pressure within the organization, from below as well as from above, for unity in outlook" (Selznick 1949: 181); and Max Weber (1978) presumes that bureaucracies have coherent, overarching policies. More relevant to the present point, many students of bureaucracy have argued that saddling public agencies with competing goals causes dysfunction and a retreat to autonomy (Wilson 1967, 1989). There are, of course, conflicts *within* the value system of any given organization or community, and I will build on that idea below—pointing out, *pace* Wilson, that some practitioners and their organizations have developed ways to cope with this complexity, even when they cannot withdraw from it.

truth-seeking). Institutional fragmentation is not a matter of choice, but a consequence of value pluralism and the nature of organizational life. In the extreme view, calls for "coordination" among distinct organizations are futile, for if it were possible to reconcile the conflicting values each represents, institutional fragmentation would not exist in the first place.

This perspective underlies some of the most engaging but also the most pessimistic thinking about the relationships among institutions. Harold Seidman and Robert Gilmour, for example, describe coordinating committees for federal agencies as a "search for the philosopher's stone" that tries to "reconcile the irreconcilable, harmonize competing and wholly divergent interests, overcome irrationalities in our government structures, and make hard policy choices to which no one will dissent" (Seidman and Gilmour 1986: 219). In the same vein, Peter Marris and Martin Rein maintain that the ambitious community action programs of the 1960s—which sought to enlist collaboration from a wide range of local agencies—were beset with dilemmas as they internalized the conflicts of the wider society (Marris and Rein 1983). In policing, the few studies of community organizations and crime that have examined organizational goals have come to related conclusions, observing that many community agencies reject ties with police departments because they do not share their values (Podolefsky 1984, 1983), or simply that community organizations with some types of missions tend not to form strong partnerships with the police (Lovig and Skogan 1995). Finally, and much more broadly, Jürgen Habermas argues against the possibility of citizen input into administration—the community partnerships of the present study— on the grounds that bureaucratic logic conflicts with any directions civil society could give to public agencies: Each sphere of life rests on a fundamentally different set of norms and values corresponding to communicative action and strategic action, respectively (Habermas 1992, 1996).

Sociologist Émile Durkheim planted the seeds of these views by describing cultural fragmentation as a necessary result of modernization. In his eyes, the main dynamic of modern

society is a growing division of labor: From its starting point of a relatively homogenous society, where all members share most tasks and a common morality, society differentiates into number of spheres of activity that Durkheim calls "social organs" (examples include medicine, academia, the social services, and policing), each of which develops its own normative system that governs the activities of its members. These diverse normative systems take many forms, but the most conspicuous is occupational culture: Durkheim explains that "there are usages and customs common to the same order of functionaries which no one of them can break without incurring the censure of the corporation," and that "he who gives himself over to a definite task is, at every moment, struck by the sentiment of common solidarity in the thousand duties of occupational morality" (Durkheim 1960: 227, 402).[10] As the division of labor progresses, these occupational cultures and other elements of "organic solidarity" begin to overtake the common culture of the primitive world as the main constituents of the moral order. In this way, communitarian society breaks up into occupational communities, bound and constituted by their distinctive normative systems; or in Durkheim's own words, "functional diversity induces a moral diversity that nothing can prevent" (Durkheim 1960: 361).

Durkheim himself did not go on to emphasize the potential for recurrent conflict across these morally-diverse groups. For him, modernism's ethos of individualism had enough power to check potential dissensus; and he believed that while homogenous "social segments" could only compete with each other when they came in contact, functionally-differentiated "social organs"

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[10] Normatively, society grants resources and power to a profession on the condition that it will use them in ways that benefit clients and the wider society. Occupational morality embodies that condition: In order to be legitimate, professional power must be exercised within its constraints.

would instead be complementary.[11] Finally, he believed that the norms and values of each social organ would regulate the behavior of its occupants in a way that would "take conscience of [other social organs'] needs," leading to a harmony of values between different groups (Durkheim 1960: 372). Nevertheless, Durkheim's many assumptions of consensus and harmony have proven to be among the least enduring aspects of his thought,[12] and I believe that on this point it is best to turn to philosophical pluralists such as Charles Larmore (1987) and Isaiah Berlin, who argue that distinct values in society can and do often come into irreconcilable conflict with one another. Berlin captures the possibility for conflict especially well:

> What is clear is that values can clash . . . . They can be incomparable between cultures, or groups in the same culture, or between you and me. You believe in always telling the truth, no matter what; I do not, because I believe that it can sometimes be too painful and too destructive. We can discuss each other's point of view, we can try to reach common ground, but in the end what you pursue may not be reconcilable with the ends to which I find that I have dedicated my life. Values may easily clash within the breast of a single individual; and it does not follow that, if they do, some must be true and others false. Justice, rigorous justice, is for some people an absolute value, but it is not compatible with what may be no less ultimate values for them—mercy, compassion, as arises in concrete cases (Berlin 1988: 15).

In this view, the cultural pluralism Durkheim describes leads to obvious problems of integration, as the different elements of the division of labor find themselves in fundamental conflict over the values they protect. The skepticism about coordination reviewed above is a natural result.

Durkheim's theory has faced many challenges in addition to those I have raised, and he drew a particularly incomplete picture of the pre-modern world (Lukes 1973). But policing, at

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[11] In his words, "different occupations can co-exist without being obliged mutually to destroy one another, for they pursue different objects" (Durkheim 1960: 267).

[12] For example, to the extent that Durkheim has an explicit theory of *why* professional ethics will "take conscience of the needs" of other social organs, it seems to be the worst sort of functionalism. He writes: "There are certain ways of mutual reaction which, finding themselves very conformable to the nature of things, are repeated very often and become habits;" thus a moral rule "only expresses in a clear-cut fashion the result of a given situation" (p. 366). Elsewhere he echoes the same point, explaining that a moral code "can arise only through itself, little by little, under the pressure of internal causes which make it necessary" (p. 409).

least, seems to be a textbook example of the dynamics he describes. In medieval society, policing

was a common responsibility of all adult men (Klockars 1985), and it did not fully emerge as a

separate social organ until 1829, with the founding of the first modern police force in London,

England. At first police took a broad view of their responsibility to maintain public order; police

historian Eric Monkkonen maintains that "in addition to arresting offenders, the police took in

tramps, returned lost children by the thousands, shot stray dogs, enforced sanitation laws,

inspected boilers, took annual censuses, and performed myriad other small tasks" (Monkkonen

1992: 554). But over the course of the following two centuries, police have progressively refined

their function and shed ancillary duties, compounding the division of labor in the process. As they

have done so, they have developed a distinctive sense of their role—that of a specialized and

impartial force that more-or-less independently protects society from serious crime—, and an

associated occupational culture that sets them apart from the outside world and thus creates

obvious barriers to collaboration. For example, William Westley's landmark study of police

culture found that police share an image of the public as hostile, and that "silence, secrecy, and

solidarity" are overriding norms for officers—their code directs them to "maintain strict secrecy

about police affairs" (Westley 1971: 110). This general discord between the police and the outside

world is compounded by more specific differences of worldview between the police, on the one

hand, and their various would-be partners in the community and the professions, on the other—

each of which internalized its own system of values as modernization progressed (*e.g.*, Holdaway

1983, 1986; Reuss-Ianni 1983). These differences are precisely of the sort that I have already

described. They do not, of course, always express themselves in conflict that is dramatic or overt:

They can arise in mutual incomprehension as much as visible fights about core values, and they

can simply arise in reluctant, plodding, and perhaps insincere agreement. But they underlie many

of the difficulties that partnerships face.

Values in the Study of Public Policy

The field of public policy still has an uncomfortable relationship with concepts like these

that turn on values. Introducing a recent book on the subject, Henry Aaron, Thomas Mann, and

Timothy Taylor explain that

> the chapters in this volume run against a deep taboo among many social scientists and particularly
> among economists. Such analysts are concerned with behaviors, tangible actions, not attitudes.
> What people say or think or feel has importance in many contexts, it is acknowledged, but not in
> analyzing how public policy can change behavior. One should focus, it is argued, on how
> measurable behavior is related to the various kinds of incentives that people face. All else is
> speculation (Aaron, Mann, and Taylor 1994: 14).

These authors question, however, whether the models that result from this commitment have gone

deep enough—whether "research methods . . . which take motivations and values as given and

which downplay how individual behaviors cumulate to form the community norms that eventually

influence the individual behaviors from which those norms emerge, are adequate to the task."

Their initial suggestions are modest,[13] and they and their authors restrict their focus to policy

rather than practice.[14] But their general conclusion is firm: "It is time to stop the pretense that

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[13] For example, they write: "Researchers might adopt a two-stage approach. Initially they would follow
current practice, assuming stable preferences and inquiring how changes in incentives affect behavior. At
some point they would step back to inquire whether changes in policies [and, I would add, changes in
practice] and induced changes in behavior will lead to changes in preferences." (Aaron, Mann, and Taylor
1994: 15)

[14] For example, in one article from this volume, economists George Akerloff and Janet Yellen elegantly
model the idea that community cooperation depends on how community members feel about police tactics,
and particularly whether they think those tactics are too punitive. But they do not explicitly analyze how
police can implement the optimal level of punitiveness. Police are seen as an empty vessel who can, through
sheer will, adopt the set of practices that communities will accept (or more precisely that optimally balance
the benefits of community cooperation with the costs of less punitiveness). The present study attempts to
extend this perspective. We must recognize that police practices arise from their *own* perspectives on
important value questions, and that these perspectives may be different than the community's. The question
that needs to be answered is how a change agent who thinks differently (perhaps informed by Akerloff and
Yellen's model) can convince officers to change their values and the associated practices. Akerloff and
Yellen ask the policy question of what balance maximizes social returns. But an important practice question
remains, which is how to implement that balance effectively.

stable values can be postulated and then set aside, as a matter of no real interest to the serious researcher" (Aaron, Mann, and Taylor 1994: 15).

In lending their support to the analysis of values in public policy, these authors join an emerging strand of social science research—one that places a new emphasis on evolving values at the expense of the more traditional emphasis on fixed interests (Shapiro 1995). A leading example of this trend is what has come to be called "the new institutionalism," which has emerged to challenge the conception of states as mere resultants of pre-existing interests. As legal scholar Martin Shapiro argues:

> Part of the new political science involves facing up to the fact that policy makers are not the mere playthings of group pressures but are also purposive actors bent on achieving their own visions of public values. Indeed, much of the "new institutionalism" that is now declared to be the leading edge of the new political science is not actually about institutions in the narrower or everyday sense of that word, but about values that dwell in individual political actors, persist over time, and play a major role in shaping political outcomes (Shapiro 1995: 5).

Some examples of the new institutionalism do take a narrowly structural view of institutions (*e.g.* Immergut 1992). But the value commitments of citizens and officials play a central role in many others, and influential authors like James March and Johan Olsen focus on the sense of purpose or "identity" that people bring to politics, and especially the ways in which public institutions shape the concerns citizens raise for them and are shaped by those concerns in turn (March and Olsen 1995, 1989). Others, like Roger Friedland and Robert Alford, cast this concern with the values underlying action in something of a Durkheimian mold, arguing that different spheres of social life rest on different logics of behavior (Friedland and Alford 1991).[15]

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[15] Mary Douglas (1986) develops the relevance of Durkheim's thought to the new institutionalism.

Values in Organizations

In each of these conceptions, distinctive values and worldviews underlie the behavior of citizens and public agencies. In that way, they exert a strong influence on public life that makes them important candidates for both theoretical and practical attention. But in what sense are organizations, groups, and individuals committed to particular values? How can we know which values a given group has institutionalized?

Social theory has offered many answers to these questions. Durkheim's own view—the belief that work groups enforce "usages and customs" and "the thousand duties of occupational morality"—is among the most conventional.[16] Durkheim's ideas fed directly into the influential Chicago School of sociology, which studied codes of conduct and systems of meaning across a wide variety of occupations. Central members like Everett Hughes described their task precisely as an investigation into the cultural dimension of Durkheim's "social organs," and they embarked on studies that viewed each occupation as the locus of a distinctive set of norms, values, and beliefs that most members held quite consciously (Hughes described them as having a "subjective aspect in the personality") (Hughes 1958: 25). For example, in William Westley's study of the

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[16] Many theorists do not emphasize this aspect of Durkheim's thought. For them, the *Division of Labor* is precisely about the *dis*enchantment of the modern world, a process in which the common values that underlay pre-modern life give way to individualism; and while individualism itself may constitute a system of values, its hold is relatively weak, and nothing more substantive colors life in the modern world. In this vein, Mary Douglas (1986) goes so far as to accuse Durkheim of a reluctance to apply his theory of social cognition to his own society. In my view, however, the communitarianism of the primitive world gave way not to disenchantment but to cultural pluralism. It may be true that the values associated with social organs do not control individuals so absolutely as those associated with social segments. But they do help to constitute social identity. Indeed, Durkheim's most important prescription for social reform built directly on this idea: He called for incorporating occupational communities formally so that they could (among other things) act as "a source of life *sui generis*" and forge "intellectual and moral homogeneity" among their members (Durkheim 1960: 26,). With or without such reforms, occupational life had a status similar to that of religion or family: "Besides the society of faith, of family, and of politics, there is one other . . . that of all workers of the same sort, in association, all who cooperate in the same function: That is, the occupational group or corporation. Identity of origin, culture, and occupation makes occupational activity the richest sort of material for a common life" (Durkheim 1951: 578; cited in Van Maanen and Barley 1984: 293).

police, written under Hughes's tutelage, the author describes his aim as understanding and accounting for his subjects' "set of shared human responses in the form of attitudes and values" (Westley 1971: xii). More recent research has taken up this line of thought through the study of "occupational communities," seen as groups of people who "share a set of values, norms, and perspectives that apply to, but extend beyond, work-related matters."[17]

In this tradition, organizations become committed to distinctive values through the occupational groups that populate them, who in turn perceive their values directly. We learn about organizational values by asking, more or less directly, the people who work there, though we may also examine the more obvious artifacts of their culture—such as the virtues of the heroes it celebrates, the lessons embedded in its myths, and the prohibitions of its taboos.

Philip Selznick, a more direct ancestor of institutionalism (Brint and Karabel 1991), offers a slightly different view of organizational values. One difference simply involves his focus: Selznick describes the process of institutionalization by which the *organization* (rather than the occupational group) develops a distinctive value system;[18] he argues that "the formation of an institution is marked by the making of value commitments, that is, choices which fix the assumptions of policymakers as to the nature of the enterprise—its distinctive aims, methods, and role in the community" (Selznick 1957: 55). These "commitments to ways of acting" affect all

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[17] The full definition given by Steven Barley and John Van Maanen (another sometime student of the police) is "a group of people who consider themselves to be engaged in the same sort of work, who identify (more or less positively) with their work; who share a set of values, norms, and perspectives that apply to, but extend beyond, work-related matters; and whose social relationships meld the realms of work and leisure" (Van Maanen and Barley 1984: 295). Like Hughes, Van Maanen and Barley trace their intellectual lineage directly to Durkheim.

[18] Indeed, in his study of the Bolsheviks, Selznick analyzed the strategies the organization used to combat the competing values professionals brought to it—in other words, the ways in which organizational values triumphed over occupational ones (Selznick 1952). That is not to say, however, that Selznick did not recognize the role played by occupations (and particularly professions) in the institutionalization of values (Selznick 1957: 121 ff.).

levels of the organization, and Selznick speaks of an "organizational character" that integrates diverse habits and controls the everyday exercise of discretion: "Organizations, like individuals, strive for a unified pattern of response. This integration will define in advance the general attitudes of personnel to specific problems as they arise." (Selznick 1949: 181). Perhaps his clearest example comes from a boat manufacturer whose obsession with quality simply would not bend:

> The first boats made by Gar Wood were high quality craft, made of the finest materials by master boat builders. Later, the company decided to mass-produce a comparatively low-cost speed boat for wide distribution. It developed that the entire organization found itself unable to cope with the effort and shift commitments. Workmen and shop supervisors alike continued to be preoccupied with high-cost quality craftsmanship. Members of the selling staff, too, could not shift emphasis from "snob appeal" to price appeal. The quality commitment was so strong that an entirely new division—operating in a separate plant hundreds of miles away and therefore recruiting from a different labor market—had to be created to do the job successfully (Selznick 1957: 53-4, citing notes from Gar Wood Vice President Edward Boehm)

Here, ideals like "quality" and "snob appeal" define the organization's commitments, and they resist transformation into ideals about low price and mass production.

In a way, Selznick sticks to the Chicago School view of values—the idea that they inhere in the worldviews of individuals—while shifting the source of those worldviews from occupations to organizations.[19] But he also puts more emphasis on the way values inhere in structures rather than minds. Some policies and practices define organizational values with particular strength, notably those for the recruitment and training of personnel, the representation of internal group interests, and cooperation with other organizations. But Selznick also shows the link between more mundane procedures and basic worldviews (in one example, he shows how the shipment policy of the Air Service Command *versus* the Ferrying Command reveals the basic orientation of

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[19] Of course, Selznick also refers to the way social groups other than organizations become committed to values; in fact, he saw his contribution partly as an application of that more traditional emphasis to the "technical" world of formal organizations (Selznick 1957: 9). The same view underlies this study: I will talk the same way about the values of communities and political leaders as I do about the values of organizations.

each—one's view of itself as an arm of the Air Force, and the other's as a servant of the entire war

effort); and he emphasizes that different units *within* an organization "are the guardians of

particular standards or aims" (Selznick 1957: 94).[20] Thus he exhorts: "Those who deal with the

more obvious ideals—such as education, science, creativity, or freedom—should more fully

recognize the dependence of these ideals on congenial though often mundane administrative

arrangements" (Selznick 1957: 141). Leadership plays a special role forming these diverse forces

into a coherent whole—an overarching commitment to certain values—, and I will return to that

role below.

Time has not always been kind to these frameworks, which today's sociologists often

dismiss as overly simplified because of their tendency to homogenize culture, downplay conflict,

and reduce individuals to "cultural dupes." With an eye to meeting these criticisms, the

perspective that sociologist Philip Smith (1998) calls the "new American cultural sociology"

leaves behind the simple "norms and values" posture of the Chicago school to explore the

"frames," "thought patterns," and "discourses" that different groups employ (*e.g.* Schön and Rein

1994; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Douglas 1986). Frames, for example, constitute normative

lenses that determine not simply what ends are valuable, but also what counts as a fact and how to

interpret it. Metaphors play an especially important role in them, providing the link between fact

and value, as when a policymaker sees the problem with social services as one of

"fragmentation"—a value-laden metaphor that implies a clear solution (Schön 1979). Moreover,

while individuals are influenced by their frames, they are not entirely their dupes: They can

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[20] Similarly, in an extensive review of the literature, Gareth Morgan locates organizational culture partly in "organizational structure, rules, policies, goals, missions, job descriptions, and standardized operating procedures," which are technical apparatuses that also serve as "cultural artifacts shaping the ongoing reality" (Morgan 1997: 144). Steve Herbert's (1998) recent theory of police culture also gives a role to formal structures and practices in the articulation of values; I return to it below.

occasionally "reframe" problems by drawing on a different framework—any situation supplies

multiple frames—or even inventing a new one. Steve Herbert (1998) has recently applied this

perspective to the police, describing police culture in terms of six distinct normative orders—sets

of rules and practices oriented around a central value. While I do not draw specifically on his six

core values, I share his basic view of police culture as potentially fragmented and contradictory,

and the idea that it is articulated through both formal and informal rules and practices (a

perspective shared by Selznick as well).[21]

These conceptions of organizational values flesh out the Durkheimian framework by

showing what it means to say that "social organs" become committed to values, tracing a path

from consciously-held attitudes and values, through structural embodiments of those values, to the

idea of frames and discourses that individuals draw on to understand the world. At the same time,

they suggest how to discover what those values are—particularly by unpacking the assumptions

behind individuals' views of the world, and even those that underlie organizational policies and

structures.

Organizational Values in Partnerships

Selznick's framework holds special relevance for the study of partnerships, for he

describes adaptation to the environment as a key mechanism through which organizations become

committed to particular values (esp. Selznick 1949). One aim of this study is to show that

partnership-building is precisely the sort of adaptive work that Selznick described—work bound

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[21] The work of Andrew Polsky, described below, adds similar nuances to the idea of organizational values. In Polsky's treatment, social personnel share not a set of values but a common "discourse" about dealing with marginal people. This discourse describes intervention techniques "that penetrated to the most minute level of everyday life to evoke higher desires and appropriate economic attitudes" (Polsky 1991: 9); like all discourses, it combines techniques, knowledge, and values into a single therapeutic worldview, which Polsky seeks to explicate and critique.

up intimately with the reorientation of values (though these should be understood according to the more expanded notion just developed). A few studies of partnerships do recall Selznick's concept of formal cooptation, which holds that community partners are typically figureheads in agency decisionmaking (Selznick 1949: ch. 7). But the bulk of his study explored the more complicated dynamics by which community institutions *do* influence an agency, as the latter adapts to their values and commitments (Selznick 1949: chs. 3-6). That insight is crucial for understanding partnership dynamics. As the partnership ideal *itself* becomes a key value in public management, the adaptive work Selznick describes becomes more and more important and extends further down the organization.

But another aim of this study is to extend Selznick's framework, which fails to wield its insights about organizations and values consistently when it explores the organizational environment. In his influential concept of "cooptation," Selznick described the environment as a collection of "forces" with which "power" and its burdens may or may not be truly shared (Selznick 1949: 259 ff.). But his case studies reveal a dynamic that this concept does not fully capture—the interaction of one organization's values with those held by others, and an eventual bleeding of values across organizational lines (esp. Selznick 1949: chs. 4, 6). Indeed, in a later summary of *TVA and The Grassroots*, Selznick used precisely these terms to describe the relationship between the TVA and the extension colleges: Each side was seen as having "commitments" to different aims, and those of the extension service ultimately took over the TVA:

> The Extension Service had become *institutionalized* and had absorbed commitments to personnel, practices, and group interests. These commitments, taken together, formed the relevant character of the Extension Services. This in turn defined the capacity of these agencies to aid the TVA's adaptation to its area of operations; but also made them something other than innocent collaborators in the administration of a technical program . . . The emergent character of the TVA itself, of course, was significantly influenced by its own interaction with the land-grant college system. As a result of this interaction, the Authority absorbed commitments to an ideology and to specific institutions that modified its role as a New Deal agency (Selznick 1957: 44-45).

Thus whether or not the Extension Service literally controls a particular TVA decision, as the concept of "informal cooptation" implies, TVA actions will respond to the Service's aims because the Authority has internalized its values. The more popular concept of "formal cooptation," where "power" is only apparently shared, needs the same refinement: What matters is not that the valley's voluntary associations are figureheads in the Authority's policymaking, but that the TVA has not institutionalized their values.

Applying this insight consistently means viewing the entire organizational environment as a collection of groups, each with their own potentially conflicting normative commitments. The result is a sort of normative ecology that the focal organization must navigate, adjusting its own commitments or doing battle with others' along the way. One example of this perspective is Andrew Polsky's *Rise of the Therapeutic State*, in which Polsky focuses on what he calls the "therapeutic" movement—a hodgepodge of social workers, mental health professionals, and behavioral specialists that form something of an occupational community (Polsky calls them "social personnel"). Over the course of the history that Polsky traces, therapeutic ideas run up against other discursive communities committed to different values, like those of the community action movement, public administration, and the legal system. In some cases, the encounters deflected therapeutic discourse. For example, as they encroached upon the juvenile court, social personnel found their ideals undermined by notions of due process and by a proclivity for punishment rather than treatment. Thus the encounter "brought social personnel into conflict with policy actors representing different discursive traditions [where] . . . clients were usually dealt with according to the ancient precepts of individual responsibility, much to the dismay of advocates of the therapeutic approach" (Polsky 1991: 18). In other cases the therapeutic activists develop strategies "to shield their instruments from corruption by other political currents" (Polsky 1991: 19), as in their confrontation with the community action movement in the 1960s. It is in this sense

that Polsky describes how the therapeutic movement navigated a normative ecology, made up of competing discourses and their associated values.

There are many occasions when Selznick *did* adhere to a conception like this one, so in some ways the task is simply to extend his own insights to the formal concept of cooptation. But even when Selznick did treat the environment as a collection of committed institutions, his analysis can be extended in two ways. First, to the extent that different institutions become committed to a modest number of distinctive values, it should be possible to unpack a recurrent set of value conflicts that will be associated with different types of partnerships. This idea of value conflict, I will argue below, offers a way to conceptually summarize the seemingly unrelated obstacles that undermine partnerships. The *specific* value conflicts I identify give that abstract notion some content for the case of policing.[22]

Second, for all the empirical and conceptual sophistication of his study, Selznick's normative stance sometimes suggests an overly traditional conception of public administration, where the only legitimate response an agency can make to its legislative mandate is literal implementation; at other times, it simply avoids important normative questions altogether. Part of the problem, I suspect, is that Selznick treats the changes in the TVA's character as "unintended consequences" of the grassroots method—despite the fact that he insists his analysis "reflects what is obvious to those who 'know the score' in TVA" (Selznick 1949: 249). In place of this functionalist approach, I believe we should analyze how practitioners confront and justify the shifts in values associated with partnerships—how they become aware of pressures from their partners, and how they convert hidden conflicts into subjects for deliberation. If we admit that

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[22] Selznick occasionally uses something like this method himself. See especially his list of the dilemmas the TVA confronted by channeling its agricultural work through the extension services (Selznick 1949: 134 *ff.*).

these things can happen, then it also becomes legitimate to ask how a manager can institutionalize some of the new values partnerships raise. I will return to these normative and practical concerns shortly.

Value Pluralism in Community Policing

With this background in mind, community policing can be understood as an attempt to reconfigure the relationships among important institutions, each of them committed to distinctive systems of values: The conflicts between them make up the the central obstacles partnerships face. To simplify, I will describe this effort in terms of four types of partnerships: *Interagency partnerships* among different public organizations, *political partnerships* between police and their political overseers, *community partnerships* with organizations in civil society, and *business partnerships* with the private sector. Each of these partnerships can be understood in terms of the institutional frameworks it brings into play: Community ties bring civil society together with the state, business ties conjoin the state and the market, political ties confront policy with administration, and interagency ties round up various occupational communities. Because each type of tie points to institutional spheres that represent distinct (and inevitably multiple) values, any attempt to forge one of them—and particularly any attempt to forge all of them—faces predictable barriers, illustrated in the conflicts and interdependencies described at the start of this section. It is in this sense that problems with "coordination" and "partnerships" are not just technical problems of will and administrative arrangements, but real, substantive conflicts of value.

Consequently, in building the four types of partnerships I have just described, the manager's task is to guide her organization through these conflicts and to manage the dilemmas they create. One important task of my analysis will be to identify what value conflicts arise in the management of partnerships: In discussing each type of partnership, I will describe a handful of

conflicts that crop up recurrently across all or most of these cases. To be successful in developing partnerships, police reform must address these tensions directly—each of its initiatives must be chosen because of its potential to mitigate them. Too often, police do identify their central task as building partnerships but then embark on reforms, like decentralization, that are largely irrelevant to these key value conflicts.

The central question, then, is which tools and initiatives *do* help police to manage these critical value conflicts. It is to that question that I now turn.

3. Styles of Practice for Managing Value Pluralism

The sociological literature I began with takes a pessimistic tone, suggesting that if these competing values could be reconciled, institutional fragmentation would not exist in the first place. But I do not believe that matters are so hopeless. Focusing on the conflicting value commitments of different institutions does not mean that nothing can be done. It simply identifies the central problem practitioners must contend with as they try to build partnerships across institutional lines—namely, the tension between diverse normative systems. Despite the difficulty of building partnerships, the growing division of labor outlined in my brief history of policing makes them increasingly necessary. One way or another, today's police practitioners must learn to negotiate an increasingly fragmented environment. According to French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, this is a task that all of us face in the modern world:

> As societies become more highly differentiated and as those relatively autonomous "worlds" that I call fields develop in them, the chances that real events (that is, encounters between independent causal series, linked to different spheres of necessity) will happen in them will continue to increase; and so, therefore, will the liberty given to complex strategies of the habitus, integrating necessities of different orders (Bourdieu 1990: 73)

It is not necessary to accept Bourdieu's view of practice as *habitus*—a relatively unreflective, unchanging set of habits that reproduces relations of domination—to grant the insight he offers here, which is that growing fragmentation demands more complex strategies of practice. In this

study I address this idea by drawing on a more opportunistic view of practice than Bourdieu's own, seeing it as made up of the strategies that effective practitioners articulate, and which reside at a fairly low level of abstraction (though I do try to use broader social science ideas to lend these eclectic notions some coherence) (*cf.* Bardach 1987). Students of public management must share ownership of key concepts with practitioners, a point that I will elaborate in chapter 2.

The empirical chapters themselves describe these strategies in more detail. In the remainder of this chapter I aim to provide two overarching concepts to help integrate them—on the one hand, the idea of institutional change, and on the other, Isaiah Berlin's concept of the fox. Each of these ideas begins from the assumption already stated: Since the central problem of working in partnership involves conflict over values, effective practice must be able to manage this conflict. Institutional change does this by drawing on tools that can help to close the gap between police values and those of their partners, while the model of the fox offers strategies for continuing to live and work in an environment where ultimate aims cannot be reconciled. The former rests on the assumption that normative systems are not inflexible, and the latter on the idea that they do not dictate action but simply constrain it. This view of practice builds on the simpler view contained in authors like Durkheim, who tend to see culture as fixed and deterministic, and whose criticisms I reviewed in the section on organizational values.

Partnerships and Institutional Change

Even if we accept the idea that different organizations advance different and conflicting values, it should be possible to make partnerships more viable by *changing* the value systems of each organization—by bringing police values more in line with their partners', or bringing partner

values more in line with those of the police.[23] In this view, partnerships depend on institutional change in Selznick's sense (Selznick 1957). On the police side, effective practitioners must clarify exactly which values community policing seeks to institutionalize, and at the expense of which others—or more precisely, what new balance among the competing aims that define the police mandate they should strike in order to put police-community partnerships on less-contentious ground—; and they must instill these values in their organizations. For example, developing community partnerships is less about beat integrity and police-community meetings than it is about institutionalizing a concern for disorder (which, as I argued above, neighborhood groups typically put more value on than police have). This process happens quite tangibly in the person of special units charged with handling quality-of-life issues, like the Portland Police Bureau's Neighborhood Response Team (which essentially became a "disorder unit" the same way that past reforms had created "drug units" and "robbery units"). But it can also happen more diffusely when an entire agency becomes committed to a quality-of-life focus, which apparently happened, at first reluctantly, in New York City.[24] The prediction is that only those departments that shift their substantive emphasis in ways like these—whether or not they have administrative systems like beat integrity—will build community partnerships effectively. In these cases, I will argue, that prediction is fulfilled.

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[23] To simplify the discussion that follows, I will focus on institutional change in policing rather than institutional change in partners. In the cases I examined, police more often solved problems of value conflict by changing their own value system than by changing their partner's. When they did the latter, their strategies often followed the same principles I will lay out in this section—especially appealing to an existing value to institutionalize a new one. But they also drew on social pressure, especially law and shame, to help shift partner values.

[24] In this connection, it is interesting to note that within individual police departments, officers who work in "disorder units" seem to have very different role conceptions than their colleagues in the rest of the patrol force (Mastrofski 1997); and that as entire organizations move towards community policing, the role conceptions of *all* officers seem to change (Skogan and Hartnett 1997: 107).

An example outside policing can clarify this idea. Some three decades ago, many city planning agencies undertook their own effort to build community partnerships, and the effort led to fundamental changes in the orientation of many of these agencies—or at least in the "community planning" units they set up to accomplish it. As Carolyn and Martin Needleman explain, the community planners exposed to neighborhood groups found themselves pressured to extend planning's focus in many directions: From physical development to social problems, from planning to unplanned action, and from elite decisionmaking to populism. Some community planners did not yield to these pressures, but these "role resisters" (as the Needlemans call them) found "their work so stressful that they avoid[ed] community contact whenever possible" (Needleman and Needleman 1974: 326). In the end, the community planners either traded in the traditional planning mandate for a new one, or they failed to maintain partnerships with the community. Of course, community planning did not transform entire agencies but rather special sub-units of them. But this nuance does not change the basic point that organizations must institutionalize new values in order to develop new partnerships. Instead, it simply illustrates one strategy for fulfilling this requirement—a strategy described by Selznick in his discussion of "precarious values," where he argues that at the outset, at least, new values demand administrative autonomy (Selznick 1957: 126). What the community planning movement apparently failed to do was to integrate the new values throughout the agency once they *had* gained enough autonomy to resist attack.[25]

The need for institutional change raises both normative and practical problems for police. Normatively, the prospect of compromising on core values clearly must not be taken lightly—

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[25] "Isolation is necessary during periods of incubation and maturation, but may be modified when this character-forming task has been accomplished" (Selznick 1957: 126-127)

especially when police are the only agency that advances those values. But it is equally clear that not every compromise should be unwelcome. Part of the critique of bureaucracy that has led to the partnership movement is an argument that public agencies have become self-serving and unresponsive to citizen concerns; "conflicts" between police and their partners may reflect insular police thinking and missed opportunities rather than inevitable disagreement. More important, police simply cannot avail themselves of partner resources without paying heed to the norms and values that govern how those resources can be used. As the resources that police now consider important were dispersed to separate social organs, police could afford to shed the values that went with them. But if police want to reverse this process, they must reverse both the normative and practical parts of it: For example, if they want to avail themselves of the special powers granted to parole officers, they must do so within the constraints of whatever values justify the use of those powers (such as rehabilitation of clients, as opposed to simply controlling them).

Police clearly cannot accept every partner demand, as the "customer service" school of thought in public management sometimes seems to suggest: They retain an obligation to authorize new missions with their *entire* authorizing environment. But this distinction simply suggests how police should view their partnerships—not as a final authority, but as a channel for rediscovering neglected values. Once discovered, these values advanced by a partner face the same normative rules as any other value a manager might pursue: They must be validated as authentically *public* values and accepted by the authorizing environment (Moore 1995).

Analyzing multiple partnerships across different constituencies reveals that process of validation in action. It shows how the values advanced by one group fare when confronted by others, and how police come to terms with the full range of public control through a search for

balance among interdependent ties.[26] In fact, I will argue, the reactions range from conflict, to

irrelevance, to synergy. The police mandate remains contested, but it is possible to find some

areas for change that meet with broad acceptance, and I will try to suggest what those areas are.

But it is equally important to suggest the areas of controversy, for these areas are precisely where

collective choice is most urgent. There may be no rational basis for choosing among the

competing values at issue. But that conclusion does not mean analysis is useless: It can still help

clarify the contours of the relevant conflicts, bequeathing final choice to those (individuals or

collectives) who face it. "The task of philosophy is to illuminate such conflicts, not to prescribe

the tradeoffs that we make," philosopher John Gray writes, describing the position of Isaiah Berlin

(Gray 1996: 62).[27]

Practically, the proponents of partnerships face a need to find ways of institutionalizing

new values into their organizations (or, in some cases, into those of their partners). It is not hard to

find individual police who accept the role change their partners expect.[28] But without the same

commitment from other parts of the organization, their promises often unravel and their

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[26] *Cf.* Hugh Heclo's argument that "it is through networks of people who regard each other as knowledgeable, or at least as needing to be answered, that public policy issues tend to be refined, evidence debated, and alternative opinions worked out" (Heclo 1978: 104). Jane Mansbridge draws out the implications of Heclo's idea for the process I am describing, summarizing his argument as follows: "The desire of members of the network for the respect of others in that network gives the other members the power to reward and punish their behavior, often in ways that direct it toward the public interest" (Mansbridge 1994: 159). This process operationalizes the Rawlsian notion that proper aims of "citizens" should appeal to those under a veil of ignorance: Through the exposure of idiosyncratic ideals to those of others, they become more nearly like the ideals that someone under a veil of ignorance would select.

[27] By contrast, Polsky's (1991) study of the therapeutic state takes an unflinching normative stance, using the yardstick of "personal autonomy" to measure therapeutic reforms. I do not think that this perspective is fatal, for readers can always use their own more nuanced value systems to disagree with Polsky's judgments. But I think it is more productive to focus on the conflicts that arise among the participants (*e.g.* the police *versus* the community), clarifying their contours and thereby informing choice, rather than trying to preordain it. Chapter 2 returns to this point.

partnerships fall apart. Consider the report of one Sergeant I spoke with who had recently become

the liaison to the local gay community:

> I think they [members of the gay community] felt the officers were kind of aggressive, in-your-face with their response. And I think they feared or perceived that the officers were laughing at them. . . [It was] a fear thing, you know, "I'm afraid they're going to laugh at me so maybe I shouldn't call. The actual physical officer that shows up at my door, what is their response to me going to be?" I think that was their biggest concern, is the person that came to the door. "Well, it's fine that you're sitting here talking to us but are you going to be the one that comes when I call?" That was their concern: It was like, "Okay, well, this is a beginning, but how can I trust the *police department* to be sensitive to my needs."

Indeed, if there is any content to the notion of inter*organizational* ties, as distinct from

interpersonal ones,[29] it must involve some commitment by the organization to back up individuals

whose partnerships it authorizes—though it is of course not easy to define the limits of this

commitment, since the employees involved may overstep their authority. Developing it means

shifting the basic values that motivate most members of an organization.

It is for this reason that serious partnerships between organizations demand relatively far-

reaching institutional changes. That demand is difficult to fulfill, for institutions do not bend

easily (Offe 1995; Selznick 1957; Douglas 1986). But I will try to identify several strategies that

practitioners have used successfully to institutionalize specific values important for police

partnerships. This analytic focus leads to a heavy emphasis on internal reform that may seem

inappropriate in a study of partnerships—traditionally seen as a question of managing the

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[28] In fact, my framework rests on the existence of these change agents. It is therefore not a theory of what causes partnerships, but a theory of practice—a theory explaining how practitioners committed to the idea can bring partnerships about, and to some extent when they should want to do so.

[29] The social networks literature has largely sidestepped this distinction. It treats the "nodes" of its networks as "actors," regardless of whether they are organizations, individuals, or something else entirely; and it simply has not invested much conceptual attention to the notion of an interorganizational tie (*e.g.* Laumann, Galaskiewicz, and Marsden's [1978] widely-cited definition of networks treats different types of actors as interchangeable). In practice, data about these ties are collected either through survey research, in which the decision about what constitutes a "relationship" or a "contact" is left to the respondent, or through archival data about specific exchanges or joint memberships. In either case, the concept of a "tie" has little definite theoretical content.

interactions across organizational lines. But the *intra*organizational focus is precisely my point: Partnerships entail more than the relationships between people at the boundaries of their organizations; most often, conflict between the organization and its environment becomes internalized, cropping up as conflict between the organization's change agents and their colleagues (Lawrence and Lorsch 1986).[30]

Roughly two categories of successful change strategies emerge from these cases. First, many police appeal to an existing value in order to institutionalize a new one (*cf.* Douglas 1986; Offe 1995)—especially through metaphors that synthesize the two formerly opposed values, which are related to the strategy that Donald Schön and Martin Rein call "reframing" (Schön and Rein 1994). Second, many practitioners develop insulated communities within their organizations that provide a safe haven for new values. In effect, their departments pursue competing values by becoming schizophrenic (in its layman's sense of "split personality")—allowing the two sets of values to stand side-by-side rather than synthesizing them. This is precisely the strategy Selznick describes for institutionalizing precarious values, and it has the same drawback of creating *intra*organizational conflict (Selznick 1957: 126 *ff.*). On the other hand, the evidence of these cases suggest that many traditional strategies focused on administrative systems—notably the creation of beat integrity and self-conscious use of training and personnel systems—are not sufficient to catalyze changes that touch an agency's core values: The systems rely for their legitimacy on their connection to those values, so attempts to use them for change amount to an

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[30] Even granting this internalization of conflict with the environment, it may seem too much to ask of a police department to change its culture fundamentally simply in order to develop one small partnership in one community. But of course there is institutional change, and there is institutional change: A broad program of partnerships, in which police hope to expand their ties throughout their city, may in fact demand widespread institutional change in a department. But more specific partnerships may work well enough with more limited shifts in values, such as a shift among a certain group of officers in a particular neighborhood. In either case,
    (footnote continued on next page)

effort at bootstrapping. That is not to say that such efforts are irrelevant to change; but there are

clear examples where using them alone leads to disaster.

Thus a department's success or failure in building different partnerships depends on its

capacity for institutional change, which in turn consists of the existence of practitioners (the more

the better, but one with authority sometimes suffices) who were able to employ the strategies just

described. These practitioners float transformative metaphors into their agencies' cultures, and

they structure them in ways that provide autonomous space where new values can grow. Public

managers who seek to build partnerships must cultivate these crucial skills.

Processing Value Conflict: The Hedgehog and the Fox

Institutional change can bring police values into closer alignment with outside groups and

thereby open up new space for partnerships. But there are two reasons why it can rarely eliminate

conflict completely. First, police can not and should not capitulate completely to all partner

values: Though partnerships are an important ideal in policing today, they must—as I have already

suggested—compete with other values, like the commitment to serve a broad public interest. As

Mark Moore puts it, "the police must continue to stand for a set of values that communities will

not always honor" (Moore 1992: 123; cf. Goldstein 1987: 25). Regardless, the inflexibility of

institutions means that they will often continue to stand for independent values whether anyone

else wants them to or not. Second, however compatible the police make themselves with a given

partner, the conflicts *among* partners can not be dealt with unilaterally. Consequently, police will

probably always find themselves with the conflicting mandates that so many students of public

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at whatever scope, the point is that one important managerial task will involve tending to organizational
values.

administration have decried and sought to exorcise (Wilson 1967, 1994). While value conflict between institutions can be softened, it cannot be eliminated.

The continued existence of value pluralism creates its own challenges of practice. To cope successfully, the practitioner must once again accomplish both normative and practical tasks. Unfortunately, some practitioners do not fare well in this area: They succumb to the organizational tendency I have already described to suppress dilemmas and reach for normative consistency, ignoring the ethical demands of value pluralism and alienating those who disagree with them. But others are comfortable with the contradictions inherent in bringing diverse partners together, and that temperament serves them well in managing across institutional lines.

Isaiah Berlin has depicted these two styles of thought—on the one hand the rigid adherence to a single value, and on the other an ability to allow for many values—through his distinction between the hedgehog and the fox. The idea comes from the Greek poet Archilochus, who wrote that "the fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing," and Berlin argues that this comparison suggests "one of the deepest differences which divide writers and thinkers, and, it may be, human beings in general."

> For there exists a great chasm between those, on one side, who relate everything to a single central vision, one system, less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of which they understand, think, or feel—a single, universal, organizing principle in terms of which alone all that they are and say has significance—and, on the other side, those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some *de facto way*, for some psychological or physiological cause, related by no moral or esthetic principle (Berlin 1978: 3; *cf.* Berlin 1955).[31]

Of course one may embrace the fox's attitude too strongly, if that means being paralyzed by the competing imperatives that might govern one's action. But Berlin suggests that one must never lose sight of the values one neglects by choosing to act on one in particular: "'To realize the

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[31] Note that this distinction differs from the one James MacGregor Burns (1956) draws between the lion and the fox.

relative validity of one's convictions,' said an admirable writer of our time, 'and yet stand for them unflinchingly, is what distinguishes a civilized man from a barbarian.' To demand more than this is perhaps a deep and incurable metaphysical need; but to allow it to determine one's practice is a symptom of an equally deep, and more dangerous, moral and political immaturity" (Berlin 1969: 172).

Value pluralism creates a *normative* challenge because it suggests that different ends cannot always be rationally ranked or combined, even in principle. The practitioner seems to have no place to stand, and Berlin communicates just how disorienting that sense can be when he describes the "deep metaphysical need" we have to deny it. Indeed, Tolstoy, Berlin's prototypical fox, was actually a frustrated hedgehog whose vision of the world's diversity tormented him as he strove to find a single unifying principle. Recognizing that values are incommensurable reveals serious and even insoluble ethical dilemmas, and these dilemmas seem to be particularly common for those wielding public authority (Walzer 1973).

But Berlin leaves no doubt that we should resist our longings for an artificial ethical order, branding the alternative as "barbarian." The fox, he suggests, should find ethical solace through a sort of moral humility—"realizing the relative validity of one's convictions," as Berlin puts it. In a word, embracing pluralism involves toleration, as he makes clear elsewhere:

> So long as only one ideal is the true goal, it will always seem to men that no means can be too difficult, no price too high, to do whatever is required to realize the ultimate goal. Such certainty is one of the great justifications of fanaticism, compulsion, persecution. . . . If there is only one solution to the puzzle, then the only problems are firstly how to find it, then how to realize it, and finally how to convert others to the solution by persuasion or by force. But if this is not so . . . then the path is open to empiricism, pluralism, toleration, compromise. Toleration is historically the product of the realization of the irreconcilability of dogmatic faiths, and the practical improbability of complete victory of one over the other. Those who wished to survive realized that they had to tolerate error. They gradually came to see the merits of diversity, and so became skeptical about definitive solutions in human affairs (Berlin 1997: 323-324).

So to the normative challenge that value pluralism poses, only the fox responds with the moral humility and toleration that is appropriate.[32] It is that ideal that I propose to hold the police in these cases up against and to investigate further. For those who do *not* meet it, we must brand their efforts as problematic even where their partnerships made progress. Those who do elucidate what the ideal means in practice.

Value pluralism also creates a *practical* challenge because it is remarkably difficult to reach agreement among groups who disagree on basic philosophical matters—even what ends their partnership should serve and what it must not sacrifice. But it is not impossible, and several authors have offered useful strategies for meeting this challenge. Legal scholar Cass Sunstein offers a particularly important example, suggesting that what he calls "incompletely theorized agreements" are "well suited to a moral universe that is diverse and pluralistic" (Sunstein 1995: 1748). He writes:

> Well-functioning legal systems often tend to adopt a special strategy for producing agreement amidst pluralism. *Participants in legal controversies try to produce incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes.* They agree on the result and on relatively narrow or low-level explanations for it. They need not agree on fundamental principle. They do not offer larger or more abstract explanations than are necessary to divide the case. When they disagree on an abstraction, they move to a greater level of particularity. The distinctive feature of this account is that it emphasizes agreement on (relative) particulars rather than on (relative) abstractions. This is an important source of social stability and an important way for diverse people to demonstrate mutual respect, in law especially but also in liberal democracy as a whole. . . . When closure cannot be based on relative abstractions, the legal system is often able to reach a degree of closure by focusing on relative particulars (Sunstein 1995: 1734, 1735-6, emphasis in original).

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[32] For a criticism that Berlin is *too* tolerant and morally humble—a wish "that he would understand a little less, and condemn a little more"—, see Lessnoff (1999). But Lessnoff does not make a convincing case: He fails to recognize that Berlin's position allows us to condemn those who *themselves* outright deny important human values. Ultimate values, Berlin is quite clear, are objectively true. What reason cannot discover is which among these values should take priority in a given instance. Different cultures and even different people reasonably disagree about that, but they cannot utterly disregard an important value the way societies that endorse slavery (the example Lessnoff is most worried about) disregard freedom. Finally, nothing in the ethic of toleration says that one should not champion one's values—"stand for them unflinchingly"—through avenues like debate, discussion, and persuasion; it is only necessary to take seriously the values held by others.

Sunstein wants to influence the style of legal reasoning that judges use in writing opinions, arguing against the "Herculean" model of reasoning from first philosophical principles that authors like Ronald Dworkin have championed. But the general idea of reaching agreement on particulars when philosophical agreement is elusive is not restricted to the legal realm, and many students of public policy have used it in practice. For example, Albert Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin (1988) describe how it was possible to reach agreement on a code of research ethics by abandoning the search for agreement on philosophical principles and looking instead towards "moral taxonomies"—case-by-case judgments of ethical propriety. As it turned out, policymakers could much more easily agree on these taxonomies than on the abstract reasons behind their judgments. Long denigrated as "casuistry", this strategy finds cogent defenders in Jonsen and Toulmin. In essence, it seeks to identify the concrete cases that do not offend any of several competing value systems. Though different camps may disagree on their reasons for endorsing a proposal, they can reach agreement about the proposal itself.

This basic strategy has worked in many policy areas, and it is worth reviewing a few examples in order to demonstrate its key characteristics—namely, an immersion in policy detail and a rejection of arguments from first principles. In the field of welfare policy, David Ellwood's pathbreaking proposal for reform took precisely this approach. Ellwood explicitly argued that competing values had "thwarted serious changes in policy for almost a decade"; for example, proposals to increase aid and appeal to those motivated by generosity to the poor inevitably alienated those who put more value on the American work ethic. But by reasoning from the long history of specific welfare policies, Ellwood identified a pattern that seemed to minimize these "conundrums": "Looking over the history of social policy," he wrote, "I am struck by the fact that the further we move toward a system that makes judgments about the causes of poverty, that tries to link benefits to work, and that avoids excessive targeting, the less bothersome the conundrums

seem to be" (Ellwood 1988: 43). Where previous authors had deduced proposals almost entirely from the viewpoint of a single value—whether generosity, or the work ethic, or curing dependence—, Ellwood recognized the importance of all of these values. Instead of choosing among them, he sought to find that rare policy that was tolerably consistent with all of them, even if it might not look ideal when judged by any *one* of them. Taking a slightly different approach, Alan Altshuler's work on the "community control" movement in the 1960s and 1970s sought to reveal how specific proposals for reform might be less controversial than the ideological debate at the time suggested. "What is most striking," he wrote, "is that the arguments in apparent conflict do not meet. They point in opposite directions, but they are in different policy dimensions. . . . [For example,] the policy realms over which black (and some white) communities are demanding control are quite different from those that urban intellectuals believe require metropolitan solutions" (Altshuler 1970: 50). While recognizing that "genuine sources of conflict" existed, Altshuler showed how several specific proposals could fly under the ideological missiles being lobbed from contending value camps.

The argument, then, is that in order to work cooperatively amidst value pluralism, practitioners should not expect to reach agreement on first principles: Instead they should train their attention on the details in order to find proposals that can coexist with *many* values. In other words, they should avoid seeking "completely theorized agreements" that resolve value disputes abstractly—deciding which of two values is most important, or how much of one to trade off for the other. Instead they should locate specific proposals that people who hold each value will approve, even if they do so for different reasons. Many concrete proposals can tolerably satisfy groups who start out from incommensurable positions, even when the positions themselves do not budge.

Meeting this practical challenge demands a taste for particulars, and that is exactly what the fox exhibits. Indeed, it is this aspect of Tolstoy's personality that Berlin identified most closely with his fox-like temperament. "His genius," Berlin writes of the Russian author, "lay in the perception of specific properties, the almost inexpressible individual quality in virtue of which the given object is uniquely different from all others . . . He saw the manifold objects and situations on earth in their full multiplicity; he grasped their individual essences, and what divided them from what they were not, with a clarity to which there is no parallel" (Berlin 1978: 38, 37). This skill frustrates any attempt to arrive at a single overarching principle that can guide action. But authors like Sunstein, Jonsen and Toulmin, Ellwood, and Altshuler show how it can be employed to reach more fleeting agreements on particulars. Put differently, the practical skills of the fox simply involve persistence in the face of competing values: The fox, as Berlin puts it, is able "to pursue many ends, unrelated and often contradictory." I will argue that this persistence enables many of the practitioners in these cases to find agreement that does not necessarily solve the relevant value disputes, but that does satisfy still-competing values tolerably well.

Thus the temperament and skills of the fox meet both the ethical and practical challenges that value pluralism presents. It is for that reason, I will argue, that those police who manifest them have more success managing partnerships—managing, in other words, in an environment where settled values do not exist, since different organizations never advance precisely the same goals. What exactly this temperament and these strategies consist of will be an overarching theme in the pages that follow, and I will try to explicate what it means to be a "fox" as I examine each of the four types of partnerships and the value conflicts that plague them. At the same time, I will describe the troubles faced by the hedgehogs, who sometimes disregard important social values that other institutions advance, and who fail to recognize opportunities for incompletely theorized agreements. In some cases the hedgehogs succeed well enough, for they are able to impose their

values on other institutions. This is particularly true for interagency ties in city government, for police can appeal to political leaders to bring recalcitrant agencies in line. But where this coercive solution is not available—indeed, the relative lack of hierarchy is precisely what distinguishes managing across organizations from managing within them—, the hedgehog finds frustration. That style of practice may be important for other types of organizational work (*e.g.* Selznick 1952). But it typically undermines the development of partnerships, a process that is intimately related to the management of value pluralism, and therefore is especially suited to the temperament of the fox.

4. The Scope and Limits of Effective Practice

The picture I have painted is one where the burden of making partnerships work falls on the police. To the extent that they are able to wield tools that can shift either their values or those of their partners, they can close the normative gap between the two and make partnerships more viable. To the extent that they can learn the temperament and strategies of foxes, they can manage value pluralism tolerably well and improve matters even more.

That picture bespeaks my focus on the question of what police can do rather than the more abstract question of what "causes" partnerships. In truth, police practice does not explain all the variation in partnership success. First, foxes and change agents often populate partner organizations instead of police departments, and sometimes *their* strategies and compromises can make up for much stubbornness on the police side. For example, many government agencies have of late taken a "tougher" approach to their social policy goals, and everyone from parole agencies to housing authorities have come to share the police concern with public safety. Second, even the most concerted efforts of institutional change face limits, and I have already suggested that those efforts can never eliminate the gaps among institutional values. Moreover, even the most flexible foxes sometimes fail to deal successfully with the dilemmas of value pluralism. So on the one

hand, what I define as ineffective police practice may not undermine all partnerships; and on the other, even the most effective practice may fail. The temperament of a fox and the capacity for institutional change are neither necessary nor sufficient for all partnerships.

But in the case studies that I will review, effective practice defined in this way goes a long way towards distinguishing success from trouble. The standouts in the community policing field like Portland, Oregon, and the dark horses like Lowell, Massachusetts—departments that have turned themselves around compared with a time when they were steeped in the insular ideals of "professionalism"—are departments with an uncommon capacity for institutional change and with uncommonly nimble practitioners who can only be compared with Berlin's fox.

Against these dynamic examples of success, we must place the more typical examples of the field. Encouragingly, none of the departments I studied—even those chosen largely at random to represent the "median" achievements in community policing—failed outright to improve their partnerships at all. Nevertheless, compared with overachievers like Lowell and Portland, some of these cases reveal how common practices—indeed even what some take as "best practice"—can stand improvement. For example, Riverside, California, revealed the efforts of an administrative virtuoso at work: A professional Chief who hailed from one of the nation's leading "problem-oriented policing" departments, and who took seriously all the field's advice about perfecting administrative systems. He and his staff decentralized authority, improved information systems, forged beat integrity, imposed new criteria on hiring, and a host of other efforts the police world holds in high esteem. But the results, I will argue, were meager and unsustainable in the area of partnerships. Political ties were highly charged, community partnerships were mostly restricted to one neighborhood for a limited period of time, and interagency ties showed notable gaps.

In my view the problem in Riverside and some other cities was a program for reform and a strategy of leadership that did not attend to the reality of value conflict that partnerships raise.

Riverside's chief, a consummate and in fact an extraordinarily skilled hedgehog, reflected much

wisdom of the policing field in seeing organizational change and the development of partnerships

as mostly a technical matter. Even those aspects of change that *were* recognized as properly

cultural were treated as problems of attrition and of designing the right personnel policies. But

without attending to cultural dynamics directly—without recognizing the existence of value

pluralism and meeting its demand for resources like moral humility, bridging metaphors, and

incompletely theorized agreements—many partnerships faltered. Riverside's reforms did develop

important experience with problem-solving and showed great imagination in enlisting property

owners in the fight against crime. But most partnerships fared unevenly, and the experience

suggests the limits of traditional managerial tools based on systems for the hard work of managing

across institutional lines. Riverside was certainly a difficult case in which problems like years of

isolation from the policing community made the prospects for reform seem bleak. But other

departments like Lowell faced equal if not greater difficulties, and in fact Lowell itself probably

faced an even more entrenched devaluation of the importance of community rapport. There,

management's sensitivity to the problems of value pluralism—including use of tools for

authentically *institutional* change and a fox-like attitude and strategies in the face of conflict—

successfully overcame many of these challenges, even if it could clearly not overcome all of them.

In the chapters that follow, I will return to this basic point in exploring each of the four

types of ties that police develop. In each case, I will argue, those departments that exhibit effective

practice as I have defined it fare better than those that do not, even where other conditions

(especially narrowly administrative sophistication) are held constant or even improved. Chapters

3, 4, 5, and 6 make this argument for community, business, political, and interagency ties,

respectively; I make each argument separately because the relevant value conflicts and appropriate

strategies vary across different institutional settings. In each I seek not only to make the general

point that the tools of institutional change and the temperament and strategies of a fox are important. I also seek to unpack more specifically exactly *which* values are at issue in each type of tie—to name and frame what I see as the distinctive value conflicts involved in community policing, and therefore the challenges that should form the center of attention for any reform program. To this end, I have organized each chapter around a small number of value conflicts that arise in most partnerships of each type. These conflicts should serve as a list of the strategic value choices that police must consider at the outset of their community policing programs. At the very least, they will need to be prepared to encounter them in the process of building each type of partnership. Other departments will hopefully have much to learn from the examples of success, which show what it takes—what substantive policies and practices must change, and how to change them—for a department to meet partner concerns successfully.

First, however, I apply the argument I have just developed to my own project of applied science, seen as an effort lying at the intersection of theory and practice—or to put the issue in institutional terms, of academia on the one hand, and management and policing on the other. Unpacking the value conflicts of my own enterprise, I attempt in Chapter 2 to arrive at a methodology that does not do too much violence to the norms and values of either of these two realms. More pragmatically, I lay out what it was that I did as I investigated the questions I have posed.

