Will to War, Will to Art: **Cultural Internationalism and the Modernist Aesthetics of** Monuments 1932-1964

by

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M.Arch., Harvard University, 2001 B.S., Civil Engineering, Princeton University, 1996

Submitted to the Department of Architecture in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture: History and Theory of Architecture

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Abstract

This dissertation examines a period around World War II when the prospect of widespread destruction provoked a profound re-evaluation of Europe's landmarks, their material value, and their ethical significance. Between 1932 and 1964, works once known as artistic and historic monuments—from buildings to bridges, paintings to shrines, ruins to colossi—acquired a "cultural" value as belonging to the "universal heritage of mankind." Promoted as didactic objects of international understanding, they became subjects of a new brand of international law. I trace the origins of this international valuation to a political movement, identified as Cultural Internationalism, whose main tenet was that the transnational circulation of knowledge constitutes an antidote to war. This ideal fueled the birth of organizations that brandished the autonomy of intellectual work as a weapon against nationalisms: most visibly, the League of Nations' Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle (IICI, 1924-1941), its successor the United Nations Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization (UNESCO, 1946-), and the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic Monuments in War Area (Roberts Commission, 1943-46). Despite the continued role of this institutional lineage in cultural production worldwide, there has not been a study of its contribution to 20th-Century aesthetics. The dissertation explores the modernist aesthetics of monuments that arose from this milieu and unfolded in three related fields: the bombed cities of the Allies' war, the architecture of the European reconstruction, and the heritage missions of the decolonization. A broad network of intellectuals, art historians, architects, and archaeologists was enlisted to show that monuments gave iconic weight to cultural autonomy in a new world order. I follow these experts' attempts to effect this autonomy: working in conferences and as field experts, spawning an intricate network of civilian and military committees, caring for a growing collection of monuments, and encountering the shifting winds of a massive geo-political realignment.

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opportunity to present and discuss portions and versions of this work to a range of more or less benevolent listeners. For their critiques, suggestions, and encouragements, I wish to thank Beatriz Colomina, Peter Galison, Michael-Ann Holly, Tom Keenan, Rem Koolhaas, Bruno Latour, Reinhold Martin, Juliana Maxim, Jorge Otero-Pailos, Michael Rock, Felicity Scott, and Bob Somol. Any misunderstanding about what they meant is purely my own.

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Index of Acronyms

AAM: American Association of Museums

ACLS: American Council of Learned Societies

ACRIM: American Commission for the Restoration of Italian Monuments

ADHG: American Defense-Harvard Group AMG: American Military Government

CAA: College Art Association

CDEA: International Center for Information on Egypt CIAM: International Congress of Modern Architects CIC: Comité International de Coopération Intellectuelle

CRAR: Committee for the Recovery of Archaeological Remains

EER: Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg für die Besetzen Gebiete

IBRD: International Bank of Reconstruction and Development

ICCROM: International Center for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments

ICOM: International Council of Museums

ICOMOS: International Council of Monuments and Sites IICI: Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle

ILO: International Labor Organization ISC: International Studies Conference

IUCN: International Union for the Conservation of Nature

MESC: Middle East Supply Center

MFA&A: Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Division

MonCom: Monuments Committee of Unesco

OIM: Office International des Musées

OIHAA: Office International des Instituts d'Histoire de l'Art et d'Archéologie

RAF: Royal Air Force

SAH: Society of Architectural Historians

TVA: Tenessee Valley Authority UAR: United Arab Republic

UN: United Nations Organization

UNCASTD: United Nations Conference on Application of Science and Technology to Development

Unesco: United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization

USAF: United States Air Force

USAID: United States Agency of Aid and International Development

USSBS: United States Strategic Bombing Survey

Introduction

It is difficult, in these solemn milieux, to speak of these great works aloud. Yet it is done, and with success. Henri Focillon, Report to the OIM, 1927

If we have to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our own men, then our men's lives count infinitely more and the buildings must go. But the choice is not always so clear-cut as that.²

-Dwight Eisenhower, Letter to All Air Force Commanders, 1944

Why not face the truth? Life would be a good deal easier for many people if there were no old buildings.³

—Editorial, The Unesco Courier, 1954

It is not easy to choose between temples and crops. I would be sorry for any man called on to make a choice who could do so without a feeling of despair.⁴

-Vittorino Veronese, World Appeal to Member-States, 1960

A dual line of enquiry was forced upon mid-twentieth-century political agents—from idealist intellectuals in the 1930s to international bureaucrats in the 1950s, from the Allied Air Forces in 1944 to Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1960—as they faced the prospect of widespread destruction: aesthetically, what is a monument worth saving, and ethically, when is it worth saving? Consistently, these authorities sought to mitigate the choice between "famous buildings" and "men's lives;" consistently, they argued that saved monuments should become emblems of lives spared. This dissertation is about the collection of monuments and the network of experts that made this mitigation possible. The monuments: a worldwide collection of landmarks once known as "artistic and historic monuments," from building to bridges, paintings to shrines, ruins to colossi, that acquired over the span of three decades a "cultural" value as belonging to the "universal heritage of mankind." Promoted as objects of international understanding, they became subjects of a new brand of international law. The experts: a broad network of thinkers concerned with aesthetic autonomy, art historians, archaeologists, museum directors and architects who became involved in the political

¹ Henri Focillon, cited in Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, Cahiers des Relations Artistiques: La Coopération Intellectuelle et les Beaux-Arts (Paris: PUF, 1927), 8. This and all subsequent translations in the dissertation are by the author, unless otherwise noted.

² Dwight Eisenhower, Letter to All US Air Force Commanders, May 26th, 1944, cited in Final Report of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Monuments in War Areas (Washington: 1946).

³ Editorial, "To save our heritage in stone," The Unesco Courier VII/6 (Nov 1954), 3.

⁴ Vittorino Veronese, "Unesco Launches a World Appeal", reprinted in Unesco Courier (May 1960), 6.

movement for "intellectual cooperation", creating an intricate series of committees within international bureaucracies from the League of Nations, to the Allied Military Government (AMG), and the United Nations Cultural, Educational and Scientific Organization (Unesco)⁵. Despite the continuing role of this institutional lineage in cultural production worldwide, there has not been a study of its contribution to 20th-Century aesthetics. The aim of the dissertation is therefore double: historically, to chronicle the untold story of these monuments and the role they played in mid-20th-Century international events; theoretically, to distill the theory of aesthetic value that was devised by these experts, in the face of a growing ethical imbalance between the value of preserving civilizations and the value of sparing lives. The dissertation argues a "modernist aesthetics of monuments" emerged the projects and debates of this period, and provides a critical study of the underlying relationship between politics and space. As such, it is intended as a contribution to aesthetic theory, to international heritage discourse, to European cultural history, and to the historiography of art and architecture.

The dissertation is meant to fill a gap in histories of international heritage and preservation, wherein the 1932 Athens Conference (for the Conservation of Artistic and Historic Monuments) was a landmark of internationalization, and the 1964 Venice Charter (for the Conservation and Preservation of Monuments and Sites) marked a neat passage from the preservation of objects to the conservation of environments. I span the projects and debates between these two events—decades when preservationist impulses are usually described as wholly foiled by the destructive forces of modernism, war, and modernization, not to be recovered until the postmodern historicism of later decades. Instead, I argue that it was precisely in contact with the institutions of war, the discourses of modernism, and techniques of modernization that monuments became modern international objects, because those institutions, discourses, and techniques paradoxically granted their autonomy a political use-value within an system of governance.

Françoise Choay's 1992 L'Allégorie du Patrimoine, translated in 2001 as The Invention of the Historic Monument, remains the most comprehensive intellectual history of the modern European monument, notable for gathering conservation, preservation, urban and architectural discourses into one sweep. The Getty Center's 1996 Historical and Philosophical Issues in the Conservation of Cultural Heritage inaugurated a wave of renewed interest on the part of art institutions, which has only intensified in light of recent restitution controversies. On the architectural side, Wim Denslagen's 1992 Architectural Restoration in

⁵ There are two naming conventions for the organization; for reasons of legibility I have adapted the more recent one which treats it like a proper noun (Unesco) rather than an acronym (UNESCO).

Western Europe surveyed the debates that led to the patrimonial policies of the 19th Century, but stopped short of 20th Century developments. While this literature depicts the mid-century as a cohesive period when monuments acquired an international value and "European architecture" emerged as a single cultural referent, these remain abstract notions, without any historical reality.

The challenge in narrating this international phenomenon lies partly in reconciling the prominence of French institutions (of which Unesco's Paris location is a reminder), the prevalence of German theorizations (evidenced by the ubiquity of Alois Riegl's 1903 essay Moderne Denkmalkultus), and Italy's dominance in the realm of technique (confirmed in recent translation of Cesare Brandi's 1963 Teoria del Restauro.) I address these competing traditions as parallel strands in a single institutional history, whose coexistence was facilitated both by the ideological vagueness of "intellectual cooperation" and by the tendency of bureaucratic formations to adhere to existing structures of expertise. For example, I show that the legal concept of "cultural heritage" was designed not only to diffuse conflicts between nations but also to dissimulate tensions between national and international interests, nesting them temporarily into one-other. Thus, rather than seeing the postwar teleologically as the progressive enlargement of a single protective trend culminating in the 1972 World Heritage convention, I show that international bureaucracies have normalized standards of "protection" that were elaborated in exceptionalist terms.

The international charters and conventions that punctuate this history continue to be invoked as if they belonged to a higher realm of history, detached from conservation practices yet valid as expressions of international moral consensus. This pattern owes much to the way monuments entered the international political order in the early decades of the century: through a scholarly appeal to Geistesgechichte on the one hand, and an alliance with idealist League politics on the other. As an intellectual history, the dissertation aims to restore these charters into the institutional history of the so-called "bureaucratization of world politics," recently described in a substantial theoretical corpus on the growth of international organizations, throughout the century, as "providers of norms." My basic historical argument vis-à-vis this "constructionist" approach to organizations is that the role assigned to art and architecture within these institutions can only be understood in light of the weight that was placed on idealist "representation" in the rhetoric of the "new diplomacy" and its corollary, "total war." War served as a crucial catalyst for bringing aesthetic notions into

⁶ This confirms the hypothesis put forth in John Merryman's now seminal "Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property," *American Journal of International Law*, (Oct 1986), 831-953.

⁷ See the issue of the Getty Conservation Institute Newsletter, "On heritage charters and conventions," (2004), v.19, n.2.

⁸ The phrase was coined by Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).

political representation. But even war is an international diplomatic event that belongs in a continuum of cooperation. I take the material on monuments produced by these institutions between 1932 and 1964 as one continuous bureaucratic archive. My research strategy has been to treat prewar, wartime, and postwar material as one continuous and cohesive literature, which produced a coherent aesthetic discourse. This strategy is certainly vindicated by the impressively long and diverse roster of luminaries that can be found in these archives: from theorizers of conservation (Gustavo Giovanoni, WG Constable, Pietro Gazzola) to original founders of modern architectural history (Henri Focillon, Erwin Panofsky, Giulio Carlo Argan), from influential cultural figures (Julian Huxley, Paul Sachs, André Malraux) to luminary intellectuals whose work marked the century (Henri Bergson, Sigmund Freud, Claude Lévi-Strauss). All of these figures' contribution to intellectual cooperation is usually treated as contingent to their main theoretical œuvre. In contrast I argue that the aesthetics of this intellectual milieu resides not only in its declarative statements but also in the collaborative network itself, which allowed competing philosophical ambitions to coexist in a single institutional framework, creating a pattern of ethical slippages between disciplines.

What the dissertation does not offer is a genealogical picking-apart of the philosophical origins of the concept of "the cultural heritage of mankind." Any conceptual clarity that was built into this formulation in the late 1920s was completely undermined by the project of intellectual cooperation, and its compulsion to separation of "concrete action" and "abstract agreement." In order to conduct a history of the institution without inheriting its philosophical confusion, I confine my intellectual history to art and architecture, recalling appeals to various philosophical traditions only as I encounter them within these disciplinary boundaries. For example—and it is the crucial one—the meaning of the word "culture" remained a source of heated disagreement and endless debate even as it became the primary rallying point for Unesco to mobilize intellectuals against nationalism. By the time "cultural internationalism" became a legitimate mode of international political action in the 1960s, "culture" was no less in crisis than the "intellectual" had been during the days of "intellectual cooperation" in the 1930s. But the crucial support for the notions of autonomy, agreement, and dissemination that were needed to sustain this institutional formation had shifted: from individuals to institutions, and from people to monuments. For this reason, I look at "monuments" to find out what was meant by "culture," not the other way around.

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⁹ For the philosophers, see H. Stuart Hughes, The Sea Change (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975) and The Obstructed Path 1930-1960 (New York: Harper & Row, 1968) and François Dosse, Histoire du Structuralisme, (Paris: Seuil, 1992).

The role played by modern institutions in shaping built environments and cultural canons has been studied extensively in the national and colonial contexts of the long 19th Century. Building on this history, I trace the revival of this "World History" in the 20th century, and the iconic role played by art and architecture in shaping it. The dissertation describes how this canon was effected, in spatial and historiographic terms. For example, saving Nubia's monuments required archaeologists to re-inscribe Nubia into a proto-internationalist history of Africa, while architects constructed an "aesthetic analogy" between the Egyptian desert and Western museum environments. The goal is to show that apparently heterogeneous discourses were based on the same territorial paradigm, where culture is a spatial value that can be "concentrated" and "disseminated" according to very specific territorial, urban and architectural principles.

The primary disciplinary motive behind this work is to complicate the role played by World War II in art- and architectural historiography. Architectural historians have only recently begun to mitigate the traditional division of the 20th Century into the prewar (European) experiments of modernism and the postwar (American) triumph of the International Style. 10 No longer a simple epistemological break, the mid-century period is now understood as a "crisis of representation" that prefigured the "waning" of architecture's symbolic power in the postwar. 11 Monuments, however, remain conspicuously absent from this new historiography, despite its avowed goal of bridging between the pre-war "Monumental Era" and the postwar "monumentalizations" of the modern masters.¹² By taking monuments as protagonists, the dissertation sheds light on their position as disciplinary catalysts—for example, as the literal and figurative "elephants in the room" of the European reconstruction, crucial anchors around which modernist urban schemes were composed. More generally, I argue that their exclusion from modern architectural discourse did not actually deprive monuments of their modernism. While architects were busy ignoring, rejecting, or emulating them, the monuments of architectural history underwent their own modern movement, at the hands of an entirely different set of international actors. Like its architectural counterpart, this monumental modernism was made of manifestos, experiments, and polemical debates. While its primary gesture was destructive, it was still conceived as a spatial imaginary produced through

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¹⁰ Siegfried Giedion inaugurated this division in the 1943 Space, Time and Architecture.

[&]quot;Kenneth Frampton's Modern Architecture was the first survey to span the war more than once. Its regionalist project was taken up in Sarah Goldhagen's Anxious Modernisms (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002). See also the timid re-periodization of Joan Ockman's Architecture Culture 1943-1968.

¹² Franco Borsi, The Monumental Era: European Architecture and Design 1929-1939 (Paris: Hazan, 1986); and Frampton "Le Corbusier and the Monumentalization of the Vernacular," and "Mies van der Rohe and the Monumentalization of Technique," in Modern Architecture.

legible aesthetic tropes: maintenance and removal, emptying and concentration, integration and proportion. These tropes constitute what I call "the modernist aesthetics of monuments."

The dissertation is structured around four episodes when political authority and academic expertise converged. Chapters 1 and 3 are fragments of institutional history; Chapters 2 and 4 are case-studies. Chapter 1 chronicles the work of the committees devoted to "The Arts and Letter" within the League of Nations' Committee for Intellectual Cooperation (CIC) between 1932 and 1941. This discourse, and the collaborative networks inaugurated by art historians like Henri Focillon, constructed a "politics of form" to relate the aesthetic autonomy of art (as moved by a "will to art") into a politically useful international solidarity (to curtail the progress of the "will to war"). Chapter 2 examines how this project was taken up and transformed during the war, by looking at the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Monuments in War Areas (Roberts Commission). Formed in late 1942 and dissolved in 1946, this group of American art historians staged a fortuitous encounter between the aesthetics of art history and the ethics of psychological warfare, compiling lists and maps of monuments "not to be bombed" by Allied Air Forces in what was eventually seen as "an unwitting city planning program" over Europe. Chapter 3 examines the first ten years of Unesco's work on Monuments by analyzing the urban, architectural and curatorial principles that were disseminated through the Museums and Monuments manuals between 1949 and 1960, in an effort to render all cultural institutions into active agents of international understanding. Echoed in the collaborative design of UNESCO's Paris headquarters, these principles proved equally valid for keepers of ancient monuments and builders of new ones. The last chapter looks at the massive International Campaign to Salvage the Monuments of Nubia that was launched by Unesco in 1959 to salvage and disperse the monuments threatened by the Soviet-funded Aswan High Dam. Under the guise of creating a "purely cultural" category of inter-governmental action, Unesco revived colonial channels of archaeological exchange, and helped to shape the Nubian desert into "the greatest open-air museum in the world."

I have treated these chapters as discreet historical frames, traversed by a single institutional lineage. This case-study method has allowed me to delimit research fields and isolate historical questions: why did each convergence between politics and aesthetics occur; what allowed disciplinary ambitions and mechanisms of power to intersect; how were conditions created, in each context, for operating under "exceptional" collaborative measures? Yet in each case, my research has led to the normative function of exception. "Monuments," in this dissertation, are objects that transformed exceptional (catastrophic, sublime, unique, auratic, etc.) value into cultural norm.



Will to War, Will to Art

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Chapter 1

Will to War, Will to Art Intellectual Cooperation and the Autonomy of the Arts, 1932-1941

The failure of the League of Nations to prevent war, and the extent to which the United Nations overcame or inherited this failure, constitutes one of the central problematics of 20th century international theory. The main participants in this debate have long shed the ideological labels that were assigned to them in the 1930s, when "realists" warned that any attempt to supercede international anarchy with supra-national institutions was doomed to failure, while "idealists" argued that the problem of the League was in its implementation, not in the principle, of permanent international organizations devoted to "perpetuating peace." The debate continues today, albeit in revised terms. All, however, agree on one point of history: despite the differences in the structure, covenants, and membership of the League and the UN, the style of diplomacy that was inaugurated in 1919 was largely validated in 1945, and this "new diplomacy" remains dominant today. Any student of international theory would therefore have detected a familiar pattern in the rhetoric that surrounded the recent unearthing of a five-hundred page tome, containing the proceedings of the first international conference on "historic and artistic conservation of monuments," now known as "The Athens Conference," which was organized by the League of Nations in 1931:

¹ The distinction was first made by EH Carr, who published Twenty Years' Crisis in 1939, in an attempt to constitute "International Studies" as a new discipline, based on analyzing the interwar as a play between "Utopia and Reality." Each side was assigned a distinguished lineage of precedents in moral and political philosophy. The realists were essentially Hobbesian; the idealists were Benthamites. For a second-generation critical summary, including how international theory became a social science in the postwar, see Hedley Bull's 1969 "The Theory of International Politics 1919-1969), in James Der Derian, ed., International Theory: Critical Investigations (New York: NYU, 1995), 181-211. This debate was recently rehearsed in Daedalus: The Challenge of Global Justice Now, V. 132, No. 1 (Winter 2003) with Jack Goldsmith and Stephen D. Krasner expounding "The Limits of Idealism" against Stanley Hoffman's case for "World Governance: Beyond Utopia." For two attempts to sort out the two theoretical camps, see David Long and Peter Wilson, Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Interwar Idealism Re-Assessed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

² In Imperialism and Internationalism in the Discipline of International Relations (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005) David Long and Brian C. Schmidt argue that the "first debate" of IR was a "myth" and that the stakes of the League are better understood by reading them as concealed debates between a set of Oxford-trained thinkers whose concerns were really between "imperialism" and "internationalism."

³ "The United Nations, in its essentials, was seen as an improved League, rather than a departure from it." For a succinct account of why "the failure of the League did not doom the whole process of international organization" see David Armstrong, The Rise of the International Organization: A Short History (New York: St Martin's, 1982), 48. For more technical discussion of the actual passage of power from League of Nations to UN, see Victor-Yves Ghebali, "La transition de la Société des Nations à l'Organisation des Nations Unies," in The League of Nations In Retrospect (Berlin: Waalter de Gruyter, 1983). For a war-time critique of the League that recommends modification into the UN, see Dell Htichner, "The Failure of the League: Lesson in Public Relations." Public Opinion Quarterly, (Spring 1944), 61-71.

In 1931, the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations organized the first international conference on the "artistic and historic conservation of monuments" in Athens. The following year, the conference's agenda and conclusions, the common resolution of the 118 participants (from 16 countries, all European), as well as the individual contributions of 51 speakers, were published in a single document.

This collection—now a rarity—is a landmark in the history of the conservation and protection of built heritage. Direct source of the Venice Charter (1964), it remains largely unknown, even in professional circles where constant reference to it is nonetheless made, with much approximation and under the name "Athens Charter."

The Athens Conference closed an era when the great monuments of art and history were conserved museologically for the sake of an aristocratic European elite, and opened the field to new lines of questioning. For the first time, historic monuments were evoked in terms of the "artistic and archaeological heritage of mankind," a matter of concern to the "community of states, keepers of civilization."

After the Athens Conference the world had to wait until 1964 ... for a new era to dawn. In the span of a few years, international colloquia multiplied across the planet, accumulating charters, recommendations and resolutions on the preservation, restoration, and usage of historic monuments, old quarters, and traditional dwellings.⁴

Thus the Athens Conference was presented as the lost covenant of international heritage: a document that inaugurated a new style of preservation, which had spread worldwide, after being "updated" in 1964 by the more doctrinaire Venice Charter. In other words, the Athens Conference is to the Venice Charter what the League is to the UN: a direct antecedent, venerable yet flawed. This born-again narrative has already been wielded for the advancement of preservation as a discipline; the impressive obscurity of the League's "intellectual" arm seemingly grants a theoretical legitimacy and a genealogical depth to a profession that has been plagued by accusations of amateurism and bureaucratism alike: once a form of "scholarship in tennis shoes," preservation now has international gravitas. But if it is by inaugurating a "multiplication of colloquia" and an "accumulation of charters" that the Athens Conference led the discipline forward, the institutional sources of this conference model have yet to be sought in the League itself. This chapter locates the origins of the international value of monuments in the institutional history of the League. I argue that, if the newfound historical pedigree of "intellectual cooperation" has helped preservationists overcome their image as "academics in tennis shoes," it is largely because "intellectual cooperation" itself was theorized as a type of "diplomacy-in-tennis-shoes."

⁴ Françoise Choay, "Introduction," in La Conférence d'Athènes sur la conservation artistique et historique des monuments (1931), (Paris: Tranches des Villes, 2002), 7. Translation from French mine. All subsequent translations from French and Italian are mine unless otherwise marked.

In addressing this intersection between international preservation and international politics, I intend to address—and, in some ways, bypass—another historical conjuncture that has been suggested by the re-discovery of the Athens Conference: its connection with the international architectural avant-garde, and in particular the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM). The habit of preservation historians to confuse their own inaugural meeting (the Athens Conference) with that of modernist urbanism (the Athens Charter) has been duly noted, and its revealing ironies drawn out:

Speculations as to its contents have become as blurry as they are fantastical. In particular, it has now earned the attribution of a so-called "charter" of Athens, in a confusion with the charter that bears this name, which was elaborated two years later by the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM) and which—salient detail—limited all heritage conservation to major monuments and directly contributed to the destruction of historic city centers throughout the world.⁵

This reference to CIAM performs the double function, of borrowing modernism's fame and identifying it as preservation's nemesis. The implication is that the Athens Conference failed to foil modernism, much as the League of Nations failed to prevent war. It is true that the Athens Charter marginalized monument conservation, and that this dissertation spans three decades when the reciprocal animosity between modern architects and monuments-conservators grew to polemical heights. 1964 is, after all, the year that Reyner Banham declared himself immune to "idiotic preservationist panics" and Walter Gropius dismissed any "nostalgic wailing at the grave" of centuries past as "unbecoming and sterile." Yet to focus exclusively on these debates is to be invested by the disciplinary myopias of both sides, ignoring more fundamental differences between them and evading any discussion of the impact of World War II on each. If the "destruction of city centers" is the main reason "the world had to wait" for international preservation to take hold, I argue a more "direct" link with this destruction can be found by investigating the relationship between international preservation and its institutional host, the League of Nations.

Athens Conference and Athens Charter belong to two distinct traditions of internationalism, although both can be traced to the cosmopolitanism of Enlightenment philosophers. The early

⁵ Choay, La Conférence d'Athènes. 9. For a example of this confusion, (all the more blatant for its appearance in a textbook series created by the institutions directly related to the Athens Conference), see "the Athens Meetings," in Jukka Jokkilehto, A History of Architectural Conservation (Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann Series in Conservation and Museology, 1999) 284-285. Jokkilehto groups Athens Conference and Athens Charter into such a seamless sequence, and summarizes their respective doctrines in such vague terms, that it is truly unclear whether these were separate events.

⁶ Reyner Banham is cited by Daniel Bluestone in "Academics in Tennis Shoes: Historic Preservation and the Academy," Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, 1999/2000. (Sep., 1999), 300-307. Walter Gropius' infamous diatribe against all things "traditional," is in "Tradition and Continuity in Architecture, Part II 136" The Architectural Record (May 1964).

CIAMs were modeled on the model of a "revolutionary" internationalism where class solidarity transcends national allegiances, as it was adapted by the artistic avant-gardes of the 20th century. In contrast, the Athens Conference belongs squarely in the history of Wilsonian diplomacy which gave birth to the League itself, where regular meetings are organized in order to normalize relations between states. As we will see, the revolutionary Internationale was of little concern to those who conceptualized intellectual cooperation within the League, especially since the League was collaborating with the International Labor Organization (ILO, 1901—), explicitly to create a response to this socialist movement of worker solidarity. The "intellectual" at the heart of the IICI was conceptualized as an extension of the "worker" of the ILO. Thus, unlike communists and modern architects who drew from international solidarity the strength to seek a functional unification of the world, the preservationists that gathered at Athens in 1931 sought to create an international network precisely to legitimate their continued autonomy as a functioning part of international political life.

As for the later transformation of the CIAMs into a professional association, bemoaned by architectural historians as a cause of demise of the avant-garde and often associated with the rise of organizations like the UN, this confrontation occurred under the aegis of professional internationalism, which was, in the prewar, as foreign to intellectual cooperation as it was to the avant-garde.⁷ As we will see in Charter 3, it is not until the postwar that the UN system cultivated a class of professionalized experts in "cultural" fields. Interwar intellectual cooperation was interested in professional groups only insofar as they could deliver entire institutional networks—literally, networks of institutions—to the League's needs.

This brings me to the second myopia in the recent Athens Conference literature: the treatment of "destruction" in preservation history. Although contemporary heritage discourse tends to give modern architecture the agency in the mid-century destruction of cities, monuments actually became a concern of the League of Nations through the filter of two disciplines where destruction was a much less polemical concern: museum conservation and archaeology. Here, the first rectification to be made in this recent historiography concerns the relative influence on the Conference of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IICI), which hosted the Athens Conference, and the Office International des Musées (OIM) which actually organized it. If the Athens Proceedings attest to the "original historic, ideological and epistemological solidarity tying the disciplines [of archaeology and museology] to the theory and practice of historical monuments,"

⁷ For a chronicle of the growth of the CIAMs in the immediate postwar see Eric Mumford, "CIAM and the Postwar World," in The CIAM discourse on Urbanism 1928-1960 (MIT Press, 2000), 131-200.

⁸ Choay, Ibid, 8.

the way these disciplinary alliances turned monuments themselves into icons of solidarity remains unclear. I argue that these disciplines introduced technical discussions and institutional practices into a series of international debates that tended towards a humanistic abstraction and idealist schematizations, and that within these structures monuments provided a way out of choosing sides in the polarizing disciplinary, intellectual, and political debates of the "Twenty Years' Crisis."

The chapter begins in the late 1920s when "intellectual cooperation" was a vague institutional ideal, promoted by political thinkers seeking an international morality. By the time war broke out in 1939, the League's claim to this "morality" has been completely undermined, to the point that Hitler's 1939 accusation—"some nations have first acquired a world by force only to defend this robbery with moralizing theories"9—was difficult to refute. Most of the League's work had proved ineffective or corrupt. The project of Intellectual Cooperation was inextricably linked to the political tragedy of the League the 1930s: its debates unfolded with growing pathos and increasingly exalted tones, and the pace of institutional activity that animated the organs of intellectual cooperation quickened undeniably in response to this mounting sense of urgency. In my account of these debates, however, I sacrifice narrative continuity in order to draw out a structural perspective instead. My goal is to chronicle the nested sequence of bureaucratic branching, and filiations that allowed "monuments of art and history" to enter international intellectual cooperation. I follow a small group of figures—and Paul Valéry, Henri Focillon, Josef Strzygowski, Gustavo Giovannoni foremost among them-and argue their efforts to turn monuments into legitimate objects of international concern should be seen as a rare and unwitting success within a string of decided institutional failures.

I begin with an overview of intellectual cooperation as it was institutionalized in the 1920s. The failure of cooperation in scientific fields, I argue, provoked both a re-orientation of intellectual cooperation towards literary themes, and an increasing focus on achieving agreement in "technical" endeavors. In this context, I cover the creation of the International Museums Office (OIM) and the International Monuments Committee, which were efforts to activate "ready-made" networks of institutional cooperation. The political effectiveness of these networks was dependent upon the transformation of theories of space and form into a liberal politics based on the "life" of museums and monuments. The Athens Conference was a crucial step in the identification of a bureaucratic model of "maintenance" suitable both to museum objects and monument conservation. The Conference opened the door to the possibility for an international preservation ethic—but this ethic was soon diverted by political events and the League's institutional response to them: a sudden

⁹ Carr, "The realist critique," in Twenty Years' Crisis, 77.

forefronting of "war," and what I argue is a "cultural turn" in intellectual cooperation. In this context I cover the creation the "League of Minds" and its art-historical offshoot the Office of Institutes of Art History, which theorized a hypothetical "will to art" dialectically opposed to a much-dramatized collective "will to war." In these idealist discourses, monuments increasingly appeared as objects that would provoke concrete 'agreement,' nest national and international allegiances, and blur the line between aesthetic and political realms. The result was not what the pioneers of intellectual cooperation had imagined: instead of averting war by enacting an international morality, international monuments entered war as icons of conflicts past. Insofar as Athens leads to Venice, this chapter chronicles all the things—institutional formations, theoretical baggage, aesthetic assumptions—that were shed along the way.

The CIC: Idealism and Intellectualism at the League

The critique that contemporary heritage discourse has leveled at the Athens Conference—that it was "elitist", "ethnocentric" and "aristocratic"—is one that plagued Intellectual Cooperation from the start. In the words of one postwar critic, "intellectual cooperation failed because it was divorced from the masses of the world, restricted to a small number of politically ineffective individuals, and because the nationalistic feeling that pervaded educational policy then, prevented it from entering the field of education." This accusation of "intellectualism," in turn, is one that permeates the literature on the League itself, beginning with EH Carr's 1939 characterization as "the most important of all the institutions affected by the one-sided intellectualism of international politics, which was an attempt to apply the principles of Lockeian liberalism to the building of a machinery of international order." As Hedley Bull pointed out, the political thinkers who defended the League of Nations were designated as "idealists", but "it is not the case that these writers were specially insistent upon the moral dimension of international relations, still less that they contributed anything important to our understanding of it." Instead what is meant by "intellectualism" is a utopian view of international

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 $^{^{10}}$ T.V. Sathyamurthy, "Changing Concepts of Intellectual Co-Operation, in International Review of Education Vol. 9, No. 4. (1963 - 1964) 386-395.

¹¹ Carr, 29. Carr's account of the lineage of utopianism implicates too many political philosophers to recall here. A synthesis can be gleaned from footnotes for his introduction to "The Utopian Background": Bentham, Mill, Comte, Wilson.

¹² Bull, International Theory Today, 185. In fact, recent scholarship on these League supporters has shown that while they were self-professed liberal reformers, most saw the League as a compromise upon more radical transformations of the existing imperial order. Alfred Zimmern, for instance, whom EH Carr accused of having launched an "international moral crusade" to mask his poor grasp of economics, is also at the origins of the revision of Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" from a proposal for a new type of World Government to a more gradual modification of the Concert of Europe. ("Alfred Zimmern: Cautious Idealism," in Thinkers of the Twenty-Years' Crisis, 87.) More radical liberals like Hobson, whose critique of empire was continuous with Lenin's, promoted the League as an imperfect but plausible

institutions, where organizations are not to be seen merely as "diplomatic machinery ... but as the first steps in the creation of a world state." The League of Nations was not only designed to resolve specific conflicts but also to provide an image of a world order, to which a hypothetical "world citizen" might conceive of belonging. The "new diplomacy" was a crucial part of this image: regular conferences, held in bucolic circumstances, and publicized to the "world court of public opinion," would help to promote the idea that an "international outlook" existed. In this sense, the mere image of cooperation contributed to the goals of internationalism. ¹⁴

What, then, was the relation between the "intellectuals" of Intellectual Cooperation and the "intellectualism" of League politics? League advocates were not content to let "international morality" be a by-product of its other activities; instead they insisted on devoting specific international work to it, under the name "intellectual cooperation." One of the most vocal proponents of separating "intellectual cooperation" from the League's other activities was British political theorist Alfred Zimmern (1879-1951), who held the first chair in "International Relations" at the University of Wales in 1919. In Learning and Leadership he described the "task of intellectual cooperation" as "the promotion of a unity in the world of thought itself" as a precondition for peace:

The future, not of democracy but of constitutional government as an effective power in the ordering of human affairs depends upon its association with the arts of thought. Unless regular and recognized methods of collaboration are worked out between the thinkers and the doers, between experts knowledge and the representatives of the public interest, power will continue to pass into private and irresponsible hands, and the drift to disaster will become irresistible. How can unity be brought about in the world of knowledge? The answer is not difficult. By the promotion of systematic arrangements for the discussion of the interests common to all who are engaged in the pursuit of knowledge. ¹⁵

Zimmern spoke of a "council of scholars" who would represent "the international mind" and whose mandate would be to bring humanity "into harmony with the great moral forces which rule

path for curbing the further expansion of empires. (David Long, "J.A. Hobson and Economic Internationalism," Thinker of the Twenty-Years' Crisis, 122.) For a survey of the debates about the Lenin-Hobson theory, see A. M. Eckstein, "Is There a 'Hobson-Lenin Thesis' on Late Nineteenth-Century Colonial Expansion?," in The Economic History Review, (May, 1991), 297-318. Even Woodrow Wilson saw his own Fourteen Points as a response to Lenin's own proposal for an "open diplomacy" in 1917. See Cornelia Navari, "The new diplomacy and the new state," in Internationalism and the State in the Twentieth Century (New York: Routeledge, 2000), 254-255.

¹³ Bull, International Theory Today, 76.

¹⁴ Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen points speech and the covenant of the League Covenants are the two documents to consult for the original phrasing of the "covenants openly arrived at." A period edition is Frederick Pollock, The League of Nations (New York: the Lawbook Exchange, 1920).

¹⁵ Alfred Zimmern, "The Problems of Intellectual Life," in Learning and Leadership (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), 85.

the destinies of mankind." Zimmern imagined that "moral revolution" had to occur before the lessons of a world order could be absorbed by an international polity.

The fact that intellectual cooperation was not one of the League's covenants, but was the mison d'être of a whole branch of its activities, is usually taken as evidence of a confusion of means and ends and of an organizational hybridity: the League as a bureaucracy was torn between a traditional "governmental" model (where a doctrinal arm might be devoted to maintaining the ideological foundations of power), and a postwar "international organization" (where moral agreement is achieved only as by-product of the achievement of specific goals). A comparison with the structure of the United Nations, whose organization is more strictly "functional", is useful here. Insofar as the UN is devoted to an ideal, it is the ideal of international human rights, which is written everywhere in the UN Charter. Indeed the Charter concludes with a pledge to devote cooperation to the promotion of "the promotion of "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."16 Yet not one of the UN "specialized agencies" (Unesco, WHO, etc.) is devoted specifically to these rights. In the case of the League, this relation was reversed: the rhetoric surrounding the League was permeated with references to an "international outlook," which was not written in any of the League covenants, but still became one of the League's concerted "functions," with the creation of the Commission for Intellectual Cooperation (CIC) in Geneva in 1922. (fig 1.01)

The idea of enlisting intellectuals in the promotion of international solidarity had been suggested by the 18th Century philosophers who had pioneered internationalism itself. Immanuel Kant's 1795 Essay on Perpetual Peace, for instance, specifically discussed the transposition of the platonic "philosopher-king" into modern international politics. While Kant's "Three Definitive Articles of Perpetual Peace" added little to the work of the moral philosophers and internationalists that preceded him, Kant added a trademark "Secret Article" that granted the philosopher a special status within his international federation:

The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into consideration by states armed for war.

... The state shall silently invite suggestions for this purpose, while at the same time keeping the fact secret.

... That kings should philosophize, or philosophers become kings, is not to be expected. ... But it is absolutely indispensable ... that both kings and sovereign nations ... should not allow the class of philosophers to disappear, nor forbid the expression of their opinions, but should allow them to speak openly. And since this class of men, by

¹⁶ Charles G. Fenwick, "The Problem of Moral Disarmament," in The American Journal of International Law, (Jan 1947), 115.

their very nature, are incapable of instigating rebellion or forming unions for purposes of political agitation, they should not be suspected of propagandism.¹⁷

Kant had specifically rejected the notion of a "state of nations" since "many nations in one state would constitute only one nation, which contradicts our hypothesis, since they are so many separate states and are not to be fused into one." In contrast to political philosophers like Rousseau who saw the modern nation-state dissolving in an international one, Kant offered a remedial solution of a "federation," where individuals' relation to the international order was mediated by national leaders. Thus by giving the philosopher the right to voice a direct opinion on matters of peace Kant made a structural exception to his federal proposal: the philosopher would be the only person not bound by "the relation of one who rules to those who obey." This was made possible by a distinction between practical and ideal goals: "perpetual peace" itself was "impractical," but the "political principles directed towards this end" were not serving as a "continual approximation to the ideal." The secrecy of the arrangement, in other words, was necessary in order to herald a truly "universal union of states" as an ideal.

It is this Kantian reliance on individuals deemed "incapable of rebellion" that was enacted in the CIC in 1922, under the chairmanship of French philosopher Henri Bergson. While the League's other committees were staffed by delegates designated by member states, the CIC members stood purely on the merits of their intellectual achievements, representing themselves in "complete independence":

The members of the committee were all personalities eminent in the various branches of human knowledge, and their relations with their respective governments, which they in no way represented, were those of complete independence.¹⁹

Yet a crucial modification to the Kantian scheme occurred in the passage from Kantian (moral) idealism into Wilsonian (political) idealism: a deliberate removal of Kant's "secrecy" clause and its replacement with "Publicity." League detractors did not fail to point this out as a crucial fallacy: when historian of diplomacy Harold Nicholson accused Woodrow Wilson of being "an idealist, and what was perhaps more dangerous, a consummate master of English prose," he implied that political idealism was better left un-publicized. ²⁰ Wilson's idea of an "open diplomacy should

¹⁷ Immanuel Kant, "Second Supplement: A Secret Article for Perpetual Peace," in Perpetual Peace A Philosophical Essay, trans. M. Campbell Smith (London: Swan Sonneschein, 1903), 158.

¹⁸ Kant, Perpetual Peace, 129.

¹⁹ International Committee of Intellectual Cooperation, Minutes of the First Session (1922), 3. UNESCO Archives.

²⁰ Harold Nicholson, The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method (London: Constable, 1954), 84-85

proceed always frankly and in the public view" was intended to provide an image of an international order more advanced than the order actually achievable at any given moment in history.

Accordingly, the intellectuals of the ICI were never kept a secret; on the contrary, their affiliation with the League was widely publicized, even though their work was subjected to significantly less scrutiny than the other technical committee. Even as the ICI became mired in controversy, its famous members were absolved from critique, their individual brilliance in no way compromised by their inability to deliver a credible program or palpable results. "Despite the eminence of the intellectuals who constituted the Committee—such men and women as Bergson, Curie, Einstein, Madariaga, Murray, Radhakrishnan, Unamuno, and Valéry—it was largely ineffectual."21 Institutional structures were blamed for failures instead. It is true that the CIC demanded the formalization of an essentially informal activity. Witness for instance how a booklet titled Where Minds Meet, produced to popularize the ICI at the 1939 New York World's Fair, described intellectual cooperation by completely obscuring its meaning:

The object of intellectual co-operation is international collaboration with a view to promoting the progress of general civilization and human knowledge, and notably the development and diffusion of science, letters and arts. Its purpose is to create an atmosphere favorable to the pacific solution of international problems. Its scope is that of the League of Nations.²²

By the time this booklet was published in 1939, the phrase "intellectual cooperation" had been used to designate activities as diverse as the legislation of intellectual property, the protection of intellectual workers, the making of an international education policy, the legislation of Esperanto, the publication of translations, the circulation of scientific abstracts, radio publicity about the activities of the League, the promotion of the cosmopolitan ideal latent within modern European philosophical thought, and the mere exchange of ideas between well-known intellectuals. (fig 1.02)

What is revealed in this combination of intellectual ecumenism and bureaucratic opacity is that the Enlightenment category of the "philosopher" had changed radically since Kant wrote in 1795. Consider for instance the involvement of French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941) who was appointed the first CIC president in 1922. Bergson had already played a semi-political role as a French envoy to Woodrow Wilson in 1917 and 1918, and he was an immensely famous public intellectual in France and at home. Bergson felt the need to theorize his own involvement in diplomacy; he did so by offering a simple philosophical distinction: between the authority of intellectual engagement (which he refuted on principle) and the authority of celebrity (which he

²¹ T.V. Sathyamurthy, 386.

²² James Shotwell, Where Minds Meet: the Intellectual Cooperation Organization of the League of Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939).

accepted as a matter of pragmatic necessity). As Philippe Soulez has demonstrated, "Bergson's missions to Wilson presupposed a platonic representation of the philosopher-king that bergsonism forbids on a theoretical level, all the while authorizing it, by pragmatism, to make use of it for utilitarian ends."²³The CIC took this platonic representation and elevated it to institutional levels. In this sense Bergson occupied a transitional role, which followed in the tradition of bilateral diplomacy by way of personal envoys inaugurated by Richelieu, while helping to usher in a 'new' multilateral diplomacy staffed by a professional class of designated individuals.²⁴

The "complete independence" of Bergson and his colleagues at the CIC was thoroughly tested by a series of debates over the question of German participation in the Commission. Since the CIC was perceived as a "vehicle of French cultural policy" (a perception that recent research has shown to be accurate), 25 there was much pressure to appoint a German member. The problem for Bergson was to find an individual acceptable to French delegates of the League where antigermanism was rampant, as it was in France as a whole. The solution was found in the appointment of Albert Einstein, who had impeccable credentials as a pacifist and as a promoter of internationalist science. Einstein, however, was skeptical of the League and resigned almost as soon as he was appointed in 1922; then, having been lured back in 1924, he threatened to resign again.

Einstein's on-again, off-again membership prompted British CIC member Gilbert Murray to publish an open letter in the Times accusing the French of sabotage and recommending the temporary suspension of the CIC. "If it is still impossible," he wrote, "for Frenchmen, Belgians, and Germans to work together, even in the dispassionate realm of the intellect, that means that "intellectual cooperation" is not at present possible." This laying-bare of the internal politics of the commission incensed Bergson, but he declined to publish a rebuttal that would have asserted unconditional openness to German cooperation. Instead he declared his allegiance to France:

On this point my duty is to account for French public opinion: it is my duty as a Frenchman, and it is also in the absolute interest of our Commission, since I do not think that it wants to break with French public opinion, with French science.²⁷

²³ Philippe Soulez, "Les philosophes dans la mêlée," in Vingtième siècle. Revue d'Histoire, 10. (Apr-Jun 1986), 122-124. See also his Bergson Politique (Paris: PUF, 1989), the reference work on the subject, and the edited volume, La Guerre et Les Philosophes de la Fin des Années 20 aux Années 50 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 1992).

²⁴ The classic period text on this transition is Nicholson's The Evolution of the Diplomatic Method, which explains the shift in diplomatic models and conveys the animosity that this shift provoked. An exposition of the "old"— 17th Century—diplomacy can be found in François de Caillères' On the Manner of Negotiating With Princes (Boston: Houghton, 2000).

²⁵ For a detailed account of the French perspective, see Jean-Jacques Renoliet, L'Unesco Oubliée: La Société des Nations et la Coopération Intellectuelle (1919-1946), (Paris: Sorbonne, 1999), 42.

²⁶ Gilbert Murray, "The League and Germany," Letter to the Editor, in The Times (5 Mar 1924), 10.

²⁷ Bersgon to Halecki, 13 mar 1924 (SdN registry, 1924, Coop int., 13c/33877/33877/IX)

Given the opportunity to make a Kantian statement of universal support for a cosmopolitan ideal, Bersgon preferred to perform a political role as a delegate of an imaginary "French people" and or "French science."

Bergson's position was inspired in part by his popularity as a public intellectual: a philosopher whose "lectures were major events," to which "tourists and society ladies flocked, as one of the sights of the capital."28 In this sense Bergson was acting more as a Hegelian intellectual, revealing another crucial transformation that the Kantian ideal had undergone: it transformation into an organicist vision of the body politic. In 1806 Hegel had critiqued the moralism of Kant's Perpetual Peace for being detached into a formalist abstraction, rather than attached to what he called "the ethical life." ²⁹ Morality could only result from a social and cultural development of a social body, conceived in organicist terms, and the philosopher was the necessary vehicle for the "reconciliation of spirit (Geist) with the history of the world."30 By the end of World War I, League advocates brought what one historiographer calls "a transposed Hegelianism" to the theory of international organization (the "transposition" having occurred through the work of liberal reformers like TH Green at Oxford). They hoped that the League would bridge organically over a gap between history and politics: between the international community and their position in history.³¹ It was Alfred Zimmern again who was most explicit in applying this Hegelian organicism to intellectual cooperation. The Intellectual Foundations of Intellectual Cooperation he wrote, was to bring "the reason and judgment of man into harmonious relationship with his environment, to resume their ascendancy in the rhythm of an altered world."32 If the works of the intellect and the works of the international community were reconciled, then history would proceed dialectically forward. Ironically, it is because Bergson was alone in embodying this organic model of intellectual leadership that he encountered difficulties as the head of the CIC. Bergson could reasonably claim to speak for France's intellectual life—since he and his theories formed the centerpiece of it—but other intellectuals in the CIC were not in the same position, and this organic model of intellectual representation was on the wane. Even as they replayed the debates of German idealism with a century's delay (in Gilbert

²⁸ H. Stuart Hughes, "Bergson and the Uses of Intuition," in Consciousness and Society (Brighton: Harvester, 1979), 113.

²⁹ Thomas Mertens, "Hegel's Homage to Kant's Perpetual Peace: An Analysis of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'," in The Review of Politics, (Autumn, 1995), 665-691.

³⁰ Hegel, Philosophy of History, 457. For an overview of the relationship, see George Armstrong Kelly, "Politics & Philosophy in Hegel," in Polity (Autumn, 1976), 3-18

³¹ For a summary of the "transposed Hegelianism" see Jeanne Moresfield, in Imperialism and Internationalism. See also "The progenitors of the new liberalism," in Navari, 232.

³² Alfred Zimmern, The Intellectual Foundations of International Cooperation (Paris: Institute of Cooperation, 1928), 19.

Murray's words, "All of us were then deeply under the German spell")³³, the CIC intellectuals were confronted with their own inability to bring the actual state of Germany "organically" into an international institution that had been constructed in large part to exclude it.

The relationship between intellectuals and the social fabric of their countries was not the only issue raised by Einstein's membership. It was also the relationship of the intellectual to the scientist that was at stake, and their competing claims on "reality". League advocates looked at the sciences as a basis for their work, noting both "the startling accumulation of scientific knowledge and its application to technological innovation" as one of the key "development that seemed to promise lasting cooperation in international relations." Their favorite examples were infrastructural: "the development of railways, telegraphic communications networks, sanitation infrastructures," but they also looked at "the internationalization of scientific research." As a result of this "promise of science," many of the League's committees were devoted to establishing links between the league and existing international scientific organizations. Therefore one solution to the impasse of national membership in the CIC itself had been to suggest that German absence was amply compensated in the League's other commissions, of which many were "technical" in the sense outlined above. To this Bergson replied with a distinction between the way "persons" and "things" negotiate conflict:

You have rightly noted that Germans are already part of certain of the League's commissions. No doubt, but these are technical commissions, concerned with hygiene or the railroads: it is only "things", not persons, that they take into account. Negotiators can therefore reach an agreement, whatever opinion they may have of each-other. Things are entirely different in our commission. Intellectual cooperation is essentially a relationship between people: it is impossible without mutual trust. 35

Thus while "things" could provoke objective agreement, only "minds" could produce intellectual cooperation. This was no small point for Bergson to make in requesting Einstein's presence at the CIC. Indeed Einstein and Bergson had a much more fundamental disagreement on the way "things" and "people" could produce "agreement."

Since 1921 Bergson and Einstein had been engaged in a disagreement over the philosophical repercussions of Einstein's theory of relativity, which Gaston Bachelard later summarized as forcing a choice between "The philosopher's time or the scientist's time."³⁶ In his Durée et Simultanéité, Bergson questioned the "twin experiment" on which Einstein had based his theory of relativity. (Peter and Paul, each armed with a clock, travel to and from each-other, one traversing a different timeframe

³³ Moresfield, 96.

 $^{^{34}}$ Jan-Stefan Fritz, "The Promise of Science," in Imperialism and Internationalism, 141-158.

³⁵ Bergson to Oscar Halecki, (SdN registry, 1924, Coop int., 13c/33877/33877/IX). Emphasis added.

³⁶ Bachelard sided with Einstein while Merleau-Ponty defended Bergson. Merleau Ponty, "Einstein and the Crisis of Reason," Signs (Northwestern University, 1964), 193.

and the other not, to find themselves "simultaneously" back together, despite having in fact spent different amounts of "time" apart.) "As far as time is concerned," Bergson argued, "there is no difference between a system endowed with any motion whatever and one in uniform translation." 37 Einstein took this statement to mean that Bergson had simply misunderstood his science. Yet in a public encounter the disagreement was revealed to be altogether more profound; Bergson questioned the hermeticism of Einstein's thought experiments, asking whether "once we admit the theory of relativity in physical theory, all is not finished."38 To this Einstein replied in no uncertain terms that "there is no philosopher's time." While the encounter was called a victory for Einstein, it continues to generate arguments for both sides today. 39 In short, the Einsteinian view is that since relativity of time originated in physics, time as a concept now belongs only to a physical theory of reality. In contrast, the Bergsonian view sees the "subject" (for example, the one viewing the experiment) as the ultimate site of relativity, and contends that so-called physical evidence for this change could be found if searched for. Clearly the debate unfolded as a disciplinary turf-war, which eventually validated science's "objective" grasp on a reality once exclusively described by philosophy. Yet it has also been noted that, by claiming the epistemic category of time for himself, Einstein had acted more like "a philosopher" (in the Kantian sense of a formal claim to knowledge) than Bergson.

For our purposes it is most important to note that the debate hinged on a distinction between "watch" and "subject" as bearer of standards—the same distinction Bergson had made between "people" (intellectuals) and "things" ("hygiene, or railroads") as catalysts for agreement at the CIC. This is especially important since these early years of intellectual cooperation were modeled on the procedures of international science organizations, with their conventionalist view of knowledge. 40 Indeed the CIC borrowed most of its techniques for circulating knowledge from science, including abstracting and producing bibliographies. 41 As Jimena Canales has shown, the two men saw their political and epistemological disagreements as related, and the theoretical rift between them

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³⁷ Henri Bergson, "Foreword to the Second Edition (1923), in Duration and Simultaneity, with Reference to Einstein's Theory trans, Leon Jacobson (New York: Bobb-Merrill, 1965), 3.

³⁸ The exchange took place on April 6 1922, and is reproduced as "Discussion avec Einstein, in Henri Bersgon, Mélanges (Paris: PUF, 1972), 1340-1347.

³⁹ Most recently, Alan Sokal and Jean Brickmont saw the incident as the first example of constructionism in science, making Bergson the grandfather of postmodernisms as "fashionable nonsense." Impostures Intellectuelles (Paris, 1997). The English edition omitted this chapter. Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science (St Martin's, 1989).

⁴⁰ It was the International Metric Commission, precursor of the International Bureau of Weights and Measures, that "brought scientists into association with diplomats for the first time" in 1875. For a history of the transformation of science into an "Internationale," see Jean-Jacques Salomon, "The Internationale of Science," in Science Studies I/1 (Jan 1971), 23-42.

⁴¹ For a chronicle of Einstein's involvement in the CIC, see "International Cooperation and the League of Nations (1922-1927) in Otto Nathan and Heinx Norden, Einstein on Peace (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960), 58-89.

effectively led to the demise of their political collaboration at the League.⁴² When Einstein resigned, it was as much out of frustration at the inability of the CIC to produce agreement even on matters of seemingly pure science (like the "proposal for the establishment of a bureau of meteorology" and the plan to "standardize scientific terminology"), as for the rampant anti-germanism that he detected in the committee.

The Einstein-Bergson debacle was certainly a failure of Kantian cosmopolitics, but astute historians have noted that the CIC emerged as more of a "caricature" than a "failure." It is important to note the structural implications of this "caricature" on the institutional development of Intellectual Cooperation in the 1930s —in particular, the effect of this assumption that "things" could bear discord more easily than "minds." On the one hand, this assumption produced a tendency to delegate disagreement to "technical" committees. Thus it is within an intricate series of technical branching-offs that "monuments" became the subject of a CIC Committee. On the other hand, demise of the CIC as an umbrella organization led to a broad re-definition of intellectual cooperation in "literary" terms. These two trends combined to provoke an intricate institutional tree, which alternated between creating ever-larger statement of literary ideals, and localizing any specificity into a 'technical' sub-committee. In both cases, the issues that had been drawn out by the Einstein-Bergson episode were replayed in these sub-committees.

After the so-called politicization of the CIC, the task of articulating a general mandate for intellectual cooperation was passed onto the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation (Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, IICI) in Paris. (fig 1.03) Within the League, the creation of the IICI in 1926 was perceived as a victory for the French view of cultural politics, since the Institute was underwritten entirely by the French government, programmatically and ideologically autonomous from Geneva. But its creation had also been supported by other League member states, who detected a trend of decentralization from which their capital cities might benefit.⁴⁴ The IICI did not initiate many endeavors, but it played a crucial role in hosting the work of other committees and publishing their voluminous conference proceedings and journals: notably, the International Office

⁴² Jimena Canales, "Einstein, Bergson, and the Experiment that Failed: Intellectual Cooperation and the League of Nations," in MLN, 120 (2005, 1168-1191.

⁴³ See Brigitte Schroeder-Gudehus, Les Scientifiques et la Paix: la Communiauté Scientifique internationale au Cours des Années 20. (Montréal: Preses de l'Université de Montréal, 1978), 216. For a more pointed study of the attitude of National Scientific organizations in each concerned country, see her "Challenge to Transnational Loyalties: International Scientific Organizations after the First World War," in Science Studies Vol. 3, No. 2, (Apr 1973), 93-118.

⁴⁴ Renoliet, 111. See particularly the creation of the Istituto Centrale del Cinematografia in Rome

of Museums (Office International des Musées, OIM), the Permanent Committee on Art and Letters (soon to be nicknamed La Société des Esprits), and the International Studies Conference (ISC).

The OIM was launched from Geneva, from a small "Sub-Commissions on the Arts and Letters" that had been created in 1924 as the only literary group in a list of technical Sub-Commissions: on "Intellectual Property," "Bibliography", "University Relations." The OIM was sent to be headquartered at the IICI, where it benefited from the literary influences of Paris and was liberated from the diplomatic solemnity of Geneva. It was programmatically independent from both, although the CIC funded its work and the ICIC published it. It was as a project of the OIM that the Athens Conference was organized, and the only League of Nations committee ever devoted to monuments, the "International Commission on Historical Monuments" was a sub-committee of the OIM. In 1930 the CIC's sub-commission on arts and letters was replaced by a Permanent Committee on Arts and Letters which soon came to be known as "The League of Minds," and repeated the branching-off pattern that had been established. First, it headquartered itself in Paris, where it held its conferences and events. In 1934, it created the International Office of the Institutes of the History of Art and Archaeology (Office International des Institute d'Histoire de l'Art et Achéologie OIAHA) which was also headquartered in Paris. This series of lateral moves were usually conceptualized as "technical" developments: spinning issues raised in the "general" discussion off into a "specialized" committee. (fig 1.01)

The only other organization to share the OIM's status (launched from the CIC in Geneva, administratively hosted by the IICI in Paris, programmatically independent of both) was the International Studies Conference (ISC). Launched in 1926 to create disciplinary cooperation among institutions teaching international political science, it was intended as a solution to increasing disillusionment of the League and its perceived recuperation by traditional power politics. The goal was to focus the technical discussion onto "political science," with the ambition to accomplish a synthesis of idealism and practicality in the political sphere itself—albeit academically. Recent research has shown that the ISC prefigured in many ways the development of IR in the postwar, although its own post-war life was rather a failure. 46 In contrast to the ISC which started with high

⁴⁵ Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle,: Cahiers de Relations Artistiques, La Coopération INtellectuelle et les Beaux-Arts (Paris: PUF, 1927), 5. The CIC's early inquiries into the "the conditions of intellectual work" had included aspects of what was called "artistic life," including the effect of economic crisis on Austrian painters, the dissemination of taste in France and the living conditions of museums. See William Martin, "The conditions of life and work of musicians;" A. Dopsch, "Conditions of intellectual work and workers;" Julien Luchaire, "Preservation and dissemination of artistic taste" in Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, Enquiry into the conditions of intellectual work (Geneva: The League, 1922).

⁴⁶ David Long summarizes that the ISC "complicates the story of the relationship between international relations and political science." He too accuses the ISC of elitism and idealism: "The ISC was an anachronism that imploded," in part because it "reflected the elitist approach inherent in League-era intellectual cooperation. Yet rather than detecting this

ambitions but lost any impetus in the postwar, the Museums Office (henceforth, OIM) was begun casually but is the longest-lasting organization of intellectual cooperation created in this period. It outlived the temporary sub-commission from which it was launched, as well as the CIC and the IICI. It resumed its publications in 1945 and in 1946 it became the International Council of Museum (ICOM), which is active today. It is easy in retrospect to see the success of the OIM as a sign that "museums" represented a fortuitous merging of "technical" imperatives and "literary" tendencies of post-scientific intellectual cooperation. But it is also important to remember that, in contrast to the ISC, the Arts and Letters Committee was created with the self-effacingly modest ambitions of being an "honest and disinterested courtier of the arts." In fact, in order to get approval from Geneva the group was defined negatively, in opposition to an inter-governmental mandate: "the intention is not to be an International Ministry of the Beaux-Arts." In the next section I describe how this modest proposal launched an organization that succeeded precisely in channeling an ambitious mandate and taking on a near-ministerial structure.

The OIM: "Ready-made Intellectual Cooperation"

The idea of creating an "international office that would connect all the museums of the world" was first suggested by French art historian Henri Focillon (1881-1943) during the first meeting of the Subcommittee on Arts and Letters in 1926. (fig 1.06) "Museums," Focillon argued, "appear to be ready-made institutions of intellectual cooperation." It was in order to achieve what he called "practical results" that Focillon suggested taking advantage of existing institutional networks. The report he submitted at the next session in January 1926, included a historical overview, whereby museums had long "played a role in the history of travel, of the exchange of ideas and of influences" and in so doing had served as "the first medium of a European and global conscience." Creating the OIM was a way to formalize this network for internationalist purposes. Yet there would also be a benefit to this existing network, which would expand and decentralize.

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elitism in the ISC itself Long chooses uses an example from "Arts and Letters" (the Freud-Einstein exchange of letters) to demonstrate this elitism. Long gives the ISC's association with the League as one of the top reasons why the ISC "died" in the face of other competing organizations like the American-born ISA and Unesco's own Political Science division. David Long, "Who Killed the International Studies Conference?," in Review of International Studies 23 (2006), 603-622. For an explanation of the place of the ISC in the CIC institutional structure, see Renoliet, 315.

⁴⁷ "La Section des Relations artistiques ne doit pas ambitionner d'être un ministère international des beaux-arts. … Elle sera donc ce 'courtier honnête et désintéressé des arts.' » « Idées Directrices, » La Coopération Intellectuelle et les Beaux-Arts, 9.

⁴⁸ "Institutions de coopération intellectuelle toutes faites." Henri Focillon, cited in "L'Oeuvre de Coopération Intellectuelle et l'Office International des Musées," in Mouseion Vol. 1 (1927), 3-10.

⁴⁹ Focillon, Ibid. In order to make this medium "useful to the international organization of intellectual work," and to "enrich the knowledge that peoples have of one-another," Focillon posited that museums had a three-fold existence: "museums are necessary to art historians, to amateurs, but most importantly before all for the public."

From the beginning Focillon was interested not in the national institutions that already served as sites of cosmopolitan exchange in capital cities, but in smaller provincial institutions that were unwitting participants in an international network of knowledge distribution. "In almost every provincial town," he wrote, "more modest museums reveal the nation to foreign visitors and present examples of the genius of foreign civilizations to the people of the city." Undoubtedly influenced by his own past as a director of the provincial museum in Lyon, he sought to grant smaller institutions a place in an international order. Thus Focillon specifically rejected the temptation of specialization, and in particular the trend of likening the museum to the laboratory: "it is not our intention," he wrote, to "consider the International Office as a kind of super-museum." By this he meant an index of an index, consisting of "cards and documents" of all the works of art collected in museums worldwide. The OIM would be "informed, in order better to inform others," but it would be a place of action: the OIM "must act, or rather, incite action." Focillon's was a self-consciously opportunistic proposal: to use museums as institutions that came with "ready-made" audiences.

In contrast to the indexical detachment of a "super-museum," Focillon sought to activate the "the federative power" of cultural institutions, based not on the isolation of objects but on their intrinsic "fraternity." For example, he proposed a "system of adoption" for smaller museums to affiliate with larger ones, provoking exchanges of art works and leveling the playing field between museums, since "any museum where there is a great work, a work of great historic and human significance, is a great museum." From the aesthetic "greatness" of art itself Focillon derived a whole a theory of social solidarity. The fraternity originated in the artworks themselves, but expanded into the space of the museum, which became an intellectual milieu. "If the exchange of works and objects is difficult," Focillon wrote, "the exchange of ideas should not."

Museums must be not only research institutes but also, and as soon as possible, environments [milieux] where one learns to love life, history, and the masters, and gets acquainted with the diversity of the world.

With characteristic vitalism Focillon wrote of a loose and supple network, using a language of influence, of radiation to describe, first, how people learned from art objects, second how museums needed to be filled, then surrounded, by people. He enlarged this scheme to the scale of the whole city, inspired by the growing professional networks of urbanism in the interwar:

It has recently been pointed out how much good can come when cities collaborate to find solutions to the problems of building, of hygiene and administration. Could this not be extended to museums?⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Focillon, Ibid.

In order to make the final step from urban sociability to international solidarity, Focillon recommended that the OIM use local "Friends' Societies," (Associations Protectrices) to develop educational programs with an internationalist bent. In contrast to their traditional "solemnity," museums were places to access art-historical insights without performing difficult analyses:

It is difficult, in these solemn milieux, to speak of great works aloud. Yet this is done, and with success. There is much in the universal history of art that attests to the efforts of men to understand and enrich each-other. ... It is not the role of the League of Nations to invent a comparative method of art history, but rather to trigger an understanding of this comparative breadth in museums worldwide. Telling the history of how a European conscience, a universal conscience, progressively came into being through the disinterested world of art, is likely to provoke such discussion. By organizing tours and lectures whose principal goal is to insist on this universal conscience, protective societies will usefully cooperated to the activities of the League of Nations. ⁵¹

In four steps, Focillon spanned from the autonomy of art, to the museum as intellectual milieu, to the kinship between all museums, to the solidarity between nations.

The reference to the "invention of a comparative method of art history" is of particular interest since a few years later Focillon created the OIAHA to develop precisely this international arthistorical method. Already in 1928 he explained the virtues of this "comparative" framework in the museum, in a text titled "Exchange and Comparison," published in Mouseion after the Conference on Ethnographic Museums in Prague. The "comparative method so central to ethnography and folklore," was useful in that it showed "influences, exchanges, resemblances, identities" between objects, revealing "a profound accord" (un accord profond) between seemingly unrelated cultures. Here again Focillon focused on smaller regional institutions, with little obligation to be "encyclopedic":

For regional museums, the goal should not be to enrich them, progressively, with a disparate collection, an ethnographic pell-mell. Conservators must choose the most useful documents and comparisons. ... As for me, I will be happy whenever I will encounter, in the glass cases of a local museum, a foreign object that has been accepted because it recalls a kinship, an agreement (un accord), even if it is fortuitous, and which will therefore provoke a spontaneous passage from the provincial to the universal. ⁵²

Thus the "life" of museums was not only a social life of groups learning about art, but also an interior mental life propelled by comparative insights. Museums were hosts of a comparative kinship, which allowed a passage from "province" to "universe."

S1 Henri Focillon, as cited in Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, Cahiers des Relations Artistiques: La Coopération Intellectuelle et les Beaux-Arts (Paris: PUF, 1927), 8.

There are two types of popular museums: the first is encyclopedic type, which attempts to capture a totality, like the Scandinavian museums and the beautiful museum in Vienna (a necessary expression of the mosaic that is the Hapsburg monarchy). The second is regional." Henri Focillon "Echanges et Comparaison," in Mouseoin, Vol.2 (1928), 210-211.

There is a strong methodological correlation between the vitalist formalism that Focillon is known for pioneering—his interest in "the life of forms in art"—and the arguments he made for expanding the international solidarity of artworks—his interest in "expanding the life of the museum." Focillon was a convinced formalist, and heavily influenced by Henri Bergson. In some sense, his work constitutes a "specialized" continuation of Bergson's work in the CIC. Yet unlike Bergson, who saw his role as a pragmatic exception to his own theories, Focillon saw his participation in Intellectual Cooperation as continuous with his formalist beliefs. It was only because art existed in an aesthetic "world" apart that it could be put to use for political purposes without compromising its fundamental value.

In his 1934 La Vie des Formes, Focillon famously introduced the term "life" to describe this fundamental value. Intended to supercede the notion of Style, "Life" allowed Focillon to construct a theory of formal change in art that did not subject forms to historical contingencies.

We must never think of forms as simply suspended in some remote, abstract zone, above the earth and above man. ... The life of forms gives definition to what may be termed "psychological landscapes" without which the essential genius of the environment would be opaque and elusive for all those who share in them... I am not anxious to isolate works of art from human life, and condemn them to blind automatism and to exactly predictable sequence. The state of a style, or, if one prefers, a state in the life of forms, is simultaneously the guarantor and the promoter of diversity. ⁵³

The Life of Forms can be understood as an organicist expansion of the formalist autonomy of art into time and space: an animated version of Kantian aesthetics. Thus "Form" was at the center of an entire cosmology which moved and evolved. While Focillon never once used the word "form" in his OIM proposal, he used "life" extensively to apply the same method for the international expansion of museums. Consider this passage, where Focillon could be speaking either of the literal museum or of the figurative "world of art:"

Technical analysis of comparative methods lead us to consider forms as living beings, milieux like plastic frames, modified by nomadic genius, inventors of novelty or by sedentary people who lives out of time and finally to consider spiritual families that neither chronology nor geography do not suffice to qualify.⁵⁴

Both museum networks and "worlds of forms" enacted the intrinsic "life" between forms. Focillon employed the same vitalist language to describe the "psychological landscape" of forms in La Vie des Formes and the "life of the museum" in the OIM.

⁵³ Focillon, Life of Forms in Art (New York: Zone, 2001),111.

⁵⁴ Focillon, "Exchange and Comparison," 208.

The Life of Forms has been read as a text operating on "such a level of abstraction" that it is best read as an "adventure of the mind" than as a "method of art history in general." At best it is a "treatise of such concentrated intellectual power" that it qualifies as a humanist tract in the medieval sense. At worst, it is an abdication of art history to a Hegelian teleology, re-aestheticized for a Bergsonian audience. Indeed as a medievalist Focillon was keen to develop collective interpretations of art, but he rejected anything resembling the 'social history of art.' Thus the collective "vitalism" that permeates his work was an alternative to sociological work and he famously feuded with Marxist colleague Meyer Schapiro, who read Romanesque art as an aesthetic symptom of a social system. Yet much of the putative "abstraction" of Focillon's treatise relies on the ethno-geographic language of intellectual cooperation. Focillon's description of "the world of forms" as "a spiritual ethnography that cuts across the best-defined races," composed of "families of the mind ... beyond all restrictions of time or place," and constitutive of "a living word in a universal language," are not just poetic generalizations. Read in light of the political idealism of the League, the infamous obscurity of Focillon's Life of Forms acquires the tone of an international politics of art.

It is important to note, then, the role that "space" played in Focillon's theorization of the "life" of forms and museums alike. As Meyer Schapiro wrote, The Life of Forms "is mainly about space," to which he added, that it was "so fashionable a concept today, when it has practically disappeared from the arts!" Subsequent historiographers have agreed that the formalist notion of "space" inherited from idealist aesthetics found one of its main "internationalizers" in Focillon, who popularized the idea in both France and the USA. ⁵⁹ One passage that appears early in the first few pages of The Life of Forms in Art is evocative of the way Focillon had, by 1934, reconfigured the relationship between space, form, and politics into a nested set of autonomies. First, Focillon claimed "space" as the realm of art, then immediately excluded from it "the soldier and the tourist":

Space is the realm of art—not the space of everyday life involving, say, a soldier and a tourist—but space treated by a technique that may be defined as matter and as movement. A work of art is the measure of space. It is form, and as form it must first make itself known to us.

⁵⁵ Emanuel Winternitz, Review of Life of Forms in Art, in College Art Journal (Mar 1943), 88-90.

⁵⁶ Walter B. Cahn has given a detailed account of the argument between Focillon and Schapiro, in "Schapiro and Focillon," *Gesta*, Vol. 41, No. 2, (2002), 129-136. Cahn points out that the debate concerned the work of one of Focillon's students, and that he and Schapiro ultimately arrived at similar interpretations of Romanesque sculpture.

⁵⁷ Life of Forms, 63.

⁵⁸ For example, "Its life of the mind is simply a preparation for its life in space," Life of Forms, 122. "Flowing together within [the work of art] the energies of many civilizations may be plainly discerned."31.

⁵⁹ Georg Germann, "L'invention de l'espace architectural," in Cahiers de la Recherche Architecturale 26 (1990), 53-58.

Yet having now situated form within a space apart, Focillon then immediately referred to a realist definition of life as art, only to withdraw again into the "entire universe" that is art:

In one of his political tracts Balzac has affirmed that "everything is form, and life itself is form." ... So it is with art as well. The formal relationships within a work of art and among different works of art constitute an order for, and a metaphor of, the entire universe."⁶⁰

It is the ease with which Focillon made this appeal to a tradition of realist art (Balzac), and the rapidity with which he excluded reality (in the form of "the tourist and the soldier") from space, that alerts us to the similarity between the idealist "life of forms" and the international "life of the museum." The point is not just that an international political project helped Focillon's to construct his formalist theory. It is also that Focillon's theory, far from a vaguely organicist humanism, is more properly described as a politics of form, whose primary medium is space.

The conceptual tie between Focillon's "life of forms" and what I have called his international "politics of form" can be found in an early lecture, titled "The Modern Conception of Museums," that Focillon delivered at the 1921 Congrès International de l'Histoire de l'Art in Paris, and from which much of his 1926 report OIM report was inspired. Two conceptions, Focillon proposed, had come to determine the 20th Century museum: "the masterpiece museum" (a Romantic legacy, devoted to the joy and education of the artist), and "the serial museum" (a Renaissance project now informed by Tainean teleologies and devoted to historical categories). Between "the historian's museum and the artists' museum" Focillon proposed a third model: "I do not hesitate to say that museums are for the public. The public, I am convinced of it, comes to the museum to find more than an ephemeral distraction, more than a technical lesson." To explicate this he theorized the kind of "reality" that was represented in the museum, a reality he opposed both to "history" and to the "life" outside the museum:

Museums are not only the concrete commentary of history, and art is not only a series of documentary vignettes. Museums do not produce a pure copy of reality: they take hold of reality, decouple it, transfigure it, and suggest its hidden poetry. ... The public must come out of museums with a heightened sense of life.⁶¹

This reference to the museum as a "concrete" instance of history and a "heightened" version of reality, recalls Balzac's realist creed that "everything is form, and life itself is form." Focillon's early descriptions depict the museum as a kind of realist medium, and already in 1921, the mission of this

⁶⁰ Focillon, The Life of Forms in Art, 33.

⁶¹ Focillon, "La Conception Moderne du Musée," in Actes du Congrès d'Histoire de l'Art Organisé par la Société de l'Histoire de l'Art Français Paris 26 Sept-5 Oct 1921 Vol. I, (Paris: PUF, 1923), 90.

medium was to decentralize and publicize. The 1921 talk gave the same recommendations as the 1926 OIM proposal albeit in more imperative form. The educational suggestion was rendered as "What is most essential is that the museum be alive," the touring proposal, "Finally, we must talk a lot in museums." Most importantly, the "comparative" method was expressed in terms of exerting a "liberal influence" upon the public:

Finally, for us museums are a lesson in intellectual liberalism. By seeing so many different aesthetic and moral preferences expressed over so brilliantly over generations, one sheds the habit of judging on principle and on preconceived notions. One loses the habit of making fast judgments and acquire the habit of reflection and comparison. ⁶²

As explicated in 1921, Focillon's museum was a realist medium which "heightened reality" by offering a "comparative viewpoint" whose goal was to "liberalize" the public." ⁶³

When transforming this 1921 paper on "museums for the public" into his 1926 "report on museums as international institutions," Focillon made some crucial changes: he re-framed his historical overview in terms of the "growth of a European conscience," and subsumed the distinction artistic/historic/public into one "intellectual milieu." Yet the basic politics of the museum remained the same, and not far from the political liberalism of League advocates: the museum offered a parallel reality where judgments are deferred, thereby delivering what Focillon called "a lesson of life, a lesson of liberalism."

Focillon's proposal for the OIM implied a fundamentally modern vision of the museum as a mass-medium, but the "ready-made" network of institutions from which he hoped to form the OIM presented a distinctly less forward-thinking reality. As soon as the OIM was formed it became plainly evident how much European museums were still invested with state power, nationalist narratives, and auratic myths. For example, Focillon had written a resolution that museums should act as "centers of reproduction", implying with Benjaminian overtones that that the museum should incorporate, rather than resist, the "reproducibility" of the work of art. The first OMI resolution in this direction was to regulate the "copying" works of arts by easel-painting, and to produce two international agreements on the decidedly uncontroversial techniques of plaster casting and copper engraving. While these early efforts eventually led to more work on international legislation of

⁶² Focillon, "La Conception moderne des musées," 85-94.

⁶³ Focillon, "La Conception moderne des musées," 90-91. Focillon assumed a paternalist stance: "how could this liberal influence not exert itself on the public, since it exerts itself on the conservators, when they are men of good will?"

⁶⁴ Focillon, "La Conception moderne du musée," 93.

⁶⁵ These early efforts did produce language on "reproduction" that eventually led to discussions of international legislation of photographic reproduction and distribution rights. In October 1926, an "Accord entre les Chalcographies de Madrid, Paris, Rome" was signed, followed in January 1928 by an "Accord entre les laboratoires de moulage des

reproduction, copyright and rights, the media at hand were deliberately chosen to make art different from all other media. Consider, in contrast, Italy's willingness to embrace mass-media as vehicles for international promotion: in response to the creation of the IICI in Paris, Italy had created an International Educational Cinematographic Institute in Rome, whose goal was to encourage "the production, distribution and exchange of educational films." Indeed later Focillon would encourage the use of films in museums himself.

There were not only technical, but also political obstacles to Focillon's vision of a "flexible" international network. The hope that the OIM would be a self-decentralizing network, spawning a chain of institutional "adoptions" was soon confronted with the rigidity of existing museum administrations. The very composition of the OIM reveals an overwhelming representation of national arts administration and capital-city museums:

- F. Alvarez de Sotomayor, director of the Prado Museum, Madrid
- D. Baud-Bovy, president of the Swiss Federal Beaux Arts Commission, Geneva
- J. Capart, chief conservator at the Musée du Cinquantenaire, Brussels
- M. Colasanti, director-general of the Beaux-Arts, Rome
- Max Friedlander, director of print museum, Vienna
- M. Gluck, painting conservator at the Kunst Historiscghen Museum, Vienna
- J. Guiffrey, painting conservator at the Louvre, Paris
- M. Oikonomos, chief conservator at the museums in Athens
- Ugo Ogetti, editor of Dedalo, Florence
- M. Petrovics, chief conservator of Beaux-Arts, Budapest
- L. Coleman, director of the American Association of Museums
- H. Verne, director of National Museums, Paris⁶⁷

This ministerial representation of its board meant that the international ideal of the OIM was essentially subjected to existing institutional structures, and their national agendas.

The first issue of Mouseoin is a case in point. France submitted an article on the history of the Musée de Sculpture Comparée, as an example of "a documentary museum created to inform the public about French art and the work of the Service des Monuments Historiques." For the Louvre-centric French museum system, this constituted a 'decentralization' of sorts, since this institution had been created against the grain of the established academic tradition. Indeed the director recalled, the museum had been inspired by Viollet le Duc, in order to impress the importance of medieval art on a public whose opinion was "still strongly imbued with absolutist theories that beauty belonged exclusively

musées d'Athènes, Berlin, Bruxelles, Florence, London, Paris." In 1928 two exhibitions of casts and chalcographies was circulated to these museums. See "L'activité de l'office des musées," in Mouseion Vol. II (1928), 177.

⁶⁶ The IECI remained open until Italy left the League in 1937.

⁶⁷ "L'Office des Musées et la Coopération Internationale," in Mouseion Vol. I (1927), 136.

to classical art."⁶⁸ Yet this was hardly the tutelage that Focillon had in mind. Similarly, the same issue featured a lengthy exposé of the "Re-organization of Italian Museums." According to Francesco Sapori, the inspector of Beaux-Arts in Rome, the re-organization showed "that the Fascist state has reinvested Italy with its cultural patrimony, and that future generations, moved by a proud ideal and confidently in control of their own destiny, will make blood with their own blood, to offer to the world the luminous proof of their particular, ever-productive, creative forces."⁶⁹ Thus the modernity of the fascist state in the decentralization of its regional museum-conservation only attested to the superiority of Italian traditions and the strength of the national ethos. (fig 1.08)

Few of the OIM's efforts to soften the prevalent academic model of arts administration succeeded. Instead, the imperative for regional representation resulted in a shift of emphasis from art to ethnography. Rather than enlisting art museums from smaller cities, the OIM drew large ethnographic museums from capital cities—to create a "decentralizing" effect. This was partly in response to Focillon's own interest in so-called folkloric arts, and his promotion of a "comparative" framework inspired by ethnographic institutions. Furthermore, exchanges of ethnographic objects were significantly less controversial than that of exchanges of works of art. There were other issues at stake that made ethnographic museums fertile ground for the international imagination. 1932 the ILO commissioned a report from the IICI on the possibility of using museums to activate the potential of "folkloric" arts ("art by the people and for the people") to "raise the general level of culture of workers," and occupy them during newfound leisure hours resulting from the eight-hour workday. 70 (fig 1.09) Although the report produced few results, it tied directly into the popularizing potential of museums, describing a blurring of reception and authorship of the folkloric objects. "The idea of reviving the popular arts is particularly seducing. They are less art for the people and more an art by the people, a source of joy for peoples, its authors."⁷¹ At face value, the result of this emphasis on ethnography was still a broader regional representation of each country. But the success of ethnographic institutions in this decade can undoubtedly be tied to the rise of nationalism throughout Europe, and ultimately the "regional" representation circulated in the pages of Mouseion was one undeniably controlled by state authorities.⁷²

Perhaps the greatest obstacle to the implementation of Focillon's vision, however, was that few European directors thought of the museum as a fundamentally public educational "milieu."

^{68 &}quot;Le Musée de Sculpture Comparée du Trocadéro à Paris," in "La Vie des Musées," in Mouseion Vol. 1 (1927), 39.

⁶⁹ Francesco Sapori, "Réorganisation des galleries et Musées Nationaux d'Italie," in Mouseion Vol I (1927), 205-221.

⁷⁰ "Folk Arts and Workers' Leisure: An Enquiry by the IICI," in Bulletin of Intellectual Cooperation (Oct Nov 1932), 159.

^{71 &}quot;Note," in Bulletin de Coopération Intellectuelle 22-23: L'art par le peuple (1932), 1214.

⁷² Nationalism and Ethnography in Museums in the 1930s.

This aversion to education was made clear at a "Conference on the Educational Role of Museums" convened in Paris in October 1927.⁷³ The conference consisted primarily of European museum directors rebutting the suggestion that they follow the "American Model," which was described by the director of the American Association of Museum (AAM), Laurence Vail Coleman. The need to attract "the advice of an American expert" had been requested from Geneva—and Coleman did not disappoint. He described American museums as "extensive educational institution." By this he meant that they "exist for the purpose of raising the general level of culture and enlightenment in the community rather than devoting themselves to special interests of any one class or group." Despite this rather grandiose democratic language, Coleman spoke with great lucidity of the administrative and financial underpinnings of the AAM's associative solidarity:

There are several possible explanations of the close ties of mutual interest which bind all of our museums together, but administrative considerations seem largely to be responsible. Each American museum is governed by a board of so-called trustees, each trustee being a public spirited citizen and a man of affairs.

. . .

A second bond between American museums is the fact that most of them are similarly supported. They receive on the one hand gifts from private sources and on the other appropriations from public treasuries. The common experience of seeking adequate support and justifying it by commensurate public service gives museums many interests in common.⁷⁴

By describing this feedback loop, between the educational mandate of US museums, their funding and taxation structure, and their public service, Coleman painted a picture of an "associative" network, in the manner Focillon had suggested. Clearly the AAM was supposed to stand as model for the OIM. Mouseion reported yearly on the activities of the AAM.

Ironically, by the 1920s the American museum system was transforming towards a European model. As Paul DiMaggio has shown, the AAM experienced unprecedented growth in this period, fueled in large part by the support of the Carnegie Corporation, of which it was the "principal client." Yet as "the early emphasis on education shifted markedly toward acquisition and connoisseurship as soon as aesthetic standards were articulated and art works embodying these standards came within grasp of American collectors. By 1920, the art museum's organization reflected the ideal and status interests of the urban social elites who governed them."⁷⁵ Indeed by the

^{73 &}quot;Programme de l'Office International des Musées," Première Réunion d'Experts. (Genève, 13 et 14 jan 1927). "La réunion attache une telle importance aux diverses façons dont les musées peuvent remplir leur rôle éducatif et contribuer à la culture générale qu'elle croit désirable la convocation d'une réunion ayant cet objet spécial, pouvant enregistrer les réalisations déjà obtenues dans cet ordre d'idées et examiner les suggestion en vue de l'extension et du développement de ces méthodes, avec l'assistance, si possible, de spécialistes américains. »

⁷⁴ Laurence Vail Coleman, "Education by American Museums," in Mouseion Vol. I (1927), 268-271.

⁷⁵ Paul DiMaggio, "Constructing an Organizational Field as a Professional Project: US Art Museums, 1920-1940," in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Ed. Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, (Chicago: University of Chicago

time Coleman traveled to Paris to advertise the public dedication of the American Museum, the AAM was engaged in an internal debate about the relative value of public participation and art acquisition, with elite museums like the MFA attempting to distance themselves from public obligations. From the European perspective, however, the AAM appeared homogeneous, and Coleman delivered a critique of what he perceived as the "static" museums of Europe:

In Europe a museum might be defined as a collection. In America, it would be defined as an organization which employs the collection for specific purposes. The call to action binds American museums together; the acceptance of the idea of a static museum holds European museums apart.

The distinction between "The European conception" and the "American conception" was repeated throughout the conference, although it was rephrased by Max Frideländer as a matter of precedence between "form" and "function:"

The essential difference between European and American museums seems to lie in the fact that European museums were formed before a clear idea of the museum's function had been set. They developed autonomously, whereas in America the reasons for studying at the museum was anterior to their function.⁷⁶

The implication was that European institutions had an intrinsic core that needed to be preserved against purposeful instrumentalizations.

Most European curators responded to Coleman's critique by defending the museum hierarchy of their home country, either for the sake of preserving art-historical expertise or for the sake of a paternalist approach to education. "American-Style" experiments that had been made in Germany, Max Friedlander attested, had proved unsuccessful. Since "the formation of the conservator is not apt to put him on the level of a popular audience, it is preferable to educate school teachers." Similarly, the Italian minister referred to the reform of education under Benedetto Croce, which made the history of art a mandatory subject in secondary school, thereby eliminating the need for conservators to address non-specialists. Both suggested that instead of training curators to talk to children (and halfway through the conference "children" began to stand in for any unspecialized audience) one could simply teach schoolteachers to speak about art. The delegates from France and the Netherlands, advocated a more gradual approach, using the diversity of museum types to educate the public's taste in art. The director of the Rijksmuseum proposed three "stages" of appreciation "from museum of natural history, to historic museum, and finally to the art museum."

Press, 1991), 269. DiMaggio also chronicled the formative years of the museum and other cultural institutions ("American art museums originated in the late nineteenth century as educational institutions dedicated to refining national taste.") in "Cultural Entrepreneurship in Nineteenth-Century Boston," in Non Profit enterprise in the Arts: Studies in Mission and Constraint (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 42-61.

⁷⁶ Max Friedländer, "Rôle éducatif des musées: méthodes actuelles et résultats," in Mouseion Vol. II (1928), 253.

For the Louvre's Louis Hautecoeur, the introduction would be done through "natural history," then onto "to local history," and only special individuals would be selected for an appreciation of "beauty" in art. All proposed to separate the "function" of the museum from its "form", and hoped to instill appreciation of one before confronting the other. This was far from Focillon's organicist, behaviorist, and ultimately populist notion that it was precisely by circulating around art that museums could be activated for an international cause. Whatever its conceptual deficiencies, Focillon's liberal politics of form took the museum seriously as an aesthetic medium.

The OIM entered the 1930s having already shifted away from the educational ideals of Focillon's proposal. Mouseion did produce a network of institutions, which successfully brought a circulation of ideas, of information, of publications, of sales catalogues, etc, amongst museums. The journal's organization reflected both its vitalist ideals and its indexical reality; rubrics included "The Life of Museums" and "Museum Catalogues." Other OIM publications also show that the two models of "super-museum" and "ready-made cooperation" continued to compete. On the one hand, the OIM published Repertoires of collections and of museums; on the other hand, it compiled "Technical manuals." The order in which inventories were published exemplify where real power lay in the commission: the first was for Holland, the second for Poland, then, France. (fig 1.10) These two parallel trends (the "re-organization" of national collections and their international inventorying) were reported with equal frequency in Mouseion—so much so that, by the end of the decade a regular reader would have the impression that an international index "was increasingly filling up with records, while the national museums were increasingly emptying out of objects. In an early embodiment of what later cultural figures would call the "imaginary museum," the more the "super-museum" was full, the emptier the "life of museums." (fig 1.08)

The OIM also published a series of Technical Manuals, whose themes were determined by the OIM's original program, which was methodically and sequentially addressed in a series of Conferences throughout the 1930s. The first conference, on "The Conservation of Museum Objects," took place in Rome in October 1930.⁷⁸ Following closely behind, and prompted by suggestions made in Rome, was the Athens Conference on the Conservation of Monuments in 1931. The third was a Conference on the Architecture of Museums in Madrid in 1934, the fourth was a Cairo Conference on archaeological finds in 1937. Each conference was followed by the creation of a

⁷⁷ M. Colasanti and Louis Hautecoeur, in "Rôle Educatif des Musées: Méthodes Actuelles et Résultats," 257-258.

⁷⁸ See "Conclusions adoptées par la conférence internationale pour l'étude des méthodes scientifiques appliqués à l'Examen et la Conservation des oeuvres d'art Rome 13-17," in Mouseoin Vol. 13-14, No. 1 (1931), 2.

rubric in Mouseion—after 1932, the informational supplement to Mouseion was renamed Musées et Monuments; after 1934 Mouseion began to feature a "museography" section, etc. In fact, for most of the 1930s the papers in Mouseion in consisted of undeniably "super-indexical" reports, interrupted by the proceedings of all the conferences. The ballooning effect of publishing these conference proceedings eventually led to the division of "news" from "doctrine;" in 1932 a monthly information bulletin titled Museums and Monuments was inaugurated.⁷⁹ (fig 1.11)

The significance of this "Conference model" of cooperation is that each conference theme allowed the OIM to expand into neighboring fields, bringing back a new kind of expert into 'ready-made' cooperation. None of these technical "themes" spun off into autonomous committees; instead these thematic gatherings lent to the OIM an aspect that it lacked by itself. As we will see in Chapter 3, the Museography conference opened the field of "space" itself for discussion and served as a filter for architectural modernism to enter the international discussion. (fig 1.07) As we will see in Chapter 4, the Archaeology conference addressed territorial issues and became the primary site for a redefinition of "exchange" between cultural institutions. What did the Athens Conference give to the OIM, and what did it get in return? In the next section I argue that the field of monument conservation inherited from the OIM the idea of a regular "maintenance" of monuments—a regularity that was crucial for the projection of an international order onto monuments—and gave back a broader, more inclusive spatial image to the idea of the 'life' of art, both by way of a broader regional network and by technical discussions of city life.

Athens: The International Monument

The 1931 Athens Conference on Monuments was convened as "a logical sequel" of the 1930 Rome Conference on Museum Objects.⁸¹ (fig 1.12) The Rome Conference had given a definitively "technical" answer to the question of the museum as "milieu," and the Athens conference was to do the same for monuments: "the conservation of architectural monuments deals with problems of such a particular nature," the OIM Governing Board wrote in its preliminary report, that the

⁷⁹ (In comparison the magazine Museum of the AAM displays a consistency that reveals the stability of the professional network of which it was an image. In 1946 the ICOM took the name "museum international" and the ICOM was largely taken over by French and American interests.).

⁸⁰ Conférence Internationale des Fouilles Le Caire: 1937. Reprinted in Mouseion, I-II (1939).

^{81 &}quot;Suite logique et nécessaire du programme de Rome, elle sera consacrée à la fois aux problèmes relatifs à la protection et à la conservation des monuments d'art et d'histoire et viendra compléter le cycle des problèmes de conservation ressortissant aux trois grandes divisions des arts plastiques : peintures, sculptures, architecture, dont l'étude est prévue par les statuts de l'Office. » « L'activité de l'Office International des Musées, Rapport présenté à la XIIIe Session de la Commission internationale de Coopération Intellectuelle par M. Jules Destrée, » in Mouseion, Vol. 16 No. IV (1931), 103.

specialists gathered in Rome were not qualified to address them. Although this implied that an entirely new set of characters was to enter the realm of intellectual cooperation, their entrance was staged to correspond to expectations set by the Board. At its April 1930 meeting, the board outlined three spheres of interest ("legal, doctrinary, and technical") and composed a conference agenda that nested them one into the other: beginning with a legal survey of a national present (I), ending with an international future(VI), and spanning doctrine (II) and technique (III-V) in between:

- I. Exposition of different legislations for the protection and conservation of artistic and historic monuments
- II. Monument restoration. Doctrine.
- III. Deteriorations due to the passage of time and to atmospheric agents.
- IV. The Surroundings of monuments
- V. Use of Monuments
- VI. What are the particular points on which it would be desirable that the OIM take an initiative, for further study or for further action? 82

In advance of the conference, a legal committee was appointed to gather information about national legislations and study precedents for cooperation, including the specific possibility of "classifying certain objects as "heritage of mankind," thereby implying certain international obligations." This constitutes one of the earliest articulations of the idea of "the heritage of mankind," but the label was to be used with great discrimination: "to be classified in this last category of objects," the Board continued, "works would have to be of a truly unique interest in the artistic patrimony of the country in which they are found." In other words, monuments were to be national monuments first, international heritage only secondly, and uniquely.

By making "heritage" an international exception to a national norm, the OIM Board was taking direct inspiration from a paper given by an Italian jurist, Antonio Fabrizi, at the 1921 Paris Conference (the same conference where Focillon had pleaded for a "liberalization of museums"). In a paper titled "International Agreement (Entente) for the Defense of Monuments of Art," Fabrizi addressed two principles of international cooperation which were "already pervasive in the minds of jurists." The first was that art belongs, conceptually, to "all of mankind":

The first principles establishes that artistic monuments, whether movable or immovable ... belong to all of mankind, so to speak, since they are the surest documentation of its material life, its sentiments and its tendency for betterment and progress. All of mankind has collaborated to the production of these monuments, although their material execution was the product of a small number of chosen ones. 84

^{82 &}quot;L'Activité de l'Office International des Musées," Mouseoin No 14, 92-94.

^{83 &}quot;L'Activité de l'Office International des Musées," Mouseoin No 14, 92-94.

⁸⁴ Alfred Fabrizi, "Entente Internationale pour la Défense des Monuments d'Art," in Actes du Congrès de l'Histoire de l'Art, Paris 26 Sep – 5 Oct 1921, Vol 1 (Pris: PUF, 1923), 220-226

Since art is the product of a unique, collective and vicarious type of authorship, Fabrizi derived from it the basis for the possibility of an "international entente" between "civilized" nations. This collective clause allowed him to exclude those countries which did not "share the same civilization:" such an international understanding, he added, was only possible in countries that already had national legislation in place. Fabrizi noted the apparent contradiction between private property and this idea of "guardianship," recognizing that national legislations over monuments usually only allowed for "control," "protection," "regulation," and "surveillance" of monuments rather than actual "ownership" of them.

While Fabrizi's first principle abstracted "property" into an international generality, the second principle abstracted "place" into a national specificity, attaching monuments to a specific location. Therefore the second principle was in tension with the first:

The second principle concerning artworks of a monumental character is less general than the first, and consists of the following: that works of art are "inseparable from the country where they were created." Indeed, aside from the very understandable malaise that is felt in national sentiment of peoples who consider it an injury when any of their masterpieces is exported, it is evident that the place that is best suited to the study of a masterpiece is the place where it was created.⁸⁵

This second principle of "inseparability" collapsed three forms of attachment into one: the aesthetic attachment of a "creation" to its place of origin, the sentimental attachment of a monument to "a people," and its disciplinary attachment to a context "for study." Furthermore, the principle stipulated that the nation—state was the best way to inscribe all three of these values geographically. Fabrizi resolved this tension by introducing a distinction between "movable" monument (subject to a relational law and bilateral agreements) and "immovable" property, (subject to a positive declarative law and international conventions). ⁸⁶ In so doing, he produced a text that expressed a fundamental tension between international value and national appurtenance, with an emphasis on mobility that reveals the weight of World War I and the issues of damage and restitutions that had arisen from it. In fact, the OIM board presented the Athens Conference as long-awaited follow-up to

⁸⁵ Fabrizi, 222.

⁸⁶ In the case of stationary monuments, "any international agreement would be limited to their conservation, whether they belong to the state to communities or to private individuals." The only cause for which international action might be required was to "declaration as monument of a building that the nation which possesses it has not yet declared as such." In other words, if a monument could not be moved, all that international action could do was to designate monuments as such. In contrast, artworks which were subject to movement could benefit from international action and arbitration in order to be returned to a "place of origin." To make this point Fabrizi recalled a long tradition of intellectuals protest against pillage and theft, beginning with a 1796 appeal of Quatremère de Quincy to French presence in Italy. Fabrizi, 223.

the 1921 Paris Conference: to Fabrizi's work, to the request for international legislation, to the problem posed by monument conservation, and to the issues that had been raised by World War I.⁸⁷

With characteristic idealism, League advocates used the Athens Conference to reconfigure Fabrizi's two legal principles (the international "belonging" of monuments, and their national "situatedness") so that they were no longer in conflict. Instead these two qualities of monuments were presented, at the close of the Athens Conference, as nested expressions of a single ideal of "international solidarity." This was made clear in a report of the President of the OIM Board, Jules Destrée, who presented the Conference as having produced "two veritable innovations in the international sphere:"

First, there is the admission, on the part of the entire Conference, of this new notion, according to which the preservation of the masterpieces that are the highest expression of civilization is in the interest of the community of peoples. This notion implies a restriction of the right of national property against its intrinsic egoism. 88

In this first principle, the international value of monuments that had been speculated by Fabrizi was stated authoritatively and positively. The second principle, in contrast, was projective: it granted the responsibility for this international value to "the people themselves:"

There is another point, corollary of the first, to which the Athens Conference paid particular attention. The members of this conference have considered that the best guarantee of the conservation of monuments and artworks resides in the attachment that the people themselves carry for them. ⁸⁹

This projection of responsibility onto "the people" represented a subtle but crucial modification of Fabrizi's model: a geographic "inseparability" of the monument and locale had been reduced to a sentimental "attachment" of people to monuments.

Whereas Fabrizi saw these two principles in a state of tension, for Destrée they were merely different expressions of the same "international solidarity." The two main recommendations that the

Restoration des Oeuvres d'Art. Muséographie" in Congrès International (1922), 228-230.

⁸⁷ Indeed many of the debates which were subsequently addressed within the League, concerning both monument conservation and art historical methodology was addressed at this Congress, including multiple American expositions of the educational role of museums and Lionello Venturi's call for a "a history of art criticism." (See L.Venturi, "Histoire de l'Art et Histoire de la Critique," in Actes du Congrès, 167). In addition, the Congress had closed with a resolution to recommend further study of the matter of international legislation, upon request from Venturi and Fabrizi, as well as a resolution to request further study on the conservation of monuments, on the request of Cuypers. "Conservation,

⁸⁸ The original translation in the English version of the Bulletin was: "First, the whole conference agreed to the new idea that the preservation of masterpieces, which represent civilization's highest power of self-expression, is a matter of interest to the community at large. This implies a restriction of the right to national ownership, inso far as this right is of a selfish character.

⁸⁹ Jules Destrée, "Rapport du Président du Comité de Direction de l'Office International des Musées sur les Travaux de la Conférence d'Athènes," in Office International des Musées, La Conservation des Monuments d'Art et d'Histoire [henceforth: CMAH] (Paris: IICI, 1934), 408-410.

Conference had made to the League, therefore, were evidence of a dual course of action. On the one hand, the principle would be demonstrated through the creation of a "procedure susceptible to give to this international solidarity a concrete expression." (This meant that the groups would be able to ask the League to intervene for "the conservation of such and such a monument" without "impeding on national sovereignty.") On the other hand, the principle would be instilled into people's minds by "educational initiatives." (This meant that the League would ask its member states to "ask public authorities to develop in the people the respect for the remains of the past, whatever the civilization and epoch to which they belong.") 90 By the time Destrée drafted recommendations on behalf of the IICI for the League of Nations, the principle of "popular attachment" had become an umbrella concept, a precondition for international valuation of monuments in both "concrete" and "educational" form:

The IICI.

believing that the best guarantee for the conservation of monument and works of art is to be found in the respect and attachment towards them felt by the peoples themselves, and that these feelings can be greatly stimulated by appropriate action on the part of the public authorities,

Requests that the Assembly address the following recommendations to member states:

That Member States should establish closer and more concrete cooperation with each-other for the purpose of ensuring the conservation of works of art.

That Member States should ask educationists to teach children and young people to respect monuments, whatever the civilization of period to which they belong, and that this educative action should also be extended to the general public with a view to associating the latter in the protection of the records of any civilization.⁹¹

Between Fabrizi's 1921 formulation to these 1933 recommendations, two shifts had occurred in the definition of a monument's "attachment" to its site: first, the link between monument and its place of origin had become a link between monument and "people;" second, this principle of attachment had become an overarching principle confirming monument's universal "belonging," rather than contradicting it. This gesture, of using "popular attachment" as an umbrella concept had long-lasting repercussions for the codification of international heritage law in the following decades. The formulation was cited verbatim in all of the OIM's (and later, Unesco's) work leading up to the World Heritage Convention of 1972. It is not until the 1980s that Fabrizi's original distinction between national and international action was rediscovered, by legal scholars seeking to account for

⁹⁰ Destrée, 409.

⁹¹ Original English translation, in "Programme of the International Commission on Historical Monuments," in Bulletin of International Cooperation, (Dec 1933-Jan 1934), 29.

⁹² This included the 1960 Recommendation for international principles for archaeological digs which was based on the 1937 "Régime des Fouilles." As cited in C.A. Beerli, UNESCO: Campagne Internationale des Monuments, Projet préliminaire, (16 Oct 1961), in Brew Archives

restitution disputes.⁹³ In the meantime, all international action was to have a "demonstrative" value, derived from one principle, and conveyed in two different ways. It is all the more crucial, then, to note the difference in the examples that the Athens Conference offered for "concrete" and "educational" forms of action.

What was meant at Athens by "educational initiative" was a deferral of internationalist goals to European nationalism. The priority of nationality over international citizenship had been a main point of doctrine for intellectual cooperation. "The road to internationalism lies through nationalism," wrote Alfred Zimmern in his 1919 Nationality and Government, expressing a paternalist view that national feeling was a necessary stage for the achievement of any international outlook:

Nationality is the one social force capable of maintaining [people's] links with the past ... It is the one force capable of doing so, because it is the one force whose appeal is instinctive and universal."⁹⁴

Thus "nationality [was] an educational, not a political concept." By 1929, when he was the Vice-president of the IICI, Zimmern had turned this theory into a distinction between "true and false" internationalism:

Any fool can book a ticket for a foreign country, just as any fool can learn Esperanto. But contacts so established effect nothing. It is through a deeper exploration and enjoyment of the infinite treasures of the worlds' nationalities by men and women whose vision has been trained and sensibilities refined because they themselves are intimately bound up with a national of their own, that an enduring network of internationalism will some day be knot and a harmony of understanding established in a work of unassailable diversity.⁹⁵

In other words, the function of the IICI was to "refine the sensibility" of peoples—to civilize them—before they could learn from one another. Similarly, OIM Board president Jules Destrée (in some ways the Alfred Zimmern of cooperation in the arts) hoped to "unify mankind around the concept of beauty," by intervening in arts education. He saw the Athens Conference as a significant step towards this unification. "The whole spirit of the Conference," for Destrée, lay in the articulation of this educational imperative: "abstract principles, rules and defenses will never have enough strength alone to safeguard the artistic heritage of mankind; only a personal conviction, ingrained since childhood, will achieve this."

⁹³ It is not until 1986 that John Henry Merryman returned to this conflict between national and international valuations, in "Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property," The American Journal of International Law (Oct 1986), 831-853.

^{94 &}quot;True and False Nationalism," in Nationality and Government, 78.

⁹⁵ Zimmern, "Nationalism and Internationalism," in The Prospect of Democracy (London: Chatto and Windus, 1929), 93.

⁹⁶ E. Foundoukidis, "L'Oeuvre Internationale de Jules Destrée dans le Domaine des Arts," in Mouseion 33-34 (1936), 12.

The most direct expression of this educational principle at Athens was a short speech given by the director of the Parisian Iconographic Society on the education of children to "respect monuments from childhood," but it was the Polish example that best showed the value of monumental nationality. The Chief of Historic monuments in Poland recounted how Prussian, German and Russian administrations had applied varied principles to the country's various monuments. "For lack of a protection by the state, it is the Poles themselves who took matter into their own hands, since this matter was so intimately connected to the question of their national culture." Here the national narrative of Polish liberation from the triple hold of imperialism was presented as a triumph of national coalescence, from which monuments and education had emerged interconnected. By the end of World War I, monument protection had become an mandate of the "National Ministry of Cults and Public Instruction," and monuments were educational instruments, vehicles of national emancipation.

In contrast, what was meant by "concrete cooperation" throughout the Athens Conference was intervention in a colonial context. Calls for the opening of a multilateral channel of action—whether legal or technical—were only made in the places where a paternalist international regime that had been operative since the middle of the 19th Century, through archaeological institutes or colonial administrations. The single most important example of this kind of concrete action was a call to salvage of Island of Philae, in Egypt, which was faced with annual flooding due to the second raising of the Aswan Dam. As Chapter 4 will show, the survey operations that ensued set the stage for post-war redefinitions of "cultural exchange." Belgian conservator Jean Capart made a point of presenting the Philae case as an exception, necessary in places where "popular attachment" to monuments had been severed by historical discontinuities:

Some circles might express discomfort at the thought of an international organization pretending to dictate the actions of to private individuals and public authorities in sovereign countries. ... But there are in the world a certain number of monuments and archeological ensembles whose conservation is of international interest ... for example, the remains of exceptionally brilliant ancient civilizations. Great population movements have created such breaks in traditions that nations currently occupying such and such a territory no longer feel any direct link with the peoples who had built the monuments that now evoke international interest. 99

In other words, whereas European populations felt an uninterrupted "attachment" to the monuments on their soil, countries where intervening "breaks" in historical continuity like Egypt and Greece

⁹⁷ Respect for monuments would become "one of those gestures, one of those figures of speech, one of those sentiments that have become instinctive." Henry Nocq, "Le Role Educatif dans la Conservation des Monuments," in CMAH, 394.

⁹⁸ Jaroslaw Wojciechowski, "Législation des Monuments Historiques en Pologne," CMAH, 142.

⁹⁹ Jean Capart, "International Collaboration for the Conservation of Monuments: the Example of Philae," CMAH, 387.

required an international action. What Capart did not mention was that, like Poland, Egypt already had strict heritage laws in vigor, which had been instituted in order to minimize illegal exports of archaeological finds.

Under the guise of a dichotomy between "concrete" and "educational" internationalism, the Athens Conference presented two standards of action, to be applied in European and non-European contexts. In doing this, it performed a conceptual trick that has now been identified as typical of intellectual cooperation under the League. Recent literature has shown that EH Carr's distinction between "realism" and "idealism" in international diplomacy hides a much more fundamental debate between "imperialism" and internationalism" as two forms of international order which was inherited from the colonial expansions of the late 19th Century. Long and Schmidt, for instance, argued that scholarly focus on the "newness" of the "new diplomacy" concealed the extent to which long-standing debates continued to pervade the preoccupations of the League. They used the International Studies Conference as an example: "The formal agenda of these conferences," they wrote, "concerned classically internationalist topics such as collective security and peaceful change. But the substance of discussion was more often about demographic change and the allocation of colonial dependencies." 100 By analogy, we can say that the Athens Conference agenda addressed classically internationalist topics like "universal heritage" and "attachment of monuments to people," but the substance of the discussion reveals another axis of concern. First, there was the increasing division between "imperialism and internationalism," as evidenced by the distinction between the colonial management of heritage and the trans-national exchange of art. Secondly—and more importantly—the Conference replayed debates that had marked the formation of monument conservation as a discipline, pitting the "interventionism" of Viollet-le-Duc, against the "noninterventionism" of William Morris and John Ruskin. 101

The classic restoration/conservation debates of the late 19th-Century surfaced everywhere in the Athens Conference. The Conference organizers had done enough research to foresee this: OIM Secretary General E. Foundoukidis gave a 1931 radio address on the "technical and doctrinary" ground to be covered by the Conference, which reminded the international community that "two points of view" had been inherited from the 19th Century: "the architectural" and the "archaeological." In this he borrowed a terminology made at the 1921 Paris Conference by a Dutch

¹⁰⁰ David Long and Brian Schmidt, "Introduction" in Imperialism and Internationalism, 14.

 $^{^{101}}$ According to Choay, "the consecration of the historic monument" in the nineteenth century unfolded both through an institutionalization of restoration practices, and a broadening of legal and administrative mechanisms for listing and classifying monuments. Choay, L'invention du patrimoine, 111.

museum conservator, A. Cuypers: the "architectural" aimed to "put the monument back in its primitive state, taking away all additions, all changes that have taken place over the centuries," while "archaeological-historical" action attempted "to conserve anything in the monument that might have acquired a historical value." Cuypers called for a type of "modern restoration" based on an "evolutionary point of view," and Foundoukitis followed his lead, offering the Athens Conference as synthesis. That this architectural/archaeological debate upstaged the "legal" discussions is shown in a revision of the order of the Conference agenda, where legal survey was now preceded by discussions of doctrine:

- I. Doctrines. General Principles
- II. Administrative and Legislative Measures Regarding Historical Monuments
- III. Aesthetic Enhancement of Ancient Monuments
- IV. Restoration Materials
- V. The Deterioration of Ancient Monuments. Scientific study of Methods of Treatment
- VI. The Technique of Conservation. Characteristic examples.
- VII. The Conservation of Monuments and International Collaboration. 103

Each paper in the session on a "Comparative Study of Doctrine" consisted of a national official recounting how the 19th-Century debates led to a contemporary restoration practice, in his own country. Paul Léon, speaking on behalf of France, endorsed Viollet-le-Duc's statement of the fundamental "modernity" of restoration ("Restoration: both the thing and the word are modern") and recounted the three-phase advent this modernity in France: through an "empirical period," a "doctrinal period," and "experimental period." Having now internalized the critique of its opponents, this rationalist tradition had stabilized into a set of national institutions. "Most architects," Léon asserted, "have foregone the reconstruction of buildings as they might have been, and turned to their conservation in the state that history has left them to us. Restoration has turned to conservation." Such temperance was necessary for conservation in a contemporary moment, "a period in which monuments will survive, rather than being resurrected." 104 What Léon advocated was a modest deployment of the rationalist arsenal. In a neat re-enactment of the 19th Century debates, the second speaker was the British president of the Society for the Protection of Ancient Buildings, A.R Powys, who began by recounting the Society's creation, at the initiative of William Morris in London in 1877. Founded largely in reaction to the spread of French-inspired "restoration" practices, the Society followed the principles of "consolidation ... aimed at conserving of those parts of the building that

¹⁰² "L'évolution des idées concernant la restauration des monuments architecturaux et décoratifs depuis le milieu du XIXe Siècle aux Pays-Bas," CMAH, 206-226.

^{103 &}quot;The Conservation of Artistic and Historical Monuments," CMAH, 417-420. Original in English.

¹⁰⁴ Paul Léon, CMAH, 56.

still exist, without replacing those parts that have been damaged by the work of time or of men." Yet he also admitted that "certain kinds of restorations" were acceptable, especially in cases of structural instability or when original parts to buildings were re-discovered. It was no longer the idea of intervening in history at all that the Society resisted, but rather the hybridity of turning monuments into "an assemblage of old and new." 105

Following this exposition of French thesis and British antithesis came an unapologetically Hegelian synthesis on the part of Italian architect-historian Gustavo Giovannoni (1873-1943). Giovannoni began with the critique that Camillo Boito had leveled against Viollet-Le-Duc in the late 19th Century, drawing from this criticality the vision of a new generation of Italian theorists, whose set of "new principles" he enumerated in one run-on sentence:

Severe and rigorous respect of every construction project that contains and artistic or historic aspect, minimization of additions, for the filling of lacuna and the re-alignment of edges, the usage of new materials with no ornamentation and as close as possible to the consistency of the original; prolongation of lines in a style similar only in cases of geometric expressions deprived of any decorative originality; highlighting of additions, either by the use of new materials or by the use of a framing system with no ornamental pretensions, or by signage and epigraphy; respect of the context of a monument; precise documentation of works, by way of analytic reports and photographs illustrating different phases.¹⁰⁶

These principles provided a just equilibrium between "two extreme tendencies," which Giovannoni called "architectural and scientific." Speaking as if a diplomat, Giovannoni granted that sacrifices had to be made for the sake of neutrality. "Like all efforts at conciliation and equilibrium," he wrote, "these efforts will most likely be judged too neutral.... But it is precisely why they appear to be the more felicitous method to adopt today." Giovannoni's approach was also notable for identifying constituencies of monuments, rather than attempting further categorizations of material phenomena. Thus Italian restoration aimed to take into account "the point of view of the erudite, who does not want to loose any trace of the building phases that the building has gone through," the "point of view of the architect, who aims for the architectonic unity of the building and the "point of view of the citizen, who carries particular affection for the monuments of his own city." In this he vaunted that Italian restorers had known to be inspired by "the spirit of the monument." What he meant by "spirit" was a combination of artistic creationism with legal jargon: not only were Italian restorers in metaphysical communion with their objects, but insofar as they adopted theory of restoration, it would be "the spirit, not the letter of this theory" that they followed.

¹⁰⁵ A.R Powys, "La Restoration des Monuments en Grande Bretagne," CMAH, 70-74.

¹⁰⁶ Gustavo Giovannoni, "La Restauration des Monuments en Italie," CMAH, 63.

¹⁰⁷ Giovannoni, CMAH, 66.

Subsequent expositions of "doctrine" repeated this pattern: recounting disciplinary debates, tracing their effects in specific national, typological, or stylistic spheres, and announcing that an age of synthesis had arrived. The Spanish representative began with the influence of Viollet-le-Duc on late-19th Century Spain, continued with "contestations" of this system at the turn of the century, and culminated in the creation of a National Restoration Service, operating since the teens under the principles of a "new spirit." Given the diversity of architectural styles at hand, he declared himself against "the establishment of general rules" for conservation, asking instead for a "general orientation," guided by "respect for the old," avoidance additive building, and maintenance of the "artistic effect" of the existing work. 108 He too spoke in conciliatory terms, calling for "eclecticism and elasticity." Even statements of doctrine that were not country-specific depicted an inherited bipolarity to be sublated into scientific categories. Belgian architect Jean Hendricks rephrased the debate in medical terms and proposed a six-class categorization of monuments and their state of health. 109 Similarly, the Belgian conservator Paul Saintevoy admitted that the debate had for him been settled by the mere fact that "everything in nature gets destroyed" and proposed to correlate the amount of usage of buildings with different levels of "patina." Finally, even the last exposition of doctrine, a defense of "the historic and rational restoration" given by Polish conservator A. Lauterbach, was conciliatory in its admission that the original rationalist tradition had been imbued with too much romanticism. 111 He proposed to resolve this with a theory/practice dichotomy, wherein "in theory only conservation is allowed, but in practice restoration cannot be omitted." 112

What did the Athens Conference contribute to these debates? Notwithstanding the conciliatory tone of these opening speeches, the conference papers revealed that the two principal poles of conservation theory still existed, and that national legislations could do little more than offer

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¹⁰⁸ L. Torres Balbas, "La Restauration des Monuments en Espagne," CMAH, 66-69.

¹⁰⁹ "Reconstruction and restoration are audacious attempts to heal, or even to resurrect monuments" while "protection, maintenance, consolidation and partial reconstruction of buildings ... [which] instead of attempting the total healing of the monument, only aim to fight against the ill that ails them." The diagnostic range went from "monuments in a state of near-perfect preservation" to "ruins," spanning "buildings still standing but risking collapse" and "buildings that have been despoiled of ornament." Jean Hendricks, "Consolidation et Réfection des Monuments," CMAH, 90-91 "Must we restore monuments? We could debate this at great lengths, but in my opinion, a side has been taken by an overwhelming assumption: everything in nature gets destroyed." Paul Saintenoy, "La Restauration des monuments: principes généraux," CMAH, 81-83

¹¹¹ A. Lauterbach, "Restauration historique et rationelle des Monuments," CMAH, 79.

¹¹² Lauterbach made perhaps the most Rieglian attempt to establish a connection between practices applied to monuments and the values attributed to them. The problem was therefore that too much "artistic value" had come to be projected onto buildings which had really only "historic value." He concluded, "the principle of "historic" restoration is therefore based upon the relative value of the monument" but remained "the most rational and the least risky" available.

classifications. Indeed preservation historians agree that from the point of view of doctrine, the restoration/conservation debates had been resolved by the late 1870s, but that in practice historicist "restorations" continued well into the 20th Century. ¹¹³ In the context of this disconnect between administrative practices and theoretical doctrine, the Athens Conference signaled a threefold shift in the way these two doctrinal poles were addressed. First, it identified a new set of threats and causes of decay; second, it rephrased the "technical" problem of maintenance in terms of an organic integrity; third, it applied bureaucratic principles to monument conservation in order to integrate them into political life.

Certainly the gathering of national representatives had the effect of softening the absolute opposition between "architectural" and "archaeological" doctrines. This softening was validated by descriptions of technical conditions for work: it was no longer in a range of extremes between complete abandonment and total reconstruction that most European restorers operated. The very presence of "administrative and legal" limits meant that the possibility for complete reconstructions favored by rationalists was increasingly regulated by state agencies. Conversely, the "natural decay" to which romantic critics had imagined abandoning monuments was increasingly interrupted by other factors. The contingent forces of deterioration, whether attributed to the effects of "nature" or to the passing of "history," produced effects that were increasingly difficult to aestheticize as "sublime" or "picturesque." This second generation of restorers was, for instance, increasingly encountering already-restored monuments:

The conservation of monuments unfortunately does not consist only in protecting of buildings against deterioration produced by age or natural decrepitude; but also to repairing the errors that our predecessors have made. 114

Whereas 19th Century theorists imagined that monuments were either restored or not, the 20th Century monument was likely to be an already-restored hybrid. Furthermore, monuments were no longer depicted as existing in an abstract space, but rather in a changing and complex urban environment. The growth of city planning and its technologies was perceived as a major new force to contend with, including in its modernist undercurrent:

¹¹³ Wim Denslagen notes that the dispute might well have been settled by Morris' 1877 manifesto. "In practice, however, few concerned themselves with these principles." He sees this realization delayed until the 1960s and makes this point for various countries in his introduction to Architectural Restoration in Western Europe: Tradition and Continuity (Amsterdam: A & NP, 1994), 12-31. Rudy Koshar, uses Riegl as starting point for this delay in German-speaking countries, "if conservationist theories carried the day, in practical terms many preservationists, builders, and state officials continued to restore historic buildings and sites. It could be argued that restorationism became stronger, not seaker, iesecially in response to the depredations of the world wars." Koshar, "On Cults and Cultists," in Giving Preservation a History ed. Page & Mason (New York: Routledge, 2004), 51.

¹¹⁴ Justus Schmidt, "Méthode pratique de conservation des monuments en Autriche," CMAH, 222.

I know from experience how difficult it is sometimes to save monuments that are threatened: you run against urbanism with its alignments (which are inexhaurable) and its hygiene (which must be achieved) or against the modern spirit, with a modernism that cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the past. 115

Yet modernism was only one type of threat that arose from the urbanization of monumental contexts. Infinitely more urgent, for the participants, were the dangers of advertising and vandalism. Similarly, the definition of a ruin was significantly modified in the case of colonial climates:

The conservation of monuments encounters in the Orient difficulties that are entirely different from those of the Occident. Exuberant vegetation, great daytime heat followed by considerable nighttime cooling, as well as the earthquakes to which these countries are subjected are so many factors that produce ruins instantly. 116

The implication of this differentiation between Orient and Occident was that an "instant" ruin was hardly a "ruin" at all, since it could not bear the melancholic projection that had been the source of its value in temperate climates.

Perhaps the most vivid example of a type of decay that caused a re-thinking of conventional restoration debates was offered by Austrian representative Justus Schmidt, who argued that the primary international threat associated with city planning was the urbanization of Europe's pigeon population:

One of the most important measures that have recently been instituted by the Austrian Historic Monuments Office and should be of greatest interest to the international community, was the initiative concerning the deteriorations that are caused by birds, and particularly, by pigeons.

A significant proliferation of birds—and particularly of the pigeon population—has been recorded across the large cities of Europe. This phenomenon is apparently explicated by a growing favor these birds encounter with citizens, who ensure they are regularly fed. 117

Having identified the pigeon as a hybrid urban-natural threat to European monuments, Schmidt then recounted in great detail his negotiations with Austrian animal protection agencies. Here the great clash between civilizational and natural forces that had been dramatized by 19th Century critics was re-enacted in petty form: the pigeons and monuments of Europe were competing for the affections of city populations, each waiting to be collectively domesticated.

All of these new threats were addressed through a vitalist conception of "the life of monuments" adapted from the OIM's idea of "the life of museums." This constitutes the Athens Conference's second, and most detailed, contribution to the 19th Century patrimonial debates: that monuments were centers of city life and their maintenance was to be enacted organically, from

¹¹⁵ Paul Léon, "La Restauration des Monuments: Principes Généraux," CMAH, 80.

¹¹⁶ F. A. Moojen, "La Conservation des Monuments aux Indes Néerlandaises," CMAH,

¹¹⁷ Schmidt, CMAH, 223.

within and from without. Foundoukidis had already described the monument's predicament as a heightening of Focillon's vitalist schema. "The life of an architectural monument, more so than that of a work of art conserved in a museum, is in a tight and constant relationship with the particular conditions of a country in which it is found." Applied to buildings, this vitalist notion acquired a specificity far beyond the abstraction of the "life of the museum," where art objects are surrounded by "talking tours." In part, this was due to the inherited discourse: the conception of buildings as living organisms had permeated the thought of 19th Century thinkers for whom architecture and restoration were continuous. In Athens, however, it was primarily an urban, functionalist transposition of organicism that was incorporated into preservation discourse. Monumental autonomy was defined as an equilibrium activated from within (from the material existence of the monuments itself) and from without (through the design of the boundaries between object and its milieu.) This balance was made clear in the theme of the two main "technical" sessions, titled "The Surroundings of Monuments" and "The Use of New Materials in Monument Conservation."

The section on "The surroundings of monuments" asserted the inherent relationship of monuments with their urban contexts. "The beauty of cities," Italian architect Giorgio Nicodemi wrote, "comes from the rhythm that has been created over the centuries, between monuments houses, and nature, by generations of architects acting in an almost unconscious collaboration." Here the collective value of monuments supported their material and aesthetic connection to their surroundings. In contrast, Belgian architect Victor Horta spoke of the tension between urban life and monuments conservation: "while monuments require permanence, city life requires constant change." So as to avoid creating "museum-cities, or dead cities," Horta proposed a set of "general laws" for the urban "valorization" emanating from monuments themselves, based on an aesthetic projection of perception around the monument. He began by drawing three perimeters around the monuments, from "free space" to "access road":

The surroundings of Monuments consist of three essential parts:

- 1. The open space (espace libre) between the monument and its surrounding
- 2. The surrounding (entourage) which consists of utilitarian or decorative buildings
- 3. Access to the surroundings, which is to say, the public roads that grant access to it. 121

¹¹⁸ Foundoukitis, Ibid.

¹¹⁹ An overview of the organicist roots of modern architecture is provided by Caroline van Eck in "Organicism in Nineteenth-Century Architecture: An Inquiry into Its Theoretical and Philosophical Background," in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, (Summer, 1997), 346-347. A detailed analysis of the entrance of the word "function" in 19th Century architectural French discourse, is in Paula Young Lee, "The meaning of molluscs: Léonce Reynaud and the Cuvier-Geoffroy debate of 1830, Paris," in Journal of architecture (Fall 1998), 211-240. For a recent recounting of all the meanings of "function" in modern architecture see Adrian Forty, "Function," in Words and Buildings: A Vocabulary of Modern Architecture

¹²⁰ Giorgio Nicodemi, "L'environnement des monuments," CMAH, 170.

¹²¹ Victor Horta, "L'entourage des monuments," CMAH, 150-151.

Horta then proposed a set of "aesthetic rules" emanating "from the architecture of the principal building," and extending to "open space." Based on a stylistic distinction between "horizontal and vertical" architectures (i.e., classical and gothic), the rule revolved around a single 45 degree line, drawn from the top of the monument into the ground: horizontal buildings required an espace libre which expanded past the line, while vertical buildings required a narrower space than the area delimited by this same 45 degree line. Horta's rules reflect a progressive focusing on the technical rules of the aesthetic effect of monument, and a clear attempt to make a link between the "liberalizing" effect of heritage and the "liberation" of monuments from their surroundings.

The session on "The use of modern materials for restoration" brought the vitalist maintenance imperative into the monuments' structural core. Whereas discussions of urbanism revealed some anxieties about cohabitation with modern buildings, an undeniably progressive tone pervaded these discussions. Paul Léon explicitly highlighted the service that modern architecture had rendered to preservation practices by creating new materials:

It is singularly paradoxical that modern architecture, which had clearly broken with ancient construction traditions..., by its universal use of molded and plastered materials, should have helped so powerfully to conserve ancient monuments, to which it is radically foreign in principles, and which it is destined eventually to replace.¹²²

Modernism had provided a new life to the skeletal structure for all monuments—and Léon implied that all monuments were therefore all becoming modern, from within. Léon and Horta offered different interpretations of the "life" of monuments. Prefiguring his 1951 La Vie Des Monuments Français, Léon hoped to write destruction into the history of French architecture would help to moderate the radicality of French modernist architectural rhetoric. As for Horta, he channeled into urbanistic formalism the vitalism he had once expressed more literally as a pioneer of the Art Nouveau, with a rigidity and conservatism that had already earned him the label of retrograde as judge for the infamous League of Nations competition in 1926. 124

While Léon abdicated "the spirit of the age" to modernism as a pervasive architectural force, and Horta regulated monumental resistance to this force in geometric terms, it was Gustavo Giovannoni who was alone in theorizing the need to rethink conservation at both a material and an urban scale. Giovannoni was both a historian and an architect, and has now been described as "the central figure in the elaboration of a method for the history of architecture that served as the basis for

¹²² Paul Léon, "La Restauration des Monuments en France," CMAH, 58.

¹²³ Paul Léon, La Vie des Monuments Français, Destruction Restauration (Paris: Picard, 1951).

¹²⁴ By this time Horta had been discredited for abandoning his avant-garde roots; in Barry Bergdoll's words, "as president of the jury for the infamous [League of Nations] competition Horta's reputation as a rear-guard had been sealed." Barry Bergdoll, "Brussels: Horta," in The Burlington Magazine, (Feb. 1997), 137.

the definition of a historical-architectural discipline," for which Italian historiography is now known. For Giovannoni, material and urban "integration" of monuments into life were but two components of a single theory of "the integral architect" that he had been developing since the turn of the century. He brought this theory with him to Athens, giving two separate interventions. First, he advocated the expansion of conservation to vernacular typologies and parts of cities:

There is one fundamental principle on which I would like to insist, and which has taken on considerable importance in Italy. Conservation is no longer a question of attributing—or not—a monumental value to a building, and extending conservation only to those works that are the most beautiful and the most important. Secondary works must also benefit from these privileges when they are sufficiently interesting, whether by their collective character or their relation with more grandiose constructions, or by the testimony they bear on the architecture of various epochs. 126

The modern monument had a "live function" as "an object made for people." Trained as an engineer and engaged in urban planning, Giovannoni advocated the incorporation of monuments into practices of hygiene and realignment characteristic of European urbanism in the teens. Having made this distinction between "live" and "dead" monuments, he then described the technical means of resuscitation. In a second intervention on the use of modern materials, Giovannoni proposed a statement of principle that prefigured by a half-century the theories of "integrity" that Unesco would eventually endorse:

The art and science of restorations must make use, without exception, of all building means that modern technology makes available, and use them as much for the purpose of consolidation as for the goal of re-integration. 128

Thus monuments could be modernized both from within and from without, through a concept of "architectural integrity" (integralité architecturale) which was to replace the idea of "stylistic unity" of the 19th Century restorationists.

To explicate his idea of "integration" Giovannoni went on a "digression on the application of modern architectural techniques for monument restoration," which outlined a two-fold relevance of contemporary architectural techniques for conservators: "on the one hand, the simplicity of

¹²⁵ Maristella Casciato and Barry Fifield, "The Italian Mosaic: The Architect as Historian," in The Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, (Mar2003), 92-101. This article features a diagram of the "School of Rome" which places Giovannoni at the source of an entire geneaology of architectural historians we know now.

¹²⁶ Giovannoni., "La Restauration des monuments en Italie," CMAH, 61.

¹²⁷ See "Gustavo Giovannoni, La naissance de l'architecte intégral en Italie," in Annales de la Recherche Urbaine, (Dec 1989),185-194. As an urbanist Giovannoni was involved in for designing working-class neighborhoods in the style of "barocchetto"— an unassuming and vaguely nostalgic architectural style intended to produce continuity with Italy's past. This was intended as a "progressive response to eclecticism," and also as an alternative to the fascist use of architecture, both in its endorsement of modernism like Terragni's and in its "monumental" tendencies in urban settings. Bruno Reichlin, "Figures of Neorealism in Italian Architecture (Part 1)", Grey Room (Fall 2001), 96.

¹²⁸ Giovannoni, "Les Moyens Modernes de Restauration," CMAH, 181

obtaining effects of mass and of ornament, and on the other constructivism, which is to say, a perfect correspondence of form and structure." Here he paused to critique the direction taken by modern architects and "other ultra-rationalists":

What do we intend by constructivism? Is it a generic and synthetic expression of the special possibilities afforded by new materials and new procedures, or is it the direct expression of constructive elements, whether left grossly bare or stylized? I firmly insist that the first answer is the right one and that the whole history of architecture stands to prove it. To take to the extreme the mechanical expression that is desired by Le Corbusier and other ultra-rationalist modern architects, is to abandon any preoccupation for rhythm, for signification and emotion, for relationships with settings—for everything that makes architecture an art. 129

Far from merely borrowing the materials of modernism, Giovannoni sought to make monument restoration "a true expression of our age" (une sincère expression de notre époque), through the application of modern materials. In other words, Giovannoni saw restoration as a path to an alternate modernity, more modern than modernism itself.

Giovannoni's attack on modernism revealed a cohesive theory of conservation as modern architecture. This theory, along with his role in the codification of the Italian architectural profession in the 20th Century, has earned Giovannoni a particular place in the historiography of Italian modernism. Bruno Zevi noted that while "Giovannoni understood nothing of modern architecture," his ideal of the "integral architect" was not far from the Bauhaus plan for the "total scope of architecture." Similarly, for Manfredo Tafuri, Giovannoni had discovered a special kind of historian's "autonomy" but deployed it to decidedly wrong-headed ends. Tafuri blamed Giovannoni for having been "rediscovered" by a postwar Italian architectural culture eager to preserve its historic cities, provoking a turn away from the CIAM's Athens Charter. This revival was for Tafuri "all the more serious because it was carried out without a clear understanding of what it was postulating." ¹³²

¹²⁹ Giovannoni, "Les Moyens Modernes," CMAH, 180.

¹³⁰ Bruno Zevi, "Gustavo Giovannoni," in Metron 13 (1947), 6. The issue of Metron was delayed so that Zevi could publish his memoriam, expressing the effect of the loss of Giovannoni by modern architects "whom he considered adversaries." Zevi's homage was a harsh critique of a moral and intellectual failure: he saw Giovannoni's work and life as a missed opportunity, his involvement with fascist cultural politics an unforgivable mistake and his aversion to modern architecture an inexplicable blindness—both of which kept him from contributing to Italian modernism the necessary historical foundations it sorely lacked.

¹³¹ Tafuri wrote: "When Italian architectural culture of the 1950s picked up again the question of historical centers, it did not link it directly with the tradition of the modern movement, but, with the excuse of introducing new valencies, turned its back on the Chartes d'Athènes and picked up again Giovannoni." Manfredo Tafuri, Theories and History of Architecture, trans. Dennis Sharp (London: Granada, 1979), 51.

¹³² Tafuri would have preferred that "the past" re-enter the city on the terms of the Athens Charter, as "fetishized" islands of history. "By reducing, in fact, the semantic poly-valency of the ancient textures to the generic concept of organism, by substituting the myth of the figurative unity of the historic center to the study of the dialectic within the urban structures, by producing a neat cut between the old and the new, the modern architects were expressing their guilt complexes towards history and their renunciation of an objective and analytical study. The historical centers were

By this he meant that Giovannoni's urban protectionism was imbued with a deeply nostalgic nationalism which, if not totally continuous with the cultural politics of the fascist state, was at least conveniently adapted to it. Indeed as a historian of Roman architecture, Giovannoni willingly depicted "Rome" as the origin of culture, Bramante as "the most Italian of all Italian architects," and restoration as the practice that would help Italy achieve "world dominion" again. 133 As the editor of the new magazine Palladio Giovannoni had promised "to illustrate Italian monuments, to create around these an awareness and affection, and to demonstrate what grand and almost uninterrupted means of a dominant civilization these are still able to document." 134 Within Giovanoni's world view, restoration was a major Italian contribution to world culture, a unique form of modernity that corresponded to the dawn of a new age of "Italianità." Giovannoni expressed this nationalist ambition in the opening paragraph of his Athens speech: "The restoration of monuments is in Italy a matter of national interest. ... Since Italy has achieved its national unity, and especially since the fascist regime has placed new value into the living forces of the Nation, the restoration of ancient monuments has been the object of intense activity." ¹³⁵ These nationalist opening statements were excised from Françoise Choay's recent re-edition of the Athens Conference proceedings, where an abridged version of Giovannoni's speech appears, beginning with the neutral declaration, "There is one fundamental principle on which I would like to insist." 136 As we will see, Giovannoni's nationalistic view of architectural history did not necessarily place him first among the collaborators of fascist cultural politics, since these tended to favor more frankly modernizing versions of "Italianità." For now it will suffice to note that Giovanoni's intervention at Athens differed from that of all the others in that he was the only one to propose an aesthetic modernism reliant almost entirely on restoration as the model for the architectural practice in the future.

Upon his return to Rome, Giovannoni composed an Italian "Charter of Restoration" (Carta del Restauro) which functioned until 1942 as a norm for Italian conservation. Although this document is now most famous for being the first to articulate a distinction between "live" and "dead"

conceptually enclosed in an abstract dimension: they were, in fact, reduced to unusable festishes." Tafuri, Theories and History, 57.

¹³³ For a commentary on the Bramante analysis that Giovannoni presented to the "circle of architecture lovers" in 1927, see Christof Thoenes, "Bramante: Giovannoni, Il Rinascimento intepretato dall'architettura fascista,"

¹³⁴ Giovannoni Palladio: editorial, (1940) 145-146.

¹³⁵ Giovannoni, CMAH, 60.

¹³⁶ Gustavo Giovannoni, "La Restauration des Monuments en Italie," CMAH, 57.

monuments, it was also blatantly based—sometimes word for word—on Giovannoni's Athens intervention, and included a reference to the work of the Conference, and Italy's triumph in it:¹³⁷

In essence our country was able to demonstrate not only an important amount of work achieved in the salvage, re-integration, and valorization of its wonderful artistic patrimony, but also a set of elevate scientific and artistic principles and an organicity of legal provisions that precede by far those of any other nation. ¹³⁸

Giovannoni saw the organic integration of conservation into the state as a progressive step in the achievement of a bureaucratic form of "scientific and aesthetic" existence. This is no small point: having been a crucial part of the reform and modernization of the Italian architectural profession in the early part of the century, he worked throughout the 1930s to expand the "integration" of conservation into Italian state machinery. As we will see, the relationship between "art and the state" would later bring him back into contact with Intellectual Cooperation at the Venice Biennale Conversation organized by the IICI in 1934. More than a nationalist proposal, Giovannoni's was a bureaucratic blueprint for the integration of restoration practices into the workings of the state—beginning with the fascist state, but continuing to others as well. Noting that "people everywhere" were expressing a renewed interest in monuments, he found that in an age of extremes, the reasonable collective spirit had found refuge in monuments:

It almost seems, in this unfortunate period that humanity is currently traversing, when the violent "winds against the serene life" are thundering, and an invading mechanical civilization inflames minds and lights the artistic spirit, that humanity's sentiment willingly has found refuge in the memory and the art of the past, renewed its affections for the monuments in which the best of antique thought is rendered stable, and attributed to them a new function for life. In the tumultuous and contradictory time in which we live, the survey, the therapy, the re-integration of these remains of past architectures is one of the most characteristic most significant and most continuous, most important themes of our human action. ¹³⁹

For Giovannoni, it was a "therapeutic" potential in architecture itself—in distinct contrast with the other arts—that allowed restoration to lay a claim on "the age." It is undoubtedly because it phrased a nostalgic claim in terms of a theory of modernity that Giovannoni's theory of "integration" was attractive to international organizations in later decades: as a professional ethic.

This brings us to the last, and most important way that the Athens Conference contributed to the patrimonial debates of the late 19th century: by proposing to have them regularly. The "General

¹³⁷ The Charter is reprinted as "Norme per il restauro dei monumenti," in Bollettino d'Arte (Jan 1932). For a commentary and detailed analysis of this and the two following Charters of the Italian 1930s, including Argan's Counter-proposal, see Paolo Nicoloso, "La Carta del Restauro di Giulio Carlo Argan, in Annali di Architettura 1994, 101-115. The Charter is also printed in appendix. It was also printed in Mouseion in 1934.

