

POLITICIZED ARMIES, MILITARIZED POLITICS:
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY AND GREECE

by

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
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
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ABSTRACT

Despite their common Ottoman heritage, Greece and Turkey have diverged widely in their modern history of civil-military relations. The armed forces have a long record of intervention in both countries, but there is a crucial difference: the military emerged as a roughly unitary, independent political actor in Turkey, whereas in Greece it remained divided into factions aligned with civilian political parties through patronage relationships. This empirical observation is then used as a basis for an attempt at theory-building. Several countries exhibit a pattern of military interventions more similar to Turkey and others to those found in Greece. Societies which developed a strong parliamentary tradition early in the modernization process also acquired organized civilian political groups with clientelist networks extending into the armed forces. On the contrary, in countries with limited or weak parliamentary development and strong security pressures, political activism was often channeled through the military, which emerged as a hotbed of political thinking, predating and pre-empting any civilian party tradition. The former type of civil-military relations was more commonly found in Southern European and Latin American countries while the latter was predominant in non-Western societies that resisted Western colonization.

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POLITICIZED ARMIES, MILITARIZED POLITICS: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TURKEY AND GREECE

Although the political science literature on civil-military relations is voluminous, one important question remains understudied: why have some militaries been more often in bed with civilians than others? Latin American area specialists have heavily influenced the study of civil-military relations, leading to a general emphasis on the stereotypical anti-communist military enjoying some open or tacit civilian support. Although civil-military relations scholars command a broader knowledge of empirical cases beyond Cold War Latin America and have classified military regimes according to various criteria, a salient typology based on closeness of association with civilian circles has not arisen. This paper attempts to create such a typology based on a comparison of a rather odd couple: Turkey and Greece.

Greece and Turkey are often discussed in pair as adversaries divided by history and culture, not as cases for a fruitful comparison. Even though both experienced numerous coups in the twentieth century, knowledgeable commentators avoid drawing any parallels between them. Indeed, Greece and Turkey differ on the subject of civil-military relations. Greece was a relatively stable parliamentary democracy in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, its military became drenched in the political antagonisms between a republican left and a royalist right until a foreign policy disaster in Cyprus prompted a return to civilian rule, political reconciliation, and full civilian control. Turkey, the successor state to the Ottoman Empire, was born in a period of revolution spearheaded by its military and became the first secular independent Muslim state. Its military has long been studied by political scientists for its involvement in

politics as an actor above parties, allegedly aiming to uphold the principles of the Kemalist reforms in a series of interventions. Although Turkey grew wealthier and more democratic during the twentieth century, its military is still considered to be playing a shadow role in government, an issue affecting Turkey's current application for admission to the European Union.

And yet it is not immediately obvious why Greece and Turkey should be so different, since both societies sprang from the political system of the Ottoman Empire, which they had shared for centuries. A common historical background is often used as point of reference when discussing similarities among Latin American countries, not least in the area of civil-military relations. Cultural disparity may make it seem natural that Greece's political path would depart from Turkey's, but it is not at all clear which cultural traits were the culprits leading to this divergence. Is it religion that affected the relationship between the armed forces and the polity? Comparative political research has associated Islam with an abstract negative correlation to democratization, but Turkey has one of the longest records of secular reform among Muslim societies. Besides, it is not the quantity but the different nature of interventions that requires explanation: military coups in Greece were just as numerous.¹ The subject of civil-military relations is most often conceived as pertaining to general political stability, making the number and frequency of coups the first focus of any study. The major difference between Greece and Turkey on the civil-military dimension has not been the level of political stability but the different relationship between the military and the civilian elites.

¹ In the twentieth century, Greece experienced military coups or outright interventions in 1909, 1916, 1922, 1923, 1925, 1926, 1933, 1935, 1967, and 1973; Turkey in 1908, 1909, 1913, 1919, 1960, 1962, 1963, 1971, 1980, and 1997. This numbering is not counting multiple coup attempts in the same year (there were two

Comparing civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey would serve to explain their dissimilar political development and also check for possible interaction, since the two states have been in an antagonistic relationship for most of their modern history. A closer look will reveal that religion, external threat, or even the political party system do not offer any easy explanations for the divergence. A more logical explanation would point to another variable: institutional synchronism. After briefly reviewing the history of civil-military relations in each country, I will offer an explanation based on the reverse lag in the development of military and political institutions.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN MODERN GREEK HISTORY

The Kingdom of Greece was created in 1832 as a result of perhaps the first Western “humanitarian intervention” in modern history. The intervention of Russia, Britain, and France against the Ottoman Empire saved the Greek Revolution from the brink of disaster and created a fully independent state with a Bavarian monarch, Otto I. At its inception, this state did not have the resources to maintain a large military. Greece’s independence was guaranteed by its great power patrons, but its small size forbade any solitary adventurism against the Ottoman Empire, still a vast and powerful state at that time. The only local military tradition available was that of the unruly bandits who had fought the War of Independence (1821-1830). Otto’s Bavarian regents—the king was a minor when he accepted the throne—created a small professional military trained by a Bavarian contingent and disbanded most of the

coups in Greece in 1935, 1967, and 1973). Counting attempted coups rather than “coup years,” Greece actually experienced more coups than Turkey in the 20th century.

irregulars. Greek military doctrine in the mid-nineteenth century envisioned a mobilization of irregular units, in Greece proper and among Greek populations in the adjacent Ottoman territories, if and when an international opportunity presented itself, e.g. in the event of another Russo-Turkish war. Without an international opportunity at hand, Greece could not dare oppose the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, a large standing military at peacetime would be an expensive excess for the impecunious young kingdom.²

As it is often ironically the case in civil-military relations history, small size did not prevent the Greek military from political involvement. First of all, the decision to disband the irregulars and commission a small number of professional officers, created bitterness among the Independence War veterans, several of whom returned to banditry or otherwise came into conflict with the Bavarian court. The domestic political situation and Greece's lack of a professional military tradition created a suitable setting for conspiratorial activity in a nascent society with very murky distinctions between military and civilian realms. The Bavarian administration, although efficient and industrious, ruled Greece without a constitution or parliament. In 1843, an agglomeration of bandit veterans and civilian politicians, assisted by the head of the Athens Cavalry Guard, led a popular revolution against King Otto demanding a constitution. The palace gave way, and Greece held its first parliamentary elections in 1844—a few years ahead of several Northern European states and two generations before the first elections in the Ottoman Empire.

² Veremes, Thanos, *The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy* (Montreal, New York, and London: Black Rose Books, 1997), pp. 12-26.

