An Analysis of the Impact of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 on the Congressional Committee Assignment Process

by

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ABSTRACT

With the passage of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), a flurry of research has been conducted on the impact on political parties. However, there exists a gap in the research regarding the impact of the legislation on the role of Members as fundraisers for their parties. What impact did BCRA have on the size and significance of contributions from Members of Congress to party committees and candidates? Furthermore, are Member contributions significant in determining a Member’s likelihood of transferring to a committee and is this effect amplified post-BCRA?

This thesis provides historical data on the importance of Member contributions from 1996 to 2004 and then turns to determining what, if any, impact financial prowess has on a Member’s likelihood to advance upwards in the committee hierarchy.

The principal findings of this research are twofold. First, money matters because BCRA cut soft money, therefore political parties have turned to their Members to serve as vital sources of campaign funds. Second, Member contributions do not significantly impact or influence a Member’s probability of transferring to a more prestigious committee. In fact, Member contributions were only significant for the Democratic Party in the era prior to BCRA (105th – 108th Congresses).

Member’s transfer are shown to be more of a tradeoff between opportunities which exist for moving up the committee hierarchy based on available vacancies and opportunity costs exhibited through a Member’s current set of committee assignments. Factors such as a Member’s seniority in the chamber and their party loyalty voting scores are also important considerations depending on their party affiliation and seniority on their current committee assignments.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The 2003-2004 election was the first cycle after the passage of the McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA). The political party’s fundraising committees, specifically the Congressional Campaign Committees (CCCs) were the organizations most directly affected by the passage of the legislation as they had relied heavily on unlimited contributions of “soft-money” that were outlawed in provisions set forth by BCRA (Corrado, 2006). Although the 2004 election does not yield enough information to be able to determine the long term impact of reform legislation on the political parties, it does however offer a glimpse of the changing landscape in campaign finance. This thesis is the culmination of an earlier work, which examined the impact of BCRA on the size and significance of contributions from Members of Congress (Members) to party committees and candidates and of new research that analyzes the impact of Member contributions on the committee assignment process.

The recent research on campaign finance has focused on the change in party fundraising strategies, the implications for competitiveness in incumbent races, or debating the constitutionality of the legislation (see Corrado, 2006; Dwyre and Kolodny, 2006; Lowenstein, 2004; Overton, 2004; Smith, 2004). While these questions are of significance, the larger question is what impact the legislation has had on the political parties? Furthermore, how have the parties dealt with the additional limitations set forth in BCRA and how have Members of Congress adapted?

This thesis will test two hypotheses:

1. Demonstrations of party loyalty through increased contributions to party committees and colleagues’ campaigns will increase the probability of party leadership granting a Member’s request for a committee transfer.

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1 This is a small sampling of the relevant literature; see the review of literature for a more comprehensive overview of the significant work on BCRA.
2. Campaign contributions to party committees and colleagues’ campaigns will be more significant in determining Member committee transfers post-BCRA.

This analysis is broken down into five components. First, I will present a review of the significance of soft money for the national parties and the Congressional Campaign Committees in elections from 1996-2004. Second, I will examine the trends in total Member contributions through their campaign accounts and Leadership PACs from 1996-2004, as well as the trends in Member contributions to the NRCC and the DCCC. Third, I will comment on the increasing significance of Leadership PACs and the significant role they will play in the post-BCRA campaign finance environment. Fourth, I will review the role of the Congressional Campaign Committees in funding races for incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates as well as the role of incumbents in funding races for challengers. Fifth, I will examine the impact of Member contributions to party committees and colleagues’ campaigns on the committee assignment process. Through these evaluations, I will seek to test the two hypotheses posed above and to provide guidance for further research in this area.

This thesis is laid out as follows: first a review of the relevant literature on the history of campaign finance reform, the role of Member’s as contributors, and the value of committee assignments; next an overview of the methods and approach used to gather and analyze data; then the data and the results obtained; and finally a discussion of the implications with suggestions for further inquiry. This research is significant because it explores the potential unanticipated consequences of campaign finance reform. While the reformers goals might have been to limit the influence of money in politics, the opposite could have resulted; BCRA could have created a system where Members are expected to contribute financially to party committees and colleagues to secure transfers to exclusive committees.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW

There are three distinct literatures that warrant mention in the context of this thesis. First, the literature focusing on campaign finance reform, specifically the legal and political implications of reform. While this literature draws its origins in the early 20th century, this review will focus on works published after 1970 starting with the passage of the Federal Elections Campaign Act through the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002.2 Second, the literature on the growth of financial contributions from Members of Congress starting with the works of Ross Baker and Clyde Wilcox in the late 1980s. Third, a brief review of the work on the committee assignment process, specifically the work on developing a hierarchal ranking of the Congressional committees. The review of these three distinct literatures provides an overview of the current research on these topics and validates the use of the variables utilized in my analysis.

A. CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM

Campaign finance has changed dramatically over the past century going from a system that was largely unregulated and potentially corrupt, to a heavily regulated system which is scrutinized by the government, the media, and the public. The debate about limiting campaign contributions began in the early 20th century; however, the first comprehensive success at reform started with the reforms of the 1970s and with the creation of the Federal Election Commission.

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The Federal Elections Campaign Act and Amendments

Against the backdrop of raising campaign costs and public calls for accountability for politicians, Congress passed the 1971 Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA). FECA was the first successful attempt at reform since the 1925 Corrupt Practices Act and provided for meaningful public disclosure, limits on media expenditures for candidates for federal office, and an income tax check-off section allowing citizens to contribute to a public fund for presidential candidates. (Moore, Preimesberger, and Tarr 2001).

After the Watergate scandal in the early 1970’s, Congress made a second attempt at reform, this time enacting a series of amendments which serve as the long-lasting legacy of FECA. The new law repealed some of the 1971 stipulations and broke new ground on contribution and expenditure limits to federal candidates. The Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 had a number of significant and controversial provisions (Herrnson 2001). These provisions included:

- **Established Expenditure Limits**: Overall spending limits (e.g. $70,000 for House candidates), limits on candidate resources, on media expenditures, and independent expenditures.

- **Established Contribution Limits**: Individuals $1,000/candidate/election (primary/general), PACs $5000/candidate/election, cap on total contributions individuals can make to all candidates $25,000, and cap on “spending on behalf of candidate” by parties.

- **Established the Federal Election Commission**, which should receive disclosure reports and implement FECA. Two board members should be appointed by the President, two by Congressional Leaders, and all must be approved by the House and Senate.

- **Public Funding for Presidential Elections**, with spending limits in exchange for full public funding during general election.

- **Disclosure** of all expenditures and contributions over $100.
• Outlawed direct contributions to candidates from corporations or labor unions, allowing these interests to form political action committees to raise and disperse money to candidates for electoral purposes.

• Allowed state and local party committees to implement grassroots campaign activities, without counting towards federal contribution/spending limits. A 1979 amendment allowed state and local parties to use nonfederal soft money to fund voter registration drives and mobilization efforts in connection with federal elections. Soft money could also be used to distribute “bumper stickers, yard signs, slate cards, and other paraphernalia that make reference to federal candidates and are associated with volunteer efforts”.

As soon at the new law was enacted, it was challenged in court on the grounds that limits on expenditures and contributions curtailed freedom of speech and expression. In 1976, in Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court decided to uphold contribution limits and reporting requirements, while it struck down limitations on expenditures, noting that they were acceptable only if they were a precondition for public financing such as the funding provided for Presidential candidates (Stewart 2001). Specifically, they struck down the clause limiting expenditures by candidates or political groups, while also ruling that limitations on the amount a candidate could contribute to their own campaign were unconstitutional. For many years after the Buckley v. Valeo decision the system of robust disclosure and limits on contributions functioned as anticipated. However, during the late 1980s and early 1990s the system began to erode, until 1996, when another landmark decision changed the political landscape and allowed for the introduction of soft money into the mainstream federal elections process.

In the case Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme Court ruled that political parties have the same rights as other organizations to make independent expenditures on behalf of Federal candidates. The Court
rejected the idea that all party expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
candidate must automatically be treated as coordinated expenditures as a matter of law (Malbin,
2004). This decision paved the way for the free flow and increased importance of soft money
expenditures from the 1996 elections onward; it was the turning point of the phenomenon of
spending soft money on behalf of Federal candidates that spiraled out of control over the 1998,
2000, and 2002 elections cycles eventually leading to BCRA.

Despite repeated calls for reform throughout the 1990s and the increasing role of soft
money and political action committees, it took nearly thirty years for another comprehensive
reform bill to be passed. With the political weight of Senator John McCain and Senator Russell
Feingold, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 passed in early 2002. This legislation
was created to address the rising problem of unregulated donations of soft money to national
parties, which were originally intended for party-building activities, but later become avenues
through which the parties would funnel special interest money to assist federal candidates (Grant
2004).

In 1996, the six major campaign committees raised an unprecedented $360 million in soft
money, nearly four times that of 1992 ($86 million). In 2000, it reached a startling $539 million. Interest groups and advocacy organizations, such as the AFL-CIO, also contributed significantly
to running issues ads, with funds from soft money donations from sources that did not have to be disclosed. These actions all but rendered FECA useless through bypassing contribution limits by permitting candidates to raise soft money for party accounts, allowing corporate and labor union contributions to pay for candidate specific advertising, and not adhering to the same disclosure regulations set forth for hard money donations (Malbin 2003).

3 See the data and results chapter for a comprehensive overview of the role of soft money in Congressional elections from 1996-2004.
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002

Therefore, reformers gained enough support after the 2000 elections cycle to start to push for serious changes to the landscape of fundraising for federal elections. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act included the following provisions:

- **National Party Committees & Soft Money**
  - **Total Ban on National Party Soft Money**: Soft money fundraising and spending is banned; National Parties and Congressional Committees may raise and spend only hard money for any purpose.
  - **Levin Amendment - Limited State and Local Party Soft Money Exception for Voter Registration/GOTV**: Exception made for state/local parties' funding of generic voter registration and GOTV, which may be funded with soft money limited to $10,000 per source if permissible under state law. Contributors may include corporations and labor unions, if state law permits.
  - **Voter Registration and GOTV**-by national parties must be funded by hard money.

- **Issue Ads/Electioneering**
  - Defines "electioneering communication" to include broadcast, cable, or satellite advertisements that refer to a clearly identified candidate within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary, and which are "targeted."
  - "Targeting:" Broadcast advertisement is targeted if it can be received by 50,000 or more persons in the congressional district or state where the election is being held.
  - **Party Issue Ads**: National Committees may raise and spend only hard money for any purpose, including "electioneering."
  - **Corporate/Union "Electioneering" Issue Ads Prohibited**, except as express advocacy through a PAC.
  - **"Electioneering" Issue Ads by Non-Profits/PACs**, prohibited by any organization that accepts corporate or labor contributions.

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Disclosure of Issue Ads: requires disclosure of funding sources.

- Contribution Limits: Hard & Soft Money
  - Individual Contributions to Candidates: $2000 per election from individuals to candidates for any federal office, indexed for inflation.
  - Individual Contributions to Parties: $25,000 per year per party committee, within the aggregate limit for national parties, indexed for inflation.
  - Millionaire Opponent Provision (Variable Contribution Limit): Increases contribution limits for Congressional candidates facing self-financed candidates on sliding scale.\(^5\)

- Coordination defined: Defines coordination as a payment made in cooperation with, at the suggestion of, or per an understanding with a candidate, candidate's agent or campaign, or party.

As with the Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments in 1974, there was an immediate court challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. In the fall of 2003, the Supreme Court issued a decision on *McConnell v. Federal Elections Commission*. The McConnell decision is by far the most crucial in the arena of campaign finance since the *Buckley v. Valeo* decision. It was the first constitutional test to the new act that challenged the restrictions on soft money as a violation of first amendment rights. In ruling, the Court upheld the major provisions of the act including (Smith 2004):

- **An “independent” expenditure** was defined as an uncoordinated communication using words of express advocacy, such as “vote for” or “vote against” a candidate, communicated through any medium at any time.
- **Coordinated expenditures** are the equivalent of contributions.
- **Independent expenditures**—uncoordinated express advocacy at any time and through any medium—may not be limited but disclosure is required.

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\(^5\) See the Campaign Finance Institute Electronic Guide to Campaign Finance Reform for additional information about the variables considered in the sliding scale. Available at: [http://www.cfinst.org/eguide/index.html](http://www.cfinst.org/eguide/index.html)
• **Electioneering** (uncoordinated, targeted, candidate-specific broadcast advertising that does not contain words of express advocacy, and that appears within 60 days of a general election and 30 days of a primary) must be disclosed and may not be financed directly or indirectly from corporate or labor treasury money.

• **Receipts or expenditures** for any purpose by a political committee covered by the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) must be disclosed, and all of the committee’s receipts must satisfy FECA’s contribution limits.

However, the Court overturned the provision of BCRA that required political parties to choose between coordinated and independent expenditures after nominating a candidate. This brief overview of FECA and BCRA provides a basis by which this thesis will proceed to analyze the impact of BCRA on Member contributions to Political Parties. The next section will examine the literature on Member contributions over the past twenty years.

**B. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AS CONTRIBUTORS**

The second relevant literature that warrants mention in this thesis is the work conducted on campaign contributions from Members of Congress. For much of the 20th century political scientists have studied the role of money in politics seeking to explain what, if any, impact monetary contributions have on the political process. This section seeks to address a small subset of that literature, which has only recently emerged; a subset focused on the significance of contributions from Members of Congress.

Given the recent changes in campaign finance legislation, namely the implementation of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Member contributions are becoming increasingly important in funding quality challengers, incumbent Members, and the Congressional Campaign Committees. This section of the literature review examines the relevant research on Member
contribute to political candidates through two avenues: personal campaign accounts and Leadership PACs. All Members have a personal campaign account, while only a subset of Members have Leadership PACs, mostly those who are in positions of power in the House such as committee chairs or party leaders (Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson 2004).

Leadership PACs have a peculiar history that began with the passage of the Federal Elections Campaign Act (and amendments) of the 1970s. FECA allowed for the formation of corporate multi-candidate PACs with a contribution limit of $5,000 per candidate per election, with no cumulative overall limit. This created the opportunity for Members to form their own
political action committees, which allowed them to contribute significantly to their colleague’s campaign efforts (Baker 1989).

From 1978 to 1989, approximately 50 Leadership PACs were created, according to Ross Baker (1989), who was one of the first political scientists to examine Leadership PAC contributions. In 1986, Leadership PACs contributed $3.5 million, an average of approximately $70,000 each compared with the $140 million given by the other 4,100 PACs, an average of approximately $34,000 each. Over the past decade, according to the Center for Responsive Politics, the number of Leadership PACs grew from 120 in 1998 to 234 currently registered with the Federal Elections Commission. Additionally, in comparison to 80 other industries such as the automotive industry, Leadership PACs currently rank 7th in contributions to federal candidates up from 17th in 1998. These numbers provide a demonstration of the increasing significance of contributions from Member-affiliated Leadership PACs to party committees and candidates for Congress.

The second source of potential contributions, which has been significant throughout the 20th century, is a Member’s personal campaign account. Through their personal campaign accounts, Members can contribute $2,000 per election for Federal candidates ($1,000 per election prior to BCRA). In addition, Members are allowed to transfer unlimited funds from their personal campaign accounts to party committees, a practice which has been deemed as collecting Member “dues”.

Contributing to a colleague’s campaign effort is not a new phenomenon. In fact, in 1914 the US House of Representatives determined that the Pendleton Act did not restrict incumbent contributions to or raising money on behalf of congressional candidates for office. This was first practiced explicitly in the 1940s with Sam Rayburn who used his ties to Texas oil to aid
Democratic candidates (Wilcox 1989). This practice continued with Democrat Hale Boggs of Louisiana who contributed his excess campaign funds, known as cash-on-hand, to colleagues who were in need of financial assistance. Members initially used these contributions to gain the good will of their colleagues, but starting in the late 1970s, began to explicitly use them to gain favors, such as support from colleagues in leadership contests or backing for certain legislation (Baker 1989; Wilcox 1990).

In 1989, Clyde Wilcox was amongst the first to write about the use of Member to Member contributions to gain favor from colleagues. In 1984, 238 Members of Congress made contributions to other Congressional candidates totaling over $1 million, while in 1988, 249 Members contributed approximately $1.4 million (Wilcox 1989). The majority of these contributors gave to only a few candidates, the median being three, however a few contributors were very active; 28 Members gave to over 10 candidates for the House.