¹³⁸ Giovannoni, Carta del Restauro, 4.

¹³⁹ Gustavo Giovannoni, "La Conferenza Internazionale di Atene Pel Restauro Dei Monumenti," in Bollettino D'Arte, 408-409

Conclusions" of the Conference, which assigned conclusions to each item of the agenda, opened with the following statement of agreement:

1. Doctrines

The Conference heard the statement of the general principles and doctrines relating to the protection of monuments.

Whatever may be the variety of concrete cases, each of which is open to a different solution, the Conference noted that there predominates in the different countries represented a general tendency to abandon restorations in toto and to avoid the attendant dangers by initiating a system of regular and permanent maintenance calculated to ensure the preservation of the buildings. ¹⁴⁰

In other words, despite remaining divergences over how to preserve monuments, the conference had reached agreement on when monuments should be preserved: regularly. In a way, this was merely a way for the conference to express collectively the creed of "conserve, not restore" that had been uttered so many time by its participants. But when expressed as an international bureaucratic method, this resolution represented a significant shift from the international debates of the 19th century, where individual monuments acted as catalysts for debates between ideologically opposed camps. Here, the mere tendency to shift away from "total" reconstructions allowed a space for the institution of preservation to be established: maintenance came first, technical and ideological debates came second. The parallel with the institution of "conference diplomacy" and the League are blatant: like the League of Nations, which was devoted to the maintenance of regular international relations, the OIM proposed to institute a regular regime of maintenance for monuments. Both systems were designed to replace ad-hoc, purpose-based practices (addressing specific conflicts when they arose / monuments when they needed restoring) with regularized, bureaucratic, regimes of care (maintaining international relations between states / maintaining monuments in a state of upkeep.) In other words, the Athens Conference placed the monuments of Europe in what Harold Nicholson called "a permanent state of conference." While the analogy between buildings and states was never explicitly made, the Athens Conference and the OIM projected onto monuments the legitimacy and self-sustaining political power that the League of Nations professed to give to its member states. It is this regularization that constitutes the primary contribution of the Athens Charter to 20th Century preservation.

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¹⁴⁰ "Conclusions of the Conference," [Original English translation, 28-29] as re-printed in an appendix in CMAH, 448.

¹⁴¹ Nicholson, 89. "The method of diplomacy by conference... I do not mean several ad hoc conferences; some of these were necessary, such as Spa, Cannes, Genoa, Lausanne, Stresa and son on. I am referring rather to the permaent state of conference introduced by the League System and later the United Nations. These conferences to little to Satisfy the vague desire for what is called open diplomacy; but they do much to diminish the utility of professional diplomatists and, in that they entail much publicity, many rumors, and wide speculation, —in that they tempt politicians to achieve quick, spectacular and often fictitious results, —they tend to promote rather than allay suspicion, and to create those very states of uncertainty which it is the purpose of good diplomatic method to prevent.

That the Athens Conference intended to place monuments in a "constant state of conference" is perhaps best evidenced in the type of committee that was created in its aftermath, the International Commission on Historical Monuments. Composed exclusively of "representatives of national fine arts administrations,"142 the commission was to be "an international body whose members would have the competence and authority to give an official character to their deliberations and findings." All 28 member states were included, (unlike the OIM board which was composed of those museum officials with the most power,) the roster of membership offered a snapshot of the types of arts administration which ruled in 1935: some were keepers of "state collections," others were "chief archaeologists" and heads of antiquities departments, some ministers of various branches of government, from art to education, academic deans, and—all ending with the US Director of the National Park Services. (fig 1.16) The mandate of the commission, however, was still written by a small advisory board composed of influential museum directors, in the broadest possible terms:

The International Commission on Historical Monuments was formed to meet the need to co-ordinate the efforts made in every country towards the conservation of testimonies of the past; its first task will be to promote the establishment of organizations responsible for such work in countries where none so far exist; late it will endeavor to facilitate discussions, exchange of documents and technicians; to constitute a collection of international documentation for the general benefit; to study the solution of problems referred to it by the administrations, and, lastly, to develop in the public mind an everincreasing respect for monuments and a spirit of international solidarity. 143

In order to set a single basis for this international bureaucratic action, the same meeting of experts defined "monuments" negatively, as that which is maintained by the state:

Generally speaking, it may be said that the designation "historical monument" applies to an edifice the conservation of which is of interest to the community by reason of its significance for history and, in particular, for the history of art. 144

The goals of this conservation, then, were divided into moral, legal and technical action—with international "documentation" a cumulative fourth:

- 1. Moral and educative action
- 2. Legislative and Administrative Action
- 3. Technical Action
- 4. International Documentation. 145

¹⁴² Bulletin, 30.

¹⁴³ Ibid. This expert committee was chaired by Giovannoni's colleague, Roberto Paribeni of Italy, with Oruerta y Duarte, Director-General of Fine Arts in Spain, Petrin of the Bundesdenkmalamt in Austria, Radford of Historic Monuments in Britain, and Hautecoeur of the Louvre in Paris.

¹⁴⁴ Meeting of a committee of experts on 21 and 22 November 1933, to "lay down the aims, composition and the functioning of the future Commission." Cited in Bulletin of Intellectual Cooperation, (Dec 1933-Jan 1934), 30.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid

This four-part mission replicated the structure of the Athens Charter, with slight replacements: "statements of doctrine" now became "educative" principles, and "international sphere" was now reduced purely to "documentation." Perhaps most importantly, the replacement of doctrine with education meant that a monumental value was now dispersed into the population, "beginning in childhood and reaching adults as well, of all social classes." That the international value of monuments was therefore now to be understood as political is evidenced in the re-definition of the main threat to monuments, in terms of vandalism and collective psychology:

It also happens that public opinion demands the destruction of this or that testimony of the past which offends a people's national, political, racial, religious or social sensibility. These psychological reactions, particularly marked in countries which have suffered under foreign domination, have already had all too many occasions to manifest themselves. To counter these manifestations, and facilitate the work of public agencies, often powerless in the face of these exigencies of public opinion, the OIM will work to develop a spirit of tolerance and of international solidarity. 146

Despite the fact that few of the interventions at the Athens Conference had dealt with these specific vandalist threats, the Monuments Committee still used the Conference to establish that monuments were to be treated exactly as political relations were to be treated within the League of Nations: by institutions relying on regular maintenance (rather than as isolated events) and with the assumption that international goodwill permeates them (rather than that chaos is default.)

Monuments became a concern of international diplomacy only insofar as they were contained within museums, where regular maintenance was not a matter of debate but a fundamental assumption. Far from an accident of bureaucracy, this was an essential step in formalizing the international "guardianship" of monuments. A reciprocal benefit between museums and monuments developed, which revolved around the conception of space as integrating aesthetics organically into urban, political, modern "life." Monuments inherited from museums the idea of having a regularized "life" which needed to be maintained by material and environmental "temperance." What the OIM got from monuments, in return, was a regional expansion of its scope and a broader "regionalization" of its network. However, this nesting of monuments in museums also means that efforts to produce an international institution, whether "legal" or "bureaucratic," devoted to conservation were never fully realized. Little progress was made by way of inter-state cooperation in technical matters. The Philae monuments were dealt with in bilateral arrangements

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¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

between US archaeologists and the UK engineers in charge of the dam.¹⁴⁷ While Mouseon published the progress of national administrations in classifying and legislating monuments throughout the 1930s, efforts at any international legislation stalled.¹⁴⁸

Before the outbreak of war the Monuments Committee made two efforts to expand its work outwards, both literally and figuratively. The first was a proposal to consider possible "international coordination" in "The Conservation of historic Monuments and the Exigencies of modern urbanism." Proposed by a French delegation and entirely phrased in reactionist terms, the memorandum on urban expansion referred to all the themes that had been bought up by Giovannoni in Athens, including the possibility of preserving "monumental axes," "ancient cities" and "other urban elements." ¹⁴⁹ The resolution led to the creation of a "Study Center on Architecture and Urbanism" but the project disappeared from the agenda of the following year. The second effort was more successful in its production of an actual resolution to the League Assembly: a proposal for the "Regulation of International Architectural Competitions," which had been requested by the International Union of Architects in 1927. ¹⁵⁰ As we will see in chapter 3, both of these endeavors laid the groundwork for modern architectural discourse to enter international organizations in the postwar. But in the decade following the Athens Conference they appeared as punctual and tentative reports which never had a life outside of the committee that produced them.

In part, the lack of further cooperative results on Monuments after the Athens Conference is explained by international events and their repercussions within the League. Between the time when the Athens Conference was held in 1931 and its proceedings were published in 1934, Germany and Japan pulled out of the League of Nations. Within another year, the Spanish War had broken out and OIM experts were suddenly drawn into questions of wartime protection. The Spanish war provoked a series of articles in Mouseion, as if an impromptu "conference" had been called on a new "technical" subject: a British expert was called as a "neutral" observer; the head of the Prado reported on the protection of paintings; experts wrote on the material effects of different weapons. Yet the sudden appearance of "war" into the page of Mouseion was also the first test of the regularization of conservation discourse, and the test proved successful: the War was seamlessly

¹⁴⁷ International tensions were increasingly reflected in the work of the legal commission on the "protection of national collections of art and history."

¹⁴⁸ Between 1927 and 1940 Mouseion reported on legislation in Germany, USA, Austria, Belgium, Spain, France, UK, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, South Africa, English Indies.

¹⁴⁹ "Travaux de Coordination: La Conservation des Monuments Historique et les exigencies de l'urbanisme moderne." In "Rapport Annuel pour l'Exercice 1935-1936," reprinted in Mouseion Vol 35-36 (1936), 232-234.

¹⁵⁰ "La Réglementation des Concours INternationaux d'Architectes," in Mouseion Vol 35-36 (1936), 201-207. The committee was composed of H. van der Velde, Paul Vago, Paul Viscer, Cart de Lafontaine and E. Pontremoli.

integrated into the rhetoric of bureaucratic monument "maintenance." Indeed the Spanish civil war produced a set of legal, technical and administrative precedents that were eventually used in World War II. As we will see, this gradual replacement of "war" for "conservation" as the main course of international legal action by the OIM and the Monuments Committee constitutes a change of course away from the "idealism" of the League. But before tracing how a "realist" framework for monuments protection was worked out by 1939, two specific effects of this focusing of technical activities on war can be noted.

First, coverage of the Spanish war finally placed images of monuments in the pages of Mouseion, which had previously featured mostly images of museum interiors. As we have seen, the innumerable articles on "the re-organizations of museums" ensured that a steady stream of interior museum photography was published, often with before/after pairs, which showed museum objects gradually acquiring a greater isolation from other objects—as if to illustrate the liberalization of the milieu by way of a spatial liberation of objects. (fig 1.08) Despite the corresponding discourse on the "open space" around monuments and their "integration" into urbanism, no image of this unencumbrement was provided in photographic form; images of buildings were documentary shots of facades. Now, as a result of the Spanish war, monuments also appeared as objects themselves, surrounded not only by this espace libre but also by sandbags, which abstracted their shapes into protective shields—as if the "space of form" that Focillon had argued belonged to art had been systematically outlined. (fig 1.33)

Secondly, the OIM found in the Spanish Civil War experience an unexpected vindication of its rhetoric about the "public valuation of monuments." Both the international outcry over the fate of monuments in the civil war, and the help that was provided by civilian volunteers, were described in detail. José Renau's explication of "the Organization of the Defense of Spanish Artistic and Historic Heritage during the Civil War" devoted an entire section to "The People's Collaboration," identifying "the spiritual element in the work of protection of artistic heritage" which had moved technical professions in charge of preservation, intellectuals and artists attached to art for its sake, and the national population into a single solidarity:

We cannot neglect an important part of the factors that contributed to the salvage of Spain's heritage ... a who series of motives have come into play which have, together, their origin in the spiritual attachment to the nation's patrimony. ... The conscience of the danger that threatened works of art and documents of our civilization sparked the interest of the people in general, and particularly of young artists and intellectuals, who offered their collaboration without reserve. The principal characteristic of the defense of

Spain's artistic patrimony has been this relationship between the technical defense of objects and this newfound respect and attachment of the people for its cultural values.¹⁵¹

Thus the attachment of people to monuments, which the OIM hoped to instill by teaching, had been catalyzed by destruction instead. War had been an unexpected form of "educational action." Rénau even concluded that the experience of using "popular collaboration as a crucial lever in the defense of cultural values" had increased attendance to monuments and museums in Spain. 152

This replacement of "war" for "education" had far-reaching consequences for the OIM's work on the international legal value of monuments through the rest of the decade. But to see progress in monument protection in the years between the Athens Conference and the war as moved solely by the contingency of external events—the rise of Hitler and the Spanish Civil war—is to miss another political development within the League itself: a re-orientation of intellectual cooperation in a "cultural" direction, and a theorizing of the collective and "spiritual" origins of the worldwide malaise, as expressed through militarist fever and economic depression. 1932 marked the creation of the "Committee on Moral Disarmament," which was devoted to creating a moral stigma against war that would lead to "material" disarmament. The IICI's work on Moral Disarmament is now remembered as its worse mistake—not only in that it was "based on erroneous premises" but that it actually "did more harm than good in the cause of world peace." The effect of its effort to "build a popular movement in the defense of international peace"153 was to place emphasis on collective psychology as the central component of warfare. In this context, the work of the IICI on monuments and museums acquired a whole new dimension, as further groups turned towards "the arts and letters" as sources for international morality. Two groups are considered next, whose work raised the stakes of describing monuments as containers of "international solidarity," by repeatedly calling for the "collective value" of art to provide a "cultural" antidote to this collective psychosis. The OIAHA, headed by Focillon and modeled on the OIM, theorized the "space" of art not as an active liberal milieu but as a politically neutral interpretive space. The Committee on Arts and Letters, soon to be known as "The League of Minds" assigned to art a value dialectically opposed to war. Together, these committees ensured that, by the time war broke out, it was perceived as a primarily "moral" event—in the idealist sense of the term: an expression of a collective, spiritual will.

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¹⁵¹ José Renau, « L'Organisation de la Défense du Patrimoine Artistique et Historique espagnol pendant la guerre civile, » in Mouseion Vol. 39-40 (1937), 7-62.

^{152 &}quot;La collaboration populaire: levier fondamental dans la défense des valeurs culturelles," in Rénau, Ibid, 56.

¹⁵³ Even Jan Kolasa, the most generous of the historians of intellectual cooperation, delivers a virulent critique of the Moral Disarmament project. See International Intellectual Cooperation: The League Experience and the Beginnings of Unesco (Wroclaw: 1962), 120-127.

The IICI: "A League of Minds"

The idea that intellectual cooperation should proceed by regular exchange of "Open Letters," followed by international "Meeting of Minds" was first proposed by French poet Paul Valéry at the meeting of the Permanent Committee on Arts and Letters in 1930. (fig 1.05) Valéry sought to turn intellectual cooperation and international politics into "parallel" worlds; "a League of Nations, he wrote, implies a League of Minds." ¹⁵⁴ (Société des Esprits) (fig 1.17) This analogical model was an implicit turn away from the CIC in the 1920s: away from the scientific idea of agreement by convention, towards an aesthetic model of representation and autonomy. Valéry raised the stakes of intellectual cooperation by placing at its center "man" and his "disinterested mind."

The League of Nations, then, is founded on a belief in man, of a certain conception of man, which implies a trust in the intelligence of man. This belief and this trust are of the kind that are essential to all scientific research, and, indeed, to every effort of the disinterested mind [l'esprit désintéressé.] 155

Valéry's elegant prose alone elevated the work of the Commission, and that coining the phrase "A league of nations implies a league of minds" was undoubtedly his most lasting contribution to the cause. 156 His proposal having been accepted, Valéry joined forces with Henri Focillon to compose a manifesto for a literary view of intellectual cooperation eventually known as "The Valéry-Focillon Proposal." The literary elevation was intended to remedy invisibility of the 1920s: "so far, the whole world of intellectuals is unaware of our effort for intellectual co-operation. The intellectual neither thinks about it nor joins in it.... Neither the need nor the habit has been created." Intellectual cooperation had existed "only administratively, in the perishable form of paper." Based on this critique, the Valéry-Focillon Proposal described a performative model, of a regular schedule of conferences, in the spirit of the League itself. These would be followed with letter-exchanges, recalling the medieval concibulae that had been "the most powerful means of contact between minds between 13th and 17th centuries." Together these regular events would construct "a living network,

¹⁵⁴ This was officially a proposal to transform the sub-commission on Arts and Letters into a Permanent Committee of Arts and Letters. "L'initiative de M. Paul Valéry, Rapport à la Commission Internationale de Cooperation Intellectuelle, Juillet 1930., in Les Arts et les Lettres à la Société des Nations: Supplément au numéro 7-8 du Bulletin de la Coopération Intellectuelle, (Paris: IICI).

¹⁵⁵ Paul Valéry, Report to the CIC, July 1930. In "Création du Comité Permanent des Lettres et des Arts," Bulletin de Coopération Intellectuelle No. 7-8 Les Arts et les Lettres à la Société des nations.

¹⁵⁶ For "literary" translations of the texts Valéry contributed to the League, see "Part V. The League of Nations," in the Volume History and Politics of Valéry's Complete Works, trans. Denise Folliot and Jackson Matthews (New York: Pantheon, 1962). Most of Valéry's contributions are abridged. In this dissertation, translations here are my own, or as published by IICI. The phrase itself was the first of the "resolutions" passed by the Committee in 1930; it was often re-printed as an aphorism at the head of IICI publications. See for example the yearly summary of the IICI of 1935, "Definition of Intelectual Co-operation.

ever expanding, ever renewed, where intellectual life expresses itself with more force and candor than in actual works." ¹⁵⁷

Over the course of the next eight years, four exchanges of "Open Letters" (Correspondance) were provoked and nine "Conversations" (Entretiens) held, resulting in twelve volumes published by the IICI. (figs 1.18-1-30) The themes of these events advertised the agenda of the group: its pacifism (Why War? L'Esprit, L'Éthique de la Guerre) its culturalism (L'avenir de la Culture, Civilizations, L'Avenir de l'Esprit Européen) and its humanism (La Formation de l'Homme Moderne, Le Nouvel Humanisme). The Conversations were also sometimes parasitically attached to existing conferences: Entretiens sur Goethe (centennial of Goethe's death), L'Art et la Réalite, L'Art et l'État (Venice Biennale), Europe-Amérique Latine (PEN Club)." 158

The Valéry-Focillon Proposition sought to create both a new discourse on "the role of the intellect" in the League of Nations and a new subject-position to hail European intellectuals into action. What was needed was a new "man" by which the modern epoch could be defined, in which intellectuals could recognize themselves. Valéry and Focillon used a variety of images to describe how this drama of recognition would unfold, initially conjuring the idea of a painting gallery:

Every great epoch has consciously given us a clear definition of man: not an accumulation of happy or unhappy experiences, not a collection of contingencies, but a kind of ideal portrait, shown as an example and capable of eliciting resemblances. History is a gallery of semi-real portraits, whose reality is all the more real in that it has been persuasive. 159

This museological view of history echoed Valéry's critical writings on museums, as well as the work that the OIM was already performing on Focillon's initiative since 1927. Yet after this initial usage no further museological reference was made. In their first Proposal, Valéry and Focillon described the League as "a kind of city of intellect that is spread over the whole earth;" later, Valéry referred to a random field of spontaneous combustions: "during some thousands of years the mind had here and there taken fire at odd hearths, scattered casually over the globe." Valéry even used the popular cerebral analogy ("More Brain!", he exclaimed). But what he meant was not "the gigantic educational system operating through the whole body of mankind" that visionaries lie HG Wells had called "World Brain." What he meant was that the League of Minds would trigger semi-scripted

¹⁵⁷ Les Arts et les Lettres à la Société des Nations, 22.

¹⁵⁸ These endeavors were all to be "in a state of parallelism." See for instance the opening note to the 3rd letter exhange: "The present volume, third in the collection of "correspondences," follows the collections published in 1933: Towards a League of Minds, and Why War. It also maintains a constant parallelism with the series Entretiens, notably those on The Future of Culture and The Future of the European Spirit. L'Esprit, L'ethique de la Guerre, unpaginated.

^{159 &}quot;Les Bases de Discussion (Proposition Valéry-Focillon)" in Les Arts et les Lettres à la Société des Nations, 7-8, 13.

¹⁶⁰ Paul Valéry and Focillon, League of Minds, 15.

¹⁶¹ Paul Valéry, in Société des Esprits, 116, .

¹⁶² H.G. Wells, "Preface," in World Brain (London: Methuen, 1938).

conversations, formulating ideas "by a series of monologues, as it happened in the human brain." ¹⁶³ Yet the most consistent conceptualization Valéry provided of the League of Minds was theatrical: "living collaboration" meant regularly scheduled performances, by a given troupe, for a given audience. Regularity itself was meant inspire confidence in the "order, faith and constancy" of intellectual work, even in the face of "fears about the direction of the future of civilization." As president and moderator, Valéry often spoke of his role as that of "making a curtain call before the play begins." ¹⁶⁴

This theatrical image was based in part on a conception of politics themselves as theatrical. "I confess that the spectacle of the political world turns my stomach," Valéry declared in his inaugural intervention in Paris in 1930. He rejected that what he called "external politics" were necessarily out of reach of intellectual speculation, since nations themselves were intellectual constructs, "political ideas of entities which can only be clearly conceived by men of a culture sufficiently great and imagination sufficiently strong to identify and personify systems of millions of being." In other words, intellectuals were especially gifted diplomats: individuals uniquely qualified to channel political ideas in literary form. The "League of Minds" simply regularized this "personification," allowing intellectuals to perform political situations.

If Valéry and Focillon set up the Conversations and Open Letters as a series of plays, the civilizational drama to be re-enacted was first elaborated by Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud. Geneva officials had been anxious to re-engage Einstein in intellectual cooperation, and Valéry himself had attempted to intervene by bringing Einstein to visit an ill Bergson in Paris. Einstein was thus enrolled into the first exchange of "open letters." He chose Sigmund Freud as interlocutor and "war" as his subject. This selection was hardly random: the two were engaged in correspondence, where Einstein had broached the subject of intellectual cooperation. He had even attempted to enlist Freud himself into "such a group of international scope, whose members would have to keep contact with each other through constant interchange of opinions," exerting "significant and wholesome moral influence on the solution of political problems." ¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ Paul Valéry, Le Destin Prochain des Letters, 146.

¹⁶⁴ Valéry, Esprit Européen, 14.

¹⁶⁵ Valéry to Madariaga, 127.

¹⁶⁶ "Do you not," Einstein had asked, "share the feeling that a change could be brought about by a free association of men whose previous work and achievements offer a guarantee of their ability and integrity? ... Such a group of international scope, whose members would have to keep contact with each other through constant interchange of opinions, might gain a significant and wholesome moral influence on the solution of political problems if its own attitudes, backed by the signatures of its concurring members, were made public through the press. Such an association would, of course, suffer from all the defects that have so often led to degeneration in learned societies; the danger that such a degeneration may develop is, unfortunately, ever present in view of the imperfections of human nature.

Einstein's decision to seek psychoanalytic answers rather than philosophical ones was a sign of a broader "cultural turn" in intellectual cooperation. Indeed by 1932 Bergson himself had drawn "civilizational" lessons from his experience with the CIC, concluding for instance his Two Sources of Morality and Religion by addressing the fundamental inadequacy of the League of Nations in the face of "the deep-rooted war-instinct underlying civilization." Thus, by 1932, philosopher and scientist alike had come to believe that the main obstacle to intellectual cooperation was cultural, not epistemological. It is clear that Einstein adapted to his new interlocutor, consulting Freud's work before officially addressing him his "Open Letter." Einstein rephrased his question in general terms; the subject was no longer "the League" but "mankind" ("is there any way of delivering mankind from the menace of war?) and, he now made with a psychoanalytic suggestion of his own (that war was due to a "psychosis of hate and destructiveness.") 168 When the exchange was published, it was with a title, Why War?, that reflected its explanatory tone.

On the one hand, the attribution of "the will to war" to all of civilization was a generalization of an accusation that had, throughout the 1920s, been leveled solely at Germany. In Einstein's own words, "the oft-cited 'German war-spirit' was frequently exaggerated" throughout the 1920s and it is all the more significant, then, that the "League of Minds" took its cue from two thinkers writing in German and soon to be refugees. ¹⁶⁹ Yet the dichotomy between "civilization" and the "instincts" undermining it had also been brandished by political thinkers of the league, for whom it was not "war" but "the economy" that constituted the primary threat to peace. Political liberals hoped to use international institutions to reform what they felt was an unchecked capitalist expansion of nations and empires. Hence Alfred Zimmern, in his inaugural lecture at Oxford:

We find ourselves, through no fault of our won, in a world in which the barbarians, in the shape of the international economic forces which mould our material existence, have assumed the mantle and have become accustomed to exercising it.... Our choice is between attempting to civilize the barbarians and abandoning our own city. It is between cooperation and exile from the world's life: between internationalism and monasticism:

However, and despite those dangers, should we not make at least an attempt to form such an association in spite of all dangers? It seems to me nothing less than an imperative duty! Once such an association of intellectuals--men of real stature--has come into being, it might then make an energetic effort to en-list religious groups in the fight against war. The association would give moral power for action to many personalities whose good intentions are today paralyzed by an attitude of painful resignation. I also believe that such an association of men, who are highly respected for their personal accomplishments, would provide important moral support to ... the League of Nations. Letter from Einstein to Freud, reprinted in Einstein on Peace, (1931.)

¹⁶⁷ "Even if the League of Nations had at its disposal a seemingly adequate armed force it would come up against the deep-rooted war-instinct underlying civilization Bergson theorized this "war instinct" as "independent, though hinging on rational motives"—much like the sphere of intellectual cooperation in which he had detected it. Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Religion and Morality, (New York: Doubleday, 1932).

¹⁶⁸ Albert Einstein, "Warum Krieg/ Pourquoi la Guerre?" (Paris: IICI, 1931).

¹⁶⁹ Text of a statement given by Einstein to the Berliner Tageblatt, cited in Einstein on Peace, 88.

between an effort at Hellenization, by whatever means may be at hand, or acquiescence in catastrophe and a return to the Dark Ages. 170

Zimmern's dramatic vocabulary conjures in retrospect the vision of the War, but he actually intended these words of "barbarity" as a description of the failures of economic liberalism in the previous decade, of which the most recent Depression was but a repercussion.

In fact, Einstein himself had hinted at an economic explanation for war in his letter to Freud. Einstein began his letter by suggesting that failure in spite of good will meant that unconscious forces were at work. "The ill success, despite their obvious sincerity, of all the efforts made during the last decade to reach this goal [of peace] leaves us no room to doubt that strong psychological factors are at work which paralyze these efforts." This paralysis was in fact due to "a small but determined group" who had "made a tool of the emotions of the masses" to achieve their mercenary goals. But rather than concentrating on the economic motives of "this small clique" Einstein asked, rhetorically, how had it had "bent the will of the majority." The answer was ontological: "man has within him a lust for hatred and destruction." Here Einstein relied on his own experience at the League to implicate "the so-called intelligentsia" as much as the majority—both equally "apt to yield to the most disastrous collective suggestions." Yet it was "the uncultured masses" that had the power to produce "the most extravagant, the most cruel form of conflict" Einstein therefore concluded by rephrasing his question: how could one prevent this "aggressive instinct" from being elevated into a "collective psychosis?"

In his response to Einstein, Freud confirmed that "it is easy to infect men with the war fever" because "man has in him active instinct for hatred and destruction, amenable to such stimulations." Recounting the "mythology" he developed in his 1930 Civilization and its Discontents, he argued that "suppression of brute force by the transfer of power to a larger combination, founded on the community of sentiments linking up its members." When addressing his political present, however, Freud was distinctly less mythical, suggesting specifically that the League of Nations was helpless without a court of justice and an executive force. "We must admit," he wrote, "that warfare well might serve to pave the way to that unbroken peace we so desire." After this moment of realism Freud then considered the more "indirect attack on the war impulse" that Einstein had suggested, which he summarized as a proposal for "a superior class of independent

¹⁷⁰ Cited in Thinkers of the Twenty Years Crisis, 87.

¹⁷¹ "Experience proves that it is rather the so-called "intelligentsia" that is most apt to yield to these disastrous collective suggestions, since the intellectual has no direct contact with life in the raw but encounters it in its easiest, synthetic form—upon the printed page."

¹⁷² Freud to Einstein, 7.

thinkers, unamenable to intimidation ... whose function it would be to guide the masses dependent on their lead." Yet having succinctly paraphrased the Kantian paradigm, Freud then dismissed it as "utterly utopian," comparable to "ugly picture of mills that grind so slowly that, before the flour is ready, men are dead of hunger." Freud even implicated himself in this utopian dismissal, granting in conclusion that "as you see nothing comes of consulting a theoretician aloof from worldly contact, on practical and urgent concerns."

Rather than ending his letter with this abdication of theory to "worldly concerns," however, Freud used it to launch the question he had meaning to address all along—what motivates certain individuals ("pacifists like us") "to protest so vehemently against war?" This reversal of question and answer is crucial. While he declined to argue that a Hegelian priestly caste was best suited to the cause of peace, Freud offered instead to detect in pacifists a particular attitude of mind. This diagnostic approach set Freud apart from Einstein, and from most others in the "League of Minds." Furthermore, the answer was that pacifism stemmed "not merely an intellectual and affective repulsion, but a constitutional intolerance.... And it would seem that the aesthetic ignominies of warfare play almost as large a part in their repugnance as war's atrocities." Thus Freud concluded by delivering perhaps the greatest validation a "League of Minds" could receive, namely, that "we may rest on the assurance that whatever makes for cultural development is working also against war." In other words, pacifism was not just ethical but aesthetic, not just intellectual but cultural.

This diagnosis of a collective "will to war" and the recommendation of a "cultural" solution were consistently repeated in the rest of the Correspondence and Entretiens. In the next set of Open Letters, titled L'Esprit, l'Ethique de la Guerre, Austrian psychoanalyst Robert Wälder took the "collective psychosis" where Freud had left it, in a long "Letter on the Etiology and the Evolution of collective Psychoses." Wälder drew from Freud's 1921 Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse to explicate how "popular movements contribute to provoking war and to maintaining, in crowds, a bellicose state of mind." In the same volume, Aldous Huxley gave a more succinct version of the same theory: "Man likes emotions. War, among other things, is a source of intense emotions. This is the reason why men like war." Subsequent exchanges were peppered with references to a collective will to

¹⁷³ Freud, 31.

¹⁷⁴ Wälder depicted modern man as nomadic (heimatlos) who engaged in war to compensate for his lost home. "The perpetual menace of death," he wrote, "increases the potential for life to the extreme. He knows what a sedentary man no longer could: the plenitude of triumph." Sigmund Freud, Group psychology and the analysis of the ego, trans. James Strachey. (New York: Norton, [1975] c1959). Robert Wälder, "Lettre dur l'Étiologie et l'Evolution de Psychoses Collectives, suivie de Quelques Remarques Sociologiques Concernant La Situation Historique Actuelle, » trad. Anne Berman, in L'Esprit, L'Éthique de la Guerre (Paris: 1934), 4.

¹⁷⁵ Aldous Huxley, "War and Personal Psychosis," in L'Esprit l'Ethique de la Guerre (Paris: IICI,

war, expressed in poetic statements (de Madariaga: "Wars. ... Wreckage! Are we merely pieces of wreckage?"), ¹⁷⁶ mythical analyses (de Haldane: "The story of Cain and Abel represents a cultural conflict between two forms of civilizations), ¹⁷⁷ or aphoristic statements (Valéry: "everything instantaneously engenders its opposite. War is present in the midst of peace. Want is born of Abundance.") ¹⁷⁸

Yet there was an important methodological difference in the way Freud and Valéry (and, by extension, the League) approached the relationship between war and culture. Freud had arrived at "culture" as an antidote to "war" only after having exhausted the political aspect of the problem, and addressed the functioning of the League of Nations as an institution. The "League of Minds," in contrast, took up the opposition between culture and war but left out the intermediary step. Indeed Valéry's theatrical model disallowed discussion of contemporary international relations, resorting instead to a strategy that Valéry called "the politics of the mind." ¹⁷⁹ This interdiction caused significant friction during the Entretiens throughout the decade, and explains why these events did not live up to the ambitions of the Valéry-Focillon proposal.

Some of the "Conversationalists" did adeptly produce political theorizations out of non-political analyses. Thomas Mann, whose membership was a symbolic coup on par with Einstein's CIC affiliation, ¹⁸⁰ made what we could call a 'discursive' analysis by reading the exercise of power in the dissemination of knowledge. Thus he connected "war" with "the intellect" in a broad historical conspiracy that began with 18th-Century idealism. "We tend to consider," he wrote in his contribution to La Formation de l'Homme Moderne, "the current state of the world, economic, intellectual, and moral, as a result of war." But while "the war had created immense material wreckage," Mann rejected the materialist view as insufficient; "war did not create the world." Instead Mann traced contemporary "moral decadence" to the 19th century thinkers who had theorized the violence to which Enlightenment ideals had been subjected. From these thinkers—Nietzsche and Marx, principally—the masses had only retained the language of violence: "violence is a principle that simplifies things to the extreme; it is not surprising that it is understood by the masses." The masses,

¹⁷⁶ de Madariaga to Yun Pei, in A League of Minds: An International Series of Open Letters, (Paris: IICI, 1933), 97.

¹⁷⁷ L'Avenir de la Culture, 56.

¹⁷⁸ Paul Valéry, in A League of Minds, 116.

¹⁷⁹ Paul Valéry, "La Politique de l'Esprit," originally printed in Variété, translated and reprinted as "Politics of the Mind," in Oeuvres, 89-129.

¹⁸⁰ This membership had been hard-earned. See the exchange between Mann and Valéry at the end of the first meeting. "Thomas Mann admitted that before arriving in Geneva he was skeptical. It was a great joy to have found a basis for common understanding, an harmonious atmosphere for work in good faith. His skepticism was soon replaced by a faith in the authority of the Commission, to which he is proud to belong. / The president (Valéry) replies that it is useful for Mann to repeat what he just said in his own country, where too many people have demonstrated the same skepticism towards the League of Nations—to which the German novelist had fallen prey." Les Art et les Lettres, 42.

Mann concluded in a poetic turn of phrase, "are sentimental and they are catastrophically philosophical." While this was a sophisticated analysis, the end-result was yet another conceptual scheme where collectivity and intellectuals acted as separate vehicles for apparently contradictory forms of spiritual development (*Geistesgechichte*).

What Mann's text highlights is that despite overwhelming agreement on the "collective psychosis that leads to war," the extent to which intellectuals were implicated in this psychosis was a matter of considerable debate. Intellectual historians point to the 1930s as a decade of growing insecurity about the value of intellectual engagement in political causes. As H. Stuart Hughes summarized, rightist and leftist engagements had come to "reinforce each-other in a redefinition of the intellectual's role, implying an impatience with the traditional concept of what the European philosopher or moralist should do." The only certainty in this predicament was that enlightenment philosophy and political ideology had progressively merged.

Thus the IICI can be situated as a French institution within the "franco-french" debate on intellectual autonomy that was unfolding in Paris in the years when the "League of Minds" was most active. ¹⁸³ Tony Judt has attributed the intense manifesto-production that overtook Paris in the first half of the 1930s to the emergence of a new generation of thinkers. "Between 1930 and 1934," he wrote, "there appeared a steady flow of books, pamphlets, clubs, plans, journals and circles, all peopled by the men and women in their twenties; some came from the political Right, others from the Left, thought most made a point of asserting their indifference to existing political divisions and organizations." ¹⁸⁴ It is undoubtedly in response to this Parisian climate that the IICI published its first 8 volumes with a unified graphic style to that expressed intellectual exchange with typographic dynamism: parallel bars for Open Letters, oblique shapes for multilateral Conversations. (figs 1.25, 1.30) The same manifesto-fever can be detected in the IICI's compulsion to re-publishing excerpts in its Bulletin de Coopération Intellectuelle, where parts of ad-libbed speeches acquired the air of political tracts. Yet even in this "manifesto style" the League offered no clearly legible position within the field of competing political ideologies: its literary focus, its stubborn resistance to all things "technical," and

¹⁸¹ Thomas Mann, La Formation de l'Homme Moderne, 14-15; 16.

¹⁸² H.Stuart Hughes, "The Decade of the 1920s: The Intellectuals at the Point of Cleavage," in Consciousness and Society: The Re-Orientation of European Social Thought 1890-1930 (New York: Octagon, 1976), 393.

¹⁸³ Julien Benda, Esprit Européen, 64. Benda's had been an indictment mostly of French intellectuals, who had givennational politics with a transcendental importance per se rather than to each particular cause. Benda explained the Society's political helplessness: that its internationalist argument simply had no traction against nationalisms, because it implied no reason for sacrifice.

¹⁸⁴ Tony Judt, "Decline and Fall," in Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944-1956 (Berkeley: UC Press), 19.

the fact that all participants were well past forty years old—all contributed to its image as a mildly nostalgic enterprise for re-covering the bygone "humanism" of a mythical "European spirit."

In the context of a growing division between left-wing internationalism and right-wing nationalism, proposing both "Europe" and "culture" as a unifying political concept meant taking a specifically liberal, centrist position. Thomas Mann serves as a case in point of this liberal centrism; having taken what he called a "non-political" position during World War I, he had now become invested in defending liberal culture as a mitigation of extremes. ¹⁸⁵ Thus he acknowledged that the reliance on culture for political stability was un-popularly "bourgeois":

Culture! The snickers of an entire generation accompany this word. They snicker at the favorite term of the liberal bourgeoisie, as if culture was ultimately nothing more than, precisely, the liberalism of the bourgeoisie itself, as if it didn't signify the opposite of human brutality, the opposite of laziness, ... in short, as if culture, ...wasn't the very essence of moral discipline!¹⁸⁶

Mann was willing to defend culture itself as a political concept, attached to a specific mode of governance and its history. But he was practically alone in doing so. The League of minds never composed a coherent political defense of liberalism—no doubt because few would have been able to explicate exactly what culture's role in this polity was. Similarly, while Valéry has now been historicized as a precursor to postwar politics of European integration, the "Europe" that was presented by the League of Minds remained a conceptual escape. 187

The Conversation on The Future of the European Mind, held at the IICI in October 1933, can serve to draw out the problems of the League of Minds. Several intellectuals from outside the League were invited, who had acquired reputations as defenders of intellectual autonomy. Consider for instance the intervention of French polemicist Julien Benda, whose 1927 La Trahison des Clercs (The Betrayal of Intellectuals) had provoked a sensation across Europe with its indictment of 20th century intellectuals. By investing all intellectual work with contemporary political value, Benda argued, intellectual had "betrayed" the philosophical autonomy that he had inherited. This book has become a historiographic marker, for the beginning of the ideological debates of the 1930s—and for

¹⁸⁵ Thomas Mann, Confessions of a Non-political man (1918). His change of heart is reflected in his 1930 "An Appeal to Reason," reprinted in Martin Jay, Ed., The Weimar Republic Reader. To the meeting, the Future of European Culture Mann contributed a written exposition of this point of view: "It can be easily admitted that many of the things that were held for sacred, indispensable and inalienable, in the 19th century—the epoch of bourgeois liberalism, have to day lost the strength of serving for life and to triumph against necessities in which European man finds himself by the force of complicated circumstance. But it is only for men who find barbarism agreeable and are intent on negating the European spirit that this consideration would mean the same thing as moral anarchy."

¹⁸⁶ Mann, La Formation de l'Homme Moderne, 13.

¹⁸⁷ For a view of Valéry as a Europeanist, see Robert Frank, "Les contretemps de l'aventure européenne" Vingtième Siècle. Les engagements du 20e siècle (Oct. - Dec., 1998), 82-101

inaugurating what has been called "the Century of the Intellectual." ¹⁸⁸ Some of Benda's formulations in defense of intellectual autonomy resonated with Valéry's conceptualization of the League of Minds as a world apart—"the intellectual must declare himself impractical," "wars today are cultural wars," "the nationalization of the spirit" has to be avoided. ¹⁸⁹ Furthermore, Benda articulated the possibility of an intellectual engagement in exceptional cases—of which the Dreyfus affair was the all-too-obvious prototype. Thus we can understand the work of the IICI in Benda's terms: an attempt to describe the catastrophic advance of a "will to war," to provoke a crisis urgent enough for intellectuals to get involved: a new Affaire worthy of a new J'accuse! But Benda's book also ruthlessly catalogued the futile international causes in which intellectuals were engaged: "the pacifism of scientific ambitions" and "other nefarious pacifisms", the illusion of "a trans-national court of justice," and the confusion of "humanism" with "humanitarianism." In fact, he insisted on distinguishing "humanism" from "internationalism," pointing out that "for a certain class of individuals, (workers, bankers, industrials) passion for the nation seems to be a movement of disinterested idealism." ¹⁹⁰

Benda brought this skepticism with him to the Conversation on "The future of the European mind." The event was attended not only by the "League of Minds" but by assorted politicians, including the French minister of Education and the Italian minister of Fine Arts. Given the breadth of ideological positions represented, Benda stated outright that he was critical of the event's conciliatory tone. "A Europeanism apt to collect and reconcile the differences in national civilizations" Benda insisted, was a "radically false idea." He was particularly critical of the IICI's unwillingness to recognize that nationalist narratives would have to be sacrificed for the sake of a European cause. "There is no Europe possible without sacrifice," Benda warned, and he pointed out that the League of Minds had become enslaved to the sterile vocabulary of the League of Nations, where nations could be collected in "a concert, a harmonious accord." The League's idealist language was so vague that it was equally applicable to nationalist and internationalist visions of a collective "spirit."

In this critique of this "false Europeanism" Benda was joined by British novelist Aldous Huxley, who sarcastically pointed out that, while the League of Minds loftily heralded Europe as a humanistic ideal, the "real" Europe continued to sink to ever-greater depths of anti-intellectualism

¹⁸⁸ For a detailed historiography, see David L. Schalk, "La Trahison des Clercs--1927 and Later" in French Historical Studies (Aut. 1971), 245-263. For a summary of the century that uses Benda as a trope, see Jean-François Sirinelli, "Les quatre saisons des clercs" in Vingtième Siècle Les engagements du 20e siècle (Oct - Dec 1998), 43-57.

¹⁹⁰ Julien Benda, La Trahison des Clercs (Paris: Grasset, 1958), 178.

¹⁹¹ Benda, in L'Avenir de l'Esprit Européen, 665. It was Huizinga who brought up "concert" by attributing to Dutch political philosopher Grotius the birth of a political Europeanism.

and vulgarity. "Anti-intellectualism," Huxley explained, "is an ongoing movement that manifests itself in different forms—Bergsonism, Freudism and Behaviorism." Having accused two of the key thinkers of intellectual cooperation of "flattering the dangerous passions" of the masses, he then arrived at a solution that they themselves had recommended, namely "Art." Like Freud, Huxley made the passage from intellect to art through political helplessness: "various national education systems are not in our hands and we are not propagandists or crowd-manipulators. Thus, for us, the only way of action on minds is persuasion—which is to say, art." Yet since "art does not rule," he proposed either to wait for the coming of an "artist of the intellect" or to begin remedying "vulgarism" by teaching "taste." For this purpose Huxley recommended a comparative exercise where classics of literature, art, music, would be paired with contemporary examples:

If I had to teach young people the art of distinguishing between the beautiful and the ugly, the real from the fictitious, I would try to choose my examples from the contemporary world. Train them to use critical sense on the speeches of politicians and on commercial advertisement. I would teach them to hear the qualitative differences between a piece of jazz and one of Beethoven's last quartets. I would have them read any detective novel, and then Crime and Punishment. 193

Huxley's story of the demise of taste since Enlightenment was essentially the same as Mann's narrative of "catastrophic philosophy" in the masses—with artists instead of philosophers. "Popular composers" had learned the great progression in musical technique of the 19th century (for Huxley: Beethoven, Berlioz, Wagner, Rimsky-Korsakoff, Debussy), and condensed them into kitsch. The only way out was to "exert the critical spirit" of the masses so that this kitsch may be recognized.

Huxley's condemnation of every –ism he could conjure vividly demonstrates the basic insecurity of a European intellectual in the 1930s, as it had been pointed out by Benda: the fear of an irreversible confusion of intellectual work with political ideology. ¹⁹⁴ It is partly because the League of Minds did not address this confusion, that it ultimately failed, as both a political and an intellectual endeavor. Furthermore, Huxley also pointed out that the League of Minds had no educational mandate, whether assigned (that "various national education systems are not in our hands") or self-appointed ("we are not propagandists or crowd-manipulators"). Early 19th-century adaptations of Enlightenment internationalisms had characteristically promoted the creation of a cosmopolitan

¹⁹² Huxley, in Avenir de l'Esprit Européen, 135. "Unfortunately art does not rule. Maybe an artist of intellectuality will appear, maybe he will not. It is not in our power to create him. Everything can be organized, except art."

¹⁹³ Aldous Huxley, L'avenir de l'Esrpir Européen, 139-141. Referring to a law of political economy regulating competing currencies, Huxley declared that "in morals and aesthetics there is also a Gresham's law… the bad always tends to chase away the good."

Huxley's equation of Bergsonism with anti-intellectualism drew protests from veteran of intellectual cooperation Leon Brunschvig, who recalled Bergson's own "universalism" and used another exchange of letters—the recently published exchange between Bergson and William James—to show that Bergson rejected any "vulgar" philosophy like pragmatism. ("I only accept from pragmatism its negative parts.") Avenir de l'Eprit Européen, 144.

educational system. Saint-Simon, for one, saw "vulgarization" as a positive tool towards his utopia; even modest proposals to federate the bourgeoning national education systems had a distinctly optimistic flair. ¹⁹⁵ But none of these proposals were followed through, as one postwar critic wrote, "liberalism and nationalism developed a kind of state which monopolized not only arms and taxes, but also education and history." ¹⁹⁶ By the time the League was formed, the question of state control over education was so touchy that a clause in favor of "examining a scheme for an International Office of Education," had to be deleted from the CIC's program before its creation was approved by the League of Nations Assembly in 1921. ¹⁹⁷ As we will see, an International Bureau of Education was created, but never integrated into the League. This educational helplessness was seldom addressed as an institutional obstacle. For example, while Valéry's "politics of the mind" was based on the recognition that "all politics contain a skewed interpretation of history, which is one of the more powerful instruments of political illusionism," ¹⁹⁸ he never addressed the dominant "instrument" of this illusion in European nations—their educational systems.

This European "Conversation" was the first real test of the Valéry-Focillon proposal, and it is important to note that Huxley's critique elicited a different reaction from the two instigators. Valéry reacted by calling Huxley's diatribe a picturesque tableau, ("we have all enjoyed Mr. Huxley's tasty world tableau") and chiding him for breaching into political territory. ("We should not penetrate the political realm you have touched, my dear Huxley—not even for an instant.") In contrast, Focillon confronted Huxley's critique head-on: he confessed that he was an avid reader of romance novels, and that he found advertising to be poetic. He then used this personal confession to warn against "excesses of purity." Rather than being "purged of "bind forces," European culture should emerge from the masses, through a "filtering" from below. To achieve this filtering, Focillon advocated teaching "European heritage", and argued his point with a long speech that described the geography of Europe:

19

¹⁹⁵ For a period exposition of Saint-Simon's and other's proposals, see Pierre Renouvin, "Les idées et les projets d'union européene au XIXe siècle," Dotation Carnegie, Bulletin 6, 1931. For his follower's proposals on the same theme, see Antoine Picon, "Enseignement Scientifique et Vulgarisation," in Les Saint Simoniens (Paris: Belin, 2002).

¹⁹⁶ Gottfried Delatour, "The Problem of International Understanding," in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 255 (Jan., 1948), 3.

¹⁹⁷ Marie Butts, "The International Bureau of Education," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 235, (Sep., 1944), 12.

¹⁹⁸ Valéry, Esprit Européen, 303.

^{199 &}quot;The European spirit no longer confuses masses with hordes, human race with animal species. We will never accept that the fate of the masses is separated form the fate of the elite. This amorphous mass—we are only too eager to filter it, to elevate it to the human condition, to take away from it this kind of fearsome privilege of animality. ... Voltaire never separated from the masses." Focillon, in Avenir de l'Esprit Européen, 147.

A number of vivid and familiar images can be conjured to opposed the notion that Europe is in pieces, fragmented, and regional.

. . .

The Mediterranean landscape does not belong exclusively to Spain, Italy, Sicily or France The Oceanic landscape ... is not a diorama of contrasts... The Baltic landscape is not defined by territorial waters. ... The great European plain creates a kind of pedestal for a common activity. ... The alpine landscape is not fragmented by borders ...

. . .

To every European man belong the sea, the plains, the mountains and the landscapes. To every European man also belongs the European city... the city rich in antiquities and the city of middle ages, the city of the classical age and the city of the nineteenth century, and the city of today... Today as in the past, modernity belongs to everyone.

. . .

This is the patrimonial décor where the heroes of the European mind lived their tales.

In a final step, then, Focillon returned to "Art" as product and author of this patrimonial landscape, countering Huxley's proposal to teach the "canon" of European music by saying that Europe itself was a canonical milieu:

Europe is the work of Dürer, Poussin, Michelangelo, Velasquez and Rembrandt.... The study of the history of art aims not to reconstitute a canon but to locate the family heirloom within a dilapidated heritage.²⁰⁰

By describing Europe primarily as an artistic milieu and its art as the product of "collective values," Focillon sought an organic model of emergence, upon which to base a politico-aesthetic theory of autonomous action.

For Focillon "milieu" was both an aesthetic and a political medium, and just as he had used it to activate the museum, he continued to resort to the idea of "milieu" as a way out of the hermeticism of the League of Minds. In "The Future of Literature," he proposed that the "life of the mind" could be understood allegorically, as a "play" or a "novel," but only if the rest of the world was included as the allegory's "milieu." (Since "readers are also characters in a novel," he asked "isn't the milieu in which we are living itself a novel?")²⁰¹ Focillon also used milieu to create a critique of totalitarianism:

The notion of milieu is difficult to pin down: biologic milieu, geographic milieu, social milieu. But as long as man has a hand in the configuration of his milieu, there is hope for the future of the spirit. ... What I find most categorically reprehensible in totalitarian states, is the way they harden milieus, deprive them of their plasticity, their necessary elasticity. ²⁰²

Again here Focillon described "the milieu" as a realm of political freedom: the same space that he claimed as a disciplinary ideal in his Life of Forms, as a "liberalizing" force in the OIM, and he would

²⁰⁰ Focillon, L'Avenir de l'Esprit Européen, 153.

²⁰¹ Henri Focillon, in IICI, Le Destin Prochain des Lettres, (Paris: IICI, 1938), 147.

²⁰² Focillon, Le Destin Prochain des Lettres, 148.

also inscribe as scholarly freedom in the OIAHA. In the context of the League of Minds, which was itself detached from any real milieu, this critique offered little direction for action.

Neither Focillon's proposal for a history of art nor Huxley's proposal for comparative taste lessons was taken up. Instead the representative of the League's "Committee of European Cooperation," Mr. Borel, proposed to establish an academic Center for European Studies, based on the model of the International Center of Statistics. Despite skepticism, both latent and expressed (some voice a fear of "cooptation", others asked whether another "historical center" was really needed) the proposal was approved. The end of the meeting was devoted to a highly theatrical "birth" of this new institute, with declarations, statues, and self-congratulatory applause. This institute was inaugurated in Nice the following March, with Valéry as its first president, and a Conversation on The Formation of Modern Man to mark the occasion. This turn of events—that the tension between the real and imagined political value of "Europe" provoked the creation of a new "institute"—only confirms the tautology inherent in Valéry's theatrical model of cooperation: that whatever the issue raised, the "League of Minds" was itself supposed to stand as a solution.

It was French novelist Jules Romains who bitingly summarized the artificiality of the situation, in a closing statement which drew a parallel between the sterility of political speech and the safety of academic jargon. The externality of "The Political," he complained, had been supplanted by the hermeticism of "The Academic:"

It was agreed from the beginning that the problem of politics, the political aspect of things would be set aside from our debates. The motives for this prohibition do not escape me, and far be it from me to deny their validity. But it is my sense that this prohibition threatens to render our debates completely sterile. Indeed throughout our conversations The Political has remained more or less outside. But it is The Academic which has taken its place. I propose that we name "Academic" the science of speaking without compromising oneself in any subject during difficult periods. It is a science that is extremely useful for the temporal tranquility of representatives of the spirit. But I don't believe there is any other virtue to it." 203

The League of Minds was merely an academic refuge, where the interdiction to speak of political matters only concealed political differences. But Romains went further, attacking not only the form of the discussion (the habit of falling back on scholarship) but its terms (the assumption that intellectuals stand in for a collective "Mind"). This false sense of collectivity simply allowed intellectuals to use a rhetoric of "will" (vouloir) to talk about otherwise unexplainable political phenomena. In other words, Romains accused the "League of Minds" not of being too detached but of being slavishly attached to seeking relevance for itself. The fundamental delusion lay in the compulsion to describe the mind as "willing" history at all:

²⁰³ Jules Romains, in L'Avenir de l'Esprit Européen, 289.

A very prudent, not very heroic, but very human attitude of mind, would consist in saying: "what is happening is temporarily stronger than I. This is a time when the inferior powers of the soul have taken hold of Empire, dragging the peoples of Europe one after the other in a circular vertigo. Let us be patient. The world has seen worse." What I find offensive, is that the "spirit" has now started saying "I willed this." No, gentlemen—with maybe one exception this is a kind of pious lie, a way to redeem oneself, or to save one's pride. The only thing the spirit should be saying is "I did not will this.²⁰⁴

It was a false metaphysics that inspired intellectuals to claim any agency in the forces that were leading Europe into its vertiginous political chaos. Between the poles of engagement and detachment, "the League of Minds" had merely constructed a vocabulary that allowed intellectuals to capitulate while pretending to fight. The intellectuals flattered themselves into thinking that there was a "will" at all. In a sense, this accusation was much worse than Benda's "betrayal": an abdication to dominant forces, followed by a theorization of one's own cowardice.

It is perhaps because Romains, Huxley and Benda articulated the helplessness of the League of Minds so poignantly that this European "Conversation" marks a turning point in the IICI's work. 205 The "Conversations" that followed went on to include a progressively larger selection of political characters who often found it easy to recuperate its theatrical hermeticism. This is particularly true in the "Conversations" that were attached to existing international congresses, conferences and events. On the one hand, this parasitic structure helped to enlist a broader selection of thinkers—from Le Corbusier to Jacques Maritain. On the other hand, these events came with the obligation to pay tribute to the political authorities hosting the events; in this context the League's taboo on political discourse was all too easily confused with silent endorsements of political regimes as diverse as the French Popular Front, Italian Fascist Party and Spanish republicanism. All these events were heralded as successes by national and international authorities alike, illustrating with yearly cadence Benda's prediction that the League's internationalism was one for which no sacrifice of nationalist myths was necessary.

In 1934 the second annual Venice Biennale was held and the IICI organized, at the invitation of the Italian Government, on the theme of Art and Reality/ Art and the State, to unfold contemporaneously with the Biennale. The Venice Conversation was promoted "as a further step forward in the series of Conversations, hitherto confined to debating very general subjects," and closer

²⁰⁴ Romains, Avenir de l'Esprit Européen, 292.

²⁰⁵ In the exchange of Open Letters that followed, some repercussions can be felt with Huizinga and Benda continuing to disagree about the value of a "concert of Europe", and Huxley expressing his theory of vulgarity in terms of an "impulse for war." IICI, L'Esprit, L'Etique de la Guerre. Benda, followed up by sending Huizienga a copy of his Discours à la Nation Européenne (Paris: Gallimard, 1933)

inspection of the conversations' debates demonstrates that it was architecture that was increasingly proposed, as a way out of the hermeticism of "The Political" and "The Academic." The theme of Art and Reality had been proposed by the Italian delegation—a reflection of the intense preoccupation with art and architecture that was characteristic of the fascist state. 206 The "reality" in the title was a euphemism for economic depression and political tensions, conditions that placed a burden of reciprocal responsibility onto art and the state. The conference agenda therefore placed emphasis on issues of patronage, causing debate over the relative value of state sponsorship and artistic freedom. Here architecture was used repeatedly to demonstrate the absurdity of the distinction (Eric MacLagan quipped "The state commissions an architect to design a bridge because it needs this bridge and not because the architect is destitute.") 207 There was also an implicit critique of contemporary art in the title: modernism severed the mimetic relation of art to reality. Some argued, in Herbert Read's word, that "modern art is abstract because all reality is psychological"—and others followed the classic League of Minds pattern by identifying an underlying "will to war" as expressed in abstraction. Viennese art historian Hans Tietze, for instance, presented 20th Century art movements as "intellectualized expression of conflicts that were likely to break out in other domains." This discussion of war also brought into the fold a discussion of monument protection: Italian critic Ugo Ojetti objected to Tietze's interpretation, but only after recalling that he and Tietze had become friends through their respective work as monuments officers on opposing sides of World War I, which Ojetti called an instance of "intellectual cooperation under fire." 208

In Venice, architecture was repeatedly proposed as a compromise to the increasing tension between "art and reality," although no single theory of architectural agreement was proposed. Henri Focillon offered his most explicit defense of formalism yet, denying "any positive value to the terms reality and realism." The intention of the artist and his patron were irrelevant; "whether he wants to or not," Focillon asserted, "the artist is always the author of a world apart." ²⁰⁹ As an example offered the "forms" of Gothic and Romanesque cathedrals in the High Middle Ages, which arisen out of a conflict of civilizations between the "animal style" which captured live forms and the "anthropomorphic" realism of classical humanism. "Architecture appeased, contained, and stabilized the debate," Focillon claimed. This model of architectonic conciliation proved that a "new humanism" could arise in built form, a model he proposed to apply for the future.

²⁰⁶ League of Nations, IICI, International Intellectual Cooperation: 1934, 23.

²⁰⁷ "The State as Patron of Art," in Bulletin of Intellectual Cooperation (Dec 1934), 336.

²⁰⁸ Ugo Ojetti, L'art et la Réalité, 53.

²⁰⁹ "Idealism and realism are outdated categories," since "art is not a dissertation on art." Focillon, L'Art et la Réalité, 59.

So it is possible that the monuments of tomorrow will see the birth of a "real" figure of man under the effect of laws that regulate the immobile life of stone, and of a thinking truly accomplished through stone—not the stone of the statue, molded in some elegant likeness, but the stone of the wall, given over to exigent reason. ²¹⁰

In other words, Focillon proposed architectural monuments as sites of abstract agreement, on a plane higher than that of human likeness. This was a politics of "abstract form," detached from "content": "Must we aggravate architecture with politics and submit it to the obsession with "content?" Alas, the history of forms can be abused to serve the purpose of any theoretical justification." Focillon then concluded with an appeal to cities as ultimate expressions of this aesthetic phenomenon of conciliation: "The agreement (accord) between abstraction and concrete, between an image in reality and an image in thought, can be found in cities with their temples and monuments. Cities invite us to expand our definition of man, to find him not in aesthetic agitations but in the mass of built things and in the order of collective forces." In a sense, Focillon's rejection of realism—articulated the same year as his Life of Forms was published—represented a final choice between autonomy and engagement, politically and aesthetically.

But if the Venice Conversation allowed Focillon to further articulate his politics of form, it also inspired a heterogeneous set of characters, peripheral to intellectual cooperation, to promote architecture as a medium with a vaguely privileged relationship to "reality." Le Corbusier took Focillon impassioned speech as an invitation to speak of urbanism, and gave a long dissertation on Venice as a Gesamtkunstwerk that belied the traditional categories of realism. "Venice is a totality; it is a unique phenomenon, as it is currently conserved, a unique expression of integral purity and civilized unity." Rephasing his 1924 "architecture or revolution," Le Corbusier described Venice as the "only modern place where one finds this intimate harmony that works of art can acquire when no revolutionary phenomena has subverted them." Similarly, but for entirely different reasons, Viennese art historian Josef Strzygowski, a pioneer in early Islamic and Byzantine architecture, also turned to Venice as a positive example of relationship between art and state, congratulating the Italian state for having "conserved its Venitian heritage," despite the fact that it represented alternative to the Roman historiography favored by fascism. The association of "realist representation" with "state service," Strzygowski reminded his colleagues, had produced a European figurative classicism that "often destroyed and annihilated" more humble and collective forms of art. 212 To this, conservationist Giovannoni responded by offering a different vision of totality and

²¹⁰ Focillon, L'Art et la Réalité, 64

²¹¹ Focillon, L'Art et la Réalité, 64.

²¹² Stzygowski, L'Art et la Réalité, 149.

integrality, where architecture was "the just path between art and reality." For Giovannoni the two poles were not between "realism" and "idealism" but between "theory" and "practice." Retracing the entire history of architecture in terms of this relationship between books and buildings, statements and construction, he offered architecture as a mediation of extremes "Construction alone is mechanics, form alone is scenography or embellishment; architecture is both, harmoniously combined into a whole."²¹³

The Venice Conversation is one of the most blatant examples of an IICI event where disagreement passed for concord.²¹⁴ Few of the speakers who referred to each-other's interventions would have agreed on much if they had confronted each-other in direct exchanges. Conversely, few of the real points of agreement—such as the value of preserving Venice—received the attention they might have drawn in a more focused conversation. As Strzygowski later recalled of a Gorgione painting he insisted represented the "spirit of Venice," "if we had tried to find an agreement in front of this painting, to establish who has the right to speak of it and who does not, we would have managed to clarify things and dissipated some of the chaos."215 Yet an important point was learned from the way that architecture's collectivity and its abstraction seemingly offered intellectual cooperation a stable basis upon which to produce an aesthetic discourse as a model for political agreement. Certainly Focillon was aware that it was only because he was speaking of architecture that he could say, "reality is what we agree [convient] it is" without drawing accusations of pure relativism from his self-conscious "League" colleagues. In this sense the Venice Conversation revealed the difference between Valéry's "politics of the mind" and what I have called Focillon's "politics of form": namely, that formalism already presumed a theory of representation. Thus discussions could concentrate on specific representations—like Venice. It was undoubtedly this realization that led Focillon to turn his attention to a disciplinary model of international debate within the International Office of Art History, the OIAHA.

The last exchange of Open Letters, between Focillon and Viennese art historian Josef Strzygowski, who was since 1909 the director of the Wiener Kunsthistorisches Institut, the so-called

²¹³ Gustavo Giovannoni, l'Art et l'Etat, 120.

²¹⁴ Note the final resolution: "The participants in the "Conversation held in Venice under the auspices of the League of Nations Permanent Committee on Arts and Letters to discuss "Contemporary Art and Reality" and "Art and the State," without expressing any conclusive opinion on these two vast questions, on which views have been exchanged in a spirit of cordial collaboration, moves the following recommendation:

To obviate the difficulties of the present moment, it would be desirable if the Governments could, so far as may be possible and by every available means, render assistance to art and artists in order that the latter may have an opportunity of filling their social role with the utmost freedom." Bulletin of Intellectual Cooperation (Dec 1934), 337.

²¹⁵ Strzygowski, Bulletin Périodique (7-8), 65.

"Vienna School" of art history, prefigured the methodological debates that would take place within the OIAHA. (fig 1.04) Srzygowski initiated the exchange in May 1932, as a follow-up to the Conversations on Goethe in Frankfurt where he had presented two Goethe drawings, interpreting them as evidence that Geothe was "a man of the North," moved by a "Nordic spirit" that "emanated from the profound depths of his being."216 Since the drawings were of mountainous landscapes, Strzygowski argued for a geographic aesthetics close to Focillon's own ("It is to landscape, as a way that nature expresses itself, that Goethe owes his place in the development of German art") but his emphasis on pan-German nationalism had alarmed all the other participants. Georges Opresco had warned that "to make of Goethe essentially a Nordic man is to belittle him." Here too architecture had played an important part: Strzygowski had proposed to build in Frankfurt "a monument to Goethe, and, through him, to the whole of German art ... a pilgrimage site for all creative minds to worship Goethe's own creative spirit."218 Swedish architect Ragnar Ostberg had countered that if it was "as a young architect Goethe went to Italy," it was "universality," that the classical temples of his Italian tour had inspired. The disagreement had been left unresolved and the Conversation had ended with repeated declarations that a "synthesis" between Orient and Occident, between "Mediterranean" and "Nordic" spirit should be attempted by the League, in the name of Goethe.

It was this debate over the "Nordic Mind" that Strzygowski hoped to follow-up in his Open Letter to Focillon. "A cult of the Mediterranean", he complained, produced a "habit of mixing up the concept of Hellenism and Latinity with that of the ancient Orient." Advocating instead "a return to the North," he recounted the historiographic arguments he hade made in his 1903 tome, Orient oder Rom?: that European cultural history could not be explained only by philological sources linking Latinity to Hellenism, but revealed also the morphological influence of "Aryan" art-forms inherited from Greece, Iran and India. This was as much a methodological argument as a formal one, therefore he complemented this analysis it with the attack on classical humanism he had made in his 1923 Krisis der Geisteswissenschaften: namely, that "humanist education has impregnated us with Mediterranean civilization." ²²⁰ It was only by deliberate, anti-humanist educational action that the

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²¹⁶ Srtzygowski, in Entretiens sur Goethe, 112.

²¹⁷ Georges Opresco, Entretiens sur Goethe, 131.

²¹⁸ Strzygowski, in Entretiens sur Goethe, 114-115.

²¹⁹ Josef Strzygowski, Orient oder Rom: Beiträge zur Geschichte der spätantiken und frühchristlichen Kunst. (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1901). For an account of the debates provoked by the book at its publication, its effect on both classical Italian scholarship and the Iranian intelligentsia, see Talinn Grigor, "Orient Oder Rom: Qajar "Aryan" Architecture and Strzygowski's Art History," in Art Bulletin (Sep 2007), 562.

²²⁰ On Strzygowsky's 1923 book see Suzanne L. Marchand, "The Rhetoric of Artifacts and the Decline of Classical GHumanism: the Case of Josef Strzygowski," in History and Theory 33, Proof and Persuasion in History (Dec 1944), 106-130. Marchand argues that Strzygowsky's "true heirs were nationalist fanatics and art historians working in the specialized

"spirit of the North" would be revived; for this purpose he outlined a specific program of research, based the one he constructed at the *Wiener Institut*, proceeding from "the object" to "knowledge."

Stzygowksi has now become a "case" in German intellectual history: his "success in securing the Middle East, Asia Minor, and India a place on the art historical agenda;" his "odious personality," anti-semitism and Nazi sympathies; and finally his "rise to modest institutional power" in turn-of-the-century Vienna—all have been linked to two contradictory currents of German intellectual history. On the one hand, the growth of the Institut fur Osterrische Geschischtsforschung and of its art-historical offshoot was fueled by a historicism deployed "in defense of the polyglot world" of the Autrio-Hungarian empire." Thus Strzygowzki learned from his teachers, Alois Riegl and Franz Wickhoff, to work on periods of art history that "emphasized the international character of European cultural development." On the other hand, the growth of this historical tradition and its associated archaeological finds spawned an "anti-humanist" movement, of which Stryzgowski was a prime advocate, and non-specialist bourgeois audiences with volkisch taste were the satisfied customers. This popular audience was interested as much in the content of Strzygowski's pan-Germanic scholarship as it was in infiltrating the elitist university sphere of Vienna and undermining its emphasis on the Roman empire. The more Strzygowski found "Aryan" roots for every important artistic development in European history, the more popular he became as a public intellectual. 223

By the time Strzygowski became involved in Intellectual Cooperation, he was at the end of his career and perceived his popularity with this non-specialized audience as a sign that his life's agenda had been vindicated. "The freedom of the spirit has begun to take on such an importance in Germany," he wrote to Focillon, "that it can no longer be neglected." Thus Strzygowski tied his own historiographic efforts with the political rise of Nazism, and advocated the teaching of the "Nordic point of view" in Germany, so that the country "which had already been liberated from the oppression" of classical humanism, could "take its place among the western community." He concluded by pleading for cultural specificity in the name of universality:

We aspire to a new order of generality, which encompasses the farthest regions of the globe, and, if possible, all of humanity. But do we not want this order, conceived on the

fields he pioneered (early Islamic art, Byzantine architecture, the art of Armenia and the Balkans.)" but also saw him as "harbinger of UNESCO universalism, both in the sense that the latter would not have been possible without the ridiculous excesses of their biological theories, and that the post-1945 transference of politico-moral legitimacy to a non-elitist, anthropological definition of culture was prepared in part by the underworld's attack on classical humanism." And that, therefore, "we are in many ways Strzygowsky's heirs."

²²¹ Strzygowski's anti-semitism is briefly summarized in Margaret Olin, "Nationalism, the Jews, and art history," in Judaism: A Quarterly Journal (Sep 1996).

²²² "The Case of Josef Strzygowski," 115

²²³ On Strzygowski's concept of race see Thomas Da Costa Kaufman, Towards a Geography of Art (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,) 70-73.

basis of the possibility of a common social existence, to guarantee to each people its intellectual freedom—just as every State intends to preserve its political power?²²⁴

In a sense, Strzygowski's anti-humanism was an argument for political autonomy: it was political pressure of Mediterranean elitism that had led Rome to become the privileged center of art historical scholarship—and it was this same hegemonic spirit that compelled the "League of Minds" to want to reconcile the "spirit of the North" and "Latinity" into one happy collective "civilization." Instead Strzygowski made one of the earliest arguments for cultural incommensurability that is to be found in the pre-history of Unesco—including its implications that intellectual freedom would produce national autonomy. Strzygowski's path to Unesco, however, went through Nazism.

While Stzygowski had begun his letter by recalling the Goethe disagreement, Focillon replied to him by recalling a moment of agreement: the first meeting of the "League of Minds" in Geneva, which addressed each artistic medium as a potential field of international action: "Music and Film"; "Literature" (including "Translations, Poetry, Theater"); and "Modern Art." This last category of "Modern Art" was taken over entirely by a discussion of architecture, triggered by a polemic of Swedish architect Ragnar Ostberg against modern architecture. "We are in an epoch," Ostberg ranted, "when some want to eliminate beauty from architecture." Calling for the committee to take a stance against "this social ideology of modern architecture," Ostberg drew approving comments from Paul Valéry, who proposed the following resolution:

In our epoch, monuments and urban works are increasingly given over to collective enterprises. The weakness of modern architecture lies precisely in the fact that no monument is the work of a man alone, but rather the anonymous result of an multiheaded organism. ²²⁶

At this first meeting of a group devoted to the collective power of intellectuals in bureaucracy, Valéry produced a statement discrediting architectural modernism for its bureaucratic anonymity. Focillon aborted the resolution, recalling that "some mass-civilizations had left admirable monuments, such as the cathedrals of the middle ages," and finding an ally in Strzygowski, who proposed an alternative resolution, for "the encouragement of modern art." ²²⁸

That Focillon should refer back to this moment in his letter to Srzygowski is exemplary of the difference between two forms of "agreement." In Geneva, Strzygowski and Focillon agreed as

²²⁴ Strzygowski, Letter to Henri Focillon, (May 1932), in Correspondance: Génie du Nord-Latinité (IICI: Paris, 1934), 126.

²²⁵ Ragnar Ostberg, Les Arts et les Lettres à la Société des Nations, 38.

²²⁶ Paul Valéry, Ibid, 40.

²²⁷ He also recalled 19th century developments, including the work of Saint-Simonians, as evidence that "even the engineer had produced beauty."

²²⁸ Strzygowsky & Focillon, Ibid, 40-41.

specialists of art and architecture: first of all, that forms seemingly authored by collectives were not to be discarded from the history of aesthetics; secondly, in Strzygowsky's words, that "the domain of art could be used as a characteristic example of the sciences of the mind;" thirdly, in Focillon's words, that in architectural history "monumental texts hold the same value as written texts—in fact an often superior value;" and finally, that art history needed to learn from the comparative methods of ethnography. Yet this agreement was in no way a guarantee that political concord existed. Indeed Focillon continued his letter by strongly rejecting Strzygowski's political agenda. While he agreed art history should have an "immediate use", a refuted any "politics based on archaeology":

The "Genius of the North" is not, any more than the Genius of Mediterranean, an invariable given, placed once and for all at the basis of history. ... If we were condemned to perpetually resemble a rigorous anthropological maquette, civilization would be without future and without becoming. All of history condemns the concept of race.

Like you, I think that our research is not without pragmatic value. Our work carries effective actuality: by unfolding our origins before us, by showing us our successive portraits and the breadth of our interconnected genealogies, it shows us how much previous generations have worked amongst themselves, and how our humanity is made atop them, like a terrain of superimposed layers and innumerable spiritual waves.

A rigorously archaeological politics not only goes against the interest of the community, it also impoverishes it the nation that adopts them. As soon as demagogy takes hold of this mystique to fascinate a youth that is exhausted before it has even had any hopes—this worries me. We can see where the myth of Aryan purity can lead. I think the dignity of our work forbids us to take this path.²³⁰

Although he argued eloquently against Strzygowski's prejudiced research, Focillon was faced with the methodological lacuna of his disciplinary liberalism. While he merely advocated an international exchange of ideas, Strzygowski imbued his very methodology with a civilizational scheme that culminated in a pan-German present. It is undoubtedly in response to this growing disagreement that Focillon began to focus his energies on the OIAHA. Formed in 1930, the Office did not begin publishing its Bulletin Périodique until June 1934. In the next section I follow the migration of this debate into the specialized realm of art history.

The OIAHA: Towards an International Critical History of Art

The OIAHA was created by Focillon on the model of the OIM, at the first meeting of the permanent Committee on Arts and Letters in 1930. Satisfied with the incorporation of "the men who

²²⁹ Focillon to Strzygowski, 133.

²³⁰ Henri Focillon, Letter to Strzygowski, 165.

collect, classify and conserve works of art" into intellectual cooperation, he proposed to do the same for "those who study works of art as expressions of the spiritual life and superior witnesses to civilization." As with the OIM, this was to be a decentralized network of institutions: Focillon echoed his earlier argument that "any museum where there is a great work, is a great museum" by arguing that any "even in more modest institutions ...there are researchers of the highest caliber." This was, in some sense, a return to the "scientific" cooperation that had been at the core of intellectual cooperation in the 1920s, based on a sharing and abstracting of information. "University and scientific institutes do not only form researchers; they structure research." Thus the proposed course of action for the Institute and its journal followed the classic scheme of gathering information and disseminating it:

- I. Material for study
- II. Methods of archaeology and art history
- III. Scientific formation
- IV. Fieldwork
- V. Publications and propaganda. 232

Although Focillon was careful to distinguish art historical institutes from museums, he made the same argument for their activation as "ready-made" institutions, and the same disclaimer about the OIAHA not being a "super-institute." Like the OIM, the OIAHA was a reaction to the institutional developments of the discipline in the first decades of the 20th century, in particular the growth of research institutes with admittedly "scientific" goals, like university departments in the United States, and European archaeological institutes. As with the OIM, the OIAHA was a mechanism for bridging from the aesthetic autonomy of art to the political autonomy of those interpreting it (in this case, art historians).

If the OIM was an attempt to codify a new museum interior, the OIAHA was an attempt to codify the new scientific atmosphere. The pages of the Bulletin demonstrated that this scientific milieu extended both to the institute and its field-work, through photographs of archaeological sites and well-stocked libraries. (fig 1.31) But if the OIM was a true invention, art historical scholarship had operated internationally for some decades, and the Bulletin was neither the first organ of international

²³¹ "Résolutions Adoptées par le Comité Permanent des Lettres et des Arts" Les Art et les Lettres à la Société des Nations, Supplement au Bulletin, 51. The original proposal was Henri Focillon, Memorandum sur un Projet concernant un centre international des Instituts d'archaeolgie et d'histoire de l'art.23 October 1930, reprinted in Bulletin Périodique, 49.

²³² Henri Focillon, "L'Office International et son But," in Bulletin Périodique, 4.

²³³ "Institutions of art history," he wrote, "have a different requirement for influence and than museums and it is important not to confuse them. Museums gather, conserve, grow and display the treasures upon which art historians and archaeologists work." Henri Focillon, "L'Office International et son But," in Bulletin Périodique, 4.

²³⁴ "Il ne s'agit pas de créer un "super-Institut" mais une liaison destinée à faciliter les recherches des travailleurs," G2 1932 "Rapport sur la Réunion du Comité d'Experts pour la création d'un Centre international des Instituts d'Art et d'Archéologie." (Paris, les 28-29 janvier 1932).

art historical discourse nor a very well-circulated publication. Focillon self-consciously proposed to coordinate its activities with the International Academic Union and the Permanent Committee of the International Congress of the History of Art, both of whom already circulated publications internationally. Furthermore, the fit between the "milieu" model of internationalization and the reality of institute life was awkward, as demonstrated in the photographs published in the Bulletin. In Mouseion, the technique of juxtaposing photographs of objects and of museum environments had successfully rendered the "containment" of one into the other, and the way this "milieu" promoted the "circulation of ideas" around objects and people. Here, in the Bulletin, pictures of sites filled with monuments and libraries filled with books only illustrated the gap that had grown between a philological tradition of interpretation and its material objects of study.

The OIAHA was a hybrid form of cooperation that combined the lofty goals of the League of Minds and the opportunism of "ready-made" cooperation. It is clear that Focillon hoped to intervene into the "generalist" discussions of the League of Minds. (In 1933 he proposed that the next Conversation address the question "What is the comparative value of plastic arts and literature, as expressions of civilization; their reciprocal contributions and their points of contact?" On the other hand, the OIAHA project allowed Focillon to design the decentralized network he had been imagining since 1921. Thus he spent the years 1930-1933 gathering "technical" information from institutes across the world—including courses taught, student enrollment, methodological emphasis, history of each institute—in an effort to develop a truly regional network. It is only after having compiled extensive data that Focillon turned to the matter of a publication, drawing up with an editorial board a list of suitable "subjects to be explored" in its pages. To differentiate itself from other art historical institutions, the OIAHA would pay particular attention to issues of methodology. A "Methodological" section was created in the Bulletin, to host "international action on the basis of the scientific activity of national institutions, in all of its complexity and diversity." Art history now could take on "domains of international collaboration in the following disciplines:"

- prehistory and history
- ethnology
- sociology
- aesthetics

²³⁵ F.30.1936. Office International des Institute d'Archéologie et d'Histoire de l'Art, Comité de Direction: Réunion des (18-19 Dec 1936), 41. (P1010710)

²³⁶ The questionnaire composed by Focillon ##

²³⁷ Current state of research in the domain of archaeology and Byzantine art; Current state of research in archaeology, numismatics, arts of the far-east, graphic arts, precolombian arts; Islamic arts; Study of the history of art and archaeology in Roumania, Greece, France; History of art criticism:(a) Art criticism in Plato's time (b) Art criticism in France from 1840 to 1850 etc.; The architecture of Greek theater in relation to dramaturgy and décor; Problems in documentation of contemporary art;

- archaeology and history of art, properly speaking, with its corollaries:
 - art criticism, and even:
 - connoisseurship (l'expertise) 238

Clearly there was a parallel, in Focillon's mind, between internationalism and inter-disciplinarity. The more he described the mandate of the OIAHA, the closer the parallel between trans-national relations and trans-disciplinary projects became, in a clear response to Strzygowski's argument that certain art historical objects necessarily implied certain political subjects.

The OIAHA's most distinctive contribution to intellectual cooperation was a sustained debate on "a new critical method of art history" that took place in the pages of the Bulletin between 1934 and 1939. This was a disciplinary enactment of Valéry's theatrical model, where an art-historical "League of Minds" engaged in a heated discussion about intellectual autonomy, which was in fact a thinly veiled political discussion. The debate was inaugurated by Italian art historian Lionello Venturi (1885-1961) in the fourth issue of the Bulletin, with a simple question: "Where does this total lack of unity come from, this methodological chaos that is found in the history of art as it is taught in universities—a chaos that is in stark contrast with the relative order that reigns over the work that is being done in museums?" 239 Venturi's answer, essentially, was that art history had become divorced from criticism—that art historians, in their recent zeal to establish encyclopedic comprehensiveness, had forgotten to cater to their own faculty of judgment. For this he blamed the threefold specialization of the discipline (art history, art criticism and aesthetics (the first encyclopedic, the second concrete, the last philosophical.) "To understand the absurdity of these distinctions," Venturi continued, "it will suffice to recall the Kantian principle that any concept without intuition is empty and any intuition without concept is blind." Then cited extensively from Benedetto Croce's 1910 Problemi di Estetica, as establishing the "identity of aesthetics and criticism":

Here is the solution to the antinomy: a work of art certainly holds a value in itself, but this "itself" is not something simple, abstract, it is not an arithmetic unity: it is something complex, concrete, alive, an organism, a whole composed of parts... This solution establishes the importance of historic interpretation for aesthetic critique orbetter yet, it establishes that real historic interpretation and real aesthetic critique intersect. 241

²³⁸ F.30.1936. Office International des Institute d'Archéologie et d'Histoire de l'Art, Comité de Direction: Réunion des (18-19 Dec 1936), 35. (P1010707)

²³⁹ Lionello Venturi, "Les Instituts universitaires et l'Histoire de la Critique d'Art," in Bulletin de l'Office International des Institts d'Archéologie et d'Histoire de l'Art Vol 2, No. 4 (July 1935), 51

²⁴⁰ Lionello Venturi, "Les Instituts universitaires et l'Histoire de la Critique d'Art," Venturi cited Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, "Intuitions without concepts are blind; concepts without intuitions are empty."

²⁴¹ Venturi,

In the same way as Focillon had drawn the "space" of the object into the realm of aesthetics, to give form its own autonomous "life," here Venturi pulled "critique" into the history of art in order to give artworks a historiographic "life."

Having established the equation of art history and criticism, the question was left of the relationship between this new "critical history of art" and aesthetics. Again it was with an appeal to Kant—this time, the Kant of the third Critique—that Argan found the path to be followed: "as Kant himself showed, aesthetic judgment, though it holds universal value, cannot be proved in the same way as a logical judgment." Therefore no amount of philosophical speculation would elucidate the nature of this critical faculty. Instead Venturi proposed to derive insights from a historical analysis of the bond between critique and its objects—a historical survey of the relationship between the judgment over a particular work of art (the work of criticism) and the definition of art (the work of aesthetics), beginning with the Renaissance.

To remedy an "insufficient self-consciousness of the discipline," Venturi called for "a study of the history of the discipline itself" which he had already begun in his recently-published Storia della critica d'arte (History of Art Criticism). This work has now been historicized as the first work to disseminate German art historical historiography in Italian, from Wölfflin, Riegl and Dvorak, and it was to these same figures that Venturi appealed in the Bulletin. A fundamental shift occurred, he argued, since "aesthetics had become an autonomous discipline" in the 18th Century. This meant that, starting in the 18th Century, "criticism has two functions: to express the particular taste of an epoch, and to contribute in itself to the theory of art." Therefore the history of post-Enlightenment criticism was not simply a succession of theories and interpretations, but a cumulative development that led to the progressive understanding of the autonomy of criticism, itself an art. Venturi made his point by comparing Vasari and Wölfflin: while Vasari had special insight into "the linear" because he understood drawing "as Michelangelo did," he had been blind to the birth of "the painterly" in front of his very eyes, and it was only Wölfflin that "represented in our mind this pictorial ideal as it was independent from drawing." As a gesture towards this history of criticism Venturi offered a rapid and dense surveys of critics of all kinds, granting them all the privileged aesthetic position usually granted only to art itself.

One consequence of this "double function" of post-Enlightenment critique was that art could now no longer be dissociated from its reception: artworks entered the realm of aesthetics accompanied by the critical judgments of historians, and their theoretical bases. The history of

²⁴² Venturi, 55.

judgment was itself a history of creation—of intellectual "re-creation," to be precise—and therefore it needed to be taught with the same rigor as the history of art itself:

The intuition of the critic resembles the intuition of the artist in a direct and immediate manner. The reason of the critic finds in the artist's reason an even more secure bond, more easily demonstrable and analyzable... It goes without saying that to critique a work of art is primarily to relive it. ... This is why, I propose that the methodological unity for a history of art and for university institutes where art history is taught should be the history of the criticism of art. ²⁴³

A corollary of this principle—that the history of criticism should be taught—was that judgments of value could now be made between different forms of criticism. Here, Venturi took a stance specifically against Strzygowski, by declaring his relative "critical immaturity" within the Vienna School of Art:

I would also like to note that the renown of art historical books do not always correspond to their critical maturity. As an example I would cite the Vienna School of Art: to this school belong both Riegl and Wickhoff, whose critical ideas hold great value, as well as M. Strzygowski, whose critical value is more limited—although this has not kept him from achieving international renown. ²⁴⁴

By declaring Strzygowski's critique inferior to that of Riegl and Wickhoff, Venturi took sides in a fight that had pitted Strzygowski against the other heirs to the Vienna School. Indeed Strzygowski only presided over a bifurcated institution, which had been separated into two branches to satisfy both "humanist" and "Volkisch" tastes and inclinations. Strzygowski and Max Dvorak had both earned their chairs in 1909 as compromises for one another, coexisting in separate realms, presiding over separate research endeavors, speaking to separate audiences and adhering to separate ideologies. From the point of view of intellectual cooperation as a political ideal, this judgment was a crucial political twist on an otherwise purely disciplinary project. By excluding the popularity of Strzygowski's work as irrelevant to its critical value, Venturi hoped to place historical responsibility on disciplinary methods. This historical responsibility was the "second function" of criticism.

Venturi's article provoked a plethora of responses, most addressing his rhetorical question but not his proposed solution. Each contributor was eager to explain "methodological chaos" as a symptom of a variety of disciplinary, institutional, and national turf-wars. For example, archaeologist W. Deonna refuted the argument that art history needed to learn from aesthetics, contending that it was aesthetics which needed to look at objects more closely:

²⁴³ Venturi, 60.

²⁴⁴ Venturi, 62.

²⁴⁵ Marchand, "The Rhetoric of Artifacts," 125.

Whether it is Kant, Schelling, Schiller, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, or whether it is de Jouffroy, Taine, Guyau, Séailles, Bergson, Delacroix, Lalo, etc... from ancients to moderns, the procedure is the same: aestheticians ignore monuments, or have a limited knowledge of them. ... It is for aesthetics to use the results of art history, rather than for art history to start learning from aesthetics. ²⁴⁶

The priority of critique and analysis, in other words, should be reversed. What this response failed to grasp was the extra-disciplinary historical project that was contained in Venturi's proposal. Similarly, American art historian MacMahon explained the necessary "pragmatism" that had accompanied the institutional development of art history in America. While he connected scholarly tendencies with political ethos, it did so in voluntarist and presentist terms:

Liberalism facilitates and accelerates the inevitable development of the historical process; while in barbaric anti-liberalism, there is no place for history, there is only place for myths, and there is no tolerance for freedom of critique, whether it is exercised on art or on other efforts of human endeavors. We must write the history of art criticism while we are still free to study history and to express rational judgments on art. 247

By rephrasing Venturi's project in pragmatist terms, MacMahon fundamentally mis-understood the project of locating historical synthesis within the realm of aesthetic judgement itself—to the exclusion of other types of judgment. The urgency of MacMahon's tone, however, does reveal that the influence of the rise of Nazism on art historical scholarship was paradoxically more keenly felt in the USA, especially at the Institute of Fine Arts where he was teaching, and where multiple German refugees had already fled.²⁴⁸

The only urgency that was correspondingly felt in the European world of art history was that of a growing competition between national traditions. The plenary session of the 1933 International Congress of the History of Art asked for example, "When, in the history of art of a certain nation, can a national character be felt for the first time, or in a particularly interesting way?" It is telling, then, that this attempt to find nationalist roots in art historical work was consciously avoided in the pages of the Bulletin, addressing its methodological debates instead. Swiss art critic Schaub-Koch saw the Bulletin debate as a continuation of a disagreement that had arisen in Stockholm between him, Venturi and Focillon, and contributed a lengthy article critiquing his two colleagues. Against Venturi he offered a legalistic interpretation of history and acused Venturi (and, by implication, Croce) of

²⁴⁶ A. Deonna, "De la Nécessité d'une Méthode en Histoire de l'Art," in Bulletin Périodique, (Nov 1935), 36.

²⁴⁷ Philip MacMahon, "L'Histoire de la Critique de l'Art et l'Etude de l'Art dans les Universités Américaines," in 55.

²⁴⁸ See Chapter 2 for an in-depth summary of the migration of German art historians to America.

²⁴⁹ XIIIe Congrès International de l'Histoire de l'Art, Résumés des Communications (Stockholm: Boktryckeri, 1933), 13-51.

²⁵⁰ There is a clear relationship between the papers given at the session "History and Principles of Art Criticism," where Lionello Venturi had delivered a version of his text on criticism. Lionello Venturi, "Sur quelques problèmes actuels de la critique d'art," in Résumés des Communications, 247.

confusing judge and witness: "In the tribunal of the history of art, it is the historian who renders judgments... the critic is only one witness, who contributes his testimony." His critique of Focillon was consisted of a scathing review of The Life of Forms in Art, which had just been published. Schaub-Koch questioned the idea of "life as form," countering that "the only creator is man." While art could be attached to form and space, these were abstract categories, not spatial variables:

Space belongs to art, says Focillon. But what is space? We have no idea. Space is empty, a nothingness that we measure by the time that it takes to go from one end of it to the other. Time and space are purely and simply unlimited conceptions, uncertain ideas in our minds. All three are infinite, which is enough to confuse them. But if it please Mr. Focillon, we would like to situate the work of art in the mind of man, and not elsewhere. ²⁵²

What Schaub-Koch objected to most vehemently was the usage of this "space" to grant art both an autonomy from history and the power to transform it. "Mr. Focillon," he wrote, "depicts an aesthetics that would transform the climate of Venice, shows us VanDyck's portraits as transforming English nobility, Rembrandt attacking Dutch tradition." Unwittingly, Schaub-Koch identified in this pattern precisely the model of historical agency that Valéry and Focillon had hoped to develop in the Valéry-Focillon Proposition, with its image of a painting gallery activating intellectual work: but for Schaub-Koch, the problem was that "portraits become models."

From this canonical portrait gallery Schaub-Koch launched an unforgivingly conservative counter-proposal: that portraits were not active historical objects, but autonomous masterpieces, "to be erected into verified law" and "criteria for comparison by which all art can be judged and critiqued in an absolute measure."²⁵³ Invoking Lessing, he looked for a set of "invariable, positive" values, based on "a series of works of art from various schools that have always been admired by a unanimous elite since the origins of Western art."²⁵⁴ Although Schaub-Koch called his own method "experimental" (against Focillon's "metaphysical" and Venturi's "encyclopedic" approaches) and incorporated the works of Picasso and Cézanne into his canonical narrative. Schaub-Kauch's critique is useful in that it identifies the affinity between Focillon and Venturi: their debts to Croce and Kant, their willingness to understand aesthetic autonomy as expandable beyond the "work" of art, their desire to "locate the work of art in time and space,"²⁵⁵ and their refusal of any positivism based

²⁵¹ Emile Schaub-Koch, "De diverses methods de critique et d'histoire de l'art," in Bulletin Périodique, (Nov 1935), 63.

²⁵² Emile Schaub-Koch, .

²⁵³ Schaub-Koch, 62.

When "studied across all epochs, across all schools, across all theories, across all the individual personalities of artists, across all technical methods, these aesthetic qualities remained true and permanent." Emile Schaub-Koch, 57.

²⁵⁵ Schaub-Koch, 59.

upon identification of "the eternal masterpiece." ²⁵⁶ But this debate also demonstrates the limits of the project of intellectual cooperation when it entered a realm of art history: the limits of specialization itself.

Venturi and Focillon hoped to spark a debate about interpretation as a historical act, but most art historians did not agree that the link between history and interpretation needed to be made at all. Within the confines of their own discipline, Venturi, Focillon and Strzygowski were more in agreement than they were with others. Much as most political theorists of the time thought of nationalism as a path to internationalist empathy rather than a hindrance to it, so most art historians failed to recognize any politics of art history, except as subjected to institutional structures and methodological allegiances.

The political stakes of this "methodological chaos" only became clear again in the 1936 issue of the Bulletin, with an intervention of another Italian art historian, Giulio Carlo Argan (1909-1992), who wrote a review of the history of the Vienna school (Die Weiner Schule der Kunstgeschichte) published by one of Strzygowski's competitors in Vienna, Julius von Schlosser. Like Venturi, Argan saw the "methodological chaos" as due to "a fundamental tension between 'critique' and 'philology', the two terms denoting, not altogether correctly, the first an idealist tendency, the second a positivist tendency," with its corollary distinction between "archaeology" and "history of art." The history of the Vienna School, then, demonstrated how these two disciplinary poles had been connected historically: the Vienna School had been founded upon "positivist premises," but its work had eventually led to "a new critical imperative, critical exigencies that found a concrete expression in the work of Riegl and Wickhoff." Argan retraced this history, from the early "comparative imperative," through the heydays of archaeological depth, leading to "a distinctly idealist renaissance."

In this rise "from the valley of philology to the summits of philosophy," Argan identified the Rieglian concept of Kunstwollen as a crucial theoretical support. Riegl had invented the notion to counter Semperian materialism, with "its overestimation of technique." The Kunstwollen was the "will to art" or "will to form" that propelled the transformation of formal motifs, in a self-contained autonomous development, which related these motifs to social and cultural norms. ²⁵⁸ The term

²⁵⁶ Straub-Koch, 60.

²⁵⁷ Julius von Schlosser, Die Weiner Schule der Kunstgeschichte. (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1934). An English translation of the section on Riegl is available as "Riegl," in Framing Formalism: Riegl's Work (London: OPA, 2001), 33-48. The translation reviewed by Argan was Julius von Schlosser, La Storia dell'Arte Nelle Esperienze e nei Ricordi di un suo cultore, trans. Giovanna Federico Ajroldi, (Bari: Laterza, 1936), 175-221.

²⁵⁸ Riegl's definition of the Kunstwollen from Late Roman Art Industry, as translated by Christopher Wood: "All human will is directed toward a satisfactory shaping of man's relationship to the world, within and beyond the individual. The plastic

Kunstwollen was therefore intended to grant art its own autonomy, while implying a collective impetus that could only be understood as somehow connected to a "historical" reality. For Argan, the Kunstwollen allowed a sublation of individualist creation into collective phenomena, a realization:

... that the history of art contained an abstraction that went beyond the individual and that deformed it, whether in its historical signification, or in this special sense that there is no "art" but "artists," that all the labels of "schools" of "trend" of "genre" do not render artistic activity,

... that the dissolution of 'expression', which is always autonomous and individual, leads the "history of art" towards that utilitarian and empirical grammar that we call "knowledge." ²⁵⁹

Riegl's Kunstwollen was for Argan the hinge that brought together this double function of criticism, by separating the question of style from the question of authorship. What Kunstwollen allowed was twofold: historically, to get past the problem of authorship and historiographically, to get past the problem of taste.

The vagueness and evolution of the concept of Kunstwollen in Riegl's usage has fueled a century-long theoretical debate, which began almost the moment that Riegl coined the term. ²⁶⁰ Von Schlosser himself noted that by 1935 it had become "a glib catch phrase." To mention two poles, Gombrich famously indicted Riegl for coining a dangerous stereotype, while Giedion found in it a the foundation for a history of modern architecture. More recent art historical analyses have parsed its significance as a formalist and psychological heuristic that prefigures post-structuralist critiques by a half-century. ²⁶¹ As we will see, in heritage discourse the Kunstwollen is seen as allowing both monuments and their interpretations to become historical realities. The easiest way to understand Argan's particular appeal to the Kunstwollen in the pages of the Bulletin of the OIAHA is as an attempt to

Kunstwollen regulates man's relationship to the sensibly perceptible appearance of things. Art expresses the way man wants to see things shaped or colored, just as the poetic Kunstwollen expresses the way man wants to imagine them. Man is not only a passive, sensory recipient, but also a desiring, active being who wishes to interpret the world in such a way (varying from one people, region, or epoch to another) that it most clearly and obligingly meets his desires. The character of this will is contained in what we call the worldview (again in the broadest sense): in religion, philosophy, science, even statecraft and law." Wood, The Vienna School Reader (New York, 2000), 94-95.

²⁵⁹ Argan, 37.

²⁶⁰ Henri Zerner distinguished two directions the term took in the work of Riegl's immediate successors in Vienna: a neo-Kantian version preferred by those like Panofsky who saw in Kunstwollen a kind of "immanent meaning," and a Hegelian metaphysics preferred by Sedlmayr and his "structuranalyse" colleagues. Henri Zerner, "Alois Riegl: Art, Value, Criticism."

²⁶¹ For a historiographic overview see Margaret Iversen, "The Concept of the Kunstwollen," in Alois Riegl: Art History and Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 2-19. Gombrich's critique is in the introduction of his Search for Cultural History. In 1976 a special issue of Daedalus had contributions from Henri Zerner and Siegfried Giedion. For a distinction between Riegl's Kunstwollen and Schnasse's teleology, see Michael Podro, "Riegl," in The Critical Historians of Art (New Haven: Yale, 1992), 96-97. Christopher Wood argues the Kunstwollen was primarily a disciplinary conceit ("the basic unit of art history") that productively spawned the work of the later Vienna School. Michael Wood, "Introduction," The Vienna School Reader (New York: Zone, 2000), 26. Margaret Iversen connected Riegl with contemporary theories of language, ("Style as Structure: Alois Riegl's Historiography," in Art History (Mar 1979), 63-72.

replace the artist by the critic—in a moment when artistic originality was in crisis. Argan emphasized that Riegl had invented the idea of Kunstwollen to interpret the late-roman period, "a period in which we do not find the presence of many artistic personalities which are historically individuated." This lack of artistic authorship (in history) could be compensated by critical interpretation (in the present); thus Riegl had shown that "this lacuna in no way constituted a limit to critical activity." Here the parallels with contemporary phenomena of international politics were clear; Argan offered to the "double function" of criticism, as if criticism had become an intellectual ethic for an age of mass culture.

It is important to note that, by using the publication of Schlosser's memoir as a pretext to return to the methods of the Vienna School, Argan deliberately obscured Schlosser's own critique of these methods. Schlosser resisted the concept of Kunstwollen, which he thought was as "an allegorizing personification of historical forces like those incarnations of collective spirits if which the Romantics were so fond." Schlosser still believed in the distinction between philological and art historical treatment, and explicitly critiqued Riegl for blurring the line between "the history of style (the history of individual artists)" and "the history of language (the history of the transmission of artistic conventions.") has Instead Schlosser resorted to Benedetto Croce in resisting any abdication of the label of "art" to any anonymous collectivity. Yet in the Bulletin Argan went out of his way to downplay Croce's influence on Schlosser. "It is certain that Croce's theoretical explication of aesthetics influenced Schlosser," he wrote, but "equally important was the direct and patient study of the work of art." It was the completeness of the critical experience developed in Vienna that Argan found admirable: the rigor and discipline of formalism. Argan depicted this perceptive concentration as a powerful defense mechanism of the critical faculty, against both historical positivism and philosophical enslavement:

More than by adhering to the latest philosophical currents, this school has found stimulus for renewal in the rigorous determination of the problem of art, and in a method which consists in placing yourself in front of the work of art with the willpower to understand precisely to understand its entirely intrinsic value, its pure,

²⁶² Otto Pächt, "Art Historians and Art Critics: VI: Alois Riegl," in The Burlington Magazine (May 1963), 188-193.

²⁶³ Julius von Schlosser, "'Stilgeschichte' und 'Sprachgeschichte' in der bildenden Kunst," (1935). This text was translated and published in the same volume of Schlosser's biography and the history of the Vienna School that Argan was reviewing. The translation is "Storia dello Stile e Storia del Linguaggio," in von Schlosser, La Storia dell'Arte Nelle Espeirenze e nei Ricordi di un suo cultore," Trans. Giovanna Federici Ajroldi, (Bari: Laterza, 1936), 175-221. For a brief overview of Schlosser's critique see Podro, 212 and Pächt, 190. For a distinction between nationalist and international strains in both art historians, see Thomas DaCosta Kauffman, "Stereotypes, Prejudice, and aesthetic judgement," in Art History Aesthetics and Visual Studies, Clark Studies in the Visual Arts (New Haven: Yale, 2002), 76-77.

²⁶⁴ Argan, 35.

absolute value, without attempting to avoid the problems that arise from it by placing it into abstract schemes that have nothing to do with it. ²⁶⁵

Argan described the critical act as a performance of personal willpower, a proof of the courage to treat the work of art autonomously, resisting the temptation to resort to pre-existing historical schemes. This was almost a scheme of political resistance, which led the critic away from historical circumstance and into a higher realm of history. Thus "by posing exactly the problem of art, one is necessarily led to the problem of history." The lessons of the Vienna School were that a leap was possible: from art, to history, through form.

But Argan was also taking sides in another critical debate, centered not in Vienna but in Rome. ²⁶⁷ The Italian debate divided Croceans and non-Croceans, fascists and non-fascists, architecture and the other arts: so for Argan to argue against a "positivist historicism" was to argue against the Rome-centric, fascist-friendly historiography which was promoted by Giovannoni. ²⁶⁸ Against Croce and his followers, who emphasized the "aspect" of art, Giovannoni argued that architecture was a distinct art form with unique ability to support political agendas and be integrated into bureaucratic life. ²⁶⁹ The disagreement culminatedin Argan's appointment at the head of a commission to revise Giovannoni's 1931 Carta del Restauro, where he removed the difference between "live and dead" monument and the right to build architecture "in the style" of its original construction. Here too the disciplinary debate had a political dimension: proponents of Crocean antifascism like Argan were in ministerial positions because they hoped to advocate for the artistic autonomy of arts from politics, and it is in the context of this de-politicization of the arts that Argan deprived architecture of any claim to "reality." ²⁷⁰ But while in the national context Argan was eager to claim the Crocean mantle and its anti-fascist stance, in the international context Argan modified

²⁶⁵ Argan, 38.

²⁶⁶ Argan, 38.

²⁶⁷ Schlosser concluded his Vienna School History with Croce, and his desire to popularize the "great master's" work in German, granting himself "the modest role of a mediator between German and Italian cultures." Schlosser, La Scuole Viennese, 163.

²⁶⁸ There is some disagreement over the different roles played by Argan and Giovannoni in fascist Italy. In 1965 Millon gave a central part to Giovanoni and his journal Palladio in his account of the role of architectural history in the spread of fascism. But he also implied that Argan, as editor-in-chief of Le Arti, had contributed to a shifting editorial policy that gradually supported Mussolini's favorite nationalistic myths. ("Le Arti was not a Fascist propaganda organ, with an editorial board composed of a few people who liked to wear black shirts, but a journal advised by the major art historians of the country.") Henry Millon, "The Role of History of Architecture in Fascist Italy," The Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians, (Mar., 1965), 53-59. Others have suggested that Argan took the ministerial position only in order to promote the autonomy of the arts from within.

²⁶⁹ Gustavo Giovannoni, "Il Metodo nella Storia dell'Architettura," in Palladio (1939), 77-79. On Giovannoni's contribution to architectural history, see Guido Zucconi, Gustavo Giovannoni: Dal Capitello alla Città (Milano: Jaca Book, 1996). ²⁷⁰ For a complete account of this debate and the text of Argan's revision, see "La "Carta del Restauro" di Giulio Carlo Argan," in Annali di Architettura (1994), 101-115, 104.

his argument by distancing Schlosser from Croce, using both as neutral bridges between Italian and Austrian traditions.

Argan's promotion of a Viennese-inspired critical formalism as a model for international action was therefore adapted from his national model of critical resistance to the fascist regime. But why return to the Vienna school at all? In part, this was a return to the original cosmopolitanism of the Hapsburg empire—an attempt to wrest the comparative methodology it has yielded from Stzrygowski's political grasp. ²⁷¹ In addition, for Venturi and Argan, intellectual cooperation seemed the appropriate opportunity to return to the first tradition of art history to rely on a theory of the "mind"— Geistesgeschichte—and find in this original importation a solution to the problem of "taste." ²⁷²

The trouble with presenting a Viennese critical method as a form of political resistance, however, is that Strzygowski also wielded a narrative of political resistance to completely different ends. In the same issue of the Bulletin, Strzygowski took on the entire debate and its attacks against him, in a lengthy re-exposition of his scholarship, his career, of his argument with Focillon, summarizing his entire life's work as a historiographic fight to undermine the master-narrative of the "art of the conqueror:"

Against the general conviction of the superiority of the art of the conqueror (Machtkunst) of the Mediterranean I can only oppose the results of my entire life's work, which tend to prove that a much superior form of art manifests itself in Greek Iranian and Gothic arts—an art that came from the North and propagated through the Middle East.²⁷³

Against the formalist idea of autonomy as resistance Strzygowski dramatized his own criticsim as redeeming a centuries-old historical injustice. He echoed this narrative with a personal story of resistance to institutional forces at the Vienna Institute.

When the first institute of History in Vienna was created, the Institute for the History of Art was in order to be devoted to the work of comparison, concerning the entire world, all periods and all peoples. Today we no longer need such an initiative. ... What we need today is an inter-state institute to serve as liaison between institutes and university chairs, which could give them themes for their research and use the results for the common goals of our science. All results would have to be given over to this central organism, where they would be classified and organized, and made available to all collaborators. ²⁷⁴

²⁷¹ Margaret Iversen addresses the relation of Vienna School scholarship to contemporary empire politics.

²⁷² For a brief summary of this filiation in German-speaking art history see W. Eugene Kleinbauer, "Geistesgeschichte and Art History," in Art Journal, (Winter, 1970-1971), 148-153.

²⁷³ Strzygowski, "L'Avenir des méthodes de recherches en matière des beaux-arts," in Bulletin 8-9 (Nov 1936-Mar 1937), 74.

²⁷⁴ Strzygowski, Ibid.

Lastly, Strzygowski cast a retrospective glance at his work in the League of Minds, admitting that "I have also always felt isolated in the meetings of the Committee on Arts and Letters, I always had the feeling of being alone among the men that I have had to combat my whole life, since my experience has led me to reject the historic humanism under which my colleagues were taken." The Directorial Board which was established in 1933 did not include Strzygowski, and had a distinctly Mediterranean composition. ²⁷⁵ Still Strzygowski took some credit for the creation of the OIAHA and saw in it a hope that had been squandered in his own Vienna:

When the IICI was created in 1931 he pleaded to add the "the terme Recherches sur l'Art (Kunstforschung) to the name of the organ, so that the superior procedures of science, rather than just the history of art, be used in this organism. I wish upon this organism to reach this goal faster than the German association of art, Kunstwissenschaft attempted to do it 20 years ago. One institute alone could not achieve this. I myself tried it in Vienna after the Great war, to establish this center that we all need, and that we all yearn for, in the great country of ancient culture that is Austria. We could have fused my institute with the archaeological institute in Warsaw, which considered my offer. But ignorance was then still too widespread and when I retired the institute was destroyed in a manner so arbitrary that it must be seen as a heroic performance of a dying humanism. ²⁷⁶

He then concluded by re-proposing the same programmatic overhaul of the OIAHA he had already proposed in his 1932 letter to Focillon, ²⁷⁷ which was intended to deal with "art objects" directly—without having recourse to written sources. But now Strzygowksi added a preliminary methodological step: the creation of a post-humanist "observer":

- I. Study of the observer
- II. Study of the object
 - (a) essence
 - (b) evolution
 - (c) knowledge (conaissance) 278

Whereas Focillon's plan for the OIAHA reflected the structure of institutional cooperation, Strzygowski's method contained a structuring of subjectivity—one devoted to forming post-humanist subjects. Under the section "knowledge" he detailed a plan for teaching schoolchildren to recognize the importance of objects, so that when they arrived at university they were prepared to

²⁷⁵ Com/Ex/Institut.26. 1934. "Office International des Instituts d'Archéologie et d'Histoire de l'Art." The Comité de Direction" was composed of: Diego Angulo (l'Université de Séville.); A. Colasanti, (Université de Rome); WG Contsbable, (Courtauld Institute); W. Deonna (Université de Genève), H. Focillon (Sorbonne), G. Opresco (Université de Bucarest)

²⁷⁶ Strzygowski, Ibid.

²⁷⁷ "The chaos that is felt by all those who approach the history of art today does not come from the insufficiency of scientific method. It is caused first and foremost by the lack of a certain bibliography and the lack of a serious and objective critical practice."

²⁷⁸ Strzygowski's ambition was to overhaul completely the methodological tradition he had inherited in Vienna, had already proposed the "objective" side of this program in his letter to Focillon: "I. Determination of object of study II. Structure III. Evolution." Strzygowski, Civilizations, 160.

process the mass of monuments produced by the "Nordic spirit." Strzygowski's anti-humanist, anti-Roman, anti-critical project therefore had its eye on a post-humanist subject, and one which was adapted to the increasingly scientific paradigm of research that art history was developping.

Thus we find in the work of the OIAHA the same discursive pattern as that of the Athens Conference and the International Studies Conferences: a reworking, under new theoretical headings, of old disciplinary debates and categorizations. Like idealists League supporters, the art historians were addressing the consequences of the influence of German idealist historiography onto their discipline, in the absence of Germany itself. But within this inherited discourse there were now two disciplinary debates in play. The first pitted classical antiquity and its advocates, with their textual sources and their archaeological institutes, against those who studied medieval, Byzantine, folkoric and other "oriental" art forms, who relied on physical inspection of material objects. Within this second category, however, the formalists were pitted against the scientists: the former sought to create a new criticality from the liberation from textual forms; the latter insisted that further accumulation in itself would redress an imbalanced picture of world history. Both were equally populist, and both believed in the political potential of their insights. Strzygowski was part of a movement to popularize art history; Focillon insisted on seeing art criticism as a modern medium. These two trends were undoubtedly both inherited by Unesco in the postwar. As Strzygowski specialists have noted, his vigorous critique of Romzentrismus made him as useful to Nazi pan-German ideology as to late-century culturalism. As for Focillon, his insistence on the formality of "life"—the life of art and the life of institutions—helped to incorporate the aesthetic model of autonomy into the programs of postwar international bureaucracies.

The Legislated Monument

In 1939, the Institute for Intellectual Cooperation published two books dealing with the international value of monuments. Both volumes were re-publications of material that had appeared throughout the decade in the pages of Mouseion. The first was to be the inaugural volume in a new thematic series, Recherche, edited by Focillon, and sponsored by all the organizations of intellectual cooperation with an interest in art and architecture: the International Museums Office, the International Commission for Historic Monuments, the International Office of Institutes of History of Art and Archaeology, the International Commission for Popular Arts and the International Study center on Architecture and Urbanism. ²⁷⁹ (fig 1.32) The second, also co-published by the OIM and the

²⁷⁹ Recherche I: Le Problème de l'Ogive (Paris: IICI, 1939).

International Monuments Committee, was a "technical and legal manual" on The Protection of monuments in War Time. Both were intended to project a conciliatory politics onto architectural forms. (fig 1.34) But while the first was a soon-forgotten collection of scholarly essays on the relatively obscure topic of Gothic rib vaulting in architecture (Le Problème de l'Ogive), the second synthesized monumental protection so effectively that it became an obligatory reference in postwar international heritage discourse. To conclude this chapter I argue that the Manual and the Recherche contain many of the same principles and that their apparent lack of relationship reveals the bifurcation between "realism" and "idealism" instituted by the political structure of the League had been absorbed even in those realms of intellectual cooperation where architecture was supposed to bridge between them.

Le Problème de l'Ogive was supposed to inaugurate a new focus on artistic and architectural forms as sites of international debate. The first debate it addressed was the controversy over the structural role of gothic rib vaulting, triggered by French architect Pol Abraham, who argued that rib vaults created an aesthetic effect of structure rather than performing any actual structural function. Against Viollet-le-Duc, who saw ribs as icons of a proto-modern structural rationalism in Gothic architects, Abraham observed that in partially-destroyed gothic constructions, some vaults had remained intact despite having lost their ribbing.²⁸⁰ Abraham's contention that Viollet le Duc had reduced the expressive potential of Gothic architecture caused a minor controversy in France, concentrating broad questions of geo-political history in a debate of architectural techniques which drew even the attention of historians of the École des Annales. 281 Focillon's contribution to this debate, in essence, was to replace a structural idea of function with a cultural one: rib vaulting should be understood as a paradoxical and changing expression of civilizational conflicts. He enlisted the expertise of four colleagues who provided archaeological examples from "Islamic architecture" and "trans-Caucasian" architecture, as well as a text from Abraham and contributing his own. 282 Together all these studies provided a plethora of examples that did not fit the "classical and exemplary solution" examined by both structural rationalism and its detractors. Despite their a-typicality, these attempts were not to be ignored "as exceptions, as aberrations." In what can no doubt be considered a demonstration of Venturi's "double function" of art historical criticism, Focillon performed what he called an act of "intellectual restitution":

²⁸⁰ Pol Abraham, Viollet le Duc et le Rationalisme Médiéval (Paris: Vincet & Fréal, 1934).

²⁸¹ Louis Lecrocq

²⁸² Pol Abraham, « Les données plastiques et fonctionnelles du problème de l'ogive ; » Walter Godfrey, « L'Arc ogival, raison esthétique plutôt que nécessité fonctionnelles, » Elis Lambert, « La croisées d'ogives dans l'architecture islamique, » Gurgis Baltrusaitis, « La croisée d'ogives dans l'architecture transcaucasienne, » Marcel Aubert, « Origine et développpement de la voûte sur croisée d'ogive. »

The problem of the ogive cannot be posed in abstracto, as if it existed "in itself' after a few concessions to primitive forms. ... Our problem is one of intellectual restitution. To think like the artist—that is the rule of our research. Indeed the artist does not think once and for all; he searches, he invents, he adapts, he perfects, he errs. The problem of the ogive is therefore double: it is historical and it is structural.²⁸³

The Problème de l'Ogive was supposed to be a didactic demonstration of the new critical agency that had been latent the League's art-historical agencies. Taking an issue of "form" as its main subject, the volume gathered multiple disciplinary strands into a single interpretive act, emerging from the accumulation of archaeological evidence with a critical point of view that confidently made judgments, folding present interpretations into the historical value of cultural artifacts. Here was "concrete" agreement, in the form of a ribbed vault.

The advent of war obscured the impact of the Problème de l'Ogive—although it is unlikely that it would have had much of an impact on the debate at all. As Charles Rufus Morey pointed out in 1944, is only after being republished in a posthumous collection of Focillon's essays, Moyen-Age: Survivances et Réveils, that Focillon's synthesis of the issue received attention. 284 Focillon died in 1943 after emigrating to the United States and seeing his physical and mental health rapidly deteriorate.²⁸⁵ It was another essay in this collection, titled "From Germanic Middle Ages to Occidental middle Ages" which Morey noted was probably "one of Focillon's last" and "reflected in some degree the profound effect of the war upon his burdened spirit." 286 Structured as a critique of Henri Pirenne's theory that Islamic conquest had created a historical break between Antiquity and Middle Ages, Focillon painted a millennium-long tableau of the "potent consolidation of Germanism" that took hold in Europe during the Carolingian empire.²⁸⁷ This text is of interest here because it offered a more eloquent redemption of the "Germanic spirit" than Strzygowski ever managed. Germanism needed to be understood in light of the "atrocious wars that tore Christianity from paganism and chaos." These wars, Focillon wrote, had left a long lasting "moral imprint" upon Europe, in addition to giving it an "obsession with universal empire and a taste for unmeasured enterprises and colossal buildings." Although Focillon found in this history of battles the origins of the "slowness" and

²⁸³ Henri Focillon, "Le Problème de l'Ogive," in Bulletin Périodique I (1934), 42, reprinted in Le Problème de l'Ogive (1939).

²⁸⁴ Henri Focillon, Moyen-Age: Survivances et Réveils: Etudes d'Art et d'Histoire (Montréal: Brentano's, 1943).

²⁸⁵ Focillon immediately became involved in the Ecole Libre des Hautes études in New York, where many other luminaries of French intellectual life came to find refuge, including Claude Levi Strauss. Madeline Stinson, "The Leaders of French Intellectual Life--At Home and in Exile," in The Modern Language Journal, (Mar., 1944) 246-253. In 1941 he also composed the outline for a text titled "L'Histoire de l'art et la Vie de l'Esprit," that re-iterated the need to find the solution to war in a history of "the mind." The text is republished in Relire Focillon (Paris: Musée du Louvre, 1998), 171-184.

²⁸⁶ Charles Rufus Morey, "Book Review. Moyen Age: Survivances et Réveils" in Art Bulletin (Dec 1944), 278-279.

²⁸⁷ Henri Pirenne, Mahomet et Charlemagne (Paris: 1937).

"barbarity" of Germanism, "its lack of originality and creativity," he also found poetry in the way this Germanic spirit had stoically defended Europe and the Mediterranean against extinction for a millennium. "It is in its archaism that lies its grandeur." In a final twist, Focillon then breached into political territory he so carefully avoided at the League:

The old continental domain of Germany seems condemned to a sort of immense provincialism. In the history of its evolution, one has to account not only for Germany's late entrance in the European community, but also for the a particular geographic place it has held since the Treaty of Verdun. Germany sees everything through an imperial lens, because it was born a violent birth, of Carolinginan wars. From this prehistory it has kept the drive for merciless wars, the nostalgia for forets and migrations of peoples, the belief in abslute value that weighs down neighboring populations. ... It is natural that it should concentrate on a racial dream. 288

Thus Focillon eventually succumbed to the temptation of historicizing the "drive for merciless wars." He did so not in order "to diminish the contribution of a nation," but rather to explicate the behavior of the "Germanic body" of Europe "in light of information borrowed from history and geopolitics." Focillon then articulated perhaps one of his clearest statements of method, and the most lucid exposition of his instrumental politics of form: that "tradition is like a vertical force," and that "whatever the diversity of this intense movement, it represents the collaboration of past to the historic present." Even in this tragic time of exile, Focillon displayed both the potential and the tragedy of intellectual cooperation, delivering this geo-political explication of contemporary atrocities with tempered liberalism and self-restrained disciplinarity.

Unlike the Problème de l'Ogive, whose untimely publication doomed it to irrelevance, the Manual on the Protection of Monuments and Works of Art During Wartime was as a timely response to a growing sense of urgency, on the part of an organization that was soon dissolved. The Manual was divided into two parts, reflecting the division of tasks that had been carried through since the early days of the Einstein-Bergson debacle. A first part on the "Technical Methods of Protection" gave specific recommendations on measures to be taken for the storage of movable monuments and emptying of immovable ones. All of these recommendations were largely inspired from the experience of the Spanish Civil war, and contained examples already published in Mouseion. The second part, titled "International Protection," compiled all the work that had been accomplished to date on the legislation of monuments. The Manual, in other words, was re-resented everything that had been in "technical" and "general" work on monuments since the Athens Conference—with the addition of "war" as a theme.

²⁸⁸ Henri Focillon, "Du Moyen Age Germanique au Moyen Age Occidental," in Moyen-Age: Survivances et Réveils, 44.

²⁸⁹ Focillon, "Du Moyen Age Germanique," 46.

The technical portion of the manual was a validation of regularized "maintenance." In his introduction, OIM president Foundoukidis presented war as a continuation of ready-made cooperation between museums. In an "ideal situation," he wrote, "museums would be emptied of artworks and transformed into centers of public information." As if the war was an opportunity to enact the "ready-made" network idea long ago articulated by Focillon, Foundoukitis depicted a wartime network of institutions "activated" and "decentralized" by war. "Conservators are called upon to evacuate their artworks to provincial institutions, where they will find a new public." Similarly, Foundoukitis presented war as an occasion to re-vive Focillon's idea of "tutelage" by larger museums of smaller institutions. "This type of decentralization will conform to a tendency that had been manifesting itself for the last few years in museographic circles." Perhaps the most obvious form of opportunism was the suggestion that the idea of "international solidarity" long promoted by the OIM could finally be demonstrated, since war focuses public opinion. This was especially the case, Foundounkitis wrote, of monuments that existed in the public view:

War will initiate an ever-growing public to the value that is attached to monuments. While regrettable, the necessities of war will draw the attention of all to the treasures that are conserved outside museums. Our works of protection, which will transform the physiognomy of artistic and historic buildings, of public monuments, statues, fountains, these structures that temporarily hide them from view, have naturally awoken the interest of population for works that it often only considered with a distracted glance, or an eye desensitized by habit.²⁹¹

In war, monuments encased in protective forms rendered an educational service merely by being the in the public eye.

The section of the manual titled "International Protection" surveyed precedents for the protection of artworks in wartime, and proposed a new international convention. This was the work of Belgian jurist and Permanent Court of International Justice member Charles de Visscher (1884-1973),²⁹² who had been at work on legislating monuments since 1934.²⁹³ He began his commentary by addressing the possible contradiction of legislating war-time protection within an institution that was devoted to the perpetuation of peace. Yet he rejected the idea that writing laws for the conduct of war was an admission wars's legitimacy. "Any international regulation," he

²⁹⁰ Foundoukitis, "Introduction," in Office International des Musées, La Protection des Monuments et Oeuvres d'art en Temps de Guerre, (Paris: IICI, 1939), 14.

²⁹¹ Founoudkitis, "Introduction," 17.

 $^{^{292}}$ The Court had been created as part of the League Covenants, although it was technically an advisory body outside the League tree. ##

²⁹³ Visscher's reports were already cited in the OIM advisory work in Spain. See JF Sanchez-Canton, "Les Premières measures de defense du Prado au course de la guerre civile en Espagne," MouseionVol 39-40 (1937),65.

wrote, "must be inspired by a frankly realist viewpoint."²⁹⁴ In this he was making the case that he would later make in his *Theory and Reality in International Law*, that laws are not imposed forms, but deduced norms.²⁹⁵ In the case of art protection, "realism" meant that protection could not conflict with military necessity.

The "idealist" position against which Visscher was positioning the convention had been made clear at the second meeting of the Permanent Arts and Letters Committee in 1932, when CIC president Gilbert Murray, declared that "if one is wise enough to spare monuments and works of art, then it would be better to start by having the wisdom not to make war at all." 296 Murray was responding to the suggestion that the Athens Conference resolutions should be complemented, in light of "recent troubles in the change of political regime in Spain," by a recommendation concerning protection of monuments in wartime. 297 But Murray was an idealist in EH Carr's sense of the term: involved in the League's "Conference on Disarmament," he took the "perpetuation of peace" as the only criterion for the League's work. In the 1939 Manual, Foudounkitis specifically cited Disarmament work as the reason why the League Assembly had stopped short of including provisions for wartime protection when ratifying the results of the Athens Conference. "It seemed inopportune," he wrote apologetically, "to raise the question in a moment when all efforts tended towards the establishment of a state of affairs that would eliminate war, and when the Conference for Disarmament was so actively working towards this goal." 298 Similarly, after the episode of the Spanish Civil War de Visscher had articulated a broadly-based defense of realism. There were two forms of skepticism to an international convention. The first was the same as the one expressed by Murray:

Some estimate that any new tentative to regulate the law of war is inopportune. Justly engaged in the abolition of war itself, and hoping to inspire in public opinion the greatest possible horror about war, they refuse to participate in a project whose avowed object is to regulate its conduct and limit its destructive effects.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁴On de Visscher's life and career, see the special issue of European Journal of International Law, "The European tradition in international law: Charles de Visscher," (2000) De Visscher, Manuel Technique et Juridique, 170.

²⁹⁵ Visscher particularly argued against the formalism of Hans Kelsen. See "The Gropings of Doctrine," in Charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law," trans. PE Corbett, (Princeton: PU Press, 1957).

²⁹⁶ Gilbert Murray, cited in J.F. Sanchez-Canton, Mouseoin p. 65

²⁹⁷ Indeed Spain triggered concern as early as 1931. At its 1931 meeting the OIM composed a press release titled "Recent troubles in Spain and the Protection of Works of Art," noting the "alarming news" that "works of art had to suffer during the troubles that marked the recent political changes" and publicizing a communiqué of the Spanish Beaux-Arts condemning this damage. See "Activité de l'Office International des Musées," in Mouséon Vol 16 (1931), 107-108. Since these events had unfolded between the Athens Conference and its recommendations to the League Assembly, questions had arisen as to the possibility of adding a "wartime" clause to the Athens Recommendations.

²⁹⁸ Foundoukidis, "Commentaire du Projet," in Manuel Technique et Juridique, 202.

²⁹⁹ Visscher, "Rapport Préliminaire présenté au comité de direction de l'Office International des Musées le 12 Octobre 1936 par le Professeur Charles de Visscher," in Manuel Technique et Juridique, 168.

But Visscher outlined an ever graver objection, which had been commonly made after the experience of World War I: that past experience showed that belligerent nations usually made a point of breaking whatever regulations for war were in place. Here Visscher offered an expert opinion that such violations "are to be attributed less—as had been thought—to a deliberate will and rather more to the intervention of unforeseen and unexpected factors." Hence Visscher concluded against "will" and in favor of "contingency". Against contingency, then, he proposed that one should concentrate on "values whose preservation in wartime does not necessarily contradict the military interest of belligerents. Values on the order of Humanity: the fate of prisoners and the wounded. Values of an intellectual order: the protection of the artistic and historic patrimony of civilized nations." Thus even in his deliberate realism Visscher granted the League's international and collective "life of the mind" the same value that the International Committee of the Red Cross granted to individual "life."

Having set a "realist" tone for the legal project, Visscher began exactly where the Athens Conference had left off: by finding reasons to protect monuments in "the will of the people themselves:"

It is certain, as the Assembly of the League of Nations recognized on 10 October 1932, that "the surest guarantee for the conservation of monuments and works of art resides in the respect and the attachment that is shown to them by the people themselves" and, consequently, that any attempt at an international regulation in times of war will find its most solid ground in the growing interest that has everywhere been arouse by the conservation of art and of vestiges of the past.³⁰⁰

But these attachments would prove effective source of public pressure in war only insofar as "they are founded on a moral opinion of the world which, thankfully, is proving to be more and more conscious, every day, of the human significance of witnesses of civilization." Setting out to compare existing precedents, Visscher rejected the Hague Conventions of 1907 as obsolete since they relied on a "localization" that distinguished between "defended" and "undefended" sites:

In reality, already in the last war the traditional distinction between "defended" and "undefended" sites was rendered obsolete: in ground warfare, by the expansion of the reach of canons; in naval warfare by the authorization of navies to destroy any objective deemed military, and in aerial warfare by recent developments in military aviation. ³⁰¹

This "triple development," involving the expansion of warzones, the dispersal of military objectives, and the extension of weapons, led Visscher to assume a territorial totality of war. Similarly, Visscher

³⁰⁰ Charles de Visscher, "Rapport Préliminaire," 172.

³⁰¹ Visscher, 140.

rejected as "unrealistic" the Roerich Pact, signed at the Pan-American Union Conference in 1935, because it relied on the assumption that one could "neutralize" certain locations altogether out of war.³⁰²

Since the Hague Conventions were outdated and the Roerich Pact unrealistic, Visscher offered two precedents as better starting points. The first was a study that the Dutch Archaeological Society produced for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1918, to learn the lessons of World War I. The Dutch jurists noted that measures for the protection of artworks and monuments had been more effective in countries which had joined the conflict later than in those where the war began in August 1914. This meant that war should no longer be seen as a punctual event: "the protection of art works in wartime," was "also a mobilization that can no longer be improvised in military terms." Thus the eventuality of war (including the specific fact that "modern wars "break out with thunderous rapidity,") had to be built into peace-time protective measures. In what is perhaps the most direct application of the principles of the "new diplomacy" to monument conservation, de Visscher advocated that being equipped for the 'perpetuation' of peace prepared nations for the eventuality of war.

Visscher's second example of a precedent adapted to the "new exigencies" of total war was a set of "Proposed Rules for the Regulation of Aerial Warfare" constructed in a Conference at The Hague in 1923.³⁰³ This attempt to regulate aerial warfare unfolded against a backdrop of improvement of bombing technologies and their testing against colonial rebellions by British, Italian and Spanish governments.³⁰⁴ It was the Italian delegates to who added to the basic set of interdictions a provision for "signaling to military commanders the monuments or buildings which are to be spared, as well as the presence of certain points on the territory of depositories where works of art would be gathered." This proposed convention was never made law, in large part because of a disagreement between US and UK delegations over what exactly was to be "spared" from the bombing. The UK wanted to restrict air attacks by using a functionalist concept of "military objective," while the US commission preferred the geographically specific "combat area." While the US won the fight and the convention text was phrased in geographic terms, the UK and France were dissatisfied enough that the regulation never was approved by the League Assembly. Still, Visscher vaunted the "realism" of these provisions, which gave "concrete and detailed dispositions, inspired

³⁰² Visscher, 170.

James W. Garner, "Proposed Rules for the Regulation of Aerial Warfare," in The American Journal of International Law, (Jan., 1924), 56-81.

³⁰⁴ For a brief account of these, see Sven Lindquist, A History of Bombing (New York: New Press, 2001), 48-49.

by a concern for conciliating international monuments protection with the inevitable exigencies of war."

The Hague provisions, which de Visscher cited extensively, reflect the spatial orientation of the US conception: they delimit an "area of protection" around monuments, and give specific dimensions and for using "flares" to demarcate monuments and the space around them:

Article 26

- 1. Any state will have the to establish an area of protection around monuments on its territory, In times of war these zones will be shielded from bombardments.
- 3. The area of protection can include, in addition to the space occupied by the monument or the group of monuments, a surrounding zone whose width is no more than 500 meters from the outer periphery of this space.³⁰⁵

Here again the designation of the "open space" around monuments became the basis for the delineation of a "surrounding zone" of political autonomy. It is clear that, while the convention was never enacted between states, the prominence of this spatial idea in the manual influenced those like Paul J. Sachs and WG Constable who first proposed that the Allied Air Forces mark monuments on their target maps. While De Visscher admitted that the specifics of the regulations might need to be revised in light of technological advances, he still heralded them for being "inspired by a realist spirit" and cited them in their entirety in the Manual.

By singling out these two precedents De Visscher repeated the pattern that had been established in Athens: one plan provided for the "regularization" of protective measures in peacetime; the other was a specific project for an "international accord" by which the specific endeavors would be regulated. The idealism of one (regulation) was offset by the realism of the other (international convention.) ³⁰⁷ Lastly, then, Visscher emphasized a specific mode of action: that a group of "disinterested international experts" be designated to oversee the implementation of the convention and arbitrate any disputes. While the 1923 convention proposed that these be appointed by each state, as a kind of monument-diplomat, de Visscher went further, asking that these neutral experts be centralized into a single international institution, which would act as a "neutral control committee" (commission neutre de surveillance):

It seems that this neutral overseeing committee should belong to a central institution. Named by this institution, its members would inspire more confidence in the

³⁰⁵ As cited in Ch. De Visscher, 173

³⁰⁶ Paul Sachs' personal copy of the manual is now kept in the Harvard Libraries. Correspondance shows WG Constable recieved his copy in England before emigrating to the US in 1936.

³⁰⁷ Visscher, 173.

belligerents; they would receive from this commission both instructions for their own actions and the assurance of protection.³⁰⁸

Visscher prepared the ground for monuments to be protected from a double "totality" of war: spatial totality, totality over time. But by relying on a neutral "central organ" to implement this totalizing norm, forgetting to incorporate the psychological totality of "the people's value" upon which he had, taking a cue from the Athens Conference, based his entire project. As we will see in Chapter II, it is towards the incorporation of this third "totality" that most of the work of the wartime monuments' committees would be devoted to: asserting an authority to implement these protective spatial measures without the institutional neutrality ensured by the League.

What is the connection between the Problème de l'Ogive and the Technical Manual? One answer can be found in the archives of British art historian WG Constable, who was on the editorial board of one (Recherche) and whose annotated copy of the other (Technical Manual) are in the archives of the US Air Force. In 1943 Constable composed a Manual for the US Army, title Field Protection of Objects of Art and Archives, which cited as inspiration "the American Red Cross First Aid Textbook," and described "the Importance of safeguarding monuments" as follows:

Safeguarding cultural monuments will not feed hungry people nor give them physical security; but it will affect the relations of armies with the peoples whose countries they occupy... It will show respect for their beliefs, the culture and the customs of all men, it will bear witness that the cultural heritage of any particular group or society is also the cultural heritage of all mankind, and it will lay a firm basis for activity in the arts the sciences and learning after the war. 309

What is striking in this paragraph is how self-evidently Constable conjoined the three spheres of international action that intellectual cooperation had kept so arduously separate: the parallel between humanitarian "life of individuals" and the humanistic "life of the mind;" the assertion that monuments contain a "cultural heritage" that transcends national boundaries; and, perhaps most importantly, the notion that war is but one event in a continuum of learned activity and monumental "maintenance."

Indeed if the Technical Manuel de Protection is the greatest contribution left by the League to postwar heritage discourse, it was hardly the legacy that the protagonists of intellectual cooperation had hoped to leave behind. League proponents—political idealists like Zimmern and Murray, but also cultural figures like Valéry and Focillon—all sought to create moral norms of temperance and

³⁰⁸ De Visscher, 179.

³⁰⁹ War Department, Civil Affairs Information Guide: Field Protection of Objects of Art and Archives, (War Department: 12 May 1944). Constable Papers, AAA #

liberalism, not technical rules for the legislation of objects. Each side arrived at architecture's ability to represent "agreement" from opposite sides of the gap that separated political and aesthetic realms. Political idealists began with an assumption of popular value, and derived from this value the (ultimately aesthetic) rules for monument preservation. The cultural critics, on the other hand, began with formalist criticism and tried to extract from it some rules for temperate behavior for an (ultimately political) liberalism. That the "international value of monuments" was launched in a thoroughly bifurcated sphere can be seen in the first publication that the OIM published when the war ended, in 1946: an index of Moussoin covering the all 50 issues published between 1927 and 1940, where the following sequence can be found under the letter "H":

Humanisation de la guerre / Humanization of war Humidification de l'air et aération dans les musées / Humidification and circulation of air in museums. 310

In linking aesthetics and politics—the "will to art" and the "will to war,"—intellectual cooperation hoped that the space of art would produce a revival of humanism, while the space of war would be regularized into obsolescence. What happened instead was the reverse: war was humanized and art rendered entirely technical.

Epilogue: on Representation

The goal of this chapter has been to ask how monuments entered the bureaucracy of intellectual cooperation, and to detect the answer in an intricate nesting of committees that was created in response to political events within and without the League. On the one hand, I have argued, monuments appeared to be natural sites of cooperation, which offered an uncontroversial opportunity for administrative coordination between nations. On the other hand, an intricate discourse was woven around monuments so that their value would fit within the idealist parameters of intellectual cooperation. Thus broadly conceived notions of "form" and "space" were theorized as media for international political autonomy. Of course form and space had already been conceptualized, throughout the second half of the 19th Century, as the sources for a new art- and architectural modernity. In the context of the League, however, the form-space discursive construct was called upon to establish a double analogy between political and aesthetic realms: a legal analogy (where form is regulated by aesthetic "laws," which are adjudicated by critics); and a diplomatic analogy (where artworks are delegates of constituencies, whose cultural conflicts they "stabilize"). The presumed universal validity of aesthetic judgment, then, could be harnessed to educate people's

^{310 &}quot;Index Alphabétique des matières," in Mouseion: Index des volumes 1 a 50 (Paris: OIM, 1945), 61.

political instincts: criticism would teach people to "defer judgment," museums would teach them to "compare," and monuments would teach them to "respect." This is what I have called the "politics of form."

Demonstrating that this politics of form was a politics at all is rendered difficult by the premise of intellectual cooperation: that any explicitly "political" speech should be avoided. This tactic—literal detachment to demonstrate liberal engagement—also means that these episodes fit uncomfortably in the intellectual history of interwar Europe, with its patterns of exile and resistance. Indeed the "engaged intellectual" is a familiar figure of 20th Century cultural history, whose detachment from his homeland is a source of political lucidity and critical insight (think Benjamin, Adorno, Saïd). The institutions of intellectual cooperation crossed path with some of these figures (it was Thomas Mann who declared "My homeland is where I am") but they were mostly attended by a different type of intellectual, who sought a political engagement that was geographically grounded and institutionally centered. These figures (Valéry, Focillon, Argan) adopted a bureaucratic tongue as a viable mode of discourse, and accepted institutional cooperation as a viable mode of authorship. While most of them stood in some accord with national political leaders, they also encountered a problem typical of the new breed of diplomats that had been created by the League of Nations: the problem of representing a nation, as an individual, without having been chosen by its population.

