

**Construing Reconstruction:
The Barcelona Pavilion and Nelson Goodman's Aesthetic Philosophy**

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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores Mies van der Rohe's Barcelona Pavilion through the lens of Nelson Goodman's philosophical categories of the autographic and the allographic in order to determine what constitutes the building's identity. The Pavilion was originally designed as a temporary structure for the 1929 International Exposition in Barcelona and rebuilt in 1986 as a permanent building. The reconstruction of this iconic building provokes a complex questioning about the identity of the Barcelona Pavilion in particular and of any architectural work in general. Goodman's notions are unique criteria to deal with issues of identity and authenticity in architecture.

The autographic identifies a category of works that cannot be replicated, i.e., every difference between a work and even its closest copy makes a difference to the work's identity. In contrast, the allographic identifies a category of works that can be replicated, i.e., the difference between an original and its duplication is irrelevant to the work's identity. By examining the Barcelona Pavilion through the lens of these notions, this thesis shows that Mies's building is a hybrid case in which the autographic and the allographic criteria are inextricably linked. To consider the 1986 Pavilion simply as a copy does not completely define its identity status; conversely, to conclude that they are two instances of the same work or that they are two different buildings is not accurate, either. This case illustrates the complexity that arises when trying to establish what constitutes the identity of an architectural work in general and, at the same time, allows us to reconsider Goodman's statements regarding architecture.

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Construing Reconstruction:

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Introduction

“I refrain from commenting on the reconstruction of the pavilion, except to applaud those responsible. Others regard the issues of its authenticity and reproducibility as significant, but I am unable to see why.”

(Robin Evans)¹

This thesis aims to argue that, contrary to Evans' opinion, the question of the authenticity and reproducibility of Mies van der Rohe's Barcelona Pavilion as well as of architectural works in general is indeed significant. The task of determining what constitutes the identity of a building is not only a relevant issue in the case of reconstructions or replicas, but is also a crucial aspect that affects the very being of architecture and art. If the distinction between an original and a copy or even a forgery of a work were not important at all, then it would be quite problematic to justify why originals are aesthetically more valuable than their copies and few reasons would explain why forgeries are repudiated. The authenticity of artworks certainly concerns art dealers, museums, and galleries. However, this fact is not simply a reflection of snobbery nor an exclusively economic matter. Rather, the notion of authenticity lies at the heart of a much

¹ Robin Evans, “Mies van der Rohe's Paradoxical Symmetries,” in *Translations from Drawing to Building and Other Essays* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), 272. This article was first published in *AA Files* 19 (Spring, 1990), 56-69.

broader philosophical inquiry that focuses on identity and has further consequences to the meaning and the aesthetic experience of works of art and architecture.

Both our understanding and experience of an architectural work change depending on whether or not we know that the work that we are contemplating is authentic. If we visit the Barcelona Pavilion today thinking that it is the original building and suddenly realize that it is a reconstruction, we may feel disappointed, even defrauded, and the knowledge just acquired will have a decisive and irreversible influence on our further comprehension of Mies's work. Thus, determining the identity of the Barcelona Pavilion or any other architectural structure is an initial and indispensable step in construing the meaning of architecture. For this reason, philosophical categories are necessary to conceptually differentiate between an original and something else as well as to establish identity criteria.

The analytical philosopher Nelson Goodman (1906 – 1998) provides unique conceptual tools to think about the notion of authenticity, namely, the autographic and the allographic, a pair of categories that allows the classification of the several artistic disciplines depending on whether the works of art can be falsified or not.² However, Goodman not only proposes these two categories but, most important, he grants aesthetics and artistic knowledge a preeminent role within his philosophical system,

² Nelson Goodman was born in Somerville (Massachusetts). He received his PhD in Philosophy at Harvard in 1941 and, after teaching at Tufts, University of Pennsylvania, and Brandeis University, taught at Harvard from 1968 to 1977, when he became professor emeritus. For a brief discussion of Goodman's life and work see: Curtis Carter, "In Memoriam: Nelson Goodman." *Aesthetics on-line*. <http://www.aesthetics-online.org/memorials/carter.html> (accessed March 27, 2007). This article is the same as Curtis Carter, "Nelson Goodman: Obituary," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 58 (2000), 251-253. See also: Catherine Elgin, "Worldmaker: Nelson Goodman 1906-1998," *Journal for General Philosophy of Science* 31 (2000), 1-18; Catherine Elgin, "Goodman, Nelson," in E. Craig (Ed.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1998) <http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/M045SECT2> (accessed March 28, 2007); Avishai Margalit, Nelson Goodman, "Goodman, Nelson," in Michael Kelly (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 319-326. For a general introduction to Goodman's thought see: Daniel Cohnitz, Marcus Rossberg, *Nelson Goodman* (Montreal; Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006).

which allows us to understand why determining the identity of a work of art and architecture is a key endeavor. For Goodman, aesthetic attitude is not a passive contemplation but an active cognitive engagement, whose main aim is comprehension and not pleasure. According to him, perception is cognitive: “emotion and cognition are interdependent: feeling without understanding is blind, and understanding without feeling is empty.”³ Knowledge configures our perception and perception configures our knowledge; there is no “innocent eye,” taking Gombrich’s expression, and thus incorrect information – such as the assumption that a copy is an original – erroneously shapes our aesthetic experience and comprehension of a work. This misguided understanding has further consequences: for Goodman the knowledge provided by art is as important and valid as the one provided by science or any other discipline. In addition, this knowledge is irreducible to that provided by any other discipline. Hence, aesthetics is a branch of epistemology, i.e. aesthetics focuses on artistic knowledge as a part of a general theory of knowledge.

The “languages of art,” paraphrasing the title of Goodman’s famous work, are not translatable (or they are only partially translatable) to a linguistic system.⁴ In other words, the knowledge transmitted through art is unique because it cannot be completely replaced by a verbal paraphrase; there is no referential system that serves as a common ground for equalizing the various kinds of knowledge. There is no last referent to contrast the truth or falsity of our statements; in Goodman’s terms, there is not “a” world or “the” world, but a plurality of worlds and systems with their own criteria of rightness, correctness, or

³ Nelson Goodman, “Replies,” *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 39 (Spring, 1981), 274. (Special issue: Aesthetics and Worldmaking: An Exchange with Nelson Goodman)

⁴ Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), in what follows quoted as *LA*.

validity. A world, or a version of the world, is correct insofar as it is intrinsically coherent and consistent.

Hence, and returning to the main issue of this thesis, to determine what constitutes the identity of an architectural work has a direct repercussion upon its meaning as well as the meaning of the world in which a building is inserted. Yet this process not only has an impact on our understanding of the world, but affects what constitutes reality, because for Goodman “[n]ature is a product of art and discourse.”⁵ Specifically, to consider the Barcelona Pavilion as an original produces a certain reality, while to consider the Pavilion a copy creates another one. In a similar way, we have two conceptions of the light: according to one light is a wave, and, according to the other, it is a particle. Thus, “issues of authenticity” are definitely significant, for they are a constitutive part of both meaning and reality.

For Goodman, reality is not fixed, immutable, but constructed; the ways of creating meaning are also “ways of worldmaking,” to cite the title of another of Goodman’s major works.⁶ That is to say, Goodman’s epistemological relativism corresponds to his pluralist constructivism. The various construals of the world are at the same time constructions of the world, e.g., light is either a wave or a particle and these two interpretations actually create two different worlds. Furthermore, the process of worldmaking always begins from preexistent worlds and excludes the existence of a first world serving as the ultimate referent. For Goodman, “[w]orldmaking begins with one version and ends with another.”⁷ It is impossible to create from nothing: to make a world

⁵ *LA*, 33.

⁶ Nelson Goodman, *Ways of Worldmaking*, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1978), in what follows quoted as *WW*.

⁷ *WW*, 97.

is always and only to remake it. This affirmation is based on the fact that, for Goodman, there is no way to have a direct access to reality, but only through the mediation of our faculties, which simultaneously are interpreting and creating reality. For this reason, “stripping off or ripping out all construals (that is, all interpretation and construction) does not leave a work cleansed of all encrustation but demolishes it.”⁸ In other words, as if it were an onion, taking out all the layers that constitute a work does not lead to its core, but leaves us with nothing.

Therefore, since construals actually construct works (including also architectural works), it is crucial to examine the conceptual elements that actively participate in these constructions, especially those referring to identity. Establishing what constitutes the identity of buildings, determining whether an architectural structure is original or not, and providing criteria to undertake these tasks are also constitutive in the creation of a work and its world. As this thesis intends to point out, the case of architecture is particularly complex because of the intrinsic features of this discipline. Mies’s Barcelona Pavilion, first built in 1929 and reconstructed in 1986, is a perfect example for examining these complexities as well as for testing Goodman’s criteria for establishing the identity of works in the specific case of architecture. Furthermore, through this examination, this thesis contributes to the debate on the Pavilion’s identity that erupted in the major architectural journals and magazines when it was known that this building was going to be reconstructed.

⁸ Nelson Goodman, Catherine Elgin, *Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988), 45, in what follows quoted as *RR*.

Since its rebuilding, the number of publications on the Pavilion and also on Mies's work in general has risen meteorically.⁹ Although some essays, such as Evans', comment on the Pavilion without regard to identity issues, the majority of authors have reflected on the implications that the fact of being reconstructed has for the Pavilion's meaning. During a visit to Barcelona in 1985, the British architect Alison Smithson already expressed her worries about the fact that the "pavilion, a myth for so many years, would now gain a second life, made out of exhibition and propaganda, to become merely a tourist attraction."¹⁰ This opinion is also shared by James A. Warren, as stated in his article on the Pavilion's dedication: "Any faithful reproduction remains just that: a copy, a facsimile. Without the original *Zeitgeist* of the age that inspired it or the original mind that conceived it, the new Barcelona Pavilion may just become a souvenir of the Modern past that was, but no longer is."¹¹ For both Smithson and Warren, the 1986 building is a mere reproduction in danger of being devalued because it lacks the initial historical context and the artist's intentionality that infused the original Pavilion. George Dodds even attributes the authorship of the 1986 Pavilion not to Mies but to the architect

⁹ "Certainly, the re-building of the pavilion is, in part, responsible for a renewed interest in an old news item. This I evinced by approximately three hundred articles and more than two dozen books published on Mies since the reconstruction, literally doubling the combined literature of the previous seventy years." George Dodds, "Body in pieces: desiring the Barcelona Pavilion," *Res* 39 (2001), 169. More than 80 articles and several books have been written focusing specifically on the Pavilion since the 1980's.

¹⁰ Her complete words were the following: "The Pavilion by Mies van der Rohe in Barcelona has been a myth for our generation, and we do not know what will happen once rebuild, in the same way as we do not know what would happen if we had a second battle of Troy. My relation to this process is as a simply observer, but I am afraid that this pavilion, a myth during so many years, would gain now a second life made out of exhibition, propaganda, and becomes merely a tourist attraction." *La Vanguardia*, 15 November 1985, 44. Translation from Spanish by author.

¹¹ Warren A., James, "Barcelona: Reconstruction of the Barcelona Pavilion," *Progressive architecture* 67 (August, 1986), 62.

responsible for the reconstruction, thus implicitly acknowledging that the extant Pavilion is distinct from the original one.¹²

In contrast to these opinions, others maintain that the Pavilion's Zeitgeist is precisely the condition for its reproducibility. As Dennis Dollens affirms, "to recall Walter Benjamin, the Barcelona Pavilion is eminently a reproducible work, and this is still an *age of mechanical reproduction*."¹³ That is to say, the Pavilion is already a work lacking "aura," and thus able to be replicated without losing any constitutive feature.¹⁴ Even more, any reproduction of the Pavilion would be as valid as the first one. Like a photographic reproduction, any building faithfully recreating the 1929 Pavilion would be a valid instance of the work, as is argued by Max Bächer in the article "Barcelona-Pavillon, Sagrada Família: Original, Kopie oder Nachahmung."¹⁵ According to him, "whether the Barcelona Pavilion is more or less an original or an authorized replica would be of most importance only if the Pavilion were a sellable collector's piece. Its authenticity lies in the aim of creating a genuine copy."¹⁶ Since this goal is achieved, the 1986 reconstruction is authentic.

The debate over whether the 1986 Pavilion is simply a copy (and, as such, will never reach the stature of the original) or, on the contrary, is a construction as valid as the

¹² In his article, Dodds refers to the 1986 Pavilion as "the Solà-Morales reconstruction" and he defines this Catalan architect as "the author of the reconstructed pavilion." Dodds, 173, 179.

¹³ Dennis L. Dollens, "Less is more again," *Sites* 15 (1986), 35. Dollens is referring to Benjamin's essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" in Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations* (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 217-251.

¹⁴ Benjamin defines aura as "that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art," and also "as the unique phenomenon of a distance, however close it may be." Benjamin, 221, 222. For a detailed discussion of Benjamin's notion of aura see sections II-IV of "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in Benjamin, 220-224.

¹⁵ Max Bächer, "Barcelona-Pavillon, Sagrada Família: Original, Kopie oder Nachahmung," *Bauwelt* 80 (May 1989), 850-853. In this article, the author comments on the Mies's Pavilion and Gaudí's Sagrada Família to show that there are two different kinds of original works: authentic and unauthentic. The Pavilion is authentic because it is a faithful reconstruction while the Sagrada Família is unauthentic because, for Bächer, the expiatory church is being finished instead of left as it was when Gaudí died.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 853. Translation from German from author.

1929 one not only took place in the context of architectural theory but also in the essays dealing with Goodman's philosophy as applied to architecture. Specifically, the case of Mies's Pavilion is the paradigmatic example when dealing with Goodman's categories of the autographic and the allographic in architecture. In his book, *The Work of Art: Immanence and Transcendence* (1994), Gérard Genette takes the Pavilion as an example of a work rebuilt after the demise of its author thanks to the availability of plans, thus acknowledging that the 1929 and the 1986 Pavilion can be (allographically) considered as two instances of the same work.¹⁷ This opinion is shared by Maurice Lagueux, who discusses the issue of authenticity of architectural works in his 1998 article, "Nelson Goodman and Architecture."¹⁸ Conversely, in her 2002 article, "Combien y a-t-il de Pavillons de Barcelone?", Sylvain Malfroy concludes that, using Goodman's notions, the logical status of the 1986 Pavilion is neither that of a copy nor that of an instance of the same work. Rather, according to her, "[w]hile transposing Mies's project, the architects of the 1986 Pavilion have indisputably claimed authorship. There is thus a real interest in distinguishing, in this respect, two Pavilions of Barcelona [...]. The most recent is not a

¹⁷ Gérard Genette, *The Work of Art. Immanence and Transcendence* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1997). His statements on the Pavilion are the following: "In contrast, buildings are "always" (as we say) being built or rebuilt from the plans of an allographic architect after his death: take a look, without leaving Barcelona, at Mies van der Rohe's German Pavilion." Genette, 37. And also: "But the fact that architectural (de)notations exist at least makes it possible to finish a work after the death of its author, like Spreckelsen's Great Arch de La Défense, or, as I have already indicated, to rebuild a demolished building exactly as it was, like the German Pavilion in Barcelona." Genette, 97.