In addition to giving to colleagues, Members have contributed to party committees which help to redistribute funds to candidates. In fact, in the 1991-1992 election cycle the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) began to formally solicit “dues” from Members. The National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) followed by instituting Member “dues” in the 1993-1994 election cycle (Herrnson 2000; Heberlig and Larson 2005a). In 2004, the DCCC required Members to contribute anywhere from $70,000 to $400,000 depending on their committee appointments, level of seniority, and leadership positions. In 2002, the average contribution per Member for the DCCC was $20,000, significantly less than the dues in 2004. In 2004, the NRCC collected “dues” ranging from $6,000 to $25,000 per Member, while the “dues” collected in 2002 were comparable (Dwyre and Kolodny 2006).
Member contributions to party committee are becoming increasingly significant, especially after the passage and implementation of BCRA. Malbin and Bedlington (2002) showed that nearly 15% of the total receipts for the NRCC and the DCCC came from Member’s personal campaign committees and Leadership PACs in the 2000 election cycle. Larson (2004) explored contributions to the NRCC showing that in 1991-1992; only two Republicans contributed a total of $10,000 to the NRCC, while in the 1999-2000 cycle, 190 Republicans contributed over $15 million to the NRCC. Larson speculated that the increases reflected two factors: first, more Members were giving to the campaign committees because contributions are important to the political parties, second, Members are contributing larger sums of money, likely because of the institutionalization of Member “dues”.

Member contributions through personal campaign accounts to party committees and to colleagues through Leadership PACs have grown significantly over the decade of the 1990s. What accounts for this increase in contributions? What are the motivations for Members which has caused such an increase in Member-to-Member and Member-to-Party contributions in the past decade?

Motivations for Member Contributions

Clyde Wilcox (1990) speculated that Members who contribute large sums through their personal campaign accounts, who fundraise on behalf of candidates, and who contribute through Leadership PACs have three clear goals, which are identical to Fenno’s (1973) goals for Members: to maximize their prospects for re-election, to enhance their power in Washington, and to make good public policy. In addition to these goals, I’ve identified three additional
motivations that result from these goals that warrant mention in this review: majority status, leadership positions and committee assignments, and ideology.⁶

For the goal of election, Wilcox (1990) explores how Members use Leadership PACs as a part of their strategy for election to higher office, such as the Senate or even the Presidency. For the goal of power, Wilcox speculates that financial contributions are used to gain influence, although he admits that extensive empirical analysis is not possible given the secretive nature of the ballots for party and committee leadership posts. However, he is able to confirm through data from the Federal Elections Commission that those who rise to party leadership positions tend to be those who contribute and fundraise for the party and for their colleagues, and once elected as a leader, continue to contribute financially and are amongst the largest contributors. For the goal of good public policy, there are two ways a Member can achieve this end. First, they can contribute to colleagues or candidates who have similar ideologies and who would likely support their positions on certain legislation. Second, they can give to incumbents and non-incumbents to build up political favors. While there are strong correlations between the ideology of contributing Members and recipients, Wilcox finds that most Members give to candidates regardless of ideology, providing support for the second of the two avenues through which Members can achieve the goal of making good public policy (Wilcox 1989).

Heberlig and Larson (2005b), agree with Fenno and Wilcox and highlight the fact that while Members could win re-election on their own, their goals of power and good public policy have to be accomplished through the political parties, especially as they have grown in power in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Therefore, they argue, Members have to contribute financially

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⁶ Note: The data analysis portion of this thesis only focuses on addressing the motivation of committee assignments in a Member’s decision to contribute to their colleagues and their party committees.
not only to colleagues to benefit their own stature, but also to party committees for the collective
good of the party.

Wilcox (1989), Currinder (2003), Malbin and Bedlington (2002), and Heberlig and Larson (2005b) speculate that Members contribute as a means to ensure the collective goal of
majority status, as majority status is a necessary prerequisite for ensuring institutional power and for promoting particular public policies. Wilcox (1990), as described previously, shows that
large sums of money are contributed by party leaders who have the motivation of maintaining
their status in the chamber by maintaining the party majority or in the case of the minority, by
working towards a majority to obtain the benefits of this status. Therefore, leaders contribute a
significant share of their total contributions to those Members who are in close races that have
the potential to lose their seat or to challengers who could gain a seat.\footnote{In the Data and Results section, Chapter IV, I analyze the significance of contributions from incumbents to challengers and the changing role of incumbent Members in funding Congressional campaigns for challengers.}

Malbin and Bedlington (2002) find that in the 1998 and 2000 elections; most top givers
were secure in their leadership posts and contributed mostly as a means to fight for the majority.
Heberlig and Larson (2005b), show that throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, especially
after the passage of BCRA, that the redistribution of excess campaign funds has increased
because of the close partisan margins and the attempts by the Democrats to retake the House.
They show that while there are close margins in the House that both parties will lean on their
Members to contribute excess cash through their personal campaign accounts and Leadership
PACs to incumbents or challengers in an effort to secure or maintain the majority. Therefore
given the close margins in Congress, in the short run, Member contributions are likely to continue to rise.

In addition to majority status, Members contribute to secure desirable committee assignments or in pursuit of leadership positions in the party hierarchy or in committees (Baker 1990, Wilcox 1989, Currinder 2003, Malbin and Bedlington 2002, Herberlig and Larson 2005b, Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson 2003, Pearson 2001, Heberlig 2003). The changing campaign finance landscape and the close partisan margins of the 1990s have caused the parties to develop mechanisms to encourage Member contributions, one of the most important being committee assignments and leadership posts.

In 1971, the House changed the way committee chairs were chosen, allowing anonymous approval of the party caucus by secret ballot; in 1973, the Democrats voted to have the members of each committee vote on the subcommittee’s chairs and budgets, therefore Members had a motivation to win favor amongst their colleagues (Baker 1990). The reforms of the 1970s made it easier to challenge dictatorial or out-of-touch committee leaders and subcommittee autonomy lead to real contests for committee leadership positions (Baker 1990). Currinder (2003) examines whether contribution trends changed depending on who is in the majority posing the question: did trends change amongst Democrats and Republicans after the 1994 Republican victory? Currinder found that the trends were similar amongst the parties, what mattered was whether or not the party was in the majority. Therefore regardless of party status, Currinder concludes, Members who aspire to positions of leadership will focus contributions on incumbents to gain their favor in future leadership races.

In 2000, House Speaker Dennis Hastert explicitly notified Members that their contributions to party committees and colleagues would influence their committee assignments.
in the 107th Congress (Heberlig 2003). Heberlig was one of the first scholars to examine the issue of committee assignments, investigating what impact Member contributions had on committee transfers. Heberlig found that the greater amount that an incumbent contributes to party committees and colleagues; the more likely they are to transfer to exclusive committees. He found that it had little impact on their transfers from policy and constituency committees. While other scholars have speculated that contributions might affect committee assignments, Heberlig is the first and only political scientist who has empirically studied the subject at length in the recent literature.

The third and final motivation that guides Member contributions to candidates is ideology, which results from an effort of Member’s to support party leaders and candidates who share the same ideology. Kanthak (2002) finds that Members make contributions in close races to boost their personal and party ideological strength in the House. For Republicans, she finds that as the ideological distance, as measured by Poole-Rosenthal D-Nominate scores, between the Member and the recipient becomes smaller, donations from the Member’s Leadership PAC increase; as the distance between the recipient and the party’s median voter decreases, contributions from Republican’s personal campaign accounts increase. For Democrats, the distance between a Member and a recipient matters in determining Leadership PAC contributions, however the ideological proximity of the recipient to the party median is not a significant determinant of the total amount of contributions that candidates receive from Democratic Members. In addition, Kanthak finds that the major donors from each party tend to be more ideologically extreme than the typical rank and file Member. This characteristic has important implications for the consequences of the increasing Member-to-Member contributions post-BCRA.
Members contribute to party committees and colleagues for a number of reasons: to prepare for their run for higher offices, to increase their position of power within the institution, to gain favor for public policies, to pursue or sustain majority status in the House, to obtain party leadership positions or committee assignments, and finally to promote their brand of political ideology. These motivations play an important role in determining the distribution of campaign funds and have significant implications for political parties and competitiveness in House elections. In the next section, I will discuss the modes of analysis used by scholars to study the issue of Member contributions to party committees and colleagues.

**Modes of Analysis**

Early analysis of contributions from Members of Congress and Leadership PACs was limited in scope because of the relatively limited amount of data available to political scientists. In fact, there were no reporting requirements until the establishment of the Federal Election Commission in the 1970s with FECA. Even in the early years of the FEC, reporting was limited and analysis was tedious. The first comprehensive analyses of Member to Member giving and of patterns of contributions through Leadership PACs were completed in the early 1990s by Clyde Wilcox (1989, 1990) and Ross Baker (1990). These initial studies reported aggregate contributions and had limited statistical analysis to determine the factors affecting the increases in Member contributions. In fact, the issue went relatively untouched for much of the 1990s, however the close partisan margins since the Republican takeover in the 1994 elections, has caused an increasing reliance on behalf of the parties on their Members financial contributions, therefore increasing the significance and impact of Member contributions (Heberlig and Larson 2005a).
Starting with Herrnson (1997), who examines aggregate contributions from Members throughout the early 1990s, and Cox and Magar (1999), who explore the value of majority status in Congress from the point of view of PACs, scholars began to take a more systematic approach to analyzing the motivations for and the consequences of Member contributions to party committee and candidates for Congress. The typical set of independent variables that have been used in the literature include leadership positions, electoral security/closeness of election, cash on hand, party loyalty/party unity voting scores, ideological closeness, region of the Member, value of committee assignment, vacancies on committees, and committee transfers. Dependent variables utilized include the total sum of contributions to party committees and candidates through personal campaign accounts and Leadership PACs and committee transfers.

Positions of leadership are defined as elective party leadership posts (e.g. speaker, majority/minority leaders, and whips) or a committee chair (or ranking member). Larson (2004) found that elective leadership positions are statistically significant in determining a Member’s willingness to support the party’s congressional campaign committees, but that whether or not a Member held a committee chairmanship was not significant in determining their likeliness to contribute to party campaign committees.

Both Larson (2004) and Kanthak (2002) developed measures of electoral security that measured the closeness of an election. In both cases a Member was considered safe or secure if they received more than 60% of the two party vote in the previous election. For Larson (2004), electoral security was not statistically significant in his analysis of Member contributions, both safe and unsafe Members contributed to party committees and colleagues. On the other hand, Kanthak (2002) finds that those elections that are close attract significantly more contributions from Leadership PACs than those that are not close. She concludes that Leadership PACs, more
so than other PACs, are interested in contributing in electoral contests where the contribution will have the largest impact. From Larson’s analysis, it appears that Members who are in close races do not differ significantly in their contribution patterns than those Members who are not in close races; while according to Kanthak close races attract more Leadership PAC contributions than races with safe incumbents.

Party loyalty is one of the most significant determinants of contributions to party committees and colleagues campaigns. Larson (2004), Currinder (2003), and Heberlig (2003) all utilize party loyalty or party unity in their regression equations. Each uses a measure of party loyalty that is based upon a Member’s roll call voting record on a set of key votes, as identified by Congressional Quarterly. The party loyalty/unity score is derived from the number of times a Member votes in accordance with the party line on these key votes. Larson finds this measure of party loyalty to have a limited role in explaining Member contributions to party committees, and the effect is greater for Democrats than for Republicans. On the other hand, Currinder examines the subset of Members with Leadership PACs from 1992-1998, finding that those with higher party unity scores were more likely to contribute to Members’ campaigns than those with lower party loyalty scores. Currinder notes that those Members with higher party loyalty scores tend to occupy party leadership posts; therefore it is reasonable given past research that they also tend to contribute more than less loyal Members to candidates for Congress.

Heberlig (2003) takes a different approach by defining party loyalty broadly to include not only the unity voting score, but also the amount of money fundraised or contributed by a Member. Whereas in most of the other papers examined, the amount contributed was used as a dependent variable, Heberlig uses it as an independent variable that serves as a proxy for party loyalty (Heberlig’s approach will be covered at greater length in a later portion of this review).
Heberlig did find that party voting is significant at the .05 level with a coefficient of 0.25 in impacting transfers to exclusive committees for Members, which turned out to be more significant than any other independent variable he examined.

Larson (2004) utilizes a measure of the amount of cash on hand; an amount that represents the total financial resources a Member has at their disposal in their personal campaign account minus any outstanding loans at the beginning of each election cycle. Larson finds that this variable was statistically significant in determining the contribution strategies of Members. He found that the more financially sound a Member is, as measured by the amount of cash on hand, the more likely they are to contribute to party committees. Therefore those Members who occupy secure seats that are able to spend less money on their re-election campaigns, are often those who are well positioned to contribute to the party committees and thus gain leadership positions, Larson postulates.

Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson (2004), utilize a measure of ideology drawn from Poole-Rosenthal’s DW Nominate scores to examine the impact of ideologically extreme Members contributing to their colleagues. First, they demonstrate that the party’s leadership is more ideologically extreme than normal rank and file Members. Second, they discuss how these Members typically are from homogeneous districts and are less likely to face stringent re-election contests; therefore they have access to and are able to contribute more to colleagues’ campaigns. Then they pose a hypothesis that those Members who contribute more to party committees and colleague’s campaigns should be rewarded with higher leadership posts. Their analysis finds that the advantages for ideologues in fundraising and contributing do not necessarily translate into a higher likelihood of securing a party leadership post.
For Democrats, Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson find that the coefficient is negative and statistically significant indicating that the more liberal a Democrat is, the more likely they are to secure a new party leadership post in the extended party leadership organization. For Republicans, on the other hand, while the coefficient is positive as they expected, it is statistically insignificant which indicates that conservatives are no more likely to win a party post than their more ideologically moderate colleagues in the Republican Party. From this analysis, it is clear that while ideology may matter in determining party leadership in some cases, the advantages that ideologues have in fundraising do not provide them any advantage in vying for a party leadership post.

Heberlig (2003) utilizes the aggregate total of Member contributions as well as a variety of other independent variables to determine what, if any, impact Member’s contributions have on their transfers between committees. Heberlig introduces three additional independent variables into his analysis of the impact of Member contributions on committee transfers: seniority in each session of Congress, the value of current committee assignments, and finally the number of vacancies on committees in each session of Congress. The seniority of Members in each session of Congress and the number of vacancies on each committee were gathered from the CQ Almanac, while the value of current committee assignments was taken from Groseclose and Stewart (1998). He finds that those Members who already have highly valued committee assignments or those in leadership or positions of seniority in a committee are less likely to transfer to an exclusive committee, while those with less desirable assignments are most likely to switch. In addition, he finds that the variable of vacancies on committees is statistically significant in the analysis regardless of whether the vacancy is on a constituency, policy, or exclusive committee. From the review of the literature, Heberlig appears to be the first to focus
on the impact of the increase in Member contributions and to wrap total Member contributions into a measure of party loyalty, as an independent variable.

Finally, Kanthak (2002) introduces region as an independent variable in the analysis of trends in Member contributions. She hypothesizes that the region of a candidate plays an important role in determining the trends in contributions from Members. She finds that region is statistically significant in examining contributions, but only slightly, and as other papers have concluded, she finds that ideology is the most significant factor in determining the distribution of Member contributions to candidates for Congress.

Scholars have utilized a variety of independent variables in their analysis of the changing trends in Member contributions throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. Leadership positions, electoral security/closeness of election, cash on hand, party loyalty/party unity voting scores, ideological closeness, region of the Member, value of committee assignment, vacancies on committees, and committee transfers are the factors which has been examined by scholars as potential sources of influence in determining contribution strategies for Members of Congress. Eric Heberlig (2003) was amongst the first to begin to investigate the impact of increasing Member contributions on a Member’s standing in the House. He was the only scholar, I encountered in this review, who utilized Member contributions as an independent variable rather than a dependent variable. It is likely with the increasing importance of Member contributions that additional research will be conducted in this fashion, looking not only to explain the trends in Member contributions, but also the consequences.

From the papers examined, scholars have utilized two items as dependent variables: first, a measure of total contributions from Members to party committees and colleagues (see Larson 2004, Currinder 2003, Kanthak 2002, and Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson 2004) and second
committee transfers (Heberlig 2003). Total contributions represent an aggregate sum of contributions from a Member’s personal campaign account and Leadership PAC (if applicable) to a party campaign committee or a candidate for Congress. Committee transfers, as defined by Heberlig, occur whenever a Member transfers from one committee to another, usually at the beginning of a new session of Congress.

Analysis of contributions from Members of Congress has been limited and until recently, has been largely qualitative in nature. Starting in the late 1990’s as a result of the shift of power in Congress and the close partisan margins in the House, both political parties started formal programs to solicit contributions from their Members and instituted policies that rewarded Members who contribute to their colleague’s campaign efforts. As a result of these changes, Member contributions to party committees and candidates for Congress increased rapidly and scholars began to examine the motivations behind and strategies of Member to Member and Member to Party financial contributions. This section has provided a brief overview of the independent and dependent variables utilized in the significant research to date on the issue of Member contributions. The final section will discuss what the literature has covered on the consequences of Member contributions to party committees and candidates for Congress.