Unsurprisingly, the first elections were far from impeccable and brought to power weak parties (initially called French, Russian, and English, depending on which major power they favored as a potential ally) led by corrupt self-interested leaders. Greece's foreign policy focused on the dream of liberating the unredeemed populations in the Ottoman lands (dubbed the "Megali Idea," i.e. the Great Idea), but the kingdom's weak international standing fell far short of the illusion. Public discontent with the king and the country's general malaise grew after the Crimean War (1853-56) when Greece's patrons went to war against each other and an Anglo-French force briefly occupied the port of Athens to prevent Greece from interfering. In 1862, another popular revolution in Athens, again with full complicity by the Greek military, forced King Otto to abdicate. He was replaced by King George I, of the Danish house of Glucksburg, who enjoyed British favor.³

In the second half of the nineteenth century, the international exigencies gradually changed Greece's security posture and domestic politics. In parliament, two crude blocs arose by the 1880s, one more recklessly irredentist (led by Theodoros Diligiannis), the other favoring commercial development and a more careful foreign policy (led by Charilaos Trikoupis). Internationally, the rise of Bulgarian nationalism, supported by Russia, put Greece in an odd position. Facing new local competitors for the division of the spoils in the Balkans and unable to count on the guaranteed support of any major power patron, the Greek state was forced to take its military preparation more seriously. Trikoupis reformed the Military Academy (Scholi Evelpidon) trying to give officers more

³ Richard Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 46-55; Triantaphyllos Gerozesis, *To Soma ton Hellenon Axiomatikon kai he these tou sten Synchrone Hellenike Koinonia* [The Greek Officer Corps and Its Place in Modern Greek Society], (Athens: Dodoni, 1996), pp. 69-112.

relevant professional training and opening a school for NCOs. Due to budgetary constraints, however, the Greek military remained small. Only rich families could afford the Military Academy's tuition, and its graduates tended to join the privileged artillery and engineers corps. As a result, the infantry remained poorly trained, with most officers rising from the ranks. Greece was peacefully enlarged in 1864 and 1881 with the addition of the Ionian islands and Thessaly, but its international position remained precarious. Some advocated cooperating with the Ottomans to forestall Bulgarian irredentism in Macedonia, but the island of Crete, whose majority Greek population frequently revolted, remained a focal point of contention with the Sublime Porte. Greece's civilian elites were disappointed by the state's perceived inability to swiftly realize the Megali Idea.⁴

Greece's diplomatic and military woes became apparent in the 1890s, when Trikoupis lost the elections and his opponent Diliyiannis came to power. A group of officers and civilians formed the Ethniki Etaireia (National Society) in 1895, a semi-clandestine pressure group bent on supporting irredentist action in the Ottoman territories. When a new revolt broke out in Crete, the Greek government thoughtlessly decided to assist it, prompting an Ottoman declaration of war and a spectacular defeat in 1897. The National Society was dissolved, but other similar groups took its place at the turn of the century, as Greek society was recovering from the humiliating defeat which prevented the unification of Crete with the motherland. Greek concerns were particularly centered on the multi-ethnic Ottoman region of Macedonia, where an underground war

⁴ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, pp. 55-71; Veremes, *The Military in Greek Politics*, pp. 27-49; Gerozeses, pp. 167-222.

between Greek and Bulgarian guerrilla units raged from 1904 until the 1908 Young Turk revolution.

Agitation was particularly acute among military academy graduates blaming the palace for maintaining a nepotistic promotion structure, which they thought simultaneously barred them from career development and condemned the country to military impotence. In 1909, an organization of mostly low-ranking officers called *Stratiotikos Syndesmos* (Military League) staged a pronunciamiento, the first real coup in Greek history.⁵ Their immediate demands concerned ending royal control of military promotions, but they soon expanded to demanding an overhaul of the political system, for which they received public support. The army returned to its barracks after forcing the king to dissolve parliament and name a prominent Cretan nationalist, Eleftherios Venizelos, as the new prime minister. Venizelos, who had excelled in the Cretan revolutionary movement, launched a full-scale military modernization program, expanded the officer corps, and entered into negotiations with Bulgaria and Serbia for an anti-Turkish alliance. He also passed the first law preventing active duty officers from holding public office.⁶ His military reforms were not fully underway when the Balkan Wars erupted in 1912, but the subsequent expansion of the Greek military, which kept on fighting almost continuously for a decade, forever changed the nature of the small aristocratic organization it had been during the nineteenth century. This growth of the military was associated with Greece's territorial aggrandizement between 1912 and 1922.

Venizelos' immense impact on Greek politics consisted in the creation of a stable two-party system since the 1911 election. His Liberal Party (*Komma Fileleftheron*)

⁵ For a detailed account, see Victor Papacosma, *The Military in Greek Politics: the 1909 Coup d'Etat* (Kent, OH: Kent University Press, 1977).

pursued a center-left, reformist, and anti-royalist line, against a royalist-conservative opposition. The only significant addition to the political spectrum after World War I was the small but vocal Greek Communist Party (KKE), which only participated in government in a few brief transitional periods. Even though the content of the political debate shifted to the left over time, the basic royalist/anti-royalist bipolar divide characterized the Greek party system until 1967.

Venizelos collided with Constantine I, King George's successor, already during the Balkan Wars, but the final rift came over the question of Greece's entry into World War I. Frustrated with Constantine's pro-German neutrality, Venizelos staged a coup in Entente-occupied Thessalonica in 1916, together with General Danglis and Admiral Koundouriotis under the slogan of *Ethniki Amyna* (National Defense). This act bitterly divided the Greek officer corps in two camps, the "amynitai" (those who joined the Entente sympathizers in Northern Greece) and the "enapomeinantes" (those who remained with the king in Athens). Greece conducted its operations in World War I and the disastrous follow-up Greek-Turkish war with a split military.⁷ When the Entente ousted Constantine in 1917, Venizelos forced most royalist officers into retirement, and made enrollment in the military academy free of charge, opening this career path to poor social groups. When Venizelos was in turn defeated in the 1920 election, Constantine returned to Greece, retired all high-ranking Venizelist officers, and had his favorites, who lacked the veteran experience of World War I, lead the campaign against Turkey. After Ataturk's forces sent the Greek army reeling back to the Aegean, the middle ranks of the

⁶ Veremes, *The Military in Greek Politics*, p. 86.