CHAPTER 2: DATA, METHODS, AND DILEMMAS

I have argued in the previous chapter that partnerships demand both institutional change and an attitude towards the world captured by Isaiah Berlin's concept of the fox. These ideas touch on fundamental questions about how the police role should change and on the centrality of value conflict in public service today. The study of partnerships raises them most concretely because it personifies the underlying tensions: We see neighborhood groups, concerned with the visible decline of their quality of life, expressing the long-standing but sometimes subordinate commitment police have had to order maintenance; we see social service partners, concerned with the well-being of their clients, expressing the element of rehabilitation in criminal justice; and we see elected officials and the press, motivated by the larger-than-life force of the dramatic incident, imploring police to take the rare but terrifying murder or case of extreme police brutality so seriously that for a time it crowds out much of the rest of the police workload. Caught in the middle of these claims, the police must constantly re-negotiate their role in a way that strikes an acceptable compromise—all the while remaining true to some of the distinctive values *they* have institutionalized. Indeed, it is precisely as police try to build outside partnerships that they confront most squarely the competing aims that different social institutions pursue, and in that way the conflicting value commitments of the wider society.

Thus the question I have posed—how can police negotiate the value pluralism that the push for partnerships has made so salient—cannot be answered in theory, but only through direct examination of the specific conflicts that actually arise between police and their would-be partners. Indeed, the diversity and specificity of the world is such that different communities will likely give different answers to this question. But I believe that by reviewing a wide variety of partnership

experiences (not a random sample of this experience, but a sample deliberately chosen to maximize variation), it is possible to understand the major conflicts that police partnerships face, the police values that produce them, and the styles of practice that can manage them. The cases assembled here provide an important opportunity to accomplish these tasks, for they hail from a broad spectrum of experience in terms of things like geography, population, community organization, and the community policing efforts themselves—how far they have advanced, what aims have guided them, and what skills their practitioners bring.

The analysis I have undertaken roughly follows the logic of the comparative case study method, trying to understand through close attention to detail, but always informed by theory, what it is that successful cases share that more problematic cases do not. I will describe this methodology more below. But more than simply laying out my data and methods, in this chapter I want to explain *why* I think that this methodology is appropriate for the task I have chosen, and more broadly why it is a useful way to approach the study of public management. I do not mean to argue that it is the only useful way. But it does meet some key challenges inherent in the study of practice. After reviewing these basic methodological concerns, I will then describe more specifically the nature of my own data and the analytic steps I have gone through to answer the questions of applied science I have posed.

1. Value Conflict in Applied Science

Public management belongs to the genre of applied science, in which scientific methods and concepts are used and developed to understand problems that arise directly in the practice of

some profession.[33] I believe that this approach is entirely appropriate in the field of public policy.

But it faces a set of dilemmas that I believe are generic to all applied science, from engineering to

social work to management. Donald Schön has described the problem well from the perspective of

the reflective practitioner who wants to use science to improve her practice—an applied scientist

on the front lines, as it were:

> In the varied topography of professional practice, there is a high, hard ground where practitioners
> can make effective use of research-based theory and technique, and there is a swampy lowland
> where situations are confusing "messes" incapable of technical solution. The difficulty is that the
> problems of the high ground, however great their technical interest, are often relatively unimportant
> to clients or to the larger society, while in the swamp are the problems of the greatest human concern
> (Schön 1983: 42).

Such dilemmas arise because applied science must simultaneously satisfy two communities: The

community of science and the community of practice. In other words, the applied scientist faces a

problem formally similar to the one faced by the police practitioners I examine in the remainder of

this study, and whose outlines I traced in the previous chapter. The applied scientist tries, more or

less concretely, to forge a partnership between a particular domain of the academic world and an

area of practice. In the case of evaluation research or in what has come to be called "action

research", the partnership can be quite literal, involving sustained interaction between practitioners

and academics. In other cases, the two audiences are only implied. But whether directly or more

distally, these two communities exert simultaneous and at times competing pressure on the applied

scientist. The tension arises because each of the two domains is an institutional setting governed

by distinctive norms and values—roughly, the norms of rigor and those of relevance. The conflict

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[33] The term "applied science" sometimes implies a particular attitude towards the study of practice, especially
one holding that science should first develop general causal laws independent of any concern with practice,
and only then map these theories onto the problems practitioners face. I use it in a more general sense to
designate knowledge for practice.

between those value systems generates the distinctive conflicts with which effective practitioners of applied science must cope.

Here I want to review the nature of these conflicts in more detail, unpacking the specific value conflicts behind the dilemma of rigor or relevance. I will also review some evidence that bears on the question of what *styles of research practice* seem most adept at managing it. In the study of police practitioners, I investigate questions like these by analyzing detailed case studies. But here I must make do with literature on social science methods for my "data", especially the subset of that literature that raises the question of how science relates to practice. In reviewing it, I aim to identify the most prominent value conflicts in applied science. More important, I aim to identify the strategies practitioners of applied science have developed to manage these conflicts successfully—*i.e.*, without subordinating the values of either of the two communities.

While there are other models of social science that seem effective in this regard—notably Chris Argyris's action science (Argyris, Putnam, and Smith 1985)—, my main aim is to demonstrate that comparative case study methodology can address the distinctive concerns of both practitioners and academics tolerably well. As I do so, I will also clarify what exactly comparing cases involves. Unlike much of the literature in this area, I will do this with an aim not simply to showing how case study methodology adheres to scientific norms, but also how it adheres to the needs of practice. The necessary result is that my own view of how the method should be employed does not always agree with more canonical views: It should be viewed as an extension of the comparative case study method to the distinctive problems of applied science.

By way of summary, I will argue that the values of the practitioner and academic communities come into conflict in three major areas: Over the role of values in analysis, over the need for abstraction, and over the question of what form good explanations should take—models that facilitate control or models that identify deep causes. First, the ideal of value-neutrality has

been a guiding norm of social science research for many years, but practitioners often find research that adheres to it as unhelpful: In their attempt to exorcise all normative traces from their work, researchers limit the reach of their work and end up avoiding problems of central concern to practitioners. Second, a basic norm of scientific research is that explanations should be general. But by pushing too far for abstraction, research can easily loose its anchor in the reality that practitioners experience, making it difficult or impossible for them even to recognize in their everyday world the "factors" that academics insist are crucial. Third, the focus of academic research on key "root causes" often strikes practitioners as unhelpful. For them, the most important question is not what "causes" some outcome, but what influence they themselves can have over it—the question of what they should do tomorrow.

Throughout, I will argue that the most conservative aspects of these academic ideals need to be abandoned in order to make research relevant to practice—in other words, that academic research needs institutional change by internalizing practitioner values in several key areas. But I will also try to discover how the spirit of these ideals can be kept alive. I believe that value-critical, comparative case study research—at least, when using a theoretical framework like the one I have proposed, since the dilemmas of applied science bear on theory as well as method—can be both relevant to practice and true to many important scientific ideals.

Groundedness vs. Abstraction

The archetypal scientific model reduces a welter of information to discrete variables, guided by Ockham's Razor and a few more specific criteria of concept-formation.[34] In realizing

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[34] I discuss some of these criteria in the next section: Indeed, it is debatable whether the two sets of value conflicts in these two sections are really distinct, since the norms of concept formation that lead to
(footnote continued on next page)

this ideal, science simplifies the world and therefore potentially improves our understanding of it in two ways: First, by ferreting out just those factors that demand most of our attention; and second, by creating manageable and testable models that provide the foundation for cumulative knowledge—in other words, by disciplining the inquiry of the community of scientists by giving them a limited but useful vocabulary of "concepts."

Unfortunately, practice cannot always abide the abstraction that science demands. As concepts become ever more parsimonious and abstract, they lose the connection to reality they must have for practitioners to recognize and manipulate them. Alvin Gouldner made this point clearly many years ago:

> A high science methodology tends to distill the complexity of social situations into a search for the effects of a few highly formalized and specially defined "variables," whose presence often cannot be gauged by direct inspection but requires special instruments employed under special conditions. Thus the "variables" sociologists study often do not exist for laymen; they are not what laymen see when they look about themselves. (Gouldner 1970: 56).

Gouldner concludes that to reverse this drift towards unhelpful abstraction, sociologists should train their attention on their immediate surroundings rather than the distant research subjects they have traditionally favored. Regardless of the merits of that particular proposal, his analysis is insightful in pointing out the disjuncture between favored "concepts," on the one hand, and anything that practitioners can experience tangibly, much less control, on the other.

The sort of qualitative research I have proposed offers a solution to Gouldner's problem in two ways. First, in both analysis and presentation it pays explicit attention precisely to the question of what concepts mean. This idea has been a longstanding theme in Charles Ragin's work on comparative and qualitative analysis, and he argues that clarifying the content of a concept can be a major outcome of research (Ragin 1998, 1997, 1994). Second, and more

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uncontrollable variables (the problem I discuss next) may also lead to ungrounded ones (the problem I discuss
(footnote continued on next page)

specifically, by working directly from the rich texture of experience, qualitative research almost

guarantees concepts that are closely linked to phenomena the practitioner can perceive. Barney

Glaser and Anselm Strauss make this point clearly in their arguments for grounded theory:

> Deliberate efforts at making logical deductions from some formal theory . . . typically result in
> theories so divorced from the everyday realities of substantive areas that one does not quite know
> how to apply them, at what part of the social structure to begin applying them, where they fit the data
> of the substantive area, or what the propositions mean in relation to the diverse problems of the area
> . . . [But] a grounded theory that is faithful to the everyday realities of a substantive area is one that
> has been carefully *induced* from diverse data, as we have described the process. Only in this way
> will the theory be closely related to the daily realities (what is actually going on) of substantive
> areas, and so be highly applicable to dealing with them. A grounded substantive theory that
> corresponds closely to the realities of an area will make sense and be understandable to the people
> working in the substantive area (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 238-9)

Thus Glaser and Strauss argue that by inducing concepts from "a multitude of diverse facts"

(rather than attending selectively to just those facts that relate to a pre-existing theory), the

researcher can hope to develop a theory that is "relevant to most situations" and that practitioners

themselves can understand and apply (Glaser and Strauss: 244, 243). The process of inducing

concepts in this way is well-described by Ragin, who explains it as "a process of *reciprocal

clarification* of the researcher's image of the research subject, on the one hand, and the concepts

that frame the investigation, on the other" (Ragin 1994: 82). It is an interpretive process much like

literary criticism, and its validity rests on explicit argument and persuasion rather than mechanical

coding and appeals to methodological routines.

By following these principles, qualitative analysis enables the researcher to traffic in the

sometimes unwieldy concepts that applied science demands. For example, in my own research,

"styles of practice," "value conflicts," and "partnerships" play key roles. All are complicated

concepts that can be difficult to pin down, but I have argued that it would be impossible dispense

with them—particularly the concept of "practice," which is the only lever that the practitioner can

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in this section). But I think it is useful to separate the issue of control from the issue of groundedness.

immediately pull. Qualitative analysis highlights precisely this process of interpreting what concepts mean and investigating their variation (for example, understanding what different forms of "practice" exist in the world). It is not, of course, alone in this regard: All research ultimately rests on interpretation of mere indicators (Stinchcombe 1968).[35] But qualitative research has the advantage that it makes this interpretive process explicit, and for that reason it is especially suited to studies of complicated phenomena (like practice) whose conceptual contours may not be immediately apparent.

In my view, there are two moments to this interpretive process. First, by drawing on in-depth interviews, direct observation, and primary documents, qualitative case study research creates a portrait of how certain events transpired—here, how different police departments develop and maintain ties with outside partners. This moment involves a relatively bare description of reality in terms of events and the perceptions of people who took part in them—a description whose norms are given by Howard Becker's (1996) exhortation to "get close to the action" and Clifford Geertz's (1973) call for "thick" description. Though in doing so it produces rich, detailed portraits of the world, it like all research cannot observe abstract variables (like a department's "style of practice") directly; a researcher must instead observe the immediate causes and effects of these variables—particularly the things practitioners say and do, and the things that they and others say they have done. From these mundane data, the researcher must infer the operative style of practice—or the value of any other variable—, through interpretation and argument. That

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[35] Arthur Stinchcombe argues that interpretation is fundamental to all measurement, as we cannot directly measure *any* variable of interest, only its immediate causes and effects (Stinchcombe 1968: 42). When quantitative types criticize the subjectivity of qualitative research, they ignore the analogous problem they themselves face—the radical and arguably *less*-constrained subjectivity that they exercise when they interpret the otherwise meaningless indicators at the root of their analyses. For example, the results of factor analysis are meaningless until the researcher interprets and argues over the meaning of his variable clusters (Overall 1964: 276).

process of argument is the second moment of qualitative analysis. It is in this sense that the qualitative researcher clarifies what is meant by a concept like "practice." In any case, only this sort of rich, detailed description and analysis can hope to articulate the subtleties of practice that, in my argument, underlie the uncommon successes in the field.

This mode of analysis makes qualitative research potentially quite useful to practitioners, as Glaser and Strauss argue. But it threatens to undermine a key norm of science by revelling in the particular and throwing up serious obstacles to causal generalization. It is not just that these analyses demand small sample sizes that cannot support canonical statistical analyses (Lieberson 1992). It is also that the theoretical phobia of authors like Glaser and Strauss, as well as Skocpol (1979), can lead to a disorderly march of knowledge that is neither cumulative nor generalizable. This problem has particularly plagued studies in the field of public management, which some feel have produced little more than a hodgepodge of intriguing stories and bits of practitioner wisdom. In this view, research has been captured by practice, abandoning distinctive concerns for research design and theory development (Lynn 1987, 1994). In my own terms, such research has completely subordinated the scientific norm of abstraction in order to attend to the concerns of practitioners. It is just as unacceptable as Gouldner's "high theory," which commits the opposite sin. Ultimately, its errors rebound to practitioners themselves, who find that they cannot rely on research to offer them well-tested propositions about what strategies are effective.

By hitching qualitative data to a theoretically-informed, comparative case study design, research can avoid these pitfalls in two ways: By gaining *some* causal leverage from the juxtaposition of cases, and by gaining the benefits of "theoretical generalization" from joining up with existing theory, in which past and future research tests are sedimented. Consider each of these ideas in turn.

First, close comparisons of carefully-chosen cases can salvage some explanatory power for a study that demands the sort of rich, qualitative descriptions that militate against large sample sizes, or even against codification of variables.[36] Theda Skocpol's discussion of the logic of these analyses is still the most succinct and clear, and I believe that its flaws (which I will return to shortly) are easily corrected. In her words, a comparative analysis "tries to establish valid associations of potential causes with the given phenomenon one is trying to explain" (Skocpol 1979: 36).[37] In my own analysis, I want to demonstrate that effective practice—including attention to institutional change and the temperament of a fox—enables a police department to establish the specific sets of ties implied by community policing.

The comparative method is at its strongest when it relies on two complementary sorts of comparisons. First, using "Mill's method of agreement," Skocpol explains that "one can try to establish that several cases having in common the phenomenon one is trying to explain also have in common a set of causal factors, although they vary in other ways that might seem causally relevant" (Skocpol 1979: 36). In the present context, my prediction is that all police departments with a specific type of tie will be departments able to manage the value conflicts inherent in that tie—in other words, departments blessed by able practitioners skilled in the ways I have outlined. Moreover, this asset will be enough to overcome other unfavorable conditions—like low social capital, resource constraints, or pettiness by would-be partners, and especially poor administrative

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[36]The same problem makes the formalized type of comparative analysis proposed by Charles Ragin (1987) equally undesirable (cf. Biernacki 1989), though I will try to incorporate the driving insight behind it, as explained below.

[37] For simplicity, this discussion will rely on the Theda Skocpol's description of the comparative method in her *States and Social Revolutions* (Skocpol 1979: 33-43), which is based on the ideas of John Stuart Mill. But the logic is mostly compatible with the case study method using multiple cases (Yin 1992) and many other presentations of the comparative case method (q.v., Ragin 1987). I will return to cautions about it in a moment.

arrangements like lack of strong beat integrity. In any case, the goal of the analysis must be to identify the variable (or complex of variables) that all success stories share.

Skocpol explains the second type of comparison ("Mill's method of difference") as follows: "One can contrast the cases in which the phenomenon to be explained and the hypothesized causes are present to other cases in which the phenomenon and the causes are both absent, but which are otherwise as similar as possible to the positive cases" (Skocpol 1979: 36). In the present context, this means establishing that botched practice *invariably* undermines a tie— even where every other background condition remains the same. In any case, the analysis must seek to identify the one variable or complex of variables that is necessary for building and maintaining ties. Mill himself, like many researchers who followed him, considered this method superior to the method of agreement in establishing causes (Ragin 1987).

Skocpol's treatment of comparative analysis has reinvigorated debate about the method, and it still serves as a starting-point for many critiques. The major caution against it comes from Ragin, who rightly argues that causal complexity (*e.g.*, the interactions among causes to produce an outcome) undermines a literal application of Mill's methods: Rather than comparing cases with respect to *individual* variables, they must be compared with respect to *combinations* of variables (Ragin 1987). Put differently, part of identifying the "cause" of some outcome is conceptualizing that cause appropriately—in particular, conceptualizing it broadly enough to encompass the full range of related factors that actually contribute to it. For example, within my concept of "effective practice" I have nested the less general ideas of institutional change and fox-like temperament, and those ideas *themselves* subsume still less-general strategies like the use of metaphor (and even the use of *specific* metaphors such as "broken windows"). As I have already argued, qualitative research aids precisely this process of conceptualization, which it accomplishes iteratively through Ragin's process of reciprocal clarification. From this viewpoint, the criticism that Mill himself

thought his methods could not be used when more than one cause was operating misfires (*e.g.*, Nichols 1986).

Another criticism of Skocpol's version of the comparative method focuses on its aversion to theory. In this case, her presentation seems to me to be clearly flawed. In my view, tying analysis to existing theory offers the second way—apart from the use of comparison itself—to avoid the pitfalls of much "practice" research. Using existing theory links the researcher to a branch of the scientific community and its time-tested propositions, and it thereby offers the prospect of theoretical generalization even when analyzing only a single case. In this view, case study research involves extending existing theory to account for anomalies, and indeed cases must be chosen precisely because they seem surprising given what we think we know (Burawoy 1998).[38] Certainty comes not so much from large samples and following certain analytic procedures, but from dialogue with the scientific community, whose challenges the researcher must be prepared to meet (Peirce 1955). New knowledge becomes sedimented in the new theory—particularly in well-specified mechanisms that link causes to their effects—, which in turn becomes tested through future applications (Burawoy 1998, Paige 1998). In my own research, I have taken my bearings especially from what I have called the Durkheimian tradition in organizational theory, which maintains that each organization becomes committed to a distinctive set of values. From this viewpoint, partnerships between organizations whose values are in conflict are unexpected. My major aim has been to identify cases where they *do* succeed, and to account for this anomaly by describing mechanisms that overcome value conflict. In my view, the reason existing theory does

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[38] In practice, this principle reinforces the criteria for case selection contained in Mill's methods, which counsel the choice of cases that challenge existing theory—for example, cases in which many factors thought to be important to an outcome do not exist but which still exhibit the outcome. More than simply "finding variation" (Tilly 1984), the research should attempt to find surprising variation.

not expect and cannot explain these successes is that it has not looked closely enough at the key variable of practice—the styles of thought and action that different practitioners use (*e.g.* Schön 1983; Rein 1983). By examining how practice can manage value conflict, I hope to extend the sociological literature and qualify its pessimism. I believe that doing so is especially urgent in an era when partnerships have become valued more highly.

Of course, tying analysis to existing theory carries the danger of falling back into the trap that Gouldner identified—using concepts that make no sense to practitioners. But I do not believe that we are back where we started. Even Glaser and Strauss, among the most atheoretical qualitative researchers, admit that formal theory can be useful so long as it finds a bridge to practice across grounded concepts. In their words, such concepts "provide a necessary bridge between the theoretical thinking of sociologists and the practical thinking of people concerned with the substantive area" (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 241; *cf.* 239). This is yet another reason why concepts must be nested. In my own research, to repeat, I have tried to follow this dictum by subsuming grounded ideas like the use of the broken windows metaphor in a succession of concepts that culminate in the abstract notion of "effective practice" (*cf.* Bardach 1987).

Thus a theoretically-informed, comparative analysis meets the concerns of practitioners for ideas that speak to their experience without sacrificing too much in the way of causal power and generalizability. By specifying the theoretical mechanisms that connect causes and effects, it is possible to gain some confidence about causal statements if the qualitative research suggests that something like those mechanisms do in fact operate; moreover, past and future research that investigates the same mechanisms adds confidence to such conclusions. And comparative analysis offers additional leverage for making causal claims by investigating the competing power of *other* specific mechanisms to account for observed outcomes—that is, by examining whether certain factors are in fact "held constant" while others vary in a way that may account for the outcomes of

interest.[39] This analysis may not have the robustness of the most sophisticated statistical experiments using highly formalized theoretical models, which take unrecognized "third variables" into some account. But that is only to say that the problems applied science faces are truly dilemmas. To take guidance only from the norms of (one model of) science is as ill-advised as to take it only from the norms of practice.

Control vs. Causation

Most scientists understand their work as an attempt to identify the "causes" of some phenomenon. Practitioners too want to understand what factors influence the problems they face. But the two groups have different criteria for judging the merits of different causal models, and the models scientists build often strike practitioners as irrelevant. Part of the difference involves the question of how "grounded" scientific concepts are. But there is another difference involving the degree to which variables can be easily manipulated. It is worth reviewing this difference briefly, because its solution rests not in appropriate methods but in appropriate theory.

Scientific models do not relate any two "variables" arbitrarily. Instead, norms of science define which variables are appropriate objects of theory and which are not. For example, many social scientists follow the imperative to identify "root" or "unique" causes of a phenomenon that will not be overturned by some "third variable" lurking in the background. Arthur Stinchcombe gave this imperative its most formal shape in his classic treatise on constructing social theories:

> Both concepts defining the thing to be explained and the causal variables get redefined, until in the ideal case each concept represents phenomena which always have the same set of effects and the same set of causes, and all other characteristics of the observations are eliminated as irrelevant. Conceptual perfection cannot go on without the increase in knowledge about how the world works,

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[39] Much qualitative research that does seek to make causal claims turns out on analysis to embody a comparative logic, extracting multiple units of analysis that can support comparison from the single "case" that ostensibly occupies the researcher's attention (Becker 1958; Robinson 1951; Glaser and Strauss 1967).

> for *conceptual perfection is the location of phenomena with a unique set of causes and effects.*
> (Stinchcombe 1968: 40, emphasis added)

This search for "unique" causes quickly becomes a search for "root" causes—those factors that are not themselves caused in any socially meaningful way. The trouble is that "legitimate" variables as defined by criteria like these may not look very relevant to practitioners. James Q. Wilson makes this point clearly, explaining how the sort of "causal analysis" that Stinchcombe puts forth as the scientific ideal necessarily draws attention away from factors that practitioners (in his case policymakers) can control.

> Causal analysis attempts to find the sources of human activity which themselves are not caused—which are, in the language of sociologists, "independent variables." Obviously nothing can be a cause if it is in turn caused by something else; it would then only be an "intervening variable." But ultimate causes cannot be the object of policy efforts precisely because, being ultimate, they cannot be changed. For example, criminologists have shown beyond doubt that men commit more crimes than women and younger men more (of certain kinds) than older ones. It is a theoretically important and scientifically correct observation. Yet it means little for policy makers concerned with crime prevention, since men cannot be changed into women or made to skip over the adolescent years (Wilson 1975: 55).

Wilson perhaps overstates the case here by presuming that gender and age are exclusively biological concepts: For example, it is not necessary to make men skip over the adolescent years so much as it is important to alter the influences associated with adolescence that lead to higher criminality. But the basic point still holds: It is not obvious how policymakers might manipulate the relevant independent variables, and that should not be surprising since they were not chosen with that aim in mind. Thus in Wilson's view, scientific rules for building theories leave in or even emphasize causal factors that are largely irrelevant to policy.

Wilson goes on to put forth a solution to this problem through policy analysis, which involves sacrificing some measure of "causal power" in order to ensure that relevant "variables" will be within reach of practitioner control.

> Policy analysis, as opposed to causal analysis . . . asks not what is the "cause" of a problem, but what is the condition one wants to bring into being, what measure do we have that will tell us when that condition exists, and what policy tools does a government (in our case, a democratic and liberal government) possess that might, when applied, produce at reasonable cost a desired alteration in the present condition or progress towards the desired condition. . . . A policy analyst would ask what

feasible changes in which of these instruments would, at what cost (monetary and nonmonetary), produce how much of a change in the rate of a given crime (Wilson 1975: 59).

Glaser and Strauss make a similar point, directing theorists to incorporate variables that practitioners can control: "The substantive theory must enable the person who uses it to have enough control in everyday situations to make its application worth trying. . . . The crux of controllability is the production and control of change through 'controllable' variables and 'access' variables" (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 245).

Responding to these imperatives is less a question of methods than theory: The crucial step is to develop a theoretical model in which the dependent variable is chosen because of its practical importance (rather than the uniqueness of its causes, as Stinchcombe would have) and key independent variables are chosen because practitioners can manipulate them (rather than because they are not themselves caused).[40] My own theoretical framework has sought to satisfy these conditions: The outcome of "successful partnerships" is chosen precisely because it has become a central concern among public managers in recent years; and the concept of "practice"— seen as the styles of thought and articulable strategies of action that managers use—encompasses exactly the control that practitioners can exercise over their situation. In brief, the framework seeks to relate the things practitioners do to their ability to maintain partnerships.

Policy analysis inevitably upends some scientific norms: Its causes are rarely "root" causes, and the outcomes it tries to explain are rarely well-formed variables in Stinchcombe's

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[40] The scientist will rejoin that such independent variables are ultimately useless, because deeper forces will return them to their initial state. In this view, variables must not simply be manipulable, but also "deep" in the chain of causation: For example, Elliot Currie (1985) puts forward a policy-oriented treatise on crime that seeks to identify interventions that address what he sees as the economic sources of crimes. The difficulty, however, is that such searches for root causes, even when they *are* informed by a concern with practice, overburden scientific analysis by demanding tightly integrated chains of causation even when—as in Currie's case—those chains are quite long. For the argument that "indirect" interventions based on long causal chains never succeed, see Rein and Winship (1998).

sense. Stinchcombe himself concedes this point, writing: "One of the fundamental difficulties with applied research generally is that natural variables *that create administrative problems* generally are not the same variables *that have a unique set of causes*. Sometimes applied researchers formulate this by saying that a natural variable 'has multiple causes.' From a scientific point of view, this means that the applied researcher is trying to explain the wrong thing" (Stinchcombe 1968: 42, emphasis in original). Stinchcombe gives the example of criminological theory, which in his view began with the explanadum of "crime" but had to refine its understanding to distinguish "subcultural crime" from "rational" crime, since each had separate causes.[41]

This problem seems to be truly a dilemma: I can discover no better solution than Wilson's, which of necessity cedes ground on the scientific front. But that surrender does not seem inherently fatal to the scientific enterprise, and its costs are balanced by some gains. As

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[41] Aversion to policy analysis as Wilson defines it stems not just from scientific norms like those Stinchcombe reviews. Michael Burawoy, for example, criticizes Glaser and Strauss for advocating "social engineering" that ignores macro forces. For example: "Whereas grounded theory might examine the way AIDS patients can be more 'effectively' handled in hospitals, the extended case method [Burawoy's preferred methodology] would examine the way the state has failed to take AIDS seriously, has held back the development of public policy, and has resisted experimentation of new drugs" (Burawoy 1991: 282). But this criticism misfires. Burawoy apparently objects not to "social engineering" *per se* but to incrementalism: He wants to investigate how the state might be changed in a way that would remove these obstacles to taking AIDS seriously. In this vein, he goes on to praise Alain Touraine for investigating the building of social movements—which will presumably lead to these changes in the state. This focus on social movements as a lever of macro change is common among leftist sociologists. The trouble is that these studies rarely take a practitioner's perspective (for example, asking what strategies those engaged in social movements should undertake in order to effect desired changes, *q.v.* Gamson 1990). In the end most suffer from the same problems of relevance as traditional social science. Those whose concerns lie at the macro level receive no special dispensation from the need to identify controllable factors, if they do in fact seek relevance. In fact I believe that Burawoy is mainly concerned with rigor rather than relevance, and that this concern drives him towards root causes rather than controllable ones. There is nothing wrong with this focus, but its norms are not entirely applicable to Glaser and Strauss's concern with relevance.

Marx put it, one of the best ways to understand the world is to try to change it, for only then do concealed sources of power become visible.

The Role of Values in Applied Science Research

Consider finally the question of values, which play starkly different roles in scientific and practical life. Scientists commonly deny that they have any competence for deciding questions about which ends are most valuable, and they seek to eliminate normative questions entirely from their analyses (Weber 1958). But practice demands decisions about values, and knowledge that systematically ignores such questions often strikes practitioners as unhelpful.

Generations of social scientists have denied this assertion, arguing that science can inform practice by identifying the best means to a given end—concluding, as Weber put it, that "*if* you take such and such a stand, then, according to scientific experience, you have to use such and such a *means* in order to carry out your conviction" (Weber 1958: 151). In practice, this view translates into a client-professional arrangement between the policymaker and the analyst: The policymaker provides the analyst with a set of values, and the analyst determines how well different interventions realize them. The problem is that the relationship rarely leads to such a clear division of labor. Martin Rein makes this point clearly:

> "Clients" can rarely provide a clear unambiguous and internally consistent statement about what they value. This is especially true of government, where competing interests are so widespread that consensus can often be purchased only at the price of ambiguity. Indeed, the aims of policy are always ambiguous, inconsistent, and conflicting, and as a result there is no simple consensual criterion, such as effectiveness, against which to judge performance (Rein 1976: 62).[42]

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[42] Rein makes this point concretely about the community action programs of the 1960s: "However tentative the premises of an experiment, their testing imposes meanwhile a more explicit and rigorous definition of means and ends that an administrator can comfortably work to" (Marris and Rein 1967: 192).

Frustration with this state-of-affairs is rampant in social science, which has yet to arrive at a fully

satisfactory solution. Consider briefly the weaknesses of two closely-related approaches:

Demanding value-consistency from the political realm, and eschewing analysis altogether when

clear values cannot be specified.

The field of evaluation exemplifies the first position. For example, in evaluating intensive

supervision parole programs, Joan Petersilia and Susan Turner express precisely the frustration

Rein speaks of: "The criteria for judging an ISP program's success should be straightforward—

did it achieve what it was intended to accomplish? However, there are often diverse, sometimes

conflicting, perceptions about ISP's character and objectives." Their solution is to advocate for

clarification:

> Jurisdictions need at the outset to specify their objectives, what mechanisms are supposed to
> accomplish those objectives, and how program effectiveness will be judged. . . . If crime control
> rather than rehabilitation is the primary goal, that should be made explicit at the outset. If a
> jurisdiction is primarily interested in delivery of an intermediate punishment, even if it does not
> reduce recidivism rates, that also should be made clear. Otherwise, the public will see the observed
> changes in recidivism rates as an indication of "failure." Finally, if the aim is to reduce recidivism
> through a combination of intensive supervision and improved rehabilitation programs, that also
> needs to be made explicit, and the programs should be structured to reflect it by devoting appropriate
> emphases and resources to treatment and surveillance (Petersilia and Turner 1993: 326).

The authors express a very real frustration of the evaluation researcher committed to the position

that she herself cannot traffic in values—the position that to the extent that values must underpin

the analysis at all, they should come explicitly from the political system. But this position is not

entirely consistent, for it ends up taking its own strong normative position in telling policymakers

how to make policy, *i.e.*, insisting that policy must take clear, unambiguous, and final positions on

central value concerns (as when Petersilia and Turner implore policymakers that their ultimate

aims "should be made explicit at the outset"). Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that

policymakers do not *want* to be so single-minded in their pronouncements, and that fractured body

called "the public" does not "want" them to do so either. Building a political coalition for any

policy means tying together diverse and contradictory aims, and the almost inevitable result is

different from an unambiguous, crystallized purpose. Moreover, there are good arguments for

value-flexibility, since the policy delivery system is a learning system in addition to being a system

for execution (March 1972).

The second solution, prevalent in "pure" sciences like sociology, simply eschews

questions where values cannot be stated with unambiguous consistency. In a way this position is

the logical extension of Petersilia and Turner's. For example, legal sociologist Donald Black

accepts the validity of what he calls "impact" studies—studies "that compare reality to legal ideals

with a very plain and specific operational meaning, . . . [*i.e.*,] a statute whose purpose is rather

clearly discernible or a judicial decision unambiguously declarative of policy. The *Miranda*

decision, for example" (Black 1973: 43). But he firmly criticizes anything less well-specified,

where ideals are ambiguous or inconsistent:

> Sociologists, however, may launch these implementation studies where legislation or judicial
> opinion is considerably more ambiguous than in *Miranda*. In such instances, the 'impact' may be
> difficult to measure. What must be done, for example, to implement *In re Gault*? Though it is
> generally recognized that *Gault* guarantees to juvenile suspects constitutional rights previously
> accorded only to adults, the extent of these juvenile rights is not at all clear. Hence it becomes
> difficult, if not impossible, to identify the degree to which *Gault* has been implemented (Black 1973:
> 43-4).

Even worse, Black feels, are studies where sociologists try to "compare legal reality to an ideal

grounded in neither statutory nor case law," such as "rule of law," "arbitrariness," and so on

(Black 1973: 44). In Black's view, science should not approach such subjects at all, or else it

should reduce them to "impact" studies by simplifying the relevant ideals.[43]

The problem is that none of Black's criticisms suggest that it is not *important* to

investigate these difficult questions—whether the law is arbitrary, what *In Re Gault* has wrought,

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[43] Wilson notes the further problem that scientific analysis divorced from values often has unethical "policy
implications": "A commitment to causal analysis, especially one that regards social processes as crucial, will
(footnote continued on next page)

or the status in practice of any number of vague and conflicting legal and social ideals. Black does not deny this, but he does deny that sociologists or anyone else claiming title to the mantle of science are the right people to study these questions (that, at least, is his explicit argument, though his criticisms of people who might not describe themselves as scientists—for example, evaluation researchers—suggests a more general impatience with anyone who studies value-laden questions methodically). But in reality who else will take up the charge? And who should: Is it better to have no one but advocates research these questions? Is there really no place for the ethical commitment to impartiality, rigor, and systematic inquiry—even if as elusive ideals—in the study of such centrally important social questions?

Thus the traditional client-professional conception of applied science faces fundamental difficulties, and neither of these prominent responses can solve them. On the one hand, applied scientists are led to make demands for consistency from their clients that are at best unrealistic and at worst unjustified; on the other hand, they abdicate the study of important social problems altogether. Apparently the model of policymaking inherent in this conception is faulty. It is rarely the case that policies can be faithfully conceptualized in terms of instrumental rationality: Instead they implicitly aim in part to discover and clarify purposes as much as to realize them (Wildavsky 1979). Indeed, the model of instrumental rationality that underlies traditional evaluation research has increasingly come under attack in areas far beyond policymaking (March 1972). Thus the applied scientist cannot escape this dilemma: The norms of science demand a disinterested value-neutrality, but adhering to that norm means abandoning much hope of relevance.

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rarely lead to discovering the grounds for policy choices, and such grounds as are discovered (for example, taking children away from their parents) will raise grave ethical and political issues" (Wilson 1975: 59).

My own response to the dilemma is to take a value-critical posture that neither eschews

values altogether nor succumbs to the pure advocacy that scholars like Black describe. In chapter

1, I have offered a few explicit values that will guide my analysis, notably Berlin's insistence that

practice should not entirely subordinate one value in a dilemma, Moore's assertion that managers

must seek to authorize agency goals with their overseers, and the value of building partnerships

itself. My entirely conventional aim is to understand what means (understood as strategies of

practice) can simultaneously accomplish all three of these ends. But admitting that these three

values are ambiguous and contradictory, I also seek to clarify their content and the conflicts among

and within them. Rein describes this strategy as a "value-critical" one:

> A value-critical position treats values not merely as the accepted aims of policy but as a subject for
> debate and analysis. When I affirm equality as a value, I want further to inquire what this means and
> why it is worth while, and not simply how one can reach this end . . . A value-critical position can, in
> addition, examine specific values in relation to others by looking at the consequences of pursuing
> these aims and by considering the latent goal conflicts among them (Rein 1976: 73)

Most important, I will apply this strategy to the substantive value conflicts that I believe lie at the

center of the challenges in forming partnerships. Part of my analytic task, in other words, is to

discover what values are at issue in the obstacles to police partnerships. Out of the vague,

inconsistent reasons that practitioners on either side offer for their disagreements with their

partners, what basic value positions can be discerned? And in what sense do the values that one

partner advances undermine those of the other?

I do not believe that engaging in such questions leaves me entirely outside the realm of

science. The second question, in particular, while not commonly the subject of research, does not

demand an advocacy posture: In many cases I will defer judgment on whether the sacrifices police

make in their own values is justified; I simply mean to point out that it is a sacrifice. This much is

entirely consistent with those who hold that it is not possible to choose rationally among values:

For example, Berlin argues that philosophy can expose the conflicts among values even if it cannot

decide among them (Gray 1996), and even Weber gives philosophy the job of asking how different

value spheres evaluate the same action—analyzing, for example, whether "you serve this god and you offend the other god when you decide to adhere to this position" (Weber 1958: 151).

My first question—what value positions underlie the vague and inconsistent judgments practitioners make—cannot claim the same degree of objectivity. But I believe we must abandon the simple dichotomy of value-neutral and value-committed. Not all interpretations of vague and conflicting aims are equally satisfactory: It is possible to make them with different degrees of regard to whether the practitioners themselves would accept them (Gamson and Rein 1995). By working backwards from the sometimes vague and conflicting ideas that practitioners advance, I attempt to identify and clarify their core values without abandoning any anchor in their own perspective. It is never possible to succeed entirely in this enterprise. But I reject the notion that we must abandon it entirely, choosing between the polar opposites of advocacy and disinterest. The norm of objectivity can have some force even as an unreachable ideal.

Thus in the analysis I have proposed, research itself identifies values. It does not so much discover or introduce them as it clarifies them by attending closely and with a passion for systematic thinking to the value concerns in which practitioners themselves engage. It does not presume that a single value or any coherent combination of values can be identified. But when they cannot, it contributes to practice by clarifying the nature of the value conflicts practitioners face, and both highlighting and sharpening the choices they present (whether they are individual or collective). The reader must understand the pitfalls of this enterprise, for I have taken inherently ambiguous objectives and imposed new order on them. But I believe that the alternative involves abandoning all hope of relevance.

2. Data and Methods

Applied science cannot escape these three dilemmas, but research that is value-critical, comparative, and qualitative can bring their tensions within a manageable range if it trains its

attention on questions in which practice variables play a central role. That is the strategy I have employed in this study. More specifically, my analysis will follow a comparative logic, drawing on qualitative case study research for its "data" in order to effectively analyze the complex concepts at play. My basic argument holds that a department's ability to develop partnerships hinges on its ability to manage the value conflicts associated with each type of partnership.

Given the methodological principles advanced in the previous section, substantiating that argument required three steps. First, I needed to identify departments that were sufficiently diverse to support a comparative analysis. Second, I needed to collect data at each site and interpret it with respect to the conceptual framework I have developed (and of course to improve that framework in the process); this qualitative analysis also involves a value-critical analysis that asks what values are at issue in each partnership I have examined. Third, I needed to identify which styles of practice seemed to contribute most to success by comparing successful cases to those that faced more trouble and trying to understand which factors accounted for the difference. In the remainder of this chapter, I describe how I approached each of these three tasks.

Site Selection

The comparative method obviously demands careful selection of cases: The researcher must first find "success stories" with as much variation on potential causal factors as possible (in order to establish that all of these otherwise diverse cases share one specific factor), and she must then find the most closely-matched "failures" possible. Fulfilling these criteria is always difficult, but as in all research designs, what is crucial is to lay out the motivating ideal.

The most basic requirement is to find both successes and failures for all four types of ties—or more specifically, to find at least some departments that built community partnerships more successfully than others; to find some that built extensive interagency partnerships more successfully; and so on. Without detailed knowledge of the 19,000 local police departments in this

country, it was impossible to select *directly* for the presence or absence of various partnerships. Instead, I sought to identify different *types* of community policing experiences, which hopefully reflected different combinations of the four partnerships—all the way from successful efforts to build all four types of ties, to complete failures to reconfigure any of them.[44]

To accomplish this, I built on the policing literature's dichotomy between "problem-oriented" community policing departments (which seem to build strong interagency ties, and sometimes inventive business ties, especially with property owners) and more "community-oriented" departments (which focus on community ties, and which frequently reconfigure political ties as well). Treating these "orientations" as two distinct variables generated a simple but complete typology of police departments:

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[44] In addition to the substantive criteria I will describe, site selection was guided by a few practical constraints. First, I limited the size of departments studied to those with 100-1,000 officers, and most of those chosen employed between 200-400 officers. (While only 5% of state and local police departments in the country fall into the 100-1,000 officer size range—most employ fewer than 10 officers—, these agencies employ about one-third of the nation's sworn officers. Another third work for departments larger than 1,000 officers, and the final third work for those smaller than 100) (Reaves and Goldberg 1998). Second, since network *creation* is an important part of my study, I tried to identify departments that implemented community policing in the recent past, so that interviewees will be better able to recall that process. These criteria define the population from which I chose my sample of 6.

Is the Department   Problem-Oriented?

		Yes	_No_
Is it _Yes_ **Community** **-Oriented?**		(1) Mixed	(2) Citizen- Dominant
	_No_	(3) Technocratic	(4) "Failed"[45]

The bulk of my analysis focused on six police departments drawn from all four corners of this table. More specifically, I chose 4 departments that seemed to have excelled at some version of community policing and its networks (cells 1-3), and two where community policing seemed to be less successful despite attempts to implement some version of it (cell 4).

To identify six appropriate departments out of the 19,000 that exist in America, I drew on two sources: First, I analyzed a survey by the Urban Institute of roughly 1,500 departments that received federal funds from the 1994 crime bill,[46] which asked a number of questions about what

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[45] "Failed" is put in quotation marks because all of these four types reflect relative tendencies, not absolute states. It is not that these departments' community policing programs were complete blunders that utterly failed to build any ties at all; it is rather that they were less successful at doing so than their above-average counterparts in the other three cells. The "failure" cell activates this concern, of course, because it was politically the most sensitive type of department to study. My strategy was not be to look for failures in the sense of departments at the absolute left tail of the spectrum of achievement. Instead I looked for more-or-less "representative" departments that provide fit comparisons to the overachievers. In other words, instead of seeking a comparison of success _versus_ failure, I simply sought to compare various degrees of success. As Charles Tilly (1984) puts it, the basic imperative involves "finding variation" (_cf._ Becker 1998: ch. 3; Glaser and Strauss 1967: ch. 3) Note that _all_ of the cases I have studied _tried_ to build new partnerships (more specifically, at least one important group in the agency—typically management—made a sustained effort to develop substantial new partnerships with outside groups): The "failed" cases do not represent cases where no one _tried_ to build partnerships. That is because my question is how practitioners who _want_ to build partnerships can succeed, not the more abstract question of when partnerships arise.

[46] Roth and Johnson (1997) provide some information on the ways in which fundees differ from non-fundees; the differences are less dramatic than one might expect, and none seem fatal to my site selection strategy.

each department was doing, as well as the history of its changes. One way I used the survey was to create a crude and simple index that sought to capture how completely a department had implemented community policing, and which could distinguish the overachievers from more representative departments. (Specifically, the index reported how many of the following four key reforms had been accomplished: Designating certain recurring patterns as problems; using a team approach for problem-solving; maintaining beat integrity in dispatching officers; and providing some in-service training on community policing.) Second, I consulted a number of experts in policing who were familiar with the national scene.[47] Though neither of these sources of information is perfect, some of their weaknesses are complementary.

In selecting sites, I used both sources together to select four leading-edge departments, looking for departments that had either strong expert testimony, high scores on the survey-generated success index, or both. I then used the survey to make sure that these four departments did in fact represent the entire spectrum of community policing mapped out in cells 1, 2 and, 3, replacing candidates as needed to fill in the spectrum. (The final choices were Lowell, Massachusetts; Portland, Oregon; Fremont, California; and Knoxville, Tennessee.) Finally, I chose my two "representative" departments by taking a random sample of all agencies that had implemented either two or three of these reforms.[48] (These two cases were Riverside, California; and Albany, New York.) The result was six cases that represented all four cells of the table above, and therefore hopefully captured a diversity of cases that had built different combinations of ties. In fact, I believe that it was in fact able to snare at least one set of paired comparisons for each

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[47] Specifically, I wish to thank William Geller, Herman Goldstein, George Kelling, David Kennedy, and Rana Sampson for their generous help selecting sites.

type of tie (*e.g.*, one department that built strong community ties together with one that did so less successfully). In this way, it does in fact facilitate a comparison based on Mill's method of difference.

Mill's method of agreement, by contrast, makes different demands on site selection: It essentially asks that our success stories be as diverse as possible with regards to potentially important causes. With this aim in mind, I drew on the rich material in the Urban Institute survey to try to stratify my four positive cases into three categories based on the nature of their "environments" (the three categories were unpromising external environment, unpromising internal environment, and benign environment).[49] Nevertheless, with three categories of "success" to explain, I felt that six cases would not give much room for diverse backgrounds: Some cells only had one positive case, making it impossible to apply the method of agreement. That problem was certainly not fatal, since the method of agreement is less convincing than the method of difference anyhow. Nevertheless, I felt that there was no reason why the study could not draw on other, less rigorously-chosen case study material to bolster this sort of analysis (a practice that has long been legitimized under the rubric of "comparatively-informed case studies"). In particular, the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University had recently developed five case studies that focused on various types of

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[48] The mean number of reforms implemented among departments in my population was three, so as a whole, the "representative" departments had implemented slightly fewer reforms than average. I chose to undershoot the mean in order to ensure that our comparisons would have enough variation to exploit effectively.

[49] I judged departments to have unpromising *external* environments if their survey responses suggested ambivalence or even hostility to change from outside groups, and also if they seemed to have weak ties to national policing networks (in that my "experts" had heard nothing about them but my index suggested that they had changed successfully). I judged them to have unpromising *internal* environments if they began their attempts to change with conservative cultures and structures (something I gauged from survey responses about the degree of internal resistance, and also from regional location: For example, West Coast departments, which started late, tend to be more "progressive" than their counterparts in some other parts of the country). I judged departments to have *benign* environments if neither of these difficulties was apparent.

successful police partnerships (most of them community and business ties).[50] These cases were more

narrowly focused than the six that form the core of my study, since they tend to focus on individual

ties rather than a department's entire network. Nevertheless, they can perform a supporting role that

enriches the analysis in crucial places—particularly in the analysis of community ties, which are

absolutely central to community policing. Indeed, precisely *because* they focus more narrowly on a

particular type of tie, cases like these can describe those ties quite richly.

Thus in the end, my analysis involved eleven case studies chosen for their diversity: Different

degrees of success in building each type of partnership, and also great variation on potentially-

important causal factors. In that way, they realize the ideal advanced by both comparative

methodology and grounded theory of examining cases with as much diversity as possible (esp. Glaser

and Strauss 1967: ch. 3; Ragin 1987; Skocpol 1979; Burawoy 1998; Tilly 1984).

Value-Critical Qualitative Analysis

In visiting each department, I tried to understand to what extent partnerships developed

and why, and I produced descriptive cases that tried to characterize any changes in the

departments' partnerships, as well as a variety of factors that may have led to those changes.[51] The

categories I used in each of these areas developed to some extent as I went along, but many were

settled early on—after my pilot case (of Lowell, Massachusetts), and my reflection on the

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[50] These cases (Seattle, Las Vegas, Chicago, Norfolk, and St. Petersberg) were written by Harvey Simon and John Buntin for the Pew Charitable Trusts (Simon 1996, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d; Buntin 1998). Each of them describes the evolution of two community partnerships, chosen for their deep differences in the type of neighborhood involved but because both were thought to have led to concrete, identifiable successes. When I draw on these cases in the text, I do not cite them directly (in part to minimize distracting citations, and in part because this analysis was prepared from drafts of the case studies): Instead I note here that *all* references to these cities draw on these cases unless I explicitly cite another source.

[51] These cases are being published by the National Institute of Justice (Thacher 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d, 1999e, 1999f). Again, most of my discussions of these cities draw on these cases without direct citation, which would be unwieldy. Occassionally I have returned to my primary data to flesh out an important point.

theoretical ideas presented in the previous chapter. It is especially important to understand how I

investigated three concepts at each site: Partnerships, value conflicts, and practice.

First, in order to understand the quality and nature of different "partnerships" in different

cities, I mostly relied on the judgments of practitioners themselves. Surprisingly often, police or

their partners—and in many cases both—would openly concede that their partnerships had not

worked very well. For example, in Seattle, I describe how even police *supporters* of a partnership

with a local community organization conceded that many hours of effort had produced almost no

tangible results. The question, then, becomes why Seattle had such trouble building this

partnership when some other cities report more success. Occasionally, I overrode practitioner

judgments according to the norms of partnerships that I describe in chapter 1: Partnerships should

involve broad cooperation on many fronts (rather than simple "exchanges" in one particular area,

as in the case of referrals), and they should not sacrifice key values of public service (for example,

in chapter 3 I treat several community partnerships as problematic because they seem to involve

"capture" by a particular community without any attention to the welfare of the broader public). In

any case, in most cases I give some detail on what happened in different partnerships so that my

reader can see what information I based my judgments on. Moreover, at the beginning of each

chapter I outline a few more specific norms that I applied to the evaluation of each type of

partnership.

Second, in order to identify "value conflicts" in each city, I engaged in value-critical

analysis of any concerns that arose in each partnership. Particularly in the cases where

partnerships faced great trouble, but also in the early history of partnerships that eventually

worked well, I looked at practitioners' descriptions of the problems they faced (in my interviews, I

inevitably asked what sorts of challenges, resistance, and obstacles new partnerships had faced),

and I tried to understand the nature of those problems. This focus on evidence of trouble allowed

me to identify the dilemmas of work that partnering involved. The analytic task then involved interpretation: Coming to some fair conceptualization of the nature of these dilemmas.[52] More specifically, for each of the four partnership types, I collected examples of the obstacles that arose and placed them in different categories—most of which involved different types of value conflict because that seemed to be the fairest way to describe them (though in the cases where other types of factors seemed to lie behind trouble in partnerships, I review them in the text). These value conflicts were my interpretations informed by the thoughts of those I interviewed. In the end, I merged these categories (usually around 10) into more abstract value conflicts and dropped a few that did not arise very often, until I had a manageable number that still covered most of the dilemmas of practice I had seen. I then drew on these examples to describe what each conflict involved: What values each side was advancing, and what consequences each value had for the others. These descriptions constitute a major result of my analysis, in that they answer the question of what problems and dilemmas developing partnerships entail, and I outline what each conflict involves at the start of each section in each chapter. Because they result from a process of interpretation, there is an unavoidable element of subjectivity to them. But in the text I quote extensively from the interviews on which I based my conclusions, and the reader can and should judge whether my interpretations of these data seem fair.

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[52] For example, in community partnerships, almost everyone I spoke with explained that in the early days, at least, police resented or were at least surprised by what they saw as the triviality of the concerns that residents raised. These concerns seemed to derive from the community's concern with their everyday experiences and their overall sense of safety—the community value of controlling "soft crime." In talking with police, particularly in places like Riverside where many of them still look askance at that value to some degree, it became clear what value a focus on soft crime had the potential to undermine: The commitment to target police resources on hard crime. Often officers framed the problem as a question of not having enough time to focus on these "trivial" issues when a call for rape or robbery might come through at any minute. Recognizing that this response gibed with well-established notions of the occupational culture in policing, I attributed it to the police values that identified their main concern as serious crime (Manning 1977).

Third, my efforts to analyze "practice" in each partnership followed a similar logic. Based on what practitioners told me they had done, how they said they understood their experiences, what I observed them doing, and what *others* said they had done, I tried to characterize their strategies of practice. As I argued above, I believe that this conceptualization is essentially an inductive and interpretive process. I did not come to the analysis with a pre-given set of "practice strategies," so that my task consisted in categorizing different practitioners (though of course I had my own preconceptions, particularly regarding the strategies of institutional change as described above). Instead I sought to develop and locate concepts that helped to summarize the inevitably wide variety of actions that practitioners report taking. For example, the concept of the "fox" emerged (or rather, showed up) as a useful way to summarize the attitude of tolerance and the willingness to change course that many police I interviewed seemed to have.[53] Again, I describe the events and quote the interviews that most informed my interpretations, so the reader can and should decide whether my interpretations seem fair.

Thus throughout, I followed a fairly traditional model of qualitative analysis, which as I have argued above enables me to engage the complicated concepts inherent in my study. I reviewed all materials relevant to each category—the quality of partnerships, the nature of value conflicts, and the style of practice—and formed an interpretation of each case on these three dimensions. How strong were its partnerships? What conflicts seemed important? How did

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[53] One of the most difficult aspects of describing the "style of practice" police had used revolved around the problem of which police I should base my judgment on: Though departments often have a general "tone"— particularly with respect to which values officers subscribe to, and sometimes even whether they are hedgehogs or foxes—, any police department reveals some variation on these questions. But in many cases, the key officers involved in a particular partnership were forged from similar molds. For example, in Riverside, although the department as a whole put great value on asserting their authority, it was clear that those officers assigned to the Casa Blanca neighborhood had been chosen precisely because they were sensitive to the community relations problems that being stern could create, and their supervisors emphasized these problems as well.

practitioners manage them? Those three questions lie at the heart of my analysis of each case. I have provided extensive quotations from my interviews and other sources so that the reader can judge whether my answers seem faithful to reality.

The data I used to answer these questions consisted of interviews, observations, primary documents, and newspaper reports. In each site, I carried out from two to three dozen interviews and focus groups with relevant individuals, including various police employees (focusing on a consistent set of roles in each site, like officers, managers, civilians, union representatives, and those who resisted community policing) as well as important outside groups (including employees of outside agencies, elected officials, and community representatives). I also tried to observe patrol activities, management meetings, interdepartmental meetings, and community meetings at each site (and in no case did I fail in more than one of these categories). Third, I made the same document request of each department, asking for grant applications, annual reports, strategic plans, budgets, personnel sheets, and general orders and other policies or bulletins relevant to community policing. Many departments and their would-be partners were still willing to cooperate after this barrage of requests, and they provided me with considerably more idiosyncratic but eminently useful documentation. Finally, I reviewed local newspapers to avail myself of contemporaneous accounts of past events. Overall, the site visits were guided by a rough protocol that left room for serendipity. The overriding aim was to understand what had changed in a department's partnerships and why.

By relying heavily on in-depth interviews with participants, I of course ran the risk of missing the same things that they themselves missed, and of being caught up in their enthusiasm. Where possible, I tried to guard against these potential problems by pressing my respondents to be concrete, verifying their impressions with archival data, and fully considering the range of opinions that differently-situated informants provided me (no generalization in the cases was based

on the opinion of a single interviewee). To reduce the even greater possibility that I

misunderstood my informants, I insisted that they comment on my drafts. These comments came

in two stages: First, interviewees commented on sections of my descriptive case studies in which

they were quoted by name. To protect them from any harm that might come from the things they

said, I gave interviewees veto power over their quotes at this stage. Few of them made very

significant changes, though some of them wanted to "clean up" their quotes in ways that made

them less natural than I would have preferred. In the handful of cases where they did not want to

be quoted on some controversial point, I was able to find another way to make it (often by quoting

them anonymously, with their consent).[54] Second, after everyone quoted by name had cleared their

own quotes, I gave drafts of long, descriptive case studies to several key informants in each city in

order to get their input on whether I had gotten the basic story right, making changes where

appropriate. They did not always agree with everything I said, even after I had incorporated their

input. But in no case did anyone suggest that I had fundamentally misrepresented their

department's experience. On the other hand, my informants have not read this analysis of those

descriptive cases, and I suspect that they would disagree with some of my conclusions here. The

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[54] Many social scientists will find it strange or even irresponsible that I quoted any informants by name at all. But I believed that a study of practice, which of necessity involves the study of particular practitioners, could not hope to disguise individuals effectively, and it would be dishonest and dangerous to pretend that I could. Instead I sought to engage interviewees themselves in the decisions about what they felt comfortable saying publicly. Had I focused on some particularly controversial issue like police brutality, this strategy might have limited my ability to say anything at all. But in the relatively uncontroversial area of building partnerships, interviewees only rarely refused to discuss areas I was interested in. Whether or not they were candid is another question, but I always gave them the opportunity to go "off the record," and I guaranteed them that I would not quote them by name without their explicit consent. In practice, I cannot how see an absolute guarantee of confidentiality would make them any more forthcoming: I imagine that the decision to use or not use tape recorders is more important (mostly, I used them). More important, I cannot see how it would better protect them from harm. In fact, I believe that it would have the opposite effect: I doubt that researchers can really judge whether anyone will be able to recognize who is behind an "anonymous" quotation. It is better, I think, to assume that they will, and make sure that the interviewee is comfortable with having her words published (in fact, in many cases I received clearance for quotes even though I printed them anonymously).

overall analysis, in other words, is my own, though I have received much input from my informants on its more factual pieces.

Comparative Analysis

This sort of purely qualitative research is able to establish the facts of a case and elucidate or develop concepts that are relevant to it, but it has only limited power to substantiate the causal claim I am making—the claim that ties fail due to the value conflicts that plague them, and that they prosper only when they are nurtured by practitioners expert at managing those conflicts. To lend more support to that claim, I will undertake the sort of comparative analysis described above.