**Consequences of Member Contributions**

Throughout the literature scholars have speculated on the consequences of the increasing reliance of the party’s congressional campaign committees on Member contributions and the close ties between Member to Member contributions and leadership positions. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, Member contributions comprised fully 43% of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee’s total receipts, while for the National Republican
Congressional Committee Member contributions represented 28% of total contributions in the 2003-2004 election cycle. Similarly, in 2003-2004, Leadership PACs contributed a total of over $33 million to Democrats and Republicans running for office. These numbers demonstrate the increasing significance of Member contributions to parties and candidates for Congress.

In this section, I will explore three consequences of these changes. First, I will examine the impact that the increasing importance of financial contributions has had on the selection of committee and subcommittee chairs and party leadership. Second, I will provide evidence on the effects these changes have had on the strength of the political parties. Third, I will comment on the likely impact of these emerging trends on the competitiveness of Congressional elections. Finally, I will briefly comment on how I believe these consequences will change in the wake of the implementation of BCRA.

Baker and Wilcox explore many of the leadership races throughout the 1970s and 1980s to identify those races in which the outcome may have been impacted by Member contributions through Leadership PACs and personal campaign accounts. For instance, Baker (1990) and Wilcox (1990) found that contributions from personal campaign accounts and Leadership PACs, as well as assistance with fundraising for Members played a pivotal role in the election of House majority whip in 1986 and for the chair of the House Democratic caucus in 1988. However, they acknowledged that all the candidates for these positions contributed to the campaigns of their colleagues; therefore it was difficult to determine what impact these strategic donations had on these particular leadership races.

Larson (2004) raises the concern that if the Members who are pursuing leadership posts are required to raise significant sums of money for the party and their colleagues, then this requirement will change the dynamic of the House and that the leaders will become those
individuals who are the best fundraisers, not necessarily best fit for the job. He continues by
asserting that if leaders are required to fundraise, then future party leaders will be tied to special
interests, political action committees, and lobbyists, rather than to what is in the best interest of
the public.

Similarly, Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson (2004) find in their review of the party
leadership from the 101st to the 107th Congresses that leaders are much more ideologically
extreme, than typical rank and file Members. This ideological extremity, they contend, could be
a function of the growing importance of fundraising as a prerequisite for party leadership
positions. The ideologically extreme Members are typically from less heterogeneous districts and
are able to raise significant sums through ideologically-focused PACs. Therefore, they claim that
the growing polarization in Congress throughout the late 1990s is potentially a function of the
increasing importance political parties have placed on fundraising.

The growing importance of money in politics, specifically the role of Members as
fundraisers for their party and their colleagues is changing the criterion for party leadership. As
demonstrated through research by the scholars mentioned above, fundraising aptitude is an
important criterion for party leaders and may be one of the causes for the increasing polarization
in Congress.

The second area of interest has been the effect the growing importance of Member
contributions has had on the strength of the political parties. Baker (1990) noted that the
increasing number of Members who have started Leadership PACs in order to contribute to their
colleagues has caused a greater dispersal of political power within the Congress because the
congressional campaign committees are no longer the sole source of campaign funds. Therefore,
Baker argues, Member’s might become loyal to their colleagues for their assistance in
contributing campaign funds which leads to a breakdown of the centralized party system. On the other hand, Baker acknowledges, Leadership PACs are effective at raising funds from sources that cannot be tapped by the large congressional campaign committees. For instance, Leadership PACs can raise funds from individuals who support a particular type of ideology that might not be aligned with the party platforms, but that can be the focus of a particular Member’s PAC.

Wilcox (1989) agrees with Baker’s assessment of the risk the increasing role of Leadership PACs play in funding congressional campaigns. However, he highlights the fact that there are only a handful of large contributors and that they tend to be the party leaders, so he argues that in a sense these Members PACs could act as another means to centralize the authority of the party. Kanthak (2002) counters by arguing that the upcoming role and spread of Leadership PACs is creating a system in which power is fragmented amongst a number of legislators who may or may not be ideologically proximate to the political parties, a system that will likely undermine the traditional seniority system and emerge as the litmus test for power in the House.

Heberlig (2003) contends that the political parties are developing new measures of party loyalty which includes not only voting with the party, but also how much money is raised and contributed. Furthermore, in his research he has found that party leaders are using a new set of selective incentives to encourage Members to contribute to the party and their colleagues including committee assignments. He found that parties have rewarded their Members more for financial contributions since the Republican takeover in 1994, mostly because of the close partisan margins. For instance, he found that by increasing a Member’s cumulative contribution from nothing to $500,000 would increase that Members probability of transferring to an exclusive committee by 5%. While this is a small increase in the probability of transferring to an
exclusive committee, Heberlig argues, that it is significant in respect to the other variables that affect committee transfers. If the political parties are considering financial contributions in determining committee assignments, Heberlig concludes, then this could signal the strengthening of the political party’s power, not the weakening.

The literature on the issue of the impact of the growing significance of Member contributions is having on the strength of the political parties is divided. While earlier scholars argue that this trend is leading to a decentralization of power, recent scholars have provided empirical evidence that this trend may actually be helping parties to strengthen their hand and centralize power within the top leadership.

The final consequence which has been examined by scholars is the issue of the competitiveness of elections. Baker (1990) argues that the growing number of Leadership PACs is positive for competitors as they tend to distribute a higher percentage of their contributions to challengers than do typical PACs who contribute to gain influence amongst incumbent Members. Leadership PACs associated with majority Members tend to give to incumbents, while those associated with minority Members give to challengers, thus promoting greater competition. Wilcox (1989) supports Baker’s finding by reporting that in 1984 the majority of contributions made to candidates through Leadership PACs from Republicans went to non-incumbents, while the biggest recipients of Democrat’s Leadership PAC money were vulnerable freshmen Congressmen, while 40% went to non-incumbents. Based on the data reported by Baker and Wilcox, Leadership PACs of both parties give large sums to quality challengers in an effort to maintain or obtain majority status.

Currinder (2003) supports Baker and Wilcox with data from Leadership PACs throughout the 1990s. She finds that the trend of Leadership PACs contributing more to non-
incumbents than traditional PACs continues and furthermore minority party Members contribute more to open seat candidates than do Members in the majority party. On the other hand, Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson (2004) introduce evidence that contributions from Leadership PACs tend to be aimed at candidates with a particular ideological focus. Based on their analysis, the Members who have Leadership PACs tend to be senior Members of the caucus, those who are usually more ideologically extreme. Therefore, when these Members contribute they will fund the campaigns of candidates with similar ideologies. They conclude that while Leadership PACs could help to foster some additional competition, that they might have much more of a negative impact in the long term by fostering additional polarization in Congress.

In another article, Larson (2004) argues that in the short term Member contributions to political parties will encourage additional quality challengers to run for Congress. He demonstrates that since the loss of soft money, with the increasing funds provided by Members, the congressional campaign committees have redistributed funds to quality challengers thus evening the playing field. While he argues with Heberlig and Hetherington that increasing Leadership PAC contributions might have a negative impact, he argued in this paper that increasing the activities of the campaign committees would be an overall positive for the nature of competitiveness in congressional elections.

While a number of the papers I reviewed acknowledged the benefit that the non-traditional sources of funding through Members has provided to challengers; others such as Heberlig, Hetherington, and Larson (2004) cautioned that while increasing available funds for challengers may increase competitiveness, the negative side effects might be detrimental to the institution of Congress.
How will these consequences change after the implementation of BCRA? Heberlig and Larson (2005b) was the only paper I found in my review which commented on this issue. They found that in 2004, the percentage of Members contributing to the congressional campaign committees increased dramatically simply as a result of the necessity due to the loss of soft money which accounted for nearly 50% of the parties total receipts in 2000 and 2002. They noted a dramatic shift from the Members contributing to state and local parties before BCRA to contributing almost solely to the national parties after BCRA. In addition, they argued that BCRA has compounded the effects of the partisan divide of the 1990s and has actually created stronger, centralized parties that work together to coordinate and control fundraising efforts amongst their incumbent Members.

After the implementation of BCRA and the loss of soft money it is clear that the political parties are leaning more and more on their Members to contribute to the campaign committees and their fellow Member’s campaign efforts. From the literature three likely consequences have emerged. First, the political parties are relying more and more on financial prowess as a criterion for committee chairmen and party leadership. Second, the strength and power of political parties is likely becoming more centralized. Third, with the increase in funds made available through the congressional campaign committees and through Leadership PACs, the parties are funding more and more quality challengers, which is a factor leading to the increase in competitiveness in congressional elections. It is likely that given the implementation of BCRA that Member contributions will continue to and likely increase the effects of the consequences mentioned in this section.
Motivation for Further Research

This section of the literature review examined the significant trends in Member contributions over the past two decades, the motivations for Members to contribute, the methods used in research on this issue, and finally the consequences of the changing trends in Member-to-Member and Member-to-Party contributions. Through the review of this literature, I found that the number of Members and the amount contributed by them has increased significantly throughout the past twenty years. Members are motivated to contribute not only by Fenno’s three goals of re-election, power, and good public policy, but also by the pursuit of majority status, leadership posts and committee assignments, and ideology.

In studying this issue scholars have examined a variety of variables finding that until recently, those in pursuit of leadership positions or those currently occupying such positions were the major contributors to congressional campaign committees and fellow Members. However, this trend has changed with BCRA; now the number of Members contributing through their campaign committees and newly established Leadership PACs is growing rapidly. Scholars have been split over the implications of these changes, arguing that fundraising might be actively considered as a criterion for party leadership and committee chairmen, that these changes are acting to centralize power in the parties, and finally that these additional funds have increased competitiveness in congressional elections.

Despite the research conducted through the articles presented in this review, the consequences of the growing significance of Member contributions are still not well understood. Further research needs to be conducted based on the shifts in contribution strategies that have occurred post-BCRA and should examine what impact Member contributions have on their standing in Congress. In the Data and Results chapter, I will examine this issue attempting to
determine what impact BCRA has had, if any, on the importance of Member contributions in the committee transfer process.

C. THE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT PROCESS

This section reviews the relevant literature on the committee assignment process, which will provide support for the approach used in this thesis to gauge the value of a Member’s portfolio of committees. As such, this section of the literature review will concentrate on a narrow subsection of the literature on the committee assignment process that is focused on determining the value a Member places on a specific committee assignment.

The starting point for this literature is the work by Bullock and Sprague (1969), which focuses on developing a ranking of the House committees based on Member preferences that are revealed through the committee transfer process. They claim that three stratification systems govern the process of committee transfers: party seniority, committee seniority, and committee prestige, indicators that are included in my analysis in the data and results chapter.

Bullock and Sprague develop a measure of committee prestige based on the number of transfers onto a committee divided by the number of transfers plus departures from a committee. This yields a number between zero and one with the values closer to one representing greater committee prestige. They claim that this measure is independent of committee size and that its limits are known, however they acknowledging that this approach requires the use of long term data, which is a shortcoming.

They also note that as the Member’s seniority in a committee increases, they are less likely to transfer given the relationships he has built and the potential of securing a future committee chairmanship. Bullock and Sprague’s analysis shows that committee seniority has no
direct affect on obtaining a good reassignment, but that it does influence a Member’s decision process in deciding to accept or reject transfer options. They conclude that a Member’s legislative career path is charted early in their service in the chamber and that their initial committee assignments are significant in determining their subsequent legislative paths.

Finally, they find that the longer a Member has served in the chamber (chamber seniority), the more likely they are to receive a higher prestige committee transfer. Bullock and Sprague’s method, known in the literature as the transfer-ratio method serves a starting point for determining the relative values of committees. However, their approach has two significant shortcomings. First, it does not take into account the committees from which the Members transferred. Second, it does not deal with the cases when Members relinquish more than one committee assignment during the transfer process, in fact, it counts these cases as two transfers and this understates the value of the committees in relation to one another.

Munger (1988) attempts to address these shortcomings by developing the “net transfer dominance ranking”, that draws it origins in social choice theory. Munger’s approach can be summarized as follows:

1. define “net transfers” between two committees A and B as the total number who left A for B minus the total number who left B for A. Develop a matrix of net transfers from all possible committees.
2. Committee A dominates committee B if this ratio exceeds 2, in absolute value
3. If the cell associated with transfers from committee A to B is +1.0, 0, or -1.0, neither committee dominates the other, if it contains a number less than or equal to -2.0, then B dominates A, greater than or equal to +2.0, then A dominates B.
4. Break the committees into two group, undominated and the remainder, then perform this analysis on the committees in the remaining group, forming pairwise comparisons and developing net transfer ratios as well as a set of committees that are undominated and the remaining committees.
5. Continue this process until no committees dominate the others in the group of remaining committees.
6. Rank the committees within each group by using the Bullock/Sprague transfer ratio.
In comparing his results with Bullock and Sprague, he notes several significant differences between rankings, however he explains these differences by speculating that certain committees lose Members to only the most valuable committees, which is why Bullock/Sprague’s ranking differ in many cases from his set of rankings. In addition, Munger attempts to explain the differences in committee rankings over the two periods which he examines, the 80th – 91st and the 95th – 99th Congresses. He speculates that there are three potential reasons why the values of committees might change: first, institutional or jurisdictional changes in the committee system, second, membership turnover, specifically the turnover of the chairman, and third, the expansion of the number of seats on a committee. He finds the most support for the final reason, concluding that neither committee prestige nor committee expansion can be studied in isolation.

Munger’s approach however neglected to address the issue of Member’s who give up their assignment on more than one committee to receive a single seat on a more prestigious committee. In addition, Groseclose and Stewart (1998), highlight the fact that the net transfer dominance method does not solve for committee values at the same time, rather it solves for them sequentially, removing higher ranked committees first, and then ranking the “remaining” committees. Groseclose and Stewart’s 1998 study was motivated by these shortcomings in an effort to address both “null” transfers and solving for committee values simultaneously.

Groseclose and Stewart (1998) developed a method that not only addresses the issues mentioned above, but which also develops a cardinal value for each committee and reveals what they term “burden” committees. These cardinal estimates allow for a ranking of committees as well as a cumulative value of a Member’s committee assignments. This total value of a Member’s committee portfolio has helped scholars such as Heberlig (2003) to utilize a
Member’s committee assignments in statistical analysis as an independent variable in studying committee transfers.

Burden committees are those committees which Members would prefer on average not to serve, even if the alternative was no committee assignments or service on fewer committees. These committees are identified in the Groseclose Method as the committees that receive negative cardinal values. Cardinal values are important because they allow us to say that if committee A receives a ranking of 2.0 and the sum of committee B and C is 1.0, that service on committee B and C, is half as valuable as service on committee A. Finally, the Groseclose and Stewart method is the only method that adequately addresses what they term as “null” transfers, those transfers when Members give up a committee assignment for no new assignment or acquire a new committee assignment without having to sacrifice one of their current assignments. Given these improvements over past methods, the Groseclose and Stewart method of ranking committees is the ranking I chose to use in my analysis.

However, Groseclose and Stewart (1998) only ranked Congressional Committees from the 81st – 102nd which does not take into account the changes that occurred post-1994, when the Republicans regained control of Congress. Therefore, I utilized a conference paper by Edwards and Stewart (2006), which estimates the cardinal value and ranking of Congressional Committees from the 96th – 109th Congress. While the method used was identical, the rankings and the values were different. However, they concluded that the exclusive committees maintained their ranking and that while there was some shifting in the lower ranked committees, the net effect is insubstantial. Despite their initial hypothesis that the Republican takeover would weaken the value of specific committee assignments, Edwards and Stewart found that the parties
are utilizing committee assignments as an inducement for Member loyalty, thereby ensuring that committees remain a valuable commodity in Congress.

The research on congressional committee assignments is quite extensive; however for the purposes of this thesis, I focused on the significant literature which has provided a rationale for the use of committee seniority, chamber seniority, and committee prestige (or value) in the assessment of Member transfers in Congress. Although this research does not directly correlate with my focus, I will use the values that Edwards and Stewart (2006) obtained for the 96th – 109th Congresses to establish a value for Member’s cumulative committee portfolios and use this value in my analysis of Member transfers.⁸

This review has provided an overview of the research that is relevant and necessary to provide a theoretical basis for my work. This thesis draws equally from all three literatures to develop a research design to study the impact of BCRA on Member contributions vis-à-vis committee transfers. The following section will explore this research design as well as define a series of variables for analysis that have been utilized in previous the research presented within this review.