⁷ Veremes, *The Military in Greek Politics*, pp. 50-69.

military revolted against Constantine, brought back Venizelos, and declared a republic with Koundouriotis as the first president.⁸

The division between Venizelist and royalist officers was perpetuated in the republican period, as each officer's career prospects depended on the political fortunes of his civilian patrons. After an unstable period of coups and counter-coups, Venizelos came to power in 1928 and effected a Greco-Turkish rapprochement with Ataturk. However, he lost the 1932 election to the conservative Popular Party (Laikon Komma). This opened the constitutional Pandora's box once again. The Popular Party refrained from declaring support for the return of the king, but such a fear was so wide-spread in the ranks of the Liberals, that Venizelos' trusted officers twice attempted to overthrow the right-wing government in 1933 and 1935. The 1935 coup was defeated by anti-Venizelist officers who brought back from abroad Constantine's son, George II. Following Venizelos' death in exile in Paris in 1936, George II gave General Ioannis Metaxas dictatorial powers, ending the period of the First Greek Republic.⁹

The Metaxas regime established fascist paraphernalia and persecuted communists, while remaining friendly to Britain in its foreign policy. Metaxas' cabinets were approximately 30% military and 70% civilian, drawn among anti-Venizelists. The navy, which had consistently supported Venizelos in the 1930s coups, was distrusted by the regime and its ammunition stockpile was guarded by the police.¹⁰ Metaxas gained personal glory in 1940 by rejecting Mussolini's ultimatum and putting Greece on Britain's side in the bleakest period of World War II; he died in 1941, after the Greek

⁸ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, pp. 73-106; Gerozeses, pp. 361-414.

⁹ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, pp. 107-118; Veremes, *The Military in Greek Politics*, pp. 90-133; Gerozeses, pp. 415-464.

army repelled the Italian invasion and before surrendering to Germany. Following the Battle of Crete, King George fled to the Middle East with his civilian cabinet and a Greek officer contingent that continued the war on the side of the Allies. While some officers escaped from occupied Greece to join their colleagues in North Africa, others joined the communist resistance group ELAS (National Popular Liberation Army) in the Greek mountains. ELAS' ranks swelled with patriotic officers without communist political backgrounds, including the ex-Venizelist Stephanos Sarafis, who became its chief of operations. A handful of right-wing officers collaborated with the Germans, while others formed a republican resistance group (EDES) that was overshadowed and almost annihilated by ELAS. King George grew increasingly wary of the success of the communist resistance; his fears were verified when a leftist mutiny broke out among the Greek units in the Middle East in 1944. The mutiny was suppressed with British help, but it was clear that a Greek civil war was in the works.¹¹ Before liberation in 1944, right-wing groups in Athens were already clashing with ELAS more often than with the Germans and the dividing line between right-wing resistance fighters and collaborators was thinning. German troops withdrew and the Allies liberated Greece in October 1944. By December, royalist forces aided by British units were crushing an ELAS uprising in Athens.¹²

Already in 1945, a right-wing group of officers had been formed within the army under the name IDEA (Holy League of Greek Officers); its purpose was to protect the

¹⁰ See Jon V. Kofas, *Authoritarianism in Greece: the Metaxas Regime*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) and D. H. Close, "The Power Base of the Metaxas Dictatorship," in *The Metaxas Dictatorship: Aspects of Greece 1936-1940*, (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1993).

¹¹ For a right-wing account of the mutiny see Evangelos Spyropoulos, *The Greek Military (1909-1941) and the Greek Mutinies in the Middle East (1941-1944)*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

¹² For a history of the occupation years see Mark Mazower's *Inside Hitler's Greece: the Experience of Occupation, 1941-44* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994).

corporate interests of royalist officers and to prevent left-wing groups from advancing in the army and repeating the events of the Middle East mutiny or of the 1930s. The political situation in Greece after liberation was extremely unstable. King George's government and ELAS signed a ceasefire and amnesty agreement after the events of December 1944, but this was only a temporary respite as mutual confidence remained low. The communist resistance group had agreed to lay down its arms, but some of its prominent members, like Sarafis, were arrested and sent to detention camps in remote islands, a practice revived from the Metaxas regime. In 1945-46 the Greek Communist Party made the mistake of alienating itself from center-left politicians—the old Liberal guard—and boycotting the elections. As was the case in much of Western Europe, the right-wing government that emerged filled public posts with anti-communists, including former collaborators. Isolated, overconfident in its strength and Soviet bloc support, and unconvinced that a return to Metaxas-era persecution was not likely, KKE made the fatal decision to launch the civil war in 1947. Its experienced units scored some initial successes holding large tracts of mountainous territory, but the combination of the Stalin-Tito rift in 1948 and the pouring of US military aid through the Marshall Plan gave the royalist forces the upper hand. In the last ditch royalist offensive in 1949, led by General Alexandros Papagos, hero of the Albanian front during World War II, the communist forces were defeated and scattered into Albania and Yugoslavia. Thousands of political refugees from northern Greece (including many among the Slavic-speaking minority) fled to the Soviet bloc.¹³

¹³ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, pp. 123-141; Veremes, *The Military in Greek Politics*, pp. 134-150; Gerozeses, pp. 517-914.

After the civil war victory, George's brother and successor King Paul tried to return the country to parliamentary normalcy and secure its position in the Western bloc. He supported retired General Papagos as the head of a revived right-wing party in 1952, the same year that Greece and Turkey joined NATO. Papagos' electoral victory and appointment as prime minister fully satisfied IDEA which supposedly dissolved that year, although the military remained a breeding ground for small conspiratorial societies. Like the public service, the military was purged of all persons with suspected leftist leniencies and political prisoners remained in island reform camps throughout the 1950s. When Papagos died in 1955, the king named as new premier the civilian Minister of Public Works Constantine Karamanlis, who became the prominent right-wing leader in Greece throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Meanwhile the communist party, which had been officially banned, simply reconstituted itself under the name EDA (United Democratic Left), but the center-left remained divided between two personalities, Sofoklis Venizelos (younger brother of the legendary Eleftherios) and George Papandreou, an ex-Venizelist who had been persecuted by Metaxas and unsuccessfully tried to head a conciliatory government of national unity in 1944. When Papandreou and Venizelos joined forces to form the Center Union party in 1961, the Greek party system of the interwar years had fully reconstituted itself; the traditional tensions between right and left rose again as Papandreou accused Karamanlis of rigging the 1961 election.

