The Rise of “China Threat” Arguments
by
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SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
AT THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

SEPTEMBER 2006

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Submitted to the Department of Political Science on August 2, 2006 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

ABSTRACT

The study seeks to explain the rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States and Japan in the 1990s by using three theories of states behavior — realism, organization theory, and democratic peace theory. The rise of “China threat” arguments occurred in the United States and Japan because of a convergence of several factors, the most important of which was the increase of China’s relative power after the Cold War. The distribution of power among states strongly affects their intentions and military capabilities. The study introduces and suggests the importance of the strategic safety-net in shaping threat perception. A strategic safety-net emerges when state’s survival depends on cooperation with another state. When the strategic safety-net exists, states suppress self-interested behavior and the ally’s intentions are perceived as benign. Interviews with former government officials in the United States and Japan confirmed that strategic necessity restrained U.S. and Japanese behavior towards China during the Cold War and limited suspicion of China. The fraying of the strategic safety-net led to the advent of “China threat” arguments.

The main difference between the United States and Japan was that whereas in the U.S. case threat perception was shaped by a primacy strategy, Japan had to face a preponderant United States and a rising China at the same time. “China threat” arguments were suppressed in Japan while Japan was unsure about its relationship with the United States. The consolidation of Japan’s relationship with the United States led to a surge of “China threat” arguments in Japan in 2000.

The interests of domestic organizations were not the major cause of the initial rise of “China threat” arguments. The relevant organizations, including the military services, made “China
threat” arguments only after they gained currency within the society. The study also finds that China’s undemocratic nature did not independently cause the perception of threat.

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Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
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This dissertation would not have been possible without the help of many people. I thank the members of my dissertation committee: Professors Richard J. Samuels, Stephen Van Evera of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Alastair Iain Johnston of Harvard University for their assistance and guidance. I especially thank Professor Barry R. Posen of Massachusetts Institute of Technology for his assistance throughout the course of this study. He read several drafts of this dissertation, each of which he sent back full of marginalia that inspired me to do more research and refine my arguments. Above all, Professor Posen taught me the importance of personal commitment and objective analysis in thinking about international relations and security.

The dissertation dealt with an ongoing phenomenon, the study of which required me to conduct many interviews. More than one hundred people accepted my request. They were all forthright in sharing their views and answered my questions in detail. They were all busy people — Andrew Marshall, Chas Freeman, Richard Solomon, James Lilley, Zalmay Khalilzad and Masaharu Gotoda to name just a few —, but they were all very generous with their time and gave me invaluable insights into the understanding of the rise of “China threat” arguments.

Friends and colleagues at the Political Science Department and the Security Studies
Program of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology offered invaluable advice on the
development of the dissertation’s central themes. I particularly thank Benjamin A. Valentino
and Jeremy Shapiro for their comments and friendship. Benjamin H. Friedman helped me with
the final editing.

For comments and assistance on my dissertation, I thank Thomas J. Christensen, Cindy
Williams, Daniel Byman, Yinan He, Christopher Twomey, Sadako Ogata, Seiichiro Takagi, Ezra
Vogel, Michael Schiffer, Yoichi Kato, Yoshifumi Wakamiya, Chihiro Kato, Akihiko Tanaka,
Sugio Takahashi, Katsuya Tsukamoto, Heigo Sato, Narushige Michishita, Mari Takada, Seema
Tikare, Gunnar Trumbull, and Mariko Higashi. Satoshi Amako and Tatsumi Okabe provided a
forum to test my arguments and collect valuable comments. The Japan Association of
International Relations gave me an opportunity to present my earlier findings at the 2001 Annual
Meeting.

The Political Science Department and the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, the MacArthur Foundation and Social Science Research Council all
gave financial support for the study. The Institute of International Relations at the Peking
University hosted me and assisted me in conducting interviews in Beijing and Shanghai. I
thank in particular Professor Yuan Ming, Yu Tiejun, Fang Shiming and Hou Yingli for their help.
The Institute of International Relations at the Sophia University gave me access to its library.
It was made possible by the sponsorship of Professors Michio Royama and Masatsugu Naya.

The National Institute for Defense Studies allowed me to continue working on the dissertation.

Fellow researchers at the Institute encouraged me and provided material and suggestions for the study.

My parents, Kenji and Satoko, gave emotional support and never faltered in their trust in me. My children, Kyoko and Michiko, cheered me all the way through and kept me going.

Their grand mother, Hideyo, took care of them during my trips abroad. Kei, my husband, supported me in more ways than I can ever acknowledge. I thank him for his friendship, love and for his clear scientific mind.
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

I. THE QUESTION

This dissertation tries to explain why China became a target of security and political debate in the United States after the end of the Cold War. I seek answers to questions such as these: What caused the rise of "China threat" arguments in the United States? Which factors were most prominent in shaping threat perceptions?

As late as 1992, in public debate, China was not perceived as a threat to the security of the United States. The potential reemergence of Russia and the rise of Japan caused greater concern until around 1992. This changed quickly in 1992-93. An increasing number of articles and reports that viewed China as a security threat began to appear. By 1997, many defense planners, military analysts, officials in the executive as well as the legislative branch, academics, human rights activists and even the religious conservatives saw China as a potential threat and a potential "peer competitor" to the United States.\(^1\) At the turn of a century, the argument that China posed a threat to U.S. national security was strong.

The story is puzzling. "China threat" arguments appeared suddenly and spread and persisted despite numerous counter arguments. In the early-1990s, China’s economic and military power was still limited and lagged far behind that of the United States, Russia or even Japan. Though it was growing fast, China had been undergoing rapid economic growth since the late-1970s. And yet it was only around 1993 that China became a security problem to be

\(^1\) The phrase "peer competitor" starts to appear in government reports and articles in 1997. For example, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of May 1997 identified China and Russia as potential "peer competitors" in the period beyond 2015.
concerned about. Furthermore, China was becoming more “liberal” and less “communist.” China had liberalized, yet attitudes regarding China worsened significantly in the 1990s, giving rise to “China threat” arguments. The dissertation tries to unravel the puzzle.

Previous works on threat perception note the importance of recent events in shaping threat perception. In the case of the rise of “China threat” arguments, events and China’s behavior did influence U.S. perceptions. However, similar events that occurred at different times evoked very different reactions from the United States. For example, media reports of Chinese espionage of U.S. nuclear weapons technology in 1990 were virtually ignored. The coverage in the New York Times in 1990 consisted of a short article on page A5. Eight years later, almost identical cases of espionage reported in the Cox Report generated wide coverage and public interest. One of the tasks of this dissertation is to find out why similar events resulted in different responses and threat arguments.

The dissertation also looks at the emergence of “China threat” arguments in Japan as a minor case. The rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan followed a similar but somewhat different process from the rise in the United States. “China threat” arguments appeared early in 1990 and increased in 1992, but remained suppressed for the rest of the 1990s. However, in 2000 “China threat” arguments surged, increasing in magnitude and content. An examination of the Japan case serves as a test of the validity of the findings from the U.S. case. I will use the findings from the U.S. case as a guide for examining the Japan case.

The dissertation evaluates the process through which a country comes to be perceived as a

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2 For example, Raymond Cohen, Threat Perception in International Crisis (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979).
4 The Cox Report came out on January 3, 1999 and was declassified and released on May 25, 1999. The formal title of the report was “Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China,” submitted by Mr. Cox of California, Chairman.
threat. How does a country not considered dangerous suddenly become labeled as a potential threat and eventually a prominent danger? The dissertation focuses on the early part of this process, attempting to unravel the causes of the rise of “China threat” arguments.

I will tackle four tasks in this dissertation. First, I will explain the rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States. Second, I will explain the rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan. Third, I will use three theories of states behavior — realism, organization theory, and democratic peace theory — as tools for studying threat arguments. Fourth, by seeking to explain the two cases, I seek to offer insights into the factors and mechanisms that shape threat perceptions in general. In addition to these four, fifth, by using structural realism to explain the cases, I hope to make a modest contribution to the understanding of the unipolar world and fill a small gap in structural realism.

II. WHY IS THIS QUESTION IMPORTANT?

The dissertation matters for three reasons. It is important because it tries to explain a phenomenon that involves two of the major powers in the world today whose relationship to each other could affect the stability of East Asia and the world as a whole. Since the early-1990s, U.S.-China relations have deteriorated. Some argue that the rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States initiated a “new Cold War.” If so, it is important to study how this new Cold War started. Extreme “China threat” arguments have been proposed by influential groups and individuals. Such arguments have affected foreign policy-making. 

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5 The case I have chosen to explain is ongoing. There are inevitably drawbacks to trying to explain an inconclusive case. Some of the documents are not available and it will be several decades before they are revealed. However, I have chosen this case is precisely because it is a current case. Understanding the rise of “China threat” arguments is important because understanding it would help shape the present and the future course of U.S.-China relations. This stems from my belief in responsibilities and roles of political scientist in offering intellectual tool to understanding the world.
Second, the dissertation seeks to explain the rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan. Relations between Japan and China are as important, if not more important than the U.S.-China relations. Whatever the condition of the bilateral relations, because of close proximity, the sheer size of the two powers relative to the rest of the region, and their history of the war, Japan-China relations affect all of East Asia. There has been very little work addressing Japanese threat perceptions of China. This dissertation will offer an introduction to the rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan as well as examining their cause.

The third reason this dissertation is important is because it offers insight into how threat perceptions form. The concept of threat is central to theories of international relations. Realism, which is a major school in international relations, argues that threats and worries about survival strongly affect how states behave. In particular, the balance of threat theory advanced by Stephen Walt contends that states balance against threats when making alliance choices. Walt defines threat as a danger to vital national interests and sovereignty.

Students and practitioners of international relations employ a formula presented by David Singer holding that threat perceptions consist of some combination of perceived capability and perceived aggressive intentions. However, what the right mix is has not been fully explored. Existing literature does not address whether substantial capability and intention are necessary or if significant capability and a little intention are sufficient to generate the perception of threat. Defense analysts and planners work hard to identify threats and create strategies and policies to counter those threats. However, we are unclear whether threat perception arises more from an absolute or increasing level of capability. Walt contends that aggregate power, offensive

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capability, geographical proximity and aggressive intentions determine the level of threat a state poses to others. But he does not offer a more exact recipe. Nor does he specify what constitutes the perception of aggressive intentions. He only acknowledges that, “One cannot determine a priori ... which sources of threat will be most important in any given case; one can say only that all of them are likely to play a role.”

Other works have tried to identify various causes of misperception of threats. For example, Robert Jervis tried to identify cognitive mechanisms and factors that caused misperception. However, works that explore how threat perceptions are formed are few, and the threat perception remains under-studied. Though this dissertation is not a theory building or a theory testing thesis, I offer insight into how threat perceptions and arguments form.

III. THE ARGUMENT
1. Increase in Relative Power

I argue that the increase in China’s relative power was the most important factor causing the rise of “China threat” arguments. When China became the potential No.2 power and was rising in relative power, “China threat” arguments emerged. The increase of China’s relative power was brought about by the decline of the Soviet Union/Russia and Japan, and by an increase of China’s economic power. In 1993, China was the only major power that was narrowing the gap with the United States. The current and anticipated rise of China’s power relative to the United States resulted in the emergence of “China threat” arguments. The importance of relative power on threat perception is seen in both U.S. and Japan’s cases. The rise and fall of U.S. threat perception of Japan were also based on Japan’s power relative to the

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The current and anticipated rise of China's power relative to Japan also caused the rise of “China threat” arguments there. The fact that China was similar to Japan in overall power and its geographical proximity caused Japan to react to China's rise earlier than did the United States. However, after their initial rise in the early 1990s, “China threat” arguments in Japan remained suppressed throughout the 1990s. This was a result of Japan's position in the international system. After the Cold War, Japan faced an overwhelmingly powerful United States and a rising China simultaneously. Until the late-1990s, Japan sought to maintain good relations with both states and therefore refrained from making “China threat” arguments. As Japan consolidated its alliance with the United States, this restraint was removed. An upsurge of “China threat” arguments resulted.

2. Power Speaks to Intentions

One of the insights of the dissertation is that relative power influences both intentions and the perception of them. I argue that the change in the world structure of power led to the changes in behavior. This resulted in the perception of aggressive intentions and perception of threat. The collapse of the Soviet Union took away the strategic need for China and the United States to maintain a cooperative relationship. This was also true for China and Japan, as well as for the United States and Japan. Realism has been understood to neglect intentions when explaining state behavior. But I argue that realism explains intentions more than previously recognized. One of the contributions of this dissertation is the argument that changes in power relations strongly affect the perception of intentions.

In this dissertation, I introduce the concept of a “strategic safety-net.” A strategic
safety-net is a guarantee that a certain state (X) will not act against the national security interest of another state (Y). When countries are in a strategic safety-net, intentions are considered benign. A strategic safety-net emerges when the national security of state X is dependent on state Y. State X cannot act against the interest of state Y because doing so would weaken its own strategic position and endanger its survival. This need for survival guarantees that state X does not hold aggressive intentions. A strategic safety-net is expected to work best when the two states oppose the same adversary in a coalition. Dependency short of this, such as trade, provides only a weak safety-net with room for suspicion.

A strategic safety-net existed among China, Japan and the United States during the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the safety-net. This created new suspicions about each other’s intentions. With the decrease of the need for cooperation and compromise, each country engaged in more self-interested behavior. This again caused the perception of aggressive intentions. The fraying of the safety-net resulted in China, the United States and Japan taking self-interested actions at the cost of the other countries. It also strongly influenced the perception of intentions. China’s maritime activities and defense buildup were interpreted quite differently after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

3. The Unipolar Position

The third argument I make in this dissertation is that the unipolar position of the United States after the end of the Cold War influenced the rise of “China threat” arguments. The No.1 position that the United States found itself in after the Cold War and the adoption of primacy strategy led the United States to prepare for a potential challenger and to take a long-term view when considering threats. China emerged as a potential threat in the U.S. security discourse
when China was seen to challenge U.S. primacy in the future. On certain occasions "China threat" arguments were also used to win public support for primacy strategy.

States are governed by incessant worries about their security. This causes states to seek to maximize power, and ultimately to pursue hegemony when structural conditions allow it. The United States began to pursue primacy after the Cold War. That policy required ensuring that no other power challenged it in the present or the future. China's power in 1993 was still limited. It lagged behind the United States, Russia and sometimes Japan. But China had the largest potential to challenge U.S. primacy in the future with its large population base and high rate of growth.

The dissertation studies a period in which the international system moved from a bipolar to unipolar and asks how a unipolar constellation might affect the behavior of the unipolar power and its relations with the second tier powers (Japan and China). Unipolarity has been undertheorized by structural realism for the simple reason that the world had never been unipolar when the theory was developed. I deduce from structural realism that the United States will seek to maintain its unipolar position as long as possible by preventing the emergence of another pole. The relationship between the United States and China (or Japan) would deteriorate after the collapse of the Soviet Union, giving rise to "China threat" arguments (and "Japan threat" arguments). China (or Japan) would seek to avoid being overpowered by the United States by either balancing against or bandwagoning with it, provided that the United States permits it.

IV. COMPETING EXPLANATIONS

I examine three possible explanations based on three different sets of theories in this
dissertation. Those theories are realism, organization and democratic peace theories. The three explanations to be examined can be summarized as follows.

(1) “China threat” arguments occurred because of changes in the world structure of power — because of the rise of China’s power relative to American power, and the decline of Soviet power relative to both American and Chinese power;

(2) “China threat” arguments occurred because of the interests of U.S. domestic organizations; and

(3) “China threat” arguments occurred because of the non-democratic nature of China.

I chose the three explanations for two reasons. First, these were the most prevalent explanations for the rise of “China threat” arguments. Second, previous works identify these factors as sources of threat perception. Previous works focus on: (i) capability; (ii) predisposition derived from organizational bias; and (iii) predisposition derived from ideas and identity as sources of threat perception. I chose democratic peace theory to examine the effects of ideas and identity because arguments about China’s threat often centered on its non-democratic nature.

1. Realist Explanation

As I argued above, the explanation based on realism offers the most valid explanation of the rise of “China threat” arguments both in the United States and Japan. “China threat” arguments resulted from an increase in China’s relative power. The increase reflected changes in the world structure of power with the collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s economic rise.

The dissertation aims to link events in international system and domestic responses. Structural realism predicts how states behave based on changes in the distribution of power in the international system. But it is not automatically clear how an event or a change in international system results in a change in perceptions and certain policies and behavior. There
are several links missing. The dissertation tries to fill that gap and show how international events affect domestic actors (organizations and individuals) and cause change in their state’s perceptions of another state.

Realism assumes that states are unitary actors and domestic actors are a black box. In this dissertation, however, I look inside the black box. My use of realism resembles but differs from neo-classical realism.\(^\text{11}\) I take a simpler approach and ask: what will be the behavior and threat arguments of domestic actors if realism is at work? In my argument, it is the distribution of power in the international system that is the main driver for the emergence of “China threat” arguments.

2. Organizational Interests of the Military and Advocacy Groups

When domestic actors deviate from realist assumptions, other theories may explain states’ behavior. Where realism cannot provide a full explanation, I turn to organization theory and democratic peace theory to see if they fare better. Here the approach of this dissertation moves closer to neo-classical realism.

An explanation based on organization theory contends that “China threat” arguments occurred because domestic organizations such as the military and interest groups wanted to promote their interests by highlighting “China threat” arguments. This argument is heard in the United States and in Chinese criticisms of U.S. “China threat” arguments. It argues that military organizations needed a new threat. The explanation is based on the observation that

organizations place a high priority on maintaining organizational size and wealth. They also avoid uncertainties and seek targets to maintain internal organization.

The dissertation finds that organization theory does little to explain the rise of “China threat” arguments. Those organizations that made “China threat” arguments seem not to have been motivated by organizational interests. For example, organizational interests do not seem to account for the arguments and behavior of the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) that played a major role in affecting the rise of “China threat” arguments. Other organizations, such as the military services, sought to maintain their organizational interests, but found and used other arguments. Military services tended to be dispassionate about China. They were not the initiators of “China threat” arguments.

There was a period after the Cold War in which U.S. defense analysts and planners went from one threat to another. For example, Colin Powell came up with the Base Force concept when he was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989-1993). He advanced “regional threats” arguments to protect the army from force reduction and budget cuts.12 “I’m running out of demons,” Powell said. “I’m running out of enemies. I’m down to Castro and Kim Il Sung.”13 The military services made “China threat” arguments from 1996-97 only after they had exhausted other arguments to maintain organizational interests.14 By then, “China threat” arguments were already prevalent among the security and foreign policy specialists. The timing suggests that these organizations were trend followers, not the initiators of “China threat” arguments. So, while organization theory explains arguments and behavior of domestic

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14 Even when they did, the Army argued least for the China threat, followed by the Air Force. The Navy showed more concern.
organizations such as the military services, organization theory did not explain the rise of “China threat” arguments per se.

The same thing can be said about public interest groups, which I call advocacy groups. The advocacy groups that made “China threat” arguments were latecomers that took advantage of the prevalent argument. They did not initiate “China threat” arguments.

Starting around 1995, advocacy groups that worked on human rights, anti-abortion, pro-choice issues, religious freedom, environmental issues, and labor began targeting China. A China specialist in the Clinton administration observed that the rise of “China threat” arguments occurred because the groups “went after where the money is,” implying that advocacy groups focused on China to gain public support and contributions for their organization.

But advocacy groups did not cause the rise of “China threat” arguments. Groups that made China-related arguments in the early-1990s did not make security related arguments. Groups that made “China threat” arguments after 1996 did not initiate “China threat” arguments. These groups, like the military services, merely took advantage of already prevalent “China threat” arguments. They contributed to the spread of “China threat” arguments but not to their initial rise.

In this dissertation I examine the following advocacy groups: (1) Anti-Communist groups; (2) Human rights groups; (3) Conservative political groups; (4) Conservative religious groups and (5) Labor organizations. I choose these groups because they either targeted the Soviet Union during the Cold War, or made “China threat” arguments and China related arguments.

3. Lack of Democracy as a Cause of “China threat” Arguments

Little empirical evidence supports the argument that the undemocratic nature of China
caused the rise of "China threat" arguments. China's undemocratic nature was not perceived as a source of threat when China was weak. It was identified as a security problem only after China was perceived as a threat. There were no "China threat" arguments immediately after the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989, an event that indicated absence of liberal democracy in China. And earlier "China threat" arguments in the early-1990s did not refer to China's non-democratic nature. However, once "China threat" arguments became prevalent, the Tiananmen Square incident was repeatedly cited as an indication of China's aggressiveness. The absence of democracy and the undemocratic nature of China did not cause "China threat" arguments.

Recent works on democratic peace theory argue that democracies a priori see democracies and non-democracies differently. The theory then predicts that the United States would not perceive another democracy as threat. Yet Japan was a democracy but it still, to an extent, was perceived as a threat. Some of those who held that Japan posed a threat in the late-1980s and early-1990s argued that Japan was not a "real" democracy. Differences between the United States and Japan were emphasized. But again, these arguments emerged after Japan threat arguments began. Once Japan was no longer seen as a threat after the mid-1990s, "democratic values" and "like-mindedness" were key phrases among security specialists of both countries. For example, a Joint Statement in September 1997 noted "The (U.S.-Japan) alliance reflects such common values as respect for freedom, democracy, and human rights." Japan was not the only case. Individuals and groups that argued China was a threat also argued that France and Russia were potential threats.

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IV. DEFINITIONS

I define “threat” as a danger to vital national interests, and “threat perception” as a perception of that danger. I use the term “‘China threat’ arguments” to refer to views which contend that China poses danger to the vital national interests of the United States (or Japan).

I examine declared threat perceptions and arguments of political elites. One could claim that declared threat perceptions are different from real threat perceptions. But I have chosen to study the declaratory threat perception for two reasons. First, it is observable. Second, and more importantly, as part of a political process, threat perceptions have to be declared to have influence. Undeclared threat perceptions have little effect on security policies. Though it is important to ask whether the declaratory threat perception reflects actual threat perception or is used instrumentally by political elites, the object of this study remains declared threat perception or what can be called threat arguments.

By “political elites” I refer to individuals and groups involved in making security policy. These include the President, military planners and security specialists in various executive branches, members of Congress and their staff, advocacy groups, scholars in think tanks and academia, and media. I will examine “China threat” arguments that appeared in National Security Strategies, DoD reports, congressional hearings and reports, think tank reports, articles in newspapers, magazines and academic journals. Public opinion polls will be used as an indicator of public attitudes towards China. Examination of public opinion is particularly important in Chapter 4 where I examine the influence of various interest and advocacy groups. Public interest in and unfavorable attitudes towards China gave these groups incentives to emphasize China in their activities.
V. METHODOLOGY

In this dissertation I seek to explain the cause of the rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States and Japan using realism, organizational theory and democratic peace theory. The three theories do not directly address the question of threat perception. I have therefore made inferences regarding what each theory predicts about the cause of threat perception. The causal explanation for the rise of “China threat” arguments must first exemplify a valid general theory. By inferring the causal factors of threat perception and the logic behind the causation based on each theory, I have framed cause and effect for each theory.

For an explanation to hold, the causal phenomenon based on the covering law must be present in the case. I have derived predictions from each hypothesis based on the three theories, and examined empirical evidence to determine whether or not the predictions are borne out in the case. As I have pointed out in the preceding section, existing literature on threat perception is not very clear in framing the cause and effect of threat perception. By examining one explanation against the other, I hope to explain the case and reach a fuller theoretical explanation of threat perception.

In the dissertation, I talk about the rise of “China threat” arguments. The rise denotes to the initial emergence of “China threat” arguments into security discourse. I also refer to an increase of “China threat” arguments. Increase is measured in several ways. Increase can be in the number of reports or articles that make “China threat” arguments. It can be in the number of groups and individuals that make “China threat” arguments. It can also be in the

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17 I have examined several groups and individuals over time, as in fixed position observation. When certain groups or individuals began to make “China threat” arguments, there is an increase.
content of the “China threat” arguments.

The period of study is from around 1985 to 2000. I have chosen 1985 as a starting point because this gives me enough time to examine the U.S.-China relations before the Tiananmen Square incident and the end of the Cold War. The mid-1980s also marked a highpoint in U.S.-China military cooperation. By 1995, “China threat” arguments were already noticeable in the United States. Starting at 1985 allows me to examine ten years of U.S.-China relations before U.S. perceptions and attitudes towards China changed.

In explaining the rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan, I will use the findings from the U.S. case as a guide. In the Japan case, I extend the period of study to 2006. This is because many events in 2005-2006 affected the “China threat” arguments in Japan.

VII. ROAD MAP

The rest of the dissertation is organized into six chapters. In Chapter 2, I will revisit the three theories: realism, organizational theory and democratic peace theory. I will introduce hypotheses and predictions from each theory. Chapters 3 to 5 will offer explanations using the three theories. In Chapter 6, I will examine the rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan. Chapter 7 will serve as the concluding chapter.
I. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, a number of hypotheses about what causes states to perceive another state as a threat, particularly as a new threat are introduced. I first review existing works that directly deal with threat perception. The existing literature on threat perception is surprisingly small, especially when we consider the fact that many students of International Relations note the importance of threat and perceptions on states’ behavior. The literature has yet to reach consensus on what causes and constitutes threat perception. A significant number of studies examine the different factors that cause variation in threat perception. In most cases, the studies list all the factors that went into shaping threat perception without determining their relative importance. While these studies provide insight into the factors that affect threat perception, they tell us little about the mechanism at work. We do not yet know whether both capability and aggressive intentions are necessary to cause threat perception or if a lot of capability and a little bit of intention are sufficient. The existing literature is thus not a useful template to explain the rise of “China threat” arguments.

In this dissertation I discuss three main factors that the existing studies have identified as sources of threat perception. The three factors are: capability, intention and predispositions. The three categories also provide the core causal factors in the three theories I use in this dissertation: Realism, “Organization theory, and Democratic Peace theory. None of the theories addresses threat perception directly, but each theory offers insights into possible mechanisms of how threats are perceived and threat arguments made. After reviewing the
basic assumptions of each theory, I make inferences about what each theory says about threat perception. Finally, I make predictions about the rise of “China threat” arguments based on each theory.

II. EXISTING WORKS

Many of the existing works on threat perception regard one or more of the three factors — capability, intention and predispositions — as a source of threat perception. In the following sections, I will review the existing works based on these three categories. The three factors were originally articulated by J. D. Singer.

Singer defined threat perception as a function of estimated capability and estimated intent:

\[ \text{Threat Perception} = (\text{Estimated Capability}) \times (\text{Estimated Intent}) \]

Singer also noted the influence of predispositions in shaping threat perception.

A combination of recent events, historical memory, and identifiable socio-cultural differences provides the vehicle by which this vague out-group suspicion may be readily converted into hostility toward a specific foreign power.¹

This statement suggests that Singer thought that recent events and identifiable socio-cultural differences trigger preexisting suspicion and create threat perception.

1. Capability as Source of Threat Perception

Capability has been regarded as a source of threat perception by many students of International Relations. The realist school, in particular, has focused on capability (power) as the source of threat and changes in distribution of power as the cause for threat perceptions to

arise. Klaus Knorr and Stephen Walt are examples of realists who see capability as essential to threat perception.

Klaus Knorr notes three kinds of threats: actual threat, potential threat and systemic threat. Actual threat is a threat that is issued by one actor against another as an instrument of coercion. It can be precise and substantive, like an ultimatum or vague, so that it must be inferred from statements and increases in armed forces. Knorr notes that state A may not notice an actual threat from state B even though state B and other states are aware of it. Conversely, state A may feel threatened even though state B has not issued any kind of threat. A may feel threatened by B “simply because the latter has the capability of making an actual threat.” Knorr calls this the perception of a potential threat. Both perceptions of actual and potential threats involve the “estimate of probabilities about whether the anticipated harm will materialize.” Knorr’s treatment of potential threat suggests that he views capability to be the necessary condition for perception of threat. Aggressive intentions without capability do not constitute potential threat in Knorr’s thinking.

Systemic threat, on the other hand, is not the result of a particular state. Systemic threats arise not because a particular state has the capability or the intention to threaten another, but rather because of the anarchic nature of the international system and because capabilities and intentions can change abruptly. Knorr notes that “it is for this reason that nearly all states have maintained armed forces even when they perceived no threats, actual or potential, and did not themselves choose to make threats.”

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2 Some works have gone as far as to disregard intentions because intentions change easily.
3 Knorr also notes that if a state is or feels threatened by another, he anticipates the loss of something of value, such as territory and population, restriction of sovereignty, economic assets, and political constitution. States may fear war itself and the losses it is apt to entail rather than defeat. This could result in greater defense efforts. Klaus Knorr, “Threat Perception,” in Klaus Knorr, ed., Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Lawrence, Kansas: Allen Press, 1976), pp. 78-79.
Threat is a central factor in Stephen Walt’s study on alliance behavior: The Origins of Alliances. Based on case studies of alliance behavior in the Middle East, Walt finds that states balance against threat rather than power.\(^4\) Walt identifies aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability and aggressive intentions as sources of threat. The first three factors speak to capability and the last to intentions. According to Walt, aggregate power is a source of threat because it can be turned into military power and potentially increases offensive capability. All things being equal, distance decreases offensive capability. Therefore geographical proximity increases offensive capability and the threat perceived. Walt, however, does not explain when and how these factors are perceived as threats. Walt excludes ideology as a source of threat. He treats ideology as an opposing concept to threat, and not as a factor that may shape threat perception.

2. Behavior as an Indicator of Aggressive Intentions

Different scholars have found different indicators of intent, but the most often identified indicator is the behavior of states. Dean G. Pruitt lists the indicators of intent as capability, actions, statements and conditions faced by the other nation. Pruitt argues that states use actions and statements as signs to infer intentions.\(^5\) Pruitt also notes that acquisition or possession of military capability may induce suspicion and indicate aggressive intention.

Walt also seems to regard behavior as an indicator of aggressive intention. I write “seems” because Walt never clearly offers a definition or a detailed explanation of “aggressive intention,” although it is a central concept in his balance of threat theory. He is not clear about what signals aggressive intentions. Nevertheless, his examples of aggressive intentions


suggest that behavior ("conduct") indicates aggressive intention and dangerous ambition to expand through conquest.⁶ Walt argues that behavior that indicates unalterable aggressiveness spurs perception of aggressive intention and threat.

Raymond Cohen’s case studies on international crises offer many examples where certain events invoked perception of threat. Cohen defines “threat perception” as “an anticipation on the part of an observer, the decision maker, of impending harm — usually of a military, strategic, or economic kind — to the state.”⁷ He concludes that states perceive threat when they observe a breach of “rules of the game” in international politics. He found this sort of breach to be the common factor in all six historical cases he examined. Cohen finds that different factors were perceived as indicators of aggressive intentions throughout history. Acquisition of certain material needed for war was considered an indicator of an aggressive intention. These strategic assets changed over time. For example, in the nineteenth century, buying horses signaled war.⁸ Today, an equivalent might be acquiring long-range bombers or aircraft carriers. In the case of “China threat” arguments, many analysts pointed to China’s acquisition of Sukhoi-27 (Su-27) jet fighters as an indicator of China’s aggressive intentions as well as an evidence of increasing Chinese military capability.

Robert Jervis also notes the importance of “recent behavior” of other states in shaping threat perception:

Although we cannot be sure what else statesmen do, they often use the recent behavior of others as important sources of information. They take the pattern they think they observe and project it forward into the future. ... Small incidents, then will have large implications if

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⁸ In March 1875, reports of France buying horses for military purposes was one of the signs causing German suspicions that France’s was preparing for war. An Imperial Decree prohibited the export of horses from German territory, and the German government accused France of military preparations. Raymond Cohen, *Threat Perception in International Crisis* (Madison, WN: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979), pp. 30-31.
they are taken as indicating that the other will harm the state later.\(^9\)

The proposition that recent behavior shapes threat perception raises a question when applied to the case of the rise of “China threat” arguments. Certain Chinese behavior was interpreted by the observers as an indication of China’s aggressive intentions and elicited “China threat” arguments. However, similar events in the 1980s did not cause “China threat” arguments. So, while Jervis and Cohen are correct to locate the importance of observee’s behavior in shaping threat perception, the “China threat” case suggests that some factor other than China’s behavior must have changed to cause similar events to cause threat perception at time \(T_2\) but not at time \(T_1\). It could be that behavior is a dependent variable of threat perception or it could be an intervening variable.

3. Predisposition as Source of Threat Perception — Motivated Bias

Predispositions have been seen to magnify or mitigate perceptions of capability and intent and hence affect threat perception. Pruitt argues that when “predispositions are strong, even minor statements may look like evidence of threat.”\(^10\) Robert Jervis differentiates two kinds of biases: motivated bias that is affect-driven and unmotivated bias that is purely cognitive. The two sources of motivated biases are interests of the leaders and organizations.

Jervis argues that motivated biases are sometimes driven by the needs of decision makers and their states:

When the motivated biases play a dominant role, many of the beliefs that seem to provide the reasons for the choice of policy are actually rationalizations. The policy comes first, often for reasons that are politically illegitimate or psychologically painful to recognize, and the justification follows, reversing the normal order in which beliefs about other states


precede and lead to the foreign policy.\textsuperscript{11}

Benjamin Fordham argues that decision makers' perception of international threats is influenced by their domestic circumstances. Leaders perceive more threats at times when use of force has greater political advantage.\textsuperscript{12}

Raymond Cohen identifies factors that shape the "predispositions" that influence threat perception. He looks at factors in geopolitical environment, domestic environment, and cognitive process of appraisal that affect threat perception. Cohen finds that decision-makers were more sensitive to events in "areas of high priority for strategic or emotional reasons or of current urgent relevance to the observer," and to threatening signals when there "was an atmosphere of tension and mistrust in ongoing relations between the observed and observing actors ... a 'bad-faith model'."\textsuperscript{13} Cohen concludes that domestic factors including personality, public opinion, and political system are too "inextricably interwoven" to isolate one from the other.\textsuperscript{14}

The second source of motivated biases is organizational interest. Knorr examines organizational biases that affect threat perception. One of the cases Knorr examines is Qing China. Qing China was slow to react to threats from Western imperialism. This was because perceiving Western powers as threats meant acknowledging the superiority of the Western system. Knorr argues the Mandarin bureaucrats did not perceive the Western powers as threats because acknowledging them would mean they would have to change their system to counter a new threat. If organizational interest worked against perceiving threats, it could also work in

\textsuperscript{11} Jervis, "Perceiving and Coping with Threat," p. 25.


\textsuperscript{13} Cohen, \textit{Threat Perception}, pp. 91 and 96

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, p. 136.
favor of it. We can infer from Knorr's argument that when perceiving a threat coincides with organizational interests, organizational bias would lead to overestimation of that threat.

Studies edited by Ernest May find many cases where organizational biases and preconceptions affected threat perception.\textsuperscript{15} Paul Kennedy shows that preexisting ideas about national security within the British military strongly influenced how the British military assessed the German threat in the early 1900s and 1910s. British military planners contemplated only the sort of war for which they were preparing. The British military showed a strong tendency to conduct threat assessments that fit a foregone conclusion.

4. Predisposition as Source of Threat Perception — Ideas and Identity

Works stemming from the findings of cognitive science have noted the role of ideas and identity on threat perception. Cognitive science has identified certain patterns in human behavior. For example, individuals have strong attachments to groups they belong to and are suspicious of members outside of their group. External threat is also believed to enhance in-group solidarity and identity.\textsuperscript{16} Ideas and beliefs have been observed to influence perception.

Jervis argues:

The most important unmotivated bias ... is that people's thinking is heavily theory-driven. Our perceptions are strongly colored by our beliefs about how the world works and what patterns it is likely to present us with.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{17} Jervis, "Perceiving and Coping with Threat," p. 18.
Preexisting belief about how the world works is then thought to shape perceptions of threat. Those who believe that the world is generally one of high conflict are more likely to perceive a threat than those who think common interests are more likely to prevail.

David Rousseau et al. conducted an experimental analysis on correlation between identity and threat perception. The study finds that shared identity decreases perception of threat. At the same time, however, shared identity was found to be both variable and manipulable.¹⁸

Recent works on democratic peace explain democratic peace using shared identity among democracies. They argue that democracies assess threat through an ideological prism, and perceive fellow democracies and non-democracies differently. Democratic peace literature is often seen as a theory of conflict resolution where the domestic structure of government and democratic norms prevent conflicts from escalating to the use of force. However, recent works argue that democracies perceive democracies and non-democracies differently from the beginning.

For example, John M. Owen argues:

Liberalism gives rise to an ideology that distinguishes states primarily according to regime type: in assessing a state, liberalism first asks whether it is a liberal democracy or not ... Liberals believe that they understand the intentions of foreign liberal democracies, and that those intentions are always pacific toward fellow liberal democracies. ... Illiberal states, on the other hand, are viewed prima facie as unreasonable, unpredictable, and potentially dangerous.¹⁹

Barbara Farnham argues that threats are assessed primarily on the basis of intentions and that democratic predispositions indicate intent. Farnham argues that Adolf Hitler's violation of democratic norms of accommodation during the Munich crisis caused President Franklin D.

Roosevelt’s perception that Germany threatened the United States. Farnham is less clear about why an indication of unlimited aims and lack of accommodation of others’ interests would be interpreted as a sign of the violation of democratic norms rather than a sign of aggressive intention.

A study by John Hurwitz and Mark Peffley finds that the more patriotic an individual, the stronger perception of threat. Being patriotic is defined as loyalty to one’s own political system as being the best. This accords with Owen’s argument. Likewise, Jie Chen’s study on Chinese threat perception finds that the more patriotic and supportive of the current Chinese regime as person is, the more likely they are to see the United States as a threat. This suggests that the correlation between support for a political institution and threat perception is not a monopoly of democracies. This trend, however, did not extend to Chinese perception of Japan as a threat. Chen assumes that this anomaly is a result of Japan not criticizing China for its lack of democracy. This suggests that non-democracies’ perception of democracies may be a response to the democracies’ attitudes towards them.

5. Explaining “China threat” Arguments

The existing theories and studies discussed above provide competing explanations for the rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States. The four major factors thought to contribute to threat perception are power, motivated biases of organizations, identity, and aggressive intentions. The first three factors are each the core of a theory: realism, organizational theory and democratic peace, respectively. On aggressive intentions, each

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theory offers different explanation of how states perceive them. In the next three sections, I review the three theories and make inferences as to what each theory says about the rise of “China threat” arguments.

III. REALIST EXPLANATIONS OF THREAT PERCEPTION

1. Basic Assumptions of Realism

Among the realists, Stephen Walt is the most explicit in using “threat” to explain states behavior. He notes that states in general balance against the biggest threat. Other realists have been more implicit in using the notion of threat. For example, Kenneth Waltz writes that “secondary states, … flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them.”

In offering realist explanations for threat perception, I begin by using the framework offered by Walt. Walt contends that aggregate power, offensive capabilities, geographical proximity and aggressive intentions are factors that shape threat perception. Because geographical proximity is a multiplier of offensive capability, I will just use aggregate power and offensive capability. Walt did not explain what causes perception of aggressive intentions. He merely gave aggressive behavior and attitudes as examples of indicators of aggressive intentions. Thus in formulating a realist explanation of threat perception, I will look further into what realism would say about behavior of states and hence intentions of states.

The realist explanations for threat perception discussed below are based on the realist

\footnote{Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 127. Waltz also notes that states (units) “worry about their survival, and the worry conditions their behavior,” States that do not help themselves “will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer,” and that “Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend towards the creation of balances of power.” Worry about survival and fear of dangers are akin to threat. Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 105, 118.}
perspective developed by scholars like Kenneth Waltz.\(^{23}\) I introduce here a composite of theories that can be termed "political realism."\(^{24}\) The assumption is that behavior and decisions are made based upon rational calculations, and changes in the international system provide the biggest motive for states’ actions.

Realism explains state behavior based on three main assumptions about the international system and the state. First, states are the principal actors in international politics. Second, states are unitary and rational actors. In other words, realism assumes that states’ behavior is determined by external environment and not by their internal characteristics, such as the type of political system, including democracy. Third, Realism assumes that the international system is one of anarchy without any higher authority to govern states’ behavior. The international environment is assumed to be zero-sum in nature. It is a “self-help” system where states have to compete and strive for their own survival.

The version of “Realism” I use in this dissertation is based on the assumptions of structural realism developed by Kenneth N. Waltz. Waltz argues that states “at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination.”\(^{25}\) Waltz predicts different behavior for great powers and secondary states. Great powers try to stop

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\(^{25}\) Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 118. Waltz also wrote: “Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied; they may range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left alone.” Ibid., p. 91.
other great powers to emerge as the leader, but they themselves seek universal domination if
given the chance. And secondary states, “if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side to
balance against the stronger side that threatens them.”

John Mearsheimer calls his own theory, “offensive realism” and calls Waltz’s “defensive realism.” Recently, there has been a
debate between two versions of Realism: “defensive” and “offensive.”

But difference between Waltz and Mearsheimer is smaller than what Mearsheimer claims. Mearsheimer’s theory focuses on great powers while Waltz looks at international system as a whole.

Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism falls within the assumptions made by Waltz’s structural realism. The antecedent to offensive behavior and drive for hegemony, then is for the state to be a great power and has secured its survival.

I argue that the anarchic nature of the international system and constant worry about

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27 Jack Snyder and Stephen Van Evera are sometimes referred to as students of “defensive realism.” Snyder claims he is partial to “defensive Realism” as opposed to “aggressive Realism.” Van Evera makes finer distinctions among variants of realism from *Type I Realism* (formerly “Classical Realism”) to *Type IV Realism* (“misperceptive fine-grained structural Realism?). The defensive version of realism sees the causes of war not only in anarchic nature of international system and distribution of power but also in unit level variables like offense dominance or oligarchic political systems. The difference between two versions of realism often lies more in what is being explained rather than in the theories themselves. The “defensive” version of Realism often focuses on the current distribution of power, whereas “offensive” version takes into account states’ fear in the future. For example, Jack Snyder, who identifies himself with “defensive” Realism, seems to base assessment of security on current power positions rather than on the future. Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, p. 12. Snyder, however, argues that states adopt a strategy of security through expansion when certain conditions such as “shifts in relative power” are present. He argues that: “A state has an incentive for preventive aggression whenever its relative power is expected to decline.” p. 22 and p. 25. On the other hand, Mearsheimer, who is a proponent of “offensive” realism, identifies uncertainty about distribution of power in the future as one of two reasons why great powers do not feel secure without dominating the system. Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999) and “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” in *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); and *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). On critique of “defensive realism”, see for example, Fareed Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay,” *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992). Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 34.
28 Mearsheimer, however, seems to believe that his theory of offensive realism differs from Waltz’s structural realism. Mearsheimer categorizes Waltz’s *Theory of International Politics* as defensive realism and supports Randall Schweller’s view that there is a “status quo bias” in Waltz’s theory. What Mearsheimer misses is that he is only quoting one portion of Waltz’s theory which argues that states at minimum seek survival. As I have pointed out, Waltz goes on to say that states “at a maximum, drive for universal domination.”
security cause states to seek power and influence, and ultimately hegemony. I, therefore, depart from classical realists who see origin of pursuit of power in human nature and hold that power is an end in itself. I do not subscribe to a view that states always seek hegemony. They will do so only when structural conditions permit them.

Structural realism has not given much thought to how a unipolar constellation would work for the simple reason that the world was never unipolar when the theory was developed. This study examines the period in which the international system has changed from a bipolar to a unipolar world. I have therefore deduced from the theory how the transition from bipolarity to unipolarity affects not just the surviving superpower but also other second tier states and their relations to the unipolar power. I infer from structural realism that when the international system moves from two poles to one, the remaining superpower would seek hegemony and try to maintain its primacy position as long as possible. The unipolar power would avoid any other power from assuming or challenging the No. 1 position. It would do so either by applying pressure (force) or by offering inducements to dissuade the second tier states from becoming another pole. So, although structural realists have contemplated that bipolarity is the most stable condition for the international system, the unipolar power would seek to maintain a unipolar world as long as possible using its preponderance of power. The unipolar power would see the strongest of the second tier states as threat. The second tier states that used to belong to the same pole under the surviving superpower become independent states. The second tier states would avoid being crashed by the unipolar power.

Then, offensive realism should be most useful in explaining behavior of the United States

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after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And balance of power theory would be useful in explaining behavior of secondary states, provided that the weaker coalition can amass enough capability to deter U.S. attack in which case secondary states may bandwagon with the United States.

In this dissertation, I examine the arguments and attitudes of various organizations within the United States and Japan from a Realist perspective. I ask: If Realism is at work, what arguments and attitudes should we expect from domestic organizations? This may seem to contradict the Realist assumption that states are unitary actors. However, Realism does not ignore the existence of actors within a state.

Though many scholars use second image (state level) and first image (personal level) theories such as organization theory and psychological theories to explain cases where state behavior deviated from realist predictions, few studies have looked at domestic organizations that conform to Realist predictions. I argue that changes in the world structure of power affect states and the organizations within them. If the organizations behave according to what is expected by realist predictions, then the change in the distribution of power is the independent variable. My understanding of Realism is therefore different from a neoclassical realist position.

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30 Waltz, who subscribes to a pure form of structural realism, does not ignore existence of domestic groups. His argument is that the assumption that states are unitary actors and the balance of power theory that the assumption rests upon explain the results produced by the uncoordinated actions of states. According to Waltz, balance of power theory explains the constraints that confine all states, and not "the expected differences in national responses." Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 122-123.


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In the following sections, I offer realist explanations for threat perception. I start from the framework offered by Walt. As noted, Walt contended that factors shaping threat perception are aggregate power, offensive capability, geographical proximity and aggressive intentions. I will just use aggregate power and offensive capability because geographical proximity is a multiplier of offensive capability. Walt did not explain what causes perception of aggressive intentions. Thus in formulating a realist explanation of threat perception, I will look further into what realism would say about behavior of states and hence intentions of states.

2. Changes in Power as a Cause of Threat Perception

(1) Changes in Relative Power Position — Aggregate Power

Realism argues that states are much concerned with their relative position in the international system. Waltz contends that: “The first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.” This tendency is evidenced by foreign policy elites’ concern about relative gains over absolute gains. It follows that states perceive relative capability of other states, especially that of a rising state, as a threat. It also follows that even when certain powers do not possess sufficient capabilities to threaten the state’s survival, they perceive these powers as potential future threats if these states challenge their...

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32 For example, Waltz wrote: “We know from structural theory that states strive to maintain their positions in the system. Thus, in their twilight years great powers try to arrest or reverse their decline.” “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 49.

33 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 126.
current power position. This is close to Knorr’s “systemic threat.” In other words, if another state hinders a state’s maximization of power, or erodes its position in the international system, that state will be seen as a threat. It may be too late to counter threats once they are imminent.

States ultimately seek primacy, but its success is dependent on the distribution of power in the international system. For most states, except for the lucky few, even survival for a given day is hard to secure. Overt pursuit of primacy is saved for a few privileged states that have already achieved some level of security.

Mearsheimer argues that states strive for hegemony and “the pursuit of power stops only when hegemony is achieved.” I would argue that pursuit of power would not stop even after states have achieved hegemony. A hegemon will add power to secure its hegemony into the future. Hegemony at one point in time does not guarantee perpetual hegemony. This is partly because the nature of technology demands continual innovation. The diffusion of technology works to the advantage of the late-developer.

(2) Changes in Offensive Capability

Realism suggests that power determines how states perceive threats. It follows that a

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34 Many “China threat” arguments talk about the “potential threat” posed by China. This means possible future threat. “Potential threat” in Knorr’s terminology refers to a threat that already has the capability to harm but has not showed threatening intentions. I use the term “potential threat” to refer to a threat that has not yet materialized in terms of capability or intentions or both.

35 Mearsheimer, Ibid., p. 34. Mearsheimer defines hegemon as “a state that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system...No other state has the military wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it. In essence, a hegemon is the only great power in the system.” p. 40. According to Mearsheimer’s definition, it seems that the United States at the time of his writing, circa 2001, would have qualified as a hegemon. However, he calls it a regional hegemon. “The United States, for example, is the most powerful state on the planet today. But it does not dominate Europe and Northeast Asia the way it does the Western Hemisphere, a it has no intention of trying to conquer and control those distant regions, mainly because of the stopping power of water...In short, there has never been a global hegemon, and there is not likely to be one anytime soon.” pp. 40-41.

state perceives another country to be a threat when it has acquired the capability to harm its national survival. In this case, threat perception is based on the present possession of a certain capability.

A state’s acquisition of capabilities that changes the military balance or gives offensive capability to harm vital national interests, triggers the perception of threat. In many cases, however, threat perceptions are evidenced not at a time when a country actually possesses a certain military capability, but when an anticipation of such a possession occurs. This is because it could be too late to respond to the threat once the possession of offensive capability materializes.

(3) Sources of Change in Power

(i) Change in Relative Power by Decline of Other States

States can improve their power position either by an indigenous increase of power, or exogenously by decline of other powers. Indigenous increase could occur, for example, through economic growth or conquest. The decline of other powers can occur, for example, by defeat in war, internal turmoil such as revolution, or by economic recession. War brings both the rise of one power (the victor) and the decline of another (the loser), thus changing their relative power significantly.

Balance of power theory, which is a central theory in Realism, argues that states in general balance against the No. 1 power. When the distribution of power changes, new alliances are formed in a way that results in maintaining a balance in the international system. Balance of power theory tries to explain alliance behavior and is not designed to explain threat perception. However, we can infer from the theory how former allies would change their perception of each
other after the distribution of power changes.

![Diagram of balance of power restoration process]

**Figure 2-1:** Process through which balance of power is restored.

When a war ends, the defeated power has lost capability and powers in the winning coalition have gained. Gaining new territory increases the capability and resources of the victor. When wars were fought primarily by infantry, territorial gains that came with soldiers directly increased military capability. With victory, former allies may gain differentially. This may cause them to rebalance. The break-ups of a war-winning coalition at or just after the moment of victory have been observed throughout history.\(^\text{37}\)

The end of a war can change many of the factors that Singer and Walt identified as sources of threat. An example is United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. Waltz notes, "the last four grand coalitions (two against Napoleon and one in each of the world wars of the twentieth century) collapsed once victory was achieved."\(^\text{38}\) Other examples of alliance partners becoming enemies after wars include: the fraying of the Athens-Sparta alliance against Persia giving way to the Peloponnesian war; the United States and France aligning against

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\(^{37}\) "Nobody wants anyone else to win; none of the great powers wants one of their number to emerge as the leader.... If two coalitions form and one of them weakens ... we expect the extent of the other coalition's military preparation to slacken or its unity to lessen. The classic example of the latter effect is the breaking apart of a war-winning coalition in or just after the moment of victory." Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 126.

\(^{38}\) Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," p. 30.
Britain from 1776-1783 and then fighting the undeclared “quasi war” of 1798; Prussia and Austria aligning against Denmark in 1864 and becoming enemies in 1866; the United States and Aginaldo’s anti-Spanish resistance in the Philippines going from allies in 1898 to enemies in 1899; Serbia and Bulgaria 1912 alliance against Turkey switching to animosity in 1913; and the United States and Ho Chi Minh aligning against Japan before fighting the Vietnam War.

(ii) Change in Relative Power by Reallocation of Military Resources — Freed Up Force

Though realism argues that relative power determines states’ behavior and threat perceptions, the orientation of power and surplus of power are important. For example, if two countries have the same amount of power, but one has one enemy to defend against and the other has two, then the one with only one enemy is stronger.

Another example might occur among three countries: A, B and C (Figure 2-2). Suppose A was in an antagonistic relationship with C, and most of A’s military forces and resources were used to defend against C. A has little power directed against country B. However, if C is no longer there (because of defeat or internal collapse) then A can reallocate its forces against B. In such a case, even if A’s power has not changed, its power vis-à-vis country B has increased tremendously.
Figure 2-2. Reallocation of country A’s forces against B after dissolution of country C.

(iii) Increase in Economic Power

In addition to changes in relative power, change could also occur in absolute terms. Changes in power could be in aggregate power or more directly in military power. These changes could change the balance of power in the system. Increases in aggregate power can occur through population increase, territorial acquisition, or economic growth.

The argument that increases in economic power gives rise to threat perception is based on the premise that military power stems from economic power. Economic growth ensures military spending and advanced technology necessary to support a modern military. Economic growth also signals future capability, and because threat perception deals mainly with possible aggression in the future, economic growth may trigger threat perception even without military investments, or aggressive behavior.

Throughout history, status quo powers have often been sensitive to and fearful of growth of a late developer. Russophobia in Britain in the 1830s to the 1850s reflected the perception in Britain that Russia was a fast growing economy. In reality, Russia had a backward economy suffering from numerous impediments to industrialization. Russia, in turn, was fearful of fast
growing Germany in the 1900s and the 1910s.

Another reason for economic growth leads to threat perception is economic competition. The economic growth of one country can hinder the economic growth of another country through market acquisition or resource supply. Economic growth may cause a trade imbalance, decreasing relative gains for a country. Thus the capability of one country can be weakened by the growth of another country.

(iv) Increase in Military Power

An obvious change in power is increased relative or absolute power. Military power increases through increased defense spending, increased armaments, acquisition of weapon systems, or technological innovation. 39

Increases in military capability are critical to threat perception for two reasons. First, military capability increases the potential adversary’s capability to inflict damage. Second, increases in military capability are often seen to indicate aggressive intentions. This is particularly true when there is seemingly no legitimate reason for the military buildup 40

3. Changes in Intentions as a Cause of Threat Perception

Realism suggests two mechanisms that affect how states perceive the intention of other states. One mechanism is shaped by the distribution of power in the international system. The other is shaped by the actual behavior of states.

39 Innovation could also be in tactics or in military effectiveness. For example, the rise of the mass army increased the military capability significantly. For impact of advent of mass army see for example, Barry Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, (Fall, 1993). Recent debates on revolution in military affairs (RMA) also look at possible innovations in doctrine as well s technology. 40 This argument is related to the discussion in the previous section on intentions. That section is (1) (ii) Intentions, under Changes in World Structure of Power.
(1) Intentions Determined by Relative Power Position — Fraying of “Strategic Safety-net”

Realist assumptions suggest that states perceive intentions on the basis of distribution of power in the international system. This is because states’ motives for survival drive their behavior and thus shape intentions. States hold aggressive intention towards a state that could harm its survival — because of the power it has — and benign intention towards a state whose power and cooperation are vital for their survival.

Cooperation and “trust” between alliance partners occurs not because of mutual friendship, but because they rely on each for survival. Glenn Snyder noted that “alliances have no meaning apart from the adversary threat to which they are a response.”41 The disappearance of a common adversary causes skepticism about an alliance partner’s intentions.

As noted in Chapter 1, a strategic safety-net exists when the survival of a state depends on another state. Where two states depend on each other for survival, the strategic safety-net binds them together. A strategic safety-net is strongest when the two countries face a common enemy. The presence of a strategic safety-net ensures that the other state will not act against the interest of another negates suspicion. The disappearance or waning of the common enemy frays the strategic safety-net.

Suppose X and Y are allied against their common enemy, Z. The presence of Z provides a “strategic safety-net.” Intentions of allies are perceived as benign because allies seek to maximize their power and fighting within the alliance would only decrease the power of the alliance vis-à-vis the common enemy. When there is the common enemy Z, an increase in Y’s capability is viewed as an effort to balance against Z and benefit X. However, without the common enemy, Y could attack X without risking its own survival. This leads to a perception

of aggressive intentions. Thus the same behavior that was seen as benign under the strategic safety-net is threatening in its absence.

My argument is different from the proposition put forward by such scholars as Fareed Zakaria that “capabilities shape intentions.” While I do not exclude such a proposition, my argument is that even without an increase in capability in absolute terms, disappearance of a common adversary would cause perception of aggressive intention.

(2) Resurfacing of Old Problems — Behavior Determined by Relative Power Position

Realism says that states perceive intentions of other powers based on their behavior, rather than their ideology, culture or form of government. Behavior indicates how a potential opponent’s military capability will be used. Changes in behavior signal changes in intentions. Changed reaction to similar events also signals a change in intentions.

Changes in the world structure of power not only affect relative capabilities, but also the behavior of states. As we have seen in the preceding section, strategic rationales change according to changes in distribution of power. Assumptions tenable under certain structural conditions may not hold under new conditions.

When there is a common threat, allies cooperate to oppose that threat. Maintaining good relations with the ally strengthens the each state. Furthermore, strengthening the ally’s capability also serves the other state’s interest. Common threats ensure that states will not

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42 Fareed Zakaria wrote “With greater wealth, a country could build a military and diplomatic apparatus capable of fulfilling its aims abroad; but its very aims, its perception of its needs and goals, all tended to expand with rising resources.” He called his version of realism “state-centered realism.” Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 5, 9.

43 For example, France before WWI gave assistance to Russia to build their railroad. France did this not because it was concerned for Russia’s development nor its security. French motive in this was purely selfish. It was to strengthen Russia against the German attack. Slow mobilization was Russia’s vulnerability and basis for the Schlieffen Plan. If Russia could not mobilize quickly enough then German army would be able to concentrate its forces on the offensive against France and then turn around to attack Russia.
attack their ally.

All these calculations change when a common enemy disappears. Old problems resurface. Issues that were considered less important than maintaining the alliance could come to the fore. For example, states may begin to pursue their own economic interests and as a result economic competition could intensify. Ideological differences could become starker and increase their importance. Domestic organizations could pursue their interests more freely. Domestic issues spill over and affect foreign policies.

Allies are often presented to the public with a better image than they really are, but this ceases when a common enemy disappears. For example, Stalin was described as a good fatherly figure during the Second World War only to be revealed and presented as a despot after the war. Chiang Kaishek was portrayed as a Christian and a believer of democracy to the American public during and right after the Second World War. It was only afterwards that the public was made aware that Chiang was as despotic leader as the communist leader, Mao Zedong.44

III. APPLICATION OF REALIST EXPLANATION TO “CHINA THREAT” ARGUMENTS

Realism explains the rise of “China threat” argument by China’s increased wealth and relative and absolute power. Realism argues that changes in power relations changed behavior and perception of intentions. Realism also argues that changes in the world structure of power, brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union, affected both the United States and China,

44 The opposite of “dressing-up” an ally might be “demonizing” of an enemy. In each case, the objective is to mobilize public support. Theoretically, one would expect a former enemy’s image to improve after the war. This seems to happen less easily than the images of former allies deteriorate. However, there are a few examples. During the Second World War, Japan was sometimes depicted as a ferocious monster or a gorilla in American popular media and propaganda posters. However, in a cartoon that appeared after the war, Japan is depicted as a pet monkey sitting on American soldier’s shoulder. For images during and after the war see, John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).
their power positions, their relations to each other and their relations to other countries. The same logic governs the perceptions and attitudes between Japan and China, and also between the United States and Japan.

1. Changes in Power as a Cause of “China threat” Arguments

(1) Offensive Capability

Realist theory expects that “China threat” arguments occurred because China acquired the capability to harm U.S. vital national interests. Procurement of new weapons system or development of greater offensive capability could trigger “China threat” arguments.

(2) Changes in Relative Power Position

(i) Change in Relative Power Caused by the Decline of the Soviet Union

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to the United States, China and Japan. Though the Cold War was not truly war, and the Soviet Union collapsed, its end had effects similar to the end of war. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Republics broke away and Russia became much smaller than the Soviet Union, in terms of territory, economic resources and military capability. As a result, the power of the United States, China and Japan increased relative to Russia. Japan and China increased their power relative to the United States.

(ii) Change in Relative Power by Reallocation of Forces as a Cause of “China threat” Arguments

The collapse of the Soviet Union freed forces and resources that had been used to defend against the Soviet threat. China no longer needed as many troops along the Sino-Soviet border
as it used to. Consequently, the capability of China increased vis-à-vis states other than the Soviet Union (Russia). Similarly, American defense spending and forces could be redeployed. Japan too could redirect its limited defense resources to counter other states after the demise of the Soviet Union.

(iii) Increases in China’s Economic Power as a Cause of “China threat” Arguments

Because the first concern of states is to maintain their relative power, states are concerned with the relative size of their economy. The United States reacted very strongly to a forecast that China would surpass the U.S. economy to become the world No. 1 economy in 2002.\footnote{A forecast published by the World Bank gave a big push to “China threat” arguments in the United States. The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and Developing Countries—1993 (Washington, DC: April 1993).}

2. Change in Intentions as a Cause of “China threat” Arguments

(1) Intentions Determined by Relative Power Position

Realism argues that during the Cold War, the threat of the Soviet Union promoted cooperation among the United States, Japan and China. Although the United States and Japan never considered China a formal ally, after the normalization of relations in the early 1970s, it was considered to be mutually opposed to the Soviet threat. It was in the interest of the United States, China and Japan to cooperate against the Soviet Union. China’s fear of the Soviet threat ensured that its intentions towards the United States and Japan were perceived as benign. China thought the same about the United States and Japan. Realism argues that intentions of the United States and Japan towards each other and toward China would also deteriorate after the disappearance of the Soviet Union.
(2) Changed Behavior as a Cause of “China threat” Arguments

Realism argues that China’s behavior towards the United States and Japan would become more aggressive after the demise of the Soviet Union. The same can be said for the United States and Japan behavior towards China and each other. The decrease in strategic rationale to maintain good relations removed constraints on China’s behavior. The same applies to U.S. behavior — and Japan’s behavior — vis-à-vis China. Old problems like the Taiwan issue or disagreements over human rights Cold War could resurface.

3. Hypotheses and Predictions Based on Realism

Hypotheses based on realist explanations for the rise of “China threat” arguments.

1. Increases in Relative Power

Hypothesis R-1: State perceives threats based on relative power position. State perceives states that have actual or potential aggregate power that exceeds their own as threats.

Hypothesis R-1-1 (Relative power position): States are concerned about their relative power position in the international system and seek to maintain or elevate their position. States will perceive a threat when the gap between itself and the next most powerful states is narrowing. States will be less worried when the gap is widening.

Hypothesis R-1-2 (Primacy): States at minimum seek survival and at maximum seek hegemony. States seek primacy given the opportunity. States that seeks primacy will see obstacles to attainment of primacy as threats.

Hypothesis R-1-3: States that have ensured their immediate security pursue hegemony and seek to create an international environment conducive to their national interests. States will see obstacles to creating such an international environment as threats.

Predictions based on Hypothesis R1:

Prediction R-1-1: The United States will seek to maintain a position of primacy after the collapse of the Soviet Union and see the No. 2 power as a threat.

Prediction R-1-2: China’s economic growth will increase its relative power. The United States will make “China threat” arguments when China becomes a rising No. 2 power.
Prediction R-1-3: The collapse of the Soviet Union and the slow-down of the Japanese economy will increase the relative power of China. The United States will make “China threat” arguments when China becomes a rising No. 2 power.

Prediction R-1-4: The collapse of the Soviet Union will free up the forces along the border deployed against the Russian forces, increasing China’s the relative capability.

We should see China decrease the number of ground troops deployed along the Russian border and redeploy resources elsewhere.

We should see China decrease the number of ground forces and develop air and naval capabilities.

Prediction R-1-5: The United States may propagate democratic values and free trade because they are conducive to its interests. The United States may see obstacles and resistance to propagating its values as threats.

2. Increases in Offensive Capability

Hypothesis R-2: A state perceives states with actual or potential power to threaten its survival as threats.

Predictions based on Hypothesis R-2:

Prediction R-2-1: China’s economic growth will increase its absolute power. When China obtains enough capability to threaten U.S. survival, the United States will perceive China as a threat.

Hypothesis R-3: States perceive a threat when other states have actual or potential military capability to threaten their survival.

Hypothesis R-3-1: A state perceives threat when another state builds up its military, particularly its offensive capability.

Hypothesis R-3-2: A state perceives threat when another state acquires strategically important assets that give them capability to inflict harm to its survival.

Hypothesis R-3-3: A state perceives threat when another state acquires strategically important assets that prepare it for war.

Prediction based on Hypothesis R-3:

Prediction R-3-1: The United States will perceive China as a threat when China’s relative military power increases.
Prediction R-3-2: The United States will perceive China as a threat when China acquires
military capability and weapons that could harm vital U.S. national interests.

Prediction R-3-3: The United States will perceive China as threat when China acquired strategically vital military capability.

3. Aggressive Intentions

Hypothesis R-4: States perceive threats based on the aggressive behavior of other state. Behavior is determined by power position in the international system.

Hypothesis R-4-1: Because states maximize the power of their alliance to balance against a common enemy, states try to maintain good relations with their ally. Allies are perceived as having benign intentions.

Hypothesis R-4-2: In the absence of a common enemy, there is more self-interested behavior and a deterioration of relations. This may lead to perceptions of aggressive intentions.

Predictions from Hypothesis R-4:

Prediction R-4-1: The United States will put less effort in maintaining good relations with China, and vise versa, after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. As a result, U.S.-China relations will deteriorate.

Prediction R-4-2: The United States will be less restrained in dealing with contentious issues such as Taiwan and human rights that were shelved during the Cold War. The Taiwan issue will reemerge as a divisive issue between the United States and China after the disappearance of the Soviet threat.

Prediction R-4-3: The United States will be more critical of human rights in China after the disappearance of the Soviet threat.

Prediction R-4-4: The United States will be more aggressive and assertive in pursuing its interests against China’s interests, and vise versa, after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Prediction R-4-5: U.S.-China relations will deteriorate as old problems resurface.

Prediction R-4-6: During the Cold War, we should see American policy-makers arguing that good relations with China require sacrificing other priorities such as Taiwan and human rights.

Hypothesis R-5: States perceive threats based on other state’s aggressive intention. Intentions are determined by power position in the international system.

Hypothesis R-5-1: Allies maximize their power to balance against their common adversary.
The presence of a common enemy serves as a “strategic safety-net” ensuring that the intentions of the allies are mutually benign. When the common enemy disappears, suspicion about the former ally’s intentions may follow. All things being equal, state is less likely to perceive a state with a common enemy as threat and more likely to perceive a state without a common enemy as threat.

Hypothesis R-5-2: States assume that other states want to improve their relative positions. A state is therefore more likely to perceive a state as a threat if it has the next greatest amount of power.

Hypothesis R-5-3: The combination of Hypotheses R4 and R5 would double the perception of aggressive intentions. The absence of common enemy lifts constraint on aggressive behavior and the former allies’ threat perception is heightened without the strategic safety-net. The same behavior will be perceived as being more aggressive intentions when there is no common enemy. Moreover, behavior itself will be aggressive and relations will deteriorate in the absence of a need to balance against a common enemy.

Predictions from Hypothesis R-5:

Prediction R-5-1: The United States will perceive China’s intentions as more aggressive and perceive China as threat after the Soviet threat disappears.

We should see statements from American policy-makers remarking on the change in China’s intentions based on China’s behavior.

Prediction R-5-2: The United States will perceive China’s military build-up as evidence of aggressive intentions towards the United States after the Soviet threat disappears.

Prediction R-5-3: The United States will perceive China’s intentions as more aggressive as its gains power relative to the United States.

III. ORGANIZATION THEORY

1. Organizational Explanation of Threat Arguments

The second theory I use to explain the rise of “China threat” arguments is “organization theory.” I examine whether or not the rise of “China threat” arguments was brought about by the organizational desire to maintain size, wealth and internal organization.

Changes in international system not only affect states and relations among states but also
affect behavior of organizations within each state. The Soviet Union provided a target for many organizations and its demise meant that organizations had to readjust themselves to a new actual and potential environment. Organizations had to readjust their task — sometimes even their purpose — and how to carry out operations and programs to achieve organizational purpose. It is conceivable that organizational interests caused the selection of China as a new target.

It is important to distinguish (a) organizations’ reactions to the changes in international system that follow realist assumptions, and (b) organizational reactions motivated by organizational interests and biases. Both reactions may be triggered by changes in the international system, but the driving force behind the former is the states’ search for power and while the latter stems from organizational interests.

In this dissertation, I explain the motives of those groups that were vocal in making “China threat” arguments. I start with military organizations including the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) of the Department of Defense (DoD), and the military services. I will not be examining other governmental organizations such as the State Department or the Central Intelligence Agency. I will then study to explain behavior and arguments of “advocacy groups” that were active in making China related arguments including human rights groups, pro-democracy groups, labor, and religious conservatives. I have chosen these groups because they were most active making “China threat” arguments.

In this section, I introduce hypotheses about what causes threat perception from organization theory. I first review the most relevant parts of organization theory. I then offer hypotheses about military organizations and threat arguments, followed by hypotheses about

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46 A close relationship between international relations and domestic politics has been emphasized by several scholars, and labeled as the “two-level game theory.” On two-level theory, see Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization, Vol. 42 (Summer 1988).
advocacy groups.

Organization theory is a rich body of literature that has been developed for "organization watchers and organization designers." Economists and psychologists have contributed greatly to the development of the theory. Here, I introduce only the portion of organization theory, which has been used by political scientists to explain why organizational behavior and decisions sometimes deviate from what seems to be rational from a realist perspective. The characteristics of organizations that have been used to explain organizational behavior are desire for survival, pursuit of wealth, size and autonomy, and minimization of uncertainty.

I take the assumptions of organization theory from the works of Herbert Simon, James March and James Wilson. Again, organizational theory does not directly address the question of threat perception. However, organizational theory provides insights into understanding how organizations react to disappearance of an existing threat and what kind of threat they are likely to perceive as the next threat, as well as how they might conduct the search.

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(1) Survival — Wealth and Size

Every organization has its purpose. Organizations survive when a sufficient number of people support their purpose with dues and a sufficient number of people think it worthwhile serve its purpose in deeds.\(^{50}\) Purpose ultimately determines whether organizations survive.

Organizations pursue size (personnel) and wealth (budget). "Organizations have at least one goal — the survival if not the growth of the organization," writes Jeffrey Pfeffer.\(^{51}\) The fact that members of an organization identify their personal goals and fulfillment with their organizations enhances this organizational drive for survival.\(^{52}\)

Organization theory suggests that organizations perceive new threats when threats disappear and that organizational wealth and size require an alternative threat. Organization theory holds that even when the environment has changed and adjustments are necessary, organizations try to maintain their original purpose and avoid adaptation. This leads to organizational inertia and irrational behavior from a national perspective. When the environmental change is sufficient, however, to threaten the organization with irrelevance and therefore threaten its survival, organizations find a new threat in order to survive.\(^{53}\)

Organizations display bounded rationality. Comprehensive rationality assumes that individuals and organizations will choose the best alternative, taking account of consequences,
their probabilities, and utilities. However, organizational behaviors often deviate from comprehensive rationality. Herbert Simon's work finds five characteristic deviations from comprehensive rationality: (1) factored problems, where organizations split up problems into small parts and deal with one at a time; (2) satisficing, where organizations do not consider all alternatives and pick the optimal action with the best consequences, but instead find a course of action that is "good enough;" (3) behavior where the search for options is stopped at the first alternative that is good enough; (4) uncertainty avoidance; and (5) repertoires.

Organization theory suggests an order in which organizations justify their size and budget. Organizations first justify their size and budget by sticking to the old explanation requiring the same purpose. When this no longer ensures resources, organizations will find a new but similar purpose. Organizations will stop at the first purpose that is "good enough." When this no longer ensures resources and support, organizations finally adopts a truly different purpose. Applied to threat perception, this logic says that organizations first justify their size and wealth by arguing that the old threat still exists, then they justify their efforts with a similar threat, and finally they argue that a totally new threat has emerged. Organizations should perceive and advance threats that promote their organizational interests rather than other threats.

(2) Averting Uncertainties

Another characteristic organizations have is aversion to uncertainties. Certainty brings a clear sense of mission and unity within the organizations. It also makes operations easier. Organizations cannot plan for uncertainty. Routine approach to a problem allows day to day activities to occur without making decisions every time. Change in the environment may bring consequences that established routines do not comprehend. When an organization loses a
target for its purpose, it will look for a new target to order to planning and operations.

When organizational purpose is defined abstractly, circumstances become more important in deciding which actual tasks and operations to employ.\textsuperscript{54} For example, according to the United States Government Manual, the purpose of the Department of State is to "promote the long-range security and well-being of the United States," the Department of Defense is "responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our country," and the mission of the Department of the Army is to "organize, train, and equip active duty and reserve forces for the preservation of peace, security, and the defense of our nation."\textsuperscript{55} But these statements are too vague to decide which tasks and programs to carry out. Each bureaucracy has to operationalize these goals based on its circumstances.

Uncertainty reinforces the organizational tendency to use threats to maintain the same purpose and seek new threats only once the environment has shifted considerably. Similar threats are more familiar to organizations and therefore less uncertain. It follows that organizations search for a new purpose and target only when old methods increase uncertainties rather than decrease them.

2. Military Organizations and Threat Perception

(1) Theory

(i) Survival — Threat to Size and Wealth

"Created by wars that required it, the machine now created the wars it required."\textsuperscript{56}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} James Wilson writes, "When goals are vague, circumstances become important." James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 36.
\end{itemize}
Schumpeter observed during World War I that military organizations tend to maintain and expand organizational size and wealth even at the cost of making unnecessary wars, the reasons for which are “of subordinate importance.”

Kenneth Waltz, a structural realist, also noted this strong organizational characteristic of the military organizations.

Organizations, especially big ones with strong traditions, have long lives. Create an organization and it will find something to do. Once created, and the more so one it has become well established, an organization becomes hard to get rid of. A big organization is managed by large number of bureaucrats who develop a strong interest in its perpetuation.

The purpose of military organizations is to defend the nation from the enemy and to make war. However, this purpose is too vague to define tasks and programs. Therefore, although the general purpose of military organizations — war making — may not change, adversaries are necessary to planning. Existence of adversaries will ensure support from the legislature and public and keep resources coming into the organization.

When a major adversary disappears, it becomes difficult for military organizations to maintain support for their organizational wealth and size. The end of the war often creates public demand for demobilization, either in actual force structure or in terms of decrease in military budget. However, according to organization theory, military organizations will seek to maintain the size of its organization, or at least minimize the decrease in their size and wealth. This organizational need gives rise to the need for a new threat.

Organization theory says that each service will identify a new adversary according to their organizational characteristics. Armies choose ground based adversary. Air forces choose adversaries with formidable air power. Navy chooses enemies with a strong naval force.

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57 On the history of Schumpeter’s writing this essay, see “Editor’s Introduction” in Ibid., p. ix. Quotation from Ibid., p. 33.
58 Waltz, Ibid., p. 20.
new type of adversary may mean that existing forces will be downsized or programs canceled and resources reallocated, even to other services. The theory also suggests that military organizations prefer rising powers as adversaries. Rising powers ensure growth in organizational size and wealth whereas declining powers do not.

Organization theory also suggests that military organizations will be slow to begin the search for a new threat. The internal interests that try to maintain the old threat are expected to be stronger than the interests that reevaluate.

Compared with some interest groups, military organizations rarely face real dangers to their organizational survival. Nevertheless, they still have to justify their force structure, programs and budgets. In non-democracies, military organizations will have to convince the leadership to support their organizational size and wealth. In democracies, the military needs the support of the executive branch, the legislative branch and ultimately the public. 59

Military organizations compete with other governmental organizations and programs, such as education or health care, for taxpayers’ money. Each service within the military organizations will also compete with each other, making independent arguments for their share. When there are sufficient resources, each service is able to gain its share more easily. But when resources are scarce, services compete more for size and wealth.

The importance of public support in maintaining the organization is expected to be greater in a pluralistic society in which various organizations compete for support. If the public correctly judges the mismatch between environment and organizational goals, then the public will create pressure for organizations to respond to new threats. It follows that the need for organizations to search for a new threat will be greater in pluralist societies.

59 With few exceptions, nations see military organizations as indispensable. An exception occurs when a country is conquered and the victor demands disarmament. Japan after the World War II is an example.
In the United States, Congress has budgetary authority. The military is aware that they must respond to Congressional preferences. This suggests Congress drives the timing and nature of military organizations’ search for a new adversary.

In Japan, military organizations also rely on executive and legislative support. However, in Japan, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) has more power than the Defense Agency (JDA) — far more than the U.S. equivalent, the Department of Treasury or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The JDA’s budget is subject to MoF’s assessment. The checking function of the Diet, on the other hand, is probably less important than that of the U.S. Congress vis-à-vis DoD. Defense issues get less public attention and therefore hold less importance in the Diet than in the United States.

(ii) Avoiding Uncertainty — Internal Organization

When a threat disappears or declines, military organizations lose a specific problem around which they are organized. Without a clear threat, choosing programs is difficult. Planning against uncertainties is much harder than planning for an enemy with a name. Organizations mitigate uncertainty by focusing on a specific threat. In the absence of a clear threat, they search for such threats to organize around.

Organizations have beliefs about the best formula for affecting organizational purpose. Military organizations, call their formula doctrines, which are ideas about how to best affect national security through military means. Observers note that stronger its grounding, the more

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60 Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, p. 251.
61 The main reason for this difference is the absence of a strong defense industry in Japan. Japan imposes self-restriction on overseas weapons sales. As a result, the defense sector has a small share of the heavy industry. For example, in the case of Mitsubishi Heavy, a leading supplier of weapons to the JSDF, the defense industry sector only makes up 11.4% of total production, whereas for Lockheed Martin it is 63.8%. Boei Sangyo-Gijutsu Kiban Kenkyukai, *Boei Sangyo-Gijutsu Kiban no Iji-Ikusei ni kansuru Kihonteki Hoko* [Study Group on Defense Industry-Technology Base, *Basic Direction on the Maintenance and Promotion of Defense Industry-Technology Base*], November 2000, p. 25.
resistant doctrine is to change. 62 The longer a doctrine has held sway, the stronger the organizational belief in that doctrine. Doctrines outlast the environment that created them. Organization theory expects a strong preference to maintain doctrine, especially those that worked in the past. Moreover the absence of factors seen to have contributed to peace or victory may be considered threats to security. For example, because maintaining strong alliances and a forward presence was seen vital during the Cold War, organizations may consider this posture critical to peace today even though the environment has changed.

Organization theory would suggest that the impact of the end of the Cold War was very large for the U.S. military. The Cold War was an especially unique case as the United States and the Soviet Union were in a hostile relationship but not actually engaged in war fighting. For more than fifty years, the U.S. military organization has prepared to counter the Soviet threat. Its force structure, long-term planning, research and development (R & D), and war plans were all based on the Soviet threat. 63 The U.S. military needed an adversary to re-organize itself internally and to continue with its tasks.

Organization theory says that organizations prefer autonomy to size. For example, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara increased military spending by about $30 billion from 1961 and 1968, whereas Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird cut defense spending by 28% or $68 billion from 1969-1973. However, McNamara was very unpopular among military services whereas Laird was a very popular, despite the cuts. 64 McNamara exercised tight control over military spending, while Laird simply told the services to make the cuts as they saw

62 For example, Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, pp. 83.
63 The end of the Cold War was not as decisive as the end of a hot war where the adversary is actually defeated, demilitarized and occupied. Therefore the collapse of the Soviet Union served as the decisive blow in terms of its impact on military organizations.
fit. Morton Halperin explained the differing popularity by observing that bureaucracies "are often prepared to accept less money with greater control than more money with less control."\(^{65}\)

To be clear, organizations do not like threats per se; they like threats that fit their purpose. A large but dissimilar adversary may leave less of a role for that particular service. For example, an army will have little interest in an adversary if the expected methods of combat with that country would be exclusively air and naval. On the other hand, civilians in the military organizations, OSD in the U.S. case, may regard size and hence aggregate power of the adversary to be more important in choosing a new adversary. OSD has less of an incentive to maintain force structure for a particular service. This suggests that OSD and the military services may argue for different adversaries after the decline of Soviet threat.

(2) Organization Theory’s Explanations for the Military and the Rise of “China threat”

Arguments

Based on organization theory, we can make the following predictions for U.S. military organizations in the “China threat” case.

(i) U.S. military organizations will perceive states with strong or increasing power as new threats;
(ii) U.S. military organizations will begin to search for new threats when the Soviet threat disappears, progressing from similar threats to less similar threats. They will first make resurgent Soviet/Russia threat arguments, then make threat arguments about a mini-Soviet threat and finally will make “China threat” arguments when other threats have failed to provide reasons for sustaining and expanding defense budgets and programs;
(iii) The U.S. Army will make threat arguments about a ground based threat, the Air Force will make threat arguments about a formidable air force and the Navy will make threat arguments about a strong naval power.

\(^{65}\) Wilson, Ibid., p. 179.
Organization theory says that U.S. military organizations will seek new adversaries to justify their size and wealth after the Cold War. The theory suggests that Congress has considerable influence on this process. U.S. military organizations should begin search for a new threat only once they perceive diminishing Congressional support for threat of a resurgent former-Soviet Union. If military organizations are astute, they might foresee waning of Congressional support when the Soviet threat started to decline. Keen observers noticed changes in the Soviet Union around 1985. Soviet change became irreversible by 1988. But it was not until the end of the 1980s that arguments other than the Soviet threat emerged. There was a period after the Cold War where defense analysts and planners shifted from one threat to another, stating different rationales for weapons programs or force structures and identifying different threats. And it was only around 1992 that “China threat” arguments emerged. Even then, the military services were not making clear “China threat” arguments but making regional threat arguments.

As noted, organizational theory predicts that the U.S. military organizations identify new threats beginning with most similar to the Soviet Union and shifting to the least similar. The Soviet Union was a militarily formidable adversary with air, ground and naval, capabilities. U.S.-Soviet war would likely have involved ground battle in Central Europe and maybe in the Middle East or in Northeast Asia. Airpower would have played a large part in those fights. Submarine warfare was likely. Organization theory says that the U.S. military would search for an adversary with similar capability.

66 For example, General Collin Powell, then President Reagan’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, “had become convinced in 1988 that the changes taking place in the Soviet Union were fundamental.” Major General Lee Butler, then Vice Director of J-5 concluded in May 1988 that “the Cold War was over, communism had failed, and the world was witnessing a second Russian Revolution.” Lorsa S. Jaffe, The Development of the Base Force: 1989-1992, Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 8, 11.
From this perspective, China offered a less organizational satisfying threat than rogue states. War with Iran, Iraq, or North Korea would require ground and air forces. China has a large army, but it is unlikely that the U.S. Army would battle China on the Eurasian land mass. China has modest airpower, and its naval forces are “brown water,” meaning they lack the range to venture out and engage the “blue water” US Navy. Hence, organization theory predicts that “China threat” arguments will emerge after the U.S. military organizations have tried arguments about threats from Iraq or North Korea, or if they were planning to acquire new capability that cannot be justified by threats from Iraq or North Korea. The Army should be less concerned with China than the Air Force and the Navy. OSD should be more concerned with China because of its aggregate power and nuclear capabilities.

Organization theory also predicts that the military would prefer a threat with specifics. A country with capabilities that can be measured is more amenable to planning than a threat from instability or terrorism. When a new threat is not sufficient to maintain forces or programs, the organization may choose to present the threat to the public in an exaggerated fashion. The need to exaggerate threats should be greater in a more pluralistic society where the public support is important.

(3) Hypotheses and Predictions for Military Organizations and “China threat” Arguments

(i) Resources and Personnel

Hypothesis O-1: Organizations seek survival. Organizations seek size, wealth and autonomy for this reason. An organizational purpose keeps resources coming into the organization, which ensures survival.

Hypothesis O-1-1: Adversaries provide purpose for military organizations. When a major adversary disappears or grows weaker, military organizations lose purpose and resources. Hence, military organizations will seek to restore purpose.
Predictions from Hypothesis O-1-1:

Prediction O-1-1: The collapse of the Soviet Union will lead to cuts in military budgets.

Prediction O-1-2: U.S. military organizations will argue that the Soviet/Russian threat is still formidable after the end of the Cold War.

Prediction O-1-3: U.S. military organizations will begin search for a new adversary (threat) after the Cold War.