The basic design of this study was to undertake four closely-linked comparisons, one for each type of partnership. The analysis of community partnerships, for example, will ask: What is it that departments with strong police-community partnerships share that other departments lack? More specifically, what does their practice consist of, and how does it differ from the practice evident in other departments that are otherwise similar (or that otherwise seem *more* likely to succeed given what current theory predicts—for example, departments that are otherwise more sophisticated in their administrative systems but that have not shifted their values in relevant ways)? Considerations of space and of my readers' patience prevent me from presenting systematic evidence that bears on all eleven case studies in every type of partnership (though before writing each chapter, I did prepare summaries of how the relevant type of partnership had fared in all cases, in order to identify which might most help me understand the conditions of success). Instead I contrast a limited number of cases that exemplify the points I am trying to make most strongly. The exception is in the chapters on political and interagency partnerships, where I restrict my attention to my own six cases (the other five had little relevant information for these types of ties): In these chapters, I do try to refer to all or most of the cases, describing the variation in their success at the outset and then analyzing the factors that seem to explain it—in

that they were present in more successful cases but absent in others that were otherwise comparable, and in that they entail theoretical mechanisms that the qualitative analysis *can* locate in the cases.

As described above, the leverage that even this sort of comparative analysis provides for making causal claims is incomplete, not least because its *ceteris paribus* clause rarely holds. But some leverage is better than none, and by tying the analysis to existing theory improves matters even more. Nevertheless, I believe that an equal if not more important function of comparing cases lies in the ability to clarify concepts—a task traditionally assigned entirely to the qualitative analysis of individual cases. But by setting cases side-by-side, it becomes possible to identify important aspects of concepts that otherwise disappear into the background. For example, it is very difficult to describe how "participatory" a planning process is in one case. But after looking at those processes in two different cases, it is much easier (though still not uncomplicated) to say which one is *more* participatory. That conclusion, in turn, helps to identify the key factors that define how "participatory" a planning process is. In my own analysis, I have used these sorts of comparisons to help interpret all of my key concepts in different cases—the strength of partnerships, the nature of their value conflicts, and the style of their practice. For example, in discussing the conception of the public interest that officers in Seattle held, it is at first not entirely easy to know whether it should be seen as "deliberative": The officers do try to *some* extent to make their case to the community. But contrasted with the experiences of Lowell and Fremont, where officers went to great lengths in this regard, it becomes clear that Seattle officers held a relatively non-deliberative conception of their duty to uphold the public interest.

Conclusion

These, then, are the data this study is based on and the approach I have used to analyze them. The choice of both was guided by what I see as the distinctive dilemmas of applied science:

By undertaking a qualitative analysis focused on practice, I hope to offer concepts that are sufficiently grounded and controllable to speak directly to the world practitioners experience. By undertaking a theoretically-informed comparative analysis, I hope to offer a convincing argument about which strategies succeed. And by accepting normative questions within a value-critical framework, I hope not to sidestep important problems practitioners face, while at the same time recognizing that these problems may have no unambiguous solution. My reader will have to judge whether I have succeeded on these scores.

CHAPTER 3: COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS

1. The Community as a Partner

Community partnerships occupy a central place in community policing, seen by many as a return to neighborhood governance and a program for direct citizen participation (Kelling 1987). Closer ties with communities are intended to address some of the central problems police have faced in recent years: First, many believe that making police more accountable to community groups will help to boost their flagging legitimacy; through this lens, community policing extends a variety of reforms that began in the 1960s, when police agencies found themselves under attack for bias, insensitivity, and lack of accountability (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy 1990; Fogelson 1977: pp. 296 *ff.*). Second, some believe that by enlisting help from the community, police will improve their effectiveness along a number of dimensions, including crime control, fear reduction, and service provision; indeed in many cities community policing emerges as an answer to the various crises in police effectiveness, since it holds out the prospect of leveraging extensive community coproduction (Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy 1990; Goldstein 1990, 1977).

So because of the potential community partnerships may hold for improving police performance, these relationships have taken center stage in many police agencies' reforms. Whether or not the most dramatic fantasies of collaboration seem either possible or appropriate, the image of police officers meeting with neighborhood residents about some safety problem clearly symbolizes community policing in many cities. It is the success or failure police have at building community partnerships that most informs an evaluation of their overall reforms.

Ambiguities in the Concept of Community Partnerships

In many ways, however, communities are the most diffuse and problematic of police partners, for they do not have the formal or even readily identifiable contours of other public agencies, businesses, or even political leaders. Citizens who work closely with police inevitably identify themselves with some community or other, but it is not clear that the rest of that community identifies itself with them. Of course, the same problem exists even in formal organizations: A few renegades may be the only employees of some city agency who work in collaboration with the police. But in that case it is at least easy to know who to ask whether the collaboration is sanctioned or looked down upon, and who to ask the renegades *about* in order to understand the answers to these questions and their consequences. By contrast, the indefinite status of any given "community" means that it is hard to understand the meaning of collaboration between police and some few individuals.

I have no better solution to these and related problems than any of the other social science studies that have struggled with the meaning of "community" (*e.g.*, Suttles 1972). My approach, imperfect as it is, is simply to define different communities in terms of their institutional manifestations: The block clubs, church groups, and even less formal groups that arise in individual neighborhoods and offer the most ready outlet for any energy from civil society that *would* want to make itself known (As Wesley Skogan and Susan Hartnett report, based on their observations in Chicago, "unorganized individuals found it difficult to sustain even simple problem-solving efforts") (Skogan and Hartnett 1997: 239).[55] At times I question the legitimacy of these claimants to the community title, as in one St. Petersberg example where the racial

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[55]Note that for the most part, when I say "community" I really mean neighborhood, for that is the equation that the policing field itself has written. I did not set out to exclude non-geographic communities, but in practice the vast majority of police effort goes into neighborhood partnerships.

composition of a group of activists is patently unrepresentative of the neighborhood it purports to represent. But I do so rarely, and when I do I make my reasons explicit. The more common questions I ask involve the obvious inequities across neighborhoods in the availability of this infrastructure: This is especially so in section 4, where I explore the implications of partnerships with unrepresentative and particularistic groups—in other words, *all* communities as I have defined them—for the idea that police should serve a broad public interest.

Explaining Success in Community Partnerships

But given my focus on organizational manifestations of "community", the important variation across these departments involves how well they succeeded in building partnerships with the various neighborhood groups that exist in their cities, subject to the constraint that in doing so they should not undermine their aim of advancing the public interest. In this chapter, I will try to explain this variation—and particularly to distinguish a few successful cases from less successful ones that are otherwise comparable—as a function of the ability of each department to internalize four values that turn out to be important to the community. First, successful agencies are able to move beyond the traditional notion of police as "crimefighters" and embrace a broader view of what "safety" entails, accepting not just "hard crime" but also "soft crime" (Reiss 1985) as an important focus for their officers' attention (section 2, "Two Concepts of Safety"). Second, they squarely confront difficult questions about how much authority police should use, recognizing the tradeoffs between liberty and order and defining the goals of policing broadly enough to encompass both values (section 3, "Harassment versus Authority"). Third, they embrace a view of the public interest in which there is an important role for deliberation with those who defend narrower interests; although as public servants they do not abandon their commitment to look beyond particularistic demands, they believe that they have a duty to articulate what they think the public interest entails and both give and accept good reasons that bear on their position (section 4,

"Equity and the Neighborhood Interest"). Finally, effective police recognize the flux inherent in loosely-organized community groups, whose aims are more fickle and variable than in their own bureaucracies; in response, they pursue a strategy of "flexible accommodation," recognizing that maximizing partnerships has more to do with seizing new opportunities than with entrenching existing structures (section 5, "Change and Tenacity").

These conflicts reflect some distinctive characteristics of neighborhood life as they intersect with the police mission. For example, the concern about soft crime—low-level problems like public drinking, harassment, and noise—seems to stem from fact that it is just those sorts of disturbances that most affect an individual's everyday sense of safety (Skogan 1990). Rarer events like homicide and robbery may inflame the common conscience, but they do not arise often enough to play an important role in the perceptions of life in all but the most troubled neighborhoods. Similarly, the conflict between equity and the neighborhood interest derives from the very nature of neighborhood groups, which at best bring forth an idiosyncratic view of what best meets the broader public's needs; at worst they bring forth naked self-interest.

Nevertheless, although in some ways the four conflicts derive from the nature of community groups in general, particular communities exhibit them in different degrees. For example, minority neighborhoods in these cases raise concerns about harassment much more often than their white counterparts, and these concerns can undermine effective partnerships. Such differences in the central value conflicts that arise across neighborhoods mean that more than any other type of partnership (with the possible exception of interagency ties), community partnerships do not succeed or fail as a group even within a single city. A department that institutionalizes the value of soft crime may have strong success among most white neighborhoods. But unless it also demands more parsimonious use of its officers' authority, it may have much less success in minority neighborhoods; indeed, that seems to have happened in both Knoxville, Tennessee and

Albany, New York. It is not clear why this difference across neighborhoods exists: It may be that police in minority neighborhoods are more quick to use authority than those in white neighborhoods, perhaps because crime is higher there, or perhaps because of racism. Or it may be that the same level of authority used in a white neighborhood inflames minority passions more strongly because the history of racial discrimination has made them (understandably) suspicious of police motives. Whatever the explanation, police cannot ignore the prevalence of harassment concerns in these neighborhoods: Those concerns seem to be a major reason why the great majority of these departments still have poor relations and few partnerships with minority groups. The unhappy state of partnerships in minority neighborhoods must stand out as the greatest disappointment in these cases—many of them in some of the nation's most successful examples of community policing. That is not to say that relations did not improve in many cities. But in most the challenge is still outstanding.

I will return to these issues in section three, where I take up the issue of harassment at length. First, however, consider a separate value conflict that arises almost universally in these cases: The conflict over what aspects of "safety" deserve most attention. Where this conflict arises, as it does almost everywhere, police reformers must find a way to make room for both the "hard crime" perspective of their fellow officers and the "soft crime" concerns of the community.

2. Two Concepts of Safety

It is often said that the police and the community make natural partners because both want to improve public safety. But in practice the two sides often have different ideas about what exactly that goal means. Police, for their part, tend to have a professionalized definition of "public safety" centered on serious crime as defined by the criminal law (Manning 1977). (Indeed, when pressed, some may admit that their operating objective is not public safety *per se* but law enforcement; and while in theory that objective advances safety, it is the objective rather than the

goal that motivates their daily work—to the point that they will enforce the law even when it does not advance safety at all.) (Goldstein 1977, 1979; *cf.* Merton 1940). On the other hand, community groups and the average city resident tend to care more about less serious safety problems that arise more frequently and visibly, variously called "soft crime" or "disorder": The rowdy teenagers on their street, the small-time drug dealers they walk past—even the dog that barks incessantly and the cars that don't stop at the stop sign. Moreover, these concerns in turn bleed inseparably into larger issues of quality-of-life: Physical decay, bad street lights, and even the lack of youth recreation. "Like it or not," two prominent policing scholars explain, "the public defines broadly what it thinks of as public order, and holds the police responsible for maintaining order" (Wilson and Kelling 1989: 49). Part of "holding them responsible" involves withdrawing support and cooperation, so that when police want to maintain strong community ties, they often find that they must increase their attention to the disorder problems that they have traditionally seen as distractions.

Partnerships and the Concern for Soft Crime

Robert Grebert, the former Deputy Chief in Albany, encountered the differences between these two views of public safety in the form of surprise—his own surprise at what community groups asked for when his department began to listen to them:

> You're in law enforcement for twenty years and you go and say, "OK, folks, what's the problem in your neighborhood?" In law enforcement, what do you expect to hear? Burglary, robbery, rape, murder. That's not what we were hearing. What we were hearing was, "The kids are out with the boom box all night," and "The dope dealers are on the corner."

As long as police cling to their priorities, they risk irrelevance to the community and threaten to undermine potential partnerships. In Albany, for example, it is not that no community groups *wanted* to form partnerships in the years before community policing, nor that police did not want to have better relationships with the community (the Mayor at the time had begun to cultivate a

relationship with the city's new neighborhood groups, and for many years the police department

maintained substations and permanent foot patrol officers designed to "bring police closer to the

community"). But these abstract affinities foundered when police lacked enthusiasm for the

concrete concerns communities brought them. For example, for community activist Harold Rubin,

a longtime leader in Albany's Center Square Association, *the* concern of neighborhood residents

for a while was parking. But while he tried to talk with police about better enforcement, officers

seemed far from enthusiastic. "Lots of times cops won't do things if they don't want to," Rubin

observes.

> Years and years ago, there was a motorcycle parked on the sidewalk. And so I told the cop about this and said, "There's a motorcycle over here." He turned to me and said, "Are you trying to tell me how to do my job?" . . . He didn't want to write the ticket for the damn thing. . . Police officers do not like to write tickets—that's beneath them.

Officers did attend meetings with Center Square, but only rarely, in response to some serious

crime spree.[56]

Today, by contrast, Center Square has a strong relationship with local foot patrol

officers—precisely, Rubin says, because officers have broadened their interests:

> The program is different now. The community policeman is prepared to deal with everything. . . . [For example,] one of the problems we have in the neighborhood is these cars blocking crosswalks. And you know, first of all, if you're driving, and you want to make a right turn on red, you can't see the cars because the cars are blocking the crosswalk. Or you have the people walking who are handicapped or blind. All of a sudden they come to a corner and there's a car there. [The community police officer] says he agrees with that. And he said when he sees the cars blocking crosswalks, he'll ticket them. Because he realizes the problem of handicapped people trying to cross the street. He's willing to do that—he agrees with that.

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[56] This seems to be a common pattern: Police have long done fine meeting with neighborhood groups after a rash of serious crimes. For example, even in Seattle, where a partnership between police and a Chinatown community development corporation long foundered partly because police did not consider the area's problems serious, the two sides sprung into action after a local arcade became the site of shootings and a stabbing. As I argue below, a crucial difference between this common situation and the less common partnerships that endure involves the willingness of police to turn their attention to less serious problems when crises subside.

Unlike some neighborhoods in Albany, Center Square had its own foot patrol officer with both

beat integrity and a long-term assignment well before community policing took off in the city. But

until the department and city hall began stressing the theme of quality-of-life, valorizing specific

types of order maintenance (loud boomboxes, public drinking, illegal parking, and so on), and

getting at least some officers to take soft crime seriously, viable community partnerships did not

really spring up.[57]

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[57]Albany's experience is hardly unique. Knoxville's Deputy Chief tells us that traffic was *the* most prominent issue community groups raised in his city, and yet he also tells us that officers first took these concerns reluctantly, saying "We know what they really need: We need to be getting the bad guys." In Norfolk's Bay View neighborhood, the Civic League forged a partnership with police on the basis of problems like truancy, minor drug sales, and graffiti—partly, it seems, because some officers had undergone self-confessed transformations into what one calls an "unorthodox" conception of policing: "You have to listen to their problems no matter how small it is," he explains. This partnership forged on the basis of minor matters later turned its attention to the serious drug and violence problem in Bay View's Hillside section. Finally, in Riverside, the tensions between police and city councilors (who in the absence of much neighborhood organizing bring forth citizen concerns) arise largely because police see citizen concerns as "inappropriate"— work that takes them away from real police business. Most officers in Riverside have not become convinced about the value of fighting soft crime, and partnerships have only developed in specific areas where officers have bucked this general trend.

Mismatched priorities do not, of course, always show themselves so clearly. In Chicago, for example, officers in beat 714 (who admit that they have not had success building partnerships) do not openly reject the disorder concerns citizens raise for them. But they see those problems as unwinnable battles, and they do not really see the point of devoting too much of their time to them. For example, one major problem residents raised at a beat meeting concerned petty drug dealing at a local convenience store, and officers did begin stopping suspicious customers as they walked out. But one senses that they did not have their hearts in the work: Casewriter Harvey Simon tells us that one Sergeant "compares these individual arrests to 'trying to drink the ocean dry one sip at a time, you know. Making dime bag pinches just don't make it." Like many police officers, those in 714 would prefer to train their sights on the top of the drug pyramid. One laments: "For the beat officer [as opposed to undercover narcs], it's very hard for you to catch somebody. You're not going to catch the seller. You might catch the person that bought something." Given such prospects, he sees his drug work as "public relations" rather than real policing. It simply does not speak to his sense of what his job is about—arresting the most serious criminal involved in a problem. We do not know for sure that these attitudes of the 714 personnel caused community members to withdraw from potential partnerships—if, for example, the woman who raised the convenience store problem but never returned to the beat meeting did so because sensed the officers' lack of enthusiasm for petty drug work. But what we do know is that in some neighboring beats where residents *did* form a strong bond with police, it was because police grew out of their narrow focus on law enforcement. "They do a lot more than catch [and] kill criminals," one nearby neighborhood leader explains approvingly of the officers she knows. "CAPS [Chicago's community policing program] is . . . all [about] community building. It's not just catching criminals. It's about preventing crime."

It is consequently important to understand *how* Albany and other departments

institutionalized a concern about soft crime, since that seems to be a key factor underlying viable

partnerships. Not all of the cases describe this process explicitly, but in those that do, we see

departments that are able to defuse the competition between the two priorities. Consider two

mechanisms here: First, the appeal to an existing value in order to institutionalize a new one, by

turning the new value into a means for realizing the old one; and second, the creation of

organizational autonomy for the new value so it can exist side-by-side with the old.

Leadership and the Evolution of Police Goals

Albany itself exemplifies the first strategy, in that management drew extensively on the

"Broken Windows" argument (Wilson and Kelling 1982) in training sessions, roll calls, and

mentoring to convince officers that order maintenance *is* crime control. The result is that today,

many Albany police feel that it makes sense to target these low-level offenses in order to get at

their underlying goal of reducing serious crime, and they recite something like the broken windows

argument in support of this view. As explained by Commander William Bowen, who oversaw the

department's training division during the early months of community policing:

> What we tried to do was to show the rank and file, the officers on the lowest level, that it was a
> partnership with the community to make life better [when we were] talking about quality of life
> issues. You know, many times the officer would think . . . "That bag of garbage out on the street on
> a night that it doesn't belong out there, that's not a big deal." And we tried to show them that that
> was a big deal when it came to the overall philosophy of quality of life. That is, if a place looks bad,
> it's going to get bad—the broken window theory and that kind of thing.

Using a somewhat different logic, many officers also argue that enforcing misdemeanor laws can

have a more direct relationship to the control of serious crime, for offenders stopped on minor

violations often turn out to have signs of serious criminality like drugs, concealed weapons, or

outstanding warrants (*cf.* Kelling and Coles 1997). As Tuffey puts it:

> If you go through a red light, they want to stop you and see who you are. They don't have to give
> you a ticket . . . but stop and see why David Thacher is driving through that red light. . . . You're
> there in the front seat and the woman is driving, [but] who's to say that . . . you're not holding a gun

on Mrs. Jones, or you wife, or your girlfriend? . . . . Maybe that's why that woman went through [the light] there. I don't know that until I stop the car. Maybe it's an old person who is disoriented and lost, has Alzheimer's or diabetes or whatever it may well be. These are all the issues that they never [checked] before—it was a no-no.

Finally, one Albany officer argues that by citing people on minor violations, police effectively alert the courts to a potential pattern: If police *fail* to write these citations, a first offense for robbery may look like a forgivable aberration, when in fact it is the culmination of years of unrecorded petty crime.

Albany's efforts have left many officers behind, but they have produced enough like the one in Center Square that community partners can now find willing ears—a huge accomplishment in a department where officers once faced outright censure for bringing minor arrests into the station. It was possible because managers like Bowen and Tuffey—drawing on one of the field's new ideas in good currency—were able to appeal to an existing value to institutionalize the new one: When "disorder maintenance" is defined as a way to look for guns and fugitives, many police accept it readily.[58] Some Albany officials stretch the notion, as when one argued that it is important to take calls for bike thefts because a murderer might steal a bike to get away; and we will see below that appeals that reinforce the aggressive side of policing can run afoul of other community values, so that Albany's success building community partnerships is not complete. But whatever the merits of this equation between hard crime and soft crime, it was rhetorically effective for Albany's cultural change. By framing the police role with help from the broken

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[58] Growing concern about drugs has also probably contributed to the convergence of police and community priorities: While many police still rank street-level drug dealing low on their list of priorities, the nation's broadly intolerant attitude towards drugs probably had some effect on that ranking. There is, of course, a corollary to this development, evident in places like Seattle's Chinatown, where the fact that drugs were *not* a serious issue (public intoxication, prostitution, and theft were) led some police to downplay the area's problems and hold back from a partnership with the local community.

windows metaphor, police managers could pay heed to one dimension of the tension between police and community concerns.

The Schizophrenic Organization

Broken Windows synthesizes police and community values in the minds of individual officers, each of whom comes to look at the police role in a way that is responsive to both sets of priorities. It is a strategy used to win an entire organization over to a concern for disorder. But many agencies have found that wholesale organizational change in this area is difficult, and they at least begin their community policing efforts by taking the easier route of creating special units— institutionalizing the new value in a separate organizational structure, as Selznick recommends for so-called "precarious" values. These units partly insulate their officers from pressures to conform to the old norms—evaluations based on arrests, camaraderie based on stories of "hot chases," a workload generated through emergency calls—, leaving them free to pursue the new ones without distraction. This strategy is probably the most common way to give soft crime a place in the police workload, and practically every department used it (for example, Norfolk's PACE officers, St. Petersberg's CPOs, and Lowell's precinct officers all played leading roles in the partnerships these cases describe). In effect, these police departments pursue competing values by becoming schizophrenic (in its layman's sense of "split personality")—allowing the two sets of values to stand side-by-side rather than synthesizing them.[59]

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[59] One Portland manager suggests the nature of this schizophrenia as he laments the passing of his precinct drug unit, which fell victim to budget cuts and sent its low-level drug workload to the central drug unit. "Traditionally the way it has worked is DVD [Drugs and Vice Division] handles mid and upper level drug dealers. They're the Miami Vice folk. And the precinct drug unit basically did rock houses and street level dealers. So their missions were apples and oranges. And now it's been combined to one." He then suggests what may happen when the precinct drug unit is gone, and in the process gives a more concrete sense about the differences in mission between the two units: "My opinion is that the guys that do the big cases

(footnote continued on next page)

That strategy turns the organization as a whole into a fox, but it leaves individual officers in the role of the hedgehog, which may be why intraorganizational conflict broke out in every case that used it (*cf.* Lawrence and Lorsch 1986). In St. Petersberg, for example, many patrol officers resented the new CPO unit bitterly, saying that "they [patrol officers] are out there having to handle calls, [and] all of a sudden 43 [sic] people were taken out of the loop to just go out there and run amok." And a Seattle officer points out that his agency's decision to remove five officers per precinct from the patrol force to create special community policing teams had the effect of reducing community policing among other officers: "These guys that are handling an area can no longer do the kind of police work that's necessary to keep an area clean, that is, be there, out of their cars, going into businesses, talking to people, getting to know the people in the community. . . . Because they're going from call to call to call to call." It is possible to sidestep these problems in part by adding new staff entirely, so that the new "disorder units" do not take away from emergency response. But the experience of Lowell, which carried out this idea with a vengeance (it expanded staffing by about 50% over four years to open new neighborhood units focused on disorder), suggests that even here conflict ensues: Tensions flared up between the neighborhood units and the older cruiser force, still focused on emergency response.

Partnerships and Institutional Change

These two strategies, each with their characteristic weaknesses, have nevertheless helped these departments institutionalize a concern for disorder, and thereby pave the way for better partnerships with communities that value soft crime more than police did. What they have in

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downtown are not gonna want to spend three or four hours searching garbage in a basement of the house for rock crumbs, which our guys did routinely here, because that was their job."

common is that both expand the range of police values: They seek to rescue concern for order

maintenance from its traditionally subordinate place in the mix of police priorities, even though the

new emphasis on soft crime comes at the expense (though few police admit it) of hard crime.[60] It

is in this sense that being responsive to the community demands fundamental institutional

change—a change in *which* values the police will advance. Whether or not this particular change

is appropriate is a question we must bequeath to each of the cities that face it. But it is important

to recognize that it *is* a question—that the development of partnerships is intimately tied to a shift

in the police mission. In answering it, it is also important to remember that part of the critique of

policing that *led* to partnerships touched on the growing isolation of police from a clear sense

about what outputs their constituencies valued: The burden of proof for the community position

should not be greater than for the police.

Moreover, institutionalizing this new concern meant not simply a different mandate but a

more complicated one, one that puts a value on multiple goals that potentially compete with each

other (none of these departments *abandoned* their concern for hard crime). This evolution runs

against the grain of many organizational processes, which seek to create, as Selznick put it, "a

unified pattern of response." But it may represent the fate of many public agencies beset by the

demands of diverse constituencies, especially as ideals like partnerships and responsiveness gain

more ground and make outside values more salient. Under those conditions, the ability to manage

the competition among values in a way that keeps each of them alive becomes crucial. In these

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[60] If there is any doubt of that, consider the strategies these departments used to emphasize soft crime: Some beefed-up foot patrol units charged with protecting quality-of-life by taking officers away from other assignments; some told their officers to spend time looking into soft crime even if it took them "out of service" for a potential hot call; and some stopped paying so much attention to felony arrests as a measure of their officers' productivity. The tradeoff potentially holds only in the short-term, but it is still contentious for many police.

agencies, that challenge was one that bore directly on managerial practice. In the most effective

agencies, strategies like the use of the synthetic metaphor of "broken windows," as well as the

cultivation of organizational schizophrenia, proved at least tolerably capable of managing the

tension that resulted.

3. Harassment and Authority

The broken windows thesis calls for a more lavish use of police authority, arguing that

police should intervene in less legally-serious transgressions in order to head off more serious

crime. It thereby has the potential to exacerbate a tension, always present in policing, between the

exercise of authority (often approved or even demanded by the community) and the desires of the

community to be left alone (sometimes expressed by the very same community members who ask

for stronger enforcement). Leaving aside the serious issue of police brutality,[61] this tension arises

in the most generically unobjectionable policing. James Q. Wilson described it clearly some

twenty-five years ago, in an essay on police-community relations that focused especially on

distrust in the black community: "The harder the police try to catch criminals, the more likely they

are to rub the raw sores of community discontent," Wilson wrote.

> There are very few strategies by which the police can reduce crime rates . . . but such strategies as
> they have require them to place a community under close surveillance and thus to multiply the
> occasions on which citizens are likely to be stopped, questioned, or observed. Inevitably, the great
> majority of the persons stopped will be innocent of any wrongdoing; inevitably, many of these
> innocent persons will believe the police are "harassing" them; inevitably, innocent blacks will
> believe that they are being "harassed" because of their race. Thus, if the law-abiding majority in a
> black community demand "more police protection," they are likely to be calling for police activity
> that will increase the frequency of real or perceived police abuses. If, on the other hand, they
> demand an end to "police harassment," they are likely to be ending police practices that have some
> (no one knows how much) crime prevention value (Wilson 1972: 63-64).

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[61] It may be that appeals to "zero tolerance" tactics resonate not only with admirable police proclivities to
maintain order uniformly and without unjustified exception, but that they also resonate with a dangerous
proclivity to let authority know no limits. These cases provide no evidence on this important question.

Or as an Albany manager saw it:

> Pretty regularly [we'll put] intensive manpower on one single corner, or one single block—sort of sweep that area for a few hours. . . . And you go to a neighborhood meeting and you tell them that you are going to do it, it's all "Rah, rah!" until a few of them have gotten tickets for not having their seat belt on. . . . . And I always tell them whenever we move from one block or one neighborhood to another, that some of the problem people are friends, maybe relatives. So be prepared. You know, justice is blind: We are going to come in and identify the problems and eliminate them. But they are likely to be closer to home than you think.

Community policing holds out the hope of resolving this tension by strengthening police

legitimacy through the use of partnerships—trying to generate community support for enforcement

before it happens, as this Albany manager does. But if the tension itself interferes with

partnership-building—police, after all, face serious distrust in many communities that feel they

have been harassed—, they must confront the issue of "harassment" as *part of*, rather than instead

of, the development of partnerships. Unfortunately, none of these cases describes any unequivocal

successes dealing with this difficult issue, and in fact none even describes a large and systematic

effort to face it. But most of these cases suggest the nature of the problem, and a few describe

some promising strategies that individual practitioners have devised to handle it.

Partnerships and the Charge of Harassment

Knoxville gives one particularly clear example of how perceptions of harassment can limit

an otherwise innovative effort to develop community partnerships. The department's most visible

attempt at community outreach came to fruition late in 1994, when the KPD undertook its first

community-wide planning session to produce a "crime control plan" for the city, in which police

and residents would jointly identify several public safety goals for the city and carry out specific

initiatives to accomplish them. In the process, the department hoped to drum up community

support and activity, and in the process it planned to create a Community Advisory Committee

(CAC) made up of some of the most active members of the planning sessions.

The process achieved many of these goals, turning out hundreds of community participants for the now-annual planning sessions, as well as a steady group of about three dozen who attend monthly CAC meetings. But these efforts have faced difficulty expanding their small base of participation among blacks, despite extensive efforts by CAC leaders to reach out to the city's predominantly-black public housing developments and other minority neighborhoods. As CAC chairperson Rhonda Garren explains:

> [We have] had a struggle trying to get members of the black community involved. The first year I know we had some people involved, [but] they quit going. . . . I would call them and say, "Why aren't you coming?" [And it turned out that] they were afraid because they were seen as snitches. In fact, one of the gentlemen, [a prominent member of the black community], came the first year for a couple of months. And then he said that he had to quit because he was having people call him a snitch, and it became dangerous—he had small children at home and it became dangerous for him. And we have one gentleman that has been actively involved, and he does a wonderful job. But a few months ago we were doing something where I asked him to talk to the media about something. And he said, "I can't. I'll go to the meetings, but I can't be on TV because somebody will come and mess my house up or hurt me."

Many of the cases described similar dynamics, suggesting that some minority residents *might* have participated in partnerships but for fear that neighbors might view them as snitches (St. Petersberg, Chicago, and Riverside are all examples). The question in all cases is why those residents in the background, exerting pressure on those who might step out, themselves harbor such suspicion of the police. Surely the bald threats of retaliation that Garren describes come from the criminal element itself. But even more upstanding members of the community sometimes look askance at those who would work closely with police, exerting subtle pressure against their cooperation. Consequently, widespread challenges building partnerships among blacks likely have as much to do with quite general issues of police-community relations as they do with the specific interactions between police and individual would-be partners.

It is always difficult to understand these complex dynamics, but in Knoxville there is good reason to believe that the issue of "harassment" lies behind the deep distrust that divides police from much of the city's black community. First of all, the city has recently experienced no less

than three high-profile incidents in which black men died at the hands of police, creating a reaction from the black community in which many accused the police of overusing their authority. For example, in the fall of 1997, two days before my site visit to Knoxville, police shot a black man named Juan Lorenzo Daniels who had threatened to kill himself, and the incident became a *cause célèbre* in the city, turning out some 350 residents to a city council meeting to protest police actions. According to the KPD, the two hostage negotiators who responded to the call spoke with the man for over an hour but opened fire when he lunged at them with a hunting knife. Particularly controversial was the fact that officers reportedly fired four rounds each at the man's chest, a barrage that some community members found excessive. Calls to understand and change the police policy on use of force and to hold police more accountable through a civilian review board became widespread.

Moreover, these incidents arose in the context of more general feelings that police overused their authority: While the incidents may have exacerbated police-community tensions, they did not create them. As one KPD manager puts it:

> The basis for the problem is what's been out there emerging and bubbling: That is traffic stops that are not supported by reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Disrespect for people. Discourteous behavior by officers. Lack of accountability by the first line supervisors, and this thing called professionalism. I mean those are the real issues. If we took care of those four issues, we wouldn't be here today talking about a shooting where a mentally deranged person is going to try to kill a policeman, or make a policeman kill him—however it comes out.

Particularly in Knoxville's public housing developments, many residents believe that police do not treat them fairly—that they are more likely to stop them than whites, that they do not treat them respectfully when they do stop them, and that they may even use excessive force. Police themselves in these areas deny that they break the law or abuse their authority, but some admit that they "walk that fine line": Feeling that many community members will not respect their authority unless they exercise it, they will not, as one put it, "go out of their way to be nice;" and they will not hesitate to stop a suspicious person, press an ambiguous answer, or pry into an unclear

situation. This suspicious attitude is palpable to many community members, who believe their privacy is being violated and their rights ignored. Unfortunately, the backlash from incidents like the Daniels shooting only puts the police on edge further and strengthens their conviction that they must act firmly. Trust begins to spiral downward.

Knoxville's Chief is not one to deny the problems that his department, in common with so many, confronts in this regard, and he and the city's Mayor recently acceded to community demands for a civilian review board in order to help build trust that police would exercise their authority properly. How these upcoming changes will affect police-community partnerships remains to be seen. In the meantime, a recent survey confirmed that Knoxville's black community believes that police treat blacks poorly (Lyons and Scheb 1998).

Dealing with the Charge of Harassment

Riverside has faced many of these problems as well, but it did make some headway with them in the predominantly-Latino Casa Blanca neighborhood, which had historically raised the loudest concerns about police harassment in the city. Part of the problem in Casa Blanca was an entrenched history of conflict in which both the police and the community felt aggrieved, creating the same spiral of distrust that took hold of Knoxville. Then-Lieutenant Jerry Carroll experienced this sense first-hand, and he concluded that the only solution was to "wipe the slate clean."

> I went out to the community action group as area commander—a new Lieutenant Area Commander. I sat down with the community and many wanted to point fingers at the police department over several previous incidents. And it was an issue of, "Who drew first blood?" For every incident they brought up—every allegation of police misconduct—, I brought two up where our officers were rocked and bottled and shot at. It was clear to me we needed to wipe the slate clean. I finally said, "Look. We need to start from the beginning here."

On the police side, many of Carroll's own officers (if not officers in other units) were willing to make this clean break—indeed, some had been assigned there precisely for their ability to "see things in a fresh light." But on the community side, Carroll felt that many activists in Casa Blanca were not as willing to let bygones be bygones. "There was kind of an 'old guard' out there that

were what I would call activists in a negative way," Carroll remembers, going on to explain that this old guard was always ready to criticize police actions.

Carroll's response was partly to connect to new groups within the community, such as senior citizens and, in particular, a group of residents who had contact with local community institutions (such as a community center and the Catholic Church). These residents, unlike the "old guard," seemed willing to work with the police, and they were thankful for Carroll's willingness to address not just crime problems but also quality-of-life concerns. "We connected with a younger group—kind of an up-and-coming group," he explains. "They were in their thirties and early forties, a new group of leaders." Indeed, Carroll and his officers actively tried to encourage this leadership to play a more central role in community affairs, taking on something of an organizer's role as they tried to build leadership capacity in the new group that was emerging.[62]

But Riverside did not entirely bypass the "old guard" and its concerns, and even among the younger activists it faced concerns about harassment squarely. For example, the RPD's traditional response to crime waves in the neighborhood had been to crack down on even the most minor forms of lawbreaking in an effort to re-establish order and arrest those involved in wrongdoing. But Carroll recognized that this strategy alienated the community: "We could not handle that particular area by going in and using zero tolerance," he explains. "It had to done from the inside out." The change in tactics did seem to register with residents, for on occasions when *other*

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[62] Police can usually bypass their problems in this way: "The community" is a complex thing with many subgroups who harbor different values, and police can usually find someone who supports their current worldview. But the results can be patently unfair or even counterproductive: For example, Norfolk's East Norview neighborhood developed a partnership based on stronger enforcement and citizen patrols, but the residents who participated were almost entirely white, even though 95% of neighborhood residents were black. And in St. Petersberg, police developed a strong partnership with one Round Lake neighborhood group based on stronger enforcement—again including citizen patrols—, but in the process they alienated a second community group, which felt that these tactics inflamed racial tensions. Thus the failure to address

(footnote continued on next page)

officers outside Carroll's team had to patrol the neighborhood, complaints about harassment returned.

Moreover, Riverside's Chief at the time, Ken Fortier, developed great credibility even with Casa Blanca's "old guard" by taking their concerns about excessive force seriously. Part of this effort centered on an exhaustive (and for most officers, immensely unpopular) revision of internal affairs and citizen complaint policies and procedures. But part of it involved a more general sensitivity to the interminable "high-profile" incidents that the department faced. For example, in late Spring of 1993, officers became embroiled in a minor riot after pulling over a car that matched the description of one that had been used in a robbery: Residents allegedly tried to interfere with officers as they arrested two men in the car, and officers used their batons and a police dog to bring the crowd under control. When residents complained that police had overreacted, used unnecessary force, and provoked the crowd by behaving unprofessionally, Fortier called for an internal review of the incident. With the results of the investigation in, the Chief insisted that the officers had not used unnecessary force, maintaining that "there is nothing at all right with interfering with an officer who is trying to make a lawful arrest." But the Chief promised to review the department's policy on the use of police dogs, and he disciplined an officer who was found to have made a vulgar remark to the crowd. Although some residents were disappointed with the finding, many apparently felt that they had at least gotten a fair hearing. "I think that they're trying," one local community member told reporters in response to questions about the incident. "There's definitely been a change since Ken Fortier's been here and I think that's been appreciated" (Ogul 1993a). In any case, the incident did not seem to seriously damage

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perceptions of harassment directly contributed to conflict within the community, and it ultimately undermined police-community relationships in the area.

police-community relations, which a few months later were publicly hailed as the best that either side could remember (Ogul 1993b). And one long-time Riverside resident who grew up in the neighborhood explains that although he personally did not always see eye-to-eye with Fortier, many in the community respected the Chief:

> In the Casablanca area he was well respected, because he filled in the gap that has been like a void. The community at large did not feel that they were being listened to before him. And he went out to the community and heard them. . . . There were a few killings over there by the police department— they called that self-defense, of course, but we call it killings any time a person dies. But he went out there and he tried to justify, in person, how the police department runs and what are the criteria [for use of force]. And maybe the explanation wasn't accepted, but at least he tried. With that he received the respect. But he was open to listening to both sides.

All of these efforts created backlash within the police department: There were criticisms of Carroll's group for cozying up to the enemy; there was widespread dislike for the department-wide elimination of "crackdowns;" and Fortier in particular came under fire for treating the "threat" in Casa Blanca so cavalierly. All of these difficulties raise questions about how sustainable the Casa Blanca partnerships will be, particularly in the wake of Chief Fortier's nearly forced departure from Riverside. But within one subset of the department, and for some period of time, a severe presumption of mistrust for the police department subsided in this community, and police and citizens were able to work successfully on a wide variety of joint efforts. It is hard to find a more successful account of dealing with serious concerns of police harassment in these cases.

This accomplishment, limited though it is, seems to have to do with the direct way Fortier and Carroll addressed the substance of the harassment complaints. There is much talk in many police departments who face serious distrust about *physically* getting closer to the community through foot patrol and substations, of following through on one's word, and finding new opportunities off the street to interact with the "good" members of the community—whether in

meetings or in community service activities like athletic leagues.[63] All are clearly laudable goals

that appeal to other important community values that I discuss elsewhere. But in communities

where the harassment issue is foremost, something more is necessary.

What distinguishes Riverside's efforts in Casa Blanca is that police management

addressed the question of economy in the use of authority directly—despite the fact that doing so

had real implications for the strategies police could use to cut crime. Fortier made serious,

extensive, and substantive revisions to the way internal affairs operated; he and Carroll eliminated

the particularly inflammatory tactic of "crackdowns"; and the Chief revisited other substantive

policies about the use of authority, such as when police may use their police dogs for crowd

control, under what conditions police should engage in vehicle pursuits, and what steps they

needed to go through to execute search warrants. Many Riverside officers feel these revisions

went too far, particularly in the area of citizen complaints, where they believe that heightened

scrutiny of their actions has led them simply to withdraw from much community interaction

altogether. "In this type of business, we do generate a lot of complaints—you know, unfounded

complaints," one community policing officer explains. "People do not like being told to shut your

party down, keep your dog quiet, keep your kids off the neighbor's lawn. So we generate

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[63] Albany's new police leadership, for example, faced entrenched mistrust in the black community, which had long complained that police harassed its members. But its major explicit strategy focused not on the harassment issue itself but on opening a substation in a largely-black neighborhood in order "to bring police closer to the community." As a vocal political minority pointed out at the time, this decision sidestepped the central complaint in these neighborhoods; moreover, Albany had maintained a similar station ten years earlier but had still faced serious mistrust in these neighborhoods, and it certainly had not been able to develop real partnerships in them (just as it had not been able to develop partnerships in places like Center Square, where disorder rather than harassment was the central issue). Some of Albany's dissident politicians called on the department to enroll officers who patrolled black neighborhoods in cultural sensitivity training, but city leaders balked. Albany is far from alone in seeking indirect solutions to the problem of harassment. For example, in St. Petersberg and Chicago—where police-minority group partnerships are also less than ideal— we hear of efforts by individual police officers to show a kinder side of policing by performing acts of charity and community service. But we do not hear of any effort to regulate the use of police authority itself.

complaints. And at one time, if we got a complaint, it would just about be found as a founded complaint no matter what we did." The result, the officer continues, was that officers sought to avoid proactive assignments, and those who took them sometimes did so halfheartedly. In this interpretation, the reforms succeeded in reducing the perception of harassment, but at some cost to proactive enforcement.

But the reality of conflicting values is such that things could not be otherwise: In order to build trust with communities where the issue of harassment is foremost, police must address the source of those concerns in their policies on how freely they will use authority—whether or not they will use "crackdowns," what principles should guide the use of field interrogation, when physical force can be used, and so on. The hedgehog becomes so fixated on the cost of these changes that he sometimes cannot even *see* their importance to the community, looking instead to tangential issues like ministations or beat integrity to sidestep the conflict. Expanding his perspective is clearly difficult, as attested to by the serious backlash against these changes in Riverside, as well as the failure of other departments (like Knoxville) to convince their officers to break the spiral of distrust and moderate their attitudes about using authority. What distinguishes the Riverside managers was their ability to broaden their perspective beyond the need for police authority to control crime and to convince a crucial subset of officers to "wipe the slate clean" and do the same. It is this shift that allowed the Casa Blanca officers to speak directly to concerns about harassment, paving the way for what may have been the first police-community partnership that neighborhood had seen.

The choices departments like Riverside face are clearly difficult and serious; as Wilson puts it: "Even under the best of circumstances, . . . there are limits to how much can be done. There is a fundamental, and to a degree inescapable, conflict between strategies designed to cut street crime (saturation patrols, close surveillance) and those designed to minimize tensions (avoid

'street stops,' reduce surveillance, ignore youth groups)" (Wilson 1972: 89-90). The question, in an era of renewed emphasis community partnerships and community relations, is whether existing policies and practices strike the right balance—at least until we have better ways of being proactive that do not inflame community tensions. Wilson's call is still worth heeding:

> Much attention will have to be given to the costs and benefits of various police methods, such as routine "street stops" to question suspicious pedestrians and drivers. There is no doubt that many of those stopped resent it, though some of the resentment may result from the manner in which it is done rather than the fact of its being done. There is also no doubt that the police find fugitives or contraband by this method. . . . The issue thus becomes one of balancing the gains to law enforcement against the costs to community relations. If, as likely, some stops under some circumstances are judged to be proper and worthwhile, then a good deal of attention should be given to defining those circumstances and training officers to carry out those stops with civility (Wilson 1985: 113-114).

That none of these departments have taken on this challenge in a sustained way—for example, engaging in a long-term dialogue with the community about policies on the use of force or field interrogations—is a source for some concern, and it also may explain why none of them have had unequivocal success developing partnerships in their minority neighborhoods, where these concerns are often in the forefront. Doing so will likely become more important as zero tolerance tactics diffuse throughout the country: All else being equal, more liberal use of police authority— citing people who play their boomboxes too loudly, ticketing drivers who flout traffic rules, breaking up groups that residents complain about—will require more sensitive ways of *using* that authority if police-community tensions are not to be inflamed (*cf.* Kelling 1996: 17 *ff.*).

4. Equity and the Neighborhood Interest

In some ways more fundamental than the tensions among competing views of public safety, and about when the use of authority becomes overuse, is a tension regarding whose interests the police will respond to. Police departments, as public agencies, derive their legitimacy in part from the idea that they serve not narrow private interests but broader public ones. In keeping with this self-image, they resist demands from the "vocal group" that drowns out others,

the "squeaky wheel" that demands more grease, and the "chronic pains in the neck" who will not moderate their narrow demands.[64] It is easy blame this problem on "uncivic" groups who *should* tame their demands to suit the police mandate for public service. But these groups do not exist to advance the public interest: They cannot, at least in the first instance, advance anything but what they perceive to be the interests of their members—which not only do not encompass the broader public, but rarely even encompass their own ostensible community (as evidenced by interminable questions about how "representative" different groups are) (*cf.* Peattie 1968). More to the point, they may have good reasons to be bold, fearing that silence leads to neglect. As one Seattle activist put it: "The squeaky wheel syndrome certainly works in the police department. The louder you scream, the more they pay attention to you, and [Chinatown] certainly has not been as vocal about its needs to them than other communities in downtown. . . . I don't know what it would take to make sure SPD [Seattle Police Department] remembered who we were down here."

Choosing Equity over Partnerships

Seattle turns out to be a good example of how the police mandate to advance the public interest—while clearly legitimate and worth preserving—has the potential to undermine partnerships with community groups, which inevitably seek to advance some more narrow interest. That potential became real at the outset of a nationally-sponsored project called the Community Action Project (CAP), which sought to forge a partnership between Seattle police and a community development corporation in Seattle's Chinatown (also called the "International

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[64] These three types of language for this concern appear in Portland, Seattle, and Albany, respectively. The derogatory tone in which particular interests get described reflects, I believe, the deep-seated progressive attitude that government decisions should be made by representatives of the *whole* public (*cf.* Altshuler 1970:78).

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District") in order to improve safety in that area. The community development corporation (called the Seattle Chinatown International District Preservation and Development Authority, or simply PDA) began by lobbying police for better coverage. In part this request simply meant more officers, but it also meant returning a bicycle cop to his old foot beat: The PDA felt that since the officer had taken to his bicycle, he had become *too* mobile—prone to patrol a nearby downtown hotspot called Pioneer Square instead of Chinatown.

Police rejected these demands with such finality that the partnership itself became precarious. Chinatown, they declared, simply did not have as many calls for service as Pioneer Square and other parts of the precinct, and calls were the standard indicator police used to allocate manpower.[65] PDA staff pointed out that whatever the calls showed, a 1992 plan had discovered widespread public perception that Chinatown was unsafe; and perhaps more important, they pointed out that Chinatown's calls for service were likely deflated by the local culture, since many District residents came from countries where they might have to pay fees for police services and where they simply distrusted state authorities.

Beyond this argument about the relative merits of Chinatown's claims and those of the rest of the precinct, police eventually argued that the PDA did not represent everyone in Chinatown. In their view, it sought to advance the interests of developers without regard to the sentiment of residents. Precinct captain Tom Grabicki explains:

> The people that tend to be the most vocal are the people that have their own interests at stake, and often it is a financial interest, and they want to use the police or police resources to affect their financial interest in a positive way. And I am not too sure they are overly concerned with police

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[65] If the point needs to be underlined, this competition for officers did lead to a reallocation of crime: Increased police attention to Pioneer Square led to a series of police sweeps in 1992 and 1993, and many of that area's criminal population apparently moved to Chinatown—to the point, one police Lieutenant admits, that Chinatown's crime statistics jumped markedly.

service delivery to the broader spectrum of the community... I think the narrow slice of the pie will be represented and I think the broader community won't, to be quite frank.[66]

In particular, the District's large population of Asian elderly had no direct connection to the CAP partnership and the PDA, which sought to cultivate a "community of the heart"—Asian-Americans who had a connection to the area but did not necessarily reside there any longer.

Grabicki's own way of handling his concerns was to strike an independent posture: "I constantly have different groups of people trying to make their issue the most important issue in the precinct so that they can get more money in the form of overtime, they can get more officers, get more attention. So I'm doing a constant balancing act and I've got to be careful I don't slight anybody. I've got to be careful I don't give the squeakiest wheel all the oil." But that posture struck PDA staff simply as unconstructive. After an early project meeting, PDA staffer Michael Yee maintained: "His tone certainly was not as cooperative as the other officers that have been attending the last two days. If you had a person like him sitting there, it would bog us down fairly quickly if he didn't have a change in attitude, in his level of cooperation with the thing."

Unfortunately for the partnership, Grabicki's perspective was fairly common within the department: PDA head Sue Taoka, who had previously worked in the Mayor's office, reports, in casewriter John Buntin's words, "that she was used to being 'lectured' by the police department, with the emphasis on what it could not do, rather than having a 'real discussion' about how to solve problems." Grabicki himself claims to have backed-down on his concerns in Chinatown

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[66] These complaints about the PDA apparently circulated widely around the precinct. For example, PDA staffer Michael Yee recalls hearing them from a Lieutenant: "It was probably the second or third month in a row we were talking about it and being critical of the police department for not making the move back [to a foot patrol]. The Police Department kept asking us for why we wanted it and . . . at that meeting Lieutenant Sidney Caldwell [was] kind of getting snippy over the issue and a little heated and at one point she said, 'Well, Michael, I don't know about this, it seems like you're just coming up with this stuff to make Michael Yee's Chinatown here'. . . . She thought I was just saying that for myself as what I wanted and not what the community wanted."

(although others in the SPD did not). But PDA staff never heard that shift, and the tension over whose interests it was pursuing and how they fit into the context of the broader precinct led to paralysis within the partnership, which sometimes found itself blocked by opponents in the police department (for example, at one point a recalcitrant Lieutenant unilaterally transferred two officers who *did* spend time on CAP projects). As a result, all sides report that CAP made no significant accomplishments by 1997, two years after it had begun: As one of the partnership's police *supporters* puts it, "You look back and you say, you've got 10,12, 15 people meeting every other week for 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 months, plus you have one person who is working full-time, which is 1,000 hours or more. Okay, show me what you've accomplished with that time and effort and money, and it wasn't enough to justify our existence quite frankly."

Choosing Partnerships over Equity

Over time Seattle did partly sidestep these conflicts, developing a fruitful relationship among the PDA, Sergeant Michael Meehan, and a two-officer team assigned to CAP that he had assembled. Despite resistance from almost everyone else in the precinct, Meehan and his officers identified with Chinatown's concerns and began to work with the PDA to address them. For example, the two officers helped deal with an arcade overrun by gang members by meeting (along with Yee) with the arcade's owner, securing help from the SPD gang unit, and training the arcade's private security how to deal with gang members; and they helped the PDA carry out a wide-ranging strategy designed to handle concerns about public intoxication, mostly associated with a group of transients who kept a camp under an outlying freeway overpass. In the process, however, they became increasingly isolated from the rest of the precinct, none of whose other officers would join them. More to the point, the three apparently ignored concerns that their attention to Chinatown left other more-deserving neighborhoods slighted, as well as the concerns that the PDA did not adequately represent even Chinatown's opinion. Indeed, when their efforts to

crack down on public intoxication displaced the activity elsewhere, the officers rejected the complaints that ensued: "[The officers] are thinking, we're doing our neighborhood, it's up to you guys to do your neighborhood," Meehan explains. "We can't baby-sit every neighborhood."

In this way, as they solidified their relationship with one community group, these officers abandoned any pretense of directly serving a broader public (even if they implicitly argued that the organization *as a whole* would do so by attending to each city neighborhood piecemeal—a form of the organizational schizophrenia I described above). They thereby express what turns out to be a common sentiment among these departments that have pursued community partnerships. A St. Petersberg officer, for example, admits that his extensive work with community activists to fight drug dealing in the Palmetto Park neighborhood has displaced the problem elsewhere, conceding, "I guess it's a little selfish in a way." And Riverside's new Chief, in order to advance partnerships and leverage scarce departmental resources, has openly retreated from the idea that all neighborhoods will get equal service, explaining: "I have a limited budget and the budget drives our department. I have limited resources. So, what are we going to do? Let's pick the battles that we need to fight, and those battles will be [for] the people and the communities that will step up, hand in hand with the police department." Finally, many departments are forced to ignore the real questions of representation that their partnerships should create, as in Las Vegas's ONE partnership, in which community residents (as opposed to professionals who work in the area) play almost no direct role. To be sure, the elusive ideal of "the public interest" motivates most of these departments to develop coping strategies—for example, Las Vegas sponsors community surveys to get *some* sense of resident opinion in the absence of direct participation; and St. Petersberg tries to handle displacement across neighborhoods by charging CPOs with tracking the movements of dealers they target, asking them to notify the CPO in a dealer's new neighborhood about the change of address. But to some degree, these examples resolve the tension between the value of

equity and partnerships—which, grounded in particular groups, cannot represent all interests—at some expense to equity.

Keeping Both Values in Play

In a world where community demands are obviously skewed—where some communities do not articulate their interests and none articulate the full range of interests in the community they purport to represent—do police inevitably do damage to the notion of equity by forming partnerships with those communities that *do* mobilize? Simplify this classic question of pluralist government in this hypothetical way: In a place with ten communities, is it an improvement or a retrogression when police develop partnerships with five?

Lowell faced a scaled-down version of this question in its Highlands neighborhood, where a well-connected neighborhood group sought to influence the location of a new precinct for the area. These substations played a central role in Lowell's community policing program, providing an anchor in each neighborhood for the substantial number of non-emergency foot patrol officers that the department began hiring to tackle neighborhood problems. When Lowell police sited their first precinct in the Centralville neighborhood, they had free reign in making the decision— "nobody knew what it meant," Chief Ed Davis explains. So although the fire department offered an abandoned fire station on a side street free of charge, Davis was able to convince the city manager to spend $600 a month in rent to put the station on a major thoroughfare, making it more visible and also more central with respect to the neighborhood's worst problems.

But after Centralville proved an enormous success, the department's siting decisions quickly came under widespread public scrutiny, and the department found itself pressured on all sides by different communities. Then-City Manager Robert Johnson explains the post-Centralville dynamics this way:

When [Centralville] opened, it was a matter of weeks—not months or years—I'm talking about a matter of weeks, when you knew of the positive effect and response from the people and from the business community and from the neighborhood groups. So now you get more money, and you can do one more. Who's going to get it? . . . It does become a political problem. And then when you decide who's going to get it, where does it go? Everyone wants it as close to them as they possibly can.

Gone were the halcyon days when Davis had more or less free reign in siting Centralville because "nobody knew what it meant," and Davis became increasingly uneasy with the essentially reactive stance that this type of interaction with the community implied. He summarizes the feeling with an aphorism: "There's a saying in community policing, 'You can teach the bear to dance, but you can't necessarily tell it when to stop.' That was what happened with these community groups." Even beyond the precinct issue, Lowell's Chief simply worried that he had lost any control over the agenda—the dialogue with the community focused exclusively on issues that the groups themselves raised. "We were always reactive. We were always going to a community group to answer for a particular injustice or a particular problem that was observed by that group."

In some cases Davis tried to win back partial control of the agenda and direct it towards broader public issues not by disengaging from the community-initiated dialogue—trying to return to the model of the Centralville decision—, but by engaging it proactively. The Highlands precinct siting is one example, for it became a focus of conflict between the department and a nearby neighborhood group. The problem was simple: The LPD wanted to locate the precinct in the largely Cambodian Lower Highlands neighborhood, and the local Boy's Club had offered the department space in a location that lay at the center of many of the area's problems. But the community group, representing the predominantly-white Cupples Square neighborhood, argued that the new precinct should be located in their neighborhood. Well-connected in local politics, the group brought their concerns to a number of city councilors, and Davis began to feel pressure to change his mind about the location of the site.

Davis felt he was in the right in this case: "This was clearly just a small segment of the community," he maintains, "and it wasn't the Cambodian people who really needed the services. That's where people were actually dying" Davis turned to a local management professor for advice:

> So she said, "Okay, well, it sounds to me like you have to put together a really good presentation that examines that data. So we'll go out and we'll take photos of the two locations and try to sell it to the group. And in addition to that, I think that you have to bring a different constituency to the meeting." So she went out and actively recruited the Cambodian community to appear at this meeting. So here you have this group of two hundred or so white lower-middle class individuals who are pretty politically-savvy. And all of a sudden, fifty or a hundred Cambodian people come in and sit down at the meeting. They don't know what to do. The people at the meeting didn't know how to handle this. And then we walked in and we put on a really good presentation with data and photos of what the two locations looked like.

Going in to the meeting, Davis had taken a hand vote to gauge support for the two sites, and he estimates that three-quarters of those voting preferred the Cupples Square location. But after the presentation—when the department presented crime statistics and other basic information about the two areas—, sentiment had switched, and the group overwhelmingly voted to go with the Boy's Club site. City manager Johnson, who attended the meeting with Davis, still remembers the event with astonishment:

> I don't think I've ever seen a neighborhood group where you expect to go in and get the shit kicked out of you and people throwing rocks at you—and he went in there with such a positive approach, with statistics, and facts and figures, that the people basically said, "He's our expert. He's the leader of this thing. We've got to give him the support." And they did. And that doesn't happen often, when people have a predetermined position. And they definitely had predetermined position going in, no question about it.

Davis insists that he would have sited the precinct where the group wanted (and given the growing political pressure, he might have had no choice): "This wasn't an ego thing. I mean, if the community really wants something, even against my better judgment, I'll do it, because I'm here to serve the community." But by engaging in a serious deliberation on the merits of this particular proposal, and by recruiting an under-represented constituency (thankfully, Davis reports that no one complained that the department had "stacked the vote"), he was able to come to a mutual

agreement with the community, preserving the LPD's commitment to serve a broader public while still maintaining its relationship with a particular group.

Other departments have had similar experiences: For example, Fremont police have not felt that "being responsive to the community" must mean passive acceptance of any demand an organized group makes, nor have they simply rejected these demands. A dramatic example comes from an early C.O.P.P.S. project known around the city as "4250 Central," after the apartment complex that became a citywide *cause célèbre* when a series of fires broke out there in 1994. That complex and several others on in the Central Avenue Corridor had become a growing concern in recent years, and the entire area had shown some signs of decline. Councilmember JoNelle Zager, who also lives in the area, recalls: "Guys would go up and urinate, they'd throw cans of oil over into people's pools, gunshots going off. Just a lot of things like that. And people got to a point where they felt unsafe and they were willing to move their families out of the area." In any case, after the fires, the Glenmoor Homeowner's Association—representing residents from an area that abutted the back side of 4250 Central—brought their concerns to City Council and demanded action (as did the Centerville Coalition, a resident's group whose membership overlapped with Glenmoor).