Karamanlis eventually fell out of favor with the palace and left the country, opening the way for Papandreou's electoral victory in 1963. Papandreou's brief term in power (1963-65) was characterized by a continuing crisis with Turkey over Cyprus which ignited anti-American feelings in Greek public opinion due to perceived American

support for Turkey's desire to partition the island. Domestically, Papandreou put an emphasis on ending political persecution and improving social welfare. Initially, he named a conservative businessman trusted by the palace as defense minister. However, Papandreou eventually sacked him and took over the ministry himself, aiming to overcome the palace's opposition to naming his preferred chiefs of staff. This move sent an alarming bolt through the right-wing establishment within the officer corps and ignited a crisis which destroyed parliamentary democracy for a second time. In 1965, the head of the Greek armed forces stationed in Cyprus, General George Grivas, accused the prime minister's son, Andreas Papandreou, of plotting a leftist coup within the army. The right-wing opposition demanded George Papandreou's resignation from the defense ministry while investigations on his son were underway.¹⁴ Instead, George Papandreou threatened to resign from premier altogether, hoping that this would force early elections and an easy Center Union victory. However, the young King Constantine II accepted his resignation and spent the next two years building odd parliamentary coalitions between Center Union defectors and the right-wing opposition party ERE. When it was finally necessary to call for elections, the king named the right-wing leader head of an interim government, but an almost certain Center Union electoral landslide was prevented by a group of colonels who launched a coup in April 1967.¹⁵

Although the history of this period is still somewhat disputed, it seems clear today that the colonels' coup had the support of a few generals but took both the king and the

¹⁴ The alleged left-wing plot within the military was codenamed ASPIDA (Shield). For an account of this controversy see Aris G. Bouloukos, *Hypothese Aspida* [The Aspida Affair], (Athens: Typos 1989).

¹⁵ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, pp. 142-159; Gerozeses, pp. 915-1070.

US embassy by surprise.¹⁶ It was an indication of how autonomous and uncontrolled the right-wing conspiratorial groups within the army had grown after the Civil War—some of the junta's members had been on Papandreou's list of officers to be sacked from critical positions. The plotters came primarily from the army, were of humble social background, and professed a confused ideology of saving the country from communism. Although they detained or put under house arrest numerous politicians from all parties, they initially retained an uneasy equilibrium with King Constantine, who opted to negotiate and appeared with them in public. Most Western European states denounced the regime but the United States soon recognized it. When Constantine tried to launch his own countercoup in December 1967, which the US government did not support, he was easily defeated and fled to Italy. For the next several years, the junta joggled between radical and moderate tendencies, hesitating to declare a republic, appointing regents even though the king was gone, passing an authoritarian constitution in 1968, and promising elections in the near future.

The junta's prominent strongman was Colonel George Papadopoulos, who came to monopolize most cabinet positions. He apparently hoped to eventually civilianize the regime while retaining personal power. With rolling promises of democratization, Papadopoulos managed to fend off US Congressional criticism of the junta, and negotiated the move of the US Sixth Fleet to a forward base in Athens in 1972—a move widely regarded as indicating high approval of the regime by the US executive branch. Although an officer tried to assassinate Papadopoulos in 1968 and other small resistance groups operated in Greece and abroad, opposition to the junta generally remained weak

¹⁶ For the best history of the junta period in English see C.M. Woodhouse, *The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels*, (London: Granada, 1985). For a Greek account of the buildup to the coup, see G. Karagiorgas,

until 1973. The junta widely employed torture but remained somewhat tolerant of the disparate opposition; prominent members of the resistance who were arrested were often freed or saved from execution either thanks to the intervention of foreign governments or by sympathizers in the Greek judiciary. The junta encouraged Greek and foreign, particularly Greek-American, investors and the economy continued to grow until the 1973 oil crisis.

Things became more complicated for Papadopoulos in May 1973, when a long-planned and repeatedly postponed navy coup broke out during a naval exercise. Papadopoulos' security services promptly arrested the plotters in Athens, but one destroyer fled to Italy, and the junta's confidence in the navy was shattered. Although the king was unconnected to the coup and avoided visiting the fugitive commander and his crew in Italy, Papadopoulos made the fatal decision of declaring a republic in summer 1973 and taking the first steps to civilianize the regime. However, he could find no reputable civilian politician (apart from the right-wing extremist Spyros Markezinis) to accept any cabinet post.

Papadopoulos' intention to perpetuate his rule in turn heightened anti-junta agitation within one of the few remaining autonomous civilian sectors of Greek society: the public universities. In November 1973, the Athens Polytechnic became the center of an improvised uprising joined by student groups and trade unionists exploiting the asylum of the university campus. The junta crushed the rebellion on November 17, with several casualties. Within days, the head of the junta's hard-line faction and commander of the dreaded military police, Brigadier Dimitrios Ioannidis, replaced Papadopoulos in a

Apo ton IDEA sten Chounta [From IDEA to the Junta], (Athens: Papazese, 1975).

bloodless coup. Ioannidis represented those elements that opposed any civilianization of the regime and preferred that the military maintain full control.

Throughout the period of the junta, Greece's relations with the Greek government in Cyprus steadily deteriorated, as Cyprus constituted a democratic Greek regime outside the junta's control and its security services had collaborated in the assassination attempt against Papadopoulos in 1968. The junta increasingly used the Greek military contingent stationed on the island to support terrorist activity against President Archbishop Makarios. After escaping a few assassination attempts and trying to arm his personal Presidential Guard with weapons from the Eastern Bloc, Makarios finally asked for the withdrawal of the mainland Greek officers in summer 1974. Awaiting this opportunity, Ioannidis launched a coup against Makarios, believing a take-over of Cyprus to be an easy affair and certain to make the junta's domestic fortunes soar. His plan failed and triggered Turkey's invasion of the island. After many years of focusing on internal suppression, the Greek armed forces were unprepared to fight Turkey, while the US and Britain declined to assist Greece. A group of lower-ranked officers took the responsibility of pushing aside Ioannidis and inviting Karamanlis to head a return to civilian rule.

Karamanlis faced immense challenges upon his return, but he managed to lead the country smoothly down the path of democratization by undoing some of the mistakes of the post-civil war period. After isolating extremists within the military and possibly avoiding an abortive coup attempt, he legalized the Communist Party and ended the political persecution of leftists. Although he originally kept communication channels with the king open, he eventually held a plebiscite in December 1974 which ratified the

abolition of monarchy. He recreated the right-wing party with the name New Democracy (ND), no longer a royalist anti-communist bloc, but a conservative neo-liberal party. Facing a wave of intense anti-Americanism at home, Karamanlis also steered the country away from the US and closer to Western Europe, which had more vocally condemned the junta. His efforts were rewarded in 1981, when Greece joined the EEC. That same year, while Karamanlis had hopped to the presidency, his party was defeated by the socialist PASOK, led by George Papandreou's son, Andreas. This marked the first socialist government in Greece and consolidated the post-junta transformation of the Greek party system to a more leftist version of its old bipolar right/center-left divide, with a small Communist Party on the far left.¹⁷