Prediction O-1-4: U.S. military organizations will begin search for new adversary outward from militarily most similar to least similar. To maintain current size and force structure, they will first argue that Soviet Union/Russia was still strong, then identify a new but similar adversary, and finally a new and different adversary as threat.

Prediction O-1-5: The Army will choose an adversary with ground power, such as Iraq or North Korea. The Air Force will choose an adversary with air power. The Navy will choose an adversary with naval power. OSD may choose an adversary with large aggregate power or with trans-service capabilities.

Prediction O-1-6: Ceteris paribus, military organizations will choose a rising power as new adversary rather than a declining power.

Prediction O-1-7: When sufficient support is not forthcoming from the Congress, military organizations may exaggerate the threat, and/or search for a different threat.

Prediction O-1-8: Changes in arguments about China’s capabilities could be greater than actual changes in China’s capability.

Prediction O-1-9: Military arguments that China is a threat should emerge after both the collapse of the Soviet Union and other threat arguments.

(ii) Target for Internal Organization

Hypothesis O-2: Organizational purpose rationalizes activity within the organization and coordinates its activities.

Hypothesis O-3: Organizations avert uncertainty. Purpose and circumstances provide organizations with standard scenarios that facilitate prediction and planning. Based on specific circumstances, organizations establish modes of operation, doctrines, and standard operating procedures (SOPs). O31 is redundant.

Predictions from Hypotheses O-2 and O-3

Prediction O-2-2: At the end of the Cold War U.S. military leaders should make statements about difficulties of carrying out operations and planning after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Union.

Prediction O-2-3: Military organizations should advance specific threats before abstract threats like “uncertainty” and “instability.”

3. Advocacy Groups and Threat Arguments

(1) Organization Theory on Advocacy Groups

(i) Survival — Size and Wealth

In this section I apply organization theory to public advocacy groups. Advocacy groups share characteristics with military organizations, but differ in some ways.

Unlike military organizations, which depend on congressional appropriation and ultimately taxes, advocacy groups depend on voluntary payments from clients and benefactors. Advocacy groups compete for donations from actual and potential members. Dependence on contributions makes advocacy groups more sensitive to popular attitudes than military organizations. Groups may follow trends, advancing the causes where the money (contribution) is.

When advocacy groups are single issue-oriented, it is conceivable that their goal may be achieved. Attainment means that the organization no longer has a purpose to pursue, threatening survival. In such cases, organizations have been observed to adopt new purposes. David Sills’ study on the National Foundation of Infantile Paralysis (“March of Dimes”), for example, found that when the vaccine for polio was discovered, rather than disband, the March of Dimes, took up birth defects.

Another difference between advocacy groups and military organizations is that advocacy groups do not defend against enemies. For military organizations, threat is not just a tool to

67 Wilson, Bureaucracy, p. 33.
gain more wealth and size, but something that must be countered to ensure the survival of organization. Failure to counter adversaries endangers their survival and national security. Advocacy groups’ perceptions of military threat do not have this linear relationship with organizational survival. Threats to advocacy groups may consist of factors other than military capability and intentions of adversaries.

Wilson notes that advocacy organizations often rely on threats rather than on promises when seeking support from their potential donors. Their direct mail advertisements often identify threats to their cause and ask for support to eliminate this threat, be it violation of human rights or the danger of losing national parks. Wilson observes that where political organizations rely on threat appeals, their leadership has a stake in magnifying the threat, and such groups will appeal over time chiefly to their most deeply aroused members and be influenced primarily by their preferences. In other words, ideological groups have tendencies to exaggerate threats and increasingly be radicalized. Wilson distinguishes ideological incentives from selective ones:

ideological incentives, especially if threat-oriented, tend to constrain and radicalize the leaders of an association, whereas selective incentives, especially material ones, tend to bestow discretionary authority on such leaders. 69

Like military organizations, advocacy groups shift from most similar to the least similar threats to maintain support. Thus if the group identified threats based on their ideology, it is likely that the group would focus on another threat of the same ideology. For instance, an anti-communist group will find a new communist power. If the group identified threats based on their nuclear arsenal, then they will find a nuclear state to target.

69 Wilson, Political Organizations, pp. x-xi.
(ii) Internal Organization

Like military organizations, many advocacy groups need a clear target to organize themselves and carry out operations. Some advocacy groups have purposes that are vague, like the enhancement of human rights. These groups might have targeted the Soviet Union in their movement. For these groups, the loss of Soviet Union will not result in lack of purpose. However, clear targets make organizational operations easier. Without a clear target, organizations will not be able to decide where to carry out their activities or send members on operations.

(2) Advocacy Groups and the Rise of “China threat” Arguments

Explanations based on organization theory contend that advocacy groups made “China threat” arguments to preserve their organizational interests. Groups that targeted the Soviet Union faced organizational crisis with the end of the Cold War and needed a new target to sustain themselves. Some organizations changed targets, while others changed purpose — for example from nuclear disarmament to human rights promotion. Some organizations capitalized on the popular interest in China and took up China related issues. These groups did not initiate “China threat” arguments but contributed to their spread.

The advocacy groups most affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union were those who targeted the Soviet Union in their activities. The more directly engaged they were in the Soviet Union, the more its demise should have affected them. Human rights groups, labor organizations, the nuclear disarmament movement, and politically conservative organizations all aimed to change conditions in the Soviet Union. Many of these organizations lost their target with the end of the Cold War.
Hypotheses and Predictions

Hypothesis A-1: Organizations have a strong tendency to maintain survival.

Hypothesis A-1-1: advocacy groups will seek to restore targets to keep their purpose intact and gain contributions.

Predictions from Hypothesis A-1:

Prediction A-1-1: With the collapse of the Soviet Union anti-communist groups will target another anti-communist country.

Prediction A-1-2: Advocacy groups, that deal with the Soviet Union, will begin the search for a new purpose when the former Soviet Union/Russia no longer wins sufficient support to sustain organizational survival. Their search for a new target will progress from most similar to least similar to the Soviet Union.

Prediction A-1-3: The collapse of the Japanese economic bubble will result in loss of purpose (target) for groups whose target used to be Japan. These groups will seek to restore purpose with a new target.

Prediction A-1-4: Advocacy groups will begin search for a new purpose or a new target when threat from Japan no longer wins sufficient support from public. Their search for a new target will progress from most similar to least similar to Japan.

Hypothesis A-2: Organizational purpose allows rationality inside the organization and coordination of its activities.

Hypothesis A-2-1: Targets provide advocacy groups with purposes that facilitate their internal organization. A clear target makes carrying out of daily operations and decision making about programs easier.

Prediction from Hypothesis A-2:

Prediction A-2-1: Advocacy groups will seek a new country target to organize themselves internally.

IV. DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

1. Introduction

The third explanation for threat perception I examine in this dissertation is based on Democratic Peace Theory. Proponents of democratic peace theory contend that the theory
explains liberal suspicion and hostility toward illiberal states. This suggests the explanation that “China threat” arguments occurred because China is a non-democracy. Many “China threat” arguments explicitly refer to China’s undemocratic nature to make the case that it is a threat. This dissertation examines the proposition that “China threat” arguments occurred in the United States because China is a non-democracy.

In this dissertation, I will use a version of democratic peace theory that speaks most directly to threat perception. Several scholars of democratic peace theory have argued that democracies perceive non-democracies as threats because of their regime type. For example, Michael Doyle wrote that “fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity; non-liberals suffer from a presumption of enmity.” John Owen IV has maintained “Prima facie, they (liberals) believe that, irrespective of physical capability, liberal states are safe and illiberal states potentially dangerous.”

As noted, Barbara Farnham has used democratic peace theory to explain Roosevelt’s threat perception of Hitler. Farnham has found that regime type alone was not sufficient to induce threat perception. Farnham noted that the case called into question the central tenet of the democratic peace theory: “the notion that democracies invariably harbor a ‘presumption of enmity’ toward nondemocracies.” Farnham’s finding was that “

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71 Thomas Christensen, for example, notes that the United States has always viewed the biggest non-democracy as a threat. Personal communication. Cambridge, Massachusetts, February 27, 2002. It is also possible that the China’s undemocratic nature may be used instrumentally to justify “China threat” arguments. In other words, the rise of threat perception may cause the increase of perception of China as a non-democracy. I examine this alternative explanation in Chapter 6.
accommodation" was the critical factor in shaping threat perception but not the regime type per se. According to Farnham, Roosevelt began to view Hitler Germany as a threat when he realized after the Munich crisis of 1938 that Hitler violated democratic norms of accommodation. Farnham held that Roosevelt's case established that these norms were not simply the epiphenomena of state interests, as realists would claim.

This dissertation follows up on the study by Farnham and examines, first whether the regime type of China was the cause of the rise of "China threat" arguments, and second whether China's lack of democratic norms of accommodation was the cause of the rise of "China threat" arguments. I will also examine other causes of threat perception derived from the theory on causes of war between democracies and non-democracies.

In the next section, I infer what theories of democratic peace theory tell us about threat perception. I will show theoretically how a democratic United States might perceive China, a non-democracy, as a threat. This section lays out the theory of democracy peace and threat perception. In Chapter 5, I examine if the rise of "China threat" arguments can be explained by the democratic peace theory.

2. Democratic Peace Theory

(1) Causal Mechanism for Peace Among Democracies

In this dissertation, "liberal democracy" refers to a state where liberalism is the major ideology providing the basis for political institutions, and where citizens have leverage over war decision through contested election of officials empowered to declare war. Liberal democracies provide a substantial fraction of its citizens with the vote and protect civil liberties such as freedom of speech, press and assembly. United States and Japan are liberal
democracies and China is a non-democracy. Proponents of democratic peace theory have advanced two causal models, one structural, one normative, or a combination of the two to explain why democracies do not fight one another. Structural explanations hold that the institutional constraints in democratic polities cause democratic peace. Normative explanations hold that the democratic norm of preferring negotiated settlement to the use of force causes democratic peace. Various statistical studies have come out, on balance supporting both causal models. Recent works viewed the two mechanisms as complementary. In this dissertation I use the version of democratic peace theory claiming that the two mechanisms are mutually reinforcing.

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75 I borrow from definitions of scholars such as John M. Owen and Bruce Russett. For Owen, liberal ideas play a central role in effecting democratic peace. His definition of liberal democracy is “a state that instantiates liberal ideas, one where liberalism is the dominant ideology and citizens have leverage over war decisions.” In my definition, I do not treat liberalism as “the dominant ideology” but as “a major ideology”. The difference comes because I notice a gradation in how “liberal” a state is. Owen himself at times refers to various democracies as more liberal or less liberal and categorizes them as “liberal”, “semi-liberal” and “illiberal.” The United States is exceptional because its political culture and national identity are so dominated by liberalism, or American Creed. In other liberal democracies, such as Japan, liberalism is as a major principle in political affairs but may not exclusively govern all aspects of society. Japanese political institutions are founded on liberal democratic ideas, but other ideas such as respect for collective harmony also present in Japanese political culture. As noted above, in this dissertation, I treat both the United States and Japan as liberal democracies, and China as a non-democracy. However, Owen has expressed doubts about categorizing Japan as liberal. He asks: “Is Japan a liberal country, in the Lockean sense used in this study?... This book has used institutional criteria to identify liberal states, but there may be deeper sociological factors that make such a criteria problematic in the case of Japan.” Owen, Ibid., p. 221. Also John Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), reprinted in Michael Brown and Sean Lynn-Jones, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace, An International Security Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), p. 118.

76 For example Russett argues that “Evidence supports both of these explanatory models. The debate between their proponents is not settled, nor should it be seen entirely as a debate. They are not fully separable in theory or in practice. Both make a contribution, and the two kinds of influences reinforce each other to produce the phenomenon of democratic peace.” Russett, however, goes on to say, “Nevertheless, some evidence suggests that the normative model is the more powerful.” Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 119. Owen writes, “I argue that liberal ideology and institutions work in tandem to bring about democratic peace.” Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” p. 118. Russett and Oneal argue “It is more helpful to think of peace among democracies as ‘overdetermined,’ explainable by several related but conceptually distinct and reinforcing, perhaps sequential, causal mechanisms.” Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), p. 53.

77 Other theorists, such as Doyle, argue that not only do the mechanisms work together, but democratic peace is realized only when these mechanisms work together. For Doyle, the three sources of democratic peace are: “republican representation, an ideological commitment to fundamental human rights and transnational interdependence.” Doyle emphasizes that “no single constitutional, international, or cosmopolitan sources is alone sufficient, but together (and only where together) the three sources plausibly connect the characteristics of Liberal polities and economies with sustained Liberal peace.” Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace (New York,
(i) Lack of Speedy Decision-Making as a Cause of Peace

One structural factor contributing to peace among democracies is the time it takes democracies to decide to go to war. Public opinion and the democratic system of checks and constrain decisions to make war. Leaders in democracies have to gain approval for a decision to go to war from the cabinet, the legislative branch and ultimately the electorate. If the leader tries to wage war against popular will, he will be voted out of office in the subsequent election. Leaders thus need to rally widespread support for war. This procedure slows decision-making. The slowness prevents hasty decisions, and may prevent a decision to use force all together. The need to win popular support may also cause other democracies to expect restraint and feel less threatened.78 These expectations leave room for negotiated settlements.

(ii) Transparency as a Cause of Peace

Another structural factor contributing to peace is transparency of the decision-making process. Transparency makes surprise attacks hard to carry out. Transparency makes stated intentions more credible because leaders are subject to audience costs in domestic politics.79 A free press and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as advocacy groups and thinktanks act as independent voices and add transparency and credibility. The role of lawful opposition increases the ability of a democracy to signal its resolve during a crisis, according to several

studies. The free flow of information and people allowed between two democracies also facilitates transparency and trust.

These two factors, the slowness and transparency of decision making process, make wars less likely, according to offense-defense theory, which argues that war is more likely when an attacker is seen to have the first mover advantage. When a surprise attack is feared, countries may be tempted to initiate the attack before waiting to be attacked. Surprise attacks are not feared among democracies because of transparency and slowness of decision-making, so wars do not occur.

(iii) Cost as a Cause of Peace

One version of democratic peace theory notes that democracies are not attacked because they are harder targets than non-democracies. The idea here is that democracies fight harder in war, allocating additional resources to achieve victory. Democratic leaders have a higher stake in winning the war to stay in office. Both democratic and non-democratic leaders aim to remain in office. But whereas non-democratic leaders need only satisfy core political elite, democratic govern via a winning coalition often with a small margin of votes keeping them in power. As a result, democracies may choose wars more carefully and select only those they think they can win. Democracies prefer dispute resolution through negotiation because, for the

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leadership, failure is assumed to be less costly than war.\textsuperscript{82}

(iv) Preference for Negotiations as a Cause of Peace

Normative explanations point to the norms or ideas held by democracies to cause peace among democracies. Democratic regimes are based on political norms that emphasize regulated political competition through peaceful means.\textsuperscript{83} Resort to organized lethal violence or the threat of it, is considered illegitimate.\textsuperscript{84} Decision makers in democracies expect decision makers in other democracies to externalize these norms, behaving in the same peaceful manner in international disputes as they do within their state.

(v) Shared Identity as a Cause of Peace

A shared democratic identity is another purported cause of democratic peace. According to Owen “a necessary condition for liberal peace is that liberal states identify one another as liberal.”\textsuperscript{85} A state must perceive itself and another state as democracies to assume that the other will act based on democratic norms and be restrained by domestic political structure. For example, the United States fought Great Britain in 1812, according to Owen, because Americans saw Britain not as a democracy but as a monarchy, while they saw themselves as a republic. In 1803-1812, “very few Americans, and virtually no British, considered Great Britain a democracy.”\textsuperscript{86}

Owen’s illustration of how democracies identify another liberal democracy is shown


\textsuperscript{84} Bruce Russett, “Why Democratic Peace?”, pp. 91-92.


\textsuperscript{86} Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” p. 137.
If democratic peace theory explains the rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States, the reference to non-democratic nature of China must not be epiphenomenal, an effort to strengthen arguments made for other reasons. Owen argues against propositions claiming that the identification of states as liberal or illiberal is epiphenomenal, that states perceive threat as illiberal, or that certain groups and individuals perceive those states that harm their own parochial interests as illiberal. \(^{88}\) Owen argues that identity as democratic or non-democratic is durable. A recent study however, by David Rousseau and several other authors, finds that shared identity is socially constructed, variable and manipulable. The work shows that shared identity decreases threat perception, as Owen would expect, but also finds that increased threat perception decreased feelings of shared identity. \(^{89}\) This suggests that while there is a correlation between threat perception and shared identity, the direction of the causal arrow is uncertain. In other words, democracies may label threats as undemocratic. \(^{90}\)

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\(^{87}\) Owen, *Liberal Peace Liberal War*, p. 50.

\(^{88}\) Owen argues liberal states identify other states based on *a priori* criteria for favored domestic institutions. These identifications are durable, and the classification of a state as liberal or illiberal changes only when a state’s institutions change to match the *a priori* criteria for liberal or illiberal. Owen, *Liberal Peace Liberal War*.


(2) War among Democracies and Non-democracies

Structural and normative restraints that contribute to peace among democracies are absent in a relationship among democracies and non-democracies. The factors that contributed to peace among democracies work towards war between a democracy and a non-democracy. Doyle calls the failures of democracies to maintain peace with non-democracies as "the natural complement" of liberalism's success among liberal states.

The very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interests, and international respect for individual rights that promote peace among liberal societies can exacerbate conflicts in relations between liberal and non-liberal societies. 91

(i) Speed as a Cause of War

The structural constraints that democratic leaders face when making war are absent in non-democratic leaders. These leaders face fewer formal checks. Much of the debate takes place only among top leaders behind closed doors. Decision makers in non-democracies are thus theoretically capable of making war more easily, rapidly and secretly. Secrecy and the speed of the decision-making process of non-democracies give rise to suspicion of surprise attack in the minds of leaders and people of democracies. Democracies may then initiate violence rather than risk being attacked. Fearing this possibility of preemptive attack by the democracies, non-democracies will be tempted to initiate attack rather than risk being attacked. This leads to a spiral of mutual threat.

(ii) Opacity as a Cause of War

Fear and uncertainty, which often lead states to expect the worst, are more abundant when democracies are dealing with non-democracies. The lack of freedom of speech, free press and open debate make decision-making process opaque. Decision makers and the public in

democracies are often suspicious of the intentions of non-democracies because there is no legitimate opposition to affirm the stated intentions of the government. Reports by the state sponsored press in non-democracies are seen as less credible.

(iii) Lack of Democratic Norms as a Cause of War

Liberal democratic norms, which prompt democracies to search for a negotiated settlement in conflicts with other democracies, are not applied to non-democracies. From democracies' point of view, sticking to democratic norms and seeking negotiation with nondemocracies risks attack. They then adopt non-democratic norms in dealing with non-democracies. This double standard in the conduct of war is seen as legitimate because non-democracies do not represent the people.

For Doyle, liberal principles, or norms, are the source of threat perception towards non-democracies. Doyle writes:

These principles begin the differentiation of policy towards liberal and nonliberal states, requiring trust of and accommodation toward fellow liberals and producing distrust of and opposition toward nonliberals. Domestically just republics, which rest on the consent of free individuals, presume foreign republics to be also consensual, just, and therefore deserving of the accommodation that the individuals that compose them deserve. ... At the same time, liberal states assume that nonliberal states, which do not rest on free consent, are not just. Because nonliberal governments are perceived to be in a state of aggression with their own people, their foreign relations become, for liberal governments deeply suspect.92

(iv) Democratic Crusades as a Cause of War

Liberal democracies at times crusade: make war to democratize a non-democracy. Liberal "imprudence" has often been observed in wars against non-democracies. David Hume wrote in 1740s of England's "imprudent vehemence" toward war against France.93

Doyle points to the failure of liberalism "in guiding foreign policy outside the liberal world." 94

John Owen argues "liberal peace always exists in the shadow of its twin, liberal war." 95

Liberal democracies have fought non-democracies with the explicit purpose of making them liberal. 96 Leaders and people in liberal democracies often differentiate leaders of a non-democracy from its people. Liberals believe that people everywhere are by right free and equal. People in non-democracies are believed to be denied this right by illiberal despots. Democracies may therefore view the use of force against a state that denies people their rights and coerces its own people as a legitimate means to restore a condition in which these rights are observed.

These democratic crusades threaten undemocratic regimes and their leaders in particular. Democratic movements could undermine their monopoly on power. For this reason, leaders of non-democracies may see the demands for human rights by democracies as an attack on their rule.

(v) Lack of Shared Identity as a Cause of War

Shared identity among democracies is believed to restrain negative feelings, allow the use of peaceful means to resolve conflicts, and dampen threat perception. Conversely, the absence of shared identity breeds distrust and skepticism against non-democracies.

3. Democratic Peace Explanations for “China threat” Arguments

(1) Democratic Peace Theory Applied to Threat Perception

The causes of democratic threat perception of non-democracies can be assorted into six causes in three categories. The three categories are: (i) propensity to use force; (ii) ideological threat and (iii) aggressive reaction to liberal imperialism.

(i) Propensity to Use of Force

(a) Potential for speedy attack as a cause of threat perception

Because democracies see decision makers of non-democracies as less constrained in their use of force they perceive aggressive intentions. Secrecy and rapidness of decision making process prompt leaders of democracies to be suspicious of surprise attacks. This results in the need for democracies to be more alert towards non-democracies.

Leaders of non-democracies in turn see decision makers of democracies as unrestrained by democratic norms in their relations and perceive their intentions with suspicion. Fearing preemptive attack by democracies, non-democracies may try to strike first, creating a spiral of threat perception, as noted.

(b) Opacity as a cause of threat perception

Lack of transparency about defense policy and defense spending are often characteristics of non-democracies. Opacity of the decision making process promotes suspicion and creates a situation where security dilemmas occur more easily. Opacity also leads to uncertainty about undemocratic states’ intentions. Democracies perceive intentions of non-democracies to be less predictable than those of democracies and therefore threatening.
Military capability of non-democracies is harder to determine, allowing overestimation.\textsuperscript{97} Military organizations tend to assume the worst amid uncertainty about enemy capability, augmenting this problem.

(c) Lack of democratic norms as a cause of threat perception

Democracies perceive intentions of non-democracies as aggressive because they believe that non-democracies tend to use force when resolving disputes. For example, around 1910 Philip Kerr, the later Lord Lothian, explained the difference in British perception towards the United States and Germany.

During the years of her supremacy has [England] lifted a finger against the United States, which have now a population twice her own and resources immeasurable greater? No, for the ideals of the United States, like her own, are essentially unaggressive and threaten their neighbours no harm. But Germanism, in its want of liberalism, its pride, its aggressive nationalism, is dangerous, and she feels instinctively that if it is allowed to become all powerful it will destroy her freedom, and with it the foundation of liberty on which the Empire rests.\textsuperscript{98}

(d) Lack of common identity as a cause of threat perception

Absence of shared identity breeds distrust and skepticism against non-democracies and leads to perception of threat.

(ii) Ideological Threat

(e) Non-democracies’ export of illiberal ideas as a cause of war

Democracies see the spread of illiberal norms as dangerous to their political institutions and way of life. John Owen observes that, “Liberals’ mistrust of illiberals is especially acute

\textsuperscript{97} Those who exaggerate a threat for organizational reason can more easily sell their argument when defense spending and military capability are not disclosed. In these cases, however, the causal variable is organizational interests, not the undemocratic nature of the country.

when liberals are threatened by illiberals within their own country.”

Way of life is an overarching term for norms, values and identity. Democratic leaders often mention the importance of maintaining “our way of life.” Edmund Burke notes that alliances were the product of a “correspondence in laws, customs, and habits of life” among states.

David Campbell writes that U.S. administrations express concern about maintaining the American way of life and the democratic system even in internal discussions, which he suggests indicates that the leaders do not merely use democracy as rhetoric to mobilize the public.

NSC-68 refers to “our way of life” and democratic system.

Our determination to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom ... our determination to create conditions under which our free and democratic system can live and prosper; and our determination to fight if necessary to defend our way of life.

The export of illiberal norms is often seen as threat not only to domestic institutions, but also to the liberal international system. Samuel Huntington notes that, “the survival of democratic institutions and values at home will depend upon their adoption abroad.” The “perpetual peace” envisioned by Kant, could only be achieved by establishing a community of liberal democratic states. It follows that expansion of illiberal democracies would make the world less peaceful, and be perceived as a threat. Huntington also argues for the importance of U.S. primacy in maintaining world stability.

A world without U.S. primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the United States is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international

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99 Owen, Liberal Peace Liberal War, pp. 38.
100 Quoted in Walt, Ibid., p. 34.
102 NSC-68 cited in Campbell, Writing Security.
order in the world.\textsuperscript{104}

British perceptions of Russia in the 1850s also reflected a fear of non-liberal states' threat to the international system. Tsarist Russia was seen as "a despotic tyrant, the gigantic obstacle to European freedom and liberation."\textsuperscript{105} This theme of civilized liberalism versus uncivilized despotism recurs during this period. The dispatch sent by Sir Hamilton Seymour on March 31, 1854 explained British aims to fight a war against Russia:

we want nothing for our trade, and we fear nothing for our Indian possessions ... It is to maintain our honour and self-respect. (Britain’s main object is) to check and repel the unjust aggression of Russia. (it is a) battle of civilization against barbarism.\textsuperscript{106}

(iii) Resistance to Liberal Crusades

(f) Non-democracies’ resistance to democratic crusades as a cause of war

Non-democratic leaders see liberal aggressiveness in promoting democratic values as threats to their regimes.\textsuperscript{107} This leads non-democracies to issue statements to prevent and deter democracies’ attempts to democratize their regime. This in turn leads democracies to perceive aggressive intentions. Owen notes that liberals believe that despots are “particularly hostile to liberal states” because “Despots, according to liberals, correctly believe that liberalism is contagious.”\textsuperscript{108}

Not all individuals and groups in democracies see non-democracies the same way. Those

\textsuperscript{107} Owen noted that “liberals, moreover, believe that despots are particularly hostile to liberal states. Despots, according to liberals, correctly believe that liberalism is contagious.” Owen, \textit{Liberal Peace}, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{108} Owen, \textit{Liberal Peace Liberal War}, pp. 38.
who place greatest importance on democratic values should see non-democracies as more of a threat than others. Hopple, Rossa and Wilkenfeld find that individuals who rank a value, like democracy, as important are more likely to be sensitized to perceive threats from those who do not ascribe to that value.\textsuperscript{109}

(2) Democratic Peace Explanation for the Rise of “China threat” Arguments

(i) Regime type as a cause of “China threat” arguments

Democratic peace theory argues that events demonstrating the undemocratic nature of China will increase U.S. perception of China as a threat. The Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989, and PLA’s missile tests intended to interfere with Taiwan’s presidential election are examples of such events. We should expect a rise in “China threat” arguments after these two events. These events could have changed U.S. perception of China from democratic to non-democratic.\textsuperscript{110}

The below Figure 2-3 shows an explanation for the rise of “China threat” arguments based on democratic peace theory. Figure 2-4 shows a competing explanation based on realism. Note that in the realist explanation reference to China as a non-democracy is not a cause for the rise but an epiphenomenon caused by the perception of threat. Event Y that shows China’s aggressive behavior is not necessary to generate perception of threat.


\textsuperscript{110} These events that indicate that China’s undemocratic nature should be differentiated from China’s behavior that point to its military aggressiveness.
Event X points to the undemocratic nature of political institutions in China

Figure 2-3: Explanation based on democratic peace theory

Increase in China’s capability × Event Y → Perception of China as aggressive → Perception of China as threat → Rise of “China threat” arguments

Event Y shows China’s aggressive behavior

Reference to China as a non-democracy

Rise of “China threat”

Figure 2-4: Explanation based on realism

(ii) Propensity to use force as a cause of “China threat” arguments

Democratic peace theory argues that China’s propensity to use force based on its undemocratic nature will give rise to “China threat” arguments. The theory says that the Tiananmen Square incident had a strong impact on how the American people regarded China. The incident should reveal China’s illiberal nature.

(iii) Export of illiberal ideology as a cause of “China threat” arguments

China’s attempt to export illiberal ideology should give rise to “China threat” arguments, according to democratic peace theory. We should then see “China threat” arguments referring to China’s attempt to spread illiberal ideology.
(iv) Resistance to democratic crusades as a cause of "China threat" arguments

China's resistance to U.S. efforts to promote liberal democracy in China should be perceived as demonstrating aggressive intentions and give rise to "China threat" arguments. U.S. foreign policy became more centered on the promotion of democracy after the Cold War. Then Secretary of State, James Baker remarked:

The Cold War has ended, and now we have a chance to forge a democratic peace, an enduring peace built on shared values — democracy and political and economic freedom. The strength of these values in Russia and the other new independent states will be the surest foundation for peace — and the strongest guarantee of our national security — for decades to come.111

The Clinton administration also took up promoting democracy as an important pillar for U.S. foreign policy. National Security Strategy of 1993 made the enlargement of democracy a U.S. security objective.

There are two competing explanations for why the U.S. promotion of democracy increased after the Cold War. One explanation is that liberal democracy became more important in American society after the end of the Cold War. The second explanation, based on realism, is that the United States began promoting democracy because it was less restrained by the Soviet Union. Owen notes that democracy provides a guide for foreign policy in an era when identifying national goals is difficult: "Liberal peace has provided a ready-made principle for foreign policy makers in a time when, with no more Soviet threat, principles are difficult to come by." 112 Oddly this is as much a realist argument as one based on liberalism and democratic peace.

112 Owen, Ibid., p. 7.
(3) Hypotheses and Predictions

Here is a summary of democratic peace explanations for the rise of “China threat” arguments.

Hypothesis D-1: Democracies will perceive non-democracies with enmity because of regime type.

Hypothesis D-1-1: The Tiananmen Incident will cause perception of China as a non-democracy and “China threat” arguments.

Hypothesis D-1-2: The Tiananmen Incident will decrease the prospects of democratization in China, giving rise to “China threat” arguments.

Hypothesis D-1-3: The Tiananmen Incident will lead to a tightening control by the Chinese government and worsening of liberal condition in China, which will give rise to “China threat” arguments.

Hypothesis D-1-4: The Taiwan missile crisis will be seen as Chinese aggression towards a democracy, causing “China threat” arguments.

Hypothesis D-1-5: The Taiwan missile crisis will result in perception of China as non-democratic causing “China threat” arguments.

Predictions from Hypothesis D-1:

Prediction D-1-1: “China threat” arguments should be more abundant and acute in the 1970s and 1980s when China was less liberal.

Prediction D-1-2: “China threat” arguments should occur after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989.

Prediction D-1-3: “China threat” arguments should increase after the Taiwan missile crisis in 1996.

Prediction D-1-4: The United States should identify China as a non-democracy before the rise of “China threat” arguments circa 1992.

Prediction D-1-5: The United States should not perceive Japan and Germany or other democracies as threats.

Prediction D-1-6: “China threat” arguments may occur without increased Chinese power.

Hypothesis D-2: A lack of common democratic identity spurs distrust and leads to the rise of “China threat” arguments.
Hypothesis D-3: Democracies will perceive intentions of non-democracies as aggressive because leaders are not constrained by domestic institutions and democratic norm of accommodation.

Hypothesis D-3-1: The United States will perceive China’s intentions as aggressive because the leaders can make decision to initiate attack quickly and easily.

Hypothesis D-3-2: The United States will perceive China’s intentions as aggressive because the leaders can make decisions to attack in secret.

Hypothesis D-3-3: The United States will perceive China’s intentions as aggressive because its leaders do not uphold democratic norms of negotiated settlement.

Predictions from Hypothesis D-3:

Prediction D-3-1: We should see U.S. statements about China’s ability to decide quickly to attack by those who make “China threat” arguments.

Prediction D-3-2: We should see statements about the opacity of Chinese decision making of use of force.

Prediction D-3-3: We should see statements about China’s preference to use force because of lack of democratic norms seeking negotiated settlement.

Prediction D-3-4: We should see statements showing fear of a sudden attack by China.

Hypothesis D-4: Democracies may overestimate capabilities of non-democracies because of their lack of transparency.

Hypothesis D-4-1: The United States may overestimate China’s military capability and intentions due to its lack of military transparency.

Predictions from Hypothesis D-4:

Prediction D-4-1: We may see overestimates of China’s military capability and intentions by U.S. defense analysts.

Hypothesis D-5: Democracies will perceive non-democracies as threats because of their export of illiberal ideas.

Prediction D-5-1: We should see statements about China’s export of illiberal ideas by those who make “China threat” arguments.

Prediction D-5-2: We should see statements about threats to U.S. domestic institutions because of China’s export of illiberal ideas and practices.
Hypothesis D-6: Groups and individuals that attach importance to upholding liberal democratic norms will make more “China threat” arguments than those who do not.

Prediction from Hypothesis D-6:

Prediction D-6-1: Pro-democracy advocacy groups such as human rights groups should be the first to make “China threat” arguments.

Hypothesis D-7: The more liberal and democratic a country is the more it will perceive non-democracies as threat.

Hypothesis D-7-1: A country that is more liberal and democratic has more groups and individuals committed to upholding liberal norms who will see danger to liberal democratic values and institutions as threats.

Hypothesis D-7-2: Ceteris peribus, a country that is more liberal and democratic is more likely promote democracy abroad. This causes non-democracies to perceive a threat.

Predictions from Hypothesis D-7:

Prediction D-7-1: “China threat” arguments in the United States should be stronger than in Japan.

Prediction D-7-2: The United States should be more active in promoting democracy abroad than Japan is.

Hypothesis D-8: Democracies will perceive non-democracies’ resistance to promotion of democracy as threat.

Hypothesis D-8-1: The United States will perceive China’s resistance or opposition to U.S. efforts to promote democracy as threat.

Prediction from Hypothesis D-8:

Prediction D-8-1: China should express opposition to U.S. efforts to promote democracy. The United States will perceive such attitudes as evidence of aggressive intentions.
CHAPTER THREE

Realism

I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines realism's explanation for the rise of "China threat" arguments. Realism suggests that states perceive threats based on capability measured by power and intentions shaped by structural conditions and measured primarily by behavior. If the explanation based on realism is valid, an increase of China's power should cause the rise of "China threat" arguments.

The first glimpse of "China threat" arguments appeared in the United States in 1988 when a President's commission on long term strategy predicted that China might become a military superpower behind the Soviet Union and the United States in the year 2010.1 But at the time, this did not lead to a widespread "China threat" arguments among the security specialists or the public. It was in 1992-93 that "China threat" arguments appeared in greater magnitude and frequency in the United States. Among the first to report China's rise and its potential threat were journalists and security specialists. Journalists' reporting on the China threat seems to have been based on a quietly growing argument within the Department of Defense (DoD).2

According to close observers of U.S. security policy, many people in the Pentagon had begun to


2 Most articles that appeared in the mass media on the Chinese military after 1992 were based on leaks from DoD officials. The leaks suggest that people in DoD intended to disseminate "China threat" arguments through the media. The author's personal experience as journalist for 10 years confirms the frequency with which policy makers use leaks to disseminate certain ideas to the public. They often use this tactic when they cannot disseminate the idea officially. This may be because of diplomatic considerations or because the idea has not been authorized by the organization as a whole.

In the sections that follow, I examine whether or not the change in the world distribution of power, especially among the United States, Russia, Japan and China, caused the rise of “China threat” arguments.

I first discuss the basic assumptions of realism and then examine changes in U.S. threat perceptions before and after 1992-1993 and 1995-1996 using realist assumptions. I draw predictions based on realist hypotheses and examine if they were borne out by events and changes in threat arguments. In addition to using realism conventionally, I take realist predictions a step further. Realism assumes that states are unitary actors and is not much concerned with groups within the state. However, I use realism to predict the behavior and arguments of certain groups within the state and examine whether these predictions conform to empirical evidence.

In this chapter, I also examine the correlation between the U.S. primacy strategy and the rise of “China threat” arguments. The primacy arguments that appeared after the Cold War held that only a preponderance of U.S. power ensured peace, and that both world order and national security required that the United States maintain primacy. Advocates of primacy saw potential challengers to U.S. hegemony as the biggest threat the United States faced. “China threat” arguments often referred to China’s growing power and undemocratic nature as reasons China was a threat to U.S. primacy. This chapter deals with power. China’s undemocratic

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3 James Mann, “U.S. Starting to View China’s Potential Enemy”, Los Angeles Times, April 16, 1995. In an interview, Mann pointed to this period as the time when the U.S. military identifying China as an opponent. James Mann, interview by author, 1 July 1999, Washington, tape recording, Washington, D.C.


nature is examined in Chapter 5.

II. REALIST EXPLANATIONS

In examining whether the causal relationships suggested by Realism are present in the case, I will use the framework presented by Stephen Walt. Walt posits that aggregate power, offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions constitute threat.\(^6\) Walt notes behavior and attitudes as indication of aggressive intentions. However, he is not explicit in saying what shapes aggressive behavior. In examining the causal relations based on Realism, I will stick to Realist causes of attitudes and behavior. I will infer what Realism says about behavior of states and examine whether the predictions drawn from Realism is present in the case of the rise of "China threat" arguments.

The views of realism in this dissertation are based on structural realism. Structural realism posits that states at minimum seek survival and at maximum seek hegemony.\(^7\) Kenneth N. Waltz, in *Theory of International Politics*, predicts different behavior for great powers and secondary states. Great powers try to prevent the emergence of other great powers and seek universal domination if given the chance. Secondary states, "if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side to balance against the stronger side that threatens them."\(^8\) John Mearsheimer also holds that great powers seek hegemony.\(^9\) Mearsheimer calls his theory "offensive realism" and Waltz's "defensive realism." According to Mearsheimer, Waltz's theory has a "status quo bias" because it says that the first concern of states is to "maintain their positions in

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\(^6\) Walt also notes the importance of geography. Geographical proximity works to enhance offensive capability and distance decreases it.

\(^7\) Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 118.


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the system," rather than maximizing power. However, their difference is smaller than Mearsheimer claims. Mearsheimer’s theory focuses on great powers while Waltz looks at international system as a whole. For Waltz, securing survival is antecedent to offensive behavior and the drive for hegemony. This does not mean, however, that great powers are not offensive. States are expected to behave offensively to maintain their position.

The dissertation examined a period in which the international system changed from a bipolar to a unipolar world. From the theory, I have deduced how unipolarity would affect second tier states and their relationship with the first tier state, and the unipolar power’s relationship with them. Under a unipolar constellation, we can deduce that the unipolar power will act to maintain its primacy and see challengers to its primacy as threats. Second tier states will be very fearful of the unipolar power without the other pole checking its behavior. The relationship between the unipolar power and the second tier powers will deteriorate because the surviving superpower would not need the cooperation of the second tier powers in its pole. The second tier powers will also be less dependent on the superpower as there is no other superpower to threaten them. The most powerful state among the second tier states will seek to challenge the unipolar power and be another pole. Secondary powers may form a coalition to balance the power of the most powerful state, provided that the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade the unipolar power from attacking.

We can then predict that United States will seek to maintain its primacy and see challengers to its position as threats. It is debatable whether Japan and China are major or secondary powers. As major powers, Japan and China would challenge the United States’ primacy. As secondary states, they would form a coalition to counter the United States, provided

that they have the freedom to do so and can amass enough power to deter the United States. The preponderant power of the United States after the collapse of the Soviet Union makes it possible that challengers would see balancing against the United States as futile and instead bandwagon with the United States. Once the secondary states have established enough security to prevent being attacked by the United States, they may seek to maximize their power through the coalition.

From Realism, I deduce three possible mechanisms that explain why the United States perceived China as a threat. The three mechanisms are related to:

1. Relative power position – China’s increased aggregate power challenged U.S. primacy causing “China threat” arguments;

2. Capability to harm – China’s acquisition of military capabilities that gave it the ability to harm the United States caused “China threat” arguments;

3. Fraying of the strategic safety-net – With the decline of the common enemy, the Soviet Union, China’s behavior became less conciliatory and at the same time, the U.S. interpretation of China’s behavior changed. This caused “China threat” arguments.

Below, I review each mechanism. In examining each possible explanation, I will first see if the cause effect relationship posited is present in the case. I then look to see if the intermediate causal steps – the process – occurred as predicted. If the proposition is valid, then the same cause and effect relations should be present in other cases, such as in U.S. threat arguments about Japan from the late-1980s to the early-1990s.

1. Changes in Relative Power as a Cause of Threat Perception

Realism holds that states are concerned with their relative power in the international
system. "China threat" arguments should then occur when China is in a position to challenge
the U.S.. An increase in China's aggregate power could be relative, brought about by the decline
of other powers such as the Soviet Union (Russia) and Japan, or it could be absolute, brought
about by China's economic growth and military buildup.

2. Change in Power to Threaten Survival as Cause of Threat Perception

Realism posits that states worry about survival. It follows that states will see a country
with the capability to harm their vital interests as a threat. Applied to China and the United
States, we should see "China threat" arguments emerge when China acquires the offensive
capability to threaten the United States.

3. Changes in Behavior as Cause of Threat Perception

As I argued in the previous chapter, intentions are important to realist explanations of
threat perception, because they indicate whether capabilities will be used. Realism suggests
that states perceive other state's intentions based on behavior and that behavior is strongly
influenced by the distribution of power in the international system. Realism says that states
generally pursue their interests, but that the means of doing so depends on the international
environment. Countries with shared interests should tend to cooperative behavior, whereas
countries with competing interests should behave aggressively. In an anarchic international
environment, a common enemy presents a reliable common interest. A decrease in the power
of that common enemy removes the guarantee of mutual restraint. I call this guarantee a
"strategic safety-net."

Realism assumes that allies will suppress their potential conflicts to marshal maximum
power against a common enemy. When the common enemy disappears, the allies’ interests
will no longer align, and they will engage in less restrained interest-seeking behavior. Old
problems will resurface, suspicion will heighten, and bilateral relations will deteriorate.

With the reemergence of differences among former allies, complaints about the other
state’s domestic politics may become more salient. This could lead groups concerned with those
issues to become more active. In China’s case, human rights and Taiwan reemerged as sources
of contention between the United States and China after the collapse of the Soviet Union and
became more important in U.S. domestic politics. Realism also assumes that the first
organizations to make threat arguments will be those concerned with national security. They
will be the first to note change in the distribution of power and react to it.

III. AGGREGATE POWER AND "CHINA THREAT" ARGUMENTS

Structural realism says that states ultimately seek primacy if they can and try to maintain
primacy if they have it. This leads to the proposition that the United States saw China as a
threat because it threatened the U.S. position as the sole superpower. In this section, I examine
the proposition that an increase in China’s power caused the rise of “China threat” arguments.
If this explanation is valid, the rise of “China threat” arguments should correspond with an
increase in China’s aggregate power.

There are two hypotheses concerning aggregate power and threat arguments. One is
related to relative power, and the other to absolute power:

Hypothesis R1 (Relative Power Position): States perceive states that have actual or potential
aggregate power that exceeds their own as threats.

(1) Relative Position—States maintain or elevate their relative power. A state will
perceive a threat when the gap between itself and the next most powerful state is
narrowing.
(2) Primacy — States at a minimum seek survival and at a maximum seek hegemony. They want primacy when given the opportunity. States that seek primacy will see obstacles to attainment of primacy as threats.

(3) States that have guaranteed their immediate security will pursue hegemony and seek to create an international environment conducive to their national interests. States will see obstacles to creating such an international environment as threats.

Predictions based on Hypothesis R1:

(1) The United States will seek to maintain primacy after the collapse of the Soviet Union and see the next most powerful state as a threat.

(2) When China’s economic growth and the decline of the Soviet Union and/or Japan make it the second most powerful state with growing power, the United States should perceive China as a threat.

(3) The United States may see obstacles to propagating free trade and democratic values, which are conducive to its interests, as threats.

Hypothesis R2 (Capability to inflict harm): Because they worry about survival, states perceive other states with the actual or potential power to endanger them as threats.

Predictions based on Hypothesis R2:

(1) China’s economic growth increases its absolute power. When China’s growth gives it enough power to potentially endanger U.S. survival, the United States would perceive China as a threat.

Realism predicts that the rise of “China threat” arguments will occur when China shows the potential to acquire power exceeding that of the United States. We should observe the rise of “China threat” arguments when China’s becomes the second most powerful state and is narrowing the gap with the United States.

I first look at China’s power relative to other powers such as the Soviet Union/Russia, Japan and the United States, and see whether changes in China’s relative position corresponded to the rise of threat arguments. In examining China’s power, I focus on both its relative power and ability harm the United States. I primarily use the gross domestic product (GDP) to
measure power. Aggregate power has been measured with factors including the size of economy, population, territory, and resources, but recently, analysts have tended to use GDP. Many of the articles and reports that made “China threat” arguments point to the size of the Chinese economy as an indicator of its power.11

I also look at the aggregate power of the Soviet Union/Russia and Japan, and see whether changes in their relative power corresponded to the rise or decline of arguments about their threat. Examining the rise and fall of Soviet threat arguments and Japan threat arguments serves two purposes. One is to study China’s relative power position in detail. The other is to test the proposition that increased relative power causes a state to be seen as more threatening.12

1. Relative Power of China

(1) The 1980s

During the 1980s, China was a fast growing but a poor country with limited economic and military power. The Soviet Union was thought to have aggregate power commensurate with the United States. Japan was the second largest economy but it lacked the territorial size and population that the Soviet Union and China had.

China’s GDP in 1985 was $253 billion in 1990 constant prices (See Figure 3-1). The GDP of the United States was $4,801 billion, the largest in the world. Japan’s GDP was $2,354 billion and second in the world followed by the Soviet Union at $1,437 billion and the Federal

11 Some “China threat” arguments use population and demographic change to assess the future economic growth of China.
12 Although the goal of this dissertation is explain the case rather than test theories, some parts of this section shed light of the validity of realist propositions. If propositions are valid, then the relative power of the Soviet Union and Japan should correspond to respective threat arguments.
Republic of Germany at $1,272 million. China’s GDP in 1985 was less than 1/18 of U.S. GDP, a little more than 1/10 of Japan’s and less than 1/5 of the Soviet GDP. China’s GDP was comparable to the GDP of such countries as Ukraine and India, and was less than half of Iran’s.

Figure 3-1: Gross Domestic Product of the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, China and Japan (Source) United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook 1993* and 1997.

(2) The late-1980s to the early-1990s (1991)

(i) China’s Economic Growth

China continued to develop at a high rate, but suffered from economic sanctions and domestic confusion in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. China’s real growth rate dropped from 9.4 % in 1988 to 4.1 % in 1989 and 3.8 % in 1990 (Figures 3-2 and 13).

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3-3). China’s trajectory was uncertain. On the whole, however, China’s growth trend was quite remarkable. Its average annual growth rate from 1979-1993 was 9.3 percent. By 1991, China’s economy was three times as big as it had been in 1978 (Figure 3-6). However, as Figure 3-1 shows, China’s relative position was still very low.

![China's Real Growth Rate](image)

Figure 3-2: China’s Real Growth Rate

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17 Data taken from United Nations, *Statistical Yearbook, 1993* and *Statistical Yearbook 1997.* Growth rates are percentage increase over GDP of previous year in U.S. dollars in constant 1990 prices converted by exchange rate.
(ii) Other Powers: The Soviet Union and Japan

From the late-1980s to the early-1990s, the Soviet Union and Japan had better relative power positions than China. In 1990, the Soviet economy was about four times larger than China's. It was widely believed that the Soviet Union was willing to spend a larger share of GDP on its military than most nations. This improved the Soviet Union's perceived power.

In this period, Japan had the world's second biggest economy. It maintained higher growth rates than the United States from the 1960s until the early-1990s. Japan's average annual growth rate in real terms was 10.2% from 1960-1968 and 8.7% from 1968-1973. The

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19 The GDP of the Soviet Union in 1990 was $1535 billion and China was $388 billion in 1990 constant U.S. dollars. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1993.
figures for the United States were 4.5% and 3.2% for the same periods. Japan maintained its high growth rate until 1991. During 1984-1991, for instance, Japan grew at 4-6 %, while the United States grew at lower rates (Figure 3-3).

(3) After 1992

(i) China's rapid growth

China's economy took an upward turn in 1991. It grew 9 % in 1991, followed by 14.4 % in 1992 and 13.5 % in 1992 (Figure 3-2). This high growth trend continued thereafter. In 1996, China's economy was the 7th largest in the world after France, the United Kingdom and Italy. By then, Russia had fallen to 15th. 22

(ii) The Collapse of the Soviet Union

The decline in the economic power of the Soviet Union and subsequently Japan further increased China's relative power. By 1992, the U.S.S.R./Russia and Japan had stopped gaining ground on the United States. China was the only major power that continued to narrow the gap (Figure 3-1) (Figure 3-5). 23

The break up of the republics was decisive in decreasing the size of the Soviet economy. By December 1991 the Union had broke into 15 independent republics. Figure 3-4 shows how much Russia/ the Soviet Union had shrunk in terms of area, population, GDP, military force and official defense budget. Figures for Russia are compared to those of the Soviet Union, with figures for the Soviet Union shown as 100. Russia's 1992 GDP was only about 60% of the

22 The top ten economies in 1996 were: 1 United States, 2 Japan, 3 Germany, 4 France, 5 United Kingdom, 6 Italy, 7 China, 8 Brazil, 9 Canada, 10 Spain. Major changes occurred in ranking of former Soviet Republics. Soviet Union was No. 3 in 1984 after the United States and Japan. Data are not available for Iran for 1996. The World Bank, World Development Indicators 1998 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1998), pp. 12-14.
23 In the early-1990s, Germany was suffering from the costs of unification.
Soviet Union’s GDP in 1990.

![Soviet-Russia Comparisons](image)

Figure 3-4: Comparison of Soviet and Russia (Soviet=100)

Russia’s decline in power is evident from its growth rates. The Soviet/Russian economy grew by 4.1% in 1988, 2.4% in 1989 and plunged in 1990 to a negative growth of -3.8%.

Again, after 1991, the data is for the Russian Federation. The decline from 1990 to 1991 was only -5%. This decline was relatively small considering that the Soviet Union had collapsed and the size of the country had declined tremendously. The Russian economy declined further after the collapse, experiencing negative growth from 1991 to 1996. The growth rate for 1992 was minus 14.5%. In 1995 China’s GDP surpassed Russia’s, becoming No. 7 in the world. By then, Russia had fallen to a No. 14 position. By 1996, Russia’s economy had shrunk to

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almost a third of what the Soviet economy was in 1990.

(iii) Japan’s Economic Slow Down

The Japanese economic bubble burst in 1989-1990. The growth rate decreased in 1992 and plunged in 1993. The U.S. economy began to recover from its recession 1992, while the Japanese economy suffered a depression. The size of the Japanese economy relative to the U.S. economy peaked in 1991. Until this point, Japan’s economic power was catching up with the United States. After 1991, the U.S. growth rate exceeded Japan’s. In other words, after 1991, the United States was widening the gap between itself and Japan. As Figure 3-5 shows, China was the only country closing the gap between its economy and that of the United States after 1991.

Figure 3-5: GDP of China, Japan and Soviet Union/Russia Relative to the United States, where data for the United States are 1.

26 Japan’s military capability was never a match for the United States. Thus Japan was considered an economic threat but there was little or no talk about Japan as a military threat. For this reason, this dissertation will not examine changes in Japanese military power.

2. Absolute Power

The realist model of threat perception suggests that some absolute level of power may be necessary to generate perception of threat. As we saw in the preceding section, China’s aggregate power increased not just in relative terms but also in absolute terms. China’s economy in 1996 was five times bigger than in 1978 (Figure 3-6). The important question here is whether this increased wealth gave China the capability to harm the vital national interests of the United States. China grew at a remarkable rate, but its growth started from a very low base. China’s absolute power in the mid-1990s was still limited and not enough to warrant the “China threat” arguments that emerged.28

Figure 3-6: China’s Economic Growth (GDP Indexes where 1978=100) (Source) Guoja Tongiji ed., Zhongguo Tongji Zhaiyao 2000.29

China was still weak in absolute terms in the early-1990s. Its GDP in 1992 was $483 billion (1990 constant U.S. dollars), one tenth of that of the United States. A large population

28 When China started its policies of reform and opening in 1978, 60 % of China’s one billion people survived on less than $1 a day, the international poverty standard. The World Bank, China 2020: Development Challenges in the New Century (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1997).
made China's economy seem big in aggregate terms, but its GDP per capita was $370 in 1992, 140th in the world — comparable to states such as Kenya and Sri Lanka.

An additional factor that seems to have affected the U.S. perception of China's power was the introduction of the purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP was introduced in around 1993 to reflect the actual purchasing power of the Chinese currency: the Yuan (See Memo). Economists thought the PPP was necessary because the exchange rate of the Yuan was set lower than the market rate and caused doubts about the real size of China's economy. The use of the PPP by various institutions, however, gave an impression that China suddenly grew in size and strength. The International Institute for Strategic Studies began using PPP from the 1993-1994 edition of The Military Balance. As a result, the defense expenditure increased by four times from the previous year, making it seem as though there was a sudden increase in the size of China's defense expenditure. Later reports cautioned readers about the use of PPPs, and the World Bank reports stopped ranking countries using PPPs.30

30 Some caution is needed when making future predictions using PPPs because China’s PPP is expected to decrease as China’s economy become more integrated in world economy. China’s financial market is expected to be more open in the future, and there will be smaller difference between prices. Greater caution is needed when using PPP rates for defense expenditure.
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)

PPP conversion factors used in the 1998 edition were derived from the price surveys conducted in 1996 by the International Comparison Programme covering 118 countries. To calculate PPPs, data on prices and spending patterns are collected through surveys in each country. Then prices within a region, such as Africa, or groups, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), are compared. Finally, regions are linked by comparing regional prices, to create a globally consistent set of comparisons. The resulting PPP indexes measure the purchasing power of national currencies in “international dollars” that have the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. PPP conversion factor for China was 4.47, India 4.17, South Korea 1.23, and Japan was 0.57 for 1996. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1998, pp. 15 and 214.

For example, William Overholt noted in 1993 that average Chinese living standards were about as high as Thai living standards, although Thailand’s statistics for 1991 showed a per capita income of $1,800 per year compared to $370 for China. Overholt concluded that Chinese average income was probably $1,500 to $1,800 a year. William H. Overholt, The Rise of China: How Economic Reform Is Creating a New Superpower (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), p. 52.

Different PPP exchange estimates have been used by different analysts. The World Bank uses a PPP estimate of around 4 for China. However, some analysts use a PPP estimate as high as 10. Because China’s aggregate figures are large to begin with, using a high PPP estimate inflates the figures considerably. For example, a study by Charles Wolf, Jr. et al used a PPP exchange rate twice as high as that of the World Bank.

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31 The PPP conversion factors used in the 1998 edition were derived from the price surveys conducted in 1996 by the International Comparison Programme covering 118 countries. To calculate PPPs, data on prices and spending patterns are collected through surveys in each country. Then prices within a region, such as Africa, or groups, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), are compared. Finally, regions are linked by comparing regional prices, to create a globally consistent set of comparisons. The resulting PPP indexes measure the purchasing power of national currencies in “international dollars” that have the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States. PPP conversion factor for China was 4.47, India 4.17, South Korea 1.23, and Japan was 0.57 for 1996. World Bank, World Development Indicators, 1998, pp. 15 and 214.

32 For example, William Overholt noted in 1993 that average Chinese living standards were about as high as Thai living standards, although Thailand’s statistics for 1991 showed a per capita income of $1,800 per year compared to $370 for China. Overholt concluded that Chinese average income was probably $1,500 to $1,800 a year. William H. Overholt, The Rise of China: How Economic Reform Is Creating a New Superpower (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), p. 52.

33 Charles Wolf, Jr., K. C. Yeh, Anil Banezai, Donald P. Henry, and Michael Kennedy, Long-Term Economic and Military Trends, 1994-2015: The United States and Asia (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995). They used PPP exchange estimates by Summers and Heston (1991). They argued that official GNP figures are too low due to underreporting in the service sector and the undervaluation of such services as housing and health care. Their PPPs took into consideration price subsidies, such as those for housing. However, it is not clear whether using a high PPP is suitable for military expenditure where housing subsidies may not apply. In later work, which appeared in 2000, these authors used a much lower PPP rate of about 4.96. Although PPP are important part of their study, they are not explicit in informing the reader what value they use for PPP rates. Charles Wolf, Jr., Anil Banezai, K. C. Yeh, and Benjamin Zycher, Asian Economic Trends and Their Security Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000). Both studies were funded by the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of Secretary of Defense.
3. Aggregate Power and "China threat" Arguments

(1) China’s rise and "China threat" arguments

China’s gains in GDP corresponded with the rise of "China threat" arguments. One of the first studies that identified China as a potential competitor was a study that began in 1985 and looked at long-term economic projections. The study was motivated by an observation of "general reordering of geopolitical situation" and a search for a "possible opponent." The study’s results were published in January 1988 as the basic report of the President’s Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, *Discriminate Deterrence*. Andrew Marshall, the director of the Office of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Charles Wolf, an economist at RAND served as co-chairmen of the Working Group on the Future Security Environment, one of the commission’s four working groups. The working group submitted a report, “Sources of Change in the Future Security Environment” to the Commission in April 1988. The report estimated that China’s GDP would grow to second in the world after the United States by 2010, followed by Japan and the Soviet Union. The Commission report, *Discriminate Deterrence* argued that:

The decades ahead are likely to bring drastic changes: China, perhaps Japan and other

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countries, will become major military powers.\textsuperscript{38}

By 2010 China may have the world’s second or third largest economy. It may well become a superpower, in military terms, though still behind the Soviet Union and the United States. Large uncertainties attach to China’s future.\textsuperscript{39}

Marshall’s group attached great importance to economic growth trends and demographic changes. Capital assets and technological development were also factored into the assessment. The group examined growth trends of 15 key countries: United States, Soviet Union, Japan, China, United Kingdom, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Turkey, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.\textsuperscript{40} The group identified three trends in their conclusion: a large relative decline of the Soviet economy; the emergence of economically and perhaps militarily powerful new actors in international politics; and a technological revolution in military affairs.\textsuperscript{41} At this time, however, the 1988 report did not lead to a rise of “China threat” arguments in the greater foreign policy/security community.

“China threat” arguments began after China’s economy started to rise again after a three year lull in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. Reports on China’s economic rise and the future size of China’s economy began to appear around 1993. The World Bank report of April 1993 received wide publicity and attention. The World Bank publishes a report, \textit{Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries}, every year. In 1993, it published the report using purchasing power parity (PPP).\textsuperscript{42} The 1993 report argued that China, together with Taiwan and Hong Kong, might approach United States’ GDP by

\textsuperscript{38} Discriminate Deterrence, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{39} Discriminate Deterrence, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{40} “Sources of Change,” p. 24.
\textsuperscript{41} “Sources of Change,” p. 23.
\textsuperscript{42} The World Bank, \textit{Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 1993} (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993), pp. 10, 66-67. The report used what was called “standard international prices (ICP)” which was later called purchasing power parity (PPP).
2002:43

Within this area, the so-called Chinese economic area (CEA), comprising China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, China exhibits a large and growing economic mass, sufficient to exert a substantial positive impact on other economies, and a persistence of medium-term growth in the face of shifting external circumstances. Arguably, it is becoming a “fourth growth pole” of the global economy. ... And if output of goods and services of this area were valued at standard international prices (ICO) rather than through the official exchange rate, by the year 2002 the CEA output would rank ahead of Germany's and Japan's and would be approaching that of the United States, although it would amount to only one-fifth the level in terms of GDP per capita.44

Both the 1988 report of the President’s Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy and the 1993 World Bank Report forecasted China’s rise. And yet only the 1993 report lead to a rise of “China threat” arguments and received great reaction from the policy makers and the public. The difference in the U.S. reactions to the two reports suggests that events between 1988 and 1993 changed public interest in China.

Two factors seem to account for the difference. One was the decline of the other economies. In 1988, the Soviet Union was perceived to be formidable and Japan was growing. So, although the 1988 report forecast the possibility of China becoming the second largest economy, the interest of the elite and the public was still on the other powers. By 1993, Russia and Japan were no longer growing. The other factor was the introduction of purchasing power parity (PPP), which made the Chinese economy appear larger than before.

(2) U.S. Primacy and “China threat” arguments

Realism posits that states are concerned with their relative position in the international system, and that states ultimately seek primacy. The most powerful state is assumed to

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43 The report also estimated that in 2002 the GDP of the CEA would amount to 9.8 trillion U.S. dollars exceeding the United States which was estimated at 9.7 trillion U.S. dollars. Table 7-6 “GDP Comparisons for four economies: market price and standard international price estimates.” Ibid., p. 67. The source was World Bank, baseline forecast, February 1993.
perceive powers that could hinder its primacy or powers that pursue primacy themselves as threats. The behavior or the United States in the 1990s seems to conform to this proposition. The international system changed from a bipolar to a unipolar world after the Cold War. The United States achieved primacy and thereafter sought to maintain it. The threats the United States identified in the 1990s — the Soviet Union/Russia, Japan, China, Iraq and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) — were either challengers to U.S. primacy or possible hindrances to U.S. global access. The emergence of “China threat” arguments in U.S. security discourse seems to have been strongly influenced by the United States’ effort to maintain primacy.

(i) The Primacy Strategy and “China threat” arguments

The primacy argument was first advanced by neo-conservatives such as Charles Krauthammer. In 1989 Krauthammer advocated a strong America and a “unipolar moment.” He argued that an “alternative to unipolarity is chaos,” and advocated a preservation of “American strength and will — the strength and will to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them.” In 1992, Elliott Abrams argued that the United States should enforce international norms of conduct using its preponderance of power. In the spring of 1993, Samuel Huntington made a similar argument in “Why International Primacy Matters.”

Primacy arguments hold that only a preponderance
of U.S. power ensures world order and national security.\textsuperscript{49} By the summer of 1993, Huntington began to argue both China and Japan represented potential sources of conflict.\textsuperscript{50}

The February 1992 draft of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for 1994-1999 was one of the first official documents that laid out the primacy strategy. The draft suggests that the threat assessment for the DPG is based on the aggregate power of states and even includes allies and democracies as potential rivals.\textsuperscript{51}

The DPG draft envisions Japan and Germany among potential threats. The draft states that part of the American mission should be “convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.” The draft argues that to remain the lone superpower, the United States “must sufficiently account for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order.”\textsuperscript{52} The draft argues that any nation combining “modern defense, industrial and technical capacity and a sizable population base” would be capable of generating a global threat.\textsuperscript{53}

Since 1992, the grand strategy of the United States had focused increasingly on


\textsuperscript{50} In the 1993 article, Huntington argued the case for China being a threat on the grounds of the difference in culture. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49. Later Huntington described China as one of the “serious external threats to America” in the future together with “Russia, Islam or some combination of hostile states.” Samuel P. Huntington, “Robust Nationalism,” \textit{National Interest}, Vol. 58 (Winter 1999/2000), p. 39.

\textsuperscript{51} The DPG draft was widely criticized for its unilateral tone. The revised version argues that the United States should prevent “any hostile power from dominating a region critical to our interests. ... (such) consolidated, non-democratic control of the resources (in the region) could generate a significant threat to our security.” The revised version also made a stronger distinction between democracies and non-democracies. The highest defense priority for the United States was identified as the preservation and expansion of the system of alliances that had built “sustained cooperation among major democratic powers” since World War II. “Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994-1999 (April 16 1992 draft),” quoted in Barton Gellman, “Pentagon Abandons Goal of Thwarting U.S. Rivals; 6-Year Plan Softens Earlier Tone on Allies,” \textit{Washington Post}, May 24, 1992, p. A1.


maintaining primacy. One alternative grand strategy was selective engagement. Selective engagement was the major U.S. strategy in the early-1990s, but by the mid-1990s, primacy became the preferred grand strategy. According to one survey, by the end of the 1990s, 85.4% of conservative opinion leaders believed that the United States should retain primacy.54

(ii) The Office of Net Assessment and “China threat” arguments

The Office of Net Assessment (ONA) was one of the first to make “China threat” arguments. And the ONA’s assessment of China seems to have been strongly influenced by the primacy strategy. A major objective of the ONA throughout the 1990s was to find a strategy to sustain U.S. primacy. For example, the 1994 ONA Summer Study specifically asked how to sustain “the U.S. Military Position in a Time of Exceptional Change.” The study envisioned difficulty in sustaining primacy “in an environment in which there is no clear and present danger.” ONA sought to find ways to successfully change and innovate in peacetime. The study cautioned readers that America’s commanding position would not be guaranteed if others were more adroit at taking advantage of an emerging RMA.55 In 2001, the ONA sponsored a private study called “Sustaining Military Dominance: Examples from Ancient History.” The study examined great empires in the past — Macedonia under Alexander the Great, Republican Rome, the Mongols — to learn from their successes and failures in maintaining dominance.56 These studies support the proposition that the ONA was primarily concerned with maintaining U.S. preeminence.

54 56.7% of conservative opinion leaders “strongly agreed,” and 28.7% “agreed” with the proposition that: “In the post-Cold War era the United States should retain its primary leadership position in the international community.” 64.7% disagreed with always seeking a multilateral approach to solving international problems, whereas 68.3% supported unilateral action when necessary. Michael P. Noonan, “Conservative Opinions on U.S. Foreign Policy,” Orbis, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Autumn 1999), pp. 621-632.
The ONA identified potential competitors to U.S. primacy based on aggregate power. The ONA identified Japan as a potential competitor and then focused increasingly on China after 1993. The factors that affected ONA’s threat assessments seem to be the factors identified in the 1988 presidential commission report: economic growth trends, demographic changes and ability to realize the revolution in military affairs.\(^{57}\) Conventional military capability was not a central factor for the ONA. For example, the ONA paid little attention to China’s acquisition of conventional weapons from Russia. Liberal democratic principles and China’s undemocratic nature played little or no role in shaping the ONA’s assessment of threats to U.S. primacy. ONA perceived China as a potential threat because of its increasing aggregate power and potential capability to capitalize on the revolution in military affairs (RMA) and thereby challenge the United States.

Others security specialists also perceived China as a potential threat based on its potential ability to challenge the U.S. primacy. For example, Zalmay Khalilzad, who managed studies on China at RAND in the mid- to late-1990s, argued that the security specialists after the Cold War had focused too much on the smaller regional powers, but that to maintain primacy, the United States had to focus on the great powers like China:

> My own view is that the United States is the preeminent power. U.S. strategy should be to maintain this position for an indefinite future which means the United States precludes a rise of a global rival so that we don’t go back to another Cold War or to a multi polar system of the 19th century which is also unstable and cause war. ... The international power structure is like a pyramid, with the United States at the top and below is middle or great powers and China is in that class. ... After the Cold War, the United States didn’t focus on the No. 2, 3, 4 or 5. I would put Iraq and North Korea way down.\(^{58}\)

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\(^{57}\) A serious epidemic such as AIDS was considered important because it could affect aggregate power of states and impact future growth trends.

(iii) Project for New American Century (PNAC) and primacy

The primacy strategy envisioned in the 1992 DPG was inherited and advocated by groups and individual security specialists throughout the 1990s. The most prominent proponent of U.S. primacy and “China threat” arguments was a group called the Project for New American Century (PNAC). The PNAC advocated what they called a “neo-Reaganite” foreign policy. Members and security specialists associated with the PNAC believed that the security of the United States and the world rested on U.S. primacy, meaning a preponderance of U.S. military power and the spread of liberal democratic ideals. The PNAC argued that the United States should seek to maintain the “unipolar moment” as long as possible and turn it into a “unipolar era.”

The PNAC started making “China threat” arguments in 1997, when the group was formed. But despite frequent reference to “China threat,” the PNAC does not seem to have been motivated by the need to counter the “China threat.” They seem to have used the “China threat” arguments to promote public support for a strong America. The PNAC acknowledged that China was not an imminent threat, but that the United States should strive to maintain primacy even without a clear threat.

The executive director of the PNAC, Gary Schmitt, advocated a higher defense spending and said:

the root cause of the current crisis is that the Nation appears to have no compelling strategic vision that justifies a large — let alone larger — defense budget.

Grand strategy should preserve and, when possible, extend a secure situation as far as possible into the future. The fact that the United States does not confront a superpower

rival at the moment and that it outspends other powers on defense does not, in short, mean that there is little to be done or that current spending is adequate to maintain a favorable strategic position. There is only a strategic pause if we want to punt this opportunity away. ... (The strategy requires) at a minimum, that we maintain our leadership role in alliances among democratic states, prevent any hostile power from gaining hegemony over a critical region of the world, deter any rising power from believing it can compete with us globally, and encourage the spread of economic freedom and liberal democratic ideals.\textsuperscript{62}

The two founders of the PNAC, William Kristol and Robert Kagan believed that the biggest danger facing the United States was squandering primacy.

But there is today a “present danger.” It has no name. It is not to be found in any single strategic adversary. ... In fact, the ubiquitous post-Cold War question — where is the threat? — is misconceived. ... Our present danger is one of declining military strength, flagging will and confusion about our role in the world.\textsuperscript{63}

American statesmen today ought to recognize that their charge is not to await the arrival of the next great threat, but rather to shape the international environment to prevent such a threat from arising in the first place.\textsuperscript{64}

The PNAC’s idea of primacy was to prevent other countries from even considering challenging American preeminent position:

A strong America capable of projecting force quickly and with devastating effect to important regions of the world would make it less likely that challengers to regional stability would attempt to alter the status quo in their favor. ... In Europe, in Asia and in the Middle East, the message we should be sending to potential foes is: “Don’t even think about it.”\textsuperscript{65}

Using this logic, the PNAC argued that China was a potential threat to U.S. primacy. The PNAC’s “China threat” arguments were based on China’s increasing military capability and strategic ambition. The PNAC believed that China had ambition to create a new security order in East Asia that no longer relied on American military and economic power and to change the

\textsuperscript{62} Schimitt, “American Primacy,” p. 56.
current international system from one which favored U.S. interests and values to one more favorable to the Chinese regime.

China is, as we all know, a rising power in a critical region of the world. ... there is a competition between the U.S. and China over whether the current international system which favors America and its allies in the region will be maintained, or whether it will be replaced by one more favorable to the present Chinese regime. ... As history demonstrates, appeasing the ambitions of a rising power rarely results in a diminution of those ambitions. 66

The threat argument of the PNAC seems to have been strongly influenced by power calculus and not liberal democratic values. Although the PNAC frequently expressed its commitment to liberal democratic values, the group did not differentiate between democracies and non-democracies when considering potential threats to U.S. primacy. 67 For instance, the PNAC considered democracies France and Russia as potential threats to U.S. primacy. 68

4. A summary of Aggregate Power and “China threat” Arguments

(1) Relative power position

The cause and effect relationship predicted by realism holds in this case: the increase in

67 The arguments put forward by the PNAC reflected the 1992 DPG draft written under the direction of Paul Wolfowitz, then Under Secretary of Defense. Wolfowitz and the then Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney were both signatories of the PNAC statement of purpose, together with Donald Rumsfeld. In the Bush-43 administration, Cheney became Vice President, Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defense and Wolfowitz became Deputy Secretary of Defense. The signatories of the PNAC’s Statement of Principles were: Elliott Abrams, Gary Bauer, William J. Bennett, Jeb Bush, Dick Cheney, Eliot A. Cohen, Midge Deacter, Paula Dorsiansky, Steve Forbes, Aaron Friedberg, Francis Fukuyama, Frank Gaffney, Fred C. Iklé, Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, I. Lewis Libby, Norman Podhorez, Dan Quayle, Peter W. Rodman, Stephen P. Rosen, Henry S. Rowen, Donald Rumsfeld, Vin Weber, George Weigel and Paul Wolfowitz.
68 In 2000, the two co-founders of the PNAC, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, expressed these view towards France and Russia. “Russia can similarly be expected to search for opportunities to weaken U.S. political, diplomatic and military preponderance in the world. Even an ally such as France may be prepared to lend itself to these efforts, viewing a unified Europe as a check on American power and using the U.N. Security Council as an arena for forging diplomatic roadblocks along with China and Russia, against effective U.S.-led international action, whether in the Balkans or in the Persian Gulf.” William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility,” in Robert Kagan and William Kristol, eds., Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000), p. 21.
China’s relative power strongly affected the rise of “China threat” arguments. The United States sought to maintain its primacy and saw China’s increase of aggregate power as a threat to its position.

The evidence suggests that trends and power positions are important in shaping threat perception. It was only after 1992 when the Soviet Union collapsed, Japan’s economy started to decline relative to the U.S. economy, and China started to resume its rapid growth, that Americans began to perceive China as a potential security threat. China had been developing rapidly in the 1980s, but China received little attention because it was not yet in the secondary position.

(2) Power to Harm

The second Realist prediction, that the rise of “China threat” arguments will occur when China obtains enough power to threaten U.S. survival, gets less support from the evidence. In absolute terms, China’s economic power was still small compared to the United States or to Japan, even though its growth had been substantial and thus its relative economic power had increased. When “China threat” arguments emerged in 1992, China’s GDP was still a little more than 1/10 of that of the United States — not enough to inflict damage to vital American interests.

It might be that absolute power at a given time is less important than relative trends in shaping threat perception. Balance of power theory, which is a central to realism, argues that the absolute amount of power matters more. This proposition cannot explain why China was perceived to be a potential threat when its aggregate power was relatively small compared to the
United States, Japan or European countries.^{69}

III. MILITARY POWER — OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY

Hypothesis R3: States perceive threat based on military capability. States perceive threats when states have actual or potential military capability to threaten their survival.

(1) States perceive threat when other states build-up their military, particularly their offensive capability.

(2) States perceive threat when other states acquire strategically important assets that give them capability to threaten their survival.

(3) States perceive threat when other states acquire strategically important assets that prepare them for war.

Predictions based on Hypothesis R3:

(1) The United States will perceive China as a threat when its relative military power increases.

(2) The United States will perceive China as a threat when develops military capability and weapons that threaten vital U.S. interests.

(3) The United States will perceive China as threat when China gains vital military capability (such as the technologies associated with the RMA).

In this section, I examine the proposition that China’s increased offensive capability gave rise to “China threat” arguments. I first offer an assessment of China’s military capability circa 1985. 1985 was chosen because 1985-1986 marked the high point in China-U.S. military cooperation, and there were no “China threat” arguments at that time. The military capabilities of the Soviet Union and Japan in 1985 are assessed for comparison. I then examine the increase in China’s military capability after 1985 and especially in the 1990s. I pay special

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^{69} As far as aggregate power is concerned, Realism explains even less about why North Korea and Iraq were perceived as threats and provided the basis for U.S. force structure after the Cold War. North Korea and Iraq had the GDPs of 20 billion and 56 billion in 1989, and 15 billion and 11 billion in 1995 respectively, about 1/300 to 1/600 of U.S. GDP. GDP figures are all in U.S. dollars in constant 1990 prices. United Nations, *UN Statistical Yearbook, 1993* and *1997*. 
attention to the Chinese forces freed up by the collapse of the Soviet Union and to an absolute level of capability. I ask whether China had offensive capability to harm vital U.S. interests.

1. Increases in Relative Military Capability

(1) Basic Military Situation circa 1985

(i) China

In the 1980s, China possessed a large but a very backward military. China was just beginning to modernize its forces in 1985. Its military doctrine aimed to defend against a technologically superior adversary by sheer size and potential to resort to guerilla warfare. Its large force lacked mobility and power projection capability. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1985 could not launch offensive operations against major militaries.

In 1985, China’s total armed forces amounted to 3.9 million men, second largest in the world after the Soviet Union, with 5.3 million, and a little less than double that of the United States with 2.2 million. However, the troops were not well-trained and lacked modern equipment and vehicles. The force relied on obsolete tanks and fighters from the 1950s and 1960s. The bulk of the manpower was in the People’s Liberation Army which was about 3 million strong, with 11,450 tanks. The Navy had 3 nuclear submarines (SSNs), 107 diesel attack submarines and 44 major combat ships. The Air Force had 5,300 combat aircrafts. China only had a minimum nuclear deterrent capability. Its strategic forces consisted of 6 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 60 intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and 50 medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). It was too small to survive a first strike by the Soviet Union or the United States.

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From the late-1960s to the 1980s, China’s primary adversary was the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, the threat that most concerned the Chinese government was a limited Soviet attack into the Chinese territory. According to Chinese accounts in the 1980s, the Chinese military was concerned that the Soviet Union might conduct raids in Xinjiang, the Beijing-Tianjin corridor, or Manchuria using their mobile and mechanized group armies supported by air and naval power. Until the early-1980s, China’s major military doctrine was the “People’s War” doctrine proposed by Mao Zedong. This doctrine was based on attrition warfare fought inside the Chinese territory. The enemy was assumed to have a stronger military capability than China. Chinese forces were to use their defensive advantage by fighting on home territory, using guerrilla warfare. This doctrine was originally developed in the 1920s during the war against Japan and the civil war, and remained a major military doctrine into the 1980s. The “People’s War” strategy relied on China’s vast territory, difficult terrain, and popular support to offset a stronger adversary, even when China had no nuclear deterrent. The doctrine also enabled the leadership to allocate resources to the development of a nuclear force instead of developing conventional forces. Chinese military doctrine was modified in the early 1980s. The new doctrine was a “People’s War under Modern Conditions.” The new doctrine sought to stop invading enemies at the border rather than inside of the Chinese territory. The development of a minimum nuclear deterrent capability by 1981 also facilitated the change of

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The changes in Chinese leaders' perception of the inevitability of a major war led to a change in the PLA's conventional force structure in the mid-1980s. The military doctrine now focused on fighting "local wars under ordinary conditions." In June 1985, Deng Xiaoping announced that China would decrease its military manpower from four million to three million. The objective of the reduction was to streamline military forces and modernize their weapons by using the funds obtained by force reduction.

During this period, China could not rely on the Soviet Union for modernization of weapons. Arms sales from the Soviet Union had stopped after 1968. China relied on indigenous production and arms transfers from other sources. The United States was one of China's most important suppliers of modern weapons.

The United States began to sell arms to China in 1979, and increased sales around 1985. High-level consultations among military and civilian officials increased after 1983. Until the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989, the United States sought to strengthen China's military capability. The United States sold China weapons for antitank warfare, artillery and

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76 On the evolution of China's military doctrine and on doctrine for "local wars under ordinary conditions" see for example, David Finkelstein, "China's National Military Strategy," James Mulvenon and Richard Yang, eds., The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), pp. 99-145.

77 Deng Xiaoping, "Speech At an Enlarged Meeting of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, June 4, 1985" Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. III: 1982-1992 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1994), p. 131. Deng explained that although there was still a danger of world war, only the United States and the Soviet Union were capable of launching a war and that neither of them wanted to start one and that "the world forces for peace are growing faster than the forces for war." Ibid, p. 132.

78 The last of the weapons ordered was the II-18D Coot transport plane ordered and delivered in 1968. Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China's Arms Acquisitions From Abroad: A Quest For 'Superb and Secret Weapons' SIPRI Research Report No. 11 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
artillery defense, air defense, and anti-submarine warfare. The United States would not sell China certain materials and services that including nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, electronic warfare, surface-ship antisubmarine warfare, intelligence, power projection, and air superiority.

Four U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs were initiated in the late-1980s, although they were never finished due to the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. The “Peace Pearl” program was a $550 million project initiated by the U.S. Air Force to upgrade the avionics (radar and navigation equipment) on the Chinese F-8II fighter aircraft. Grumman Aerospace contracted to provide system definition and full-scale development of 55 avionics and fire control systems, including AN/APG-66 radar. The project continued even after the Tiananmen Square incident until 1990, when it was canceled because it had become too expensive for the Chinese.

China’s military capability circa 1985 was quite limited. The Chinese leaders were aware of its weakness and sought to modernize the PLA’s weapon systems by reducing the number of ground forces. The PLA lacked offensive capability to inflict harm to the United States. China’s military modernization program did not alarm the United States because China relied on the United States as a supplier of modern weapons.

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81 Other foreign military sales programs included a large scale ammunition program and a Hughes Aircraft Corporation-run program to provide 4 AN/TPQ-37 artillery locating radars and 8 AN/VRC-46 radio sets; and four Mk46 Mod. 2 anti-submarine torpedoes. There were also commercial arms sales to China. The Sikorsky Corporation, for instance, sold China 24 S-70C Blackhawk helicopters. For details of the Peace Pearl program and other U.S. arms sales to China, see Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China’s Arms Acquisitions From Abroad: A Quest for ‘Superb and Secret Weapons,’ SIPRI Research Report No. 11 (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995).
82 James Mann, About Face, p. 143.
(ii) Soviet Union

During the 1980s, Soviet military capability was overwhelming compared to any other competitors. In 1985, the Soviet Union had 5,300,000 men in its armed forces. Its strategic forces included 979 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in 77 submarines and 1,398 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Its ground forces consisted of 51 tank divisions, 141 motor rifle divisions and 7 airborne divisions. The Soviets had 52,600 tanks, 5,900 combat aircrafts, 371 submarines and 6 aircraft carriers.83

Throughout most of the 1980s, the dominant concern for the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was a rapid preemptive conventional offensive by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact in central Europe. One of the most important questions for defense planners was whether the Warsaw Pact forces had the capability to win a decisive victory before the NATO forces were able to mobilize to defend and begin a counter-offensive. The Soviets were believed to have mastered deep penetration by operational maneuver groups (OMGs) designed to seize strategic targets that included airfields and other nuclear-related facilities and control centers before NATO's nuclear weapons could be used.84

The U.S. military cooperation with China must be understood against the backdrop of Soviet offensive capability. The United States sought to increase China’s military capability to serve as a counterweight to the Soviet military power. Thus during the 1980s, the United States did not regard China’s offensive capability as a threat.

(iii) Japan

Japan, the world's second largest economy, maintained a modern but a limited military

capability. The Japanese Constitution forbids Japan from having a military force. The Japanese government introduced new interpretations of its Constitution over the years allowing it possess military power in the form of Self Defense Force, but the Constitution limits the amount and the kind of weapons Japan can possess. Japan's "basic policies" for national defense included an "exclusively defense-oriented policy" and "not becoming a military power." Its weapons procurement has also been sensitive to constitutional constraints and negative reactions from its neighbors. Japan has restrained itself from acquiring power projection capabilities such as aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, bombers, and long-range missiles.

Japan has maintained a small military capability relative to its economy. Defense expenditure was kept below 1 % of the GNP after 1967. The "1 % ceiling" was legally removed in December 1986 but expenditure remained at or below 1 % of the GNP except in

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85 Article IX of the Constitution reads: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerence of the state will not be recognized."

86 New interpretations were often the result of U.S. pressure on Japan to make a larger military contribution, in such cases as during the Korean War of 1950 and the Gulf War of 1990.

87 The "exclusively defense-oriented policy" means that "military force cannot be exercised until armed attack is initiated and that the scope and level of use of defense forces are kept to the minimum required for the purpose of self-defense. Moreover, the defense capability to be possessed by Japan must be limited to the minimum necessary level." The Japanese government defined "not becoming a military power" to mean that "Japan will not possess military capabilities strong enough to pose a military threat to other countries, beyond the minimum necessary level of the defense capability for self-defense." The Japanese government has reiterated its basic policies in its defense white papers. For example, Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 2000* (Tokyo: Urban Connections, 2001), p. 64.

88 There were exceptions. For example, defense-related budget for 2001 included costs for acquiring air-to-air refueling tankers. The rationale for this acquisition was that the tankers were needed for international cooperation missions. There was still considerable opposition to this procurement within Japan. To emphasize the nonoffensive nature of the plane, the formal name of the plane became "aircraft with in-flight refueling capability and with transport capability which can be used for international cooperation activities."