¹⁸ Maurice Lagueux, "Nelson Goodman and Architecture," *Assemblage* 35 (1998), 18-35. This is the first article that comments on Goodman's contributions regarding architecture. Lagueux briefly analyzes architecture taking Goodman's main aesthetical notions as a conceptual tool while pointing out some difficulties he finds. When discussing the Mies's work he affirms: "In this manner, the famous Barcelona Pavilion built by Mies van der Rohe for the International Exposition of 1929, held in the city that gave it its name, was disassembled shortly afterwards – under conditions such that the materials from which it was constructed disappeared mysteriously – but was recently rebuilt on the site in accordance with its architect's plans using similar materials. Here we can state that the 1929 and 1989 pavilions, which are undoubtedly much more alike than are some interpretations of the same symphony, constitute two instances of the same work and can be identified allographically, even if, when faced with purists upset at not being able to admire Mies's *own* work, we might hesitate to assure them that these are equivalent instances of the same building." Lagueux, 21.

copy, but an original work à propos of a preceding work.”¹⁹ Although Malfroy insists that her position is undeniable, both Genette and Lagueux argue the opposite, also basing their arguments on Goodman’s thought.

This thesis defends another point of view. It argues that to consider the 1986 Pavilion simply as a copy – or as a reproduction, reconstruction, replica, recreation, or facsimile, taking the terms used to refer to the newer Pavilion – does not completely define its identity status. Moreover, to conclude either that the two Pavilions are instances of the same work or that they are two different buildings entails a restriction of the elements that constitute the identity of Mies’s work. As is shown in this thesis, the specific characteristics of architecture challenge Goodman’s distinction between the autographic and the allographic and, at the same time, these categories help us to better understand the nature of architecture. The first chapter of this thesis focuses on Goodman’s criteria for establishing the identity of architectural works by discussing several kinds of constructions. The second chapter examines Mies van der Rohe’s Barcelona Pavilion through the lens of Goodman’s categories to show the inherent complexity of architecture as well as to emphasize the importance of determining the status of this iconic building. It must be said right away that no simple response can be given to the question of what constitutes the identity of a building. Nevertheless, the attempt to give an answer shows how every nuance is indeed significant in the continuous process of construing architecture.

¹⁹ Sylvain Malfroy, “Combien y a-t-il de *Pavillons de Barcelone*? Réflexion sur le statut logique de la “réplique” *in situ* d’un édifice détruit,” *Matières* 5 (2002), 76-89. Quotation, Malfroy, 87. Translation from French by author.

Chapter 1.

The Identity of Architectural Works: the Autographic and the Allographic

The question of authenticity in art has long been disregarded in analytical aesthetic philosophy.²⁰ With the exception of Walter Benjamin – whose philosophical context was another –, the North American philosopher Nelson Goodman was one of the first to undertake a systematic approach and provide decisive categories to philosophically discern between an original work and its copy, reproduction, or forgery.²¹ In his main work on aesthetics, *Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols* (1968), Goodman devotes central chapters to deal with this issue, pointing out that different criteria are required when establishing authenticity in the various artistic disciplines.²² However clear these distinctions might be in cases such as painting or music, difficulties arise when dealing with architecture. For this reason, to concentrate on the specific features architecture presents, it is first necessary to consider Goodman's

²⁰ The first article in dealing the question of authenticity and forgeries in the context of analytical philosophy dates to 1965: Alfred Lessing, "What is wrong with a forgery?", *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 23 (1965), 461-471. This article, as well as Goodman's chapter "Art and Authenticity" first published in *Languages of Art*, were published together with other relevant articles in a monograph on forgery: Denis Dutton (ed.), *The Forger's Art. Forgery and the Philosophy of Art* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). Goodman's reflections on authenticity have fostered the debate on this issue. See, especially, the following comments on Goodman's theory: Anthony Ralls, "The Uniqueness and Reproducibility of a Work of Art: A Critique of Goodman's Theory," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 22 (Jan., 1972), 1-18; Luise H. Morton; Thomas R. Foster, "Goodman, Forgery, and the Aesthetic," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 49 (1991), 155-159. Other relevant works on forgery and its philosophical status are: Denis Dutton, "Artistic Crimes: The Problem of Forgery in the Arts," *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 19 (1979), 302-314; Tomáš Kulka, "The Artistic and Aesthetic Status of Forgeries," *Leonardo* 15 (1982), 115-117; Mark Sagoff, "The Aesthetic Status of Forgeries," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 35 (1976), 169-180; Mark Sagoff, "On Restoring and Reproducing Art," *The Journal of Philosophy* 75 (1978), 453-470; W. E. Kennick, "Art and Inauthenticity," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 44 (1985), 3-12; Mark Sagoff, "He Had a Hat," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 44 (1985), 191-192.

²¹ Walter Benjamin deals with this issue in his 1936 text "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction." See: Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations* (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 217-251.

²² See, especially, Chapter 3 "Art and Authenticity," *LA*, 99-123, and Chapter 5 "Score, Sketch, and Script," *LA*, 177-221.

conceptions regarding authenticity in general and in relation to the visual and performing arts.

When discussing the characteristics of an original work, Goodman notes that some works of art cannot be faked. While it is possible to have a perfect copy of a painting – Rembrandt’s *Lucretia*, to take Goodman’s example –, no forgery of a known musical piece can be made.²³ This leads him to trace a general differentiation between what he terms autographic as opposed to allographic arts, i.e., arts such as painting, which are “fakable,” and arts such as music, which he affirms are “unfakable.” In his words:

A work of art [is] *autographic* if and only if the distinction between original and forgery of it is significant; or better, if and only if even the most exact duplication of it does not thereby count as genuine. If a work of art is autographic, we may also call that art autographic. Thus painting is autographic, music nonautographic, or *allographic*.²⁴

This distinction implies two different criteria for establishing the identity of a work of art. In the autographic arts, on the one hand, authenticity is defined by the history of production, i.e., if two works do not share the same history of production they are not considered the same work and, consequently, one is the original and the other is

²³ It is theoretically possible to forge an unknown musical work by using allographic processes, as it is argued in the following articles, based on Goodman’s philosophy: Peter Kivy, “How to Forge a Musical Work,” *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 58 (2000), 233-235; Kirk Pillow, “Versions and Forgeries: A Response to Kivy,” *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 60 (2002), 177-179; Peter Kivy, “Versions and “Versions,” Forgeries and “Forgeries”: A Response to Kirk Pillow,” *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 60 (2002), 180-182.

²⁴ *LA*, 113.

not. But if both works have in common the same history of production, then they are instances of the same work. Hence, the autographic does not mean singularity, for there are autographic and multiple works, such as engravings and cast sculptures: the several prints of Goya's *Capricho 43* – “*El sueño de la razón produce monstruos*” are instances of the same autographic work, for they were made from the same plate; Picasso's *She-Goat* in the artist's Museum in Paris, dated 1950, is the same as the cast in 1952 now in the Museum of Modern Art in New York.²⁵ In other words, an artistic discipline is autographic if the identification of the works in this discipline necessarily depends on the history of production and this is not related to singularity or multiplicity.²⁶

On the other hand, the identity of allographic works is established either by means of a notational scheme or by means of a notational system. Two literary texts, for example, are considered two instances of a particular work if they are spelled exactly the same, if they follow a notational scheme; two musical pieces are instances of a particular

²⁵ The case of cast sculptures requires a thorough discussion, since it fostered a central debate on the notion of originality within the history of art. In her 1981 article, “The Originality of the Avant-Garde,” Rosalind Krauss comments on Rodin's posthumous cast of *The Gates of Hell* to question its validity as an original work and to discuss the notions of original, copy, and reproduction during the Avant-Garde and throughout the twentieth century. These aspects are closely related to the artist's intentionality and work as a creator, i.e., as an originator of new artistic proposals. In other words, the question of originality is not only a crucial issue in philosophical aesthetics but lies also at the very core of the development of art. For a description of the various types of cast sculpture as well as a discussion on Nineteenth-Century French sculpture see Jacques de Caso, “Serial Sculpture in Nineteenth-Century France,” Jeanne L. Wasserman (ed.), *Metamorphoses in Nineteenth-Century Sculpture* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 1-27; for a brief survey on the notion of originality in art history see: Richard Schiff, “Originality,” in Richard S. Nelson, Richard Schiff (eds.), *Critical Terms for Art History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 103-15; see also Krauss' article and posterior comments: Rosalind E. Krauss, “The Originality of the Avant-Garde,” *The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 151-170, Albert Elsen, “On the Question of Originality: A Letter,” *October 20* (Spring 1982), 107-109, Rosalind E. Krauss, “Sincerely Yours,” *October 20* (Spring 1982), 110-130, also in *The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 171-194.

²⁶ As Goodman affirms: “Concerning the distinction between autographic and allographic arts or works, the first point is that this distinction does not coincide with that between singular and multiple arts; for some multiple arts, such as etching, are autographic.” Nelson Goodman, *Of Mind and Other Matters*, (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1984), 140, in what follows quoted as *MM*.) Goodman first discussed the notions of autographic and allographic in *Languages of Art*. In *Of Mind and Other Matters*, he provides further specifications that arose as an answer to several comments and critiques received after the publication of *Languages of Art*. Specifically, the quoted passage is an excerpt of Goodman's answer to Richard Wohlheim's critiques.

work if they are in compliance with the structural features fixed on a notational system. Hence, this implies that allographic works are potentially multiple and reproducible; there can be several instances of the same allographic work. Although these works of art also have histories of production, this is not the criterion for defining the work as it is. It is known, for instance, that Johann Sebastian Bach composed the *Goldberg Variations* around 1741 for Count Hermann Karl von Keyserling, who suffered from insomnia and wanted his harpsichordist Johann Gottlieb Goldberg to play during his sleepless nights. Yet this is not the criterion according to which a musical piece is identified as a performance of the *Goldberg Variations*; instead of the history of production of the piece, the criterion used is a score, i.e., a notational system. As Goodman affirms:

Authority for a notation must be found in an antecedent classification by history of production; but definitive identification of works, fully freed from history of production, is achieved only when a notation is established. The allographic art has won its emancipation not by proclamation but by notation.²⁷

Despite having a history of production, music, literature, and performing arts are allographic, for a score, a text, or a script are needed to identify a work as such. In general, then, an artistic discipline is allographic if the identification of the works in this discipline necessarily depends on a notational scheme or system.²⁸

²⁷ LA, 122.

²⁸ Goodman emphasizes this aspect of allographic works as follows: "But for distinguishing allographic from autographic works, all that counts is whether or not identity of the work – quite apart from any particular question of author or opus – is independent of history of production. [...] Of course for any work,

According to Goodman, the primary logical function of a notational scheme or system is to identify a work, even though it has other functions such as being a “practical aid to production.”²⁹ A musical score, for instance, in addition to its fundamental role of identifying a piece from performance to performance, serves musicians as a tool for remembering what to play. In order to fulfill its identificatory function, a score and, in general every notational system, has to accomplish certain syntactic and semantic requirements. Syntactically, a notational system has to be composed of unconnected or “disjoint” elements, so that it allows the substitution of one element for another: e.g., it is possible to change a note in a score from C to D, and the musical phrase will continue being a phrase.³⁰ Furthermore, the elements that are part of a notational system are “character-indifferent,” for instance, all the letters “R,” “r,” “r,” and “r” correspond to the same character, and using one or the other in the word “remedy” does not alter its spelling.³¹ Finally, these elements have to be “finitely differentiated, or articulate[d],” the criterion for distinguishing among characters is limited to a certain degree. This happens in the Western musical system, where the semitone is the smallest interval codified in the scale, even though smaller intervals as quarter tones and commas are audible.³² Semantically, notational systems have to be first “unambiguous” to avoid referring to different works with the same notation refers.³³ Theoretically, each character has to correspond to only one referent to allow the univocal identification of a work. Second,

autographic or allographic, determination of authorship, opus, period, and so on, are aspects of history of production. What distinguishes an allographic work is that identification of an object or event as an instance of the work depends not at all upon how or when or by whom that object or event was produced.”

MM, 140.

²⁹ *LA*, 128.

³⁰ *LA*, 133.

³¹ *LA*, 132.

³² *LA*, 135. For a detailed discussion on the syntactic requirements of a notational system see *LA*, 130-141.

³³ *LA*, 148.

redundancy has to be avoided, although in some notational systems such as the musical score, this principle is violated because some notes refer to the same sound: C, B#, and *Dbb* refer to the same pitch.³⁴

Thus, every notation that fulfills these syntactic and semantic requirements serves the function of establishing what allographically constitutes the identity of a work. In general, music, literature, and dance are allographic arts, although there are some exceptions: music with no score, such as jazz improvisations, is autographic; however, since it is possible to actually create a notational system that fixes their identities, they can be taken as allographic too. In opposition, painting, etchings, and sculpture are usually autographic.³⁵ And architecture, according to Goodman, can be classified under both categories:³⁶

We are not as comfortable about identifying an architectural work with a design rather than a building as we are about identifying a musical work with a composition rather than a performance. In that architecture has a reasonably appropriate notational system and that some of its works are unmistakably allographic, the art is allographic. But insofar as its

³⁴ For a detailed discussion on the semantic requirements of a notational system see *LA*, 148-154.

³⁵ Some exceptions can also be found in the autographic arts. See, for instance: Kirk Pillow, "Did Goodman's distinction survive LeWitt?", *Journal of aesthetics and art criticism* 61 (Fall, 2003), 365-380, in which the author argues that Goodman's autographic-allographic distinction does not apply for some of LeWitt's paintings. See also: Michel Weemans, "Pratiques allographiques et reproduction: Sol LeWitt, Claude Rutault, Lawrence Weiner," in Véronique Goudinoux, Michel Weemans (eds.) *Reproductibilité et irréproductibilité de l'oeuvre d'art* (Bruxelles: Ante, 2001), 136-165, in which the author comments on LeWitt's murals, Rutault's definitions-methods, and Weiner's general and specific works to argue that the allographic criterion is valid in those cases and, hence, painting can be also allographic.