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⁸ See the Methods and Study Design section for a comprehensive overview of study design and variable definition.
III. METHODS AND STUDY DESIGN

The central question this thesis seeks to address is what impact the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 had on the importance of Member contributions to their colleagues’ campaigns and party committees? I seek to analyze how valuable Member contributions are and what role these contributions play in the decision making process about committee transfer requests. To address this question I developed a study with two focuses, first to determine the significance of Member contributions to party committees and candidates for Congress, and second, to determine what impact monetary contributions have on a Member’s transfer request. Are Member’s who contribute actively to party committees and their colleagues campaigns more likely to transfer upwards in the committee hierarchy or to an exclusive committee?9

This thesis aims to test two hypotheses:

1. Demonstrations of party loyalty through increased contributions to party committees and colleagues’ campaigns will increase the probability of party leadership granting a Member’s request for a committee transfer.
2. Campaign contributions to party committees and colleagues’ campaigns will be more significant in determining Member committee transfers post-BCRA.

For the purposes of this paper, committee transfers are assumed to be upwards in the committee hierarchy as ranked by Edwards and Stewart (2006).

I make this assumption knowing that Members of Congress have the option of transferring and will likely not transfer to a less prestigious committee or take a new assignment if it reduces their overall committee portfolio value. In addition, this study is limited to the time period encompassing the 105th – 109th Congresses. I chose to limit my dataset because of the requirements which were set forth by certain variables, such as party loyalty voting score, which

9 In the context of this paper, exclusive committees are Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules.
required information on a Congressman’s voting record from the previous Congress.¹⁰ From the onset, I looked to limit my data to the 104th Congress forward, because of the changes in committee jurisdictions and rules that took place when the Republicans assumed control of Congress in 1995.

The remainder of this section will proceed as follows. First, I will discuss the data I collected to determine the significance of Member contributions. For this purpose I collected data on the aggregate totals of hard and soft money received by the parties from the 105th Congress forward as well as on the total of Members contributions to party committees and colleagues through their campaign accounts and Leadership PACs, with a specific focus on the growing role of Leadership PACs. Finally I examined the issue of competitiveness by collecting data on the position of party committee in funding races for incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates with a focus on the importance of incumbents in funding races for challengers.

Second, I will define the variables used for my analysis on the impact of Member contributions on a Member’s committee transfer requests. For dependent variables, I use committee transfers and committee transfers to exclusive committees. For independent variables, I utilize a series of variables that were used in previous research and that have been shown to have an affect on a Member’s prospects for committee transfer. These include political party, total committee portfolio value, number of vacancies available on higher ranked committees, the Member’s ranking on their best committee assignment, committee seniority or committee leadership status, region of Member, chamber seniority, party loyalty voting score, percentage of the vote in the previous election, and total contributions from a Member’s Leadership PAC and personal campaign account to party committees and colleagues.

¹⁰ This particular issue will be explored further in the latter part of this section when I explain the rationale behind each of the variables selected for my analysis.
A. ASSESSING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MEMBER CONTRIBUTIONS

One of the major provisions of BCRA was the elimination of soft money, which for over a decade had served as a resource which parties could tap to allow unlimited contributions from individuals and PACs. To determine the significance of soft money, data was collected from the Federal Election Commission and the Center for Responsive Politics on the total hard and soft money receipts for the two political parties. In addition, data was collected on the total receipts received by each committee to determine the percentage distribution of hard and soft money receipts for the six elections cycles.

After gaining an understanding of the significance of soft money and the role it played in helping the national parties to finance their activities, I gathered data on the role of Members as contributors through their campaign accounts and Leadership PACs. Members tended to contribute to party committees through their personal campaign accounts and contribute to colleague’s campaigns largely through their Leadership PACs. This trend occurs because Members are not limited in the amount that they can transfer from personal campaign accounts to party committees. In addition, the maximum amount a lawmaker can give to a candidate from his or her campaign account is $1,000 per election. On the other hand, as with any other PAC, Leadership PACs can give up to $5,000 to a candidate per election.

Due to the rising importance of Leadership PACs and the growth in contributions specifically from these PACs, I decided to collect data on the amount contributed to candidates from Leadership PACs from 1996-2004. I also collected information on the number of Leadership PACs in this time period. While Leadership PACs have typically been a vehicle for

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11 This data represents the total hard and soft money collected by the six major fundraising committees: the Democratic National Committee (DNC), the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC), the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC), the Republican National Committee (RNC), the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), and the National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC).
party leaders to contribute to candidate campaigns and to redistribute some of their resources to ensure electoral victory for colleagues, they are increasingly becoming a means to mobility in Congress. In other words, with the elimination of soft money, growing numbers of rank and file Members are starting Leadership PACs to allow them to collect money and contribute to colleague’s campaign efforts.

Finally as the political parties have vied for control of Congress over the past decade the Congressional Campaign Committees have gotten increasingly involved in strategic contributions to incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates. As noted above, Members are expected to contribute “dues” to party campaign committees so that the committees can distribute these funds to incumbents who are in tight races, to challengers who have a chance of taking a seat, and to candidates in open seat races in competitive districts. To explore the role of parties in funding candidates in these types of races, data was collected on contributions from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee and the National Republican Congressional Committee to incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates for 1996-2004. In addition, I was interested in the impact that the changes in campaign finance legislation had on political competitiveness. To measure this effect, I examined the changes in the total incumbent Member contributions to challengers from 1996-2004.

By collecting this data and aggregating Member contributions this thesis will be able to show the impact of BCRA on the political parties, more specifically the Congressional Campaign Committees, and how this has been passed onto the incumbent Members of Congress. As the Congressional Campaign Committees have relied more and more on their Members as a financial resource, has this affected the emphasis the party leadership places on a Member’s contributions in the assessment of their requests for committee transfers?
B. ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF MEMBER CONTRIBUTIONS ON COMMITTEE TRANSFERS

To assess the question of what, if any, impact Member contributions have had on committee transfer requests, I gathered data on a wide range of variables which were shown through the literature review to have some impact on committee assignments and transfers. This section will provide a brief overview of the motivation behind the selection of each variable as well as the limitations in the data which was collected.

It should be noted from the onset, that all independent variables have been lagged; meaning an entry from the 109th represents information collected from the 108th. The only variables that are not lagged are the two dependent variables, transfer and transfer to exclusive, which require information about a Member’s committee assignments from the current Congress. All independent variables, except region, were standardized before regression analysis was conducted.

Political Party

The variable of political party is a customary variable included in most analyses of Congress. It allows for me to test additional hypotheses concerning differences within the parties on how important Member contributions are in the evaluation process for transfer requests. For instance, the data collected in the Data and Results chapter will show that Democrats depended on soft money much more than their Republican counterparts throughout the 1990s. Therefore, based on the results from the 2004 campaign cycle, it is clear that the Democrats relied more on their Members to contribute to party committees and colleagues than did the Republicans.

However, I do not expect to see much difference between the parties in how they utilize monetary contributions in their assessment of transfer requests, I included this variable to allow
for the testing of this hypothesis and others in future analyses. Information regarding a Member’s partisan affiliation came from each Member’s candidate file with the Federal Election Commission.

**Total Committee Portfolio Values**

The idea for developing a measure of a Member’s total committee portfolio was derived from research by Heberlig (2003), who utilized the value of a Member’s former committee assignments as a measure of what they would be sacrificing if they did indeed transfer. Like Groseclose and Stewart, Heberlig recognized that Member’s have the option of accepting or rejecting transfer opportunities and therefore weigh the total value of their current assignments against the total value of their assignments after any transfer.

First, each Member’s current committee assignments were coded using Stewart and Woon (2005). Then each committee assignment was weighted with the appropriate values using Edwards and Stewarts (2006) cardinal values for the 99th – 109th Congresses. The total of value of each Member’s committee assignments over each Congress was summed to get the total committee portfolio value. It should be noted that because this variable as well as a few other require data on a Member from a previous Congress that this limited the dataset in any given year to all non-freshmen Members. Therefore, an entry in the dataset for the 109th Congress is lagged to represent the total value of a Member’s committee assignments in the 108th Congress.

**Vacancies Upwards**

Heberlig (2003) speculates that vacancies play an important role in the equation of the party leadership in determining how many transfer requests to grant. Furthermore, Munger
(1988) also discussed the importance of committee vacancies in exploring committee transfers, speculating that party leadership could either queue Members for highly desirable committees or expand them, to allow for more Members to reward faithful Members. Therefore, for each Congress from the 105th forward, I collected and coded data on the number of vacant seats for each standing committee.

I referenced copies of the committee rosters available from the House Clerk, consulting only the latest released version, which does not account for midterm transfers onto or off of committees. The number of vacancies is equal to the total number of new Member’s appointed to each committee by each party at the start of each Congress. Since committee size is fluid based on the desires of the Leadership, the best way to gauge the number of available seats is to examine the number of Member’s who were appointed during each Congress. For instance, the total number of vacant seats for the Armed Services Committee in the 109th Congress for the Republicans is equal to the total number of Republican Member’s who were assigned to this committee for this Congress, in this case it was seven.

With the number of vacancies available on each committee by party, by Congress, I developed a variable which measured the number of available seats upwards in the committee hierarchy. In other words, based on the rankings provided by Edwards and Stewart (2006) (see table 1); I summed the total number of seats available to a Member for transfer to any committee that was ranked higher than their best committee assignment. For instance, if a Member served on Ways and Means, the number of vacancies upwards would be zero, since Ways and Means is ranked number one in the committee hierarchy. On the other hand, if a Member’s best committee assignment was the House Science committee, ranked 15th, the total number of available vacancies upwards would be equal to the number of vacancies on the top 14 committees. As
mentioned above, this variable is specific to the number of vacancies by party by committee for each Congress.

**Member’s Rank on Highest Valued Committee Assignment**

For the variable vacancies upwards, I examined each Member’s committee portfolio to find the highest ranked committee assignment, per Edwards and Stewart (2006). After I identified their top assignment, I took their rank within that committee, where they start at the end of the queue when first assigned and work their way up to the number one spot. Therefore, a Member’s rank is based on their standing in the committee. Committee chairmen are ranked as one, while new Members are ranked starting behind the least senior Member of the committee. These rankings were gathered from the appointment citations in the Congressional resolutions appointing Member’s to committees at the beginning of each Congress. They are from Stewart and Woon’s (2005) dataset.

**Leader**

This variable measures whether or not the Member served as a committee chair or ranking Member for any of their committee assignments. It is a dichotomous variable, where the value of 1 signifies that the Member was a leader and the value of 0 represents not being a leader. Gauging a Member’s potential leadership status on a committee is important in understanding whether or not they will transfer. For instance, a Member who is the chair of Financial Services, ranked thirteen, might not transfer to an exclusive committee such as Rules, ranked fourth, because they would be required to transfer to the end of the committee seniority queue and therefore their assignment with Financial Services is of greater value because of their
leadership position. If they could retain their seat on Financial Services and serve on the Rules committee, perhaps they would transfer. However, the rules of the Republican caucus specify that Member’s serving on exclusive committees will not have any other committee assignments.

**Senior Member of Committee**

A senior Member of a committee is any Member who is ranked in the top three spots for their party for any of their committee assignments. Similar to the leader variable described above, this variable provides insight into the opportunity cost for senior Member’s of committees to transfer. This dummy variable will shed light on the impact of a Member’s seniority on a committee on their decision to transfer.

**Member Contributions**

Perhaps the most critical variable in my analysis is the variable representing the total amount that each Member contributed to their party and their colleagues during an election cycle. Unfortunately, given the limitations of the databases at the Federal Elections Commission, it also proved to be one of the most difficult variables for me to develop. There are three components to total Member contributions which required the use of three different variables. They include Member contributions through Leadership PACs, Member contributions to other Member’s through personal campaign accounts, and Member contributions to party committees.

The FEC does not separate the Leadership PACs from the other committees in the committee data files. Therefore I utilized Congressional Quarterly’s Almanac of Federal PACs 2006-2007 as my main resource to determine which PACs were associated with Members of Congress (see Rogers 2006). I did not include PACs associated with Senators, former Members,
or any other candidates, just PACs associated with Members of Congress during their tenure of service in the House. In the Data and Results chapter, I will explore the growth and significance of Leadership PACs in greater depth showing that it is increasingly becoming a means through which Members can show their loyalty and obtain preferred committee transfers.

Member contributions through their personal campaign accounts are becoming increasingly important, as discussed in the literature review. I collected data on each transfer made from one Member to another Member during each election cycle, then aggregated these contributions to develop a total of contributions to Members.

Member contributions to party committees were separated because these are likely the most important in determining whether or not a Member’s committee transfer request is granted. I gathered information on the amount a Member contributed to their Congressional Campaign Committee and their National Party Committee. For Democrats, this included the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). For the Republicans, this included the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) and the Republican National Committee (RNC).

Finally, I totaled all Member contributions, those to fellow Members through Leadership PACs and campaign accounts and the total to party committees to arrive at an aggregate total of contributions for each election cycle. This is the one variable out of this set that I utilize in my analysis. For total contributions, the number appearing in the dataset for any given Congress represents the total contributions from the previous election cycle. For instance, in the 109th, this variable represents the data collected from the 2003-2004 election cycle.
**Percentage of the Vote in Previous Election**

This variable represents the percentage of the two-party vote that the Member received in the general election in the previous election cycle. This variable is included in the analysis to determine whether or not the security of a Member’s seat is considered by the leadership as an important component in the committee transfer process.

**Chamber Seniority**

This variable records the total terms of service of a Member in Congress. These terms do not have to be contiguous and are calculated from the dates/terms of service given in the Congressional directory. It has been noted in the literature that chamber seniority may play an important role in the leadership’s decision about committee transfer requests.

**Party Loyalty Voting Score**

Perhaps one of the most significant independent variables which I will include in my analysis, the party loyalty voting score is a score calculated by Congressional Quarterly for each Member during each session of Congress. This represents the Members the number of times the Member agreed with a majority of their caucus on a set of “key” votes in the previous Congress, adjusted for attendance (see Sharp, 2006). For example, a voting score of 94 in the 107th slot, means that the Member had a record of voting 94% of the time with his/her party on key votes in the 106th Congress. This is another variable where information about a Member is required from their record in a previous Congress. This again limits the dataset to non-freshmen in each Congress.
Region of Member

For each Member, I collected data on the state and district they represented. Then I created a variable known as region, which clusters Members from certain regions together. In theory, Members from certain regions have advantages for transferring to specific committees. For instance, those from states in what I term the West-North-Central region, such as Kansas and Iowa, might have a higher likelihood of obtaining a transfer to a constituency committee such as Agriculture than a Member from Nevada. The regions are New England, Mid-Atlantic, East-North-Central, West-North-Central, Solid South, Border States, Mountains States, and Pacific States. The states which are group in each region can be examined by referring to the Membership Dataset Codebook, Appendix B of this thesis.

Transfers

The list above represents the independent variables which will be utilized in my analysis. The two dependent variables that will be used include transfers, which records if a Member transfers to a new committee or receives an additional assignment, and transfers to exclusive committees, which records whether or not the Member transferred onto an exclusive committee. Each variable is dichotomous where the value 1 represents a transfer, and 0 means no change. Transfers were coded utilizing the committee assignment data prepared by Stewart and Woon (2005).

I determined when a Member transferred by examining their committee seniority ranking in Stewart and Woon’s spreadsheet. Committee seniority is used as an indication of how long a Member has served on a particular committee. This is the number of the concurrent terms that the Member has served on a particular committee. If a Member leaves and then returns to a
committee this number is reset to one. Therefore, when the variable for committee seniority was one, I assumed that a Member had transferred to that committee. This variable was originally included in the regression analysis, although because it was used to develop the dependent variable, I had to remove it from the analysis because of it’s correlation with transfers and transfers to exclusive committees.

Limitations

Despite my best efforts in design, there are still several limitations to the variables I developed and the data I collected. First, I exclude all freshmen Congressmen, which is a significant pool of Congressmen each session. Given the data I’ve collected, it appears that they are also quite active in contributing to party committees in order to gain favor for a good set of committee assignments during their first term in Congress. However, many first term Congressmen end up serving on burden committees such as Standards of Official Conduct, Veteran’s Affairs, and Small Business. Despite this, they are an important pool of Congressmen that warrant investigation in this context, but are beyond the current extent of this study.

Second, I have a limited dataset, including data from only four Congresses 105th-109th. In addition, since I am trying to test whether the importance of Member contributions changed post-BCRA, I only have one election cycle of information post-BCRA. Therefore, this analysis is preliminary at best and would benefit from extending the dataset to Congresses before the 104th as well as after the 109th.