In response, the city created an interdepartmental Centerville Action Team to spearhead a multifaceted response, from creating a long-term revitalization plan to dealing with the immediate safety con ᴄᴇⁿ ᵗt the complex (including both the fires and the drug activity many felt went on in the area). Initially the FPD's mandate, as per complaints from the community, was to deal with the problem at 4250. But Lieutenant Gus Arroyo, who got assigned to the project and spent several months working on it, soon found that the issue was more complicated than that. As he remembers it,

> The interesting thing is that a lot of the things that were said to be going on at 4250 Central, once we started really looking at it and doing a scan and analysis, turned out not to be there. We were actually being sidetracked by perceptions, assumptions, and unconfirmed information [that] officers

were putting out. Not that officers were trying to deceive, it's just that their perceptions were inaccurate as to what was actually happening. No one had looked into the complaints in depth. In discussions of 4250 Central, officers basically said, "Well, you've got a bunch of people in there, there's a lot of illegal activity, there's a lot of drugs, there's prostitution, there's a lot of illegal aliens (90% of the residents were Hispanic), and they are all uncooperative." That turned out not to be the case. A very small number of residents were found to be involved in drugs, no cases of prostitution were identified, no more than five to ten percent of the residents were a problem, the majority of the residents were very cooperative, as was the resident manager. The property owner, while somewhat eccentric, was also not uncooperative. Many of the problems and people causing problems turned out to have no connection whatsoever to 4250 Central. For some reason people believed, and even insisted, the complex and its residents were the problem, and I'm still not sure why.

Arroyo himself came to this conclusion in conjunction with Housing Department employee May Lee, who he had consulted when he found that there were housing code issues and landlord-tenant problems at 4250. As the two spoke with residents, reviewed police data, and simply spent more and more time in the complex, they began to feel that 4250—though not without its problems—was not entirely to blame for the area's difficulties. In particular, Arroyo spent a long period of time building trust with the residents (many of whom were Mexican immigrants, both legal and illegal), and he eventually began getting their perspective on who was behind the problems. "Eventually, they started pinpointing a very small group of people," Arroyo remembers. "[They were] saying, 'Well, you know, the people in that apartment, and a bunch of people who visit, who don't even live here.'" At the same time, Arroyo's analyses of police data were finding that 4250 was not really a hot spot at all: "In order to put it in perspective, I . . . started looking at data in monthly increments, and then compared it to other apartments of the same size, and you could see that it was really no different than any other apartment of that same size." In particular, the rest of the Central Avenue area—including a number of other apartment complexes and a nearby commercial area—had problems at least as large as 4250 did.

Finally, Arroyo tried to investigate some concerns about the residents themselves. As Arroyo remembers it, many complaints about the building portrayed it as an overstuffed, unsafe place to live. "Some officers were saying, 'Oh, there's nothing but drugs and ten, twenty people living in an apartment.'" He and May Lee decided to investigate that claim themselves:

> We went apartment by apartment and interviewed each person. We found that of the forty-six apartments, forty-four were occupied by family groups: The husband, wife, kids. Sometimes they had in-laws living with them, or other relatives. The remaining two apartments were occupied by adult males—four shared one and five shared the other. Things were not at all like what we were told. So perceptions were just not right. The worst part about it, I think, is that officers fell for those perceptions and responded to complaints and calls for service with preconceptions and failed to analyze or check things out. There was so much talk about the problems at 4250 Central that I believe officers told themselves, "Well, we're getting complaints that these people are doing this, so they must be doing it." By not having done a proper analysis, we perpetuated a false premise.

What was important was that Arroyo confronted some of the community members who were complaining about 4250 with the information he had learned. The Lieutenant remembers one meeting with the Glenmoor group particularly well:

> We said, "Look, the things that you are saying these people are doing, we don't believe they're the ones doing it." And the group says to me, "Well, how do you know this?" I said, "Well, have you ever met any of these people, or talked to them, or walked through the complex?" "No, we're afraid to do that." So I said, "Well, tell you what, why don't you walk through the complex with me and we'll take a look." And they agreed to do that. When they walked through the complex and saw us interacting with residents and talking to the kids who lived there, it was like their whole mind-set changed, and they realized and recognized that maybe they had been putting blame on people who didn't deserve to have it.

Arroyo began bringing that same message to many of the people in government and in the community who had their attention focused on 4250. The complex was not without its problems, and he and Lee worked hard to deal with those through eviction and enforcement. But the data and personal knowledge Arroyo had amassed showed that many other nearby areas deserved at least as much attention, and he and May Lee worked hard to get that message out.

> We had to convince people that 4250 Central was not *the* problem. Because to the Glenmoor homeowner's association 4250 Central was, in fact, a real issue, that perception had to be changed. So it became a matter of doing presentations to different groups and saying to them, "Here's what the data shows, here's what we're seeing when we actually go out there, here's what officers have been saying, here's the calls for service and complaints, and here's what residents are saying. When we overlapped the information and removed what was claimed but had never been confirmed, perceptions began to change, and people were saying, "Well gee, maybe we're wrong." We showed videotape and photographs of the complex and said, "Look, here's a typical apartment, here's the complex, here are some of the residents." They could see the complex was old but well-maintained, residents were pleasant, the kids did typical kid kinds of things. Eventually people began to say, "Hey, maybe we are overreacting and maybe we are laying blame on the wrong group here."

The story illustrates that in some ways, community policing has meant taking a *less* "responsive" posture towards expressed community concerns. Fremont officers had for years

taken neighborhood complaints about 4250 at face value, responding to them with heavy enforcement and saturation patrols. But Arroyo and Lee, by working closely with the residents of the complex—who themselves had *not* been organized—found that the story was more complicated, and they argued that point forcefully against those who thought differently. In the end, backed by a situated analysis of the problem, they were able to reframe the discussion about Central Avenue and redirect police resources to the areas that needed it. Many of the Corridor's problems were temporarily cleaned up within about six months through a combination of law enforcement, physical repairs, and evictions. More to the present point, the FPD was able to maintain its relationship with the Glenmoor group even while disagreeing with its views—not shared by the wider public—about the nature of a central problem it raised.

Partnerships and Public Deliberation

There is no doubt that the PDA, the Lower Highlands Group, or the Fremont homeowners are all "squeaky wheels" with the potential to skew police priorities: The nature of a community organization implies that. The question for police is how to react to them. Seattle evidences two extremes: The department mainstream rejected the squeaky wheel outright, while its community policing minority cooperated with them relatively unequivocally, to the point that outside concerns did not enter. But places like Lowell and Fremont reintroduced the value of serving the public interest into the debates that had started out with a narrower focus on community concerns. These departments engaged their "vocal groups" in a dialogue that transformed their interests rather than subordinating them; they did so by reaching out to absent publics, however imperfectly, and by focusing debate firmly on the question of the public good: Where does this precinct belong? What in truth are this neighborhood's problems? They recognized that they cannot be blindly responsive to community demands, because the police protect important values that individual

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communities will not. But they took this fact as advice about what ideals to inject into the debate, not as advice to break off the debate altogether.

Seattle's mainstream did at first seek to justify its own view of the public interest by comparing call-for-service data across neighborhoods, trying to show that Chinatown's needs simply did not justify the resources the PDA had asked for. But after the PDA pointed out good reasons why those data were inadequate, real inquiry stalled, for no one offered a mutually-acceptable way to gauge need. Whether the case evidences the limits of inquiry or a failure of imagination is an open question, for neither Fremont nor Lowell faced precisely such an intractable disagreement. But the treatment of absent publics reveals a less ambiguous difference: All three cases confronted common problems of representation—the elderly Asian minority absent in the PDA, the unorganized Cambodian population in Lower Highlands, and the Mexican-American population on which Fremont's homeowner association blamed the problems of the Central Avenue corridor. But in Seattle, police stopped after (rightly) pointing out the PDA's problems of representation. They did not, as in Fremont or Lowell, pursue even imperfect ways of gauging the absent public's sentiments. Problems of representation led them to question the legitimacy of the PDA-police partnership, not look for ways to improve it. The result was that they faced a stark tradeoff between equity and their partnership—a tradeoff that Lowell and Fremont were able to mitigate somewhat by instilling public-regarding norms into the partnership itself.

The Lowell and Fremont stories obviously have much in common with the increasingly popular idea of public deliberation as a process that transforms self-regarding, individualistic interests into public-regarding ones (and thereby addresses the conflict between "community" interest and the public interest that motivated this section). John Dewey's discussion of majority rule suggests the relevant affinities, for he argues that it is not the direct representation of every

possible interest that is paramount (even if that ideal is a worthy benchmark to keep in mind), but

the process of inquiry that forming a majority sets in motion:

> Majority rule, just as majority rule, is as foolish as its critics charge it with being. But it is never *merely* majority rule. As a practical politician, Samuel J. Tilden, said a long time ago: 'The means by which a majority comes to be a majority is the more important thing': Antecedent debates, modifications of views to meet the opinions of minorities, the relative satisfaction given the latter by the fact that it has had a chance and that the next time it may be successful in becoming a majority. . . . The essential need, in other words, is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion. That is *the* problem of the public (Dewey 1954: 207-208; *cf.* Cohen 1989; Cohen and Rogers 1992; Elster 1986; and for applications to community policing, Fung 1998).

Thus by improving the methods and conditions of debate, as Chief Davis tried to do in Lowell and

Lieutenant Arroyo tried to do in Fremont, police can uphold the value of serving a broader public

without undermining their partnerships with particular groups.

Nevertheless, at least three differences between the idea of public deliberation and the

Lowell and Fremont stories are worth noting. First of all, deliberation and the power of the better

argument, while important elements in cases like Lowell and Fremont, do not work alone: Both

departments made a real effort to represent absent publics concretely, even to personify them in a

way that makes it difficult to neglect their views. Indeed, while the differences between these

departments and Seattle on the appeal to *reasons* is arguably slight, the differences on how they

handled *absent publics* is large, with Seattle merely hypothesizing about them, Fremont learning

their views and conveying them as an intermediary, and Lowell actually mobilizing them—

concretely confronting the Lower Highlands group with those whose views they have not

considered.

Second, the idea of deliberative democracy is, in keeping with the traditions of political

theory, often (at its most concrete) presented as a question of appropriate institutions—rules of

debate, methods of selecting participants, and so on; the role of the individual is slighted.[67] But it

seems wrong to describe these stories in terms of fixed institutions, for they involve coping with

institutional *failures*, such as the failure of generic police-community meetings to elicit public-

regarding motives. To ensure that their partnerships with particular groups show some

consciousness of broader public views, police must bring a professional sensibility that makes a

firm commitment to the concepts of the common good and the absent public—not necessarily as

given facts but as motivating values. By advancing these ideas in their partnerships, police help

"create" the values that their partners hold, or at least that the partnership will arrive at. The

cultivation of partnerships is thus not purely a question of institutions, at least in the common use

of that term, but a question of professional ethics and practice.[68]

Finally, successful deliberation is not restricted entirely to the abstract level of reasons: In

both the Lowell and Fremont examples, practitioners found agreement only by descending to

particulars. Much of the deliberation literature would accept this point. But sometimes

deliberation is seen as a way to strive for shared agreement on principles (*e.g.* Cohen 1994). There

is an aspect of that type of process in the Lowell story, where the Cupples Square group may have

come to embrace a commitment to the public interest that had previously been weak or absent: In

this sense, public deliberation truly helps to socialize individuals into their role as citizens and to

shift their values. But the two sides may also simply come to view the particular case before them

in new ways; the Fremont example in particular seems to fit with this interpretation. In the end,

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[67] For example, Jürgen Habermas holds that "to the degree that practical reason is implanted in the very forms of communication and institutionalized procedures, it need not be embodied exclusively or even predominantly in the heads of collective or individual actors" (Habermas 1996: 341).

[68] Alternatively, ideas about appropriate practice and ethics in policing can themselves be seen as important "institutions" (Zegans 1992, cited in Moore 1995).

agreement through deliberation probably rests on both of these processes—on deliberation over values *as well as* a less completely-theorized debate over the meaning of particulars.

Whatever its imperfections, the concept of public deliberation can help advance these aspects of policing by offering a metaphor of democratic practice—one that retains a commitment to a broader public interest without foreclosing the role for potential partners, which is something that the older ideal of "juridical democracy" clearly did (Lowi 1979; *cf.* Fogelson 1977). The effective practitioners in these cases have embraced this conception and made it part of the way they understand the world. In doing so they have enabled themselves to pay simultaneous attention to the competing values of equity and the neighborhood interest, and thereby taken on something of the nature of Berlin's fox in this centrally important dimension of value. At the very least, they have the moral humility to believe that their own conclusions need justification in the face of others they do not share, and even those that they are quite certain they should not share.

5. Change and Tenacity

Each of the three conflicts I have considered so far turns on the substance of police and community values and the differences between them. But there is one source of tension that has more to do with the different *forms* police and community value systems take. As formal organizations deriving from a longstanding institutional model, police have a relatively well-defined, constant, and coherent sense of their role. Police certainly differ in some of their priorities, both within and across departments, but in communities that variation is more extreme: Since the are usually far less institutionalized than formal organizations like bureaucracies, they have less rigid aims and even lifespans. They do not all think alike on the issues I have reviewed, even if the general tendencies are as I have described them, so that there is no generic "community" culture even to the same imperfect degree that there is a police culture.

Variations in community positions on the "safety" question can exemplify this idea, for in some of the cases we find activists who would prefer that police stick to serious crime—even if most communities put forward the opposite demand for police. St. Petersberg's Round Lake is a case in point: There the most cooperative community resident did *not* think his beat officer should bother with physical disorder (things like alerting the sanitation department to old sofas left on the street), explaining that such work is "way down on the priority list compared to the things that he has to deal with." (By contrast, in Albany Rubin counted it as a point in the police's favor that they could recently—empowered by a new city ordinance—cite property owners for such problems directly; the sanitation department need not get involved at all.) Moreover, after some moderate declines in Round Lake drug dealing, the local neighborhood association did not want to make a fuss about the activity that remained, worrying especially that high-profile "drug marches" police favored would simply reinforce the perception that their neighborhood was a hotbed for crack. "We have so many investments coming in," one neighborhood leader explains. "We have so many good tenants coming in. These drug marches would hurt us immensely." In this neighborhood where "public safety" is a matter of perceptions and discourse, more attention can mean less "safety" (*cf.* Podolefsky 1983).

It is not simply that different neighborhoods think about these issues in different ways: Many neighborhoods shift their focus over time, as local interests and the conditions they face evolve. Indeed, one way to think about the common problem of fading interest—neighborhoods where groups mobilize to deal with some safety crisis but disband as soon as it subsides—is to understand that the overriding "goals" of these neighborhoods are in flux (whether because previously silent residents become engaged, because the power balance across active residents changes, or because active residents actually change their minds). Unless police have the flexibility to adapt to these changes, they cannot hope to maintain viable community partnerships.

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The Need for Flexible Accommodation in Partnerships

That flexibility describes an important difference between two efforts in Las Vegas: The short-lived "Operation Watchdog" and the longer-term One Neighborhood for Everyone (ONE) effort that followed it. Both efforts focused on recurrent crime problems in the Pennwood/Arville neighborhood, and both began as joint police-community efforts that brought almost identical players together to tackle the neighborhood's difficulties (including code enforcement, property managers, a city councilman, and the police). Both also reportedly did well bringing serious crime under control, using saturation patrols and aggressive investigations to drive out the most troublesome criminals, and using aggressive code enforcement and strict property management as well. The difference came after the major problems subsided: Police in Watchdog apparently saw no role for themselves once the most serious crimes had been stopped, and they withdrew from the neighborhood and their erstwhile partners, with the result that crime quickly crept back in. But under ONE, officers simply switched to what they called "maintenance mode," turning their attention to things like graffiti removal, apartment clean-ups, and activities at the high school. The result was a more sustained partnership that kept the police in touch with the rest of the ONE collaborative, even as its activities diverged from traditional police interests.[69] More broadly, one of the major lessons of the protean ONE partnership is the importance of flexibility: The

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[69] This career also describes places like East Norview and Lowell's Centralville, where police tactics and activities changed when the neighborhoods' preoccupations did. Of course, even for the Norfolk officers, their own self-image as policemen eventually got the better of the partnership, as they lost interest as safety issues got less serious. "It's preventative. It's not reactive," one explains with some disappointment. "You are getting in there and keeping something from happening rather than putting them in jail after it happens. [An officer] can derive a tremendous amount of satisfaction for that. [But] I want to get out there and start dealing with gangsters again. . . . There is not a cop out here that doesn't feel like, you know, this is what I am and who I am when they slap the cuffs on somebody and put them in the patrol car and take them down and book them into jail. I mean, that is certainly a thrill." Another adds: "You can't ask a brain surgeon to do tonsillectomies for the next two years and not expect him to want to do something else." Both officers took new assignments after two years, producing the turnover in personnel that ONE participants saw as the *bete noir* of their partnership.

collaborative consciously let some activities be replaced by others as key positions—and the priorities that filled them—changed hands. For example, when the area elected a new city councilor, the collaborative did not press her to take up all the projects her predecessor had been involved in, and which she seemed "reluctant" to become associated with. Instead, it welcomed her interest in newer proposals like a Police Athletic League. "It's our job . . . to facilitate the elected people's needs," one police Lieutenant explains.

The Practice of Flexible Accomodation

Fremont's police have perhaps perfected this strategy of flexible accommodation. The city's relatively wealthy, low-crime environment does not spark much self-initiated neighborhood activity around public safety issues—not only do residents rarely witness hard crime, as in many cities, but they rarely even come across *soft* crime. Thus police issues come up only intermittently, at the margins of other concerns: To build partnerships with the community and learn about its priorities, the department has had to remain open to even the most tangential possibilities for dialogue. One manager gives this example:

> We had an interesting meeting last week. Claudia [the city's neighborhood organizer] helped organize the meeting, [which] was simply focused on a new sign ordinance for the city of Fremont. So we seized upon the opportunity, since everybody is interested in the sign ordinance: As code enforcement moves through different areas to enforce it, they get a hold of chambers of commerce, business associations, and neighborhoods, and say "We're having a meeting to discuss the issue." And then of course, other issues pop up. Claudia heard some issues that are popping up about loiterers and drunks hanging out in the alleys, and she notified us. So we come in the back door, so to speak, of this meeting just to answer questions. Versus the old way of doing business with the city [where] we'd say, "We're only going to concentrate on this one issue? And that other issue that's law enforcement, talk to the police department." [But] we have their attention for this one issue, why not answer all the questions and work as one cohesive problem-solving group? Because the sign ordinance, and the fact we have loiterers or drunks or drug problems is all dealing with the health of that community. Well, we all sat down and answered some questions about law enforcement. And then they asked a lot of questions about signs, followed up with more questions about law enforcement. But at least we now have a group that's thinking the same way about working together on a multitude of issues versus this one issue.

The important point here is that Fremont police have become exceptionally conscious of how diverse community priorities can be: They recognize that to maximize dialogue, police need to approach the community on *its* terms.

In a related vein, department managers have a keen sense of the way community values vary from place to place. They learned this lesson early on, as the city tried to hold "town hall" meetings for five large areas of the city (areas that only a few decades ago were actually distinct cities). But the meetings attracted little interest because, management concluded, they were called at too high a level of aggregation. One explains:

> For instance, we used to go into Centerville and say, "Listen Centerville, we'll have a big community meeting in a town hall and everybody will show up." Well, unless you really go out and say to the Afghan Women's Association, and the Apartment Renter's Association, and the Villa Home Owner's Association, and the Glenmoor Home Owner's Association, and the Centerville Business Coalition, and about ten or twenty different home owner's associations and maybe another hundred [Neighborhood Watch] groups, and twenty-five CERT groups [Citizen Emergency Response Team groups, organized by the Fire Department], we haven't done our job. Because those are all different focus groups. And unless we bring to the table issues that affect them directly, they don't care. Unless you say that it's going impact their group and get representation from their group, then they, nine times out of ten, won't show up.

Thus to maintain partnerships, police must be sensitive to the nuances of the complex communities they work with, and they must have the flexibility to respond to the varying concerns those diverse groups bring. Criminologists have long pointed out that on the community side, groups should not focus solely on narrowly-defined crime problems, or they will certainly go out of existence once their immediate crises subside (*e.g.* Skogan 1988). A similar principle holds for police, whose partnerships will fall off unless they can recognize and accommodate the varying and changing interests that communities bring them. This flexibility, as much as any of the specific strategies of value-synthesis I have outlined, defines the police practitioner as fox. It is exemplified by the Fremont managers described above, who explicitly recognize that partner missions are complex and dynamic—and therefore that the possibilities for partnerships are always evolving.

Indeed, since partnerships arise at the shifting intersection of institutional values, it is foolhardy to think they will last forever: To maximize partnerships, the most important thing police can do is perhaps *not* to seek to entrench existing structures, but to cultivate the ability to seize new opportunities. This ability, of course, is one important element of leadership: The ability to identify emerging opportunities for action and seize them before they disappear.

6. Conclusion

These four conflicts hardly exhaust the disagreements that can interfere with effective police-community partnerships. For example, some communities have strong feelings about racial diversity on the police force, and for them that issue stands out as a fundamental barrier to collaboration. But reviewing the evidence that these 11 diverse cases provide, I believe that the four conflicts described above capture a large part of the obstacles to police-community cooperation in these cities.

For the police, the fact that *these* four conflicts are so important suggests how the police mandate must change if community partnerships are to become a reality—namely, in the direction of the community position on each of the four pairs of values. Developing community partnerships, in other words, involves striking a new balance among the elements of the police mandate: More attention to soft crime relative to hard crime; more parsimonious and sensitive use of police authority; a deliberative conception of the public interest; and more openness to the flux inherent in working with dynamic communities. In some cases, police also seek to catalyze change in the community; most notably, where equity conflicts with neighborhood interests, police may be able to instill more public-regarding values in the community groups they work with. Either way, what is crucial is to understand what aspects of the relevant organization are relevant to these values and to try to make changes to them. For example, I have argued that parsimony in the use of authority arises in things like the decision to use police crackdowns, criteria for initiating field

interrogations, and (less tangibly) the style in which police use authority. By making changes in these organizational systems, police adjust their aims and practices in ways that may make them more agreeable to community sentiment. It is in this sense that they are engaged in a type of institutional change that closes the gap between their values and those of their partners. In doing so, they make it possible to work in the sort of joint collaboration that partnerships imply—one that makes great demands on mutual agreement about which problems are important and how to tackle them.

Beyond the substance of these four value shifts, it is also interesting to notice their direction: In each case, police move closer to the community's priorities rather than the community moving towards theirs. The idea of public deliberation is a partial exception, since while it does involve a value shift on the part of policing—a change in how police see their duty to protect the public interest—, that shift ultimately influences the community as well, as deliberation transforms neighborhood interests by making them more public-regarding. But relatively speaking, among these eleven cases, those departments that built partnerships successfully tended to be those that internalized community priorities. This fact should become more clear as the discussion turns to business partnerships, where the most striking successes arise from police efforts to change their partner values rather than their own.

Beyond simply shifting their values or those of their partners, the most effective police in these cases also found ways of engaging competing values—in other words, of playing the role of the fox. Indeed, doing so was *part of* institutional change, where the first step usually involved openness to community values, and where success demanded sensitivity to *officer* concerns even as those were challenged. But the temperament of the fox also picked up where institutional change left off. For example, when Lowell and Fremont police felt they could not respond to certain community demands unequivocally—where they could not blindly internalize community

priorities—, they nevertheless felt a duty to take those demands seriously; it is that moral humility

(as well as the focus on particulars in the case of Fremont) that distinguishes their successful and

yet still ethical partnerships from the more problematic case of Seattle. I will return to this point in

the conclusion.

CHAPTER 4: BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS

1. Police Advocacy in Business Partnerships

I have argued that success in community partnerships comes largely from institutional changes in policing—from a reconsideration of the values to which police see themselves as committed. This rethinking of professional commitments is clearly an essential element of building partnerships, for shifts in the values that police hold most dear can open up new regions of overlap—spaces for viable partnerships—between their aims and those of their partners. But there is a danger of seeing the police as ever-changing while their environment remains fixed and given. In fact, these cases show how changing social norms about how *partners* should behave can also open up space for police-community partnerships; at the same time, they show how police can influence these changes. This dynamic plays out repeatedly in partnerships with businesses and property owners, which are especially important as police partners because they can clearly influence safety (Mazerolle, Kadleck, and Roehl 1998).

To be sure, some of the same internal shifts in *police* values enable business partnerships as well: For example, private sector partners often have as much concern about soft crime as the community, and when police give growing attention to the issue, they open up new areas of common ground where business partnerships can prosper. But in these eleven cases, an altogether different value conflict seems to underlie the challenges most business partnerships face, and police manage it not through compromise but through advocacy.

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The conflict itself is straightforward, and it derives from the distinctive aims of private sector institutions (*q.v.* Friedland and Alford 1991). On the one hand, the private sector is committed to individualistic norms that privilege self-interest and profit and downplay social responsibility. On the other hand, the essential ideal of community policing involves some measure of responsibility for crime among community institutions. The conflict, of course, is not always so sharp: For example, the more enlightened property owners believe that taking responsibility for crime simply makes good business sense, since it makes it easier for them to maintain full occupancy and increases the rents they can charge; moreover, many in the affordable housing community are naturally motivated by a larger sense of responsibility for the community's welfare (Keyes 1992). But while police can be thankful when they encounter such attitudes, they must be prepared for more resistance. In many cases, property and business owners believe that *their* duty is to make a profit or simply provide housing at the lowest cost; responsibility for safety—which can be an expensive proposition if it means turning away customers or installing new security measures—befalls the police. Many of these examples suggest that most business partners fall in this category, as in the case of St. Petersberg, where roughly 80% of property owners contacted *en masse* initially balked at cooperating with police. Most important, regardless of how common this attitude is in general, it does seem to underlie most of the hard cases, and those are precisely the ones where police need most help.

The police who meet these challenges do so not by abandoning their own commitment to the responsibilities of community institutions—an ideal that is intimately bound up with the very notion of partnerships—but largely by finding ways to catalyze change in their partners. In the words of one sociologist who examined landlord partnerships in Portland, these police seek to "enforce social responsibility," trying to redress the inaction of many institutions about crime and safety (Williams 1996). They do not outright *impose* their beliefs about how much responsibility

businesses should take for crime: When they try to do that, they may get compliance in the short run, but they undermine any possibility for a long-term partnership; thus the most successful police in this area make some concessions to private sector beliefs about how much responsibility they should take. But compared with community partnerships, business partnerships involve police pulling their partners towards *their* value systems rather than making the journey themselves.

2. Rights vs. Responsibilities

The recent past has seen sweeping changes in how much responsibility—both moral and legal—we assign to these institutions for the safety of their clients.[70] In many of these cases this trend is still unfolding, and police have helped push it along by trying to force responsibility for unsafe environments on institutional partners. The partners, however, push back: They insist that the burden for maintaining safety should fall on the police themselves, and in any case they sometimes do not feel that they have much of a personal stake in how tenants or customers behave, as long as they pay their bills. For example, in St. Petersberg's Palmetto Park Neighborhood, one community resident who became deeply involved in the fight against drug dealing, a man named David Prior, tried to enlist cooperation from the dealers' landlords. But the landlords resisted his

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[70] For example, a book promoting Pasadena's Safe Streets Now! approach—which has cropped up all over the nation as a new crimefighting tool—argues as follows: "In the past, we have relied solely on police, courts, and prisons to stem the business of drugs and the crime and violence associated with them. This approach has not worked. . . . It is time for us to reexamine how we look at the business of drugs. Instead of seeing it only as a criminal problem, we must now step back and look at the business of drugs as a property management problem," going on to quote California state law that dictates "a property owner's responsibility is to use the property in an ordinary and reasonable manner that is conducive to the peace and harmony of the neighborhood" (Wetzel 1992: 14). Portland's Landlord Training guide similarly emphasizes the landlord's responsibility repeatedly, arguing that "in our frustration [with chronic drug dealing], we often only look to the police or the 'system' for solutions and forget that neighbors and landlords have tremendous health over the basic health of a community. To be sure, both city government and police have a critical responsibility, but we as citizens—landlords, tenants, and homeowners—remain the foundation that makes it all work. . . . Each bears a responsibility to keep a community strong" (Campbell 1996).

appeals. "The drug dealers were running wild and the landlord would say, 'Well, yeah, that's a police problem,'" Prior explains. This sentiment was apparently widespread: When police in the neighborhood sent out a batch of letters to the owners of some three dozen problem properties and implored them to make improvements, only one in five even replied.

That response suggests that some owners do cooperate willingly. But it also suggests that most do not think it is their responsibility to handle the sorts of safety complaints that the Round Lake partnership raised.[71] Other cities have had more success: For example, in Portland, where similar letters spell out potential legal consequences in no uncertain terms—while also explaining that police will work with the property to prevent things from reaching that point—, a local DA insists that landlords almost always respond. But that fact simply underscores the point that property owners tend not to cooperate unless coaxed—unless, in other words, police foist responsibility for safety on them, in effect by institutionalizing that value in businesses and landlords. Doing so is a delicate balancing act, for too much coaxing leads to an insincere and unstable partnership. But too little leads to the sort of situation that arose in Round Lake, where

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[71]This reluctance seems to extend far beyond Round Lake: On the other side of St. Petersberg, a police Sergeant who made similar efforts to enlist landlords' cooperation—particularly by getting the ·'o screen their tenants—found that although property owners initially responded positively to his requests, their promises turned out to be "lip service." "They were looking at just making their money [i.e., keeping the rooms rented]," the Sergeant maintains. Similarly, in Norfolk's East Norview neighborhood, Simon tells us: "Nor did the property managers, who worked for the owners, take an interest in cracking down on people who were conducting illicit activities in the buildings; they saw their role as keeping the units filled and collecting the rent." Portland, Seattle, Fremont, Lowell, Albany, and Riverside all report uncooperative property owners who—as a Portland officer puts it—"kind of hem and haw . . . when police make contact with [them] . . . because the money's still coming to them for rent." Finally, the same pattern often holds for businesses, such as the gang-hangout Na Hang restaurant in Seattle, which refused to cooperate with police and community representatives; the local office of a troublesome Motel 6 in Fremont; or the initially reluctant tavern owners in Albany, from which police and University leaders wanted cooperation in dealing with underage drinking. Police and community members eventually won over many of these businesses and apartment complexes. But at first they faced unwilling "partners" who denied their responsibility for public safety—in many cases, it seems, because that responsibility would eat directly into their revenues (screening out potential tenants or hotel guests, or refusing to serve potential customers).

the private sector did not come forth to cooperate at all. Consider three ways in which police sought to institutionalize a sense of responsibility among landlords and businesses: Law, shame, and training.

Forcing Responsibility Through Law

The St. Petersberg story does not end in failure, for Prior refused to accept what he saw as an abdication of duty. "Well, they owned the property," he argues. "Somebody had to be responsible and, damn it, if you owned the property, you should be responsible." That sentiment apparently drove him and some of Round Lake's other politically-savvy residents to lobby successfully for St. Petersberg's "Nuisance Abatement Law" in 1990. That law changed property owners' stakes in safety dramatically, for it allowed the city to appoint a volunteer Nuisance Abatement Board with the power to shut down a business or apartment building for one year if police made more than two drug arrests there. Round Lake later lobbied the state legislature and City Council to expand the law, allowing the city to close properties with a history of prostitution arrests as well.

After the law had been passed, St. Petersberg police found it much easier to get cooperation from landlords. They did not necessarily have to *use* the law: In St. Petersberg as in so many cities, police often found that simply by threatening to use it, or even by simply pointing out that it applied, they could persuade property managers to evict troublesome tenants or make other needed changes. A case in point was the police follow-up to its unsuccessful letter-writing: When that "voluntary" approach to getting owners to take responsibility for their problem properties failed, police began stressing the potential legal liability. "I think the one key was getting with the owners and letting them know that their place was a problem and that we expected them to do something with it or we were going to begin some type of legal action," the Sergeant in charge of the project maintains. "What we found was when the owners were kind of put on notice

and put on the spot . . . they responded. Not all of them but quite a few of them." In any case, by

the end of 1996—two years after the original three-dozen properties had been identified—33 of

them had been renovated or demolished. The overall improvement in safety was so great that

detectives and informants assigned to make drug buys in the area had difficulty finding anything

for sale. "They would drive around for an hour or two and not be able to get anywhere," the

Sergeant insists. "When I was in vice and narcotics, you could go in there and make five or six

buys in the same period of time."

But eventually the same struggle that had hindered more voluntary partnerships re-

emerged in the legal forum to which residents had pushed it:[72] Landlords fought back, contending

that the Nuisance Abatement law was unfair, and they argued this point in court by pointing out

that the Abatement Boards effectively took their property without just compensation, in violation

of the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution. Eventually, a county judge accepted these

arguments when apartment owner William Bowen challenged the closure of his complex, and the

judge ordered St. Petersberg to pay Bowen for lost rent during the year his building was closed.[73]

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[72] Legal institutions were not the only outsiders to weigh in on this dispute between landlords and residents. The local newspaper quickly sided with landlords, decrying a lack of due process and amateurism in the volunteer Abatement Board (e.g., *St. Petersberg Times* 1995), and some members of the public agreed. Political leaders and neighborhood groups, on the other hand, took up the Nuisance Board's cause. The case is thus more than a simple court appeal; it is rather an instance of what E.E. Schattschneider called "the socialization of conflict"—broadening the forum of a disagreement in the hopes that the scales will thereby tip to one's own advantage. Indeed, appeals to values are, in the final, stubborn analysis, irresolvable, and it is precisely the function of these political struggles—mobilizing more and more adherents to the cause—to resolve them. Police can not remain oblivious to the wider political and legal context of their actions, for those who would gain from it always stand ready to mobilize the relevant outsiders. As Schattschneider (1960) puts it: "When a fight starts, watch the crowd."

[73]Specifically, the judge wrote: "If the city of St. Petersburg wants to wage a war on drugs in part by means of this type of temporary taking then the city will be required to pay landowners just compensation." As cited in *City of St. Petersberg v. William A. Bowen*, 675 So. 2d 626 (1996 Fla. App). City appeals of the decision failed: The appellate court adopted the circuit court's ruling in full, and both the state Supreme court and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case. Indeed, the legal issue of whether blocking all economic use of a property amounts to a taking (even if the action is only temporary), and whether government must compensate the owners (even if the closure serves a public purpose) is not an area of dispute; see esp. *Lucas*

The judgment did not invalidate the Abatement Board, but it made its actions enormously expensive for the city. In response, the state legislature passed a law empowering abatement boards to fine properties instead of closing them entirely, and so far that power has not been undermined.

This legal dance reflects a mutual adjustment to the two conflicting values at issue: Property owners' right to use their property to earn a profit, and their responsibility for maintaining safety (a value pressed doggedly by neighborhood residents). Just as the property owners' bald insistence that police alone had the responsibility to keep their developments safe met with stiff resistance, so too the Abatement Board's implicit position that safety took absolute priority—to the point that the owner could be put out of business altogether—proved untenable. In each case the single-minded position of the hedgehog proved untenable for a subject that touched on competing values.

While many advocates in policing, municipal government, and the neighborhoods took the *Bowen* case as a crucial test of their position and expressed alarm at the courts' decisions, more moderate sanctions *have* still proven effective both in St. Peterberg and around the country. For example, even after *Bowen*, police and the Abatement Board were able to negotiate with many property owners to make improvements (such as hiring security guards or screening tenants) without resorting to the last-ditch effort of closing the property—something that many observers argue happened too often in St. Petersberg, so that the city deserved to have the tool taken away.[74]

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v. *South Carolina Coastal Council*, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) and, on the issue of temporary takings, *First English Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles*, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). In any case, the owners of the Round Lake apartment complex on 5th avenue (who the police Sergeant above accused of paying "lip service" to screening their tenants) used the Bowen case to challenge the city's closing of their property, and they too recently won a judgment for lost rent.

[74] Lowell is another city where some felt that local government was overly quick to use its powers of condemnation (in this case through building code enforcement rather than nuisance abatement laws), and it

Some credible threat must, of course, hang in the background, and *Bowen* weakened that threat in St. Petersberg. But less extreme legal sanctions may serve the same motivational purpose, particularly when used sparingly.

The fines now prevalent in Florida are a case in point, and similar penalties have arisen throughout the country, including Portland (which has established fines for several varieties of "Chronic Nuisances"), Norfolk (where police rehabilitated a seldom-used state law that penalizes landlords for renting to drug dealers), and Riverside (which adopted a variant of Pasadena's popular Safe Streets Now! program, allowing residents to sue problem property owners in civil court). Moreover, other agencies have found different types of leverage over uncooperative property owners. Examples include subsidized housing money, which HUD may withdraw from drug-ridden developments (Fremont and Riverside both use this tactic); building code enforcement (used by practically all departments, which have found that drug activity often goes hand-in-hand with deteriorated or illegally-modified structures); and appeal to higher powers who are more sensitive to police concerns (for example, when Fremont faced an uncooperative local Motel 6, it contacted corporate headquarters and found them very helpful; and when Las Vegas officers encountered difficult landlords, they were usually able to work through the larger property management companies that employed them and which were apparently more sensitive about their reputations and therefore willing to accept greater community responsibilities).

In each case, police have used these strategies to shift the institutional background against which business and property owners operate. They have tried and mostly succeeded in using

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too experienced backlash—partly from housing advocates, who argued that innocent families were forced out of apartments for the neighbors' misdeeds—, leading the city to back off somewhat. The other cases, by contrast, report that condemnation is a rare event, though the threat of doing so always lies in the background; and none of them report significant challenges to their legal tools.

higher authority to increase the private sector's responsibility for its social impacts, and as a result

they have made business partnerships more viable: The bleak situation Round Lake faced at first

shows up in none of the places (including Round Lake itself) where these steps have been taken.

In pursing this path, police have had to abandon their grandest desires: Extreme solutions like the

early law in St. Petersberg proved unsustainable. But more graduated expectations have proven

mostly successful and improving cooperation from business and property owners. Indeed, the only

city that had little success enlisting landlords in partnerships was Albany, and there police have not

yet moved forward with ideas to pass legislation that would change the rules governing

responsibility for property. Without institutionalizing such duties in the law, individual officers

report little luck enlisting cooperation from the private sector.

Beyond the Courts: The Use of Shame in Seattle

Law and authority, of course, are only one way society renders its judgments against those

viewed as derelict in their duties and pressures them to change. In the Seattle case, officers and

community members drew on a wider range of influence to bring property owners on board.

Central among these tactics was shame. Early on, the officers used the glare of publicity

to coax liquor store owners to stop selling malt liquor and fortified wines, a practice that many felt

nurtured the chronic public drunkenness problem that plagued Seattle's Chinatown. The strategy

was simple and ostensibly non-threatening: Vendors would be asked to voluntarily sign non-

binding "Good Neighbor Agreements" in public, and these agreements would commit them to stop

selling malt liquor and fortified wines. But the community members and police who pushed the

agreements reportedly understood the important role that shame played in them, as casewriter John

Buntin writes that "the highly public nature of the process was intended to embarrass vendors who

refused to sign or who were tempted to violate their agreement."

Officers used shaming to even greater effect when they faced resistance from the owner of a vacant, overgrown property that served as one of the neighborhood's largest transient camps. Community activists and police had jointly identified the transient camps as being among Chinatown's most serious threats to public safety, insisting that they hosted widespread drug dealing and served as a refuge of petty criminals (a charge police bolstered when they repeatedly recovered stolen property in the camps). But property owner Paul Liao was reportedly "nervous" and "elusive" when police approached him to discuss how he could help abate the problem on his land.

Liao's attitude only changed after police arranged a tour of the area for a neighborhood newspaper reporter. The newspaper soon ran a front-page article on the transient camps, connecting them to what was called a "crime wave" in the area, and the city-wide *Seattle Times* picked up the story shortly thereafter. The bad press put immense pressure on Liao to cooperate, and it had the same effect on a few reluctant city agencies. As Buntin puts it, "suddenly [the officer's] message—let's work on this together so that none of us get embarrassed by this—had a new resonance." Liao quickly complied with police requests trim the site's overgrowth and cut a foot path for officers, and he began making plans to redevelop it.

As it turned out, however, Liao's property was not easy to redevelop: He had tried to do so when he first bought the property, but he had been stymied by environmental regulations that kicked in after the city reclassified the site as an environmentally-protected slide area (this reclassification had occurred shortly after Liao bought the site from the city Housing Authority). One officer explains that this designation made it nearly impossible to develop the site or even take any abatement actions: "He can only work on the foundation stuff during certain times of the year. He can't disrupt the vegetation, root systems and all that, so he can't spray the blackberry. As soon as you get a transient camp in place, cleaning it up now becomes a concern about biohazards.

So now all of a sudden the cost of just sending somebody in to use a weed-whacker and truck out some of the debris has sky-rocketed." The result was that police were not asking anything simple from Liao. They needed his determined cooperation if the site was to be redeveloped.

The danger, of course, was that Liao might not want to make this effort at the urging of officers who had just embarrassed him. This is clearly a generic danger with forcing landowners to cooperate, whether through legal means or through shame: It is one thing to force someone to take some specific, uncomplicated action, but it is quite another to force their earnest cooperation in a long enterprise that will give them many legitimate excuses to throw in the towel. It is therefore not surprising that few of the examples I have cited led to very deep partnerships. These landowners typically conceded to the specific demands police made of them once they were under legal or other sorts of fire. But not surprisingly, none apparently became integral parts of the larger partnerships in the neighborhood.

The Seattle officers, however, always hedged their potentially strong-armed tactics.[75] With respect to the good-neighbor agreements, for example, Doran and Yee apparently tried to center their appeal on community support for the effort, leaving the threat of embarrassment implicit. Buntin explains: "Yee and Doran were careful not to come across as heavy-handed— veiled threats of abatement actions were not their style." And in Liao's case, it is not clear that the property owner *knew* that Doran partly lay behind the newspaper article: It was the press, not the police, who had earned his ire. Indeed, the fact that a third party (the newspaper) played the part

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[75] A similar hedging shows up in many of the strong police-property owner partnerships in these cases. In Fremont, for example, police managers dealing with a troublesome Motel 6 entered the negotiations with the owners by saying, "let's take the fact that we're not going to put the Motel 6 out of business. Now how do we resolve the issue?" Again, the central imperative involves finding a strategy that combines the disparate and competing values at issue: On the one hand, an insistence that property owners must take responsibility for safety; but on the other hand, a recognition that they have a business to run.

of the antagonist may have been crucial in preserving the possibility for a serious partnership between the officers and Liao. This arrangement seems to represent a generic strategy for retaining the possibility of a partnership while retaining the "stick" of shame or other sanctions; it is a strategy where police find someone *else* to play the necessary part of the bulldog.[76]

Equally important, once Liao offered his cooperation, Doran switched roles from adversary to ally, making great efforts to help Liao navigate the environmental bureaucracy, and he personally tried to remove every roadblock that emerged:

> You can't burn it because of the smoke and debris and whatever else. We even talked to city engineers. We even talked about, "Well, if we remove the vegetation in the transient camp, what about the rats? Where do we displace them to?" Okay, so we've got all these rats we're going to displace into the local community. So now how do we deal with those rats? Okay, well if we put out poison—we can't put out poison for this reason or that reason. So every possible solution that you put through you come up will all kinds of obstacles to, and it is very frustrating.

The persistence, however, eventually paid off: Liao got his permit to redevelop the property, and one major piece of the transient camp began to come under control. With similar efforts for the other pieces, the neighborhood eventually rid itself of the most egregious problems those camps had caused.

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[76] It is evident, for example, in Las Vegas, where a city councilor who needed to maintain a good working relationship with an absentee landlord asked a nearby school official to deliver a threat to the property, which had become a problem for the neighborhood. Wayne Tanaka, the school official, explains: "The problem is [the councilor] can't be in a threatening mode with the absentee landlord and he said, 'Wayne, we know who he is, he's in Hawaii, we know you have contacts in Hawaii, can you help us out?' I picked up the phone, da da da, started calling. Pretty soon I've got his attorney talking to me, I've got him talking to me and I'm telling him, 'If you're not cooperating with us we're going to make it bad, we're going to put heat.' Now, he can't go after Councilman McDonald and say, 'Hey, you put a bulldog on me.' He's talking to a school guy, I have nothing to do with McDonald. But in the collaboration you better believe I can put heat on that guy." This strategy like the others I have reviewed reveals a fox-like pursuit of competing values: The benefits of an amicable relationship, but also the conflicting benefits of coercion. It is the classic good-cop, bad-cop arrangement, one that rests on duplicity and the differentiation of a role; it enlists the practical but not the moral skills of the fox.

This success clearly relied on the partnership police developed with Liao, and that in turn relied on the fox-like ability of the officers involved to press their own concerns without ignoring those of the property owner: First, they were able to strike a balance between the business owner's interests and his responsibilities, using a non-confrontational style in general and offering him assistance that helped balance the demands they made on him. Second, they were able to enlist a third party (the newspaper) to wield the tactic of shame, which almost inevitably alienates its target; they thereby preserved the possibility of a partnership within an inherently coercive situation. Each of these strategies requires finding sources of social pressure that the would-be partner *will* take into account. But it also involves tending to the potential backlash against this pressure—whether by calibrating its use carefully, or by finding a fuse that can intercept it (as with the strategy of finding a bulldog).

Socializing Partners through Training: The Scope and Limits of Persuasion

The potential for heavy-handed tactics to backfire may make them a last if often necessary resort. Many departments have found subtler ways to coax landlords and business owners to take on new responsibilities, particularly the use of so-called "training" programs that school landlords and other business partners in the sorts of responsibilities that police wish they would take. Portland and Riverside can serve as examples of exactly what new responsibilities these programs sought to foist on landlords.

Portland embarked on its effort at the outset of its community policing program 1989, when it began work on a massive campaign to educate landlords as to how they could maintain safety most effectively. The effort centered on a formal "Landlord Training Program," developed

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and run in collaboration with a private consulting firm.[77] The program touched on a variety of property management issues relevant to safety, such as how to screen tenants effectively, how to streamline evictions, and how to improve physical security. Throughout, the training sought to frame landlords' responsibility for crime in terms of their own self-interest: For example, the training manual notes in its opening pages that "community-oriented property management is also good business" (Campbell 1996: iii). Just as the "Broken Windows" argument appealed to an existing police value to institutionalize a new one, so this argument appeals to an existing value of property managers to institutionalize a new sense of responsibility—it defines crime prevention as *part of* effective asset management. In any case, several thousand landlords have participated in the program, and one survey found that over 90% of them say they went on to make changes in the way they managed their property.

Riverside took a similar tack with a slightly more aggressive emphasis, organizing a training program for landlords called the "Crime-Free Multihousing Program" that offered advice about crime prevention strategies. A number of programs of this sort were becoming popular in policing circles at the time, but Riverside imported the idea from Mesa, Arizona. Sergeant Lisa Williams, who oversees Crime-Free Multihousing today, explains that Riverside had more affinity for Mesa's program because of its "aggressive" posture:

> Aggressive, as in [we tell them], "If you don't want the problems, don't rent to those kind of people." We'll right up front [say], "If you think you're going to have people that you're going to have to evict, or who are going to create crime problems in your property, just don't rent to them." And they can do that—landlords and owners can. They can run criminal background checks, they can run credit checks, and if there's a problem, then they don't have to rent to them.

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[77] Less formal training takes place as well: In some neighborhoods, the standard response to a new landlord seems to be an invitation to a community meeting, where officers and others can give tips on security.

Sympathetic to this approach, the RPD sent a detective to Mesa to be trained in the program, and it received support from city government to move forward.

Today the program works in a number of phases, the first of which is the training itself. As Williams describes it, the training centers on one basic message, which is the ability landlords have to keep difficult tenants out: "You can set the tone. You're the owner, and if you want to set very high standards for your property, then by all means, do so." Screening techniques are one strategy, and landlords are taught that so long as they apply legitimate categories consistently (such as prior criminal record), they can keep certain types of people out of their property. But the sessions also describe procedures like how to evict problem tenants who slip through that process, how to implement effective crime prevention techniques, and how and when to contact police. The training is mostly designed and run by officers from Riverside's Problem-Oriented Policing unit, but others participate as well. For example, the Riverside City Attorney lectures the class on how managers can protect themselves from civil liability suits, and his office also prepared the curriculum for evictions. Landlords are not required to use specific techniques; instead, the training seeks to describe the menu of options available to them so that they can make informed choices about how to manage their properties.

This element of voluntarism and persuasion is on the one hand the advantage of these training programs, which avoid starting out with the confrontational tone that legal action or shaming can create. But on the other hand it means that many of the most problematic landlords will not participate in the program without prodding. Some do sign up willingly for the classes, seeing them as a way to help bring crime under control. "[A lot of] people," Williams explains, "come to class and take it real seriously, with the attitude, 'I have to live here, and my kids have to live here;'" the fact that Riverside markets its program to appeal to landlords' bottom line probably

helps to snare additional "volunteers". But not all landlords accept these appeals immediately, and in those cases Riverside like all departments must fall back on some degree of coercion.

Here public pressure, and indeed shame, is part of the solution, and Riverside has brought these social pressures into play by publicly recognizing landlords who participate. Specifically, RPD officers follow up the training after a set period of time by visiting each participant's property and checking it for compliance with program principles. For example, to be considered "compliant," certain standards of physical security and upkeep must be met, and a landlord must have some process for screening applicants (though for legal reasons the department can not prescribe *what* screening criteria should be used). Compliant properties then host an open tenant meeting attended by POP officers, who explain to residents what their landlord is doing and ask for help in monitoring the property's compliance. Properties that satisfy all of these requirements are issued signs that announce their participation in Crime-Free Multihousing, and which serve as something of an advertisement to potential tenants that the landlord is serious about safety. The signs can be revoked if a property fails to meet program guidelines, and new owners or managers must attend the class to keep their property in compliance. Thus social pressure on landlords is here woven in to the more "voluntary" approach implied by training, and Riverside police draw effectively on residents to help enforce it, since as rent-payers they do have leverage over property owners.

With some of the most difficult landlords, however, Riverside has had to rely even more directly on coercion—and judging from community police officers' stories, some of the most significant problem-solving projects they have undertaken fall into this category. Indeed, one community police officer calls his strategy for handling these recalcitrant landlords the "hammer" approach, explaining that "[Community Policing] is the most aggressive form of policing in the world. Some of these landlords, we'd come after them with the gang enforcement, we'd come

after them with codes, we'd come after them with HUD . . . [They would] come up to me and say, 'What the hell is going on here?'" Occasionally, local courts have even ordered landlords into the Crime Free Multihousing Program as part of a civil judgment, bringing us full circle back to the coercive solution we began with.

3. Conclusion

The various strategies for instilling a new sense of responsibility in landlords and their brethren are closely linked in this way. The essential aim in all cases is to socialize property owners into a broader sense of their role—away from the view prevalent in Norfolk, where we learn that "property managers saw their role as keeping units filled and collecting the rent", and towards what Portland calls "Community-Oriented Property Management," which includes strict screening and lease enforcement, as well as active physical maintenance. Focus shifts from the rights of property ownership to its responsibilities. In this sense, the management of business partnerships obeys the same basic dynamics as the management of community partnership: The basic obstacles to developing them involve conflicting values between police and their partners (as the early experience in Round Lake makes clear), and overcoming them means closing the gap between police values and those of their partners.

But whereas conflicts with the community over values like the importance of disorder and the proper use of authority required police themselves to make institutional changes, here police must catalyze institutional change in their partners. Law, shame, and training have emerged as effective and complementary strategies for doing so—particularly when they are wielded carefully, with attention to the distinctive concerns landlords themselves have; and in combination, as a sort of graduated sanction that can be fit to the particular landlord. The qualifications, in particular, seem to distinguish the most thoroughgoing successes from less dramatic examples: Almost every department in these cities had modest success enlisting cooperation from landlords, but those

where cooperation was particularly extensive or deep (like in Portland, Riverside, and the Chinatown neighborhood in Seattle) were the departments that could their approach to different degrees of receptiveness; they treated the hammer approach as a last resort, and even shaming was used with care. In dealing with the private sector, at least, the practitioners involved in these efforts could recognize when single-minded advocacy might backfire.

To be sure, advocacy of the sort that these police engaged in inevitably involves an aspect of the hedgehog, particularly where strategies like law and shaming are involved: It is precisely their aim to foist police values on their partners. But absent complete authority to *force* compliance, police must moderate their demands or at least tailor their strategies in recognition of partner values. These adaptations do not always take the form of moral humility, as the strategy of finding a bulldog makes most clear (*cf.* footnote 76). But all involve at least pragmatic recognition that competing values are at issue, and they thereby incorporate the practical dimensions of the fox if not the normative ones.

CHAPTER 5: POLITICAL PARTNERSHIPS

1. The Idea of Political Partnerships

Although community groups play the starring role in community policing, any change in the community's influence must ripple through other police relationships as well. This is particularly true of political partnerships: If community groups direct police priorities more and more, then must not city councilors, ward leaders, mayors, and city managers all direct them less and less? At the least, political influence will take different forms and have different effects than it did in an era where direct community participation was downplayed.

Nevertheless, the partnership ideal applies to political leaders as well as neighborhoods and businesses. Like other police partners, political leaders control a wide range of resources that can help police manage their central problems—from new city ordinances on truancy and petty crime that can help maintain order, to land use regulations that may influence safety, to authority over other agencies that may help police gain their cooperation. From the other direction, political leaders also have reasons to value close partnerships with the police. This country's politicians often hear about citizen concerns before administrators do (Almond and Verba 1965), and they naturally want at least to know what police are doing about them; it may even make sense (though this idea incites more controversy) for political leaders to pass constituent problems on to the police, asking them directly to address concerns as they arise. Finally, changing views of accountability also put a premium on political ties: Where progressives viewed the oversight relationship as a hierarchy, one where political leaders announce policies for administrators to execute, contemporary thought views it more as a dialogue. In this view police can no longer fall

back on legislative directives handed down to them. They must instead engage political leaders in

a dialogue about their purposes and how they will be held accountable for achieving them (Moore

1995).

Thus for all these reasons, police reform today does in fact entail stronger relationships

between police and political leaders. For years, many police agencies saw themselves as

somewhat removed from city hall; as Herman Goldstein explains it:

> The effect that partisan political pressures had on the police through much of their history was apparently so catastrophic that fear of a recurrence has given rise to a fetish of sorts that equates any form of citizen involvement in directing police agencies with the most nefarious form of political corruption. As a result, even though most police chiefs are now directly responsible to the chief executive officer of a municipality, the chief executive tends to refrain from exercising the authority granted to him. *In contrast with their relationship with other departments of city government, mayors and city managers have sought to avoid involvement in police business* (Goldstein 1977: 135, emphasis added).

But this situation led to an irony that Goldstein captures well: "The startling result of this aversion

to putting any political pressure on the police is that the police now actually have greater

autonomy than other agencies that exercise much less authority" (Goldstein 1977: 135); more than

other agency executives, police managers could and did tend to ignore politicians' concerns. But

as it turned out, this distance did not unequivocally expand the autonomy of police managers:

Chiefs often found themselves without support from political leaders that could help them steer

their agencies in the face of internal resistance (Goldstein 1977: 136; Sayre and Kaufman 1960;

Moore and Stephens 1991), and they also found themselves unable to avail themselves of the sorts

of resources in city hall described above that could have helped police realize valued ends

(Goldstein 1977: ch. 4). Consequently, both police managers and political in some cities have

sought to strengthen their ties with one another, and these cases all show signs of that effort to

some degree.

The Scope and Limits of Political Partnerships

Political partnership do not, of course, follow the same standards as partnerships with the community. As I have described it, a partnership involves an open-ended relationship between two institutional domains where each side offers up many or even most of its respective resources to the other. But this basic norm of mutual cooperation conflicts with other ideas—still accepted by even the most ardent defenders of a responsive public management—about the proper limits to the relationship between elected officials and administrative agencies. Much more than the relationship between police and the community or even police and other public agencies, the relationship between police and elected officials exists against a background of formal hierarchy that defines and limits the role that each side can take with respect to the other. Thus the political relationships police have are not partnerships but hybrids—part the unconstrained collaboration of independent groups, but part formalized hierarchical relationship.

The difference is surely one of degree, for community partnerships face limits as well. But ties between an administrative agency and its political overseers are more explicit subjects of regulation. In Lowell, for example, state law makes it outright illegal for police and city council members to develop a partnership in the sense of the term I have been using; section 107 of the Massachusetts General Law on city charters, which applies to all cities operating under the council-manager form of government, forecloses practically any direct contact between council members and administrative agencies like the police: "Except for the purpose of inquiry, the city council shall deal with [city administration] solely through the city manager, and neither the city council nor any member thereof shall give orders to any subordinate of the city manager either publicly or privately." Responsive public management challenges such strict claims of administrative autonomy to some degree, but it does not abandon them altogether. At minimum, it still recognizes that political leaders cannot respond blindly to police requests because they are

limited by how much money and authority their overseers have granted them, and furthermore by the claims on these resources that citizen concerns other than public safety make. Finally, it still recognizes the claims of expertise and organizational logic on police decisions—claims that limit *their* ability to be responsive to political leaders.

As a result, the ideal against which the examples in these cases should be measured is somewhat more moderate for political partnerships than for those with the community, businesses, or other public agencies—too much is as unwelcome as too little. That value judgment does not come only from public management theory but also from the cases themselves. Where political leaders and police managers have a very close, collaborative relationship, it is not just employees in the police department itself who disapprove; nor is it just "good government" reformers. The political leaders and police managers themselves often play down or subtly misrepresent their relationships, even when there is nothing illegal about them, because they seem to recognize that they do not fully comport with their own ideals about community policing. The result is a sort of twilight partnership that exists without being fully acknowledged. It is just as problematic as the more familiar case of failure in which no strong relationship at all takes hold.