³⁶ I will take for granted that architecture is or can be considered an art, although not every building is a work of art taking into account Goodman's statement according to which "A building is a work of art insofar as it signifies, means, refers, symbolizes in some way." *RR*, 33. Nevertheless, since also according to Goodman it is possible to make a "work work," i.e., that almost any object can be considered from an aesthetic point of view, then it seems that it is, at least theoretically, always possible to consider a building aesthetically. Goodman discusses this topic in an article devoted to the function of museums and the works they host; nevertheless, I think his argument is as valid for works of architecture and other arts that are not located in a museum. (See: "The End of the Museum," *MM*, 174-187.)

notational language has not yet acquired full authority to divorce identity of work in all cases from particular production, architecture is a mixed and transitional case.³⁷

In this passage, Goodman comments on the hybrid status of architecture as an artistic discipline that is both autographic and allographic, since both criteria for establishing the identity of a work are valid. Some buildings are identified by the history of their production while others by means of a notational system; moreover, a single building can be judged according to both criteria at the same time. This in-between position of architecture is not only synchronic but also diachronic: defining architecture as a “mixed case” means that the autographic and the allographic criteria coexist simultaneously; defining it as a “transitional case” means that the allographic criterion to establish the identity of an architectural work succeeds the autographic, and thus presupposes an inherent historical process. This is precisely what Goodman assumes when he states that architecture will become completely allographic once its notational system has “acquired full authority to divorce identity of work in all cases from particular production.”³⁸ In other words, this affirmation acknowledges that the decisive factor in

³⁷ *LA*, 221. Goodman reaches this conclusion after comparing architecture to the other arts: “Among other arts, sculpture is autographic; cast sculpture is comparable to printmaking while carved sculpture is comparable to painting. Architecture and the drama, on the other hand, are more nearly comparable to music. Any building that conforms to the plans and specifications, and performance of the text of a play in accordance with the stage directions, is as original an instance of the work as any other. But architecture seems to differ from music in that testing for compliance of a building with the specifications requires not that these be pronounced, or transcribed into sound, but that their application be understood. This is true also for the stage directions, as contrasted with the dialogue, of a play. Does this make architecture and the drama less purely allographic arts? Again, an architect’s plans seem a good deal like a painter’s sketches; and painting is an autographic art. On what grounds can we say that in the one case but not the other a veritable notation is involved? Such questions cannot be answered until we have carried through some rather painstaking analysis.” *LA*, 120-121.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

determining whether architecture is autographic or allographic is the perfection of the correspondent notational system, in this case, plans, elevations, and sections.

When discussing architectural plans, Goodman compares them with musical scores, which are the paradigmatic example for notational systems in art. Unlike literature, which is allographic because its identity is defined by a notational scheme, music and architecture are allographic because their identity is defined by a notational system. That is to say, while a book does constitute a literary work, plans and scores do not constitute architectural and musical works: they are their notational systems. Plans and scores include integral parts that constitute the notational system itself, and others that cannot be considered notational. The notational system of plans results from the combination of accurate drawing and measurements represented on a scale, which is parallel to the musical scale system; the non-notational parts of plans are the written specifications or other non-codified indications regarding certain aspects of the building (construction materials, for instance), which are comparable to the verbal specifications of tempo in a score. In a certain sense, the non-notational aspects of plans over-define, as it were, a building insofar as they establish more properties apart from the ones that are strictly constitutive elements, i.e., that are fixed by a notation that fulfills the syntactic and semantic requirements.³⁹

Despite these similarities between architectural and musical notations, scores are much more codified than plans, and for this reason Goodman affirms that architecture does not share the entire characteristic features of a mature notational system. While musical scores can resort to very precise codifications to establish how every single note has to be played (“.” for staccato, “-” for tenuto, “>” for sforzando, or “^” to mark an

³⁹ For Goodman’s detailed discussion on architectural plans see: *LA*, 218-221.

accent, to mention only a few articulation signs in Western musical notation), architectural plans lack a similar system to fix how each and every one of their parts has to be executed. Therefore, extranotational information is (still) required to explicitly state constructive elements such as the wall texture, or the exact color; these are usually exemplified by means of a sample: a piece of a wall with the correspondent definitive surface and color serves as a model for the rest of the building.⁴⁰ Since for Goodman architecture will not become absolutely allographic until its notational system is able to completely fix the identity of architectural works, it is fundamental to explore whether it is feasible that plans develop into a perfect notation to include the features now expressed in an extranotational way (acknowledging, of course, that these characteristics are constitutive for the work's identity). This is exactly what Saul Fisher undertakes in his article "Architectural Notation and Computer Aided Design," when he argues, based on Goodman's theory, that Computer Aided Design (CAD) theoretically allows the complete specification of the elements that are part of the architect's extranotational language by means of codification.⁴¹ In this way, identification of architectural works could be independent of any particular building or, in other words, with the progressive

⁴⁰ For Goodman's discussion on samples and its symbolical function see the section "Samples" in his essay "When is art?", *WW*, 63-70.

⁴¹ Saul Fisher, "Architectural Notation and Computer Aided Design," *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 58 (2000), 273-289. In this article, Fisher not only argues that through CAD it is possible to develop a notational system that fixes the constitutive elements of a building, but also the "expressive" or aesthetic ones. I disagree with this statement, because the role of notational systems is only to identify a work as such and not to uniquely fix its aesthetic properties. First, Fisher should clearly define what an aesthetic property is. Second, the inclusion of aesthetic properties in a notation would have as a consequence that two instances of a same work with different aesthetic properties could not be identified as the same work or with the same notation. If this were right, Glenn Gould's 1955 and 1981 performances of Bach's *Goldberg Variations* would require two different scores, for their aesthetic properties are significantly different. As Goodman affirms: "Thus, even where the constitutive properties of a work are clearly distinguished by means of a notation, they cannot be identified with the aesthetic properties." (*LA*, 120). Apart from confusing constitutive and aesthetic properties, Fisher also mixes up the artist's intentionality and constitutive features of a work and this brings him to limit the range of Goodman's allographic criterion and, to a certain extent, to blur the distinction between the autographic and the allographic.

transformation of plans from analogical to digital, the notational system can potentially become the only criterion to determine the identity of a building.

However, even though a perfect notational system could be available, some architectural works resist being considered only from an allographic perspective. As Goodman affirms:

[A]ll houses complying with the plans for Smith-Jones Split-Level #17 are equally instances of that architectural work. But in the case of an earlier architectural tribute to womanhood, the Taj Mahal, we may bridle at considering another building from the same plans and even on the same site to be an instance of the same work rather than a copy.⁴²

Even though it would be possible to build a copy of the Taj Mahal, the criterion to identify this building is still the history of its construction and not a notational system. It is important to note that the fact of not knowing exactly every detail of its history of production does not invalidate the possibility of establishing the work's identity autographically. In order to identify the Taj Mahal, it suffices to know, for instance, that it was built between 1631 and 1654 (although we can only approximate the dates), that it was designed by several people (although we do not know exactly what parts were under the supervision of which designer), and that around 20,000 people worked on its construction (although we do not know what every single one of them did). Moreover, even if we did not possess any information about the history of production of a work, this would not invalidate the autographic criterion of determining its identity. This is the case

⁴² *LA*, 220-221.

of anonymous buildings, such as most medieval cathedrals, whose history of production is impossible to trace back and yet they can only be autographically identified.

Apart from stressing that an exact reproduction of the Taj Mahal would only be a copy, the passage by Goodman just cited also implies that the difference between multiple allographic buildings and singular autographic architectural works is related to the distinction between what could be called high and low architecture.⁴³ While tract housing sprawls throughout suburban areas and this process has no effect on its identity, no masterpiece of architecture is reproduced without emphasizing that the subsequent instances are not the original but simply replicas (the Parthenon in Nashville's Centennial Park is simply a copy of the one in Athens). It thus seems that, for buildings aesthetically less valuable, the identity criterion is the allographic, and, for the others, it is the autographic. However, some exceptions can be found: Together with his studio, Rem Koolhaas is about to create "Generics," a branch of the Office of Metropolitan Architecture (OMA) with the purpose of designing "high quality allographic architecture," i.e., OMA intends to create plans that allow the unlimited construction of buildings but with aesthetic value.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, there exists a dichotomy between potential reproducibility and actual limitation in the construction of architectural works, which is expressed by Gérard Genette as follows:

⁴³ Note that it is also possible to have two or more identical, original, and autographic buildings. In that case, it could be considered that the architectural work is composed of two or more buildings, for a copy or a reproduction of this work would mean to construct all of them. This is the case, for instance, of Mies van der Rohe's two Lake Shore Drive Apartments in Chicago, or M.I. Pei three Silver Towers in New York.

⁴⁴ There is no written notice yet about this project. Rem Koolhaas announced the aim of creating "generics" during the course of a lecture held at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on November 14, 2006, and also in another lecture at the University of Southern California on March 1, 2007. Ironically, this allographic architecture has the imprint of an autographic architect.

The case of architecture may seem paradoxical, because this art, which today possesses systems of (de)notation powerful enough to make possible the indefinite multiplication of its realizations, never exploits this possibility, except in aesthetically least prestigious productions [...]. As to the unique character of works of high fashion (actually, I am told, one realization of each is authorized *per continent*, whatever that rather hazy geographical term may mean), it stems in part from a deliberate restriction whose motives are obvious, and in part from the autographic nature of this practice – for not only does nothing prevent an art from functioning in one regime in the case of certain of its works, and in the other in the case of certain others; it is also quite possible for one and the same work to be autographic in one of its parts and allographic in another.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ Gérard Genette, *The Work of Art. Immanence and Transcendence* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 97. In this work, Genette takes Goodman's notions of allographic and autographic as a basis for developing his own theory on the ontology of the work of art. Since the aim of this chapter is not to comment on this book, here I want to briefly argue against Genette's undertaking. (I am aware that Genette's considerations would require a much more thorough and deep argumentation to be refuted.) Genette rejects Goodman's approach to art as follows: "I certainly do not underestimate the advantages of this strictly nominalist or empiricist position, which eliminates the concept of transcendence, doubtless nebulous for some, and the entity, which the same people apparently have no use for, represented by a work distinct, however slightly, from the (unique or multiple) material objects that manifest it. Despite the neatness of the principle it rests on, however, this position seems to me to be logically uncertain and untenable in practice." (202) The uncertainty and untenability of Goodman's philosophy is what fuels Genette to develop his theory of immanence and transcendence of the work of art. I do not subscribe to Genette's appropriation and reinterpretation of Goodman's notions of autographic and allographic, nor to the parallel he establishes between autographic and transcendence, and allographic and immanence of a work of art. In my opinion, Genette takes only some features of Goodman's theory and ignores some of the philosophical bases that lead Goodman to establish the arguments he proposes. In other words, Genette considers Goodman's theory as a "nominalist or strictly empiricist position," while not taking into account Goodman's position according to which worlds are continuously constructed, which rejects any "strictly empiricist position." To me, Genette's notions of immanence and transcendence unnecessarily complicate the analysis of what constitutes the identity of the work of art; it seems that his considerations are more suitable for literature, which is the field he dominates and the art he takes as a model when discussing allographic works. That literature is the model upon which Genette develops his argument is clear in the following passage: "The allographic work, to repeat, exhibits the paradox (and practical inconvenience) of being entirely itself only in the ideal object it immanates in; but this object, because it is ideal, is physically imperceptible, so that there exists, even for the mind, nothing more than a vanishing point that can be defined but not observed." (125) If we take allographic works in Genette's sense, then architecture would

As stated in this passage, architecture has a double nature; it is a “mixed and transitional case,” not only because some buildings are considered autographic while at the same time others are taken to be allographic, but also because some of their parts are autographic and others allographic.⁴⁶ As Genette illustrates with the example of paintings, this would be the case of autographic buildings containing an allographic inscription.⁴⁷ Yet architecture can be considered partly autographic and partly allographic from another point of view. According to Goodman, arts can be classified into one-stage and two-stage arts.⁴⁸ Architecture is a two-stage art, because first it is necessary to design a building and then to actually build it, which implies two phases in the construction process. Precisely for this reason a notational system was developed: to assure the correct transition from design to construction in a process in which several people intervene.⁴⁹ Architecture can be considered allographic in its first phase and autographic in the second phase. The plan is allographic because its relevant aspect is to accurately reproduce a series of specifications that fix the identity of a building, and, for this sake, the history of its production is irrelevant; in other words, it does not matter if the plan is the first and original one (if existing) or not. The actual building, which corresponds to the second phase, is autographic, for the history of production is the criterion necessary to

not be allographic at all, because architecture generally only exists if built. In Goodman’s terms, architecture is a two-stage art (*LA*, 114-155); first it is designed and then constructed, and without the second part, there is no architecture. Obviously, it can be argued that non-built architecture is still architecture, and that plans, sketches, drawings, and models already constitute an architectural work (and not just its notational system). These are the main reasons why I disagree with Genette’s main thesis of his book. Nevertheless, it can be read without considering his key notions (immanence and transcendence) and his work becomes an excellent introduction to Goodman’s thought.

⁴⁶ *LA*, 221.

⁴⁷ “This is obviously the case (a common one) with a pictorial work that contains a verbal inscription.” *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *LA*, 114-115.

⁴⁹ When commenting on architectural plans, Goodman says: “the notational language was developed in response rather to the need for participation of many hands in construction.” *LA*, 220.

distinguish between two buildings that follow the same plan, i.e., the first phase of an architectural work. This is the only way to distinguish, for instance, between the Cinderella Castle built in 1971 in the Walt Disney Resort in Florida and the one built in 1983 for the Tokyo Disney Resort.

Obviously, the distinction between the two Cinderella Castles – and, in general, the distinction among identical works – is possible only if site-specificity is taken as an indispensable requisite of their histories of production. Although at first glance it might seem that architecture is always site-specific, this statement cannot be generalized. Otherwise, some buildings that have been moved would not be the same building anymore: the Pergamon Altar now in the Pergamon Museum in Berlin would not be the Pergamon Altar, for it is not in Pergamon, but in Berlin. This difficulty is what leads Maurice Lagueux to affirm that architecture is neither autographic nor allographic. In his article “Nelson Goodman and Architecture,” he states:

Hence, works of architecture can hardly be characterized as allographic, since, if we disregard a few atypical exceptions, the strictest fidelity to its plans will not be enough to turn a “reconstruction” of a building into another instance of it. Yet neither are they autographic, since their identity is not really defined by the historical conditions of their production, unless we consider that the site is in some way included in what Goodman means by the “historical conditions” of the production of a work of art. But if such is the proper interpretation of Goodman’s views, it would cease to be obvious that paintings could qualify as autographic; for unless they are

structurally linked with architecture (like frescoes or altar-pieces), they are typically context independent and can be exhibited anywhere in the world without loss of authenticity.⁵⁰

Certainly, as Goodman himself affirms, “not every art can be classed as autographic or as allographic. This classification applies only where we have some means of sorting objects or events into works – that is, where there is some criterion for identity of a work.”⁵¹ Yet architecture can indeed be classified according to these two categories, as the several examples discussed in this chapter illustrate. Furthermore, Lagueux’s argument refuting Goodman’s categories of autographic and allographic presents several problems. First of all, by negating the possibility of allographically identifying architectural works, Lagueux is making impossible the “reconstruction” of a building, for the only way to accurately rebuild an architectural work is precisely by means of plans. That is to say, in his argument, Lagueux uses as a counterexample a reconstruction, i.e., an instance of a work that is only possible if the existence and aim of plans are acknowledged, while the rejection of notational systems as identity criterion implies denying also the possibility of reconstructions, and thus invalidating them as a counterexample. Second, there is a misunderstanding of Goodman’s autographic criterion for establishing the identity of a work of art. Although Lagueux is right in affirming that the notion of history of production does not necessarily imply site-specificity as one of its constitutive elements, this autographic criterion is still valid for distinguishing between two identical works located on different sites: it is enough to know that there is one

⁵⁰ Lagueux, 24.