Finally, the method I used to record transfers is fairly elementary. I recorded a transfer whenever a Member’s committee seniority was equal to one, assuming that the only way to receive this value was to have just transferred onto the committee. However, similar to the
concerns voiced by Groseclose and Stewart (1998) concerning the transfer ratio and net transfer ratio method, I do not take into account accurately the committee from which the Member transfers. However, I assumed that if a transfer occurs, a Member will be increasing or improving their overall committee portfolio value. Therefore, I rely heavily on Edwards and Stewart’s (2006) ranking and cardinal values of committees to ensure that if a Member transfers, then they are transferring upwards in the committee hierarchy.

C. Methods of Analysis

To analyze the data collected on Members of Congress, first I examined the dataset to ensure there were no irregularities. The model utilizes a set of ten independent variables and two dependent variables that take different approaches to measuring committee transfers. Table 2: Summary Statistics for Key Variables includes the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values for each variable.

For the purposes of this thesis, based on the research reviewed, I propose the following models (equations) for committee transfers:

1) \( p(\text{transfer}) = \alpha + \beta_1 \gamma + \beta_2 \delta + \beta_3 \xi + \beta_4 \eta + \beta_5 \theta + \beta_6 \lambda + \beta_7 \mu + \beta_8 \nu + \beta_9 \phi + \beta_{10} \omega + \epsilon \)

2) \( p(\text{trans_exclus}) = \alpha + \beta_1 \gamma + \beta_2 \delta + \beta_3 \xi + \beta_4 \eta + \beta_5 \theta + \beta_6 \lambda + \beta_7 \mu + \beta_8 \nu + \beta_9 \phi + \beta_{10} \omega + \epsilon \)

where:
\( \alpha = \text{constant} \)
\( \gamma = \text{Total Committee Portfolio Value by Groseclose/Stewart Method (tot_cmt_value)} \)
\( \delta = \text{Number of Vacancies Upwards (vacancy_up)} \)
\( \xi = \text{Member Rank in Best Committee (mc_rank_best_comm)} \)
\( \eta = \text{Committee Leader – 1 if committee chair or ranking member (leader)} \)
\( \theta = \text{Senior Committee Member – 1 if top three MCs on committee (sencommem)} \)
\( \lambda = \text{Chamber Seniority – the number of years of service in the House (ch_senior)} \)
\( \mu = \text{Party Loyalty Vote Score (ptyvotescore)} \)
\( \nu = \text{Percent Vote in Previous Election Cycle (votepct)} \)
Using these two models as a guide, I performed both linear OLS regressions and as well as probit regressions on the entire dataset and on subsections of the dataset by political party and by period (e.g. pre-BCRA and post-BCRA.

Before performing the regressions, I checked the dataset for consistency, missing values, and irregularities (or outliers). In the first check, I found some severe problems with the number of observations per Congress. While I expected there to be around 425-475 observations per Congress (after removing freshmen congressman from each session), I found that there were less than 350 in all cases. I also experienced issues with timing of the variables, in some cases the variables were lagged appropriately, but in other important cases such as party loyalty voting score, the variables were not lagged, therefore there were holes in my dataset. After reconstructing the dataset, I found that the number of observations per Congress matched what I expected. Table 3 below provides an overview of the number of observations per Congress.

[Table 3]

After checking the dataset, I started my analysis using OLS regression. First, I utilized the entire dataset for models 1 and 2, with transfers and transfers to exclusive committees as the dependent variables respectively. Then I removed MCs that had best committee assignments that were an exclusive committee because presumably they would not be vying for a higher committee assignment or a transfer. This dropped the number of observations significantly (see
table 3, last column for an overview of the number of observations remaining after dropping MCs on exclusive committees). Using this dataset, I conducted OLS regression by party and by period, where I divided the dataset into pre-BCRA (105th – 108th Congresses) and post-BCRA (109th Congress). As mentioned previously, all independent variables, but region were standardized for ease of analysis and robust standard errors were reported.

After using OLS, I utilized probit analysis in a similar manner. First, I tested the entire dataset, then only those MCs who did not serve on an exclusive committee. Finally, I broke the dataset down by party and by period. Robust standard errors were reported.

Through breaking the dataset down by party and by period, I could examine the differences that emerge in the importance of certain independent variables by party and more importantly by period. In order to test my hypothesis of the impact of BCRA, I had to break the data down by period to examine the influence of Member contributions before BCRA, when parties had access to ample amounts of soft money, and after BCRA when parties relied increasingly on Member contributions to fund their activities.

The next section will delve into the results of my analysis. It will present figures and tables of summary results and test the two hypotheses posed at the beginning of this chapter.
IV. DATA AND RESULTS

This section reviews the data collected and results obtained from the analysis on Member contributions from 105th – 109th. First, I will discuss the role of soft money in political parties and speculate on the impact of the elimination of soft money. Second, I will explore the role of Members as contributors through campaign accounts and Leadership PACs. Third, I will examine the increasing importance of Leadership PACs. Fourth, I will analyze the role of party campaign committees in funding races for incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates as well as the importance of incumbent contributions to challengers. Fifth, I will explore the factors influencing committee transfers through ordinary least squares regression analysis. Sixth, I will continue this exploration by using probit analysis techniques. Finally, I will conclude with some thoughts on the implications of these findings for future reform efforts and for Congress.

A. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOFT MONEY

Since 1979 with an amendment to the Federal Elections Campaign Act, state and local parties were allowed to use nonfederal soft money to fund voter registration drives and mobilization efforts in connection with federal elections. Soft money could also be used to distribute bumper stickers, yard signs, slate cards, and other paraphernalia that make reference to federal candidates and are associated with volunteer efforts (Herrnson 2001). However, it was not until 1996, with the Supreme Court ruling in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission, that the parties fully utilized the resource of soft money to advocate on behalf of federal candidates (Malbin 2004).

12 All data reported in this section was obtained from the Federal Election Commission (www.fec.gov) unless otherwise specified. In addition, all dollar amounts reported have been indexed for inflation and represent their value in 2005 dollars.
Figure 1: *Political Party Receipts Hard Money (HM) and Soft Money (SM) 1996-2004*, highlights the trend in the amount of soft money received by the national parties from 1996 to 2004. This figure speaks to the importance of soft money for the Democrats especially in the 1996 and 2000 election cycles when soft money made up 48% and 61% of their total receipts, respectively.

[Figure 1]

Figure 2: *Percentage of Total Receipts Comprised of Soft Money Donations* shows the importance of soft money for both parties in each election cycle. The Republicans have always had an advantage in hard money fundraising because of their robust direct mail program; therefore as exhibited in Figure 2, the Democrats relied most heavily on soft money contributions. In 2000 and 2002, these contributions made up more than 50% of their total receipts, representing fully 61% and 53%, respectively. Without soft money, primarily the Democrats, but also the Republicans have had to find new sources to tap to fund their activities. As a result, both Congressional Campaign Committees have turned to their Members with increasing pressure to solicit dues.

[Figure 2]

Figure 3: *Democratic Campaign Committees Hard and Soft Money Receipts 1996-2004* and Figure 4: *Republican Campaign Committees Hard and Soft Money Receipts 1996-2004* display the breakdown of the total receipts of hard and soft money for the six main party fundraising committees. The blocks outlined in dotted lines represent soft money receipts, while the blocks outlined with solid lines represent hard money receipts.

For the DCCC, soft money receipts either equaled or exceeded receipts in hard money for 1996-2004. This shows the heavy reliance of the Democrats primary Congressional Campaign
Committee on soft money. Furthermore, the elimination of soft money in 2004 created a need for the Democrats to make up for this loss of revenue, which is one reason that the DCCC has leaned increasingly on incumbents to help fund their activities. The DNC and the DSCC relied heavily on soft money in the 2000 and 2002 campaigns. The 2004 cycle shows that the DNC more than made up for the loss of soft money by rising more than $320 million, while in 2002 they raised a combined total of $176 million and in 2000 a combined total of $296 million. As will be discussed later in this thesis, Member contributions played a key role in helping to make up the discrepancy in total receipts from the loss of soft money.

[Figure 3]

In contrast to the DCCC, the NRCC never heavily relied on soft money to serve as a major portion of their total receipts. In fact in 1998 soft money made up the largest portion of total receipts for the NRCC for the six election cycles examined, 46% of total receipts, then it tailored off in 2000 and 2002 with 33% of total receipts each election cycle. Similarly, in the two other campaign committees, the RNC and the NRSC, total hard money receipts outperformed fundraising in soft money for each election cycle, except for the NRSC in 2002 when they raised about $8 million more in soft money than in hard money. This data provides evidence related to the concern that was voiced by many Democrats prior to the passage of BCRA that the legislation would disproportionately affect Democrats who relied more heavily on soft money receipts than did their Republican counterparts.

[Figure 4]

Across the board for all six major campaign committees, when comparing the 2000 and 2004 election cycles, five of the six committees did not raise as much in total hard money receipts in 2004 as they did in combined hard and soft money receipts in 2000. The only
committee that was successful at exceeding total receipts from 2000 in 2004 was the DNC, by approximately $25 million. Therefore, it appears that the Congressional Campaign Committees are still adjusting to this change in the campaign finance landscape and that in 2004 they were not successful at making up for all of the losses incurred from the loss of soft money.

B. Members of Congress as Contributors

The loss of soft money with the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 prompted the parties to rethink their strategy of encouraging Members to contribute to the collective party goal of obtaining or holding majority status. This in turn resulted in a dramatic increase for the Democrats in contributions through campaign accounts and for the Republicans through Leadership PACs to party committees and colleague’s campaigns in 2004.

Figure 5: Trends in Member Contributions through Campaign Accounts 1996-2004\textsuperscript{13}, highlights the gradual growth in Member contributions to party committees and colleague’s campaigns. The sharp spike in the 2003-2004 election cycle helps to address the shortage in campaign funds that were available from the Democratic Campaign Committees after BCRA.

The nearly four fold increase in Democratic Member contributions from 2000 to 2004 shows just how important Member contributions have become for the Democrats in the post-BCRA campaign finance environment. There are early indications from data for the 2005-2006 election cycle that this trend in Member giving is continuing and will likely increase during the upcoming election cycle as both parties struggle to gain seats in the midterm Congressional elections.

[Figure 5]

\textsuperscript{13} Data for this figure was gathered from the Center for Responsive Politics campaign finance website, www.opensecrets.org.
Figure 6: *Trends in Leadership PAC Contributions 1996-2004*\(^{14}\), shows the trends in Member contributions to party committees and colleague’s campaigns through Leadership PACs over the past four election cycles. It is important to note that the Democratic Leadership PACs were continually outperformed by the Republican Leadership PACs from 1996-2004. In addition, Democratic contributions to candidates and party committees for the 2004 cycle dropped nearly 40% from their 2002 levels. This is likely a result of the loss of soft money stemming from the implementation of BCRA. Since Leadership PACs can accept up to $5000 donations from individuals and candidate campaign committees can only accept up to $1000 per election (pre-BCRA), it is likely that large soft money donors would seek to contribute through Leadership PACs in order to maximize their contribution ability. Therefore it is logical that since Democrats relied more heavily on soft money donations, that contributions from Leadership PACs in 2004 would decline.

[Figure 6]

Member contributions through campaign accounts and Leadership PACs constitute an increasingly significant share of vital campaign contributions to party committees and candidates running for office. Figure 7: *Member Contributions to House Campaign Committees 1996-2004* and Figure 8: *Percentage of Total Receipts of CCCs from Member Contributions 1996-2004* provide a clear picture the important role of incumbents in serving as fundraisers for their parties.

In Figure 7, it is evident that as soft money became increasingly important as a source for the House Congressional Campaign Committees during the 1998, 2000, and 2002 elections Member contributions were not as significant or as large of a share of the total contributions.

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\(^{14}\) Data for this figure was gathered from the Center for Responsive Politics campaign finance website, [www.opensecrets.org](http://www.opensecrets.org).
However, after BCRA, total Member contributions to the NRCC and DCCC skyrocketed during the 2004 election reaching fully 28% and 43% of total receipts, respectively.

[Figure 7]

Figure 8 shows the proportion that Member contributions constituted of the total receipts from the NRCC and DCCC.

[Figure 8]

Figures 7 and 8 leave much to be desired as they are not sufficient to tell the entire story of the changes that have occurred in Member giving over the past decade. There are a number of other factors that could have played a role in the trends exhibited here. One factor is the close partisan margins that have existed since the Republican takeover of the House in 1994. This has forced the Congressional Campaign Committees to become more active in helping incumbents hold their seats, in financing quality challengers to gain more seats, and in vying for open seats in competitive districts. Another potential factor is the growing importance of unregulated soft money, as was mentioned above. Since 1996, as shown in Figures 3 and 4, the House Congressional Campaign Committees relied heavily on soft money donations from individuals, PACs, and Members. Finally, both the NRCC and the DCCC and party leaders have in recent years made explicit claims that contributions would be tied to committee assignments and leadership posts (see for instance Allen 2000; Bresnahan 2000; Cillizza 2002; Rice 1999; Van Dongen 2000; Wallison 2002).

C. THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES:

Since 1978 when the first Leadership PAC was created by Representative Henry Waxman, Members have utilized these committees to contribute to colleague’s campaigns and to
gain favor amongst party leaders in an effort to gain political capital in Congress (Baker 1990; Heberlig 2003). Until recently, only party leaders and senior Members had Leadership PACs. Now, with the changes brought forth by BCRA, even a few politically ambitious freshmen and sophomore Members are creating Leadership PACs in order to vie for open seats on exclusive committees such as Appropriations or Ways and Means (Heberlig 2003). This section explores the increasingly significant role played by Leadership PACs in providing funding for the political parties and for candidate’s campaigns.

Table 4: Total Contributions from Leadership PACs to Political Parties 1996-2004

shows Member contributions from Leadership PACs to the Democrats and Republicans as well as the number of Member Leadership PACs for each party for each election. There has been a steady pattern of growth in the number of Members who hold Leadership PACs in both parties as well a growing number of rank and file Members who have such committees. However, the largest Leadership PACs tend to be those held by the leadership of both parties. For instance, in 2002 Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) through her Leadership PAC “PAC to the Future” contributed over $1,000,000 to House candidates. Similarly, Tom Delay (R-TX), Majority Leader, contributed over $1,000,000 through his “Americans for a Republican Majority” Leadership PAC. In 2004, Steny Hoyer (D-MD), Minority Whip, contributed $821,000 and Dennis Hastert (R-IL), Speaker, contributed $836,000 to Congressional Candidates.

Examining both Table 4 and Figures 5/6 shows that overall Democratic Members tend to contribute more to party committees and colleagues through their personal campaign accounts. For instance in 2004 Democrats contributed over $75 million to party committees and candidates through their primary campaign accounts while only contributing $9 million through their

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15 This number represents the total number of Leadership PACs for incumbent House Members and does not include Leadership PACs for Senators, former Members, Governors, or other partisans.
Leadership PACs. On the other hand, this data indicates that Republicans tend to contribute to party committees and colleagues campaigns equally through their Leadership PACs and personal campaign accounts giving nearly $24 million and $31 million through these sources, respectively, in 2004.

[Table 4]

Given the restrictions imposed by BCRA, I believe that the number and significance of Leadership PACs will continue to grow in the next decade. Since Leadership PACs enable Members to contribute $5000 per election to candidates and since this allows Members to gain political capital with their colleagues, I believe that Leadership PACs will serve as the preferred means by which Members will contribute to colleagues’ campaigns. On the other hand, Members can transfer unlimited amounts of money to the national party through their personal campaign accounts, transactions often known as “dues”, and then the national parties can distribute these funds to candidates for office. However, the downside of this method is that Members do not receive the credit for contributing to specific candidates. Perhaps the best method of Member contributions is a mix of the two: contributions from personal campaign accounts to national party campaign committees to meet their obligations to the party and contributions from Leadership PACs to colleague’s campaigns to create political capital.

In the final section of this chapter I will examine the role played by the two House Congressional Campaign Committees, the NRCC and the DCCC, in providing campaign contributions for incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates. I will also review the changes in incumbent contributions to challengers.
D. FUNDING INCUMBENTS, CHALLENGERS, AND CANDIDATES FOR OPEN SEATS

Since the 1994 election, close margins have created an increasingly partisan atmosphere which has been characterized by an era of stronger parties. As a consequence, the Democrats and Republicans have leaned on their Members to redistribute some of their campaign funds to assist their colleagues in electoral contests. As shown above in Figure 7, Member contributions to the House Campaign Committees have skyrocketed during the 2003-2004 election cycle. Given this increase, I would expect an increase in the activity of the Congressional Campaign Committees in House races for incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates. In addition, as Member contributions to party committees and colleague’s campaigns have become increasingly more important I would expect incumbent politicians to be much more conservative in their giving patterns to challengers. This shift of priorities would have important implications for political competition potentially making incumbents safer and decreasing the competitiveness of Congressional elections.