89 The National Defense Council and the Cabinet decided on November 5, 1976 that defense-related expenditure was not to exceed 1 % of the GNP. Cabinet determination, November 5, 1976, "Tomen no Boeiryoku Seibi ni tsuite" (Regarding the current defense buildup). Even before 1967, defense-related expenditure was kept below 2% of GNP.
1989 when it exceeded 1 % by 0.006 percentage points. The 1 % ceiling reassured the Japanese neighbors.

In 1985, Japan’s defense spending was $12,094 million in 1980 constant U.S. dollars, the eighth most in the world. The Soviet Union was the second after the United States, and China was the tenth. The Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) had more than 50 destroyers, twice the number in the U.S. Seventh Fleet, over 100 ASW aircrafts (13 PS-1, 77 P-2J and 18 P-3C) which were as many as the United States had in both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Japan possessed more than 400 tactical aircraft — more than the United States had in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines combined.

Despite many restrictions, Japan’s military growth was nevertheless significant during its rapid economic rise. Double-digit nominal economic growth for most of the 1960s and 1970s, meant that even when the defense expenditure was kept below 1 % of the GNP, it still grew at a double-digit rate. The defense budget for 1974 was 21.4 % more than the one the year before. For most of the 1980s and even in the 1990s, however, U.S. policy makers were concerned about the lack of Japanese military spending. U.S. leaders, concerned about Japan’s insufficient capability to deter Soviet aggression and inadequate “burden sharing,” pressured Japan to increase its defense budget throughout the 1980s.

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The United States saw the Japanese military as a method of balancing against the Soviet Union in the Pacific. The JSDF’s main role was to defend Japan’s territory from Hokkaido to Okinawa and the adjacent air and sea space. In addition, Japan was to defend selected sea-lanes out to 1000 nautical miles. The JSDF was expected to be able to independently deny a “limited and small-scale aggression” by the Soviet Union. Japan’s capability to deny the Soviet SSBN forces free passage in the straits of Soya and Tsugaru was considered especially important. The U.S. government also believed that the capability to close three key straits (Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima) would enhance Japan’s deterrent capability. It was also believed that while Japan already possessed sufficient ships to carry out mine-laying operations, it lacked necessary air cover. Japan responded to U.S. pressure by upping defense spending from 1986 to 1990. In short, the United States did not regard the increase of Japan’s defense capability as a threat, but actively encouraged it. The U.S. assessment during the 1980s was that the military balance was in the Soviet’s favor and Japanese military development would complicate Soviet planning.


96 “Limited and small-scale aggression” was defined as “aggression which, in general, is in the nature of a surprise attack without large-scale preparation for invasion so that the aggressive intent would not be perceived in advance and which, moreover, aims at creating a de facto situation within a short period of time.” Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan* 1986, p. 80.


100 Japan’s increased military spending served two purposes for the United States. One purpose was to solve the "free rider" problem. Some people in the United States believed that Japan’s economic growth resulted from free-riding on U.S. military protection. An increase of Japan’s defense spending alleviated such criticisms. The
(2) Improvements in China’s Military Capability

(i) Freed-Up Forces

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union decreased the need for China to defend against the Soviet Union. This potentially freed up the forces deployed along the Sino-Soviet border, and these forces could be reduced or reallocated elsewhere.\(^\text{101}\)

The Soviet Union began shrinking its military in 1988.\(^\text{102}\) In December 1988, in a United Nations speech, Gorbachev pledged a unilateral reduction of 500,000 troops and a reduction of 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces and 800 combat aircraft from Eastern Europe, including European Russia, by 1991. This reduction would reduce Soviet forces east of the Urals by 40%. 200,000 of the 500,000 men to be reduced were to be taken from the Far East, including Mongolia, 240,000 from west of the Urals, and 60,000 from the Southern borders.\(^\text{103}\) Soviet forces completed withdrawal from Afghanistan by February 15, 1989. During a visit to Beijing in May 1989, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet forces along the Far East borders

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\(^{101}\) The same logic of course also applies to the United States and Japan. U.S. forces and Japanese forces which were deployed to counter Soviet threat could counter other threats.


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would be reduced by 120,000 men and 12 army divisions, and 11 air force regiments would be disbanded. In addition, 16 warships were to be withdrawn from the Pacific fleet. China and the Soviet Union agreed to normalize their state-to-state and party-to-party relations.

Figure 3-7: The Number of Divisions Along the Sino-Soviet Border
(Source) *The Military Balance*.  

104 The numbers of divisions for the Soviet Union are the sums of the divisions in Transbaykal, Far East and Mongolia Military Districts. Those of Russia are the sums of Transbaykal and Far East. Those for China are the sums of the divisions in Beijing and Shenyang Military Districts. Data are taken from *The Military Balance*. Data for Soviet Union is not available for 1987, and for China for 1993 and 1994 are missing. Dots are connected to ease comparison.
Table 3-1: The number of divisions on the Sino-Soviet border
(Source) The Military Balance

Figure 3-7 and Table 3-1 show the changes in the number of divisions along the Russian border. China’s removal of forces from the Beijing and Shenyang military districts, adjacent to the Soviet Union/Russia, preceded both the disarmament of the Soviet/Russian forces and the improvement of the bilateral relations. China had already begun cutting the number of ground troops as part of its modernization efforts — independent of shifts in Soviet force posture. The improvement of China’s relations with the Soviet Union in 1989 accelerated the disarmament process.

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105 The number of divisions for China is the total number of divisions in the military districts of Beijing and Shenyang. The number of divisions for Soviet Union is the total number of divisions in military districts of Transbaykal, Far East, Siberian and Mongolia. Mongolia is not included after 1991. Data taken from IISS. The Military Balance of corresponding year’s editions.
The divisions in the Beijing and Shenyang military districts were not directly reallocated to other districts, such as the Nanjing district where the forces might counter Taiwan, the United States, or Japan. The resources freed from the reduction of forces seem to have been used to finance modernization programs, especially of the Air Force and the Navy. China’s defense expenditures grew despite the reduction of its manpower. This suggests that China’s actual military capability increased in the 1990s beyond the forces that were freed up.

(ii) Increases in Chinese Defense Spending

This section looks at increases in China’s defense spending in the 1990s. As we saw in the previous section, China reduced its forces along the Soviet border. Rather than collecting the peace dividend, China’s officially declared defense budget grew significantly during the late 1980s and through the 1990s, as it improved quality of the PLA forces while reducing manpower.

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Figure 3-9: China’s Defense Budgets (Yuan)

Figure 3-9 shows China’s defense budgets from 1985 to 2000 in Yuan. China’s official defense spending increased at a double-digit rate beginning in 1989.108 This marked a stark contrast with the low defense spending during the 1980s, when the Chinese government carried out a large reduction of forces. After the war with Vietnam in 1979, Chinese defense budget decreased for two years and thereafter increased at low rates between 0 and 6%.

Many analysts took the rapid increase in defense spending to indicate a military build up. Some analysts, however, held that much of the increase was due to inflation.109 But the Chinese government suppressed inflation from 1996 on, and the increase in the defense budget continued. The upward turn in defense spending after 1997 clearly outpaced inflation (Figure 3-10).

108 After 1989, defense spending increased by a rate of 11.56% to 15.44% every year.
109 For example, United States Accounting Office (GAO), Report to the Congressional Committees, “National Security: Impact of China’s Military Modernization in the Pacific Region” (June 1995) contends that “analysis revealed that when adjusted for inflation there has been almost no real growth in the official defense budget.”
Figure 3-10. China’s Defense Budget Trend Compared with Consumer Price Increase (Source) Guojia Tongjiju, ed., Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian.\textsuperscript{110}

The real growth in China’s military spending is even clearer when compared with the United States and Japan (Figure 3-11). After the Cold War, U.S. and Japanese defense spending remained basically flat (Figure 3-12).

Note: Consumer price increase rates for 1978-1984 are those of retail price.
The absolute level of China’s defense spending remained relatively low. Figure 3-12 shows the official defense budgets of the United States, USSR/Russia, China and Japan. China’s nominal official defense budget grew from 25.147 billion yuan in 1989 to 72.006 billion yuan in 1997. However, it was still less than 4 % of the U.S. defense budget.

The defense budget of the Soviet Union/Russian Federation decreased sharply in 1992 even after its collapse the preceding year. The seeming increase from 1988 to 1989 was due to the disclosure of information by the Soviet government rather than a real increase. The Soviet

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government announced its defense budget figures publicly as part of Glasnost. Russia’s defense budget decreased even relative to its economy. In 1996, Japan’s defense spending exceeded Russia’s. By 2000, the defense budgets of Russia and China were approaching parity.

![Defense Budget Graph](image)

Figure 3-12: Official Defense Budgets of China, USSR/Russia, the United States and Japan (Source) The Military Balance 1985-1986 edition to 1999-2000 edition; Annual Reports of the U.S. Secretary of Defense to the Congress and the President; China Statistical Yearbook, 1997; Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense in 2000; and Asagumo Shimbun, ed., Hand Book for Defense.\(^\text{113}\)

Along with the decline of other powers’ defense expenditure and the rapid increase of China’s defense spending, the introduction of purchasing power parity (PPP) contributed to a perception of China’s military growth. As we saw in the preceding section, various institutions began to use PPP in calculating defense expenditure around 1993. This made it seem that there was a sudden increase in the size of China’s defense budget.\(^\text{114}\)


Reports that used PPP tended to rate China’s military capability as more capable than those that did not. A RAND study using a high PPP and estimating the China’s economy would grow by 4.9% a year, estimated that China’s military capability would surpass the United States by the year 2007.

2. Acquisition of military capability to threaten vital U.S. interests

In this section, I examine the new weapon systems China acquired in the 1990s to see if they gave China capability to threaten vital U.S. interests. I first examine the acquisition of conventional forces, then strategic forces and finally China’s capability in affecting a revolution in military affairs (RMA).

(1) Conventional forces

China acquired modern weapons, such as Sukhoi-27 fighter jets, Kilo-class diesel submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia in the 1990s. The PLA had only obsolete weapons until then, and the new weapons improved the capability of the PLA forces considerably. However, these weapons were not enough to enable China to threaten vital U.S. national interests. China’s offensive capability vis-à-vis the United States remained quite limited.

As we saw, China had begun modernizing its military in the mid-1980s. The improved relations with the Soviet Union had opened the door to Soviet arms sales to China. In addition, the Gulf War in 1991 made China realize how obsolete its forces were. After the outbreak of

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115 For example, Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1997).
116 Charles Wolf, Jr., K. C. Yeh, Anil Bamezai, Donald P. Henry, and Michael Kennedy, *Long-Term Economic and Military Trends 1994-2015: The United States and Asia* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995). The study was funded by ONA, which tended to perceive China as more powerful than other agencies.
the Gulf War, Jiang Zemin said, “the Gulf War let us further realize the importance of
technology in a modern war.”\textsuperscript{117} China increased its efforts to modernize the PLA. In 1993, it adopted a new military doctrine to fight and win “a local war under high-tech conditions.”

Arms transfers from the Soviet Union to China increased after the Tiananmen Square incident when U.S. sanctions forced China to find a new supplier.\textsuperscript{118} These transfers showed the reduced threat perception between China and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{119} Sino-Soviet negotiations for advanced Soviet aircraft are said to have begun during General Liu Huaqing’s visit to Moscow in June 1990.\textsuperscript{120} It was reported in defense journals in November 1990 that China was planning to buy 24 Sukhoi-27 (Su-27) fighters.\textsuperscript{121} China and the Soviet Union were believed to have agreed on the sale in May 1991. Along with the 24 Su-27s, China acquired 144 AA-10 AAMs, 96 AA-8 AAMs, 40 spare engines, and a Su-27 flight simulator.\textsuperscript{122} By 1992, 24 Su-27s and 4 Su-27B had been delivered and were based at Wuhu Air Base.\textsuperscript{123}

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\textsuperscript{117} Gurtov and Hwang, \textit{China’s Security}, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{118} The United States suspended its arms transfer to China after the Tiananmen Square incident. China had to turn to the Soviet Union. With the sanctions, the United States lost its ability to control China’s military capability through arms transfers.
\textsuperscript{119} Some argue that Russia avoids selling China its most sophisticated weapons. For instance, China’s licensed production of Su-27 fighters is said to include only simple assembly, not the production of engines. Others note that Russia’s defense industry now depends on China. Moreover, Russian arms transfers are in Russia’s interest because modernization takes forces away from the border districts and shifts funds to fighters and submarines deployed along the coast or off shore where they do not threaten Russia. I would like to thank Yoshiaki Sakaguchi for suggesting this point to me.
\end{flushright}
May 1995, China received a second batch of 24 Su-27s. These were delivered in April 1996 and based at Suixi Air Base. \(^{124}\) In February 1996, China obtained a license to produce Su-27s for $2.5 billion. It was reported that if production were successful, China would build more than 72 to 78 planes, outfitting three regiments. \(^{125}\) By 2000, China possessed 65 Su-27s and 40 some Su-30s. \(^{126}\)

The Su-27 Flanker is one of the premiere fighter-interceptor aircrafts of the world. It has a combat radius of 1500 km. With mid-air refueling, this can be extended to 2000 km. It is a look-down/shoot-down fighter with a pulse-Doppler radar and up to ten AAMs. \(^{127}\) China's air force (People's Liberation Army Air Force: PLAAF) and naval aviation (People's Liberation Army Navy Air Force: PLANAF) had a fixed-wing fleet of 5,300 combat aircraft in 2000. But the Su-27 and Su-30 were the only fourth-generation aircraft in China's inventory in 2000. \(^{128}\)

A 2000 DoD report estimated that by 2005 PLA fourth-generation fighter aircraft would number about 150. But even that would amount to only about 4% of the fighter force. \(^{129}\)

China's acquisition of the Kilo-class submarines marked an improvement over the older Romeo class submarines. Kilo is a very quiet submarine, and U.S. anti-submarine forces would have more difficulty detecting it. The Kilo-class submarine sale was concluded in November

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\(^{125}\) David Fulghum, *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, February 12, 1996, Vol. 144, No. 7, p. 60. From the database of Info Trac OneFile, http://infotrac.london.galegroup.com/. Under the initial agreement, China would produce up to 200 aircraft from Russian-made components over three to five years. Russia licensed coproduction of Su-27s to the Shenyang Aircraft Company, which could produce 15 to 20 per year. Some speculated that China might seek to obtain as many as 300 Su-27s. Federation of American Scientists, *People's Liberation Army Air Force*.


1994. The contract was believed to be for 4 Type EKM 877 Kilo class submarines at about $250 million each.\textsuperscript{130} Reports at the time quoted U.S. naval sources stating that China agreed to purchase 10 Kilo submarines and might purchase an additional twelve.\textsuperscript{131} As of 2000, China possessed five Kilo-class submarines — two Type EKM 877 and three Type EKM 636.\textsuperscript{132}

In December 1996, China agreed to purchase two Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with eight 3M-80E Moskit SS-N-22 SUNBURN supersonic antiship cruise missiles and 48 SA-N-7 SAMs from Russia.\textsuperscript{133} The first of the destroyers was delivered in February 2000.\textsuperscript{134} The Sovremenny was superior to China’s indigenous destroyers, especially in its capability to attack surface ships with its Moskit missiles. These can descend to a “sea-skimming” altitude, twenty meters above the sea surface and accelerate to a speed of Mach 2.5.\textsuperscript{135}

These Russian weapons increased China’s offensive capability considerably. China now relied less on sheer numbers and more on quality. The newly acquired weapons increased the force’s survivability, and improved China’s capability to deny to foreign forces access to its periphery.

The PLA’s offensive capability remained limited however, insufficient to threaten vital U.S. interests. For example, the Su-27s range of 1500 km includes only Taiwan and the southern part of Japan (Okinawa, Kyushu, most of Shikoku and south west portion of Honshu). The 5 Kilo-class submarines and 2 Sovremenny-class destroyers also did not give China the kind of

\textsuperscript{130} FBIS-SOV, 1 November 1994, p. 10; and FBIS-CHI, 8 November 1994, pp. 11-12. Cited in Gill and Kim, \textit{China’s Arms Acquisitions from Abroad}, pp. 61-62.
\textsuperscript{134} Bernard D. Cole, \textit{The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century} (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2001), p. 93.
blue water navy that could threaten far-off locations.

These weapons gave China the capability to challenge U.S. access to China’s periphery. This would pose a problem for the United States only if the United States sought unchallenged global access. The U.S. primacy strategy requires that the United States maintain “command of the commons.” China’s Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers could potentially deny American access to seas near China, and threatening primacy.

(2) Strategic Forces

There were some improvements in China’s nuclear capability in the 1990s. China successfully tested solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that would improve the survivability of its nuclear forces and improve its second strike capability. However, at the end of the 1990s, China only had about 10 ICBMs capable of striking the continental United States. Even after the improvements in the 1990s, most reports argued that China had not achieved mutually assured destruction against the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

China has been a nuclear-weapon state since 1964. China was reported to possess approximately 450 weapons in the late-1990s, which made it the third largest nuclear military

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136 Barry Posen defines “command of the commons” as command of the sea, space and air. It is analogous to command of the sea, or “naval mastery” in Paul Kennedy’s terminology. The commons are areas that belong to no one state and that provide access to much of the globe. Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 5-46.

137 An argument is often made that U.S. aircraft carriers will not enter seas that are not “sanitized” of hostile submarines.

138 China’s estimated supply of ICBMs ranges from seven to 20 depending on the report. Jones and McDonough use seven. Jones and McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, p. 55. A classified CIA report put the number at 18, according to press reports, with 13 targeted against U.S. cities and the remaining 5 against Russia and neighboring countries. Bill Geertz, “China Targets Nukes at U.S.: CIA Missile Report Contradicts Clinton,” Washington Times, May 1, 1998, p. A1. In September 1998, a CIA official publicly confirmed that China had deployed about 20 CSS-4 (DF-5) ICBMs, with most of them targeted at the United States. These missiles were kept unfueled and without warheads mated to the missiles. In 1999, an Air Force report noted that the PLA had deployed less than 25 CSS-4s in silos. In September 1999, the National Intelligence Council estimated that by 2015, “China is likely to have tens of missiles capable of targeting the United States, including a few tens of more survivable, land- and sea-based mobile missiles with smaller nuclear warheads.” National Intelligence Council, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States Through 2015.”
power. Since then, this number has been reestimated downwards to approximately 130 warheads for delivery and a total stockpile of approximately 200 warheads. The United States and Russia had over 7,000 and 5,000 warheads respectively. All 192 warheads in the British nuclear arsenal are SLBMs deployed on submarines, and most of the French nuclear arsenal of 449 warheads is also SLBMs. This made British and French nuclear forces highly survivable against an enemy’s first strike. However, most of Chinese nuclear forces were ground based and used liquid fuel. This meant that Chinese nuclear force lacked mobility and were vulnerable to attack.

In 1995, China was reported to have successfully flight-tested the new Dongfeng-31 (DF-31) ICBM. DF-31 missiles use solid fuel and are believed to have a range of 10,000-12,000 km, just enough to reach Washington, D.C from Beijing. China also continued to upgrade its submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), Julang-2 (JL-2), based on the DF-31, and its nuclear submarines. At the end of the 1990s, there were no reports indicating that China had succeeded in developing the JL-2. In addition, China continued work on multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) warheads.

By the 1990s China was seen to have changed its nuclear doctrine from “minimum deterrence” to “limited deterrence” (you xian wei she). A minimum deterrence sought only

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142 A Japanese daily newspaper, the Yomiuri Shimbun, reported that China successfully conducted the MIRV test on December 2002, but no official confirmation was available.

143 The writings of limited deterrence appeared within the Chinese military in the late-1980s. One of the first articles on limited deterrence appeared in the PLA Daily (Jiefangjun Bao) in 1987. Zhang Jianzhi proposed a
the capability to attack a few cities. Limited deterrence doctrine sought second strike
capability against enemy forces and strategically important assets, such as political and military
centers.\footnote{144}

From the developments in the early- to mid-1990s, U.S. analysts concluded that China had
embarked on a major program to upgrade its nuclear forces in the 1990s and expected too see
continued improvements. For example, in February 1996, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency testified that China's "strategic nuclear force is expanding, we expect to see
steady growth in this force."\footnote{145} From the reports of successive tests, some analysts inferred
that China was developing a higher yield-to-weight which would allow China to make advances
in missile accuracy, mobile ballistic missiles, missile submarine forces, and multiple-warhead
missiles.\footnote{146} However, as the DoD report suggested in 1998, the pace of replacement of
liquid-propellant missiles with solid-propellant missiles was gradual.\footnote{147}

China's nuclear capabilities remained limited. President Clinton emphasized this point
by saying in a speech in April 1999: "China has fewer than two dozen long-range nuclear


145 Testimony of Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, DIA Director, before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, \textit{Current and Projected National Security Threat to the United States and Its Interests Abroad}

(No 11, 14, 1997).

147 The report also observed that "China's experience with the presumed newer warhead technologies is very
limited and China could, in the future, encounter difficulties in its development or maintenance." "Future Military
Capabilities and Strategy of the People's Republic of China," Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1226 of the
weapons today. We have over 6,000.”

(3) The revolution in military affairs (RMA)

In the 1990s, some security specialists in the United States thought that technological and doctrinal breakthroughs created a potential revolution in military affairs (RMA) that could increase the military capability of a nation by a great magnitude. It followed that maintaining a technological advantage was critical to U.S. primacy, and countries that could affect a RMA were potential threats to U.S. primacy.

China began to study the RMA concept in the mid-1990s. In the beginning, the intention was mostly to study the developments and arguments in the United States. The focus of the PLA’s modernization program was mechanization of its troops. China redirected its modernization plans, however, after observing the wars the United States fought after the Cold War. The Gulf War of 1990 and Kosovo in 1999, particularly the use of precision bombing, made China realize its military backwardness. Writings began to appear in Chinese military journals about the RMA. The PLA began to recruit university students that were adept in sophisticated technology to their officer corps from the late-1990s.

In the 1990s, the PLA remained technologically unsophisticated. China had tried to back engineer several weapon systems without success. The development of indigenous weapons also had many problems. China thus relied on arms transfer from Russia to modernize.

After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, China seems to have realized the importance of information technology in warfighting. The PLA emphasized the need to “informationize” and mechanize its forces simultaneously. China aspired to develop RMA technologies and to catch

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up with the modern militaries, but at the turn of the century China still lacked mobility and precision.

3. Offensive Capability and “China threat” Arguments

China’s rising defense expenditure and acquisition of modern weapons from Russia triggered the first of the “China threat” arguments, which appeared in around 1992. Defense analysts had been aware of China’s modernization program from the mid-1980s. Several articles had appeared in defense journals, but the tone of reports was not alarmist, and the circulation was confined to security specialists. This changed in 1992. Security specialists began to voice their concerns about China, and articles on China’s modernization appeared not just in military journals but also in major newspapers and magazines as well as think tank reports.

Security specialists were especially concerned by China’s acquisition of modern weapons in the early- to mid-1990s. Many “China threat” arguments cited China’s acquisition of Sukhoi-27 (Su-27) fighters and Kilo-class diesel submarines as indications of China’s potential threat. Richard Bush, Chairman of American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) from 1997 through 2001 holds that rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States was caused by China’s acquisition of Russian weapons after the Cold War.

Other analysts saw China’s military defense buildup as modest. For example, a 1995

GAO study reported that adjusting for inflation, there had been almost no real growth in the official defense budget of the PLA. A study by the Atlantic Council concluded that while China’s military spending was comparable to that of France, Britain or Japan, the PLA was far less capable, hindered by China’s weak industrial and science and technology base.

Most analysts agreed that China hoped to create a military force capable of power projection and modern warfare. The disagreement was about timing. Some held that China would soon possess such a military. Others claimed that it might be two to three decades before these goals were achieved.

Many analysts regarded RMA capability as a way to leapfrog military competitors. These analysts assessed threats and challengers based on their ability to harness RMA. This was case with the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

A 1992 ONA study assessed the likelihood of various countries realizing the RMA (then called the “military-technical revolutions — MTR.”) Japan and Germany were identified as the main U.S. competitors in using these technologies: “Germany and Japan, ... with other possible members being France (in alliance with another power), and Russia” were listed as “Category I competitors,” that “have the necessary resources — human, economic, and technological — to compete now if they choose to do so.” China was placed in “Category II,” which comprised “MTR ‘wanna be’ competitors” that could compete in significant ways in ten years or so.

Andrew Marshall, director of the ONA, a strong believer in RMA, became interested in China’s

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154 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002), p. 45. The assessment was originally circulated in July 1992 by the ONA, and was published in 2002 by CSBA, of which Krepinevich was the director.

155 Ibid., Krepinevich, pp. 45-46.
threat in part because of its interest in RMA. He reached this conclusion after reviewing the military journals of 30 countries.\textsuperscript{156}

4. Summary: Gains in Chinese military capability and “China threat” arguments

(1) Relative military capability

The examination of China’s military capability supports the Realist proposition that states perceive threats when states build-up their offensive capability. China’s defense spending grew at a double-digit rate in the 1990s. China’s rapid defense caused alarm for two reasons. First, other powers’ defense spending declined or slowed in the same period. Second, it grew despite the decline of the Soviet/Russian military power. Many “China threat” arguments saw China as a future threat to the United States, not a current threat. These arguments saw the growth in China’s military capability as a trend likely to continue, even though China was starting from a very low base.

(2) China’s capability to harm the United States

The evidence only weakly supports the realist prediction that China’s acquisition of the capability to threaten vital U.S. interests would cause “China threat” arguments evidence. The rise of “China threat” arguments cannot be explained by China’s capability to threaten U.S. survival.

There were no major changes in China’s offensive capability in the 1990s. China’s acquisition of modern weapons from Russia, including Su-27s, Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers brought the Chinese military out of obsolescence, but the gains did

\textsuperscript{156} Marshall, interview by author, 22 February 2002, Washington, tape recording, Washington, D.C.
not allow China to carry out offensive operations against the United States or Japan. China’s military capability was not even sufficient to invade Taiwan. China lacked capability to establish air superiority over Taiwan, as well as the transport and logistical capabilities needed to move forces onto the island. The only military capability China possessed that could threaten U.S. national interests — and Japan and Taiwan — was missiles of various ranges, some armed with nuclear warheads. But China had these in the 1980s, and therefore they cannot account for the rise of “China threat” arguments in the 1990s.

The case for the irrelevance of China’s offensive capabilities to U.S. threat perception is strengthened by the reaction the United States had to Russia. China was perceived as a threat with its limited offensive capabilities while Russia was seen as a declining threat when it was Russian weapons that invited “China threat” arguments.

China’s aspiration to realize the RMA was one factor that invited the concern of some U.S. analysts, especially those who worked closely with ONA. Those who believed in the importance of RMA tended to perceive China as a potential peer competitor. The increase in China’s offensive power only explains the rise of “China threat” arguments made by those who believed in the virtues of U.S. primacy and believed that RMA allowed China to threaten U.S. primacy.

IV. REALIST ARGUMENTS ABOUT INTENTIONS

Realists tend to treat intentions as less important than power because intentions can change quickly and because they are hard to ascertain. For example, John Mearsheimer argues, “Uncertainty about intentions is unavoidable, which means that states can never be sure that
other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities."\textsuperscript{157} However, even given uncertainty, states have to make assessments of others' intentions. And since resources are not unlimited, states cannot base their security policies on the worst case scenarios all the time. They have to assess whose capability is most likely to be used against them. Failure to prioritize will leave them open to dangers.\textsuperscript{158} Intentions can change overnight, but in reality there usually is some warning.

I argue that Realism says more about how states view intentions than many realists think. Aggressive intentions occur — and are perceived by others — when states’ positional concerns require aggressive behavior. Realism says that states’ relative power governs their intentions.

Stephen Walt, in his balance of threat theory, holds that one of the factors that shape threat perception is aggressive intentions. Walt’s argues that states perceive intentions based on the behavior of other states. Other theories argue that states perceive aggressive intentions based on other indicators, like ideology. I suggest that much of Walt’s explanation for the perception of aggressive intentions can be explained by structural realism.\textsuperscript{159} State behavior is strongly influenced by the relative power of states in the international system. It follows that the world’s distribution of power is an important source of intentions, and when there is a change in the world’s distribution of power, states’ behavior and intentions will also change.

Hypothesis R4: States perceive threats based on the aggressive behavior of other states. Behavior is strongly influenced by states’ relative power in the international system.

(1) Because states seek to maximize the power of their alliances to balance against common enemies, states try to maintain good relations with their allies. This leads states

\textsuperscript{157} Mearsheimer, \textit{The Tragedy}, p. 31.

\textsuperscript{158} Preparing for all cases and worst cases will waste resources and result in national peril. Waltz writes that “A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer.” Waltz, \textit{Theory of International Politics}, p. 118.

\textsuperscript{159} Walt’s balance of power theory has been critiqued as a departure from Realism because he introduces intangible factors like intentions. I argue, however, that intentions can be explained by the distribution of power among states and thus that Walt’s theory fits squarely in a realist framework. I do not argue that the distribution of power is the only source of state intention, however.
to behave benignly toward their allies. Benign behavior leads to the perception of benign intentions (strategic safety-net).

(2) In the absence of a common enemy, there is less constraint on behavior. This results in more self-interest seeking behavior. This may lead to the perception of aggressive intentions.

Predictions for “China threat” case:

(1) The United States will put less effort into maintaining good relations with China, and vice versa, after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. As a result, U.S.-China relations will deteriorate.

(2) The United States will be less restrained in its behavior regarding contentious issues, such as Taiwan, which were shelved during the Cold War. The Taiwan issue would come back as a major problem between the United States and China after the disappearance of Soviet threat.

(3) The United States will be more critical of human rights issues in China after the disappearance of the Soviet threat.

(4) China will more aggressively pursue its interest against U.S. interest, and vice versa.

Hypothesis R5: States perceive threats based on aggressive intentions. Intentions are strongly influenced by states’ relative power.

(1) Allies seek to maximize their power to balance against common adversaries. A common enemy serves as a “strategic safety-net” which limits uncertainty about whether the allies’ intentions are mutually benign. When the common enemy disappears, uncertainty about the former ally’s intentions results. All things being equal, a state is less likely to perceive a state with a common enemy as a threat. A state is more likely to perceive a state without a common enemy as a threat.

(2) States worry about their relative power. States assume that other states want to improve their relative power. It follows, all things being equal, that a dominant state will perceive the next-most powerful state to harbor aggressive intentions and see it as a threat.

(3) The combination of Hypotheses R4 and R5 reinforces the perception of aggressive intentions. The absence of the strategic safety-net leads to more aggressive behavior, and states are also likely to perceive former allies’ behavior as aggressive, even if it does not change.

Predictions for “China threat” case:

(1) The United States will perceive China’s intentions as more aggressive and perceive China as a threat after the Soviet threat has disappeared.
(2) After the Soviet threat has disappeared, the United States will perceive China’s military build-up as intended for conflict with the U.S. military.

(3) The United States will perceive China’s intentions as more aggressive when China becomes the next most powerful state and begins to narrow the gap.

1. Changes in Behavior without a “Strategic Safety-net”

Realism predicts that with the disappearance of the common adversary, and thus a fraying of a strategic safety-net, both parties, no longer needing to support an alliance, are free to pursue their own interests at the cost of the other. Self-interested behavior will lead to a deterioration of relations, inviting suspicion and the perception of aggressive intentions.

This theory predicts that during the Cold War the United States and China would restrain behavior that might be harmful to their cooperation or weaken their aggregate capability. The same thing can be said about the United States and Japan, and Japan and China. Contentious issues, such as the Taiwan problem and human rights issues, are expected to be shelved for the common good of cooperating to counter the common threat. Without the common enemy, relations should sour and even turn to mutual hostility and fear.

The United States and China were quasi-allies throughout the 1980s. In many instances, opposing the Soviet Union took precedence over any other differences the United States and China might have had. In the mid-1980s, the United States and China shared intelligence on Soviet military capabilities, and the United States supplied arms to China. The two most contentious issues that lay between the two countries were Taiwan and human rights. As the

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160 For example, the United States and China exchanged intelligence on the situation in Kampuchea and Afghanistan. There was a significant cooperation between the United States and China in supplying mules and arms to the mujahideen in Afghanistan. The United States (CIA) paid the costs, and Chinese intelligence supplied the weapons. For more on the cooperation, see James Mann, *About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, From Nixon to Clinton* (Knopf, New York: 1999), pp. 136-137. Between 1984 and 1987, nine seismographic monitoring sites were set up to monitor Soviet underground tests. It was also revealed that without public disclosure, targets in China were dropped from the U.S. nuclear war strike plan (SIOP) in 1982. Raymond Garthoff, *The Great Transition: American-Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War* (The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.: 1994), pp. 635-636.
following sections show, the United States and China became less restrained in their behavior after 1992, which led to a deterioration of relations and worsening perceptions of each other’s intentions.

(1) The Taiwan Problem

During the Cold War, the leaders of both the United States and China agreed that the differences over Taiwan were best left in the background. China’s attitudes during the Cold War were well described by Mao Zedong’s comments to Richard Nixon: “The issue [Taiwan] is not an important one. The issue of the international situation is an important one.”161 The U.S. attitude towards China in the 1980s can be summarized by then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s statement upon meeting the Chinese premier: “Zhang Aiping was unquestionably a Communist, but he was an anti-Soviet Communist.”162 The two governments suppressed differences for the higher good of countering Soviet expansionism.

During the Cold War, the U.S. government valued maintaining good relations with China more than supporting Taiwan. For example, once he was in office, President Reagan revoked the pro-Taiwan position he took during his election campaign and sought a good relationship with the PRC.163 Upon signing to the U.S.-China Joint Communiqué in 1982, the Reagan administration agreed to place a qualitative and quantitative limit on U.S. arms sales to

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163 President Reagan had come into the office in 1981 committed to upgrading U.S. relations with Taiwan. In May 1980, during his election campaign, he stated that he could “see no reason why, with an embassy in Peking, we could not now have an official liaison office in Taiwan, the same as we had in Peking before the change occurred,” so that Taiwan could have a “government relation” with the United States. However, two month after taking office, Reagan wrote a personal letter to Chinese leaders emphasizing his desire to maintain stable and friendly relations. On Reagan’s position on Taiwan see, Harding, A Fragile Relations, pp. 107-119.
Taiwan. In addition to restraining its behavior, the U.S. government put great effort into improving China’s image in the United States. For example, the Reagan administration leaked information about U.S.-China relations during the 1980s, revealing previously secret military cooperation, such as the existence of U.S.-China joint facilities in western China to monitor Soviet missile tests and increased Chinese exports of rare metals to the United States.

Congress and the media also suppressed criticisms of China to aid U.S.-China relations. American press coverage of China was mostly favorable in the 1980s. Journalists themselves recalled writing articles in favor of China in the 1980s. Many admitted that there was a general atmosphere among the media encouraging positive reports about China.

U.S. attitudes toward Taiwan began to change as the Soviet threat declined. For example, in July 1991, President George H.W. Bush pledged in a letter to “work actively” to see that Taiwan was able to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Before this, the United States had been unwilling to allow Taiwan to enter the GATT before China. Another major change in U.S. policy towards Taiwan came in September 1992, when President Bush announced the sale of 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan during his presidential election campaign. According to Carl Ford, a senior Pentagon official in the Bush administration, “F-16s had been

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164 Both the U.S. and Chinese governments made concessions to reach an agreement. The communique stated that “the United States government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan”. “United States-China Joint Communique on United States Arms Sales to Taiwan” (August 17, 1982) cited in Harding, Appendix D, Ibid., pp. 383-385.
165 Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 120.
the number one item on their (Taiwan’s) list every year, bar none,” since the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{168}

They had been turned down every time until 1992. The Chinese government objected furiously to U.S. decision to sell the F-16s to Taiwan.

James Mann, a journalist and a close observer of U.S.-China relations noted that the F-16 sale to Taiwan illustrated:

More than any other event in the early 1990s, how the end of the Cold War had altered the relationship between the United States and China. The deal showed the Chinese that America no longer cared what Beijing thought to the extent that it had before the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the United States would never have sold the same warplanes to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{169}

Even in the 1980s, Congress had been concerned about Taiwan’s security and opposed tipping the military balance in China’s favor. However this sentiment usually failed to win enough votes to pass legislation. For example, some Congressmen opposed U.S. assistance in upgrading Chinese F-8 fighters (the Peace Pearl project). But the bill was defeated.\textsuperscript{170} China’s cooperation in fighting the Soviet Union took precedence.

Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs during the Bush administration (1989-1992), attested to the efforts the U.S. government would make to maintain good relations with China – including enlisting the media –, and the support that was more forthcoming from both the media and the Congress. Solomon noted:

Had the Soviet threat been still strong in the mid-1990s, it would have been easier to say to the Congress and the media, yes China does have human rights problems and Taiwan and all that, but we have to keep good relations with China to fight the Soviet Union, and they would have listened. But it didn’t happen that way.\textsuperscript{171}

In another change, the U.S. government issued a visa to the Taiwanese president Lee

\textsuperscript{168} Carl Ford, interview by James Mann, October 7, 1996, quoted in Mann, \textit{About Face}, p. 264.
\textsuperscript{169} Mann, Ibid., p. 269.
\textsuperscript{170} Such legislation was originally proposed by Martin Lasater of the Heritage Foundation, and supported by Senators Jesse Helms and Barry Goldwater and by Congressmen Philip Crane and Mark Siljander. Harding, \textit{A Fragile Relationship}, p. 420, note 75.
\textsuperscript{171} Richard Solomon, interview by author, 23 September 1999, Washington, tape recording, Washignton, D.C.
Teng-hui in May 1995. Congress had passed a resolution calling on President Clinton to grant the visa by votes of 390 to 0 in the House and 97 to 1 in the Senate. Representative Benjamin Gilman (R-NY), chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations supported the resolution by arguing "Enough is enough. We have to put some balance back into our relationship with Taiwan and Beijing." \(^{173}\)

An argument often made around this time said that the United States should stop giving China a special treatment. The assumption behind the argument was the United States had restrained its behavior in China's favor during the Cold War. Even taking Taiwan's lobbying and a conservative Congress into account, the change in the U.S. attitude regarding the Taiwan issue was large. \(^{174}\) This is evidenced by the surprise a representative of the Taipei Economic and Culture Representative Office (TECRO) in Washington expressed at the support Taiwan received in Congress. \(^{175}\) He had not expected nearly unanimous votes. \(^{176}\)

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\(^{172}\) "Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding a private visit by President Lee Teng-hui of the Republic of China on Taiwan to the United States," H. Con. Res. 53. The issuance of the visa in 1995 was influenced by the sympathy events of the previous year had caused. In May 1994, Taiwan had asked the U.S. State Department to President Lee permission to spend a night in Hawaii during a refueling stop on en route to Central America. Permission was denied, and Lee defiantly confined himself to the aircraft. This led to sympathy within the Congress, which was fueled by Taiwanese lobbying.


\(^{174}\) Lobbying by Taiwan increased in the mid-1990s. Some claim that the lobbying and public relations firm Cassidy & Associates contributed greatly to Lee's visit to the United States. Cassidy & Associates were hired by Taiwan Research Institute (TRI), which was closely associated with the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party or KMT). The firm received $2.5 million from the "Friends of Lee Teng-hui" in 1994. Cited in Lampton, Ibid., pp. 47-48. In 1996, Cassidy & Associates received another $2.5 million from TRI. The company met with 36 members of Congress that year. United States Department of Justice, Foreign Agents Registration Act: Report to Congress for six months ended June 30, 1997. Cited also in Chikako Kawakatsu (Ueki), Amerika ni okeru Taichu Ninshiki: Rieki Dantai no Eikyo [U.S. Perceptions of China: Influence of Interest Groups], (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo [Japan Institute of International Affairs], 1999), pp. 32-33. Robert Hathaway, a professional staff member on the House International Relations Committee for 1993-1999, stated that the Taiwan lobby became increasingly active around 1995. In some cases, the Taiwan lobby provided the draft of the resolution that was then presented to Congress. Many resolutions expressing "the sense of the Congress" were written by the Taiwan Lobby and were passed because they had only symbolic effect. Robert Hathaway, interview by author, 9 December 1998, Washington, tape recording, Washington, D.C.

\(^{175}\) TECRO serves in practice as an unofficial embassy of Taiwan in the United States.

\(^{176}\) Interview by author. September 1998, Washington, D.C.
China’s behavior was also affected by the fraying of the strategic safety-net.\textsuperscript{177} In 1995-1996, China’s approach to Taiwan became markedly more aggressive. Lee’s visit to the United States in 1995 led Beijing to fear that Taiwan would declare independence with U.S. support. In August 1995, China expanded a routine military exercise and conducted ten days of naval exercises and live ballistic missile test firing in the Taiwan Strait. Just before the presidential election in Taiwan in March 1996, the PLA again conducted joint exercises and ballistic missile exercises with two impact areas near Taiwan. The U.S. government criticized China’s military threats against Taiwan as “reckless” and “irresponsible” and responded by sending two carrier battle groups to the region.\textsuperscript{178}

This was the closest that the United States and China had come to a direct military confrontation since the 1950s.\textsuperscript{179} The incident, still referred to as the “Taiwan Strait crisis,” increased public awareness of a possible military confrontation.

In late-1995 and 1996, several Chinese officials warned the United States not to intervene in the Taiwan problem. They hinted that China would use nuclear weapons in response to U.S. military intervention. According to the \textit{New York Times}, in October 1995 a PLA leader told Charles (Chas.) W. Freeman Jr., a retired State and Defense Department China specialist, that China would sacrifice millions of people to defend its interest in Taiwan. Freeman was reportedly told, “You will not sacrifice Los Angeles to protect Taiwan.”\textsuperscript{180} Freeman did not

\textsuperscript{177} It is unclear whether the changes in China’s behavior were driven primarily by the collapse of the Soviet Union, or U.S. behavior.

\textsuperscript{178} Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, speaking to NBC’s “Meet the Press,” quoted in John O’Neil, “U.S. Sending More Ships to Taiwan Area in Warning to China,” \textit{New York Times}, 11 March 1996, p. A5. The Pentagon announced that two U.S. carrier battle groups had been ordered to the area on March 10, 1996. The two battle carrier groups did not enter the Taiwan Strait but came close to Taiwan.

\textsuperscript{179} Patrick Tyler, “China Signaling that It will Not Invade Taiwan,” \textit{New York Times}, 13 March 1996, p. A3. The Pentagon also disclosed that Chinese government has signaled to the U.S. government it has no intention of attacking Taiwan. 14 March 1996.

disclose the name of the Chinese officer, but other sources identified him as General Xiong Guankai, the deputy chief of general staff and chief of military intelligence for the PLA.\(^\text{181}\)

Several China scholars were reported to have received similar warnings.\(^\text{182}\) One American scholar was warned by Qiao Shi, the head of China's National People's Congress, that if China were attacked by nuclear weapons, it could respond by hitting New York City.\(^\text{183}\)

Another example of less restrained Chinese behavior causing the perception of aggressive intention was an incident involving a U.S. aircraft carrier and a Chinese submarine. On October 27-29, 1994, the U.S. aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk* and a Chinese *Han*-class nuclear submarine met in the Yellow Sea. *Kitty Hawk* dispatched an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft to track the submarine. China responded by scrambling jet fighters against it. It was reported that a Chinese government official told a U.S. military attaché in Beijing that the next time such a situation arises; China's order will be to shoot to kill.\(^\text{184}\) The incident heightened the American concern that China might increase its military assertiveness and could consider using nuclear weapons in future conflict scenarios.

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\(^\text{181}\) Mann, *About Face*, p. 334. Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (1993-1997), confirmed this point in an interview. Lord was asked, “How serious do you believe the nuclear threats were that Xiong Guankai made in his talks with Chas. Freeman?” Lord replied, “Basically the Chinese were alleged to have said more or less as follows. They said, ‘Look, we’re not worried if we get into some tension and potential conflict with the United States. By the way, we have nuclear weapons, too. In the event of a real confrontation we don’t think that the Americans are going to “give up” Los Angeles in exchange for Taiwan.’” Tucker, *China Confidential*, p. 484.

\(^\text{182}\) One such scholar is John W. Lewis, a Stanford University political scientist. Tyler, *As China Threatens*.


\(^\text{184}\) The incident was first reported on December 14 by the *Los Angeles Times*. Jim Mann and Art Pine, “Faceoff Between U.S. Ship, Chinese Sub Is Revealed Military: October incident in Yellow Sea highlights growing chance of naval conflict. Beijing sounds warning.” *The Los Angeles Times*, December 14, 1994, p. 1. Dennis Boxx, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) confirmed the incident in a briefing on December 15. He acknowledged that he had reports of the Chinese warning but said as they were “comments made in a social setting … and I don’t believe that constitutes any official position of the Chinese government.” DoD News Briefing, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Thursday, December 15, 1994 - 1:30 p.m. The encounter has also been confirmed by Chinese sources. For example, “Meiji jinnian kuitan wo qingbao shijian (U.S. airplanes’ recent spying incidents)” *Shenhuo Shibao*, April 7, 2001. http://www.peopledaily.co.jp/GB/junshi/62/20010407/435339.html
U.S. impressions of China’s aggressive intentions.  

(2) Human Rights Problems

Human rights conditions in China were another problem that became controversial in the United States in the 1990s. The U.S. response to China’s human rights conditions changed beginning in late-1980s and accelerated after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This change evoked a hostile response from China, which in turn heightened U.S. perceptions of China’s aggressive intentions.

China’s human rights conditions had been seen as a problem in the United States from the mid-1980s. Human rights groups studied China and lobbied Congress on human rights and birth control issues. However, during the 1980s, the Reagan and Bush administrations were careful not to offend China. Until the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, the U.S. government did not sanction China, and made sure that China was not singled out for criticism.

In the late-1980s, the United States maintained good relations with China with relatively little difficulty. Winston Lord, then U.S. Ambassador to Beijing (November 1985-April 1989),

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187 For example, in 1984 and 1985, the Reagan administration withheld 50 % of the U.S. contribution to the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), responding to pressures from Congress and the public. With further pressure, the administration terminated all funding for the UNFPA in 1986, 1987 and 1988.

recalled that his period was “probably the most positive period in U.S.-China relations since the opening.” Lord noted that the human rights problem “was not a dominant issue.”\textsuperscript{189}

As noted earlier, Richard Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs during the Bush administration (1989-1992), noted that during this period, because of the Soviet threat, it was easy to convince the human rights groups and Congress to limit criticisms of China on human rights issues.

Even after the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989, the U.S. government sought to maintain good relations with China. The public reaction to the incident was strong and proponents of human rights in the United States were vocal in their attacks on the Chinese government. President Bush imposed sanctions on China, but only under public pressure and criticisms for being soft on China.\textsuperscript{190} Evidence indicates that the Bush administration continued efforts to maintain good relations with China even after the U.S. government imposed sanctions. For example, President Bush’s letter to Deng Xiaoping written on June 20, 1989 expressed his belief “with passion” that good relations between the two countries were in the fundamental interest of both countries.\textsuperscript{191} At this point, there were still a considerable number of policy elites who saw a strategic value in maintaining good relations with China. Although Soviet threat had declined, the administration remained apprehensive about improved Sino-Soviet relations and wanted to make sure that “rapprochement between Moscow and


\textsuperscript{190} The sanctions included the suspension of military-to-military cooperation and suspension of military and high-level leadership exchanges, and recommendation to indefinitely postpone new international financial agency loans to China.\textsuperscript{190}

\textsuperscript{191} Bush, \textit{All the Best}, pp. 428-129. Bush and Scowcroft, \textit{A World Transformed}, p. 100. See Chapter 4 for more details.
Beijing ... did not come at our (U.S.) expense.”192 The Bush administration was worried that precipitous action might “throw China back into the hands of the Soviet Union.”193 Bush sent his national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger to Beijing in secret only a month after the incident.194 Bush also allowed the sale of four Boeing aircraft to China in July. In October, Bush took steps to revive work on the Chinese F-8 fighter aircraft upgrade project “Peace Pearl,” allowing work to continue at the Grumman Corporation on Long Island.195 In December, Bush waived a congressional ban on Export-Import Bank loans to firms doing business in China and announced the export of three satellites to China.196

In 1989, China remained apprehensive about the Soviet Union. When they met in February 1989, Deng told Bush, “How can China not feel that the greatest threat comes from the Soviet Union?”197 Also in February, President Yang Shangkun assured Bush that: “We will on no account imperil the interests of any third country in improving relations with the Soviet Union.”198

The conciliatory attitude of the United States changed in 1992 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. A speech by Bill Clinton in April 1992, then a presidential candidate, indicated a clear departure from the perceptions of previous presidents. One of Clinton’s main

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192 Brent Scowcroft in Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, p. 91. The Bush administration was eager to meet with Deng Xiaoping before Gorbachev, but thought the President’s visit to Beijing could be justified so early in the presidency. Bush seized the opportunity to visit Beijing when he visited Japan for the funeral of Emperor Hirohito. The trip made Bush the first president to travel to Asia before Europe, “a sign of priorities for the new era.” Scowcroft, in Ibid., p. 91.


194 The trip was kept secret until it was revealed after they visited Beijing again in December 1989. There was strong criticism in the the media and Congress.


198 Yang Shangkun quoted by Bush in Ibid., pp. 91-92. President Bush met with Yang Shangkun
arguments was the irrationality of keeping the “China card” when its strategic value had
disappeared with the demise of the Soviet Union.\footnote{I am grateful for Jim Mann for pointing Clinton’s position out to me. James Mann, interview by author, 1 July 1999, Washington, tape recording, Washington, D.C.}

In China, the President continues to coddle aging rulers with undisguised contempt for democracy, human rights, and the need to control the spread of dangerous technologies. Such forbearance on our part might have been justified during the Cold War as a strategic necessity, when China was a counterweight to Soviet power. But it makes not sense to play the China card now, when our opponents have thrown in their hand. ... I have called for greater American leadership to reinforce the powerful global movement toward democracy and market economies, as brave men and women fight for freedom in China and Haiti and South Africa. If we succeed, the world will be a safer place. The spread of free institutions will make foreign rulers accountable to their people and check tyranny and external aggression.\footnote{The speech was delivered at the Foreign Policy Association in New York on April 1, 1992. Bill Clinton, “A Strategy for Foreign Policy Assistance to Russia,” April 1, 1992, \textit{Vital Speeches of the Day}, Vol. LVIII, No. 14 (May 1992), p. 422. I would like to thank James Mann for pointing this speech to me.}

Accepting the nomination, at the Democratic National Convention in New York City in July 1992, Clinton promised “an America that will not coddle dictators from Baghdad to Beijing.”\footnote{Text of Bill Clinton’s speech to Democratic National Convention, July 16, 1992.} Clinton’s position on China was that in the absence of a strategic rationale, the United States should stop giving special treatment to China.

Clinton’s views of China were widely shared by certain foreign policy elites, Congressmen, and the public. For example, Winston Lord advocated a new foreign policy approach to China as early as December 1989. Lord argued that the Soviet factor should be weighed differently now that the Cold War was over. He stated that America’s “de facto alliance” with China was less important and that it was time to correct the double standard in human rights that had existed since the 1970s:

\begin{quote}
China posed no threat to the United States and proved helpful on many international issues while the Soviet Union was expanding its arsenals and engaging in adventurism. With many of these premises now overturned, it is time to shelve the double standard.\footnote{Text of Winston Lord’s speech to \textit{Washington Post}, December 19, 1989, p. A23.}\
\end{quote}
Increased U.S. criticism of China's human rights conditions was not a result of worsening of China's human rights practice per se, but of the disappearance of the strategic safety-net.

Much Congressional debate regarding China's most favored nation (MFN) status reflected this idea that it did not make sense to make exceptions for China when the United States no longer needed China's strategic cooperation. The debate reached its zenith in 1991-1992, rather than right after the Tiananmen Square incident. This again attests to the impact of the demise of the Soviet Union. Although criticisms of China's human rights abuse increased after the Tiananmen Square incident, no resolution was introduced to limit or condition China's MFN status in 1989. The United States never denied MFN status to China, but China's human rights conditions continued to dominate much of U.S. policy debate towards China in the 1990s.

Tibet is another example of unrestrained U.S. behavior after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The problem of Chinese maltreatment of Tibet had existed all through the 1980s, but it was only in 1994 that Congress introduced a bill establishing a Special Envoy to Tibet who

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203 President Bush extended China's MFN status on May 24, 1990, despite some opposition. This extension was the first after the Tiananmen Square incident.
205 Bush had granted MFN status to China on the eve of the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989.
would have the personal rank of an ambassador.²⁰⁷ Similar bills were introduced subsequently until the U.S. government appointed a “coordinator” for Tibet affairs in November 1997.²⁰⁸

China reacted strongly to the changes in U.S. attitude about human rights. U.S. sanctions on human rights grounds were seen to aid the “peaceful evolution (heping yenbian)” that China’s communist leaders feared would undermine their regime. The Chinese government began to see U.S. initiatives to improve human rights conditions around the world and the doctrine of “human rights over sovereign rights (renquan yu zhuquan)” as threatening to their regime.²⁰⁹ The Chinese government began to vigilantly track U.S. support for secessionist movements within China, especially in Tibet. China’s opposition to humanitarian intervention, in turn, made the United States to be skeptical about China’s intentions.²¹⁰

2. Change in Perceptions Without the “Strategic Safety-net”

In this section, I examine the proposition that the lack of strategic safety-net invites suspicion and makes actions that would otherwise appear innocuous seem aggressive.

²⁰⁷ The “Special Envoy for Tibet Act of 1994” (S. 2554) was introduced in the Senate on September 12, 1994. The bill was not discussed further. I would like to thank Richard Solomon for suggesting examination of this issue.


²⁰⁹ Usually “peaceful evolution (heping yenbian)” has a strong negative connotation in Chinese whereas in English it has a positive meaning. China began to see the U.S. humanitarian intervention as a potential threat, especially after the U.S. intervention in Yugoslavia and Kosovo. The accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by the United States in May 1999 heightened China’s suspicion.

²¹⁰ China’s negative reactions to U.S. efforts to spread democracy will be examined in detail in Chapter 5 on Democratic Peace Theory.
Changes in perception of military capabilities

The influence of the fraying of the strategic safety-net was most notable in United States’
perception of China’s military build up. As discussed in the previous sections, China started
the modernization of its military around 1985. The objective of the modernization was to build
a military that could wage a “people’s war under modern conditions.” The PLA was too
obsolete to fight an adversary with modern weapons outside China. The PLA’s strength was
size and thus made for attrition warfare inside its own territory. It lacked mobility and the
ability to carry out modern combined arms warfare. The modernization of the PLA did not cause
U.S. concern in the 1980s. On the contrary, the United States had encouraged and assisted
China’s military build up through arms transfers.

This changed in 1992. Without a Soviet threat, China’s military modernization was
perceived as an indication of China’s expansionist and aggressive intentions, possibly a prelude
to a war with the United States. The modernization of the PLA was reasonable, however,
given the military capability of other Pacific powers: the United States, Japan, South Korea and
Taiwan.

China’s increased defense spending went against the post-Cold War trend of disarmament.
Political elites worldwide expected defense spending to fall after the Cold War China’s deviation
from this trend heightened U.S suspicions.

The same logic applied to Chinese perceptions of U.S. and Japanese intentions. During
the 1980s, China saw these countries’ military spending as helpful. As Wang Jianwei and Wu
Xinbo observed,

Beijing’s attitudes (towards U.S. alliances with Japan and Korea) are often determined not
by the two alliances per se but rather by its perception of the sources of threat to its
security and whether these security alliances can alleviate or aggravate the threat.\textsuperscript{211}

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China’s skepticism of U.S. and Japanese intentions grew. Wang Jisi, a Chinese international relations scholar observed:

With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, an overarching rationale for the two countries to cooperate with each other is still lacking ... (and) some of the American actions ... have led the Chinese to question the sincerity of these vocalized American intentions. In particular, whether the United States really welcomes a stronger China under the current communist leadership is very doubtful.\textsuperscript{212}

The renewal of the U.S.-Japan security alliance also worried the Chinese.\textsuperscript{213} Chinese security specialists reasoned that the alliance, which once served China’s strategic interest, was an instrument to contain China. China criticized the alliance as a legacy of Cold War thinking and a cover for U.S. hegemony and Japanese expansion. China’s criticisms helped confirm U.S. fears about China’s aggressive intentions.

(2) Changes in Perception of Behavior

As I noted in Chapter 1, Chinese behavior that had once provoked little U.S. and Japanese response caused concern once the Cold War ended. One example is the change in U.S. interpretation of China’s territorial claims. China has territorial disputes with many of its neighbors. The Spratly Islands are claimed by China, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Taiwan.\textsuperscript{214} China and Japan contest the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Disputes and skirmishes over the Spratly islands had occurred since the 1980s. In 1988, the Chinese and

\textsuperscript{211} Wang and Wu, “Against Us or with Us?”, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{213} The U.S.-Japan alliance was redefined by “Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security” in April 1996 and “Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation” were renewed in September 1997 despite the disappearance of Soviet threat.
\textsuperscript{214} Brunei established an exclusive fishing zone that encompasses Louisa Reef in 1984, but it has not publicly claimed the island. CIA, \textit{The World Factbook}, “Spratly Islands,” http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pg.html
Vietnamese navies clashed at the Johnson Reef. The Chinese navy sank several Vietnamese boats, killing over 70 sailors. This incident received little attention in the United States or in Japan, and did not lead to “China threat” arguments. Also during the negotiations about the continued presence of the U.S. forces in the Philippines from 1989 to 1991, neither state showed much concern about the potential threat from China.\(^{215}\) U.S. officials conceded in September 1990 that bases in the Philippines were not as important as they used to be.\(^{216}\) The Pentagon recommended abandoning Clark Air Base in 1991.\(^{217}\) David Newsom, a former undersecretary of state observed in October 1992 that the closing of the Subic Bay Naval Base “went virtually without notice,” which resulted from “a general belief that the Cold War had removed the principal rationale for such bases; the Philippines was now less important.”\(^{218}\)

In February 1992, the Chinese government passed a Law on Territorial Waters. The law claimed 80% of the South China Sea and the East China Sea as China’s territorial sea, much of which was contested by other countries.\(^{219}\) The law brought concern from neighboring

\(^{215}\) Richard Solomon, then Ambassador to Manila, noted that there was apprehension in the Philippines about China, but Philippine nationalism outweighed it. Richard Solomon, interview by author, 23 September 1999, Washington, tape recording, Washington, D.C.

\(^{216}\) One official was quoted as saying, “The world is changing. ... Those bases are not as valuable as they used to be.” Keith Richburg, “U.S. to Start Phasing Out Military Bases in Philippines,” The Washington Post, September 14, 1990, p. A1.

\(^{217}\) “Pentagon to Support Closing of Clark Air Base,” USA Today, July 17, 1991, p. 4A. Mount Pinatubo erupted in June 1991, disabling Clark Air Base. DoD considered it was too costly to refurbish the base given its decreased importance. In October 1991, the Philippine Senate endorsed a three-year pull-out plan and in September 1992 rejected the new treaty which would have allowed the United States to stay for ten years.


\(^{219}\) The law was a domestic law accompanying the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, which regulates Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) for each member state. The Convention was signed in 1982. The Convention established a seabed authority, headquartered in Jamaica, responsible for working out acceptable procedures for exploiting the mineral resources of the seabed. The Law establishes 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for each country. Thus, originally, the EEZs were put in place to protect the marine life from unregulated development. Each member country was to be responsible for the economic activities within their territorial waters. But the definition of territorial waters and the establishment of EEZs rekindled many territorial disputes. According to China’s claim, 3 million square kilometers (km\(^2\)) out of 4.7 million km\(^2\) of the South and East China seas would be Chinese.
countries including Japan and the ASEAN countries, but U.S. reaction remained muted. 220

The February 1995 report of China's construction of a building on the Mischief Reef, however, led to an increase of "China threat" arguments in the United States. U.S. security analysts viewed the Mischief Reef construction as indicative of China's expansionism. The construction was seen as "the first time in decades that the Chinese have directly challenged the territorial claims of its non-Communist neighbors in Southeast Asia." 221 Some analysts saw China's activities in the Spratly Islands as a result of a power vacuum created by the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines. Arguments were made that the Spratly islands were located near several primary shipping lanes, and the occupation of the islands by China threatened U.S. interests. Reports claimed that the U.S. military began training Philippine naval commandos after the Mischief Reef incident and that "Washington committed itself to using American military force, if necessary, to keep international shipping lanes open in the South China Sea." 222 Arguments were also made for maintaining a U.S. forward military presence in the region. 223 In 1994 and 1995, it was reported that the U.S. Naval War College ran a series of war games simulating a conflict set in 2010 with China over the South China Sea. In each case, China defeated U.S. forces by using new military technologies. 224 The fact that the war games were set in the South China Sea demonstrates the U.S. military's concern by

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220 The Territorial Waters Law went almost unnoticed in the United States. Noboru Yamaguchi, a Major General of the Japan Ground Self Defense Force, recalled that in 1992 the U.S. officers were little concerned by China's Navy at this time. Noboru Yamaguchi, interview by author, Washington, 16 June 1999. Yamaguchi was Defense Attaché to the United States at the time of the interview.


223 By 1997, senators in the Philippines were demanding U.S. forces to make frequent port-calls at Subic Bay to counter China's "growing assertiveness in disputed areas in the South China Sea." Luz Baguio, "Ramos Urged to Up US Presence to Counter China," The Strait Times, May 29, 1997, p. 29.

1994-95 about China’s activities in this region.\footnote{225}{The fact that conflicts between Vietnam and China were seen as disagreements between the communist states, seems insufficient to explain the difference of reaction to the Mischief Reef construction in 1995 and killing of 70 Vietnamese sailors in 1988.}

China’s alleged espionage of nuclear weapons technology is another example of the change in the U.S. perceptions. When news of the espionage was first reported in November 1990, there was almost no reaction among the policy makers and public. But in 1999, similar cases of espionage led to an investigation by a bipartisan committee (the Cox Committee) and sparked nation-wide concern and growing perception of China’s aggressive intentions against the United States. Edward Timperlake and William Triplett II observed in 1999 that:

The Cox Report was a stunning document. It made headlines across the country and dominated television and radio news programs. For the first time, many Americans began to consider that Communist China — armed with nuclear weapons — might target the United States.\footnote{226}{Edward Timperlake and William Triplett II, \textit{Red Dragon Rising: Communist China’s Military Threat to America} (Washington, DC: Regency Publishing, 1999), p. 12.}

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is another example. China was, on the whole, more cooperative with proliferation controls in the 1990s than in earlier decades. During the Cold War, China had been an outsider to most international arms control initiatives. China never signed the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and only became a member of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984.\footnote{227}{Jones and McDonaugh, \textit{Tracking Nuclear Proliferation}, p. 55.} The United States had regarded China’s proliferation of WMD and related delivery systems (for example, missiles) as a problem since the mid-1980s.\footnote{228}{For example, in response to China’s weapons transfer of Silkworm missiles to Iran, the U.S. government suspended the liberalization of controls on advanced technology exports to China in October 1987. \textit{New York Times}, October 23, 1987, pp. A1, A9. Cited in Harding, Ibid., p. 187. In September 1988, the Chinese government told Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci during his visit to Beijing that China would stop missile transfers to the Middle East.} However, U.S. response was restrained during this period.

In 1992, China acceded to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and agreed to abide by the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In October 1994, China
reaffirmed its commitment to abide by the MTCR Guidelines and agreed not to export ballistic missiles in exchange for the United States agreeing to lift the sanctions it imposed in August 1993 for China's transfer of M-11 related equipment to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{229} On the North Korean nuclear weapons program, China was supportive of U.S. position and endorsed the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework.\textsuperscript{230} DoD observed in 1996 that "since mid-1991, China has shifted from avoidance to participation in international arms control regimes."\textsuperscript{231}

Nevertheless, the United States perceived China's proliferation as a growing problem in the 1990s. Robert Sutter, a researcher at the Congressional Research Service for more than twenty years, observed in 1996 that China had a long-standing record of proliferating sensitive material for profit, but the United States restrained its response:

In the past, U.S. and other western-aligned international observers tended to play down the consequences of these Chinese actions. They appeared more interested in sustaining a broadly cooperative relationship with Beijing in the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{232}

U.S. officials largely believed that China was easier to manage when it was dependent on the United States during the Cold War. For example, Winston Lord, former U.S. Ambassador to Beijing (November 1985-April 1989), noted that he could use "a combination of carrots and sticks" to induce China's cooperation. He remembered how he was able to reach an agreement with the Chinese by offering them dual-use technology in exchange for suspending missile

\textsuperscript{229} Some argue that the initial transfer of M-11 missiles to Pakistan was provoked by U.S. arms sales of F-16 fighters to Taiwan.
\textsuperscript{230} Ibid.
proliferation.  

These examples show that U.S. perceptions of China changed between the late-1980s and 1999, especially from 1992 and 1995. China's behavior did not change enough to warrant the difference in U.S. perceptions. Similar behavior was interpreted as having different intentions. These examples show that the biggest source of difference was the disappearance of the Soviet threat.

3. The Strategic Safety-net and "Japan Threat" Arguments

The United States and Japan were allies during the Cold War. The theory predicts that the safety-net will begin to fray after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and both countries will engage in self-interested behavior. Without the safety-net, the United States should view Japan's behavior and intentions with suspicion, and vice versa.

During the Cold War, many in the United States viewed the alliance as a safety-net against Japanese aggression. Richard Armitage, then Assistant Secretary of Defense, stated in the above mentioned congressional testimony of June 1984 that the alliance assured that Japan would not pursue a path to militarism. A 1986 research report published by the National War College laid out concerns about a more independent Japanese military.

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It is clearly essential to US regional and world-wide interests that Japan’s military power develops within the context of the US-Japan relationship and the Mutual Security Treaty. This will ... Maintain the political benefit of Japan’s dependence on the US for strategic protection. A Japan that develops its defense policies outside the context of the US-Japan relationship would not only be a source of concern to its neighbors, but would almost certainly be more politically independent of the US and probably economically more intractable.\(^{236}\)

The United States saw the alliance as a “cork in the bottle” restraining Japan’s rearrestment and aggressive behavior. For example, in 1990, Major General Henry C. Stackpole III, commander of Marine Corps Bases in Japan said in an interview with the *Washington Post* that Japan would beef up “what is already a very, very potent military” if U.S. forces withdrew. General Stackpole stated that “No one wants a rearmed, resurgent Japan... So we are a cap in the bottle, if you will.”\(^{237}\) The underlying concern was that Japan might become a threat without the alliance.

“Japan threat” arguments emerged in the United States in the late-1980s. Threat arguments about Japan were almost exclusively economic and technological. Militarily, Japan was not viewed as a threat. This was reflected in the amicable relations between the DoD and the JDA, and close ties between the respective services. The Japanese military was well-integrated with the U.S. forces. The Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMDSF) routinely exercised and carried out operations with the U.S. navy. Through integration and weapons transfers, the United States could control Japan’s military. The basic concept underlying Japan’s weapons procurement and force structure was to “effectively counter any limited and small-scale aggression” of Soviet forces until the U.S. forces came to Japan’s defense.\(^{238}\)

\(^{236}\) Deming and Lawless, pp. 35-36.
The behavior of both Japan and the United States became less restrained after the Cold War. Support for the alliance decreased and the bilateral relations deteriorated as both countries pursued their own economic interests. In 1992, many security specialists in the United States saw Japan as a potential threat to the United States.

The case of the United States and Japan confirms the influence of strategic safety-net. Its relevance in this case is less evident because the strategic safety-net never completely disappeared. Japan continued to depend on the United States for its national security, relying on arms sales, offensive strike capability and nuclear deterrence. The United States was dependent on Japan for bases in Asia.

4. Summary: Realist Explanations of Intentions

(1) Change in Behavior

This case supports the proposition that “China threat” arguments emerged because the collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States and China with less reason to restrain self-interested behavior. The two states were less accommodating of each other’s interests. The change in behavior was more visible on the U.S. side. This is in keeping with the theory. The United States had less to lose from the deterioration of the relationship.\(^{239}\) China was not dependent on the United States for its survival, but still needed the United States for technology transfers, and in a paradoxical way, for preventing Taiwan’s independence. China’s aggressive behavior seemed to have resulted from changes in U.S. behavior regarding Taiwan in particular.

\(^{239}\) A Chinese scholar observed in 2002 that China needs the United States all the time but the United States only needs China sometimes.
(2) Change in Interpretation

The absence of the Soviet Union and hence strategic safety-net seems to have strongly affected the U.S. interpretation of China’s activities and vice versa. The United States interpreted China’s behavior quite differently with and without the safety-net. China’s military buildup, once viewed as beneficial to the United States, was perceived as indicative of China’s aggressive intentions. Disputed territorial claims and nuclear technology espionage, which went almost unnoticed during the 1980s and the early-1990s, became evidence of China’s aggressive intentions. China, for its part, viewed the continuation of U.S.-Japan alliance and its redefinition in 1996 as an indication of U.S. aggressive intentions against China.

V. REALIST ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE BEHAVIOR OF GROUPS

Hypothesis R6: Groups tasked with national security will be first to react to the emergence of a new threat.

Predictions based on Hypothesis R6.

(1) Security specialists will make “China threat” arguments earlier than others.

(2) Primacists will be among the earliest and strongest advocates of “China threat” arguments.

(3) Security specialists in the United States will try to maintain primacy.

(4) Other groups, such as human rights groups will make “China threat” arguments after the security specialists.

Hypothesis R7: Groups working on non-security issues related to China will gain more power and influence in domestic politics after the end of a war (the disappearance of a strategic safety-net).

Prediction based on Hypothesis R7.

(1) The activities of human rights groups will gain more support and influence after the end of the Cold War.
Realism predicts that national security specialists will be among the first to perceive China as a threat and make “China threat” arguments. The 1988 Presidential Committee report was the first report to perceive a potential threat from China. The Office of Net Assessment saw China as a threat and began to make “China threat” arguments around 1993. Other security specialists also began to make “China threat” arguments in 1993 and especially after 1995.

Realism predicts that human rights groups will not be among the first to make “China threat” arguments, but that their influence will increase after the end of the Cold War as the strategic safety-net disappears. The empirical evidence supports this point. Human rights groups did not make direct “China threat” arguments, but they did gain support in domestic politics in the early-1990s. Human rights conditions in China became a contentious issue between the United States and China and created an environment where “China threat” arguments were more easily accepted.

Realism predicts that there would be little variance in threat perception and threat arguments among security specialists because the parochial interest of organizations or predispositions would not affect threat perceptions. However, this was not the case. Security specialists from conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation and American Enterprise Institute made strong “China threat” arguments, while more liberal think tanks like the Brookings Institute made less of the China threat. Within DoD, OSD was active in making “China threat” arguments whereas the military services, especially the army, made few “China threat” arguments. As we saw in the section on U.S. primacy and “China threat” arguments, those that supported the primacy strategy tended to make “China threat” arguments. Different groups’ approaches to China are examined in the next chapter on organization theory.
VI. CONCLUSION

1. Scoring Sheet

The following is a summary of how the realist hypotheses fared.

(1) Relative Power (Aggregate Power): The hypothesis about relative power was well supported in the case.

The United States sought to maintain its primacy after the collapse of the Soviet Union and viewed and saw potential challengers to its primacy as threats. This hypothesis was not only confirmed in the China case but in the case of U.S. threat arguments about states like Japan and Germany in the late-1980s to the early-1990s.

(2) Capability to Harm (Aggregate Power): The proposition about the absolute amount of power was only weakly confirmed.

China’s power was growing in absolute terms but was still small compared to the United States and other major powers such as Japan and Germany when the “China threat” arguments emerged in 1992.

(3) Military Power — Offensive Capability: This hypothesis was only weakly confirmed.

China’s military capability was growing fast but started from a very low base. In the mid-1980s, China deployed ICBMs (Dongfeng-5: DF-5) and acquired offensive capability that could inflict large-scale damage to the United States. There was no significant change in China’s offensive capability against the United States in the 1990s. China had acquired modern weapons from Russia in the 1990s but none seriously enhanced China’s ability to damage the U.S. vital interests. The newly acquired weapons from Russia mainly increased China’s capability to battle U.S. forces if they intervened in the conflict between China and Taiwan.

(4) Perception of Intention based on Behavior: The hypothesis that the perception of aggressive intentions would result from changes in behavior after the fraying of the strategic safety-net was well-supported by empirical evidence.

China and U.S. behavior became more damaging to each other’s interests with the collapse of the Soviet Union. China reacted negatively to changes in U.S. behavior, and this reaction was seen in the United States to show aggressive intentions. Former U.S. government officials confirmed that the demise of the Soviet Union had this effect on relations.

(5) Changes in Perception of Intention due to changes in the Distribution of Power: This hypothesis was strongly confirmed by empirical data.

The United States interpreted China’s power differently without the strategic safety-net.
Similar events caused different interpretations of China's intentions. China also perceived U.S. intentions differently without the safety-net.

(6) Groups: The case seems to confirm the hypothesis about groups. However, this case alone is indeterminate on this point because the study has not yet examined whether or not other explanations about groups (organization theory and democratic peace theory) fair better.

National security specialists were the first to make “China threat” arguments. Those who supported the primacy strategy were the driving factor behind the rise of “China threat” arguments. Advocacy groups, such as human rights groups, also paid increased attention to China after the Cold War. This seems to have been the result of the fraying of the strategic safety-net.

2. Realist Explanation for the Rise of “China threat” Arguments

The rise of “China threat” arguments occurred in the United States because China’s economic and military power grew quickly. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of Japan’s economy, combined with China’s economic growth, made China the only major power to be narrowing the gap with the United States. As predicted by realism, “China threat” arguments began when China showed the potential to challenge U.S. primacy. By then, both Russia and Japan had ceased to challenge the U.S. position.

Structural realism and offensive realism posit that a state in the top position will seek to maintain its primacy and see challengers as threats. The United States was the only superpower remaining after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We should then see the United States make threat arguments about the next most powerful state.

This cause and effect relationship was present in the case. The United States sought to maintain primacy and viewed first Japan (and Germany) and then China as threats. Threat arguments in the United States were sensitive to changes in states’ relative power. “China threat” arguments emerged in U.S. security discourse after 1992 when China was the only major power increasing its power relative to the United States.
Growth trends were important in affecting threat arguments. Once a country stopped narrowing the gap between itself and the United States, threat arguments disappeared. Many “China threat” arguments talked about China’s power in 20 years. It was conceivable that during the 20 years, China’s growth could slow, Russia or Japan could recover, or another power could emerge. But uncertainty about whether China’s growth would continue did not affect threat arguments.

An increase in offensive capability also led to the perception of threat. China’s increased defense spending and its modernization of its conventional forces contributed to the rise of “China threat” arguments in the early-1990s.

Realism also provided explanations for the perception of intentions. Relative power strongly affected behavior and the perception of intentions. The behavior of China, the United States, and Japan became less restrained with the disappearance of the common enemy, the Soviet Union. Statements from several former U.S. government officials pointed to the importance of the Soviet threat during the Cold War in driving cooperation between the United States and China. As the Soviet threat began to decline in the mid-1980s, the two states behavior vis-à-vis each other became more self-interested. Changes in behavior invited suspicion about China’s intentions and sometimes led to perception of aggressive intention. China also reacted negatively to the changed behavior of the United States, and the United States saw this reaction evidence of China’s aggressive intentions.

Without the strategic safety-net, the United States lost the guarantee of China’s benign intentions. The disappearance of the Soviet Union brought expectations that China’s military spending would fall. Instead it allowed China to reorient its forces. Rapid economic growth

\[240\] Many studies discuss the difficulties China faces in sustaining its growth. Among these difficulties are problems with the banking system, unemployment, the aging population, and social instability.
and renewed arms sales from Russia aided this reinvestment. This resulted in the U.S.
perception that China had aggressive intentions against other powers.

The increased suspicion combined with less restrained behavior to heighten the perception
of aggressive intentions. An examination of a correlation between “China threat” arguments
and China’s behavior showed that similar behavior was interpreted as having aggressive
intention after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Aggressive behavior alone was not
sufficient to induce “China threat” arguments. A change in distribution of power in the
international system was necessary to generate threat perception.

Realism predicts that security specialists would be among the first to make “China threat”
arguments. Realism also predicts that among security specialists, there would not be variance
because organizational interests do not affect threat perception. Realism predicts that other
groups that do not specialize in security, such as human rights groups or democracy advocacy
groups, would not make “China threat” arguments first.

This prediction was confirmed. Among domestic actors, security specialists tasked with
long-term strategy, such as those working for the ONA, were the first to realize China’s
potential as a challenger and make “China threat” arguments. They reacted most sensitively to
China’s rise in the 1990s. Those who supported the primacy strategy based on a
preponderance of U.S. power especially made “China threat” arguments.

This case did not fully confirm the lack of variance in “China threat” arguments among
security specialists. Some groups and individuals were certain of China’s threat to U.S.
security while others contended that there was no threat. However, “China threat” arguments
did gain greater currency among the U.S. security elite over time. It is possible that a time lag
among the groups and not a variance based on different interests or ideology explains the
difference in threat arguments. An examination only based on the realist perspective cannot solve the issue.

The case did not support the expected correlation between the absolute level of China’s power and the rise of “China threat” arguments. Realism predicts that the United States would make “China threat” arguments when China’s offensive capability became sufficient to harm vital U.S. interests. But China’s lacked this capability when “China threat” arguments occurred. Two-hundred modern fighters and six diesel submarines and a destroyer are not an offensive capability sufficient to constitute a threat to the United States. China’s nuclear forces were often viewed as a source of threat, but their numbers were small compared with the Russian arsenal. It is doubtful that China’s 10 to 20 ICBMs provide a deterrent capability against the United States. Realism argues that the United States should have been more worried about Russia’s intentions changing than China acquiring a greater capability. But the United States was more concerned about China’s small nuclear force than Russia’s far larger one.

The case suggests that power trends have greater effect on states’ perceptions than absolute power. This tendency was also seen in U.S. reactions to Japan. “Japan threat” arguments occurred in the late-1980s to the early-1990s, when Japan lacked offensive capability. It did not possess nuclear weapons or power projection capability such as long-range bombers, offensive missiles, aircraft carriers or nuclear submarines. And yet, people identified Japan as a future threat given its economic potential. These arguments appear far-fetched in retrospect but were seriously made by security and foreign policy specialists.

The strong influence of trends suggests two things. One is that states take a long-term approach in assessing threats. Realism tells us that dominant states will not wait for potential
challengers to grow powerful enough to challenge them, but will try to minimize dangers at an earlier stage. Second, this tendency may be inherent in defense organizations. Les Aspin observed this tendency in the U.S. defense establishment in the 1970s. He noted that DoD uses comparative growth trends as parts of arguments to gain support for a large defense budget, without asking how much force is sufficient. If the motive for arguing that a growing state is a threat comes from defending organizational size and wealth, then the outcome is consistent with organizational theory not realism.

3. Test on Unipolarity

In the process of explaining the emergence of “China threat” arguments, I have deduced how a transition from a bipolar to a unipolar power constellation would affect the unipolar power and the second tier states and their relationship with the unipolar power. I inferred from structural realism that the unipolar power (the United States) would seek to maintain its primacy and prevent the rise of a second tier state (first Japan and then China) to challenge it and emerge as the other pole.

The case confirmed the plausibility of these deductions fairly strongly. After the disappearance of the other pole (the Soviet Union) the United States shifted its strategy to prevent the emergence of a challenger to its primacy. Without the other pole, the relationship among the countries in the former western bloc deteriorated. The United States saw the second tier states as its potential challenger. The second tier states in turn saw the United States as a threat without the other pole checking it. Despite the preponderance of power, however, the influence of the United States to affect the behavior of the second tier states waned as the strategic value of the United States decreased as a provider of security. The United States was
less able to control the behavior of the second tier states and increasingly saw them as harboring aggressive intentions.
INTRODUCTION TO CHAPTERS 4 AND 5

In the next two chapters, I examine the roles various organizations played in the rise of "China threat" arguments. A similar set of organizations are examined in both chapters. In Chapter 4, I study whether or not the organizations' behavior and arguments were driven by their organizational interests and organizational patterns of behavior. The explanations tested here are derived from organization theory. In Chapter 5, I examine whether or not the organization's behavior and arguments were shaped by their ideology of liberal democracy and by the illiberal and undemocratic nature of China. The explanations tested in Chapter 5 are derived from democratic peace theory. Because they examine a similar set of organizations, the two chapters overlap. I am aware of the redundancy but repeat the examination in the interest of clarifying the argument and determining what causal logic best explains the rise of "China threat" arguments.

The groups examined in the two chapters consist of those likely to have had a vested interest in making "China threat" arguments, those that were active in making "China threat" arguments, and those active in promoting democratic values. The groups are: (1) Foreign Policy-Security elites: (a) The Department of Defense, the Office of Secretary of Defense, and the Office of Net Assessment in particular; (b) The Military services; (c) Think tanks and Scholars; (d) The “Blue Team” made up of security specialists and congressional staff with strong anti-China positions; (2) Advocacy groups: (a) Anti-Communist Groups;
(b) Conservative Political Groups; (c) Conservative Religious Groups; (d) Human Rights Groups; (e) Pro-democracy Groups; (f) Organized Labor. In Chapter 5, I examine the (a) Mass Media; and (b) General Public.

I. THE ORGANIZATIONAL EXPLANATION FOR “CHINA THREAT” ARGUMENTS

I first review organization theory and how it relates to the rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States. The hypotheses and predictions for the “China threat” case from each hypothesis follow:

Hypothesis O-1: Organizations seek survival and try to maintain size and wealth.

(1) Organizations seek to keep resources coming into the organization. They perceive new threats when existing threats disappear because organizational interests cannot be served without an alternative threat.

(2) All things being equal, organizations will perceive and advance threats that promote their organizational interests rather than threats that might undermine them.

Predictions based on hypothesis O-1:

(P1) Organizations that planned for the Soviet threat will argue that other threats exist after the Soviet threat disappears

(P2) Organizations will make “China threat” arguments once it becomes clear that other threat arguments no longer ensure the size and wealth of the organization.

Hypothesis O-2: Organizations seek a target to enhance internal organization, minimizing internal uncertainty.

(3) Organizations need targets to organize themselves internally. When an existing target (threat) disappears, they seek a new threat to reduce uncertainty and to make carrying out tasks easier.

(4) Organizations try to minimize change in their organization when they search for new threats. Organization use new threats to retain existing programs even when the environment has changed.
Predictions based on hypothesis O-2:

(P3) Organizations will start to make “China threat” arguments when internal cohesion has begun to decrease after the Soviet threat disappears.

(P4) Organizations will advocate threats in this order (a) resurgence of the old threat, (b) emergence of a new but similar threat, and (c) emergence of an entirely new threat.

This chapter explores whether or not organizational interests and traits caused the rise of “China threat” arguments. I first look at the defense policy community, including the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) and the military services. I then look at nongovernmental groups that were active in advancing “China threat” arguments.

II. THE SITUATION IN THE 1990s

Before examining the behavior and arguments of different groups in detail, I briefly review some of the events that occurred in the early to mid 1990s that affected the domestic actors.

William Clinton was elected President in November 1992 and assumed presidency in January 1993. Democrats had been the majority party in both houses since 1954 when Republicans regained the majority in both houses in 1994. In the 1996 Presidential election, Clinton defeated Senator Bob (Robert) Dole.

The Clinton administration placed a strong emphasis on the economy. Health care reform was one of the foci of political debates in the first years of the Clinton administration. The annual review of China’s most favored nation (MFN) status was another. In May 1993, President Clinton linked improvements in human rights in China to China’s 1994 MFN

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1 MFN trading status was first granted to China on February 1, 1980, and has been extended annually ever since. Annual extensions of MFN are granted based on a Presidential determination and a report to Congress that the waiver authority will promote the freedom of emigration objectives of the Trade Act of 1974. The annual Presidential waiver authority expires on July 3 each year. The renewal procedure requires that the President submit to Congress a recommendation for a 12-month extension by no later than June 3. This means that groups had an annual opportunity to present their views on the matter.
Clinton delinked China’s MFN status and human rights the following year. In December 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the same time President George W. Bush gave China permanent normal trading relations (PNTR) status. This ended the annual MFN renewal and debate.