⁵¹ *MM*, 139.

Cinderella Castle built in 1971 and another in 1983 to discriminate one from the other. And if both had been built at exactly the same time, different people would have participated in the construction, for no human being has the gift of ubiquity, and thus their histories of production would continue being different and valid as an identification criterion. Therefore, location is not an indispensable condition for a work to be autographic, even though some autographic works are site-specific. In logical terms, Lagueux commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent: that the Taj Mahal is site-specific does not imply that all other autographic works, such as Rembrandt's *Lucretia*, have to be site-specific. Hence, neither of Lagueux's arguments rejecting the allographic and the autographic criterion is consistent.

Not only are these arguments inconsistent, but the affirmation that architecture is neither autographic nor allographic would leave us with no criteria to establish the identity of architectural works. In other words, there would be no manner to conceptually differentiate between an original and a copy, a reproduction, or even a forgery of a building.⁵² Furthermore, without identification criteria, it would be difficult to define the status of another kind of constructions, namely, restorations. Certainly, the process of fixing the constitutive elements of a building is arduous, yet it is not impossible or pointless. On the contrary, the difficulties that arise during this process are rather a reflection of the complexity that architecture entails, and this is precisely what demands thorough analysis.

⁵² According to Goodman, "a forgery of a work of art is an object falsely purporting to have the history of production requisite for the (or an) original of the work." *LA*, 122. Although technically complicated, it is not impossible to forge a building, at least an unknown one: by creating a false history of production a temple can be "discovered" in the middle of the jungle, or the plans of an unidentified palace can be "found." For a general discussion of Goodman's conception of forgery and some of its further critiques see Jakob Steinbrenner, "Fälschung und Identität," *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 43-2 (1998), 191-222.

A restoration is an architectural amalgam that illustrates the complexity inherent in trying to establish what constitutes the identity of an architectural work. If architecture is considered only as allographic, then a building is restored by following the notational system and by repairing or reconstructing the missing or damaged elements of that building according to the features established in plans. Let us take, for instance, the Romanesque Monastery of Sant Pere de Rodes, located in the north-east of Spain.⁵³ This complex was mainly built during the tenth and eleventh centuries with some posterior additions built until 1798, when the monastery was definitively abandoned. After sporadic restorations undertaken in the 1930s, the main restoration work took place between 1989 and 1999, whose result is the building now extant. The present Monastery is thus an instance made out of a tenth century building with several components subsequently added and, finally, with some of its elements recently attached. Since, if allographic, its history of production is irrelevant, the restored building has to be taken as another instance of the work (if it accurately follows the Monastery plans). Even more, in this case, Sant Pere de Rodes is the only instance of this allographic work.

Although the restored Monastery is an instance of the work according to the allographic criterion, the interventions undertaken to restore Sant Pere de Rodes are visible. In other words, a purist, and not an integral, restoration was done. An integral restoration intends to repair a work to make the whole look original. On the contrary, a purist or archeological restoration contends that any substitution or addition has to be visible to avoid any pretense of authenticity. In this latter case, the missing parts are not replaced with pieces indistinguishable from the already existing ones, but clearly

⁵³ For a detailed discussion on this monastery see: Immaculada Lorés, *El monestir de Sant Pere de Rodes* (Bellaterra: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2002).

discernible from the old ones.⁵⁴ The missing arches, columns and capitals from the Monastery's cloister, for instance, were built using concrete cement, explicitly showing that they were prostheses to an original work (Fig. 1). Thus, this means that Sant Pere de Rodes has not simply been considered as an allographic work, for the distinction between its original and its newer parts is relevant; consequently, the Monastery is also autographic.



Fig. 1. Cloister of the Monastery of Sant Pere de Rodes. This is an example of a purist restoration: the added parts are visibly differentiated from the original ones.

If architecture is considered as only autographic, then a restoration can be regarded as an alteration of the building, since it implies replacing, adding, and also eliminating some traces of the history of production of the building. Nevertheless, these traces could also disappear through the effect of aging, and the autographic criterion

⁵⁴ For a detailed discussion of these two kinds of restoration and its consequences on the aesthetic experience of a work of art see Mark Sagoff, "On Restoring and Reproducing Art," *The Journal of Philosophy* 75 (1978), 453-470, especially 457-458.

would nonetheless remain valid for determining the identity of the work. Although a restored building would not wholly be like the initial building, it is still the same building as long as the original can be identified as such by the same history of production.⁵⁵

Yet it is not clear if we could still consider Sant Pere de Rodes the same building if, for preservation's sake, each and every one of the original pieces were replaced with new ones. This is similar to the logical paradox raised by the ship of Theseus, whose planks were substituted for new ones when they became damaged until there was no trace left of the original ship and thus posing the question whether it was the same ship or not. As a corollary, one can question what happens if the replaced planks were used to build a second ship. If the stones that constituted the Monastery were used to build the exact building, we could ask which of the Monasteries, if any, is the original work. If allographic, then both buildings would be instances of the same work. If autographic, then it would be first necessary to determine which elements of the history of production of both buildings are relevant to the work's identity: to consider that the materials make the work to be the original has as a consequence that only the second Monastery would be the original; to consider that place is relevant leads us to affirm that the complete reconstructed building is the original.

⁵⁵ Catherine Elgin argues that, even though the history of production allows the distinction between an original and an exact copy, this does not involve restorations. When referring to paintings she affirms: "The identity of a painting is fixed, Goodman and I contend, by its history of production. A painting is a syntactically dense symbol, and such symbols admit of no replicas. No difference is so small as to be insignificant. Even the closest copy is bound to diverge from the original somewhere. So nothing with a different history can be the same painting. This explains why even the best reproductions are not instances of the paintings they purport to reproduce. It does not, however, tell against restorations. Although every difference *between instances* constitutes a difference between the symbols they instantiate, it does not follow that every change *in an individual instance* constitutes a difference in the symbol it instantiates." Catherine Z. Elgin, *Between the absolute and the arbitrary* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 106. For the question of identity and restoration see the entire chapter "Restoration and Work Identity," 97-109.

In his article "Architectural Restoration: Resurrection or Replication?", Robert Wicks proposes the two categories of "refabrication" and "reconstruction" for distinguishing between a partial and a total restoration.⁵⁶ According to him, refabrication is the complete reconstruction of a building, i.e., the exact copy or replica of an original in whose construction materials other than the original ones have been used. Moreover, there is a temporal discontinuity between original and copy. On the other hand, reconstruction is a partial restoration and, therefore, some of the original materials are maintained. In addition, there is a temporal discontinuity between original and reconstruction. This latter case asks us to decide between an integral or a purist restoration. Wick's distinction, however, does not help in establishing the identity of an architectural work: in Goodman's terms, if architecture is considered allographic, then every refabrication that accurately follows the plans would be an instance of the work; if autographic, then it would not be the original work. And a reconstruction in Wicks' sense can either be an instance of the work, if allographically considered, or the original, if autographically considered.

To sum up, Goodman's categories of the autographic and the allographic allow us to establish what constitutes the identity of an architectural work. Although there are some architectural works that can be identified as clearly autographic (such as the Taj Mahal) or clearly allographic (such as the plentiful examples of tract housing), the majority of buildings can be considered from both the autographic and the allographic perspective (as has been shown in the cases of copies and restorations). Thus, not only is

⁵⁶ Robert Wicks, "Architectural Restoration: Resurrection or Replication?", *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 34 (1994), 163-169. See also a reply to this article A. MacC. Armstrong, "The identity of a work of architecture," *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 35 (1995), 165-167, in which the author argues against Wicks' distinction and denies that the identity of a building only resides in its design. None of these articles make reference to Goodman.

architecture as an artistic discipline a “mixed and transitional case” because it simultaneously comprises autographic as well as allographic works, but these two criteria are also intertwined within one and the same building. Both criteria to establish the identity of a work are interlaced insofar as the first stage of the construction process of a building is allographic and the second stage autographic; both criteria are inextricably linked insofar as the two are necessary to identify one and the same building, i.e., the autographic criterion serves to distinguish two identical buildings (such as the two Cinderella Castles), and, at the same time, the allographic criterion allows us to actually build two identical buildings (such as the Cinderella Castle in Orlando and the one in Tokyo). This array of possibilities does not have to be interpreted as a failure in the process of identifying works, but as evidence of the inherent complexity and richness of architecture. In other words, the affirmation that architecture is a “mixed and transitional” case is a reflection of the way in which we judge the buildings’ identity. On the one hand, some buildings are judged according to their history of production; on the other, some buildings are judged taking a notational system as the criterion; and sometimes both criteria are used for one and the same building. The cause of this mixture lies not only in the lack of a perfect notational system to identify works, but in our reluctance to judge some buildings exclusively from an allographic or an autographic perspective. As discussed in the next chapter, this hybridism in defining what constitutes the identity of architectural works is paradigmatically illustrated by the case of Mies van der Rohe’s Barcelona Pavilion.

Chapter 2.

The Barcelona Pavilion: Autographic versus Allographic

The reconstruction of the German Pavilion by Mies van der Rohe was dedicated on June 2, 1986. Originally designed as a temporary structure for the 1929 International Exposition in Barcelona, the rebuilt Pavilion now opened its doors as a permanent building. As Georgia van der Rohe underscored in the dedication ceremony, her father's work was "one of the most beautiful buildings in our century that can be lived in today for a second time."⁵⁷ These words might seem perfunctory, yet they reflect long-standing assumptions about the Pavilion's iconic stature. The major experts on Mies's work never hesitated to define the Pavilion as "one of the key structures of modern architecture," a "canonical building" discussed in almost all the histories of architecture.⁵⁸ Such a view might explain, at least partly, why this example of ephemeral architecture was recreated by the Catalan architect Ignasi de Solà-Morales along with Cristian Cirici and Fernando Ramos. The rebuilt Pavilion, however, provokes a complex question about the identity of an architectural work: Can the 1929 and the 1986 Pavilions be considered the same work? Although this question might seem a rhetorical one, it leads to further philosophical questions: what is the relation between the 1929 building called the "German Pavilion" (now known as the "Barcelona Pavilion") and the 1986 building also

⁵⁷ Víctor A. Amela, "Inaugurado en Barcelona el pabellón alemán de Mies van der Rohe con la presencia de su hija," *La Vanguardia*, 3 June 1986, 52. Translation from Spanish by author.

⁵⁸ Quotations from: Wolf Tegethoff, *Mies van der Rohe. The Villas and Country Houses* (New York: The Museum of Modern Art; distributed by the MIT Press, 1985), 70; Claire Zimmerman, "German Pavilion, International Exposition, Barcelona, 1928-29," in Terence Riley, Barry Bergdoll (eds.), *Mies in Berlin* (New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2001), 237. See, for instance, the following histories of architecture: Leonardo Benevolo, *History of Modern Architecture 2* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971), 490-491; Kenneth Frampton, *Modern Architecture: A Critical History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 164-166; Bruno Zevi, *Storia dell'architettura moderna* (Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1961), 143-145.

called the “German” or “Barcelona Pavilion”? Which criteria are used to establish the identity – or the identities – of the “Barcelona Pavilion”? Nelson Goodman’s notions of autographic and allographic are crucial concepts to deal with these questions.

To briefly recapitulate, Goodman draws the distinction between forms of art that are “autographic” as opposed to “allographic.” The autographic identifies a category of works that cannot be replicated, i.e., every difference between a work and even its closest copy makes a difference to the work’s identity. The history of production is the criterion for establishing the identity of an autographic work and what allows us to discriminate between original and copy, reproduction, replica, or forgery: e.g. between Edward Munch’s 1893 painting *The Scream* and its copy, exhibited in the artist’s museum in Oslo in 2004 replacing the stolen original.

By contrast, the allographic identifies a category of works that can be replicated, i.e., the difference between an original and its duplication is irrelevant. A notational scheme and a notational system are the criteria for establishing the identity of allographic works and what allows us to affirm that pieces sharing certain determinate and identifiable characteristics are the same work: e.g. the successive editions of Miguel de Cervantes’s *Don Quixote de la Mancha*, or, more interestingly, Glenn Gould’s 1955 and 1981 versions of J.S. Bach’s *Goldberg Variations* (this despite the extreme differences in his performances, especially with regards to tempo, phrasing, and intensity).

When referring to architecture, Goodman affirms that it is a “mixed and transitional case,” partly autographic and partly allographic, partly replicable and partly not, since not all architectural works are determined by only their history of production or

only their corresponding notational systems.⁵⁹ That architecture is “mixed” implies that it can be considered both autographic and allographic, and “transitional” implies that sometime in the future architecture will become completely allographic. This leads to the more difficult question of determining whether there is historical development in architecture that leads from a purely autographic to a purely allographic art. Testing Goodman’s distinction between allographic and autographic with Mies’s Barcelona Pavilion, thus, helps us to determine whether architecture is, in fact, a “mixed and transitional case.”

It is my contention too that examining Mies’s Pavilion through the lens of Goodman’s categories will guide us in answering our initial question concerning the identity of the 1929 and the 1986 Pavilions. If one accepts that the distinction between the 1929 and the 1986 Pavilion is relevant, i.e. that it is an autographic work, then we cannot attribute to the 1986 Pavilion each and every one of the characteristics we attribute to the 1929 Pavilion – in the same way that we do not attribute each and every one of the characteristics of Edvard Munch’s *The Scream* to its reproduction. Conversely, if one accepts that the distinction between the two is irrelevant, i.e., that it is an allographic work, then only some of their characteristics make them the same work, namely only the characteristics that constitute work identity. These common features are what allow us to affirm that Gould’s 1955 and 1981 performances of Bach’s *Goldberg Variations* are the same musical piece.

The 1986 Barcelona Pavilion is placed, first of all, on the very same spot as the old, on the north slope of Montjuïc, the hill dominating Barcelona to the southwest. The visitor approaches the Pavilion by first walking through a central axis that connects the

⁵⁹ *LA*, 221.



