Ethnic Leftists, Populist Ethnics: The New Politics of Identity

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ABSTRACT

Group identifications – in particular, those based on ethnicity and class – are central to political mobilization during elections. This dissertation asks: when and why does the salience of ethnic and class categories vary across elections in emerging democracies? It argues that which categories are politicized has less to do with which categories are most salient to voters and more to do with which are most useful to politicians. The strategies of politicians, however, are constrained in a particular way, by opportunity, which is provided by party system crises, and by the political space, which is given by the structure of existing social identity categories, particularly their sizes and degrees of overlap with traditionally-politicized categories. Given the institutional rules, size and overlap affect which identity groups have the numbers to win and which describe similar constituencies that could be switched between for political expediency. The project nests the theory within an explanatory framework describing four key factors that drive variation in identification: voter preferences, political institutions, party institutions, and elite manipulation.

The dissertation presents data from three sources: a fieldwork-based study of Bolivian party politics, focusing on the democratic period from 1982 to 2005; data from the “Constructivist Dataset on Ethnicity and Institutions (CDEI)” on political parties and elections in Latin America in the early 1990s; and four shadow cases from the Andean region (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela). These data are used to map variation in identification across countries and over time; to illustrate the plausibility of the argument and to test it against predictions drawn from alternative hypotheses; and to explore the generalizability of the argument.

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# Table of Contents

Acknowledgments........................................................................................................7

Chapter 1: Introduction: Elections and Identity in Emerging Democracies..............10

**Part I: Theory and Method**

Chapter 2: Identity Politics: Conceptualization and Measurement.........................31
Chapter 3: A Framework and Theory.......................................................................82

**Part II: Identification Politics**

Chapter 4: Cross-National Variation: Latin American Elections after 1989.........115
Chapter 5: Bolivia: Historical Legacies and the Rise of the “Indigenous Left”......181

**Part III: Explanation**

Chapter 6: Illustration and Testing of Alternative Hypotheses: Bolivia, 1982-2005...241
Chapter 7: Cross-National Variation: The Andean Countries..............................281

Chapter 8: Elections and the New Politics of Identity.............................................354

Appendix A: Protocol for Coding of Economic Parties........................................369
Appendix B: Protocol for Coding of Issues............................................................380
Appendix C: Classification of Latin American Parties........................................391

Bibliography............................................................................................................398
Figures and Tables

Figures

Figure 3.1: Theory I ............................................................................ 102
Figure 3.2: Theory II ............................................................................ 103
Figure 3.3: Theory III ............................................................................ 106
Figure 3.4: Broad Prediction ............................................................... 107
Figure 3.5: The Argument in Brief .................................................... 108
Figure 4.1: Hypothesis I – Relationship between the Indigenous and Left Vote ....... 158
Figure 5.1: Map of Bolivia .................................................................... 185
Figure 5.2: Ethnologue Map of Bolivia .................................................. 187
Figure 5.3: Map of the “Camba Nation” .............................................. 190
Figure 5.4: Relative Population Across the Nine Bolivian Departments .............. 191
Figure 5.5: Number of Parties, Bolivian General Elections 1980-2005 .................... 200
Figure 5.6: Estimated Percentage of the Population that Votes, 1840-2002 ............. 201
Figure 5.7: MNR Hegemony, General Elections 1952-1964 ............................ 207
Figure 5.8: Vote for Ethnic- and Class-Mobilizing Parties, 1980-2005 ................... 221
Figure 6.1: The Bolivian Economic Crisis – I ........................................ 238
Figure 6.2: The Bolivian Economic Crisis – II ....................................... 239
Figure 6.3: The Bolivian Economic Crisis – III ...................................... 239
Figure 6.4: The Bolivian Economic Crisis – IV ..................................... 240
Figure 6.5: Representation of the Policy Positions of Major Parties .................... 247
Figure 6.6: Condepa – Formal Organizational Structure ............................ 251
Figure 6.7: Condepa’s Functional Structure .......................................... 253
Figure 6.8: Alternative Hypotheses ...................................................... 278
Figure 7.1: Bolivia ............................................................................... 285
Figure 7.2: Map of South America ....................................................... 288
Figure 7.3: Ethnic Groups .................................................................... 290
Figure 7.4: Ecuador ............................................................................... 295
Figure 7.5: Members’ Positioning of Parties in Ecuador ............................... 301
Figure 7.6: Venezuela .......................................................................... 311
Figure 7.7: Venezuela, Legislative Elections, 1958-2000 ............................... 315
Figure 7.8: Venezuela, Presidential Elections, 1958-2000 ............................. 316
Figure 7.9: Members’ Positioning of Parties in Venezuela ............................. 323
Figure 7.10: Peru circa 1990 .................................................................. 333
Figure 7.11: Members’ Positioning of Parties in Peru .................................. 338
Figure 7.12: Peru since 2000 .................................................................. 339
Figure 7.13: Colombia ......................................................................... 345
Figure 7.14: Members’ Positioning of Parties in Colombia ............................ 347
Figure 7.15: Colombia, Presidential Elections, 1958-2006 ............................ 349
Figure 7.16: Colombia, Legislative Elections (Lower House), 1958-2002 .......... 350
### Tables

Table 2.1: Arguments about Identity Change .......................................................... 42
Table 3.1: Key Explanations from the Literature for Variation in Identification .......... 89
Table 3.2: Party System Crises .................................................................................... 112
Table 4.1: Latin American Democracies by Sub-Region .............................................. 119
Table 4.2: Periods of Democracy in Latin America ................................................... 120
Table 4.3: Freedom House Scores and Democratic Status ........................................... 124
Table 4.4: Countries by Democratic Status ................................................................... 125
Table 4.5: Party System Institutionalization ................................................................. 127
Table 4.6: Timeline of Elections in the CDEI .................................................................. 133
Table 4.7: Description of CDEI Coverage .................................................................... 134
Table 4.8: Research on Latin American Parties and Democracy .................................. 136
Table 4.9: Form of Government – Legislative Branch .................................................. 137
Table 4.10: Presidential Electoral Systems .................................................................... 138
Table 4.11: Legislative Electoral System (Lower House) .............................................. 139
Table 4.12: Basic Facts ................................................................................................. 141
Table 4.13: Ethnic, Economic, and Class Vote in Each Country ..................................... 144
Table 4.14: Hypothesis 2 – Modernization, and Ethnic and Class Salience ................. 160
Table 4.15: Hypothesis 2 – Type of Vote and Measures of Development ..................... 161
Table 4.16: Hypothesis 3 – Ethnic Fractionalization Correlations ................................. 163
Table 4.17: Hypothesis 3 – Ethnic Fractionalization and Ethnic Party Support ............ 163
Table 4.18: Hypothesis 3 – “Politically Relevant” Ethnicities and Fractionalization ....... 165
Table 4.19: Hypothesis 4 – Indigenous Vote and Success with Target Group ................ 168
Table 4.20: Hypothesis 5 – Winning Coalitions and Ethnic Demography ...................... 172
Table 4.21: Assumption 1 – Group-Based Appeals ........................................................ 175
Table 4.22: Assumption 2 – Ethnic-Economic Parties ................................................... 176
Table 4.23: Assumption 3 – Types of Issues Highlighted by Ethnic Parties ................. 179
Table 5.1: Bolivian Population across the Nine Departments ....................................... 191
Table 5.2: Bolivian Legislative Election Rules, Elections 1980-2005 ............................ 195
Table 5.3: The Bolivian Party System, 1825-2006 ......................................................... 199
Table 5.4: Suffrage in Bolivia, 1840-2002 ................................................................... 202
Table 5.5: MNR Hegemony – Election Results, 1956-1964 ........................................... 208
Table 5.6: Bolivian Governments, 1964-1982 ............................................................... 210
Table 5.7: Results of the July 1979 Elections ................................................................. 216
Table 5.8: Results of the June 1980 General Elections .................................................. 218
Table 5.9: 1985 General Election Results and Party Classifications ............................... 220
Table 5.10: Major Ethnic-Mobilizing Parties in Bolivia ............................................... 223
Table 5.11: Classification of Major “Ethnic-Mobilizing” Parties ...................................... 225
Table 6.1: Results of the June 1985 General Elections .................................................. 244
Table 6.2: Poverty in Major Cities, 1986-1997 ............................................................... 249
Table 6.3: Some Ethnic Groups in Bolivia ................................................................. 275
Table 6.4: Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Population by Occupational Group .......... 276
Table 6.5: Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Population by Type of Employment ........ 276
Table 7.1: Governability Crises in Latin America, 1979-2002 ....................................... 293
Table 7.2: Ecuador, Legislative Elections (Provincial Seats), 1979-2002 ....................... 298
Table 7.3: Ecuador, Presidential Elections (Second Round), 1979-2006 ................. 299  
Table 7.4: Ecuador’s Indigenous Population .................................................. 303  
Table 7.5: Party Support in Venezuela’s 1958 elections .................................. 314  
Table 7.6: Venezuela, Legislative Elections (Lower House), 1958-2000 ............. 318  
Table 7.7: Venezuela, Presidential Elections, 1958-2000 ................................ 319  
Table 7.8: Peru, Legislative Elections (Lower House), 1980-2006 ....................... 330  
Table 7.9: Peru, Presidential Elections, 1980-2006 ........................................ 331  
Table 7.10: Bill Initiation Attempts in the Colombian Congress .......................... 351  
Table C.1: Ethnic-Mobilizing Parties in the CDEI ....................................... 391  
Table C.2: Economic-Mobilizing Parties in the CDEI .................................... 393  
Table C.3: Leftist Parties in the CDEI ......................................................... 396
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for people around the world, and are thus worth taking seriously and getting right; and second, through his own example, why fieldwork matters and how to do it.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: ELECTIONS AND IDENTITY IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES

When the Berlin Wall came down, when Václav Havel stood on the balcony in Prague’s Wenceslas Square and crowds cheered the collapse of the Communist regimes across Europe, I thought, like many people, that we were about to witness a new era of liberal democracy. ... With blithe lightness of mind, we assumed that the world was moving irrevocably beyond nationalism, beyond tribalism, beyond the provincial confines of the identities inscribed in our passports, towards a global market culture which was to be our new home. In retrospect, we were whistling in the dark. (Ignatieff 1994: 2)

Group identifications are central to political mobilization during elections.¹ Politicians appeal to voters not only as individuals who hold particular political positions, but also as members of groups² – ethnic minorities, members of “tribes,” the working class, the middle class, women, youth, businesspeople, students, professionals, union members, and so on. This is a common feature of politics in democracies in general, but it seems that it should be especially important in emerging democracies, where weakly-institutionalized political parties tend not to present programmatic platforms (see Kitschelt et al. 1999). Focusing on emerging democracies, this dissertation studies

¹ This study uses the term “identification” to refer to what is often called “identity” in other work in political science on identity politics. “Identification” refers to an expressed or attributed identity group membership or affiliation in a particular context (see Brubaker and Cooper 2000). The distinction between “identity” and “identification” is discussed in Chapter 2.
² “Group” and “category” are used interchangeably in this chapter. Chapter 2 introduces a slightly more precise usage, employing “group” to refer to socially-organized categories.
variation in the types of group identifications salient in elections. It seeks to measure salience so that it can be compared across countries and over time, and to develop explanations for variation.

Individuals may identify politically with many different types of groups. Of these, ethnicity and class are two of the most common categories around which people form national domestic political coalitions. Everyone can be described in both terms, yet in politics around the world, around the world, it is clear that some people identify in ethnic terms, others in class terms, some in terms of both ethnicity and class, and others in terms of some other type of identity altogether. As the quote from Ignatieff (1994) at the beginning of this chapter suggests, changes in the salience of ethnicity and class over time seem to have been especially pronounced in recent years. Since the late 1980s, many studies have highlighted a worldwide decline in class-based identification and a rise in ethnic identification triggered by or coinciding with the end of the Cold War. More recently, some observers have pointed to a remarkable rebirth of the left in electoral politics, most notably in Latin America. Work on Western Europe and the U.S. touches on related debates over whether class politics has declined and over the “culture wars” and electoral realignment, respectively.

3 Consistent with much of the literature but inconsistent with some common practice, “ethnic” is defined in this study to include categories based on ascriptive attributes that are generally inherited at birth, including language, tribe, caste, religion, region, kinship, and “other markers of communal identity” (Htun 2004: 453, building on Chandra 2004, Horowitz 1985). “Class” refers to a category that distinguishes based on persistent differences in economic wealth and status, often tied to occupation. It can be linked in the Marxist sense to the relationship to the means of production. Definitions are discussed in Chapter 2.

4 For an overview, see Evans 1999, 2000. Evans argues that class voting is in fact not dying out in advanced industrial countries and criticizes the use of the Alford index to come to this conclusion (Alford 1962). For arguments on the other side, see, e.g., Lipset 1981 (this edition stresses the decline of class voting, as compared to the 1960 edition), Ingelhart 1990, Clark and Lipset 1991, and Franklin et al. 1992. See also Przeworski and Sprague 1986. As will become clear in Chapter 2, this debate is tangential to this
Broadly, this study is concerned with identity politics in democracies, as expressed in national party politics. How does the salience of different types of identity groups in politics vary across countries and over time? Why do we see shifts of this type over time in some countries? Can these shifts be predicted and explained? Specifically, this study is concerned with variation in ethnic and class identification in national electoral politics in emerging democracies since the “third wave” of democratization in the 1980s. Why, particularly in this set of countries during this time period, do we see variation in the salience of ethnicity and class in electoral politics across countries? When and why within countries do the salient identifications change from one type of group to another?

Describing and explaining variation (both spatial and temporal) in this sort of identification is important because it speaks to central questions about representation in democracies, and because it has potential implications for a variety of key political outcomes. Scholars have linked ethnically-based party systems, in particular, to

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5. For an overview of the realignment literature, see Mayhew 2000, which offers a critical view. For classic work on realignment, see, e.g., Key 1955, Schattschiender 1960, Sunquist 1973, Burnham 1970. For other sympathetic views and related arguments, see, e.g., Carmines and Wagner 2006, Miller and Schofield 2003, and Frank 2004 (a popular discussion of the “culture wars”). For a critique of the culture wars argument presented in Frank 2004, see Bartels 2005. As Chapter 3 highlights, this literature also does not directly address the question at hand as this project deals with salient group identifications, which, it argues, are not clearly tied to shifts between the “social” (including ethnic) and “economic” issue dimensions, the focus of the realignment literature.

everything from poor quality of governance to the failure to adopt sound economic policies to the outbreak of civil conflict.  

Although the theory developed in this study may have implications for other cases, it speaks most directly to emerging democracies as a distinct set. First, as mentioned above, we might expect identity groups to play a larger role in emerging democracies as compared to established democracies because parties there tend to be more weakly-institutionalized and less likely to present programmatic platforms (see Kitschelt et al. 1999; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). In addition, the newness of multiparty democracy suggests that the dimensions of party competition should be more fluid, and thus that changes in identification should happen more often than in other contexts. This point has been well-developed in the literature on social cleavages and political parties from Lipset and Rokkan (1967) on. Further, the fact that most emerging democracies also tend to be developing countries, as opposed to advanced industrialized countries, suggests differences in their identity politics tied to macro-structural factors. As Ingelhart (1990, 1997) suggests, modernization may affect culture and norms; the “postmodern” values and identity politics in advanced industrial societies thus may differ in systematic ways from those in low-income and developing countries. Finally, the focus on the post Cold War-period highlights the changes in class and ethnic

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7 On governance and patronage, see Fearon 1999, Wantchekon 2003, Young 1976; on economic policy, see Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999, Easterly and Levine 1997; on conflict, see Bates 1999, Cederman and Girardin 2007, Dahl 1971, Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin 2007, Horowitz 1985, Lijphart 1977, Maalouf 1998, Rabushka and Shepsle 1972. For work challenging the negative effects of ethnic parties, see Birnir 2004b, 2006; Chandra 2005b. Note, however, that the way in which some of this work defines ethnic parties differs from the way in which the term is used in this project.

8 However, clearly some countries have institutionalized party systems without democracy (e.g., see discussion in Chapter 4).
identification that are at the center of this project, but still presents significant unexplained variation.

**The Argument: A Theory and Framework**

In answer to its central questions, the dissertation provides both a framework of four explanations for variation in identification, and, building on the explanation highlighting elite manipulation, a theory of “constrained leadership” that offers more precise predictions than existing work. The study tests and rejects several causal hypotheses developed in other studies, but the framework approach allows that several different processes may explain variation under different conditions and may even be at work in the same case.\(^9\) This study focuses on the theory of constrained leadership because, it argues, this area is least specified in the literature.

Building on work by Bates (1974), Chandra (2004), and Posner (2005), the argument begins with the assumption that individuals identify electorally with the group or groups that best position them to receive goods and benefits distributed or controlled by the government to be elected. These goods and benefits may include a range of patronage goods such as jobs, cash outlays, or contracts controlled by the state, as well as more complex economic and psychic benefits accruing from the adoption of

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\(^9\) This approach builds especially on the structure of Petersen 2002. Another example of an argument like this is Magnusson and Clark 2005. On the general approach, see also work on “analytic narratives” (Bates et al. 1998).
programmatic policies that support the interests of particular groups or sectors.\textsuperscript{10}

Underlying how voters identify in politics thus is their position on a political issue space, defining what they want from government. Politicians appeal to those with similar political preferences as members of identity groups. Variation in identification can be the result of four principal factors: (1) variation in voter preferences and demographics; (2) variation in political institutions, which affect how goods and benefits are distributed and the composition of the groups competing for them; (3) variation in party institutions, which affect the types of issues and groups that parties may represent; and (4) strategic manipulation by elites, which changes how individuals see their interests and their identity options even when other factors remain constant.

The theory of constrained leadership predicts that even absent variation in popular preferences, political institutions, and party institutions, major shifts and variation in political identification can occur due to strategic coalition-building by elites following party system crises. Crises, which bring to light the failure of parties to represent voter preferences, allow competition to be reframed through the entry of “new” elites, some true “outsiders” to the traditional party system and some actually old elites with new images. These elites seek to position themselves to maximize their political influence, generally by maximizing votes. Their strategic actions, however, are constrained by the political space available for the formation of new coalitions and by the structure of

\textsuperscript{10} This distinction builds on Kitschelt et al. (1999)'s discussion of the types of parties and party-client linkages, specifically the distinction between patronage and clientelist-based parties and programmatic parties. For further discussion, see Chapter 3.
existing social identity groups, particularly their sizes and degrees of overlap. Size and overlap affect which identity groups have the numbers to win and which identity groups describe similar constituencies that could be switched between for political expediency.

In other words, there are a wide variety of social identity groups that could be made salient in politics – i.e., they exist, are socially salient, could be tied to salient political issues, and are large enough to win representation and policy influence through elections, given a country’s particular electoral and political institutions. Which of these many identity groups are politicized has less to do with which are most salient to voters and more to do with which are most useful to politicians. Thus, politicians do not “create” new identity groups, contrary to many instrumentalist arguments in ethnic politics; however, they can raise the political salience of certain existing categories from among the many possibilities.

For politicians, the most useful identity groups are those that define coalitions of voters that give them the numbers to win and that they believe they can attract over their competitors. As other work suggests, barring major shifts in voter preferences and institutions, the basic dividing lines of competition are normally stable: even as the electoral fortunes of particular parties and politicians vary, the groups that these parties and politicians compete over – the social cleavages embodied in the party system – remain relatively stable (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967). A party system crisis, however,

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11 Parties are defined as “team[s] seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election” (Downs 1957: 25). I.e., this includes what are sometimes labeled “electoral groups.” For further discussion, see Chapter 3.
shakes up this relationship, providing the opportunity for change through the entry of “new” (or “revamped”) politicians and parties, “outsiders” to politics as usual.

Whether or not such a crisis is accompanied by major shifts in voter preferences, “new” politicians have the best chance of taking advantage of the crisis to enter and win if they can distinguish themselves from traditional elites and capture their core constituencies – i.e., reframe political debate to their advantage. In addition to emphasizing their outsider status, they can generally do this best by linking still salient issues to previously un-politicized identity groups to which incumbent politicians have not established links. In situations where various groups overlap, such as in a ranked ethnic system, this sort of reframing can be relatively simple and involve appealing to “overlapping” identity groups – thus creating the sorts of shifts in political identification (between ethnicity and class) studied in this project. In situations where this sort of overlap does not exist, and preferences or institutions have not changed, such shifts should be unlikely. (Chapter 3 discusses the theory and predictions in more depth.)

The types of shifts studied in this project are well highlighted in the case of Bolivia, which is used in this project as a theory-generating case. In Bolivia, from 1952, when universal suffrage was extended, until the 1985 general elections, the most salient social division in electoral politics was class. Prior to the 1980s, although major ethnic social movements emerged (several of which formed small political parties) ethnicity was not explicitly central to electoral politics. As Chapter 5 illustrates, however, each general

\[12 \text{ The term "reinforcing" is sometimes used. This term is not used because it implies stability of political divisions, whereas this project focuses on change.}\]

\[13 \text{ Note however that during most of this period, Bolivia was not a democracy.}\]
election from 1985 to 2005 saw ethnicity becoming increasingly salient, with parties that highlighted "indigenous" identification capturing increasing percentages of the vote. Meanwhile, the electoral success of the traditional left declined overall relative to the earlier period, although fluctuating considerably. By the 2002 and 2005 elections, broad support was clear for the outsider "indigenous left" mobilized by Evo Morales's Movement toward Socialism (*Movimiento al Socialismo*—MAS).

This project highlights two explanatory factors for these shifts. First, a party system crisis in the early to mid-1980s—in this case, triggered by economic crisis and government mismanagement—provided the opportunity for the entry of new parties that reframed the terms of debate. Second, the overlap between indigenous and class categories meant that for new and "outsider" party leaders, appealing to voters on an "indigenous" basis was politically useful. The association between some traditional parties and the poor and working class, as well as the space for entry on the left created by the real, programmatic move of all traditional parties to the right, meant that an appeal to the "indigenous" was also effectively an appeal to those of the "working class." New party leaders thus could capture the support of working class voters (a.k.a. indigenous voters) while distinguishing themselves from traditional parties. In addition to these variables, events in Bolivia highlight the additional, intervening importance of the emergence of new social groups (in particular, urban migrants and *cocaleros*), "new" groups picked up by "new" parties (an intervening factor that fits into the framework presented in Chapter 3 the under the heading of "shifts in voter preferences").

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14 Several other scholars of Bolivian politics disagree with the timing as described here. Chapter 5 discusses this debate and defends this timeline.
The mechanisms at work in the Bolivian case can also be seen in the other Andean countries. As other work has highlighted, politics in these countries has been marked since the 1980s by political crises and the rise of “outsider” politicians, who have won even the presidency in all countries: in Bolivia, Evo Morales in 2005; in Colombia, Álvaro Uribe in 2002 and 2006; in Ecuador, Lucio Gutiérrez in 2002 and Rafael Correa in 2006; in Peru, Alberto Fujimori in 1990, 1995, and 2000 and Alejandro Toledo in 2001; and in Venezuela, Hugo Chávez in 1993, 1998, 2000, and 2006 (see Mainwaring et al. 2006). Other work has addressed these insider/outsider divisions, but the emergence of these outsiders has also involved shifts in the salience of ethnic and class identification of the type studied in this project – a key point not addressed fully in other work (see Kenney 1998). In Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, the rise of these outsiders was linked in varying degrees of explicitness to ethnic and class identifications with non-dominant groups: the indigenous, those not of European descent, the working class, and the poor. (Whether these outsider politicians actually pursued policies that advanced the interests of these groups is a different matter.) In Colombia, however, this has not been the case; the emergence of new political forces thus far has not corresponded to a clear realignment of politics around significantly stronger ethnic identifications. Chapter 7 explains these shifts and variations in shift through variation in the timing and dynamics of crisis, social structure, and elite strategy.

More generally, applied to elections in emerging democracies since the 1980s, the theory offers a new explanation for why there were shifts in the salience of ethnic and
class identification in some new democracies and not in others following the end of the Cold War. Broadly, it suggests that the collapse of communism and the process of Third Wave democratization (including related institutional reforms) acted like a political crisis by shaking up traditional political divisions and creating space for the emergence of new political actors. Many of these actors mobilized as “outsiders” to the authoritarianism, poor governance, and corruption of previous regimes. Meanwhile, the rise of the neo-liberal consensus and new constraints on foreign lending and assistance made leftist/statist platforms infeasible for parties in government, effectively contracting the viable set of issue positions that political actors in government could credibly adopt. This happened despite the fact that many voters remained in favor of nominally redistributive, pro-poor, and “leftist” policies. The theory suggests that rising politicians who wanted to enter faced several options in countries where class had been salient and ethnic and class groups overlapped (e.g., much of Latin America). In particular, they could appeal to the left’s natural constituency in ethnic terms, thus building on existing ethnic organizations by mobilizing new “ethnic” parties around economic and other objectives. In other countries, where ethnicity had been salient and ethnic and class groups overlapped poorly (e.g., much of Africa), “new” politicians could not do the same, and thus had to try to beat traditional politicians at their own ethnic game or to fashion new electoral coalitions purely around their outsider status and populist appeal.

In other words, the idea is of a sort of a two-level game, where international and domestic politics interact (see Putnam 1988; Gourevitch 1978).

Alternatively, depending on institutional rules, elites may try to shift the dimension of ethnic cleavage, especially in “nested” ethnic systems (see Posner 2005).
In other words, the theory suggests that, holding constant other major changes, we should expect to observe broad variation tied to these social-structural differences in the ways in which shifts in identity politics played out in emerging democracies since the 1980s. Furthermore, contrary to other work on the rise of multicultural politics, the theory predicts that the rise of ethnic identification in politics should have been driven not so much by increased focus on cultural and “traditional” issues, as by pursuit of standard economic and political objectives by newly-politicized identity coalitions.

Data and Methods

The theory of this project thus is intended to add “a new item to our repertoire of ways in which things happen” (Elster 1989: 10), which can be understood with the broader explanatory framework presented in Chapter 3. It is also intended to provide broad predictions about trends, but not precise predictions about how particular leaders will act; in the theory, elite agency plays a key role in these sorts of particular outcomes.

The dissertation thus aims to show (1) that the theory is plausible; (2) that it explains important events in at least some countries better than alternative explanations; and (3) that it points us to new and testable predictions in other countries. Given these aims, the dissertation presents data from three sources. First, it presents an in-depth study of Bolivian party politics, focusing on the democratic period from 1982 to 2005. These data are drawn from about ten months of fieldwork in Bolivia during three research trips during 2003 to 2005, including interviews with political elites; ethnographic observation
of two election campaigns and, during the 2004 municipal campaigns, in four sites throughout the country (La Paz, Santa Cruz, Quillacas, and Loreto),\textsuperscript{17} review of primary and secondary sources on parties, social movements, ethnic groups, and politics in general; and collection and analysis of existing census and survey data.

Second, it presents data from the “Constructivist Dataset on Ethnicity and Institutions (CDEI),” that has collected extensive data on parties that competed in legislative elections in over one hundred electoral democracies in the early 1990s and has classified these parties as “ethnic,” “multi-ethnic,” and “non-ethnic” based on content analysis of party statements and news coverage (Chandra 2005b; Chandra et al. 2005b). The CDEI is currently being extended for other years. This dissertation draws particularly on the data on Latin America in the CDEI, from which it has used the material collected in the core CDEI project to add additional coding on “economic” parties and on the types of issues that parties emphasize in elections (“material,” “political,” “cultural,” and “other”).\textsuperscript{18}

Third, it reviews four shadow cases from the Andean region (Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) that build from data from the CDEI to study politics over time and to explore how the theory and framework explain outcomes. Data on these cases is drawn primarily from secondary sources and from news articles.

\textsuperscript{17} La Paz and Santa Cruz were selected as the main urban centers, and Quillacas and Loreto rural towns, in the “western” Highlands and “eastern” Lowlands, key regions of the country.

\textsuperscript{18} These variables are included in the CDEI, and coding protocols (which are co-authored with Chandra) have been appended to the CDEI project, but they were not part of the “core” project to code ethnic parties. For coding protocols, see Appendices A and B. For party classifications in Latin America, see Appendix C.
In summary, the project adopts a “nested” or “hybrid” research strategy, drawing both on cross-national and case study methods. This strategy allows for exploration and testing of specific arguments about mechanisms using the detailed data collected on Bolivia over time and analysis of broader predictions for other countries through the shadow cases and CDEI data. The design thus addresses challenges related both to the internal and external validity of the argument (see Campbell and Stanley 1966). Given the ability of hybrid research designs to address such challenges to validity, they are a particularly effective way to conduct research in comparative politics. Other studies that have used nested research designs and other discussions of how to conduct such research, however, tend to adopt or to argue in favor of a somewhat different approach than the one taken here (see Lieberman 2003; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This standard approach begins with cross-national data and statistical analysis, using it to test and eliminate hypotheses drawn from the literature, and then using results to select case studies. Case studies are then used to test the hypotheses that held up to cross-national testing, to explore the mechanisms behind “typical” cases on the regression line, or to explore explanations for outliers, using this information to refine initial theories.¹⁹

This standard strategy was not adopted in this project because the large-n data available was and is insufficient to explore important aspects of the project’s central question and argument. This is due in part to the unavailability of sufficient cross-national data on identity and the difficulty in collecting it, problems highlighted by a

¹⁹ Another example of a project that employs this type of design is Dooreenspleet et al. (2006)’s project on “Deviant Democracies: Democratization against All Odds,” which uses cross-national analysis to select cases of “deviant” democratization.
number of scholars (in particular, see Abdelal et al. 2003). Cross-national datasets that are available tend to focus only on specific regions and on one or a few aspects of identity, like ethnicity, race, language, or class (see, e.g., Alesina et al. 2003; Chandra 2005b; Fearon 2003; Posner 2004; Roeder 2001; Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999). The identity categories included in census data collected across countries are also not comparable (Morning 2005). Given the complexity, fluidity, and multidimensionality of identities discussed in Chapter 2, it is not even clear if it is possible or worthwhile to collect all of the data needed to cross-nationally test a theory like the one presented here, which would require (at a minimum) collection of data not only on identifications in party politics across elections in all emerging democracies since the 1980s or so, but also collection of data on all ethnic and class categories in each society, including their percentage share in the population and their degree of overlap with other types of categories. Such an extensive data collection effort should not be the first step in answering the questions posed by this project: the first step should be theory building – i.e., developing plausible explanations about the specific mechanisms at work, not “testing” broad correlations with little sense for what processes might be behind them.

**Contributions to Theory**

This project makes several contributions to the literature. First, it builds on work in political science and other fields to defend an alternative way of conceptualizing identity politics and to argue that ethnic and class identifications in particular should be considered in the study of parties and elections in Third and Fourth Wave democracies.
This conceptualization challenges work in several areas. Contrary to work on multiculturalism and to primordialist arguments about ethnic politics, the project challenges the idea that ethnicity “naturally” defines an individual’s primary political identity and that ethnic parties are tied to “ethnic interests” of a cultural or traditional nature (see Chandra 2001b). Contrary to constructivist and instrumentalist work on ethnic politics, it argues for a reintegration of cultural arguments and challenges theories that disregard the “groupness” of identity politics, suggesting that political elites can create or freely manipulate identity categories to win elections. Although both of these challenges have been advanced separately by other scholars (as outlined in Chapter 2), the integration of these two challenges and the conceptualization of identity politics presented in this dissertation is one contribution.

Second, building on this conceptualization, the project presents a measure of salient identifications in electoral politics across countries and over time, offering new data on how such identifications vary. Few other projects offer such data, which is a major gap in the literature. As Abdelal et al. (2003) summarize:

The concept of identity has taken an increasingly prominent place in the social sciences of late. ... The dominant implication of this varied literature is that identities are among the most important social facts of the world in which we live. Yet, much of the literature on identity has sidestepped an obvious set of questions: If identity is a key independent variable explaining political, economic, and social behavior, how does it...
vary, why does it vary, and how would one know variation if one saw it?

(1)

Several other recent projects have sought to measure ethnicity across countries, taking into account constructivist challenges to existing measurements, but this has not been done for both ethnic and class identifications.

Third, in measuring identification using party data and in discussing variation in party competition across countries, the project presents new data on parties and party systems in emerging democracies, another area in which relatively little data has been systematically collected. As Kitschelt et al. (1999) summarize:

Given the holistic predisposition of much research on new democracies, the comparative analysis of parties and party systems in Third Wave politics is underdeveloped. … To our knowledge, no one has attempted in a systematic, comparative, and empirically grounded fashion to analyze … the alignments, if any, that divide parties and their constituencies (1-2).20

Research in this area is also relevant to the study of the quality of democracy, also an emerging area of research.

20 The last sentence was edited to emphasize the point relevant to this project. The complete sentence is: "To our knowledge, no one has attempted in a systematic, comparative, and empirically grounded fashion to analyze the linkage mechanisms between citizens and party elites in these countries or the alignments, if any, that divide parties and their constituencies."
Overview

The dissertation is organized into three parts. Part I deals with theory and methods, Part II with data mapping variation in identification politics (the dependent variable), and Part III with explaining the variation mapped in Part II. Each of these three parts is divided into several chapters. Part I begins in Chapter 2 with a discussion of the conceptualization and measurement of identity politics. It reviews the literature on identity construction, argues for a focus on “identification” politics, discusses why ethnicity and class are key types of identifications for the project at hand, and defends a way of measuring identification using data from political parties and elections. Chapter 3 then develops the framework and theory outlined above for explaining variation in identification.

Part II includes two chapters. Chapter 4 presents data from the CDEI and the coding done for this project on Latin America, showing how the measurement of identifications outlined in Chapter 2 can be carried out, mapping cross-national variation, and presenting descriptive statistics and simple comparisons. This chapter makes several descriptive points: Few Latin American countries had major parties that mobilized along ethnic lines in the early 1990s, but many had major class-based (leftist) parties. Contrary to what we might expect based on other work, support for “ethnic-mobilizing” parties was not explained fully by degrees of ethnic diversity, the percentage of the population that was indigenous, degrees of development, or the sizes of different ethnic groups and electoral thresholds. The chapter also shows, consistent with the assumptions of the
theory, first, that appeals to ethnic and economic groups (as opposed to positioning in terms of policy and issues alone) have been central to electoral strategy, and second, that the types of groups to which parties appeal does not determine the types of issues they discuss (i.e., ethnic parties often focus on economic or political issues, as well as “ethnic” cultural issues).

The second chapter in Part II, Chapter 5, focuses on measuring and describing variation over time in Bolivia, highlighting the period since democratization in 1982 until the December 2005 general elections, which brought Evo Morales to power. This chapter shows how ethnic salience increased in Bolivia from 1985 to 2005, while the salience of traditional class-based identifications declined throughout the period, even while “ethnic leftist” identifications increased in 2002 and 2005. The chapter also presents descriptions of the key ethnic, ethnic leftist, and populist parties relevant to this study.

Part III begins in Chapter 6 with an illustration of the theory to explain the changes in identification in Bolivian politics from 1982 to 2005 and, using these data, a testing of alternative explanations. Chapter 7 then explores the application of the theory and framework to other countries in the Andean region, looking at whether and how party system crises and the overlap between social cleavages and traditional party divisions has played into changes in political identifications in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. The concluding chapter focuses on extensions and implications of the
argument by showing how it compares to alternative and related explanations for shifts in ethnic and class salience in emerging democracies since the 1980s.

A careful reader will note an underlying tension in the way this dissertation is set up: The theory presented in Chapter 3 is developed in general terms, beginning with the simplifying assumption that all types of groups can be treated as equivalent bases for electoral coalition-building, but the discussion of identities in Chapter 2 and the empirical discussion in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 focus on two particular types of group identifications, ethnicity and class, thus effectively treating them as “special” and highlighting some of their arguably specific characteristics. The project is set up in this way for several reasons. First, as argued in Chapter 2, ethnicity and class are particularly important types of groups. Other types of groups may sometimes be relevant, but ethnicity and class are generally more important as bases for national political mobilization in elections. In addition, in practical terms, it is more straightforward to describe and explain variation in the salience of ethnicity and class – and to motivate the importance of this discussion with real world examples – than to discuss abstractly changes in the salience of “group type x” and “group type y.”

Finally, the simplifying assumption that all groups are equivalent bases for political mobilization is just that – a simplifying assumption. The theory adopts this assumption because, the dissertation argues, it is useful in developing a general explanation that helps us to understand a wide variety of cases. This is a trade-off that
many political scientists would make because they care more about developing general explanations about variation than about fully describing all aspects of single events or cases (in the way that historians or anthropologists might). Nevertheless, while the dissertation argues that the theory developed in Chapter 3 offers useful predictions, more focused description of the particular identifications at play is also worthwhile – it helps us to understand the empirical nuance of events and may help us to better spot the limits of the theory and potential ways to revise it.
[W]hen a sizable group of people identifies as and therefore with each other, they constitute an identity group. When they act in an organized fashion in politics on the basis of their group identities—whether for the sake of gaining recognition or furthering their interests—they are part of identity group politics. (Gutmann 2003: 10)

The study of identity politics can be approached at many different levels of analysis— from intimate portraits of how particular individuals construct their identities, to macro-structural analyses of changing international norms over decades or even centuries. At one end of the spectrum, for instance, is the work of the writer bell hooks, who explores how race, class, gender, and ideology have influenced her writing and how she has tried, despite societal expectations, not to claim “a fixed standpoint” as “Marxist, socialist-feminist, poststructuralist,” or “black,” etc. (hooks 1997: 202). At the other end of the spectrum, sociologist Michael Hechter (2004) argues that “culture” has become more salient than class in advanced capitalist countries over the past century and that this shift is due to the expansion of “direct rule” (i.e., the welfare state), which has largely made the claims of class groups obsolete.\footnote{The debate over whether class voting has actually declined is summarized in Evans 2000.} In Identity in Democracy, political theorist Amy Gutmann takes an approach in the middle, highlighting the role of organized
identity groups in national democratic politics and assessing “the good, the bad, and the ugly” in terms of justice in democracy. Like Gutmann’s study, this project focuses on national politics. Unlike her study, it concentrates on identity groups within (rather than outside) party politics and formal political processes and, rather than normatively assessing this relationship, on understanding empirically how and why it varies.22

This chapter addresses the dependent variable in this project – the types of identifications salient in national politics, and changes in these identifications. The conceptualization and measurement of identity fills a large literature.23 Ultimately, however, because this project seeks to answer questions about why outcomes vary over broad trajectories of time and space, the methods used by other studies of identity politics that have a more narrow focus (on particular countries, regions within countries, elections, parties, or individuals) – or that focus only on one type of identity category (such as ethnicity) – are not appropriate to answering the questions at hand. In order to map out variation in the dependent variable and to explore the predictions of the theory, the project must rely on a measure that can capture changes over time and variation across countries.24

22 As discussed in Chapter 1, the central question of this project is significant in part because of the normative and theoretical points that Gutmann and others highlight about multiculturalism and democracy. The project is relevant to that literature in two key ways. First, as discussed in this chapter, it challenges the way in which that literature conceptualizes identity politics. Second, it provides new relevant empirical data.
23 For review and discussion, see, e.g., Abdelal et al. 2003; Fearon 2003; Posner 2004a.
24 For projects that do explicitly address ethnicity along with class (albeit for particular countries or smaller samples of countries), see, e.g., Clark 1996 (U.S. city politics) and Lijphart 1979 (religious versus linguistic versus class voting in Belgium, Canada, South Africa, and Switzerland). See also Hechter 2004 (class and culture in advanced capitalist countries).
This chapter first discusses the concept of identity in politics. By reviewing the ways in which the concept is used in other studies, the chapter highlights the constructed and contextual nature of identities and argues that it is useful to distinguish in particular between *identity* and *identification* (i.e., expressed identity in a particular context). If we are interested in developing explanations that can be applied beyond particular events or individuals, the chapter argues, a focused study of identification – that pays attention to context – can shed more light on identity politics than a more inclusive but necessarily blurrier view that tries to get at the broader and more ambiguous concept of identity.

The chapter next addresses the project’s focus on ethnicity and class. It argues that these two broad types of identifications are worthy of independent focus because they tend to be the most central types of group identifications in national politics and because they are different in kind from other types of identifications, such as those based on gender, sexual orientation, ideology, or political position. As the example of castes in India suggests, there can be ambiguity in whether some groups are “ethnic” or “class” identity groups. However, the chapter argues that despite some exceptions, these two types of groups can be seen as conceptually distinct as defined in this chapter.

The final part of the chapter turns to issues of measurement. Challenging conventional approaches for failing to take into account the contextual and multidimensional character of identity, it defends a new way of measuring identification relevant to the central question of this project – the identifications highlighted by
politicians and parties in election campaigns. This indicator uses the approach developed in the “Constructivist Dataset on Ethnicity and Institutions (CDEI)” (Chandra 2005b; Chandra, et al. 2005b). The chapter concludes by discussing some other measurements that can be used to compliment these data.

The Constructed and Contextual Nature of Identity

We often treat identities – particularly ethnic identities – as if they were fixed by history or biology, with markers and ties that clearly define groups whose members share common interests, common backgrounds, or a common culture. Hale (1997)’s description of “identity politics” in Latin America illustrates this view:

On my office wall hangs a poster, distributed by an organization of Maya cultural activism in Guatemala, whose slogan reads: ‘Only when a people (un Pueblo) learns (acepta) its history and affirms (asume) its identity, does it have the right to define its future.’ This statement encapsulates a

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25 This chapter does not present data. Data from the Constructivist Dataset on Ethnicity and Institutions (CDEI) and additional variables that the author has added to the CDEI are presented in Chapter 4, which maps comparisons across Latin American countries. Data showing variation over time is presented in Chapter 5, which focuses on the Bolivian case.

26 The most important distinction between the approach and use of the data in this project and that in Chandra (2005b; forthcoming) is that this project treats these data as measurements of identification and politicization rather than of constructed identities. Chandra (2005b) also suggests the importance of context/situation, but it plays a different role in her argument. In terms of the CDEI data, Chandra (2005b) argues more specifically that this approach collects data on “politically activated” identities, specifically those that are “activated in institutionalized politics.” Among “politically activated” identities, they are activated in party politics. Among identities that are activated in party politics, they are “explicitly,” rather than implicitly, activated (see Chandra 2005b: 3-5). The main purpose of the data collection of “EVOTE” (i.e., the vote for ethnic parties) is “to account for variation in the performance of ethnic parties across political systems and to test for the relationship between the emergence of ethnic parties and democratic consolidation” (Chandra 2005b: 2). This distinction, which is addressed further in Chapter 3, is important because Chandra’s approach is consistent with the role of elites being more important in its power to construct “new” identities than is argued in this project.
notion of identity as unique and differentiated (possessing its own historical ontology) and inherently endowed with fundamental rights (beginning with self-determination). We might want to think about the era of ‘identity politics’ [in Latin America] as beginning when this particular use of the term identity became the standard, generalized idiom through which groups engage in politics with one another, the state, and other powerful adversaries (Handler 1994, Rouse 1995a). (571-572)

When identity is treated in this way – as clearly defining historically-based groups that therefore deserve rights – the study of “identity politics” tends to be approached in one of two ways. On the one hand, highlighting the normative aspects of this topic, work focuses on the rights of minority and “low status” groups and on the implications of minority rights for justice and democracy (see Bernstein 2005; Gutmann 2002; Kymlicka 1995a, 1995b; Piore 1995). On the other hand, adopting a more empirical approach, work focuses on the apparently inevitable conflicts that arise among identity groups, and between identity groups and the state, looking at the trajectory and effects of such conflicts and at how they might be mediated.

This project begins with the observation that identities in fact are not fixed, nor are they clearly defined and easily measured. If there is one conclusion in the literature on ethnic identity politics, it is that identities are “constructed” – in some way (see

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27 According to Bernstein (2005), “In 1979, Anspach first used the term identity politics to refer to activism by people with disabilities to transform both self- and societal conceptions of people with disabilities” (47).
Chandra et al. 2001; Hale 2004).\footnote{Although it is now common in work in the social sciences to explicitly note that identity is “constructed,” the “social construction” of identity is a more controversial position in work on psychology on identity (see Monroe et al. 2000; Howard 2000). This inconsistency seems to be due to differences in how the term “identity” is understood, as described below, as well as to related differences in what is meant by social construction: while work in psychology tends to focus on a particular process of social construction of the “self,” the constructivist position in political science is minimal by comparison, and largely a means of distinguishing one’s approach from essentialist or primordialist arguments. As I argue below, much of what is meant by “constructivism” in political science is what Monroe et al. (2000) refer to as changes in the “salience” of “group identifications” in particular contexts, and “construct[ing] new coalitions from latent identity categories” – i.e., not at all what Monroe et al. mean by the “social construction” of identity (436, 441).} To be clear, the conclusion is not that people freely choose all aspects of their identities, but rather that which “identity option” they identify with or are identified with by others, is constructed (Waters 1990).

This argument should not be confused with several other arguments that may initially sound similar. First, the argument is not that identities must be constantly changing. Certainly, aspects of identity, under some conditions, might be fixed enough for us to treat them as if they were fixed, as some of the scholars cited above would argue.

Second, the argument is not that individuals can easily change physical or other characteristics about themselves that identify them to others as members of one or another ethnic group. For instance, the argument does not challenge the unlikelihood that a red-haired person of Irish ancestry could one day decide to be Chinese and successfully be accepted as such.

Finally, the argument is not that individuals fully and freely choose their identity options and the characteristics that identify them to others as members of particular
groups. Obvious examples are physical characteristics such as skin color. But this point also holds for other seemingly more social characteristics, such as sexual orientation. For instance, many individuals who identify as "gay" point out that they were born oriented towards other men or women; it was not something they chose or were socialized into. The argument that identities are constructed does not question this assertion, but points out that there is fluidity and construction at work in whether, when, and how this identity option is asserted or ascribed by others. This point is highlighted by Berkus (2003) in his study of suburban gay culture. He notes: "contrary to the public perception of a unitary, easily identifiable, and coherent way to be gay (or to be any other identity), there are multiple ways to present and organize a marked identity" and "there is considerable conflict within identity categories about how to perform one's identity" (11; as quoted in Gamson and Moon 2004: 50).

Research on the fluidity and construction of identities comprises a large literature. A number of classic studies demonstrate how identity groups have emerged or been reconstructed through long-term macro-structural processes like industrialization (see Gellner 1983), nation-building (Weber 1976), the emergence of print capitalism (Anderson 1983), urbanization (Deutsch 1953), modernization in Africa (Bates 1974, Melson and Wolpe 1970), and colonial rule (see Vail 1991). Other studies identify changes in salient political identities during shorter periods, such as between elections (e.g. Wilkinson 2004, Chandra 2004, Posner 2005). Finally, other work focuses on the changing identities of individuals, showing shifts throughout the life cycle (see Erikson...
1959) and moment-to-moment as individuals face different situations in the course of daily life (see Brubaker et al. forthcoming).

It is common in recent work on ethnic and identity politics to frame discussion in terms of the debate between "constructivists" (those cited in the previous paragraph) and "primordialists" (those who argue that identities are "primordial" and determined by ancestry, race, or culture) (see Bates forthcoming, Chandra 2001, Hale 2004). This project does not speak directly to that debate because, as these recent surveys of the literature suggest, if we want to "cumulate knowledge" about identity politics, it is more useful to focus on the finer points of the debate – which is about exactly how and how often identities are constructed (i.e., about identity change) (Chandra 2001; see Brubaker et al. forthcoming: 7-8).

As Hale (2004) points out, the constructivist position in the constructivist-primordialist debate is largely against a straw man opponent. Outside of journalistic and polemical discussions, almost no one today argues seriously for the extreme position

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29 An example of "primordialist" work that is often cited is Isaacs 1975. Some scholars divide the "constructivist" camp into two groups, "instrumentalist" and "constructivist" (see Varshney, Bates forthcoming). In this classification, "instrumentalist" refers to work highlighting the strategic manipulation of identities (usually a rapid process) and "constructivist" to work describing less purposive, generally longer-term processes. The use of the term "instrumentalist" in this project is consistent with that definition, while "constructivist" is used to highlight the broader category and the distinction with primordialism (Chandra et al. 2001). Varshney has argued that classifying work in this way is an error, involving a misreading of the literature (see comments at APSA 2005). I see it instead as a difference in terminology, hinging on how "constructivism" is defined. Although some scholars use the term in a narrower sense, my use of the term is consistent with other work; as Hale (2004) notes in a critique of the literature: "Theorists typically divide this debate into two camps, usually dubbed 'primordialism' and 'constructivism' ..." (458).

30 A related point is developed in Hale (1997), which challenges the "dichotomy between essentialism ["primordialism"] and 'constructivism,'" noting that perhaps this dichotomy may be useful to "track theoretical allegiances within the academy" but that it does not contribute to our understanding of "political consciousness" because "essentialist" views of identity are used in politics, regardless of whether we know that identities in fact are constructed (578).
commonly attributed to the primordialist side that identities are always fixed. Even self-proclaimed primordialists are constructivists in the sense that they tend to agree that identity groups, of course, were constructed at some point in (distant) history. One example of this is Van Evera (2001)’s defense of primordialism (“Primordialism Lives!”), which notes that “the constructivist claim that ethnic identities are socially constructed is clearly correct” (20). The defense highlights that today’s ethnic groups should nevertheless be treated as “primordial” or fixed in social analysis in the sense that a number of factors – in particular, “mass literacy, violent conflict, and non-immigrant character” – make many of them unlikely to shift today (21). Several of these arguments closely resemble arguments by self-labeled “constructivists.” Claims about mass literacy, for instance, are similar to Benedict Anderson’s classic constructivist argument about how the development of print capitalism nurtured the emergence of “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983).

Another basic claim of the constructivist side – that identities are contextual, and thus may change from moment to moment – is equally uncontroversial when fully considered.31 Most of us know from personal experience that context matters in how we identify ourselves (see Ellemers et al. 2002). If an American is interacting only with fellow Americans, for instance, trying to distinguish himself by identifying as an American generally makes little sense. More relevant are identities like “Democrat” or “New Yorker” or “Mexican American.” If the same person goes abroad and is asked to

31 Brubaker and Cooper (2000): “We argue that the prevailing constructivist stance on identity – the attempt to ‘soften’ the term, to acquit it of the charge of ‘essentialism’ by stipulating that identities are constructed, fluid, and multiple – leaves us without a rationale for talking about ‘identities’ at all and ill-equipped to examine the ‘hard’ dynamics and essentialist claims of contemporary identity politics...” (1).
identify himself, however, he will probably first identify as an American and then in other ways. Indeed, if he traveled to a remote region where people had no sense of what New York was, it would be strange for him to persist in identifying himself only as a “New Yorker” rather than the more recognizable “American,” no matter how proud he was of being from New York. Making these sorts of adjustments in how we identify ourselves and behave in different contexts is so commonplace that those who fail to adapt to the people with whom they are interacting in this way are sometimes described in terms suggesting a disorder— as socially autistic.32

Along this line, a number of studies in the constructivist tradition have focused on studying how identities change in different contexts. For instance, in their study of ethnic identity in Cluj, a Transylvanian city with Hungarian roots, Brubaker et al. (forthcoming) uses discourse analysis of group discussions, interviews, and conversations to observe “everyday ethnicity,” i.e., how ethnic categories and cues (such as the language of conversation) are used in daily social life (15-16). What is interesting about this study is not that it has proven that identities are contextual—we knew that already—but that it illustrates precisely how identifications work in particular contexts and how shifts might be measured.

32 Ellemers et al. (2002) describe the importance of context in terms of social identity theory: “First, the context provides feedback about one’s social position (of the person in the group, of the group in relation to other groups) that can provide a sense of security (even superiority) or engender a source of threat to self (Ouwerkerk & Ellemers 2001). At the group level, social status and group distinctiveness are the main contextual factors that produce this threat. Second, the context also constitutes the social reality that facilitates or restricts attempts to cope with these potential threats.”(165)
If we treat identity as a dependent variable, the central debates in the literature are over how and how often identities are constructed.\textsuperscript{33} Building on Chandra (2001) and Hale (2004), arguments can be classified in terms of two parameters: (1) the variable or process that causes identity change or “construction” (i.e., the independent variable) and (2) how often this variable or process occurs. Table 2.1 illustrates.\textsuperscript{34} It focuses on three key variables or processes that cause identity change (“X”): individual choice or strategy, institutional change, and macro-structural change. (These three processes are echoed in the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3.) The frequency with which “X” occurs can be thought of as a continuous variable, ranging from “all the time” to “never.” Table 2.1 shows three possibilities: “many times in our lifetime,” “once or twice in our lifetime,” and “once every several generations.”

The two parameters in this scheme may seem to coincide – i.e., instrumentalist arguments about individual action are generally consistent with a view of identity as changing often, while macro-structural arguments are generally consistent with a view of identity as hardly ever changing. Table 2.1 illustrates that this characterization is incorrect in key instances. For example, instrumentalist arguments that hinge on the strategies of extraordinary national leaders like Kemal Ataturk or Mohandas Gandhi, who emerge only once in a great while, predict identity change rarely – only in the unlikely instances when such leaders are born and rise to power. On the other hand, macro-

\textsuperscript{33} Other key work focuses on identities as independent variables (see Abdelal et al. 2003). There have also been some efforts to link the process of identity construction to the effects of identity. For instance, in “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity,” Fearon and Laitin (2000a) describe three processes linking the construction of “antagonistic ethnic identities” and violence: discursive logics, the strategic actions of elites, and the strategic actions of masses.

\textsuperscript{34} This table builds on comments by Chandra.
structural arguments may be consistent with more frequent identity change during periods of major structural shift. Further, some arguments that seem inconsistent in terms of their predictions about the frequency of identity change – e.g., Laitin 1986 versus Laitin 1998 – in fact make consistent arguments about the importance of key variables. In the case of Laitin's work, the role of state institutions (colonial or newly-independent) in creating and fixing identities is highlighted in both books; the variation in the rapidity of identity change depends on how often states change.35

Table 2.1: Arguments about Identity Change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency that X occurs</th>
<th>X = the variable that causes identity change/construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fr = over generations</td>
<td>X = individual choice or elite manipulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Extraordinary leaders build new nations and national/ethnic identities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colonialism in Africa cemented the identity groups which are politicized today (Laitin 1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industrialization in Europe created new national/ethnic groups (Gellner 1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fr = perhaps twice in our lifetimes</td>
<td>X = institutional change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party elites manipulate and construct new identity groups to win elections (Chandra 2004; Wilkinson 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The emergence of new states in the Near Abroad led to the construction of new identities (Laitin 1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urbanization and migration lead to new identity groups (Deutsch 1953)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fr = many times in our lifetimes all the time</td>
<td>X = macro-structural changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Individuals reconstruct their identities moment-to-moment (Bhabha 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changes in institutions affect the politicization of identity groups (Posner 2005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35 This point draws on the APSA 2005 roundtable, “Being David Laitin: The Fearon Factor.”
Identity versus Identification

Before going further, it is useful to clarify the key concept of “identity” – a term a number of scholars have highlighted as ambiguous, in Brubaker and Cooper (2000)’s terms “hopelessly” so (6; see also Abdelal et al. 2003; Bernstein 2005). The varying ways in which “identity” is used in the literature make theories particularly difficult to evaluate comparatively. Noting this, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue convincingly for the need for greater conceptual clarity and for the use of more precise terms. They note that the ambiguity of the concept “affects not only the language of social analysis but also – inseparably – its substance” (2). This same point is underscored by Posner (2004)’s discussion of how the long-running debate in the ethnic politics literature between primordialists and instrumentalists is due largely to a conceptual misunderstanding:

In response to instrumentalist assumptions about the flexibility of ethnic identities, most primordialists take a position summarized by the biblical refrain: can the Ethiopian change his skin or the leopard his spots? My response is that while the Ethiopian cannot change his skin, he can choose to define himself in terms of a component of his identity repertoire other than skin color – for example, as a Christian, an Oromo, or a Southerner. When instrumentalists insist that ethnic identities are fluid, they almost always have examples of this sort of within-repertoire identity change in mind. When their critics retort that ethnic identities are not nearly so plastic as the instrumentalists claim, they are almost always thinking of the
impossibility (or extreme difficulty) of identity changes outside of a person’s repertoire (e.g., the Ethiopian trying to adopt an identity as “Muslim,” “Tigre,” or “Northerner”). The two perspectives do not necessarily contradict one another. They just locate their supporting or disconfirming examples in different types of identity change. (15)

Even if we do not fully accept Posner’s suggestion that primordialist and instrumentalist arguments could be reconciled by clarifying concepts, the point remains that those who argue that identities tend to be stable and those who argue that they tend to change rapidly through instrumental calculations, often simply speak past each other: they disagree about identity change, but they do not mean the same thing by “identity change.”

“Identity” is commonly used in comparative political science to refer to at least three different concepts. First, it is used to refer to identity groups or categories, highlighting ways to distinguish sets of people on the basis of common social markers. Identity “categories” may or may not describe actual social groups (Chandra and Boulet 2003). Identity groups may form around any number of social markers, including as

36 If we were to focus on other fields and subfields, we might highlight additional uses of the concept of identity, or classify these uses differently. Working within a sociological tradition, for instance, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) highlight five uses of the concept of “identity”: (1) as “a ground or basis of social or political action;” (2) as a “collective phenomenon” that “denotes a fundamental and consequential sameness among members of a group or category”; (3) as “a core aspect of (individual or collective) ‘selfhood’ or as a fundamental condition of social being”; (4) as “a product of social or political action”; and (5) as “the evanescent product of multiple and competing discourses” (6-8). From the perspective of social identity theory in psychology, we would distinguish between the “social, defined by membership in various groups; and personal, the idiosyncratic attributes that distinguish an individual from others” (Howard 2000: 369). Even within political science, the international relations literature highlights different aspects of identity (see, e.g. Katzenstein 1996).
Gutmann (2001) notes, “ethnicity, race, nationality, culture, religion, gender, sexual orientation, class, disability, age, ideology” (2). In this project, identity in this sense is referred to as “identity groups” or “identity categories,” depending on their degree of social organization (see Brubaker et al. forthcoming: 11-12).

Second, the term “identity” is used to refer to the entire multilayered mix of group affiliations, influences, and memberships that comprise an individual’s identity – all of the identity groups and categories that one belongs to, can claim membership in, is treated as a member of, and may be categorized as. Posner (2004) refers to this mix as an “identity repertoire.” In this sense, hooks’s memoir explores the development of her “identity,” just as many other memoirs, autobiographies, and biographies trace the evolution of their subjects’ identities in highly specific terms. Psychological studies like Erikson’s classic *Identity and the Life Cycle*, also highlight identity in this sense (see also, e.g., Gordon 1976; Monroe et al. 2000). According to Erikson (1968), identity is “a process ‘located’ in the core of the individual and yet also in the core of his communal culture, a process which establishes… the identity of those two identities.”38 In this project, the term “identity” is maintained for this concept because this approach seems closest to how the term is most often understood outside, as well as inside, specialized academic discussion.

Finally, “identity” may refer to one’s primary or most salient identity option. For instance, it may refer to an ethnic identity in an ethnically-divided society, such as “Serb”

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37 This distinction is in contrast to Chandra and Boulet (2003).
38 As cited in Brubaker and Cooper 2000: 37.
in the former Yugoslavia, “Hutu” in Rwanda, or “African American” in the U.S. Identity used in this way answers the question, “What are you?” – assuming one can give a single and concise answer to that question. If we think in terms of identity repertoires, identity in this sense is the option in the repertoire that “trumps” the rest in a particular context. In this project, consistent with Brubaker and Cooper (2000), as well as with other work (in particular, Calla 2003), this concept is referred to as “identification” – i.e., the identity claimed or expressed in a particular situation.

Confusing “identification” with “identity” is problematic in several ways. On the one hand, this is because one’s identification in a particular context does not express one’s complete identity, or even necessarily the aspects of it that are most central to who one is or to one’s sense of self. Highlighting these points, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) describe how confusion of “identification” with “identity” has been problematic both in terms of colonial policy and essentialist approaches to the study of ethnic politics in Africa:

To a greater extent than the forms of domination that preceded it, colonial rule attempted a one-to-one mapping of people with some putatively common characteristic onto territory. .... The colonial era did indeed witness complex struggles over identification, but it flattens our understanding of these struggles to see them as producing ‘identities.’ People could live with shadings – and continued to do so day-by-day even when political lines were drawn. (24).
This point echoes a number of studies on the roots of “tribalism” in the region (e.g., see Vail 1989). Iliffe (1979)’s description of the “creation of tribes” in colonial Tanganyika illustrates this point well:

In pre-colonial Tanganyika each individual had belonged to several social groups: nuclear family and extended family, lineage and chiefdom, and perhaps clan and tribe. Successful warfare had stimulated consciousness of Hehe identity, travel had taught others that strangers called them Nyamwezi, and Shambaa clans had atrophied under unified Kilindi rule. Yet groups and identities had remained so amorphous that to write of them is to oversimplify them. … [I]t is clear that emphasis on tribe rather than other identities resulted from socio-economic change and government policy. The policy was indirect rule. Although conservative in origin it was radical in effect because it rested on a historical misunderstanding. The British wrongly believed that Tanganyikans belonged to tribes; Tanganyikans created tribes to function within the colonial framework.

Confusing “identity” with “identification” is also problematic because collecting extensive data on many aspects of the identities of various individuals in society does not necessarily tell us about their identifications in particular contexts. Assuming that it can may lead us to incorrect conclusions about the salience of particular identifications for
people in society, especially when the typical characteristics of different categories are highly correlated. This rather abstract point can be illustrated with a simple example: Assume, for instance, that a researcher wants to study the effect of ethnicity on voting in thirty emerging democracies. His model of voting suggests that vote choice is explained by ethnicity, measured in terms of maternal language, and a handful of other aspects of identity, including age, gender, father’s party affiliation, region of residence, level of education, and religious affiliation. After carefully collecting the relevant data, he regresses a measure of vote choice on these variables, and uses this analysis to assess the relative salience of ethnicity in politics in the countries of study. Given the large and statistically significant coefficient on the “ethnic” variable, he concludes that ethnic identification is the most salient factor in vote choice.

Although his conclusions seem to be supported by his data, in-depth case studies are unfortunately beyond the scope of his study, and detailed knowledge of some of these countries would show that they are not internally valid because of omitted variable bias. Specifically, among the countries in his study are several with “ranked” ethnic systems. In Country X, for instance, one’s maternal language is almost a perfect predictor of one’s class – e.g., a person who speaks Arabic is “upper class” 90 percent of the time, and one who speaks French is usually “working class,” and vice versa. In this country, class is the most salient identification in national elections: when asked, voters identify themselves as “working class” or “upper class,” and the key divisions between parties are

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39 This example is not meant as a criticism of all work that studies the effect of ethnicity on voting. There are many excellent examples of studies that, even if they all do not consider class and multiple ethnic options as much as I would like, do include controls that might proxy for class, as well as controls for other identifications, and make strong arguments about the relationship between ethnicity and voting (see Ferree 2005; Mozaffar, et al. 2003, Norris and Mattes 2003; Lijphart 1979).
in terms of their programmatic and symbolic support for the “working class” versus the
“upper class” and their organization through “working class” unions versus “upper class”
social clubs and chambers of commerce. Our researcher, however, can see none of this.
On the basis of his extensive (but flawed) study of identity politics and voting, he
concludes that ethnicity is the most salient identification in electoral politics, when in fact
(at least in Country X) class is. His predictions about the nature and development of
politics could be entirely misleading. In other words, because we have no deterministic
model of how “identity” translates into “identification,” knowing a lot about various
aspects of identity may tell us very little about identification in the particular contexts we
care about.

Identity Change

The ambiguity in the concept of “identity” as employed in the literature also
makes its way into arguments about “identity change,” which alternate among each of the
three concepts highlighted in the previous section (identity group/category, identity, and
identification). As Posner suggests, instrumentalist arguments about identity change
often use “identity” in the sense of what is referred to in this project as “identification.”
For instrumentalists, “identity change” often refers to switching between identity options
within one’s identity repertoire – i.e. “identification change.” Posner (2004), which
focuses on explaining why tribe rather than language group is sometimes salient in
Zambian elections, is one example of an argument about identification change. Brubaker
et al. (forthcoming) is a non-instrumentalist example of work highlighting (more subtle)
shifts in identification as individuals move from one social situation to another.

Postmodernist work also tends to highlight identification change. For instance, when Bhabha writes of ever changing postcolonial identities in his essays in *The Location of Culture* (1994), he usually means shifts between existing options in one's identity repertoire—not a complete revamping moment-to-moment of who one is and all the influences that have shaped that.

Alternatively, many arguments about identity change refer to identity in the first sense discussed above—i.e., in terms of identity groups or categories. These arguments tend to treat identity change as involving the emergence of new categories. For instance, Laitin's *Identity in Formation* (1998), as its title suggests, measures and explains the formation of new national identity categories in former Soviet states. In addition, although Posner (2004)'s focus is on identification change in Zambian elections, the first part of his book also discusses identity change in this sense, beginning with a discussion of how the main ethnic identity options in Zambia (tribe and language group) were constructed and became dominant within the identity repertoires of most Zambians (outweighing say religion).

