| 1 |
Introduction and Warmup: Searle Against AI |
Required Readings
Searle, John R. "Can Computers Think?" Chapter 63 in Chalmers.
Block, Ned. "The Mind as the Software of the Brain." Chapter 11 in An Invitation to Cognitive Science. Edited by D. Osherson, L. Gleitman, S. Kosslyn, E. Smith, and S. Sternberg. Vol. 3. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995, section 4. ISBN: 0262150433.
A version of "The Mind as the Software of the Brain" is also available. |
| 2 |
Introduction and Warmup: Searle Against AI (cont.)
Dualism |
Required Readings
Armstrong. Chapter 1 and 2. pp. 9-20.
Introduction and Warmup: Searle Against AI
Searle, John R. "Minds, Brains, and Programs." Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3, no. 3 (1980): 417-457.
Dualism
Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy (II, VI). 4th ed. Translated by Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998. ISBN: 0872204200.
———. Passions of the Soul: an English Translation. Translated by Stephen Voss. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989. ISBN: 0872200353.
Optional Readings
Searle, John R. "Is the Brain a Digital Computer?" Presidential Address. Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 1990.
Byrne, Alex. "Intentionality." Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Edited by J. Pfeifer and S. Sarkar. New York, NY: Routledge. (Forthcoming) |
| 3 |
Dualism (cont.)
Behaviorism |
Required Readings
Armstrong. Chapter 2, pp. 20-5; Chapter 5.
Dualism
Descartes, Rene. Meditations on First Philosophy (II, VI). 4th ed. Translated by Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998. ISBN: 0872204200.
———. Passions of the Soul: an English Translation. Translated by Stephen Voss. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989. ISBN: 0872200353.
Smullyan, Raymond M. "An Unfortunate Dualist." Chapter 4 in Chalmers.
Behaviorism
Ryle, Gilbert. "Descartes' Myth." Chapter 5 in Chalmers. |
| 4 |
Behaviorism (cont.)
The Identity Theory |
Required Readings
Place, U. T. "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" Chapter 8 in Chalmers.
Smart, J. J. C. "Sensations and Brain Processes." Chapter 9 in Chalmers.
Armstrong. Chapter 6.
Optional Readings
Byrne, Alex. "Behaviourism." In A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Edited by S. D. Guttenplan. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1994, pp. 132-140.
Behaviorism (SEP) |
| 5 |
The Identity Theory (cont.) |
Required Readings
Place, U. T. "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?" Chapter 8 in Chalmers.
Smart, J. J. C. "Sensations and Brain Processes." Chapter 9 in Chalmers.
Kripke, Saul A. Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980. ISBN: 0674598458.
Optional Readings
Feigl, Herbert. "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'." Chapter 10 in Chalmers. |
| 6 |
Functionalism |
Required Readings
Armstrong, David M. "The Causal Theory of the Mind." Chapter 12 in Chalmers.
Putnam, Hilary. "The Nature of Mental States." Chapter 11 in Chalmers.
Block, Ned. "The Mind as the Software of the Brain." Chapter 11 in An Invitation to Cognitive Science. Edited by D. Osherson, L. Gleitman, S. Kosslyn, E. Smith, and S. Sternberg. Vol. 3. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995, section 4. ISBN: 0262150433.
A version of "The Mind as the Software of the Brain" is also available.
Lewis, David. "Mad Pain and Martian Pain." In The Nature of Man. Edited by David M. Rosenthal. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991. ISBN: 0195046714.
Block, Ned. "Troubles with Functionalism." Chapter 14 in Chalmers.
Armstrong. Chapter 7. |
| 7 |
Functionalism (cont.)
Content: Intentionality and Externalism |
Required Readings
Brentano, Franz. "The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena." Chapter 44 in Chalmers.
Byrne, Alex. "Intentionality." Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Edited by J. Pfeifer and S. Sarkar. New York, NY: Routledge. (Forthcoming)
Putnam, Hilary. "The Meaning of 'Meaning'." Chapter 54 in Chalmers.
Burge, Tyler. "Individualism and the Mental." Chapter 55 in Chalmers.
Armstrong. Chapter 9.
Recommended Readings
Lewis, David. "Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications." Chapter 13 in Chalmers.
Optional Readings
Clark, Andy, and David J. Chalmers. "The Extended Mind." Chapter 59 in Chalmers. |
| 8 |
Content: Intentionality and Externalism (cont.)
Content: Psychosemantics |
Required Readings
Dretske, Fred. "A Recipe for Thought." Chapter 40 in Chalmers.
Armstrong. Chapter 12.
Optional Readings
Millikan, Ruth. "Biosemantics." Chapter 47 in Chalmers. |
| 9 |
Content: Psychosemantics (cont.)
Externalism and Self-knowledge |
Required Readings
Content: Psychosemantics
Dennett, Daniel C. "True Believers." Chapter 52 in Chalmers.
Externalism and Self-knowledge
McKinsey, Michael. "Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access." Analysis 51 (1991): 9-16.
Brueckner, A. "What an Anti-Individualist Knows A Priori." Analysis 52 (1992): 111-118. |
| 10 |
Consciousness and Intentionality
Consciousness and its Place in Nature |
Required Readings
Consciousness and Intentionality
Tye, Michael. "Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited." Chapter 42 in Chalmers.
Consciousness and its Place in Nature
Nagel, Thomas. "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Chapter 25 in Chalmers.
Armstrong. Chapter 10.
Recommended Readings
Block, Ned. "Concepts of Consciousness." Chapter 24 in Chalmers.
Peacocke, Christopher. "Sensation and the Content of Experience: A Distinction." Chapter 41 in Chalmers.
Optional Readings
Horgan, Terence, and John M. Tienson. "The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality." Chapter 49 in Chalmers. |
| 11 |
Consciousness and its Place in Nature (cont.) |
Required Readings
Chalmers, David J. "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature." Chapter 27 in Chalmers. |
| 12 |
The Knowledge Argument |
Required Readings
Jackson, Frank. "Epiphenomenal Qualia." Chapter 28 in Chalmers.
Lewis, David. "What Experience Teaches." Chapter 29 in Chalmers.
Dennett, Daniel. " What RoboMary Knows."
Armstrong. Chapter 11.
Optional Readings
Stoljar, Daniel. "Two Conceptions of the Physical." Chapter 31 in Chalmers. |
| 13 |
The Explanatory Gap and Kripke's Argument Revisited |
Required Readings
Levine, Joseph. "Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap." Chapter 35 in Chalmers.
Block, Ned. and Robert Stalnaker. "Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap." Philosophical Review 108 (1999): 1-46.
A version of " Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap" is available. |
| 14 |
Discussion of Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem? |
Required Readings
McGinn, C. "Can we solve the mind-body problem?" Mind xcviii, no. 391 (1989): 349-366. |