Fig. 2. Aerial view of the exhibition grounds, 1929, with the Barcelona Pavilion on the top right of the image and the National Palace on the top center.

entrance in Plaça Espanya to the rest of the Exposition's grounds, and then climbing the first flight of stairs leading to the imposing National Palace at the top of the hill (Fig. 2). On the right, on a rectangular travertine podium, is the Pavilion, which the visitor reaches via a few stairs on its east side. A series of rectangular surfaces define the space: they are horizontal and vertical plates in perpendicular or parallel orientation that separate different areas, but without creating closed spaces (Fig. 3). Thus the




Fig. 3. View of the Pavilion from the south-east, 1929.

Pavilion is an open plan; the visitor can freely walk through it without a predetermined path. One can enter first its covered part at the north half of the podium, a one-story building with a flat, rectangular roof sustained by two rows of four cruciform columns made of chrome. The space is divided by asymmetrically placed walls, some of them made of glass, others of green marble, and the central one of onyx. (Fig. 4)




Fig. 4. Barcelona Pavilion, interior, 1929.

Through a glass wall one can see the rear exterior pool, flanked by green marble walls, with *Alba*, the statue of a woman by Georg Kolbe, its pedestal rising from the water at one extreme of the pond (Fig.5). The statue is reflected in the water, the polished marble, and the glass walls; it can also be seen from the exterior part of the Pavilion (Fig. 6), from a travertine bench placed in front of another pool, a big rectangle of water delimited by travertine walls that reflects the covered part of the Pavilion (Fig. 3). The bench is backed by a travertine wall parallel to it (Fig. 7). Behind this wall are a narrow path and the

mountain slope, and on the southwest corner a small covered space made of travertine and glass.




Fig. 5. Rear pool and Kolbe's *Alba*, 1929.




Fig. 6. *Alba* viewed from the back corridor, 1929.




Fig. 7. Travertine bench, exterior pool, and covered part of the Pavilion, 1929.

This is the Pavilion Mies's daughter praised in the dedication ceremony as "one of the most beautiful buildings in our century," thus taking for granted that this and the 1929 Pavilion are the same building.⁶⁰ Indeed, at first glance it seems self-evident that they are the same: the reconstructed Pavilion is located on the same site – on the right side of the central axis, on a half-moon-shaped plot of land bounded by the north façade of the Palace of Alfonso XIII to the south, a curved street to the north, the slope of Montjuïc's hill to the west, and, to the east, the big esplanade with the Magic Fountain (one of the main attractions of the Exposition). Moreover, it is built using the same materials – steel, glass, green marble, travertine, and onyx. As Mies's daughter affirmed: "now, we can even touch the onyx wall," as if we were touching the same wall as in

⁶⁰ Víctor A. Amela, 52.

1929.⁶¹ However, thorough inspection reveals that it is far from being self-evident that both Pavilions are the same. Georgia van der Rohe's words do not mean that we are literally touching the same onyx doré wall that constituted the Pavilion in 1929; rather, we are touching a wall made of the same kind of onyx – but not exactly the same piece of marble – used for the first Pavilion. The architects in charge of the reconstruction conducted extensive research to find out the origin of the onyx used in 1929 so they could use the same onyx doré marble from the same region: “The reconstruction work took us to all the onyx quarries we could find, from Egypt to Morocco, and led us to the conclusion that the onyx used by Mies must have come, virtually beyond all doubt, from one of the quarries in the Oran region of Algeria.”⁶² That is to say, since it was impossible to use the exact same pieces of marble chosen by Mies in 1929, the fact of coming from the same quarry was a sufficient condition for choosing the marble for the 1986 reconstruction. The criterion was to find a piece of marble with the same origins, not to search for one that closely resembled the one used in 1929, with similar visual features, such as watery forms and tonalities. For the architects and also for Georgia van der Rohe, to constitute sameness it sufficed that the marble had the same origin. This allows her to affirm that the 1986 onyx wall is the same as the 1929 one, even though the

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² “The reconstruction work took us to all the onyx quarries we could find, from Egypt to Morocco, and led us to the conclusion that the onyx used by Mies must have come, virtually beyond all doubt, from one of the quarries in the Oran region of Algeria.” Ignasi de Solà-Morales Rubió, Cristian Cirici, Fernando Ramos, *Mies van der Rohe: Barcelona Pavilion* (Barcelona: Gustavo Gili, 1993), 13 (note 20). This is the main publication on the reconstruction of the Pavilion. Earlier versions and excerpts of this book have been published in several journals: Cristian Cirici, Fernando Ramos, Ignasi de Solà-Morales, “Proyecto de reconstrucción del Pabellón Alemán de la Exposición Internacional de Barcelona de 1929,” *Arquitecturas bis* 44 (July 1983), 6-17; Ignasi de Solà-Morales Rubió, “Le Pavillon de Mies van der Rohe” *Oeil* 372-373 (July-August 1986), 74-77; Ignasi de Solà-Morales Rubió, “Ludwig Mies van der Rohe: Barcellona 1929-1986,” *Domus* 674 (July-August 1986), 76-80.

Pavilion was demolished after the Exposition. Even more, it means that to visit the 1986 Pavilion means to visit the 1929 (reconstructed) Pavilion.

Since its dismantling in January 1930 – the Exhibition’s Executive Committee refused to maintain the German Pavilion and there was no interest in buying it – there have been several attempts to reconstruct the Barcelona Pavilion.⁶³ In 1955, the architect Oriol Bohigas proposed to rebuild it reusing its steel structure, which supposedly lay abandoned in a municipal warehouse in Barcelona.⁶⁴ Two years later, he contacted Mies to tell him about the project and Mies agreed with the idea offering to redraw the plans, for “[t]he original construction drawings of the Pavilion were lost or misplaced in Germany.”⁶⁵ Despite Mies’s willingness to collaborate, the project was not carried out due to the lack of support from the municipal authorities. During the nineteen sixties and seventies, several initiatives were undertaken to reconstruct the Pavilion. Some articles were published advocating (without success) the reconstruction of the Pavilion, and questioning the existence of its remains, which, as it turned out, were not stored in Barcelona but lost.⁶⁶ In 1964, the architect Joan Bassegoda Nonell presented a model and some sketches of the Pavilion to the then mayor of Barcelona with the purpose of convincing him to reconstruct Mies’s work. This attempt was unsuccessful, as was the following one, initiated by the Barcelona City Council in 1967. The City contacted Mies, telling him of the plan to reconstruct the Pavilion on the occasion of the 1970 World

⁶³ Bonaventura Bassegoda, “Letter to *La Vanguardia*. Mies van der Rohe,” *La Vanguardia*, 6 May 1966, 21, and Solà-Morales, 21.

⁶⁴ Oriol Bohigas, “La obra barcelonesa de Mies van der Rohe,” *Cuadernos de Arquitectura* 21 (May 1955), 17-21.

⁶⁵ Letter from Mies to Bohigas, 30 January, 1957. Quoted after Cirici et. al, 6.

⁶⁶ “Un gran parque para Barcelona,” *La Vanguardia*, 8 January 1960, 14; M. Masalles, “Letter to *La Vanguardia*: Van der Rohe,” *La Vanguardia*, 1 May 1966, 28; B. Bassegoda, “Letter to *La Vanguardia*. Mies van der Rohe,” *La Vanguardia*, 6 May 1966, 21; “El Pabellón de Mies van der Rohe,” *La Vanguardia*, 29 January 1970, 29; “El Pabellón de Mies van der Rohe,” *La Vanguardia*, 17 May 1970, 25.

Conference on Housing and Urbanism. Mies again offered his support and a reconstruction committee prepared plans, sketches, and a model. However, there was no budget to carry out the reconstruction and the project was once more abandoned.⁶⁷ In 1974, Fernando Ramos organized a seminar about the Pavilion in the School of Architecture of Barcelona, and in 1978, Ignasi de Solà-Morales offered a seminar on the 1929 Barcelona Exhibition. At that time, contacts were established with Ludwig Glaeser to exchange documentary materials on the Pavilion; Glaeser, then responsible for the Mies van der Rohe Archive of the Museum of Modern Art, was curating an exhibition on the Pavilion on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of its construction.⁶⁸ It was precisely in 1979 when the reconstruction of the Pavilion was requested, and failed again.⁶⁹ In 1981, Bohigas (the first to have proposed the reconstruction) became head of the Department of Housing and Urbanism of Barcelona and, finally, the initiative prospered, thanks to the active support of the mayor of Barcelona and of the president of the International Trade Fair, who was responsible for the area in which the 1929 Pavilion had been located. The project was commissioned to Solà-Morales, Cirici, and Ramos, and the Public Foundation of the German Pavilion of Barcelona was created to supervise funds and the construction process.⁷⁰

The present reproduction of the Barcelona Pavilion is the result of the exhaustive research undertaken since the mid-1970s by the architects in charge of the project, who

⁶⁷ For a detailed discussion of these two attempts to reconstruct the Pavilion, as well as a listing of the former ones, see Bonaventura Bassegoda Nonell, "Historia y anécdota de una obra de Mies van der Rohe," *La Vanguardia*, 6 October 1979, 6.

⁶⁸ For a detailed discussion of these events see "1. Antecedents" in Solà-Morales, 26-27.

⁶⁹ "Se pide la reconstrucción del 'Pabellón Barcelona'," *La Vanguardia*, 27 September 1979, 15.

⁷⁰ Solà-Morales, 26-27.

officially presented the definitive project in 1983.⁷¹ The first stone was placed on October 10, 1983, and the construction process began that December.⁷² The Pavilion's dedication coincided with the hundredth anniversary of Mies's birth in 1986. One of the main arguments in favor of rebuilding the Pavilion, repeated by all who promoted its reconstruction, is the consideration of the Pavilion as "one of the fundamental works of this [twentieth] century," quoting Bohigas's expression in the first proposal to reconstruct it.⁷³ In other words, the Pavilion was worthy of being reconstructed because it was considered an icon of modern architecture.⁷⁴ In a certain sense, then, the Barcelona Pavilion was rebuilt because of its uniqueness. If we consider that the building that was unique was the 1929 Pavilion, or, using Goodman's terms, that one of the features that makes the Pavilion autographic is its uniqueness, i.e., that in this case being autographic follows from uniqueness, then the 1986 Pavilion is a replica of the original one.⁷⁵ Architecture is here considered as an autographic art or, in other words, the history of production of the building is significant. That is to say, it is precisely the history of

⁷¹ See: Cirici, 6-17; Ignasi de Solà-Morales, "Reconstrucción del Pabellón Mies van der Rohe," *La Vanguardia*, 3 May 1983, 43.

⁷² Jordi Bordas, "Barcelona volverá a tener el pabellón más importante de la Exposición de 1929," *La Vanguardia*, 11 October 1983, 17; "La reconstrucción del pabellón de Van der Rohe se iniciará en diciembre," *La Vanguardia*, 17 November 1983, 25.

⁷³ Bohigas, 19.

⁷⁴ The Pavilion's iconic stature is reflected in several works: from the flashy headline "Barcelona reconstructs an icon of architectural modernism," *Architectural Record* 174 (August 1986), 60-61, to some of the most recent histories of architecture: "Mies van der Rohe's German National Pavilion, built for the 1929 Barcelona International Exhibition, became an icon of the modernist aesthetic almost from the beginning." Francis D.K. Ching, Mark M. Jarzombek, Vikramaditya Prakash, *A Global History of Architecture* (Hoboken, N.J.: J. Wiley & Sons, 2007), 696. See also Solà-Morales, 38: "The building, that we had seen reproduced dozens of times in all the major books on the history of art and architecture, whose simple plan we had studied on so many occasions without entirely grasping the distance between the clear order it seemed to reveal to us and the intellectual tension of the displaced elements, was an icon which for more than fifty years had been generating an intense energy, as a presence confined to the pages of books and magazines."

⁷⁵ I use the term "replica" in the sense of reconstruction, "copy, duplicate, or reproduction of a work of art" (*OED*), and not in Goodman's technical sense according to which a work is a replica of another if and only if they are instances of the same work and share the same syntactical properties. This implies that there are only replicas of allographic works that have the same notational system. (See *LA*, 131-132.)

production that allows us to distinguish between the original and the replica: even though both Pavilions look the same, we know that they are different because one has a history of production (or construction) that took place under certain conditions in the spring of 1929 and the other has a history of construction under other conditions that took place between 1983 and 1986. That we are able to make this distinction between both buildings, and that we consider the distinction between an original and its replica relevant, brings us to affirm that the Barcelona Pavilion is an autographic work of architecture. This seems to be the general view, particularly because the 1986 building is defined as a reconstruction, and not as the original. Yet the distinction between reconstruction and original is not conclusive enough for determining the identities of the 1929 and the 1986 Pavilions and unquestionably assuming that they are two different buildings.

When the reconstructed Pavilion was dedicated, Georgia van der Rohe affirmed that “for a second time, the German Pavilion of Barcelona ha[d] been given to the world.”⁷⁶ Only a work that is not unique can be given “for a second time” and still continue to be the same; only allographic works can be reproduced and maintain the same identity. This compels us to affirm that the building recovered in 1986 is the same as the one erected in 1929, i.e., that the world has been given back the “German Pavilion of Barcelona,” assuming that what has been recovered is the same as what had been lost in 1930. In this context, the autographic distinction between original and replica is meaningless, because a unique and original work – a work of which there is only one – cannot be given twice. In other words, the Pavilion “can be lived in today for a second

⁷⁶ Víctor A. Amela, 52.

time” only if it is interpreted as an allographic work.⁷⁷ Here we find a first oscillation between autographic and allographic criteria; a closer look at the process of reconstruction will show how this shifting is continuous, in other words, how autographic and allographic features are inextricably interwoven when trying to determine the identity of the Barcelona Pavilion.