In March 1996, China fired missiles near Taiwan. This occurred during a military exercise. However, the launch was widely seen as an effort to intimidate the voters in Taiwan’s first presidential election. The United States sent two carrier battle groups to the sea near Taiwan (not to the Strait itself). This was referred to as the Taiwan Straits Crisis. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of May 1997, a strategy document published every four year by the U.S. Department of Defense, named China as a future global peer competitor for the first time.

In February 1997, the Washington Post reported on a campaign finance scandal. A Justice Department investigation revealed illegal attempts by the Chinese government to funnel contributions to the Democratic national committee before the 1996 presidential election. In spring 1997, the Project for New American Century (PNAC) was formed.

III. DEFENSE POLICY COMMUNITY

1. Predictions for Military Organizations

Organization theory makes a number of predictions about how military organizations will make “China threat” arguments.

(1) OSD and the military services will make “China threat” arguments after the Soviet

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2 In Presidential Determination 92-23, President Clinton recommended renewal of extend China’s MFN status for another year. But at the same time, in Executive Order 12850, the President said that human rights would be a criteria used in considering the MFN renewal.

3 In July 1998, legislation was passed replacing the term “most favored nation” with the term “normal trade relations.”
threat has disappeared and when it has become difficult to sustain organizational size and wealth without a new threat.

(2) The U.S. military organizations will each advance threat arguments that justify their favorite programs.

(3) The U.S. military organizations will first argue that the Soviet/Russia threat is still formidable, then argue that Soviet/Russia threat may reemerge, and then make mini-Soviet threat arguments (threats that involve ground forces, air forces, submarine forces and nuclear forces).

(4) The U.S. military organizations will make “China threat” arguments when other threats have failed to provide reasons to sustain and expand defense budgets and programs.

(5) All things being equal, the U.S. military organizations will make threat arguments about states with increasing power because these threats are more likely to ensure growing budgets.

2. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

(1) The OSD

The threat arguments of OSD conform to these predictions. In official documents and public statements, OSD began to make “China threat” arguments only when the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was published in May 1997. By then, the OSD had exhausted other threat arguments including the resurgent Soviet/Russian threat and then regional threats like Iraq and North Korea.

After the Cold War, OSD argued that the Soviet threat was still strong. After the December 1989 meeting between George H.W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta, most observers concluded that the Cold War had ended. However, DoD officials continued to consider the Soviet Union a threat.

DoD’s assessments were in general more pessimistic than assessments of those outside of the DoD, including the CIA. For example, in March 1990, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and William Webster, the Director of Central Intelligence, offered opposite assessments of the
Soviet threat. Cheney argued that the Soviets “retain enormous military capabilities (which are) getting stronger in the one area that is most dangerous to the United States - strategic nuclear warheads,” and that future Soviet leadership “could reverse military course decisively.”\(^4\) Webster, on the other hand, told the House Armed Services Committee that “the changes are probably already irreversible in several critical respects, (offering) little chance that Soviet hegemony could be restored in Eastern Europe.”\(^5\) Cheney did not say that the CIA’s assessment was wrong, but nevertheless criticized Webster for revealing a contradictory assessment, which made getting congressional approval of the defense budget more difficult.\(^6\) Cheney argued that his job as defense secretary “imposes some ... requirements on me” to take a darker view of Soviet intentions and “make certain we preserve our military capability.”\(^7\)

Under Secretary of Defense for policy, Paul Wolfowitz testified before the Senate Armed Services committee in April 1990, that there had been:

> Relatively little or almost no change in the Soviet threat in the Far East... and the welcome trends we have seen in Europe have not transformed the security situation in Asia as dramatically as they have transformed the European landscape.\(^8\)

The Soviet Union began to collapse in August 1991, and in December 1991 the eleven republics of the Soviet Union formally reconstituted themselves as the Commonwealth of Independent States and Gorbachev resigned as President of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not bring euphoria in the U.S. defense establishment. Many security and

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6 Tyler, “Cheney Finds CIA Director Is No Comrade in Arms.”

7 Cheney quoted in Tyler, “Cheney Finds CIA Director Is No Comrade in Arms.”

military specialists stated their disillusionment at absence of threat. Although some still warned of a resurgent Soviet threat, the organizations funded to meet the threat were becoming harder to justify.

Security specialists outside DoD called for a fundamental reassessment of military budget. For example, Representative Les Aspin, chairman of the Armed Services Committee argued:

For all my lifetime, the driving force for everything has been the Soviet threat. ... Now that it has gone away, we are cut loose from a lot of our certainties, and we must ask ourselves first-principles questions which haven’t been asked in 40 to 50 years.9

However, DoD assessments were still shaped by “old habits and minds.”10 DoD’s thinking around this time is summarized by a statement by a former Defense Secretary Harold Brown, who served in the Carter administration. Brown noted: “It can’t be a clean sheet of paper. You have an immense capital investment, and you can’t throw it away.”11 This statement suggests that there was a tendency within OSD to maintain force structure and programs. DoD warned against a hasty reduction of the forces. The annual report of 1990 argued:

any reductions must be managed with great care. Even if the Soviet threat recedes permanently — and it has certainly not yet done so — American power will still be required to meet other contingencies and obligations worldwide ... It is important, ... not to initiate premature 1992-97 budget cuts in 1991.12

One justification for opposing the reduction of forces used in the early 1990s was to claim “uncertainty” as a threat.13 The 1990 National Security Strategy described a world of

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11 Harold Brown, quoted in Tyler, “While Fears of Big War Fades”.
opportunities and uncertainties.” It argued in 1991 that “The obstacles and uncertainties before us are quite real.” The 1992 DoD annual report noted that “the years ahead still pose significant uncertainties.” It argued that existing alliances such as the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S.-ROK alliance were necessary to manage an uncertain world.

When the time came to form the first defense budget after the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, uncertainty was not sufficient. Demands for a more concrete threat were raised within the OSD and the services. The military needed something for which to plan. Also, defense programs needed justification. To alleviate confusion, Under Secretary for policy, Paul Wolfowitz, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in August 1991 to assist the DoD’s civilian leaders in developing detailed scenarios for potential foreign conflicts. The scenarios, issued by the OSD in February 1992, were intended to help structure the services pending spending plans for the 1994-1999 budget years.

The “seven scenarios” were developed by a working group drawn from the Joint Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and OSD. The scenarios drafted by a special group of military officers working under Admiral David Jeremiah, the vice chairman of the JCS. So, although OSD initiated the creation of the scenarios, their content was much influenced by the JCS and their preference for maintaining the existing forces. Only the seventh scenario envisioned a future adversary.

The seventh scenario called for a strategy to deter the re-emergence of a global

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15 The obstacles were “trade disputes and burden sharing debates among the industrial democracies and the turmoil and dangers in the developing world.”
"adversarial rival" or "international coalition with an aggressive expansionist security policy."
The documents argued that United States should maintain a “technological” and “doctrinal edge” and a credible capability to expand military forces.19 This scenario was based on the possibility that by the year 2001, “a single nation or a coalition of nations” would emerge “to adopt an adversarial security strategy and develop a military capability to threaten U.S. interests through global military competition.”20 The “adversarial rival,” referred to as an R.E.G.T., or “resurgent/emergent global threat,” was generally believed to be a euphemism for a resurgent Russia, and not China.21

The seven scenarios were included in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for fiscal years 1994-1999. As discussed in the last chapter, the February 1992 draft of the DPG said that the U.S. political and military mission was to maintain U.S. primacy.22 This DPG was the first since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the last of the first Bush administration. The wording of the final version was modified because it was thought that the draft was too unilateral. This indicates that in 1992, the idea of maintaining primacy did not have much support from the security and foreign policy community. But primacy gained support during the decade.

DoD’s annual reports showed little concern about China in the early-1990s. The 1994

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20 Tyler, “Seven Hypothetical Conflicts.”
The report was the first report under the Clinton administration and its first secretary of defense, Les Aspin. The report focused on regional threats and nuclear proliferation. It clearly stated that the Soviet threat had disappeared. China was not mentioned in the report. The 1996 report emphasized the importance of an engagement policy towards China. China was mentioned, but the only concerns raised were its nuclear forces and role as a supplier of nuclear material.23

Strategy reports assessed China similarly. In the 1990 East Asia Strategy Report, China was said to be a nation that did not pose a major military threat.24 The 1992 Strategy for East Asia noted China’s large and increasing power, but the Bottom-Up Review of 1993 did not mention China. The 1995 East Asia Strategy, also known as the Nye Report, showed a slightly more concern about China’s military buildup and expressed fears that a security dilemma might develop in East Asia. It noted that “China’s military modernization effort is in an early stage” but nevertheless cautioned that “its long-term goals are unclear.”25

The idea of China as a potential “global peer competitor” of the United States was first expressed in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).26 The main difference from the previous Bottom-Up Review was that the QDR emphasized the need to prepare for the future.

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23 For example, the 1996 annual defense report says, “China is growing militarily and economically and has the potential to make major increases in the size and capability of its strategic nuclear arsenal during the next decade.” William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, March 1996, p. 213. In the 1997 report, the wording remained almost the same, but there was a reference to the implications China’s growth had for the United States. “China is growing militarily and economically and has the potential to make major increases in the size and capability of its strategic nuclear arsenal in the near future. Hence, while the threat of massive nuclear attack on the United States is lower than it was during the Cold War, there is still a valid need to maintain substantial strategic nuclear forces.” William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, April 1997, p. 207.

24 The report noted the regression China made after the Tiananmen Incident. “China went through a decade of opening to the West and economic reform which showed tremendous promise, only to retreat to repressive measures to sustain the regime, even at the expense of the entire nation’s development. However, China continues to place military modernization at the bottom of its list of four ‘modernization’s’ and thus its posture does not currently present a major military threat.” East Asia Strategy, 1995, p. 15.

The QDR tried to identify long-term threats and problems facing the United States:

The QDR has also placed much greater emphasis on the need to prepare now for the future, in which hostile and potentially hostile states will acquire new capabilities.\textsuperscript{27}

The QDR marked a departure from force planning based on regional threats. The Review abandoned the idea that the appropriate force structure should be based on the capabilities of Iraq, Iran or North Korea:

Between now and 2015, it is reasonable to assume that more than one aspiring regional power will have both the desire and the means to challenge U.S. interest militarily.\textsuperscript{28}

China has the potential to become a major military power in Asia. The United States will continue to engage China, seeking to foster cooperation in areas where our interests overlap and influence it to make a positive contribution to regional stability and act as a responsible member of the international community. China is likely to continue to face a number of internal challenges, including the further development of its economic infrastructure and the tension between a modern market economy and authoritarian political system that may slow the pace of its military modernization. Moreover, China's efforts to modernize its forces and improve its power-projection capabilities will not go unnoticed, likely spurring concerns from others in the region.\textsuperscript{29}

Although it is by no means certain that a regional great power or global peer will emerge before the 2010-2015 time frame, the Department believed it was important to analyze the potential requirements that would be posed by an aggressor with capabilities significantly greater than those anticipated for Iraq, Iran, or North Korea, so that future demands could inform near-term decisions, particularly in the area of modernization.\textsuperscript{30}

OSD's arguments conformed to organization theory. The organization sought to preserve its structure and programs by advancing successive arguments. DoD first focused on the remaining threat from the Soviet Union or a resurgent Russia, then the threat of “uncertainty” and regional threats. The shift from regional threats to a “future peer competitor” conforms to the prediction that organizations prefer more similar threats and move to less similar ones only when forced. However, the advent of “global peer competitor” arguments is less well explained by organization theory. Regional threat arguments would have sufficed to maintain

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
organizational size and wealth. It was when the organization sought to increase its capabilities that a future global peer competitor was necessary. This argument was closely related to the idea of primacy.

(2) The Office of Net Assessment (ONA)

The Office of Net Assessment (ONA) was one of the first groups to identify China as a potential threat to the United States. It was also the central group that advocated the idea that the United States should prevent the rise of a peer competitor. ONA was ahead of the debate in most cases from the late-1980s to the mid-1990s. Many strategic concepts and threat arguments originated from the ONA and spread within the DoD and the greater security community. Many of the “China threat” arguments also had their origins in ONA studies.

An examination of the studies and arguments coming out of the ONA since the Cold War reveals that the pursuit of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) was very important in assessing potential threats and competitors. The ONA’s hypothesis was that countries that could harness the RMA would increase their military capability by a great magnitude. Two questions that need to be addressed then are:

a) What was ONA purpose of promoting the RMA? Was the RMA hypothesis put forward to serve the ONA’s organizational interests — in other words to maintain its wealth and influence? Was it to save Cold War weapon systems? Or was it driven by a realist imperative to maintain the military capability to keep primacy?

b) What was ONA’s purpose in making “China threat” arguments? Was “China threat” hypothesis put forward to push the RMA?

Organization theory predicts that ONA used “China threat” arguments to promote RMA to
maintain the ONA’s organizational interest. Organization theory also predicts that ONA made "China threat" arguments when other threats could no longer sustain their organizational interests and programs. An alternative explanation based on realism would be that the ONA promoted the RMA to maintain primacy.31 In the following sections, I examine ONA and its RMA arguments and "China threat" arguments.

(i) Overview of the ONA

ONA was established in 1973 with Andrew Marshall as its director. Marshall has been the Director ever since. During the Cold War, ONA’s main task was to analyze the long-term relative military capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. Marshall was associated with many of U.S. strategic concepts and analysis during the 1980s. Some of the achievements attributed to the ONA are detecting the decline of the Soviet Union in the late-1980s and developing the concept of competitive strategy that forced the Soviet Union to invest and compete in the areas of U.S. advantage.32

Part of ONA’s job is to identify threats and evaluate their capability relative to that of the United States. Secretary William Cohen explained in September 2000 that the ONA “was charged to ... try to look and peer into the future to see what potentialities might exist and what would be the United States’ response to those potentialities.”33

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31 Another explanation would be that the personal views and influence of the ONA director Andrew Marshall — including his worldview on non-democracies — affected the ONA’s focus on China.
32 Examples of competitive strategies are the maritime strategies that forced the Soviet submarines to defend in their home waters instead of the sea lines of communications (SLOC) and competition between U.S. bombers and cruise missile programs against Soviet air defenses. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Remarks for the farewell to secretary of the air force James Roche,” January 18, 2005; Andrew W. Marshall, “Competitive Strategies - History and Background,” (Unpublished paper, March 3, 1988); and J.J. Martin, C. Makins, and G. Weaver, The U.S.-Soviet Long-Term Military Competition. The report was sponsored by the Defense Nuclear Agency and prepared for Director Defense Nuclear Agency and Director, Net Assessment. June 5, 1990. I would like to thank Narushige Michishita in pointing out this report.
The responsibilities and functions of the Director of Net Assessment are as follows.

The Director of Net Assessment is the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on net assessment matters. The Director shall develop and coordinate net assessments of the standing, trends, and future prospects of U.S. military capabilities and military potential in comparison with those of other countries or groups of countries so as to identify emerging or future threats or opportunities for the United States. 34

Organizationally, the ONA is part of the OSD. The Director of Net Assessment (DNA) used to report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense through the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy — PDUSD (P). 35 In November 1997, then Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced the Defense Reform Initiative Report, which included a plan to transfer the ONA to the National Defense University (NDU). 36 This plan was understood to be a down-grade for the ONA. After strong opposition from in and out of DoD, ONA remained in OSD, and Marshall was made Advisor to the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment. 37 A directive in August 2001 elevated the DNA's position, putting it on par with an Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) and stated that the DNA would "report directly to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense." 38

ONA is a small organization with a staff of about 12. ONA operates mainly through the

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36 William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Defense Reform Initiative Report, November 1997, p. 55. The report was announced on November 10, 1997. The defense reform called for the Director of Net Assessment to report to the President of the NDU.


research it commissions to its staff and outside institutions. Some reports are circulated to a wide readership in and out of the DoD and other reports are confined to a few top leaders. One assessment is said to have had only two readers. ONA has commissioned many studies to think tanks, such as RAND and Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), and sponsored research at universities such as Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Sometimes, the ONA came up with the research questions and had other parts of the DoD fund the study. Starting in 1985, the ONA organized a “Summer Study” on various themes related to the long-term strategy of the United States. Participants of the Summer Studies were specialists drawn mostly from think tanks and universities, as well as business and government. Not all the summer studies were made public. Summer Studies were held in August of 1985, 1986, 1988, 1990, and every year there after.

The concept of “net assessment” developed by ONA assesses competition rather than situations or outcome of battles. It makes comparative evaluation of the balance of strength and weaknesses of countries by looking at various factors that go into shaping these strengths and weaknesses. These factors include quantitative and qualitative military capabilities as well

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42 Summer studies were held almost every year at the Naval War College, New Port, Rhode Island for ten days. Work-group chairmen present the final report to the Secretary of Defense. Naval War College website. http://www.nwc.navy.mil/Academics/Conferences.htm
43 A Summer Study was conducted every year from 1990 to 1999.
as other social and economic factors.\textsuperscript{44}

(ii) The ONA and “China threat” arguments

Organization theory predicts that ONA would make “China threat” arguments when it anticipated a threat to organizational size and wealth. This should have occurred at the end of the Cold War in 1989, and more so after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. It should have occurred in particular in November 1997 when Cohen tried to move the office to NDU, which would have decreased its autonomy and influence. In fact, all along, ONA’s “China threat” arguments appear to have come as result of a combination of two beliefs: the need to maintain U.S. primacy and the idea that a series of technological changes had created a revolution in military affairs.

Marshall assessed China as a potential military competitor in 1988, ahead of most others. ONA predicted the rise of China when it predicted the decline of the Soviet Union. But, there is no evidence that the reason the ONA regarded China as a potential threat in 1988 was to maintain its organizational interests. Evidence suggests that it was the assessment of China’s relative power of China that prompted ONA’s “China threat” arguments.

ONA’s initial concern about China came from its rapid growth. ONA had been studying China’s rise from the mid-1980s. Marshall recalled a study in 1985 that looked at the long-term economic projections of the world, which stirred his interest in China. According to Marshall, the study was motivated by the observation of the “general reordering of geopolitical situation” and to search for a “possible opponent.”\textsuperscript{45} The study was published in January 1988 as the basic report of the President’s Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy,


\textsuperscript{45} Andrew Marshall, interview by author, 22 February 2002, Washington, tape recording, Washington, D.C.
Discriminate Deterrence, which was discussed above. The report claimed that China's GDP would be second in the world after the United States by 2010, followed by Japan and the Soviet Union and said that RMA would transform military competition. Marshall reiterated his interest in China and RMA in a 1988 paper. He envisioned a multi-power world where Japan and China were military competitors:

The Chinese are committed to becoming a major military power as soon as their economic and technological development allows; the Japanese will have the capability but may not wish to assume the role of a military power, although they might do some time during this period.

The focus of ONA’s activities after the Cold War had been to find a means to sustain the U.S. preponderance of power and technological edge without a peer competitor. Starting around 1990, the ONA organized several studies and workshops dealing with how to conduct net assessment in the post-Cold War. The ONA’s method during the Cold War had been to search for and exploit Soviet weaknesses and find ways to pressure the Soviets to compete in areas of U.S. advantage. Now the ONA argued that the maintenance of U.S. power required that the United States identify areas that would become important in ten to twenty years and invest in those areas.

According to Andrew Krepinevich, a military assistant at the ONA in the early-1990s, Marshall “indicated his intention to move beyond the Cold War military balance assessments” in

46 Fred Iklé, Albert Wohlstetter, et al., Discriminate Deterrence (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1988). As noted in the previous chapter, the co-chairs of this commission were Fred Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter. Commission members included former National Security Advisors to the President, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brezinski, Samuel Huntington, General Andrew Goodpaster (USA, Ret.), and Admiral James Halloway (USN, Ret.), Ambassador Anne Armstrong, Judge William Clark, W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Dr. Joshua Lederberg, General Bernard Schriver (USAF, Ret.), and General John Vessey (USA, Ret.). Discriminate Deterrence, cover and commission’s memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

47 Marshall argued that the RMA was yet to be developed and its concrete form was not certain. RMA in actual terms consisted of a set of new technologies like better sensors, data links, and precision weapons that theoretically allow lighter forces to compete with armored enemies and destroy them from longer ranges.

a meeting on December 19, 1990. And on August 1, 1991, Marshall stated his intention to a small group of advisors at the ONA “to undertake a different kind of net assessment from the Soviet-oriented efforts that had dominated the ONA’s efforts since its establishment in 1973.”

These considerations led ONA to focus more on RMA. The Gulf War had further convinced Marshall and ONA of RMA’s potential. Marshall came to believe that RMA would change the warfare, like Blitzkrieg, strategic bombing, and carrier aviation. Marshall’s interest in RMA was triggered by Soviet discussions in the late-1970s an early-1980s. The Soviet military talked of “military-technical revolutions”, and their writings were public by the early 1980s.

In 1991, Krepinevich was asked to begin a study on RMA, specifically on how the United States would define its competition if the Soviet Union’s power continued to wane, the growing lethality of conventional war and how rapid advances in technology might change war-fighting concepts. Krepinevich assessment was finished in July 1992, and an updated version was sent to Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in the summer of 1993. Marshall wrote a

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memorandum in July 1993 pointing to the importance of RMA. Marshall believed that failure to achieve RMA would endanger U.S. primacy.

RMA gradually gained adherents in and out of the DoD. Five RMA task forces were established by Secretary of Defense William Perry in 1994 to examine long-term effects of RMA. General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the JCS, his deputy Admiral William Owens, and deputy defense secretary John Deutch came to espouse the idea. Shalikashvili stated in a written statement to the House and Senate committees in February 1995 “What we set in motion is an entirely new era in warfare ... What is changing is the very nature of modern battle.”

Although Krepinevich’s 1992 study on the RMA was made public only in 2002, Marshall called the study, “the best-known assessment prepared by the Office of Net Assessment.” This suggests that the paper was circulated widely within the DoD.

At the same time as it conceptualized the RMA, ONA assessed which countries were most likely to realize the RMA. ONA’s 1992 assessment grouped competitors into three general categories. Category I included states that already had the necessary human, economic and technological resources to compete with the United States. Germany, Japan and France, when allied with another power, were placed in this category along with Russia and the European Union. China was in Category II, comprised of MRA “wanna be” – competitors that might enter competition in 10 years or so, but currently still lacking the “ability to compete on a qualitatively equal basis with the Category I states.” India and Israel were also in this category.

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54 A. W. Marshall, Director of Net Assessment, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Some Thoughts on Military Revolutions, 27 July 1993. Excerpts of the memorandum are quoted in Ibid., pp. 6-8.
56 Andrew W. Marshall, “Foreword,” The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment, p. i. Marshall went on to say, “It has, I believe, held up well over time. The strategic management issues it raised should still be of special interest to top-level Department of Defense officials.” This suggests that the study was probably circulated among the top-level DoD officials in 1992 when it first came out.
57 The study was conducted in 1992 and released to the public in 2002.
Category III states were those that did not have the ability to compete but nevertheless might want to disrupt the system of the Category I states and could thereby pose a threat.\textsuperscript{58}

Increasingly, the ONA began to view China as the most likely candidate to realize RMA. Marshall recalled that in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the ONA started to look “still more closely at China.” The shock hi-tech nature of the war gave the Chinese and the enthusiasm the PLA showed towards it afterwards were the main drivers for the ONA’s interest in China.\textsuperscript{59} Marshall was concerned that China was more enthusiastic about RMA than the United States. However, Marshall said that even if China failed to develop RMA, there were always other countries. The “Swedes and Singaporeans are very serious about RMA,” he said. According to Marshall, it was not so much China itself that was the source of concern. What was important was for the United States to realize RMA.\textsuperscript{60}

In 1994 ONA began to propose the idea of China as a potential “peer competitor.” Starting in 1993-94, ONA conducted several war games with China as the opponent. An ONA Summer Study examined China independently for the first time. A group headed by Ron Morse of the University of Maryland developed alternative future scenarios of China over the next seven years or so. The question raised then was whether or not China would disintegrate like the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{61} The study asserted that there was “a 50-50 chance” that the current transition period would lead to a “Soviet-style breakup of China.”\textsuperscript{62} The study also asserted

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{58} Brazil, South Africa, South Korea and Ukraine were also placed in Category II.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Marshall, interview by author, 22 February, Washington, tape recording, Washington, DC.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Marshall, interview by author, 22 February, Washington, tape recording, Washington, DC.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Marshall, Letter to Summer Studies Participant. Members of the group that examined China in the Near Term included: Arthur Waldron, Mike Brown, Iain Johnston, Yu-Ping Liu, John Garver, David Zweig, Mike Field, Lonnie Keene, Thomas Christensen, Mike Vickers, Art Corbett, Michael Pillsbury, Tom Clark, Robert Sutter, Gilbert Rozman, Takashi Hoshino, and Erland Heginbotham.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Some participants of the Summer Study claimed that Morse’s conclusion misrepresented the group’s argument. Only half the members saw possibilities of a breakup of China’s breakup as possible, which is different from “a 50-50 chance” of a breakup. Participants of the 1994 Summer Study, interview by author, Cambridge,
\end{itemize}
that "whatever scenario dominates in the future, all Chinas would be different from the present and all Chinas may challenge US interests." The 1994 China study was made public in January 1995. The ONA Summer Studies are rarely made public. The public distribution suggests that ONA and the OSD wanted to publicize the possibility of China's disintegration and the problems it could pose for the United States.

At the same 1994 Summer Study, another group headed by Jim Martin of SAIC examined the problems of planning in an uncertain environment. This group identified China as a potential "major regional military competitor to the United States, and even a peer competitor over time" and advocated establishing a "Center of Excellence on China." This was the first "China threat" argument the ONA had made since the 1987 Presidential commission had identified China as a potential military power.

The main focus of the study was how to sustain the U.S. military primacy. The study cautioned against relative decline of the United States similar to the British decline at the end of

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64 Morse claimed that the study received much attention and that it was Secretary Perry's idea to disclose it, possibly indicating of Perry's interest in publicizing aspects of the report. However, on a different occasion, Morse is reported to have acknowledged that Pentagon sponsors "were quite upset about" the study. Participants of the 1994 Summer Study, interview by author, Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 1997. Ronald Morse, interview by author, Chiba, Japan, 17 July 2001. Also see Eduardo Lachia, "Hedging bets for China's post-Deng era: U.S. study creates a stir, saying China's breakup is possible after Deng," Wall Street Journal, February 21, 1995, p. A20.

65 The problem of planning in an uncertain environment has been one of ONA's research interests since the Cold War. For example, Bruce W. Bennett, Sam Gardiner, Daniel B. Fox, and Nicholas K. J. Witney, Theater Analysis and Modeling in an Era of Uncertainty: The Present and Future Warfare, Prepared for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994).

66 Undersecretary of Defense (Policy), 1994 Summer Study: Sustaining the U.S. Military Position in a Time of Exceptional Change, Organized by the Director, Net Assessment, held at Newport, Rhode Island, August 1-10, 1994, p. 50. A "Center of Excellence on China" was established on March 1, 2000 in the National Defense University as the "Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs" pursuant to the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act. However, the center became a target of contention between hard-line and soft-line approaches to China. As a result, the center could not appoint a director and it became almost totally inactive after hosting one conference on China in October 2001.
the 19th century.  

While the U.S. position currently is an excellent one, the Department of Defense must ask how long this advantage can be maintained. In what areas is it likely to degrade most rapidly, absent attention? As funding continues to drop, how can decline be prevented or forestalled?  

The study suggested incorporating strategies used by successful organizations which “try aggressively to shape their environments” and “raise entry barriers to new competitors”. The report emphasized the need to: “Give the future a seat at the table.”

An effective way to give the future a greater voice is to surface specific future-oriented issues that seize the attention of the top leaders. An example might be RMA possibilities such as information warfare.

In other words, the study pushed for future-oriented issues such as RMA to be brought to the attention of top leaders. The study also identified one problem facing DoD as the difficulty of sustaining military preponderance in an era of decreasing defense budgets.

Around this time the ONA began supporting works of Michael Pillsbury, a China specialist at National Defense University. The study the ONA sponsored was published as a book;  

*Chinese Views of Future Warfare.* Former Secretary of Defense, William Perry, wrote in a blurb: “This book reflects the keen interest that its sponsor, the Director of Net Assessment, Andy Marshall, has shown in Chinese views of a potential revolution in military affairs.”

As we have seen, the ONA’s “China threat” arguments were based on China’s potential power as a country with a potential to challenge U.S. preponderance of power with its large

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67 Britain’s relative decline is studied in detail by Aaron L. Friedberg in *The Weary Titan: British And the Experience of Relative Decline 1895-1905* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). Friedberg participated in the 1994 Summer Study. His wariness about relative decline seems to have influenced ONA’s thinking. This point and the book were introduced to the author by Michael Pillsbury.


69 Ibid., p. 22.

70 *1994 Summer Study: Sustaining*, p. 27.


72 Michael Pillsbury, *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*

73 Pillsbury, *Chinese Views of Future Warfare*, back cover.
There is little evidence to suggest that ONA made “China threat” arguments to promote its material organizational interests. However, ONA seems to have exaggerated “China threat” to gain support for the RMA. Marshall denied that he was “using” China to realize the RMA. However, in some cases, it used China as a concrete target for future scenarios.

For example, in 1994-1995, ONA organized a number of war games said to take place between 2015 and 2020 with China as the adversary. The war games were used to explore operational and organizational concepts of RMA. At the same time, games were used to educate and persuade uniformed officers, who resisted RMA, the importance and military effectiveness of the RMA. The imaginary Chinese forces were equipped with RMA capabilities whereas the U.S. forces were without the RMA capabilities. The result was an overwhelming victory by the Chinese. The war games received much publicity through leaks and releases, especially because of their alarming results. China won because of the RMA capability it had and the US forces lost because they did not.

75 Some of the war games were organized by the ONA in conjunction with the Naval War College and the Chief of Naval Operation's Executive Panel (CEP).
ONA seems to have sent several messages with these war games. One, China was a potential threat; and two, RMA was vital for the U.S. military. Pillsbury, the China specialist working with the ONA, admitted that China’s interest in developing the RMA was used to promote the RMA in the United States. Pillsbury said it was useful to say that “the other countries are doing it” to gain resources for RMA programs.

Analysts and researchers working closely with the ONA tend to rate China’s capabilities more highly than others. A RAND study commissioned by the ONA estimated that China’s military and economic growth would occur much more rapidly than the estimates by the World Bank said. The study estimated that China’s economic size would surpass the United States’ in 2007, and that China’s defense expenditure would be 1.5 times than the United States in 2015. Other RAND studies rated China’s military capability to be more modest.

The same individuals frequently participated in the ONA studies. Researchers who have assessed China’s power to be modest were also invited to the study but were rarely asked to participate in future studies. Pillsbury’s book has been criticized as collecting only the material that would point to China’s interest in the RMA. Alfred Wilhelm, Jr., Executive Vice President of the Atlantic Council of the United States and a security specialist on China, noted

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79 Other war games were conducted with different adversaries. A war game conducted in 1995 set North Korea as the adversary. Ian Bruce, “Cyber Warriors on Battlefield of the Future,” Caledonian Newspapers, April 10, 1995, p. 8.
80 Michael Pillsbury, interview by author, 4 October, 1999, Washington, tape recording, Washington, D.C.
82 For example, a RAND study funded by Smith Richardson Foundation assessed China’s capability to be more modest. David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000). Another RAND study funded by the U.S. Air Force concluded that modernization process of the PLAAF would be “prolonged and subject to fits, starts, and reversals.” Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan D. Pollack, China’s Air Force Enters the 21st Century (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995).
83 For example, S. Enders Wimbush, Aaron Friedberg and Michael Pillsbury.
84 For example, Thomas Rawski, a professor of economics at the University of Pittsburgh judged China’s GDP to be much less than the officially announced GDP in Thomas G. Rawski, “What’s Happening to China’s GDP Statistics?” China Economic Review, Vol. 12, No. 4 (December 2001). He was invited to ONA to brief his study but was not asked back. Thomas Rawski, interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, June 2002.
that Pillsbury selectively gathered material from Chinese military journals to exaggerate the
PLA's interest in RMA. Wilhelm worked closely with Pillsbury, and the Atlantic Council
co-sponsored Pillsbury's book together with the ONA. "Pillsbury did his homework and got
an answer Andy Marshall wanted. He went out and found what he had to." Pillsbury
refutes such criticism by saying that until proven otherwise, one has to presume that China
might succeed in developing the RMA even if those who advocated the RMA within the PLA
are a minority view.

ONA's "China threat" arguments tended to argue that China posed a threat to the United
States under all circumstances. The 1994 Summer Study argued that a disintegrated China and
a strong China posed a threat. Within the disintegrated China scenario, all of the options —
"nationalist strongman," "democratic China," "command socialism," "regionalism" and "total
collapse" — posed a threat.

Krepinevich's 1992 RMA study argued that China had the aspirations but not the
technological capability to achieve RMA, but only two years later, China was identified as the
nation most able to compete with the United States RMA and used in war games as an opposing
force with RMA capabilities. In a 1997 study, Pillsbury warned of China's "dangerous
misperceptions." In that study, one of China's misperceptions was overestimating U.S.
military weakness. China was portrayed as seeing the U.S. military victory in the Gulf War as
having "barely defeated Saddam" and believing that the United States would "lose its status as

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85 Alfred Wilhelm, Jr., interview by author, Washington, D.C., 11 June 1999. Wilhelm was Executive Vice
President of the Atlantic Council from 1989 to 2001. The Office of Net Assessment and the Atlantic Council
co-sponsored Chinese Views of Future Warfare.
86 Pillsbury, interview by author.
87 China in the Near Term, 1994 Summer Study, p. 29.
the sole superpower in the next two decades. The supposed results of China’s misperceptions were a Chinese willingness to preempt the United States in conflicts over Taiwan or Korea and U.S. deterrence failure. However, in other instances, ONA noted that China became aware of its military backwardness after seeing the one-sided U.S. victory in the Gulf War and. These arguments contradicted one another, but all arguments pointed to a “China threat.” This suggests that ONA has a strong inclination to make the argument that China was a threat.

(iii) The Cause of ONA’s RMA Arguments — Organizational Interests?

There is no evidence to support the claim based on organization theory that the ONA’s promotion of the RMA was caused by the ONA’s parochial interest. ONA seems to have had a genuine belief in RMA’s importance. The arguments about the importance of the RMA were constant over time. They started in the late-1980s when the Soviet Union was still there. The ONA argued that technological advancement was not sufficient to bring about the revolution but that doctrinal and organizational reforms were also necessary. These arguments were unpopular with the services, making the idea that they advanced ONA’s interests untenable.

The increase of the RMA arguments and “China threat” arguments in 1994 cannot be explained by the ONA’s parochial interest either. In 1994, two of the ONA’s strong supporters assumed key positions in DoD. William Perry became Secretary of Defense and Admiral

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91 One of the reasons ONA reached the conclusions it did about China could be the approach the ONA took in examining China. The questions were often framed to identify all the cases where China could pose a threat to the United States, rather than to ask whether or not China posed a threat.
William Owens became Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Therefore the ONA was in no need of proving its importance to the leaders of the OSD. When ONA was nearly moved out of OSD in 1997, there was an organizational need to demonstrate its importance. However, there was no marked change in the ONA's arguments.

If the motive for promoting the RMA hypothesis was not the parochial interests of the ONA, was it to save some late-Cold War weapon systems? ONA was a strong supporter for some weapon systems, such as the B-2 bombers. However, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the ONA's promoted RMA to save weapon systems.

In the early-1990s, ONA argued that RMA was still in its nascent stages. Marshall stated that the form of the RMA was still uncertain. And yet the ONA identified long range precision strike capability and information technology as essential to RMA. The B-2 bomber may have been saved by the RMA hypothesis. Originally, the DoD planned to buy 132 B-2 bombers. In April 1990, Secretary of Defense Cheney announced a reduction to a purchase of 75 bombers. In November 1991, Congress effectively blocked the purchase of B-2s beyond the fifteen already ordered. In May 1992, a House Armed Services subcommittee voted to halt the program after 20. In 1994, the B-2 contractor Northrop launched a lobbying campaign to sell 20 more B-2s. In January 1995, seven former secretaries of defense wrote a letter to President Clinton pushing him buy more B-2s. In March 1998, a congressional panel concluded that 21 B-2s were sufficient.

The ONA has worked closely with members of the defense industry. Most of its ties stemmed from former assistants of Marshall — “St. Andrew’s Prep” — who moved on to the

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93 The seven secretaries of defense were Cheney, Weinberger, Carlucci, Brown, Schlesinger, Rumsfeld and Laird.
defense industry after leaving the services or the Pentagon. For example, both James Roche and Barry Watts worked for the Northrop Grumman Corporation after ONA. Roche was their Corporate Vice President, and Watts was director of the Northrop Grumman Analysis Center. Both Roche and Watts continued to work closely with ONA while in industry and participated in its Summer Studies and produced "pro bono work" for the office. Roche also acted as an organizer for the Summer Studies. Watts noted that relationship with the ONA was beneficial for both the ONA and the company.

Rather than trying to market or sell products or systems, we interact with our customers as colleagues in an attempt to understand defense trends and needs. ... we were heavily involved with the Air Staff ... Another Pentagon office with which we have had a long-term relationship is the Office of Net Assessment under Andy Marshall. These relationships benefit our customers, but they also benefit the company.94 Roche was appointed Secretary of Air Force in 2001 by George W. Bush.95 Watts was appointed Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation in the OSD.96 Watts was one of strongest advocates for the RMA.

Despite ONA's links to the defense industry, there is no reason to reject the realist explanation that a belief in the importance of primacy drove ONA's RMA advocacy. ONA was consistent in its argument that RMA required new doctrines and organizational structures, not just technology. This suggests that the motive for the promotion of the RMA did not come from saving the technologies and advancing it forward.97

97 One possible explanation for the ONA's keen interest in promoting RMA is the organization's interest in maintaining its influence within the DoD and the defense community. The ONA had produced many ideas during the Cold War and was famous for it. Peering into the future and developing big thoughts were tasks assigned to ONA. It is therefore not inconceivable to argue that ONA was motivated by organizational interest to stay
Was there then an unmotivated bias causing ONA to promote RMA and "China threat" arguments? The ONA’s task was to identify long-term threats and devise responses. In addition, the ONA sought to avoid falling victim to organizational inertia. ONA sought to avoid this problem by focusing on preparing for the future war instead of fighting the last war. This tendency probably influenced the ONA’s assessment of China and RMA. RMA was seen as something that would take hold in the future and China as a nation with tremendous potential and the intention to challenge the United States.

(iv) ONA as a Center of Security Policy Community

One of the major characteristics of the ONA is the personal nature of the organization. The responsibilities and functions reside with the director, not the office. Along with the actual organization is what is know as "St. Andrew’s Prep" — an informal network of former aides, extending from the JCS to the CIA to Harvard University, to think tanks, the military services, and across the defense industry. ONA’s "China threat" arguments are better understood when the ONA is seen as a center of the national security community. One-time ONA analysts such as Barry Watts and Jim Roche moved in and out of the government. Former ONA staff included Stephen Rosen of Harvard University and Andrew Krepinevich, Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and a member of the National Defense Panel. These people gave ONA a central role in creating ideas in the national security policy community. There was also an overlap among the members of the ONA, the PNAC and the relevant and influential by promoting RMA. However, I did not find any evidence that supports this claim over a realist claim.

98 This was the conclusion the ONA had reached after reviewing the mistakes of several countries.
(3) Summary of Office of Net Assessment and “China threat” Arguments

Organization Theory did little to explain the behavior of ONA. ONA’s “China threat” arguments were caused primarily by the ONA’s interest in sustaining U.S. primacy rather than ONA’s organizational interest. The ONA’s studies after the Cold War were devoted to identifying future trends and factors important in maintaining U.S. primacy. In the early-1990s, the ONA identified RMA as a factor that could shape future competition among states. Since then, future competitors were evaluated by their capability and intention to realize RMA. China was seen as one of nations most likely to grasp RMA. China’s increasing relative power and desire to realize RMA drove ONA’s judgment that China was a potential threat.

Organization theory suggests that organizations pursue size and wealth. According to the theory, when the major adversary disappears military organizations search for an alternative threat. ONA’s “China threat” arguments did not conform to the timing predicted by the theory — 1989, 1991 and 1997. The ONA saw China as a potential threat as early as 1987, before the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the waning of public support for U.S. defense spending. The ONA and Marshall were one of the first to predict the Soviet’s demise. ONA began to examine China closely after 1994, but the ONA was in a strong organizational position at the time, with allies at key DoD positions. When ONA was threatened with being removed from OSD in 1997, there was no increase of “China threat” in its arguments.  

Organization theory also predicts that defense organizations search for new threats, starting from those most similar to the old threat and shifting to less similar threat only by

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necessity. In this case, organizational theory expects arguments for a Soviet/Russian threat, a mini-Soviet threat, and then a new threat. However, ONA was among the first to predict the decline of the Soviet Union. In the 1980s and 1990s ONA mentioned the Soviet Union, China, Japan, Germany, India and North Korea as threats or potential threats. Aside from North Korea, these countries were viewed as great powers with potential to challenge U.S. primacy. These countries were not threats that could justify U.S. conventional force structure.

In addition, RMA was not a means of preserving force structure and budget. Marshall often argued that RMA could be realized only with new concepts of operations in military organizations.\(^{101}\) RMA would end existing defense programs and force structure, rather than prolong them. The strong opposition from military services is evidence of this.

Some evidence indicated that ONA exaggerated “China threat” arguments to increase support for RMA. ONA pushed RMA regardless of the enemy it was justified around. The Soviet Union had tried to develop an earlier version of RMA with their system of systems. China’s seeming interest in RMA provided ONA with an alternative threat to the Soviet Union, which could be used to promote RMA. It is doubtful that China would have been considered a potential threat if not for Marshall’s strong belief in RMA. China’s overall military capability lagged far behind the Soviets. Without RMA magnifying its capabilities, China lacked the capability to harm the U.S.’s vital interests. China provided a basis for ONA’s argument in favor of RMA and a concrete rationale for allocating resources for RMA. Thus China was used to win support within the OSD, military services, and general security community for RMA.\(^{102}\)


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3. Military Services — Joint Chiefs of Staff

The military services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were not among the first to make “China threat” arguments. Unlike ONA, the JCS maintained that Soviet threat remained strong even after the end of the Cold War. It was only around 1996-97 that the military services started arguing that China was a potential threat to the United States. Even then, arguments that held that China would be a peer competitor to the United States were rare among the services. “China threat” arguments among the services focused primarily on Chinese naval and missile capabilities.

Just as the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) noticed a waning of Soviet power and threat in the late-1980s, some military officers also noticed the change. Colin Powell, then President Reagan’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, and later Chairman of the JCS (October 1 1989 – September 30 1993), was one of them. He “became convinced in 1988 that the changes taking place in the Soviet Union were fundamental.” However, Powell and the JCS did not begin search for an alternative threat to the Soviet Union. The emphasis was instead on maintaining force structure. Powell’s frequent mention of hollowing out of the military forces after the World War II and Vietnam suggests that these past experiences weighed heavily on his thinking. The JCS did not try to match the force structure to the new international environment but rather to develop a justification for keeping forces. Powell remarked in May 1989 that while the reality of the Soviet military threat remained, the public’s perception of a lessened threat and its consequent reluctance to fund forces to meet it meant that the military

104 For example, in his September 20, 1989 confirmation hearing as Chairman of the JCS, Powell argued that force realignments were necessary because if funding continued to decline while the size of the armed forces and their missions remained unchanged, the result would be hollow forces. S. Hrg. 101-537, Committee on Armed Services, “Nomination of Gen. Colin L. Powell, USA, for Reappointment in the Grade of General and for Reassignment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” Cited in Jaffe, The Development, p. 12.
must find another basis for its policies and programming. Powell believed that if the military did not plan the reductions in a rational manner, then Congress and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) would impose less sensible reductions.

Powell adopted the term “Base Force” for his recommended minimum force. By using this term, Powell sought to convey that his proposed force structure represented a “floor” below which the United States could not go. Throughout this period, until around April 1990 when Powell started making public statements about the Base Force, the major concern for Powell and the JCS was to counter mounting public and congressional pressure for a “peace dividend.” Powell was consciously seeking to develop a persuasive case for his proposed force structure.

The JCS first argued that the Soviet threat still justified a large U.S. military. Powell argued that Soviet Union remained the dominant Eurasian military power with a nuclear arsenal that continued to threaten the United States. In a speech to the National Press Club on June 22, 1990 Powell said that the Soviet Union will remain a superpower well into the next century and “So, even as we reduce, we must maintain our ability to deter and defend.” This argument was presented often by various U.S. military and defense officials in the early-1990s.

Former chairman of the JCS, Admiral William Crowe, wrote in the spring of 1991:

The major strategic issue is still the USSR. It is not clear how the United States should cope with the remaining, and in some respects growing, Soviet military capability in the Asian-Pacific area.

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107 Ibid., p. 21.
109 Address by General Powell to the Town Hall of California, Los Angeles, California, 23 March 1990, cited in Jaffe, The Development, p. 29.
Another argument the JCS presented was threat of uncertainty. "Uncertainty" provided much of the rationale for maintaining military force after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Powell rejected threat-based analysis because it was impossible to predict where the United States might become engaged. Powell told the press in 1991,

We no longer have the luxury of having a threat to plan for. What we plan for is that we're a superpower. We are the major player on the world stage with responsibilities around the world.

The idea of the threat of uncertainty allowed the JCS and the DoD to argue that the United States had to be engaged everywhere in the world and spend heavily on defense. Many DoD and White House reports made this argument. Uncertainty enabled the services to maintain organizational size and wealth.

Powell reiterated the dangers the United States faced in June 1990:

I have been reminded again and again since becoming chairman that this is still a dangerous world and that you'd better be able to respond if someone challenges your interests.

Powell maintained that because of these dangers, the United States must remain an engaged

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112 Jaffe, The Development, p. 22.
114 For example, DoD's annual report argued in 1990: "Much remains unsettled, the Soviet Union remains a nuclear superpower, and U.S. interests over the coming decades will face a growing number of potentially serious threats from other sources. In short, the opportunities are great, but so are the uncertainties and risks." Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (January 1990), p. i. The 1993 annual report similarly stated; "Although the world is less dangerous now than during the Cold War, the world in the 1990s in many respects is more complex and uncertain." Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (January 1993), p. 1. The White House made similar arguments. The National Security Strategy of 1991 stated, "The old has been swept away, the new not yet fully in place. The obstacles and uncertainties before us are quite real". National Security Strategy of 1993 argued, "the world remains a dangerous place. While we no longer face the single defining threat which dominated our policy, budgets, force structures, and indeed our fears for forty years, multiple threats to our security still remain. Today's challenges are more complex, ambiguous and diffuse than ever before." The National Security Strategy of 1994 argued, "The central security challenge of the past half century — the threat of communist expansion — is gone. The dangers we face today are more diverse." The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (August 1991), The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (January 1993), and The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (July 1994).
superpower, and thus there was a Base Force below which the United States should not go. The new defense strategy and Base Force concept were announced by President Bush on August 2, 1990, a day after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Base Force was sized to respond to regional threats rather than to a global challenge from the Soviet forces. The Base Force and regional strategy enabled the military services to justify maintenance of their core forces. When the Gulf War ended in February 1991, the United States had one less threat. Powell was quoted after the war:

I'm running out of demons. I'm running out of villains. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung.

This statement suggests that the JCS had searched for alternative threats to the Soviet Union but even the regional threats were becoming scarce.

The Base Force was outlined in detail in the National Military Strategy of January 1992. The Base Force had four components: Strategic Forces, Atlantic Forces, Pacific Forces, and Contingency Forces. It was supported by four capabilities: a logistics network, including transportation to project and sustain military forces, space-based assets; research and development to ensure technological superiority, and the capability to reconstitute forces when necessary. In other words, Base Force maintained most of the core components of military

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116 Address by General Powell to the Town Hall of California, Los Angeles, California, 23 March 1990, cited in Jaffe, The Development, p. 29.
119 Colin Powell was interviewed by the Army Times newspaper published on April 8, 1991. Powell was justifying the force reduction plan. Powell went to say that he would be “very surprised if another Iraq occurred. Iraq has spent somewhere in the neighborhood of $50 or $60 billion over the past 10 or 12 years. Whether that kind of wealth is around and whether anybody wishes to invest that wealth in hardware for war is unlikely.” Quoted in “General Advocates Cuts to U.S. military Budget,” The Toronto Star, April 9, 1991, p. A3; Stephen Budionsky, Bruce B. Auster, “Mission Implausible,” U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 111, No. 16, p. 24.
forces. Although the Base Force was designed to fight conflicts anywhere in the world, it only maintained forces in Europe and in the Pacific. At the same time, it inherited the two-war strategy that guided the Cold War in a reduced scale. U.S. military strategy during the Cold War was designed to fight a large-scale ground war in Central Europe against the Warsaw Pact forces and another war in other regions such as the Middle East or Korea. The 1992 Military Strategy stated the need to deter a potential aggressor while responding to one substantial regional crisis in another, thus pointing to the need to maintain a sizable force in at least two areas. The size of the Base Force was cut further through defense reviews that followed; the Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of September 1993 and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of May 1997. However, the basic strategy of fighting two regional conflicts was maintained. War with China was not among the possible scenarios that drove the force structure. The BUR called it the 2 MRCs (Major Regional Contingencies) and the QDR of 1997 the 2 MTWs (Major Theater Wars), but the basic strategy and force structure that followed from it remained unchanged. The QDR of 1997 added the need to maintain continued overseas presence. The QDR of 2001 stated that it sought to move away from “the threat-based, two-MTW

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120 The report stated “Our strategy also recognizes that when the United States is responding to one substantial regional crisis, potential aggressors in other areas may be tempted to take advantage of our preoccupation. Thus, we can not reduce forces to a level which would leave us or our allies vulnerable elsewhere.” National Military Strategy of the United States, January 1992, p. 7.


123 “We have determined that U.S. forces must be capable of fighting and winning two major theater wars nearly simultaneously. However, while the Bottom-Up Review focused primarily on that difficult task, we have also carefully evaluated other factors; including placing greater emphasis on the continuing need to maintain continuous overseas presence in order to shape the international environment and to be better able to respond to a variety of smaller-scale contingencies and asymmetric threats.”
construct, to a future transformed force.” However, instead of reducing the force size, the 2001 QDR maintained a two-MTW sizing construct and added two more areas. It was more demanding than the 1997 QDR. It sought to deter in four areas, prevail in two nearly simultaneous conflicts, taking the capital and changing the regime in one of the two. 124

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124 The 2001 QDR stated “The new force-sizing construct specifically shapes forces to: Defend the United States; Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions; Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of those conflicts — including the possibility of regime change or occupation; and Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.” Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (September 30, 2001), p. 17. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz articulated this point in his statement to Congress. He stated that U.S. forces will maintain the capability to “Deter conflicts in four critical areas of the world, by demonstrating the ability to defeat enemy attacks, and do so far more swiftly than in the past or even today. Defeat aggressors in overlapping timeframes in any two of those four areas. At the direction of the President, decisively defeat one of these two adversaries — to include invading and occupying enemy territory. Decisively impose our will on any one aggressor of our choosing... The approach we are proposing will give the U.S. sufficient forces to prevail in two nearly simultaneous conflicts. Where it differs from the previous sizing construct is that in one conflict, we will have sufficient force to occupy the adversary’s capital and replace the regime, while in the other, our forces will be sufficient to prevail over enemy forces and repel and act of aggression — much as we did in the Persian Gulf War — but without marching on, and occupying the capital.” Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Prepared Statement for the House and Senate Armed Services Committees: ‘Building a Military for the 21st Century,’” October 3 and 4, 2001. (http://www.defense.gov/speeches/2001/s20011003-depsecdef.html)
In addition to maintaining the size and wealth of their organization, the military services sought concrete targets to organize themselves internally. Arguments about uncertainty and need to deploy everywhere on the globe did not provide guidance to planning operations.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, it became difficult to argue that the Soviet threat was unchanged or increasing. Although uncertainty arguments persisted, it was becoming increasingly difficult to plan defense programs and budgets without specific threats. Around this time, many military officers pointed to the difficulties not having an enemy created for organizational size and internal focus. An Army colonel Dennis Long, the director of “total

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125 Compiled from various DoD Annual Reports.
126 Air force wings are counted in terms of fighter wing equivalents (FWEs), with each FWE including 72 combat aircraft. Relative to notional 72-aircraft FWE, the size of operational wings varies according to each wing’s mission. FWE quantities are based on the primary mission aircraft inventory (PMAI). PMAI denotes aircraft authorized to combat units for the performance of the units’ basic missions. It excludes aircraft maintained for other purposes, such as training, testing, attrition replacements, and reconstitution reserves. See for example, William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, (April 1997), pp. 162-163.
We had a clear enemy with demonstrable qualities, and we have scouted them out. (Now) we will have to practice day in and day out without knowing anything about the other team... That is very distressing to the military establishment, especially when you are trying to justify the existence of your organization and your systems.\textsuperscript{127}

To alleviate confusion and facilitate planning and budgeting, seven hypothetical scenarios were put together starting in August 1991, as detailed in the previous section. The JCS was instrumental in putting together the scenarios. Except for the last scenario, which envisioned a global competitor, the other six scenarios involved regional conflicts. The remaining six scenarios were: (1) Iraq invades Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; (2) North Korea attacks South Korea; (3) The Iraqi and North Korean invasions occur at the same time; (4) Russia attacks Lithuania and Poland with help from Belarus; (5) A coup in the Philippines threatens 5,000 Americans there; and (6) A coup in Panama threatens access to the Panama Canal. These scenarios reflected the regional strategy and Base Force concepts presented by Powell.

(1) Army

The arguments put forward by the JCS largely reflected the Army’s ideas. The Army’s official documents showed little concern about China’s military capabilities, even though China’s ground forces were stronger than still modest air and naval forces. Probably because a Taiwan crisis would be fought over water, it was believed that there was little chance that the U.S. Army would fight the PLA. Even in the Korean conflict context, China was hardly ever mentioned as a possible adversary despite the fact the U.S. forces fought the PLA in the 1950s.

In Army journals, China received greater attention. In the U.S. Army War College Quarterly, \textit{Parameters}, articles concerning China began to appear around 1995. In 1995,

Colonel Karl Eikenberry assessed whether or not China "is a threat to the peace of the Asia-Pacific region through the first decade" in the 21st century. His conclusion was "in terms of capabilities or of likely intentions, the PRC cannot be regarded as a serious threat in the mid-term to Asia-Pacific stability." Other articles were more pessimistic. An article in 1998 argued against further reductions in defense spending and advocated continuing to deter China. None of these arguments, however, drew implications for the force structure of the Army. Around 1998, the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth published a few studies on China's interest in RMA and information warfare.

(2) Navy

The U.S. Navy's interests in China as a threat started around 1994. Before then, some naval analysts and officers have commented on the modernization program of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), but it was almost never seen as a force which the U.S. Navy had to counter. By 1994, articles appeared in military journals spelling out concerns about the growth of the PLAN. Lieutenant Michael Forsythe, USN, wrote in August 1994:

Each year that China continues to post staggering rates of economic expansion reduces its "magic number" — the number of years before it surpasses the United States — by one. Failure of the U.S. Navy to plan for this ever-increasing likelihood is strategic procrastination of the highest order.

Beginning in 1997, the Navy began to promote China as a potential threat to the United States. For example, a 1997 study commissioned by Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) identified China as “a central driving force.” It argues:

Through 2010, China will not be a military peer competitor for the United States. China’s navy will have limited blue-water capability, and will not be able to oppose the U.S. Navy successfully. However, the PLA Navy will grow in military capability and will be, in perception and reality, an increasingly powerful regional factor. It will be a substantial force from the perspective of other countries in the region, capable of intimidating any of its maritime neighbors except Japan. ... China may be able to complicate the ability of the Seventh Fleet to operate freely in such places as the South and East China seas and the Taiwan Straits.\(^\text{132}\)

The study went as far as to suggest that though a Major Regional Contingency (MRC) involving land forces were unlikely even on the Korean Peninsula, a Major Maritime Contingency (MMC) was more likely.

The Navy’s “China threat” arguments from around 1997 can be attributed to the Taiwan Strait crisis of March 1996. The crisis showed how the U.S. Navy might be involved in a military conflict with China. On March 8, 1996, China fired three M-9 (DF-15) missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan.\(^\text{133}\) At the same time, the PLA massed 150,000 troops along the coast.

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\(^{132}\) The study was commissioned in December 1995 and released in August 1997. Gregory Suess; M. Lyall Breckon; W. Seth Carus; and Jeffrey Babos, LCDR, USN; *Strategic Vision for the Pacific Fleet: Challenges, Opportunities, and Strategies for the Future* (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, 1997), p. 61.

opposite Taiwan. Another DF-15 missile was fired on March 13. Live fire tests and war
games were conducted off the coast of Fujian to the north and south of the Strait between March
12 and March 25. The U.S. government perceived the missile tests an attempt to influence the
election and sent two carrier battle groups near Taiwan.

Official DoD and JCS reports did not identify the Chinese navy as threat until 1999.
Annual Defense Report started to mention diesel-powered submarines as threats in a generic
way from 1994.\textsuperscript{134} It started to name China from 1998, but only in a limited way. The report
changed its description of Chinese submarines in 1999. In 1998, the report wrote:

Although projected Chinese and Russian submarine force levels are declining, anti-submarine warfare will remain a daunting challenge as these countries modernize
their remaining forces.\textsuperscript{135}

In 1999, the report was much more forceful in conveying its perception of growing
submarine threat from China:

A maritime threat of increasing concern is the proliferation of advanced submarine
technology to countries with and interest in impeding access to international waters. ... China’s navy operates the third largest number of submarines in the world, and has
cultivated a relationship with Russia that has enabled it to obtain access to some of the
most advanced undersea warfare technology.\textsuperscript{136}

China started modernizing its submarine forces in 1994, when it concluded the purchase of

\textit{Kilo}-class diesel submarines from Russia during Russian Commander Felix Gromov’s visit to

\textsuperscript{134} The 1994 Report stated: “Another undersea threat — diesel-electric submarines — can be very difficult to
detect under certain conditions. While the submarine threat has diminished relative to that posed by the former
Soviet Union, diesel submarines nonetheless can disrupt shipping and hinder allied sea control in littoral areas.” Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, \textit{Annual Report to the President and the Congress} (January 1994), p. 166. By contrast, the 1992 Report emphasized the reduced threat. It wrote: “The attack submarine force will be reduced by 15 percent by 1997. This reduction can be safely accomplished because of the dramatic changes that have taken place in the Soviet threat and world situation.” Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, \textit{Annual Report to the President and the Congress} (February 1992), p. 77.

\textsuperscript{135} William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, \textit{Annual Report to the President and the Congress} (1998), p. 25. No

\textsuperscript{136} William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, \textit{Annual Report to the President and the Congress} (1999), p. 39.
China. In 1995, the first Kilo (Type EKM 877) was commissioned. In 1996, a second Kilo (Type EKM 877) was commissioned, followed by a third (Type EKM 636) in 1997. The fourth Kilo (Type EKM 636) was delivered in 1999. China also purchased Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia. The purchase was agreed to in December 1996, and the first of the destroyers was delivered in February 2000. Aside from the delivery of the fourth Kilo, there was no change in the Chinese submarine forces around 1999 significant enough to warrant a change in the U.S. assessment of Chinese submarine threat.

Bernard Cole, a professor and a specialist on the Chinese navy at the National War College, noted that the debates on the China threat were usually associated with debates on U.S. military budgets. In 1998-99, the JCS was conducting a study on attack submarine force level. As a follow-up to the 1997 QDR, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the JCS to conduct a study on SSN force level to determine the number of attack submarines required in 2015-2025. The study, “1999 CJCS Attack Submarine Study” was completed in late 1999 and released in February 2000. The QDR stated that the number of attack submarines (SSNs) should be reduced to 50. However, the CJCS Study had concluded that 68 SSNs in the 2015 and 76 SSNs in the 2025 time frame were required. This consideration of reductions in the

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138 In addition, two Sovremenny-class destroyers were ordered in late 1996.
140 Sovremenny was equipped with 8 3M-80E Moskit SS-N-22 SUNBURN supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles and 48 SA-N-7 SAMs.
141 As of 2004, China had acquired 2 Sovremenny destroyers and 2 more were said to be on order. See for example, Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act.
142 Bernard Cole, interview by author, Washington, D.C., 1998. Bernard Cole holds a Ph. D. in history and also was a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy, retiring as a captain in 1995. Dr. Bernard Cole and Captain Bernard Cole, USN (Retired) are thus the same person. See note 89 above.
submarine force coincided with the period when the U.S. Navy started to make China-related threat arguments.

Rear Admiral Albert Konetzni, Commander of Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet, testified to House Armed Services Committee in June 2000 about the “pain” caused by “an inadequate number of attack submarines” due to the many security issues that the Pacific Submarine Force had to face. He noted the development of Chinese navy as one of the issues:

With the purchase of foreign submarine technology and tactical weapons, China is rapidly developing a navy that could project power beyond territorial waters.

The 2001 QDR identified “the East Asian littoral” as one of critical areas for the first time, and said that “Precluding hostile domination” in this area was a U.S. national interest. The East Asian littoral was defined as “the region stretching from south of Japan through Australia and into the Bay of Bengal.”

(3) Air Force

Compared with the Navy, the Air Force has been much less interested in and concerned about China. Annual Defense Reports have not mentioned China in their aviation threats

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145 Ibid.

section or in connection with the Air Force throughout the 1990s.147 “Near-term threats” were assessed to “remain below levels that would put U.S. air superiority at significant risk in a regional conflict,” and “chief potential regional adversaries” were named as “Iraq, Iran and North Korea.”148 It seems that China was not even on the Air Force’s radar screen until the Taiwan Strait Crisis of March 1996. After the crisis, some officers started to identify the China-Taiwan situation as a potential flashpoint. For example, the Pacific Air Forces Commander, General John Lorber named China/Taiwan situation and Korean peninsula as the two hot-spots concerning PACAF in an interview. He noted that:

There are two areas we are closely watching. The second area is the China/Taiwan situation. Tensions are presently high and will rise or fall depending on how this situation of one country-two governments eventually plays out.149

Unlike the Navy, the Air Force does not seem to have used China to justify its force structure. Some officers were more concerned with the Indian air force demonstrated.150

There was little interest in China even in air force journals, where opinions are more freely expressed. Aerospace Power Journal (formerly Airpower Journal), a professional publication of the Air Force, only had one article on China between 1988 and 2001.151 Air Force Magazine, published by the Air Force Association, was not much different. It did not have any article on China from 1988 until 1997. After 1997, several articles were published including

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147 The only exception was the 1997 report which stated air force’s efforts in “Constructive Engagement with China.” William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (April 1997).
148 For example, William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (1999).
three by Bill Gertz, a reporter for Washington Times known for his hard-line views of China.  

The Air Force only became interested and somewhat concerned of China after the Taiwan Straits Crisis presented the potential for a war against China. “China threat” arguments were already prevalent in the United States by 1995 and thus, the Air Force was a late-comer in the debate and did not cause the rise of “China threat” arguments.

(4) Summary of Military Services and “China threat” Arguments

The behavior and arguments of the military services conformed to organization theory. Organization theory predicts that organizations seek a new threat to maintain size and wealth. Military organizations are expected to search for threats in the order of the most similar to less similar threats. The JCS and the services maintained that the Soviet Union was formidable after the end of the Cold War and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The services began to search for an alternative threat to justify their force structure when public and congressional demand for “peace dividend” and hence force cuts were anticipated.

The first alternative threat the services pointed to was regional conflicts. This would have been a convenient threat for maintaining force structure because arguments could be made that regional conflicts could not be anticipated in advance, and thus existing forces were necessary. This threat of “uncertainty” was also supported by civilian leaders. However, the

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153 One exception was ballistic missiles. Although the Air Force as a whole did not make arguments about Chinese ballistic missiles, some officers were prominent in writing articles related to Chinese ballistic missiles. For example, Mark Stokes, “China’s Military Space and Conventional Theater Missile Development: Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait,” Colonel Susan M. Puska, ed., People’s Liberation Army After Next (Washington, DC: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000). Lieutenant Colonel Mark Stokes is Country Director for China and Taiwan within OSD as of 2003. He served as an assistant air attaché in Beijing, from 1992 to 1995.
services needed a more concrete threat for which they could train and plan. The 1992 Defense Planning Guidance laid out several scenarios for that purpose. China was not included in any of the scenarios at this point. The two regional conflicts that emerged from the seven scenarios were the Middle East and Korea, both of which were old threats in terms of force structure, because the U.S. military planned to fight two wars even during the Cold War, one in Central Europe and one either in Middle East or in Korea.

The services began to make “China threat” arguments around 1995. China’s occupation of the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in 1995 and missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 provided the services with scenarios for which to plan. However, even then, “China threat” arguments were not very prominent among the military services. The Navy’s arguments about attack submarines are an exception, which were closely related to budgetary demands for increase of attack submarines. This behavior can also be explained by organization theory.

The JCS and by Colin Powell argued for regional threats and the Base Force to maintain primacy. However, unlike ONA’s view of primacy, the services emphasized maintaining existing force structure and programs. There was also a strong tendency for the services to focus on threats based on actual scenarios rather than long term threats based on aggregate power competition.

Both the ONA and the military services were driven by the maintenance of primacy after the demise of the Soviet Union. The difference in the way they made “China threat” arguments seemed to be influenced by their differing roles. Tasked with assessing and reacting to long-term threats, ONA was one of the first and the most active in making “China threat” arguments. Once they have identified a country as potential threat based on power trends, the
ONA asked questions like: what are the ways in which China can pose problems for the United States? The military services, on the other hand, were slow and less active in making “China threat” arguments. The influence of organizational interests seemed to be stronger on the military services. They made threat arguments to justify their force requirements. The military services asked questions like: where are conflicts likely to occur? It seems that Marshall, the ONA, and the security community associated with it envisioned a role for the United States as a hegemon with preponderance of power that prevented the rise of a rival. And the military services envisioned a more reactive role dealing with security problems as they became manifest. Taiwan was regarded as one of the places where U.S. forces might be required to fight.

IV. INTEREST GROUPS (ADVOCACY GROUPS)

1. Predictions for Advocacy Groups:

(1) Anti-communist organizations will make “China threat” arguments after the Soviet threat has disappeared and when it has become difficult to sustain organizational size, wealth and internal organization without a new threat.

(2) Political conservatives, human rights groups, religious conservatives and labor organizations will make “China threat” arguments when it has become difficult to sustain its organizational interest with other threats and issues.

Organization theory argues that organizational interests led these groups to make “China threat” arguments to maintain their interest. Close observers of U.S. policies towards China have pointed out the strong influence domestic interest groups on U.S. perceptions of and arguments about China. This section will examine whether this cause and effect relationship is present in the case.

The main groups that made “China threat” arguments were political conservative groups
such as the Heritage Foundation, the Project for New American Century (PNAC), religious conservatives such as the Family Research Council (FRC) and the so-called Blue Team made up of security specialists and congressional staffers that held strong anti-China views. In addition, human rights groups and labor groups made strong anti-China arguments. Some of these arguments were not about threats per se, but they may have facilitated the rise of "China threat" arguments. I will also examine such a proposition.

Organization theory predicts that interest groups advocated "China threat" arguments to maintain their organizational interests. The groups should make "China threat" arguments when they can no longer support their organizational interest without a new threat argument. Again, the explanation based on organization theory will be tested against the explanation based on Realism.

For some interest groups, countering the Soviet threat — or other threats — provided a purpose and target for the organization. Without these threats, it would be difficult for the organizations to keep resources coming into the organization. Anti-Communist groups, human rights groups, nuclear disarmament groups, and labor groups, to differing degrees, targeted the Soviet Union. Organization Theory predicts that these groups would begin a search for a new target after the end of the Cold War in 1989 or after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Some groups targeted Japan prior to the mid-1990s. Others targeted South Africa before it repealed apartheid in 1990-91. By 1993, they had all lost their primary target.

An examination of various organizations reveals that organization theory explains little about the rise of "China threat" arguments. Organization theory predicts that organizations first choose threats that are most similar to the old threat. Some groups, such as human rights and

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right-to-life organizations, conformed to what organization theory predicts. They utilized China to serve their organizational ends and made anti-China arguments. However, they did not make “China threat” arguments. Their arguments did not involve security issues.\(^{155}\)

Organization theory does a better job of explaining the spread of “China threat” arguments starting from 1996-1997. Several groups began to use anti-China rhetoric to draw attention to their message. By 1996, anti-China arguments had already gained some currency among policy makers. The issue of China’s MFN status brought together diverse groups. Some of these groups made “China threat” arguments even though security was not an issue their organization typically raised.

2. Anti-Communist Groups

Organization theory predicts that anti-Communist organizations are the most likely groups to make “China threat” arguments. But the anti-Communist groups did not make “China threat” arguments. They sought an alternative goal after the Soviet Union fell, but shifted to promoting democracy rather than focusing on China’s communism.

For many anti-Communist groups in the United States, the end of the Cold War was both a great victory and a serious organizational crisis. Many groups suffered a loss of contributions and membership. For example, the American Conservative Union’s number of donors fell from 750,000 in 1980 to 50,000 in 1990. The National Conservative Political Action Committee also had to move away from the anti-Communist movement and find a new goal. Brent Bozell, the Committee’s finance director said in 1990 that funding opportunities for conservative

organizations had shifted to monitoring elections and running training seminars in capitalism: “It can’t be an anti-Communist movement but a pro-freedom one. ... That’s the new reality.” However, the Committee could not gather enough funding and was forced to go out of business. Many anti-Communist groups and conservative organizations which used to focus on the Soviet Union shifted to promoting democracy in their old geographical area, the former Soviet Union and East Europe. Their agenda became less confrontational. Anti-Communist groups were generally not active in making “China threat” arguments in the early- to mid-1990s.

3. Human Rights Groups

During the Cold War, some human rights groups focused on changing conditions in the Soviet Union. For these groups and much of American public, the Cold War was not just a military confrontation but a moral issue. Although human rights conditions in China in the 1950s to the 1970s were as bad as those in the Soviet Union and East European states, no U.S. human rights groups targeted China until the mid-1980s. Some human rights groups began to work on China’s human rights around 1986, but as described in Chapter 3, the issue did not receive much support in the Congress or in the public before the end of the Cold War.

(1) Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch (HRW) was an early and vociferous opponent of the Chinese government’s human rights record. However, the HRW did not talk about national security. The group only provided information about China’s human rights abuse, which was often used

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158 Harry Harding, Fragile Relationship, p. 199. Also see Chapter 5.
by groups that made “China threat” arguments. In this way, the HRW indirectly facilitated the spread of “China threat” arguments.

HRW became very focused on China after the Tiananmen incident of June 1989, before the rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States. There was no significant increase in the amount of attention the organization paid towards China throughout the 1990s. Unlike some organizations, such as Christian Conservative groups that began to make “China threat” arguments around 1996 using human rights issues, the HRW was consistent in its arguments.

The Asia division of HRW was founded in 1985. According to its former Washington Director, Mike Jendrzejczyk, until 1989 most of its efforts were devoted to South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.

After 1989, China became a top priority of all of our work in Asia. We established an office in Hong Kong in 1991, which provided a research outpost. China has become a top priority in terms of staff allocation, the amount of resources we devote to both research and publications, as well as advocacy work that we do.159

*Human Rights Watch World Report 1990* also noted HRW’s focus on China.

Because of the scale of abuses there and the cowardice of the Bush administration’s response, China continues to receive the greatest share of Asia Watch’s staff time and resources.160

HRW analysts testified about China before Congress nine times during 1990s, often as part of debates over China’s MFN status.161 Human Rights Watch continuously opposed granting MFN status to China. Its information was used by other organizations to make “China threat” arguments, but it did not seek alliances with other types of organizations.162

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162 Jendrzejczyk noted that “Right after Tiananmen incident, human rights in China very much defined the image of China and image of the Chinese government. Over time that has changed. Human rights issue, while still on the agenda, is far less important in both bilateral and international relations. It is an issue that all governments
The MFN debate in the Congress brought together groups with diverse aims. Many, such as the AFL-CIO and Family Research Council, used HRW reports to further their organizational cause. Jendrzejczyk commented on this process:

Much of organizations’ interests in China are imbedded into the MFN debate. ... I think it was in the context of the MFN debate that the issues of security, human rights and trade all three got combined. Those who are driving the MFN debate here have different motives. Some are very legitimately, and genuinely concerned about promoting human rights in China, and saw this is a constructive ways to do that. Others had different agenda. It was mixed. Human rights do get a lot of attention during the MFN debate. On the other hand, the outcome was not as productive as we had hoped. I do find it a problem of China being demonized by someone that wants to use human rights to project an image that is not based on reality. Sometimes it triggers calls to contain China or punish China. I think that’s very counter-productive in terms of human rights. 

Jendrzejczyk noted the receptiveness of the media to the issue and acknowledged a temptation to oversell it:

It’s always a risk, because for example the media is easily captured by anything sensational about China. Sometimes there is a temptation. I wouldn’t say (to) exaggerate, but rather (in) the way you package information and the way you present it.

Although HRW itself did not make “China threat” arguments, its reports aided other groups, some of which did make “China threat” arguments. HRW thus contributed to the rise of the U.S. perception that China was a threat.

give some attention to and in some cases give some lip service to but not anything more substantial...There is a bit of a disconnect. The notable critics of China (in the United States) are those most out of touch with how China has changed. They have used the issue much more for political reasons. The debate on China has become more polarized and all sides of the debate had to use human rights and information about human rights to explain or justify their position. For example, when religious freedom in China was hot a few years ago, we were criticized by some religious groups for not being more critical of China and soft-pedaling some of the problems. But at the same time, we see groups quoting our information when they would go up to the Congress or administration to demand a tougher policy on China. We feel like we were cheated.” Jendrzejczyk, interview by author, June 1999, Washington, tape recording, Washington, DC. Criticisms of HRW’s position on religious persecution were expressed by Freedom House, for example. Adrian Karatnycky wrote in Wall Street Journal in 1997 that HRW has soft-pedaled the issue. Adrian Karatnycky, “Human Rights Groups Ignore Today’s Martyrs,” Wall Street Journal, October 23, 1997, p. A18.

163 Jendrzejczyk, interview by author.
164 Jendrzejczyk, interview by author.
Organization theory predicts that Freedom House would take up China once Communism in the Soviet Union no longer presented a problem for the United States, in order to maintain organizational health. This seems to have occurred. Freedom House was instrumental in bringing different groups together in a loose coalition against China after 1996. Some of these groups made "China threat" arguments.

Freedom House was founded in 1941 by Eleanor Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie to fight Nazism and Communism in Europe. It is the oldest human rights group in the United States. Throughout the Cold War, fighting Communism was central to the mission of Freedom House. It is a non-partisan, non-profit organization, and its Board of Trustees is composed of Democrats, Republicans, and independents; and business and labor leaders. Freedom House has several security and foreign policy specialists on its Board, such as Zbigniew Brezinski, former National Security Advisor to President Carter; and R. James Woolsey, former Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).\footnote{Other members include Samuel Huntington, Professor of Harvard University and former Coordinator of Security Planning for the National Security Council; Kenneth Adelman, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and former Assistant Secretary of Defense; Anthony Lake, former National Security Advisor to President Clinton; Dan Quayle, former Vice President of the United States; and Jeane Kirkpatrick, former ambassador to the United Nations.}

As predicted by organization theory, Freedom House’s became more concerned with China after the collapse of the Soviet Union.\footnote{Freedom House had been concerned with freedoms in China since the 1970s. Until the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, China’s political rights and civil liberties were assessed at the lowest possible level (a 7 on a scale from 1 to 7 where 7 represents the lowest degree of freedom). Between 1977 and 1989, the rating was a 6 for both categories. The rating dropped back to 7 again after 1989 for both categories, remaining there throughout the 1990s. The rating for civil liberties returned to 6 in 1998 and remained there until at least 2003. Freedom House, \textit{Freedom in the World 2003—The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties} (Rowman and Little, 2003). Data taken from Freedom House’s website. http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/table.pdf (July 22, 2003).} Freedom House’s renewed interest in China was strongly influenced by the loss of the Soviet Union and apartheid as organizational targets.
Fighting communism was still an important issue for the organization, and China was a communist country.\textsuperscript{167} In the early-1990s, Freedom House shifted its focus from resisting totalitarian threats to spreading freedom. China issues took a more prominent position as a target for the organization. In 1993, Freedom House expressed great concern about the ability of undemocratic countries such as China to continue to prosper.\textsuperscript{168} Freedom House also noted that 1993 was the "worst single-year setback for freedom since 1972" when it first started its comprehensive survey.\textsuperscript{169} This was a somewhat surprising statement given that 1993 was the year after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is possible that Freedom House may have overstated the lack of freedom in countries to serve its organizational purpose. For example, Freedom House ranked conditions in China after 1989 to be the same as during the Cultural Revolution. Some expressed doubts about this assessment. For example the Far Eastern Economic Review wrote in a 1993 editorial that:

However repressive China of 1993 may be today, it is a far sight better than the China of 1973... Even if Freedom House sees liberty in retreat elsewhere in the world, we see a 1994 of continued progress in much of Asia.\textsuperscript{170}

Freedom House’s 2000 mission statement continued to show concern about China:

A changing world requires a rededication of purpose. ... While there is no dominant alternative ideological challenging the values of political freedom, influential voices argue for authoritarian paths of development. Large portion of the globe, including China, the world’s most populous nation, remain unfree.\textsuperscript{171}

Promoting religious freedom became a more important mission for Freedom House after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Center for Religious Freedom, a division of Freedom

\textsuperscript{167} Nina Shea, telephone interview by author, July 1999.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{171} Freedom House, Mission Statement, 2000, from the website.
House, was established in 1986. The Center became active on China issues in the mid-1990s. In January 1996, its director, Nina Shea, brought religious conservatives and human rights advocacy groups together to form a loose coalition dealing with China-related issues. Shea was quoted in the press welcoming the growing interest in China:

I am thrilled and overjoyed that the Christian organizations and churches are starting to wake up (to the issue of international religious freedom). ... They are natural constituency for human rights.172

China presented common denominator for various groups because it had human rights problems, religions freedom issues, forced abortion policies that offended both pro-life and pro-choice advocates, and exported cheap goods that hurt American workers. Although the Freedom House did not make “China threat” arguments per se, it contributed to the spread of anti-China arguments by drawing the attention of various groups to China. The groups cooperated in opposing the renewal of China’s MNF status and on putting the fight against the denial of religious freedom on the U.S. government’s agenda.

Freedom House organized this coalition in January 1996, before the Taiwan Strait crisis of March 1996. This suggests that the increased attention Freedom House generated among the advocacy groups was independent of the increase in “China threat” arguments that occurred after the Taiwan Strait crisis.

4. Political Conservative Organizations (Think Tanks)

During the Cold War, many conservative organizations targeted the Soviet Union. Organization theory predicts that these groups would seek an alternative threat to serve their organizational interest. However, conservative organizations rarely made “China threat”

arguments before 1996. The conservative organizations instead shifted their focus to domestic politics.

In the 1992 presidential election, fighting communism was not an issue. Instead, the election focused on domestic issues. Some conservatives advocated nativist positions and others argued for a restoration of “family values.” Presidential candidate Bill Clinton won the election with a focus on domestic issue. To the extent that foreign policy was debated, the emphasis was on trade. Japan’s trade policies were targeted. A Republican candidate Patrick Buchanan called for the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Democrats and Jerry Brown and Senator Tom Harkin used harsh anti-Japanese language when talking about American trade failures. Democratic Senator Bob Kerrey used a television spot in New Hampshire to tell voters that if Japan did not open its markets to American products then the United States would reciprocally close its markets.173

The candidates took anti-Japanese positions because voters were receptive to them. In 1991, there was a significant decline in “warm feelings” towards Japan.174 In 1990, 60% of Americans identified Japan as the critical threat to the United States.175 In March 1992, 31% of Americans named Japan as America’s greatest security threat, and only 13% picked the former Soviet Union.176

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176 In 1990, according to Times Mirror, only 8% of Americans spontaneously identified Japan as America’s greatest security threat, 32% named the Soviet Union. Despite some anti-Japanese feelings among the public, candidates who took strong anti-Japanese stances did not fare well in the election. Kerrey stopped running his commercial after New Hampshire. When asked why, he responded: “Because it didn’t work.”
During the first term of Clinton’s administration, conservative organizations focused on domestic issues such as the health-care reform, rather than on foreign policy issues. It was only in the second term, that conservative groups actively made “China threat” arguments. The force behind the change was promoting an alternative foreign policy for the United States based on strength and primacy.

In this section, I examine the threat arguments put forward by politically conservative organizations. The groups I will examine are the Heritage Foundation, Project for New American Century (PNAC) and the Blue Team. These groups are chosen because they were the most vocal proponents of “China threat” arguments.

(1) Heritage Foundation

The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank which often supplied policy-oriented research for the Republican party, worked extensively on analyzing the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Even in May 1991, researchers at the Foundation argued that Soviet threat was still formidable in Asia.177 Throughout the 1980s, Heritage wrote little on China, expect for some pieces on human rights and Taiwan.178 A 1986 report argued for offering arms assistance to China as a counterweight to Soviet Union, but not enough to disrupt the balance between China rivalry, economic rivalry was not seen in a zero-sum terms. Ornstein, “Foreign Policy and the 1992 Election,” p. 6.

177 Richard Fisher, “Why Asia Is Not Ready For Arms Control,” *Asian Studies Center Backgrounder*, No. 113, (May 25, 1991). Fisher observes that “Moscow continues to pour new and more capable ships, submarines and aircraft into its Far Eastern military forces.” (p. 2) He argues, “This huge Soviet deployment in Asia means that America's first security goal in Asia is to deter the Soviets.” (p. 6)

There were several reports after the Tiananmen Square Incident written about the balance between human rights interests and economic interests. But overall, little attention was paid to China. A lecture in July 1989 even argued that China's capability and strength were being exaggerated:

In fifty years, China may once again become a world power to be reckoned with. At present, however, China is neither another Soviet Union, nor another Japan. It is a dragon of papier-mâché and poster paints. It is India on the China Sea. ... China has no Soviet card to play.  

The Heritage Foundation remained focused on domestic issues after the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially after President Clinton took office. This was reflected in their major policy publication, *Backgrounder*, which focused on health care reform and economy during this period. The international issues written on were primarily trade issues, namely free trade agreements and trade problems with Japan. National security arguments were mainly about budgets and not about specific threats. Even the *Asian Studies Center Backgrounder* did not give much attention to China.