A variation on this type of change highlights changes in the meaning or content of existing identity categories. Nobles (2000)'s discussion of how the meaning of the category "black" (or "Negro") has changed over time in the U.S. census is one example. As she describes, from 1850 to 1920, during the era of "race science," "black" referred to "all persons who are evidently full-blooded negroes" and a distinction was drawn

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between “blacks” and “mulattos” – i.e., “all persons having some proportion or perceptible trace of negro blood.”\textsuperscript{41} From 1930 to 1960, “negro” was redefined to refer to “a person of mixed white and Negro blood … no matter how small the percentage of Negro blood.”\textsuperscript{42} In 1977, in OMB Statistical Directive #15, the definition of “black” was again reformulated to refer to “a person having origins in any of the black racial groups of Africa.”\textsuperscript{43}

Another example of changes in the content of identity categories – in this case, through instrumental actions by elites – is Chandra (2004)’s discussion of the “Bahujan” category in India. As she describes, Kanshi Ram, leader of the Bahujan Samaj Party, “resuscitated” the term, which had originally been used by the Satyashadhat Samaj reform movement in Maharashtra around the turn of the century. He “redefined it to refer not only to subordinate Hindu castes in Maharashtra but also to groups throughout India defined by caste, religion, and tribe whom he described as being united in sharing a history of humiliation and subordination at the hands of the Hindu upper castes.”\textsuperscript{44}

Finally, arguments about identity change sometimes mean “identity” in the second broad sense – as the term “identity” is used in this study. Here, identity change refers to the addition of new identity options or to changes in the relative importance of

\textsuperscript{41} Based on 1910 and 1920 census as described in Nobles 2000.
\textsuperscript{42} It continues: “Both black and mulatto persons are to be returned as Negroes, without distinction. A person of mixed Indian and Negro blood should be returned as a Negro, unless the Indian blood predominates and the status of an Indian is generally accepted in the community.” From 1930, 1940, and 1950 census (identical wording) as described in Nobles 2000.
\textsuperscript{43} Brubaker and Cooper (2000) note that “the different ways in which race was configured in the Americas was one of the subjects in which comparative history came into being, notably in the aftermath of Frank Tannenbaum, \textit{Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas} (New York: Knopf, 1946)” (46). Work on “white” ethnic identity in the U.S. also highlights various meanings (McDermott and Samson 2005).
\textsuperscript{44} Chandra 2004: 148.
various options within an individual’s identity repertoire, often over the course of one’s lifetime. This sort of identity change is often the focus of work in psychology, or of work focusing on particular individuals, such as biographies or memoirs.

**Identification Politics**

This project focuses on changes in identification, and, to a lesser extent, on changes in identity groups and categories. It purposely does not address identity change in the broad sense of changes in all of the factors and influences that make up who an individual is. In other words, for accuracy, the title of this chapter could be revised to refer to “identification politics,” rather than “identity politics.”

Why are identity politics in the broad sense set aside here? A detailed study of any individual’s identity obviously sheds some light on how she will identify in particular contexts, and gives us insight into how her identification may be different in different contexts or may shift over time. But, if our purpose is to understand political phenomena like the cleavages that divide society, representation in a democracy, public policy, or civil conflict – the types of outcomes that we care about ultimately in this project – a careful study of the identifications most politically salient for most people is more appropriate than a study of identity broadly defined.

In order to understand key political outcomes, we need to understand first and foremost how people act and what they believe in reference to particular politically-
relevant arenas and topics – how they vote and who they vote for, how they organize during election campaigns, what parties they support, what civil society groups they are active in, what policies they will implement if elected to office, and so on. These are all questions about identification in particular contexts (and about interests with regard to particular issues). As highlighted above, identification of course is part of identity, but even a very detailed picture of one individual’s identity does not necessarily offer clear predictions about his identification in any of these contexts. Thus, trying to measure the amorphous concept of identity as a means of understanding political behavior is a highly indirect and often imprecise way of trying to get at the identifications relevant to political behavior.

Clearly, certain questions about politics require us to look both at identity and identification. But, even the most ambitious researcher cannot hope to measure or even describe all of the aspects of the identities of all relevant political actors. If we do choose to look at identity broadly, this necessarily means that we must limit our sample size, focusing only on particular individuals or smaller groups of people.

In this sense, a study of identity writ large would make most sense as a means of understanding the political outcomes important to the concerns of this project if we were convinced that particular leaders had decisive influence over their societies. If this were true, the best way to understand political outcomes would be to develop detailed portraits of the identities of key leaders, drawing on the tools and theories of psychology and other fields to explain and offer predictions about their identifications, interests, and behavior.
in different situations. One of the key assumptions of this project is that leaders, while
influential, are not decisive to this extent. Thus, in order to understand political
outcomes, it is more important to aim for an accurate picture of the relevant
characteristics of the political communities that give rise to, influence, and constrain
these leaders – either directly through surveys and other methods, or indirectly (as in this
study) through careful attention to how leaders address “the masses,” data which are
more readily available.

Ethnicity and Class

People may identify in any number of ways, around any number of social identity
groups, including as Gutmann (2001) notes, those based on “ethnicity, race, nationality,
culture, religion, gender, sexual orientation, class, disability, age, ideology, and other
social markers” (2). In this project, what Gutmann calls race, nationality, culture, and
religion, are all included under the label of “ethnicity.” Consistent with much of the
literature on ethnic politics, “ethnic” refers to categories based on ascriptive attributes
that are generally inherited at birth and including language, tribe, caste, religion, race,
region, kinship, and “other markers of communal identity” (Htun 2004: 453; building on
Chandra 2004; Horowitz 1985). Markers, characteristics, or “attributes” commonly
associated with ethnic categories include physical characteristics like skin color;
language; family name; cultural practice, including dress; and ancestry (Chandra and
Boulet 2003; Posner 2005).
This broad definition of ethnicity is consistent with “ordinary language” in many countries, but inconsistent with common usage in others (see Fearon and Laitin 2000b). It is employed here because it allows us to avoid the inconsistencies inherent in the narrow view of ethnicity as conceptualized by Gutmann (2001) and others. Such inconsistencies are clear when we think about specific examples. Consider, for instance, how one might respond in the U.S. to questions about one’s ethnicity. Typical answers include “African American,” “black,” “Jewish,” “Asian American,” or “Mexican American,” etc. These answers do not fit at all neatly into “ethnicity” as used by Gutmann and others: “black” might best be described as a race, but as Nobles (2000) shows, what is defined as “black” is institutionally and culturally determined; “Jewish” is perhaps a religious category, but many of those who identify as Jewish do not practice Judaism, and identify as such more in terms of culture or ancestry; “Asian American” and “African American” are perhaps racial, regional, or cultural categories, but there are difficulties in classifying them in each of these ways; and “Mexican American” highlights perhaps a national origin (Mexico), but many self-identified Mexican Americans are not originally from Mexico and are descendants of families that lived for generations in U.S. territory.

Another example of the inconsistencies that seep in when adopting a narrow usage of the term comes from how it is understood popularly and in the media. For instance, it is common in the press for all of the following to be described as ethnic conflicts: Hindu-Muslim violence in India, the conflict between Jews and Palestinians, and so on.  

45 The point highlighted in these examples is thanks in particular to Kanchan Chandra and CDEI team’s efforts to classify the ethnic “dimension” mobilized by ethnic parties.  
46 It also might be considered a culture.
discrimination against Muslims in Europe, conflicts between the nationality groups of the former Yugoslavia in the Balkans, the Sudanese civil war and Darfur conflict, the Rwandan genocide, mobilization by Basques in Spain, and conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. As in the previous example, it is not clear how to classify the groups highlighted here in terms of religious, regional, national, cultural, racial, tribal, or “ethnic” in Gutmann’s terms. But, all of these groups can clearly be classified as “ethnic” as it is understood in this study.

The fact that specific classifications are not arrived at here is not due to laziness in definition; it has basis in how ethnicity is conceptualized. The idea that it is important to maintain a distinction among racial, cultural, national, regional, religious, and “ethnic” groups, and that these distinctions have inherent meaning, is much more difficult to sustain when we recognize that identity groups are constructed than when we believe that they are primordial. Of course, understanding the details of how ethnicity is mobilized (i.e., around skin color versus religion) is important, and a broad definition, ignoring such details, may obscure the importance of divisions tied to particular attributes.47 On the other hand, even divisions like race that are often seen as obviously different from other sorts of ethnic divisions in the visibility and “stickiness” of key attributes like skin color, can be seen on the basis of closer scrutiny also to be socially constructed. Nobles (2000)’s study makes this clear: Even racial categories are not determined by “objective” differences, but rather are constructed by social institutions like (according to Nobles) the census.

47 This is a common argument about race.
Another point to highlight about ethnicity is that it may refer to many different ethnic “dimensions”/“cleavages”/“divisions”/types of groups in any one country (Boulet and Chandra 2003; Posner 2004). For instance, in many African countries there are several nested layers of “tribal” ethnic divisions, along with divisions based on religion, region, race, national origin, language group, and so on (see Ferree 2005; Scarritt and Mozaffar 1999). In southern Sudan, for instance, the population may be described in tribal terms as Dinka, Nuer, etc. (see Evans-Pritchards 1940). Each of these tribal groups is also composed of various sub-groups, and it is not necessarily the broad “Nuer” or “Dinka” identity that is relevant to social life (see Hutchinson 1995).

Like ethnicity, “class” is defined broadly in this project to refer to a social category that distinguishes based on usually persistent differences in economic wealth and status, often linked in the Marxist sense to the relationship to the means of production, although not strictly defined in these terms. The study of class formation, as Fantasia (1995) notes, “has often been framed as a dual historical process comprising an objective side (in the mechanisms by which people are distributed into different economic practices) and a subjective side (ideational class consciousness)” (276; see also Bartolini 2000; Bartolini and Mair 1990). The definition adopted here thus focuses on the subjective side. As with ethnicity, class is ultimately not defined in terms of individually-held “objective” attributes, even if such attributes may be used as proxies for group membership (see Chandra and Boulet 2003). Attributes commonly associated with class include wealth, standard of living (e.g., where one lives, what one owns, whether

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48 For a review of classical formulations on class stratification in Marx and Weber, as well as more recent formulations, see Clark and Lipset 1991.
and where one goes on vacation), education, and occupation. Income is another indicator but a generally poor one at any particular point in time because it varies widely over one’s lifetime.

The way in which ethnic and class groups are conceptualized in this project draws on Fearon (2004)’s discussion of “radial categories” used by linguists and cognitive scientists (201). In this approach, there may be a number of common features of a “prototypical” ethnic group, but one or more of these features can be taken away and the group still considered an ethnic group. For instance, building on Smith (1993), we can see that a prototypical ethnic group (“ethnie”) has 1) belief or myth of common ancestry; 2) a sense of common history and destiny; 3) a shared culture (language, religion, dress, food, music crafts); 4) attachment to a specific territory; and 5) a sense of community. But, a group that has a shared culture and a sense of community, but nothing else, can still be considered an ethnic group, although not a prototypical one. In short, strict definitional criteria, relying on the presence of particular characteristics or attributes (like a common history, language, relationship to the means of production, etc.), are rejected. Several standard definitions of ethnic groups in particular are thus not used in this project. Smith (1993)’s definition, for instance, suggests that there are some groups that may claim to be ethnic groups, but are not really ethnic groups, a claim rejected here. The definition used here also differs from that proposed by Chandra and Boulet (2003), which suggests that ethnic groups can be identified by the presence or absence of particular individually-held attributes (like skin color or maternal language) (see also Chandra 2006). In other words, in the approach taken here, groups or categories cannot
be identified in isolation and absent their social context, whereas they could be in a view that identifies them based on particular attributes. 49

The Significance of Ethnicity and Class

Among all of the ways in which one might identify, this project focuses on class and ethnic options because, it is argued here, they are significant and central to national political debate around the world in a way that other types of identity options are not. Although there may be some differences between the two as discussed below, they seem more similar to each other than to other types of identity options. This claim is based on six observations. 50

First, many of the major political divisions around the world are defined in terms of class and/or ethnicity and many of the political parties and social movements active in new democracies today are or have been rooted in ethnic and class divisions. By contrast, parties based on gender, sexual preference, or particular political positions (e.g., environmentalism) tend to be minor or “niche” parties. Mobilization of key ideological groups (Marxists, Communists, neo-conservatives) tends to be closely associated with mobilization along class lines or identification with particular classes.

50 For a related discussion, see Dahl 1971 (105-123). Dahl’s discussion, however, adopts what I would call a more essentialist view of ethnicity than the one employed here.
Second, political science theory, beginning with its foundational works, has highlighted class and ethnicity and the relationship between the two as central to the politics of modernization, nation-building, and democratization. From Tönnies, Durkheim, Weber, and Marx to the modernization theorists, the distinction between ethnicity and class has long been treated as akin to the distinction between the "traditional" and the "modern." The broad prediction drawn from this work is that class politics should replace traditional "ethnic" politics as societies modernize. This expectation has been challenged by another large body of work on ethnic mobilization in modernizing and in industrialized societies that shows that ethnic identification is not only a pre-modern phenomenon (see Melson and Wolpe 1970; Bates 1974).

Drawing on the modernization tradition, Lipset and Rokkan’s classic *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (1967) explores the type of conflicts that arose in the foundation of party systems in Western Europe and how these conflicts influenced party cleavage structures. The framework that they develop highlights four key types of cleavages, two of which are "ethnic," and two of which are "class-based," in the terms of this project (although not in Lipset and Rokkan’s terms). The two ethnic cleavages arose through the embodiment in the party system of conflicts tied to the formation of the nation state – between the dominant cultural group and minority groups and between the church and secular forces. The two class cleavages arose through the institutionalization of conflicts tied to the Industrial Revolution (or more generally in the process of
modernization), between rural landed and urban entrepreneurs, and between urban 
owners and workers.\footnote{Bartolini (2000) summarizes, p. 14.}

Lipset and Rokkan (1967)’s framework has been built on in other work, notably recent work extending their hypotheses to speak to the creation of party systems in post-authoritarian states in Eastern Europe (see Zielinski 2002). Kitschelt et al (1999)’s study, in particular, highlights five divides, several of which highlight “ethnic” and “class” identifications in the terms of this project. The first divide, the “political regime divide,” is based on support or opposition towards the old regime. Depending on the nature of the old regime, this divide might be tied to ethnic or class identification (e.g., a Communist regime or a regime dominated by a particular ethnic group), but is not necessarily so. Second, the “economic-distributive divide” is based on support or opposition towards the market economy. As Kitschelt et al. (1999) note: “In the most general terms, those who expect to become losers in the market economy tend to oppose economic reform and opt for a social-protectionist, administratively intermediated economy, whereas the likely winners of market liberalization support it. … [C]lass in the broader Weberian sense of ‘market position’ clearly affects voters’ economic preferences” (65). This divide is clearly tied to “class” identification as defined in this project. It might also relate to economic sector. Third, the “socio-cultural divide” is based on support or opposition towards socio-cultural libertarianism. Kitschelt et al. (1999) note that, “As in Western democracy, socio-cultural libertarianism is greater among younger individuals and the more educated citizens who have more capabilities and ambition to govern their own lives in a complex, information-rich society. …” (67). Fourth, there is a “national-
cosmopolitan divide” that also might be linked to ethnic or class identification. Finally, there are “ethnic divides,” based on “traditional” ethnic divisions.

In addition to this work, research in the constructivist and instrumentalist tradition in ethnic politics suggests interesting relationships between ethnicity and class. In particular, this work argues that ethnic boundaries can be constructed from class divisions and mobilized around material objectives (see, e.g., Barth 1969; Hechter 1974). Taken together, this work raises the question: what then is the difference between an ethnic and an economic group, or between ethnic and economic identification in politics, if one can be constructed from the other? If ethnic identities are not primordial, what distinguishes them from non-ethnic identities (especially those based on economic difference)?

A third observation pointing to the significance of ethnicity and class is that almost everyone has attributes that allow them to identify and to be identified as a member of at least one ethnic group and at least one social class, making just about everyone a potential, active member of both types of groups. There may be rare exceptions to this – for instance, we might argue this is the case for mixed race individuals who live in societies in which they are never fully considered members of either race \(^{52}\) – but, in general, ethnicity and class are unlike ideological and political groups in this sense. By contrast, not all individuals identify strongly enough with any ideological or political position to be active members of an identity group of this type.

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\(^{52}\) For instance, Lie (2001) describes in Japan the case of the popular 1970s baseball player Oh Sadaharu, a second-generation Taiwanese Japanese, who was born and raised in Japan, had a Japanese mother, spoke Japanese fluently, etc., but was not considered fully Japanese enough to be eligible to play for certain baseball leagues.
For instance, while some people in most countries might identify as members of an environmentalist identity group, those who do not do so are not necessarily members of an “anti-environmentalist” group. In other words, unlike with some other types of identity categories, there is generally no clear ethnic or class “default” group across countries.53

Fourth, in contrast to gender, sexual orientation, ideology, and political position, the attributes that define membership in ethnic and class groups are more likely to be passed from generation to generation—inherited at birth (physical characteristics, family wealth) or learned through childhood socialization (maternal language, accent or manner of speaking, education). (The extent to which this is true for class clearly varies across societies and this is one reason that ethnicity and class differ.) This means not only that they are difficult to change (although not any more difficult than gender or sexual orientation), but also that they tend to be shared among family members. This might have several implications. If we think of individuals’ welfare as dependent not only on their own welfare but also on that of other members of their families or households, we might expect identifications shared among family members to be more centrally relevant to national political debate than those that are not commonly held (see Becker 1976). In other words, because families are more likely to be “mixed” groups in terms of gender, sexual orientation, ideology, and political positions, but homogenous groups in terms of ethnicity and social experience, we might hypothesize that it is especially important for households that national policies be favorable (or at least not discriminatory) towards

53 In certain countries, there may be “default” ethnic or class groups. For instance, in the U.S., it is sometimes argued that “white” is a default category. However, there is recent work challenging this view (see McDermott and Samson 2005).
their ethnic and class groups. Although discrimination on an ethnic basis will hurt everyone in the household, discrimination on the basis of gender is less overall damaging to the welfare of a “mixed” household because it only directly hurts some members. A related hypothesis – that also suggests ultimately the relative salience of ethnicity and class in politics – is that, given the “mixed” character of households in terms of some identity categories, individuals should be less favorable towards politicization and discrimination based on these categories because they do not want to discriminate against members of their own households; discrimination against those not in the household is more favored.

Fifth, markers or attributes of ethnicity and class are arguably more visible than those of other types of identity categories, with the exception of gender. Several scholars have made this point in terms of ethnic politics, highlighting ethnic markers like name, skin color and other physical characteristics, and dress (Akerlof 1976; Chandra 2004). Similarly, while there tend to be few such “low information” markers of sexual orientation or political position, there are a number of low-information markers of class – including general area of residence (e.g., inner city versus suburbs, etc.), accent, dress, occupation, and education. In countries where ethnicity and class closely coincide, ethnic markers also may be used to identify class and vice versa. Such markers often misidentify ethnic and class membership, but they are nevertheless known by members of each society. 

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54 One example of the unreliability of such markers is provided by the large literature on the Rwandan genocide. As this work makes clear, although the stereotypical Tutsi is taller, light-skinned, and more “European” looking than the stereotypical Hutu, many Hutus and Tutsis do not fit these descriptions (see Lemarchand 1994). However, even if faulty, such markers could still be enumerated and used to classify
The differences between the types of attributes used to identify ethnic groups and those used to identify class groups are one of the reasons that ethnic and class mobilization may differ. For instance, a strong argument could be made that identifications based on attributes like skin color and language are, on balance, more obvious in low information situations and more difficult to change than are attributes tied to economic well-being and status markers of class.

**Culture**

A final reason that ethnicity and class are particularly interesting has to do with culture. "Culture" is understood in this project, following Geertz’s classic definition, as a "symbolic system" of shared meanings (see Geertz 1973). Scholars who take a cultural view of ethnic politics have argued that one of the main reasons for the importance of ethnicity is that ethnic groups share a common culture, which gives them unique mobilizing power and instills their claims with particular legitimacy (see Laitin 1986). Culture, this work suggests, is important in two key respects. On the one hand, it implies the sharing of certain “points of meaning” that influence what the members of the culture value, believe, and think about their political options (see Laitin 1986). On the other
hand, culture facilitates communication and the flow of information within the group and inhibits communication outside of the group. Communication is facilitated not only by a common language, but also by non-verbal norms and cues (see Hall 1981).

Political scientists sometimes treat cultural groups and ethnic groups as synonymous. However, other types of groups also may share common cultures. In terms of class, for instance, there are studies of a number of class-based cultures – the “culture of poverty” (Lewis 1975), the English working class (Thompson 1966), upper class women (Ostrander 1984), the new “upper class” in the U.S. (Brooks 2000), etc. Other observers have explored cultures (or “subcultures”) held by other types of identity groups – for instance, “queer culture” (Cain 1991, as cited in Howard 2000), the culture of soccer hooligans (Buford 1993), “disability culture” (Scheer 1994), and so on. The large literature on “organizational culture,” the development of which Ouchi and Wilkins (1985) trace to research in the 1970s comparing Japanese and Western firms, provides additional examples of cultures shared by other groups and organizations.

If we accept the view of culturalist interpretations of ethnic politics suggesting that the political power of ethnicity is tied to the ability of cultures held by ethnic groups to establish “points of meaning” and to facilitate communication, it is worthwhile considering the extent to which these two characteristics can be seen in cultures shared by non-ethnic groups as well. For instance, bureaucrats often communicate by relying on a common vocabulary of acronyms known within government circles only. This aspect of organizational culture facilitates communication within the group but inhibits

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56 For a review of this literature, see Fantasia 1995.
communication outside of it. Communication across class lines also may be inhibited in a number of ways—by the use of different languages or dialects (in the extreme case), as well as through a variety of verbal and non-verbal norms and cues.

Similarly, the cultures of non-ethnic groups may share common beliefs, values, and ways of thinking about particular issues, as well as a sense of shared fate or mission in terms of at least some areas of life. Organizations with strong cultures like the military are regularly described in this way (see Beitz and Hook 1998). Class-based cultures also may have this characteristic, especially in the sense of a shared fate or set of interests.

Although all sorts of group cultures might facilitate communication and instill points of meaning to some extent, these two key characteristics of culture seem to be most encompassing for the cultures of ethnic groups and (this project argues) of class groups, as compared to those of other types of groups. For instance, the fact that government bureaucrats share a common vocabulary certainly impedes communication with non-bureaucrats, but it does so in a more limited way than would a common language, dialect, or broad shared norms of communication. Although many organizational cultures instill common points of meaning and mission, they generally do so with reference to a rather limited sphere, such as work life alone. By contrast, cultures shared by ethnic and class groups tend to deal with a broader range of life issues with clear relevance to the central policies and priorities of government in terms of economic redistribution and nation-building.
Ethnic group cultures seem particularly all encompassing in this respect as they may address fundamental values and beliefs that affect everything from work life to intimate family relations. In this sense, we can hypothesize several reasons that some “ethnic” cultures may be more binding or deeply felt than “class” cultures, although both tend to be more encompassing than cultures shared by other types of groups. The theory presented in Chapter 3 assumes they have equal force, but this assumption is relaxed and explored more fully in the descriptive case chapters.

Comparisons with Other Views of Culture

The view of culture proposed here is different from how culture is often treated in political science (for reviews of this literature, see Berezin 1997; Gaenslen 1986; Ross 1997; Wedeen 2002). For one, it challenges arguments that treat culture as the result of other processes and not as a causal variable. It also rejects culturalist arguments that treat culture as a set of rules or practices that determine how members of a culture will act. This view tends to treat culture has having several characteristics. First, it is considered to be stable over long periods of time. For instance, Putnam (1993) treats Italian civic culture as emerging in the 1400s. Second, it is treated as a set of rules or common beliefs that we might measure through surveys of individuals (see Almond and Verba 1963, 1980). Third, it is seen as monolithic in the sense that individuals tend to be members of one culture, rather than of multiple (and possibly conflicting) cultures, or that they at least have one “core” culture (see Huntington 1993). The view of culture proposed here challenges each of these three points.
Culture in the view proposed in this chapter is not infinitely malleable, nor a monolithic straightjacket of binding rules. As Keesing (1974) notes, as an anthropologist, "standing amid the swirling tides of change and individual diversity, we can no longer say comfortably that 'a culture' is the heritage people in a particular society share" (73).\footnote{In the context of the article, this statement is partly a critique of the broad way in which the concept of "culture" is employed in the anthropological literature.} This is partly because all individuals are influenced by numerous cultures. It is also because cultures change. And, finally it is because there may be internal inconsistencies (Sahlins 1976) and contested meanings (see Scott 1985) within cultures, providing room for maneuver in certain areas. In this view of culture, individuals to some extent can choose among the norms, "meanings," or "stories" they draw from in "choosing" how to act and in justifying their choices (Swidler 2001). Mobilizing identifications with particular identity groups thus has power (and is political useful) largely because of culture – its symbolic meaning and the social institutions tied to it.

Going back to Geertz’s classic definition then what defines the members of a culture is not that they obey all the rules, but that they “share a common set of meanings,” i.e., not that they follow the rules, but that they know what the rules are. They may use these rules (meanings, stories, or norms) to explain their behavior, even if they did not always act because of these rules. An example consistent with this view of culture is summarized by Bowen and Petersen (1999):\footnote{In terms of the problems of such an approach for comparative research, summarizing Barth’s chapter in the same volume, Bowen and Petersen (1999) argue further that “isolating cultural traits – a rule about whom one marries, or the general status of women – and subjecting them to cross-cultural statistical analysis omits their context-specific character and may systematically, not just randomly, distort the analysis” (13).}
Pierre Bourdieu (1972) argues that members of Kabyle society in Algeria say that a man ought to marry a cousin related to him through other males, and this may be coded as the preferred marriage for comparative analyses, but this trumpeted ‘rule’ disguises the fact that many couples are brought together through female ties; men then reinterpret the marriage to highlight (often more distant) male ties. (13; see also Bourdieu 2001)

Although aspects of culture in this view are malleable, cultural norms and beliefs are nevertheless “real.” The cultural meanings and ties that bind together ethnic and class identity groups are part of what gives power to ethnic and class-based appeals, and these ties (both symbolic and organizational) cannot be reconstructed at will. But this does not mean that the identifications mobilized in politics were the only ones that could have been mobilized with such cultural force behind them.

**Problems of Conventional Measurement**

Ethnic and class identifications have been measured in a number of different ways. Bartolini (2000)’s work on the creation of the class “cleavage” in Europe provides a useful overview of approaches that might be taken. He highlights three dimensions of the class cleavage: “social constituency,” “organizational network,” and “cultural distinctiveness” (25-26). “Social constituency” is based (1) on the electoral strength of leftist organizations and (2) on the social composition of the electoral constituency (i.e.,
whether they mobilize their target class and others). “Organizational network” refers to both organizational cohesion (whether the left is united or divided) and organizational density (i.e., whether the cleavage is based on a dense network of associations or not). Finally, “cultural distinctiveness” highlights the ideological orientation of the movement (particular ideology and whether moderate or radical) and the level of cultural solidarity with working-class culture as based on the “degree of community” (values, sense of belonging) (27). Of all of these, Bartolini (2000) deals directly with social constituency as seen in electoral strength and social homogeneity; organizational density and cohesion; and ideological orientation. He leaves aside cultural solidarity.

In terms of Bartolini’s framework, this project focuses on the “social constituency” of cleavages, particularly as seen through electoral strength. It considers other aspects in the discussion of particular countries and parties, but does not do so systematically and cross-nationally given the available data. If we conceptualize identity politics in the way described above, standard ways of measuring the electoral strength of ethnic and class identifications (or cleavages) are problematic. In particular, as suggested above, this conceptualization challenges the convention of using census or survey data in regression analysis on voting or other political behavior in order to “test” whether particular identity groups (especially ethnic groups) are salient in politics (see Torcal and Mainwaring 2003; Chhibber and Torcal 1997; see also Cho 1999; Arvizu 1994; Lawson and Gisselquist 2004). In this type of analysis, the researcher attempts to test whether the variable of interest (e.g., race) is statistically significant in explaining variation in the
dependent variable, holding constant a variety of socioeconomic and other relevant factors.

The problem with this standard approach is partly conceptual. For one, it is often assumed at the outset of such projects that individuals have only one identity that could be relevant to the study of “identity politics” (in particular, an ethnic identity). Leaving aside data constraints, problems stemming from this limited conceptualization of identity politics could be addressed in theory if the researcher includes as controls variables that proxy for other types of identity group membership.

Another problem with this approach is that it tends to assume that relevant identities (particularly ethnic identities) are objectively captured in the census or other dataset. The conceptual problems of this assumption are highlighted in the discussion above: because identifications are contextual, data drawn from such sources must be taken carefully as the context within which such questions are asked (including the particular question and the options given) will affect responses. Projects to enumerate and measure the groups in society are also highly political. As Nobles (2000) and Cohn (1987) have shown, censuses do not so much capture the social groups that objectively “exist” in society as they define and officially sanction certain ones. Some socially relevant categories also may be left off the census for political reasons. For instance, from 1951 until the present, the Indian census has not reported data on caste (except for the “Scheduled Caste” category), yet studies of Indian politics suggest that caste has been
salient in Indian politics. Another example is the Belgian census, which since 1947 has not collected data on language, also a highly salient division.

The conventional method is also problematic for reasons having to do with data. Even a researcher who recognizes the complexity of identity and identification does not have enough data to study the type of question posed by this project. Only the most detailed surveys can get at the plethora of identity group memberships and attributions that each individual in society might take into account in choosing how to identify in politics in order to test and hold constant all of the relevant relationships. Almost no surveys even attempt this level of detail.⁵⁹ If we want to address the sort of question posed by this project – about variation in identification across large trajectories of time and space – there is no dataset that contains all or even most of the necessary variables. Collecting one would be a substantial undertaking. As a result, the conventional method tends to suffer from problems of validity and reliability.

All of this is not to say that survey and regression analysis can add nothing to the study of identity politics. Rather, the point is that this approach is typically only a poor first cut, given the complexity of identity politics, data constraints, and our interest in mapping broad variations. Given the sort of data that has been collected by other work, such analysis can better be used as a complement to another method to provide additional tests on particular propositions for particular countries or regions during particular time periods.

⁵⁹ The Eurobarometer, Afrobarometer, and Latinobarometer projects have collected some relevant data.
An Alternative: A Measurement of Identification in Parties

In this project, the basic method of measuring the electoral strength of particular identifications in politics draws on the approach developed in the Constructivist Dataset on Ethnicity and Institutions (CDEI) project to focus on the identifications that parties emphasize to voters during election campaigns (see Chandra 2005, Chandra et al. 2005b). (The term “party” is used loosely here to refer to any group that presents candidates for elections.) Once the salient identifications for each party have been assessed, this data is then used to measure the identification or identifications salient in society by taking into account the vote shares earned by parties or electoral groups that emphasize each type of identification. This approach to measurement thus highlights the identifications that elites highlight in their appeals to voters, rather than attributed identification based on candidate characteristics or support base. This is a standard way of looking at the electoral strength of particular cleavages although it is not often used for ethnic cleavages (see Bartolini 2000, chapter 2). It does not rely on programs or programmatic platforms but on statements, as parties in many emerging democracies in particular do not have coherent programs (see Kitschelt et al. 1999: 7).

As Gutmann (2003) points out, “Many political parties are identity groups, calling upon and cultivating shared identities around ideology, class, religion, and ethnicity, among other mutual recognitions” (4). We often think of parties as emphasizing one type of identity category at a time, but this does not have to be the case; parties may call upon several identity groups at the same time, and be, in the terms of this project, both “ethnic-
and class-mobilizing.” Similarly, they may mobilize several ethnic or class categories, such as the middle class and the working class. Parties also may call upon neither of these types of identity groups in a central way, and instead appeal to voters on another basis such as in terms of other types of identity groups, the issues alone, or support for the party leader himself.

Data on parties is drawn from the CDEI, a cross-national dataset project that classifies political parties across the world as ethnic, multi-ethnic, and non-ethnic based on content analysis of reports on party statements during election campaigns (see Chandra 2005; Chandra et al. 2005b). This dissertation project added several variables on appeals to “economic” categories and on the types of issues parties emphasized. Coding protocols are included in Appendices A and B.

The coding of parties as ethnic and economic is based on the groups that they explicitly seek to mobilize in their campaign messages and platforms, as based on summaries of their platforms and media coverage of campaigns. Because others adopt different definitions of ethnic and economic parties, there are several points to note about the method. First, classification is based on party message and platform, rather than on support base, organization, or the identities of party leadership or personnel. This means, for instance, that a party described because of its support base as a “middle class party” in another project is not necessarily a class-mobilizing party here. Similarly, a party described as a “Muslim party” because the majority of its members are Muslim would not necessarily be an “ethnic-mobilizing party” (“ethnic party,” for short) here.
Second, classification is based on explicit message and platform, rather than on implicit or coded messages. Coding of implicit messages is not done because such messages, by their nature, may be ignored or misinterpreted by voters and because, in terms of coding, classification of implicit statements requires so much contextual knowledge of each case that it would not be feasible cross-nationally for this project. Target groups also often cannot be read straightforwardly from policy. For instance, if an ethnic group is disproportionately represented among the business class like the Chinese in Malaysia, should a policy that supports enterprise development be understood also as an implicit appeal to the Chinese community? Research on the impact of structural adjustment reforms provides a number of other examples of the complexity of assessing the winners and losers to specific policies.

Third, this project gives most weight to what party leaders emphasize through their statements and speeches during election campaigns. This is measured by focusing on local and international news coverage of parties just before elections and supplemented by secondary source material. Unless they are reported in the news, the CDEI does not focus on written campaign manifestos because the point is to capture what the party emphasizes to the public and manifestos often contain points that are not emphasized. This is a key difference with other party datasets like the Comparative Manifestos Project (see Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987; Laver 2001). For similar reasons, this project also does not classify parties based on their membership in international party organizations or on party families (see Mair and Mudde 1998).
In testing when and why parties mobilize along ethnic, class, mixed ethnic and class, or "neither" lines, it is useful to know exactly how all these types of parties are different, if at all, in terms of the issues that they emphasize. An important assumption in much of the literature is that ethnic parties champion "ethnic" issues that are closely related to tradition and culture (see, e.g., Van Cott 2005). If this is true, surely one reason that parties mobilize along ethnic rather than economic lines is that these sorts of cultural issues are more important to voters, party elites, or both, than material issues.

In order to evaluate hypotheses about how the types of issues that parties advocate affect how they mobilize, the coding added to the CDEI for this project also distinguishes among material, political, cultural, and "other" types of issues. Material issues are related primarily to material assets or opportunity, such as jobs, scholarships, public services, infrastructure projects, contracts, and bribes. Political issues are related primarily to political rights, the political system, the relative power of different actors in the system, or the state bureaucracy. Typical examples include democracy, representation, changes to the electoral system, and constitutional reform. Cultural issues are related to the culture or traditions of a group, including language rights, bilingual education, use of a particular flag, dress, or religious practice. "Other" issues are primarily material, political, or cultural, such as environmentalism, women's rights, or ideologies that do not advocate any specific material, political or cultural issues.
Many issues can fall into more than one camp – for instance, they can be material, political, cultural, and other, or some combination. Land rights are one key example, which might have cultural significance as a group’s homeland, material significance to a group’s livelihood, political significance in terms of demands for national independence or territorial autonomy, and significance in terms of environmental concerns. In such cases, how the issue is framed is taken into account in determining what type of issue it is most and whether material, political, cultural, and/or other aspects are stressed.

Other Measures

In addition to the two measures focused on above, there are several additional ways to measure the identifications salient in party politics (some of which have been noted above). Key methods are reviewed briefly here. Data on these aspects of party politics are presented in the chapters on Bolivia, allowing for some comparison with the key measurement used in this dissertation:

*Party ideology:* Parties are classified according to their ideologies, either based on some explicit coding criteria using name and party manifesto, or on evaluation by experts based on their assessments of party platform, policy, and other factors. The Comparative Manifestos Project is one key example (see Budge, Robertson, and Hearl 1987; Laver 2001; see also Coppedge 1997). Using these data, salient identity groups might be assessed based on the groups targeted by the particular ideologies. For instance, 

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60 In other work on parties and in existing datasets, several methods are often used separately or in combination, but they are described individually here for clarity.
the working class would be the salient group for a party classified as “Marxist-Leninist.”

There are several major drawbacks in applying this approach in this project. For one, parties, especially in emerging democracies, do not always have an ideological basis and, even if they profess one, do not necessarily act or adopt policies in a manner consistent with that ideology. Further, while existing datasets tend to be attentive to class-based ideologies, they are less attentive (and consistent) in coding “ethnic” ideologies. In addition, in countries where there are a variety of parties with the same ideology (e.g., leftist parties in Bolivia), this method does not allow us to distinguish among parties.

Support Base. The groups salient to each party are assessed based on their support base coded in terms of the identities of party members, organizational ties, or expert assessments (rather than statistical analysis of the determinants of the vote). This approach allows us to distinguish among parties with the same professed ideology, that nevertheless may have different bases. It also allows us to move beyond rhetorical adherence to ideologies to get at what parties “really” do. One drawback to this method for this project is that it requires significant in-depth knowledge about particular parties and countries, making it a difficult method to use cross-nationally. More important, when used to assess salient identifications, this method relies on assessment of the identifications salient to the groups with which each party has ties or the individuals who support each party. Assessing this leads us back to the same dilemma we have when classifying parties: how to assess salient identifications?
Leadership. A method often used in conjunction with classification based on support base looks at the identities of leaders, e.g., the party head or presidential candidate, or some group from among the top leadership. One of the criteria for an ethnic party coding in Van Cott (2005), for instance, is that 50 percent of the party leadership be “indigenous.” Like the previous method, this approach suffers from data constraints. It also brings us back to the question of how to measure identification. If identification is based on outside assessment, we might misidentify individuals. If it is based on self-identification, the context within which identification is measured matters a great deal.

Coded party statements. The method used in this project focuses on explicit party appeals. Another approach is to also take into account implicit or coded appeals (e.g., Mendelberg 2001). This method, in particular, requires so much information that it is difficult to do cross-nationally. Furthermore, even those knowledgeable about particular cases may disagree about coded appeals – both about whether they were there and whether the voting population picked up on them.

Policy. The groups salient to particular parties also might be classified based on how their policies affect particular groups. This method tries to capture whether a party is actually working for the good of a particular community/group, rather than simply lending rhetoric significance to that group. For instance, one of Van Cott (2005)’s criteria for an ethnic party is that it must support ethnic rights and culture in its platform. Aside from data constraints, this approach is fundamentally problematic because it relies
on strong assumptions imposed by the researcher about what it is in the interests of particular groups. Meanwhile, even party leaders who really want to work in the interests of Group X may have a different assessment than the researcher about what is best for the group. In addition, the effects of many policies on particular groups can be very difficult assess and even experts may disagree about them.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{61} For instance, many Third and Fourth Wave democracies during the period of study adopted structural adjustment reforms. Even proponents of these reforms would agree that they might hurt some groups in the short run, even if they benefited them in the long run. Analysis of effects on particular groups fills a large literature.
Chapter 3
A Framework and Theory

It is true that people win politically because they have induced other people to join them in alliances and coalitions. But the winners induce more than rhetorical attraction. Typically they win because they have set up the situation in such a way that other people will want to join them—or will feel forced by circumstances to join them—even without any persuasion at all. And this is what heresthetic is about: structuring the world so you can win. (Riker 1986: ix)

Why are certain identity groups, rather than others, salient in national party politics in particular countries? When should we expect change in terms of the relative salience of different types of identity groups? This chapter first presents a framework for explaining variation in identification. The framework builds on the literature to highlight four causal factors: voter preferences, political institutions, party structure, and elite manipulation. Each of these causal factors may contribute to particular shifts and variation across countries. The literature provides examples of how each has worked in different situations. Although theories that highlight the first three causal factors are generally well-specified enough to provide systematic explanations and predictions, theories about the fourth process are not. Theories about what Riker (1986) calls the art of “heresthetic” tend to tell us little about exactly how leaders will “set up the situation”
so that they can win. If we assume that leaders can "set up the situation" in a variety of ways, highlighting both or either ethnic and class identifications, among others, these theories give us little basis for prediction beyond suggesting that if circumstances are ripe, and if leaders have the requisite skill, they will set up the situation in a manner consistent with their preferences. Agency obviously plays a role in politics, but this explanation is inherently unsatisfying, pointing us to unsystematic factors like the backgrounds and psychology of particular leaders. Thus, the second and main purpose of this chapter is to present a theory of "constrained" leadership. The theory addresses how social structural factors limit the potentially infinite ways in which leaders might realistically frame political competition to their advantage.

The theory of constrained leadership relies on an instrumental view of identification in politics - i.e., certain identity categories are salient in politics, not because they are more fundamental or have deeper roots in society than other types of categories (as is often argued), but because they describe coalitions that are, or were at some point, useful to political elites, as well as being useful to voters in pursuing their political interests. However, although leaders have strong influence on the politicization of identity categories, their influence is not without bounds. Elites in the theory do not instrumentally "create" from scratch the groups that form their electoral coalitions; existing identity categories and groups embody real constraints and opportunities in terms of their strategies. Identity categories are politically useful precisely because they exist independent of elite strategy. For one, voters understand what existing identity categories mean and to whom they refer. In addition, identity groups (i.e., organized
categories) can provide organizational and financial benefits to politicians through their cultural ties and through the organizations that represent them. In Riker’s terms, people will “want to join” coalitions mobilized on the basis of these categories because these categories mean something to them and because they may belong to other organizations mobilized on the basis of these categories that rope them in.

Focusing especially on variation over time, the theory thus proposes that, even barring changes in voter preferences and in political and party institutions, the salient identifications in politics will change when political elites take advantage of moments of opportunity during crises of representation to politicize the categories in society that they think will best support their interests. These calculations are constrained in particular by the sizes and degree of overlap of the ethnic and class categories in society. Ethnic and class categories (rather than other types of categories) are particularly important for the reasons described in Chapter 2. Size affects which categories can form coalitions large enough to gain influence, given the electoral rules. Overlap tells us about the extent to which new leaders can capture the constituencies of weakened incumbents by appealing to voters in new terms, even when voter preferences do not vary. Beyond this, calculations are influenced by agency – i.e., a variety of unsystematic factors, including a leader’s own identity and goals.

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62 Chhibber (1999) develops a related argument about the influence of party strategy on social cleavages in India, also rejecting arguments based on the social cleavages literature and on electoral institutions. This argument is discussed further below.
Party Systems and Alignments

This dissertation explores identification in politics through the lens of identification in parties and party systems. Parties are understood here in minimal terms, following Downs (1957), as “team[s] seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election” (25). In other words, “parties” include what are sometimes called “electoral groups.” They may also be coalitions or alliances of smaller parties. Other work on party systems often focuses on explaining characteristics like the number and configuration of parties (e.g., Amorim-Neto and Cox 1997; Duverger 1954, Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Sartori 1976); the number of “effective” parties (Laasko and Taagepera 1979); the structure of party competition (open/closed) (Mair 1997: 211-214); party system institutionalization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995); party system nationalization (Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Jones and Mainwaring 2003); and the degree of electoral volatility (e.g., Ferree 2005). This study highlights another aspect of party systems, the principal dimension or dimensions of identity group competition embodied in them. This is a more amorphous characteristic than the others because it relies not on numbers but on assessment of what the parties stand for (see Mair 1997; Kitschelt et al. 1999).

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63 “Identification in parties” should not be confused with “party identification” (i.e., identification with a particular party), although the two ideas are clearly related (for a review on party identification, see Johnston 2006). As Chapter 2 suggests, parties can be identity groups with which individuals identify, but what we are interested in here are the ethnic and class identifications associated with particular parties.

64 In Bolivia, for instance, new electoral laws allowed “citizens’ groups” to participate in municipal elections in 2004. Although formally different from Bolivian parties in terms of registration requirements, these citizens’ groups are no different from parties in the minimal way in which the term is used here.

65 For a review, see Mair 1997 (199-223).
Studying the principal dimension(s) of identity group competition embodied in a party system is one way of addressing what Kitschelt et al. (1999) describe as the principal “alignments … that divide parties and their constituencies” (1-2). This dependent variable thus is closely related to what the Americanist literature studies as “realignment” – i.e., “the transformation of an existing alignment caused by the introduction of a new dimension of conflict” (Carmines 1994: 77, as cited in Carmines and Wagner 2006: 69). The key difference between recent work on realignment and the dependent variable of this project has to do with what type of shifts in competition that are being explained. Although work on realignment seeks to explain changes in which issue dimensions are salient (e.g., shifts between an “economic” and a “social” dimension), this project focuses on shifts in terms of identification – which may involve shifts between the salience of economic and social issues, but need not. According to the argument presented in this chapter, identity groups/categories can be linked to salient and relatively stable policy preferences in different ways – this is part of the art of heresthetics.

Issue and identification dimensions are closely related and are often collapsed into one. For instance, positions on an issue dimension describing support for different national language policies may correspond closely to positions on an identification dimension describing membership in different national language groups. Similarly, positions on an issue dimension describing support for economic redistribution may correspond to positions on an identification dimension describing economic class.

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66 Carmines and Wagner represent one strain of this literature highlighting “issue evolution.” For another (more critical) review of work on realignment, see Mayhew 2000.
Nevertheless, treating issue and identification dimensions as synonymous is problematic when we think of identifications as socially-constructed in the manner described in Chapter 2. As Chapter 2 argues, those who identify in politics in “ethnic” terms, for instance, are not completely defined by their ethnicity; they also care about a variety of “non-ethnic” issues (economic policy, social policy, foreign policy, etc.), just as those who identify in “class” terms also care about a variety of “non-class” issues. Thus, while a particular category may be used to mobilize a coalition of voters, the type of category used does not imply the types of issues around which they are mobilized. (This assumption is explored empirically for Latin American parties in Chapter 4.)

**Explaining Variation: A Framework**

Research on party systems tells us that the dimensions of competition embodied in a party system are generally stable: the conflicts in society at the time that a party system was established affect which cleavages are embodied in the party system, and party system origins influence later developments (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; see also Sartori 1969; Mair 1997). This project does not challenge this broad claim but focuses on the rarer instances in which major change does occur.

The literature highlights several general points about party system change. First, change is most likely in new party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Zielinski 2002). This makes emerging democracies an especially interesting set of cases upon which to study theories of change. Second, even for party systems in emerging democracies,
research on specific cases suggests that there is stability in the sense that the old regime exerts strong influence on partisan politics. Kitschelt et al. (1999)'s typology of key political divisions in emerging democracies in Eastern Europe highlights this as the “political regime divide,” which is based on support or opposition towards the old regime, on divisions between “insiders” and “outsiders” (see Kenney 1998).

Third, it might be particularly difficult for incumbent parties to change their positions. Luebbert (1986) illustrates this well in his discussion of how party leaders are constrained in their actions by their party’s “policy profile,” which is derived from its history and the identity of its supporters. Motivated by the desire to remain in power, party leaders do not act outside of this “policy profile,” even if it is otherwise to their benefit to do so. Thus, in understanding major shifts in the dimensions of identity group competition in politics, we should expect to find them driven especially by new parties (see also Kitschelt 1992; Hug 2001).

Beyond these general propositions, the literature offers a number of explanations for variation (both temporal and spatial) in identification politics as expressed in party systems. Specifically, this work highlights four causal factors, which are reviewed briefly here and in Table 3.1: (1) voter preferences; (2) political institutions; (3) party institutions; and (4) elite manipulation.

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67 In Mexico, for instance, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) exerted tremendous influence on electoral competition as the system liberalized (see Klesner 2005; Bruhn 1997; Lawson 2004; Preston and Dillon 2004). Vincente Fox and the National Action Party (PAN) won in 2000, not so much because the PAN was a conservative, pro-clerical, and pro-business party, with a northern base, but because it was “anti-PRI,” a new party that, especially for middle class voters, represented democratic change.
Table 3.1: Key Explanations from the Literature for Variation in Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Broad Causal Factors</th>
<th>Specific Factors</th>
<th>Predicted Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voter Preferences</td>
<td>Modernization</td>
<td>Increased class salience; decreased ethnic salience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Backlash against modernization</td>
<td>Increased ethnic salience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Specific shocks that affect public opinion</td>
<td>Depends on the shock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic and class demographics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Institutions</td>
<td>Numbers and size of winning coalition</td>
<td>Depends on the institutional arrangements and the configuration of groups (especially size)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ease of new party entry</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Political boundaries and constituencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New arenas of political contestation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Institutions</td>
<td>Type of citizen-party linkage (Kitschelt, Chandra)</td>
<td>Cyclical variation between class and ethnic salience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interaction of activists and candidates (Miller and Schofield)</td>
<td>Depends on opportunity and on the preferences of elites, according to existing theories. <em>(The theory presented in this chapter offers more precise predictions.)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Manipulation</td>
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</table>

**Voter Preferences**

The first causal factor highlighted in the literature is variation in voter preferences (in terms of identities, issues preferences, and social cleavages). In this sense, variation over time might be explained by the fact that voters have come to care more about issues associated with ethnic identification than they do about issues associated with class identification, or vice versa. It might also be tied to the emergence of class-based identity groups to replace ethnic identity groups, or vice versa. Variation across countries might be explained in analogous ways, through stronger “ethnic preferences” or class preferences.

A number of variables and processes might cause this sort of variation. One classic argument – from Tönnies to Durheim, Weber, and Marx to the modernization
theorists – highlights the role of long-term structural changes such as industrialization in creating societal shifts of this type, from traditional communities based on primordial attachments (Gemeinschaft) to formally structured societies with complex class hierarchies (Gelleschaft).\textsuperscript{68} The process of modernization is expected to affect individual preferences, as well as social structure (e.g., the emergence of the middle class), and to be reflected in the party system (see Lipset 1960). Looking cross-nationally, this argument suggests that party systems in more developed countries should be more class-based and that those in very poor, “traditional” societies should be more ethnic. It also suggests analogous shifts over time in particular countries.

As Chapter 4 explores in greater detail, this argument does not explain variation across emerging countries very well; despite the conventional wisdom, poorer countries are not more likely than wealthier countries to have parties that mobilize voters on an ethnic basis and support for parties that highlight class does not clearly vary with wealth. However, this argument can be useful in understanding trends in historical cases, especially in Europe (see Lipset and Rokkan 1967). For instance, one example is provided by the Dutch party system, which has undergone several shifts of the type studied in this project. After WWII, as ten Napel (1999) describes, there was a shift away from religious parties, reflecting the traditional religious “pillarization” of Dutch society, towards parties emphasizing social class.\textsuperscript{69} After 1939 (and especially after 1945), class-based parties became more important, due to the changing priorities of

\textsuperscript{68} For a summary and critique of this large literature, see Huntington 1971.

\textsuperscript{69} The second realignment after 1967, however, seems more clearly due to structural changes combined with failed party strategies.
voters, which were tied to new interests in post-war reconstruction and the establishing of the welfare state.

A related argument highlighting the casual role of voter preferences focuses on modernization “backlash” – in other words, in terms of ethnic mobilization, the argument that modernization may have precisely the opposite effect of that posited by modernization theory, resulting in increased ethnic salience in politics (see Melson and Wolpe 1970; Epstein 1958). The literature specifies a number of specific mechanisms, ranging from mobilization by traditional (rural, ethnic) elites against encroachments on their power by new (urban) elites, to the strategic use of ethnic coalition-making to capture the “goods of modernity” (Bates 1974).

Another broad argument explaining variation over time highlights the role of more rapid shifts in public opinion in response to specific shocks. For instance, one example is provided by the Italian party system in the 1990s, another well-studied case of party system change, which marked the decline of the political dominance of Christian Democracy (DC), and its anti-communist platform, and the rise of the Northern League, which highlighted regionalist and ethnic exclusionary appeals (see Daniels 1999; Bartolini, Chiaramonte, D’Alimonte 2004; Golden 2004; Morlino 1996). As Golden (2004) summarizes, conventional accounts of the collapse of the DC highlight how several such specific shocks caused changes in the Italian party system. In particular, they focus on “the breakup of the Soviet Union, which is said to have freed Catholic voters to switch to new regionalist protest parties” (1238). They also highlight the role of
major corruption scandals within the DC during 1992-94 (which, according to Golden, in fact occurred after the DC’s dramatic losses in the 1992 elections) (see 1252-53). Furthermore, they explain Northern League support in terms of voter preferences for more regionalist and exclusionary positions – a point Golden also challenges, citing data from Manneheimer (1993: 100) showing that Northern League supporters were not “more likely to speak a local dialect instead of Italian than were supporters of other parties, were not less attached to their Italian as opposed to their local identities, and were not more intolerant toward southerners or nonwhites than other Italians” (1254). Golden (2004)’s own argument highlights the role of another public opinion shift – responses to economic opportunities presented by the 1991 Maastricht Treaty” (1238). She argues that the possibility of entry into the EMU prompted voters to vote out the DC, which had long been known for bad government and was expected to limit Italy’s chances of entering the EMU, and to lend greater support to the Northern League, which was pro-market and anti-corruption.

Another example of such shifts occurring in response to specific shocks is explored in Melson (1971)’s study of the political identifications of Nigerian workers during the five months between the Nigerian general strike of June 1964 and the Federal elections that December.  

70 Melson conducted five non-probabilistic sample surveys, three of which were of trade unionists, one of railway workers, and one a mail questionnaire (162). He was interested in looking at the “cross-pressures” between ethnic and class loyalties that affected workers. In terms of biases, he notes: “In all cases, our respondents were better educated, better paid, longer in the trade union movement, and more likely to be trade union officers than was the labor population as a whole. Consequently, ... we would expect that the Nigerian working class population as a whole would tend to be more descriptively inconsistent than the results indicate” (162).
created by the strike to mobilize workers along class lines to support a new Nigerian Labor Party. As Melson notes: “They made their appeals to the class-consciousness and self-interest of Nigerian workers defined as workers, not as members of this or that ethnic group” (161). This strategy worked for a time: In July, many Nigerian workers – 88 percent of Melson’s sample – were in fact sympathetic to a labor party, and only a small minority – 5 percent – willing to vote for an ethnic party. By December, however, as the momentum from the strike wore off, their identifications had shifted basically back: among the same workers, support for a labor party was down to 41 percent, while another 41 percent said that they would only support an ethnic party in the polls.

Other arguments of this type focus on the demographic structure of the electorate, highlighting factors like the degree of ethnic fractionalization, the size of key populations (e.g., “minorities” or the “working class”), and changes like immigration that affect demographic structure. For instance, one assumption incorporated into many analyses is that ethnic diversity should be correlated with support for ethnic parties.

Political Institutions

A second causal factor identified in the literature is formal political institutions. Arguments about institutions highlight several mechanisms through which institutions

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71 On Nigerian parties, see in particular Sklar 1963.
72 In his sample, 88 percent indicated some labor party support, while 5 percent supported an ethnic party only (163).
73 In his sample, 41 percent indicated some labor party support, 41 percent supported an ethnic party only, and 17 percent responded “other.”
affect when and how groups are represented in politics. One has to do with numbers and the size of winning coalitions. For instance, institutional reforms that involve changes from majoritarian to proportional representation systems, changes from one proportional formula to another, or changes in the existence or size of electoral thresholds for representation affect change in electoral outcomes by changing the percentage of votes needed to gain representation. Even holding constant the underlying voting population and its preferences, therefore, such institutional reforms can trigger changes in which groups are mobilized in the party system. In particular, research has shown that such changes can promote the representation of new and minority interests.  

A second mechanism identified in the literature focuses on the role of institutional reforms that encourage the formation of new parties, especially to represent underrepresented groups. Examples include many of those cited above, in addition to changes in the laws governing party registration or the shift from a one-party to a multi-party regime.

A third mechanism has to do with the redrawing of political boundaries and constituencies. Institutional changes that involve redistricting or changing federal arrangements, for instance, can change electoral outcomes by changing who votes for specific offices. Holding constant the percentages needed to win, this mechanism

74 See, e.g., Lardeyret 1993; Lijphart 1977; Reilly and Reynolds 1999.
75 Another factor is district magnitude, which larger districts tending to favor smaller parties (Lijphart 1990). As Moreno (2005) points out: “Small parties can also win elections by targeting specific populations in large districts, for example a single indigenous group (Ames, 1995). Unfortunately, even if the party gets a substantial portion of the indigenous vote, it is diluted across three small districts, each with a small number of seats, the party may not gain representation. However, if that same party competes in a
works by changing the arena of political competition, and with it the salient social conflicts and the relative sizes of groups. A key example in this vein is Posner (2005), which argues that the shift from one-party to multi-party competition in Zambia changed the “effective arena of political competition,” expanding it “from the electoral constituency to the nation as a whole” (145). Focusing on ethnic cleavages, he shows that this shift changed political conflict from revolving around salient constituency-level ethnic cleavages (“tribe”) to broader national-level ethnic divisions (“language group”). Institutional changes that operate through this mechanism need not involve the changing of physical boundaries. For instance, they may change the voting population through policies that encourage (or discourage) participation and turnout. If certain groups were previously excluded on an ethnic basis for instance (e.g., African Americans in the U.S., the indigenous in some Latin American states), their inclusion following institutional reforms may bring to light new social conflicts on an ethnic basis.

A fourth mechanism identified in the literature has to do with creating new arenas of political contestation, as such through decentralization. By bringing politics closer to the people, decentralization, it is argued, can encourage local-level participation and mobilization, which can serve as a basis for mobilization at the national level (see Van Cott 2003). Depending on the types of groups that are organized and mobilized at the local level, decentralization then might encourage party system change if these locally-mobilized groups are different from those salient in the pre-decentralization party system.
Party Institutions

A less developed area of work that touches on the central question of this project addresses how variation in party institutions themselves may influence whether and how identity groups are salient in party politics. This is suggested broadly in Kitschelt et al. (1999)’s typology of the varieties of “citizen-party linkages,” which highlights four types of parties: parties led by charismatic leaders; legislative faction or proto-parties, which are formed in the legislative arena and lack mass support; clientelist or patronage-based parties, which secure support through direct compensation to supporters; and programmatic parties, which “compensate contributors indirectly by the policy packages politicians promise to pursue if elected to legislative and executive office” (48; see also Gunther and Diamond 2001). In both of the latter two of these types of parties, groups play a key role (directly or indirectly), suggesting that some type of identity groups will be salient in politics if these types of parties dominate.

Work on patronage politics helps to refine hypotheses about how the types of parties (i.e., whether patronage-based or not) affect the types of identity groups that are salient in politics. Chandra (2004) in particular suggests that if parties (and democracies more broadly) are patronage-based, ethnic salience should be especially likely because patronage is more easily distributed to ethnic groups which can be identified on the basis of markers that require little information (see also Wolfinger 1974; Young 1976).76 Chapter 2 critiques the claim that ethnic markers are necessarily more easily identifiable

76 Chandra’s argument also highlights another aspect of party institutions, competitive rules for intra-party advancement.
than those of class in particular, suggesting that this argument might also apply to class categories in some contexts.

Finally, another important argument about how party dynamics and structure themselves might affect the types of groups salient in party debate is Miller and Schofield (2003), which, focusing on American politics, proposes that realignments from the “social” to the “economic” dimension and back again are simply cyclical and the result of the interaction of “policy-specializing” activists and “vote maximizing” candidates (245; see also Schofield and Sened 2006). Assuming a two-dimensional policy space, Miller and Schofield’s model builds, on the one hand, on the finding in the spatial modeling literature that, if parties are vote maximizing and if the issue space is multidimensional, party positions will be inherently unstable because there will be no position that cannot be beaten by another position in the next election (in particular, see McKelvey 1979). Miller and Schofield’s prediction of “dynamic stability” (i.e., more disciplined cycling from one dimension to the other) is based on the assumption that parties (specifically, their candidates) will attempt to attract the support of disaffected “activist” voters, who are tied to the essential processes of “winning primaries, raising funds, and mobilizing volunteers” (250; see also Aldrich 1995). Activists are ideologically or policy driven (in comparison to vote maximizing candidates). Although the policy space is two-dimensional, Miller and Schofield argue, politics will be played out on one salient dimension, while the other will be “submerged or passive” and “obscured by tacit party agreement” (245). “Disaffected” activists care about the passive policy dimension, pushing continually for realignment, while other activists care about the salient policy
dimension and resist efforts to realign politics as the disaffected activists would like. “Dynamic stability” comes as result of these counteracting forces. Third parties led by disaffected activists play an especially interesting role in this process as they can prompt candidates to engage in “flanking” moves, thus hastening realignment (253-254). To the extent that the types of issues salient in politics can also be tied to the types of groups/categories salient (which is not always the case, this dissertation argues), this argument implies cyclical variation in the salience of ethnic and class identification in politics.

**Elite Manipulation**

Finally, Miller and Schofield’s argument is also relevant to a fourth broad explanation for variation in identification politics highlighting the role of political elites. In this broad explanation, elites manipulate politics to their advantage by mobilizing new groups or introducing new dimensions of political debate. In terms of work on ethnic politics, this line of argument is consistent with much work in the instrumentalist tradition. More generally, it is consistent with Riker (1986)’s theory of “heresthetics,” that politicians will try to manipulate politics to their advantage by introducing new dimensions of political debate and by framing politics to their advantage.

The literature on elite manipulation narrows predictions in two key ways relevant to this project. First, it highlights that such manipulation is most likely during periods when party systems are in flux, such as following an authoritarian transition. Torcal and
Mainwaring (2003) and Chhibber and Torcal (1997), for instance, argue that political elites in Spain and Chile were able to manipulate the social bases of party systems to their advantage following regime transitions. Similarly, Kitschelt (1992) argues that political entrepreneurs in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s to early 1990s were able to create successful new parties by mobilizing new issue dimensions (see also Kitschelt et al. 1999; Zielinski 2002).

Chhibber (1999), which focuses on party politics and social cleavages in India, develops a second key argument. Along similar lines to the framework developed here, Chhibber argues that shifts in the Indian party system (increasing fragmentation and the rise of cleavage-based parties) cannot be explained by changes in the electoral system or the independent structure of social cleavages, but instead by party strategies, which have shaped social divisions. Because of the strength of the state and the lack of formal organizations representing social cleavages in India (i.e., the weakness of “associational life”), Chhibber argues, parties were less influenced by social cleavages than in some other countries, but instead influenced social cleavages themselves. Chhibber’s argument, on the one hand, is consistent with the argument here in that it shows how politicians may politicize weakly-institutionalized categories. It also presents an important potential condition on the operation of the theory – that elite manipulation of the type described, is more likely in countries with weak associational life than in those with strong associational life; or, in other words, that elites may be more able to play with the salience of identifications when the meanings of identity categories are looser and thus more manipulable.
Arguments about the elite manipulation of identity politics are powerful because they offer explanations for variation that is unexplained by voter preferences and institutions. However, the problem with these explanations is that they tend to offer little basis for prediction about exactly how elites will change identification politics. Given the diversity of social categories in most countries, many different categories may provide the numbers to win. Beyond the numbers, these arguments do not provide clear guidelines about why politicians during periods of transition will politicize one rather than another category. They also tend to rely on the troubling assumption that voters buy all of the lines that elites try to sell them. Politicians of course try to frame political debate and identifications to their ideal advantage, but clearly not all of their efforts succeed. Can we say anything more specific about which ones will?

A Theory of Constrained Leadership

As described above, variation in identification may sometimes be explained in terms of variation in voter preferences, political institutions, or party institutions. In other cases, variation in identification is due to the ability of political elites to successfully politicize different identity groups. Elites are constrained in doing this both by opportunity and by social structure. Opportunities are provided by crises of representation, in which large segments of the voting population find themselves without parties representing their political preferences well. In terms of social structure, sizes and overlap among categories (given the country’s particular institutional rules) describe
which are large enough to win influence and which can be switched between for political expediency. In other words:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Crisis of Representation} & \quad + \\
\text{Social Structure} & \quad \rightarrow \quad \text{Change in the Identifications} \\
& \quad + \\
\text{Salient to Competition} & \\
\text{Action by Elites}
\end{align*}
\]

We begin by assuming that there is an underlying political issue space that describes the salient political preferences of voters (i.e., what they want from government) and on which we might array the positions of parties. Parties appeal directly to voters however by appealing to them as members of different identity groups that roughly map on to this issue space – i.e., competition is played out in terms of appeals to an array of mobilized identity groups, rather than in terms of programmatic platforms. We might refer to the political issue space as the salient “issue dimension” and the array of salient identity groups as the salient “identification dimension.”

The underlying political issue space/dimension can be anything. For instance, similar to standard one-dimensional spatial voting models, it might correspond to positions on a left-right spectrum, with working class voters tending to be on the left and wealthy voters tending to be on the right. It might also simply describe positions about the distribution of resources to various ethno-regions. In the simple two-group case, we might thus envision an issue dimension and a coinciding identification dimension that
map extremely pro-“Group A” positions on the left and extremely pro-“Group B”
positions on the right (see Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Furthermore, the salient
political issue dimension might fall diagonally across a two-dimensional issue space with
axes defining economic and social dimensions (see Miller and Schofield 2003). In this
case, party positions might favor some mix of ethnic and social issues, similarly tying
these issues to competition for the support of some array of identity groups. However the
issue dimension is conceived, in this theory is it assumed to be relatively stable. What is
of key interest is how the array of identity groups linked to these issues and salient to
party competition varies.