This section reviews the trends in contributions from the NRCC and the DCCC to candidates for the House of Representatives for 1996-2004 and highlights a few significant aspects of these contributions in the past decade. In addition, it examines the changes in Member contributions to challengers for Congress from 1996-2004 to get a sense of what impact BCRA might have had on political competitiveness.

[Figure 9]

Figure 9: National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) Contributions to Incumbent, Challengers, and Open Seat Candidates 1996-2004, examines the trends in the activity of the NRCC in funding candidate’s campaign efforts. It should be noted that these numbers represent direct hard money contributions to candidate’s campaign committees and do
not represent any independent expenditures that might have taken place on behalf of the candidate.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore soft money, which was used for issue advertisements and independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate, but independent of any coordination with the campaign, appears to have represented a significant proportion of the activity conducted by the Congressional Campaign Committees on behalf of candidates prior to BCRA. As a result, prior to 2002, as shown in Figure 9, direct hard money contributions from the Congressional Campaign Committees were relatively modest, not exceeding $1,000,000 in any election cycle for the NRCC.

Figure 10: Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) Contributions to Incumbent, Challengers, and Open Seat Candidates 1996-2004, displays the trends in contributions for the DCCC. This figure shows that the DCCC was rather active in supporting challengers in 1996, many of whom had lost their seats in the turnover in 1994. Like the NRCC, the DCCC supported candidates through independent expenditures and soft money during the 1998-2002 election cycles. In 2003-2004, there is a dramatic increase in the support of the DCCC for incumbents, challengers, and open seat contenders. However, the total contributed by the DCCC in 2003-2004, less than $5 million, is still a relatively small proportion of the total amount raised by these three categories of candidates.\textsuperscript{17}

Figures 9 and 10 do not provide information outside of hard money contributions to candidates on the role of the House Campaign Committees in Congressional races. In addition to

\textsuperscript{16} As mentioned in the literature review, before 2002 and the passage of BCRA, the Supreme Court in \textit{Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Commission}, opened the door for independent expenditures on behalf of Federal candidates, which allowed for the introduction and use of large sums of soft money.

\textsuperscript{17} The average spent by incumbents for the 2003-2004 election was $1,000,000, the average spent by challengers was $200,000, except for five targeted races where challengers beat the incumbents where their total raised was approximately $2,000,000, the average spent by open seat contenders was $1,500,000 (with 35 open seats in 2004). Source: Center for Responsive Politics, \texttt{www.opensecrets.org}. 

-66-
independent expenditures, depending on the race, House leaders or prominent members of the party might campaign for a particular candidate or might assist with a fundraiser as was the case with the 2nd Congressional District of West Virginia in 2000. During this election, House Republicans campaigned heavily for the Republican running for the open seat, Shelly Capito, including Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, Republican Presidential nominee George W. Bush, House Majority Leader Dick Armey, and NRCC Chair Jim Nicholson (Malbin 2003; Tuckwiller 2000). Consequently, although the DCCC expected to have a lock on the longtime Democratic seat, Jim Humphreys ended up losing to Capito in the general election. In addition to the support she received from senior leadership in the Republican Party, because of their endorsement, she was able to raise over $1.4 million from fellow Republicans, the NRCC, individuals, and PACs.

Figure 11: Contributions from Incumbents to Challengers 1996-2004, highlights the changes that have occurred in the total contributions from incumbents to challengers over the past decade.

[Figure 11]

Figure 11 shows that the total contributions from incumbents seem to be less a function of changes in campaign finance legislation and more so related to close partisan margins in Congress. For much of the decade of the 1990s, incumbent contributions from Republicans decrease as the party attempts to retain control of Congress while the incumbent Democrats increase their contributions to challengers in an effort to regain the majority. However, the total of incumbent contributions from both parties, when adjusted for inflation, does not change much from 1996 to 2004.

Throughout the decade incumbent contributions were a significant source of campaign funds for challengers, as significant or in many cases more significant a source than the
Congressional Campaign Committees. For example, in 1996 Republican incumbents contributed over $435,000 to challengers, while the NRCC contributed approximately the same with $443,000. On the other hand, the Democratic incumbents contributed $810,000 while the DCCC contributed only $518,000. In 2000, Republican incumbents contributed approximately $450,000 while the NRCC contributed approximately $230,000 to challengers. The Democratic incumbents contributed approximately $750,000 while the DCCC contributed just over $210,000. These numbers show that Member contributions to challengers are a major source through which the parties support candidates for the House. It is possible that as Members are required to pay more to party committees in dues and to contribute more to fellow Members to build clout, that the amount of contributions from Members to challengers might decrease, thereby decreasing the competitiveness of future elections.

[Figure 12]

Figure 12: Number of MCs Contributing to Challengers 1996-2004, shows the changes in the number of incumbents who contribute to challengers for the House. Although the overall total of Member contributions to challengers has not changed much over the course of the decade the total number of Members contributing to challengers has decreased slightly, possibly as a result of the increasing financial burden that is being placed on Members as a result of campaign finance reform. Therefore, there is a smaller subset of Members who are contributing to challengers for the House. In most cases, this smaller subgroup tends to be the leaders of the party, committee chairs, or Members from the same region as the challenger. These individuals have an advantage for fundraising and have a vested interest in helping quality challengers to win election to the House to increase their share of the seats. I expect that the total number of
incumbents contributing to challengers has reached equilibrium and will remain relatively stable over the next decade as it has from 1996-2004.

From Figures 9 and 10 it appears that the role of the parties in assisting in incumbent, challenger, and open seat contests for Congress is not directly financial, but rather the parties might serve as a resource to tap into potential donors, to assist in policy research, to provide campaign advice, and to sponsor get out the vote efforts to rally the party faithful (Herrnson 1997). However, what is clear through figures 9 and 10 is that the Congressional Campaign Committees played a larger financial role in these races in 2004 than in any election in the past decade. I expect this financial role of the Congressional Campaign Committees through hard money contributions to candidates to continue and to increase in the years ahead.

Figures 11 and 12 show that on the other hand, despite the changes in the campaign finance landscape and the growing importance of Member contribution to party committees, it appears as those Member contributions to challengers are more responsive to the partisan divide in Congress than they are to the tightening of the belt that has occurred since the implementation of BCRA. Campaign contributions from incumbents to challengers have not decreased significantly over the course of the past 10 years; they have remained stable and have continued to be a significant amount of the total party contributions to challengers. In this respect, contrary to what I expected it does not seem as though BCRA had a negative effect on political competitiveness, although it is likely too early to draw conclusions given that there has only been one election since the implementation of BCRA.
E. EXAMINING COMMITTEE TRANSFERS BY ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION

Committee transfers are the variable which was used to gauge the impact of Member contributions on their standing in Congress. As noted in the literature review, committee transfers are often used as incentives by party leaders to encourage party loyalty through voting and financial contributions. Therefore I would expect these factors to influence a Member’s probability of transferring, where all transfers are assumed to be upwards in the committee hierarchy. In addition to party loyalty a Member’s term of service on a committee and their time in the chamber have also been reported in previous research to influence their likelihood of transfer.

With transfer and transfer to an exclusive committee as the dependent variables, I began by performing simple OLS regression. The results for this analysis are presented in Tables 5 - 8. For convenience, because of the various units in which the ten independent variables are measured, I standardized all the coefficients before using them in performing these regressions in Stata. In addition, all reported standard errors are robust standard errors.

[Table 5]

Table 5 shows a basic linear regression utilizing model 1 and model 2. First, the f-test is less than .05, therefore both models are statistically significant; however the $R^2$ values are 0.11 and 0.06 respectively, which means the models do not account for much of the variance in the variable transfer or trans_exclus. Second, the variables total committee portfolio, vacancies upwards, rank in best committee, senior committee member, chamber seniority, and total contributions are significant in both models at various levels. For model 1, the two values that yield the greatest influence on the variable transfer are chamber seniority ($\beta = -0.094$) and rank in best committee ($\beta = 0.035$).
Since I utilized standardized variables, a one standard deviation increase in the variable chamber seniority will lead to a 0.094 standard deviation decrease in the likelihood of transferring. Therefore, the longer a Member serves in Congress, the less likely they are to transfer. While it would seem as though more senior Members in the chamber would be more likely to transfer, it is also possible that they have gained seniority on their current assignments and may not wish to sacrifice their standing on their current committees for a chance of transferring to a better committee. For rank in best committee, a one standard deviation increase in this variable will lead to a 0.035 standard deviation increase in the probability of a transfer. In other words, as a Member increases in seniority on their best committee, they are more likely to take a new assignment. Again, this finding in contradictory to what I would expect. I would expect that as Member’s gain seniority in their best committees that they would be less likely to transfer because of the prospect of gaining a committee leadership post.

For model 2, the $R^2 = 0.06$, which means the model explains very little of the variance in the variable trans_exclus. In this model, the variable that yields the greatest influence is chamber seniority. It is significant to the 1% level and for a one standard deviation increase in chamber seniority, there is a 0.043 standard deviation decrease in the probability of transfer to an exclusive committee. This result follows from those in model 1, where senior Members of the chamber are less likely to transfer to a new committee possibly because they’ve gained seniority on a current committee assignment. Finally, for model 2 party loyalty voting score is significant at the 10% level, but the $\beta$ coefficient is 0.010, meaning that it yields very little influence, if any, over the probability of a transfer to an exclusive committee.

To put these $\beta$ coefficients in context, the standard deviation of transfer is 0.425 and trans_exclus is 0.242 (see table 2 for more information regarding the variables in use in this
analysis). Therefore, for model 1 the only variable that yields an influence on the probability of transfer is chamber seniority given its $\beta$ coefficient of -0.094 and the standard deviation of transfer of 0.425. On the whole, neither models 1 or 2 provide much support for hypothesis 1, which states that increasing Member contributions to party committees and colleagues will increase the likelihood of transfer. To address hypothesis 2 and further explore the linear regression models in greater depth, I continue by dividing the data first by party and then by period (105th – 108th and 109th or pre-BCRA, post-BCRA).

Table 6 repeats the analysis presented in table 5 for models 1 and 2, except for the fact that I’ve dropped all Members who has an exclusive committee assignment as their best assignment. I assume that Members who serve on exclusive committees will not move from one exclusive committee to another, therefore I drop these observations and am left only with those Members who will either transfer up in the committee hierarchy or who will receive a transfer to an exclusive committee. As can be seen, this drop the number of observations evaluated from 2248 to 1395. Now the variables of significance for model 1 include vacancies upwards (1%), rank in best committee (1%), senior committee member (5%), and chamber seniority (1%). For model 2, they include rank in best committee (5%), senior committee member (1%), chamber seniority (1%), and party loyalty voting score (10%).

As in table 5, chamber seniority appears to yield the most influence on transfers (model 1) and transfers to exclusive committees (model 2). For model 1, a one standard deviation increase in chamber seniority will yield a 0.125 standard deviation decrease in the probability of a transfer. For model 2, a one standard deviation increase in chamber seniority will yield a 0.067 decrease in the probability of transferring to an exclusive committee. As with the results from
Table 5, the negative effect of chamber seniority is unexpected, but is logical if we consider that as a Member’s period of service in the chamber increases, they tend to transfer less because they obtain some measure of seniority on their committee assignments and therefore do not wish to forego this seniority to start once again on a more prestigious committee, but at the bottom of the seniority chain.

[Table 7]

Table 7 utilizes the dataset reduced by the number of Members who serve on an exclusive committee and is split by party affiliation. For Republicans, both models 1 and 2 are statistically significant with $R^2$ values of 0.11 and 0.10, respectively. In model 1, the variables senior committee member, chamber seniority, and party loyalty voting score are significant. Unlike with the previous regressions, party loyalty voting score is significant to the 1% level for Republicans for model 1. While chamber seniority has a negative coefficient, -0.155, both senior committee member and party loyalty voting score have positive coefficient 0.047 and 0.059 respectively. Therefore, a Member who is loyal the Republican party in their voting record, who is fairly young in the chamber, but has seniority on a committee would be considered more likely to transfer than a Member with a weak party voting record and who is a senior Member of the chamber. On the other hand, for transfers to an exclusive committee, it appears that the two variables that have the most influence are chamber seniority and senior committee member with coefficients of -0.097 and 0.063, respectively.

For Democrats, the result differed greatly. For model 1 ($R^2 = 0.12$), while chamber seniority was found to be significant, in addition, the number of vacancies upwards, their rank in their best committee, the percent of the two party vote received, and finally total contributions. The coefficient on chamber seniority still was the largest ($\beta = -0.101$), but total contributions and
vacancies upwards were also important contributions to the model with $\beta = 0.083$ and $\beta = 0.080$, respectively. Therefore, Democrats take into consideration not only a Member’s stance in the chamber, but also the number of seats available for assignment and the amount that a Member contributed to the party and their colleagues. Since Democrats were in the minority throughout my period of analysis ($105^{th} - 109^{th}$), it seems logical that the leadership would weigh Member contributions more heavily because of their importance to being able to support challengers for Republican seats.

On the other hand, for model 2 ($R^2 = 0.04$), the only variables of significance are chamber seniority (1%) and total contributions (10%). Given the low $R^2$ value it seems as though this model does not yield any concrete answers on what variables are important in the Democrats consideration of Members for exclusive committee transfers. In examining OLS regression results for models 1 and 2 by party, I notice that there are not many differences between the two for variables of significance for the Republicans, while for Democrats the variables that are important in the probability of a Member’s transfer are very different.

[Table 8]

Table 8 looks to address hypothesis 2, which states that the value of Member contributions to party committees and colleagues should increase post-BCRA because of the limits this new law imposed on soft money and the effects it had on the parties. Therefore I broke the data down into two periods by Congresses: first ($105^{th} - 108^{th}$) and second ($109^{th}$).

For model 1 during the first period I found that the variables of chamber seniority (1%), rank in best committee (1%), vacancies upwards (5%), and total contributions (5%) were significant. Overall the model was weak with an $R^2$ value of 0.09 and with similar coefficients from previous regressions. For model 2 for the first period only senior committee member and
chamber seniority were significant, both at the 1% level. However, this model is very weak with an R² value of only 0.05.

For the second period, the 109th Congress, model 1 has an R² of 0.20. Variables of significance include vacancies upwards (10%), senior committee member (5%), chamber seniority (1%), and region (10%). The most influential variables include chamber seniority (β = -0.157) and senior committee member (β = 0.062). Region (β = 0.023) exerts very little influence on a Member’s probability of transferring; however it is still significant at the 10% level.

Model 2 for the 109th Congress yields an R² of 0.11, which is better than for the previous period, but is still so low that it is difficult to interpret the effects of these variables on transfers to exclusive committees. Variables of significance included the standard ones such as rank in best committee (5%), senior committee member (5%) and chamber seniority (5%), as well as party loyalty voting score (5%). In this case, the variable that exerts the most influence on the probability of a Member transferring to an exclusive committee is their rank on their current best committee assignment (β = 0.053). In addition, compared with chamber seniority (β = -0.051) which typically has the largest β coefficient, a member’s party loyalty voting score (β = 0.041) is also very influential in the 109th Congress in determining a Member’s probability of transfer to an exclusive committee.

Overall, model 1 with the dependent variable as transfers preformed better than model 2 with the dependent variable as transfers to exclusive committees using ordinary least squares regression. It could be because there are a greater total number of transfers (N=530) compared with the total number of transfers to exclusive committees (N=140). It could also be because of the assumptions of OLS regression. One of the most important assumptions is linearity; that is that the relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable should be linear.
This assumption is not really satisfied in this instance because as table 10 demonstrates the correlations between the independent variables and the dependent variables for models 1 and 2 are low; lower so for model 2, which might explain why it performed poorly utilizing OLS.

[Table 9]

Given the limitations of OLS regression analysis, I utilized probit regression analysis as well. The next section explores the results using this analysis with the same breakdown of data discussed in this section.

**F. EXAMINING COMMITTEE TRANSFERS BY PROBIT REGRESSION**

This section discusses tables 10-13 which are identical to those presented in the previous section, except for the fact that probit analysis is utilized rather than OLS regression.