The League of Minds never took seriously its role as a political "representation." How its actions were supposed to impact the international "world court of public opinion" was never discussed; instead it compulsively set itself apart by pointing out its imperviousness to political ideology. Thus the discussion of ideas among intellectuals was supposed to be intrinsically different from the propagation of these same ideas within the masses. Note the deadpan way Ugo Ojetti declared that guiding "the life of the Mind" in no way required "changing one's mind":

Our conversations are not made to change the ideas of those who take part in them. I even think that the participants emerge more convinced of the fundamental correctness of their thesis and the error of their adversaries.... You can only change the opinion of men who are in bad faith or men who have no culture. By asking questions of the men who spoke before me, I have no intention of changing their opinions.³¹¹

Ojetti's disclaimer was aimed at Josef Strzygowski, a man who, more than any other, embodies the conflation of intellectual autonomy with political ideology. Yet the absurdity of the theatrical model of the "League of Minds" was only ever addressed in jest, as when Duhamel sarcastically suggested

³¹¹ Ugo Ojetti, in L'Art et la Réalité, 51.

that all "the Mind" could do was to project a conciliatory optimism, issuing the Resolution: "The Committee, after having been convened for four days, contends that all is well." 312

The only committees to debate the political mediation of "the life of the mind" with any specificity, I argued, were made of art and architectural historians, who contributed to the new diplomacy's political representation a theory of aesthetic representation. Ironically, these were figures who customarily attract accusations of detachment within their disciplines: Meyer Schapiro accused Focillon of constructing "a formalist universe"; Tafuri chastised Giovannoni for achieving a "kind of autonomy, a detachment from general history," and even Strzygowski's attachment to the "germanic spirit" has been read as proof that he was 'out of touch' with reality. Their involvement in the League shows that they intentionally cultivated this detachment, in search for a political and disciplinary modernity based on the autonomous development of monuments and their milieu. It is this same project that allowed Strzygowski, Giovannoni and Focillon to make such crucial contributions to the growth of architectural history as a discipline in their home countries. These figures thought they were discovering a new field of agency, where distinctions between historical agency and critical interpretation was no longer necessary, as long as historical judgments were imbued with contemporary value.

If these committees offered the League an analogy between political freedom and aesthetic judgments, what intellectual cooperation promised in return was to deal with a single problem: the perceived accumulation of new "monuments" since the last decades of the 19th Century. In arthistorical discourse, the proliferation of artifacts to be analyzed was accompanied by an unchecked progress of "positivist" methods. Thus the OIAHA hoped to establish an international critical eye and codify comparative methods in order to establish hierarchies between all these artifacts. In Strzygowski's words, "the role of art history is to contribute to the concentration and the conciliation of these various monuments, and guide them in a spiritual direction" In conservation discourse, the accumulation of ever more "monuments" in the rosters of European nations was accompanied by an increasing failure of state mechanisms to assume responsibility for their conservation. Thus the Athens Conference was meant in part to distribute responsibility for care among political constituencies. All this talk of accumulation certainly resonates with the concerns of contemporary multi-culturalism, but it is also important to note how strikingly canonical the "monuments" in question were, from a 21st Century perspective. The OIAHA's most oft-cited examples of fields

³¹² Duhamel, in Le Destin Prochain des Lettres, 190.

^{313 &}quot;Manfredo Tafuri su Giovannoni," excerpt from a 1994 interview republished in Casabella (Apr 1996), 73.

³¹⁴ Sztrygowski, 71. "L'Avenir des Méthodes de Recherche en Matière des Beaux Arts."

which had been "excluded" from the canons were "Gothic Architecture" and "Egyptian art." Similarly, the Athens Conference debated the conservation of monuments which are now world-famous and project the image of being under perpetual maintenance: the Pantheon in Rome, the Parthenon in Athens, and the Alhambra in Spain.

Despite their disciplinary kinship and institutional proximity within the League, these two poles of aesthetic idealism—popular, 'ready-made' idealism and learned, 'critical' idealism—were never conjoined. Instead, I have shown, each committee replayed the disciplinary debates that were already unfolding in national contexts, to little international effect. There is, however, one turn-of-the century debate that was notably not replayed on the international stage, although it concerned precisely how a "Geistesgechichte" could be harnessed to manage the modern phenomenon that Alois Riegl termed "The Cult of Monuments" (Denkmalkultus). In light of the revival of Riegl's Kunstwollen by the League's art historians, the fact that his work on monuments, which was imbued by the same cosmopolitan Kunstwollen, was never referred to is of interest. A brief look is warranted here.

Riegl's Denkmalkultus essay, written in 1903 when he was the director of the Austrian Monuments Commission, has always triggered a kind of melancholia in historians of 20th-century heritage. Even as these historians trace the filiations between various thinkers and the gradual formation of national administrations, they express a fundamental longing for an alternate scenario: a history of heritage that would end with *World Heritage* but would begin with Riegl's *Denkmalkutus*, which prefigures so many of the postwar developments in international heritage. To cite two examples, Choay found in Riegl's work the "germination of future interrogations" and bemoaned it "could have constituted the basis for practices and pedagogies of the historical monument;" Mario Frigo reads in Riegl's legal project an "extraordinary modernity," which was only manifested in reality in the 1954 Hague Convention. Instead of discovering their origins in the Athens Conference (with its technocratic tone), contemporary heritages wishes it could legitimately trace its roots to Riegl's Cult of Monuments (with its elegant aesthetic theory).

The "modernity" of Riegl's text lies in the way it places monuments in a relative system based on scales of dichotomous values (intentional/unintentional, historic/ artistic, newness/age, etc.). While some of these values are contained in monumental forms, the system is designed to account mainly for the social and psychological values, which are projected onto the monuments. In

³¹⁵ Choay, l'Allégorie du Patrimoine, 126.

³¹⁶ Mario Frigo, "Sul progetto di legge per la riorganizzazione della tutela dei monumenti in Austria del 1903," in Sandro Scarrocchia, ed., *Alois Riegl: Teoria e Prassi della Conservazione dei Monumenti* Antologia di Scritti, discorsi, rapporti 1898-1905, con una scelta di saggi critici (Bologna: Accademia Clementina, 1995), 499.

fact Riegl described the cult as "socialistic", the political character of his language has been underexamined: the cult unfolded as a series of "conflicts" between "values," and this language of conflict lead Riegl to use term Kunstwollen as if it denoted a living political constituency whose attentions must be courted.³¹⁷

More to the point, what has been overlooked is that Riegl's essay was only the preamble to a legal project, a "Project for a Legislative Organization of Conservation in Austria", which had been commissioned by the Austrian Government. The famous ending of the Cult of Monuments essay—its call for incorporating "the farthest-reaching interests of the public," was in fact not an ending but a beginning. It was immediately followed by a text on protective laws, which opened with this question: "Why has not been hitherto in Austria a protective conservation law, and why has it become necessary, in this moment, to introduce such a law?" Riegl found the answer in the rise of "age-value" in the public imagination. Previously monuments had been valued only by sentiments that were "national-egoistical, state-egoistical," which is to say, based on an experience of "isolation" between cities, empires and nationalities." In contrast, Riegl wrote, "the sentiment of age-value, is based on a solidarity with the entire world. ... This is a universal sentiment." He therefore concluded that an Austrian protective law had not yet been devised because this sentiment had not yet reached the level of universality to compete with the "contemporary value" placed on the built environment. It was only now, that this universal feeling become "pervasive and socialistic," that a law was warranted:

Today a law protecting monuments in Austria has become a necessity, because today everyone considers monuments to have age-value, and any offense against this age value is considered as painful as the desecration of symbols of faith. ... The resurgence of age-value is but another aspect of a broader social movement. In a monument we find something that concerns us all, without exception, and which therefore must be removed from the hands of individual interests. This social characteristic is complemented by an objective side of things—that age value remains independent from other values, as those of the material, technique, or artistic and historic content. In other words, from the point of view of age value, all monuments are equal.

Riegl's notion of age value has attracted as much theoretical speculation in heritage discourse as the Kunstwollen in art history. Indeed the two concepts are related: the "conflict" between "age value and newness value" can be understood as a fight for the attention of "the modern Kunswollen." Yet again

³¹⁷ "Here a true conflict between newness-value and age-value arises which surpasses all previous conflicts in sharness and implacability. Newness-value is indeed the most formidable opponent of age-value;" "it would appear that we are facing an irresolvable conflict." "a monument has to appeal to the modern Kunstwollen," and or can "appeal downright ugly in the view of the modern Kunstwollen.") Alois Riegl, "The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Character and Its Origins," trans. Kurt W. Forster and Diane Ghirardo in Oppositions 644.

³¹⁸ The second half of the text has not been translated into English. Translations above are from the Italian republication: Alois Riegl, "La Legge di Tutela dei Monumenti," in Scarrocchia, ed., Alois Riegl: Teoria e Prassi, 208.

few have noted the national/international distinction that Riegl used to define the term: "artistic and historic" values were nationalist, whereas "age-value" was international.

In 1905 Riegl made this distinction between national and international values even clearer when he engaged in a debate with German conservationist Georg Dehio. Dehio had made a very public argument that monuments should be legislated because they were "a part of national life." Riegl responded to this lecture in a 1905 review article on "new tendencies in monument conservation." He endorsed Dehio's thesis that "in front of a monument, the interest of the collectivity supervenes in immeasurable ways the interest of the individual," but he protested that nationalism was a form of egotism and an unsuitable basis for law. Nationalism was an illusion adopted by those who were afraid of the irrationality of their own attachment:

The modern cultured man does not want to admit that the sentiment he feels in front of a monument is not immediately explainable: he deludes himself into thinking that the monument pleased him because it was beautiful or historically interesting. This is also the direction that Dehio takes: that it is a national conscience that moves the cult of monuments, because this conscience is based on a common belonging to race and constituted an effectively universal factor.

Instead of masking egoism with nationalistic pride, Riegl described a far-reaching metaphysical longing, "a feeling of humanity" (Menschheitsgefühl):

It is a sentiment both irresistible and imperious that pushes us to the cult of monuments, not aesthetic or historic passion. ... Monuments fascinate us as testimonies of the fact that the collective of which we are a part was alive and productive for such a long time before us.

Any law could only be founded on a sentiment that is akin to a religious feeling, independent of any aesthetic of historic specialization, and free of any rational consideration—a feeling that is such that, the lack of its respect would be felt as unbeable.³²⁰

In fact, Riegl thought that Dehio's nationalist rhetoric hurt his own preservationist agenda, which he had encapsulated in his slogan "Conserve, don't restore," (Konservieren, nicht restorieren). The "weak spot" in Dehio's polemic was that "national feeling" was still a "specialized" value which could therefore be "restored" specifically, rather than being the reason for a generalist ethic of "conservation."

From this cursory overview it should be clear why Riegl's Denkmalkultus has become a favorite reference as a precursor for late-20th Century heritage discourse. Every component of his theory

³¹⁹ The texts of the debate are republished as Alois Riegl & Georg Dehio, Konservieren, Nicht Restaurieren: Streitschriften zur Denkmalpflege um 1900 (Wiesbaden: Vierweg, 1988). Dehio made this speech in Strasbourg and in the presence of political authority, and therefore the in speech that now stands as a marker of preservation's disciplinary formation, and its connection with German politics.

³²⁰ Riegl, "Le tendenze nella conservazione," 295.

legitimates an international valuation: the "feeling of humanity," its collective articulation, its ability to raise the "unbearable feelings" in the masses—all of these are what the expression "cultural heritage of mankind" was supposed to embody. That he developed this theory in a public debate, over the relative value of national and international legislation, makes its absence in the League's work all the more conspicuous. Nor was this a case of academic obscurity; as Rudy Koshar has noted, by the first half of the 20th Century "the German cult of monuments had an international profile." Why, then was it conspicuously absent from Athens, and from Intellectual Cooperation?

Two answers can be ventured here. The first is that Riegl's theory was sacrificed to the institutional tree of intellectual cooperation, and the way it reflected a disciplinary and historiographic feud between Rome and Vienna. Strzygowski (Riegl's student, who disagreed with him vehemently but shared his methods), was not interested in preservation. Giovannoni (who was the most influential of the restorationists) was not interested in any theory outside those linked to Renaissance Rome. 322 The second answer is that insofar as a historiographic trail exists of Rieglian influence, it dead-ends into Germany. For example, the work of Bonn conservationist Paul Clemen appears in Paul de Visscher's notes of for the project of an international Convention in 1936, but Clemen disappears.³²³ Indeed insofar as institutional discontinuities at the League were due to a local feud between Vienna and Rome, Germany had developed a national conservation discourse that overcame the provincialism of this debate and struck an administrative compromise between national and universal valuations. This German discourse would have been an apt model for international action. Yet the Athens Conference took place after most of the League's "technical subcommittees" had been depleted of German participation. Only two German conservationists attended. By the time the Monuments Committee was formed, Germany had withdrawn from the League. In this sense, the theoretical absence of Riegl from 20th Century international conservation discourse can reasonably be linked to the political "failure of the League." Ye this is not to say that a Riegl-centric scenario can reasonably be imagined. If Riegl's work on monuments had been purposely introduced into intellectual cooperation, it is likely that his theories, like Freud's, would have been turned on their head. Given the chance, Charles de Visscher would have undoubtedly argued against Riegl's conception of law, which was as formalist as his art-historical method and

 $^{^{321}}$ Rudy Koshar, "On Cults and Cultists," in Giving Preservation a History, ed. Max Page & Randall Mason (New York: Routledge, 2004.), 49.

³²² See Tafuri's specific assertion that Giovannoni would not have known of Riegl and found the implication that he should distasteful. In "Manfredo Tafuri su Giovannoni."

Max Dvořák, Katechismus der Denkmalpflege, (Wien: J. Bard, 1916); Paul Clemen, Aufgaben und arbeiten des kunstschutzes im weltkriege (Leipzig, J.A. Barth, 1921); cited in Charles de Visscher, Technical Manual, Op. Cit., 141.

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stood as an "idealist" counterpart for the "realist" vision that he successfully institutionalized.³²⁴ This is a subtle but important distinction. Contemporary heritage discourse thinks of the "conference model" as the reality of preservation and "international law" as its universalizing ideal. Yet primary lesson of the diplomatic history of monuments in intellectual cooperation is that monuments entered international organizations the other way around: conference diplomacy became the international "form" of monuments, and international law became their normative reality. This was, undoubtedly, a failure of the politics of form.

³²⁴ Riegl's legal project bears rhetorical and conceptual similarities with that of Viennese scholar Hans Kelsen, who argued that international law was a path towards international peace, and against whom de Visscher worked arduously while on the Permanent Court. See Danilo Zolo, "Hans Kelsen: International Peace through International Law," in International Law Journal (1992), and de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law, Op. Cit.





FIG. 1.01 Creation of "Arts & Letters" Committees over time. Diagram by the Author.

Lucia Allais





1.02

FIG. 1.02 The CIC at work in the 1920s.

FIG. 1.03 The IICl at Palais-Royal, Paris.

FIG. 1.04 Josef Strzygowski, ca 1930.


FIG. 1.05 Paul Valéry, ca 1922.

FIG. 1.06 Henri Focillon, 1939.



1.03













FIG. 1.07 Mouseion cover. FIG. 1.08 "Re-organization of Museums" in Mouseion, 1934-1939.







MUSÉE DU LOUVRE. SALLE DES PRIMITIPS ÉTALIENS DITE DES SEPT MÉTRES. ANCIENNE ET NOUVELLE DESPOSITIONS.



WINDS OF LYON. - CANCENNE GALLERY DES PRINTERS PRANCES.



LA MÉRIC GALERIE APRÈS DON DÉAMENAGEMEN



DÉCORATION EN HARMONIE AVEC L'ORJET EXPOSÉ. SALLE DE CÉRAMIQUE ESPACNOLE DU XVIIT SIÈCLE. MUSÉE ARCHÉOLOGIQUE DE MADRID.



DÉCOBATION SIMPLEMENT NEUTRE. MUSÉR NATIONAL D'ART MODERNE A MADRID.



TRANCE

OFFICE INTERNATIONAL DES MUSÉES

OFFICE INTERNATIONAL DES MUSÉES

1.10



FIG. 1.09 L'art par le peuple, 1928.


FIG. 1.10 Répertoire International Des Musées: France, 1931.

FIG. 1.11 Musées et Monuments: Information Mensuelles, No 1., 1932.


FIG. 1.12 La Conservation des Monuments d'Art & d'Histoire, 1932.


FIG. 1.13 Museographie, 1934.

FIG. 1.14 La Réglementation des Concours International d'Architecture, 1938.





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






1. Will to War, Will to Art











PI. XLVI






FIG. 1.15 Images shown at the Athens Conference, c.1937

List of Members of the INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON HISTORICAL MONUMENTS (International Museums Office) (1)

Algeria: M. Eugène Albertini, Inspector of Algerian Antiquities, Professor at the Collège de France; Australia: Mr. Kenneth Binns, Librarian of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Library, Canberra; Austria: Dr. Leodegar Petrin, President of the Bundesdenkmalamt; Brazil; M. Gustavo Barroso, Director of the National History Museum, Rio de Janeiro, member of the Brazilian Academy of Letters; China: Mr. Li Ki, President of the Preparatory Committee of the National Central Museum; Czechoslovakia: M. Josef CIBULKA, Professor of Theology at Prague University; Denmark: Dr. M. MACKEPRANG, Director of the Danish National Museum; Estonia: M. Gottlieb Ney, Director at the Ministry of Public Education; France: M. G. Huisman, Director-General of Fine Arts; Greece: M. G. Oikonomos, Director of the Archæological Service; Hungary: M. Tiberius Gerevitch, Vice-President of the Commission on Historical Monuments, President of the Hungarian Society of Archæology and History of Art; India: Mr. Daya Ram Sahni, Director-General of Archæology; Irish Free State: Mr. H. G. LEASK, Inspector of National Monuments; Italy: H. E. Roberto Paribeni, Formerly Director-General of Antiquities and Fine Arts, Member of the Italian Royal Academy; Japan: Mr. S. Kikusawa, Director of Religious Affairs at the Ministry of Public Education, Head of the Historical Monuments Department; Latvia: Dr. Francis Balodis, President of the Ancient Monuments Office; Luxemburg: M. Paul Wigneux, Principal Government Architect: Mexico: Dr. Alfonso Gaso, Director of the Mexican National Museum of Archæology; Morocco: M. G. Huisman, Director-General of Fine Arts, France; Netherlands: Dr. J. KALF, Director of the Bureau of Historical Monuments ; Poland : M. Georges REMER, Chief Curator at the Ministry for Worship and Public Education; M. Alfred LAUTERBACH (deputy member), Director of State Art Collections; Portugal: Dr. José DE FIGUEREDO, President of the Academy of Fine Arts, Director of the Museum of Early Art, Member of the Lisbon Academy of Science; Roumania: M. N. Jorga, Former Prime Minister, President of the Commission on Historical Monuments; Spain: M. Eduardo Chicharro, Director-General of Fine Arts; Switzerland: Professor Albert NAEF, President of the Federal Commission on Historical Monuments ; Syria : M. Pierre Coupel, Architect of the Antiquities Department; United Kingdom: Mr. J. S. RICHARDSON, Inspector of Ancient Monuments for Scotland; United States: Dr. Arno B. CAMMERER, Director of the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior, Washington.

(1) List of members drawn up at the beginning of 1935.

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



FIG. 1.17 Les Arts et les Lettres à la Société des Nations, Paris, 1930.

FIG. 1.18 Entretiens: Entretiens sur Goethe, Frankfurt, 1932.







FIG. 1.19 Entretiens: L'Avenir de la Culture, Madrid, 1932.

FIG. 1.20 Entretiens: L'Avenir De L'Esprit Européen, Paris, 1933.







FIG. 1.21 Entretiens: Civilisations: L'art et la Réalité, l'Art et l'État, Venice, 1934.

FIG. 1.22 Entretiens: La Formation de L'Homme Moderne, Nice, 1935.










FIG. 1.23 Entretiens: Europe - Amérique Latine, Buenos Aires, 1936.


FIG. 1.24 Le Destin Prochain des Lettres, Paris, 1937.






















FIG. 1.25 Entretiens, published by the IICI, 1932-1939.




FIG. 1.26 Correspondance: La Société des Esprits, 1932.

FIG. 1.27 Correspondance: Warum Krieg?, 1932.



1. Will to War, Will to Art








FIG. 1.28 Correspondance: L'Esprit, l'Ethique de la Guerre, 1933.

FIG. 1.29 Correspondance: Civilisations: Orient-Occident; Génie du Nord-Latinité, 1934.












FIG. 1.30 Correspondance published by the IICI, 1932-1935.

FIG. 1.31 Bulletin Périodique of the OIAHA, 1934-1939

OFFICE DES INSTITUTS D'ARCHÉOLOGIE ET D'HISTOIRE DE L'ART BULLETIN PÉRIODIQUE

INSTITUT INTERNATIONAL DE COOPÉRATION INTELLECTUELLE

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



FIG. 1.32 Recherche, No.1: Le Problème de L'Ogive, 1939







Fig. 9. — abbaye de saphar. Porche de st-sava.






FIG. 27. PROTECTION DE LA FONTAINE DE CIBÈLE A MADRID. — REVÊTEMENT DE BRIQUES CIMENTÉES ET DE SACS DE SABLE AU CENTRE.






FIG. 28. PROTECTION DU MAUSOLÉE DE GALLA PLACIDIA A RAVENNE.

FIG. 1.33 Protective measures published in Mouseion, 1936.

D'ART EN TEMPS DE GUERRE



PLAN DE L'ARMATURE DE PROTECTION.






FIG. 1.34 La Protection Des Monuments et Œuvres d'Art en Temps de Guerre, 1939.



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Chapter 2

Protected Monuments American art history and European cities in war, 1943-1945

That cities have acquired the iconic value once reserved for monuments has recently been evidenced in the creation of a new category to designate their destruction: the category of "urbicide." The contemporary discourse on urbicide blends an ethical concern for human rights into its aesthetic readings of urban destruction, to arrive at a definition of cities as autonomous forms of cultural and political "representation." This definition has reignited a long-standing debate over what happened to European cities in the Second World War: did they "die", along with millions of their inhabitants whose homes were deliberately bombed? Or did they "survive", since they were largely rebuilt on their existing footprints? Phrased in these humanitarian terms, these questions seem to resonate with renewed urgency. Indeed urbicide, defined broadly as the modern killing of cities, was coined at the end of a century when large-scale, spectacular destruction became a norm of urban warfare and urban planning alike. In this climate, it is easy to forget that such destruction was already an integral component of urbanism, defined in the early 20th century as the planning of modern cities.² Undoubtedly, World War II solidified this integration. The conflict broke out when urbanism was in its infancy, and the objecthood of Europe's cities belonged chiefly to their monuments. By 1945, the "European city" itself had emerged as an object, albeit one in ruins. This ruined object now stands as the prototype for a theory of urban iconoclasm in the 20^{th} century, yet its architectural characteristics have yet to be elaborated.³ Thus the truism that the "totality" of modern war manifested itself in the legible form of a tabula rasa has been left unverified. This chapter addresses this truism, by looking at the monuments that were still standing among the ruins in 1945.

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¹ The discourse on "urbicide" gathers geographically disparate areas of research under a single theoretical umbrella: post-Soviet Balkan cities, post-colonial Middle Eastern cities, and post-war American urban renewal. See the conference Urbicide: The Killing Of Cities (Nov 2005) whose proceedings will be published in the journal Theory and Event, as well as The Slaughter of Cities: Urban Renewal as Ethnic Cleansing Ed. Michael Jones (South Bend: Indiana Press, 2004).

² The "planning" referred to here is not that of Europe's distinguished lineage of ideal cities (Plato's Republic, or Filarete's Sforzinda) and urban transformations (Baroque Rome, Haussmann's Paris). It is rather the technocratic instrument, prescribing formal rules for future expansion, that was institutionalized Europe-wide in the 1910s. "Urbanism" was first chronicled in Leonardo Benevolo, Le Origini dell'urbanistica (1963), anthologized in Françoise Choay, Urbanismes: Utopies et Réalités (Paris: Seuil, 1965), and polemicized in Manfredo Tafuri, Progetto e Utopia (Milano: Laterza, 1973).

³ Recent works on iconoclasm address its 20th century transformations: Dario Gamboni's The Destruction of Art: Iconoclasm and Vandalism since the French Revolution (New Haven: Yale, 1997) asks whether "the image of disorder must really remain a disorder," while Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel's Iconoclash: Beyond the Images Wars in Science, Religion and Art (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003) provides a taxonomy of iconoclastic intentions and their political effects.

These have only ever been treated as fortuitous survivors, passive recipients of the opportunism of wartime strategists and postwar architects. Instead, I investigate their aesthetic and ethical predicament as "protected" objects, by examining the way the Allies excerpted them from their bombings of Western Europe, cared for them during their occupation, and facilitated their survival through even the most radical of reconstructions. The agents of this protection were the members of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, also known as the Roberts Commission: a group of art historians, archaeologists, anthropologists, curators, museum directors, and architects, who volunteered to help the US Army "avoid" Europe's monuments and were, to their own surprise, recruited to the task.

Between 1943 and 1945, over a hundred and sixty scholars were enlisted into the Roberts Commission, to produce lists and maps of monuments to be "protected" in the US's aerial campaigns, first in Europe, then in the Pacific Theater. As a civilian agency in Washington, the Roberts Commission was composed of prominent cultural figures such as former Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish and National Gallery director David Finley (fig 2.01). However, this official body resulted from the merging of more informal "Monuments Committees" from two volunteer organizations. On the one hand, a committee of the American Defense-Harvard Group, headed by Harvard Fogg Museum director Paul J. Sachs, enlisted sixty-one scholars in a list-making project headquartered in Cambridge. On the other hand, a committee of the American Council of Learned Societies, headed by archaeologist William Bell Dinsmoor, had the collaboration of over a hundred scholars to make maps in New York. (figs 2.02-3) Together these two committees mobilized a veritable who's who of American art history, from luminaries to graduate students. Over the span of two years, they produced one 50-page "List of Monuments" for every country involved in war, with the exception of the US, Britain and the USSR. (fig. 2.04) These lists were annotated with a system of "stars" to indicate relative importance of monuments, and prefaced with "Introductions" describing each country's valuation of them. Reduced to 25-page "Short Lists," they were appended with maps and published by the Army as Civil Affairs Handbooks and Atlas Supplements (figs. 2.05-7). The maps were also translated into target maps for US Air Force pilots, annotated with instructions on "how to miss cultural sites." (figs. 2.08-9) The implementation of this policy on the ground was ensured by the creation of the Monuments, Fine Arts & Archives Division (MFA&A) of the Army, headed by an architect, Col. Henry Newton, and composed of soldiers with art-historical expertise. The mission of the MFA&A was to protect monuments from the ground, and provide "first aid" in case of damage. Finally, the Commission organized a lecture tour of the universities for officers in training. The Roberts Commission eventually collaborated with its British counterpart, the McMillan Commission. Under the combined mandate of the inter-allied Vaucher Commission, members of both became

involved in the Conference of Allied Ministers (CAME) which led to the formation of UNESCO, and after the war other members transitioned into an involvement with issues of restitution and reconstruction. Although the existence of the Roberts Commission has been acknowledged, the immense volume of material it produced has never been approached as a cohesive body of work—whether as product of an unprecedented disciplinary collaboration, or as instrument of a protective mandate of unprecedented scale.

My purpose in examining the Allied policy of monument protection is to not verify its efficacy, but rather to ask whether it constitutes a mitigation, or an integral part of the concept of "total war." For this reason, I do not recount the chronological progress of Europe's tabula rasa, but only its prophetic conjuring as an emblem of totality, in war and in modernism. Chroniclers of destruction have perfected a "Short World War History of Architecture" that locates spared and damaged monuments along the war's unprecedented crescendo of destruction, from Warsaw to Hiroshima. 4 Retracing this timeline here would be all the more redundant, however, in light of my second caveat: that I only account for one side of the story of monuments at war, the Allied side. I do not follow the development of Axis policies on art—the creation of the Kunstschutz, the treatment of so-called degenerate art, the dilemmas of restitution—except as they were perceived by the Allies, with their avowed goal of "combating totalitarianism," and their willingness to detect in this totalitarianism a symptom of aestheticism gone awry. Scholarly literature on Nazi art policies tends to retrace a narrative arc that the Allies already constructed in wartime: to cite a 1946 account, from "Hitler's Aesthetic Intuition" to "Nazi Looters Act According to a Plan" Like Walter Benjamin in the 1930s, throughout the war the Allies diagnosed as a trademark of fascism the tendency "to experience humanity's own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure." The fear of this tendency—more so, I argue, than the fear of destruction itself—was the key trigger for the creation of the Allies' policy of protection, and a constant foil in its perpetuation.

Haunted by the looming totality of war, and racing against their enemy's "rendering aesthetic" of it, the scholars charged by the Allies with protecting monuments were constantly faced

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⁴ This title heads the second chapter in Nicola Lambourne's War Damage in Western Europe: the Destruction of Historic Monuments During the Second World War (Edinburgh University Press, 2001), which gives a comprehensive overview of Axis and Allied policies, including a paragraph on the Commission. Lambourne's scope is international, but continues a lineage of national surveys, cf. Paul Léon's La Vie des Monuments Français: Destruction, Restauration (Paris: Picard, 1951).

⁵ These two phrases head the first and last chapter of George Mihan's Looted Treasure: Germany's Raid on Art, Alliance Press, 1945. Recent research gives a more nuanced, though hardly more forgiving, view of the Kunstschutz: Lynn Nicholas' The Rape of Europa: The Fate of Europe's Treasures in the Third Reich and the Second World War (New York: Vintage, 1994) accounts for both sides. See also Degenerate Art: the fate of the avant-garde in Nazi Germany (New York: Abrams, 1991). As for restitution, recent de-classifications have prompted research that promises to implicate Allied actors in Nazi smuggling schemes.
⁶ Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," trans. Harry Zohn, in Illuminations (New York: Schoken, 1968), 242. Benjamin famously countered that "communism responds by policitizing art."
⁷ Ibid., 242.

with the question of whether they, too, were "acting according to a plan." It is this question of historical agency that guides my research—a question that posed itself all the more vividly since the pre-war discourse of intellectual cooperation had completely failed to address it. Intellectual cooperation, as described in Chapter 1, presented no plan for military intervention, and relied on an institutional and epistemological framework that quickly dissolved at the outbreak of war. When the occasion for protection arose, the conditions for its implementation had radically changed, under the terms of the Allied Military Government. Most obviously, the material prepared by the IICI was uselessly encyclopedic: at war, art-historical knowledge had to pass through the disciplinary filter of American academia to be codified as useful civilian expertise. Similarly, legal instruments prepared in the pre-war now needed to become active political agent in planning future reconstruction. In other words, while the creation of the Roberts Commission qualifies as an instance of intellectual cooperation (a group of intellectuals, collaborating across disciplinary and national boundaries for the cause of a future peace), it was also an event that registered in the disciplinary trajectory of art history, in the development of psychological warfare, and the architectural history of modernism.

Proceeding chronologically, I begin in the pre-war, by examining the parallel prophecies of radical change made by proponents of modernist urbanism and of aerial warfare. The radical "totality" in both realms lay not in a quantitative fact, but rather a qualitative effect, and I argue that the ethical problem of deliberate "wantonness" in one echoes the aesthetic deployment of "pictorialism" in the other. I then follow the fulfillment of this convergence through the staging of art history as civilian expertise, in the context of the US Army's reliance on the "sciences" to support their precision-bombing policies. The formation of the Roberts Commission two sub-committees is examined through their arguments for the aesthetic autonomy of "monuments" at war, which parallel mid-century arguments for the autonomy of the Humanities in academia. The value of monuments as cultural objects in war was thus tied to the value of Lists of Monuments as disciplinary artifacts in the university. Although they served as catalysts for an unprecedented collaborative authorship, these lists also provoked considerable ethical anxieties, culminating in a moment when the scholars were faced with the prospect of molding their objects of study into the shape of their own classifications. These epistemological anxieties arose, I argue, as a type of warfare and a mode of scholarship were revealed to be dependent upon the same spatial paradigm: a territorial and discursive totality in which a selected urban collection of "monuments" stand in for the collective unconscious of entire civilizations.

Prewar Prophecies: modernism's tabula rasa and militarism's total war

In 1924, the Swiss-born architect Le Corbusier proposed to turn the center of Paris into what he called "a coquettishly arranged cemetery, à la Monceau," in which "historical monuments are carefully collected, because they are a page of history or a work of art." By collaging a swath of his ideal Ville Contemporaine onto an aerial photograph of Paris, he aimed to resolve the debate that had animated French urbanism since the teens: would the capital's ills (congestion, insalubrity) be cured by "Surgery, or Medicine?" Le Corbusier proposed to combine the drastic precision of surgery with the comprehensive moderation of medicine; crucially, he called upon the city's monuments to demonstrate the point. Although his diorama featured "Cartesian skyscrapers" gleaming tall amidst the greenery, its caption read: "The Plan Voisin: on the left, the Louvre, in the background, the Sacré Coeur" (fig 2.10), as if Paris's identity was preserved as long as its monuments remained intact. Accordingly, Le Corbusier began perfecting a sequence of pictograms which told the history of city as a collection of landmarks, under the heading "This is Paris!" (fig. 2.13)¹⁰ The last vignette showed the Plan Voisin as a natural extension of this city of objects. Yet Le Corbusier made no apologies for the extensive demolition this Plan required, defiantly re-printing images of Parisian streets buried under piles of Haussmannian debris. This polemical stance overshadowed his conciliatory attitude towards historic monuments, and the Plan Voisin, displayed at the 1924 Exposition des Arts Décoratifs, instantly became an emblem for the modernist urge to erase history.

It is not until a half a century later that Le Corbusier's famed tabula rasa was revealed to be a slate wiped-not-quite-clean, a city punctuated with monuments. To take a canonical postmodern example, in their 1978 Collage City, British architectural historian Colin Rowe and American architect Fred Koetter drew a "Gestalt diagram" of the Plan Voisin which showed the monuments Le Corbusier left standing. (fig. 2.14) "The principal aim is manifesto," they wrote, emphasizing Le Corbusier's nonchalance and his insistence on speaking of destruction of Paris as a pictorial gesture, "an architectural composition." Yet Le Corbusier's selective preservation was not purely rhetorical, it was the product of a curatorial mentality, not unlike that of Haussmann's, which can be detected, for example, in the way the crenellated pattern of the maisons à redents (housing blocks) neatly frames

⁸ Ibid., 272.

⁹ Le Corbusier, Urbanisme, (1925; Paris: Flammarion, 1983), 248. Translation mine.

¹⁰ Le Corbusier, Précisions: On the Present State of Architecture and City Planning (Paris: 1930), 1975. For a detailed examination of monument conservation in the Plan Voisin, see Thordis Arrhenius, "Restoration in the Machine Age: thems of Conservation in Le Corbusier's Plan Voisin," in AA Files 38 (Spring 1999), 10-21.

¹¹ Colin Rowe & Fred Koetter, Collage City (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), 62. Subjecting a number of city plans to this graphic treatment, they argued modernist urbanism reversed the figure-ground proportion of "the traditional city," concluding that "in considering the modern city from the point of view of perceptual performance, by Gestalt criteria it can only be condemned." Ibid., 64.

¹² Collage City, 72

Charles Garnier's Opera House, and seamlessly incorporates the Place des Vosges. The Plan Voisin was indeed a "prophecy theater," a "phoenix symbol rising from the ashes of old," but Le Corbusier's choice of monuments was not casual, as Rowe and Koetter would have it. Rather the composition of his modernist typologies around the monuments produced a picturesque effect of surprise and carelessness. "The past", in Le Corbusier's words, was "put in its place." ¹³

The Plan Voisin has remained the "prophecy theater" for modernist urbanism as a whole, not only because it set the stage for the future by constructing the remains of a specific past, but also because it now stands as a remarkably accurate prediction of the fate of European cities in the 20th century. Whether this prophecy is seen to be self-fulfilling depends on the historical agency one attributes to a treatise, The Athens Charter, in the face of a catastrophic event, World War II. In the 1934 Athens Charter, Le Corbusier and his colleagues from the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne formally articulated the "four functions" around which the modernist city should be designed and constructed: Living, Working, Leisure, Circulation. 14 A little-known section entitled "The Historic Patrimony of Cities" was appended to this famous foursome, to make a distinction between "slum" to be destroyed and "monument" that could be preserved. Hence the Athens Charter further elaborated Le Corbusier's ambition to "put the past in its place," yet like the monuments of the Plan Voisin, this section was long outweighed by the doctrinaire gravitas of the rest of the Athens Charter. Although its notoriety grew, the Charter remained unpublished until the war broke out. Its publication, in 1943, was intended to capitalize on the providence of war: by some cruel twist of fate, World War II was implementing the most theoretical component of modernist urbanism (the destructive component) and even the most utopian pre-war proposals, like the Plan Voisin, were gaining retroactive plausibility. 15 Le Corbusier did not fail to point this out, publishing in 1941 a revised version of the plan under the title "The Destiny of Paris," based on the assumption that the center of Paris was "destined for destruction." ¹⁶ By 1947, the Athens Charter's four functions had been written into urban reconstruction programs across Europe. Whether the principles of modernism were thereby faithfully translated continues to be a matter of debate among supporters and detractors alike. Yet all accounts of the European reconstruction are unanimous on one point: in the words of French architect Marcel Lods, that the war presented architects with "a monstrous opportunity." 17

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¹³ Le Corbusier, Op. Cit., 272.

¹⁴ Le Corbusier, La Charte d'Athènes (1943; Paris: Seuil, 1965). Translation mine.

¹⁵ On the decision to publish the Athens Charter, see Eric Mumford, The CIAM Discourse On Urbanism, 1928-1960 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000).

¹⁶ Le Corbusier, Destin de Paris, avec des illustrations de l'auteur. Paris: F. Sorlot, 1941

¹⁷ Lods, a member of CIAM, opined that "to use the slightly brutal but justified expression, the monstrous opportunity of war had been lost." Marcel Lods, Le Métier d'Architecte (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1976), 25. Translation mine. Modernists generally thought the principles of the Athens Charter had been diluted, while conservative architects and

If the Athens Charter is remembered as the charter of blank-slate urbanism, World War II is remembered as the war of unconditional destruction. And just as with the totality of modernism, the totality of the war is seen to begin, a few years after the Plan Voisin, with a prophecy that turns out to have been remarkably accurate. In 1927, Italian General Giulio Douhet predicted that the "War of 19__" would be a "total war" that would rely on aerial power to unfold over entire territories rather than on specific fronts. Douhet's was "a particularly unvarnished summary of the view of many bombing advocates before World War II." These advocates drew a two-part lesson from World War I: in civilian terms, that the Versailles Peace treaty would undoubtedly lead to a second conflict; in military terms, that this conflict would be fought over "the command of the air." Warring nations would have to be conceptualized as uninterrupted battlegrounds, as they could be perceived and attacked from the air. This aerial conquest, in turn, would eradicate the distinction between civilian and combatant, "because when nations are at war, everyone takes part in it: the soldier carrying his gun, the woman loading shells in a factory, the farmer growing wheat, the scientist experimenting in his laboratory." Douhet saw this new war ethic as both exceptionally inhumane and as exceptionally efficient:

A complete breakdown of social structure cannot but take place in a country subjected to this kind of merciless pounding from the air. The time would soon come when, to put an end to horror and suffering, the people themselves, driven by the instinct of self-preservation, would rise up and demand an end to the war.²¹

Thus the totality of the new war was to be conceived in both territorial and psychological terms: just as the physical space of war would expand to include every point on a nation's map, so the discursive space of war would expand to include every civilian's potential outrage at the atrocity of war. It is this tension, between military efficiency and civilian morality, between physical destruction and rhetorical deterrence, that constitutes Douhet's real legacy.

urbanists from the academy thought radicalism had essentially won. See Anatole Kopp, L'Architecture de la Reconstruction (1984), and the special issue of Rassegna: The Reconstruction in Europe after World War II, Vol. 54, No. 2 (June 1993).

¹⁸ Stephen Garret, Ethics and Airpower in World War II (New York: St Martin's, 1993), 8.

¹⁹ Much as in architectural history, in military history the pre-war advocates of "total war" are alternatively seen as precipitating the prophecy they proclaimed, or as improperly foreseeing its consequences. DC Watt's Too Serious a Business: European Armed Forces and the approach to the Second World War, (Berkeley: UC Press, 1975) argues that European armies' lack of realism contributed to interwar appeasement, exacerbating international tensions. Historians of the strategic bombings of city centers that ensued continue to debate where ethical responsibility for these bombings should be attributed, whether in technological insufficiencies or geo-political one-upmanship. Military, political and literary views of this problem are represented, respectively, by Garrett's Ethics and Airpower, Sven Lindquist's A History of Bombing, trans. Linda Rugg (New York: New Press, 2001) and W.G. Sebald's On the Natural History of Destruction (New York: Random House, c2003).

²⁰ Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, followed by Probable Aspects of a Future War, trans. Dino Ferrari, (1928; Milan: Italian Ministry of War. republished by Office of Air Force History, 1983), 196

²¹ Douhet, 6-7.

Throughout World War II, Allied and Axis countries negotiated between actual destruction and the perceived threat of potential destruction, each claiming to be achieving that elusive "breakdown" of the enemy's "social structure." The bargaining chips in this negotiation were not military assets, but cities, as sites of civilian density. In Douhet's words, "what could happen to a single city in a single day could also happen to ten, twenty, fifty cities."22 Hence Hitler obtained the surrender of the Netherlands in 1940 by threatening to "terror bomb" the center of Rotterdam. 23 On the Allied side, the British "area raids" over Milan in 1942 were deemed successful not for the "amount of material damage" they produced, but rather for the very immaterial "hysterical behavior" and "utter disorganization" they provoked in the Italian population. 24 (figs. 2.16-17) Yet if Douhet was proved right in the advent of aerial warfare, the desired effect—precipitating peace—did not follow suit. Instead, the blurry psychological variable he had called the "instinct of selfpreservation" became progressively codified, into a discourse on "morale" that could turn even the most psychological losses into material ones, and vice-versa. Perhaps the best evidence of this codification is the series of qualifiers that were appended to the gerund "bombing" to connote varying degrees of atrocity—area bombing, carpet bombing, indiscriminate bombing, mass bombing, morale bombing, fire bombing, saturation bombing, terror bombing—each referring to a slightly different technology. but all euphemisms for the "merciless pounding from the air" theorized by Douhet. As the conflict was prolonged, cities grew in importance, as concentrated sites of civilian psychology. This rise of cities as strategic objects was facilitated by the development of aerial photography as a pictorial counterpart to the totality of war. By recording a potentially continuous horizontal image of the field of war, aerial photography seemingly provided a "total image" through which to envision the "total war."25 Through this dual mechanism of area bombing and reconnaissance photography, the ruins of cities acquired value as representations of psychology destroyed, retroactive emblems of the values that once held together the social fabric of the enemy. It is in reaction to these emblems that that modern architects spent the war years planning, Athens Charter in hand, the reconstruction of

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²² Douhet, 58.

²³ Rotterdam was actually bombed after the Dutch had already surrendered—in a quid pro quo that itself demonstrates that the value of "terror" as a deterrent was always arbitrary. For a view of bombing as political bargaining, see George Quester, "Bargaining and Bombing During World War II in Europe," in World Politics Vol. 15, No. 3 (Apr., 1963), 417-437.

²⁴ Sir Arthur Harris, Despatch on War Operations, (London: Frank Cass, 1995. Orig. 1946), 38. Sir "Bomber" Harris' appointment at the head of the RAF in February 1943 marks the adoption of aerial bombing as central strategy. The British amended their aims to include "the attack the morale of the enemy's civil population and in particular, of the industrial workers." Alan Levine, The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945. (London: Praeger, 1992), 6

²⁵ Aerial photography as a technology was not new, but repeated aerial views of the progress of trenches offered limited strategic advantages in the first World War; while in the second, intelligence could be derived from the interpretation of a single shot. For a theorization of aerial photography as a proto-digital imaging technique, see Manuel de Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (New York: Swerve, 1991) 5-6.

European cities—somewhat grateful for the war's fortuitous "clearing of slums", and somewhat incredulous at the "miraculous" survival of so many of Europe's monuments.

Yet if aerial bombing relieved Le Corbusier and his colleagues from the obligation of becoming latter-day Haussmanns, the agency in the production of this "monstrous opportunity" is attributed to war as a generic phenomenon: a technological fortuity that turned pre-war theories into post-war realities. In this view, the survival of monuments is a happy accident. The episode of the Roberts Commission complicates this account, by suggesting that the patchwork terrain that was handed to European architects for reconstruction after the war—the punctuated tabula rasa that served as the literal and conceptual ground for the dissemination of modernist urbanism in Western Europe—was in some sense determined by the work of a group of American academics. What are we to make of their intervention? Are we to understand the Commission's very existence as a mitigation of the concept of total war? The cursory account of the preceding pages demonstrate that the totality of war and the totality of modernism both accommodated accident and fortuity within their unconditional prophecies of radical change. Hence the Roberts Commission stands as a potential link between the ethics of "deliberate" bombing, and the aesthetics of "deliberate" preservation—a mitigation of the accusation of "wantonness" in war and of "pictorialism" in urbanism.

The few existing accounts of the Commission's work have concentrated on the weakness of its authority in the war, correctly pointing out that its protective mandate seldom trumped the destructive needs of military authorities. Nicola Lambourne, for example, concludes that "the physical effects of war on historic monuments were of far more interest to propagandists exploiting the symbolism of this aspect of the Second World War than to those with the power to damage those buildings." Lambourne concedes that the monuments of Europe emerged largely protected. Yet her insistence on distinguishing between the realm of "power" and that of "symbolism" leads her to conclude, in the manner of Rowe and Koetter, that "the principal aim was manifesto." Far from a polemical conclusion, this finding should stand as a theoretical starting point: if the goal of monuments' protection was not the imposition of an ethical absolute, but rather the projection of a symbolic effect, what is the nature of this effect? If the principal aim of architectural survival was manifesto, what did the surviving monuments eventually manifest?

The closest approximation of a "manifesto" for the Roberts Commission's work was delivered on May $26^{\rm th}$, 1944, when General Dwight Eisenhower issued an order to all commanders:

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²⁶ Lambourne, War Damage, 163.

Shortly we will be fighting our way across the Continent of Europe in battles designed to preserve our civilization. Inevitably, in the path of our advance we will find historical monuments and cultural centers which symbolize the world that we are fighting to preserve. These monuments by their creation helped and now in their old age illustrate the growth of the civilization which is ours We are bound to respect these monuments so far as war allows.

If we have to choose between destroying a famous building and sacrificing our own men, then our men's lives count infinitely more and the buildings must go. But the choice is not always so clear-cut as that. ²⁷

Eisenhower presented the protection of monuments as a matter of demonstrating that war, far from constituting a decline of civilization, continued to illustrate its growth. Clearly this was a victor's discourse, and as such, it is a useful key for understanding the version of "total war" endorsed by the US Army he commanded—its emphasis on occupation, its penchant for precision, and its reliance on expertise.

While Eisenhower outlined a hierarchy between the relative value of "men's lives" and "famous buildings", the more crucial formulation was one that weighed the military means of achieving victory against the political instruments for occupation. This trope was common in the language of Military Government, an Army component developed to achieve better occupation, by ensuring that "by the time the war is won we have not inadvertently undermined some of the aims for which it is being fought." Learning from the First World War, the US military instituted a School of Military Government in Charlottesville, VA to achieve a "territorial form of military government," where political criteria for governance were built into military operations. What Eisenhower grandly called "the growth of the civilization which is ours" was but a political means of achieving a successful occupation. Accordingly, the commanders training at Charlottesville were instructed to present the protection of monuments to their troops as a means of obtaining "the cooperation of the local population." Local civilians, the argument went, would be more likely to collaborate with occupation forces if they showed sensitivity to their "culture", as embodied in their "monuments." Despite this emphasis on locality, the discourse on the value of monuments in an American occupation of Europe was perforce unconditional: in order to support a policy that would

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²⁷ Dwight Eisenhower, Letter to All US Air Force Commanders, May 26th, 1944. As cited in Final Report of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Monuments in War Areas (Washington: 1946).

²⁸ The "military government" officers publicized their work in an article, "Prepare to Occupy," in Fortune Vol. 27, No. 2, The Job Before Us (Feb 1943), 90-214. It described the founding, "much to the president's surprise," of the School of Military Government, aimed at "the improvement of our technique of occupation." As the article put it, "the numerous civilian organizations now set up there is a great deal of confusion." Ibid., 214.

²⁹ Col Joseph Harris, "Selection and training of Civil Affairs Officers," in Public Opinion Quarterly Vol. 7, No. 4, Occupation of Enemy Territory (Winter 1943), 694-706. Harris distinguished this from the "tactical form" employed First World War, putting the matter in terms of total war: "We are today in the midst of a total war in which whole nations are engaged. The skill with which occupied territories are administered is highly important factor in the winning of the war."

be equally applicable to Axis and Allied countries, monuments had to be presented as the bearers of a universal value, of which Europe had been the creator and America would become the keeper, if temporarily.

This territorial management of occupation is intimately connected with the US Air Force's stated preference for "precision" bombing. Rather than attempting to destroy large swaths of enemy-held territory, US bombs were aimed at crippling nodal points in the German war economy. 30 This preference was supported by suspicions that the RAF's area bombings confused the qualitiative totality of war with its quantitative fulfillment. This flaw was chillingly summarized in the months immediately following the war, in the few pages of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey devoted to "the attack on the will to make war, commonly known as morale." 31 In addition to evaluating physical losses, the analysts of the USSBS were asked to quantify the psychological value of destruction. Using such variables as "wanting the war to end", "showing demoralizing fear" and "willingness to surrender" they exposed the architectural equation that had underlain the logic of area bombing: a destroyed home equaled a depressed worker, which equaled a weakened war machine. What emerged from their analysis, however, was that "morale" was not, as Douhet had thought, inversely proportional to "home destruction" (fig. 2.15). In fact, in as much as it could be quantified, the psychological value of architecture offered only "diminishing returns with increasing bomb tonnage." (Although workers in bombed towns were proportionally less "willing" to make war than those whose towns were intact, this relationship weakened with increasing destruction.) In other words, the tabula rasa imagined by advocates of area bombing was not, in psychological terms, worth the bombs that had been required to achieve it—a small amount of destruction would have sufficed.32

It is important to note that this evaluation of area bombing was quantitative, not ethical. While supported by a distaste for civilian casualties, America's strategy of precision was a policy driven primarily by technological concerns.³³ This technological imperative could be readily be combined with the British area raids: hence the joint Allied Bomber Offensive over Europe, as agreed

³⁰ Having spent the interwar years developing smaller and faster airplanes, the US had bet its entire air force apparatus on precision. For a synthetic account of the technological developments that ensued from this decision, see Peter Galison's "Ontology of the Enemy" in Critical Inquiry 21 (Autumn 1994), 228-266.

³¹ United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Overall Report: European War. (Washington: Sept 30 1945).

³² The Survey concluded that "bombing thus succeeded in lowering psychological morale but its effects upon behavior was less decisive." Later studies, such as those commissioned during the cold war by the Rand Corporation, confirmed that the British estimations of the value of morale was "more propaganda than fact", while also calling into question the USSBS's scientific protocols: "the actual incidence of anti-enemy sentiment was probably underestimated … since the interviews were conducted by Americans … under military occupation." Irving Janis, Air War and Emotional Stress (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951) 132.

³³ The development and deployment of nuclear weapons shows that, given the right weapon and a different civilian population, the US military willingly engaged in "wantonness." See Sven Lindqvist A History of Bombing, 100.

upon at the 1943 Casablanca Conference, was based on a "round-the-clock complementary campaign." While the RAF continued conducting daylight area raids, the US Air Force began conducting precision raids at night. This round-the-clock policy implicated US authorities as much as their British counterparts in the deliberate targeting of civilians. In other words, although the preservation of monuments inaugurated in 1943 brought a new understanding of "morale" the Allies' war (placing greater emphasis on the "will to collaborate"), protected monuments did not become the immediate psychological substitute for targeted civilians. Rather, the "round-the-clock" policy ensured that preserved monuments were always simultaneous with civilian casualties, to the effect that the former became a de-facto way to memorialize the latter. The role of redemption, was unproblematically projected onto art and architecture, and here then the ethical implications of Eisenhower's order become clear: if the whole of European cities had been razed, but all of their monuments had survived, then "European civilization" could still have been said to have remained intact.

Monuments had already risen as emblems of the growing disconnect between civilian lives and civilian psychology. In the months of May and June 1942, the flaw in morale bombing's logic of architectural containment had been made dramatically obvious when the Luftwaffe raided four historic British towns, which held neither strategic importance nor particularly high civilian density. These attacks soon earned the name "Baedeker Raids," because their targets seemed to have been picked out of the popular Baedeker's tourist guides. (figs. 20, 21) The Baedeker Raids inaugurated the emergence of architecture's monumental value as a variable with which to compute morale, illustrating that even the willingness for arbitrary destruction could be deployed with deliberate precision. After the Baedeker Raids, it became necessary to determine exactly what a monument was worth. Nor should this convergence of target list and tourist guide be taken as a mere turn-of-phrase. In 1944 the US published a target list, entitled The Bomber's Baedeker, which contained "a guide to the economic importance of German towns and cities." but no information on culture or history.³⁴ (fig. 2.19) Art history entered the war at precisely the moment between these two instances. While precision was not intended as a mitigation of total war, it reconfigured the concept, notably requiring the support of a widespread civilian effort of expertise—an expanded version of what Douhet called "the scientist working in his laboratory." In Eisenhower's terms, art history was the form of expertise that could relate the material value of "a famous building" to the morale of "the world we are trying to preserve."

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³⁴ The Bomber's Baedeker: A Guide to the Economic Importance of German Cities and Towns. Washington: 1944.

The Staging of Expertise: from Baedeker Raids to Bomber's Baedeker

The entrance of art history into the Allies' war bridges the gap between the 1942 "Baedeker Raids" and the 1944 Bomber's Baedeker. These two invocations of Karl Baedeker's name were coined for propaganda effect, to connote a sinister marriage of tourism of warfare. Tet Baedeker figures literally between them in the historical record of war: between the touring guide as symbol for Germany's wantonness, and the touring guide as an emblem of America's intelligence, there stand the actual copies of Baedeker's famous Handbook for Travellers that were checked out of university libraries across the Northeast, to serve as primary source for the US Army's lists of protected monuments. As soon as the Harvard Committee's Army liaison, Colonel James Shoemaker, made the first official request for "a summary list of important art monuments, divided by countries" in mid-March 1943³⁶, the Committee's list editors began using the image of the Baedeker to commission collaborators ("Your report will look something like a Baedeker, but an edited Baedeker"). As a result, Baedeker became an indispensable source of form and content for what came to be known as "The Harvard Lists."

The idea of using Baedeker as a guide for avoiding monuments was first circulated in Washington in early 1943, in a two-page manifesto written by British émigré art historian W.G. Constable (1887-1976). Constable, who was curator of paintings at Boston's MFA and soon became vice-chair of the Harvard Committee, argued for monument protection on general terms but gave the specific suggestion that military officers be issued "(a) strictly limited lists of important monuments, collections, etc., which in the case of Europe might well be Baedeker's two stars and one star monuments, and (b) very simple instructions ... for safeguarding these." By May 1944, Constable's two-part scheme had effectively been implemented, with the first Harvard Lists issued in May 1943, and a manual on Field Protection of Objects of Art and Archives published a year later. By then Constable had also transformed this initial memo into a public lecture, where he described the "elaborate machinery" through which the Harvard Lists were composed, and addressed the question of why the Army was not just using Baedekers themselves. The answer was both quantitative ("Baedeker does not cover all the countries, ... [and excludes] archaeological sites and private collections) and qualitative

³⁵ As Nicola Lambourne points out, the Baedeker Guidebook company was still distancing itself from this effect in 1959. Postwar editions of the Baedeker's Guide to England included a disclaimer discounting any involvement their eponymous "Raids."

³⁶ "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Lt-Col. James H. Shoemaker," March 17, 1943. Perry Papers, ADHG Archive.

³⁷ Letter from Charles Robinson to William Bell Dinsmoor, 23 Apr 1943. ASCSA I/2.

³⁸ W.G. Constable, "Works of Art During and After the War," December 21, 1942 petition. Emphasis added. Correspondance Folder, ADHG. This memo was the first attempt at a statement of purpose for the Harvard Committee. ³⁹ Known among the scholars as the "Manual on Safeguarding," published as Civil Affairs Information Guide: Field Protection of Objects of Art and Archives. War Department Pamphlet No. 31-103. War Department: 12 May 1944.

(Baedeker is too long and complicated for the immediate purpose of the list"). 40 Yet Constable did not seek to disprove the basic fact that tourist guides and military lists were composed of the same information—adding only that the latter were more "useful", because compiled by "specialists."41

The role eventually played by Baedeker's Handbook in making the Harvard Lists was that of a standardizing framework. What was needed was an existing listing typology, to unify the work of scholars who were both methodologically disparate and geographically dispersed. The Harvard Committee was composed of 34 scholars, residing in 7 cities and affiliated with 11 institutions. including university museums, commercial art galleries, research institutes and art history departments. All sent their lists to the Fogg Museum, where they were edited by Constable and Hugh O'Neill Hencken Curator of European Archaeology at Harvard's Peabody Museum. The Harvard Lists adopted two key formatting standards from the Baedeker series: its "system of star" and its regional divisions. The history of the modern tourist handbook is a history of standardization—one in which the Baedeker family achieved "international hegemony" by the end of the 19th century, modulating its voice to suit a variety of national narratives. 42 Baedeker's use of "the asterisk as a mark of commendation", inaugurated in 1844 as a "laconic substitute for the adjectival raptures of competing authors,"43 had by the mid-20th-century become the trademark of an entire genre of touring literature. The Harvard Lists expanded this system to *, ** or ***, to indicate "monuments of first, second, and third importance," and later, reduced these initial 50-page lists by using the "starred monuments only." Similarly, the Harvard Committee adopted Baedeker's ready-made division of Europe into discreet regions and distinct national audiences. 44 Thus Baedeker effectively functioned as a source of multilateral objectivity. As Constable made clear in a 1953 homage, the "long row of smallish volumes, of the same size, bound in the same hard cloth with gold lettering, and marbled edges" had become a trusted companion for sedentary scholars as much as for touring travelers, who relied on Baedeker as much for "his attitude, which is that of a compiler for railway

⁴⁰ W.G. Constable, "Works of Art in Wartime," Lecture delivered Jan-Mar 1944. Constable Papers, AAA #3077.

⁴¹ Col. Shoemaker put the point more bluntly, in response to early versions of the Lists that included touring advice: "There will doubtless come a time, as at the end of the last war," he wrote in March 1943, "when troops can go on sight-seeing trips. But ... instructions in respect to this will appear rather ironic to officers under present conditions." Letter to Perry on May 14, 1943, Perry Folder, ADHG Archives. He was correct in this prevision; the MFA&A organized such sight-seeing, notably in Italy, starting in 1944. By then the duality of soldier and tourist had been resolved into a single museological framework: under the supervision of curators-turned-soldiers, "protected sites" were marked with touring regulations, and opened for visiting hours.

⁴² For a history of guidebooks' influence on national narratives, see Rudy Koshar, "What Ought to be Seen: Tourists' Guidebooks and National Identities in Modern Germany and Europe." Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 33 No. 3 (1998), 323-340. See also Edward Mendelson, "Baedeker's Universe", in Yale Review of Books Vol. 74, No. 3 (April 1985) and James Buzard, The Beaten Track: European Tourism, Literature, and the Ways to Culture (Oxford Press, 1993).

⁴⁴ On April 11 1943, Constable wrote to Georges Wildenstein and Kenneth Conant, who were jointly compiling the List for France, that "the division between Northern and Southern will be as in Baedeker." Constable Papers, AAA #3077.

timetable or a telephone directory," as for offering "a consistent set of principles for action, a Weltanschauung." 45

By the time Baedeker's Handbooks provided the Harvard Committee with a functional framework for listing, their purpose as touring guides had been superceded by their popularity as a representation of Europe, and the uniformity of this Weltanschauung had been detached from the hypothetical tourist to whom it was addressed. Yet the art historians of the Harvard Group should not therefore be seen as mere conduits of commercially-available information. Modern tourism and modern art history share common roots in the post-Enlightenment rise of nationalisms, and the concomitant valuation of "monuments" as centers of attraction for tourism and scholarship alike. Yet it is the academic art historian, not the commercial guide-writer, who handed the US Army their Baedekers.

The prominent role played by such a popularized version of art history in the discipline's military contribution, however, points to the primacy of "the list" in giving art historical knowledge a tactical value in the war. Unlike Op-Ed critiques of destruction voiced throughout the war by academics and amateurs, Constable's "Baedeker Memo" offered volunteer expertise. If this expertise was so easily accepted, it is in large part because it could be made to fit into the already-established format of military intelligence, which consisted of lists and maps of targets. Within the span of a few months, the Harvard Committee was able to complement these with lists, and later maps, of non-targets. This centrality of the list is all the more problematic in that art history famously codifies itself as everything but the list. If Giorgio Vasari's Lives of Artists of 1550 can be taken as art history's inaugural text, the archetypal definition of the discipline asserts that it would be possible "simply provide a straight-forward list of works, without offering any opinions," but discounts this "mere repertoire" as "not a worthwhile objective." The story of art history's involvement in war, then, can be seen as a test of Vasari's two-part hypothesis: first, whether a "straight-forward list of works" could reasonably be constructed; second, whether such a repertoire would really be devoid of arthistorical value. Constable himself articulated this hypothesis, writing that the goal of the Lists of Monuments was "not to teach art history or aesthetic value, [but] merely to indicate by its presence in the list

⁴⁵ W.G. Constable, "Karl Baedeker", Lecture at Smith College in 1953. Constable Papers, AAA #3071.

⁴⁶ A study of tourist guides as a geographic representation of Europe can be found in Joze Böröcz's work. Correlating patterns of tourism with of industrial development, Böröcz questions the common assumption that a search for "alterity" alone explicates the rise of modern tourism—an assumption that has long motivated the line of scholarship that focuses on tourists and their passivity. Of interest here are Böröcz' illustration of the "mental maps" of Europe according to their guide-book entries. See Böröcz's "Travel-Capitalism: The Structure of Europe and the Advent of the Tourist," in Comparative Studies in Society and History In Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 33 (3) and his Leisure Migration: A Sociological Study of Tourism (New York: Pergamon, 1996).

⁴⁷ I follow recent chroniclers of the "end" of art-history in choosing Vasari's Lives as its "beginning." Giorgio Vasari, Preface to Part II in Lives of the Artists: Vol. 2, trans. George Bull (London: Penguin, 1965), 83. See Donald Preziosi, Rethinking Art History: Meditations on a Coy Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

that a monument should be looked at."⁴⁸ In their successive attempts to construct this repertoire and to formulate its value throughout the war, the art historians were confronted with a variety of list-making models, of which Baedeker was the most well-known, but not the most self-consciously "objective."⁴⁹

That the American academic setting was crucial in staging the monuments lists as objective, and art historians as a volunteer force, is evidenced by the reluctance of their British counterparts to participate. When Constable sent his "Baedeker Memo" to his former colleagues in London— Kenneth Clark, Director of the National Gallery, and Eric MacLagen, Director of the Victoria & Albert Museum—both expressed skepticism at the ambition. 50 Clark found it "hard to believe any machinery could be set up which could carry out the suggestions contained in your petition," and MacLagen thrice asserted a fundamental disciplinary helplessness: "I do not feel that there is anything which art historians like ourselves can do... I do not honestly see that anything can be done about it... I cannot see how art historians at the present moment can be of any assistance."51 Undoubtedly these responses reflects the reality of living in a bombed city and caring for its museums during the Blitzkrieg. Yet this helplessness also highlights more abstractly the difference between British and American images of the totality of war: the one imposing absolute passivity, the other demanding involvement into an all-consuming "machinery." To answer the question of why lists of monuments were able to become useful in America's war, then, is to ask a disciplinary question, of how Constable and his colleagues devised an "elaborate machinery" for turning art historical knowledge into military expertise.

An initial picture of what was expected from art history in war can be gleaned by examining its position among other forms of American civilian expertise. The Bomber's Boedeker, for one, was the work of a new breed of civilian experts that produced target lists out of economic analysis. These "operations analysts" were scientists, engineers and economists recruited from the US industry to produce, in Peter Galison's words, "a methodical theoretical reconstruction of the interconnections that held together the German economy and war machine and that asked how it could be blown

⁴⁸ Letter from Constable to British Ambassador Nickell, Sep 16, 1943. Constable Papers, AAA #1077. Emphasis added.

⁴⁹ Constable himself recognized that Baedeker's value as a stand-alone list did not preclude it from carrying aesthetic value: "Baedeker's impersonality is merely a mask. ... His famous system of asterisks and double asterisks... sheds much light on Baedeker's tastes and aesthetic principles. Broadly, these principles stem from the 18th century." Constable, "Karl Baedeker." Constable Papers, AAA #3071

⁵⁰ Constable had been the first director of the Courtauld Institute. For his relationship with Sachs, see Kathryn Brush, "Marburg, Harvard, and purpose-built architecture for art history, 1927" in Elisabeth Mansfield, ed., Art History and Its Institutions: foundations of a Discipline (London: Routledge, 2002), 65-84.

⁵¹ Letter from Kenneth Clark to WG Constable, 25 Feb 1943 & Letter from Eric MacLagen to WG Constable, 27 Feb 1943. Constable Papers, AAA#3077. Clark and MacLagen consulted with the British Secretary of Education on their answer, which suggests that their helplessness was also informed by contact with British officials.

apart."⁵² Factories were listed as targets only if they stood as significant "nodes" in this military-industrial web, and if their destruction produced maximal return on minimum bomb tonnage. In their first incarnation as Harvard Lists, the Army's lists of monuments resembled these lists of targets made by the engineers: they were distributed as raw information to bombers, whose reconnaissance photographs were marked with "not-to-bomb" targets. Yet this use of monuments as "non-targets" from the air was never explicitly stated as the official goal of the Commission's work. Whereas the lists of industrial targets had strategic value, the lists of cultural monuments were intended to hold a merely tactical value. Accordingly, although the Lists served the Air Force as much as the Military Government, officially they were only published as Sections 17 and 17A of the Military Government's Civil Affairs Handbook. These manuals are best understood as forming a "cultural" counterpart to the "industrial" reconstruction of enemy nations described by Galison. In Col. Shoemaker's terms, this was described as a "framework of information and plans":

We are compiling military government handbooks by countries which will include the general background (country and people), government, public finance, money and banking, agriculture, labor, industry, transportation, communications, public health and sanitation, public safety (police system), public welfare, etc., as well as material of the sort you are sending us. ⁵³

In form, the art historian's knowledge resembled, that of the engineers'. Yet as experts, the art historians themselves resembled rather the social scientists who wrote the other 16 sections of the Civil Affais Handbooks: anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists and geographers. Ather than distilling their knowledge into analytical lists, social scientists were expected to make encyclopedic contributions that described enemy societies as epistemological totalities.

Therefore, as a form of military intelligence, the Lists of Monuments stood somewhere between the selected targets of the applied sciences and the comprehensive theories of the social sciences. This is no small point. As a growing genre of historiography has shown, war-time collaborations between America's military and its academia greatly contributed to the subsequent codification of university disciplines in the post-war. Hence the postwar engineering sciences developed their postwar institutional structure, largely out of their contribution to the USSBS. ⁵⁵

⁵² Peter Galison, "War Against the Center," in *Grey Room* 04 (Summer 2001), 8. Galison describes the transformation of civilian applied scientists into military intelligence-producers, and the subsequent re-application of this intelligence onto civil defense through the dispersal of industrial buildings away from city centers.

⁵³ Shoemaker to Perry, ADHG.

⁵⁴ The "Topical Outline" repeated on the inside cover of every Handbook was:

^{1.} Geographical and Social Background 2. Government and Administration 3. Legal Affairs 4. Government Finance 5. Money and Banking 6. Natural Resources 7. Agriculture 8. Industry and Commerce 9. Labor 10. Public Works and Utilities 11. Transportation Systems 12. Communications 13. Public Health and Sanitation 14. Public Safety 15. Education 16. Public Welfare 17. Cultural Institutions 17B. Atlas of Cultural Institutions

⁵⁵ Peter Galison's "Ontology of the Enemy." Critical Inquiry (Autumn 1994).

Similarly, the involvement of ego psychologists in the deployment of morale-based psychological warfare fueled the postwar boom of the political consulting industry and psychology departments alike. ⁵⁶ In this literature, war-time collaborations are understood as disciplinary catalysts, rather than epistemological breaks. Hence much of the form and content for the Civil Affairs Handbooks was inherited from the pre-war development of a "comparative approach" in the behavioral sciences. ⁵⁷

What these disciplinary histories share is a narrative of post-war specialization fueled by prewar scientific ambitions. Such a narrative can also be found in canonical histories of American art history: as Craig Hugh Smyth has noted, James Ackerman's classic 1963 account, "stressed its 'scientific' aims in this country after World War I, and contrasted it with the earlier gentlemanly and ethically oriented art history."58 Yet art history's institutional trajectory towards (and disciplinary recovery from) military collaboration differs fundamentally from that of the social and applied sciences, in that art historians specifically entered the war under the heading of "the humanities." As we will see, interwar American art history leveraged its own scientific ambitions against the pressures of the sciences on the humanities, in order to become a legitimate branch of the humanities itself. This leveraging helps to explain the peculiar position of the Lists of Monument in wartime, as non-scientific objects serving a scientific purpose. And just as art history projected two images during the 1930s—a scientific one from within, a humanistic one from without—so there are two ways of telling the story of art-historical lists as disciplinary objects at war: from within (accounting for the scientific function of lists in art history) and from without (accounting for the function of art history in a humanistic war). I begin here with the latter, in order to highlight the dramatic debut of the Monuments Lists as "volunteer objects" in war.

The Apparatus of the Humanities: the ACLS and the ADHG

Archaeology. Humanistic Scholarship in America (Princeton: PU Press, 1963).

The two monuments sub-committees out of which the Roberts Commission was constituted were both formed as a contribution of the humanities to war. Both were sponsored by large scholarly organizations, whose members were engaged since the 1920s in an ongoing nationwide

⁵⁶This narrative is told in Emily Herman, The Romance of American Psychology: Political Culture in the Age of Experts (Berkeley: UC, 1995).

⁵⁷ Formed in the image of a "Laboratory Without Walls," and embodied in the Yale-based Human Relations Area Files (HRAF), this approach created a comprehensive encyclopedic framework, an "Outline of World Cultures," that continued to be filled well into the post-war. See Joseph Tobin's "The HRAF as Radical Text?" in Cultural Anthropology Vol. 5, No. 4, (Nov., 1990), 473-487A; Outline of Cultural Materials, Behavior Science Outlines (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, Inc, 1950), Human Relations Area Files, 1949-1959 Report (New Haven: HRAF, 1959), and Function and Scope of the Human Relations Area files, (New Haven: HRAF, 1949). For a critique, see Franz Boas's "The Limitations of the Comparative Method of Anthropology," in Race, Language and Culture (New York: MacMillan, 1940), 270-280.

⁵⁸ Craig Hugh Smyth & Peter Lukehart, The Early Years of Art History in the United States: Notes and Essays on Departments, Teaching and Scholars. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 6. Smyth refers to James Ackerman & Rhys Carpenter, Art and

debate on the importance of the humanities in US universities. At stake in this debate, which raged in university administrations, education journals and Op-Ed pieces in the national press, was the continued relevance of humanistic studies in the face of the rise of laboratory-based scientific research. ⁵⁹ It is a testament to the advent of a Douhetian form of total war that, far from being overshadowed by the prospect of military conflict, this civilian concern with the structuring of undergraduate education only intensified at the outbreak of war. In a 1944 article titled "Humanities vs. War," W. Edward Farrison took stock of this intensification, summarizing that the usual peacetime critique of humanities professors, "not relating their subjects to life", had now been complemented by a follow-up question, "What is the place of literature, or of philosophy, in a world at war?" ⁶⁰ It is in the context of this two-part pressure that the parent organizations of both Monuments' Committees must be understood. Throughout the war, the Humanities acted both as the epistemological filter through which Monuments Lists were volunteered to the Army, and as the discursive chamber in which any argument for the protection of monuments could resonate.

The Frick Committee was created under the tutelage of the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) and the leadership of archaeologist William Bell Dinsmoor (1886-1973), then-director of the Archaeological Institute of America (AIA). As Dinsmoor recounted in a 1935 address at Columbia University, the ACLS had been founded, as a national counterpart for the Union Internationale des Académies, and one of the first American organizations to claim an exclusive concern with "humanistic fields." In his lecture, titled "New Trends in Humanistic Studies", Dinsmoor gave "internationalism" as an answer to the question of "humanism." His narrative spanned from the 1425 Council of Constance (where political events had circuitously led to the discovery of forgotten Cicero manuscripts), to contemporary "debates on peace and war" at the League of Nations. "The days of simple humanism are long past," Dinsmoor wrote, "it has become quite impossible for any single individual to acquaint himself with all sides of it. . . . What internationalism

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⁵⁹ This debate turned out to span the whole century. The mid-century moment is book-ended by Patricia Beesley's influential 1940 The Revival of the Humanities in University Education (New York: Columbia), and the ACLS's own 1964 Report of the Commission on the Humanities (New York: ACLS) which led to the creation of the National Endowment for the Humanities. For a sardonic account of the "humanities as a 20th century invention" wherein, "in a technocracy, the humanities are the opiate of the masses," see Mel A. Topf's "Smooth Things: the Rockefeller Commission's Report on the Humanities." In College English Vol.43, No. 5, Sept. 1981. More recently see the issue of Daidalos devoted to the theme "On the Humanities," (Spring 2006).

⁶⁰ W. Edward Farrison, "Humanities vs. War" Phylon (1944) 334-338. See also Loren MacKinney "Humanities after Three Years of War," in South Atlantic Bulletin (Dec. 1944), 1-8.

⁶¹ Steven Markus points out that the ACLS's self-designation was less useful in defining "humanistic fields" than the splitting off of a number of organizations into the Social Science Research Council. Markus, 19. For a "Comparison of American and French Humanism", see Beesley's The Revival of the Humanities, 61.

offers to humanistic studies is the means of catching up with the accumulation of five centuries." In order to perform this task, Dinsmoor emphasized that international work was best focused on "the apparatus of scholarship": bibliographies, indices, translations, and other comprehensive epistemological endeavors. Yet he also faulted this approach for outlining often implausible goals, such as "the compilation of a balance sheet of all archaeological treasures not yet found." Patriotically, he warned that "American organizations have found that the most successful results are obtained not so much from a predetermined program as from the initiative of single individuals or groups of individuals." It is all the more ironic, then, that once appointed to the ACLS's new "Committee for the Conservation of Cultural Monuments in Europe" on January 29, 1943, Dinsmoor's vision was revealed to be just as full of institutional procedure, and devoid of flexibility, as the internationalism he faulted. 64

The ACLS itself played a near-governmental role in the organization of America's "homefront" starting in 1941. This bureaucratic prominence of the ACLS in Washington, along with Dinsmoor's emphasis on "the apparatus of scholarship," helps to explain why the ACLS Monuments Committee lagged so far behind its Harvard counterpart in its entry into war—despite the fact that both committees were formed at around the same time, and with the same mandate. ⁶⁵ By the time Dinsmoor's ACLS committee held its first full meeting on June 25, 1943, the bulk of the Harvard Committee's work had been completed: contact with the Army had been established, lists had been commissioned and refined, and the first sets had been sent to Mediterranean and European theaters of Operations. ⁶⁶ In contrast, Dinsmoor's first impulse had been to compose a questionnaire, to be distributed nationwide in order to attract a "representative" sample of volunteers. This scheme was rapidly aborted by Paul Sachs, who divulged to Dinsmoor the work of his committee on the Harvard Lists, explaining that "it was desired by the War Department that this work should be done quietly,

62 William Bell Dinsmoor, "New Trends in Humanistic Study," Columbia University Quarterly (Vol. XXVII, No.4: Dec. 1935), 415-426.

⁶³ Dinsmoor, "New Trends," 419, 420.

⁶⁴ Director Waldo Leland, for example, served in the National Resource Planning Board, as Chairman of the Committee on Conservation of Cultural Resources.

⁶⁵ This mandate ("the protection of cultural monuments in Europe," later "in war areas.") was spelled out in an abstracted version of Constable's Baedeker Memo, a petition dated 8 Jan 1943, titled "Protection of Monuments: A Proposal for Consideration during War and Rehabilitation." Written by George Stout, signed by Dean of Harvard University George Chase, and by Paul Sachs, it was circulated in Washington after being sent, for endorsement, to Francis Taylor (for the Association of Museum Directors), Dinsmoor (for the AIA), Coleman (for the American Association of Museums), and Waldo Leland (for the ACLS). ASCSA I/2.

⁶⁶ In a neat reversal of the ACLS chronology, work on the Harvard Lists preceded the formalization of its authors into an official "committee". The first informal meeting was held at Shady Hill on Dec 28, 1942; Shoemaker issued his request for material on Mar 18, 1943, and a second informal meeting on March 20th was followed on Mar 22, 1943 by the appointment of "a small executive committee to carry out the War Department assignment." ADHG/ Perry.

unofficially and promptly." Sachs proposed that the two groups might "quietly collaborate." Yet even as their two committees began to share members, tasks, and were eventually conjoined into the Roberts Commission, Dinsmoor seemed unable to subordinate the format of the lists to the urgency of their purpose, and repeatedly pointed out that the Harvard Lists were full of inconsistencies in place-names, dates, and abbreviations. Hugh Hencken, who, as the Group's secretary, fielded both Dinsmoor's complaints and Col. Shoemaker's requests, responded by making explicit the tension between scholarship and instrumentality that had always plagued intellectual cooperation: "I have never adopted the idea, and have tried to discourage others from thinking, that these lists were to be viewed as scholarly publications." ⁶⁹

The work of Dinsmoor's committee began in earnest in the summer of 1943, when it moved into its new headquarters in the basement of the Frick Art Reference Library in New York. The ACLS Committee became the Frick Committee, and Dinsmoor's emphasis on the "apparatus" of the lists was vindicated by a shift in the Army's needs: the Harvard Lists were now to be "abstracted," complemented with maps, and officially published as part of the Civil Affairs Handbooks. The need for speed (which the Harvard Committee had met by volunteering the unpaid time of prominent scholars), was superceded by the necessity for standardization (achieved at the Frick through a procedure involving a Rockefeller foundation grant, visiting scholars, and a secretarial staff). Similarly, the ACLS's roster of visible cultural figures—such as Metropolitan Museum director Francis Taylor, National Gallery director David Finley, and former Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish, whom the Harvard Committee often called "art politicians" —eventually proved crucial in the formalization of the Roberts Commission as an official civilian body in Washington. The ACLS's prominence in Washington was particularly crucial in receiving funding for "fieldwork" in Europe. Yet without the Harvard Committee's direct contacts the Army, this commission would

⁶⁷ Sachs to Dinsmoor, May 18, 1943. ASCSA III/2.

⁶⁸ Dinsmoor complained that "every item in the Harvard Lists must be rechecked before we can utilize it," and Hencken responded "Of course there are inaccuracies in the lists. We are meeting a deadline." Dinsmoor to Perry, Aug 28, 1943; Hencken to Perry, Sep 1, 1943. ADHG Archives, Dinsmoor Folder. Perry asked for "a relaxation of one's scholarly standards and scruples," to "meet the conditions imposed by the rapid march of events." Perry to Koehler, May 10 1943, ADHG/Köhler.

⁶⁹ Letter from Hencken to Perry, Sept 1, 1943. ADHG/Dinsmoor.

⁷⁰ Committee of the American Council of Learned Societies on Protection of Cultural Treasures in War Areas, "Minutes of the First Full meeting Held at the Century Association." Frick Art Reference Library, Helen C. Frick Correspondence. ⁷¹ "When these art politicians get together there is such a lot of apple polishing that goes on that I am skeptical of the results." Letter from Stout to Constable, Nov 29, 1943. Constable Papers, AAA #3077.

⁷² Finley, Taylor and Dinsmoor each wrote a letter to President Roosevelt on December 8, 1942, joining forces with Chief Justice Harlan Stone to construct a proposal for the creation of an advisory civilian body. This proposal was adopted verbatim in September 1943, after being "under presidential consideration" for nine months. Letter from Stone to Roosevelt, 8 Dec 1942. ADHG Archives. Dinsmoor and Finley to Roosevelt, ASCSA III/1.

likely have remained an advisory group in the manner of the IICI, and monuments lists would not have reached the Army in time to effect their early missions in European and Mediterranean theaters.

How, then, did the Harvard Committee penetrate the army so "quietly, unofficially and promptly"? The answer lies largely in its emphasis on education. To avoid political and bureaucratic obstacles, the Harvard Committee made its initial contact with the Army by proposing to compose Lists of Monuments for officers training at the School of Military Government. Having been endorsed as curricular, the idea of the Lists rose the ranks through this pedagogical framework, eventually reaching the Director of Military Government, who appointed Col. Shoemaker as delegate. Together, Shoemaker and the directors of the Harvard Committee carefully navigated any further contacts with civilian agencies, so as to keep their connection efficiently "unofficial." They agreed, for instance, that "the project should not appear as officially sponsored by the Army but rather as an undertaking of [the] American Defense Organization,"73 and avoided contact with the inquisitive delegate of the State Department's Cultural Relations Division to Harvard. 74 This nimble use of the Army's educational network reveals an attention to manpower and implementation that was lacking in Dinsmoor's administrative approach. Whereas the Frick Committee universally addressed the task of collecting knowledge, Harvard's was a localized entry into the problem of making scholarship useful in wartime. Yet it would be a mistake to diagnose in Harvard's success, as Dinsmoor might, the effect of a heroic American "initiative". This pedagogical emphasis should rather be read as a symptom of a different conception to which the whole of the American Defense-Harvard Group adhered—a conception, developed by its chairman Ralph Barton Perry and imbued in an American pragmatist tradition, that encompassed not only the objecthood of knowledge, but contained a theory of subjectivity as well.

The American Defense-Harvard Group (ADHG) was formed in late June 1940 as part of a wave of US political activity fueled by interventionist conviction and prompted by France's surrender. The Group's chairman, Harvard philosopher and William James biographer Ralph Barton Perry (1876-1957), denounced in an early circular the "imminent threat of world-dominion by the Axis powers," which he advocated should "be met with firmness, not with appeasement." By mobilizing "the Harvard community", Perry intended specifically to counteract the populist appeal of totalitarianism. "Although their ends and methods are profoundly repugnant to Americans," he wrote in the first resolution passed by the Group, "totalitarian countries derive power from the faith

⁷³ To avoid "giving any clues to any actual strategic program." Shoemaker to Perry, Mar 18, 1943. ADHG Archives. ⁷⁴ "His interest in the matter differs from ours in that it is a broader, long range, interest and lies beyond our own Ralph Turner, Shoemaker to Perry, Apr 19, 1943. Constable Papers, AAA #3077

and spirit of sacrifice with which all classes and individuals are imbued."⁷⁵ This culture of mass-consent could be met with "nothing less than the united and organized effort of all the people." As Perry's final report put it, "one of the original impulses leading to the creation of the Group was the query, 'What can I do?'"⁷⁶ The answer was found in an early version of the concept of "a clearing house of information": an institutional network that would work, through democratic means of persuasion, to achieve "moral solidarity" among Allied populations.⁷⁷

The ADHG's emphasis on achieving "moral solidarity" only increased once America entered into war, but its foremost task shifted from "combating isolationism" to "supporting the war effort." By the time its Committee for the Protection of Monuments was formed, its other committees were devoted mostly to matters of public opinion: Information, Press and Writing, Radio, Speaking and National Morale. Others, such as the Committee for Care of Refugee Children, served largely as fundraising organs, by channeling Boston-area philanthropy towards Allied relief organizations. To these morale-boosting endeavors was now also added the task of serving as a filter for academic expertise, to the effect that "the working personnel of the Group was steadily drained away, not only into the armed forces but into civilian agencies and bureaus in Washington and elsewhere." 78 The Committee for the Protection of Cultural Monuments in War Areas is a case in point: W.G. Constable and Sachs approached Perry in late 1942, to get their Monuments at War petition "widely and influentially signed," and to "arouse interest and possible action" in Washington. 79 Perry created the Monuments Committee to host their efforts. He provided financial support, and remained an intermediary until the Roberts Commission superceded it. Perry proudly saw this kind of brain-drain as evidence of what "an American University can contribute ... over and above the technical research conducted in its laboratories." For Perry the experience of the Harvard Group "demonstrated that there is no reason why any university scholar or teacher should feel a sense of uselessness and frustration, whatever his subject, and whether he serve in Washington, overseas, or in his own community."80 The clearing house of politically useful information, in other words, also worked as a clearing house of politically engaged humanists, providing a literal "place" for the humanities in a "world at war."

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⁷⁵ American Defense-Harvard Group, Circular of December 18, 1940. ADHG.

⁷⁶ American Defense-Harvard Group, Final Report: June 1940-June 1945, 5. ADHG.

⁷⁷ ADHG, Final Report, 14. Throughout the war and its immediate aftermath, the "clearing house" concept would gain currency as a specifically democratic response to the effectiveness of totalitarian propaganda, becoming a notable point of consensus at the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME) where UNESCO was created in 1944.

⁷⁸ ADHG, Final Report. 39.

⁷⁹ Constable to Perry, Dec 31, 1942. Constable Folder, ADHG Archives.

⁸⁰ ADHG, Final Report. 5; 39; 19; 39-40.

The question "what can I do?" was for Perry more than an expression of war-time volunteerism; it contained an entire philosophy of freedom. 81 Perry dedicated much of his career to deducing from the pragmatism of his mentor William James the principles for a "militant liberalism." Acknowledging that "all moralists, James included, emphasize the 'humanitarian' distribution of goods over their 'humanistic' or cultural quality,"82 Perry nevertheless posited as possible "the reconciliation of a provident and tolerant humanitarianism with the militant will—of the idea of inclusiveness with the temper of exclusiveness."83 In his attempts to resolve this contradiction, the conflation of individual subjectivity with academic disciplinarity was a recurring trope: both were based on a voluntarist conception of "freedom as enlightened choice," which Perry notably developed in response to the question "What is the Meaning of the Humanities?" the theme for the 1937 Spencer Trask Lectures at Princeton University. 84 Against the commonplace formulation that "the function of the humanities is to humanize man," Perry proposed to define "the humanities as any situation or agencies ... that are conducive to freedom."85 To counter "the pulverizing effect of specialized research and administrative decentralization,"86 Perry recommended a view of the humanities as transcending disciplinary divisions, by seeing "every study as a potential humanity, even professional studies." Thus Perry's theory of autonomous choice in the liberal individual was also a theory of academic autonomy in the liberal arts college—an implicit critique of the branch of pragmatism influenced by John Dewey that supported educational reform in the direction of vocational training.88 The relevance of this "humanistic/humanitarian" understanding of pragmatism here is that it allowed Perry to give a double definition of the Humanities—one purposely vague, the other defensively pragmatic—that closely parallels the double value which the Harvard Group attributed to the protection of Monuments during the war. For this reason Perry's 1937 definition of the humanities is a useful guide to understanding the value granted to monuments at war in 1943.

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⁸¹ Constable was familiar with this theory, incorporating "Ralph Barton Perry's conception of freedom for enlightened choice, rather than an anarchical freedom..., which the artist demands" in a 1942 lecture on "Art, its Place in a Changing World." Constable Papers, AAA #3071.

⁸² Ralph Barton Perry, In the Spirit of William James (New Haven: Yale UP, 1938), 129.

⁸³ Perry, In the Spirit of William James, 153.

⁸⁴ Ralph Barton Perry, "A Definition of the Humanities", in T.M. Greene, Ed., The Meaning of the Humanities: Spencer Trask Lectures 1937-1938 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1938), 1-42.

⁸⁵ Ralph Barton Perry, "Philosophy," Lecture Outline, Mar 3, 1938. Morey Papers, 10/G. Original emphasis.

⁸⁶ Perry, "A Definition of the Humanities," 32.

⁸⁷ With this ambivalent pronouncement that anything can be humanistic, Perry legitimized Princeton's own pedagogy, notably its creation in 1936 of an interdisciplinary "Special Program in the Humanities," based on giving students inter-departmental freedom.

⁸⁸ Dewey's position in the Humanities debate is summarized by Gerald Graf, "General Education and the Pedagogy of Criticism: 1930-1950," in Professing Literature: An Institutional History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

The "Fundamental Purpose" of Monuments and Documents

Perry's first proposed re-definition of the Humanities as "any activity conducive to freedom" was calculatedly vague—so vague that the fundamental purpose of the humanities remained unclear, much as the "fundamental purpose" of the Army's lists of monuments remained unclear throughout the war, even as their more "immediate" use-value was constantly re-calibrated. As soon as the Harvard Committee realized that "the idea [of preserving monuments] no longer has to be sold to the army; they definitely want information, for definite purposes and it is up to us to supply it," Perry and Shoemaker engaged in a correspondence which left this "definite purpose" unstated:

March 30, 1943

Quite apart form the fundamental purpose for which [this material] is being prepared, there is another and very urgent need for it in connection with the training of military administrators. 90

April 7, 1943

Quite apart from its more fundamental purpose, this project has important values in establishing confidence in the Army in the minds of intellectual leaders in occupied areas and in changing some of the popular misconceptions in the US in respect to the character and the interests of the Army.⁹¹

With every "immediate use", a new tactical function was envisaged for the Lists; by April, Shoemaker had outlined to Perry "three functions" that the art historian's material was to fulfill in the Army's hands. ⁹² This emphasis on the purpose of the Lists helped to circumvent the more delicate question of the purpose of monuments themselves. In June Shoemaker finally arrived at a definition of the "basic purpose" of the Committee's work, which resembles a basic definition of the Humanities, but did so only to reinforce a "more immediate interest":

15 June 1943

The basic purpose of this work is the protection of those media through which culture is carried from one generation to the next. We also have a more immediate and practical interest in it, however... 93

In a neat process of bifurcation, the more the "practical interest" of the lists was codified, the more the "fundamental purpose" of monuments was generalized into a humanistic autonomy. The crowning event in this progressive split between humanistic and humanitarian values was the public

⁸⁹ March 22, 1943, WG Constable to Stout, AAA#3077.

⁹⁰ March 30, 1943. Memo from Shoemaker for Dr. William Longer, Chairman, Board of Analysts, Office of Strategic Studies Forwarded to Perry. AAA #3077

⁹¹ Shoemaker to Perry. 7 April, 1943

⁹² "The material you are preparing should fulfill these three functions: (1) the information in full detail will be available to trainees in working out "problems" as a part of their training. (2) it will also be assembled to be put into the hands of those few appointees who are experts to be used in the field. (3) the most pertinent of this material will be extracted and summarize for use in military government handbooks." Shoemaker to Perry, 19 Apr 1943.

⁹³ Shoemaker to Hencken, 15 June 1943. ADHG.

announcement, in September 1943, that the Roberts Commission had been appointed to protect monuments "for their own sake." This announcement drew protests from the Harvard scholars themselves, who had been asked to compose lists for more "immediate" purposes. Hugh Hencken responded to these complaints on Perry's behalf:

I am not at all sure that the appointment of the Commission to protect monuments "for their own sake" should change our attitude towards the lists ... While we are here interested in the monuments for their own sake, popular regard for them in occupied countries would still be important to the military I should guess that we ought still to think of as many reasons as possible for protecting these things.⁹⁴

Hencken's formulation, that "as many reasons as possible for protecting these things" were needed, shows that the lack of purposive clarity was remedied by a negative definition of monuments, and of the humanities, as that which needs to be defended from attack.

In contrast to the arguments made by the Harvard Group to convince the Army, arguments explaining the protection of monuments to the public were explicitly modeled on the discourse on the humanities, which had always been conducted in antagonistic terms. For example, Perry gave a pre-emptive view of the humanities as a scheme of resistance against what he called the "the advance of 'instrumentalism' and 'operationalism'." This advance had infiltrated the Humanities, which were now threatened by a tendency to "dehumanize" themselves from within. Thus the "pragmatic" half of Perry's 1937 definition was that "the Humanities are that which resists de-humanization." This theory of resistance led Perry to privilege art history and literature as humanistically resilient disciplines:

The Humanities being defined ... as those studies which inhumane teachers cannot completely dehumanize, literature and the arts possess an uncommonly stubborn quality ... The content of literature and of the arts is intrinsically humane. It presents life concretely ... [and] will speak for itself in a voice that is never wholly drowned by the hum of academic machinery.

Perry arrived at a theory of stubborn objecthood through a philosophy of militant subjectivity, with a coupling of art and literature that highlighted another unspoken assumption of the mid-20th-

⁹⁴ Hencken to Koehler, September 11, 1943. ADHG.

⁹⁵ Perry, In the Spirit of William James, 56. The war itself was seen as symptom of this advance: "on every hand today ... we are called upon to defend "the Humanities" against war abroad and against socio-economic and scientific-naturalistic fatalism at home." Lennox Grey, "Editor's Foreward" in Beesley, vii.

⁹⁶ "A college is a place where students ... predisposed to humanity ... endeavor more or less effectively to preserve their humanism." This self-destructive narrative allowed Perry to that grant philosophy a lasting place in the university, as a repository that "must carry the burden of humanism" even as "other subjects or departments have abandoned their humanistic birthright." Perry, "A Definition of the Humanities," 33.

century discourse on the Humanities: namely, that it was an unmistakably object-based (one might say, "monumental") approach to knowledge.⁹⁷

Objecthood was, for the humanities in academia and for monuments at war, a way to grant relevance to the humanistic "past" in an evidently scientific "present." This approach owed much to the debates over the "Great Books" programs, initially developed by John Erksine as a course for American soldiers in France during World War I. By the late 1930s the idea of reading one "great book" per week had gained currency as a proposal for reforming American education as a whole, by shifting the focus away from Classics (Greek and Latin philology) and towards The Classics ("the best sellers of the Western World"98). Although their reformist ambitions were often thwarted, "Great Books" advocates unquestionably succeeded in focusing Humanities education on "the book" as an object.99 Against the backdrop of this object-based conception of the Humanities, familiar arguments about books "containing" a history of civilization were easily transformed, during the war, into generalist arguments for the preservation of monuments, which were especially resonant with non-specialist audiences. For example, the "Lecture on the Protection of Cultural Treasures" which introduced Army officers to the Roberts Commission opened with the assertion that "The history of civilization and liberty is written in the artistic and historic monuments of Europe to whose conservation the President's Commission is dedicated." ¹⁰⁰ Similarly, the Rockefeller Foundation explained its financial support of the ACLS' Monuments Committee to its trustees by making a literary analogy with Shakespeare:

The acropolis in Athens, the monasteries of the Balkans countries, the churches in Rome, the paintings in Florence, the vast architecture and artistic wealth of Italy, these treasures are as much part of the present as the poetry of Shakespeare. 101

This description of Shakespeare's poetry as a living component of "the present" was clearly aimed at an audience who had inherited a conception of the humanities where ideas remained relevant

⁹⁷ Perry already arrived at objecthood to resolve disciplinary fragmentation in his 1926 General Theory of Value. Proceeding by elimination, he arrived at "any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it; just as anything whatsoever becomes a target when anyone whatsoever aims at it." A General Theory of Value Its Meaning and Basic Principles Construed in Terms of Interest (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1926), 115f.

⁹⁸ Graf, 133. For a history this passage, see Steven Markus, "From Classics to Cultural Studies," in Daidalos, "On the Humanities," 15-21.

⁹⁹ In the 1953 words of Richard C. Snyder, "if there is a distinction in the kinds of general education being offered today, this is it: Chicago concerns itself with giving practice in how to read a Great Book; Harvard, Columbia, Princeton and Yale are more concerned with what the Great Book says." Snyder, "The Humanities in Education" in College English, Vol. 15, No. 2. (Nov 1953), 119.

^{100 &}quot;Lecture on the Protection of Cultural Treasures," ASCSA IX/2.

¹⁰¹ "The Protection of a Cultural Heritage," in Rockefeller Foundation, Annual Report, 1943, 34. ASCSA XI.

through a physically legible objecthood. It is this kind of redemptive objecthood that was repeatedly projected onto the word "monument" during the war. 102

Perry's affiliation of literature and art, the Rockefeller Foundation's reliance on objecthood: both were recognizable tropes of the way art historical discourse had entered the humanities in the 1930s. The entrance of monuments into the war, which followed closely behind this process, involved essentially the same roster of scholars. For example, the author of the "Lecture on the Protection of Cultural Treasures" cited above was medievalist Charles Rufus Morey (1877-1955), founder of Princeton's Index of Christian Art and chairman of its department of Art and Archaeology. Before serving as Vice-Chairman of the Frick Committee, Morey had been actively involved in organizing Princeton's new Firestone library as a "Humanistic Laboratory," and in promoting art history a legitimate "fourth branch" thereof. As early as 1929, he refuted the "ornamental" role to which he and his colleagues had hitherto been relegated:

Art history is no longer a mere embroidering on the other humanities of history and literature, but a humanistic discipline of independent value, nay, or paramount value, by reasons of its power to coordinate and integrate the other humanistic pursuits. ¹⁰³

The success of Morey's attempts to give art history this "paramount value" is reflected partly in the presence of an art historian at Princeton's 1937 Trask Lectures, Erwin Panofsky (1892-1968). Panofsky would also later be involved, in the war, in the Frick Committee's listing of monuments. Significantly, his Trask lecture, titled "The History of Art as Humanistic Discipline," had placed primary importance on "monuments" as disciplinary objects, by defining the humanities as "the investigation of human 'record'." 104

All human records, according to Panofksy, could be understood either as "primary material (a monument)" or "secondary material (a document)." Generalizing that the Humanities were the realm

Dinsmoor wrote this equivalence between art and literature into his introduction to The Architecture of Ancient Greece, and put it specifically in terms of an exchange between monuments and documents: "The higher flights of literature and architecture present an almost perfect parallel. Both have more art than science, and show little progress within themselves down the ages, while they clearly reflect the progress of the soul of man. It may be that the greatness of the Greeks is not demonstrated most of all in their architecture; but it is by their architecture, using the word in its widest sense, that we may now most readily comprehend their civilization in all its bearings. A masterpiece turned out in the workshop... is in itself a document, for those who have eyes to read it, more precious by far than any single work of Greek literature. ... In this sense architecture might be called the sheet-anchor of history, which without the everlasting testimony of the monuments would certainly become fluid and unstable." William Bell Dinsmoor, "Introduction," Dinsmoor, The Architecture of Ancient Greece, (3rd edition, revised: 1950), xv-xvi. Significantly, this positive assertion that an architectural monument is a document "by far more precious" than a literary work was revised in the 1950 edition, whose manuscript Dinsmoor finished "during nights of aerial bombardement in London" in 1944; the 1927 edition had merely asked rhetorically, "a masterpiece ... is it not itself a document...?" (Cf The Architecture of Ancient Greece), Anderson & Spiers (London: 1927).

¹⁰³ As quoted in Constable, "The Arts in Education," 1929 Lecture, Constable Papers, AAA #3071.

¹⁰⁴ Erwin Panofsky, "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," in The Meaning of the Humanities, 91-118.

where "everyone's 'monuments' are everyone else's 'documents'," Panofsky effectively made art history paradigmatic of any humanistic endeavor, by defining the humanities broadly as the study of objecthood:

Unless a scholar is exclusively interested in what is called "events" ... everyone's "monuments" are everyone else's "documents", and vice-versa. In practical work we are even compelled actually to annex "monuments" rightfully belonging to our colleagues. ... An art historian, then, is a humanist whose "primary material" consists of those records which have come down to us in the form of works of art. 105

Having thereby defined every object as a potential "monument", Panofsky arrived at what Thomas Crow has called his "zero-degree definition" of art, as "a man-made object demanding to be explained aesthetically." ¹⁰⁶ This definition, which placed "monuments" at the center of all humanities and proceeded opportunistically outward, has itself become a landmark in the historiography of art history. Its significance here is double: on the one hand, it was re-enacted almost literally in 1943, when the Harvard Group was faced with defining what qualified as a "monument" worthy of protection. On the other hand, this very "re-enactment" can be seen, in light of Panofsky's definition, as a form of trans-historical agency belonging uniquely to humanists.

Like Panofsky in 1937, the Army in 1943 began with the idea of protecting "monuments" and ended with the protection of all possible "human records." The Harvard Committee's original instructions only recommended that contributors include "churches, shrines and pilgrimage sites." In June 1943, Shoemaker wrote Perry that they should expand this list: "I believe this whole subject would receive more (and more favorable) attention if all media through which culture is passed on could be combined and handled as various aspects of the same problem." This opportunistic extension of the protection of monuments literally rehearsed Panofsky's "annexing" of all the humanities into the history of art, with the immediate result that the army's definition of a "monument" was enlarged. Thus, in response to Shoemaker's request, Perry and Constable composed a detailed taxonomy of monuments to be included for the Harvard Lists:

- a. Churches and other religious buildings
- b. Secular buildings, including private houses
- c. Sites of archaeological, historical, or religious importance.
- d. Shrines, places of pilgrimage, and other places of special local importance.
- e. Works of art (movable or otherwise) such as statues, monuments, fountains.
- f. Art collections, both public and private (including arms and armour collection.)

¹⁰⁵ Panofsky, "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline,"101.

¹⁰⁶ Thomas Crow, "The practice of Art History in America" in Daedalus Vol. 135, No. 2 (Spring 2006), 73. In fact, Crow refers to the slightly-modified phrase, "man-made objects to which we assign a more than utilitarian value," which Panofsky gave in a 1953 lecture, also generically titled "The History of Art", and published in Cultural Migration: The European Scholar in America (Philadelphia: U. Penn, 1953), 82-111. In 1955 Panofsky republished both lectures, as the introduction and the epilogue of a collection, titled Meaning in the Visual Arts. The active object of 1937, which "demands to be experienced" became, in 1953, a passive object to which "value is given."

¹⁰⁷ Shoemaker to Perry, 11 June 1943. ADHG, Shoemaker. Emphasis added.

- g. Archaeological collections, both public and private.
- h. Scientific collections, both public and private
- i. Libraries and archives. 108

This list "borrowed" liberally from "other media," with the particularly intriguing result that "archives" and "scientific collections" were now to be understood as "monuments." In the terms of Panofsky's definition, the document / monument equivalence was here translated into a logic of containment: any building containing relevant "documents" was to be considered as humanistically "monumental." This expansion to "libraries and archives" was completed in October 1943, when Archibald MacLeish consulted with Solon Buck, archivist of the United States, who recommended that the Commission should "think of archives in the widest sense ... for loss of records in modern industrialized countries result in far-reaching paralysis of life." Buck invoked "Not only property rights but human rights," since the disappearance of archives would mean that "Thousands ... will have to search through public records for evidence that will be legally acceptable as to their very identity." This archival understanding of documents "giving reality" to life was adapted into the Commission's work, echoing Panofsky's earlier definition.

Nearly a year after this new taxonomy had been composed, Panofsky was enlisted as one of the Frick Committee's volunteers, and charged with "checking" the lists for twelve German cities, giving "uniformity" to their number of stars, and formatting them for publication in the Civil Affairs Handbooks. 110 (fig. 2.57). Undoubtedly he kept his expanded definition of "monuments" in mind as he performed this operation. Perhaps more to the point, his theory of the reciprocity between monuments and documents returns us to the "fundamental disciplinary purpose" of such an intervention. If buildings containing documents functioned as monuments, what was the function of a document containing these monuments in turn, such as the Lists he was helping to construct? A paragraph Panofksy wrote in 1941 gives a hint at an answer; it was intended as his contribution to a disciplinary definition circulated by College Art Association director, and soon-to-be Special Advisor to the Roberts Commission, Sumner Crosby:

The historical interpretation of art works has the same autonomous value as the historical interpretation of all other documents of civilization; it may even be claimed that this autonomous value is greater, inasmuch as the basic experiences of the human mind express themselves more directly in works of art than in textual sources which tend to

¹⁰⁸ Hencken to Doro Levi, 3 April 1943. ADHG/ Levi. Form letter, sent to all contributors.

¹⁰⁹ From Solomon Buck to Archibald MacLeish, October 1, 1943. ASCSA I/6

¹¹⁰ Panofsky's assignment began in March 1943 and came from Sumner Crosby, who asked "I am particularly interested in the number of stars as I am afraid uniformity does not exist, and it is for that reason I am asking you to check them before the final photo-statting." Crosby to Panofsky, May 21, 1944. ASCSA V/1. Panosfky's work included the cities of Hamburg, Hanover, Munster, Paderborn, Sardt, Marburg, Dortmund, Wiesbaden and such part of Lubeck as had erroneously been listed under Hamburg." Panofsky to Crosby, March 13, 1944. ASCSA V.

subject these basic experiences to a process of conscious rationalization, and more articulately than in music which is by definition non-representational.¹¹¹

Panofsky described in terms of the "autonomy" of the art historian the theory he had previously described in terms of the 'humanistic' value of works of art. The autonomy of the artwork transferred, in a sense, to the interpretation of its significance, and therefore the "documents" of the art historians became media for the expression of this autonomy.

Panofsky had already described, in his 1937 lecture, the essence of this "re-enactment" of the autonomy of art, by offering to make a contrast "between the humanities and the sciences." Scientists and humanists, for Panofsky, both proceeded by "Three steps (observation, interpretation, and organization)," but whereas scientists worked in "the cosmos of nature", humanists constructed the "cosmos of culture," and therefore "the relationship between 'monuments' and 'documents'" was "comparable to that between 'natural phenomena' and 'instruments.'" As Michael Ann Holly has pointed out, this was a transposition of a Diltheyan distinction between physical and mental sciences, wherein the humanist, unlike the scientist, is required "mentally to re-enact the actions and re-create the creations" he studied. 113 By this criterion, the Army's Lists were the art historian's instruments for "recreating" Europe's monuments, attesting to their presence so that they might be survive destruction. The fact that the Army's definition closely "re-enacted" Panofsky's is far from trivial, then, even if this re-enactment yielded documents resembling already-existing lists. The analogy with the sciences was a way for Panofsky to theorize his own position as author of documents, and to argue that these documents made monuments "real." ("Admittedly," Panofsky wrote, "the Humanities concern themselves with the past. Why should we be interested in the past? Because we are interested in reality. There is nothing less real than the present.") He illustrated this theory of trans-historical agency in a dramatic anecdote: recalling the scientific paradigm of action: "the man who is run over by an automobile is run over by mathematics, physics and chemistry, I could just well have said that he is run over by Euclid, Archimedes and Lavoisier."114 Similarly. making lists allowed humanists to act upon the present, re-creating a "cultural cosmos" that was seemingly being "run over" by the sciences. 115

¹¹¹ Erwin Panofsky, "Proposed Amendments to Draft of Circular to the Members of the College Art Association." Attached to a letter to Sumner Crosby, June 10, 1941. Panofsky Papers, AAA #2111.

¹¹² This short-hand version of the argument is from Panofksy, "Art and Archaeology", Lecture Outline, 24 Feb 1938." Morey Papers, 10/G.

¹¹³ Michael-Ann Holly, Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 38.

¹¹⁴ Panofksy, "The History of Art," 155.

¹¹⁵ Ralph Barton Perry had used a similar anecdote in his lecture, recounting a fundraiser who, acting on behalf of the departments of chemistry, business, and fine arts, "called attention to the silk stockings of the ladies present. In their dyes ... they are chemistry; as commodities, they are business administration, while in their attractiveness to the eye, they are fine arts." Where Panofsky's model of agency differed from Perry is that while Perry was content simply to

The Army's Lists were "instruments" which allowed US art historians to intervene in the monumental "reality" they had been assigned to recreate. From without, this intervention was supported by the academic framework of the humanities. How was this disciplinary instrument the "lists"—constructed from within art history? Lists had been a fundamental component of art historical scholarship since Vasari; yet when the removal of an item from a list leads to its potential destruction, the practice connotes a whole new set of ethical obligations. How did art historians rise to this ethical challenge? Collectively, and anonymously. While the first Harvard Lists hurriedly sent to Europe in early 1943 still contained a list of authors, by October of that year it was agreed that "the material should be prepared impersonally" and therefore that "the name of any unofficial group or individual should not appear" on the lists. 116 This collective anonymity was originally intended to placate the rivalries between competing committees; it eventually came to embody the disinterestedness of art history as a whole. This disciplinary cohesion, as we will see, also helped to mask the ethical objections encountered by various scholars when faced with the adaptation of their disciplinary "instruments" to military ends.

Sachs' Method: Composing the lists

In 1969 Colin Eisler, gave perhaps the most colorful depiction of American art history between the two wars, by evoking a "very very American epoch" when the discipline was divided in three camps: "Those who interested themselves in stones were completely satisfied. Those who interested themselves in facts, possibly. Those interested in ideas, certainly not."117 Less caricatured but similarly three-fold, James Ackerman's 1963 account also described the first half of the 20th century in three waves: the "gentlemanly and ethically oriented art history" inherited from the 19th Century, the advent of "scientific aims after World War I," and the "arrival of a group of preeminent European teachers ... who were masters of the empirical method" in the 1930s. 118 Subsequent studies have left this three-part history largely untouched, although they have mitigated the abruptness of their succession, adding institutional factors to the basic story of intellectual migration. Notably, the proliferation of art history departments throughout the 1920s has be re-

look at a useful object, (silk stockings), for Panofsky the document played a mediating role in humanistic agency. Perry, "A Definition of the Humanities," 32.

¹¹⁶ Letter from Dinsmoor to Shoemaker, October 9, 1943. ASCSA I/6.

¹¹⁷ Eisler was actually borrowing classicist William M. Calder's evocation of the same period in his own discipline, Classical Studies. From "Die Geschichte der klassichen Philologie," cited in Colin Eisler, "Kunstgeschichte American Style," in Fleming & Bailyn, Eds, The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America, 1930-1960 (Cambridge: Harvard, 1969), 559. 118 Ackerman, 141. In an interview with the author, Ackerman reiterated this characterization and extended its validity through the 1950s: "American art history at the outbreak of war had basically two branches: the fact-gathering branch and the connoisseurship brand." James Ackerman, Conversation with the author, June 19, 2006.

examined in light of the curricular advances that transformed the "gentlemanly" tradition into a fully professionalized course of study (spear-headed by Paul Sachs's "laboratory for the art department" at Harvard) and a comprehensive survey of Christian archaeology (at the Frick Art Reference Library and the Princeton Index of Christian Art). ¹¹⁹ As for the wave of European émigrés who came to swell the ranks of these departments—the phenomenon Walter Cook famously called "the providential synchronism between the rise of fascism and Nazism in Europe and the spontaneous efflorescence of the history of art in the United States" —recent scholarship has revealed not only that transatlantic exchanges occurred decades before this mass exile, abut also that the methodological repercussions from these émigrés' arrivals were not felt until the 1960s, when their students graduated in large numbers. ¹²¹

From this historiography, the mid-century has emerged as a period of transition for a discipline whose members still numbered in the double digits: at worst a moment of confusion, at best the last gasp of an elite informality. Within this field, the Roberts Commission must be seen as a catalyst for disciplinary codification, especially in light of the overwhelming overlap in membership between the Roberts Commission and the College Art Association. Indeed the same small-scale informality that allowed heterogeneous methodologies to co-exist in this period also enabled the discipline to act as a cohesive whole during the war. War-time issues of the College Art Journal demonstrate how closely the problems of disciplinary cohesion and monumental protection were linked: throughout 1941-1945 the Journal published an elaborate series of debates on the merits of different forms of graduate education in the Arts, periodically interrupted by reports sent from war-torn Europe by MFA&A officers. This parallel pattern culminated, in 1944, when the CAA

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¹¹⁹ Smyth and Lukehart's Early Years of Art History was dedicated to honoring a group of scholars who had partaken in this institutional history. Kathryn Brush augmented the point with scholarly evidence, in her Vastly More than Brick and Mortar: Reinventing the Fogg Art Museum in the 1920s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

¹²⁰ As director of the IFA, Walter Cook had an exaggerated view of this "providential synchronism" since he who provided many posts for European exiles. Beneficents of his policy had a similarly distorted impression of coincidence. The citation above is from Panofsky's "Three decades of Art History;" Colin Eisner used the phrase "All Medium, No Message" in "Kunstgeschichte American Style." The orthodox view of American art history as "provincial" was given by John Coolidge as late as 1967: "By the early 1930s, after a decade of brilliant contributions, art history in America remained sporadic and provincial. It was the task of the refugees from Germany to establish a unified discipline and to bring a breast of continental practice." "Walter Friedlander," in Art Journal (Sp 1967), 260.

History," in America after World War I. Interrelationships, Exchanges, Contexts," Marburger Jahrbuch für Kunstwissenschaft, (1999), 7-36: "The rapid upswing in the formalized study of art history in the United States after World War I and the intensified contact with European scholarship that ensued did not grow out of a void. Instead the postwar "boom" built to a large extent upon the results of earlier initiatives to establish the study of art as a serious area of academic inquiry in America." While Thomas Crow talked about delayed influences in "The practice of Art History," Op Cit. As we will see in Chapter 3, art historians' relations with Unesco and its affiliated international organizations turned sour precisely when bureaucratic procedures took precedence over personal connections in recruiting heritage experts. The College Art Journal (CAJ) was the 1941 re-incarnation of the Association's journal Parnassus. Reports on the Roberts Commission's work appeared as follows: Sumner McK. Crosby, "The Protection of Artistic Monuments in Europe" CAJ (Mar 1944), 109-113; Charles R. Morey's "The War and Mediaeval Art" and Rensselaer Lee's "The Effect of the War on

published a "Statement on the Place of the History of Art in the Liberal Arts Curriculum," which asserted the importance of the "useless areas" of art historical training in the face of the "specialization, indifference to ends, disregard of the emotional and imaginative life" that had been precipitated by war. This "Statement" was signed by an array of art historians (most involved in the Roberts Commission's work) so staggeringly diverse that it seemed designed to demonstrate external cohesion, despite internal strife, in the face of war. 124 In light of this self-fashioning as a "useless" discipline averse to "vocational training," it is all the more important to note that many of the proposals for pedagogical reform devised in this period found an immediate, if unexpected, testing ground in the instrumental war-time work of the Roberts Commission. Indeed preservationist fervor alone cannot explain the intense competition provoked by the Commission's work, between individuals and groups wanting to provide better, faster, or more comprehensive service to the Army. Undoubtedly the Roberts Commission was also seen as an opportunity to showcase, humanistic creed notwithstanding, the "usefulness" of nascent institutional formations in an increasingly "instrumental" academic paradigm. In lieu of a person-by-person account of the manifold convergences between art historical pedagogy and wartime protection, and in place of an overview of the reciprocal instrumentality between the two, I narrate the making of the Lists of Monuments through a composite sketch, by following three key figures, whose methodological differences became the blueprint for a threefold distribution of tasks: making, editing, and implementing lists. While Paul Sachs (and other American "museum men") established a framework for listing, Wilhelm Köhler (and other émigré art historians) provided the geographic

Renaissance and Baroque Art in Italy" in CAJ (Jan., 1945), 75-80; Gladys Hamlin's "European Art Collections and the War" in CAJ (Mar., 1945), 155-163; Stanley Meltzoff's "Letter from North Italy" CAJ (Nov 1945), 34-36; Marvin C. Ross "SHAEF and the Protection of Monuments in Northwest Europe" in CAJ (Jan., 1946), 119-122. Significantly, the Society of Architectural Historians (SAH), branched off of the CAA in 1941, and included a preservationist clause in its mandate. See "Round Table Discussion on the Preservation of Historic Architectural Monuments, Held Tuesday, March 18, 1941" The Journal of the American Society of Architectural Historians Vol. 1, No. 2 (1941).

^{124 &}quot;A statement on the Place of the History of Art in the Liberal Arts Curriculum," in CAJ (Mar 1944), 82-87. It was authored by A Committee of the College Art Association; Millard Meiss; Alfred H. Barr, Jr.; Sumner McK. Crosby; Sirarpie Der Nersessian; George Kubler; Rensselaer W. Lee; Ulrich Middeldorf; C. R. Morey; Erwin Panofsky; Stephen Pepper; Chandler R. Post; Agnes Rindge; Paul J. Sachs; Meyer Schapiro; Clarence H. Ward. The statement admitted to differences in method: "The war has focused attention on an issue that has existed in American education for many years. Immediate military necessity has led to technological training on a greatly extended scale. Faced with the urgent demand for this training and with serious economic insecurity, our colleges have had to curtail their program of instruction in all the "useless" areas. In this way the tendency of American education throughout the twentieth century to become more practical and to emphasize science and vocational training has been suddenly and very rapidly accelerated. The great dangers inherent in this tendency—specialization, indifference to ends, disregard of the emotional and imaginative life—have now been magnified. ... The history of art has been affected by the general educational trend, and it is faced with some additional problems of its own. The real function of the study of art in the liberal arts college is often confused with professional training-the training of artists or of art historians. When, on the other hand, courses in the arts are designed, as they should be, to further understanding and enjoyment, there is considerable difference of opinion as to what method of study best achieves this purpose."

coverage required by the lists, and William Bell Dinsmoor (as chief expatriate archaeologist) traveled to war zones to oversee their implementation. (figs. 2.24-28) I begin with the connoisseur.

Paul Sachs' contribution to the Roberts Commission as a volunteer effort neatly mirrors his contribution to American art history as an institution: both consisted in the application of a scientific model of laboratory investigation—known informally as the "Fogg Method"—to the creation of aesthetically cohesive art collections. "Every distinguished collection," Sachs wrote in the 1930s, "is a work of art in itself, revealing qualities of proportion and harmony which spring from a controlling idea. A true collection manifests a sense of design." 125 Sachs taught this "design" method in his "Museum Course" at Harvard, which focused on detailed study of the objects in the Museum's collection, and hoped to build, in this manner, both the Fogg's collection and a new generation of curators to staff a growing number of museums in America. (fig. 2.24) Indeed the growth of American art-history is intimately connected to the emergence of a new American collecting class in David Watkin's words, the rise of "the connoisseurship of wealthy collectors, many of whom were new to the art world and therefore sought expert guidance." 126 Having been one such collector himself, Paul Sachs saw no conflict in his curatorial and scholarly mandates, nor in the "selfperpetuating system" of personal connections he established through his teaching, whereby alumni who had become collectors could donate abundantly to the Fogg. It is this fluidity between professional, personal, and academic realms that led Sachs to play such a leading role in the early organization of the Harvard Committee's work. As one of the "most powerful gatekeepers to the museum profession", he became the primary "gatekeeper" for the MFA&A, 127 turning his arthistorical network over to the Army, convincing military authorities that the MFA&A could be entirely staffed by his students and alumni, and advising the entire "personnel" operation himself. 128 Months before the first List of Monuments was sent to Europe, Sachs had already composed and transmitted innumerable Lists of Personnel to the Army. In convincing the Army that the MFA&A was a realistic proposition, he was helped by the fact that his "museum course" included mandatory training in the techniques of art conservation. 129 Hence the "Field Record" form distributed to MFA&A

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¹²⁵ As quoted in Kantor, 171.

¹²⁶ David Watkin, The Rise of Architectural History (London: Architectural Press, 1980), 36.

[&]quot;Sachs's museum course was the first of its kind in this country. Alumni (in later years, alumnae) were placed in art museums throughout America, making Harvard the West Point of museum studies. ... Sachs became one of the most powerful gatekeepers for the museum profession." Goodwin, 57.

¹²⁸ Constable to Stout, 22 Mar 1943, "Whether the matter will broaden out into the creation of a conservation corps and the use of trained men is another and later matter..."

Eisler, "Kunstgeschichte American Style," 557. According to Eisler the "unique fusion of art history with studies in conservation and techniques," was a "short-lived combination [that] soon drew apart, each pole ossifying in isolation."

officers to record the condition of monuments was designed by Sachs' conservator at the Fogg, George Leslie Stout. (fig. 2.32)

One way we can understand Europe's monuments as having been "collected" by the Fogg Method, then, is that most of the scholars-soldiers enlisted into the MFA&A were trained in Sachs' Museum Course. Nor was it unusual for Sachs to send these students on reconnaissance missions abroad, list of places and people in hand. As described by a former student, an integral part of the museum course before the war were summers spent in Europe, where "contacts with dealers, museum administrators, and other collectors were cultivated and developed for both present and future use":

Sent forth to Europe with dozens of introductory letters (it wasn't unusual for a student to be clutching over one-hundred letters and cards) students were expected to add detailed information about conditions in the art world, country by country, to the list of names and addresses, books, collections, paintings, galleries, that Sachs had accumulated.¹³⁰

This description might well be substituted for a brief of the MFA&A's mandate in war, with the addition of "surveying damage" and "giving monuments first aid." (fig. 2.30) The continuity between these two practices (touring monuments in summer, saving monuments in war) is further attested by the way Sachs' sent his "List of Personal Acquaintances," to Shoemaker—a list which had acted before the war like a private Baedeker's Guide to the art world for his students—with a note that "Some of these people, may, of course, have disappeared during the war. This is the 1938 list." Later Sachs worked to have John Walker appointed "special adviser" to the Commission, not in his capacity as Chief Curator of the National Gallery of Art, but because he had resided in Italy and the mentorship of noted American collector Bernhard Berenson would have afforded him "the opportunity to visit private collections closed to students." 132

Lists of people and lists of monuments fit together in an elaborate indexing scheme that was kept in an extensive card file at the Commission's headquarters. (fig. 2.29) A veritable monument to the art world, this file was constantly updated to provide an exact image of the state of monuments and its monuments-men worldwide. Thus any list was only one item in a list of lists:

War Status

I. PERSONS

a. artistic

b. dealers or firms

c. owners or donors

d. personnel, directors, art historians

Both Harvard's departmental roster and Roberts Commission's "Personnel File" were divided into "technical side" and "art history side." See the List composed by Paul Sachs for Huntington Cairns on October 21 1943. AAA #3077

 $^{^{130}}$ Sybil Gordon Kantor, "The Beginnings of Art History at Harvard and the Fogg Method," The Early Years, 171.

¹³¹ Paul J. Sachs, "Paul J. Sachs, European List (Personal Acquaintances), Roberts Commission, National Archives.

Minutes of Organizational Meeting of The American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe. Wednesday August 25, 1943, National Gallery of Art." ASCSA III/2

II. PLACES

- a. auctions
- b. governments
- c. repositories and museums, acquisitions, staff changes
- d. other normal activities, discoveries, restorations
- e. war damages, losses by transfer, theft, forgery

III. OBJECTS, ANONYMOUS MOVABLE

VI. PROPAGANDA, GENERAL

VII. PUBLICATIONS

Pre-War Status

VIII. MONUMENTS, LIST OF FIXED

- a. churches
- b. palaces and houses
- c. monuments

IX. INSTITUTIONS, REPOSITORIES of movable property

- a. public art collections
- b. private art collections
- c. libraries and archives
- d. scientific museums and institutions. 133

In an adaptation of Panofsky's theory of humanistic "re-enactment," the management of this detailed inventory served as a substitute for control over the "cultural cosmos" that it represented. The ethical value of any List of Monuments lay in this substitution: the possibility that this entire art world might disappear was remedied by its re-presentation, in precise indexical form. It is all the more significant, then, that monuments and institutions were recorded in their "Pre-war Status," independent from the contingencies of war, enacting the "autonomy" the Commission had set out to implement.

The second way that Sachs' Museum Course served as a model for the work of the Roberts Commission was in the application of his collecting method to the composition of the Harvard Lists themselves. This method it is perhaps most helpfully understood as having evolved from Sachs's debt to two successive conoisseurial traditions. Sachs inherited his institutional post from "amateur intellectual" Charles Elliot Norton, who had taught Harvard's—and America's—first course in art history in 1873. Norton's teachings, which were famously described by his son as "Modern Morals as Illustrated by the Art of the Ancient," sought to reconcile the realms of "ethics and aesthetics," in particular the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mills with a sympathy for Ruskin's aesthetic vision of social reform. One consequence of this mixture was that Norton emphasized both individual encounters with art ("The love of the beautiful is the best possession that a man who wants to lead a

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Dinsmoor, "Frick Reference Library Status, January 4, 1944." ASCSA I/8. The location of this file was the subject of debate in 1944, it was forwarded to the OSS. Dinsmoor to Constable, 21 Sep 1944. AAA

¹³⁴ As cited in Edward H. Madden, "Charles Eliot Norton on Art and Morals" in Journal of the History of Ideas (Jun, 1957), 432. For Norton's own views, see his "The Educational Value of the History of the Fine Arts," Educational Review (April 1895), 343-348. The phrase "Amateur Intellectual" is from Timothy P. Duffy, "The Gender of Letters: Charles Eliot Norton and the Decline of the Amateur Intellectual Tradition," in The New England Quarterly, (Mar 1996), 91-109.

moral life can have,")¹³⁵ and the value of art for teaching "the lessons of moderation, of self-control of wise, sweet, simple, temperate living" in an industrializing America. ¹³⁶ Two generations later, Sachs taught his museum course from the home which had been Norton's at Shady Hill. While the institution of art history at Harvard had undergone significant transformation in the intervening half-century, Norton's emphasis on ethics continued to permeate Sachs' teachings. ¹³⁷ Witness for instance the yearly guest lecture by W.G. Constable, titled Ethics for Museum Men, which depicted the museumman as motivated by a higher moral calling. "In museum work today," Constable asserted, "intellectual ability and professional knowledge are not enough; they must be inspired and guided by a high standard of morals and a high sensitiveness to moral implications in each individual." ¹³⁸ Yet the ethical mandate of the 20th century aesthete no longer applied to only to personal comportment; it amounted rather to a collecting ethic that stressed issues of "originality, authenticity and value of art." ¹³⁹

In this passage from gentlemanly to institutional ethics, a crucial transfer had occurred, between the "temperance" of aesthetic enjoyment and the "isolation" of art objects. Fogg director Edward Forbes addressed this link in a 1918 seminar on "the question of how art is to be displayed." "The importance of quality rather than quantity cannot be strongly emphasized," Forbes argued, and he marshaled as many Victorian apercus of moral behavior in support of this theory of display:

Everyone knows enough not to try to eat two turkeys in one meal, yet most of us are guilty of a like lack of restraint and moderation when we are in a museum. ... I believe that the principle should be established that no one except the habitués of museums should remain more than two hours in a gallery.... It was a wise man who defined intemperance as "taking a thing because it was there."

In spite of the tendency of the public to be intemperate in their use of museums, the museum official has the opportunity to do a great deal of good ... Even those who want too much, want one thing at a time... if a large room were filled with five thousand of the finest Chinese porcelains in the world, the visitor would give one look and flee discouraged. If on the other hand one of these were placed in the center of this vast room, every one would tend to swarm in. 140

¹³⁵ "Appendix B: Norton's College Lectures," in Letters of Charles Eliot Norton, ed. Norton & Howe (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), Vol II, 451. "I am sometimes inclined to think that simply to cultivate one's self is the best service an American can render in these days," in Kermit Vanderbilt, Charles Eliot Norton: Apostle of Culture in a Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard, 1959), 187.

¹³⁶ Student's notes on Greek art, in Vanderbilt, Charles Eliot Norton, 128.

¹³⁷ Shady Hill, which Duffy describes as one of the legendary "abodes of lettered culture" in New England," was also where the first meeting of the Harvard Monuments Committee was convened. For a brief description of Norton's Harvard legacy, see Stebbins and Ricci, "Charles Eliot Norton, Ruskin's Friend, Harvard's Sage," in the Last Ruskinians: Charles Eliot Norton, Charles Herbert Moore and Their Circle, (Harvard Art Museums, 2007), 13-28.

¹³⁸ "Museum Ethics," Constable Papers, AAA #3073. Also published as "Ethics for Museum Men," in The Museums Journal (October 1941).

¹³⁹ Constable, "Museum Ethics," 13.

¹⁴⁰ "The classical example of this," he continued, "is Raphael's Sistine Madonna, which occupies a room by itself in Dresden Edward W. Forbes. "The Art Museum and the Teaching of the Fine Arts," Seminar at the Metropolitan Museum on March 30, 1918, The Bulletin of the College Art Association of America, (Sep 1918), 126-127.

From a principle of "temperate" behavior, Forbes derived a spatial regime for the isolation of museum objects. That the entire department was ruled by this translation is perhaps most easily demonstrated in the departmental portraits, which included not only each faculty's likeness, but also an object from the Fogg collection.

In this passage from experiencing art to collecting it, Sachs and Constable were indebted to a more recent model of connoisseurship, spearheaded by Bernhard Berenson. After studying with Norton, Berenson had become an "adviser to the Gilded Age's wealthiest collectors, whose gifts would form the cornerstones of many American museums." 141 While Berenson emphasized appreciation like Norton through personal acquaintance, he also insisted on establishing the facts of authorship, date, provenance, and genealogy, before making judgments of value. With Berenson the tradition of the connoisseur took a distinctly "scientific" turn, as evidenced by his innovations in the establishment of lists as a form of art historical knowledge. Thus Berenson's judgments were "brief, elliptical, aphoristic, informal, conversational yet assertive, occasionally arbitrary and personal," in the manner of Norton's moral apercus. 142 But he appended them with extensive and carefully constructed inventories of works, artists, places. (fig. 2.22) That Berenson was content to segregate his artistry and his science is evidenced in the separate publication, after 1936, of his judgments (e.g., Italian Painters of the Renaissance) and his inventories (e.g., Italian Pictures of the Renaissance) arranged alphabetically and by geographic location. In contrast to this separation, Sachs belonged to the first generation of art historians who transformed art collecting into a fully integrated academic science, complete with a laboratory component and a precise methodology. Where Berenson could impart onto his clients a vague sense of the "tactile" value of art, Sachs' ambition was to render aesthetic judgments wholly teachable.

Sachs' art history was a discipline driven by the search for protocols and the building of classifications, and it is in these ambitions that his work for the Roberts Commission was anchored. As with the Ethics for Museum Men, Sachs relied on his British colleague Constable to provide a written exposition of his art-historical method. In his 1938 Art History and Conoisseurship, Constable cited Berenson's definition of "the work of art itself as the event of art history," but he distinguished between the connoisseur, who narrates this event, and the art historian, who collects it in four steps:

¹⁴¹ George M. Goodwin, "A New Jewish Elite: Curators, Directors, and Benefactors of American Art Museums," in Modern Judaism, (Feb., 1998), 47-79.

¹⁴² Michael Rinehart, "Bernard Berenson," in The Early Years of Art History, 92. Rather than seeking ethical lessons in art, "the idea that art enhanced life was focused on tactile value."

¹⁴³ W.G. Constable, Art History and Conoisseurship: Their Scope and Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 10. The citation from Berenson's Study and Criticism of Italian Art reads: "All that remains of a event in general history is the account of it in document or tradition; but in art, the work of art itself is the event."

- (i) Collection of material
- (ii) Study and analysis of its character and consequent grouping and classification
- (iii) Investigation of why the material has taken a particular form at a particular time and place
- (iv) Estimation in relation to other material of its importance, historical certainly and possibly aesthetic. 144

Each step in this progression, which began with a "material" collection and culminated in an "aesthetic" judgment, was replicated in the making the Harvard Lists, as evidenced in the first set of instructions that Sachs, Constable and Henken sent to contributors on April 5th, 1943:

The specifications for listing are as follows:

- 1. It should be up to 50 pages long
- 2. The material should be listed by provinces and cities so that all the material from one city or locality could be listed together and placed in order of relative importance.
- 3. The list should include: a. churches, b. secular buildings, c. sites of archaelogical, historical importance d. shrines. ... e. works of art ... f. art collections ... g. archaeological collections ... h. scientific collections i. libraries and archives.
- 4. The significance of the material in the eyes of the local population should be emphasized, since its proper protection by the occupying forces would have an important effect on the morale of the inhabitants. In special cases, a few lines might be added stressing the place held by the particular item in local pride or religious belief. 145

From these instructions, a neat correspondence can be drawn between the needs of the Army and the method of the art historian: "collection" occurs in the 50-page lists; "classification" in the regional grouping and later in the introductions, "estimation" in the ordering and later in the assignment of stars. In war, however, the scientific coherence of the art historian's method was disturbed: these steps were to be fulfilled out of order, with step (iii) taking precedence over the rest of the endeavor. According to the Army the question "why the material has taken a particular form at a particular time" was to be answered by a blanket statement of attachment between region and monument. Arguments about "artistic merit" were to be suppressed, and the scientific method that supported them was up-ended, but the judgments arrived at would retain their validity.

The ethical problems posed by this separation of scientific method from critical judgment became dramatically evident as soon as the first Harvard Lists were sent to Colonel Shoemaker in March 1943, and Shoemaker promptly returned them with a complaint that they contained "too many discussions of an art historical nature." The main problem was that the lists had been composed as ends in themselves rather than means to a military end. "It is not necessary," Shoemaker assured, "to argue for the artistic merits of the materials listed:"

¹⁴⁴ W.G. Constable, Art History and Conoisseurship, 12.

¹⁴⁵ Hencken to Köhler, 5 Apr 1943. ADHG / Köhler.

Please refrain from instructing the army in art history... What is wanted is practical, factual information ... [about] ... the ways in which recognition of any given item or of the tradition centering around it can be utilized for our own selfish ends. 146

Through repeated admonitions, Shoemaker explained that aesthetic judgments should not be didactically arrived at, but rather given as starting points. A new set of instructions devised by Sachs, Constable and Hencken further pulled apart the four-fold distribution of the format (notably introducing the use of "stars" and the need for an overall "introduction." ¹⁴⁷ The editors also made a list of what the art historians "are asked not to do," ¹⁴⁸ including "talk down to the Army" and "instruct the Army in art history." Finally, they rephrased Shoemarker's admonition, by declaring as a given the autonomous value of art-historical judgement:

The Army will accept your judgment as to what items should be given priority, and it is not necessary to argue for the artistic merits of the materials listed. 149

In other words, the Army was willing to "accept" art history as an autonomous discipline, capable of arriving at its own judgments of value, as long as this autonomy could operate in the service of a specific military policy, described as "our own selfish ends."

The new set of instructions produced considerable confusion over the meaning of the word "monument," although they successfully conveyed the need for brevity. The resulting drafts of lists are a model of hybridity. For example, uncertain as to what constituted a monument's legitimate, but "not artistic" merit, Georges Wildenstein and Kenneth Conant resolved to append to each item a single fact. While these facts were multivalent in their representation—age, meaning, architectural features, form, beauty, style, popularity with tourists, usage by authorities, and even presence in the literature—all were presented under the guise of a monumental "fame":

	Bernières (Loiret)	Church with beautiful spire*, famous
	Blois (Loire & Cher)	Chateau*** remarkable for first-rate historic interest and architectural
		form
• • •	Carnac (Finistère)	Menhirs*** alignments*** etc. most famous of their kind
• • •	Champdeniers (D.S.)	Church*, parts about 1000 years old
	Chantilly (Oise)	Chateau* and stables* famous and much visited
	Chartres (Eure & L.)	Cathedral***, unquestionably one of the finest of all medieval

¹⁴⁶ Shoemaker to Paul J. Sachs, 4 Apr 1943. ADHG/ Sachs.

