Problem Sets
Problem Set 1 (PDF)
Problem Set 2 (PDF)
Problem Set 3 (PDF)
Problem Set 4 (PDF)
Problem Set 5 (PDF)
Problem Set 6 (PDF)
Problem Set 7 (PDF)
Problem Set 8 (PDF)
Problem Set 9 (PDF)
Paper Topics
Final paper topics. Assigned 5 days after lecture 11. Due 3 days after lecture 14, before 5 pm.
NB1: no quotations, no paraphrases; answer in your own words. Answer one question in five pages.
NB2: You are encouraged to submit outlines of your papers to the professor and teaching assistants for comment.
NB3: If you elect to do question 7, you must email your proposed question to the professor and teaching assistants for approval by 5pm on Lecture 13. You must then meet with us to discuss it within next 4 days.
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Explain Dennett's "perverse claim" (p. 564). What are the main similarities and differences between the perverse claim and the claim that passing a certain demanding kind of Turing test is sufficient for having a mind? What does the perverse claim imply about Block's Aunt Bubbles machine? There are some objections to behaviorism that are not objections to the perverse claim. Take two of these objections, and explain why they leave the perverse claim unscathed. Why does Dennett think that the perverse claim is correct? Is it?
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Dretske and Dennett both try to give a broadly physicalistic account of mental representation. But their accounts are very different. Compare and contrast them. Which is the superior one? Defend it against some objections.
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What is "externalism" about mental content? Briefly outline what you take to be the most convincing kind of example that purports to demonstrate externalism (about a certain class of mental states). Is the argument convincing? Why or why not? Explain McKinsey's worry that externalism is incompatible with privileged access. Is it? If so, which thesis should be rejected?
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What, according to Michael Tye ("Visual Qualia...") are "qualia" and "Qualia"? What according to Frank Jackson ("Epiphenomenal qualia"), are "qualia"? What is the connection between Tye's (twofold) sense of the term, and Jackson's sense? What, according to Jackson, does it mean to say that qualia are "epiphenomenal"? Evaluate the three objections to the claim that qualia are epiphenomenal discussed by Jackson in section IV. Does Jackson succeed in rebutting them? Are qualia epiphenomenal?
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Nagel, Chalmers, and Jackson all think that consciousness poses a problem for physicalism, on somewhat similar grounds. Critically compare and contrast their views. Is the "hard problem of consciousness" exceptionally hard?
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Take one of the theories as taxonomized in "Consciousness and its place in nature" that you think is false. Explain what this theory is, and why you think it's false. Now take the theory that you think is true (or, at any rate, is the least implausible of the lot). Defend it against objections.
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Wildcard - make up your own question