[Table 10]

Table 10 provides a basic overview of the probit regression using the entire dataset for models 1 and 2. For these analyses a pseudo $R^2$ is given because this model is not linear. Therefore, this value must be interpreted cautiously as it is not analogous to the $R^2$ value from OLS. For model 1, the pseudo $R^2$ is 0.11 and the significant variables are total committee portfolio value (1%), vacancies upwards (1%), senior committee member (10%), chamber seniority (1%), party loyalty voting score (5%), and total contributions (1%). The variables with the greatest influence are chamber seniority ($\beta = -0.45$), total committee portfolio value ($\beta = -0.133$), and total contributions ($\beta = 0.130$). A one standard deviation increase in chamber seniority would cause a 0.45 standard deviation decrease in the probability of a transfer. A one standard deviation increase in total committee portfolio value would result in a 0.13 standard deviation decrease in the likelihood of transfer. Finally, a one standard deviation increase in total
contributions would lead to a 0.13 increase in the probability of transfer. Therefore total contributions, in this scenario has a positive influence on a Member’s probability of transfer, although the effect is quite small.

Model 2 has a pseudo $R^2$ of 0.19, slightly better than model 1, although these values are difficult to interpret. This model has five variables of significance: total committee portfolio value (1%), senior committee member (10%), chamber seniority (1%), party loyalty voting score (1%), and total contributions (1%). In this scenario, committee leader was dropped because certain values of the variable predict failure perfectly; therefore probit drops this variable from the analysis. In model 2, chamber seniority yields the greatest influence over the probability of transfer with a $\beta$ coefficient of -0.919. Total committee portfolio ($\beta = -0.268$) and party loyalty voting score ($\beta = 0.129$) also have a significant influence on a Member’s likelihood of transferring to an exclusive committee. As with the analysis for OLS, I will conduct the remainder of the analysis without the Members who are assigned to an exclusive committee.

[Table 11]

For the probit analysis without the Members on exclusive committees vacancies upwards (1%), rank in best committee (10%), and chamber seniority (1%). Unlike the OLS regression using this subset of the dataset, senior committee member is not found to be significant. By far, the largest coefficient is the $\beta$ coefficient for chamber seniority ($\beta = -0.498$). For a one standard deviation change in chamber seniority, the probability of a transfer would decrease by 0.498 standard deviations. For model 2, there are only two variables that are significant: chamber seniority (1%) and party loyalty voting score (10%). Despite the relatively small coefficient on party loyalty voting score ($\beta = 0.096$) the fact that in this regression it is the only variable which has a positive impact on the probability of transfer to an exclusive committee is important. As
with the probit analysis in table 10, the variable committee leader was dropped from this analysis as well.

In table 12, I break the dataset by party. For Republicans, model 1 preformed similarly to model 1 in OLS with the significant variables being chamber seniority (1%) and party loyalty voting score (5%). While chamber seniority has the largest \( \beta \) coefficient (\( \beta = -0.541 \)), party loyalty voting score has a significant positive effect (\( \beta = 0.196 \)). Therefore for a one standard deviation increase in the party loyalty voting index, there is a 0.196 standard deviation increase in the probability of a Member transferring. Model 2 also resembles OLS model 2, where the variables of significance include total committee portfolio value (10%), senior committee member (5%), and chamber seniority (1%). In this case, chamber seniority has the largest and most significant effect on the probability of transfer to an exclusive committee with a \( \beta \) coefficient of -1.375. A one standard deviation increase in chamber seniority leads to a 1.375 standard deviation decrease in the probability of transfer to an exclusive committee for Republicans.

For the Democrats, model 1 is similar to OLS model 1 with variables of significance including vacancies upwards (1%), chamber seniority (1%), percent of the two party vote (5%), and total contributions (1%). Model 2 also resembles the OLS version with chamber seniority and total contributions being significant in the analysis. Notably, the \( \beta \) coefficient for total contributions is 0.339, meaning a one standard deviation change in total contributions will result in a 0.339 standard deviation increase in the likelihood of a Member transferring to an exclusive committee.
It is interesting that in these models with the party breakdown that for Democrats total contributions are significant and for Republicans party loyalty voting is significant to the probability of transferring. This is likely a result of the fact that on the whole Democrats are less effective at fundraising than the Republicans, therefore the leadership of the Democratic Party in Congress consider total contributions to be a significant factor in determining whether or not to grant a transfer. On the other hand, the Republicans tend to be the more disciplined party; therefore Republican leadership in Congress expects party members to be loyal in voting if they wish to advance in the committee hierarchy.

[Table 13]

Table 13 is the equivalent of table 8 for OLS regression, breaking the data down by period to explore if there are any differences in the importance of the predictor variables on the outcome variables. For the 105th – 108th Congresses model 1 has four variables of significance: vacancies upwards (5%), rank in best committee (10%), chamber seniority (1%), and total contributions. Besides chamber seniority, total contributions and vacancies upwards have large positive β coefficients, 0.238 and 0.130, respectively. During the 105th-108th Congresses, a one standard deviation increase in total contributions yielded a 0.238 standard deviation increase in the probability of transfer for a Member. Model 2, for transfers to exclusive committees, has chamber seniority (1%) and total contributions (10%) as significant variables in the equation. In this case, chamber seniority has the largest β coefficient with a one standard deviation increase in chamber seniority resulting in a 0.842 standard deviation decrease in the likelihood of transferring to an exclusive committee.

For the 109th Congress, model 1 only has three significant variables vacancies upwards (5%), chamber seniority (1%), and region (10%). The β coefficients on chamber seniority (β = -
0.855) and vacancies upwards (\( \beta = 0.225 \)) are influential, but the coefficient on region (\( \beta = 0.084 \)) is quite small and insubstantial in the equation for transfers post-BCRA. For model 2, the variables of significance are chamber seniority (1%) and party loyalty voting score (5%). In fact, party loyalty voting score has a large positive \( \beta \) coefficient of 0.616, meaning that a one standard deviation increase in the party voting index would lead to a 0.616 standard deviation increase in the likelihood of a transfer to an exclusive committee. It is interesting how this variable is significant only for model 2, for transfers to exclusive committees, and only for the 109th Congress. Perhaps party loyalty as expressed through voting, rather than through contributions is becoming increasingly important in determining a Member’s likelihood to transfer to an exclusive committee post-BCRA.

From OLS and probit analysis it clear that Member contributions do not play a significant role in determining a Member’s likelihood of transfer or of transferring to an exclusive committee post BCRA. However, there are a number of significant factors that affect a Member’s probability of transferring. These factors as well as final thoughts and suggestions for further research will be provided in the final chapter of this thesis.
V. CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has attempted to provide a comprehensive overview of the role of financial contributions from Members of Congress to political parties and candidates for office as well as the impact of these contributions on Members’ standing in Congress vis-à-vis the committee transfer process. In the course of this thesis a number of significant findings have emerged relating to the role of Member contributions and significance of these contributions in evaluating a Member’s committee transfer prospects. This section will highlight these findings as well as discuss the potential options for further research regarding the impact of BCRA on the significance of Member contributions.

First, soft money was found to be especially important for Democrats throughout the 1990s as they have typically lagged behind Republicans in hard money receipts. In 2000, soft money made up 61% of the Democrats total receipts, in 2002, soft money constituted 53%. Furthermore, for the DCCC, soft money receipts were equal or in most cases exceeded hard money receipts for the four election cycles from 1996-2002. Furthermore, five of the six major Congressional Campaign Committees did not make up for the loss of soft money when comparing total receipts hard and soft money receipts from 2000 and 2002 to total hard money receipts in 2004.

Second, Member contributions through personal campaign accounts for Democrats spiked in 2004 going from $20 million in 2000 to nearly $80 million in 2004, a four-fold increase. However, contributions from Democratic Leadership PACs dropped off in 2004 to $8 million from a high of $15 million in 2002, likely a result of the loss of soft money as a resource for these PACs. Similarly, Member contributions to House Congressional Campaign Committees skyrocketed in 2004. For instance, for the DCCC in 2002 only 6% of their total receipts came
from Member contributions, while in 2004, 43% of the total receipts were from Democratic Members of Congress. For the NRCC in 2002, 2% of total receipts were from Members, while in 2004, this jumped to 28% of total receipts from Member contributions. These statistics show the increasing role of Member contributions in funding the activities of the House Congressional Campaign Committees.

Third, given the restrictions of BCRA and the benefits that have been implicitly and explicitly tied to Member contributions, it is likely that the number and significance of Leadership PACs will grow in the coming years. Despite the modest growth in the total number of Leadership PACs, their role in elections is increasingly important as Members can contribute up to $5000 per election through a PAC, whereas they can only contribute $1000 per election through their personal campaign accounts. Furthermore, the popularity of Leadership PACs is growing as freshmen and sophomore Members are starting PACs to contribute to colleague’s in order to gain political capital to assist them in receiving favorable committee assignments.

Fourth, the role of the NRCC and the DCCC in Congressional elections for much of the past decade has not been entirely financial and the role of incumbents in funding challengers has not changed. However, the CCCs are beginning to serve more as a collector of Member contributions and as redistributors of campaign funds to incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates. This increasing financial role, although small in comparison to the total amount raised for Congressional candidates, signals an important shift in policy from the last decade – a shift from a decentralized party system and a return to system of strong parties and centralized power.

Fifth, the two hypotheses posed at the beginning of this thesis were tested. In regards to the first hypothesis, for the most part Members contributing to their party committees and
colleagues did not see an increase in the probability of a transfer to a better committee or to an
exclusive committee. In fact, Member contributions only mattered when the data was separated
by party and in this case only for the Democrats. The coefficients for the Democrats for total
contributions for the two models using OLS were quite small (model 1 $\beta = 0.083$, model 2 $\beta =
0.044$), however for the models using probit analysis, the coefficients increased dramatically
(model 1 $\beta = 0.317$, model 2 $\beta = 0.339$). Reviewing the data on Member contributions, this result
is logical because it is apparent that Member contributions are more significant to the Democrats
than to the Republicans because of the loss of soft money. Therefore there is support for the first
hypothesis, that Member contributions will increase the likelihood of transfer, but only for the
Democrats, not the Republicans.

In regards to the second hypothesis: Member contributions will be more significant in the
committee transfer equation post-BCRA because of the elimination of soft money, I found little
to support this conclusion. When the data was split by period (105th - 108th Congress or pre-
BCRA, and 109th Congress or post-BCRA), total contributions were only significant in the first
period, for model 1. Therefore according to my results, total contributions did not have an impact
on the committee transfer equation in the post-BCRA period. This finding is surprising given
that the analysis of Member contributions shows that they are increasingly important to the party
and especially to the party committees. Not to mention, there has been wide speculation that
Congressional leaders are using financial prowess as a means to evaluate a Member’s transfer
requests.

Despite the weak support for the main two hypotheses in this thesis, the results from the
regression analyses shed light on the important factors in committee transfers for Members. The
most significant finding is that the drivers for committee transfers can be characterized as
opportunities for advancement (e.g. the number of vacant seats available upwards) and opportunity costs (e.g. the value of a Member’s current committee portfolio and their ranking on their best committee assignment). In addition to these factors, throughout each analysis, chamber seniority was found to be significant and the coefficients were quite large and negative. Therefore, as a Member gains seniority in the chamber they are less likely to transfer, perhaps because they also have gained seniority on a committee and would prefer to maintain this assignment and the prospect of a committee leadership post over transferring to an exclusive committee and starting on the bottom of the queue.

From the analysis presented in this thesis it is evident that the committee transfer and assignment process is complex and constrained by a number of factors, many of which did not make it into the equation studied in this thesis. Based on the weak R² values for all of the models in the results section, I am lead to believe that there are a number of factors that have yet to be considered in how the party leadership decides committee transfer requests. In future studies, scholars should consider developing monetary values for committee assignments or positions. How much is a specific committee assignment worth to a Member? How much can the Member benefit by receiving a new assignment through increased individual and PAC contributions? In addition, scholars should take the Grosewart Method one additional step and develop values for positions within a committee. How much more valuable is a seat on Armed Services where a Member is third in line to be chair than a seat on Appropriations where the Member is ranked at the bottom of the committee seniority listing?

Despite the inconclusive findings presented within this thesis, it is clear that Member contributions are on the rise and that party committees are developing new mechanisms to entice Members to contribute. It is also clear that BCRA has only amplified this effort and that Member
contributions are more significant to the parties now that pre-BCRA. The question remains, however, what impact does the increase in Member contributions post-BCRA have on a Member’s standing in Congress?
VI. Works Cited


Edwards, Keith, and Charles Stewart III. “The Value of Committee Assignments in Congress


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![Bar chart showing contributions from incumbents to challengers from 1996 to 2004. The data is presented in a table format with years and amount contributed in 2005 dollars.]

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Figure 12: Number of MCs Contributing to Challengers 1996-2004

![Bar chart showing the number of MCs contributing to challengers from 1996 to 2004. The data is presented with total MCs and split by political affiliation.]

- Total
- Republicans
- Democrats

-97-
B. TABLES

Table 1: House Committee Values, 99th - 109th Congresses

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<td>2.84</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriations</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy and Commerce</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Security</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Services</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Relations</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Reform and Oversight</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Infrastructure</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Services</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House Administration</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and the Workplace</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standards of Official Conduct</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans Affairs</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Business</td>
<td>-0.40</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 1086
LLF = -529.42

n/a = not applicable

### Table 2: Summary Statistics of Key Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th># of Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>transfer (y)</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.425</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>trans_exclus (y)</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tot_cmt_val (x)</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>1.217</td>
<td>0.936</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>4.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vacancy_up (x)</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mc_rank_best_comm (x)</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>4.397</td>
<td>3.590</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>region (x)</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>4.631</td>
<td>2.138</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leader (x)</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>0.048</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sencommem (x)</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ch_senior (x)</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>5.084</td>
<td>3.901</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ptyvotescore (x)</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>votepct (x)</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>12.77</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total_contribs (x)</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>6.411</td>
<td>12.71</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>218.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All contributions are in US Dollars indexed to the year 2005.

### Table 3: Number of Observations by Congress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Number of Observations w/ all Members of Congress</th>
<th>Number of Observations without MCs on Exclusive Committees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105th</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106th</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107th</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108th</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109th</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4: Total Contributions from Leadership PACs to Political Parties 1996-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Cycle</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Total Contributions</th>
<th>Donations to Dems</th>
<th># of PACs</th>
<th>Donations to Reps</th>
<th># of PACs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>$8,428,267</td>
<td>$1,545,771</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>$6,881,496</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>$13,354,001</td>
<td>$3,501,437</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>$9,849,564</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>$21,091,702</td>
<td>$7,629,655</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>$13,434,787</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>$34,263,099</td>
<td>$14,247,511</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>$19,984,088</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>$33,314,871</td>
<td>$9,404,517</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>$23,796,577</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 Prior to 2004, donations of funds from leadership PACs likely included soft money, however after 2002 (post-BCRA), these donations were entirely from hard money which is governed by contribution limits. Adopted from data available through the Center for Responsive Politics, [www.opensecrets.org](http://www.opensecrets.org)
Table 5: OLS Regression Analysis with Model 1 and 2 (robust standard errors)\textsuperscript{19}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 (y = transfers)</th>
<th>Model 2 (y = trans exclus)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Committee Portfolio</td>
<td>-0.034*** (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.020*** (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancies Upwards</td>
<td>0.043*** (0.014)</td>
<td>0.014* (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank in Best Committee</td>
<td>0.035*** (0.013)</td>
<td>0.014* (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.004 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Committee Member</td>
<td>0.029*** (0.011)</td>
<td>0.023*** (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Seniority</td>
<td>-0.094*** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.043*** (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Loyalty Voting Score</td>
<td>0.013 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.010* (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Two-Party Vote</td>
<td>0.007 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Contributions</td>
<td>0.033*** (0.012)</td>
<td>0.009* (0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.005 (0.004)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{N} 2248 2248  
\textbf{R}^2 0.11 0.06  
\textbf{F} 31.13 13.82  

\textbf{*** Indicates significant at 1\%, ** Indicates significant at 5\%, * indicates significant at 10\%}