Although PASOK and ND vehemently clashed over accusations of populism and corruption in the following decades, their policies on civil-military relations converged. While modernizing the military to pose a deterrent to Turkey, neither party favored any of the coup-plotting conspiracies that had characterized Greek politics until the 1960s. Purges, pursued more vigorously by Papandreou than Karamanlis, were limited to the top tiers of the junta collaborators. Both parties chose to pursue a sort of benign subjective control by appointing retired generals with known democratic and analogous partisan loyalties as chiefs of staff. This may have had a detrimental effect on the modernization of Greek military doctrine, but at least it limited partisan clientelism to only the highest layer of the military command, whereas in previous periods of Greek history it had been prevalent throughout the officer corps. This bipartisan management of the military was

¹⁷ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, pp. 166-180.

so successful that Greece evolved into a stable European democracy even faster than Portugal and Spain, facing no attempted coups from 1975 on.¹⁸

By the late 1990s, the Greek military was unintentionally shrinking due to demographic pressures and was increasingly deployed in humanitarian missions in the Balkans. Both tendencies put pressure towards professionalization, meaning a decreased reliance on the draft and increased dependence on specially trained career cadres. After 1999, relations with Turkey have cooled and Greek governments have been taking the prospect of waging conventional war less and less seriously. The defense budget and the length of compulsory service are both declining. Unless an unanticipated international development upsets the current trend, the Greek military is well on its way to conforming to the new Western European military standard: a small professional constabulary force trained for NATO peacekeeping, Olympic Games policing, and other such noble but inglorious causes of the 21st century.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN MODERN TURKISH HISTORY

Despite the Ottoman Empire's size, its military institutions were gravely antiquated, leading to repeated defeats and loss of territory in the 18th century. In its classical height, the empire relied for its expeditions on Muslim feudal units (sipahi) raised in each province by its local governors and an elite imperial force, the Janissaries, who were converted Christian boys recruited by levy and brought up as the sultan's slave army and administrators. Although this idiosyncratic system initially prevented the rise of a Muslim military aristocracy, by the 18th century the Janissary institution was in

¹⁸ Veremes, *The Military in Greek Politics*, pp. 170-182. There were rumors of a final coup plot in 1975.

profound decay. The Christian levy had been discontinued and the Janissaries became a martial social class, passing membership hereditarily, which was originally forbidden. Many Janissaries spent more time in private enterprises than in the sultan's service and mystic Sufi order cults were particularly popular among them. Naturally, the Janissaries opposed any military reform that would deprive them of their social status; in 1807, they deposed Selim III, the first Ottoman reformer sultan, who tried to do just that.

Selim's successor, Mahmut II, finally managed to defeat and abolish the Janissary corps in a bloody episode in 1826, during the Greek Revolution. To achieve this, Mahmut used the troops trained in the first army engineering school opened by Selim in 1795. From Mahmut II on, the Ottoman sultans began a series of far-reaching modernization efforts within the empire, which touched many areas of public administration, but were initiated for and often focused on improved military efficiency. Measuring up to the foreign threat, particularly from Russia, remained at the core of Ottoman modernization reforms throughout the 19th century, spreading in concentric circles from military training to an educational system for public servants to the development of transportation and internal communications.¹⁹

Historians place the formal beginning of the reform period (Tanzimat) in 1839, when Mahmut's successor Abdul Mecit officially made such a declaration at the wake of the empire's humiliating defeat by its own former vassal, Egypt. The Tanzimat reforms preached equality between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens, but when conscription was introduced in 1845, non-Muslims were eventually excluded, as had been long-established Islamic custom; in the age of nationalism, Christian recruits were believed to be

unreliable, and the state needed the exemption tax traditionally levied on Christians.²⁰ There was great opposition to conscription in Muslim quarters as well, particularly from the regional nobility which henceforth lost its military value. A large part of the government's efforts concentrated on creating a modern, even rudimentary, educational system for its Muslim subjects, to prepare future civil servants and career officers; the Turkish army's practice of recruiting youngsters from elite high schools in major urban centers dates to this period. The school program also aimed at closing the existent educational rift with the non-Muslim communities.²¹

The educational and print revolution within the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by the rise of a new generation of intellectuals, many but not all of Turkish-speaking heritage. Some of them found the sultan's government to be too conservative and oppressive and sought refuge from persecution abroad, particularly in Paris in the 1860s. Western Europeans named this movement the Young Turks (*Jeunes Turcs*), a term then generalized to all progressive opposition to the Sultan inside or outside the empire. These Young Turks were civilian elites, who played a great role not only in the intellectual and literary development of modern Turkish nationalism, but also in the constitutional revolution of 1875, which broke out in Istanbul while the empire was being shaken by Slavic revolts in Bosnia and Bulgaria. However, this and future revolutions

¹⁹ For a brief history of the Ottoman reform period, see Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: a Modern History* (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998), pp. 11-94. For a review of the military dimension, see William Hale's classic, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).

²⁰ Christian exemption was a source of complaint for many reformists but their conscription was only finally enforced in 1908 by the CUP. In the Balkan Wars Christian units had very high rates of defection, and their role in World War I was limited to compulsory labor service. See Ufuk Gülsoy, *Osmanlı Gayrimüslimlerin Askerlik Servuveni* [The Military Service Odyssey of Ottoman Non-Muslims] (Istanbul: Simurg, 2000).

²¹ After the Greek Revolution, the empire could no longer afford to rely heavily on the services of Greeks, as it had in the 18th century, although Jews and Armenians were still regarded as faithful minorities (the latter only until the last quarter of the 19th century), and even Ottoman Greeks managed to regain their economic and social status within a few decades.

could not have happened had there not also been significant opposition among officers, who kept secret contacts with the civilian dissidents abroad. The 1875 revolutionaries brought to power Sultan Abdul Hamid, who initially seemed obedient to their goals, accepting the empire's first constitution and promising elections. However, with the help of more conservative elements, he soon regained the upper hand, suspending the constitution and maintaining absolute power, while the Ottoman army was suffering another crushing defeat in the hands of Russia in 1877.

Abdul Hamid continued economic and military modernizations, including an ambitious railway construction program, but also created a formidable police state, driving more exiles to Paris. Nevertheless, Abdul Hamid was ingenious at dividing them, occasionally inviting some to return and assume public post. The overall importance of civilian expatriates amid the sultan's opposition thereby declined, and the main conspiratorial activity was taking place within the military, although Western analysts mistakenly believed that these two groups were in full coordination with each other.