In thinking about how parties position themselves, we assume a proportional
representation system with more than two parties and parties that are not vote
maximizing but care about policy (see Schofield and Sened 2006: 3). Because the
median voter theorem does not apply, parties should position themselves at various points
on the issue dimension (see Cox 1990). For simplicity, let us assume the simple case of
an underlying issue space defined by positions on economic redistribution, tied to class-
based appeals (see Acemoglu and Robinson 2005). This is represented in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Theory I
Opportunities for elites to instrumentally change the types of groups salient in party politics are provided by crises of representation in the party system. These “party system crises” occur when large segments of voters find themselves without parties representing their preferences, as represented in Figure 3.2. In other words, they involve the creation of “space” on the political issue dimension (in Figure 3.2, at the left) for the entry of new parties or the shifting of incumbent party positions.

This space might come about in several ways. First, it may be the result of changes in voter preferences or institutions with predictions following the explanations described in the framework summarized in Table 3.1. Second, it may come about even without such changes when major incumbent parties experience crises or collapse (e.g., Party A in Figure 3.1 drops out). Third, also without such changes, it may be created when incumbent parties for some reason shift their positions in one direction (e.g., at the left in Figure 3.2).

**Figure 3.2: Theory II**

Given that we have assumed that the distribution of voter preferences from Figure 3.1 to Figure 3.2 has not significantly changed, why would incumbent parties shift their positions in this way? There are several possibilities. First, incumbent parties may misjudge public opinion, assuming that it has shifted in ways that it has not. Second,
incumbent parties may be more interested in policy than in maximizing votes, and party leaders may hold different policy preferences than the majority of voters. This might occur when voters and party leaders are influenced by significantly different factors and sources of information. For instance, political elites may be more tied to international ideas, norms, and capital than the majority of voters (see O'Donnell 1988; Janos 1989). It may also occur when elites have more technical knowledge than most voters and thus know, unlike voters, that certain positions are inadvisable. Third, incumbent parties, even if they want to maximize votes, may be heavily constrained in the positions that they can take. For instance, in a country reliant on international assistance, parties in government can be constrained in the policies that they can adopt by the conditions of foreign assistance. 77

What is key about party system crises in the theory is that they imply the creation of a reservoir of “floating” voters over some portion of the political issue space, voters who no longer have parties whose positions are close to their issue preferences. In Figure 3.2, these voters might vote for Party A, but they would prefer a party with a position farther to the left. The possibility of capturing these votes creates opportunities for the entry of new parties.

In trying to capture these floating voters, new parties can appeal to them in several ways. First, they can appeal in essentially the same terms as incumbent parties, pledging to be better representatives of the same groups. For instance, in trying to lure

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77 If we find that this last point is what drives the discrepancy between party and voter positions, this suggests that the theory is most applicable to small, aid-dependent countries.
voters from a collapsing Socialist “Party A” on the left, a new party could highlight Party A’s failures in government, its insincere commitment to leftist policies, and the corruption of its leaders. In other words, they can appeal as “outsider” leftists.

Second, new parties can attempt to distinguish themselves from incumbent parties and to strengthen their ties to voters by appealing to them in slightly different terms from those used by incumbent parties. If another identification dimension maps on reasonably well with the salient political issue space – i.e., resonates well with the political priorities of voters – shifting debate in this way can be strategically useful, allowing new parties to secure organizational and financial support from social groups not already mobilized in politics and tied to incumbent parties. In other words, parties in these instances can appeal also as “outsiders” representing new (previously excluded) groups.

Since voter preferences and institutions have not changed, in order to shift debate towards a new identification dimension, new parties need an identification dimension that overlaps well with the traditionally-salient identification dimension. A “ranked” ethnic system, where class and ethnicity overlap well, provides an ideal situation, as represented in Figure 3.3. In this case, by adopting a position at the left of the ethnic dimension in Figure 3.3, “New Party D” has positioned itself to capture the floating voters on the left of the old class dimension, while also reframing debate and avoiding competing with incumbent parties on their own terms. In addition, since Socialist “Party A” has a history of ties with key labor unions, “New Party D” can be at a disadvantage in trying to establish relationships with unions; even if Party A’s real policy position has changed,
organizational relationships may take some time to catch up. By locating on the ethnic
dimension, New Party D can go after the support of the working class through their
ethnic associations. Since ethnic associations were not previously mobilized in party
politics, they may also be eager to gain influence by supporting a new party.

Figure 3.3: Theory III

In more general terms, new parties can be expected to position themselves along a
dimension describing any social cleavage that overlaps well with the traditionally-salient
identification dimension. For instance, this could involve a shift from one type of ethnic
cleavage to another (e.g., language to region).

If no dimensions of social cleavage overlap well with the traditionally-salient
identification dimension, new parties might also try to "construct" a new dimension that
overlaps. This strategy allows new parties to reframe debate away from the incumbents'
terms, but has the weakness of drawing on no existing social organizations. For this
reason, it is a second-best strategy, most likely to succeed if the party is led by a popular
and charismatic leader or group, with independent financial resources, that does not need
the organizational and financial support of existing social organizations. Thus, parties
that successfully pursue this strategy should tend to be “personalistic” or “populist” parties (in the Latin American sense) – i.e., although their core voters may be described in class or ethnic terms, explicit appeals to class and ethnic categories should not be central to their platforms. A leader might pursue this strategy for personal reasons, such as commitment to a particular ideology or the fact that he personally lacks the characteristics to present himself credibly as a leader of the overlapping identification dimension (e.g., he is not credibly an “ethnic” leader).

The broad predictions drawn from the theory are summarized in Figure 3.4.

**Figure 3.4: Broad Prediction**

- **Party System Crisis**
  
  ↓

- **Cleavage Overlap?**
  
  Yes → **Likely Shift from Ethnic (Class) to Class (Ethnic) Salience**
  
  No → **Unlikely Shift from Ethnic (Class) to Class (Ethnic) Salience**
  
  *Ethnicity (Class) Remains Salient or New “Populist” Dimension May be Mobilized*

Figure 3.5 reviews the basic argument and how it relates to the explanatory framework (Table 3.1). The argument begins at the far left of the diagram with a node describing whether there are changes in preferences and/or institutions. If there are such changes, there will be possible shifts in identification (“realignments”) along the lines outlined in Table 3.1. If not, the possibility for such realignment depends first on whether there is a crisis (node 2). If there is no crisis, no change is predicted. If there is a
crisis, change is possible if there is "overlap" between the traditionally-salient group identification dimension and another identification dimension.

At this point, agency comes in. "Strategic leaders" will take advantage of this overlap to enter politics by playing on an overlapping, but previously not politicized, identification dimension(s). Their successful entry will create shifts in the type of identifications salient in politics. Some leaders, however, will not be "strategic" in this way, which will influence the timing of change and possibly whether it occurs at all in particular countries.

Figure 3.5: The Argument in Brief

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78 This chart is thanks to Chappell Lawson.
Party System Crises

The second node in Figure 3.5 highlights the significance of the crisis variable. Crises of representation give elites the opportunity to change party systems. Thus, although a complete theory of the causes of party system crises is not central to this project, it is important to be able to identify such a crisis by its characteristics and not simply by its effects (i.e., shifts in salient identifications). Furthermore, this discussion addresses one potential criticism of the theory: that it fails to acknowledge the endogeneity of crises to elite manipulation – i.e., that elites have much more influence than suggested by the theory because elites actually engineer crises in order to make their preferred identity groups salient. As will become clear, elites can play this precipitating role in crises, but many relevant crises are the result of exogenous factors that are beyond the direct influence of particular individuals.

Referring again to Figure 3.2, what types of events are associated with this sort of “crisis” (represented by the space at the left of the diagram)? There are several possibilities. The first two are suggested by the framework presented in Table 3.1. For instance, one possibility is that voter preferences might change, either rapidly or gradually, and that some event might reveal a disjuncture between party and voter positions. When this sort of crisis occurs, we should expect that either new parties will emerge or incumbent parties will shift their positions to reflect these new preferences. If the political issue space has shifted, we should expect realignment of the salient identifications dimension(s).
Another possibility suggested by the framework in Table 3.1 is that institutions might change, changing the rules of the game and creating new institutional incentives. When this sort of “crisis” occurs, we should also expect that either new parties will emerge or incumbent parties will shift their positions to reflect these new incentives. Depending on the particular institutional and social structure, this also may involve a “realignment” of the salient identifications – for instance, as the Posner (2005) example cited above suggests, in terms of “realignment” from tribal to linguistic lines.

The more interesting possibilities for this theory occur when changing voter preferences and institutions are not key. In this case, there are several possibilities. One is that a major party for some reason collapses or drops out of the political arena as a strong electoral contender. Even when voters continue to support the positions that this party advocates, this might occur, for instance, due to events that severely weaken the party like a major corruption scandal, the death of one or several key party leaders, or a major internal party dispute. Political entrepreneurs inside and outside the party clearly can directly influence this sort of crisis by creating or exaggerating corruption scandals, fomenting internal disputes, or even hastening the demise of particular leaders. However, unplanned, exogenous events may also trigger this sort of crisis: a party leader may die suddenly in an accident, several party members might happen to be corrupt and to engage in corrupt activities that are discovered, or leaders of different party factions may happen to be personal enemies and refuse at all costs to accommodate each other.
Although the occurrence of these sorts of chance events cannot be very accurately predicted, we can say something about the vulnerability of particular parties and party systems to these sorts of crises. For instance, parties that are highly centralized and identified with one leader should be most vulnerable to this leader’s death. Similarly, parties with poor party discipline that cannot enforce standards of behavior on their leaders should be more vulnerable to corruption scandals and internal party disputes. In other words, crises affecting particular parties should be most likely for poorly-institutionalized parties based on charismatic leadership. Because these characteristics generally describe parties in emerging democracies more than those in established democracies, we should expect crises of this sort to be more likely to occur in emerging democracies.

The most interesting type of crisis for this theory occurs, as suggested above, when some event highlights or creates a disjuncture between the positions held by incumbent parties (and party elites), and those of voters. This sort of crisis affects the legitimacy or political feasibility of particular political positions for parties in government, but leaves the distribution of voter preferences largely unchanged. One example of such an event might be changes in the patterns of foreign assistance in the 1980s (tied, in part, to a growing distrust of state-led development policies by donors), which involved a decline in international support for parties and governments pursuing “leftist” state-led policies, even though strong popular support for “leftist,” redistributive policies.

79 Decentralized parties also might be better than highly centralized parties at dealing with internal disputes or scandals once they arise because they might be able to isolate such problems in one branch of the party.
policies nevertheless remained (see Diamond and Plattner 1995; Haggard and Kaufman 1995).

### Table 3.2: Party System Crises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of “Crisis”</th>
<th>Most Fertile Conditions</th>
<th>Predicted Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Changes in voter preferences and an event that reveals the disjuncture between party and voter positions</td>
<td>Periods of rapid modernization, large-scale immigration, etc.</td>
<td>The emergence of new parties or a shift in the positions of incumbent parties to reflect these new preferences. (May involve a shift in the dimensions of competition.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional change</td>
<td>Periods of regime transition.</td>
<td>The emergence of new parties or a shift in the positions of incumbent parties to reflect new institutional incentives. (May involve a shift in the dimensions of competition.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis affecting particular incumbent parties</td>
<td>Personalistic, poorly institutionalized parties.</td>
<td>The emergence of new parties or a shift in the positions of incumbent parties to fill the same space or to mobilize along an overlapping identification dimension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event affecting particular positions held by incumbent parties, but not voters</td>
<td>Small, open countries affected by international shocks.</td>
<td>Shift in the dimensions of competition engineered by new parties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although predicting such crises is complicated, these sorts of crises can be identified by the presence of a specific event that affects the legitimacy or feasibility of particular positions in the eyes of political elites, more than of voters, and by a shift in the positions of incumbent parties that is not fully explained by shifts in voter preferences. Such crises seem most likely in countries where elites and voters are governed by very different constraints and sources of information.

**Hypotheses**

The theory developed in this chapter assumes that:

- Ethnic and class coalitions in party politics should be basically equivalent bases of political mobilization – i.e., neither is more “weighty” or fundamental to voters than
The mobilization of both ethnic and class identity groups may be tied to different types of issues (economic, political, cultural, etc.); type of group and type of issue are not the same thing.

- Parties should make appeals to identity groups central to their mobilizing strategies (i.e., even more than programmatic appeals on the basis of policy issues).

- Parties may also appeal to several different identity groups at once.

It leads to four key predictions:

1. Variation in the relative salience of ethnic and class identifications in party systems should be observed even absent variation in voter preferences and institutions, looking both across countries and over time in particular countries. (Other types of variation may also affect variation in ethnic and class identification as explored in other work, with predictions as outlined in the framework in Table 3.1.)

2. Shifts between ethnic and class identification in party politics over time should be most likely in situations where ethnicity and class overlap, following crises that affect the legitimacy or feasibility of incumbent party positions. They should be driven by the emergence of new parties.

3. More generally, shifts in party competition should be most likely between overlapping identification dimensions, of whatever type, following such crises.
4. In situations where ethnicity and class overlap poorly, shifts of this type should be unlikely, even following major party system crises. If there is any change in the dimensions of competition, it should involve shifts to some other overlapping dimension or the rise of personalistic or populist parties organized around a charismatic leader.
CHAPTER 4

CROSS-NATIONAL VARIATION: LATIN AMERICAN ELECTIONS AFTER 1989

This chapter uses cross-national data from the Constructivst Dataset on Ethnicity and Institutions (CDEI) to provide a systematic picture of elections and identity politics in seventeen Latin American democracies in the early 1990s. Exploring a snapshot in time of parties that participated in legislative elections during this period, it shows how the measurement of identifications outlined in Chapter 2 can be carried out; illustrates that these data do not well support several simple, commonly-accepted hypotheses; and suggests the plausibility of several key assumptions of the theory. It also presents background material on parties and elections in the region. Within this comparative context, Chapters 5 and 6 then focus on Bolivia and Chapter 7 presents brief case studies on party competition in the four other countries of the Andean region.

This chapter first identifies the universe of cases in Latin America (electoral democracies) and presents basic comparative data on each. Drawing on the CDEI, it then presents descriptive data on the ethnic-, economic-, and leftist class-mobilizing parties.

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80 Data in this section is drawn from the CDEI 2005, both summary data and codesheets. Data on economic-mobilizing parties (including leftist parties) and on issues is “preliminary” in the CDEI 2005 as it has not yet been fully checked according to the standards of the dataset. The discussion below includes some quotes from news articles and background information cited on the codesheets. Information from news articles is cited by newspaper and date; the original sources are in the relevant country file. Sources are not cited for general factual information such as dates and circumstances of party founding, unless sources conflict. The two main secondary sources drawn on in the CDEI for this sort of information are the Europa World Yearbook and Political Handbook of the World (various years).
and electoral groups that participated in elections in Latin America in the early 1990s and on variation in support for each of these types of parties across countries. Consistent with other work, these data show that even after the fall of the Soviet Union and the related rise of ethnic social movements around the world, there was little support for ethnic-mobilizing parties in Latin America and there remained substantial support for leftist parties of various stripes (see Alcántara Sáez and Freidenberg 2001; Coppedge 1997; Madrid 2004).

Next, the chapter uses the CDEI to explore several simple, commonly-accepted hypotheses about ethnic and class salience in elections. In showing that these hypotheses are not supported by the cross-national data, it attempts to “clear the field” of some often-held assumptions (simple hypotheses) so that the rest of the dissertation can turn to the theory and to other alternative hypotheses.81 First, the data show that ethnic-mobilizing parties were, at least in this period, not clear substitutes for leftist-parties at any one point in time: i.e., the ethnic vote was not higher in countries with a low leftist vote. Second, support for ethnic-mobilizing parties and leftist parties did not vary clearly with levels of development in the way that we would expect based on simple versions of modernization theory: the ethnic vote was not uniformly higher in the least-developed countries, nor was the vote for class-mobilizing leftist parties higher in the most-developed countries. Third, countries that had ethnic-mobilizing parties during this period were not the most ethnically-diverse, nor did the “indigenous vote” fully line up with the size of the indigenous population (see also Van Cott 2005, Yashar 2005). Finally, ethnic

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81 For analysis of similar and related hypotheses using the CDEI 2005 for all countries, see Chandra et al. 2005.
demography and electoral thresholds for representation alone did not fully explain ethnic party formation and success (see Posner 2005, Chandra 2005).

In the last section, the chapter uses the CDEI data to provide supporting evidence for the plausibility of three key assumptions of the theory: First, parties do indeed make appeals to identity groups central to their mobilizing strategies; it is fair to assume, as the theory does, that party competition is played out in terms of “capture” of groups, rather than only of issue positions. Second, group-based appeals can be made to several groups at once, even when there is no consistent ideological basis for lumping such groups together. Third, the types of groups to which parties directly appeal and the types of issues they discuss are distinct: contrary to a lot of other work, the data suggest that parties that appeal along ethnic lines do not only focus on the sorts of “traditional” or “cultural” issues commonly thought of as “ethnic issues,” nor do parties that mobilize groups defined in terms of economic class only focus on economic issues (see Chandra 2001). Instead, parties appear to use ethnic and economic groups to define and mobilize coalitions of voters with interests in a variety of types of issues. But, the mobilization of ethnic identifications does seem to have been tied somewhat to increasing focus on cultural issues and (political) issues of representation.

82 The instrumentalist literature on ethnic politics suggests this point in part in its contention that ethnic groups are mobilized around economic objectives. However, this dissertation supports a broader version of this argument: i.e., it is not only that ethnic groups are mobilized around economic objectives, but also that identity groups in general are mobilized politically to define coalitions around a variety of economic and non-economic issues. This point is illustrated in greater depth in the Bolivian chapters.


Latin American Democracies

The theory and framework presented in this dissertation, first, should be applicable to countries with competitive elections (i.e., electoral democracies). Second, although the theory and framework are presented in general terms, there are several reasons that they should be most applicable to emerging democracies as opposed to fully consolidated democracies with well-institutionalized party systems and entrenched patterns of electoral competition. Thus, in identifying the universe of cases upon which the theory and framework can be tested, we first need to identify democracies, and second to identify emerging democracies. Although failure to explain changes in the first set is problematic for the argument (and would suggest it should be reframed in more narrow terms), failure to explain change in the second set would be more damning.

The theory presented here requires significant data on internal politics in order to be evaluated, even at a “first cut” level, so this chapter focuses on one world region, Latin America, in order to identify the universe of cases within that region. As Wiarda and Kline (1985) note, Latin America can be “broadly defined as Middle, Central, and South America and the Caribbean – ... a vast area” (5). Most often, the region is understood to include those countries in the new world colonized by Spain or Portugal. Among these, the eighteen that hold competitive national elections are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,

As Wiarda and Kline (1985) note: “For the purpose of this book and to facilitate comparison among countries, we shall be concentrating on the Luso-Hispanic countries of Latin America—the area colonized by Spain and Portugal, which includes Puerto Rico. References to Latin America thus can be understood to exclude the present or former British, Dutch, and French colonies or territories: Guyana, Suriname, Belize, Jamaica, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, and the other smaller islands” (5). The Philippines is also often considered a nominally Latin American country. Two examples of projects that study “the Americas” in strictly geographic terms are Nohlen (2005) and Jones (1994).
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. These eighteen countries can be grouped into three sub-regions, as summarized in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Latin American Democracies by Sub-Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Andean Region</th>
<th>Southern Cone</th>
<th>Mexico and Central America, and the Dominican Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are several ways in which we might examine briefly the degree of democratic consolidation in each of these eighteen countries. One indicator is the length of time a country has held competitive elections (i.e., what Bratton and van de Walle (1997) refer to as democratic “survival”). Data on democratic transitions show that the majority of these eighteen countries transitioned most recently to (electoral) democracy since 1989, during Huntington’s “Third Wave” of democratization (Huntington 1991).

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84 In other words, in line with Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), the argument here draws a distinction between “democratic survival” and “democratic consolidation.” As they note: “In our view, consolidation is the more or less total institutionalization of democratic practices, complete only when citizens and the political class alike come to accept democratic practices as the only way to resolve conflict. It requires that political actors so fully internalize the rules of the game that they can no longer imagine resorting to nonelectoral practices to obtain office” (235).

85 Huntington (1991) attributes the “Third Wave,” which began in 1974, to a variety of causal factors: deepening problems of legitimacy for authoritarian states; unprecedented economic growth in the 1960s and a related expansion of the middle class; a progressive shift in Catholic church doctrine (including Vatican II, 1963-65); a rising commitment on the part of international actors to democracy (e.g., US human rights policy after 1974); and “snowballing” or demonstration effects of democratization around the world, a process enhanced by improvements in communications.
## Table 4.2: Periods of Democracy in Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Periods with Competitive Elections (Nohlen 2005, II-9)</th>
<th>Periods of “Minimal Democracy” – Based on Competition and Inclusiveness (Doorenspleet 2005)</th>
<th>Date of Most Recent Regime Transition from “Autocracy” to “Democracy” (Polity IV)</th>
<th>Most Recent Democratic “Wave” (Huntington 1991)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1953-1963</td>
<td>1949-1953</td>
<td>10 December 1919</td>
<td>First or Second Wave</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

86 In general for the countries listed here, differences in years of democracy involve only a few years at most. The discrepancies between Polity IV and the other two sources are as follows: for Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Panama, Polity IV differs by a year from Nohlen (2005) and/or Doorenspleet (2000); for Brazil, El Salvador, and Paraguay, Polity IV is consistent with Doorenspleet (2000), but not with Nohlen (2005); for Venezuela, Polity IV is consistent with Nohlen (2005), but not with Doorenspleet (2000); for Costa Rica, Polity IV’s transition year is well before both Nohlen (2005)’s and Doorenspleet (2000)’s; and for Mexico, Polity IV identifies a democratic transition (from 0 to 4 on the “polity” scale) in 1994, but it also notes, consistent with Nohlen (2005) and Doorenspleet (2000), an increase in the polity score from 4 to 6 on 7 July 1997.

87 “Electoral democracy” is based on the holding of “general and competitive elections.”

88 The Polity IV data is based on “BYEAR,” “BMONTH,” and “BDAY” variables in the most recent year in which the “POLITY” score rose above zero.

89 This column is based on the dates listed in the previous three columns and the waves identified in Huntington 1991, as well as Doorenspleet 2000 and 2004 (330).

90 Doorenspleet (2005) codes 1800 to 2001. This is the author’s estimate.

91 Fourth wave based on its latest transition.
Table 4.2 summarizes the periods of democracy in each country based on three different criteria. In the first column, based on Nohlen (2005), democracy is defined as the holding of competitive elections. This minimal criterion is the least restrictive of the three approaches summarized, showing early periods of competitive elections in a number of the countries in the sample (e.g., Argentina 1912-1930, Colombia 1853-1858).

In the second column, based on Doorenspleet (2000, 2005), democracy is defined in terms of both the holding of competitive elections and inclusive participation (see Dahl 1971). The addition of the inclusiveness criterion in particular limits the sample as compared to the first column. Finally, the third column shows the start of the most recent democratic period in each country based on Polity IV’s democracy measure, which ranks countries on a 0 to 10 point scale taking into account the competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the executive, and the competitiveness of political participation. Although generally consistent with the Doorenspleet measure, Polity IV’s measure is different in several cases (e.g., Costa Rica and Venezuela).

Despite some differences, the three measures are consistent enough for us to identify roughly the most recent democratic transition. The final column of Table 4.2 lists the most recent democratic “wave” in which each country transitioned to democracy (see Huntington 1991). The three approaches are consistent in these terms in all but three cases, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Paraguay. As the table shows, most Latin American countries transitioned (or “re”-transitioned) to democracy in the 1980s, but three

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92 Nohlen (2005) is used because it is one of the most comprehensive sources on Latin American elections, including summaries of elections in all eighteen countries. However, it does not include specific coding criteria.

93 The two measures also differ by a year for four other countries – Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama. In these cases, differences can be explained by how the beginning of a regime is coded.
countries – Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela – have been electoral democracies at least since the second democratic wave (the period between World War II and 1962). Other countries (Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela) also transitioning to democracy in the second wave, but then relapsed into authoritarianism.

A handful of countries – Chile, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru, along with, according to some classifications, Mexico and Paraguay – most recently transitioned to electoral democracy since 1989, in the “fourth wave” (see Diamond 1999; Doorenspleet 2004). Looking at the most recent period of democratic transition suggests that the most consolidated democracies in Latin America in terms of democratic survival are Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela – i.e. those that transitioned during the second wave or prior. The least consolidated in these terms are Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru – all of which transitioned during the third or fourth wave.

Another simple way to get at democratic consolidation is in terms of the degree to which democratic norms are respected. Diamond et al. (1999) describe one measure of “democratic status” using Freedom House indicators, which rank countries in terms of respect for both civil liberties and political rights on a scale of 1 (high) to 7 (low). In Diamond et al. (1999)’s terms, countries with a combined Freedom House score of more than 5 are classified as liberal democracies, and those with a score of between 6 and 8 are

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94 The Second Wave, according to Huntington (1991), lasted from 1943 to 1962 and involved 41 transitions. It was followed by a second “reverse wave” in 1958 to 1975, involving 22 reversals. Second wave democratic transitions in general were caused, according to Huntington, by political and military factors, including Allied-imposed democracy and decolonization.

95 More specifically, democracy here is as measured by Nohlen (2005) in terms of contestation (i.e., the holding of free and fair elections). Doorenspleet (2000)’s “minimal democracy,” which takes into account “inclusion” of groups (particularly women and minorities) as well as contestation, tends to limit the number of cases.
electoral democracies (including pseudodemocracies democracies)” (62). Countries with scores of 9 or higher are classified as authoritarian regimes. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show these data for 1985, 1995, and 2005. (As we will see below, the elections studied in the CDEI data were selected as those in 1996 or closest to that year, but not after – the latest in fact being in 1995. The years 1985 and 2005 measure a decade before and after that year.)

As Diamond et al. (1999) point out (and consistent with these data), there was a general increase in the number of democracies (both liberal and electoral combined) as compared to authoritarian regimes from the 1980s to the 1990s and 2000s. However, the 1990s also saw the rise of electoral and pseudo democracies at the expense of both authoritarian regimes and liberal democracies. In 1985, eleven of the eighteen Latin American countries in the sample were liberal democracies, while three were electoral democracies and four were authoritarian regimes. By 1995, only six were liberal democracies and none were authoritarian regimes, while the number of electoral democracies had risen to twelve. By 2005, however, the number of liberal democracies had returned almost to its 1985 level, while eight countries remained electoral democracies.96

96 More exactly, seven remained electoral democracies, while one (Ecuador) declined from a liberal democracy in 1995 to an electoral democracy in 2005.
Table 4.3: Freedom House Scores and Democratic Status
For those countries that were not classified by 1985 as democracies in Table 4.2, the year of democratic transition is included. Note however several coding discrepancies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2,2 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>2,3 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>2,2 - Liberal Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>2,3 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>2,4 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>3,3 - Electoral Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3,2 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>2,4 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>2,2 - Liberal Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile (1989-)</td>
<td>6,5 - Authoritarian</td>
<td>2,2 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>1,1 - Liberal Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2,3 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>4,4 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>3,3 - Electoral Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1,1 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>1,2 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>1,1 - Liberal Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1,3 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>4,3 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>2,2 - Liberal Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2,3 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>2,3 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>3,3 - Electoral Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2,4 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>3,3 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>2,3 - Liberal Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>4,4 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>4,5 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>4,4 - Electoral Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2,3 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>3,3 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>3,3 - Electoral Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>4,4 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>4,4 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>2,2 - Liberal Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>5,5 - Authoritarian</td>
<td>4,4 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>3,3 - Electoral Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>6,3 - Authoritarian</td>
<td>2,3 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>1,2 - Liberal Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>5,5 - Authoritarian</td>
<td>4,3 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>3,3 - Electoral Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru (1980-1992; 2001-)</td>
<td>2,3 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>5,4 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>2,3 - Liberal Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay (1985-)</td>
<td>2,2 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>2,2 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>1,1 - Liberal Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1,2 - Liberal Democracy</td>
<td>3,3 - Electoral Democracy</td>
<td>4,4 - Electoral Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>11 Liberal Democracies</td>
<td>6 Liberal Democracies</td>
<td>10 Liberal Democracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Electoral Democracies</td>
<td>12 Electoral Democracies</td>
<td>8 Electoral Democracies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Authoritarian Regimes</td>
<td>No Authoritarian Regimes</td>
<td>No Authoritarian Regimes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

97 Where democratic classifications differ (see Table 4.2), the earliest year is used.
98 Diamond et al. (1999) use Freedom House Scores for Political Rights and Civil Liberties to classify countries as "liberal democracies" (Freedom Score = 2 to 5); "electoral democracies (and pseudodemocracies)" (6 to 9); and "authoritarian" (10 to 14). However, they focus on data for the years 1987, 1993, and 1997. This table reports scores from Freedom House for the years 1985, 1995, and 2005 because 1995 is the year used as a cut-off for data in the CDEI data used here (elections included were those in 1995 or closest to that year, but not after). The years 1985 and 2005 are ten years before and after, and 1985 falls several years after the democratic transitions in most of the Third Wave countries studied here.
99 This year covers the period November 1984 to November 1985.
100 Diamond et al. 1999 (62) suggests a similar trend in the decline of liberal for electoral democracies between 1987 and 1993.
Table 4.4: Countries by Democratic Status
(Based on Diamond et al. 1999, Table 1.3)\(^{101}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985(^{102})</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberal Democracies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Score of 2</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Score of 3-4</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Score of 5</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Electoral Democracies (and Pseudodemocracies)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Score of 6-7</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Score of 8-9</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Authoritarian Regimes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Score of 10-14</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In these terms, the most consolidated democracies in the sense of the acceptance of democratic norms are those rated “liberal democracies” throughout the periods of study – Argentina, Costa Rica, and Uruguay. Among these, only Costa Rica also ranks among the most consolidated countries in terms of democratic survival. By contrast, the

\(^{101}\) Based on data presented in Table 4.3.
\(^{102}\) This year covers the period November 1984 to November 1985.
other long-term democracies, Colombia and Venezuela, remained formally democratic throughout the period (i.e. they continued to hold elections), but experienced clear declines in democratic status – falling from a ranking as liberal democracies to one of electoral democracies between the 1980s and 1990s. This suggests that, with the exception of Costa Rica, all of the Latin American countries summarized here are emerging democracies (as opposed to fully consolidated democracies) during the period of study. Thus, the theory and framework might be evaluated against all of these cases, but failure to explain Costa Rica would be less problematic to the argument than failure to explain the other cases.

Finally, we might consider the degree of party system institutionalization, drawing on Mainwaring and Scully (1995). A party system, in their definition, is “the set of patterned interactions in the competition among parties” (4). Because parties play such a vital role in democracies, very weakly-institutionalized party systems should be a sign of “emerging” as opposed to “fully consolidated” democracies. (However, the presence of an institutionalized party system clearly does not mean that a country must be a consolidated democracy. Many of the party systems in the region have roots well before democratization. For instance, Mexico has been an electoral democracy only since the 1990s, but its former ruling party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional—PRI), was founded in 1929, and the incumbent National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional—PAN) was founded ten years later.103

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103 The PRI was founded in 1929 as the National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario) and adopted its current name in 1946.
An institutionalized party system, according to Mainwaring and Scully meets four criteria: it exhibits stable patterns of party competition; it has stable roots in society; it is considered legitimate by the major political actors; and it is made up of parties with strong organizations, not subordinated to the interests of particular leaders (5). They classify party systems, ranging from “institutionalized” to “hegemonic” to “inchoate,” on the basis of these four criteria. The first criteria, which can be assessed using Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility, is easily determined and compared across countries. The other three require more information, including analysis of the linkages among parties, citizens, and interest groups; survey data or expert evaluation of the degree of party system legitimacy; and data on party organizations across countries (9-17).

**Table 4.5: Party System Institutionalization**
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutionalized</th>
<th>Hegemonic</th>
<th>Inchoate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td></td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using this approach, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) classify twelve of the countries in our sample. As shown in Table 4.5, with the exception of Brazil, the most weakly-institutionalized party systems have been in the Andes – Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. In the intermediate, “hegemonic” category, Mexico and Paraguay have had more institutionalized party systems. The most institutionalized party systems include the three longest-running electoral democracies in Latin America, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela. The group has also included Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay – the other

---

104 They also note that “institutionalization” is in fact a continuous variable (see p. 17).
Southern Cone countries in their sample (with the exceptions of Brazil and Paraguay).

Taken together, these data support a "universe of emerging democracy cases" in Latin America, with the exception of Costa Rica. Data on aspects of democratic consolidation suggest that the theory might be least likely to apply in some of the more consolidated countries (by different measures): Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

**Constructivist Dataset on Ethnicity and Institutions (CDEI)**

This chapter presents data from the Constructivist Dataset on Ethnicity and Institutions (CDEI 2005), including variables added to the core dataset for this project (Chandra 2005). The CDEI 2005 includes data on all parties in electoral democracies that competed in legislative lower house elections in 1996 or closest to that year but not after. The original purpose of the dataset was to classify all parties that competed in these elections as ethnic, multi-ethnic, or non-ethnic based on the presence or absence of central and explicit party appeals to ethnic groups during the election campaign. In other words, a party was classified as "ethnic," for instance, only if it made a central and explicit appeal to an ethnic group in its campaign statements. Although broadly similar to coding based on party manifestos, this approach focuses instead on topics stressed in

---

105 A handful of countries, including Colombia and Ecuador, were dropped from the CDEI 2005 because of problems in obtaining data, particularly on vote shares. No data were collected on Ecuador and it is thus dropped from the sample here as recreating the coding done for the project (multiple rounds, several coders) was infeasible. For Colombia, data were collected and analyzed, but then dropped from the CDEI 2005 sample because only data on seat totals (rather than vote shares) were available. Data on vote shares was later obtained in the research for this dissertation and thus Colombia is included here.

128
public statements at the national level during electoral campaigns. Manifestos, which are geared towards political elites rather than average voters, tend to be much wider in their coverage, touching on many topics that are not stressed in public statements. In addition, they tend to be less sensitive to changes in party messages over time and across elections.

Each party was first classified by its name based on a list of terms described in the coding protocol (see Chandra 2004b). Parties were then classified by platform based on a review of secondary sources and on news articles on each election from local and international sources. To ensure inter-coder reliability, different coders coded each file in three rounds of coding. Results were checked and summarized in a final round.

As part of this dissertation, additional variables were added to the CDEI to classify (1) all parties as economic, multi-economic, or non-economic based on their central and explicit appeals to economic groups (i.e., in an analogous way to ethnic parties) and (2) the types of issues (economic, political, cultural, and/or other) stressed by each party. The coding protocols for both of these sets of variables are included under Appendices A and B (Gisselquist and Chandra 2004a and 2004b).

Based on the preliminary results, an additional variable was added for leftist class-mobilizing parties. This was done for two reasons. First, among all the types of economic groups appealed to by economic-mobilizing parties in the sample, the working

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106 Preliminary coding for economic parties and issues was completed for Latin America (August 2004). Preliminary economic party coding was also completed for Africa (January 2006). Coding is “preliminary” because it was added in the last round and has not yet been thoroughly checked according to project procedures.
class and poor (appealed to on a leftist basis) were the largest. Other economic groups represented included business interests, the agricultural sector, the middle class, and the poor from a non-leftist standpoint. Thus, the data showed leftist parties to be empirically interesting and an especially important subset of economic-mobilizing parties.

The second reason was that review of the files suggested that explicit appeals to dominant economic groups were more difficult to advance politically than leftist appeals to non-dominant class groups. For instance, the platforms of many parties could have been construed as favoring “business interests” because of the policies supported by the parties. However, few parties appealed explicitly and centrally to “business” as a group. Those that did so often hid the centrality of their group-based appeal to business by appealing also to other groups, such as the poor and working class. The platform of Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) in Bolivia’s 1993 election provides one example. While championing neo-liberal reform and garnering support from business interests on the basis of its economic policies, the MNR also explicitly highlighted social safety net programs, appealing directly to the poor and working class from a non-leftist standpoint.

Thus, appeals to non-leftist economic groups were especially “muddy” in the data — not for lack of information, but because the appeals themselves were purposefully ambiguous. Although the data suggest that this “muddiness” is also characteristic of ethnic-mobilizing parties in some places (e.g., in Africa), it is not generally characteristic of ethnic-mobilizing parties in Latin America. However, as described in Chapter 5, there
is some evidence that parties with bases among dominant ethnic groups (e.g., the non-
indigenous in Bolivia in the 2005 elections) may try to obscure their core constituencies
in a similar way. Thus, the data suggested that the most comparable categories were
ethnic-mobilizing parties (especially those representing non-dominant groups like the
indigenous) and class-mobilizing leftist parties. The analysis presented in this chapter
thus focuses on these categories, although some data on economic-mobilizing parties is
also presented.

Without going into the specifics of the coding procedures (see Appendices A and
B), there are several key points to highlight in reference to the Latin American data.
First, as Chapter 2 notes, parties were classified based on their explicit appeals during
elections to ethnic and/or economic groups. Thus, classifications naturally differ in some
cases from those in other studies, which are based on ideology and manifestos, support
base, leadership, issue positions, or implicit appeals. To emphasize this distinction, this
dissertation refers to parties that appeal to ethnic groups as “ethnic-mobilizing” and those
that appeal to economic groups as “economic-mobilizing.” Other work using the CDEI
does not adopt this terminology (e.g., Chandra 2004b; Chandra et al. 2005). Although
the explicitness criterion may seem problematic at first glance (e.g., excluding
consideration of more subtle appeals), work on the broader dataset, which includes data
on one hundred countries around the world, suggests that it is not for this set of cases.
The explicitness criterion is most problematic in countries where there are norms or even
laws against explicit ethnic appeals. This is a problem in sub-Saharan Africa, where
ethnic politics are generally seen as a negative outcome and are associated with political
division and violence. This was not generally the case in Latin America in the early 1990s (see Birnir 2007).

The particular benefit of focusing on explicit appeals, as argued in Chapter 2, is that it addresses questions of multiple and overlapping identities by allowing actors within the system (i.e., party elites) to label and name themselves, rather than relying on an outside coder’s classification. This is particularly important in this project because the overlap of groups is so central. Comparisons between several different classification schemes are explored in more depth for the Bolivian case in Chapter 5.

Second, the coding of each party is done with the assumption that parties can appeal to multiple groups – including various ethnic and economic ones, as well as to other types of groups, such as to women or to youth, although these latter appeals are not recorded in the dataset. This means that parties may be classified, for instance, as both ethnic- and economic-mobilizing or that they might mobilize several ethnic groups. Consistent with Horowitz (1985), a party is only classified as multiethnic or multieconomic if it mobilizes all relevant ethnic groups along a particular cleavage dimension – such as all races or religious groups. As the CDEI coding protocol explains (Chandra 2004), parties are thus coded because of the fluidity of ethnic categories and labels in the sense that most “single” groups can in fact also be described in terms of various component groups and vice versa. The category “indigenous” provides one simple example of this point: “indigenous” in one sense might be

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107 Some other work (e.g., Van Cott 2005) labels parties “multiethnic” if they simply mobilize several different groups.
considered a single ethnic group, while in another instance they can be seen to be composed of numerous groups (Maya, Quechua, Mapuche, etc.). A multiethnic party like the African National Congress, by contrast, appeals to all relevant ethnic groups (in this case, “white,” “African,” “Asian,” and “Coloured”).

Third, the CDEI purposely focuses on appeals in particular campaigns, allowing for variation over time in party platforms. (This is another reason that CDEI classifications may differ from those in other studies, which tend to weight more heavily a party’s history.) Because of its time sensitive focus, the CDEI is completed only for one time period and provides a snapshot in time of parties and elections during that period. Most of the elections studied in the CDEI in Latin America occurred in 1993 or 1994, with dates ranging from February 1990 (Nicaragua) to November 1995 (Guatemala) (see Table 4.6).

Table 4.6: Timeline of Elections in the CDEI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25-Feb-90</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-May-93</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-June-93</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-Nov-93</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-Dec-93</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-Dec-93</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-Feb-94</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-Mar-94</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-Mar-94</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-May-94</td>
<td>Panama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-May-94</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-Aug-94</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Oct-94</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-Nov-94</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-Apr-95</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-May-95</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12-Nov-95</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.7: Description of CDEI Coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year of Election Studied</th>
<th>Percentage of the Vote Coded</th>
<th>Largest Vote Share Possible for a Party that is Not Coded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>90.5%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>99.0%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>[not included]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>98.3%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>99.8%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>95.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>95.2%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>99.8%</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7 summarizes the election years covered for each country and the extent of the party coverage. Of the eighteen countries in the Latin American sample, one (Ecuador) is not coded in the CDEI because of missing data.\textsuperscript{111} It is revisited in Chapter 7 using other data. Over 90 percent of the vote is coded in all sixteen countries and over 95 percent in all but three. The country with the lowest share of the vote coded is Colombia.\textsuperscript{112} In terms of individual parties, the highest possible vote share for an uncoded party is estimated at 4.8 percent in Paraguay, followed by 4.5 percent in

\textsuperscript{108} Based on CDEI 2005 data.
\textsuperscript{109} Certainty estimates range from 1 to 3. This figure includes all coded parties, including those coded with "low" certainty.
\textsuperscript{110} The lower share of coded vote for Colombia is because vote share data was not initially available and so smaller parties were not fully investigated in CDEI 2005.
\textsuperscript{111} Another option would have been to approximate classifications similar to the CDEI's for this chapter. I do not do that in this chapter in order to remain faithful to the coding procedures used in the CDEI.
\textsuperscript{112} This is most likely because vote share data was not initially available for Colombia and so smaller parties were not fully investigated in CDEI 2005.
Nicaragua. Thus, the CDEI is a generally good source on major parties and electoral divisions – i.e., what we are most interested in for this project – and a reasonably good source on minor parties.\textsuperscript{113}

Even with the exclusion of Ecuador, the CDEI covers more countries and parties than almost any other comparative study on Latin American party systems, with the exception of Alcántara Sáez and Freidenberg (2001), which covers all eighteen countries. Their study, however, is limited to major or established parties in roughly the late 1990s, not including many of the minor and new parties that existed in the early and mid 1990s, or in the 2000s. For instance, their coverage of Bolivia looks only at the National Democratic Action party (Acción Democrática Nacionalista—ADN), the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario—MNR), the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionario—MIR), and the Civic Solidarity Union (Unidad Civica Solidaridad—UCS). It does not cover any of the ethnic-mobilizing parties described in Chapter 5, most of which were minor parties and not active by the time that Alcántara Sáez and Freidenberg’s study was published. Similarly, Peru’s coverage looks only at the Peruvian Aprista Party (Partido Aprista Peruano—PAP) and Change ‘90 (Cambio ‘90), but not at the numerous smaller and less established parties active in Peru.

Table 4.8 compares the sample of countries covered in the CDEI with that in six often-cited comparative studies on Latin American parties, democracy, and ethnic

\textsuperscript{113} The CDEI also includes certainty codings for each platform classification (ethnic, economic, and issue). Certainty codings are based on the number of articles used in the coding and the coder’s assessment of their quality and range from 1 (low certainty) to 3 (high certainty).
politics. In addition to Alcántara Sáez and Freidenberg (2001), this includes Mainwaring and Scully (1995), which covers twelve countries; Diamond et al. (1999), which covers nine countries; Coppedge (1998), which covers eleven countries; Van Cott (2005), which covers six countries; and the surveys from Seligson’s “Latin American Public Opinion Project,” which provide impressive coverage of public opinion in sixteen Latin American countries (among others), but do not focus on parties.

**Table 4.8: Research on Latin American Parties and Democracy – Countries Studied in the CDEI and in Other Work**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country Coverage</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>12 countries</strong></td>
<td><strong>9 countries</strong></td>
<td><strong>11 countries</strong></td>
<td><strong>18 countries</strong></td>
<td><strong>6 countries</strong></td>
<td><strong>16 countries</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Basic Facts: Institutions and Demographics

All of the eighteen Latin American democracies are institutionally similar in the sense of having presidential systems (see Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). In terms of legislatures, ten countries have bicameral systems and eight unicameral systems (see Table 4.9). The most recent institutional change in this respect was in Peru, which switched from a bicameral to a unicameral system in 1995.

Table 4.9: Form of Government – Legislative Branch
(All are presidential democracies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bicameral</th>
<th>Unicameral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina, 1983-</td>
<td>Costa Rica, 1953-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia, 1985-</td>
<td>Ecuador, 1978-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil, 1986-</td>
<td>El Salvador, 1984-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile, 1989-</td>
<td>Guatemala, 1985-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia, 1974-</td>
<td>Honduras, 1981-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic, 1978-</td>
<td>Nicaragua, 1984-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico, 1994-</td>
<td>Panama, 1989-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay, 1993-</td>
<td>Peru, 1995-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay, 1966-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela, 1958-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In presidential elections, ten countries adopt a system based on absolute majority, three require a plurality of at least 40 or 45 percent, and the remaining five adopt plurality (see Table 4.10). In the first two of these cases, if no candidate wins the requisite percentage of the vote in the first round, the president is elected through some form of runoff between the two top candidates. Winning presidential candidates tend to win less

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114 Thus, although the CDEI focuses on legislative campaigns, these campaigns tend to be strongly influenced by presidential politics, in terms of candidates and platforms. This clearly reflected in the CDEI data where national presidential and legislative electoral platforms are often indistinguishable – perhaps unsurprising given the simultaneous holding of presidential and legislative elections in the majority of countries (with the exception of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Venezuela).

115 Based on Jones 1994 (Table 1, p. 7).
than a majority of the vote. During first round elections, there were about 3.7 "effective" presidential candidates on average across countries.

Table 4.10: Presidential Electoral Systems
(from Nohlen 2005, II-21 (Table 5) and II-27 (Table 7))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Electoral System</th>
<th>Effects of Electoral System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simultaneous presidential and parliamentary</td>
<td>Effective number of presidential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elections?</td>
<td>candidates (1st round)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required majority</td>
<td>Votes for the first place candidate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further procedure</td>
<td>(average)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentine</td>
<td>Runoff (1995, 1999) 49.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality of 45%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivian</td>
<td>5.01 (1980-97) 31.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute majority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3.62 (1982-98) 45.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute majority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2.36 (1989-99) 53.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute majority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2.79 (1994, 1998) 40.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute majority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2.17 (1978-98) 51.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality of 40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.R.</td>
<td>2.87 (1996, 2000) 45.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute majority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>4.10 (1998) 34.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute majority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2.81 (1984-99) 49.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute majority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>4.33 (1985-99) 37.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute majority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2.15 (1981-97) 51.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2.50 (1984-2000) 54.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2.47 (1996) 51.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality of 40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>2.78 (1989-99) 49.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2.18 (1989-98) 57.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2.80 (1985-2000) 50.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute majority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>3.30 (1999) 40.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute majority</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>2.73 (1978-2000) 48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plurality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Runoff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

116 In Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru, however, candidates tended to win with a slight majority.

117 The highest number of effective first round candidates was in Bolivia (about 5), followed by Guatemala and Ecuador (about 4 each). The lowest effective numbers of candidates were in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Paraguay, each with just over 2 effective candidates.

118 When there are multiple systems, the most recent is given along with relevant years in parentheses under the effective number of parties. If this does not include elections in the early 1990s (i.e., the period covered in the CDEI), relevant information is included in a footnote. Nohlen 2005, Table 7, includes values for all years.

119 "40% if there is a difference of at least ten percentage points between the two strongest candidates."

120 Runoff between two strongest candidates

121 In elections during 1978-96 (under a majority with runoff system), the effective number of presidential candidates was 5.15 and the average votes for the first place candidate was 28.0%

122 "Except mid-term elections."

123 In 1990 (under a plurality system), values were 2.14 and 54.7 percent respectively.

124 In 1984-94 elections (under a plurality system), values were 3.23 and 37.5 percent respectively.
Table 4.11: Legislative Electoral System (Lower House)
(from Nohlen 2005: 27, 30-32)\textsuperscript{125}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Elected Seats</th>
<th>Electoral Formula</th>
<th>Effective Number of Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>PR in MMC</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>d’Hondt; legal threshold: 3% constituency level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Mixed-member PR\textsuperscript{127}</td>
<td>130\textsuperscript{128}</td>
<td>d’Hondt; legal threshold: 3% nationwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>PR in MMC</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>Hare quota, greatest average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Binominal system</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>Plurality list gets the 1\textsuperscript{st} seat, and the 2\textsuperscript{nd}, only if it doubles the vote share of the second best list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>PR in MMC</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>D’Hondt; legal threshold; 50% of the Hare quota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>PR in MMC</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Hare quota, largest remainder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>PR in MMC</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>PR in MMC</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>PR in MMC</td>
<td>84\textsuperscript{132}</td>
<td>Hare quota, largest remainder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>PR in MMC</td>
<td>158\textsuperscript{133}</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>PR in MMC</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>Hare quota, largest remainder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Hybrid system</td>
<td>500\textsuperscript{134}</td>
<td>Plurality threshold: 2% nationwide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Pure PR</td>
<td>90\textsuperscript{135}</td>
<td>At both levels: Hare quota, largest remainder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>PR in MMC</td>
<td>71\textsuperscript{137}</td>
<td>Plurality; PR in three stages: Hare quota, half Hare quota and highest number of personal votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>PR in MMC</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Pure PR</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{125} When there are multiple systems, the most recent is used. Relevant years are given in parentheses under the effective number of parties. If this does not include elections in the early 1990s, relevant information is included in a footnote. Nohlen 2005, Table 7, includes values for all years.
\textsuperscript{126} 2.70 (1983, 1989).
\textsuperscript{127} Since 1997.
\textsuperscript{128} 68 by PR, 62 by majority.
\textsuperscript{129} 2.33 (1978-90).
\textsuperscript{130} 2.43 (1978-94).
\textsuperscript{131} 5.69 (1978-96).
\textsuperscript{132} 64, 20
\textsuperscript{133} 127, 31
\textsuperscript{134} 300, 200
\textsuperscript{135} 70, 20
\textsuperscript{136} 2.05 (1990)
\textsuperscript{137} 26, 45
\textsuperscript{138} 3.18 (1984-94).
\textsuperscript{139} 105, 98
Looking at legislative elections as described in Table 4.11, sixteen countries adopt some form of proportional representation (although electoral formulas vary). The two exceptions, Chile and Mexico, adopt a binomial system and a hybrid system, respectively. The effective number of parties ranges from an average of just over two in Honduras and Paraguay to about five in Bolivia and Chile, and almost seven in Brazil.

In economic terms, the region exhibits considerable diversity, both within and across countries. In 1995, the poorest countries were Nicaragua and Bolivia, with GDP per capita values of less than $2000 per year ($1,217 and $1,831, respectively).\footnote{Values are real GDP per capita in 1985 prices, taken from the “LEVEL” variable in 1995 in Przeworski et al. 2004.} In the wealthiest country, Venezuela, GDP per capita ($6,729) was more than five times as much as Nicaragua’s and almost twice the regional average of $3,567. Within countries, measures of inequality are among the highest in the world, roughly on par with sub-Saharan Africa, and considerably greater than in other regions, including Eastern Europe and Asia. Latin America’s average Gini coefficient in 1995 was estimated at 51.34. By comparison, Sweden was about half as unequal at 25.67 and the U.S. in the middle at 39.55. Over half of the countries in the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Paraguay) had Gini coefficients over 50.
Table 4.12: Basic Facts
Early 1990s (time period of CDEI), if available.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>29.45</td>
<td>$5,852</td>
<td>51.00</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>&lt; 2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>8.06</td>
<td>$1,831</td>
<td>48.30</td>
<td>0.740</td>
<td>60-70 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>156.41</td>
<td>$4,307</td>
<td>58.41</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>&lt; 1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>13.77</td>
<td>$5,834</td>
<td>56.25</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>4-6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>33.95</td>
<td>$3,766</td>
<td>58.46</td>
<td>0.601</td>
<td>&lt; 2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>$3,805</td>
<td>46.11</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>&lt; 1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.R.</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>$2,400</td>
<td>47.36</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>&lt;1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td>$2,890</td>
<td>40.65</td>
<td>0.655</td>
<td>&lt; 2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2.46</td>
<td>$2,130</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>&lt; 2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>8.69</td>
<td>$2,357</td>
<td>57.06</td>
<td>0.512</td>
<td>45-60 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>$1,385</td>
<td>55.25</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>2-3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>91.21</td>
<td>$5,919</td>
<td>55.86</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>12-14 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>$1,217</td>
<td>51.35</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>&lt; 2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>$3,485</td>
<td>55.91</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td>4-8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>$2,269</td>
<td>59.00</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>22.74</td>
<td>$2,574</td>
<td>45.36</td>
<td>0.657</td>
<td>38-40 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>$5,459</td>
<td>43.65</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>20.71</td>
<td>$6,729</td>
<td>44.26</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>&lt; 2 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, the region exhibits considerable ethnic diversity, despite its reputation to the contrary. In terms of ethnic fractionalization, Alesina et al. (2002)'s figures show that most Latin American countries are not so different from countries in other regions where ethnic conflict has received much more attention (see Table 4.12). The most fractionalized Latin American country, Bolivia, has roughly the same fractionalization

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141 World Bank
142 D&D update, August 2, 2004, real GDP per capita 1985 prices. LEVEL.
144 Estimate based on information in the Political Handbook of the World: “About 70 percent of the population is of mixed ancestry, both mestizo and mulatto, with small minorities (about 15 percent each) of pure Caucasian (Spanish) and Negro origin.”
value as South Africa (0.740 and 0.752). Peru’s and Ecuador’s values (0.657 and 0.655) are similar to Malawi’s (0.674). Venezuela is roughly as diverse as the U.S. (0.497 and 0.490). And, Colombia is slightly more fractionalized than Malaysia (0.601 compared to 0.588). These figures also mask some diversity: for instance, although Paraguay’s ethnic fractionalization value is only 0.169 (because 91 percent of the population is mestizo), if we were to look at linguistic fractionalization (also from Alesina et al. 2002), Paraguay, like Colombia, is slightly more “fractionalized” than Malaysia (0.598 compared to 0.588). Furthermore, according to these data, the indigenous population during the period of study made up over 40 percent the population in three countries (Bolivia, Guatemala, and Peru), over 10 percent in Mexico, and roughly 5 percent in Chile and Panama. In Paraguay, although only 2 percent of the population is classified as indigenous, some 40 percent of the population speaks Guarani.

As Chapter 2 underscores, although used here for simplicity, the figures cited in the previous paragraph clearly depend on how ethnic groups are defined and categorized, definitions that are not “objective” and that differ across countries. This is true even if we use national census figures, which do not measure “indigenous” in the same way across countries (see Morning 2005; Stavenhagen 2004). To take one simple example, in Mexico, as noted, Alesina et al. (2002) count about 10 percent of the population as “indigenous.” Yashar (2005)’s figures for 1978-1991 give the indigenous population as 12-14 percent. According to the UNDP (2004b), 30 percent of the population was
“indigenous” circa 2000. Other data in the same UNDP report estimates the “indigenous” population in 1993-2000 as between 9.5 and 14.7 percent. According to the Mexican Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia (1987), about 7.8 percent of the population was “indigenous” in the late 1980s, ranging from a low of less than 0.1 percent in the state of Zacatecas to a high of about 46 percent in Yucatán. Classifications based on cultural criteria, such as being “culturally” indigenous, give even lower estimates of 2-5 percent. Only some of the variation in these figures can possibly be due to the different time periods of study; clearly, “indigenous” is a label applied to different groups, defined in different ways – ambiguity that can be exploited by identity entrepreneurs.

**Variation in the Ethnic and Class-Mobilizing Leftist Vote in the Early 1990s**

Despite the emergence of several major ethnic social movements in the region during this period and the worldwide focus on ethnic politics, the ethnic vote (i.e., the vote going to ethnic-mobilizing parties) was relatively low across Latin American countries. There were no ethnic-mobilizing parties in thirteen of the seventeen countries studied and only eight ethnic-mobilizing parties in all countries. (Several difficult codings are discussed below.) Across countries, the average total ethnic vote

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145 Table 120 (p. 180), which cites the following sources: Infoplease.com (2003); Torres (2001: 94, Table 2); Bello and Rangel (2002: 50); Inter-American Dialogue (2003: 1). This table classifies the populations of each Latin American country as “white,” “mestizo,” “indigenous,” “afrodescendant,” and “other.”

146 Table 121 (p. 181). The table cites the following sources: Matos Mar (1993: 232-33, Tables 1 and 2); Meentzen (2002: 12, Table 1); Proyecto Estado de la Nación en Desarrollo Humano Sostenible (2002b: 13); UN, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2001, 2002).


148 For the analysis here, the name and/or platform give the classification. If there is a discrepancy, the platform coding is used.
was about 6.4 percent, and the average support per ethnic-mobilizing party about 6.6 percent – both figures with large variation. On the other hand, support for economic-mobilizing parties averaged just under 50 percent across countries. About half of this vote went to class-mobilizing (“leftist”) parties. The rest was captured by parties appealing to various other economic groups – including the poor and/or working class in non-leftist terms, the agricultural sector, and the business community. In terms of parties, average vote shares for both economic-mobilizing and class-mobilizing parties were similar at 13 and 10.6 percent respectively (and higher than the 6.6 percent average for ethnic-mobilizing parties). These averages also were similar to the average support for all parties in Latin America, which was about 11 percent. 149

Table 4.13: Ethnic, Economic, and Class Vote in Each Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Election</th>
<th>“Ethnic” Vote</th>
<th>“Economic” Vote</th>
<th>“Leftist” Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>14-May-95</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>6-June-93</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1-Oct-94</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>11-Dec-93</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>13-Mar-94</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>6-Feb-94</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>94.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.R.</td>
<td>16-May-94</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>20-Mar-94</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>12-Nov-95</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>28-Nov-93</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>21-Aug-94</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>99.2%</td>
<td>68.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>25-Feb-90</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
<td>40.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>8-May-94</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>9-May-93</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>9-Apr-95</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>27-Nov-94</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>5-Dec-93</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

149 By comparison, the world average was about 6.7 percent for all countries in the CDEI.
150 53.70% if the MNR-MRTKL is included based on the MRTKL coding.
151 9.23% if the MNR-MRTKL is included.
By contrast, the total national vote for economic-mobilizing parties averaged 46 percent, with 25 percent going to leftist parties. Leftist parties achieved the greatest vote shares in the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Nicaragua, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Lowest support was in Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Colombia, and Peru. Aggregate figures for each country are presented in Table 4.13.

Looking more closely at the data, we can see that support for ethnic-mobilizing parties ranged from no support in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 152 Panama, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, to highs of 42.9 percent in Guatemala and 18.1 percent in Bolivia. Between these two extremes were small ethnic constituencies in Peru (4.4 percent) and Costa Rica (1.2 percent). In terms of the leftist class-mobilizing vote, nine countries had numbers below 10 percent: Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, and Paraguay, each with none; Colombia and Peru at 3.0 percent; Bolivia at 8.5 percent; and Guatemala at 9.1 percent. The strongest support for parties mobilizing class groups in leftist terms was in Mexico (68.3 percent), Brazil (64.5 percent), Chile (63.2 percent), the Dominican Republic (57.7 percent), and Nicaragua (40.8 percent). A listing of parties and their classifications is included in Appendix C.

The highest ethnic-mobilizing vote in the sample went to Guatemala (42.9 percent), where this vote was due to three parties, the Guatemalan Republican Front (Frente Republicana Guatemalteca—FRG), which placed second in the polls with 21

152 This case is discussed further below.
percent; the National Alliance (Alianza Nacional—AN), 12.8 percent; and the New Guatemala Democratic Front (Frente Democrático Nuevo Guatemala—FDNG), 9.1 percent. The classification of the FRG, the party of ex-Guatemalan dictator General Efrain Rios Montt (1982-83), as an “ethnic party” clearly would be challenged by many observers for two key reasons. First, it is by no means an indigenous party as they are often thought of (see Madrid 2005: 702, fn. 21). Indeed, widespread human rights abuses, including massacres of Indian villages, were conducted during the presidency of FRG leader “el General” Rios Montt in 1982-83. Second, and related, the FRG’s central and explicit “ethnic” appeal – the reason for its ethnic classification – was to a religious group, Evangelical Protestants, which make up about 20 percent of the Guatemalan population (Europa 1996). According to one report, “Rios Montt’s image was a cross between Billy Graham and Atila the Hun,” and the FRG emphasized to voters Christian fundamentalism along with the need for law and order.

However, although classifying the FRG as an ethnic-mobilizing party fits uneasily with some work on ethnic politics, the CDEI data shows that this classification is indeed consistent with many standard constructivist definitions of “ethnic”. If we consistently apply the definition outlined in Chapter 2, evangelical Protestants in Guatemala are an ethnic category and there is no reason that a party associated with horrific crimes against indigenous communities cannot also be, on that basis, an ethnic-mobilizing party. To the extent that this stretches too far some conceptions of ethnicity, the classification of the

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153 In addition to his explicit appeal, Rios Montt also had support among indigenous voters (see Madrid 2005: 702). According to the Agence France Presse (11/12/95), his anti-crime, anti-corruption message resonated with the urban middle class and “in rural areas and heavily indigenous towns such as Chichicastenango... where many residents are fed up with street crime, kidnappings and violence.”

154 The Vancouver Sun, 11/13/95.
FRG highlights how the definition employed here differs from these conceptions.\textsuperscript{155}

However, because religious and regional categories are excluded from some constructivist definitions of ethnicity, the discussion below also includes analysis with and without the FRG and other parties that appeal to these types of groups. Excluding the FRG, Guatemala’s ethnic vote, is about 22 percent.

The second two ethnic-mobilizing parties in Guatemala, the AN and the FDNG, fit more closely with how we often think of ethnic parties in the region. The emphasis on ethnicity by both parties can also be tied to a platform favoring the consolidation of peace, democratic reform, and the redress of human rights abuses, especially those committed against indigenous Mayan communities. In the case of the centrist AN (an alliance of three parties), the platform of the party and its presidential candidate Fernando Andrade stressed assurances that the nation was multiethnic, multicultural, and multilingual and that Andrade’s administration would support the rights and identities of indigenous peoples. The newly-formed FDNG, “a fractious coalition of labor unions, Maya Indian groups and supporters of leftist insurgents,” similarly stressed political opening, participatory democracy, and reforms to address the rights and identities of indigenous (and particularly Mayan) communities.\textsuperscript{156} Unlike the AN, the FDNG was also closer to how many people think of indigenous parties – i.e., it had an ethnic (Maya) support base;\textsuperscript{157} it supported political and cultural issues for the indigenous (including agrarian reform); and its leaders, many of them of indigenous ancestry, emerged from the

\textsuperscript{155} Rather than an error in coding, it also suggests the possible need to refine the definition of ethnicity in constructivist and instrumentalist work if the purpose is to fit with common language understandings (see Fearon and Laitin 200b; for an alternative view, see Chandra 2006).

\textsuperscript{156} The Gazette [Montreal], 11/14/95.

\textsuperscript{157} Latin American Regional Reports, 10/5/95.
political left. Appealing explicitly to “the Mayan people,” as well as to peasants, unions, women, university students and professionals, the FDNG’s presidential candidate Jorge Luis González del Valle described the centrality of the party’s ethnic appeal thus: “[t]he hope of a democratic left is reemerging, but with a new ingredient: the participation of the Mayan people. That is what gives this alliance strength.” The FDNG in fact also represented the only leftist party in Guatemala’s 1995 election. Given the long-term repression of the left, González was the country’s first leftist presidential candidate in half a century.

The second highest ethnic vote share among countries was in Bolivia (18.1 percent). In this case, the vote was due to four electoral coalitions or parties: the Consciousness of the Fatherland party (*Conciencia de Patria*—CONDEPA), 14.3 percent; the Bolivian Renovating Alliance (*Alianza de Renovación Boliviana*—ARBOL), 1.9 percent; the *Eje Patriótico* (Patriotic Eje), 1.1 percent; and the National Katarist Movement (*Movimiento Katarista Nacional*—MKN), 0.8 percent. The alliance of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement and the Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Movement—Liberation (*Movimiento Nationalista Revolucionario*—MNR and *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari-Liberación*—MRTKL), which won a plurality of 35.6 percent and the presidency, is also useful to note in this group. As shown in Table C.1, the MNR-MRTKL is classified by name as ethnic-mobilizing, but its platform is classified as non-ethnic, giving a non-ethnic overall coding. (The analysis in the rest of this chapter was conducted with and without the MNR-MRTKL counting as an ethnic-

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158 IPS, 11/10/95.
159 *Latin American Regional Reports*, 10/5/95.
mobilizing party. Overall, the claims in this chapter are supported in both cases, and notes are included when there were exceptions.)

Leaving aside the three minor groups, the MNR-MRTKL and Condepa are interesting in representing two other variants of pro-indigenous appeals. The MNR-MRTKL was also among the few electoral coalitions in the sample in which coding by name (ethnic) and coding by platform (non-ethnic) differed. However, if the two parties in the MNR-MRTKL coalition had been classified individually rather than together, it is clear that the minor party in the coalition, the MRTKL, would have been classified as an ethnic-mobilizing party. As detailed in Chapter 5, the MRTKL is one the main Katarista movement parties, representing a developed and explicit ethnic ideology (Katarism), led by indigenous leaders, and with an indigenous support base. The MNR-MRTKL coalition also ran the first indigenous vice-presidential candidate, Victor Hugo Cardenas, leader of the MRTKL, even though its overall platform was not explicitly ethnic. To the extent that the concerns of the much smaller MRTKL were reflected in the coalition’s platform, they were expressed generally in economic terms — e.g., through the incorporation of social safety net programs for the (largely indigenous) poor, working class, and rural areas (see Albó 1994).