\textsuperscript{19} For all OLS and Probit analysis, Model 1 utilizes transfers to any committee as the dependent variables, while Model 2 utilizes transfers to exclusive committees as the dependent variable. Exclusive committees are defined as Ways and Means, Appropriations, Energy and Commerce, and Rules. See pages 54-55 for an overview of these two models.
Table 6: OLS Regression Analysis with Model 1 and 2 (without MCs serving on an exclusive committee)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 (y = transfer)</th>
<th>Model 2 (y = trans_exclus)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Committee Portfolio</td>
<td>-0.010 (0.028)</td>
<td>0.021 (0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancies Upwards</td>
<td>0.046*** (0.015)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank in Best Committee</td>
<td>0.047*** (0.018)</td>
<td>0.025** (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>0.008 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Committee Member</td>
<td>0.032** (0.014)</td>
<td>0.032*** (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Seniority</td>
<td>-0.125*** (0.017)</td>
<td>-0.067*** (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Loyalty Voting Score</td>
<td>0.006 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.013* (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Two-Party Vote</td>
<td>0.010 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Contributions</td>
<td>0.022 (0.022)</td>
<td>0.013 (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.006 (0.005)</td>
<td>0.000 (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1395</td>
<td>1395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>22.74</td>
<td>12.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Indicates significant at 1%, ** Indicates significant at 5%, * indicates significant at 10%
Table 7: OLS Regression Analysis with Model 1 and 2 (without MCs serving on an exclusive committee) by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(y=transfers)</td>
<td>(y=trans_exclus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Committee Portfolio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.004 (0.041)</td>
<td>0.046* (0.027)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancies Upwards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.002 (0.022)</td>
<td>0.008 (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank in Best Committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.027 (0.024)</td>
<td>0.024 (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.005 (0.018)</td>
<td>-0.011 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Committee Member</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.047** (0.022)</td>
<td>0.063*** (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Seniority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.155*** (0.027)</td>
<td>-0.097*** (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Loyalty Voting Score</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.059*** (0.023)</td>
<td>0.030* (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Two-Party Vote</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.015 (0.018)</td>
<td>-0.015 (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Contributions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.011 (0.024)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.001 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>11.12</td>
<td>8.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Indicates significant at 1%, ** Indicates significant at 5%, * indicates significant at 10%
Table 8: OLS Regression Analysis with Model 1 and Model 2 (without MCs serving on an exclusive committee) by Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>105th – 108th Congress</th>
<th>109th Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1 (y=transfers)</td>
<td>Model 2 (y=trans_exclus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Committee Portfolio</td>
<td>-0.003 (0.038)</td>
<td>0.034 (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancies Upwards</td>
<td>0.041** (0.017)</td>
<td>0.012 (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank in Best Committee</td>
<td>0.052** (0.020)</td>
<td>0.018 (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>0.003 (0.012)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Committee Member</td>
<td>0.020 (0.016)</td>
<td>0.032*** (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Seniority</td>
<td>-0.110*** (0.020)</td>
<td>-0.073*** (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Loyalty Voting Score</td>
<td>0.005 (0.012)</td>
<td>0.009 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Two-Party Vote</td>
<td>0.015 (0.013)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Contributions</td>
<td>0.069** (0.032)</td>
<td>0.018 (0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.002 (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.002 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1129</td>
<td>1129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
<td>17.55</td>
<td>9.99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Indicates significant at 1%, ** Indicates significant at 5%, * indicates significant at 10%

Table 9: Correlation Coefficients for Dependent and Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Transfer</th>
<th>Transfer to Exclusive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Committee Portfolio</td>
<td>-0.201</td>
<td>-0.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancies Up</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Rank in Best Committee</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>0.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Committee Member</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Contributions</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of the Two-Party Vote</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Seniority</td>
<td>-0.268</td>
<td>-0.200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Vote Score</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10: Probit Regression Analysis with Model 1 and 2 (robust standard errors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 (y=transfers)</th>
<th>Model 2 (y=trans_exclus)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Committee Portfolio</td>
<td>-0.133*** (0.049)</td>
<td>-0.268*** (0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancies Upwards</td>
<td>0.126*** (0.043)</td>
<td>0.058 (0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank in Best Committee</td>
<td>0.065 (0.044)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>-0.016 (0.052)</td>
<td>dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Committee Member</td>
<td>0.080* (0.046)</td>
<td>0.127* (0.074)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Seniority</td>
<td>-0.448*** (0.058)</td>
<td>-0.919*** (0.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Loyalty Voting Score</td>
<td>0.064** (0.033)</td>
<td>0.129** (0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Two-Party Vote</td>
<td>0.032 (0.031)</td>
<td>0.019 (0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Contributions</td>
<td>0.130*** (0.046)</td>
<td>0.117* (0.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.020 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.007 (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>2248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi²</td>
<td>208.67</td>
<td>157.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Indicates significant at 1%, ** Indicates significant at 5%, * indicates significant at 10%
Table 11: Probit Regression Analysis with Model 1 and 2 (without MCs serving on an exclusive committee)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 (y=transfers)</th>
<th>Model 2 (y=trans exclus)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Committee Portfolio</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.091)</td>
<td>0.166 (0.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancies Upwards</td>
<td>0.153*** (0.046)</td>
<td>0.083 (0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank in Best Committee</td>
<td>0.092* (0.052)</td>
<td>0.050 (0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>0.006 (0.062)</td>
<td>dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Committee Member</td>
<td>0.069 (0.052)</td>
<td>0.116 (0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Seniority</td>
<td>-0.498*** (0.072)</td>
<td>-0.899*** (0.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Loyalty Voting Score</td>
<td>0.023 (0.036)</td>
<td>0.096* (0.057)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Two-Party Vote</td>
<td>0.036 (0.035)</td>
<td>0.020 (0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Contributions</td>
<td>0.077 (0.069)</td>
<td>0.103 (0.070)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.019 (0.018)</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1395</td>
<td>1395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Ch²</td>
<td>130.19</td>
<td>97.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Indicates significant at 1%, ** Indicates significant at 5%, * indicates significant at 10%
Table 12: Probit Regression Analysis with Model 1 and 2 (without MCs serving on an exclusive committee) by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Committee Portfolio</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.321*</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td>(0.144)</td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancies Upwards</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.276***</td>
<td>0.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank in Best Committee</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td>(0.102)</td>
<td>(0.084)</td>
<td>(0.107)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>dropped</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.082)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Committee Member</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.266**</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
<td>(0.073)</td>
<td>(0.099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Seniority</td>
<td>-0.541***</td>
<td>-1.375***</td>
<td>-0.460***</td>
<td>-0.627***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.274)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Loyalty Voting Score</td>
<td>0.196**</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.058)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Two-Party Vote</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
<td>0.108**</td>
<td>0.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Contributions</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.317***</td>
<td>0.339***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N                             | 691        | 691       | 704         | 704       |
| Pseudo $R^2$                  | 0.10       | 0.21      | 0.12        | 0.09      |
| Wald Chi²                     | 63.22      | 60.89     | 79.45       | 51.04     |

*** Indicates significant at 1%, ** Indicates significant at 5%, * indicates significant at 10%
Table 13: Probit Regression Analysis with Model 1 and Model 2 (without MCs serving on an exclusive committee) by Period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>105th – 108th Congress</th>
<th>109th Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1 (y=transfers)</td>
<td>Model 2 (y=trans_exclus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Committee Portfolio</td>
<td>0.013 (0.115)</td>
<td>0.215 (0.143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacancies Upwards</td>
<td>0.130** (0.053)</td>
<td>0.073 (0.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank in Best Committee</td>
<td>0.111* (0.059)</td>
<td>0.035 (0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Leader</td>
<td>-0.034 (0.077)</td>
<td>dropped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Committee Member</td>
<td>0.035 (0.057)</td>
<td>0.129 (0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber Seniority</td>
<td>-0.428*** (0.079)</td>
<td>-0.842*** (0.116)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Loyalty Voting Score</td>
<td>0.020 (0.039)</td>
<td>0.062 (0.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Two-Party Vote</td>
<td>0.050 (0.039)</td>
<td>0.010 (0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Contributions</td>
<td>0.238*** (0.094)</td>
<td>0.188* (0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>0.009 (0.019)</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1129</td>
<td>1129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi$^2$</td>
<td>99.09</td>
<td>82.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Indicates significant at 1%, ** Indicates significant at 5%, * indicates significant at 10%
APPENDIX B. MEMBER DATASET CODEBOOK

MEMBER DATASET 105-109 (1997-2005)
Dataset for M.S. Thesis for MIT Department of Political Science
Last Updated: 8/28/2006

John R. Velasco
Candidate for Master's of Science in Political Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

NOTE: This codebook and the variables mentioned within were drawn from a variety of primary and secondary sources. The major sources for this data include:


FORMATTED SUMMARY FOR MEMBER DATASET 104-109 (see below for a more detailed description)

Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cong</td>
<td>Congress Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>name</td>
<td>Member Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>candid</td>
<td>Candidate FEC ID Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party_num</td>
<td>Party Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>party_txt</td>
<td>Party Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tot_cmt_val</td>
<td>Total of Groseclose-Stewart Committee Values for Previous Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vacancy_up</td>
<td># of Vacant Seats Upwards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>best_comm_code</td>
<td>Highest Rank Committee Assignment from Previous Congress (code)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>best_comm_name</td>
<td>Highest Rank Committee Assignment from Previous Congress (name)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mc_rank_best_comm_leader</td>
<td>Member's Rank on Highest Committee Assignment from Previous Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sencommem</td>
<td>Senior Committee Member in Previous Congress (one of the top three MCs from each party on a committee) from Previous Congress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-108-
total_contribs - Total of All MC Contributions to Fellow MCs and Party Committees from Previous Election Cycle
votepct - Percentage of the Vote Received in Previous Election Cycle
region - Regional Code
ch_senior - Chamber seniority from Previous Congress
ptyvotescore - Party Voting Score from Previous Congress
transfer - Transfer (1=yes, 0=no)
trans_exclus - Transfer to an Exclusive Committee (1=yes, 2=no)
exclusive - Member of Exclusive Committee (1=yes, 2=no)

**Standardized Values of Independent Variables for Regression**

\[ z_{\text{tot cmt val}} \]
\[ z_{\text{vacancy up}} \]
\[ z_{\text{mc rank best comm}} \]
\[ z_{\text{leader}} \]
\[ z_{\text{sencommem}} \]
\[ z_{\text{total contribs}} \]
\[ z_{\text{votepct}} \]
\[ z_{\text{ch senior}} \]
\[ z_{\text{ptyvotescore}} \]

CONGRESS NUMBER (cong)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Congress</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>105th</td>
<td>(1997-1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>106th</td>
<td>(1999-2001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MEMBER NAME (name)

For the most part, the names are as they appear in the Congressional Directory.

CANDIDATE FEC ID NUMBER (candid)

Candidate identification number utilized by the Federal Election Commission in all internal financial records and reports.
PARTY NUMBER (party_num)

100 Democrat
200 Republican

*NOTE: this dataset does not include any Members who identify as independents or as other minor third parties.*

PARTY NAME (party_txt)

One letter abbreviation, where D = Democrat and R = Republican.

TOTAL COMMITTEE PORTFOLIO VALUE (tot_cmt_val)

This number represents a cumulative total of the cardinal committee values for each Member's set of committee assignments for each Congress that are calculated through the Grosewart Method (see Groseclose, Timothy, and Charles Stewart III. “The Value of Committee Seats in the House, 1947-91.” American Journal of Political Science. 42.2 (1998): 453-74).

For the Ways and Means committee, which under the Grosewart Method does not have a value (it has a value of infinity, since no Members transferred off this committee for another committee), I used the value calculated by Edwards and Stewart (see Edwards, Keith, and Charles Stewart III. “The Value of Committee Assignments in Congress since 1994.” Presented at the annual meetings of the Southern Political Science Association. Atlanta, 2006).

This value will serve as a proxy for how valuable a Member's current assignments are, and will assist in the evaluation of the motivation behind committee transfers.

VACANCIES UPWARDS (vacancy_up)

This variable represents the total number of vacant seats available to a Member of Congress on committees that are higher ranked (based on the Grosewart Method) than their current highest rank assignment. For instance, if a Member serves on Ways and Means, this value would be 0, since Ways and Means is ranked 1 by the Grosewart Method. The number of available seats upwards is calculated for each party for each Congress.

The number of vacant seats on a committee was obtained by examining the number of new members appointed to each committee from each party for each Congress. Given that the number of seats on any particular committee can be adjusted by the party leadership and that the partisan margins in Congress adjust each election cycle, it would be difficult to determine the number of available seats purely by examining the number of retiring Members or Members who transferred of the committee. Therefore, I used the number of new appointees as a measure of the number of available seats.
HIGHEST RANK COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT FROM PREVIOUS CONGRESS - CODE
(best_comm_code)

The code of the highest rank assignment for each Member of Congress. The same set of codes was used for all congresses under consideration. Even though jurisdictions and names of committees changed during this time period, the same committee codes were used. For example, the Armed Services committee became the National Security committee, but both use the same committee code.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>Appropriations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>Armed Services (109th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Security (104th - 108th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>Banking and Financial Services (104th - 106th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial Services (106th - 109th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>Economic and Educational Opportunities (104th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Education and the Workplace (105th - 109th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>Energy and Commerce (107th - 109th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commerce (104th - 106th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138</td>
<td>Government Reform and Oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>House Administration (109th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>House Oversight (104th - 108th)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>Judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173</td>
<td>Transportation and Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176</td>
<td>Rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182</td>
<td>Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>Small Business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186</td>
<td>Standards of Official Conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>192</td>
<td>Veterans Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>196</td>
<td>Ways and Means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242</td>
<td>Intelligence (Select)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251</td>
<td>Homeland Security (Select 107th and 108th; Standing, 109th)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HIGHEST RANK COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT FROM PREVIOUS CONGRESS - NAME
(best_comm_name)

The name of the highest ranked assignment for each Member of Congress.
MEMBER RANKING ON HIGHEST RANKED COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT FROM PREVIOUS CONGRESS - NAME (mc_rank_best_comm)

This represents the Member's rank within the committee that is the most valuable or highly ranked committee in their committee portfolio. With this information, we are able to gauge the opportunity cost of a Member transferring for their highest ranked committee.

LEADER (leader)

This is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the Member held a committee chair or ranking member position on any of their committee assignments during the previous Congress, 0 otherwise.

SENIOR COMMITTEE MEMBER (sencommem)

This is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the Member was in one of the top three positions for their party in any of their committee assignments for the previous Congress, 0 otherwise.

TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS (total_contribs)

This represents the total of all contributions to party committees and colleagues from a Member's personal campaign account and leadership PAC for a given election cycle.

The value is the total contributions to fellow MCs and party committees for the previous election cycle. For instance, the total contributions entry for the 109th Congress represents the total contributions made by this Member to fellow MCs and Party Committees during the 2003-2004 election cycle.

PERCENTAGE OF THE VOTE RECEIVED IN PREVIOUS ELECTION (votepct)

This represents the vote share of the two party vote that the Member received in the previous election cycle. For instance, a listing of 90 for a Member of the 108th means that Member received 90% of the vote for the election cycle 2001-2002.

REGIONAL CODE (region)

This is a numeric code which represents different regions in the United States. The states are grouped into regions as mentioned below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>New England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>Maine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>Vermont</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Middle Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Delaware</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>New York</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East North Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Indiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>West North Central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Iowa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Kansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
</tr>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Missouri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>North Dakota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>South Dakota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solid South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Arkansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Louisiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>South Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Border States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Kentucky</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
52 Maryland
53 Oklahoma
54 Tennessee
56 West Virginia

Mountain States
7  61 Arizona
62 Colorado
63 Idaho
64 Montana
65 Nevada
66 New Mexico
67 Utah
68 Wyoming

8  Pacific States
71 California
72 Oregon
73 Washington
74 Alaska
75 Hawaii

CHAMBER SENIORITY (ch_senior)

The term served in this Congress. This variable represents total (not just continuous) service in the chamber and is calculated from the dates/terms of service given in the Congressional Directory.

PARTY VOTING SCORE (ptyvotescore)

This represents the Members Voting Score in the previous Congress, as measured by the two scores of CQ’s party voting scores, adjusted for attendance, during the previous Congress. The scores are calculated separately for each party during each Congress – standardization allows for comparisons across sessions of Congress and Political Parties (see Sharp, Michael J. Directory of Congressional Voting Scores and Interest Group Ratings, 4th Edition. Congressional Quarterly Press, Inc. Washington, DC 2006). For example, a voting score 94 in the 107th slot, means that the Member had a record of voting 94% of the time with his/her party on key votes in the 106th Congress.

COMMITTEE TRANSFERS (transfer)

This is a dummy variable that records when any Member transfers from one committee to another. It is assumed that anyone who is transferring is moving "up" in the committee hierarchy,
because they would likely prefer to keep their current assignment if they did not gain something from transferring.

When a Member transfers the variable transfer = 1, otherwise 0.

TRANSFERS TO EXCLUSIVE COMMITTEES (trans_exclus)

This is a dummy variable which records when a Member transfers to an exclusive committee. The exclusive committees include appropriations, ways and means, energy and commerce, and rules.

When a Member transfers to an exclusive committee the variable trans_exclus = 1, otherwise 0.

EXCLUSIVE (exclusive)

This is a dummy variable that records which Members are serving on an exclusive committee. This is utilized during the analysis to eliminate those Members who are already on an exclusive committee, since it is likely that they will not transfer upwards from an exclusive committee assignment.

When a Member is on an exclusive committee the variable exclusive = 1, otherwise 0.