When a coup finally erupted against Abdul Hamid in 1908, it was one planned by an organization of officers in Macedonia called the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).²² The CUP garnered enough public and military support to replace the sultan and take power, and it invited émigrés from abroad to return. The CUP ran the first Ottoman elections, crushed an Islamist counter-coup in 1909, and ruled the empire's fortunes until its defeat and dismemberment in the First World War.

Although it theoretically had mixed military and civilian and mixed ethnic membership, the CUP's core component consisted of Turkish army officers. The CUP's

opposition consisted either of Islamists, who included the clergy and some officers purged after the failed 1909 counter-revolution, or Liberals, a clearly civilian and more tolerant group which supported a multi-ethnic vision for the future of the empire. Non-Muslim minority groups, however, were hesitant to back the Liberals because the CUP was unmistakably in control of the situation. The CUP organized an election in 1908 and a much less free one in 1912 by negotiating the number of seats with local Muslim and non-Muslim community leaders.

Fearing that the CUP might usher a period of rapid centralization of the empire, many of its neighbors opted to grab what they could, from Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia in 1908 to the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911 to the Balkan Wars in 1912. While fighting these wars, the CUP consolidated its position, finally abolishing all opposition in a 1913 coup. From that point on, authority was concentrated mostly in the hands of a ruling triumvirate: Enver, Talat, and Cemal. The former two were officers and controlled foreign policy, leaving economic policy to the civilian. Talat and Cemal were assassinated by vengeful Armenians after World War I, while Enver died in Central Asia fighting the Soviets. The CUP collapsed after the Ottoman surrender in 1918; while the Sultan bowed to Entente demands in the treaty of Sevres, an ex-CUP member and hero of the Great War, Mustafa Kemal, led his famed revolutionary resistance in Anatolia until the treaty was revised at Lausanne in 1923.²³

The CUP's rhetoric had spanned the spectrum of ideological currents popular at the time: Turkism, which varied from admiration for ancient Turkic civilizations and

²² A classic study of the CUP, particularly the outbreak of the 1908 revolution, is Feroz Ahmad's *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics 1908-1914*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969).

customs to pan-Turkic irredentist plans against Russia, Ottomanism, which hoped to instill a common identity to all Ottoman subjects, and Islamism, which upheld the importance of religion as the core of the empire's existence. The CUP was clearly unfavorable to conservative clerical influence in government, but they tried to use religious propaganda against the Entente and up until the 1919-1923 War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal also relied on calls to faith to rally the Muslim populations of Anatolia (including Kurds) against marauding English, French, Armenians, and Greeks. Hence, the military's ideology may seem hazy during the Young Turk period, but it never departed from defending the empire's territorial integrity, the unity of Muslim peoples, the need for technological and cultural modernization, and the centrality and value of Turkish culture and language.

As the predominantly Arab lands were left outside Turkey's borders and the disloyal Christian populations cleansed by 1923, the way was open for Mustafa Kemal to give more focused ideological content to his revolution than the CUP could have afforded to. Although he purged all his remaining ex-CUP opponents in public trials in 1926, he employed the same intellectuals who had been the CUP's favorites to elaborate on his ideological platform. What came to be known as Kemalism, a formalized doctrine with six sub-principles (nationalism, secularism, republicanism, reformism, populism, and statism) taught to all schoolchildren, owed much to the Young Turk legacy, particularly Turkism and Ottomanism. Although rejecting wild irredentist aspirations that would alarm the USSR and drag Turkey into dangerous adventures (Pan-Turkist publications were carefully suppressed until Atatürk's death), Mustafa Kemal domestically

²³ An excellent short history of the CUP era is A. L. Macfie's *The End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1923* (London and New York: Longman, 1998).

encouraged many forms of Turkish cultural chauvinism, including the theory of the primacy of Turkish among world languages. But a great deal of emphasis was placed on consolidating a modern Turkish homeland in Anatolia. The type of nationalism promoted by the state simultaneously encouraged all citizens to linguistically assimilate to the Turkish majority, while downplaying the centrality of Islam for Turkish identity, emphasizing the role of the Anatolian peninsula as a cradle of civilizations and proposing a theory of historical continuity across them (from Hittite, to Ionian, to Byzantine, to Seljuk and Ottoman). The use of the Kurdish language was suppressed after bloody revolts in the southeastern provinces in 1925-27.²⁴

Like the CUP before him, most of Kemal's immediate associates were men of Turkish origin with military background. In addition to other sweeping westernizing reforms, Kemal civilianized his regime and passed a law banning active officers from serving in parliament.²⁵ He created the Republican People's Party in 1924 (RPP or CHP in Turkish) and officially declared a one-party state in 1931. During the one-party era, the relationship between the military and the state was uneventful and symbiotic.²⁶ The state took particular care to indoctrinate officers in the tenets of Kemalism. Atatürk maintained the same chief of staff (General Çakmak) throughout his rule.²⁷ When he died in 1938, he was succeeded in the presidency by his old aide-de-camp, İsmet İnönü.

İnönü kept Turkey neutral until the last months of World War II, but at the end of the war he came under increasing domestic and international pressure (from the US) to liberalize the regime. The RPP had experimented with allowing opposition parties in the

²⁴ The discussion on points of continuity and departure between the Young Turk and Kemalist periods draws largely from Zürcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 97-288.

²⁵ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, ch. 4. Note that they could, however, serve as ministers.

past, but quickly suppressed them. Its statist economic policies in the 1930s had favored urban over rural areas. Inonu allowed the RPP-offshoot Democrat Party (DP) to compete in the 1946 elections, which were likely rigged but still produced a legislative opposition. Encouraged by the experiment, the RPP held free elections in 1950 and was defeated by the DP in a landslide, magnified by the majoritarian electoral system. In foreign policy, the DP continued the RPP's turn away from Kemalist neutralism and drift to the West, by participating in the Korean War and joining NATO in 1952. Domestically, the DP developed into a dynamic and equally authoritarian party as the RPP, albeit garnering support from rural populations and pursuing more market-oriented economic policies. It also relaxed censorship of religion, satisfying its conservative voter base. The RPP retained the support of the urban middle classes, civil servants, and the military, but it was unable to reclaim power from the DP in successive elections.²⁸ The DP allowed civil servant and officer salaries to be seriously eroded by inflation and passed oppressive laws that restricted the opposition's activities; by 1959-1960 it was threatening to confiscate all RPP assets. Alarmed by this prospect of total DP domination, the military responded by staging a coup on May 27 1960.²⁹

The 1960 coup originated at the level of colonels, most hurt by DP economic policies, but it was quickly placed under the authority of General Gursel, who set up a National Unity Committee (NUC). Inonu was not closely consulted before the coup, nor did the NUC hand power to the RPP. The military first had to internally agree on its own agenda, and a group of fourteen radical officers, who favored total military rule, were

²⁶ For a detailed study see Ümit Özdağ, *Ordu-Siyaset İlişkisi: Atatürk ve İnönü Dönemleri* [Civil-Military Relations: The Ataturk and Inonu Periods] (Ankara: Gündoğan Yayınları, 1991).