The Central Conflicts of Political Partnerships

Despite these limits, community policing and the themes of public management that it echoes do expect a somewhat closer relationship between police and their political overseers. The chief difficulty police face in realizing this expectation is that the political sphere, as much as the community and business spheres, institutionalizes distinctive concerns that police do not always

share.[78] In this chapter I will argue that three areas of disagreement are especially important in the cases I have analyzed: Disagreements about money, mistakes, and responsiveness. First, political leaders tend to feel the limits placed on government's scope more strongly than the police themselves do, and this difference of perspective emerges most clearly in fights about agency finances: Politicians act as gatekeepers in most budgeting processes against agency tendencies to expand, and the fights about money that express this role often dominate the tenor and substance of political oversight, to the point that it can fundamentally sour this relationship. Second, political leaders shun scandals—it is often said that police chiefs get fired not for failure to control crime but because of some wrongdoing by their officers—, and while police hardly embrace the blunders that underlie them, they are more likely to view mistakes as a necessary cost of trying to be effective. These different tolerances for error are a persistent source of tension in some of these cases, where they contribute to mutual suspicion between police and city hall on a wide variety of specific reforms. Finally, the representative institutions of political leadership are committed to the central value of responsiveness to a greater degree than administrators are. They believe that their very survival as politicians depends on their constituent service, and in any case that job comports with their sense of their role as representatives. Although administrative agencies increasingly share this value because of the very trends in public management thinking that this study has examined, they also pledge allegiance to ideas of professionalism—notably expertise and impartiality—that can conflict with the ideal of popular control over administration; indeed this conflict has long been a central dilemma of public administration, evident in chronic disagreement about concepts like the divide between policy and administration.

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[78] On the idea of coherent role conceptions and value systems among political leaders, akin to but substantively different from the occupational cultures of administrators, see Meltsner (1971).

The ability of police to manage these conflicts of political partnerships becomes more difficult because of their commitment to forge new relationships with the community as well. Each type of relationship demands fundamental shifts in police values and new strategies of practice, and the call to forge both of them simultaneously exacerbates an already difficult challenge: The burden of reconciling the conflicting demands communities and political leaders may make falls to the police themselves. To be sure, it may not matter to the community either way how police respond to some political demands—values are not so intricately intertwined that more attention to one *always* means less to another. Moreover, in some cases community and political demands are not just compatible but positively reinforcing, as when both groups value the same ends of safety, or responsiveness, or parsimonious use of authority. But in at least some cases, demands from government and the community are not entirely compatible, and this tension narrows the range of options that police have if they intend to maintain their relationships with both groups. To give only the simplest example, one easy solution to the explosion of demands for "more protection" from each city neighborhood is to expand the police force entirely, opening up new substations in each neighborhood as police did in Lowell. But that strategy makes life more difficult for political leaders in their role as protectors of the public purse, and in several cities it has apparently soured relationships between police and city hall.

Explaining Success: The Management of Political Partnerships

The three value conflicts I have describe do not exhaust the disagreements between political leaders and police. For example, many politicians—particularly geography-based city council members—seem to pursue some of the same values that community groups in those areas do, like concern about soft crime or harassment, and they face the same sorts of conflicts with police. Moreover, political leaders sometimes seem preoccupied with values that simply are not problematic for the police. For example, mayors in these cases frequently became concerned with

high-profile incidents of serious crime and pressed police to redouble their efforts to solve them. But those events did not really take the form of value conflicts: Police themselves typically saw these investigations as central to their purposes, and they accepted pressure to "do something" with alacrity.

Nevertheless, I will argue that the ability of practitioners to manage these three conflicts over money, mistakes, and responsiveness is sufficient to explain the fate of political partnerships in these six cities—to distinguish departments that have built political ties successfully from those that have faced more difficulty. It is easier to make this comparison for political partnerships than for other types of ties I examine, like community partnerships and those between government agencies: Those other types of partnerships involve relationships with a wide variety of groups, and success may be uneven across them (as it was, for example, in Knoxville between the black community and predominantly white neighborhoods). But the realm of political leadership, while surely fragmented, is more limited. In each city there is only one mayor or city manager, and only one city council—which even if its members are of different minds must, in many areas police care about, offer its support or opposition as a majority. Thus it becomes possible to speak approximately but not incoherently about the quality of a department's political partnership as a whole.

Considered in this way, these six cases reveal much diversity in the quality of the relationship between police and city hall, as reported by observers and participants but judged with reference to the norms outlined above. Many faced significant tension or an unwelcome lack of dialogue in at least some of the years before community policing; indeed, that situation describes all the cases except Fremont. But a few of the departments—notably Knoxville, Portland, and Lowell—were able improve their relationship with city government in a way that increased accountability and gave police the benefit of legislative and other help from political leaders.

Albany and Riverside, on the other hand, faced more difficulty, as various groups of police managers split between two polar patterns—on the one hand, capitulating to political demands entirely, and on the other, seeking to defy them. Of course, the stories of these two departments are complicated: In each city the relationship between parts of the police department and parts of the political system improved in some ways. And even in those areas where I think it did not, some city and police officials will disagree with me. But compared with the admittedly atypical cases of Knoxville, Portland, and Lowell, I believe that there are still opportunities for these departments to forge stronger partnerships with city hall, and I will try to justify that assessment below.

In this chapter I try to describe and explain this difference between Knoxville, Portland, and Lowell, on the one hand, and Riverside and Albany on the other. I will argue that the first group's success hinges on their abilities to manage the three value conflicts described above—conflicts that Riverside and Albany never fully resolved. With respect to all three conflicts, those police who successfully manage these difficult dilemmas do so by internalizing the priorities of political leaders to some degree, but without abandoning their attention to distinctive values of the police: If they do that, they inevitably alienate their fellow officers and create a backlash that undermines their early but ultimately superficial achievements. Begin with the conflicts police and political leaders face over police budgets, which derive from more basic disagreements about how much police service is necessary, and different sensitivities to the taxpayer's purse.

2. Service At What Price?

Public agencies like to spend money. More often than not, public servants are enthusiastic about the function they serve, so it is not surprising if they think that society needs more of it. Some political leaders may share some of this sentiment for some functions, some of the time. But unlike administrators, they feel government's limits as well as its promise. Administrators hear

citizen demands for more and better service; politicians hear these demands, but also the taxpayer

demands to be frugal and to spread the limited public purse across a wide range of government

functions (cf. Meltsner 1971: ch. 2). More concretely, one of the most salient facts of the local

politician's life is the budget, and one of her central preoccupations is keeping it down. The fact

that agencies often have the opposite drive (Niskanen 1971) is a recurrent source of tension in

these cases. That tension can be understood as a conflict over what share of taxpayer resources an

agency should command, or between the competing values of financial conservatism and providing

service.

Of course, the budget dance is heavily choreographed, and stable norms of behavior soften

some of the friction that conflicting aims might cause (Wildavsky 1984).[79] But the system of

norms and role conceptions that stabilize budgeting *can* break down—particularly in times of

recession or flush funding that upset the stabilizing expectation of incrementalism; in times of

growing ideological dissensus about the scope and aims of government; and simply in times of

changing agency personnel or political leaders, who may arrive on the scene without a proper

understanding for the system, or even with a contempt for it. When the system breaks down for

these reasons, the disequilibrium that results exposes and feeds the value conflicts that helped to

create it (Wildavsky and Caiden 1997).

Moreover, even if the budgetary process itself can endure endemic tension between

agencies and political leaders, the wider relationship may suffer. When the connection between

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[79] Indeed, legislators may even expect or downright *need* agencies to oversell themselves; as Wildavsky put it: "If the agencies suddenly reversed roles and sold themselves short, the entire pattern of mutual expectations would be upset, leaving the participants without an anchor in a sea of complexity. For if agencies refuse to be advocates, congressmen would not only have to choose among the margins of the best programs placed before them, they would also have to discover what these good programs might be" (Wildavsky 1972: 194).

political leaders and agencies is narrow, restricted *solely* to the budgetary process, there is no need

to consider the secondary effects of tension. But a system of institutionalized suspicion—however

functional for budgeting itself—may well undermine a broader partnership between political

leaders and administrators. Affection and even like-mindedness is needed if city councilors are to

work with police not just on appropriations but also on other jobs, like legislation that advances

police problem-solving, setting priorities on constituent concerns, and appeals for cooperation

from other agencies. That is the sense in which the call for political partnerships makes traditional

tensions about money—which have existed in cities for years, and are hardly unique to community

policing—more salient than they once were. As the presumption of police autonomy subsides, and

as police themselves turn more frequently to city hall for non-budgetary help, traditionally

manageable tensions about money become more salient.

Budget Problems in Political Partnerships

Portland exemplified that problem in the years just prior to community policing. The

city's mayor has always had great formal power over the Police Bureau—he could both appoint

and remove the police chief at will, and technically he could act as the police commissioner and

override the chief's own decisions—, but for many years the police were independent. In

particular, through the early 1980s, Chief Ronald Still and Mayor Frank Ivancie worked together

to maintain a buffer between the police and city hall.[80]

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[80] See the discussion in Moose (1993: 66-67). One example of this collusion for autonomy arose when Still
and Ivancie actively tried to block a significant attempt by city council to play a more direct role in police
issues. The conflict arose over the recommendations of the Task Force on Police Internal Affairs (appointed
in reaction to a recent series of PPB scandals), which called for a Council-appointed citizen's advisory
committee that would review internal affairs cases. Still and Ivancie refused to appoint the committee, but
Council banded together to overrule them, creating the Police Internal Affairs Auditing Committee (PIIAC).
The patrol officer's union subsequently tried to abolish PIIAC by raising the issue in a general election. But
though they were successful in getting PIIAC on the ballot, the union ultimately lost the vote.

The city's 1984 mayoral elections promised to revamp the police-city relationship, as winning candidate Bud Clark explicitly ran against Ivancie's closed style of government, and specifically against Still's closed Police Department (Moose 1993: 67; Kennedy 1988a: 12). But success did not come quickly. Although the new Mayor was immediately able to appoint his own Chief with a mandate to "open up" the Bureau—the PPB's entire command staff retired when the populist Clark became their boss—, his regime began at the onset of a long financial crisis in Portland, spurred by the recession of the mid-1980s and made worse in the Police Bureau by the end of large federal law enforcement grants. The result was that budgetary haggles set the tone for police-city relations.

The first trouble came when Clark asked the PPB to lay off 16 officers at a time when the city's population and crime rate were actually growing, a move that caused police management to become defensive. Particularly controversial was their decision to rely on standards and models from the police professional community to bolster their claim that they deserved *more*, not fewer officers: Using a recommendation from the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) that cities should keep 40% of their officers' time free for "proactive work," together with a RAND computer model that could determine how many officers were needed to answer Portland's existing volume of emergency calls, PPB planners argued that the city needed as many as 200 additional officers at a time when the city's budget was declining. At first, after intense Bureau lobbying of the city council, the mayor, the newspaper, and several local interest groups, council accepted these arguments grudgingly (in part, it seems, because drugs had recently become a front-burner issue in the city, and local government was under pressure to do something about the problem). But the fight left a legacy of animosity between city hall and PPB Chief Penny Harrington, who was fired soon after her budgetary victory.

Many reasons underlay the decision to remove Harrington, but a lingering distaste for her aggressive budgetary tactics clearly helped set the stage (Kennedy 1988). In any case, the fate of her successor, James Davis, was even more directly tied to the fight over resources. Davis continued Harrington's strategy against an increasingly-skeptical city hall, which by this time had the backing of a performance audit of the Police Bureau—one that seriously questioned the PPB's estimates of its needs, arguing that it was making inefficient use of the resources it already had and that it was misusing the RAND and IACP recommendations. When Davis proved recalcitrant, and even began a vicious fight with the city auditor over her team's conclusions, Clark fired him as well and put a stop to the Bureau's budget growth.

Throughout this period Clark's broader aim of bringing community policing to Portland went nowhere. In particular, relations between city hall and the Police Bureau deteriorated to the point that collaboration was out of the question: Existing joint ventures like PIIAC were widely viewed as ineffective (Anderson 1996), and Bureau members cannot recall any significant instances of cooperation with political leaders. As one Bureau member puts it, "it was sort of a reluctant relationship in that both sides were kind of leery of each other." The main source for this suspicion seems to have been the highly-visible fights over resources, which in turn revealed a deep disagreement over what level of police service was appropriate in Portland: A level derived from the algorithms of need for service generated by the professional community; or one limited by the proportion of taxpayer resources that political leaders had sensed to be appropriate.

Taking Fiscal Problems Seriously

A few years after Davis was fired, the relationship between city hall and the police had changed, and the two sides worked together often on community policing reform and the projects that arose out of it. For example, City Council worked closely with the Bureau to identify the goals that would guide its organizational change, and in 1990 the Council passed a resolution

adopting "expected outcomes" for community policing that both police and their political overseers had agreed to. Equally important, over the following several years Council worked closely with the PPB to pass a number of city ordinances that advanced police problem-solving, such as several "chronic nuisance" ordinances that created penalties for landlords who failed to address safety problems in their developments.

Part of the explanation for this dramatic improvement in the police relationship with city hall involves the growing deference of police managers to financial pressures. For example, the mid-1990s found Portland once again in a serious fiscal crisis that recalled the turmoil of the 1980s (this time due to a statewide property tax rollback rather than recession). Portland faced overall budget cuts of nearly 10%, and though the new state law explicitly directed cities to give priority to public safety, the PPB still faced substantial cuts amounting to almost 5% of its budget. Chief Charles Moose, however, had a very different reaction to this problem compared with either Davis or Harrington.

First of all, Moose took the position that while the budget cuts would be difficult for the Bureau, police had to accept their share of reductions, and he did not engage in traditional defensive strategies, like cutting his most popular programs in the expectation that the city would have to restore them (Wildavsky 1984). Instead, the Chief insisted that the PPB would make its difficult decisions openly and with outside input. As he puts it:

> Yes, we have this fiscal crisis, but at the same hand we're going to approach it in an open and democratic fashion. So that we can get as much input and feedback as possible. So that people can be aware of what services are going to be reduced, what services are going to be kept. Even in this crisis, the philosophy still has to lead. And so you can't decide anything in secret. You can't decide anything in the back room. It has got to be an open and public process.[81]

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[81] Moose expressed similar sentiments publicly in an *Oregonian* op-ed piece (Moose 1997).

Indeed, the Bureau has consulted with groups like its Chief's Forum—comprised largely of community representatives appointed by city council, the mayor, and several citywide interest groups—to discuss where it should make cuts and which types of crimes represent priorities (so that, for example, detectives can prioritize their work when cuts force them to make tough choices). Where Harrington and Davis championed what they viewed as objective agency needs, as defined by the police profession, Moose felt that such "needs" had to be balanced against financial limits set by the public. The budget proposal he brought to city hall was already tempered by political leaders' fiscal concerns. Indeed, the Chief's conciliatory posture was obvious to his own officers, who blamed Moose and the Mayor when many PPB units underwent severe cuts. No rebellion ensued, but morale sank drastically in the Bureau. In this way, Moose's deference to the needs of political officials lost him some credibility with his troops (cf. Reuss-Ianni 1983): He had not balanced the competing values of financial conservatism and service, but sacrificed the latter to the former—just as Harrington and Davis had done the opposite.

More successful was a second strategy Moose used to deal with budgetary crisis, namely, searching for additional revenue. Most dramatic was his role in securing a large hiring grant from the federal COPS program: In August of 1997, the Chief took the Bureau's troubles to Washington, personally applying to the COPS office for a hiring grant that would pay for 60 officers, and asking for a full waiver from the usual 25% matching requirement. To support his case, Moose pointed towards the extraordinary circumstances that the statewide tax rollback had created, and he outlined an uncommonly explicit plan for retention: The city committed itself to putting away approximately $1 million per year from its general fund so that it could draw on the money when the grants expired (Mayor Katz, a fiscal conservative who takes pride in Portland's AAA bond rating, would settle for no less). In the event, COPS approved Portland's proposal, and Moose came back from Washington as something of a local hero. The grant made front page news

in the *Oregonian*, and many inside and outside the PPB credited the chief with averting the most

severe crisis the Bureau had faced in recent years.

This latter strategy may not seem particularly novel: One would think that any agency

would avail itself of free federal money, subject to the usual constraints of matching funds, phase-

outs, and so on. But not all agencies do; and in any case, grant-getting is simply the easiest case of

a general posture towards revenue-seeking. That posture, in turn, is far from universal. Indeed,

Meltsner's study of revenue politics in Oakland, California concluded that agency heads could not

be counted on to search for additional revenue without direct prodding from the city manager: Not

only did they not see that as their role, but revenue-seeking often conflicted with their service

objectives (Meltsner 1971). Many of these Chiefs, by contrast, have actively pursued not just

federal funding, but also donations of space and money from businesses and the community,

higher fees for certain police services, and even political advocacy for new taxes. Doing so

enables them to satisfy both political concerns about city finances and agency concerns about

effective levels of service. Thus in an era that values political partnerships, subject to the

continuing need for organizational harmony, revenue-seeking becomes an increasingly important

managerial posture because it partly relieves the tension between two important competing values.

It does not convince politicians that the objective need police claim for their services is real, nor

does it convince police that this need is illusory. Instead it bypasses the sort of abstract debate

over such issues that plagued Portland in the 1980s and looks for a pragmatic resolution based on

looking for ways to expand the pie.

The other cases with firm political partnerships reveal police with a similar attitude

towards fiscal problems. Knoxville managers, for example, have clearly internalized the fiscal

concerns of political leaders in order to forestall potential conflict. For example, speaking of the

decision to go after grant money, one KPD administrator explains that the department developed

its "wish list" independently, but with council's perspective firmly in mind. The result was a set

of tempered proposals that received easy approval—a pattern that one administrator describes as

the norm in Knoxville:

> Council does tend to pretty much leave [those decisions to] the departments, whether it's our department, community development (who has the CBDG funds), . . . recreation, [or] traffic engineering . . . They're pretty good, because they know that we're not going to come to them and ask for something that is just beyond reasonableness. First of all, maybe the chief has already talked with the mayor. [And second,] we know how much they can stand.

This understanding that police must make reasonable demands apparently preempts the sort of

turmoil that led to Davis's and Harrington's demise. But as in Portland's more recent

administration, many officers feel that management has not gone to bat for them. In particular,

KPD officers believe that their salaries are unacceptably low—to the point that morale has begun

to suffer, and some believe that officers have started leaving for better prospects.

Lowell, however, has successfully merged the two concerns by intensively seeking new

revenue sources: For example, the department raised over $100,000 in business contributions to

buy a "mobile precinct," and it has developed a grantwriting capacity second to none in the city.

In particular, Lowell's Chief oversaw a massive push for federal money that helped expand

department staffing by 50% over four years, and he became a hero with both officers (who

credited him with rectifying a staffing shortage that had threatened to turn into an officer safety

issue) and political leaders (who hailed him as the most successful revenue-raiser in city

government). Indeed, the department's capacity to win grants became so respected that the city

eventually put it to uses that had nothing to do with the police department. For example, LPD

grantwriters recently helped the city prepare its successful Enterprise Community proposal—a

complete role reversal from a few years earlier, when the one Captain in the department who *did*

want to pursue grant money (the LPD had never done this before) had to ask the city for help

writing the application. In this sense, the LPD institutionalized an entirely new concern for

revenue-seeking. It did so quite tangibly in the person of its two civilian grantwriters: These

employees have other responsibilities in the department, but as designated grant experts they fill a role that simply did not exist in the past. The result of this new capacity in Lowell was that police improved their credibility in city hall, and the once-anemic relationship between those two groups grew stronger. This pattern recurs in many of the other cities, albeit not as dramatically as in Lowell.

Thus Portland and the other cases that have developed political partnerships have seen a shift in the attitudes their top managers take towards fiscal responsibility: The advocacy for self-defined serv ice needs that characterize Chiefs like Harrington and Davis represent an entirely different (and indeed more traditional) professional posture from the more tempered and entrepreneurial attitude of Moose. He is both self-limiting in the demands he makes and proactive in helping to resolve the city's fiscal problems—characteristics he shares with both Lowell's management and the KPD's. He reflects a pattern of management in which administrative heads share responsibility with political leaders for deciding how large an agency's ration of taxpayer resources should be.

Limits of Accommodation

Moose's sympathy for the fiscal concerns of political leaders may have costs to the police department (as suggested by the backlash against his recent budget cuts), and it put a new burden on added revenue sources, like the federal government and community donors. For that reason, the attitude that political partnerships require of police managers may undermine or at least challenge other relationships—particularly their relationship with their own troops—, and by implication the values that they embody. It is one thing for police Chiefs themselves to accept the values of their political partners, who after all have always been an important part of their reference group. It is quite another for them to make this compromise acceptable to their troops, whose perspective is more firmly grounded in their profession.

In Albany, for example, the close relationship between Mayor Jerry Jennings and Chief

Kevin Tuffey (a childhood friend Jennings appointed amidst accusations of cronyism) did not

extend to the rest of the police department. An important example is Deputy Chief Robert Grebert,

the Albany manager with the closest ties to the police professional community, including study at

the prestigious FBI academy in Quantico and a stay at Michigan State University's community

policing institute. Grebert's tendency to view APD issues from the perspective of his profession

rather than the city often placed him in conflict with Tuffey and Jennings, and I will return to that

dynamic below. Here it is enough to note that several of these conflicts centered on resource

levels.

An important example involved the opening of a new police station in Albany's Arbor Hill

neighborhood, which Tuffey and Jennings saw as a central element of their community policing

reforms and which would allow the APD to decentralize its operations to four separate stations.

Grebert, however, believed that the plan was ill-conceived.[82] Most notably, although the

committee charged with the decentralization had broad scope to examine organizational roles and

structure, it had to work within a non-negotiable budget, and that constraint in turn affected the

distribution of manpower. The result was that staffing for Arbor Hill was fixed by the capacity of

the building that the Mayor had proposed there: "Rather than saying, 'OK, how many officers do

we need over there to staff this?' it was built in terms of, 'OK, here's so much money that we have

to spend over there, and for that amount of money, put there what you can," Grebert maintains,

succinctly formulating the essential conflict that underlies all of these financial squabbles. In part,

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[82] At first, he objected to the entire concept of the substation, arguing it was unnecessary and that the money would be better spent towards a new headquarters (the current building was built in the 19th century and in poor condition). When it became clear that Jennings had no plans to spend anything like the amount needed for a new headquarters, Grebert accepted the plan for Arbor Hill and used it to advance a complete decentralization of the department around four stations (some underutilized at the time).

Grebert's worries stemmed from his neighborhood perspective, for he worried that residents of the area would be disappointed when they found out that their new station had far fewer officers than an older neighborhood unit in the area that had been closed years ago. But more important, he felt that the lack of staffing would make it impossible to avoid violating beat integrity, a central concept that the police professional community associated with decentralization: "What's going to happen when they open it [is that] cops from the other stations will constantly be called into that neighborhood, and it will really screw up this ownership idea that we were trying to create." The tension over all of these issues exacerbated Grebert's already poor relationship with Jennings, and he was asked to resign not long after this dispute, taking many of his connections to the professional community with him.

Albany, however, was not the most difficult case in this regard, since the city's mayor ranked police highly among city services, and he was willing to divert funds from other agencies to the police department (for example, even community development block grants, traditionally used in Albany for neighborhood improvement projects and youth services, increasingly went to the police department under Jennings). Thus Albany's Chief could maintain an amicable relationship in city hall even though he did not always show much concern for financial conservatism the way managers in Knoxville and Portland did. For example, Tuffey dismissed concerns about how the city would sustain temporary federal grants he had applied for by saying "I'm not the budget director, so I don't have to worry about that stuff down the road."[83]

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[83] On the other hand, this shared cavalier attitude towards spending created difficulties for the city's relationship with federal grant agencies. In particular, Albany's increasingly tight fiscal situation led the city to seek to use federal money in ways that violated grant guidelines. In one instance, the city sought to use federal money to pay for officers it had already hired recently; and in another, it wanted to use federal money from one grant to pick up the slack from another grant that was due to expire. Both plans violated supplantation rules, and the latter seemed to show bad faith on phase-out commitments. The disputes spilled

Riverside's experience proved more contentious, and financial issues became one of a handful that effectively sank the leadership of Chief Ken Fortier and soured his agency's relationship with much of city hall. Fortier at first glance seems to have the necessary mix of entrepreneurialism and fiscal sensitivity that would ensure him smooth relations with city leaders. Like Portland, Riverside faced a serious budget crisis as the 1990s wore on, in this case due to a combination of statewide recession and the deregulation of electric utilities, which Riverside government had depended on for a substantial and growing piece of its revenue. And like Moose but unlike Harrington and Davis, Fortier took political leaders' fiscal concerns seriously, embarking on a program of fiscal rationalization in which he sought to cut costs, find new sources of revenue, and reduce workload through call diversion and prioritization. But his failure to win his troops over to the same attitude—in part because they felt he had abandoned *their* concerns— ultimately caused his effort to backfire.

Fortier's strategy initially endeared him to the city manager's office, which saw the Chief's fiscal zeal produce more savings than anyone had felt possible. Reducing court-related overtime expenses, for example, had been considered an impossible job: "There was a belief here from everyone that you couldn't control overtime, that it was unmanageable," one RPD member explains. But Fortier was able to identify unnecessary costs in the system—for example, the D.A. would regularly call every officer at the scene of a crime when testimony from one would suffice—, and by creating a "Court Services Unit" within the police department to coordinate appearances with the D.A., he was able to reduce expenses by $300,000 in little more than three years (almost every quarter after the program's inception showed a one-third drop in court

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over into city politics, where common council members accused the mayor of threatening public safety in the city.

overtime expenses compared with the same quarter the previous year). Moreover, a comprehensive "risk management" effort—a broad umbrella that included everything from internal affairs reforms to tightened search warrant procedures—led to such a marked reduction in liability claims that the city actually began returning money to the general fund from its liability reserves. "Obviously he's not the only part of it," Assistant City Manager Larry Paulsen maintains, crediting the new City Attorney for part of the downward trend in claims. "But the combination of the two [Fortier and the City Attorney] was the right combination. . . . We turned around one year and returned over a million bucks out of the liability fund to the general fund."

Many of these cuts, however, undermined Fortier's support by infringing on the agency's sacred cows. The reduction in court overtime, for example, reportedly "went over like a lead balloon," as one city official puts it: However rational from city hall's perspective, the effort robbed officers and detectives of additional income from overtime. An effort to change detective work schedules to conserve staffing also became controversial: Shortly before Fortier had arrived in Riverside, the city and the RPOA had agreed to try out the 4-10 schedule in the detective division on a trial basis for six months. But the agreement gave the RPD Chief the right to recommend against making the change permanent, and when Fortier told the RPOA he intended to do so, the Association threatened to sue. Each side carried out its announced intentions, and after a protracted struggle the detectives wound up with a compromise 9-80 plan.[84]

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[84] A 1993 consulting report had raised financial concerns about the 4-10 plan as a whole, arguing that it demanded 24% more officers than a 5-8 schedule to manage the same workload. But by the time Fortier had arrived in Riverside, the city had written the plan permanently into the RPOA contract, so Fortier did not try to tamper with 4-10 in the patrol force.

Perhaps the most explosive cost-containment effort Fortier undertook was reducing

Riverside's fleet of patrol cars. Fortier felt that the department's huge patrol car fleet was simply

becoming unsustainable in the light of a tight fiscal policy:

> I was asked to cut a little over a million dollars from the upcoming operating budget. And in looking at it . . . [I needed to] really look at that big fleet of cars out there. There's 300 marked patrol cars sitting out there that rarely get driven . . . just four shifts a week for the most part. There's a lot of money sitting out there, and you're scheduled to buy another $850,000 worth of cars next year. It really doesn't make a lot of sense with these cars just sitting there.

The large fleet stemmed from an earlier policy decision to provide one car per officer: As

complaints about getting into cars that someone else had driven grew, the administration conceded

to officer demands for personal cars. (In fact, Riverside was just finishing its four-year phase-in of

the policy when Fortier arrived in the city.) But Fortier felt that the practice could not continue, so

he proposed switching to a pool fleet in which officers would share cars—a change that would

ultimately cut the number of cars by more than half. In his words:

> I said, "You can't afford it." So we got with the POA and we went through and we said, "We've got to cut this fleet down." And we cut $850,000 out of that next year's budget to make budget. But the trade-off was that we started putting mobile data terminals in every police car. I went around all the roll calls, and we met with the supervisors and said, "Here's what's happening, and you need to really help us out here," explaining this thing to the troops: That they can't drive their own personal patrol car, but it's going to be a newer model than the one they are driving, it's going to be better equipped, etc.

But despite these attempts to build support for the effort, many officers rejected it with a

vengeance: Promises of MDTs (which many officers did not particularly want, and still do not use

extensively today) did not compensate for the loss of personal cars. "That didn't work," Fortier

admits. "We just got nothing but total resistance to that. And we really got no help from those

who could have helped us in terms of [keeping] these cars maintained. The opposite happened:

They started trying to find things wrong with the fleet, and started damaging [the cars] and not

reporting damage, and stuff like that. They really worked against it." Indeed, against the

background of innumerable smaller gripes about reform in Riverside, the patrol car issue stands

out as one of a handful that were viewed as serious affronts.

Most important for present purposes, concern about the patrol car issue fed back into the RPD's political ties and soured management's relationship with City Council. As part of its decentralization into areas and its new mandate to forge partnerships, the RPD encouraged a close dialogue with City Council all the way down to the patrol officer level, adopting a new general order that explicitly authorized direct contact between council members and street-level officers. But that decentralization meant that the department no longer spoke with one voice to the Council, and Fortier found his own positions undermined. "It became increasingly the case that they were learning of issues in the police department not through the City Manager and the Chief but from police officers and from lower level people," Fortier explains of the City Council. "So they were in a position to hear all of the gripes, all of the reaction to changes, all the rumor, all the gossip. [They would] get it first hand, and, being human, they would react to that. And that's how they would form their opinions of the Police Chief and what he was doing, as opposed to dealing directly with me." Fortier's efforts to downsize the patrol car fleet were a prime example of this dynamic, as Deputy Chief Mike Blakely explains that the growing relationship between officers and council members provided a willing ear for police concerns.

> The officers, by having that relationship were able to express their views: "This is an officer safety issue." "We don't have any cars to drive." "They're all broken." "They're not being maintained correctly . . . ." And it just went on. We had council members that were just convinced we didn't have enough police cars, that officers were having to stand there after roll call without a car to drive. . . . What it took was . . . . to be able to drive them down to our police lot at nine-thirty at night . . . when we have the most officers out in the field, and say, "Look at the lot. They're telling you we don't have any police cars to drive." And there would be a hundred cars in the lot.

Officers brought many other complaints to city council's attention through this channel, and as time wore on, the patrol officer's union began trying to influence council opinion about the Chief directly. In the end, Fortier's difficulties with the troops ended up taking a considerable toll on his political support, and a number of city officials maintain that officer dissatisfaction led at least two council members to withdraw their support for his leadership. That shift helped tipped the balance

against Fortier, who by 1997 faced a hostile council majority that contributed to the pressure (I

will describe its other sources below) for him to resign.

Managing the Tension Between Cost and Service

The backlash against Fortier's cost-consciousness in Riverside was far more extreme than

in Portland or Knoxville, and unlike in those cities, it reached the point of undermining the Chief's

political ties—which had motivated Fortier to cut costs in the first place. Two factors seemed to

contribute to this dynamic. First of all, Fortier's cost-cutting struck close to home for his officers:

Where Moose's budget cuts eliminated a few special units and downsized many others, affecting

the level of service the police department could provide, Fortier's reforms apparently infringed on

more central values that involved officers' working conditions and benefits—things like having

their own patrol cars, the hours they worked, and earning income from overtime. I will qualify this

conclusion shortly, but in some ways the value in most serious competition with cost-

consciousness is not a selfless commitment to professional service but a more self-interested

commitment to working conditions.[85] The second factor that apparently exacerbated resistance in

Riverside involved strategy: While Moose was eventually able to relieve some tension between

the two sets of values by drawing on federal funding to sidestep it, Fortier never made as much

headway on the revenue side as he did with costs.[86] Thus Fortier's approach to the fiscal crisis

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[85] Of course, the two are often closely connected. As Selznick puts it, an organization's "defensive activities are aided when a set of beliefs is so fashioned as at once to fortify the special needs or interests of the organization and to provide an aura of disinterestedness under which formal discussions may be pursued" (Selznick 1949: 51).

[86] He did make several efforts on this front, working on a citywide effort to attach fees to certain services, getting a 7-officer federal grant, and supporting a ballot measure that would raise property taxes and earmark most of the funds for public safety. But the grant and fee efforts never produced much revenue (the fees because they were relatively small and the grants because police and city officials decided that they did not want to commit themselves extensively to temporary grant programs), and the ballot measure failed badly amidst lackluster support (in fact, a single opponent apparently outspent the entire pro-tax effort, which raised

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was unbalanced, in the sense that it focused on heavy cuts to department costs that affected officers directly without bringing in substantial new revenues to offset them.

Of course, the cost containment efforts probably helped the RPD stave off staffing cuts, and in that way one might expect that they would have earned Fortier political capital with his troops. For example, Ed Davis in Lowell earned considerable credibility in the LPD when he helped to stop city plans to lay off 32 officers during a recession, even though officers had to give up their holiday pay (some $3-$4,000 per officer) in exchange.[87] But where in Davis's case officers' sacrifice had an obvious connection to the question of staffing cuts, Fortier never made that nexus clear. He had an immense ability to serve values important to *political leaders*; but unlike Davis, he was never able to frame his reforms in such a way that *officers* felt their aims were being advanced. In part, he may have misread his officers' values—failing to anticipate, for example, that MDTs would not compensate for the more rudimentary benefit of vehicle ownership. In part, he may simply have failed to make clear the full extent to which the sacrifices he demanded would protect officer values (like job stability) that *were* important.

Thus Fortier's failure seems to have rested in attending *too* diligently to the political value of fiscal constraint, and not diligently enough to how his reforms would affect officer concerns— in other words, in acting the part of the hedgehog. His compromise struck officers as a

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little more than $2,000). The small improvements that Fortier was able to accomplish did not seem to register with the patrol force, as the complaints about lack of manpower never went away; by contrast, Moose's success winning 60 officers, and Davis's success growing his department by half were highly visible to officers.

[87] Union president Jerry Flynn testifies: "[Davis] is somebody who took a department that had 127 patrolmen at time and we were in the midst of laying off 32 more. . . . I think he was a captain at the time, but it was him and I who sat at the table, and at the time everybody else got up from the negotiating table. And we stood there and requested the addendum of city manager Dick Johnson to give us another seven days to post this, and for the union to go as a body and say, 'Look, we need to reduce this holiday pay in order to save these 32 police officers.' Through those efforts, we did ultimately get that and we did actually save the 32 jobs, which

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capitulation, and they ultimately rebelled against his cost-cutting. Two problems resulted. First, fiscal consciousness was not truly institutionalized in the RPD but simply held by its chief, and officers occasionally undermined initiatives like the patrol car cuts. Second, and more seriously, officers took their case to city hall, which turned out to be less single-minded about fiscal conservatism than Fortier himself: Council members in particular became concerned about the consequences these reforms were having, even if they did not always see the connection clearly. In all likelihood, part of the problem was merely rhetorical: Contrasting examples like Lowell show how officers can be convinced to support even severe sacrifices, if only management takes pains to convince officers that it recognizes them as such, and that it only makes them for lack of a better alternative—if, in other words, they do not completely neglect competing values. But part of the problem was substantive: By focusing on reducing costs rather than increasing revenues, Fortier sharpened the tradeoff between fiscal conservatism and service. To the extent that he *did* attend to revenues, he again made the rhetorical mistake of failing to point this fact out to the troops. In all cases, he focused on political values all too intently, neglecting attention to the costs that pursuing them would inevitably have. By contrast, more successful cases like Portland and Lowell did not ignore fiscal conservatism (the way Portland had in its past), but they attended equally to its costs in terms of police service. They could not combine these competing values easily. But strategies like proactive pursuit of revenues helped satisfy both tolerably well (more formally, they served as "incompletely theorized agreements"); and argument and persuasion that established the need for *some* sacrifice helped soften the most extreme views about needs for service and appropriate working conditions, reducing the scope of the tension that all these

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I think the cornerstone of this whole department. Had we lost those 32 guys, morale would have been extremely low. These are guys on the job with young families."

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departments had to contend with. In that sense, managerial strategies and styles help to explain the more successful relationships between police and political leaders in Lowell and Portland compared with the difficulties that emerged in Riverside.

3. Mistakes and Effectiveness

The tensions in Riverside arising from financial trouble were exacerbated by a second set of conflicts over organizational errors—serious mistakes like wrongful arrests, search warrants served to the wrong address, or guns fired inappropriately. Police, even more than other public agencies, are expected and pressed to avoid such blunders; as Mark Moore puts it:

> Because police can restrain freedom, intrude into private life, damage reputations, and even injure and kill in pursuit of their law enforcement objectives, and because they often must act in ambiguous circumstances without the benefit of supervision, counsel, or time to think, an enormous premium is placed on avoiding errors. They, more than any other city employees, must live up to a standard of "zero tolerance" (Moore 1994: 199-200).

But in fact Moore is reporting one particular perspective on this question, namely, the perspective of political leaders and the public. Relatively speaking, police themselves tend to see their mistakes in different terms: They often insist that while tragic, their errors are the unavoidable price of proactive work—a defense seldom heard from city councilors, mayors, or even city managers. Moreover, they see attempts to rein in their mistakes through stricter policies and reviews of their actions as infringements on their professional autonomy and on their ability to work effectively. In any case, political leaders apparently place greater value on precision than administrators themselves do, and they are more willing to trade off organizational effectiveness to

advance it.[88] Because this tradeoff arises so clearly in so many areas of policing, different

perspectives on it can easily undermine political partnerships.[89]

A Mixed Success: Reforming Riverside's Search Warrant Process

Riverside faced significant tension between its political leadership and police management

for many years, in part because management was unwilling to address or even acknowledge its

officers' blunders—despite the fact that these concerns were central to the city manager's office,

which increasingly found itself paying out large sums to settle suits for erroneous searches and

allegations of abuse. Assistant City Manager Larry Paulsen explains that the inability to discuss

them in a meaningful way put a serious damper on the relationship between police and city hall for

years: "The good people [in the RPD] outnumber the bad a gazillion to one," he insists, "but some

of the characters that you find in the department, they do wrong things. And many times the

department has trouble articulating those things to outside people, or they just don't. It's a culture

that 'we don't do it.'"

Recently-appointed City Manager John Holmes tried to crack down on police blunders

after a string of search warrants that were served at the wrong addresses, and the effort that

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[88] For example, controlling wrong-door search warrants became an important priority for reform in Albany and Riverside, and in both its impetus came from political leaders (the Mayor in Albany and the City Manager in Riverside). To be sure, some Mayors suggest their sympathy with administrators on this score: For example, Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist decries "gotcha government" that operates "by waiting for people to violate procedures and then jumping down their throats," on the grounds that it provides unconstructive incentives: "The incentive in gotcha government is for managers to look busy while doing as little as possible. If you don't try to do much, then you won't do much wrong" (Norquist 1998: 39-40). But the need for an innovative mayor to make this point underlines just how common the system he criticizes has been.

[89] In part this conflict echoes the tension over how much authority police should use—what balance to strike between liberty and order—that I argued was so important for community partnerships. But while many political leaders *do* agree with the community on that question, putting them at odds with many police, for many politicians the issue is not so much authority as error. In any case, the two value conflicts are clearly linked closely.

emerged illustrates the tensions that surround such efforts. Holmes describes the search warrant

problem as the spark that ignited his interest in RPD reform, and it added to his growing sense that

the RPD was "becoming a loosely-controlled organization" prone to embarrassing and expensive

mistakes. As Holmes recalls it, that sense first crystallized in his discussions with a local

businessman who had close ties with police:

> [The businessman] said that there had been a series of wrong door searches during the previous 18 months, and the family of one of his employees had been the victim of one of these searches. I had the opportunity to meet his employee, and it was obvious from his facial expression and voice that the search had been traumatic for his family—one he would never forget. I asked the Chief for a report on wrong-door searches and received a response that there had been three. The businessman told me later that there were five based on his discussions with police officers. These events are serious, simply should not occur, and if they did, they should have been brought to my attention. I hoped that my inquiry and discussion with the Chief would end these careless searches.[90]

Some police expressed concern about these events as well, particularly in upper management. But

many others argued that Holmes's "zero tolerance" attitude towards wrongful searches was

unrealistic and counterproductive. "With so many warrants being served," one officer insisted

after an error that eventually led to a lawsuit, "mistakes are bound to happen" (Ogul 1992). The

captain in charge of narcotics reportedly held the same opinion, telling an RPD colleague, "well,

sometimes that's just the cost of doing business;" and a third RPD manager explains the reaction

in more detail, describing how the narcotics unit's existing norms—which placed great value on

the *volume* of warrants served—contributed to the problem of wrong-door searches: "I think we

had five or six lawsuits pending . . . . It seemed when I went to the division that quantity was real

important. There were still people there that thought that doing a lot of search warrants and

arresting a lot of people had tremendous value."

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[90] The concern about wrong-door search warrants also arose in Albany, and there too the push to do something about it came from political leaders, not the police.

Recognizing the trade-off between aggressiveness and the potential for error, this manager concluded that mistakes might be reduced through more *strategic* use of search warrants— evaluating the merits of each one more rigorously through the same "problem-solving" logic being introduced elsewhere in the RPD. "What I looked at and what the organization was looking at [was], What is the impact [of each warrant]? Problem solve: Let's don't keep going back, let's don't keep doing tons of search warrants." The unit's new managers also began putting extra safeguards on the search warrant process, proliferating traditional bureaucratic controls that Riverside had historically neglected (for example, a new policy required detectives to check recent utility records on a targeted apartment to make sure that the suspected criminal still lived there). Ultimately, the effort expanded to focus on many areas of the narcotics division, including not just search warrants but also other scandal-prone practices like cash control.

Several RPD members insist that these reforms went off relatively well because of the way in which they were implemented. The new policies were developed by division managers in collaboration with the city attorney's office over an extended period of time, and detectives had several opportunities to review and comment on drafts. When the new policies were complete, the announcement and training that followed were framed in decidedly non-confrontational terms: While some top RPD managers and city officials had described the search warrant problem as the result of "sloppy work," "macho police officers [who think] they can just go around kicking in doors," and a "lackadaisical attitude," the reformers themselves tried to soften this rhetoric. For example, when a reporter asked Assistant City Attorney Greg Priamos about the training session for the new policies that he played a key role in, he responded: "Police departments should always

enhance their training in high-risk areas [for litigation]. I don't see anything unusual here;"[91] and

his presentation to officers and detectives reportedly stressed the reasons why the policies were

necessary. "It was all done in a manner that engendered buy-in from all the officers," one of the

narcotics managers says of the reforms.

That is not to say that this traditional strategy of generating "buy-in" enjoyed complete

success, and one manager who used it concedes that a few narcotics detectives took the reforms as

an unwelcome infringement on their professional autonomy and their ability to do their job. Most

important among this group was a detective named Jack Palm, who started an intense campaign to

remove the Chief partly (some think mostly) out of his frustration with changes in narcotics. "He

really started [saying], 'This is really affecting the way I do business, all this crap about policy and

training and all this'," Fortier maintains. "[So] he ended up running for POA president and getting

the position, and he made it his mission to get rid of the Chief" (though Palm himself describes the

issue in broader terms of standing up to the Fortier's excesses and his arrogance, explaining that he

acted tenaciously because "somebody has to be willing to stand up to what isn't right") (Ogul

1995b).

"Just Do It": The Backlash Against IA Reform in Riverside

Even so, the narcotics reforms did not lead to the widespread backlash that characterized

other RPD reforms aimed at police mistakes—a backlash that sowed the seeds of discontent Palm

would eventually harvest. In all cases, making police more responsive to political leadership by

internalizing its aversion to errors carried the risk of alienating officers, whose values of

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[91] Ogul (1995a). Fortier, by contrast, told the same reporter: "Put yourself in the position of some guy sitting
at home, watching television, and a bunch of cops come crashing through your door with their guns drawn.
Searching a home is a serious matter. It should be treated that way."

aggressive work and professional autonomy could make strict controls unwelcome. But this risk did not always materialize as resistance, and the strategies managers used seems to explain much of the difference. In the narcotics case, the managers most directly involved recognized the potential for conflict and forestalled it with modest success: They tried not to make a frontal assault on officer values wherever possible, and they offered several opportunities for input from detectives. But in several other reforms, management was more single-minded in its allegiance to the values that political leaders had championed. Their "just do it" attitude towards reform would eventually backfire in the same manner as the patrol car cuts.

Internal affairs and citizen complaints were the most prominent example. As with the search warrant problem, the impetus for these reforms also came from the City Manager's office. Early in his tenure, Holmes had become suspicious about the low volume of citizen complaints police recorded, and when he commissioned an outside audit of the RPD, the report concluded that the department did not collect or investigate citizen complaints systematically. Holmes and other city officials saw this as further evidence of the "high trust, low control" philosophy that governed the RPD and led to a careless attitude on the part of some officers. That careless attitude, in turn, was blamed by many in city hall for the large number of embarrassing lawsuits and minor scandals that Riverside officers faced.

In response, city officials—notably the city manager's office and the recently-appointed city attorney, who took his direction directly from the council—pressed the RPD to undertake a broad risk management effort that addressed the problem of "looseness" and its corollary mistakes. The effort encompassed a wide variety of reforms, including the pursuit policy (considered too aggressive and too prone to lead to accidents) and the policy on how to handle officer-involved shootings (which became crucial in high-profile cases where officers were accused of using their

guns unnecessarily). But the reforms to internal affairs and citizen complaints were the most

dramatic, and they can serve to illustrate the tensions the risk management effort created.

Fortier himself sympathized completely with city hall's perspective on this issue. He had

learned about several potential problems with complaints and discipline from the Ralph Andersen

audit, and his first days as Chief confirmed them. "The first day I was there, I asked for a little

synopsis of every police complaint that resulted in discipline for the last year," he recalls.

> I wanted to know how many citizen's complaints have we had, what kinds of things people
> complained about, and what if any discipline have we levied, or any lawsuits that had been settled.
> Just the whole rundown. I asked our person that was supposedly assigned to internal affairs and risk
> management. She looked at me with a blank look on her face, like, "We don't have that
> information." And I said, "What do you mean, you don't have it?" She says, "We don't keep track
> of citizen's complaints." And I said, "Well, you're required to by law: California law requires that
> you file a report with the Department of Justice once a year." "Well, we sent something in but all of
> us really know it's not really accurate. The Chief handled all the discipline."

The lack of records was of course only the tip of the iceberg, for most complaints were not handled

formally at all. "A lot of the time," one RPD veteran explains, "a complaint was pretty much

handled informally by a Sergeant who said, 'Okay, ma'am I'll take care of it. I'll talk to my guy.' .

. . There had been minimal tracking of citizens' complaints and for all intents and purposes

minimum accountability." Those few complaints that were too serious or tenacious to handle

informally[92] were sent directly to the Chief's office. In theory, they were supposed to be

investigated by the single Sergeant who made up the RPD's Internal Affairs unit, and who also had

responsibility for duties like risk management and workers compensation claims. But Fortier

quickly got the impression that this arrangement wasn't working. "Investigations really weren't

being done," he maintains.

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[92]From 1986 through 1992, departmental reports to the state's Bureau of Criminal Statistics list from 19 to 44 total complaints per year, most of them non-criminal. Criminal complaints ranged from a low of 1 in 1988 to a high of 12 the year before.

We had a pretty significant case up where . . . we ended up criminally charging [an officer] and firing him. And I could see the quality of the work that was produced just wasn't there—it wasn't up to standards that I would accept. And clearly the training hadn't been there: They just had not been expected to do that kind of investigation. They weren't asking the tough questions, and they were stopping the investigation short of really getting to the meaty issues. They clearly didn't want to know that there might be a problem with a cop. And nowhere was it more apparent than when you started looking at some of these old cases and the current actions of an officer. We'd have an officer that would do something pretty serious, and I'd say, "Anything previous on this guy?" And somebody would remember something that he did, and generally there wouldn't be any investigative reports available. But if there were, they were horrible. I mean, they clearly didn't ask the tough questions, and there was not a real motivation to get at the heart of it. . . . The problem was not that they didn't have the skills. If they took that cop out and put a crook in they'd probably do it right. They just didn't have the will to do it with a cop.[93]

Thus Fortier felt that there were problems clear through the complaint and discipline system: Many complaints were being deflected at the time citizens made them, never making it into the department's records at all; and those that did make it through were not being investigated thoroughly. In this sense, the RPD did not evidence great concern about its officers' alleged transgressions.

Pressed by city hall to change that disposition, one way the RPD responded was by revising the policy that governed citizen complaints. Fortier assigned the job to newly-promoted Lieutenant Audrey Wilson, who as Sergeant had overseen IA during the last months of the previous Chief's administration. Wilson's basic mandate was to craft a policy that would require the department to record and investigate every bona-fide complaint that came in, regardless of how minor it was, who it came from, or who it was made to. Complainants would no longer be told to come back when the officer's Sergeant was on duty, and Sergeants would no longer try to dissuade people from filing their complaints with them.

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[93]Statistical information is obviously inconclusive here, but it is worth noting that RPD records show only three sustained criminal complaints from 1986 through 1992 (two were misdemeanors and one a felony), and 41 sustained noncriminal complaints.

Recognizing that the topic was contentious, Wilson tried to build consensus for the revisions by seeking a wide spectrum of opinions as in the case of the narcotics reforms. "We had a couple of drafts and we were really trying to be, I would say, collaborative," she explains.

> It was kind of controversial, so we were trying to be as complete as possible and develop a policy that was going to be easy to get buy-in from everyone. . . . We were trying to work with supervisors and get some buy-in from stakeholders and develop a policy that wouldn't have ended up looking much different than it looks right now. except that everybody would have felt like they had some input and that they had been consulted and that their opinions had been considered. We all knew that our policy was inadequate and we all knew that it needed to be changed and we all knew that we needed to be current with what was going on elsewhere across the board.

But Wilson reports that Fortier cut this process short: "It wasn't going fast enough for Fortier and he called me into his office one day and he said, 'I want a policy, and I want it today. . . Just do it.'" Wilson expressed her misgivings to the Chief, but he felt the policy was ready to go out, so she made a few additional adjustments on her own and sent the policy out the same afternoon.

The first real signs of trouble came a few weeks later, in September of 1993, when Wilson had to announce the policy to the department's Sergeants, who would be responsible for investigating the bulk of the complaints that would now be taken in. "I stood up in front of all those Sergeants, and I swear to God, if they could have thrown tomatoes at me, they would have thrown tomatoes at me," Wilson remembers. "It was that bad." Many Sergeants reportedly felt that the policy would overwhelm them with mostly trivial and even downright fabricated complaints, and they resented having it forced on them without much say in the matter.

Officers reacted even more strongly. "There was considerable resistance by the troops to that because . . . police officers don't like to be under investigation no matter what the charge," one Sergeant explains. "Whether it's a capital offense or more than three guys at a restaurant, they don't like to be under investigation." RPOA President Ron Wright gives a similar interpretation of the reaction:

> I think what happened was is that [Internal Affairs] issues got married with the customer service issues as far as [complaints like] "This guy is rude, this guy is wearing sunglasses, this guy did not quite call me back." Traditional IA stuff—you know, brutality, theft, lying, that sort of stuff—I see

as an IA function. "This guy was rude," "He was curt," whatever, should be separated out in the complaint process. One complaint shouldn't do both. It makes cops nervous as hell when somebody files a complaint on them.

In this interpretation, *some* degree of increased concern with the most serious transgressions might have met grudging acceptance. But officers felt that management had taken city hall's concern for propriety too far, applying the serious threat of an IA investigation to relatively minor mistakes.[94] (In Albany, by contrast, management's approach to the same problem distinguished customer service concerns from more serious accusations by creating a new system for *supervisors*, not IA, to investigate their officers, and much less resistance arose.) Moreover, officers argued that just as the Sergeants had worried, many complaints were bogus, and that management had not taken sufficient steps to protect them from frivolous accusations:[95] Like all professionals, they believed that the public was too unqualified and partial to judge when they had misbehaved (Hughes 1963).

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[94] For its part, management insists that Sergeants took the policy further than they ever intended, accepting literally every issue raised by a citizen as a "complaint" to be investigated, even cases that Fortier himself felt warranted less formal treatment. "What the policy said very clearly was, 'Use your judgment,'" Fortier explains. "If the issue isn't really bona fide, say so, and move on." The Chief interpreted the Sergeant's reaction as a form of resistance. "I think they were taking it very literally and . . . saying, 'Well, God, the Chief tells me that I've got to take these complaints and investigate them. . . . Well, I'm going show him. I'm not going to get in any trouble by making that judgment call, so I'm going to do everything." But others argue that the problem was Fortier's growing reputation as inflexible. Pete Curzon, who took over IAD in 1995, explains that "Fortier was viewed as somewhat autocratic. Nobody wanted to get on his bad side, so people just took the complaints instead of applying some common sense." Wilson elaborates on the same idea: "Everyone, because of the reputation that he was getting, was afraid to take any latitude because they were afraid that something would happen to them." The result was that Sergeants did implement the new policy, but they did so mechanically, disfiguring the policy's basic purpose. Eventually the policy was moderated somewhat, but by that time the damage had apparently been done.

[95]Officers became particularly concerned about the fact that the RPD took complaints from "people with little or no credibility," as one officer puts it, and at one point the RPOA used its newsletter to publish the names of four Riverside families who had allegedly made "frivolous and unfounded complaints" (Danelski 1995; the quotation is from then-RPOA president Jack Palm). The union intended to investigate whether or not the complaints violated state laws against knowingly filing false complaints against police, but it apparently backed off on those plans amidst a firestorm of public criticism for "Gestapo tactics" designed to intimidate residents from filing complaints at all, and even for racism: The newsletter only printed the four families' surnames, and all four were relatively common Hispanic names—thus Casa Blanca leaders claimed that the tactic stigmatized a large portion of their community.

In the end, the issue turned in to one of the most serious concerns about Fortier's leadership. "It just became the albatross around [Fortier's] neck," one widely-respected Lieutenant explains. "It really did. He could not shake that complaint policy."

The administration expected resistance, so it was not particularly surprised by these reactions. Blakely recalls: "There was no panic. We knew these types of changes were going to result in the kind of responses we received." He concedes that "you do react" to the resistance. "You have to react to that." But the reaction was not to change the policy substantially in response to officer complaints, and indeed the administration took the position that the Patrol Officers' Association did not have any formal voice in the matter, since the complaint policy arguably did not affect "working conditions" as defined by the collective bargaining agreement. In any case, Blakely's focus was on city hall, whose concerns about police carelessness had motivated these reforms in the first place. "I think we did a good job of educating our bosses, the city hall and the council, as to what to expect. We were not surprised . . . As that path took its course, we were able to continually point back to our projections on what would transpire. And we established greater credibility in the eyes of city hall and the Council."

The gain, of course, was only short-term. The complaint policy, like other reforms reviewed in this section, did lead to organizational controls that reduced mistakes and thereby "established greater credibility in the eyes of city hall and the Council," as Blakely put it. (Indeed, Paulsen asserts that Fortier's ability to tackle the sensitive issue of police wrongdoing as "probably the most distinctive difference between Fortier and the other [Chiefs] that I've experienced." He goes on to describe the difficulty most police chiefs have tackling or even acknowledging this problem, as quoted above, but he concludes that "Fortier broke through that and was able to maintain a very good relationship outside the department where other Chiefs prior to him were hesitant in doing that.") Officers, however, felt that the new controls interfered with their ability

to do their jobs, and in the end, those complaints added to those stemming from other value conflicts like those over money and exacerbated patrol officer resistance. Ultimately that resistance became such a dramatic public issue that it tilted city council's sentiment against Fortier, as described in the previous section, and through that channel it began to touch the city manager's office. "Of course, I am at will too, so they could release me at any city council meeting," Holmes recalls. "Chief Fortier decided to retire, so it worked out, but there was a year of considerable stress for the council and for me."

Thus by being responsive to political demands to reduce error—at least, by being responsive through the traditional instrument of increasing bureaucratic control—, Fortier and his leadership team sank their credibility with the troops and ultimately with a large part of city hall itself. In a way this dynamic may have been inevitable, for concern over precision cannot be completely reconciled with concerns for effectiveness and professional autonomy. But the RPD's top management may have exacerbated this inevitable tension through its uncompromising zeal on almost every initiative, exemplified most clearly in Fortier's confident order to Wilson to stop negotiations over the IA policy and "just do it." Indeed, the search warrant reforms were the one effort in Riverside that showed more moderation, and they apparently engendered the least resistance overall (though they may have alienated a key player in Jack Palm). This interpretation of how a hedgehog-like managerial strategy exacerbated Riverside's difficulties finds support in the contrasting experience of Lowell, where a different strategy for realizing similar aims met with much less severe resistance.

Incorporating Officer Values

Crackdowns on police "carelessness" are almost inevitably controversial, since for officers there is a fine line between legitimate controls and overzealous regulation. Attempts to rein in their errors are typically viewed as infringements on their autonomy and as limits to their

effectiveness. Some cities fought these battles years ago in the earlier drive for

"professsionalization"; for example, Portland and Fremont *already* had strict policies and practices

with regards to serving search warrants and investigating citizen complaints. But in departments

that never fully reached the professional model's ideal—and most police departments probably fall

into that group—, the attempt to internalize city hall's concerns about mistakes almost inevitably

breeds serious resistance the way it did in Riverside.[96]

Lowell's experience, however, was somewhat different. Although Lowell's police faced

many of the same concerns that city hall had raised in Riverside, management was able to respond

to them without seriously alienating most officers. Internal affairs reform was a case in point.

Partly a response to community concerns about overuse of authority, IA reform also emerged out

of city hall's concerns about lawsuits against officers. As in Riverside, many city leaders believed

that the LPD did not take officer misbehavior seriously enough, and they found evidence of that

charge in an IA process that routinely turned citizen complainants away.