¹⁴⁷ "The following are needed: 1. An introduction grouping various categories of items, explaining their religious, political, or other importance in the eyes of the local population. 2. The outstanding items should be listed with an indication of their relative importance (as by number of stars). ...3. These lists should be arranged, first, by geographical areas, and then alphabetically by towns or other localities under the larger divisions." Sachs to contributors, 24 May 1943. ADHG

[&]quot;1. We are requested not to "talk down" to the Army by telling them they must respect monuments ... 2. We are requested not to make suggestions as to the conduct of military affairs ... 3. We are requested to avoid seeming to instruct the Army in art history ... 4. We are requested not to include discussions of the artistic or other merits of any items except insofar as these factors make it precious to the local populations." Sachs to contributors, 24 May 1943. ADHG

The new set of instructions, sent by Sachs to Köhler, 24 April 1943,

	buildings
 Chaumont (Hte.M.)	Chateau* used by Pershing and GHQ of AEF
Chauvigny (VIenne)	Chateau** and church* ensemble, very picturesque
 Domremy (Vosges)	Birthplace of Jeanne d'Arc*** French heroine; important for that reason only
Josselin (Morb.)	Chateau**, famous and rightly so; church
Le Dorat (The V.)	Church*, bold and interesting design
Le Mans (Sarthe)	Cathedral** very noble building, apse one of finest in Gothic style
Le Raincy (Seine)	Parish Church**, one of the most interesting of the modern
	French churches
Loches (I. etL.)	Chateau*, well-known medieval building; church of St. Ours*, curious 4-spired Romanesque building, unique in form
Morienval (Oise)	Church***, widely known example of primitive Gothic, cited in all books on the subject

The appendage of "fame" to the monuments in no way replaced scholarly evaluations, acting instead an additional layer through which "purely artistic merit" was still visible. A similar effect of didactic transparency resulted from the request to provide "a general introduction," as early drafts of these introductions contained an explanation of the criteria that had been applied to the selection of monuments. ("Monuments included in this list, have been selected on account of their economic and cultural importance.") ¹⁵⁰ This transparency reveals just the kind of methodical ethos that Constable had prescribed in 1938. Yet Constable now found that, under the constrainst of war, "the art historians had behaved rather foolishly," displaying an "extraordinary incapacity to grasp what was necessary." ¹⁵¹ In the face of this incapacity, it became the job of the list editors to provide "a controlling idea" to the Harvard Lists.

Robbed of the discourse to which they were accustomed, and required to articulate a general theory of monumental value, list editors Constable and Hencken resorted to making a general argument about European people's attachment to their monuments. Rather than disclosing the process by which monuments had been selected, they presented monuments as containers of value. Rather than taking responsibility for this value, they attributed the judgment to "local populations." And rather than appending this value to each item in the list, they applied it uniformly as the opening sentence for every list's "Introduction":

To the Norwegians every kind of monument of the past ... is precious and valuable. In short, the Belgian nation as a whole is highly conscious of the great significance of its artistic heritage

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 $^{^{150}}$ "These have been chosen with a view to protecting structures valued by the people because of their economic and historic importance." Milton Anastos' list for Rumania. ADHG / Koehler I.

¹⁵¹ "The art historians have behaved rather foolishly. They have shown an extraordinary incapacity to grasp what was necessary and an in many cases have tried to teach the Army its business and introduce, into what they submitted, information doubtless of great interest and value to the student, but quite irrelevant to the purpose of the document they were preparing. Mercifully, Alex Robinson has been working on the list for Greece and has provided a pattern." Constable to George Stout, May 28 1943. AAA#3077.

The Dutch people hold their monuments and the art of their past in high esteem. They cherish the old towns and are proud of their famous museums...

Consciousness of their national artistic supremacy, of the value of their art treasures and monuments ... is one of the distinctive characteristics of the French people.

The Hungarians are extremely proud of their nation, and all classes of people are deeply interested in its history and culture.

Italy is a nation of art lovers who are intensely proud of their history and of the monuments in which it is given visible evidence, and all classes of the Italian people hold these tings in the very highest esteem.

The Austrian has a great respect for tradition, and is very retentive of habits and practices sanctified by custom. Every respect should therefore be paid to his monuments. 152

From these introductions, the people of Western Europe emerged as a homogeneous mass, animated by a generic attachment to their art. The application of this "pattern of argument" to the introduction had the double effect of homogenizing European cultures while enabling America's exceptional status as an objective observer, a collector of cultures.

Read collectively, these Introductions also reveal a disciplinary paradigm that recalls the panoramic image used by Erwin Panofsky in 1953 to describe the emergence of an American discursive model where "historical distance proved to be replaceable by cultural and geographical distance":

Where the Europeans art historians were conditioned to think in terms of national and regional boundaries, no such limitations existed for the Americans.... Seen from the other side of the Atlantic, the whole of Europe from Spain to the Eastern Mediterranean merged into one panorama the planes of which appeared at proper intervals and in equally sharp focus. ¹⁵³

Panofsky's description of the American art historian as a surveyor of transatlantic panoramas helps to explain why, by the early 1940's, art historical method could be seamlessly integrated into a military strategy based on "the command of the air": because both were based on the same paradigm of a territorial and discursive totality punctuated with monuments. As the next section will show, on the one hand, Panofsky's geographic metaphor stops being a metaphor in the case of the Roberts Commission's work, which was dependent upon a literal perception of Europe as "one panorama" from a Bomber's cockpit. On the other hand, this homogenization must be understood as a willing

^{152 [}Sigrid Unset], "Introduction," Civil Affairs Handbook, Norway. Section 17: Cultural Institutions (Army Service Forces: M 350-17: 19 July 1944). [Jakob Rosenberg], "Introduction," Civil Affairs Handbook, Belgium, Section 17: Cultural Institutions (Army Service Forces: M361-17, 13 May 1944). [Ernst Kitzinger], "Introduction", Civil Affairs Handbook, Netherlands, Section 17: Cultural Institutions (Army Service Forces: M357-17: 13 May 1944). [George Wildenstein and Kenneth Conant], "Introduction" in Civil Affairs Handbook, France. Section 17B: Cultural Institutions. (Army Service Forces Manual M352-17B, 3 June 1944), vii. [Margaret Ames], "Introduction," American Defense-Harvard Group, List of Protected Monuments in Hungary by Margaret Ames. [Doro Levi], "Introduction," Civil Affairs Handbook, Italy. Section 17A: Cultural Institutions, Italy. (Army Services Forces: M353-17A, 6 July 1944.), vii. [Otto Benesch], "Introduction," American Defense-Harvard Group, List of Protected Monuments in Austria by Otto Benesch.

Erwin Panofsky, "Three Decades of Art History in the United States," in Meaning in the Visual Arts, (New York: Penguin, 1955), 376

war-time distortion on the part of émigrés who saw their own exile as a symptom of the impending danger to their own country's monuments, and the work of the Commission as a solution to it. Indeed while the Army sent American art-historians-in-training to care for Europe's monuments, in the US it was a team largely made up of European émigrés that was charged with composing the lists of monuments.

Köhler's Kunstwissenschaft: The geography of collaboration

The extent to which mass intellectual exile homogenized the study of European art history, as described by Panofsky, and the extent to which the Roberts Commission contributed to this historiogeographic phenomenon, can be verified by examining the role of Wilhelm Köhler (1884-1959) to the production of the Harvard Lists. A German medievalist who emigrated to Harvard in 1935, Köhler was the brother of "illustrious immigrant" and Gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler. 154 (fig. 2.27) While Köhler the psychologist is known for carrying an entire experimental tradition across the Atlantic, Köhler the art historian more quietly personified the encounter, in Ackerman's words, between the European "mastery of the empirical tradition" and the pragmatic institutions of American connoisseurship. At Harvard, Köhler taught the under-represented art of the early Byzantine Empire, a period then still known as the "Dark Ages." This narrow field of specialization betrays Köhler's debt to the methods of the new Kunstwissenschaft, with its aim of systematically undermining the traditional hierarchies between major and minor arts, regions and schools—one period at a time. In 1941, Köhler was appointed the senior fellow at Harvard's new institute in Washington, DC, the Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection. This trajectory exemplifies how a generation of German émigrés found in the US an institutional setup that was paradoxically better suited to the epistemological categories they had brought with them, since this setup was controlled the "scientific" ambitions of America's new class of museum men like Paul Sachs. 155 What Sachs and Köhler had in common was the use of scientific rhetoric to liberate art history from subjectivity, and while Sachs' "laboratory" method was more obviously informed by gentlemanly

¹⁵⁴ A pioneer of Gestalt psychology, Wolfgang Köhler visited Harvard in the 1930s, delivering the William James lectures in 1934 and befriending the ADHG's Ralph Barton Perry—this friendship might in part explain both Wilhelm's emigration to Harvard and his early involvement in the ADHG's monument committee; documents show that he was present at the very first meeting at Shady Hill. Wolfgang was an early and vocal critic of the Nazi regime, resigning from Berlin's Psychologic Institut in 1935, and being appointed to Swarthmore the same year, where he created one of the foremost American centers of psychological research. See Jean Matter Mandler & George Mandler, "The Diaspora of Experimental Psychology: the Gestaltists and Others," in The Intellectual Migration, 371-419.

¹⁵⁵ The donation of the estate to Harvard had been Sachs' doing: he had lobbied his classmate Robert Woods Bliss for a decade, and he oversaw its administration until 1956. Goodwin, 59. The Collection was opened on Nov 1,1940 and donated to Harvard four weeks later, "to be administered as a resident institute of research." Berta Segall, "The Dumbarton Oaks Collection" American Journal of Archaeology, (Jan - Mar 1941), 7.

ethics, Köhler's collaborative "archiving" mechanism was no less ruled by a strict research ethic, that was tested during the war as a military procedure.

Dumbarton Oaks has entered international history as the setting for the eponymous Conference that led to birth of the United Nations in November 1944. 156 But the Institute's war-time service actually began at the hands of the art historians who first came to inhabit it in 1941, under Köhler's leadership. Köhler saw the hundreds of miles separating the Georgetown mansion from the Cambridge museum as a space of opportunity—as he put it to the CAA in 1942, a way to add "a kind of top story put upon the Graduate School of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences." 157 Despite its collecting seriousness and technical exactitude, Harvard had for Köhler failed to produce a setting suited to "advanced research and intellectual development" in art history. This critique was surreptitiously aimed at Sachs's "laboratory" model: the real laboratory sciences were guided by experimental procedures, while research in the humanities was still characterized by a "lack of orientation," and this was particularly true of the field of research to which the new institute was devoted, "the development and formation of Early Byzantine Art." Köhler identified "two lacunae in the scholarly equipment" of the Byzantine scholar: philological disorder ("the written sources have never been systematically collected") and overemphasis on small objects at the expense of monuments ("the monumental material, consisting of structures, and of their sculptural and pictorial decoration, has never been comprehensively investigated and coordinated.") Köhler's remedy, the "backbone for the scholarly activities of the new institute," was to engage Junior Fellows in a systematic survey project based on "the principle of collaborative research." The choice of research topic was taken away from the individual, but the collective framework ensured a broad interpretive perspective, and allowed, as a byproduct, the compilation of a comprehensive "Research Archive" of "all available information about any monument important for the development of Christian art," which could serve as "a guide both to the monument and its literature." 158

The conference took place between August 21 and October 7, 1944. According to 1990s institute director Angeliki E. Laiou, "heat was one of the main reasons Dumbarton Oaks was chosen; ...it is one of the coolest spots in Washington." Angeliki E. Laiou, "Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 1944-1994: Remarks from the Opening Session," in The Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and the United Nations 1944-1994, Ed. Ernest May and Angeliki Laiou, (Harvard, 1998.), ix. The music room was temporarily transformed into the "Assembly Room," effectively making the institute the first United Nations headquarters. Much architectural insight can be drawn form this typological continuity between private institute devoted to quiet scholarly work and the island of optimism needed for this postwar planning. Elsewhere I have argued that the architecture of parliamentary diplomacy was based precisely on this adaptation of a domestic "salon" model to diplomatic needs. See Lucia Allais, "Monumentality by the Linear Foot: Carlu's UN and the Architecture of Parliamentary Diplomacy."

¹⁵⁷ Wilhelm Köhler, "The Dumbarton Oaks Program and the Principle of Collaborative Research," in Speculum (Jan 1943), 118-123. "A Paper read before the College Art Association on January 23, 1942, at a meeting devoted to the discussion of methods of research in the Fine Arts."

¹⁵⁸ Köhler, "The Dumbarton Oaks Program," 120.

This collaborative scheme had been in place for barely 2 years when Dumbarton Oaks became, for a summer, "a home center for the protection project." By the time the institute's closing neared in May 1943, only "preliminary lists" had been sent to Europe and North Africa, and Köhler proposed that the institute remain open through the summer to complete the work. "An ideal office and framework," he argued, "already exists at Dumbarton Oaks":

- 1) A group of competent scholars, our Junior Fellows, is available for this kind of work.
- 2) In the files of our Research Archives large portions of the pertinent material in North Africa and in Eastern Europe has already been collected
- 3) Each Junior Fellow is well acquainted with the monuments of the region assigned to him or her and (more important for the preparatory work than the knowledge of the country itself) each fellow knows thoroughly the literature of his or her country.
- 4) The Senior Fellow in charge of research can be expected to coordinate the work of the Junior fellows and to see that necessary degree of uniformity in the lists is achieved. 160

The proposal was approved by Sachs' board, and lists for Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Tunisia were made at Dumbaton Oaks that summer under the supervision of émigré medievalist Ernst Kitzinger. ¹⁶¹ Later enlisted in the OSS to decode intelligence, Kiztinger recounted a continuity between art-historical and strategic analysis: "the methods were the same he used when he analyzed sources in his scholarly work; but ... the study had to be done within two weeks, and at the end of it one would know with awful certainty whether the analysis had been right or wrong." ¹⁶² Similarly, the analytical "backbone" of Dumbarton Oaks proved "an ideal framework" for Kitzinger to oversee the Junior Fellow's work on the Harvard List, because it was a system for deriving monumental meaning out of geographic analysis. In Köhler's 1941 words, Junior Fellows took "geographically scattered" material to conduct "monographic investigation of certain regional groups of monuments." In doing this, they had complete interpretive freedom, as long as their research began by delimiting a "geographic unit," and ended by identifying "monuments to be recorded according to a prescribed system." ¹⁶³

In peace-time, this regional model of analysis was supposed to liberate the history of Byzantine art from the unfavorable "Dark Ages" where Hegelian dialectical schemes had plunged it. In war-time, this model facilitated the subordination of art history's science to an ethical framework that projected nationalist pride onto monuments worldwide. The geographic assumptions that

¹⁵⁹ By 24 April 1943 Hencken requested "whatever material you have already assembled dealing with material or artistic and cultural importance in Tunisia, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Hungary, and the Balkans. This should be marked, 'Preliminary draft – incomplete – subject to revision'." Hencken to Köhler. ADHG/ KI.

¹⁶⁰ Köhler to Hencken, summarizing a discussion with Sachs the week prior. Undated, probably June 1943.

¹⁶¹ Köhler to Sachs, 26 May 1943. "Minutes of the Administrative Committee for Dumbarton Oaks." ADHG/Köhler

¹⁶² Laiou, x. Laiou references Kitzinger's list-making, telling an anecdote that some "tobacco and newspaper kiosks" in Tunisia had been "carefully protected from bombing because somehow they were thought to be shrines."

[&]quot;Within the geographical unit assigned to him, the Fellow in studying the monuments is bound only by two obligations: ... to record the monuments according to a prescribed system; and ... never to lose sight of the ultimate goal to which the group research is committed." Köhler, "The Dumbarton Oaks Program," 120.

underlay the development of 20th century art-historical categories, and the ethical dimension they carried, have only recently received historiographic treatment. As Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann has shown, European scholarship between the wars was motivated by a search for a system, producing a plethora of historical explanations for the succession of styles that, whether formalist or iconographic, were always also implicitly geographical. ¹⁶⁴ Kaufmann distinguished between a French branch of *Géographie de l'art* that analyzed land morphology over the *longue durée* (an approach he termed "possibilistic") and a German style of Kunstgeographie that attached collective value to art through the psychology of various *Völker* (an argument he deemed "deterministic"). According to Kaufmann, the French tradition dead-ended in Focillon's departure to America, whereas "since the mid-20th century the Germanic tradition of Kunstgeographie has continued to shape thinking about the study of artistic geography." ¹⁶⁵

The diversity of geographic interpretations of art that European scholars brought as they migrated to America would have been evident to anyone attending the lectures delivered at Dumbarton Oaks's inauguration in 1941. Each lecturer followed a distinctly geographic line of inquiry—among which Kaufmann would undoubtedly detect more "possibilistism" than "determinism." Henri Focillon sought a geological connection between medieval and prehistoric forms ("All great civilizations," he opened, "stand atop a rich undersoil of prehistoric traditions and forms"), ¹⁶⁶ while Russian historian Michael Rostovtzeff gave an account of "some traits of the [Byzantine] mentality and its relationship to the environment," ¹⁶⁷ and Charles Rufus Morey set out to determine the provenance of the Institute's ivory collection. ¹⁶⁸ As for Köhler, he began by leading his audience on a tour of a French hamlet:

Ladies and Gentlemen, I invite you to follow me to one of the loveliest regions in France, to Burgundy. You will see a little group of white buildings in rolling country,

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¹⁶⁴ Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann, "From Kunstgeographie to Visual Culture: Geographical Ideas about Art from the First World War to the Present," in Towards a Geography of Art (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 68-106
¹⁶⁵ Kaufmann, 85. In his telling, Paul Frankl's 1939 Das System der Kunstwissenschaft contains as "a summation of studies in

¹⁶⁵ Kaufmann, 85. In his telling, Paul Frankl's 1939 Das System der Kunstwissenschaft contains as "a summation of studies in this area before the Second World War ... certainly the most sustained theoretical statement devoted to the question," although it stood as "a coda to such discussions rather than as a stimulus for further work."

Henri Focillon, "Préhistoire et Moyen Age," in Dumbarton Oaks Inaugural Lectures, November 2nd and 3rd, 1940 by Henri Focillon Michael Ivanovich Rostovtzeff, Charles Rufus Morey, Wilhelm Koehler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1. Translation mine. This echoes the opening line of The Art of the West, "The succeeding chapters of our civilization are each a product of a particular geographical area, and rooted in their native soil." Henri Focillon, The Art of the West in the Middle Ages Volume I: Romanesque Art. Trans. Donald King, (New York: Phaidon, 1963), 3.

¹⁶⁷ Michael Ivanovich Rostovtzeff, "The Near East in the Hellenistic and Roman Times," in Dumbarton Oaks Inaugural Lectures, 27. Rostovtzeff protested his assignment: "I cannot confidently speak of social and economic conditions as a background for the evolution o other manifestations of human life... we may speak of inter-relations between various manifestations but not of dependence of one on the other..... Nevertheless the student of the history of art it may be of interest to know, in general outline, under what social and economic conditions."

¹⁶⁸ They "have been assigned to centers as far west as Italy and as far east as Antioch. The question of their provenance is consequently something that early Christian archaeology cannot leave alone." Charles Rufus Morey, "The Early Christian Ivories of the Eastern Empire," in Dumbarton Oaks Inaugural Lectures, 43.

the hamlet of Berzét la Ville, a few miles from Mâcon. It looks like hundreds of other villages in Burgundy, but one of the buildings, called the Château des Moines by the peasants, contains in a chapel of modest size the most beautiful Romanesque wall paintings in France.¹⁶⁹

By approaching the "most beautiful painting in France" through an anodyne hamlet, Köhler was implicitly demonstrating the rigors of the Kunstwissenschaft system: only by being systematic could the art historian uncover monuments of artistic "significance" even in the most "insignificant" of locales. This ability to detect monumental value in unremarkable lands acquired a new role in war, however, in the context of the Army's notion of geography as "the foundation for national power."

To argue in wartime that monuments had a collective value, distributed along regional lines, was not only to use collective psychology as a pretext for artistic protection. It was also to introduce monuments into a geographic model of national cohesion that pervaded the Army' Handbooks series. An Army Manual titled Geographical Foundations of National Power explained this model in tectonic terms. "National cohesion" was an "imponderable" factor of national power, which depended on the ability of "certain human traits and abilities" to act as glue, holding together a "vertical" alignment of "horizontal groups." Wars occurred, then, when "vertical or horizontal cleavages" occurred in this tectonic whole:

The ability to maintain national cohesion is perhaps the most important of the imponderables... The existence of different human areas within a country may tend to loosen its national cohesion, to make it crack apart along regional boundaries The planes of cleavage might be regarded as vertical planes cutting through the social structure of a nation. There are also horizontal planes of cleavage, separating social classes, occupational groups, and political parties ... No comparison of the power potential of different nations is valid until account is taken of their propensities to crack along the vertical and horizontal planes. 171

The Army's tectonic model of geography distributed populations in horizontal strata, as if "human traits" were a substance that could be spread evenly along the earth's crust. Thus the same psychological unity that the Harvard Lists described as being "contained" in monuments, was now described by geographers as the very stuff of a country's cohesion: monuments and social structures

¹⁶⁹ Wilhelm Köhler, "Byzantine Art in the West," in Dumbarton Oaks Inaugural Lectures, 63.

¹⁷⁰ "The essential fact that distinguishes the people of a modern nation from people who are merely inhabitants of a country or subjects of a state is that the former are acutely conscious of their unity and common interests. They share political ideals and ambitions as well as feel a patriotic devotion to their country. If they are free, they strive to maintain their freedom; if subject to another state or divided among many petty states, their leaders agitate constantly for independence and unity." "Nations and National Power," 3.

¹⁷¹ "The essential fact that distinguishes the people of a modern nation from people who are merely inhabitants of a country or subjects of a state is that the former are acutely conscious of their unity and common interests. They share political ideals and ambitions as well as feel a patriotic devotion to their country. If they are free, they strive to maintain their freedom; if subject to another state or divided among many petty states, their leaders agitate constantly for independence and unity." "Nations and National Power," 3.

were made of the same geological substance. Thus the importance of arguing for the meaning of monuments in the value of the "local population" becomes clear: monuments were sites of concentrated value, extruded from the horizontal strata of "national cohesion" below.

As the Lists were formalized, this geographic model came to complement the statements about collective attachment to art that had opened the introductions. By June 1943, Sachs and Constable had realized that "the request to omit considerations of art history [did] not preclude a brief sketch of the main periods of art in the introduction," and that in fact, "this feature was considered highly desirable." The outline of these "main periods in history" soon became the place for a three-fold explanation: a geographic overview, an outline of national history, and a detailed categorization of the "Monuments and Material to be Safeguarded," in each country. Thus the introduction for France, which began, as we have seen, with the French people's "consciousness of their own artistic supremacy," concluded by describing monuments arising from a distinctly French "geographic and ethnographic synthesis":

Geographical position and physical characteristics make the climate and productivity of France extraordinarily varied. There is not only a great variety in the monuments of its art, but many materials belonging to the natural resources of the country ... have contributed to the richness of the French artistic patrimony. The ethnographic and social structure of France has also helped to determine the character of French artistic production. ... Out of this variety of elements, however, a distinctive French synthesis has been achieved. 173

The Army's tectonic model of geography supported the Roberts Commission's use of cultural and historical arguments for the importance of monuments in national cohesion. In turn, and perhaps more importantly, the Commission's description of monuments allowed the Army's psychological arguments to pass for geographic ones, and vice-versa.

This wartime blurring of art-geography as "determination" and as "possibility" helps to explain how Kunstgeographic continued to pervade art historical scholarship in the postwar, despite the sharp retreat from any interpretation too close to the categorizations of Nazi eugenicists. The stigma attached to collective interpretations of art in the immediate postwar was perhaps best captured in the accusation of "myth-making" leveled at Riegl and Wickoff by Viennese émigré Ernst Gombrich in 1954: "the habit of talking in terms of collectives, of 'mankind,' of 'races,' of 'ages,' weakens resistance to totalitarian habits of mind." This critique had already been articulated in 1936 by Meyer Shapiro, writing from exile in New York, who detected in "the new art history" the usage of a "mysterious racial and animistic language in the name of a higher science of art." Unlike

¹⁷² Sachs to Köhler, 17 Jun 1943. ADHG.

^{173 &}quot;Monuments and Material to be Safeguarded," in Introduction, Civil Affairs Handbook: France; Section 17 B, xiv.

¹⁷⁴ E.H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation (Princeton University Press, 1960), 19.

Gombrich, who pointed only to the concepts as "dangerous," Shapiro had made a connection with nationalist recuperations of the built environment. It was artists' and art historians' responsibility not to make artworks into monumental icons of the Blud und Boden ideology that fueled nationalisms:

Where else but in the historic remains of the arts does the nationalist find the evidence of his fixed racial character? His own experience is limited to one or two generations; only the artistic monuments of his country assure him that his ancestors were like himself and that his character is an unchangeable heritage rooted in his blood and native soil.¹⁷⁵

It is exactly this kind of "dangerous" connection between nationalist pride, monumental heritage, and collective identity that the Army required of the Lists' Introductions. The value-judgment that took the place of speculation—the step (iii) in Constable's method—connected "the form of monuments" with "a particular locale" by way of "its value in the eyes of the local population." Indeed the entire Commission's work was based on the assumption that monuments embody the connection between the geo-political histories of nations and the "collective" descendents of these histories. Insofar as the role of the introductions was to make this connection, the Roberts Commission reinforced the impression that each nation had its own autonomous art, indeed its own art history, which remained alive exclusively in the collective consciousness of its modern-day inhabitants.

In light of this indictment, it is important to note that the nationalist "pattern" that had been applied uniformly to the countries of Western Europe received a slightly modified treatment in places where populations could not reasonably be described as homogeneous. The lists for the Balkan peninsula, made under Kitzinger' supervision, began with a division of monuments into categories, and proceeded to attach each category to a population group: in Albania, Kitzinger recommended that "prehistoric and Illyrian remains" be protected because "The Albanians believe themselves the direct descendents of the ancients Illyrians and pride themselves on having the longest continuous national existence of all people in Europe," while "Churches and Mosques" were to be protected because "79% of the population are Moslem, 20% are Orthodox, 10% Roman Catholic," and the "medieval citadels" were "frequently associated with memories of the Albanians' centuries of struggle for independence from the Turks." Even more dis-articulated was Kitzinger's list for Yugoslavia, which began with a statement of regional variation ("Jugoslav monuments vary greatly from region to region"), distinguished between five building typologies, and assigned each to an

¹⁷⁵ Meyer Schapiro, "Race, Nationality and Art," in Art Front 2 (March 1936), 10. The same year Schapiro published a critique of "The New Viennese School" in a review of Kunstwissenchaftliche Forschungen II. It was not clear "what Dr. Pächt means by his formal 'constants'... beyond attributing the constant to such indefinite entities as French art, Dutch art, and Flemish art." "The New Viennese School" in The Art Bulletin, (Jun 1936), 258-266.

¹⁷⁶ American Defense-Harvard Group: List of Monuments in Albania by Ernst Kitzinger.

ethnic group for whom it represented nationhood. ¹⁷⁷Hence the "habit of speaking in terms of collectives" could be more finely calibrated to account for mis-alignments in political and architectural history. Yet even when described in this finer grain of collectivity, geography continued to be the locus of a substitution: the judgment of an art historian was presented as being the valuation of an entire population.

The limits of this monumental demagoguery become only too evident when one contrasts the European Lists, where independence from colonial powers was treated as a source of "national consciousness," with those of colonial territories, where popular attachment was reduced to fanaticism. The opening line for Tunisia, for example, replaced the typical statement of collective identity with a wholesale argument about tourism:

During the last three decades, Tunisia has become more and more a region favored by European tourists. The economy of the country depends to a great extent on foreign visitors. From these resources the population of Tunisia draws much of its subsistence.

While in Mitteleuropa the struggle for independence from Ottoman rule supported a narrative of long-term national emergence, here a history of colonial struggle was altogether suppressed. It is not the argument for tourism per se that makes Tunisia stand apart from other lists. Indeed Sachs had suggested early on that tourist revenue be included in all lists to convey the "considerable economic importance" of monuments.¹⁷⁸ What is significant is that the tourist was here posited as the primary audience of the list, revealing the "pattern" of empathetic identification that underlay the lists: the US soldier could only empathize with the touring European.

Where empathy was judged inappropriate, "fanaticism" was invoked. In Tunisia this was outlined in religious terms:

Among the monuments the Mohammedan buildings are particularly important because of their religious significance. The religious fanaticism of the Mohammedans is notorious.¹⁷⁹

Similarly, the Japanese were depicted as "fanatical" about the very protective spirit that the Commission was supposed to advocate:

<u>Japan</u>

-

The monuments of groups 1,3,4, are important to the local population chiefly because they attract tourists.

The monuments of group 2 belong to the Serbian Orthodox Church. Apart from their religious significance, they have to the Serbs great national significance. ... The monuments of group 5 are also object of national pride, especially in Northern parts of the country. Finally, the mosques should be protected out of regard for the Moslem population, which is large in Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro." ADHG, List of Monuments: Jugoslavia by Ernst Kitzinger

178 "It should be mentioned that the material to be listed has a considerable economic importance, since in peace-time it attracts tourists, students, or excavators who spend money in the locality. In some cases, needless damage would arouse resentment on the part of the population on these grounds alone." Sachs to Collaborators, 24 May 1943

179 ADHG, Lists of Monuments for Tunisia by Wilhelm Köhler and Margaret Ames. ADHG/Köhler II. Köhler's "preliminary draft" had left a space empty for an introduction; it was the Harvard editors that made it the opening paragraph.

Although only a relatively few important cultural monuments exist in Japan as compared with a small European country, the Japanese hold an almost fanatical reverence for even the most humble shrine. It colors their entire way of life and it is this attitude which is one of the most difficult characteristics for a foreigner to understand. ¹⁸⁰ Korea

It will immediately be obvious that the Koreans themselves (unlike their Japanese conquerors) have no great interest in or knowledge of the relics of their own past. 181

Where monument protection was described as a "model" in European countries, in Japan it was the purpose of the US to moderate local fanaticism. Even in its aim of familiarizing the US soldier with protective systems already in place, the Commission used mental-health vocabulary that encouraged the GI to be objectively understanding, while refraining from empathy.

The Commission's use of a mental-health vocabulary suited the social-scientific tone of the American Military Government, which itself had adapted neo-Freudian ego-psychology in its arguments that Germany and Japan should not be "destroyed" but "cured." ¹⁸² In so doing, the Commission echoed the wartime work of American anthropologists such as Margaret Mead, who relied on cultural particularism to argue that America's postwar mission was to be the mid-wife of other nations' cultural reconstruction.

In contrast to proposals like Morgenthau's plan to "pastoralize" Germany into a pre-industrial state¹⁸³, Mead argued that "Each culture cultivates some potentialities of mankind and disallows others." In her 1942 And Keep your Powder Dry, ¹⁸⁴ Mead advocated that America "enter a pact with the world, to build a world to which all of us ... contribute by having people embody our different values." Thus the war was an occasion for America to find its identity, and Mead proposed that, in the postwar, "America's special job [was] going to be analysis." Crucially, what Mead meant by "analysis" was the ability to discern which elements of other "cultures" should be "eliminated":

We are to study and conserve the cultures of France and Albania, and Roumania and India, so that we may learn from them, that there shall not perish from the earth discoveries so basic that we may never make them again. At the same time, we are to make demands of all of these cultures that they eliminate certain elements which are incompatible with world order as we see it. 186

The surgical procedure Margaret Mead described in "cultural" terms was implemented in physical terms by the Roberts Commission. If the spatial expression of Morgenthau's plan was a literal tabula

^{180 &}quot;Introduction," Civil Affair Handbook: Japan Section 17: Cultural Institutions M354-17 (24 July 1944).

^{181 &}quot;Korea". List of Monuments in Korea by Langdon Warner, draft.

¹⁸² See Richard Brickner's Is Germany Incurable? (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1943), with an introduction by Margaret Mead.

¹⁸³ Morgenthau's plan was published in 1945 as Germany is our Problem (New York: Harper, 1945)

¹⁸⁴ Margaret Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist looks at America (New York: Morrow, 1942).

¹⁸⁵ Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry, 253.

¹⁸⁶ Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry, 242.

rusa, the Roberts Commission's job was to give Mead' particularism a territorial image—all the while validating the art historians' judgments as a form of "analysis" and enabling America's status as a nation of "editors."

It was the collaborative scheme of Dumbarton Oaks, with its the regional assignment of list-making duties, that formed the support for this ethical transfer between the valuations of art historians and the "cultures" of far-away populations. Just as, for Sachs, managing a card-index of monuments substituted for caring for the monuments themselves, for Köhler managing a group of scholars was a substitute for surveying localities. Before making lists of monuments one had to make lists of scholars, and the many lists Köhler composed during the Harvard Committee's meetings indicate a search for optimal geographic and historical coverage, expressed in people rather than monuments. Each scholar stood atop his own region, embodying a "concentration" of monumental meaning within a single point. (fig. 2.32) For example, the decision to include a list of manuscript libraries, which were closed to the public and went unrecorded in tourist books, required an intricate tabulation that forced a peculiar kind of intellectual autobiography on each scholar: describe himself in a "starred" list of regionally-arranged libraries. (fig. 2.33) Before becoming surveyors of panoramas, in other words, Panofsky and his colleagues stood as regional landmarks themselves, in a panoramic survey where all periods and regions of European art history were rendered "in equally sharp focus."

One unintended consequence of the application of a Dumbarton-Oaks-style collaborative scheme to all the lists, is that a Byzantine uniformity emerged from even lists that would otherwise have followed the strictly hierarchical rules of the Hegelian canon. Brown University classicist Charles Robinson, who had coined the image of "the edited Baedeker," found that managing the 8 scholars composing the list for Ancient Greece meant re-thinking the assumed importance of certain monuments over others. Facing a similar task of scholar-management for Italy, Princeton classical archaeologist Doro Levi, saw the lack of homogeneity as resulting from discrepancy in "generosity of stars":

The criteria followed by the collaborators are not always identical, and there must be a final revision to bring in uniformity. ... For example, Bloch has been much more generous of stars than everybody else; I cut or reduced for the balance of the whole Every arbiter, when seeing the kind of "epitome" of history adopted generally ... might have a suggestion to improve his own part. ¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁷ Levi to Hencken, 8 Jul 1943. ADHG/ Levi. Levi's contributors were: Marion Blake; Herbert Bloch (Harvard Classics); W.A. Jackson (Houghton); Clarence Kennedy (Smith College); Mrs. Clarence Kennedy; Renselaer Lee (Princeton Institute); Doro Levi; Karl Lehman-Hartleben (IFA); EA Lowe (IFA); D. Randall-McIver (British Academy); Georg Swarzenski (MFA, Boston.)

The "stars" had become the visual index used by list editors to discern the quality of the lists they received. ("Don't we need," Constable wondered, "more starred things in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania?")¹⁸⁸ It was as if the collective "epitome of history" that lay latent in the disciplinary structure of America's art history departments had manifested itself in a hidden pattern of "starred things."

The concern with "uniformity," "balance," and "evenness" that pervaded the activities of list editors reveals that the process of making lists was indeed a compositional project. This vindicated the collecting impulses of the museum-men—stars were a way to grant the lists the "overall sense of design" that Sachs had declared to be the hallmark of "any good collection." Even Köhler was susceptible to this kind of appreciation, noting that the lists for the Balkans appeared "sparse, sparser still than his own list for Tunisia." This process of composition, however, became problematic when the lists were shrunk from 50 to 25 pages, prompting "the original compilers to want to re-write the whole list, and completely vary their system of stars." 190

Some compilers had, strategically, planned for the shrinking of their lists from 50 to 25 pages. Rennsselaer Lee, for instance, admitted that "the plan to prepare short lists from the 2- and 3-starred monuments" had led him "to add stars here and there, particularly in large cites and in some of the places in which the Army might not otherwise thing there is anything of exceptional interest." To this admission Lee added, somewhat guiltily, that "monuments so starred" were still indeed "interesting monuments." The guilt Lee felt at his own strategic starring reveals that an ethical threshold was reached when the starring system, originally intended as quantitative, had become qualitative. To resolve this dilemma Constable conducted the final reduction himself, "under slogan 'the best is the enemy of the good'." With this single Voltarian maxim, Constable revealed his debt to the gentlemanly ethics of the connoisseur, with which he had proudly tempered what he called the "wissenschaftlisch" zeal of the professional art historians. ¹⁹³

As significant set of ethical anxieties arose from the change in focus—from managing lists of scholars to managing lists of monuments—in particular in the composition of the German List. Germany differed from other countries in that the fate of its list was never assured: originally no list was planned; eventually the Harvard Long List was sent to Allied Command, but never published as

¹⁸⁸ Constable to Hencken, 23 Jun 1943. AAA #3077.

¹⁸⁹ Henken to Constable, 25 Jun 1943. AAA #3077.

¹⁹⁰ Constable, "Works of Art in Wartime," Jan-March 1944. AAA #3077.

¹⁹¹ Lee to Henken, 2 Sep 1943. ADHG/ Lee

¹⁹² Constable, "Works of Art in Wartime," Jan-March 1944. AAA #3077.

¹⁹³ Hencken to Constable. 7 Mar 1942. AAA #3077

part of the Handbook; although the Atlas Supplement was eventually published, it was printed without an introduction; further lists were composed in the Fall of 1944, but few general statements survived in these publications. 194 It is not that general statements were not prepared; Köhler took them on himself, composing for instance a guide to "The German Organization in Charge of the Conservation of Monuments (Denkmalpflege)" where he described "the immense task on which two generations of [German] art historians have worked," namely, the comprehensive inventories of monuments in publications like the Bau- und Kunstdenkmäler. 195 Similarly, Köhler had composed the Introduction for the Harvard List, applying to this work a personal zeal that was undoubtedly inspired by from his own resentment at the Nazi regime. Ironically, this personal investment made Köhler into a model of the interested collector Sachs was trying to form at the Fogg. Thus while Constable had feared Köhler's tendency to be "too wissenschaftlisch," instead it was the German émigré's personal motivations he found repeatedly "tempering." The first instance of this intervention was the removal of "the parthenian shot at the Führer" that Köhler had written in his introduction. 196 The resulting Introduction, edited by Contable, retains some specificities ("The richness of German libraries and archives in manuscripts and incunabula reflect the historical fact that printing was discovered in Germany") but it is mostly a text composed of generic formulations perfected elsewhere ("The cultural treasures of Germany are important to the German people not only from a historical, artistic and national point of view but for economic reasons as well"). Where other introductions culminated in a "synthesis," the German introduction ended with a prudent reexposition of the Commission's general mandate ("Whether included here or not, every one of [Germany's treasures] is representative of the civilization which is ours. As such they must, so far as war allows, receive consideration and respect"). 197

The second manner in which Köhler expressed a personal investment, rather than a scientific authority, in the German list, was by refusing to partake in the starring scheme. More than the censoring of his anti-Nazi introduction, it was his ethical stance on starring that led to him to a serious crisis of conscience. When Köhler first produced a list without stars, the result, according to Hencken, was "the best prepared piece of work that we have received." Indeed Hencken added "on a

¹⁹⁴ A complete picture of what publications were available in ETO by the end of 1944 can be gleaned from Sumner Crosby's "Memorandum on the Information available to and the Work Accomplished by the Monuments, Fine Art and Archives Subsection US Group CC", 25 Nov 1944, Military Government Property Section, Crosby I/3.

¹⁹⁵ Wilhelm Köhler, "The German Organization in Charge of the Conservation of Monuments (Denkmalpflege)," Undated draft, (Apr 1943?). ADHG/ Köhler II. This text was later replaced by "The Krautheimer Report," the Civil Affairs Guide. 31-112. Legal and administrative aspects of the protection of monuments in Germany and Austria. (Washington: War Department, 1944). ¹⁹⁶ Hencken to Constable, 22 Oct 1943.

¹⁹⁷ Introduction for German List, undated draft of which page 1 is missing. Köhler's critique of the Nazi regime was likely contained in the missing first page. This draft can be found in both Dinsmoor's papers (ASCSA V/1) and as "Germany" in Köhler's handwritten notes (ADHG/Köhler).

strictly personal" that he was happy to see that Köhler "gave such careful attention to prehistory and early history as well as to later and more impressive monuments." The lack of stars, however, became a problem in the compilation of the Short List. Hencken eventually persuaded Köhler to accept the suggestions he had made, "in pencil," for which monuments could become of "the first importance." Yet Köhler was clearly alarmed by the shrinking of his carefully constructed list, and incensed that the Italian list was seemingly allowed, in contrast, to expand indefinitely. In a final act of desperation, and seized with remorse after the list had left Cambridge, Köhler wrote directly to Col. Shoemaker to attempt an intercept before his list was published:

From the beginning I objected to such a radically abbreviated list in the case of Germany. ... My so-called 'long list' of Monuments in Germany ... already forms so radical a condensation that it might truly be described as the equivalent of the 'short lists' for other countries, for instance Italy.

Initially voicing his complaint in relative terms, Köhler concluded his letter with what amounts to a fundamental disciplinary doubt about the "subjectivity" of his own classifications, and questioned very validity of the process he had helped construct:

After having finished, I am more convinced than ever that any list reduced to such an extent is completely arbitrary, subjective, and therefore open to thoroughly justified criticism, and that in this two-fold process of elimination certain monuments of the first importance have had to be dropped. In my opinion, it would be a fatal mistake to publish in the handbook for Germany the 'short list' as submitted 199

Because the "dropping" of monuments from the list signified their potential destruction, Köhler experienced as a personal tragedy the disciplinary mechanism by which he operated every day.

There is a double irony in the personal tone of Kohler's protest. The first stems from his frank admission of "arbitrariness:" it never seems to have occurred to Köhler that a peacetime list, by the standards of his own Kunstwissenschaft, was no less a "reduction" than a wartime lists, nor a 50-page-list any less arbitrary than a 25 page-list. All the editors felt the same sense of removal from the documents they had authored; even Doro Levi, who edited the (much longer) Italian List, expressed some anxiety about "assuming responsibility for the publication" of the list in its "shortened" format. Similarly, the Dumbarton Oaks Fellows tried to "recall" their (much shorter) lists for the Balkans, realizing at the last minute that they were "not quite of the same quality as others. But Köhler's anxiety at the "radical abbreviation" of his list shows that he detected a more fundamental conflict between the presumed autonomy of his art historical classifications and the instrumentality of their application.

¹⁹⁸ Hencken to Köhler, undated, probably June 1943. ADHG/Köhler II.

¹⁹⁹ Köhler to Shoemaker 17 July 1944. Emphasis in the original. ADHG, Köhler II.

²⁰⁰ Levi to Hencken, 8 Jul 1943. ADHG/ Levi.

²⁰¹ Constable to Cairns, 27 Oct 1943. AAA #3077

The lists had not been shrunk simply by "eliminating" certain monuments and keeping others. Instead monuments, and the artistic singularity they represented, had been twice excised from the context that gave them value and placed into another frame of reference: first, out of the context of elite connoisseurship ("the world of art") ²⁰² and into the realm of psychological warfare, where they were granted the value of local sentiment; second, from the disciplinary frame of art history into a cultural "epitome of history," ²⁰³ through the common medium of geography. Each step in this two-fold re-positioning represented an ethical displacement, which was accompanied by a slight but significant shift in disciplinary agency. As soon as a scholar was faced with an ethical questioning of his own scholarly methods, another type of expert stood ready to take on the relay, chaperoning the lists of monuments through further displacements. Thus when Köhler received notice, in response to his letter from Shoemaker, that his list had already been "put to good use," ²⁰⁴ this meant largely that it had passed into the custody of William Bell Dinsmoor, who applied a wholly different idea of scholarly integrity to his mandate—an archaeological one. The second irony of Köhler's anxiety, then, is that yet more "radical reductions" to his list were still to come, and that these reductions would only intensify what he had identified as their "arbitrary" nature.

Dinsmoor's Maps: Shrinking and proportion

The transformation of Dinsmoor's ACLS committee from a bureaucratic irritant into an efficient map-making workshop was prompted by architectural historian and OSS analyst Richard Krautheimer, who wrote a letter to the ACLS on July 19, 1943, the day of "Rome's first bombing." Krautheimer reported that the Harvard Lists had been used in the bombing, as US Air Force crews had been "briefed by means of maps and photographs on which primary monuments to be avoided were marked." Krautheimer found these reports "encouraging," insofar as they demonstrated "the army's desire to spare cultural monuments, so far as this is compatible with military necessity." He therefore recommended that the ACLS produce maps from the outset, which "could be prepared very quickly, and would have the advantage of presenting in concise and graphic form the more important data, which the air forces could constantly relate to their projected

²⁰² Paul Sachs particularly recommended that artists be literally transferred as figures in the "world of art" to the world of nationalism: "Emphasis should be laid on the fact that Rembrandt is revered in Holland as a great Dutchman ... It is not necessary to stress his general importance in the world of art." Sachs to Contributors, 24 May 1943. ADHG.

²⁰³ "Our lists should be made in terms of culture in general rather than in terms of art alone." E.g., "local festivals,"

"The birthday of Ludwig II in Bavaria" and "The Oberammungen Passionplay." Hencken to Köhler 6 Jul 1943.

²⁰⁴ "The short lists have already left [the Commission's] hands, and ... they did not consider it desirable to change the others, since they found that they already fully met the requirements of the Army." Hencken to Köhler 5 Nov 1943.

²⁰⁵ "Rail Centers Hit: San Lorenzo, Littorio Yards And Ciampino Airfield Targets No U.S. Planes Lost Religious Edifices Marked In Red On Fliers' Maps To Be Avoided At All Cost. With Our Rangers And Paratroopers In Sicily Allies Give Rome Its First Bombing." Drew Middleton, New York Times (Jul 20, 1943), 1.

targets."²⁰⁶The Frick Committee immediately set out to follow Krautheimer's suggestion: "shrinking" the Harvard lists to make them "indices" for points marked on a map, annotated with numbers, coordinates, and stars, and published as "Atlas Supplements" to the Civil Affairs Handbooks. (fig. 2.34-37) Where Köhler had assigned regions to rosters of scholars, Dinsmoor assigned scholars to work on regional maps, and maps replaced lists as the primary medium of art historical "synthesis."

It is clear that Dinsmoor seized on this map-making opportunity because he sought to achieve a more direct medium of intervention in an aerial war. Yet the passage from (Harvard) list to (Frick) map should not be understood as removing all mediation between "starring" monuments on paper and "avoiding" them from the air. The maps did facilitate the fulfillment of the Commission's mandate, by providing easier communication between agencies and faster identification of monuments. But these maps were, in Krautheimer's own words, to "be informative only, and in no respect presume to be advisory," and did not eliminate the margin of contingency that had been built into the lists. Note for instance that the bombing of Rome produced the first major architectural casualty of the US precision-bombing policy. Where Krautheimer saw "the army's desire to spare cultural monuments," the rest of the world saw the nearly-destroyed basilica of San Lorenzo fuori le mura, hit by a bomb intended for the neighboring railyards. (fig. 2.38) In the prolonged propaganda war that ensued, "monuments to be avoided" were only one in a long list of "cultural" factors, including: the high proportion of Catholics in the Air Force, the large number of civilian casualties, the dropping of leaflets, the chance given to pilots to "refuse the mission for cultural reasons," the efforts of the Pope and US Cardinals to declare Rome an "open city." The sacrificial nature of the church culminated in the dramatic papal visit to the neighborhood of San Lorenzo, now commemorated in monumental form by a statue on the site. (fig. 2.39) Yet for the Allies, as for Krautheimer, even the destruction of San Lorenzo was to be read iconographically as evidence of success—since the avoidance of the Vatican, of the city center, and the proximity of San Lorenzo to the railyards, meant that the event could be read symbolically as an accident. Perhaps the best evidence that the US policy of "avoidance" was not absolute, then, is that its inaugural example, the Rome bombing, is one of notorious destruction.

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²⁰⁶ "Any good city maps will serve as a basis. ... On these maps, the most important monuments of each city or locale should be marked. ... An accompanying list gives a key." The list was signed by: Richard Krautheimer (senior research analyst, OSS), Helen Franc (Target Information Branch- Intelligence Division), and Mr. John Phillips Coolidge, to Wetmore (Smithsonian), 19 July 1943. ASCSA I/3. They wrote to the ACLS in response to Dinsmoor's questionnaire. ²⁰⁷ "Brereton's Fliers Also Raided Rome ... Many Crewmen Catholic." New York Times, (Jul 20, 1943), 4. "Rome Raiders Rejected Chance to Decline Task," New York Times (Jul 21, 1943), 4. "Open City Status By Rome Doubted," New York Times (Jul 21, 1943), 3. Daniel Brigham, "Pius Tells Of Plea: Says 'Reasonable Hope' of Saving Rome From Raid Was Disappointed Mourns Ruin Of Church." New York Times, (Jul 22, 1943), 1.

Nor should the appearance of maps in the Roberts Commission's work be understood as marking a return from an ethics of objecthood to a concern for territorial continuity: the transfer of monuments back onto maps did not signify their re-inscription into their urban contexts. Note for instance this paragraph, from an early draft of the French introduction to the Harvard List, which attempted to expand protection form monuments to "groups of buildings" and "ensembles" by making a contextualist argument:

There are numerous groups of buildings in France, important not merely for the individual buildings, but as ensembles. The French are particularly appreciative of groups such as these. They have shown great skill in developing the setting for great buildings by good design in the smaller ones round about. Thus while the cathedral of Rouen remains nearly intact, the burning out of a picturesque quarter of mediaeval houses nearby (the result of a tank battle) is understood as a tragedy for the cathedral, since no modern setting can be as sympathetic as the old one. ²⁰⁸

This attempt surreptitiously to extend monumental value to the urban context was suppressed when the list was published in the Civil Affairs Handbooks, confirming that these were designed to present monuments as qualitatively different from their surroundings. A year later, the Frick Maps introduced a new visual nomenclature, which allowed scholars to indicate "characteristic streets" by hatching them on city maps. (fig. 2.41) These "hatched areas," in combination with the stark blackening of monuments, seem to convey a spatial bleeding of the protective boundary around monuments—exactly the kind of monumental contextualism conveyed in the original introduction. Yet in the lists accompanying the maps, what seemed like an imprecise hatching was rendered precisely: the streets were treated as monuments, starred, numbered and counted. (fig. #) Accordingly, although house-lined streets were allowed to appear in the Atlas introduction, they did so not as "atmospheric" complements to monuments but rather as vernacular exemples in themselves:

Most French towns and villages are dominated by the spire of a church. ... But the individual character and atmosphere of nearly every French village does not arise exclusively from its church. The houses that line its streets are not only picturesque, but are often time of great artistic and historical value. Many of them are centuries old, and are important examples of civil architecture. ²⁰⁹

In this subtle distinction between a "sympathetic context" and a "picturesque example" lies an entire ethical system which is dependent upon discontinuity and objecthood. It was only ever in contradistinction with its non-starred adjacencies that the "starring" of urban elements—be they

²⁰⁸ "Architecture in France" Preliminary Draft, American Defense Harvard Group, (KG2789), iii

²⁰⁹ Statement by the Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe, in Civil Affairs Handbook: France: Section 17B: Atlas Supplement.

monuments or characteristic streets—could function.²¹⁰ Monuments were located on city maps only after having been deliberately "excerpted" from the city, and they retained their value as "excerptions" in the transposition.

The effect that map-making decidedly did have on the Roberts Commission's work was a consolidation of monumental value through urban concentration. In part, this was due to the decision to make maps only for towns with a certain monument density: "City and town plans," Dinsmoor reported, "were generally made only when there are at least 5 monuments of exceptional importance to be indicated, or when fewer monuments are of exceptional importance but are embedded in confused areas."211 Thus monuments served to "clarify" urban confusion, reducing a town to 5 points or fewer points. As a consequence, the Commission was able to expand its "starring" logic to a territorial scale: by locating monuments on city plans, and locating these plans onto national maps, entire countries became visible as territories punctuated by "starred things." (fig. 2.42) The Frick maps that were published epitomize this territorial punctuation: the Civil Affairs Atlas Supplements all opened with a national maps peppered with numbered points and annotated with an index of "cities with lists." (fig. 2.42-43) Thus entire cities became "starred things" themselves, collected in a single index at the end of each Atlas. As the scope of the Commission's work expanded, the number of starred "things" decreased while the average value of each "thing" increased. Cities were progressively codified as objects themselves, formally legible as collections of monuments.

Despite the immense effort that had been devoted to making art-historical knowledge more "instrumental" to a hypothetical Army- or Air- man, neither Civil Affairs Handbooks nor their Atlas Supplements ever became direct "instruments" of warfare. Instead, they served as a basis for the construction of further lists and maps. Some of these later documents still bear the trace of the Commission's authorship and can therefore be understood as "tactical" derivatives of its "strategic" work. Others were completely re-constructed in various Theaters of Operations and re-authored by various commissions. For instance, after the MFA&A moved to London under joint Allied Command in May 1944, new lists for France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Norway were composed by

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²¹⁰ See also the Zone HandBook for Tuscany, which stated unequivocally that "The whole city of Florence must rank as a work of art of the first importance. No requisitions should be made without reference to the MFA&A officers of the A.C.C." List of Protected Monuments Italy. 4: Regions of Tuscany, Umbria, and Le Marche. Allied Control Division, Allied Military Government, Sub-Commission for Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives (30 Mar. 1944), 18.

²¹¹ Dinsmoor, "Statement of Material furnished by the American Commission for the Protection of Monuments in Europe." 4 Jan 1944. ASCSA I/8.

representatives of their governments in exile.²¹² But even as these several degrees of authorship were placed between the US Commission and the protective mechanism it had set in motion, the legitimacy of its Handbooks only increased, and the proportional idea that supported their composition was validated, in a perpetual rehearsal of monumental arithmetic—counting "things," locating them on a map, and assigning them stars.

A further consolidation of value occurred when the Civil Affairs Handbooks arrived in Europe and "military necessity" proved to be a proportional system itself—no longer an abstract idea of contingency, but a set of specific needs that varied according to tactical circumstance. For example, the first Frick maps arrived in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in January 1944, as "conditions were defined under which alone certain outstanding cities could become a target." Although this synchrony made the Atlases urgently useful, it also rendered them "hopelessly insufficient in number and not suitable for the purposes required." Therefore the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF) flew a series of reconnaissance missions in Italy, over "79 cities and towns where targets were known to exist or where tactical planning indicated that suitable targets might develop." The aerial photographs collected were annotated with monuments, and published in March 1944 as The Ancient Monuments of Italy use by pilots. 213 (fig. 2.45)

The inscription of monuments directly onto Air Force aerial photographs appeared to represent a position of absolute control over the horizontal field of war. Therefore, although not authored strictu sensu by the Commission, this document granted the art historians their long-standing wish of identifying "non-targets" in the horizontal field of war:

The Handbooks are of great assistance ...but cannot be compared with an aerial photograph clipped upon the operational clip-board in the hands of the pilot as he drops into the bomb run. ... For the purpose of aerial planning [the new document] is much superior to the maps of the Civil Affairs Handbooks or the Cultural Maps since each photograph clearly indicated terrain features and other essential information. The picture itself clearly represents the area as the pilot and bombardier actually observe it. 214

The MAAF's aerial photographs completed the chain of agency that had been imagined by the art historians. Indeed when the Frick's map-making had begun, Dinsmoor had traveled to Washington

²¹² "The French naturally considered that they were better able than their allies to discriminate between their historic monuments, and it was essential that they should have the last word on the subject The whole Norway list, the Dutch and Belgian lists were ... furnished by representatives of those countries." Woolley, 45.

²¹³ This was made clear in the introduction: "It is pointed out that only a selection, comprising what are considered to be the most important Monuments in enemy-held ITALY, is given here. In all cases there are more Monuments in the Towns listed than are shown. Nearly every Italian Town contains a number of important Monuments and it would be a task of great magnitude to produce a complete list. More detailed and complete information can be obtained from the town plans issued by the Frick Art Reference Library which should be available to A-2 sections." The Ancient Monuments of Italy, Mediterranean Allied Photo Reconnaissance Command. National Archives, Photographic Archives.

²¹⁴ Sir Leonard Woolley, A Record of the Work Done by the Military Authorities For the protection of the Treasures of Art and History in War Areas. Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Branch of Civil Affairs, War Office. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947), 42.

to attempt an integration into the Air Force's target-mapping activities, but had been told that his committee should "use city plans available in recent guides, such as Guida d'Italia, Guide Bleu, Baedeker" instead. Although disappointed, Dinsmoor eventually concluded that by supplying pilots with base atlases, "we shall have gone as far as seems to be possible." The ethical overtones of this statement can only be understood in the context of the USAAF's decentralized structure, with its deferral to the judgment of individual pilots. This intervention in the visual field of the bombing crew merely activated of an ethics of personal intervention, predicated not only on a "total" penetration of enemy territory, but also on the ability of individual pilot to exercise a personal judgment, in which the "the training of the eye of the bombardier" was a crucial instrument. Although the technical means of implementation of this ethic had little to do with the methods of the connoisseur, this was, in the last instance, an ethic of personal comportment in which the "eye" played an important part in formulating "judgment." Yet the finality of aerial photographs as instruments of total control in aerial warfare was belied by the continued transformation of maps and lists well into the occupation of Europe.

The system of relative valuation that helped to produce these photographs was repeatedly recalibrated for the purposes of ground troop occupation. As D-Day approached, the MFA&A produced another set of publications, titled Lists of Protected Monuments, based on a re-expansion of the lists and a re-introduction of stars. When these lists were sent to "Northern Europe" to select buildings that could be requisitioned for the "billeting" of troops, these too had to be re-composed. Here, unlike with aerial photography, it was not the tactical precision but the geographic "evenness" of the lists that needed to be enhanced:

These lists were too uneven in density of monuments listed, and varied too much from country to country to be used for precise military purposes. In consequence, it was decided to make new lists. ... the decision was made that these new lists should be basic lists, having the authority of a military order and not weakened by discrimination, as between monuments included in them. ²¹⁸

²¹⁵ Dinsmoor, "Report on Visit to Washington: July 21-23, 1943." ASCSA I/3

²¹⁶ "As for the fact that the maps ... were ordinary ground maps rather than aerial maps, this was at first a disappointment, but, as we talked the matter over, this seemed after all to be the most practical solution. The fact that we should not be working exactly on the type of map employed by the Air Service seems almost immaterial, since the ultimate type of map on which all information is concentrated is the target map, on which we should probably not be allowed to work directly under any circumstances." Dinsmoor to McLeish, 19 Aug 1943. ASCSA

²¹⁷ The emphasis on "the eye of the bombardier" is a trope of literature on the ethics of bombing in an aerial war In this literature, the bombardier occupies an almost allegorical position, standing in for a technologically mediated humanity whose by-the-minute calibration between ends and means was mediated by the new mode of perception produced by aerial photography. The importance of the "crewman's eye" in the understanding of the horizontal plane of war is crucial—and the ethical dilemma of bombing was often expressed as a conflict between the pleasure of detecting target by depth within shadows, and having to destroy the targets—as if planemetric truths were revealed at the moment of their imminent destruction.

²¹⁸ "North West Europe / SHAEF / The Development of the MFA&A Branch." In Woolley, A Record of the Work... 41.

Thus all "starring" was removed in order better to approximate "the authority of a military order" through listing. The implication was that the Army would prefer to be given an absolute choice, between monuments and non-monuments, and that any relative system "weakened" this distinction. Yet when these new, "non-discriminatory", lists were sent to SHAEF a week before D-Day for authorization, they looked "so formidably long" that SHAEF protested that "they would hamper military operations by making it impossible to billet troops." Once more, the lists had to be explained in "discriminatory" terms. This time it was a proportional analysis of architectural typology that was delivered to SHAEF:

The answer took the form of an analysis: for the five départements of Normandy the list scheduled approximately 210 monuments, of which 84 were churches, some were Roman or mediaeval ruins, dolmens and prehistoric stone circles, fountains, belfries, etc.; in the whole of Normandy it was unlikely that there were 35 buildings that might be desirable for billeting troops and be denied to them by MFAA&A restrictions. The official list was promptly approved. ²¹⁹

Even in their "non-discriminatory nature," these lists forced a type of art historical expertise based on a sliding scale: 84 churches were subject to an overarching interdiction; statues, ruins and fountains could not be occupied; therefore only 35 "monuments"—palaces, houses, museums, libraries, etc.—were really being excerpted from occupation by troops in Normandy. When Woolley repeated the anecdote at the end of the war, he still spoke of delivering "an analysis" but phrased the story in terms of "moderation," concluding that the list was officially approved because "the answer from SHAEF was that we had been astonishingly moderate." Thus, insofar as the art historians were asked to deliver not only "information" but also "analysis," this was one of based on principles of moderation and proportionality.

From this repeated application of a proportional logic to the lists of monuments, there emerged some measures of absolute value and a sense of ideal proportion. A comparison of five Italian cities as represented in 5 successive documents, for example, reveals what one might call Köhler's threshold of arbitrariness (in reference to his protest that "any list reduced to such an extent was arbitrary"), whereby no major city was ever reduced below 10 monuments. (fig. 2.49) Similarly, a comparison of ten Italian small towns over the same period shows that the same process left Italian towns with no more than 5 monuments, a figure that one might call Dinsmoor's criterion (in reference to Dinsmoor's decision to make maps only when "at least 5 monuments of exceptional importance are to be indicated.") But while Dinsmoor had intended to invent a criterion for selection, this

²¹⁹ Woolley, A Record, 41.

²²⁰ Woolley, "Introduction," in Lord Methuen, Normandy Diary, xvii.

criterion became an upward limit instead, which served to equalize disparate towns into a single category. Similarly, "Köhler's threshold" was verified, but only as the lower limit of a range, which defined Italian cities as locales with monuments numbering between 10 and 25. (fig. 2.50)

Between Spring 1943 and Spring 1944, this relative system was repeatedly deployed to arrive at a greater uniformity between maps, through two moments of condensation: the USAAF photographs condensed the Frick Atlases, in the same way as the Harvard Short list had condensed the Long Lists. Thus, as the number of monuments decreased, their overall value emerged enhanced. Dinsmoor's criterion and Köhler's threshold, then, were "arbitrary" only in the sense that any 5 monuments could have performed this function; moments of periodic "arbitrariness" served as a moderating technique, so that the difference between Venice, Florence, Cesena, Saronno, etc., could be gradually equalized. In addition, this transformation progressively evened out the distribution of "stars" for all towns, tending towards an ideal proportion: by May 1944, all the cities had acquired a pyramidal structure wherein the *** category was the smallest and the "unstarred" the largest. (figs. 2.46-47). Hence Venice, which had begun as disproportionately bottom-heavy, and Florence, where each category of starring had been evenly filled, had begun to resemble Padova. (fig. 2.48) What had been a qualitative hierarchy (*** are more important than **, etc.) was now implemented quantitatively: (*** are fewer than **, etc.). The value of monuments was now inversely proportional to its availability in a given city—a logic of scarcity had been progressively applied.

By the time Dinsmoor traveled to Europe to witness the implementation of the Roberts Commission's work, at least five versions of these lists and maps were circulating in various theaters of war. What pervaded all these documents was a representation of monuments as regulated by proportional logic, as located by a process of excision, and as anchored by psycho-geographic rhetoric. The logic of scarcity that resulted from this depiction was dramatically verified as Dinsmoor encountered the single greatest obstacle to the implementation of the US policy in the European Theater of Operations: the British Royal Air Force, and its policy of nighttime carpet-bombing. As early as October 1943, Army representative General Hildring had reported that "the RAF night bombing made it difficult for them to utilize the information regarding the location of artistic and historic monuments supplied by the Commission." However, he added that "the theater commanders were trying to influence the British to make sure use of it as they could." Over the next few months, this "influence" spread through joint centers of aerial command, as the USAAF demonstrated that precision bombing, including the information on monuments, could be adapted

²²¹ "Roberts Commission Special Meeting, Friday October 1943," AAA #3077

even to the technology RAF pilots had in hand. ²²² It is also in this period that archaeologist Sir Leonard Woolley was appointed "special archaeological adviser" to the British War Office, becoming a liaison with the Roberts Commission and coordinating the British MFA&A troops. Yet no overall mitigation of British "morale bombing" was forthcoming: Wolley was allowed into "the military machine" only better to be subjected to its hierarchies, and the American model of a civilian Commission was specifically rejected. ²²³ The MacMillan Commission, appointed by Churchill on May 4th 1944 as a counterpart to the Roberts Commission, was concerned purely with postwar restitution, and it was perceived among British strategists as a propaganda project. It was rather in his contacts with the Inter-allied Commission for Protection and Restitution of Cultural Material ("the Vaucher Commission") formed in April 1944 as part of the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME), that Dinsmoor confronted the conflict between carpet bombing and monument protection.

The Vaucher Commission witnessed from London the advance of Allied troops through Normandy. By July 10th, this advance had caused such destruction that the commission composed a resolution, summarized by Dinsmoor under the heading Carpet Bombing and the Vaucher Commission:

Despite the distribution of maps and lists of cultural monuments in France to the Air Forces, the employment of the technique of "carpet bombing" has resulted in the destruction of a considerable number of cultural monuments. The Vaucher Commission and the MacMillan Committee were disturbed by the extent of the devastation in Normandy and the prospect of further obliteration of entire areas in France by Allied bombing. The Vaucher Commission passed a resolution ... to be forwarded to appropriate governmental quarters, expressing the hope that (1) some alternative to "carpet bombing" might be devised or (2) if modification of that technique were not feasible, then a few areas containing monuments of outstanding importance be selected for special consideration. ²²⁴

In pointing out the contradiction between the existence of the monuments maps and the destruction wrought by tactical air support through Normandy, the Vaucher resolution hoped to achieve one of two objectives. The primary wish was to mitigate "carpet bombing" altogether; hence the first draft of this resolution explicitly asked that techniques of "night-time precision bombing" be employed

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United States Strategic Bombing Survey, "Report No. 4: Description of Royal Air Force Bombing," 8.

The suggestion that the American example should be followed was carefully considered and finally rejected on the grounds that the necessary work in the field was essentially a military responsibility and could only be performed by military personnel under the exclusive control of the Commander-in-Chief concerned; it required for its success direct representation at the War Office, and the Archaeological Adviser, having military rank and being inside the military machine, enjoyed every advantage over a civilian Advisory Committee." Woolley, A Record, 6. Woolley's high military led to some considerable confusion of hierarchy with the American MFA&A troops: the US commissions had a much broader power but its MFA&A troops were of comparatively low grade and subject to being ignored by their superiors. Woolley did eventually form an advisory civilian panel "Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Panel" composed of museum officials: Sir Robert Ardy, Sir Kenneth Clark, Sir John Forsdyke, Basil Gray, Sir Frederick Kenyon, Sir Eric Maclagan, J.G. Mann, Major S. F. Markham, Dr. Eric Millar, K.G. Parker, and Sir Robert Witt. Woolley, A Record, 67.

Maclagan, J.G. Mann, Major S. F. Markham, Dr. Eric Millar, K.G. Parker, and Sir Robert Witt. Woolley, A Record, 67.

Maclagan, J.G. Mann, Major S. F. Markham, Dr. Eric Millar, K.G. Parker, and Sir Robert Witt. Woolley, A Record, 67.

Maclagan, J.G. Mann, Major S. F. Markham, Dr. Eric Millar, K.G. Parker, and Sir Robert Witt. Woolley, A Record, 67.

Maclagan, J.G. Mann, Major S. F. Markham, Dr. Eric Millar, K.G. Parker, and Sir Robert Witt. Woolley, A Record, 67.

instead, to arrive at "results of remarkable precision and afford a corresponding degree of immunity to non-military buildings in the neighborhood of the targets." This tactical modification, the Commission argued, would "offer a prospect of saving for prosperity something more than a mere remnant of the cultural heritage of Europe." Yet, as if it were clear that ethical absolutes could not be implemented by purely tactical means, the resolution proposed another alternative which consisted of a strategic shift in outlook. The second option was "frankly to recognize" the possibility of destruction in a "new" elaboration of the issue, by inverting the notion of "immunity":

Alternatively, in case modification of the 'carpet bombing' technique is not tactically feasible, the Commission would suggest that the problem of preservation be approached anew with a frank recognition of the fact that every monument located in a theater of military operations is more likely to be destroyed than not.

In effect, the Commission asked the Army to assume the destruction of "every monument" in order to ensure its protection. Astonishingly, even in a "realist" reversal of ethical terms, the solution to the problem of the totality of war continued to lie in the construction of a list.

The Vaucher Commission met with Dinsmoor on June 26th to construct a list of "the 25 most important monuments in all of France." Entrusted with this secret list, Dinsmoor wrote a confidential communiqué to accompany it:

CONFIDENTIAL August 24, 1944

The positions marked in red on the general map of France (page vii) represent the 23 sites containing the 25 most important monuments of the cultural heritage of all France. The responsibility for the section of the listed sites ... rests on the French themselves. The list was drawn up by [the] French delegates ... and was personally handed to me by them in London on June 26 under a promise of secrecy, in case it should be employed for planning operations. I have, therefore, shown this list to nobody and have kept no copy; I have transferred the information to the maps with my own hand without permitting anybody else to see them. I have retained nothing pertaining to this affair with the exception of a carbon copy of this letter. 225

Thus the Vaucher Commission shrunk the entirety of France to 25 monumental sites, in a final rehearsal, at the national scale, of the listing logic that had been perfected by the Commission's work. In this transfer, the projection of ethical responsibility "onto the French themselves" vindicated a transfer of meaning and significance from Allied invaders to "local populations" which had underlain the entire project. Perhaps more to the point, Dinsmoor used the Civil Affair Atlas: France as a medium to convey this information, by marking the monuments on the national map found on page vii. With a few strokes of a green crayon, Dinsmoor had crossed, at last, the elusive line

²²⁵ "Professor Paul Vaucher (Chairman) and "Monsieur d'Orange" and Lieut. (de Vasseau) Gilloux, French delegates to the (inter-allied) Commission for the Protection and Restitution of Cultural Material—created by the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education." "The areas marked in green crayon, of course, represent the approximate areas occupied by the Allied Expeditionary Forces up to today, and may be extended with the course of events. But it will be noted that, as of today, only five (nos. 43A, 46, 47, 58, 60) of the 23 sites lie within the areas yet occupied by Allied forces, though others are very close to the present line." William Bell Dinsmoor, ASCSA III/2

between the "informative" and the "advisory," and his Atlas had finally become the art-historical instrument he had been hoping to provide. 226 (fig. 2.53)

Far from becoming increasingly differentiated from the field of war, monuments progressively merged with targets, in a collapse of tactical means and strategic ends that seemingly enacted the definition of the war's ethical—and now epistemological—totality. The form of total war and the shape of art historical knowledge emerged connected in a way that reversed the expectations. For example, Köhler had been correct in detecting a fundamental arbitrariness in list-making, since his carefully constructed lists of monuments turned out to be modifiable at will. But the arbitrariness lay not in the low numbers: the "radical reduction" of France to 25 sites shows that, the shorter the lists had become, the more deliberate the choice of monuments: below a certain number, subjective judgments of value had been replaced by objective prediction. The twenty-five monuments had not been subjectively judged to be more valuable, but objectively designated "most likely to be destroyed." In the last instance the monuments' lists became predictive of war rather than autonomous from it.

A new conception of iconoclasm underlies this predictive conflation of monument and target. Iconoclasm meant the deliberate destruction of aesthetic value—not because anyone intended these 25 points' destruction (the way, for instance, that so-called degenerate art needed protection from Nazi looting) but rather that because they were most likely to become emblems of arbitrariness: the arbitrariness of total war made destruction the best criterion for choosing any 5 points on a map—be they targets or monuments. This convergence of targets and non-targets occurred not in the abstract terms of total war but in the context of the summer of 1944, which military historians identify as a turning point when "last instance" tactics were deployed. Recounting the timeline that followed the invasion of Normandy would be too long here, two dates suffice to situate this "radical reduction" in this timeline: the date Dinsmoor received the list (July 26th, 1944), and the date he conveyed it to the US Army (August 24th, 1944).

Dinsmoor received the Vaucher "List of 25" at the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME) on July 26th, in a relay that highlights the continuity in between wartime commissions and the postwar international organization that would become UNESCO. This continuity lies foremost in a set of actors: notably Commission member Archibald McLeish, who accompanied Dinsmoor to London to attend the 9th meeting of CAME—the first such meeting to be

Dinsmoor kept his promise of secrecy and no record of the list exists in his archives. The five numbers he does cite, 43A, 46, 47, 58, 60 represent Paris, Versailles, St Malô, Chartres and Fontainebleau. ASCSA III/2

attended by an official US delegation, rather than mere observation team. 227 MacLeish is now remembered as having penned the famous opening line to the preamble of Unesco's constitution, "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses for peace must be erected."228 Already in Spring 1944, MacLeish had arrived in London having drafted the US delegation's Recommendations on the Restoration of Art Objects and the Restoration of Basic Library Materials, which stated unequivocally—and less poetically—that "it is not in the interest of the American or British Governments to permit considerable areas of the world to be deprived of basic library materials essential to the functioning of a modern society."229 Upon arriving in London, MacLeish helped to transform the Vaucher Commission from a sub-committee of CAME into "an international forum for discussion."230 As soon as it was formed on April 25th, this commission resolved "to divide its work into three main sections: An Index of Places; and Index of Persons; and an Index of Objects." In this three-fold division of tasks, the index of places was the only "extremely urgent task," since it was "designed to cover monuments which might be destroyed or damaged during the bombing or the Liberation." As with the Roberts Commission's card file in the US, in the Vaucher Commissions work the "index of places" (including monuments) had a "war-time" reality, whereas "people and objects" were assumed to be only matters of "postwar restitution." The Frick Maps became the basis for this index, and it is as a result of this urgency that the Commission wrote the Resolution Drawing attention to the dangers to monuments caused by the employment of the technique of "carpet bombing" and that, the next day, French delegates handed Dinsmoor their list of 25 French sites. Thus the creation, in extremis, of "an index of places" as a result of a fundamental impotence in the face of war, coincides with the moment when peacetime international organizations took on the task of creating a worldwide inventory of monuments.

Dinsmoor did not transmit the Vaucher List to US authorities until August 24, 1944—the eve of the Liberation of Paris, and a date that has done perhaps more than the CAME to disseminate the idea that "the minds of men" are populated with monuments, by demonstrating that monumental value could seemingly trump even a direct order from Hitler. Hitler had sent General Dietrich von Choltitz to act as Commander of Grossstadt Paris, with orders to destroy the city rather than surrendering it. Von Choltitz had earned his promotion to General by planning and enacting the

This change marked "the willingness of the US Government to take part in an international program for the educational and cultural reconstruction of the war-torn countries." Walter Laves & Charles Thomson, UNESCO: Purpose Progress Prospects. (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1957), 21.

²²⁸ In doing this MacLeish was acting as "Chairman of the committee to draft the Preamble and First Article of the Constitution," and inspired by British P.M Atlee at Unesco's first meeting in Nov 1945, who denounced "the totalitarian practice of drawing a curtain around the minds of the people." Laves & Thomson, 4; 359n.5.

²³⁰ The Commission for the Protection and Restitution of Cultural Material. Document AME/A/148. In Crosby I/7.

1940 bombing of Rotterdam; he therefore understood the meaning of large-scale urban destruction. But despite the nearing Allies and repeated admonitions from Hitler ("Brennt Paris?"), von Choltiz never implemented the order, writing in a memoir that he had been motivated "by the love of the city," and earning, from Paris' last-minute escape from destruction, his own escape from war tribunals. Recent research has questioned the hagiography that has since been built around this act, by showing that von Choltitz lacked the means to destroy a whole city and suggesting that he stalled to fashion his heroic post-war legacy as "the savior of Paris." What clearly remains from the episode, however, is the heroic status of the city of Paris, which emerged as a "monument" exactly in the sense that the Roberts Commission had worked to apply to works of art and architecture throughout the war. Certainly the statement released by President Roosevelt's about he Liberation of Paris used the language that the Commission had invented for the use of monuments: "For Paris is a precious symbol of that civilization which it was the aim of Hitler and his armed hordes to destroy." 232

The analogy between monuments and cities as "symbols of civilization" was made visually clear in a spread published by the New York Times on the same day, where "Paris, The Eternal City" was depicted by views of its monuments, and an aerial panorama of the skyline. This view, punctuated with monuments, was essentially the same panorama that Le Corbusier had sketched from the Montmartre rooftops in the 1930s. But where Le Corbusier had polemically proclaimed, "This is Paris!," the New York Times was able triumphantly to declaim that the prophecy had been fulfilled: "This is the Paris that was—and the Paris that will be." (fig. 2.52) Even as Dinsmoor was secretly transferring his carefully chosen sites onto his French Atlas, cities were publicly absorbing the value that had once been granted to its individual monuments, fulfilling on two scales the spatial order represented the Vaucher "List of 25."

Wilhelm Köhler would no doubt have protested so "radical" an abbreviation of any list country to a mere 25 monuments, but Dinsmoor experienced few ethical problems in adopting this synthetic point of view. His broad humanistic viewpoint allowed him to speak in terms of civilizations, and his archaeological experience led him to a realist position on the inevitability of

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²³¹ Von Choltitz gave an account in daily editorials in the French Gaullist newspaper Le Figaro, between 3 and 17 October 1949, under the title "Why I did not destroy Paris" (Pouquoi je n'ai pas détruit Paris). Re-publishing these in a German memoir a year later, he claimed that he had originally offered the neutral title "How the German Commander saw the last days of Paris," (Wie des deutsche Befehlshaber die letzten Tage von Paris sah) and would in any case have preferred "How did Paris escape destruction?" (Wie entging Paris der Zerstörung?). See Dietrich von Choltitz, "Nachwort," in Brennt Paris? ... Adolf Hitler. Tatsachenbericht des letzten deutschen Befehlshabers in Paris. (Mannheim: UNA Weltbucherei, 1950).

Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Statement on the Liberation of Paris," August 24th, 1944. John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project. University of California. (www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16547).

destruction. As an archaelogist Dinsmoor was able to detect even in the smallest fragment the value of a monument's whole. ²³³ This helps to explain why, even as he participated in the large-scale planning activities of the Vaucher Commission, he also spent most of his European mission trying to close what he called "the cultural lag"—a period of two weeks that separated the end of fighting and the arrival of MFA&A troops to take care of monuments.

MFA&A reports had noted that a large amount of "avoidable damage" to monuments occurred during this "cultural lag, when everything is disordered, morale of the troops has relaxed, rather than as a result of fighting itself.²³⁴ Dinsmoor felt about this issue the way that Köhler did about starring the German List. He pleaded directly to the head of the Commission Judge Roberts that this cultural lag be reduced. "The fragments of important monuments," he pleaded, "should be rescued while on the ground before they are heaped up by bulldozer and used for utilitarian construction." "Speaking professionally and from my own experience," Dinsmoor emphasized that fragments were all archaeologists had to deal with anyways:

Military officers may not realize the importance of preserving characteristic fragments of buildings and broken statues and may regard anything once broken as worthy only of the dump heap, but many of us who have devoted entire lives to the reconstruction of monuments from broken fragments can testify that the opposite is true.²³⁵

Other classical archaeologists had already written this point into the Army's Handbooks: "The fact that a building is in ruins," Doro Levi wrote in the Italian introduction, "in no way detracts from its importance." Although Levi had intended to describe the "Roman ruins at Pompeii, Greek Temples and Etruscan tombs," his statement soon became applicable to much of Europe itself.

The transfer of responsibility from art historians to archaeologists meant that the system of aesthetic proportion once regimenting the work of protection turned into an archaeological system of metonymy. While the art historians and connoisseurs placed value on the design of the collection, archaeologists proceeded from the fragment to the whole. It was this archaeological eye that

²³³ Dinsmoor traveled to London in April 1944 and remained until June 1944, writing three "Reports from London" (23 April 1944, 2 May 1944 and 3 June 1944). Francis Taylor also traveled to Europe and Crosby took over from Dinsmoor (Mission to Europe (2-13 Oct. 1944; 8 March-10 June 1945)

²³⁴ "The MFA&A were held too far behind the lines and were not allowed to go forward until long after the advanced echelon and the occupational detachments had gone ahead. I once estimated on the basis on incomplete data that there was a cultural lag of about 2 weeks." Dinsmoor, "First Weekly Report: Sunday April 23, 1944, American Embassy, London," 29. ASCSA III/3. This was confirmed by Scammel, who spoke at the same event: "Experience showed that a large part of damage by troops occurred between the time when the combat troops moved forward and when reserved and administrative units moved into an area." Major Joseph M. Scammel, "The Duties of Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Officers" Paper delivered at the symposium "Europe's Monuments as Affected by the War" organized by the Archaeological Institute of America at the Metropolitan Museum of Art (28 Dec, 1944), 8. ASCSA IX.

²³⁵ Dinsmoor to Roberts, 25 Oct 1943. Roberts responded that "the matter was presented to Asst. Secretary of War McCloy, and he has authorized me to state that the art and monuments officers reach the affected areas at the earliest practicable moment. It is impossible to have the arts and monuments offices accompany the troops because they are not trained for combat work." ASCSA I/6.

²³⁶ "Introduction," in Civil Affairs Handbook: Italy. Section 17A: Cultural Institutions Central Italy (M353-17A: 6 July 1944), vii.

ultimately led Dinsmoor to a blunt visualization of the implications of his own agency. Upon his return from Europe Dinsmoor delivered a report at a symposium titled Europe's Monuments as Affected by the War organized at the Metropolitan Museum of Art on December 28th, 1944. Here he explained the effect of witnessing first-hand the work of the MFA&A troops:

I very much fear that, unwittingly, we have been engaged in a city planning program and that some of the towns, in which the most severe fighting has occurred, now very closely resemble our maps, with only the marked protected monuments now standing.

I began to acquire such impressions as I traversed the devastated towns between Naples and Rome. An announcement of the French Ministry of Information, dated November 2, 1944, reporting on the results of the complete survey of the 17,000 monuments historiques of France, stated that 8,000 of the 17,000 have been injured, thought most of them in insignificant details and none, not even the cathedral of Rouen, in such a manner that it cannot be restored. "But," it goes on, "the reports of the architects are filled with astonishment in the presence of miracles, such as the Cathedral of Beauvais upright and the Episcopalian Palace intact in the midst of a field of ruins, the Cathedral of Amiens mutilated but still living among the debris, the Cathedral of Avraches intact at the edge of piles of rubbish. The specially marked maps handed over to the liberating bombardiers have been of remarkable efficacy." 237

In his reconnaissance mission through Europe, guided by his archaeological eye, Dinsmoor detected in the fragments the image of the maps he had spent so much time developing, and he also detected in these few standing monuments "an urban whole" that represented the beginnings of "a planning program." After touring Europe in ruins to advocate the basic archaeological principle that "restoration can often be made from relatively minute fragments" Dinsmoor had detected in the "minute fragments" of destroyed cities the indices of his own historical agency.

By recognizing in the destruction of cities his own hand in a "city planning program," Dinsmoor retrospectively assigned himself a role he had described, a decade earlier, as "the problem of modern architecture." In the introduction to his seminal Architecture of Ancient Greece, Dinsmoor, who had been trained as an architect, had offered his survey as a service to modern-day architects, who should be supplied with a complete picture in order to perform their essential task, "choosing the good and refusing the bad:"

In what way to use tradition is the problem of modern architecture. In earlier days an architect's retrospect was bounded by the works of his grandfather, or at most by the primitive arts of his own district. But now there is this difference, that it ranges over the larger traditions of all of architectural history, choosing the good and refusing the bad, and doubtless out of this selective use will come in the fullness of time a living art as

 $^{^{237}}$ Dinsmoor, "Lecture on the Preservation of Monuments. Paper No.2—Dinsmoor." Delivered at the symposium "Europe's Monuments as Affected by the War" organized by the Archaeological Institute of America at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, on December 29th, 1944. ASCSA IX/2.

²³⁸ Dinsmoor, "Text For Lecture On Cultural Monuments. Final Draft." ASCSA IX/2.

noble as Greek, more cosmopolitan than Roman, and perfectly characteristic of the age we live in. ²³⁹

Dinsmoor intended this description as a methodology of influence: through archaeological contacts with architectural monuments, the modern architect was inspired to apply lessons learned from tradition to the design of new architecture. In this process, the relationship between "the past" and the monument was metaphorical—to "use the past" meant to acquire knowledge about monuments. In contrast, the Roberts Commission "selective use of the past" had been altogether archaeological: the metonymic relation of part to whole had been a made material—and thus Dinsmoor was suddenly faced with the materiality of his own classifications. His knowledge, which he had assumed to concern "all of architectural history"—which is to say, the totality of civilization over the entirety of time—consisted in fact of a specific collection of monuments in a specific set of modern cities.

"Unwitting City Planning": The MFA&A between damage and conspiracy

Did the Roberts Commission really shape the cities of Europe into the image of their protection plan? As a historical claim, Dinsmoor's contention that his maps of monuments had determined patterns of destruction must be tested beyond the veracity of an eye-witness account. Dinsmoor's realization is in fact a three-part hypothesis—that there had been a "planning program," that it operated at an "urban" scale, and that the art historians had been "unwittingly" removed from the consequences of their own actions—which is a useful guide for understanding how "military necessity" mitigated not only the possibility for action, but the very idea of agency in war.

For instance, to take seriously the contention that the Frick maps performed "with remarkably accuracy" one must examine the way bombing technology re-defined the notion of accuracy. By the time the USSBS engineers surveyed bombing damage in 1945, they admitted that it was difficult to distinguish between damage caused by "area raids" and "precision raids", particularly in the last phase of the war, when the USAAF introduced "blind bombing" techniques based on the use of the radar. 240 85% of the total bomb tonnage dropped by the Allies on Europe occurred after January 1944 and this period accounts for the greatest proportion of bombing destruction in the whole war. By the USSBS's own admission, "in many cases bombs dropped by instruments in "precision" raids fell over a wide area comparable to that covered normally in an

239 Dinsmoor, "Geographical Considerations," in "Introduction," The Architecture of Ancient Greece, xvii

These "pathfinder bombs" were dropped to delimit the edge of a destruction area, giving subsequent pilots markers with which to aim at specific strategic targets. See "The Bombsights," in Stewart Halsey Ross, Strategic Bombing by the United States in World War II: the Myths and the Facts (Jefferson, NC: MacFarland, 2003), 123-141.

'area raid'," and therefore after Spring 1944, any precision raid against an urban target "had the practical effect of an area raid against that city." ²⁴¹ Certainly the French cities named by the Vaucher Commission in its "Resolution against Carpet Bombing" had actually sustained damage from what were intended to be precision raids.²⁴² Despite this progressive blurring, however, raids continued to be recorded not according to the type of damage they inflicted, but "on the basis of the declared intention of the attackers." In other words, the criterion of accuracy used to classify bombing technologies by the end of war contained assumptions about the relationship between destruction and intent. Foremost among the factors that complicate Dinsmoor's claim of "city planning" by destruction, then, is the difficulty of distinguishing between destruction caused by precision and by carpet bombing, despite the deep ethical divide that separated these two techniques in the abstract.

To this failure of precision-bombing instruments to perform with accuracy should be added the overwhelming success of technologies that were designed to be imprecise, such as the "incendiary bombs" used by USAAF and RAF to cause firestorms in German cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants like Hamburg, Darmstadt and Dresden. Here the USSBS laconically acknowledged that these German cities had, by the end of war, "lost their central and business districts and remained as suburban rings surrounding destroyed cores," and that "for residential areas fire was the chief cause of the damage that resulted from bombing."243 Since most German monuments marked on the Frick maps lay in these historic centers, to account for the high proportion of monuments standing in these "destroyed cores," one must account for the tendency of residential building types to burn faster than masonry monuments. To refer to the graphic nomenclature of the Frick maps, one might say that "hatched" residential areas were generally more vulnerable to fire than the monuments which had been "colored" in black. This material distinction significantly modifies the terms of the physical "resemblance" that Dinsmoor perceived on his European tour. For example, the MFA&A damage report from Mainz described that "the great part of the old city ... is little better than rubble, with the towers of its medieval churches—the one part

²⁴¹ "In many cases bombs dropped by instruments in "precision" raids directed against specific targets fell over a wide area comparable to that covered normally in an 'area raid'." It is not that the intentions of the bombing did not count; on the contrary the USSBS acknowledged that the greatest inaccuracy in its damage reports stemmed from the fact raids were classified according to intention, rather than actual technology. "but on the basis of the declared intention of the attackers it would go into the air force records as a precision attack on the transportation site" For this reason, "it proved somewhat difficult to distinguish between the economic consequences of true area raids and raids of the kind described USSBS, "The Attack on German Cities," 21/38

²⁴² Similarly, the Cathedral of Beauvais, Amiens and Avraches mentioned both in the report and in Dinsmoor's talk, had been the result of "precision raids" led by radar. (in final report: St Lô, Coutances, Beauvais, Rouen.)

²⁴³ "In many incidents ignition followed the use of high-explosive bombs But the principal weapon for setting fires was the incendiary bomb." "Physical Damage from Bombing," in USSBS, 28/38

of these buildings relatively undamaged—alone standing to mark what the city once was." That "the city" was still legible in its remaining towers supports Dinsmoor's story of a "city planning program," but it also points to the imprecision of his realization: merely detecting that "towers had survived" was not the same as finding that all monuments had been deliberately spared. Any part of a surviving monument was a marker around which urban form could be approximated. For the MFA&A officer this approximation was a trace of a bygone city; for Dinsmoor they were the basis for a proportional gestalt of success.

Indeed Dinsmoor's fear of having partaken in a "city planning program" was based on a single visual impression—that "the towns very closely resembled the maps"—which is itself a hypothesis to be verified. This "resemblance" occurred to Dinsmoor as he visited bombed cities in Europe, and he later tried to duplicate its effect for his colleagues at the Met, by showing slides of monuments "standing intact in the midst of a field of ruins." Crucially, this genre of photography also pervades the Roberts Commission's Final Report, published in 1946. Like Dinsmoor's lecture at the Met, the Report gave a visual narrative of the war, beginning with map-making at the Frick, and ending with views of destroyed city centers dominated by stone monuments. (fig. 2.55) It is through this graphic narrative that a gestalt of historical agency and the impression of overall success were disseminated—reinforced by the geographic range of the pictures, which showed monuments "preserved" in Italy, France, Germany, Holland, Belgium and Austria. Unlike Dinsmoor's lecture, however, the Report was careful to avoid claiming any overall credit, offering instead a detailed account of the small-scale efficiency of MFA&A officers on the ground. Indeed a closer reading of the Report's text reveals that this genre of photography was used to illustrate widely divergent damage reports: from confident statements that whole patrimonies were safeguarded ("None of the great national treasures of France, Belgium, or Holland were lost in the war"245) to stories of fortuitous survival ("More fortunate but far fewer were the [Austrian] towns and cities of which it was possible to report negligible damage"246) and frank admissions of widespread destruction ("the enormous damage visited upon Western Germany ... is exemplified in the 40-50-60-percent and

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 $^{^{244}}$ "The particular quality of this old town, its remarkably unity as an assembly of fine buildings from the $14^{\rm th}$ to the $18^{\rm th}$ century, has gone for good." Final Report, 155.

²⁴⁵ Final Report, 101.

²⁴⁶ Final Report, 152. Austria was a case of "fortunate survival," as the British damage report shows: "Though some of the larger towns suffered from bombing, there has been little destruction, or even damage, to historical monuments or collections. ... The numerous country houses and castles ... have survived with proportionately very slight loss, though few have suffered severely before our arrival.... The most vulnerable of the towns was Graz ... but by great good fortune destruction was limited to things of minor importance. In the remainder of the worst-bombed towns,... the monuments were of less consequence, but even so, few of them have suffered. To some extent this fortunate outcome is due to the excellent measures taken by the Austrians themselves." Sir Leonard Woolley, "General Report on the British Zone of Austria," Works of Art in Austria (British Zone of Occupation):Losses and Survival in the War (London: HM's Stationery Officer, 1946), 3.

even, in many instances, in the 100 percent destruction of world-famous monuments in such cities at Köln, Dusseldorf, Koblenz, and Trier.") 247 While the Final Report's photographs showcased monuments that had survived, the text never claimed credit for their survival.

A distinctly conspiratorial tone resulted from this disjuncture between image and text, and it was never dispelled. Even as photographs of surviving monuments in ruined cities were widely disseminated, no direct claim of success on the part of the Commission ever came to accompany them. Instead, they were embedded in a cautious but sustained tone of optimism that emphasized how "miraculous" the survival of so many monuments had been. "The picture," the Final Report concluded, "is on the whole enheartening." This miraculous narrative is so pervasive that it inverts the terms by which we can question the "resemblance" posited by Dinsmoor: if the Frick maps never became instruments, if bombing was inaccurate, and if it is only by reading patterns of destruction that military action could be deduced—if, in short, the Allied protection plan was never systematically implemented—why do the Commission's maps and the destroyed towns resemble each-other at all?

The answer begins undoubtedly in the way the MFA&A troops accomplished their missions. To understand the "resemblance" between Frick maps and damaged cities, we must recall that the MFA&A troops held those maps in hand when they toured the cities, and used them as guides for what damage to record and where to administer "first aid". The MFA&A's damage reports belong to the same document family as the Frick Atlases—they are series of images appended with lists—and it in this structure that any "resemblance" begins. Note for instance the double representation of the city of Frankfurt in the Final Report: on the one hand, an aerial view of the city center depicts the Dom among ruins, under the label of "Destruction in the area of the Cathedral." (fig.#) On the other hand, the text cites at length from a preliminary report made by MFA&A Captain Robert Posey, of the 3rd US Army, when he visited the city on April 15th 1944:

FRANKFURT. Entire central portion of town devastated by air raid 22 March 1944. B-1: Dom, tower not seriously damaged. All windows and most of tracery blown out. Right transept roof and vault destroyed. Excellent Kunstschutz protection for finest permanent side-altars prevented damage except where wooden pinnacles stood above boxing. Wall paintings by Steinle, modern, damaged. Hatchments and escutcheons of famous Frankfurt families damaged. Crucifixion group by Hans Backhofen of Mainz (1509), given elaborate Kunstschutz protection. Good late Gothic free-standing Crucifixion, exterior apse-end, undamaged except for the head of Thief on right, broken, now placed on coping. Sacristy and Chapel, undamaged. All portable works seem to have been removed early in war. B-2: Schoppenbrunnen, 18th century stone, gilded fountain, undamaged. B-3: Stadtarchiv, building destroyed. B-4: Stadtgeschichtliches Museum, formerly Historisches Museum, destroyed. B-5: Rothschild House, destroyed. B-6: Baroque fountain (1759), near Dom apse, undamaged. B-7: Studtbibliothek destroyed, except for facade, some walls and pediment. Stucco neo-classic relief, destroyed. B-8: Nikolaikirche, roof burned, vault intact. Elaborate Kunstschutz protection for organ, and room which at one time seems to have been used as depot, entered by low metal door. Old wooden pulpit, removed. Kunstschutz protection for

²⁴⁷ Final Report, 153.

²⁴⁸ Final Report, Figure #

monument on interior and carving on exterior. B-9: Römerburg, some parts of outer walls still stand. Buildings on three sides of platz (Haus zum Römer Haus Limpburg, Haus Löwenstein), gutted. B-10: Justitiabrunnen (1543- figure modern), undamaged. B-11: Poulkirsche (1787-1855), walls only standing. B-12: Alte and Neue Rathaus (from 1400), some walls only, stand. B-13: Zoological Gardens, badly damaged, some deer still in enclosure. B-14: Katherinnekirsche, 18th Century baroque, gutted. B-15: Hauptwache (1730), handsome town-guard-house, pediment and facade walls only, stand. B-15: Stadel Hochschule fur Bildene Kunst und Mode, gutted, B-16: Museum für Kunstwerke, gutted. B-17: Opernhaus (1877), gutted, roof collapsed, walls standing, cellars intact. B-18: Polytechnische Institut, gutted. B-19: Bibliothek für Neuere Sprache, Richard Strauss Sammlung, Museum für Theatre-und Musikgeschichte (in former Rothschild Haus). Building (early neoclassic 19th century) damaged, upper parts burned some books and other materials now in cellar, Finer books and musical instruments had been removed. House in use as rationing cellar. Book shelves usable. **B-20**: St. Leonhardskirche, restored, from 13th Century, roof burned. Good Kunstschutz protection, particularly to side-chapel used for depot, and bricking up of Romanesque portal on interior, Some wood-planking first-aid to leaking roof. Water enters from cracks and holes in vaulting. Holbein The Elder's (?) Last Supper, cased and in straw, in chapel. Two fine late gothic altars, stained glass, church furniture removed to chapel which now has temporary wooden plank roof. Chapel is dry and safe. Organloft and organ burned. Stations of Cross, paintings (modern), damaged. Three bells fell and melted. Church in custody of Sisters of Charity Recommended to Mil. Gov. Det. F2D2 first-aid be urged upon Civil Government. B-21: Goethehaus, destroyed, cellar exists inhabited by Dr. Franz GOTTING, curator. Best holdings exist, safe outside Frankfurt, 18th Century garden-figures and standing nude by Georg KOLBE, in garden, undamaged. B-22: Liebfrauenkirche (14th-15th centuries) gutted, south portal seriously damaged, scattered sculptural fragments still attached to walls, which are badly cracked. B-23: Fountain (Schneidermünd, 1771), good Kunstschutz protection of handsome red stone plinth, surmounted by gilt-bronze sunburst. B-24: Eschenheimer Turm (early 15th century), no war damage. Action recommended: Contacted Capt Mil. Gov. Det. F2D2, and requested that he interview Dr. Ernst BETTLER, Director of Goethe Museum, Dr. Franz GOTTING, Conservator, Goethe Museum and Dr. MANOVSKY, Kunstgewerbe and Decorative Art, with view to setting up directorate for Cultural Institutions in Civil Government.²⁴⁹

The same "destroyed area" that appeared to be an undifferentiated field of rubble in the Resport's photograph was methodically described in the text: starting from the Dom and unfolding outward, quadrant by quadrant, with a textual density that echoes the relentlessness of the damage.

It should be noted that, already in wartime, the MFA&A's work was assessed as a very mitigated success—crippled by serious problems of staffing, hierarchy, timing, and coverage. ²⁵⁰ In their reports the MFA&A field officers conveyed a fundamental helplessness in the face of large-scale destruction, insufficient resources, and lack of military authority, and all are peppered with stories of

²⁴⁹ Final Report, 151-153.

²⁵⁰ Of particular interest is the fact that regional assignment of MFA&A officers had been counter-productive, immobilizing capable hands in theaters where they were not needed.

Although the MFA&A officers stood the most literal force of "implementation" of the Roberts Commission, the civilian affiliation of the Commission and the military nature of the MFA&A was eventually understood to have been a major conflict. Colonel Newton, an architect who was appointed to head the MFA&A, had to accept a demotion from general to Colonel in order to be assigned to the European Theater. He did not have any authority to issue orders. Newton expressed this difficulty in a letter written to Sumner Crosby from London in late 1944: "Don't permit yourself to become too optimistic, since from this "worm's eye" viewpoint, there isn't any cause for optimism. In your cable, you stated in part "he requests these be forwarded to G-5 SHAEF." Be very careful of how you word your cables, remember, I can't state anything. You have to make your recommendation as if it emulated form you. This is very important, since I feel that the War Department would rather have me over here than in Washington for reasons well known to both of us." Letter from Newton to Crosby, 4 Dec 1944. Crosby papers, I/3 What Newton did have, through the Commission, was a direct channel of influence with the War Department, and on several occasions he was able to produce a decree directly from Eisenhower. See Stratton Hammon, "Memoir of the Ranking Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Officer in the RTO during World War II, in Military Affairs (April 1988), 61-68. Another common trope of the correspondence between MFA&A and the commission was the expression of frustration about the British organization, Woolley in particular, by using cognates of the word "wool." ("it's just another one of those "wool pulling" episodes"; "these are woolley times!")

compromises that vary from the anecdotal to the systemic. ²⁵¹ MFA&A officers, who were either architects or curators, found that their expertise was not always suited to the particular type of monument—building or painting—their units encountered. ²⁵² As summarized in the Final Report, the MFA&A's problem was largely a proportional one:

The enormity of the task of inspection can be seen from the following brief statistics. The areas covered by the MFA&A officers grew, within a very short time, to such an extent that it was practically impossible to inspect and report on all the officially protected monuments, much less those not mentioned on the official lists. Up to December 1, 1944, during the first 4 months of operations within Headquarters Communications Zone alone, a total of 1,240 sites and 597 towns were visited by an average of 2 ½ MFA&A officers in the field. This amounted to 125 sites and 60 towns per man per months. A recapitulation of the official lists for France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany reveals a total of 3,415 items. For the major part of operation, the MFA&A officers in the field averaged 10 in number... This meant 341 ½ officially listed monuments per officer, and did not include the several thousand other structures eventually to come within their puerview, or the approximately 350 known repositories of works of art which were to come within the area of US forces in Germany by May 7, 1945. 253

Despite this lengthy statistical disclaimer the Final Report went out of its way to connect, in its overall conclusion, the fortuitous "proportion" of surviving monuments with the "disproportion" of MFA&A officers in their fight against "military necessity":

The picture ... is on the whole quite enheartening. ... And the successful activities of these few men is out of all proportion to their number and their position within the military machine. ... Always striving against the demands of military necessity, this group was able to accomplish a task of great magnitude. The task was nothing less than to preserve as much as they could of man's creative past. ²⁵⁴

The conceptual analogy between the disproportion of the MFA&A officers and their ability to "temper" destruction reveals that another crucial ethical transfer had occurred, between objects and subjects. The exceptional value of monuments among targets was vindicated by the disproportionate minority of MFA&A troops among military men. In spite—or perhaps because—of this basic proportional disparity, it is also clear that the arrival of MFA&A officers in any damaged town, and

²⁵¹ See Lord Methuen, Normandy Diary (London: Robert Hale, 1946); John Skilton, Jr., Défense de l'Art Européen, trans; Jacqueline de Gromard (Paris: Editions Internationales, 1948); James Rorimer, Survival: The Salvage and Protection of Art in War (New York: Abelard Press, 1950); Frederick Hartt, Florentine Art Under Fire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949); Henry LaFarge, ed., Lost Treasures of Europe (New York: Pantheon, 1946).

²⁵² Typical of an "anecdotal" approach is Stratton Hammond's complaint that "architects, especially those who had been in the army for years, were better at convincing the artillery to miss important targets." More systemic is his follow-up observation on steeples, that "in the case of churches with steeples, this could not often be accomplished." Hammon, 62. Similarly Woolley summarized that "In Belgium … the damage or destruction of buildings assumed serious proportions and occurred on a more or less well-defined line. That line was punctuated by churches whose towers constituted the only useful observation posts in a flat country." Woolley, A Record, 51.

²⁵³ Final Report, 105-106.

Final Report, 160. The proportion was described numerically by Charles Kuntzman: a total of 185 personnel, of which 17 were British; they were to cover 560,000 square miles of territory with an official list of 3,415 monuments. "By the first of December 1,240 sites had been visited bin 597 towns by an average of two and a half MFAA officers." 57.

their implementation of a curatorial regime of "first aid," instituted a clear distinction between monument and not-monument which, as we will see, had long-term consequences in the unfolding of the reconstruction.

If MFA&A officers were too few and powerless to act as an implementation force in Dinsmoor's hypothetical "city planning program," they did however usher a smooth transition from lists of monuments needing protection, to lists of monuments needing repair. This was accomplished by translating a sliding scale of protection into a sliding scale of destruction. Hence four-part nomenclature introduced by the MFA&A to record destruction in its so-called report-cards of destruction ("Intact or slightly damaged/ Damaged but repairable / Seriously damaged/ Destroyed" bechoed the four-part starring system that had been appended to monuments in the Harvard Lists. Just as the starring system had facilitated the transfer and transformation of the Commission's list and maps from committee to committee, so the sliding scale of destruction facilitated the Civil Affairs' transfer of power over monuments to local authorities.

The MFA&A's damage reporting system became a lingua franca of national art-protection administrations as they recovered their mandates in the aftermath of liberation. France's Direction des Monuments Historiques, for instance, published its "War Damage Report" using a numerical system that assigned to each monument an index of destruction, from 0 to 4: "[0] destroyed; [1] very severely damaged; [2] severely damaged; [3]; moderately damaged; [4] lightly damaged." While this numerical representation was a highly abbreviated report, it also provided a shorthand of what proportion of each monument had been left standing—in the words of archaeologist Jean Verrier, an "all too dry but, alas, all too eloquent" depiction of the archaeological record of war. The widespread destruction wrought on the Normandy city of Caen, for instance, can be discerned as a pattern of zeros in a densely packed inventory of names and numbers:

Calvados. – Airan, église (C)[1]; Aizy, église (C)[2]; Amblie, portail de l'église (C) [4]; Auigny, château (I) [4]; Audrieu, église (C)[2]; Authie, église (C) [2]; Banneville-sur-Ajon, chapelle (C)[4]; Baron, clocher (C)[0], Beaumais, église (C)[4]; Bernières-sur-Mer, église (C)[3]; Biéville-sur-Ornes, église (C)[3]; Billy, église, (C)[3;]Bougy, église (C)[3]; Bourguébus, église (I)[3]; Bretteville-sur-Laize, église de Quilly (C)[3]; Bricqueville, église (C)[3]; Caen, chapelle du Saint-Sépulchre (C)[3], église Saint-Étienne (C) [4], Notre-Dame-de-la-Gloriette (C)[4], St-Gilles (C)[1], Saint-Jean (C)[2], Saint-Michel-De-Vaucelles (C)[4], Saint-Nicolas (C)[4], Saint-Pierre (C)[2], Saint-Sauveur (I)[4], La Trinité

²⁵⁵ See for instance "Appendix A: reports on Archives and Tables Showing the State of Historical Monuments in North-Western France, Arranged Alphabetically," in Lord Methuen, Normandy Diary (London: Hale, 1946), 200.

²⁵⁶Nous nous sommes contentés de faire suivre chaque nom d'une initiale, (C), classé, ou (I), inscrit, et d'un numéro [0] détruit; [1] dommages très graves; [2] dommages graves; [3] dommages moyens; [4] dommages légers." Jean Verrier, "Les dommages de guerre aux édifices classés parmi les monuments historiques et inscrits à l'inventaire supplémentaire." Bulletin Monumental CIV (1946), 207.

(C)[3], église du Vieux-Saint-Étienne (C)[2], château (C)[3], hôtel d'Escoville (C)[1], hôtel de Montrainville (C)[2], hôtel de Than (C)[2], hôtel des Monnaies (C)[0], lycée Malherbe (C)[3], maison des Gens d'armes (C)[4], maisons 19, 37, 94 rue Saint-Jean, 10, rue Montoir-Poissonneie (C)[0], tour des Morts (C)[0] ...²⁵⁷

The advantage of this statistical accounting is that it could easily be tabulated into a national summary. Verrier offered a tentatively optimistic conclusion, that "the war has affected ... 1,700 of 8,000 classés monuments and 12,000 inscrits, which is to say, 2% of French monuments," most of which "could be reconstructed" given the appropriate resources. Within ten years, Verrier confidently asserted, France would "regain the architectural sheen [parure] worthy of the quality of its historic monuments." By ensuring that damaged monuments received more immediate attention than the rest of damaged, the MFA&A connected the proportional likelihood of monuments to remain intact with the archaeological tendency of these monuments to be reconstructed.

This connection between the urban aerial view of the Commission and the archaeological "worm's eye" of the MFA&A on the ground was theorized by Sir Leonard Woolley in November 1945, in an informal talk to the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA). Woolley's talk was the equivalent of Dinsmoor's AIA lecture at the Met, and was similarly illustrated by images of "Cathedral[s] undamaged in the centre of an almost totally destroyed area." Because he was subject to stronger propaganda pressures than his American colleague, Woolley spoke more explicitly than Dinsmoor of "the success of the scheme." For example, when his talk was published in the RIBA Journal, he unequivocally labeled his images "Examples of notable buildings saved from destruction by the careful briefing of British and American gunners and airmen." (fig. 2.56) Yet even Woolley eschewed specific stories of salvage in favor of an overall, proportional reading. In particular, he recommended erasing the identity of individual monuments, in order to temper the impression of an "orgy of destruction." 1940

Thinking of destruction in quantitative rather than qualitative terms, Woolley argued, was the only way to numb connoisseurial recognition of "familiar names":

The record of damage makes sorry reading—it is bound to do so. If we list the buildings that have been destroyed or damaged, it might well appear, as one familiar name follows another, that little has survived from the orgy of destruction. It is necessary to look at things in a better perspective. In the first place, damage is more often than not reparable.... The total number of buildings destroyed beyond hope of repair is relatively small. What we ought to do is to take the total number of historic monuments

²⁵⁷ Verrier, "Dommages de Guerre," 211.

²⁵⁸ Verrier, "Dommages de Guerre," 208.

²⁵⁹ Wolley, in RIBA Journal, 38. Center of Argentan, Worms Cathedral, Cologne Cathedral, Mantes cathedral.

²⁶⁰ Woolley, RIBA Journal, 40.

in any one area and see what percentage has disappeared or as been irretrievably damaged.²⁶¹

Woolley gave three examples of this statistical reporting of damage, which echoed the proportional logic that had informed the listing of monuments in war: only one monument in the French list of 25 had "suffered serious injury"; only 25 of the 210 monuments listed in Normandy were described as "destroyed,' 'badly damaged' or 'gutted',"; and "less than five percent [72 of 792 listed monuments] in Tuscany have perished utterly or been so far destroyed as to have lost their character and their interest." In other words, insofar as the Commission had succeeded, it had done so by ensuring destruction was legible in proportional terms—the same proportional logic that had regimented the design of its lists and maps. ²⁶²

By the time the Commission issued its first trans-national reports, Woolley's statistical approximation had been integrated into a sense of impending European reconstruction. In the 1946 edited volume Lost Treasures of Europe, ex-MFA&A officer Ernest Dewald adopted a passive tone:

Destruction there was bound to be," he wrote, "no matter what precautions were taken. It is difficult to state dogmatically that any one single form of action caused the greatest destruction. It is difficult even to state that air raids in general were more obliterating than ground action, except in instances of concentrated fury visited upon Germany. ²⁶³

Rather than read in this "concentrated fury" any iconoclastic intent on the part of military authorities, DeWald concluded with a Benjaminian turn of phrase that implicated the entirety of mankind in an escatological enjoyment of its own destruction. "The spectacle of man's destructive fury against himself and his achievements lies before us," he wrote. Yet even in the face of this totality DeWald confidently proposed that, much as monuments worldwide had "survived past wars and devastations," so the "burned-out hulks of buildings, the facades and walls of which are still standing, are nuclei for attempts at reconstruction and contain much historical and architectural value

²⁶¹ Sir Leonard Woolley, "The Preservation of Historical Architecture in the War Zones." Journal of the RIBA (December 1945) 40

The only qualitative concession Woolley made was in an architectonic interpretation of the fate of the Baroque: "What has suffered the most," he ventured, "has been baroque architecture. Owing to its nature, the elaborate decoration and so on, it has suffered a great deal." Charles Rufus Morey had offered similar story at the Met symposium, in his account of Medieval Art and the War. "The baroque got it," Morey said, quoting an MFA&A officer. Morey attempted to use monumental style as a predictor of destruction, but his interpretation was the opposite of Woolley's: "this result might have been expected ... since the larger monuments of the Renaissance and the Baroque periods made larger targets for bombs and shells." Charles Rufus Morey, "The War and Mediaeval Art," in College Art Journal (Jan 1945), 75. While Wooley blamed the frailty of the baroque, Morey sought to read iconoclastic intention in destruction. In contrast to this early search for iconoclastic meaning, the Commission's reports of destruction progressively lost any specificity as they became more comprehensive.

²⁶³ DeWald had been director of the MFA&A operations in Italy and in Austria. Ernest T. deWald, "Introduction" in Henry LaFarge, Ed., Lost Treausres of Europe (New York; Pantheon Books, 1946), 8-9.

for the future." By inspecting monuments mere 10 days after they had been damaged, the MFA&A had helped to curate them as "nuclei for reconstruction." ²⁶⁴

The passage from protected lists to damaged lists is a useful way to understand the legal redefinition of the concept of "heritage" as international property. Far from an abstract universal, the appurtenance of monuments to "mankind" was understood as a specific form of military custody, which included not only the obligation to safeguard monuments in wartime, but also the opportunity to return them to local authorities, in whatever state, upon war's end. In this sense it is not only the two-week delay between the end of fighting and the arrival of MFA&A troops that constitutes a "cultural lag" but also the entire MFA&A operation itself. This lag is another reason why it is difficult to verify the efficacy of the Roberts Commission's work as a cohesive "program." Indeed as monuments were returned to local and national authorities who devised various "plans" for their reconstruction, the general idea that protection had itself been "planned" began to fade.

It is all the more important to note, then, that as damage reports became more statistical and the identity of individual monuments disappeared from them, members of the Commission began to emphasize the consultative nature of their work. Two years after Dinsmoor and Woolley gave their triumphant lectures with pictures of "saved" monuments, British and American Commissions published their final reports, which turned away from claiming success in any kind of "plan." The US report emphasized not that monuments had been saved but that "information" had been "supplied":

At least 95 percent of the damage inflicted to major monuments was caused by air bombardment, It is difficult to estimate how far the comparative immunity of the greater cathedrals of France from damage was due to the efforts of the Allied Air Forces based on information supplied by SHAEF, but certainly such information was sought by the air staff and supplied. ²⁶⁵

Similarly, the British report repeated the figure of 95% and retrospectively recast the entire work of the MFA&A, from a mission of "immunity" into a mission about "ignorance:"

At least 95 per cent of the damage inflicted on major monuments by the Allies was caused by air-bombardment. The clear task of the MFAA Sub-commission was to ensure that at least no part of this destruction should be wrought through ignorance of the existence and importance of individual monuments. ²⁶⁶

²⁶⁴ "Yet the burned-out hulks of buildings, the facades and walls of which are still standing, are nuclei for attempts at reconstruction and contain much of historical and architectural value for the future, as is the case with the Parthenon, the palace of Theodoric at Ravenna, or the many ruined abbeys of France and England which have survived past wars and devastations. In such guise the present shells of many a Romanesque church in Pisa or of the palaces at Genoa may resume significance for the future."

²⁶⁵ "Except for Rouen, the great Gothic monuments of France have escaped comparatively lightly" Final Report, 99. ²⁶⁶ Woolley, A Record..., 27

Instead of affirming that monuments had been saved, the US and UK Final reports merely stated that information had been transmitted.

The more clearly a picture of the "comparative immunity" of Europe's monuments was delineated, the less it was portrayed as a result of the Commission's work, and rather as an indirect consequence of the availability of "information." ²⁶⁷ In some sense, this turn of events enacted the disclaimer that had been stamped on the inside cover of every list and atlas, certifying that the "Purposes of the Civil Affairs Handbook" was not to imply "action" but to supply "basic factual information":

The Handbooks do not deal with plans or policies. It should clearly be understood that they do not imply any official program of action. They are rather ready reference source books containing basic factual information needed for planning and policy making.²⁶⁸

Because its work was exempted from carrying the weight of "any official plan of action," the MFA&A was relieved from any evaluation at war's end. Clearly the emphasis on the provision of "knowledge" was intended to evade any accusation of deliberate destruction—as Col. Geoffrey Webb wrote in a 1944 report, since military authorities had been informed of the location of monuments, "it is satisfactory to note that up to date so little damage is attributed to wantonness or ignorance on the part of Allied troops." 269 Yet the emphasis on disproving "wantonness" paradoxically reinforced the overall narrative of a "miraculous" survival of monuments, and helped military authorities to avoid the delicate question of whether monuments had been preserved at the expense of human lives.

Still today, an anecdotal tone pervades historical accounts of war damage to European monuments. While the disproportionate destruction wrought onto Germany is commonly acknowledged, it is treated as an "exception" that supports the theory that protection and iconoclasm were both idiosyncratic. In Nicola Lambourne's words, "if definite instances of the intentional targeting of historic monuments are rare, indisputable cases of intentional avoidance of the buildings are equally elusive.... In the absence of a positive stated Allied policy of bombing buildings of historic and cultural importance in Germany, the strongest impression given is more that of a lack of interest in avoiding them on the part of air forces and governments except towards the end of the war, when a succession of historic cities were devastated." The continued habit of presenting the preservation of monuments as contingent to the real narrative of war betrays a belief in the

²⁶⁷ Similarly, in September 1944 Colonel Webb was able to report "it is satisfactory to note that up to date so little damage is attributed to wantonness or ignorance on the part of Allied troops." Webb cited in Woolley, A Record..., 48. ²⁶⁸ "Purposes of the Civil Affairs Handbook" Printed as page iii of all volumes of Civil Affairs Handbooks.

²⁶⁹ Cited in Woolley. 20.

²⁷⁰ Lambourne, 163. For a pointed critique of this conclusion see J. Diefendorf's review in The Journal of Military History (Oct., 2001), 1151-1152.

autonomy of monuments—the very autonomy that it would be possible to verify with systematic analysis of damage. Now that a variety of historical taboos about military agency in an age of total war have been lifted, why has there not been more interest in verifying the efficacy of the Commission's work?

A half-century after the Commission issued its own evasive report, it is entirely possible to verify both the "resemblance" of Frick maps with patterns of destruction in individual cities, and the "efficacy" of the overall policy in the European war. A comprehensive study comparing all the monuments "protected" by Frick maps, "damaged" by aerial bombing, and given "first aid" by the MFA&A, would yield a transnational statistical range of efficacy with which the success of the Commission's work could be assessed—by the standards of Woolley's statistical method. Such a comprehensive study would undoubtedly verify the hierarchy between theaters of operation that was already evident in wartime—elucidating, for example, whether the passage from "testing" the protection policy in Europe to "applying" it in the Pacific yielded increased efficacy or a more perfunctory attitude. Similarly, monuments in the Eastern sectors—those the Roberts Commission omitted from its maps, and/or which were ultimately passed in the hands of the decidedly less interested Soviet authorities—could serve as a control group against which to test the Allied policy. This kind of comprehensive analysis would need also to account for the protective efforts of the German Kunstschutz, investigating whether a cumulative effect resulted in places where monuments were subject to both German and American protective mechanisms.

These large-scale statistical analyses lie clearly beyond the scope of this dissertation. (For Germany alone, the massive inventory published in 1988 as Kriegschicksale Deutscher Architektur: Verluste—Schäden—Wiederaufbau involved the collaboration of 65 scholars working in archives scattered across the country.)²⁷¹ In lieu of a general survey, however, some general lines of interpretation can be proposed by contrasting three countries for which comprehensive damage reports have been compiled: in Italy (where 5% of monuments were affected by war but the MFA&A's work is presented as a resounding success), in France (where all but 2% of monuments emerged intact and this survival is seen as "miraculous") and in Germany (where over 20% of monuments were affected, a statistic that is subsumed in a larger narrative of urban destruction). Each of these national surveys carries the statistical evaluations made by the MFA&A at war's end, but subjects them to proportional readings that reflect the morphology of destruction in each country. Despite the varied states of destruction in which the three countries found themselves at war's end, all three countries began reconstruction by attempting to draw historical conclusions from the damage itself. This

²⁷¹ Hartwig Beseler and Niels Gutschow, Kriegsschicksale Deutscher Architektur: Verluste—Schäden—Wiederaufbau (Karl Wachholtz Verlag, 1988), XI

reverse iconoclasm remains prevalent in reconstruction historiography today—as if the level of contingency involved in psychological warfare could only be surpassed by finding meaning in the shape of destruction, deducing from ruins both the military "intention" of attackers and the prescriptions for a civilian "morality" for national reconstruction.

Before addressing these national reconstruction narratives, however, there is one historical synchrony in the last year of war that can be addressed to help explain the increasing reluctance of the Roberts Commission to claim any kind of protection "plan": namely, the coincidence between the drastic escalation of Allied bombings in Germany and the dramatic discovery by MFA&A troops of the Nazi Art looting operation known as the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg für die Besetzen Gebiete (ERR). As soon as MFA&A officers entered German soil in the Fall of 1944, they encountered the hundreds of Nazi repositories of art—"castles, monasteries, cathedrals, private residences, farm houses and barns, office building basements, various mines and air-raid shelters" 272—containing thousands of movable cultural objects, from confiscated "ownerless" Jewish collections, to artworks requisitioned for Hitler's and Göring's personal collections, to furniture evacuated from state museums. The encounter with these repositories led the MFA&A to uncover the vast "Looting operation" that the Nazi party officials had planned, and the extent to which this looting had been successful. These events were "full of melodrama" and took over the entire MFA&A division. 273 As the Final Report frankly admitted, "The recovery, care for and return of portable objects of cultural value had priority of interest and activity in Germany and Austria. All other operations were curtailed owing to this overriding demand for attention."274 While this diversion of manpower was commensurate with the scope of the looting plan, the inventorying and protection of these collections also had the effect of diverting preciously few MFA&A troops away from giving "first-aid" to monuments in German cities, at precisely the moment when Allies Air Forces delivered their most destructive blow to these cities.

The MFA&A troops experienced this diversion—away from Germany's cites and towards repositories on far-away hilltops and in underground salt-mines—as an unexpected change of course, a sudden shift of attention from buildings to objects. This is no small point: MFA&A leaders considered that they had "tested" their policy in Italy and "perfected" it in France; Germany was therefore to be the third phase in the transformation of an ad-hoc system into a normalized

²⁷² Charles Kunzelman, "Some Trials, Tribulations, and Successes of the Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Teams in the European Theater During WWII," in Military Affairs (Apr 1988), 57.

²⁷³ "The action around these mine-repositories was filled with melodrama." Final Report, 140.

²⁷⁴ Final Report, 151.

policy.²⁷⁵ The simultaneous bombing escalation and discovery of the repositories went against their plan not only by dispersing the troops but also by radically separating "movable" and "immovable" monuments, and thereby undermining the logic of containment that, as we have seen, lay at the heart of the Allied definition of "monuments" This separation helped to spark a propaganda battle, that was sustained until the end of the war: between MFA&A officers exhibiting "looted" art works as evidence of Nazi cultural greed, while German propagandists brandished bombed city centers as evidence of Allied barbarism. (fig. 2.54)

Clearly German troops had removed cultural objects to repositories in part to exempt them from Allied bombings. Paradoxically, when the MFA&A troops took over these repositories and Allies proceeded to bomb the city centers whence much of this art had come, they were able to argue that they were protecting the art from Axis forces. In fact, MFA&A officers guarding repositories were charged not only with protecting the art, but also with collecting from these repositories "a large collection of documents" pertaining to the looting operation itself, which methodically detailed the movement and provenance of each artwork. In part, the point was to be able eventually to plan for the works' eventual "restitution" to original owners. But they also gathered these documents into a dossier titled "The Plunder of Art Treasures," 276 contributing to the building of the Allied charge of "conspiracy" against Nazi party officials at the Nuremberg Trial. In other words, if the last year of war diverted the MFA&A away from their protection "plan," it is in large part because they encountered the spoils—and began to accumulate evidence—of Hitler's own sinister plan for Europe's art. 277

The weight carried by art-looting in bringing a charge of "Conspiracy" against the Nazi regime at Nuremberg was small, but the central role played by the idea of hatching a "common plan" in the trial, and the spatial dimension of this plan, should not be underestimated. Before being indicted for three most infamous counts—Crime against Peace, Crimes of War, and Crimes against Humanity—Nazi party officials were accused, and some indicted, for having "conspired" to commit them:

²⁷⁵ For the most blunt usage of the terminology of "testing" and experimentation see Woolley, 19. There is evidence to show that the MFA&A itself realized that "the scattered and often isolated character of repositories" was keeping them from dealing with "the extremely severe destruction, especially in the northern part of the Rhine Province, the confusion" making it difficult to "initiate first-aid repairs to monuments" Webb, cited in Woolley, Final Report, 52 ²⁷⁶ "Chapter XIV: "The Plunder of Art Treasures." In Office of the United States Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume I (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946), 109. ²⁷⁷ As James Rorimer reported, "efforts concentrated on safeguarding the larger repositories of cultural resources and particular those in which "looted" items from foreign countries predominated." Rorimer, in Final Report, 137.

The Charter provided that those participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of these crimes would be held responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.²⁷⁸

The count of Conspiracy required the court simply to show that the defendants had hatched "a common plan," and from this line of argument a new definition of "a plan" emerged: "A plan in the execution of which a number of persons participate is still a plan, even though conceived by only one of them; and those who execute the plan do not avoid responsibility ... if they knew what they were doing." 279 After the court established that the "central core" of the conspiracy was "the Nazi party itself," it went through the main points of Nazi ideology, including its spatial dimension, the idea of Lebensraum. It is in this context, that documents about the ERR were introduced, to demonstrate that the cleansing of Lebensroum through bombing and genocide was a long-term plan for dispersal of Teutonic culture and cultural objects. 280 Indeed as soon as the MFA&A began inventorying the works, they instituted a distinction between objects which had been put away and objects which had been looted, and to note that, even if "the Germans abstained from attempting to secure works of art from public collections" it was because "such action would have conflicted with their propaganda for a 'New European Order.'"281 Once the Nüremberg trial got underway, the MFA&A used this information as "Evidence that Seizures [of art] Were not Merely for Protective Purposes," 282 to show that the ERR was not an improvised wartime loot but rather a long-term "plan" for the occupation of territory.

The idea that merely "conspiring to wage war" was grounds for the legal indictment of an entire regime marked a significant turning point in the way ethical responsibility was conceived in the age of total war. As the German defense team pointed out in the trial, "the concept of Conspiracy, as used by the Prosecution, [was] entirely unknown to German law" and to the entire civil law tradition. Yet the convictions that the United States secured on Count One set both the tone for the entire trial, and a precedent for postwar international law. It is significant for instance that the bombing of cities was excluded from the Nüremberg procedures, because it would have

²⁷⁸ Harold Leventhal, Sam Harris, John Wools72ey, and Warren Farr, "The Nuernberg Verdict," in Harvard Law Review, (Jul 1947), 858.

²⁷⁹ HLR, 870.

²⁸⁰ Discussion of Lebensraum at the trial can be found in Chapter XII: "Means Used by the Nazi Conspirators in Gaining control of the German State," Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, 184.

²⁸¹ AME / A/148 "The Commission for the Protection and Restitution of Cultural Material," Cosby Archive I/7.

²⁸² Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Vol.1, 1117.

²⁸³ W. J. Wagner was prompted to write in 1951 on "Conspiracy in Civil Law Countries," which began "It was revealed, at the Nuremberg Trial, that the approach to the problem of conspiracy in common law and in civil law countries is different." The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science (Jul-Aug 1951), 171-183.

implicated both Allied and Axis leadership,²⁸⁴ but that by the standards established by the Court, morale bombing as deployed by both RAF and Luftwaffe would qualify as a war-crime today. After the Nuremberg trials, in other words, "the crucial question" in war criminality became not "whether one had committed crimes" but whether one "knew or was chargeable with knowledge" of these crimes.²⁸⁵

In light of this conspiratorial redefinition of a "common plan," and its effects on ethical responsibility in war, one can return to Dinsmoor's deliberate characterization of the Allied protection policy as "unwitting," and to the insistence of British and American Final Reports that there was a gap of uncertainty between the provision of "information" about monuments and the deployment of "damage" in the Allied Offensive. In particular, if the Commission became so reluctant to claim any kind of "success" in its protection plan, it was not in fear that the plan might be revealed a failure, but rather for fear of revealing that there had been an Allied "plan" at all—lest it be seen in the same conspiratorial terms as the ERR.

Certainly the discovery of the ERR's repositories raised the stakes of the Roberts Commission's work and triggered the personal involvement of high-level "art politicians" who had hitherto only been nominally involved, such as National Gallery Director Francis Taylor. In 1944 Taylor traveled to Europe to visit the German repositories, publishing upon his return an article titled "The Rape of Europa" that used the art works and documents found in the salt mines at Alt-Haussée as evidence that Hitler had planned an "organized and methodical pillage" of cultural objects. "Obviously," Taylor wrote, "such a military program could not have been undertaken without many years of preparation." In contrast, Taylor described the Roberts Commission as a reactive measure whose level of success had surprised even its own protagonists: "In August 1943, when President Roosevelt appointed the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, no one dared to hope that the art of Europe would get off so easily as it has."286 In part, this was an accurate depiction—both of the reaction nature of the Commission, which amended its title to include "the Protection and Restitution of Cultural Material", and of the stealth with which a small group of academics had come to influence the conduct of war. Even MFA&A officers had been surprised at the rapidity by which "a job [which] started as a strange and almost ridiculous undertaking... was now accepted down the line." 287 By all accounts, the protective policy had been pushed by the art historians, and accepted by the War Department only

²⁸⁴ The Nazi defense included the bombing of Hamburg and Hiroshima in their defenses. Garrett, "Final Reflections," in Ethics and Airpower in World War II, 199-200.

²⁸⁵ The defense's citation is taken from HLR, 871.

²⁸⁶ Francis Henry Taylor, "The Rape of Europa," in The Atlantic Monthly (January 1945), 53.

²⁸⁷ Stout to Constable, 30 March 1945. Constable Papers AAA #3077.

"on the understanding that it would not impede military necessity." What Taylor never addressed, however, was how smoothly this work had been incorporated into Allied plans, and how easy it had been not to "disturb" the proportional ethic of military necessity. What are we to make of this seamlessness?

Clearly the art historians of the Roberts Commission did not "conspire" to preserve Europe's monuments by bombing the cities around them—not, at least, in the same sense as Nazi party officials "conspired" to empty Poland of its population, clearing a Lebensroum to be populated with German people and European cultural objects. But can it therefore be said that there is no connection between "what the art historians knew" and the spatial regime that resulted from the war—between the form of their knowledge and the shape of destruction? As our analysis of the disciplinary structure of the Roberts Commission has shown, it was the very structure of their discipline that allowed the scholars to participate seamlessly in the conduct of war. What, then, is the historical connection between the scholars composing maps and the cities that sustained damage as a result of them? What is, for example, Erwin Panofsky's responsibility to the 12 maps of German cities that he helped to compose? (fig. 2.57) What, more precisely, is the role played by city maps in the spatial development of the Allied protection plan? The Allied devised the image of "custody" partly in reaction to the image of a Nazi "conspiracy." To conclude this chapter, I look at the way this idea of custody was transmitted to the civilian affairs officers whose job it was to implement it. As with "conspiracy," the question to ask of these Allied actors is "what they knew." Unlike "conspiracy," however, the test of this knowledge is not whether it was "implemented" as a "plan," but whether it provided a form of custody to usher monuments in the transformations undergone by cities during and after the war. For this reason, I examine the spatial paradigms that these custodial schemes relied on, and how these were used at the end of fighting to insert monuments in damage morphologies, psychologies of reconstruction, and reconstruction plans in Italy, France and Germany.

Italy: Custody and restoration

If Italy had been the theater where the Allies had explicitly "tested" their protection policy during the war, it also became the site for a deliberate demonstration of the concept of monumental "custody" during reconstruction. As soon as they were able, MFA&A troops and Roberts Commission officers engineered the very public "return" of artworks to Italy, showcasing

²⁸⁸ "While the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not expect any military advantage from the proposed agency, they agreed to have American commanders cooperate with it in ways that did not interfere with military necessity." Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 48.

"salvaged" works in re-opened galleries and organizing impromptu "museums" at key collecting points. ²⁸⁹ (fig. 2.54 & 58) In keeping with this curatorial mentality, a few months after the Commission was dissolved key members transitioned into a post-war restoration project: transferring their efforts—and their budget—into the American Committee for the Reconstruction of Italian Monuments (ACRIM). ²⁹⁰ Using their contacts with Italian arts administrators and picking up directly where the Allied Military Government's financial support for the MFA&A ended, the ACRIM spent 1946 organizing exhibitions to raise funds for the restoration of monuments damaged by the Allies: the first titled Fifty War-Damaged Monuments, the second War's Toll of Italian Art. (fig. 2.61) These exhibitions effectively showcased the work of the Roberts Commission. War's Toll on Italian Art, for instance, was a photographic narrative in three sections: "Protection and Prevention of Damage", "Damage" and "Repair and Reconstruction," a sequence clearly designed to demonstrate that the ACRIM could extend the MFA&A's mission into the postwar.

It must be noted that in Italy the statistic that 5% of monuments were affected by war was placed into a larger analysis of destruction as shaped along a clearly legible path of war. In the words of one archaeologist, the war had created a "frightful via crucis" that had traversed certain cities like Naples but left others like Venice intact.²⁹¹ In this context, the damaged works of art and architecture were considered the cultural price Italy paid for escaping other encounters with the totality of war. By this logic, even those restoring damaged monuments saw their work in sacrificial terms. For example, the Associatione Nazionale per il Restauro dei Monumenti Danneggiati dalla Guerra (National Association for the Restoration of Monuments Damaged by War) introduced its 1945 "Exhibition of Italian Art" at by distinguishing two types of destruction, each with its own morality:

Many are the ruins today upon which Italians are forced to cry, or, better yet, to mediate. They are moral ruins and material ruins. But for some of these ruins, time—by which is meant here a complex and varied set of forces—can bring rebirth and reconstruction. There is however, one kind of destruction for which neither time nor goodwill of men can do anything: the destruction of a work of art. ²⁹²

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²⁸⁹ For a play-by-play of this "return", see Frederick Hartt, Forentine Art Under Fire (Princeton, 1949), 96-110.
²⁹⁰ Including Harvard members like Sachs and Constable, ACLS members like Crosby and Morey, and MFA&A officers like Dewalt and Hardt.

²⁹¹ "Che grande sono stati i danni patiti dall'arte italiana in questa guerra: da S. Chiara di Napoli al Camposanto di Pisa, da Montecassino al Tempio Malatestiano, dalle chiese barocche siciliane alle architetture civile di Verona, di Vicenza, via via, da sud a nord e tutta una spaventosa via crucis …" in Associazione Nazionale per il Restauro dei Monumenti Danneggiati dalla Guerra, Mostra d'Arte Italiana a Palazzo Venezia (Roma: 1945), no page.

²⁹² "Premessa," in Mostra d'Arte Italiana a Palazzo Venezia. The Associazione was directed by cultural minister Umberto Zanotti Bianco and composed of arts administrators Giorgio Castelfranco, Aldo de Rinaldis, Mariaroa Gagliardi Gabrielli, Enrico Gagliardi, Luigi Grassi, Federico Hermanin, Giovanni Incisa della Rochetta, Emiglio Lavagnino, Valerio Mariani, and Ruggero Schiff Giorgini. Cesare Brandi, of later Unesco fame, was invited to participate for his expertise in Sienese medieval art.

In accordance with this sacrificial psychology, the anonymous figure of 5% was suppressed in favor of the absolute quantity of 2,500 monuments. Of these, the most important were cited by name, as recognizable losses against the backdrop of what Woolley had called the "orgy of destruction."

The ACRIM exhibitions echoed the themes of its Italian counterpart, but leveraged them into an expiatory exercise for the Allies. Where the Associazione had opened with a morality tale, the ACRIM catalog began with a text, by Italian Director of Antiquities Bianchi-Bandinelli, which described for an American reader the spatial disposition of Italy's heritage: "Buildings of artistic value in Italy are not, as in other countries, gathered in the most important cities in groups of constructions that were carried out according to a pre-arranged plan." The shape of destruction, then, was explained not by the random path of war but also by Italy's regional monumental history.

The task of connecting Italy's dispersed monumental landscape to the psychology of total war, then, was left to philosopher Benedetto Croce, who contributed a preface to the ACRIM catalogue. Croce's text both confirmed the religiosity of the situation ("these losses are the outward aspect of the age that has come upon us in an abasement and bewilderment of moral and religious forces overcome by forces of blind and brutal power, unchained by destiny, which yet will have their own unfamiliar justification, in the hidden plans of Providence,") and its connection with psychological warfare ("it is childish to expect tumults and revolts for peace from supposed terror since in these cases a new psychology appears, which is different from the psychology of tranquil and ordinary life, dominated by resignation and possessed of a kind of tranquility.") 294

Following these Italian statements of spatial fortuity and psychological resignation, came an introduction by the chairman of ACRIM's "planning committee," Millard Meiss, that relieved Allied and Fascists alike from any responsibility: "Despite the intelligent efforts of the Allies and the Italians to prevent and repair damage, without which the losses would have been much worse, the war waged through the Italian peninsula battered or destroyed some 2500 works of artistic and historic interest, among them a number of masterpieces." While the exhibition catalogue implied that any of the exposed works might be the object of American help, in private meetings the ACRIM decreed that funds should be used "to preserve permanently what has been saved by the initial work of salvage and protection." The role of the ACRIM, even in the postwar, was to defy contingency.

²⁹³ Ranuccio Bianchi-Badinelli "Foreword," in Fifty War-Damaged Monuments of Italy, trans. Sara T. Morey (Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato: Roma, 1946), ix. Also in cited War's Toll of Italian Art, iv.

²⁹⁴ Benedetto Croce, "Foreword," Fifty War-Damaged Monuments of Italy, v-vi. The somewhat obscure text is partially due to the translation by Sara T. Morey.

Millard Meiss, (Co-chairman, Planning Committee, ACRIM), "Foreword," in War's Toll of Italian Art: An Exhibition Sponsored by the American Committee for the Restoration of Italian Monuments (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1946), i. Meiss to Constable, Jan 2 1947. Constable Papers, AAA #3078.