Condepa, on the other hand, unlike the MNR was a new party, founded several years before the election. Its message, like that of the MRTKL, appealed to the indigenous, but it did not have a developed ethnic ideology like Katarism. Rather, it expressed a clearly populist position, involving a variety of ad hoc appeals to indigenous
voters by its charismatic leader Carlos Palenque, a media personality whose TV show was especially popular among Aymara migrants in La Paz. Party leaders also developed in their manifesto a position called “endogenism,” favoring endogenous development, in a variety of ways, including through the support of “endogenous” culture.

Despite the historic strength of the left in Bolivian politics, the leftist class-mobilizing parties were outstripped in this election by ethnic-mobilizing parties, winning just 8.5 percent of the vote. Chapter 5 shows that this was in fact a dip, which was preceded and followed by stronger showings. Although there is evidence that support for the left did decline, its overall strength in this election is masked by the fact that the largest leftist party active during this period, the centre-left Movement of the Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionario—MIR), ran as part of a coalition, the Patriotic Accord (Acuerdo Patriótico—AP). The AP, which won 21.05 percent, brought together four parties of various political stripes, including the rightwing National Democratic Action party (Acción Democrática Nacionalista—ADN), thus diluting any leftist elements of the coalition’s overall appeal. In this election, the leftist class-mobilizing vote came from four minor groups, the Free Bolivia Movement (Movimiento Bolivia Libre—MBL), 5.4 percent; the Revolutionary Vanguard of the 9th of April (Vanguardia Revolucionaria 9 de Abril—VR-9), 1.3 percent; and the United Left (Izquierda Unida), 1.0 percent; and the National Katarista Movement (Movimiento Katarista Nacional—MKN), 0.8 percent.

The two final countries with ethnic-mobilizing parties in the CDEI are Peru and
Costa Rica, one of whose minor parties appealed regionally to people from Cartago (Cartago Agricultural Action, *Acción Agrícola Cartaginense*, 1.2 percent). More significant is the Peruvian case, which in this election had two ethnic-mobilizing parties—the Democratic Coordination—Peru Viable Nation (*Coordinación Democrática*—Peru *Pais Posible*—CODE), 4.2 percent, and the very small Independent Incan Movement (*Movimiento Independiente Inca*), 0.2 percent. CODE-Pais Posible, a coalition of two parties, was the electoral vehicle through which future president Alejandro Toledo, an economist of indigenous background, first ran for that office. CODE was founded in 1992 by a dissident of one of Peru’s key traditional parties, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*—APRA), while Pais Posible was the group with which Toledo first entered the presidential race.

CODE-Pais Posible also was not an “indigenous party” in the sense employed by studies such as Van Cott (2005) and Birnir (2007). It supported neoliberal reform and did not emphasize issues such as traditional culture. Although Toledo sometimes adopted ethnic descriptions of himself, he reportedly also seemed to reject the “indigenous” or “cholo” label, which was applied to him in pejorative terms. Nevertheless, an ethnic appeal was central to CODE-Pais Posible’s message (and continued to be important in Toledo’s platform in later elections, as will be discussed in Chapter 7). Although not expressed in “traditional” terms, Toledo’s ethnicity was an important aspect of his popular appeal, giving rise to the nickname, “the Golden Cholo” (Schmidt 2000). In addition, his support base was perceived in ethnic terms: like President Alberto Fujimori, Toledo was not a member of the predominantly European and *mestizo* traditional

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160 Also known as Democratic Convergence (*Convergencia Democrática*).
Peruvian political elite, and thus was seen as Fujimori’s rival for the emerging cholo ("cholo emergente") vote.\textsuperscript{161} As Schmidt (2000) summarizes, Toledo was “a Peruvian Horatio Alger who had risen from tending sheep and shining shoes to become a professor at Peru’s leading business school after earning his doctorate at Stanford” and “during the campaign, he called on Peru’s indigenous population to put one of their own in the presidential palace” (107).

Peru’s leftist-mobilizing vote in this election was slightly less than its ethnic-mobilizing vote at 3 percent, coming from two minor parties. This low percentage masks somewhat the importance of class in this election. For instance, 24 percent of the vote is classified as economic-mobilizing, all of it going to parties appealing either to the poor or to agriculture. In addition, the group that placed first, Fujimori’s Change 90-New Majority (\textit{Cambio 90-Nueva Mayoria} –C90-NM) (52.10 percent), was strongly tied to Fujimori’s populist appeal.\textsuperscript{162} Although this appeal was not made in leftist terms, there was a clear undercurrent of class politics at play.

Finally, another country worth highlighting is Nicaragua, whose winning party, the National Opposition Union (\textit{Unión Nacional Opositora}—UNO), included among the key elements of its platform an explicit appeal to non-indigenous voters through a courting of indigenous support. Because Nicaragua’s indigenous population by all counts

\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Latin American Weekly Report}, 1/26/95.
\textsuperscript{162} Because the party also appealed to various other groups a group-based economic appeal was not judged central enough in this C90-NM’s platform to warrant an economic-mobilizing coding.
was relatively small (about 5 percent), the UNO clearly was not trying to win by winning indigenous voters; indeed, the UNO’s vote share of 54.7 percent was much larger than the size of the indigenous population. Nevertheless, it did stress support for indigenous voters, presenting an interesting variant on the use of ethnic appeals in elections.

The UNO, an alliance of fourteen parties, was founded in 1985 in opposition to the Sandinista Government. The 1990 elections followed the signing of the Tela agreement in August 1989, detailing the end of the conflict between the Sandinistas and the Contras. As in many of the other post-conflict elections in the sample, the most central issues in the campaign were peace and reconciliation, democratization, and economic recovery. Debate also centered on international (and especially U.S.) relations, and on peace with coastal Indian groups, who had been heavily involved in the conflict. The UNO included among its traditional supporters Miskito Indian opponents of the Sandinistas, and cemented its pro-indigenous appeal through the signing of the Yatama resolution, which addressed questions of rights, autonomy, and development for the Indians of the Atlantic Coast, including Miskito, Sumu, and Rama groups, and Creoles.

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163 Percentage is consistent with Yashar’s figure of 4.5 percent and Alesina et al. 2002’s figure of 5 percent of Amerindian.
164 The UNO included parties of various ideological stripes. The members were the National Conservative Party (Partido Conservador Nicaragüense--PCN), the Conservative Popular Alliance (Alianza Popular Conservadora--APC), Conservative National Action Party (Partido de Acción Nacional Conservadora--PANC), Independent Liberal Party (Partido Liberal Independiente--PLI), the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal--PL), Liberal Constitutionalist Party (Partido Liberal Constitucionalista--PLC), National Action Party (Partido de Acción Nacional--PAN), Nicaraguan Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Nicaragüense--PSN), Communist Party of Nicaragua (Partido Comunista de Nicaragua (PCdeN), Social Christian Popular Party (Partido Popular Social Cristiano--PPSC), Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (Movimiento Democrático Nicaragüense--MDN), Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Demócrata--PSD), Central American Integrationist Party (Partido Integracionista Centroamericano--PICA), and the Democratic Party of National Confidence (Partido Democrata de Confianza Nacional--PDC).
Despite making up only a small share of the Nicaraguan population, this constituency had symbolic value beyond the core group because of its role in civil war. As one article summarized: “The ethnic vote in the large but sparsely populated Caribbean coast represents about 80,000 people in a nationwide roll of 1.7 million. But it has strong symbolic value because of the Indians’ fierce independence. ... [Yatama leader Brooklyn] Rivera said Yatama had decided to back Mrs. Chamorro because she is sympathetic to the concerns of the underdeveloped, isolated coast and because she’s going to win.”

Looking at the countries with the highest leftist vote shares, it is clear that there was continuing support for a number of leftist and center-leftist parties in this period, many of them “traditional” parties, which have been written about much more extensively in other work. In Brazil, most of these were founded in the early 1980s, or were split-off from parties founded then. In the highly fractionalized Brazilian system, these included the center-leftist Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro—PMDB), founded in 1980 (which won a plurality of 20.32 percent); the Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira—PSDB), founded in 1988 by leftist deputies from the Historico faction of the PMDB; the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores—PT), founded in 1980 and the first independent labor party; and the Democratic Labor Party (Partido

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166 Associated Press, 2/8/90. The Yatama federation switched its support to UNO presidential candidate Violeta de Chamorro less than three weeks before the elections.

167 As Table 4.10 shows, for legislative elections during 1980-97, Brazil’s effective number of parties was 6.70, the highest in Latin America (Nohlen 2005: 27, 30-32).
Democratico Trabalhista—PDT), founded in 1980 by and the leader of the pre-1965 Brazilian Labor Party. In Mexico, much of the left vote was accounted for by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional—PRI), which placed first with 40.5 percent, and third place, Party of the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática—PRD) (21.2 percent), which split from the PRI in 1988. Although the PRI included a variety of factions, it was officially designated a "workers’ party" in 1978 and was moderately left-wing, making explicit appeals to workers and peasants. The PRD represented the independent left in Mexican electoral politics.

The Dominican Republic’s class-mobilizing leftist vote share was due to two electoral groups, the Dominican Revolutionary Party-Democratic Unity alliance (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano-Unidad Democrática—PRD-UD) and the Party of the Dominican Liberation (Partido de la Liberación Dominicana--PLD). Founded in 1939, the leftist PRD was the oldest party competing in the 1994 election and its coalition won with a plurality of 41.91 percent. The PLD was a breakaway faction of the PRD founded in 1974. In Nicaragua, the leftist vote went to the Sandinistas.

In Uruguay, the leftist vote was particularly significant as the 1994 elections

---

168 Leonel da Moira Brizola, a former governor of Grande do Sul.
169 PRD leader Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas had previously led the Democratic Current within the PRI.
170 Although there is no evidence that it was explicit or central, there was also an element of ethnic politics in the PRD’s message. According an article in the Manchester Guardian (5/8/94), presidential candidate José Francisco Pena Gomez was “the only black candidate in this country where the majority of the population is of mixed ancestry.” It continues: “His critics allege he is of Haitian origin and accuse him of being the instrument of a ‘plan to merge the two states sharing the island of Hispaniola.’ Pena’s detractors say the plan was orchestrated by several foreign powers, particularly France.”
171 According to the Political Handbook of the World, it was founded in 1994.
marked the emergence of a new leftist counterforce, the Progressive Encounter alliance 
(Encuentro Progresista), against Uruguay's two main traditional parties, the Colorado 
Party (Partido Colorado) and the National Party (Partido Nacional), founded in 1836 
and 1823 respectively. The Progressive Encounter was composed of three groups, the 
most important being the Broad Front (Frente Amplio), founded in 1971.172 The New 
Space party (Nuevo Espacio), the second largest leftist alliance in this election (5.2 
percent), was founded in 1989 through a division within the Broad Front over presidential 
candidates.

Finally, the left also emerged in Venezuela where two key parties made leftist 
appeals. The third place party in the polls, the leftist and populist Radical Cause party 
(Causa Radical—Causa R) (19.9 percent), was led by trade union leader, Andres 
Velasquez. A year before the December 1993 national elections, it had also won the 
mayorship of Caracas. The other leftist party, the Movement toward Socialism 
(Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS) (not to be confused with the Bolivian MAS), won 
12.4 percent. Founded as a far-left group in 1971 by dissident members of the 
Communist Party of Venezuela (Partido Comunista de Venezuela—PCV), the MAS by 
1993 had moderated its stance to such an extent that it ran in coalition in this election 
with the neoliberal National Convergence party (Convergencia Nacional—NC, 12.9

172 Vote shares are given only for the Frente Amplio, which won 30.64 percent, while the seats (31) went to 
the broader alliance. The other two members of the Progressive Encounter were the Communist Party 
(Partido Comunista) and the Socialist Party of Uruguay (Partido Socialista del Uruguay). The Frente 
Amplio was composed of the following socialist and communist parties: the Left Front of Liberation 
(Frente Izquierda de Liberación—FIDEL), the Pregon Group (Grupo Pregón), the National Action 
Movement (Movimiento de Acción Nacionalista—MAN), the Popular and Progressive White Movement 
(Movimiento Blanco Popular y Progresista-MBPP) (a reference to the National Party, known as the 
"Blanco"), the National Liberation Movement – Tupamaros (Movimiento de Liberación Nacional (MLN)- 
Tupamaros), and the 26th of March Movement (Movimiento 26 de Marzo).
percent), a coalition of convenience according to party leaders.

**Five Simple Hypotheses**

Using the CDEI data, this section explores and presents evidence evaluating five common assumptions about the causes and correlates of ethnic salience in electoral politics. Although some of these hypotheses are addressed in other work (especially through case studies), they remain commonly accepted in many popular and scholarly discussions about identity politics. As described above, the CDEI allows for systematic analysis of a larger set of countries in a way that has not been possible in other studies. Using simple statistics, this analysis suggests that none of these simple hypotheses are well supported in the data (although there is limited support for some). It is thus intended to “clear the field” so that later chapters can focus on the theory and on more sophisticated alternative hypotheses (some variations of these five). Although none of these hypotheses can be definitively rejected here (there are not enough data points), this analysis taken together suggests overall that hypotheses about ethnic demographics alone do not explain ethnic mobilization in politics, nor the mobilization of identity groups more generally. Four of these five hypotheses suggest no relationship between ethnic and class salience and three deal exclusively with ethnic salience: the evidence presented here that these hypotheses do not hold up well thus suggests that there is something more going on that has to do with something other than ethnic demographics.

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173 As noted above, for tests of similar hypotheses using the data for all CDEI countries, see Chandra et al. 2005.
**Hypothesis 1:** There is an inverse relationship between the indigenous vote and the left vote.

The first hypothesis can be explored in the CDEI data by looking at simple descriptive statistics and correlations across countries. If this hypothesis were correct, we would expect to see a negative correlation between the indigenous vote share and the leftist vote share – i.e., less support for the left would be replaced by greater support for pro-indigenous parties. Although the indigenous and leftist votes have a negative relationship (as do the ethnic and leftist votes), the correlation is very low at -0.0694. This is also true of the correlation between the ethnic and left vote (-0.0408).\(^{174}\) Figure 4.1 illustrates this relationship.

**Figure 4.1: Hypothesis 1 – Relationship between the Indigenous and Left Vote**

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\(^{174}\) The correlation between the ethnic and indigenous vote is 0.9659.
Focusing on the three countries that had indigenous votes greater than zero (Guatemala, Bolivia, and Peru), if this hypothesis were correct, we would expect to see an increasing trend in the leftist vote as we moved from Guatemala (the country with the highest indigenous vote) to Peru (the country with the lowest indigenous vote). Although the sample is too small to draw any conclusions, the opposite trend is in fact suggested: i.e., among these countries, Guatemala has the high leftist vote as well, and Peru the lowest.

**Hypothesis 2:** In undeveloped countries, “traditional” ethnic ties will be more salient in politics than other types of identities. Conversely, class ties will be more salient in more developed countries.

This second hypothesis emerges from a simple interpretation of modernization theory. If it were correct, we would expect to find a negative relationship between the ethnic vote (i.e., ethnic salience) and development, and a positive relationship between the left vote (i.e., class salience) and development.\(^\text{175}\) Two simple measures of development are GDP per capita and the female enrollment rate in secondary school in the year of the election.\(^\text{176}\)

Table 4.14a shows the relationship between GDP per capita and the ethnic and leftist votes. (The “indigenous” vote is also shown because it is based on a more narrow

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\(^{175}\) Clearly, there are other hypotheses that would lead to conflicting predications. For instance, high degrees of poverty and inequality might be expected to give rise to a higher leftist vote (e.g., the countries with lower GDP per capita values should be more leftist than those with higher values). This hypothesis also is not supported in the data.

\(^{176}\) Table 4.16 shows that the correlation between GDP per capita and the schooling variable is not high (0.55). Clearly neither variable fully captures development or modernization, but these are often used proxies.
Table 4.14: Hypothesis 2 – Modernization, and Ethnic and Class Salience

Table 4.14a: “Modernization” Measured in terms of GDP per Capita

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1295.0</td>
<td>Highest ethnic vote, lowest class vote</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>0.408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1428.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1752.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2048.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2208.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.R.</td>
<td>2330.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2356.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2573.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>3485.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>3627.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>3794.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>4189.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>5146.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>5596.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>5850.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>6419.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>6943.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because the indigenous and ethnic votes are so highly correlated, only the ethnic vote is considered in the rest of this chapter.

Table 4.14b: “Modernization” Measured in terms of Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Highest ethnic vote, lowest class vote</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.R.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.15: Hypothesis 2 –
Correlation among of Type of Vote and Measures of Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Vote (CDEI 2005)</th>
<th>Leftist Vote (CDEI 2005)</th>
<th>GDP per Capita (1985$)</th>
<th>Female Enrollment Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethic Vote (CDEI 2005)</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>Female Enrollment Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist Vote (2005)</td>
<td>-0.0430</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td>Female Enrollment Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita (1985$)</td>
<td>-0.4519</td>
<td>0.4318</td>
<td>Female Enrollment Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Enrollment Rate</td>
<td>-0.3853</td>
<td>0.1928</td>
<td>Female Enrollment Rate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hypothesis 3: Ethnicity is politically salient in elections in countries with high degrees of ethnic fractionalization.

Another common assumption is that ethnicity will naturally be salient in countries

---

that are ethnically “fractionalized” or highly diverse. A number of studies have
challenged this assumption. For instance, Posner (2004) points out that the standard
measures of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) do not capture “politically relevant”
ethnic divisions.

If this simple hypothesis were correct, we would expect to find a high correlation
between measures of ethnic fractionalization and the ethnic vote. This analysis
considered three measures. The first two are measures of ethno-linguistic
fractionalization, updated by Alesina et al. (2002) and Fearon (2003) with more recent
data than in the original (criticized) ELF measure. The third is a measure of “cultural
fractionalization” developed by Fearon (2003). Analysis of the Fearon and Alesina
ethnic fractionalization measures show them to be highly similar.\textsuperscript{180} Not surprisingly
then, Fearon’s cultural fractionalization measure is significantly different both from his
ethnic fractionalization measure (0.572) and from Alesina’s ethnic fractionalization
measure (0.613).

Tables 4.17a and 4.17b compare degrees of ethnic and cultural fractionalization
against the ethnic vote across countries.\textsuperscript{181} Clearly, Bolivia, which has the highest degree
of ethnic \textit{and} cultural fractionalization in the region according to these figures, also has a
relatively high ethnic vote – although its ethnic vote is not the highest in the sample. The
relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the ethnic vote is relatively low as Table
4.17a suggests. The correlation between the two is 0.3000 for Fearon’s value and 0.3314
for Alesina et al.’s (see Table 4.16). In terms of cultural fractionalization, there is some

\textsuperscript{180} Correlation of 0.90. F-test value=0.95.
\textsuperscript{181} The Alesina and Fearon measures for ethnic fractionalization are similar, so only one is used.
evidence of a relationship at very high levels of fractionalization (a correlation of 0.6340).

**Table 4.16: Hypothesis 3 – Ethnic Fractionalization Correlations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic Vote (CDEI)</th>
<th>Ethnic Fractionalization (Fearon)</th>
<th>Cultural Fractionalization (Fearon)</th>
<th>Ethnic Fractionalization (Alesina et al.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Vote (CDEI)</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization (Fearon)</td>
<td>0.3000</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Fractionalization (Fearon)</td>
<td>0.6340</td>
<td>0.5513</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Fractionalization (Alesina et al.)</td>
<td>0.3314</td>
<td>0.8989</td>
<td>0.5382</td>
<td>1.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.17: Hypothesis 3 – Ethnic Fractionalization and Ethnic Party Support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>0.740</td>
<td>0.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.657</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.601</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.541</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>0.512</td>
<td>0.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>0.255</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>0.429</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Building on some of the criticisms that have been leveled against fractionalization indices, one likely reason for the lack of relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the ethnic vote is that the “ethnic groups” used to calculate fractionalization measures are not the “politically relevant” ones. The data support this argument, as we can see if we compare the groups mobilized by political parties in each country to the ethnic groups considered in the calculation of the ethnic fractionalization index. Table 4.18 shows this analysis using Alesina et al.’s measure, which presents the most clearly disaggregated data. The first column shows the fractionalization value, the second the year of the source used on ethnicities. The third column lists the groups considered in the calculation of the ethnic fractionalization index. For instance, Argentina was considered to have two ethnic groups, “Europeans” at 85 percent of the population and “Mestizos” at 15 percent. In general, the groups considered tend to be “ethno-racial” groups, however this is not entirely consistent and the categories used are not comparable across countries.
Table 4.18: Hypothesis 3 – “Politically Relevant” Ethnicities and Fractionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Ethnic Fractionalization</th>
<th>Year of Data Used by Alesina et al.</th>
<th>“Ethnicities” Used to Calculate Fractionalization by Alesina et al.</th>
<th>Ethnic Vote (CDEI 2005)</th>
<th>Ethnic Groups Mobilized by Ethnic-Mobilizing Parties</th>
<th>Ethnic Vote if Only Ethnicities Used to Calculate Fractionalization are Included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>European (85%); Mestizo (15%)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Blancos (10.127%); Aymara (30.380%); Quechua (30.380%); Mestizos (25.316%); Other groups (3.797%)</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>“Cholos” and indios/Indians/indigenous; evangelical Protestants; Indians/indigenous (especially Highland Indians)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>White (54.4%); Mixed (40.1%); Black (4.9%); Asian (0.5%); Amerindian (0.1%)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>European &amp; Mestizo (89.7%); Araucanian (9.6%); Aymara (0.5%); Rapa Nui Polynesian (0.2%)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Mestizo (58%); White (20%); Mulatto (14%); Black (4%); Black-Indian (3%); Amerindian (1%)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>White (87%); Mestizo (7%); Mulatto (3%); Asian (2%); Amerindian (1%)</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>Cartago region</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Mixed (73%); White (16%); Black (11%)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Mestizo (89%); Amerindian (10%); White (1%)</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Religious Affiliation</td>
<td>Indigenous/Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>Mestizo (55%); Amerindian (43%); Guatemala Other (2%)</td>
<td>Evangelical Protestants; Indians and Mayan, Garifuna, and Xinca peoples; Mayans and Indians/indigenous in general</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>Mestizo (89.9%); Amerindian (6.7%); Black (2.1%); White (1.3%)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>Mestizo (60%); Amerindian (30%); Caucasian (9%); Other Mexico (1%)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>Mestizo (69%); White (17%); Black (9%); Amerindian (5%)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>Mestizo (64%); Black/Mulato (14%); White (10%); Amerindian (8%); Asian (4%)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>Quechua (47.1%); Mestizo (32.1%); White (12%); Aymara (5.4%); Other Peru (3.5%)</td>
<td>Indigenous, “cholos” and mestizos (i.e., excludes whites); those of Incan ancestry</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>White (86%); Mestizo (8%); Mulatto (6%)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>Mestizo (67%); White (21%); Black (10%); Indian (2%)</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The latter two are included as “Amerindian.”
2 Including, Indians of Atlantic Coast, including Miskito, Sumu, and Rama, and Creole groups.
3 Treated here as equivalent to Quechua.
The fifth column shows the groups mobilized by ethnic-mobilizing parties in the CDEI. Most of these groups clearly were not considered as "ethnic groups" in the calculation of ethnic fractionalization. This is highlighted in the last column which shows what the "ethnic vote" would have been if only groups used to calculate the ethnic fractionalization index had been considered ethnic in the classification of ethnic-mobilizing parties. Notably, the "ethnic" vote in this case would fall to zero in Bolivia, where the indigenous as a group were not counted among the ethnic groups used to calculate the fractionalization index.

Hypothesis 4: Indigenous identity is politically salient in elections in democracies where a large share of the population is indigenous.

There is some support for this hypothesis in the data: as Table 4.19 shows, the three countries with indigenous vote shares were the three most indigenous countries in Latin America. However, electoral support did not follow the size of the indigenous population. For instance, Bolivia had the largest indigenous population, but not the largest ethnic mobilizing vote.\(^{185}\)

Relatedly, we might also estimate the maximum possible success rate of each country's indigenous-mobilizing parties with the indigenous population as shown in the last column of Table 4.19. For the sake of simplicity, parties that appeal to the indigenous and to those of mixed indigenous heritage (i.e., mestizos or "cholo" groups)

\(^{185}\) In this instance, including the MNR-MRTKL would suggest a stronger relationship between the size of the indigenous population and support for ethnic-mobilizing parties.
are treated here as simply trying to mobilize the indigenous alone and the size of the indigenous population is used to calculate a high estimate of the success rate. The success rate is estimated as highest in Guatemala (37-49 percent), falling to 23-27 percent in Bolivia and 11-12 percent in Peru.

### Table 4.19: Hypothesis 4 – Indigenous Vote and Success with Target Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>60-70%</td>
<td>16.2%**</td>
<td>23-27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>45-60%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>37-49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>38-40%</td>
<td>4.4%**</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>12-14%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>4-6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>4-8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2-3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>&lt;2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>&lt;2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>&lt;2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>&lt;2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>&lt;2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

186 This is useful for getting an estimate of maximum possible success. It is also necessary given the limits of the data: most countries do not have good data on the size of the *mestizo* or “cholo” populations, even if parties do appeal to them directly.

187 If Bolivia’s MNR-MRTKL were included here, success rates for Bolivia would be estimated at 74-86 percent. If Nicaragua’s UNO were included here, its success rate would be estimated at 2735 percent!

188 This figure may be high as the relevant ethnic-mobilizing parties in fact appeal to the indigenous and “cholos.” Data on the size of the “cholo” population is not taken into account here.

189 This figure may be high as the relevant ethnic-mobilizing parties in fact appeal to the indigenous and “cholos.” Data on the size of the “cholo” population is not taken into account here.
Hypothesis 5: The size of the minimum winning coalition and the sizes of ethnic groups in society explain which ethnic groups will mobilize.

The fifth simple hypothesis, which has been explored in more complicated form in other work (see Posner 2005, Chandra 2005), attributes causal power to ethnic demography and the size of the minimum winning coalition alone. In other words, the ethnic groups that are large enough to form minimum winning coalitions should mobilize. This hypothesis is examined roughly in this section in the following way using the data on ethnic groups ("ethnic," linguistic, and religious) provided in Alesina et al. (2002). This is not an ideal source because it does not consider all types of groups (e.g., immigrant groups) and defines "ethnicity" in an uneven manner across countries, but it is a useful first cut:

First, for each country, the results in the election were analyzed to estimate the effective vote shares needed to win 1 seat, 10 percent of seats, 25 percent of seats, and a majority of seats. These cutoff points were chosen to represent symbolic legislative representation (1 seat), some coalition bargaining power (10 and 25 percent of seats), and control of the legislature (50 percent of seats). For each of these cutoff points, the vote share of the party that won at least this many seats was recorded. This method was used as a rough way of taking into account the effects of the various electoral rules and party system norms on effective thresholds for representation. In some countries, this is clearly a highly inexact method as, for instance, the party that receives at least 10 percent of seats may also be the party that receives at least 25 percent of seats. Another way to estimate
thresholds for representation would have been to calculate them based on electoral rules and the size of constituencies. However, this method is not able to take into account other effects on effective thresholds such as the strength of traditional parties in the system.

Second, for each of these thresholds, the Alesina et al. (2002) data was used to record the groups of each ethnic type ("ethnic," linguistic, and religious) that would have been large enough to achieve this threshold. The smallest group was then selected as the group with the minimum winning coalition. For instance, in Argentina, the lowest vote share to win at least 1 seat in the lower house was 3 percent, which went to the Union of the Democratic Center (Unión del Centro Democrático—UCD). The ethnic groups listed in Alesina et al. which made up at least 3 percent of the population were: European (85 percent), Mestizo (15 percent), Spanish speakers (96.84 percent), Roman Catholic (87.84 percent), and Protestant (7.51 percent). In this group, "Protestant" was thus chosen as the minimum winning coalition to win 1 seat. This analysis was repeated for each threshold for each country.

Third, three variations on this analysis were done in order to limit the "ethnic" groups considered to those that would be seen as viable and "real" ethnic groups. In the first instance, only groups that had some relationship to indigenous identity were considered (e.g., Aymara or Quechua ethnicities, Amerindian, speakers of various
indigenous language groups\textsuperscript{190}). In the second instance, only “viable” groups were considered – i.e., religious groups and “Spanish speakers” were excluded from the analysis because they would not be considered ethnic groups by many Latin Americanists. In the third instance, only non-dominant groups were considered, including religious groups – for instance, “Europeans” were not included and “Protestants” were.\textsuperscript{191}

Based on this analysis, rough predictions were developed about whether ethnic parties would form in each country and around which ethnic groups. For instance, in Argentina, analysis of “indigenous” identities suggests that no indigenous parties should form; analysis of “viable” ethnic identities suggests that a major party should form around the “European” identity; and analysis of “non-dominant” ethnic identities suggests the likelihood of a “Protestant” or “mestizo” party. Predictions for all countries are outlined in Table 4.20.

These predictions are then compared with the CDEI results. As Table 4.20 shows, predictions were most supported in considering “indigenous” identities and poorly supported when looser definitions of ethnicity were employed. In other words, it is not simply ethnic numbers at work: certain types of ethnic identities do seem to have more weight as bases for political mobilization and ethnicity is not mobilized everywhere it might theoretically be.

\textsuperscript{190} For some countries, the dataset included very disaggregated language data. In these instances, minority linguistic groups were considered individually and also in a combined way (i.e., summing all minority language groups to get an “indigenous language” group).

\textsuperscript{191} These groups might also be labeled “minority” groups, but that label is confusing in many Latin American countries where dominant groups are numerical minorities.
Table 4.20: Hypothesis 5 – Winning Coalitions and Ethnic Demography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1) Prediction Based on Analysis of “Indigenous” Ethnicities</th>
<th>2) Prediction Based on Analysis of “Viable” Ethnicities</th>
<th>3) Prediction Based on Analysis of “Non-Dominant” Ethnicities</th>
<th>CDEI Outcome</th>
<th>Any predictions supported?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina&lt;sup&gt;192&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>Major “European” party</td>
<td>Protestant party (or mestizo party)</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>#1 supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Ethnic Aymara and Quechua parties</td>
<td>Major “Mestizo” party</td>
<td>Mestizo party and small party of mono-lingual Aymara speakers</td>
<td>Several parties appealing to “indigenous” and “cholo” voters, along with minor religious party</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Possible small (1 seat) indigenous party</td>
<td>Various racial and linguistic parties, also minor indigenous party</td>
<td>Mixed race party and minor indigenous and Japanese language parties</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>European &amp; Mestizo party</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>#1 and #3 supported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia&lt;sup&gt;193&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Possible minor Black-Indian and Amerindian parties</td>
<td>Minor Black and Amerindian parties</td>
<td>Minor Amerindian party</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica&lt;sup&gt;194&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>Small mestizo party and “White” party</td>
<td>Mestizo party</td>
<td>Minor regional party</td>
<td>#1 supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>“White” party</td>
<td>“White” party</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>#1 supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Minor Amerindian party</td>
<td>Mestizo party</td>
<td>Minor Amerindian party</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Mayan language party</td>
<td>Mayan language party</td>
<td>Mayan language party</td>
<td>All partially supported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Minor indigenous or Amerindian party</td>
<td>Mestizo party and small indigenous party</td>
<td>Minor indigenous party</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>192</sup> Nine percent of seats are unaccounted for in this estimate.

<sup>193</sup> Estimate is based on seat share data as vote share data was not initially available.

<sup>194</sup> Two seats are unaccounted for in calculating this estimate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party Type</th>
<th>Language Details</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Amerindian Party</td>
<td>Mestizo and Amerindian parties, minor indigenous language party</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>Mestizo party</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>Party appealing to indigenous, #1 and #3 supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Small Kuna Indian party</td>
<td>Mestizo party, minor indigenous and Kuna parties</td>
<td>Minor Kuna speaker party, possible midsize racial parties</td>
<td>No ethnic parties, Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Ethnic Guarani party</td>
<td>Guarani speakers party</td>
<td>Guarani Party</td>
<td>No ethnic parties, Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Ethnic Quecha party and possible small Aymara party</td>
<td>Spanish speakers party, Quechua speakers party, minor indigenous language party</td>
<td>Quechua speakers party; minor indigenous languages party</td>
<td>Several parties appealing to indigenous, “cholos,” mestizos, and those of Incan ancestry, Not supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>White party, and small mulatto party</td>
<td>Minor Mulatto/Mestizo parties</td>
<td>No ethnic parties, #1 supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>No ethnic parties</td>
<td>Mestizo and White parties</td>
<td>White parties</td>
<td>No ethnic parties, #1 supported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Examining Assumptions of the Theory**

Finally, the CDEI data was used to assess the plausibility of several key assumptions of the theory. These points are also addressed descriptively in Chapters 5 and 6 through the Bolivian study. However, the CDEI coding on parties and platform issues, and the data on party leaders collected for the project, helps to place the more detailed Bolivian data in comparative perspective.

The first point supported by the CDEI data is that parties in the region do indeed make appeals to identity groups central to their mobilizing strategies, although there is

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195 Alesina data disaggregate all language groups. An aggregate “indigenous language” speakers category was added for this analysis.
some variation across countries in the extent to which they do so. In other words, it is fair to assume that parties position themselves in electoral politics as much to appeal to voters as members of groups as to appeal to voters as proponents of particular issue positions (i.e., the standard assumption in spatial voting models); party competition can be modeled as a game over the “capture” of groups, rather than of issue positions.

The extent to which group-based appeals are central to party platforms can be estimated by using the classifications of whether parties are ethnic- and economic-mobilizing. A party classified as economic-mobilizing, for instance, by definition is one that appeals centrally and explicitly to economic groups as part of its platform. If we look at the total vote share going to parties that are ethnic- and/or economic-mobilizing, we can estimate the electoral importance of appeals to two of the most important types of identity groups. Because the CDEI does not include data on appeals to other types of identity groups (e.g., women or youth), this estimate should be a low one for the importance of group-based appeals. Table 4.21 shows the vote going to parties that are either or both ethnic- and economic-mobilizing: According to the CDEI data, on average, about half of the vote goes to parties that make group-based appeals central to their platforms. This ranges from a low of 0 percent in Paraguay to over 99 percent in Mexico. The reasons behind this variation cannot be fully assessed here. A reading of the CDEI files, however, suggests that party appeals in countries with very low “group-based appeal” values seem to be centered around party loyalty and the general charisma of particular leaders, as well as on the presentation of policy/issue positions.
Table 4.21: Assumption 1 – Group-Based Appeals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of vote going to parties that make ethnic or economic group-based appeals</th>
<th>% of vote going to parties that make NO ethnic or economic group-based appeals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
<td>35.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>54.4%</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>94.2%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>43.8%</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>47.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>99.2%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>95.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>75.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>64.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A second, related assumption is that parties may appeal to several groups at once. For instance, a party might appeal to both ethnic and economic groups, to several different ethnic groups, or to an economic group and to women. In the case of ethnic and leftist class appeals, this approach suggests that parties may appeal to both types of groups, even if it is inconsistent with the party’s leftist ideology to do so. Many other studies, by contrast, assume that parties will be *either* ethnic or leftist. The theory does not make a prediction about how frequent such mixed appeals will be, although it might be extended to support the prediction that mixed ethnic-economic appeals should be most likely when ethnic and economic identification dimensions overlap, such as in a ranked ethnic system.
### Table 4.22: Assumption 2 – Ethnic-Economic Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic-Economic</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Vote Share</th>
<th>Basis of Classification</th>
<th>Certainty of Platform Coding (1 to 3)</th>
<th>Explicit Target Group(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario-Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari-Liberación (MNR-MRTKL)</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>For ethnic coding: name (but platform is non-ethnic overall). For economic coding: platform.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indigenous and the working class, rural population/peasants, the poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic-Leftist</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Movimiento Katarista Nacional</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>Name and Platform</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indians/indigenous (especially from Highlands) and the working class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic-Economic</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Acción Agrícola Cartaginense</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>Name and Platform</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>People from Cartago and agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic-Leftist</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>Platform</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mayans and Indians/indigenous in general, and peasants and unions, as well as university students and professionals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic-Economic</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Coordinación Democrática-Perú País Posible</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>Platform</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Indigenous, “cholos” and mestizos (i.e., those not white), and the poor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data show that mixed ethnic and economic appeals are more common than other work might suggest: as Table 4.22 shows, five out of the eleven ethnic-mobilizing parties in the sample are also classified as economic-mobilizing. Of these, two (Bolivia’s National Katarist Movement—MKN and the New Guatemala Democratic Front—FDNG) are also ethnic-leftist parties, mobilizing both the indigenous and the

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196 This includes the MNR-MRTKL.
working class or poor from a leftist standpoint. Among the other ethnic-economic parties, ethnic-economic overlap also played a clear role: In Bolivia, the alliance of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement and the Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Movement – Liberation (MNR-MRTKL) appealed by name and/or platform to the indigenous and the working class, but overall from a neo-liberal rather than a leftist standpoint. The Peruvian alliance Democratic Coordination – Peru Viable Nation (CODE-Pais Posible) adopted a similar platform, appealing also to “cholos” and mestizos. In Costa Rica, the Cartago Agricultural Action party (one of the very small parties in the sample about which little is known) apparently appealed both to the Cartago region and to agricultural interests there.

A third assumption that can be explored in the data has to do with the types of issues discussed by parties. The theory assumes that parties essentially use group labels simply to describe coalitions of voters; these labels do not necessarily correspond with particular types of issues (see also Chandra 2004). For instance, a party appealing to ethnic groups will not necessarily discuss “ethnic” issues, such as those having to do with traditional culture or group representation. Similarly, a party appealing to the working class will not necessarily only discuss “leftist” issues, such as class consciousness or worker solidarity. This approach to ethnic parties in particular challenges other work that assumes that ethnic parties mobilize only or mainly cultural “ethnic” issues.

In order to explore this point, the dissertation added to the CDEI coding on the types of issues stressed by parties in their electoral platforms, classifying issues into three
types – economic/material, political, and cultural – along with an "other" category. Some issues such as rights to traditionally-held land, for instance, were classified as falling into several categories. For each party and each country, then, the coding gave a rough percentage of "attention" paid to each type of issue – economic/material, political, cultural, and other. A detailed listing of issues stressed by each party was also recorded.

Although further work can be done with these data, for our purposes, looking at the types of issues mobilized by ethnic-mobilizing parties is most important. The data show clearly that ethnic-mobilizing parties in the CDEI did not focus exclusively or even mainly on culture. Table 4.24 summarizes the types of issues stressed by each ethnic-mobilizing party in the sample for which sufficient data was available to conduct the issue coding with at least moderate certainty. The percentages in the table are intended as rough estimates of the relative attention paid to different types of issues based on the assessment of the coder. Although several parties did stress cultural and symbolic issues (including indigenous culture and religious faith), overall, cultural issues received less attention than political issues and equal attention went to cultural and economic issues.

If we compare the issue-coding for ethnic-mobilizing parties with that for parties in Latin America as a whole, we can see that ethnic-mobilizing parties do stress cultural issues more than other types of parties, perhaps reflecting some changing voter

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197 Certainty codings were given for each party coding based on the number of articles used and the general quality of information on each party. Each coding was ranked as poor, moderate, or high certainty.
198 This does not include parties in Brazil and the Dominican Republic for which issue-coding was not completed. The average is intended as a rough estimate calculated by averaging the averages for all parties in each country (i.e., it is not weighted by vote share). All parties with issue classifications are included, including those coded with low certainty.
preferences. In general, this seems to be due to their placing relatively less stress on economic/material issues: in ethnic-mobilizing parties, about one-quarter of the party message highlighted economic/material issues, whereas in all parties, about half of the party message highlighted them. On the other hand, ethnic-mobilizing parties stressed political issues about as much as parties did overall (just under half of all party messages were devoted to them). In particular, political issues highlighted topics such as democracy, political liberalization, electoral rules, and corruption.

Table 4.23: Assumption 3 – Types of Issues Highlighted by Ethnic Parties
(Based only on ethnic-mobilizing parties coded with at least moderate certainty.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country, Party Name, and Vote Share</th>
<th>Explicit Target Group(s)</th>
<th>Issue Coding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia – Conciencia de Patria (14.3%)</td>
<td>“Cholos” and indios/Indians/ indigenous</td>
<td>0.34 0.33 0.33 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala – Frente Republicana Guatemalteca (21%)</td>
<td>Evangelical Protestants, Pentecostal Protestants, Christian Fundamentalists</td>
<td>0 0.65 0.35 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala – Alianza Nacional (12.8%)</td>
<td>Indians and Mayan, Garifuna, and Xinca peoples</td>
<td>0.25 0.45 0.2 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala – Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala (9.1%)</td>
<td>Mayans and Indians/indigenous in general</td>
<td>0.1 0.5 0.3 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru – Coordinación Democrática-Peru Pais Posible (4.2%)</td>
<td>Indigenous, “cholos” and mestizos (i.e., those not white)</td>
<td>0.5 0.5 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average for ethnic-mobilizing parties</td>
<td>0.24 0.49 0.24 0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average for all parties in the CDEI Latin America sample</td>
<td>0.48 0.41 0.06 0.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

199 This does not include parties in Brazil and the Dominican Republic for which issue-coding was not completed. The average is intended as a rough estimate calculated by averaging the country averages for.
Summary

This chapter has used cross-national data from the CDEI to provide a picture of elections and identity politics in seventeen Latin American democracies in the early 1990s. It first identified the universe of cases in Latin America as all Latin American democracies, with the possible exclusion of Costa Rica (which has been a democracy longer than most countries in Europe). Next, it described the universe of ethnic-mobilizing, economic-mobilizing, and leftist class-mobilizing parties across countries. It then used the CDEI to explore five simple hypotheses about ethnic and class salience in elections. Taken together, this analysis suggests that ethnic variables help to explain some aspects of ethnic political mobilization in the region, but they are incomplete—i.e., we need to look beyond ethnic variables to explain ethnic and identity politics more generally. Finally, the chapter presented additional data from the CDEI to address several assumptions of the theory. This descriptive data suggest that it is fair to assume, as the theory does, that party competition is played out in terms of the “capture” of groups, rather than only of issue positions; that group-based appeals are made to several groups at once relatively frequently, especially when these groups are overlapping; and that the types of groups to which parties appeal and the types of issues they discuss are distinct (i.e., that ethnic-mobilizing parties do focus a bit more on cultural issues than other types of parties, but that, like other parties, they focus significantly on political issues, and economic issues also).

all parties or electoral groups that competed and for which we have vote shares for the party and/or alliance (i.e., it is not weighted by vote share, but it tends not to include very minor parties that did not compete or which we had insufficient data for the coding of issues). All parties with issue classifications are included, including those coded with low certainty.
CHAPTER 5

BOLIVIA: HISTORICAL LEGACIES AND THE RISE OF THE “INDIGENOUS LEFT”

My people are not fighting for a small victory, for a small increase in salary here, a small palliative there. No. My people are preparing to expel capitalism and its internal and external servants forever from our country. My people are preparing to reach socialism.

What I am saying is not my own invention. It was proclaimed in a Congress of the Bolivian Workers’ Central: ‘Bolivia will only be free when it is a socialist country.’

-- Domilita Barrios de Chungara, activist, vice-presidential candidate, and leader of the Housewives Committee of Siglo XX Mine, 1976

We, the Aymara people, are a socio-cultural reality, alive and current; with a homogeneous culture and an ancient history, with our own, legitimate geographic Pachamama, with all of the conditions for a SOVEREIGN-NATION-STATE.

-- Luciano Tapia, founder of the Tupaj Katari Indian Movement (MITKA), a political party founded in 1978, July 1995

This cultural democratic struggle, this democratic cultural revolution is a part of the struggle of our ancestors, is a continuation of the struggle of Tupac Katari.

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This fight and these results are the continuation of Che Guevara. We are here sisters and brothers of Bolivia and Latin America. We are going to continue until we achieve equality in our country....

--Evo Morales, president of Bolivia, inaugural speech, 22 January 2006

Among emerging democracies, Bolivia offers one of the most interesting cases of realignment from class towards greater ethnic identification in electoral politics since democratization in 1982. This point has been highlighted by several recent studies (see Birnir 2001, 2007; Calla Ortega 2003; García et al 2001; Madrid 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Rice and Van Cott 2006; Singer and Morrison 2004; Van Cott 2003a, 2003b, 2005). Almost all of this work focuses on the rising salience of ethnicity in Bolivian electoral politics since about 2000, highlighting the 2002 elections as a turning point.

The purpose of this chapter is first to illustrate the traditional bases of the party system in place at democratization in 1982 and then to briefly present aggregate measurements of the changes in identification that have occurred since 1982 using the method described in Chapter 2. This chapter shows that the trend assumed by most previous work is in fact inexact: While the rise in ethnic identification in Bolivian politics since democratization is significant when understood in the context of Bolivian history, the shift towards greater

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203 The key exception here is Calla Ortega (2003). However, he does not present systematic data on measurement over time and his analysis (which was originally published in 1993) does not address the later period. It is also important to note that Van Cott’s work, in particular, does trace “ethnic party” support over time (with ethnic parties defined much more restrictively than in this project). However, with the exception of Madrid’s work, none of these studies focus on class identification and the relative salience of ethnicity and class.
ethnic identification in fact occurred earlier than previous studies suggest – in the mid to late 1980s. In other words, the 2002 elections are best understood as part of a longer term trend, not a turning point.

This chapter shows that from 1952, when universal suffrage was extended, until the 1985 general elections, the most salient social division in Bolivian party debate was class.\(^204\) Although major ethnic social movements emerged – several of which formed small political parties – ethnicity was not central to electoral politics during this period. In each general election from 1985 to 2005, however, ethnic divisions became increasingly salient, with parties that highlighted ethnicity capturing increasing percentages of the vote. Meanwhile, the electoral success of the left declined overall relative to the earlier period, although fluctuating considerably. The 2002 and 2005 elections in fact reflected a clear rise in the “indigenous left” vote captured by Evo Morales’s Movement toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS).

These sorts of shifts are illustrated in the quotes from the Bolivian leaders presented above. It is important to note that all of these leaders could be described as “indigenous” – and thus, would be likely to look similar in survey or census data focused on ethnicity. Yet, as these statements illustrate, they identified politically in different ways. For Domitila Chungara, it was class that was most important to her politics, while for Luciano Tapia, it was the Aymara nation. Evo Morales, by contrast, highlights in his

\(^{204}\) Note however that during most of this period, Bolivia was not a democracy.
statement both the struggle of an indigenous hero (Tupaj Katari\textsuperscript{205}) and of a leftist revolutionary (Che Guevara).

Because of the weaknesses of the Bolivian party system, especially the strong role of patronage and personal connections in who votes for whom, there is a tendency among some observers of Bolivian politics to disregard the sorts of explicit party statements and electoral debate used to classify parties in this chapter as irrelevant to the "real" substance of politics – as just party "rhetoric" (see Gamarra and Malloy 1995; Mainwaring 2006). This is too simple. While voters in Bolivia (as elsewhere) clearly base their decisions on more than what parties say, what parties say is one important source of their information about parties. And, as other work highlights, the identification shifts mapped out in this chapter can be tied to major shifts in Bolivian politics and public policy – even when parties played fast and loose with their campaign promises (see Albó 1994, 2002; Calla Ortega 2003; Paco Patzi 1999; Sanjines 2004; Ticona et al 1995; Van Cott 2005).

Furthermore, in a country where the majority of the population self-identified as indigenous in the last census and individuals have long suffered social, economic, and political discrimination because of their indigenous status, the increasing visibility of self-proclaimed "indigenous" and "pro-indigenous" parties is profoundly important for symbolic reasons, if nothing else.

This chapter first provides some key background to the case, a brief history of the region and an overview of basic institutions since 1982. It then turns to trends in the

\textsuperscript{205} Tupaj Katari, in some contexts, is also identified specifically as a hero of the "Aymara," although here his status as a hero of the "indigenous" community is highlighted. Evo Morales, like Tapia, could identify as Aymara, but leads a party that appeals most clearly to the "indigenous" in general.
party system and the legacies of the "traditional" party system prior to democratization. Finally, focusing on the period since 1982, it presents aggregate measures of the changes in identification politics within the party system. This discussion is continued in Chapter 6, which discusses the parties and events behind these changes in greater detail.

Figure 5.1: Map of Bolivia

A Brief History of the Region

Bolivia, which has a population of about 6.4 million,\textsuperscript{207} can be divided into several geographic regions, the Andean highlands towards the west, the tropical lowlands towards the east, and the semitropical valleys between them. (See Figure 5.1.) In contrast to many areas of the world where the population is concentrated at lower elevations, in Bolivia it is the highlands that has historically been the most densely populated. Two of the largest indigenous language groups in Bolivia, Quechua-speakers and Aymara-speakers make up 31 and 25 percent of the population respectively according to the 2001 census.\textsuperscript{208} As Figure 5.2 suggests, Aymara-speakers are generally concentrated in the highlands around La Paz and Quechua-speakers in the valleys from Cochabamba to Bolivia's southern borders with Chile and Argentina. "Quechua-speakers" and "Aymara-speakers" are not synonymous with "Quechua" and "Aymara" cultural groups, even though much work treats them that way. Bolivian anthropologists like Ricardo Calla Ortega and Ramiro Molina Rivero highlight that there are Quechua speakers who might be described as "culturally" more Aymara, Aymara speakers who might be described as culturally more Quechua, those who speak both languages, etc. (see also Gordillo 2000).\textsuperscript{209}

\textsuperscript{207} The population recorded in the 2001 census is 6,420,792.
\textsuperscript{208} Population figures here are based on self-identification in the 2001 Bolivian census. The non-indigenous population makes up 37.95 percent.
\textsuperscript{209} Based on discussions with Ricardo Calla Ortega and Ramiro Molina Rivero, 2003-05.
Figure 5.2: Ethnologue Map of Bolivia

NOTES:
1. DASHED LINES SHOW OVERLAP OF LANGUAGE AREAS.
2. BRACKETS SHOW THE NUMBER OF TIMES A LANGUAGE'S NUMBER APPEARS ON MAP IF MORE THAN ONCE.

1. APACOA
2. AYOREO (3)
3. BAURE
4. CAVINEÑA
5. CENTRAL AYMARÁ
6. CHACOBO
7. CHIPAYA
8. CHIQUITANO (2)
9. EASTERN BOLIVIAN GUARANI (2)
10. ESE EJJA (3)
11. GUARAYU
12. IGNACIANO
13. ITONAMA
14. IYOWUJIWA CHOROTE
15. LECO
16. MOVIMA
17. NORTH BOLIVIAN QUECHUA
18. PAñAHUARA
19. SIRIONO
20. SOUTH BOLIVIAN QUECHUA
21. TACANA
22. TAPIETE
23. TOBA
24. TRINITARIO
25. Tsimane
26. URU
27. WESTERN BOLIVIAN GUARANI (2)
28. WICHÍ LHAMETÉS NOCTEN
29. YAMIÑAHUIA
30. YUIQUI
31. YURACARE

From about 1000 BC until the first century, the highlands was home to the Tiwanaku empire, centered around Lake Titicaca in the present-day department of La Paz. A precursor to the Incan empire (in Peru), the historical forerunner to today’s Quechua culture, Tiwanaku is seen by many as the historical home of the Aymara. During the time of the Incan empire (from about 1400 AD), the Highlands, known to the Incans as the Kollasuyo empire, was made up of various kingdoms or “manors” (“señoríos”), united and governed in the pre-colonial period from the court at Zapana (Gisbert 2003: 33-48; see also Molina Rivero and Barragán 1987). According to Molina Rivero (1998), this empire formed a sort of proto-typical multiethnic state. 211

Historically, the lowlands were sparsely populated by diverse, small, and largely independent groups. The linguistic diversity of the region today is suggestive of this structure. According to the 2001 census, the most widely spoken lowlands indigenous language is Guarani/Guarayu, by about 1.5 percent of the total Bolivian indigenous population and 0.76 percent of the total Bolivian population. 212 The 2001 census identifies the following other language groups in the region: Ayoreo/Zamuco, Baure, Canichana, Cavineño, Cayubaba, Chimán/Tsimane, Chiquitano/Bésire/Napeco/Paunaca/Moncaca, Guarayo, Itonama, Joaquiniano, Machineri, Moré, Movima, Pacahuara, Reyesano/Maropa, Sirionó, Takana, Tapieté,

211 He argues further that, therefore, the contemporary project of creating a “multicultural” state in Bolivia has historical, pre-colonial roots and legitimacy in the region.

212 Based on languages (“idiomas o lenguas”) spoken (see INE 2003, Table 13).
Weenhayek/Mataco, and Yaminawa. The majority of these groups make up less than one percent of the population classified as indigenous in the census.

The Spanish colonial period in the region began with the arrival of Francisco Pizarro in the early 16th century. Under the Spanish, much of the region that is today Bolivia was part of the territory of Upper Peru (Alto Perú). Its rich silver mines made Potosí an important regional capital, while today’s administrative capital, La Paz, developed as an intermediate trading post and commercial center (Schoop 1981). The wealth of the silver and tin mines of Potosí and Oruro made western Bolivia the economic powerhouse of the country until the collapse of the mining industry in the mid 20th century. The Spanish colonial economy and political system were centered there, and the eastern provinces left mainly to a few missionaries and crown emissaries (including the administration [intendencia] of Santa Cruz). It was not until the mid 20th century when the east began to grow, spurred on by the export of petroleum, natural gas, and agricultural products. In mobilizations since about 2000, this history of eastern “neglect” by the western-based center has had a key place in the discourse of the members of the Camba Nation (“Nación Camba”) and others supporting regional autonomy or secession.

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213 This includes only linguistic groups whose population is concentrated in the departments of Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, and Tarija.
214 On 16 November 1532, due partly to an internal power struggle in the Incan empire, Pizarro was able to defeat the Incan forces at Cajamarca in less than two hours.
Figure 5.3: Map of the “Camba Nation”

Map from the Camba Nation Movement of Liberation (Movimiento Nación Camba de Liberación) online. Downloaded from http://www.nacioncamba.net/extras/mapas.htm, 2 March 2006.
Table 5.1: Bolivian Population across the Nine Departments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>abs. no.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>abs. no.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1,633,610</td>
<td>3,019,031</td>
<td>4,613,486</td>
<td>6,420,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>196,434</td>
<td>12.02%</td>
<td>282,980</td>
<td>9.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>426,930</td>
<td>26.13%</td>
<td>948,446</td>
<td>31.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>326,163</td>
<td>19.97%</td>
<td>490,475</td>
<td>16.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>86,081</td>
<td>5.27%</td>
<td>210,260</td>
<td>6.96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosi</td>
<td>325,615</td>
<td>19.93%</td>
<td>534,399</td>
<td>17.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>67,887</td>
<td>4.16%</td>
<td>126,752</td>
<td>4.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>171,592</td>
<td>10.50%</td>
<td>286,145</td>
<td>9.48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni</td>
<td>25,680</td>
<td>1.57%</td>
<td>119,770</td>
<td>3.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>19,804</td>
<td>0.66%</td>
<td>34,493</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.4: Relative Population Across the Nine Bolivian Departments

Relative Population Across the Nine Departments
(Shown as % of total Bolivian population based on 1950, 1976, and 2001 censuses)

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218 Sources: Bolivian censuses (INE 1950, 1976, and 2001), and 1900 census, as given in Klein 1982: 319. For 1950, see Table 2 (pp. 7-10); for 1976, Table 1 (p. 29); and for 2001, Table 2 (pp. 223-235).

219 Note that Klein (1982: 319)'s figures differ slightly from those reported here for other years. The six principal cities are La Paz, Cochabamba, Oruro, Sucre, Potosi, and Santa Cruz, all located in the departments of the same name except for the Bolivian capital, Sucre, which is in the department of Chuquisaca.
Among the defining legacies of Spanish colonialism in the Andean region has been the continued presence of large indigenous populations, a significant colonial settler population, and intermarriage and cultural intermixing between the descendants of Spanish colonialists and the local population. While earlier and more specific figures are not available, Humbold’s figures on racial groups in the Americas at the end of the 18th century are at least suggestive (as cited in de Mesa and Gisbert 2003: 288).

According to Humbold, at this point, roughly 45 percent of the American population was “Indian,” 31 percent “mestizo,” 19 percent “white,” and less than 5 percent “black.” Within the “white” population, one could also draw political divisions between the European-born and the American-born. As Anderson (1983) has pointed out, American-born creoles (criollos), their national imaginations and possibilities for political and social advancement shaped by their place of birth, were key actors in the national revolutions that gave birth to the new independent countries of the continent. Among the first of these revolutions in South America were the revolutions of Chuquisaca and of La Paz in 1809, but it was only in 1825 that Bolivia became an independent republic.

Also key to Bolivia’s national history were the political claims of “indigenous” leaders, as well as how these interacted with “Creole” and “mestizo” movements. As Thomson (2002) describes, tensions among all of these groups against the colonial administration came to head in the Andean civil war of the 1780s. The war had two, successive fronts. The first one, in Cuzco (Peru), the historic Incan capital, was led by

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220 These legacies, for instance, stand in contrast to the experience of Anglo-American colonialism in North America, which involved almost the complete annihilation of the indigenous population. They also differ from British and French colonialism in West Africa, where the European settler population was small and there was relatively little racial intermixing.
José Gabriel Condorcanqui Túpac Amaru (known as “Túpac Amaru”), an indigenous cacique (local ruler), who called for the expulsion of Europeans and a return to a traditional Incan socio-political order. As the direct descendant of the Incan king killed by the Spaniards in the 16th century, Túpac Amaru, a nobleman, claimed the title and leadership of the Inca. The second, and final front, in Bolivia around La Paz, was led by Julián Apaza, known as “Túpaj Katari” (or “Tupac Katari”). By contrast to Tupaj Amaru, Túpaj Katari was an Aymara peasant who spoke no Spanish and somehow came to become Túpac Amaru’s self-proclaimed “Viceroy” in the region (see Thomson 2002: 190), leading an indigenous army that laid siege to the city of La Paz in 1781 for 184 days. When finally defeated and captured, Katari was publicly quartered and parts of his body were sent to regions around La Paz as a macabre warning to would-be rebels. As the quote from Evo Morales at the beginning of this chapter suggests, Túpaj Katari/Julián Apaza (along with his consort, Bartolina Sisa) has symbolic significance for members of the indigenous movement today due to his stance against European colonialism. The statement that Katari made before his death – “I die, but one day I will come back, converted into thousands and thousands” – has become a rallying cry for indigenous organizations, especially those with an Aymara base.221 “Túpaj Katari” is also a name synonymous with “savagery” for many Bolivians, a point that suggests some of the divisions in Bolivia today.222

221 Hurtado 1986: 18, trans. mine. In Spanish, the statement is: “Yo muero, pero un día volveré convertido en miles y miles.” There are several slight variations on this quote/slogan.

222 Túpach Katari was clearly a brutal military leader, but as Thomson (2002) suggests, there is also a racial element to the association of Katari with brutality, highlighting stereotypes about “savage” “natives.”
Institutional Background since 1982

At the national level, Bolivia has, in Gamarra (1997)’s terms, a “hybrid presidential” system. Both the president and the members of the legislature are elected in simultaneous elections every five years. The legislature consists of a 27-member Senate and 130-member Chamber of Deputies. The Senate includes three representatives for each of the nine departments, while departmental representation in the lower house varies roughly according to population. Since the 1997 elections, 62 of the deputies have been elected from party lists by proportional representation (“plurinominal candidates” [“candidatos plurinominales”]), while 68 deputies have been elected directly by First Past the Post voting in 68 single-member districts (“uninominal candidates” [“candidatos uninominales”]). Previously, all lower house seats were elected by PR under several different counting rules. Table 5.2 summarizes basic facts about the electoral system.

Voting is obligatory for all citizens at least 18 years old. Since the 1997 elections, voters have cast two votes. One is for a party, to select the president and vice-president, departmental Senators, and plurinominal deputies. The second vote is for the uninominal candidate in each constituency.

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223 Until 1996, the term was four years. Presidents cannot hold consecutive terms in office.
224 Law No. 1585 (12 August 1994) and Law No. 1704 (2 August 1996).
225 Before 1997, there was a single ballot for all executive and legislative seats.
Table 5.2: Bolivian Legislative Election Rules, Elections 1980-2005
(Changes are indicated in italics)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Years</th>
<th>Electoral System</th>
<th>Number of Seats in Chamber of Deputies</th>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Formula for PR Seats</th>
<th>Relevant Legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
<td>Constitution, Article 90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>“Double quotient of participation and allocation of seats” = hindered access of small parties to Congress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>List PR</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>Sainte-Lagué = encouraged small parties</td>
<td>Law No. 1246 (5 July 1991)227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)</td>
<td>130 (68 chosen by FPTP in single-member districts and 62 by List PR)</td>
<td>4 years</td>
<td>D’Hondt with 3% threshold</td>
<td>Law No. 1585 (12 August 1994) and Law No. 1704 (2 August 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002, 2005</td>
<td>MMP</td>
<td>130 (68 chosen by FPTP in single-member districts and 62 by List PR)</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>D’Hondt</td>
<td>Law No. 1585 (12 August 1994)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the election of the president and vice-president, if no party wins an absolute majority, the newly-elected Congress votes on the two top candidates (before 1996, between the top three). In the congressional vote, the candidate who wins an absolute majority is elected. If no candidate wins an absolute majority, the congressional vote is repeated. If an absolute majority is still not achieved, the candidate who won a simple majority is elected. If no candidate wins an absolute majority, the congressional vote is repeated. If an absolute majority is still not achieved, the candidate who won a simple majority is elected.

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227 Artículo 133. “a) Los votos obtenidos por cada partido, frente, alianza o coalición, se dividirán entre la serie de divisores impares en forma correlativa, continua y obligada (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, etc.) según sea necesario en cada Departamento. B) Los cocientes resultantes de estas operaciones, dispuestos en estricto orden descendente (de mayor a menor), servirán para la adjudicación de las diputaciones correspondientes por cada Departamento según lo dispuesto en al Artículo 132.”
majority in the popular vote is elected president.

In all elections since the democratic transition until 2005, no candidate won an absolute majority, meaning that all Bolivian presidents were chosen through congressional vote and coalition bargaining. A rather unique feature of this system is that Bolivian presidents have been routinely elected with roughly a third the popular vote and several have had only the second or third highest popular vote share. It is this characteristic of the party system that leads to its label as “parliamentarized presidential” because the president, although not subject to legislative confidence, tends to be chosen by congress in post-election bargaining (Mayorga 2001). The 2005 elections were the first in the current democratic period in which the president won outright in the popular vote.

In the Senate elections, the party that receives the most votes in each department receives two seats. The party that runs second receives the third seat. In the Chamber, for the uninominal seats in each of the 68 constituencies, the candidate who places first, wins. For the plurinominal seats in the Chamber, each of the nine departments is treated as a multi-member district with a fixed number of seats. Seats are assigned basically by the d'Hondt formula, with a 3 percent threshold, but in a compensatory manner, taking into account the uninominal seats won and respecting List PR results. As Table 5.2

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228 For instance, Hugo Banzer Suárez (ADN) placed first (32.8 percent) in the general elections of 1985, but the parliament elected second-place winner, Víctor Paz Estenssoro (MNR, 30.4 percent), president of Bolivia, in a vote of 94 to 51 (see Mesa Gisbert 2003: 744-5). In the 1989 general elections, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (MNR) placed first (25.7 percent), followed by Hugo Banzer (ADN, 25.2 percent) and Jaime Paz Zamora (MIR, 21.8 percent), but it was Paz Zamora who began president.

229 Specifically, the number of uninominal seats won by each party in each department is subtracted from the total number of seats in each department to get the remaining number of seats that can be won by each
illuminates, Bolivia’s electoral rules and formulas have been remarkably unstable.

Electoral reforms in 1986, 1991, and 1994, as Mayorga (2001) notes, “were characterized by short-term calculations and contingent reactions to political pressures, and not by research or deliberate political engineering.”

At the sub-national level, Bolivia has three layers of government, the department (departamento), province (provincia), and municipality (municipio). There are nine departments, 112 provinces, and 327 municipalities. Informally, the country can be divided regionally into the “Highlands” and the “Lowlands,” or the “west” and the “east.” These distinctions roughly map on to what some Camba Nation groups designate as “Alto Perú” and the “Nación Camba.” (See Figure 5.3)

In the current democratic period, elections have been held for municipal governments since 1987, although these elections did not take on much meaning until decentralization began after 1994 (see Albó and Quispe 2004). Municipal governments, elected through List PR (d’Hondt formula), consist of a mayor and a 5, 7, 9, or 11-member council, depending on the size of the municipality. In addition to the party. Thus, a party that wins no votes on the party ballot (i.e., PR votes), but whose candidates win uninominal constituencies, wins those legislative seats. Assuming a party wins both plurinominal and uninominal seats, however, it can only win as many seats overall as determined by its PR votes. In other words, as Mayorga (2001) explains, “if a party wins 10 seats through the overall List PR voting, and five seats in single-member districts, it is ultimately entitled to ten parliamentary seats.” The “reallocated” 5 seats would then be assigned by party list position. Before the current Mixed Member Proportional system was established for the 1997 elections, all seats were allocated by List PR. Several different formulas were used to translate votes into seats. The 1978, 1979, 1980, and 1985 elections were held under the d’Hondt formula. The 1989 elections were held under a “double quotient of participation and allocation of seats.” The 1993 elections were held under the Sainte-Laguë formula, which encouraged the representation of small parties. The 1997, 2002, and 2005 elections have used the formula described above.