Captain Chauncey Normandin, who Chief Davis assigned to fix the IA problem,

recognized that it would be an extremely touchy area to reform. But he was able to take several

steps to forestall resistance. First, he framed the reforms not simply as an attempt to rein in

misbehavior, but also as a way to provide better protections for officers who behaved properly, and

to demonstrate that most LPD members were exemplary employees. "A city of this size with this

many police officers will get complaints," Normandin explains. "But we also can show that of

these complaints, not all of them are founded. . . . [And I] also wanted to make sure that the

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[96] In Albany during the 1980s, for example, one Chief resigned over a fight with then-Mayor Thomas Whalen about discipline, and that issue joined recurrent fights about budget-cutting to sour relations between police and the Mayor's office. The result was that the Mayor found it difficult to push more substantive reforms: For example, despite four years of efforts to implement community policing towards the end of his tenure, Whalen was only able to establish a marginal special unit, leaving the rest of the department untouched.

officers were protected, and afford them no fewer rights than any other person would be afforded."

Normandin stressed this last point repeatedly once the policy took effect. For example, during the

first case brought against an officer under the new policy, Normandin pointed out that the accused

officer was represented not just by an attorney but also by a union official and a department

representative of his choosing. Moreover, the Internal Affairs unit (renamed "Professional

Standards") kept officers apprised of the case, and Normandin announced an open-door policy that

he hoped would dispel rumors (and officers did indeed visit him to find out what was happening);

he also made sure the LPD's two unions kept officers informed about the procedures that were

being followed.

The second step Normandin took to forestall resistance involved giving respected officers

a direct say in the reforms. Recognizing that his word alone would not reassure the officers

(particularly since he was a member of the command staff), Normandin enlisted the help of officer

Bryan McMahon, who was at the time the vice-president of the patrol officer's union, and by all

accounts a trusted member of the department. In particular, as Normandin drafted the new policy a

section at a time, he drew heavily on models from the professional community, but he was careful

to give each section to McMahon to review. "He would mark it up in red and do different things,

and I would make the changes " Normandin remembers. "Or if I had a conflict with something he

had, a change he would want to make, we would sit down and we would talk about it." Moreover,

Normandin enlisted McMahon's help in serving as an ambassador to the patrol force: "Brian

could present it to his union and say, 'Look, this is what we are doing, this is why we are doing it.'

Relieve all of their fears." Finally, Normandin also brought criminal investigations head Garrett

Sheehan into the process. Sheehan was also a trusted member of the department, and he was the

brother of the recently-retired chief—which meant that he would hopefully have clout with

precisely the officers who might feel somewhat alienated by the new Chief's reforms. In any case,

Normandin asked for Sheehan's advice on key issues like the question of how to investigate

criminal charges against officers. "[Sheehan] didn't want to be in the business of investigating

Lowell cops," Normandin remembers, and he knew that the public would have little faith in such

an investigation anyway. So the team developed a very specific set of guidelines about when cases

would be turned over to the District Attorney's office. The DA's office was not entirely happy

with this responsibility when it faced his first investigation, but it did eventually comply.

Normandin's accommodations to officer concerns did not, he insist, vitiate the policy,

which he describes as specific and comprehensive (and which is essentially the same as

Riverside's): "It didn't leave a lot of discretion as to how things would react when an officer faces

a problem or a potential problem," Normandin explains. All complaints would be forwarded

directly to the internal affairs office as soon as they were received (the general order announcing

the policy stated in boldface: "No person should be directed to return at a later time or to call back

later").

Many officers hardly welcomed the new policy. In particular, when two officers were

recently found guilty of charges against them, many considered the outcome unjust, and they

blamed the new zeal in Internal Affairs for bringing an unsound case to trial. "These were two

guys who did their job and have always done a good job," union President Jerry Flynn maintains.

"And ultimately because of what's happening in policing today with the O.J. Simpson thing and

the L.A. incident, you're going to have jurors who are going be against the police." In response to

this incident and more general concerns, the union has raised concerns about the policy with

Davis, and Flynn intends to try to make changes. But in the end he does not seem to oppose it

fundamentally: "We understand where his concern with this is," he explains.

Thus in all these cities, conflict still simmers: Where city hall sees lawsuits, accusations,

and scandals as evidence of recklessness, police see them simply as evidence of a hostile public, or

the unavoidable cost of proactive work. This tension creates serious obstacles to political partnerships: Those relationships cannot succeed unless police *do* put more value on avoiding errors, but by doing so they risk severe internal strife.

Nevertheless, there are clearly differences of degree. Lowell's IA reforms and Riverside's reforms to its search warrant process were able to pay *some* heed to relevant officer values, most traditionally by giving officers voice in the reforms, but also by appealing directly to the values that were being threatened—showing how reforms might actually help to advance them. For example, when the Riverside narcotics manager sought to change division norms that emphasized *quantity*, he framed the change not as conservatism born of the desire to cut down on error, but as a more strategic approach to effectiveness. And when Normandin tackled IA reform, he framed it as an opportunity to strengthen officers' rights and to demonstrate that most complaints were unfounded. By contrast, Fortier and Blakely approached Riverside's complaint policy with a single-minded focus on reining officers in, and the result was an explosive backlash that spilled over into the political arena. The strategies used in these two departments vary in many ways. But among the most important ways must be the room each made for competing values—the fox-like attention to both officer values and political concerns in Lowell, and the more determined pursuit of political concerns in Riverside.

4. The Public or the Expert

A final recurrent conflict in these cases derives from a more explicit value of the political realm. Representative institutions like city council and the mayoralty exist precisely to provide popular control over governmental affairs, so responsiveness to citizen desires is a central value that governs them. Even city managers in council-manager forms of government may feel closer to political winds than their subordinates and more readily embrace responsiveness. Administrators increasingly share this value as well, touched as they are by the very themes of

"customer service" and "partnerships" that this study has explored. But they also pledge allegiance to other values that limit their freedom to accept community direction—notably the value of expertise, closely aligned to a detachment from lay opinion that has neither the knowledge nor the impartiality to understand the consequences different choices may have. "Every profession," Everett Hughes explains, "considers itself the proper body to set the terms in which some aspect of society, life, or nature is to be thought of, and to define the general lines, or even the details, of public policy concerning it" (Hughes 1963: 657). Put bluntly and no doubt too simply: To the extent that professionals and their near cousins put their faith in the conclusions of their peers and the ideal of dispassionate intervention, they lose scope to respond to client and public concerns. *In extremis*, professionalization of the public service appears as "a technocratic distortion of democratic values" (Schön 1983: 340). More moderately, the professional posture puts its adherents at odds with politicians and others for whom responsiveness is a central value.[97]

The ideal of responsiveness is a broad one: Because politicians *represent* citizen concerns more or less abstractly (less when citizens call about specific problems), their calls for a police department that is responsive to the public is at the same time a call for a police department that is more responsive to *them*: Thus the idea of responsiveness is tied to the broader theme of political accountability and popular control of administration. But I believe that the conflicts over this broader conception of responsiveness can often best be analyzed in terms of the more substantive political values I have already examined in this chapter, so such instances will play only a

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[97] When both values (which I consider central to democracy) do indeed exist strongly, this conflict arises regardless of the administrative framework. To take two polar opposites: Juridical democracy puts strict limits on politicians' ability to respond to citizens, loading the exasperation on their end; while machine politics frustrates bureaucrats' aspirations to autonomy. The tension is only resolved when one side or the other internalizes the norms governing the other side's actions—when, for example, machine politics stunts professionalization, or juridical democracy molds technocrats in city hall.

secondary role in this section. Instead I focus mostly, though not entirely, on politicians' views

about how responsive police should be to *citizens*, and the ways in which those views create

tension in political partnerships.

A clear example of the dynamic I *do* have in mind comes from Lowell, where longtime

Chief Richard Sheehan found himself increasingly uncomfortable with the neighborhood-oriented

direction city hall was taking. Sheehan was a staunch opponent of community policing and the

idea of citizen input that came with it, and many LPD members explain that their department had

almost no tradition of taking community suggestions seriously. (One puts the matter curtly:

"Never, ever did anybody listen to the community. Never. It just never happened. 'Yeah, all

right. Get out of here before I lock you up,' that kind of attitude."). But city hall had begun to

work more closely with neighborhood organizations, most notably by assigning a liaison to

community and business groups who worked out of the city's Community Development

Department. City Manager Richard Johnson explains:

> We really were doing an extensive amount of neighborhood work. The administration and the
> council and the mayor and everybody was really encouraging the development of neighborhood
> organizations, so that you had and you have today very strong neighborhood groups who are
> organized, who meet on a regular basis. And a lot of them initially started because of the crime
> issues, because of the drug houses, the prostitution, the prostitutes in the neighborhoods and crime. .
> . Most of those neighborhood meetings, when I first attended, were all crime. People were talking
> more about crime incidents than anything else.

Given the neighborhoods' concern with crime, Johnson quickly tried to get the LPD involved.[98]

And the LPD did oblige the Manager as he went to the neighborhood meetings: "The Chief would

come with me. He would bring his personnel with him that were working those neighborhoods."

Still, the collaboration was not all it might have been: "Chief Sheehan was working with what was

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[98] Similarly, Moose describes Portland's program for community policing as a response—at first grudging—
to the mayor's desire to "to open City Hall and other bureaucracies (including the police) to the regular
citizens of Portland."

happening, wasn't overly excited about it, but at the same time, I think he recognized that it had to happen. . . I'm not saying that Chief Sheehan fought [community policing], but he didn't accept it readily." But many city officials report that Sheehan's reluctance to let outside groups have input into police decisionmaking caused tension with city hall and contributed to his early retirement.

Resisting the Call for Responsiveness

Riverside repeatedly faced a similar conflict, as many police decried outside input as "interference." That belief put a serious strain on their relations with the city council, which saw police as an important arrow in their quiver of constituent services. Many council members may never have fully realized the extent of police dissatisfaction with their requests. But each side had markedly different views about what role citizens and their representatives should play in administration, and failure to pay heed to the police view on this question led to enduring resistance that plagues Riverside's system to this day. In contrast to the council members, police themselves felt seriously torn by a relationship that violated their sense of autonomy, and Riverside's new Chief has vowed to put the breaks on council's influence.

The most visible conflict centered around the decentralization of patrol operations into areas, a move intended to create a link between these new police units and the community. City council members were and are extremely positive about this effort, which created a rough match between policing beats and city council wards and made it possible for city council members to join each area's problem-solving team. In part, at least, the area commands were *designed* to create this relationship, and departmental policy was changed to authorize council inquiries at any level of the chain-of-command. "That type of involvement really fosters what I mean by community policing, which is that we're all one community," Blakely explains, referring to the growing dialogue between city council members and area commanders. "We're all different facets, but we're all one community working to resolve the same issues." The five policing areas

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did not match perfectly with Riverside's seven council wards, but in most cases, the bulk of any given ward was under a single area command, giving council members a new point of access into the police department; previously, they had little choice but to talk directly with the Chief or his assistant. The result was a growing relationship between individual council members and (for the most part) individual area commanders, as well as the officers who reported to them.

Council members saw the relationship as a way to accomplish several things, but its contribution to constituent service—and thus the central value of responsiveness—was crucial. An open dialogue with area lieutenants gave council members an effective new way to relay constituent concerns to police, bringing up issues ranging from lax traffic enforcement, to problem properties, to drug labs. More simply, many council members saw the relationship as an opportunity to learn more about what their police were doing so that they could respond to the inevitable questions from ward residents—questions about everything from yesterday's neighborhood shooting to the progress of a long-term anti-prostitution effort.[99] Thus council members saw their dialogue with area lieutenants largely in terms of its contribution to their constituent service.

Area Lieutenants welcomed some aspects of these emerging relationships, but overall they were much less enthusiastic about them than the council members were. The basic issue as many police see it is that elected officials do not properly appreciate the role that law enforcement should play, and consequently they "want to divert resources in ways that we probably wouldn't

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[99] Council members' own authority to pass laws and fund projects also made it possible for them to make their own contributions to some of the RPD's larger problem-solving efforts. For example, Beaty has recently helped POP officers think about how to deal with a concentration of downtown halfway houses that neighbors feel have begun to destroy their community. The problem, as Beaty sees it, is zoning law: "If you own a piece of property, a small home, you're allowed to keep six unrelated people in there without any permission, and without any conditions of use." In response, he has begun working with the area's state assemblyman to try to pass legislation that would give cities some power over these sensitive land uses.

use them," as one puts it. Another officer argues the point more bluntly: "Elected officials don't

really have any conception of what the police department does. They should let the police

department, the chain of command make these decisions." Even people like Assistant City

Manager Larry Paulsen, who supports the growing dialogue between police and elected officials,

recognize the potential for problems. "It's something you try to keep control of," Paulsen

explains.

> Because in a council/manager government you're sort of trying to avoid those pitfalls of . . . just
> [being] directed by local officials without any program or policy . . . . I've worked for City Managers
> who really didn't like elected officials to talk to department heads and give them directions. And
> you take a couple of steps down to a person who is not used to dealing with an elected official, and
> all of a sudden your lofty politician wants so and so. [The person says,] "Yes, sir. Yes, ma'am. I'll
> do that right away." And it may be something totally outside the policy of the department or the city,
> or not within the perimeter of what they're supposed to do.

Even more seriously, police seem more likely than council members to see the difficulties with the

ideal of "responsiveness," which can amount to capitulation to the powerful. In this view, political

partnerships embroil police too directly in electoral politics, as council's need to solve problems

for their voters and financial backers leads to more and more insistent requests for police

assistance. In any case, it conflicts directly with the independence police need in order to base

their actions on professional judgments. For example, one Lieutenant maintains that council

members have tried (unsuccessfully) to influence police recommendations about the conditional

use permits for individual bars, which they had based on their analysis of potential crime

problems:

> We are asked to evaluate a request by a business to set up in an area. The Planning Department
> routinely sends us requests to review something. There have been occasions when a request to open
> a bar in a neighborhood comes before us. We do the analysis to find out if a bar here had been a
> problem before. And if so, we recommend against it. Sometimes it goes against the political wishes
> of the council person, and we get a call from them wanting us to change our opinion and
> recommendation on this planning issue.

Incidents like these lead police to view the entire police-council relationship as unethical. "I know

the intentions are there to maintain a very professional and ethical police department," one

Lieutenant explains. "But the intentions are one thing. The reality is if political and influential

people in the community have an increased amount of say in how the department is run, you are

skating on the thin edge of unethical practices. It's just not good."

City council members insist that there is nothing unethical about their growing relationship

with the area commands, and that it is not only appropriate but essential for them to have a

constant dialogue with police because of the demands their constituents put on them. For better or

for worse, when many citizens reach out to city government, they begin with their city council

member, and council must at the very least be well-informed. One council member argues the

point as follows:

> As a politician, you can assume a role with the Lieutenant in not providing direction, but being part
> of what's going on. Because you know that people *do* turn to the politician, because they're like
> representatives every time something happens. A good example was there was a shooting last night:
> Two officers were on tour, in a domestic violence situation. The man had a knife and he came at
> them with the knife. He was killed. I know the people on that block. [The area Lieutenant] left me
> a message on my phone, so when I got up this morning I knew.

Another council member makes essentially the same point. "If we wake up in the morning and the

phone starts ringing, and we haven't read the paper yet and there's something kind of important in

there that happened, we want to be forewarned."

Nevertheless, these arguments sidestep the question of professional autonomy by framing

the political partnership as a one-way street—police keeping council members informed. That

picture simply does not represent the full spectrum of Riverside's experience. Riverside Mayor

Ron Loveridge is more forthright in engaging those cases—clearly common in Riverside—where

council members (himself included) *do* suggest what course of action police should take. In his

mind, the police complaint that outside input "misdirects resources" often rests on an inflexible

view of professional wisdom; what some call misdirected priorities might look to others like

innovations:

> When I was a councilman, you wanted some attention to downtown crime problems, so you develop
> a downtown foot beat. Is that misallocation of resources? Well, if your objective is solely response
> time in responding to calls, I guess you could argue that a downtown beat officer is a misuse of
> resources. Or, I was very instrumental in this whole business of bike patrols. They do things in

police work that you couldn't get done otherwise. Are they a misuse of resources? I don't think so. Maybe some do.

Several elected officials make similar arguments, suggesting that the controversies over political influence were simply the normal tensions that all police face as they are asked to think more broadly about what constitutes a safety concern and how to deal with it effectively: Recognizing that responding to citizen ideas can mean violating standard professional practices, these council members try to modify the professional conceptions directly. Several of these efforts spilled over into academic controversies about whether or not interventions Council suggested—like neighborhood watch or mounted patrols—did or did not increase safety at an acceptable cost, with each side pointing to studies that backed its position.

But in many cases, there is simply a bare conflict between responsiveness and police autonomy. Loverage continues his argument by simply appealing to the importance of constituent service:

> A councilman gets a call about a crack house. Calls Vice up and that gets some attention. Is that a misuse? I don't know. Clearly, you can misuse police power, but I find in most of the calls [council members] tend to make, they're responding to calls to *them* [i.e., from citizens]. I compare council members and to some extent the mayor's office to a hotel operator: You wait until the red light comes on and plug in and see what you can do. Now, is that a misuse of resources? I don't know. I don't think so.

Here Loveridge admits the difficulty of the problem, which boils down to a value judgment about whether responsiveness is appropriate. But his own sympathies as an elected official are clear.

Pressing a Strong Case too Far

Some council members apparently recognized this essential conflict and developed their own strategies for mitigating it. The attempt to engage police on their own terms by entering professional and academic debates is one example. Another comes from council members who simply accepted the fact that area Lieutenants might have to "back off" from their relationship with council members because of orders from their superiors. Finally, one council member who

recognized that police might often see suggestions as meddling tried to pose them in a way that would not incite that reaction: "Ninety-nine percent of the time, I try not to frame that in such a way as to put the police over here and put myself over here," the council member explains.

The area lieutenants, however, felt that the decentralization into areas had not included any safeguards that would protect them from interference with their professional duties. They believed that Fortier expected them to handle essentially all issues council members raised. One Lieutenant goes so far as to say, "With community-oriented policing, the Lieutenants answer mostly to council people. Those are our bosses." Fortier himself insists that he set clear limits to political influence: "The message that I sent to the area commanders was, 'You call the shots on police service. Don't get yourself in a confrontation with a Council member, but if it really gets to loggerheads, let somebody know and we'll deal with it administratively.'" But many department members did not get the same message, and they felt extremely uncomfortable with their political partnerships as a result.

Thus the new system contained a serious tension. It clearly made room for the value of responsiveness—it was directly *designed* to facilitate community input—, so it did become quite popular with city council members and in their minds improved their partnerships with police. But police believed that they no longer had the independence necessary to make decisions based on their professional training (for example, the analysis of new bar permits based on prior crime rates). The first team of Area Lieutenants sought to uphold their values through sheer force of will, but they increasingly felt they were engaged in a lonely fight, and the sense of abandonment by their superiors led to a sense of anomie: They felt in a very emotional way that central values of policing had been lost. For example, they worried that the group of Sergeants right behind them—many of whom were promoted quickly under Fortier—did not have the same sense of

professional integrity that they did, and that without it political partnerships might slide into

corruption; one Lieutenant explains:

> We went through a developmental process [referring to himself and others of his rank]. The present rank in this department went through a developmental process to where we understand what our limitations are legally, morally, ethically, and professionally. We're educated. The people coming behind us aren't. They haven't gone through that process. . . . You could end up very easily with corruption.

Another makes a similar point, based on the idea that newly-promoted Lieutenants will not have

the job security needed to stand on a firm set of values:

> A newly promoted Lieutenant who's an area commander is not going to recommend something against the wishes of his or her council person. I have done that: I've been called upon to interfere in the criminal justice process in favor of an individual, and I am secure enough in my position to say 'No, I won't do that.' But a person on probation may not be that secure.

Another Lieutenant captures the overall point well, arguing that the state of flux that policing finds

itself in makes it very difficult to stand firm on a clear set of values: "The values are kind of

changing, and no one has really defined what they are anymore," he explains. In all these

quotations, we see police who feel that their basic values have been sacrificed to the mantra of

responsiveness, and the result is a deep sense of emotional malaise.

It is not that a responsive posture never serves ends that both police and city council

members might agree are important. But the assumption that political input amounts to

"interference" is strong and pervasive enough that reformers must take special steps to show how

their proposals serve police values. In Riverside, the move to improve responsiveness was

attempted by fiat: The changes in departmental policy regarding council inquiries, the

decentralization into areas matched roughly to council wards, and exhortation. All of these

strategies presumed what police found most problematic—that responsiveness was a positive

virtue and that the values that competed with it (like expertise and autonomy) were outdated. In

the end, Fortier's perceived failure to address concerns about political interference proved

damaging to his decentralization effort, and ultimately to the quality and stability of the political partnerships it tried to forge.

Another Strong Case Pressed too Far: Politics and the Police in Albany

Police resistance on this score is not always so absolute, and even in Riverside Lieutenants argue that they do not oppose responsiveness when it involves partnerships with the community rather than control by political leaders. But the distinctions can be subtle, and the tendency of police and political leaders to view the same proposal differently—for police to see untoward "interference" where political leaders see healthy "responsiveness"—is precisely the problem most in need of attention.

In Albany, for example, police repeatedly complained about the extent of Mayor Jerry Jennings's influence over the police department, and this issue was central to his growing disagreements with Deputy Chief Robert Grebert, community policing's architect in Albany. "The relationship went downhill from [my first day]," Grebert says of his rapport with Jennings. "I guess I'm fairly independent. Like when you get to a hostage situation and the Mayor wants to take the phone out of the negotiator's hands. You appreciate his support at a scene like that. But he shouldn't be the hands-on person there. So we had four years of these sorts of things."

In some cases Jennings's influence may have actually improved APD proposals by imparting them with his politician's sense of community concerns and its social geography. But he sometimes pressed his own position too far, in the sense that he alienated police and undermined *their* distinctive contributions to reform. For example, when the department and an umbrella group of neighborhood associations proposed a new Community Police Council that would provide a forum for neighborhood representatives in the APD, the Mayor broadened the proposal's focus, including not just the leaders of Albany's neighborhood groups that had been proposed but also several non-neighborhood constituencies (such as the clergy, citywide interest

groups, the school district, and the common council). More sensitive to the city's political landscape than either police themselves or the neighborhoods, Jennings saw better than APD managers the diversity of interests that an advisory body should include.

But the Mayor's actual appointments to this body struck many police as political favoritism. "I was surprised to see many of the same faces on this as on many of the other police-related committees," Grebert explains. "We certainly appreciate people's commitment, but we were looking for some fresh faces to work with." While he admits that Jennings did not leave any important constituency out of the Council, Grebert argues that by dipping entirely into the world of active political players, Jennings created a council whose members were not fully invested in it. "I don't think I've heard, 'Gee, we've been left out. What I have heard is, 'Gee, I couldn't make it because . . . I'm also on the community police relations board [a ten-year-old board that reviews complaints against police] and I had to go to that meeting last night.' . . . Four or five of the people who were on that group were also put on the community police advisory council." By paying attention only to the political landscape, Jennings produced an administratively unworkable body that did not speak to the police vision for the Council.

In some cases political proposals *were* left open to change from police themselves: For example, the Arbor Hill station (described above) was born as a politically-driven proposal to answer a constant request from one important Albany neighborhood, but the APD's chief allowed Grebert to use it as an opportunity for widespread decentralization in the department: The new Arbor Hill station became one of four geographic divisions in the APD, each with significant autonomy from police headquarters. Grebert did feel that Jennings had not left enough flexibility in station size—as described above, police had a fixed budget that effectively limited how many personnel each station could accommodate—, but the Mayor and his Chief were not entirely inflexible with their initial proposal.

But in cases like the Police Community Council, Jennings's influence appeared less tempered to police. Their resentment over interference grew, contributing not just to the growing tension between Jennings and Grebert that ultimately led to the latter's retirement, but also to a general cynicism among officers that politics ruled their department. Jennings and his Chief were never fully able to convey the productive functions of political input in a way that police accepted (for example, pointing out that they themselves had expertise about the city's political landscape that rank-and-file police did not share). Indeed, they themselves apparently had difficulty distinguishing an acceptable degree of responsiveness from interference, leading them to implausible denials that the Mayor was controlling the police department at all. In this sense, they developed a tunnel-vision about responsiveness that blinded them to key police concerns over autonomy and expertise. The result was suspicion among many in the police department about city hall, and the loss of key proponents of professionalism like Grebert.

Incorporating Police Values in Portland

Portland like all these cases faced demands from its political leaders to become more responsive to the community: That call was the centerpiece of Mayor Clark's vision for the PPB and a main theme in many more particularistic council concerns, and if the Bureau had not internalized it successfully it would have no doubt faced great tension with city hall, as in the cases of Lowell under Richard Sheehan or Riverside and Albany (at least those Albany managers like Grebert who pledge strong allegiance to the professional community) today. Portland's ability to do so hinged on its strategy of framing responsiveness as a way of fulfilling professional concerns of the police, and of ensuring police a voice in forums for community input so that they could defend police values communities might miss. To be sure, Portland has hardly avoided concerns about interference, as some officers believe their management is too beholden to political leaders. But such concerns are much more rife in places like Albany or even Riverside, and Portland has

had more success preserving space for the professional community to influence the course of reform. Indeed, the PPB is one of the leading examples of a community policing effort driven by the professional community and research, but at the same time it is a leading example—some believe *the* leading example—of an effort that has been responsive to community input. By examining a few examples of *how* the PPB internalized Clark's concern with responsiveness, it is possible to see what strategies of practice it used to combine these competing values in its reforms.

One of the most important PPB institutions for community input was its Chief's Forum, a body designed to give community representatives input into Bureau policymaking. The story of its development displays the PPB's institutionalization of responsiveness in microcosm, complete with all the potential conflicts this process creates for police. But it also reveals the attitude and design strategies PPB managers brought to this task, and the ways in which they mitigated conflicts.

As civilian PPB manager Jane Braaten explains it, the germ of the idea for the Chief's Forum emerged during Chief Walker's tenure, but it did not take shape until the month that Tom Potter took command of the Bureau: "The name Chief's Forum had cropped up somewhere in the summer of 1990," she remembers. "But the way that it was envisioned at that time was more of a very informal kind of a kitchen cabinet. 'I will call in some sort of business leaders in the community and meet with them periodically and those will be my advisors.'" Braaten was skeptical of that model, and she raised her concerns with Potter, who she worked under at the time in the Community Policing Division: "He and I talked and I said, 'I think that if they want to do that they should call it a different name because when you use the word Forum it conveys a different [meaning].'"

The conversation apparently stuck in Potter's mind, for as soon he was sworn in as Chief (on November 19, 1990), he immediately directed Braaten to get the Chief's Forum running:

So he called me in . . . and said, "I want something called the Chief's Forum. I have an idea of some of the players that I think should be involved in that. And I want their first meeting by December because we just had a property tax limitation measure passed . . . and we just can't wait. We just have to have them up and running so that they can begin advising us on this budget process." . . . So Thanksgiving weekend—I remember it well—, I was here all weekend, working on a concept paper for the Chief's Forum.

In writing the concept paper, Braaten tried to address a number of concerns that were surfacing about the idea at the time. On the police side, some Bureau members expressed concerns that the Forum would be a sort of citizen review board that micromanaged the Bureau and took an exclusively critical posture—that responsiveness would amount to interference. On the community side, concerns were raised that the Forum might just be a "rubber stamp" for the Chief's agenda—that responsiveness would be apparent rather than real. Finally, Braaten and Potter themselves worried about the caliber of participation: How could they ensure that members would take the assignment seriously and have clout in the communities they represented?

The core of the idea, which would hopefully address all of these concerns, was to have a Forum made up of diverse interests—including both the community *and* the police—in which each group got to select its own membership. Braaten explains that the Chief put police on the Forum in order to meet their concerns about creating an entirely critical and uninformed civilian review board; police, she argues, are able to raise issues like officer safety that citizens might not think of, and otherwise counterbalance citizens' lack of expertise about the subjects they address. For example, Braaten describes one instance where citizens initially condemned differential treatment of a Black and White suspect, but police on the Forum were able to convince their critics that there was more to the story:

It was over a weekend, and there were two separate instances. [In one,] two White people beat up one Black person. And then two Black people beat up one White person. The charges against the perpetrators were different, and there was a community perception, especially within the African-American community, that this was another example [of racism] and it was outrageous. I think one of the real community education pieces that was done in the Forum was that following Monday. While we couldn't talk about that investigation, . . . we were able to have this discussion about, "Theoretically, let me tell you what it takes to bring charges of assault, and what it takes to bring charges of attempted murder, so that I can explain to you why those charges might be different." What that did was it sort of took the lid off this boiling pot, and [one Forum member] said "Oh,

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okay, that is information that I didn't have before. There may be more information than I know right now. Let me kind of simmer down and find out more." It was a very dramatic moment in that group.

Police amount to one-third of the membership on the Forum, so theirs is not a token voice in the body, and Braaten argues strongly against the practice of many other police agencies that create similar bodies without much or any police representation.

To deal with the opposite concern, that the Forum would be a rubber stamp for police projects, the PPB gave up control over the Forum's membership. Specifically, Braaten's paper outlined nine "areas of interest" that would be represented (including groups like "neighborhoods," "business," and "community"), and it designated a particular body or individual with the power to appoint the representatives for each area. (For example, "community" representatives were appointed by City Council members, and neighborhood representatives were appointed through the city's Office of Neighborhood Associations, which oversees and supports several quasi-official representatives of each of Portland's neighborhoods.) Since the Bureau had no control over *who* served on the Forum, it could not dictate what position the Forum would take on any particular issue. Moreover, the Forum itself could vote to expand its membership to include new groups (for example, it took this step for the elderly when that community raised concerns that it was not represented.)

Finally, Braaten tried to ensure a committed and powerful membership by setting a tone with the initial appointments. The Citizen's Crime Commission, which appointed the two business representatives, helped accomplish this goal when it announced its first appointment as Fred Stickel, publisher of the *Oregonian* and a well-known figure in Portland's public life. Braaten made sure other appointment-makers knew about the CCC's choice:

> It was sort of like signing a baseball team . . . . When I talked to people [I] name-dropped. And I said, "Well, for instance these are the appointments that have already been made," as a cue to people that that's what we are looking for. And it seemed to work. I mean, no one wants to be embarrassed in making an appointment either. And they really did a nice job of making good selections.

That is not to say that the Forum was stacked with pro-police partisans. For example, Mayor

Clark's initial appointment was Richard Brown, co-chair of the Black United Front, and someone

who had been a strong critic of the police. Though today Brown works closely with the PPB on

many fronts, he candidly admits to having a different perspective in years past—indeed, to being

one of the many people in Portland who didn't think the police "do anything right":

> And one of the challenges for me early on was to find out what they *were* doing right. And when we
> started the police chief's forum, . . . I used to tell a story, my community policing story, after every
> meeting. That forced me—someone who had been jaundiced about what police were doing—to find
> positive things that the police were doing.

In any case, it was hard to argue that the Forum was "stacked" with police partisans with members

like Brown, who argued on behalf of communities that felt particularly slighted by them.

In its early years the 22-member Forum had a full agenda, since the transition forced the

Bureau to rethink many long-standing policies. Beginning with the budget issues for which Potter

had rushed its formation, the Forum considered subjects like hiring, use of force, and the Bureau's

drug enforcement policy. Though Forum input was non-binding, it was reportedly taken very

seriously. For example, when the PPB considered revising its drug policy, Potter consulted with

the Forum, and its members insisted that the policy explicitly state that police should pay attention

to neighborhood-level dealing; while the Drug unit had traditionally emphasized mid- to high-level

dealers, most Forum members felt that low-level dealing had the most direct impact on quality-of-

life. With respect to hiring, Assistant Chief Bruce Prunk maintains that he took Forum input very

seriously: "We're not going to make [a] policy decision, obviously, if there's a lot of public

resistance to it," he explains. In any case, a year into its operation, outside observers felt that the

forum did have clout; For example, City Councilor Mike Lindberg maintained, "It's clear that's

where the action is, that's where the power is. [Its recommendations] carry a lot of weight"

(Rollins 1991).

In the Forum example, Braaten and Potter designed police representation directly into their proposal, as a sort of counterbalance to potentially ill-informed citizen opinion. The result was a deliberative body with an explicit mechanism for incorporating police "expertise." But the expertise was not unquestionable: It was institutionalized together with the competing value of responsiveness. The resulting body was neither pure democracy nor pure professional self-control. But it apparently paid tolerable attention to both ideals, since political leaders consider it a powerful channel for community input, and police have not decried it as a capitulation. More important, the two values could each guide more situated deliberations (for example, the controversy over differing charges between the two black and white suspects), and many of *those* events have come to a conclusion all sides accept tolerably well. Less balanced advisory bodies in other cities have not had the legitimacy needed to perform this function.[100]

In other cases, Bureau managers have tried to synthesize the two competing values by seeking to frame participation as a *means* to realizing some professional end. For example, as PPB managers took their first steps towards community policing, they sought to provide widespread community input through a series of open forums and through participation with the city council. But they did not describe these efforts simply as deference to the will of the community: They (and particularly Deputy Chief Tom Potter, who led the effort) framed it as a way to build unflagging outside support for a particular reform that many department members and the profession as a whole favored; and—perhaps more important—as a way to build some stability into the direction of a department that had been plagued by leadership turnover. Assistant Chief Bruce Prunk explains the reasoning as follows:

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[100] For example, Riverside's Law Enforcement Policy Advisory Committee, whose members are appointed entirely by city hall, reportedly has little clout or even visibility in the city (Pitchford 1993).

> You can change chiefs, as long as you tell the organization that no matter who's in charge or where you go to work, this is what we're going to be doing. So you don't get that "this is a passing fad" philosophy where people can say, "I'll wait this out. I'll wait this sergeant out. I'll wait this lieutenant out. I'll wait this captain out. When they leave this all will go away." .... This was a partnership between city council and us—us being police management and the community. We're saying, "This was passed by ordinance, this is the policy of the city, this is the policy of the organization. It doesn't matter who's in charge, this is how we're going to do business."

Assistant Chief Davis Williams reinforces the special importance of outside support in this strategy, explaining: "It was important to get a buy-off from all of the politicians and all of the community leaders, including the citizens. Because . . . as mayors and council members come and go, police chiefs come and go, you've got something that has been supported by council resolution that says 'This is what we think is important for this city.'" Such reasoning (echoed in Moore 1995) was apparently convincing at least within the team committed to reform. It offered a view of the role of community participation and public accountability that spoke to a need of the reformers themselves—how to institutionalize their efforts in a department that had been plagued by severely unstable leadership.

It was precisely this bridging ability that never arose in places like Albany and Riverside. Both places clearly had high-level managers (like Fortier and Blakely in Riverside and Tuffey in Albany) who were sympathetic to political demands for responsiveness—indeed, so sympathetic that some members of their departments believed that they had completely abandoned competing concerns. But they apparently could not convince many of their subordinates of their concern for *their* values of expertise and autonomy, precisely because of their single-mindedness about being responsive. The result was that neither organization ever fully institutionalized the new value. In Riverside, that failure was serious enough to bring widespread discord to one of the most important political partnerships, which has become at best problematic and at worst unsustainable. By contrast, Portland managers embraced the value of responsiveness without abandoning police claims to expertise or other professional values: Indeed, they were able to show how responsiveness could help managers realize some of their own professional aims; and for cases

where the conflict was truly irresolvable, they were able to develop an institution that made enough room for both values that each could be brought to bear on situated disputes. The result was an ability to maintain a viable political partnership without creating an untenable situation inside the PPB, even if some officers clearly feel that there is too much political interference with Portland police.

5. Political Partnerships and Police Values

It is perhaps still an open question what exactly effective practice in this area consists of: It is very difficult to determine precisely what distinguishes managers like those in Portland from those in other cities that have faced more trouble in shifting their organizations' basic values. The fox-like refusal to lose sight of competing values is certainly part of what distinguishes the Lowell and Portland teams from those in Albany and Riverside; and this idea is given some managerial content in institutions like the Chief's Forum, strategies like revenue-seeking, and arguments like Normandin's about the *benefits* of IA reform for police. Nevertheless, the clearest conclusion from these cases of political partnerships is probably not the precise nature of successful strategies but the value conflicts they must attend to.

In these cities, at least, political leaders repeatedly raised a fairly coherent set of concerns that centered on money, mistakes, and responsiveness. The traditional police departments they initially encountered usually offered up resistance to one or more of these ideals, to the point that conflict permeated the oversight relationship and undermined any possibility of a broad political partnership—the kind, for example, that is necessary for a strategic reform such as Portland's shift to community policing. Portland, Knoxville, and Lowell were able to internalize the values of their political environment and reduce tensions in their relationship with it. They became more concerned with revenue-seeking and fiscal conservatism; they took police mistakes and wrongdoing more seriously; and they relinquished some professional and organizational

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independence in the name of responsiveness. Those value shifts, in turn, enabled them to relax strain on the city budget, reduce the incidence of scandals, and improve direct constituent service.

Each of those functions are central to democratic government for the reasons I have already described. But with the exception of scandal-control, responsibility for them has traditionally been loaded almost entirely onto the political sphere rather than administration.[101] Political leaders, however, find that they can hardly fulfill this function alone. They face a problem of shared authority that exactly mirrors the one that led police to pursue their partnerships, though the values they want those partnerships to *serve* are quite different. Thus as police reach out to political leaders to improve their organizational effectiveness, they entwine themselves in purposes they never intended: The development of partnerships implies gaining the benefits of the resources political leaders control, but it also implies submitting to the norms and values that guide the use of those resources.

Thus the development of political partnerships is intimately bound up with a shift in the role of public managers in which they internalize important values traditionally given to the political sphere. There is a danger that some of these values may actually undermine the police's own mission, and many officers believe that danger became very real in Riverside and Albany. But the experiences of Portland, Knoxville, and Lowell seem to suggest that police can add these three political values to their aims without fundamentally compromising their core ideals. At least, that seems to be the conclusion in practice of many of the professionals who have maintained the strongest commitment to those ideals.

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[101] Scandal-control *has* been considered an administrative responsibility—one virtue of bureaucracies is supposed to be their precision—, but in practice many organizations have been unable to rein in their own mistakes, and the *de facto* burden of concern about them has been left to institutions like the press and political leadership (Sherman 1973).

CHAPTER 6: INTERAGENCY PARTNERSHIPS

1. The Success of Interagency Partnerships

The final type of tie I will examine is the interagency partnership: Relationships among

public sector organizations, each of which controls a wide range of resources that are often not just

useful but necessary to the others. For example, many city laws governing land use and housing

conditions have an important influence on crime, and they can be leveraged to clean up otherwise

recalcitrant problems like drug houses. But police today have no authority to enforce them:

Instead they must turn to building and housing code agencies, and in fact those agencies have

become among the most popular police partners for many "problem-oriented" police departments

(*e.g.* Eck 1990).[102] A wide range of agencies offer similar points of leverage and other resources

of use to police, and this roster includes youth service agencies, public works departments,

planning agencies, schools, and parole boards (Kennedy 1997; Goldstein 1990, 1977).

Interagency partnerships differ from community, business, and political ties in several

ways. The first difference, of course, is that the value conflicts they involve are different,

involving more directly than any of the other ties the many specific aims of public policy—in

particular, the relative emphasis on crime control as opposed to things like real estate

development, youth recreation, the rehabilitation of troubled citizens, and public health. But

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[102] Interestingly, until the 20th century police *did* enforce many municipal codes themselves (Monkkonen 1992). Their current problem of shared authority derives from the accelerating division of labor in municipal services.

interagency partnerships are also different because of their institutional underpinnings. This is so in two ways.

First, interagency ties do not find police in the same subordinate position as most community ties and political ties: Those partners relate to police as those who authorize public action to those who deliver it. While that distinction is not absolute, and in principle police can influence what their authorizers ask of them (Moore 1995), it is telling that almost all of the agencies that built community and political ties successfully made significant adjustments to their own aims. While most agencies did not simply "implement" the will of the community or the polity but instead elaborated on the values articulated in those spheres, only a few departments built new ties in these areas by fundamentally shifting *partner* goals. By contrast, interagency ties are much more like private sector partnerships, where successful police did mostly distinguish themselves by catalyzing change in partner agencies.

But there are differences here too, and these differences reveal the second important attribute of the institutional environment for interagency ties, which is the relatively greater degree of structure and hierarchy that underlies it. Police had little direct authority over private sector "partners", so they had to develop creative strategies of influence like shaming and "training", or indirect controls like legislative change. Interagency ties, by contrast, exist within a more hierarchical framework. In particular, police and other government agencies in the same city obey a common master: The political leadership in their community. That fact has at least two implications. First, when outside agencies resist police overtures because of their commitment to different values, police can often appeal to political leaders to *force* the other agencies to comply. Second, agency mandates naturally have *some* coherence that derives from the overall political program of their city. One example is Albany, where a new Mayor brought a "quality of life" focus to *all* city agencies; another is Fremont, where the City Manager championed broad reforms

about "reinventing government," "focus on the community," and "breaking down agency silos." Under circumstances like these, police find that many partners in city government are, relatively speaking, more predisposed than one might expect to accept the purposes they want to advance through their partnerships.

Thus compared with community partnerships and public-private partnerships, cooperation among the agencies of local government transpire in a more structured context—less a state of nature and more a world with "a common power to keep them all in awe" (Hobbes 1992: 76). Like political partnerships, these relationships are hybrids: Partly the voluntary cooperation of autonomous actors, but partly the ordered relationship of a hierarchical system. Interagency ties that *cross* jurisdictions—like the relationships police forge with county courts, state social welfare agencies, or district schools—do not have this character to the same degree. Indeed, the distinction between inter- and intra-jurisdictional partnerships will emerge as central in this chapter, for their relative difficulty and the strategies appropriate to each are quite different. Consequently, it is important for practitioners to recognize the hierarchy around them as a potential resource in improving interagency partnerships.

Some Methodological Considerations about Success

Partly because this resource can be so powerful, interagency partnerships turn out to be more broadly successful than the other types of ties examined in this study. That fact creates something of a methodological problem for the analysis, since it means that no really clear comparison cases exist: With only relatively successful cases to work from, it is difficult to establish convincingly which strategies and value shifts contribute to the development of partnerships. All of the strategies described in these cases are *associated* with success; but they might not be sufficient for it, since they may also be associated with (unobserved) failure. Moreover, it is difficult to specify the successful strategies in sharp detail without any comparative

evidence about what unsuccessful strategies look like. In other chapters, I have used this sort of evidence to clarify the differences between effective and ineffective practice, but here it is less plentiful.

I believe that the relative success of interagency ties in these cases is not simply an accident of sampling: My site selection, as described in chapter 2, made special efforts to identify two departments that had not reached the outer envelope of change, and they did in fact yield departments facing serious implementation problems (dramatic internal and external resistance in Riverside and a weak administrative legacy that held back several elements of change in Albany). Moreover, my site selection tried to ensure that at least some of the other four departments faced challenging environments for all facets of change, and indeed all but one of the cases I chose (Portland) operated in cities that had little tradition of interagency collaboration. But while these efforts to diversify the experiences I studied *did* yield clear comparison cases for most types of ties, they did not do so as well for interagency ties: Even departments that had trouble in those other partnerships were reasonably successful with interagency work. While it is not impossible that a different sample would find different results, it is also not impossible that modest success comes more easily in interagency relations than in other partnerships, and that truly "unsupportive" environments for such efforts are not very common.

Interagency Partnerships in the 1990s: Effects of a "Get Tough" Social Policy

I have already suggested one reason that might be the case, but that reason—the relative structure of interagency ties compared with other types of partnerships—is ahistorical; it can not explain the change over time that seems to have taken hold in most of these cities. I believe that this change hinges on the widespread national concern with crime and drugs that emerged in the late 1980s and continued into the 1990s, and the more general "toughening" of social policy that occurred over the same period.

That interpretation is supported by a fact that will hopefully become clear in the analysis: The success of interagency ties often resulted from changes in outside agencies, not on anything the police themselves did, and those changes seem to have been almost universally common in the early 1990s. As in each of the other types of ties, one of the most striking dynamics that accompanied the growth of interagency partnerships was institutional change—a closer alignment of values between police and their partners. But while for community and political ties this alignment typically resulted from institutional change in *policing*, and while for private sector ties it resulted from changes in other partners that police *catalyzed*, police interagency ties benefited much more often from institutional shifts that police themselves had little or nothing to do with.

For example, until recently, public housing authorities often saw themselves as housing of last resort, and their primary aim was to serve those who had no place in the private housing market—a commitment reinforced by a strong tradition of tenant's rights. But over the last decade or so housing agencies have become much more concerned with maintaining a stable environment for "responsible" tenants, and therefore with maintaining order in their developments. Langley Keyes noted the emergence of this trend in the early 1980s, writing:

> "Doing something" about problem tenants . . . has reemerged as an idea in good currency among those who monitor and participate in the future of large scale public housing in the nation's central cities. No longer are one's liberal credentials viewed as suspect if one argues that public housing is not housing of last resort, that some level of standards has to be enforced, and that eviction should be an instrument readily available to the local authority (Keyes 1982: Intro-7).

Today, the ideal of "housing of last resort" has been resolutely abandoned in national policy in favor of ideas like "income mixing", and over the past two decades HUD has allocated more and more funding to order maintenance (*e.g.*, the Public Housing Drug Elimination Grants) while simultaneously making restrictions on tenant behavior more strict (*e.g.*, the growing intolerance for drug use that culminated in the "one strike you're out" rule, which requires housing authorities to evict families in which one member—or even one regular visitor—is arrested but not even necessarily convicted on drug charges).

Consequently, many housing agencies have become much more attuned to the value of maintaining order in their developments, and they have reduced their commitment to values (like a dominant commitment to due process, or providing housing for anyone who needs it) that potentially conflict with that goal.[103] The result is that they are quite willing and even eager to cooperate with police to control crime in their developments. For example, Riverside and Fremont police have worked with local housing agencies to use the conditions attached to housing assistance as leverage to pressure problem tenants—not on rare occasions, but as a matter of regular practice on both sides. While such cooperation was not unheard of 20 years ago, both departments insist that the systematic use of this tactic was rare until recently. It may be that in the past, policymakers and practitioners for housing agencies were more likely to be uncomfortable revoking housing assistance for anything but the most serious lease violations, and that they simply found such an openly coercive role distasteful. In any case, HUD has recently encouraged a tougher posture through policies like "one strike you're out."

More broadly, recent years—and particularly the period around the early- to mid-1990s when most of these cases transpired—have seen growing attention to crime and safety problems at many levels of government and across many different regions. Surging public concern about crime, which dominated the top slots in opinion polls, led many cities to make crime their top priority, and spending at all levels of government swelled: Cities spent more on their police forces, states spent more on corrections, and the federal government passed the largest public safety bill since the days of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. This consensus

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[103] There were, of course, always conditions attached to leases that regulated the behavior of residents, so that it was never literally true that *anyone*, no matter how disruptive, could live in public housing. The point is simply that these conditions have become more stringent—so much so that for many housing agencies, the value of order maintenance has become coequal with or even superior to the value of sheltering the underserved.

around public safety also apparently manifested itself in new mandates for all manner of public

agencies. For example, these cases describe developments like planning departments newly

charged with controlling liquor establishments, public universities admonished to control student

delinquency, high school districts paying more and more attention to violence in schools, and

parole agencies becoming more hardened in their attitude towards what they see as an increasingly

recalcitrant caseload. With only a few exceptions, police have no need to press for these changes,

which whatever their intrinsic merits *do* make these agencies more receptive to police overtures for

cooperation. Independent of police actions, these changes emerge spontaneously from local

political leadership and the professional communities involved—though of course police

practitioners need to recognize these opportunities and seize them in order to make partnerships

actually happen (*q.v.* chapter 3).

Thus a fundamental shift in priorities washed over many of these cities during the time

period I studied, and social control encroached on ideals like universal service and rehabilitation.

The result was that police often found a willing ear for their appeals to cooperation, even when (as

was usually the case) those appeals centered on traditional police values of stronger enforcement

that many institutions might have rejected under a different climate of opinion. Even when police

faced initial resistance from some agencies (and that was not uncommon), they could usually

overcome it without much difficulty: Powerful allies like city executives were themselves

uncommonly sensitive to safety concerns and therefore willing to intervene on the police's behalf.

Practice in Interagency Partnerships

Nevertheless, there are *some* differences in achievement across these six departments, and

at least some of those differences seem attributable to police actions (rather than differential

changes in the police environment). In particular, Fremont police distinguished their efforts with

by far the broadest program of interagency cooperation, embracing not just traditional partners like

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code enforcement but also a wide range of social service and economic development agencies. Fremont faced no crisis of public safety like the other cities; instead its uncommon success seems to stem from the fact that Fremont police made the most systematic effort to build support among outside agencies and rethink how their own practices hindered interagency work. Moreover, Knoxville's repeat offender program assembled a wide range of agencies to target serious criminals in an uncommonly systematic way, and while part of this success seems attributable to changes in other criminal justice agencies, Knoxville police were also especially savvy at navigating the tricky waters of interagency agreements. The other four departments faced few glaring failures in their interagency efforts, but none accomplished the breadth of Fremont or the depth of Knoxville, and they were also somewhat less sophisticated in their strategies for building support. In the analysis that follows, I will try to unpack what exactly was distinctive about the strategies that practitioners in Knoxville and Fremont used to such effect.

Three Value Conflicts in Interagency Partnerships

But given the almost universal success of interagency ties (even if it was a success of many gradations), I will also try to identify what factors were common across _all_ these cases. I believe that the existence of some development that softened three important value conflicts was central. These conflicts involved the relative priority of crime control compared with other policy goals, how much responsibility police should have for dealing with less-serious safety problems (a variant of the "soft crime" conflict in chapter 3), and how to draw the lines around organizational domains.

Most important, all six cases found police and their partners struggling over basic missions—especially the importance of crime control compared with the core aims of other agencies, such as client welfare for parole and social service agencies, the encouragement of real estate development for planning departments, and the generation of knowledge for universities.

The ability to resolve these conflicts divided successful from unsuccessful partnerships: In the very few examples of failed interagency ties, police and their partners could never agree on how much weight crime control deserved compared with other missions, and the tension erupted repeatedly to undermine collaboration. But in the more common case of successful interagency ties, either police strategy, some outside development, or orders from city hall arose to bridge the gap between competing priorities. One pattern is exemplified by Fremont, where police re-examined their own priorities and found room to make changes in them. But the more common pattern found police much more in the mode of a hedgehog, all but ignoring their partners' aims. The growing salience of crime and the toughening of social policy conspired to make partners and city halls more receptive to police values, and from the police perspective, this development meant that many conflicts simply faded away no matter what they did. So compared with community, business, and political ties, such fox-like strategies were less necessary for interagency work, which benefited from broader social trends.

While the conflict over crime control dominated these cases, some of them also revealed two different value tensions. First, a few partners in a few cities showed *more* enthusiasm for controlling crime than police did. For example, several school districts were extremely concerned about improving discipline, and they made demands that police found excessive (mostly because of resource constraints, but in two cases for philosophical reasons as well); in these cases, police had to find a way to satisfy the partner's value or risk undermining the partnership. Second, most cities saw some minor tension about organizational domains—the turf issue of which agency should have responsibility for different policy goals (Levine and White 1961). In other words, independent of their substantive sentiments about how *important* different values are, organizations also have opinions about who should take responsibility for each. Most cities still face some tension around this question; indeed, paradoxically it seems to become more pressing to

the extent that other value conflicts decline. But in no case did it alone undermine interagency work, perhaps because these partnerships by definition span relatively *different* domains, so any overlap and resulting conflict are fairly minor.

Beyond these strategies specific to each conflict, some general points about interagency work span all three. In particular, the relative coherence of local government that I have already described is a resource police can use to manage all three conflicts (and it often affects them even when police ignore it). Conversely, ties that cross this important jurisdictional barrier face more difficult prospects and find fewer resources for police to use.

In any case, the fate of interagency partnerships is tied to the fate of these three value conflicts over the importance of crime control compared to other public goals, the limits on crime control itself, and the proper ordering of organizational domains. Resolving those conflicts, in turn, depends much less on police practice than in previous chapters. In the 1990s, at least, police seem to find a receptive audience for appeals based only on their own values. While a fox-like openness *does* seem to improve the odds of success and the scope of partnerships, as evidenced by the case of Fremont, less dramatic but still useful collaboration can succeed even among more single-minded police.

2. The Competing Aims of Public Policy

The diversity of agency partners and their missions has the consequence that value conflicts are extremely varied among different interagency ties: Each agency's distinctive mission intersects that of the police at a different angle, and a different conflict results. Consequently, it would be unwieldy to list systematically the different conflicts police face with planning agencies, parole boards, building departments, schools, and the rest of the diverse organizations they work with. These conflicts serve as a catalogue of the competing goals of public policy.

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It helps to simplify this diversity, however, to recognize that many of these conflicts have a common anchor in the police priority of crime control. For most police, bringing crime and delinquency under control is their *raison d'être*, the central aim that animates their work even if others elaborate or delimit it. But other organizations do not share this basic mission, and while they hardly oppose it, for them it plays second fiddle to the overriding concerns that motivate *their* work—encouraging new development, rehabilitating clients, generating knowledge, and so on.[104] The result is chronic disagreement across agencies about how and whether to handle different problems, particularly when doing so might undermine other aims.

For example, when police decide to refer a code violation to the building department, they typically do so because the offending building contributes to some serious problem of crime and delinquency—not, for example, because it is the most egregious structural or electrical risk. Even when they technically violate city codes, the problems police nominate often strike building officials as less pressing than much of the rest of their backlogged workload, which has presumably been ranked by its intrinsic danger rather than its association with criminality. As a result, police become frustrated with code enforcement's unresponsiveness, and code enforcement with police interference.

To be sure, not all agencies develop a strong, independent sense of their mission. To continue with the code enforcement example, Albany's unit sends inspectors out entirely on the basis of complaints, and it applies essentially no screening criteria to them. Without any autonomous workload to speak of, it is perfectly happy to follow up on police complaints, which

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[104] On the other hand, some agency mandates clearly do have more affinity than others do with police aims, and we might expect that these agencies would be among the most willing police partners. That is particularly the case of social control agencies that aim to handle legal and normative violations. Code enforcement is an example, and in fact police-code enforcement partnerships are among the most common in these cases, suggesting that the affinity of mandates does improve the odds that partnerships will succeed.

look no different from those made by private citizens. (Indeed, Albany's code enforcement system is uncommonly unspecialized: Most code violations are actually handled by the fire department, where firefighters receive 88 hours of training on the subject but have no other contact with the code enforcement community, and many firefighters apparently see this aspect of their job as peripheral.) But the exception proves the rule, for partnerships between police and code enforcement were initially much more problematic in other cities, where code enforcement agencies *did* make proactive inspections and rank outside complaints by "seriousness"—where, in other words, these agencies had an independent sense of mission that gave a normative cast to their workload choices. In these cities, police-nominated violations did not always look so important to code enforcement officials. Part of working in collaboration involved convincing code enforcement that these problems *did* deserve quick action.

This basic form of conflict—conflict about the relative priority of crime control and the diverse missions of other agencies—plays out in several ways according to the basic mission of each partner agency. Nevertheless, three factors helped most of these cities to manage it. First, in many cities the conflict has begun to soften in recent years, as growing concern with crime and safety has washed over a variety of public institutions: More and more, public agencies of all stripes have begun to view safety and crime control as not just desirable but as critical to their missions. Second, in some cities (notably Fremont and Knoxville) police themselves began to internalize the values of *other* agencies, moderating their own crime-control aims by taking account of such goals as youth recreation and real estate development; this strategy proved particularly important in interjurisdictional partnerships, a subject I will return to at the end of this section. Finally, conflict over agency missions declined in a number of cities as city hall took a more or less direct role in *forcing* police partners to pay more heed to crime control goals. Consider each of these three developments in turn.

Social Control or Social Service? Valuing Safety over Client Welfare

Knoxville's most successful interagency partnership—and perhaps the most innovative partnership of this type in these cases—offers a clear example of the first dynamic. The effort in question involved a growing collaboration between police and the local parole and probation system, which had responsibility for supervising convicted criminals who had been released or diverted from prison and for helping them to reintegrate into society.

For many years Knoxville police had little contact with the East Tennessee Board of Paroles and its brethren, like the Department of Children's Services, which supervised juvenile delinquents after or instead of their incarceration. For example, one DCS employee laments that in the 1980s, "we were all doing these jobs and dealing with the same people, but none of us knew one another. Back then, I didn't know anybody in the police department. So dealing with these serious kids on probation, if we needed [the KPD], we didn't know who to call." The Parole Board itself also had a weak relationship with the KPD, and it had trouble with basic tasks like getting arrest warrants served on delinquent parolees. (As a matter of policy, the Tennessee Board of Paroles does not allow its officers to serve warrants themselves, so the agency depends on local law enforcement for this service.) Much of the problem centered on a still-simmering feud between city police and the county sheriff's office, who shuffled this responsibility back and forth. But the fact that city police and the Parole Board could not work out simple problems like this one—and they have since been able to do so despite continuing poor relations between the KPD and the sheriff—suggests underlying distrust and disagreement between the two agencies.

Parole Board Director Jim Cosby, at least, confirms that idea:

At one point in time we were kind of viewed as an adversary [of police] . . . . We probably weren't viewed as enemies, but we were certainly viewed as, "You're the guys that let all the people out that cause us all these problems." And it was basically a lack of understanding of how the process worked, and what part of the justice system we occupy.

More specifically, parole's mandate to help rehabilitate its clients and help them make the transition back into society gave it something of the cast of a social service agency: While the parole board obviously cared about controlling its clients' behavior, it was also concerned with their welfare as individuals. The conflict between those two ideals is apparently what made the agencies seem like adversaries: To police, parole officers looked like advocates for the very people whose behavior they were concerned about; and to parole, the police sometimes seemed indifferent to the welfare of their clients.