This changed with the Taiwan missile crisis of March 1996. There was a marked increase in the organization's interest in China. The *Asian Studies Center Backgrounder* analyzed the impact of the crisis on U.S. national security. Thereafter, nine out of thirteen issues of *Asian Studies Center Backgrounder* dealt with China. The first *Backgrounder* to take

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179 Martin Lasater, “Wanted: A U.S. Policy for Selling Arms to China,” Executive Memorandum, No. 106 (January 15, 1986). Lasater argued “They (Pentagon aides) argue correctly that the U.S. must help upgrade the equipment of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) because the gap between China’s military capabilities and those of Moscow’s Asia-based forces is widening rapidly in the Soviet’s favor.”


up a China-related issue in the 1990s appeared in November 1997, warning against China’s military buildup.\textsuperscript{183} Richard Fisher, former director of Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, was trained as a Soviet specialist and wrote extensively on Soviet threat until the early-1990s.\textsuperscript{184} He began writing on Chinese military threat around 1995 and became known for his hawkish positions.\textsuperscript{185}

The Heritage Foundation supported continued MFN status for China, meaning it was not part of the coalition of human rights, religious conservatives and labor organizations discussed in the last section. Heritage saw the maintenance of normal trading relations with China as an important part of U.S. global commercial strategy. The two main reasons Heritage gave for continued MFN for China in 1996 were economic. It argued that revoking China’s MFN would: (a) harm American workers; and (b) threaten U.S. business and investment.\textsuperscript{186}

The behavior and arguments of the Heritage Foundation conform to some of the predictions of organization theory. Heritage continued to target the Soviet Union even after there was a marked change in the security environment. The Foundation shifted its focus to economic and domestic issues rather than security issues because it followed the public trend, thus maintaining public support and hence resources. Big business was an important constituency for Heritage. The resulting support for trade with China may have had a moderating effect on the organization’s arguments about China.

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\textsuperscript{185} Richard Fisher left the Heritage Foundation in 1999. It was speculated that he resigned because of criticisms for his strong position on China.
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The shift back to foreign policy issues during Clinton’s second term is less well explained by organization theory. There was no marked change in public attention to domestic issues that meant there was no need for the Foundation to argue that China was a threat to sustain its organizational interests. The focus on China and subsequent “China threat” arguments were caused by an event – the Taiwan Strait crisis – and by the increased interest among policy makers. Heritage was not among the initiators of “China threat” arguments.

(2) Project for New American Century

A Washington based political group, the Project for New American Century (PNAC) was a strong advocate of “China threat” arguments. PNAC was one of the many organizations that started to pay more attention on foreign policy issues in President Clinton’s second term in office. PNAC was founded especially to deal with foreign policy issues and worked extensively on China. PNAC also provided a forum for individual security/foreign policy specialists known as the “Blue Team” that made strong “China threat” arguments.

PNAC was founded in the spring of 1997 after the presidential election of 1996. The organization grew out of a group that provided foreign policy recommendations to Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole’s campaign. They formerly established PNAC to “give voice to a conservative Reaganite perspective on foreign and defense policies.” William Kristol was the chairman of the PNAC together with its co-founder Robert Kagan. The two were the Editor and Contributing Editor of a conservative magazine, The Weekly Standard.

PNAC was motivated by two factors. First, it aimed to create an opposing voice to the Clinton administration’s foreign policy. Second, it sought to promote a foreign policy based on

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military strength — a “neo-Reaganite foreign policy” in PNAC’s terminology, and more generally referred to as “neoconservatism.”

Organization theory argues that PNAC would make “China threat” arguments when the organization could no longer sustain support for the organization with other issues. However, PNAC was a new organization in the 1990s, making this prediction irrelevant.

On the other hand, organizational theory says something about PNAC because it was a successor to another organization, the Project for the Republican Future (PRF). William Kristol was the chairman of that organization from 1992 to 1995. The PRF worked mainly on domestic issues and was “very successful and killed the Hillary health-care plan,” according to one of its members.\(^{188}\) Some give credit to the PRF for shaping the strategy which helped the 1994 Republican congressional victory. Blocking the health-care reform bill was seen a way to undermine the Democratic party and President Clinton.\(^{189}\)

The PNAC was a foreign policy version of the PRF. The “China threat” was to the PNAC what the health-care reform bill was to the PRF: a means to discredit the administration. Gary Schmitt, Executive Director of PNAC, said that they took up “China threat” arguments in President Clinton’s second term because there were enough domestic issues to work on during the first term: “Clinton’s focus and the focus of the political debate were domestic. There was no time or occasion to bring China issues up.”\(^{190}\) The shift to China issues was brought about by the change in domestic politics and heightened public interest in China.

PNAC’s second organizational purpose was to realize a neo-Reaganite foreign policy.

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\(^{189}\) Former President Clinton cites William Kristol’s memorandum to the Republican leaders in June 1994 which stated the importance of the health-care reform bill in bipartisan politics. Clinton recalled that in the memorandum Kristol said that “a success on health care would present a ‘serious political threat to the Republican Party,’ while its demise would be a ‘monumental setback for the President.’” Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), p. 601.

Kristol and other members of the PNAC opposed not only the Democrats' foreign policy, which focused on economic issues, but also the foreign policies of Republican realists like Henry Kissinger and isolationists within the Republican party. Schmitt said: “What worried us after the 1996 election was a real quasi isolationist perspective which generated a sense of emergency.”

Organization theory argues that when organizations change their purpose, they find one as similar to the old purpose as possible. The PRF/ PNAC’s redefinition of its organizational goal did not conform to the predictions drawn from the organization theory. However, the PNAC’s purpose was quite different from that of the PRF. Realization of neo-Reaganite foreign policy was not chosen because of the anticipated support from the public or from the policy makers. Nor can this goal be seen to serve the interests of the Republican party. It attacked the isolationist and realist foreign policies held by broad swaths of the party. The organization’s motivation seems to have been ideological, one based on power and liberal democracy.

PNAC’s position was well documented in Kristol and Kagan’s 1996 article “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy” which appeared in Foreign Affairs. The article argues that the United States should pursue a “benevolent global hegemony” through “a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military supremacy and moral confidence.” It argues that “the main threat the United States faces now and in the future is its own weakness” and stated the importance of having “an overall strategy of containing, influencing, and ultimately seeking to change the regime in Beijing.”

The PNAC’s statement of principles of June 1997 follows the same line of argument.

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191 Gary Schmitt, interview by author.
193 Ibid., pp. 20, 23.
194 Ibid., p. 23.
The statement states its intention to "rally support for American global leadership." In 2000, PNAC published a book called: *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy*. The title of the book was taken from the Committee on Present Danger, a group created in the 1970s to increase awareness of the Soviet Threat and block détente. The book argued that:

The present danger is that the United States, the world's dominant power on whom the maintenance of international peace and the support of liberal democratic principles depends, will shrink its responsibilities and — in a fit of absentmindedness, or parsimony, or indifference — allow the international order that it created and sustains to collapse. Our present danger is one of declining military strength, flagging will and confusion about our role in the world.  

The PNAC began to make "China threat" arguments around 1997. The PNAC argued and wrote about both the "China threat" in the future and current situations involving Taiwan. Their "Statement of the Defense of Taiwan" released in conjunction with the Heritage Foundation in August 1999 is an example of the later. However, for PNAC, China *per se* was not the issue. The central issue was the wariness about the disinterest of the U.S. public and the policymakers in maintaining preponderance. For PNAC, the danger was the United States wasting the opportunity to shape the world to its interest. Kristol explained:

I'm not a China expert at all. My view of China ... flows from my view of what you think U.S. foreign policy should be ... American weakness is really the danger.

Kristol saw China as a powerful vehicle to realize the strong America that he hoped to establish. Kristol seems to have chosen China because the annual MFN debate in Congress

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197 Aside from the signatories of the Statement of Principles of PNAC, the "Statement on the Defense of Taiwan," August 20, 1999 was signed by such individuals as Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.; Richard V. Allen; Richard L. Armitage; John R. Bolton; William F. Buckley, Jr.; Jeane J. Kirkpatrick; Edwin Meese III; Richard Perle; William Schneider, Jr.; Arthur Waldron; Malcolm Wallop; James Webb; Casper Weinberger; Paul Weyrich; and R. James Woolsey.
198 William Kristol, quoted in Kaiser and Mufson, "'Blue team' Draws a Hard Line on Beijing."
had already put it at the center of the political debate by 1996. Kristol reportedly was struck by
the focus on China among foreign-policy thinkers on the right and decided to elevate opposition
to China's trade status into a major conservative issue in 1997.\textsuperscript{199} He discovered that China
was a hot-button issue, which could help revive the anti-Communist fervor of the Reagan
years.\textsuperscript{200} The PNAC and Kristol used the "China threat" to further their cause.

Organization theory argues that organizations have tendencies to make arguments that
promote organizational wealth. Governmental organizations seek larger budgets and advocacy
groups seek more funding. PNAC denied this proposition. According to Schmitt, the PNAC
denied funding from the defense industries when the group was founded because he did not
want others to think that money was driving what PNAC said. PNAC raised funds from
private foundations including the Bradley Foundation, the John M. Olin Foundation, and Sarah
Scaife Foundation.

When we started, defense companies came rushing with money. I said no, because I
wanted to build up a track record of stated oppositions without having taken any money
from them. I did not want people to say money is driving what we say.\textsuperscript{201}

According to Schmitt, by 2002, PNAC could take funding from Lockheed Martin and
Northrop Grumman, defense contractors because it had a track record.\textsuperscript{202} Bruce Jackson, one
of PNAC’s three Project Directors along with Kristol and Kagan was a vice president at
Lockheed Martin Corporation until 2002.\textsuperscript{203} Thomas Donnelly, a PNAC Senior Fellow and
former Deputy Executive Director, was the director of strategic communications and initiatives

\textsuperscript{199} Gerald Seib and John Harwood, "Disparate groups on the right join forces to make opposition to China's trade
\textsuperscript{201} Gary Schmitt, interview by author.
\textsuperscript{202} Gary Schmitt, interview by author.
\textsuperscript{203} Bruce Jackson worked for Lockheed Martin from March 1993 to 2002, including the time before the merger of
Martin Marietta and Lockheed Corporation in 1995. He was the head of the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO
and chair of the Republican Party Platform Subcommittee for National Security and Foreign Policy for President
George W. Bush during his presidential campaign. Jackson became Chairman of the Committee for the
Liberation of Iraq in 2002.
of Lockheed Martin Corporation in 2002. Clearly PNAC had a close relationship with
Lockheed Martin. But Schmitt denied the influence of defense industry on their opinion:

> There is no think tank in this town who is not open to the charge of having gotten money
from somebody and tailoring its message to that. There are think tanks that tailor their
message because of the money and those who get money because they already had that
message.\(^\text{204}\)

As described above, by the time PNAC and Kristol became interested in and concerned
with China in 1996, "China threat" arguments were already prevalent in American society, and
certainly among foreign policy elites. The Taiwan Straits crisis of March 1996 had increased
the magnitude and frequency of "China threat" arguments as the military services and think
tanks began to take up the argument. The timing suggests that PNAC did not initiate "China
threat" arguments, but contributed to their spread. Kristol and his allies seem to have chose
China as an issue because it was a good vehicle for the primacy strategy.

(3) The Blue Team

A group that sometimes called itself the "Blue Team" held the most hawkish views on
China. The "Blue Team" was closely associated with the Project for the New American
Century (PNAC). Some members of the Blue Team have also worked closely with ONA.
The members of the Blue Team identified China as the imminent threat to U.S. national security
and often advocated a policy close to containment. The Blue Team was a loosely organized
group made up of scholars in think tanks, congressional staff, magazine editors and writers.\(^\text{205}\)

The name Blue Team refers to the hostile forces that the regular Red Team of the People’s

\(^204\) Gary Schmitt, interview by author.

\(^205\) "Blue Team" is referred to as "a loose alliance of members of Congress, congressional staff, think tank fellows, Republican political operatives, conservative journalists, lobbyists for Taiwan, former intelligence officers and a handful of academics, all united in the view that a rising China poses a treat risks to America’s vital interests." Robert G. Kaiser and Steven Mufson, "Blue Team’ Draws a Hard Line on Beijing: Action on Hill Reflects Informal Groups’ Clout," *Washington Post*, February 22, 2000, p. A1.
Liberation Army uses in training exercises. Many members of the Blue Team participated in a study group run by the PNAC and funded by Richard Mellon Scaife, the Pittsburgh billionaire who supports right-wing causes.206

The Blue Team is not the type of group organization theory addresses. However, the group did represent some organizational interest to the extent that many of the members were congressional staffers for Republican members. The group acted to promote the interests of the Republican Party and especially its conservative members.

The Blue Team members who had worked as congressional staff were William C. Triplett II, Jim Doran, Michael Pillsbury, Al Santoli, Mark Lagon, and Peter Brookes. The congressmen they worked for were Republican Senators Jesse Helms (South Carolina) and Robert Bennett (Utah), and Republican Representatives such as Christopher Cox (California) and Dana Rohrabacher (California).

For example, Triplett was an aide to Senator Bennett and a former staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee whose Chairman was Jesse Helms. The term “Blue Team” was coined by Triplett. Triplett is the co-author of such books as Year of the Rat: How Bill Clinton Compromised U.S. Security for Chinese Cash, and Red Dragon Rising: Communist China’s Military Threat to America.207 A close observer of U.S.-China relations in Washington remarked that “Triplett’s footprints are all over the place” when legislations and resolutions that take a hard position on China are passed.208 Triplett prides himself as being “the person on


208 Interview with a Washington political correspondent.
China issues on the Hill. Mark Lagon is a political scientist working for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Jim Doran worked as an aide to Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Senior Professional Staff Member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Peter Brookes was the Principal Advisor for East Asian Affairs with the Republican Staff of the House International Relations Committee, and served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2001 to 2002. Michael Pillsbury, worked for the Office of Net Assessment as special assistant for Asian Affairs, and served Assistant Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Planning, and as a Senate staff coordinator. Frank Gaffney, who runs a think tank called Center for Security Policy, was also a former congressional aide and a Defense Department official in the Reagan administration. Other members include journalists like Bill Gertz of Washington Times and Ross Munro, an author of the book Coming Conflict with China; think tank scholars like Richard Fisher; and academics like Arthur Waldron, a scholar of Chinese history at University of Pennsylvania.

There was a strong element of partisanship in the behavior and arguments put forth by the members of the Blue Team. Some of “China threat” arguments were used to undermine President Clinton. Members of the Blue Team wrote books such as Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security and Year of the Rat: How Bill Clinton Compromised U.S. Security for Chinese Cash.

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210 Waldron was a former Director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute and taught at the U.S. Naval War College. He was also a member of the Congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

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Organization theory does little to explain the “China threat” arguments of conservative organizations. A common factor driving the conservative groups was partisan politics, not individual organizational interests. There seems to be two reasons for the emergence of “China threat” arguments among the conservative groups. One was to attack President Clinton. The other was to promote primacy.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, conservative organizations initially focused on domestic issues. This was partly because of the domestic and economic focus of the Clinton administration. Issues such as health-care reform provided the conservative groups with a target to organize their movement. The political agenda had shifted to security issues by the second term, and conservative think tanks responded. Conservative groups took up “China threat” because China was regarded as the single issue that could attract the attention of a large number of people. By 1996 when the conservative groups began “China threat” arguments, China had already gathered attention of the policymakers and the public through the annual MFN debate and the Taiwan Straight Crisis.

The second reason why some of the conservative groups took up “China threat” arguments was to promote primacy. This was an alternative policy to the Clinton administration’s foreign policy which focused on engagement and economic interests.

Conservative groups were not the first ones to make “China threat” arguments and therefore did not cause the rise of “China threat” arguments. The ONA and individual scholars and security specialists in think tanks and universities made “China threat” arguments beginning in 1992-1993. Anti-China arguments also stemmed from the MFN debate and human rights concerns. PNAC and the Blue Team proliferated “China threat” arguments in the wider
security policy community of policy makers and the public. They also gave an extremist and alarmist tone to “China threat” arguments.

5. Social Conservatives/ Religious Conservatives

The religious right was another group that made “China threat” arguments. The Family Research Council (FRC) headed by a Republican presidential candidate Gary Bauer was the most vocal of these groups. It began to make “China threat” arguments around 1996.

During the Cold War, opposing the Soviet Union had presented religious conservatives with a sense of mission. Ralph Reed, former Executive Director of the Christian Coalition, wrote:

Americans opposed Communism not only because of its Marxist economic system but also because of atheism. Religious folk were at the forefront in creating a national crusade against Communism. ... At the height of the Cold War, the American people defined themselves in opposition to Soviet Communism, and that meant as a religious people.²¹²

When the Soviet Union collapsed, religious conservatives lost one of the causes which held different groups together. Paul Weyrich, founder of the Heritage Foundation in 1974 and President of Free Congress Foundation since 1977 observed:

Opposition to the Soviet Empire, was a glue that had held all sorts of disparate elements of the conservative movement together, because whether you were a religious-right person or an extreme libertarian or whatever in between, the one thing everybody could agree on was that the Soviet Union was ‘the evil empire’ and that it had to be opposed. With that disintegrating, you had an entirely different dynamic, and you shifted from the Cold War framework that had dominated American politics from the end of World War II to 1990 or so, to a domestic-oriented political framework. That had a profound impact on the [Religious Right] movement, because it now had to define itself much more carefully than it had in the past, when it could be part of a large framework.²¹³

Religious conservatives did not take up China right away after the Cold War. Similar to other conservative groups, they initially focused more on domestic issues. Reed wrote:

Liberals charged after the collapse of the Soviet Union that the right merely replaced the demon of Communism with a new demon of homosexuality and other forms of socially deviant behavior in order to whip up its supporters and sustain its political fortunes. ... What happened in fact was that a religiously inspired movement opposing tyranny abroad turned its attention to social injustice at home. Freed from the international threat of Communisms, it had the ability to focus on domestic social problems that threaten the survival of the family, the faith, and the culture.214

Bill Clinton’s victory in the 1992 election was seen by some religious conservatives as presenting a new “enemy” for the movement.215 Guy Rodgers, the Christian Coalition’s first national field director from 1991, saw an opportunity for the organization when Clinton was elected because Clinton was “an openly pro-abortion, pro-gay rights liberal.”216 Bobbie Kilberg, who worked in George H. W. Bush’s White House public liaison office, identified Bill Clinton as the new target for conservatives:

What better way to galvanize your troops than to have Bill Clinton to fight against? He was a new bad guy. They no longer had the bad guy of communism. The Cold War was over, the Berlin Wall was gone. They had a lot of trouble raising money and organizing in the last two years of the Bush administration, because there was nobody to be angry at, and you don’t raise money just by sending out ‘feel-good’ letters. Now they had this other big bad guy, and the first thing he did was decide to put gays in the military. I don’t know where his head was, but what a wonderful issue to galvanize the far right, and they were off and running.217

Religious conservatives increased their influence within the Republican Party in the early-1990s. Religious conservatives had traditionally been a strong base for the Republican party. Some estimate the conservative traditional values base at fifty million.218 The movement drew most of its members from white evangelical Protestants which comprised

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214 Reed, *Active Faith*, pp. 55-56.
215 Some observed that Clinton’s attack on President Bush’s record on China and human rights during the 1992 presidential election made China policy a focus of the Republicans’ attack on President Clinton.
216 Guy Rodgers, quoted in Martin, *With God on Our Side*, p. 327.
218 Martin, *With God on Our Side*, p. 316.
nearly 25% of all registered voters. This was three times the number of African American Christian voters, four times the number of non-religious voters, and twelve times the number of Jewish voters.219 According to a 1994 study by Campaigns and Elections magazine, they dominated the Republican Party in at least 18 states and had substantial influence in at least 13 others.220 Their votes were also extremely important and useful because unlike some material interest driven organizations, members of religious groups were highly motivated and thus provided powerful agents for gathering votes. Bobbie Kilberg explained the strength of the religious right as a political organization.

I think you will still find that the majority of Republican voters are in the center of the party, but it’s hard to get moderate, pragmatic people to organize themselves. They’re into too many other things in their lives. But people who are ideological and who believe they are directed by God to do something have an enormous force and enormous energy.221

In the 1992 election, Bush sought support of the religious conservatives, especially when the recession began harming his reelection chances. Reed explained that “the only card the Bush campaign had left to play was the social-conservative moral-issue, ‘family values’ card.”222 Republicans captured the Congress in 1994 election with great help from Christian activists. They tended to be “middle-income, working-class voters who care deeply about issues such as abortion and school prayer.”223 As a result, these issues grew more important in the Republican agenda.

After 1996-1997, religious conservatives began to focus on China. From the spring of 1996, Christian conservatives began to take interest in opposing the extension of China’s MFN

220 Quoted in Martin, “The Christian Right and American Foreign Policy,” p. 68.
222 Ralph Reed, quoted in William Martin, With God on Our Side, p. 327.

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status. Until then, Christian conservatives had mainly worked on domestic issues. For instance, before 1996, Gary Bauer, head of the FRC, had mainly testified in Congress on issues like the defense of marriage act or on family tax relief. In September 1997, however, Bauer testified in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations regarding China.

Christian conservatives’ interest in China was the result of a number of things. One was the approach from other conservatives. For example, as noted in the section on PNAC, William Kristol recruited Gary Bauer into the circle of China hawks. Bauer became active in making “China threat” arguments related to human rights abuse and the military threat from 1996. In the course of elevating opposition to China’s trade status into a major conservative issue in 1997, Kristol is said to have recruited Bauer to write an article opposing China’s trade privileges on the basis of human rights and national security. Jacob Heilbrunn wrote in *The New Republic* in July 1997 that, “For Kristol, Bauer served as an instrument with which to prevent social conservatives from becoming foreign policy isolationists.”

Second, Freedom House also recruited religious conservatives in their fight against China’s human rights abuses. Nina Shea, a human rights activist with the Freedom House, was instrumental in bringing different groups together. In January 1996, she organized a meeting called, “Global Persecution of Christians” which started a campaign to ask the government to

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place the fight against the persecution of Christians in other countries on their agenda. The National Association of Evangelicals, the largest evangelical organization in the United States, which represented more than ten million conservative Christians, was in the forefront. Gary Bauer of the Family Research Council attended. Michael Horowitz, director of the Hudson Institute’s Project on Civil Justice Reform and Project on International Religious Liberty, was also there. Freedom from religious persecution bills were introduced in Congress in 1997 as a result of this effort.

The annual renewal of China’s most favored nation status (MFN) provided a forum where different groups advanced their arguments against China. Debates in the congress were widely reported and highly publicized. The occasion provided the groups with an opportunity to promote their points of view with little cost. This made issues associated with the debate any easy way to win organizational support.

For example, William Saunders, Foreign Policy and Human Rights Counsel of the FRC explained:

FRC’s focus has been not exclusively but mainly domestic until probably 1996. China focus per se is recent and that is driven by human rights issues and religious persecution and religious freedom denial issues. ... I think the MFN renewal galvanized a lot of human rights groups to say look here is an issue that the ordinary domestic public in America might become aware of and therefore we can make them become aware of human rights dimension of it.

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230 Jacob Heilbrunn called Michael Horowitz, “the impresario of the anti-China movement.” Heilbrunn observed that “For Horowitz, China represents a golden opportunity to realize the neoconservative dream of creating a permanent alliance between Jews and evangelicals.” Horowitz was quoted as saying, “The Bible Belt is our safety belt.” Jacob Heilbrunn, “Christian Rights,” The New Republic, July 7, 1997, p. 20.
231 Five bills related to religious persecution were introduced in Congress in 1997. See, for example, H.R. 1685: To establish an Office of Religious Persecution Monitoring, to provide for the imposition of sanctions against countries engaged in a pattern of religious persecution, and for other purposes; and H.R. 2431: An act to express United States foreign policy with respect to, and to strengthen United States advocacy on behalf of, individuals persecuted in foreign countries on account of religion; to authorize United States actions in response to violations of religious freedom in foreign countries; to establish an Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom within the Department of State, a Commission on International Religious Freedom, and a Special Advisor on International Religious Freedom within the National Security Council; and for other purposes.

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The MFN debate enabled organizations with different agenda to work together. 233 Gary Bauer was quoted in 1997:

A close coalition has been formed that upsets all the traditional rules. It’s myself, the AFL-CIO, some human-rights groups and the Catholic Bishops. 234 China for a variety of reasons seems to generate opposition on the left and right ... (but this coalition is no more unlikely than the one of) American capitalists and Chinese communists. 235

Opposing the renewal of MFN status to China also provided a way to attack President Clinton. Gary Bauer explained:

Each year that MFN for China came up for a vote in Congress, I was against it, I kept waiting for others to take up the fight. I was disappointed that my fellow social conservatives had forgotten Ronald Reagan’s principles of how you stand up against totalitarianism. ... If we can force the veto (on President Clinton), we will have transformed our policies toward China and sent an unbelievably important message to the American foreign-policy establishment. 236

Third, out-reach to international issues was partly a result of the difficulty of pursuing the abortion issue, a key part of the Christian Conservative agenda, domestically. The use of violence against abortion clinics led to harsh criticisms and more moderate anti-abortion forces began to distance themselves from the movement. 237 This made the continuation of the movement within the United States more difficult. By 1996, the religious conservatives were in search of targets. Christian persecution overseas and human rights abuse in general

233 The odd coalition was evident in the unusual mix of protesters when President Jiang Zemin visited the United States in 1997. Human rights groups, labor organizations, environmental groups, anti-nuclear activists, Christian conservatives and Tibetan monks with the International Campaign for Tibet all participated. Jack Kelley, “Protesters prepare for Chinese leader’s visit China officials are concerned about images,” USA Today, October 17, 1997, p. A8.


237 On March 10, 1993, an anti-abortion activist Michael Griffin assassinated a gynecologist outside of his clinic where he performed abortions. In July 1994, another doctor and his driver were killed, followed by a murder of two people at an abortion clinic in Brookline, Massachusetts in December 1994. See Martin, With God On Our Side, pp. 355-356.
provided the groups with that target. Randall Balmer, a professor of American religious history at Barnard College, observed a change when the Christian Coalition’s president, Don Hodel, announced in August 1997 that he was putting the religious persecution bill at the top of his fall legislative agenda: “The Christian Coalition is searching for an issue right now that is less contentious than abortion ... This is a way to keep their troops mobilized.”

Lastly, religious conservatives took up China issue in response to public interest in the issue. It is said that the FRC started to really focus on China in 1996 after their fund raising letter concerning China’s human rights violations generated overwhelming response from the contributors. Public opinion polls showed that favorable feelings towards China decreased markedly after the Tiananmen incident of June 1989, plunging from 72% in March 1989 to 16% in June. The rating never recovered during the 1990s, remaining in the 30s. In 1997, 69% of respondents felt that the job the Chinese government does in respecting the human rights of its citizens was “very bad” (34%) and “mostly bad” (35%).

Given a choice of “(taking a) strong stand on human rights” and “(establishing) strong diplomatic and trade relations,” 56% of poll respondents preferred taking strong stand in May 1996. The figure remained unchanged through 1999.

6. Labor Organizations — AFL-CIO

The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO),

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239 I was not able to confirm this point with the Family Research Council.
240 Taken from polls by ABC/Washington Post and others, quoted in “US Relations with China,” from the Americans and the World website. (http://www.americans-world.org/digest/regional_issues/china/china1-dat.cfm)
241 Gallup Organization/Cable News Network, USA Today, (June 1, 1997), quoted in “US Relations with China,” from the Americans and the World website.
242 Poll conducted by Time, Cable News Network (May 9, 1996), quoted in Ibid.
the largest labor union federation in the United States, actively opposed China’s MFN status in the 1990s. The AFL-CIO began to express concerns about trade problems with China in 1993 but worked on the China issue more actively from 1995-96. The AFL-CIO worked “in parallel” with Family Research Council and other human rights groups. There was an implicit understanding with the conservatives that AFL-CIO would lobby the Democrats on the MFN issue and that FRC would lobby the Republicans. This unlikely partnership has sometimes been called the “unholy alliance.”

The timing of the AFL-CIO’s adoption of anti-China arguments conforms to organization theory. The AFL-CIO had expressed concerns of China in the 1980s, but mainly about workers’ rights. Trade problems with China began to gain notice from members of the AFL-CIO in the early-1990s. However, it was not until around 1995-96 that the organization shifted its attention to China. In the 1980s and early-1990s, the AFL-CIO’s main target was Japan. The organization worked extensively on trade problems with Japan. Also, from around 1991 to 1993, the AFL-CIO was preoccupied with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It was only after the AFL-CIO had exhausted its efforts on other issues that the organization began to work on China.

The AFL-CIO was motivated by the increase in cheap imports from China. The organization argued that many members were losing jobs due to increase in exports from China.

243 The AFL-CIO is a voluntary federation of sixty-five national and international labor unions and represents thirteen million workers.
244 Mark Anderson, Director International Economic Policy, AFL-CIO (1983-1997), interview by author, 30 June 1999, Washington, tape recording, Washington, D.C. Anderson denied that there was a “coalition” with the Family Research Council, and said that AFL-CIO never worked “together” but worked “in parallel” with the FRC.
246 Anderson, interview by author.
citing as evidence the petitions filed under the trade adjustment assistance program. Imports from China forced job losses within the United States. The AFL-CIO's increased attention to China issues was caused by the increased trade imbalance with China.

The AFL-CIO does not work on security issues and therefore did not make "China threat" arguments per se. However, the AFL-CIO took advantage of the already prevalent human rights and security arguments to enhance support for the organization. Prison labor and PLA affiliated companies were ready-made targets for the AFL-CIO. For example, in 1994, the AFL-CIO leader, Lane Kirkland opposed extension of China's MFN status by arguing in part that China was fattening its military coffers by setting up factories run by the Chinese Army and the police to do business with American corporations like Kmart and Wal-Mart.248

In June 1997, the AFL-CIO, together with its Food and Allied Service Trades (FAST) and United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW), launched a nationwide campaign to "Kick the PLA Out of the U.S.A." The campaign called upon President Clinton to revoke visas of all representatives of the PLA and People's Armed Police (PAP) and asked Congress to enact legislation to ban trade and investment with the United States by PLA and PAP companies. It also called upon American consumers not to buy PLA and PAP products.249 FAST also published a report, "China's People's Liberation Army — Where to Find PLA Companies in America, What Products the PLA Sells in America and Who are the PLA’s Customers." The campaign coincided with national security arguments other organizations were making. AFL-CIO denied having interests in national security issues and stated that the PLA was used as a symbol to get public attention:

247 Anderson, interview by author.
The AFL-CIO does not work on security issues. I don’t focus on what China can do to the United States. I don’t look at China from that lens. We thought “Kick the PLA Out of the U.S” campaign was a graphic example of the nature of the economic structure in China. ... We are saying this as a symbolic exercise. Why should we allow the agencies shooting people in China to operate commercially in the United States?250

Public attention was then what put China on the AFL-CIO’s agenda. As one official explained, China had become a more salient issue than Japan:

(Recently) we are hearing more about China than Japan because currently there are a lot more going on with China. Constructive engagement, the whole spying issue. There is certainly an element of China being used to attack Clinton. ... People have gotten used to relationship with Japan. In the 1980s, the problems with Japan were more serious. But it was a part of the restructuring going on in the U.S. economy. The 80s were a wrenching period for the manufacturers in the United States as a result of all kinds of reasons, one of maybe ten was trade with Japan. But it is always easier to jump on those outside of the country.251

(2) Summary: Labor Organization and “China threat” Arguments

The AFL-CIO’s China arguments conform to many of the predictions of organization theory. The AFL-CIO began to target China around 1995 when Japan and NAFTA ceased to be top priority issues in the United States.

Several facts indicate that the organization exaggerated China’s threat to promote its organizational agenda. For example, AFL-CIO did not make national security arguments, but used the PLA as a symbol for their movement in order to gain public attention. The organization worked in loose coalition with other groups, which made “China threat” arguments, to further their agendas.

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250 Anderson, interview by author.
251 Anderson, interview by author.
V. CONCLUSION

Organization theory explained some organizations' “China threat” arguments but not others. The theory failed to explain the initial rise of “China threat” arguments in the early-1990s. It offered a better explanation for the spread of “China threat” arguments from 1996-1997.

There were three different kinds of organizations and “China threat” arguments. First, there were those that made “China threat” arguments out of long term security concerns. For these groups, the motivation behind making “China threat” arguments was primarily to sustain U.S. primacy, not organizational interests. The Office of Net Assessment (ONA) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is an example. The ONA was one of the first groups to make “China threat” arguments. It identified China as a potential threat as early as 1987 but made “China threat” arguments more after 1993, and was influential in shaping the threat arguments in the 1990s. The threat arguments of the ONA, however, did not conform to the predictions of the organization theory. Instead of seeking to maintain existing defense strategy and defense programs, as organization theory suggests, the ONA sought to promote innovation in defense programs (to realize the RMA) and to restructure existing defense organizations. The ONA’s motivation for promoting RMA and making “China threat” arguments seems to have been to promote primacy, rather than some organizational interest. However, the ONA did exaggerate “China threat” arguments to promote RMA and reduce the resistance of the military services to it. PNAC also seems to have been driven primarily by the pursuit of primacy. However, the PNAC was not the cause of the rise of “China threat” arguments. The group began to make “China threat” arguments after the arguments had a certain currency among the security policy community.
Second, there were those that made “China threat” arguments mainly for organizational interest. These groups’ threat arguments conformed to organization theory. These organizations made “China threat” arguments when they served organizational well-being. The military services are the primary examples. The services were slow in making “China threat” arguments. As predicted by organization theory, the services argued first for threats most similar to the old and then for next most similar, and so on. After the Cold War, the military services argued for a continued and resurgent threat posed by the Soviet Union/Russia. This was followed by regional threats posed by countries like North Korea and Iraq, and threats of “uncertainty.” It was only after the Taiwan Strait crisis of March 1996 that the services began to make “China threat” arguments, although in a limited way. After the crisis, the services began to perceive the Taiwan Strait as a possible theater of U.S.-China military confrontation. The Navy made the earliest and most prominent “China threat” arguments because the possible conflict in the Taiwan Strait was likely to be a naval engagement. The Navy also made “China threat” arguments in connection with the arguments about maintaining a formidable submarine force. The Army and the Air Force showed some concern about China’s military capability after the Taiwan Strait crisis, but their “China threat” arguments were negligible. They did not make their “China threat” arguments in connection with force structure.

Third, there were the organizations that bandwagoned on the prevalent anti-China arguments that emerged out of human rights and trade issues. These organizations began to make “China threat” arguments around 1997. The AFL-CIO and the Family Research Council (FRC) are examples in this category. They saw a strong interest in China among the policy makers and the public and utilized “China threat” arguments to promote their organizational
objectives. The AFL-CIO promoted policies that restrict trade with China by using “China threat” arguments. The FRC promoted religious freedom using “China threat” arguments. The annual debate over the renewal of China’s MFN status provided a ready forum for the organizations to express their position, getting them attention without much cost. In this way, the annual MFN debate in Congress contributed to the rise and spread of “China threat” arguments.

Still there were others that did not make “China threat” arguments although they were active in China related issues. For example, human rights groups were active in disseminating information about Chinese human rights abuses but did not make threat related arguments. Organizations such as HRW became more interested in China after the Tiananmen Incident of June 1989, but their arguments did not change significantly throughout the 1990s. HRW, which was the most active human rights organization on China, did not use “China threat” arguments for its organizational interest. But many organizations used the HRW’s human rights reports to promote “China threat” arguments.

Organization theory explains the “China threat” arguments of the second and the third groups. However, these groups were not the initiators of “China threat” arguments. It was the first group that was the most influential in the emergence of “China threat” arguments in U.S. security discourse. Their arguments were driven primarily by concerns about primacy.
I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the proposition that the rise of “China threat” arguments occurred because China was not a democracy. The proposition is based on a version of democratic peace theory. Many “China threat” arguments referred to China's undemocratic nature as a source of threat. This suggests that the rise of “China threat” arguments was a result of the fact that China is not a democracy. But in some cases, China’s undemocratic nature became part of “China threat” arguments only after China was perceived as a threat. In other cases, evidence suggests that China’s undemocratic nature was just a dressing to sell the threat arguments or the strategy that followed from them.

The influence of liberal democracy on U.S. foreign policy has been observed to be both significant and insignificant in the past. Louis Hartz notes that “liberal absolutism” in American society “hampers creative action abroad by identifying the alien with the unintelligible, and it inspires hysteria at home by generating the anxiety that unintelligible things produce.” Alternatively, the United States has been known to define dubious regimes as “democratic” for their opposition to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The United States supported undemocratic regimes during the Cold War in the Philippines, South Korea, the

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Dominican Republic, Chile, and elsewhere. When assessing threats, the United States was far more interested in whether a state was communist than whether it was democratic. John Kennedy demonstrated his preference for an undemocratic regime over a communist one when the dictator, Rafael Trujillo, died in the Dominican Republic in 1961.

There are three possibilities in descending (in) order of preference: a decent democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro regime. We ought to aim at the first, but we really can’t renounce the second until we are sure we can avoid the third.

On the other hand, after the end of the Cold War, American analysts saw fellow democracies, such as Germany and Japan, as potential threats. Does a state’s democratic nature affect threat perception, or are threats defined as non-democracies?

In this chapter I ask whether the rise of “China threat” arguments occurred because China was not a democracy or whether China’s undemocratic nature was highlighted because China’s power made it a threat. The first answer is from democratic peace theory, the second from realism.

For democratic peace theory to explain the rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States, the theory must show that the reference to China’s undemocratic nature in threat arguments was not epiphenomenal. Policy makers often realize national security objectives by exaggerating external threats. Fareed Zakaria notes that statesmen “manufacture consciously or unconsciously, ‘threats’ and ‘dangers to security’ to justify expansion” rather than

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4 Example of such arguments is seen in the “Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years (February 18 1992 draft).” The draft of the DPG was quoted in Patrick E. Tyler, “Pentagon Drops Goal of Blocking New Superpowers,” New York Times, May 24, 1992, p. A1. This point will be discussed in detail in the later section.
acknowledge their desires for influence and hegemony. Thomas Christensen notes that leaders sometimes exaggerate external threats to mobilize the public to realize national security strategy. These explanations lead to the idea that “China threat” arguments may be a means to induce the United States to a particular strategy, like primacy. The threat arguments and mention of spreading democracy may simply serve the offensive realist purpose of achieving hegemony.

Democratic peace theory incorporates liberal democratic imprudence. Democracies have initiated wars against non-democracies with a specific purpose of making them liberal. The causal logic for these wars is based on democratic peace. We should not conflate these wars with the wars democracies wage based on power but justify with the rhetoric of democratic values.

2. Road Map

In the following sections, I examine various groups to see if China’s undemocratic nature caused their “China threat” arguments. First, I will offer a brief overview of the Democratic Peace theory of threat perception and how it applies to the “China threat” case. I list the questions I will ask for each of the groups and for the public. The groups I examine are democracy advocacy groups and foreign policy-security elites that were vocal in making “China threat” arguments. I then examine the influence of China’s undemocratic nature to the primacy strategy. I also examine arguments about Japan in the late-1980s to the early-1990s as a comparative case.

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3. Summary: Democratic Peace Theory and “China threat” Arguments

(1) Democratic Peace Theory of Threat Perception

Democratic peace theory seeks to explain the empirical observation that, while democracies have frequently fought non-democracies, they have rarely gone to war with other democracies. Several proponents of democratic peace have argued that democracies perceive democracies and non-democracies differently. They argue that, irrespective of physical capability, liberal democracies view their like as safe and illiberal non-democracies as threats.\(^7\)

Democratic peace theory consists of a diverse and growing literature, which includes many disputes among its proponents. I use a version of democratic peace that speaks most directly to threat perception. I focus on works by such scholars as Michael Doyle, John Owen IV and Bruce Russett, along with several others. Below I summarize the causal mechanisms the theory uses to explain war between a democracy and a non-democracy and make inferences about what the theory says about democracies’ threat perception.

Democratic peace posits six causes of threat perception among democracies and non-democracies, which fit in three categories. The three categories are: (a) propensity to use force; (b) ideological threat and (c) reaction to a liberal crusade.

(a) Propensity to Use of Force

(i) Speed of attack as a cause of threat perception

Some structural constraints that democratic leaders face when making decisions are absent for undemocratic leaders. According to democratic peace theory, leaders of non-democracies can


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initiate war more easily, rapidly and secretly. Perceiving this fact, democracies in conflicts with non-democracies may initiate violence. Noting this possibility of preemptive attack by democracies, non-democracies might also initiate attack rather than risk being attacked. This spiral of threat perception magnifies hostilities and fears between democracies and non-democracies, the theory says.

(ii) Opacity of intentions and force structure as a cause of threat perception

The opacity resulting from the lack of democratic institutions leads to uncertainty about non-democracies’ intentions. It also increases uncertainty about their capabilities, which could result in overestimation of capabilities.\(^8\) This leads to a perception of greater threat.

(iii) Lack of cooperative norms as a cause of threat perception

According to democratic peace theory, liberal democratic norms prompting democracies to search for a negotiated settlement to conflicts are lacking in non-democracies. Democracies, in turn, do not apply these cooperative norms to non-democracies for fear of risking attack. This lack of cooperative norms in the relations of democracies and non-democracies leads to perception of threat on both sides.

(iv) Lack of common identity as a cause threat perception

The shared identity felt by liberal peoples towards other democracies is believed to spur positive feelings and enforces the preference to use peaceful means to resolve conflicts. The absence of shared identity breeds distrust and skepticism against non-democracies and leads to the perception of threat.

\(^8\) Opacity could also result in underestimation of capabilities. Opacity combined with the organizational traits of military organizations, however, tends to result in overestimation.
(b) Ideological Threat

(v) Non-democracies’ export of illiberal ideas as a cause of war

Democracies fear their domestic institutions might become undemocratic. Non-democracies’ export of illiberal undemocratic ideas leads to the perception of threat.9

(c) Resistance to Liberal Crusades

(vi) Non-democracies’ resistance to democratic crusades as a cause of war

Democracies believe that the establishment of a democratic zone of states will ensure peace and security within it. This leads democracies to attempt to democratize undemocratic regimes through various means, including use of force. This leads to resistance by leaders of non-democracies. This results in the perception of threat on both sides.

(2) The Summary of Hypotheses

(i) Democracies will perceive the intentions of non-democracies as aggressive because leaders are not restrained by domestic institutions and can make decisions to initiate attack more easily and faster.

(ii) Democracies will perceive the intentions of non-democracies as aggressive because their decision-making process is harder to see.

(iii) Democracies will perceive the intentions of non-democracies as aggressive because their presumed lack of cooperative norms are thought to produce a preference for the use of force.

(iv) Democracies will perceive the intentions of non-democracies as aggressive because of their

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9 John M. Owen IV argues that democracies view other states by comparing those states’ institutions to their own. Those with similar governmental institutions are regarded as benign and those that have very different institutions are regarded as threats. John M. Owen IV, Liberal Peace Liberal War: American Politics and International Security (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
export of illiberal ideas.

(v) The more liberal a country is, the more it will perceive non-democracies as threats.

(vi) Democracies will perceive the intentions of non-democracies as aggressive because of their resistance to democracies’ attempts to spread liberal ideas.

(vii) Democracies will perceive the intentions of non-democracies as aggressive because of their lack of common identity.

4. The Questions to be Examined

(1) Timing of “China threat” arguments

The timing of “China threat” arguments should match the level of democracy in China. Incidents that demonstrate China’s undemocratic nature should increase “China threat” arguments. Examples include the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989, the Taiwan Strait crisis of March 1996, which began with China’s attempt to influence Taiwan’s Presidential election, and the crackdown on the Falun Gong after April 1999. Alternatively, indications of improvement in democracy should decrease threat arguments.

During the Cultural Revolution of 1967-1977, individual rights and democratic conditions in China were at their worst. After 1978, when “policies of reform and opening to the outside world” were implemented, democratic conditions were still bad, but there was a gradual improvement. Local elections in the rural villages began spontaneously from the early-1980s and were institutionalized in 1988. There was a perception in the outside world that China was moving slowly towards democratization. In June 1989, however, the Tiananmen Square incident occurred. The incident was seen to indicate China’s disregard for individual rights and the Chinese government’s resistance to democratization.
The 1990s saw improvement in some aspects of individual rights and rule by law, punctuated by several events that showed China's undemocratic nature. Regulations were eased to spur economic growth and integrate China with the international economy. There were also changes in domestic laws that allowed for more openness within the Communist Party. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident, the Chinese government limited freedom of organization. The firing of missiles near Taiwan in March 1996 was planned to influence the outcome of the Taiwan's first direct election. The missile crisis was seen as China's attempt to intimidate Taiwan's voters. In 1999, the government banned the Falun Gong movement after a demonstration on April 25, 1999 outside the Zhongnanhai, a residence of the top leaders, including President Jiang Zemin, in which some 20,000 members participated. The Chinese government banned the group on July 22, calling it an "evil cult."  

(2) Do “China threat” arguments conform to Democratic Peace theory?  

If China's undemocratic nature is the source of “China threat” arguments, the causal mechanism derived from the theory should be present in “China threat” arguments. Those who make “China threat” arguments should have theory about why a non-democracy is a threat and how that threat could be addressed. “China threat” arguments should point to the following as sources of threat.

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10 Falun Gong is a spiritual practice purporting to improve the mind, body and spirit. Estimates of the number of Falun Gong followers range ten million to 100 million. The organization included many retirees seeking health and comradeship. (Ministry of Public Security of the People's Republic of China. http://www.china-embassy.or.jp/jpn/zt/xjflg/t62966.htm). The footage of the government burning Falun Gong books were shown on television and articles reported on the crackdown. Ian Johnston of the *Wall Street Journal* received the 2001 Pulitzer Prize for articles reporting “the Chinese government’s often brutal suppression of the Falun Gong movement.” The Pulitzer Board. http://www.pulitzer.org/year/2001/international-reporting/
(i) Speed/Propensity to use force

(ii) Opacity

(iii) Export of undemocratic ideas

(iv) Hostile reactions to democratic crusades

(3) What are the arguments about other non-democracies/democracies?

If states’ undemocratic nature is the source of threat perception, there should be consistency in how other non-democracies and democracies are perceived. In other words, other non-democracies should be perceived and argued as threats, and other democracies should not be perceived as threats.

5. Summary of Predictions

Prediction 1. Timing of “China threat” arguments: “China threat” arguments should occur after an event indicating China’s undemocratic nature.

Prediction 1-1. “China threat” arguments should be stronger in the 1970s and 1980s than in the 1990s.


Prediction 1-3. “China threat” arguments should occur/increase after the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996.

Prediction 1-4. “China threat” arguments should increase in relation to increased revelations about China’s undemocratic nature.

Prediction 1-5. The perception of China as undemocratic should exist prior to the rise of “China threat” arguments.

Prediction 1-6. Liberals and pro-democracy advocacy groups should have been concerned with China’s behavior and domestic conditions before the 1980s when the situation was much worse.
Prediction 2. Liberals within the United States should identify China as a threat more acutely and make more “China threat” arguments than other groups (political realists, hawks, etc.) in society.

Prediction 2-1. Pro-democracy groups should be the first to make “China threat” arguments.

Prediction 3. Contents of “China threat” arguments: “China threat” arguments should point to China’s undemocratic nature.

Prediction 3-1. “China threat” arguments should point to China’s propensity to use force based on the speed of its decision-making due to its lack of democratic institutions.

Prediction 3-2. “China threat” arguments should point to China’s propensity to use force because of its lack of cooperative norms.

Prediction 3-3. “China threat” arguments should point to the opacity of China’s decision-making and intentions as a source of threat.

Prediction 3-4. “China threat” arguments should point to China’s export of undemocratic ideology.

Prediction 3-5. “China threat” arguments should point to China’s aggressive resistance to U.S. efforts to democratize China.

Prediction 4. Threat arguments about other non-democracies and democracies should be consistent.

Prediction 4-1. Proponents of “China threat” arguments should view other non-democracies as threats.

Prediction 4-2. Proponents of “China threat” arguments should not view other democracies as threats.

Prediction 4-3. The United States should see actions taken by China as more threatening than similar actions taken by democracies.

Prediction 5. “China threat” arguments should not be based on power.

Prediction 5-1. Proponents of “China threat” arguments should not be making threat arguments based on power.

Prediction 5-2. “China threat” arguments should occur even without a change in the distribution of power.

Prediction 5-3. “China threat” arguments should occur when events indicate China’s...
undemocratic nature.

II. Pro-democracy Groups

1. Human Rights Groups

Contrary to democratic peace theory, those most committed to liberal democratic values, human rights groups, did not make the earliest and strongest “China threat” arguments. Human rights advocacy groups, such as the Human Rights Watch (HRW), became particularly active on China’s human rights conditions after the Tiananmen Square incident. The timing of the change conforms to Democratic Peace Theory. However, none of the major human rights groups or pro-democracy groups made “China threat” arguments. For example, Human Rights Watch, which strongly criticized China, did not make “China threat” arguments. Their arguments did not spill over to national security issues. Attaching human rights conditions to trade status was as far as HRW would go. Amnesty International, another active human rights group, also did not make threat related arguments. Amnesty did not even oppose the MFN status. Neither did the National Endowment for Democracy, an organization dedicated to spreading democracy, participate in the security debate or make “China threat” arguments. The same goes for Freedom House. While it identified itself as “a clear voice for democracy around the world” and “a vigorous proponent of democratic values and steadfast opponent of dictatorships of the far left and the far right,” its trustees have been “united in the view that American leadership in international affairs is essential to the cause of human rights and

11 Amnesty International is less political than Human Rights Watch. Amnesty approach is to support universal human rights and not to criticize the policies of any particular government. For this reason, Amnesty does not advance policy prescription and was not active on MFN issues.

2. Religious Conservatives

The Family Research Council (FRC) was prominent in making "China threat" arguments. The FRC began to make "China threat" arguments in 1997. Even before then, the FRC had worked on military issues, but only when they overlapped with cultural issues such as gays in the military. However, the FRC did not make "China threat" arguments after the Tiananmen Square incident. This suggests that a clear example of China's undemocratic nature was not sufficient for the FRC to view China as a threat or make "China threat" arguments. The timing suggests that the Taiwan Strait crisis may have had an impact on the group's perception of China.

China's undemocratic nature was an important component of the FRC's "China threat" arguments. China's violation of human rights and democratic norms were among the reasons the FRC saw China as a threat to U.S. interests. The FRC opposed the Chinese government's violation of human rights, suppression of democratic movements, policy of forced abortion, military build up, and belligerent rhetoric towards Taiwan. Gary Bauer, president of the FRC, wrote in the February 24, 1997 issue of The Weekly Standard, which William Kristol edits, that:

Reagan understood that American foreign policy must be consistent with American principles. ... Reagan understood that when a regime crushes its domestic opponents, as China does; when it suppresses the Catholic church and jails evangelical pastors, as China does; when it beats and tortures its own people, as China does; or subjects them to a massive campaign of forced abortions, as China does; it is unlikely to be a stable partner in international trade or a force for world peace.  

Here, Bauer was consistent with the democratic peace theory. He sees China's disrespect for individual rights and disinclination to negotiate settlements domestically as evidence that China

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13 Ibid.
was unlikely to solve international disputes through peaceful means and would not abide by international agreements. In June 1997, Bauer wrote an article in *USA Today* again attacking China’s undemocratic behavior:

China’s dictators do not deserve most-favored-nation trade privileges. Beijing’s rulers killed thousands of Chinese students in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and continue to brutalize their own people. Secret police harass and murder priests and pastors and oppress believers of all faiths ... China’s one-child policy has led to massive forced abortions and female infanticide. Every pro-democracy dissident has been jailed, exiled or killed. The Beijing regime is using its $65 billion trade bonus to modernize its military. While the United States and other democracies are rapidly scaling back our defenses, Communist China’s feverish arms buildup menaces us and our allies. China’s military talks openly of “a small war” with the United States over Taiwan by 2010. ... Ronald Reagan proved that firmness in defense and a foreign policy based on American ideals are what define a great nation. That should be our policy.  

Democratic peace theory predicts that liberals would see China’s export of illiberal undemocratic ideology as threatening. However, Bauer did not mention China’s ideological expansion as a source of threat. His perception of China’s propensity to use force was based on China’s rhetoric and not on China’s lack of domestic institutions, as the democratic peace theory predicts.

China’s military buildup was an important factor affecting the FRC’s “China threat” arguments. Bauer’s 1997 article showed his strong concern about China’s military modernization. The FRC published updates on the “Chinese security threat.”

China is an ascending world power that potentially threatens American security. ... China is rapidly modernizing its military and embracing an aggressive strategy with expansionist overtones.  

In 2001, Robert Maginnis saw a “coming of U.S.-China Cold War” and argued that the United

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States should “engage from a position of strength based upon firm principles.”

The FRC was also active in opposing the renewal of China’s MFN status. One of the reasons was because the FRC believed that China used its trade surplus to “bankroll a military modernization campaign” that seriously threatened U.S. interests in Asia.

Restoring the Reagan agenda was a recurring theme for the FRC and Bauer. As we saw in the February 1997 article, Bauer promoted Ronald Reagan’s China policy based on a commitment to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. What Bauer did not tell the readers was that during Reagan’s presidency (1981-1989), the United States and China engaged in close military cooperation, sharing intelligence and military technology. In his speech in Shanghai on February 30, 1984, President Reagan spoke of the different values that the United States and China held but went on to emphasize their common strategic interests:

There’s much that naturally divides us: time and space, different languages and values, different cultures and histories, and political systems that are fundamentally different. There’s no point in hiding the truth for the sake of a friendship, ... But let us, for a moment, put aside the words that name our differences and think what we have in common. ... Already there are some political concerns that align us, and there are some important questions on which we both agree...we share a stake in preserving peace in this area of the world. Neither of us is an expansionist power. We do not desire your land, nor you ours. We do not challenge your borders. We do not provoke your anxieties. In fact, both the United States and China are forced to arm themselves against those who do.

China was less democratic in 1984, and President Reagan was aware of its undemocratic nature. Nonetheless, Reagan did not see China as a threat, contrary to what Bauer and other Reaganites had argued in the late-1990s.

The two main objectives of the FRC’s “China threat” arguments were to maintain morality...
in U.S. foreign policy and to not grant MFN trade status to China. Morality was described in terms of democratic and conservative values. Liberty was important for the FRC, and it was believed to come from God. To do business with China meant betraying morality.

For the FRC, it was not just China’s undemocratic nature but its military buildup that was the source of threat. The FRC’s timing in making “China threat” arguments suggests that the increase in China’s military power was necessary to induce “China threat” arguments.

3. Summary: Advocacy Groups and “China threat” arguments

The groups most committed to spreading democracy and liberal democratic values, human rights groups, did not make “China threat” arguments. This is contrary to what the democratic peace theory predicts. These groups were quick to respond to the Tiananmen Square incident, indicating their sensitivity to China’s undemocratic nature. However, these groups were opposed to making threat arguments based on human rights conditions.

Strong proponents of “China threat” arguments, like the Family Research Council, started making “China threat” arguments only around 1997. This timing does not conform to the prediction based on the theory, suggesting that the undemocratic nature evidenced by the Tiananmen Square incident did not trigger “China threat” arguments. It also suggests that the FRC was not the initiator of “China threat” arguments. The content of the FRC’s “China threat” arguments did conform to democratic peace theory. It is, however, unclear whether China’s undemocratic nature triggered the FRC’s “China threat” arguments.

III. FOREIGN POLICY-SECURITY ELITE

In this section, I look at the influence of China’s undemocratic nature on the “China
threat" arguments of foreign policy- security elites. I examine security specialists in the Office of Net Assessment in DoD, think tanks, and universities.

1. Promotion of Democracy in U.S. National Strategy

Before examining the various groups, I briefly discuss how the promotion of democracy has been framed in U.S. strategy. Promoting democracy has been a stated goal of U.S. foreign policy for a long time. There are abundant examples of the rhetoric of liberal ideology in U.S. strategy. Security specialists that worked in the ONA described the role of the United States after the WWII as "the leading guarantor of democratic ideals and peace in the world." Democratic values were important for the United States during the Cold War. In June 1982, President Ronald Reagan declared "a crusade for freedom" and U.S. commitment "as a nation" to assisting democratic development.

Toward the end of the Cold War, the 1988 National Security Strategy emphasized the importance of democratic values:

There has been impressive continuity in U.S. National Security Strategy...designed to preserve the fundamental values of our democracy... [The] National Security Strategy must start with values that we as a nation prize...values such as human dignity, personal freedom, individual rights, the pursuit of happiness, peace and prosperity. These are the values that lead us to seek an international order that encourages self-determination, democratic institutions, economic development, and human rights. The ultimate purpose of our National Security Strategy is to protect and advance those values.

The importance of democratic values remained unchanged after the Cold War. In fact, the unchanging importance of democratic values was a constant subject of statements and

official documents. President George H. W. Bush pointed to the importance of democratic values as “enduring elements” of U.S. national strategy in the National Security Strategy of 1990:

Throughout our history, our national security strategy has pursued broad, consistent goals. ... We have also worked to advance the welfare of our people by contributing to an international environment of peace, freedom, and progress within which our democracy — and other free nations — can flourish.

We have always believed that, although the flourishing of democracy in America did not require a completely democratic world, it could not long survive in one largely totalitarian. It is a common moral vision that holds together our alliances in Europe, East Asia, and other parts of the world ... The American commitment to an alliance strategy, therefore, has a more enduring basis than simply the perception of a common enemy. 23

The same theme was repeated in the National Strategy Report of 1991.

Our response ... is shaped by what we are as a people, for our values are the link between our past and our future, between our domestic life and our foreign policy, between our power and our purpose. It is our deepest belief that all nations and peoples seek political and economic freedom. 24

The 1993 Report articulated the thesis of Democratic Peace. One month before retiring from presidency, President Bush wrote his aspirations for future historians to “look back on the end of the 20th century as the beginning of an ‘Age of Democratic Peace’.” 25

Our policy has one overriding goal: real peace — not the illusory and fragile peace maintained by a balance of terror, but an enduring democratic peace based on shared values.

The subsequent Clinton administration included the promotion of democracy abroad as one of the three central goals in the 1994 National Security Strategy report. 26 Reflecting the importance of promotion of democracy, the report was entitled “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.”

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This trend continued throughout the 1990s. “National security liberalism” became more pronounced as a factor in U.S. national security strategy. Reference to democratic values was abundant in the writings and statements coming out from Washington in the 1990s and 2000s. By 2000, the situation was such that Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen observed that democratic peace theory was “currently the most influential political science theory among American foreign policy elites.”

It was against this backdrop “China threat” arguments began in the early-1990s.

2. Department of Defense — Office of Net Assessment

(1) Timing

As we saw in Chapter 4, one of the very first groups to identify China as a potential threat were the security analysts working for the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) in the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD). The ONA had been studying China’s rise from the mid-1980s. In the case of ONA, as we saw, it was the change in the distribution of power that led to attention and apprehension towards China. The change in perception toward China occurred around 1986-87, before the Tiananmen Square incident. This suggests that it was power and not the realization that China was undemocratic that caused the rise of ONA’s “China threat” arguments. ONA increased the attention it gave China after 1992. This increase was due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and changes in the world’s geopolitical landscape, East Asia in

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(2) Conformity to the Theory

(i) Propensity to Use Force

Some evidence indicates that China’s undemocratic nature affected ONA’s assessment. ONA generally viewed non-democracies as sources of instability. One study by ONA relied on the assumption that Asia was more unstable because there were fewer democracies in the region.

The dominant conclusion (of the 1992 Summer Study) was for a number of reasons that Asia would be much more likely to have serious inter-state military conflicts than in Europe. The reasons for this was the density of democratic regimes in Europe was greater that the density of democratic regimes in Asia and the stability of democratic regimes in Europe was greater than the stability of democratic regimes in Asia largely because Asian democracies were younger. ... Notice that the argument was not that China was a threat but Asian international environment was more likely to have a conflict because of a combination of factors including the absence of democracy in China. 30

Some scholars who worked in ONA projects noted that instability could feed aggressive intentions. For example, the 1999 summer study suggested that an unstable China would be more likely to use force to bolster domestic legitimacy. 31

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29 The director of a working group at the ONA 1992 Summer Study, Stephen Rosen of Harvard University, recalled that the study arose primarily because of realignments in world distribution of power. Rosen noted that “Soviet Union had collapsed. At that time, Andy (Marshall) asked why don’t we make an initial attempt to think about what the character of the world politics would look like now that the Soviet Union is collapsed, and what could be the emerging alliances and alignments since the anti-Soviet alignments were no longer likely to persist.” Stephen Peter Rosen, interview by author, February 28, 2001, Cambridge, tape recording, Cambridge, MA. 30 Rosen, interview by author. Rosen listed several other factors as sources of instability in the region. One was rapid economic growth, including China’s, which could lead to more aggressive and nationalistic behavior towards other countries. “We understood roughly that as regimes changed internally in response to industrialization they often became more bellicose. So this was not just China but also industrialization of India, possibly Indonesia, possibly Korea. We were saying, if some historical trends hold true then we should see rapid increases in levels of nationalism. Not in Japan. Japan had already nationalized. Japan had its growth of nationalism in the 1920s and 30s, but India, China, South Korea were undergoing very rapid industrialization, therefore [they] might be expected to be very nationalistic. So for all these reasons if you were an American defense planner, then you should be much more worried about potential international conflict in Asia than in Europe.”

31 Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), Asia 2025, 1999 Summer Study, Organized by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment, 25 July - 4 August 1999, Newport, Rhode Island. The argument that domestic instability leads to external aggressive behavior was fairly widely supported by proponents of “China threat” arguments.
(ii) Opacity

The opacity of China's undemocratic system exacerbated suspicion and the security dilemma. Policy planners in OSD and ONA showed tendencies to be skeptical about China's weapons program. The lack of transparency led analysts to assume the worst. They refused to accept the argument that China was not realizing a revolution in military affairs (RMA) and developing certain weapon systems without clear evidence. Insufficient information caused by China's closed system led analysts to prefer to err on the side of assuming that China could develop certain weapons rather than that it could not.

For example, Michael Pillsbury, who was a central figure analyzing China's military capabilities for ONA, argued against those who said that China was not developing RMA.

How come these people be so sure? I say at least we know that these are the aspiration of some people in China. We don’t know how strong they are, maybe they are just a minority view, based on the aspirations of the PLA officers. ... In the case of Russia, we can prove it. In the case of China we can only say that they are writing about this, because it’s a very closed country, isn’t it? 32

The flip side of the argument is that the opacity of the Chinese system also made refuting “China threat” arguments more difficult. In other words, the lack of transparency allowed for an environment in which “China threat” arguments are easily exaggerated and hard to check.

(iii) Export of Undemocratic Ideology

The ONA did not make arguments that China was seeking to export its undemocratic ideology.

(iv) Hostile Reaction to Democratization

The Chinese government's resistance to democratization caused some security specialists to perceive China's intentions as hostile to the United States. For example, Pillsbury noted that

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China's attitude had turned hostile after the Tiananmen Square incident. He assessed that the purge of leaders sympathetic to democratization had caused China to become more hawkish toward the United States. 33

(3) Arguments about Other Democracies and Non-Democracies

If undemocratic nature caused the rise of "China threat" arguments, then we should see similar arguments made towards other non-democracies and different arguments towards other democracies. In other words, there should be consistency in the argument.

ONA was primarily concerned with big powers. During the 1990s, ONA studied such countries as China, Russia, India, Japan and Germany. Small undemocratic countries were not the focus of the ONA studies. At the end of the 1980s, Marshall and others examined the growth trends of fifteen key countries: the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, China, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Turkey, India, South Korea, Taiwan, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. 34 Of these, only the Soviet Union and China were undemocratic. This suggests that being a non-democracy was not a necessary condition for ONA to perceive a country as a potential threat.

Similarly, the 1991 Summer Study organized by ONA regarded Germany and Japan as potential threats. The study defined a "manageable" world as one in which there was no threat to America's superpower role. The main risk to American society, the study argued, was

33 Pillsbury noted, "The biggest change for me was the arrest of and firing of the reform wing of the communist party in the Tiananmen massacre. Many people in Washington D.C. were stunned. In the 80s, there were a lot of high officials in the Communist party in China moving on the political reform path. You could meet people writing papers for Zhao Ziyang who often advocated multi-party system government. They were closely watching what Gorbachev was doing in a positive way, and it was presented as just a matter of time. These communist party officials would implement democratic reform in China. Of course the communist party would be one of many parties. Those guys got arrested including Zhao Ziyang himself. All of that thinking was crashed and it became that worst thing you can call a political personality was Gorbachev, that meant a traitor." Pillsbury, interview.

“Germany and/or Japan disconnecting from multilateral security and economic arrangements and pursuing an independent course.”

The 1992 study on RMA also identified Germany and Japan as the main U.S. competitors: “Germany and Japan ... with other possible members being France (in alliance with another power), and Russia” were listed as Category I competitors, that “have the necessary resources — human, economic, and technological — to compete now if they choose to do so.” China was placed in the Category II which comprised of “MTR ‘wanna be’ competitors” that could compete in significant ways in ten years or so.

Andrew Marshall, the Director of the ONA, was little influenced by China’s undemocratic nature. ONA viewed the uniqueness of China’s behavior and difficulties of assessing it to be based on its tradition and culture. Marshall argued that China’s patterns of behavior came from its culture would not change even if China became democratic. Reflecting this position, ONA has been involved in studies of China’s traditional strategic thinking.

The military services’ “China threat” arguments rarely made reference to values and ideology. They explained that they were more interested in force structure and military doctrine. An officer and a close observer of China, who saw China as a long-term potential threat, explained that military was required to look at long-term trends because of the nature of force planning, procurement and weapons development. The opacity and the unpredictability of Chinese decision making affected the rise of military “China threat” arguments to the extent

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36 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2002), p. 45. The assessment was originally circulated in July 1992 by the ONA and was published in 2002 by CSBA, where Krepinevich is director. The RMA was then called “military-technical revolutions (MTR).”
37 Ibid., Krepinevich, pp. 45-46.
39 Army Officer, interview by author, July 1997, Beijing, China. He spoke on condition of anonymity.
they forced the planners to assume the worst case scenario. Planners assumed that China might use force even when there was little chance of military success or strategic rationale.

3. Security Specialists in Think Tanks and Universities

(1) Timing

The timing in which security specialists began to make “China threat” arguments does not comply with democratic peace theory. Security specialists in think tanks and universities began to make “China threat” arguments around 1993, rather than right after the Tiananmen Square incident. This timing suggests that a change in distribution of power in the region prompted the change in threat perception.

The content of the arguments during this period supports this proposition. Most “China threat” arguments in the early-1990s focused on a regional threat from China. There were seen to be two sources of potential threat to U.S. interests in the region. One source centered on a possible rivalry in East Asia between China and Japan, which was seen as a source of instability. The other concerned China’s potential threat to its neighbors in South East Asia. China’s acquisition of modern weapons from Russia (such as Su-27 fighters and Kilo-class submarines) prompted arguments about China’s potential to menace its neighbors. China’s undemocratic nature was not a central factor in the arguments.

There was an increase of “China threat” related articles after 1995. The number of individuals and groups that made “China threat” arguments increased further after the Taiwan Strait crisis of March 1996. The crisis seems to have had an impact on the rise of “China

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threat arguments.

The Blue Team made the strongest “China threat” arguments. The timing of the Blue Team’s “China threat” arguments varied. Some began in 1993, but most in 1995. Two Blue Team members, Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, explained that the Taiwan Strait crisis prompted them to write *The Coming Conflict with China*. They claimed to have written because “it seemed that China’s rise to great-power status was putting it on a course of intensified rivalry with the United States.” They did not mention democracy. Many “China threat” arguments put forward by Blue Team members referred to the Tiananmen Square incident. However, no member of the Blue Team made “China threat” arguments right after the incident. This suggests that despite frequent reference to the incident, it was something other than the China’s lack of democracy — most likely the increase of China’s capabilities — that prompted the Blue Team members to view China as a threat.

The Project for New American Century (PNAC) was explicit about the need to realize a U.S. foreign policy based on liberal democratic values. However, the group only started making “China threat” arguments in 1997. The timing shows that the PNAC was not affected by the Tiananmen Square incident, but was driven more by the security debate within the United States.

“China threat” arguments after 1997 were mainly concerned with the potential capability of China to threaten the United States. The economic and military rise of China was the primary source of threat. Many specialists acknowledged that China was not yet a threat but


argued that the United States should maintain its military preponderance to curb China's military misbehavior. This version of "China threat" arguments did not advocate containment of China, and did not necessarily oppose trade with China.43

(2) Conformity with the Theory

(i) Propensity to Use Force

Security specialists often made references to the correlation between the undemocratic nature of China and its propensity to use force. They identified two factors that led them to assume that China had a propensity to use force. One was the nature of the Chinese regime, which tended to use force to solve domestic problems. The other was the idea that unstable regimes tend to resort to external aggression to win popular support.

The first line of argument was that a Chinese government that uses force against its own citizens to solve domestic problems, as in the Tiananmen Square incident, would not hesitate to use force to solve international conflicts. For example, William C. Triplett II, a congressional aide and a member of the Blue Team, wrote with Edward Timperlake in 1999:

The Tiananmen Square killers infest the highest ranks of the Chinese military establishment. Having butchered young Chinese people without hesitation, they would have no reluctance to do the same to foreigners.44

Paul Wolfowitz identified China in 2000 as "the biggest challenge to maintaining a peaceful world through the first part of this century," and laid out the reasons it was threatening:


A China that governs its own people by force is more likely to try to impose its will on its neighbors, while conversely, a China that is democratic is more likely to respect the choice of its neighbors. And its neighbors, including the United States, are more likely to trust it and accept its growing influence. 45

Bernstein and Munro, writing about the crackdown of the Chinese government after the Tiananmen Square incident, note that "(the Chinese regime) will stop at almost nothing when it feels that its monopoly on political power is at stake."46

Democratic peace theory contends that democratic norms dictate that states seek negotiated settlements. China’s lack of democratic norms was viewed as a cause for China’s aggressive intentions. Some contended that China was inherently hostile and aggressive because it was a non-democracy. Writing in 2000, Mosher, noted that the pursuit of hegemony was unique to non-democracies.

Still somewhat exotic is hegemony: the non-Western notion that the premier goal of foreign policy should be to establish absolute dominance over one’s region and, by slow extension, the world. In a sense, hegemony is the natural external expression of totalitarianism, with disputes involving unabsorbed territories resolved by the threat and, if necessary, the reality of force, just as the natural expression of democracy is peaceful, neighborly relations, with disputes resolved by negotiation and treaty. 47

The second line of argument noted that an undemocratic regime was fundamentally unstable and would have to resort to external aggression to maintain popular support. Arguments were made that the Chinese government was resorting to nationalism to win legitimacy and that this was a source of its aggressiveness. As we saw in the ONA section, the 1999 ONA Summer Study also articulated this point. 48

47 Mosher, Hegemon, p. 2.
Arthur Waldron, a professor of Chinese history and a member of the Blue Team who often worked for the ONA, emphasized this point in his statement before the Senate in 1995.

Instead of communism, the (Chinese) government now stresses nationalism as its legitimator...But the government's purpose is to use nationalism to distract the population from discontent and domestic agendas of reform and democratization. Hence the change has a threatening side as well. Nationalism includes the “recovery” of territory, by military means if necessary. 

Elliott Abrams wrote in 2000:

Preserving our dominance will not only advance our own national interests but will preserve peace and promote the cause of democracy and human rights. ... in the PRC today the problem is rule by a Communist elite whose interests contradicts those of its own people — and ours. ... The Chinese regime, like all Communist regimes, is fundamentally insecure because it does not rest on popular support. ... The recent crackdown on the apparently harmless Falun Gong movement and the continuing refusal to allow freedom of religion demonstrate how limited personal autonomy is likely to be and how extraordinarily insecure the government feels. As in the Soviet case, the regime will seek military power and success as a means of improving its legitimacy — and of cowering both its own people and its Asian neighbors.

Wolfowitz also made the connection between non-democracies and nationalism.

A government whose legitimacy rests on valid claims to be representative has less need to make dangerous appeals to nationalism.

The claims about nationalism are problematic for democratic peace theory, however, because they could lead to the argument that a democratic China would still be a threat, given its nationalism. Some did make the argument that China would present a threat to the United States even if it democratized because of nationalism. For example, Gideon Rachman wrote in 1996:

At present, it is China’s ruthless and authoritarian leadership that most alarms the rest of the world. It certainly seems to be true that democratic countries are less likely to go to

51 Paul Wolfowitz, “Remembering the Future,” The National Interest, No. 59 (Winter 2000), p. 42. This article is almost the same as “Statesmanship in a New Century,” except in a few places.
war with each other. But even if one makes the heroic assumption that China will democratize over the next 20 years, Chinese nationalism could still make life uncomfortable for its neighbors and the rest of the world. 52

China’s would-be democratic transition was also viewed as a threat. Richard K. Betts and Thomas J. Christensen write about the dangers of a democratizing China. Betts and Christensen, while skeptical about China’s ability to match the U.S. strength as a peer competitor, nevertheless caution against China’s potential threat, even with limited capabilities.53 They contend that while it was not inevitable that China will be a threat to American interests, “the United States is much more likely to go to war with China than it is with any other major power.” They cite China’s undemocratic government as a reason for a potential conflict with China.54 However, they also argue that China would pose a threat even if it democratized. They give two reasons. One is that it would be an illiberal democracy and democratic peace theory would not apply. The other is that a democratizing China could be more “violent and destabilizing.” They argue that “in the early phases of democratization, China should be ripe for jingoism.” Elites would have “incentives to manipulate populist or nationalist themes and to adopt tough international policies as an electoral strategy.”55 So, although they mention undemocratic government as a factor causing a potential conflict with China, this point was irrelevant because China would still be a problem even if it had a democratic government. So, China was viewed as a threat irrespective of whether it was a non-democracy, a democratizing state or even a democracy. This suggests that China’s

54 Betts and Christensen characterized China as “a rising power with high expectations, unresolved grievances and an undemocratic government.” Betts and Christensen, “China: Getting the Questions Right,” p. 17.
undemocratic nature was not what drove security specialists' threat arguments.

PNAC’s “China threat” arguments were based on China’s increasing military capability and strategic ambition. Despite the PNAC’s repeated references to democratic values and ideals, their “China threat” arguments did not discuss China’s aggressive intentions based on the lack of democratic institutions or opacity.

In “China threat” arguments, the Taiwan Strait crisis was presented in two ways. One was as an indication of China’s aggressive intentions and behavior towards a democratic Taiwan. The other was as an example of how United States and China could be dragged into war. The former emphasized China’s undemocratic and therefore aggressive propensities. The latter argument was based on realism rather than the lack of democracy. Most articles included both arguments.

(ii) Opacity

Some argued that opacity of undemocratic regimes as a source of danger. For example, Bill Gertz argued opacity made China a “hard target” for the U.S. intelligence agencies, while its insularity made the Chinese regime prone to making miscalculations as “Japan’s dictators did in attacking Pearl Harbor.” This increased the likelihood of conflict.

(iii) Export of Undemocratic Ideas

According to democratic peace theory, the export of undemocratic values is an important component of non-democracy’s threat to democracies. There were, however, no “China threat” arguments that held that China was exporting undemocratic ideology. This also presents a problem to the liberal primacy argument that sees China as a threat. An important underlying

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56 Gertz, The China Threat, p. xii.
assumption for the primacy version of “China threat” arguments was that China could build an
international system based on its values and ideas. However, if the claim that China was
seeking to expand its undemocratic ideas cannot be made, the primacy version of “China threat”
arguments cannot hold either.

Wolfowitz, a strong proponent of U.S. primacy, flatly dismissed the idea that China was
exporting undemocratic ideas.

Almost surely, China will neither become an ideological threat like the old Soviet Union,
nor try to conduct the ideological crusades and campaigns of subversion that it did in the
1950s and 1960s. Not only is the ideological fervor gone in China, but also the ideology
has no appeal internationally, least of all perhaps to “overseas” Chinese. It is sometimes
suggested that China might become the representative of the grievances of the developing
world, but that suggestion also lacks plausibility.57

Bernstein and Munro also denied that China export an ideology.

Because Communist ideology — as opposed to the power of something still called the
Communist Party — is dead in China, the country has none of the messianic impulses that
made the Soviet Union more threatening. China does not seek to spread its way of life to
other countries.58

Zalmay M. Khalilzad, who saw China’s expansionism as threat to the United States, rejected
China’s ideological expansionism. His reasoning was based on its geopolitical ambitions.

Although China has abandoned communism as a global ideology and seems to have
accepted the economic imperative of the global economy, it is still seeking geopolitically
its “rightful” place in the world.59

In fact, in Munro’s view, it was the demise of the communist ideology that made China

59 Zalmay M. Khalilzad, From Containment to Global Leadership?: America and the World After the Cold War, Project AIR FORCE (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), p. 29. David Shambaugh also saw China’s search for a
rightful place as a source of threat. Shambaugh dismissed China’s chances of becoming a superpower because it
lacked “substantial economic and military prowess and moral and ideological appeal.” David Shambaugh,
“Containment or Engagement of China?: Calculating Beijing’s Responses” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2
(Fall 1996), p.188.
aggressive as the government saw the need to resort to nationalism to win popular support.⁶⁰

PNAC viewed China as having aspirations of upsetting the present world order. The PNAC saw that China had an ambition to create a new security order in East Asia that no longer relied on American military and economic power and to replace the current international system which favored U.S. interests and values with one favorable to the Chinese regime.

China is, as we all know, a rising power in a critical region of the world...There is a competition between the U.S. and China over whether the current international system which favors America and its allies in the region will be maintained, or whether it will be replaced by one more favorable to the present Chinese regime. ... As history demonstrates, appeasing the ambitions of a rising power rarely results in a diminution of those ambitions.⁶¹

The basic assumption of the argument stressing the importance of maintaining U.S. primacy was that there were potential peer competitors aspiring to change the international system based on values inimical to U.S. values. There were frequent reminders of and alarm about dangers to U.S. primacy. However, PNAC did not regard China as an exporter of any ideology.

(iv) Hostile Response to U.S. Promotion of Democracy

Proponents of "China threat" arguments thought China was hostile to the United States because China felt threatened by the United States. Some thought the Chinese government was threatened by the U.S. export of democratic ideas. Munro argues that:

The very fact that they are dictators makes China's rulers hostile to a United States that represents and promotes democracy and individual rights as well as an open, market economy that nobody controls.⁶²

Shambaugh noted that Chinese leaders have been fearful of American subversion since

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⁶² Munro, "China: The Challenge of a Rising Power."
John Foster Dulles spoke of promoting the “peaceful evolution of Communist China.” He argues that there was a tendency for the Chinese leaders to look for hostile foreign forces behind domestic unrest and this tendency was exacerbated after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. Steven W. Mosher writes that the Chinese leaders’ “nightmare should be our foreign policy goal: the peaceful evolution of China from a one-party dictatorship practicing lawless coercion into a democratic state operating under the rule of law.”

(3) Arguments about other Democracies and Non-democracies

According to democratic peace theory, democracies view democracies and non-democracies differently. The theory suggests that democracies see only non-democracies as threats. Contrary to this expectation, some groups and analysts who saw the undemocratic nature of China as a source of threat also saw other democracies, such as Japan, as potential threats.

For example, PNAC did not differentiate democracies and non-democracies as potential threats to U.S. primacy. The arguments put forward by the PNAC strongly reflected the 1992 DPG draft that was drawn up by the direction of Paul Wolfowitz, the then Undersecretary of Defense, and did not differentiate between a democracy and a non-democracy. Its threat assessment was based on power. Wolfowitz and the then Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney were both signatories of the PNAC statement of purpose, together with Donald Rumsfeld.

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63 Shambaugh, “Containment or Engagement of China?”, p. 194.
PNAC’s arguments about France and Russia indicate that PNAC also did not exclude democracies as potential threats to U.S. primacy. The two co-founders of the PNAC, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, expressed their vigilance towards France and Russia in 2000:

Russia can similarly be expected to search for opportunities to weaken U.S. political, diplomatic and military preponderance in the world. Even an ally such as France may be prepared to lend itself to these efforts, viewing a unified Europe as a check on American power and using the U.N. Security Council as an arena for forging diplomatic roadblocks along with China and Russia, against effective U.S.-led international action, whether in the Balkans or in the Persian Gulf.66

PNAC members frequently expressed this vigilance towards France. For example, in April 2003 Kristol testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about France’s intention to balance the United States:

France’s priorities lie with the European Union and/or the UN — not NATO. And there is no question that many in Paris desire to see a France-led European Union as a counterweight to U.S. power.67

Ellen Bork, another PNAC member, posits a France-China alliance that sought a multipolar world.

The potential for serious disagreement among the allies over China arises ... from Europe’s regional ambitions and, more importantly, from the temptation to align itself with China against the US. ... China has a “multipolar view of the world into which Europe fits rather well.” Jacques Chirac, the French president, has a more straightforward formulation. He has formally agreed with China to “foster the march towards multipolarity” in order to “oppose any attempt at domination in international affairs” — a reference to the global role of the US.68

Furthermore, a conflict between China and Japan was seen as a problem because it would inevitably involve the United States. The source of contention between China and Japan was not seen as a difference of political systems and beliefs. The rivalry was viewed as a rivalry

between a rising power and a status quo power, and between two countries with distrust for each other because of their history of war. 69

(4) Theory about the Democratization of China

Skepticism about the prospects for democratization in China was a common perception among those who made “China threat” arguments. Proponents of “China threat” arguments generally resisted the view that China would become a democracy through trade and increased interaction. Those who supported the hypothesis that China would become more liberal and democratized through increased trade and communications generally did not make “China threat” arguments. These people were advocates of engagement policy. Madeleine Albright and Joseph Nye are such examples. 70 Implicit in both arguments was the assumption that a democratic China was more prone to peace than an undemocratic China. In this view, a strong China that was democratic posed less threat to the United States than a strong undemocratic China. 71 Those who made “China threat” arguments argued that China would not change and would therefore remain a threat.

Democratic peace theory argues that democratic states may attempt to spread democracy. The theory does not say, however, when democracies use coercive measures to spread democracy and when not. In the China case, those who argued that China was not a threat, or at least not yet, advocated engagement on the assumption that increased trade and interdependence would lead to a more liberal and law-abiding China and eventually to a

69 For example of scholarly literature on potential antagonism between China and Japan because of the history of war, see Thomas F. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/October 1996), pp. 37-52.

70 Other example of proponents of this line of argument is Robert S. Ross, “Beijing as a Conservative Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44.

71 There is a
democratic China. Those who argued that China was a threat, actual or potential, advocated containment policy or “congagement” policy.  

The members of the Blue Team were skeptical of the prospects of democratization of China. They did not believe that increased interdependence through trade would cause China to peacefully evolve. According to Jim Doran, a self-identified member of the Blue Team, one way to describe members of the Blue Team was as “people who are so concerned about the direction China is taking politically and militarily that they would be willing to use trade as a weapon against China.” In their minds, Communist regimes had to be overthrown to become democratic:

Conservatives believe in peace through strength. They do not believe that communism could be reformed but communism needs to be overthrown. ... We think it is immutable and inevitable, and you cannot gloss it over. China’s interests are different from ours in a very fundamental way because of the nature of their regime. The only way to improve that situation is to get rid of the regime. That’s what conservatives believe. They believe that one of the ways you get rid of the regime is by ensuring that our military strength in East Asia including on Taiwan is as strong as possible. We don’t put much hope in summits or arms control agreement or dialogue. ... Those who believe in engagement policy, their views are very fundamentally, philosophically different views of, a) what U.S. foreign policy ought to be and, b) what China is and what it is doing.

The members of the Blue Team often argued that the United States and China were on an inevitable collision course because of the difference in values. Doran noted:

A fundamental lesson of the twentieth century is that democracies cannot coexist

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72 Congagement policy is a hybrid of containment and engagement where the United States engage China to bring China into the current international system while at the same time strengthen U.S. military capability to deter China from becoming hostile Congagement policy was proposed by Zalmay M. Khalilzad of RAND. Zalmay M. Khalilzad, “Sweet and Sour: Recipe for a New China Policy,” RAND Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 6-11.