Further changes seem likely. One of the major campaign issues in 2005 was the demand by PODEMOS (an acronym that, in Spanish, means “we can”) that all lower house seats be uninominal (i.e., elected through FPTP in single member districts). PODEMOS argued that uninominal deputies were more tied to and accountable to their constituencies than plurinominal (i.e., PR-elected) deputies.
government, there are a variety of social and non-governmental, non-party political
groups organized at the municipal and sub-municipal level – these include in particular
_ayllus_ and vigilance committees. At the departmental level, prefectural governments
have been elected since December 2005. Prior to 2005, prefectural governments were
appointed. There were also “civic committees” active in each department throughout the
current democratic period, which represent department-level interests (especially in urban
areas) and were instrumental in mobilizing for the December 2005 prefectural elections.

**Broad Trends in the Party System**

The origins of the current Bolivian party system can be traced to the first half of
the 19th century and the history loosely divided into three periods. From the time of the
1825 constituent assembly until the early 20th century, parties had their origins in political
factions and functioned like elite clubs.²³¹ In the early to mid 20th century, parties with
more broad-based appeals and attempts at mass mobilization began to emerge, although
they were still dominated by elite groups. Since democratization in 1982, popular
criticism of the traditional party system has highlighted the disconnect between mass
mobilization and elite party domination, and several new parties have emerged with
stronger “mass” ties to social movements and popular leaders. The system has also seen
the emergence of “electoral groups,” which have looser registration requirements than
traditional parties. In the 2004 municipal elections and 2005 general elections, “citizens’

²³¹ As Gamarra and Malloy (1995) describe, Bolivian parties had their origins in factions divided in the
founding Assembly of 1825 over how to define Bolivia’s boundaries (399). These factions were
“extremely narrow and had more to do with personal struggles for power than with programmatic issues,
and did not constitute the basis for forming governments” (399).
groups” and “indigenous peoples” competed directly, alongside registered “political parties.” In general, the main difference between these electoral groups is in terms of registration requirements.

**Table 5.3: The Bolivian Party System, 1825-2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period 1 (19th – early 20th c.)</th>
<th>Type of Parties</th>
<th>Type of Party System (in Sartori’s terms)</th>
<th>Suffrage and Political Liberalization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite parties</td>
<td>Two-party, with limited pluralism in some periods</td>
<td>Participation limited to &lt;10% of adult men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period 3 (since mid 1980s)</td>
<td>Deepening of mass party ties (and search for “non-party” alternatives)</td>
<td>Limited pluralism, with the effective number of parties increasing from 3 to 6</td>
<td>Universal suffrage. Democratic transition, 1982, and various constitutional reforms to increase participation, mid 1990s. Constituent assembly, 2006.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These three periods of Bolivia’s party history highlight an evolution from elite to mass parties. They also can be characterized in terms of Sartori (1976)’s classification of party systems. During most of the first period, there was a two-party or limited plurality system, dominated at different periods by the Liberal and Conservative or Liberal and Republican parties. During the second period, the system began as one of limited pluralism, became a hegemonic party system dominated by the Revolutionary Nationalist

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232 Klein argues that Bolivia’s history with modern multiparty politics dates from about the end of the War of the Pacific with Chile (1884-1879) (Klein 1969; see also Hofmeister and Bamberger 1993). For nearly half a century, this system was dominated by the Conservative and Liberal parties of Eliodoro Camacho and Narcisco Campero respectively. The initial difference between Camacho and Campero was in their positions on war. Camacho and the Conservatives presented a more pacifist stance against the more bellicose position of Campero and the Liberals. The Liberal position was developed further in 1883, when the party published its first manifesto. The manifesto set out a liberal ideological stance in favor of individual rights, political liberty, smaller government, and a liberal economy.
Movement party (*Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* – MNR), and then transitioned back to limited pluralism. (However, during 1964-1982, with the exception of a few years, Bolivia was under military dictatorship.) During the third period, the system has been one of limited pluralism. The absolute number of parties has fluctuated between 8 and 12, while the effective number of parties (using the Laasko formula) fluctuated between 4 and 6 between 1980 and 2002, and dropped to 2.62 in 2005.

**Figure 5.5: Number of Parties, Bolivian General Elections 1980-2005**

The three periods of party development in Bolivia can also be described in terms of suffrage and political participation. Figure 5.5 and Table 5.4 illustrate the evolution in suffrage over time from 1844 to 2002. During the first period, suffrage was extremely limited, with less than 10 percent of the population granted the right to vote. Citizenship under the constitutions of this period (1826, 1831, 1834, 1839, 1843, 1851, 1861, 1868,
1871, 1878, 1883, 1938, and 1947) was generally defined by the ability to read and write and by minimum property requirements (Barragán 2005: 288-292). During the second period, which overlapped with the National Revolution, universal suffrage was granted (in 1952). The 1961 constitution gave citizenship rights to all Bolivians (Barragán 2005: 292). The third period brought the restoration of constitutional authority to Bolivia and a return to free and competitive multiparty politics. Key reforms were also undertaken in 1994 with the goal of broadening popular participation.

Figure 5.6: Estimated Percentage of the Population that Votes, 1840-2002

(Based on Table 5.4)

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233 Based on data presented in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Suffrage in Bolivia, 1840-2002
(From Barragán 2005: 299-300, Table 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of citizen votes</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Estimated total adult male population</th>
<th>Estimated total adult population</th>
<th>Estimated % of adult population that votes</th>
<th>Estimated % of adult male population that votes (1840-1952)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>8,073 [16,168 voters]</td>
<td>1,378,896</td>
<td>385,842</td>
<td>799,760</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>6,641</td>
<td>1,378,896</td>
<td>399,879</td>
<td>799,760</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>7,331</td>
<td>1,378,896</td>
<td>399,879</td>
<td>799,760</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>5,935</td>
<td>1,378,896</td>
<td>399,879</td>
<td>799,760</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>14,414 [13,766]</td>
<td>2,326,126</td>
<td>674,577</td>
<td>1,349,153</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>16,939</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
<td>22,912</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>35,081</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1872</td>
<td>14,186 [14,349]</td>
<td>1,172,156</td>
<td>339,924</td>
<td>679,850</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>16,674</td>
<td>1,172,156</td>
<td>339,924</td>
<td>679,850</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>30,465</td>
<td>1,172,156</td>
<td>339,924</td>
<td>679,850</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>34,418/32,110</td>
<td>1,402,884</td>
<td>406,836</td>
<td>813,673</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>35,785</td>
<td>1,402,884</td>
<td>406,836</td>
<td>813,673</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>42,228</td>
<td>1,633,610</td>
<td>473,747</td>
<td>947,494</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>34,803</td>
<td>1,633,610</td>
<td>473,747</td>
<td>947,494</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>78,622</td>
<td>1,633,610</td>
<td>473,747</td>
<td>947,494</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>79,281</td>
<td>1,633,610</td>
<td>473,747</td>
<td>947,494</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>54,068</td>
<td>1,633,610</td>
<td>473,747</td>
<td>947,494</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>58,060</td>
<td>3,080,921</td>
<td>893,467</td>
<td>1,786,934</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>126,123</td>
<td>3,080,921</td>
<td>893,467</td>
<td>1,786,934</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>955,349</td>
<td>3,328,450</td>
<td>1,930,501</td>
<td></td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>987,373</td>
<td>3,576,010</td>
<td>2,074,086</td>
<td></td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>127,249</td>
<td>3,823,570</td>
<td>2,217,671</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,099,994</td>
<td>3,941,350</td>
<td>2,285,983</td>
<td></td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,971,968</td>
<td>4,808,176</td>
<td>2,788,742</td>
<td></td>
<td>70.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,693,233</td>
<td>4,905,521</td>
<td>2,845,202</td>
<td></td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,489,484</td>
<td>5,002,866</td>
<td>2,901,662</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,728,365</td>
<td>5,489,591</td>
<td>3,183,963</td>
<td></td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1,573,790</td>
<td>5,878,971</td>
<td>3,409,803</td>
<td></td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1,731,309</td>
<td>6,597,627</td>
<td>3,826,624</td>
<td></td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2,321,117</td>
<td>7,300,441</td>
<td>4,234,256</td>
<td></td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2,994,065</td>
<td>8,501,041</td>
<td>4,930,604</td>
<td></td>
<td>60.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Columns 1-3 are copied exactly. Column 4 is copied exactly for the years 1840-1896 and estimated using the same formula Barragán uses for 1904-2002. Column 5 is estimated using the same percentage Barragán used throughout to estimate the adult population (58%); it is intended as a rough estimate, not equivalent to census figures. Column 5 is recalculated. Column 6 is equivalent to Barragán’s column 4 for 1840-1896 with some rounding differences, and the inclusion of new calculations for years 1904-1951, during which women did not have the vote.
Parties before the National Revolution and the Birth of the MNR

As Gamarra and Malloy (1995) describe, parties in 19th and early 20th century Bolivia were mainly “parties of notables” that functioned in Congress, while excluding “the middle and lower sectors of Bolivian society from participation and positions of power within the party structure” (400). In the early 20th century, strong challenges to this system began to emerge. In the 1920s, there were several major revolts by miners and indigenous groups that the state violently suppressed. As the Bolivian middle class grew, there were also increasingly organized non-party groups that stood in opposition to the dominant Liberal oligarchy.

As Klein (1969) argues, it was the Chaco War, however, that triggered change in the party system. Beginning in 1932 with Bolivia’s attack on Paraguay, the war lasted until 1935 and claimed some 57,000 lives. The Chaco War had two key effects. First, Bolivia’s defeat highlighted failures of leadership by the government and traditional elites. Second, the war itself brought close contact between indigenous and mestizo-Creole soldiers, which had a nationalizing effect. Returning home, a new generation of Chaco War veterans entered politics, bringing with them a new spirit of populism, and a

235 For instance, the Jesús de Macaca revolt in 1921, Mining Massacre at Uncía, and the revolt at Chayanta in 1927.
236 The Chaco War was fought over the border between Paraguay and Bolivia over control of the Chaco region. After Bolivia lost its access to the Pacific Ocean to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884), becoming a landlocked nation, the Chaco region became increasingly important to Bolivia as it sought to gain access to the Atlantic Ocean. The region was largely undeveloped, but believed to contain oil reserves (some minor discoveries by Standard Oil in Bolivia and Royal Dutch Shell in Paraguay).
237 The defeat in fact led directly to a brief period in which traditional elites fought over power. In 1934, in the first military coup since 1800, the government of Daniel Salamanca (Republican) was overthrown, bringing to power José Luis Tejada Sorzano (Liberal). As Klein (1969) notes: “The return to pre-war politics was only a transitional stage before the complete breakdown of the traditional political system” (199).
dedication to *mestizaje* and the incorporation of the indigenous population into the national project (see Sanjines 2004).

During the post-Chaco War period, a number of new parties were founded, many drawing on earlier non-party political movements. The four of the most important of these were the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (*Partido Obrero Revolucionario*—POR); the Revolutionary Left Party (*Partido Izquierda Revolucionario*—PIR); the Nationalist Revolutionary Party (*Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*—MNR); and the Bolivian Socialist Falange (*Falange Socialista Boliviana*—FSB) (see Klein 1969). The POR, a Trotskyite party, was founded in exile in Argentina in 1934. The FSB, a nationalist party with ties to the Spanish socialists, was founded in exile in Chile in 1937. The PIR, a Marxist party, was founded in 1940.

Of these four parties, the MNR, in particular, became a force in the opposition. Founded in 1942, the MNR was initially led by a group of journalists who had begun to organize in the 1920s and promoted an ideology of “revolutionary nationalism.” Party leaders described the MNR as “antifeudal, anticapitalist, and antioligarchic” (Gamarra and Malloy 1995: 401-2), highlighting their opposition to the traditional oligarchy and their goal of increasing political participation. In its early years, the party’s statements also had, as Gamarra and Malloy note, an “antiliberal, anti-Marxist, and anti-Semitic” edge (1995: 401-2).\(^{238}\) Although explicit in its written documents, the MNR’s anti-Semitism was generally not stressed in its popular message. Its stated opposition to Marxism likewise did not prevent it from allying with workers’ organizations, one of the

\(^{238}\) They continue: “later charges of links to European National Socialism were not unfounded” (401).
central aspects of its mobilization strategy.

Through the 1940s, the MNR built a more broad-based, mass organization than any of the early Bolivian parties had attempted. It drew its support mainly from Chaco War veterans’ associations, peasant unions of Quechua farmers in the Cochabamba valley, and the mestizo-Creole middle class. Although the MNR had broader support among “indigenous” populations than did previous parties, it did not appeal to them at the national level in “indigenous” terms. Instead, the language of class figured centrally in its message, which was based in an explicitly “multi-class” appeal (Jettè 1989, Lora 1987, Rolan Anaya 1999). It also gained the support of the mining unions, including the powerful Syndicate Federation of Mining Workers of Bolivia (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia—FSTMB).

The National Revolution and MNR Hegemony

In May 1951, presidential elections were held and the MNR made a last attempt to obtain power through the polls. When it became clear that the MNR candidates would be elected, the army intervened, annulled the elections, and established a military junta led by General Hugo Ballivián. On April 9, 1952, the MNR seized power in a military coup (followed in 1956 by elections) and proceeded to carry out a series of broad social and political reforms. This national revolution, modeled after Mexico’s, was the first and only one of its kind in South America.239 Under the leadership of presidents Víctor Paz Estenssoro (1952-1956 and 1960-1964) and Hernán Siles Zuazo (1956-1960), the MNR

239 The third Latin American revolution often placed in this group is the Cuban Revolution (1959).
held power from 1952 to 1964. During 1952-1956, it worked in “co-government” with the Bolivian Workers’ Central (Central Obrera Boliviana—COB), led by Juan Lechin Oquendo. The co-government structure involved the participation of three to five “worker ministers” in each government (Ibañiez Rojo 1993: 20; see also Lazarte 1988: 121). The strength of workers’ political organization in this period was impressive, even when compared to others’ in the region. As Jette (1989) notes: “The Bolivian workers’ movement was long considered the vanguard workers movement in Latin America” (13). The program of reform carried out as part of the National Revolution was far-reaching (although some on the left note that it could have gone farther). Universal suffrage was introduced in July 1952, incorporating for the first time both women and adult men previously excluded by literacy and property requirements (see Table 5.4). In late 1952, the government moved to nationalize the mines. This included the creation of the state-owned Mining Bank of Bolivia (Banco Minero de Bolivia) to administer the export and sale of all minerals, the creation of the Mining Corporation of Bolivia (Corporación Minera de Bolivia – Comibol) to run the state-owned enterprises, and the nationalization of the three major tin companies (Patiño, Hoschild, and Aramayo). Next, the government undertook land reform. The Agrarian Reform Law of August 1953 abolished forced labor and redistributed estates of low productivity to peasants. The state also undertook education reform, with particular focus on extending education to rural areas. Finally, it moved to change the structure of the army and to reduce its power.

240 “El movimiento obrero boliviano ha sido considerado durante mucho tiempo como la vanguardia del movimiento obrero en América Latina” (Jetté 1989: 13).
241 See also Dunkerley 2003 [1987]; Gordillo 2000; Grindle and Domingo 2003.
242 For instance, the military college was closed and the number of officers reduced.
During the twelve years of MNR government from 1952 to 1964, elections were held every two years. The MNR's electoral hegemony during this period is illustrated in Figure 5.7 and Table 5.5. At least ten different parties contested elections from 1952-1964, but the MNR won upwards of 75 percent in every election. Its vote share ranged from a high of 97.9 percent in 1964 to a low of 76.1 percent in 1960, the first election in which the Authentic Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario Autentico*—PRA), an MNR spin-off, competed.

**Figure 5.7: MNR Hegemony, General Elections 1952-1964**

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243 Przeworski et al.'s dataset categorizes these years nevertheless as dictatorship.

244 The PRA was founded in 1960 by former MNR leader Walter Guevara Arce in order to support his electoral bid against Paz Estenssoro (Jettè 1989: 78).
### Table 5.5: MNR Hegemony – Election Results, 1956-1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>84.4%</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>76.1%</td>
<td>84.8%</td>
<td>97.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCB</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POR</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRA</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1.8%</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBA</td>
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<td>1.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCN</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIN</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% blank &amp; null votes</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% valid votes</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>97.9%</td>
<td>98.0%</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% voted</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>91.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity Score</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Aside from the PRA, the main opposition parties during this period were the Bolivian Socialist Falange (*Falange Socialista Boliviana*—FSB) and the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (*Partido Obrero Revolucionario*—POR), both founded about the same time as the MNR, and the newer Bolivian Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Boliviana*—PCB). The FSB, by far the most successful opposition party during this period, maintained a right-wing platform, but also stood simply as a party in opposition to MNR hegemony. The POR, by contrast, maintained a Trotskyite line, while the PCB followed a Marxist-Leninist line. Founded in 1950, the PCB had its roots in the Revolutionary Left Party (*Partido Izquierda Revolucionario*—PIR), which was founded in the same period as the POR, FSB, and MNR. Other parties that contested elections during this period included the Social Christian Party (*Partido Social Cristiano*—PSC),

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245 Source for election results: Nohlen 2005: 77. Democracy data is from Pérez-Liñán dataset on regimes.
the Bolivian Civic Action (*Accion Civica Boliviana*—ACB), the National Civic Union (*Union Civica Nacional*—UCN), the Bolivian Anticommunist Front (*Frente Boliviano Anticomunista*—FBA), and the Revolutionary Party of the Nationalist Left (*Partido Revolucionario de la Izquierda Nacionalista*—PRIN). None of these parties ever won more than 2 percent of the vote in a general election.

**Military Rule, Rebellion, and Indigenous Mobilization, 1964-1982**

In November 1964, vice president General René Barrientos seized power from Paz Estenssoro in a military coup. Over the next eighteen years, Bolivia was under almost continuous military dictatorship. Eleven coups d’états were staged, in 1964, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1978 (twice), 1979, 1980, 1981 (twice), and 1982 – an average of more than one coup every other year. Four elections were also held (1966, 1978, 1979, and 1980). Civilian governments were in power in 1966-1969 (under Barrientos and, after his death, Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas), 1979 (Wálter Guevara Arze, PRA), and 1979-80 (Lidia Gueiler Tejada, MNR). Table 5.6 provides an overview of the governments from 1964 to 1982.

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246 The 1978 results were later annulled.
Table 5.6: Bolivian Governments, 1964-1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Regime Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1964-1965</td>
<td>René Barrientos Ortuño</td>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>René Barrientos Ortuño and Alfredo Ovando Candia</td>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(co-presidents)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Alfredo Ovando Candia</td>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1969</td>
<td>René Barrientos Ortuño</td>
<td>Electoral democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas</td>
<td>Electoral democracy (Succeeded after Barrientos’s death)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1970</td>
<td>Alfredo Ovando Candia</td>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td>Juan José Torres González</td>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1978</td>
<td>Hugo Banzer Suárez</td>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Juan Pereda Asbún</td>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-1979</td>
<td>David Padilla Arancibia</td>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Wálder Guevara Arze</td>
<td>Electoral democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Alberto Natusch Busch</td>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-1980</td>
<td>Lidia Gueiler Tejada</td>
<td>Electoral democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1981</td>
<td>Luis García Meza Tejada</td>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Celso Torrelio, Waldo Bernal, and Óscar Pammo (Governing junta)</td>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1982</td>
<td>Celso Torrelio Villa</td>
<td>Military dictatorship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1960s are an important period for understanding the development of indigenous and campesino social movements. Especially after 1956, with the collapse of the MNR-COB co-government, the relationship between workers and campesinos, on the one hand, and the state, on the other, entered a period of instability. As the MNR attempted to manipulate the peasantry for political gain, campesinos gradually turned to the military for protection, a relationship that came to be known as the Military-Campesino Pact (Pacto Campesino-Militar). When they took power in November 1964, Barrientos and his supporters pledged to revive the National Revolution. The years under

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248 My classification.
Barrientos (1964-1969) extended the pact, effectively co-opting independent *campesino* organizations, especially in the areas of the Cochabamba valley where the pact was strongest.  

At the same time, beginning in the 1960s, urban Aymara migrants to La Paz began to organize in a number of cultural and unionist organizations, which in the 1970s, became known as the “Katarista” movement. Katarism remains the most established “indigenous ideology” in Bolivia. Its basic principles were set out in the Tiwanaku Manifesto (1973). The movement took its name from the leader of the 1781 rebellion, Túpac Katari. Over time, the Katarista movement, which had begun among urban university students, expanded to address issues that tied together urban and rural concerns. In 1969, for instance, Aymara residents in La Paz formed the Center for *Campesino* Promotion and Coordination—MINK’A (*Centro de Promoción y Coordinación Campesina—MINK’A*) with the goal of promoting rural and urban education. In 1971, Highland *campesinos* and city residents formed the Tupac Katari *Campesino* Center (*Centro Campesino Tupaq Katari*) (Rivera C. 2003: 153). Among *campesinos*, Rivera C. (2003) argues, the Katarista project tapped into the demands of a new rural generation, a product of agrarian reform during the National Revolution, that

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249 The first Barrientos government was from November 1964 to May 1965. It was replaced in May 1965 by the “co-presidency” of Barrientos and General Alfredo Ovando. In July 1966, Barrientos sought to legitimize his leadership through elections. Running as the Front of the Bolivian Revolution (*Frente de la Revolución Boliviana*—FRB), a grouping of minor parties of the center and right and dissident groups from the MNR, Barrientos won these elections with 67.1 percent of the vote (Rolon Anaya: 228). The FRB pledged to revive the revolution, with calls for a Restoring Revolution (“*Revolución Restauradora*”) and Second Republic (“*Segunda República*”).

250 The classic statement of its history and ideas is Javier Hurtado’s *El Katarismo*.

251 Early organizations included the “November 15th Movement” (*Movimiento 15 de Noviembre*), a study group whose name commemorated the date of Tupaq Katari’s death that focused on the work of Fausto Reynaga, and the Julian Apaza University Movement (*Movimiento Universitario Julián Apaza*—MUJA) (Rivera C. 2003: 151, citing Hurtado 1986).
had begun to realize the problems inherent in the system and sought to defend their own culture (151-2). By the late 1960s and 1970s, she describes, rural Kataristas began to exercise increasing influence in the campesino syndicates of the Highlands, especially around La Paz. The campesino and indigenous movements gained increasing support as the Military-Campesino Pact began to break down and repression in the countryside increased, especially under the dictatorship of Hugo Banzer (1971-1978).

In the late 1970s, the Katarista movement divided into two main currents, a more moderate “Katarista” branch, and a more extreme “Indianista” branch. Indianistas like Luciano Tapia (quoted at the beginning of this chapter) called for the sovereignty or autonomy of an Aymara or indigenous state and explicitly rejected what they saw as foreign/imposed class-based labels such as “campesino.” In the late 1970s, these groups formed two main political parties, the Katarista Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari--MRTK) and the Indianista Tupaj Katari Indian Movement (Movimiento Indio Tupaj Katari—MITKA). (Later on, both of these parties split further, dividing into the MRTK and MRTKL, and MITKA and MITKA-1.) Other minor parties also emerged with similar ideological roots (see Van Cott 2005).

252 “Resulta entonces explicable su defensa de la cultura propia y su vehementemente rechazo a las manipulaciones que sufrian a travs del aparato sindical, manipulaciones que eran calificadas como una forma de pongueaje politico, es decir, como una aproximaci6n servil-colonial al poder” (152).

253 A key event was the Tolata Massacre (January 1974) in which the government killed or wounded more than 100 campesinos who were demonstrating against price increases.

254 In general, they also reject the term “indigenous” (“indigena”) for related reasons. “Indigenous” is sometimes defined in class-terms in Bolivia as synonymous with campesino (for instance, in the census). Indianistas, as their name suggests, tend to use the term “Indian,” or to speak specifically of the Aymara nation, etc.
The “Traditional” Party System on the Eve of Democratization

The slow move back towards democratic rule began in the late 1970s when several factors converged to push Banzer to hold elections. For one, it had become clear that the economic boom was over. In 1976, GDP growth was 6.1 percent. From 1976 until 1982, it dropped each year until it reached a low of -4.36 percent in 1982 (see Figure 6.1). Internationally, the U.S. placed increasing pressure on Banzer to improve the country’s human rights record. Domestically, civil society groups were increasingly mobilized. In holding elections in 1978, Banzer sought to legitimize his regime. Although he initially planned to stand himself, eventually, Banzer backed Juan Pereda Asbún, his Minister of the Interior, and the newly-formed National Union of the People (Unión Nacionalista del Pueblo—UNP), which grouped together various small parties and factions (Mesa 2003: 710). The other major groupings to contest the election were the MNR and the Popular Democratic Union (Unión Democrática Popular—UDP), a leftist coalition composed of the MNRI, MIR, and PCB, that would become the first party in government after democratization in 1982. The MNR’s influence remained strong, in both the MNRI and UDP. The MNRI, whose leader Siles Zuazo led the UDP ticket, was one of the main parties split off from the MNR.

Among the new parties, the MIR, founded in 1971, was a moderate leftist party with a strong base among students and younger voters. Founded in opposition to military rule, it became one of the main “traditional,” established parties in the democratic period.
MITKA also competed for the first time in these elections, although it remained a minor party throughout. Other minor parties included the Revolutionary Leftist Front (*Frente Revolucionario de Izquierda*—FRI) (f. 1978), whose vice presidential candidate was the Domitila Chungara quoted at the beginning of this section.

The 1978 elections were marked by fraud. As expected, Pereda and the UNP won a majority, but with a vote of just 50 percent (even despite the electoral irregularities), this victory was unexpectedly slim. The leftist UDP placed second with 25 percent, followed by the MNR with 11 percent. (The MITKA won 0.6 percent.) Several days later, Pereda overthrew Banzer in a military coup. The Pereda government, however, was promptly faced with strong opposition from the main opposition parties of the election, the UDP, MNRA, and PS-1, and lasted less than two months. During the five years between 1978 and 1982, Bolivia had nine different governments. In November 1978, another military coup brought to power a new military junta under General David Padilla. Padilla was supported by a faction of the Armed Forces (FFAA) that favored bringing a new military government to power in order to make way for democratic transition and his government called elections for June 1, 1979 (Mesa 2003: 715).

The key competitors in the 1979 elections were similar to those in 1978: for the presidency, Siles Zuazo, Paz Estenssoro, Banzer, and Quiroga Santa Cruz. Siles Zuazo, a

255 For instance, results showed 67,155 more votes counted than registered voters (1,922,556) (Mesa 2003b: 158).
256 He was supported by the Council of National Unity (*Consejo de Unidad Nacional*—CUN).
member of the MNRI, ran again with the UDP, Quiroga Santa Cruz with the PS-1, and Paz Estenssoro with the MNR Alliance (*Alianza del MNR*—AMNR), the new name of the core MNR party. The former dictator Banzer also contested the election, with a new party, National Democratic Action (*Acción Democrática Nacional*—ADN). Founded about two months before the election in March, the ADN was initially a means to support Banzer’s candidacy, but became a key right-wing party in the democratic period with a platform stressing discipline, order, and in particular neo-liberal economic policy. Among the minor parties, the *Indianista* MITKA also contested again.

The results of the 1979 elections, shown in Table 5.7, were a virtual tie between the UDP (35.99 percent) and AMNR (35.89 percent).²⁵⁷ Banzer’s ADN came in third (12.9 percent), followed by Quiroga Santa Cruz’s PS-1 (4.2 percent).²⁵⁸ The *Indianista* party MITKA won a high of 2.7 percent in La Paz and 1.8 percent in the country as a whole. This turnout was more than double its 1978 showing and earned the party one seat in Congress.

²⁵⁷ In Jetté 1989, results are 31.2 to 31.1 percent.
²⁵⁸ Despite the UDP’s slightly higher vote share, however, the AMNR in fact won more legislative seats, 64 compared to 46. This was because more seats were allocated to rural areas, where the MNR had its strongest support (Jetté 1989: 136). The results also revealed a strong regional division in party support. In the largest department of La Paz (35.6 percent of the population), the UDP won a plurality with 43.3 percent, while in the smaller eastern departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Pando, the AMNR won a majority (53.2, 62, and 54.3 percent respectively), reflecting the AMNR’s strong ties with the elites of the eastern lowlands. The AMNR, reflecting its history, also performed well in the mining departments of Potosi and Oruro, with 46.4 percent and 37.8 percent of the vote respectively. In Chuquisaca, the UDP and AMNR were tied with 34.4 percent each. The rightist ADN’s strongest support came from lowlands especially in Beni and Pando (32.7 and 22.7 percent). It also had significant support in Santa Cruz (14.6 percent) and Cochabamba (15.9 percent). Among the minor parties, MITKA and the leftist PS-1, on the other hand, were strongest in the western Highlands, particularly La Paz and Oruro, the only department where PS-1 earned over 5 percent.
Table 5.7: Results of the July 1979 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% of national electorate</th>
<th>UDP</th>
<th>AMNR</th>
<th>ADN</th>
<th>PS-1</th>
<th>MITKA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosí</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of elected parliamentarians

46  64  22  5  1

The virtual tie between the UDP and AMNR led to a fierce congressional battle over the presidency, eventually resulting in the designation of Wálter Guevara Arce, president of the Senate, as constitutional president for one year. Along with Paz Estenssoro and Siles Zuazo, Guevara Arce was one of the founders of the MNR, although he had left the party in the 1960s to form the Authentic Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Auténtico—PRA). Guevara held office for just three months before being overthrown by a military coup led by Colonel Alberto Natusch Busch in November. The coup was supported by some sectors of the military, along with some MNR and MNRI parliamentarians (see Mesa 2003: 721). After sixteen days of negotiations, the FFAA agreed to accept Natusch Busch’s resignation if Guevara Arce would not return to power (Mesa 2003: 723).

260 The coup was supported by some sectors of the military, along with some MNR and MNRI parliamentarians (see Mesa 2003: 721).
261 Negotiations led eventually to the appointment of Lidia Gueiler Tejada (MNR), president of the Chamber of Deputies, as Bolivia’s new
By the time Gueiler took office, the economic crisis was clear. Economic growth had fallen to 3.40 percent in 1978, and inflation had risen to 10.36 percent. Gueiler’s government took several measures to respond to the crisis, including the devaluation of the boliviano. These measures prompted protest from both workers and campesinos, including the COB and the CSUTCB. Amidst this environment of uncertainty, the Gueiler government held scheduled elections in June 1980.

The 1980 elections are significant because it was on the basis of these results that Bolivia’s new democratic government was formed in October 1982. Like the 1979 elections, they once again revealed no clear majority and expected deadlock. The vote for Siles Zuazo and the UDP, on the one hand, however, increased slightly to 38.7 percent (57 seats), while support for Paz Estenssoro and the MNR declined by more than 10 percent to 20.1 (44 seats), a decline explained in part by the unpopularity of the Gueiler government’s economic policies. Support for the smaller parties increased at the MNR’s expense: the vote for Banzer and ADN rose from 12.9 to 16.8; Quiroga Santa Cruz and the PS-1 more than doubled their support from 4.2 to 8.7; and the two Indianista MITKA factions (MITKA and MITKA-1) doubled their combined legislative representation from one to two representatives, with a vote share increasing from 1.8 to 2.5 percent.262

262 Once again a regional split was evident in the results, this time even more pronounced, with clear division between the “eastern” and “western”/Andean departments. In La Paz, Cochabamba, Potosí, Oruro, and Chuquisaca, the leftist UDP achieved the highest vote share, and in La Paz, it won a majority (51.6 percent). In all of the eastern lowlands departments (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando), the AMNR won
Table 5.8: Results of the June 1980 General Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>% of national electorate</th>
<th>UDP</th>
<th>AMNR</th>
<th>ADN</th>
<th>PS-1</th>
<th>MITKA &amp; MITKA-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosi</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of elected parliamentarians</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Just a month after the 1980 elections, Luis García Meza Tejada, head of a hardline group in the Armed Forces and a participant in the November 1979 coup led by Alberto Natusch Busch, seized power. García Meza’s period of rule (July 1980 – 1981) was marked by severe repression and human rights violations, as well as a rise in narcotrafficking. As pressures for political liberalization mounted, García Mesa voluntarily resigned in favor of a three-man military junta, which later gave way to a government under Celso Torrelio, and then another under Guido Vildoso Caldrón, who came to power with the promise to pave the way for the democratic transition.  

The central debate in the months up to October 1982 was over who was to govern the new regime. One group demanded that the results of 1980 elections, the last held

and Chuquisaca, the leftist UDP achieved the highest vote share, and in La Paz, it won a majority (51.6 percent). In all of the eastern lowlands departments (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and Pando), the AMNR won a plurality. The PS-1 and the two MITKA factions again received their strongest support in the west (Oruro, Cochabamba, La Paz, and Potosi). PS-1 significantly expanded its support in Cochabamba, from 1.2 to 12.8 percent. MITKA remained based in La Paz, where it received more than 60 percent of its vote (Jetté 1989: 161).


264 Composed of Celso Torrelio, Waldo Bernal, and Óscar Pammo.
under civilian rule, be upheld. Another group, which included Siles Zuazo and the UDP, favored new elections, with the hope that they would win a stronger mandate for governing. In the end, the pro-1980 election group won and the UDP coalition government was sworn in.

Changes in Ethnic and Class Identification since 1982: Aggregate Measures

The main "traditional" parties and coalitions in Bolivia as the country transitioned to democracy in 1982 were thus the MNR, UDP, MNRI, MIR, PS-1, and ADN. Class identification had long been salient in national politics, explicitly in party rhetoric as well as through the political participation of key class-based organizations like the COB. Although several ethnic social movements existed however, none of the major parties highlighted ethnic identification explicitly and ethnic parties never attracted more than a few percentages of the national vote.

In order to study how ethnic and class identification have shifted since democratization, each party was classified in each election in which it competed based on information from secondary sources on elections, interviews, party documents, and news articles.\textsuperscript{265} As outlined in Chapter 2, parties were classified as appealing primarily to ethnic groups ("ethnic-mobilizing"), appealing primarily to class groups ("class-mobilizing"), appealing to both, or appealing to neither. The explicit target group was

also recorded (e.g., “indigenous,” “Aymara,” “the poor,” etc.). The collective vote share for each of these types of parties in each general election was then added up (including the vote for parties that appealed on both an ethnic and a class basis), giving a measure of support for “ethnic-mobilizing” and “class-mobilizing” parties and candidates in each election. The Movement toward Socialism (MAS), for instance, was classified as both leftist and indigenous, and its vote share counted both as ethnic-mobilizing and class-mobilizing.

Several parties like the New Republican Force (NFR), a center-right, populist party, made no clear group-based appeals and were thus classified as neither ethnic- nor class-mobilizing. Table 5.9 shows classifications for parties in the 1985 elections.

### Table 5.9: 1985 General Election Results and Party Classifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Vote</th>
<th>Classification based on platform</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Democratic Action <em>(Accion Democrática Nacionalista (ADN)</em></td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Revolutionary Movement <em>(Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario -- MNR)</em></td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>Not ethnic-mobilizing; Multi-class-mobilizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement of the Revolutionary Left – New Majority <em>(Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria -- Nueva Mayoría -- MIR/MIR-NM)</em></td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>Not ethnic-mobilizing; Class-mobilizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Revolutionary Movement of the Left <em>(Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de la Izquierda – MNRI)</em></td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>Not ethnic-mobilizing; Class-mobilizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Vanguard Nationalist Revolutionary Movement <em>(Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario Vanguardia-- MNRV)</em></td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>Not ethnic-mobilizing; Multi-class-mobilizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*United People's Front <em>(Frente del Pueblo Unido – FPU)</em></td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party - 1 <em>(Partido Socialista - 1 -- PS-1)</em></td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>Not ethnic-mobilizing; Class-mobilizing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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266 Data were also collected data on the types of issues discussed (economic, political, cultural, other), support base, leadership, and organizational ties.
267 Some observers also argue that the MAS is not an indigenous party. The disagreement here is also due to different definitions of what an ethnic (or indigenous) party is, rather than disagreement over what the party platform and rhetoric is. Most observers who claim that MAS is not an indigenous party are basing their claims on arguments that (1) despite its rhetoric, MAS’s main interests are not in the best interests of the indigenous, but rather of “cocaleros” (coca growers); (2) its objectives, both explicit and implicit, are not focused on the preservation or practice of indigenous culture, but seem to be more economic; and (3) it is not organized along traditional indigenous lines and does not have an “indigenous” organizational culture. None of these points disqualify the MAS as an ethnic-mobilizing party by my definition.
Figure 5.8 illustrates how support for ethnic and class mobilizing parties has changed over time. As it illustrates, ethnicity became increasingly salient in the Bolivian party system after 1985, began leveling off in the 1990s, and increased further after 1997.\footnote{This leveling off in the 1990s in fact may be somewhat misleading in terms of the salience of indigenous identification in electoral politics because in 1993 Bolivia elected its first self-identified indigenous vice president, Victor Hugo Cárdenas, a leader of the Katarista movement and the MRTKL party.} Class identification, on the other hand, declined overall between 1980 and 1993, and then increased after 1993. However, the trend of support for “traditional” leftist parties was declining throughout the entire period; the rise in support for the left in 2002 and 2005 is explained in particular by support for the MAS’s “indigenous leftist” appeal.

Figure 5.8: Vote for Ethnic- and Class-Mobilizing Parties, 1980-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Mobilization Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Movement of Liberation (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberación – MRTKL)</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>Ethnic-mobilizing; Class-mobilizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiana – DC)</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivian Socialist Falange (Falange Socialista Boliviana – FSB)</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>Neither</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari – MRTK)</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>Ethnic-mobilizing; Class-mobilizing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*United Left (Izquierda Unida – IU)</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>Not ethnic-mobilizing; Class-mobilizing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Three ethnic-mobilizing parties were critical in the shift towards greater ethnic identification in the party system: the Consciousness of the Fatherland party (Condepa), the Movement toward Socialism (MAS), and the Indigenous Pachakuti Movement (MIP). Condepa, founded in 1988, won 12.3 percent of the vote in its first national electoral outing (mainly from La Paz). Its vote share increased to a high of 17.2 percent in 1997 and then fell to less than 1 percent in 2002 due to internal party problems (including the death of its founder. The MAS, a party with strong ties to coca growers, was founded under another name in 1995. It won 3.7 percent in its first national elections, but almost 21 percent in 2002 and over 50 percent in 2005. The MIP, an Indianista party in the tradition of the MITKA founded in 2000, won over 6 percent in its first national election in 2002 — i.e., less than either Condepa or MAS but considerably more than other Indianista parties in the past. Its vote share had fallen to 2.2 percent by 2005 however. Table 5.11 summarizes information on each of these parties, including how they might be classified based on other data such as leadership, organizational linkages, support base, and underlying interests (all of which are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 6).

A closer look at these parties suggests a three-stage process in the development of ethnic parties in Bolivia. In the first stage, the major ethnic-mobilizing party was Condepa. Condepa made clear, explicit, and central appeals to the indigenous and to cholo/as, drawing loosely on Katarista ideology, and appealing especially to new urban migrants, many of whom had migrated due to the economic crisis. Its electoral success

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brought a clear change in Bolivian partisan politics in terms of framing and rhetoric: it
was the first party to bring to office a self-identified “chola” parliamentarian and the first
major party to make indigenous and “cholo/a”-focused issues central to its message. It is
only in the 1990s, after Condepa, that we begin to see other parties putting “chola”
candidates on their party lists, and a rise in the strategic use of ethnic appeals by the
major traditional parties. But, while the ethnic populism of Condepa was revolutionary
in this sense, its top leadership – although all new to politics – was from the same
mestizo-Creole, middle and upper middle class spectrum as the leadership of the
traditional parties (see Madrid 2005: 695, fn. 8). Although members of the “popular”
classes were the key impetus behind Condepa’s founding, in the party organization,
founding leaders were relegated to lower positions and many eventually left.

Table 5.10: Major Ethnic-Mobilizing Parties in Bolivia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Target Ethnic and Class Group(s)</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Condepa</td>
<td>Ethnic-mobilizing</td>
<td>Indigenous, urban indigenous, and cholo/as, as well as the poor (but not from a class-based or leftist stance)</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAS</td>
<td>Ethnic-mobilizing; Class-mobilizing</td>
<td>Indigenous, and poor and working class</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.7%*</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>Ethnic-mobilizing</td>
<td>Indigenous, especially Aymaras, and, to a lesser extent, the poor and working class in general (but it explicitly rejects leftist and class-mobilizing ideology)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

270 In 1997, MAS competed in general elections as the United Left (Izquierda Unida—IU).
In the second stage, with the rise of the MAS and MIP after 2000, a different type of ethnic-mobilizing party emerged. In terms of party platforms, there is a more absolutist ethnic message, separating “whites” from the “indigenous,” and with almost no mention of any groups in the middle, such as “mestizos” or “cholos.” The parties of this second stage completely dropped Condepa’s project of “cholaje” (“cholo-ization”). Indeed, in the MIP’s more extreme discourse, the project is “Indianization” (see Sanjinés 2004). An equally important change is in terms of leadership; in this second stage, all of the key leaders self-identify as indigenous (especially Highland indigenous).

The third possible stage, involving a shift back towards the center and with more focus on class identification, can be seen in the recent trajectories of the MAS and MIP. With the 2004 municipal elections and 2005 general elections, the MAS became the leading party in Bolivia. In both of these races, party leaders explicitly worked to broaden the party’s appeal to the mestizo middle class. Meanwhile, since 2002, the more Indianist MIP has become increasingly marginalized, even by the MAS, as a “racist” party. While the MIP has explicitly rejected “foreign” leftist ideologies, the MAS, which includes in its ranks a number of non-indigenous leftist leaders, has embraced a new brand of “indigenous leftist” politics.

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271 Taking a longer-run perspective, we might also describe a shift from the MNR’s project of “mestizaje” (1930s-1970s), to Condepa’s project of “cholaje” (1988 to late 1990s), to the MIP’s (and a lesser extent, MAS’s) project of “Indianization” (from 2000), each of these successive projects involving increasing levels of “Indianization” (see also Sanjines 2004).

272 Based on MAS interviews. The need for such a strategy was explicitly outlined in a conversation with Álvaro García Linera, La Paz, April 2005. García Linera was then a university professor and political commentator with ties to the MAS. In December 2005, he was elected vice president on the MAS ticket.

273 Based on interviews.
Table 5.11: Classification of Major "Ethnic-Mobilizing" Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Platform</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Support Base</th>
<th>Organizational Linkages</th>
<th>Possible Underlying Interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Condepa</strong> (f. 1988)</td>
<td>Targets the &quot;indigenous,&quot; &quot;urban indigenous,&quot; and &quot;cholo/as,&quot; as well as &quot;the poor&quot; (but not from a leftist class-based stance)</td>
<td>Founder Carlos Palenque is a mestizo/Creole media personality, but Remedios Loza self-identifies as a &quot;chola,&quot; from a working class background.</td>
<td>Performed best in urban areas in the Highlands, especially in the department of La Paz.</td>
<td>Most closely tied to Palenque's TV station and show.</td>
<td>Palenque's personal appeal and goals, promotion of urban migrants, distribution of patronage (once in office).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAS</strong> (f. 1995)</td>
<td>Targets the &quot;indigenous,&quot; and &quot;poor&quot; and &quot;working class.&quot;</td>
<td>Leader Evo Morales self-identifies as &quot;indigenous&quot; and as a unionist cocalero.</td>
<td>Performs best in the Highlands among indigenous, working class and campesino voters, with especially strong support in Cochambaba.</td>
<td>At the national level, most closely tied to the Six Federations, Loayza's branch of the CSUTCB, the Bartolina Sisa National Federation of Campesinas Women, Colonizers Confederation of Bolivia.</td>
<td>Support for cocalero cause, opposition to the US and US drug policy in the region, leftist policy, equality for the indigenous, patronage to MAS supporters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MIP</strong> (f. 2000)</td>
<td>Targets the &quot;indigenous,&quot; especially &quot;Aymaras,&quot; and, to a lesser extent, &quot;the poor&quot; and &quot;working class&quot; (but explicitly rejects leftist ideologies as foreign)</td>
<td>Leader Felipe Quispe self-identifies as Aymara and Indian. Others also stress working class and campesino status.</td>
<td>Performs best in Aymara communities in the Highlands, especially in the department of La Paz.</td>
<td>Most closely tied to Quispe's branch of the CSUTCB.</td>
<td>Aymara autonomy and nationhood, equality, patronage to Aymara campesinos in La Paz.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Putting these events into the broader historical context summarized above, the development of ethnic parties in Bolivia can be characterized broadly as follows:
• 1920s-1988: Ideologically-focused ethnic “niche” parties that never won more than a few legislative seats (Partido Indio, MITKA, MRTK)

• 1988-2000: Electorally-successful “ethnic populist” parties led by new non-indigenous elites (Condepa)

• 2000-2006: The rise of “mass” ethnic parties led by new indigenous elites (MAS, MIP), which developed broader, mass appeals over time
CHAPTER 6

AN ILLUSTRATION AND TESTING OF ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES: BOLIVIA, 1982-2005

This chapter illustrates the plausibility of the theory presented in this dissertation and explores key alternative hypotheses. The chapter makes several main points in relation to the theory. First, picking up from Chapter 4, it clears the field of one of the most commonly-accepted hypotheses about the rise of indigenous parties in Bolivia, that political liberalization and ethnic demographics alone explain the rise of indigenous parties. Although Bolivia is Latin America’s most indigenous country, several other major ethnic divisions exist (including indigenous sub-groups), and under other circumstances, might have been mobilized in the party system with numbers large enough to win representation at the polls. This commonly-accepted hypothesis also does not explain the timing of the rise of indigenous parties.

Next, the chapter describes how the case illustrates the mechanisms of the theory: 1) how the timing of the shift towards ethnic identification mapped in Chapter 5 was tied to opportunities for new party entry due to the party system crisis of the mid 1980s and 2) how new party leaders, appealing to voters on an “indigenous” basis was politically useful because of the overlap between indigenous and class lines and the space for entry on the political left. By appealing to the “indigenous,” rather than the “working class,” new party leaders thus could capture similar bases while distinguishing themselves from
traditional parties.

The chapter also illustrates the intervening role of several other factors identified in the literature on Bolivia and highlighted in the explanatory framework presented in Chapter 3, “testing” several alternative hypotheses. While the narrative suggests the intervening role of several of these factors, the chapter argues that none of these factors on their own account for the timing of the shift and why it involved the politicization of “indigenous” identification, rather than of other group identifications. Other specific factors that contributed to Bolivia’s realignment include the development of indigenous social movements, Bolivia’s economic crisis, the end of the Cold War and the decline in international support for leftist parties, structural changes in the economy and the related emergence of new social groups, and the role of institutional reforms in the mid 1990s.

The Puzzle: Bolivia and the Literature on Ethnic Politics

Looked at from one angle, Bolivia – a country one observer compares to South Africa in its history of ethnic discrimination274 – can be studied as a case about how indigenous communities have mobilized to claim their individual and collective rights in both social movements and political parties.275 From this perspective, the fact that it was indigenous communities in Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America that mobilized in recent years is hardly a puzzle; what is puzzling is why they were able to do so in some

274 See King 2006.
countries and not in others, and why they did so at certain moments and not others.  

Furthermore, within the context of Bolivian politics, “ethnic” identity is generally treated as synonymous with “indigenous” identity and the study of ethnic politics concentrates on the rights of indigenous ethnic groups and the challenges they face in mobilizing to demand and exercise these rights.

The case study of Bolivia presented in this chapter has been informed by work that takes this approach, which is grounded in deep understanding of the history and politics of the region. Many of those interviewed for this dissertation also take this approach. However, the approach taken in this study is different. It in a sense takes the Bolivian case “out of context,” by thinking about it from the perspective of general theories of identity group politics. For many Latin Americanists, the question posed in this chapter about why indigenous identification became salient in Bolivian party politics (and when) is not especially puzzling. But, in terms of general theories of identity politics, and outside of the Latin American context, the shift from class towards indigenous salience in Bolivian party politics is puzzling. In taking Bolivia out of context, we can highlight the causal importance of what is unique about this context (i.e., this project argues, the overlap of class and indigenous categories in particular).

Treating the emergence of indigenous parties in Bolivia as a question of the rights of indigenous peoples in a democracy suggests two implicit assumptions: (1) that the only (or the “objectively” most important) ethnic division in Bolivia is between those who identify as indigenous and those who do not and (2) that in ethnically-diverse

\[276\] See Birnir 2001; Madrid 2005a, 2005b; Rice and Van Cott 2006; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005.
democracies, all ethnic groups should be represented in party politics (so that indigenous parties would be expected to emerge as politics in Bolivia democratized after 1982). The first of these points, which is explored below, masks the extent of Bolivia’s ethnic diversity. The second, as Chapter 3 suggests, is highly contested in the theoretical literature: there are a variety of reasons why many ethnically-diverse countries do not have ethnic party systems.

In terms of ethnic groups in Bolivia, the division between “indigenous” and “non-indigenous” is clearly among the most important dividing lines in politics and society. It is measured in the census and has long been a basis for discrimination, both institutional and informal. According to the 2001 census, 62 percent of Bolivians self-identify as indigenous. This figure makes Bolivia the most indigenous country in Latin America (see Van Cott 1994, Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1994). Precise numbers vary by source, but most are consistent in that the majority is indigenous, as opposed to non-indigenous.277

The meaning of the category “indigenous,” however, changes depending on context (i.e., on the other categories given as identification options). For instance, it is also common in Bolivia for people to identify themselves and others according to the “mixed” categories “mestizo” and “cholo,” as well as “indigenous” and “white.”278 Asked to identify in these terms, nationally-representative 2000 survey data reported in Seligson

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277 The definition of “indigenous” as used in the Bolivian census has also varied over time (see Grieshaber 1985).
(2001), shows that only 9 percent of the population identified as “indigenous,” while the majority (57 percent) self-identified as “mestizo.” Another 26 percent self-identified as “white,” 2.5 percent as “cholo,” and 1.5 percent as “black.” Given that this survey was only a year after the 2001 census, population changes are unlikely to explain this discrepancy.

The fact that all of these figures are based on self-identification rather than classification by someone else also plays a role in the numbers. For instance, because the term “cholo” can have pejorative connotations, it may be an unlikely category for someone to self-identify with. However, given how commonly the term is used in Bolivia – especially to describe women (“chola,” “cholita”) – it is possible that the “size” of the “cholo” group would be much larger if based on classification by others (see Albó et al. 1983: 10-11, as cited in Widmark 2003: 71). In theory, thus, an ethnic entrepreneur might mobilize a large “anti-cholo” category.

Race and one’s degree of assimilation into western culture also define even more specific ethnic distinctions in everyday use. (Like the term “cholo/a,” many of these terms can be pejorative.) In their study of identities among young people in the city of El Alto, for instance, Guaygua, Riveros, and Quisbert (2003) describe the categories “chotas” and “birlochas,” both of which are basically sub-categories of “chola.” They note that “chotas” “wear a skirt and pinafore and do their hair in one plait,” are engaged in trade, and have little education, and “birlochas” “wear a skirt or trousers with modern
blouses and wear their hair loose or in a fashionable style, and are not involved in trade” (126; see also Archondo 2003).

More relevant to national politics, communities further can be distinguished in terms of language and culture. The diversity of language groups in Bolivia is illustrated in the map in Figure 5.2. According to the 2001 census, 95 percent of the indigenous population identifies as either Quechua-speaking (30.71 percent of the total Bolivian population) or Aymara-speaking (25.23 percent). Given Bolivia’s electoral rules, and the fact that Bolivian presidents have routinely been elected with about one-third of the popular vote (as discussed in Chapter 5), both of these groups – along with mestizos – at least have the numbers to form ethnic parties and to win ethnic representation at the polls. In addition, one might expect that their long history of social and political organization and their regional concentration would facilitate mobilization. During the pre-colonial and colonial eras, precursors of these groups built states in the western region of today’s Bolivia (see Molina Rivero 1998). Today, many language groups remain regionally concentrated as Figure 5.2 suggests.

Yet another way in which the Bolivian population is described, based on a mix of what might be called “race” and “culture,” gives the following groups: “Aymaras” (30 percent), “Quechus” (30 percent), mestizos (25 percent), whites (10 percent), and other groups (4 percent) (Alesina et al. 2002). Based on these categories, Bolivia has an ethnic fractionalization index of 0.74, which is high, and about equal to South Africa’s of 0.75, making Bolivia Latin America’s most ethnically-fractionalized country, an often cited

\(^{279}\) On urban Aymara-speakers in particular, see Barragán 2004, Widmark 2003.
figure (Alesina et al. 2001). This set of categories is problematic from a conceptual standpoint because many anthropologists argue that it is misleading to speak of “Aymaras” and “Quechuas” as if they were clearly distinct or homogenous cultural groups. Nevertheless, ethnic entrepreneurs in other countries have constructed ethnic coalitions based on categories with equally contested cultural and historical underpinnings.

Finally, Bolivia also has increasingly mobilized regional groups, particularly supporters of the “Camba Nation” in the east, who stress cultural, racial, historical, and economic differences with the rest of the country. The emergence and increasing politicization of these regional groups has highlighted debates about the authenticity of their ethnic claims, as many Bolivians dispute their sincerity and veracity. Nevertheless, “Cambas” and “Kollas” (of the western Highlands) are “ethnic” as defined in Chapter 2 and also have the numbers at least to form potentially influential parties. Figure 5.3 shows a map of Bolivia according to one Camba Nation organization.

Given this ethnic profile and what we know about ethnic parties in other countries, we might expect to see a very different Bolivian party system. First, if

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280 Based on figures for “ethnic” fractionalization in Alesina et al. 2001. Bolivia’s index value in fact looks more like much of sub-Saharan Africa than the rest of South or Latin America. The average ethnic fractionalization for sub-Saharan Africa according to this data is 0.64, with a range from 0.93 (Uganda) to 0.00 (Comoros). The average for Latin America is 0.43, ranging from 0.74 (Bolivia) to 0.17 (Paraguay).

281 This point is from Ricardo Calla Ortega and Ramiro Molina Rivera.

282 A few examples include the “Bahujan” category mobilized by the Bahujan Samaj Party in India (Chandra 2004: 148); the “Beta Israel” (or “Falasha Jews”) of Ethiopia, who have claimed to be members of one of the lost tribes of Israel (see Lucotte and Smetts 1999); and the proponents of the “Ivoirité” movement in Côte d’Ivoire, whose controversial claims about “Ivoirianness” contributed to tensions that led to the division of the country (see Dozon 2000).

ethnicity is supposed to trump other social cleavages as a basis for political mobilization, we might expect to see major ethnic parties in the Bolivian party system from the time that universal suffrage was extended in 1952. Alternatively, given political liberalization after 1982, we might expect to see then a flourishing of ethnic parties explicitly representing a variety of ethnic groups. Second, if we believe that ethnic fractionalization should tell us about political divisions, we should expect to find ethnically-based parties that look much like those in many African countries — i.e., very ethnically-fractionalized with each party representing a different linguistic, cultural, or ethno-regional group. Third, if we believe that ethnic demographics and electoral incentives should matter in determining which ethnic groups are politically salient, we should expect to find parties representing groups like “Quechua,” “Aymara,” “mestizo,” “Kolla,” and “Camba,” all of which are large enough to win representation at the polls and represent smaller minimum winning coalitions than the “indigenous.” In Bolivia, however, none of these expectations are met.

**Explaining the Rise of the “Indigenous Left”**

As Chapter 5 illustrates, Bolivia offers one of the clearest examples of shifts in identification from class towards ethnic and ethnic/class lines. The broad outlines of the Bolivian story told here are as follows: From the early 20th century until 1985, the main social cleavage expressed in party competition in the Bolivian party system was class, with parties appealing to groups in explicitly class terms. This “traditional” party system had its roots in the nationalist and leftist parties that emerged in the 1930s, and cannot be
fully understood with looking also at the role of major class-based non-party actors, such as the Bolivian Workers' Central (Central Obrera Boliviana—COB). The parties that emerged in the 1930s, in turn, were founded in reaction to earlier Bolivian parties of the 19th century.

Although several indigenous parties were founded in the late 1970s, they remained niche parties, at the fringes of national electoral debate, winning at most two seats in the 1978, 1979, and 1980 elections. A major shift towards the ethnic dimension in politics only began to occur after 1985 due to the opportunity presented by the crisis of leftist parties during this period. This crisis was brought on by the economic crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s, the leftist coalition government’s failure to manage it, and strong opposition to the leftist government both from the right and from other leftist groups. It was compounded by international changes (in particular the collapse of communism), as well as by the deaths of several key leftist party leaders. Because Bolivian political elites were arguably more tied to international incentives and norms than the majority of Bolivian voters, the crisis delegitimized the left clearly in the eyes of party elites, even while many Bolivian voters remained committed to leftist economic policies. In addition, the hardships associated with the government’s economic policy designed to address the crisis (Decree 21060) cemented additional opposition to the “neo-liberal” policies supported by all of the major incumbent parties. As traditional party elites shifted party positions to the right, voters on the left thus found themselves without any party that closely represented their interests. Ties to traditional parties were also loosened during this period by structural changes in the Bolivian economy, which led to the emergence of
“new” social groups (in particular, urban migrants).

The mass of “floating” voters created by these shifts provided an opportunity for the entry of new parties. Because indigenous and class lines overlapped so closely, one way to capture these votes, while avoiding the leftist rhetoric of the traditional parties and direct competition with traditional parties in their own terms, was to appeal to voters as “indigenous,” rather than, or in addition to, as “workers” or “the poor.” Several new parties took advantage of this political space in the late 1980s—in particular, the Consciousness of the Fatherland party (Conciencia de Patria—Condepa), formed in 1988. As a pro-indigenous populist party that earned 12.3 percent in its first electoral outing, Condepa had an urban migrant base and was very different from the earlier ideologically-focused ethnic niche parties of the 1970s and early 1980s. The crisis also facilitated the rise of the Civic Solidarity Union (Unión Cívica Solidaridad—UCS), a populist party with an indigenous/working class base, led by a charismatic Aymara/mestizo businessman, Max Fernández.

By the 1990s, self-identified indigenous political elites had become an increasingly visible force in Bolivian politics. In the 1993 election, Bolivia’s main “traditional” party, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), allied with the Tupaj Katari Revolutionary Movement for Liberation (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari de Liberación—MRTKL), one of the main Katarista parties. Although the MRTKL was clearly the junior partner in this coalition, aspects of its agenda were reflected in the major reforms implemented by the MNR-MRTKL government that was
elected. The government’s “Plan for Everyone” (Plan de Todos) introduced a set a wide-ranging institutional reforms designed to broaden popular participation and soften the social costs of economic adjustment. A constitutional amendment also recognized Bolivia’s status as a multiethnic and “pluri-cultural” nation. These reforms shaped the later political mobilization of locally-organized groups, both indigenous and not.

Meanwhile, influenced by international factors and continuing economic pressures, indigenous and campesino social movement groups were becoming increasingly mobilized. The most important of these groups were coca growers ("cocaleros") critical of US drug policy in Bolivia; urban migrants who faced social and economic discrimination and hardships; campesinos in the Highlands who found it increasingly difficult to make a living off the land; and rural ethnic groups, especially in the lowlands, who sought to gain control of their land. The mix of economic, political, and cultural demands expressed by these groups was placed dramatically on the electoral agenda in the 2002 elections. Partly in reaction to these groups, new conservative social movements began to form, especially in Santa Cruz representing the business community.

The years 2002-2005 brought continuing social protest, culminating in 2003 and in 2005 with the resignation of two democratically-elected presidents. Campaigns in the December 2005 general elections incorporated many of the demands expressed by these social groups, highlighting direct competition between two distinct political visions: on the one hand, Morales’s (MAS) appeal to the “indigenous left” and, on the other, Jorge
Quiroga’s (PODEMOS) “non-indigenous” neo-liberal appeal, which explicitly did not make ethnicity central but was interpreted by many as pro-white and mestizo, with strong ties to some conservative groups in Santa Cruz, that some observers describe as “fascist.”

The UDP Government and Crisis (October 10, 1982 – July 1985)

The UDP government, which took office in October 1982, was plagued with difficulties from the start. Problems were tied, on the one hand, to the country’s growing economic crisis and the UDP government’s failure to respond adequately to it. The UDP oversaw the worst period of hyperinflation ever in Bolivia (and the seventh worst in world history), with prices rising from 123 percent in 1982 to 8,757 percent in 1985 (INE and Banco Central in Mesa Gisbert 2003: 740). The UDP sought initially to consolidate the nationalist revolutionary model of 1952, based in a mixed economy and economic gradualism.

Figure 6.1: The Bolivian Economic Crisis – I

\[\text{Annual GDP Growth in Bolivia, 1970-2000 (\%)}\]

\[\text{Data is from INE as cited in Mesa (2003): 783, 858.}\]
Figure 6.2: The Bolivian Economic Crisis – II

Figure 6.3: The Bolivian Economic Crisis – III

Data is from INE as cited in Mesa (2003): 783, 858.

Data is from INE as cited in Mesa (2003): 858.
Problems also stemmed from political divisions and management challenges within the governing coalition. Although the governing coalition began with four partners (MNRI, MIR, PCB, and PDC), eventually all parties except the MNRI had left the coalition.\(^{288}\) During the three years of the Siles Zuazo government, there were seven different cabinets.

Arguably more important – and closely tied to both of these problems – was the strong opposition to the UDP from both the right and the left. Within Congress, the UDP faced opposition both from the ADN and the MNR. Outside of government, the traditional Trotskyite leftist opposition criticized the UDP for not being radical enough. From the start, Calla Ortega (1985) argues, the leftist opposition, centered in the Revolutionary Workers Party (Partido Obrero Revolucionario—POR), charged the UDP

\(^{287}\) Data is from INE as cited in Mesa (2003): 783, 858.

\(^{288}\) The three original parties, plus the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano—PDC).
with leading a “bourgeois regime.” It held as its principal demand the adoption of a minimum salary with a sliding scale. By pushing this demand, it sought to create a state of tension that would topple the UDP government (Calla Ortega 1985: 70).

It is possible nevertheless that the UDP government, if it had played its hand better, could have survived. Calla Ortega’s discussion suggests one possible resolution: Partly in reaction to the POR line, another leftist opposition position emerged during this period, led by Filemón Escobar of the COB. Although still critical of the UDP government, the Escobar group sought to combat “fascism” and to preserve democracy, and was thus critical of the POR. Escobar’s principal proposal was for a co-government of the UDP and the COB, a proposal which eventually also gained the support of the CSUTCB, thus uniting several key leftist groups.289 After beginning discussions with the COB however, the government for some reason abandoned discussions in late 1983.

The result of all of these factors was a climate of social unrest and anti-government protest that surpassed even the period prior to the democratic transition. According to Mesa Gisbert (2003), there were more than a thousand strikes, including four general strikes of 4, 7, 9, and 16 days (741). According to Laserna (1989), there

289 As Calla Ortega (1985) describes (pp. 74-80), by early 1983, this proposal had gained substantial support within the left, including partial support in COB and the FSTMB declarations for co-government in the COMIBOL. In April, however, in response to FSTMB strikes and demands, the Siles government strongly rejected the FSTMB as “anarcoresindicalists.” By the end of June, however, the “co-government” camp had another supporter as the CSUTCB in its Second National Congress to be in favor of establishing a “cogovernment” of the COB, UDP, and CSUTCB. This majority bloc was led by Genero Flores of the CSUTCB. It was opposed by a minority bloc loyal to the UDP government, including the Cochabamba delegation, which abandoned the meeting. In response to the CSUTCB’s declaration, the COB re-broached the cogovernment debate and on August 2, 1983, held protests throughout the country. Although the cogovernment proposal was not a central theme in these protests they did effectively prompt the UDP on August 4, 1983, “to invite the COB to initiate dialogue on the ‘possibility of labor participation in the government’” (80). The COB responded by presenting an emergency social and economic plan. But on August 22, 1983, however, the UDP abruptly ended discussions on the possibility of a cogovernment.
were on average 53 conflicts per month reported in the press, compared with 34 per month during the Ovando-Torres periods (1969-71) and 10 per month during the Bánzer regime (1971-1978) (13). As the crisis continued and worsened, Siles Zuazo took several desperate steps before resigning from office, first promising to resolve the crisis in 100 days, then staging an unsuccessful hunger strike. Finally, new elections were called for June 14, 1985.

The 1985 Elections and the New Economic Policy

The 1985 elections revealed above all a drop in support for the parties that had formed the UDP (MNRI, PDC, and MIR), whose support fell by more than half when compared to the 1980 results. Support for the other main leftist party, the Socialist Party (PS/PS-1), also fell, from 8.7 to 2.5 percent. This decline however can be tied directly to the assassination of its leader Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz in 1980 and the subsequent disorganization of the party. Likewise, the MIR, although undoubtedly hurt by its association with the UDP, also suffered the loss of one of its top leaders in a helicopter crash.