²⁷ Inonu, who did not get along with him, replaced him in 1944.

purged. Among them was the Turkish Cypriot Alpaslan Turkes, later founder of the far right pan-Turkist party. The NUC executed DP top leaders and passed a new constitution through a mixed RPP-military constitutional assembly in 1961. The constitution created a National Security Council (NSC) consisting of the president, the chiefs of staff, and top cabinet ministers, entrusted with a wide consultative prerogative over foreign and domestic policy. The electoral laws, however, were changed to open competition to many parties, foreclosing the possibility of renewed one-party domination. Before the constitution was put into place, the NUC had to put down desperate coup attempts in 1962-3 by die-hard Colonel Talat Aydemir, supported by elements in the air force.³⁰ The military also created OYAK (Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu), a public fund reserved for the financing of officer pensions. Used in diverse private investments and benefiting from the growth of Turkey's economy, OYAK has grown substantially over the years, creating a bond between the military and Turkey's industrial elite and ensuring a comfortable standard of living for those who complete a lifetime's career in military service.³¹

In 1963, the military handed over power to a coalition government under the octogenarian Ismet Inonu, just before relations with Greece decisively soured due to events on Cyprus. In 1965, however, the RPP lost the elections again to the Justice Party (JP), essentially the DP reconstituted under a new name, led by Suleyman Demirel. This was the first in a long series of reincarnations of political parties after coups. By the late 1960s, the Turkish party system had developed its essential cleavages, more multi-polar

²⁸ The DP's higher rural support was decisive, because Turkey was still overwhelmingly an agricultural country in the 1950s.

²⁹ Zürcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-252; Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, pp. 95-99.

³⁰ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, ch. 6-7.

³¹ Partial pensions are not awarded, so this is one mechanism for discouraging officers from political activity that might cost them their early discharge. See Semin Vaner, "The Army" in *Turkey in Transition*

than those in Greece. In 1961, the Workers' Party was founded, representing communist and far-leftist ideas. Apart from pro-labor, the Turkish far left has been particularly tolerant of Kurdish separatism, also tacitly supported for strategic reasons by the USSR during most of the Cold War. Alpaslan Turkes founded the National Action Party (NAP or MHP in Turkish) with obvious pan-Turkist and fascist tendencies. An Islamist party emerged under Necmedin Erbakan. These three smaller political spaces were added to the two established major parties, one statist (RPP) and one free-market (JP). By giving more freedom to the press, the unions, and the universities, the constitution had unlocked political participation for larger segments of the population.

Worried by rising labor and student unrest, the Joint Chiefs of Staff convened in March 1971 and decided upon an ultimatum to Demirel, forcing him to resign. They declared martial law, closed down the Workers' and Islamist parties, and appointed a caretaker government headed by conservative diplomat Nihat Erim, whom they entrusted to enforce more austere economic policy and curb leftist propaganda in the universities. A Higher Education Commission was specifically created for this purpose. Officers who supported a full take-over of government were again purged. However, Erim was unable to pass all the desired legislation through parliament and resigned in 1972. The military's attempt at a mild intervention without dissolving the legislature thus failed.³²

By 1973, the rising political star Bulent Ecevit had snatched control of the RPP from Inonu and shifted the party's platform left, targeting the burgeoning urban poor, many of whom were recent migrants from the countryside. Ecevit boosted his popularity by ordering the invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Although the RPP and the JP jointly retained

(New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 251-253; Gerasimos Karabelias, "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-war Turkey, 1980-95," *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 35, n. 4 (October 1999), p. 140.

a majority of the vote, they could not form governments on their own, and the intense dislike between Demirel and Ecevit meant that the smaller parties, the Islamists and the Nationalists, had increased leverage in parliament. Turkey thus stumbled through the 1970s with coalition governments, while political violence soared. Left-wing groups were battling against the police and Turkes' nationalist youth in various towns. In 1978 the Kurdish Marxist-separatist organization PKK launched its campaign in the southeast, while Sunnis and Alevis clashed in deadly riots in Central Anatolia. A pluralistic political system coupled with the 1970s world economic slump had brought all of Turkey's social and ethnic divisions to the surface.³³

This time the military decided on a full-fledged intervention, launching a coup in September 1980. This coup was well planned and run by the top military echelons under General Evren, without any subsequent disagreements or purges.³⁴ All political parties were abolished; Turkes, Erbakan, and union leaders were tried.³⁵ A new constitution, which seriously restricted civil liberties, was put to referendum and passed in 1982, simultaneously installing Evren as president. The military prepared the way for controlled elections in 1983, banishing old prominent politicians from running and setting up its own party, while allowing a few others to participate. A new electoral law set a very high threshold of 10% for entry into parliament, intended at excluding small parties of the extreme left and right. To the military's dismay, first at the polls came the Motherland Party (MP) headed by Turgut Ozal, a civilian technocrat whom the military had appointed as economics minister in its emergency cabinet. The military accepted

³² Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, ch. 8.

³³ Zürcher, op. cit., pp. 253-291; Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, ch. 9.

Ozal as prime minister, trusting his pro-Western and free-market orientation. Ozal expressed Turkey's interest to join the EEC, but unlike Karamanlis in the 1970s, he was given the cold shoulder. Ozal belonged to a mystic order, which helped his party capture a good part of the religious vote: the military, following a general trend in Middle Eastern politics in the 1980s, tolerated mild Islamism as a bulwark against leftism. Throughout the decade and the next, a guerrilla war against the PKK was raging in the Kurdish provinces.³⁶

As before, the old parties were resurrected with new names by the 1984 local elections, and the ban on old politicians was lifted by referendum in 1987. Ozal won his second victory that year, and in 1989 he decided to use his parliamentary majority to become president, the first civilian to do so since the 1950s. The military's leadership initially frowned upon but soon accepted this development, which signaled the final step towards normalization.³⁷ By the early 1990s, a revamped multiparty system was again in place, but even more fragmented than before. The right-wing vote was divided between the Motherland Party and Demirel's True Path Party, while the left split between a party run by Inonu's son Erdal, and another one by Ecevit. The 10% qualifying threshold made it impossible for far leftist and pro-Kurdish parties to make it into the legislature on their own, but they still participated in elections, as did Islamists and extreme nationalists. The political scene became more volatile, since no party could win more than a quarter of

³⁴ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, ch. 10; a detailed account of the background to the coup is Mehmet Ali Birand's *The Generals' Coup in Turkey: an Inside Story of 12 September 1980* (London: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1987).