73 Opposition to trade with China was one of the issues that differentiated the Blue Team from other proponents of “China threat” arguments. For example, former U.S. ambassador to Beijing and Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), James Lilley held a hawkish position on China. Some members of the Blue Team, such as Richard Fisher, learned to consider China a threat based on information from Lilley. However, Lilley was not considered a member of the Blue Team because of his support of normal trade relations with China.


indefinitely with powerful and ambitious totalitarian regimes. Sooner or later the competing goals and ideologies bring conflict, whether hot war or cold, until one or the other side prevails. This central lesson must be learned before we can even begin to understand the China threat.\textsuperscript{76}

It seems that a key factor that influenced those that made “China threat” arguments was their assessment of the likelihood of China’s democratization. Those that believed in the prospects of democratization through engagement and trade did not make “China threat” arguments. Those that held that only force could change China’s behavior saw China as a threat.

5. Summary: Security Elites and “China threat” arguments

Security elites did not begin to make “China threat” arguments shortly after events that showed China’s undemocratic nature. The strongest evidence against the democratic peace explanation for “China threat” arguments was that no individuals or groups made “China threat” arguments right after the Tiananmen Square incident, although many referenced it later once they have had decided that China was a threat. This suggests that China’s undemocratic nature did not have a strong influence on the rise of “China threat” arguments.

Many “China threat” arguments referred to China’s undemocratic nature, but few conformed to the propositions of democratic peace theory. One prediction that did hold was the idea that China’s lack of democracy gave it a propensity to use of force abroad. Many argued that the instability of China’s undemocratic government would cause an aggressive foreign policy.

Democratic peace theory also holds democracies perceive other democracies as aggressive because of their lack of democratic institutions, constraining leaders from initiating large-scale

\textsuperscript{76} Gertz, The China Threat, p. xi.
military operations. However, “China threat” arguments did not mention China’s lack of
democratic procedures as a source threat. Instead, many security specialists argued that
Chinese nationalism would push its leaders to take aggressive actions. The nationalistic public
was seen to push Chinese leaders towards conflict with Taiwan, Japan or the United States.

China’s closed system and the opacity of its defense policy led security elites to make
higher estimates of its military capability and threat. On the other hand, no one argued that
China sought to export its undemocratic ideas. This is strong evidence against the democratic
peace theory explanation. “China threat” arguments from 1997 on concerned China’s threat to
U.S. primacy. This version of “China threat” arguments held that if the United States did not
maintain primacy, China would change the international system based on its values and interests.
The underlying assumption was that China was an ideological threat. However, no one argued
that China exported undemocratic ideas.

The primacy argument itself had been around throughout the 1990s. However, primacy
arguments before 1997 did involve China. Threats to U.S. primacy were not seen as limited to
non-democracies. Primacy arguments in the early-1990s viewed Japan and Germany as
potential threats. Russia was considered a potential threat despite its democratization. When
France opposed the United States’ war against Iraq in 2002 and 2003, arguments appeared
claiming France was a threat to U.S. primacy. These arguments indicate that the driving
factor for seeing China as a threat was not the lack of democracy.

III. PUBLIC OPINION

In this section, I examine the public opinion surveys to see whether or not the changes in
American public opinion towards China were related to the changes in China’s behavior in
terms of human rights or democratic values.

1. Public Opinion Surveys on China

Figure 5-1 shows U.S. public opinion over time. Favorable opinion towards China increased steadily from 1976 to March 1989. There was a sharp dip in June 1989 after the Tiananmen Square incident. Favorable opinion dropped from 72% to 12%, whereas unfavorable opinion increased from 13% to 78%. Favorable opinion towards China never recovered the perch it reached prior to the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989. Unfavorable opinion fluctuated between 61% and 47%. Obviously, the Tiananmen Square incident had a powerful effect on overall opinion toward China.

Figure 5-1: Overall Opinion Towards China
(Source) Program on International Policy Attitudes.  

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77 One exception was in November 1993 when unfavorable opinion towards China was 39%.
Figure 5-2 shows U.S. public opinion on critical threats to U.S. vital interests in the next ten years. In 1990, 60% of the public thought Japan would be the critical threat. This shows that democracy or not was not a critical factor causing public threat perception. The number two threat for the public was China (40%), then Russia (33%) and Europe (30%).

Figure 5-2: Critical Threat to the United States (Public)

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79 The respondents were asked "I am going to read you a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please tell me if you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all." The list was "Economic Power of Japan", "Development of China as a World Power", "Military power of Soviet Union", and "Economic competition from Europe".


In the same 1990 survey, the number one threat for the leaders was also Japan (63%), followed by Europe (41%), and Russia (20%). Only 16% of leaders thought China would be a threat (Figure 5-3). There is no data available before 1990 for leaders because the same survey did not ask the question.

Unlike the general public, few leaders saw China as threat after the Tiananmen Square incident. The percentage of the leaders who viewed China as a critical threat after the Tiananmen Square incident was only 16%. It increased to 46% in 1994 (making it the number one threat) and peaked in 1998 at 56%. The absence of an increase after the Tiananmen Square incident suggests that China’s undemocratic nature was not the critical factor in shaping leaders’ threat perception. Furthermore, the high percentage of both the public and leaders viewing Japan as a critical threat suggests that being a democracy does not exclude the country from being perceived as a threat. The fact that a high percentage of leaders saw Japan and Europe as

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a threat than China in 1990 suggests that the leaders were more concerned with power than with
democratic values when making threat assessments. The drop in the percentage of the leaders
who viewed Japan as a threat also seems to be driven by power. It seems to have decreased
with the slowdown in Japan’s economy.

Throughout the 1990s, the percentage of the public who viewed China as the critical threat
remained relatively high. It was 40% in 1990, 57% in 1994 and in 1998, and 56% in 2002.
There was an increase of 17% points in the 1994 survey, indicating an increase in public threat
perception of China between 1990 and 1994 (Figure 5-2). There was no significant change in
public threat perception of China after the Taiwan Strait crisis of March 1996. The firing of
missiles to intimidate the Taiwan voters from voting for a pro-independence candidate was often
referred to as an example of China’s violation of democratic principles. However, as far as this
survey was concerned, the crisis did not affect public perception of China’s threat.

2. Summary: Public Opinion and “China threat” arguments

Data from public opinion surveys suggests that the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989
had a significant impact on the threat perception of the public but not on the leaders. The
public was more affected by the violation of democratic values, more specifically of human
rights. Leaders’ only began to see China as a critical threat some time between 1990 and 1994.
The leaders’ threat perception responded more sensitively to China’s power. The Taiwan
missile exercises of March 1996 did not affect the threat perception of either the public or the
leaders.

According to the public opinion polls, the perception that China was the critical threat to
the United States was widespread before 1994, which implies that this perception did not occur
because advocacy groups such as the religious conservatives propagated "China threat" arguments starting in 1996-97. Alternatively, the rise of "China threat" arguments among these groups in 1996-97 cannot be explained by these groups following the mood of the public, since there was a two year gap between the rise of "China threat" feelings among the public and the rise of these arguments.

Although the public's threat perception of China seems to have been influenced by the Tiananmen Square incident, it is unclear whether democracy influenced China threat perception. Both the public and the leaders perceived Japan, a democracy, as a critical threat in 1990. This suggests that being a democracy does not prevent a country from being perceived as a threat. But it remains possible that non-democracy increases the perception of threat. The U.S. perception of Japan will be examined in detail in the later section.

V. PRIMACY ARGUMENTS AND "CHINA THREAT" ARGUMENTS

In this section, I examine the primacy argument that speaks specifically to liberal democratic values. As discussed in Chapter 3, proponents of U.S. primacy often used strong rhetoric about commitment to liberal democratic principles. Many "China threat" arguments were made within the context of the primacy argument. And it was often within the context of primacy that undemocratic nature of China was argued to be a source of threat. A close examination of primacy arguments and "China threat" arguments should tell us whether or not China was said to be a threat because China was a non-democracy. According to democratic peace theory, commitment to liberal democratic values should lead the liberal primacists to view non-democracies as threats and to see democracies are unthreatening. This was not the case. Proponents of primacy viewed other democracies, such as Japan and Germany, as threats while
some opposed the idea that China was a threat.

1. Primacy arguments and “China threat” arguments

Primacy arguments began right after the Cold War. As Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross observe, although the primacy strategy is focused on the maintenance of overwhelming U.S. power and influence, it remained “strongly committed to liberal principles.”\(^{83}\) Francis Fukuyama’s proposition, put forward by in the summer 1989, that liberal democracy had triumphed as the final form of government, had a strong influence on the primacy argument.\(^{84}\) In 1992-1993, Elliott Abrams and Samuel Huntington argued for an American foreign policy that embraces the role of enforcing international norms of conduct using a preponderance of power.\(^{85}\)

Democratic peace theory argues that the proponents of primacy will view non-democracies as threats because of their strong commitment to liberal democratic values. However, for example, in 1993, Huntington regarded Japan as a challenger to U.S. primacy. For Huntington and other primacists, only the United States was fully committed to liberal democratic values, and threats to U.S. primacy could come both from democracies and non-democracies.\(^{86}\)

Both the February 1992 draft of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) for 1994-1999 and

\(^{83}\) Posen and Ross, “Competing Visions,” p. 34.
\(^{84}\) Fukuyama wrote: “But the century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an ‘end of ideology’ or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism. The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.” Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest, Summer 1989, pp. 3, 4.
\(^{86}\) By the summer of 1993, Huntington began to argue that both China and Japan represented sources of conflict. However, this was not because of their undemocratic nature but because of the difference in civilization. Later, Huntington described China as one of the future “serious external threats to America” along with “Russia, Islam or some combination of hostile states. But again, lack of democracy was not the source of threat. Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilization?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49; Samuel P. Huntington, “Robust Nationalism,” National Interest, Vol. 58 (Winter 1999/2000), p. 39.
arguments put forward by ONA advocated maintaining U.S. primacy. However, liberal democracy had little to do with the threat assessment contained in these formulations. The DPG draft viewed even allies and democracies as potential threats. The “enemy list” that accompanied the 1992 DPG did not include China.87

As we have seen, ONA saw China as a potential threat to U.S. primacy. But their arguments were primarily based on China’s capability and aspirations to realize an RMA capability. ONA’s primacy arguments and “China threat” arguments did not rely on China’s undemocratic nature.

Proponents of primacy began to make “China threat” arguments based on liberal democratic principles beginning around 1997. PNAC was the strongest advocate of such arguments. However, as we saw in the earlier section, PNAC did not regard China as capable of exporting undemocratic values and also saw democracies as potential threats.

2. Liberal Primacists and “China threat” Arguments

Not all primacists made “China threat” arguments. For example, Madeleine Albright and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. were both proponents of U.S. primacy and liberalism but were opposed to making “China threat” arguments.

As Secretary of State in the Clinton administration, Albright promoted primacy based on liberalism. Albright spoke in June 1997 of the importance of promoting democracy:

Today, the greatest danger to America is not some foreign enemy; it is the possibility that we will fail to heed the example of that generation; that we will allow the momentum toward democracy to stall, take for granted the institutions and principles upon which our own freedom is based, and forget what the history of this century reminds us: that

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problems abroad, if left unattended, will all-too often come home to America. A decade or two from now, we will be known as the neo-isolationists who allowed tyranny and lawlessness to rise again or as the generations that solidified the global triumph of democratic principles ... as the generations that took strong measures to force alliances, deter aggression, and keep the peace. 88

Nye was among the first to argue for enduring U.S. primacy. There was a debate from the late-1980s to the early-1990s about whether the United States was declining vis-à-vis other major powers or not. Nye was a strong proponent of the view that the United States was not in relative decline. Nye wrote in 1991 that the United States was “bound to lead.” 89

However, neither Albright nor Nye made “China threat” arguments. Albright advocated a policy of engagement towards China.

Through our strategic dialogue, we are encouraging the Chinese to accept what we believe is true — that China will be able to find greater security, prosperity, and well-being inside a rule-based international system than outside. ... Given the undemocratic nature of China’s government, we can expect that further movement in the direction of inclusion will be gradual. But we believe continued U.S. engagement is the best way to encourage that movement. 90

Nye served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Clinton administration from 1994 to 1995. He warned that China threat arguments would become a self-fulfilling prophesy. 91 Nye wrote in 1998, “If the United States treats China as an enemy now, it will guarantee an enemy in the future.” 92

The absence of “China threat” arguments among these liberal primacists suggests that the

pursuit of U.S. primacy and commitment to liberal democratic principles are not sufficient conditions for the rise of "China threat" arguments. What differentiates these liberal primacists from PNAC members seems to be optimism about the pacifying effect of trade and engagement.

IV. "JAPAN THREAT" ARGUMENTS

U.S. perceptions of Japan serve as a comparative case to test the democratic peace theory of threat perception. In the late-1980s and early-1990s, there were threat arguments against Japan. In 1990, Japan was regarded as the most critical threat to the United States both by the public and the leaders (Figure 5-2) (Figure 5-3). “Japan threat” arguments often emphasized Japan’s competitiveness and U.S. relative decline. There were strong arguments for maintaining U.S. competitiveness against Japan. For example, Michael Borrus and John Zysman cautioned that:

Relative decline in economic position and the erosion of technological leadership will soon undermine the exercise of American power. 93

The reality is that our major allies have the range of capabilities required to act on their own in the international system, to behave as great powers...Whether they use their capabilities to pursue their foreign policy preferences is increasingly a matter of their political choice. 94

“Japan threat” arguments were still present during the 1992 presidential election. However, they rapidly declined from 1993 and disappeared by around 1995. The U.S.-Japan auto talks of 1995 were viewed as the “final battle.”95 This shift was reflected in public opinion polls. As we saw, in 1990, 63 % of U.S. leaders thought economic competition from

94 Ibid., p. 167.
Japan was a critical threat to vital U.S. interests. In 1994 this number dropped to 21%.  

The explanation based on democratic peace theory for the rise and fall of threat arguments about Japan would be that Japan was not a democracy before 1990 and became a democracy between 1990 and 1994. Japan has been a democracy since 1946. Japan's constitution, which came into effect in May 1947, is one of the most democratic constitutions in the world. This suggests that being a democracy does not exclude a state from being perceived as a threat.

The "Japan threat" case raises another question about the assumptions of democratic peace theory. Democratic peace theory posits that non-democracies are identified as threats, whereas realism predicts that threats are perceived based on power and sometimes portrayed as non-democracies. It appears that Japan was called a non-democracy while it was perceived as a threat. Such arguments disappeared when Japan was no longer seen as a threat.

The argument that Japan was not a "real" democracy emerged in the late-1980s and disappeared in the mid-1990s when "Japan threat" arguments disappeared. From the

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97 The Liberal Party won the general election in 1946, and the Socialist Party took office by forming a coalition government after the 1947 general election. True, the Liberal Democratic party was in power from its merger in 1955 until 1993. Samuel Huntington has argued that one criterion for measuring the consolidation of democracy as the two turnover test. Huntington has argued in 1991 that Japan has not met the two-turnover test, in which the party in power turns over power to subsequent election winners peacefully, and that election’s winners then peacefull turn over power of the winners of a later election. "Japan was universally and properly viewed as a democratic nation after World War II, but it did not meet this test and, indeed, effectively never has had even one electoral turnover." But as this citation shows, Huntington viewed Japan as a democratic nation. Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 266-267.

98 Here, however, one must ask why anyone (quite often policy makers) would need to identify threats as non-democracies, unless calling them non-democracies serves a purpose. There seems to be an assumption that non-democracies are inherently bad and therefore easier to demonize.
mid-1990s, there has been an emphasis on common values between the United States and Japan. This suggests that the causation arrow was opposite of what democratic peace theory posits. States that are perceived by democracies as threats are regarded as non-democracies rather than non-democracies being perceived as threats.  

Arguments that Japan was not a democracy occurred simultaneously with criticisms of Japan’s trade surplus and economic expansion. In September 1989, a *New York Times* editorial contended that Japan did not practice liberal democracy and argued that Japan’s form of governance could be a serious rival to liberal democracy.

Japan is often assumed to be a Western liberal democracy, because that is the form of government imposed by General MacArthur. But the substance of power in Japan has always been separate from its form. Career government officials, not elected political leaders, set the budget, write most legislation and make major policy decisions.

In May 1989, James Fallows wrote an article, “Containing Japan” in *The Atlantic Monthly*. Fallows noted that a weakness in or lack of universal principles such as democracy and charity led Japan to be expansionist in its economic behavior. The structure of Japanese politics and the weakness of grass-roots democracy kept the expansion going:

Unless Japan is contained, therefore, several things that matter to America will be jeopardized: America’s own authority to carry out its foreign policy and advance its ideals, American citizens’ future prospects within the world’s most powerful business firms, and also the very system of free trade that America has helped sustain since the Second World War. The major threat to the free-trade system does not come from American protectionism. It comes from the example set by Japan...We do have the right to defend our interests and our values, and they are not identical to Japan’s.

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99 John M. Owen, IV categorizes Japan and Western Europe as “the most liberal areas of the world.” He argued that “the degree to which a state counterbalances U.S. power is a function of how politically liberal that state is,” and argued that Japan acquiesced to rather than counterbalanced against the United States because of its liberal democratic nature. Owen also notes that “Americans are apprehensive about the illiberal purposes to which China would put its power.” Owens, however, dismisses American apprehension about Japan in the 1980s and early-1990s. He is more convincing when he makes the case that power differentials alone cannot explain why the United States should treat “Russia, a stagnant power at best, as it treats Western Europe and Japan.” John M. Owen, IV, “Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy,” *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/02).


Others argued against the proposition that Japan was undemocratic. For example, a former State Department Director for Japan attacked the above *New York Times* editorial:

You waffle on the distinction between “democracy” and “liberal democracy,” but no matter what the definition, it is hard to establish that Japan is not a democracy. It has perhaps the most liberal constitution in the world (written by the American occupation), which is generally accepted and applied by the people.\(^{102}\)

George Packard, a specialist on Japan, was equally vocal in arguing against the idea that Japan was undemocratic:

Van Wolfren is dead wrong when he claims Japan is not a democracy...Fallows is equally wrong when he jumps from his critique of Japanese trade policy to indict the whole nation for its “different” values...The choice should be clear: either the United States and Japan will be closer partners, with benefits for the entire world, or they will be angry rivals, on a collision course. Not even the most severe of the critics can wish for a new collision with Japan.\(^{103}\)

Arguments made against Japan resembled arguments about the Soviet Union and arguments about China. For example, Fallows argued that while Japan does not respond to abstract principles, it does respond to power:

The lack of interest in principle makes sheer power the main test of what is “fair.” Might makes right anywhere, but in Japan’s dealings with the outside world it does so sweepingly.\(^{104}\)

George Kennan, an author of the containment policy, described the Soviet Union similarly in his famous telegram from Moscow:

Impervious to logic or reason, [the Soviet Union] is highly sensitive to the logic of force, For this reason it can easily withdraw — and usually does — when strong resistance is encountered at any point.\(^{105}\)

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China was also seen to only respond to power and pressure. For example, Bill Gertz argued that making concessions and seeking negotiations with China was futile.

Communist governments have never responded favorably to concessions ... But they do respond to pressure.\(^{106}\)

When arguments concerning the threat posed by Japan receded after 1993-1994, Japan was portrayed as a democracy. For example, a *Washington Post* editorial in May 1998 contrasted Japan and China:

> It is important to cultivate friendly relations with both China and Japan. But it’s also important to keep in mind which country really is America’s strategic partner. China remains a dictatorship committed to curtailing U.S. influence in the world. Japan is a democracy, with a far larger economy, that supports the United States at almost every turn.\(^{107}\)

Some even defended Japan’s slowness to change its economic behavior because of its democracy.\(^{108}\)

The proposition that democracy’s perception of threat causes them to see states as undemocratic passes a second test because Japan was seen as a democracy before Japan was perceived as a threat. For example, a 1979 Heritage Foundation policy review argues that Japan is a democracy and China a communist totalitarian dictatorship:

> We are not at present stationing forces in China or helping it in any way. Unlike Japan, a democracy, or South Korea, an anti-communist authoritarian regime, China is a communist totalitarian dictatorship, in principle hostile to us. But we share a foe with China: the Soviet Union, another and more powerful communist totalitarian regime.\(^{109}\)

The “Japan threat” case suggests that democratic peace theory does not offer a strong


explanation of the rise and fall of threat arguments. Japan’s political regime type did not change from the 1980s to the mid-1990s. What changed was Japan’s GDP growth. Richard J. Samuels notes that changes in the U.S. attitudes toward Japan reflected the changes in U.S.-Japan power relations:

The disinterest of the 1970s suddenly was obsession. The difference, it seems was Japan’s economic miracle and consequence change in U.S.-Japanese relations. More precisely, it was a recognition of a shift in the relative power of the United States and Japan in the global economy.\(^\text{110}\)

Japan’s economy took a sudden dive in 1990-1992 when its bubble economy burst. As we saw in Chapter 4, after 1991, Japan stopped closing the economic gap with the United States. U.S. threat arguments ended when the United States had secured its primacy.

V. CONCLUSION

Many “China threat” arguments referred to China’s undemocratic nature. This leads one to presume that China’s lack of democracy influenced the rise of “China threat” arguments. This chapter examined this proposition but found that democracy had little effect on the emergence of “China threat” arguments in the United States. The cause and effect relationship on threat perception deduced from democratic peace theory was not present in either the case of “China threat” arguments or “Japan threat” arguments. An explanation based on power seems a better explanation even for those arguments.

1. Democratic Norms and the Propensity to use force

The strongest evidence suggesting that China’s undemocratic nature affected American threat arguments was the American perception of China’s propensity to use force. Democratic

peace theory posits that the absence of cooperative norms in non-democracies gives rise to a perception of aggressive intentions and eagerness to use force. Proponents of “China threat” arguments saw China as preferring force to resolution through negotiation. China’s decision to use force to solve the Tiananmen Square incident and to deter Taiwan’s move towards independence in March 1996 led to the perception that China easily resorted to force.

Proponents of “China threat” arguments held that China’s behavior could not be constrained by international agreements or concessions. China’s perceived preference for force led to the argument that the United States also must use force to change China’s behavior.

The prospects for democratization and adherence to negotiated settlements seemed to be important factors dividing opinion on China’s threat. Those who thought China would democratize through engagement and trade did not make “China threat” arguments. Those that believed in the use of force as the optimal means to change China’s behavior and ultimately its regime viewed China as a threat and argued so.

2. Timing

Other than the perception of China’s propensity to use force, the predictions based on democratic peace theory fared poorly. The rise of “China threat” arguments did not correspond to events that demonstrated China’s undemocratic nature. The arguments began in 1988 among a small number of security specialists, increased in 1992 and became widespread in 1994-1995. This timing does not conform to democratic conditions in China or to events showing its disregard for liberal values. This suggests that China’s undemocratic nature did not much influence the rise of “China threat” arguments.

There were few “China threat” arguments in the 1970s (after 1972) when democratic
conditions there were much worse than in the 1990s (Prediction 1-1). And although many
“China threat” arguments referred to the Tiananmen Square incident as evidence of China’s lack
of democracy, no individuals or groups made “China threat” arguments right after the incident
(Prediction 1-2). There was little change in threat arguments about China after 1989. Human
rights advocacy groups paid more attention to China after 1989, but they did not make
threat-related arguments (Prediction 2-1). The public opinion data show that the Tiananmen
Square incident affected the U.S. public perception of China’s threat. U.S. leaders, on the
other hand, were little affected by the incident. Their perception of China’s threat remained
low while many continued to view Japan as a threat. “China threat” arguments did increase
after the Taiwan Strait crisis as the theory predicts. But whether the cause was the
undemocratic nature of China or the prospects for a direct military confrontation between the
United States and China could not be determined from the case (Prediction 1-3).

3. Inconsistency of the Arguments

(1) Export of Undemocratic Values

The contents of the “China threat” arguments barely reflected the assumptions of
Democratic Peace theory. The case did not support the theory’s two posited causal factors that
lead democracies to perceive non-democracies as threats. One is the danger of the export of
illiberal values. No groups or individuals made the argument that China was exporting illiberal
values or trying to establish an alternative international system. Many “China threat”
arguments held that unless U.S. primacy was maintained, China would ascend to that position
and shape the international system to suit their values and interests. But no one offered
evidence that China had values to export or was trying to promote anything. This
inconsistency in argument suggests that U.S. primacy was sought not because of China's threat, but for its own sake.

(2) Inconsistency of Arguments — Absence of Democratic Constraints

The second reason Democratic Peace theory says that democracies see non-democracies as threats has to do with institutions. The absence of democratic institutions is said to allow decision makers to use force without the same constraints as democratic leaders face. There was a general perception among the groups considered in this chapter that undemocratic leaders would not hesitate to resort to force in order to defend their regime. However, "China threat" arguments did not explicitly connect the lack of democratic institutions to the propensity to use force. Some "China threat" arguments, on the other hand, saw Chinese leaders as potentially driven to aggression by nationalistic public opinion. This logic is the opposite of what Democratic Peace theory assumes.

(3) Inconsistency of arguments — Threat perception towards Democracies

If China's undemocratic nature caused the rise of "China threat" arguments, then we should see a consistency in how threats are perceived and discussed. Proponents of "China threat" arguments should make threat arguments about other non-democracies. Alternatively, those who make "China threat" arguments should never view democracies as threats (Prediction 5-1 and 5-2). The empirical findings were not consistent with these predictions.

The 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and the 1991 Summer Study of the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) both recognized Germany and Japan as potential threats to U.S. preponderance of power. The opinion poll of the leaders in 1990 showed that 41% viewed
Europe as the critical threat. The Project for New American Century (PNAC), which was supported by the architects of the 1992 DPG, repeatedly identified liberal democratic values as the governing principle of U.S. foreign policy. However, PNAC made arguments against France and cautioned against a possible threat from a France-China alliance.

An examination of arguments about the “Japan threat” undermined the democratic peace theory of threat perception. Japan has been a democracy since 1946, and yet “Japan threat” arguments were accompanied by arguments that held Japan was not a democracy, at least not a “real democracy.” During the 1970s, before Japan was viewed as a threat, Japan was identified as a democracy. Skeptical arguments about Japan being a democracy began to appear in the late-1980s and disappeared in the mid-1990s. Japan was viewed as a competitor and a potential threat to U.S. primacy in the same period. By the late-1990s, Japan was again considered a democracy. Frequent references were made in recent years to the post-war occupation of Japan as a successful case of democratization and a model for Iraq. These facts suggest the causation arrow was opposite from what the Democratic Peace theory posits. The perception of Japan as a non-democracy followed from the perception of Japan as a threat.

4. The Remaining Question

The question remains why so many of “China threat” arguments referred to China’s undemocratic nature when its undemocratic nature had so little influence on threat perception. There are three possible explanations.

One is that China was perceived as a non-democracy after China was perceived as a threat. However, China was always perceived as a non-democracy, so the proposition that threatening states are defined as non-democracies does not hold.
The second explanation is that China’s undemocratic nature was emphasized to win support for “China threat” arguments. This, as we saw in the previous chapter, was what occurred among certain interest groups.

The third explanation is that China’s undemocratic nature gained greater meaning after China was identified as a threat. In this case, China’s undemocratic nature might have reinforced but not caused the rise and spread of “China threat” arguments. It may be that China was perceived as a non-democracy but it was not an issue for U.S. national security until China was perceived as a threat. China was seen as a threat only after China increased its relative power after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The process of threat assessment seems to have been to first identify as potential threat based on relative power and then consider problems in the relationship that might cause conflicts. Problems considered include specific patterns of behavior, conflicts of interests, and domestic situation that might influence external behavior. China’s undemocratic nature seems to have become a perceived source of problems through this process.
I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan in the 1990s. Some arguments describing the danger posed by China appeared in the early-1970s, but disappeared by the end of the 1970s and were absent in the 1980s. The first article employing “China threat” arguments reappeared in May 1990. Numerous articles followed in 1992. The number of arguments increased in 1995 and 1996. From that period until 2000, “China threat” arguments increased gradually, but they remained reserved and expressions were often indirect. This changed after 2000 with a surge of “China threat” arguments thereafter. Warnings about the danger created by China appeared in various sectors of the society. Some “China threat” arguments had a visceral tone. There were emotional “China threat” arguments at the mass level and also among policy makers and security specialists. This chapter seeks to examine the rise and increase of “China threat” arguments in 1992, 1995-96 and after 2000.

In seeking to explain the Japan case, I will use the findings I obtained from the U.S. case to see if they explain the rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan.

In this chapter, I show that Realism offers the strongest explanation. The increase of China’s economic power and military power and the disappearance of the common threat, a strategic safety-net, caused the rise of “China threat” arguments. China’s behavior vis-à-vis Japan worsened. Japan’s interpretations of Chinese intentions also worsened without the strategic safety-net. The lifting of many of the restraints present during the Cold War permitted Japan to make “China threat” arguments. In the American case, the most influential
factor for the rise of “China threat” arguments was the U.S. search for primacy and China’s
potential, through its ascent, to undermine or threaten U.S. primacy. Japan, however, reacted less
to the possibility of China becoming a global superpower. The Japanese were more concerned
by the short- to medium-term military threat from China. For Japan, relations with the United
States were the most important issue in the 1990s. For the first half of that decade, Japan
sought flexibility to pursue good relations with both the United States and China. While
remaining concerned about abandonment by the United States, Japan restrained “China threat”
arguments.

In the remainder of this chapter, I first list the hypotheses and predictions drawn from the
three theories that I used to explain the U.S. case. These are: realism, organization theory and
democratic peace theory. I then offer a brief overview of “China threat” arguments in Japan.
Using the three theories, I examine the rise of those arguments in detail.

1. Realist Theory of Threat Perception

(1) Changes in Power as Cause of Threat Perception

(i) Power to threaten survival

Hypothesis R-1: States perceive other states as threats when they have the capability to threaten
national survival and harm vital national interests. The rise of threat arguments will occur
when the state has acquired such a capability.

Prediction R-1-1: Japan will perceive acquisition of military capability, by China or other
states, to threaten Japan’s national survival as threat.

(ii) Relative power position

Hypothesis R-2: States perceive other states as threats when they have the actual or potential
power to challenge their relative power. The rise of threat arguments will occur when the
second most powerful state begins to narrow the gap.

Prediction R-2-1: Japan will perceive China as a threat when it has the actual or potential
power to be the dominant power in the region.

(2) Changes in Intentions as a Cause of Threat Perception

(i) Intentions determined by relative power

Hypothesis R-3: States perceive other states as threats based on their aggressive intentions. The intentions of allies are perceived as benign because allies seeks to maximize their power and fighting within the alliance would decrease the power of the alliance vis-à-vis the adversary.

Prediction R-3-1: Japan will perceive the United States’ intentions as aggressive after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This will lead to the rise of “U.S. threat” arguments.

Prediction R-3-2: Japan will perceive China as a threat after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

(ii) Intentions determined by change in behavior

Hypothesis R-4: States will perceive other states as threats based on their behavior. Allies suppress their disagreements to maximize the power of the alliance. A conflict with an ally would weaken the alliance vis-à-vis the adversary. The disappearance of a common threat decreases the need to suppress aggressive behavior and results in the perception of hostile intentions. This leads to the rise of threat arguments.

Prediction R-4-1: Japan will see the United States as a threat when preexisting problems between the two countries reemerge after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Prediction R-4-2: Japan will see China as a threat when preexisting problems between the two countries reemerge after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

2. Organizational theory of threat perception

(1) Survival

Hypothesis O-1: Organizations perceive new threats when an existing threat disappears and organizational interests cannot be sustained or expanded without an alternative threat.

Prediction O-1-1: Japanese organizations will make “China threat” arguments when organizational interests cannot be sustained with the disappearance of the Soviet threat.

Hypothesis O-2: All things being equal, organizations will advance threat arguments that promote their organizational interests rather than undermine them.

Prediction O-2-1: Japanese organizations will make “China threat” arguments when they advance their organizational interests.
(2) Internal organization

Hypothesis O-3: Organizations seek new targets to maintain internal cohesion.

Prediction O-3-1: Japanese organizations will make “China threat” arguments when they have lost a specific target.

(3) Avoiding uncertainties

Hypothesis O-4: Organizations seek new threats to reduce uncertainties and to make carrying out daily operations easier. Organizations will search for new threats in this order (a) resurgence of old threats, (b) emergence of a new but similar threat, and (c) emergence of an entirely new threat.

Prediction O-4-1: Japanese organizations will make threat arguments in this order (a) remaining/resurgent Russian threat, (b) pseudo-Soviet or mini-Soviet threat, and (c) new threat.

3. Democratic Peace theory of threat perception

(1) Propensity to use force as a source of threat perception

Hypothesis D-1: Democracies perceive non-democracies to have a high propensity to use force because they are not restrained by democratic institutions and cooperative norms.

Prediction D-1-1: Japan will see China as a threat after an event that indicates China’s propensity to use force due to the lack of democratic institutions.

Prediction D-1-2: Japan will see China as a threat after an event that indicates China’s preference not to seek negotiated settlements.

(2) Export of non-democratic ideology as a source of threat perception

Hypothesis D-2: Democracies perceive non-democracies’ export of non-democratic ideology as a threat to domestic political institutions.

Prediction D-2-1: Japan will perceive China as a threat when it exports a non-democratic ideology to Japan.

(3) Resistance to democratization as a source of threat perception

Hypothesis D-3: Democracies perceive that non-democracies’ resistance to democracies’ attempts to spread democracy indicate hostility.

Prediction D-3-1: Japan will perceive China’s resistance to Japan’s efforts to democratize China as a source of threat.
II. "CHINA THREAT" ARGUMENTS IN JAPAN

In this section, I give a brief overview of "China threat" arguments in Japan. The section serves to familiarize readers with the evolution and the range of "China threat" arguments in Japan. I offer a more detailed account of the rise of "China threat" arguments within each case study in the following sections. In this section, I first chronologically introduce the evolution of "China threat" arguments in Japan. I then highlight the content and magnitude of these arguments. Finally, I compare these arguments to other threat arguments that were present at the time to see if the same mechanism drove all threat arguments.

1. The Evolution of "China threat" Arguments in Japan

(1) The 1970s

In the early-1970s, Japanese security specialists showed wariness towards China in two ways. First, they viewed China as a part of the monolithic communist threat with the Soviet Union. However, throughout the 1970s, they increasingly viewed China’s military capability as a force opposing the Soviet Union. The concern the Japanese government had shown towards this monolithic threat had disappeared by 1977.

Second, Japan saw China as a threat to the offshore islands in the East China Sea.

Takuya Kubo, an official of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), for example, wrote in February

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2 For example, the 1970 version of the Defense White Paper used the term “Communist China” and wrote that China was the only country in Asia developing nuclear weapons. Boeicho, Nihon no Boei [Defense Agency, Defense of Japan], October 1970, p. 29.
1971 that possible threats to Japan included “conflicts over continental shelf and Okinawa.”

But such arguments disappeared after the governments of Japan and China began a normalization process and put aside the territorial issues. “These issues can be shelved for a while,” Deng Xiaoping said in October 1978, “The next generation will have more wisdom.”

(2) The 1980s

Japanese attitudes towards China were positive in the 1980s. There were no “China threat” arguments. Japan continued to perceive China’s military capability as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. The 1990 Defense White Paper still regarded the objective of China’s military modernization as countering the Soviet threat.

The military confrontation has continued along the long border between the forces of both sides. This fact indicates that China still seems to consider the Soviet Union a potential military threat. Hence, in a move to cope with the Soviet armed forces which possess enormous firepower and mobility, China has continued shifting its conventional posture of the ‘people’s war’...to a posture of war by regulars.

Public attitudes towards China were also favorable throughout the 1980s. In 1980, 78.6% of the Japanese public felt an affinity towards China. An editorial of the Yomiuri Shim bun, a moderately conservative daily newspaper, emphasized the importance of the Sino-Japanese relations in November 1986 and advocated that Japan take great care due to its...

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3 Takuya Kubo, “Boei Ryoku Seibi no Kangaekata (KB Kojin Ronbun) [Concept for Defense Buildup (KB Personal Paper)],” from the Sengo Nihon Seiji, Gaiko Database. http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPSC/19710220.O1j.html/ (Last accessed April 9, 2005). Kubo was Director General of Bureau of Defense Policy at the time. This “KB Paper” is said to have provided the basic concept of force planning for Japan that led to the “Basic Defense Capability” concept. For more on the KB Paper, see Akihiko Tanaka, Anzen Hosho - Sengo 50 Ren no Mosaku [Security - A 50 Year Search After the War] (Yomiuri Shim bun, Tokyo: 1997), pp. 244-248.


Even the right wing conservatives who would make strong “China threat” arguments in the 1990s did not regard China as a security problem then. For example, in December 1989, Shintaro Ishihara, a radical conservative politician, was quoted in the press as saying there would be an era of economic competition after the Cold War and that China would be seen as a prospective market. He argued that “rationalization” of the U.S.-Japan security arrangement was necessary. He saw China then not as a competitor or a threat but as a potential market over which Japan and the United States would compete.

(3) The 1990s

Throughout the 1990s, the magnitude of “China threat” arguments in Japan was lower than in the United States. “China threat” arguments in Japan have remained more ambivalent than those in the United States. There were more articles and arguments that questioned the possibility of China becoming a threat.

During the 1990s, China was not the main security concern. The issue that dominated

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6 “Nicchu Yuko no Kiso wo Katamenaoso (Reconsolidate the Foundations of Sino-Japanese Friendship),” Yomiuri Shimbun, November 7, 1986, p. 3.
8 Shintaro Ishihara, quoted in “Jimin Giin: Dou Miru ‘Maruta Go’ Seizaikai ni Kiku: Jo (Liberal Democratic Party Members of Parliament: Prospects for the ‘Post-Malta’ World: Part One),” Asahi Shimbun, December 7, 1989, p. 1. The word “rationalization” is used here to mean “streamline or cut if there is no justification for it.”
9 As I will show in the later section, Ishihara’s perception of China changed drastically making a strong “China threat” arguments by 2000.
10 For example, see articles in Satoshi Amoko, ed., Chugoku ha Kyoui ka [Is China a Threat?] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1997).
public debate in quantity and intensity was relations with the United States. After 1998, North Korean threat arguments also arose. Only beginning in 2000 did the security debate on China became prominent. Until then, “China threat” arguments were regarded as somewhat taboo in the public discourse. “China threat” arguments rarely appeared in the documents of government and private organizations. But 2000 was the critical point in “China threat” arguments in Japan. The arguments increased in magnitude that year, and people in official positions began to publicly make “China threat” arguments.

(i) 1990-1994

The first of warnings about the danger posed by China appeared in May 1990. An article entitled “The Neo-China ‘Threat’ Thesis” appeared in a conservative magazine, Shokun! The author was Tomohide Murai, a China specialist at the National Defense Academy. The article argues that China could pose a potential threat as a result of the collapse of the Cold War power structure and the military modernization of the PLA. The article, however, still reflected a minority view and most of the debates on security policy were still about the Japan-U.S. relations.

More articles on “China threat” arguments appeared after 1992, especially after China passed the Territorial Waters Act in February 1992. The articles focus on two things: China’s potential threat to the ASEAN countries and China’s possible expansionist intentions, as demonstrated by its increased activities in the surrounding seas.

The 1992 Defense White Paper reported on China’s increased activities in the surrounding seas.

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11 Tomohide Murai, “Shin-Chugoku ‘Kyoui’ Ron (The Neo-China ‘Threat’ Thesis),” Shokun!, May 1990, pp. 186-197. This was probably the first instance that the phrase “China threat” was used. Murai’s argument was that the Cold War suppressed many of the local and historical tensions among states. Now that the Cold War was over, there was a possibility that rivalry between Japan and China would reemerge. The PRC government lacked legitimacy through democratic procedure and depended on nationalism. Murai warned of the possibility that the Chinese government having to resort to external aggression to maintain popular support.
seas for the first time.

China is recently moving to expand the sphere of its maritime activity by reinforcing its activities on the Spratly and Paracel Islands and enhancing its presence in the region. China is reported to be considering the purchase of Soviet Su-27 fighters, a move which is being watched in connection with movements toward the expansion of naval operational theater.

In February 1992, China promulgated and enforced the Territorial Waters Act. It is worth noting that the Act declares as part of the Chinese territory Senkaku Islands, which is an integral part of Japan, and the Spratly and Paracel Islands, which are claimed by other countries.  

After 1992, China’s description in the defense white papers began to change incrementally. The focus was on China’s maritime activities and effort to modernize its naval forces.

In January 1994, a Japanese governmental official expressed concern about China’s military buildup for the first time. China had increased its defense budget by around 15% since 1990 and by 30% in 1994. Then Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata visited China and expressed his concern about its increased defense budget and asked for more transparency.

(ii) 1995-2000

“China threat” arguments increased further in 1995-1996. China’s expansion in the South China Sea, for example its seizure of the Mischief Reef in February 1995, was viewed as evidence of China’s expansionist behavior. The argument was that the vacuum created by the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Philippines in 1992 allowed China’s expansion. The 1995 Defense White Paper expressed its concern about China’s activities in the surrounding seas.

(The construction on the Mischief Reef is) creating increased concern among the countries involved. ... Such Chinese movements toward the expansion of the scope of activities at sea need continuous attention.

China’s nuclear weapons tests in 1995 worsened Japanese perceptions of China. The

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tests provoked public criticism and skepticism about China's reasons for improving its nuclear arsenal.

Another increase in "China threat" arguments occurred after China's missile tests off Taiwan in March 1996. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto expressed his "very strong concern (kenen)" at the firing of missiles in the Taiwan Strait. He attributed his concern to the fact that increased tension in the Taiwan Strait was "very bad for the peace and stability of East Asia" and that the testing site was "extremely near Japan's territory and territorial waters."15

In 1998, the defense white paper for the first time reported the activities of Chinese naval vessels in the Japanese territorial waters.16 Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan in 1998 and his continuous reference to Japan's wartime aggression unnerved many Japanese. Jiang's visit disillusioned many politicians and foreign policy elites who had worked hard to improve bilateral relations. Arguments defending China decreased as a result of a lack of enthusiasm among the pro-China individuals.

(iii) 2000 and On

In 2000, "China threat" arguments surged in Japan. Criticism of China's maritime activities within Japan's territorial waters and of a naval information gathering ship that circled Japan came from in and out of the government. More arguments demanding the suspension of economic aid to China appeared. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members said that the

16 "In connection with movements concerning Japan's Senkaku Islands, Chinese ocean research vessels were seen last year and this year conducted what appeared to be oceanographic research work in waters around the islands, including Japan's territorial sea." Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, 1997, p. 51.
activities of the Chinese maritime research vessels "touches on the basis of Japan’s national security and would send a wrong message if Japan were to give special yen loans to China." 17 The activities were perceived to "threaten Japan’s sovereignty." 18

The language used in "China threat" arguments intensified after 2000. Arguments were less restrained and compromising. In 2005, the Foreign Minister and the leader of the opposition party both asserted that China was a threat. 19 This was a departure from Japan’s previous position.

2. Characteristics of Japan’s "China threat" Arguments

(1) The Range of "China threat" Arguments

"China threat" arguments in Japan ranged from threat of regional hegemony to a more proximate threat to Japan’s offshore islands and territorial waters. The latter was the central point in many "China threat" arguments. In government statements and reports as well as in articles in popular magazines, an increase of China’s defense spending and conventional military buildup was cited as a source of threat.

(i) Hegemony

Few arguments raised the possibility of China becoming a global hegemon or gaining primacy by surpassing the United States. A systemic change where the international system was altered to suit the terms and rules set by China was not considered. Some analysts predicted a dual hegemony where China and the United States shared power and influence of the

17 "Chugoku he no yen shakkan nado kyogi, Jimin shoi (LDP Subcommittee Discusses Yen Loans to China)," Sankei Shimbun, August 9, 2000.
18 Sankei Shimbun, August 9, 2000; and Asahi Shimbun, August 9, 2000. Quoted in Masuda, “Japan’s Changing ODA Policy.”
world. But these views were in the minority. “China threat” arguments usually dealt with problems and threats in the near- to medium-term. Unlike the “China threat” arguments in the United States that dealt with threats posed by China as a future peer competitor, the long term prospects of China becoming a competitor to the U.S. were not the focus of “China threat” arguments in Japan.

(ii) Regional threat

Arguments in Japan instead saw China’s search for regional hegemony as a threat. The argument was that China traditionally saw itself as the leader of East Asia. According to this view, China always wanted to recover the territories and power of its past empire that extended to the whole of East Asia including the Korean peninsula, Okinawa, Indochina and Russia. With the increase of China’s economic and military power this ambition was to be fulfilled.

These types of “China threat” arguments began to appear from the early-1990s and increased in number towards the end of the 1990s and into the 2000s. For example, in April 1997, Nobuo Noda, a professor at Kyoto University, argued that China’s aggressive intentions created the possibility of China “swallowing” Japan. Terumasa Nakanishi, also a professor at Kyoto University, wrote in 2004 from a historical context about China’s potential threat as a hegemon. The historical legacy of China as an empire and a suzerain led to the perception of

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20 For example, Katsumi Sugiyama pointed to China’s ambition to dominate the world together with the United States. Katsumi Sugiyama, Gunji Teikoku: Chugoku no Saishu Mokuteki [Military Empire: China’s Final Objective] (Tokyo: Shodensha, 2000).


23 Terumasa Nakanishi, Teikoku to shite no Chugoku — Haken no Ronri to Genjitsu [China as an Empire: Logic and Reality of Hegemony] (Tokyo: Keizai Shinpo, 2004).
China’s Sino-centricism and expansionist intentions. 24

Proponents of these “China threat” arguments included university professors of conservative orientation, security analysts and retired officers of the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF). 25

(iii) Threat to Offshore Islands

Concerns about China in Japan centered on the danger posed to the offshore islands and the territorial waters in the East China. 26 The first “China threat” arguments that appeared in 1992 referred to threats to the offshore islands and territorial waters. 27 China’s increased naval capabilities and activities were regarded as an indication of China’s intention to dominate the territorial waters.

Proponents of maritime threats from China came from various places in Japan. Such arguments appeared in official documents like the defense white papers and in statements of


government officials. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) published policy proposals for defending the maritime interests in June 2004 and March 2005. The Nippon Keidanren, a federation of economic organizations, also argued for the defense of maritime rights in its January 2005 report. Editorials in most of the major newspapers condemned China’s activities. A liberal newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun, called for a restrained behavior and expressed concern that an intensification of nationalism could spin out of control.

"China threat" arguments over territorial waters ranged from analytical assessments to emotional nationalistic agitation. After 2000, these arguments increasingly became emotional and sometimes used visceral rhetoric. Maritime threats were often coupled with growing anti-Japanese sentiments in China and Chinese protests against Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.

(iv) Threat of Encroachment

Many “China threat” arguments noted the threat of encroachment by China. Few people saw a possibility of outright invasion of Japan or a nuclear attack. But encroachment by China into Japanese territories and economic interests in the region were perceived as a threat to Japanese national interests. China was regarded as hoping for a fait accompli by intruding into the territorial waters with maritime research vessels, developing natural gas fields and building

28 JDA, Defense of Japan in its 1992 version and thereafter, and more explicitly in the 2000 version.
31 For example, the Sankei Shimbun declared in its editorial “We absolutely must defend Japan’s maritime rights from the equidistance line including the Senkaku Islands.” “Higashi-shina-kai Gasu Den, Kodo de Shimeso Nihon no Shucho [Gas Fields in the East China Sea, Let Us Make Our Claim by Action],” Sankei Shimbun, 14 April 2005.
rigs near the contested waters.

Most of the arguments prescribed a show of will by Japan and a resolute stand against Chinese misbehavior and demands. Proponents of “China threat” arguments believed that China’s expansion was allowed less by military weakness than Japan’s conciliatory attitude. The policy of engagement and accommodation from the 1980s was viewed as ineffective. Proponents of “China threat” arguments argued that Japan should stop prioritizing maintenance of good relations with China and instead remain “kizen” (resolute).\(^33\)

(2) Diversity of Types of Threat

Arguments about the military and security threat posed by China were only a subset of a wide range of “China threat” arguments. Even within the security context, both the rise of China and its possible collapse were viewed as sources of threat.\(^34\) The possibility of political and social unrest resulting in a massive refugee flow from China was seen as a danger.

Arguments about the economic threat from China were strong from the end of the 1990s until 2003. The business community in Japan argued that the rise of China caused Japan’s economic recession and hurt its economy. According to a survey conducted in 2002 by the Kyushu bureau of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 96 out of 100 local

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\(^{33}\) For example, the Study Group on Japan’s Diplomacy for China, “Policy Recommendations on Japan’s Diplomacy for China,” (Sponsored by the Tokyo Foundation), July 5, 2005. The group began with “Warnings for the Japanese Government and People,” and recommended that “Japan should not be conciliatory only to seek friendship with China. Rather it should resolutely deal with China without fear of temporary conflicts.” The recommendation was endorsed by 40 people, including several Members of the Diet (Kazuhiro Haraguchi, Akihisa Nagashima, Yoko Komiyama, Takeshi Nishida, Takashi Yonezawa, Yoshitaka Sakurada, Yasuhiro Sonoda); former ministers (Kazuo Aichi, former Minister of State for Defense; Shigeo Nagano, former Minister of Justice), retired generals and admirals of the Self Defense Forces, scholars, and journalists.

\(^{34}\) See for example, Satoshi Amoko, “Chugoku ha Kyoui ka,” in Amako, ed., Chugoku ha Kyoui ka, pp. 6-12.
firms viewed the Chinese economy as a threat.  

The environmental threat was another issue cited in Japan. The impact of air pollution was considered to be a serious problem. Japan lies on the west of China, and it was feared that the prevailing westerly winds would carry Chinese pollution to Japan.

Energy security was another issue. The argument was that there would be a shortage of energy if China continued its development. Some feared competition and conflict over access to energy sources.

3. Other Arguments

(1) Soviet Threat

Threat arguments during the 1980s focused on the threat from the Soviet Union. Defense white papers discussed Soviet military capabilities and activities in detail. This continued into the 1990s. The 1989 version expressed skepticism about the consequences of domestic changes in the Soviet Union. The 1991 version wrote:

Although the recent domestic and international environments of the Soviet Union apparently make it more difficult than before for the Soviet Union to conduct aggressive behavior against another country, it remains unchanged that the above-mentioned situation of the Soviet forces in the Far East makes severe military environment around Japan.  

The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the Japanese government continued to view Russia with suspicion. The reduction of forces based on the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty in Europe was regarded as having led to a transfer of weapons to the Far East resulting in a qualitative increase of the Russian forces in that region. Japan’s assessment of Russia’s military gradually changed as the activities of Russian military forces decreased. But

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until 1995, the defense white papers still identified the existence of the Russian military forces in the Far East as “an unstable factor for the security of this region.”

(2) The United States

The U.S.-Japan relations dominated the foreign-security policy debate in the early part of the 1990s. Issue after issue of magazines and journals around this time debated the phenomenon of “Japan bashing” in the United States and the future role of the U.S.-Japan alliance. A featured article in the May 1990 issue of the *Shokun!* asked whether Japan needed the United States. Much of the debate was in response to the “Japan threat” arguments in the United States, but there were also arguments expressing skepticism about the alliance and the drawbacks of remaining a subordinate and dependent partner. At the same time, arguments about concerns of abandonment by the United States and the “isolation (*koritsuka*)” of Japan were offered.

(3) North Korea

Concerns about danger posed by North Korea followed the Soviet threat arguments. The 1991 Defense White Paper mentioned the possible nuclear weapons program by the North Korea. In 1993, the White Paper wrote:

> If the development of nuclear weapons were combined with the missile development, it could create an extremely dangerous situation. Such movements constitute a factor which could bring instability to the international community as a whole. Japan is strongly concerned about the development trend of the missile.

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The North Korean threat remained the most prominent danger for Japanese policy makers and the Japanese public throughout the 1990s, into the 2000s.

III. REALIST EXPLANATION

In the U.S. case, realism offered the strongest explanation for the rise of “China threat” arguments. The United States reacted most acutely to the rise in China’s relative power, however small it was. The collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the sole superpower with a great power lead over other nations. This allowed U.S. hegemony. The increase in China’s relative power as a result of China’s rapid growth, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the slow-down of the Japanese economy gave rise to an American perception of China’s growing capability. The reordering of relative power also caused the United States to view China’s intentions with suspicion. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the strongest rationale for the United States and China to suppress conflicts. This led to the re-surfacing of old problems and a worsening of the bilateral relations. The fraying of the strategic safety-net and changes in China’s behavior caused the perception of aggressive intentions and a sense of threat. The increase of China’s absolute power was less responsible for the rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States.

In Japan’s case, realism predicts that “China threat” arguments would arise after an increase of China’s relative power. Japan should react acutely to China’s actual or potential power to surpass Japan’s relative power. We should then see a rise of “China threat” arguments in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet Union and more so after 1993, when China’s rapid economic growth became apparent. Realism also predicts that China’s behavior would be less accommodating to Japan’s interests and that its intentions would be regarded with greater
suspicion by Japan. “China threat” arguments should also arise when the strategic safety-net disappeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Old problems that were suppressed during the Cold War should resurface and lead to a perception of aggressive intentions on both sides. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, we should see a deterioration of Japan-China relations and changes in attitudes and behavior on both sides. China’s military capability that was perceived as a counterweight against the Soviet Union during the Cold War would be perceived as a threat to Japan.

Realism also predicts that Japan’s relations with the United States would deteriorate after the collapse of the Soviet Union, causing a rise of “U.S. threat” arguments in Japan. The United States maintained a preponderance of power throughout the 1990s. If absolute power caused the rise of threat arguments, then we should see “U.S. threat” arguments in Japan rise and continue.40

The rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan followed a slightly more complicated path than in the United States. In the U.S. case, China was the only country narrowing the gap with the United States after the decline of the Soviet Union and Japan. However, in the Japanese case, the United States remained the preponderant power while China rose. “China threat” arguments became more common in the 1990s while at the same time the dominant security debate remained Japan’s relations with the United States. I argue in this section that the rise of “China threat” arguments was strongly influenced by the increase of China’s power and the disappearance of the strategic safety-net provided by the common threat, the Soviet Union. I also argue that the relatively weak expression of “China threat” arguments in Japan during the 1990s and especially in the first half of the 1990s was strongly influenced by the continued

40 In the U.S. case, “Japan threat” arguments subsided when the relative power of Japan began to decline.
strength of and then the weakening of the strategic safety-net with the United States. Although the U.S.-Japan alliance existed even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many security specialists in Japan raised concerns about the lack of common threat binding the two countries. Many policy makers refrained from making “China threat” arguments until the U.S.-Japan alliance was consolidated after the end of the Cold War.

1. Aggregate Power and “China threat” Arguments

(1) China’s Relative Power

Realism argues that states perceive threats based on other states’ relative power. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union left the United States as the sole superpower. Balance of power theory argues that Japan would perceive the biggest power, the United States, as a threat. If we take a long-term view, then balance of power theory would argue that Japan would begin to perceive a future top power as a potential threat. We should then see a rise of U.S. threat arguments in Japan after the collapse of the Soviet Union. We should also see a rise of “China threat” arguments when China’s power shows a potential to exceed that of the United States.

China began its economic development in 1978 when it began the policies of reform and opening to the outside world. Many China watchers in Japan had noticed China’s economic rise. But it became more evident to the public in 1993 when a World Bank report estimated that China would become the world’s largest economy in 2002.  

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41 The World Bank estimate was for the “Chinese economic area (CEA)” comprising China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. However, “China threat” arguments that followed often only referred to China and did not mention that CEA included Taiwan. The report used what was then called the “standard international price,” an equivalent of what was later called the purchasing power parity (PPP) to estimate China’s economy. Standard international prices and PPP were both derived from the International Comparison Program (ICP) of the World Bank. The
double-digit growth in real terms for consecutive years in 1992 and 1993 after a temporary slow-down after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989.\textsuperscript{42}

However, few people in Japan anticipated the possibility of China surpassing the United States. Japanese economists had anticipated and hoped for China’s economic growth in the 1980s, but were skeptical about Chinese economy becoming the world’s largest. The 1993 World Bank report was met with considerable coolness and did not directly result in the rise of “China threat” arguments. Many arguments expressed doubts about China’s assuming primacy.\textsuperscript{43}

“China threat” arguments during the early- to mid-1990s were still restrained. Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, the strongest power was perceived to be the United States. Therefore unlike in the U.S. case, in which “China threat” arguments started after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the halt in the Japanese economy, the rise of “China threat” arguments did not follow the collapse of the Soviet Union. Most of the security and foreign policy arguments in the early- and mid-1990s focused on how to deal with the United States rather than with China.

Realism argues that a state’s economic rise invokes threat perception because it increases the economic power that could be translated into military power. However, some scholars have noted Japan’s receptiveness to economic power even without it being translated into military power. For example, Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels argued in 1999 that Japan’s foreign policy was driven by “mercantile realism” in which states see

\textsuperscript{42} The real growth rates of Chinese economy from 1988 to 1993 were: 9.4%, 4.1%, 3.8%, 9.0%, 14.4% and 13.5%. The data are in 1990 constant U.S. dollars. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook 1993.
\textsuperscript{43} For example, a conservative journal Shokun! carried featured articles “Verifying the Chinese Great Economy Argument.” Yuji Osaki argued that the Chinese economy had many problems and its rapid development would probably only last for another two or three years. Yuji Osaki, “Shakai Shugi Shijo Keizai no Shotai [The True Nature of Socialist Market Economy],” Shokun! Vol. 25, No. 7 (July 1993), pp. 134 -143.
de-industrialization and dependency as primary threat to state security.44 Japan’s perception and arguments about China’s economic threat followed what mercantile realism would predict; the fears were about threats of hollowing and losing economic competitiveness. Such arguments started from 1995 and intensified in 2000-2001. These arguments subsided by 2003-2004 among the economic and governmental organizations but remained in commentaries of the mass media.

(2) Relative Power Position

Realism also posits that states are concerned about their relative power position in the international system. A top power is expected to be concerned about the secondary power catching up and taking its position. The United States had been a dominant power during the Cold War with Japan as the world’s second largest economy. States’ fears about losing their position suggests that the United States would be worried about a rising Japan (or a rising China), and Japan worried about a rising China. Given states’ concern for their relative power, we can infer that a secondary state would be less worried about an increase of power of the top state. However, this does not seem to have occurred. Realism predicts that unless the secondary power has a guarantee that the top state will not use its power to harm its national interest, the secondary power will worry about the top state. We can assume that Japan was quite concerned about the United States after the collapse of the Soviet Union that took away the strategic rationale for the alliance.

The prediction about relative power and the rise of “China threat” arguments is that Japan

will make “China threat” arguments once it perceives a possibility that China’s power will surpass its own. Japan’s perception of China should change after an increase of China’s power, and after Japan’s own power stopped growing relative to China.

Consistent with the realist prediction, long-term concerns about the consequences of China’s rise began to be expressed among security specialists in 1993. For example in 1993, Seiki Nishihiro noted that China would be Japan’s main national security threat in the 21st century. Nishihiro was a former Administrative Vice Minister of JDA (June 1988-July 1990) and then a member of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues that wrote the so-called Higuchi Report that reviewed Japan’s defense policy after the Cold War. Nishihiro noted that China would be a comprehensive threat to Japan; a threat militarily, politically, socially and economically. Articles appeared in newspapers and magazines that expressed concerns that the increase of China’s economic and military power could constrain Japan’s behavior and harm its national interests. The authors of these articles were mainly columnists and political and security analysts.

“China threat” arguments in Japan were less frequent and intense before 2000. However, there is evidence to suggest that people regarded China as threat based on its increase of power but refrained from making “China threat” arguments publicly. In 2000, Masaharu Gotoda, a former Cabinet Secretary in the Nakasone administration and a former chairman of the Japan-China Friendship Center stated in an interview that he viewed China as a threat. His perception was based on China’s growing power.

The Japan-U.S. alliance is really for China. No one will say it aloud but everyone thinks so...I think China is a threat. If you look around the world after the Soviet threat is gone, there is no other country but China that could be a threat...It is not because of Tiananmen...It is not because of ideology. It is because China is growing. The alliance

is necessary not because China will attack Japan militarily, but because of the political power it will have backed by its military power. 46

Gotoda did not make “China threat” arguments in public, and his main argument was about the importance of building close economic relations with China to constrain China’s behavior.

More extreme views warned against a Chinese take-over of Japan. One column noted that:

China is a proud nation. It will not continue to serve Japan as it does now. One day it will retaliate. And it’s not just with the nuclear missiles. When the Japanese economy de-industrializes, the President of China can triple the price of its exports and the Japanese economy will easily collapse. They can do this. We must regard China seriously. Criminals are smuggled into Japan by boats. The jingoistic crowd come to the Senkakus in fishing boats and provokes us. It’s not just the firms, Japan as a whole is to be taken over. 47

Some expressed concerns about competition between Japan and China over the leadership in Asia. For example, an official of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) was quoted as being concerned about China winning the lead in forming an FTA in Asia.48 Some economic commentators pointed to the danger of China seizing hegemony in currency and establishing control over the world economy. 49

China’s growing economic power led to the emergence of “China threat” arguments in Japan’s security discourse in the mid- to late-1990s. China’s huge population base, together with its rapid economic growth led some security specialists to view China as a potential threat to Japan by 1993. However, until the turn of the century, “China threat” arguments in Japan seemed to have been restrained due to Japan’s concern of and preoccupation with its relations with the United States, the largest power. This is in keeping with realist predictions. In

46 Masaharu Gotoda, Interview by author, 19 April 2000, Tokyo, Japan.
47 “This is How to View China,” Sankei Business i, May 19, 2004.
addition, the argument that China would become a global peer competitor to the United States was rarely made in Japan. The majority of “China threat” arguments expressed concerns for China’s potential threat to Japan and its interests in the region.

2. Military Power

(1) Relative Military Power

Realism predicts that “China threat” arguments would occur when China increased its relative military power. The earlier “China threat” arguments that appeared in 1992 noted two factors as sources of threat. One of which was the increase in China’s defense spending and modernization of weapons. The first articles that expressed concern about China’s growing military capability appeared in April 1992 in a conservative magazine, Shokun! It argued that China’s military capability was “the future threat.” However, this article and other articles that appeared during the early-1990s focused mainly on China’s threat to South East Asia and the responses from the ASEAN countries.

In 1993, the Discussion Group on Defense, a panel under the Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy that reviewed Japan’s defense policy, noted, “it was not necessarily

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50 The other factor was the passing of the Territorial Waters Act in February 1992. Senkaku Islands and the surrounding waters, which Japan claimed as its own, were included in Chinese territorial claim.


appropriate to view China as a threat”.  

Japan’s attitude towards China changed in 1994. Although much of the public debate on security still centered on the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance, by 1994 the “China threat” was being discussed. For example, in January 1994, a Japanese government official expressed concern about China’s military buildup for the first time. Then Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata visited China and expressed his concern about the increase of the defense budget and asked for more transparency. Hata also told his Chinese counterparts of Japan’s intention to shorten the five-year yen loan to three years.

China had increased its defense budget by about 15% annually since 1989. China’s announcement of another 22.4% increase in 1994 further alarmed the Japanese. Newspaper articles expressed alarm and suspicion. For example, Sankei Shimbun wrote that the surge of China’s defense budget despite its financial deficit would inevitably raise “China threat” arguments from surrounding countries. The following year, the Chinese government announced that the actual outlay for 1994 had increased not by 22.4% but by 29.3%. This

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55 The immediate cause for the change in Japanese government’s attitude was the underground nuclear test which China conducted on October 5, 1993. The Japanese public had protested strongly. This was the first time the Japanese government unilaterally “sanctioned” China for its behavior. And although the real harm was minimal, it was a symbolic departure from Japan’s previous policies which placed utmost importance on maintaining good relations with China.


further increased concerns.\textsuperscript{58}

China’s military modernization was also viewed as a threat. For example, in March 1994, Yuken Hironaka, president of the National Institute for Defense Studies, wrote that the three dangers facing Japan were Russia’s military in the Far East, China’s military modernization and North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. He also noted that “the U.S. military presence based on the U.S.-Japan security arrangement functions as a counter balance to military capability of the regional powers,” suggesting that he saw the need to balance against China.\textsuperscript{59}

The National Defense Program Outline (FY 1996) approved on November 28, 1995 did not specifically mention China, but it noted the presence in the region of:

Large-scale military capabilities including nuclear arsenals and many countries in the region are expanding or modernizing their military capabilities mainly against the background of their economic development.\textsuperscript{60}

At the time the NDPO was adopted, former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa expressed his concerns about China to Masahiro Akiyama, then Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy, JDA. According to Akiyama, Miyazawa showed concerns for the growth of China and of downsizing of the JSDF.\textsuperscript{61}

In October 1995, Foreign Minister Yohei Kohno expressed his concerns about a change in Chinese behavior. Kohno’s statement is particularly noteworthy because he was considered to be “soft” on China within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

\textsuperscript{60} National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996, adopted by the Security Council and by the Cabinet on November 28, 1995 (Tentative Unofficial Translation prepared for the convenience of the working press).
\textsuperscript{61} Masahiro Akiyama, interview by author, 19 July 1999, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Akiyama was Administrative Vice Minister of JDA from July 1997 to November 1998. According to Akiyama, Miyazawa asked whether the downsizing of the forces was based on threat assessment. Miyazawa agreed with Akiyama that China would not be a threat for another 15 years.
Recently, China has taken a number of moves that merit our careful attention... As China accomplished a rapid economic development, China's increase of military power has also taken a more rapid pace. If you ask the Chinese, they will explain that it is not an increase but renewal and modernization of weapons. But I think we must observe (the change) with even greater caution. 62

Ezra Vogel's recollection of his fall 1995 visit to Japan attests to this change in Japanese perception of China. 63 He recalled, "Japanese leaders had been very concerned about the ascendency of China." 64

Keizo Takemi, an LDP Diet member, saw China's military buildup as a destabilizing factor in the region. Takemi was the chairman of an LDP's committee that decided to reduce Japan's aid to China in 2000. In April 2000, he expressed his concern about China's potential threat to Japan and the region, particularly of China's naval capability:

I think the Japanese people are watching China sensibly. The official defense spending is growing at a double digit pace. China is the only country among the P5 (permanent members of the United Nations Security Council) strengthening its nuclear forces. China is increasing the number of its Su-27 fighters and the cross-strait balance of power is maintained at a higher level. The Kilo class submarines can be used to blockade the Taiwan Strait. A conflict in the surrounding waters is certain to occur. China is expanding its activities into the East China Sea and the South China Sea. An arms race involving the whole region could occur. 65

The increase of China's military spending was one of the major factors that caused "China threat" arguments. For example, Seiji Maehara expressed his "very serious concern" about China's military buildup in a speech he gave in Washington in December 2005. 66 He reiterated

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63 Vogel was the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia at the National Intelligence Council from fall 1993 to fall 1995.
64 Ezra Vogel, interview by Yoichi Funabashi. Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift, p. 258.
65 Keizo Takemi, interview by author, 10 April, 2000, Tokyo.
his concern in a television interview in January 2006:

China has Japan within its missile range, has increased its military power by more than 10% for 17 consecutive years. China has thoroughly researched the seas around Japan. It is strengthening its fighter aircraft to fifth generation fighters. There is also a difference over the maritime rights and territorial issues. My honest feeling is, if you don’t call this a threat then what is?67

Foreign Minister Taro Aso seconded Maehara’s view in a press conference in December 2005, and said he viewed China as a threat. He listed China’s defense buildup and possession of atomic bomb as evidence:

A neighboring country...has a population of 1 billion and an atomic bomb and its military spending has been increasing at a double-digit rate for 17 consecutive years. There is little transparency. What these amount to is that China is beginning to pose a considerable threat, in my sense.68

The Cabinet, however, quickly modified Aso’s position by stating in a written answer to a member of the House of Representatives, “The Government does not perceive China as a threat.” The Cabinet showed some concern about China’s military increase but stated that “the Japanese government does not think that China has the “intention to invade Japan.” The written answer listed the Joint Declaration of 1972 and Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978, which state that the two countries will resolve all conflicts through peaceful means, as reasons to assume that China’s intentions were non-aggressive.69

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69 The written answer assessed the PLA to be “The largest in the world in terms of size, but it has old equipment and weapons with insufficient firepower and mobility, which are not deployed throughout the whole military. Thus China is modernizing its nuclear-missile forces and naval and air power. China’s defense budget, according to the Chinese government’s official announcements, has increased by double-digit rates for the last seventeen years. We perceive that there is still a lack of transparency about these points and that it is important for China to increase military transparency to resolve the concerns of the surrounding countries.” The Cabinet of Japan, “Written Answer to Questions by Representative Kantoku Teruya Regarding China Threat Arguments,” January 31, 2006.
(2) China’s Capability to Harm Japan

Realism would predict that Japan would perceive a threat from China when China has acquired capabilities to harm Japan. This was supported in part by empirical evidence.

China’s modernization of its forces during the 1990s aimed to increase its offensive capability in the Taiwan theater. It was also believed that China sought to increase its capability to deny military intervention by the United States and Japan into a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The major increase in China’s military capability in the 1990s was believed to be in its acquisition of modern fighter airplanes and conventional submarines. China acquired Su-27 and Su-30 fighters and Kilo-class diesel submarines. China also improved its missile capabilities by increasing the number and mobility.

The two areas many “China threat” arguments pointed as concerns were China’s nuclear weapons and threat to Japan’s offshore islands. These threat arguments were based upon China’s actual capabilities to harm Japan, supporting the realist proposition that states perceive threats based on capability to harm. However, as I describe below, China’s increased offensive capability against Japan was limited. In addition, China already possessed nuclear weapons that could attack Japan, so, while China’s nuclear weapons affected Japan’s “China threat” arguments, they do not explain the emergence of “China threat” arguments in the 1990s.

China developed solid-fuel intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), Dongfeng 21 (DF-21 or CSS-5), in the late 1980s and is said to have deployed them between 1989 and 1991. China continued to replace the liquid-fuel IRBMs with the new solid-fuel Dongfeng 21, increasing the weapons’ survivability, but not by much. The improvement in China’s nuclear capability vis-à-vis Japan during the 1990s was not large.

70 The Military Balance, corresponding editions.
The Japanese response to China’s nuclear capabilities changed after the 1990s, however. Throughout the 1990s, the defense white papers had described China’s nuclear and missile capabilities only in a restrained and a limited way. From 2000 on, the white papers began to discuss the weapons more directly and wrote that the range of China’s IRBMls included Japan. This was the first time that the JDA expressed concern about China’s nuclear weapons targeting Japan.

There were some improvements in China’s offensive capabilities against the offshore islands. China’s modernization of weapons in the 1990s was primarily in its conventional forces designed to attack and threaten Taiwan. The improvements in China’s military capability were not sufficient to directly threaten the main islands of Japan. The only areas that were threatened militarily were the offshore islands of the Senkakus and Okinawa. The Senkaku Islands are only about 380 km from China, 200 km from Taiwan and about 430 km from the main island of Okinawa. The acquisition of the Su-27 fighter aircrafts improved the offensive capability of the Chinese Air Force over the older fighters. The Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) has its 83rd Air Wing in Okinawa with the 302nd squadron of F-4EJ fighter aircrafts. F-4EJ is an older aircraft than the Su-27.

“China threat” arguments made by the Japanese security specialists focused more on China’s actual and near future capabilities than on long-term threats. Compared with the U.S. case, Japanese perception of China’s military capability was more based on China’s actual military capability. This is caused by Japan’s geographical proximity to China. China’s conventional forces that are too weak to threaten the United States can reach Okinawa. A general in the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) pointed to the proximity of Japan to China as

71 From the website of the Naha Base. http://www.dii.jda.go.jp/asdf/83wg/ayumi.html
72 There has been a debate about moving the F-15 fighters from the bases in northern Japan, but this has not happened as of 2005, which indicates limited concern about the Chinese Su-27s.
a source of threat.

China is already a threat to Japan with its missiles and threat to the SLOC. For Japan, a brown water navy and a blue water navy are not different. If JMSDF and the PLAN were to fight in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, then Japan can defeat China. China cannot win in one hundred years. But the SLOC along China's coast cannot be defended even with aircraft carriers. This is a simple arithmetic. There are so many airplanes an aircraft carrier can carry. Planes can be much better operated from a land base. We cannot defend the areas within the range of Su-27s even with aircraft carriers.73

Many of “China threat” arguments pointed to threat of nuclear weapons. In this context, Japan’s “China threat” arguments were commensurate with China’s capability to harm. However, these were not newly acquired capabilities and do not account for the rise of “China threat” arguments. Many “China threat” arguments also pointed to threat to the offshore islands. The newly acquired capabilities of Su-27s and Kilo-class submarines increased China’s capability to harm the offshore islands. However, they are not substantial enough to account for threat arguments claiming that Japan’s interests could be strangled by China’s power. I argue below that the emergence of arguments concerning threat to the offshore islands was strongly influenced by the fraying of the strategic safety-net and reemergence of old problems.

3. Realist Explanations for the Perception of Intentions

(1) China’s Aggressive Behavior

Realism predicts that Japan would perceive China’s intentions to be aggressive based on China’s actual behavior rather than their ideology, culture or form of government. Actual behavior suggests how a potential adversary’s military capability will be used. In addition, China’s intentions should be perceived as more aggressive without a common according to realism.

73 Noboru Yamaguchi, interview by author, 16 June 1999, Washington, D.C. Yamaguchi was a defense attaché to the United States.
One of the first expressions of “China threat” arguments followed China’s firing of the ballistic missiles. In June 1995, Tetsuya Nishimoto, chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the Self Defense Forces, expressed his concerns about China’s test firing of a ballistic missile. China’s missile tests off Taiwan in March 1996 provided another stimulus to “China threat” arguments in Japan. After the missile tests, Prime Minister Hashimoto expressed his grave concern:

Heightening tension in the Taiwan Strait is obviously not desirable for the peace and stability of East Asia. The exercise area this time is very close to Japan. From these points of view, the Japanese government has been very concerned that China began the missile exercise, and we have repeatedly expressed our interest.

As we will see in the next section, China’s maritime activities in and around the contested territorial waters and offshore islands were interpreted as signs of China’s aggressive intentions. “China threat” arguments in Japan did not accompany a primacy or hegemony arguments. “China threat” arguments were reactions to actual Chinese behavior that was perceived to threaten Japanese territory and interests. These behaviors included increased defense spending, increased maritime and naval activities, firing missiles off Taiwan, and conducting nuclear tests. There was no argument about a threat of China changing the international system. Japan’s confidence that the United States would remain the hegemon did not falter throughout the 1990s.

China, on the other hand, became suspicious about Japan’s defense forces expanding their role in overseas missions through the UN or together with the United States. The maintenance and upgrade of the U.S.-Japan alliance invited China’s threat perception. Concerns expressed by China were perceived as an indication of its malign intentions towards Japan and further increased suspicion on the Japan’s side. For example, China’s criticisms of Japan’s research on

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74 Tetsuya Nishimoto, quoted in “China’s ICBM tests likely to continue: report,” Agence France-Presse, June 2, 1995.
theater missile defense (TMD) led to a perception that China was targeting Japan with its missiles and caused “China threat” arguments.

(2) Changes in Behavior without the Strategic Safety-net

Japan and China enjoyed good relations during the 1980s. Japanese public opinion polls showed that in 1980 as many as 78% of the people viewed China favorably. As we saw in the previous sections, problems existed between Japan and China during the Cold War. However, these problems were suppressed or shelved during the 1980s to concentrate on fighting the Soviet threat. Maintaining good Japan-China relations was an important goal of Japanese foreign policy, and took precedence over other bilateral and domestic issues.

Realism predicts that Japan would begin to pursue its national interests at the cost of China’s interests after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Old problems would resurface and Japan’s behavior and arguments would be less restrained. China is expected to behave in the same way.

In the course of the 1990s, Japan removed restraints on its behavior towards China and old problems gradually resurfaced. At the same time, restraints on making “China threat” arguments were also removed. Several things occurred simultaneously: a) an increase in Japan’ self-interested behavior; b) an increase in China’s self-interested behavior; c) a decline in efforts to maintain good Japan-China relations; d) a decline in restraints on making “China threat” arguments. These factors resulted in the deterioration of Japan-China relations and an

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76 The argument was that since the TMD was a defensive system to counter in-coming missiles, China should not be concerned if it had no intention of attacking Japan. The fact China expressed its concerns was an evidence of China’s potential intention to attack Japan.

increase in the perception of China’s aggressive intentions. The political taboo that suppressed “China threat” arguments during the 1980s was also being lifted.

In the sections that follow, I review the changes in Japan’s behavior and inquire into their cause. China’s behavior also changed after the Cold War. It is highly probable that the same mechanism is at work. However, this dissertation does not discuss China’s threat perception.

“China threat” arguments began to emerge after 1992 among security specialists, but efforts to maintain good bilateral relations continued through 1995. These efforts had the influence of suppressing “China threat” arguments. In the early- to mid-1990s, there was a tension between the rise of “China threat” arguments and this effort to maintain good relations. The critical point came in 2000. By this time, many of the old problems had re-surfaced and the constraints that had checked “China threat” arguments were also removed.78

(i) The Territorial Disputes

The biggest issue between Japan and China was the territorial dispute regarding the Senkaku Islands and the territorial waters in the East China Sea.79 Beginning in the 1970s, defense specialists regarded conflict over the offshore islands and China’s activities in the Japanese territorial waters as a potential threat to Japan. However, the issue had been shelved in the normalization process, and the suppression of the problem continued through the 1980s.

As predicted by Realism, the territorial problem reemerged in 1992 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, worsened after 1995, and intensified in 2000. The changes occurred on both sides. China’s activities increased in magnitude and frequency, while Japan’s reactions became more pronounced and less compromising. This led to an exacerbation of the problem and

78 A similar tension was present in the U.S. case. However, the difference was that in the United States the debate involved two camps; the engagement school and the “China threat” school, whereas in Japan the tension was less visible and “China threat” arguments remained subdued during the 1990s.
79 The Chinese call the islands “Daoyutai” Islands.
heightened perceptions of aggressive intentions.

China’s maritime activities were one of the main factors cited in “China threat” arguments in the 1990s. One gets the impression that Chinese maritime activities in the East China Sea were a post-Cold War phenomenon and did not happen in the 1980s. However, this was not the case. China’s activities occurred during the 1980s without causing alarm. On occasion the Japanese government sought to minimize the negative effect of the incidents on the Japan-China relations. For example, in the interest of not harming the bilateral relations, the government asked the media not to report on an incident in 1988, in which Japanese fishermen were fired at by the Chinese.

Even when China’s activities were reported, the reaction of Japanese security specialists and the public was quiet. China had been conducting maritime surveys in the East China Sea since the end of the 1980s. Chinese maritime research vessels frequently entered the Japanese EEZ and territorial waters.

Until 1992, Japan’s reaction was almost nonexistent. Shigeo Hiramatsu, a former researcher at the National Institute for Defense Studies and Professor at Kyorin University, who had watched the PLA since the 1960s attested to the lack of concern in Japan before 1992. Hiramatsu wrote about the Chinese Navy’s advancement into the East China Sea for the first time in November 1991. He had talked to the press several times about his concerns about China’s activities but recalled that both the article and his suggestions to the media received

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little response. The response from the security specialists was also cold.\textsuperscript{82}

After 1992, the territorial dispute worsened as China took more assertive actions and Japan responded with less restraint. Behavior and responses escalated in phases occurring in 1992, 1996-97 and 1999-2000. Each time, both sides interpreted the other’s less cooperative and more assertive attitudes as evidence of aggressive intentions.

The first major change occurred on the Chinese side. China adopted the Law on the Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas (Territorial Waters Act) on February 25, 1992. The Territorial Waters Act included the Senkaku Islands as part of China’s territory. It also authorized the Chinese Navy to defend the territorial waters. “China threat” arguments occurred in Japan as a response to the Act. The law was perceived as a challenge to Japan and was interpreted to mean that the Chinese government had shown its intention to defend the Senkaku Islands and the surrounding waters by force.\textsuperscript{83}

“China threat” arguments around this period, however, were still not the central issue in the national security debate. Hiramatsu recalled that the North Korean problem remained the focus of attention for some time, even in closed meetings among specialists.\textsuperscript{84} Nevertheless, there was a growing awareness of China’s potential threat. In 1994, the Higuchi Report noted the danger of territorial disputes escalating into a conflict with China.\textsuperscript{85}

1995 was the second turning point in China’s behavior and Japan’s perception of China’s

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\textsuperscript{83} The Japanese government holds the position that the Senkaku Islands are an integral part of the Japanese territory, and that no territorial dispute exists. Japan and China both claim 200 nautical miles EEZ rights but the width of the East China Sea only extends to 360 nautical miles. The Japanese government maintains that the median line between Japan and China delimits an EEZ of Japan. China, on the other hand, claims an EEZ extending to the eastern end of the Chinese continental shelf which goes beyond the median line and deep into the Japanese EEZ. For Japan’s official position, see, \textit{The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands.”} Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. \url{http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/senkaku.html} (accessed December 21, 2005).

\textsuperscript{84} Shigeo Hiramatsu, interview by author. April 8, 1999, Kanagawa, Japan.

\textsuperscript{85} The report did not mention “threats” but used the word “dangers.”
threat. In 1995, China’s maritime activities increased. The number of Chinese ships sighted by the Japanese Coastal Guard increased from 2 to 15. Since 1995, Chinese vessels have conducted marine research and drilled experimental oil wells beyond the median line between Japan and China.

China’s activities in the South China Sea also increased in 1995. The Philippine government announced in February 1995 that China had constructed a building on the Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands. The building was perceived as an indication of China’s expansionist intention to seize the Spratly Islands and also the Senkakus.

Editorials appeared in Japanese newspapers criticizing China and pointing to the Chinese threat. Sankei Shimbun carried an editorial on February 22, 1995 arguing, “Today’s Spartlys are Tomorrow’s Senkakus.”

In both Japan and China, efforts to maintain good bilateral relations continued from 1990 to 1995. However, enthusiasm for improving the relationship waned gradually among the foreign policy elites in Japan while nationalist groups became more agitated by the territorial issue.

Events in 1996-1997 further exacerbated the problem, resulting in an increased perception of Chinese aggressive intention. The Japanese government and the public gradually became more aggravated. In addition, China’s nuclear tests in May and August 1995, despite repeated protests from the Japanese government, aroused strong anti-China sentiments in Japan. The territorial problem and nuclear tests had the synergic effect and reinforced “China threat” arguments.

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EVENTS OF 1996-97 REGARDING THE SENKAKU ISLANDS PROBLEM

On July 15 1996, a Japanese right wing group built a lighthouse on the island. On July 20, 1996, the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea to effect for Japan and the Japanese government decided on the EEZ around the Senkaku Islands. Protesters from Hong Kong and Taiwan tried to land on the island in September 1996 and were stopped by the Japanese coast guard. One of the activists from Hong Kong died jumping into the sea. In April 1997, a member of a city assembly in Okinawa landed on the island. Also on May 7 1997, a Diet member and a later Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense, Shingo Nishimura landed on the island. On both occasions, the Japanese government expressed “regret.” At the same time, however, the Japanese government began to take harder measures. In May 1997, civilian groups from Taiwan and Hong Kong tried to land on the islands. The Japanese government said that it would take hard measures and dispatched some fifty coast guard ships to stop the groups from landing on the islands. Though the activists were from Taiwan and Hong Kong, not from mainland China, the incidents had the effect of increasing threat arguments vis-à-vis China.