One example of this conflict turned out to be a turning point in police-parole board relations. In the early 1990s, Knoxville police proposed an ID card system for new parolees. Under the police plan, newly-released parolees would be issued ID cards identifying them as convicted criminals, and they would be required to show these cards whenever police stopped them. That way, police felt, they would be alerted to the fact when they were dealing with serious offenders, and they would have valuable information about the conditions attached to their parole.

As Director of the Parole Board, Cosby remembers his initial reaction to the idea as skeptical, for he felt that the ID cards might unfairly label parolees as incorrigible. "I thought, 'Well, we'll put a brand on their head, a big 'P' on their head and brand them for life'," he recalls sardonically. At first glance, the effort looked to Cosby like one more police effort to "persecute" parolees, and it might seriously impair their prospects for reintegrating into society. The proposal therefore began life as another example of the two agencies' conflicting missions, and its prospects for success seemed dim.

But over a series of meetings with the police department, the Parole Board director began to change his mind. First of all, some reflection on his changing caseload convinced him that the parole population *was* in fact becoming more and more dominated by serious offenders for whom concerns about rehabilitation might unfortunately have to take a back seat to concerns about

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control. In Cosby's words, "I think one of the main things that convinced me was simply taking a

good, hard look at our clientele and the type of offenders that were getting out the door at that time

. . . Because they're high-profile offenders, and we don't have any choir boys and girls

anymore."[105]

But police did not simply benefit from sober reflection by the parole board: Cosby insists

that this KPD proposal seemed different, and that police were not being overzealous in their

proposal to target parolees.

> I was convinced that they were not trying to run a trail 'em, nail 'em, and jail 'em program, and that they were not out to persecute parolees. I think their attitude was one of overall focus on what's best for the community and what's best for Knoxville and the members of the public. It was not your traditional adversarial role. . . . I began to see that what was actually going on was simply a move to try to better serve the community. And after I realized that, it didn't take that long [to agree to the program]—a couple of meetings, two or three meetings I think.

Exactly how police framed their proposal to produce this sense in Cosby is unfortunately lost to

history. But it is clear that they softened the focus on control somewhat and took account of

parole's concerns about client welfare. In any case, Cosby began to see the KPD proposal not as

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[105] There is ample evidence about community corrections to suggest that Cosby is not alone, either in his changing caseload or in his evolving sense of mission. With respect to changing caseloads, a national study concluded that the population of probationers is made up more and more of people convicted of felonies rather than misdemeanors (Cuniff and Shilton 1991, cited in Petersilia and Turner 1993), and it may be that parolees as a group are becoming more hardened as well. With respect to changing missions, one scholar taking an historical perspective on U.S., English, and Canadian parole systems describes international changes that echo those in eastern Tennessee, concluding: "The supervision which, for advocates of the rehabilitative theory of parole, was primarily justified as an aid and assistance for the resettlement of offenders would come to be seen as a simple transfer of control from prison into the community (custody without bars). Supervisors [i.e. parole officers] would not, of course, be precluded from offering help and support, but the essential raison d'être would be an extension of control" (Bottomley 1990: 366). Other researchers concur, pointing to the "greater emphasis on surveillance and control" in community corrections (Clear and Braga 1995: 423), and noting that recent parole reforms have "de-emphasized the delivery of services and assistance while emphasizing offender accountability and issues of risk control" (Ringel, Cowles, and Castellano 1994: 317). Finally, well-known practitioners in community corrections have begun making statements about their missions that would have been unthinkable a few decades ago. For example, Barry Nidorf, Chief probation officer for Los Angeles County, argues that recidivism should not only be seen as a failure to rehabilitate the client, but also as a success in detecting his new offenses and thereby protecting the public. "Why isn't revocation and sentencing of a probation violator considered a 'success'? I believe it should be." (Nidorf 1991, cited in Petersilia 1993: 332).

an attempt to "persecute parolees" and interfere with their social reintegration, but instead a legitimate attempt to keep better tabs on an increasingly hardened population. Moreover, he began to see this emphasis on control as an increasingly-important element of his own mission—which in turn looked more and more congruent with that of the police. "Our mission statements are very, very similar as far as public safety and protecting the public is concerned," Cosby explains today.

Having mutually agreed to the system in principle, the two sides spent about six months ironing out the details. The program that emerged was relatively straightforward: When a parolee first meets with his parole officer, he receives a color-coded ID card that identifies the type of crime that landed him in prison and outlines the conditions of his parole—conditions like curfews he must observe, places he cannot frequent, and people with whom he cannot associate. When an officer stops a parolee on the street, the parolee must identify himself by showing his card, and failure to do so can be grounds for revoking his parole or attaching new conditions to it.

This effort quickly blossomed into a broad collaborative initiative between these two agencies, mostly focused on controlling repeat offenders. The federally-funded umbrella program that covered all these efforts (the Serious Habitual Offenders Comprehensive Action Program, or "SHOCAP") had gotten its start some five years before the ID card system. But while that program had sputtered along without major hang-ups, police and parole officials both agree that it did not truly flourish until the early 1990s—the time of the ID card system and Cosby's epiphany about his agency's mission. At that time, collaboration between the two agencies emerged on many fronts, including data sharing, a ride-along program for parole officers, several efforts to target different categories of repeat offenders, and a "team supervision" initiative that may enlist service providers and police officers to help parole officers monitor and manage their parolees. Indeed, collaboration between the two agencies has begun to snowball in a way that suggests that some sort of critical mass has been reached.

Because most of these projects involved controlling parolee behavior more effectively, it seems unlikely that any of it could have succeeded in a parole agency that saw its mission primarily in terms of parolee welfare rather than community safety.[106] Again, both of these values were always part of the parole board's mission, but until the relative emphasis on each changed—a trend that seems to be occurring nationally—, efforts at police-parole collaboration were largely stillborn.

At some cost of abstraction, it is possible to understand the KPD-parole story in a way that echoes many other police partnerships. As already noted, a parole agency may have some characteristics of a social service agency, particularly its concern with the welfare of its clients as individuals, as distinct from the welfare of the community they impact (which parole officers *also* care about, but which does not motivate them as exclusively as it motivates police). In this view, parole officers have an important job to do in helping their clients find services and resources, and even in helping them to gain autonomy, in order to further their rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Where a police officer gets most excited about a "good pinch," a parole officer gets excited about a successful client—one who has truly turned over a new leaf and provided justification for the parole officer's trust and aid. This concern for client welfare and development

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[106] For example, data sharing sought to put serious offenders in a fishbowl. State law had long required the parole board to notify local law enforcement agencies about new parolees, but the information had always been sent out as individual paper notices that a particular prisoner was being released. In that form, the information was practically useless for a fairly large city like Knoxville, which at best kept the notices in a file cabinet that did not facilitate any analysis. But as the Parole Board became aware of this problem through its growing dialogue with the KPD, it began to offer the information to the KPD by computer—at first on diskettes, and later through a remote server. The KPD's crime analysis unit quickly developed a sophisticated search engine for analyzing the data, making it possible to print out maps of parolee addresses for beat officers and for investigators to identify potential suspects in unsolved crimes by analyzing the database's location and criminal history information.

can conflict with the police concern about parolees' impact on the community, specifically its immediate level of order and safety.[107]

A similar conflict arises with several other types of agencies that we might call "client-serving"—including social service providers, recreation departments, and in some cases even regulatory agencies.[108] In these cases, like parole, one of the two competing values must shift: Either the client-serving agency must sacrifice some of its emphasis on client welfare, or the police must make concessions to that value. Knoxville's experience consisted of a mix of both of these trends, for the Board of Paroles reconsidered its priorities and police apparently took more care to avoid "persecuting parolees." But the endpoint clearly entailed more change from the Parole Board than from police.

Valuing Client Welfare over Safety

Fremont offers an example towards the other end of the continuum in a relationship between police and the city recreation department—one in which client welfare (specifically the

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[107] In the long term, of course, rehabilitation should itself improve community safety. But as a rule it seems that police like other professionals tend to view choices in terms of their *immediate*, not their ultimate consequences: Confronted by a delinquent parolee, police are not likely to give much weight to the possible long-term social benefit of giving him another chance—say, of choosing not to stain his record again in order to improve his chances of returning to a productive life. The police officer faces a need to control the immediate situation, and his central imperative is to meet that charge (Wilson 1968). In any case, the possibility that tipping the balance away from punitive aims and towards rehabilitative ones will ultimately improve safety is not an objective truth but a matter of argument: Should parole officials or anyone else wish to instill this sense in police, they need to convince them of its validity—just as the "broken windows" theory, while perhaps always "true", needs to be introduced as an ideal in the police cosmology in order to make "soft crime" a palatable focus.

[108] One way this can happen is when the object of regulation is seen not only as a potential violator, but as a constituent with needs. For example, in Lowell cooperation between police and the code enforcement department was scaled back after housing advocates argued that condemnation was hurting innocent families, whose apartment complexes were being closed down because of the misdeeds of their neighbors. (Note that here, the partner itself—*i.e.* code enforcement—did not hold the client-serving value, but one of its constituents successfully forced it to attend to it.) Another way regulatory agencies take on the character of

(footnote continued on next page)

welfare of youth, who the recreation department viewed as its primary clients) took the upper hand

to some order maintenance concerns. For years things had been otherwise in Fremont:

Maintenance and Recreation Director Jack Rogers explains that police regularly shot down events

his office proposed on the grounds that they might potentially create safety problems—that they

might bring together rival youth from opposite ends of town, for example; or simply that large

neighborhood events would upset neighbors and lead to noise and rowdiness complaints. "There

were times when I may even have hesitated calling the police department, telling them I was

putting together a big activity, because I knew they were going put the kabash on it," Rogers

remembers. "So you look around and you say, 'My job is to run some of these things and their job

is to avoid all risk.'"

But with the advent of community policing, Fremont police apparently began to relax

some of their concerns about safety and disorder in order to accommodate Recreation's intent to

provide youth with constructive activities. Rogers describes one recent example:

> We've had a debate with a citizen at one of our parks on closing the park and shutting off the lights
> [at night] because there's basketball being played too late, and they don't like the sound of this thing.
> And when [FPD Captain] Mike Lanam stopped [in]—I think I met him in the hallway a couple
> weeks ago—he says, "You know . . . we've come to the conclusion we'd rather have those kids on
> the basketball courts doing positive things there than shutting down this park at this point and
> pushing them out onto the streets."

Here citizen complaints provided police with a clear choice: Should they consider late-night

basketball games a case of neighborhood disorder (and possibly a technical curfew violation), or a

constructive outlet for youth energy? The former might seem to fit more squarely within the

traditional view of the police role, which is after all primarily concerned with maintaining public

order. But in the event the FPD viewed late-night basketball not as delinquency but as a

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client-serving agencies is by being captured by the objects of their regulation, as in the example of code
enforcement in Albany described below (cf. Bernstein 1955).

constructive activity—a view that obviously agrees with Rogers's own. Lanam's words about

"pushing [the youth] out onto the streets" seems to suggest that he began to see late-night

basketball not simply as a valuable activity that came at some price to neighborhood order, but as

something that positively prevented crime. This increasingly-common perspective synthesizes the

potentially opposing values and, like the broken windows argument, makes it that much easier to

institutionalize the new one: Youth recreation *becomes* order maintenance.

Of Hedgehogs and Foxes in Fremont: Safety versus Development. There is some

evidence, however, that what changed in Fremont was not simply police attitudes towards a

specific values like youth recreation, but their more general openness towards the importance of

other agencies' missions. In other words, Fremont police began more and more to abandon the

posture of the hedgehog in favor of that of the fox.[109]

Senior Planner Roger Shanks, who works for the city's Development and Environmental

Services Department, describes this change in terms of the "tunnel vision" he says police once had,

offering a useful metaphor for the hedgehog's single-mindedness. One example comes from

Fremont's City Technical Coordinating Committee (CTCC), which meets weekly to talk about all

new projects coming into the planning department for approval. Shanks explains the committee as

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[109] In addition to this change in their *own* outlook, Fremont police also made a diffuse effort to affect change in their partners through training. Most simply, the FPD invited employees of other city agencies (among others) to most of its own internal training sessions, so that those agencies "would learn about [community policing] and sort of make the same commitment to the thought processes that we're looking for," as one FPD manager puts it. Moreover, on two occasions the FPD invited back a consultant who put on *its* training specifically to speak to agency heads and some of their staff. The first appearance was simply intended to explain C.O.P.P.S. to the rest of city government—to help those agencies understand "what the police department was doing and why they were doing it," as the consultant puts it. "To build some expectations in the system about how the [FPD] was changing, and that that would mean that the interaction with the city would be changing as well." Later, the FPD brought this consultant back for a more novel approach to interdepartmental training—one that focused on community problem-solving in general, not just problem-solving by the police. As one FPD manager explains, "[We] asked her [the consultant] to provide training specific to those departments in problem solving. And once they understood what we said was community problem solving . . . , then we could speak the same language."

"a chance for projects to get up there and get thrown in front of a group" so that different agencies can comment on the projects.[110] Fremont Police participated in the CTCC for years, but Shanks insists that in the past, police focused too narrowly on their own concerns in these deliberations.

> The PD was always opposed to this and opposed to that, and [saying], "We don't want this kind of housing because it is going to bring crime. And we don't [want] multi-family because that is a crime breeder. Small lots are bad. The shopping center is bad." Always looking at it from a negative stand point—"What is the impact going to be on us?"—and not really looking at the overall intent of what the general plan said [or] what the ordinances said. Looking at it from strictly a PD stand point and not looking at it from a city wide stand point.

Shanks does not articulate precisely what it is that police concerns about safety threatened to sacrifice. But his focus on the ways in which police try to *block* new development—that they were "always opposed to this and opposed to that"—suggests that his concern is with *facilitating* development. Though not unconcerned with crime, Shanks was more likely than police to accept

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[110] While I will use this example to describe the *problems* with interagency partnerships in Fremont's past, note that it already involves some interaction between planning and police—and that because planning had already qualified its commitment to development with the caveat that it should not increase crime inordinately. In Riverside, even this condition did not hold in years past, and *its* story of interagency progress for police and planning ends at the point where Fremont's began: Riverside Planning director Steve Whyld explains that until 1993, there was essentially no interaction between the two agencies, a circumstance he attributes to his agency's traditional mandate: "We didn't get involved on the social problems of the world and the crime," Whyld explains. "But over time ? ime became such an overwhelming issue, I think it was something we had to deal with as a city, [and that] included Planning." The crucial juncture came in the Spring of 1993, when City Council embarked on an effort to deal with bars and entertainment uses in the city (spurred on, interestingly enough, by concerns about a downtown nightclub close to the historic Mission Inn, which was undergoing a multimillion dollar makeover that would be the centerpiece of Riverside's downtown revitalization efforts). Under existing law, local government had little control over these establishments beyond generic state laws regulating alcohol sales. In response, council passed an ordinance that required certain types of establishments—including those serving alcohol or offering entertainment—to secure a permit that laid out conditions for operation and could be revoked if those conditions were violated. Thus planning's mandate came to include concern not simply for development that was *physically* orderly but also for its impact on social problems (*cf.* Gans 1968). Whyld quickly began soliciting advice from police on new developments, creating a system of police input that served the same purpose as Fremont's CTCC. It also faced some of the same problems: "We're all going through a learning curve," Whyld explains. "Police officials don't always know what planners do and what our internal issues are, and planners don't always know what police do and what their internal issues are."

the risk of somewhat more crime in order to facilitate new development, which he apparently saw

as an important part of his agency's aim.[111]

Today, Shanks is more optimistic, explaining that police strike a posture that he views as

more constructive, in that it takes specific account of his agency's aims:

> They have got issues. They have got very valid issues sometimes, but they are approaching it from an angle that is, "We need to work with it, we can suggest this, we need to see if we can work around this." There is a different philosophy. . . . We are now getting people in there that see a broader picture [in terms of] how the project works for the community, how it works from a design stand point, from a use stand point: The community stand point. Not just their needs, but the needs of engineering, planning, building, fire. So it is more than one area of reference. It is no longer just a PD issue, but it is how the whole thing ties together.

That posture apparently transcends the CTCC itself. For example, when police and planning

found themselves jointly considering concerns raised about a local Motel 6 that generated an

inordinate number of calls to the police, they were in substantial agreement about their basic

approach. That, in turn, was apparently because police considered the motel's continued financial

health as a basic parameter within which they had to work; one explains: "Let's take the fact that

we're not going to put Motel 6 out of business. Now how do we resolve the issue?" That

perspective absolutely echoed that of planning: As Shanks describes the problem, "Our job here is

not to categorically deny a project because the neighborhood doesn't like it, but to try and see how

we can solve the problems and make it a success for all parties."

The Knoxville and Fremont stories describe two models for the way in which interagency

partnerships arise. In each case, once-divergent missions converged, but through different

mechanisms: In Knoxville, changing values in the *partner agency* brought it more in line with

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[111] For the view of planning agencies as centrally concerned with encouraging development, see Goodman (1971) and Weiss (1987). Of course, not all planning agencies share this aim, for some cities take a positively anti-growth posture. In these cities, planning would no doubt *welcome* police concerns about new developments as one more way to ration growth. Goodwin and Weiss, of course, would not disagree with this view, since growth controls serve existing real estate interests.

police; while Fremont police enabled partnerships by broadening *their* aims beyond public safety

to include things like development and youth recreation.[112]

The Hobbesian Solution

Cooperation by Command. Several other examples—notably but not exclusively in code

enforcement agencies—found police actively influencing their partners' mandates by taking their

case to political leaders; elected officials, in turn, could put pressure on reluctant agency partners

by invoking their authority over them. For example, most of the RPD's efforts to win support in

other city agencies rested on intervention from high-level city officials, and police explicitly asked

for many of these interventions. This was the case with code enforcement when that agency

reacted slowly to projects police had nominated: The Problem-Oriented Policing Sergeant and

ultimately Chief Fortier brought the issue up with the City Manager, who reinforced the mandate

he had already given other city agencies to make POP projects a high priority. Deputy Chief

Blakely explains that similar if less explicit appeals were quite common with officers who tried to

craft solutions to neighborhood problems: "Officers were astute enough to know that if they're

going to get Parks and Recreation, and they're going to get Public Works, and they're going to get

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[112] There are many other examples of both patterns, but the Knoxville experience—in which partners
capitulated to police concerns—is more common in these cases: It underlies new partnerships Riverside
police developed with planning, parks and recreation, and the city attorney (each of which received a new and
explicit mandate from city council to focus more on crime); the partnership Albany police developed with
code enforcement (changes in the political landscape reinvigorated that function in the city, though the
Albany story is somewhat complicated); the ties that Lowell police developed with a variety of city agencies
(public attention to crime led council members and the city manager to direct all agencies to give top priority
to police concerns); and the relationship that Portland police developed with the DA's office (which shifted to
a philosophy focused on neighborhood quality-of-life that was similar to the police's own). Even Fremont
police clearly benefited from changes in their partner agencies, which apparently had their roots in a new city
manager who encouraged *all* city agencies to attend to other organizations' concerns, and in a city council
that formally resolved to make public safety a top priority in the city.

Code Compliance . . . they need some clout. And what's going to get that [is] inviting a council member for that ward."

Another example is Fremont, where City Manager Jan Perkins quickly became a staunch ally for the FPD, and she regularly used her authority to advance police problem-solving. Lieutenant Jan Gove remembers one example from the Irvington district of Fremont where interagency collaboration was key:

> One of the largest projects ran on my shift, under the direction of Sergeant Dean Cobet. It was a problem house in our Irvington area. The residence had more code enforcement problems than police problems, but several of the residents were on probation for drug offenses. The neighbors reported some drug dealing from the residence but were more upset over a number of other problems such as rats, fleas, junk, illegal structures, and so on. The residence was a neighborhood eyesore and health problem. We did a probation search of the house and the violations were so terrible it took code enforcement and about seven other city departments to clean up the problems.

Gove and the rest of her team sought cooperation from other city agencies, and while those agencies did not exactly resist participating, they did not initially start out wholeheartedly. "Not so much because they didn't want to do the work, but because it definitely does increase their work load," Gove remembers. Indeed, given that the project was something of a break from the past, it is not surprising that city departments needed a signal from above to authorize their commitment of time and resources. It is in this connection, Gove remembers, that Perkins's support was crucial:

> The key to making that happen was that in that particular project, the city manager saw the problem residence and how awful it was. She had a lot of influence getting cooperation from other departments. We had not been in C.O.P.P.S. long. We were learning about it, but we had not actually completed very many complex projects. The other departments weren't quite sure what was their role because we had mainly worked separately in the past. City Manager Perkins and Chief Steckler were right behind the project, and Perkins was able to make it work. We had one meeting with her and she came the night we did the probation search. During the course of the search, we brought in a number of other city departments for their expertise in identifying problems: Tax and License came because they were running a business from the house without the proper permits. Animal control came in for the vector problems, building inspections for illegal structures, the fire department for fire safety concerns. And code enforcement and the city attorney's office came and were very instrumental in the final success of the project. Once the employees present saw how committed Perkins was to rectifying the neighbors' concerns, we had full cooperation.

Thus with the city manager on board with C.O.P.P.S., many other pieces fell in place.

The partnerships in these examples are not voluntary but essentially mandated, and they point up a special characteristic of governmental partnerships that community and business partnerships do not fully share: Public sector partnerships exist within a framework of authority, and police can often appeal to that authority successfully when more voluntary efforts fail. Indeed, these cases reveal *no* examples where police appeals to city hall did not improve the collaborative effort in question.

The (Relative) Coherence of Local Policy. The coherence of local government—even if it is only partial—also underlies many cases where police did *not* play a visible role in the changing mandates of partner agencies. While city policies are hardly unified (Yates 1977), they are not entirely fragmented either (Stone 1989), for city leaders tend to push the agencies that report to them in similar directions.

In Lowell, for example, police did not explicitly *ask* city hall to direct code enforcement and public works to collaborate. But their own interest in a stronger relationship had the same source as their partners' willingness to reciprocate. City leaders had taken a growing interest in crime, which had begun to make front-page news regularly in the early 1990s, and they eventually pressured police to make significant organizational changes to respond to it. At the same time, the political leadership also directed *other* city agencies to give police their cooperation. Indeed, with the prodding of elected officials, many city agencies apparently developed a sense of shared mission around growing problems with crime. Most notably, then-Captain Ed Davis started up the new Centralville precinct (which was to be a flagship for the LPD's reforms) with a sense of empowerment, as he had received direction from the City Manager and a key councilman to do whatever was necessary to clean up the area's drug problem: "I knew that I had the support of the City Manager's office, so I kind of ran with the ball," Davis explains. In the event, the Manager did deliver, as the Lieutenant who took over day-to-day management of Centralville explains:

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We had the ability, through the City Manager's office at the time, to contact various agencies. And those agencies were instructed to follow-up immediately with the concerns of that precinct because that was the first one . . . . And that determined if we were to get additional grant money [Centralville was funded by a federal grant channeled through the state]. So everybody in the city got together and said, "You know something, if we don't stick together and take care of these problems as they come in, we're not going to get any more money and this city won't be a safer city to live in. And it could be a potential other city that's declining really bad."

The Lieutenant remembers this sense of collaboration as crucial, not just for Centralville but for the future of community policing in Lowell: "I can't downplay that position because that was the catalyst of everything that's occurred since then, that togetherness."

Albany offers an even more extreme example, for the strongly-centralized power of the Democratic machine has ensured that city and even county agencies were all on the same page: Since public servants worked as much for ward leaders as they did for their respective agencies, the "barriers" between different agencies were not especially salient. For many years this close collaboration came at a serious cost, in that different city and county agencies did not truly defend the values that made up their formal mandate. For example, many allege that there was all too much cooperation in the machine-controlled criminal justice system, which elected its judges, its county attorneys, and (until 1968) its DA with the blessing of the Democratic Committee; there are even those who allege that the Democrats influenced jury lists, pointing to a 1960s study that found disproportionate representation of city residents, Democrats, and party workers on both trial and grand juries (Robinson 1977: ch. 14). The result was a "partnership" across these agencies that undermined due process and legal recourse for many citizens (for example, the entire criminal justice system would mobilize against those who made unwelcome complaints against police) (Robinson 1977: ch. 13; Wilson 1968: 167 *ff.*). Code enforcement offers another example: Long-time building department officials explain that well into the 1970s, political leaders gave them explicit directions about which properties to inspect and which not to inspect, and many property owners reportedly became untouchable because of their support for the Democratic party. In this way, code enforcement apparently lost any sense of its role as regulator concerned with the safety

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of city buildings[113]—instead code officials had a mandate to *protect* individual property owners from regulatory harassment (for example, when increasingly-vocal neighborhood groups began to call for crackdowns on dilapidated structures). In these cases, close cooperation came at the expense of the distinctive values partner agencies were charged with protecting.

Outright corruption like this has reportedly died along with the machine, leaving Albany in a more desirable situation. It clearly still enjoys some of the benefits of close agreement among city leaders, for Albany's public service has remained a remarkably tight-knit community. For example, Code Enforcement Director Mike Whelan is a long-time acquaintance of both the Mayor and the Police Chief, who attended high school with Whelan's older brother. "There are a core of people here," one APD manager says of the city. "Although we have some big city problems, it's really kind of a small town in a lot of ways."

In particular, it is still the case that most agencies will in principle accept direction from the Mayor's office, and that responsiveness has enabled the city to embark on remarkably coordinated efforts like its quality-of-life crusade (in which police, the fire department, and the department of general services have teamed up to crack down on social and physical disorder along the lines of New York City's famous example). Cooperation in this effort even came from the county criminal justice system, which happens to be uncommonly responsive to city control—

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[113] This argument comports with that of William Berry (1984), who maintains that degree of professionalism largely explains how closely regulation conforms to abstract ideals: In his example of public utilities, the ideal is that rates should equal the cost of providing service; while in my code enforcement example, the ideal is that inspections and sanctions should be applied to the most egregious structural and electrical risks. Berry, however, emphasizes the "resources" professionalism offers (*i.e.* he believes that "a highly professionalized commission is able to use its information resources—and, in general, meet its objectives—more effectively than a less professionalized commission") (Berry 1984: 554). I prefer to emphasize the relative resilience of professional ideals—supported by strong socialization and existing ties to the professional community—against any outside influence that might sway them.

in part because the county democratic party serves as a bridge of influence, and in part because of

unusual legal arrangements (for example, Albany's Mayor appoints the city's police court judge).

This fact became evident when the quality-of-life campaign affected criminal justice

caseloads, which began to grow and change in character: Where previously Albany police handled

minor violations informally if at all, around 1995 they began bringing in cases of public lewdness,

open containers, and disorderly conduct in droves. The result was a marked jump in filings at the

local police court: According to records from the New York State Unified Court System, annual

filings rose from 7,500 in 1993 and 7,200 in 1994 to 9,500 in 1995, 9,000 in 1996, and 9,800 in

1997—despite the fact that serious crime actually declined during this period in Albany.[114]

The criminal justice system initially resisted some of the new cases patrol officers brought

in—from the point of intake all the way to the judges. For example, one department member

maintains that employees at the local jail complained when police first began bringing low-level

violations in for processing, saying that police were "wasting their time" with petty offenses.

Some judges at the local police court also reportedly chastised officers who brought minor

offenders directly into their courtroom for arraignments. But when top management in the APD

heard about these problems, they were apparently able to convince the judges and other justice

workers that police needed their cooperation by explaining the APD's new direction: The same

department members who report early problems in the justice system maintain that for the most

part, these problems have subsided. In any case, one suspects that the problem could have been

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[114] Some department members attribute part of the increase to the county's new 911 system, which was launched barely a month before community policing, but most believe that changing police priorities played a role as well. One statistic tends to support the police priorities explanation rather than 911: In 1995—the first full year of both 911 and the new community policing program—, arrests climbed by 20%, while calls answered climbed only 3%. (Part I crimes *fell* by 9% over this period.) A third possible explanation is the growth in the patrol force, but filings per sworn officer rose by 20% from 1993 to 1997.

worse, for Jennings had the opportunity to hand-pick the primary police court judge only a month

after community policing got started, and he openly expressed his intention to choose an individual

who could "deliver a strong message to the city relative to crime" (Jochnowitz 1994).

Philosophical agreement with the new APD program did not, of course, necessarily solve

the capacity problem created by heightened police enforcement. Jail space has not been an issue in

Albany, where county jails are so flush with cells that they have been able to rent out space to

other agencies like the Federal Government. But local *courts* have reportedly strained under the

growing workload police brought them—to the point that in the first two years of community

policing, courts disposed of a much smaller proportion of the filings brought before them than they

had in previous years. (Specifically, while police court disposed of 64% of its cases in 1993 and

73% in 1994, it disposed of barely half in the next two years of increased workload—52% in 1995

and 51% in 1996, again according to New York State Court records)

. Concerned about the city's growing caseload, the Mayor helped orchestrate a deal with

state government that would fund an additional judge for Albany's city court beginning January 1,

1997. As a result, the court's backlog apparently subsided: In 1997, the ratio of dispositions to

new filings returned to 69%, even though court personnel report that the workload strain still feels

severe. As part of its promise to fund the additional judge (who now works in temporary quarters),

the state asked city government to foot the bill for a new courtroom, and construction for the

addition is currently underway in an already-cramped police headquarters, which is where the

police court is located.

Thus while Albany's political system is more fragmented than it once was, it still has

uncommon influence over most administrative agencies. This influence, in turn, means that police

usually find their agency partners in agreement on basic goals; when they do not, they can appeal

to political leaders to help fix the situation—whether that means pressuring partner agencies to

accept police priorities or raising money that can relieve the tension between the two goals. It is possible, of course, that there is still too little commitment to the respective professional ideals in Albany agencies, which have less autonomous senses of their distinctive missions than in the other cities. If that is true, then attention to different public values may be more at the mercy of political leadership. Indeed, the courts themselves may offer an example: While they proved quite receptive to the local quality-of-life campaign, they have found themselves out-of-favor with their professional community, as a state watchdog group for courts recently criticized Albany's system for inefficiency and disorganization.

In any case, Lowell and Albany are the most dramatic examples of the way the relative coherence of local government facilitated interagency partnerships, even if questions remain about the legitimacy of those partnerships in Albany. But the basic pattern is probably more general: It stands to reason that interagency cooperation in local government will, at the margin, be more forthcoming than cooperation that does *not* exist within a similar hierarchy of authority—at least if police are willing and able to appeal to that authority.[115] That is because relatively speaking, city agencies often share an overarching vision that can soften the conflicts among their particular values.

Challenges and Strategies of Interjurisdictional Partnerships

That idea becomes particularly clear through comparison with partnerships *across* jurisdictional lines, where failed partnerships are more common, and those that succeed require

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[115] Academic literature on this topic may be correct to point out the difficulties, but its lack of comparative focus—*e.g.*, comparisons between interagency ties within and across jurisdictional lines, or between governmental ties and public-private partnerships—makes it too pessimistic, and leads most authors to discount or simply miss the enormous potential of appeals to political leaders. That potential, however limited, simply does not exist to the same degree when police try to forge ties with community groups, businesses, or even agencies in other jurisdictions.

different strategies from practitioners than those reviewed so far. Consider three examples in increasing order of their "success" from Riverside, Fremont, and Knoxville. The first is a problematic partnership between Riverside police and the local university in which value conflicts were never resolved. The second involves the use of substitute partners by Fremont police in order to cope with frustrations they had about the county justice system. The third involves the strategies Knoxville police used to secure cooperation from a wide variety of nonlocal agencies on information-sharing.

Data and Action in Riverside. Downright failure is not particularly common among interagency ties, but there was considerable unrest in a few RPD partnerships, and all involved partners outside local government—a fact that suggests the relative difficulty of partnerships that cross jurisdictional lines. One example involves the area school district, described below because it involves a different form of value conflict from the examples in this section. But a second example *does* involve disagreement over the importance of crime control. In this case, the partner was the University of California at Riverside, and its aim of creating new knowledge put the University at odds with more action-minded police, as well as a few other city agencies involved in the partnership.

This collaboration, like most in Riverside, emerged from the city's political leadership: In 1994, Mayor Ron Loveridge, who was also a faculty member at UCR, gave a public presentation to police administrators on the subject of gangs in the city, offering several programmatic suggestions and encouraging the RPD to identify new ways to deal with this growing problem. Within months, UCR faculty applied for a federal grant program focused on interagency strategies for dealing with gang violence, and police and about a dozen other city agencies signed on to participate. But while police report that the project "has been good for everyone involved," they and other city agencies became frustrated with the project's lack of action, which three years after

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its inception was still in the data collection phase. "I guess we're too proactive," one city official explains. "Let's quit talking about it; let's just do it. . . . Let's just get involved and do a pilot program in the community and make a difference and measure it." Or as one RPD member puts it: "They are interested in numbers and statistics, and we want a product that the officer is going to be able to use to promote officer safety, reduce crime, and help him do his job better in all respects."

> When we went into this partnership with the University on this whole gang thing, we had our own set of expectations over here, and that was that we were going to achieve something that was going to reduce gang related crime in the city of Riverside. [But] the University's expectation is that they are going to develop data, research data, and that they are going to be able to have access to all of our data to have research product. And so it has been at times difficult for us to make those two things match.

More specifically, the research-based planning process (which was mandated by the funding agency) apparently leaned towards the norms of the pure science model reviewed in chapter two—particularly the concern for causal explanation rather than policy analysis. In principle, the focus on evaluating an "intervention" privileged policy-relevant variables. But three more specific norms of pure science, all antagonistic to the value of policy relevance, encroached on that focus.

First, the effort took its bearings from a "root causes" perspective on delinquency that implied a holistic intervention. The result was a somewhat disjointed and confusing plan (as described below), and some of its elements—chosen for their association with root causes rather than their feasibility—struck city agencies as unrealistic. For example, referring to the intervention's focus on "opportunities" for delinquent youth, one RPD member argues that it simply was not in their power or domain of responsibility to affect this factor:

> We can't go out and be the youth intervention workers. You have a difference of opinion as to what our role is and should be, and what our mandate is under law . . . If someone's breaking the law, as a police officer we're not going to say, "Okay you need to contact so-and-so and get a job." We're going to arrest them.

Second, concern with a "replication" model of theory-testing led some practitioners to view the effort as inflexible and inappropriate to conditions in Riverside. One participant explains:

> They always kept using the model that he set up in Chicago, the Village in Chicago. And maybe there's different dynamics there—economic dynamics, and what the cities were able to bring to [the

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effort]. I don't think we have those things here. I mean, they hired a full-time employee to the recreation department in the Village to go out and serve as a liaison to the community. Hands on person—understood all the gang members. At a time when we just laid off 251 employees [in Riverside city government], I don't think we're going to do that. And there's no one out there [now]. Who's identified in . . . the Casablanca community [and the] Eastside community where the gangs are—who has been identified as the key person, the liaison in that community that could be the heartbeat to everybody?

Once again, a scientific practice designed to make causal generalization possible undermined policy relevance: The "intervention" was designed based on the need for cross-site consistency, not the availability of specific policy levers in Riverside.

These two problems arose from the federally-mandated research design, but a third apparently stemmed from a less concrete but still important commitment to scientific values. This problem was a relatively single-minded focus by the researchers on questions about data availability—an issue that spoke directly to their need to create scientifically valid indicators, but was not relevant to pressing practitioner questions about what the group would *do*. For example, one overview presentation for the task force devoted twice as many bullet points to data and assessment issues as it did to the intervention itself, despite the relative complexity and confusion surrounding the latter. The result was that practitioners became confused about the intervention's content and skeptical about its utility. "We're confused too," one responded when asked what the intervention involved. "We got there and said, what the heck are we doing? We meet, we talk about things, what is the goal? We've got $800,000 to do all these things, all we're doing is tracking information. And I finally came to the realization that was the goal, was to track information, develop a database so that you could further track."[116]

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[116] Thus this example, while too schematic to make the point strongly, is consistent with the position advanced in chapter two, which argued that pure science cannot function effectively in an applied context without alienating either practitioners or scientists.

UCR faculty eventually handed control of the project over to the RPD, but until that time they were apparently not responsive to these concerns from police and other agencies, who in turn had no recourse to higher powers the way they did in the examples described above. The result was uneven commitment among agency partners, and many attended meetings irregularly or sent low-level staff without much influence within their agencies, seeing the project goals of knowledge-creation (at least, one specific type of knowledge-creation) as tangential or even antagonistic to their own concern with action. These problems did not mean that the effort failed utterly; but over three years and $1.7 million into the grant, an RPD report on the effort described several key disappointments about both processes and outcomes.

Substitute Partners in Fremont. In other cases, police rebuffed through one channel have found satisfaction from another. For example, Fremont police regularly found frustration in the county criminal justice system, as the courts rejected many of the cases for which city police and the community wanted attention. The crux of the problem is that Fremont is a relatively low-crime community in a high-crime county: The sorts of cases Fremont sends to the county justice system tend to be less serious than those from its neighbors to the North (particularly Oakland, Berkeley, and Hayward), so the response tends to be less serious as well. The result has been frustration in the local community, which finds the criminal justice system unresponsive. For example, one FPD civilian recalls that the county juvenile justice system all but ignored the graffiti cases Fremont sent it: "We were experiencing a lot of incidents of graffiti all around town," the civilian explains. "The problem was that the juvenile justice system had been impacted by an increase in violent crime [by] juveniles, and a lot of budget cuts at the same time. So, when we send our cases for graffiti over to them, nothing would happen." Although local government was quite supportive of FPD efforts, county governments, responding to a different set of political realities, had little investment in them.

The FPD's response to these challenges has been to look beyond the criminal justice system for sanctions. For example, in response to the graffiti issue, the Department developed a diversion program for youth: When officers cite youth for graffiti, they write up a Notice to Appear (NTA) but do not send it to the court immediately. Instead, the offenders are given the option of completing a community service program, in which they clean up graffiti and vandalism around the city under the supervision of FPD staff, and they attend required counseling sessions through the city Department of Human Services. If they complete the program (as 95% do), the NTA is destroyed. Fremont has expanded the original program to include a number of first-time misdemeanor offenses, and it has started a separate juvenile diversion program for first-time offenders arrested for drug possession.

Police efforts to enlist juvenile justice did not fail completely: The juvenile probation department itself offered support for the diversion program and has begun using it to dispose of some of its own cases. But the city Human Services department, as well as FPD's own civilian staff (who supervise the community service element),[117] play a much larger role in this array of diversion programs: They, rather than juvenile courts, meet the FPD's felt need to sanction and rehabilitate these youth. In that sense, those agencies act as something like "substitutes" for juvenile justice partners, which were unable to accommodate police concerns because of their own priorities—particularly their sense that other cities' cases were simply more serious than those from Fremont.[118]

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[117] In other words, the FPD itself has successfully internalized some of the functions on which it was dependent (cf. Pfeffer 1972).

[118] The idea of "substitute partners" has broad applicability, even beyond the subject of interagency ties, as many officers rebounded from failed collaborations when they found a different partner to satisfy the original need. A particularly intriguing example came from Portland, where criminal informants became less feasible choices as partners (DAs reportedly became less and less likely to completely drop charges in exchange for cooperation as informants, and PPB policy also tried to discourage informant use as the agency became more

Advocating Change in Knoxville. In other cross-jurisdictional partnerships, police simply fell back on the same sorts of appeals they used in nongovernmental partnerships (recall the use of strategies like shaming to mobilize business partners). Consider Knoxville's repeat offender programs, which assembled some two dozen agencies to help control several categories of chronic offenders more effectively. Two of the central agencies in this effort were the Parole Board and various probation agencies, and I have already described how changing philosophies of community corrections predisposed those agencies to cooperate. But several other agencies— including state departments of human services and youth development, the county school district, and even far-flung agencies like the TVA—did not come along so readily, and the KPD did not secure their cooperation until it had found ways to soften the tension between its own priorities and theirs.

For example, arriving at a standardized release of information form was reportedly one of the most difficult negotiations the group went through. The form was intended to make it easier for participating agencies to share information about habitual offenders by asking the offenders to sign a blanket release form up-front. But concerns about legal exposure threatened to sabotage this effort: As the idea became a concrete proposal about what the form would actually say, agency lawyers chimed in with innumerable objections about issues like privacy rights and confidentiality (legalistic elaborations of the client welfare concern). At that point, police invited in a national expert on information-sharing from Pepperdine University, and he explained to the group how their effort could work legally by creating restrictions like a prohibition against sharing the

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sensitive to the problems informants created for the community). PPB officers still use informants, but the community itself has begun to replace them in one capacity, as the DA's office has worked hard to develop a protocol for getting search warrants based entirely on citizen complaints and observations—previously, information from informants was the major way to justify search warrant requests.

information *outside* the task force. This intervention apparently set the stage for the project's success, for after several more iterations of amendments the group did settle on a mutually-acceptable document that is now in use. Thus in this case, it was necessary to appeal to recalcitrant partners on their own terms, persuading them that the collaboration was consistent with their own ideals since it was not possible to command them to change them.[119] Moreover, the task force honed in on the particulars of the agreement rather than engaging in a more general debate about the conflict between client privacy and other values.

Conclusion

Thus a main axis along which these partnerships turn is the line that separates political jurisdictions, for partnerships that span them demand more sophisticated or at least different strategies than those that exist within a single jurisdiction. Value systems are only partly a matter of the professional ideologies Durkheim emphasized so heavily: They are also a matter of *political* ideology. In other words, political units can themselves become communities of shared values, and this was clearly the case in Albany, and more moderately so in Fremont. That both cities experienced fairly strong and unproblematic interagency ties despite wide differences in other areas attests to the power of a coherent political program to pave the way for partnerships.

But as in community, business, and political partnerships, effective police practice can improve the odds that partnerships will work and the depth of their accomplishment. That is particularly evident in Fremont, which revealed the most extensive program of interagency relations and also the most serious effort by police to rethink *their* priorities—an effort where they

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[119] In one case, however, intervention from on high *was* pivotal: Knox county schools balked at providing truancy information to police and the rest of the interagency group until the federal government passed legislation that effectively required it.

moved beyond the hedgehog's "tunnel vision" to take account of competing aims raised by other agencies (in part, it seems, by drawing on new ideas in good currency like the view that midnight basketball prevents delinquency). By contrast, in Albany, for example, I find no examples of police managers describing how the distinctive concerns of other agencies might legitimately take priority over crime control. Fremont's strong sense of political community around the new city manager's reforms certainly contributed to the success of the FPD's interagency efforts. But Albany's political community was even *more* closely-knit, and while police there faced no real failures in their interagency ties, their network never achieved the same reach as Fremont's— where police ties extended to agencies like economic development, planning, and human services. Moreover, the APD's interagency ties were mostly a matter of simple referrals compared with the broader scope of the FPD's, which encompassed not just referrals but also joint problem-solving, as in the motel example. Thus while political community can enable interagency partnerships, effective practice consisting of self-reflection about agency goals can bolster it further.

Buttressing this argument about the importance of practice is the fact that the other standout in interagency ties was Knoxville, where the most impressive partnership crossed jurisdictional lines and therefore cannot be explained by the institutional coherence of local government. To be sure, it cannot be explained entirely by effective practice either, for changing values in the community corrections world meant that many conflicts simply faded away. But others did not, as the information-sharing example suggests, and in these cases Knoxville managers coped with conflict effectively: They were able to show how their proposals made sense in terms of their *partner's* values by entering into the debate on *their* terms. This fox-like ability of Knoxville managers to attend seriously to partner values becomes even clearer when we examine some further value conflicts they faced.

In sum, the ability to develop partnerships across different agencies hinges on the ability to close the gap between competing missions of different agencies—especially to either convince other agencies to give more priority to crime control, or to convince fellow police to put less priority on it. Three main ways in which this task gets accomplished emerge: The use (explicit or implicit) of city hall's authority to make other agencies more receptive to crime control; exogenous shifts of partner values in this direction, as in the case of the East Tennessee Board of Paroles; and self-reflection by police in which they internalize some distinctive concerns of other agencies.

3. Overzealous Partners: Some Limits to Crime Control

The tensions of the previous section revolve around partner commitments to values *other than* crime control—with commitments to client welfare, development, and knowledge being the clearest examples. But in some cases partners are committed to crime control all too well. For police, that commitment comes along with several restrictions, both practical and philosophical. Practically, the authority, time, and space that they and the rest of the criminal justice system can dedicate to crime control are all scarce, and not every case of misconduct can be punished. Philosophically, the use of police authority is limited by ideals of due process and privacy, and we have already seen how other police partners defend those ideals and make tnem a condition of their *own* collaboration. But agency partners that *welcome* police authority do not always have the same sense police do about its limits. They welcome police crackdowns on crime, and even encourage them more than police themselves feel is proper or possible. To these partners, police inaction looks like lack of will or incompetence, and in any case it sours them on the benefits of cooperation, which does not solve their most pressing concerns.

Relationships with school districts—a growth industry in these cases—provide a good example of these tensions, for in each case the basic pressures are the same: The desire from schools to have police play a stronger role than police want to in controlling troublesome students.

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Consider three examples from school partnerships in Knoxville, Lowell, and Riverside, each of which addressed the underlying conflict differently. Knoxville moved beyond its crisis successfully by convincing school officials about the constraints they work under and by crafting new a institutional outlets for the schools' frustrations; these solutions did not please everyone, but they were crafted in a public way that left no doubt about what was happening and gave all parties—including the wider public outside the partnership—a chance to make their cases. Lowell moved beyond *its* conflict as well, and its strategy also involved giving more weight to the schools' position. But police there never fully acknowledged that their focus had shifted, leaving unanswered questions about the partnership's legitimacy. Finally, Riverside police stood their ground against what they saw as inappropriate demands, but in doing so they undermined their partnership.

Thus confronted by the same set of tensions over the constraints on police authority, the three examples reveal different responses: Public compromise, private compromise, and tenacity. Each of these strategies had different consequences for interagency partnerships—two of them ended up "successful," but one of these perhaps lacked legitimacy; and the third was broken off altogether. Consider each of these strategies and outcomes in turn.

Bringing Order to the Knox County Schools

Knoxville's crisis emerged between the KPD and the Knox County School District, where teachers and principals felt police were not doing enough to manage troublesome students in their classrooms. This concern arose during early meetings for one of the region's many serious-offender task forces, in this case the youth-focused Serious Habitual Offenders Comprehensive Action Plan (SHOCAP).

Knox County schools participated in the SHOCAP task force from its inception, but their concerns about the repeat offender programs have an equally long history. From the task force

perspective, the school system was one of the most important institutions young offenders came into contact with, and it potentially offered valuable information about SHOCAPpers' behavior. But from the schools' perspective, the task force was making unreasonable demands for information (as described above), and it was not doing enough to prevent serious offenders from disrupting school life.

In SHOCAP's early years, the latter problem was apparently the most serious one. Rhonda Garren, who at the time worked for the Department of Children's Services in general probation, recalls that the school system initially took a hard line on dealing with serious young offenders:

> It started with the school system [wanting] all of these kids out of school. The principals and teachers didn't want to deal with them. . . . The school system expected that if these children were charged with violation of probation for violating the SHOCAP rules, that that meant that they were automatically locked into detention, and sent back to state custody. And we had to explain to them that that's not the way it worked.

At first, the disagreements over how to respond to even minor violations became so severe that the school system actually pulled out of the task force and stopped sending a representative at all. But within a few months, the schools assigned a new representative to the SHOCAP task force, and two strategies for dealing with the schools' concerns emerged.

The first was simply educating the educators about the constraints faced by justice agencies. "We had to explain to them that on the violation of probation or after-care you have to have several charges before you can recommit them," Garren explains. "In the State of Tennessee, we had so few secure institutional beds that we could not lock the students up in institutional beds for missing one day of school. . . . And we had to do a lot of training with the principals that that wasn't the whole basis for the SHOCAP program, to keep them locked up. It was to keep them in the community, law abiding and [under] watch." To a point, these explanations seemed to work, as the superintendent and his new representative to the task force warmed up to the SHOCAP program and agreed to participate in principle.

But individual principals still did not always fall into line, and state law gave them significant autonomy to make decisions about their schools; in Garren's words, "They have the superintendent of schools, but he doesn't actually tell the principals what they can do in their schools." For example, one principal found an obscure code in the Tennessee Code Annotated that he interpreted as giving him the power to expel any student with a criminal record. Garren remembers the problems these sorts of actions created as severe: "We had principals that were telling these kids, 'You can't go to school here,' [while] part of their probation was that they had to go to school."

Garren sympathized with the underlying concerns: "I can understand the principals' philosophy," she maintains, revealing the foxes moral humility. "They do *not* want those students in school."

> You know, when we were in school, the heroes were the football players and the basketball players. And now the heroes in school, or at least in some of the schools, are the kids that have been locked up in state custody and they come out. It's a badge of honor to have been in state custody. So these kids went back into the school system, and a lot of he wanna-be kids looked up to them and tried to emulate their behavior. [And] a lot of the innocent kids were victimized by these people.

In response, some members of the task force made an ambitious proposal to develop a "transition school" for the most hardened young offenders, raising the idea in a meeting between DCS, the school system, the juvenile court, and the KPD. When the local players responded enthusiastically to the idea, the group brought the proposal to the state board of education and received permission to start an entirely separate institution, together with a $200,000 grant to help finance it. The state's cooperation put the final pieces of the puzzle in place, and the agencies that had attended the original meeting set out to carry their plans forward; for its part, the KPD, assigned a training and education specialist out of its crime prevention unit to help design pieces like the lesson plans that KPD officers would deliver.

When completed, the school gave strong emphasis to discipline and order. Security, for example, was tight: The twenty-student school was initially patrolled by two full-time security

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guards, and a police Lieutenant was always present at the building as well. Weapons were screened out by multiple searches, including one by the security guard who picked up every student at home, and gang colors were strictly forbidden. Indeed, the surrounding community would settle for no less, as it had initially protested against locating an institution for serious offenders in the neighborhood. As Garren remembers it, "[We] explained to the residents that they were much safer being located near that school than any other high school, because students in transition schools don't go the bathroom without a security guard with them." At the same time, the schools' designers argued that strict discipline was partly for the students' benefit, as it ensured that they would have a structured environment for learning.

In any case, the discipline-based system was backed-up by the juvenile court, which was as central to the transition school as it was to the rest of the SHOCAP effort. Students were court-ordered into the school, and they were told that there would be no suspension and no truancy from it; if anyone failed to attend, a police officer would be dispatched to pick him up and take him to school. In the extreme, repeated discipline problems would land students back in prison. At first, Garren explains, some students balked at the threat: "They didn't care if they were sent back to this institution near us. It's like 'big deal': They've got a nice place to sleep, good food and everything—better than home." But the juvenile court judge was able to get the attention of recalcitrant students by threatening to send them not to the local juvenile institution but to a far-away facility called Taft, which had a reputation as a tough place where the state's worst offenders from its largest cities wound up. "The judge told them if you're recommitted for violating over at the transition school, you don't go to this one up here; you go to Taft," Garren explains. "And the first two kids that we had in court [said], 'Well, let me think about that then. I don't want to go to Taft.'" In any case, the point is that the ability to maintain order in the new school depended on the existence of credible threats against misbehavior—which in turn depended on the cooperation

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and resourcefulness of the juvenile court judge. "Without [the judge's] support, you couldn't do much of what we did," Garren maintains, speaking not only of the transition school but of the SHOCAP effort in general.[120]

Those involved in developing the transition school were more than pleased with the results, but some observers—particularly the students' own defense attorneys—criticized the effort on philosophical grounds, arguing that it was an overly punitive institution that only further separated young offenders from the mainstream community. Transition school supporters did not agree with that assessment: They described the school as a "stepping stone" back to regular schools for young people who might otherwise not attend school at all; moreover, they pointed out that the school's 10-to-1 student-teacher ratio meant that its students got much closer attention than their counterparts in the rest of the public school system. Defense attorneys, in particular, were reportedly not convinced by those arguments: For them, the transition school was just one more misguided attempt to label their clients as incorrigible—an attempt that underlay the entire SHOCAP effort. But those objections effectively ended at the juvenile courtroom door; as Garren remembers it:

> Judge Garret [in the Juvenile Court] just set them straight quickly. Because we carefully developed our criteria. And it's not that we labelled them SHOCAP; it's the students themselves that make themselves SHOCAPs by their behavior. . . . . We had a point system based on the seriousness of the crime, [and] they had to have at least one felony. We started out with sixty points, and after a

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[120]The local juvenile court judge could not, of course, meet all the county's desires unilaterally. For example, the SHOCAP task force felt that young habitual offenders should all be sent to the same strict juvenile institution, but any formal arrangement of that sort would have to be approved at the state level. The state, however, argued that it could not legitimately single out one county's juvenile offenders for special treatment, and it also rebuffed the county's proposal to take the SHOCAP system state wide, arguing that Tennessee simply could not afford to start up a brand-new institution for habitual offenders. In response, the task force has taken a bottom-up approach to creating a statewide program by trying to help other Tennessee counties start SHOCAPs one-by-one. Unfortunately, after eight years of trying, no other Tennessee county has been able to replicate SHOCAP (though several have replicated GOCAP), largely because of problems getting a foundational interagency agreement. These tribulations suggest the importance of supportive players outside the partnership itself; and indeed the transition school itself owed its existence to state funding.

few years we had so many that it started to become unmanageable, so we raised it to seventy points. Now the kids that we deal with, some of them have three to five hundred points: I mean, they're the gang leaders, the shooters, the [people involved in] armed robbery and all of that. So after the defense attorneys learned that Judge Garrett wouldn't take any of their stuff in court, they would settle on that.

Thus the new school did not please everyone, but it had the support it needed to function, and it was able to provide the outlet the schools wanted for those youth they considered disruptive.

In this way, the SHOCAP task force dealt with the school district's concerns by helping it create a new capacity for handling disruptive students on its own. This process, too, involved institutional change—in this case, developing a new transition school predicated on the ideal of controlling difficult youth. The result was a hybrid institution that merged the coercive role of the police (and provided it with more resources) with the educational function of schooling. This transition school struck many advocates of the youth in question as too punitive. But that only underlines the fact that a real question of values was involved—namely, the importance of ideals like discipline, order, and control in the education and development of youth. Knoxville police and other task force participants did try to soften the school district's stance. But in the end they met it much more than half way.[121]

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[121] Evidence is less conclusive for education than parole, but there are some reasons to believe that school attitudes have recently become more punitive. The explosion of "zero tolerance" policies on drugs, weapons, and violence is consistent with this view, and one researcher's list of "several major trends [that] have emerged over the past few years" is a catalogue of stricter control measures: "An expanded role for the courts, probation officers, law enforcers, and other youth-serving professionals in the schools; the sharing of more juvenile justice information with school administrators; a greater focus on student accountability; an increasing number of juveniles being prosecuted as adults for their crimes; more serious behavioral problems being exhibited by young people in schools; emerging parent liability; more alternative schools; a reduced tolerance for youth violence; metal detectors in schools; mandatory student uniform policies; the development of safe school plans; and an increasing focus on school crime prevention" (Stephens 1997: 72); Stephens goes on to review near-consensus among policymakers on the importance of improving order in the schools. Against this view, however, we must place mixed sentiment among school officials themselves, for opinion data do not show their concerns about school violence increasing (Heaviside et. al. 1998; Elam 1995); as well as suggestions that the teaching profession has become more likely to embrace ethics of care rather than control (Weinstein 1998; McLaughlin 1991).

Throughout, SHOCAP practitioners took school concerns about violence seriously. They did not back down from their position that justice could and should not come down severely on every disruptive student. But they conceded to the position of principals, who believed those students were interfering with the education of others. They did not subordinate one aim to the other in the manner of a hedgehog. Instead they exercised their ingenuity and political capital to devise a tolerable solution to the conundrum—one that did not resolve the basic value conflict but did find a situated solution that would not inflame it.

Private Compromise

Lowell police also made school concerns their own, but their compromise took a different, less public form, and arguably less legitimate form. Police started their new school liaison program with the explicit intention to avoid a disciplinary role. But teachers and principals quickly began asking the new liaison officers to do just that, and in practice the liaisons' role apparently shifted. So despite an initial commitment to the idea that liaisons would simply serve as "role models" for youth in schools and help to humanize perceptions of police, school officials wanted something different. Eventually the liaisons weakened their commitment to the original ideal in practice, and in doing so they responded to partner values. But department policy—and indeed the liaisons' own overt beliefs about their role—never reflected the change.

For example, one liaison explains, "I'm not there for discipline. I'm there to get to know these kids, to be their friend, help them out, you know."

> I don't want these kids to think that I'm there to get them in trouble and to do reports and take them to court and all that. I'm there to be their friend. The other cruiser, the area cruiser can do that, take reports and things like that. I do it. I help out, you know, as much as I can but as far as discipline, that's not what I'm there for and that's not what the police department wants me to do on that.

But this officer immediately turns to examples in which school officials asked him to act as a disciplinarian.

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> Today I got sent back, called to the school for two kids that wouldn't listen to the assistant principal, and ended up suspending them both. . . . They [school officials] call me. They're not supposed to because I'm not there for discipline. But he did for the simple reason [that] I could talk to them, you know, and he knows me. And he felt more comfortable, the assistant principal, with me being there, so I don't mind once in a while.

"Once in a while," however, does not seem to describe his involvement in discipline accurately. Elsewhere, the officer concedes that he spends as much time talking with school officials about their concerns (which inevitably revolve around order in the school) as he does with youth themselves. And most of the examples he gives of contact with youth revolve precisely around maintaining order at the school—things like looking in to truancy problems, talking with (if not explicitly disciplining) youth who act up in class, and simply acting as the police department's antenna in the schools. For example, when asked why it makes sense to assign officers to schools, the first reason he gives is that "you can get to know a lot of problem kids."

> You know what I'm saying? You can see things. You can hear about things. And just filter it to the police department. Some of them want to talk to me about gang related things that are going on, which I take that information. One kid told me where there was, he knew where there was guns buried in the dirt, in the cement. I write that information down. I gave it to the gang unit. They talked to the kid. I guess they made an arrest out of it.