The work of the ACRIM can be seen as a final show of disciplinary cohesion on the part of art history in the face of total war. But it should be noted that the ACRIM also re-injected art-historical "judgment" with the hierarchies that had suspended during the war—especially once it became clear that certain monuments would have to be chosen to receive American financial aid. By the time funds had been collected from the exhibition, the Italian Ministry of Fine Arts made clear that "the time for first-aid repairs was over," and provided a list of monuments that were candidates for more serious restorations. (fig. 2.60) These were organized in a hierarchical system that weighed "urgency of repair" against "artistic importance":

- Class 1. Monuments of absolutely first artistic importance, seriously damaged but not involving prohibitive sums
- Class 2. Monuments of great artistic importance, so badly damaged that enormous sums will be necessary for their repair or restoration
- Class 3. Monuments of considerable importance and medium expense, but not of the absolute supremacy or urgency of class 1. 298

The American art historians accepted the Italian Government's list of suggested monuments, but found that this three-part classification oversimplified the relation between the monetary value of repair and cultural value of reconstruction. Instead a special sub-committee of ACRIM was formed, chaired by Sachs and Constable, to devise a set of criteria for selection. Sachs and Constable unequivocally re-instated art historical judgment to the place whence it had been removed during the war: "The primary criterion of choice should be artistic and historic importance," they decreed. "Subject to these overriding criteria, considerations of geographical distribution, American interest, and urgency or repair should be taken into account." Following these criteria, the members of ACRIM conducted a "vote" to decide which monuments would receive financial aid. The winning monument, the CampoSanto in Pisa, received \$15,000. Later, \$50,000 were spent on the Tempio Malatestiano in Rimini, leaving a total of \$25,000 which was eventually allotted to smaller projects.

²⁹⁷ "Ma se Voi mi permettete di parlare liberamente Vi dirò con tutta franchezza il mio pensiero. Oramai per le opere, come dite di first aid, e alquanto tardi." Ettore Modignani (Sovrintendenza All'Arte Medioevale e Moderna delle Provincie Lombardi, Milano) to Constable 2 Dec, 1946, Constable Papers, AAA #3078.

²⁹⁸ ACRIM, Report given by Frederick Hartt, November 1946. Constable Papers AAA #3078

²⁹⁹ ACRIM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on Monuments at the Meeting on November 30th 1946." December 15, 1946. This committee was made up of Paul Sachs and WG Constable, co-chairmen, along with Perry Cott, Sumner Crosby, Ernest deWald, Frederick Hardt, Richard Krautheimer, and Robert Lehman. AAA #3077

³⁰⁰ Lee to Constable, 13 Nov 1947. Constable Papers, AAA #3077. On April 13 1948 Meiss gave a final accounting: 8,000 including Cincinnati money raised for Milan: for the Portico of Bramante

^{5,000} for the basilica of Vicenza (this is sufficient to repair the Palladian arcades, the part of the building which are of course, most interested.)

^{2,000} for complete restoration of one house at Pompei, specific house to be selected by Maiuri

^{5,000} to the villa Falconieri, Frascati; as well as some funds to the Motion Picture Association of America."

With this vote, the ACRIM completed the transition from preventative to restorative selection, and began to articulate the principles by which these "choices" would become visually legible in the built environment, both in individual monuments and at the level of archaeological fragments. When 5,000 Lira were attributed to the restoration of the Basilica of Vicenza, this amount was judged "sufficient to repair the Palladian arcades, the part of the building which are of course, most interested." The differentiation between "intact" and "restored" was then carried over into a restoration ethic, in keeping with the principles that Ranuccio Bianchi-Bandinelli enunciated in the ACRIM catalog:

The new must be distinguishable from the old; but at the same time the work of art must give again to whoever looks at it the same sensation that it gave in its original form. The sensation is stronger the more clearly the original part can be distinguished from the restoration.

As we will see, this practice of distinguishing the "old" from the "new" exemplifies the principle of "integrity" that Unesco would develop in the postwar. Here this restorative principle was connected to the idea of a two-part morality, and a compromised set of principles for action.

No documents better demonstrate the hybridity of the Commission's agency in this transitional climate than this "postal vote." (fig. 2.59) What this list conveys is the power to make a judgment of aesthetic value (that damaged monuments should be restored) based on an ethical obligation (to devote American funds monuments damaged by American bombs), but only as suggested by Italian archaeological expertise, and as subjected to the bureaucratic procedure of a "postal vote." Clearly the effects of this vote on the reconstruction of Italy as a whole were small, and the "drama" with which the MFA&A activity in Italy continues to be recounted as a resounding success is chiefly due to the because it is the place where the Roberts Commission most dramatically continued to implement its idea of "custody" in the postwar. Yet it is there is no doubt that this bureaucratic procedure became a blueprint for postwar international cultural action. The meaning of "custody" in the Italian case point us forward to the next chapter, and to a decade when Unesco took the idea of "custody" to a principle of international bureaucracy.

Already in the immediate postwar, some members of the Roberts Commission became involved in institutional reconstruction, ensuring art-historical continuities in a moment when Allied policies would otherwise have mandated institutional ruptures. The most notable example is Charles Rufus Morey, who became cultural attaché to the US Embassy in Rome and as such engineered the survival of "the ex-German Library." The Library was threatened by dissolution following the Potsdam agreement, according to which "German assets in Italy should be sold and the proceeds

³⁰¹ Ranuccio Bianchi-Bandinelli, xii.

disposed of for reparation to the 3 powers." Morey's proposal to form an International Union of Archaeology, History and History of Art in Rome received the support of a Unesco grant, to purchase the Library and ensured its continued existence as an institution under Morey's directorship. 302

As the scholars transitioned into these reconstruction projects, their lists and maps of monuments themselves experienced a significant afterlife—especially as their potential value in the development of postwar tourism became apparent. Already in early 1944 Sumner Crosby had inquired with Archibald MacLeish about "the possibility of copy-righting the maps," to prepare for the possibility that these might be "published as a sort of guidebook," at war's end. 303 This scheme was fulfilled in a 1946 proposal by Gladys Hamlin to construct An Art Guide of Italy, With Notes on War Damage based on the entire volume of material produced by the Commission, from Civil Affairs Atlases to MFA&A Reports. 304 Although this guide was never published, its popularizing intent vindicated the work that had been put into formatting art-historical expertise for a broad audience in Constable's words, the continued efforts to address the lists to "Captain John Smith from Kalamazoo, in real life a bond salesman," by continuing to cater to him in the postwar. 305 Others participants sought to leverage the unprecedented scope of the collaboration that had been undertaken during war, to pursue postwar scholarly ends. For instance, in 1948 Dinsmoor submitted a proposal to use the Roberts Commission's Card File as the basis for building a comprehensive "Photographic Archive of Works of Art" in America. While the members of the CAA panel assigned to evaluate Dinsmoor's proposal found it unrealistically ambitious, they did offer a counter-proposal of their own: to conduct a survey of the photographs already held in personal and public collections in the US, and to use the results to gather financial support and thematic direction for building the CAA's library of slides by sending "photographic expeditions" abroad. 306

Each of these proposed uses of the lists can be understood as early versions of "custodial" projects later taken on by UNESCO: "campaigns" devoted to the salvage of specific monuments, "missions" to enhance the tourist value of others, and construction of circulation of global inventories of monuments in the place of—and to encourage—the worldwide circulation of people. There also exist some specific continuities between the Roberts Commission and the staffing of the US delegation who helped to draft the Hague Convention for the Protection of Monuments in War Areas. As a

³⁰² Morey to Constable, 16 Feb 1949, Constable Papers. AAA#3078.

³⁰³ Crosby to MacLeish, 14 Jan 1944. "We should like to protect ourselves as well as the right of the our collaborators and also be in a position to supervise or control any such future publication." ASCSA I/8.

³⁰⁴ Hamlin to Dinsmoor, 21 Feb 1946. The proposal, attached, which was "designed to meet the needs of the tourist." Constable, "Works of Art In Wartime," 38. Constable Papers, AAA #3077.

³⁰⁶ Julius Held, Grace Morley & Craig Hugh Smyth, Chairnman, "Report of the Committee Appointed to Consider the Proposal for a Photographic Archive made by Professor Dinsmoor of Columbia University." [Jan 1948?] Crosby Papers, V/49.

delegate in this group, Sumner McKnight Crosby was charged in 1954, for example, with consulting former members of the MFA&A troops on the proposed language of the Convention. Their comments, perhaps not surprisingly, bore mostly on the way the question of "military necessity" was summarily mentioned at the beginning of the text, but never addressed as a particular modus operandi of the implementation procedure. "It is assumed," one of them wrote, "that warfare is still conducted on the high level of diplomatic courtesy which existed before 1914." While most found the drafting of a convention a sign of "a marked improvement," over the ad-hoc system they had experienced, and others saw in the effort, however failed, a symptom that the issue had reached appropriate levels of power ("Perhaps such an elaborate spelling out of the polite and complex movements of diplomatic negotiations is useful to elevate the problem to a high level of diplomatic thought and recognition"), most voiced the same skepticism at the very idea that "avoidance" could be implemented by "inspectors." This overwhelming skepticism at the idea of immunity itself undoubtedly stemmed from having experienced first hand the flexibility of this notion during the war.

France: An urban tour of cultural treasures

Even as the members of the Roberts Commission wielded their lists as instruments of restitution politics in Italy, they continued retrospectively to recast their wartime work as a mission of "information," rather than "protection." It is for instance in his introduction to War's Toll of Italian Art that Charles Rufus Morey summarized his participation in the "mapping" of monuments as a form of information-gathering: the goal was to "gather all information we could that might be useful in repairing what damage was done." Crucially, in this post-facto re-calibration of the Commission's ambitions, Morey emphasized the graphic portion of the Commission's work. Monuments had been "protected," he implied, not by being "avoided" but by being "mapped." This allowed Morey to claim that all monuments had been equally protected, since all countries had been mapped: "To us a cultural monument was a cultural monument, wherever it happened to be, and we mapped in Germany and Japan as busily as anywhere else." Yet as we have seen, there was a quantitative and a qualitative difference in the way these three countries had been "mapped":

³⁰⁷ "Comments by Certain Former MFA&A Officers on the Unesco Draft Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict." In an accompanying letter to Max MacCullough on 2 Apr 1954, Crosby explained: "I have consulted with a few representative people on this problem who were also very active in this same matter during 1943-1946. In general, reactions are enthusiastic at least in regard to the real progress such a document as this indicates. On the other hand, given this particular moment in our civilization, there is, quite naturally, a good deal of pessimism." Crosby Papers, XII/129.

³⁰⁸ "Any damage which the appointment of ... inspectors is meant to avoid will long since have been perpetrated." ³⁰⁹ Charles Rufus Morey, "Foreword," in Fifty War-Damaged Monuments of Italy, vii-viii.

while Italy was comprehensively described in detailed regional inventories, the German atlas consisted exclusively of city maps, while all the monuments in Japan had been fit legibly on a single country map. While it is true that all three countries had been mapped, a crucial ethical hierarchy had been implemented by the scale of the map itself.

Far from a neutral medium, the geographic paradigm of a map punctuated by monuments was a crucial instrument for the transmission of "what the art historians knew" to the Army, and the dissemination to MFA&A officers of an ethic of proportional selection. Morey played a major role in devising this framework: not only by composing the maps, but also by authoring the "Lecture on Preservation of Cultural Treasures" for Civil Affairs Officers training in a universities across the country. This lecture reveals with particular poignancy the spatial principles used to convey the idea of "custody" of monuments, and shows that the Commission's maps carried not just inventories of monuments but an entire spatial paradigm of cultural history.

Written over a few months with periodical input from Dinsmoor, the "Lecture on Preservation of Cultural Treasures" began by inviting officers to see architectural monuments landmarks of the "enlightenment of mankind":

The history of civilization and liberty is written in the artistic and historic monuments of Europe ... The churches and monuments, the sculpture and painting, of the countries the Nazis have invaded are ... the tangible and visible documents of ... the enlightenment ... of mankind. 310

For the sake of synthesis, Morey and Dinsmoor then condensed this entire history into five national phases, each of which stood to represent both a stage in the historic progress and a region in geographic coverage of all of Europe:

Greece introduced into Europe the rational habit of mind which has been the norm of thinking in the western world ... Rome spread classic culture throughout the shores of the Mediterranean, and kept it alive in its Latin form in the dark days of the early middle ages. ... In Italy began the revival of learning and science known as the Renaissance. ... France in the Middle Ages organized and codified the Christian faith, and the theology of Thomas Aquinas of the 12th century is still the core of Catholic teaching today ... In Poland monument after monument commemorated—or did before the Nazi invasion—the heroic struggles of that nation to keep itself politically free and intact, and to preserve its religion and rich culture. 311

Dinsmoor and Morey perfected this sequence of countries in order to arrive at a universal and teleological representation of "nationhood." Aside from the notable absence of Germany in this history, the result was a rather banal illustration of the cultural geography of Europe in the lecture's

 $^{^{310}}$ Charles Rufus Morey and William Bell Dinsmoor, "Text for a Lecture on Cultural Monuments, Final Draft," 1. ASCSA IX/ 2

^{311 &}quot;Text for a Lecture...." 3.

first four slides: the Parthenon, Michelangelo's Pietà, Amiens's Cathedral and the Wiskiewicz statue in Cracow.

The lecture's innovation lay in what followed: its explication of the categories of Monuments to be protected.³¹² Here too the lecture proceeded by example, illustrating each of the four categories with a "famous building." But while the first drafts of this lecture used examples from a variety of countries—a Florentine church, a Loire Valley castle, a Greek ruin—subsequent drafts progressively streamlined the lecture to contain only French examples, and to use a sequence of "pairs of slides," each pairing a nationally known example ("a very famous building"), with a local equivalent from the city of Dijon:

To explain these classifications, I shall show you a very famous building in each category, and along with it a parallel example taken from a French town of the type that might quite possibly be your specific assignment. Let us suppose that the town is Dijon in eastern France.

. . .

Churches are the first category because they are on the whole the foremost cultural treasures in the consciousness of the inhabitants of any European city or town. Notre Dame at Paris, a masterpiece of Gothic architecture and probably the most famous architectural monument in France. But the importance of this smaller church of the same name at Dijon, for Dijon, is just about as great.

. . .

Palaces in Europe have a broader and less romantic significance than with us... The chateau of Chenonceaux ... is a well-known example of these fortified residences. ... At Dijon there is a structure in the same category—now converted into a museum for half of its considerable extent, and into the town-hall for its other half.

. . .

The Louvre in Paris is what comes to mind when the word "museum" is mentioned, it is the richest museum in Europe ... Dijon's museum is in the ducal palace is full of relics dating from the days of Burgundian glory.³¹³

Using the Dijon map from the French Handbook as a key, the lecture explicated both the meaning of the word "monument" and its manifestations in Europe, through an analogy between intellectual "consciousness" and spatial disposition—as if an urban promenade through a French city was the standard experience of the history of mankind. Thus every French town had its own Louvre, its own Notre Dame, its own laboratory, etc. Not only did France become a cultural blueprint for Europe as a whole, but Dijon became a metonymic representation of France. The result of this parallel was that the cultural geography of Europe was contained in the single urban plan of a mid-sized French town.

³¹² ""'Artistic and Historic Monuments,' or 'Cultural Treasures'," the lecture continued, "are very comprehensive terms, and are intended to be. The rough classification so far followed by the Commission divides "cultural treasures" into (1) churches; (2) palaces, châteaux and houses; (3) monuments, under which heading are included not only commemorative monuments, but remains of ancient structures, buildings of historic or artistic importance (other than churches and palaces), open-air works of art such as fountains, etc., and (4) cultural institutions, which include museums, university buildings, libraries, archives, scientific collections, laboratories, and the like." "Text for a Lecture...," 4.

³¹³ "Lecture on the Protection...," 5-7.

While the city maps conveyed specific information, this lecture conveyed an overall urban thinking that might help to edit this information in the face of contingency. If certain "marked" monuments were going to have to be sacrificed to "military necessity", the operative principle behind the policy as a whole was that any European town plan contained at least five monuments. By the emerging standards of international law, one might say that the scholars "knew what they were doing" when they structured this lecture around an urban promenade, teaching military officers to think in urban terms, that urban plans are monumental metaphors of the intellectual history of European civilization.

One of the things that this lecture helps to explain is the central—indeed paradigmatic—position that France occupied in the Allies' perception of the overall fate of European monuments. The story of a "miraculous" survival of monuments was largely based on the French figure of 2%, released in 1944, which continued to be disseminated in the postwar decades. In contrast with Italy's trail of destruction, in France the morphology of damage was dispersed and variegated—product of several waves of destruction, caused by diverse forms of fighting, from both sides, in urban, coastal, and rural sites. Surviving monuments were therefore incorporated into a version of total war as a game of chance. This version was also supported by the narrative of "resistance" mythologized by the Gaullist regime starting in 1945: like the Résistance, French monuments had survived attack against immesurable odds. Against this narrative, subsequent research has found that measures implemented by the Vichy regime as early as 1941 worked to affect the conduct of war, including the way monuments were administered. Yet specific coincidences between monumental survival and destruction—such as the fact that France was a major focus of Kunstschutz activity—have not been investigated. Thus it remains unclear whether what continues to be perceived

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³¹⁴ By 1948 this figure had become so nominal a marker of "comparative immunity" that Sumner Crosby mistakenly cited the figure as 12%, but still used it as evidence that France had been "singularly fortunate." "Although approximately 12%, or over 1700, classified historical monuments throughout France were damaged in varying degrees during the war, it must be admitted that, except for certain areas in Normandy and in Alsace and in Lorraine, France Sumner McK. Crosby, "Report on Conditions Relating to Research and Study in the History of Art in France," in College Art Journal, V. 7, N. 3. (Spring, 1948), 202-204.

³¹⁵ Notably, Danièle Voldman argued in La reconstruction des villes françaises de 1940 à 1954: histoire d'une politique. (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997), that "la rupture de 1944-1945, évidente sur le plan politique et militaire s'éstompe dans le domaine urbain pour trois raisons au moins": first, the importance of cities as strategic units in total war; second, the continued validity of the legal framework setup during Vichy, and third, the continued desire for a statewide policy and bureaucracy even after the change of hands. Voldman, "Avant-propos," 7-15. See also Voldman's edited Images, Discours et Enjeux de la Reconstruction des Villes Françaises après 1945, Cahiers de l'Institut d'Histoire du Temps Présent 5 (Jun 1987) and her "La France après les ruines," in Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire 30. (Apr – Jun 1991), 103-104, where she reviews the 1991 exhibition Reconstructions et modernisation, La France après les ruines, 1918... 1945..., at the Musée de l'histoire de France (Paris: Archives Nationales, 1991).

as a "happy accident" was in fact the cumulative effect of having three protective policies (German, French and Allied) operative in one place.³¹⁶

Consider for instance the Northern city of Beauvais: when the war broke out the city was still undergoing reconstructions from World War I; it counted 80 monuments inscrit or classés. The city sustained German bombings in 1940 and Allied raids in 1944; while 80% of the center-city was destroyed, the 13 monuments that had been marked on the Frick map emerged "intact" by the time Dinsmoor visited them—no doubt in part because throughout these successive destructions, they were consistently under some form of protection. Placing the Frick map of Beauvais in a sequence with pre-war and post-war plan of the city, demonstrates visually the urban nature of the notion of "custody" in France. (fig. 2.62)

If Morey and Dinsmoor were able to structure their lecture as a walking tour of a randomly chosen French city, it is because a regional policy of monuments protection had been in place in France since the early 19th century. Inaugurated in 1830 the Service des Monuments Historiques had been devised by Guizot as a "custodial" system itself, which appropriated monuments once belonging to the aristocracy in an inventory maintained by a republican administration on behalf of the patrie. ³¹⁷ By the middle of the 20th century, this custodial system had been propagated along regional lines, producing the nested heritage categories used in their lecture: to every town its churches, palaces, museums, city halls, etc. Notably, a 1913 urban law had been the first to implement monumental protection at the urban level.

The visual exercise of placing Frick maps in a sequence between pre- and post-war urban plans can be repeated for any French cities that underwent significant destruction. (fig. 2.63) This pattern shows how consistently the MFA&A implemented a French custodial regime that had been temporarily suspended in war. Perhaps more importantly, these sequences also reveal a striking, but generally untold, aspect of the French reconstruction: that France rebuilt its cities around its monuments. Orthodox histories of the French reconstruction distinguish three tendencies in city planning schemes in the first postwar decade: "identical reconstructions," (some, like Gien, begun during Vichy), "tabula rasa" (dreamed by modernists and seldom implemented, except at Le Havre and Maubeuge) and "reasonable modernizations" (most common and seen to result from a compromise, as at Beauvais and Rouen). 318 Despite the ubiquity of monuments in all three types of

³¹⁶ For the MFA&A's own report of the Kunstschutz's activities in France, see Marvin C. Ross, "The Kunstschutz in Occupied France," in College Art Journal (May 1946), 336-352.

For an analysis of "The Guizot moment," see Dominique Poulot & Richard Wrigley, "The Birth of Heritage: 'Le moment Guizot'," in Oxford Art Journal Vol. 11, No.2 (1988), 40-56

These categories belong to Anatole Kopp, L'Architecture de la Reconstruction en France 1945-1953 (Paris: Moniteur, 1982), "Projets et Réalisations," 103-128. A similar distinction, in abbreviated form, is given in the first chapter if Trente-cinq

MM. les Urbanistes (Paris: 15 Marc 1945).

reconstructions, their role in the "moderation" of "radicality" that is presumed to have emerged from the reconstruction has not been examined. (fig. 2.63-67)

The ubiquity of monuments in French reconstruction urbanism, and the silent role they played as anchors in the "reasonable modernization" of French cities, must be understood in light of the way the reconstruction reorganized the French architectural profession into a hierarchical system, which centered both architects and their commissions in nested urban scales. The Charte des Architectes issued by the Ministry of Reconstruction in 1945 recommended a zoning strategy that was based loosely on the four functions of the Athens Charter. But despite its embrace of modernist rhetoric this system effectively promoted an academic view of urbanism as "architecture on the large scale," by encouraging Beaux-Arts compositional thinking at the level of the city block ("ilot"). In combination with the fiscal re-structuring of private property around block-wide collectivities, this scaling system produced an urbanism of islands, which tended to be "composed" around surviving monuments. 319 (In fact, as with the Athens Charter's own concession to "historic monuments," the Architects' Charter included a provision that some ilots could be left as historic islands, "curated" into "veritable open-air museums." 320) Furthermore, the Ministry kept in place a law passed by the Vichy regime in 1943, dictating that all monuments be surrounded by a 500-meter "diameter of visibility." This diameter gave architects of the Service des Monuments Historiques a say in the disposition of all buildings neighboring monuments—effectively giving them an invisible hand in reconstruction schemes nation-wide.321 Thus the authority of the Monuments Historiques was quietly built into the legal and bureaucratic framework of the reconstruction, ensuring first, that any monument protected by the Allies was adequately "curated," and secondly, that monuments became the "elephants in the room" of French reconstruction urbanism.

Six years after having inventoried monument damage in the Bulletin Monumental, Jean Verrier assessed the effect that the reconstruction—and in particular the 1943 "visibility law"—had transformed the relation between "Ancient Monuments and Urbanism" since the war. ³²² Verrier's

ans d'urbanisme (Paris: Confédération Française pour l'habitation et l'urbanisme, 1985). Voldman's categories are more sublte since she follows a progressive transformation but the idea that reconstruction was a "compromise" remains.

319 On the rules of re-membrement and their impact on the morphology of postwar cities, see Jacques Lucan's text.

320 «Rien n'est plus honorable pour un urbaniste et un architecte que de réaliser le "curetage" d'un beau vieux quartier plein d'histoire et de beaux vieux immeubles de haute qualité artistique. Ces îlots conservés pourront constituer de véritables musées vivants, tandis qu leurs rues, itinéraires archaéologiques et historique offriront au touriste et au promeneur le charme et le visage réel des maisons du passé. » Ministère de la Reconstruction et de l'Urbanisme, Note à

³²¹ See P. Verdier, "Monuments historiques: administration—legislation—financement," in *Techniques et Architecture* Vol.9, No. 11-12, Conservation et Création (Nov 1950), 71-73.

³²² The purpose of the publication was evidently to re-normalize preservation discourse; most articles inscribed the advances, projects or debates produced by war into a long-term history of French preservation. For example, Jean Trouvelot's introductory survey, "De la restoration des monuments historiques," began with a long list of

article appeared in a special issue of Techniques et Architecture titled Conservation et Création. Much like reconstruction urbanists, Verrier saw the reconstruction as a compromise. In some cities this had been a positive result: when "monuments imposed a certain urbanization," (as at St Lô), or where monuments had been "re-aligned" to fit within circulation schemes (as with Beauvais's Théatre de la Ville whose façade had been set back stone by stone). But Verrier also bemoaned that the law had too often been understood as an obligation produce a "dégagement" (unecumbering) around monuments, learning the worst lessons from the 19th century debates. Most French monuments, Verrier added, were meant to be embedded in a medieval city fabric that hugged their base and forced an intimate experience of their intricate sculptural details. Instead, Verrier bemoaned, an excess of space had been built around too many surviving monuments—as if the friction Verrier between the "architecte-urbanistes and the architects of the Monuments Historiques" had grown a new type of urban space around monuments—resolving a professional discomfort by leaving awkward adjacencies. Elsewhere in the issue, another contributor summarized the neutralizing effect this had on monuments: French cities, he wrote, had been effectively "Haussmannized." ³²³

Verrier's analysis confirms that monuments—and those in whose custody they lay—played a crucial role in the "reasonable modernization" devised by the French Ministry of Reconstruction. That this was a form of "moderation" is perhaps best seen in contrast with the article contributed, a by Le Corbusier to the same issue, under the title "Urbanism and respect of heritage," which took up his Parisian vignettes of the 1930s, and added other European cities, to illustrate the point that "everything is continuous: traditions and revolutions" and to argue that "there is no need to anihilate the sacred heritage of the past." (fig. 2.64) He demonstrated the point by including two ruined churches on the edges of his famous scheme for the reconstruction of St-Dié. (fig. 2.65-66) Yet this didactic positioning of the churches, as romantic portals on either end of the modernist scheme, constituted a clear a departure from the more integrated Plan Voisin scheme of the 1930s. There, monuments had been sprinkled throughout, closely framed by modernist typologies, here a

[&]quot;deteriorating factors", both natural and man-made, that contribute to monumental wear and tear. Similarly, Verdier's inventory of legislation unproblematically inserted the laws passed in war—including the visibility law, into a long-term narrative beginning with Guizot in 1830. Jean Verrier, "Monuments Anciens et Urbanisme," in Conservation et Création, 81-82.

³²³ This argument was made by Henri Vergnolle, as part of a larger advocacy for the creation of some "quartier de pierres" (stone neighborhoods) assembled out of monuments (like "puzzle pieces")—literally moving them to make way for the destruction of the "quartiers insalubres" that surrounded monuments in city centers. Vergnolle cited an American precedent in support of this scheme: "ce n'est pas une chose nouvelle. Depuis longtemps les Américains nous ont instruit du procédé: combine de vieux châteaux, de vielles chapelles, de morceaux d'architecture n'ont-ils pas déposés, numérotés, transportés et réédifiés sur le sol du nouveau continent!" Henri Vergnolle, "Du quartier de tauds au quartier de vieilles pierres," in Conservation et Création, 83-85. Ironically, this "island" scheme is closer to the post-war proposals Le Corbusier had turned to by 1950; in this sense Verrier constitutes the middle-ground position in the issues three articles about monuments in city planning.

³²⁴ Le Corbusier. "L'urbanisme et le respect du patrimoine artistique," in Conservation et Création, 86-90.

deliberate white space lay between city and heritage, as if the middle ground between past and future had simply been removed. What this also demonstrates is that, unlike the MRU's reconstruction urbanism, Le Corbusier's utopia was not scalable.

The scalable character of the Roberts Commission's custody program is what makes its "Lecture on the Protection of Monuments" significant as an overall conceptual scheme, beyond its premonition of postwar French urbanism. Indeed this use of the urban plan as a model of cultural history was crucial in helping Commission members like Morey legitimize the leap from supplying descriptive information to making prescriptive recommendations. Certainly an unresolved link between "monuments" and "civilization" had been latent in Morey's work in the 1930s—note for instance a lecture he gave to explain "The Arts in Relation to History," answered the question, "What is the Function of Art History?" with the single statement, "Art is a function of Civilization." Presenting European cities as monumental metaphors of the history of civilization was a way to solve the philosophical problem of this circular "functionality." But it was the war that prompted Morey to make the further leap, from using cities to describe the history of art, to using monuments to defend cities.

As the Allies approached Paris in the summer of 1944, Morey broadcast an appeal to spare "Paris, and its Cultural Treasures" by giving listeners a tour of the city's monuments. Like the general Lecture, this tour presented Paris as a storehouse of European civilization:

Will Paris be besieged, as it was in 1870, and suffer the tenfold greater damage which modern bombardment may bring, no matter how carefully our aviators be briefed and our gunners informed about the irreplaceable treasures of architecture, art and history which are housed in this City of Light? Paris has borne this name of "City of Light" for a century of two, as the focus of European culture, the Athens of the modern world. She well deserved the title, for there is little that these centuries added to our store of literature and art that did not have its beginnings in the capital of France.

Morey then recounted its development from antiquity and, as he proceeded towards modern times, what had begun as a tour of existing monuments became a tour of a city that might practically disappear. "The list of Parisian structures, monuments, memorials that the world cannot afford to lose is long." Yet he offered amazingly, that if any monument had to be "sacrificed to war's destruction," it would be the column of the Place Vendôme. As a monument to modern indutrialized warfare ("consecrated to the record of Napoleon's victories that made France the mistress of Europe,") which was made of melted German artillery, it deserved to be destroyed "a

³²⁵ Charles Rufus Morey, "Art in Relation to History," Lecture Notes Morey Papers XII/A.

relic of the epoch of power politics and aggression which this war will bring to an end"). 326 By 1944, Morey had not only accepted that some listed monuments might disappear; he had also become ready to "select" which monuments had become expendable because they were "least characteristic of a capital of culture." This idea that removing a monument might help to edit European history for a better future, marks a crucial turning point in the urban thinking of the Commission: the moment when the "function" of monuments stopped being explicative of history and became instrumental instead. At the moment when the art historians realized that their plan was imperfect, "however carefully our aviators be briefed," the protection policy became a "witting" urban planning program. Since selecting monuments for preservation might not preserve them, it was better to select those monuments "that might be least regretted" instead.

Germany: The urban utopia of "re-orientation"

Morey was not the only member of the Commission to use an abstract urban image to argue for the preservations of monuments as markers of civilization. Since 1934, WG Constable had been at work on a text explicating "the function of the arts in society" by using an urban image he called a "utopia." In the span of a decade and in the face of war, Constable turned his theory of the place of art in the university into a theory of the place of monuments in a modern city. The lecture began as a lesson on "Art Schools and Community," given when Constable was still in England, at Coventry in 1934. "That art is an indispensable element in a great civilization," Constable argued, "is suggested by history." He then conjured an image of an urban Utopia to prove the point:

Everybody probably has a Utopia in his minds, some vision of a perfect organization of society. Think of a great city in such conditions. Such institutions as the Treasury, and all the countless buildings occupied with law, finance, and war, would disappear. [They represent means not ends] Some of them perhaps might be retained as fine buildings in themselves.

Later that year, Constable modified these notes for the sake of an American audience, replacing "a great city" with "Washington," and continuing: "But whatever else disappeared, such institutions as the Library of Congress, the National Gallery, the cathedral, the Smithsonian institution, places devoted to the arts, the pursuit of knowledge, the practice of religion, would be retained. Such a vision is an effective measure of the necessity of art" ³²⁷ In other words, "art" was what distinguished between institutions that might become "monuments" and those which would simply "disappear."

³²⁶ "There are a few of the cultural treasures of Paris for which all must devoutly hope a safe survival through the hazards of war." Charles Rufus Morey, "Paris and Its Cultural Treasures," Transcript of a Broadcast in Summer 1944. Morey Papers, XIII/O.

³²⁷ W.G. Constable, "Art Schools and Community" Lecture, Coventry, 1934. Constable Papers, AAA #3071.

As we will see, the removal of institutional "superfluities" and the reconstruction of cities around monumental shells would later become the central component of "the cultural reconstruction" of Western Europe.

By using the image of the utopian city, Constable was able to conflate monumental architecture with the institutions contained within it, a conflation he repeated in his 1938 Art History and Conoisseurship, using the image of London as a "reasonable utopia":

It may be noted that in any reasonable Utopia, most of the buildings in Whitewall would become distasteful superfluities; but the National Gallery at one end and Westminster Abbey at the other would be possessions even more cherished than today.³²⁸

In the face of war, Constable grew more apologetic about the need to conjure a utopia at all. By 1942, Constable had transformed his peace-time advocacy of "the function of the arts in civilization" into a war-time lecture on the need to think of the arts to act as "ends" in a postwar future.³²⁹

Constable put his distinction between "means and ends" to use by giving his utopia a teleological element, in a Radcliffe lecture titled Art: Its Place in a Changing World. "It is my belief that art can make comparatively little direct contribution in carrying out the war... but on the other hand the arts can play a vital and indispensable part in the society we hope to build in the future." Having introduced a distinction between the "immediate present" where the war was unfolding, and a conceptual "today" where a utopia could be imagined, Constable began including in his hypothetical "ideal city" not only its great monuments but also the mechanisms for preserving them. Crucially, he invoked Charles Eliot Norton to make the point:

I am not concerned with the war-torn world of the immediate present. ... The relegation of arts to secondary position is a confusion of means and ends.... All of you who cherish a Utopia—then imagine Washington in terms of its cathedral, national gallery, library of congress—all would be preserved [while the] rest, except as monuments, disappeared. This emphas[izes] CE Norton's dictum, that the mark of high civilization is extent to which the arts are preserved and cultivated." 330

Thus at the heart of Constable's utopia we find Norton's utilitarian dilemma: the problem of art ("an end") residing in institutions (which are "means"). Constable resolved this dilemma by proposing a utopian image where the "arts" function urbanistically. As Constable transformed his lecture on the place of the arts in civilization into a plan for art institutions in a post-war society, he increasingly borrowed patterns of argument from a lineage of utopian urban thought: bemoaning that "art and life had become divorced in the 19th century," positing that "the problem is how to integrate

³²⁸ W.G. Constable, "Art History and Conoisseurship: Their Scope and Method" (London: Cambridge, 1938).

There exist several drafts of the 1942 lecture; "Art Schools and Community" at Coventry in 1934 was slightly modified version of "Importance of art in life and function of art school," in 1942. AAA #3071

³³⁰ W.G. Constable, "Art: its Place in a changing World" Lecture at Radcliffe, 1942. Constable Papers, AAA #3071

them", and advocating as a solution the creation of "a fine and dignified physical environment for daily life." The best evidence that an environmental utopia, would work, Constable wrote, was the "immense success and value of such public undertakings as the great national parks and various schemes in city planning." By the year 1942, in other words, Constable had arrived at a functionalist theory of urbanism.

In 1948, Constable was given the opportunity to implement his utopian vision of the urban functionality of art when he was recruited as an "Art advisor" by the Education and Cultural Relations (ECR) Division of the US Military Government in Germany. The self-described task of the Division was "the re-orientation of the German mind;" Constable's mission was to tour Germany's museums and cultural institutions for three months, making recommendations for their future. Despite this narrow mandate, Constable began his final report, Art and Re-orientation, ³³² by stating an astonishingly broad ambition: to use art "to induce a more liberal temper in the German mind, by involving ... every problem of German life." Accordingly, Constable's report began with a proposal for the "Reconstruction of ruined cities and buildings," and ended with a scheme for "Arts Education" in Germany. ³³³ (fig. 2.68)

As with Constable's "urban utopia," Art and Re-Orientation projected the image of a new world in which most of the built environment has disappeared, and only selected monuments remain as anchors for reconstruction. Constable's report began with a list of "Basic Assumptions" re-iterating the curatorial role that America should play in cultural reconstruction. Rather than attempting any "substitution" of Germany's "long and vigorous cultural tradition," Constable wrote, American efforts should follow a logic of "selection," by learning

... to select and emphasize those elements in the German tradition which are most in consonance with American aims. I have found, for example, ... that to quote the example of (say) Dürer, Bach or Goethe, or even the Bauhaus, changes the whole atmosphere of discussion. 334

Here Constable enacted what Margaret Mead had identified as America's postwar duty: applying the skill of "analysis" to the postwar world. Most of Constable's recommendations involved "reorienting" cultural institutions in a basic propaganda scheme to re-present chosen German "elements" within a new cultural framework: opening museums to the public, sending curators for training in America, producing traveling exhibitions of art and architecture, etc., in order literally to expose German minds to "democratic aims." But it was in his recommendations for "The

³³¹ "Art, Its Place in a Changing World," AAA #3071.

³³² Constable's position was that of "Visiting Expert on the Project, Art Historian." He served for ninety days.

³³³ Constable, "The German Problem," (1950), Constable Papers AAA#3073.

³³⁴ Constable, Art and Re-Orientation: Status and Future of Museums and the Teaching of Art in Western Germany (Educational and Cultural Relations Division, Office of Military Government for Germany, US, Sept. 1949), 2.

Restoration of Historic Structures and Monuments" that Constable was most explicit about what it meant to the select "elements of German culture," by using the reconstruction of damaged monuments as an example of this selection process.

In contrast to the "Reconstruction of Italian monuments," the "Re-orientation of the German Mind" was far from an expiatory exercise. Indeed Constable returned from Germany emboldened to take a critical stance on how reconstruction was unfolding, and particularly on the continued power of "an elderly officialdom whose ideas are often completely petrified." This ideological petrification, Constable thought, was evident in "the marked inclination towards brick-by-brick reconstructions, not only in historic monuments, but in such buildings as museums." When modernist alternatives to brick-by-brick reconstructions were available, as with the railway station in Munich, Constable favored the "modern ideas" proposed by "younger architects" over the traditionalist solution eventually chosen. Yet it was not the issue of authenticity that moved Constable in his opposition to identical reconstructions: "the moral and esthetic objections to producing in the case of historic buildings what are virtually fakes," he conceded, were "hardly a concern of Military Government." Instead, he argued that the wrong criteria were being used to choose reconstruction projects. For example, Constable objected to the reconstruction of Goethe's House in Frankfurt, on the grounds that it was "a rallying point for extreme nationalistic feeling." Similarly insisted that the rebuilding of ecclesiastical buildings was a fueled by excessive religious fervor, that drained funds away from more urgent projects.336

Throughout these recommendations, Constable adhered to the urban vision of monuments he had outlined in his "utopia," applying its principles to the problem of German reconstruction. For instance, he argued that the gutted shells of secular monuments should resume their urban identity while undergoing a cultural rejuvenation from the inside. In Munich he objected to the plans to "rebuild the gutted Residenz … without knowing whether it is to be used as a museum as public offices, or as a seat of legislature, each of which would require different interior planning." (fig. 2.69) In the case of museums, Constable legitimized interior modernization by the need to update German curatorial environments and teaching facilities, to American standards. He called this "rebuilding on lines to suit modern needs and democratic policies" indispensable for "humanizing

³³⁵ Constable visited Germany at the moment that this controversy over the reconstruction of the Goethe House was raging; he had a very self-consciously interpretation that "the legend was that it was deliberately destroyed because it was a symbol of German nationalism." Interview at MFA, 23 Jun 1949. Constable Papers, AAA #3078.

³³⁶ For example, he bemoaned the "millions of marks that have been poured into the restoration of Cologne Cathedral (in any case built largely in the 19th century), while the whole housing program of the city has been postponed."

³³⁷ Constable, Art and ReOrientation, 6.

and liberalizing museum work." ³³⁸ Crucially, Constable also saw interior modernization as an opportunity to reconfigure German art collections dispersed by war. In Munich he suggested, much to the horror of local curators, that objects from the Alte Pinakotek be relocated in the Glyptotek. Cultural institutions were to be reassembled to reflect the radical spatial re-ordering that Europe had undergone in war. Only those institutions would remain, which had learned the spatial lessons of the tabula rasa—including the dispersal of cultural objects, and the re-positioning of urban "elements" in a new cultural frame.

Constable's recommendations were never implemented as a whole, largely because he issued his report before the Marshall Plan came radically to modify the terms of Germany's reconstruction and set in motion its "economic miracle." However, the attitude of the American Military Government towards culture in postwar Germany did follow the broad lines of Constable's "utopia": emptying cultural institutions and re-organizing them as institutional kernels of democratic planning. Certainly the network of Amerika Haüser—cultural centers established by the USIA in the center of major Western European and Austrian cities—constitutes a system devoted to institutional "re-orientation." In Munich, where Americans "played a role in shaping the face of the city," the AMG "encouraged the rebuilding of major historic monuments, ... and mandated the destruction of several Nazi-era buildings." Significantly, despite its Nazi-era architecture the Hous der Kunst was rebuilt, since it predated the Nazi regime and was therefore deemed suitable for the kind of institutional "re-orientation" recommended by Constable. 340 Similarly, Constable had recommended that Germany "follow the Italian example" of ACRIM by soliciting international help and, "in cooperation with foreigners, select a few buildings which are capable of restoration, and have an international significance."341 While this international appeal was never realized, the reconstruction of many of Germany's churches was achieved by soliciting religious networks for international contributions. Constable's recommendations also point us to the next chapter, to a decade when Unesco took on the reform of cultural institutions on a global scale. But while all these specific connections—between Constable and the American occupation of Germany and later the policies of

³³⁸ "Not only are out-of-date gallery types and lighting systems being perpetuated; but provision is rarely being made for such things as an auditorium, special exhibitions galleries, and educational facilities, all of which are indispensable for humanizing and liberalizing museum work."

³³⁹ A disclaimer printed in the preface made clear that "some recommendations are no longer valid." In particular, his "The Use and Maintenance of Historic Structures," addressed the Land Reform Law of 1946, which "affected landowners' ability to provide financially for the maintenance of monuments." Constable recommended a two-fold fund-raising scheme: on the one hand, a decentralization of the financial responsibility to maintain monuments to regional populations, in the manner of the Society of the Preservation of New England Antiquities. On the other hand, he suggested an international appeal.

³⁴⁰ Jeffry Diefendorf "The Role of Historic Preservation," In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German Cities after World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 94.

³⁴¹ Constable, Art and Re-orientation, 12.

Unesco—a more fundamental connection can also be sought, between Constable's 'utopia' as a system of urban "custody," and the fate of monuments in the radical transformation of German cities before, during, and after the war.

In contrast to France and Italy, the scale of destruction in Germany was such that the only image of total war that seemed available was one that drew a literal connection between the ethical extent of war's totality and the physical ubiquity of the rubble. Yet only recently has the urban destruction been examined historically as a direct consequence of Allied military action and policies. He cent studies have suggested, to sometimes scandalous effect, that the escalation in Allied bombings in the last year of the European War was based on a decidedly Douhetian calculation that more bombs would yield a faster and more "unconditional surrender" from Hitler. This douhetian hypothesis has been supported by painstaking compiled inventories of destruction, which rely on extensive tabulations, in the manner of the USSBS, of the effects of "round the clock" bombing on German cities—bomb tonnage dropped, lives lost, civilians dehoused, dwellings destroyed, pounds of rubble, etc.—in the apparent hope of deciphering the sinister formula that was used by the Allies to choose targets in this escalation. Hut this statistical accounting only ever treats cities as containers of civilian lives, committing in some sense the same interpretive mistake as Douhet and the USSBS.

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³⁴² During German reconstruction the abstraction of "total war" erased the agency of the Allies in bombing cities; add to this the overwhelming tendency of postwar historiography to implicate all of Germany in the emergence—and therefore the crimes—of the Third Reich, the fate of German cities in war remained for many decades un-examined. 343 The case for the Allied offensive on Germany as a textbook example of Douhetian "total war" has most convincingly been made by an American, Ronald Schaeffer in Wings of Judgment. He summarized in a chilling single sentence the various forms that this "proportional" ethic took: "The most important factor moving the AAF toward Douhetian war was the attitude of the country's top civilian and military leaders. Arnold... despite his preference for selective bombing, sometimes promoted less discriminate forms of attack; Eisenhower ... would do anything to bring a speedy end to the conflict; Marshall... wanted to ... show the Germans fleeing to Munich that their situation was hopeless; Lovett, ... felt the war should be painful and unforgettable to the German civilians; Stimson, defended participation in the Eastern raids, yet did not inquire carefully into the way American air power was actually used; and Franklin Roosevelt... recalling what had happened after the First World War, believed the German people must be compelled this time to recognize their defeat and accept responsibility for the horrors their country had inflicted on the world." Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford, 1985), 106. For a view from the bombed civilian's perspective, see Friedrich Jürg, Der Brand: Deutschland im Bombenkrieg 1940-1945 (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 2002). 344 See for instance the table on "Number of Air Raids / Dead / Dead per 1000 inhabitants / Homes destroyed or damaged / Total destroyed homes / Number of bombs dropped / Percent of homes destroyed compared to 1939." (Zahl der Luftangriffe / Gefallene beurkundet oder geschatzt / Gefallene je 1000 Ew. / Gebaude-schaden zerstört und beschadigt / total zerstorte Wohnungen/v.H. des Bestandes 1939/ Anzahl des geworfenen Bomben) in Maximilian Czesany, Allierter Bombenterror: Des Luftkrieg die Zivilbevolkerung Europas 1940-1945. (Ulm: Druffel-Verlag, 1986), 649. The calculation of "pounds of rubble" is found in reconstruction accounts, for instance in Jeffry Difendorf includes a table of "Cities with Largest Amounts of Rubble", as well as a "Rubble per Capita in Large Cities." He also includes a table of "Damage to public buildings in Hamburg", detailed as "Religious buildings / Medical Buildings / Schools / Cultural Buildings." In the Wake of War: the Reconstruction of German Cities after World War II (New York: Oxford, 1993), 17, 29.

Adding a "monumental" factor to this statistical calculation was, until recently, made difficult by the lack of any accurate estimate of damage to monuments alone. In 1947, the AMG assessed that 54% of the monuments listed in its sector had been affected by war, but this figure could not be generalized to other zones, where bombing had been lighter. As Hartwig Beseler noted, "no single statistic of German monuments lost in war had been compiled" until he arrived at his estimate of 20% in 1988.³⁴⁵ Yet insofar as damage to German monuments has been systematically compiled, little insight has been drawn from the concentration of historic structures in city centers and the importance of these centers as targets in the escalation towards "unconditional surrender." The destruction of monuments continues to be seen as an exacerbated form of morale bombing.³⁴⁶

Reading the shape of Germany's urban destruction has been further complicated by the so-called "Second Destruction" of German cities—a term coined by historian Erwin Schleich to describe the radical reconfiguration of cities in the rubble-clearing phase at the end of war. Indeed initial clearing efforts soon revealed that damage to German cities appeared quantitatively worse than it qualitatively was. If the ubiquity of rubble "had the uncanny effect of making destruction look normal," taken individually many urban structures were more likely to be "partially damaged" than "totally destroyed." (fig. 2.73) Yet many still-partially standing structures were demolished to make way for city planning schemes; as Bundespräsident Walter Scheels admitted in 1975, "in Germany, more buildings worthy of preservation were destroyed after the war than during the war." From the point of view of preservation, even the authorities of the Denkmalpflege deferred to the imperative to rebuild. As Niels Gutschow concisely summarized, "city planners acted not as monument restorers but as "surgeons of the homeland" [Chirurgen die Heimat] who could, first and foremost, create a new 'cityscape' with improved living conditions."

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³⁴⁵ Beseler, Vol. 1, XXIV.

³⁴⁶ For example, Beseler makes a connection with Hitler's biography: Hitler reacted to the first Allied bombings by instructing party officials to leave monuments in ruins, as emblems of the Allies' inhumanity. This order was issued on 20th July 1944, the date of the failed assassination attempt on Hitler. Beseler therefore locates this date within a chronological table of the bombing of city centers where "historic monuments were concentrated," and speculates that most of the destroyed monuments might have been spared if the assassination had succeeded. While this coincidence undoubtedly connects the timeline of bombing with monumental damage, it accepts the conventional definition of total war, both in its identification with Hitler's wantonness and in speculation that the war might have ended sooner—therefore doing nothing to explain how monuments actually acted, themselves, as agents of psychological warfare. Beseler, Vol. 1, XI.

³⁴⁷ Schleich, Die Zweite Zertörung München (Berlin: 1978).

³⁴⁸ This observation is from Constable's lecture, "The German Problem", 1950. AAA #3073

³⁴⁹ Scheels was speaking on the Year of Architecture in 1975. Cited in Beseler, XI.

³⁵⁰ Gutschow cites Bremen city planner Hermann Deckert in 1947: "The only parts of the old city that must be rescued from the rubble are those that with which the new city will become 'homeland' again." Niels Gutschow, "Die Hitorische Stadt im Städtdebau der vierzige Jahre," in Kriegsschickale Deutsche Architektur, XLIX. The term "homeland" is clearly a poor translation of the German Heimat. See Celia Applegate, A Nations of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

That this "surgical" selection was the same as the process devised by the Roberts Commission can be demonstrated by inserting Frick maps in sequence with reconstruction plans to show they had been instruments of "unwitting urban planning program." For example, a comparison of the Frick and damage maps of Frankfurt reveals that the Dom was salvaged while most of the structures in the hatched areas were not—except in individual cases when an argument was made, like the Goethe Haus (fig. 2.70). The wartime "hatching" of the Altstadt acts as a premonitory key to how the "second destruction" eventually unfolded: "hatching" designates portions of cities where a selection had to be made.

Reconstruction historians have chronicled the debates over individual monuments, deriving "memorial" meaning from each controversy and concluding that the reconstruction was achieved as a progressive mitigation of "extremes." 351 Few have noted that there was an aesthetic significance in this pattern of selection itself—which helped to implement the kind of "reasonable utopia" promoted by Constable. Norbert Huse, for instance, has noted that conservators often made concessions to modernizers by invoking a vague criterion of "proportion" [Maßstäblichkeit], paradoxically turning moderation into an "absolute measure." In the 1947 words of one conservator, "the right solution lies in an absolute adherence to a system of proportion." Yet this concept of proportion was vague, not only because it allowed considerable latitude in destruction, but also, and more importantly, because it collapsed a formal prescription (subjecting modern architecture and urbanism to rules of height and size derived from historic architecture) with an ethical one (that the postwar German citizen, planner and inhabitant alike, should behave with moderation). Thus the same criterion that Italian conservators applied to the restoration of monumental fragments was applied, in Germany, at the urban level. "The old" was made "distinguishable from the new", but the overall "effect" was retained. In this sense "hatching" can be seen as a form of cultural influence: if the Altstadt itself disappeared, the "effect" the Atlstadt would continue to be felt, in moderation.

It should be noted that this "second destruction" phenomenon is usually interpreted as evidence that the reconstruction of West-German cities was a moment of pragmatism, which got under way only after initial impulses for "utopian thinking" had passed. Rudy Koshar puts it this way: "after utopian ideas about the future of German cities were passed around and dropped ... the emphasis was on practical measures rather than on painful reflection." Koshar's two example of

³⁵¹ The argument is laid out most synthetically in Diefendorf's In the Wake of War, most extensively in Träume in Trümmern.
352 Norbert Huse, "Denkmalpflege und Wiederaufbau," in Denkmalpflege: Deutsche Texte aus Deri Jahrhunderten (München: Beck, 1984), 193.

³⁵³ "Commemorative Noise," in Rudy Koshar, Germany's Transient Pasts: Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth Century (Chapell Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 204.

utopias are characteristically pastoral ("the utopian idea ... to leave Rostock's many ruins in place, allowing a garden city to grow over the devastation," or "the utopian plan of rebuilding Würzburg in a different place.") Yet as we have seen, by war's end the project of turning cultural institutions into "practical measures" for urban reconstruction had achieved the status of a "utopia"—in the sense of a parallel and imaginary universe that accompanied military policies as they were developed, while never being the subject of "action." While Koshar acknowledges the role played by the Allied commission in selecting which monuments were prevented from this "second destruction," he fails to detect in this process of "selection" the "utopian" dimension with which the Allied had imbued it.³⁵⁴

Placing Frick maps of German cities after the damage maps and before their reconstruction plans provides an uncanny image of the "utopian" dimension that was latent in the "second destruction," even if reconstruction plans never articulated it as such. (fig. 2.74) Similarly, the decidedly post-utopian circulation plan for Lübeck, featuring only roads and monuments, provides a convincing image of what Constable might have imagined as his "utopia" (with perhaps a few churches replaced by museums). (fig. 2.72) Neither a pastoral regeneration nor a new industrial birth, this was to be a utopia of the cultural realm: an urban regime dependent upon fragments but still reliant on a proportional effect to diffuse a totalizing "moderation."

What, then, is the relation between monuments as "proportional" anchors for cultural reconstruction and cities as targets in the "proportional" ethic of total war? To ask the question in graphic terms, what is the relation between the Frick maps and the famous map of "The Destruction of German Cities" that has become the obligatory starting point for all accounts of Germany's reconstruction? (fig. 2.75) The map represents cities with precision (in their correct location and proportionately scaled) but also as statistical abstractions (pie-charts expressing a percentage of destruction). In this sense the map demonstrates the similarity between the Roberts Commission's "balanced" selection of monuments in a city, and the concern for territorial evenness that regimented the Allies' bombing of Germany—leading them to attack even mid-size German cities like Würzburg, because to have left them standing would have been conspicuous. Indeed the

³⁵⁴ "The obstacles to preservation were overcome somewhat by the fact that the Allied occupiers had an organization for protecting monuments and works of art, modeled after that of the German army, that helped to guard important ruins until clearance or reconstruction could take place." Koshar, 210.

³⁵⁵ This map was originally compiled in G.W. Harmssen's report to the Allied authorities on reparation, Reparationen, Sozialprodukt, Lebensstandard: Versuch einer Wirtschaftsbilanz Vol. 3 (Bremen: Trojen, 1948), 149, and re-printed in Träumen in Trümmern, XII. It was then re-drawn in Werner Duth and Niel Gutschow's Träume in Trümmern, 1. Konzepte (Wiesbaden: Vierweg & Sohn, 1988), 143, and without even a title in Hartmut Frank, "The Late Victory of Neues Bauen: German Architectus after World War II," in Rasegna 52/2 (June 1993): The Reconstruction in Europe after World War II, 58-67.
356 Ross, "The Five Cities," in Strategic Bombing by the United States, 176-194. Mid-sized cities suffered less absolute damage, but greater proportion of destruction than the more iconic examples of Dresden and Hamburg. Würzburg is the object

entire American strategic bombing offensive was premised upon a representation of the German economy as having been "designed" for war, a representation wherein German cities stood clearly as "icons" of Hitler's war machine. The Bomber's Boedeker showed that any built-up area could be quantified in terms of Germany's industrial geography. In fact, postwar research has shown that Hitler had not actually pursued as "total" an "economic mobilization of Germany" as the Americans had imagined, and that more integrated "Designs for Total War" had been available to him. This research has raised the possibility that American analysts fundamentally misunderstand the economy of Nazi Germany, and reinforced the historical thesis that the Allies attributed a strategic value to German cities that was based as much on iconographic reading as on empirical fact.³⁵⁷

It is all the more important to note, then, that the graphic nomenclature of representing cities as pie-charts derives directly from the system for inventorying damage devised by Albert Speer's ministry of reconstruction. 358 (fig. 2.65) Designed to standardize the damage reports sent by city architects to the Ministry, this system translated (both graphically and conceptually) the iconography of city centers as "targets" into a statistical view of destruction. The first person to put these pie charts on a map was Senator G.W. Harmssen, who was commissioned by the Allies in 1947 to assess the state of Germany's economy and plan for "reparations." Harmssen produced a memorandum (Reparationenen Sozialprodukt Lebensstandard) that attacked the "fettering of Germany's economic capacity and on the imposition of excessive and long-drawn reparations." Harmssen argued that Germany had already repaid 6 Million Dollars to the Allies, including in his calculation controversial forms of "expenditure," such as the deportation of populations to Eastern territories, the confiscation of industrial assets, and the destruction of city centers. 359 In so doing, he exposed an entire project of "intellectual reparation" that the Allies had hoped to keep a secret: "Project Paperclip" which mined the German scientists, engineers, patents, and technologies, that had fueled German's war machine, and brought them back to the US to enrich America's own industrial and military capacity. As a 1947 intelligence statement summarized, "the government is using vacuum-cleaner methods to acquire all the technical and scientific information that the Germans have. The value of this

of a study that compares intended bombing with actual destruction, draws conclusions about the relative precision of USAAF and RAF raids, and accounts for the MFA&A's role in first-aid and reconstruction. Hermann Knell, "Loss of Cultural Assets," in To Destroy a City: Strategic Bombing and its Human Consequences in World War II (Cambridge: DaCapo Press, 2003), 296.

³⁵⁷ Berenice Carroll, Design For Total War: Arms and Economic in the Third Reich (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), for instance, studied General Georg Thomas who pursued the "total economic mobilization" of Germany. Peter De Mendelssohn's 1947 Design for Aggression: The Inside Story of Hitler's War Plans (New York: Harper, 1947) can be taken as an example of the orthodox theory that Hitler's war plans and his economic plans had always been one.

³⁵⁸ See "Schadensblianz," in Werner Durth and Niels Gutschow, Träume in Trümmern: Planungen zum Wiederaufbau zerstörter Städte im Westen Deutschlands 1940-1950 (Wiesbaden: Vieweg & Sohn, 1988), 63-67

³⁵⁹ For a full exposition of the project, see John Gimbel, Science, Technology and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).

information to the United States will probably far exceed any cash reparations."360 Thus the Harmssen memorandum was vehemently rejected by the Allies and attacked as "a Minor Mein Kampf" by the Allied press. 361 What the Allies found objectionable was its "utter lack of appreciation of Germany's moral responsibility for the war," and the presumption that moral reparation could be settled statistically—the way Speer's statistical accounting of city damage had helped him to clear enough rubble for the war to continue, but leave enough ruins to represent Allied wantonness in Nazi propaganda.

"Project Paperclip" can be understood as the "second destruction" of Germany's industrial capacity. 362 Just as, in German cities, an urbanism of "surgical selection" followed the actual destruction and became the basis for planned reconstruction, so at the national scale this extensive looting of industrial knowledge followed the targeting of Germany's industrial centers, and became the basis for economic recovery under the Marshall Plan. 363 The idea that Germany's "moral responsibility for war" was to be avenged by secretly conducting "intellectual reparations" shows how integral civilian knowledge had become to the totality of war. Insofar as it "failed to distinguish between war booty, reparations, and loot," the industrial depletion plan is strikingly similar to the "conspiracy" for which the Nazi regime was indicted at Nüremberg, including its art looting component.

The importance of Project Paperclip for understanding the Allied definition of "custody" can be evidenced by another "intellectual reparations" project conducted by the US in this same period: the controversial "Exhibition of German Art" organized at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, to exhibit of works "recovered" in the salt mines by the MFA&A. These works were brought to the US under the pretext of providing safe haven for them until German institutions became safe curatorial environments. Despite the involvement of some Roberts Commission members in this exhibition, the whole episode drew accusations of "looting" on the part a petitionfull of Roberts Commission collaborators and former MFA&A officers.364 "It is impossible to

³⁶⁰ Proposed press release on "Project Paperclip," Joint Intelligence Objectives Agency, 14 March 1946, cited in full a an "Appendix" in John Gimbel, Science, Technology and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 187-189

^{361 &}quot;A Minor Mein Kampf," The Economist (Mar 13, 1948), 59. More measured reviews were written by E. Rosenbaum, in International Affairs (Apr. 1949), 213-215. And Herbert Furth in American Economic Review, (Dec 1948), 924-932.

³⁶²According to its chroniclers, it "grew out of a wartime intelligence operation and may perhaps be seen as a logical result of modern, total war." Gimbel, 158.

³⁶³ It goes without saying that much of the literature on the Marshall Plan and the ERP also include lengthy discussions of the meaning of the word "plan". This is clearlt not the place to address it; a summary view is offered in "Paths to Plenty: European recovery planning and the American policy compromise," in Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

³⁶⁴ The controversy over the show caused some art historians to resign from their posts in the commission, but the show proceeded anyways. Material on this exhibition can be found both in the Roberts Commission's files, Sachs' archives, Constable's archives, and is chronicled in Lynn Nicholas' The Rape of Europa.

defend," the petition read, "on technical, political or moral grounds the decision to ship to this country two hundred internationally known and extremely valuable pictures belonging indisputably to German institutions." The signatories decried the "the subterfuge of 'protective custody'" that had been used to organize the exhibition, notably comparing it to the Nazi art looting conspiracy they had worked hard to prevent:

The moral foundations of our war effort and final victories will be subtly undermined if we, who understand the implications, pass over in silence an action taken by our own officials that, in outward appearance at least cannot be distinguished from those, detestable to all right thinking people, which the Nazis' policy of pillage inspired and condoned. 365

With this final distortion of the concept of "custody", the ethical dilemma that had been circulating since 1943 among the expert circles of the Roberts Commission finally came to haunt its most weathered collaborators—the MFA&A officers. The German paintings were eventually returned, but the institutions had been emptied of their contents, demonstrating with geo-political pomp that the iconographic link between interior and exterior that had been so central to the Commission's definition of monuments had been definitively severed.

What these two episodes demonstrates is that postwar Allied "custody"—be it of paintings or of industrial equipment—had to be supported by a very careful spatial regime in order to differentiated from the Nazi conspiracy. Where the Axis powers had planned to radically change the geography Europe by designating some of it as lebensruum, the Allied plan was to "dial down" the industrial capacity of German cities, one by one, reducing their importance by "vacuuming" out their expertise. Indeed if the pie-chart map of "Destruction of German Cities" is to stand as an iconic image, it an image of how "destruction" was followed by "surgery" and "vacuuming." This proportional mining was crucial to the stealth of the scheme, and led to a massive decentralization of German industry. City centers were left as monumental cores, and each monument saved became a marker for a pie-chart city—a proportional monument. It is through this "second destruction" of German cities that a monumental factor was finally added to the statistical accounting of destruction characteristic of total war. If the USSBS failed to devise a proportional ethics of wanton destruction

³⁶⁵ The petition invoked the MFA&A: "the Monuments Officers attached to our armed forces with their specialized knowledge of the practical risks involved unanimously condemned the decision. Those Americans whose profession it is to study and preserve old paintings deplore it. On ethical grounds it is disapproved by the opinion of enlightened laymen." Petition sent to Crosby, Constable, Sachs and others, April 22, 1946, on Whitney Museum Stationary. Crosby archives, I/7. Along with MFA&A officers and Roberts Commission member, the petition was signed by over 80 scholars, curators and museum directors, including: Alfred Barr, Mortimer Clapp, Wlater Cook, Sumner Crosby, Charles Cunningham, Juliana Force, Lloyd Goodrich, George Hamilton, Talbot Hamlin, Joseph Hudnut, Horace Janson, Edgar Kaufmann, Sheldon Keck, Lincoln Kirstein, George Kubler, Rensselaer Lee, Everet Meeks, Millard Meiss, Grace Morley, Chandler Post, Marvin Ross, Baldwin Smith, Gordon Washburn, and Lewis York.

during the war, it was with an urban aesthetic of "moderation" that the victors' proportional reckoning was eventually delivered.

Epilogue: Ethics of Proportion and Aesthetics of Moderation

My goal in this chapter has been to point out that, if World War II made cities into iconographic elements of modern warfare, the role played by experts of iconography—art historians—in this transformation should not be underestimated. I argued that a new kind of historical responsibility, somewhere between bureaucratic power and academic authorship, can reasonably be attributed to the art historians of the Roberts Commission in determining the fate of Europe's monuments. Clear attribution of "responsibility" in this episode is made difficult by various factors—the elusive quality of any policy subject to "military necessity", the collaborative nature of expertise that distributes knowledge amongst committees, and the changing nature of urbanism that became a bureaucratic form of design. Perhaps most tellingly, the art historians themselves were skeptical of their involvement, and disturbed by its ethical implications—although they tended to express this skepticism by attacking their colleagues. When Dinsmoor critiqued the work of the Harvard group as amateurish ("suitable for doughboys on leave" 366) and Constable replied that the ACLS was idealistic—its maps "conceived as a kind of Emily Post's Guide to good behavior when bombing,"367 the exchange revealed an overall unease about the possible connection between efforts to preserve monuments and "allied" efforts to destroy city centers. These art historians spent much of the war trying to pre-empt this connection, inventing an aesthetics of contingency to encompass it.

Protected monuments and damaged cities emerged connected, I have argued, in two ways. First, through memorialization: since the same psychological substance that was projected into city fabric to justify its destruction was also injected into monuments to justify their preservation, monuments preserved inevitably served as memorials to lives destroyed. Second, and more importantly, psychological warfare also produced an iconographic correspondence between ethical and aesthetic realms, through the concept of "proportion." For the wagers of psychological warfare, a small amount of destruction was inherent to demonstrate arbitrariness; for a professional class of experts, a narrative of proportional helplessness in the face of destruction was necessary to maintain academic autonomy. The contingency of one became the "necessity" of the other.

³⁶⁶ Dinsmoor to Brigadier General Cornelius Wickerman, 7 Jun 1943. ASCSA I/2.

³⁶⁷ Constable, "Works of Art in Wartime" (Jan-March 1944), 48. In fact Contable meant this as a compliment to the Harvard work: "Although initially conceived as a kind of Emily Post's guide to good behavior when bombing enemy cities, these maps ultimately became valuable punctual supplements to the Harvard lists."

The reason this notion of proportion is crucial is that war ethics are characteristically seen I proportional terms (military means must be proportional to the stated ends) and of intention (one must not "intend" to kill the innocent). While the ethics of World War II were clearly proportional, as early as 1941 "means" and "ends" began to reside both in civilian and military realms, making it difficult to distinguish between what was intentional and what was wanton. Therefore another idea of proportion—an aesthetic proportion—intervened to "represent" an ethics of un-intention.

This convergence was in some sense facilitated by previous intersections between ethics and aesthetics. For instance, the tradition of connoisseurship accepted the idea that art was a guide to personal comportment, a guide that could be described in terms of "temperance" and "moderation." By this logic, the repeatable ethics of behavior could be modeled on the unique value of art. In contradistinction with this Romantic aesthetics of morality, there was also a humanistic ethic of autonomy inherited from idealist aesthetics. According to this logic, the exceptional and autonomous value of the work of art must be continually enacted by its keepers. To understand how these contrary philosophies of art were able to co-operate, we have to understand the physical form that allowed them to be exceptions to one another: cities. For example, while the romantic idea of 'composition' was embodied in the city as a collection of objects, an idealist aesthetic autonomy was granted to each of the monuments. Whether in their utopian descriptions or their mapping of cities, the Roberts Commission always depicted cities as environments where temperate men experienced autonomous objects. Similarly, while the idealist notion of monuments "containing" traces of the history of ideas was progressively turned into a public creed for the Commission's work, the actual monuments were progressively emptied of their contents, negating the more pragmatic vision of institutions as containers of morals. By allowing this seamless transfer between aesthetic objects and ethical men, architecture provided a crucial support for the confusion of means and ends, objects and subjects. The ethical problem of total war—that it redefined the ethical proportion of means to ends—was given an temporary aesthetic solution: making the means (lists and maps) look like ends (the world of art).

This transfer of ethical value fundamentally calls into question any claim of monumental autonomy that has been made about the structure of European cities in the postwar. In their 1978 plea for a "museum-city," for instance, Colin Rowe and Fred Koetter took the now-infamous Munich Residenz as the first and paradigmatic example of an "Ambiguous and Composite Building," a building whose hybrid plan produces an urban politics of moderation. (fig. 2.77) The language they used to describe their favorite monumental architecture resonates unmistakably with the Allied propaganda that had turned monuments into seeds of "re-orientation":

They, all of them, oscillate between a passive and an active behavior. They, all of them, both quietly collaborate and strenuously assert. They, all of them, are occasionally ideal. But, above all, this series is highly accessible to a present sensibility and, of its nature, is capable of almost every local accommodation.³⁶⁸

Rowe and Koetter sought to discover the ethical dimension of "Gestalt," but the plans they insisted on reading formally, as autonomous aesthetic objects, had already been imbued with an ethical mandate. (Indeed, one might even say that their "Gestalt" method had already been employed by the art historians who preceded them by 25 years). Their post-modern, post-utopian attempt to read city plans as icons of temperate behavior can only be seen as a self-fulfilling prophecy—the "second destruction" of a monumental autonomy that, having been "unwittingly" dismantled by total war, could now be "deliberately" rediscovered.

³⁶⁸ "Ambiguous and Composite Buildings," in Collage City, 168.






FIG. **2.01** Roberts Commission, Organigram. (Drawing by Author, data from Roberts Commission: *Final Report of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas*, 1946). Color is used as index of institutional affiliation, using university colors. Yellow is used for museums and galleries not affiliated with universities.

FIG. 2.02 ADHG Monuments Commitee, Organigram (Drawing by Author, Information from Roberts Commission: Final Report, 1946)





Commission, Final Report, 1946)

CHARLES WILKINSON







FIG. 2.04 Civil Affairs Handbook: Section 17A Cultural Institutions, Italy (July 1944)

FIG. 2.05 Civil Affairs Handbook, Atlas Supplement: Section 17A: Italy (July 1944)

FIG. 2.06 Allied Military Government: List of Protected Monuments, Italy 2,3,5,7 (1944)

FIG. 2.07 War Department Pamphlet No.31 103: Field Protection of Objects of Art and Archives (May 1944)





How to Miss Cultural Sites

When bombing establishes rail blocks between rear areas and the front, it is part of the broad plan of the MAAF to go back and homb piled up traffie. Going after the yards in the larger effect is complicated because of the effort that is made to avoid hitting structures of historical or cultural interest, many of which usually are in the neighborhood of the railway stations. This is exemplified by the situation at Florence, shown in the mosaic used to brief bombing crews (right). The main yards are immediately adjacent to the area in which all the baildings that must be missed are grouped.


PROBLEM MAPPED for bombardiers is that of hitting these Florence railway yards and missing cultural monuments as annotated. These are classified as first, second, or third degree in importance. Two of first order, closest to main yards (B) are the Santa Maria Novella (8) and the San Lorenzo church and New Sagrestria Library (9). Other prime "don'ts" are (16) the Baptistery, (17) the Cathedral, (32) Podestra Palace and National Museum, (41) Old Palace, (42) Church of Santa Maria Del Carmine, (43) Santo Spirito Church, (47) Uffizi Palace and Royal State Archives, (50) Royal National Central Library, (54) Pitti Palace and Boboli Gardens. Secondary railroad yards (A), is also a target.







FIG. 2.08 "How to Miss Cultural Sites" Annotated aerial photograph of Florence. *Impact: Air Force Journal* (1944)

FIG. 2.09 (Below) US Air Force: Aerial map of Padova, with monuments marked. The Ancient Monuments of Italy (March 10, 1944)













FIG. 2.10 Le Corbusier, Plan Voisin: Collage. *Urbanisme* (1925)

FIG. 2.11 Le Corbusier, Plan Voisin: Diorama. *Urbanisme* (1925)

FIG. 2.13 Le Corbusier, "Ca, c'est Paris!" *Précisions* sur l'Etat de l'Urbanisme Français (1930)

FIG. 2.14 Colin Rowe & Fred Koetter, "Gestalt Diagram" of Plan Voisin, *Collage City* (1978)



74	People showing low morale	
	Cross- section sample A	Cross- section sample B
Cities with—	Percent	Percel
60-80 percent homes destroyed	55	
40-59 percent homes destroyed	58	- 8
20-39 percent homes destroyed	59	1
1-19 percent homes destroyed	43	
0 homes destroyed		

	Heavily bombed towns, 30,000 tons	Medium, 6,100 tons	Light, 500 tons	Un- bombed
People—				
Showing high	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
morale	44	42	51	59
Trusting leaders Willing to sur-	48	44	52	62
render	59	59	54	51

	Bombed communi- ties	Unbombed communi- ties
People—	Percent	Percent
Wanting the war to end	59	50
Willing to surrender	58	51
Distrusting leaders	42	31
Feeling own group penalized	57	49
Showing demoralizing fear	16	9









FIG. 2.15a, b, c (Top Left) "The Attack on Morale", *United States Strategic Bombing Survey* (1945)

FIG. 2.16 a, b (Above) Milan bombing by RAF Bomber Command, 1942: Bombing Sorties and Aerial Reconaissance photograph.

FIG. 2.17 (Left) Aerial View of Rotterdam after bombing by Luftwaffe (1941)







FIG. 2.19 Enemy Branch, AMG: The Bomber's Baedeker: Guide to the Economic Importance of German Towns and Cities. Part I: Aachen-Küstrin (1944)

FIG. 2.20 Karl Baedeker. Baedeker's Guide: London and its Environs (1937 edition)

FIG. 2.21 Coventry after "Baedeker Raid", 1943.



RESTRICTED

CENTRAL ITALY - Region of Tuncany Province of Florence

F'ARENCE (Cont'd) - PAJACES

***Palazzo del Podestà, 13th-14th centuries. Houses Piazza di S. Firenze ***Museo Wazionale containing sculpture, painting and minor arts. Palazzo Gondi, 15th century, by Giuliano da

Sangallo.

***Palazzo Vecchio (Palazzo della Signoria), 14th Piazza della Signoria century with later additions; paintings and sculpture of 14th-16th centuries. Also houses Archivio Storico del Comune. (see below)

***Palazzo degli Uffizi, 16th century, by Giorgio Piazzale degli Uffizi Vasari. Galleria degli Uffizi one of the great European galleries of painting, sculpture and drawings. Also houses Archivio di Stato.

MONUMENTS

Ponte alla Carraia, 16th century, by Ammannati. Piazza Goldoni Ponte a S. Trinità, 16th century, by Ammannati. Via Tornabuoni
Ponte Vecchio, chiefly 14th century. Via Por S. Maria

**Spedale degli Innocenti, 15th century, by Brunellesco: paintings and sculpture of 15th-16th centuries.

Loggia del Bigallo, 14th century; paintings and Piazza del Duomo and sculpture of 12th-16th centuries.

*Loggia dei Lanzi (Loggia della Signoria), 14th Piazza della Signoria century; sculptures of 14th-16th centuries.

CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS

Galleria Corsini; private collection of paintings of 14th-17th centuries.

***Pelazzo Pitti. One of the great European collec- Piazza Pitti tions of paintings.

*R. Bibliotecs Marucellians. Contains 170,000 vol- 45 Via Cavour umes, 2,000 mss. and bibliographical rarities.

**Galleria dell'Accademia; paintings and sculpture of 14th-16th centuries.

***R. Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana. Contains 28.000 Church of S. Lorenzo, volumes, 10,180 mss., incumabula and papyri.

*R. Biblioteca Riccardiana, Contains 3,951 mas. Museo degli Strumenti Musicali Antichi. musical instruments and compositions of 16th-19th centuries.

**Museo Archeologico. Etruscan, Greco-Roman, and Edyptian antiquities,

Archivio Arcivescovile.

"Museo dell'Opera del Duomo. Drawings, paintings, sculpture of 14th-16th centuries.

*Musec Nazionale di Antropologia ed Etnologia,

16th-17th century. and minor arts.

Piazza di S. Pirenze

Piazza della SS. Annunziata

.

Via Calzaiuoli

10 Lungarno Corsini

52 Via Ricasoli

Piazza di S. Lorenzo. Palazzo Medici, Via Cavour 84 Via degli Alfani

28 Via della Colonna

3 Plazza S. Glovanni 12 Plazza del Duomo

12 Via del Proconsolo

Palazzo del Podestà, Piazza di S. Firenze

- 78 -

RESTRICTED

Peggio alls Murz. (See Mentalizio.)
Peggio di Eretta, (See Mentalizio.)
Peggio Maire (See Mentalizio.)
Peggio Native (Sabina), SASTERISIA ASCUPITATA: Antoniagropoliciere, Holvat on Vitas (Musika), Campl. Davide Gintlanddely, Sellin.
Pelganno a Mare (Bart) Diorgo, Agentyre Cartificiabili,
Pelganno a Mare (Bart)
Mare (

FIG. 2.23 (Left) Bernard Berenson, "Index of Places," in *Italian Painters of the Renaissance* (1928)

FIG. 2.24 (Below, Left) Paul Sachs' Museum Course at the Fogg Museum (1930s)


FIG. 2.25 (Below) William George (WG) Constable, 1930s

FIG. 2.26 (Bottom Left) Paul Sachs (1930s)

FIG. 2.27 (Bottom Middle) Wilhelm Köhler (1930s)

FIG. 2.28 (Bottom Right) William Bell Dinsmoor (1940s)














FIG. 2.29 (Above) Blank index card used in the Commission's Card File, 1943

FIG. 2.30 (Right) Lincoln Kirstein poses as a MFA&A officer asking local civilian for information in Italy, 1943.

FIG. 2.31 (Below) George Leslie Stout, First Aid Protection for Art Treasures and Monuments, Leaflet distributed to troops by Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives; Chance Find of Object - Field Record" used by Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives officers.



FIRST AID PROTECTION FOR Art Treasures and Monuments

n Ta thái

THE FIRST ALM of the President's Commission for the Procection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe is evident from its title. Its ultimate aim is part of the objective of this war, which is to preserve our civilization from destruction. A history of civilization and liberty is written in the artistic and historic monuments of Europe, monuments which are falling victims to the hazard of war or to the vandalism and cupidity of inraders. Insofar as this record of history disappears, some essential part of our intellectual heritage goes with it.

Artistic and Historic Monuments are of many norts, but an be classified for pressur purposes under the badding Charicker, Editory, Mouments, and Calitard Harsteiner Charicker, Editory, Mouments, and Calitard Harsteiner, and Carlotter and Charicker, Editory, Mouments, and Calitard Harsteiner, and the control of the contr

The first work of protecting and salvaging artists and historic monuments in Europe must be carried out in large part by the forces in the field. The following first-aid measures have been briefly outlined to help them in this work.

Special Officer

There are at present statched to the Allied Military Government specially qualified Army and Navy personned forming a Subcommission for Montaments, Pine Arts, and Archiver measure directors, theration, archivists, archivets, painters, scalptors, archaeologists, and art historians. Their particular anispment is to present and salvage cultural treasures. It is no be expected that such afficers will be in charge of Their advices the control of the control

Guide Maps

These men are supplied with guide usage and other priminary data by the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in Europe, austised by control of the American Library Association, of Learned Societies, of the American Library Association, and of Harvard University. Si the end of 1949 it was possible to bring nearly to completion a series of maps of the footnote of the Commission of the Commission of the Commission of the Control of the Commission of the Commission of the Control map is accompanied by a less of monoments, while societies of contrar of antiquities, librarians, professors, moseum discretors, and archivins.

Local Personne

an autobil view each when in Scottige dole religiouslishing responsible provise may be the prince, or the school eacher, or vere a local collector. It will, low-very, be part of a highly developed vegenisation heading up in the natural government. In every case the epicial knowledge of these news and when we have been according to the control of the convents, and will be invaluable in carrying and identifying these works, and will be invaluable in carrying one operations which are well-taked in their nature.

Buildings

In the case of hindring designated for conservation, a paint, in pass existing, and as weren't of received inspections as seed, to feet requirements. Damaged buildings chould be laugered as to fixed stilling. It should be rescueltaved that elementation of partly demaged structures is use of the govern hazarda workship is to the contract as whigher. Even those married as of entired interest, ordinary pump and shorting up of wells, saudits, and estings should be used to finate a prison on I fix beginned as designed and the sun of the saudy proposed and proposed a beauty for the say prisons of I fix beginning demagned building, often appearing mendy as a beauty of middle, advantaged building, often appearing mendy as a beauty of middle, advantaged for fixture examination by experts, because restriction of the case made from the time of the case the made from testingly invested registerate. Movable constents of value may be affected by removed to a benter greenedered plant, speciality if the building it in

Archaeological Site

In most European countries trumerous excuraciones of activalencing and south-posts activate and modeless; will be encountered. There are often open areas containing only foundations and foresteen, and to may appear to cotative over contractive and the independent of modelessing countries of suppressance, in without importance to architecturally. Connecquently, it is desirable to present a contractive and the local grantly contractive and the local grantly and to locate and keep watch over the categories and the local grantly and to locate and keep watch over the activation of the local grantly and the suppressance, and to must not be disturbed or deprived with the contractive and contractive and contractive and contractive and contractive and the contractive and activate and acti

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



FIG. 2.32 (Above, Left to Right) Wilhelm Köhler: Sketch Lists of Scholars, Germany; Sketch List of monuments, Germany; List of Scholars, Balkan Countries; List of Monuments, Bakan Countries

FIG. 2.33 (Below, Left to Right) Erwin Panofsky, "List of Libraries in which I have studied"; "List of Manuscript Collections by P.O. Kristeller"; Dinsmoor, List of Scholars for Illuminated Manuscripts



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List of mes. collections seem by F.O.Ariotollar

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Lucia Allais





FIG. 2.34 (Left) The Frick Committee poses for the OSS to demonstrate "map making." Dinsmoor is at left. Roberts Commission, *Final Report* (1946)

FIG. 2.35 (Bottom, Left) Frick Committee, Base Map for Lombardy & grid overlay

FIG. 2.36 (Bottom, Right) Frick Committee, Final photostatic map for Tuscany, Detail


FIG. 2.37 (Below) WB Dinsmoor, List of Lists, ACLS, *Minutes of Final Meeting* (1945)














FIG. 2.38 a,b,c (Top, Left to Right and Left) San Lorenzo Fuori Le Mura. 1920; Allied Damage to San Lorenzo. 19 July 1943; Aerial Photograph of Damage

FIG. 2.39 a,b,c (Below, Left to Right). Pope Pius XII visits the nieghborhood of San Lorenzo. 20 July 1943; San Lorenzo restored, without frescos; Statue of Pius XII commemorating his visit to the site.














FIG. 2.41 (Left) Detail: Frankfurt City Map & List including Dom and "hatched area." Civil Affairs Handbook: Germany Section 17. Atlas on Churches, Museums, Libraries and Other Cultural Institutions in Germany. August 1944.


FIG. 2.42 a,b,c,d (Bottom) Maps of Kyoto and of Japan from two successive editions of the Civil Affairs Handbook: Japan: Section 17S: Special Maps (12 August 1944); and Japan Section 17A: Cultural Institutions (May 1945).














FIG. 2.43 (Left) List and Map of Monuments for Venice. Civil Affairs Handbook Italy. Section 17: Supplement. 4 January 1944.


FIG. 2.44 (Above) National map of Italy, with list of "Cities with Lists", Civil Affairs Handbook Italy. Section 17: Supplement. 4 January 1944.


FIG. 2.45 (Below) Aerial photograph and list for Venice, from the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces (MAAF), *The Ancient Monuments of Italy* (March 1944)





VENICE. G.S.G.S. 4164. Sheet 51/7051. This list is only a small selection of the city's major monuments. 1. Basilica di S. Merco. 2. Palaszo Ducalo. 2. Pelazzo Ducale. 3. Church of S. Maria Gloriosa dei Frari. 4. Church of SS. Glovenni e Paolo. 5. Church of S. Salvatore. 6. Church of S. Salvatore. 7. Church of Il Redentore. 8. Church of S. Maria dei Miracoli. 9. Church of S. Maria dei Miracoli. 10. Church of S. Maria Formosa. 11. Church of S. Maria Formosa. 11. Church of S. Zaccaria. 12. Church of S. Giobbo. 13. Church of S. Giovanni Crisostono. 14. Church of S. Fanting. 15. Church of S. Giorgio Schiavone. 16. Church of Gesuati. 17. Church of S. Stefano. 18. Palace of Foscari. 19. "" Labia. 20. "" "" Pesaro. 21. "" "" Vendiramin Calerei. 22. "" "" Ca D'ero. 23. "" "" Van Axel. 3 24. Accademia. 25. Bridge of Rialto. VERCELLI. G.S.G.S. 4164. Sheet 57/6352. 1. Church of S. Andrea. 2. Cathedral and Library. 3. Church of S. Cristoforo. 4. Archives.









FIG. 2.47 (Above) Distribution of stars in 5 Italian cities in the MFAA *Lists of Protected Monuments* (March 1944).

FIG. 2.48 (Right) Number of Monuments and Distribution of Stars in 5 Italian cities and 5 document. May '43 to Mar '44.

LEGEND 1: Harvard Long List / 2: Harvard Short List / 3: Civil Affairs Atlas / 4: AAF Aerial Map / 5: MFAA List of Monuments








FIG. 2.49 (Top) "Köhler's Threshold": Monuments/Town in 5 Italian Lists. May '43 to Mar '44.

FIG. 2.50 (Bottom) "Dinsmoor's Criterion": Monuments/ City in 5 Italian Lists. May '43 to Mar '44.









FIG. 2.52 (Above) "Paris the Eternal" New York Times 24 August 1944

FIG. 2.53 (Right) Civil Affairs Handbook, France. Section 17: Supplementary Atlas on Churches, Museums, Libraries and Other Cultural Institutions (1944). Shaded area duplicates Dinsmoor's "green crayon", with 5 of the "25 most important sites"

FIG. 2.54 (Below & Right) MFA&A Troops in action. "Keep Off" sign in Pompei, Manet painting in the Salt Mine at Alt-Aussée; "Golden Arrow Art Museum" improvised by the 8th Infantry Division.




























FIG. 2.55 (Above) "The towns very much resemble the maps": Sequence of Illustrations from the Roberts Commission, *Final Report*

FIG. 2.56 (Right) "More examples of notable buildings saved from destruction by the careful briefing of British and American gunners and airmen." Sir Leonard Wolley, Article in the *RIBA Journal*, December 1945









FIG. 2.57 Panofksy's twelve cities. Civil Affairs Handbook, Germany: Section 17. Atlas on Churches, Museums, Libraries and Other Cultural Institutions in Germany. August 1944













FIG. 2.58 (Below) US Army truck marked "Florentine Works of Art Return from Alto Adige," 1944.


FIG. 2.59 (Below right) American Commission for the Reonstruction of Italian Monuments (ACRIM): "Postal Vote by members of the Subcommittee on Monuments to which immediate assistance should be given."


FIG. 2.60 (Right) "Elenco dei Monumenti Daneggiati" (Inventory of the damaged monuments, for ACRIM)

FIG. 2.61 (Bottom) "War's Toll of Italian Art" Exhibition Catalogue organized by ACRIM











Lucia Allais


FIG. 2.62 (Left) "Reasonable Modernization of the area around St. Etienne in Beauvais: 1939 plan / 1945 plan / 1943 Frick map

FIG. 2.63 (Right) "Reasonable Modernization of the right bank in Rouen: 1947 plan / Frick map

















Paris - 1922-1950

« La Beauté I La Patrie I ... »
« Les protecteurs de la Patrie sont ceux qui la créent chaque jour »
cousse de pérennife d'Athènes, de Pise, de Florence, de Paris, de Rome, de Stockholm (Fig. 9).
« Et pour faire éclater la gloire des villes, en avait, en tous temps et lieux, dessiné les traits de leur visage ».
« C'était le religiaux » le royal aujourd'hui : pour l'homme ».

Il n'est nu besoin d'aréantir le patrimoine sacré du passé, les águs cohabitent dans la paix, naisée la fièvre provoqué à chaque fois par l'installation d'un nouveau venu (Fig. 10). Des causes inéluctables dictent les initiatives (Fig. 11).








FIG. 2.64 (Above, right) Le Corbusier: "Paris, 1922-1950" in Conservation - Création


FIG. 2.65 (Above Left) Le Corbusier, View of St Dié from the ruins of the Cathedral "La Cathédrale témoigne"

FIG. 2.66 (Right) Le Corbusier, Plan for St. Dié, in Conservation - Création

FIG. 2.67 (Below) Reconstruction plans by André Lurçat in Maubeuge (right); by Auguste Perret in Le Havre (left).














FIG. 2.68 (Above, Top) WG Constable, *Art and Re-Orientation*, Allied Military Government: September 1946.

FIG. 2.69 (Above, bottom) Munich Residenz, damaged in 1945.

FIG. 2.70 (Right) Frankfurt's Altstadt: 1939 plan / Frick map / 1948 plan











FIG. 2.71 (Above) Hannover:1939 plan; 1944 Frick map; 1945 damage map; 1947 plan.


FIG. 2.72 (Right) Lübeck: circulation proposal by Emil Steffan, 1946

FIG. 2.73 (Below) Reichsministerium Speer, Arbeitsstab Wiederaufnauplanung zertörter Städte, "Schadensgruppen und Fortschreibende Schadenskarten," 1944. Darker is more damaged.

FIG. 2.74 (Bottom) Hamburg (top row) and Münster (bottom row): 1945 damage map / Frick map / 1947 plan













FIG. 2.75 (Left) "Kriegszertörungen in deutsche Städten," in G.W. Harmssen, Reparationen, Sozialprodukt, Lebensstandard, 1948.

FIG. 2.76 (Below left) Reichsministerium Speer: damage reports from Lübeck, Rostock, Kiel, Bremen and Wilhelshaven on December 1944.

FIG. 2.77 (Below right) München: prewar figure-ground plan, from *Collage City*; with plan of *Residenz*.





3. Functional Monuments

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Chapter 3

Functional Monuments Heritage Missions, HQ Architecture, and Museum Space 1949-1960

When Italian architect Ernesto Rogers recalled his involvement in the design of the Unesco House in 1959, he offered his recollections as a tragic political lesson for modernism. "The problem of Unesco House," he wrote in the pages of Casabella, "is to a large extent the drama of democracy." Throughout the decade Rogers had served as one of "the Five," an architectural advisory group appointed by Unesco to help guide "the Three," another group of modern architects charged with the design of the organization's Paris Headquarter. (fig 3.01) Together these eight figures were some of the most illustrious personalities of the CIAMs, yet as Rogers recalled, a protracted bureaucratic process had yielded a compromised solution and "mediocracy" had prevailed. "The drama of democracy" was that political institutions had imposed procedural norms onto modernism's own collaborative ethos.2 "It is difficult," he lamented, "for anyone who has not witnessed one of those international panels to imagine the extent to which the respect of formalities (dangerously approaching an empty formalism) rendered difficult any agreement on even the simplest of concepts." Modernism had lost the political battle between cooperation and collaboration, and this failure was legible in the architecture itself: the building was "a noble office building that makes a broad, organic gesture in the city," but its interior space "failed to elevate or to provide an escape." This lack of spatial differentiation was emblematic of the "imperfection of democracy," its sacrifice of individuality to "the harmonious consortium of humanity." Similarly, instead of being a "Monument to World Culture" the Unesco House merely provided "the competent application of a common language," an architectural version of the organization's bureaucratic tongue, devoid of "accents and inflections." Thus the "formality" of international cooperation had reduced modernism to a meaningless "formalism."

Rogers' political lesson to naïve architects was meant to pre-empt the expectation that the Unesco Headquarters would consummate the long-latent romance between architectural modernism and international organizations. This expectation, and its disappointment, was expressed a year later by Lewis Mumford in a scathing review of the building as a collection of "clichés." Mumford saw

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¹ Ernesto Nathan Rogers, "Il Dramma del palazzo dell'Unesco," in Casabella Continuità, (Apr 1959), 2.

² "One of the characteristics of democracy is the dialectical contrast between institutional structures and the procedures that are necessary to correlate its various parts." Rogers, 4.

the "elephantine mediocrity" of Unesco House as a fitting end to a tragic timeline beginning with the fiasco of the League of Nations Competition in Geneva in the 1920s and continuing with the compromises of the UN headquarters of 1940s New York. Mumford agreed with Rogers that "the failure was an instructive one" but made the point through an analogy with the museum:

The result is a Museum of the Antiquities of Modern Art and Architecture. In this museum, the scholarly curators have, as if for historical completeness, preserved with excquisite zeal the mediocre, and the bad, as well as the excellent, and have place them all on view at once.³

Mumford's museological image was partly inspired by the extensive sculptural and mural program of the building, but it also sealed the critical fate of the headquarters as an architectural work; subsequent critiques followed his lead, perpetuating the basic argument that Unesco's political malfunctioning was reflected in the staleness of its architecture. The Unesco House therefore entered the history of architecture as a symbol of the institutional death of modernism, and it brought along the three analogies between modern architecture and international political discourse which had been used to make the point: the linguistic analogy (that the building's international style was a bland Esperanto), the spatial analogy (that its lack of spatial differentiation reflected Unesco's demoagoguery), and the museum analogy (that the collection of modernist tropes signified their death and mummification)—all of which (along with the failure of modernist collaboration to trump bureaucratic procedure) represented the tragic political "institutionalization" of modernism itself.'

The image of the museum as the destination of a dying modernism had in fact been used by Roger later in 1959. It was not only the language of modernism that belonged in a museum but its primary modus operandi, the CIAM, which had been "condemned by its own success, its own vulgarization." The museum—the site of its last meeting in Otterlo—was a fitting destination for an avant-garde that had been institutionalized into obsolescence. Yet the connection between the death of modernist collaboration and Unesco's own international cooperation has remained unclear, and other places where modernism and cooperation interacted in Unesco have remained unexplored. In this chapter I argue that the focus on the collaborative aspect of the CIAM-Unesco encounter has

³ Lewis Mumford: "Unesco House: Out, Damned Cliché!," (1960), in The Highway and the City (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1963), 70.

⁴ To cite a recent summary, "Descriptive accounts ... have seldom refrained from delivering negative verdicts. Criticism has not been restricted to the architectural syntax of the forms alone—which, despite many individually impressive solutions, have generally been found wanting as a unity. Discussion has also focused on the cooperation between artists and architects, compelled, in the course of their close collaboration, to accept an excessive number of compromises." G.D. Growe, "The Paris Unesco Complex," Marcel Breuer: Design and Architecture (Vitra Design Museum, 2003), 334.

⁵ Ernesto Nathan Rogers, "I CIAM al Museo," in Casabella (Oct 1959), 4. Translation mine.

distracted from a more fundamental kinship between the design of Unesco house as a late-CIAM project and the principles of architectural modernism that were being developed within Unesco in the 1950s. The chapter chronicles Unesco's encounter with modernism through the formation of its Monuments Committee (MonCom), which codified the space of the museum, as paradigmatically modern space, carrier of a political agency. I examine the ten volumes of the manual series Museums and Monuments which were published between 1949 and 1960 in conjunction with the International Council of Museums (ICOM). The title of these manuals reveals in itself the breadth of endeavor taken on by this committee: if World War II had demonstrated that monuments could be "protected," the other nine volumes showed that the problem of protection did not end there, that monuments also had to be "problematized," "reconstructed," "surrounded," "preserved and presented," "exhibited" and, perhaps most importantly, "organized." (fig 3.02)

Culture as Function

The primary difference between Unesco as one of the United Nations "Specialized Agencies" and the IICI as an organ of the League of Nations is that Unesco was assigned a specific function, "culture," which implied a certain constituency. The United Nations system was designed during the wartime as a "practical" alternative to "more elegantly designed" systems, including proposals for federations of states and constitutional world governments. As described by its most influential proponent David Mitrany, the "functionalist theory of politics" was "an attempt, after looking squarely at the lessons of history, to offer a practical line of action." This line of action involved gradually integrating international constituents into a world community by achieving specific tasks, rather than pursuing international unity as a goal in itself. In a memorandum titled "Territorial, Ideological or Functional international Organization?" submitted to the Foreign Office in 1941, Mitrany described functionalism as "the organic elements of federalism by installments."

Sovereignty cannot in fact be transferred effectively through a formula, only through a function. ... By entrusting an authority with a certain task, carrying with it command over the requisite powers and means, a slice of sovereignty is transferred from the old authority to the new; and the accumulation of such partial transfers in time brings about a translation of a new seat of authority.⁸

⁶ David Mitrany, "A War-time Submission: Territorial, Ideological, or Functional International Organization? (1941)" in Functional Theory of Politics, 118. This theory was based partly on a critique of the League and its lack of a mechanism to allowed states, such as the US, to partake in specific projects without having to belong to the organization as such.

⁷ David Mitrany, "A War-time Submission," 120.

⁸ David Mitrany, "A Working Peace System (1943)," in The Functional Theory of Politics (London School of Economics / St Martin's Press, 1975), 128. On Mitrany see also Cornelia Navari, "Functional Internationalism," in Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Interwar Idealism Reassessed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

This was an organic analogy that focused on processes of transformation. In Mitrany's words, "the virtue of the functional pattern is the virtue of technical self-determination." In 1943 Mitrany further elaborated the model by describing functions as flexible, autonomous and self-evolving:

The function determines its appropriate organs. ... The function, one might say, determines the political instrument suitable for its proper activity. And by the same means provides for its reform and every stage.⁹

The organic analogy was particularly well-suited to technocratic endeavors; accordingly, functionalists' favorite examples of integration were large technological endeavors in culturally homogeneous regions—the Tennessee Valley Authority in the pre-war, the Middle East Supply Center during the war, and eventually, the European Coal and Steel Community. At the level of international organization, however, the organic analogy was abstracted to the level of the international body politic, with "health" "labor" as favorite examples of organs. It is as one such 'organ' that we have to understand the "Mind" in Unesco's creed, that "since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses for peace must be erected."

Insofar as political functionalism was a system for changing the relations between states, rather than establishing or maintaining them, its approach to cultural matters was focussed on education from the start. Mitrany had cited "culture" as one of the system's functions as early as 1941,¹⁰ but it was out of the Conferece of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME) that Unesco was created, in a move that was specifically described as a merging of the IICI with the International Bureau of Education. As we have already seen, the IBE had been explicitly excluded from the League by governments eager to maintain ideological control over their educational policies. Now "education" and "mass communication" were Unesco's primary concerns, and it was undoubtedly the "E" in the acronym UNESCO that gave Unesco its constituency. Whereas the publications of the IICI had been semi-academic, publications, printed in limited runs of less than a thousand numbered copies and displaying objects ad sites, the Unesco Courier was a mass-produced glossy magazine whose pages were populated by people—children, teachers, cultural figures past and present.

Between 1946 and 1950 a plethora of books popularizing "The Cultural Approach to International Relations," were published, triggering a wave of pointed critiques on the part of realist political thinkers. ¹¹ Hans Morgenthau, for example, devoted an entire chapter of his 1949 Politics

⁹ Mitrany, "A Working Peace System," 129.

¹⁰ "In the field of positive active functions" Mitrany identified the fields of "economic, social, cultural" Mitrany, 120.

¹¹ Ruth McMurry and Muna Lee, The cultural approach, another way in international relations (Chapel Hill, UNC Press, 1947). Some were republications of wartime works, like Ruth Nanda Anshen, ed., Freedom and its Meaning (London: Harcourt, 1940) and Alain Locke, and Bernhard Stern, eds., When Peoples Meet: A study in Race and Culture Contacts (New York: Hinds Hayden & Eldredge, 1946). Unesco was a major part of this publishing wave; see David Hardman, Reflections on Our Age:

Among Nations to the newly-created Organization, endorsing the functionalism of the UN but singling out Unesco for being an organization with no real mandate. Morgenthau's critique was two-fold:

The philosophy of UNESCO starts with the assumption that education, cultural interchange, and in general all activities which tend to increase contacts among members of different nations are factors in creation of an international community and in the maintenance of peace. Implicit in this assumption is the supposition that nations are nationalistic and go to war with each-other because they do not know each other well enough and because they operate on different levels of education and culture. Both assumptions are erroneous.

There are primitive people, completely lacking in institutionalized education, who are generally peace-loving and receptive to the influence of foreign cultures. There are other peoples, highly educated and steeped in classical cultures, such as the Germans, who are generally nationalistic and warlike.

. .

Furthermore, in the history of some nations, such as the British and the French, periods of nationalistic exclusiveness and warlike politics alternate with cosmopolitan and peaceful ones, and no correlation exists between these changes and the development of education and culture.¹²

From this two-fold historical generalization Morgenthau concluded that "the quantity and quality of education and culture as such is irrelevant to the issue of a world community." Morgenthau's skepticism was derived from his view of culture as an end in itself—"however meritorious they may be intrinsically," Unesco's projects had no place in a world order. Instead Morgenthau advocated that what was needed was "a moral and political transformation," revealing the ethical role that had been overwhelmingly projected onto Unesco, although it was never quite articulated as such. Indeed Morgenthau's critique recalled Harold Nicholson's attack on the "new diplomacy," and in particular the fact that the externalization of international relations into "open diplomacy" had forced upon diplomats a definition of morality as a public performance of rather than a secret professional ethic. Similarly, Morgenthau expressed the widespread impression that Unesco had been created merely as a public-relations gesture, to represent the presence of "the conscience of mankind" to a public of world opinion. ¹³ But when he wrote that "the world community is a community of moral

Lectures Deliered at the Opening Session of Unesco at the Sorbonne (London: Wingate, 1948), and Theodore Besterman, Unesco: Peace in the Minds of Men (New York: Praeger, 1951).

¹² Morgenthau's example is relevant here: in 1947 a proposal had been made that Unesco should start a program for the "conservation of nature," but this proposal had been rejected "not because it lacks merit but vecause it does not appear to be appropriate for understaking by Unesco as a contribution to peace and security." Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf, 1949), 407.

[&]quot;The world has compensated for such losses by inventing for itself an entirely new form of international intercourse ... It is possible to contend that ...[the League and the UN tribunals] ... are mere essays in idealism and that they assume a level of international ethics which, if it were a correct assumption, would render any Covenant or Charter unnecessary. ... Yet it is also true that there does exist such a thing as "the conscience of mankind" and that even the most autocratic and impervious nation must in the end become aware that it is unprofitable to unite that conscience

judgments and political actions not of intellectual endowments and esthetic appreciation,"14 he hoped sever a bond between aesthetics and morality that had been gradually formed through the pre-war and throughout the war itself, and that most proponents of the "cultural" approach considered a hard-won victory.

Against this backlash of realist critiques, Unesco advocates worked hard to articulate this bond between morality and aesthetics in functionalist terms, often contributing to further confusion about the respective role of "Science," "Culture," and "Education" in the organization's mandate. The first secretary-general Julian Huxley, for example, proposed a "scientific humanism" as the working philosophy for the entire organization. In part, this philosophy echoed the arguments he and other scientists had originally made to add the "S" to the organization's acronym to oversee the work of scientists. 15 This was a straightforward application of morality to science in an atomic age. But Huxley also articulated an evolutionary analogy on an international scale, with Unesco "a higher vertebrate [that] coordinates the activities of its various different organs, and adjust the claims of its different innate impulses." ¹⁶ Culture and education played a "functional" role in the evolution towards "understanding on a world scale," in particular through "Libraries, Museums and other cultural institutions," which he defined as "institutions and organizations devoted to the twin functions of preserving the world's scientific and cultural heritage and of making it available when preserved." 17 Here "science" was no longer a practice needing oversight but a network of institutions, as it was clear that Huxley based his definition of "cultural institutions" on natural history museums and zoos. A year later Huxley offered a slightly different analogy between cultural and biological phenomena, applying it directly to "the domain of the arts" and giving culture a "function" in a more strictly social-scientific definition, as a set of practices:

against them." Harold Nicholson. "The Old Diplomacy and the New." David Davies Institute of International Studies. (March 1961), 9

¹⁴ Morgenthau, 412.

^{15 &}quot;On Nov, 1 1945, British minister of Education Ellen Wilkinson heeded the call of scientists for a place in the organizational title, offering a commitment at a meeting with Sir Henry Dale and Julian Huxley. ... In these days, when we are all wondering, perhaps apprehensively, what the scientists will do us next, it is important that tey should be liknked closely with the humanities and sholud feel that they have a responsibility to mankind for the result of their labours.' The "S" was soon proposed by American delegates and supported readily by most others." James P. Sewell, Unesco and World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 78-79.

^{16 &}quot;social organization is the mechanism on which man must rely to effect evolutionary process. ... Mutatis Mutandis, these are the problems of a modern society—but, of course, with the basic differentce that the individual human being has claims quite other than those of the single cells or organs of the animal body." Julian Huxley, Unesco: Its Purpose and its Philosophy, (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1947), 47.

¹⁷ Julian Huxley, Unesco: Its Purpose and its Philosophy, 56. In the case of "these institutions which are brought into exsitence of tperform a particular kind of function in relation to culture and scienc" Unesco would be concerned with "techniques and their improvement."

A distinctive art or culture, once it has died out, cannot be revived or recreated any more than can an extinct species of animal or plant ... We have to face the fact that in large sectors of the modern world, art plays but a very small role. We thus have to study the means whereby the arts shall be accepted as a necessary element in life.¹⁸

Thus Huxley was torn between three analogies between science and culture: one where Unesco acted as an ethical judge of scientific research, another where Unesco coordinated existing scientific institutions; finally one where Unesco fulfilled an organic function in the body politic.

A similar confusion characterized the work of Huxley's successor, Jaime Torres-Bodet, whose preferred terminology for describing Unesco's work was legal—especially after the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. "Political security," he wrote, "is meaningless if it is not founded upon the four fundamental human rights, to which the great Agencies of the United Nations correspond: the right to life, to health, to work and, Unesco's own reason for being, the right to education and culture." For Torres-Bodet the war had confirmed the relevance of the ideals of Enlightenment philosophers, rather than rendering them obsolete. Unesco's role was to harness them in order to produce "the will to peace." The role played by "art" in the production of this "will to peace" was made graphically clear in the accompanying illustration, which conflated the head of a child with the "O" of the organizational acronym, the continents with paint colors on a palette. (fig 3.03) This graphic style became a signature for the Organization in this period, and it relied overwhelmingly on the conflation of the circle as the "O" of organization, the "mind" of international understanding, and the "influence" was Unesco was supposed to institute between them: thus the cover of Julian Huxley's manifesto used a radio-wave as a icon, while social scientists surveying the "influence" of public libraries used concentric circles to track the influence of cultural institutions like public libraries. (fig 3.04) This abstract iconography was indicative of an organization which was uncertain how to represent its own influence.

One of the few thinkers to integrate education as a right and culture as an institution into a single theory of international life was the director of the International Bureau of Education, Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget, who was asked by Unesco in 1948 to compose a manifesto titled The Right to Education. Piaget described the task of international education as a perpetual de-centering of subjectivity towards objectivity. While he repeated the pre-war idea of political idealists that national

[&]quot;One problem of considerable urgency is that of the arts of non-industrialized countries and peoples. In many cases, such arts are in danger of either dying out completely, or of being debased or distorted through contact with industrial civilization. It is clearly the duty of Unesco to try to prevent this." Julian Huxley, "The Role of Unesco in the Domain of the Arts," in The Studio Vol. 134 (Oct 1947), 110-111.

^{19 &}quot;The Will to Peace," in The Unesco Courier II/12 (1 Jan 1950), 1.

and international spheres are nested, he focused on the passage between one sphere to the next, in a process he called "de-centering":

Whether it is a question of intelligence, ethical formation, or international formation, the issue is each time to "de-center" the individual, to make him spontaneously give up his subjective or egocentric attitudes and to lead him to reciprocity and (this is practically synonymous) to objectivity.²⁰

Thus objectivity was aimed for by proceeding outwards from the center of subjectivity, in a sequence of displacements that Piaget implied was potentially indefinite:

If at each new level human thinking has come to disengage itself from a particular form of egocentrism, seemingly primitive or naïve after the fact, it is to fall once again each time into a more refined egocentrism, which again impedes complete objectivity. From a social point of view, it is, a fortiori, the same thing: the "de-centering of the "I" or the "We" or of their symbols or of their terrotories is still hampered by more obstacles.

From this succession of de-centerings Piaget concluded that, practically speaking, international education could not simply reside in some classes about "international institutions" or "the idea that they represent and defend" that would be added as appendages to existing curricula. Instead he recommended instituting "a group of active methods," which included creating "model governments," so that "international life" could be "discovered through 'lived-in' experience." ²¹

Piaget elaborated what he meant by "lived-in experience" through the concept of "space," in a book titled The Child's Perception of Space published the same year. Here Piaget used "space" as a variable with which to measure a child's cognitive development. Piaget's goal was to disprove mathematical conceptions of space as consisting of "euclidian concepts such as straight lines, angles, squares, circles, measurements, and the like," and demonstrate, instead, that fundamental spatial principles were "topological"—which is to say, "based entirely on qualitative or 'bi-continuous' correspondences, involving concepts like proximity and separation, order and enclosure." In other words, space itself was not Euclidian; Euclidian geometry was a norm progressively formed in the child's mind. What this meant was that space, for the child, was "essentially of an operational character." Thus one of the basic skills that Piaget tested in children was the ability to use and recognize the conventions of orthographic projection. Asking children to construct "Diagrammatic layouts and the plan of a model village," Piaget tracked the progressive reliance on plans as evidence

²⁰ Jean Piaget, The Right to Education in the Present World, (Paris: Unesco, 1948), reprinted in Piaget, To Understand is to Invent (New York: Viking Press, 1973), 131.

Jean Piaget, The Right to Education, 141. "International life is the theater of the same conflicts of reciprocity and the same misunderstandings of all social intercourse on an entirely different level. ... all common phenoemena on all levels, and to understand their importance on the international plane it is essential to have discovered them through a "lived-in" experience.

²² Piaget, "Preface," in The Child's Conception of Space, trans. Langdon & Lunzer, (New York: Humanities Press, 1956), vii.

that "the construction of a physical reference frames proceed side by side with the general coordination of viewpoints." One corollary of the construction of "space" is that there was a moral dimension to this spatial development; here Piaget echoed his 1932 The Moral Judgment of the Child, where he had argued that the child "constructs his own morality" after observation and interaction with the world, rather than through the imposition of authoritative norms. In other words, there was a moral dimension to "lived-in" spatial development.²⁴

This is not say that Piaget considered morality a relative quantity, dependent upon cultural content. On the contrary morality was invariable and universalizable. In fact, Piaget spoke of social phenomena as fundamentally exterior to human subjectivity; insofar as he spoke of "culture" at all, it was usually to describe it an alienated externality. In his manifesto on international education he explained the fundamental misunderstanding between individuals and their expected norms of behavior:

We do not understand the present world either morally or intellectually. ... We are like the old Eskimo who was asked by an ethnologist why his tribe so piously preserved certain rites, and answered ... "we preserve our old customs so that the universe will continue."

Therefore spatial autonomy could be used as an illusory instrument of cultural self-preservation. It is statements like these that have fueled a debate over whether Piaget's theory was anti-social and individualistic—in the words of one sociologist, whether "Piaget's child is a solitary scientist constructing knowledge apart from the social context." But this is to miss that Piaget's was a theory of an absent center, a theory of relationships between subjects and everything else (be it a culture, a person, or an object) and that the medium for these relationships was a formalist notion of space. The connection between this outward—decentering and Unesco's work on monuments is twofold. On the one hand, it is clear that by focusing on space Piaget avoided the problem of the "collective" which had proved so problematic to intellectual cooperation in the prewar, and with which many social scientists continued to grapple in the postwar. On the other hand, monuments in postwar cultural internationalism were mediated by a changing set of spatial relationships—in the city, internally, as a network—which implied a perpetual de-centering. Therefore the heritage missions and museum architecture of the 1950s can be understood by analogy with Piaget's project: as

²³ Piaget, The Child's Conception of Space, 419. "To investigate this hypothesis in greater detail, and at the same time conclude the present series of experiments, we cannot do better than examine the way children set about making a plan or layout, in the sense of creating an accurate topographical schema. Such an activity is extremely important, both from the psychological aspect, considering the development of children's geometrical drawing; and historically, as regards the actual origins of geometry from land surveying as practices in ancient Egypt."

²⁴ Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, (London: Trubner, 1932).

²⁵ Rheta DeVries, "Piaget's Social Theory," Educational Researcher, (Mar., 1997), 4.

attempts to work subjectivity and "culture" back into intellectual cooperation without resorting to a collective subjectivity, but choosing "space" as a medium instead.

The MonCom and Heritage Missions

The tension between culture as Unesco's function, education as its medium, and morality as its effect was reflected in the work of its Monuments Committee, which was formed in late 1949. Monuments had been absent from Unesco's initial program—the "conservation and protection of the world's inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history and science" was written into Article II of Unesco's constitution, but as a sub-heading of what was admittedly its broadest mandate: "to maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge." The appointment of the first "Group of Experts on Monuments" has a strictly functional origin, in the political sense of the term: Returning from the Middle East in 1948, Julian Huxley suggested the creation of "a cultural liaison service for the region" which would "think of the immense wealth of archaeological and artistic and architectural treasures in terms of the region as a whole and organize their exhibition on a regional basis."27 This "Committee of Experts on Sites and Monuments of Art and History" met for the first time in October 1949, and despite the instrumental reasons for their first gathering they immediately set out to make become a permanent group. They set up a symposium in the manner of the Athens Conference, where representatives of monuments administrations gave national reports. These representatives were also asked to bring photographic evidence of recent work, which was compiled into a public exhibition at Unesco Headquarters, the first of its kind.²⁸ Published as the first Museum and Monuments manual in 1950, the proceedings of this meeting were compiled as a body of evidence which could legitimize the continued need for monuments expertise.

The substance of this first manual is aptly summarized in its title, "Problèmes Actuels" [Sites and Monuments: Problems of Today], as it consists largely an "actualization" of all the technical and administrative issues that had been addressed at the Athens Conference in 1932. Italian historian and restorationist Roberto Pane was assigned the task of synthesizing the national contributions into international trends. Pane began his survey by recalling again the basic 19th Century opposition between "stylistic and historical" points of view and proclaiming that conservation had long ago

²⁶ Unesco Constitution, Article I, paragraph 2. As cited in Com.Mon.1.4/ Doc. 12, (25 Sep 1951), International Committee on Monuments, First session, 21-25 May 1951, Plan For the Future Work of the International Committee.

²⁷ Julian Huxley, in Report of the Director General on the Activities of the Organization in 1948. (Paris: Unesco, 1948), 10.

²⁸ "Report on the Findings of the Meeting of Experts," in Museums & Monuments I: Sites and Monuments, Problems of Today (Paris: Unesco, 1950). This Conference/ Exhibition format became the norm; it is the form of the Venice Charter.

won the war against preservation ("The accepted views today are the exact opposite of those advanced by Viollet le Duc.)."²⁹ He frankly blamed popular sentiment for this continued opposition, as experts usually advocated that destroyed buildings should not be rebuilt, while the public demanded restoration for sentimental reasons. ("The conflict still exists between expert and the public.") Yet he also admitted that the war had exacerbated the gap between doctrine and practice, by creating more destruction than the pre-war doctrine of "conservation" had been designed to deal with. Therefore it was "imperative to take action even if a compromise has to be made." Here Pane used Giovannoni's distinction between "living" and "dead" monument to justify the kind of partial reconstructions that were "not always in accordance with the general rules of modern restoration." Taking the example of "a half demolished church," Pane conceded that the "life" criterion justified demolition. ("if it is a living monument, still fulfilling its original functions,... an easy solution is to build a new church in its place.") Yet he contended that this was "not facing up to the real problem. Instead the "new" could be integrated into the "old" through the judicious design of modern lines and shapes:

Care will be taken to make the reconstructed part stand out clearly from the rest. This does not imply that the new part should not be closely linked with the old in its patterns of lines and spaces; it cannot therefore be a totally new design, even where the restorer will have to face a whole series of minor problems for the solution of which tastes and inventiveness must often be combined with technical experience.³⁰

For the first time in the international discourse of conservation an overriding aesthetic criterion was introduced by which to judge the adequacy of conservation, and this aesthetic criterion was differential, not absolute: it was the legibility of the difference between new and old—to be designed by the restorer's talent and skill. Furthermore, Pane made the startling proposal that modern architecture was particularly well-suited to the task of abstracting historic forms into contemporary restorations:

It must be admitted that the new trends of modern architecture facilitate the solution of this problem. The sheer simplicity of structure, the careful study of rhythmic relations and of a proper distribution of light, the possibility of using new materials and the great assistance that reinforced concrete has been for decades in solving the most complex restoration problems, enable us to cope successfully with the special cases.

The primary example of this integration was the church of San Lorenzo, whose front facade had been rebuilt without applied decoration. (fig 2.38) In formal terms, this principle of using modern

²⁹ "The reconstruction of monuments based on stylistic analogies, or the retention of forms which are wrongly considered typical has most decidedly given way to respect for each historic phase in the life of a monument." Roberto Pane, "Some Considerations on the Meeting of Experts held at Unesco House 17-21 October 1949," in Museums and Monuments I: Sites and Monuments: Problems of Today (Unesco: 1949), 49.

³⁰ Pane, Problems of Today, 74.

architectural gestures to approximate historic forms amounts to a kind of proto-postmodernism. In doctrinary terms, Pane reconciled this recommendation by theorizing that both conservation and restoration could be understood as ways of "preserving aesthetic unity." Clearly inspired by the theory of painting conservation that had been pioneered by Cesare Brandi and that the ICOM endorsed in this period, Pane recommended that this unity should be legible from a certain distance, while closer inspection would reveal differences in material and detailing between old and new. This compromise required learning from the "restorations" that had been hitherto taboo. But Pane recommended that any wholeness was better than destruction and challenged the hypocrisy of his opponents who inherited monuments "restored" in the past only to impose strict "conservation" on them. "To all who today object to any restoration, we might well ask: what would now remain, not only of the monuments of architecture, but of all works of art, had there not been men to wage a frequently heroic battle against the ravages of time in order that these symbols of civilization may endure." In other words, the destructions of the war had condensed history and precipitated the advent of a compromise solution that might otherwise have taken much longer to work out.

Throughout the Manual, postwar reconstructions were invariably depicted as a practical demonstrations of the principles theorized in Athens, but instead of being disparate examples they now constituted a cumulative international norm. The "use of modern materials" was exemplified in the restoration of roofs in concrete and steel—here French cathedrals were the best example. (fig 3.06) The idea of modernizing monuments "from within" was represented in the de-composition and re-building of the façade of the Tempio Malatesta in Rimini, whose proportions had been thrown off by the blast of a nearby bomb. (fig 3.07) The cohesion of material "integrity" and urban "integration" was exemplified by the Church of Saint Anne in Warsaw, which received "injections of cement, hollow piles of reinforced cement, resistance walls, changes in horizontal and vertical positions, steel tightening and a frame belt of reinforced concrete"—and, perhaps crucially, a new ring-road highway to circumvent it . (fig 3.05) The MonCom meeting synthesized the encounter urban reconstruction that had prevailed throughout European reconstruction into one compromise:

Generally speaking the best way of adjusting the often conflicting claims of "preservation" and town planning is to try, in the first place, to meet the real needs of civic economy, and then to adapt aesthetic considerations to them. This is also the lesson taught to us by the past, since it is clear that the old thoroughfares and squares in many

³¹ In painting conservation, this technique required the deployment of a change of orientation in the brushstroke: missing parts of painting could be filled in by the restorer, as long as they were painted with a brushstroke that was visibly different to the naked eye—although from afar the effect of "aesthetic unity" would be maintained. The second Museums and Monuments Manuals, was entitled The Conservation of Paintings, and was devoted largely to this technique. ICOM, The Conservation of Paintings. Museums & Monuments II (Paris: Unesco, 1950).

³² Pane, Problems of Today, 78-79.

European towns owe their beauty to their logical solution of the practical problem of everyday life, and not to the abstract search for the "monumental." ³³

Against the abstract search for the "monumental" in the pre-war's myopic emphasis on buildings themselves, an urbanized monumentality gradually became the focus of the MonCom's discourse. Although Pane's theory of "aesthetic wholeness" was most forcefully articulated in material and architectonic terms it was primarily at the scale of urban and regional development that this aesthetic criterion could be tested in a series of case-studies which constitute the subsequent six Museums and Monuments manuals.

Julian Huxley had hoped to send the first heritage missions to the Middle East, but two events delayed the accomplishment of this task: the earthquake in the Pervian city of Cuzco on May 21 1950, and the thaw in relations with Yugoslavia. Funds for the first two missions were redirected to Peru and Yugoslavia, and while neither mission had a particularly regional mandate, their reports set the stage for monuments to become into active agents of international intervention at the urban and regional scale. Certainly the structure of these two reports reveal the transformation of art historical and archaeological expertise into a "cultural" consultancy. The report on the mission to the church of St Sophia Orchrida began with a statement of art historical value ("The church of Saint Sophia at Ochrida is one of the most important and ancient religious buildings surviving in Macedonia")³⁴ and ended with its incorporation into international life ("these cultural contacts will contribute to a wider knowledge of the common heritage of the past, and to a better understanding of the various countries' civilizations"). Similarly, the Cuzco report began with a statement of archaeological differentiation ("Cuzco is three cities. One is Inca. The second is colonial. The third is modern." 35) and ended with an international regulation ("conservation and restoration policy in Cuzco should be administered within the projected framework of the Cuzco Development authority, under the United Nations.")³⁶ In between these two extremes—technical solutions to repair monuments and international appeals for organization—the missions resorted to a broad panoply of measures, including administrative regulations and urban planning measures like "zoning" and circulation.

The Yugoslav mission was led by Italian conservationist Cesare Brandi, and its mandate was to survey the decay of the frescoes and the deformation of the walls the church of St Sofia Ochrida.

³³ Roberto Pane, "Some Considerations," Sites and Monuments: Problems of Today, 50.

³⁴ Ferdinando Forlati, Cesare Brandi and Yves Froideaux, Saint Sophia of Ochrida: reservation and Restoration of the Building and its Ffrescoes: Museums & Monuments IV (Unesco: Paris, 1951), 5.

³⁵ Georges Kubler, Cuzco: Reconstruction of the Town and Restoration of the Monuments: Museums & Monuments III, (Unesco: Paris 1951), 2.

³⁶ Kubler, Cuzco, 38.

Brandi and his team recommended very specific techniques for removing the frescoes while the walls were straightened and reinforced, but they also included a set of "general improvements"—by which they meant urban un-encumbrement. (fig 3.08) First, "the old houses surrounding Saint Sophia" were to be "safeguarded by administrative measures," because they constituted "the best backdrop" for the church. Secondly, the "general harmony of the area" was to be increased by regrading the alley along the west façade down to the level of the building's arcade, and compensating for the change in elevation by adding an urban stair at either end of the alley. Third, since "the narrowness of the alley precluded a good view" of the building, the mission recommended demolishing "one characteristic structure to provide a small open space from which the architectural qualities of the building could be properly appreciated." Lastly, the mission recommended converting the open space around the North and East of the building "into a garden," but taking care "to avoid any symmetrical plan reminiscent of small-town squares." These were not quite the geometrical rules that Victor Horta had proposed in Athens to ensure the proper "open space" around each monuments, but the effect was the same: the monument asserted its urban presence by clearing an open space around itself.

The Cuzco mission established an even more explicit bond between functional internationalism and functionalist urbanism. Headed by Yale Americanist and Focillon disciple George Kubler, the mission surveyed the damage from the quake and advised on specific buildings' archaeological reconstructions. But it also made recommended that conservation be regularized within Cuzco's administrative and planning mechanisms. The mission chastised the Highway Department for causing 20% of the destruction during the rubble-clearing phase, and critiqued the building statutes of the Ministry of Fomento, which did not regulate the use of adobe in new construction, and allowed "setbacks with front, side, and rear yards in the familiar wasteful North American suburban pattern." Then, recalling that a "development commission" had been created on the UN's initiative to deal with the growth of the city, the Unesco report endorsed the traffic-diversion plan that had been proposed by the city's Planning Commission of the city. (fig 3.09) Thirdly, the mission Instead Lastly, the mission recommended its own zoning plan, according to a progressive relaxation of preservation rules in proportion with the distance away from the historic "center" of the city:

- A. An archaeological and historical zone to be conserved and restored
- B. Residential districts susceptible of modification
- C. Districts in which total rebuilding is permissible

³⁷ "General Improvements," Saint Sophia of Ochrida, 22-23.

³⁸ Kubler, Cuzco, 4. "Nothing could be more alien to the traditional architecture of Cuzco."

D. Districts for future urban growth³⁹

To implement this plan the mission recommended the creation of a "an authoritative zoning board, which will maintain the zoning, and safeguard colonial and archaeological monuments, without hindering the economic life of the city." This board would also he forbid the use of "unsightly building materials" and incorporate "the traditional courtyard system," into building statutes. Together, all the various authorities would be reconciled into a "broad urban reform."

Thus by the time funding was secured for a mission in the Middle East, the scope of the MonCom's work had grown more ambitious. A Middle East mission was formed, which spent a whole year surveying the sites of the region and publishing its recommendations in two manuals, Lebanon and Syria. The mission fulfilled Huxley's desire by recommending the creation of roads, hotels, rest-houses, along with the restoration of a suitable number of churches and castles, to create a single circuit connecting all the monuments in the region. The missions also made recommendations for administrative reorganization, addressing what Huxley had called "the two-fold problem" of dealing with the arts in "dependent territories: first, how to persuade those in charge of the colonial administration in the mother-country that they have a responsibility in the matter, and secondly, how to persuade the peoples of the territories themselves that their own arts and culture have a real value."

The missions to Syria and Lebanon provided a realm where three functionalisms (political, social scientific, architectural) could come together into a single overarching theory for incorporating monuments into urban growth and development:

In large and rapidly expanding towns... attention must be drawn to the interest which historical monuments have for the present generation. Their aesthetic value must be taken into consideration in all town-planning schemes, which should endeavour to preserve or create the most appropriate atmosphere around them, befitting their proportions, character and style. Far from hindering the natural development of a city, they should continue to embellish it, being given their rightful place in the scene so as to do full justice to their cultural significance as well as to the needs of modern life. 42

In advance of this growth some municipalities had hired architects and planners, and the Unesco mission took on the job of critiquing available plans. In some cases Unesco approved the work: in Aleppo the mission endorsed the plans of André Gutto, an urbanist of the Institut d'Urbanisme in

³⁹ Kubler, Cuzco, 45.

⁴⁰ Paul Collart, Selim Abdul-Hak, Armando Dillon, "Conclusion," in Syria: Problems of Presentation and Preservation of Sites and Monuments. Museums and Monuments: VII. (Paris: Unesco, 1955), 28

⁴¹ Huxley, "The Role of Unecso in the Domain of the Arts," 111.

⁴² Paul Collart, Selim Abdul-Hak, Armando Dillon, "Conclusion," in Syria.

Paris. ⁴³ More frequently, the plans followed Beaux-Arts principles that Unesco deemed disruptive of the monumental "atmosphere." In Tripoli, the mission critiqued the 1947 plan, which included a proposal "for the old streets to be widened and for the buildings on either side to be pulled down," taking sides with the Antiquities Department which had opposed the plan. But whereas the Antiquities Department had simply protected the monuments archaeologically by "listing" them, the mission gave an urban rationale for their value (that the urban fabric formed an aesthetic "whole" which could not be fragmented) and proposed an overhaul of traffic patterns instead, a comprehensive plan that included digging a tunnel under the city center. (fig. 3.11) Similarly, in Baalbek, the mission analyzed the salient points of a plan that had been drawn up in 1951 by the municipality, and commended it for "meeting all the practical requirements." But it also raised "serious objections form the aesthetic points of view", its cutting of avenues, and the creation of a network of circular roundabouts:

All the proposed roads are to be straight, and this is quite out of keeping with the character of the Baalbek oasis and the surroundings of the ruins. The building of a roadway all around the ruin would destroy the charm of the present paths, the circular temple, through set off to great advantage, would still be isolated. A large open space, bare and noisy, in front of the entrance to the temples and carrying a heavy traffic load is hardly calculated to prepare tourists for the aesthetic emotions they should feel on a visit to the Baalkebk ruins. 44

The mission provided an alternative sketch for "planning the citadel like a park", by maintaining the proposed circulation patterns but inflecting their geometry to the topography of the site, bending the roads around the location of the monuments, and incorporating the "corners, bends and parking areas" into a picturesque approach "arranged so as to provide interesting views." (fig. 3.10)

While none of the plans recommended by Unesco in the Middle East were implemented, they effectively put a stop to a certain kind of un-regulated urban growth, establishing the administrative structures for later incorporations of heritage urbanism, and introduced ideas of large-scale urban functionalism not implemented in Europe and America until later decades. Thus Unesco acted as an agent of a type of urban planning that Lewis Mumford would call "the highway and the city" by replacing the Beaux-Arts of the immediate postwar with more strictly "functionalist" ideas drawing from a modernist palette, including zoning, tunneling, and parks. "There is nothing artificial in the plan we propose," the mission architect wrote in Lebanon, "it is

⁴³ "We are glad indeed to associate ourselves with the recommendations and reservations in the report accompanying the scheme of improvements adopted by the municipality." 23.

⁴⁴ "Baalbek: enhancement of the ruins," in Lebanon, 28. Mission leader Paul Collart had collaborated with the director of Antiquities Pierre Coupel. See Paul Collart and Pierre Coupel, L'Autel Monumental de Baalbek, (Paris: Institut Français d'Archéologie de Beyrouth / Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1951.)

⁴⁵ See Peter Larkham, Conservation and the City (London: Routledge, 2005).

dictated by the natural flow of traffic."⁴⁶ At the urban scale the term "function" had expanded to an administrative level, and the object of conservation had grown correspondingly, from isolated objects into entire neighborhoods.

As the work of the MonCom progressed and it began to produce manuals on general themes, this urban functionalism was gradually complemented by an architectural definition of function, as the purpose of building. In part this was due to a move away from cities and into the countryside. In a 1953memorandum, Mon Com member and modernist historian Eduard Sekler recommended that monuments in the increasingly de-populated countryside should simply be assigned "a new function:"

There is the possibility of collaboration and assistance on an international level when trying to find new functions for buildings which are in danger of decay because their old functions do not exist any longer. In this connexion especially country seats ("ville") castles and monastic buildings should be mentioned. Apart from new function which may be found for them on a national level are probably quite a few useful purposes they might serve on an international level.⁴⁷

The single most frequently proposed solution in this search for a new "function" was "museum." Already in the first Museums and Monuments manual Roberto Pane had offered the example of "old buildings converted into art museums" as paradigmatic way to reintegrate monuments into "life." The practice of converting monument into museums offered "many analogies with restoration," in particular because they usually had "very modern fixtures" that combined ancient architecture with modern forms." Pane also supported his argument by referring to a report by Georges-Henri Rivière on the increasing need for monuments to be accompanied by "Museums of the Monument." For Rivière the attachment of a museum space to monuments was a trend that needed to be modernized. "The old functional museums, may even today be regarded as patterns." This pattern was a way not only to re-inhabit monuments from within but also to colonize them from without—using the urban logic of "open space" that had been discovered in heritage missions and assigning it a museological "function."

⁴⁶ Paul Collart, *Lebanon*, 30. It has to be said that the organicist theory of urban "functions" was distinctly modern and did not belong exclusively to the CIAMs, it was widespread idea of European technocratic urbanism since the teens. Indeed the invention of the Athens Charter was to not to have assigned functions to city elements but to have limited the number of functions to four. In fact, the CIAMs of the immediate post war were marked by a heated debate over the need for a fifth function to complement this scheme. As we have seen in Chapter 2 the monuments of Europe filled this role in the reconstruction schemes. Here "function" became a more broad administrative category, corresponding not to objects but to entire neighborhoods.

⁴⁷ Eduard Sekler, "Some Problems Connected with the Preservation of Monuments in the Countryside: Rural architecture, country seats, former ecclesiastical buildings, etc," WS/093.10 4 July 1953

⁴⁸ Pane, Problems of Today, 76.

⁴⁹ "Museums of the Monument," in Problems of Today, 62.

The function of museums was to "organize" culture. The analogy between the "organization" of objects in the museums the "functional planning" of historic districts in developing cities was everywhere present in the reports of heritage missions. Thus the report for Tripoli:

Works of art which have for long been overlooked and neglected are often found to have acquired interest and importance in the course of time, through the research of art historians and archaeologists. They are then suddenly given prominence in the showcases of museums or the shows of antiquarians. We too the view that the ancient city of Tripoli was a work of art which, with a little restoration and re-planning, could regain some of its former beauty and take its due place in the luxurious settings of the modern district.⁵⁰

This advocacy of urban museumification relied on a parallel between scholarship and development. Just as "research" fueled n the progress of art-historical knowledge and the concomitant expansion of the realm of valuable objects, so demographic development fueled the growth of cities and the concomitant expansion of cultural heritage sites. Functionalist urbanism dealt with the expansion of the social realm; museums organization dealt with expansion of the world of objects. What the design of museum space allowed was a passage from the functionalization of culture to the organization of cultural artifacts—both gestures derived from the organic analogy inherent in the UN system. While regionalist heritage missions attempted to achieve this organization at the scale of the entire world, the museum offered a microcosm, where smaller monuments could be arranged to reflect the objectivity expected from this new cultural functionalism.

From Museography to Museology

It is a truism of architectural history that modern architects spoke often of museums but had few opportunities to build them. In the words of Rosalind Krauss, "although the twentieth century saw many constructions of shiny, marble art palaces, with their rooms succeeding one another *en* filade, two new models had been elaborated [by 1949] which had far more in common with the rewriting of the terms of the museum within the era of modernism. These models were based, on the one hand, on the 'universal space' of Mies van der Rohe, and on the other on the spiral ramps of Le Corbusier and Frank Lloyd Wright." According to Krauss, these two models alone bridge the gap between the Beaux-Arts enfilade and what she calls, borrowing from André Malraux, "postmodernism's museum without walls." Ludwig Glaeser pointed out that this transformation

⁵⁰ Paul Collart, Emir Maurice Chehab and Armando Dillon, "Tripoli: replanning the old town," in Lebanon Suggestions for the Plan of Tripoli and for the Surroudnings of the Baalbek Acropolis: Museums and Monuments VI (Unesco: Paris, 1954), 24.

⁵¹ Rosalind Krauss, "Postmodernism's Museum Without Walls," in Reesa Greenberg, Bruce W. Freguson, Sandy Nairne, Thinking About Exhibitions (London: Routledge, 1996), 343-344.

occurred mostly "outside of museum walls," in exhibition halls, fair pavilions and private galleries. 52 In Mark Jarzombek's analysis, it was the investment of museums with nationalist myths that was the primary obstacle to reform, and "modernism could do little to challenge the equation of museum architecture and neoclassical academicism" in the first half of the century. 53 All three agree that it was not until the postmodern reform of the institution itself that the lessons of modernism were brought to bear on the architecture of new museums.⁵⁴ In this section I examine the efforts of these institutions to reform themselves from within during precisely in this mid-century period—after modernist models had been worked out, but before new museums were built. By triggering and hosting a discourse on the architecture of museums, international organizations like Unesco, the OIM and ICOM brought modernist spatial tropes into these famed academic halls and played a crucial role in disseminating the idea that museum space was a quintessentially modern condition. My analysis revolves around the comparison of the two volumes published 30 years apart. The first is the massive two-volume Muséographie published by the OIM in 1934 as a follow up to the Madrid Conference, whose findings were disseminated and debated in architectural forums throughout the 1930s. 55 (fig 1.13) The second is the last Museums and Monuments manual to be published in the 1960s, titled The Organization of Museums: Practical Advice. Widely disseminated to museum professionals across the world, this was a stand-alone reference for how to design, staff and operate a small museum from scratch. A comparison between the two volumes, their similarities, differences, and filiations demonstrates the passage from the "enfilade" academic typology to the "museum without walls," and the role that the "spiral model" and the "universal space" played in this passage.

The 1934 Madrid Museography Conference was the third conference organized by the International Museums Office. Although its putative theme was "the architecture of museums," the subject actually addressed was, in the words of one participant, "the palace transformed into a museum." Most European museums were converted palaces, and the political problem this legacy

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⁵² Ludwig Glaeser, The Architecture of Museums (New York: MoMA, Sep-Nov 1968), 2.

⁵³ Mark Jarzombek "Postmodern Museum," in Global Architecture, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2007), 749.

⁵⁴ For a theoretical rounding-up of this reform, see Donald Preziosi and Claire Farago, Grasping the World: The Idea of the Museum (London: Ashgate, 2004).

⁵⁵ See for example the special issue of Architecture d'Aujourd'hui titled "Muséographie" (Jun 1938). Hautecoeur's text was recently republished by the Louvre, as Architecture et Aménagement des Musées (Paris: Louvre, 1993).