The main obstacle faced by the architects responsible for the reconstruction of Mies’s Pavilion was the absence of reliable and definitive plans. In their words: “One thing that has been a constant problem in recreating the scheme for the German Pavilion in Barcelona is precisely its nonexistence.”⁷⁸ Thus the first step was to fix its identity by means of a notational system, i.e., new plans, cross sections, and elevations. Although the autographic character of the Pavilion is what allows us to distinguish between the two buildings, the criterion followed to build the 1986 Pavilion was not the history of production of the building, but the recreation of a “scheme.” Moreover, it is literally impossible to reproduce the history of production of the 1929 Pavilion to build the 1986 one and, therefore, the only possible way to rebuild the Pavilion is by developing a series of plans. In other words, the identity of the Barcelona Pavilion is established by allographic processes, i.e., by the creation of a notational system. Goodman expresses this idea as follows:

[W]hile availability of a notation is usually what establishes an art as allographic, mere availability of a notation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. What *is necessary* is that identification of the or an

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Solà-Morales, 9.

instance of a work be independent of the history of production; a notation as much codifies as creates such an independent criterion.⁷⁹

This is precisely the case of the Barcelona Pavilion. Although a notational system that uniquely determined the work was not available, it was possible to identify the work without relying on the history of its construction: it was possible to create a notational system. The work of Solà-Morales, Cirici, and Ramos was to create this allographic criterion. Thus the Pavilion is here rather allographic than autographic, because it is actually possible to create a notational system and because the history of its construction is not decisive to fix its identity. Nevertheless, the process of allographically establishing the identity of the Pavilion was open-ended. The architects found themselves “faced with the singular circumstance of a task of reconstruction for which there was an abundance of information relating to what we were to rebuild, yet not enough to establish, beyond all doubt, the characteristics belonging to Mies’s [...] building.”⁸⁰ A series of preliminary drawings, sketches, plans, elevations, sections, and details of some parts of the Pavilion (such as the travertine bench, the small pool, the metalwork, and the glass doors) dated 1928 and 1929, some drawings made by Mies thirty years later in his studio in Chicago, photographs taken during its construction and the nine months the Pavilion stood in 1929 and 1930 as well as the information gotten through excavations *in situ* and provided by architects who had seen and commented on the original building were the basis for establishing what constitutes the Barcelona Pavilion.⁸¹

⁷⁹ *MM*, 139.

⁸⁰ Solà-Morales, 5.

⁸¹ Photographs of the Pavilion were published in 1929, for instance, in: Nicolas M. Rubió i Tudurí, “Le Pavillon de l’Allemagne à l’Exposition de Barcelona par Mies van der Rohe,” *Les Cahiers d’Art* 8-9

Despite all the research done, it was impossible to determine “beyond all doubt” how the 1929 Pavilion exactly was, because not all the available sources provided the same information, nor were completely reliable. Mies’s drawings made in Chicago, for instance, “tend not to reproduce with complete fidelity the reality of the building constructed in 1929,”⁸² nor did the ground plan published in 1929, once the Pavilion was already built, and that was long considered to be the only known original plan (Fig. 8).⁸³




Fig. 8. First published plan of the Barcelona Pavilion, 1929.

(1929), 408-411. The relevance of the photographs taken in 1929 and published in specialized magazines, such as the ones that appeared in *Die Form* 16, (August, 1929), are discussed thoroughly by George Dodds. This author argues that the Pavilion’s photographic representation was idealized (with the supervision and acknowledgment of Mies himself) and, since during several years this was the only visual access to the Pavilion, the interpretation of Mies’s work and the creation of its iconic stature had been based on images that did not correspond to the reality. Moreover, he argues that the 1986 reconstruction aims to reproduce the Pavilion as depicted in these photographs, and thus, is recreating already a photographic reconstruction of the 1929 Pavilion. For Dodd’s highly interesting argument see: George Dodds, “Body in Pieces: Desiring the Barcelona Pavilion,” *Res* 39 (2001), 168-191; George Dodds, *Building desire: on the Barcelona Pavilion* (New York: Routledge, 2005). See also the following book reviews: Gevork Hartoonian, “Building desire: On the Barcelona Pavilion by George Dodds,” *Architectural Theory Review: Journal of the Department of Architecture, the University of Sydney* 10 (2005), 109-111; Barbara Penner, “Building desire: On the Barcelona Pavilion, by George Dodds,” *Journal of architecture* 11 (April, 2006), 269-272.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 6.

⁸³ This plan was originally published in the *Zentralblatt der Bauverwaltung*, vol. 49, no. 34 (August, 1929), 542. I use the illustration reproduced in Tegethoff, 70.

In this plan, which includes an indication of scale, orientation, and explanatory notes about the materials used, the marble walls are depicted thicker than they actually were, as can be seen if we compare them to the thickness of the lines representing the glass walls and to photographs of the 1929 Pavilion. Moreover, while the podium is represented as if it would continue around the entire building, photographs from that time show that the podium ends abruptly just behind the northeast corner (Fig. 9).




Fig. 9. General view of the Pavilion from the northeast, 1929. The travertine podium ends abruptly at the northeast corner.

There is another inaccuracy in that plan: the bench is represented as being lined up with the back wall, while photographs show that it stopped before its southern end (Fig. 7). Other preliminary plans do not make reference to the final building, but reflect the several stages the project went through. On the first preliminary plan, dated 1928, for instance, the pool is depicted as placed in the middle of the podium and not adjacent to

the Pavilion's exterior walls (Fig. 10).




Fig. 10. Preliminary plan, dated 1928. The exterior pool is depicted as being in the middle of the podium.

Posterior floor plan reconstructions are not accurate either. In 1964, Werner Blaser published a plan prepared in Mies's studio in Chicago (Fig. 11).⁸⁴




Fig. 11. Plan of the Pavilion published in 1964 by Werner Blaser.

⁸⁴ Werner Blaser, *Mies van der Rohe. The Art of Structure* (New York: Praeger, 1965), 30-31.

This plan, too, lacks precision: the podium is represented as limiting the entire building; the roof covering the office annex seems to finish just above the travertine bench, while photographs from the original show the roof being larger; lastly, this plan depicts the ground as being a regular grid of tiles all of the same size that, if correct, would imply that the Pavilion was larger than it actually was. The floor depicted by Blaser conflicts with the plan made by Köstner und Gottschalk, the firm that supplied the marble pieces for the 1929 Pavilion (Fig. 12).




Fig. 12 Plan designed by Köstner und Gottschalk, the firm responsible for supplying and installing the marble pieces of the Pavilion.

It could be argued that this degree of uncertainty, even if minimal, invalidates the possibility of establishing the identity of Mies's work in an allographic way. However, the fact that it is not possible to exactly determine each and every one of the features that constituted the 1929 building does not mean that we cannot establish its identity by means of a notational system, for some of the properties are irrelevant when establishing identity. A notational system – a score, a script, an architectural plan – is abstract and

“defines a work solely in terms of its necessary features, even if its contingent features are legion.”⁸⁵ In other words, idiosyncratic attributes are excluded from notation and only unrenounceable properties are allographically fixed. Parallel cases in other arts, in which similar processes are undertaken to establish the identity of the work and whose validity is not questioned, reveal that uncertainty is not an impediment to define an architectural work by means of a plan: critical editions of literary works compare several versions of the same work and, in case of conflict, one of them (or a specific passage) is established as the canonical one. Much the same occurs when there are several versions of a musical score and the identity of the piece is established by fixing a unique score; the musical press Breitkopf, for instance, specializes in “Urtext Editions,” which are supposed to provide the score as written by the composer. However, it is important to note that, despite the establishment of canonical versions, different scores and different scripts constitute different works, and sometimes it is impossible to definitively fix the work’s identity by means of a single notational scheme or system. This is the case with William Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*: there are two extant versions of this work with some differing passages and there is no way to decide which one should be taken as the original. Strictly speaking, therefore, there are two *Hamlets* by Shakespeare.

New plans, elevations for each façade, and various sections and details of the Pavilion were developed, specifying several features that had not been defined in previous plans, and thus fixing what would constitute its identity in an unprecedented way. From that moment, following Goodman’s theory, only the building that fulfills the conditions established by these notational systems can be considered the Barcelona

⁸⁵ Gérard Genette, *The Work of Art. Immanence and Transcendence* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1997), 19.

Pavilion. Hence, not only are doors and their opening direction, the position of the furniture, the plants surrounding the structure, and the roofs of the two covered spaces now constitutive elements of the Pavilion, but also some details for which there was no reference (Figs. 13, 14, and 15).⁸⁶




Fig. 13. General plan of the reconstructed Pavilion with the surroundings.

⁸⁶ Mies considered the furniture's placing as a constitutive part of the Pavilion. For this reason Paolo Amaldi argues that, in the 1986 Pavilion, the furniture should be placed as it was in 1929. In that way, the same conception of space would be restored and the current focal points created by the Barcelona chairs and stools eliminated. For the complete argument see Paolo Amaldi, "Chairs, Postures, and Points of View: For an Exact Restitution of the Barcelona Pavilion" *Future Anterior: Journal of Historic Preservation History, Theory and Criticism* 2, (Winter, 2005), 16-23.




Fig. 14. Plan of the reconstructed Pavilion, with the placing of the furniture as well as the doors with their opening directions.




Fig. 15. Roof plan of the reconstructed Pavilion.

This is the case with “the process of assembly and the modularization of the panels out of wood that divided the lower part of the building into four distinct spaces intended for the reception area and the toilets,” specified now in a section drawing.⁸⁷ The solution adopted is the same as Mies used in other still extant buildings, specifically, the Lake Shore Drive Apartments in Chicago (1948-1951). That is to say, an assembly procedure taken from

⁸⁷ Cristian Cirici, “De la dévotion à l’émotion: Reconstruction du Pavillon Allemand de L. Mies van der Rohe pour l’Exposition Internationale de Barcelone, 1929,” *Architecture d’aujourd’hui* 245 (June, 1986), XV. Translation from French by author.

another building is now a determining characteristic of the Barcelona Pavilion (Fig. 16).




Fig. 16. Detail of the metalwork for assembling the marble to the walls.

Therefore, during this process of establishing what constitutes the identity of Mies's Pavilion, the prevailing criterion was not always the reliable information about the 1929 building. It is known, for instance, that the foundations of the 1929 Pavilion were made of the so-called "Catalan vaults": robust, self-supporting vaults made of thin tiles and layers of mortar with the particularities that the tiles are joined at their narrow side following the curve of the roof and that no scaffolding is needed. The vaults were built upon a framework made of iron beams supported by brick walls – leaving an empty space between the slope of the hill and the vaulted roof – and then covered with solid concrete, a solution prompted by the urgent need to complete the work in less than two months.

The foundations of the 1986 Pavilion, however, were made of a poured concrete foundation and not the traditional Catalan system (Fig. 17).⁸⁸



Fig. 17. Construction of the Pavilion's foundations by means of Catalan vaults, 1929.

Here again, the criterion followed to establish the identity of Mies's work shifts from autographic to allographic. Acknowledging that the foundations can be considered as a part of the building, the criterion followed to determine the Pavilion's identity was not the history of its 1929 production – which, in Goodman's terms, would mean to consider the Pavilion autographic –, but the established notational system – which would imply

⁸⁸ “The tradition-conscious architecture of Barcelona took a certain pride in explaining that the construction of the podium base employed the time-honoured Catalan vault: small vaults built of brick, plastered on the narrower side, which allowed the construction of self-supporting surfaces with no need for scaffolding.” *Ibid.*, 15. The solution proposed by Mies is unknown, for no original drawings of the foundation remain. Bonaventura Bassegoda, when discussing the Catalan vaulting system used for the Pavilion, affirms that Mies proposed a “monolithic concrete foundation”: “The ‘Sociedad Metropolitana de Construcciones’ made the work, and its architect, Juan Bergós Massó had the opportunity to find out in depth how the project was. At its moment, he referred to the anecdote of the suppression of the monolithic concrete foundation projected by Mies and that was replaced by walls of brick, main beams of iron, and timbrel vaults, without Van der Rohe being aware of it until he returned to Barcelona in May of 1929.” B. Bassegoda, *La Vanguardia*, 6 October 1979, 6. Translation from Spanish by author.

that the Pavilion is considered allographic. The 1986 Pavilion is, in this case, an (allographic) instance of the Barcelona Pavilion, even though the 1986 is not exactly like the 1929 Pavilion, in the same way as either of Gould's *Goldberg Variations* are an instance of the *Goldberg Variations*. That is to say, the 1986 Pavilion fulfills the identity requirements established by the Barcelona Pavilion plans in the same way as both of Gould's performances fulfill the identity requirements established by the *Goldberg Variations* score. If the foundation were a constitutive element of the work's identity, then both Pavilions could be still considered the same allographic work insofar as the plan would be general enough to include the two versions. The architects responsible for the 1986 Pavilion described their main reconstruction criterion as follows:

[A]n undisputed premise here was the concept of a reconstruction that would interpret as faithfully as possible the idea and the material form of the 1929 Pavilion. If we have made a distinction between idea and material form, it is because the study of the materials used in the project, alongside other contemporary schemes by its architect, indicates that the physical execution of the building, for reasons of economy, haste or simple technological limitations, did not always come up to the level of its ideal character before, during and after construction.⁸⁹

Here Goodman's terms prompt us to consider that the Pavilion is allographic; the "ideal character" of the work would correspond to a work whose features are completely established by a notational system, and the "material form" would be an actual built

⁸⁹ Solà-Morales, 29.

instance of this work. Yet, according to this premise, the 1929 Pavilion would not be a perfect version of the Barcelona Pavilion: it is known, for instance, that due to the scarcity of green marble and travertine, “the exterior walls and the rear part of the Pavilion were not clad with these, despite the obvious need for continuity of material, but were instead built of ordinary brick, plastered and painted green and yellow.”⁹⁰ That is to say, the built 1929 Pavilion was an approximation of what it actually should have been, a building that apparently was the Barcelona Pavilion, but did not possess some of its properties. Not by chance, there are barely pictures showing the Pavilion from a perspective that would reveal its imperfection (Fig. 18).




Fig.18. Barcelona Pavilion from the southwest, 1929. The southern wall was not covered with marble but made of brick, plastered, and painted yellow.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

Strictly speaking, hence, the 1929 Pavilion cannot be considered as an instance of the “Barcelona Pavilion” as planned by Mies, for the “physical execution of the building” does not “come up to the level of its ideal character,” as noted by Solà-Morales, Cirici, and Ramos. In other words, the 1929 Pavilion cannot be taken as an instance of the Barcelona Pavilion, in the same manner in which a version of the *Goldberg Variations* including notes different from the ones in the score cannot be considered as an instance of the *Goldberg Variations*. Obviously, one is very reluctant to affirm that the Barcelona Pavilion built in 1929 is not the actual Barcelona Pavilion, and that the 1986 building is indeed an instance of the Pavilion, or, more precisely, the first and only instance of the Pavilion, because it accurately fulfills the requirements established by the notational system to be considered an instance of the work. As a matter of fact, this is literally the aim the reconstruction had – to complete the uncompleted 1929 work:

It should be noted that it was our firm decision to totally clad all three faces of this wall, although we were well aware that on the 1929 building two of the exterior wall surfaces were without the green marble, which was replaced by a simple rendering in the same tone as the stone.

In this respect, too, we were perfectly clear that our criterion was not to reproduce the building as it had actually been when it was completed – or not completed – in 1929, but to carry through to its conclusion an idea with regard to which we had an abundance of information and the support of an architectural logic that was beyond all doubt.⁹¹

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 32.