Events in 1999-2000 further escalated the territorial disputes and Japan’s “China threat” arguments. The increasing activities of the Chinese maritime research vessels aroused strong reactions from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Diet members. This led to more explicit “China threat” arguments. An incident in May-June 2000, where Haibing-723, a Chinese icebreaker/intelligence gathering ship circled around Japan had a particularly strong impact on “China threat” arguments in Japan. This trip aroused a strong criticism towards China. The LDP members reacted strongly, leading to a demand to cut the ODA to China. By 2000,

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87 The same group had built a lighthouse in 1978 and 1988.
88 Nishimura was appointed Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Defense but was forced to resign after only two weeks for his suggestions in an interview with the Playboy magazine that Japan should review its ban on nuclear weapons.
China’s activities within Japan’s EEZ were seen to “threaten Japan’s sovereignty.”92 The LDP members had also demanded that the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) write more explicitly about the Chinese maritime activities in the defense white paper.93

“China threat” arguments regarding China’s activities in the East China Sea grew more pronounced after 2000. The number of Chinese activities itself had increased. China conducted marine research in Japan’s EEZ 16 times in 1998, 30 times in 1999 and 24 times in 2000.94 In addition, the Chinese naval fighting ships were observed twice in 1999 operating within the Japanese EEZ in the East China Sea, and thrice in 2000. On the Japanese side, the establishment of two political groups contributed to the increase of “China threat” arguments. The bipartisan “Young Diet Members’ Groups for Establishing a Security Framework for the New Century” was established in November 2001 and took up the issue of defending maritime rights in the East China Sea beginning in March 2005. Another committee established in the LDP began to take up the issue in March 2004. The influence of these groups is examined in the later section on the “Lifting of Taboos.” Japan’s efforts to stop the Chinese activists from landing on the island became harsher. In March 2004, the Chinese activists landed on one of the islands and were arrested and deported back to China.

The territorial problem escalated further when China developed natural gas sites near the median line. Although the sites were on the Chinese side of the median line, because the facilities were just several kilometers away from the median line, it was argued that China would unearth gas buried in the Japanese side. In 2004, China began to develop the Shungyo (Chunshao) site. Because it was done despite the protests of the Japanese government, it was

92 Sankei Shimbun, August 9, 2000; and Asahi Shimbun, August 9, 2000. Quoted in Masuda, “Japan’s Changing ODA Policy.”
93 An SDF officer, interview by author, December 2000, Tokyo, Japan.
perceived as an indication of China’s intention to establish a *fait accompli* seizing control of these waters. These actions, combined with increased activities of the maritime research vessels, strengthened the perception of China’s malign intent. A Chinese nuclear submarine trespassed into Japanese territorial waters near the Ishigaki Island in Okinawa in November 2004. This incident further aggravated the already aroused public opinion in Japan.

The Japanese government retaliated in July 2005 by granting prospecting right for a district near the median line to a Japanese oil company, Teikoku Oil.\(^95\) It was also reported in September 2005 that the JGSDF had a “Defense Plan” to defend the Southwest islands, including the Senkakus, against China.\(^96\)

The territorial problem offers a good example of the lack of strategic safety-net leading to less restraint behavior of Japan and China. The territorial problem had been shelved during the 1980s as both Japan and China prioritized maintaining good relations over pursuing the territorial rights. This strategic imperative disappeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union. China escalated its self-interested behavior. Japan sought to maintain good relations with China until the mid-1990s, and its reactions were restrained. However, it became increasingly difficult to maintain domestic support for conciliatory policy towards China. As a result, Japan began to react aggressively to Chinese actions. Booth sides interpreted the changes in behavior and reactions as evidence of changes in intentions. This resulted in perception that the other sides’ aggression might cause conflict.

(ii) The History Issue

Disputes over the interpretation of history followed a similar trajectory, deteriorating over


\(^{96}\) This was the first time that China was included in the Defense Plan. The Defense Plan is similar to a war plan where operational plans are laid out based on assessments of a possible attack on Japan. “Chugoku no Shinko mo Soutei, Rikuji Keikaku Hanmei, Hoppou Jushi kara Tenkan [JGSDF Defense Plan Revealed, ‘Chinese Invasion’ Assumed, A Shift from a Northern Focus],” *Asahi Shimbun*, September 26, 2005. p. 1.
the course of the 1990s. Differences over the interpretation and blame for the war in the 1930s and 1940s recurred several times during the 1980s and the 1990s. Throughout this period, every time a problem arose, the Japanese government had compromised with and accommodated China's position. The problem followed a pattern where a Japanese public figure took an action or made a statement that slighted Japan's past aggression toward China, China protested, and the Japanese side either resigned from the public position or apologized. As a result, the problem never worsened beyond the initial stage. In 2001, however, Prime Minister Koizumi broke the pattern by visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, despite China's strong protest.

(a) 1980s - 1990s

The history issue emerged as a problem between Japan and China in 1982 over a Japanese history textbook. In 1985, then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone paid an “official visit” to the Yasukuni Shrine, the first time a Prime Minister had done so. In the following year 1986, however, the cabinet issued an official statement saying that the prime minister should not visit the shrine. The decision was made to maintain good relations with China.97

Former Prime Minister Nakasone explained in 2004 that the reason for his decision not to visit the shrine in 1986 was because fighting the Soviet Union took precedence over other issues. Nakasone emphasized the difference in the strategic situation of the 1980s and the 2000s. He recalled in a television interview:

Back then, the Soviet Union was the enemy. Communism was (the enemy). It was the time of the Cold War. China was a country we needed to keep on our side. There was a same atmosphere in China. So, since China was protesting (the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine) I thought I would stop ... To have China on our side to balance the communist

Russia, that was the big national objective.  

Nakasone’s statement supports the realist proposition about changes in distribution of power resulting in changes in behavior and resurfacing of preexisting problems.

1992 was when the history problem was at its best. Since then, the problem worsened gradually. In 1992, the Chinese government invited Emperor Akihito to China. The Chinese government had promised not to make the history an issue during the visit. Their Japanese counterparts felt that the history issue was finally being laid to rest. The objective of Emperor Akihito’s visit to China was to maintain strong Japan-China relations. The Chinese leadership had also wanted to establish good relations with Japan after the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 to end its international isolation. The Emperor’s visit was met by a strong opposition from right wing radicals and the conservative wing of the LDP. One of the reasons for their opposition was China’s past protests of prime ministers’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. In 1992, maintaining good Japan-China relations won over. The Japanese government was determined to engage China.

After 1992, first there were several changes on the Chinese side. The Chinese government began the Patriotic Education Campaign in the fall of 1994 to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the “War Against Japan.” Many of the 100 books and 100 films the government recommended for the occasion depicted the Japanese as atrocious aggressors.

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98 Yasuhiro Nakasone, interview by Soichiro Tawara, in a television program, Sunday Project, TV Asahi, 10 October 2004, video recording, Tokyo.
100 Masayuki Fujio (a Diet member) was one of the first to oppose the visit at a general council meeting of the LDP on January 17, 1992. National meetings were held in March and July of 1992 in opposition to the visit. On July 17, 1992, the Sankei Shimbun carried a one whole page advertisement opposing the visit with signatures of 110 people including academics, business people and TV celebrities. For details, see Yoshibumi Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia — How the Political Right Delayed Japan’s Coming to Terms With its History of Aggression in Asia (Tokyo, LTCB Library Foundation: 1998).
101 According to an undisclosed public opinion poll conducted by the government, 72 % of the people supported the emperor’s visit. Other opinion polls conducted by various newspapers showed similar results. Quoted in Wakamiya, The Postwar Conservative View of Asia.
This led to speculation in Japan that the Chinese government was trying to instill anti-Japanese sentiments among their young. President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998 further aggravated the problem. President Jiang believed that a continuous reminder of Japan’s past aggression was the key to improving bilateral relations. However, Jiang’s repeated references to the aggression throughout his visit irritated even those who were sympathetic to China. Those who thought the emperor’s visit in 1992 had finally ended the history problem felt betrayed. Many of those most committed to maintaining good bilateral relations lost enthusiasm.

During this period, there were some problems caused by the Japanese. But in each case, the Japanese side made concessions, prioritizing good relations. In May and August of 1994, two cabinet ministers made statements that justified Japan’s war behavior. Both were forced to resign. In July 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited the Yasukuni Shrine — the first Prime Minister to do so since Nakasone’s 1985 visit. His visit was met by a strong protest from the Chinese government. Hashimoto was the former president of Nippon Izokukai (Japan Bereaved Families Association), the main advocate of Prime Minister’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Despite his close affiliation with the group, Hashimoto canceled his visit the following year to maintain good relations. The succeeding Prime Ministers, Keizo Obuchi and Yoshiro

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102 For example, Jiang Zemin stated his belief in the importance of emphasizing the history issue on September 1, 1998: “There are many arguments about whether or not we should take up the history problem in Sino-Japan relations. Some people say that we should not take up the history issue. However, the more we take up the issue, the greater the benefit for the friendship of generations to come.” Jiang Zemin quoted in Tokyo Shimbun, 2 September 1998, cited in Yoshikazu Shimizu, Chugoku ha Naze “Hannichi” ni Natta noka [Why Did China Become “Anti-Japan”?](Tokyo, Bungeishunju, 2003), p. 26. Jiang was also reported to have said that the problem of history and Taiwan, which are at the root of Japan-China relations, cannot be sidestepped,” during the summit meeting with Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi during Jiang’s state visit to Japan in November 1998. Jiang Zemin, quoted in Kazuo Sato, “The Japan-China Summit and Joint Declaration of 1998: A Watershed for Japan-China Relations in the 21st Century?” CNAPS Working Paper, Brookings Institute, January 2001, p. 11. http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/sato_01.pdf (accessed 30 June 2006).

103 In May 1994, Minister of Justice Nagomo said that the Nanjing Massacre did not happen, and was forced to resign. In August 1994, the Minister of State for Environment said that Japan had not intended to start a war of aggression and should not be the only party blamed. He withdrew his statement and was dismissed.
Mori both refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine while in office after considering the issue for some time.\textsuperscript{104}

(b) 2001 and On

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the shrine in 2001 and every year since. Unlike his predecessors, he did not stop after China had protested. His visits became the focus of contention between Japan and China. The two leaders were unable to exchange official visits, even though the two governments had agreed in 1998 to annual visits. Chinese President Hu Jintao refused to meet with Koizumi in 2005 even in a third country when multilateral meetings were held. Koizumi’s continuous visits to the shrine were one cause of mass anti-Japan demonstrations in 2005 in China.\textsuperscript{105}

There were several reasons why Koizumi continued to visit the shrine. One of the reasons was Koizumi placed greater importance on bilateral relations with the United States which in his words was the “only ally” that would come to Japan’s defense.\textsuperscript{106} He paid less attention and made less effort to maintaining good bilateral relations with China, although Koizumi had repeatedly stated that he did not see China as a threat. From 2004, the LDP had included the continued visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in the party’s action guidelines.\textsuperscript{107} The majority of the LDP and about half of the public supported the visit.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{104} “Mori Shusho Kisha Kaiken no Youshi [Summary of Prime Minister Mori’s statements at the press conference]” Sankei Shimbun, August 7, 2000.

\textsuperscript{105} By 2004, the public sentiments of both countries worsened over the history issue and became more emotional. The behavior of the Chinese soccer fans toward the Japanese team during the August 2004 Asia Cup had aggravated the Japanese perception of China. The fans continuously booed the Japanese team and smashed an embassy car, breaking a window, after the final match in Beijing. In April 2005, the Chinese public reacted negatively to Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the UNSC. Public demonstrated in several cities breaking Japanese restaurants, stores and cars.


\textsuperscript{108} In November 2004, 38\% of the respondents thought Koizumi “should continue” the visits, and 39\% thought he “should stop.” In May 2005, 39\% were in favor and 49\% was against his continuing to visit. In June 2005, 41\%
(iii) The Taiwan Problem

Taiwan was another issue that had been left untouched during the Cold War. Again, the Japanese government placed higher priority on respecting China's positions until 2000. In 1994, Taiwan's President Lee Tenghui tried to attend the opening ceremony of the Asian Games held in Hiroshima, Japan. The Chinese government protested strongly and Lee's visit did not materialize. Compared to the situation in the United States, the Japanese government was more accommodating of China's demands. It was only in April 2001 after Lee Tenghui retired from the presidency, that he was able to visit Japan, but even then only to receive medical care and only under the condition that he would not engage in any political activities.

Changes after 2001 were starker. For example, in January 2003, a retired JGSDF general was sent to the Taipei office of the Interchange Association, Japan (IAJ) as full time staff.109 IAJ is similar to the American Institute in Taiwan and functioned like an embassy since Japan and Taiwan ended their diplomatic relations in 1972. In December 2003, former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visited Taiwan and met with President Chen Suibian and former President Lee Tenghui.110 In December 2004, Lee Tenghui revisited Japan, this time as a tourist. On each occasion, Japan made the decision despite strong protests from the Chinese government.111

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were in favor and 50% opposed. The first two surveys were conducted by the Asahi Shimbun. Both are online at http://www.asahi.com/special/shijiritsu/TKY200411290310.html and http://www.asahi.com/politics/naikaku/TKY200505300363.html (both accessed 14 January, 2006).


111 Arguments opposing the Japanese decision cited the fear of harming the Japan-China relations, often in the context of the six party talks for the North Korean nuclear problem.
(iv) Change in Interpretation of Intentions without the Strategic Safety-net

The common threat provided assurance that China would not act against Japan’s vital interest. Harming Japan interest would weaken the coalition against the Soviet Union and harming China itself. The common threat acted as a strategic safety-net. In addition to changes in behavior we have seen so far, the interpretation of behavior also changed with the disappearance of the strategic safety-net. This was most visible in the interpretation of China’s arms buildup.

During the 1980s, China’s arms buildup was perceived as an effort to balance the Soviet forces. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China’s effort to modernize its military began to be perceived with suspicion. The increase of defense spending in the 1990s was perceived as indicative of China’s aggressive intention towards Japan and the United States. The acquisition of modern weapons, such as Su-27 fighters and Kilo-class submarines from Russia, and up-graded nuclear weapons were also perceived to signal aggressive intentions.

As we have seen, Japan’s suspicion about China’s military was first expressed in 1994 in a demand for more transparency by Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata. Since then, increased transparency had been a continuous demand of the Japanese government towards China. Many “China threat” arguments stated that Chinese military capability was still modest but questioned the motive behind the rapid buildup.

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112 For example, General Noboru Yamaguchi, said in 1999 that during the Cold War the JSDF regarded the Chinese military as a force to subtract from the Soviet forces when making assessments. Noboru Yamaguchi, interview by author, June 16, 1999, Washington, D.C.

113 For examples of arguments questioning the intention of China’s arms buildup see; Cabinet of Japan, “Written Answer to Questions by Representative Kantoku Teruya Regarding China Threat Arguments,” January 31, 2006; Editorial, “Chugoku no Antei Jushi to Kokubou Yosan Zo [China’s Emphasis on Stability and Increase of its Defense Budget],” Hokkaido Shimbun, 14 March 1994, p. 2; Ikuo Kayahara, “Chugoku no Gunjiryoku to Kokubou Seisaku no Shiten [Advancement of China’s Military Power and Defense Policy],” Satoshi Amoko, ed., Chugoku ha Kyousi ka [Is China a Threat?] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1997). Kayahara wrote that even if China’s real defense spending was three times the officially stated figure, it was still not an amount to be concerned about, but he
China also became suspicious of Japan’s defense spending after the decline of the Soviet threat. Chinese skepticism toward Japan and its military started before the end of the Cold War in 1987. The Chinese government expressed concern over Japan’s decision to abolish the one percent ceiling on defense expenditures. This was a departure from the Chinese government’s concern in 1980 that Japan’s defense budget was too low.

4. Arguments about the United States

(1) U.S.-Japan relations and “China threat” arguments

As I noted, the rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan presented a more complex picture than the U.S. case, because Japan had to deal with both the United States and China. Japan’s perception of and relations with the United States strongly influenced Japan’s “China threat” arguments.

Realism predicts that Japan’s relations with the United States would deteriorate after the end of the Cold War. The United States remained the strongest power with the capability to annihilate Japan if it chose to. The strategic guarantee that had existed when the Soviet Union was the common threat had disappeared although the alliance as an institution remained.

Realism predicts that Japan would perceive the United States as potential threat and
Japan's relations with the United States would be the biggest concern for Japan. Japan would either balance against or bandwagon with it. As I will show in the following sections, Japan chose to bandwagon with the United States. And Japan's main security concern in the 1990s was Japan's relations with the United States.

If the United States was the biggest security concern, then we should see Japan make an effort to seek closer relations with the United States. However, because Japan should be uncertain about the robustness of the bandwagon, we should see Japan simultaneously seek good relations with China. The more worried Japan was about abandonment by the United States, the more committed Japan should be to maintaining good relations with China. Alternatively, the less worried Japan was about abandonment by the United States, the less committed Japan should be to maintaining good relations with China. In this case, we should first see arguments expressing concerns about the United States. At the same time, "China threat" arguments would be suppressed, followed by a disappearance of concerns about the alliance and an increase of "China threat" arguments. This was supported by empirical evidence. "China threat" arguments were suppressed in the first half of the 1990s but began to be expressed more publicly as Japan consolidated its relations with the United States.

An alternative explanation is that the "China threat" was Japan's main concern and perception of an increased China threat drove Japan to seek a closer alliance with the United States. In this case, "China threat" arguments should have increased in Japan before or while Japan made efforts to solidify the alliance with the United States. However, concern about the drifting of the alliance preceded widespread concern about China. Although the U.S.-Japan alliance was upgraded shortly after the Taiwan Missile Crisis, officials in both governments

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One of the findings from the U.S. case was that policy preferences influenced threat arguments. Those who wanted to balance against China made "China threat" arguments.
attest that it was just a coincidence, and preparation for the reaffirmation of the alliance predated the Missile Crisis.\(^{117}\) There is also no indication that Japan made “China threat” arguments to convince the United States to upgrade the alliance.

(2) The Deterioration of U.S.-Japan Relations

During the Cold War, Japan did not perceive the United States as a threat because of the Soviet threat and the U.S.-Japan alliance, which institutionalized the cooperative relationship. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was skepticism about the ability of the alliance to maintain good bilateral relations.

As realism predicts, the relations between Japan and the United States deteriorated from the end of the 1980s and especially in the early 1990s. Changes first occurred on the U.S. side. The United States saw Japan as an economic threat that could turn into a security threat. Japan reciprocated the negative attitudes coming from the United States. Anti-U.S. sentiments were expressed as the United States increased its demands on Japan. “No” to Ieru Nippon [Japan that Can Say “No”] became a best seller in 1989.\(^{118}\) The popularity of the book reflected the frustrations felt by the Japanese public towards the United States. Books appeared with titles like The American Trap and The U.S.-Japan ‘New Cold War’.\(^{119}\) The conflict over the development of the FS-X (fighter support experimental) increased Japan’s anti-U.S. sentiments and suspicions about U.S. intentions towards Japan. The FS-X incident was likened to “a fuse

\(^{117}\) President Clinton planned to visit Japan in the fall of 1995 but had to postpone the trip due to the shutdown of the federal government. Had he made the trip as planned, the reaffirmation of the alliance would have occurred before the Taiwan missile crisis.


to a cold war between Japan and the United States.\textsuperscript{120}

This trend continued and worsened after the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States increased its demand for Japanese defense spending and the lowering of trade barriers. On the Japanese side, skepticism about U.S. intentions increased. In the early-1990s, Japan showed concerns towards the United States, the Soviet Union, and China.\textsuperscript{121} Enthusiasm for holding the bilateral relations intact decreased starting in 1992. Arguments appeared questioning the efficacy of the alliance.\textsuperscript{122}

U.S.-Japan relations hit bottom in 1994-95. A Congressional Research Service report wrote in August 1994 that:

Japan-U.S. relations are more uncertain and subject to greater strain today than at any time since World War II...Japan today is our foremost economic and technological competitor.\textsuperscript{123}

In February 1994, the summit meeting between Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa and President Bill Clinton failed to reach an agreement over trade issues. The meeting’s failure was received favorably by the Japanese public, who believed that the Prime Minister had stood firm against the United States. When a schoolgirl was raped by a U.S. marine in Okinawa in September 1995, even a long-standing supporter of the alliance within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) stopped defending the alliance. Takakazu Kuriyama, Ambassador to Washington


\textsuperscript{121} For example, Japan’s Foreign Minister told the National Diet in April 1990 that Japan needed to closely watch the behavior of “the Soviet Union, China and the United States.” Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama, statement in the Budget Committee of the Lower House, April 6, 1990, in response to a question from Tsuruo Yamaguchi. http://www.kokkai.ndl.go.jp (accessed February 28, 2005).


(1992-1996), wrote in his book that at the time he even feared a direct confrontation with the United States.124

Realism predicts that given the deteriorating situation between the Japan and the United States, Japan would do one of the following: (a) seek a more self-reliant defense policy; (b) maximize its options by seeking cooperative relations with China and therefore suppress “China threat” arguments; or (c) seek to restore relations and alliance with the United States. Empirical evidence suggests that from the early to mid-1990s Japan chose (b). As the U.S.-Japan relationship worsened, Japanese foreign policy and security specialists began to discuss the need to strengthen ties with China and other Asian countries as either an alternative or to complement the alliance. The report of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues, the so-called Higuchi Report of August 1994, said that multilateral efforts were more important than the Japan-U.S. alliance.125 This reflected the prevalent doubts about the alliance and the search for an alternative security arrangement.126 In 1994, Seiki Nishihiro, a former vice minister of defense and a member of the Advisory Group was quoted in the press as saying:

During the Cold War, increasing the trust of the Japan-U.S. alliance constituted all of Japan’s defense policy. With the end of the Soviet threat and East-West confrontation, we must think about the role of the Japan-U.S. alliance from the very basics.127

The cover of the October 1994 issue of the *Nikkei Business* showed the title “JAPAN SWINGS”.128 There was a picture of a pendulum with “Japan” written on it swinging away

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126 Nobushige Takamizawa, an official of the JDA, who assisted in the drafting of the Report, noted that the members of the Advisory Group did not have great trust in the United States. Nobushige Takamizawa quoted in Sotooka, Honda, Miura, *Nichibei*, p. 494.
from the U.S. flag towards a Chinese flag. This picture reflected the atmosphere of the time among the Japanese public and the elites.

(3) The Improvement of U.S.-Japan Relations — Bandwagoning with the United States

Faced with a strong America, Japan had two choices: balance or bandwagon. None of the empirical evidence suggests that Japan sought to actively balance against the United States. Statements by government officials and security specialists at the time suggest that Japan chose to bandwagon. In 1994, Japan moved toward option (c), aiming to restore Japan’s relations with the United States. The security elite in Japan began to make conscious efforts to revitalize the alliance and stop it from “drifting apart.” As a result, the U.S.-Japan alliance was reaffirmed on April 17, 1996 by the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security. The improvement of relations and the consolidation of the alliance led to the increase of “China threat” arguments in Japan.

(i) Bandwagoning to Avoid Conflict — Alliance as a Mitigater

One of the objectives of the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance was to avoid conflict with the United States. In August 1990, Ichiro Ozawa, Secretary General of the LDP and a leading advocate of Japan becoming a “normal nation,” stated that Japan needed to bandwagon

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129 If Japan chose to balance against the United States, then we should see a rise of “U.S. threat” arguments and continued suppression of “China threat” arguments to maintain better relations with China.
130 Defense policy makers in both countries met frequently to discuss the future of the alliance. The so-called Nye initiative of 1995 was a product of such consultations. Meetings were held at a formal and an informal level. For example, at a breakfast meeting in July 1994, Ichiro Ozawa, then the head of the Shinseito and a former vice cabinet secretary, and Richard Armitage, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, agreed on the importance of the alliance as a stabilizing factor for East Asia. Both felt that the alliance was being taken for granted. Joseph Nye, then on the National Intelligence Council, and later Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and Ezra Vogel, then National Intelligence Council were also present. Nye and Vogel were instrumental in bringing about the so-called Nye initiative, “The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,” in February 1995.
131 This bandwagon function of the U.S.-Japan alliance had been present even during the Cold War. The Japanese security elite saw a dual function in the U.S.-Japan alliance. One aim was to balance the Soviet threat and another was to avoid conflict with the United States.
with the United States to avoid being crushed by it. After witnessing Washington’s harsh
demands on Japan after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Ozawa was reported as saying to Takakazu
Kuriyama, the then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs:

The United States is beginning to crush Japan. It’s safer to jump into the arms of the
United States like hugging a ferocious bear.132

In 1993, Ozawa reiterated the importance of the alliance as a means to avoid conflict with the
United States. He wrote that the U.S.-Japan alliance had three functions. The first was the
friendship and cooperation treaty, the second was the antiwar pact, and the third was a defensive
treaty against foreign aggression, the equivalent to NATO. Ozawa emphasized the importance
of the first and the second function in the post-Cold War:

Those who argue that the U.S.-Japan alliance is no longer necessary are only looking at
this (third) portion. Why does the U.S.-Japan alliance have the first and the second tier
unlike the NATO? It is because the two countries have different culture and race, and
have fought a major war. 133

A discussion group established within the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) in June 1993 to
review the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) also saw a function of the alliance as
avoiding conflict with the United States.134 The Group noted, “The Japan-U.S. security system
should be maintained to prevent future antagonism between Japan and the United States.”135

The alliance was seen to mitigate U.S. pressure against Japan. It was reasoned that without the
alliance the United States would not respect Japan’s national interests.

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132 Ichiro Ozawa, quoted in Hidetoshi Sotooka, Masaru Honda and Toshiaki Miura, *Nichi Bei Domei Han Seiki —
Anpo to Mitsuyaku [A Half a Century of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Security Treaty and Secret Agreements]* (Tokyo,
134 The group was called Discussion Group on Defense in the New Era (Shinjidai no Boei wo Kataru Kai). The
group was a private panel under the Director General of the Bureau of Defense Policy of the Defense Agency.
The National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) is sometimes seen as a national security strategy.
135 "Shin-jidai no Boei wo Kataru Kai’ ni Okeru Rongi no Gaiyo [Outline of the Discussions at the Discussion
tuiten Kento — 21 Seiki ni muketeno Kadai to Tenbo — [Examination of the Modality of Defense Capability —
Issues and Outlook for the 21 Century —*], February, 1996.
(ii) Bandwagoning for Profit

The U.S.-Japan alliance was seen to serve Japan’s national interests.\textsuperscript{136} Japan’s strategy seems to have been to help the United States consolidate its hegemony and thereby reap the maximum profit out of the international system that the United States heads.

Seiki Nishihiro, a former Vice Minister of JDA (June 1988-July 1990) and a member of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues that wrote a post-Cold War defense strategy in 1994, called the U.S.-Japan alliance a “passport to international society” for Japan.\textsuperscript{137} Japan’s leaders believed that a more active role in overseas military operations, such as the U.N. peacekeeping missions, was necessary for Japan to increase its political influence. However, a more active military role by Japan was viewed with skepticism by the neighboring countries that were victims of Japan’s aggression during WWII. The U.S.-Japan alliance was believed to alleviate the fear of the countries in the region. In other words, by accepting the “cork in the bottle” function of the alliance, Japan could play a more active role politically and militarily without provoking perceptions of threat and thereby a security dilemma in East Asia. This method of alleviating neighbor’s concerns was easier than major diplomatic efforts to mend fences over the history issues, which would require a major domestic debate and concessions from the conservative nationalists.

(iii) Bandwagoning to Prevent Abandonment

Abandonment by the United States was a recurring concern in the Japanese defense policy


\textsuperscript{137} Seiki Nishihiro, quoted in Sotooka, Honda and Miura, \textit{Nichibei}, p. 540.
The fear was that when China became powerful, the United States might abandon Japan because Japan would become less significant. Nye remembered the concern expressed by the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) during his 1994 visit to Tokyo.

It wasn’t so much the JDA people who talked about China but the Gaimusho (MoFA) people. At an informal meeting they said: What’s going to happen to us, are you going to abandon us? Are you going to play Japan against China? ... I was not so worried about Japan’s overreaction to China’s rise, because Japan had always been careful not to offend China.  

Japan’s policies during the 1990s attest to this concern over abandonment and efforts to maintain the alliance. For example, the Japanese government increased host nation support by about 56% during the 1990s. This was a way to defray U.S. costs and ensure continued U.S. presence. These measures taken in the mid-1990s indicate that Japan increased its burden sharing more than the United States. Japan saw more need to maintain the alliance than the United States.

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138 Concerns about U.S. abandonment were present even in the 1970s and 1980s. The “Nixon shock” of the United States establishing relations with China and President Nixon visiting Beijing in February 1972 without notifying Japan seems to have encouraged Japan’s concern about abandonment.


141 An argument made in the United States in the mid-1990s held that it was cheaper to keep U.S. forces stationed in Japan than to bring them home. This argument was often used to counter arguments for force reduction and as a justification for keeping one million troops deployed in Asia.
(4) The Increase of “China threat” arguments

As predicted by realism, “China threat” arguments began to increase after the reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan alliance in April 1996. The concerns about U.S. abandonment, however, were not totally absent during the Clinton presidency. For example, Ambassador Walter Mondale was quoted in the press in September 1996 saying that the U.S. forces were not obliged to defend the Senkaku Islands under the U.S.-Japan security treaty. This ambiguous position was perceived as an indication of a lack of U.S. commitment. However, under the Bush administration, Japan became much more confident in the U.S. commitment to Japan. President Bush took a more confrontational approach toward China. At the same time, Japan was able to establish close relations with the United States through the cooperation after the September 11 terrorist attacks and by expressing strong political support for U.S.’s war against Iraq. Japan primarily provided rear area support for the U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. For example, the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) sent destroyers including the Aegis to the Indian Ocean to refuel U.S. naval ships and helicopters. Japan also sent troops to the southern part of Iraq for reconstruction operations. This was the first time since World War II that Japan had sent its troops overseas outside of a UN peacekeeping mission. Abandonment by the United States was perceived as highly unlikely given the fight against terrorism and potential threat from China. This explains the intensification of “China threat”

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142 The Clinton administration’s China policy was one of engagement, and the administration often showed conciliatory attitudes towards China. When President Clinton visited China in 1998, he did not stop in Japan and this “Japan passing” invited skepticism about the U.S. commitment to Japan. The Clinton administration had called the U.S.-China relations as the “strategic partnership.”


144 Bush called China a “strategic competitor” during the presidential election in 2000.


146 Japan sent a total of 5,500 troops to Iraq from January 2004 to June 2006.
arguments in Japan after 2000 and especially after 2002.

One caveat is that public sentiments towards the United States remained somewhat skeptical even after the improvement and consolidation of the U.S.-Japan relations. In most opinion poll surveys in the 1990s, more people regarded the United States as a threat than China. In an opinion poll conducted in November 2001, 15% of the people named the United States as a military threat. This was the second largest after North Korea at 43%. Only 8% felt China was a military threat.¹⁴⁷

5. Lifting of the Taboo

Criticizing China was long considered taboo in Japan. Strategically, it was taboo because China's cooperation was important during the Cold War to counter the Soviet threat. Morally, it was taboo because of Japan's past aggression against China. This taboo was gradually lifted during the 1990s due to several factors. The most important factor was the redistribution of power and reordering of relations after the end of the Cold War. As we saw in the preceding sections, China was not as helpful to Japan's interests as before after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The consolidation of Japan's relations with the United States also took away an incentive to maintain good relations with China. Another factor was the fact that the older generation of conservatives that felt responsibility for the war against China had either retired or died by the end of the 1990s. Many of the younger generation of conservatives refused to give China a special treatment. Also, as discussed below, the Tiananmen Square incident lifted some of Japan's sense of moral obligation.

Maintaining friendly Japan-China relations remained important even in the 1990s, despite

the gradual resurfacing of old problems. Masaharu Gotoda, a former Cabinet Secretary in the Nakasone administration, attested to the importance of maintaining Japan-China relations for the Japanese government. Gotoda remarked in 2000 that making “China threat” arguments was political suicide in Japan:

If we say that China is a threat, it will not hold politically in Japan. If we say something like that, Japan-China relations will be in turmoil and the (Japanese) government will collapse. This is because of the historical circumstances.148

The statements of several former government officials attest to the suppression of “China threat” arguments in the 1990s. They were concerned of “China threat” privately but did not make “China threat” arguments publicly. As we saw earlier, Gotoda himself stated in private that he regarded China as threat and that most people did without admitting it. Former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, known for his conciliatory stance towards China, had expressed his concern for potential threat from China to Masahiro Akiyama, then a JDA official, in 1995.149 Former ambassador Hiroshi Hashimoto, who was the central figure in arranging the emperor’s visit to China in 1992, had hinted at the potential threat of China.150

However, the balance tipped in favor of making “China threat” arguments sometime after 2000. Before 2000, people refrained from making public statements against China; after 2000 people refrained from publicly defending China. As a result, bilateral relations deteriorated rapidly. As the long-standing problems resurfaced, “China threat” arguments were more easily made and accepted. By 2004, the problems with China had become so serious that a new generation of politicians stayed away from the China issues. By this time, many of the older

148 Masaharu Gotoda, interview by author, 19 April 2000, Tokyo, Japan. Tadashi Ogawa, former Prime Minister’s Secretary to Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, and former Administrative Vice Minister of Ministry of Finance, also noted that jeopardizing Japan-China relations would not hold politically and could lead to the collapse of the administration. Tadashi Ogawa, interview by author, 10 May 2000, Tokyo, Japan.
149 Akiyama was Administrative Vice Minister of JDA from July 1997 to November 1998. Masahiro Akiyama, interview by author, 19 July 1999, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
150 Hiroshi Hashimoto, interview by author, 20 April, Tokyo, Japan.
generation of pro-China politicians who have worked to maintain good bilateral relations since
the 1972 normalization had retired from.\footnote{In addition, there was a change in the internal dynamics of the LDP which contributed to change in Japan's attitudes towards China. This will be discussed in detail towards the end of the chapter.}

The lifting of the taboo was apparent in the criticisms of the accommodation policy
towards China. Arguments in favor of an assertive and uncompromising policy towards China
began to gain support from the mid- to late-1990s. Shigeo Hiramatsu, who had been the most
active writer on China's maritime activities from the early-1990s, noted in 2000 that the real
problem was not the threat from China per se but the lack of awareness in Japan.\footnote{Shigeo Hiramatsu, interview by author, 8 April 1999, Kanagawa, Japan.} From the
mid- to the late-1990s, criticism of being too “soft” on China began to be leveled against the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and the government. \textit{Sankei Shimbun} wrote in an editorial
in May 1996 that the Japanese government has forgotten the golden rule of diplomacy: “to say
what one must.” It cautioned that China had a tendency to expand its national interest if other
countries did not resist.\footnote{“Chugoku Kaiyo Chosa ni Chinmoku ha Kinmotsu [Silence is Taboo Concerning Chinese Maritime Research],” \textit{Sankei Shimbun}, May 5, 1996.} In April 1997, another \textit{Sankei} editorial criticized the MoFA's idea
that Japan should refrain from taking actions that might invite diplomatic trouble.\footnote{“Nihon no Umi ha Imaya Chugoku no Umi [Japan's Seas are Now China's Seas],” \textit{Sankei Shimbun}, April 20, 1997.} In an
editorial in June 2004, the \textit{Yomiuri} argued that the cause of the territorial dispute was excessive
consideration for China and prescribed a firm stand against China. This was a departure from
\textit{Yomiuri}'s November 1986 editorial that argued that Japan should take great care towards China
given history.\footnote{“Nicchu Yuko no Kiso wo Katameaoso (Reconsolidate the Foundations of Sino-Japanese Friendship),” \textit{Yomiuri Shimbun}, November 7, 1986, p. 3.} Japan's new assessment of China’s intentions reflected a similar logic to that
expressed in Sir Eyre Crowe’s famous memorandum of 1907 that cautioned against
appeasement and advocated a resolute stand against Germany, which Crowe likened to a
There was another taboo that shaped much of Japanese security discourse during the Cold War. This was the taboo against discussing national security issues in military terms. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution had theoretically prohibited Japan from having armed forces and renounced the right of belligerency. During the Cold War, successive governments changed the interpretation of Article 9 incrementally to enable Japan to have a military capable of defending against the communist threat. U.S. pressure precipitated the changes. However, public opinion remained strongly pacifist and public debate on military issues was generally thought of as taboo until the end of the 1980s.

The taboo on debating military issues was gradually lifted during the 1990s. The emergence of a multi-party conservative coalition within the Diet in 2001 was a manifestation of the taboo's disappearance. As we saw earlier, 101 Diet members formed a group called the "Young Diet Members' Group for Establishing a Security Framework for the New Century" in November 2001. The young conservatives were in their thirties and forties and urged Japan to defend its national interest based upon "realism." The group's objective was to revise the Constitution and allow the right of collective self defense, which would enable the SDF to

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156 Eyre Crowe wrote: "The blackmailer's trade is generally ruined by the first resolute stand made against his exactions and the determination rather to face all risks of a possibly disagreeable situation than to continue in the path of endless concessions. But, failing such determination, it is more than probable that the relations between the two parties will grow steadily worse." Eyre Crowe, "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany," quoted in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1989-1914, Vol. III: The Testing of the Entente 1904-6 (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1928), pp. 402-403, 414-416, 419-420.

157 Examples of this taboo in Japanese society are, an SDF general being fired for conducting a study of war plans in the so-called Mitsuya Incident, not identifying the Soviet Union explicitly as a threat during the Cold War, and staff of the Defense Agency to be denied access to certain universities such as the University of Tokyo either as students or as instructors.

engage in combat missions overseas together with the U.S. forces. This, in their view, was necessary to forging a strong alliance with the United States and assuming an important political position in the world. Members belonged to five different parties. Shigeru Ishiba of LDP and Seiji Maehara of Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) were the main figures organizing the group. Ishiba later became Minister of State for Defense (September 2002 - September 2004), and Seiji Maehara became the leader of the DPJ (September 2005-April 2006).159

By 2004 the number had grown to 167, which made up 23% of the Diet. There were 85 LDP members and 73 DPJ members. One out of every three newly elected lawmakers joined the group. Out of 118 members who were born after 1960, 53 have joined the group.160

The direct cause for the establishment of the group was the September 11 terrorist attacks. The Japanese public as well as the politicians became conscious of the need to build a security system that worked. A succession of incidents involving North Korea worked as an impetus to lifting the taboo. The trespass of a North Korean ship into Japanese territorial waters in October 2002, and the disclosure of the details of the North Korea's abduction of Japanese citizens after Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang in September 2002 helped break many of the taboos in Japan's defense policy. Reviewing the right of collective self-defense and the exclusively defense-oriented posture was put on the political agenda. Takemi explained the reasons for the change:

The shock of having your neighbor abducted. And the threat of that country possessing ballistic missiles. The Japanese nation's views on security changed from the bottom. Naturally the Diet members changed too.161

The young conservatives also removed the taboo on China and gradually began to work on

159 Maehara was National Security Minister and Foreign Minister in the Next Cabinet before becoming the leader of the party. The "next cabinet" is similar to the shadow cabinet in the U.K. system.
161 Keizo Takemi quoted in "Shin Anpo Zoku."
issues related to China. In March 2005, the group began to consider the defense of the maritime resources in the East China Sea. Takemi was also the chairman of the LDP’s Special Committee on Ocean Matters. The LDP set up a working team on ocean resources in March 2004 and the team was elevated to a special committee. The team made an emergency proposal in defense of Japan’s maritime interests in March 2005 and the members visited the Senkaku islands in April 2005.

"China threat" arguments became politically acceptable by 2005. In December 2005, the leader of the opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), Seiji Maehara, stated in a speech that he considered China as a “real threat.” Foreign Minister Taro Aso also stated at a press conference that he considered China to be a threat.

6. A Summary of the Realist Explanation

Empirical evidence supported the realist prediction that the rise of “China threat” arguments occurred because of China’s increased relative power. The increase in China’s power after the demise of the Soviet Union combined with China’s economic growth to generate an increase in China’s power and Japan’s perception of potential threat. However, China’s relative power position was not the main factor in “China threat” arguments. Very few arguments anticipated China surpassing the United States. Japan perceived the United States to be the top power throughout the 1990s. As a result, Japan’s security arguments were

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dominated by consideration of relations with the United States. While Japan had concerns about U.S. abandonment, Japan adopted a dual hedging strategy and restrained "China threat" arguments.

"China threat" arguments in Japan reacted more sensitively to an increase in absolute power of China. Japanese security elites did not fear a large-scale Chinese invasion or envision China's primacy. It was a fear of "encroachment" and possible invasion at the periphery, such as the islands and territorial waters. As Walt's balance of threat theory posits, geography influenced Japan's threat perception. Because of Japan's geographical proximity, Japan reacted acutely to China's actual military capability but paid less attention to China's possible hegemony. Strong arguments were made about China's aggressive intentions towards the Senkaku Islands and the East China Sea. The modernization of Chinese airpower and naval capability also strengthened the perception of potential threat to the offshore islands.

The realist prediction that changes in distribution of power affect relations among states, resulting in resurfacing of old problems and the lifting of restraints on threat arguments held up here. Problems that were shelved during the Cold War reemerged and intensified during the 1990s. The two major problems were the territorial disputes and the history problem. The worsening of these problems led to a perception that China had aggressive intentions and to a perception that a conflict might occur over these issues. The worsening of relations lifted the restraints on "China threat" arguments. China became more assertive and more active in its claims to the islands and the territorial waters. This led to a perception of aggressive intention.

The realist prediction that the absence of a common enemy will lead to the fraying of the strategic safety-net and a perception of aggressive intentions was supported empirically. Japan became suspicious of U.S. and Chinese intentions. China's military capability that used to be
perceived as a force against the Soviet Union took on a different meaning. The nuclear tests, the modernization of weapons and an increasing defense budget were seen as evidence of China's aggressive intentions.

The same was true of China. China reacted negatively to the continuation of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the modernization of the JSDF's weapons. Japanese policy makers thought these were status quo measures, and thus China's criticisms of them was perceived to indicate China's aggressive intentions.

Japan's skepticism about U.S. intentions also began after the Cold War. Competition between the United States and Japan, centering on trade issues, intensified until 1993-1994. Japan questioned the efficacy of the alliance, and the United States viewed Japan as its competitor and a potential threat. This changed when it became evident that Japan's economy was no longer growing. The United States stopped seeing Japan as a threat and Japan bashing subsided. On the other hand, Japan's concerns for abandonment by the United States increased. This led Japan to make active efforts to revitalize the alliance. The more overt expression of U.S. concern about the China threat by the Bush administration increased Japan's confidence in the U.S. commitment to Japan. The redefinition of the alliance in 1996 and its reconsolidation after 2000 contributed to lift the restraint on making overt "China threat" arguments. As a result "China threat" arguments in Japan increased and intensified after 2000.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL EXPLANATION

In this section, I examine the proposition based on organization theory that "China threat" arguments were proponed by organizations that sought to maintain organizational interests. Organizations examined are: (1) defense organizations — Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and
Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF); (2) conservative groups; and (3) economic organizations.

1. Defense Organizations

Established in 1954, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) focused on the Soviet Union from its inception. The direct cause for its establishment, despite the pacifist constitution that renounced the use of force and armed forces, was the Korean War of 1950. The force structure was maintained to meet a small scale aggression by the Soviet forces. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the JDA and the JSDF lost their organizational target. Organization theory predicts that the defense organizations would seek a new target to maintain organizational size, wealth and internal cohesion.

An organizational explanation for the rise of “China threat” arguments is that the Japanese defense organizations made “China threat” arguments to maintain force structure and defense programs and to acquire new ones, if possible. The defense organizations would make threat arguments beginning with the most similar to the Soviet threat and evolving toward the least similar. Organization theory predicts that the defense organizations would first argue that Soviet/Russia threat still remained, followed by arguments that it would reemerge. The organizations should begin to search for a new threat argument when a resurgent Russian threat argument can no longer maintain organizational size, wealth and internal cohesion and make “China threat” arguments for the same reason.

According to organization theory, the JDA should start making “China threat” arguments

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164 General MacArthur authorized the establishment of the National Police Reserve on July 8, 1950 after the outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950. The National Police Reserve was replaced with the establishment of the JDA and JSDF on July 1, 1954.

165 The logic behind the force structure was that the global balance of power made war between the United States and the Soviet Union less likely in the 1970s and 1980s, and what the SDF had to be most prepared for was small-scale aggression that the Soviet Union could initiate without prior mobilization of forces outside of the Far East. This assessment provided the basis of the Basic Defense Capability, which is described in more detail below.
before a major review of defense plans or introduction of new weapon systems. Major reviews after the Cold War were undertaken in 1993-1995 for the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), 2000 for the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) for FY2001-2005, and 2004 for the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG).166

(1) “China threat” Arguments

An examination of the arguments put forward by the JDA and the JSDF indicates that they did seek to maintain organizational interests after the Cold War but did not make “China threat” arguments to sustain their organizational interests. They had better arguments for advancing organizational interests. An exception was China’s potential threat to the offshore islands in the Southeast. The JDA made such arguments from throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s. Most of the arguments were driven by China’s actual activities, but in some cases arguments about China’s threat arguments to the offshore islands were used to maintain or create defense programs and forces, such as the follow-on aircraft to the P3-Cs and the special brigade to defend the offshore islands.

(i) After the Cold War and the Collapse of the Soviet Union — 1990-1992

The JDA first made “China threat” argument in 1992 regarding China’s maritime activities in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. As we saw, the 1992 Defense White Paper discusses China’s increased maritime activities, possible acquisition of Su-27 fighters and China’s claim of the Senkaku Islands. Observers recall that such arguments started in 1992 when China passed the Territorial Waters Act. For example, Noboru Yamaguchi, Major General of the GSDF, recalled that Japan noticed China’s potential threat to the islands in 1992 before the

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166 The NDPO — later renamed NDPG — provides the conceptual framework for the force structure. In addition, the Japanese government reviews the defense programs once every five years and decides on the MTDP, which provides the detailed “shopping list” for the given five fiscal years. It is the basis for the annual defense budgets.
United States did.  

Aside from the potential threat to the offshore islands, the JDA did not make “China threat” arguments in the early-1990s. As I show in the following sections, the JDA sought to maintain a Cold War level force structure by first arguing that the Soviet/Russian threat still remained, and then by arguing that the Cold War force level was not based on any particular threat and thus force reduction was not necessary.


Organization theory predicts that the JDA would make new threat arguments before the revision of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) in 1995. From 1993 to 1995, the “China threat” arguments the JDA put forward continued to concern China’s increased maritime activities. For example, the 1995 Defense White Paper noted that “Chinese movements towards the expansion of the scope of activities at sea need continuous attention.”  

The expression used for “China threat” was fairly moderate and subtle. However, there are signs that the JDA tried to make more explicit “China threat” arguments in the draft of the NDPO. A newspaper article in December 1995 reported that the NDPO draft the JDA initially proposed was changed because it could be interpreted as a “China threat” argument. Other newspaper reports suggest that the SDF sought unsuccessfully to mention in the report of the need to procure certain weapons by arguing for the need to defend the offshore islands in the Southeast.

The Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) sought to win support for the development of the follow-on aircraft to the P3-Cs in 1995 and after. The MSDF had tried to gain funding for

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167 Noboru Yamaguchi, interview by author, 16 June 1999, Washington, D.C. Yamaguchi has been a Major General in the GSDF since 1999 and was a defense attaché to the United States.
169 "'Fuyoron' no Takamari ni Kikikan [Increasing Argument that it (U.S.-Japan Alliance) is Unnecessary Gives Sense of Crisis]," Mainichi Shimbun, December 1, 1995, p. 2.
the research and development of the follow-on aircraft in the MTDP (FY1996-2001), but was not successful. It is conceivable that the MSDF put forward an argument that upgrading the P-3Cs was necessary for the patrol of the offshore islands, but such arguments were not made in public.

The Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) was later reported to have studied the defense plans for the offshore islands in the mid-1990s, but this was not made public at the time. It was also reported that the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) sought to move the F-15 fighter squadron from the north of Japan to Okinawa to defend the offshore islands. However, the move was not approved. Whatever “China threat” argument the JDA might have put forward to influence the NDPO, it was not done publicly, and the NDPO only subtly hinted at China’s threat:

There still remain large-scale military capabilities including nuclear arsenals and many countries in the region are expanding or modernizing their military capabilities mainly against the background of their economic development.

Although evidence indicates that the JDA and SDF did not make “China threat” arguments overtly, there were certain changes in the revised NDPO that suggest that the JDA had turned its attention towards China. For example, the NDPO cut two divisions deployed in the north of Japan (Hokkaido), but kept two divisions in the south (Kyushu) and upgraded one combined brigade (Konseidan) in Okinawa to a brigade (Ryodan). The JDA did not admit that the change in the deployment of forces to the southeast was to counter a potential threat from China.

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170 The JDA proposed its plan to the ruling LDP on December 12, 1995 but the funding was not included in the MTDP (Fiscal 1996-2001). “Boeicho, Shin ‘Chukibo’ ni P-3C, C-1 Kokeiki no Chotatsu Morikomu Hoshin [JDA Plans to Included the Procurement of Follow-on Aircraft to P-3Cs and C-1s In the New MTDP],” Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun [Business and Technology], December 14, 1995.


172 Ibid., pp. 185-186.

The JDA explained that the changes would correct the skewed balance from the Cold War force
deployment which concentrated the forces in the north.


There was a surge of “China threat” arguments in Japan in and after 2000. An
explanation based on organization theory is that other security arguments were no longer
sufficient to sustain organizational interests. One explanation could be that the summit
meeting between North and South Koreas in June 2000 might have been perceived by the
defense specialists as leading to a decrease of the North Korean threat, leading to a need to sell
“China threat” arguments. An alternative explanation is that the rise in concern about China
was prompted by the actual increase of China’s threat.

There are some evidence to suggest that the waning of North Korean threat worried the
JDA and the SDF.

For example, Toshiyuki Shikata, a retired JGSDF general, wrote in June 2000:

If the peninsula clearly begins to move towards stability, the Japanese public’s threat
perception will change and short-sighted arguments will occur that say: the need for the
TMD has decreased; the USFJ (U.S. Forces Japan) should be cut; and the U.S.-Japan
alliance itself should be reviewed.

Shikata went on to warn that Japan must be prepared to think about a situation “we don’t want
to think about” where “China’s political and military influence becomes overwhelming when the
peninsula heads towards stability and U.S. military presence diminishes or disappears.”

The public opinion reacted as Shikata had predicted. An opinion poll conducted in November 2000
found that the portion of the public who strongly felt the North Korean threat decreased from

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174 Toshiyuki Shikata, “Seiron: Chucho Shunou Kaidan no Gunjiteki Imi [Sound Argument: The Military
33% in 1999 to 12%.\textsuperscript{175}

Media reports at the time also noted a "sense of crisis" within the JDA about losing North Korea as a justification for defense programs like the ballistic missile defense system. The Kyodo News observed in October 2000 that the increased concern towards China shown in the 2000 Defense White Paper reflected a sense of crisis that a decreasing tension on the Korean peninsula would take away the justification for the ballistic missile defense system.\textsuperscript{176} The Defense White Paper reported on the increased Chinese maritime activities and Chinese missiles. There is, however, no more substantial evidence to support this argument.

A counter argument to this explanation is that increased Japanese perception of the North Korea threat after the fall 2002 revelations about the North Korean nuclear weapons programs and kidnapping did not lead to a decline of "China threat" arguments. Public awareness of the abduction issue grew after Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to North Korea in September 2002, and the revelation of North Korea's continuation of its nuclear weapons program occurred in October 2002. Organization theory suggests that the JDA and the SDF would have less incentive to make "China threat" arguments once North Korean threat arguments increased. However, "China threat" arguments continued to intensify after 2002 and even after 2005.

The cause for the rise of "China threat" arguments in 2000 cited most by the proponents of "China threat" arguments was the increase in Chinese naval activities in the seas around Japan. As I have noted, a Chinese naval information gathering ship circled Japan in May and June of 2000. The 2000 Defense White Paper wrote about China's maritime activities in detail. As noted, this event had a big impact on the perception and arguments of the conservative

\textsuperscript{175} Among other responses, the question asked respondents to say whether they "strongly feel," or "feel" the North Korean threat. Those who said they "feel" the North Korean threat were 15% of respondents in 1999 and 22% in 2000.

\textsuperscript{176} "Toboshii Sougouteki Anpo no Shiten [Poor View Point on Comprehensive Security]," Kyodo Tsushin, October 29, 2000.
politicians of the LDP. It is said that it was at the request of the LDP members that Chinese maritime activities were discussed in the white paper at length.\textsuperscript{177} This shows that increased arguments about China's threat to the offshore islands were not driven by the JDA's organizational interests but by the LDP's national security concerns. It seems that the JDA used the publicly accepted arguments about territorial rights to gain support for its organizational interests.

(iv) The National Program Guidelines (NDPG) — 2004

2003-2004 was another period leading to the revision of the National Defense Program Guideline for FY 2005 and beyond. Organization theory predicts that the defense organizations have a strong incentive to make "China threat" arguments to influence the document. This was especially the case because the Koizumi Cabinet announced the development of ballistic missile defense system (BMD) on December 19, 2003 and at the same time ordered each service to cut their forces.\textsuperscript{178}

The NDPG approved in December 2004 mentioned China for the first time:

China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions.\textsuperscript{179}

None of the services made overt "China threat" arguments, but there is evidence that all three services used "China threat" arguments to maintain their forces. For example, the MSDF held briefings for the press in 2003-2004 prior to the revision of the NDPG to discuss the increased activities of the Chinese vessels and submarines in the seas around Japan. A reporter

\textsuperscript{177} An SDF officer, interview by author. Tokyo, November, 2000.

\textsuperscript{178} Development of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (adopted by the Security Council of Japan and by the Cabinet on December 19, 2003).

\textsuperscript{179} National Defense Program Guideline, FY 2005- (Provisional Translation), Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 10, 2004, p. 2.
who attended the press briefing felt that the MSDF was trying to establish their raison-d’être.  

The MSDF distributed maps of the Chinese naval activities to the reporters. The MSDF also disclosed detailed maps showing activities of China’s maritime research and naval vessels in 2004.

The cabinet decision of December 19 stated the need to decrease the size of the force, change the procurement concept of the JMSDF that emphasized the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, and review the modality of the fixed-wing patrol aircraft.

The MSDF’s chief mission during the Cold War had been to defend sea lines of communication (SLOC) against the Soviet submarines. This role for the MSDF was decided in 1981 by President Reagan and Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki. Japan’s role was to defend 1000 miles of the SLOC. Japan procured 101 P-3Cs from the 1970s to the 1990s for anti-submarine operations. The last of the P-3Cs was delivered to the MSDF in September 1997. The MSDF had planned to develop and procure a follow-on aircraft to the P-3Cs, but by the mid-1990s, the activities of the Russian submarines had decreased. It was no longer convincing to argue that the P-3Cs and the next generation aircrafts were necessary for the ASW missions. In the 1995 NDPO, the mission of the P3-Cs was changed from anti-submarine and patrol to just patrol. The MSDF emphasized the importance of the P-3Cs in patrolling against the illegal immigrants from China and subsequently to watch Chinese maritime activities.

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180 A defense correspondent, interview by author, Tokyo, June, 2005.
181 Maps were disclosed as part of the material presented to the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities and uploaded on the website of the Prime Minister’s Office. The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, 5th session, 29 June 2004. http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei/kaisai.html
183 In March 1997, the government put together a patrol system against illegal immigrants from China. JMSDF, the Coast Guard and the Fisheries Agency were to coordinate the patrol, and the P-3Cs were given a central role in
As we saw, the MSDF tried to gain funding for the research and development of the follow-on aircraft in the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) for fiscal years 1996-2001, but was not successful. The R&D plan for the follow-on of the P-3Cs was included in the next MTDP (Fiscal 2001-2005). Defense white papers prior to 2002 stated that the P-3Cs were used for “surveillance of the sea.” Beginning with the 2002 version, the JDA had changed the wording to “surveillance of ships on the sea surface” and “surveillance on possible missile launches.”

The U.S. military argued that acquisition of submarines were necessary to counter the new Kilo-class submarines the Chinese navy had acquired. The JDA and MSDF did not make such arguments. The Japanese submarines were not up for a renewal and patrolling against intruding surface ships was an easier argument to win.

The NDPG (FY 2005- ) included a section on “Response to the Invasion of Japan’s Offshore Islands,” and “(Response to) submerged foreign submarines operating in Japan’s territorial waters.” This was a response to the incident where a Chinese submarine entered Japanese territorial waters in November 2004.

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184 The JDA proposed its plan to the ruling LDP on December 12, 1995 but the funding was not included in the MTDP (Fiscal 1996-2001). “Boeicho, Shin ‘Chukibo’ ni P-3C, C-1 Kokeiki no Chotatsu Morikomu Hoshin [JDA Plans to Included the Procurement of Follow-on Aircraft to P-3Cs and C-1s In the New MTDP],” Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun [Business and Technology], December 14, 1995.

185 The Mid-Term Defense Program (Fiscal 2001-2005) read: “Research and development shall be promoted for the follow-up P-3C fixed-wing patrol aircraft.”


Organization theory suggests that the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) would seek a target the most aggressively among the services, because with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, there were no remaining countries that possessed capabilities to invade Japan by ground. The December 19 cabinet decision had called for a review of the current force structure by improving mobility and cutting down on the number of tanks and artillery.\footnote{189}

The GSDF did not make “China threat” arguments, however. The possibility of an invasion by the PLA was never seen even as a long-term prospect. Nevertheless, the GSDF also used China threats to the offshore islands to justify its forces. For example, the shift in the geographical focus of the deployment of the forces “from North to South” and “from East to West” was explained to “strengthen the deployment of forces on the Sea of Japan and the South-West Islands fronts.” The reason given was “to counter new threats.” A rapid reaction brigade, called the offshore island type brigade, was to be created to deal with the defense of isolated islands. Although the GSDF did not mention China, the shift of forces to the southeast and the creation of the offshore island brigade were a response to China and indicate the GSDF’s concern about China’s threat to the islands.

Although there was a surge of “China threat” arguments among the public and the politicians, the “China threat” arguments presented by the JDA were still confined to threats to the offshore islands and nuclear weapons. This seems to be because the JDA’s assessment of Chinese military capabilities was still modest. It was believed that sustaining the current force level was not possible if force requirements were calculated against Chinese forces. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. \url{http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/gaisho/g0411.html#7-A} (accessed July 2, 2006).

\footnote{189} The translation of the Cabinet Decision that appeared in the Defense Whitepaper read: “GSDF: Convert the initiatives that are mainly against armored units, establish a system that promptly deals with new threats through improved mobility, review tanks and artillery, and appropriately scale them down.” “Development of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (adopted by the Security Council of Japan and by the Cabinet on December 19, 2003), Japan Defense Agency, \textit{Defense of Japan 2004}, p. 551.
military was thought to be too small and weak to be a “sparring partner” in lieu of the
Russians.\footnote{Sugio Takahashi, interview by author, 25 January 2006, Tokyo, tape recording, Tokyo, Japan.} China’s military activities were also still relatively small. For example, the
number of scramble take-offs was still larger for the Russian air force than the Chinese. The
total number peaked in 1984 at 944 times a year. In 2004 it was down to 141 times. Of the
141 take-offs, 85\% were against Russian aircraft and 10\% against the Chinese. In 2000 and
after, Chinese aircraft only made up a tiny share of the total (5\% in 2001, 0\% in 2002, and a
few \% in 2003). Even though the level of activity of the Russian military has declined greatly
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian forces, despite their decline, were still more
active than the Chinese forces.\footnote{Press Release Material prepared by the Air Self Defense Force.}

Despite the small activity of the Chinese air force, the ASDF also used China’s threat to
the offshore islands to justify its fighter forces. Several newspaper articles appeared in
November and December 2004, just before the NDPG was finalized. The timing and the
content of the articles suggest that the ASDF was subtly making “China threat” arguments
through the press. For example, an article in December reported an increase of scramble
take-offs by the Chinese air force in the East China Sea area since 2002.\footnote{“China, Active Reconnaissance Also in the Air; ASDF, Scrambles Increase; East China Sea Air District,” Sankei Shimbun, 3 December 2004.} As the above
figures for percentage of total scramble take-offs show, the increase after 2000 was still very
small.

(2) Other arguments put forward by the JDA after the Cold War

In this section, I introduce other arguments that the defense organizations put forward after
the Cold War. They were: (i) remaining Russian threat, (ii) non-threat based approach, (iii)
new missions, (iv) maintenance of the alliance, and (v) North Korea threat arguments. These
arguments indicate that the JDA sought to maintain organizational interests after the end of the Cold War. The order in which these arguments were made conforms to organization theory. However, the JDA used arguments other than new threats to gain public support.

(i) Remaining Russian Threat

As predicted by the organization theory, the first argument that the defense organization put forward after the end of the Cold War was that the threat from the Soviet Union/Russia remained and the situation in East Asia was still unstable and uncertain. On April 9, 1990, Yozo Ishikawa, Minister of State for Defense, admitted that there was a decrease in the Soviet threat, but noted that he perceived the presence of Soviet forces in the Asia-Pacific region as a potential threat. The defense white papers continued to argue that Russia's military capability remained formidable and the situation was uncertain.

The JDA also argued that the situation in North East Asia was different from Europe and that the Russian forces remained as a cause of instability. For example, a 1995 version of the defense white paper says:

Russian forces in the Far East continue to show the tendency toward quantitative reduction, and their military activity is low-key, and their state of readiness is considered lower than before, both due to Russia's current harsh economic conditions and other reasons. But enormous military forces are still in a state of accumulation and are still being modernized, though at a moderate pace, through the relocation of new equipment from the European theater. The presence of such Russian forces in the Far East constitutes a destabilizing factor for the security of the Asia-Pacific region.

Japan considered Russia a threat even after the United States had ceased to. DoD considered Russia a possible threat through 1994 but by then there was a general realization in

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193 Yozo Ishikawa, Committee on Budget, House of Representatives, 118 Session, April 9, 1990. Dai 118 Kai Kokkai Shugiin Yosan Imkaigiroku dai 6 go [118 Session House of Representatives Record of the Committee on Budget], No. 6, p. 10.
the United States that the Russian military had collapsed. The Japanese defense white papers continued to express wariness about Russia throughout the 1990s. It was only in 2001 that the defense white paper wrote that Russia’s military resurgence to a Cold War level was unlikely within the foreseeable future. Even in 2004, Russia was still viewed as a potential cause of insecurity. Uncertainty due to Russia’s economic and political ambiguity was cited as a reason to “continue monitoring the future developments.”

The amount of attention paid to the Soviet Union/Russia did not decrease in the defense white papers. In some cases, Russian forces were portrayed so as to give an impression that they were not declining. For example, the defense white papers began to publish a chart of “Far East Russian Military Deployment in Areas Close to Japan” beginning in the 1989 version. The chart showed a map of North-Eastern Russia marked with the location of all air force and naval bases, including the number of divisions, aircrafts and ships. The number of ground forces in the “Far East” increased in 1999 from 190,000 to 210,000. This was because the JDA included the Siberia Military District in the “Far East” when Russia integrated the Siberia Military District and Trans-Baikal District. The number increased to 220,000 in 2000, but the following year, the JDA revised the number and cut it by half to 110,000. No explanation was given except that it was revised “as a result of the comprehensive analysis based upon various information.”

196 The 2001 Defense White Paper states, “it is unlikely that the force level and posture of the Russian forces will go back to those of the Soviet forces during the Cold War within the foreseeable future.” Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2001, p. 42.
(ii) A non-threat based argument

Organization theory predicts that the JDA would begin to search for an alternative threat after the end of the Cold War and when remaining Soviet threat arguments could no longer sustain support for organizational well-being. However, the supposedly non-threat based approach of a “Basic Defense Capability (BDC)” enabled the JDA to maintain its force structure after the collapse of the Soviet Union without having to justify it with a new threat. When the Cold War ended, instead of making new threat arguments, the JDA began to emphasize the non-threat based aspect of Japan’s force structure.

The Basic Defense Capability concept was formulated in 1976 and outlined in detail in the 1977 Defense White Paper. The BDC concept provided the theoretical basis for Japan’s force structure until it was abandoned in 2004. The BDC was based on an assessment that the possibility of an outbreak of a large scale military conflict around Japan was low. The BDC sought to “enable Japan to maintain a full surveillance posture during peacetime, and cope effectively with conflict to the extent of limited and small-scale aggression.”

There are many examples of the JDA noting the threat based nature of the BDC during the Cold War. For example, the 1977 Defense White Paper clearly indicated that the BDC was a

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201 Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1977, p. 52. “Limited and small-scale aggression” was defined as an attack that could be mounted without major advance preparation and that seeks to establish a fait accompli within a limited timeframe. The document reads: “‘Limited and small-scale aggression’ is herein defined as aggression of a small scale within the generic category of limited acts of aggression. Generally, such small-scale aggression is carried out as a surprise invasion without that major advance preparation which could reveal the prior ‘intent’ of such invasion. Moreover, the aim of such aggression is to present a fait accompli within a given timeframe.” Ibid., p. 51.

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threat-based approach:

The essential, universal nature of defense is preparation to meet external threat. Obviously, any defensive system which disregards external threat is inherently untenable. 202

In 1985, Koichi Kato, then Minister of State for Defense, stated that the BDC was not a 100% threat-based force because of the constraints imposed by the budget, public opinion, terrain and recruitment. 203 In 1987, Seiki Nishihiro of the JDA described the concept as threat-based, but in a limited way. It was limited because the force was not designed to counter all the potential threats Japan faced, but to counter a small scale aggression. 204 Both of these statements indicate that the BDC was a threat-based approach to force planning.

It is also true, however, that within the BDC concept there were elements of non-threat based planning. For example, the JDA explained in 1976 that the BDC “moves away from a threat-based thinking and determines the size of the defense force independently.” 205 It was described as “independent” because the size of the forces was determined by taking Japan’s geographical features into account. 206

The 1977 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) notes that the force structure and

204 National Diet, House of Representatives, Seiki Nishihiro, Director General, Bureau of Defense Policy, JDA, speaking in response to a question by Takenori Kanzaki (Komei) to the Special Committee on Security, August 24, 1987. 109th Session, House of Representatives, Record of the Special Committee
206 The 1977 Defense White Paper argues as follows: “Previous plans regarded threat as the capability to launch limited aggression against Japan ... In contrast, the Standard Defense Force Concept does not necessarily estimate the quantity of defense capability simply in light of the scale of potential threat involved. Instead, quantitative strength was studied from the point of maintaining a flawless, balanced defense structure of organization and deployment; and of supporting a full surveillance posture during peacetime. This approach, which centers on quantitatively assessing a defense capability based on peacetime defense preparedness, is a major feature of the Standard Defense Force Concept.” Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1977, p. 53.
deployment of the ground force must conform to the terrain of Japan.

The Ground Self Defense Force, in order to be capable of swift and effective systematic defense operations from the outset of aggression in any part of Japan, must deploy its divisions and other units with a balance conforming to Japan’s natural features.²⁰⁷

The number of troops, twelve divisions and two combined brigades, was determined by natural boundaries of “mountain ranges, rives and straits” and administrative “prefectural boundaries”²⁰⁸ (Table 6-1). In other words, Japan’s force structure sought to deny aggression by deploying forces across Japan based on its geographical features. This force planning concept based on geographical features was dubbed the “Mountain-river theory (Yamakawa ron).”

The force structure of Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) was based on three main requirements. One was to defend against aggression. For this purpose one escort flotilla was to be kept on alert at all times, requiring a total of four flotillas. The other was coastal defense and surveillance. Japan’s nearby sea areas were divided into five regional defense districts based on coastline features. Two divisions were assigned to each regional district, requiring a total of ten divisions (Table 6-1). The third requirement was maintaining surveillance and sanitizing capabilities (anti-submarine and minesweeping capabilities) at important harbors and the three major straits of Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima.²⁰⁹

The requirement for the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) was to maintain surveillance capability throughout Japanese airspace and to possess air defense capability with fighters and high-altitude ground-to-air missile units. Japanese airspace was divided into six defense zones based on geography and the operational range of the fighter aircraft. Two fighter squadrons

²⁰⁷ National Defense Program Outline (Adopted by the National Defense Council on October 29, 1976, and approved by the Cabinet that day).
were assigned to each defense zone. A total of twelve operational fighter squadrons were required to maintain “full national alert posture” plus one squadron for pilot training (Table 6-1).

As I said earlier, the BDC concept continued to provide a conceptual basis for Japan’s force structure until 2004. However, the phrase “BDC concept” disappeared from the defense white papers in 1980, and the non-threat based aspect of the BDC was not mentioned during the 1980s.

This changed with the end of the Cold War. The JDA began to emphasize the non-threat based aspect of the BDC. The 1992 version of the defense white paper had a section entitled “Concept of BDC,” which explained that the concept was “an idea that Japan would not become an unstable element in this region by becoming a force vacuum rather than aiming at directly countering a military threat to the country.”

In September 1991, Yukihiko Ikeda, Minister of State for Defense, stated that because Japan did not take a threat-based approach but held the Basic Defense Capability, the decrease in the Soviet threat did not require the revision of National Defense Program Outline (NDPO).

In December 1992, Sohei Miyashita, Minister of State for Defense, stated that Japan’s defense force structure did not take a threat-based approach and did not just look at the changes in the international situation.

Needless to say, Japan does not take a threat-based approach in relations to international situation, and we have repeatedly explained that Japan holds the Basic Defense Capability concept. Therefore, we do not only look at the changes in international situation but must respect the basic thinking and philosophy of the NDPO.

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212 National Diet, House of Representatives, Yukihiko Ikeda, Minister of State for Defense, speaking in response to a question by Tetsu Ueda (Socialist) to the Special Committee on International Peace Cooperation, 30 September 1991. 121st Session, House of Representatives, Record of the Special Committee on International Peace Cooperation, No. 5, p. 9.
The first Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) after the Cold War was decided upon in December 1990. In this MTDP (FY1991-95), the JDA managed to maintain the size of the forces. The number of forces increased in some cases. For example, the number of the F-15 fighter aircrafts was increased from 164 to 204.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and continued decline of the Russia's military activities, it became difficult to argue that the changes in the international situation should not affect Japan's force structure. In December 1992, the Japanese government decided to revise the MTDP and decreased the size of its forces. The National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), however, was not revised until November 28, 1995 because "various unstable factors have remained" and because "in a new era characterized by instability and uncertainty, the changes must be kept cautiously watched in the future." The revised NDPO still did not abandon the BDC concept. The main bulk of the SDF force structure remained (Table 6-1).

Testuya Nishimoto, former Chairman of the Joint Staff Council (July 1993-March 1996) stated that the slowness of the system to change allowed for the force structure to persist after the end of the Cold War.

It took five years to revise the NDPO. The slowness of the system allowed for the force level to be maintained.

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214 In addition to the changes in the international situation, the "fiscal situation, ever increasing in severity," was given as the reason for the review. Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1992, p. 110.

215 The number of tanks was decreased by 24 from an initial 1,136 to 1,112. Destroyers were decreased by two, from 58 to 56. F-15 jet fighters were decreased by eleven, from 204 to 193. Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 1993, p. 95.


217 Testuya Nishimoto, interview by author, June 27, 2002, Osterville, Massachusetts.
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<td>Minesweeping units</td>
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<td>Aircraft control and warning units</td>
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<td>Fighter support</td>
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<td>(350)</td>
<td>(290)</td>
<td>(300)</td>
<td>(290)</td>
<td>(260)</td>
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</table>

Table 6-1: The Force Structure of the SDF under Different Defense Programs

*Mobile denotes mobile operation units. ** Regional denotes regionally deployed units.
*** The number of fighters is included in the number of combat aircraft.

(Rev=revision; sqn=squadron; recon=reconnaissance; CR=Central Readiness; hel=helicopter; comb=combined; bde=brigade; cbt=combat; armd=armored; AB=airborne; div=division; gpr=group)

(iii) New Missions — Disaster Relief and International Contribution

The Japanese government added two new missions for the SDF after the Cold War. One was disaster relief, and the other was international cooperation.²¹⁹ The two missions were included formerly in the NDPO (FY 1996- ). Until then, national defense was the only main mission of the JSDF. Relief missions were subsidiary, and international cooperation was not included in the list of missions. The JDA sometime used these two missions to justify the procurement of new equipment.

After the Cold War, and more importantly after the Gulf War of 1990, political leaders such as Ichiro Ozawa began to promote the idea of “International Contribution (Kokusai koken).” The argument put forward was that Japan could not continue to be a mere “cash dispenser” in the international community. Sending the JSDF to the conflict areas was proposed during and after the Gulf War.²²⁰ The International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992 opened the way for the JSDF to be sent overseas. The first time SDF units were sent abroad was in September 1992 to support United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). During this period, the argument for deployed the JDF, was mainly driven by the politicians and supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, rather than by the JDA.²²¹ Nevertheless, there were cases where the JDA had used the benign image of “international

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²²⁰ The Bill on Cooperation with United Nations Peace Keeping Operations was proposed to the diet in 1990 but did not pass.

²²¹ Testuya Nishimoto, former Chairman of the Joint Staff Council (July 1993-March 1996), noted that the international cooperation missions did not provide sufficient reason to sustain the force structure. “I don’t think it was the new mission of international cooperation that maintained the force level. There is a big difference between the level of force requirements to counter the Soviet threat and that for international cooperation.” Nishimoto, interview by author, June 27, 2002, Osterville, Massachusetts.
contribution” to win support for the procurement of new equipment.

For example, International Cooperation was used as a justification to obtain mid-air refueling tanker aircraft in the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) for FY 2001-2005. These types of aircraft had been a controversial item since the 1960s because of the power projection capability they give, which was considered to be beyond the limit of the “exclusive defense posture” that Japan took under its constitution. The introduction of the tankers was justified by their use for international cooperation activities. The official name for the tanker was “Aircraft with In-Flight Refueling Capability and with Transport Capability Which can be Used for International Cooperation Activities.”  

The MTDP stated:

In order to serve effective training, accident prevention and noise reduction of fighter aircraft, swift conduct of international cooperation activities such as humanitarian relief, and various transport purposes as well as to improve air defense capability, acquire aircraft with both in-flight refueling and transport capabilities which can be used for international cooperation activities.  

The importance of disaster relief and the public support for it gave justification to maintaining certain force level, prolonging the life of the Basic Defense Capability force structure. The public support for the JSDF’s efforts during the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in January 1995 and the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway systems precipitated the move.

The procurement of helicopter destroyers (116 DDH) was justified by their use in relief operations.  

The JDA included relief operations in large-scale disasters and rescuing

225 The displacement of the DDH was planned to be about 13,500 tons with a flush-deck which can land up to four helicopters simultaneously.
Japanese nationals overseas in its stated reasons for procuring the DDH.

These new helicopter destroyers ... will be equipped with superior command, control and communications/intelligence capability, capability to operate a minesweep transport helicopter in addition to three maritime patrol helicopters as well as enhanced anti-submarine capability, stealth capability and survivability, in order to deal with various situations such as large-scale disasters and transportation of Japanese nationals overseas along with the main task of maritime defense.\textsuperscript{226}

(iv) For the Alliance

Another argument often put forward by the JDA was the need to maintain the alliance. Many of the new weapon systems were said to be necessary to maintain the U.S.-Japan alliance and to answer international demands.\textsuperscript{227}

As we saw in the realism section, there was a period in which security experts and the public debated the efficacy of maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance. But from 1994-95, the JDA and the DoD began to work towards the redefinition of the alliance in 1996, and the revision of the guidelines in 1997. During this period, JDA officials and former officials made arguments that conscious efforts were necessary to maintain the alliance.\textsuperscript{228}

Four laws were passed from 1999 to 2000. The “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” was one of them. This law allowed the JSDF to conduct rear-area support for U.S. forces in the event of military conflict near Japan.\textsuperscript{229} A conflict in the Taiwan Strait could be the sort of incident to which this law applied. However, the laws were not justified by “China threat” arguments but as necessary ways to implement the U.S.-Japan Guidelines.

\textsuperscript{227} “International demands” often meant “U.S. demands.”
\textsuperscript{228} For example, Makoto Sakuma, a former Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the Self Defense Forces and former Chief of Staff, Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF), noted that the situation after the Cold War was different from during the Cold War when the alliance was a given. Conscious efforts were necessary. Makoto Sakuma, “Road to the U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration on Security,” \textit{The Journal of National Defense}, Vol. 24, No. 4, March 1997, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{229} “Areas Surrounding Japan” was explained not to be a geographical concept.
The great importance placed on the U.S.-Japan alliance suggests that the JDA made “China threat” arguments in order to gain support for the maintenance and upgrade of the alliance. However, the “China threat” arguments made by the JDA and the government do not support this proposition.\(^ {230}\) The North Korean threat and maintaining stability in an uncertain world were the reasons often given for maintaining the alliance.

The JDA explained the need to study the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) by arguing that the RMA was important to maintaining inter-operability with the U.S. forces. In the U.S. case, DoD’s pursuit of the RMA influenced the emergence of “China threat” arguments. DoD sometimes used “China threat” arguments to win support for the pursuit of the RMA. However, the JDA did not mention China when arguing for the need to research the RMA.\(^ {231}\)

Sugio Takahashi, a member of the study group on the Information-RMA, stated that the need for RMA was based on working with the United States, not dealing with China:

> The United States had already developed the concept of the RMA and the examples were more concrete. The Chinese had not developed anything and it was not convincing to argue against a hypothetical RMA system. There were “peer competitor” schools within the JDA, but our assessment was that China was not about to develop the RMA.\(^ {232}\)

Also, in the early to mid-1990s, the ballistic missile defense system was said to be a necessary “glue” for the alliance, but this explanation was soon dropped. It was the North Korean missile

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\(^ {230}\) In fact, Yoichi Funabashi, a journalist for the *Asahi Shimbun*, and a close observer of policy makers in Washington and Tokyo, contends the opposite. He argues that “‘China threat’ arguments were made in the U.S. and originated in the Pentagon, Heritage and the Marines. ... I think Japan had a different assessment. When in 1995-1996 a U.S. commander talked about a China threat at an informal meeting, Japan’s top brass denied it, and said a China card would have a negative effect on (the revision of) the U.S.-Japan guidelines. I heard that the SDF did an operation game after that with a Senkaku scenario. The SDF won overwhelmingly against the Chinese.” Yoichi Funabashi, interview by author, 18 February 2000, Tokyo, tape recording.


\(^ {232}\) Sugio Takahashi, interview by author, 25 January 2006, Tokyo, tape recording, Tokyo, Japan.
threat that ultimately justified the introduction of the BMD system.

(v) North Korean Threat

Arguments about the North Korean threat remained more pronounced than the “China threat” arguments throughout the 1990s. The JDA made threat arguments about North Korea beginning right after the Cold War. The tension on the Korean Peninsula was given as the reason why the Cold War in Asia had not ended, and therefore why the Self Defense Force was still necessary. In addition, the defense white papers began to discuss the missile threat from North Korea in 1991. North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT in March 1993 and subsequent test firing of a Nodong missile in May 1993 led to the perception that North Korea had become a direct threat to Japan.

The NDPO (FY 1996- ) mentioned North Korea as a remaining threat: “There remains uncertainty and unpredictability such as continued tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and a stable security environment has not been fully established.” The NDPO also mentioned that “new kinds of dangers, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including arms and missiles, are on the increase.

The test firing of a Taepodong missile over Japan in August 1998 shocked Japan. After 1998, North Korea was seen as the most serious threat by both security specialists and the Japanese public. The incursion of two suspicious boats, believed to be North Korean ships, in March 1999, aroused additional threat arguments regarding North Korea. Maritime security operations were ordered for the first time in response to these two boats spotted off the Noto Peninsula on March 23.

The North Korean threat provided justification for many newly acquired weapons after the Cold War. For example, satellite and missile defense systems were introduced to counter the
North Korean threat. North Korea also justified the continuation and upgrade of the U.S.-Japan alliance and the introduction of new laws.

Among defense specialists, a possible crisis on the Korean Peninsula was perceived as an indirect problem for Japan, however. It was sometimes viewed as a “test” for the U.S.-Japan alliance. It was not the North Korean threat *per se* that was the concern for the JDA and the government. The concern was that the alliance would not function effectively during the crisis, inviting U.S. criticism of the alliance. The North Korean problem provided incentives to review the U.S.-Japan Guidelines.

Then Vice Cabinet Secretary, Nobuo Ishihara’s demonstrates this point. He recalled he had concerns about the alliance being harmed by the handling of the North Korean nuclear problem in 1994:

> At the time, I thought things could be in a serious state if the situation worsened. There was a concern that the relations with the United States could get very strained so that the workings of the U.S.-Japan alliance itself might be in trouble. I thought we must put together a manual very quickly and so I suggested to the related ministries to prepare accordingly. 233

This concern led to the revision of the U.S.-Japan Guidelines in September 1997 and the introduction of the Law Concerning Situations Surrounding Japan on May 24, 1999. 234 The firing of the Taepodong and the incident of the suspicious boats helped the law pass.

The Japanese government immediately decided to procure reconnaissance satellites after North Korea launched a Taepodong missile over Japanese airspace in 1998. The reaction of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was very quick. The LDP decided to strengthen the air

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234 The full title of the law is “Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan.”
defense system the next day and established a project team to introduce the reconnaissance satellite. It only took one month for the government to decide on the introduction of the satellites. The JDA had long debated the need for satellites during the Cold War, but there was never enough support until then. On December 25, 1998, the Japanese government also approved Japan-U.S. cooperative research on ballistic missile defense technologies that had been languishing on the agenda since 1994. The sequence of events indicates that the main driver for the procurement came from the Liberal Democratic Party response to North Korea, not from the JDA's organizational interests.

(3) Summary: Defense Organizations and “China threat” arguments

The “China threat” arguments made by the JDA were limited to potential threats to offshore islands and territorial waters and threats of ballistic missiles. The JDA and the SDF sought to maintain their organizational interests and force structure, but did not need to make “China threat” arguments to sustain much of their organizational interests. Other arguments more easily won support from the decision makers and the public. “China threat” arguments were often too controversial domestically to support organizational interests. The “China threat” arguments that were made concerned the less controversial threats.

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235 The reconnaissance satellite had been considered to be too aggressive a weapon system. Even when the procurement was approved the satellite was called an “information gathering satellite” and was to be owned not just by the JDA but by several ministries.

236 The U.S. government had been pushing Japan to cooperate in the development of the TMD since 1994, but the Japanese government had been slow in deciding to join the research. The Taepodong provided the impetus.

237 On September 1, the LDP decided to strengthen the air defense system and established a project team to introduce information gathering satellites. The National Defense and Foreign Affairs Divisions passed a resolution to strengthen Japan's air defenses and established a project team for the satellites. On October 29, the LDP decided to demand an early introduction of the information satellite. And on November 6, the government decided to introduce the information-gathering satellite. On December 25, 1998, the Japanese Security Council approved the Japan-U.S. cooperative research on ballistic missile defense technologies. “Nihonban Joho Eisei, Naigai ni Kadai, Kido Sadamarazu [Japanese Information Satellite, Domestic and Foreign Problems, Not Yet in Orbit],” Sankei Shimbun, June 28, 1999.
The remaining Russian threat and the Basic Defense Capability concept provided the basis for maintaining much of the Cold War level force structure. Even with a rapid decline of the Russian military capability, proximity and the magnitude of Russian forces relative to the SDF prolonged the life of the potential Russian threat. The Basic Defense Capability concept enabled the JDA to argue that the SDF force structure was not threat-based but based on unchanging geographical features. The BDC was only abandoned in 2004 with the two revisions of the NDPO.

The need to maintain Japan-U.S. alliance provided the largest rationale for serving the interests of the JDA. The arguments for the two new missions of disaster relief and international cooperation provided rationale for maintaining some of the GSDF.

The above arguments were all considered politically correct, and thus their political costs were low. The cost of making North Korea threat arguments was low because there was a broad consensus that North Korea posed a threat. North Korea thus provided much of the rationale for the procurement of new weapon systems such as the reconnaissance satellites and the ballistic missile defense system.