⁵⁶ Muséographie: Architecture et Aménagement des Musées d'Art. Conférence Internationale de Madrid. (Paris: IICI, 1935). The volume reprinted all of the contributions after they were edited by an editorial board, which included: F. Schkmidt-Dgener (director of the Rijskmuseum), Eric MacLagan (Director of the Victoria and Albert Museum), F. Sanchez-Canton (assistant director of the Prado Museum), and E. Foundoukidis, (director of the OIM.)

posed onto the growth of 20th Century museums was most aptly summarized by American architect Clarence Stein:

There is probably no other category of building whose form has been less affected by changes in its function, as well as by progress in mechanical and technical realms, than the museum. Although it has become a social and democratic institution, the museum often remains retrenched behind the walls of a princely palace.⁵⁷

Louvre conservator Louis Hautecoeur supported this interpretation in a historical overview that recalled the museum's aristocratic birth, its academic development, and the 50-year critique that these 19th-Century dispositions had undergone. His survey was graphic as well as historical; he offered an inventory of the evolution of "the architectural program of the museum" in a sequence of ten plans. (fig. 3.15) The weight of this "princely" precedent was such that long narrow galleries had become a typology, now sorely insufficient. The "monotony and boredom of these long galleries and enormous salons" and the "lack of incorporation of "technical considerations" into the architecture itself" meant that architectural forms were imposing a political exclusionism onto an institution that was, in fact, ready to modernize. 58 Indeed the greatest problem of this typology was its hindrance to the emergence of a new kind of museum—what Henri Focillon had called "the public's museum", and which the conference called, alternatively, "the democratic museum," the "inviting museum," or "the educative" museum. 59 In light of the ludicity of this architectural critique, the solutions proposed in Madrid appear surprisingly academic—the most popular proposal being Clarence Stein's own star-shaped plan for "an ideal museum," which used a concentric "zoning strategy" to differentiate between "the public's museum for appreciation" at the center and "the student's museum for investigation" on the periphery. (fig 3.13)

The ICOM's role in transforming this academic typology into a modernist model is evidenced in a 1947 publication by André Leveillé on the role of museums in the popularization of science. Leveillé's was an argument for the popularization both of science and of the museum itself; he argued that each city should be furnished with a museum of science, and provided two options for the plan: a "Maximum musem", concentric in plan, inspired by the Stein diagram, and affording both lengthy and shortened circulation routes; and a "minimum museum," which consisted in a single oblong room measuring of 12 by 20 meters. While the architecture of the two spaces was radically different, Léveillé used the same diagram to organize the information on display. The sequence to be followed by the visitor remained the same: it began with "mathematics"

⁵⁷ Clarence Stein, "Eclairage Naturel et Eclairage Artificiel," Muséographie, 78.

⁵⁸ Louis Hautecoeur, "Le Programme Architectural du Musée: Principes Généraux," in Muséographie, 17.

⁵⁹ It had first been published as "The Art Museum of Tomorrow" in The Architects' Journal (Jan 1930), 5-12.

⁶⁰ André Léveillé, Scientific, Technical, Health Museums, Planetaria and the Popularization of Science (Paris: ICOM, 1948).

and proceeded outwards, either towards astronomy or through physics, to merge again at the level of "biology." (fig. 3.14) In other words, Léveillé had effected a spatial version of the scientific process of abstracting: the minimum museum was an "abstract" of the maximum plan, conveying the same information but with a synthetic reduction of details.

This process of reduction by scientific abstraction is a fitting analogy for the passage from the intricate organizational diagrams of Muséographie to the modern architectural principles of the Organization of Museums manual. The point is not only that there is a direct connection between the academic typologies of the "monumental era" and free-plans of "the international style," and that international organizations preformed a work of dissemination and popularization. The point is also that in the passage from one model to the other, a set of formal and theoretical tropes were deployed that allowed certain architectural gestures to be seen as intrinsically modern. Three architectural gestures can be identified in particular, that allowed this process of "abstracting" to unfold: "the division of space," which helped to transform the enfilade model into a free-plan model; the design of "continuous circulation," which served to disassociate the accumulation of objects from the distribution of visitors; and the issue of "lighting," which helped to make of "ambiance" and atmosphere a legitimate architectural concern.

The idea that the museum design should proceed by a "division of space" was introduced, in Madrid, as a way to talk about the interiors of formerly royal palaces in democratic terms—to describe the need to "divide" and "break down" the long and undifferentiated space of the gallery. Despite the modernism latent in this language the solutions proposed was still based on the creation of "rooms," some of which—like the "polygonal rooms of the MFA"— were extracted from their plans to resemble Léveillé's minimum museum. (fig 3.16) Hautecoeur articulated this as a compromise: "a system of movable walls leaves room for a variety of arrangements," but "an architecture of rooms [une architecture de salle] allows for compartmentalization and affords more latitude for growth." The few examples of a "dynamic division of space" were examples where walls were made of vitrines encasing objects. (fig 3.17) The most progressive position vis-à-vis the planning of exhibition walls was provided by the director of the Rijskmuseum, who connected the space "around" the artwork to the psychology of the public eye [psychologie du regard public]:

The great discovery that modern trends have brought to our museums is the psychological effect of free space around the work of art. ... Today the eye has been awakened to new exigencies: the work of art gives the impression of being a mass which is carried by the open space that surrounds it. By increasing this space we are able to

^{61 &}quot;Aménagement des Musées," Muséographie, 51.

impress upon the spectator the aesthetic importance of the work. This space has primarily a psychological effect on the visitor. 62

If "space" was the great luxury" in museums, it was be to abused—excessive isolation would be "pretentious". Therefore a set of guidelines could be drawn from the style of the art itself: while "symmetrical arrangements" ennobled Italian art, Dutch painting required a more "individualized" display. Thus an aesthetic regime emanating from the work of art itself began to regulate the space of the new "visual field." This field itself was to be designed—all decorations to be removed, "architectural divisions" avoided, "sponge-painting techniques applied", in order to heighten the "atmospheric" properties of the space of the museum. These instructions echoed the articles published throughout the 1930s in Mouseion on "the re-organization of national collections," which showed a progressive removal of paintings from view and de-densification of the visual field. The idea that "the wall" was the curator's main project was also echoed in articles that mediated the relationship between objects themselves and the wall-space, such as an article by Germain Bazin on the re-framing project of the Louvre, which began with the definition of "frame" in spatial and conceptual terms. (fig. 3.18) ("The word "frame" designates that which delimits a form. Taken abstractly, this can be a mental form: a concept. Concretely, the frame is a partition in time and space."63) All of this work of partitioning and dividing "space" was intended to appeal to a new, neutral subjectivity: "a spectator who, in himself represents nothing at all." As if the architectural stripping of the museum wall had also stripped the viewer's mind of any thoughts, the viewer entered the museum "without reasoning" and exited "in a state of vague well-being, a certain euphoria."64

Concern over the well-being of a new modern visitor translated not only into a new visual expectation but also in the need to design specific routes around the objects. Here the museographers engaged in a protracted argument about the suitability of "shortcuts" and the desirability of designing sequences according to criteria other than historical succession. Again because of the limitations of "the architecture of rooms," the debate focussed on the location of doors and the fatigue created by enfilades. (fig 3.26) But perhaps greatest innovation in the discourse on the "circulation" of the visitor was the analogy between locating works of art in the museum and the placement of the museum in the city. Here the Conference made two crucial recommendations: on the one hand, museums should be located in the center of the city (against recent trends of seeking

⁶² F. Schmidt-Degener, "Principes Généraux de la Mise en Valeur des Oeuvres d'Art," in Museographie, 213.

⁶³ Germain Bazin, "Principes d'Encadrement des Peintures Anciennes," Mouseion 55-56 (1946), 279.

⁶⁴ Schmidt-Degener, 218.

suburban sites) so that "the life of the museum [would be] integrated into the movement of the city, in the manner of churches, schools, theaters, etc."65 Yet unlike those other institutions, museums should always be planned for future expansion, initially occupying only parts of their sites. The effect of this double requirement was to make of the museum an object with a centripetal force in the city: an object not unlike the ones inside its walls, which commanded both an "open space" around itself and a "zone of influence" into the city. The best architectural model for this modern typology, according to Louis Hautecoeur, was the "the museum with horizontal expansion" which had been proposed by Le Corbusier. Initially designed for a Paul Otlet's Mundaneum project at the Palace of Nations in Geneva, this was an architectural typology meant to register the social force emanating from objects themselves—an "objectivity" that was not as static as the classic Bauhaus "sachligkeit" but as an outward spatial force of aesthetic experience. 66 (fig 3.24) Le Corbusier arrived at this typology by making a historical argument about accumulation, namely, that museums were institutions that "grew" indefinitely. But the spiraling outwards was also a formal gesture expressing the power of this objectivity, and its ability to determine behavior. Thus, unlike his proposal for the League of Nations competition which was composed according to strict functionalist lines, imposing a traditional sachligkeit onto the international subject, the mundaneum drew subjects into a spatial pattern produced by the perpetual accumulation of objects. (figs 3.23-25) When Le Corbusier re-proposed the mundaneum for the competition for the museum of modern art in Paris, its pyramidal form now flattened, Mouseion republished the plans and models with a note that the central core allowed circulation in one part of the plan to be modified without affecting the others—as if Clarence Stein's ideal plan had been re-proposed in spiral form. 67 (fig. 3.24)

The last architectural trope that was inaugurated in Madrid and fulfilled in the 1960 Manual was that of a grid of lighting. Clarence Stein, who had been asked to provide the technical expose of recent innovations in lighting, proposed no less than to use lighting as a way to bridge between the old princely container and the new, universal, democratic institution. As we have seen, Stein blamed the "monumental style" for the growing gap between form and function in museums: distracted by the imitation of the "princely allure and pretentious aspect of buildings designed in the monumental style," architects had forgotten to incorporate technical innovations in lighting and ventilation. Stein advocated "breaking of the barrier" between modern architecture and museum programs, but saw

⁶⁵ Hautecoeur, 28

⁶⁶ Le Corbusier had made this clear in a debate with Czeck architect Karel Tiege who had protested his pyramidal form was too "academic." See Karel Teige, "Mundaneum" and Le Corbusier, "In defense of Architecture," both reprinted in Oppositions 4 (1974), 83-108. For a discussion of Otlet, Geddes, Le Corbusier and the spiral typology, see Alessandra Ponte, "Building the Stair Spiral of Evolution" Assemblage 10 (Dec 1989), 47-64.

⁶⁷ "Plan d'un musée à extension horizontale, établi par l'architecte Le Corbusier," Mouseion 49-50, (1940), 29-38.

"lighting"—and particularly "zenithal lighting"—as a palliative measure that could bring an "aesthetic and educative modernity" into the existing palace-museums. In a highly technical exposé of sky-lighting techniques, Stein gave the impression that the limitations of academic architecture were gradually being overcome with a universalizing canopy grid, which deployed an even "ambiance" of light and atmosphere onto all the spaces, people, and objects below. (fig 3.27) Optical diagrams spanned the space between objects, walls and visitors with geometrical patterns that seemingly abstracted space into an atmospheric ether. Stein's recommendations and vocabulary were seconded by British engineer J.A. MacIntyre, who explained the means of maintaining an acceptable range of temperature and humidity in museum environments, ensuring the comfort of the visitor and the preservation of objects through "atmospheric conditioning." While these technical discourses were applied to the conditioning of air and light, they also lent scientific veracity to an otherwise vague psycho-political discourse. The vocabulary of "dosage" and "moderation", of technical control over quality and quantity, was applied indiscriminately to the density of artworks, as to the amount of lighting, and to the behavior of the visitor. The political implications were clear: "The principles that command the installation of works in a museum are the same as the principles of good government: to safeguard individuality of each unit, without hurting the whole." ⁶⁹ The walls of a museum formed a political field to be ordered and then—visually, atmospherically projected into the mind of the visitor.

All three of these architectural tropes—the "division of space," the design of "circulation routes" and the use of "universal lighting"—were echoed in Unesco's 1960 Manual on the Organization of Museums. In contrast to the Muséographie volume, which was filled with Beaux-Arts architecture, the 1960 manual was full of modern architecture, including works by Mies van der Rohe, Max Bill, and Albert Laprade. Unlike the conversational Muséographie volume, the Organization of Museums manual exuded a technical instrumentality. Its tone was unforgivingly dry and technical; its pages combined architectural plans with tabulated information, administrative setups, technical instructions and a table of temperatures—all presented matter-of-factly as international norms. The intended audience for this "practical advice" was addressed in by Unesco's Director General, Luther Evans, who presented the Manual as a direct descendent of the Museography volume, but also synthesized the radical changes that had occurred in the meantime:

⁶⁸ J.A. MacIntyre, "Chauffage, Ventilation et Aération," Muséographie.

^{69 &}quot;Principes Généraux de la mise en valeur des oeuvres d'art," in Muséographie, 204.

A great deal has happened, however, since Muséographie was published: social and political changes have occurred, a rapid advance is being made in technology, communication facilities have improved, air travel has reached a high stage of development, we are on the threshold of developing new sources of energy and the first attempts at the exploration of outer space have begun.⁷⁰

The implication was clear: from the exploration of outer space to the expansion of museum space, Unesco was an agent in the technical expansion of environment for people and objects. Evans then proceeded to recount the specific frontiers that Unesco had reached in its heritage work:

Experts have been sent to advise on aspects of museum development to Afghanistan, Ceylon, Ecuador, India Indonesia, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore and the Sudan. Fellowships have been given to nationals of Aghanistan, Beligium, Burma, Cuba, Denmakr, Ecuadro, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan and Poland.

Evans also referred to the three seminars on "The Educational Role of Museums" which acted as the discursive complements to the technical manual: training seminars where the ground was prepared for "museological" training to be received as a technical aid.

But if the conditions underlying museum space had radically changed, certain crucial diagrams and visual tropes that had been used to describe beaux-arts museum architecture in 1934 were republished in the Manual, now imbued with technical legitimacy and removed from the museums whence they came. The concept of the "division of space" was conveyed with the same diagram on "different ways to divide space" and the plan of the Hamburg Ethnographic museum. (figs 3.18-19) In this context, the juxtaposition implied a very specific formal evolution: from the "architecture of rooms" with polygonal forms, to the thickening of walls with objects themselves, to the "articulation of space", and finally to the liberation of the object and the wall so that both could inhabiting a single space autonomously. (figs 3.20-21) Similarly, the diagram on the location of doors was reprinted, now accompanied by a recommendation that "arrangements should be made to enable visitors to the galleries to follow a continuous route or special routes, the principle being that the visitors' exit should be at the same place as the entrance ... differences in level should be avoided."71 Lastly, Clarence Stein's catalog of lighting sections were reprinted, but now the ubiquitous "zenithal grid" disappeared, and the only grids to be found were in the plans featured in the Manual-foremost among them the "Museum for a small city" designed by Mies van der Rohe, presented with a caption "The absence of architecture." (fig 3.29)

By 1960, ICOM presented this universal space as the optimal medium space for the educational mandate of museums to unfold. The museum's other missions (scholarship and storage)

⁷⁰ Luther Evans, "Foreword," The Organization of Museums: Practical Advice. Museums & Monuments IX (Unesco: Paris, 1960), 9-10.

⁷¹ Rôle Educatif des Musées, 20.

were relegated to supporting roles. The distinction between different constituencies, once a dilemma, was now understood unproblematically as a multiplicity of "the museum's functions." Similarly, the political project of aesthetic temperance and atmospheric well-being was now rephrased in social-scientific terms, with museums exerting an "integrating influence" on an alienated subject:

Many influences today are actively at work to undermine man's human qualities, and if love of knowledge and contact with the good, the true, and the beautiful are ever to grow and develop in those who seem often to despise them, the museum is perhaps one of the few instruments which can be effective. Museums are marginal institutions which can have an integrating influence in a world suffering from division. ... They have an urgent task in a modern world.⁷³

In light of this social mandate it is important to note that the OIM and ICOM saw themselves as codifying a new discipline altogether, and that by the time "museography" had turned into "museology," architecture had been removed into its own form of autonomous expertise. On the one hand, this meant that museologists could openly advocate the hiring of modern architects. For example, George Henri Rivière unabashedly recommended to the Educational Seminar in Rio that museum directors appoint "progressive architects":

The curator should:

- (a) seek the advice of all his qualified colleagues;
- (b) obtain as much information as possible about the advances that have been made in the fields of museology concerned,
- (c) wherever his opinion is likely to carry weight, seek to induce the responsible authority to appoint a "progressive" architect, who would himself cooperate with all the scientific and technical experts required for the purposes of the latest trends in architecture.⁷⁴

Rivière is credited with coining the term and founding the discipline of "museology"; as a curator of ethnographic collections at Chaillot, Rivière had been a key figure of what James Clifford has called "Ethnographic surrealism"—advocating a rapprochement between museums of art and ethological collections like his own Musée de l'Homme.⁷⁵ Now in charge of the Musée des Arts et Traditions Populaires, Rivière was also the vice-president of ICOM and brought the same fervor to the regionalization of the international museum as he did to the collection of regional artifacts from

⁷² Douglas Allan, "On the Museum's Functions," in The Organization of Museums, 13-26.

⁷³ Molly Harrison, "Education in Museums," in The Organization of Museums, 92.

⁷⁴ Georges-Henri Rivière, "General Principles," in "The Architecture of Museums," in Regional Seminar on the Educational Rôle of Museums. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 7-30 September 1959. Educational Studies and Documents No. 38 (Paris: UNESCO, 1960), 18.

⁷⁵ Rivière's key contribution to this movement was the 1930 text, "De l'objet d'un musée d'ethnographie comparé à celui d'un musée de beaux-arts," Cahiers de la Belgique 3 (Nov 1930). For an analysis of this text's importance in the world of the artistic avant-gardes see James Hebert, "Entr'acte," in 1937: Worlds on Exhibition (Ithaca: Cornell, 1998). See Jame Clifford, "On Ethnographic Surrealism," in Comparative Studies in Society and History (Oct 1981), 539-564.

3. Functional Monuments

bygone French peasant lifestyles.⁷⁶ In the hands of a connoisseur of folklores, architecture became a cultural expression among others, to be curated along with other appropriate forms of international styles of life:

There should be no hesitation about adopting a 'cosmopolitan' style of architecture. One of the main features of progressive architecture is a preference for functionalism and economy rather than for the perpetuation of the various existing styles; consequently a much truer idea of the characteristics of a nation can be conveyed by progressive architecture than by copying the styles of the past.⁷⁷

What this means is that museologists were now curating the modernism of museums from within. Thus the transition from beaux-arts museography to modernist museology proceeded along the lines of an inversion: from a space "retrenched behind the princely walls" of the monumental style, to a space to surrounding and encompassing monuments—even modern functional monuments like the museum. Even the city became a legitimate museum object, circulating around this ubiquitous museum interior—in a proliferation of exhibitions on city planning which proclaimed, "this could be your town." (fig. 3.22) It was these disciplines that ushered the monument into architectural modernity, from within and without.

Unesco Headquarters

The peculiar reciprocity between modern architecture and museology as both its function and its patron returns us to the predicament of Unesco House, and its surplus of modernist authorship. To conclude the chapter I propose to bring the lessons of heritage urbanism and museum space to bear on the Unesco House, in order to re-read its "political failure" in terms of the project of cultural internationalism. Indeed the assumption that the political fate of Unesco House lies exclusively in its collaboration has overshadowed any political reading of the project itself, aside from the "drama" of its design process. My interpretation relies on a three-part argument. First, that the urban presence of the building is an embodiment of the organizational functionalism that was characteristic of the museums as urban monuments and carriers of a different Sachligkeit. The Unesco site—indeed all of Paris, since the headquarters was planned for two different sites in Paris and its influenced on the capital's monumental axes was carefully calibrated each time—was intended to be

⁷⁶ Rivière's course on "Museology" was reprinted posthumously in La Muséologie selon de George-Henri Rivière (Paris: Dunod,1989). This book also credits him with the invention of "the ecomuseum." Rivière's own recollections can be found in the Huxley Memorial Lecture he delivered in 1968, "My experience at the Musée d'Ethnologie," reprinted in the Proceedings of the royal ANthropoligical Institute (1968), 17-21. See also the Eulogy delivered by Claude Levi-Strauss, highlighting his "revolutionary concepion of folklore," in "Hommage à Georges Henri Rivière," Ethnologie Française XIV/1 (1986), 123-136. An article on Rivière and the architecture of his museum is forthcoming.

⁷⁷ Georges-Henri Rivière, "The Architecture of Museums," 20.

the kind of the didactic space that forced a perpetual de-centering upon the urban subject. (fig 3.33) In this sense the Unesco house does not really have an interior—the design process reveals that, like the vitrines of the ethnographic museum, its volumes were progressively inflected in an abstract space in order to express the cultural charge of the objects within. (fig 3.34-36)

Secondly, what is perceived as a lack of spatial differentiation in the interior of Unesco House is the effect of the bending of axes, division of space, and atmospheric compositions that are characteristic of museum space as Unesco itself helped to codify it. Typologically, this is only fitting: unlike the United Nations headquarters, whose "delegate lounges" were spaces of negotiations, backstage for the "new diplomacy" and therefore planned to be confined to specific "salons," here the public spaces of the Unesco house were only supposed to impart a cultural goodwill, moderation, and spirit of agreement—this is why they were designed as a museum of modernist murals. The type of cultural functionalism that determines this space is best demonstrated in a comparison with the scheme that was designed a previous site at the porte Maillot, which was composed of three volumes following a strict architectural functionalism: an office tower, an assembly hall, and a conference center-rigidly connected with links and plazas. (fig 3.31-32) In contrast, the project that was built at the place de Fontenoy the project was limited by the height of the nearby Ecole Militaire and therefore unfolded as a sequence of organized, choreographed museological experiences. That the result was "undifferentiated" was far from an unintended consequence; it was the prerequisite condition for the space to be understood as "cultural" at all. (fig 3.35-36)

Thus, the equation of Unesco with the failure of the CIAMs can be rethough in light of the definition that 'modernism' had acquired by the time the headquarters was designed. There are three ways that Unesco appears in the history of the CIAMs. The first is as an emblem of modernism's political helplessness. For example, when Bruno Zevi wrote his famous "Message to the CIAMs" in 1948, he used the weakness of Unesco's "city planning and building center" as evidence of the fact that "we architects of today have not yet learned how to cooperate together on the political scene." The second is as a hopeful partner for a project to reform the education of architects in the immediate postwar. In 1947 Siegfried Giedion wrote a manifesto-like letter on "the education of the architect" proposing that architecture become the discipline which is best able to "learn to coordinate human activities," and Unesco as the only agency "able to accomplish an integration

⁷⁸ Bruno Zevi, "Messaggio al "Congrès international d'architecture moderne": Della Cultura Architettonica," in Metron, 31-32 (1948), 5-30.

3. Functional Monuments

which has to come about if our civilization is not to collapse." The third is as a client—or rather, a potential client of Le Corbusier. When the Unesco House was first begun and Le Corbusier lobbied to become the sole architect of the commission, he garnered the support of a petition signed by the CIAM directors. 80 But CIAM also appears in the archives of Unesco as an organization that does not fit the existing categories of international organizations, whose congresses Unesco bureaucrats attend in order to ascertain whether they validly qualify as a "non-governmental organization,"81 and whose privileged status as a "consultant organization" has to be constantly defended on the part of a few interested individuals buried deep within the bureaucracy. In this body of literature, the turbulent postwar struggles at the leadership of the CIAM are legible in a frequent changes of names, structure, and leadership that were regularly registered with Unesco, which kept track of all arts organizations of this nature. From this perspective, it is evident that, for Unesco, the CIAMs represented not a body of expertise but rather a cultural phenomenon, to be witnessed, preserved, and approached only within certain norms and forms. Within this pattern, the Unesco House appears not as a failure but a success: a procedure that successfully "conserved" the modern tradition in architecture by "bringing it to life" within a functional space in the modern city. The bureaucratic atrophy that felt by the CIAM as a result of this collaboration was only a symptom that would soon be felt in the preserved neighborhoods in cities across the world: the uncanny "formalism" that comes from having been functionally, successfully, "conserved."

⁷⁹ Siegfried Giedion, "On the Education of the Architect," Architecture, You and Me (Cambridge: Harvard, 1958), 102-103 ⁸⁰ The letter was jointly written and signed by Gropius, Rogers, Sert, Emery, Wells Coates, and Giedion on 26 July 1953. On Le Corbusier's efforts to become the sole architect see Barbara Shapiro, "Tout ça est foutaise: Le Corbusier and Unesco," RACAR XVI, 2 (1989), 171-306.

⁸¹ UNESCO/ 72 A 01 ICMA, "International Congresses for Modern Architecture," Unesco Archives. This archival group begin with letters from Giedion to Huxley, continue with arrangements for an enthusiastic Unesco librarian to attend them, then onto the problem of whether CIAM's association with the INternational Union of Architects meant that it should lose its privileged "consultant" status, and ends a stern letter to Jaap Bakema, after the Otterloo meeting, asking: (1) what are the permanent activities of the center? (2) Does the congress have regular mode of communication with its members (bulletin, regular meetings, etc?)




FIG. 3.01 The Five and the Three. "Unesco House is their handiwork," in Unesco Courier (1958).




FIG. 3.02 Unesco: Museums & Monuments manuals published between 1949 and 1960.



THE WILL TO PEACE

FITY years ago our fathers stood at the threshold of the Twentieth Century. That was a time of progress and of belief in progress, and the eyes of all men progress, and the eyes of all men to the control were soon to dash their hopes. Twice, since then, war has plunged the world into bloodshed and horror. And our generation we for belief in a better future ?

It would be easy — but quite unjust.— It obtains the men of the unjust.— It obtains the men of the carlier centures of self-interest, of greed and of misunderstanding control of the cont

resignation:

of the Tweatisth Comtile New, londed, made things no
better. But through suffering men
have at least—and at last—learned
the unity of human destiny. We
have a least—and at last—learned
the unity of human destiny. We
have a least suffering men
that no least the philosophers
had valuity sitempted to teach usthat no class, no state, no race, no
had no class, no state, no race,
had no class, no state, no race,
had no class, no state,
had no state of the class
that no class, no state,
had no state
likevise. And the family he leaves
selled him has leasing claims upon

T HE Twentieth Century has already witnessed two catastrophes. But, in the midst of disaster, it has also been responsible for two inspired creations, unprecedented in history.

For the frame

HUMAN RIGHTS DAY, (Puge 4

THE FRST PEACE P.P.E. AN AMERICAN INDIAN FOLK TALE. (Page 5)

PLMS BRING ART TO THE PEO-PLE SCIENCE AND THE CINEMA (Pages 8 and T)

EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIE

The League of Nations and the United Nations. Whatever the immediate results of these two temperatures of these two temperatures of these two temperatures of the sought a world solution for the problems of makind. At least the solution of the security of a solution for the security for an erequire security for an erequire security is meaningless if it is no security is meaningless if it is no security in the security of the security is meaningless if it is no security in the security in the security is meaningless if it is no security in the security in the security is meaningless if it is not security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security is security in the security in the security in the security in the security is s

The conquest of these rights wi demand many long years. W cannot even hope that this centur will see the full achievement of such a programme. Nevertheless only through such a programm can world peace become peace for mankind, peace for all mer everywhere.

If we are to deserve and the achieve this we must, above all vigilantly maintain our will the peace. We know now that the most generous resolutions and the most admirable intentions are of littly value if we are not ready to translate them into action. We have

proclaimed Rights of Man; now, inrough our efforts, the union of the peoples must become more than a legal phrase. If we do not work for peace that is possible today, we shall never create peace that will last for ever. This torn world of ours needs a faith; faith in the brotherhood of human kind.

brotherhood of human kind.

In wishing all the peoples of the
world a New Year of concord and
harmony, Unesco reaffirms its
belief in the power of the values
of the mind for the cause of liberty,
of justice and of peace.

(New Year Message From The







FIG. 3.04 "Distance between home and library," in Unesco, *The Delhi Public Library*, 1957.

FIG. 3.03 Jaime Torres-Bodet, "The Will to Peace," in The *Unesco Courier*, January 1950.

FIG. 3.04 Julian Huxley, cover of, *Unesco: Its Purpose and Philosophy,* 1946.






FIG. 3.05 St. Anne, Warsaw: plan and view from the new highway. From *Museums and Monuments* I, 1950. FIG. 3.06 "The reconstruction of roofs with new materials." From *Museums and Monuments* I, 1950.

FIG. 3.07 Tempio Malatesta, Rimini: restoration elevation and detail. From Museums and Monuments I, 1950.

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




FIG. 3.08 St Sophia Ochrida: "General Improvements" plan. *Museums and Monuments* IV, 1953.


FIG. 3.09 Cuzco: "Preservation Zoning Plan." *Museums and Monuments* II, 1951.


FIG. 3.10 Baalbek: 1951 plan (left) & Unesco plan (right). Museums and Monuments VII, 1954.


FIG. 3.11 Tripoli: proposed tunnel under the old city. *Museums and Monuments* VI, 1954.
















FIG. 3.12 Distribution of services in an ideal museum. From OIM, *Muséographie*, 1934.

FIG. 3.13 Clarence Stein: Plan for the Public. From OIM, *Muséographie*, 1934.

FIG. 3.14 André Leveillé: Le musée maximum et le musée minimum, plans. ICOM, *Musées Scientifiques*, 1947.





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





FIG. 3.15 Louis Hautecoeur, "Le Programme Architectural du Musée," from OIM, Muséographie, 1934.

FIG. 3.16 "Polygonal Halls", from OIM, Muséographie, 1934; and Unesco, The Organization of Museums, 1960.





17. Musée ethnographique de Hambourg. Schéma de disposition de vitrines.






FIG. 3.17 Hamburg Ethnographic Museum: Plan of cases. From OIM, *Muséographie*, 1934; and Unesco, *The Organization of Museums*, 1960.

FIG. 3.18 Germain Bazin, "The Reframing of Pictures," in *Mouseion*, 1940.

FIG. 3.19 "Different ways of dividing up exhibition space" from Unesco, *The Organization of Museums*, 1960.



3. Functional Monuments








FIG. 3.20 Displays from Unesco, Museums & Monuments X: The Organization of Museums, 1960.

FIG. 3.21 "The visitor" from OIM, *Muséographie*, 1934.


FIG. 3.22 "This is your town" and "This could be your town," displays from *Museums & Monuments V: Travelling Exhibitions.*








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


FIG. 3.23 Le Corbusier, League of Nations Competition, 1922.

FIG. 3.24 Le Corbusier, Mundaneum, 1924.

FIG. 3.25 Le Corbusier, "Musée à croissance illimitée," submission for the Musée d'Art National, from *Mouseion*, 1937.








FIG. 3.26 "Plans for the locations of Doors." From OIM, *Muséographie*, 1934 & Unesco, *The Organization of Museums*, 1960.


FIG. 3.28 "Different methods of admitting light" from OIM, *Muséographie*, 1934; and Unesco, *The Organization of Museums*, 1960.
















FIG. 3.27 "Éclairage Zénithal," in Paris, Berlin, Hamburg, Toledo, Cambridge. From OIM, *Muséographie*, 1934.

FIG. 3.29 Mies van der Rohe, Design for a small city, 1942, from Unesco, *The Organization of Museums*, 1960.

3. Functional Monuments





FIG. 3.30 Unesco House, Porte Maillot Project: View, 1952

FIG. 3.31 Unesco House, Porte Maillot Project: "Unesco in Paris," 1952







FIG. 3.32 Unesco House, Porte Maillot project: plan, site plan and site section.








FIG. 3.33 Unesco House, Place Fontenoy: Site plan and "Unesco in Paris," 1953









FIG. 3.34 Unesco House, Place Fontenoy: Views & "The Three" at work, 1953

3. Functional Monuments







FIG. 3.35 Unesco House, Place Fontenoy. Location of artwork.

FIG. 3.36 Unesco House, Place Fontenoy. Organigram and ground floor plan.





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Chapter 4

Salvaged Monuments Technology and Cultural Exchange on the Nile, 1959-1964

"Work has begun on the great Aswan Dam." It is by conjuring this image of monumental architecture arising from international cooperation that the director-general of Unesco, Vittorino Veronese, launched the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia on March 8th, 1960. In the matter of a few years, the Aswan High Dam would transform of the Middle Valley of the Nile into a huge reservoir, rendering fertile entire stretches of desert, and flooding innumerable monuments and archaeological sites in the process. For Unesco, this presented a "magnificent opportunity" to renew the Organization's commitment to "the protection of mankind's cultural heritage." Since 1946 this commitment had been associated with the destructions of city centers; as traces of these destructions grew ever fainter, the flooding of the Nile offered an identifiable new "threat" to an identifiable collection of what Veronese called "wondrous structures." Unlike the war, however, the Dam could not be described as a purely destructive event. Instead Veronese acclaimed it as a major step towards the betterment of human welfare, and tinged his appeal with the "anguish" of having "to choose between a heritage of the past and the well-being of a people." "It is not easy", he acknowledged, "to choose between temples and crops. I would be sorry for any man called on to make a choice who could do so without a feeling of despair." Most accounts of the massive International Campaign that followed have taken their cue from Veronese, telling the story of a 20-year architectural "salvage" from this all-too-human "despair." Few have noted that the construction of the Aswan High Dam threatened not only to submerge a significant number of monuments, but also to render obsolete Unesco's working definition of monumentality. This chapter addresses the choice that was implied in the campaign, not between "temples and crops," but between two conceptions of monumentality: the one, ancient and passive; the other, modern and technological—both born of the integration of "the technical" and "the cultural."

I look at the Nubian Campaign as an elaborate bureaucratic mechanism for producing monumental value: a value described as "technical" so as to compete with development schemes, but removed from political contingency into a "purely cultural" category of action. I examine how

¹ Vittorino Veronese, "Unesco Launches a World Appeal" reprinted as "Appeal by the Director-General of Unesco," Unesco Courier: A Window Open onto The World May 1960, 6.

Unesco transformed the "artistic and historic" monuments of the Nile Valley into "cultural" objects by recording, preserving, and relocating them. I look at this transformation from within (as an institutional opportunity for Unesco) and from without (as a solution to a cold-war problem). My main argument is that, as Unesco modified the legal framework, territorial practices, and economic regime of archaeological exchange to present Nubian monuments as the "surplus" of Egypt, a spatial logic of excess emerged that reconfigured Nubia, (and by extension, the nascent category of The Cultural Heritage of Mankind) into what André Malraux called "an imaginary museum." This spatial logic, I argue, operated at two scales: at the scale of the desert, a principle of "aesthetic analogy" allowed temples to be dispersed in oases along the Nile, or disbursed as "gifts-in-return" to Western museums. At the scale of the monument, the principle of "integrity" allowed structures to be re-engineered into landmarks of contemporary technological bravura. Thus Nubia served as the inaugural case both for the economic viability of tourism as international subjectivity, and for the theoretical viability of heritage conservation as international action—particularly through the involvement of the principal authors of the Venice Charter. I conclude with the international competition to move the temples of Abu Simbel, whose monolithic construction "in sand and out of sand" blurred the distinction between object and environment. Disfigured into blocks then refigured into the "face of mankind", the temples were literally injected with social assumptions that made them more suitable for tourism. Far from a supporting act, the immense technological, financial, and rhetorical effort expended in the Nubian Campaign was constitutive of the value of the monuments it sought to preserve. This effort is usually taken as proof that the monuments saved were worthy of salvage—and conversely that the salvage constitutes a "manifestation of Unesco's faithfulness to its own ideal." Instead I ask why this effort was able to occur at all, and analyze all of the "exceptional" forms of action, political channels, discursive tropes, and material practices that had to be invented along the way, in spite of this collaborative ideal.

Mankind saves Mankind

On January 14th, 1964, the New York Times published a photograph of Soviet president Nikita Krutschev and United Arab Republic president Gamal Nasser "hurling rocks" into the Nile to inaugurate the construction of Aswan High Dam. ³ (fig 4.04) The photo was disseminated in the

² Vittorino Veronese, "Compte-rendu analytique provisoire de la neuvième séance," in 55 EX/SR.9 (Prov., 2 Dec 1959), 2.

³ Jay Walz, "Kruschev Joins in Nile Ceremony: He and Nasser Hurl Rocks Into Gap at Aswan Dam," New York Times, 14 Jan 1964.

Western press as a classic cold-war-era cautionary tale: the stones of the Aswan Dam were carriers of a politicizing force, which could stop not only the flow of the Nile but also Western channels of influence in the Middle East. There was no shortage of infrastructural metaphors to make the point; Krutschev himself used the first visit to declare his intention to "drown capitalism on the African continent." Indeed infrastructural projects were favorite bargaining chips of non-aligned leaders like Nasser in this period, and this particular dam had been the object of an international debate long before Nasser had made it the centerpiece of his revolutionary project in 1952. Designed by an international consortium in 1946 under the leadership of Harvard geological engineer, the High Dam was meant to replace the original Aswan Dam, built by the British in 1903 and raised once in 1924. In 1956, Nasser had obtained an offer of funding for the new project from the US, the UK and the World Bank, only to see the offer withdrawn a few months later—in punishment both for his refusal to submit to World Bank supervision and for continued flirtations with the USSR. Now, after a decade-long international tug-of-war, (including invasions by former colonial powers and war with Israel) the dam was being built with Soviet money and expertise.

It is a testament to the effectiveness of Nasser's non-alignment policy that by 1964, the Dam had become a veritable iron curtain (to use another cold-war infrastructural cliché) neatly dividing the Nile Valley between Eastern and Western blocks, each side was running a large-scale engineering project. (figs 4.02-03) Downstream, Russian engineers and architects built the dam, its surrounding town, and a series of electrical stations punctuating the Nile to bring power up to Cairo. Upstream, the entire region of Nubia, soon to be transformed into a gigantic reservoir lake, was crowded with Western archaeologists and engineers, moving monuments and surveying archaeological sites before they were flooded by six trillion cubic feet of Nile water. Nasser played both sides of the fence: with Krutschev he "hurled" the rocks of modernization into the Nile, with Unesco his ministry of culture saved ancient rocks from the flood of modernity.

At stake in the success of Unesco's Nubian Campaign, was not only the re-orientation of its protective mandate towards peace-time goals, but also a reclamation of the tropes of monumentality, away from the (evidently politicized) world of economic development, to put them back into the (presumably autonomous) realm of culture. By 1960 the Dam was already known as a project whose proportions dwarfed the largest monuments in history, largely because the UAR's Department of Information was hard at work comparing it with the monuments of Pharaonic Egypt. The aptly-titled pamphlet Assouan: Ville des Nouvelles Réalisations Plus Grandioses que les Obélisques et les Pyramides computed that the dam would utilize enough stone blocks to build 26 ancient pyramids, a comparison made all the more poignant in that the dam itself was to be a rock-fill dam,

"in the form of a collapsed pyramid." (fig 4.05) But whereas the pyramids were "monstrous architectural conceptions" that wasted material and exploited labor, each stone of the dam would remain active in hydrological perpetuity. Therefore the "comparison" with the marvels of the past" was "not so exact after all:"

Obelisks and pyramids were built by ancient Egyptians to perpetuate the memory of a few men. ... Their construction provided work to thousands of laborers but, once they were finished, they became completely useless. Of the projects currently being built in Aswan, one can say that they are larger than those built by the Pharaohs and also more human. Their goal is not to provoke admiration but to create and to satisfy needs. In doing this, they reflect a new society very different from the egotistical autocracies of the past.⁵

Against the dead stones of "a few egotistical men", Nasser proposed "larger and more human" monuments to economic development. This image of an "active stone" was echoed by a promotion of the "technological revolution to be embodied in the new dam" as distinctly Egyptian. According to one analyst, "continental engineers had found a new way of utilizing the materials of the earth's crust, … guided by the new science of Soil Mechanics … [that] was already widely known and practiced in Egypt." While the old Aswan dam had been built by the British in an Egyptian style, ornamented with pseudo-Pharaonic flourishes, "Nasser's Pyramid" would be made of Egyptian soil, with a technique that legitimized its enormous size. In the words of a 1960 projection, "In comparison with this great construction, the present dam will be a puny affair."

In reaction to this propaganda the West began depicting "Nasser's Pyramid" as an economic folly, rather than a realistic project for raising the living standards of Egyptians. US policy-makers admitted that their support had been "motivated by political rather than economic considerations," and mined the World Bank's report for a critique of the design. Critiques were couched in hydrological terms: what was needed was "a new and comprehensive study of the Nile as hydrological entity"—in short, "a lesser dam" would have been preferable. Since "the Nile is a

⁴ Counting the stones of the Pyramid had also been Napoleon's reaction to Gyza, as narrated by Julian Huxley: "He first demanded to know the measurement of the Great Pyramid: and then astonished his staff, on their return from climbing to the top, by pointing out that its cubic content would suffice to build a wall ten feet high and a foot thick entirely surrounding France." Huxley, From an Antique Land: Ancient and Modern in the Middle East, 240.

⁵ United Arab Republic, Assouan: La Ville des Nouvelles Réalisations Plus Grandioses que les Obélisques et les Pyramides (Le Caire: Administration de l'Information, 1961), 18.

⁶ Herbert Addison, Sun and Shadow at Aswan (London: Chapman & Hall, 1959), 122. Credit for the design of the Aswan High Dam is given to Viennese engineer, Harvard expatriate and inventor of the discipline of soil-mechanics Karl Terzaghi. Terzaghi was chairman of the International Consulting Board for the construction of the Aswan High Dam in 1954, but resigned in 1959 in protest against the Russian engineering of his scheme.

⁷ "Nasser's Pyramid" is Addison's formulation. For the first dam see Sir William Willcocks, in The Nile Reservoir Dam at Assuân and After (London: Strand, 1903).

⁸ L.P. Kirwan, Review of Addison's Sun and Shadows at Aswan, The Geographical Journal (Jun 1960), 220-221.

regional river. It should be developed on a regional basis." Thus the proposal to build one single dam (rather than multiple ones); so far upstream (rather than closer to Cairo); to produce the largest possible reservoir lake (rather than calibrating it to immediate water needs) and to keep in within Egypt (rather than spanning into other countries)—all of these engineering decisions were portrayed as an "Egyptian monopolization of the Nile" ¹⁰

These Western critiques of the Dam as a nationalist "caprice" only solidified its image as a monument to post-colonial development—especially once Soviet aid was secured and the dam was actually built. "Everywhere one hears about the contrast between the dam and the Pyramids," reported a Washington Post commentator in 1963, upon visiting the construction site, which he found "dominated by some 800 Russian engineers." Decades later, political scientist John Waterbury agreed: "whether a triumph of Soviet-Egyptian solidarity or a triumph of the Egyptian people, the diplomatic history of the dam dictated that it be a triumph of some sort." It is through this decadelong hydropolitical debate that an image of the dam as a super-human wonder was constructed. By 1971 it was clear that the "the dam was simply unequal to the problems it was designed to solve," yet it was still "consecrated [as a] massive monument, built by the Soviets." The crucial term here is "design": the technical form of the dam had remained unchanged throughout variations in funding, management, and ideology. Eventually, the charge of improbability built into Western critiques of the "mammoth project" became the standard against which its realization was measured: regardless of its merits as an engineering feat, the dam became an international "wonder" merely for beating such long geo-political odds.

Yet Nasser's decision to build the dam without Western support was not only a political affront to international institutions; it was also an attack on a specific ideology about who should control technology in the "economic progress of the less developed countries." When an American policy paper legitimized the rejection of the scheme by decrying it as "a capricious 'development'

9 Morris Llewellyn Cooke, Nasser's Aswan High Dam: Panacea or Politics? (Washington: Public Affairs Institute, 1956), 4.

¹⁰ Panacea or Politics?, 19. Robert W. Rycrift and Joseph Szyliowicz, in "The Technological Aspects of Decision Making: The Case of the Aswan High Dam," in *World* Politics (Oct., 1980), 57, conclude that "other hydrological approaches were actively discouraged," and "only the High Dam gained access to the political agenda" of the Nasser regime.

¹¹ Max Freedman, "The Aswan Dam," in The Washington Post, 23 Feb 1963, A9. Freedman was correspondent for The Manchester Guardian. "The chief significance of the dam will be missed if it is seen merely as an economic project; it is more significant as a moral symbol, a token of the determination of the Egyptian people."

¹² John Waterbury, Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979), 114-115.

¹³ In 1981 anthropologist Hussein M. Fahim summarized the negative view that eventually emerged as 'a disaster reflecting a classic case of ecological ignorance and shortsightedness'. Fahim, Dams, People and Development: The Aswan High Dam Case (New York: Pergamon, 1981), 4.

¹⁴ Waterbury, Hydropolitics, 151.

program completely out of line with the realities of its precarious economic position," the word 'development' was placed in quotation marks throughout the paper, to make clear that Nasser's usage was a distortion of the accepted definition. At stake in this debate over the scale of the dam as a vehicle for "adequate" development was a venerable legacy of large-scale infrastructural projects in the 19th-century—a canon of engineering history, composed of projects so large that their "organization," rather than their outcome, had become the primary concern of engineers, leading to the emergence of what historian of technology Tom Peters has called the "aesthetics of process." According to this history, the modern engineer, unlike the architect, designs systems and processes. Similarly, unlike the scientist who operates with fixed objectivity, the engineer proceeds by "rationalization," a dynamic process aiming for totalities. ¹⁸

Nasser's affront to this engineering tradition was all the more violent in that he had resolved to pay for the Aswan Dam by nationalizing the Suez Canal, itself a landmark in the history of "process engineering." The construction of the Suez Canal had been a Saint-Simonian dream, then a commercial tug of war between French and British interests. ¹⁹ As a "system" the canal radically modified the British monopoly over water transport routes in and out of the Mediterranean—as evidenced by a panorama from the 1883 Nouvelles Conquêtes de la Science which labeled each geographic features that would be connected, from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. (fig 4.06) As a "process" the construction of the Canal had inaugurated the passage from ad-hoc building, using human labor to planned construction using mechanized processes and what Peters calls the "rationalization" of the building site. A paradigmatic example of this is the "simple but highly rationalized site factory" for building concrete blocks on the beach of the canal. ²⁰ It is this kind of gigantic endeavor, helped by a national narrative of radical change, that Nasser hoped to jump-start his country's modernity,

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¹⁵ Panacea or Politics?, 28.

¹⁶ For a description of Nasser's Egypt-centric regional "development" plan, and the role of the Dam therein, see the conference of the Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Co-Operation, convened in Cairo in 1959. Y.M. Simaika, "Irrigation in Egypt," in Proceedings of the Economic Conference for Afro-Asian Countries, 8-11 December 1959, (Cairo: Centre for the Afro-Asian Organization for Economic Cooperation, 1959), 247-254.

 $^{^{17}}$ See Tom F. Peters, "Conclusion: The Building Process and Technological Thinking," in Building the Ninteenth Century (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.), 348-356.

¹⁸ For a description of engineering rationality, and its debt to hegemonic desires, see Antoine Picon, "Pour une histoire de la rationalité technique," in L'Invention de l'Ingénieur Moderne: L'Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées 1747-1851 (Paris: Ponts et Chaussées, 1992).

¹⁹ For the role of Egypt in Saint-Simonian thought, see Philippe Régnier & Amin F. Abdelnour, Les Saint-Simoniens en Egypte (Le Caire: BUE, 1991)

²⁰ Tom F. Peters, Building the Ninteenth Century, 178.

boasting that "it should be possible for Egypt to do in 30 years what it took Europe 300 years to achieve."²¹

Yet by the time Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, what had begun as a technique for managing ever-larger infrastructural wonders had become an international professional ethic that favored smaller, incremental projects over massive, heroic ones. In contrast to Nasser's revolutionary rhetoric, organizations like the UN and the World Bank argued that agricultural societies like Egypt needed to be "gradually" lifted into modernity through modifications in their patterns of behavior. The ruling idea in the World Bank and Unesco was that poor nation should be modernized incrementally, by way of controlled "updates" to existing infrastructural networks. This argument, in turn, was supported by social-scientific descriptions of the role of "culture" in technology. For instance, the first UN Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of Less Developed Areas (UNCAST) in 1963, devoted an entire session to the problem of "transfer and adaptation"—the problem of translating radical epistemological shifts into incremental technical projects. According to the session summary, the "contemporary scientific revolution" differed from the "19th Century industrial revolution" in that a self-consciously 'cultural' dimension had been added to development:

The application of science and technology is primarily a social rather than a technical process. ... Technological change involves cultural change.... Culture, however, is not an accumulation of unrelated and accidental elements, but is an integrated whole expressing a certain way of life, a fundamental attitude shared in a greater or lesser degree by all the members of the society which produced that culture.²³

In other words, now that culture itself was considered a "system" ("a system of human relations and attitudes"), it was the "process" of entire nations' "modernization" that engineers were entrusted with designing, and international organizations asked that they do so while minimizing radical shifts.

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²¹ Freedman, A9. "It is a challenging boast", Freedman continued, "which has caught the imagination of less developed nations. They have come to Aswan in large numbers to see the marvel."

²² For an account of these criteria through case-studies drawn from the "first development decade," see John A. King, "Aspects of Project Appraisal," in Economic Development Projects and their Appraisal: Cases and Principles from The Experience of the World Bank (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1966), 3-18.

²³ "International Co-operation and problems of transfer and adaptation," in UNCAST, Science and Technology for Development. Volume I: World of Opportunity (New York: UN, 1963) 193. The argument can be summarized with excerpts from the session titled "The contemporary scientific revolution", which explained how this revolution differed from the "industrial revolution of the previous century:" "Modern science and technology have widened the gap between the rich and the poor countries... because the advanced countries have been in a better position to use them. ... Science and technology, however, cannot simply be bought in the market.... If Science and technology are to play an active role in the process of development, they cannot operate in a vacuum. The country as a whole, with its won geographical and climatic features, resources, population distribution, and education, cultural and political problems, must be taken into account. The decisive role belongs to the creative effort of the country itself." UNCAST, 184-186.

For this purpose the UN also became concerned with the training of engineers—as evidenced by the UNSCAT conference session titled "Producing Good Engineers Quickly." Engineers who would be taught both expertise and the ethic of its implementation, gradually expanding a technical education into an economic viewpoint. Hence the "probable path of a future career" was summarized, not altogether in jest, as follows: "The growth of many engineers follows the path: machines, materials, men, management, method, money."24 Training engineers was a way for international organizations to chaperone their investments into developing countries and ensure that technological change would be accompanied by appropriate behavioral and societal results. If the engineer was the human enactor of this ethic, the dam was the paradigmatic example of a complex system in which engineering expertise would be attracted: in the words of one reviewer of the UNCAST report wrote, "a typical development project [that] illustrates the integral part science and technology play in the development process." As an illustration the author listed no less than twelve forms of technical expertise that were sequentially involved in the building of a dam: from "hydrologists study the movement of water in the river bed to select the proper site for the dam," to "finally, educators come into the villages to teach the basic sciences." Dams would bring not only development, but also enlightenment.

The Aswan High Dam appears periodically in the UNCAST report, although the question of its scale is carefully avoided. Insofar as all dam projects have now retroactively been re-evaluated in light of fin-de-siècle environmental anxieties, the Aswan Dam holds the dubious honor of being one of the first dams to be condemned as environmentally irresponsible. By 1977 the Aswan High Dam had become literally a textbook case of engineering ethics gone wrong—a case where the engineers had omitted to include "social, political, and economic factors" in their technical calculation—if one is to judge by an MIT lecture series titled *What* is Engineering? which devoted its first four lectures to the Aswan High Dam as a "controversial" project. Civil engineering professor Fred Moavenzadeh used the Dam to present students with a kind of coming-out story, where the engineering profession was increasingly placed "in relation with the public," and should develop a suitably "public" attitude. Moavenzadeh presented the Aswan High Dam as a case study of complex factors in decision—making, giving the "pros and cons": "In some views the decision to build the dam was the most catastrophic, in others it was the most appropriate, decision that Egypt could make at the time." "²⁶ Whichever side the students adopted, however, the implication was the same: that "catastrophe" in

²⁴ UNSCAT, Volume VI: Education and Training (New York: UN, 1963), 98.

 $^{^{25}}$ Sherman Katz, "The Application of Science and Technology to Development," International Organization (Winter 1968), 397

²⁶ Fred. Moavenzadeh, "Introductory Lecture on the Aswan Dam," What Is Engineering? (MIT: Sep 15, 1977).

engineering was more likely to be due to "social, political and economic" miscalculations rather than technological failure.

If the Aswan Dam has become an emblem of the way "technical" matters became subjugated to "cultural" concerns, the International Campaign for Nubia corresponds to a moment when the cultural historians see heritage as taking a distinctly technological turn. The international debates over the fate of the Nubian monuments closely mimicked the pattern of debates that had surrounded the dam: from a technical problem of unprecedented scale, through an unlikely funding scheme, with political disagreements translated into engineering problems, all leading to a resolution, by way of international cooperation, against long odds. This was not the effect of an actual convergence between the two endeavors, but of the definite gap that began to separate them in 1960. The greater this gap, the more the "cultural" campaign was able to echo the heroic tone of the dam's "technological" construction. But while political historians unanimously attribute the credit for completing the unlikely Dam project to Nasser, cultural historians have yet to explicate the achievement of Unesco's (equally unlikely) Campaign.

Consider the fate of the Abu Simbel temples. They served as emblems for the entire Nubian campaign from the beginning. It was not only that the size of the temples gave a colossal face to Unesco's repeated calls for human action on an "unprecedented scale;" or that their seated pose in front of a rising Nile made for a stoic dramatization of the impending flood. (fig 4.07) It was also that these figures were hewn as one piece from the sandstone rock. If the general campaign was supposed to show that "the works of previous generations scattered throughout the world [are] an indivisible whole constituting a single heritage," the monolithic temples provided a material analog for the conceptual integrity of this "indivisible whole." By 1971, Concluding Report victoriously declared that "every piece of stone sculptured in the rock more than 3,200 years ago still does

²⁷ This period also corresponds to the time that Unesco got involved in issues of technology transfer. In 1964 Unesco started a program of hydrological training, which taught engineers that water was to be thought of as an "international heritage, not belonging to a single nation.

²⁸ Throughout the 1950s the salvage of Nubia's monuments remained a sub-plot in the intrigue of dam's construction. Even the tourist value of archaeological treasures subsumed under the dam's economic potential as a national monument. Writing in the 1959 the director of the Egyptian Antiquities Department projected that "with the erection of the High Dam, Aswan will become one of the most important towns of Egypt. Moreover, the proposed transference of many monuments and objects of Nubia to Aswan will add to its importance in historical remains." Labib Habachi, in Habachi & Henri Riad, Aswan: The Town with a Glorious Past and a Promising Future, (Cairo: Imprimerie de l'Institut Français d'Archéologie Orientale, 1959), iv. The UAR's literature also mentioned the "radical measures" taken to record antiquities, but these were perfunctory attempts to evade the kind of outcry that had erupted over the submersion of Philae during the building of the first Aswan dam.

²⁹ M'Bow, 11.

exist!"³⁰ This carefully chosen expression was intended to omit the crucial fact that the block had actually been cut into blocks. What happened to this conceptual integrity when the temples were cut to pieces, then glued back together with sand and epoxy? In 1960 the Unesco Courier had confidently proclaimed that "One would not dismantle Westminster Abbey."³¹ Now the temples had been "dismantled" after all. What, exactly was achieved?

The Concluding Report, showed the relocated temples facing with a dense mass of arriving visitors on opening day with the caption:

On 22nd September, 1968, the day of the solemn yet joyful re-inauguration of the Abu Simbel Temples, more visitors to the Temples were gathered than perhaps since the day of the first inauguration of the Temples some 3,200 years ago.³²

In contrast to the early images of a lonely Rameses awaiting tragedy in the desert, the relocated temples were reassuringly surrounded by a representative sample of humanity. (fig 4.08) "This is, of course," the report continued, "the whole point of salvaging and preserving the Monuments: that as many visitors as possible should be enabled to visit them." This staging of a momentous encounter between "mankind" and its "heritage" had also been explicitly prophesized in 1960. Narrating "The Drama of Nubia", Georges Fradier used the shorthand of a universal "we":

Someone once said that it is best to announce a great calamity like a fire, a massacre or a tidal wave, in measured tones and in simple words. I shall therefore say quite simply: the monuments of ancient Egypt, among them Philae, Amada, Kalabsha and Abu Simbel, are in danger. ... What it really means is that we are in danger. ³⁴

To show the relocated temples surrounded by visitors was for Unesco to demonstrate that its identification of a generic "we" with the monuments of ancient Egypt had worked: mankind had recognized itself in Abu Simbel. It is true that the temples had been taken apart; but while they had been reconstituted, a new kind of humanity had been constituted. The "indivisibility" of the stone had somehow been transferred to the social fabric of the crowd facing it, the monolithic nature of the rock now represented by the solidarity of people around it.

The encounter between a universalizing "we" and an ever-growing body of distant monuments has now been theorized as a central trope in the postwar predicament of monuments, particularly in French heritage discourse. Françoise Choay concluded her 1992 L'Allégorie du Patrimoine with a chapter on "the narcissistic pursuit" that has driven "the process of accumulation of cultural"

³⁰ "Conclusion" in Vattenbyggnadsbyrån, The Salvage of the Abu Simbel Temples: Concluding Report, December 1971; Arab Republic of Egypt Ministry of Culture (Stockholm: Vattenbyggnadsbyrån, 1971), 215.

³¹ Georges Fradier, "The Drama of Nubia," in Unesco Courier: Save the Treasures of Nubia (Feb. 1960), 7.

³² VBB, "Completion of the Contract Works," Concluding Report, Caption to Figure 23.2:1, 209.

³³ VBB, Concluding Report, 214.

³⁴ Fradier, 5.

property" since World War II. "Heritage today," she wrote, "seems to play the role of a vast mirror in which we, members of late-20th century human societies, contemplate our own image." Appealing to Freud, Choay proposed to see this mirroring as a "prosthetic" technology which worked to effect "the anthropomorphization" of the world, spreading a "cult of generic human identity" through a global network of monuments. Choay historicized this interpretation by recalling that the postwar intensification of the "patrimonial cult" coincided with the advent of a "technological revolution confirmed at the end of the 1950s," which produced an "interiorization" of techniques and a "dissimulation of mediation." ³⁶

While Choay identified a technological basis for what she called "heritage inflation," she repeated the universalist fault of the discourse she critiqued, in her generic interpretation of postwar technology: "the advent of an electronic era [of] artificial memories and ever-more performing communication systems," produced arbitrary classifications of monuments, while the development of "hyper rapid transportation" had produced a dissociation of meaning from "place." Thus technology was for Choay still the bearer of a loss of authenticity, and the cause of a replacement of authorship by machination and artificiality. Choay's diagnosis, then, culminated in the decidedly undialectical proclamation that monuments, which had previously served as "dynamic cultural foundations", had come to generate only "passive self-contemplation and the cult of a generic identity." Choay then repeated this theory of psychoanalytic passivity in geo-political form, with a center-periphery account of the "cultural upheaval without precedent at the heart of advanced industrial societies and, consequentially, in the whole world." With "passivity" and "placelessness" as foregone conclusions, Choay remained inside the all-inclusive "we" invented by Unesco.

Certainly we could read the inaugural image to confirms Choay's diagnosis: a snapshot a post-Freudian narcissist encounter. By consulting an aerial view of the temples, we could reveal the "hidden technologies"—access roads and parking lots—that were built behind the monument to accommodate millions of tourists brought by "hyper-rapid transportation." (fig 4.10) Superimposing this view with an original plan of the temples would also reveal the absence of any traces of the immense engineering project that "saved" the temples, and see this absence as a symptom of a mirror-like "dissimulation of technology." (fig 4.11) In other words, the campaign to salvage Abu Simbel can be seen as an episode when enormous financial, technical, and rhetorical effort was expended to displace these temples by 60 meters, for the sake of making commensurate

³⁵ This process now proceeded "with no other aim than a symbolic exhaustiveness, and seemingly with no criterion for selectivity or classification." Françoise Choay, l'Allégorie du Patrimoine (Paris: Seuil), 182-183.

³⁶ Choay, 184.

³⁷ Choay, 182.

two notions of mankind—the generic mankind (contained in the temples) and the specific mankind (embodied in a stream of visitors)—and all traces of this technological expenditure were erased, absorbed in the cultural value of the monuments.

Yet if interpreting heritage as a technology is an attractive proposition, it is precisely in order to get past the problem of passivity in heritage discourse—the problem of seeing the postwar valuation of monuments merely as a question of reception, as most heritage literature does. The salvage of Abu Simbel was intended as a mirroring act, and Unesco publicized it by using what Bruno Latour called its trademark "sociological Esperanto," saying for instance that "The World Saved Abu Simbel." 38 (In contrast, Krutschev claimed that "Soviet-Egyptian friendship" had built the Aswan Dam.") Yet the temples that emerged from the salvage were not any more "generic" than they had originally been, and specific "agency" can be read in their transformation. Consider the two photographs of Abu Simbel before and after relocation (figs 4.07-09). The "original" temples can be understood to contain human agency in three ways: in terms of authorship (Pharaoh Rameses II enlisted an Egyptian architect, and Nubian slaves to build them, in the 12th Century BC); in terms of image (they represent Rameses and his wife Neferati, by way of sculpture, bas-relief, and text); and in architectural terms (they were designed to host the ritual occupation of humans, both in statuesque and in bodily form.) The Unesco campaign doubled each of these terms: in their new location, authorship was enlarged to encompass the engineers of the salvage scheme; as symbols the colossi represented modern cooperation; as ritual environments they became attractors for tourists. The notion of "the heritage of mankind" that Unesco proposed in this period was intended to contain all these forms of agency at once, projecting them back onto the monument as one. This certainly constitutes a technologically-enabled "mirroring" act. But to say that this mirroring produced a "generic" human identity is not necessarily to say that this identity had no describable qualities. As our cursory formal analysis demonstrates, the image of mankind that Unesco proposed in Abu Simbel was an aggregate, figurative, and hospitable mankind.

To be methodologically clear: we should not take at face value Unesco's pronouncement that the "World saved Abu Simbel," because Unesco used this pronouncement to project a social achievement—that agreement over the value of a representation (as demonstrated in the salvage)

³⁸ Bruno Latour, "Whose Cosmos, Which Cosmopolitics? Comments on the Peace Terms of Ulrich Beck," in Common Knowledge X/3, Symposium: Talking Peace with Gods (2004), 450-462. Latour uses Ulrich Beck's proposal as an alibi for an indictment of "cosmopolitics" which he sees embodied in Kant, Hegel, Unesco, the UN, and a variety of other institutions and figures. The first page features what could be seen as a clear indictment of cultural internationalism: "The problem with Beck's solution is that, if world wars were about issues of universality and particularity, as he makes them out to be, then world peace would have ensued long ago. The limitation of Beck's approach is that his "cosmopolitics" entails no cosmos and hence no politics either."

will lead to a political agreement—that has no basis in any political constituency. In Latour's terms, Unesco's is a "cosmopolitics that entails no cosmos and therefore no politics." What we can do, however, is to detect what historical agency was actually contained in this "world"—the specific institutional channels, political constituencies, aesthetic discourses, and material practices—that were required for this "agreement" and read backwards what "cosmos" was thereby posited. Just as the salvaged monument has formal qualities despite being "generic," so Uneco's world has historical agency despite being a notoriously universalizing abstraction.

Certainly it is not the first time that Unesco is accused of destroying values through a process of abstraction. In Chapter I, abstraction was a process, informed by the scientific practice of "abstracting" statements from data analysis, which was confronted for being an inadequate vehicle for political agreement. In Chapter III the postwar educational imperative to proceed "from concrete example to universal rule" in education was easily married to modernist aesthetic of abstraction, which offered a way around the problem of translation. Here, in the salvage of Abu Simbel was abstraction itself an engineering project. What were its specific technologies? How was it designed, as a process, and what systems were devised to sustain it?

One place to begin is the Concluding Report compiled by the Swedish Engineers, Vattenbyggnadsbyrån (VBB) in 1971, which offered a detailed description of the "world" that had saved Abu Simbel, by distributing agency along a classic scale from the universal to the particular:

The world-famous Abu Simbel Temples have been salvaged from the rising waters of the Nile and rebuilt on a secure site more than sixty meters above their original position.

This is an outstanding achievement. It is the result of great human effort and substantial economic sacrifice.

The EGYPTIAN PEOPLE, through their GOVERNMENT, have shouldered the greatest part of the burden of this noble enterprise.

UNESCO called on nations and people all over the world and urged them to make generous contributions.

The ARCHAEOLOGIST, represented by specialists from Egypt as well as from other countries, outlined the fundamental conditions for the Salvage Operation.

The CONTRACTOR, in the form of a Joint Venture composed of companies from Egypt, Italy, France, Germany and Sweden, executed the gigantic works involved.

The CONSULTING ENGINEER planned and prepared the whole project and supervised the works. He also submitted this report.³⁹

Not only was the universal expertise of "the engineer" connected to the particular predicament of "the Egyptian people", but each category of action was an embodied technology: a collaborative

³⁹ Concluding Report, 5.

shorthand that stands in for entire social categories, political constituencies, and professional groups. The structure of this chapter proceeds along this chain of agents. We have already seen how "The Egyptian people" was in fact an economic development plan devised by Nasser's regime and monumentalized in the Aswan Dam. I continue by situating the Nubian campaign in Unesco's history, continue with an account of the archaeological campaign, and end with the role of the engineer in producing the cultural value of monuments—both at the scale of the entire desert and in the salvage of Abu Simbel, where many of the issues that were dispersed throughout the campaign were condensed and brought into a single dramatic narrative of monumental salvage.

I. How culture became "technical": the campaign in Unesco's history

The Major Projects, the Tourist Tax and the International Fund

If the International Campaign for Nubia was a response to Nasser's gigantism, it also corresponds to a particular period in Unesco's history, when the regular proclamation of the "unprecedented scale" of the organization's work became a substitute for any critical assessment of its successes and failures. Ironically, this maximalist pattern was the effect of a minimalist turn in the mid-1950s, when Director-General Luther Evans resolved to concentrate resources and focus publicity by centering the Organization's program around selected "Major Projects." But programmatic modesty only fueled rhetorical bombast. By the mid-1960s, Unesco publicized even its most scholarly Major Project, the History of Mankind: Scientific and Cultural Development, as "A Great and Unparalleled Publishing Venture," as if to calibrate the reader's expectations to the magnitude of the undertaking, rather than the pertinence of its insights. Designed to be historical events in themselves, the Major Projects were Unesco's own interventions into the History of Mankind: a narrative of ever-increasing solidarity, evidenced by ever-larger human accomplishments.

The Nubian Campaign clearly partook in this vision of history as propelled by large-scale cooperative efforts, though it was never officially declared a Major Project. At the 1980 closing ceremony, Director-General M'Bow proclaimed the campaign "the first example of international cooperation to an essentially cultural end," "unparalleled in Unesco's history" and "achieved thanks

⁴⁰ See T.V. Sathyamurthy's 1966 summary of the "doctrine of program concentration" and his description of Evans was "a true votary of 'functionalism', pure and simple," with a "strong conviction that UNESCO should actively pursue well-defined undertakings, rather than animate its miscellaneous activities with a permissive ideology." "Twenty Years of UNESCO: An Interpretation," International Organization 21/3 (Summer 1967), 620-621.

⁴¹ The citation itself was taken from (and credited to) the New York Times.

to a movement of worldwide solidarity without precedent in the history of mankind."⁴² Recalling that 40 archaeological missions came from 5 continents, six groups of monuments were moved, five temples donated, and a total of \$26 Million was raised by 50 member states, M'Bow "the present-day world community ... mobilized in Nubia resources which ... can be compared to those used by the sovereigns of Egypt to build the temples of Philae island, to carve out those of Abu Simbel or to erect the fortress of Buhen."⁴³ Unesco had achieved a scale of cultural agency to match the monuments it salvaged—the implication being that these had become monuments to international cooperation. This chapter addresses this act of monumental recuperation—not as the post-facto rationalization of megalomaniac leaders, but as an imperative that dictated the conditions for the campaign's success at every stage. Indeed the very idea of "major project" lends itself to monumentalization. Hence a nesting of histories is legible within the Nubian campaign: the salvage of Abu Simbel served as the "major project" of the Campaign: the largest and most visible undertaking and test for new collaborative channels, and a focus point for fund-raising.

While the Nubian Campaign was an intervention in a decade-long geopolitical struggle between Egypt, the World Bank, and the USSR, it also represented the culmination of an internal struggle within Unesco itself: the struggle of the Cultural Affairs Division (CUA) to register financially on the same scale as the other components of Unesco's program. The history of this internal struggle begins at the 1948 General Conference in Beirut, which instructed the Director-General to investigate all ways "monuments" might become the focus of Unesco activity. The resulting memorandum, Measures for Ensuring the Co-Operation of Interested States in the Protection, Preservation and Restoration of Antiquities, Monuments and Historic Sites; and Possibility of Establishing an International Fund to Subsidize Such Preservation and Restoration, stands in many ways as a blueprint for all efforts Unesco directed at monuments throughout the 1950s and 1960s. ⁴⁴ It recommended renaming Unesco's "Museums Division" the "Museums and Historic Monuments Division" and outlined three "main aspects of international cooperation" in this domain: A. Education and Propaganda / B. Legislative and administrative action / C. Technical Action. This last category included 6 sub-fields, which were consolidated the following year, when the Paris Conference appointed an Expert Committee to consider three categories of "technical work" in the field of monuments:

- general protection, preservation and restoration of antiquities, monuments and historic sites

⁻ establishment of an international fund to subsidize the work of preservation and restoration

⁴² Amadou-Mahtar M-Bow, "Introduction," in Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia: The International Rescue Campaign at Abu Simbel, Philae and Other Sites," ed Torgny Säve-Söderbergh, (London: Thames & Hudson / Paris: Unesco, 1987).

⁴³ M'Bow, 13.

⁴⁴ Unesco /5c/PRG/6, "Item 8.6.1.5 of the Provisional Agenda" (Paris, 27 Mar 1950).

- specific protection of objects of cultural value against the dangers of modern war. 45

This three-part distribution of tasks guided the division's work through the 1950s. By 1960, the mandate of "general protection" had been addressed by establishing a regular schedule of expert missions, publishing a series of technical manuals, and conducting publicity campaigns, while the ratification of the Hague Convention in 1954 had settled the terms of "specific protection" related to war-time. All attempts to "establish an international fund," however, had failed. The debates surrounding these proposals reveal the difficulties encountered by all attempts to quantify terms the value of monuments in absolute financial terms.

The first idea for the accumulation of an International Fund for Monuments was a 1951 proposal for "a special tourist tax," levied on all tourists entering member states, and devoted to "the maintenance of museums, monuments and collections possessed of universal interest." ⁴⁶ A US \$3 fee per tourist would accumulate into a fund shared by the host government and Unesco (in the amount of at least 20%), in exchange for which the tourist would receive free entry to State and municipal museums. The proposal received scant support when it was circulated in preliminary form. The difficulties began with the very definition of the word "tourist"—thus the Iranian National Commission asked whether the term was "applicable to pilgrims visiting the holy places of their religion,... situated in foreign countries." Others, like the Italian Government, opposed the idea of a per capita tax, proposing a daily collective tax instead, adjustable to the length of stay. These objections revealed that Unesco had underestimated how much financial stake each member state had invested in tourism, and how much this stake was dependent upon different versions of tourism. As Museums and Monuments Division director Hiroshi Daifuku recalled, with 25 years of hindsight:

the use of a tax on tourism ran counter to prevailing tendencies to liberalize travel formalities and in many cases, special taxes (such as airport fees) were considered to be an important source of income which governments were reluctant to increase for purposes other than travel facilities. 48

This retrospective account of a "liberalization" of tourism is supported by the distinction, throughout the 1950s, between smaller states who opposed the "tourist tax" but supported the principle of an

⁴⁵ Emphasis added. "Note on the Desirability of framing an international Convention establishing an international fund for the preservation and restoration of monuments and historic sites and for the development and creation of museums and introducing a special tourist tax" UNESCO Document CL/452, Annex I, December 1950.

⁴⁶ Proposal made the Mexican government to the 6th General Conference in 1951. Summarized in CL/452, Annex I.

 $^{^{47}}$ "Supplementary Report on the possibility and advisability of adopting an international convention instituting a special tourist tax for the preservation of monuments and museums." UNESCO Document 6C/PRG/10, Addendum I.

 $^{^{48}}$ Hiroshi Daifuku, "The First Decade" in ICCROM Comes of Age 1959-1979 / L'Iccrom a 20 ans 1959-1979, Rome: International Centre for the Conservation and Preservation of Cultural Property, 1979, 5.

international fund (Italy, Iran, Turkey, for instance), and the countries who opposed both: Australia, Canada, the UK and the US.

The US position against the International Fund was arrived at, in part, on the advice of museum officials (National Gallery director David Finley and ACLS director Waldo Leland, both of the Roberts Commission), who expressed "very little sympathy," because, as National Park Service director Ronald Lee summarized, "the belief is that the fund would have to be collected largely from the United States."49 Lee expressed this point formally in a memo that made three objections to the Mexican proposal. First, against the generalized definition of the word "tourist", the US pointed out that not all foreigners visit the US to visit museums, and that most US museums were "visited principally by nationals." Secondly, against the financial proposal, the US felt that the tax would "impede the flow of foreign visitors and tend to defeat the purpose of greater mutual cultural appreciation," that the promise of free admittance was impractical in countries where collections were privately owned, and that the "imposition of special administrative procedures on foreigners" would "be too costly." Finally, and most vehemently, the US objected on principle to the proposed utilization of Unesco's share of the fund "to support archaeological research and study-abroad grants, preparation of seminars, etc."50 This proposal, the US wrote, "arises from the inherent subscription to the unconscionable principle that the general traveling public should be taxed for the benefit of a very specialized group."51

What all these debates revealed was that the category of "tourist" was too general, yet not universal enough, to be the bearer of Unesco's mandate on behalf of "the cultural heritage of mankind." The failure of the tourist tax was a failure of correspondence between the universalizing idea of monuments developed by Unesco, and the increasingly technical nature of its activities, which required the training and dispatching of specialized experts. The attachment of an international fund to tourist travel was never realized; as the final report put it, "the original plan was replaced by a more modest one," namely a proposal for "International Center for the Centre for the Scientific study of the problems of preserving and restoring cultural property." This center, which was soon to be established in Rome, was eventually to become ICCROM. The diversion of efforts

⁴⁹ Letter from Ronald Lee (Nat'l Park Service) to J.O. Brew, May 17 1951. Brew 7/1083b.

⁵⁰ CL / 452, Annex II: Questionnaire, 13-14.

⁵¹ Subcommittee on Foreign Travel of the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, "Proposed Adoption of an International Convention Establishing a Special Tourist Tax for the Preservation of Monuments, Museums and Historic Sites in the Signatory Countries, and for an International Fund Controlled by Unesco." Draft, February 13, 1951. Brew 7/1083b.

⁵² 7 C/PRG/6 Report on the Possibility of Establishing an International Fund for the Maintenance of Museums, Monuments and Collections of Universal Interest. Paris, 22 Aug 1952.

from an international fund towards the Rome Center was clearly a "technical" turn of events—in the US's terms, away from "the general public" and towards "the very specialized group."

Similarly, it was only when the opportunity for the Fund to receive a frankly "technical" treatment that the proposal was revived—in 1963, for the specific case of the Nubian Monuments, to remedy the fact that "the resources available to the Organization are unfortunately inadequate for large-scale operations, which, in many cases, are very urgently required." This time, the recommendation included specific request to "explore, in particular, ways and means of financing the fund from special sources." The 56th session of the executive committee created a Trust Fund for Nubia, and the idea of a tourist tax was revived, to supply part of these funds—again applied only to Egypt. As we will see, the tourist which came to determine the criteria for the Nubian campaign was one who could deliver "hard" currency directly to Egypt.

The decision to name the Nubian project an "International Campaign" can be seen as an apt summary for the way the project would combine "technical" problems with a broad-range ambitions. This expression was originally coined to describe large-scale publicity campaigns about cultural institutions. The first of its kind, "The International Campaign for Museums" was launched in 1954 to encourage member states to promote their museums; a second campaign, devoted to "Monuments" was supposed to begin 1960 but was put on hold for the sake of the Nubian Campaign, which soon overshadowed these two precedents. Folding into its operation a smaller "technical center" which had been created in Cairo as an initial response to the Nubian problem, the Campaign therefore became a catch-all project within which all previously proposed general ideas on monuments could be revisited, including "the whole business of tourism." ⁵⁵⁵

The TVA Idea

The specific "technical" label adopted by the Campaign was archaeological: it was that of a TVA of Archaeology. The phrase was coined at the 1960 launch by André Malraux, who praised the Campaign in his dramatic vibrato as "a plan so magnificent and so precise in its boldness—one

⁵³ Item 4.4.1 of the Provisional Agenda, Study of Measures for the Preservation of Monuments through the Establishment of an International Fund of by any other Appropriate Means. 65 EX /9 Paris, 22 March 1963.

⁵⁴ 56 EX/5 Add. 1/ "International Action to Safeguard the Archaeological Monuments of Nubia." Brew /"Counterpart funds". The tax of 2 dollars was imposed on each entrance visa to Egypt; The intention was to raise hard currency for Abu Simbel, although an exemption had to be made for diplomats. It was collected as an the Egyptian Antiquities Organization. Save-Sodeberg, Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia, 78-79.

⁵⁵ Letter from Brew to Minnich (Exec Secretary of US Nat'l Commission to UNESCO) Sep 25, 1962. Brew 7/1083b. Writing in 1962, Jo Brew promoted the idea of the Monuments Campaign as "of even greater general interest" than the Campaign for Museums which had taken place in the 1950s, because "the material with which it deals are more concrete; they are easier to focus on; and … they will generate a broader participation, including the whole business of tourism."

might say, a kind of Tennessee Valley Authority of archaeology—the antithesis of the kind of gigantic exhibitionism by which great modern states try to outbid each other." We will return to Malraux's own role in the campaign and his careful choice of words: having just completed his Musée Imaginaire de Sculpture Mondiale, Malraux did not critique "gigantic exhibitionism" carelessly, and as a confirmed Hegelian he did not use the term "antithesis" lightly. For now it might suffice to note that Malraux's phrase was conscientiously highlighted when The Unesco Courier published Malraux's speech and that it continued to be used opportunistically, especially to publicize the Campaign to an American audience. For instance, the Campaign Guide of the US National Committee for the Preservation of the Nubian Monuments contained the key talking point that "One might say that this Nubian project is indeed a Tennessee Valley of Archaeology. Expeditions from the U.A.R., Poland, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, France, Sweden, Norway, the USSR, the Federal Republic of Germany, are all working in unison to catalogue and enlarge our knowledge of the area prior to the danger of submersion." This section examines the implication of this phrase, both in the way that "the TVA idea" was a model for international action and by exploring how salvage archaeology made culture more "technical."

Two years before becoming Unesco's first Director General, Julian Huxley published a study presenting the TVA as "An Achievement in Democratic Planning" to an international audience. Huxley's installment as the first director of Unesco two years later cemented his reputation as an international popularizer of science; and as Chapter 3 demonstrated, his functionalism led him to understand intellectual cooperation as part of "the human phase" in evolutionary history. Within this institutional and scientific framework, the TVA embodied for Huxley the advent of this collaborative stage in human history: a large-scale technical undertaking, dedicated to a single goal, but producing generalizable benefits. To support this point he cited liberally from political theorist David Mitrany, who had explicitly relied on the TVA as "a fair prototype for joint international

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⁵⁶ André Malraux, "TVA of Archaeology," in Unesco Courier May 1960, 10.

⁵⁷ US Committee for the Preservation of the Nubian Monuments, "Campaign Guide to Preserve the Monuments of Nubia," 6. Brew /"US Commission."

⁵⁸ Julian Huxley, TVA: Adventure in Planning (London: Architectural Press, 1943), also published as a special issue of the British architectural journal The Architectural Review, as "TVA: An Achievement of Democratic Planning," (June 1943).

⁵⁹ The last chapter of Huxley's Evolution in Action, titled "The Human Phase," summarized that "psycho-social evolution—human history for short—operates by cultural transmission." And that "the general tendency of the past few centuries has been to intensify this trend.... Of intercommunication and cultural interchange" which lead to "the inevitable outline for the future—the emergence of a single world community." Julian Huxley, Evolution in Action (New York: Mentor Books, 1953), 118, 122.

action" to develop his "functional theory of politics" on which the UN's system of specialized agencies was based.⁶⁰

For Huxley, as for Mitrany, the TVA had "introduce[d] a new dimension into the constitutional structure of the United States—without any formal change in the constitution." This surreptitious penetration by a "cooperative, unified, multi-purpose undertaking" was possible only because the TVA acted "as an autonomous authority", while being "clothed with the power of government" and could therefore "cross and envelop all political boundary lines." Hence Huxley took on Mitrany's formulation of "full powers for a limited function" to describe a new kind of political autonomy on an international stage, both self-contained and all-encompassing, that worked by "undercutting and transcending nationalist sovereignties, as the TVA undercuts and transcends States' rights and boundaries."

"The TVA idea", as Huxley called it, had "already found its way into the world's general thinking" by 1943. He saw particular promise in the application of this idea "to promote the planned development ... of regions of greater backwardness," and his example of a region ripe for functional internationalization was the Middle East. "TVA ideas and methods" for example, had already "guided the growth of new planning agencies such as the Middle East Supply Council [sic]." The Middle East Supply Centre (MESC) was a war-time invention, an integration of resources devised by the UK and US to focus the economic and industrial production of the region against the German attack on North Africa. Dissolved in 1945, the MESC suffered a fate exemplary of "the TVA idea" in the postwar: while the political partnership that sustained the industrial integration fell apart, the regional identity that this partnership produced began to acquire an autonomous reality. All that was left of the MESC in the late 1950s was the designation "Middle East", which became the preferred label for what used to be called "the Ancient Lands," and carried with it an updated set of expectations about the political, economic, and cultural cohesion of the region centered on Egypt. 164

⁶⁰ David Mitrany, "The Making of the Functional Theory: A Memoir," in The Functional Theory of Politics (London: LSE/St Martin's Press, 1975), 27.

⁶¹ Mitrany as cited by Huxley, TVA: Adventure in Planning, 135. The citation is from an article of David Mitrany, in Agenda in October 1942, republished as "The New Deal" in A Functional Theory of Politics, 160-164.

⁶² Huxley, TVA, 134.

⁶³ On the MESC, see a review of Martin Wilmington's The Middle East Supply Centre in The International Journal of Middle East Studies 4/3 (Jul 1973), 377-378, which summarizes the view that the MESC was an internationalist solution to centuries-old problems: "successful in averting economic (and perhaps even political) disaster, and also contributed by means of technical assistance in promoting a regional approach to the solution of problems which for centuries had obstructed economic progress in the ancient lands."

⁶⁴ On the emergence of the regional concept of the Middle East, and the role played by the MESC's "military communiqués" in coining the term, see C.G. Smith, "The Emergence of the Middle East," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 3/3, The Middle East (Jul 1968,) 3-17). Smith points out that, although by 1945 the "Middle East" was identifiable as "a vast military province where British influence was paramount", the postwar saw the progressive blurring of the

Nasser's own "three rings"—Arabism, Islam, Africa—were eventually seen to rely on the same idea of Egypt as a "center" of a vaguely defined region. The link with water control was also made throughout the 1950s, as Western advocates of "the TVA idea" never failed to list the Aswan High Dam—in its World Bank incarnation, not its eventual Soviet realization—as a project that had learned the "region-building lessons from the Tennessee Valley." ⁶⁵

Huxley was not alone in promoting the TVA as a model for international governance, but it is his devotion to the aesthetics of "the TVA idea" that makes him prescient of its eventual Nubian appropriation. Huxley was intent on detecting in the TVA's architecture its success as a civilizing endeavor:

I will pass over many other facets of the work going on in the Valley, but I must devote some space to architecture, for in this field the existence of the TVA has had important cultural repercussions.... [it] has made a notable contribution to the central architectural problem of to-day—how to integrate human construction and its natural environment into a planned whole, and to do so in a way which shall conduce to better living, including aesthetic satisfaction. ⁶⁶

From this statement of the central problematic of architectural modernism, Huxley proposed to see the TVA as a regional Gesamtkunstwerk which provided "aesthetic satisfaction," and proceeded to a formal analysis of this aesthetic "integration into a planned whole:" first, a formal suppression of objecthood helped to undermine the artificial boundary between natural and human worlds: "the dams and power houses form a unity with the landscape ... instead of standing out ... in gross and defiant conflict with the natural environment." Secondly, in a separate section titled "details" Huxley found that "It is in the design of detail that the architect, as the great humanizer, has played a magnificent role. From a major element to a minor, one finds the same meticulous care taken in the choice of material and simplification of form." Materials, abstraction and integrated planning made the TVA a paradigmatically modernist endeavor.

Despite this seamless "integration" into the environment, Huxley argued, the dams and power-houses of TVA architecture still acted as recognizable "monuments," "expressive of the pride a whole nation takes in itself," and "in some ways a modern equivalent of medieval cathedrals or renaissance palaces." Citing the Chief architect of the TVA, Huxley noted that the TVA "consciously adopted architecture as one of the instruments of policy for building up a sounder, more vital

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conceptual boundaries between geographical, political and cultural affiliations in the region. He pointed to Nasser's three rings—Arabism, Islam and Africa—as a continuation of this blur.

⁶⁵ James Dahir, Region Building; Community development lessons from the Tennessee Valley (New York: Harper Collins, 1955). See in particular the chapter "Beyond TVA," which lists international applications of the idea including the Aswan case, 156.

⁶⁶ Huxley, 73. "The great dams are planned from the outset as works of art as well as utilitarian constructions."

⁶⁷ Huxely, 74, 94.

civilization in the Valley."⁶⁸ Architecture was the way "planning" affected "civilization" directly, even when the object of design was not buildings but highways, bridges, stations, filling stations, etc. Hence Huxley was quick to point that this new type of monumentality "attracted a steady stream of visitors" and that, although "the attraction lies in their stupendous quality as engineering works, yet few can escape being influenced by their architectural quality."

Huxley's description of architecture "influencing" the visitor to the Tennessee Valley was not a casual reference to tourist enjoyment, but a technical description of architecture's aesthetic mode, which worked by integrating "the order, amenities, and beauty that should characterize a well-functioning society" directly into the social sphere. Throughout the text, Huxley repeatedly attributed to architecture the powers of "influence:" as a mode of human agency ("the architectural influence of the TVA is not confined to that exerted by its own architects"), a category of knowledge ("further promotion of good architecture and design is achieved by the TVA exerting pervasive influence on a number of contractors"), and a mode of perception ("Details ... everywhere contribute to the one major effect ... Unconsciously, through them, the whole architectural effect is registered in the mind.") ⁶⁹ Huxley's obsession with architecture's influence, and the attendant idea that the TVA's regionalism operated by way of an aesthetic effect, was confirmed in a separate section of the book titled "The Architecture of TVA."

Printed on glossy paper, lavishly illustrated by black-and-white photographs, and written by British architects Gordon and Flora Stephenson, this text gave disciplinary legitimacy to Huxley's idea of architecture as "effect":

We have become accustomed to thinking of architecture as isolated buildings; as of this, that or the other style; as an art for the few. ... Many times in history a unifying philosophy of the age has brought about unity of design. The sense of the whole predominated. Then you were not conscious of architecture; only of architectural effect. And so it is with the work of TVA. Here is architecture on a scale dictated by the age. ⁷⁰

The evolutionary narrative of a "unity of design" arising from architectural history was a commonplace trope of in mid-century British architectural discourse. But this modernist historiography took on a different glow in light of Huxley's credentials as an evolutionary biologist. Thus the advent of an architecture of influence, that blurred the distinction between object and context, was for Huxley a scientific event: a historical substitution of discreet monumentality by regional effect.

⁶⁸ Huxley, 75.

⁶⁹ Huxley 75, 94. Note that this 3-part distinction echoes the division of architecture in the early years of Unesco as seen in Chapter 3.

⁷⁰ Stephenson, in Huxley, 77. Continues: "Democratic government, engineers and architects, skilled and unskilled labour, active citizens, all participate."

Huxley's aesthetic advocacy of regional integration is a useful guide to understanding how the Nubian campaign unfolded an architectural "effect"—complete with landscape composition, simplification of form, and integrative materials—with historic monuments now filling the monumental mandate of dams and power stations. Certainly the monuments of Nubia were described as blurring the distinction between object and context; and while Huxley assigned to contemporary architects a "humanizing" role, it was at the hands of archaeologists that the application of an aesthetic "influence" was eventually effected. This replacement of archaeology for architecture is explained in part by the methodological convergence between Huxley's own biological Darwinism and archaeology as a mid-century discipline: the former devoted to finding a convergence between social developments and natural selection; the latter, as Alan Schnapp pointed out, borne of the realization that "natural history and human history were one." But before this convergence is recounted, the association of the TVA with archaeology must be examined in its own right: by the time it was invoked in 1960, it recalled a 30-year history of association between archaeological digging and infrastructural development—a history in which the TVA was a landmark achievement, and a trajectory in which Unesco itself had recently become a major actor, by inaugurating a program in "salvage archaeology".

Salvage Archaeology as Redemptive Historical Force

Salvage archaeology was given its clearest definition by Harvard Peabody Museum director and Monuments Committee (MonCom) chairman John Otis (Jo) Brew, in a 1960 paper that presented the archaeological projects of the TVA and the Aswan High Dam, under the title Emergency Archaeology: Salvage in Advance of Technological Progress. During the last 15 years, Brew proclaimed, "a new dimension has come to archaeology. The thing it describes is not new but because of the development of modern technology it has taken on unusual prominence. We call it Salvage Archaeology." Brew's association of archaeology with "technological progress" described both the conditions under which an increasing number of archaeological digs were conducted ("the construction of the great multipurpose reservoirs, elaborate modern highways, extensive airfields,

⁷¹ Alain Schnapp, The Discovery of the Past (London: British Museum Press, 1996).

⁷² John Otis Brew, Emergency Archaeology: Salvage in Advance of Technological Progress, (draft) Paper delivered to the American Philosophical Society, ca.1960. Brew 10. The paper was originally given at the 1958 Technical Meeting of the I.U.C.N., as "The Repercussions of Dams on Historical Monuments and Prehistoric Remains," Athens Proceedings of the IUCN, Technical Meeting, 1959, 2/187-192; and later republished, as "Introduction" in Fred Wendorf, A Guide for Salvage Archaeology (Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 1962).

⁷³ Brew, in A Guide for Salvage Archaeology, 7.

petroleum and gas pipelines, urban and industrial development")⁷⁴ and the historical patterns of human development that these digs sought to uncover (human progress as the 'subject matter' of archaeology). Accordingly, Brew began his treatise with a grand historical narrative conflating the history of mankind and the history of archaeology into a single thread: an intelligent search for origins, fueled by increasingly sophisticated technology. Life in Babylon, for instance, was described entirely by the sentence, "On monuments of stone and tablets of clay, man recorded not only current affairs but also important events from past centuries in the history of his civilization." This conflation implied that a basic archaeological drive distinguished humanity from other animals—a proposition Brew made explicitly when he re-published the text in the 1962 Guide for Salvage Archaeology:

Anthropologists often seek cross-cultural generalities ... those elusive threads called cultural universals, which are thought to ... distinguish us from our near relatives, the higher apes. ... Little indeed can be said about our earlier ancestors which will survive attacks by eager colleagues skilled in physiology, psychology, and the various dialectics. It is difficult to imagine, however, anyone with a brain sufficiently developed to be classified as human who would not occasionally pause from time to time in his search for food, sex, and shelter to speculate upon his origin.⁷⁵

Having made of a 'speculation on origins' an intrinsic human drive like "sex" and "food", Brew then recounted the parallel evolution of mankind and of its historical self-consciousness: from the production of a "clearer and clearer record to be read by the curious ... as man grew in skills," to the nineteenth century discoveries that "brought archaeology to the threshold of professional status." By the early 20th century, "the whole field of the history of mankind took on meaning, content, and purpose." Yet it was only the "innovation of salvage archaeology" that turned this "esoteric humanistic discipline, of significance only in the realms of the imagination and as a very minor subject in academic halls," into "a matter of concern to the board rooms of great construction companies, to the world's most august legislative assemblies, to the cabinets of nations, and even to heads of state."

Salvage Archaeology was not the first attempt of archaeologists to reach out to the engineering professions. Witness for instance the 1912 pamphlet Archaeology as a By-Product, advertised as a "pamphlet for use by German engineers of the Bagdad [sic] railway, to enable them to utilize

⁷⁴ Brew, "The Repercussions of Dams," 187.

⁷⁵ Brew, in A Guide for Salvage Archaeology, 7-8.

⁷⁶ Brew, in Wendorf, 9.

⁷⁷ Brew "Emergency Archaeology," 3.

their opportunities for scientific observations not connected with their work."⁷⁸ But in contrast to this presentation of archaeological discovery as a "by-product" of infrastructural development, Brew saw salvage as a triumphantly professional end to a history of parasitical amateurism.⁷⁹

The relationship of technology-driven destruction to archaeological discovery is crucial for understanding Brew's theorization of his newfound disciplinary predicament. Archaeology's political rise was due to a historical foregrounding of technology itself, a "revolution":

The reason for this change, which is actually a revolution, is to be found in our twentieth century technology. The great population explosion which is manifest all over the world and the technological developments which have been devised to cope with it present a frightening threat to our historical and archaeological heritage. Salvage archaeology has developed to meet this concerted threat.

This archaeological view of 20th-century infrastructural development painted a picture of an expanding human mass, leaving technological traces on a growing area of the planet. While this technological determinism was unremarkable in itself, it allowed Brew to legitimate archaeology's new bureaucratic procedures as an internal, disciplinary development: archaeology had finally succeeded in permeating the very technological forces of which it had always been the record. Thus Brew arrived at the most important pronouncement about his subject, namely, that "archaeological salvage neither denies nor impedes progress." It is not that salvage changed archaeology fundamentally; but rather that it occurred as the opportunistic application of archaeological objectivity to present-day technological developments.

Far from "impeding or denying progress," archaeology was an invisible redemptive force that hovered around 20th century technology, salvaging the past. Brew's story of this new force was a

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⁷⁸ William N. Bates, "Archaeological Discussions," in American Journal of Archaeology, 16/4. (Oct-Dec, 1912), 561. 79 Brew was operating within what is now recognized as "the first formal paradigm of Americanist archaeology," the paradigm of "culture history," which bridged the gap between late-19th-century Darwinian influences and the structuralist developments of the 1960s. Brew figures in the recent The Rise and Fall of Culture History, for instance, as an early critic of phylogenic filiation, perceptive in his attack on "the paradox" of the methods he inherited, and alone in detecting the "conflation of essentialist and materialist metaphysics," which is to say, the tension between universal typological classifications and evolutionary schemes of cultural change, ["J.O. Brew and the death of Phylogenies," in R. Lee Lyman, Michael J. O'Brien and Robert C. Dunnell, The Rise and Fall of Culture History (New York: Plenum Press, c1997), 101-102.] But because Brew's proposed solution was to "simply create more new classifications," the authors dismiss his career as "evidence of the pervasive lack of archaeological theory" in this period. Certainly this theoretical dearth can be verified in the imprecise language of Brew's texts, where he sweepingly describes archaeology, alternatively, as "the history of mankind", as "anthropology", or as a generic "search for origins." Yet as James E. Snead has pointed out, the theoretical contradictions of culture-historical methods cannot be understood without noting "the influence on disciplinary thought" of such "contextual elements" as "the complex institutional rivalries of the 1910s, the massive government interventions of the depression years, ... or the accelerating estrangement of archaeology from anthropology." [James E. Snead, Review of The Rise and Fall of Culture History, Journal of Anthropological Research 54 (1998), 266.] From this perspective, these Salvage Archaeology texts represent the closest Brew ever got to theorizing his own discipline: a theory that these three "contextual" limits—institutional hermeticism, federal bureaucratization, and a loss of anthropological credibility—was to be progressively surpassed by an emerging international prominence.

four-part narrative arc that spanned a half-century, and neatly tied Egypt and the United States: (1) the construction of the Aswan Dam in 1907, where "the Egyptian Government provided for a systematic archaeological survey" directed by G.A. Reisner of Harvard University; (2) the first raising of the dam in 1929, which prompted three more years of surveying by British archaeologists; (3) the first "major program of salvage archaeology in the US", connected with the constructions of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the 1930s; and (4) the crowning event—the 1945 formation of the US Committee for the Recovery of Archaeological Remains (CRAR), the first federal program that systematically surveyed the ground covered by the construction of any public works in the US. This neat historical arc, with its experimental beginnings in Egypt and its bureaucratization in the United States, then culminated in the "the situation in Nubia," which Brew called "the greatest challenge yet to be faced by Salvage Archaeology." Thus what had begun in Aswan ended in Aswan, with help from the "TVA idea," "federalized" in the US, then "internationalized" by Unesco.

One unspoken advantage of presenting salvage archaeology in this manner—a "new dimension" of history achieved exclusively in the 20th century—was that it gave a positive ending to the often unsavory history that tied archaeological discovery to colonial conquest and imperial expansion.⁸¹ Although Brew himself was involved in the TVA program and the creation of the CRAR, he detached himself from these projects, by compulsively using a passive voice that rendered archaeological salvage as an autonomous historical force that had accomplished its own "extraordinary achievements" throughout the century, an "it":

It has built a museum in the middle of what was once the Zuider Zee. It is turning the major river valleys of the world into vast archaeological laboratories. It delayed the construction of new buildings in the centers of bombed-out cities of Europe ... It has joined together in a major scientific research program ... It has caused a great natural gas pipe-line company to devote space ... And, beginning this year, it will reopen the field of Egyptology."⁸²

Brew's third-person account of archaeology made for a cleaned-up history of the relationship between politics and discovery—a history more easily presented to politicians weary of reviving colonial pasts. Indeed his text contained key formulations, used throughout the Nubian campaign to convince political authorities that archaeological salvage belonged properly on their agendas.

⁸⁰ Brew, Emergency Archaeology, 5.

⁸¹ Recent work on the intersection of the two include *The Archaeology of Colonialism* ed. Claire L. Lyons and John K. Papadopoulos (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, c2002) and also Margarita Diaz-Andreu's *A World History of Nineteenth-Century Archaeology*: Nationalism, Colonialism and the Past (Oxford: Oxford, 2007), and Nationalism and archaeology in Europe, ed. Margarita Díaz-Andreu & Timothy Champion (London: UCL Press, 1996).

⁸² Brew, Emergency Archaeology, 4.

Foremost among these neutral formulations of archaeological obligation was the principle of "necessary minimum salvage," which distinguished between 'saving' and 'salvaging', and separated salvage archaeology from a history of antiquarianism and open-ended collecting:

Obviously everything cannot be saved, but it can be surveyed and recorded. Outstanding sites can be excavated and important buildings can sometimes be moved. But for the most part, the salvage consists of study and excavation, after which construction can proceed... The salvage actually lies in the publication of the report of the archaeological research.⁸³

By arguing that the ultimate goal of salvage was not ownership of monuments but their presence in the historical record, Brew inaugurated a debate that unfolded throughout the Campaign, over which monuments were "outstanding" enough to be "saved." More crucially, his description of salvage as "the publication of reports" anticipated the requirements of the United Nations Technical Assistance program, which disbursed aid to member states by dispatching experts, who compiled such "reports." Indeed Brew's MonCom work throughout the late 1950s was devoted to having salvage archaeology "incorporated into the official Unesco Technical Assistance program, so that the nations without competent archaeologists can obtain aid in the setting up and administration of a salvage program." Salvage Archaeology represented the MonCom's best hope for entering the Technical Assistance circuit, which had remained out of reach of the Cultural Affairs Division. 86

The "Purely Cultural" category of action

In 1959 Salvage Archaeology achieved what Brew proudly called "a toehold on the official UNESCO program," by securing the funds to publish a "a general report bearing on the consequences of large-scale engineering works in regard to the conservation of the cultural heritage of mankind." Brew saw this success as a "major step ... for general international relationships in the humanities." Archaeology, with its territorial mode of research and its objective attachment to

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⁸³ Brew, Emergency Archaeology, 12.

⁸⁴ Contemporary reference works consider Unesco's campaign the moment when work in Nubia turned from mere recording to monumental salvages. See for instance the "Lake Nasser" entry in *A Dictionary of Archaeology*, Ed. Ian Shaw and Robert Jameson (London: Blackwell, 2002), 349-350: "Whereas the two previous major phases of Nubian exploration had concentrated on the simple recording of threatened sites by mapping and excavation, the Unesco-sponsored Nubian Salvage Campaign also included the ambitious dismantling of 14 entire stone temple complexes."

⁸⁵ Letter from J.O. Brew to Dr. Mike Daugherty, Jan 28, 1959. Brew 8/1054d.

⁸⁶ Letter from Brew to Frederick Johnson, Peabody Foundation, Andover, MA (undated): the committee "has made the formal recommendation to the DG: (1) that provision for archaeological salvage be made in all plans for River Basin development and <u>all other construction projects</u> projected under Technical Aid." Brew Archive 7/1084a.

⁸⁷ CUA/129: The Preservation of Cultural Property endangered by Public or Private Works: Preliminary Report, (Unesco: Paris, 10 September 1965), 4.

⁸⁸ Letter or J.O. Brew to Dr. Mike Daugherty of the ACLS, in support of funding for Ralph Solecki's mission to travel to Paris to work on a salvage archaeology handbook. Jan 28, 1959. Brew 8/1085b.

technological development, was to be the new mode of cooperation for Unesco's "purely cultural" endeavors.

Throughout the 1950s, an increasingly long list of professions were recruited into this new mode of international collaboration centered around monument "salvage." Lists of "interested specialists" circulated internationally and progressively optimized by the members of the MonCom. JO Brew's own contribution to the circulating draft was to add, in pencil, the category of "architect" to an already long list: "pédagogues, écologistes, systématiciens, géographes, urbanistes, [added in pencil] architectes, anthropologues, ethnologues, archéologues, historiens de l'art, etc." The final recommendation was phrased in terms of cooperation: it recommended that, in the case of infrastructural development, "a meeting should be convened in situ of representatives of the following disciplines":

anthropology
archaeology
ethnology
history of art (in particular, of architecture)
study of traditional cultures
natural sciences
physics
engineering
political economy
town planning and modern architecture

This double appearance of architecture in this list of in situ expertise—as historical subject and planning practice—reveals a search for synthesis that would give meaning to the MonCom's mandate after the problem of war-time protection had been resolved.

As we have seen in Chapter 3, the detachment of monuments from the "specific protection" of war coincided with an increasing focus on monuments in urban settings, but this focus was difficult to qualify in terms likely to warrant the label of "general protection." Accordingly, MonCom proposals of this period oscillated between trying to find new objects to "protect" and defining a new "threat" against which to protect them:

- 1953: Preservation of Monuments in the Countryside: Rural architecture, country seats, former ecclesiastical buildings, etc.⁹¹
- 1953: Safeguarding of monuments used for other than their original purpose"92
- 1953: Study of Vestiges of the Past endangered by Large-Scale Works

⁸⁹ Draft of the recommendation, written by committee, unmarked, undated. Brew 7/1084a.

⁹⁰ Com.Mon. 6.43/116 Doc. 49: "Protection of Vestiges of the Past and Aspects of Nature endangered by Large-Scale Engineering Works." 29 April-2 May 1957.

⁹¹ Eduard Sekler, "Some Problems Connected with the Preservation of Monuments in the Countryside: Rural architecture, country seats, former ecclesiastical buildings, etc." Unesco/Com.Mon.6.21/58 Doc. 32.

⁹² ML/1026, 13 Aug 1953. Brew 7/1084a.

1957: Protection of Vestiges of the Past and Aspects of Nature endangered by Large-Scale Engineering Works⁹³

1960: Safeguarding the Beauty and the Character of the Landscapes and Sites 94

1965: Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private Works. 95

This progression demonstrates the increasing influence of the protection of nature on Unesco's conception of the protection of "culture." Brew was a crucial agent in contriving this overlap; in fact he had delivered the first version of his paper to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 1958, in a session titled "The Effects of Dams on Habitat and Landscape." As late as 1957 the MonCom consulted with the president of the IUCN, Roger Heim, to compile a comprehensive- proposal for "large-scale engineering works upon several categories of cultural property or natural resources." By 1960, this alliance with nature conservation had become stronger than the idea of defense from destruction, and the formulation on "the Beauty and the Character of the Landscapes and Sites" removed any specific mention of risk from public works. This removal provoked a discussion that fears that this "sounded too much like Heimatschutz"—the traditional German formulation for a generic protection of "the homeland." The final wording, "Endangerment by Public or Private Works" kept salvage archaeology separate from any proposals that "sounded like Heimatschutz," and represents a return to a reactive vocabulary that would both capitalize on the existing idea of "cultural property", as it had already been codified in the Hague Convention of 1954 and continue to attract funding as attachment to public works projects.

The MonCom's "general" work during this period—aside from its "technical" work in Nubia—placed monuments on a sliding spectrum between urban and natural poles, and archaeology occupied the centre of this spectrum. So, while Brew intended to grant archaeology greater prominence in international politics, ⁹⁹ these selfish disciplinary motives were complemented by a keen sense of interdisciplinary opportunism. Brew's main insight, as MonCom chairman in this transitional period, was that archaeology could become a medium through which to expand the horizontal reach of monuments' protection. Because the territorial aspect of archaeology was not in

⁹³ UNESCO/Com.Mon.6.43/116 Doc.49, Paris, 19 May 3, 1957. Brew 7/1084a

⁹⁴ Preliminary Study of the Technical and Legal Aspects of International Regulations Concerning the Safeguarding of the Beauty and the Character of the Landscape." UNESCO/CUA/100. Paris: 12 February 1960. Unesco Archive ⁹⁵ CUA/129.

^{96 &}quot;Technical Meeting - Athens 1958, Theme Ib" Brew 7/1084a.

⁹⁷ "Protection of Vestiges of the Past and Aspects of Nature endangered by Large-Scale Engineering works," UNESCO /Com.Mon.6.43/116 Doc.49 (19 Apr-May 3, 1957), 1. Brew 7/1084a.

⁹⁸ Letter from Jo Brew to Van den Haagen, 26 Jan 1959. Brew 8/1085b. "It was my understanding ... that a manual was wanted for the salvage archaeology program which I thought we had always kept separate from the Heimatschutz." ⁹⁹ and to capitalize on the success of the 1957 Recommendation regarding the "International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations," See 9c/PRG/7 27 "Draft Recommendation of International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations", 1956.

question, it could mediate between the urban pole represented in the protection of "centers containing monuments" and the natural pole represented by a progressive interest in the safeguard of "the beauty and character of landscapes."

Unesco's program in salvage archaeology was cancelled early in 1960, as the Nubian campaign began to take over the entire Cultural Affairs Division. Yale archaeologist Ralph Solecki, who had been appointed editor of the "Salvage Archaeology" manual, was divested from his duties, "to make eventual use of the lessons learned form the Nubian project, which is becoming one of the most important examples of the protection and salvage of cultural property endangered by large-scale engineering works." Thus the Nubian campaign can be understood, from the point of view of Unesco's institutional history, as a case-study that substituted for a more general elaboration of principles. In particular, the mission of striking a delicate conceptual balance between Heimatschutz, protection of "cultural property", and the regulation of archaeological access, was achieved in exemplary form through the Campaign. Once the bulk of the archaeological work in Nubia was completed in 1963, the MonCom's work on the salvage recommendation resumed, inaugurating a thread of resolutions that led directly to the signing of the 1972 World Heritage Convention, which brought architectural, urban, archaeological and natural heritage under a single protective mechanism.

But this substitution of "an important example" instead of a "general report" was not effected without a cost. As Solecki noted with irony, there was one aspect of the Nubian Campaign that was "directly opposed" to "one of the main themes" of the Salvage Archaeology publication, as he would have developed it: "that the cost of salvage archaeology was to be incorporated in the cost of the works project." This principle of financial incorporation was far from a technicality; Brew had made it the only explicit "overriding principle" of salvage archaeology:

There is one overriding principle which should be established at the beginning of any salvage project; namely, the cost of the salvage surveys and excavations should be an integral part of the cost of the dam or highway...The cost of salvage archaeology in a large reservoir would seem relatively very great when considered in the terms of the annual budget of a national university or national museum, but if this same figure can be

¹⁰⁰ Letter from J.K. van den Haagen to Ralph Solecki. 1 March 1960. Brew 8/1085b.

¹⁰¹ Document CUA/129 summarized this episode as follows: "While considering the implications involved in the safeguarding of landscapes, recommended to the Director General the compilation of a general report bearing on the consequences of large-scale engineering works in regard to the conservation of the cultural heritage of mankind. Later that year, however, it was decided to undertake an international campaign [for Nubian monuments.] In order to benefit from the lessons to be learned from such an unprecedented action, it was decided to defer the project for a publication to a later date." CUA/129: The Preservation of Cultural Property endangered by Public or Private Works: Preliminary Report, (10 Sep 1965), 4.

viewed in relation to the cost of the construction of the dam, it is so small a percentage as to be almost negligible. 102

In order to avoid the impression that "the tail would seem to be wagging the dog", the financial cost of salvage archaeology was to be incorporated directly into development funding. This technique was a way for archaeology to detach itself from the diminutive cultural budgets of museums and universities, and attach themselves to engineering works themselves. In contrast, Solecki wryly noted, the salvage project planned by Unesco was "like a tagged afterthought, very much a poor relation" of the funding of the Aswan High Dam. An added irony was that the Dam was planned and funded by the Russians, who "certainly understood salvage archaeology in their own country." ¹⁰³

Solecki was not the only one to note that separating the finances of the Nubian Campaign from Dam's finances would be perceived as a cold war gesture. The point was made, with a reference to the TVA, by the chairman of the US Senate Hearing committee for the amendment of the Mutual Security Act in 1959:

ARE THE RUSSIANS GOING TO CONTRIBUTE TO THIS PROJECT?

The Chairman: One last question. Since the Russians have undertaken the construction of the Aswan Dam project, why isn't this a part of the overall cost of the project? In this country when the Federal Government builds a dam, part of the cost is the acquisition and removal of structures within the basin covered by the dam. In TVA this was done by the Government in building the dam. Why isn't this a cost of the Aswan Dam project?¹⁰⁴

Brew's answer demonstrated he thought international bureaucratization had placed archaeology into a larger geo-political frame, where the principles of financial autonomy had to be recalibrated. "There is a very tricky possible gimmick here," he wrote to Solecki, "that the Russky's may eventually shoulder the costs if the Western world failed to raise the money, pointing out gleefully that we were perfectly willing to let all this cultural material go under water." He did, however, find comfort in the idea that archaeology would only emerge reinforced from the tug-of-war: "the considerable publicity this movement is going to have all through the world will do no harm either to archaeology in general or salvage archaeology in particular." 105

Nevertheless, the re-attachment of salvage funding to a cultural institution (Unesco) rather than to the engineering work itself (the Aswan high Dam) propelled the Nubian campaign into the

¹⁰² John Otis Brew, "The Repercussions of Dams on Historical and Archaeological Monuments and Prehistoric Remains." Extracted from Athens Proceedings of the IUCN Technical Meeting, 2 (1959), 190.

¹⁰³ Letter from Solecki to Brew, March 22, 1960. Brew 8/1085b. Brew too acknowledged the Russians as pioneers in salvage archaeology, and recommended for this reason that an American should be designated to "design Unesco's salvage program."

^{104 &}quot;Mutual Security Act of 1960," Foreign Relations of the United States, 582.

¹⁰⁵ Letter from Bew to Solecki. Brew Archives, 8/1085b.

cold war, 106 and this is where the meaning of its "purely cultural" character has to be examined. Throughout the campaign, the expression "purely cultural" was attached to a definition of funding as unrelated to any international politics. For instance, Director General René Maheu addressed "The member states prepared to make voluntary contributions for moving the temples of Abu Simbel" in Cairo by recalling the disinterestedness of the endeavor. Though he acknowledged that "this is not the first time that mankind has reacted generously to a noble cause," since "Man is essentially alive to the appeal of noble causes" yet he confidently declaimed the autonomy of culture from any international politics "But this is the first time that an international fellowship has found expression on so large a scale in matters of culture." ¹⁰⁷ Brew made a point of using the phrase in its literature to public relations, "one of the first opportunities for the most exciting and extensive program of international cooperation on a purely cultural matter" ¹⁰⁸ This kind of proclamation cannot be understood without looking more specifically at the way Unesco redefined "culture" in opposition to its other program elements (Education, and Science), and the way this redefinition bore on the conduct of archaeological exchange in Egypt that themselves had a long history of being implicated in political powers. The label of "purely cultural" was a convenient formulation to detach the Nubian campaign both from cold war politics, and from archaeological "abuses" of the past.

Recent scholarship on the "restitution of cultural property" has made of the Aswan salvage campaign a historical turning-point, hopeful evidence that "the Mephistophelian relationship of imperialism with dominated cultures," inherited from the 19th century, "may have a more constructive future" in a post-colonial age. In his introduction to the Getty Center's recent volume, Claiming the Stones, Naming the Bones, Elazar Barkan put it in terms of "mutual benefit":

Contemporary conservation and collecting often work to the mutual benefit of both larger museums and local cultures. The Ägyptisches Museum in Berlin, among others, participated in salvaging Egyptian antiquities as part of the Aswan Dam project, which flooded major archaeological sites in Egypt. In return, the Egyptian government granted certain impressive antiquities to the museum, which were prominently displayed there.

The rest of the conversation demonstrates this: "The Chairman: We are told that they are extremely interested in cultural affairs./ Mr. Wilson: Yes, sir, they are extremely interested. They are extremely defective in this particular line of Egyptian archaeology./ Senator Sparkman. May I ask is Russia is a member of UNESCO? / Mr. Wilson: Russia has a representative on UNESCO, yes; and there will be Russian committee members on UNESCO, committees on this project. /" Mutual Security Act of 1960, 582 in Foreign Relations of the United States.

107 DG/1963/5 Address by René Maheu, Meeting of Member States, 9 November 1963, Cairo. Brew 10/54a.

¹⁰⁷ DG/1963/5 Address by René Maheu, Meeting of Member States, 9 November 1963, Cairo. Brew 10/54a. ¹⁰⁸ Letter from Brew to the CEO of the Today Show, Feb 7, 1963. Brew Archives. In response to an unfavorable show on February 6th when Dr. John Cooney of the Brooklyn Museum suggested that the money could have been used in some other fashion.

This is in contrast to the notorious controversy ... between the museum and the Egyptian government concerning the restitution of Nefertiti. 109

Based on this apparent symmetry between "impressive antiquities" salvaged in one country and "prominently displayed" in another, Barkan goes on to argue that "the growing awareness of a new moral perspective on the part of museums" might be "the best guarantee [against] the worst abuses of the past." As a symbol of such abuse, Barkan offers the head of Nefertiti, exported from Egypt by the Deutsche Orientgesellschaft in 1912 and which remains to this day in the Ägyptisches Museum despite a century of controversy. Thus the case of the Aswan Dam serves to expand the category of "restitution" to include not only the literal return of cultural property once taken by imperial powers, but also the rectification of a basic "power disparity" between Western nations rich in museums, and non-western cultures rich in cultural content. ¹¹⁰

To see the Nubian campaign as triggering a new era of "restitution" is theoretically misleading, though it rings historically true. On the one hand, Barkan is correct that the Nubian Campaign coincided with Unesco's definition of a new type of "cultural exchange" between uneven powers among its member states. This exchange was spelled out, for example, by the director of the Cultural Activities Division in the 1961-1962 Program:

If Unesco contributes less in its cultural activities programme than in its other fields to technical assistance in less developed countries, it makes up for the deficiency by a very important psychological help. Often the country that is poor in the economic and industrial sense is rich in cultural values ... Thus there can be a real exchange, a two-way action, which will enable all the countries to give and to receive, to enrich each other."¹¹¹

Unesco's prescription of cultural exchange as "a two-way action" resonates with Barkan's hope for a postwar age of "mutual benefit". Yet "psychological help" should not be confused with object exchange, especially since Unesco used "cultural values" to compensate for financial imbalances in its program.

Certainly one cannot take at face-value the equivalence of an object "displayed" and a cultural value "exchanged." The Nubian campaign, as closer inspection will show, was an elaborate mechanism for extracting archaeological "value" from cultural "objects," and it was careful to avoid the depiction of objects being "exchanged" at all. The financial imbalance between countries

¹⁰⁹ Elazar Barkan, "Amending Historical Injustices: the Restitution of Cultural Property—An Overview," in Claiming the Stones, Naming the Bones: Cultural Property and the Negotiation of National and Ethnic Identity, ed. Elazar Barkan and Ronald Bush (Santa Monica: Getty Research Institute Issues & Debates, 2002), 38.

¹¹⁰ Barkan, 39. "The growing moral awareness on the part of museums may serve, at present, as the best guarantee that the worst abuses of the past stemming from power disparities are less likely to occur in the future."

¹¹¹ Rudolf Salat, "Cultural Values and International Cooperation," in The Proposed Program for Unesco, 1961-1962, as published in Unesco Chronicle 6/11, 416.

within Unesco's program was due to the increasing leverage of the UN's Technical Aid program onto Unesco's definition of culture; therefore Egypt's cultural objects had to become "technical" entities before they could properly be exchanged for international help. This redefinition of culture as "technical" was specifically aimed against the two labels of 'art and history' that had hitherto been attached to monuments: "By culture Unesco implies neither a luxury reserved for a minority nor the mere heritage of the past." ¹¹²

Similarly, Barkan generalizes the Aswan salvage as a model of exchange between "local cultures" and "larger museums," assuming that an informal culture always represents autochtonous localities while formal institutions represent the hegemony of the West. Yet the Nubian Campaign involved local cultures and larger institutions on both sides. In particular, we will see that the emergence of a "regime of archaeological excavation" in international law, resulted from a struggle between Western Egyptologists trying to retain the informal "local culture" they had established along the Nile, and the Egyptian Antiquities Department trying to become a national bureaucracy—a "larger museum." In short, if Barkan's depiction of the Aswan campaign as a neat exchange between "participating in salvage" and "displaying impressive antiquities" is misleading, it is because it implies that the antiquities were impressive all along—that they began as a local product, and retained this value throughout. Closer look at how the Nubian Campaign was structured, and a comparison with pre-war forms of archaeological exchange will demonstrate that the archaeological value of the Nubian antiquities was acquired in the process of exchange itself.

II. "Objects and Values": Postwar archaeology and the law of gift exchange Nefertiti's Head: the logic of the counter-object

The episode of Nefertiti's Head—undoubtedly one the most famous Egyptian objects of the century—provides a useful starting point for understanding how Unesco modified pre-war archaeological exchange into a new, "purely cultural" category of action. As John Wilson recalled in his History of American Egyptology, the episode of Nefertiti's head began with an expedition of the Deustche Orient-Gesellschaft to the Nubian site of Armana, led by Ludwig Borchardt, cut short by World

¹¹² Unesco, "Unesco Adopts a New Programme in Cultural Activities." Press Release 2335, (Paris: Dec 11, 1962). Spelled out the pressure put on the word "culture:" "By culture Unesco implies neither a luxury reserved for a minority nor the mere heritage of the past. ... It is through the loyalty to the authentic spirit of culture, to its freedom, its soundness and its fertility that Unesco can contribute to placing culture in the service of man as an entity." From Brew 8/1085c.

¹¹³ Dominic Montserrat's "Ninety Years of Nefertiti," *Apollo* 485 (2002), 3-8 gives a very short summary of the circulation, both literal and symbolic, of Nefertiti's head over the century.

War I, and which brought back to Berlin a uniquely delicate bust of Nefertiti. ¹¹⁴ (fig 4.12) The limestone bust remained in private hands for a decade, then was given to the Museum and "published" in 1923. As soon as the publication was made, government authorities in Cairo protested that they would never have conceded "such an outstanding work of art" to the German expedition, with "the implication of some kind of devious activity which prevented Egypt from retaining this treasure." ¹¹⁵ The controversy continues to this day—although already at the time, perceptive archaeologists like Wilson noted that Borchardt's published report contained a pre-emptive defense: that ""two outstanding objects" had actually been found in the 1912 digging season—Nefertiti's head, on the one hand, and a limestone altarpiece of the Royal Family, on the other." As was customary, Borchardt explained, one piece was only "conceded to the Germans" because the second one "acted as a counterpiece" and went the Cairo museum according to a "division of paired values." ¹¹⁶ (fig 4.13)

This concept of a "counterpiece", with its implication of a reciprocity between foreign excavator and host government, had long been the medium of exchange between Egyptologists and Egypt. This medium was designed to ensure a fair trade between access to a site (granted by the Egyptian Government) and the expertise to dig in this site (held by Western archaeologists, aided by local diggers). As explained by Wilson, this agreement dictated that every archaeological find was automatically composed of two halves, so that a "fifty-fifty division of value" could occur:

The older dispensation ... had been on the order of a fifty-fifty division by value. When the archaeologist had sorted his season's finds into two lots, roughly equal in importance, a representative of the Egyptian government would review that assignment, probably make some changes in it, and then accept one lot for the Cairo Museum. The other lot would be assigned to the excavator, to be cleared for export abroad. 117

For every object owned by a Western institution, there was a counter-object in the Cairo museum, whose value was certified by the ghosted presence of its separated "paired value" abroad. Thus any controversy over an exported object was in fact a controversy over two objects. What the "fifty-fifty division of value" meant is that every archaeological dig was in fact a form of exchange, a complicated equation involving objects, knowledge about those objects, and access to its location:

KNOWLEDGE	[Egyptologist]		OBJECT [Nefertiti's head]
TERRITORY	[Egypt]	$\rightarrow_{(\mathrm{DIG})} \rightarrow$	COUNTEROBJECT [Altarpiece]

¹¹⁴ John Wilson, Signs and Wonders upon Pharaoh: A History of American Egyptology (Chicago, 1964).

¹¹⁵ Wilson, 155

¹¹⁶ Wilson, 156. Borchardt's original report of the digging season was published in Mittleitungen der Deustchen Orient-Gesellschaft 55 (Dec 1914), 1-45, and translated in Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution (1915), 445-457.

¹¹⁷ Wilson, 194.

The basic equation of archaeology—that digging is the transformation of knowledge and territory into objects—was also a system for dividing the world of objects into a system of values.

If archaeological value was created through this digging operation, the fairness of the split between object and counter-object hinged on the simultaneity of the exchange between access and expertise. The debate over Nefertiti's head, in fact, was never about who owned the piece, but rather about when and where knowledge about its value was made public. By all accounts, "the Germans were immediately aware of the high value" of their find, while the Egyptian government only realized its value after Borchardt "published" the piece under the safety of institutional cover in Berlin. In other words, the real currency by which to value archaeological objects was knowledge, as Wilson revealed:

It is not unknown for archaeologists to try to safeguard their most cherished pieces by pretending that their greatest interest is in objects of lesser merit, in order to direct attention of the government man away from the prizes. This is a well-known bargaining technique in the Orient.¹¹⁸

The so-called fifty-fifty rule was in actuality a "bargaining technique" which implicated two unequal actors in a bluffing game where knowledge, object, and territory were three potentially separable spheres. At stake in this bargain was the wholeness of the archaeological object.

The Nefertiti episode put this "bargaining technique" into crisis. The regime of fifty-fifty, which had ruled over Egyptian excavations since the mid-19th century, was revoked in the late 1920s, as all objects found automatically became state property of Egypt. According to Wilson, "a stalemate resulted for nearly a generation." Subsequent historiographers have confirmed Wilson's account of a "general retreat" of Western institutions, who "phased out their excavations" in the 1930s as a result of both the Nefertiti episode and the Tutenkhamon exhibition. These two controversies are now seen to have coincided both with an expansion of local archaeological knowledge and a surge in nationalism, making national authorities more suspicious of surreptitious exports and triggering a general change of attitude. In these histories, the 1957 creation of the CEDAE under Unesco's tutelage, becomes the first experiment in local control of Egyptian archaeology, before "complete local control of archaeology came along with full political independence in the 1950s." The Nubian campaign then figures as a third step in the "Decolonization of a Profession:" the event that

¹¹⁸ Wilson, 156.

¹¹⁹ Wilson, 156.

¹²⁰ "Indigenous Egyptology: the Decolonization of a Profession?" in Journal of the American Oriental Society, 105/2 (Apr-Jun 1985), 233-246.

¹²¹ Ibid. "But questions of dependency on the West linger in Egyptology as they do in Egyptian national affairs."

"usher[ed] in a new era of international Egyptological cooperation." The implication is that a new international regime emerged, and that a freer circulation of knowledge and of people evened out the terms of the 'fifty-fifty' equation. The flaw in this narrative is that it assumes the neutrality of Unesco's intervention into the equation of classical archaeological exchange.

To say that a prewar power imbalance was rectified in the postwar is to assume that archaeological supply and demand remained constant throughout the "stalemate" period. In fact, demand for archaeological access to Egypt had all but died by the late 1950s. The very image of an "appeal" made by an international organization, and answered by a worldwide army of ready experts, is a Unesco fabrication. By John Wilson's own admission, when the appeal was made in 1959, interest in Nubian archaeology was meager at best:

Nearly twenty-five years had passed with a minimum of field work. The Egyptologists had turned to other lines of research; few of them were now experienced in excavation. Further, when compared to Egypt proper, Nubia was a backward and unpromising area for digging. The preservation of the stone temples of Nubia was a job for the engineers, not the archaeologists. The first reaction to the appeal was one of dismay. What could we do?¹²²

That archaeologists showed little interest in the "impressive antiquities" when they were first offered to them in 1959 is perhaps the best evidence that the value of these antiquities was acquired in their salvage. More to the point, we arrive at a crucial historical question about the Campaign as a whole: if the archaeologists themselves doubted the value of conducting it, how did the Nubian campaign occur at all? How was such an elaborate exchange of objects and values performed, under the explicit label of "a TVA of archaeology," if the archaeologists themselves were so "dismayed" that their help was wanted? Wilson gave a retrospective answer that hinted at the mechanisms underlying a new type of archaeological exchange: "The two governments offered the archaeologists generous terms: at least a fifty-fifty division of the objects found, and ... the future right to excavate in Egypt proper, plus the ceding of certain temples and of antiquities from the government storehouses. The atmosphere was genuinely cordial." On the face of it, this answer confirms the story of a restoration

John A. Wilson, "The Sequel," in Signs and Wonders Upon Pharaoh: A History of American Egyptology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 195. A more detailed version of how the UAR's "new and enlightened policy" was "a restoration of the older ruling" is given by Walter Emery in his Lost Land Emerging, 20-24. About the of the UAR, he writes that "It may seem rather sad that such a response is apparently only forthcoming because of a promised reward, but such is not really the case, as a study of the economics of archaeological research will show." He then proceeds to recount the story of the imposition of state ownership onto all archaeological finds during the "Stalemate", and absolved the west from accusations of fetishism, since expeditions always had a "twofold objective of promoting archaeological and historical knowledge and of gaining additional material", crediting the West with the insight that "the value of the finer objects of ancient art was enhanced by knowledge of its origins." Ultimately Emery supports the interpretation given here that the objects provided were "surplus": "the irony is that the storerooms in the basement of the great museum at Cairo and big warehouses on the sites of excavations such as those at Sakkra were crammed with duplicate objects, unworthy of a place in the collections of Cairo, but which would have been of great value in Western Museums."

of the rule of "fifty-fifty division of value." But if a rule was merely restored, why does Wilson talk so compulsively of generosity, of "future rights", and cordiality? What kind of exchange is performed when the problem is a total disinterest, and the solution is total generosity?

Far from restoring the pre-war "fifty-fifty" regime, the Nubian Campaign disbursed gifts to unwilling receivers. In so doing, it enacted the principle Marcel Mauss had called "total prestation": the principle that "one gives because one is forced to so… because the recipient has a sort of proprietary right over everything which belongs to the donor." In his Essai sur & Don, Mauss theorized that the gift carries a triple obligation: "the obligation to repay gifts received, … the obligation to give presents, and the obligation to receive them." Taking on the contradiction of this perpetual reciprocity between donor and receiver, Mauss argued that a single value circulates among the network of persons and things involved in gift exchange.

the pattern that tightly connects these symmetrical and reciprocal rights and duties ceases to be a contradiction, if we realize that it is first and foremost a pattern of spiritual bonds between things which are to some extent parts of persons, and groups and individuals that behave in some measure as if they were things. 123

While Mauss inherited the qualification of these bonds as "spiritual" from the ethnographers of his primary sources, it is possible to understand the connection he proposed between "things that are parts of persons" and "persons who behave like things" in relational terms, as Claude Levi-Strauss did in his 1950 Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss. Lévi-Strauss aimed to detect in Mauss's text the "relational character of symbolic thought," proposing to rename the singular value of gifts more abstractly as a "symbolic value, degree zero." As we have seen, the problem posed by the preservation of the Nubian monuments was a problem of "mankind saving mankind," through the medium of a collection of objects. In Maussian terms, there is little doubt that monuments were "things which are to some extent parts of persons" and that Unesco's Mankind was "a group that behaves in some measure as if it were a thing." In Levi-Strauss' terms, the monumental value produced by the exchange of monuments for culture can be seen as a monumental value "degree

^{123 &}quot;La prestation totale n'emporte pas seulement l'obligation de rendre le cadeaux reçus; mais elle en suppose deux autres aussi importantes: obligation d'en faire, d'une part, obligation d'en recevoir, de l'autre." 161. "Mais ce mélange étroit de droits et de devoirs symétriques et contraires cesse de paraître contradictoire si l'on conçoit qu'il y a, avant tout, mélange de lien spirituels entre les choses qui sont à quelque degré de l'âme et les individus et les groupes qui se traitent à quelque degré comme des choses." 163. « Tout va et vient comme s'il y avait échange constant d'une matière spirituelle comprenant choses et hommes ... », 164. Marcel Mauss, "Essai sur le Don," in Sociologie et Anthropologie, (Paris: PUF, 1950), orig. 1912; 145-280. Translation mine.

¹²⁴ Claude Lévi-Strauss, "Introduction a l'Oeuvre de Marcel Mauss," in Sociologie et Anthropologie, (Paris: PUF, 1950), IX-LII. Levi-Strauss himself made the connection between Mauss and a nascent psychoanalytic discourse in France. For a concise, dense, and sweeping summary of where Mauss fits within Western metaphysics, see Mark Taylor, "Capitalizing (on) Gifting," The Enigma of Gift and Sacrifice, ed. Edith Wyschogrod, Jean-Joseph Goux, Eric Boynton, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 50-76.

zero," an empty category residing equally in the objects offered by Egypt and the mankind proposed by Unesco. Levi-Strauss himself made the connection between Mauss' system of "total facts" and the encyclopedic ambitions of Unesco's "heritage of mankind" in his introduction, proposing that Unesco fulfill the mandate outlined by Mauss.

The next section deals with the way this exchange was conducted. First, I will look at the legal document that elaborated its terms, (the Declaration.) Then I will look at the collection of objects and how it was presented as a collection of gifts (the objects). Then, I will look at the type of expert that was enlisted and the debates they engendered (the knowledge). Finally, I will look at Nubia itself as it was posed as a design problem, as well as a historiographic problem (the territory). This re-examination will then transition into why Abu Simbel itself was saved, in order to see how the cultural value that had been produced was then traded against political and national power. This means that we proceed roughly in chronological order: from the devising of a legal scheme for the campaign in late 1959—with some flashbacks to the developments since the 1930s that informed this scheme—to the beginning of the campaign and the enlistment of experts, and to the larger salvage operations of the mid-1960s.

The law: from Régime International to International Action

Between October 1st and 11th 1959, the twelve members of the International Consultative Committee of Experts, led by chairman Jo Brew, traveled by boat up the Nile to visit the temples threatened by the flood, and "draw up a plan for international action." The document that resulted from this Nubian cruise, The Declaration by the Government of the United Arab Republic Concerning The International Action to be Taken to Safeguard the Monuments and Sites of Ancient Nubia provided a blueprint for how to conduct salvage and exchange of objects. Authored in equal parts by the Egyptian Minister of Culture and National Guidance, Saroid Okasha, and the archaeologists of the Consultative Committee, it is the best place to detect the modified regime of cultural exchange that came into being through the Nubian Campaign.

Structured in 6 parts, the *Declaration* proceeded like a legal contract between two parties, from the obligations of one actor (agencies "participating in the international action", 1. a—e), to the values provided in exchange by the other ("the Government of the United Arab Republic," 5. a—c) through the arbitration of an intermediary agent (UNESCO, 2—4). This tripartite structure modified

¹²⁵ Technically authored by the Minister of Culture and National Guidance, Saroït Okacha, in Cairo, on 1 October 1959, the declaration was also reprinted as an annex in Unesco, *A Common Trust: The Preservation of the Ancient Monuments of Nubia* (Paris: Unesco, 1960), 27-28, which was timed for the diffusion at the launch of the campaign.

the archaeological binary of object/counter-object, since Unesco now served an "intermediary role," mediating between what used to be "Egypt" and what used to be the "Egyptologist." ¹²⁶ This role was soon formalized in an intricate network of committees which filtered the "offers for participation" from foreign institutions and assigned them "archaeological concessions" in return. But Unesco's impact on the resulting regime was far more pervasive than this simple insertion implies.

Each side of the new archaeological equation reveals, in its structure and language, the influence of a lineage of efforts to regulate archaeological excavations by way of international law. On the side of "foreign agencies", for instance, every "procedure" composing international action was described as a self-contained archaeological endeavor, in a Unesco parlance that embodies the expectation that the Nubian campaign should mobilize "scientific, technical, financial" programs into a single "purely cultural" endeavor:

- 1. ... procedures to be adopted by those participating in the international action:
- (a) Scientific, technical and financial responsibility for ... excavation work... on sites where inadequate or no survey has been carried out
- (b) Scientific, technical and financial responsibility for... preservation ... of monuments which cannot be moved
- (c) Scientific, technical and financial responsibility for ... transfer ... of specific items... (removal of a temple or part thereof)
- (d) Scientific, technical or financial assistance ... for surveys of threatened monuments

With this trio of "science/technique/finance," Unesco codified archaeological digs as complete and conscribed campaigns, rather than dispersed open-ended probes. This is no small point: the trail of unfinished archaeological sites, filled with exposed cultural objects, that was left behind by foreign expeditions had long been a source of discontent for governments hosting archaeological missions. In fact, the first formal proposal for an international regulation of archaeological digging—what came to be known as the Régime International des Fouilles—was designed to evade precisely this kind of incompletion: at the 1931 Athens Conference, Greek archaeologist Keramoloulos, made a distinction between "methodical" and "hasty" digging, and proposed an "international regulatory mechanism" to allow foreign schools only one dig at a time, and require them to record all of the antiquities they found, and pay for their display and conservation. 127

¹²⁶ UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, 4.

¹²⁷ A. D. Kermoloulos, "Le Régime des Fouilles: Nécessité d'une Réglementation Internationale," in Office International des Musées, La Conservation des Monuments d'Art et d'Histoire (Paris: Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle, 1933) 392-393. Kermoloulos identified as a primary issue the "scientific impatience of those authorized to dig, which led them not to "mener leurs recherches jusqu'à bout" and "porte a exiger a l'archeologue une hate inconciliable avec les travaux ... méthodique." The image of foreign archaeologists running around Greek sites irresponsibly, leaving behind a trail of unfinished digs and exposed antiquities is confirmed here, and he blamed "cet état d'esprit qui fait des recherches archéologiques un veritable sport." In response to Barkan's assumption about who occupies the position

Keramoloulos blamed irresponsible foreign archaeologists, for leaving behind a trail of exposed antiquities, in "a state of mind that made of archaeological research a veritable sport." His critique, in other words, was that foreign archaeologists behaved as an informal culture which left the formalities of surveying, recording, and institutionalizing to the national antiquities administrations. What he hoped instead was to force upon foreign diggers what Unesco, 30 years later, called "the scientific, technical and financial responsibility" for their archaeological concessions.

If the first half of the Declaration defined a new kind of "international action" in archaeology, the second half of the contract, which appeared to restore the terms of the fifty-fifty regime, was frankly qualified by Unesco's work in international archaeological law. The entire paragraph was preceded by a disclaimer that the UAR had been "guided by the Recommendation, adopted by the General Assembly of Unesco on 5 December 1956, and especially paragraph 23, concerning the assignment of finds." Passed largely as a result of Brew's efforts, this Recommendation was also the outcome of a line of efforts that began with Keramololous at Athens, and continued in the framework of International Cooperation, culminating notably in the so-called Cairo Conference of 1937. Although the Cairo Conference itself had been inconclusive, its Final Act known as The Cairo Agreement, is worth an analytical detour as a precedent for the 1960 Declaration: the first document to transform the binary of object/counterobject into a three part regime.