Even if, according to the architects responsible for the reconstruction, the 1986 building is more the Barcelona Pavilion (and the 1929 Pavilion less), our intuitive reluctance to conclude that the 1929 Pavilion is not the Barcelona Pavilion – that the original Pavilion is actually not the Pavilion designed by Mies and built under his direction in 1929 because it was “not completed” – points to the need to shift the chosen identity criterion again, from allographic to autographic. In other words, this leads us to question the way in which the identity of the Barcelona Pavilion had been established by Solà-Morales, Cirici, and Ramos. Their premise when reconstructing Mies’s work was to fulfill the Pavilion’s “ideal character” fixed by them in a notational system even though this would exclude the 1929 Pavilion from being an instance of the work. This means that their plan fixed as constitutive elements of the work some characteristics that the 1929 Pavilion did not fulfill. Nevertheless, a notational system, or plan in this case, does not necessarily have to fix the “ideal,” but only determine the constitutive elements of a work. It is perfectly possible to design a plan that establishes the identity of both the 1929 and the 1986 Pavilions, in the same way as the score of the *Goldberg Variations* with no indication of the grace notes referring to trills, mordents, turns, or appoggiature, for instance, leaves to the interpreter the freedom to play the ornaments she wants, with her version still being an instance of Bach’s *Goldberg Variations*. That is to say (and returning to Goodman’s categories), the fact that the 1929 Pavilion does not fulfill the requirements established by a certain plan does not mean that the Barcelona Pavilion cannot be considered as an allographic work.

Another shift from allographic to autographic identity processes is necessary at this point. To elude the counterintuitive statement that the 1929 Pavilion is not the

Barcelona Pavilion, it should be taken into account that the Barcelona Pavilion is not completely allographic, i.e., that its identity is not totally defined by a plan. While scores and scripts seem to be sufficient in fixing the identity of musical pieces and plays, and we consider that the differences among instances do not matter for establishing their identity (the differences between the 1955 and the 1981 Gould *Goldberg Variations* do not make them two different pieces), this seems not to be the case of architectural plans, for extranotational information is required to absolutely determine a building. This aspect is shown in the Barcelona Pavilion plan published in 1929, in which some of its specifications, such as the materials used (“Onyx doré polierte,” “Trav polierte,” or “Spiegelglas weiß”), or the functions of the spaces (the space corresponding to the office is labeled as “Büro”) are written down in explanatory notes and are not codified by means of a notational system (Fig. 8). It can be argued that the extranotational information is required because the notational system in architecture is not accurate enough to completely establish the identity of a certain building. This is precisely what Goodman maintains when affirming that “insofar as its notational language has not yet acquired full authority to divorce identity of work in all cases from particular production, architecture is a mixed and transitional case.”⁹² Nevertheless, it should be considered whether the extranotational information is necessary to determine the identity of a work because some features that constitute its identity are not able to be allographically fixed. That is to say, even if we had a perfect notational system, a specific work can also be determined by autographic features, and then its identity would still be a mixed case of allographic and autographic characteristics. In fact, this is actually the case of the Barcelona Pavilion: on the one hand, we distinguish between original and replica through

⁹² LA, 221.

the different histories of constructions – autographically –; and, on the other, the reconstruction was possible by means of the creation of a notational system – allographically. Thus Goodman’s statement about architecture being a transitional case is incorrect: architecture is not a “mixed and transitional case.” It is a mixed but not transitional case.

For (to attempt a *reductio ad absurdum*), let us suppose that we would consider the Barcelona Pavilion only as an allographic work, i.e., that we would establish its identity based only on a notational system – which, as we have seen, is not enough for defining all the necessary and sufficient features that constitute the Pavilion, because there are constitutive features that cannot (yet) be codified in a plan. Then, not only would the 1929 and the 1986 Pavilion be considered instances of the work, but so would every building that fulfilled the requirements established by the plan. Consequently, if the specific location of the Pavilion is not determined by its notational system, it would be possible to have an indeterminate number of Barcelona Pavilions spread around the world. Yet it can also be argued that the location of the Pavilion can be fixed by a notational system by including its latitude, longitude, and orientation in a plan. In this way, only one building at a time would be able to fulfill the requirements allographically established. Thus, only the 1929 and the 1986 Pavilion – and not any other Pavilion built in any other place – would be instances of the Barcelona Pavilion. This would mean that the Pavilion is an allographic work with two instances (1929 and 1986) – provided, of course, that the 1929 Pavilion is an actual instance of the Pavilion, which, as has been discussed above, is questionable depending on the notational system used to establish its identity. Even if it is possible to consider that the Barcelona Pavilion is only allographic,

this does not seem to be completely adequate: even if it is technically possible to endlessly reproduce the Barcelona Pavilion following a plan, its site-specificity limits this allographic potential. Considering this, then Goodman's argument, according to which the Pavilion is not completely allographic because "its notational language has not yet acquired full authority to divorce identity of work in all cases from particular production,"⁹³ is not quite right. The Pavilion is autographic because intrinsic autographic features preclude its being a completely allographic work; even if a perfect notational system were available, the Pavilion would still be partly autographic. This resistance to becoming completely allographic is a reflection of the values that prevail when we classify works as autographic or allographic. That is to say, if we are reluctant to consider the Pavilion completely allographic, it is because an important element of its identity would be lost; the Pavilion has indelible autographic features that limit its allographic characteristics.

That site is a constitutive element of the Barcelona Pavilion was a given for the architects responsible for the reconstruction: as Solà-Morales affirmed in the dedication of the reconstruction in June 1986, the Pavilion "should not and could not be in any other place."⁹⁴ This is not, however, a shared opinion, for not everybody agrees that the Barcelona Pavilion is site-specific:

There was a widely received idea, very much in line with the interpretation of Mies' architecture in the fifties, that saw the Barcelona Pavilion as a prototype; a perfect, autonomous spatial experiment capable

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ *La Vanguardia*, 3 June 1986, 52.

of being considered as an object. Given the terms of this logic, it was by no means strange that for many people it made little or no difference whether it was rebuilt in Barcelona or in Bologna, Frankfurt or Berlin. A more detailed, more rigorous knowledge of the Pavilion clearly revealed to us the building's total relationship with the site that Mies himself had chosen for it. The relationship with the other buildings, the Gran Plaza, the ascent from this to the hill of the Pueblo Español, the topography, were all aspects of the basic premises of the project, without which the building was stripped of all its meaning. For this reason the site chosen for the reconstruction of the German Pavilion was precisely the spot occupied by the original in 1929-1930.⁹⁵

Even if considering the Pavilion as not site-specific makes of it an allographic building reproducible everywhere (because its identity is determined by a notational system that does not define its location), the fact of being site-specific does not make it immediately autographic (for site-specificity is not a necessary condition for a work to be autographic). Picasso's *Guernica*, for instance, is an autographic work and, like most paintings, not site-specific: it was the same work when first shown in the Paris International Exposition in 1937; it continued being the same as it traveled through the world and was shown in the Museum of Modern Art in New York; and, finally, it is still the same displayed since 1981 in the Museo Nacional Reina Sofia in Madrid. If the

⁹⁵ Solà-Morales, 28. The same idea is expressed by George Dodds as follows: "For some, the pavilion is one of the most contextual and site-specific of Mies's European buildings. Others have argued with equal persuasiveness that it was a placeless and autonomous object and that its reconstruction could be sited anywhere in that the original was unfettered by distinctions of place." George Dodds, "Body in pieces: desiring the Barcelona Pavilion," *Res* 39 (2001), 168-191,173.

Barcelona Pavilion is taken to be autographic, it is because its location has been considered a constitutive element of its identity, i.e., a relevant feature in the history of its construction, which is not the case of the *Guernica*.

A problem arises, however, when trying to determine what exactly it means for the Pavilion to be site-specific. If the reconstruction was placed on the very same site and in the same orientation (and not east façade looking west, and the north facing south, for instance), it was because the relationship between the Pavilion and its surroundings was to be restored. A first obstacle arises when trying to define the Pavilion's surroundings, for it is not clear what constitute its surroundings: only the areas adjacent to it are its surroundings, or the entire 1929 Exposition ground, or even the whole city of Barcelona – to establish the limit somewhere. Further difficulties arise because that which constitutes the surroundings is continuously evolving. In 1986, the surroundings were not exactly the same as in 1929: even if “the Gran Plaza, the ascent from this to the hill of the Pueblo Español, [and] the topography” are still the same, they have aged, and they do not look the same as in 1929. Furthermore, there are some elements that have disappeared, such as the eight Ionic columns built in 1923 by Josep Puig i Cadafalch, located just in front of the Pavilion, so that the front façade of the Pavilion could only be seen through those

columns from the central square of the Exposition area (Fig. 19).




Fig.19. Ionic columns designed by Puig i Cadafalch photographed during the Pavilion's construction, 1929.

Other elements, such as the vegetation, have been recreated for the reconstruction to imitate the original surroundings; nevertheless, there are still some of the trees and bushes planted in 1929, which are now seventy years old, and others planted in 1986.⁹⁶ If the surroundings are not the same, then placing the Pavilion in exactly the same spot in which it was built in 1929 does not imply reestablishing exactly the former relationship between Pavilion and surroundings. Moreover, we can imagine an extreme case, in which the 1986 Pavilion is standing at exactly the same geographical coordinates as the 1929

⁹⁶ "All this induced us to recreate a comparable environment, above all bearing in mind the fact that many of the trees planted for the 1929 Exposition had survived in place. These somewhat abandoned plantations included umbras, magnolias, cypresses and laurels, a number of which were in a sufficiently precarious state as to need replacing, while others needed no more than a careful pruning to revitalize them." *Ibid.*, 37.

Pavilion, but the entire environment has been devastated by a natural catastrophe. If site in the sense of “surroundings” is a constitutive element of the Pavilion, it seems dubious that we could continue affirming that it is the same Pavilion. This compels us to conclude that, even though the Pavilion’s surroundings are a relevant aspect for establishing the identity of the Barcelona Pavilion, they are not a necessary condition. We should rather say that the Pavilion is site-specific because it is placed at certain geographic coordinates, independently from the appearance and evolution of its surroundings, in the same way as we consider the Parthenon in Athens to be site-specific, even though its surroundings have continuously changed since it was built.

It turns out, hence, that the Barcelona Pavilion can be regarded as both site-specific and not site-specific, and this judgment is not only based on whether the Pavilion is a prototype, “a perfect, autonomous spatial experiment capable of being considered as an object,” but also depends on what is understood by “site.”⁹⁷ For the architects in charge of the 1986 reconstruction, “site” refers to the spot where the 1929 Pavilion was located with some of the elements that constituted its surroundings. Despite the complexities that arise when trying to define “site,” those features seem to be enough to determine the site that was a constitutive element of the 1929 Pavilion and to establish what needs to be reproduced in the 1986 Pavilion. That is to say, even if it is not at all clear what “site” refers to, the fact of considering that it is a relevant aspect of the history of construction of the Barcelona Pavilion entails considering it as an autographic work. Consequently, the 1986 Pavilion is only a replica, or, more concretely, the only possible replica.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 28.

One of the reasons it has been problematic to define exactly what “site” is has been time. The purpose in the 1986 reconstruction was not only to reproduce the building but also to recreate the environment where it was located, even though these surroundings had evolved and aged since 1929. But time affected not only the surroundings but also the Pavilion, or, more specifically, the two Pavilions. While the 1929 Pavilion was designed as an ephemeral building, to last the time the International Exposition of Barcelona was open (from May 19, 1929 to January 15, 1930), the 1986 Pavilion was designed to endure:

The reconstruction was thus undertaken not in order to arise [*sic*] anew a building following exactly the same technical conditions of the 1929 Pavilion, but with a view to guaranteeing its permanence.⁹⁸

The 1986 Pavilion, hence, does not respect the ephemeral character the 1929 Pavilion had, nor it completely respects the materials used in 1929. Actually, some of the changes in the materials were undertaken to ensure that the Pavilion would endure: a poured concrete foundation system substituted for the traditional Catalan vaulted brick system; the chrome-plated columns were instead made of stainless steel, to assure they would resist climatic conditions; a harder travertine was substituted (also for climate reasons) for the soft, honey-colored Roman travertine chosen by Mies; and a new roof and drainage system were constructed to avoid leaks. Other modifications were carried out to assure the Pavilion could be permanently used: artificial lighting, heating, and air conditioning system was added; exterior doors were permanently mounted; and a security

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 29.

system was installed. Furthermore, the rear exteriors of the Pavilion that were originally painted green to approximate the color of the desired marble were covered with that actual green marble.⁹⁹ These material and design changes were made to respond to the previously mentioned criterion of completing a project left unfinished in 1929. In Goodman's terms, to allographically fulfill the requirements established in a notational system. However, this is not the Pavilion's definite status, for another shift in the identity criteria is possible. It can be argued that the Barcelona Pavilion is autographic and that its ephemeral character is a constitutive element of the history of its production, because Mies designed it taking into account that it would stand only nine months, and for this reason the services were provisory and locally resolved: there was no heating installed, the draining system for the flat roofs was inefficient, and the water pump for the pools on the outside was provisional.¹⁰⁰ The 1986 Pavilion would then be, if it were only autographic, a partial reproduction of the 1929 Pavilion because it ignores the ephemeral character of the original having lasted (as of this writing) twenty-one years longer. Since this ephemeral character is not respected in the reproduction, either the durability of the Pavilion is not a constitutive element of the history of its construction – which seems difficult to maintain given the circumstances for which it was built –, or the Pavilion is rather allographic than autographic – which is actually one of the underlying and implicit conditions for the Pavilion to be rebuilt, because the possibility of creating a notational system is what allowed the reconstruction–. Neither is this last point, however, the

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 30-33.

¹⁰⁰ For a detailed discussion of the services see Solà-Morales, 36-37. Leonardo Benevolo interprets the Pavilion to be a temporary building: "Mies realized that an exhibition pavilion was not an ordinary building but something essentially different, which was to remain in existence only as long as it was going to be looked at and which was at the service of the public who was looking at it. For this reason he did not conceive of it as an enclosed building but as a collection of detached buildings, suited temporarily to defining a certain stretch of space." Benevolo, 490.

ultimate definition of the Pavilion, as the “final reflection” by the architects responsible for the reconstruction asserts:

We have no doubt that all those of us who played some part in this undertaking are conscious of the distance that exists between original and its replica. Not because the quality of its execution is inferior, which is not the case, or because it was impossible to determine precisely how all of the details of the building had been resolved, but because every replica is, indisputably, a *reinterpretation*.