Thus in this case, despite the initial intention *not* to add to the schools' systems for discipline and order maintenance, the liaison could not help but be drawn into those systems, which school administrators viewed as central to their mission.

The troubling aspect of this particular relationship is that this shift in police role was never openly acknowledged. Indeed, even this liaison officer still insists that discipline is not his primary role, despite the fact that much of his workload, even if not all of it, clearly derives from that function. Like Knoxville police, the LPD did end up creating more commitment to discipline in schools, and this shift may have salvaged a potentially difficult partnership. But unlike in Knoxville, Lowell agencies never confronted the implicit value choice directly, and indeed they maintained that police were only in schools as role models even when the reality was quite different. In doing so the two sides protected themselves from controversy about creeping

disciplinarianism in schools, such as those that arose in Knoxville around the transition school. But those questions should not be hidden from view, for doing so undermines public sovereignty over important questions about the use of coercion (Foucault 1977).[122] Moreover, it is possible that the SROs have not combined the values of stronger discipline with legitimate constraints on it, but that they have instead subordinated the constraints to the drive for discipline. In that sense, shielding the effort from publicity may have encouraged the single-mindedness of the hedgehog by limiting the range of values that came to bear on it.

Standing Firm

Riverside reveals yet a third dynamic, one that highlights the price police may pay for staying out of school discipline. In the years before the RPD officially moved towards community policing, relations between police and area schools had apparently been quite good, for police played exactly the disciplinary role school officials wanted them to play.[123] But Chief Fortier

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[122] More specifically, the example is "disciplinary" in Foucault's sense because it involves clandestine use of authority that is not obviously an exercise of coercive force, thereby sidestepping usual controls over the exercise of juridical power. More concretely, the liaisons insist that they do not formally implement discipline, in the sense that they do not pass formal judgment on students, and they do not enforce administrative punishments. But they clearly play an instrumental role in those functions and extend their reach—in part by gathering surveillance in something of an undercover capacity, and in part by implicitly exercising their own authority as police officers. Andrew Polsky perhaps provides a clearer critique than Foucault—Polsky seems less conflicted than Foucault about what justifies his disapproval of disciplinary practices—, arguing that those who develop "new forms of social control" must justify them (Polsky 1991: 55).

[123] The RPD had assigned seven officers to a School Resource Officer (SRO) program for some time, pairing individual officers with individual schools. One school official from the period recalls that in his mind, this relationship worked well. "They [the SROs] had been someone that the principal or vice-principal could count on to deal with violent and difficult situations," he explains. "They were in many ways also intelligence officers [because] they knew the kids, they knew the gangsters on the campus, and they had intelligence that they were able to pass on." Indeed, this school official recalls that SROs became such an integral part of area schools that when one of his vice principals had to take time off because of a heart attack, the school's SRO was actually able to take over the position temporarily. "You just don't put anyone in charge of discipline in a school like that and just suddenly let them appear on the scene and think they're going to do it. But the SRO had been there for over a year and really worked very closely with this vice principal. I went to the Chief of Police at the time and said, 'This is going to be a crazy request. I've already cleared it with the school
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disapproved of the direction of the SRO program, and he sought to change it soon after his arrival

in Riverside. In part the issue was purely financial, for the program was entirely funded through

the RPD rather than the school district, and Fortier thought that if school officials wanted their

own police force, they should foot the bill. But the Chief also had philosophical concerns that had

been brought to his attention by a community activist, who argued that schools "were abusing our

children and using the SROs as a pawn to do that." Moreover, Fortier wanted the officers to what

he saw as their original mandates: Crime prevention and education, not discipline. "We had some

problems with being too intertwined with the school discipline systems," Fortier told a newspaper

reporter at the time. "The officers have enough responsibilities already with their mandated duties

not to be just a security service for the school" (Greene 1994). Other RPD members agreed

strongly with Fortier on these issues.

These conflicts contributed to increasingly-tense relations between schools and police,

who could not agree on the terms of their cooperation. There were other sources of this tension

that I will describe below. But police unwillingness to give schools more help with discipline was

clearly a central issue, and police never found a way to resolve this tension.

In Knoxville, by contrast, police were also concerned about excessive school demands.[124]

But they did not sacrifice their partnership to resolve it; nor, as in Lowell, did they completely

capitulate to school officials in practice. Instead they worked to develop a new institutional

capacity for school discipline (*i.e.*, the transition school, which both relieved other schools of the

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board, but I'd like for that officer to become a vice principal here while [the vice principal is] gone.' And he didn't hesitate. He said, 'Fine, you've got him.' So, for the first time and the last time in this area, a police officer was allowed to function in both roles."

[124] It is important to note, however, that their concerns were more pragmatic than philosophical, centered on the capacity of local jails rather than the "abuse" of district students; more resources might not resolve Fortier's concerns the way it did in Knoxville (though his suggestion that schools should start their own security force suggests otherwise).

most disruptive students and gave more structure to *those* students' school experience). In the process they surfaced the underlying value questions, which were centered on the rights of troublesome students and the place of discipline in schooling. Doing so did not make the conflict go away, but it at least raised it in a public forum where it could be confronted squarely. Riverside police stopped after pointing out the limits on their resources, refusing to help find a way the schools could realize *their* value of more orderly classrooms. Making that effort is precisely what distinguishes the efforts of the Knoxville task force.

Thus the Riverside and Knoxville stories articulate once again the postures of the hedgehog and the fox: Fortier focused his efforts on defending the values of his own agency, paying less attention to those of the schools—the ways school values might be realized or the reasons why they should not be. The Knoxville team, by contrast, was able to keep both sets of values in play long enough to arrive at a strategy that satisfied both of them. This temperament is exemplified by Garren's concession that she could "understand the principals' philosophy," and it is in this sense that she and other SHOCAP practitioners exemplify the position of the fox.

In any case, these three stories reveal a pattern opposite to those described in the previous section: They find *police*, not their partners, calling for less attention to order because of the need to protect some other value (even if it is simply the value of husbanding police resources to tackle more pressing concerns elsewhere). In some ways, this tension simply echoes the "soft crime/hard crime" conflict that arises in community partnerships, for both cases involve partners who want more attention to neglected categories of crime. But with agency partners like schools (and examples could also be drawn from institutions like housing providers and domestic violence shelters), I believe there is a further issue at stake. It is not simply that school officials feel the effects of classroom disorder more strongly than police. It is also that the school officials see handling that disorder as a distraction from their real job of education, and even distasteful given

their ethic of care rather than control (McLaughlin 1991; Weinstein 1998). Discipline is critical to their mission, but they do not want to handle it themselves. This dilemma gives urgency to their calls for help from the police, to the point that it becomes *the* central issue they want any partnership to address. These ideas fade into the final conflict I will examine in this chapter.

In any case, the way police respond to school concerns about discipline has much to do with the health of their partnerships: These cases reveal a perfect correlation between compromise and success. But because the compromise involves stepping-up the use of authority and a less free (if more orderly) school environment, it entails an important value shift that deserves public scrutiny.

4. Domain Consensus

The two conflicts just reviewed turn on substantive questions about the importance of different goals: Crime control, order, and discipline, on the one hand, and aims like client welfare, development, and husbanding police resources on the other. But a further form of value conflict arises in these cases that turns not on goals but on means—specifically on the question of *who* should have responsibility for each goal, even if everyone agrees those goals are worthy.

Sociologists Sol Levine and Paul E. White first pointed out this problem almost forty years ago, and they highlighted its special importance to interorganizational relations. Defining an organization's domain as "the specific goals it wishes to pursue and the functions it undertakes in order to implement its goals,"[125] they argue that "exchange agreements [*i.e.*, interagency relationships] rest upon prior consensus regarding domain." For example, if the domains of two

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[125] For example, in the health agencies they studied, Levine and White describe domain as follows: "In operational terms, organizational domain in the health field refers to the claims that an organization stakes out
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health agencies overlap—if they offer the same services to the same population for the same diseases—, they will often find themselves in conflict:

> Intense competition may occur occasionally between two agencies offering the same services, especially when other agencies have no specific criteria for referring patients to one rather than the other. . . . Personnel of referring agencies in this case frequently deplore the "duplication of services" in the community (Levine and White 1961: 598).

The solution to problems like these involves delimiting each agency's domain. That, indeed, is the central insight of Levine and White's idea: Each agency develops a strong sense of the proper scope of its activity, and conflict arises if these senses are out of alignment, and especially if they overlap.

The need for domain consensus creates a dilemma for interagency work. To this point I have focused on the tension that arises when agencies serve different goals. But the problem of domain consensus arises when agencies serve the *same* goals.[126] Thus the dilemma: As agencies from different institutional settings create partnerships, they come more and more to share the same goals. But when they do so they risk infringing on each others' domains and thereby generating a new form of conflict. Indeed, this dilemma arises regularly in community policing: In order to appeal to community members and other partners, police expand their goals to include values like social service and youth development. But in doing so they may upset agency partners by encroaching on their turf.

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for itself in terms of (1) disease covered, (2) population served, and (3) services rendered. The goals of the organization constitute in effect the organization's claim to future functions" (Levine and White 1961: 597).

[126] Martin Rein tells me that Walter B. Miller once argued along these lines, though I have not been able to locate Miller's essay. For Miller, interagency agreement came easier for organizations that served *different* functions (*e.g.* police and social work agencies) than within a single type of agency (*e.g.* two social work agencies) (*cf.* also Durkheim 1960). I have tried to show throughout this study what problems arise for partnerships across institutional types. But it is entirely right to point out partnerships within a single type also face challenges—even if the challenges are of a different type.

This dynamic explains recurrent tensions in several of the cases. Although these tensions did not fundamentally *undermine* any partnerships, they could apparently undermine trust to some extent, or at least create some minor ill-will. The contrasting stories of Riverside and Fremont explain how these problems could arise, and they also suggest how fox-like management can mitigate them.

Domain Consensus in Riverside

While a number of conflicts led to the breakdown of relations between Riverside Police and the local school system, domain concerns played a prominent role in this process. Part of the problem, as I have argued, was that police relieved themselves of responsibility for discipline at the schools at a time when school officials did not want them to. But schools were also upset about the things police *did* want to do with their SRO program. One example was the RPD's proposal for the grant-funded Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) program, in which SROs would teach third, fourth, and seventh graders a curriculum focused on gangs, thereby fulfilling what Fortier saw as their mandate to be "educators." "That was a change in focus," one former school administrator remembers. "And that wasn't something I particularly wanted to happen. . . . I didn't, as an educator, see that the police officers were trained to be teachers. They were trained to be policemen." Equally important, the school district already covered similar topics through its own curriculum called Riverside Against Drugs (RAD), which was funded by a local businessman and had wide support in the Chamber of Commerce. Police argued that RAD did not give enough in-depth coverage of important topics like gangs and that it lacked direct instruction by police officers, and the RPD was able to experiment with GREAT for one year. But when the year had run its course, the program was not renewed. The example suggests concretely how an expanded police mandate can create turf wars: Schools saw GREAT and other SRO programs as a duplication of services, and an amateurish one at that.

Other Riverside agencies expressed similar concerns. For example, one Recreation department official asks rhetorically,

> Why are [police] running intervention programs? . . . I have a ten dollar an hour person running that program, who's a professional, has a degree in it, he's experienced in it and probably has his master's degree in it. They're bringing a cop in to run it at fifty dollars an hour, who's not trained in it—they're trained to shoot, kill, arrest, and those type of issues . . . And then they still have to call upon us because they don't have any interpreters [for Spanish-speaking youth].

Instead of trying to run their own program, this official would rather see police work as collaborators: "I think they play a valuable role. When we have intervention programs, we'll have an overnight camp and talk about racial diversity, and we bring a police officer in and talk plain facts with [the youth]—scare tactics, if you will. And they bring a very important, intricate role to that. But for them to be the lead agency to run the program? I don't know." In most cases these concerns appear relatively minor: Recreation describes its relationship with the RPD as good, even though there are no extensive examples of collaboration between the two departments. But at least one concrete effort at a collaborative approach fell through when Recreation and the RPD applied for the same federal Crime Bill grant for recreation services. "We asked that they co-sponsor us and put a name on it," the Recreation official explains, "and they refused to, because they saw it as competition against the grant. That's a barrier we need to break down still."

What emerges in Riverside is a recurrent disagreement about the proper scope of police goals—not because anyone views the goals themselves as undesirable, but because they disagree about who should advance them. So far as I could discern, in neither example did police try to justify their position to the relevant agencies. This inattention to forging domain consensus could only allow the conflicts to continue. That dynamic becomes clearer when we compare the Riverside experience to Fremont's.

Managing Domain Consensus

Fremont's great success in forging interagency partnerships did not mean that it avoided

recurrent conflicts over organizational domains. Indeed, Fremont's very success at both building

relationships with many other agencies and at expanding its own mandate seem to underlie new

turf issues in the city. One Human Services manager explains:

> Some of the tasks police are encouraged to undertake as community-oriented policing unfolds may overlap with the work other departments do. For example, in their efforts, how much counseling and assistance do they provide before they turn to professional counselors and social workers in other departments? In getting to know local teenagers and establishing a rapport, how much basketball and other sports activities do they undertake before they call on the folks in the Recreation Department? It's important to strike a balance: For the officers to know when they should undertake the task themselves, and when to coordinate . . . with other departments. It's also a matter of resource allocation and cost efficiency, since trained sworn officers often cost more than other professional or para-professional staff who could carry out the same roles or tasks.

But this agency, like the others that raise similar concerns in Fremont, still maintains a strong

relationship with police (for example, it is a key partner in the diversion program described above;

and Human Services staff coordinate regularly with SROs on troubled youth). In part, that may be

because these tensions, like those in the Riverside recreation example, are not deal-breakers the

way more substantive value conflicts can be. Partner agencies raise concerns about police

programs that violate domain consensus, but the concerns are rarely strong enough (at least, I find

no examples in these cases) to justify withholding cooperation on other issues.[127]

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[127] The only exceptions may be a few cases of cooperation across police agencies. In particular, there was significant tension between Knox County Sheriff and the KPD, as well as between the Multnomah County Sheriff and the PPB, and these problems partly seemed to stem from disagreements about which agency should deliver police services to different areas (for example, in Portland that question became a political fight connected with annexation). Lowell during the 1980s offers a less extreme example of this pattern, for local police had little relationship with state and federal law enforcement agencies—largely, one LPD manager explains, because the department "was pretty parochial about enforcement, and they looked at another agency that came in to assist, or to be involved in an investigation, as people who were intruding on their territory."

The fact that interorganizational conflict among *police agencies* centers on domain dissensus, and that domain concerns only arise tangentially elsewhere, is another manifestation of the dilemma described above: Like-mindedness on basic value issues (which presumably characterizes collaboration among police agencies)

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But it may also be that Fremont has taken steps, however imperfect, to address these problems. For example, when the FPD started an after-school basketball program at the local junior high, the city's Maintenance and Recreation Department found the effort troubling. One recreation specialist explains:

> We thought that Recreation [was] just as capable, if not more so, of doing this kind of recreation. We were also frustrated because of the way we heard about the program. Someone dropped off a flyer at our office that they had picked up at a school, and they wanted to ask some questions about the form. Of course, we had no knowledge of the project, but studying the flyer, we discovered that the Police Department was running the program. What was the most surprising was that people from recreation, youth and family counseling, and the FPD had been meeting regularly to develop a grant proposal for at-risk youth. There was plenty of opportunity to bring the topic up at one of the meetings, but it didn't happen. It was also frustrating because at the same time, recreation was trying to start an after school program on junior high campuses. When I called the school to find out what was going on, the school district said, "Well, we thought it was okay because it was your police department that came and talked to us about it." I guess it was like the right hand knows what is going on but the left hand doesn't.

Maintenance and Recreation Direction Jack Rogers explains that the incident was particularly frustrating because it took place at a time when his department was trying to get the FPD to participate in a summer camp program.

> At a time when the City was undergoing a budget cutback, and the Recreation Department was cutting programs, recreation staff came up with a concept of using some police officers assigned to the in-school programs to meet with youngsters attending the city's summer day camp program. We thought this would give the police department a way of reaching out and communicating a positive image in the community. The response from the police department was that they were too busy. A short time later, this news article broke announcing [that] a new summer basketball program was being offered. This new program was staffed by the same officers who said they were too busy to augment the summer day camp program. As if this weren't bad enough, due to budget constraints, the Recreation Department had only recently terminated an after school/summer playground program at the same school site the officers were introducing their basketball program to. This incident raised a question as to what city resources could provide the services most efficiently.

But Rogers felt that the FPD Chief understood these concerns.

> We have pretty good rapport, so I looked at him and said, "Hey, this is what I'm hearing from my staff. We're not at all happy with this whole thing. They feel like they're devalued in the process." And [FPD Chief] Craig [Steckler] says—his reaction was that "look, we're asking people to change. We're asking them to do things differently. We're encouraging them to be self-thinking. And I

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creates problems of domain consensus; by contrast, the division of labor by values solves the domain question but creates new conflicts over goals—conflicts of the sort that have dominated this study.

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think this is one of the bumps in the road." And so those are. It's true. It is one of the bumps in the road. But its a bump that has to be dealt with honestly and in a straightforward manner, I think, by both pieces of the organization [*i.e.*, city government].

Thus Steckler assuaged recreation's concerns by pointing out the difficulty of what Fremont police were trying to do through community policing—a reform that recreation strongly supported in principle—, and by ensuring Rogers that he would try to avoid such problems in the future (they were simply "bumps in the road"). Indeed, Rogers and other recreation staff insist that the situation had improved since this two-year-old example, in that police had not infringed on their domain so unacceptably.

Thus while domain consensus is indeed a recurrent conflict that arises in these cases, it seems neither serious enough to undermine otherwise healthy relationships nor too difficult to solve; indeed, re-working organizational domains may be part of the fine-tuning that goes on after more fundamental disagreements about values have been settled. But it does require a minimally fox-like perspective: An ability, as exemplified by Steckler in the recreation example, to take partner concerns about domain seriously even while conceding that, given the nature of *police* values, they may be inevitable.

5. Conclusion

In some ways the growth of interagency ties has simply reinforced the trends involved in other police partnerships. Relationships with public sector organizations demand the same keen sensitivity to partner values that other ties do, so they privilege police practitioners who can embrace value pluralism and work effectively within it, and also those who are willing to relax traditional police commitments. But there are at least two differences.

The Distinctive Conflicts of Interagency Partnerships

First, many value shifts demanded by interagency ties are different from and even in conflict with those demanded by other types of ties. For the most part, these conflicts involve the competing goals of public policy, in which crime control plays only one part. To the extent that its part is *subordinate*, police must restrict their attention to a more serious group of crimes; they must let minor delinquency go if controlling it would undermine other policy goals, such as client welfare, development, or due process. But any movement in that direction may alienate community partners, who typically want police to *strengthen* their commitment to order—to dip ever deeper into the pool of wrongdoing. Either the community or other agencies will be somewhat unhappy. On the one side, we have the decision by Fremont police to support late-night basketball in the interest of youth development, despite concerns from neighbors. On the other are the tensions Albany police initially faced in the criminal justice system over its "quality of life" enforcement, which was enormously popular among most segments of the community.

Nevertheless, recent ideological trends have dulled these conflicts. More than other partnerships in these cases, interagency ties benefit from spontaneous shifts in partner values— housing agencies, parole boards, and schools that have come to take crime control more seriously, to the point that they will relax their commitment to other ideals like universal service and rehabilitation. Indeed, we saw that many schools have become so willing to expel and lock up troublesome students that police themselves find the strategy troubling—at least as a drain on their resources, and at worst as a form of student "abuse," or an insensitivity to ideals like rehabilitation (as in the concerns the Knoxville task force expressed about principals who expelled student probationers). More commonly, however, changing partner mandates bring their values well within a range police find acceptable. The result is that interagency partnerships demand less

reflection by police, many of whom stood firm on their traditional values without facing much

trouble in interagency work.

Beyond raising these distinctive concerns about the police value of crime control,

interagency ties also highlight the problem of domain consensus, a conflict that did not arise so

explicitly in community, business, or political ties. Public agencies are apparently quite self-

conscious about the division of labor in public policy. Ironically, this problem becomes more

pressing precisely as agencies come to share similar values. Unless they serve them in distinctive

ways, they risk "duplicating services" in a way that strikes partner agencies as improper.

Durkheim recognized this possibility clearly, noting that undifferentiated "social segments" would

find themselves in competition if they came in contact. These cases show how some practitioners

manage this problem, asking partner agencies for some forbearance, but also finding flexibility in

their own conceptions of domain that make room for partner concerns.

The Distinctive Resources of Interagency Partnerships

The second difference between interagency and other ties involves not the value conflicts

at issue, but the resources available for resolving them. In particular, local government is a

relatively structured institutional setting. Agency values do derive in part from the various

professions involved. But they are not completely autonomous: Political ideology can have as

much influence on agency missions as professional ideology, and in places like Albany it may

even have more. The existence of a local political community may simply appear to police as a

happy accident, as it softens what otherwise might be intractable conflicts across occupational

communities (for example in Lowell, city hall successfully created a sense of crisis about crime

among all city agencies, and this sense of shared purpose made many agencies receptive to police

overtures). But police can also take an active role in constructing it: In some cities police

appealed successfully to the political leadership to bring recalcitrant agency partners in line. Here

multiple ties create synergy, not conflict, as political partnerships aid interagency ties.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Growing calls for partnerships in public agencies have fundamentally changed the capacities needed for public service. The progressive era in American government found its key ideal in autonomy, and it cultivated a model of the public servant who was passive in the face of political oversight but unflinching in every other realm: Professional values and clear mandates were to serve as an anchor in the turbulent sea of special interests. But as the expectations of public agencies have changed, so has the type of public servant who is able to meet them. The agencies in this study that built and sustained different partnerships successfully put the necessary skills and temperaments on display. By way of reviewing their nature, consider some implications of this study for policing, public management, and social theory.

1. Implications for Policing and Public Management

The major challenge of building partnerships involves ferreting out the key values that different partners hold dear and finding out whether and how they can be changed, for it is the conflicts among these values that make partnerships contested. In many neighborhoods, for example, the development of community partnerships depends on nothing so much as the ability of police to understand that community groups put far more importance on soft crime than they themselves traditionally have, and to focus their own organization's attention on that problem. Successful community partnerships come only when police institutionalize a concern for soft crime. This specific example suggests the general conclusion: Which partnerships are viable depends on which values police organizations subscribe to and how they think about their role.

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Developing partnerships is at the same time a reconsideration of the basic values that motivate police, from the perspective of each of their partners in turn.

To realize the aims of community policing, the policing field needs to recognize this relationship between partnerships and basic values more explicitly, for the failure to emphasize it has sometimes made reform seem too simple—an apple-pie issue of "getting closer to the community." That naïveté, in turn, leaves many departments unprepared for the types of resistance that emerge and incapable of understanding it. This is particularly so at lower levels of the organization, where a kind of anomie can descend on officers and supervisors who find themselves caught between the values they have long been taught and those put forward by the community they are supposed to work with. Earlier I quoted one Riverside middle manager who had become uncomfortable with the turn his work had taken as a result of partnerships, and he exclaimed that he found it very difficult to stand firm on a clear set of values: "The values are kind of changing, and no one has really defined what they are anymore," he lamented, the victim of a reform effort that mostly saw community policing as a technical matter.

As they approach each of the four types of institutions I have reviewed, police come in contact with a distinctive set of values commonly tied to each one. Without some way of reducing the distance between these values and those of the police—subject to the constraints that they must satisfy *other* partners and remain true to some core ideals of the public service—, the conflicts between them flow through the partnership and undermine it. I have tried here to specify some of the elements of the necessary compromise, so that they can be brought out openly in departments that have embarked on this reform—in advance of the problems that will inevitably arise.

Central Value Conflicts in Community Policing

The mix of values associated with different institutions can be complex, and there are certainly variations across different institutions of the same type. But this study suggests that it is

possible to develop a finite list describing the distinctive conflicts in each of the four types of

partnerships—that there *are* identifiable contours to the basic values of different institutions, and

that public managers bent on building partnerships must try to comprehend them. A few other

studies of public-sector partnerships have noted in passing or even at some length that conflicting

values may play a role in the development of partnerships (*e.g.*, Weiss 1981, Bardach 1998,

Selznick 1949). But none have explored this insight systematically. I have tried to suggest that it

is possible to do so: That the idea of conflicting values across institutions can be used

methodically to unpack key obstacles to the development of partnerships. Approaching

partnerships in this way can help public managers simplify a potentially overwhelming task.

In policing, I have argued, the relevant value conflicts cluster around ties with community

groups, private sector partners, political leaders, and public agencies. Each of these partners hails

from a different institutional setting that instills those who work or live in it with a distinctive

value system—a distinctive set of norms, values, and conventions; or to use more contemporary

terminology, a distinctive discourse and distinctive institutional frames. For example, community

concerns cluster around the ideal of neighborhood livability: Freedom from the most visible types

of safety problems, protection from intrusive police practices, and a concern with the nature and

level of government services provided to the neighborhood. By contrast, political concerns reflect

the central position that political leaders play in the system of representative government: Their

overarching role in managing the public purse, their accountability and public exposure for

governmental errors, and their role as conduits of public sentiment and agents of responsiveness in

urban government. When these distinct value systems intersect with the mix of aims that govern

the police, they produce the value conflicts I have catalogued in this study, summarized in table 7-

1.

Table 7-1
Value Conflicts in Community Policing

Partnership Type	Partner Values	Police Values
Community	Soft Crime	Hard Crime
	Liberty	Order
	Neighborhood Interest	Equity
	Change and Flexibility	Tenacity
Business	Right to Make a Profit	Responsibility for Social Impacts
Political	Fiscal Responsibility	Provide Service/ Improve Work Conditions and Pay
	Precision (Avoid Errors)	Effectiveness
	Responsiveness	Expertise/Autonomy
Interagency	Basic Mission (Client Welfare, Real Estate Development, etc.)	Crime Control
	Order	Due Process/Conserve Resources
	Respect Turf	Expand Service Offerings
	*(Domain	Consensus)*

Institutional Change as a Strategy for Managing Value Conflict

At one level, the fact that *these* conflicts are so important simply suggests how police and partner mandates must change if partnerships are to become a reality: One or both sides must make some movement in the direction of the other, or else it will be difficult to find common ground for joint action, and the sorts of conflicts that erupted in many of these cases will undermine effective partnerships. In some cases, police themselves needed to do very little to effect this convergence: Especially in their interagency partnerships, partners sometimes shifted their values for reasons that had little or nothing to do with anything the police did. But in most cases, partnerships faltered unless police played an active role in shifting institutional values— either their own or those of their partners. In all cases, making this effort improved the prospects

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for new relationships across institutions. Consequently, understanding how to effect this sort of movement is a key challenge in building partnerships, and I will return to it shortly.

The Normative Challenge of Institutional Change. Police and their partners cannot, to be sure, abandon the distinctive values they protect. At best, they will make some movement in the direction of partner values, but they will still retain a commitment to their own ideals (a point I return to below). At worst, police or their partners may conclude that the necessary shifts come at too high a cost—that it is not possible to reduce common value conflicts appreciably, because the price of doing so would be the loss of important elements of their mandate.

That conclusion, however, was not a very common one in these cases, suggesting that sufficient room for institutional change exists so long as relevant police values are not *entirely* subordinated. Of course, it may be that the police who acquiesced to partner values did so unwisely and illegitimately. Indeed, readiness to change in these cases *did* sometimes arise from a failure to confront its significance, as in a few community partnerships where police lost sight of their obligations to the broader public: They unilaterally decided to put more resources in just those communities that would step up in partnership, ignoring or even denying the equity implications this decision had.

But more commonly, police rose to the normative challenge implied by institutional change, and they believed that they were able to meet it: They and most of their overseers openly acknowledged and consciously accepted the necessary changes. Much has been written about the way police agencies have grown more and more insular since the progressive era (*e.g.* Goldstein 1977). These cases suggest fairly broad agreement that this autonomy has reached the point of dysfunction, in that many police agencies find considerable room to take guidance from their partners' ideals, even when they recognize their duty to authorize this guidance with their oversight environment (of which community groups form only a part).

The Practical Challenge of Institutional Change. Wherever different cities come out on these questions, the relationship between partnering and shifts in values seems clear: These relationships entwine police in purposes they never intended, and they must either influence those purposes or make them their own if they mean to sustain their new relationships. In community and political partnerships, the second pattern dominated, as the ability of police to sustain their relationships rested on their willingness and ability to strike a new balance among the elements of the police mandate. Community partnerships demanded more attention to soft crime relative to hard crime; more parsimonious and sensitive use of police authority; a deliberative conception of the public interest; and more openness to the flux inherent in working with dynamic communities. Political partnerships demanded that police internalize some of the traditional functions of political leadership: A degree of fiscal consciousness, more concern with avoiding errors, and a responsive attitude towards public input.

What is crucial is to understand what aspects of the police organization are relevant to these values and to try to make changes to them. For example, we have seen that parsimony in the use of authority arises in things like the decision to use police crackdowns, criteria for initiating field interrogations, and (less tangibly) the style in which police use authority. By making changes in these organizational systems, police adjust their aims and practices in ways that may make them more agreeable to community sentiment. They thereby make it possible to work in the sort of joint collaboration that partnerships imply—one that makes great demands on mutual agreement about which problems are important and how to tackle them.

Because these changes are authentically *institutional* ones, in that they involve shifts in basic organizational values (Selznick 1957), effecting them means obeying the logic of cultural systems. These systems have a somewhat autonomous life that is connected to the conventional managerial terrain of administrative systems, but that also transcends them. This is not the place

to develop a complete theory of cultural change in organizations. But the most effective practitioners in these cases—the ones who were able to catalyze the value changes just listed— suggest some of the relevant elements. They paid direct attention to their organizations' cultural logic, wielding strategies specifically tailored to its dynamics.

As I argued at the outset, two strategies were especially important: Appealing to an existing value to institutionalize a new one (Douglas 1986; Offe 1995), and carving out autonomous space for new values to grow (Selznick 1957). The first strategy in particular suggests the autonomy of cultural dynamics: New ideals need to be justified within the existing framework of values. Effective managers in these cases were especially skilled at justifying new reforms in terms of the way they realized existing (if sometimes subordinate) values. For example, many departments were able to institutionalize a concern for soft crime, and I have suggested that in some agencies, this shift was accomplished with help from the Broken Windows metaphor (Wilson and Kelling 1982), which justifies attention to soft crime by way of its connection to hard crime. As the Broken Windows metaphor has diffused throughout the policing world, it has provided an argument that links a traditionally neglected aspect of police work to long-dominant goals of policing.

By contrast, when managers tried to institutionalize new values by fiat, they found their legitimacy undermined, and their reforms fell apart. Riverside's experience exemplifies this problem: Convinced of the rightness of the values he championed, Chief Fortier repeatedly refused to make any concessions to officer concerns, to frame his proposals in their language, or to pay heed to their central symbols. Instead he sought to use his authority over key systems to force change: He embarked on a massive effort to change the department's culture by changing hiring and promotional criteria and encouraging retirements, and within four years he had promoted the great majority of the department's supervisors, managers, and leaders. But in the eyes of the

troops, the new criteria lacked legitimacy: They became cynical about how supervisors and managers had made rank, and they became Machiavellian about their own survival strategies in the RPD. Reform fell apart quickly, as dissent within the disintegrating department spilled over into city politics and undermined the Chief's base of support. The problem apparently lay in Fortier's rejection of the idea that he needed to establish legitimacy—most obviously when he directed to the IA Sergeant to cut short her efforts to do just that: "Just do it," he insisted when the process of gaining buy-in proved laborious.

In this sense, Fortier believed that the culture needed to be bucked rather than engaged, and this conviction holds considerable attraction precisely in cases like these where the desire is to *change* police values. But contrasting examples like Lowell's Ed Davis show how managers can engage police culture partly on its own terms and still make important changes. One might hope for more. But it is a fantasy to believe that even the most thoroughgoing administrative reforms can force stark leaps in police values. The approach the effective managers in these cases take is a more gradual one that still engages the question of values directly: It takes seriously the existing values most officers hold, but it treats them as a framework within which to pose a challenge to move in *new* directions. It makes extensive changes to administrative systems (for example, realizing parsimony in the use of authority meant making the direct changes to the technical core described above), but as it does so it pays heed to the special challenges that arise when those changes imply a fundamental shift in basic values. In this way, effective managers are able to institutionalize the values that pave the way for effective partnerships, and in many cases they have been able to produce dramatic changes in a short period of time.

Roughly the same conclusion holds when police turn their attention outward, trying to catalyze change in partner organizations. That pattern held especially clearly in business partnerships, where police sought to institutionalize a sense of responsibility in private sector

partners. Where they were successful, they did so by paying heed to existing business values even as they championed new ones (for example, framing crime control as part of asset management). Nevertheless, affecting partner mandates often also meant finding some source of authority to back these arguments up: Legal pressure or shame in business partnerships; or the authority of political leaders in interagency partnerships within city government. This type of authority is not problematic for intraorganizational change, and indeed Chiefs like Fortier are drawn to it all too readily—the greater danger there involves ignoring cultural dynamics. But when trying to shift the values of *other* organizations, finding some source of authority is just as problematic as understanding the relevant cultural dynamics.

Embracing Complexity: The Hedgehog and the Fox

At the same time, it is important to recognize that tension can never be removed from the mix of values police and their communities hold dear. First of all, different partners think differently about these matters, and indeed the same partner may think differently about them on different days. While I believe that the conflicts I have outlined are large and general, and that most partners in these cases tend to take the positions I attributed to them, there are certainly exceptions (such as neighborhood groups that wish the police would stick to serious crime and communities that wish police would use *more* authority even when they themselves must endure it). This fragmentation within partners means that by internalizing values that please some groups, police will inevitably alienate others—or at least that police will find themselves traveling down contradictory paths in order to simultaneously please partners with opposite desires. This dilemma becomes particularly obvious when different partners have diametrically opposite desires, as when each neighborhood exerts pressure for more resources, but city hall exerts pressures for economy; or when the community calls for more attention to soft crime, but the justice system calls for careful prioritization of cases by seriousness.

Even if this were not so, there would be inescapable tension in the police mandate, for police cannot simply accept every priority partners bring them, just as they cannot ignore those priorities entirely. As an important element of the division of labor, police institutionalize certain goals—such as a concern for serious crime and bringing criminals to justice—that no other institution does; if they completely abandon their current mandate, society loses its ability to pursue an important set of values. So, for example, even as police turn their attention to soft crime, they must simultaneously reserve some focus on hard crime (and if they fail to do so, other partners like the justice system will no doubt remind them, as happened initially in Albany). In any case, institutions do not bend easily, so existing values will persist whether police leaders want them to or not: Change is less a question of giving up an old value to make room for a new one than it is a question of adding a new aim to the existing mix. This is apparent from the fact that in none of these cases did "community policing" priorities completely overtake the organization. It makes normative sense for the reasons I outlined in chapter one: When confronted by a dilemma, the *worst* response is to subordinate one of the relevant values completely.

For reasons like these, the strategy of institutional change comes up against limits in the form of incompatible views across partners and the internal contradictions of the new trends in public management (which has embraced partnerships without fully recognizing how they conflict with other continuing ideals of public service). Partnerships demand not just a shift *which* values police subscribe to, but also the development of an organizational capacity to attend to *competing* values. I have mostly described this capacity as a question of practice—of cultivating practitioners who do not succumb to the usual tendency to subordinate one value to another. This need is particularly clear among those front-line workers who actually manage partnerships.

Thus police practitioners engaged in partnerships face a need to work in an environment of different and sometimes antagonistic values. If they aim to forge effective partnerships, they must

be as comfortable as Berlin's fox with the contradictions inherent in bringing diverse partners together. In the face of conflicting but equally important values, it is too easy to take the attitude of the hedgehog and simply abandon one of them entirely. For example, in the face of a "squeaky wheel" or "vocal group"—which pits the self-interest of a particular group against the police commitment to the public interest—, we saw two opposite patterns, both of them pathological from the viewpoint of community policing: On the one hand, many police simply reject the narrow interests of the group, striking a detached posture that alienates their partners altogether. On the other hand, some police become entirely co-opted by the group and lose sight of a distinctive goal of the public service. By contrast, one of the things that distinguishes Lieutenant Arroyo in Fremont and Chief Davis in Lowell is their ability to take seriously the concerns of the groups they are dealing with even while they argue against them. Something of the same moral humility and sensitivity to multiple perspectives must be necessary for police who insist on their need to crack down fairly in the face of community concerns about the practice; or for police policymakers who take community concerns about soft crime seriously even as they insist that it has begun to take too much attention away from hard crime. Building partnerships demands that special characteristic of the reflective practitioner, the openness to question and moderate one's own basic value commitments (Schön 1983)

Beyond moral humility, working amidst competing values also means finding ways to reach agreement that bypass intractable disagreements about values. In practice, that meant finding situated solutions that did not offend too badly any of the several different value frameworks that partners held. Revenue-seeking is a clear example: It was consistent with both political concerns for fiscal consciousness and police concerns about service levels, even though it never resolved the abstract debates about how much of one to trade off for the other. Portland's response to conflicts about minority hiring is another example: Management had felt pressure

from community groups to increase minority hiring, but the officer's union resisted initial efforts to use an affirmative action approach that lowered test score requirements for minority applicants. Instead of trying to solve what may have been an intractable disagreement over the propriety of affirmative action, management turned to a recruitment strategy that paid special attention to minority colleges. This strategy enabled police to boost minority hiring dramatically without raising objections to "special treatment." It did not run seriously afoul of either of the relevant sets of values.

Both the revenue-seeking and minority hiring examples suggest a key insight relevant to practice amidst value pluralism: Many different strategies have some ability to realize any given value; but when multiple values must be realized, managers must narrow their search to just those strategies that advance each value tolerably well. The insight may seem obvious, but it is often neglected—as when managers choose the strategy that best realizes *their* cherished value and then (at best) try to convince their partners that this value deserves absolute priority. That common response misses the possibility of an incompletely theorized agreement on a strategy that each party can endorse, but perhaps for different reasons.

Different Foxes for Different Partnerships?

The idea of a fox-like temperament suggests an abstract potential that will transcend institutional areas: We would expect that practitioners who succeed with partnerships in one area will also succeed in another. There is certainly some correlation across partnership types in these cases: For example, the fox-like practitioners in Fremont served the FPD well in both interagency ties and community ties, and Lowell's Chief helped pave the way for effective partnerships in both the community realm and the political arena. Conversely, the inflexibility of many Riverside officers and their top management caused that department to face difficulty in almost every type of partnership.

But there are also exceptions to this rule, exemplified by Knoxville, which had great success in interagency and political partnerships but serious problems with community partnerships in its black community. Similarly, Riverside faced considerable difficulty in most types of partnerships, but it did do well developing business ties, and its relationships in the Casa Blanca neighborhood were absolutely exemplary. There are at least three explanations for such discrepancies.

The simplest involves an ambiguity in my unit of analysis: For convenience I have mostly analyzed partnerships at the organizational level, evaluating the "success" of each type of partnership in each *department*. But in fact organizations are not homogeneous. In Knoxville, for example, the officers and managers most staunchly committed to the importance of police authority found their way to the squad that patrols black neighborhoods (or, what amounts to the same thing, that squad has developed norms of behavior that privilege the value of police authority, which becomes ingrained in whatever personnel work there). Many Knoxville managers are foxes, and their partnerships are successful; those who work in black neighborhoods happen to be hedgehogs, thus "the department" has trouble building partnerships with blacks. Conversely, while Riverside is apparently dominated by hedgehogs, it has a few foxes among its ranks, and indeed top management deliberately tried to assign them (the department's deputy Chief described them as "people who were able to see things in a fresh light") to Casa Blanca. The result was uncommon success with partnerships in Casa Blanca, where the foxes worked, even though the rest of the department had trouble maintaining partnerships with political leaders, other communities, and even some public agencies. The great outstanding challenge in departments like Riverside involves ironing out some of this heterogeneity of practice within an organization: Their fox-like managers need to instill a fox-like commitment among their troops. If they succeed, they homogenize practice in their organizations and spread partnership success.

A second explanation for the uneven success of some foxes involves variation in the dependent variable. Put simply, some partnerships may be more difficult than others. For example, Knoxville could succeed in the relatively easy task of developing interagency ties and in the moderately difficult task of maintaining strong political ties. But the difficult business of building ties with minority communities—where virtually none of these departments can claim unequivocal success—eluded them. The problem may be that the concerns that arise in these areas are particularly incompatible with current conceptions of the police role, which puts a premium on establishing police authority (Van Maanen 1978) that directly conflicts with community concerns about harassment. Partnerships that demand value change in these dimensions may be especially difficult to sustain.

A final explanation involves variation in the key independent variable, or the specificity of styles of practice. In theory, fox-like behavior applies to any value conflict: The ability to engage competing values does not depend on what those values are. But that assumption may be wrong: For example, because fox-like strategies rely partly on the grasp of detail, and each value conflict entails a different set of details, many strategies are not portable across values. A similar argument holds for metaphors, which are obviously non-portable—even if the openness to new metaphors is. If these arguments are right, then the distinctive structure of each value conflict and the responses that are appropriate to it must be learned anew. The right temperament simply makes practitioners *open* to that learning process. Thus being a fox means exhibiting at least two things: A *temperament* that accepts the reality of value conflict; and a *substantive knowledge relevant to specific value conflicts.*[128]

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[128] This explanation may subsume the previous one: In that interpretation, Knoxville police simply have not yet registered and accepted the values of the black community, which happen to be especially difficult for police to accept; moreover, Knoxville's Chief suggests that they simply were not exposed to those concerns—

Implications for Public Management: Is the Police Case Unique?

I have argued that if police mean to develop partnerships, a central problem they will face involves value conflict, and they will need to find effective ways to manage it that look like the strategies I have just described. But does this conclusion hold for other institutions?

There are at least two reasons to believe that it may not. First, the police culture described by scholars like Westley (1971) is particularly strong, and few other public sector agencies contend with anything that approaches it in that respect. Occupational values may be less important in areas other than policing, and where they are less salient, value conflict may be less sharp. Second, community policing brings together an uncommonly wide range of partners with a wide variety of values—everyone from police, to social workers, to block clubs, to housing providers. In other words, community policing involves an especially high level of value pluralism; where the range of values represented is lower, value conflict may fade into the background. That outcome seems especially likely as value pluralism vanishes, as it does in collaborations among agencies of the same type (*e.g.*, police agencies cooperating with each other). Factors other than value conflict will make themselves known as obstacles to partnerships.

Nevertheless, many types of collaboration in the public sector may be similar enough to community policing—involving occupational values that are highly salient, and a wide range of value pluralism—that the role of value conflict will be large. Most public agencies have some distinctive sense of their role that can fairly be described as a system of values; and many potential partners do not entirely share that sense. For example, community partnerships will probably surface value conflicts for a wide variety of agencies: The public service involves distinctive

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that black leaders only began to voice their concerns about harassment two years ago (Jacobs and Satterfield 1998).

commitments (like the ideal of serving the broader public) that particular communities will never entirely share. Moreover, political partnerships will likely always involve some of the tensions reviewed in chapter 5, since most of them did not touch so much on the conflicts between police and politicians as they did on more generic conflicts between policy and administration.

I have already argued in the introduction how value conflict arose in other examples of partnerships, like the community action programs of the 1960s, the community planning efforts of the decade that followed, and coordination efforts among federal bureaucracies. Here I will add one more example to the list in order to draw out more fully the implications this idea has for management.

Early in the 1980s, the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) faced a crisis in its adoption efforts, finding itself unable to place many black children: Among infants in the Cook County foster care system, all 69 were black; and over 70% of older children were also black, despite the fact that only 26% of the general population was.[129] The main strategy DCFS director Gregory Coler developed to address this alarming problem centered on the development of partnerships: The agency would turn to the black community, and especially black churches, to help find homes for black children.

The effort was dubbed "One Church, One Child," and it seemed to make good sense: DCFS outreach in the black community was poor, and a partnerships with the churches looked like a perfect way to improve it. But an unanticipated problem arose just as the partnership began to bear fruit: The families the churches brought forth did not match the profile DCFS had traditionally used to evaluate prospective parents. That challenge suggested that something more fundamental than outreach was at issue:

Changes in recruitment practices alone—difficult as they were for staff members—would not, Coler felt, guarantee success for the One Church program. The department would also have to take a hard look at its methods of evaluating prospective parents who responded to its recruiting efforts— methods Coler believed discouraged working class black parents from pursuing adoption. Some of DCFS's procedures were dictated by state regulation—for example, the requirement that infants could not share a bedroom with adults, a standard that immediately disqualified families living in one-bedroom apartments. Other evaluative criteria were more a matter of longstanding departmental practice. "The regulation never stated you had to own your own home, have x-amount of income, be married for a certain number of years," says Emelda C. Granger, supervisor of the DCFS adoptive family development unit. "Practice indicated that that was the case." Even if prospective parents met these standards, they often failed subtler measures of suitability during interviews with staff members. Prospective parents lacking in education or sophisticated conversational skills, says Granger, were usually "screened out because they didn't seem too bright," a judgment based on eloquence rather than character. Other features of the application process, such as a written autobiography, intimidated families who felt insecure expressing themselves in writing (Warrock 1988a: 10-11).

Over the years, the Department of Children and Family Services had evolved a set of norms and values that described what good parents should look like. But those ideals had become increasingly counterproductive, for they had the effect of discriminating against black parents. DCFS's difficulty placing black children was the result, but that connection did not become apparent until its staff confronted a *different* view of what good parents should look like—the view held by its new partners in the black churches.

Making the partnership work meant internalizing some elements of the churches' views. "The department would have to find ways to alter its practices if the families drawn in by the pastors were ultimately to adopt a child," writes Warrock, going on to frame the challenge in terms similar to those I have been using to describe that of the police: "But the ingrained habits and attitudes of years, not to mention the dictates of state regulations, would not be easily brushed aside. . . . Coler had been able to overcome the pastors' skepticism and win their support for One Church, One Child. Now he would have to do the same with his own staff " (Warrock 1988a: 11).

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[129] This case is detailed in Warrock (1988a, 1988b).

The specific strategies need not detain us here, but note that the substance of the changes involved significant shifts in the conception of "good" parents:

> The fresh view of new staff members enabled the department to examine the methods adoption workers had used to evaluate prospective black parents. The new black adoption workers, Granger says, "did not employ those rigid white middle class standards on black families." Staff also felt free to examine those practices because they realized the One Church program was meant to break new ground (Warrock 1988b: 1).

DCFS did not abandon its duty to screen new parents, and indeed, the agency held firm on a number of problematic requirements—in part because state law mandated them. But DCFS workers sought to find practices that could tolerably satisfy those requirements without outright rejecting most of the families the church leaders brought forth.

> The regulations that could not be changed, such as the requirement that infants could not share a bedroom with adults, were adapted to meet the housing profile of black inner city neighborhoods. Formerly, an adoption worker who learned that a prospective parent lived in a one-bedroom apartment might end the conversation right there with "I'm sorry, but you don't have enough space." But in Chicago, as elsewhere, old inner city apartments often have huge dining rooms or sun parlors that could meet the standards for space. "If the family can fix that room so that it affords privacy and closet space, we'll accept that," Granger says. If the apartment is truly too small but the person or family still wants to adopt, the staff will start the preparation process while the people look for a new apartment (Warrock 1988b: 2).

The One Church, One Child program proved enormously successful in Cook County: The number of unplaced black children halved almost every year until 1986, when only 39 black children remained on the adoption list, down from 702 in 1979. But making it work meant more than simply using black churches as passive outreach agents: It meant facing up to a conflict between different views about what makes a good parent. DCFS managers faced the same normative and practical challenges as the police departments we have examined at length.

Thus the One Church, One Child story confirms that some of the ideas in this study apply beyond policing. In each case, managers who seek to build partnerships must identify key value conflicts and find ways to resolve them—usually, but not always, by internalizing partner values. I have tried to make some headway in this direction for the police, showing which values they need to reconsider to make four different types of partnership work. But I have also tried to put forth a

general example of a form of analysis that can be used in different policy areas. The core of that method is to pay close attention to the contours of recurrent value conflicts, in order to identify the strategic choices each partnership raises. The method's details remain to be fleshed out in a technology that a manager or a consultant could use to guide major efforts to develop partnerships. But even the more conceptual argument I have presented helps to clarify the hard work involved in building partnerships: One of its essential elements involves re-examining agency values and practices in order to meet the challenges of conflicting values.

2. Implications for Social Theory: Networks, Culture, and Practice

These conclusions suggest that practice is not impotent in the face of value conflict—that new relationships can still be built and sustained, if the requirements I have just outlined are met. The most pessimistic sociologists suggest that value conflict makes cooperation across institutions hopeless. But while their skepticism is helpful in focusing attention on what *is* in fact a key challenge, it is excessive in concluding that it cannot be met. It *can*, and in two interrelated ways. Consider each of them briefly here, in order to recapitulate the argument and place it in the context of social theory.

Institutional Change and the Role of Culture in Network Dynamics

First, institutional values are not fixed, and effective practitioners are able to shift them in ways that soften existing value conflicts. Doing so presents both the practical challenge of institutionalizing a new value and the normative challenge of justifying it; but neither is insurmountable. One must of course recognize that institutional values cannot be manipulated arbitrarily. But even in the public sector, where it is especially true that organizations cannot choose to shift their missions at will, it is sometimes possible and justifiable to push to realize new

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values (Moore 1995). That flexibility provides room to reduce tension between the values of an

organization and its different partners, and to put partnerships on less-contentious ground.

Thus networks are constrained by values, but values themselves can be manipulated

according to their own somewhat autonomous logic. Research on social networks can profit from

this perspective, which offers a way of explaining network dynamics—the development and

maintenance of network ties, a subject that has been a blind spot in most social network theories.[130]

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[130] The reader may have wondered up to this point why a study about the ways in which police organizations develop and change their networks does not draw more extensively on the social networks literature itself. The reason is that most of this literature is concerned with the *effects* of networks or simply with *modeling* them, not with the *causes of* or *constraints on* network formation (*e.g.*, Wasserman and Faust 1994: 9); Emirbayer and Goodwin, who I quote above, maintain that network theory "has yet to provide a fully adequate explanatory model for the actual formation, reproduction, and transformation of social networks" (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1413). Some exceptions exist, notably authors who explain interorganizational networks as a function of organizational goals, structures, and activities, or of the actions of self-interested individuals (Schermerhorn 1975; Van de Ven 1976; Galaskiewicz and Krohn 1984; Galaskiewicz 1979; cf. Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Evan 1966; Benson 1975; and Levine and White 1961, though the latter authors introduce the important idea that "domain consensus" regarding the proper scope of an organization's action is a prerequisite to their self-interested network formation). Schermerhorm (1975) exemplifies this genre, explaining interorganizational cooperation as a result of the rational choices of individuals within organizations. But as I have argued, the disappointing experience of community policing suggests that organizations *cannot* simply "choose" their networks to suit their self-defined purposes. Police executives *have* chosen to cooperate—they have expressed "demand" in Schermerhorn's terms, and thereby climbed two of his ladder's three steps to cooperation. And yet their efforts have failed. Schermerhorn explains such failure blandly as implementation failures: He tells our police executives that they misperceived "organizational and environmental support capacity." But this answer only restates the problem: *Why* can't the organization and the environment support cooperation? What aspects of organizations and environments have our police executives missed? I have tried to answer these questions in this study.

A second set of theories that treats networks and their brethren as a dependent variable advances what we might call a "history is destiny" argument. Most famously, Robert Putnam (1993) recently argued that Northern Italy's stock of social capital is an inheritance from history, traceable to the middle ages (though most of his book investigates social capital's *impact* on government reform, not its *cause*); cf. the related, but less long-term argument in Turk (1970). But by ruling out any role for practice, this view seems neither realistic nor helpful.

Finally, the theory of structural balance has some potential to explain network dynamics (esp. Heider 1958; Cartwright and Harary 1956; Wasserman and Faust 1994: ch. 6). For example, the simplest propositions in balance theory are that a friend of a friend should be a friend, and that an enemy of a friend should be an enemy; or that the friend of a favored cause should be a friend, and vice versa. If these rules are violated, psychological stress will develop, creating pressure to alter the triad—to make friends with the enemy, to alienate the friend, or to rethink one's position on the cause. Balance theory implicitly argues that *an actor's ability to create or maintain a network depends on whether or not that network is balanced*. In its most

(footnote continued on next page)

In this view, building partnerships means effecting cultural change. It echoes a recent argument

made by Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, who maintain that to explain network dynamics,

theory must pay more attention than it has to agency and culture—two shibboleths in the social

netwcrks world:

> Network analysis gains its purchase upon social structure only at the considerable cost of losing its
> conceptual grasp upon culture, agency, and process. It provides a useful set of tools for investigating
> the patterned relationships among historical actors. These tools, however, by themselves fail
> ultimately to make sense of the mechanisms through which these relationships are reproduced or
> reconfigured over time. Our own position is that a truly synthetic account of social processes and
> transformations that takes into consideration not only structural but also cultural and discursive
> factors will necessarily entail a fuller conception of social action than has been provided thus far by
> network analysis (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1446-1447).

My own account makes the same effort at synthesis. These cases provide direct support for it, for

they show how practitioners—actors exercising agency in Mustafa and Goodwin's terms—alter

network structures precisely by shifting the normative systems that govern each node.

Foxes and Weak Ties

Second, even where an organization cannot internalize partner values, it can sometimes

find ways of sustaining partnerships amidst continuing value pluralism. Many styles of practice

undermine this possibility—most notably that of the hedgehog, who in the face of competing

values subordinates them to his own. But the fox is able to sustain partnerships by engaging

competing values, using such strategies as moral humility and incompletely theorized agreements.

Foxes are especially important for organizations trying to build multiple partnerships with groups

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extreme form, balance theory argues that some networks contain explosive conflicts that render them
unstable; what remains is the set of available networks from which we must choose. This theory is entirely
consistent with the one I describe in this section, for it asserts that similarity between two actors improves the
odds that they will be able to develop partnerships (Newcomb 1981): To complete it, it is necessary to
explicate the processes that make two organizations more similar, which I have tried to do through the notion
of institutional change. I will, however, modify this view in the next section by describing the conditions
under which two *dissimilar* actors can maintain a relationship.

from different institutional settings. Under these conditions, the organization confronts multiple demands that conflict with each other: It is not possible to satisfy any one partner fully, since the cost of doing so might well be alienating the others. Instead, the fox tries to find ways that tolerably satisfy each.

The strategies of the fox suggest another way (aside from institutional change) in which practice can overcome the obstacle value conflict presents to the development of partnerships. But it can only do so to a degree, and the force of value conflict makes itself felt in the *nature* of the resulting partnership. The basic problem is this: A partner that has only been satisfied *tolerably* well will likely offer less than unequivocal cooperation. In network terms, such ties will likely be weak rather than strong—less frequent, and less intense.

This insight helps to explain a puzzle in the social networks literature: The unexplained correlation between the weakness of ties and the condition of being a "bridge" across structural holes.[131] Many years ago, Mark Granovetter introduced one of the most enduring ideas in this literature by noting that paradoxically, weak ties are more important than strong ties because they tend to bridge otherwise isolated social groups; strong ties, by contrast, tend to connect actors who have other easy avenues of connection. For example, when job-seekers find work through personal contacts, the referrals come much more often through distant contacts than through more immediate relations (Granovetter 1973, 1974).

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[131] The concept of structural holes has been one of the most influential ideas in recent social network theory. Its main proponent, Ronald Burt (1992), describes structural holes as the gaps in social structure that separate more tightly-connected social groups. For example, in a given city, many police know one another well, and many affordable housing providers also know one another well. But few police know many affordable housing providers: A structural hole separates the two communities. Burt argues that ties that span these structural holes provide valuable benefits to those that hold them: These boundary-spanners are uniquely positioned to direct a network and gain new information.

More recently, Ronald Burt has argued that Granovetter's empirical observation masked the truly significant factor: Ties have special benefits not because they are weak, but because they span structural holes. "The causal agent . . . is not the weakness of a tie but the structural hole it spans," Burt insists. "Tie weakness is a correlate, not a cause." After further argument that need not detain us here, he concludes that "there is no theoretical reason to expect a strong correlation between the strength of a relationship and the information benefits it provides," and that "bridge strength is an aside in the structural hole argument" (Burt 1992: 27-30).

The lack of any theoretical reason to expect what Granovetter found—that hole-spanning ties tend to be weak ones—is not a curiosity but a defect. The argument offered above can help to overcome it: Since each cohesive community tends to have a distinctive system of values, a tie that bridges a structural hole also bridges values. A practitioner who means to maintain it without undermining his other ties—especially those with other members of his own community, but also those that span *other* structural holes—will find himself pressured by a set of competing values that can only be managed by a fox. He will need to satisfy each group's values, but he will only be able to do so tolerably well. The ties built with outside communities—those that bridge structural holes—will be weak ones.

That conclusion represents a realistic middle ground between different ideas I have tried to build on in this study. At one extreme, literatures on social networks and policing often suggest that building relationships across institutional settings is not problematic at all: That police and other social actors can choose to cooperate with anyone they decide, to any degree; networks are a matter of unconstrained choice. At the other extreme, the sociological literature I reviewed in Chapter 1 treats relationships among institutions as a "philosopher's stone" that can never be realized because the values that underlie each institution fundamentally conflict: If those values could be reconciled, institutional fragmentation would not exist in the first place. But realistic and

useful theory must avoid these extremes. It must accept both the potential for agency and the constraints of institutional values.

The reality of conflicting values means that building and sustaining partnerships will not be easy, and that success may be equivocal (as captured in the idea of a weak tie). Calling attention to these challenges is the great merit of the sociological view of the conflicts between institutions. But it is also important to recognize how practitioners can overcome those challenges. Managing across institutions is neither unproblematic nor impossible, and the effective practitioners in these 11 cities exemplify how it can be done.

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