The 1937 Cairo Agreement divided into three categories the "Problems Involved in Free Access to Archaeological Excavations": "(A) Authority to Excavate, (B) Assignment of Finds, (C) Excavator's Scientific Ownership of his Finds." A and C concerned the left side of the archaeological regime (knowledge and territory), while B addressed the right side (object and counterpiece). To address the issues of A and C, the Agreement attempted to regularize a variety of disparate national legal traditions by introducing two ideas: First, that the "archaeological subsoil" of any country should be considered State property, regardless of the private ownership of the top soil above it. Second, that archaeological findings should be published in an international market of ideas, regardless of the private sponsorship of the expedition which produced the finds. When work on the Régime International resumed within Unesco after the war, the distinction between the ownership of territory and the ownership of knowledge had only been accentuated; working documents for the

in cultural exchange, the critique here was precisely that foreign archaeologists behaved as an informal culture which left the formalities of surveying, recording, and institutionalizing to the national authorities.

¹²⁸ UNESCO/Com.Mon.4.4 Doc.6. Paris: 21 March 1951. International Committee for Monuments, First Session, Remarks on a Plan for International Agreements to Allow Archaeologists from all Countries Free Access to Archaeological Excavations and Sites." Unesco Archives, MonCom

1956 Resolution distinguished "a Government's ownership of the archaeological subsoil" and "an excavator's scientific ownership of his finds."

Here, then, is important to note that the avowed purpose of regulating archaeological digging was to liberalize it, so that Western institutions and foreign governments could overcome private monopolies on land and objects alike.¹²⁹ In the case of regulated access, archaeological concessions were now to "allow the possibility of 'competing' for licenses;" in the case of results, scientific research would be published "without violation of the principles governing intellectual ownership."¹³⁰ In effect, the international régime was developed to act as a defense mechanism against the progress of private property, not as a positive instrument for the establishment of international value.

The only part of the Cairo Agreement that reflected the internationalist inclination of the institutions hosting the debates was the famous "Paragraph 23" cited in the 1959 Declaration, about the "assignment of finds." As written into the 1956 Recommendation, the paragraph dictated that "finds should be used, in the first place, for building up, in the museums of the country in which excavations are carried out, complete collections." Adopting these standards, the 1959 Declaration excerpted both "unique" and "representative" objects from its "grants-in-return":

- 5. ... guided by the Recommendation ... the UAR will conceded the following grants in return ...
- (a) cede at least half of the proceeds of their finds to parties which have carried out excavations in threatened area ...
- (b) authorize excavations outside the threatened area ...
- ... on the understanding that certain items which are unique or ... most representative of the civilization... shall be assigned to the museums of the UAR
- (c) cede, with a view to their transfer abroad, Nubian temples and a large collection of antiquities

By subjecting the fifty-fifty rule to universalist standards of judgment, Unesco mitigated the traditional equation that had mediated between two kinds of private ownership. Thus the Nubian Campaign was, simultaneously, the first instance when the fifty-fifty rule was formally upheld in a


¹²⁹ Brew placed the 1956 accord along these lines of "liberalization" in a letter to Donald Hurdeck, program officer Unesco Relations staff on October 20 1955: "The point of the present proposed revision of the so-called "Cairo Agreement is not to make additional restriction regulations but to liberalize and improve facilities for foreign scientists to work in the various countries." Brew 8/ 1086b.

 $^{^{130}}$ UNESCO/ Com.Mon.44/71 Doc.36. Paris: 10 March 1954. International Committee for Monuments, Artistic and Historical Sites, and Archaeological Excavations, Fifth Session. Working Paper on International Regulations with Regard to Archaeological Excavations., p.1

¹³¹ See document UNESCO/CUA/68 "Draft International Principles Governing Archaeological Excavations," (Paris: August 9, 1965), Part II: "Previous Action" for a summary of the Cairo Conference and the subsequent international efforts regarding archaeology, leading up to the 1957 resolution. The Resolution itself is found as an appendix to the Records of the General Conference, "Appendices to the Programme for 1957-1958: Recommendation on International Principles applicable to Archaeological Excavations," (Paris: Unesco, 1956), 40-44.

legal instrument for international exchange, and the first instance when this traditional division was subjected to international standards. In some sense, the expectation remained throughout the campaign that every object found would be haunted by a counter-object. Even as it was mitigated by tentative principles of international law, the logic of "fifty-fifty" remained in a shadowy form.

A more radical departure from both Cairo Agreement and fifty-fifty rule was evident in the last item of each term of the Declaration. On the Foreign side, item (1.e) detached financial contributions from any archaeological obligations, thereby breaking the pattern of "completion" that otherwise tied knowledge, object, territory into a neat package. On the UAR's side, item (5.c) promised temples and antiquities in return for this purely financial aid, thereby detaching objects from their traditional counter-objects and imposing another kind of "completion"—an encyclopedic idea of comprehension—onto archaeological exchange. Finally, the last item of the Declaration itself, item (6), required that objects thereby exchanged be made available to an international public. Together, these new elements constituted a third dimension of archaeological exchange:



This third dimension of archaeological exchange is where "salvage funds" had finally come to lodge themselves. Separated first from the engineering works themselves, and now dissociated from actual archaeological salvage, these "financial contributions" now stood as a potential tipping point in Unesco's attempts to balance archaeological access and cultural reward. The dissociation of finance from aid introduced two new types of objects into the pattern of archaeological exchange: on the one hand were objects to be placed in national collections because they were judged "representative" of a national culture; on the other hand were objects ceded for export because they would be "exposed" to an international public. In a certain sense these two kinds of objects acted as counterpieces to one another, but the pattern that established their equivalence had changed.

¹³² This isolation of the financial aspect of salvage was later reflected in Unesco's creation of an International Fund to receive the contributions to the campaign of member states. See 56 EX/5 Add. 1 Establishment of a Trust fund for Contributions for the Safeguarding of the Monuments of Nubia.

The objects: "Gifts from the Nile"

The Declaration set the legal terms for an exchange between monetary contributions and cultural property, but forbade the establishment of a quantitative equivalence between the two. Accordingly, throughout the campaign no object was ever described as being "exchanged," whether for a financial contribution or for another object of equivalent value. Other language was used—the United States "offer" talked about "the quid-pro-quo element" that allowed a "transfer of matching funds" in return for "adequate reward in objects." This was, in effect, a new "bargaining technique," which came to replace the one that had been operative in the pre-war "fifty-fifty" regime. And just as with the Nefertiti episode, it was John Wilson who revealed what lay behind a seemingly equitable division of objects and values. Upon returning from Washington, Wilson reported that the Declaration should be thought of as a "package deal:"

A rumor active in Washington was that the UAR would insist on a "package deal" for foreign agencies. That is, no institution could win the bonus of digging north of the dam ... or could be rewarded with surplus antiquities or with one of the smaller temples, unless that institution <u>both</u> excavated in Egyptian Nubia <u>and</u> made a contribution to the preservation of the Big temples. ¹³⁴

Wilson confirmed the rumor one month later, upon returning from Cairo: "if we really want rights and objects, we have to present a 'package deal:' money for safeguarding the temples, in addition to our digging." This meant that no single item on the list of "procedures" could be triggered, unless contributions were made to the campaign as a whole. Archaeological digging was not, after all, a self-sufficient form of technical assistance. In addition, the whole exchange was now to be referred to in terms of excess: institutions could be "rewarded"; antiquities could be rendered "surplus," and "access" was described as "bonus." It was as if the idea of "completion" introduced by Unesco had brought with it an image of surplus: objects not needed to achieve completion could be described as excessive, and it was this excess that would be granted "in return" for voluntary assistance. What kind of archaeological regime resulted from this disarticulation of the balanced equation of classical Egyptology? How did this new "surplus" regime differ from the "counterpiece" logic it superceded?

¹³³ US National Committee for the preservation of Nubian Monuments, Memo of Phone Call from Washgington, Lois Haase, Nov 29, 1960. Brew "Counterpart" Folder. (This impression was reinforced by the language of Western Archaeologists, who remembered all the objects that were "kept in the coffers" of the Egyptian antiquities and clearly expected that these antiquities would be "given as counterparts.")

¹³⁴ National Committee for the Rescue of the Monuments of Nubia. "Interim Report to the Executive Committee, from executive secretary John Wilson." April 4, 1960. Brew 9/1086h.

¹³⁵ In his report Wilson paraphrased Okasha as follows: "Please, Please you offer to dig X-group cemeteries or copy rock inscriptions. What we need is money! How can you expect us to reward you handsomely for digging and copying, when you are not giving the money to safeguard the temples?" John Wilson, US National Committee for the Preservation of Nubian Monuments. Informal Report to the Executive Committee on Cairo Meeting, Consultative Committee (23 May -1 Jun 1960), 2. Brew: Folder "US Commission."

The language of surplus that permeated the Campaign was arguably inaugurated on the second day of the Nubian cruise, when the International Action Committee decided not to translate the French word "contrepartie," but to use the English "grant-in-return" instead:

Definition of the French word contrepartie, in the U.A.R. Government's Declaration, of which the literal English translation is not clear. After an exchange of opinions, it was proposed to substitute the phrase grant-in-return for the English word counterpart. Referring to the word contrepartie and the comments made by several experts, the Chairman thought it right to make it clear that we ought not to consider the gift of certain monuments or objects by Egypt as cutting them off from Egypt's cultural inheritance, but much rather as a further extension of it. 136

While Okacha had appealed to the fifty-fifty tradition by describing as "counterparts" the monuments his ministry would grant to foreign countries, the International Action Committee chose to call them "Grants-in-Return" instead. The intention of this substitution was double: first, to avoid placing the exchange of objects "on the same level as a commercial transaction," and secondly, to prevent museums from "ask for particular objects." Instead museums should be content "to make their requests in general form." Thus the transformation of Okasha's Declaration into a generous "offer" had the effect of homogenizing the objects into a single collection of "gifts." When Okacha agreed to change his terminology, he wrested control of the objects away from the West, triggering a chain of designation that soon led these temples and antiquities to be "declared surplus." 137

The passage from "counterpart" to "gift" in Unesco's publicity material was effected in a few months: first published in the 1960 A Common Trust, the Declaration was illustrated with a list of "Objects to be Offered by the UAR as Counterpart." By October 1961 the Unesco Courier: Abu Simbel: Now or Never featured a spread of "Gifts from the Land of Pharaohs," collected under the label of "Ancient Treasures which the Government of the UAR is Offering as Grants-in-return." 138 Unesco's international audience had already heard this gifting vocabulary activated by Vittorino Veronese, who had ended his inaugural appeal with the phrase "Egypt is a Gift of the Nile," which was "for countless students the first Greek phrase which they learnt to translate." The implication was that gifting acted a universal tongue, which could unify the value of the Egyptian objects, despite their disparate historical and geographic provenance. Similarly, while "counterparts" contained specific

¹³⁶ UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, 3. An announcement was made at the end of the meeting on 7th October 1959 that Okacha had agreed to the sawp: "The Minister of Culture has agreed to substitute, in the English translation of the official declaration of the U.A.R. Government, the expression "a grant in return" for the word "counterpart." Ibid, 27.

 $^{^{137}}$ Brew described the temples as "originally declared 'surplus'" in a letter to Wilson, 5 Aug 1963. Brew 10/54b.

^{138 &}quot;Gifts from the Land of the Pharaohs," in Unesco Courier: Abu Simbel: Now or Never (Oct 1961), 22-23. The spread compulsively repeated that these objects were "gifts:" "Also offered are five pharaonic temples. Both the UAR and the Sudan have also offered 50 percent of excavation finds ... and Egypt has generously modified its antiquity laws."

reference to their own archaeological origin, "gifts" could come generically from "the land of the Pharaohs," their value as a collection certified by their autonomy as gifts.

A few further conclusions can be drawn from the substitution of "grant-in-return" for "countrepartie." The decision to avoid the English "counterpart" later acquired greater significance in light of the type of funds that the US eventually devoted to earning such temples—as will be described later, these funds were called "counterpart funds" and were derived from the sale of surplus agricultural commodities to Egypt. It should also be noted that the birth of this language of surplus coincided with an anxiety of secession—the fear that "the gifting certain monuments or objects" might mean "cutting them off from Egypt's cultural inheritance." This fear that "gifts-in-return" would no longer be understood as belonging to Egypt reveals how much the system of counter-objects had previously connected exported objects to their original location.

Thus, in its afterlife throughout the Campaign, this Declaration continued to be used delicately to appeal to this systemic longing for a counter-origin, while also enlisting experts interested in objects and values "for their own sake." The assurance that gifts-in-return would serve as a "further extension" of Egypt, in turn, hints at the way the surplus economy of heritage was legitimated by a geographic image of expansion. In the next section I describe how the distribution of surplus antiquities across Egypt and the world was a strategy for inscribing Nubia into a spatial regime for the disposition of excess. I begin with the afterlife of the Declaration, to see how it was used by Unesco to enlist experts into three categories of action that would otherwise have appeared gratuitous, in increasing order of self-interest: the archaeologists performing a "systematic survey," preservation architects doing the "dismantling and removal of ancient temples," and engineers with "the two most important projects of the campaign—the preservation in situ." ¹³⁹

The experts: knowing vs. saving

The veneer of generosity that coated the UAR's Ministerial Declaration, the language of surplus of the "package deal," and the elaborate legal mechanisms that gave substance to this "gifting" rhetoric—all were devised, it must be remembered, to preempt the puzzlement of Western archaeologists: as expressed by John Wilson, the "dismay" of "what could we do?" This dismay, in turn, was due to the impression that neither digging in Nubia nor moving temples were sufficiently archaeological projects to warrant the attention of Egyptology as a traditional Western discipline. The function of the Ministerial Declaration was to answer this rhetorical "what could we do?" by making an archaeological connection where none existed, between a kind of digging that yielded no objects

¹³⁹ "Abu Simbel: Now or Never," in Unesco Courier, (Oct 1961), 6.

(surveying Nubian sites) and a kind of <u>object that required no digging</u> (preserved monuments.) To do so, the Declaration abstracted the basic equation of archaeology—digging is the transformation of knowledge and territory into objects—into a bureaucratic procedure, deployed at an international scale, beginning with "digging in Nubia" and ending with "preserved temples." Thus the mediatic label of a "TVA of archaeology," which was applied unequivocally to the photographs, films, and reports of Unesco's fieldwork in Nubia, worked to conceal the lack of any connection between the teams of scientists busily surveying the banks of the Nubian Nile, and the collection of monuments heroically salvaged from catastrophe.

If the function of the Appeal was to "create a real psychological shock" in the international community at large, the function of the Declaration, as a document disseminated to Unesco's member states, was to trigger the successive enlistment of specific experts, in a disciplinary chain-reaction devised in September 1959 at a meeting convened in Washington DC by Assistant D-G Julian Thomas, MonCom members, and a group of American experts. 141 The question was how best to stimulate interest of Western institutions, and the answer came in the form of a distinction between two kinds of archaeologists: those who could conduct the majority of the work, and those who could attract the majority of the funding. All agreed that "the majority of the work would go into saving the thousands of sites which ... would be submerged by the construction of the dam." Since "many of these sites are pre-historic and contain the hearths, homes, flint implements and other artifacts of Neolithic and Paleolithic man,"142 this kind of intensive, repetitive and comprehensive digging was likely to attract "scientific institutions interested in uncovering information as to early history just for its own sake." But despite consensus that these "so-called dirt archaeologists would have a field day in Nubia," "it was generally conceded that the practical aspect of this being a method for museums to acquire materials might be the more important consideration." 143

Behind the distinction between "uncovering information for its own sake" and "acquiring material"—between knowing and having—lay an institutional divide: "dirt archaeologists" were prehistorians from research universities, but better-endowed museums were needed to serve as

¹⁴⁰ "Plan of Action," in UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR (12 Nov 1959), 42.

¹⁴¹ CUL (59)4 Summary Meeting on Unesco involvement in the Safeguarding of the Sites and Monuments of Ancient Nubia. (Sept 18, 1959.) The meeting was attended by representatives of: Unesco; the New York Office of Unesco; the Egyptian Department at Metropolitan Museum of Art; the Division of American Ethnology, the Freer Art Gallery, and the Division of Old World Archaeology at the Smithsonian Institution; the National Park Service, the National Science Foundation, and various Bureaus of the State Department.

¹⁴² CUL(59)4.

¹⁴³ CUL (59)4, p.5

institutional partners for the UAR. Indeed Unesco's cultural politics bypassed nation-states only by going through cultural institutions instead, and it is museums that had traditionally been interested in Egypt. 144 "These museums," as MonCom director Gysin put it a month later during the Nubian cruise, were "run by independent trustees who could not hand over money without being sure of a proper quid pro quo." Such museums would cooperate only if they could "receive objects in return", either to "complete their collections of Egyptology" or to create one. 145 However, these Egyptology departments were interested only in objects of Pharaonic origin—not in the "hearths and homes" of anonymous prehistoric men. And as an Egyptologist diplomatically summarized during the Nubian cruise, "Simply to return to the old rule of 50% would produce a bad effect on archaeological research, for it was certain that finds in Nubia would be poor." ¹⁴⁶ Thus the generosity of the Declaration was calculated to lure Egyptologists with promises of "rights" to sites North of the dam that were sure to be "richer," as well as "objects" from Cairo's warehouses, which would "satisfy the heart of any curator of a foreign museum." The expectation was, that these satisfied curators would bring funding to Nubia in return. Nor was this simply an American equation—as the Wall Street Journal cited a "European Egyptologist" as saying, "it is only logical to open purses by opening warehouses."147

This emphasis on objecthood ran contrary to the disciplinary tendencies of prehistorians, who were skeptical of "squawking Egyptologists" and expressed their skepticism in terms of a debate between science and aesthetics. ¹⁴⁸ Knowledge about Nubia's prehistory, they argued, had to be gathered before the flood, whereas Pharaonic antiquities had already been recorded and their location was a museological matter, not an archaeological one. The implication was that science was an absolute criterion for salvage, while a greedy obsession with objecthood would never be satiated. ¹⁴⁹ Yet even their positivistic argument was subject to relative evaluations—certainly state officials remembered having already funded the First and Second archaeological surveys in the early

¹⁴⁴ In the case of the United States, the Smithsonian Institution served as "the formal, official, general archaeological agency of the Federal Government," the NSF was deemed "the most practical agency for administering grants," and museum directors from Ivy-League Universities were enlisted to ensure that the "the distribution of antiquities" became the responsibility of the American Association of Museums. That this institutional imperative came from Unesco is evidenced by Brew's own distaste for it: "Any project will work better if it doesn't have to be saddled with the Smithsonian. … If we could contribute to the reform of the Smithsonian, this would be a greater achievement than lifting Abu Simbel 200 feet." Letter from Brew to Wilson, April 11, 1961.

¹⁴⁵ Gysin, UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, 27.

¹⁴⁶ Walter Emery, in UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, 40.

¹⁴⁷ James Wallace, "High dams, Old Scarabs," in Wall Street Journal (Mar 16, 1960), 14.

¹⁴⁸ Letter from Brew to William Y. Adams, April 24, 1967, Brew archives, Correspondance: Adams.

¹⁴⁹ Aside from the few archaeologists like Adams and who had been involved in the first Survey, most pre-historians eventually enlisted had trained on sites in their own national territories.

part of the century, and were therefore convinced that "Nubia had been thoroughly dug in earlier years," and was therefore "known" by scientific standards.¹⁵⁰

Egyptologists' motives in the campaign were frankly ulterior, yet they still expressed their interests in terms of disciplinary autonomy, as part of an altruistic "revival of Egyptology." The Curator of Egyptian Art at Boston's MFA, for instance, saw "an opportunity for the finest kind of international cooperation" which would bring new objects back from Egypt, and care for existing ones in the US:

Our great collections of Egyptian art, if combined together, would probably represent holdings only to be equaled in a single country by those of Egypt itself. ... Our distinguished tradition of Egyptian studies has been maintained by a handful of people, the problem of whose training has been of increasingly alarming difficulty ... this is of particular interest in the Museum field ... if our great holdings of Egyptian art are to be properly cared for, evaluated and made known to the public. We should also visualize their increase through the possibility of excavation. ¹⁵¹

By granting Western museums rights and objects, the Campaign would re-connect US experts and US objects to their field of origin, and renew the disciplinary legitimacy of "Egyptian studies." Clearly this attitude reinforced the connection between objects and their counterpieces, since Western collections would be "increased" with pieces that had been accumulating in Cairo, after a century's worth of fifty-fifty divisions. Hence to "visualize the increase" of collections was to visualize the reunification of separated pairs, and if the Nubian Campaign is to stand as an example of any kind of restitution, it is one that benefited Western museums, who received the "duplicate objects" they had once given up and considered rightfully theirs. 152

Egyptologists repaid the contempt of dirt archaeologists with zealotry, sounding alarm at any news of prehistoric objects exported to the West for purposes of "research." The most notorious

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¹⁵⁰ The US contributed to the two archaeological campaigns in the early part of the century. Rainey was the director of University Museum at the University of Pennsylvania, and elected director of AAM in 1960. He was told in Washington that the first demand for funds in 1959 was stuck because the cultural affairs officers knew Nubia "had been thoroughly dug in earlier years." But while the Department of State was therefore biased towards "Egyptology", Brew noted that the NSF was marked by "an emphasis on prehistory, which arises from the fact that the social science division is committee to that kind of archaeology." Letter from Brew to Wilson, April 11, 1961

¹⁵¹ CUL (60) 8: William S. Smith, "The Rescue of the Monuments of Nubia," delivered to the US Committee of the International Council of Museums, (Boston, May 25, 1960), 3. Brew Archives, Correspondance Folder. Smith defined the collections as witnesses to past expertise: "Our collections will testify to the important results of such excavations."

¹⁵² Walter Emery was a particularly vocal proponent of this argument: "The irony is that the storerooms in the basement of the great museum at Cairo and big warehouses on the sites of excavations such as those at Sakkra were crammed with duplicate objects, unworthy of a place in the collections of Cairo, but which would have been of great value in Western Museums." Lost Land Emerging, 20-24. During the Nubian cruise he revealed he had specific objects in mind: "Mr. Emery quoted from personal experience. A small part of his discoveries at Saqqara, at present preserved in the storerooms since only a small part of them could be exhibited, would satisfy the heart of any curator of a foreign museum." Emery even extended the idea of surplus to the ground itself: "Moreover, how many times had he not been forced, faced with an abundance of finds of the same kind, to rebury pottery that could usefully be exhibited outside Egypt." UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, 41.

incident featured skull fragments post-dated by a few thousand years and re-classified as "modern man" in order to qualify for export. This incident caused Unesco officer Jan van den Haagen to intervene, making explicit the underlying clash between two disciplinary autonomies, one based on historical objects the other on historical narratives. "Questions concerning the 'illicit export' of some prehistorical pieces," Van den Haagen granted, "may be overdone or even incongruous, as an enormous number of them can be found," but "Egyptologists do not think in the same terms as prehistorians and are prone to consider every object as a 'cultural treasure'." And since Egyptologists were in charge of archaeological laws, the export of "information for its own sake" was ultimately bound by the same rules as the export of "cultural treasures." ¹⁵³

This tension between science and aesthetics was exacerbated by a territorial tug-of-war, triggered by a rule that bound the Egyptologist's "bonus digging" in northern Egypt to the completion of the prehistorians' excavations in Nubia. Each lobbied to be disassociated from the other: Egyptologists claimed that "the real political purpose … was to start excavations in the north of Egypt again," ¹⁵⁴ and continually pressed for the end of "prehistoric excavations, which are for the birds," in order to begin "honest archaeology." ¹⁵⁵ The dirt archaeologists, in turn, worried about attempts to "monopolize Egypt" with object-driven digging. ¹⁵⁶ The dispute was mediated by the International Action Committee, but even members of this committee were embroiled in competing allegiances: chairman John Wilson, for example saw his position as "complicated by a triple responsibility:" on the consultative committee, he was "obliged to work for the success of the Nubian campaign regardless of nationality," but as secretary of the US National Committee, he worked "for the best interests of America in the total picture" by obtaining rights and objects for US

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¹⁵³ Letter from Haagen to Solecki, Brew 10/54a. "Correspondance" Folder. The debate was over "several pieces of human skull including frontal," found by Yale zoologist Ralph Reed, and which interested him because they "exhibited very large brow bridges." Reed then "re-examined the skull pieces and came to the conclusion that the brow bridges really weren't so big after all, so it could safely be described as modern man and taken out of the country for study." Fred Wendorf and Ralph Solecki protested that in doing so Reed "risked creating another Nefertiti scandal," exposing him to the Egyptian director of Antiquities. It was Louis Christophe who wrote van den Haagen to warn that such letters were prone to be mis-understood by the Egyptian Antiquities, prompting van den Haagen to write to Solecki. Brew 10/54b.

¹⁵⁴ They were supported by the State Department in this conviction. "I don't know what is eating Wilson... surely he has known from the start that the real political purpose behind all of this was to start excavations in the north of Egypt again... surely he must know that 'higher ups at State" are primarily interested in American work in the major sites of the North—and care little about this business of digging in Nubia which no one wants to do." Letter from Froehlich Rainey to Brew, April 9, 1962. Brew 10/54b.

¹⁵⁵ Letter from Rainey to Brew and Wilson, Mar 14, 1962. Brew 10/p. 8.

¹⁵⁶ See an exchange of letters between Charles Reed of Yale and Ralph Solecki, mediated by Jo Brew, in February 1962. Brew 9/1086d.

museums, while he also remained a delegate of the Oriental Institute at the University of Chicago, which had "honestly applied for funds ... not until Nubia is really finished." ¹⁵⁷

What Wilson experienced as a personal anxiety—the dilemma of knowing when "Nubia was really finished"—was a symptom of the tenacity of the fifty-fifty rule, which continued to manifest itself in two now contradictory strains: the lingering pressure to exclude Nubia from "Egypt proper," and the continuing strength of the counter-object as a mode of legitimation. If Egyptologists were skeptical of Nubia as a cultural entity, it is because their discipline traditionally excluded it. Witness for instance Bourguigon d'Anville's maps in the Napoleonic Description de l'Egypte (Egyptology's inaugural text), which showed that Egypt ended precisely where Nubia began. ¹⁵⁸ (fig 4.14) Yet the Unesco Campaign transformed this difference (Egypt/not-Egypt) into an equivalence (Egypt/Nubia), the kind of archaeological equivalence where one object is deserved in exchange for the other. This same logic, which had previously divided all archaeological finds into two lots, was now dividing Egypt into two halves, each needing the other to guarantee its legitimacy.

What this fight between the two Egypts shows is that even when its legal terms had dissolved, the "fifty-fifty" regime remained as a shadowy bond, projected at a territorial scale onto the entirety of the UAR. It was the Aswan Dam that now acted as the line of archaeological demarcation, making the operative distinction between "digging north of the dam" and "excavating in Nubia." It is through this geographic version of a object/counter-object pair, that Egypt became "whole" again as a place of archaeological discovery. In this sense, Western museums earned their surplus temples not only in return for assistance to Egypt but also so they could return to Egypt, their Egyptology departments newly legitimized, with Nubia now included.¹⁵⁹

III. The "Greatest Open-Air Museum in the World"

Nubia as international space

The reconstitution of Egypt into a museological referent was only one aspect of a broad reworking of "Nubia" into an international entity. This cultural redefinition of Nubia was strung along

¹⁵⁷ Letter from Wilson to Brew, July 24, 1962. Brew 10/54b.

^{158 &}quot;The Description de l'Egypte is itself a monument," writes C.C. Gillispie in the introduction, adding that the Description's "nine volumes of memoirs, description, and commentary, averaging 800 pages each, may be considered the point of departure of Egyptology as a field of study." CC. Gillispie, "Historical Introduction," in Monuments of Egypt, 1.

¹⁵⁹The autonomy of this reconstituted archaeological territory was dependent on two mutually-exclusive, yet complementary autonomies: the scientific autonomy of prehistory as expertise, and the aesthetic autonomy of Egyptian antiquities as museum objects.

a new historiographic continuum that began with Nubia's past as a "Corridor to Africa," encompassed its present as "A Vast Archaeological Camp," and continued into its future as a "the Greatest Open-air Museum in the World." ¹⁶¹ The foundation for this cultural history had been laid in the 1907 by the First Archaeological Survey, when extensive digging had yielded "several phases of indigenous Nubian culture (the so-called A,B,C, and X Groups)," thereby "effectively refuting the commonly held-belief that ancient Nubia was culturally dependent on Egypt." ¹⁶² The archaeologists of the Unesco campaign continued to "accumulate new data" to fill this A,B,C,D,X framework, further supporting the hypothesis that Nubia was as an autonomous cultural entity. But they also went much further in extrapolating from this early history a legitimization of Nubia's present-day situation. In some cases this extension was made by the same scholars, with early and late phases of the same career punctuated by the construction of the dam. British archaeologist Walter Emery, for instance, who had been Director of the Second Archaeological Survey of 1929, led the British expeditions for Unesco and published his authoritative Lost Land Emerging upon his return in 1964.

In his "General Outline of Nubian History" Emery asked "Where is Nubia?," and gave a historical answer to this geographic question: "such is its history as a highway to battle for the contending armies of the North and South, that Nubia never really attained a independent status of its own." Yet Nubia was a distinct region, a "Battleground of the Ancient World," and home of "a very distinct nationality, very closely knit by blood relationships and a common way of life." Emery also ventured into the present-day, giving four pages of amateur ethnographic insights on "the modern Nubian," an intrinsic paradigmatic traveler whose attachment to his homeland was not deterred by frequent movement and perennial exile. "The Nubian of today," Emery wrote, "is racially distinct from the Egyptian," and "unlike the Egyptian, he is a great traveler." The significance of this mobility is that Nubians had become an exemplary labor force ("a first-class servant," "all the best butlers and cooks in Egypt,") and as such, had achieved "the protection which in Europe can only be expected from a strong labor union." Thus despite their dispersal in Egyptian cities, Nubian communities formed a "united group." The answer to the question "where is Nubia?", then, was that Nubia was not a place but "a cultural network," a "social system that works." If Nubia was

¹⁶⁰ Louis Christophe, "Nubia Today: A Vast Archaeological Camp, in Unesco Courier, (October 1961), 21.

¹⁶¹ Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt, "The Greatest open-air museum in the world is about to disappear." In Museum XIII, 3, (1960).

¹⁶² "Lake Nasser" entry in A Dictionary of Archaeology, Ed. Ian Shaw and Robert Jameson (London: Blackwell, 2002), 349-350. The campaign granted further archaeological legitimacy to the differentiation between Egypt and Nubia by acting as "an important catalyst for focusing the attention of archaeologists in the Nile valley on the hitherto-neglected study of towns and cities, thus also ensuring that many Egyptologists were trained in the more exacting scientific methods and approaches required by settlement archaeology."

¹⁶³ Walter B. Emery, Lost Land Emerging (New York: Scribner & Sons), 8-9.

understood as a place of passage, the Nubians themselves were conceptualized as a model cultural constituency, mobile yet authentic.

Emery's (and others') description of Nubian social networks as a "system" eventually helped to legitimate the relocation of over 120,000 Nubians from their soon-to-be-flooded villages to "New Nubia" and "New Wadi." (fig 4.19) As early as 1959 the relocation of people and of monuments were paired as the human and archaeological "prices" to be paid for the Aswan Dam's economic "benefits," and this symmetry often served to fold Nubia's history of local autonomy unproblematically into its new role as an international land. The French journal La Vie Urbaine, whose brand of urban geography was particularly attentive to population movements, described "The Drama of Nubia" as a trade-off between "the joy of economists and philanthropists" and the "discomfort of relocated Nubians." But while the editors called the displacement of Nubians "a secondary problem, to be resolved on a local scale," they saw the movement of antiquities as "a much graver problem" on the scale "of the entire civilized world." 164 Although the distance traveled by most antiquities was infinitely smaller than that endured by Nubians, their resettlement in distant new towns was considered a "local" problem, while the movement of monuments was seen to be "universal." (fig 4.25) This hierarchy carried over into later assessments of the dam's success, as the monumental culture saved came to serve as a substitution for the human culture displaced. 165

These repeated accounts of Nubia as a place of passage between Africa and the Mediterranean produced a cohesive depiction of an independent region, whose cultural identity had survived a lineage of imposed regimes, from Pharaonic rule, to Christianity, Islam and, by implication, Nasser's "socialist experiment." Certainly Unesco's publicity department capitalized on these ethno-archaeological insights to present Nubia as a place of peaceful ethnic encounter, "the meeting place of civilizations," 166 like Unesco itself. (fig 4.18-19) The International Consultative Committee, for instance, referred to the "The Spirit of Nubia" as a cooperative impulse that pervaded their negotiations on the Nile:

We came from six different language backgrounds. We had political backgrounds which were monolithic or highly individualistic. ... In view of these factors, the sessions were

¹⁶⁴ Jeanne Hugueney, "Le Drame de la Nubie," in La Vie Urbaine No.1, Vol. (Jan-Mar 1961), 48. An urbanistic study of the actual resettlement of Nubians was eventually conducted in 1973 in the journal Ekistics. See Hussein M. Fahim, "Nubian Resettlement in the Sudan," in Ekistics 212 (July 1973), 42-49.,

¹⁶⁵ By 1976 Nature magazine approvingly noted that no "cultural losses" had been felt thanks to the salvage campaign, and that despite the "bitterness and serious social consequences," caused by the relocation of Nubians, "the value of the Aswan High Dam" was to be "judged according to an overall assessment of Egypt's situation," as if "social consequences" in no way contributed to this national picture. The same article noted that Nubians had always remained "stubbornly hostile to foreigners." Julian Rzoska, "A controversy reviewed," in Nature Vol. 261 (June 10, 1976), 445 166 55 EX/30 "Communication of the Government of Sudan Concerning the archaeological sites and Monuments threatened...'

harmonious and candid. ... the atmosphere continued so cordial that you heard joking little references to "the spirit of Nubia" as being the right attitude to the problem. ... And in this spirit of Nubia there is hope for a real revival of Egyptology. 167

As the campaign progressed, and teams of archaeologists repeated this inaugural cruise in their "Floating Laboratories on the Nile," 168 the image of Nubia as a cooperative milieu became more technical. Not only had Nubia been the "island workshop of stone age man," where "Man achieved his first triumph over his material conditions." 169 Nubia was a place of architectural experimentation and it would now also be a model for technical aid in the Unesco sense. These archaeological results painted a picture of a hospitable mankind and made the Nubians into a model international constituency. Thus Nubia was only continuing its role as "a Corridor to Africa" by enabling the movement of archaeologists and, eventually, tourists.

"Geography is partly discovered and partly invented," admitted anthropologist Bill Adams with 30 years of hindsight, when recalling his role as the leader of Unesco's campaign in the Sudan. Acknowledging his own role in "The Invention of Nubia," he analyzed it as a six-part historical arc: there was "the Egyptians' Nubia / the Egyptologists' Nubia / the Greeks and Romans' Nubia / the Black Nationalists' Nubia / the Nubiologists' Nubia / the Nubians' Nubia." Each identified a territory that was occupied by varying degrees of otherness: "Nubians as inferior Egyptians; Nubians as noble savages, Nubians as Africans; Nubians as the originators of civilization; Nubians as culturally unique; Nubians as Arabs." While Adams credited the Unesco campaign with creating one particular breed of expert (the Nubiologist, whose "cultural particularism" he critiqued), it is important to note that, during the actual Campaign, these identities were used with equal fervor by Unesco and its various committees for fund-raising purposes.

American archaeologists, for example, routinely described Nubians as "the first historically recognizable black African people" to imply a direct connection between Unecso's work and

^{167 &}quot;We came from six different language backgrounds. We had political backgrounds which were monolithic or highly individualistic. In one sense, several of us were bargaining with several others ... In view of these factors, the sessions were harmonious and candid. ... the atmosphere continued so cordial that you heard joking little references to "the spirit of Nubia" as being the right attitude to the problem. ... And in this spirit of Nubia there is hope for a real revival of Egyptology." John Wilson, "General Results: Positive," in US National Committee for the Presrvation of Nubian Monuments, Informal Report to the Executive Committee on Cairo Meeting, Consultative Committee, May 23-June 1, 1960, June 6, 1960, 2. Brew Archives, "Counterpart" Folder

¹⁶⁸ Christiane Desroches-Noblecourt, "Floating Laboratories on the Nile," in Unesco Courier: Abu Simbel Now or Never, 26-29.

¹⁶⁹ Rex Keating, "Journey to the Land of Kush," in Unesco Courier, Now or Never, 32-36.

¹⁷⁰ William Y. Adams, "The Invention of Nubia," Hommages a Jean Leclant Vol. 2 (Le Caire, 1994) reprinted in Arkamani: Sudan Journal of Archaeology and Anthropology, (February 2002), 1.

contemporary American race relations."¹⁷¹ In the context the civil right debates of the early 1960s, American archaeologists testified in Washington about the cultural autonomy of Nubia and the need to inscribe the region into a general history of "Africa."¹⁷² In his Senate testimony on behalf of the US committee, Chicago orientalist John Wilson described Nubia as the place where "the first Negroes entered history," and implied that "research in the area" might yield a solution to domestic civil-rights issues.¹⁷³ In some ways the effect of these arguments was not felt until much later, after the Black power movement had reclaimed for their revolutionary cause the Nubian icons made famous by Unesco, and the archaeological findings of the Nubian campaign became evidence in the heated scholarly debates over the erasure of "black pharaohs" from Western historiography in the 1980s.

Similarly, anthropologists working on the Sudan described Nubia in their fund-raising material as "a kind of 'mouvance,' in the medieval sense, between Egypt and the Southern World," and emphasized the importance of investigating "the exceptionally late survival of Christianity in this part of the Moslem Sudan." Adams himself titled his application for an NSF grant "An Archaeological Investigation of the Cultural Transition from Christianity to Islam in Nubia." Clearly this emphasis on the "survival of Christianity" was a poignant way both to differentiate Sudanese Nubia from Egyptian Nubia, and to distance Unesco from the revolutionary

¹⁷¹ Adams, The Invention of Nubia.

¹⁷² It was Martin Bernal who revived Nubia as a place of potential "Black" ontology, with Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization. Bernal, Black Athena, Volume 1: The Fabrication of Ancient Greece 1785-1985, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1987). Bernal argued that Western historiography had, since the 18th century, purged the image of Ancient Greece of the contributions made by Egyptian and Phoenician cultures. Bernal proposed to locate the genesis of Ancient Greece in ancient Egypt, and to see Egypt itself as "fundamentally African," sparking a bitter debate over whether ancient Egyptians could, in his formulation, "be usefully understood as black." It Bernal's detractors who solidified Nubia as place of blackness: while they agreed with his critique, they asked to remove this African specificity from Egypt, and often granted it to Nubia instead. The volume Black Athena Revisited is typical in offering Nubia as a "really a black African culture with enormous influence and power," and using the archaeological results of Unesco's campaign to do so. "Nubians in the Ancient Mediterranean World," 121-128, in Frank M. Snowden, Jr., "Bernal's 'Blacks and the Afrocentrists,' in Black Athena Revisited, ed. Mark Lefkowitz and Guy MacLean Rogers (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1996.)

¹⁷³ Mutual Security Act of 1960, 576. "Between 4,000 and 3,000 years ago the first Negroes to enter history entered in that area, and this process needs to be studied in terms of the evidence here." That this was a pressing issue is evidenced by Wilson's own report that the hearing was poorly attended meeting, because "there was a civil rights ebate on the floor of the Senate, so that only three menmner of the committee appeared." National Committee for the Rescuye of the Monuments of Nubia, Interm Report to the executive committee from executive Scretary Wilson, April 4, 1960. Brew 9/Nubia 10.

¹⁷⁴ W. Y. Adams and J. Vercoutter, "Why Excavate in Sudanese Nubia?" Lecture (undated), in Brew 9/1086L "Sudanese Nubia," p.13.

¹⁷⁵ "International Meeting on the archaeological Campaign in Sudanese Nubia, Venice, Italy, 18-22 April 1966,". Addition made by Brew onto the draft meeting notes. Brew 9/p.16.

¹⁷⁶ University of Kentucky Research Foundation, on Behalf of the University of Kentucky, initiated by William Y. Adams., Dept of Anthropology. Brew 9/p.16.

regime that had ruled Sudan since 1956 with notable hostility to the catholic missionary presence on its soil.¹⁷⁷ But, as with all the other "Nubias," Adams' hypothesis of "Cultural Transition" was only a working concept, a way to contribute to a general theory of social and historical hybridity. What anthropologists, archaeologists and historians all sought in Nubia, on behalf of Unesco, was not a new international ontology but rather a regional epistemology that allowed for flexibility, hybridity, and expansion.

Two major themes emerged from this international redefinition of Nubia: hybridity and mobility. The first—wherein Nubia was a hybrid social environment—must be understood as a contribution to Unesco's concurrent attempt to conceptualize a World Civilization as the product of an optimized mix of "contributions of cultures." The second—wherein Nubia was a land of transient material cultures—helped to legitimize the relocation of the Nubian temples. Each warrants its own examination, because both set the stage for how "space" (understood geographically or environmentally) participated in the creation of a "cultural" value for monuments.

"Contribution of cultures" vs. "museum without walls"

The task of accommodating hybridity and diversity within a new definition of world civilization was one to which Unesco had devoted a number of projects since 1950.¹⁷⁸ As part of the International Campaign Against Racism, the Committee for Diversity organized a series of conferences and published the results as anti-racist manifestos. The 1952 edited volume La question raciale devant la science moderne, for instance, posed the question "the contribution of cultures to civilization" to an eminent roster of thinkers, including a young Claude Levi Strauss.¹⁷⁹ In his text "Race and History," the French anthropologist Levi Strauss introduced the notion that human societies are built for "optimum diversity"—a notion which has now become famous as much for having been repudiated by the author in 1971 as for becoming, despite this repudiation, the main tenet of Unesco's

¹⁷⁷ The Unesco Campaign drew attention to this hostility, and provoked denials by the Sudanese government: "A number of articles ... appeared with increasing frequency ... raising the question of religious freedoms in the Republic of Soudan, alleging.... Government intervention with the right of Sudanese citizens and foreign nationals in the Sudan to practice Christianity; others have alleged the expulsion of Christian missionaries ... The policy of the Sudan has always been to guarantee and protect freedom of religion and worship of all citizens and foreign residents without discrimination of any kind." "Statement by the Embassy of the Republic of Sudan in Washington, DC", (Jan 29, 1963). Brew 9/p16.

¹⁷⁸ "L'Unesco lance une Campagne Mondiale contre l'Injustice raciale: Notice Historique," Après-Papier No. 104 (Paris: 19 July 1950).

¹⁷⁹ Claude Levi-Strauss, "Race et Histoire," UNESCO, La question raciale devant les sciences modernes (Paris: 1952), republished in 1960 in Le racisme devant la Science. See also L'originalité des cultures: son role dans la comprehension internationale (Paris: 1953).

multiculturalism. ¹⁸⁰ In short, Levi-Strauss proposed that while cultures are clearly unique and could be identified in relative position to one another, there was no cumulative "civilization" in which these contributions were to be collected. Instead the problem of the diversity of cultures was solely a problem of relation, where each culture had to be preserved by way of its difference against others. As recently as 2001, the text was cited as inspiration for the drafting of the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity which became a Convention in 2005. ¹⁸¹ But decades before Unesco was involved in preserving entire "cultures" it was concerned with preserving cultural monuments, and it is significant that Levi-Strauss' abstract statement of the problem was contemporaneous with an applied working out in Nubia. By 1960 Levi Strauss' text had already become canonical, and the problem of disposing the temples in the Nubian desert can be understood in light of this ambition to "optimize diversity" while acknowledging the lack of any "cumulative" shell.

Unesco hosted these debates on the "contributions of cultures" in the hope of displacing a eugenicist discourse on race that relied overwhelmingly on evolution as an organizing principle, and assigned a secondary role to the environment. Levi Strauss resorted to geography in order to discredit this discourse, and it is this geographic feature of his argument, more so than the notion of diversity alone, that sets it apart from others. Julian Huxley—to take the most obvious counter-example—continued to speak about the relationship between race and environment in eugenicist terms of evolutionary "optimization," albeit with an updated sensibility. ("Eugenics is not just a matter of stopping deterioration," he wrote in 1952, "it can also be aimed at securing further improvement.") ¹⁸² In contrast, Levi-Strauss attacked racial hierarchies by speaking of culture in geographic terms. "The opposition between progressive cultures and inert cultures," he wrote,

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^{180 &}quot;Human societies define themselves by a certain optimum of diversity, above which they cannot go, but below which they can also not descend without danger." Claude Levi-Strauss, "Race et Histoire," Race et Histoire / Race et Culture (Paris: Albin Michel / Unesco, 2001). Levi-Strauss' repudiation came in the form of a 1971 lecture given on the occasion of another "Year of the fight against racism," which was titled Race and Culture and which Unesco reluctantly published in the Revue Internationale des Sciences Sociales XXIII:4(1971). Levi-Strauss included, and the second in The View from Afar in 1983, preceded by a preface that clarified Levi-Strauss' position. We will return to this preface in the conclusion of the dissertation. All quotations here are from the new Unesco edition of both texts, published with a preface by Michel Izard that chronicles the entire controversy.

¹⁸¹ CLT.2002/WS/9: Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, adopted by the 31st session of the General Conference of UNESCO, (Paris: 2 Nov 2001).

Huxley clearly intended himself as a standard-bearer in an age of relativism: "There are standards in evolution," Huxley wrote in his 1952 Evolution in Action (London: Harper Books, 1953), 121. "One school of anthropologists s never tired of proclaiming the doctrines of cultural diversity—that different cultures are not higher or lower, but merely adjusted in different ways. But this is to neglect the lessons of biology." While Huxley attempted to update his evolutionist doctrine by restorting to a cartographic metaphor, he did so only to make the point that any "map must be a four-dimensional one. A three dimensional map will help [man] determine his position and chart his direction, but a four-dmesional one will also help him choosing his destination." Ibid, 135.

"seems actually to stem from a difference in localization." While he agreed that the "diversity of cultures cannot be conceived statically," and used the conventional diagram of two forces working against one another, (one tending towards particularism, and the other towards integration) he painted a spatial picture of their balancing act: "isolation" bread homogenization, while "geographic contiguity" encouraged assimilation and affinity. Is In other words, "Frontier regions" like Nubia were perfect subjects for case-studies in the conflict between particularization and integration.

Yet one advantage of the evolutionist thesis over the culturalist one—and undoubtedly the reason Unesco continued to endorse a version of eugenics into the 1950s—was that evolutionists offered to legitimate Unesco's own work as the logical result of millennia of a natural progression, the latest "cultural" phase in human evolution. It is in contrast, Levi Strauss' thesis assigned a curatorial role to Unesco: the "mission of international organizations" was "to preserve the fact of diversity, not its historical content. Instead of a accumulation, this "fact" could be described in relational terms, as the space between contributions: "The veritable contribution of cultures does not consist in a list of their particular inventions but in the differential gap that is offered in between them." Significantly, Levi Strauss justified this differential gap through an archaeological vision of world history:

The development of archaeological and prehistoric knowledge tends to spread out in space those forms of civilizations that we are accustomed to imagine as stacked up in time in time. ... Progress is not continuous; but proceeds by jumps and leaps. ... The progress of humanity does not resemble a character climbing a stair ... it invokes rather a gambler whose luck is spread over several dice and who, every time he throws them, sees them disperse over the carpet, bringing different scores. ¹⁸⁷

In speaking of the progress of humanity as a game of chance that dispersed events in space, rather than stacking them up in time, Lévi Strauss prefigured the archaeological results of the Nubian survey campaign which studied a haphazard sequence of events that had left scattered archaeological remains in the desert. What Levi Strauss's text didn't address, however, was the non-archaeological

¹⁸³ Instead Levi Strauss proposed a distinction between two types of contributions: "isolated acquisitions," features with a clear provenance and but limited use, and "patterns" (Levi Strauss used the English word) lifestyles which are so clearly identified with specific cultures that any synthesis or hybridization would signify a dramatic cultural change. Levi Strauss, 71.

¹⁸⁴ Levi Strauss used a linguistic example of phonetic convergences between tongues in neighboring lands, but added that "other human institutions, such as religion and art," would furnish similar evidence. Levi-Strauss, Race et Histoire, 40.

¹⁸⁵ Huxley's saw "the human phase" as the last chapter of his "synthetic" view of evolution.

¹⁸⁶ Levi Strauss, 119. He actually used a medical analogy to express this mission, speaking of "an international body" that was "threatened with infection" by "dead diversities" that lingered, "putrefied vestiges" of collaborations past.

¹⁸⁷ Levi Strauss, 64.

portion of the campaign, which was to intervene into this horizontal field of chance ddiberately. If the spatial regime of evolution was a haphazard field, what spatial order should guide a willing intervention into this carpet?

"Locality" was systematically offered as an answer to this problem of cumulative history, notably in the History of Mankind: Cultural and Scientific Development, of which the first of ten volumes appeared in 1953. In his introduction to the series, the President of the International Commission for a History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind, invoked geography as an index of developments past, describing "development," in contrast to accumulation, as being made of multiple strains of progress and of progress as having collective authorship. Indeed the History of Mankind emphasized "the life of the mind" (as opposed to events) and the "contributions of cultures" (as opposed to those of individuals). Thus "development" proposed here as a scholarly concept echoed the idea of "development" that the UN supported in its Technical Aid programs: a process where by technologically-enabled inventions afforded humanity ever-greater coverage of its earth. Yet to compensate for this removal of the heroic figures that usually propelled universal historical narratives, the History of Mankind tended to chronicle a succession of regional settlements. Effectively "place" became the subject of history. 188 Monuments themselves tended to be underplayed—Egypt, for instance made its appearance in the chapter on "The Urbanization of Society" rather than in its classic role as the first "monumental" civilization.

A decade after the first impact of the History of Mankind, the Nubian campaign offered both a specific region in which to experiment with this idea of locality, and an opportunity to design an image of a non-cumulative universality itself. Yet it is also particularly ironic that Nubia—a region relentlessly subjected to the linearity of the Nile, which stretched at some points no wider than a few miles on either side of the river-bank—gave Unesco its first opportunity to incorporate monuments into the non-linearity of human development. To be certain, the Nile was central to the understanding of Nubia as a place of "passage." In addition, Nubia's dependence upon the Nile supported a universalizing notion of geographic locality—where "life" is determined by geographic features, not innate human traits—that Unesco echoed elsewhere. Yet the Nile corridor had also become a common trope in the linear, cumulative vision of progress, especially since European powers had progressed further and further upstream and returned to tell the tale. Consider for instance the imagined panorama of monuments that served as the frontispiece for Description de l'Egypte

Unesco, History of Mankind: Cultural and Scientific Development Vol. One, Part II: Sir Leonard Wooley, The Beginnings of Civilization (New York: Mentor Books, 1963).

published upon the return of Napoleon's Egyptian campaigns.¹⁸⁹ (fig 4.21) Collapsing into a single perspective view a three-thousand mile stretch of the Nile valley, this engraving presented a cumulative view of all the monuments the French expedition had witnessed, from Cairo to Kom Ombo—in a visual demonstration of physical conquest. Here the Nile Valley served as a visual counterpart to the "world civilization" that France had claimed to domesticate, placing the entire view in a frame from which the emerging bourgeois viewer could enjoy the growth of the "provinces of France." Against this history of exploratory cumulation, Levi-Strauss asked Unesco to propose a different idea of history: an archaeological one, which implied horizontal layering, successive passage, and progressive hybridity.

Unesco came close to producing a "non-cumulative" counterpart to the Napoleonic frontispiece in 1964, when it produced a short publicity film for the launch of The International Campaign for Monuments. Like the frontispiece, it described a collection of ancient monuments, while appealing to a contemporary viewer to connect the space between disparate monuments. (fig 4.23) The film consists of shots of eleven monuments: one building (Florence's Palazzo Vecchio) and ten colossal sculpted faces, impassibly over a few seconds of film. Between these shots of colossal faces are inserted short clips of modern man, in the form of four Unesco officials pronouncing speeches during the launch of the International Campaign. The origin of this cinematic technique—shot/countershot; monuments/men—can be found in the Nubian campaign: when the Unesco Courier had published double-page collections of faces: two pages of ancient sculpture (the "Gifts from the Nile,") and two pages of modern portraits (the "Patrons of the International Campaign to Save Nubia's Monuments" who had lent their fame to the cause.) The Monuments Campaign film represents the result of shuffling and intercalating these two sets of faces, and animating them into a montage.

This montage of colossal faces used human figuration to create a formal continuity, while highlighting a fundamental discontinuity between each sculptural tradition. In doing so it borrowed a cinematic technique that had been pioneered by French art critic and cultural minister André Malraux (1901-1976) in his Musée Imaginaire de Sculpture Mondiale. Malraux's text, first published in 1946 and perfected over decade of re-editions as an art book, was structured primarily around the

¹⁸⁹ CC. Gillispie and Michel Dewachter, eds., Monuments of Egypt: The Napoleonic Edition, ed. (Princeton: PA Press, 1987).

¹⁹⁰ They were: René Maheu (Director General), Paulo de Berredo Carneiro (president of the General Conference), Baron Castro (president of the executive council) and Jo Brew, president of the MonCom For a plan of the inaugural ceremony see Campagne Internationale des Monuments: Projet de programme pour la cérémonie d'inauguration (undated, 1964) in Brew Archives

^{191 &}quot;Patrons of the International Campaign to Save Nubia's Monuments," in Unesco Courier, (May 1960), 14-15.

¹⁹² First edition is André Malraux, Le Musée Imaginaire de la Sculpture Mondiale (Paris: Pléiade, 1952).

juxtaposition of close-up shots of sculpted human form. It is all the more significant, then, that Malraux had presided over the ceremony the launch of the Nubian campaign on March 8, 1960, and that his speech had offered to Unesco this Imaginary Museum as a model of cultural action. A closer inspection of Malraux's text is warranted here.

While archaeologists inscribed Nubia into a cultural history of "Africa," Malraux placed the Campaign in a different kind of universal history, where monuments are carriers of a fundamental "unity" of civilization, and art constitutes a "universal language." Malraux opened his launch speech by setting Unesco's action apart from the realities of international politics, where nations were "engaged in overt or open conflict." In contrast to "the gigantic exhibitionism by which states try to outdo each-other," Malraux saw Unesco's collaborative "TVA of archaeology" as an act of reclamation: civilization was, for the first time, "claiming the world's art as its indivisible heritage." The political "unity" of nations and the cultural "indivisiblity" of heritage were therefore conjoined: the first a political turning point, the second an epistemological shift when "men have discovered the universal language of art."

Within this double narrative of political unification and aesthetic resurrection, preservation served as an index of progress: a victory of humanity over nature, and a victory of "art" over "history." Malraux pointed out that, paradoxically, increasing uncertainty about historical masternarratives had led to increased certainty over the material value of monuments. ¹⁹⁴ Egypt's rise in the Western imagination was a case in point: from being admired "as a province of the Bible," to being prized for its "naiveté," to belonging "within the realm of history rather than the realm of art," Egyptian monuments had finally become "living witnesses" in the 20th Century. Yet he warned against any empathetic re-creation of ancient Egypt since "we can really only comprehend a culture that survives." Instead he offered to see the salvage Nubian monuments as the prophetic apparition of a worldwide aesthetic rebirth.

In describing how Nubian monuments recreated "an Egypt that never existed," Malraux resorted both to formalism ("Egypt survives by virtue of certain forms") and expressionism ("these statues have acquired a soul"), ably combining the analytic qualities of one with the dramatic potential of the other. This elision was only possible because the "forms" he depicted were exclusively human figures: he spoke of "sculpted mountains," of "colossal effigies," of "the face of Queen Nefertiti" of "colossal death-masks." The emphasis on sculpture, then, allowed Malraux to

¹⁹³ André Malraux, Speech delivered at the launch of the International Campaign for the Salvage of the Monuments of Nubia, Unesco House, March 8, 1960, reprinted as "TVA of Archaeology," in Unesco Courier May 1960, 8.

¹⁹⁴ "In the days when the West believed its cultural heritage had its source in Athens it could nonetheless look on with equanimity while the Acropolis crumbled away." "TVA of Archaeology," 10.

rephrase Veronese's ethical dilemma of "choosing between temples and crops" in aesthetic terms, as a choice between men and statues, a "rescue operation" deployed "on behalf of statues, the immense resources usually harnessed for the service of men." Ultimately Malraux resolved this tension between aesthetic form and ethical expression by resorting to a conventionalist view of art, where the Nubian monuments were simply carriers of the "Egyptian convention," which was "designed to mediate between ephemeral men and the controlling stars."

Malraux was not the first to theorize Egyptian art as "the art that translated the temporal into the eternal." Certainly he made no distinction between Nubia's monuments and those of lower Egypt. Indeed the Campaign was for Malraux simply an example, a precedent for future action, which might have arisen for any other art. ¹⁹⁵ But insofar as his intervention raised the profile of Unesco's campaign, and the superficiality of Malraux's interpretation helped to depict the Campaign as a gesture towards perpertuity. Like Egyptian funerary art, monuments salvage was an aesthetic defiance of mortality, "the most signal victory of human effort over death." Thus Malraux's famous closing pronouncement was equally applicable to the monuments and their salvage:

There is only one action of which indifferent starts and unchanging rivers have no sway: it is the action of a man who snatches something from death.

When Malraux's speech was mined for slogans to be used in the campaign, it was this conclusion that was repeatedly excerpted to be incanted throughout the fund-raising process. 196

By dramatizing Unesco's "snatching of monuments from death," Malraux was in fact giving the organization permission to act as what he had called "an imaginary superartist." In his Musée Imaginaire Malraux had described the construction of a world-wide inventory in terms of the parallel progress of "real" museums in capital cities and their "imaginary" counterpart in the modern mind. "A museum without walls has been opened to us," he wrote. Similarly, he described Nubia as only one place to access "the tremendous storehouse of art;" by saving its monuments Unesco was bringing them "into a single family relationship the masterpieces of many civilizations which knew nothing or even hated each-other." In the Musée Imaginaire, Malraux attributed agency to this collection to a metphysical undercurrent, which unified seemingly unrelated works of art as if a single spirit inhabited them all:

...as if an imaginary spirit of art pushed forward from miniature to painting and from fresco to stained-glass window in a single conquest ... as if a subterranean torrent of history unified all these scattered works by dragging them along with it ...Reproduction,

^{195 &}quot;It goes without saying that it would try to save other great ruins, Angkor or Nara, for instance." Ibid., 12.

¹⁹⁶ For an efficient theorization of Malraux's rhetoric as an artform, see William Righter, The Rhetorical Hero: An Essay on the Aesthetics of André Malraux, (New York: Chilmark Press, 1964).

and reproduction alone, has brought into art those imaginary super-artists which have an indistinct birth, a life with its conquests and concessions to the taste for wealth or seduction, and a death-agony and resurrection—and who are called styles. 197

If creating juxtapositions was "an art" in itself, and the salvage of Nubian monuments helped to placed them in a universal survey of art, then Unesco took on the role of an "imaginary superartist:" a transcendent hand, which could breathe "life" into inanimate cultural objects and lodge them straight into the foreground of modern consciousness.¹⁹⁸

Insofar as the Nubian Campaign was but "an example" of future action, it is useful to note that it was also as an example of Malraux's work, and conversely, how many aspects of Malraux's work lent themselves to recuperation by Unesco's agenda. Most easily adaptable to the cause of cultural internationalism was Malraux's idea that art exists as "furniture of the mind" in modern consciousness. This idea was clearly echoed in Unesco's interest in aesthetic perception as the basis for cross-cultural exchange that would not rely on a language-based "comprehension." What Malraux called "intellection," Unesco called "international understanding." Yet this connection, between individual aesthetic experience and the metaphysical value of art, is the most controversial aspect of Malraux's work. Already in the 1950s Marlaux drew accusations, from art historians like Ernst Gombrich, of being a mere "prophet" and an irresponsible popularizer. In his "Search for a cultural history," Gombrich condemned Malraux for inventing a "romantic saga of art" that "reinforced the mythology of history that had dominated historiography since Hegel had people the past with the "Spirits of nations and races." 199 Invoking Spengler in a defense of particularity, Gombrich dismissed precisely the elements of Malraux's work that made it so useful for Unesco: "the idea of a united mankind is so much sentimental humanitarianism." ²⁰⁰ In doing so he highlighted the paradox of Malraux's work—namely, why anyone who so deftly analyzed the illusionary powers of art "would rather have faith in an illusion than no faith at all." The search for a connection between Malraux's individualistic expressionism and his icollective meta-narratives has since drawn attention to his own biography. But neither Malraux's early years as an antiquitiesexporting adventurer, nor his later years as a Gaullist "art politician" offer any reassurance that he was motivated by anything more than sheer meglomania. In this sense, the opportunism of Malraux

André Malraux, Museum Without Walls, trans. Stuart Gilbert and Francis Price (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 160.

Malraux was even lucid about restoration itself as a stylized intervention, a metamorphosis which implied super-historical agency: "Even mutilations have their style. A process of filtration, which it would be too simple to call taste, contributes to our resurrection;... Chance may shatter and time brings metamorphosis, but it is we who choose." Museum Without Walls, 167.

¹⁹⁹ E.H Gombeirh, "André Malraux and the Crisis of Expressionism," in *The Burlington Magazine* (Dec 1954), 375.
²⁰⁰ "Can we hope to do more than describe the strange varieties which exist among human civilizations?" Gombrich, 376.

and Unesco worked both ways—the Imaginary Museum benefited from being associated with the campaign as a "real" event in world history, even if the politics underlying the event were a benevolent culturalism that relied on a self-fulfilling narrative of cultural autonomy.

While Unesco and Malraux were equally vague in drawing connections between collective meta-narratives and the history of art, both were equally precise in their endorsement of mass-media as enhancements to the collective value of artworks themselves.²⁰¹ Unesco's production of inventories, exhibitions and catalogs to popularize the world's art can essentially be seen as an exact embodiment of Malraux's idea that "reproduction, though not the cause of our intellectualization of art, is its most effective tool."202 A generation after Gombrich, art historians have begun to read Malraux's paradox not in ethical but in aesthetic terms. "Malraux's profound incoherence," Henri Zerner wrote, "lies in the fundamental incompatibility between, on the one hand, the ontology of art to which he proudly proclaimed his allegiance and his awareness that works of art only achieve their existence as works of art thanks to the intervention of photographic reproduction." For Zerner, Malraux's invention was to have treated photography as a legitimate aesthetic medium, and pioneered in his books "a mute discourse, a type of visual writing, and achieved an unexpected eloquence. Where others saw a simple didactic device, Malraux discovered a means of action." 203 It is this same transformation of visual media into "action" that Unesco attempted. 204 Lyotard even saw Malraux's writing style as a formalist conceit: "identification of scenes, centering, filming, montage"205 and there is no doubt a potential analysis that can be conducted comparing Malraux's texts, films and photographs, with those produced by Unesco in these years.

Similarly, formalist critics like Rosalind Krauss have concentrated on Malraux's analysis of the museum as a medium, highlighting the spatial component of Malraux's analogy between 'real' and 'imaginary' museum. Like Zerner, Krauss detected a fundamental modernism in Malraux's museum in the sense of a Greenbergian medium with built-in self-consciousness: "an open field into which the viewer's most imaginative, projective, play was welcomed, making the space of modernism itself the ground of a universalization of the power of the artist and of the creative

²⁰¹ "The museum without walls is not a heritage of vanished ardors, it is an assemblage of works of art—but how can we see in these works only the expression of a will to art? ... It is what is said to us by theses sculptures and these paintings, and not what they have said." Museum without walls, 239.

²⁰² Museum Without Walls, 82.

Henri Zerner, "Malraux and the Power of Photography," in Sculpture and Photography: Envisioning the Third Dimension, ed. Geraldine Johnson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 116-130.

²⁰⁴ Zerner, 126.

[&]quot;Malraux's writings—his novels, essays on art, funeral orations, even his literary criticism, not to speak of is film—are all fashioned in this way: identification of scenes, centering, filming, montage." Jean Francois Lyotard, Soundproof Room: Malraux's Anti-Aesthetics, trans. Robert Harvey, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 62

act."²⁰⁶ Writing in 1986, Krauss pointed out that since Malraux's work "things have changed," and that critical discourse name the advent of this change "postmodernism." In the intervening years, Krauss pointed out, the model used by Malraux—the Louvre, with its enlifede—was superceded by a modernist architectural paradigm, "the spatial idea of 'the plan' in its neutrality and immensity."²⁰⁷ For Krauss, this development meant that Malraux's abstract idea had been turned in to actual architecture, the same literalization that occurred when the word "Imaginaire" in the French title had been translated into the English Without Walls.

What Krauss did not point out, in bridging these thirty years architecturally, is that Malraux himself had hinted that the story of the two museums might have a spatial denoument, born himself of the tendency of art objects to destroy the space around them. The imaginary museum had for Malraux been created "in response to the appeal of the 'real' museums": the first had created an appetite for exhaustiveness that the second tried to fulfill: "the assemblage of so many masterpieces—from which, nonetheless, so many are missing—conjures up in the mind's eye all of the world's masterpieces." Thus it was in order to begin to "fill the gaps left by museums" that extra-institutional activities like tourism, photography, and publications, had come to construct the imaginary museum. In other words, the Musée Imaginaire was not a museum "without walls" but a museum "without gaps." The success of this "filling in," then, had begun to affect the "real institutions" in an inversely proportional way. The more crowded the "imaginary inventory," the more sparse the "real museum" had become. This progression was clearly legible in the transformation of museums into photographic backdrops:

The point has been reached when the real museum is beginning to resemble the museum without walls; its statues are much better lit and far less frequently clustered together. ... Michelangelo's Rondanini Pietà in the Castello Sforzescho in Milan (it is too isolated) seems admirably posed, awaiting photographers. ²⁰⁸

Paradoxically, the photographic expectation created an increasing "isolation" of objects. This "destruction of surroundings" was a constitutive feature of all museums; what museums destroyed was "not the life of the object but the life of its surroundings":

Our museum without walls is founded on the metamorphosis of the surroundings of the works it includes. It is an ignorance of this metamorphosis that so often leads our museums to be qualified as cemeteries.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁶ Rosalind Krauss, "Postmodernism's Museum without Walls," in Thinking About Exhibitions, ed. Reesa Greenberg (New York: Routledge, 1996.), 346.

²⁰⁷ Krauss, 344

²⁰⁸ Museum Without Walls, 110.

²⁰⁹ Museum Without Walls, 220.

Within this narrative, then, Malraux predicted a change that would bring a renewal of curatorial conventions:

The curators of museums will not much longer be content with "the best possible presentation of objects": even now they are seeking a means of expressing the mysterious unity of works of art, of which they are constantly reminded by the images in books published by the museums themselves."²¹⁰

It is this dilemma between isolation as a consequence of the photographic imagination, and collection as a consequence of photographic accumulation, that constitutes Malraux's relevance for our purposes. As we will see, the Nubian campaign corresponded to a conceptualization of Nubia as a "museum" both real and imaginary—both navigable by tourists and to be reproduced for mass-consumption.

While Levi-Strauss had entrusted Unesco with preserving a differential gap of diversity, Malraux asked Unesco to dramatize this gap for aesthetic effect. Where Levi-Strauss saw an opportunity for optimal hybridity, Malraux saw an opportunity for a new kind of stylistic unity. Both models, however, relied on a spatial analogy to undermine previous paradigms of historical succession. Whether as a metaphysical "imaginary" realm or as an underlying layer of cultural archaeology, Nubia would be reconfigured into a field (not a timeline) of events.

The Design of the Desert

The reworking of Nubia as an archaeological myth, the discourse on the diversity of cultures, and the invocation of art in defiance of death—all set the stage for a contemporary intervention in the Nubian desert. But while it is by theming Nubia with a history of international "mobility" that Unesco hoped to legitimate its relocation of the 24 Nubian temples, the experts approached to perform this relocation were in an altogether more sedentary mood. (fig 4.17) By the end of the 1950s the concept of monumental "function" developed by MonCom experts (as seen in Chaper 3), had evolved into an ethic that allowed both drastic urban changes and total architectural reconstructions. But never before had the reconfiguration of a "monumental collection" and its context posed itself on such a large and desertic scale. However radical the war-time transformation of European cities, reconstruction architects and urbanists had theorized their projects with formal concepts—like "footprint," "neighborhood," "proportion"—that allowed them to argue cities themselves had retained their identity as human settlements. Indeed from the experience of reconstruction the international preservation community had emerged inclined to think that what had been preserved were not Europe's objects but the very "spirit of its cities."

²¹⁰ Museum Without Walls, 220.

The pressure to think of Nubia as a cohesive environment and its monuments as inextricably anchored in their sites was exacerbated by Unesco's publicity, which encouraged a geographic approach to the region's predicament. The American magazine Nature published an article on "Nubia, an African Frontier Region" that concluded that monuments were to be valued not for their objecthood, but for their "striking environment":

Even under the Pharaohs who have left so many monuments in Nubia, the level of life, and of art, was never better than provincial. Much is now being written about Egyptian art in Nubia, but the Egyptian temples there owe more to the effects of an unusual and striking environment than to their qualities of sculpture or relief.²¹¹

Thus, the international public was introduced to the Nubian desert as a monumental environment, rather than to the temples as paradigmatic Egyptian objects. But if the authenticity of Nubian monuments lay in their relation to their locale, this relation could not easily be described with the traditional criteria whereby the international monument was supposed to "belong" to a certain "place." Not only were there no "local populations" to whose history the monuments could be anchored (since Nubia was historically a space of transience, and local populations' claims to the monuments were therefore mediated by a history of imperial subjugation), but the very idea that human inhabitation leaves traces in the ground was made problematic by the sandy materiality of the Nubian desert. Even archaeologists, who specialized in studying those traces, admitted that the Nubian monuments were "question marks in the desert," inexplicably isolated from all traces of human settlement.²¹²

In the wake of this double success—the portrayal of European reconstruction as a preservation of place, and the successful popularization of Nubia as monumental environment—preservationists involved in the campaign repeatedly expressed reservations about the idea of moving the monuments at all. This was particularly true of the central figure in the campaign, Piero Gazzola (1908–1979), who was inspector at the Italian Antiquities, later founder of the International Center for the Preservation of Monuments (ICOMOS), and principal author of the Venice Charter. Gazzola had been sent to Nubia on a reconnaissance mission in 1959; the report he authored upon his return became an instant reference for the campaign, distributed as The Gazzola Report to every committee created between 1959 and 1963, and appended to meeting minutes as a technical Annex. (fig 4.29) The Gazzola Report used plans, photographs, and texts to describe the condition of each monument to be saved; it was also, however, prefaced with the following "statement of principle":

²¹¹ "Nubia: An African Frontier Region," in Supplement to Nature (1 Sep 1962), 883.

²¹² "Question marks in the Desert," in Unesco Courier (Feb 1960).

As far as the principle of transfer is concerned, I must begin by stating my negative scientific opinion against any monument relocation: for reasons of history and of architectural authenticity. However, in absolutely exceptional cases, such relocation is inevitable, and can nonetheless be acceptable.

In this sense, the most advanced modern techniques, and the experience we have recently gained from the destructions of war, have changed nothing of what remains, fundamentally, a problem of principle. Indeed, the transfer of any monument, as perfectly executed as it can be with contemporary techniques, is still an imperfect solution [solution boiteuse].²¹³

This disclaimer articulated the "exceptional" terms of Gazzola's (and, by implication, Unesco's) involvement in the Nubian campaign, in two ways. By invoking the war, Gazzola likened the flooding of Nubia to an inevitable catastrophe. By distinguishing both the war and the dam from an entire history of "lame solutions," Gazzola also distanced himself from the innumerable Egyptian monuments which had been relocated, as colonial souvenirs, under decidedly un-catastrophic circumstances. In fact, in the next paragraph of his preface Gazzola rejected the very idea that monuments could act as international "ambassadors," frankly disapproving of the UAR's offer for temples "in return," and boldly wishing that "no government would avail itself of this offer." "The times for moving monuments out of their national borders," Gazzola concluded, "have thankfully passed." What Gazzola invoked was a whole history of political recuperations of Egyptian monuments by successive imperial powers.

Indeed if the Aswan Dam recalled the pyramids as paradigmatic ancient Egyptian monuments, Unesco's Campaign recalled in no uncertain terms the paradigmatic modern Egyptian monument: the relocated obelisk. Egyptian obelisks occupy crucial positions in European cities and a central place in the history of modern European city planning. The displacement of a monolith, in this history, tied the passing of political power with the marking of a new place, "since the most tangible result of this view of history was a vast mobilization to move obelisks to more obviously central, and Christian, places." Indeed, architectural historians have made of the exiled obelisk a kind of Ur-form in the development of urbanism itself—in Henry Millon's eloquent formulation, "the

²¹³ UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/6 (Le Caire, 28 September 1959). Transfert des Temples et autres monuments et ruines: considérations de caractère architectural et archéologique. Rapport de M. Pietro Gazzola, Dr. Phil, Inspecteur Central des Monuments auprès de la Direction Générale des Antiquités et Beaux-Arts d'Italie, 3. Translation mine, from French.

²¹⁵ From the moment Assyrian monarch Assurbanipal conquered Thebes in 664 BC and carried two obelisks some 1,600 miles home to mark the occasion, the displacement of an Egyptian object has been charged with political meaning. For a chronicle of obelisks moved, see Peter Tompkins, The Magic of Obelisks (New York: Harper and Row, 1981). The urban component of this charge was inaugurated by the Roman Empire, who made obelisks into "centerpieces of a new vision of world history," emblems of "the passing of the sacred torch from the Kingdom of Egypt to the Roman Empire," and, eventually, "to the Roman Catholic Church." "Movement is at the center of the rediscovery of the Egyptian obelisks in Rome." E. Ann Matter, Review of Giovanni Cipriani's Gli obelischi egizi: politica e cultura nella Roma barocca. In Sixteenth Century Journal XXVI / 2 (1995).

idea that an urban complex can be described and bounded by a series of crucially placed stone needles." ²¹⁶

Despite the crucial role played by moving Egyptian objects in the history of monumental place-making, this tradition of monument relocation was entirely absent from Unesco's campaign. Even the technological history of obelisk transport—a noted "chapter in the history of engineering," with its narrative of sponsored ingenuity and technological bravura—was barely mentioned, and then only to authenticate "movement" as genuinely and ingenuously Egyptian. This conspicuous omission points to Unesco's insecurity about the political implications of the Nubian campaign as an international model of action. While UAR officials were only too willing to recall that Egyptian monuments had long served as "extraordinary ambassadors of Pharaonic culture" abroad, in order to contrast the "unintentional" colonial exports of the past and the "intentional" ones of the nationalist present, Unesco promoters were reluctant to inscribe modern intellectual cooperation in this history of imperial displacements.

Certainly this pattern of monumental displacements is so prevalent in modern European political history that obelisks had ceased being specifically Egyptian monuments. Instead they acted as generic markers of power—what George Bataille described as the epitome of modern, capitalist, "headless" power. For Bataille, the French decision to mark the spot of the guillotine by importing an obelisk from Egypt, and transforming Paris's Place du Roi into the Place de la Concorde, marked a fundamental shift in the ability of monuments to turn conscious meaning into unconscious forgetting. "Total sovereignty and the guillotine-blade that put an end to it no longer occupied any place in the minds of men," Bataille wrote, invoking an erasure of history, a replacement of principled monuments with psychological ones: "Where monuments that had clearly affirmed principles were razed," Bataille wrote, "the obelisk remains only so long as the sovereign authority and command it symbolizes do not become conscious." Ironically, it is precisely this erasure of sovereignty and this passage from "conscious" to "unconscious" monument that Unesco was trying to produce on a global scale.

Clearly the Nubian temples were not obelisks. They were inhabitable temples, of varying styles and periods, and most were not "monoliths" in the sense that gives obelisks their spectacular technological difficulty. Yet what made the Nubian monuments more like obelisks than like the

²¹⁶ Henry Millon, "The Visible Character of the City." In The Historian and the City, ed Oscar Hndlin & John Burchard, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1963).

For this history see Bern Dibner, Moving the Obelisks, (MIT: Burndy Library, 1991.) Christiane Desroche-Noblecourt for instance invoked the "Egyptian engineering tradition of using water to transport temples."

²¹⁸ George Bataille, "The Obelisk," in Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, trans. Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 221.

monuments of World War II is that they constituted a system: much as baroque Rome was defined as "streets and obelisks," Nubia was defined by Unesco as "the Nile and its temples", as points along a path.²¹⁹ Thus, while the monuments of postwar European cities had remained "themselves" chiefly by staying the same "place," in Nubia the identity of place and object alike were at stake. Since the Nile was to change so drastically, in order for "Nubia" to be "salvaged," a whole set of relationships would have to be re-designed. Yet as Gazzola's early disclaimers demonstrate, the nascent preservation discourse understood "site" as a feature intrinsically attached to each object, not as an abstract relationship in space.

Before examining the debates on temple relocation, it is important to understand the fundamental compromise that had to be struck between Gazzola as an expert and Unesco as an agency giving him power to act. The compromise was discursive: what was clearly a project of regional restructuring was never discussed in terms of architectural, landscape, or urban design. Instead the phases of relocation—the choice of sites, the disposition of monuments, the design of access roads—were discussed as mere consequences of the movement of each object. Still, the spatial charge that Bataille had attributed to the obelisk as a modern political instrument—the dilemmas of "concentration," "erasure," and "dissemination"—permeated every discussion of the relocation and ultimately, I argue, regulated the design of the Nubian desert.

The debates over the relocation of temples were inaugurated during the initial Nubian cruise of late 1959, as the Executive Committee traveled down the Nile, "Gazzola Report" in hand. The discussion pitted those who wanted to preserve all monuments in situ against those for whom granting tourist accessibility was paramount. Leading the charge for the in situ camp was Gazzola. "Bearing in mind," he wrote, "that the essential role of those who are responsible for protecting ancient monuments is to do the utmost possible to maintain their integrity and their setting, the experts believe above all that the maximum of effort should be exerted to preserve the most important of them in situ." Opposing this view was British Egyptologist Walter Emery, who questioned whether tourists would travel to a "desolate Nubia" purely for its temples. This objection re-oriented the discussion towards the nature of "the Nubian landscape" as a "monumental environment" and its importance for the significance of the temples. In some ways Emery was more intransigent than Gazzola: "the Egyptians always chose a site for building their sanctuaries with regard to a ritual conception," he remarked, and therefore, if preservation was to alter monumental

²¹⁹ See for example the Unesco feature "The Nile: Waterway of art & history," in Unesco Courier (February 1960).

²²⁰ "Preservation of Monuments," UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/REPORT, 7.

sites at all, it would be preferable to "dismantle and transfer all the temples to an island near a tourist site such as Luxor." The Director of Egyptian Antiquities, however, took the opposing view, that "it was not above all a question of satisfying tourists, but one of saving the witnesses of a definite culture within its own framework." This objection, in turn, re-oriented the discussion towards the problem of how to translate a "cultural framework" into a physical landscape.

One solution for translating "culture" into "environment", all the while "continuing to attract tourists to Nubia" was proposed by CEDAE director Christiane Noblecourt and supported by the Chairman of the High Dam project, Hassan Zaki. Their proposal was to relocate the temples in the sites where "a majority of the Nubian population would be concentrated," namely, in two "oases" planned along the new lake, at Kalabsha and Abu Simbel. This proposal was meant as a compromise: to please the British Egyptologists (by ensuring that tourists traveling long distances to Nubia would be rewarded with an authentically exotic experience) and to placate the Italian conservationist (by ensuring that the settings would "remain a Nubian landscape.") This strategy worked: Gazzola acquiesced that temples could be moved "in exceptional cases," so long as any new site was "aesthetically analogous" to the monuments' original locations, and a "tablet was affixed to the new site, indicating the original position of the monument in relation to the Nile."

For the rest of the cruise Gazzola wielded this concept of an "aesthetic analogy" as a weapon against any homogenization of the Nubian landscape, warning that seemingly "natural" features of sites were in fact traces of human quarrying, and that these trademarks feature would have to be reproduced at great expense when relocating temples. ²²⁴ But graver still than the problem of reproducing human traces in the Nubian landscape was the problem of exporting temples outside of Egypt, to radically "dissimilar" environments like Western museums. It was the delegate for the Egyptian Cultural Ministry, Anwar Shukry, who put an end to the debate by translating the language of surplus into a spatial logic, and proposing to see the dilemma of relocation in terms of visual and spatial excess:

The UAR would be very happy to preserve all the temples in Nubia with the aid of the whole world. Yet if, in order to preserve them, they had to be grouped around the two Kalabsha and Abu Simbel sites, these temples would be very numerous. In such a case, the Egyptian government would be ready to concede several of them, which would be extraordinary ambassadors for Pharaonic culture abroad.²²⁵

²²¹ UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, 5.

²²² UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, 7.

²²³ UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/REPORT, 5.

²²⁴ UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR, He first invoked it when discussing the temple of Kalabsha, remarking that in front of the temple "the rock had been quarried out to make at least one recess emplacement."

²²⁵ Ibid. This formulation "nouveaux ambassadeurs extraordinaires" acquired a life of its own, cf Sodeberg, 70.

Having first "concentrated" the temples in two points, the Minister then "dispersed" them again for the sake of environmental authenticity. In so doing he created a legitimate, "contextual" reason for European museums to receive them.

In other words, portraying the temples as being too "numerous" provided a solution to both the aesthetic problem of "the Nubian landscape" and the technical problem of rewarding archaeological aid with "grants in return." Just as they had to be designated as "non essential" to Egyptian national heritage, the temples were spatial surplus. Both the economic idea of an excess of Nubian antiquities, and the geographic proposal for an extension of this excess abroad, were supported by a spatial logic: an imaginary sequence of design moves involving concentration, crowding, and dissemination.

Despite this apparent resolution, the debate over temple relocation replayed itself over a two-year period, chiefly because plans of the Lake Reservoir, and the resettlement of Nubians in two "oases", were still in a preliminary stage. Gazzola took this as an opportunity to dismiss the "oasis" solution, and to begin advocating that the "aesthetic analogy" between old and new site should rely primarily on proximity. In this he was helped by Harold Plenderleith, director of the newly-founded International Center for the Conservation of Cultural Property in Rome (ICCROM). Asked to write up the terms of a second mission to be led by Gazzola again in 1960, Plenderleith wrote a report that built proximity into the criteria for relocation:

For reasons of conservation and for theoretical reasons, it is preferable to reconstruct temples, as much as is possible, in sites that present the maximum of analogy with the original site (physical conditions, landscape, orientation, distance to the Nile) and even, as close as possible to these origins. ²²⁶

Before he embarked on this second mission to seek "proximate" sites, Gazzola intensified his campaign against concentration, pronouncing himself "against oases" altogether. "It seemed better," he summarized in December 1959, "to choose spots near the preset sites where the natural conditions are similar. This appears likely to lessen the dangers of transfer still further and at the same time to ensure the most realistic setting obtainable." To this "realism" of a proximate site was now added a factor technological efficacy: shorter distances meant safer travel for the temples.

²²⁶ CP4/RES.1 Centre International d'Études pour la conservation et la Restauration des Biens Culturels, Conseil Provisoire, Avis du Centre de Rome Sur la Mission Préliminaire en Nubie concernant le Déplacement des Temples, prevue au Paragraphe 53 du Rapport 55 Ex/7, (Rome: 8-10 Dec, 1959), 1-2. Translation mine.

²²⁷ 11 C/PRG/9 – Add.I / Annex III: "Short Statement by the Preparatory Mission On the Transfer of Monuments, Sent by Unesco to Nubia, Under Professor Gazzola." (Rome: Oct 1960.) "The experts originally suggested that the Egyptian monuments should be removed to the vicinity of the oases it is proposed to create

By the time Gazzola came back from this second mission, what had begun as a "preference" had become a doctrinary "imperative." Thus "any concentration into oases" was a "betrayal of history:"

The displacement of a monument and the choice of a new site

This brings me to another fundamental imperative: one must not betray history, nor erase the vestiges of a country's, a people's, past.

Populations must not be deprived of their greatest cultural patrimony. Monuments that symbolize their spiritual roots must remain—like living documents—within their homelands, in the very place where they emerged, as witnesses, indices, and reminders to future generations.

For monuments to retain this primordial function, if it ever becomes impossible to preserve them on their own sites, one must transfer them to a place as near as possible to their original location, situating them with an orientation and ambiance that corresponds to their current siting. In this case this rule is all the more important, given the sacred character of these monuments.

Indeed these buildings were built facing the Nile, and are connected to the sacred river by very tight—though mysterious—bond.

As a result, it goes without saying that to group these monuments in an oasis is out of the question. ²²⁸

In this final generalization of his criteria, Gazzola made two crucial moves: he "sacralized" the relationship between the temples and the Nile (by way of a "mysterious bond") and he added a social factor to the rule of proximity (by way of "people's past"). Indeed, the more generally Gazzola articulated his argument against monumental concentration, the larger the role he attributed to "people" in his doctrine.

Despite Gazzola's protests, when the expert committee met again in 1962, the number of oases proposed by the UAR had grown to three, and four temples had been designated for export as "grants-in-return." (fig 4.26)

Recommendation 3.5: Relocation of temples

For the present, three new sites are recommended for the regrouping of temples. (a) south of the Sadd al-Ali, on the left bank—for Kalabsha, Beit el-Wali, and the Qertassi Kiosk; (b) northwest of Wadi es-Sebua, on the left bank—for Dakka, Wadi es-Sebua, Mahharaqah and Gerf Hussein; (c) near Amada, on the left bank—for Amada, the chapels of Qasr Ibrim, and Pennut. 229

In each of new grouping of temples certain principles should control the organization of temples in their relation to each other, to their setting, and to the facilities provided for visiting them.

in the region, but, out of regard for the considerations set out above—the importance of choosing settings comparable to the original..."

²²⁸ Pietro Gazzola, Projet de sauvetage des monuments existants dans le territoire de la Nubie Destinés à être innondés à la suite de la construction duh au barrage d'Assouan (1960), 5-6. ICCROM Archives. "Practical reasons, such as accessibility, tourist frequency, and simplified supervision, undoubtedly hold some weight, but have no relation to the exigencies of art and the spirit, which suggest that works of art should be protected in their integrity and their site."

²²⁹ "Recommendation 3.4: Relocation of temples." In UNESCO/Nubia/2CE/9

This final recommendation differs from Gazzola's in that it incorporates a visiting tourist into the criteria for relocation. A final act of concentration and dissemination had been performed, for the sake of the international tourist. But perhaps more importantly, the oases themselves had been depopulated, as Egyptian and Sudanese governments had decided to resettle their entire Nubian populations in two inland locations, where new industrial development and infrastructural extensions would create the new towns of "New Nubia," near Kom Ombo in Egypt, and "New Wadi", near Khartoum in the Sudan. This physical separation of Nubians from the Nile revealed a latent hierarchy in Gazzola's criteria—namely, that proximity to the Nile trumped proximity to local populations.

Furthermore, Gazzola's technological argument that moving the temples to nearby locations would minimize the risk of damage was disproved, as six temples had already been dismantled and stored, as collections of stones, on Elephantine island near Aswan.²³¹ In a sense, this turn of events was a triumph of "rationalization," in the sense that historians of technology have given to this term, the organization of a process that takes precedence over the organization of a product. Certainly the dismantling of the temples and their storage, in advance of the resolution of their final site, was a "rationalized" process much like the mass-resettlement of the Nubians. In contrast, Gazzola's solution of assigning each temples a "nearby" location, relied on the idea that only an "authentic evolution," would also have required building a new access road for each temple.

Politically, this three-oases solution reveals Unesco's overwhelming passivity in the face of bilateral relations. If the UAR government was able to proceed with the removal of temples to Elephantine Island, it is because it secured funds directly from member states for temples as standalone projects: the temples of Amana were moved by France, the temple Kalabsha by West Germany, and the speos of upper Nubia by the United States. ²³² These countries entered in direct agreements with Egypt, making their funds available directly to the UAR government in Egyptian

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by the Ford Foundation, which unfolded in two phases: The Ethnographic Survey of Nubia 1960-1963 and A Study of Newly Settled Communities: The Abis area in the Northwestern Nile Delta, and Kom Ombo, Upper Egypt, 1963-1975. For contemporary evaluations, see Fernea & Kennedy, "Initial Adaptations to Resettlement: A New Life for Egyptian Nubians," in Current Anthropology, 7, 3. (Jun 1966),349-354. For the statement of the project, see Ethnological Survey of Nubia: Statement of purpose and organization (Cairo: Social Research Center, May 1961.) For a principal work to come out of this grant, see Hussein Fahim, Dams, people and development: the Aswan High Dam case. (New York: Pergamon, 1981).

²³¹ "UNESCO/NUBIA/CE/II/SR.1, 21-23 march 1963" Executive Committee Summary Record. "Mr. Chehata Adam (UAR) drew attention to the fact that six temples had been dismantled and removed between 1960 and 1962. NUBIE/9, page 21

²³² UNESCO/NUBIA/2.126

pounds and were therefore not subject to Unesco authority ²³³ Unesco was not an autonomous political actor, but rather a facilitator of bilateral relations in moments when diplomatic ties between countries were severed or severely strained.

After the UAR began dismantling temples to concentrate them in tourist-friendly locations, Gazzola and other MonCom experts began bitterly emphasizing that, since "the government of the UAR is the maitre d'œuvre, ... Unesco's opinion on particular aspects of the technical operations is not relevant."²³⁴ But while the UAR bypassed the authority of Unesco experts in concentrating its temples, the problem of a visual "concentration" still posed itself at its three new oases, which ran the risk of looking too "crowded" with monuments. The UAR created a new committee to review the site proposals for each site along the Nile. The United Arab Republic Consultative Committee Concerning the Safeguarding of the Sites and Monuments of Nubia, a group composed of architects, landscape architects and engineers, and included Van den Haagen and Plenderleith, wrote a set of "basic principles" to evaluate these disparate proposals for relocation. A single aesthetic principle of isolation, was to unify all proposals for temple relocation:

- 1. New sites should be selected as far as possible in the vicinity of existing sites.
- 2. When temples are grouped to form a precinct, they should be separated so as to be visible only one at a time, and the original orientation of each temple is to be maintained.
- 3. Landing quays should not be placed immediately before any temple but sited at a distance, preferably in a place where they are concealed.
- 4. Rest-houses and other installations should likewise be hidden and should be sited so as definitely not to be a part of the temples complex.
- 5. The false analogy of an open-air museum could be harmful: the atmosphere of a temple precinct is to be sought and maintained and might be enhanced eventually by the judicious introduction of trees. ²³⁵

These principles were prescriptive of an architectural typology—the desert as an optimal monumental environment—which afforded monuments the integrity of being continuous with their environment, and the objecthood that comes with being "visible only one at a time."

²³³ See "Protection of Temples and Monuments from Inundation from Aswan High Dam: Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (Effected by Exchange of Notes, Signed at Paris January 11 and 19, 1962)" in Cultural Relations of the United States Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4941 (1961). This agreement allocated 2 Million Dollars to the relocation of temples, and named those temples specifically. While the agreement was between Unesco and the US, in fact the funds were part of a PL 480 and were therefore only made available if the UAR government officially "requested" them.

²³⁴ Letter from van den Haagen to Valter Furuskog, 28 May 1962, ICCROM Archives.

²³⁵ UNESCO/Nubia/2CE/9. United Arab Republic Consultative Committee Concerning the Safeguarding of the Sites and Monuments of Nubia: Third Session. (Cairo, 24-Jan – 3 Feb 1962), 6.

The recommendation to avoid the "false analogy with open-air museum" merits its own examination, especially in light of how liberally this analogy had been invoked in the early days of the campaign launch. In 1960, director of CEDAE Christiane Noblecourt contributed an article to Museum titled "The Greatest Open-Air Museum in the World is About to Disappear." 236 Noblecourt gave the reader a literal "tour" of this open-air museum, taking the analogy between desert and museum to its metaphorical extreme. Because "the temples were set at almost regular intervals," they acted literally like the "floors in a museum": "Nature and man have combined to arrange this amazing museum in such a way that each of its levels displays the monuments and works of art of a separate epoch. ... The path of the visitor to this far-off country has been smoothed by a daring and gifted museum expert. As in any other museum, access to the Holy of Holies is by a door ... This portal is the Aswan Dam." Having thereby established the analogy, Noblecourt then proceeded through Nubia as if it were the Louvre where she had been trained: through a sequential enfilade of successive periods. "The visitor now comes to the first floor of the exhibition, where he finds an entirely different environment, one created by the great builders of the New Kingdom." The 19th-Century engraving by Horeau accompanying the text confirmed that this was an unabashedly "cumulative" telling of monumental history: a bird's eye view of the Nubian temples, scattered one by one, as seen from what the text described as "the summit, where another period, that of medieval Nubia, unexpectedly makes its appearance." (fig 4.35)

This article was published in 1960, when the UAR was till planning its two-oases-scheme. Accordingly, Noblecourt concluded with a confident prediction that "two attractions will bring the tourist back to Nubia." Yet in so doing she described exactly the "open-air typology" that the committee would eventually come to reject:

At the Kalabsha oasis the visitor will encounter a reconstitution of that Nubian life and husbandry which he thought were lost forever. Then, at the same latitude as Abu Simbel, he will find a similar oasis where the monuments removed from that site will be grouped together. Lastly, not far from the projecting promontory, he will see the huge artificial mound, covered with flowers and trees, which will guard one of the world's most historic spots.

As a typology, the open-air museum was unabashedly vernacular, implying a connection to local history, and inhabitation by contemporary descendants whose claims to the monuments might compete with that of the international subject—whether tourist or archaeologist. Thus the final forbidding of the analogy with the open-air museum can be understood both as a final concession to

²³⁶ Christiane Desroche-Noblecourt, "The Greatest Open-Air Museum is about to Disappear," in Museum XIII/3 (1960), 156-194.

preservationist ideology, and as the assertion of national authority over cultural heritage. By recommending temples be "isolated," and "the atmosphere of a temple precinct" be maintained," the UAR controlled the design of its Nubian museum into a museological experience detached from historic veracity—a narrative left to experience itself. In this sense, what had been an "open-air museum" became an "imaginary museum" instead, in the sense that Malraux meant it: an art-book on the Nile, a cinematic sequence of individual sights, isolated for photographic reproduction and orchestrated for the sake of an international imagination. (fig 4.27)

That the effect of this intricate system of temple-relocation was to consolidate Nubia's value as a cultural entity can be seen by comparing two Baedeker's Guide to Egypt that were published a halfcentury apart (figs 4.31-32). In 1928, Boedeker's Egypt showed Nubia in a double-page map as a desert landscape traversed by the Nile, densely dotted on either side by a continuous fabric of undifferentiated sites. In this uninterrupted sequence, Philae and Abu Simbel are the only ones to earn any of Baedeker's "stars." In contrast, the 1984 Baedeker includes Nubia in the general map of "Principal tourist sites in Egypt," where it is now represented by the four oases, each now earning two stars. The concentration of temples, in other words, produced a double a consolidation of value. What had been an undifferentiated field of became a clear itinerary, legible at the scale of Egypt itself. The four temples sent abroad also appear in the 1984 Baedeker, in the section titled "Museums with Egyptian materials," having apparently retained their authenticity as Egyptian objects despite their relocation. This section is illustrated by three photographs: the temple of Dendur at the Metropolitan Museum, given to the US as a "grant in return", the famous head of Nefertiti, and the Obelisk in Rome's Piazza del Popolo. The expansion of 'heritage' had worked retroactively to grant all Egyptian objects dispersed over the course of history a legitimate international value—whether their original displacement had been operated along imperial, colonial or post-colonial modes. In addition, the internationalization of Egypt had expanded far past Nubia: not only had Nubia become a part of Egypt, but now New York, Berlin, even Baroque Rome, were also in Egypt.

To the twofold "mobility" that had defined Nubia (the enforced mobility of Nubian populations relocated to make way for Lake Nasser, and the engineered mobility of monuments relocated along the new Nile Lake) was thereby added a third: the imagined mobility of future tourists, able to navigate Nubia as a proto-internationalist utopia. It was this hypothetical European tourist who inherited Nubia's history as a place where material cultures are deposited along the trails of a transient mankind.

Particularization: Venice in Nubia

It is not only the future of European tourism, but also the future of preservation as a profession that was assured through this reconfiguration of the Nubian desert. Piero Gazzola summarized the developments made by preservation in the 1960s by saying that "We have gone from punctual protection to global protection." 237 Writing in 1976, Gazzola was speaking mostly of the Venice Charter, a document signed in May 1964 by the International Congress of Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments. In fact, Gazzola's involvement in the Nubian Campaign coincides with the period when he entered preservation history a principal author of the Venice Charter and the founder of ICOMOS. Conventional histories usually separate the two events as parallel historical "firsts," belonging respectively to practical and theoretical realms: the Nubian campaign as the first international act of preservation, the Venice Charter as the first international statement of preservation doctrine. 238 In addition, the Venice Charter is known for its historical and conceptual rigidity: Patrick Ponsot sees it as a "dated and inapplicable" document, "written in the consensual and incomprehensible tongue of diplomacy" and symbol of a bygone style of restoration. 239 Francoise Choay reads in it a "limited horizon" and a "dogmatism" that lost the distinctive richness of the Athens Conference. 240 Gazzola himself, in his 1978 retrospective, treated the Venice Charter as the beginning of an evolution: a constitutional effort upon which further progress was to be based. In his account of the passage from Athens Conference to Venice Charter he talked about an increasing particularization of the monument—by way of the inclusion of "smaller" and more "vernacular" typologies, as well as an "expansion" of the mandate of protection, in geographic and stylistic terms. In other words, Gazzola's statement is usually interpreted to mean that preservationists turned their attention to vernacular typologies, natural sites, and urban complexes. Yet the role of the Nubian campaign in this narrative remains unexamined by all. It is not enough to say that the

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²³⁷ Gazzola actually continued intended the stament as a warning, that "total protection can actually mean no protection.": "Siamo passati dalla protezione puntuale a quella globale: non nascondiamocene I pericoli. La protezione totale può avere come conseguenza la non protezione." Pietro Gazzola, "L'Evoluzione del Concetto del Restauro Prima e Dopo la Carta di Venezia," in Bollettino del Centro INternazionale di Studi di Architettura Andrea Palladio XX (1978), 243.

For a good example of introspection from the heart of the discipline, see Jean-Louis Luxen, "Reflections on the Use of Heritage Charters and Conventions," in Newsletter of the Getty Conservation Institute XIX/2 (2004), 4-9.

²³⁹ Offering a frankly French perspective, Ponsot's article is most interesting in its detecting Italian "intellectualism" of the period in the Venice Charter and for its dating of a "style." "Ce n'est pas en general cela que l'on retient de la Charte de Venise en France, mais plutôt un certain style de restauration, très date, qui irait de l'écorché archéologique à la prothèse moderniste." Patrick Ponsot, "Pourquoi lire Cesare Brandi?" in Bulletin Monumental, 161/3 (2003), 223-229.

²⁴⁰ "Dans le cadre de la mondialisation du patrimoine, la première Charte internationale sur la conservation des monuments et des sites, élaborée à l'issue du congrès de Venise, demeure le document de référence. Pourtant, son horizon limité et son dogmatisme la situnet singulièrement en retrait au regard des travaux d'Athènes dont la démarche ouverte, questionnante et dialectique est plus que jamais d'actualité." Françoise Choay, "Introduction," La Conférence d'Athènes (Paris: Tranches de Villes, 2002), 9.

Nubian campaign "prefigured" the work on the Venice Charter. Close inspection of the progress of Gazzola and his colleagues' rhetoric throughout the campaign reveal a distinct progression, from particular "recommendations" to universal "declarations", indicative of a much tighter and reciprocal relation between Venice and Nubia: on the one hand, the Nubian campaign provided Gazzola an opportunity to articulate his theory in increasingly doctrinary terms; on the other hand, this theoretical universalization of protection was accompanied by an increasingly technical description of objects to be protected.

Why did Gazzola participate in the campaign at all? As we have seen, he was torn between the impulse to distance himself from a three-thousand year political history of international monument movement, and the opportunity to capitalize on the ideological gains that preservation had made as a result of Unesco's work in the post-war reconstruction. This tension was evident in Gazzola's compulsion to preface ever report he wrote by stating the "historical," "aesthetic," "architectural" objections that could be made to Unesco's work. Like his colleagues involved in the archaeological surveys of Nubia for the sake of "Salvage Archaeology," Gazzola had a choice between two ways of achieving disciplinary autonomy: the benefits of the visibility of the campaign vs. the need for statements of orthodoxy. That he chose to proceed with the campaign only confirms what his disclaimer already hinted at: that preservationist ideology proceeds by negation of established precedent, as a kind of retrospective policing act.

Gazzola remained involved in the campaign in order to "police" the application of his nascent preservation doctrine. As a result, he began to articulate with ever-greater vehemence an orthodoxy, in which the Nubian project was clearly theorized as an "exception." For example, in his preliminary mission Gazzola had simply acknowledged possible "historical and aesthetic objections" to temple movement. A year later, these objections had become a full-fledged "exception":

Any principle, however fundamental, must undergo exceptions: there are human reasons which are profoundly valid and which are beyond us. The case of the Aswan Dam is one such exception. ²⁴²

Following Gazzola's lead, Plenderleith took every opportunity in ICCROM's reports to confirm the distinction between "principles" and "project":

Considering the urgency and the importance of this project, the center made a deliberate effort to avoid any perfectionist inclination in order to present to Unesco a program that would be both concrete and realistic.²⁴³

²⁴¹ "This solution is undoubtedly open to objections: historically, since the original position of the monuments is changed, and aesthetically, because it involves their re-erection on sites and in settings that are not genuine. However, this remains the only way of avoiding their total destruction."

²⁴² Gazzola, "Projet de Sauvetage," 6.

Once this pattern of disclaimers had been set, Gazzola and Plenderleith were able to make pronouncement of principles with increasing authority, even as these principles were increasingly violated by Unesco. By the end of his third mission, Gazzola set his doctrine apart in an introductory section titled "Theoretical Principles of the Conservation of Monuments," articulating a set of rules that correspond in large part to the main body of the Venice Charter. ²⁴⁴ In other words, Gazzola used these Nubian reports as rough drafts for the Venice Charter.

The Nubian Campaign and the Venice Charter belong in the same bureaucratic chronology: the Venice meetings for the "Second International Congress of Restoration" were scheduled to avoid conflict with the Nubian meetings, and much of the conversation at the meetings revolved around the intrigue of the Campaign—in particular, over the US contribution to the Abu Simbel, which had just been denied a second time by Congress. Jo Brew, who served as vice-president of the Venice meetings, used the Venice event to leverage better support for the project upon his return. He composed a letter to Senators:

The Venice meeting was made up of approximately seven hundred scholars, architects, and engineers from all over the world devoted to the preservation of our cultural heritage. I can assure you that my conversation with them convinced me that favorable action toward the preservation of Abu Simbel would be justified by its effect in our international relations alone. ²⁴⁵

In other words: the Venice Congress took place against a Nubian backdrop, and Venice was a crucial stop on the way to getting support for the Nubian campaign. It was Nubia, in fact, that provided an image of international action for the Venice Charter. The Nubian Campaign was a crucial precedent for the articulation of the Venice charter as a set of universal imperatives.

²⁴³ CP4/RES.1: Centre International d'Études pour la conservation et la Restauration des Biens Culturels, Conseil Provisoire, "Avis du Centre de Rome Sur la Mission Préliminaire en Nubie concernant le Déplacement des Temples, prevue au Paragraphe 53 du Rapport 55 Ex/7" (Rome: 8-10 Dec, 1959), 1-2. Translation mine.

²⁴⁴ The Venice Charter is published in a variety of forms; most useful for exegesis is the tri-lingual edition introduced by current ICOMOS president Michael Petzet. Grundsätze der Denkmalpflege / Principles of Monument Conservation / Principles de conservation des monuments historiques (Munchen: Karl M. Lipp Verlag, 1992). The list of signatories survives in its original order, with Gazzola at the top: Piero Gazzola (Italy), Chairman; Raymond Lemaire (Belgium), Reporter; Jose Bassegoda-Nonell (Spain); Luis Benavente (Portugal); Djurdje Boskovic (Yugoslavia); Hiroshi Daifuku (UNESCO); P.L de Vrieze (Netherlands); Harald Langberg (Demmark); Mario Matteucci (Italy); Jean Merlet (France); Carlos Flores Marini (Mexico); Roberto Pane (Italy); S.C.J. Pavel (Czechoslovakia); Paul Philippot (ICCROM); Victor Pimentel (Peru); Harold Plenderleith (ICCROM); Deoclecio Redig de Campos (Vatican); Jean Sonnier (France); Francois Sorlin (France); Eustathios Stikas (Greece); Mrs. Gertrud Tripp (Austria); Jan Zachwatovicz (Poland); Mustafa S. Zbiss (Tunisia).

²⁴⁵ Letter from Brew to senators, June 23 1964. [Carl Hayden, Ronan H Ruska, Leverett Saltonstall. Brew 10/54a. The Exhibition of projects displayed at Palazzo Grassi was published in Seconda Mostra Internazionale del restauro Monumentale Catalogo Guida (Venezia: Palazzo Grassi, 25 Maggio-25 Giunio 1964) while the proceedings were published in 1971 as International Council of Monuments and Sites, Il Monument Per l'Uomo: Atti del II Congresso Internazionale del Restauro Venezia 25-31 Maggio 1964 (Padova: Marsilio / ICOMOS. 1971)

A comparison between the 1964 Venice meeting and the first "International Congress of Restoration," which had been held in Paris in 1957 demonstrates the impact of the Nubian Campaign on the ambitions of international restoration. The Congress, attended roughly by the same roster of professionals, was hosted by the French Government at the Musée des Monuments Français. It produced a set of recommendations that are, in substance, similar to those of the Venice Charter: expressing a need for specialization, a concern for the material value of monuments to be codified, and for protective measures against urban development. But in Paris in 1957 these were articulated as recommendations by each session, and phrased as internal notes, indicating where future disciplinary progress might be directed. In contrast, the Venice Charter, inspired by the scope of international action achieved in Nubia, addressed a broad public beyond the specialized community. Within the history of international charters, the Nubian campaign should figure as the "exceptional" concession for the cause of a general theory. Conversely, it is imperative to understand the orthodoxy of the Venice charter as the product of exception.

What were the terms of this "exception?" The answer lies in the increasingly technicality with which Gazzola and Plenderleith described the material value of the temples as they lost the battle over their natural connection to their site. The first explicit statement of "principles that are fundamental to the present theories on the protection of monuments," made by Gazzola and Harold Plenderleith in 1959, indicated that when transfer operation could not be avoided, the operative principle would be the "absolute value of each stone":

- Considered in principle alone, the transfer of a monument, out of respect for the civilization of which it remains a living witness, should not be envisaged. It is only in quite special cases when such a transfer is absolutely necessary that it is acceptable.

- Every stone, even if it is not decorated, has in itself an absolute value. It should be preserved at any \cos^{247}

The Gazzola-Plenderleith "Declaration" displaced the absolute value of the monument onto the material itself. If the location of a monument had to be compromised, then at least its material would be treated as inviolable. Gazzola and Plenderleith articulated this clause about the "sanctity of stone" with increasing specificity, as the movement of temples became increasingly certain, and the sanctity of the monument was progressively distributed throughout its material constituency:

²⁴⁶ See Jean Verrier, "Le Congrès International des Architectes et technicians des monuments Historiques, in Monuments Historiques de la France, Apr-Jun 1957, 65-88.

²⁴⁷ "Recommendations regarding the transfer of the temples: Declarations of Messrs. Gazzola and Plenderleith." Annex VII: 11th Meeting, in UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/SR Meeting of International Experts on the Safeguarding of the Setes and Monuments of Ancient Nubia Cairo, 12 November 1959.

For most people the value of a stone is negligible Yet on the contrary it imperative to consider the primordial value that each stone contains in itself. ... The sacred value that a monument hold in its entirety ... distributes itself over every one of its elements: in itself, in relation to its exact position in the unity of the monument, and its place within the blocks around it.

Thus the more theoretically mobile the monument became, the more aggregate it became in technical terms. By 1962, when Plenderleith was asked to compose a general document on "Ideas that should be taken into consideration in re-erecting ancient monuments" he composed perhaps the only statement of universal value that was never violated throughout the campaign:

<u>Ideas that should be taken into consideration in re-erecting ancient monuments</u>
1. Stones consist of granules in a connective tissue. In sandstone the granules are impervious: the connective tissue is inclined to decay. ²⁴⁸

The effects of this increasing particularization of the monuments were most visibly felt in the actual reports of the campaign, which became increasingly technical. A survey of format of the lists in which the monuments were inventoried may suffice to evidence this progression: beginning as points on a map, becoming North-South inventories of assigned processes and new locations appended, and eventually turning into lists of construction typologies and material samples. (fig 4. 28) This increasingly detailed description of the tectonic reality of the temples was accompanied with an increasingly scientific description of the material substance and chemical behavior of these types of stone. The UAR began regularly sending samples of stones to the ICCROM laboratories in Rome, which returned them with an "identity card" of stone types. By granting each "stone granule in a connective tissue" an intrinsic value, the conservationists hoped that the monuments would retain some intrinsic connection to their site—which was made of the same "connective tissue." In a sense, all of the Nubian temples were described as "monoliths." In light of this, one can return to the attribution of a civilizational spirit to the monument in Gazzola's rhetoric. By the time Gazzola was able to assert in 1962 that "a building is a work of the spirit," which "participates in a soul and in

²⁴⁸ Harold PLenderleith, Report by Dr. Plenderleith UNESCO/NUBIA/2/CE/13 Annex II (Paris: 3 April 1962),3.

²⁴⁹ 30 October 1960: "These twenty-four monuments constitute an artistic group of the highest importance, and the problem of their salvage is all the more difficult to resolve in view of their different techniques of construction. In terms of constructional method, the monuments fall into four categories:

¹⁾ monuments quarried of large Nubian sandstone blocks (example: Kalabsha (Egypt), Temple of Madulia)

²⁾ monuments hewn into the rock (speos) (example: Aniba (Egypt), Tomb of Pennut)

³⁾ monuments consisting of a masonry frontage and a rock-hewn speos behind (example: Wadi Es Sebua (Egypt), temple of Ramses II)

⁴⁾ mud-brick monuments with frescoes. (example: Adb El Kadir (Sudan), Christian Church)." Gazzola, Projet de Sauvetage, 7. The introduction to Projet de sauvetage was shortened and made into the "short statement." Appended to 11C/PRG/9 Add.I.

history of a people which created it," the implication was that the "spirit's" material of choice was Nubian sandstone.²⁵⁰

The relationship between Nubia as a particular case and the Venice Charter as a universal declaration is not a trivial matter, since Unesco presents itself as an agent of universalization and particularity. To return to Gazzola's claim that the Venice Charter provoked a passage "from punctual protection to global protection," with its classic interpretation that monuments became smaller and more vernacular, while the protective envelope around them got bigger and bigger. What the Nubian campaign reveals is another process of "particularization," whereby monuments in were described in finer and finer grain. The more the principles of architectural conservation were set in stone (figuratively inscribed into international charters, and literally engraved on stone tablets near salvaged monuments), the more aggregate the monuments became (figuratively described in scientific formulae measuring graininess and porosity, and literally disassembled into blocks). In the case of the Nubian Campaign, it is the protective boundary that became increasingly finer—more "punctual," one might say—and the monument's value emerged proportionally more "global." In other words, the more the monument was 'particularized,' the more protection was 'universalized.'

IV. The "big temples": cultural expenditure as cold war aid

Commensuration

In the battle between "knowing" and "saving," the so-called Big Temples had emerged as largely expendable. The temples of Abu Simbel and the island of Philae were the campaign's icons from the start, but their fate was far from assured. They differed from other temples in that they were to be preserved in situ, and therefore the schemes for their salvage faced the problem of being the most expensive and the least visible. While smaller temples would gain surplus value in being displaced, Philae and Abu Simbel seemed destined to absorb value without giving anything in return. This was all the more problematic because, despite Unesco's efforts to portray them as equal parts "Art and Science," few of Unesco's own specialists were willing to discuss the two monuments' artistic or historic merits.²⁵¹ Certainly the grandiose projects for their salvage "encountered an appreciable amount of opposition from the 'dirt archaeologists':"

²⁵⁰ Gazzola "Projet de Sauvetage." (1960), 5.

²⁵¹ "Art & Science Conspired with Nature," in "Abu Simbel: Now or Never," in Unesco Courier, (Oct 1961), 8.

They are all for salvaging remnants of unknown prehistoric cultures but take a very dim view of the vast amount of money which will be necessary to preserve Abu Simbel, Philae, etc. They feel that, scientifically speaking, these monuments are completely known and described, particularly with photogrammetric studies. They are not impressed with the aesthetic of symbolic values, at that price.²⁵²

This reference to "the aesthetic of symbolic values," was intended as an indictment of Egyptologists. But while the latter brought to the Campaign the institutional support and aesthetic sensibility that the distinctly un-glamorous dirt archaeologists lacked, they did nothing to dispel their colleagues' skepticism about the salvage of Philae and Abu Simbel.

Where dirt archaeologists withdrew any "scientific" endorsement of these projects, Egyptologists refrained from granting the temples much "aesthetic" value. In particular, they insisted that Abu Simbel was "an inferior work of architecture and art," "an atrocity [with] everything out of proportion, everything all wrong," and were happy to dispense this opinion in the mainstream press. Against this negative aesthetic valuation as a "monument," journalists began to argue for the value of Abu Simbel as a "document"—the Washington Post, for instance, vaunting "its historical, philological and archaeological importance, especially the hieroglyphic inscriptions which are believed to afford the key to the origins of the Sinaitic and Moabite alphabets; also the scrawlings by the various Greek, Levantine and Anatolian Kilroys who visited the place many centuries after its construction." The battle between science and aesthetics that had animated the specialist committees was repeated in the non-specialist press, with art critics now wielding a documentary logic against the aesthetic appreciations of amateur collectors.

In light of these lukewarm scientific and aesthetic appraisals, it was against Abu Simbel's value as "the heritage of mankind" that skepticism was collectively re-directed—especially as it became apparent that nobody had yet differentiated between this value and crass tourist appeal:

Egyptologists I have talked with feel very strongly that there is no real reason to preserve it. ... The sculptures are not only huge... they are crude. Look at the thick knees. The battle reliefs, outside and in, are not new creations but were introduced 200 years before. While Abu Simbel easily dazzles the tourist, still one asks: What is priceless about it? What part of "man's heritage" does it represent? Is it art?²⁵⁵

²⁵² Letter from Brew to Hiroshi Hidaifu, Mar 17, 1960. Brew Archives,

²⁵³ Dr. Holland Hall, cited in the Washington Post. The "scientific skepticism" was also leaked to the press, as when The New York Times reported on a Mar 15, 1961 meeting of the Columbia Department of Archaeology on March 15th where "scientists Were doubtful that the effort was worth the cost, since the monument had been widely studied and there were many other important sites in the same area that had not been investigated at all." "Saving of Temples on Nile is Disputed." New York Times, Mar 16, 1961, 30. The presentation had been made by Edward E. White.

²⁵⁴ "For the Temple," in Washington Post (Mar 21, 1960), A12.

²⁵⁵ Emma Swan Hall, "Abu Simbel as Art: Preserving Temples threatened by Dam Waters Questioned," New York Times April 28, 1963, 185.

If Abu Simbel was neither a unique document nor a unique monument, it was neither worth "saving" nor "recording." Even MonCom chairman Jo Brew, who had skillfully negotiated the demands of competing archaeologists by arguing for pluralistic expertise, eventually resolved that "the line to adopt" was that "Philae and Abu Simbel are not basically archaeological projects in the technical sense." Why, then, were they saved at all?

The answer begins with a notion of commensuration, which was introduced by Unesco to redirect the qualitative question "what part of man's heritage?" towards a quantitative evaluation instead. Okacha expressed this quantitative imperative in terms of scale: "The world-wide common effort which can make [the campaign] a success must be commensurate with the priceless heritage which is to be preserved for all mankind."257 Commensuration translated contemporary effort into monumental worth, according to an aesthetic system that bypassed the valuation of monuments in absolute terms, and placed them in a system of relative value instead: it was, in short, a system of proportion. However, because the elements to be compared were "priceless," it was a system that valued disproportion. While the rest of the campaign was conducted under the sign of the "incommensurability of cultures," the salvage of the Big Temples was performed for the sake of commensuration—in the sense of the ability of values to be translated. One way to understand this is a rhetorical reversal: while Nubia was a cultural particular which was saved as an example of universality, the "big temples salvage proceeded from an assumption of universal value (the big temples represented universal relevance of Egyptian culture) to the search for a particular instance of modern action that the temples could be made to represent. This process of translation was presented as occurring in an abstract realm (the conversion of "priceless heritage" into "worldwide common effort") but can actually be traced specifically as it unfolded in a variety of discursive realms. 258

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²⁵⁶ Brew to Wilson April 3, 1961. Brew Archives, Correspondance Folder. "I think this is the line we should all adopt. We should make a greater effort to sell this to our archaeological colleagues for they are at the source of the statement that we know all there is to know about Abu Simbel. This statement is doing us harm."

²⁵⁷ CUL (59) 4, p. 5.

²⁵⁸ Three bodies of literature are useful here. First, the philosophical discourse on incommensurability, in its two strains: one literary, concerned with translation, trauma, and hermeneutics (cf. David Couzens Hoy, "Hermeneutic Circularity, Indeterminacy, and Incommensurability," in New Literary History, Literary Hermeneutics (Autumn 1978), 161-173), the other scientific, revolving around Thomas Kuhn's thesis on the incommensurability of scientific theories (Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, 1962). Unesco appears in this literature in passing, cited as an agency that assumes the preservation of the incommensurability of world cultures.

The influence of these theories on the social sciences has been felt, on the one hand, in a reevaluation of comparative methods (see George Steinmetz, "Odious Comparisons: Incommensurability, the Case Study, and "Small N's in Sociology," Sociological Theory (Sep 2004), 371-400), and more usefully, in analyses of commensuration as "a social process," particularly as a bureaucratic procedure (Wendy Nelson Espeland and Mitchell Stevens, "Commensuration as a Social Process," in Annual Review of Sociology (1998), 313-343. Most pertinent is Espeland's account of how American regulatory agencies changed their dam-building ethos after the National Environmental Policy Act. See "Bureaucrats and

The most obvious way Unesco wielded commensuration as a value in itself was to account for the central role played by financial contributions in the fate of the temples. Consider for instance how the official Unesco history of the Campaign tells the Abu Simbel story with one graph, showing both estimated costs and funds pledged between 1959 and 1968. (figs 4.32-4.33) The graph uses the four engineering schemes proposed between 1959 and 1963 as fund-raising landmarks and as as successive stages in a linear process of achieving "realism" in the campaign. According to this history, "only the proposal of more realistic schemes brought a better balance" between cost estimate and pledged contributions. 259 In effect, the graph is supposed to demonstrate that economic and technical factors converged into a single, "commensurate", monumental value. A similar graph also exists for the temples of Philae with the same interpretation that "only the adoption of a lessexpensive, realistic project starts to attract more important contributions." At face value, this account is correct: four engineering schemes were solicited for Abu Simbel, each cheaper than the previous one, while the salvage of Philae was originally under-estimated and eventually grew to be more expensive than Abu Simbel. But one thing these graphs ignore is the fact that neither project ended up being a "dam" and that therefore a new qualitative criterion was added to the technological proposal. Perhaps more importantly, the graphs do not convey the importance of the US contribution: the fact that it represented more than 30% of the total fund, that it was originally pledged to Philae but eventually devoted to Abu SImbel, and that it consisted exclusively of Egyptian pounds, instead of convertible dollars. Thus these two graphs are actually connected—to each other and to the campaign as a whole—and the isolation of each monument into a separate process of linear "realism" is misleading.

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Indians in a Contemporary Colonial Encounter, Law & Social Inquiry (Spring, 2001), 403-433, and The Struggle for Water: Politics, Rationality, and Identity in the American Southwest (Chicago, 1998). The case is similar to the Aswan case; the dam threatened to destroy a Native American settlement grounds. But as Charles Perrow pointed out, this work substitutes hermeneutics for any analysis of power, since "the presence of incommensuration makes all rational choices suspect and simple "interest" accounts misleading." See Perrow's review in Social Forces (Jun 1999), 1652-1654.

Such technical discussions of "interest" are available in the legal discourse, concerned with how to regulate the translation of values that are thought to be incommensurable, usually for purposes of "compensation." See "Law and Incommensurability", University of Pennsylvania Law Review (Jun 1998). This includes natural environments ("Million-Dollar Mountains: Prices, Sanctions, and the Legal Regulation of Collective Social and Environmental Goods," Op Cit, 1327-1369.) and works of art (Cass R. Sunstein, "Incommensurability and Valuation in Law," Michigan Law Review (Feb., 1994), 843.") Most useful is the legal distinction between the "commensurability of options or choices," and "the incommensurability of other items (such as values, goods, life-plans, and so forth)," and the debate over whether the latter is reducible to the former. (Matthew Adler, Op Cit, 1170.) That the value of objects can be deduced from the measurement of options is precisely the position taken by Okasha in his appeal: by asking not whether the monument should be saved but how they should be saved.

²⁵⁹ On Philae:" Only the adoption of a less-expensive, realistic project starts to attract more important contributions." Temples and Tombs, 169, Fig.17. On Abu Simbel: "only the adoption of the more realistic cutting scheme resulted in a better balance." Save-Sodeberg, 79, Fig 1.

If commensuration is a process of conversion of value, what values were really converted in the four proposed schemes? As we summarily seen, the temples were not presented as containing any value except one available for exchange. What value was invested into them, and what return did they offer? Commensuration, I will argue, was a transformative economy that unfolded in multiple registers, translating economic quantities into political ones, "technical" values into "cultural" ones, and aesthetic discourses into tourist techniques. Most importantly, I argue that that commensuration was not an exclusively quantitative process. On the contrary, economic factors played a qualitative role: it was not only the amount but also the type of funding, that served as the ultimate measure for the evaluation of salvage proposals. Furthermore, a kind of symbolic exchange between quantity and quality occurred in the process of convincing the political constituencies to expend the available funds. I begin here by looking at the debates over the meaning of Abu Simbel, as a quantitative transformation of purely technical values into an international aesthetic. I then look at the debates over the funding for the salvage, which reveal a quantitative transformation of economic measure into political value. Only after having problematized both of these realms can we then proceed along the graph of commensuration to examine each engineering proposal.

"Who was Abu Simbel?"

Commensuration set the comparative terms for an aesthetic valuation that superceded the absolute value of monuments and voided them of their importance as artistic and historic signifiers. Nowhere is this emptying of monumental referent clearer than in the way Philae and Abu Simbel were differentiated. The Big Temples first entered political discourse as alternatives: both projects were "dam" projects, and the simplicity of fighting dams with dams made them easily comparable in aesthetic and economic terms. In his original pledge—a November 1961 message to Congress—President Kennedy presented the two projects as alternatives. But while the Abu Simbel salvage was "plagued with difficulties" and had been estimated at an extravagant \$80 Million, thus any US commitment to the salvage was "premature." Instead Kennedy offered \$6 Million for the whole island of Philae, and \$6 Million for "remaining lesser temples." By the time these funds were finally made available to Unesco in 1964, the same \$12 Million were appropriated for saving Abu Simbel instead; Philae was, in some sense, a down-payment for Abu Simbel. The first process of

²⁶⁰ "The task of saving the Nubian monuments can be conveniently divided into two parts: (a) the reservation of the Abu Simbel on the one hand, and (b) the preservation of the temples on the Island of Philae and the remaining lesser temples in the threatened area." "Two major plans have been advanced for saving these monuments; … each of these plans entails serious difficulties, and further studies are being made. Therefore I feel it would be premature to recommend, at the present time, that any US funds be provided for this purpose." Kennedy Appeal, 3.

commensuration to be examined, therefore, is the one that transformed the salvage of Philae into the Salvage of Abu Simbel.

It was not only for financial reasons that Kennedy considered the project of salvaging the island of Philae a more natural fit project with US interests. Geographically, the island's location near Aswan meant it could be easily incorporated into exiting tourist circuits. Historically, the island bore the traces of five consecutive imperial recuperations of the Isis and Osiris cults, and could be read as a veritable index of the history of civilizations. In addition, the temple of Isis had served a key scientific role in the "recovery of knowledge ... of hieroglyphic script" by helping to corroborate the name of Ptolemy on the Rosetta Stone. Artistically, Philae had a long history of being known as "the Pearl of Egypt," and its temples as jewels of "architectural elegance, planned in scale with the small size of the island." Nor would Philae's salvage be devoid of spectacle. The island had been almost entirely submerged since the building of the first Aswan Dam. With its column capitals barely emerging from water, Philae dramatized the meaning of archaeological "salvage" by reemerging every year, in a periodic enactment of the impending flood. (fig 4.36)

The yearly flooding of Philae since the first raising of the dam in 1924 had already erased significant archaeological information on the island—obliterating "the maze of mud-brick houses, churches and other buildings" around the temples, which had been insufficiently recorded by the First Survey. But this only made a second salvage more dramatic and redemptive. Hence, to the economic idea of proportion was added an aesthetic one. The US hoped to undertake the entire project by itself salvage of Philae by itself, in the same way that West Germany and France had each "chosen" a temple project to represent them. Kennedy expressed this hope for the exclusive "American" rights to Philae by saying, "There would be no more effective expression of our interest in preserving the cultural monuments of the Nile Valley than an American offer to finance the preservation of the Philae temples." As an island, Philae was a metonymic representation of the Nile Valley and "its monuments"—a role it had played since appearing in the Description de l'Egypte. Philae

²⁶¹ In a letter to Rainey, sent from Cairo, on 5 July 1960, Reinhardt spelled out why the US embassy chose Philae: "1) it could be saved at reasonable cost; 2) cost ... could be paid in local currency; 3) near enough Aswan to become a tourist attraction; 4) considered one of the jewels of Egyptian art, second only to Abu Simbel." Brew 10/54b.

²⁶² Both of these descriptions are summarized in the appendix to Save-Sodeberg's Temples and Tombs. Annex V: The Temples of Abu Simbel and Annex VI: Philae—The Pearl of Egypt.

²⁶³ Walter Emery, Lost Land Emerging, 28. Emery continued: "All were destroyed by the water of the reservoir... and with them went archaeological evidence of vital importance to the student of Nubia's later history... The stone structures on the island remain, but the loss of information which must have existed within the humble brick buildings is, I think, one of the major tragedies in the long record of archaeological research."

The calculation was correct; the two temples got a lot of press as exemplars of a single country's dedication: in Abu Simbel Now or Naver, for example, the editorial noted that Germany had offered to save Kalabsha and France Amada, 6.

had the advantage of already being perceived as a cohesive whole.²⁶⁵ (fig 4.34) The American hope was that the island itself would become a singular monument to the US contribution, in perfect proportion to America's intentions.

While the US wanted a collection of monuments (Philae) to represent its sole contribution, the UAR wanted a single monument (Abu Simbel) to represent collective effort: after years of cooperative crescendo, "a phase that calls for collective action." The US had always known, in the words of Rainer, that "from a political point of view we would probably gain more here from Abu Simbel." But in contrast to Philae's temples, which were designed in proportion to their site, and whose origins were visible in tectonic and archaeological form, Abu Simbel was a historic and artistic cipher. This archaeological riddle only contributed to its disproportionate monumentality:

Abu Simbel was a place of considerable importance, but historians and archaeologists have found it difficult to explain the role not only of Abu Simbel but also of the other temples built in lower Nubia by Rameses II. The odd fact is that the number of contemporary settlements and cemeteries is insignificant in relation to the majesty of the monuments. ... It remains a riddle why practically no traces have been found of the settlements which must have existed in the neighborhood of the great temples where the daily rituals would have demanded the presence of a large number of priests and servants of the cult. And it is strange too that the tombs of temple personnel have never been found despite painstaking investigations." ²⁶⁸

This inexplicable lack of context and origins was integral to its "magnitude," and Unesco's admission that Abu Simbel was an archaeological enigma only fueled the impression that it had been created ex nihilo out of the sand. While Philae's "appeal arose not from magnitude but perfect grace and exquisite beauty" Abu Simbel's salvage was itself a mystery. While taking apart smaller temples had made them speak, revealing for instance a whole history of block re-use, Abu Simbel's monolithic construction dissimulated the traces of its human origins.²⁶⁹ In short, while Philae was

²⁶⁵ See Michel-Ange Lancret's account of his arrival in Philae by night ride on the Nile: "In one of the most extraordinary locations on the earth, amid places that partake of the fabulous, the names of which ... have assumed gigantic and almost magical significance. ... Nowhere else are monuments still surviving of one of the most ancient peoples of the world, inscriptions that it has carved in to the rocks throughout seems to speak to posterity. Such objects, by carrying the mind back to the most distant centuries, enrich the panorama with a beauty greater than anything that nature alone can offer in most imposing sites." Cited in C.C. Gillispie, "Historical Introduction," in Monuments of Egypt: The Napoleonic Edition. 18.

²⁶⁶ "Statement of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of 20 June 1961 on the Preservation of Abu Simbel Temples." CUA/109 Annex III. "an important phase … the most serious stage… phase that calls for collective action."

²⁶⁷ Even as he explained the rationale for saving Philae, Rainer gave a personal vote in favor of Abu Simbel: "I have no doubt that [the UAR] would be delighted to have the US undertake the Philae project but would be most anxious that this would preclude participation in Abu Simbel job. It is my personal feeling that from a political point of view we would probably gain more here from Abu Simbel." Reinhardt to Rainey, 5 July 1960, Brew 10/54b.

²⁶⁸ "Annex V: The Temples of Abu Simbel,", Temples and Tombs of Ancient Nubia, 234.

²⁶⁹ This was a feature of the campaign that was widely advertised: for instance about the Temples of Dakka, "When it is dismantled, many blocks of stone dating from earlier periods, which had been used over again, will probably be identified." *A Common Trust*, 12.

precious and legible, Abu Simbel was almost as mute as a mountain. Unesco and its archaeologists spent three years trying to make Abu Simbel "speak" to the US on behalf of the UAR.

Once the question of a US participation in Abu Simbel's salvage became a subject of political debate in America, Rameses II himself became the object of a monument/document debate. It was as it had become necessary to attach a persona to the temples' sculpted figures—"to ask the prize question," as a recalcitrant Congressman Rooney did, "Who is Abu Simbel?" Rooney's mistake was quickly rectified ("Mr. Chairman, Abu Simbel refers to a geographical location"), but his desire to fix the identity of the colossus only expressed the widespread expectation that monuments have a definitive referent. No satisfactory answer was forthcoming: Rameses II was "not an awfully important pharaoh," who was "usually identified with the Pharaoh of the earlier chapters of the Book of Exodus." Although he was megalomaniac enough to "have foresightedly had himself sculpted in quadriplicate," this repetition ironically rendered each of his sculptures less valuable. As Unesco itself advertiszed, "the kings' image is to be seen everywhere." By the standards of history, Rameses had merely pulled off a publicity stunt; by the standards of art, he had the bad taste of being monument-obsessed.

The search for Abu Simbel's biographic referent was partly motivated by a desire to seek historical precedents for an age when heroic figuration was itself perceived to be a feature of totalitarianism. The UAR saw an opportunity to give Pharaonic origins to Unesco's new universal subject; skeptical Western politicians were eager to demonize Nasser and other Soviet-friendly leaders as despots. Even the New York Times conceded that "if Rameses II were alive today he would probably be recognized as one of the world's most boring and dangerous characters, though he would have competition." But it was precisely the symbolic deficiency of Rameses and his monument—the sheer "boredom" of his reign—that made Abu Simbel a suitable Unesco monument. As one letter writer responded: "No doubt Abu Simbel is an expression of ruthlessness, power and inhumanity, ... but most people see it as a unique and powerful work of Egyptian art,

²⁷⁰ The exchange was reported in Drew Pearson, "Aid for Historic Treasures Denied," Los Angeles Times, Jun 3, 1964.

²⁷¹ John Canaday, "Temple in Extremis," The New York Times, Apr 14, 1963, 119.

²⁷² Few were willing to remind the public that he had chased the Hebrews out of Egypt.

²⁷³ Jay Walz, "Cairo Seeks to Save Temples Above Aswan," Jan 23, 1960, 3. "A fault in the rock long ago let one of the heads crash to the ground. But since Rameses, foresightedly had himself sculpted in quadriplicate, archaeologists do not regard this blemish as major."

²⁷⁴ "Abu Simbel," in A Common Trust.

²⁷⁵ Rooney, for instance, suggested that Nasser, Krustchev and Castro should pool resources to rescue Rameses.

²⁷⁶ "And Who Was Rameses II?" in New York Times, Jan 24, 1960. E10. The article made clear that megalomania was itself the subject of the Rameses' reign: "The greatest achievement of Rameses II was to produce the temple of Abu Simbel and decorate the same with gigantic statues of himself." And opined of the salvage that "If it is done, it will probably rank as the most expensive commercial in the all the history of paid publicity."

and only incidentally as the tomb of some Pharaoh."²⁷⁷ Thus none of the attempts to make totalitarianism itself the subject of Abu Simbel were successful; what remained instead was a tension between figuration as mode of empathy and abstraction as a technique of universalization: Abu Simbel was human enough to "capture" the world's philanthropic "imagination," but abstract enough to be proposed to Western countries as an international monument. This tension was far from resolved by the time money for the salvage was obtained.

In fighting against the image of Abu Simbel as a monument to a despot, Egyptologists developed an interpretation of Abu Simbel's sculptural seriality as an early example of mass-produced art. The Keeper of Egyptian Antiquities at the British Musem, Dr. Edwards, for instance, told of a phase of Egyptian art that was defined by the problem of quantity instead of quality. In his "urge to win immortality at any cost." Rameses had pushed his artisans and architects towards "a technique of effect by mass and frequent repetition." Edwards used this to justify both the lack of quality of the Abu Simbel temples and their exceptional status among all examples of this era. "With the emphasis mainly on quantity, it is not surprising that much of the sculpture of the time lacks any aesthetic appeal and originality." By the time Minister Okasha inaugurated the monuments again in his 1968 speech, this repetitive anonymity had been recuperated for Unesco's own symbolic ends: "Rameses the Second's dearest wish was to ensure his immortality. He has it, but it is after out own fashion that we have bestowed it upon him." The temple's lack of aesthetic "originality" had become a positive quality: crudeness, anonymity, and seriality stood to represent modern cooperation.

Instead of appealing to a stable artistic or historic referent, Unesco forged an aesthetic that valued "magnitude" over "beauty." In addition to describing the temples as a reproducible, Unesco worked to incorporate a quantitatively-minded spectator into the meaning of the temples, by staging an appeal to sublimity and activating a discursive lineage that had long detected "the sublime" in Egypt's monuments. In his 1790 Critique of Judgement, Immanuel Kant had offered the pyramids as an illustration of the "mathematical sublime." The mathematical sublime was defined as resulting

²⁷⁷ "Preserving Abu Simbel" Letter to the New York Times 10 Feb, 1960, p. 36.

²⁷⁸ Edwards, "Foreword," in MacQuitty, Abu Simbel (New York: Putnam, 1965), 9-11.

²⁷⁹ Sarwat Okacha, in Abu Simbel: addresses delivered at the ceremony to mark the completion of the operations for saving the two temples, Abu Simbel, 22 September, 1968. (Paris; Unesco, 1968). SHC.68/d.41. English version, p. 18. The French version of the speech has a slightly different tone: "Le désir le plus cher de Ramsès était d'assurer son immortalité. C'est chose faite et nous y avons contribué à notre manière. Aujourd'hui ses temples se dressent de nouveau pour l'éternité."

²⁸⁰ Kant distinguished three forms of aesthetic enjoyment: the agreeable is "made intelligible by its Quantity," the beautiful "requires a presentation of the Quality of the object," and the sublime "pleases immediately by reason of its opposition to the interest of sense." The idea of the sublime required "the estimation of the magnitude of natural things," and

specifically from a confrontation with objects that are so perceptually overwhelming, that they trigger in the viewer an attempt to estimate their magnitude by mathematical means. While mathematics belong to the realm of reason, Kant posited, mathematical apprehension of physical magnitudes was actually aesthetic, since it depended upon an "aesthetic estimation" of a basic unit of measurement by perceptual means. (In other words, the physical magnitude of objects can only be perceived by means of an aesthetic, not an exact, representation of scale in the subject's imagination.) The sublime effect is triggered, then, when this original unit of measure "disappears from the imagination" during the process of trying to comprehend the object, provoking a "movement" in the mind as comprehension (aesthetic estimation) attempts in vain to catch up to apprehension (mathematical estimation).