In the same sense that it is impossible for us to hear the *St Matthew Passion* as Bach conducted it in the church of St Thomas in Leipzig, for all that we can enjoy brilliant and sensitive contemporary interpretations of it, so too for this masterpiece of modern architecture [...] what we have attempted to bring to a successful conclusion is an *interpretation*.¹⁰¹

Again, in Goodman’s terms, autographic and allographic features are mixed when trying to establish the identity of the Barcelona Pavilion. While it is acknowledged that there exists a distance between original and replica (a distinction that can only be established if the Pavilion is taken to be autographic), at the same time, the replica is considered as a “reinterpretation” or an “interpretation,” as if the identity of the Pavilion would only be established by its notational system. Furthermore, and rereading the second part of the quotation in light of Goodman’s categories, if the 1986 Barcelona Pavilion is an interpretation in the same way as is the *St Matthew Passion* conducted by

¹⁰¹Solà-Morales, 39. For the whole argument see “Final reflection: In defence of a replica,” *Ibid.*, 38-39.

Philippe Herreweghe or the one conducted by Nikolaus Harnoncourt, then the Pavilion is clearly allographic. Nevertheless, the analogy between the *St Matthew Passion* interpreted in Leipzig by Bach and the 1929 Barcelona Pavilion constructed by Mies is problematic: while Bach could have directed the *St Matthew Passion* in many different places, not only in Leipzig, and it would still have been the same piece, we would not easily admit that Mies could have built many different Barcelona or German Pavilions for the International Exposition in 1929. The première of Bach's *St Matthew Passion* does not equal the 1929 Barcelona Pavilion, and the 1986 Pavilion interpreted by Solà-Morales, Cirici, and Ramos does not equal the *St Matthew Passion* by Herreweghe, because Bach's performance of the *St Matthew Passion* in the Thomaskirche in Leipzig is also an interpretation of the work, another instance as valid as the others, while Mies's 1929 Pavilion cannot simply be taken as an interpretation of a work but also is the original.

After having discussed all the elements of the process of reconstruction of the Barcelona Pavilion, it seems that the initial question, i.e., whether the 1929 Pavilion and the 1986 Pavilion are the same or not, does not have a univocal answer. In Goodman's terms, the Pavilion is both autographic and allographic: it is autographic, considering the history of its production (and then the work we can visit now on Montjuïc is a replica), and allographic, considering its notational system (and the present work is the 1986 instance of it). As has been shown, the two criteria to establish what constitutes the identity of a work (history of production and notational system) are both pertinent for determining the identity of the Barcelona Pavilion. More than that, they are inseparable, for arguing that the Pavilion is only autographic or only allographic does not lead to

convincing conclusions. Maintaining that the Barcelona Pavilion is only autographic ignores the fact that the identity of Mies's work can be established by a notational system. Arguing that the Pavilion is only allographic could lead to the conclusion that the 1929 Pavilion itself is not the Barcelona Pavilion at all (if its notational system fixes as relevant features the 1929 Pavilion did not possess). The Pavilion clearly has both autographic and allographic characteristics. Since we are reluctant to admit that the 1929 Pavilion is not an instance of the work and, rather, we consider it as the original, the Barcelona Pavilion is an autographic work and, consequently, the 1986 Pavilion is a reproduction. Nevertheless, since there exists the possibility to create a notational system to fix its identity (and it has actually been created), the Barcelona Pavilion is allographic and the 1986 Pavilion is an instance of it. Yet not all the features of the Pavilion, such as site and materials, can indisputably be established by means of a notational system: this makes the Pavilion more autographic than allographic – of course, only if these features are considered to be constitutive for the Pavilion. Furthermore, even though these features would be established by a plan, it would be possible to change them and the work continue to be considered the same, which is what actually happened: Mies decided to use brick instead of marble on some of the exterior walls and thus violated the initial project, but the Barcelona Pavilion continued being the Barcelona Pavilion. Taking this fact into account, the Pavilion is autographic rather than allographic.

According to Goodman, “[t]he allographic art has won its emancipation not by proclamation but by notation.”¹⁰² After challenging the notions of autographic and allographic with the case of the Barcelona Pavilion, we should specify and affirm that notation is a necessary condition for architecture to achieve “full authority to divorce

¹⁰² *LA*, 122.

identity of work in all cases from particular production,” but not a sufficient one.¹⁰³ Apart from a precise and accurate notational system, it is necessary that the difference between two architectural works based on the same plan be considered irrelevant, and this is (still) not the case in the Barcelona Pavilion. The affirmation that the Pavilion “should not and could not be in any other place,” although it actually could be placed on another site, or that “now, we can even touch the onyx wall,” implying that it is the same wall even if it is not exactly the same one, creates an invisible but indelible patina of autographicness on the 1929 Pavilion, converting the 1986 Pavilion into a reproduction and not into an instance of the work.¹⁰⁴ Thus, the Barcelona Pavilion could be a completely allographic work, but it is not: the Barcelona Pavilion is both autographic and allographic.

Even though Georgia van der Rohe affirmed that “for a second time, the German Pavilion of Barcelona [had] been given to the world,” she was not dedicating the same building as King Alfonso XII in 1929.¹⁰⁵ To be considered the same building, the two Pavilions should be understood allographically as two instances of the same work, such as happens with the several instances of Bach’s *Goldberg Variations*. This is not the case of the Barcelona Pavilion, for its identity is also determined by autographic features when it is considered that the 1986 Pavilion is a “faithful reconstruction” of the 1929 one.¹⁰⁶

Thus the Pavilion one can visit on the slope of Montjuïc, when considered according to the features that make it an allographic work, is the “same” as the one erected in 1929. Taking into account the autographic features of the Barcelona Pavilion, what one visits is a reproduction of it, and thus cannot be considered as the “same.”

¹⁰³ *LA*, 221.

¹⁰⁴ Both quotations from Víctor. A. Amela, 52.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*

Hence the Barcelona Pavilion is a hybrid: it is not completely allographic but also autographic, a mixed work of architecture whose identity is established by autographic and allographic features – neither reducible to the other.

Final thoughts

As has been argued, when examined through the lens of Goodman's categories, the Barcelona Pavilion is both autographic and allographic. Insofar as the different histories of construction serve to distinguish between original and replica, the Pavilion is autographic; insofar as the 1986 reconstruction was only possible because a notational system could be created, the Pavilion is allographic. Reducing its identity only to autographic or only to allographic features would not reflect the conception we have of this building: some crucial features would be missing if we limited the Pavilion's identity to either one or the other. One of the functions of the autographic and the allographic criteria is to help us in clarifying and classifying our judgments regarding the identity of a work of art, i.e., these criteria are a reflection of our practice of distinguishing the constitutive elements of a work. In addition, they mirror our way of establishing the work's identity and our ways of discriminating between an original, a reproduction, and a forgery.

Goodman's statement, that "insofar as its notational language has not yet acquired full authority to divorce identity of work in all cases from particular production, architecture is a mixed and transitional case," has to be understood within the context of the current judgments concerning the identity of architecture.¹⁰⁷ While it is certainly true that architecture is a "mixed" case, i.e., that the autographic and the allographic coexist as criteria to identify works, the affirmation that architecture is "transitional" needs to be reconsidered. Goodman's prediction, according to which architecture will become completely allographic once a notational system that completely identifies a work is

¹⁰⁷ *LA*, 221.

achieved, does not have as a necessary consequence that the work's identity will be independent from its history of production. In other words, the autographic criterion for identifying works still affects contemporary buildings with an accurate notation that fulfills its function of fixing the work's identity. Thus, the distinction between autographic and allographic is not related to an intrinsic historical development of architecture, a process which would bring us to affirm that architecture is currently a transitional case. Nevertheless, it must be noted that architecture could only become allographic with the establishment of plans, which is indeed a historical process. Furthermore, since architecture is a discipline continuously evolving, it cannot be definitively excluded that, in the future, the allographic criterion will be enough for identifying an architectural work. That is to say, it is uncertain whether or not the autographic features will cease being considered as constitutive elements of a work's identity and, in that way, when establishing the identity of a work, no loss of any fundamental property would be experienced.

However, this is not (yet) the case of the Barcelona Pavilion: it is a mixed, but not a transitional, work. The process undertaken to build the 1986 reconstruction makes the Pavilion more allographic than autographic or, better, the fact of judging the Pavilion as an allographic and thus reproducible work allowed the creation of a notational system precisely for reproduction's sake. But this step does not imply that the Pavilion will become completely allographic in the future, which would only occur when all the features considered as constitutive of the work's identity are necessarily and uniquely fixed in a notational system and the autographic criterion is considered superfluous. Since this is not the case with the Pavilion, it should rather be defined as a hybrid. Even more,

this hybrid status allows us to understand aspects of the Pavilion that otherwise would not be possible to understand, such as the relevancy of the difference between original and replica and, simultaneously, the possibility of the replica. In this context, each of the several interpretations of the Pavilion's status can be understood as based on either autographic or allographic features while at the same time ignoring its hybrid status as a work both autographic and allographic. Those who affirm that the 1986 Pavilion is only a copy are relying on the autographic criterion; those who consider the newer Pavilion as an instance as valid as the 1929 building are relying on the allographic criterion. This last position is also Evans': when he states that he is unable to see "issues of its authenticity and reproducibility as significant," he is implicitly stating that the Pavilion is only an allographic work.¹⁰⁸ Even more, since Evans refers to the 1986 building as if it were the 1929 one, he is attributing the same aesthetic characteristics to both.

Yet it is important to note that identity features are completely unrelated to aesthetic features. Thus, even though the two Pavilions are allographically the same work, this does not imply that they have the same aesthetic features, in the same way as Glenn Gould's 1955 and 1981 performances of Bach's *Goldberg Variations* are the same piece but with considerably different aesthetic characteristics. This distinction between authenticity and aesthetic quality applies not only to instances of the same work, but also to an original and its copy or even its forgery. As Goodman affirms:

Here as earlier, we must be careful not to confuse genuineness with aesthetic merit. That the distinction between original and forgery is

¹⁰⁸ Robin Evans, "Mies van der Rohe's Paradoxical Symmetries," in *Translations from Drawing to Building and Other Essays* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997), 272.

aesthetically important does not, we have seen, imply that the original is superior to the forgery. An original painting may be less rewarding than an inspired copy; an impression from a badly worn plate may be aesthetically much further removed from an early impression than is a good photographic reproduction.¹⁰⁹

Hence, aesthetically, the 1986 reconstruction might be more “rewarding” than the 1929 Pavilion, but, again, this appreciation is completely unrelated to identity issues. Unless we limit our examination to the identity features of the Pavilion, in a similar way as we would concentrate on the notes fixed in a score constituting the *Goldberg Variations* without considering how they are actually played, the discussion on aesthetic features will differ whether we analyze the 1929 or the 1986 Pavilion, because every nuance is relevant. The water marks in the onyx and the green marble, the texture of the travertine, the reflections on the water in the two pools, the changing colors, and the game of shadows during the day: all these particular characteristics mark our aesthetic comprehension of the Pavilion and the further symbolic meaning, which is different in the 1929 and the 1986 buildings. The Pavilion’s political function as representing the German nation in the International Exposition is clearly symbolized in the 1929 building through the colors of the German flag that were used in the carpet, the curtains and the onyx wall; the Pavilion’s modernist features are emphasized by the symmetrical patterns created by the arrangement of the marble plates of the 1986 Pavilion. Moreover, it can be argued that the 1929 and the 1986 buildings allow us to notice aspects of Mies’s work that we were not able to see in the other one, in a similar way in which Gould’s 1981

¹⁰⁹ LA, 119.

performance of Bach's *Goldberg Variations* allows us to hear some details of his 1955 performance that we had not noticed before because those were more emphasized in the latter than in the former performance. The color of the carpet of the 1986 Pavilion becomes relevant once its symbolic meaning in the 1929 Pavilion is known; we pay attention to the regularities in the marble of the 1929 Pavilion once the pattern has been recognized in the 1986 one.

It must be said that there is a significant difference between the comments based on the 1929 and the ones based on the 1986 Pavilion, since the majority of the interpretations of the 1929 Pavilion were based on photographs, i.e., black-and-white static reproductions that only captured instants of the work's ephemeral existence.¹¹⁰ Therefore, the understanding of the 1929 Pavilion does not consider the spatial experience of the building, nor the Pavilion's colors and texture, but relies mainly on a two-dimensional representation. However, the extant photographs of the first Pavilion can help us be aware of some features of the 1986 Pavilion, such as the huge game of reflections clearly appreciable in the black-and-white pictures. Yet buildings age, and the colors of the materials that constitute the 1986 Pavilion also suffered and are suffering alterations. As Max Bächer stated in 1989:

However, nobody had expected that the bright Roman travertine would get dirty so fast, nor that the "verde antiguo" from Tinos would lose its color so rapidly because of the sunlight. If the old pavilion had not been

¹¹⁰ Juan Pablo Bonta discusses the succession of the several interpretations of the Pavilion in: Juan Pablo Bonta, *Anatomía de la interpretación en arquitectura: reseña semiótica de la crítica del Pabellón de Barcelona de Mies van der Rohe = An anatomy of architectural interpretation: a semiotic review of the criticism of Mies van der Rohe's Barcelona Pavilion* (Barcelona: Gustavo Gili, 1975). Note that this book was written before the 1986 reconstruction.

demolished, then today the original would probably look as in earlier photographs, i.e., black, white, and grey.¹¹¹

Nevertheless, neither the fact that the 1929 Pavilion would have aged in such a way that it would look as photographic reproductions depicted it, nor that the 1986 Pavilion actually ages has an effect on their identity features. Rather, the fact that aesthetic features change throughout time demonstrates that they cannot be confused with the features that constitute the work's identity, which are permanent. The autographic and the allographic remain as valid identification criteria despite the work's changes.

Thus, the process of establishing what constitutes the identity of an architectural work is a first step in the process of construing architecture. While some buildings can be considered as clearly autographic and others clearly allographic, Goodman's criteria for establishing the identity of architectural works are intertwined in the majority of cases. Even more, it can be argued the all the architectural works can be judged according to both criteria and that only in exceptional cases (such as the Taj Mahal or tract housing) one undoubtedly dominates the other. As paradigmatically shown with the Barcelona Pavilion, architectural works can be interpreted as hybrids, in which the autographic and the allographic are inextricably linked. Judging what constitutes the identity of an architectural work turns out to be an intricate process that, at the same time, is a sign of the complexity inherent in architecture. Goodman's categories serve to better explain this entanglement, which constitutes the richness and the challenge architecture presents. Once the identity of a work has been established, further interpreting can focus on the

¹¹¹ Max Bächer, "Barcelona-Pavillon, Sagrada Familia: Original, Kopie oder Nachahmung," *Bauwelt* 80 (May 1989), 853.

features that make a particular work unique. By emphasizing the elements that constitute the work's identity and by pointing out the specific characteristics that make a difference in an architectural work, our discourse both describes how buildings symbolize and conveys meaning to architecture. Given that for Goodman reality is a product of discourse, our construals of an architectural work are simultaneously creating it. Since works of architecture incessantly age, change, and evolve, we are immersed in a never-ending process of construing and constructing architecture.

Illustration Credits

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