The “China threat” arguments made by the JDA were limited to the ballistic missile threat and the threat to the offshore islands. Although the JDA often referred to China’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, the JDA did not make an explicit argument connecting the need for BMD and China’s missiles. The North Korean missiles were the reason given by the JDA.

The threat to the offshore islands was the one “China threat” argument that was explicitly made by the JDA and the services. The argument started in 1992, right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, continued throughout the 1990s and intensified after 2000. There was little political cost to making such arguments because the Senkaku Islands were claimed as Japanese
Each service used arguments about China’s threat to the offshore islands and China’s maritime resources to maintain their defense programs. The Maritime Forces argued that P-3Cs were important for checking the Chinese maritime activities. The Ground Forces argued for and created an offshore type rapid reaction brigade. It also kept two divisions in the south when two divisions were cut in the north. The Air Forces argued for the transfer of F-15 fighters to Okinawa.

2. Conservative Groups

(1) Traditional Right Wing Groups

The right wing radical groups in Japan are made up of various groups ranging from highly spiritual and ideological groups to those closely connected to organized crime. Some of the groups have a strong political influence. Some right wing leaders have had close connections to political leaders as high as the prime minister.238

The two characteristics of the right wing movement in Japan were anti-communism and respect for the emperor. During the 1980s, the right wing radical groups targeted the Soviet Union. The territorial disputes over the Northern Islands provided a concrete target for the right wing groups. In 1987, the groups gathered in largest number in the history of the anti-Soviet day (August 9).239 The right wing radical groups continued to target the Soviet

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238 The sources of their power are not always made clear. But it seems to come from being able to solve problems by deterring other right wing radical groups. The groups are financed through publishing magazines and contributions. An example of an influential right wing leader is Yoshio Kodama who was known as a “king maker” in Japanese politics in the 1950s to the 1970s. On the right wing movement in Japan see for example, Yukio Hori, Sengo no Uyoku Seiryoku [Right Wing Groups After the War] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1999).

Union and Russia in the early-1990s.240

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the right wing radicals lost their target. In 1992, a prominent leader of a right wing radical movement was quoted as saying that:

Most of our slogans have been realized. In other words, our mission has been attained. But now the right wing movement is lost and confused. We have suddenly lost our 'enemy' and we don’t know what to do.241

The right wing radicals that pursued anti-Communist activities since WWII lost their function after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Countries in East Europe.242 Some groups shifted their focus back to the nationalism, because the right wing movement after all was an "indigenous movement beyond ideology."243 Respect for the emperor also became more important for some of the groups.

From the mid-1990s, the right wing groups sought new targets in issues that captured public interests and were widely publicized. They had followed the public interest rather than initiate a new movement. In 1995, the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, the groups focused on attacking the view of history exemplified by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. In 1995, they had protested the nuclear tests by China and France, and the rape of a school girl by a U.S. marine. China was not the single focus of their activities.

From 1997, the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima Island issues became targets for their activities. There were fewer activities related to the Northern Territories. There is no evidence that shows that the right wing radicals singled out China. For example, the number of groups and people that participated in the protests against China and South Korea over the

island territories was about the same for China and for South Korea.\(^{244}\)

Nihon Seinensha, a right wing radical group that built a light house on one of the islands in the Senkakus in 1978, 1988 and 1996, supported China on various issues. They were opposed to China and South Korea on territorial and history issues, but on several occasions expressed the need to cooperate with China and South Korea and for Japan to be more independent of the United States.\(^{245}\) For example, in 2003 the group argued: “Good times are over if Japan followed the United States ignoring China.” And asked: “Why would it be against Japan’s national interest to establish political and economic friendship with China?” The group expressed support for the United States after the September 11 attacks but expressed disagreement with the war against Iraq. They were opposed to China and South Korea on territorial and history issues, but on several occasions expressed the need to cooperate with China and South Korea for Japan to be more independent of the United States and to be able to say “No” to it.\(^{246}\)

The activities and arguments of the right wing radicals conformed to organization theory in that they sought new targets after the collapse of the Soviet Union. They were not however, the cause of the rise of “China threat” arguments. The right wing radical groups were more the followers of the popular threat arguments and nationalist sentiments. They did not single out China among the various targets — the United States, South Korea, France and Russia — they sought after the Cold War.

\(^{244}\) For example, in 1997 the numbers of groups and people rallying for Takeshima Island issue were 800 groups, 3,670 people, using 1,080 cars, and for Senkaku, 570 groups, 2,200 people with 670 cars. The numbers were larger for Takeshima in 1998 as well. National Police Agency, Police White Paper 1998 and 1999.

\(^{245}\) Mitsuo Ogata, “Kiki Kanri to Jishu Gaiko wo Soukyu ni Kakuritsu shi Ajia Keizaiken wo Genjitsu no mono to Seyo! [We Must Establish Fast a Crisis Management System and Independent Diplomacy and Realize an Asian Economic Zone!]” From the website of the Nihon Seinensha. http://www.seinensya.org/

\(^{246}\) Mitsuo Ogata, “Kiki Kanri to Jishu Gaiko wo Soukyu ni Kakuritsu shi Ajia Keizaiken wo Genjitsu no mono to Seyo! [We Must Establish Fast a Crisis Management System and Independent Diplomacy and Realize an Asian Economic Zone!]” From the website of the Nihon Seinensha. http://www.seinensya.org/
In 2001, Japan witnessed the emergence of a multi-party conservative coalition within the Diet, different from the traditional right wing conservatives. Traditionally, the defense zoku ("policy tribes") — Diet members influential in defense policies — were concerned mainly with defense procurement. During the Cold War, there was little room to discuss strategy. The pacifist opposition was much stronger within the Diet and the public was not interested in security issues. The only political gains to be had from being a defense zoku were ties with the defense industry, which only made up a small fraction of the Japanese industry, and with the SDF personnel. There were simply very few votes on defense policy. Several factors changed this, one of which was the North Korea threat. The test firing of the Taepodong in 1998 and more importantly, the increased awareness of the abduction problem after Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang in September 2002, got the public emotionally involved in security issues.

Some of the new defense zoku started off by preparing legislation to respond to terrorist attacks and countering the North Korean threat. In March 2005, the group began to work on defending maritime resources in the East China Sea. The group’s activity was driven by popular support for dealing with the problem. However, the group did not act as an organization and its “China threat” arguments were not caused by organizational interests.

3. Economic Organizations

In this section, I examine the role Japanese economic and agricultural organizations played in the rise of “China threat” arguments. Arguments about China’s economic threat began in 1995 with the increasing agricultural and manufacturing imports from China. China’s
economic threat arguments peaked in 2000-2001, right before and after China’s entry into the WTO. The main line of argument was that China was undercutting Japanese industry. Related arguments that appeared in the mass media were quite visceral and warned of the dangers of Chinese hegemony. However, the latter arguments were rarely made by economic organizations and by 2003, “China threat” arguments began to recede among the economic organizations. The view that China’s economic growth provided opportunities for the Japanese economy became dominant. Unlike in the United States, where the renewal of the MFN status to China became a political issue, there was no single issue that integrated different economic organizations. Articles came out that viewed the Chinese market as the “main battlefield.” The competition was not between Japan and China but over who would gain access to the emerging Chinese market.

(1) Small Business and Agricultural Organizations

There were two types of economic threat arguments in Japan. The first argued that China’s economy was hurting the Japanese economy with its cheap products thus undermining Japanese manufacturing and agriculture. The second argument concerned the increase in China’s economic power leading to Chinese hegemony.

The first argument was first put forward by agricultural organizations after 1995. Vegetable imports from China had risen from 5% of the total vegetable imports in 1995 to 34.8% in 1998. By 2001 the imports of certain products were hurting the Japanese farmers so much so that the Japanese government enacted provisional safeguard measures on some

247 For example, the cover story of the April 2004 issue of the weekly magazine *Diamond* was “China is the Main Battlefield,” and featured success stories of 35 Japanese companies in China. “Chugoku ka Shu Senjo [China is the Main Battlefield],” *Shukan Diamond*, Vol. 28, April 24 2004.
agricultural products in April 2001 for 200 days.\footnote{1} The farming organizations lobbied the Liberal Democratic Party before the House of Councilors election in May 2001 to win the provisional safeguard measure.\footnote{2}

The "China threat" arguments that began in the agricultural sector spread to the textile industry. In February 2001, the Japan Towel Industry Union Federation (\textit{Nihon Taoru Kogyo Kumiai Rengokai}) demanded that the government to place a safeguard on towels in February 2001. Articles appeared in newspapers and magazines arguing that cheap Chinese goods could undermine other industries. This line of "China threat" arguments held that small and medium-sized Japanese firms were unable to compete with the low prices of the Chinese products. The Chinese economy was taking away jobs, driving small companies out of business and exporting deflation. "Low price" and "price destruction" became words with negative meanings and China was said to be causing a "deflation spiral."

However, the "China threat" arguments made by some agricultural and textile organizations were opposed from within the same sector. For example, soon after one towel industry organization demanded safeguard measures, another organization made up of towel manufactures with factories in China petitioned against it.\footnote{3} It was the same with vegetable imports. Consumers and supermarkets supported the cheap Chinese products and did not

\footnote{1} The provisional safeguard was placed on \textit{shiitake} mushrooms, scallion and rush (\textit{tatami} mats). Imports of \textit{shiitake} mushrooms grew rapidly in the 1990s and by 2001, 99.9\% of fresh \textit{shiitake} mushrooms came from China. \footnote{2} Tsutomu Takebe, then Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, stated in May 2001 that safeguard measures were not "over-protectionism," but it was reported that the members of the ruling LDP had placed the safeguard measures to win the votes of the farmers in the July 2001 election of the House of Councilors. Tsutomu Takebe, quoted in "Keizai Kakuryo ni Kiku, Takebe Tsutomu, Nosuisho, Sefu Gado ha Kahogo deha nai [Ask the Economic Ministers, Tsutomu Takebe Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Safe-guards are not Over-protectionism]," \textit{Sankei Shimbun}, May 4, 2001. "Shiken: Sefu Gado, Kyosoryoku Kyoka koso Senketsu, Hatsudo deha naku Sangyo Saisei Bijon wo [Opinion: Safe-guard, Increasing Competitiveness Must be the First Consideration, Visions for Restructuring of Industries are Necessary, Not Safeguards]," \textit{Nihon Kogyo Shimbun}, April 10, 2001. \footnote{3} The organization was made up of seven towel manufacturing firms that have factories in China, and was called Chugoku Shinshutsu Taoru Kigyo Renraku Kyogikai [Association of Towel Firms Advancing in China].
support protectionist measures.

The threat of China taking Japanese jobs was also mentioned regularly. Many Japanese companies moved their production sites to China where the labor costs were low. The transfer of production sites was said to portend a loss Japan’s skilled workers and technological lead over China. Small and medium size firms were hard hit by the transfer of production to China. In 2002, about 40% of the small and medium size firms in Tokyo felt that this movement of production to China was the most serious problem for them, up 14% from the year before.251 And also, in 2002, 96 out of 100 firms in the southern Japan viewed the Chinese economy as a threat.252

Small manufactures and firms made “China threat” arguments to protect their interests. However, the organizations did not make security arguments. What the organizations did was lower the cost of making “China threat” arguments by creating a domestic political environment conducive to anti-China rhetoric. Making outright “China threat” arguments would have been too costly and politically untenable, as attested by the statement of Gotoda in the previous section, but arguing for the protection of Japanese farmers and small industries was viewed as politically legitimate. Economic threat arguments facilitated making security threat arguments.

(2) The Big Business Organizations — Keidanren

In this section, I examine the arguments made by the business community and how they affected the rise of “China threat” arguments. Observers of Japan have long noted the strong

influence of the economic organizations on Japan’s foreign policy. However, as far as the rise of “China threat” arguments was concerned, the business community did not play a large role. While the economic “China threat” arguments were strong and abundant, they were made not by the business community but more by the popular press and economic analysts.

Some CEOs of big companies expressed concern for “China threat” to the Japanese economy. For example, Kentaro Aikawa, CEO of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Chairman of the Japan Society of Industrial Machinery Manufacturers, expressed his concern that:

(if the Japanese firms kept moving its production sites to China then) Japan will decline by the hollowing out of the industry...Technology and the know-how will also transfer to China. So, in the long run Japan’s competitiveness will be lost.

President Hiroyuki Nakajima of the Asahi Denka Corporation argued in January 2002 that Japanese companies could not compete with Chinese products if the quality and technology of the products were the same.

The hollowing out of the Japanese industry has become a serious problem. Chinese technology has improved significantly over the last few years. China is becoming a threat.

However, economic threat arguments subsided by 2003-2004. The big business organizations argued that “China threat” arguments were counter-productive. “China threat” arguments were regarded as excuses for avoiding the necessary structural reform of the
industries. The Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) argued that the Japanese economy had to seek a way to create a “win-win” situation for both Japan and China. The Keidanren published a proposal— the so-called “Okuda Vision”— in January 2003 and promoted strengthening economic integration in East Asia, including with China.

Government agencies, such as the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), argued that “China threat” arguments could hinder innovative restructuring of Japanese industry. The Economic and Social Research Institute of the Cabinet Office issued a report in December 2002 that laid out two versions of economic “China threat” arguments. The bad version of “China threat” arguments was where Japan-China trade friction was caused by some industries exercising political clout when they were losing in competition with China. This was what happened with agricultural products. The good version of “China threat” arguments was where Japan turns the rise of China to its advantage by making the necessary changes to its economy. Japan could focus on revitalizing internationally competitive sectors, while transferring the non-competitive sectors to overseas. The 2002 version of the Manufacturing Base White paper advocated technological innovation and structural reform of industry and cautioned that otherwise a “real China threat” could occur. This line of argument gained ground and was

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257 Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) is a comprehensive economic organization established in May 2002 by amalgamation of Keidanren (Japan Federation of Economic Organization) and Nikkeiren (Japan Foundation of Employers’ Association).


259 The report argues that: “China Threat Theory’ is convenient for the authorities and managers to hide their lack of efforts. However, the cost for averting the attention from the true nature of the problem and further delay in reform is extremely high.” “Report of the Study Group on China; Issue in the 21st Century and Influences on the International Economy,” Economic and Social Research institute, Cabinet Office. http://www.esri.go.jp/en/archive/hou/abstract/hou007-e.html

put forward by various economic organizations.

The first type of economic "China threat" arguments were made by the business organizations starting late in the late-1990s and lasted for only a few years. The economic hegemony arguments were rarely made by business organizations. They were more often made by mass media and commentators.

The business organizations did not often make statements about China outside of the economic issues. Two exceptions were the Yasukuni issue and the territorial issue, both of which were a focus of tension in the bilateral relations beginning in 2001.

On the subject of Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, for example, Yotaro Kobayashi, chairman of the Fuji Xerox company expressed opposition to the visit at a press conference in September 2004 and received death threats. Kobayashi was a former chairman of the Keizai Doyukai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives: JACE) and a chairman of the New 21st Century Committee for Japan-China Friendship. The New 21st Century Committee was established by the two governments after the summit meeting between Prime Minister Koizumi and President Hu Jintao in St. Petersburg in May 2003. Kakutaro Kitashiro, chairman of the JACE and the chairman of the board of IBM Japan, also expressed his views in November 2004 that most of the business community thought that Prime Minister Koizumi should refrain from visiting the Yasukuni shrine. The business organizations


sought better relations with China because they hoped to enter the Chinese economy and expand their business. Such statements were criticized by some conservatives as being co-opted by the Chinese government. The arguments against the Yasukuni visit from the business community might have had some ameliorating effect on “China threat” arguments, but their impact was not large. For example, Koizumi continued with his visits.

On the territorial and maritime resources issues, the business community took a tougher position against China. For example, the Nippon Keidanren issued a report in January 2005 reiterating the need to “accomplish, as a whole nation, the project to expand the territories [ryodo no kakudai] that touches on Japan’s national interest.” The report proposed that:

We must make legitimate claims regarding the territorial issues with our neighboring countries and maritime interests and rights in the East China Sea, based on a broad foreign policy/national security strategy. 264

The business community was not an important actor in spreading “China threat” arguments regarding the territorial disputes. While the business community sought to maintain good relations with China through opposition to the Yasukuni visit, it did not seek to dampen the threat arguments about the offshore islands and maritime resources.

4. Summary of the Organizational Explanation

Organization theory argues that organizations make new threat arguments when they cannot sustain their organizational interest after the old threat disappears. Applied to the rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan, organizations should begin to make “China threat” arguments when they can no longer win support for their organizational size, wealth and internal

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cohesion with other threats. The organizations should make alternative threat arguments beginning with the threats most similar to the former threat and shifting toward the least similar threats.

The Japanese defense organizations did not actively make “China threat” arguments except for those related to the defense of the Senkaku Islands and the territorial waters in the East China Sea. The behavior and arguments of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the Self Defense Force (SDF) conformed to many of the predictions drawn from the organization theory. The defense organizations sought to maintain their organizational interest after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, they found and used arguments other than “China threat” arguments to serve their organizational interests. These were arguments about the remaining and resurgent Soviet/Russian threat, the non-threat based nature of the Basic Defense Force Concept, the importance of upholding the U.S.-Japan alliance, the newly added missions of international cooperation and disaster relief, and the threat from North Korea. The JDA decided that the Chinese threat was too weak to justify their force levels.

Organization theory predicts that the JDA and SDF would make “China threat” arguments when they have exhausted other arguments. However, the first of “China threat” arguments regarding the threat to the offshore islands and maritime resources occurred in 1992, responding to the Territorial Waters Act and the increased activities of the Chinese ships. This suggests that the arguments were driven by actual events rather than organizational needs. The threat to the offshore islands had been a concern even in the 1970s. Therefore, it was a resurgence of an old problem that had been suppressed during the 1980s when Japan and China were both fighting the Soviet threat. There were incremental changes in the JDA’s “China threat” arguments over the course of the 1990s. The changes were mainly in response to China’s
behavior.

The “China threat” arguments from the late-1990s and more from 2000 were prompted by the deterioration of general relations with China. The defense organizations used “China threat” arguments to explain the need to defend the islands in the East China Sea. The MSDF argued that the next generation of the P-3C aircraft was necessary to patrol the surface ships in the East China Sea. The defense of the offshore islands also provided a rationale for the GSDF. The GSDF argued that an offshore type brigade was necessary.

By 2000, arguments for the defense of the offshore islands and territorial waters were considered to be legitimate and politically correct, and therefore they could easily win the support of the decision makers and the public. Unlike other issues such as the security of the Taiwan Strait and China’s bid for regional hegemony that invited divisive debate, the defense of the offshore islands and the maritime resources and rights was one area that many groups were able to agree upon.

According to organization theory, conservative groups would make “China threat” arguments after the disappearance of the Soviet threat. The behavior and arguments of the radical right wing organizations conformed to the predictions of the theory. They lost their main target after the Cold War and took up various issues that got attention in the media. The groups targeted Russia, the United States, China and South Korea on various issues. There is no evidence to suggest that they singled out China as their target. The groups were followers of public opinion rather than the cause of the rise of “China threat” arguments.

Organization theory argues that economic organizations make “China threat” arguments to sustain or increase their organizational interests. There was very little economic activity with the Soviet Union, so the collapse of the Soviet Union had little impact on the organizations.
Economic threat arguments were made from the mid-1990s, first by the less-competitive sectors, such as agriculture and textile industries. For about four years from 1999 to 2003, there were strong “China threat” arguments about China’s economic growth and possible economic hegemony. However, by 2003 arguments that promoted innovative reforms in Japanese industry became more prominent.

The evidence indicates that organizations were not the cause of “China threat” arguments. Organizations showed a tendency to sell the cheapest argument that gets the biggest sales. Rather than initiating “China threat” arguments, organizations took advantage of already prevalent arguments to maintain their organizational interests. For instance, many organizations used China’s threat to the offshore islands and maritime resources to attach their interests to an area that already generated great public concern. As a result, “China threat” arguments were most vocal regarding the East China Sea.

V. DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY’S EXPLANATION

Democratic peace theory argues that the rise of “China threat” arguments occurred in Japan because China was a non-democracy. This explanation suggests that “China threat” arguments in Japan began as a result of the perception of China’s level of democracy. According to the theory, the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989 and the Taiwan Strait Crisis that sought to influence the election in Taiwan in March 1996, events that demonstrate China’s contempt for liberal norms, should contribute to the rise of “China threat” arguments. The groups that make the “China threat” arguments most strongly are expected to be those who are the most concerned about liberal democratic values.

The U.S. case showed that China’s non-democratic nature was not an independent cause of
the rise of “China threat” arguments. Relative power was the main cause. Almost no one made “China threat” arguments when China was less democratic but weak. Alternatively there were “Japan threat” arguments when Japan was rising even though it was democratic, and some even argued that Japan was not a real democracy. Those that made “China threat” arguments based on China’s undemocratic nature were usually not the initiators of “China threat” arguments but followers, and were often conservatives. Those who held that China’s behavior could be moderated through trade and engagement did not make “China threat” arguments.

In this section, I examine whether the rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan conforms to predictions drawn from democratic peace theory. I ask the same questions I asked in examining the U.S. case. They are: (1) Does the timing of the rise of “China threat” arguments conform to the events that demonstrated China’s non-democratic nature? (2) Does the content of “China threat” arguments conform to democratic peace theory? (3) What are the arguments about other democracies and non-democracies? I also examine whether or not the actors making “China threat” arguments are the liberals in the society, as predicted by the theory. I then examine whether absence of common identity as liberal democracies caused the rise of “China threat” arguments.

In the remainder of the section, I briefly introduce how democratic values were treated in Japan’s national security policy.

1. Democratic Values in Japan’s National Security Policy

In official documents, democratic values have long been identified as an important foundation for Japan and for its alliance with the United States.

For example, the Basic Policy for National Defense adopted in May 1957, the most basic
document on Japan’s defense policy, states that the aim of national defense is “to prevent direct
and indirect aggression and to repel any such aggression with the aim of protecting Japan’s
independence and peace, which are founded on democracy.”

The virtues of democracy and the need to defend it have been articulated in many official
documents of U.S.-Japan alliance, beginning during the Cold War. The Joint Communiqué by
Prime Minister Suzuki and President Reagan in 1981 states:

The Prime Minister and the President, recognizing that the alliance between Japan and the
United States is built upon their shared values of democracy and liberty, reaffirmed their
solidarity, friendship and mutual trust.

The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century, signed in April
1996, states:

The benefits of peace and prosperity that spring from the Alliance are due not only to the
commitments of the two governments, but also to the contributions of the Japanese and
American people who have shared the burden of securing freedom and democracy.

The Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee of September 23,
1997 also emphasized liberal democratic values:

The alliance reflects such common values as respect for freedom, democracy, and human
rights, and serves as a political basis for wide-ranging bilateral cooperation, including
efforts to build a more stable international security environment.

Japan’s unilateral effort in defending and spreading democracy is also mentioned in
official documents, although it was less articulate and infrequently stated outside of the

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265 “Basic Policy for National Defense,” Adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet on
266 “Joint Communiqué Between Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki and President Ronald Reagan (Excerpts), May 8,
267 The Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century, signed on April 17, 1996. From
the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
268 Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, New York, New York, September 23, 1997. From the website of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
alliance. One of the most articulate arguments for the defense of liberal democracy was
given by Shigeru Ishiba, Minister of State for Defense, in his speech at a ceremony to dispatch
the Air Self Defense Force to Iraq. He said that one of the objectives for the SDF mission in
Iraq was to “defend liberal democratic values and human rights, which we hold most
important.” He noted that terrorism was “a challenge to Japan that holds liberty and
democracy as the highest value.” Ishiba is one of the new generation conservative
politicians.

A task force for Prime Minister Koizumi issued a basic foreign policy strategy in
November 2002 that emphasized Japan’s responsibility to promote democracy. The document
lists the protection of “freedom, democracy and human rights” as one of the four basic national
interest of Japan and notes that “it is Japan’s duty as well to demonstrate a consistent
commitment to the protection of these values.” However, the strategy proposed that Japan take
a moderate approach to promoting democracy, unlike the direct approach taken by the United
States and some European countries. This document shows that while the promotion of
democracy was a stated foreign policy objective, Japan was reluctant to promote democracy by
force. The preferred means of promotion was economic assistance and interdependence.

269 None of the National Defense Program Outlines (or Guidelines) referred to the defense of democracy or
democratic values.

270 Ishiba’s speech was given on December 24, 2003. http://www.jda.go.jp/j/iraq/kunji/tyoukan01.htm (accessed 16
February 2006).

271 Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, “Basic Strategies for Japan’s Foreign Policy in the 21st
translation). From the website of the Prime Minister’s Office.
and Defense Capabilities Report of 2004 also notes the importance of defending freedom and democracy together
with other values: “Security under a democratic government must extend to protecting social life and other cultural
values that the people treasure, including freedom and democracy.” The Council on Security and Defense

272 An example of this can be seen in the public reaction to the U.S. war on Iraq. In December 2002, 63% of the
people thought U.S. policy towards Iraq was wrong. 59% thought the Koizumi administration’s support for the
war was wrong. And yet in the same survey, 69% of the people said that Japan should contribute to the
2. The Timing of “China threat” Arguments

Democratic peace theory predicts that democracies will make “China threat” after an event indicates China’s non-democratic nature. The theory predicts that there would be an increase in “China threat” arguments after the Tiananmen Incident of June 1989 and Taiwan missile crisis of March 1996.

(1) The Tiananmen Square Incident

Almost no “China threat” arguments were made after the Tiananmen Square incident. The Japanese government’s reaction was mild. Japan’s policies aimed not to antagonize China. The Japanese public and the media showed a tougher reaction, condemning the Chinese government. However, they also did not make threat arguments. The main points made after the incident were concern about China’s domestic instability and warnings that isolating China could destabilize it.

Japan was more accommodating than other powers toward China after the Tiananmen Square incident. Right after the incident, Nobuo Matsunaga, the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, stated that Japan might take a different policy than the United States.273 Japan lobbied the G7 countries not to isolate China. The Japanese government was the first among the major powers to send its minister to China after the incident. Japan’s policy toward China was seen as too lenient by the United States and other European countries. This perceived leniency contributed to the U.S. impression that Japan did not share liberal democratic values.274

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273 This was a break away from Japan’s usual foreign policy that followed the United States and other powers.
No “China threat” arguments were made from within the government at this time. The defense white paper in 1990 did not criticize the Chinese government or cite a threat. The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) argued that the incident had “an adverse impact on China’s economic construction and military modernization.”\(^{275}\) The incident was regarded as having weakened China’s capability, not as an indication of China’s threat.

Criticisms towards the Chinese government came more from the left than from the right, as expected by the theory. Liberal magazines showed strong interest in the incident and harshly criticized the Chinese government. *The Asahi Journal* ran a series of articles on the “massacre.”\(^{276}\) *Sekai*, a liberal monthly journal, published an issue devoting more than one hundred pages of articles to the incident.\(^{277}\) But again, their criticisms did not include “China threat” arguments.

Conservative magazines, such as *Bungei Shunju* and *Shokun!*, which became proponents of “China threat” arguments beginning in the mid- to late-1990s showed little interest in the incident at the time, carrying only a few articles on it.\(^{278}\) Their main topics in 1989-1990 were the Japan bashing in the United States and the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance.\(^{279}\) The same magazines carried “China threat” arguments in the late-1990s that cited the non-democratic and autocratic nature of China as sources of threat. However, China’s undemocratic nature was not

\(^{276}\) For example, “Pekin 89.6.4 Tenammon sangeki! (Beijing 89.6.4. Tiananmen atrocity)” *Asahi Journal*, Vol. 31.
\(^{278}\) For example, the August 1989 issue of a conservative magazine, *Shokun!* carried three articles on the incident, two of which were analysis of the cause of the incident and one criticizing the policies of the Japanese government. Kou Shoudo, “Sensei Seiji no Dento ni Modotta Tou Shohei [Deng Xiaoping Goes Back to the Tradition of Despotism];” Kikuzo Ito, “Jimmin kahogun ha nani wo ‘kaiho’ shitandanoka [What did the Peoples Liberation Army ‘Liberate’];” Taiga So, “Aratamete Nihon seifu no taichu shisei wo tadasu [Questioning Japanese government’s stance towards China];” *Shokun!*, Vol. 21, No. 8, August 1989.
\(^{279}\) Testuya Kataoka, “J. Farozu shi heno Hanron, Nihon wo ‘Fujikome’ te Nanni naru! [Rebuttal to Mr. J. Fallows, What’s the Use of ‘Containing’ Japan!], *Shokun!* Vol. 21, No. 8, August 1989.
perceived as a source of threat in 1989.

This, however, does not mean that the incident had no impact on the Japanese perception of China. The Japanese public reacted sensitively to the Tiananmen Square incident. Public opinion towards China deteriorated rapidly after 1989 (Figure 6-1).\textsuperscript{280}

![Affinity towards China](image)

Figure 6-1: Affinity towards China
(Source) Cabinet Office, \textit{Gaiko ni Kansuru Yoronchosa}\textsuperscript{281}

The percentage of respondents who felt an affinity towards China was around 70\% in the 1980s. The high was in 1980 at 78.6\%. This number plunged 16.9\% points to 51.6\% in October 1989. It never recovered to the level of the 1980s.\textsuperscript{282}

Although affinity towards China declined throughout the 1990s, public threat perception

\textsuperscript{282} This figure never recovered to this high throughout the 1990s. It recovered to 55.5\% in 1992 and remained in the mid- to upper-40s thereafter. It dropped to an all time low of 37.6\% in 2004. Naikakufu daijin kanbo kohoshitu (Public Relations Office of the Minister’s Secretariat, Cabinet Office), \textit{Gaiko ni kansuru yoronchosa} (Public opinion poll on foreign relations), October 2004 survey, Cabinet office website. http://www8.ca0.go.jp/survey/h16/h16-gaikou/images/h05.csv (accessed February 10, 2005)
toward China was little affected by the Tiananmen incident. Polling data taken from various surveys is shown in Figure 6-2.\textsuperscript{283} In March 1990, only 12\% of respondents thought China posed a military threat to Japan. This was much less than those who viewed the Soviet Union and the United States as threats. 47\% viewed the Soviet Union as a threat and 37\% thought the United States posed a military threat to Japan. In almost all the surveys until January 1995, more people viewed the United States as a military threat than China.

![Graph of Threat to Japan](image)

Figure 6-2: Public Opinion on Threat to Japan  
(Source) Compiled from various surveys by the author\textsuperscript{284}

The public reaction to the Japanese government's moderate response to the Tiananmen incident was mixed. According to a public opinion survey, 32\% thought the response was appropriate and 5\% said it was inevitable, while 51\% thought that it was inappropriate. One

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{283} These data show the strength of "China threat" arguments relative to other threats. The data should be used only as a rough indicator of trends over time, however, because the wording of the each survey was different.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
factor worth noting here is the restraint on Japan’s criticism towards China. I explained in the realism section that there were two restraints preventing “China threat” arguments. One was the strategic imperative to maintain good relations during the Cold War and the other was the moral responsibility Japan felt for its past aggression of China. The restraints were at work in this case. The moral responsibility Japan felt towards China seemed to have stopped the public from condemning the Chinese government. For example, among those in their 60s who thought the response of the Japanese government was inevitable, 58% thought that Japan was not in a position to criticize the Chinese government given what it did to China during the war.285

The Tiananmen incident worked to lift the moral restraint. Observers noted a change in Japanese public’s attitude towards China. Seiichiro Takagi observed in 1995 that on moral grounds, “Japan had been consistently in a weaker position because of the history of its invasion into China” but “the Tiananmen Square incident had made a dent on China’s one-sided superiority.”286 As China increased its criticisms of Japan’s past aggression and lack of remorse during the 1990s, the Japanese increased their criticisms of China’s current policies.

(2) The Taiwan Missile Crisis

The rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan occurred after 1992, before the Taiwan missile crisis of 1996, which suggests that the missile crisis was not the initial cause. Nevertheless, the increase of “China threat” arguments in 1995-1996 could have been caused

partly by the missile crisis. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto expressed his concern about China for the first time in March 1996. However, he stated that his concerns did not arise from China’s disrespect for democratic elections, but because the increased tension in the Taiwan Strait was “very bad for the peace and stability of East Asia.”

The impact of the Taiwan missile crisis on the overall public perception of China was less pronounced than that of the Tiananmen Square incident. Japanese affinity towards China decreased in the October 1996 survey but increased again in the 1997 survey. There was no sharp drop comparable to that after the incident. The decline was by 3.3% points from the previous year, about the same as the year before.

The perception that China posed a threat to Japan increased after the Taiwan missile crisis. In the April 1996 survey, 26.6% regarded China as threat to Japan. This was the first time that more of the public viewed China as a threat than the United States or Russia. This increase was a part of an upward trend that began in 1995. The numbers increased from 7% in 1994 to 21% in 1995, 26.6% in 1996 and 32% in 1997 (Figure 6-2). Since the increase started before the Taiwan Strait crisis, it is not possible to conclude that the non-democratic nature manifest in the crisis was the cause for the rise of “China threat” arguments.

3. China’s Undemocratic Nature in “China threat” Arguments

In this section, I examine whether references to China’s non-democratic nature conformed to democratic peace theory.

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289 In the October 1993 survey, the percentage of respondents that viewed China as threat was about the same as amount that viewed the United States as threat.
(1) Propensity to Use Force

Many “China threat” arguments argued that China had a propensity to use force because of its undemocratic political system. Some argued that China was a threat to Japan and the region because of the aggressiveness inherent in a despotic regime. For example, Katsunori Nakamura, a conservative scholar, argued:

The biggest reason why China is the cause of a storm in Asia-Pacific is that it is not a democracy...One of the characteristics of despotism is power politics. Internally it is politics that violates human rights, and externally it is politics that seeks invasion and robbery-like expansionism. It says what is mine is mine and what is your is also mine.\(^{290}\)

Others argued that China lacked restraint because of its political system. For example, an editorial of *Hakkaido Shim bun* on March 14, 1994 expressed wariness about China’s defense buildup without a democratic political system to check the government.

China prioritizes on stability but is not as enthusiastic in opening-up of politics and reforms towards democratization as it is in economic reform. We are concerned that whether or not a political system will be established that will put a restraint on overemphasis on the military.\(^{291}\)

Shigeru Ishiba, a former Minister of State for Defense (September 2002 - September 2004) also noted that democratic political systems restrained war through freedom of speech and financial competition. Ishiba argued that North Korea and Iraq were fundamentally the same, as they lacked democracy, which restrained war. Ishiba only referred to North Korea and Iraq and did not make a “China threat” argument based on China’s lack of democracy. However, on several occasions he was quoted in the press as stating his wariness toward China. Although his statements about China were related to China’s advances into the Indian Ocean where Japan’s important SLOC lay, his assessment of China may have been influenced by its lack of

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Many "China threat" arguments referred to China's national character "Taishitsu (innate characteristic)" as a cause for its aggressiveness. In these arguments, China's culture, not its undemocratic nature, was the main cause for its propensity to use force. For example, Yuken Hironaka argued in March 1994:

China's military modernization combined with China's innate characteristic that does not hesitate to use force if necessary is making its neighbors, especially the ASEAN countries, feel vigilant. 292

Ikuo Kayahara also mentioned the "innate characteristics coming from Sinocentricism" as factors that needed to be examined to assess China's threat. 293 He also noted the importance of assessing China's threat based on how China's political and economic systems might change. These statements suggest that the perception of China's propensity to use force was based not only China's undemocratic nature but also on China's Sinocentricism and hegemonic behavior in the past.

Hajime Sakuma, a former Chairman of the Joint Staff Council of the JSDF (1991-1993) and Chief of Staff, MSDF (1989-1991) also noted the influence of China's "Taishitsu." Speaking at a committee hearing in the Diet, Sakuma stated that China's innate characteristics lead it to take a long-term approach — fifty to hundred years — to realize its goals. According to Sakuma, China's strategic goal was maritime advancement. He also noted that the international community, however it approached China, could not change this advancement. 294

(2) Aggressive Reaction to Democratization

Still others argued that China’s aggressive behavior was a result of its fear of democratization. Mineo Nakajima, a specialist on Chinese politics and then the President of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, wrote in February 1996, “China’s hard-line stance is the other side of the coin of the vulnerability of China’s political system and its fears of freedom and democracy.”

However, no arguments saw China as reacting aggressively to Japan’s efforts to democratize China. Although the long-term goal of Japan’s economic aid to China had been to promote democratization of China, the Japanese people did not have a clear consciousness that Japan’s policy was trying to democratize China and that China might see this as a threat. Japan’s economic assistance to China began after 1979, when then Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira visited Beijing. The assistance was meant to spur economic development and political stability, which was in Japan’s interest. Japan was to help establish stability and development in China, which would facilitate stable and friendly relations between Japan and China.

Demand for democratization of China was not publicly mentioned as an objective of Japan’s China policy. Noninterference in domestic affairs had been observed in Japan’s China policy, at least until the end of the 1990s. On January 17, 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi stated that he wished that China would make “more efforts towards democratization.” This was a rare case in which a Japanese leader commented on Japan’s wish for China’s democratization.

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297 Koizumi was commenting on the death of Zhao Ziyang, the premier that was ousted from power for being too lenient toward the demonstrators at the Tiananmen Square in 1989. “Chugoku ha Minshuka Doryoku wo, Koizumi Shusho [China Should Make More Efforts Towards Democratization, Prime Minister Koizumi],” Kyodo News, January 17, 2005.
(3) Opacity

Concerns were often expressed about the lack of transparency in China’s defense policy. The Japanese government has repeatedly demanded the Chinese government to increase the transparency of its defense spending and policies. In this regard, China’s undemocratic nature was often referred to as one of the factors that constituted a threat. The first official statement of concern about China’s military growth came in a demand for more transparency by then Foreign Minister Tsutomu Hata in January 1994. In December 2005, Foreign Minister Taro Aso stated that China’s opacity was exacerbating distrust towards China. He differentiated South Korea and China by saying that South Korea was a democracy that shared common values with Japan unlike China.  

Aso said that he viewed China as threat.  

(4) Export of Non-democratic Ideology

No arguments were made about China’s export of illiberal ideas.

(5) Arguments about Other Democracies

Proponents of democratic peace theory hold that liberal democracies perceive non-democracies and democracies differently. Non-democracies are threats; democracies are fellows. Contrary to what the theory suggests, according to opinion polls the Japanese public saw the United States as a greater threat than China from 1990 to 1996 and again from 2000 to 2002, as we saw, (Figure 6-2). Even after the rise of “China threat” arguments, in January 1995, more Japanese thought the United States posed a military threat to Japan than did China (27% and 21%). In September 1997, by a small margin more people viewed the United States


299 Ibid.

445
as a military threat than China. In November 2001, 15% thought the United States was a military threat and only 8% thought China was. Being a democracy did not exclude the United States from being perceived as a threat. This suggests that China’s undemocratic nature was not the central factor causing “China threat” arguments.

Japan’s responses to events that invoked threat perception showed little sensitivity to democracy. For example, the Japanese public very strongly protested the Chinese and French nuclear tests in 1995. In May 1995, the Japanese government announced its intention to decrease the grant aid to China. In August, the government froze its grant aid of about seven billion Yen (72 million dollars) to China in protest. But the Japanese government and the public did not single out China and protests were directed equally at France. The Japanese parliament unanimously passed a resolution condemning China and France on August 4, 1995. Finance Minister Masayoshi Takemura, who was the head of the one of three parties in the ruling coalition, called for a boycott of French imports and personally went to Tahiti to participate in a protest rally.

There was also tension between Japan and democratic South Korea. A territorial dispute over the Takeshima Island between Japan and South Korea and South Korea’s strong reaction to the history issue led to perception of South Korea’s hostility toward Japan. While few people saw South Korea as threat to Japan, some people feared that a unified Korea would be anti-Japan and present a threat to Japan, even though they realized that a unified Korea would likely to be a democracy.

(6) Threat from a Democratic China

Some “China threat” arguments in the United States saw growing Chinese nationalism as a source of aggressive intentions. They argued that Chinese nationalism would remain strong even after China democratized. Similar arguments in Japan held that China would be more nationalistic and anti-Japan after it democratized.

Many Japanese thought that the Chinese government was suppressing a nationalistic mass movement that would otherwise turn aggressive against the outside world. Nationalistic feelings targeting Japan in China and also in South Korea were seen as results of weak leadership. 303 Some policy makers in Japan believed that relations with China would work better under despotic rule.

4. Actors

Democratic Peace Theory suggests that liberal groups in society identify non-democracies as threats more than non-liberals. However, the U.S. case showed that it was the conservatives and/or hawks that made “China threat” arguments and not the liberals per se. Those who believed in the pacifying effects of trade and inter-dependence did not make “China threat” arguments. The same phenomenon occurred in the Japan case. There was no evidence to suggest that liberals in society were more prone to making “China threat” arguments. As in the United States, it was the conservatives that made the most “China threat” arguments.

In both countries those who made the strongest “China threat” arguments were hawks (believers in a strong defense and a strong state), who were conservative and believed in the superiority of liberal democracy.

303 Anti-Japan demonstrations that turned violent in some places in 2005 were viewed as a result of weak central leadership.
(1) Pro-Democracy Groups

While Japan emphasized the importance of democratic values and human rights in its security policy and alliance choices, China's human rights problems were almost never made an issue in Japanese politics. The human rights groups in Japan did not make "China threat" arguments. Generally, organizations promoting democracy and individual rights were on the left. The left was associated with such parties as the Japan Socialist Party, which in general was sympathetic to socialism and China. The left was often critical of the government's defense policies. They were opposed to the use or possession of force. Therefore they avoided making threat arguments.

Most of the groups that promoted civil liberties were concerned with domestic problems, such as discrimination against the descendants of outcast populations and discrimination against women. International issues were rarely dealt with by these organizations. And none of them made "China threat" arguments. The groups that worked to promote democracy and individual rights outside Japan were almost exclusively the Japanese branches of international organizations such as the Amnesty International. One exception was the issue of abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea. Many organizations identified the abduction issue as a human rights problem and worked to bring the abductees back to Japan. In these cases arguments against the North Korean regime were made.304

(2) Conservatives

Those who made "China threat" arguments were predominantly conservatives. There were three types of conservatives: right wing radicals, political conservatives that made up the bulk of Japan's establishment, and a new generation of political conservatives.305

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304 For example, Nihon Jinken Yougo Kyokai [Japan Human Rights Association]
305 There is no equivalent to the U.S. social religious right in Japan.
The right wing radicals were strong supporters of ethnicity, tradition and respect for the emperor. Their ideology rested on collectivism and regarded liberalism and individualism as something foreign. China’s undemocratic nature was not an important element in the “China threat” arguments put forward by these groups. For example, Shintaro Ishihara, a radical conservative and the mayor of Tokyo, repeatedly made “China threat” arguments. Ishihara often targeted the United States as well as China in his arguments.

The Japanese establishment, which was conservative in general, supported close relations with the United States. Many conservatives in Japan argued the importance of working together with the United States, with which, they argued, Japan shared common values of democracy. The mainstream establishment argued in favor of coexisting with China. They showed concerns about China’s growing military capability but made few “China threat” arguments. For example, when Foreign Minister Aso called China a “threat” in December 2005, a leading centrist LDP argued that Aso “should not have said ‘threat’ in respect of Japan-China relations.”

A new generation of conservatives was more vocal in making “China threat” arguments. An example was the “Young Diet Members’ Group for Establishing a Security Framework for the New Century.” They differed from the traditional conservatives. They were born after WWII and took pride in Japan’s democratic institutions. This sometimes led to an expression of moral superiority over non-democracies. The young members unburdened by the moral obligation of the war, made “China threat” arguments with little reservation.

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Their assessments of China’s threat were based mainly on China’s military power. For example, Ishiba argued that China had sufficient military capability to threaten Japan.

Nagashima also noted that China’s military capability constituted a threat to Japan. Although military power seemed to be the major factor shaping their threat assessment, these young conservatives also saw China’s lack of transparency and civilian control of the military as sources of concern.

Nagashima explained the difference between the United States and China.

What is the difference between U.S. military buildup which is not a threat and China’s military buildup which is a threat? ... There is transparency in the U.S. military buildup. The United States publicly announces its security strategy on a regular basis and its objectives are clear. China’s military buildup has low transparency and it is beyond the scale that can be explained by the Taiwan problem.

Ishiba noted:

The PLA is not a military of the people. It is a military of the Chinese Communist Party. Democratic civilian control, as we have in the United States or Japan, does not function in China. I have not heard that a healthy formation of public opinion, or a healthy and free
criticism of the government is permitted (in China).312

Ishiba believed that one of the causes for Japan initiating a war in the 1930s was the lack of civilian control of the military. The lack of democratic control of the military seemed to him to be an additional reason to be concerned about China.

5. Common Identity as Democracies

Democratic peace theory argues that a democracy must identify another state as a democracy for democratic peace to work.313 The theory contends that the common identity as democracies restrains threat perception. Alternatively, the lack of common identity spurs threat perception.

Opinion surveys in 1997 found that the majority of the Japanese public thought China would democratize as its economy developed.314 David L. Rosenau’s study on American and Japanese perceptions concludes from this data that the Japanese public fell squarely in the liberal-constructivist camp as opposed to the realist one. He contends that “identity drives interests and perceptions,” and argues that because the vast majority of the Japanese public believed that economic change would transform Chinese identity, they did not see China as threatening.315

Other evidence supports the democratic peace claim. Public opinion polls found that affinity toward China was affected by China’s undemocratic nature. For example, according to

313 John M. Owen IV, Liberal Peace, Liberal War.
314 Two surveys in January and October of 1997 found that 57 % and 52 %, respectively, thought China would become more democratic as its economy developed. Yomiuri Shimbun. Also quoted in David L. Rousseau, “American and Japanese Perceptions of the Rise of China,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 29, 2002, Boston, MA.
315 Rosenau, “American and Japanese Perceptions.”
a survey conducted in August 1997, the main reason (33.3%) respondents did not feel an affinity towards China, was "because China is a one party despotism of the communist party and suppression such as the Tiananmen incident occurred." Although identity and affinity are different concepts, we can infer from these results that China's undemocratic nature caused a lack of a sense of common identity with China.

Rosenau reasons that future prospects for democratization — which he sees as an indication of common identity — resulted in the lack of threat perception in Japan. However, while expectations of China becoming more democratic might have existed among the Japanese public, it did not stop the Japanese from regarding China as threat. In another survey from 1997, 32% of the respondents viewed China as a threat (Figure 6-2). As we saw in the preceding sections, "China threat" arguments were certainly present in Japan, although "China threat" arguments in general were weaker than in the United States. "China threat" arguments increased in Japan in the 2000s. In a November 2005 survey, as many as 76% of the people felt "threatened" by China's military buildup.

According to democratic peace theory and Rosenau, threat perception should be based on lack of common identity as democracies. However, China's undemocratic nature was not the primary factor causing threat perception. Military capability and economic power were viewed as more important factors constituting threat. For example, in a May 1998 survey, where 23.8% of those who denied having an affinity towards China, selected "crimes by illegal immigrants," as their reason, 22.1% picked "because I feel military threat from nuclear tests and missile exercises," and 15.5% picked "because China strongly criticizes Japan on historical perception over the Sino-Japanese War." The main reason for feeling an affinity towards China, on the other hand, was "because of long-time relations of exchange of culture and people" (52.4%). "A survey conducted by Kyodo News," Chunichi Shimbun, September 3, 1997.

respondents were asked to identify a factor that posed serious threat to Japan, 18% replied “different political system.” This was less than “military capability” (22%) and “economic competition” (20%).

Furthermore, the Japanese public was pessimistic about finding common ground with China based on democratic values. For example, a survey in March 1999 asked whether or not “China and Japan will be able to work together to adopt the same common values about democracy and a market economy.” 55% thought that the two countries could not work together to adopt common values. 30% replied in the affirmative.

However, even without a shared common identity, working together with China was believed to be possible. This view was held by those who promoted the engagement policy. Statements by Masaharu Gotoda and Hiroshi Hashimoto, we saw earlier, are examples of such a view. The 2005 report of the Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) advocated that the two governments make efforts to overcome differences in values and standpoints. This indicates that the Keidanren was aware of the lack of common identity, but it felt that the two countries could build good relations despite the difference.

What Rosenau’s findings suggest is not that the lack of common identity causes threat perception or that the prospects for democratization prevent threat perception. What his article suggests is that the prospects for establishing cooperative relations dampen threat perception. The prospects for cooperation need not be determined by common identity as democracies.

The absence of common identity did not cause “China threat” arguments.

6. Summary: Democratic Peace Explanation

Democratic peace theory did not offer a strong explanation of the rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan. China’s undemocratic nature did not cause the rise of “China threat” arguments.

(1) Timing

Democratic peace theory suggests that “China threat” arguments will occur and increase after events that point to China’s undemocratic nature. The Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 and the Taiwan missile crisis of 1996 are such events. However, the Tiananmen Square incident had almost no affect on Japan’s threat perception of China. The Taiwan missile crisis led to the perception that China had a propensity to use force and that there was a possibility of a military conflict occurring near Japan. This led to an increase of “China threat” arguments. However, there is no evidence to show that it was the contempt for democracy in Taiwan that had aroused threat arguments. “China threat” arguments increased from 1994-1995, prior to the Taiwan missile crisis. Japan reacted to other events such as the nuclear tests and maritime activities in and around Japan’s territorial waters.

(2) Propensity to use force

The perception of China’s propensity to use force was an important component in shaping “China threat” arguments. China’s aggressive intentions were inferred from various factors. The lack of democratic institutions and lack of preference for negotiated settlements were among the factors. This is limited evidence for the proposition that democratic peace theory explained the rise of “China threat” arguments. However, China’s lack of democracy was not
the only factor giving rise to the perception of aggressive intentions. There were also arguments pointing to China’s innate character, *Taishitsu*.

(3) Arguments about other democracies

Democratic peace theory argues that democracies perceive non-democracies as threats but do not perceive other democracies as threats. But in this case, it was often argued that a democratic China would be more aggressive towards Japan than a China ruled by the Communist regime. Nationalism was seen to have greater impact on China’s foreign policy than democratic norms or institutions.

Japan also saw other democracies as potential threats. In several surveys from the 1990s, the Japanese public saw the United States as more of a threat than China. This seems to have been the result of the U.S. propensity to use force and its military capability.

Additionally, Japan did not respond to China’s actions with any more alarm than when democracies took similar actions. For example, Japan reacted strongly to French nuclear tests and South Korean territorial claims. This suggests that behavior and power, not China’s undemocratic nature, caused Japan’s “China threat” arguments.

(4) Actors

Democratic peace theory also suggests that groups and individuals active in promoting democracy and human rights will make “China threat” arguments more than others. However, as in the U.S. case, the empirical evidence did not support this proposition. Those that made “China threat” arguments based its lack of democracy were mainly conservatives. The groups active in promoting human rights and individual rights did not make “China threat” arguments.
Japanese human rights groups worked almost exclusively on domestic issues and did not make human rights conditions in China a political issue. The strongest proponents of “China threat” arguments were conservatives with a preference for a strong defense and a belief in the superiority of democratic values.

V. ADDITIONAL EXPLANATION—DOMESTIC POLITICS

I list here some additional factors within Japanese domestic politics that contributed to the rise of “China threat” arguments that do not fall squarely into any of the three explanations I examined.

1. Changes within the Liberal Democratic Party

I have explained that the lifting of the taboo against making anti-China arguments was instrumental in causing the rise of “China threat” arguments. Changes in the distribution of power after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Tiananmen Square incident both contributed to this change. There were some other changes in Japan’s domestic politics that contributed to the lifting of the taboo. One was the decline of the former Tanaka faction and the ascendancy of the Koizumi group, and an overall generational change.

The former Tanaka faction was the most pro-China group within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Kakuei Tanaka was the prime minister who normalized the relations with China in 1972. Since then he and his faction had close relations with China and its leaders. After Tanaka, the faction was headed by three prime ministers, Noboru Takeshita (Prime Minister from 1987 to 1989), Ryutaro Hashimoto (1995-1998), and Keizo Obuchi (1998-2000). Prime ministers like Yoshiro Mori (2000-2001) and Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006), were both from
the former Kishi faction, which did not have close relations with China. The Koizumi cabinet implemented several policies that weakened the power of the former Tanaka faction. As a result, the pro-China group declined in power within the ruling LDP. The displacement of the pro-China group helped lift the constraint on making “China threat” arguments.

2. The Decline of the Left

The weakening of the political left in the 1990s resulted in the strengthening of the conservatives. This created an environment in which “China threat” arguments were more easily made. The Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) had maintained a strong pacifist policy. At the height of its power, in 1990, the SDPJ had 136 seats in the House of Representatives, and more seats than the LDP in the House of Councilors. The SDPJ gradually lost power as many of the unions that supported the party were dissolved in the late-1980s and in the 1990s. Ironically, the decisive factor weakening the SDPJ was what happened when the SDPJ leader, Tomiichi Murayama, became Prime Minister in a coalition government with the LDP in June 1994. After assuming office, Murayama abandoned the SDPJ’s long held policies and recognized the U.S.-Japan alliance and the Self Defense Force. The SDPJ lost its supporters as a result, and was dissolved in January 1996 after Murayama resigned as prime minister.

The reform of the voting system and the introduction of the small electorates in the 1990s further weakened the left. The Socialist Democratic Party (SDP), which inherited the SDPJ’s mantle, had only seven seats in the House of Representatives and five in the House of Councilors after the September 2005 election.

321 The Kishi faction traditionally had a closer relationship with Taiwan.
322 The privatization of the national railways led to the weakening of one of the most influential labor unions, the Kokuro, Kokutetsu Rodo Kumiai, the union for the National Railways.
3. The Decline of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lost power in 2001 when a scandal regarding its public relations fund was revealed. MoFA's conciliatory policies were criticized as kow-tow diplomacy which disregarded Japan's national interest. The discrediting of MoFA's policies led to an increase of hawkish arguments in Japanese politics.

VI. CONCLUSION

The rise of "China threat" arguments in Japan was caused mainly by three factors. First, the long-term growth in Chinese power led to a perception of its potential threat. Second, the disappearance of the Soviet threat allowed long-standing problems in the Japan-China relationship to resurface. Without a strategic rationale for cooperation, the behavior of both states became less restrained. Without the strategic safety-net, these changes in behavior led to a perception of aggressive intention. Third, taboo that had existed in the Japanese society against making anti-China arguments was lifted. This third factor was caused by several things. The most important was the change in the distribution of power after the Cold War. Without the Soviet threat, maintaining a good relationship with China was not as important. A reconsolidation of the alliance with the United States further undermined the need to observe the taboo. The Tiananmen Square incident also limited Japanese war guilt. The other factor was domestic politics, where the retirement of a generation of policy makers personally committed to upholding pro-China policies contributed to the lifting of the taboo.

Out of the three theories examined, Realism offered the strongest explanation for the rise of "China threat" arguments in Japan. Among the realist predictions, three were most strongly supported by the empirical evidence. First, the demise of the strategic imperative to cooperate
against the Soviet Union caused changes in China’s behavior towards Japan, and vice versa. As a result, contentious issues, such as the territorial issue, the Taiwan problem and the history issue reemerged. Changes in China’s behavior and reactions were perceived as signs of aggressive intentions towards Japan.

Second, in addition to the change in behavior, the absence of the strategic safety-net invited perceptions of aggressive intentions. The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the meaning of China’s military capability and behavior. Japan had been wary of China’s military capability since the 1970s. China’s nuclear capability and claim to the offshore islands were the sources of concern even then. However, Japan did not perceive China as a threat during the Cold War because China’s military force was perceived to be balancing the Soviet Union. After the end of the Cold War, China’s military capability was freed to threaten other countries, including Japan. The rapid increase of China’s military spending was seen as an indication of China’s aggressive intentions.

Third, the realist prediction that capability to harm national interests causes threat perception was better supported in the Japan case than in the U.S. case. “China threat” arguments in Japan were sensitive to increased Chinese capability to occupy the offshore islands. Long-term trends and China’s potential capability to exploit the revolution in military affairs (RMA) were not central concerns in Japan.

Realism predicts that Japan would be concerned with maintaining its position as the most powerful state in Asia and second largest economy in the world and begin to make “China threat” arguments when China has acquired enough power to challenge Japan’s position. This prediction was supported in part by the empirical evidence. There was an increase in wariness towards China’s rise after 1994 when China’s defense spending began to grow rapidly. There
was also concern about China’s becoming the top power in East Asia. However, “China threat” arguments in Japan remained fairly restrained throughout the 1990s.

The rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan followed a somewhat complicated process. Japan’s threat arguments about China were a function of Japan’s relations with the United States. After the Cold War, Japan’s relations with the United States deteriorated due to the fraying of the strategic safety-net. For a time, Japan hedged its bets by maintaining good relations with both China and the United States. This required avoiding overt “China threat” arguments. After its economic slowdown, around 1994, Japan decided to bandwagon with the United States. By the late-1990s, the alliance was secure and restraints on “China threat” arguments were removed.

I inferred the prediction from Realism that since states worry about relative position, Japan will be more concerned about losing its place to the rising China than about its relations with the top power, the United States. However, for the most of the 1990s, Japan was more concerned with its relations with the United States than China. This suggests that major powers are more concerned about the top power, than whether they are the second or third most powerful state.

Organization theory did not offer a strong explanation for the rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan. The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) sought to maintain its organizational interests after the collapse of the Soviet Union but found arguments besides China that allowed it to retain force structure and defense programs. The JDA did make “China threat” arguments regarding China’s nuclear weapons and the defense of the offshore islands. The defense of the offshore islands was the central part of the JDA’s “China threat” arguments. The Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) justified the acquisition of patrol planes by arguing for surveillance missions to track Chinese surface ships in the contested areas in the East China Sea.
Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) argued that a new brigade was necessary to defend the offshore islands. There was little risk in making these arguments about China's threat to the offshore islands because after 2000 the political leaders and the public were emotionally aroused over the issue.

Democratic peace theory did not offer a strong explanation for the rise of "China threat" arguments. The Tiananmen Square incident, which was a clear indication of China's disregard for democratic values, did not give rise to "China threat" arguments. The Taiwan missile crisis did give rise to "China threat" arguments, but its impact was not any greater than other events that had nothing to do with democracy, such as China's nuclear tests and increased maritime activities.

China's lack of democracy was cited as a reason for China's propensity to use force in some "China threat" arguments. At the same time, however, those who made "China threat" arguments based on China's undemocratic nature made arguments based on China's power. This indicates that China's lack of democracy was not an independent cause of "China threat" arguments. In addition, cultural characteristics were cited as a source of China's propensity to use force.

The offshore islands and territorial waters issues, by 2004, had become the focus of "China threat" arguments in Japan. The conservative nationalists were aroused by the intrusion of the Chinese vessels into the Japanese territorial waters. Government officials, the defense organizations, and big business all made "China threat" arguments based on the threat to the offshore islands and the territorial waters.

Several factors came together to cause this. First, the long-standing taboo against criticisms of China had been lifted. The Tiananmen incident in 1989, the disappearance of the
Soviet Union at the end of 1991, and the generational and factional changes in Japanese politics by 2001, had all undermined the taboo. At the same time, the reconsolidation of the U.S.-Japan alliance, starting with the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security of April 1996, alleviated concerns about U.S. abandonment. This also took away the need to maintain good relations with China. This led to a surge of “China threat” arguments after 2000.
CHAPTER SEVEN

Conclusion

This dissertation did four things. First, it explained the rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States. Second, it explained the rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan. Third, it systematically used three theories of state behavior — realism, organization theory, and democratic peace theory — as tools for studying threat arguments. Fourth, it offered insights into about threat perception in general. The main tasks were the first two. The major case was the United States and the minor case Japan. However, the cases help explain why states and actors within them make arguments about what states are threatening and why they perceive threats. In addition, I was able to make a small contribution to the understanding of how a unipolar constellation affects the behavior of states, and hence refine structural realism.

1. EXPLAINING THE RISE OF “CHINA THREAT” ARGUMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

The rise of “China threat” arguments occurred in the United States because of a convergence of several factors, the most important of which was the increase of China’s relative power after the Cold War.

1. The Increase of Relative Power of China — Capability

The biggest cause of the rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States was the increase of China’s relative power. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of the Japanese economy left China as the only major power increasing its capability and narrowing
the power gap with the United States.

At the end of the Cold War, security specialists in the United States anticipated a reordering of relations among states, including U.S. relations with former Cold War allies. They identified Japan as a potential competitor to the United States. Japan was perceived to have sufficient aggregate power (economic and technological) to become a strong military power if it so chose. China at this point was perceived to be in the third tier, having the aspirations to be a great power but lacking the capabilities. Many of the arguments made about Japan then resemble the “China threat” arguments in the 1990s.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the slowdown of the Japanese economy, China remained as the only potential challenger to the United States. This, coupled with China’s rapid economic growth, generated a perception of increasing Chinese power.

There were two different kinds of “China threat” arguments. One kind looked at China’s current to near-term capabilities. The acquisition of modern weapon systems, such as the Kilo-class submarines and Sukhoi Su-27 fighters, from Russia was seen to increase China’s military capability in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan Strait and perceived as a source of threat. Another kind of “China threat” argument looked at the China’s future prospects. The rapid increase in China’s economy and defense spending led to forecasts of China becoming the primary power in the world sometime in the 21st century. It was this latter type of China that was believed to challenge the United States.
2. Lack of Strategic Safety-net — Intentions

The collapse of the Soviet Union not only changed China’s relative power but also changed China’s behavior. Without the common threat, the United States became increasingly skeptical about China’s intentions. This led to a perception of aggressive intentions and to the rise of “China threat” arguments. The fraying of the strategic safety-net strongly influenced the behavior of the United States and China as well as the perception of each other’s intentions.

The United States and China were quasi-allies during the Cold War and had cooperated militarily through arms transfers and intelligence sharing. China’s strategic imperative to balance against the Soviet threat guaranteed that China would not act against U.S. vital interests. I have called this guarantee a “strategic safety-net.” Both the United States and China restrained their behavior to maintain good U.S.-China relations and to maximize the power of the quasi-alliance against the Soviet Union.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, this restraint was removed on both sides and preexisting problems such as the Taiwan resurfaced. Changes in China’s behavior and its reactions to U.S. actions were regarded as signals that China’s intentions had become aggressive. Even Chinese behavior that went almost unnoticed before China’s increase in relative power was perceived as indicative of aggression. For example, China’s alleged espionage and theft of nuclear weapons technology received little notice in 1990, but got national attention in 1999 and led to a surge of “China threat” arguments. Also, China’s maritime activities in the South China Sea received little attention in 1988, even when twenty Vietnamese sailors were killed. But the construction of a building on the Mischief Reef in 1995 was perceived as an indication of China’s expansionist intentions and resulted in an increase of “China threat” arguments.
3. The U.S. Primacy Strategy

Despite the rapid growth of its economy and military power, China's absolute power remained modest relative to the United States. The growth rate was large because China was starting from a very low base. This presents a puzzle. When the United States identified China as a future global peer competitor, China only had one tenth of the U.S. economy and one tenth of U.S. defense spending. China possessed three modern submarines and some 48 Su-27 fighters.\(^1\) Explanations based on power are not very convincing when we look at China's absolute power.

The rise of "China threat" arguments in the United States cannot be explained without looking at the U.S. primacy strategy. The United States found itself as the sole superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The grand strategy of the United States was to maintain this position as long as possible. In order to remain the number one power, the United States had to meet the challenge of potential competitors long into the future. The biggest difficulty the U.S. strategic planners faced in the 1990s was how to compete without an actual competitor. "China threat" arguments were made to allow the United States continue its efforts to maintain its preponderance of power.

The grand strategy envisioned by the security specialists and articulated in the February 1992 draft of the Defense Planning Guidance was to maintain U.S. primacy by dissuading the potential challengers. This was to be done in two ways. First by providing security to cooperative powers, the United States would eliminate the need for the potential competitors to develop their own military capability. Second, the United States' preponderance of power

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would deter uncooperative powers from challenging the U.S. position. Both steps required a strong military capability. Japan dropped out of the competition due to its economic slow-down and the reconsolidation of its alliance with the United States. The United States was able to dissuade Japan from taking a more independent path that would inevitably challenge U.S. primacy. China was not dissuaded and continued with an independent foreign policy and military buildup.

"China threat" arguments arose among those that supported the primacy strategy. They argued that the United States had to consciously make efforts to sustain its primacy. Militarily, security specialists associated with the Office of Net Assessment advocated continuing with an aggressive effort to innovate and transform U.S. military power. The increase of China's power and its interest in exploiting the revolution in military affairs (RMA) led ONA to view China as a future peer competitor. Politically, the foreign/security policy elite associated with the Project for New American Century (PNAC) — such as Paul Wolfowitz, Samuel Huntington, William Kristol — argued the importance of the United States being committed to shaping the world. "China threat" arguments were made to counter to an isolationist or economically driven foreign policy.

Thomas Christensen argues that leaders sometime adopt overly aggressive policies to mobilize the public behind a long-term grand strategy.² Something similar to this public mobilization occurred on certain occasions when "China threat" arguments were used to promote the primacy strategy. Further study is necessary, however, to determine how much the security leaders used "China threat" arguments to promote primacy.

4. Organizations as Trend Followers and not the Initiators of “China threat” Arguments

One popular explanation for the rise of “China threat” arguments is that “China threat” arguments occurred because the military promoted a new enemy to serve their organizational interest. This was not supported by empirical evidence.

Organization theory seems to provide a good explanation for the military organization’s behavior after the disappearance of a Soviet threat, but it did not explain the rise of “China threat” arguments. The military services were generally not active in making “China threat” arguments. After the end of the Cold War, the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) and the military services made arguments about a residual Soviet threat, a resurgent Soviet/Russian threat, threats of uncertainty, regional threats of Iraq and North Korea, and finally — when the argument suited their organizational interests — made “China threat” arguments.

The military services were focused more on the current and short-term problems than long-term threats with hypothetical future capabilities. China’s military capabilities were still too small to be used as a basis for U.S. force planning. The services also tended to make threat arguments that had a high possibility of being accepted by the public and the policy makers. In most cases, therefore, they were followers of existing threat arguments and not the initiators of “China threat” arguments.

Advocacy groups displayed similar behavior when making threat arguments. Advocacy groups began to make “China threat” arguments relatively late, in 1996-97. They took advantage of already prevalent “China threat” arguments.

The dissertation noted the presence of a group of intellectuals and practitioners centered around the office of Net Assessment and in the conservative policy community that were influential in shaping the U.S. security discourse after the Cold War. This group strongly
affected the emergence of “China threat” arguments and promoted the primacy strategy. The group was made up of individuals like Andrew Marshall, the long time director of the Office of Net Assessment in DoD and security specialists close to him. They ranged from scholars in academic institutions like Harvard and Princeton, former military officers, security specialists in defense industries and officials in the DoD. Individuals in this group interacted closely with the Project for New American Century and the Blue Team.

The individuals in the group did not represent a formal organization but acted and argued individually. Ideas were shared and spread to the greater policy making community by these individuals through informal channels. Organization theory, therefore, was not a very useful framework to explain their behavior and arguments.

5. China’s Undemocratic Nature Mattered Only After its Increase of Power

Another popular explanation for the rise of “China threat” arguments was that the United States perceived China as a threat because China was a non-democracy. Security debate in the 1990s and the 2000s focused on the dichotomy between democracies and non-democracies. “China threat” arguments often referred to China’s undemocratic nature as a source of threat. However, evidence showed that this was not a strong cause of the rise of “China threat” arguments.

One event most often cited by those who made “China threat” arguments was the Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989. However, no-one saw China as a threat in 1989. The Tiananmen Square incident and the violation of human rights were seen as a problem but not a security concern. The public lost favorable feelings towards China. But the political leaders, including President George W. Bush, were little affected by the incident and sought to
maintain good relations with China.

It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union and reports of China's rapid economic growth that China was perceived as a security threat. And it was only after a revelation of China's rise that "China threat" arguments emerged and security specialists and advocacy groups began to argue that China's undemocratic nature was a factor contributing to its threat. This suggests that the lack of democracy was not a sufficient condition to generate threat arguments.

The U.S. perception of Japan provided strong evidence against the propositions based on democratic peace theory. The United States viewed Japan, a democracy, as a potential threat in the late-1980s to the early-1990s. During this period, there were also arguments that held Japan was not a real democracy. "Japan threat" arguments subsided after the slow-down of Japan's economy after 1992. Then, Japan was again described as a fellow democracy. These two cases suggest that a state's undemocratic nature becomes a source of threat perception only after its increased power identifies it as a potential threat.

Democratic peace theory explained some aspects of the rise of "China threat" arguments. One was the perception of China's propensity to use force. Another was China's negative reactions to U.S. promotion of democracy. The propensity to use force was an important factor shaping threat perception. Many "China threat" arguments inferred China's propensity to use force from its undemocratic nature. The perceived lack of preference for negotiated settlements — which is believed to originate from democratic norms — and the lack of structural constraints on decision-makers were seen to result in a propensity to use force. China was also perceived to react negatively to U.S. efforts to spread democracy to the world, especially in China.
In some cases, it seems that China’s undemocratic nature was exaggerated to win support for the threat argument. But in other cases, proponents of “China threat” arguments seemed to truly think that China’s undemocratic nature was a source of threat. It is not clear why this was so. Although the dissertation found that China’s undemocratic nature was not sufficient to cause threat arguments, and the Japan case showed that being a democracy does not exclude a country from being perceived as a threat, it did not solve this puzzle. A study of the influence of democracy on threat perception and power would increase our understanding of democracies’ threat perception of non-democracies.

II. EXPLAINING THE RISE OF “CHINA THREAT” ARGUMENTS IN JAPAN

1. Increase of Relative Power and Challenge to Primacy

The Japan case showed similar mechanisms. The increase in China’s relative power was an important cause of the rise of “China threat” arguments. Security specialists and policy makers in Japan perceived the rise of China’s military power as a source of threat. The double-digit growth of China’s defense budget caused alarm. The first official statement of a “China threat” argument was when a Foreign Minister expressed concerns to Chinese leaders in 1994 about China’s defense buildup.

Compared to the U.S. case, however, Japan reacted less acutely to the increase in China’s long-term aggregate power. Japan perceived China’s increased power as source of potential threats in the short-term. Japan was less worried about China assuming primacy. For the most part in the 1990s, Japan was more concerned about its relations with the United States than about China’s threat.
2. Lack of Strategic Safety-net

The disappearance of the strategic safety-net was an important cause for the rise of “China threat” arguments in Japan. The lack of strategic safety-net changed the behavior of both states. China’s behavior became more self-interested and less accommodating to Japan’s interests and demands. This led to a perception of aggressive intentions. Preexisting problems that were restrained during the Cold War reemerged, undermining Japan-China relations.

For example, China’s threat to the offshore islands and the surrounding sea was perceived as a threat in 1971 before Japan began its normalization process with China in 1972. The issue was not a cause of concern during the Cold War. But it reemerged in 1992 and remained central to “China threat” arguments in Japan.

At the same time, without the safety-net, Japan changed its perception of China’s intentions. Without the Soviet threat, Japan perceived China’s military buildup with wariness. During the 1980s, Chinese military power was seen to counter the Soviet forces and to improve Japan’s security. After the Cold War, it was seen as a force that could be used against Japan. It was reasoned that now that the Soviet threat no longer existed, China faced no external threat and therefore China’s military buildup must be offensive in purpose.

Compared with the U.S. case, the impact of the absence of the strategic safety-net was larger in the Japan case. This seems to have been caused by geographic proximity. China’s nuclear weapons and conventional weapons that could not threaten the United States could reach Japan. However this did not cause threat perception during the Cold War. “China threat” arguments were absent because Japan perceived China’s intention to be benign back then. Japan also resisted making “China threat” arguments to maintain good bilateral relations which were considered important in balancing the Soviet Union.
3. Organizations were Trend Followers Not Threat Initiators

Organizational interests were not the major cause of the rise of "China threat" arguments in Japan. Japanese organizations, like U.S. organizations, were followers of the prevalent mood among the elite and the public rather than initiators of "China threat" arguments. As predicted by organization theory, Japanese defense organizations sought to maintain their organizational interests after the Cold War. However, they found arguments other than "China threat" arguments to preserve their size and wealth. The defense organizations focused on a residual and resurgent Soviet/Russia threat and the North Korean threat. At the same time, they argued that the Cold War force structure was not based on threat-based assessment and resisted the down-sizing of forces. After China's threat to the Senkaku Islands became widely accepted among the public, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and the three services made "China threat" arguments to justify new weapon systems and the transformation of the forces.

4. A Strategy to Maximize Options as a Restraint on "China threat" Arguments

A major difference between the rise of "China threat" arguments in Japan and the United States was that "China threat" arguments were more restrained in Japan in the early- to mid-1990s. "China threat" arguments in Japan only surged after 2000. This occurred because while Japan was uncertain of its relations with the United States, it sought to maintain the option of building a cooperative relationship with China. This flexibility restrained Japanese behavior and its "China threat" arguments.

Again, relative power seems to offer an explanation for the difference between Japan and the United States. While the United States made threat arguments about the potential challenger to U.S. primacy, Japan had to reposition itself between a preponderant United States
and a rising China. The reconsolidation of the alliance with the United States occurred when Japan was no longer in the position to challenge the United States after its economy stalled. Japan seems to have made a choice to be a close ally of the United States to reap the fruit of its hegemony. Japan also increasingly saw itself as one of the biggest beneficiaries of the current international system. The U.S.-Japan reconsolidation in the late-1990s decreased the incentive for Japan to suppress "China threat" arguments. As a result, a rapid increase of "China threat" arguments occurred after 2000.

III. CONTRIBUTION TO UNDERSTANDING OF THREAT ARGUMENTS

1. Relative Power as a Determinant of Intentions

An examination of the rise of "China threat" arguments in the United States and Japan suggested that the relative power of states matters greatly to the rise of threat arguments. The U.S. and Japanese perception of China's threat and the U.S. perception of Japan were driven by increased relative power.

I have shown in this dissertation that realism speaks more to the perception of intentions than the literature has recognized. Relative power, actual and perceived, strongly affects intentions. The concept of a strategic safety-net is also important to understanding threat perception. States bound by a common enemy restrain self-interested behavior that could weaken the coalition and aid the adversary. Changes in the distribution of power impact the safety-net. The decrease in the relative power of the adversary undermines the alliance, leading to self-interested behavior.

The distribution of power also strongly influences perceived intentions. When there is a common enemy, as explained in the above paragraph, a state assumes that the intentions of an
ally are benign. With the fraying of the safety-net, intentions are perceived with suspicion and lead to the perception of aggressive intentions.

A classic work on threat perception by David Singer noted that threat perception is a function of perceived capability and perceived intentions. This axiom has long been used as a basis of threat assessment and studies of threat perception. In the practical world, security specialists and practitioners have sought to analyze capabilities and intentions separately. However, this dissertation showed that capabilities and intentions are linked. My argument is similar but distinct from the proposition that “capabilities shape intentions,” expressed by scholars like Fareed Zakaria. His argument was that greater wealth enables the state to pursue greater goals and thus shapes intention. While I do not disagree, my argument is that even without an increase of absolute power, if the distribution of power in the international system changes, it could generate changes in intentions and perceptions of intentions.

A work on threat perception by Raymond Cohen finds that recent events greatly affect threat perception. This was true in the cases examined here. The United States and Japan perceived China’s intentions through its behavior. However, the case also showed that events were perceived differently depending on China’s relative power. Relative power determined how states behave and how states perceive each other. Similar behavior and capabilities are interpreted differently without the strategic safety-net.

Because states have been known to worry about their relative power, I deduced that the top state would perceive the rise of the number two power as a threat. This was supported by the empirical evidence. I also deduced that the number two power would perceive the rise of the

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number three power as threatening rather than worry about the number one power. This was refuted by the evidence. Japan was much more concerned about its relations with the United States than about China. It could either be that the original deduction was incorrect or that there is a hidden factor at play. The examination of explanations based on organizational interests and democratic peace theory suggest that these are not the hidden factor. Therefore, it seems more likely that the deduction was incorrect. Although states are concerned with their relative power, this concern seems to have the most influence on states when they seek or maintain the top position. Their concern about being third or fourth seems to matter less. As balance of power theory posits, both Japan and China were primarily interested in their relationship with the strongest power, the United States.

2. Paths for Future Research

First, I must ask how much of what I have found in the U.S. case is unique to the United States or to unipolar powers. The comparison of the causes of “China threat” arguments in the United States and Japan suggests that U.S. threat arguments were heavily influenced by primacy. Offensive realism seems to explain the rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States very well. It was the fear of losing primacy that drove the United States to make “China threat” arguments. “China threat” arguments in Japan were concerned much more with its actual and near-term capabilities. As we have seen, Japan was more concerned about its relations with the United States. Offensive realism better explains the rise of “China threat” arguments in the United States than in Japan.

A study on other cases involving the rise of threat arguments would increase the generalizability of the findings of this dissertation. For instance, Great Britain reacted acutely
to the rise of Russia in the 1830s-1850s. Russia was a big country with a backward economy. It lacked much of infrastructure a modern industrial state needed, but it was seen as a threat to Britain and its empire. On the other hand, Great Britain did not react acutely to the rise of Germany until the 1900s. A study into how primary powers develop threat perceptions toward rising powers would enhance our understanding of threat arguments.

Second, the dissertation did not inquire into the causes of China’s behavior and its threat perception after the Cold War. Evidence suggests that China began to see the United States as a potential threat as the United States began to change its arguments and behavior towards China. There seems to have been an interaction effect between the United States and China, as well as between Japan and China. A study of China’s threat arguments and perception would contribute to a fuller understanding of these phenomena and the two bilateral relationships.

Third, a puzzle exists regarding variance within the society. Within the United States and Japan, some made “China threat” arguments while others did not. The dissertation did not explore cases where “China threat” arguments did not occur. Identifying the factors that differentiate those that made “China threat” arguments from those that did not would increase the understanding of threat arguments.

This study did offer some clues. For example, organizations only made “China threat” arguments when they had an interest in doing so. They made “China threat” arguments when the cost was cheap and the benefit great. This was why many organizations began to make “China threat” arguments after the arguments had already gained certain recognition and support from the public and the policymakers.

Also, those who supported a confrontational policy toward China made “China threat” arguments, whereas those who supported a more accommodating policy did not. This seems
logical; those who perceived China as threat prescribed a confrontational policy, and those that did not perceive China as a threat prescribed an accommodating policy. However, at times, policy preference seems to have driven assessment. In some cases, as outlined above, preference was shaped by organizational interests. But in other cases, policy preference seemed to be shaped by preexisting beliefs about how the world works. Those who see international relations as tending to spirals of conflict were to be cautious in making threat arguments, while those who worried chiefly about deterrence failure tended to be quicker to make threat arguments. Further examination of the correlation between these worldviews and threat arguments could reveal a great deal about the perceptions of threats.

3. Contribution to the Understanding of the Unipolar World

The dissertation makes a small contribution to the understanding of the unipolar world. Unipolarity was understudied by structural realists because the world was not unipolar when the theory was developed. The dissertation studied the transition to unipolarity. In seeking to explain the emergence of “China threat” arguments, I thought deductively about how a unipolar world affects the behavior of the unipolar power (the United States) and its relationship with second tier states (China and Japan). So, although the primary objective was to explain the cases, it also served as a theory building case filling in small gaps in structural realism.

The transition from a bipolar to a unipolar world affected not only the surviving superpower but others as well. I predicted that the unipolar power would try to maintain its power position (primacy) and repel second tier states from becoming another pole. I also predicted that the unipolar power would see the strongest of the second tier states as a challenger to its primacy. The second tier states, on the other hand, would see that the unipolar power was
unchecked and worry about its aggression. These states should defend themselves by doing one of the following: (1) balancing against the unipolar power and attempting to amass enough power to form another pole, or (2) bandwagon with the unipolar power if it will let them. The relationship among second tier states is less predictable. It is likely that a second tier state will primarily be concerned about its relationship with the unipolar power and its relationship with other second tier states will be strongly influenced by that relationship.

The two cases strongly supported these predictions. The United States regarded Japan as its main target when it was potentially the strongest second tier state. U.S.-Japan relations improved and U.S.-China relations worsened when China became the strongest second tier state. Japan quickly moved to consolidate its relationship with the United States when it was given the opportunity.

IV. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

No other country in modern history has come as close to achieving hegemony as the United States today. It is natural and rational for the United States to want to maintain that position. The United States seems to have chosen to do that with the primacy strategy. The strategy forces the United States to ensure its preponderance of power. This has resulted in seeking to match its capability to a China that has not yet materialized and probably never will. This strategy guarantees that the United States will never under-react to potential threats. On the other hand, this strategy does not guarantee an optimal distribution of national and international resources. Furthermore, potential competitors are certain to imitate the successes of the primary power. Potential competitors have the advantage of developing late. So, even if China initially had no intention of realizing RMA, it could theoretically do so when it saw U.S.
successes realizing it.

The study has shown that “China threat” arguments were sometimes used to promote the U.S. primacy strategy. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) released in February 2006 has confirmed the basic tenets of the February draft of the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance. The 2006 QDR wrote:

It [the United States] will also seek to ensure that no foreign power can dictate the terms of regional or global security. It will attempt to dissuade any military competitor from developing disruptive or other capabilities that could enable regional hegemony or hostile action against the United States or other friendly countries, and it will seek to deter aggression or coercion. Should deterrence fail, the United States would deny a hostile power its strategic and operational objectives.4

Thus the primacy strategy which had to be modified to be publicly accepted in 1992 was endorsed in 2006. The QDR report also identifies China as the major competitor.

Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantage absent U.S. counter strategies.5

The primacy strategy requires that the United States continue to prepare itself to fight major powers in the future. If the primacy strategy succeeds and China is dissuaded, another target may be necessary to sustain U.S. primacy.

However, threat arguments involve costs. This was why we observed a suppression of “China threat” arguments in Japan in the early- to mid-1990s, and a decline of “China threat” arguments in the United States after the September 11 terrorist attacks. States forsake possibilities of cooperative relations by making threat arguments. The opportunity costs and benefits of making threat arguments have to be weighed carefully.

The study found that in many cases, military organizations were not the initiators of threat arguments but were followers. This means that once threat arguments gain certain currency in

5 Ibid., p. 29.
the policy making community, threat arguments are more likely to be used to further organizational interests.

More than a decade has passed since the rise of “China threat” arguments in the early-1990s. When the arguments started, some argued that “China threat” arguments were a fad, soon to disappear. However, “China threat” arguments increased in magnitude and intensity, and seem to be on the rise again in the United States and in Japan today. History suggests that there might be an increase of “China threat” arguments in the future. As “China threat” arguments gained currency, more organizations made “China threat” arguments. This has resulted in a spread of “China threat” arguments and a deterioration of relations between the United States and China — and Japan and China. This trend is likely to continue. Both in Washington and in Tokyo, “China threat” arguments have become easier to make. This will increase the incentives to make “China threat” arguments and decrease the incentives to argue against the “China threat.”

Finally, we can infer from the cases that China will perceive the United States and Japan as threats. The United States has aggregate and military power far beyond China’s. Japan, while no longer developing rapidly and lacking some critical military capabilities, also exceeds China’s power in several areas. In addition, the combined power of the United States and Japan far exceeds that of China. Without the strategic safety-net provided by the Soviet threat, China is likely to view the United States and Japan as threats.

This notion that China may be acting based on insecurity is often forgotten in policy debates. China is seen to act on its own initiative rather than reacting to U.S. or Japanese actions. It should be remembered that past wars have sometimes occurred when the stronger power felt insecure about the rise of a weaker power. If China has learned this lesson, it should
be very worried about the United States and Japan. It is important to remember that “China threat” arguments that are intended to increase domestic support for security strategies have audience in China and elsewhere. The consequences of making threat arguments should be assessed and security dilemmas minimized.
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