The first place in the polls went to the ADN (32.8 percent), which ran on a platform emphasizing its rightwing economic and political stance and adopted the slogans “Peace, order, and work” and “Now’s the time: Banzer returns” (Jettè 1989:

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290 The rise in social protest here of course is due to a number of factors beyond the errors of the UDP government. In particular, there is more repression of social protest under authoritarian regimes.
Support for the MNR however also remained strong. Winning 30.4 percent of the vote (up from 20.2 percent in 1980), the MNR placed second. MNR spin-offs (MNRI and MNRV) also earned a total of just over 10 percent nationally.

Regionally, the shift towards the right was notable in the highland and valley departments of La Paz, Cochabamba, and Oruro. In La Paz, while the UDP had easily won in 1979 and 1980, the 1985 polls revealed a clear win for the ADN with 31 percent compared to just 16.7 for the MNR, the ADN’s closest running competitor. The MNR, on the other hand, maintained its electoral dominance in the east and lowlands, running first (although by a slim margin) in Santa Cruz and Beni, as well as (by a larger margin) in Tarija and Pando. The parties of the left, the MIR and PS-1, experienced substantial drops in the polls throughout the country, but maintained their support in Potosí, Oruro, and Chuquisaca, with decent showings in La Paz and Cochabamba.

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291 "Paz, orden y trabajo” and “Ahora sí: Banzer vuelve” (Jettè 1989: 247).
Table 6.1: Results of the June 1985 General Elections²⁹²
(Shown only for parties that earned > 1% of the national vote)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of valid votes nationwide</th>
<th>ADN</th>
<th>MNR</th>
<th>MIR</th>
<th>MNRI</th>
<th>MNRV</th>
<th>PS-1</th>
<th>FPU</th>
<th>MRTKL</th>
<th>PDC</th>
<th>FSB</th>
<th>MRTK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Paz</td>
<td>34.30%</td>
<td>36.39%</td>
<td>19.57%</td>
<td>9.12%</td>
<td>6.52%</td>
<td>10.39%</td>
<td>2.81%</td>
<td>1.62%</td>
<td>3.89%</td>
<td>1.35%</td>
<td>0.71%</td>
<td>1.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Cruz</td>
<td>18.56%</td>
<td>38.60%</td>
<td>42.77%</td>
<td>5.57%</td>
<td>3.33%</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
<td>1.31%</td>
<td>1.56%</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
<td>0.62%</td>
<td>2.34%</td>
<td>0.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cochabamba</td>
<td>15.31%</td>
<td>34.26%</td>
<td>31.00%</td>
<td>11.51%</td>
<td>4.10%</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
<td>3.49%</td>
<td>2.25%</td>
<td>1.09%</td>
<td>2.70%</td>
<td>0.85%</td>
<td>1.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potosi</td>
<td>11.20%</td>
<td>20.88%</td>
<td>33.06%</td>
<td>15.19%</td>
<td>6.13%</td>
<td>3.14%</td>
<td>2.54%</td>
<td>4.95%</td>
<td>2.33%</td>
<td>2.66%</td>
<td>0.98%</td>
<td>1.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruro</td>
<td>6.71%</td>
<td>28.33%</td>
<td>28.86%</td>
<td>12.05%</td>
<td>10.43%</td>
<td>2.34%</td>
<td>4.23%</td>
<td>2.13%</td>
<td>2.03%</td>
<td>1.88%</td>
<td>0.78%</td>
<td>1.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuquisaca</td>
<td>5.54%</td>
<td>21.37%</td>
<td>25.39%</td>
<td>21.90%</td>
<td>5.95%</td>
<td>2.54%</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
<td>6.60%</td>
<td>1.32%</td>
<td>1.93%</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
<td>1.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarija</td>
<td>4.51%</td>
<td>24.13%</td>
<td>52.81%</td>
<td>6.65%</td>
<td>4.27%</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
<td>1.30%</td>
<td>3.27%</td>
<td>1.17%</td>
<td>0.80%</td>
<td>0.74%</td>
<td>0.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beni</td>
<td>3.31%</td>
<td>37.44%</td>
<td>38.71%</td>
<td>6.34%</td>
<td>1.97%</td>
<td>0.68%</td>
<td>0.81%</td>
<td>3.72%</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
<td>1.07%</td>
<td>6.92%</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pando</td>
<td>0.55%</td>
<td>33.30%</td>
<td>45.96%</td>
<td>4.43%</td>
<td>4.06%</td>
<td>0.49%</td>
<td>0.61%</td>
<td>2.01%</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
<td>1.29%</td>
<td>6.07%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32.83%</td>
<td>30.37%</td>
<td>10.18%</td>
<td>5.48%</td>
<td>4.80%</td>
<td>2.58%</td>
<td>2.53%</td>
<td>2.11%</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
<td>1.33%</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the perspective of indigenous politics, one of the most significant occurrences in this election was the participation of the Katarista MRTK and MRTKL parties. MRTK’s candidate Macabeo Chila, was an “ex-ally” of the MNR’s Paz Estenssoro in 1979 and 1980 (Jette 1989: 247). The MRTK-L, in particular, demonstrated the growing mix of indigenous with leftist issues, running labor leader Genaro Flores of the CSUTCB as its presidential candidate, along with Filemón Escobar of the COB as its vice-presidential candidate. The indigenous parties however continued to play a minor electoral role, concentrated mainly in La Paz and the other Andean departments and once again earning only two legislative seats. Given the high indigenous population in this region, the support of these parties among their target ethnic group was low.

Because no party received an absolute majority, the president was chosen by congressional vote. Although Banzer Suarez had received the most votes, there was a strong movement against his election because of his political history. Thus, Paz Estenssoro was elected through a deal between the MNR, MIR and MNRI, winning 94 votes to Banzer’s 51. (In October, however, concerned with having a coalition strong enough for governing, the MNR allied with ADN to form the “Pact for Democracy.”) It was in this way that Paz Estenssoro, the MNR leader most associated with building the Bolivian interventionist state, came to lead the administration that dismantled this state (1985-89).

Shortly after his inauguration, Paz Estenssoro named a governmental commission
to prepare a response to the economic crisis, focusing on hyperinflation (see Arze Cuadros 2002: 388).\textsuperscript{293} On August 29, Paz unveiled Decree 21060 (Decreto Supremo 21060), the central feature of his government’s New Economic Policy. Decree 21060 included eight key elements: price liberalization; external opening (in terms of imports, exports, free movement of capital, tariff reductions); progressive dismantling of state enterprises; redolarization; privatization; free contracting [libre contratación]; the freezing of salaries in the public sector and re-localization of the personnel and administration of the state; and tributary reform (see Arze Cuadros 2002: 390-391).\textsuperscript{294}

In Arze Cuadros’s terms, Decree 21060 was “the antithesis” of the MNR’s founding ideology as embodied in the “University Program of 1928” and of the “Bases and Principles of Immediate Action of the MNR of 1942” (391). It was also counter to the programs of the other leftist parties. Yet, because of the circumstances, it was passed with little opposition in government. Gamarra and Malloy (1995: 414) argue that: “The relative ease with which the decree was imposed reflected the dramatic decline of the political salience of the parties of the left. Because of their association with the Siles Zuazo debacle, they suffered a tremendous loss of prestige, from which they have yet [in 1995] to recover.”

\textsuperscript{293} The commission met during 6-28 August 1985. Key players included Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Minister of Planning; Fernando Romero; Juan Cariaga, Eduardo Quintanilla, and Francisco Muñoz. Cariaga was an ADNista, and based on his participation, ADN took credit for the reform (Mesa Gisbert 2003: 745). It was also advised by Professor Jeffrey Sachs of Harvard University, who had been invited to participate by Ronny MacLean, one of the founding members of the ADN (see Arze Cuadros 2002). MacLean had come to know Sachs during his days as a Harvard student.

\textsuperscript{294} In more abstract terms, the policy entailed a dramatic restructuring of state-society relations along neoliberal lines. As Lazarte Rojas notes, “Decree 21060, although it is at the center of national controversy/debate, is only the tip of the iceberg. That is to say, it is only the economic and technical realization of a more global and longer term project of reordering society post-1952, and as a result, of the substantial modification of the relations of power and of power between groups and social classes” (1993: 65, trans. mine). Yashar (2005) highlights the dramatic, related changes in citizenship regimes.
In rough terms, the positions of the key parties during this period might be described as in Figure 6.5.

**Figure 6.5: Representation of the Policy Positions of Major Parties**

*At Democratization (1982)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>MNR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>ADN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*After 1985*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MIR</td>
<td>MNR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(UDP → defunct)

Outside of government, however, opposition to Decree 21060 was dramatic. It included a 15-day general strike by the COB and a public announcement by the Workers Syndicate of the Central Bank of Bolivia (*Sindicato de Empleados del Banco Central de Bolivia*) that it would not comply with the terms of the decree. In August 1986, miners, who were especially hard-hit by the policy and crisis organized the “March for Life” scheduled to travel from Oruro to La Paz, although stopped by the government in Calamarca (see Mesa 2003: 747-749; Klein 1982: 274-277).

To the extent that it achieved rapid economic stabilization, Decree 21060 was a success. Inflation, which had reached 1281 percent in 1984, declined dramatically to 16 percent in 1988 (see Figure 6.2), and modest GDP growth was achieved. Internationally,
the Bolivian “shock therapy” was judged so successful that it became one of the models for other stabilization programs.

The effects of cuts in government spending tied to the program, however, were strongly criticized by some sectors. Among the central aspects of the program was the closure of many long unproductive mines. Once the backbone of the Bolivian economy, the mines had become a significant drain on state resources (see Nash 1993). But whether economically necessary or not, the process of closing the mines was one of the bitterest legacies of this period and it affected one of most politically organized sectors in society. Former miners remember that the closures of the mines were often managed so poorly that, after suffering months of shortages and rumors, they suddenly received announcements that they had just half a day to pack up their belongings, abandon their homes, and get on busses out of the area (see Eisenstadt 2004).

In the late 1980s, the closures of mines and drought in the Oruro and Potosí countrysides brought thousands of migrants into and around the cities of La Paz/El Alto and Cochabamba, and into the coca growing regions of Chapare (Cochabamba department). As a result of these shifts, between 1976 and 2001, the population of La Paz’s satellite city, El Alto, multiplied almost six times (INE 2003). Urban poverty also increased (see Table 6.2).

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295 For statistics, see Sandoval and Sostres (1989), as cited in Romero Zumarán (2003), appendix p. 15.
Table 6.2: Poverty in Major Cities, 1986-1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Poverty Headcount Index</th>
<th>Population in Extreme Poverty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986 (World Bank est.)</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 (World Bank est.)</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 (UDAPSO and UDAPE est.)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 (UDAPSO and UDAPE est.)</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 (UDAPSO and UDAPE est.)</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 (World Bank, INE, and UDAPE est.)</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Condepa

As the migrant population of La Paz/El Alto grew, one of the most visible symbols of this new phenomenon was the growing popularity of Carlos Palenque, host of "The Free Tribune of the People" (La Tribuna Libre del Pueblo), a TV show filmed in La Paz that featured an open-mike forum for Bolivians to voice their complaints, disputes, and needs. In a typical segment, "Compadre Palenque" would offer words of advice and consolation, as well as cash or other gifts. Although of mestizo origin himself, Palenque identified his audience as "the people" (el pueblo), "indigenous" and "cholo" (urban indigenous). Co-hosted by Remedios Loza, a self-identified "chola" woman who acted as translator, the show included segments in Spanish, Aymara, and Quechua. Palenque had been a popular Bolivian entertainer and radio personality since the 1960s. He was also an entrepreneur, owning the TV/radio station (Radio

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297 The Tribuna Libre was started in April 1980, but was basically a continuation of two earlier programs also hosted by Palenque, La Hora del Chairo (a program on Radio Chuquisaca) and Sabor a Tierra (a program on Radio Illimani), which ran from 1968 to 1979 (Archondo 1991: 105).
298 See surveys by Saravia and Sandoval 1991.
299 The Free Tribune was among the first to use indigenous languages in its broadcasts. As Archondo (1991) highlights, however, other stations also did this so it cannot be the only key to his success.
Televisión Popular—RTP) which aired the Free Tribune. During this period his popularity as “Defender of the People” grew to almost mythical proportions (see Archondo 1991; Saravia and Sandoval 1991; San Martin 1991; Alenda 2002; Lazar 2002).

In 1988, Palenque launched the Consciousness of the Fatherland party (Consciencia de Patria – Condepa), the first major party in Bolivia’s history to stress ethnic identification. The process of transforming the Palenque phenomenon into a political party began in mid 1988. In June, an RTP program aired a phone call by known drug trafficker, Roberto Suárez. Under Bolivian law, providing a forum for narcotraffickers to address the public was illegal, and the Bolivian government closed the RTP. The closure of the RTP rapidly became a subject of heated public debate. Supporters of the decision included various media groups and party and government representatives. Opponents of the decision included some 44 union, gremial, and social organizations, along with members of the RTP “family” (both employees and viewers), who held a hunger strike and organized large marches in La Paz and El Alto.

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300 No evidence that I am aware of suggests that Palenque was an advocate of Suárez or at all tied to him, beyond the airing of this call.
301 These included the Federación de Trabajadores de la Prensa de Bolivia, Sindicato de la Prensa de Cochabamba, UNITELE, Canal 6, the Asociación de Periodistas; editorials in the Red ATB and in Opinión, El Deber, and El Mundo; and party and government representatives from the MBL, MIR, and La Paz Prefecture.
302 The list of organizations that issues public statements condemning the closure of RTP is impressive and notable in its more “social” and “popular” character than the list of organizations that supported the closure. These organizations include the Central Obrera Bolivia, various transportation organizations (Confederación de Chóferes de Bolivia, Caja de Chóferes, etc.), various miners’ organizations (Federación Nacional de Cooperativas mineras de Bolivia, etc.), various campesino organizations (Federación departamental de trabajadores campesinos, Conferación de colonizadores de Bolivia, etc.), various gremial and market associations (Vendedoras del Mercado Rodríguez, etc.), and various neighborhood juntas in La Paz and El Alto (Federación de Juntas Vecinales – El Alto, etc.) (Archondo 1991: 177-178).
According to Archondo (1991)'s detailed study, over the following weeks, a Defense Committee for the RTP formed to push for the station's reopening. This Committee consisted of approximately 60 people, drawn largely from the “popular” classes that constituted the RTP’s core viewing public. This group began to call on Palenque to participate in formal politics, a demand that he began to take seriously in August/September. As Palenque’s move toward politics began, a group of middle class, mestizo intellectuals from outside this movement (the “October Revolutionary Group”) entered into talks with Palenque, eventually forming Condepa’s key advisory group. By the time Condepa was formally founded, the members of this group had supplanted most of the members of the Defense Committee in the formal leadership ranks of the party. Figure 6.6 shows the formal organization of the party; Genaro Torres was the only leader incorporated from the popular movement.

Figure 6.6: Condepa – Formal Organizational Structure

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Condepa’s formal platform was centered around the “ideology” of “endogeneity,” a program spelled out by Andres Solis Rada and Reynaldo Venegas, two of Palenque’s key advisors and members of the October Revolutionary Group. The program stressed the impoverishment of Bolivia and other periphery nations by the nations of the center, thus concluding that the solution was to cut off from this system, supporting “endogenous” production and “endogenization” of food, clothing, housing, and culture in general, in a process of “cholaje,” or “cholo-ization.” The ethnic aspect of the formal platform was picked up especially in Condepa’s more popular message, expressed in Palenque’s speeches and symbolic actions. For instance, the party was founded (on September 21, 1988) at the ancient city of Tiwanaku, a site chosen, as Palenque pointed out in his speech, for its importance to the indigenous people of Bolivia. Going further, Palenque, using Aymara terms, spoke about the “Jach’a Uru,” or the “Great Day” that would come when he became president and reformed the system (Saravia and Sandoval 1991).

In its populist message of indigenous revival, Palenque and Condepa borrowed some points from Katarism, but also represented something quite different. Palenque, for one, was not an indigenous leader. His status as “Compadre” was more reminiscent of traditional hierarchical mestizo-indigenous relations than the Katarist’s and Indianist’s focus on equality and indigenous leadership. For the most part, his message itself, while highlighting indigenous languages, did not stress “traditional” culture and life in rural “traditional” communities, but rather the plight of the indigenous in urban centers

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304 Condepa documents; interview, Soliz Rada, April 2005.
305 Acknowledged by Solis Rada.
(especially La Paz/El Alto) to achieve basic economic well-being and a voice within the system. Finally, the party was highly centralized in the person of Palenque, who made all key decisions, including candidate selection. The leadership and finances of the party were also mixed up with those of the RTP organization and the Palenque family.\footnote{See Solis Rada interview, April 2005.}

Thus, to the extent that we might identify what an “indigenous” organizational structure would be, Condepa was not one. Although \textit{chola} women formed its key local level activists and were highly visible members of the party, aside from Remedios Loza, none of the top leadership positions were held by indigenous or \textit{cholo} individuals. Figure 6.7, drawn from Lazar (2002), illustrates Condepa’s basic structure.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics{Condepa_Structure.pdf}
\caption{Condepa’s Functional Structure}
\end{figure}
The 1989 Elections

The 1989 elections, which marked Condepa’s first electoral outing, were once again a close race, with many of the same contenders – the MNR, ADN, and MIR in particular. The top three candidates each received roughly a quarter of the vote each -- Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and the MNR at 25.7 percent, followed by Hugo Banzer and the ADN at 25.2 percent, and Jaime Paz and the MIR at 21.8 percent. The remaining quarter of the vote was split among the smaller parties. Because no party had received a majority, the vote went to the legislature. Through an alliance between the ADN and MIR – the “Patriotic Accord” (Acuerdo Patriótica—AP), the third place candidate, Jaime Paz Zamora (MIR), was elected president. The two members of the AP were a strange pair, joining not only the traditional left with the traditional right, but also a party founded in opposition to Banzer’s dictatorship with Banzer’s own party.

While the top three parties were “traditional,” however, a significant portion of the remaining vote went to new forces, several of them appealing directly to indigenous communities. Condepa ran fourth with 12.3 percent of the vote. Most of this vote, in fact, was won in the department of La Paz, and especially in the cities of La Paz/El Alto, Condepa’s base (see Romero Ballivian 2003; Jones and Mainwaring 2003). The Katarista MRTKL won an 1.6 percent.

In addition, in August 1989, a second major populist party, the Civic Solidarity Union (Unidad Cívica Solidaridad—UCS), was also founded. Although registered too
late to contest the 1989 general elections, the UCS competed in municipal elections that same year, winning 16.5 percent nationally. There are a number of similarities between the UCS and Condepa in terms of leadership, organization, base, and populist orientation. The UCS was founded by Max Fernández, a wealthy, charismatic businessman, like Palenque, new to politics and a representative of the "new" elite. Like Condepa, the UCS’s program reflected the rather ad hoc commitments of its leader. It proposed "transcendental" change in Bolivian politics, highlighting corruption and problems caused by neo-liberal policy.

At the same time, the UCS identified as a "civic" and "patriotic" movement with a philosophical, humanist, and Christian base, that identified with "all sectors of the country." Among other issues, it emphasized liberty, social justice, democracy, honesty and hard work, discrimination against women, and the participation of the private sector (see "Declaración de Principios," in Rolon Anaya 1999: 518-522). Thus, unlike Condepa, the party did not explicitly appeal to the indigenous or to "cholos," but it had a strong base in the "popular classes." Although there was clearly an ethnic undercurrent to the party’s support, ethnic identification was not emphasized explicitly. This is even more notable considering that Fernández, unlike Palenque, was of Aymara ancestry, a fact he noted in interviews but did not stress in his message to voters. More important to Fernández’s appeal was his rags to riches story. Like Palenque, Fernández was also a charismatic, populist leader, known for providing gifts of cement and drinks from his companies, contributions to local teams and clubs, etc.
1993 Elections

The impressive rise of these new social forces – indigenous and populist – set the stage for Bolivia’s 1993 general elections, which ushered in some of the most important institutional changes in the country’s recent democratic history. The MNR, recognizing the growing force of indigenous leaders in politics, formed an unlikely alliance with the MRTKL. The MNR-MRTKL alliance, which was to win the election, combined one of the principal authors of Decree 21060, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, as presidential candidate, with one of Bolivia’s most-respected indigenous leaders, Víctor Hugo Cárdenas, as vice presidential candidate. An intellectual of Aymara descent, Cárdenas had been a leader of the Katarista movement since the 1970s. From the MNR’s side, the alliance gave the MNR the opportunity to appeal to the segment of the population most hurt by the New Economic Policy. From the MRTKL’s perspective, it gave the party political influence that it had been unable to achieve on its own in past elections.307

Campaigns were dominated by debate of the neo-liberal economic reform and its effects on social groups and on poverty in general, along with discussion of reform of the state and the process of democratization. The MNR-MRTKL’s program, which later became the 1993 “Plan for Everyone” (“Plan de Todos”), added social safety net programs to the neo-liberal package and incorporated some recognition of indigenous rights and customs. It was also focused on broadening popular participation,
decentralization, and education reform. Although the overall plan did not make

307 The alliance however was a controversial one. Some sectors of the Katarista movement in particular criticized Cárdenas for selling out. Cárdenas and his supporters maintained that he could do more good from inside the government than outside.
indigenous identity explicitly central (focusing more on the indigenous in terms of poverty and political exclusion), the importance of ethnicity especially in terms of candidate selection was clear.308

The MNR-MRTKL’s principal opponent, the Patriotic Accord (AP) now included the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) and the Revolutionary Front of the Left (FRI), in addition to the ADN and MIR. The AP’s program likewise stressed poverty and other economic problems in the country, including lack of basic services, especially education, corruption, and lack of infrastructure (Foro 1993). The other major contenders in the race included Condepa and the UCS.

In the final count, the MNR-MRTKL placed first, with 35.6 percent. Although the MRTKL’s place in the alliance surely helped to garner some votes, extrapolations based on both parties’ vote shares in the 1989 and 1997 elections suggest that the vast majority of this vote share (roughly 97 percent of the vote) was due to the MNR.309 The MNR-MRTKL alliance was followed in the polls by the AP with 21 percent, Condepa and the UCS with 14 percent each, and the Free Bolivia Movement (Movimiento Bolivia Libre—MBL) with 5 percent. As in other elections, there was a significant regional split in the vote. This split was especially notable in the case of Condepa (which performed

308 This is the reason that the MNR-MRTKL is not classified as “ethnic-mobilizing” in this project. If it were, ethnic salience would have been even higher in 1993.
309 The rough estimate was calculated using vote shares for each party in the 1989 general elections and 1993 municipal elections, taking the average of each party’s vote share, and comparing the two averages. Using 1993 and 1997 general elections results would have been ideal, but MRTKL did not compete in 1997.
best in La Paz), but can also be seen in the higher shares for UCS and AP in the west. On the other hand, the MNR-MRTKL did roughly uniformly well in all nine departments.\(^{310}\)

**The Plan de Todos, 1993-97**

In 1993, for the first time in several elections, the presidency went to the candidate running first in the popular vote, Sánchez de Lozada, and a governing coalition was formed by the MNR-MRTKL with the support of the UCS and MBL. The 1993-1997 government was significant for several reasons. First, the new vice-president, Cárdenas, was the first Aymara to hold such a high office. Ethnic identification was central to his political persona from the start. Demonstrating the dramatic changes in Bolivian politics, Cárdenas was sworn in wearing indigenous dress and spoke in Aymara, Quechua, and Guarani. The new government’s recognition of ethnic issues was further institutionalized in changes to the constitution in 1994, which declared Bolivia a “multi-ethnic and pluri-cultural” nation and adopted Aymara, Quechua, and Guarani as state languages alongside Spanish (see Van Cott 2000).\(^{311}\)

In the *Plan de Todos*, the new government implemented a far-reaching program of reform, which had three main components, “capitalization,” popular participation, and education reform. The government also implemented land reform. The influence of these policies was clear in later social mobilizations. Capitalization, a Bolivian variant

\(^{310}\) Ten parties competed in the 1993 elections. This was two more than competed in 1989 when the “double quotient” counting method had been in place, but in fact slightly fewer “effective” parties. Of the parties that competed five earned more than 3 percent of the vote. See also nationalization scores for Bolivian parties from Jones and Mainwaring 2003.

\(^{311}\) Reformed constitution of 12 August 1994.
on privatization, involved the set up of “mixed capital corporations,” with the goal of promoting competition and efficiency.\textsuperscript{312} Capitalization was carried out between 1994 and 1997 in the areas of electricity, telecommunications, hydrocarbons, water, and transportation.\textsuperscript{313}

The second key element of the Plan de Todos was the promotion of popular participation through administrative decentralization. Under the Law of Popular Participation (1551; 20 April 1994), 311 municipalities were created, which were to receive funds proportional to their populations to be administered by the local community.\textsuperscript{314} The law specifically recognized the role of “indigenous, campesino, and urban communities,” giving “juridical personality” (legal status) to Territorial Organizations of the Base (Organizaciones Territoriales de Base) – specifically, “campesino communities, indigenous peoples, and vigilance communities, organized

\textsuperscript{312} It involved the sale of 50 percent of an enterprise’s shares to the private investor with the highest bid, who then gained management control of the company, while the majority of the government’s remaining shares (45-50 percent) were then transferred to the Collective Capitalization Fund (CCF). Company employees received the remaining shares (about 4 percent on average). Barja, McKenzie, and Urquiola 2005. Key legislation was the 1994 Sectoral Regulation System law (Sistema de Regulación Sectorial--SIRESE).

\textsuperscript{313} Privatization was started in 1992. Remaining government shares were directed at transfers to private citizens through the set-up of an old-age pension fund (Bonomosol), payments for funeral expenses, and investment in an Individual Capitalization Fund of individually-owned pension plans. Based on Barja, McKenzie, and Urquiola (2005): 135-136. They note: “The Bonosol was paid only once before the administration that implemented the capitalization process left office. A debate immediately ensued over whether the CCF had sufficient funds to continue payments at that pace [i.e., $248 in 1997 to 320,000 citizens 65 and older]. The next administration did not make payments for a period and then switched to Bolivida, which it began disbursing in December 2000. The Bolivida was a cash payment of $60 for every citizen over age 65. Retroactive payments for 1998 and 1999 ($60 per year) were made; by March 2001, 150,000 individuals had benefited.” (135-6).

\textsuperscript{314} By the December 2005 municipal elections, this number had increased to 327.
according to usage, custom, and statutory arrangements." On the basis of this law, municipal elections, which had been reinstituted in 1987, gained new significance.

A third key set of reforms focused on education, designed to improve the quality and administration of education, as well as to incorporate it into the popular participation reforms. One of the most important aspects of the reform in terms of ethnic issues was the provision for bilingual education.

Finally, the government undertook to revise the agrarian reform law of 1953, among the cornerstones of the National Revolution. In terms of identity politics, one of the most important aspects of this reform was the provision for title to be granted collectively to those groups who could demonstrate their rights to the land as “original” or “indigenous” peoples. This was especially important in the eastern part of the country, which was greatly affected by patronage-type distribution of land during the dictatorship.

The Emergence of the MAS

The reforms of the Sánchez de Lozada government and continuing debates over land rights, participation, and economic wellbeing laid the groundwork for further changes in Bolivian politics, in particular the emergence of several new locally-based movements that became major forces at the national level from the late 1990s. In

\[315\] From Law 1551, Article 3: “Se define como sujetos de la Participación Popular a las Organizaciones Territoriales de Base, expresadas en las comunidades campesinas, pueblos indígenas y juntas vecinales, organizadas según sus usos, costumbres o disposiciones estatutarias.”

\[316\] Law 1565, 7 July 1994.

retrospect, the most significant effect of these processes in terms of parties was the emergence of the Movement toward Socialism (MAS). The MAS was founded in March 1995 at the Congress on Land and Territory (Congreso Tierra y Territorio) held in Santa Cruz by a number of campesino and workers organizations, including the CSUTCB, the Central Sindical de Campesinos de Bolivia (CSCB), the Central Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (CIDOB), the Federación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas de Bolivia – Bartolina Sisa (FNMCB-BS). It was officially named the Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People (Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos – IPSP), a name which has survived in the party’s official name, MAS-IPSP. Due to various difficulties in registering with the National Electoral Court, the MAS-IPSP however contested the 1995 municipal elections as the United Left (Izquierda Unida—IU), an “empty shell” composed of the MAS and PCB. Although formed in Santa Cruz, the MAS-IPSP was in fact based in the coca growing regions of Cochabamba where it had strong ties with the Bolivian Confederation of “Colonizers” (Confederación de Colonizadores de Bolivia), an association of migrants to the area, as well as through its leadership to the Six Federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba, an association of coca-growers led by Evo Morales. While the IU received less than 4 percent nationwide in the

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318 MAS was formally founded on 23 July 1987 (Resolution No. 48/87 of 30 July 1987). See CNE (August 2005).

319 Orozco Ramirez 2005: 17, citing Stefanoni. According to Loayza, the three key founding organizations of the IPSP are the CSUTCB, FNMCB-BS, and the Confederación de Colonizadores de Bolivia, and IPSP is the “political instrument” of these organizations and their bases.

320 The founding date was March 27, 1995.

321 MAS interviews. Romero Ballivián (2003)’s description is slightly different: This begins with a small fraction of the FSB (the key opposition to the MNR in the 1950s), headed by the parliamentarian David Añez (presidential candidate for FSB in 1985). From 1985, Añez favored socialist elements in the party and gathered together the IU in 1989. When this leftist coalition divided, MAS was left in the IU.
municipal polls, it had an impressive showing in Cochabamba (especially in the Trópico), where it won 49 council seats and 10 mayorships.322

In April 1996, at the VII Ordinary Congress of the CSUTCB, also in Santa Cruz, the MAS-ISPS was “reaffirmed” as the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People (Asamblea por la Soberanía de los Pueblos—ASP).323 In the 1997 general elections, the party again contested as the IU. At this point, Alejo Véliz was head of the ASP and the IU’s presidential candidate.324 Evo Morales, who later become the party’s head, was a candidate for a uninominal deputy seat in the Chapare region and won with the highest percentage in the country, 61.8 percent.325 In 1998, Evo Morales’s faction separated from Alejo Véliz, who eventually allied in 2002 with another new Cochabamba-based party, the New Republican Force (Nueva Fuerza Republicana—NFR). The PCB–MAS alliance (IU) dissolved prior to the 1999 municipal elections. At that point, borrowing a party registration from Oscar Unzaga de la Vega and the Bolivian Socialist Falange (Falange Socialista Boliviana--FSB), the party ran under the Movement toward Socialism registration, changing its name to the MAS-IPSP.326

In its platform and organization, the MAS represented an entirely new form of ethnic-mobilizing party in Bolivia. In contrast to the Katarista parties, the MAS did not have a clear, developed ethnic ideology; it was not a niche ideological party and its early

322 Orozco Ramírez 2005: 18; Paz Ballivián 2003: 244.
323 The ASP, however, eventually dissolved due to internal divisions.
324 Marcos Dominic was the vice-presidential candidate.
325 Paz Ballivián 2003: 244; Orozco Ramírez 2005: 18. Other uninominal deputies elected were Roman Loayza, Felix Sánchez, and Nestor Guzman Villarroel.
326 This fact helps to explain why one of the criticisms of the MAS by Felipe Quispe and others is that the party has “fascist” roots.
top leaders were not ethnic intellectuals or ethnic activists. Although led mainly by indigenous leaders, the MAS did not reject external ideologies of left and, in its early years, focused on issues related to the economic livelihood of coca growers in particular. Although the MAS highlighted the struggle of the indigenous and the discrimination they faced historically, it did not focus on traditional cultural revival, nor on the establishment of an independent Aymara state. With a base among migrants in the Chapare (coca growers and former miners and campesinos), in fact, it had stronger support among Quechua than Aymara groups, although Morales was of Aymara ancestry. Its base organizations were drawn from various locally-organized groups, some ethnic (ayllus), some leftist (unions), some vigilance committees. In the late 1990s, Morales himself was best known as a leftist and a Bolivian nationalist, a fast rising cocalero union leader strongly critical of US intervention and repression in the Chapare. Morales’s ethnic discourse developed more later as the party sought national status.

While the MAS differed from the narrow ideological focus of the Katarista parties, it also differed from the populist indigenism of Condepa. In contrast to Condepa, the MAS was truly an indigenous-led party lacking what might be described as Palenque’s paternalistic edge. Although also centralized and lacking strong midlevel organization, the MAS in its earliest years had strong ties to base organizations and made concerted efforts (not all successful) to “democratize” party decision-making and organization. Thus, although like Condepa, the MAS appealed to the masses promising profound change in the structure of society, the MAS’s promises in many ways seemed more credible, its organization and leadership embodying (or working to

327 Alvaro García Linera, April 2005.
embody) many of the principles it expressed—indigenous leadership, equality, and popular participation.

**Banzer’s Return and the Rise of Social Protest**

The 1997 general elections, the first held under the new MMP rules, were contested by the same key players as in 1993, with two notable exceptions—Fernández (UCS) and Palenque (Condepa), who both died during the 1993 administration. Given the degree to which UCS and Condepa were organized around their leaders, Fernández’s death in an airplane accident in 1995 and Palenque’s of a heart attack in 1997 clearly weakened their parties. Although both parties in fact maintained (and even slightly increased) their vote shares in the 1997 polls with candidates running on their founders’ legacies, the electoral support of both parties began to decline by the 1999 municipal elections.

Overall, the results of the 1997 elections reflected many of the same tendencies as in 1993, however with a clear drop in support for the MNR, which fell by half from 36 to 18 percent. This was due in large part to the controversial nature of the MNR’s broad reform program. The ADN in particular benefited from this decline, placing first with 22 percent, a clear increase over the ADN-MIR-PDC-FRI alliance’s 1993 results and almost up to its 1989 share of 25 percent. Most of the remaining vote went to Condepa (17 percent), MIR (17 percent), and the UCS (16 percent). By congressional vote, ex-dictator
Banzer was thus elected president in 1997. A broad governing coalition was formed between the ADN and Condepa, MIR, UCS, and NFR.

Several important economic and societal shifts occurred during this period. One was the expansion of the natural gas sector, which in proven and probable reserves expanded from 4.24 trillion cubic feet in 1996 to 52.30 in 2002. Petroleum reserves also increased from 178.2 million barrels in 1996 to 929.1 in 2002. The majority of gas and petroleum reserves (some 80-90 percent) were located in Tarija and another 10 percent in Santa Cruz, dramatically increasing the economic power of the eastern part of the country. At the same time, despite the increase in hydrocarbon reserves, 1999-2001 marked a period of economic recession. Annual GDP growth declined to 1-2 percent.

The period also saw the broad extension of coca eradication under “Plan Dignidad” – funded largely by the US. Over 25,000 hectares of coca were eliminated, while monetary compensation schemes previously distributed to communities hurt by eradication were suspended.

Social protest also increased over the continuing capitalization of public enterprises. These tensions came to head in April 2000 with the “Water War” in Cochabamba. The target of protests was the Aguas del Tunari company, a joint Bolivian-foreign enterprise that held the contract for public water supply in the city of Cochabamba.

328 The last year of this administration was under Banzer’s vice president Jorge Quiroga Ramirez. Banzer, who suffered from lung cancer, resigned from office on August 6, 2001, and died on May 5, 2002. 329 The remaining 7 percent of petroleum reserves were in Cochabamba and about 1 percent of both petroleum and gas reserves in Chuquisaca. Numbers from YPFP as cited in Mesa 2003: 767.
Cochabamba, Bolivia’s third largest city. Organized by the “Coordinadora del Agua,” protesters demanded that the contract be rescinded, staging large – and eventually successful – protests.

One of the principal leaders of the social mobilizations of this period was Felipe Quispe Huanca, an Indianist leader who had been a member of MITKA and later of the armed radical Tupaj Katari Guerrilla Army (Ejército Guerrillero Tupac Katari—EGTK). Jailed in 1992 on charges of terrorism, he was released in 1998, following which, benefiting from the continuing conflict between Morales and Veliz over control of the CSTUCB, Quispe became the CSTUCB’s secretary general. In November 2000, Quispe founded the Indigenous Pachakuti Movement (Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti—MIP). The MIP, a clear descendant of the MITKA (f. 1978), expressed an Indianist and pro-Aymara platform favoring cultural revival, autonomy, and equality.

2002 Elections

Following on this period of social mobilization, the 2002 elections revealed the growing strength of new political actors and the continuing crisis of the traditional parties. Eleven parties or coalitions presented candidates. Among the front-running candidates were several newcomers. The New Republican Force (NFR) (f. 1996), led by popular Cochabamba mayor Manfred Reyes Villa, was slated in early polls to place second. The MAS, which did not seem to be a top contender early in the race, received

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increasing national attention after the US Ambassador Manuel Rocha cautioned Bolivians against voting for the “cocalero” party, threatening a cutoff of US aid – a statement which backfired completely given strong US antipathy among many Bolivians. (A popular joke among MAS activists was that US Ambassador Rocha was Morales’s number one supporter in the election.) The Free Bolivia Movement (Movimiento Bolivia Libre—MBL), a small center-left party that split off from the MIR in the mid-1980s and was particularly vocal on issues of corruption and human rights, ran in coalition with the MNR.

Both based in Cochabamba, the NFR and the MAS made clear efforts in this election to broaden their bases through the election of their vice presidential candidates. The center-right NFR, on the one hand, chose Ivo Kujlis, a well-known businessman from Santa Cruz. The MAS, which ran Evo Morales for president, selected Antonio Peredo Leigue, a well-known (non-indigenous) leftist leader who, along with his brothers, had fought alongside Che Guevara in his Bolivian insurgency in the 1960s. The MAS’s strategy of appealing to the middle class and the left provides an interesting contrast with that of the MIP, which highlighted Indianism above all else, making little effort to a more mass appeal.

Among the other major parties in the race were the MNR (running with the MBL) and the MIR-NM, running in coalition with the FRI. The results of the 2002 elections revealed a dramatic upset for the traditional parties. The UCS, Condepa, and ADN (whose leader Banzer had died in office in 2002) struggled with internal organization
after the deaths of their leaders. Although the MNR-MBL placed first – later winning the presidency – with 22.46 percent and 47 legislative seats, it was followed closely in the polls by the MAS (20.94 percent, 35 seats) and NFR (20.91 percent, 27 seats). The MIR-NM/FRI coalition ran fourth with 16.32 percent (31 seats). The MIP, meanwhile, achieved the highest vote share ever for an Indianist party with 6.09 percent and 6 seats (all from La Paz). The new government was formed through an alliance between the MNR and MIR, joined by the MBL and UCS.

**2002-05 Governments**

The Sánchez de Lozada government marked a second period of mounting social protest. The first major incident occurred in February 2003, triggered by the announcement of a tax increase. In response, protests were called by the MAS, COB, and civic and labor groups in Cochabamba. They were also supported by the Special Security Group (*Grupos Especial de Seguridad*—GES) of the National Police Force, whose members were also protesting the fact that they had not received their January salaries and that a request for a salary increase had been rejected. In several days of confrontations between protestors and military during “Black February,” 34 people were killed and 182 seriously injured. The government subsequently withdrew its tax proposal.

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The second major incident, which eventually led to the resignation of Sánchez de Lozada on October 17, 2003, began in September with protests by highland campesinos calling for the ratification of a 72-point agreement that included demands for the resignation of Carlos Sánchez Berzain (Sánchez de Lozada’s Minister of Defense) and freedom for El Alto local leader Edwin Huambo. Sánchez Berzain, who had been a central player in the February 2003 events and was active in the coca eradication program, was accused of by his opponents of human rights violations. Huambo was incarcerated for the application of communitarian justice, a central issue of public debate. This group was soon joined by long-distance truckers and by students of the Public University of El Alto (Universidad Pública de El Alto--UPEA). During September, various distinct social groups throughout the country also mobilized. Initially organized each for their own distinct sectoral demands, these groups began to mobilize nationally with the unified objective of preventing the sale of Bolivian gas to the United States through Chile. Following a violent confrontation between protesters and government forces in Warisata, the “War of Gas” began. Quispe discontinued dialogue with the government, declaring “a state of siege in all twenty provinces of La Paz.”

Protests had a clear ethnic edge: Farmers in the Río Abajo, for instance, stated that they would lose their production so that the “k’aras” [whites] would die of hunger.” By early October, there were mobilizations by cocaleros in the Yungas, road-blocks by

333 September 8, 2003. This section draws largely on Rivero 2004.
334 In the months prior, crime and violence had reportedly experienced a sharp increase in El Alto and other areas. In response, some local leaders began to take the law into their own hands, arguing that they were carrying out “communitarian justice.”
335 “chóferes interprovinciales”
336 In Montero, Cobija, and Santa Cruz, as well as in El Alto.
337 Rivero 2004: 11, translation mine.
338 Rivero 2004: 11, translation mine.
campesinos in Inquisivi and Collana, marches in Cochabamba, and a civil strike/work-stoppage\textsuperscript{339} in El Alto, where protesters called for civil war.\textsuperscript{340}

The turning point in these protests occurred on October 12, when the army opened fire on a crowd of civilians at the Rio Seco bridge in El Alto, killing over twenty people.\textsuperscript{341} Broadcast on TV and heard from La Paz, the events galvanized the Bolivian public, including – for the first time – the middle class, who now joined the original protesters in calling for Sánchez de Lózada’s resignation. On October 17, Sánchez de Lozada resigned in a letter to Congress, fleeing by plane to Miami.\textsuperscript{342}

Taking office the following day, former vice-president Carlos Mesa pledged to uphold the “October Agenda” – to revise the hydrocarbons law; hold a constituent assembly to move toward equality; and to bring Sánchez de Lozada, Sánchez Berzaín, and others to justice. A historian with little political experience and no party backing, Mesa’s new administration oversaw several years of continuing protests. Criticism came both from leftist and indigenous social movements, which argued that Mesa had not done enough to uphold the October Agenda, and from the right and Santa Cruz, which argued that Mesa had shifted too far to the left and the interests of the Highlands. In mid 2005, Mesa’s resignation – submitted already three times – was finally upheld. Transitional

\textsuperscript{339} “paro civil”
\textsuperscript{340} “Ahora sí, guerra civil”
\textsuperscript{341} Reports suggest that one soldier who did not comply with orders was shot by his commanding officer.
\textsuperscript{342} In all, at least sixty people were killed during the protests. Seven others died in “dubious circumstances,” although they are not officially classified as victims. Escape (2004), 17.
authority was transferred to Eduardo Rodríguez, head of the Supreme Court, and the country began organizing for early elections.\footnote{The official line of succession would have given power to head of the Senate, Hermando Vaca Diez, a cruceño unacceptable to the left. Reportedly, part of the deal in Mesa’s resignation was that Vaca Diez declined the nomination, handing power over to the head of the Supreme Court, Rodríguez. Rodríguez, an attorney and graduate of Harvard’s Kennedy School, was known as a conservative, but also sufficiently apolitical and fair enough to guide the country to its next elections.}

2005 Elections and Constitutional Reform

The 2005 campaigns brought to the fore issues that had been percolating since the mid 1980s – the threat of democratic breakdown, the melding of leftist and indigenous appeals, the regional split between the left and the right, and increasingly strong demands for regional autonomy – especially from the east. The regional issue was highlighted further by the debate over the distribution of seats based on the 2001 census, which pushed scheduled elections back several weeks to December 18. The 2005 elections also marked the first time in which departmental prefects were popularly elected, a demand advanced particularly by eastern groups.

It was clear from the start of the campaigns that the two frontrunners were Morales of the MAS and Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga of PODEMOS, a new electoral alliance dominated by members of the ADN. Polls showed these two candidates neck and neck from the beginning, with the third place candidate, Samuel Doria Medina and the new National Unity party (\textit{Unidad Nacional}—UN), a clear third. The UN, which had cut its teeth in the December 2004 municipal elections, presented a platform quite similar to that of the earlier UCS, like the UN led by a charismatic businessman, in this case one who
had made his fortune in cement and Burger King franchises. Interestingly, the UN was also the only party to explicitly highlight the regional divisions in the country in its campaign strategy; given Doria Medina’s western ties, the party strategically selected Carlos Dabdoub, a leader from Santa Cruz as Doria Medina’s vice presidential running mate.344

While Dorina Medina stood in the middle, Morales and Quiroga were divided in almost every sense – ideologically, in terms of their regional support bases, and in ethnic terms. Morales and MAS represented the left and the politically excluded – with a base among the indigenous left of the highlands – although they also tried to attract the non-indigenous middle classes. Quiroga, on the other hand, a former president and ADN leader, represented the right in economic terms, had close ties to business interests in the east, and was a member of the traditional ruling class. Even at the most basic level, the physical contrast between the two presidential candidates was striking. Morales highlighted his indigenous and campesino roots; in terms of dress, he stood out from traditional politicians by refusing to wear a suit and tie and favoring the sweaters and leather jackets commonly worn in the highlands. Quiroga, a blond businessman, educated at Harvard and married to an American, was shown in campaign posters alongside his vice presidential candidate, María René Duchén, also “white” and also middle class, a former TV reporter for one of Bolivia’s major news stations.

The MAS made an open appeal to the country’s indigenous population, highlighting its numerical majority and historical exclusion politically, economically, and

344 UN interview, December 2005.
culturally. It also appealed to the “majority” in economic terms, as “campesinos,” “workers,” and those of the “middle class.” Well aware of its rural indigenous base, the party made a concerted effort to attract the middle class. This included not only the selection of a popular political analyst and activist, Alvaro García Linera, as Morales’s running mate, but also a number of campaign ads featuring middle class professionals pledging their support to the party. Unlike the other key indigenous party in the race, the MIP, the MAS also explicitly adopted leftist ideology in its platform, as well as in its membership, incorporating once again a number of prominent traditional and non-indigenous leftists as candidates. The MAS platform highlighted six issues, echoing the “October agenda”: the nationalization of hydrocarbons; the need for a constituent assembly to restructure state institutions; the need for a new economic model and a move away from neoliberalism; decentralization and regional autonomy; addressing of natural resource issues, including the redistribution of land; and poverty alleviation.

Quiroga’s campaign, on the other hand, was almost the mirror image of the MAS’s. While not stressing explicit appeals to any economic groups, Quiroga’s campaign emphasized economic issues and political pragmatism, voicing points highlighted by the country’s business class and professionals. Although some analysts charged that the party had strong support among racist groups in Santa Cruz, the party’s explicit message deemphasized ethnic issues. Asked in a televised interview, if, “with all due respect,” the PODEMOS campaign was not just a little too “white,” vice presidential candidate Duchén emphasized the party’s efforts to deal with the issue of economic inequality, and in that way to help the indigenous, while at the same time highlighting the

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345 These included, for instance, several leaders who had fought alongside Che Guevara in the 1960s.
common statement in Bolivia that “we are all mestizos.” The clear focus of Quiroga’s campaign was the economic – “the ocean, gas, and soy” (“Mar, gas y soya”) – a program of economic pragmatism and liberalism.

The results of the election were highly significant, both in cementing the MAS’s role as Bolivia’s new leading party and in signaling the collapse of the “traditional” parties. MAS placed first with 53.75 percent, followed by PODEMOS with 28.59 percent and UN with 7.98 percent. The MNR received only 6.47 percent and all other parties less than 3 percent. While polls had predicted that the MAS would win a plurality, few observers expected Morales to win the absolute majority in the popular vote necessary for his direct election – the first time in Bolivia’s recent democratic history. Despite continuing threats from both leftist and indigenous social movements – only loosely united behind him – and from rightwing and eastern parties and social movements – firmly in opposition to him – this uniquely strong mandate placed Morales in a decent position as he took office in January 2006.

Social Structure

In taking advantage of the party system crisis to create new parties, political elites were constrained by the structure of social groups and by how these groups overlapping with the traditionally salient class dimension, that still mapped on to voters’ key concerns about economic policy and redistribution. As discussed above, there are a number of ethnic divisions in Bolivia, and, if numbers and the social salience of ethnicity were all
that mattered, leaders should have created new parties around several of these groups. Table 6.3 summarizes some of the most socially-salient ethnic groups and their "dimensions" and sizes.  

### Table 6.3: Some Ethnic Groups in Bolivia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&quot;Dimension&quot;</th>
<th>Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racial/Cultural 1</td>
<td>Indigenous (62%), Non-indigenous (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial/Cultural 2</td>
<td>Indigenous, Mestizo, White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial/Cultural 2</td>
<td>Indigenous (9%), Cholo (2.5%), Mestizo (57%) White (26%), Black (1.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural/Linguistic</td>
<td>Not indigenous (38%), Quechua (31%), Aymara (25%), Guarani (1.6%),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Chiquitano (2.2%), Mojeno (0.9%), Other Native (1.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-region</td>
<td>Highland indigenous (92+% of indigenous), Lowland indigenous (about 8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region/Department</td>
<td>From Chuquisaca (7%), La Paz (30%), Cochabamba (17%), Oruro (5%),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potosi (10%), Tarija (5%), Santa Cruz (21%), Beni (4%), Pando (0.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>&quot;Camba&quot;/Easterner, &quot;Kolla&quot;/Westerner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several of these groups overlap with each other and with economic divisions. For instance, there are generally higher income levels today in the hydrocarbon and agriculture-rich "east" than in the highlands. In addition, while the Quechua and Aymara, as Hahn (1996) notes, have traditionally been peasantry in the sense of being "small-plot subsistence agriculturalists," non-Andean indigenous populations “have been artisans, hunters, and gatherers for the most part” (1996: 97). Finally, there has been historical division between Quechua and Aymara groups in terms of their degree of integration into the mining economy. While the Quechua communities of the Cochabamba valley especially were engaged in mining, the Aymara remained much more independent from this system (Rivera 2003).

Data for Race 3 is from Seligson (2001). Other figures are from the 2001 census (Race 1 and Cultural/linguistic group are based on self-identification).
Table 6.4: Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Population by Occupational Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Group (Population &gt; 10 yrs old)</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Non-indigenous</th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers in agriculture and fishing</td>
<td>40.53%</td>
<td>6.75%</td>
<td>74.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technicians and service professionals</td>
<td>5.92%</td>
<td>8.61%</td>
<td>3.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals, scientists, and intellectuals</td>
<td>1.35%</td>
<td>2.53%</td>
<td>0.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration and enterprise management</td>
<td>0.83%</td>
<td>1.37%</td>
<td>0.28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6.5: Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Population by Type of Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Employment of Employed Population (%)</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Non-Indigenous</th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed worker</td>
<td>50.07%</td>
<td>33.79%</td>
<td>60.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker/employee</td>
<td>42.01%</td>
<td>57.01%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family worker or apprentice without remuneration</td>
<td>4.45%</td>
<td>4.35%</td>
<td>4.51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive, partner, or employer</td>
<td>3.10%</td>
<td>4.64%</td>
<td>2.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of cooperative</td>
<td>0.38%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite these relationships, however, none are as pronounced as the overlap between the traditionally salient political issue dimension, and indigenous/non-indigenous status. This overlap can be seen both in the numbers and in popular perception. For one, the fact that the terms “indigenous” and “campesino” have been and are often used interchangeably is telling. This is not the case for other types of ethnic groups (e.g., “rich” and “Colla” are not interchangeable, nor “miner” and “Quechua”). Further, the types of occupational differences that Hahn (1996) describes between Highland and Lowland indigenous groups may be pronounced, but the distinction
between small-scale agriculturalists, and hunters and gatherers has never been central to the political issue dimension in Bolivian party politics. Census data on indigenous status and employment, income, and education levels also illustrates the indigenous/class overlap. Tables 8 and 9, for instance, highlight the differences in types of employment for those classified as indigenous and non-indigenous in the 2001 census. Education levels also show clear variation: in 2001, while 38.2 percent of the indigenous population was functionally illiterate, a much lower percentage, about 11.81 percent, of the non-indigenous population was (INE 2003: 104).

Alternative Hypotheses

The discussion of the Bolivian case illustrates the influence of several factors key to alternative explanations drawn from work on Bolivia. However, while important, none of them on their own fully explain the timing of the shift in political identifications and why the shift involved the politicization of “indigenous” identity, rather than of other group identities. The predictions of three key alternative arguments are summarized briefly here and, in referring to Figure 6.8, can be tested against the shifts in party competition measured in Chapter 5.

First, one key argument highlights the causal effect of international norms and trends, including the end of the Cold War. The precise mechanism at work may highlight ideational change; a decline in international support (organizational and financial) for leftist parties; a related increase in international support for indigenous

groups and parties; or demonstration effects from other indigenous movements in the region. This argument is consistent with a prediction of a permanent shift away from class salience and a shift to indigenous salience beginning after 1989. As Figure 6.8 illustrates, this prediction is inconsistent with the timing of changes in Bolivian party competition: the vote for leftist parties did decline between 1989 and 1993, but it increased afterwards, and the vote for parties highlighting indigenous identity began increasing in 1985, not 1989.

**Figure 6.8: Alternative Hypotheses**

*Support for Ethnic-Mobilizing and Leftist Parties*  
*Bolivian General Elections, 1980-2005*
Second, another key argument highlights the role of social movements and the increasing mobilization of indigenous populations. This work provides a number of explanations for the development of indigenous social movements, but, generally does not focus on the specific linkages between social movements and electoral politics, assuming a rather fluid relationship (however, see Van Cott 2005). This work is generally consistent with the prediction that the shift towards indigenous salience should have begun during “high” periods of indigenous social mobilization. Research highlights two such recent periods: in the 1970s (e.g., when the Tiwanaku Manifesto was signed), and around 2000 with indigenous mobilizations around the country. This prediction also is not consistent with the timing of the shift towards indigenous salience: in the 1970s, although indigenous parties formed, they were never able to gain more than a few percentage points, and although there was certainly a rise in the vote for indigenous parties between 1997 and 2005, the trend actually began in the mid to late 1980s.

A third key explanation highlights institutional change, in particular decentralization and other institutional reforms designed to encourage popular participation, which created opportunities for the emergence and success of indigenous parties especially in the 2002 elections. Most of the key institutional reforms were implemented under the 1993-1997 government (e.g., the 1994 Law of Popular Participation). Thus, this explanation should predict change sometime after 1993. It is

also consistent with a prediction that locally-salient identities (e.g., region, language) should have become more represented in the party system, not necessarily “indigenous” identification. As Figure 6.8 suggests, predictions drawn from this argument are also inconsistent with the overall timing of the changes observed in Bolivia. In fact, the causal arrow seems to be stronger the other way: that is, a rise in indigenous salience after 1985 contributed to the MNR’s decision to form a coalition with the MRTKL in the 1993 elections, leading to the election of Bolivia’s first “indigenous” vice president, Victor Hugo Cárdenas, and to its “Plan de Todos” which described major institutional reforms designed to address the concerns of indigenous and excluded populations (see Albó 1994).
Chapter 7

Cross-National Variation: The Andean Countries

Chapter 6 illustrates how the theory developed in this dissertation is consistent with shifts in political identification in Bolivia. This chapter focuses on the generalizability of the argument (theory and framework), showing how it also helps to explain variation in the identifications salient over time in electoral politics in the other countries of the Andean region—Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.

These cases are interesting for several reasons. For one, if the argument applies anywhere, it should apply in countries like these—emerging democracies that have experienced severe party system crises, and with ethnic divisions that have not been central to competition among traditional parties (see Kornblith et al. 2004; Mainwaring 2006a, 2006b; Tanaka 2006). In comparison to other countries in Latin America, they also have overall more weakly-institutionalized party systems (until the 1990s, with the exceptions of Colombia and Venezuela) (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 2006). In addition, focusing on a regionally-defined set of countries limits variation across a variety of historical, cultural, and institutional factors that influence politics and identification, and thus helps us to focus on the mechanisms and variables identified in the theory. In particular, these countries have related colonial and pre-colonial histories;
share some of the same ethnic groups (although demographics vary); have similar
traditions of formal and informal discrimination against indigenous populations; have
indigenous social movements with ties across national boundaries to others in the region;
have relatively high degrees of economic inequality and organized union movements;
were affected by similar and related economic crisis during the 1970s-90s (although
specific causes and severity varied); and have generally strong presidential systems (see
Council on Foreign Relations 2004; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005). They also have been
more marked in recent years by governmental crises that have threatened democratic
stability (see Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 2006; Pérez-Liñan 2006; Shifter

Despite these similarities, the CDEI data presented in Chapter 4 suggest
considerable variation in the types of identifications salient in elections across countries
in the region. In the elections studied in the early 1990s, a considerably larger share of
the vote went to ethnic-mobilizing and economic-mobilizing parties in Bolivia than in
any of the other countries (61.4 percent compared with 50.4 percent for Colombia, 24.2
percent for Peru, and 32.3 percent for Venezuela). The “ethnic” vote was comparatively
strongest in Bolivia, while the “leftist” vote in Venezuela surpassed that in all other
Andean countries – even though traditions of leftist parties and union politics were
arguably as strong or stronger elsewhere.

Looking over time, it is clear that there have also been major changes in identity
politics in the region since the 1980s, in addition to variation in such changes across
countries. Several aspects of these changes have been addressed in other work. Studies by Yashar (2005) and Van Cott (2005), in particular, have highlighted the notable rise of indigenous parties and social movements in the region. Studies by Mainwaring (2006), Kornblith et al (2004), Tanaka (2006), and Kenney (1998) in particular have explored the emergence of new, anti-system and "outsider" parties and politicians. However, no other project that I am aware of addresses the equally notable emergence, and variation in the emergence, of new partisan divisions highlighting ethnicity and class – broadly defined, as in this study. As the Bolivian case suggests, such shifts seem to be part of the longer-term processes through which the sorts of indigenous parties and social movements that Yashar (2005) and Van Cott (2005) study have emerged on the national electoral stage.

This chapter suggests how three key sets of factors identified in the theory explain much of the variation in these cases: the presence and timing of party system crises; the key political divisions between traditional political parties and whether and how these divisions overlapped with divisions between groups in society; and given this, how elites responded to political crises. In all of the countries studied, political crises from the 1980s facilitated the emergence of new political forces (often populist parties loosely organized around a charismatic leader), which gained support by effectively portraying themselves as political "outsiders" in contrast to traditional party and elite "insiders" (see Kenney 1998). In all countries, these outsider politicians attracted enough support to win even the presidency in at least one election (Mainwaring 2006).

However, the outsider/insider division that emerged in political competition in the
region had different characteristics across each of the five Andean countries. In Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, it was eventually linked in varying degrees of explicitness to ethnic and class identifications with non-dominant groups (the indigenous, those not of European descent, the working class, and the poor). (Whether these outsider politicians actually pursued policies that advanced the interests of these groups is a different matter.) In Colombia, however, this has not been the case; the emergence of new political forces thus far has not corresponded to a clear realignment of politics around significantly stronger ethnic identifications, although there is some evidence of an emerging left.

In Bolivia, as we have seen, rising “outsiders” during the 1980s to 2006 have included explicitly and implicitly pro-indigenous populists (CONDEPA and the UCS), Katarista and Indianista ideologues (MIP, MRTKL), and indigenous leftists (MAS). (The basic narrative of the Bolivian case as presented in Chapter 6 is illustrated in Figure 7.2. The diagram should be familiar from Chapter 3 (Figure 3.5), with the lines in bold indicating the basic story.) A similar trend towards the rise of indigenous and indigenous left politicians can also be seen in Ecuador. In Ecuador, however, ethnic elites have exercised a more organized role in the process through which indigenous identification has been politicized in electoral politics. Despite a long-term party system crisis since the 1980s and the fact that indigenous organizations in national and local politics were potentially strong enough to organize successful electoral runs, ethnicity only became central and explicit in national electoral debate from the late 1990s. This is largely explained by the stance of leading indigenous groups which explicitly decided to opt out of electoral politics before 1996, viewing elections as inconsistent with indigenous aims.
Another similar trend to Bolivia can be seen in Venezuela, where the outsider politician Hugo Chávez rose to power highlighting a leftist, nationalist appeal, which included ethnic undercurrents (sometimes explicit) – as in his identification as “indigenous” and “black.” Not surprising given Venezuela’s smaller indigenous population, more ethnically-mixed character, and comparatively weaker indigenous social movements, however, the rise of ethnic and class identifications in Venezuelan politics has had a more “rhetorical” character than in either Bolivia or Ecuador, where it has been linked more consistently to developed indigenous ideologies and social movement groups.
In Peru, key “outsider” politicians Alberto Fujimori, Alejandro Toledo, and Ollanta Humala and the parties they formed to support their electoral runs, have also explicitly and implicitly highlighted their status as members of non-dominant ethnic groups and have appealed directly to the poor. In comparison to the other three cases, however, in Peru, there has been a greater diversity of “outsider,” ethnic-mobilizing platforms reflecting a more complex relationship between ethnic, class, and ideological divisions. Unlike in the other three countries, ethnic outsider politicians in Peru, more often than not, have endorsed neo-liberal, as opposed to leftist, policies.351 There has also been support for outsider politicians (in particular Humala), who have advanced ethnic nationalist leftist platforms comparable to those of Evo Morales and Hugo Chávez. In the last two elections, furthermore, the traditional center-left (which did not play a major role during the Fujimori years) has reemerged and recast itself as “outsiders” to the politics of the last several decades, an appeal that has largely not highlighted ethnicity.

In contrast to these other cases, in Colombia, where traditional parties remained dominant for longer (until the late 1990s), the weakening of the Liberal and Conservative parties gave rise to the electoral dominance of President Álvaro Uribe and his platform of “democratic security,” which defined the main political cleavage. Although there are some signs of an emerging left at odds with the centrist positions of Colombia’s traditional parties and of Uribe, there is little evidence that ethnic identifications are becoming central to national debate. This can also be explained in terms of the argument of this dissertation: Colombia’s traditional party system was in fact divided largely by

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351 This is a broad generalization. As Selverston-Scher (2001) reminds us for Ecuador, “a broad spectrum of political ideologies can be found within the indigenous movement” (32).
support for various regional caudillos and neither these regional divisions nor the insider/outsider political cleavage that emerged in the late 1990s overlapped well with any nationally-salient ethnic division, such as divisions between non-indigenous and indigenous populations (which are very small) or between “white” and “non-white” populations. A number of new parties and politicians emerged but they had no clear incentives to mobilize in ethnic terms. Because Colombia’s traditional parties have occupied the ideological center (in addition to their expression of regional interests), however, there has been some room for the emergence of “outsider” leftists.

In discussing these cases, the chapter also notes some of the other factors that played an intervening role in influencing change in political identification. As in Bolivia, key among these factors were structural shifts in the economy that gave rise to new social groups; economic crisis and the declining ability of traditional political elites to attract support through the distribution of patronage; and international (and regional) influences on class-based politics and in favor of ethnic mobilization. The size of indigenous groups also mattered in whether and how they became salient in electoral politics. However, the chapter attempts to show that none of these factors on their own were sufficient to explain the type of change in political debate highlighted in this dissertation.
Figure 7.2: Map of South America

The Andean Countries

Linked by geography, the countries of the Andean region also share historical traditions. By the late 15th century, the Incan empire centered in Peru controlled about a 9-12 million people, a third of South America, extending north to Ecuador and east through the Bolivian highlands, and spreading the Quechua language throughout the region. Political, economic, and cultural ties continued after the arrival of the Spanish. These shared pre-colonial and colonial histories have influenced a variety of aspects of life today, including social divisions. As Chapter 4 suggests, several of the Andean countries – Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru – are among the most indigenous in Latin America. In Bolivia, the most indigenous country in Latin America, 50-60 percent of the population is classified as indigenous, according to Yashar (2005: 21). Ecuador and Peru also rank high, with 30-38 percent and 38-40 percent of the population respectively. The two most northern Andean countries, Colombia and Venezuela, have relatively small indigenous/Amerindian populations of less than 2 percent. However, all five countries also have large mixed populations, as suggested by the size of the “mestizo” population. According to Alesina et al. (2002)’s data, this population ranges from an estimated one quarter to a third of the population in Bolivia and Peru, to 40 percent in Ecuador, to over 50 percent in Colombia and Venezuela (see Figure 7.3). Legacies of poverty and economic inequality are also pronounced, although overall not at outlier levels among Latin American countries more generally, as Chapter 4 shows.
Figure 7.3: Ethnic Groups
(from Alesina et al. 2002)

Ethnic Groups in Bolivia
(Alesina et al. 2002)

- Aymara, 30.38%
- Quechua, 30.38%
- Mestizo, 25.32%
- Other groups, 10.13%
- Blancos, 3.89%

Ethnic Groups in Ecuador
(Alesina et al. 2002)

- Amerindian, 40.00%
- White, 15.00%
- Mestizo, 21.20%

Ethnic Groups in Colombia
(Alesina et al. 2002)

- Mestizo, 58%
- Aymara, 30.38%
- White, 20%
- Other, 1%

Ethnic Groups in Peru
(Alesina et al. 2002)

- Quechua, 47.10%
- White, 12%
- Mestizo, 21.80%
- Other, 3.50%

Ethnic Groups in Venezuela
(Alesina et al. 2002)

- Black, 10%
- Mestizo, 6.70%
- White, 21%
- Indian, 2%
In terms of democratic politics, the first countries to democratize in the region were Colombia and Venezuela, which have held free and fair elections with inclusive suffrage since the late 1950s. About two decades later in 1979, Ecuador followed suit, trailed in 1982 by Bolivia. Peru, which also transitioned to democracy during this period (in 1980), experienced almost a decade of authoritarian rule in the 1990s under Alberto Fujimori before transitioning back to democracy in 2001 (although elections continued to be held during the 1990s).