The pyramids for Kant vividly illustrated this flight of the imagination, large tectonic forms whose original measure of scale vanishes as the eye moves up the stone tiers:

This explains Savary's observations in his account of Egypt, that in order to get the full emotional effect of the size of the Pyramids we must avoid coming too near just as much as remaining too far away. For in the latter case the representation of the apprehended parts (the tiers of stone) is but obscure, and produces no effect upon the aesthetic judgment of the Subject. In the former, however, it takes the eye some time to complete the apprehension from the base to the summit; but in this interval the first tiers always in part disappear before the imagination has taken in the last, and so the comprehension is never complete.

The pyramid mediates this flight to infinity with geometric precision: serving as a funnel of perception, wherein "as much is lost at one end as it gained at the other." Instead of comprehending the object, the subject derives pleasure from the insufficiency of his senses vis-à-vis his imagination. Again in Paul de Man's words, "what the sublime achieves ... is the awareness of another faculty besides understanding and reason, namely, the imagination." What is to be retained from the sublime interpretation of the pyramid, for our purposes, is the problem of situating the criterion of heritage of mankind inside the subject itself.

Unesco's sublime aesthetic was a fight for the "imagination" of an international subject, and this is why its struggle to differentiate heritage value from tourist appeal is far from trivial. Kant, as many have pointed out, never saw the pyramids first-hand; he relied instead on the account of one of Napoleon's Egyptologists, Savory. By the mid-20th century the pyramids had been seen by

produced in the subject the realization of the impossibility of representing this estimation by human understanding. Immanuel Kant, "Analytic of the Sublime," in The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), §26, 119. In Paul de Man's rendition, "the sublime is not 'the large' but 'the largest,' it is that 'compared to which everything else is small'... the sublime is to be borderless and yet a totality." Paul de Man, "Phenomenality and Materiality in Kant," Aesthetic Ideology, ed. Andrej Warminski (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 75.

²⁸¹ Paul de Man, 75.

innumerable tourists, their image circulated internationally, and the problem of their sublimity had become intertwined with the potential boredom of tourist expectation. Julian Huxley, for one, admitted in his memoir From an Antique Land that by the time he visited them as Unesco's Director General, "Familiarity (though second-hand) had led me ... to discount the Pyramids. They had become international commonplaces, degraded to the level of the tourist souvenir." And yet he argued that the experience of seeing the pyramids in person trumped this debasement:

In actuality, they make an overpowering impression. It is not one of beauty, but on the other hand not one of mere bigness. Though size enters into it, and there is an element of aesthetic satisfaction in the elemental simplicity of their triangular silhouette. But this combines with an element of vicarious pride in the magnitude of the human achievement involved, and a sense of bold novelty and their historical uniqueness, to produce an effect different from that of any other work of man. ²⁸²

Huxley's description of his visit to the pyramids recalls Kant's definition of the mathematical sublime. Where his rendition differed from Kant's, however, was in the direction of his "flight to infinity:" instead of reflecting back on his own imagination as a universal subject, he imagined the literal effort that had been expended to create the monument, in a kind of trans-historical empathy.

Unesco did everything it could to channel this empathy towards itself, leveraging the sublimity of the colossi into a "vicarious pride" towards its own achievements. This "culturalization" of the sublime experience reveals a link between tourist expectation and sublime experience which should not be taken lightly, especially in the case of Abu Simbel. It was, after all, at Abu Simbel that Gustave Flaubert, paradigmatic 19th century orientalist, felt compelled to record the reflection "the Egyptian temples bore me profoundly." Yet what mattered to Unesco is not that Flaubert was actually bored. His ability to experience the sublime infinity of the colossi was hampered by all the sand covering the colossus—in his own words, "Handsome heads, ugly feet." Furthermore, his wariness was archaeological, since had just spent two days helping "dig out the chin" of the fourth colossus for Du Camp's photographic purposes. (fig 4.62) Thus "what bored him," in geographer Derek Gregory's words, "was not so much the ruins as their incorporation … within the discourses of archaeology and tourism that policed their appropriation." A century later, it was these

²⁸² Julian Huxley, From an Antique Land: Ancient and Modern in the Middle East (London: Max Parrish, 1954), 239.

²⁸³ "Are they going to become like the churches in Brittany, the waterfalls in the Pyrenees? Oh necessity! To do what you are supposed to do; to be always ... what a young man, or a tourist, or an artist, or a son, or a citizen, etc., is supposed to be!" Gustave Flaubert, in Flaubert in Egyppt, ed. Francis Steegmuller, (London: Penguin), 141-143

²⁸⁴ Many commentators, including fellow-traveler Maxime du Camp, have pointed out that Flaubert's detachment and homesickness were misleading; Steegmuller makes of this "disdain" a novelist's trait, in opposition to du Camp's "journalistic" impulses, which led him to remark that "Balzac was the same: he looked at nothing and remembere4d everything." Steegmuller, "Editor's Foreward," in Flaubert in Egypt.

²⁸⁵ Derek Gregory, "Between the Book and the Lamp: Imaginative Geographies of Egypt, 1849-50," Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 20/1 (1995), 43.

discourses that Unesco tried to "police" into the meaning of the monument itself. By the time Unesco proposed to save them, the temples carried an expectation of sublimity, connected to boredom as a tourist symptom. It was a success for Unesco merely to have argued that Abu Simbel belonged not in a range from "art" to "science," but on a spectrum from "boredom" to "imagination."

Unesco hoped to turn every tourist who visited the temples between 1959 and 1964 into a potential "witness" to the sublime power of the temples, cooperating with the UAR government to make the site accessible to as many vistors as possible. The experience of New York Times art critic John Canaday, is exemplary. Canaday felt "a sense of duty" to verify the advertised effect before endorsing the salvage project, in order to clear the "suspicion that the colossal monument ... might be only a gigantic novelty." ²⁸⁶ Having been coached to recognize modern agency in the possible salvage of the temples, Canaday returned from his visit convinced. Upon visiting the temples, Canaday felt that, salvaged or not, the monument had activated a sentimental "resonance" and that this alone was reason for the salvage to occur. Canaday theorized, following Malraux, that Abu Simbel was "among the half-dozen examples of Egyptian art where the presence of a creative artist is most strongly felt, and where life most pervades an art dedicated to the placation of death." In other words, collaboration had already become the new "direction" towards which the sublimity of Abu Simbel "brought the imagination." When Okacha consecrated Abu Simbel as an international monument in 1968, he was able to herald this sublime "pride" as the only suitable criterion for the success of "tremendous scale" of effort expended.

Yet it is not until this sublime aesthetics of commensuration was complemented by an archaeological impulse for retrospection that it became the operative motive for saving Abu Simbel. By late 1962, 22 teams of excavators had invaded Nubia, and a sense of accomplishment had begun to pervade the international archaeological community. As Brew proudly wrote to Jacob Javits in November, the digs were themselves "extraordinary achievements." But, he continued candidly, international recognition of these achievements would never be forthcoming, unless a commensurate monument was heralded as an immediate result:

Were it not for Abu Simbel we would all be patting eachother on the back and claiming a great triumph. The fact that within two years ... some thirty expeditions with scientists

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²⁸⁶ Canaday was unequivocal in his answer: "I was wrong." "Every argument ... has been made except the one that surprised me most and impresses me as most valid, which is that the temple as a whole and the painted bas-reliefs on the interior and in particular are aesthetically, if not Egyptologically, among the half-dozen examples of Egyptian art where the presence of a creative artist is most strongly felt, and where life most pervades an art dedicated to the placation of death." John Canaday, "Temple in Extremis," The New York Times (April 14, 1963), 119.

from 25 countries would be excavating in Nubia is itself an extraordinary achievement. The peoples of the world governments and academic institutions have joined together on a cultural matter ... to an extent none of us was optimistic enough to foresee. Unfortunately ... unless we can save Abu Simbel a great many people, including our best friends in Egypt, will feel that we have failed. So our big fight remains to save the two superb temples at Abu Simbel. ²⁸⁷

Brew identified two scales of commensuration and attached to each a political constituency. Yet what sounded like a political imperative—placating political allies in Egypt and satisfying a fascinated public in the West—was in fact a feedback system, that built contemporary evaluation into monumental meaning. This new meaning was legible in the very fine distinction between the "purely cultural" and the "purely archaeological." As Williams Adams recalled in 1967, "the continuation of all forms of archaeological research depends in the long run on public support, and in Nubia it was Abu Simbel which captured the public imagination. Had there been no Abu Simbel, the scope of the purely archaeological campaign in Nubia would assuredly have been smaller, not larger." Thus, Adams concluded, the "principles of conservation of cultural treasures" were truly different from the principles of "the advancement of scientific knowledge." If Abu Simbel's salvage was not "archaeological in the technical sense," it could still acquire an archaeological value retrospectively. "Cultural" principles tied Abu Simbel's survival to the immediate continuation of archaeology, and imagined the monument's survival in a very distant future.

As the temples neared immersion, Unesco's tone grew more dramatic and it emphasis turned to commemoration: "One of man's distinctive features," the 1964 pamphlet announced, "is a habit of leaving behind on the soil from which he wrests his livelihood all sort so remains which provide a record of his history." The archaeologists were all too aware that, however "extraordinary", the achievements of salvage archaeology in Nubia would leave no traces behind. (Even with the archaeological work being done, Brew wrote in late 1963, "the record of at least 500 thousand years of human history will be obliterated.") ²⁹⁰ Abu Simbel was an immediately available monument,

²⁸⁷ Letter from Brew to Jacob Javits, Nov 20, 1962. Brew 9/1086f.

²⁸⁸ "Unesco's participation in the campaign was founded on principles of conservation of cultural treasures, not advancement of scientific knowledge." Draft of lecture, April 1967. In Brew Archives, Correspondance: Adams. The phrase "captured imagination" was a trope used by all to signify the political importance of the campaign in the eyes of an international public, and the political potential represented in these captive eyes. Kennedy's appeal used it for the campaign as a whole "In making these funds available the United States will be participating in an international effort which has captured the imagination and sympathy of people throughout the world." PR (61)5.

In the discourse of the archaeologists like Adams, the phrase was used as a euphemism for the amateur interests of powerful politicians, crucial to the continuing funding in congress. See for example Brew's account of meeting with Kenneth Galbraith: "his interest in archaeology was in seeing it. ... For the inspirational value of great archaeological sites." Letter from Brew to Wilson. April 3, 1961. Brew Archive 10/54b.

²⁸⁹ CUA.64/D.30/A. Unesco, International Campaign for Monuments (Paris: Unesco, 1964.) Unesco Archives.

²⁹⁰ "Nubia and the Aswan Dam," Cranbrook Newsletter (Aug 1963). Brew 8/1086c.

that could render visible the archaeological effort already expended. In other words, archaeologists embarked on their "big fight to save the two superb temples at Abu Simbel" in large part to make render visible the archaeological work they had already completed. How did this "big fight" unfold?

The "big fight" to turn food aid into cultural exchange

The "big fight" of American archaeologists to secure funding for the salvage of Abu Simbel illustrates that a temple did not have to be exported as a "grant-in-return" in order to be understood as a "surplus" object. This fight began in January 1960, when Unesco's representative at the State Department, Mr. Thayer, convened a "meeting in Washington of Egyptologists and museum directors to explore their interest in the project" at the National Gallery of Art in Washington, DC. The resulting memorandum gave "three aspects of the Nubia question that seemed to merit consideration." This list of aspects placed the value of saving the temples on a sliding scale of interest, from "altruism" to "national interest:"

- 1) Altruism: It was reasonable to suppose that many Americans would respond favorably to the appeal to preserve these great monuments for posterity.
- 2) Enlightened self-interest: A re-awakening of interest in Egyptology was foreseen through widespread publicity... especially for the saving of Abu Simbel
- 3) The obtaining of good digging sites: ... since the Europeans would not delay in organizing digging parties in Nubia, the US should seriously consider ... that this project be discussed in terms of national interest, as well as particular interests.²⁹¹

This progression connected two forms of abstract valuation ("altruism" valued the relative prominence of "monuments" in "posterity," while "national interest" valued the prominence of nations in the Nubian desert) through a specific value of single monument, Abu Simbel (which, in itself, was valued in the realm of "a revival of Egyptology".

This pattern connecting cultural altruism to political self-interest was consistently repeated, as expert committees proliferated and politicians requested their judgment with increasing frequency. In 1963, when estimates for an acceptable moving scheme for Abu Simbel were proposed, State Department liaison Max McCullough wrote Brew and Wilson, asking them to state "their best judgment on the value of preserving the temples." Wilson replied by spanning from the monument's "unique value" to the country's "cultural leadership" in five numbered steps:

- 1. Abu Simbel is unique and of value which transcends any money valuation.
- 2. This opportunity is the most brilliant one currently available in the arts and will do much to advance the standing of the arts and humanities

²⁹¹ Minutes of Meeting at the National Gallery of Art, 24 March 1960. Brew 9/1086m.

- 3. An international agreement to preserve something for the long future represents a peaceful consensus of nations, which must not be brushed aside;
- 4. A success in the endeavor may be of marked aid in out relations with the United Arab Republic; and
- 5. The United States here has a brilliant opportunity to show cultural leadership. 292

A nested set of autonomies was manifest in this sliding scale from objecthood to politics. Each numbered item was listed as having value in and of itself, beginning with the monument, which had value because it transcends valuation, and onto the "arts and humanities" which could only advance their own standing. The juxtaposition of these autonomous elements, then, legitimated the presence of the nation-state in the list, as a autonomous cultural entity to be preserved for its own sake. This time, the progression from "altruism" to "self-interest" was mediated not by the monument but rather by "the peaceful consensus of nations:" a new international space where the autonomy of a cultural object could mutate into the self-interest of a nation.

The analogy between a collection of monuments and the consensus of nations had already been made by President Kennedy in his recommendation to Congress, which referred to Nasser's claim that the temples were cherished by "the whole world, which believes that the ancient and the new components of human culture should blend in one harmonious whole." This fusion of ancient and modern, Kennedy continued, was visible in the bilateral relations between the US and Egypt: "The United States, one of the newest of civilizations, has long had ... a special interest in the civilization of ancient Egypt ... and a deep friendship with the people of the Nile Valley." It was in the same "harmonious whole" that monuments and nation-states should co-exist, and the history of mankind would be shaped into the image of an international order. Perhaps more to the point, nation-states would borrow the autonomy of monuments from culture, that harmonious milieu of disinterest.

The progression from a monument's "valuation" to a nation's "leadership" reveals the process latent in the Nubian campaign: a conversion of the raw value of cultural objects into political power. Brew spelled out the workings of this transformative process: "If the US aids this project," he wrote to Thayer, "we shall gain credit all over the world for contributing to a <u>major cultural project</u>. Not only will be doing something worthwhile itself but we will be advertising to the world the fact that we <u>are</u> interested in something beyond military security and economic prosperity." By publicizing its disinterestedness, the US would demonstrate its power. Here we can understand the

²⁹² Letter from Wilson to Max McCullough, 8 Jan 1963, Brew archives, Correspondance folder.

²⁹³ John F. Kennedy, Letter from the President to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, April 6, 1961. Reprinted as Press Release PR(61)5, 7 Apr 1961.

²⁹⁴ Letter from Brew to Thayer, Jan 2 1963. Brew 10/54d.

trope that Abu Simbel had "captured imaginations" more literally: the monument contained hundreds of thousands of captive attentions, a public from which it was necessary extract political gain.

Where Brew's explanation went further than Wilson's is that he made an economic argument in addition to a political one: the campaign could be seen as a cultural solution to a coldwar spending problem. Thayer had asked for a quantitative "assessment of the cultural and historic value of these monuments." ²⁹⁵ Brew responded qualitatively: that there was a type of funds that was commensurate to the task at hand.:

This would seem to be an excellent opportunity to use for good purpose some of the considerable amount of money which has accumulated in Cairo under Public Law 480. ... Large accumulation of PL 480 funds are subject to last through devaluation of the local currency. The Abu Simbel project seems to me to be a good way to protect ourselves, in part, from this contingency and at the same time to gain credit for a laudable action of which people all over the world will approve. ²⁹⁶

Brew suggested was that the US Government use so-called "counterpart funds," which were also known as "Public Law (PL) 480 funds," that resulted from the sale of agricultural surpluses to Egypt, and were earmarked for US-approved "Aid" projects. In other words, Brew proposed to bridge the sliding scale from political power to "purely cultural" value of objects, by using a funding scheme that already bridged between "disinterested" action (feeding the hungry) and "strategic interests" (enlisting allies abroad.)

In Maussian terms, the fact that the US contributed "counterpart funds" to the campaign means that these contributions were intended to take back from the UAR the power it had gained by offering its antiquities as "gifts-in-return." In a neat application of Mauss' theory, the campaign unfolded according in this pattern of giving and countergiving. Just as the Egyptian government had interested the US by offering these temples as "gifts," the US now presented itself as giving away a very specific form of "aid" which came with obligations. The US's financial contribution to the Abu Simbel salvage project must be understood as a counter-gift, in the strict Maussian sense: an object offered, whose value is intended to exceed that of a gift received. Indeed one might see this post-colonial back-and-forth pattern as an enactment of George Bataille's politico-economic interpretation of Mauss, where "giving must become acquiring a power." What was exchanged in this political rivalry between the US and the UAR was generosity itself, the idea of giving and the power to receive. 297

²⁹⁵ "Only a very high estimate of the worth of these monuments could justify so large an expenditure." Thayer to Brew and Wilson. Brew 10/54d.

²⁹⁶ Letter from Brew to Thayer, Jan 2 1963. Brew 10/54d.

²⁹⁷ "The subject who gives... enriches himself with a contempt for riches, and what he proves to be miserly of is in fact his generosity") Bataille, La Part Maudite (Paris: Minuit, 1967), 129. Bataille described this reclamation, as a

The US was not the only member state to partake in the salvage of Abu Simbel without contributing hard currencies. Former colonial powers took Unesco's appeal as an occasion to resolve asset disputes that had arisen from the Suez Canal crisis. France "offered to contribute one million dollars payable in French property confiscated in Egypt in 1956,"298 and Britain's contribution, in "impounded pounds," was partially drawn from donations given to cultural institutions in 1953 but frozen by the UAR government in the expropriation of foreign assets in 1957. 299 In both cases, these contributions were presented to domestic public as a tactical solution to the severance of diplomatic relations with Egypt in a post-Suez climate. Both "donations" intended to strong-arm Nasser into giving up property he had acquired by nationalization: a very public reclaiming of assets that he was holding hostage in the UAR.

What distinguished the American "counterpart" funds" from these other contributions, however, is that laws governing these funds tied US economic aid to the disposal of "those world renowned surpluses, American wheat and cotton."300 Counterpart funds were US assets held by the UAR, but they had not been "taken" by Nasser; rather, they had in some ways already been "given" to him. Thus they were already laden with counter-gift power: they allowed the US to match the UAR's contention that its temples were "surplus" with a proposition to contribute funds which were also "in excess." Thus the story of the "big fight" to secure these funds for Abu Simbel is the story of how archaeologists battled to transform the value of America's "surplus food" into the value of the UAR's "surplus temples."

Originally inspired by Marshall Plan funding, the sale of America's surplus agricultural commodities to developing countries in local currencies was a way to accommodate "long-term pressure for surplus disposal." Over the course of the 1950s, the problem of finding "customers for American grain in an impoverished world became intertwined with attempts to solve complex

destruction: "If he destroyed the object in solitude, in silence, no sort of power would result from the act.... But if he destroys the object in front of another person or if he gives it away, the one who gives has actually acquired, in the other's eyes, the power of giving or destroying. ... He is now rich for having ostentatiously consumed what is wealth only if it is consumed." The relationship of destruction to power is crucial to understand, since Unesco expected the campaign to represent the power of mankind to resist destruction. (This is a form of sublimity.) Georges Bataille, "The Gift of Rivalry: Potlatch" The Accursed Share Vol I Trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Zone, 1991), 69.

²⁹⁸ "Unesco Gets New Plan to Save Temple," in Chicago Tribune (May 12, 1963), A14.

²⁹⁹ The British contribution was made by settling a dispute over a gift made in 1953 by former British Commissioner for the Egyptian Public Debt upon his death, to the Fitzwilliam Museum in Cambridge and the National Art Collections. Since Cairo had refused to release these funds, the UK Foreign Office made the contributions itself, then "informed President Nasser that he could regard the money as Britain's official contribution toward saving the Abu Simbel temples." See "Gift: Impounded Pounds" New York Times (May 4, 1964), 20.

^{300 &}quot;Artisans Enlisted in Egypt to Use Surpluses" New York Times (Oct 17, 1960), 39.

political and military problems abroad."³⁰¹ The amount of negotiating power that the US really derived from its PL 480 power has remained unclear—as recent analyses have shown, "there is little evidence that US food aid policy usefully served US diplomatic interests."³⁰² Egypt's participation in the PL 480 program is a case in point: it dated to 1955, was suspended during the Suez crisis, but resumed the following year, and reached its peak in 1962. John F Kennedy was a particular believer in the fund, however, renaming the program "Food for Peace" and pledging to use it more forcefully as an instrument of international politics during his presidential campaign. His arrival at the presidency therefore intensified reliance on these funds, in particular to influence Middle East policy by "recognizing the force of Arab Nationalism" and "channeling it constructive lines." In the case of Egypt Kennedy proposed to use counterpart funds to prompt spending on domestic projects, hoping to turn Nasser's nationalism inward, away from any communist alliances and tendencies. "If neutrality is the result of concentration on internal problems, raising the standard of living of the people and so forth, particularly in the underdeveloped countries, I would accept that."³⁰³ Thus, although it was proferred under the cover of an internationalist agenda, Kennedy's pledge of PL 480 funds was actually an attempt to neutralize Nasser's international ambitions.

The idea of using Counterpart Funds for cultural purposes was not new; they had already been the primary source of funding for the US archaeological excavations during the early part of the campaign. But the sums involved in the salvage of Abu Simbel were so large that they began to figure in a symbolic way in Unesco's discourse: the US contribution would be pivotal to the very success of the endeavor. Kennedy's pledge received widespread international publicity, After the Kennedy pledge was made public, the US contribution was featured in the press as stand-alone, equal only to the UAR's own. But after it became the contribution to Abu Simbel instead of Philae, it also acquired a specific connotation: since the US was anxious to "preserve the traditional pattern of an American ceiling of 30 percent in international expenditures," the sum of \$12 million implied that a \$36 million dollar project was possible. This impression was reinforced by the Egyptian decision to match the US contribution with its own \$12 Million.

³⁰¹ Harriet Friedmann, "The Political Economy of Food: The rise and Fall of the Postwar International Food Order." in The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 88 Supplement: Marxist Inquiries: Studies of Labor, class, and States (1982), S251. For a contextualization of American Food Aid in worldwide context, see Michael Wallerstein, Food for War – Food for Peace: United States Food Aid in a Global Context (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980.)

^{302 &}quot;Public Law 480: "Better than a Bomber," Middle East Report Mar-Apr 1987, 25.

³⁰³ JF Kennedy, Strategy of Peace, 217-219, cited in Douglas Little, "The New frontier on the Nile: JFK, Nasser, and Arab Nationalism, Journal of American History 75/2 (Sep 1988), 501-527.

³⁰⁴ Note from Brew, Memorandum from a Phone Call from Washington, Lois Haase, Nov 29, 1960.

The trouble with the link between domestic politics and international aid is that it subjected counterpart funds both to being "requested" by the receiving country and being "appropriated" by Congress. However public Kennedy's pledge, it was not binding to congress, and the extent to which these contributions were approved largely depended on a perceived political climate of the moment. By the time Unesco archaeologists went to request the funds in Congress, the climate of cooperation between Nasser and US had soured. The archaeologists approached a hostile Congress twice, and were twice confronted with a refusal to appropriate the funds.

The first time that the archaeologists approached congress, they made the very simple argument that PL 480 funds were accumulating disproportionately in Egypt, and that these funds "in excess" of US needs presented a significant risk of devaluation, especially in light of mounting tensions with Nasser.³⁰⁵ When John Wilson testified to the Senate that "these funds exist there with the problem of what the disposal of them might be," he paraphrased Bataille's famous encapsulation of the Marshall Plan: "Le problème se pose de la dépense de l'excédent." ³⁰⁶ Kennedy's pledge itself made this "excess" apparent:

The US contribution can be in the form of US-owned Egyptian currency generated under PL 480. The total of these contributions recommended below can be met from the portion of these currencies available for U.S. use which is determined to be in excess of U.S. prospective requirements.³⁰⁷

In private, the archaeologists saw this threat of excessive accumulation as an opportunity: "threat of devaluation.... is a good argument for people who would not otherwise be interested in a cultural matter." In front of Congress, they presented culture as a safe, "non-controversial" mode of expenditure: "It cannot be called cultural politics to use our surplus funds for this cultural purpose." Certainly the excess of surplus made US politicians nervous as it created an imbalance in the gifting patterns between US and UAR. By 1961 a rumor circulated amongst archaeologists that "the appropriations committee is seeking good usage of the PL 480 funds." To the "surplus" value of the imported wheat was now added the "excess" value of the aid.

³⁰⁵ Historians today see the 1960s as a moment when the problem of 'Excess funds" became apparent: "Over time, the local-currency provisions of the large PL 480 sales to Egypt created a problem. ... Proceeds from local-currency sale were placed into a special account for the use of the local government. However, in Egypt local currency accounts became very large, leading congress to become concerned about the uses of this 'Excess currency.' The presence of such excess-currency countries eventually led Congress to substitute long-term dollar-credit sales for the use of local currency." Lisa Martin, Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation (Princeton: PU Press, 2000), 142.

³⁰⁷ As Kennedy wrote in his letter, "The US contribution can be in the form of US-owned Egyptian currency generated under PL 480." Kennedy appeal, PR (61) 5, page 2.

³⁰⁸ Brew Memorandum to the Executive Committee, 19 Sep, 1961. Brew 9/1086f.

³⁰⁹ Mutual Security Act of 1960, 576.

Yet congressional skepticism of the proposed use of funds in Egypt was supported by ignorance of the role of Unesco as a channel for international action, and familiarity, in contrast, with a tradition of personal or corporate philanthropy. Kennedy's pledge had been secured largely through inter-personal diplomacy: enlisting the first lady to pressure Kennedy on his "cultural" interests, leveraging his personal relationship with Nasser. Private diplomacy at the highest level had also been necessary to negotiate an assurance from Nasser that he would accept the use of the funds. As Brew wrote, "we are greatly handicapped in seeking funds from the Federal Government by the fact that the Egyptians themselves do not request them." Thus the Swiss-born Prince Saruddin Aga Khan had served as an mediator. Similarly, US archaeologists were encouraged to appear in Congress as private citizens, rather than representatives of institutions, organizations or committees, to avoid the impression of special interests. Yet this recourse to personal diplomacy backfired: some expressed distaste for the particular individuals involved, and most suggested, essentially, that private funds should be sought for the salvage rather than government expenditure.

After this first Congressional refusal to appropriate funds in September 1961, the archaeologists inverted their strategy. They embarked on a national publicity campaign to argue that monuments-salvage would succeed where the "food for peace" had failed: by rendering visible America's influence in Egypt. It was no longer devaluation, but recuperation that was the major threat, as they played on growing fears that food aid to Egypt went "unsung," and that Nasser was reaping the public-relations benefit that properly belonged to the US. Indeed "food for peace" had been publicized as "better than a bomber" (again echoing Bataille, "The American economy is in fact the greatest explosive mass the world has ever known.") ³¹² because by "speaking the language of food" American surpluses won the allegiance of foreign populations by feeding them. But as visiting American politicians found, most Egyptians were convinced that the wheat came from

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³¹⁰ Much of 1962 was spent trying to find a way for Egypt to "ask" for the funds. "Every year the Egyptians make requests for us of part of the blocked currency under various categories. One of these categories does not even need the approval of Congress. What is needed, however, is an expression of their wishes and a high priority for Abu Simbel by the Egyptian Government. This we never had. Last April I went into this very thoroughly with Akasha during an hour's session in his office. I pointed out exactly the various moves that would facilitate the matter, if made by the Egyptian Government. Nothing came of it." Letter from Brew to Mortimer Wheeler. 27 Dec, 1962. Brew 10/54d.

³¹¹ René Maheu himself suggested to the Executive Committee that "a campaign in the private sector" be started, although he did so only in "confidentially," at a meeting in October 1961: "The third and last point raised by Maheu was the matter of starting a campaign in the private sector. M. Maheu confidentially suggested that a formal organization for the Nubian Committee was needed. To foster such a move M. Maheu promised to endow the newly chartered committee with a quasi-official Unesco status and even offered to make a token financial contribution for its support." US National Committee, Minutes of Meeting of Executive Committee, (October 14, 1961). Brew Archives, 9/1086e.

³¹² Bataille, "The Marshall Plan," 171.

Nasser—worse yet, from the Aswan High Dam. ³¹³ In contrast, the archaeologists argued that the Kennedy pledge had already garnered enough publicity abroad, including in Egypt, that the US was already speaking the language of monuments. In personal letters to senators and congressmen, archaeologists argued that to retract the funds would be perceived as a tragic repetition of the Aswan Dam fiasco.

Unesco's archaeologists argued that monuments—especially large monuments like Abu Simbel—could accomplish what no wheat could: visibility. Yet by the time these arguments were made the second time, in 1963, Egyptian-Soviet friendship had escalated to symbolic levels, as evidenced by Khrushchev's visit to the Dam. Not wanting to monumentalize its aid to a country over which it evidently had no political control, the US Congress refused a second time to appropriate the funds. Paradoxically, this second refusal marks a failure of the food-for-peace program and the success of the archaeologists' symbolic conversion: the archaeologists had successfully convinced the senators that contributing to the campaign would constitute a significant symbolic gesture—and this is precisely why the senators refused to do so.

Faced with this second failure, in May 1964, to align political symbolism with economic opportunity, the State Department resolved to take matter out of Congress and to offer to appropriate the funds by "appropriation waiver authority," in a process where "no vote was necessary." PL 480 funds could be made available to the State Department directly without any negotiation "for specific purposes—in this case economic support." The only requirement was for the project to be reviewed by the US Agency of International Development (USAID), which certified that funds devoted to Abu Simbel would contribute to the idea of "balanced economic development." Two lessons can be drawn from this development. First, that in this case, the "balance" of development was provided by tourism: it was ultimately argued that "the US should be associated with the preservation of the temples which not only have great cultural interest, but will contribute to the economic development of the UAR through increased tourism." Secondly, that the channel that was thereby opened to make the funds available was closed off to re-use as soon as it was opened at all. Thus a final "exception" was made in the appropriation:

While the committee feels that the US should be associated with the preservation of these temples, which not only have great cultural interest, but will contribute to the

³¹³ Jean-Jacques Dethier and Kathy Funk, "The Language of PL 480 in Egypt," Middle East Report 145, The Struggle For Food (Mar-Apr 1978) 22-28.

³¹⁴ Letter July 24, 1962, Brew 10/54d.

³¹⁵ Letter from Brew to Wilson, 14 Aug 1964. Brew 10/54a. For a brief theorization of the role of tourism in the Middle East in the 20th Century, see Robert Vitalis, "The Middle East on the Edge of the Pleasure Periphery" in Middle East Report, 196, Tourism and the Business of Pleasure (Sep- Oct 1995), 2-7. For cultural criticism on the contemporary effects of this history, see Rami Farouk Daher, Tourism in the Middle East (Buffalo: Channel View, 2007).

economic development of the UAR through increased tourism, it does not believe that an appropriation, as such, is necessary under the circumstances.

The Committee recommends that the US contribution be funded through a Public Law 480, Title I, 104 (c) grant from the appropriate portion of the currencies available as the result of the sale of agricultural commodities to the UAR under this title. The state department has indicated the feasibility of making the contribution in this manner.

While recommending this method of financing this particular instance, the Committee emphasizes that, in general, it disapproves of the use of the appropriations waiver authority in the making of outright grants, which authority, in the past, has been misused.³¹⁶

This use of funds for a cultural purpose was only "a particular instance," not the basis for a new age of cultural politics. The success of the Abu Simbel appropriation was dependent, much like the rest of the campaign, on allowing cultural value to be realized in temporary and exception conditions, while publicized as fulfilling apparently permanent and normative goals.

This "big fight" therefore opened two channels of exchange between the US and the UAR, both designed to bypass tensions in their diplomatic relations. The first channel was secret; it allowed economic aid to continue to flow from the US to the UAR despite international tensions; here it was the uniqueness of the economic opportunity that helped the salvage to occur. The second channel was public; it mobilized "international public opinion" in favor of the salvage in both countries; here it was the reproducible anonymity of the temples that was foregrounded.

V. Abu Simbel and the birth of International Style preservation

The French "dam" and Italian "lifting" schemes

Between 1959 and 1963 over ten schemes for saving Abu Simbel were proposed to Unesco; only four earned the status of an official proposal worthy of expert evaluation, but all were evaluated according to the criterion of "integrity." As a norm for international preservation, integrity implied that the value of monuments stemmed from their relation to their site, but allowed monuments to be moved while retaining this value. ³¹⁷ As Unesco historian Save-Sodeberg has noted, despite the

³¹⁶ Minutes of the Senate Subcommittee, Cited in a letter from Wilson to Brew, August 14, 1964. Brew 10/54a.

³¹⁷ Upon visiting the temples during the Nubian cruise the experts unanimously agreed that "no effort must be sparedto salvage this complex in its integrity."55 EX/7 Annexe I, page 6. "Les 2 temples d'Abou Simbel constituent un complexe monumental de la plus haute importance, dans un site admirable. Les experts sont unanimes à considérer que s disparition serait une perte irréparable pour le patrimoine culturel de l'humanité. En conséquence, ils estiment que rien ne doit être négligé pour sauvegarder cet ensemble dans son intégrité."

prominence of this term in the Abu Simbel debates, it is not until 1968, when the cast of experts reconvened for the salvage of Philae, that this concept of "integrity" was officially defined:

By the phrase integrity of monuments is meant the preservation of the original geographic, architectural and cultural position and ambiance of the monument including not only the position of various buildings vis-à-vis each other, but also their original relationship with surrounding physiographic and cultural features in the area.³¹⁸

What was meant by "integrity," in other words, was a matrix of relationships between site and monument. It is precisely because the bond between monument and context was to be broken, that this bond was elevated into a principle. Each scheme for salvaging Abu Simbel was understood as a proposal for how best to sever this "integral" bond, and how to reconstruct it with "integrity."

This passage from the "integration" of objects to the "integrity" of actions implied crucial ethical overtones. In a neat application of the aesthetics of process, engineering was invoked to transform an ontological problem (on the value of the object) into a deontological dilemma (on the value of action). While most teams included architects, the competition unfolded undoubtedly as an engineering event—as evidenced, for instance, by the fact that each proposal began with a critique of its predecessors. Even the first scheme commissioned began with an enumeration of the four options outlined by the Executive Committee on its Nubian cruise, and presented the solution as a comparative "choice." Thus in contrast to the Aswan Dam, Unesco's salvage project followed the 'decision-making' protocol set for engineering projects by development institutions. One of the consequences of this engineering procedure is that each scheme cumulatively contributed to the final solution, even if it was harshly judged when evaluated in itself.

Each national team was also an experiment in collaboration, and all projected a ecumenical role onto the figure of the engineer: the ethical integrity of the engineer would substitute for the material integrity of the temple. Many of the hybrid modes of architectural authorship that were later codified by postwar architecture and engineering avant-gardes were prefigured here: from the poetic figure of the architect-engineer with a structural vision (Italy's Riccardo Morandi with conservationist Piero Gazzola), to the heroic technocrats of territorial management (France's Coyne & Belier, with colonial urbanist Albert Laprade); from the multivalent consortia of infrastructural

³¹⁸ Save-Södeberg, 100. UNESCO/SNUBIA15 (1968), 15.

³¹⁹ These were: - Lifting the temples and surrounding rocks above the levels of the waters;

⁻ Construction of a concrete dam in front of each temple;

⁻ Construction of a vaulted concrete dam, protecting the temples from up close

⁻ Construction of a rock-fill earth dam, approximately 700 meters wide, in such a manner that the rock mounds in which the temples have been hewn are respected in their totality. The distance between the façade of the great temple and the crest of the dam would be around 300 meters.

⁵⁵ EX/7 Annexe 1: "Réunion d'Experts Internationaux pour la sauvegarde des sites et monuments de Nubie menacés," Le Caire, 1-11-Octobre 1959, "Rapport", 6.

development (Sweden's VBB and Italy's Italconsult), to the innovators who launched engineering's own international avant-garde (Britain's Ove Arup, led by Ted Happold, with architects Drew & Fry). While these collaborations clearly can be inserted in the emergence of a trans-national engineering profession, one should not underestimate the effect of the "national" affiliation under which these teams were convened, and the effect of their sponsorship by state or para-state institutions. These teams, especially those lacking a preservationist, were united by unspoken assumptions about restoration. Insofar as all these teams contributed to the definition of an international "integrity" upon which Unesco would build its "international style" of preservation, they also served as carriers of national conventions inherited from the 19th century.

The first scheme to be officially adopted by Unesco was proposed by the French engineering firm of Coyne et Bellier: to preserve the temples in situ by building a rock-fill dam—in some ways a copy of the Aswan High Dam—in front of the temples. (fig 4.39) The scheme had been conceived during the Nubian cruise by French engineer, and former president of the International Commission for High Dams, André Coyne (1891-1960).³²⁰ In a massive, two-volume Report submitted to Unesco, Coyne & Bellier (C&B) explicated all the technical, financial and aesthetic aspects, proposing a straightforward application of the "aesthetics of process" to the entire Nubian environment: by reintegrating Abu Simbel into its new settings by using the same technologies that had radically transformed the site in the first place.

The actual design of the dam was left to French architect Albert Laprade (1893-1978), who explicated his proposal in a paragraph titled "Aesthetics." The "extraordinary harmony" of the site, Laprade argued, could never be "reconstituted by artifice" but should rather be "magnified and maintained" in an "enclave", albeit in "reduced scale and more limited horizon." The new dam, in other words, was not to be an "additional monument" but rather a "jewel-case" for the existing temples. What was "preserved" in this scheme was a set of relationship between the orientation of the sun, the arrival by water, and the Nubian hillside. In order to retain the effect of the sun rising on the temples, a broad space was left in front of the temples, and "in order to maintain the perspective"

³²⁰ Coyne was instrumental in modernizing France's dam-building practices in a moment when hydro-electricity became central to the French energy policy. The encyclopedic Art de l'Ingénieur has him learning the lessons of the TVA and introducing thinner concrete-vaulted dams to France. Coyne built 61 dams in France and 23 abroad. A. Picon, ed., L'art de l'ingénieur, 141-142. The Commission Internationale des Grands Barrages (CIGB) was created in 1928, as part of the Conférence mondiale de l'énergie (CME/WPC). For Coyne's primary invention, the "ski-jump" dam section, see A. Coyne, "Quelques Nouveautés dans la structure des barrages et usines hydro-électriques," Techniques et architectures 6 (1946) 193-196. At the Nubian meeting Coyne was represented by his colleague Georges Post.

³²¹ Albert Laprade, "Esthétique," Bureau d'études André Coyne et Jean Bellier, Avant-Projet des Ouvrages de Protection des Temples d'Abou Simbel. Vol. 1: Rapport. (Paris: 1960), 1,2-3.

of the arrival by boat" this space would be filled with a shallow pool of water. Similarly, it was in order to "melt [fondre] the work into the landscape" that Laprade proposed making the dam an ellipse rather than a circle, since "the circular form ... would have been too majestic." He also purposely "avoided any axis of symmetry" which would have "diverted onto the amphitheater of the dam the attention that should be directed at the temples." Both of these choices were explained in terms of aesthetic integration:

Because of the unique aesthetic requirements, enough space must be left in front of the temples for visitors to be able to view them in their natural perspective and the lines and apperance of the dam bust be integrated with the monuments and their surroundings.³²²

As Laprade's perspective view showed, not a single element was left out of the choreography: visitors, slowly descending towards the temples along a diagonal path, would theatrically re-create the elemental performance of man, earth, sun, wind and water that had always defined the site.

It is clear that Laprade felt no anxiety in leaving a legible human gesture in the desert sand—as long as it was a gesture aesthetically continuous with the original setting. As an academic architect ("the last grand architect-planner graduate of the Ecole des Beaux-Arts" according to one encyclopedia), Laprade used his own hand to mediate between building and site. ³²³ But the resulting scheme can also be understood as a version of the practice of "restoration", as it had been defined by Viollet le Duc: the act of "re-instating a monument in a condition of completeness which might have never existed at any given time." ³²⁴ Indeed all of Laprade's restoration work can be understood as adapting this preservationist creed to the urban and colonial scales of Beaux-Arts planning. His theory of vernacular Moroccan architecture, elaborated in pattern-books like the 1924 Le Jardin et la maison arabes au Maroc and in designs like the 1917 Nouvelle Ville Indigène, was based on a design system as "completely" invented as it was "rationally" derived from a rigorous stylistic analysis.

Similarly, at Abu Simbel, Laprade performed what can only be called a stylistic analysis of the site—studying "the materials, the forms, even the colors, against which the temples have stood for thirty centuries"—in order to insert his own hand into this timeless landscape, producing a dam with an "almost natural appearance, [un aspect presque naturel]."

Laprade was undoubtedly invited to collaborate with Coyne & Bellier because of his double experience, working as an urban planner in North Africa, and designing dams in France. As Gwendolyn Wright has noted, Laprade saw Arab constructive traditions as effectively "existing out

³²² II C/PRG/9 Add.I Annex I: "Summary of the Preliminary Design Prepared by Coyne et Bellier, consulting engineers, for the protection of the Abu Simbel temples."

³²³ Elizabeth McLane, "Laprade, Albert," 610.

³²⁴ Viollet-le-Duc, "On restoration" Trans. Charles Wethered, (London: Sampson, Low, Marttson, Low and Sparce, 1875).

of time" (much as Viollet le Duc's gothic masons were idealized agents of constructive truths, rather than real historical figures.)³²⁵ Wright concludes that "despite good intentions" Laprade only produced "an architecture of pastiche." Laprade's involvement in the Abu Simbel project shows that the collaborative "harmony" he read in medieval building traditions fed both his appetite for pastiche forms and for modern-day collaborations. Whether in North African vernaculars or in the "façade systems" of Parisian old quarters, Laprade's interest in vernacular forms was only one facet of a much larger vision for the future: the architectural "integration" of France. 326 This would include reviving its regional traditions, marrying its landscapes with industrial forms and—most crucially—re-uniting its long-separated architectural and engineering professions.³²⁷ It is in order to usher a new age of architectural heroism that Laprade sought a new type of architectural collaborations. In 1957 he wrote of a "veritable renaissance of the aesthetic sense in the world of engineers," and gave André Coyne a place of honor in his roster of examples. 328 In other words, in participating in projects like the Abu Simbel salvage, Laprade was trying to hoist himself, and the whole French architectural profession, "out of time." He even invoked Egypt as a model, recalling that "in the marvelous history of Egypt one out of five men who were deified were architects." 329 Thus the very form of this Coyne-Laprade partnership was designed to follow in the heroic footsteps of ancient engineers.

The technical portions of C&B's report echoed Laprade's elemental understanding of "integrity," by presenting the choice of a rock-fill dam (over a more tight-fitting, arcuated, concrete solution) as a concession to the "natural harmony" of the site. Coyne et Bellier were France's

Wright cites from Laprade's Croquis: Portugal, Espagne, Maroc: "Up to 1909, custom (cïad) had not changed since the fifteenth century. Mason, sculptor, carpenter, ironworker, each enjoyed himself on his own without breaking the harmony among them, so much had traditions remained stable in these countries situated outside the grand currents of Europe." Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991), 113.

³²⁶ Laprade gave an impassioned defense of these old quarters in his contribution to the "Pour ou Contre?" series, against Pierre Dufau's arguments "for" urban renewal. Albert Laprade & Pierre Dufau, Pour ou Contre la Démolition de Paris? (Nancy: Berger-Levrault, 1967). This defense did not prevent him from building a much-reviled administrative building on the Ile St Louis, despite having argued for "modesty" and "sensibility." See Laprade, "Aménagement des quartiers historiques," Techniques et Architectures and "Plaidoyer pour la sensibilité et la modestie," L'Art sacré (1948), 11-13.

³²⁷ For Laprade's dam designs, see "Les arts et la technique dans la vie moderne," in Maurice Culot, Albert Laprade: Architecte, jardinier, urbaniste, dessinateur, serviteur du patrimoine (Paris: Norma, 2007), 262-292. The author mentions the Abu Simbel scheme in passing (286) calling it "the most just and elegant of the solutions", but only in order to make the collaboration into a cautionary tale about the decline of both Laprade and Coyne's careers. Coyne died in 1960, a few months after the catastrophic failure of his dam at Malpasset, which ruined his international reputation and demoralized him, apparently to death. Citing from Laprade's eulogy, the authors argue that Laprade's last work, the Préfecture de Paris, was a career-canceling failure on par with Coyne's Malpasset dam.

³²⁸ Albert Laprade, "Les Architectes et les Grands Travaux Publics," in Laprade, Les Architectes (Paris: SADG, 1957). Originally published in Bulletin mensuel d'informations de la SADG 9 (Dec 1954).

³²⁹ Albert Laprade, "Notes sur un Congrès," in Les Architectes v. I, 51-53

foremost dam-builders, primary beneficiaries of the mid-century "French infatuation with hydro-electricity" and pioneers in the nationalization of its electric power and the design of thin-shell concrete dams. 330 In Nubia, however, they drew the three alternatives and concluded that a "classic design" for an earth dam was most suitable, since it allowed a larger perimeter around the temples. To this "classic design" they added two other hydraulic systems designed to "cut off any path for water" to get to the temples. Indeed, despite the dam water was to infiltrate the rock at any level below that of the reservoir lake. With a "very complex system of injection" an underground "clay curtain" around the temples would be created, projecting the crest of the dam deep into the ground, and continuing beyond the lake with a curve mirroring the ellipse in the back the temples. Yet even this scrim was not sufficient to keep out any seepage: it would only "reduce the water flow to pumpable levels." The water would be to be collected in drainage galleries, and funneled to a pumping station at the back of the site. The elaborate nature of this hydrological scheme was used in the report further to legitimize the elliptical design as aesthetically and hydrologically "integrated" into the site: providing enough space for a monumental approach in front of the temples, and enough space for the pumping station to be hidden from view in the back of the temples. (fig 4.40-42)

Yet it is within this technological sophistication that the fault of the scheme lay. The architectural legibility of the dam could not conceal its procedural difficulties as an engineering proposal. In fact, Although the C&B report was the first document to expose to the Unesco committee the nature of the problem, highlighting that the problems of infiltration, of deposits, and salination would not be solved by a dam alone. As Jo Brew soon realized, "unfortunately, dams are made to go across streams not to protect something on the side of the stream." The document made clear to Unesco's expert committees how radically the Aswan Dam was going to transform the material ecology of Nubia, whether or not its monuments would be flooded. The reason for preferring the earth dam as a solution—that it "respected the extraordinary harmony between the elements of this unique site"—had disappeared, since the Asawn Dam was going to throw off the "elemental" balance of the Nile Valley altogether. Instead it was the pumping station that would do most of the work of "preservation." Accordingly, out of the total \$80M cost, the report estimated

³³⁰ See Robert L. Frost, Alternating Currents: Nationalized Power in France, 1946-1970 (Ithaca: Cornell, 1970) and Michel Vilain, La Politique de l'Energie en France de la Second Guerre Mondiale à l'Horizon 1985 (Paris: Cujas, 1969).

³³¹ "Un tel écran réduira les venues d'eau dans l'enceinte à des débits aisément pompables." In "Considérations Techniques," Coyne et Bellier, Op.Cit., 1,2-7.

³³² Letter from Brew to Ralph T. Barney (20 Dec 1962). Brew 10/54a.

"annual maintenance" at 300,000 \$/year. This sum "appalled" Unesco and UAR officials alike. Faced with this prospect of perpetual upkeep, they commissioned an alternative study. 333

Unesco commissioned a study of an Italian scheme which had always existed as an unofficial alternative to the C&B proposal: to "lift the temples and surrounding rocks above the level of the waters," by cutting each temple loose from the rock, and elevating the two massive monoliths hydraulically, and reconstituting surrounding beach and hillside on the new plateau.³³⁴ (fig 4.35) This scheme, known as the "Gazzola Plan," had been considered during the Nubian cruise but set aside, for two reasons. First, any "cutting" appeared, against in situ solutions, to be a compromise of "the integrity of the site and its monuments." Second, the technologies that Gazzola relied on were too experimental, requiring "the adoption of apparatus and techniques ... which have not yet been confirmed by experience, that is to say, which cannot entirely eliminate the risk of serious damage to the temples."³³⁵ The Gazzola plan, in short, was too risky. It is only after realizing that the C&B scheme distributed risk over time instead, that the committee decided to grant the Gazzola plan official status.

The Gazzola Plan was the first scheme to propose "liberating" any part of the temples from the mountain: the monument was now to be understood as a building—with a façade, an interior, a structure, and a site. In contrast to the stylistic "completion" that motivated the French scheme, Gazzola equated integrity with "wholeness." To allow severing the temples from their hill, Gazzola claimed his scheme would "preserve the integrity of the monument by lifting it whole." In so doing Gazzola revealed his conceptual ties to an Italian tradition which focused, as articulated by its main promoter Cesare Brandi in his 1963 Teoria del Restauro, on "restoring the potential oneness of the work of art," by focusing on its "material life." The difference between Italian "oneness" and French "completion" is that while Laprade, following Viollet-le-Duc, posited a timeless state "that might never have existed in history," Brandi defined restoration as a moment in time: "the methodological moment in which the work of art is appreciated in its material form and in its

³³³ "Apparently everyone has been appalled by the Coyne and Bellier estimate of annual maintenance costs in connection with their dam. I hope that you will be able to impress on the Egyptians and everyone else that there will be an annual maintenance cost whatever is done and there is little point in doing anything unless the UAR Government is prepared to take proper care of the site afterwards." Letter from Brew to White, Dec 22, 1960. Brew 10/54a.

See a letter on December 1950 from Wilson to Rainey. "Until the other day I understand there was no formal alternative to the coffer dam around the temples, so that the Gazzola Plan and others could receive no official recognition. Only the Coyne-Bellier report has been authorized. Now the Paris group wants to study the Gazzola plan so that Unesco may give it some official recognition." Brew 10/54a.

³³⁵ "Annex VI: Safeguard of Abu Simbel, Report of the Sub-Committee," Unesco/SN/EXP/SR, 8.

³³⁶ Gazzola Report, 32.

historical and aesthetic duality, with a point of view to transmitting it to the future." Restoration, in other words, was a method, a re-enactment of value. 337

Insofar as Gazzola invoked it to sever the temples from their site, it is important to note that Brandi's "method" emerged from a tradition of painting conservation, which made distinctions better suited to paintings and statues than buildings, and least of all to hybrid typologies like monolithic rock-hewn temples. Brandi proposed an "in-depth examination of the relationship between matter and the work of art," but the first step in this investigation was to make a distinction between "structure" and "appearance" [strutture e aspetto]:

The material used in a work of art carries the message of the image and it does so in two ways which can be defined as structure and appearance. ... Together they represent the two functions of material in a work of art and normally one does not contradict the other, although conflict is still possible. Such conflict is usually in the contrast between the aesthetic case and the historical case, and in the end appearance will override structure, where they cannot otherwise be reconciled.³³⁹

Brandi was careful to give both literal and figurative examples of a severance between "structure and appearance" (a canvas whose wooden support has rotten, a collapsed building whose interior plan structure can be modified to better withstand future earthquakes) but even his attempt to distinguish between the "historic" nature of structure and the "aesthetic" qualities of appearance reveal a distinctly classicizing architectural sensibility.

Where did the "structure" of Abu Simbel begin and its "appearance" end? What hierarchy would they be subjected to? Perhaps the best evidence that the Gazzola Plan for Abu Simbel was one where "appearance overrides structure" is that, while the C&B scheme was the official choice, Gazzola had been put in charge of the mission to "consolidate the façade" of the temples. Thus in his 1960 report, Gazzola removed his suggestion to "lift" the temples, but added a detailed project

³³⁷ Brandi, "The Concept of Restoration, in *A Theory of Restoration*, trans. Cythia Rockwell, (Rome: Nardini/ Istituto Centrale per il Restauro, 2005), 52. In accordance to this emphasis on action, Brandi added guidelines of behavior to this objective definition, in the form of two principles. First, that "only the material form of the work of art is restored," and secondly, "Restoration should aim to re-establish the potential oneness of the work of art, as long as this is possible without committing artistic or historical forgery, and without erasing every trace of the passage through time of the work of art."

³³⁸ Elsewhere Brandi elaborated on the applicability of these principles to architectural monuments, making of "rock-cut" monuments a special case of monument which is "indissolubly bound to a place." Brandi, "Principle for the Restoration of Monuments," Theory of Restoration, 94.

³³⁹ Cesare Brandi, "The Material of a Work of Art," A Theory of Restoration, 52.

³⁴⁰ This Group of Experts on the Consolidation of the Façades and Interiors of the Abu Simbel temples and the Reconstitution of the Site was composed of Harold Plenderleith, Direccto or ICCROM, Cesare Brandi, Paul Coremans, director of the Institut Royal du Patrimoine Artistique in Belgium, swiss architect William Dunkel, Ernst Habetha of the Bundesanstalt für Bodenforschung, and Zaky Iskander, Director of the Chemical Laboratory of the Cairo Antiquities service (UAR), with Piero Gazzola and Paolo Mora, principal restorer of the Istituto Centrale del Restauro. Brandi had been involved in other aspects of the campaign, as well, notably the 1958 mission to restore the wall-paintings in the tomb of Nefertiti.

for consolidating their "facades."³⁴¹ By the time the Italian scheme had been adopted in 1961, a whole "Group of experts" had been formed around the problem, which included Brandi himself, in addition to Gazzola and Plenderleith. Furthermore, the group's mission of "consolidating the facades of the temples" had been complemented with that of "reconstructing the site." This division of tasks twice detached the monolithic "structure" of rock from its "appearance": first from its sculpted surfaces, and then from its surrounding desert.³⁴²

This architectonic division between "structure" and "façade," reveals Gazzola's interpretation of Abu Simbel as a monument to be entirely architectural: the temples would remain monolithic as long as the stone block cut around them was large enough to deny it any architectural legibility except as a block. In this sense, Gazzola's plan for Abu Simbel was consistent with the recommendations he made for other Nubian temples, particularly in the principle that "each stone has absolute value." His first proposal included a schematic design for a horizontal concrete platform poured directly under the temples. (fig 4.43) As his proposal was refined into a real engineering proposal in the Italconsult report, the platform had transformed into a concrete "box," but the size and shape of this "block" remained a constant. The sequence of works proposed by the Italian group therefore described a distinction between "block," "box", and "rock":

Preliminary works
Removing the rock above the temple
Cutting off the block from the rest of the surrounding material
Reinforcing the block by a strong ferro-concrete structure
Positioning the jacks below the block so obtained.
Lifting the block and simultaneous construction of supporting pillars;
Reconstructing the environment.

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In other words, the Gazzola/Italconsult proposal was to turn Abu Simbel into a "block" of stone which could be treated with "absolute value."

Gazzola's fixation on the "sanctity of the stone" at Abu Simbel was a logical sequel to his career as a preservationist, particularly as an expert in stone-by-stone medieval reconstructions. His most famous achievement as superintendent of Antiquities in Verona, for example, was the reconstruction of the Ponte Pietra and the Ponte Castelvecchio—two Veronese bridges which had been shelled by retreating German troops in 1945. Here Gazzola ensured that the "absolute value of

³⁴¹ Gazzola "Project..." 1960, 22.

³⁴² UNESCO Nubia/2 CE/8 "Meeting of a Group of Experts on the Consolidation of the Façades and interior of the Abu Simbel Temples and the Reconstitution of the Site: Report of the Group." (30 Mar 1962), 6-7. The recommendations of this committee steered away from anything perceived as "architectural" ("architectural shapes are to be avoided.") therefore reinforcing that while the work of this "façade committee" was highly specialized, the rock itself was determined by the architectural criteria that Gazzola had built into his plan.

³⁴³ Italconsult Report, 6.

each stone" was re-enacted in the salvage process: each stone was recovered, counted, numbered, drawn, cast in plaster (or, when missing, substituted by a stone discretely marked as "new"), and ultimately re-integrated in a bridge structure, re-constituted with medieval bridge-building techniques.³⁴⁴ (fig 4.44) These projects effectively demonstrate the orthodoxy that arose when Brandi's theory of restoration was applied at an architectural scale, legitimizing "identical" reconstruction and encouraging a rationalist view of architecture where "structure" and "appearance" can only be one and the same.

In contrast to the medieval bridges of Verona, the block of Abu Simbel could never be "reintegrated" into its context. This is no small point. Brandi's theorization of the "material" of art was problematic in the case of Abu Simbel, because this distinction between "structure" and "appearance" was accompanied by another distinction between human "history" and everything else:

It is a common misapprehension that un-quarried marble is no different to marble that has been worked into a statue. (This could be called the illusion of immanence.") Whereas unquarried marble has only its physical makeup, the marble in a statue has undergone radical transformation to become the vehicle of an image. In doing so it has become a part of history thanks to the work of a human hands, and a chasm has opened between its existence as calcium carbonate and its existence as an image. ³⁴⁵

Brandi had intended to shatter what he called "the illusion of immanence." Yet in discrediting one metaphysics, Brandi had invented another: while no organic evolutive value could be attributed to the "unquarried stone", the transcendent power of human hands allowed materials to "enter history." Clearly at Abu Simbel the line between 'quarried and unquarried' was unclear. In addition, the "vehicles" that had allowed Nubia to "enter history" stretched sometimes as far as the Sudan. By the standards of Brandi's own theory, "cutting off the block" from the rock was equivalent to deciding what belongs in "history" and what does not.

It is by adapting Gazzola's Brandian scheme into an engineering proposal that the Italian engineering team re-invented the criterion of "integrity" in terms of mechanical behavior. The team

³⁴⁴ Gazzola recounted the reconstruction of the Ponte Pietra in his 1963 Ponte Pietra (Firenze: Leo Olschki, 1963), of which the first volume was devoted to all the stone bridges of Verona, while the second volume was devoted to the reconstruction. For the Ponte Castelvecchio, see Egizio Nichelli, "Ponte di Castelvecchio a Verona: Il Cantiere di restauro di Piero Gazzola" in Architettura e Restauro: Esempi di Restauro eseguiti nel dologuerra (ed Carlo Perogalli (Milaon: Görlich, 1955), 90-104.

³⁴⁵ Brandi: "It is a common misapprehension that un-quarried marble is no different to marble that has been worked into a statue. (This could be called the illusion of immanence.") Whereas unquarried marble has only its physical makeup, the marble in a statue has undergone radical transformation to become the vehicle of an image. In doing so it has become a part of history thanks to the work of a human hands, and a chasm has opened between its existence as calcium carbonate and its existence as an image." Brandi, "The material of a work of art," Theory of Restoration, 53.

differed from the French team in that the engineers were bridge-builders, and bridge-building played in Italy the role that dam-building did in France. The proposal was overseen by Italconsult, a consultancy group created in 1957 to channel Italian expertise and influence into the Third World, and headed by industrialist, former Fiat president, and soon-to-be Club of Rome founder, Aurelio Peccei. Peccei enlisted Paolo Lodigiani, the engineer at the head of one if Italy's largest construction companies, to compile the report, under the direction of two other engineers: Gustavo Colonetti, a mathematician-engineer with a theory of elasticity, and Riccardo Morandi, an engineer-architect with a laboratory devoted to pre-stressed concrete. Gazzola and Colonetti were concerned with concrete as a material that defied any Brandian reduction into 'structure' and 'appearance.' At the core of the Italconsult team, then, was a theory of materials not as inert masses but as rich speculative universes.

Whereas Brandi declared all material passive until a human hand transformed it, the Italconsult team subscribed to post-Galilean view mechanics, where, in the words of Edoardo Benvenuto, inert materials are "idealized elementary machines ... a virtual construction site, frozen in time." Morandi was interested in preservation as a form of applied research; thus his first major restoration project, was to consolidate a portion of the Arena of Verona by effectively "pre-stressing" the Roman structure from within, and letting it stand as an autonomous, free-standing fragment. This structural understanding of pre-stressing was, in itself, an inversion of the Brandian hierarchy where "material" as primary, and "structure" is a function assigned to it. Similiarly, Gustavo Colonnetti had spent his career developing a pedigree as "an almost perfect synthesis between the figure of the engineer and the mathematician." Colonnetti's work was focused on finding both a new theory of elasticity and better techniques of construction, and pre-stressed concrete was his experimental site of choice because it allowed him to isolate, study, and design the kind of strain that

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³⁴⁶ Benvenuto, writing in l'Art de l'ingénieur, wrote that after Galileo "chaque élément de la construction fut reconnu comme le siège d'une machine élémentaire idéale opérant en son sein. ... En somme, le champ de la construction sembla se transformer en un chantier virtuel figé. » Edoardo Benvenuto, "Histoire de la résistance des matériaux" in L'Art de l'Ingénieur, 410. He had written this formulation into his 1994 text on restoration, where « architecture becomes a congealed construction site (cantiere congelato). » « Restauro Architettonico : Il Tema Strutturale ». Dialoghi di Restauro 3, (Trento : Comitato Giuseppe Gerola, 1994). See also Benevuto, Materialismo e Pensiero Scientifico (Milano: Tamburini, 1974).

³⁴⁷ See "Research applied to Specific Restoration Works," in Imbesi, Morandi, Moschini, eds., Riccardo Morandi: Innovazione Tecnologia Progetto (Roma: Gangemi, 1991), 231 Although the authors see Morandi as making "no attempt to theorize the problem of restoration" they note that his "interpretation of ancient structures was linked to a historicizing process of techniques. Morandi basically felt tied to 'the previous stages in excursus of the art of building.' For Morandi's restoration projects see the recollections of Salvatore d'Agostino, in the same volume, 235-238. See also Giorgio Boaga and Benito Boni, The Concrete Architecture of Riccardo Morandi (New York: Praeger, 1966) and Lara-Vinca Masini, Riccardo Morandi (Roma: de Luca, 1974), and

the classical theory of elasticity could not explain.³⁴⁸ In short, Morandi and Colonnetti saw the Nubian sandstone—whether naturally sedimented, sculpted into a relief, or carved into a temple—as a dynamic assemblage waiting to be interacted with.

It was by re-conceiving the material value of Gazzola's block in terms of "elasticity" that Morandi and Colonnetti allowed it to retain its "integrity" even as it was radically displaced. Reinforced concrete was crucial to this operation. (fig 43) Colonnetti described the problem of maintaining the integrity of the temples as two-fold. The first difficulty was "to isolate the block that contains the temple without disturbing the equilibrium of the stone of which it is made." To solve this problem, the temples would not abruptly be "cut" from the rock; instead a matrix of vertical shafts and horizontal tunnels would be dug around the temples, into which a reinforced concrete would be poured. Once connected, these cast-in-the-rock elements would constitute "an enormous and extremely resistant box [un resistantissimo cassone], capable of containing the block and of maintaining it in its current state of internal equilibrium when its connections with the surrounding hillside would be severed." In other words, the monumental context of the block was temporarily replaced by a tight-fitting concrete net, whose "elastic" value was continuous with that of the sandstone cliff.

The second major difficulty was to maintain this elastic equilibrium during lifting, applying external pressures to this assemblage without "ever knowing the distribution of loads on the base of the concrete box." Colonnetti conceded that monolithic architecture could never be described by a precise mathematical model: "the non-homogeneity of the rock, the fissuring that has been produced in the past, the presence of a large cavity constituting the temples—all of this certainly makes for a very irregular distribution of loads, but this distribution cannot be computed, even very approximately." In order to compensate for this, Colonetti recommended that the jacks operate by incremental distance, rather than dispensing a given force. Thus a measuring system would be built into the hydraulic grid, to monitor the displacement of each point as it was being produced, and interrupt the lifting when the displacement had reached the set interval of 2 mm. As for the final measure of security—the horizontality of the base—Colonnetti recommended that a "plane of reference", a horizontal chamber filled with mercury, be built into the base of the box. As with the C&B scheme where a dam was asked to perform a duty beyond its engineered purpose, Colonetti admitted that the jacks would be put to a use for which they had not been designed—to keep a horizontal surface level.

³⁴⁸ "Pioneer in construction techniques based on the use of prestressed concrete." Citations and a clear explanation of Colonnetti's contribution can be found in: Gaetano Fischera, "The Italian contribution to the mathematical theory of elasticity," Meccanica 19/4 (Dec 1984), 259-268.

The elegance of the Italian scheme lay both in its interpretation of integrity as the "elastic continuity" between old and new materials, and its progressive building of a "new ground" for the elevated temples, out of the structure constructed for lifting. Every time the base of the box was raised by 30 centimeters, a new concrete matrix would be laid for the jacks, gradually building up a new ground from below. Upon reaching the required displacement of 62 meters, this concrete formwork would then serve as the skeleton for the reconstituted sandstone site.³⁴⁹ Thus, where the C&B scheme had hidden process behind objecthood, here the process of salvage was made visible in a technological expenditure that would eventually leave no trace on the monument itself, while being present beneath.

One cannot overstate the technological heroism that permeated this scheme, which remained Unesco's official solution for most of 1963. Already in his first report Gazzola emphasized that the value of the monument would be <u>enhanced</u> by their movement, and the international community should therefore not shy away from "extraordinary means":

We should not hesitate to resort to extraordinary means. Considering the technology available to us, and the sometimes destructive purposes to which we devote sometimes fabulous sums, our atomic age should not miss this opportunity to brilliantly demonstrate that our appreciation of spiritual values is not just made of words. 350

Similarly, the Italconsult report concluded with an assurance that a continuity existed between "ancient" and "modern" engineering miracles, the former absorbing the value of the latter.

Modern engineering techniques has displayed its best resources in order to save these miracles of ancient engineering ... when the project has been brought to completion, mankind will rightly say that the value of the monuments was worth the immense effort accomplished.³⁵¹

The continuity between the original authors and the modern preservationist was, it should be noted, consistent with Brandi's idea of a restoration as re-enactment. And indeed despite significant internal differences the Italconsult team was undeniably bound by a vague Crocean phenomenology that found the origin of a work of art in a human creative act.

Hoping to turn this "aesthetics of process" into a fund-raising strategy Unesco publicized the schemewith a press release titled How Modern Techniques can Save one of the Great Monuments of the Past that called the scheme "a tribute to the experts of the past." The organization also circulated the

³⁴⁹ Colonnetti's description can be found in Gustavo Colonnetti, "Il Progetto italiano per il salvataggio dei templi di Abu-Simbel" in Problemi Attuali di Scienza e di Cultura (Roma: Accademia dei Lincei, 1961), 3-12. His own contribution to the theory of elasticity was published as Gustavo Colonnetti, Scienza delle costruzioni (Giuliu Einaudi, 1948).

³⁵⁰ Pietro Gazzola, "Abou Simbel," in "Transfert des Temples et Autres Monuments et Ruines: Considérations de Carcatere architectural et archeologique." UNESCO/SN/R.EXP/6 (28 Sep 1959).

^{351 &}quot;Conclusions," Italconsult, Saving the Temples of Abu Simbel (Rome, November 1960), 11.

³⁵² This release was often reproduced verbatim; "the Temples of Abu Simbel' in AIA Journal (Sep 1962), 33-36.

sketches of the lifting made by Riccardo Morandi. While these rendering were spectacular, they paradoxically did little to dramatize the technology of lifting. (figs 4.47) The lifting technology—the hydraulic jacks—were barely present, dwarfed by the concrete "box" that itself appeared to be some sort of Brutalist monument. The box also dwarfed all other conventional construction technologies on the site, including two cranes and three construction barracks. This had the strange effect of rendering the box completely static. (The cartoon-version of this drawing featured on the cover of Unesco Courier: Abu Simbel, now or never added teams of workers and enlarged one of the cranes (fig 4.46)) The Italconsult drawings did include a sequence of axonometric renderings, which were sometimes reproduced in more technical publications to demonstrate the sequential order of operations and the progressive lifting of the temples. (fig 4.4) But little "effort" was conveyed in these images, and the result was distinctly un-dynamic, seemingly reinforcing the weight of the block and the difficulty of its lifting.

Morandi left all the dynamism of the operation for another perspective rendering, which was never disseminated to the press. Titled "Position of Jacks During Lifting Operation." (fig 4.47) this drawing masqueraded behind this technical name a utopian vision of a technologically-enabled future. The rendering was of one of the "tunnels" dug in the space between the monument and its site, occupied by two Nubian children. Undoubtedly Morandi drew the figures to demonstrate the monumental scale of the hydraulic jacks. But, as the only representative of modern-day mankind in the whole scheme, they also served an allegorical purpose of inhabiting the space opened up by the gap between ancient and modern technologies—as Brandi might say, the "chasm" between history and inert matter—and confidently progressing along a teleological tunnel of stone. The Italian scheme borrowed from architecture not only its conceptualization of a "block" but also the mandate of depicting utopias that would unfold in a technologically-enabled future. Despite—or perhaps because of—the utopian resonances of these drawings, and their distinct architectural sensibility, the scheme never attracted the funds necessary for its completion.

The British "underwater" and French "floating" schemes

As the flooding of the monuments grew near and fund-raising stalled, national delegations volunteered their own alternative schemes. Of these, a British proposal was labeled the most 'fantastic', because it proposed to leave the temples underwater. Based on the assumption that it was not water itself, but the chemical composition of the Nile, that would cause the temples to decompose if they were flooded, the British team proposed to build a thin membrane dam around the temples, separating reservoir from purified water. The British team had perhaps the greatest

avant-garde credentials of all, as the architecture of the scheme revealed a combitantion of architectural brutalism, with light-structure expressionism, held together by an intricate architectural promenade. (fig 4.48) From the top visitors proceeded down an elevator, to occupy three levels of tunnels, where circular windows and bubbles of glass offered glimpses of the colossus, and worm's eye views of the shrines. 353

This scenography had first been invented by Irish film produced Bill MacQuitty, MacQuitty, who had made a film about the titanic, A Night to Remember, (he is featured as himself in the 1997 film Titanic) was an avid scuba diver, and eventually became involved in underwater archaeology (a cause with which Unesco didn't concern itself until decades later). MacQuitty had visited Abu Simbel on a reconnaissance for a film; but he was also partly inspired by his own theory of underwater perception, whereby "one can see better underwater." It was upon returning from a dive that MacQuitty contacted Jane Drew to propose that they develop the scheme. As with the others schemes, this proposal, echoed the principles of restoration first introduced by 19th Century thinkersparticularly, of John Ruskin's definition of restoration as "the most total destruction which a building can suffer." Ruskin's was, if anything, a theory of dis-integrity: 355 since "the life of the whole" embodied in a monument lay in the entire epoch "we have no right whatever to touch them." 356 Instead, monuments were to be left to the force of "universal decay", after which they would acquire the beauty of a "parasitical sublimity" that Ruskin dared to call "picturesque." 357 Certainly MacQuitty's idea that human intervention would damage the temple more than water Ruskinian. The cinematic nature of the scheme, its choreographed path, its reliance on surprise and optical effect resonated with Ruskinian "picturesque" overtones. But MacQuitty also added an envionmentalist's futurology to the proposal: predicting that the dam would become an obsolete technology, that nuclear power would replace hydroelectricity, that the reservoir would be drained, and the temples re-discovered. 358 With this narrative of a future re-discovery, MacQuitty hoped to put to rest all the other schemes that presumed to 'save' the temples by irrevocably transforming them.

 $^{^{353}}$ Bill MacQuitty, "The Author's Scheme," Abu Simbel (New York: Putnam's, 1965), 182

³⁵⁴ Drew summarized the incident in her memoirs: "It happened like this. Bill who was a great friend of mine and a friend of the ICA, phoned me up one day and said, "Jane I have been swimming under water this morning and I find you can see better under water. They are going to flood the Nile and submerge the Abu Simbel figures or else they are going to put them upon a hill where they will get totally eroded. All countries are supposed to put up scheme to UNESCO, why don't you do one with my idea?" Jane Drew, "Memoir" (Unpublished) CCA Collections

³⁵⁵ John Ruskin, "The Lamp of Memory," The Seven Lamps of Architecture (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1988), 178.

³⁵⁶ Ruskin, 186.

³⁵⁷ Ruskin, 184.

³⁵⁸ "Within the next hundred years the high dam itself will be outdated by atomic power bringing new methods of irrigation and electricity. And if that happened the Nile water would return to its original level, and the temples of Abu

The public explanation of the scheme fell to a young engineer from Ove Arup, Ted Happold, who described the scheme as a critique of the Coyne & Bellier "dam" scheme.. 359 Instead, Happold proposed to perform many of the same operations—surrounding the temples with a curtain, pumping and purifying water—but without the additional problem of draining the site. Eliminating the task of retaining water removed the main bulk from the estimated cost, as well as most of the thickness out from the surfaces, turning the dam into "a light and inexpensive membrane" and cleverly condensing in this "membrane" the work of maintaining integrity of the site. 360 Indeed, all the surfaces were drawn so thin that they barely appeared to be an edge at all; the concrete dam was drawn so thinly that it appeared like glass—a flexible curtain, casually "folded" for stability. ingenuity of this solution lay in the thinness of this interface between object, subject, and site. It was not the monument, but the visitor that was encased, in bubbles that implied a nomadic underwater life and left undisturbed the harmonious continuum of elements. (fig 48-51)

The integration of architecture, subject and environment was a common theme in the work of Jane Drew and Max Fry. Both their treatise Architecture and the Environment and their didactic booklet Architecture for Children argued for a climate-driven architecture; both began with a summary of "How our forefathers built" which demonstrated the archetype of an architectural "environment" with a simple diagram of Egypt as "Nile", "Sun" and "desert. (fig 4.50) "It is useful to remember," they wrote, "that every civilization is the result of circumstances. The Egyptians did not make their civilization; it arose because the Nile was the most fertile place in the known world, and attracted people to it." 361 Yet in pointing out that "the Egyptians' lives were dominated by two things—the sun and the Nile" they pointed to the one environmental feature that their design for Abu Simbel would completely eliminate: the sun. 362 Indeed the only stenographic certainty of the Abu Simbel site was a once-a-year alignment of the rising sun with the axis of the main sancturary, which illuminated three of the four statues at the very back of the shrines deep into the rock. (fig 4.50) Here,

Simbel could be restored to their present state." MacQuitty cited in "New Scheme to Save Abu Simbel Temples," Architects' Journal (20 Mar 1963), 610.

³⁵⁹ On Ted Happold and his later career, see Derek Walker, ed., Happold: The Confidence to Build (London: Happold Trust Publications, 1997).

³⁶⁰ "They required not only a dam on the river side but also had to provide an elaborate grouting system and cut-off trench to reduce seepage through the rock, and pumping equipment to deal with any water which penetrated. As even a small quantity of water reaching the tunnels would cause damage the problem became extremely difficult." "The proposed scheme is very simple in principle. Round each temple will be built a thin 'membrane' enclosing clean water on the temple side and keeping it constantly at the same level as the Nile water outside. This would result in the pressure on the membrane being balanced on both sides, so that the membrane could be as light ad inexpensive structure." Edmund Happold, "The Scheme Explained," The Architects' Journal (20 Mar 1963).

³⁶¹ Jane Drew and Maxwell Fry, Architecture and the Environment, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1976), 75.

^{362 &}quot;To worship the sun and the river," they wrote "was natural and necessary, as was the rule of their priests, the chief among whom was also their king." Architecture and the Environment, 73.

the sun would never reach the back of the temples again. MacQuitty proposed a suitably cinematic substitution, replacing the sun completely by engineered artifice ("Powerful electric lights reproduce the rising and setting of the sun"³⁶³) and selling the idea as "a cool modern miracle at a relatively low cost."³⁶⁴ But the British scheme sacrificed the only environmental feature of the site that even skeptical Egyptologists had deemed important. Similarly, while they argued that sandstone would be preserved underwater they showed no concern for the deterioration of the plaster-painted frescoes and reliefs on the interior of the shrine, to whose preservation Unesco had dedicated an entire committee. Ultimately it is Unesco the environmental sensibility of the scheme, which distributed risk, expense, and artifice so evenly across the site, that made it too radical for Unesco. Both Drew and MacQuitty also later wrote that their British affiliation, rather than their technological vangardism, sank their proposal—as Drew summarized in her memoirs, "after Suez nothing British would be acceptable."³⁶⁵ Still, the scheme had a significant impact as a critique of the ItalConsult scheme, and as a proposal for an environmental version of "integrity" against which to measure Unesco's decidedly more object-based conception.

In contrast to the British scheme which captured the public imagination but was never taken seriously by Unesco, a second French scheme was given the consideration by the Executive Committee but never gained publicity except as a one-liner. (fig 4.53) Designed by venerable French military engineer Albert Caquot: to cut off each temple into a block, encase it in steel and concrete, and "float" them up the river in synchrony with the rising of the Nile. Clearly this scheme was motivated by a much broader "hydraulic" vision than the one embodied the 650 diminutive hydraulic jacks of the Italconsult scheme, and Caquot explicitly offered it as a betterment of it. After reviewing the jacks designs, Caquot proposed a what he called a "realistic" solution borrowed from his own experience: "the only procedure being practically used today to lift vertically, and transfer horizontally, any mass weighting thousands of tons is the floater. It is used in particular for the building of artificial islands until their final anchoring, as well as for the construction of ships." ³⁶⁶ Caquot had pioneered the use of floating platforms for ship-repair at the military port of Saint

MacQuitty wrote a book which included the four schemes at the end. "The great temple is submerged in clear water. The muddy water of the Nile are kept out by a membrane dam a foot thick. It does not have to be heavily constructed as the pressure of water on either side always remains the same. Running through the dam are two passages at different levels. These contain reinforced glass windows through which the colossi can be seen from various angles. Powerful electric lights reproduce the rising and setting of the sun. Further passages lead beneath the temple floors and emerge into reinforced glass chambers from which the interiors of the temples can be examined. The water is constantly filters and supplied with chemical to ensure the preservation of the sandstone." MacQuitty, Abu Simbel, 181.

³⁶⁴ William MacQuitty, "Khartoum to Abu Simbel," A Life to Remember (London: Quartet), 341.

³⁶⁵ Drew, Memoir, 154. MacQuitty describes in greater depth the exchange of letters and meetings with British delegation and UAR ambassadors, but comes essentially to the same conclusion. MacQuitty, A Life to Remember, 342.

³⁶⁶ Albert Caquot, Les Temples d'Abou Simbel: Avant-Projet de leur Déplacement Complet (Paris: Simecsol, 1963), 8.

Nazaire, where ships floated into platforms shaped in "radoub", then the water around them would be drained for repair. The Abu Simbel temples would also be encases twice: first in a "floater" then a reservoir designed to accommodate the "horizontal and vertical translations." The floaters were circular, and the reservoirs had oval plans and L-shaped sections. (fig 4.53) Thus the temples would be "stored" in the reservoirs until the level of the Nile had reached its final elevation (4-5 years), at which time the water would be let into the reservoir, which would gently guide the temples, in their floaters, to their new situation:

An so, without no impact and no noise, the island containing the rock will lift itself and float towards the definitive place that has been made for it. The operation will brely last the necessary time that it takes for the reservoir to be filled.³⁶⁷

Caquot's modest proposal came with a revised estimate for less than 40 million dollars—but the elegance of his solution, including its appeal to the ancient tradition of Nile transport, did not compensate for the incompletion of the scheme. Indeed this scheme had only been proposed as a way to "save" the Italian project against a "cutting" proposal which had been secretly worked out. The Caquot scheme was last-minute attempt at a "wet" scheme before the "dry" thinking was brought to its dreaded logical conclusion: cutting the temples into smaller and smaller blocks.

Before the Swedish "cutting scheme" that was eventually realized can be examined, one last point must be made about the process of selection itself, and the contribution of these schemes to the codification of an international language of integrity during this "competition" period. The schemes were cumulative: in each moved the temples further and further away from their original location, to an increasingly less scandalous effect, and the criterion for evaluation—"integrity"—remained the same throughout. Thus a timeline of shifting meaning can be constructed, where schemes previously declared to lack "integrity" were adopted, and integrity itself was redefined opportunistically: from an ideal, to a future state, then to an existing condition, and lastly, to a dutiful choice. ³⁶⁸

October1959:

The sub-committee recommends the earth dam solution [C&G] as being the best from the archaeological an aesthetic viewpoint. ... This solution more fully <u>safeguards the integrity of the site and the monuments</u>, something that no proposal for raising could do. 369

[&]quot;Ainsi, sans heurts et sans bruits, l'ile contenant le rocher se soulèvera et dérivera avers la situation définitive qui est preéue, l'opération ne durera guère que le temps nécessaire au remplissage du réservoir." Albert Caquot, Les Temples d'Abou Simbel: Projet d'ensemble de déplacement des temples (Paris: Simecsol, 1963), 25.

The first comparison was about risk. The estimate maintenance cost was so high that western consultants saw this as an indication of naiveté on the part of the UAR government. (Echoes of the World Bank debates) in both of these comparisons—each time it was about distributing risk. Some options were on the table secretly—which options were actually eliminated? (brew, for instance).

^{369 55} EX/ 7 Annexe VI: Report of the Subcommittee to safeguard Abu Simbel, page 6

January 1961:

The Committee of Experts considers that the Italconsult scheme is more satisfactory from the archaeological point of view [because it] offers greater safety to the temples in the future as well as far fewer problems of maintenance than does the C&B project. 370

5-7 June 1963

The Board of Consultants fully appreciates, as in the "Lifting" project, the great advantages in maintaining the existing integrity of the temples. It would far more appropriate, from an archaeological viewpoint, to conserve the temples as they currently are.

. . .

The Control Committee is immensely repulsed at the thought of accepting or recommending a project that <u>leads to the cutting or fragmenting</u> of these precious monuments in any way possible, <u>even if they can be reconstituted in another site</u>, offering visitors an appearance similar to the one that these temples had when they were built, more than 3,000 years ago. From the archaeological point of view, the project "B" would have of course been preferable, if we had had the necessary funds to complete it.³⁷¹

10-12 June 1963

The Executive Committee declared itself in favor of cutting the temples. Although he personally would naturally have preferred a scheme allowing the Abu Simbel <u>temples to be preserved intact</u>, the Chairman <u>considered it is his duty to back the cutting project</u>, which offered the only chance of saving Abu Simbel from submersion.³⁷²

No progression could give clearer demonstration of how political and specialist realm benefited from the circulation of a common language. Integrity has now become the basis for what can be called the "international style" of preservation and it is therefore important to note that it belongs to the bureaucratic tongue of Unesco, which was used to summarize discussions where other, more colorful vocabulary was used. For each of these utterances of the term, there exists an informal transcript, letter, or note that features terms like "cutting," "scalping", "digging," "mutilating", etc. More importantly, what the progression shows is that, when the integrity of the temples is no longer mentioned it is the integrity of the speaker, (his "principle", his "appreciation," or his "duty") that is invoked instead. This was a progression of a political discourse appropriating a term as "technical" which has actually been coined by the experts not for the sake of precision, but for its ethical connotations.

It is apparent from the above progression that VBB "cutting scheme" was never evaluated by the criterion of integrity. Nor indeed was it proposed in the same framework as the other four. Designed by request from the UAR, it was the work of engineers engaged in a direct consultancy

³⁷⁰ Annex III: Committee of Experts for Abu Simbel. Report, January 16th, 1961, p. 21.

³⁷¹ Nubia/4/Annex III, 9.

³⁷² Nubia/4, 3.

with the UAR, the Swedish firm VBB, which had originally been hired by as geological consultants. As such, they had been commissioned to plan the movement of smaller rock-hewn temples, to prepare bidding documents for the Italconsult scheme, to design the reconstruction of the site, and, ultimately, to oversee the lifting process. By the time the UAR government asked them to propose a "cutting" scheme, they had begun to occupy a visible position in the campaign, both by redesigning some key features of the Italconsult scheme³⁷³ and by being asked to take a stand on the translation of "technical operations" into a "cultural objective." ³⁷⁴ In some ways the prospect of a scheme for "cutting the temples to pieces" had been looming from the start. As early as January 1961 a key advisor to the US Committee for Abu Simbel who reviewed the C&B and Italconsult schemes declared it "perfectly apparent that these two methods are much too expensive" and revealed his "current thinking to cut up the facades of the 2 temples and remove them in sections." The first plan for cutting was produced—and marked "confidential"—in September 1962. 376

The chain of events that led to the "choice" of this cutting scheme was set in motion in December 1962 when the 12th session of Unesco's General Assembly decided not make contributions to the Abu Simbel protection compulsory. In reaction to the lackluster results of the fund-raising campaign, it had been suggested that member-states be forced to contribute to the campaign. This proposal was rehected; instead a resolution was passed that "voluntary contributions" should be sought, that a pledging conference be planned for the following March. In advance of this conference, the price for the lifting scheme was evaluated at 60 Million (of which 37 in hard currency), and the executive committee prepared as set of alternative financial scenarios. Yet none of these scenarios allowed contributions already made to be redirected anywhere but at Egypt ["Q: Has

³⁷³ For example, in VBB's project the concrete "box" became elliptical. UNESCO/Nubia/BC1/1 Board of Consultants for th Scheme of Lifting the Abu Simbel temples, First Meeting. (9-13 Oct 1961), 3.

 $^{^{374}}$ In a UNESCO Nubia/2 CE/8 "Meeting of a Group of Experts on the Consolidation of the Façades and interior of the Abu Simbel Temples and the Reconstitution of the Site: Report of the Group." (30 Mar 1962), 6-7. In reaction to these changes, the committee for the consolidation of facades had specifically asked them to take "a cultural position." In a section apart titled "Exchange of views regarding technical operations conducted with the object of attaining a cultural objective," the group specifically pleaded that the translation of "technical" to "cultural" was problem of "the engineer": "The group was in complete agreement regarding the absolute importance of the technical operations but felt it necessary to emphasize at the outset that these were designed with the object of effecting the solution of a cultural problem, namely, the preservation of an ensemble of unique archaeological and artistic importance for the benefit of future generations. ... The technical operations involved many disciplines, but primarily that of the engineer. ... It was not certain that enough details had been provided in advance on the latest views of the engineers (VBB etc) that might have a bearing on the cultural objective. ... There was general agreement that the Board of Consultants controlling all works carried out at Abu Simbel should have as a member someone experienced in the safeguarding of historic monuments."

³⁷⁵ White to Brew, Jan 6 1961.

³⁷⁶ "Preliminary Report on the Project of Dismantling, Moving and Re-erecting the Abu Simbel Temples, September 1962 (VBB). As cited in Wednell Johnson's report.

the UAR prepared alternative solutions, in case this minimum is not reached?" "A: The salvage of Abu Simbel forms an indivisible whole and all efforts must tend towards the preservation of this complex."³⁷⁷] What emerged from the debates before the pledging conference was held is that both the temples of Abu Simbel and the International Fund for its salvage were to be considered "indivisible wholes."

The bidding conference of March 20 1963 only raised 7.5. Million dollars, (of which \$ 6.5 Million in hard currency). The US's reaction to this disappointing turnout was to decline to make any pledge ("since its contributions would have been in Egyptian pounds and [the US] saw no prospect of raising the necessary foreign currency") and to communicate a secret message to the UAR instead, offering "the cooperation of the US toward the development of an alternative that would be technically and financially feasible," and guaranteeing that the US would contribute to such a plan in Egyptian pounds. These recommendations were crucial, as they represented the ultimate criteria for "commensuration" that the UAR would have to apply to its selection of the scheme. They were:

... that steps be taken to induce contractors to study the possibility of substantially reducing, by appropriate technical and financial means, the proportion of expenditure in "hard" currency ...

... that negotiations be undertaken ... with the successful contractors with a view to taking maximum possible advantage of the credit facilities that might be granted to them, under national legislation, by virtue of the financial provisions designed to promote the execution of large-scale undertakings abroad.

... that the UAR should study the measures it might take, in view of the scale of its tourist resources, to cover part of the "hard" currency required (for example, by introducing a special tourist tax or visa)³⁷⁹

In other words, while the US offered to subsidize a cheaper scheme, Unesco authorized the UAR to seek technical reductions in the price. The fix, so to speak, was in. Shortly thereafter, the State Department sent the Chief of Engineering Division of the US Army Corps of Engineers, Wendell Johnson, on a "fact-finding mission" to Egypt, to "learn as much as possible about the plans being developed by the UAR." Upon his return he wrote approvingly of "the 'dismantling and re-erection" plan of VBB, calling it "entirely feasible" and recommending it "based on engineering considerations, and subject to appropriate considerations of the archaeological, geological, financing

³⁷⁷ NUBIE/1, "Rapport du comité executif" (17-19 Dec 1962), 6.

³⁷⁸ Letter from McCullough to Brew, May 1, 1963.

³⁷⁹ NUBIA/4 Executive Committee, Paris June 28, 1963, Annex II: Resolution V, page 8.

and policy aspects."³⁸⁰ Although he was instructed not to "indicate in any way the US position," three days after his return, the Egyptian government withdrew the Italconsult scheme, and proposed the VBB scheme instead; at the same meeting, the US representative declared that the US would "give sympathetic consideration" to it if "it was adopted as a practical scheme."³⁸¹

The US and UAR therefore reached a behind-the-scenes agreement, which they presented to other member states as a fait accompli. Yet the French delegation, having evidently heard of the cutting alternative, proposed the Caquot scheme at this same meeting, forcing both schemes ("cutting" and "floating") to be forwarded to various committees for evaluation. Correspondance shows that all parties involved were aware that the Caquot proposal was far too schematic to be considered for immediate bidding; yet the need to compare the two schemes triggered a final act of adjudication, which served the interest of both sides. In this sense, the Caquot scheme was never really considered; it served as a foil for the VBB scheme to appear to have been chosen as a result of a "comparative" process. This comparative process is of interest in itself, since it reveals a progressive isolation of "cultural" value away from "purely archaeological" and "purely technical" considerations, and towards increasingly "financial" goals. First, the Executive Committee declared the VBB scheme "acceptable from a technical point of view" but asked a panel of experts to judge the "archaeological" aspects. This panel of experts, which met in Paris from 7th to 9th of May, "found that a decision in favor of either project could not be reached purely on archaeological or technical grounds, and recommended that technical and economic aspects be examined by the Board of Consultants." Finally, the Board of Consultants, which had been hired directly by the UAR, declared that while "from the archaeological point of view" the Caquot project was preferable, in terms of funding the VBB scheme was the only one adoptable.

Meanwhile, on the American side, the US Commission also gathered its own expert committee to "formulate an American attitude." "Generally speaking," one participant recalled, "nobody wanted to cut the temples up, but thought that it was not a major risk, would be somewhere within the 36 million range, and require less than 1/2 the hard currency than the Italian plan required." Indeed the cutting scheme relied overwhelmingly on local labor—the same labor that had been brought to Nubia for the building of the dam—which could be paid for in Egyptian pounds. The next meeting of the Executive Committee resolved the agreement: the US declared its

³⁸⁰ Wendell Johnson, "Report on Visit of Wendell E. Johnson to Egypt Re: Abu Simbel Temples," April 1962, Brew Archives

³⁸¹ As summarized in UNESCO/NUBIA/CE/VIII/3, "Draft Joint Report of the Executive Committee and the Director General to the Thirteenth Session of the General Conference." (Paris, 14 Oct 1964).

³⁸² The American experts met on 10 May 1963. Letter from Wilson to Brew and Lasallale, 13 May 1963.

intention to fund the equivalent of 30% of the scheme. Unesco recalled that it had "for four years deployed considerable efforts in order to ensure the salvage of the Abu Simbel temples," and that therefore, "the moment had come to take a decision that takes into consideration the financial means of international cooperation." Effectively given no alternative, all nations agreed to channel their contributions, originally intended for the "lifting" scheme, towards the "cutting" scheme instead.

From this circuitous process it should be evident that the decision to cut Abu Simbel into blocks was made through a secret bilateral agreement between the US and UAR. Unesco helped to "maintain the international character" of the decision-making process, by strong-arming nationstates into contributing to one scheme the funds they had already pledged to another. In addition, since conventional diplomatic channels between the two governments were strained, the deal was worked out through an international Board of Consultants, independent of Unesco, which included French, Italian and German engineers, the head of the US Army Corps of Engineers, and the head of civil engineering at the World Bank, Gail Hathaway. The type of US funds impacted the technological solution in two ways: it imposed greater reliance on local labor and encouraged nation-states to find creative solutions for "converting" hard cash into local Egyptian pounds. The sub-committee on converting currency recommended that contributing nations use construction companies as semi-state-sponsored enterprises which could carry the loans be repaid over the longterm, and that Egypt institute a tourist tax to attract dollars directly from visitors. Thus many of the mechanisms of international development that the Aswan High Dam was supposed to have inaugurated in Egypt were actually enacted in the campaign for Abu Simbel: the choice of a more reasonable, "smaller" scheme based on minimizing financial risk; the involvement of international consultants; the opening of new markets for western engineering consortia; and the liberalization of tourism as a mechanism for converting counterpart funds into hard currency. In this sense, Abu Simbel stands clearly as a counterpart to the Aswan High Dam.

Certainly this turn of events constitutes a triumph of "rationalization" in the sense intended by historians of technology: an instance when process took precedence over result. But now both process and product were "processes": the one economic and hidden; the other technological and aestheticized by Unesco. From the financial point of view, the "hidden" salvage process of helped to liquidate surpluses; from Unesco's point of view the public salvage process still represented the advent of an age of "integrity"—financial and material.

³⁸³ NUBIE/4 Annexe III: "Report Executive committee of the International Campaign for the Salvage of Nubian monuments (28 Jun 1963), 2.

Sand as a technology: disfiguration and refiguration

What happened, then, to the integrity of the temples? The cutting plan drew violent protests from the preservationists who had been advocating the salvage—including the group of experts convened by Unesco in May 1963, who decried it as a "barbarous" disfiguration and a "butchery." To cut into the human figures of the temples, they argued, was irrevocably to compromise the integrity of the monument. (fig 4.54) But if Abu Simbel was disfigured, what is the relation between this accusation of disfiguration of the monument and the process of abstraction that we set out to detect at the beginning of this chapter? After all, despite the apparent compromise of their monumental integrity, the temples are still perceived as the same monument today. Nobody—not Gazzola, the doctrinary figurehead of the campaign, not the critical historians like Choay and not, least of all, Unesco—dares to speak of Abu Simbel as a counterfeit. ³⁸⁴ Thus we should be careful not to equate the failure of the architectural scale with a failure of integrity. Instead we should ask, what version of integrity was validated in the end.

The answer, I will argue, lies in the use of sand as a technology. No technology played a more spectacular role in the salvage than sand itself. The aesthetics of the performance can be seen in the film version of The World saves Abu Simbel, which recorded the salvage process. (fig 4.55) The film features an overwhelming display of human agency, both specialist and not: the sandstone was sawed by hand continuously through the night so that the fissures would not grow with changes in temperature. But everywhere there is a human hand there is also a lot of sand. Any cutting is followed by the pouring of sand. Any whole is filled with sand. Any block is stored on a bed of sand. Sand is ubiquitous, and its role is to mitigate the image of the temples being mutilated. In other words, VBB replaced an architectural integrity (based on the legibility of a large "block") with an engineered integrity based on the fluidity of sand. By inscribing monument-movement in an intricate system of sand-displacement, VBB maintained Abu Simbel's image as a monolith while cutting it into increasingly smaller pieces.

It is only after having described the monument geologically as an aggregate system that VBB cut it into blocks. This descriptive work, which particularized the infrastructural scale of the intervention, had begun when VBB were geological consultants to the Italconsult scheme. First, they

³⁸⁴ A replica scheme always existed as a separate option. As early as December 1960 a scheme for "constructing a replica" of the temples based on molding and photogrammetry had been proposed. "There is also a growing feeling that perhaps the best thing to do would be to reproduce the temples completely as replicas. From the point of view of integrity of the monument, this solution should be a last resort. If all others prove to be either impractical or too expensive, I believe we are already have a complete photogrammetric record which would permit duplication down to very fine detail. This replica could be in the immediate vicinity or at some point, like Aswan, where more people would see it." Brew to Edmund White, 22 Dec 1960. Brew 10/54b.

had revealed the ingenuity of the original Egyptian architects, who had incorporated the geological variations of the mountain into their design, by using layers of hard rock as ceiling planes, and softer rock surfaces for sculpting finer reliefs. (fig 4.56) Secondly, they had drawn detailed elevations of the fissures in the temple front and located them precisely in history—most being very ancient. Thirdly, they had built a descriptive model of this geological predicament, which abstracted these fissures as intersecting planes of Plexiglas. (fig 4.57) What these models show is that, insofar as VBB turned Abu Simbel into a building, they did so in geological terms. That VBB considered this geological engieering as an actual building technology, rather than merely an analytical category, can be seen in a last set of models they made for the 'reconstruction of the site,' which "molded" the Nubian sandstone around the temple assertively in what the consultative committee alarmingly called "definite architectural shapes." (fig 4.59)

The prevalence of sand in the scheme also shows that in removing the architect the VBB engineers had made a direct connection with archeology instead. For instance, the entire temple-front was covered in fine sand to minimize damage to the sculpted figures while the "mountain" behind them was being dismantled. (fig 4.60) This was a clever technological solution, but it also reveals a distinctly archaeological sensibility that implies a strong correlation between the abstraction of sand (as a technology) and the figuration of the statue (as a monument). The entire discourse on the "sanctity of the stone" was redirected towards the Nubian authenticity of certain types of sand, in a way that confused the "authentic evolution" of architectural materials with its engineering properties as a technology. This covering of the temples in sand rehearsed the original discovery of the monument—and the near-ritual repetition of this discovery throughout the 19th century. Indeed the temples were first discovered by Ludwig Burckhardt in 1812, and, as Tom Little summarized, "For almost the rest of the century, Abu Simbel was the vanishing wonder, for it was the characteristic of the site that the sand was perpetually swept down to blanket the façade." When Flaubert and Du Camp visited in 1888, they spent three days "uncovering it from sand" in order to take a photograph. (fig 4.62) Thus by the time Unesco arrived at Abu Simbel, sand had already been a

³⁸⁵ UNESCO/Nubia/2CE/9, p. 9.

³⁸⁶ Tom Little, High Dam at Aswan: Subjugation of the Nile (London: Methuen, 1965), 188. Little gives each instance of clearing: "Belzoni [sent by the British in 1817, who first discovered the 'cavren'] did a prodigious job of clearing it, but it is probably that no one saw the temple again until 18144 when the famous Egyptologist Lepsius cleared it once more. In 1869 the Director of Egyptian Antiquities, Mariette, reopened the temple for the visit of the Empress Eugénie. After another 23 years the sand was removed again and some restoration done to the façade, but on this occasion a British engineer, Captain Johnstone, built walls on the plateau to protect the temple from the drift of sand. Alessandro Barsanti did some more clearing in 1909.... Since 1892, and more particularly since the Barsanti expedition, both temples of Abu Simbel have been open to those people who ventured up the Nile into Nubia."

crucial interface between Rameses as the face of antiquity and the modern explorer, and the Courier willingly recalled this "Saga of a Temple Freed from a Grave of Sand." ³⁸⁷

It is undoubtedly the symbolism implied in this pattern of covering and uncovering that had earned Abu Simbel a place in the offices of Sigmund Freud in Vienna, in the form of above a reproduction of Ernst Körner's painting, placed above the psychoanalytic couch as an invitation to retrospection.³⁸⁸ (fig 4.63) Freud's office was, of course, filled with antiquities, but Abu Simbel was was the only "antiquity" to be covered in sand, depicted in the act of discovery, recalling Freud's statement, in The Interpretation of Dreams, that "to many people the idea of being buried alive while appearing to be dead is the most uncanny thing of all." ³⁸⁹ For Freud himself the inaccessibility of memories was precisely what allowed them to be "preserved" intact until they were uncovered. Archaeology, in this Freudian universe, was a practice where figuration and abstraction were intimately connected, through sand. To say that the temples were disfigured, then, is to underestimate how much Abu Simbel was identified as a mythical archaeological object with a famous "face." The Swedish scheme, as publicized by Unesco, capitalized on this face by inscribing constructive tropes of digging, molding and sculpting into what was actually a cutting endeavor. To be sure, the idea of 'sand' as a technology had been significantly updated since the days of Flaubert and Ducamp. Steel bars were used to make connections between blocks, and epoxy was injected into the temple blocks to consolidate them before cutting. As the commentary to The World Saves Abu Simbel shows, Unesco described both technical usages of sand and the resulting monument in anthropomorphic terms: the removing of the outer layer of the cliff was called "peeling of 'mountain skin,'" while Rameses "took one last look at his living likeness." (fig 4.61)

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³⁸⁷ Louis A. Christophe, "The Saga of a Temple Freed from a Grave of Sand," in Unesco Courier: Save the Temples of Nubia Now! (February 1960), 20-22. This became the basis for a book, Abou-Simbel et l'Epopée de sa Découverte, (Bruxelles: Editions P.F. Merckk, 1965).

³⁸⁸ Much has been made of the analogy that Freud made in Civilization and its Discontents in 1932 between Rome and the human psyche—most resulting in a metaphoric interpretation of architecture as a container for "multiple contents." For a view that connects Freud's theories to his life of exile, see Carl E. Schorske, "Freud: The Psychoarchaeology of Civilizations," in The Cambridge Companion to Freud, ed. Jerome Neu (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). For a disciplinary project of detecting an archaeological impulse in the basic theoretical framework of "modernity," see Julian Thomas, Archaeology and Modernity (London: Routledge, 2004). Architectural discourse has taken Freud's proclamation that "the same space cannot have two different contents" as a challenge, an invitation to overcome this material impossibility with a symbolic simultaneity. See for Peter Eisenman's introduction to the American edition of Aldo Rossi's The Architecture of the City (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), titled "The Houses of Memory: the texts of Analogue", 3-11, for a metaphorical theorization of monuments as containers of "multiple contents." By this reading, in order to be a Freudian object architecture must be immaterial in spite, not because, of its objecthood.

 $^{^{389}}$ Anthony Vidler, "The Architecture of the Uncanny," Assemblage 3 (Jul 1987), 20.

Thus the dis-figuration of the monolith was accompanied by a re-figuring. There are three interpretive directions that can be derived from this conclusion.³⁹⁰ The first is that an analysis of preservation "processes" can be wielded more forcefully in a revision of the conventional narratives of heritage, especially since these are often initiated by organizations like Unesco. A better awareness of the technologies of heritage would undoubtedly begin to redefine the debate over ethically charged terms like "integrity." Consider for instance the fundamentally architectural role played by epoxy, as it was injected into the face of Rameses to "consolidate" it before cutting it.³⁹¹ (fig 4.61) While it is designed to be invisible, epoxy occupies the air between stone granules, changing the density of the material, and creating, over time, an uncanny darkening effect:

The darkening of the surface of a porous stone following treatment with an epoxy resin solution is an optical effect. The original, diffusely scattering, high surface roughness or high porosity surface is modified by the epoxy solution and the degree of specular, or mirror-like, reflection increases.³⁹²

In short, the Rameses we see today is a stiffer, more "puffy" version of himself. Here then we can return to Choay's Freudian diagnosis of a narcissism in heritage inflation, one could say that it is not the case that all traces of technological expenditure have been erased from the monument: it is between the stone granules of Rameses's face that they can be found, in changes of its elasticity and increases in its degree of "specularity." Ironically, it is precisely in becoming more "reflective" that Abu Simbel's performance as a "mirror" can be detected. Choay uses this collective interprtation to recommend various ways to "break" the mirror; in particular, by a recovering of sensory experience, to connect "the human body to the patrimonial body," in order to create a kinesthetic prevention against patrimonial "fixations." But if a psycho-analytic interpretation of heritage must be made, it is not enough to say that preservation is an act of narcissism; we have to conclude that preservation is already a serious act of self-mutilation (in the salvage of Abu Simbel alone, we find evidence of such neuroses as mankind cutting itself, mankind burying itself alive, and of course, mankind getting botox injections) and that it is in the fine distinctions between preservation

³⁹⁰ The World Saves Abu Simbel (Paris: Unesco, 1984)

³⁹¹ Epoxy has since become a controversial subject in preservation circles, and Abu Simbel was one of the earliest examples of epoxy used to reinforce not the joints between stone blocks but the actual fabric of a monument. For retrospective histories of the use of the material, see Lal Gauri, "Efficiency of Epoxy Resins as Stone Preservatives," in Studies in Conservation, (May 1974), 100-101; P. Kotlík, P. Justa & J. Zelinger, "The Application of Epoxy Resins for the Consolidation of Porous Stone," in Studies in Conservation (May1983), 75-79; and Nicholas L. Gianopulos, "Doubts about Epoxy Article," APT Bulletin, 21/1 (1989), 2-3.

³⁹² William S. Ginell & Richard Coffman, "Epoxy Resin-Consolidated Stone: Appearance Change on Aging," in Studies in Conservation, 43/4 (1998), 242.

³⁹³ Choay, "Sortir du narcissisme: le miroir patrimonial conjuré," L'Allégorie du Patrimoine, 198.

techniques that preservation's participation in any process, be it aesthetic, technological, or psychoanalytic, can be detected and remedied.

The second field of interpretation that is opened up by a technological understanding of the ethics of preservation is the history of tourism. In contrast to Choay's call for a new sensory evaluation of heritage, architectural historians have come late to the study of tourism, and most have take their cue from social sciences and cultural studies by theorizing architecture as a form of "immaterial mediation." According to this discourse the "spectacularization" and "commodification" of architectural environments occurs entirely in an immaterial realm that turns unique experiences into mass-produced images. But if the Nubian Campaign teaches anything about the impact of tourism, it is the way in which the very material composition of the monuments was transformed to bear the projection of tourist expectation. To learn to recognize these material modifications—to inaugurate a conoisseurial system that spoke of preservation styles in addition to architectural ones—would undoubtedly grant more legitimacy to tourism as a properly "architectural" field of inquiry.

But it is in the field of architectural historiography that perhaps the farthest reaching conclusions can be drawn, especially in the light the orthodox histories that treat technology as an unproblematically futuristic force in postwar architecture. Thus any historicist application of technology is treated as a dialectical contradiction, a reactionary anomaly. Against this automatism, the concept of "integrity", understood as a technological removal of boundaries, is a useful concept that accommodates both futuristic and nostalgic interventions of technology in architecture. By the standards of integrity, the Nubian monuments that survive from the Campaign today are not ones that have been carefully removed from their setting and thoughtfully placed back, but rather those that have been injected with boundaries: monuments whose "elasticity" as monuments and as material objects has been constrained. From an architectural perspective, then, the traces of technological expenditure are most easily found in the spaces that escaped from these constraints—for instance, in the new dome that was built behind the Abu Simbel temples to support the new artificial hill. Just as in Western museums it is an engineered "exterior" environment that now

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³⁹⁴ The recent collection on Architecture and Tourism, for instance, focuses explicitly on the "mediating" role of architecture redefining the term altogether, as "the process of reception, representation, use, spectacularization, and commodification as meaning is mediated by the rhetorical strategies of diverse media and performance." Because architects are largely absent as agents in the construction of tourist environments, the editors also feel compelled to expand "the concept of the architect ... to include a greater array of 'designers'" (by which they mean such "rhetoreticians" as "travel agents and advertisers.") and to expand architecture's materiality: "The concept of architectural materials also needs to be broadened, to include propaganda, policy and print." Then the intro ends the disclaimer with a explication that "photography, films and souvenirs have been deployed to help mediate and mythologize specific sites." Architecture and Tourism: Perception, Performance and Place ed. D. Melinda Lasansky and Brian McLaren. (New York: Berg, 2004), 10.

performs the integrity of imported Nubian monuments, in the desert it is in the new injected "interior" that the integrity of Abu Simbel now resides—as if a bubble of 1960s technological utopia had been built in Nubia after all.

Epilogue: On "Hegelian monstrosities"

In this chapter I have argued that while the Nubian Campaign was launched as a "verification of Unesco's ideals," it was achieved largely in spite of these ideals. Even as the campaign was promoted as a precedent for future international action, a series of exceptions had to be carved out of normative political, aesthetic, and economic patterns in order for the massive salvage operation to be achieved. What emerged from this inaugural "case-study," I have argued, is a "case-study" theory of history, which has become the basis for a global preservation practice. The question of whether monuments (or now, "world heritage sites") constitute exceptional examples, or are rather constitutive of a cumulative norm, is important because Unesco claims to be a universalist organization devoted to the preservation of particulars. Unesco's creed that individual "minds" aggregate into a collective "mankind" was applied to Nubia's monuments by resorting to two contradictory processes of "abstraction". At the scale of the desert, a range of locality and internationalism was spanned: "Nubia" was salvaged for the sake of its cultural particularity, but it was physically redesigned into the image of a universalist "imaginary museum of monuments." Thus monumental oases had to be depopulated in order to become emblems of mankind. At the scale of individual monuments, the abstraction from concrete materials to immaterial aesthetic value was progressively applied at a finer and finer grain, camouflaging social exclusions and disguising a consolidation of value as a "dissemination." Sand was the primary agent of this spatial subterfuge: ontologized as a concrete support for integrity and deployed as a technology for an "ethic" of performance.

No less important than the spatial subterfuge of aggregation was the historical subterfuge of the "major project." The Nubian campaign was intended not only to demonstrate the value of monuments in space but also the value of monumental action in time, forcing upon disparate historical agents a concentration of effort—and often a recalibration of ambitions. Disciplinary histories are a case in point: hailed by Unesco as forms of "technical expertise", archaeology and architectural preservation were forced into positivist codification based on a promise of future autonomy. Both disciplines emerged with statements of orthodoxy that were blatantly dependent upon exceptions. The opportunism unfolded differently in each discipline. For example, Abu Simbel was saved not because of but in spite of the judgment of Egyptologists, but its crudeness and anonymity

made it an ideal experimental object for emerging preservation technologies. Both archaeologists and preservationists, however, ultimately derived a conflicted legitimacy from the campaign, accepting conceptual compromises for the sake of scientific advances, whose consequences were not felt until the post-modernist debates of the 1980s.

Ultimately the greatest "concentration of action" that Unesco was able to draw out was in the realm of food-aid and economic exchange. Originally an incongruous event which had to be promoted as a rhetorical demonstration of humanistic "disinterest," the salvage of Abu Simbel eventually became an opportunity for the UAR and the US to minimize the risk of economic imbalance during a moment of political instability—a solution to a problem of surplusses. The amounts expended (\$ 12 M) barely registers in the economic history of the cold war, but they still qualify as a "concentration" of value which departs significantly from established precedent. Ironically, this makes Abu Simbel and the other Nubian temples intentional monuments in the traditional Rieglian sense of the term: building projects that commemorate a political event, and whose cultural significance derives from the importance of this event. From the point of view of the cold war, the Nubian campaign qualifies was a relatively straightforward monumentalization of political action, akin to that of the ancient Egyptians or Napoleon—albeit within an updated cultural sphere, where "intention" is distributed among multiple constituents (including international institutions, its experts, and its imagined constituencies). The irony, then, is that the Campaign went on to become the precedent for a new "unintentionality" in preservation culture, which wrested control over history away from state actors.

For Riegl, intentional and unintentional monuments differed not only in the circumstances of their creation but in their behavior over time: while the intentional monument denotes a historical action by fixing it in history and space, the unintentional monument simply conveys the abstract feeling of the passage of time. To return one last time to the theoretical lineage of Maussian interpretations that has been threaded throughout this chapter, in terms of gift-exchange, the theme of "time" as cultural referent is echoed by Jacques Derrida in his Counterfeit Money. Derrida offers to replace what Mauss had called the "spirituality" with "temporality." The gift must be forgotten in order for the counter-gift to be sent in return. Therefore the gift is only a gift of time:

The gift is not a gift, the gift only gives to the extent that it gives time. The difference between a gift and every other operation of pure and simple exchange is that the gift gives time. There where there is gift, there is time, What it gives, the gift, is time, but this gift is also a demand of time. The thing must not be restituted immediately and right away. ... The gift gives, demands, and takes time. 395

³⁹⁵ Jacques Derrida, Given Time I Counterfeit Money trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

This passage aptly summarizes the ways Unesco tried to insert the archaeological campaign into existing political timelines by arguing for the existence of a kind of cultural time-delay. For instance, the antiquities that had "filled the coffers" of the Cairo museum in the early 20th century only became acceptable "gifts-in-return" after a half-century during which their value as counterpieces slowly expired. Thus, Western archaeologists hoping for a 'revival of Egyptology' found in the campaign a way to "buy time" during difficult years of trans-national relations. Similarly, it is as way to secure future debt from one another that Egypt and the US engaged in the circuitous process of salvaging Abu Simbel. But perhaps the most important way that the Nubian monuments "gave" time was to Unesco: by allowing it to construct a redemptive theory of history: the Nubian monuments contained a promise of historical agency, both present and future: a retrospective value applied to the Nubian monuments and all other monuments salvaged in the future.

Unesco, as I have shown, emerged politically helpless in all its efforts to develop specifically "cultural" modes of action independent from the conduct of international relations. Yet this political helplessness does not absolve the organization from the consequences of its insistence on connecting individual consciousness with collective action. In this sense Unesco is guilty of the same "Hegelian Monstrosity" of which Maurice Merleau-Ponty accused André Malraux in his commentary on the Musée Imaginaire: a reconciliation of individual perception with a transcendent telos, "a History which reunites scattered efforts, and a Reason in history of which he [Malraux] is the instrument." By analogy we might say that the Nubian campaign allowed Unesco to abdicate its own responsibility, as the instrument of a kind of monumental "reason," which gathered scattered "intentions" for the sake of perpetuating a history of unintention.

An image of this "Hegelian monstrosity" is provided by a photograph of André Malraux's visit the Abu Simbel salvage site in 1966. (fig 4.64) Re-enacting the classic archaeological encounter, Malraux stared into Rameses' colossal face, undoubtedly recalling his 1960 pronouncement that "the face of queen Nefertiti haunts our painters as Cleopatra has inspired out poets; but whereas Cleopatra is a queen without a face, Nefertiti, for us, is a face without a kingdom." In the intervening years, Malraux had established France's own "imaginary museum" and established himself as the saviour of its monuments—thus it is not difficult to situate the salvage of Abu Simbel in the chronology of

³⁹⁶ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," in Signs trans. Richard McLeary(Chicago: Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, 1964), 65. Reprinted with some revisions as "The Indirect Language," The Prose of the World (Evanston: Northwest University Press, 1973).

³⁹⁷ André Malraux, TVA of Archaeology, 2.

Malraux's work in France.³⁹⁸ There are enough resonances between Malraux's deeds and Unesco's work to conclude that there were significant reciprocal influences between the two organizations.³⁹⁹ The cultural narcissism of the encounter was reinforced by the pointed questions that young Nasserist government officials asked Malraux during his trip, about the discrepancy between the socialist ideals Malraux had expressed in his pre-war work, La Condition Humaine, and his postwar ministerial position in the Gaullist government. 400 This was the same question Malraux was everywhere confronting in France, and the fact that it was raised here only highlights the continuity between Malraux's international work and his later institution of the "Loi Malraux" and other heritage work in France. Yet the "monstrosity" lies precisely in this undue attention to Malraux as an institution. If any cultural ministry is to be credited for the Nubian salvage, it is Nasser's Ministry of Culture and National Guidance, whose first appointed minister, Sarwat Okasha, played a crucial part in involving Nasser—who himself appears to have held little interest in Nubia and its monuments. As the sole contact for Western experts, and a scholar himself, Okasha himself is today the public official that Unesco commemorates in the anniversary of the Campaign. 401 Okasha's agency in the campaign can be understood as a reversal of Malraux's: Malraux was present to make proclamations at the launch and the success of the salvage, Okacha had been a decisive force at most stages of the campaign, but was absent in the 1966 photograph, having fallen out of favor and replaced by a more closely aligned Nasserist, Abdel Hakem, who is featured in the photograph. Re-instated a few years later, Okasha authored an official memoir of the Campaign for Egyptian history books.

There is also a third person present in the photograph, representing a third type of historical agency: Malraux's chaperon, CEDAE director and Louvre-trained Egyptologist Christiane Noblecourt. It is she who can claim the greatest personal investment in the campaign, having played a pivotal role in bringing the temples to the attention of Unesco, and to the Egyptian antiquities, having agitated for the creation of the CEDAE, and written many of the popularized accounts of the history of Nubia, and eventually centering her entire career on this adventure, which she called "La Grande

³⁹⁸ For a brief overview of the birth of the French ministry of culture see Xavier Laurent, "Le Renouvellement des Cadres," Grandeur et Misère du Patrimoine d'André Malraux à Jacques Duhamel (1959-1973), (Paris: Mémoires et Documents de l'Ecole des Chartes: 2003), 35-44. Malraux's trip was officially to facilitate France's participation in the King Tut exhibition which traveled worldwide and whose proceeds were donated to the Unesco campaign—a position that was, in the United States, filled by former first lady Jacqueline Kennedy.

³⁹⁹ Jean-Françoise Lyotard sums up: "As minister of Culture, his initiatives are well known: the inventory of France's artistic heritage; the creation of the Maisons de la Culture; the facelift of Paris; the regional support funding for the plastic arts, museum and theater; the protection and preservation of historic monuments and urban sites; the creation of the Ochestre de Paris; the overhaul of the Opera and the naming of Georges Auric as its director..." Jean-Françoise Lyotard, Signé Malraux (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), 277.

⁴⁰⁰ The episode is recounted by Christiane Laroche-Noblecourt in La Grande Nubiade (Paris: Stock/Pernod: 1992), 298.

 $^{^{401}}$ Unesco's celebration of the 30^{th} anniversary of the Nubian Campaign honored Okasha and Christiane Laroche-Noblecourt.

Nubiade." In a sense, many of the values in whose name Noblecourt fought were deeply anachronistic: she argued for turning Nubia into an "open-air museum" and she spearheaded the effort to stop the VBB scheme as "barbaric." Yet her actions can also be seen as prototype of a later channel of cultural action which acquired a higher profile in the decade after the campaign: the profile of the grass-roots organizer operating within a non-governmental organization.

Indeed the Nubian campaign marks the end of an era of intergovernmental cultural politics and the beginning of the rise of small-scale NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations). Many of the figures involved in the Campaign helped in this transition: Gazzola went on to found the International Council of Monuments and Sites in 1965 (ICOMOS), and Brew used the Campaign as leverage to convince the US to become a member of the International Center for the Conservation of Cultural Property in Rome (ICCROM). Further campaigns were conducted largely without the toptier cultural figures like Malraux and Okasha. In the West, this shift away from governments was experienced as a political revival of preservationist activism, connected with the turn towards the preservation of cities. Thus Christiane Noblecourt, with her nostalgic reconstruction of "Nubian life," is ultimately not far removed from Jane Jacobs, and her plea for the preservation of "communities" in Western cities. But even this "constituency turn" in heritage discourse hides a Hegelian monstrosity: the illusion that, in turning their attention to forms of urban "heritage" which were literal containers of people, who could be politically mobilized against urban renewal, the international preservation movement had purged monuments of all the figurative ways that heritage was codified as a figurative container of cultural, economic and political collectivities.

FIG. 4.01 Transmission of electricity generated by the Aswan High Dam. UAR Information Department, 1960.

FIG. 4.02 Survey of the Nile Valley, UNESCO, 1960.

FIG. 4.03 Aswan: Symbol of Soviet-Egyptian Friendship, 1965.


FIG. 4.04 New York Times, Jan 14, 1964.








4.04





4.02





FIG. 4.05 Aswan High Dam section. UAR Information Department, 1960.

FIG. 4.06 Suez Canal: On-site concrete factory (left) and Panorama (right). From Nouvelles Conquêtes de la Science, 1883.












FIG. 4.07 Abu Simbel on the cover of the Unesco Courier, 1960-1964.

FIG. 4.09 Unesco, The World Saves Abu Simbel, 1978.

FIG. 4.08 Abu Simbel on opening day, 22 September 1968.







FIG. 4.10 Satellite photograph of the new temples.

FIG. 4.11 Satellite photograph of the temples, superimposed with plan of their original location.








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
FIG. 4.12 Head of Nefertiti, exported to Germany in 1912.

FIG. 4.13 Limestone altarpiece, left as counterpart to the Cairo Museum.

FIG. 4.14 Map of Egypt, ending where Nubia begins. *Description de l'Egypte*.

FIG. 4.15 The International Action Committee at work on its Nubian Cruise.









4.15



FIG. 4.16 "Gifts from the land of the Pharaohs," in The Unesco Courier, October 1961.

FIG. 4.17 "Twenty-three temples will be moved," in *The Unesco Courier*, October 1961.







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FIG. 4.18 Direct participation in excavation and restoration work, measured in manpower. Data from Unesco, diagram by author.

FIG. 4.19 Resettlement of Nubian populations. Diagram by author.

FIG. 4.20 Archaeological concessions by country. Diagram by author.





Lucia Allais






FIG. 4.21 Description de l'Egypte: Frontispiece.


FIG. 4.22 "Patrons of the International Campaign to Save Nubia's Monuments," in *The Unesco Courier*, 1961. Malraux is second from bottom in the right-most column.


FIG. 4.23 Stills form Unesco's promotional film International Campaign for Monuments, June-November 1964.






- FIG. 4.24 Map of the Unesco appeal.
- FIG. 4.25 Temple relocation. Diagram by author.
- **FIG. 4.26** Four temples exported as "grants-in-return" ("Surplus temples") in their new locations.














FIG. 4.27 Temple relocation into four oases. Diagram by author.

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Il s'agit des monuments suivants :

- PHILAT, temples gréco-romains.

II - DEROD, temple gréco-romain

III - KERTASSI, Kiosque gréco-romain; inscriptions et bas-reliefs dans les carrières au sud du Kiosque.

- BEIT ET OUALI, spéos du Nouvel Empire.

- KALABSHA, temple gréco-romain.

- DENDOUR, temple gréco-romain.

WII - GERF HUSSEIN, temple du Nouvel Empire.

VIII - DAKKE, temple ptolémaique.

- MARAQQA, temple gréco-romain.

- OUADI ES SEBOUA, temple du Nouvel Empire.

XI - AMADA, temple du Nouvel Empire.

temple du Nouvel Empire. XII - DERR,

XIII - CLLESYIA, spécs du Nouvel Empire.


IIV - QASR IBRIM, chapelles taillées dans le roc (Nouvel Empire).

IV - ANIBA, tombe de Pennout (Nouvel Impire).

IVI - ABOU-SIMBEL, temples du Nouvel Empire et monuments annexes.

IVII - ABOU-ODA, spéos du Nouvel Empire transformé en église.

IVIII- GEBEL SHAMS, chapelle rupestre du Nouvel Empire.



some of the drowned temples along the river seem to prove. The cripin of these naturact variations are not yet fully understood, it to still a question which the crust-natural is drawn out of the own-crusted rock itself slong the expection-gradient or from file natural.

Guestions of permodulity, that nears native permetty or the possibility of air, pass or liquid solution-signation within the fruitful. It tight however the most office in the bolden it secure fruitful. It tight however the second office the extra the provesses better preclicit to the bodding time vertical to it. Finis should be kept in sind whom discussing natural scopages will as consolidating notices.

Those consolidating notices.

Those considerations lead from physics-chomical proporties of the material itself to its natural arrangement in space, the material citizen of strate and other recolunits and similar for-tures influencing the behaviour of the greater real unit.

A rock mass countries of minural-engregator and - in most mages in subdivided in und.-minito of rock, in strate, bods, joint-bedies and so forth, that same, it is, at the whole, very prely a homogeneous mass. This concerns its beintions towards deforma-tion just so used no its activate towards or enginet infiltration, composition, expellently and similar infilmence.

The single rock-units are asparated from each-other by primary or secondary planus; a subsection of whom is given below: 1)

Bedding planes, primary elements connected with sedimentation itself. They include

<u>Groupogating</u>, i.e. local variations in budding-angles, mostly indicating a torrential or estuarine environment of mediaentation.



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historic clauses ("gravity-showele") boundary-planes of shiding rock portions along cliffe, as some in small ended often in curth-slump and, in greater scale accompagy the Nile valley along it be kinesteen-cliffs between laxor and deno (Valley of the Kings).

Sciention-planes, housdary planes of ixpansion-shields, parallel to rock surfaces of convex promoteories (abs Stabel). They originate in

III. KIRTASSI (18 Septembre à 12 h.) à 45 hm. du Barrage d'Assouan.

Rionauc construit en blocs de grês de disensions sevennes, func forme architecturale analogue su Kionque de Philae; il a été édifé à l'époque groco-rossine. Oubsergé des maintonant pendent une grande partie de l'annés, il ost prosque completement édeolis. Lors d'une éventualle reconstruction l'on pourre compter sur environ un tière du matériel original. De fât de l'absence de déceration, je pense qu'une opération de démontage pour transfort est bien possible. KERTASSI

Carrière. Au mud du Kiosque, toujours sur la rive Quest, une sacionne carrière de grès contient une niche dent l'entrée est surmen tés d'une comiche et encadrée par un terc (2 m. x ln. 20); ectte entrée est fianquée de doux bastes en bas-relief es style remain; de part et d'autre, des inscriptions groques dont l'une d'elles nous gyrend que conscrutiere en feurni les pierres utilisées pour le construction des temples de Philac. Le sauvotage de cet ensemble ne présente pas de difficulté soccasive : la niche et les deux bustes pouvant être détachés de la carrière et déplacés.

Quant aux inscriptions, clies pourront être, en rupport de lour importance, soit déplacées soit moulées.





V.	Localité	Honuments	Methode de sauvetage	
1	KERTASSI	Kiosque bati	Demontage, transport par route et remontage en proximité	
2	KERTASSI	Carriéra creuse dans le roo	Liberation par sciage Transport de grands blocs Recomposition de la Carriére en proximité	
	BBIT EL	Temple en Spécs	Liberation par sociage Transport par route des grand bloos - Recomposition du spécs au proximité	
	KALESHA	Temple bati	Demontage, transport par route et remontage en proximité	
	DENDOUR	Temple bati	Demontage, transport par route et remontage en proximité	
	GERP HUSSELV	Temple bati et creusé	Demontage transport per route e recomposition de la partie bati Liberation de la partie en spéc par soingo-Transport des grand blocs.Recomposition en proximi	
	DAKKE	Temple bati	Demontage, transport par route et remontage en proximité	
	MAHARRAKA	Temple bati	Demontage, transport par routs et remontage en proximité	
	OUADI ES SEBOUA	Temple bati et oreumé	Demontage transport par route of recomposition de la partie bati Liberation de la partie en spéce par sciage. Transport des grand blocs.Recomposition en proximité	




FIG. 4.29 Gazzola's map identifying the sites of the Monuments, The Gazzola Report, 1959.





FIG. 4.30 "The Nile from Assuan to the Second Cataract," in *Baedeker's Egypt*, 1928.

FIG. 4.31 "Tourist High Spots of Egypt" and "Museums with Egyptian Materials," in Baedeker's Guide to Egypt, 1984.












FIG. 4.34 "The Island of Philae" from Description de l'Egypte.

FIG. 4.35 Victor Horeau, panorama, "The Greatest Open-Air Museum is about to Disappear."

FIG. 4.36 The island of Philae submerged, 1924.










FIG. 4.37 Cash contributions to the Abu Simbel fund. Data from Unesco, diagram by the author.

FIG. 4.38 Contributions to the Abu Simbel safeguard. From Sarwat Okasha, Memoirs, 1984.

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


FIG. 4.39 French "Dam" Scheme: Perspective views. Coyne & Bellier, Engineers; Albert Laprade, Architect.






FIG. 4.40 Coyne & Bellier: Three dam options.

FIG. 4.41 Coyne & Bellier, Site plan of pumping scheme

FIG. 4.42 Coyne & Bellier, Earth dam section










FIG. 4.43 ItalConsult Scheme: Section of Concrete "Box"

FIG. 4.43 ItalConsult Scheme: preliminary sketches by Pietro Gazzola in Gazzola Report 1959.

FIG. 4.43 ItalConsult Scheme: section.












FIG. 4.44 Axonometric sequence of salvage

FIG. 4.45 Pietro Gazzola, drawing from the reconstruction of the Ponte Pietra in Verona

FIG. 4.46 Rendering of ItalConsult scheme in *Unesco Courier: Abu Simbel: Now or Never*, 1962.










FIG. 4.47 Renderings of the ItalConsult scheme, by Riccardo Morandi.








FIG. 4.48 British "underwater" scheme: axonometric, plan and section.





FIG. 4.49 British scheme: view inside the shrine.


FIG. 4.50 Jane Drew & Max Fry, "The Nile" in *Architecture* and the *Environment*.

FIG. 4.51 Illumination of the figures at the back of the shrine.


FIG. 4.52 British scheme: view from the tunnels in the dam.










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




FIG. 4.56 VBB: Rendering of the fissures

FIG. 4.57 VBB: Plexiglass model of the fissures in the stone


FIG. 4.58 VBB: Plan drawing of the fissures in the stone

FIG. 4.59 VBB: Proposed reconstruction of the site, 1961.





Lucia Allais






FIG. 4.60 VBB: Facade is covered in fine sand to avoid damage to the statues

FIG. 4.61 VBB: Statues are injected with epoxy before cutting

FIG. 4.62 Maxime du Camp: Colosse d'Ibsamboul, photograph taken in 1883.

FIG. 4.63 Rendering of Abu Simbel above the couch in Sigmund Freud's Vienna office.








FIG. 4.64 André Malraux visits Abu Simbel, accompanied by Christiane Laroche-Noblecourt (left) and Abdel Hakem (right).

Conclusion

That the great moments in the struggles of individuals form links in one single chain; that they combine to form a mountain range of humankind through the millennia; that for me the highest point of such a long-since-past moment is still alive, bright and great—this is the fundamental thought in the belief in humanity that expresses itself in the demand for monumental history.\(^1\)
—Friedrich Nietszche, 1874.

A law for the protection of monuments can only refer to non-intentional monuments, and to intentional ones only inasmuch as they belong, at the same time, to the category of non-intentional monuments.²

-Alois Riegl, 1903.

It is true that, in many countries, remarkable efforts have already been made and are still being made to protect those monuments which are endangered; and there is no nation today which is not proud of its artistic heritage and conscious of its importance in cultural life. But Unesco, which, under its constitution, is called upon to assure the conservation and protection of the world's heritage of works of art and monuments, had a duty to take its own steps to bring these national efforts into a world-wide scheme, and to show the key role that may be played in the cultural formation of contemporary man by communion with works produced, through the centuries, in the various centers of civilization which cover the surface of the globe like so many volcanoes of History.³

—René Maheu, 1964.

It will not have escaped even a distracted reader that the "will to war" and the "will to art" advertised in the title have appeared only infrequently as a pair in the projects and debates surveyed in the dissertation. Yet these two "wills" were pervasive in the minds of the mid-century internationalists. Even if their relationship was never cohesively theorized, they are still the surest anchor for a strict periodization of the material at hand: the dissertation begins when the League first combined these two forms of volition to achieve an effect of political autonomy, and ends when Unesco no longer felt it necessary to resort to either one in order to conjure up "the importance of cultural life." Cultural Internationalism remains a strong political movement and the modernist aesthetics of monuments has now become an International Style—but the Will to War and the Will

¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Utility and Liability of History for Life," in The Nietzsche Reader (London: Blackwell, 2006), 132.

² Alois Riegl, "A Law for Protection of Monuments," in Reform Project- Laws of Protection, 207.

³ René Maheu, "The preservation of monuments for posterity is one of the duties of mankind," in Unesco Chronicle (Aug-Sep 1964), 265.

to Art have largely disappeared, leaving behind the certainty that monuments give iconic weight to cultural autonomy in a new world order. To conclude, I venture briefly into earlier and later decades, to clarify the provenance of this autonomy and speculate on its fate in the postmodern aftermath.

What was meant by "will to war" in mid-century international discourse was a version of what Nietszche had, in 1874, called the "will to power" ("Die Wille zur Macht") and which French-speakers translated as volonté. Nietszche coined the term to describe human agency in a postidealist world: the power of human subjectivity to act over history itself. Nietszche's Macht has of course been connected to the political nationalisms of the 20th Century; and Niesztche's despiction of "German cultivation as containing internally struggling chaos of all foreign lands and all prior history" can certainly be heard resonating through all of intellectual cooperation. But he also brought this theory of freedom and volition to bear on monuments directly, in his description of "the uses and disadvantages" of three kinds of history, each kind representing the actions of modern subjectivity onto past events. Nietszche was surprisingly specific in his description of the form of monumental history: the way it naturalized events (monuments were "mountain chains" emerging from "a dense earthly fog") while at the same time dematerializing the connection between moment and monument (monumental history was but "a collection of effects in themselves.") Monuments absorbed autonomous human volition with "iconic veracity," and anyone familiar with Unesco's rhetoric will find a striking similarity between the language of monuments in the service of "peace in the minds of men" and Nietzsche's description of this "iconic veracity."

What was meant by the "will to art" in mid-century art history was inspired by what Alois Riegl had called "Kunstwollen," which the French translated with the infinitive vouloir, and which I have already described as a formalist regulation of artworks themselves. While Nietszche's subject made "demands" onto monumental history, Riegl's wollen was a collective volition that proceeded from the object outward. Tt is Riegl's willingness to speak of this autonomous force in political terms that must not be underestimated: this force was so comprehensive that it folded even the most potent of intentions into un-intention, thus even blatantly commemorative objects could only be legislated if they were "valued by the terms of the modern Kunstwollen." War memorials were, of course, the paradigmatic example of an intentional monument. Riegl turned the range spanned by Nietszche between "moments" and "monuments" into a feedback loop of "effects in themselves." In this sense, Nietzsche's politics tended towards Riegl's formalism, and vice-versa.

⁴ Nietzsche, 140.

Consider now René Maheu's speech launching "The International Campaign for Monuments" in 1960, which used many of the formulations that Unesco had earned monuments, including their value as "the world's heritage" and their role in the progress towards ever-more respect between cultures. Maheu borrowed Nietzsche's allegory, naturalizing monuments as "volcanoes of History" that "covered the surface of the globe" and offering them for "communion" with human subjectivity. He also took on Riegl's legal analysis, describing the intentions of nations as irrelevant to the legislation of cultural artifacts, and granting Unesco the privilege of "showing the key role" played by unintention in "cultural formations." Where Maheu fundamentally differed from his venerable philosophical sources was in the apolitical character of his statement: the authority of his "worldwide scheme" was given quietly to Unesco's constitution, as if the highly dramatized vouloir and volonté created during the turbulent mid-century had disappeared into a bureaucratic anonymity. It is this institutional, regularized, and normalized autonomy that monuments—or "urban sites," or indeed actual "mountainous chains"—are granted when they are designated "world heritage sites" today.

Yet is not this liberal politics of monuments that was revived when postmodernist architects and post-structuralist critics re-discovered "the monument" in the last quarter of the 20th Century. When the journal Oppositions translated Riegl's Cult of Monuments into English for the first time in 1982, the text was illustrated with images from the annals of 20th Century conservation, and introduced by a text of Alan Coquhoun that attested to its historicist relevance despite its putative "modernity." Through monuments, postmodernism hoped to rediscover its historical consciousness. There was nothing social, political or even ideological about the historicist monument: it was a disciplinary artifact that connected architecture back to an institution that modernism had rejected. Similarly, the "memory discourse" that followed suit in the 1990s, directing monuments towards the identity between history and memory, completely "forgot" about the unintentional monument. Instead a kind of theoretical solipsism developed that was conveniently suited to the interpretation of all the intentional monuments that had just been built, written, and theorized to commemorate the destructions of World War II. But what postmodernism called "history" and poststructuralism called "memory," the mid-century had simply called "culture." What remains unclear, and undoubtedly a subject of further investigation, is how the institutional ethos that had been built into these disciplinary conceits helped postmodern theory—architectural and otherwise—reclaim this cultural autonomy for itself.

⁵ Alan Colquhoun, "Newness and Age-Value in Alois Riegl," in Oppositions 25 (Fall 1982).

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