Colombia’s and Venezuela’s longer traditions with multiparty democracy are evidenced in their historically more institutionalized party systems (see Mainwaring and Scully 1995). However, the continuity of the party actors in both countries can also be misleading. In Colombia, the Liberal and Conservative parties have historically had very weak party discipline, acting more like umbrella labels for fractious regional caudillos. In Venezuela, the traditional system dominated by the Democratic Action party (Acción Democrática—AD) and the Committee of Independent Electoral Political Organization (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente—COPEI) has historically been more disciplined, but has also arguably been in decline over the last several decades (see Morgan 2007). Not surprisingly, electoral volatility has been high in all Andean countries, although lowest in Colombia and Venezuela. Mean electoral volatility in lower house elections since 1978 has ranged from a low of 22.1 percent in Colombia to a high of 51.9 percent in Peru (among the highest levels in the world). Venezuela (31.3 percent), Ecuador (36.4 percent), and Bolivia (39.8 percent) fall between these two extremes (Mainwaring 2006: 16).
Electoral instability has gone hand in hand with low levels of trust in democratic institutions, particularly parties (Kornblith et al. 2004; Mainwaring 2006a). It has also been accompanied by crises of governance (see Mainwaring 2006b, Mainwaring, Bejarano, and Pizarro Leongómez 2006). Pérez-Liñán (2006)’s coding of “governability crises” provides one systematic measure, showing that such crises have been even more frequent in Andean countries than in other countries in Latin America. The data summarized in Table 7.1 is coded using a simple index, ranging from (1) to (4). (1) indicates normal politics; (2) confrontation involving a questioning of the legitimacy of government; (3) resolution of this sort of confrontation through legal means (e.g., dissolution of parliament); and (4) “resolution” through military means (139-140). Over half of the crises thus coded (with scores of 2, 3, or 4) were in Andean countries, over twice as many as in non-Andean countries (i.e., ten of 18 crises occurred in five of 18 countries). This level of instability suggests that the theory developed in this dissertation should apply particularly well in this region.

As Mainwaring 2006 notes, according to the Latinobarometer 2003, “very few respondents [in the Andean countries] expressed ‘some or a lot of confidence’ in political parties: 5 percent in Ecuador (down from 18 percent in 1996), 6 percent in Bolivia (16 percent in 1996), 8 percent in Peru (18 percent in 1996), and 9 percent in Colombia (11 percent in 1996). The percentage was only slightly higher, 14 percent, in Venezuela (up from 11 percent in 1996)” (16, see also 14-15).

Data are from Keesing’s Record of World Events, 1979-2002 (London, Longman). As Pérez-Liñán (2006) describes: “The lowest score (1) is reserved for administrations that operated under ‘normal politics’ throughout their terms. In such cases, the president and congress may have cooperated or confronted each other, but normal institutional channels were respected and no political debacle took place. The following category (2) comprises situations in which one of the elected branches of government openly questioned the legitimacy of the other and called for its dissolution.... The third level includes all cases in which one of the elected branches found a constitutional way to execute its threat (e.g., the president was impeached and removed from office, or a constitutional assembly disbanded congress). The maximum score (4) corresponds to situations in which the military intervened in the confrontation in order to oust the president, disband the legislature, or both. The four categories together indicate a latent continuum in terms of constitutional instability” (139-140).
Table 7.1: Governability Crises in Latin America, 1979-2002  
(from Pérez-Liñán 2006: 140)

Sample includes 18 countries (79 administrations). Andean countries are listed in bold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis and category</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Crises</th>
<th>President, Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 – Normal politics</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>Ecuador, 1984, 1987</td>
<td>León Febres Cordero, PSC</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Honduras, 1985</td>
<td>Roberto Suazo Córdova, PLH</td>
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<td></td>
<td>El Salvador, 1987</td>
<td>José Napoleón Duarte, PDC</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ecuador, 1990</td>
<td>Rodrigo Borja, ID</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Bolivia, 1990</td>
<td>Jaime Paz Zamora, MIR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nicaragua, 1992</td>
<td>Violeta Chamorro, UNO</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia, 1996</td>
<td>Ernesto Samper, Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – Confrontation</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>Ecuador, 1984, 1987</td>
<td>León Febres Cordero, PSC</td>
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<td>Honduras, 1985</td>
<td>Roberto Suazo Córdova, PLH</td>
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<td>El Salvador, 1987</td>
<td>José Napoleón Duarte, PDC</td>
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<td>Bolivia, 1990</td>
<td>Jaime Paz Zamora, MIR</td>
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<td>Nicaragua, 1992</td>
<td>Violeta Chamorro, UNO</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia, 1996</td>
<td>Ernesto Samper, Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 – Legal dissolution</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>Colombia, 1991</td>
<td>César Gaviria, Liberal</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Brazil, 1992</td>
<td>Fernando Collor, PRN</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Venezuela, 1993</td>
<td>Carlos A. Pérez, AD</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ecuador, 1997</td>
<td>Abdalá Bucaram, PRE</td>
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<td>Paraguay, 1999</td>
<td>Raúl Cubas Grau, ANR</td>
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<td>Venezuela, 1999</td>
<td>Hugo Chávez, MVR</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Argentina, 2001</td>
<td>Fernando de la Rúa, UCR</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 – Military intervention</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Peru, 1992</td>
<td>Alberto Fujimori, Cambio 90</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guatemala, 1993</td>
<td>Jorge Serrano, MAS</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ecuador, 2000</td>
<td>Jamil Mahuad UIT, DP</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Venezuela, 2002</td>
<td>Hugo Chávez, MVR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total (mean = 1.43)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Finally, the region has been marked by the rise of political “outsiders” and independents in politics (see Kenney 1988, Mainwaring 2006). The importance of these outsider/independent politicians can be seen in that they have been elected to the highest political office in all five countries: in Bolivia, Evo Morales in 2005; in Colombia, Alvaro Uribe in 2002 and 2006; in Ecuador, Lucio Gutiérrez in 2002 and Rafael Correa in 2006; in Peru, Alberto Fujimori in 1990, 1995, and 2000 and Alejandro Toledo in 2001; and in Venezuela, Hugo Chávez in 1993, 1998, 2000, and 2006. The real ties and comparisons drawn between several of these leaders – in particular, Morales, Chávez, Gutiérrez, and Correa (along with Peru’s 2006 second-place presidential candidate,
Humala) – suggest some of the similarities and possible “spillover” effects among these countries as well (see Lucas 2002; Van Cott 2005).

**Ecuador: The Rise of the Indigenous Left**

Similar in many ways to Bolivia, Ecuador has a large indigenous population and a strong tradition of indigenous mobilization and organization. In many ways, Ecuador’s indigenous movement has been more organized than Bolivia’s (see Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005). As in Bolivia, the years since democratization have brought the rise of the indigenous left. However, in Ecuador, although the party system was very weak, in crisis since at least the 1980s, ethnic identification was not politicized in elections until a decade later, beginning in the late 1990s.

Key to the differences between the Ecuadorian and Bolivian cases was the role of indigenous elites, who prior to 1996 in Ecuador explicitly opted out of electoral politics in an organized fashion. Beginning in the late 1990s, however, indigenous groups became increasingly involved in elections and also participated in a series of anti-government protests that helped to bring about the collapse of several traditional party governments and the rise of new actors. Figure 7.4 summarizes the basic narrative for Ecuador in the terms of the theory.
**The Traditional Party System**

Since Ecuador’s independence, politics have been highly personalistic and dominated by regional divisions, particularly between the coast, which benefited from agricultural growth (principally cocoa) and the banking sector, and the traditionally dominant highlands, whose landowners were allied with the Catholic Church. Ecuador’s traditional parties, the Liberal Radical and Conservative parties emerged in the late 19th century, and remained influential through the 1970s (Conaghan 1995: 439).

Early constitutions (1830, 1861, 1884, 1929, 1946) provided for the election of
the president and legislature (Ecuador was the first Latin American country to grant suffrage to women in 1929), but it was not until the 1978 constitution that the literacy requirement was removed as a requirement for suffrage, a restriction that had previously excluded much of the indigenous population (Nohlen and Pachano 2005). Ecuador’s 20th century history was also marked by periods of military rule, with coups in 1925, 1937, 1963, and 1972. Cementing the strong personalistic character of Ecuadorian politics, one of the key leaders during this time was the populist José María Velasco Ibarra, who was head of state during five different periods from 1934 until February 1972, when he was ousted in a military coup.

A number of other parties were also active, many of them split-offs and dissident factions of earlier parties, representing a variety of left, right, and populist positions and generally centered around particular leaders and regional bases. As Conaghan (1995) describes, in addition to the supporters of Velasco (Velasquismo), another important populist movement centered in Guayaquil was led by Carlos Guevara Moreno, who founded the Concentration of Popular Forces (Concentración de Fuerzas Populares—CFP) in 1947. On the left, other key parties included the Ecuadorian Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano—PSE), founded in 1926, which gave birth in 1931 to the Communist Party (Partido Comunista—PC), which in turn later produced the Popular Democratic Movement (Movimiento Popular Democrático—MPD) and became the leading party in the Broad Left Front (Frente Amplio de Izquierda—FADI). On the right were the Social Christian Movement (Movimiento Social Cristiano, later the Partido Social Cristiano—PSC) founded in 1951 among middle-class Catholics in Quito, and the

355 This discussion is drawn largely from Conaghan 1995: 441-2.
Democratic Institutional Coalition (Coalición Institutionalista Demócrata—CID) and the Nationalist Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario), founded in the mid 1960s with bases on the coast, in Guayaquil. Still other new parties were formed in the 1960s and 1970s. These included the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiana—PDC), founded in 1964 by university students and dissidents from the PSC; the Popular Democracy-Democratic Union (Democracia Popular—Unión Demócrata—DP-UD), founded in 1978 by the PDC and a faction of the Conservative party; the social democratic Democratic Left (Izquierda Democrática—ID), founded in 1970 by a dissident faction of the Liberal Party; the populist Alfarista Radical Front (Frente Radical Alfarista), founded in 1972 through another split from the Liberal party; and the Democratic Party (Partido Demócrata—PD), founded in 1978, also by a split from the Liberal party. Among these groups, the ID, DP, and CFP were especially successful with new urban and middle-class groups that emerged since the 1950s.

From 1976 on, Ecuador embarked on process of democratization, culminating in a referendum in 1978 that brought a new constitution and a return to democracy through democratic elections in 1979. The first president elected was Jaime Roldos of the populist CFP. After he died in a plane crash in 1981, he was succeeded by vice president, Oswaldo Hurtado of the DP, and members of his family formed, in 1982, the populist Ecuadorian Roldos Party (Partido Roldósista Ecuatoriano—PRE), which became a leading party thereafter. Roldos’s death also contributed to internal divisions leading to the decline of the CFP in elections after 1979, as can be seen in election results shown in Tables 7.2 and 7.3. Along with the PRE, at least three other parties formed during the
previous period have been especially important in Ecuador’s democratic period since 1979: the ID, PSC, and DP-UDC.

Another characteristic of the “traditional” Ecuadorian party system since 1979, however, has been its fractionalization, along with a high degree of electoral volatility (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). This is suggested in Table 7.2, which shows support for the CFP, ID, PSC, DP-UP, and PRE in legislative elections from 1979 to 2002, along with the vote going to “other” parties. Even prior to the emergence of major new political forces in 2002, the vote for other parties ranged from a low of 13.7 percent in 1998 to 48 percent in 1986. By 2002, among the key “traditional” parties, only the ID and PSC were significant players (both winning under 10 percent), and 78.7 percent of the legislative vote went to other parties.

Table 7.2: Ecuador, Legislative Elections (Provincial Seats), 1979-2002

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popular Force</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concentration (CFP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Left (ID)</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Christian</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party (PSC)</td>
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<td>Popular Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>(DP-UDC)</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roldosista Party (PRE)</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes cast (as % of</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
<td>77.7%</td>
<td>67.7%</td>
<td>71.0%</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
<td>67.8%</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td></td>
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<td>registered voters)</td>
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</table>

356 From Nohlen 2005.
Table 7.3: Ecuador, Presidential Elections (Second Round), 1979-2006

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>54.8%</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
<td>80.5% 78.1% 77.7% 70.1% 71.7% 70.1% 71.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
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<td>1988</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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<td>1996</td>
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<td>1998</td>
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<td>2002</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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</table>

Elected president: Roldós Febres Cordero, Roldós Febres Cordero, Borja Cevallos, Durán Ballén, Abdalá Bucaram Ortiz, Jamil Mahuad Witt, Lucio Gutiérrez Bobúa, Rafael Correa Delgado.

Sources: Results in Nohlen 2005, updated and checked with Economist Intelligence Unit, and on data from Corte Nacional Electoral, Tribunal Suprema as reported by the Political Database of the Americas (http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Eleedata/Ecuador/pres06.html).
The fractionalization of the party system is also suggested in the second round presidential election results shown in Table 7.3. As Conaghan (1995) summarizes: “Both electoral data and available survey research reveal the weakness and discontinuity of ties between parties and the electorate. Ecuadorean politics is marked by the presence of both ‘floating’ politicians and ‘floating’ voters” (450).

Nevertheless, as the presidential election results suggest, the main parties and divisions remained relatively stable through the 1990s in the sense that the balance of power shifted among the parties, but the key parties that were viable contenders for the presidency remained constant. In terms of left-right positioning, the parties active since 1979 have adopted a range of positions, ranging from the leftist Pachakutik Movement (MUPP-NP, an indigenous ethnic-mobilizing party that will be discussed further below) to the moderately right-wing PSC. Figure 7.5 gives party positioning as given by legislative surveys in the late 1990s conducted as part of the PELA and PPAL surveys reported in Alcántara Sáez and Freidenberg (2001).358 (Note that not all parties are represented in the surveys, nor are all time periods, but these are the best available data.)

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358 The results shown in Figure 7.5 and in the other figures using the PELA and PPAL surveys are based on members’ own descriptions of party’s positions on a left-right spectrum. Data is also collected on perceived positions. Positioning tends to be similar enough that it is not useful to describe both for our purposes here.
Figure 7.5: Members' Positioning of Parties in Ecuador

(Based on PELA and PPAL surveys as presented in Freidenberg 2001: 247, 282, 318, 350, 387.)

1996 – Legislators
(Sample: 24 PSC; 10 DP; 0 ID; 14 PRE; 7 MUPP-NP)

Left (=1)                                           Right (=10)

3.4 MUPP-NP 4.5 DP 4.6 PRE 6.8 PSC

1998 – Legislators
(Sample: 25 PSC; 30 DP; 17 ID; 22 PRE; 6 MUPP-NP)

Left (=1)                                           Right (=10)

4.2 ID 4.4 PRE 5.7 DP 7.4 PSC

3.5 MUPP-NP

1999 – Legislators, Leaders (Dirigentes), and Militants
(Sample: 21 PSC; 16 DP; 15 ID; 19 PRE; 9 MUPP-NP)

Left (=1)                                           Right (=10)

1.7 MUPP-NP 3.2 ID 3.8 PRE 5.1 DP 7.4 PSC

Indigenous Politics in the 1980s and 1990s

Several factors supported the emergence of ethnic division in party competition from the 1980s: in particular, the presence of a ranked ethnic system and a large indigenous population, along with weak links between parties and voters. From the 1970s, as in Bolivia, there was also a strong indigenous movement, with leaders and
organizational resources that might have been expected to mobilize along ethnic lines towards viable electoral runs. The fact that major ethnic-mobilizing parties did not emerge during this period highlights the importance of elite agency, particularly the decisions of Ecuador’s strong, nationally-representative indigenous movement (see also Van Cott 2005).

As Selverston-Scher (2001) describes, Ecuador’s indigenous movement has a long history (31-41). Among the first indigenous organizations was the Indigenous Federation of Ecuador (Federación Ecuatoriana de Indígenas—FEI), organized in the highlands in 1944 by the Communist Party, to organize rural workers/peasants and to push for land reform. Some observers cite this mobilization as part of the impetus behind Ecuador’s Agrarian Reform Law (1964). Many of Ecuador’s subsequent indigenous organizations in the Highlands emerged in response to the process of agrarian reform beginning in this period. The main Quichua (Quechua) organization, Ecuador Indians Awaken (Ecuador Renacunapac Richamiui, also known as Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Quichua del Ecuador—ECUARUNARI), was founded in 1972. In the 1970s, several key organizations also emerged in the Amazon region, again largely in response to conflicts over land.359 In 1980, these Amazonian organizations united as the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana—CONFENIAE) and, along with ECUARUNARI (the larger and more powerful group), formed the Coordinating Council of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (Consejo de Coordinación Nacional de las

359 These included the Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza (Organización de Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza—OPIP) and the Federation of Indigenous Organizations of Napo (Federación de Organizaciones Indígenas de Napo—FOIN).
CONACNIE then formed the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador—CONAIE) in 1986, a national organization representing indigenous groups from the Sierra, Amazon, and coastal regions.\textsuperscript{360} Table 7.4 shows the estimated relative sizes of Ecuador’s indigenous population.

### Table 7.4: Ecuador’s Indigenous Population
(Source: CONAIE, 2002)\textsuperscript{361}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region and Group</th>
<th>Group Population</th>
<th>Regional Population</th>
<th>Share of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Highlands</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>96.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kichwa/Quichua</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Amazon Basin</td>
<td>104,300</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kichwa/Quichua</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Shuar</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Huaorani</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Siona-Secoya</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cofan</td>
<td>800</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achuar</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Coast</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awa</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chachi</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsachila</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Population</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,111,900</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In the late 1980s, the leftist administration of Rodrigo Borja of the ID (1988-92) made several moves to incorporate the demands of indigenous organizations regarding recognition, land, and education. This included recognition of CONAIE as the national representative of the indigenous people and holding of a series of dialogues between the

\textsuperscript{360} CONAIE also represents coastal groups through the Coordinator of the Indigenous Organizations of the Coast of Ecuador (Coordinadora de Organizaciones de la Costa Ecuatoriana—COICE).

\textsuperscript{361} CONAIE as reported in “Two Indigenous Candidacies Threaten to Divide Movement,” *Latin America Regional Reports*, 9 April 2002.
government and CONAIE. CONAIE also emerged definitively on the national stage through the Indigenous Uprising of June 1990, in a week of protests and mobilizations for indigenous rights that spread throughout the Sierra.  

During the first half of the 1990s, however, CONAIE and other indigenous organizations explicitly opted out of electoral politics, seeing parties as inconsistent with their interests. Some indigenous candidates did participate in elections (especially at the local level), but they did so with non-indigenous parties (especially on the left), such as the Broad Leftist Front (FADI) and the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP) (Selverston Scher 2001: 48). In 1996, CONAIE formally decided to participate in politics and indigenous groups formed the Pachakutik Movement for Plurinational Unity (MUPP). In 1998, the MUPP-Nuevo País alliance (MUPP-NP)’s presidential candidate, Freddy Ehlers, placed fourth with 14.3 percent and it won six of 120 legislative seats.  

Shifts since the late 1990s

Although traditional Ecuadorian parties remained largely dominant through the 1990s, by the 2002 elections, the electoral landscape had shifted dramatically. In the presidential polls, traditional parties were replaced by the January 21st Patriotic Society (Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero), Institutional Renewal Party of National Action (Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional--PRIAN), and PAIS Alliance (Alianza PAIS) as the main presidential contenders. Although ties to parties had been weak

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throughout the 1980s and 1990s, in the late 1990s, organized social protest in which indigenous groups played a key part (as noted above), served to further weaken the traditional parties at the expense of new actors. Incumbent parties also weakened their own hand through mismanagement and corruption.

In July 1996, Abdalá Bucaram Ortiz of the PRE was elected with 54.47 percent (26.28 percent in the first round). Once in office, Bucaram launched a controversial economic adjustment program. After demonstrations, he was removed from office the following February for mental incompetence, and the president of the legislature was appointed interim president until the 1998 elections. Instability worsened during the presidency of Jamil Mahuad Witt, the former mayor of Quito and a member of the centrist DP. Although Mahuad’s popularity was boosted early on by the signing of a peace agreement with Peru, settling a border dispute, by the end of 1999, his approval ratings had dropped dramatically as Ecuador faced its worst economic crisis. There was also strong criticism over a campaign finance scandal that linked Mahuad to the former president of the Banco del Progresso, which had been taken over by the government during the banking crisis that year, an action that had received strong public criticism.

In January 2000, the decision to dollarize the economy (a move to prevent hyperinflation) sparked a popular uprising led by sections of the military, along with indigenous groups, that eventually led to Mahaud’s resignation. For a brief period, the government was led by a triumvirate consisting of the president of CONAIE, Antonio Vargas; the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, General Mendoza; and the former

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364 The first round plurality went to Jaime Nebot Saadi of the Social Christian Party (27.17 percent).
president of the Supreme Court, Carlos Solórzano. On 22 January, constitutional order
was restored with the negotiated succession of vice president Gustavo Noboa, who
became the sixth president in five years. Neither the government, nor the opposition, was
able to form a working majority in the legislature, where the largest party (PSC) held just

The following elections in October 2002 brought a number of new candidates and
parties to politics, including several key ethnic-mobilizing ones, as well as several new
leftists and indigenous leftists. The two presidential candidates that eventually competed
in the second round were, on the right, business tycoon Alvaro Noboa (no relation to
Gustavo Noboa), running with the PRIAN; and on the left, Lucio Gutiérrez, a former
colonel who was a leader of the January 2000 coup (hence the name of the new party
with which he contested, the January 21st Patriotic Society) (*Costas* 2002). While Noboa,
a banana magnate, was among the richest men in the Ecuador, Gutiérrez ran as a
leftwing outsider, “cobbling together a front of leftist and center-left forces and social
movements.”

Early candidates also included two key indigenous “ethnic-mobilizing” leaders:
Antonio Vargas, former president of CONAIE, and his newly created Future Front of
Ecuador (*Frente Futuro de Ecuador*—FFE), and Auki Titua, the indigenous mayor of
Cotachachi, who ran as the candidate of the Pachakutik Movement (*Movimiento
Pachakutik*—MUPP), the party usually considered the political arm of CONAIE. While

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363 Lucas 2002a, 2002b.
366 A month before the elections, however, Vargas (along with several others) was disqualified because he
failed to collect enough signatures for registration. However, he did contest in the end.
both indigenous leaders, Vargas and Titua had different regional bases, with Titua’s support strongest among communities of the Andean highlands (with the largest indigenous populations)\textsuperscript{367} and Vargas’s support stronger in the Amazon and on the coast.\textsuperscript{368} Titua also clearly had support among non-indigenous (mestizo) voters in his region, winning an 85 percent in Cotachachi in the 2000 local elections.\textsuperscript{369}

As in Bolivia, indigenous leaders and parties can be seen to have made several strategic calculations in the race. For its part, the MUPP took advantage of the overlaps in the interests of indigenous and leftist constituencies and negotiated “with political and social groups to create a left and centre-left front and [to moot] a possible alliance with Gutiérrez, among others…” Meanwhile, Vargas’s group made other bargains, allying in Guayaquil “with right-wingers accused of participating in paramilitary groups during the government of Leon Febres Cordero (1984-1988).”\textsuperscript{370} For its part, CONAIE announced in April that it would not field a presidential candidate in order to preserve the confederation’s stability and, arguably, not to split the indigenous vote. After the first round, however, CONAIE, along with the MUPP (recognizing that Titua would not win), endorsed Gutiérrez, who won with 54.8 percent.\textsuperscript{371}

Although Vargas, who was the first indigenous presidential candidate in Ecuador’s history, won less than 1 percent of the vote, the strong support for the MUPP and for Gutiérrez highlight the increasing salience of ethnic identification (and of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{367} Within CONAIE, Titua was backed by ECUARUNARI.
\item \textsuperscript{368} \textit{Latin America Weekly Report}, 12 March 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{369} In 1996, he won just over 50 percent (Lucas 2002b).
\item \textsuperscript{370} \textit{Latin America Regional Reports}, 9 April 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{371} Lucas 2002b.
\end{itemize}
indigenous groups) in Ecuadorean politics between 1998 and 2002. In the legislative
results, the MUPP increased its influence, winning 10 of 100 seats (over 5 in the
previous). Gutiérrez’s cabinet also included key indigenous leaders Nina Pacari and Luis
Macas (MacDonald 2003). Welcoming Gutiérrez’s victory, CONAIE president
Leonidas Iza underscored its ethnic significance: “This is a historic day. We have been
excluded for a long time and we now have hope for change; and not only for the
indigenous sector but for all of the sectors that are dispossessed and neglected and have
been deceived by various administrations.”

Gutiérrez’s presidency, however, was to mark another political crisis for Ecuador.
In particular, he faced strong criticism for his adoption of neo-liberal economic policies,
particularly by the co-governing CONAIE, which withdrew its support in August 2003,
leaving Gutiérrez with just six seats in the legislature (see Lucas 2003a, 2003b).
Gutiérrez was also widely criticized for ignoring the constitution and for increasing
authoritarianism. In 2004, the Amazonian indigenous organization, CONFENIAE, also
broke with Gutiérrez. In April 2005, he was removed from office following widespread
protests and replaced until the next elections by vice president Alfredo Palacio (see Reel
2005).

The 2006 elections suggest the continuation and deepening of trends from 2002,
pitting the left and indigenous left against the rest. Once again, the presidential runoff
included two party outsiders, the populist candidate, Alvaro Noboa (PRIAN), and the

372 “President of Indian Confederation CONAIE Welcomes Gutiérrez’s Victory,” BBC Monitoring
leftist nationalist candidate, Rafael Correa, a U.S. trained economist who had served as finance minister under Palacio, and who ran with the newly-formed PAIS Alliance, eventually winning in the runoff with 56.7 percent. Other key contenders in the first round race included, on the left, Léon Roldos of the leftist coalition between ID and the new Red Ética y Democracia, and on the center-right, Cynthia Viteri of the PSC, highlighting the continuing (though diminished) relevance of the traditional parties, as well as of region. The MUPP fielded Luis Macas, leader of CONAIE, who in addition to his indigenous appeal also explicitly identified in leftist terms, suggesting in June to other leftist candidates Correa and the MPD’s Luis Villacis, that the leftist candidates hold a primary to elect a single candidate.

Correa’s platform emphasized several issues. For one, he adopted a clear leftist nationalist stance, explicitly drawing comparisons with Hugo Chávez, and calling for a “united Latin America than can confront a globalization that is inhumane and cruel” (Correa, as quoted in Forero 2006). In addition, he also ran as an outsider, voicing strong criticism of traditional elites and parties. He called the Ecuadorean legislature a “sewer” of corruption, his party ran no candidates in the legislative race, and he pledged a “citizen’s revolution” against the establishment (Hayes 2007a, 2007b). Finally, he emphasized and cultivated links with indigenous voters, both through symbolic acts and policy promises. Visits to indigenous communities were important in his campaign, and his ability to speak Quechua was emphasized. Like Morales and Chávez, he also promised a constituent assembly, largely to address the concerns of indigenous communities.

373 Movimiento Patria Altiva “i” Soberana (PAiS).
Venezuela: The “Ethnic” Left

A related trend in the rise of ethnic salience can be seen in Venezuela, where the outsider politician Hugo Chávez rose to power in the late 1990s highlighting a populist nationalist appeal, which included clear leftist elements and ethnic undercurrents (such as in his identification as “indigenous” and “black”) and by 2006 was explicitly defining his position “indigenous socialism” (socialismo indígena). Despite its relatively strong party history, by the late 1980s, Venezuela’s traditional party system was in decline (see Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Morgan 2007). Although the main traditional parties in 1958 had relatively distinct social bases and ideological appeals, by the 1990s the positions of the two key parties, the Democratic Action party (AD) and COPEI, were both relatively centrist, even though there is evidence that considerable popular support remained for the left. In terms of elections, the AD and COPEI continued to be viable contenders for the presidency until the 1988 elections (and arguably through to the 1993 elections as well), but their support declined sharply after that. In legislative elections, their overall vote fell in every election from 1983 on. These shifts created space for the rise of new leftist parties, and eventually the emergence of Chávez and the MVR, which defined its core constituency in both class and ethnic terms (those excluded groups on the left, along with non-dominant ethnic communities). The narrative of this section is summarized in Figure 7.6.

The Traditional Party System

Similar to Bolivia, the “traditional” Venezuelan party system had its roots in movements and structural change in the 1920s. In Venezuela, the driver was the development of the petroleum industry, which led to emergence of new elites and social groups, especially student movements and trade unionists (Kornblith and Levine 1995: 40). The AD, Venezuela’s first mass political party, emerged in late 1930s following the death of the military dictator, Juan Vincente Gómez, in 1935. Formally founded in 1941 by Rómulo Betancourt, it was an opponent of the dictatorship of General Eleazar López Contreras. Originally organized along Leninist lines, it dominated elections in the 1940s
During this period, several other key parties emerged: COPEI, a center-right party that eventually became one of the two key Venezuelan parties, was founded in 1946 by Rafael Caldera, “a young lawyer seeking to apply Catholic social thought to conditions in Venezuela” (Myers 1988: 497). The Democratic Republican Union (Union Republicana Democratica--URD), which represented the “non-Communist left wing” that supported 1940s leader General Isaías Medina, was also founded (Kornblith and Levine 1995: 42).

Venezuela became a democracy in 1958 with the overthrow of General Pérez Jiménez and the holding of national elections in December. As Kornblith and Levine (1995) note, “Political parties have always been at the center of modern Venezuelan democracy” (37). The democratic transition was supported by elite pacts among the three main parties of the time, the AD, COPEI, and the URD, as well as by business and professional groups and elements of the military (44-45). Reminiscent of Bolivia, there was also continued opposition to the settlement both from the left and the right. Among the strongest opponents on the left was the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV), which was in fact founded before the AD although it was never as influential, and was excluded from negotiations between the AD, COPEI, and URD over the transition. Key opponents on the right included former allies of Perez Jiménez (Myers 1998: 504).

Although a handful of parties were represented in the legislature after 1958, it was not until thirty years after Venezuela’s democratic transition that a president was elected from a party other than the AD or COPEI. The party of the president has also held a
plurality – but not a majority – of legislative seats in most elections (with the exception of 1969 and 1993), so most presidents have governed through multiparty coalitions (see Shugart 1992).\textsuperscript{375} Despite their different ideological positions, observers generally describe support for the main parties as based more on patronage than on ideology or on class divisions. From the beginning, these parties tended to be broad coalitions, “combining group representation with strong centralized leadership.” Party activists, particularly of the AD, were instrumental in mobilizing a variety of groups, including “trade unions, peasant groups, teachers’ organizations, and student and professional societies” (Kornblith and Levine 1995: 40; also Levine and Crisp 1999: 385).

Traditionally, there has also been some evidence that party support has reflected economic divisions (Myers 1998; see also Dix 1998). Myers (1998)’s data on party support across 642 municipalities in the 1958 elections, combined with data from the 1961 census, show that consistent with its position on the centre-left, AD’s supporters in 1958 tended to be more likely to reside in slums, less likely to be literate, and more likely to live in Caracas, while COPEI’s supporters were relatively better off, more rural, and more likely to reside outside of Caracas.\textsuperscript{376} Table 7.5 shows Myers’ results for 1958.

\textsuperscript{375} In Venezuela’s strongly presidential system, the president has been directly elected by plurality and until 1993, legislators were elected on a single legislative ballot with closed party lists in the 22 states. \textsuperscript{376} Myers (1998) summarizes: “The most significant divided voters residing in rural municipalities from those that were urban, voters residing in poor municipalities from those that were not poor, voters residing in traditional municipalities from those that were modern, and voters residing in center region municipalities from those in the periphery. At the time [in the 1950s and 1960s], therefore, the structural cleavages that Lipset and Rokkan saw as configuring European party systems were not all significant. For example, Europe’s consuming clerical/anti-clerical cleavage had no counterpart in democratic Venezuela, and the poor/others cleavage that initially caused AD to be viewed as a pariah by large landowners, entrepreneurs and the capital city’s middle class, mobilized few partisans in France, England or Germany” (514-5).
Table 7.5: Party Support in Venezuela’s 1958 elections

(From Myers 1998 (502), using data from 642 municipalities and the 1961 census.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>COPEI</th>
<th>URD</th>
<th>PCV</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent residing in slum housing</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>-0.36**</td>
<td>0.11**</td>
<td>0.08*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent residing in capital of the municipality</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.29**</td>
<td>0.26**</td>
<td>0.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent literate</td>
<td>-0.22**</td>
<td>-0.15**</td>
<td>0.37**</td>
<td>0.45**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence in the ‘periphery’ (i.e., not in Caracas)</td>
<td>0.48**</td>
<td>-0.48**</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>47.01</td>
<td>55.03</td>
<td>-4.24</td>
<td>-3.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"*=beta weight significant to .05; **=beta weight significant to .10."

This relationship between parties and these social divisions, however, also clearly eroded over time. Myers (1998) attributes this shift especially during the 1970s, to Venezuela’s considerable income from petroleum sales abroad which allowed AD and COPEI leaders to put funds toward “patronage to reward party loyalty,” weakening the relationship between social cleavages and parties “because the construction and operation of state-centered development projects, permeated by considerations of strengthening the governing political party, provided incentives for all classes and strata to affiliate with either AD or COPEI” (507).

The 1980s

In 1974, the AD won the presidency again, bringing Carlos Andrés Pérez to power. Under Pérez, Venezuela embarked on a major state-led development program, including the nationalization of the petroleum industry. By the 1978 elections, however, accusations of corruption had weakened Pérez’s position and COPEI’s Luis Herrera
Campins was elected on promises to combat corruption and manage the economy better. Although Herrera intended to implement austerity programs, the second petroleum boom in 1979-81 intervened, creating pressures for increased spending, which led to the eventual tripling of Venezuela’s international debt (to $35 billion) before a decline in the petroleum market in 1983 forced cuts in spending and the devaluation of the currency (Myers 1998: 507). By 1984, GDP per capita, which had risen steadily in the 1960s and 1970s, was $2,447 – below 1966 levels ($2,651). The newly-elected president Jaime Lusinchi of the AD, however, did not adjust spending, assuming that petroleum prices would recover. They collapsed in 1986.

Figure 7.7: Venezuela, Legislative Elections, 1958-2000
Support for “Traditional” Parties (see Table 7.6)

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These structural changes, compounded by economic policies, contributed to the decline of support for the AD and COPEI from the mid 1980s, as illustrated in Figures 7.7 and 7.8. Among the key parties that increased their support during the 1980s were several on the left, in particular the social democratic Movement towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS), which was founded in 1971 by dissidents of the PCV who had opposed the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the Revolutionary Left Movement (Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario—MIR) (Myers 1998: 497). These two parties doubled their support in legislative elections throughout the 1980s, from 5.3 percent in 1973 to 10.8 percent in 1993 (Martinez 1989: 185).

Figure 7.8: Venezuela, Presidential Elections, 1958-2000
Support for Major Parties (see Table 7.7)

Another key element contributing to decline of the AD and COPEI during this period were institutional reforms begun in the 1980s. Impetus for reforms was driven by
calls for democratizing the parties, improving the electoral process, "establishing conditions for 'fair play' between parties," and making the system more representative overall (Kornblith and Levine 1995: 61-62; see also Martinez 1989). It also came from opposition to the AD's and COPEI's political dominance and from concern with increasing rates of abstention (Crisp and Levine 1998). As Levine and Crisp (1999) summarize: "Given ... the organizational penetration of and the control of state resources by AD and COPEI, it was virtually impossible to be politically active without expressing partisan affiliation and making secondary the preferences of one's group to those of a major party. "Partidocracia," or rule by parties, became a major source of frustration in Venezuelan politics and one of the primary targets of opposition groups and reformers by the late 1980s" (385). Reforms included, in 1989, the adoption of direct elections for state governors and mayors, and in 1993, the adoption of a mixed-member proportional system.
Table 7.6: Venezuela, Legislative Elections (Lower House), 1958-2000

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Action (Acción Democrática—AD)</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee of Independent Electoral Political Organization (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente—COPEI)</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Republican Union (Union Republicana Democrática--URD)</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
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<td>Venezuelan Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Venezuela -- PCV)</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
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<td>Independents for the National Front (Independientes Pro Frente Venezuela—IPFN)</td>
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<td>Popular Democratic Front (Frente Democrático Popular—FDP)</td>
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<td>People’s Electoral Movement (Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo—MEP)</td>
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<td>Nationalist Civic Crusade (Crusada Cívica Nacionalista—CCN)</td>
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<td>Movement towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAS/Revolutionary Left Movement (Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario—MIR)</td>
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<td>10.2%</td>
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<td>Radical Cause (La Causa Radical—CR)</td>
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<td>20.7%</td>
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<td>Convergence (Convergencia)</td>
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<td>13.8%</td>
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<td>Project Venezuela (Proyecto Venezuela—PV)</td>
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<td>10.4%</td>
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<td>Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento V República—MVR)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others (parties with &lt; 5%)</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voters (% of registered)</td>
<td>92.1%</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
<td>94.5%</td>
<td>96.5%</td>
<td>87.6%</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
<td>52.7%</td>
<td>56.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Nohlen 2005.
Table 7.7: Venezuela, Presidential Elections, 1958-2000\(^{370}\)

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Action (Acción Democrática—AD)</td>
<td>49.2%</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republican Union (Unión Republicana Democrática—URD)</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
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<td>43.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Committee of Independent Electoral Political Organization (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente—COPEI)</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
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<td>Independents for the National Front (Independientes Pro Frente Venezuela—IPFN)</td>
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<td>19.3%</td>
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<td>Movement towards Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo—MAS)</td>
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<td>Convergence (Convergencia)</td>
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<td>Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento V República—MVR)</td>
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<td>Project Venezuela (Proyecto Venezuela—PV)</td>
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<td>40.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independent candidate (Francisco Arias-Cárdenas)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others (&lt;5%)</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes cast</td>
<td>93.4%</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
<td>96.5%</td>
<td>87.6%</td>
<td>87.3%</td>
<td>81.9%</td>
<td>60.2%</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{370}\) Nohlen 2005.
Crisis and Change from the late 1980s

Regaining the presidency in February 1989, the AD’s Perez faced a situation of continuing economic crisis and embarked on a major economic liberalization program – a situation reminiscent of Paz Estenssoro’s administration in Bolivia in the 1980s. As Martinez Villafranca (1989) notes: “The name of Carlos Andres Perez already had a historical association for Venezuela. It was he who nationalized the steel and petroleum industries, thereby giving the country a progressive image and demonstrating that, as indeed occurred, the country would take change of its own destiny” (83). In February, opposition to Perez’s structural adjustment program led to one of the worst episodes of violence in Venezuela since 1958. Some 300 people were killed in the “Caracazo” riots (Myers 1998: 510).

As many observers pointed out, these riots were evidence of economic and political crisis – particularly in terms of representation by the traditional parties. Shugart (1992) summarizes: “One commentator called the riots ‘a political crisis masquerading as an economic crisis’ (Fisher, 1989). A party elite, what Venezuelans call the cogollo (which literally refers to the dense core of a cabbage), had each of the two major parties so firmly in its control that its own rank and file has neither incentive nor ability to transmit constituents’ disaffection to the party leaders” (27). Public opinion surveys also suggest declines in party identification during 1988 to 1992 (see also Morgan 2007).380

380 Torres Uribe-Herrera CA, as cited in Myers 1998: 511. By this time, there was clear evidence of a
One real possible result of the crisis was the breakdown of democracy. In February 1992, a group of military officers led by Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez staged an almost successful coup, and although Chávez was arrested and imprisoned until 1994, the coup was widely popular. According to Myers (1998), this possibility that opposition would be united around military rule was averted largely by a second failed coup attempt in November 1992, this time by navy officers, that highlighted the dangers of this course, leading to an elite consensus that military rule would be worse (513). Instability continued however, and by May 1993, Perez was forced out of office, charged with the misuse of public funds.

In the 1993 elections (those studied in the CDEI), corruption and public distrust of the traditional parties unsurprisingly were key issues. Some old faces remained: the elected president, Rafael Caldera (30.4 percent), was a founder of COPEI and had been president from 1969 to 1973. However, there were clear signs that new political forces were emerging. Caldera had been rejected as COPEI’s presidential candidate and ran as head of the National Convergence (Convergencia Nacional), a coalition of nineteen minor parties. The election also marked the first time since 1958 that neither the AD nor the COPEI candidate had won the presidency. Other breakaway parties from the COPEI that competed in this election included First Justice (Primero Justicia—PJ) and Project Venezuela (Proyecto Venezuela—PV), while AD members formed Alianza Brava Pueblo. Support for the left also increased dramatically between 1988 and 1993. The decline in party loyalties, with polls between 1988 and 1993 showing declining identification with the AD, COPEI, and MAS, and slightly increased identification as independents (“to just under four in ten”) (Myers 1998: 512).
third-place candidate in both the legislative and presidential races was another relatively new party, the leftwing Radical Cause party (La Causa Radical—Causa R), which was formed in the early 1970s as a split-off from the Communist Party. The Causa R also won the mayorship of Caracas in December 1992. (Support for the MAS was relatively constant from the previous election at 10.2 to 10.8 percent in the legislative polls.)

As new parties emerged, political crisis continued and “Caldera’s administration became marked by massive demonstrations and strikes in response to austerity measures agreed to with the IMF after two years of heterodox muddling” (Levine and Crisp 1999: 394). In April 1996, the government adopted an economic adjustment program, Agenda Venezuela. Meanwhile, anti-system sentiment increased, including within the left. In 1996, the Patria for Everyone (Patria para Todos—PPT), a more radical and pro-Chávez faction of the Causa R, split off. In the presidential election that year, 96 percent of the vote went to two of the new parties, Chávez’s Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento Quinta República—MVR) and Project Venezuela. These parties also performed well in the legislative elections, running second and fourth, although the AD and COPEI remained the first and third largest parties respectively.

In the presidential elections, Chávez won with 56 percent of the vote, with an anti-system platform – pledging to create a Fifth Republic. Upon entering office, he held a referendum on the holding of a constituent assembly, which drafted a new constitution and paved the way for new elections in July 2000 to relegitimize elected posts. (Chávez was reelected with 60 percent of the vote.) Although the rise of Chávez and the MVR
can be seen partly as reflecting a trend in increasing support for the left steadily going back the 1980s, Chávez’s appeal also represented something else, capitalizing on opposition to the system in general and a position as an “outsider,” in political and ethnic terms (see Lapper 2005). (Although only some 2 percent of the population was “indigenous,” 10 percent are “black,” and a much largest estimated share (67 percent) of mixed descent (Alesina et al. 2002).) The importance of the “ethnic,” populist, and nationalist elements of Chávez’s message are suggested by a look at how the MVR measures up in left-right ideological terms with other key Venezuelan parties. Figure 7.9 shows the results of survey data presented in Alcántara Sáez and Freidenberg (2001), suggesting that in fact MVR and AD are relatively close in left-right ideological terms, and the MAS in fact is more leftist than MVR.

**Figure 7.9: Members’ Positioning of Parties in Venezuela**
(Based on PELA surveys as presented in Molina 2001: 501, 517, 557, 591)

c. 1990s
*(Sample: 1995 legislators –3 MAS, 16 COPEI; 1994 AD estimate;\(^{381}\) 1998 MVR estimate\(^{382}\))*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left (=1)</th>
<th>Right (=10)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAS 3.7</td>
<td>MVR 4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>AD 4.4</td>
<td>COPEI 5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2000 – Legislators
*(Sample: 13 MAS, 4 COPEI)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Left (=1)</th>
<th>Right (=10)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAS 3.8</td>
<td>COPEI 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{381}\) Legislators sample from Coppedge 1994 (77), as cited in Molina 2001 (557).
\(^{382}\) Party sympathizers from Encuesta REDPOL 1998, as cited in Molina 2001 (591).
Peru: Left, Right, and Ethnic

In many ways similar to Bolivia’s, Peru’s political history has been characterized since independence in 1821 by profound ethnic and economic inequalities, a system in which “a small, generally white minority dominated the majority, most of which was Indian” (Cotler 1995: 324). Nevertheless, traditional Peruvian parties operating when the country democratized in 1980 are generally described in ideological terms (left, right, centrist), although also strongly tied to personalistic leadership (see McClintock 1999). Beginning with democratization and the economic crisis of the late 1980s, outsider politicians like Alberto Fujimori also began to assume a central role in politics. Following Fujimori’s ouster in 2000, a second wave of outsider politicians entered, this time positioning themselves as outsiders to Fujimori and his allies.

In both explicit and implicit ways, the rise of these outsider politicians in Peru brought with it the rising salience of ethnicity in electoral politics. Unlike in Bolivia and Ecuador, however, Peruvian ethnic politics are not well described as indigenous politics, but instead reflect the Peruvian population’s more mixed ethnic demographics – with appeals to those who are “not white” or are of mixed race, rather than to the indigenous per se. For this reason, many students of Latin American politics cite Peru as an example of a country where ethnic parties and politics have not taken root (Yashar 2005: 54; Van Cott 2005; Madrid 2005).

Ethnic appeals in Peru also differed from those in Bolivia and Ecuador in a
second key way: Although coupled with appeals to the poor and working class, they have been successfully advanced both by those on the political “right” (Fujimori and Toledo, who both explicitly favored neo-liberal economic policies) and the left (Humala, who favored unreformed statist economic policies). Furthermore, elections since Fujimori’s ouster have seen the rise of leftist, class-based politics, including appeals by one of Peru’s traditional parties that reemerged, framing itself as a center-left outsider to the Fujimori regime, and by the ethnic, nationalist left, represented by Humala (McClintock 2006: 95). The review of Peruvian politics presented below highlights these two periods of crisis and shift in party competition: the first, beginning in the mid 1980s, and second, from about 2000.

Party Politics Pre-1992

Although democratic elections (with inclusive suffrage) were not held until 1980, Peru held elections with limited suffrage since the late 19th century. In the 1895 presidential elections, for instance, there were 4,310 voters out of a total population of almost 2.9 million. The first Peruvian political parties emerged during this period. The country’s first party, the Civil Party (Partido Civil—PC), was formally established in 1872, in opposition to the military caudillos who had dominated Peruvian politics up until that point. With a base among merchants in Lima (who made their wealth through the export trade of guano), the Civil Party favored state consolidation and “modernization”

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383 “Right” and left are obviously relative. In the U.S., for instance, many observers probably would not describe Toledo’s positions as being on the right, whereas elsewhere he would be described as right or center-right.

384 From Wilkie and Lorey 1987 (894), as cited in Cotler 1999 (324).
(Cotler 1995: 325; McClintock 1999). Other key early parties included the Democratic Party (*Partido Democrático*—PD), which, among other issues, supported a federal union of Peru, Chile, and Bolivia, and the National Party (*Partido Nacional*—PN), whose program was unclear (Tuesta Soldevilla 2005: 446).

The 1920s brought strong challenges to this traditional order. In 1919, Augusto B. Leguía (a former PC leader) took power with the support of “traders, civil servants, middle and lower ranked military, and workers” — i.e. of “social groups that had only recently emerged and that had different demands to those of the old political elite” (Tuesta Soldevilla 2005: 446). During Leguía’s eleven year presidency, the government centralized state control away from regional elites and established close ties with international investors, particularly the U.S. Popular support for Leguía was cemented both through large-scale public works projects (financed by export revenues and loans from U.S. banks), as well as by progressive reforms, including the establishment of the eight-hour work day and a minimum wage, and the formation of an Indian affairs bureau (McClintock 1999: 316). These changes effectively mobilized new social groups and intellectual movements, who pushed for the incorporation of Peru’s indigenous population and the formation of “mass” political parties. Key leaders emerging from these movements included Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, who in 1924 founded the center-leftist Popular Revolutionary American Alliance party (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*—APRA), and José Carlos Mariátegui, who in 1928 founded the Peruvian Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista del Perú*—PSP), a Marxist party. Although Mariátegui died in 1930, his political influence continued, with the PSP
becoming the Peruvian Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Peruano*—PCP). In 1970, an offshoot of the PCP led by Abimael Guzmán formed the Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*), a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla organization that adopted terrorist tactics a decade later and has been an important force in Peruvian politics since.

APRA remained influential from the 1920s on, becoming Peru’s first mass party with the support of workers, the lower middle class, students, and a base among the “sugar workers of the haciendas of the north coast” (McClintock 1999: 318; see also Cotler 1995: 343). The AP, which became APRA’s main competitor in elections in the 1960s, was formed by political newcomer Fernando Belaúnde in 1956 with support from students, professionals, and business interests, favoring a “nationalistic, redistributive, and state-centered platform that won the support of reform-minded sectors in the armed forces and the Church.” It gained the support of “growing numbers of urban middle classes and rural masses, abandoned by [APRA’s] Haya de la Torre in his quest for integration into political life” (Cotler 1995: 330-1). Other key parties of this period that survived through the 1980 democratic transition included the Christian Democrats (*Democracia Cristiana*—DC), also formed in 1956, and the conservative Popular Christian Party (*Partido Popular Cristiano*—PPC), which split from the DC in 1967.

In the late 1970s, economic crisis and rising popular protest facilitated the transition to democracy, beginning in 1978 with the “Political Transfer Plan” and the election of a constituent assembly. In July 1979, a new democratic constitution was approved, under which elections were held in 1980, marking Peru’s first transition to
electoral democracy. The 1980 elections were characterized on the one hand by the continuing strength of the AP, APRA, and PPC. The AP won both the presidential and legislative polls, with 44.9 percent and 38.9 percent respectively, bringing Belaúnde to the presidency. It was followed in the legislative and presidential polls by APRA with about 27 percent and the PPC with about 10 percent. The 1980 elections were also characterized by strong fractionalization of the vote and the proliferation of small parties, a general characteristic of Peruvian politics. In the legislative elections, about a quarter of the vote went to small parties earning less than 5 percent. In the presidential polls, the figure was just slightly lower at 18 percent.

The electoral dominance of the “traditional” Peruvian parties continued through the 1985 elections, where the APRA placed first with a slight majority in both the presidential and legislative races, bringing its Secretary-General Alan García to the presidency with an unusually strong electoral mandate. The 1985 elections also marked the emergence of the United Left (Izquierda Unida—IU), an electoral front composed of smaller leftist parties and groups that had participated independently in previous elections. Thus, the 1985 polls showed change in the sense of a political shift away from the AP and towards the left and center-left (represented by the IU and the now populist APRA), but the broad lines of competition and salient identifications remained relatively constant. The causes of the political shift away from the AP can be attributed to dissatisfaction with the Belaúnde (AP) government and its policies, as well as with several key shocks (the international debt crisis in 1982 and the effects of El Niño in

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385 The IU was created following the 1980 presidential elections to compete in the municipal polls (Cotler 1995: 340).
1983) that negatively affected the Peruvian economy and which the government had been unable to address effectively (see Cotler 1995: 340). It was also during this period that the more radical left became active outside of the electoral arena: the Shining Path took up arms in the Ayacucho highlands and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru*) formed with backing from APRA dissidents.

Coming to office with a strong electoral mandate, García adopted the sorts of populist economic and social policies that he had promised during the campaign, continuing even as criticism within and outside his party mounted. In July 1987, however, he went too far, nationalizing the banking system and thus betraying the top business leaders who had thus-far lent him strong support. Turning against him, his former allies were supported by the AP and the PPC opposition (Cotler 1995: 344-5). The IU, which won about a quarter of the vote in the 1985 polls meanwhile was plagued by internal divisions, which were fueled by debates over the relationship of the party with the García administration, its former ally (see Levitsky and Cameron 2003: 7).
Table 7.8: Peru, Legislative Elections (Lower House), 1980-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>1980 (%)</th>
<th>1985 (%)</th>
<th>1990 (%)</th>
<th>1995* (%)</th>
<th>2000* (%)</th>
<th>2001* (%)</th>
<th>2006* (%)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popular Action (Acción Popular—AP)</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
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<td>Peruvian Aprista Party (Partido Aprista Peruano—PAP: APRA)</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>People’s Christian Party (Partido Popular Cristiano—PPC)</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Left (Izquierda Unida—IU)</td>
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<td>Change 90 (Cambio 90–C 90)</td>
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<td>16.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union for Peru (Unión por el Peru)</td>
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<td>21.1</td>
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<td>National Unity (Unidad Nacional—UN)</td>
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<td>13.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
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<td>Alliance from the Future (Alianza por el Futuro)</td>
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<td>13.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Center Front (Frente del Centro)</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Union for Peru (Unión por el Perú—UPP)</td>
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<td>13.6</td>
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<td>Moralizing Independent Front (Frente Independiente Moralizador—FIM)</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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<td>Peru 2000</td>
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<td>Possible Peru (Peru Posible)</td>
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<td>23.2</td>
<td>26.3</td>
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<td>National Solidarity (Solidaridad Nacional)</td>
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<td>7.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>We Are Peru (Somos Peru)</td>
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<td>5.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others (parties with &lt;5%)</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes (% of registered)</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>85.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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387 In this election, PPC allied with the Hayista Movement (Movimiento de Bases Hayistas—MBH) to form the Democratic Agreement (Convergencia Democrática—CODE).
Table 7.9: Peru, Presidential Elections, 1980-2006

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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Popular Action</strong> (Accion Popular—AP)</td>
<td>44.9%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Peruvian Aprista Party</strong> (Partido Aprista Peruano—PAP: APRA)</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>People's Christian Party</strong> (Partido Popular Cristiano—PPC)</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>United Left</strong> (Izquierda Unida—IU)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic Front</strong> (Frente Democratico—FREDEMO)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32.6%</td>
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<td><strong>Others</strong> (parties with &lt;5%)</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
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<td>13.7%</td>
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<td><strong>Voters</strong> (% of registered)</td>
<td>79.1%</td>
<td>90.6%</td>
<td>78.3%</td>
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389 In this election, PPC allied with the Hayista Grassroots Movement (Movimiento de Bases Hayistas—MBH) to form the Democratic Agreement (Convergencia Democrática—CODE).
Cotler (1995) notes that “in terms of party politics, the most notable feature of the period between 1987 and 1992 was the loss of trust in the parties” (346; see also McClintock 1999: 347). By the 1990 elections, support for APRA and its ally, the IU, was less than a half and a third respectively of support in 1985. Because of dissatisfaction with the Belaúnde government, support for the AP began to trail off earlier, falling from about 40 percent to less than 10 percent in the 1985 presidential and legislative polls. By 1990, the AP did not contest directly, but supported the candidates of FREDEMO, a new electoral front founded in 1988. Its ally, the PPC, was also hurt by its association with Belaúnde and in 1985 contested in alliance with a dissident conservative faction of APRA (the Hayista Grassroots Movement) as the Democratic Convergence (Convergencia Democrática—CODE).

This crisis in party politics, Levitsky and Cameron (2003) argue, was rooted partly in structural shifts that brought new social groups and issues into politics. Many of these shifts are reminiscent of the Bolivia case, including “the elimination of the last barriers to full suffrage, large-scale urban migration, and the expansion of the urban informal sector … which encompassed more than 50 percent of the economically active population by 1990, weakened class-based organizations, [and] eroded collective and partisan identities … [which] produced a growing pool of politically unattached voters” (4-5). At the same time, the traditional parties had lessened capacity to respond to these shifts because of the economic crisis and because of internal party disputes (4-5).
addition, as McClintock (1999) suggests, the crisis was arguably "possible because of the poor democratic performance in 1980-1992, a poor performance that reflected not only the enduring problems of social mistrust and weak civilian political institutions but also the preponderance of leftist attitudes among Peru's citizens and leaders at the time of the Latin American debt crisis and shift toward free-market economic policies" (McClintock 1999: 310-311).

Figure 7.10: Peru circa 1990

- Starting point: System organized around roughly left-right division with four main parties (AP, PPC, APRA, and IU).
- Party crisis: Structural shifts along with internal party divisions on the left lead to collapse of support for traditional parties.
- Result: Emergence of new "anti-party" force led by Alberto Fujimori, which highlights political outsider/insider division that overlaps loosely with racial and class divisions (i.e., traditional white, upper middle class political elite vs. non-white working class and poor "outsiders").
Figure 7.10 maps the basic changes in Peruvian politics circa 1990. Two of the key processes in the framework are at work here: on the one hand, changes in preferences that encouraged the entry of new actors and issues into Peruvian politics, and on the other, a party system crisis. Both processes created space for the rise of new actors from “outside” of traditional party politics. The overlap of this new outsider/insider cleavage with ethnic and economic divisions (non-dominant/dominant ethnic groups, and poor/wealthy) created incentives for appeals to voters along these lines as well.

A number of new and independent political leaders emerged during this period. These included Ricardo Belmont, who started the Obras movement and was elected mayor of Lima; internationally-acclaimed writer Mario Vargas Llosa, who had been a strong critic of García and ran for president in 1990 as an independent with the newly-formed Democratic Front (Frente Democrático—FREDEMO), which had the support from the AP and the PPC; and the agronomist, Alberto Fujimori, who formed the Change 90 party (Cambio 90) shortly before the election, running on the slogan “honesty, hard work, and technology” (see Ropp 2004). Although Vargas Llosa and FREDEMO took an early lead and eventually won a plurality in the lower house (30.1 percent) and in the first round presidential elections (32.6 percent), Fujimori won the presidency in the second round with 62.4 percent of the vote, an upset victory.

The 1990 presidential elections highlight the importance of elite framing in identity politics: both of the two top candidates and parties in the race were political
outsiders in the sense of being new to electoral politics, but one of the reasons often cited for Vargas Llosa’s loss was his perceived status as an “insider.” This was tied to public skepticism over his ties to the traditional parties and the fact that he was “white” and a member of the traditional elite class (see Taylor 2005). This perception was partly the work of his opponents, but according to Graham and Kane (1998), was also “exacerbated by FREDEMO’s campaign style and slogans, which appealed far more to the aristocracy than to the mestizo and Indian populations” (76).

By contrast, Fujimori’s electoral platform capitalized on what might otherwise have been a weakness, his position as the ultimate outsider – in political and ethnic terms. The descendant of Japanese immigrants, Fujimori had no clear ethnic constituency; if we think of Peru’s ethnic groups in the standard terms described in Figure 7.3, Fujimori belonged to an ethnic group that made up less than 1 percent of the total Peruvian population. Yet, although not of indigenous or mestizo ancestry, Fujimori was also clearly “not white.” Nicknamed “El Chino,” he capitalized on this identification, drawing parallels between himself and indigenous and mixed-race voters, even explicitly framing his candidacy as that of “the Chinaman and the cholos, against the whites” (Sakuda 1999: 395; as cited in Ropp 2004: 10). In economic terms, Fujimori also appealed to the poor, an appeal not framed in leftist terms, but linked to populist promises and ideas of capitalist development. As Ropp (2004) describes, he successfully drew symbolic links between the successes of “Asian capitalism” and promises for “Andean modernization.” As Graham and Kane (1996) summarize: Fujimori’s 1990 campaign

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390 This estimate is based on the Political Handbook of the World, 1995-96 edition, which gives the population as Indians (of Inca descent) (46%), White (10%), and mestizo (44%). Alesina et al. (2002) give the total “other” population (possibly including both Asians and other groups) at 3.5 percent.
was "vague but simple, stressing work, honesty, and technology. His electoral coalition, Cambio 90, established its primary base of support among small and medium-sized businesses as well as in the limited but active evangelical community, which generated popular support in shantytowns and other low-income areas. Fujimori's vague platform as well as his being of Japanese rather than the traditional European origin seemed to appeal broadly, particularly among lower-income groups" (76).

On April 5, 1992, Fujimori staged an *autogolpe* (a "self-coup") ending Peru's first period of electoral democracy. The relative economic success of Fujimori's regime at least during the first half of the 1990s cemented his popularity for a time and "effectively buried the established parties," thus creating "a new partisan cleavage: Fujimori versus 'the opposition,' with anti-Fujimori politicians in fact becoming known in derogatory terms as 'la oposición'" (Levitsky and Cameron 2003: 9). Eventually, Fujimori created four pro-Fujimori electoral vehicles: Change-90 (*Cambio 90—C-90*), formed prior to the 1990 elections; New Majority (*Nueva Mayoria—NM*), formed prior to the 1992 elections; Let's Go Neighbor (*Vamos Vecino*), created for the 1998 municipal elections; and Perú 2000, created for the 2000 election (see Schmidt 2000).

By the time of the 1995 elections studied in the CDEI data, the traditional parties were no longer major contenders, and all but APRA won less than 5 percent of the vote (APRA received just 6.53 percent and 8 seats). The main opposition to Fujimori's C-

391 Levitsky and Cameron (2003) argue, building on Tanaka (1998), Fujimori’s successful politicking during this period sealed the fates of the parties. "[O]utsider presidents Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil and Jorge Serrano of Guatemala lost similar battles during this period. Had Fujimori been
90/NM alliance was another new group, the Union for Peru (Union por el Peru—UPP), formed prior to the 1995 polls and a campaign vehicle for former UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. Trying to position himself as more democratic and more pro-poor than Fujimori, Pérez de Cuéllar emphasized “democratic institutionalism,” along with neo-liberal economic policy (the “IMF formula”) with social safety nets for the poor and “work for all.” A broad tent, the UPP included “representatives of big, medium, and small business; a leader of Peru's major labor confederation; prominent political independents; journalists who had been critical of Fujimori; and an assortment of political activists, NGO members, and teachers,” an eclecticism that contributed to popular perception that a UPP government would not be viable (Schmidt 2000: 111). Although his economic message was similar to Fujimori’s (neo-liberal and pro-poor), in the last few weeks of the campaign, Pérez de Cuéllar took a more leftist stance, favoring a social market economy and criticizing privatization (Schmidt 2000: 113). Thus, there is some evidence that a leftist undercurrent remained salient in electoral politics during this period, but such appeals did not tend to be central.

The ideological proximity of the political alternatives available to Peruvian voters during this period is suggested by available data on party positions. Figure 7.11 is based on survey data reported in Alcántara Sáez and Freidenberg (2001). Data on two parties, C-90 and APRA, is included, based on surveys of legislators and party activists in 1996 and 1999 (see Montero and Freidenberg 2001: 424, 453). These data suggest that the electoral options available to voters in these two main, electorally-viable parties ranged impeached like Collor, or had he failed in his autogolpe attempt like Serrano, Peru’s party system might have ended up similar to those of Brazil and Guatemala: weak and discredited but essentially intact” (8).

392 From CDEI 2005 issues coding.
from center-left to center-right – even in an environment where, as McClintock (1999) suggests, there remained untapped support for the left.

**Figure 7.11: Members’ Positioning of Parties in Peru**

(Based on PELA and PPAL surveys as presented in Montero and Freidenberg 2001: 424, 453.)

1996 – Legislators
(Sample: 7 APRA; 48 Cambio 90)

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<td>APRA</td>
<td>C-90</td>
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1999 – Legislators, Leaders (Dirigentes), and Militants
(Sample: 10 APRA; 10 Cambio 90)

Left (=1) Right (=10)

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<td>APRA</td>
<td>C-90</td>
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**Politics Since 2000**

The changes in Peruvian politics that have occurred since the return to electoral democracy in 2001 can also be understood in terms of the framework developed in this dissertation. During this period, the collapse of support for Fujimori – and his eventual departure from politics amidst scandal in late 2000 – opened up considerable space for the entry of new political actors. Almost all ran essentially as second generation “outsiders”/opponents to Fujimori’s regime, but many also distinguished themselves in additional ways, effectively capitalizing on the economic and ethnic divisions in society.
that Fujimori had begun to mobilize. These included continuing politicization of the “white” versus “non-white” divide and renewed emphasis on class divisions, by both “traditional” leftists and ethnic leftists. Figure 7.12 illustrates the key process highlighted in the narrative of this section.

**Figure 7.12: Peru since 2000**

- **Starting point:** System organized around outsider/insider division reflecting support for and against Fujimori.
- **Party crisis:** The collapse of the Fujimori regime and his departure from politics in 2000 creates an opening for new electoral contenders.
- **Result:** Emergence of new “outsider” groups reflecting racial and class divisions in society, along with the gradual reemergence of the traditional APRA party recast as a new leftist alternative.

In the late 1990s, as economic problems worsened and the corruption and authoritarianism of the Fujimori government became increasingly pronounced, Fujimori’s hold on power lessened. One sign of this in the 2000 elections was the
relatively strong showing of Alejandro Toledo, who competed this time with Possible Peru (Peru Posible). Toledo, who first ran for president in 1995, in this election raised his first-round showing from 3.3 percent to 40.2 percent. (The victory in 2000, however, went to Fujimori, with a reported 49.9 percent in the first round and 74.3 percent in the second round.) Toledo’s appeal was in many ways similar to Fujimori’s: although clearly more focused on democracy, also central to his platform were appeals to ethnic outsiders (indigenous and “cholo” voters) and to the poor and working class from a neo-liberal standpoint. Nicknamed “the Golden Cholo,” Toledo even in 1995 and 2000 was Fujimori’s rival for the “cholo emergente” vote.393 As highlighted in Chapter 4, he was seen as “a Peruvian Horatio Alger who had risen from tending sheep and shining shoes to become a professor at Peru’s leading business school after earning his doctorate at Stanford,” and unlike Fujimori, who was not of indigenous descent, he had a more legitimate basis to call “on Peru’s indigenous population to put one of their own in the presidential palace” – which he did during the 2000 campaign (Schmidt 2000: 107). As Levitsky and Cameron (2003) point out, his rise to power was due to “strategic voting by anti-Fujimoristas desperately seeking a viable candidate” (22). But, what is notable here for the question at hand is that Toledo – largely because of his ethnic and class background – was that viable candidate, demonstrating the increasing salience of these identifications to electoral politics. Strategic anti-Fujimori voters could have supported other candidates with profiles like Pérez de Cuéllar or Vargas Llosa, but they did not.

In 2001, with Fujimori out of the picture and his allies in disarray, Toledo won the presidency with 53.1 percent in the second round (36.5 percent in the first). The

393 Latin American Weekly Report, 1/26/95.
campaign adopted a centrist stance, emphasizing “job creation, decentralization, and the satisfaction of basic human needs” (Schmidt 2003: 344). One of the first major politicians of indigenous or partly indigenous (“cholo”) background (the first president of indigenous descent since 1931), Toledo also did not fit the typical profile of the “indigenous politician.” Although he did highlight his ethnicity, which was well-known among voters, he clearly was not seen as a traditional indigenous leader or a leader of the indigenous movement (McClintock 2006: 97). Nevertheless, as noted, ethnicity was central to his message. This was suggested also by his support base. In both 2000 and 2001, Toledo’s strongest showing was “in his home department of Ancash, in southern Peru, the most indigenous part of the country, and in the jungle department of Loreto. In Lima, which accounted for almost two-fifths of the valid vote, Toledo showed consistent strength across class lines, winning a plurality of 32.6% and finishing no lower than second in any major district” (Schmidt 2003: 348).

Other key contenders in the 2001 elections included the center-leftist APRA, which raised its support in the legislative polls from less than 10 percent in elections during the Fujimori years, to 19.7 percent in 2001; the center-right National Unity party (Unidad Nacional—UN); and the Independent Moralizing Front (Frente Independiente Moralizador—FIM), a party founded prior to the 1995 elections by Fernando Olivera, a former investigator for the state prosecutor’s office who had been a strong opponent of Alan García (APRA) during his presidency and formerly of the (center-right) PPC. For his part, García portrayed himself as the “new Alan,” now supporting conciliation and a “united” Peru (Taylor 2005: 575). Former Fujimori supporters who backed a presidential
candidate in the race tended to favor Carlos Boloña of the Popular Solution Party (SOLPOP), while others supported only candidates from the C90-NM congressional lists (Schmidt 2003).

By the 2006 elections, Toledo's popularity had plummeted, among other reasons due to scandals tying him and his party to election fraud during the 2000 elections and to personal criticisms surrounding his lifestyle and actions while in office (for instance, giving himself a salary of $216,000 – which was later dropped to $144,000). Thus, although many of the same issues and social divisions remained central to political competition, in 2006, other political contenders became more prominent, including the "new Alan" García of the center-leftist APRA and the center-right Lourdes Flores of the UN, who had also competed in 2001. The key new addition was Ollanta Humala, running with the newly formed Union for Peru coalition (Union por el Peru—UPP).

Humala, who placed first in the first round with 30.6 percent and narrowly lost in the second round (47.4 percent), adopted a populist platform, basically to the left of García economically (e.g., supporting the nationalization of natural resources), while also advancing an authoritarian stance and framing himself (like the other two candidates) as an "outsider." He also played the ethnic card in a way that neither of the other three top candidates did or could, emphasizing his indigenous roots and drawing on his association

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394 He was found by a congressional commission in May 2005, but congress voted not to impeach him.
395 According to McClintock (2006), he was also hurt by the comparison of his lifestyle with Fujimori's, who had a reputation as an "austere workaholic," and there was an ethnic element to criticism as well because his lifestyle did not fit well with "assumptions of what was appropriate for people of indigenous descent" (98).
with “ethnocacerism,” an ethno-nationalist movement founded by his father, Isaac Humala, that, as Páez (2006) describes, is “rooted in the vindication of the indigenous roots of the majority of Peru’s population” and “is based on the view that only the country’s Andean indigenous peoples will be capable of freeing Peruvians from the system of exploitation put in place by the Spanish colonial power.” He continues:

With the dream that one of his sons might turn out to be a new [General Andrés Avelino] Cáceres [a nationalist leader of the War of the Pacific] and head up an indigenous revolution to free the millions of Peruvians impoverished by the ‘white elite,’ Isaac enrolled his sons Anauro and Ollanta in the military school in Chorrillos. After they graduated, they organized meetings in the barracks to spread the word of ‘ethnocacerism’ among their fellow officers.

Despite this personal history, Humala, like Toledo, fits uncomfortably in other ways with views of what an “indigenous politician” should be: he is of mixed (mestizo) descent, he grew up in Lima, he is from a middle-class family, and his platform and party are not seen as consistent with “traditional” culture, even though they advocate ethnic revindication (see Páez 2006, 2007; McClintock 2006). Furthermore, Humala has been closely associated with the military to such an extent that “one pundit said he was not an ‘outsider’ but ‘in insider’”; he was implicated in extrajudicial killings in 1992 in the Upper Huallaga Valley; and his uprising in October 2000 was seen by some as a smokescreen for Montesinos’s escape from Peru (McClintock 2006: 100).
The ethnic element to Humala’s political identity (as with Toledo) is also suggested by his support base. As McClintock summarizes: “There was a deep regional divide [in support for García and Humala]. García won handily in Peru’s relatively prosperous coastal area, including Lima. In the interior, Humala won all but two departments, and in the southern highlands – Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Cusco, and Puno—he averaged 75 percent of the vote” (McClintock 2006: 95; see also Cameron 2006). Although Humala lost the presidency, the UPP won a plurality in the congressional elections of 9 April (45 seats).

Despite his presidential loss, the strength of Humala’s ethnic appeal – an appeal in many ways similar to Toledo’s, and to Fujimori’s, but with an even more explicit “ethnic” nationalist tinge – suggests the continuing, and even increasing salience of ethnic identification in Peruvian politics. Meanwhile, the dominance of various leftist politicians of different stripes, suggests the rising salience of class identification. Polls suggest that Humala did not lose so much because voters did not identify with his ethnic nationalist and unreformed leftist stance, but rather because he was perceived as too radical and anti-democratic, the other significant components of his electoral platform. As McClintock (2006) reports: “In a post-election University of Lima poll, the most frequent explanations for Humala’s loss were, first, ‘because he is authoritarian’; second, ‘because of the intervention of Hugo Chávez’; and third, ‘because he is very radical’” (104). The 2006 results thus suggest that ethnicity and class – and “ethnic leftists” – will only remain salient in future elections as they remain useful ways to mobilize key electoral coalitions.
Colombia: A Rising Left?

In contrast to these other cases, in Colombia, the weakening (but still dominant position) of the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties has given rise to the emergence of the electoral dominance of President Álvaro Uribe and his platform of "democratic security." Although there are some signs of an emerging left, filling in the space to the left of the centrist positions of Colombia's traditional parties and of Uribe, there is little evidence that ethnic identifications are becoming central to national debate. The basic argument of this section is outlined in Figure 7.13.

**Figure 7.13: Colombia**

- **Starting point:** Parties organized around regional elites affiliated with Liberal and Conservative Parties.
- **Party crisis:** Intra-party disputes and the continuing failure of the traditional parties to solve the rising civil conflict. (Additional intervening variables noted in the text: Changes in electoral institutions in the 1990s and 2000s to facilitate the emergence of new parties, reflecting public and elite concern over traditional party dominance; and a shift in public opinion towards greater concern with security.)
- **Result:** Emergence of new parties, but no significant change in ethnic salience. Possible emergence of leftist alternative (although too early to tell).
In comparison to its neighbors, Colombia has enjoyed a great deal of constitutional stability. Presidents have been regularly elected by direct rule since 1914, with the exception of a period of military rule during 1953-1957 (Ulloa and Carbó 2003: 785). As Chapter 4 shows, it has been classified as an electoral democracy since 1958, making it a member of the second wave of democratization.

Since the nineteenth century, politics has been dominated by two political parties, the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal—PL) and the Conservative Party (Partido Conservador—PC). Historically, the PC has tended to be more supportive of centralized government and Roman Catholicism, while the PL has been more supportive of federal government and free trade, but party loyalty has tended to be regional (based on regional elites) and ideological divisions between the two parties have been and are slim. This is suggested in the survey data reported in Alcántara Sáez and Freidenberg (2001). As Figure 7.14 suggests, the two parties occupy a relatively slim section of ideological space, ranging from centrist (PL) to center-right (PC).

A key feature of the system has been what Sartori called its “façade two-partism” because the electoral units were “patronage-based networks organized around individual politicians that present several different party lists” (1994: 177, 180-181, as cited in Posada Carbó 2006: 87). This regime has been closely tied to the system of seat allocation, which has been to rival lists rather than parties, meaning that in many regions of the country, more than one Liberal and Conservative list contested, each generally named after a local boss (e.g., “list headed by Luis Enrique”) (Shugart 1992: 24). This

system supported the two parties as broad umbrellas with leaders, “taking advantage of whatever brand meaning the party label may have to voters, rather than running as a ‘third’ party” (Shugart 1992: 24). The system has roots in the regionalism of Colombian politics, stemming from the traditionally weak penetration of the nation state and patron-client relations.

**Figure 7.14: Members’ Positioning of Parties in Colombia**

(Based on PELA and PPAL surveys as presented in Roll 2001: 165, 201.)

1995 – Legislators  
*(Sample: 40 PLC; 15 PC)*

Left (=1) | Right (=10)
---|---
5.5 | 7.3
PLC | PC

1999 – Legislators, Leaders (Dirigentes), and Militants  
*(Sample: 17 PLC; 17 PC)*

Left (=1) | Right (=10)
---|---
5.76 | 7.47
PLC | PC

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397 Shugart (1992): “Given the proliferation of lists that this system encouraged, the vast majority of seats in Colombia were won by remainders and not by quotas. What this means is that, despite the executive’s great discretion over the allocation of budgetary resources that augmented members’ auxilios, it took relatively few votes to win a congressional seat. Thus the executive and the party leaderships had sharply limited ability to control the make-up of their respective parties’ congressional delegations” (25).
Nevertheless, divisions between the Conservative and Liberal parties have played a central role in politics since the mid nineteenth century, and have erupted into violence in two key periods, the War of a Thousand Days (La Guerra de los Mil Días) in 1899-1902, in which some 100,000 people died, and the period of “La Violencia” (roughly, 1948-58) in which 300,000 people died. In 1958, the Conservatives and Liberals joined forces to form the National Front, quelling the violence, while effectively excluding other political actors. Although the National Front dissolved in 1974, there has since been a tradition of elite accommodation between the two parties.

The period of “La Violencia” gave rise to several guerrilla movements, that have played a key role in politics since, although largely outside of the electoral arena. These included the pro-Soviet Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which has become the largest guerrilla group; the pro-Cuban National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional—ELN); and the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Popular—EPL). Another major guerrilla organization, the 19th of April Movement (Movimiento 19 de Abril—M-19), formed in the 1970s and demobilized in the 1980s. Its members formed a political party, the M-19 Democratic Alliance (Alianza Democrática M-19—AD/M-19), which won 12.6 percent in presidential elections in 1990 and 10.3 percent in legislative elections in 1991. Largely in response to guerrilla activity and with close ties to the drug trade, by the 1990s, a number of right-wing paramilitary groups were active in protecting landowners and other local economic interests. In April 1997, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) formed as an umbrella organization of these groups.
Despite these challenges to state authority, Colombia’s traditional parties maintained their electoral dominance for a longer period than those in the other Andean countries. It was only in 2002 that Álvaro Uribe, an “independent” candidate, won the presidency. Although support for the PC has declined in the both the legislative and presidential elections from the 1970s, even in 1998, Andrés Pastrana, running as the candidate of the Conservative Party-New Democratic Force Movement 98 Alliance (Great Alliance For Change), won in a second round victory with 51.9 percent (see Figure 7.15).399 The support of other smaller parties nevertheless has been increasing steadily since the 1980s, as suggested especially by legislative results (see Figure 7.16).

399 See Radio Cadena Nacional, Bogota, in Spanish 0044 gmt 1 Jun 98, as excerpted by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, “Opposition candidate Pastrana says Colombians have challenged status quo,” 2 June 1998.
The emergence of new parties has been facilitated by institutional reforms to encourage the entry of new parties, especially changes in registration requirements in 1985, 1991, and 1994 (Moreno 2005: 492-493; Posada-Carbó 2006: 86). Concern over “minority” and small party representation was tied largely to representation of guerrilla-based parties, including M-19 but also, e.g., the Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica) tied to the FARC. Nevertheless, these “new” parties have not for the most part represented major change in the types of issues central to party debate. Looking at bill initiation in the Colombian legislature, for instance, Moreno (2005)’s analysis shows no significant change in the types of bills initiated by traditional and new parties during 1986-90 and 1994-98 (Table 7.10). She concludes that “On the whole, ‘new’ parties did not differ dramatically from their traditional counterparts since they tended to initiate [legislative
bills] in the same issue areas and with similar frequencies” (Moreno 2005: 501).

Nevertheless, according to these data, there was some evidence of change on the margins, with truly independent parties (i.e., those not affiliated with the traditional parties) tending to emphasize civil rights issues slightly more than traditional parties (7.1 percent versus 3.5-2.3 percent).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Major parties</th>
<th>“New” parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public welfare</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic welfare</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil rights/liberties</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public defense/security</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural/ceremonial</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment/natural resource planning</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total legislative attempts</td>
<td>1673</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the late 1990s, however, as the country experienced economic recession and both the FARC and the ELN extended their influence, there was continuing dissatisfaction with politics as usual. This is reflected in particular in the 2002 and 2006 elections, which Posada-Carbó (2006) calls “critical elections,” i.e., elections that produce significant electoral realignments or changes in government policy (86). Both were won by Alvaro Uribe, a PL leader who ran as an independent, on a platform stressing “democratic security” and a pledge to use military force against the rebels.

During his term, his approval ratings were about 70 percent. Although previously

401 There were also differences in terms of the focus on “ceremonial issues,” which tended to be stressed more by traditional parties (18.2% versus 10 percent), and agricultural issues, which were most important to the new parties affiliated with traditional parties (9.7%) than for either traditional parties (4%) or independent parties (5.2%).

402 $\chi^2: p$ level = 0.1999.
presidents were only allowed one term in office, in 2004-05, the Congress and Constitutional Court approved a controversial constitutional amendment that allowed for a second presidential term, and in May 2006, Uribe won again with 62 percent in the first round, an even stronger showing than in 2002.

Following the presidential elections of May 2006, *El Nuevo Herald* (Miami) reported the “the disappearance of the bipartisan system that had governed the country with the alternation of Liberals and Conservatives for over a century.”\(^{403}\) With a new division surrounding support for and against Uribe and the security question, there were also signs of an emerging multiparty system, including a left-wing alternative, the Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA). As Posada-Carbó (2006) notes, “by 2002, there were 74 political parties and movements registered with the electoral authorities, and more than 40 had seats in Congress” (87).

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shown how shifts in political competition across the Andean region can be understood in terms of the theory and framework presented in this dissertation. Similar to Bolivia, the overlap of ethnic and class divisions and party system crises since the 1990s in Ecuador, Venezuela, and Peru have led to the politicization of ethnic, along with class, identifications. In recent elections, we find in all of these countries, the rise of indigenous leftist outsider nationalists – Morales, Correa, Chávez, and Humala. In Colombia, however, where the traditional party system held on

\(^{403}\) As quoted in Posada-Carbó 2006: 81.
longer and political divisions did not overlap well with ethnic divisions, this has not been the case. However, there is some evidence an emerging “outsider” left.

Some scholars argue that the sorts of changes studied in this chapter are largely rhetorical, rather than “real.” This is partly true. As we have seen, strategic political leaders with slim attachments to ethnic and class movements and ideologies have claimed to be representatives of ethnic and class groups. As in Bolivia, there is also some evidence that strategic leaders have shifted their positions over time to more clearly emphasize ethnic and class identifications. Chávez’s move towards the explicit embrace of “indigenous socialism” in 2007 is one example. We have also seen how, once in office, many of these leaders have advanced policies that seem to be against the interests of those very ethnic and class movements that they identified with in campaigns. Ecuador’s Gutiérrez is an example here. Nevertheless, the shifts in politics studied in this chapter should not be dismissed only as rhetorical. They are also tied to real changes in representation – including some of the first indigenous candidates in all countries – and in some policies to be more inclusive and more representative of previously excluded groups.
CHAPTER 8

ELECTIONS AND THE NEW POLITICS OF IDENTITY

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. ... And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language. (Marx 1963 [1852]: 15)

This dissertation has argued that, even absent variation in voter preferences and in institutions, there can be major variation in the types of identifications salient in politics across countries and over time due to strategic coalition-building by politicians in elections. Unlike most theories focused on leaders, however, the theory proposed here highlights the constraints that politicians face in mobilizing identity groups to build these political coalitions. Specifically, it argues that the political space within which leaders can form new parties and bring to light new group identifications, depends upon the structure of existing social identity groups - not only their sizes (as has been highlighted in other work), but also their degrees of overlap. Size and overlap affect which identity

404 From The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
groups have the numbers to win and which identity groups describe constituencies that elites might strategically switch between for political expediency to claim and mobilize "new" identity group coalitions.

In terms of elections in emerging democracies since the 1980s, the argument suggests that the collapse of communism and the Third Wave of democracy created opportunities for the emergence of "new" political actors, who often cast themselves as outsiders to traditional politics as usual. Meanwhile, these factors combined with the rise of the neo-liberal consensus and related changes in foreign assistance also made leftist/statist alternatives infeasible for parties in government, effectively contracting the viable set of ideological platforms that parties in government could credibly adopt. Thus, even though many voters remained in favor of redistributive, pro-poor policies (leftist or not), new "outsider" leaders were initially less likely to be militant leftists than they were in previous years.

In framing their candidacies, these new leaders faced several alternatives. In countries like Bolivia where class had been electorally salient, at least some ethnic and class groups overlapped closely, and the socially-salient "indigenous" ethnic group was large enough to win significant representation at the polls – new leaders had the opportunity to appeal to poor and working class voters in ethnic terms, as indigenous voters. Thus, they were able to build on existing ethnic solidarity and organizations to mobilize "new" ethnic political constituencies around still salient economic and other objectives. Similar events unfolded in Peru and Venezuela – although, given the smaller
sizes of their indigenous populations, in these countries ethnic appeals were more focused on “mixed” identifications ("cholo" or "mestizo") and have been less explicit. The “new” left has also experienced a resurgence in both countries. In Ecuador, similar events also took place, ultimately leading to the rise of indigenous and indigenous/leftist politicians in elections from the late 1990s, even though key ethnic politicians initially refused to play electoral politics.

In countries where ethnic and class (or other) groups overlapped poorly or neither type of group was initially salient in electoral politics, new political leaders had different options. In countries like these, the theory predicts, new leaders could not play the ethnic card in the same way. Often, they were forced to try to fashion new electoral constituencies purely around their “outsider” status and appeals as “populist,” charismatic, or just generally strong leaders. Colombia is basically consistent with this story: the lines of competition salient in the traditional party system did not well overlap with other social divisions and lend themselves to “switching” as in the other Andean countries. For a variety of reasons, the late 1990s also saw the emergence of a number of new parties, but by and large, no new identity groups emerged as centrally salient to electoral competition. The most salient dividing line to emerge in political competition since 2000 has centered on support and opposition to President Uribe and his policy of “democratic security.”
Alternative Explanations

In order to understand the implications of the argument, it is useful to consider how it compares with other explanations for the “new” politics of identity over the past several decades. Six explanations are considered briefly here. The first two, “ancient hatreds” and “changing international norms,” are the most widely and popularly accepted, developed both in scholarly work and in popular discussion. The next four are advanced by individual scholars – Snyder in *Voting to Violence* (2000); Chua in *World on Fire* (2003); Yashar in *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America* (2005); and Adekanye in “Structural Adjustment, Democratization and Rising Ethnic Tensions in Africa” (1995). Each outline alternative mechanisms through which political and/or economic liberalization since the late 1980s could have caused rising ethnic tensions around the world, pointing us to different predictions and recommended responses. One difficulty with almost all of these arguments in thinking about the central questions of this project is that they do not focus on parties and elections, but (generally) on social conflict or social movements. Nevertheless, arguments like these are often extended to electoral politics as is done here.

The first explanation is suggested in the quote from Ignatieff (1994) at the beginning of this dissertation. In *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (1994), one popular presentation of an “ancient hatreds” argument, Ignatieff

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405 The literature on realignment in the U.S. suggests an additional major hypothesis, although it has not been explored for non-U.S. cases (see Mayhew 2000). This hypothesis is discussed further in Chapter 3. 406 Ignatieff’s sentiments in that quote raise comparisons with Fukuyama’s well-known, earlier claim that the triumph of liberalism would bring “the end of history.” See Fukuyama 1989.
argues that “the collapse of Communist regimes across Europe” and the end of the Cold War politics of great power “imperialism” and spheres of influence in Africa, Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East led to the “unfreezing” of ethnic tensions around the world in the early 1990s. 407 He explains:

In crucial zones of the world, once heavily policed by empire – notably the Balkans – populations find themselves without an imperial arbiter to appeal to. Small wonder then, that, unrestrained by stronger hands, they have set upon each other for that final settling of scores so long deferred by the presence of empire. (8-9)

Another well-known argument highlighting ancient hatreds is Huntington (1993)’s thesis on the “clash of civilizations.”

The principal difference between the argument of this dissertation and the ancient hatreds explanation stems from how ethnicity is conceptualized and thus what needs to be explained. The ancient hatreds explanation relies on a primordial conception of ethnic identity, an identity that will be active and divisive unless controlled (by the state, by empire). This dissertation has argued that identity is constructed and multiple, including

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407 Ignatieff calls these “nationalist” tensions, but they are “ethnic” in the terms used here. His explanation also highlights the role of the U.S.’s position as the only superpower and the U.S.’s objective of defending its national interest, rather than maintaining “an imperial system of global order” (8). The phrase “ancient hatreds” seems to be drawn from popular usage by both politicians and pundits, including President Bill Clinton in his 1993 inauguration address, who spoke explicitly of the “ancient hatreds” that threatened the post-Cold War world. Clinton stated that “a generation raised in the shadows of the cold war assumes new responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom but threatened still by ancient hatreds” (as quoted in Snyder 2000: 18, which quotes from Rudolph and Rudolph 1993: 24). Snyder notes that “Clinton later acknowledged that his ‘ancient hatreds’ remarks were erroneous” (18).
a number of viable ethnic and non-ethnic options. Because such “hatreds” could be tied to or constructed around several of these identity options, it is therefore a puzzle why some are mobilized politically and others are not.

The policy prescriptions that follow from the ancient hatreds explanation are also quite different from those supported by this dissertation. Ancient hatreds explanations suggest principally that ethnic identity conflicts can be controlled through ethnic power-sharing agreements (e.g., Lijphart’s consociational democracy) or through partition into ethnically homogeneous nations. This dissertation, by contrast, implies that, because there are multiple possible identity conflicts and because the identity cleavages salient in politics may change, the design of institutional solutions to “control” identity conflicts is a much less promising solution. Even if institutions can be implemented to discourage the mobilization of ethnic cleavages, there is no reason that other, perhaps equally divisive identifications like class, will not be mobilized in politics.

A second popular and widely accepted explanation for the new politics of identity focuses on changing international norms, particularly the decline of leftist politics tied to the collapse of communism and rising support for indigenous and other ethnic movements. This explanation is also advanced in a number of sources, both scholarly and popular. One of the most developed arguments about how these normative changes led to the rise of ethnic politics is presented by Brysk in From Tribal Village to Global Village (2000). Brysk highlights the intersection of international relations and domestic

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408 On consociationalism, see Lijphart 1977. On partition, see e.g., Kaufmann 1996.  
409 For discussion of this point, see e.g., Lijphart 2001.
politics, developing an argument about the “the transnational Indian rights movement” to explain indigenous mobilization in Latin America.410 An illustration of the “global” and “local” worlds that Brysk explores is suggested by the well-known Zapatista movement and the way in which Subcomandante Marcos masterfully used the internet to publicize its message from Chiapas throughout Mexico and across international borders.411

This dissertation does not directly contradict the changing international norms explanation – especially the version presented by Brysk (2000). Indeed, changing international norms fit into the explanatory framework presented in Chapter 3 in terms of their effect on voter preferences. They also may influence elite preferences and actions in ways indirectly relevant to the theory of this dissertation. However, the dissertation argues that changing international norms do not explain the variation considered – not the variation across Latin American democracies in the elections after 1989, nor the variation over time in Bolivia and the other Andean countries. Among other things, the timing is simply off. As Yashar (2007) relatedly notes, “Latin America’s first indigenous movements emerged prior to the contemporary wave of economic globalization in Ecuador and Bolivia” (164).

Another difference between the norms argument and the argument of this dissertation is in how ethnic identity is conceptualized. Even if we accept that

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410 A different version of an international norms argument is Slavoj Zizek’s *Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology* (1993), which argues that the collapse of communism created a void, a “negative,” that was filled by nationalism. More along Brysk (2000)’s lines is other work on Latin America by Madrid (2004, 2005), Rice and Van Cott (2006), and Van Cott (2005), which discusses norm change and regional “spillover” in the decline of the left and the rise of indigenous parties in the region.

411 See e.g., Marcos and Ponce de Leon 2002.
international norm change privileged ethnic identification over class identification, we
still do not know why one ethnic division became salient rather than another. In Bolivia,
the influence of international norms supporting ethnic mobilization do not explain why it
was the indigenous/non-indigenous divide, rather than the divisions among indigenous
linguistic groups (Aymara and Quechua in particular), that were successfully mobilized
in the electoral system from the late 1980s.

A third alternative explanation, proposed by Jack Snyder in *From Voting to
Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (2000), has gained prominence
particularly among international relations scholars (see also Mansfield and Snyder
1995). First pointing out that there is an empirical correlation between
democratization and nationalist violence, Snyder then develops an explanation linking the
two in both historical and contemporary cases through the efforts of elites in new
democracies to “use ‘nationalist’ [in the terms of this project, “ethnic”] appeals to
compete for popular support” (32). As Snyder explains:

Democratization gives rise to nationalism because it serves the interests
of powerful groups within the nation who seek to harness popular
energies to the tasks of war and economic development without

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412 This argument responds directly to a large body of work in international relations on the “democratic
peace” – i.e., it challenges the claim of some of this literature (and of foreign policy based on it) that
promoting democracy promotes peace, arguing that it instead can create nationalist violence. See Brown et
al 1996.

413 The interpretation of the data, as presented in Mansfield and Snyder (1995), which is cited in Snyder
(2003), might be challenged for showing most clearly that regime change in general – not democratization
in particular – is associated with the danger of war. The fact that regime change in general seems to be
correlated with war brings into question causal explanations linking the specificities of the democratization
process (e.g., elites trying to win elected office) to war, rather than factors associated with regime change in
general.
surrendering real political authority to the average citizen. ... Nationalism, a doctrine of rule in the name of the people but not necessarily by the people, provided a way for elites to be popular without being fully democratic. (36)

According to the argument, basically the only situation in which democratization does not lead to ethnic conflict is one in which national political institutions are strong and elite interests are compatible with democracy. The rise of (violent) ethnic mobilization since the 1980s can thus be explained by political liberalization and democratization; the weakness of national political institutions in Third and Fourth Wave democracies; and the fundamental incompatibility between democratic representation and the interests of elites in these countries.

Like the ancient hatreds explanation, Snyder’s explanation relies on a view of ethnic/”nationalist” identification as somehow inherently stronger and more divisive than

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414 The type of nationalism that develops, in turn, is explained in the theory by the “adaptability of [elite] interests to a more democratic setting” (i.e., how much democracy threatens the interests of elites) and by the strength of political institutions, which affect elites’ opportunities to promote exclusionary nationalism (37). The argument suggests four possible outcomes – “civic” nationalism, “revolutionary” nationalism, “counterrevolutionary” nationalism, and “ethnic” nationalism – the last three of which are likely to lead to nationalist violence (38).

415 Relevant to this last point, Adekanye (1995) (discussed further below) notes: “The wave of democratization is held by some to be the cause of the current explosion of ethnic conflicts on the continent. This is the position held by status quo regimes, such as Eyadema’s Togo, Paul Biya’s Cameroon, Omar Bongo’s Gabon, Mobutu’s Zaire, and arap Moi’s Kenya, that feel threatened by the potential loss of power and privilege. It is a sentiment which echoes some of the statements of Africa’s first-generation leaders who had rationalized one-party political rule as a system of government and used this as a basis for rejecting demands for political pluralism, devolution of power, and safeguarding of fundamental freedoms. However, associating democratization with rising ethnic tensions can also be a problematic thesis to pursue. It is true that democratization, as a process of instituting electoral competition for power, can in itself be divisive for an already disunited society …. But the imposition of authoritarian rule, and the overt stability accredited to that alternative, can in the long run prove even more destabilizing, if not completely disaggregative, for a badly divided multi-ethnic state” (356-357).
other types of identifications such as class, a point challenged in this project. Further, although Snyder's explanation focuses on some similar causal variables to this project, the role they play is different. While both arguments see an elite role in manipulating the identities of the masses, the theory presented in this dissertation argues for specific constraints on how elites might mobilize ethnic identification that are put in place by the structure of identity groups. Thus, this dissertation implies that democratization, institutional weakness, and ethnic entrepreneurs are not such problems on their own: for nationalist violence to be truly a threat, we would also need the right socio-structural conditions.

Another explanation that has received a lot of attention is Amy Chua's *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (2003). Chua argues that free market capitalism has increased the economic power of "market dominant minorities" (like the Chinese in Malaysia, Indians in East Africa, or Jews in post-Communist Russia) and that, meanwhile, democratization has led to an increase in organized resentment of these minorities by poorer ethnic majority groups. Her explanation for the rise of ethnic mobilization thus points to both economic and political liberalization as causal factors, specifically through their effects on rising inequality and rising mass mobilization. As Chua explains:

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416 This argument is reminiscent of Huntington's argument in *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1969) that economic development increases inequality at the same time that social mobilization decreases the legitimacy of inequality and that this gap between social mobilization and economic development leads to instability. Huntington's recommendation for encouraging "civic" (as opposed to praetorian) politics highlights institutions, arguing that it depends on the development of stable patterns of institutional authority "appropriate" for the level of social mobilization and political participation — specifically, the balanced development of bureaucracy and political parties (which broaden participation and help to legitimate traditional institutions).
Market-dominant minorities are the Achilles’ heel of free market democracy. In societies with a market-dominant ethnic minority, markets and democracy favor not just different people, or different classes, but different ethnic groups. Markets concentrate wealth, often spectacular wealth, in the hands of the market-dominant minority, while democracy increases the political power of the impoverished majority. In these circumstances the pursuit of free market democracy becomes an engine of potentially catastrophic ethnonationalism, pitting a frustrated ‘indigenous’ majority, easily aroused by opportunistic vote-seeking politicians, against a resented, wealthy ethnic minority. (6-7)

Chua’s argument is related to the argument of this dissertation in the sense that ethnic identification is tied closely to economic interests and inequalities.417 However, while Chua suggests that ethnic identification is driven by the mobilization of non-dominant ethnic majority groups, this project makes no such claims. In Bolivia, it was ethnic majority and poorer groups that mobilized most explicitly, but there is no theoretical reason, according to the argument presented here, that ethnic majority and poorer groups should mobilize rather than other groups. Furthermore, Chua’s book suggests that, in face of rising economic inequality, it is obvious that ethnic divisions would be mobilized rather than class divisions, an assumption challenged by this project.

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417 Chua’s argument highlights these inequalities as objective, although this point is not consistent in her cases, suggesting a more “constructed” inequality as problematic. The Rwandan case, for instance, relies on historical data and stereotypes about differences between Hutus and Tutsi that were reiterated by Hutu ethnic entrepreneurs prior to the 1994 genocide. Explaining how and why identification was constructed in this way is not Chua’s focus, but it is a central issue in this project.
A fifth key possible alternative explanation is developed by Deborah Yashar in *Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge* (2005), which also offers a specific study of Bolivia. Yashar’s important book explains the rise of ethnic movements in Latin America as the result of the changing nature of the state and of citizenship regimes, an argument that might also be extended to other regions. Specifically, the argument is that: “contemporary changes in citizenship regimes politicized indigenous identities precisely because they unwittingly challenged enclaves of local autonomy that had gone largely unrecognized by the state” (8). She also points to the importance of two additional factors: “political associational space that provided the political opportunity to organize and the transcommunity networks that provided the capacity for diverse and often spatially distinct indigenous community to scale up and confront the state” (8).

Yashar’s careful argument suggests a “bottom up” process of mobilization, led by local groups. In this sense, although her argument focuses on social mobilization and the argument of this dissertation on political elites, the two arguments can be complementary. Yashar’s argument helps to explain variation in the social organization that elites might draw on in trying to mobilize ethnic constituencies in national electoral politics (which she does not focus on). Within the explanatory framework presented in Chapter 3, Yashar’s argument suggests one version of a “variation in voter preferences” explanation – i.e., it explains a particular process that drives changes in voter preferences, which then might be translated into electoral politics, given the opportunity.
Finally, a sixth alternative explanation for the new politics of identity comes from J. ‘Bayo Adekanye’s article “Structural Adjustment, Democratization and Rising Ethnic Tensions in Africa” (1995). As the title suggests, Adekanye argues that conflict over structural adjustment (SAP) and its effects on poverty have led to rising ethnic tensions. He summarizes: “a core argument of this article is that the current ethnic tensions, like the ongoing democratic struggles, are arising as part of the general resistance against both SAP, because of its pauperizing impact, and against the state, which is seen as increasingly coercive and as negligent of its basic welfare responsibilities towards its citizens” (355). He also identifies several factors influencing the impact of the SAP on ethnic conflict, including the degree to which different ethnic groups are concentrated in different economic sectors. Given evidence that SAPs had differential effects on economic sectors, the concentration of different ethnic groups in these sectors would have meant the exacerbation of ethnic conflict.\(^{418}\)

Adekanye’s argument is less specified than those discussed above, but its highlighting of the importance of how ethnic and economic groups relate to each other is closely related to the approach taken in this dissertation, suggesting some of the ways in which the theory might be extended to countries outside of Latin America. In the framework developed in this project, Adekanye’s explanation, like Yashar’s, falls under

\(^{418}\) The second factor is the relative power of different ethnic groups, particularly whether they constitute the “ruling group” or not, but the argument about how this plays into the relationship between structural adjustment programs and ethnic tensions is less clear. He notes that: “It has long been known that those communities, ethnic groups, or political regions (or their elites, rather than the majority of the members) that have access to power do much better economically than others, even where resources from the other areas provide much of the basis for the nation’s wealth. One example of this is the contrasting fortunes of the old Northern (Hausa-Fulani) aristocracy, that has dominated much of Nigeria’s history since independence in 1960, and the oil-producing Ogoniland to the southeast; the protests of the people of Ogoniland against all forms of economic and environmental injustices … have intensified of late, and rise to international attention” (367).
the category of an argument highlighting voter preferences (the rising salience of ethnic divisions indirectly triggered by the effects of structural adjustment).

The overarching difference, of course, between the theory presented in this dissertation and all of these other explanations is that the theory of the dissertation (when taken in its most simple form) suggests that the “new” ethnic politics about which so much has been written, are not necessarily anything more than a shift in framing – more reminiscent of the quote from Marx at the beginning of this chapter than of major changes in what voters want from government. In other words, the theory predicts the possibility of shift “back” at some point to politics expressed in class terms. There is some evidence that this is happening already with the rise of leftist parties in Latin America.

Taking a more nuanced view, however, the possible peculiarities of ethnic identifications discussed in Chapter 2 complicate the picture somewhat – suggesting some reasons why this might not actually happen because ethnic identifications in politics, once adopted, may be especially “sticky.” If this is true, generally or in specific countries, it is possible that even major crises under the right conditions, will not induce shifts “back” to class salience.

In more concrete terms, the mechanism identified in the theory is thus worth considering, in particular, because it points to the effects of international policy – i.e., something we can directly influence – on the rise of potentially divisive and persistent
ethnic politics in emerging democracies since the 1980s. In particular, if the argument presented in this dissertation is correct, we should more carefully consider the indirect political effects of efforts by donors and other international actors to influence domestic policy abroad. Even if intended to promote “good” economic policy and outcomes, the theory suggests, such efforts can have unintended effects on domestic conflict through their effects on rhetorical and mobilizational strategies during elections. In short, by effectively constraining the types of platforms that parties in government can present, in favor of more (arguably) economically-advisable alternatives, such efforts may have driven voters towards support for politicians adopting more potentially problematic ethnic and populist appeals.

In other words, some sympathy for leftist politics seems inevitable in poor countries with high degrees of inequality. Yet, there is a difference between what Castañeda (2006) identifies for Latin America as the “right left” and the “wrong left” (see also McClintock 2006). The “wrong left” in Castañeda’s terms is characterized by nationalism (both ethnic and patriotic), as well as authoritarianism and support for strongly statist economic policies. It seems much more likely to gain support when there is no real “right left” among parties in government.
APPENDIX A

PROTOCOL FOR CODING OF ECONOMIC PARTIES

Rachel Gisselquist and Kanchan Chandra

This protocol is an addendum to “Coding Protocol for Cross-National Dataset on Ethnic Parties” (Chandra 2004b). It closely mirrors that protocol, both in method and structure.

I. Summary Features of Dataset

Description: This project builds on the Cross-National Dataset on Ethnic Parties, a cross-national database that classifies political parties across the world as ethnic, multi-ethnic, and non-ethnic based on content analysis of election campaigns. The purpose of this project is to augment the Chandra dataset so that it can be used to test hypotheses about when and why parties mobilize along ethnic and/or economic lines. Thus, in an analogous manner, it classifies whether each political party also appeals to voters on an economic basis. The augmented dataset will classify each party based on the appeal or appeals that are central to its campaign, thus allowing parties to be classified, for instance, as both ethnic and economic. It will provide a snapshot in time of parties that competed in legislative elections held in 1996, or closest to that year but not after.

419 The last substantive update to this protocol was 24 July 2004. It thus reflects the coding procedures used for all of the economic party coding presented in this dissertation. It has been edited lightly here for clarity.
420 Of course, parties also might mobilize along bases that are neither ethnic nor economic. For instance, a party might be simply “pro-democracy.” For further discussion, See chapter 2.
Coverage: All democratic countries, measured as all countries that received LIEC scores in 1996 of 6 or 7 in Keefer’s dataset. (For further discussion, see Chandra 2004b.)

Method: I classify parties based on content analysis of election campaigns using materials collected and used in the three rounds of coding done for the Chandra Dataset. The materials used in each round include: (1) Europa World Yearbook 1996; (2) FBIS articles for all parties for the relevant election campaign; and (3) Political Handbook of the World, Lexis-Nexis articles, and a range of other sources. I use sources from each of the three rounds consecutively in the coding for each country, but I do not conduct separate rounds of coding. In other words, I complete the entire coding for each country using all sources and then move on to the next country.

II. Definitions

Definitions of ethnic group, ethnic party, multi-ethnic party, and non-ethnic party are given in Chandra 2004b. I adopt the same definitions here.

The coding of parties as ethnic and economic in this dataset is based on the groups that they explicitly seek to mobilize in their campaign messages and platforms. Because others adopt different definitions of ethnic and economic parties, there are a couple of key points to note about the method employed here. First, this classification is based on party message and platform, rather than on support base, organization, or the
identities of party leadership or personnel. This means, for instance, that a party described because of its support base as a “middle class party” in another project is not necessarily an economic party here. Similarly, a party described as a “Muslim party” because the majority of its members are Muslim would not necessarily be an ethnic party here.

Second, in classifying parties this project focuses on explicit message and platform, rather than on implicit or coded messages. This means that parties are not classified as appealing to particular groups unless these appeals are explicitly emphasized by the party; in other words, even if I know (or think) that the economic policies promoted by a party support particular economic groups, I would not code the party on this basis as economic. Among other reasons, this is because in many instances the effects of economic and other policies are uncertain with respect to various groups; even after these policies have been implemented and data has been collected, analysts debate their direct and indirect beneficiaries. The extensive literature on structural adjustment reforms provides a number of examples of this sort of complexity in assessing the winners and losers to specific policies. It is beyond the scope of this project to resolve these issues here for each country in the dataset. Assessing implicit target groups also becomes even more complicated when we take into account the overlap of groups. For instance, if an ethnic group is disproportionately represented among the business class like the Chinese in Malaysia, should a “pro-business” policy be taken to also be an implicit appeal to the Chinese community?

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421 Nevertheless, it is also important for this project to collect information on “issues,” including stances on economic policies, in order to think systematically about how implicit appeals might play in. The issues protocol describes how information was be collected on this. See Appendix B.
Third, this project gives most weight to what party leaders emphasize through their statements and speeches during election campaigns. This is measured by focusing on local and international news coverage of parties just before elections and supplemented by secondary source material. Unless written campaign manifestos are reported in the news, this project does not focus on them because the point is to capture what the party emphasizes to the public and manifestos often contain points that are not emphasized. This is a key difference with other party datasets like the Comparative Manifestos Project. For similar reasons, this project also does not classify parties based only on their membership in international party organizations or on party families.

Economic Groups

The definition of an economic group is analogous to that of an ethnic group as defined in the Chandra protocol. While an ethnic group is an “impersonal social category in which membership is determined by inherited attributes and which comprises a subgroup of a country’s population,” an economic group is an impersonal social category in which membership is determined by economic attributes and which comprises a subgroup of a country’s population.

The key distinction between an ethnic group and an economic group is the attributes that define membership. For ethnic groups, these are often physical and biological and are almost always inherited. By contrast, the key attributes that define
membership in an economic group describe material assets or attributes, such as income, wealth, land holdings, occupation, or industry. These attributes are, in many societies, difficult to change in one’s lifetime, but are not necessarily inherited.

Economic groups or categories can be organized along a variety of dimensions. The literature suggests that one of the most important for this project is class.\textsuperscript{422} Other dimensions include economic sector, occupation, and wealth.

\textbf{Economic Party}

An \textit{economic party} represents itself to voters as the champion of the interests of one economic group or set of economic groups to the exclusion of others, and makes such a representation central to its mobilizing strategy. The key aspects of this definition are:

\textsuperscript{422} The literature gives two reasons why separating out class might be particularly important. First, there are a variety of arguments about how class and ethnicity overlap, particularly in work that takes a neo-Marxist approach (see Hechter 1975, Hroch 2000; see also Horowitz 1985 and Bates 1974). Hypotheses from the literature about other types of economic groups are not as clear. Second, the literature offers hypotheses about how international events like the fall of the Soviet Union have affected the ability of parties to mobilize on class lines that do not pertain to their ability to mobilize along other economic lines. In order to take these variables into account and to examine these, it is important to be able to define and separate out class from other types of economic groups. The difficulty here is that class is understood in a variety of ways – in the Marxist sense in terms of the relationship to the means of production (for an operationalization of this, see Przeworski and Sprague 1986); as a category defined explicitly by such characteristics as occupation and educational background (sometimes in the census as, for instance, in the Philippines); as an economic category defined purely by relative wealth or income; or as a more ambiguously defined socio-economic category ("social class"), defined by such characteristics as language, accent, dress, and parents’ occupation and income. However, the hypotheses and literature mentioned above suggest that class in the Marxist sense is most relevant to this project. It is clear, for instance, that the fall of communism should affect “class” mobilization by communists, but not necessarily that it should affect the mobilization of “the middle class” by non-leftist parties. For this reason, this project focuses on class in the (loosely) Marxist sense.
• *Openness:* An economic group party *openly* identifies with the interests of one or more economic groups. It *explicitly* frames its message in this way. I do not collect data here on parties that send coded or implicit appeals to economic groups.

• *Exclusion:* An economic group party aligns itself with one or more economic groups and explicitly or implicitly *excludes* others.

• *Centrality:* An economic group party makes an appeal to economic interests central to its political platform. Even if it champions the interests of one economic group to the exclusion of others, it is not an economic group party if it does not make such championing central to its platform.

Note that this definition characterizes a party as an *economic party* even if it claims to speak for more than one economic group, so long as it does not speak for all economic groups on a given dimension. At first glance, it might seem that a party that speaks for several economic categories should be classified as a “multi-economic” party. This intuition is misleading for economic parties in much the same way as it is for ethnic parties because many supposedly “single” economic groups, if looked at closely, are amalgams of others. The category “teachers,” for instance, can be a conglomerate of the smaller categories, “university professors,” “secondary school teachers,” and “primary school teachers.” Indeed, economic parties that claim to speak on behalf of one economic group are often trying to unify several disparate economic groups under a broader heading. If we treat parties that mobilize multiple economic groups as multi-economic parties, then we would also need to determine for each country whether each economic group under discussion can be broken apart into smaller groups in order to
determine if economic parties that claim to speak for a single named economic group are really speaking for the multiple groups that make up this single economic group. Rather, multi-economic parties, like multi-ethnic parties, should be distinguished on another basis, as described below.

**Multi-economic Parties**

A multi-economic party is a party that makes an appeal related to economic groups central to its mobilizing strategy but assumes a position of neutrality/equidistance towards all relevant economic groups and does not exclude any relevant economic group from its appeal. For instance, in a society in which there were just two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing, a party whose central mobilizing strategy is to appeal *on the basis of sector* equally to both those working in agriculture and those working in manufacturing would be classified here as a multi-economic party. A party that appealed to everyone, but not on the basis of sector, would not be classified as a multi-economic party.

In order to determine whether or not parties should be coded as multi-economic or not and to collect information on how economic parties organized along different dimensions might act differently, information is collected on economic dimension. As a starting point in collecting information on this, this project will collect background information and notes about how to classify economic parties on the following dimensions: Class, Industry/sector, Occupation, Income, Wealth, and Other. Some
categories may potentially fall into multiple dimensions depending on the context. For instance, “the poor” might be discussed as a class by some, but as an income group by others. In choosing which dimension is most appropriate, this project relies on whether the party names a specific dimension and on context.  

III. Guidelines for Coding

The key principles of this project are the same as those in ethnic parties dataset. Economic coding is added to the Chandra spreadsheets in red. Although first, second, and third round sources are used, information is only added to the “Summary” and “Memo” worksheets. All information on parties is recorded on the Summary worksheet.

First Round Sources

The first round source is the Europa Yearbook for 1996, which provides a brief listing of facts for each party in the section on political parties and some more detailed information in the opening narrative section. It also provides basic statistics, which can be used in ascertaining the percentage of the population that target groups make up.

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423 With regard to class the working criteria are as follows: If an economic group with a class label (e.g., “workers,” “peasants,” “the poor,” “the landless,”) is discussed within the context of a class-based program or ideology, the group is classified as a class. For instance, if a “leftist” party appeals to “workers,” that would be understood here as a class appeal. In determining the sizes of each “target” class, the goal is to measure the size of the group described by the party. In most cases, however, party statements are not particularly specific about the characteristics of membership. Because I am focusing on classes in neo-Marxist sense then, the objective is to adopt a simpler version of Przeworski and Spague’s method, which categorizes occupational groups into classes. In many cases, however, because of data limitations, such fine-grained analysis will not be possible. In these cases, I will use the data available on class, however it is defined in the secondary source materials on that country.
As with ethnic parties, the first source of information for each party is its name. If an economic label/adjective appears in the name, then the party should be coded based on that label as economic. A second source of information is the brief description of each party given in the Europa section on parties.

A list of common names and labels and how they should be coded is included below. Terms in the first column explicitly identify a target economic group (e.g., workers, business, entrepreneurs) or explicitly identify an ideology that has a clear target economic group (e.g., Marxist-Leninist, Trotskyist). Terms in the third column explicitly identity a non-economic target group (e.g., an ethnic one like “immigrants” or “Arab”) or identify an ideology or party family that does not have a clear target economic group (e.g., Christian Democrat, right-wing).

The difficulty with such a list is that some of the “non-economic” terms listed below may be used to describe economic parties. Because this dataset relies on explicitness, however, these terms are treated as “non-economic” by name; in other words, they may suggest or imply economic target groups, but those groups are not explicit based on this label. Thus, when coding based on name, this list should be strictly followed. When coding based on platform, however, use this list as a guideline, but take context into account. If more than one term is included in a name, assume both labels are central. For instance, the “Czech Socialist Party” should be coded based on name as economic and as ethnic.
Names/Labels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Multi-economic</th>
<th>Non-economic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maoist</td>
<td>[No examples yet.</td>
<td>Arab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist</td>
<td>Probably most relevant to alliances of economic parties.</td>
<td>Immigrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxist-Leninist</td>
<td></td>
<td>Conservative*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td></td>
<td>Right-wing*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant</td>
<td></td>
<td>Christian Democratic*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Development*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trotskyist</td>
<td></td>
<td>Popular*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td></td>
<td>Liberal Democratic*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td></td>
<td>Libertarian*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castroite</td>
<td></td>
<td>Center-right*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Unionist</td>
<td></td>
<td>Neo-liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center-left</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitalist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next step is to review the narrative section of the *Europa* Yearbook. Add additional notes on divisions between economic groups, on economic divisions, and on the economic attributes of ethnic groups (e.g., the Chinese in Malaysia comprise two main economic groups, an urban commercial class and rural peasants).

**Coding using Second and Third Round Sources**

The source for the second round of coding is FBIS. A sample of articles for each party is included in the folder for each country in the dataset. Sampling guidelines are discussed in the Chandra proposal.

The following sources are used in the third round: *Political Handbook of the World*, international news articles from the Lexis-Nexis database, and other sources. Sampling procedures are discussed in the Chandra proposal. Copies of all materials are in the files for the ethnic parties database.
Classify parties based on the central issues in their platforms. Note that each party may have multiple classifications – e.g., as ethnic and economic, or as multiethnic and economic, and so on.
APPENDIX B

PROTOCOL FOR CODING OF ISSUES

Rachel Giselquist and Kanchan Chandra

This protocol is an addendum to “Coding Protocol for Cross-National Dataset on Ethnic Parties” (Chandra 2004b). It closely mirrors that protocol, both in method and structure.

I. Summary Features of Dataset

Description: This project builds on Chandra’s Cross-National Dataset on Ethnic Parties, a cross-national database that classifies political parties across the world as ethnic, multi-ethnic, and non-ethnic based on content analysis of election campaigns. The purpose of this project is to augment the Chandra dataset so that it can be used to test hypotheses about when and why parties mobilize along ethnic and/or economic lines or something else. It will be used in conjunction with coding on whether each party also appeals to voters on an economic basis (described in “Protocol for Coding of Economic Parties”).

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424 The last substantive update to this protocol was 24 July 2004. It thus reflects the coding procedures used for all of the issue coding. It has been edited lightly here for clarity.

425 It also builds on issue coding done for Indian political parties connected to early versions of the CDEI (see also Chandra 2001b).
The first purpose of the additional set of variables described here is to collect information that will be used to assess the differences in the messages of parties that appeal to ethnic groups as compared to those that appeal to economic groups. This is important because one of the key hypotheses of this project is that the issues emphasized by both ethnic and economic parties are, on average, similar and that it is some other variables beyond concern with “ethnic” or “material” issues that are affecting party mobilization strategies – i.e., ethnic parties do not necessarily become successful because voters come to care more about “ethnic” issues; they may care about material issues, but be mobilized in ethnic terms.

A second purpose of this additional set of variables is to collect information on economic positions taken by parties that might be used to determine whether parties make implicit appeals to economic groups not captured in the coding of explicit appeals described in the “Protocol for Coding of Economic Parties.” Such appeals seem to be important in the elections and set of countries under study. Preliminary research for this project suggests that parties often do not make explicit appeals to economic groups, but rather that, through their economic platforms, they appeal implicitly to groups that believe that they will be economic winners or losers under different governments. By only collecting information on explicit economic appeals by parties and not on issues, I would fail to capture these dynamics.

Coverage: All democratic countries, measured as all countries that received LIEC scores in 1996 of 6 or 7 in Keefer’s dataset. (For further discussion, see Chandra 2004b.)
Method: I classify parties based on content analysis of election campaigns using materials collected and used in the three rounds of coding done for the Chandra Dataset. The materials used in each round include: (1) Europa World Yearbook 1996; (2) FBIS articles for all parties for the relevant election campaign; and (3) Political Handbook of the World, Lexis-Nexis articles, and a range of other sources. I use sources from each of the three rounds consecutively in the coding for each country, but I do not conduct separate rounds of coding. In other words, I complete the entire coding for each country using all sources and then move on to the next country.

II. Definitions

Issues and Central Issues

An issue is defined as a statement or policy stance upon which a party appeals to voters. This project focuses on central issues. Central issues are those that the party says are central or that are mentioned frequently. The point of focusing on central issues is not to be picky about the degree of centrality, but to exclude issues that a party clearly does not think important overall. These include topics mentioned once in response to interview prompting and issues mentioned briefly in long party manifestos that are never discussed by party representatives in speeches or interviews.
An issue can be general (e.g., “we support workers”) or specific (e.g., “we will hold a national conference of the following trades unions on July 25th…”).

Types of Issues: Material, Political, Cultural, and “Other”

In testing when and why parties mobilize and/or ethnic versus economic lines, it is useful to know exactly how ethnic versus economic parties are different, if at all, in terms of the issues that they emphasize in their platforms. An important assumption in some of the literature is that ethnic parties champion “ethnic” issues that are often seen as synonymous with “tradition” and “culture.” If this is true, surely one reason that parties mobilize along ethnic rather than economic lines is that these sorts of cultural issues are more important to party elites and members than “material” issues.

In order to test hypotheses about how the types of issues that parties advocate affect who they mobilize, this project distinguishes among material, political, cultural, and “other” types of issues.

Material issues are defined here as those related primarily to material assets or opportunity, such as jobs, scholarships, public services, infrastructure projects, contracts, and bribes. Political issues are those related primarily to political rights, the political system, relative power of different actors in the system, or the state bureaucracy. Typical examples include democracy, representation, changes to the electoral system, constitutional reform, and good governance or corruption. Cultural issues are those
related to the culture or traditions of a group, including language rights, use of a particular flag, dress, or religious practice. "Other" issues are those that are not primarily material, political, or cultural, such as environmentalism, women’s rights, or ideologies that do not advocate any specific material, political or cultural issues.

Many issues fall into more than one camp; they can be material, political, cultural, and other, or some combination. A key example is land, which might have cultural significance as a group’s homeland, material significance to a group’s livelihood, political significance in terms of demands for national independence or territorial autonomy, and significance in terms of environmental concerns. In such cases, framing is important in determining what type of issue it most is and whether material, political, cultural, or other aspects are stressed.

II. Guidelines for Coding

The key principles of this project are the same as those in the ethnic parties dataset. Economic coding is added to the Chandra spreadsheets in red. Although first, second, and third round sources are used, information is only added to the “Summary” and “Memo” worksheets. All information on parties is recorded on the Summary worksheet.

The objective here is first to develop a comprehensive list of the issues emphasized by each party, and second to classify what type of issues these are.
How to Determine What the Issues Are

If the descriptions of parties entered on the standard Phase I, II, and III codesheets are detailed and complete, coding may be done on the basis of the codesheets. In some cases, however, coders have focused their descriptions on ethnic topics only, so party descriptions need to be redone. As with the ethnic parties coding, the first source of information for each party is its name. The second source of information is the brief description of each party given in the Europa Yearbook for 1996. More important and detailed information on issues, however, is usually from the second and third round coding sources.

Based on the party descriptions in each round of coding, list all issues brought up by each party in the “issues” column on the codesheet. In listing issues, note the following guidelines:

1. If you are unsure if a topic qualifies as a “central issue,” enter it. The point here is not to be picky about how central the issues are, but to exclude issues that are obviously not at all important.

2. Try to enter the most important issues first, but do not worry about a careful rank ordering. If you know that one or a few issues are most central, make a quick

426 This ended up being true in most cases.
note of this in parentheses (e.g., “lower taxation (most important”)”) and underline it.

3. Enter as disaggregated a list as possible, but do not worry about numbers, dates, timelines, percentages, or names, unless political debate hinges on them. For instance, list “lower taxes to help the middle class,” rather than “standard social democratic economic policies.” The point is to record enough information about the issue and its framing that this list can be used (1) to classify issues as material, political, cultural, etc. and (2) to aid in the classification of parties as economic, multi-economic, and non-economic (see Appendix A).

4. Do not worry about repetition and overlap of issues. In other words, the following listing for the United Republican Party in Guyana is fine: “1) ‘right wing’ issues (probably in terms of economic policy); 2) free enterprise economy; 3) federal government; 4) increase production and export by removing duties on manufacturing for export.”

5. Do not impute issues based on ideology, party family, or membership in international party organizations. For instance, if all we know about a party is that it is “Communist,” list “unspecified ‘Communist’ issues.” Do not list specific issues generally associated with Communist parties or ideology. Even if information about ideology, party family, and membership in international organizations can be helpful in understanding party messages, it is a highly
imperfect guide to the issues that parties emphasize in elections. If such imputations and hypotheses are recorded here, it will be difficult at a later stage for those checking or using the data to distinguish between what is actually in the data and your hypotheses.

6. Do not worry about the quality of the issues. If an issue deals more with personalities than policy, or seems silly or frivolous, record it anyway. The goal is to describe the party’s platform and message as accurately as possible, not to evaluate it. Likewise, if a party’s issues seem contradictory, do not edit them to make sense.\footnote{The one exception is if you are quite sure that issues have been misreported or that there is a typographical error in the coverage.}

7. Note, however, that the details of intra- and inter-party politics can generally be excluded from the list of issues. The exception is when party members make statements on this basis that are relevant to voters. For instance, “party leaders say Mr. X is dismissed” would not be an issue, but “party leaders say Mr. X is dismissed from the party because his racist statements run counter to the party’s support for multiculturalism” is. Some issues are tricky. For instance, if a party is accused of being divided, disorganized, and therefore unable to get things done if elected, it might respond by emphasizing that it has no such disputes, suggesting to voters that it actually will be effective. In this case, its “efficacy” would be the issue. As in borderline cases like this one, if you are unsure if something qualifies as an issue, include it.
How to Classify Issues

After completing the issues column, in the next column, classify each of these issues, by number, as “material”, “political,” “cultural”, “other,” or some combination of these. For instance, if the issues column includes the following entry: “1) lower taxation (most important); 2) will increase public service jobs; 3) advocates use of Aymara language in schools,” the entry in the following column would be something like “1) material; 2) material; 3) cultural.”

A list of common terms and how they would generally be coded is included below. This is intended as a guideline. Also pay attention to context. For instance, if a party advocates “the eradication of taxes” purely because taxation is “against its group’s culture,” this issue should be classified as cultural, not material. Likewise, if the issue of land rights is discussed purely in terms of livelihood and income, it should be classified as material only.

Classification of Key Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Material Issues</th>
<th>Political Issues</th>
<th>Cultural Issues</th>
<th>Issues that can be material, political, and cultural, or some mix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>Representation</td>
<td>Language rights</td>
<td>Land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>Religious practice</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public services</td>
<td>Electoral system</td>
<td>Religious freedom</td>
<td>Nationhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure projects</td>
<td>Constitutional change</td>
<td>Dress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bribes</td>
<td></td>
<td>State religion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic equality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty eradication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living standards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Once an issue is classified, the next step is to create a summary coding of the types of issues discussed by each party and to record a justification for that coding. This is done by recording in fractional terms the coder’s assessment of how material, political, cultural, or “other” the party’s central issues are overall. A column for each type is included on the spreadsheet. These values entered in these four columns should sum to 1.

In cases where all issues that the party brings up fall into one type, obviously code the party accordingly. In most cases, however, classification will require some judgment by the coder. The coder should take into account (1) what issues are most central to the party’s message and (2) the numerical balance of material to political to cultural to other issues.

Suppose that all we know about a party is that it demands “land rights for the indigenous.” The overall coding for this party’s issues would be 0.25 material; 0.25 political; 0.25 cultural; and 0.25 other because this is the only issue the party discusses and we have no further information on how the issue is framed. On the other hand, suppose the party discusses “alleviating poverty by giving the indigenous ownership of their land.” Here, the focus is on the material aspects of land rights. The overall coding for this party’s issues could be material=1 (i.e., 100% material).

The purpose of recording this information in fractional terms is to make using the data easier. These columns will give us a sense of whether parties pay roughly equal attention, for instance, to material and political issues and no attention to cultural issues,
or vice versa. The numbers are intended to be very rough estimates – i.e., the difference between 0.25 and 0.50 matters, but the difference between 0.25 and 0.35 generally does not.

Finally, complete the memo.
APPENDIX C

CLASSIFICATION OF LATIN AMERICAN PARTIES

The tables in this section describe the classifications of ethnic-mobilizing, economic-mobilizing, and class-mobilizing/leftist parties in the CDEI 2005 data, based on the core coding protocol and the protocols developed for this dissertation and included under Appendix A and B.

Table C.1: Ethnic-Mobilizing Parties in the CDEI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Vote Share</th>
<th>Basis of Classification</th>
<th>Certainty of Platform Coding (1-3)</th>
<th>Explicit Target Group(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario-Movimiento Revolucionario Tupaj Katari-Liberación (MNR-MRTKL)</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>Name Only (Platform coding is non-ethnic)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Indigenous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Conciencia de Patria</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>Platform</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>“Cholos” and indios/Indians/Indigenous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Alianza de Renovación Boliviana</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>Platform</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Evangelical Protestants</td>
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<td>Eje Patriótico</td>
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<td>0.8%</td>
<td>Name and Platform</td>
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<td>Indians/indigenous (especially from Highlands)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Acción Agrícola Cartaginense</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>Name and Platform</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>People from Cartago</td>
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</table>

428 The platform coding for the MRTKL is ethnic. The MNR’s platform coding is non-ethnic. Because the MNR is clearly the dominant partner in this coalition, the overall platform coding for the MNR-MRTKL is non-ethnic. For further discussion of the party’s platform in this election, see Chapters 5 and 6.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party/Movement</th>
<th>% Share</th>
<th>Platform</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Frente Republicana Guatemalteca</td>
<td>21%</td>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
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<td>9.1%</td>
<td>Platform</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.2%</td>
<td>Platform</td>
<td>Indigenous, “cholos” and mestizos (i.e., those not white)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Movimiento Independiente Inca</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>Name</td>
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<td>Basis of Classification</td>
<td>Certainty of Platform Coding (1-3)</td>
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<td>Name</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<td>0.8%</td>
<td>Name and Platform</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB)</td>
<td>20.32%</td>
<td>Platform</td>
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<td>13.9%</td>
<td>Name and Platform</td>
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<td>Name and Platform</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Party Name</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Platform</td>
<td>Name and Sectors of Society</td>
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<td>Concertación de los Partidos de la Democracia</td>
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<td>working class</td>
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<td>La Nueva Izquierda</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>working class</td>
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<td>21.4%</td>
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<td>9.1%</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Party Name</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Platform</td>
<td>Base</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Partido de la Revolución Democrática</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>Platform</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Partido del Trabajo</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstrucción Nacional</td>
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<td>Name</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Partido Popular Socialista</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>Name</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Panama</td>
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<td>4.2%</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Izquierda Unida</td>
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<td>Platform</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<td>0.8%</td>
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<td>Uruguay</td>
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</table>

429 Addition to the CDEI based on comments from Chappell Lawson. Regional bases are not noted here because they are not explicitly ethnic or economic by our criteria.

395
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>Basis of Classification</th>
<th>Certainty of Platform Coding (1-3)</th>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>Vanguardia Revolucionaria 9 de Abril (VR-9)</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>working class</td>
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<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Izquierda Unida</td>
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<td>Name and Platform</td>
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<td>working class</td>
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<td>Movimiento Katarista Nacional</td>
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<td>Name and Platform</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>working class</td>
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<td>working class</td>
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<td>Working class</td>
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<td>Working class</td>
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<td>Working class</td>
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<td>Working class</td>
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<td>Working class</td>
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<td>55.4%</td>
<td>Name and Platform</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>Working class</td>
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<td>Name and Platform</td>
<td>Working class</td>
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<td>Name and Platform 3 workers, small and medium enterprises, cooperatives, the informal sector</td>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
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<td>Platform 2 peasants and unions, as well as university students and professionals</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Partido del Frente Cardenista de Reconstrucción Nacional</td>
<td>Name and Platform 1 the poor, especially in rural areas</td>
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<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Partido Popular Socialista</td>
<td>Name n/a working class</td>
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<td>Partido Democrática Mexicano-Unión Nacional Opositora</td>
<td>Platform 1 rural poor, rural peasants</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional</td>
<td>Name and Platform 2 peasants and workers</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>Izquierda Unida</td>
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<td>Frente Popular Agrícola -- FIA del Perú</td>
<td>Name n/a Agriculture</td>
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<td>Frente Amplio</td>
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<td>Partido de los Trabajadores</td>
<td>Name and Platform 1 workers/workers/working class</td>
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<td>Causa Radical</td>
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<td>Movimiento al Socialismo</td>
<td>Name and Platform 1 workers</td>
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423


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