³⁵ Leftists and Islamists were generally treated more harshly than pan-Turkists.

³⁶ A good source for 1980-83 is C. H. Dodd, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy* (Beverly, UK: The Eothen Press, 1983), pp. 42-79.

³⁷ For discussions of the military's gradual withdrawal by the 1990s, see Metin Heper and Güney Aylin, "The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 22 (1996),

the total vote, and sometimes a party could be an important player in one parliament and be left out of the next. This volatility made for weak undulating coalition governments in the 1990s, always overseen by the military through the NSC.³⁸

By 1995, however, Erbakan's Islamist Welfare Party had secured a strong position in parliament and brokered a coalition with Tansu Ciller, Ozal's successor as leader of Motherland and first female Turkish premier. When Erbakan's turn to assume the prime ministry came, the military grew very uneasy with his visits to Islamic countries and plans to equate religious and public school graduates. In 1997, the military twisted Erbakan's arm, forcing him to resign in what was termed a "velvet" or "post-modern" coup by analysts.³⁹ Outright military interventions were no longer tolerated by Turkey's Western allies, but they did not seem necessary. Other major political figures were now acceptable for the military, while Islamists and far leftists were banned with the help of the constitutional court and repeatedly forced to close down whichever party structure they attempted to set up. While these cases were being tried, Ozal's successor Mesut Yilmaz and Bulent Ecevit led coalition governments in the late 1990s which brought the guerrilla war to an end by capturing PKK's leader Abdullah Ocalan, and renewed Turkey's bid to EU accession, this time without Greek opposition.

The prospect of EU entry has had a major impact on Turkish politics and the military establishment's changing mindset has not yet been thoroughly researched. It seems that Turkey's dire economic condition after the 1999 earthquakes and 2000

no. 4: 619-642 and "Military and the Consolidation of Democracy: the recent Turkish experience," *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 26 (2000), no. 4: 635-657.

³⁸ Zürcher, *op. cit.*, pp. 292-342; Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, ch. 11.

³⁹ See Ben Lombardi, "Turkey—the Return of the Reluctant Generals?" *Political Science Quarterly*, v. 112 (Summer 1997): 191-215. For discussions in Turkish, see Ali Osman Eğilmez, "*Briefing'deki İrtica: Türkiye'de Militarizm Yönetim İlişkileri ve İslam* [Reaction at the Briefing: Civil-Military Relations and

financial collapse made closer association with the EU seem more vital than ever. Joining the West's largest economic bloc would be the apogee of the long-time turn towards the West which began with accession to NATO in 1952. However, the EU was very strict in its accession criteria, and in 2002 the Ecevit government introduced a series of liberalizing amendments to the 1982 constitution and emergency laws. Restrictions on civil liberties and freedom of the press were lifted and the article on the NSC was amended to confine the military to a purely advisory role. Subsequent bills reduced the jurisdiction of military courts, gave limited amnesty to PKK fighters, and approved the use of Kurdish in education and the electronic media.

As if these changes were not momentous enough, a new generation of Islamist politicians also decided to support EU accession, seeing this as the best way to end restrictions on electoral participation. Thanks to the 10% threshold and Ecevit's dive in popularity after the 2000 financial crisis, the 2002 elections produced a bipartisan parliament for the first time since the 1950s. The clear winner was a reorganized Islamist formation, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by Tayyip Erdogan. The sole opposition became the resurrected leftist-secularist RPP, making Turkey's legislature look deceptively similar to a standard Western European Christian-Democrat/Socialist bipartisan system. In fact, Erdogan has strongly encouraged an image of his party as the Islamic equivalent of Christian Democracy, while he continues to push in the direction of EU accession, despite an ostensible backlash in Western European public opinion against Turkey. Although Erdogan suffered frictions with the military, having to relapse to a more conservative policy on Cyprus and retract controversial religiously inspired

Islam in Turkey] (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 1998) and Mustafa Erdogan, *28 Subat Süreci* [The February 28 Process] (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayinlari, 1999).

legislation, his party will likely complete its term and win another election. Turkish accession negotiations may take over a decade, yet it seems very possible that civil-military relations have undergone a permanent dramatic change. Everything remains contingent though on a positive international dynamic and the assumption that the Islamist party will be moderate in its agenda and relations with other political forces.

GREECE AND TURKEY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

These narratives served to demonstrate that the history of civil-military relations in Greece and Turkey is qualitatively different. The military in Greece is sometimes remembered as a monolithic anti-communist force, but this is only because of the experience of the 1967-1974 junta. Up until World War II, and even during the Cold War, the Greek military was in fact politically fractionalized. Similarly, the Turkish military is often referred to as the bastion of Kemalism, but its post-war era interventions aimed not only at constraining political Islam; its motives were in fact much more diverse—combating left-wing extremism, Kurdish separatism, or protecting its own professional interests. The key difference is that the Turkish military has been and continues to be *an actor in politics* with its strong corporate spirit and a fairly homogenous dominant ideological stance, whereas the Greek military was, for a very long time, *an area of politics*, permeated by and intertwined with patronage networks of civilian parties with conflicting ideological platforms.

Before seeking an explanation for this divergence, it is necessary to outline the major differences in the institutional history of the Greek and Turkish militaries. Experts

who have written on the subject before have identified three main dissimilarities: the social background of the officer corps, the existence or lack of a unifying corporate ethos, and the relative size of the services.⁴⁰ To these I would add the control of internal promotions and the nature of military elite cooptation by civilian leaders.

Historically, the Greek military, particularly the army and air force, has recruited primarily from rural areas. Enlistment was and continues to be a good path to social mobility, but it is a strategy with a single generation time span. On the contrary, the Turkish military has much higher rates of intergenerational continuity. In a study with data from the 1980s, James Brown found that self-recruitment (having an officer father) in the Greek officer corps was highest in the navy (16.7%) followed by the army (7.7%) and the air force (5.7%). In contrast, the figures in Turkey were 20.5% for the army, 26.1% for the navy, and 19.9% for the air force. Additionally, a significant percentage of the remaining Turkish officers had fathers with careers in civil service (17.9% in the army, 29.4% in the navy, and 19.9% in the air force). These two professional groups, military officers and civil servants, who only represented 1.8 and 0.9% of Turkey's population respectively, were grossly overrepresented in the military. It is evident that the military in Turkey has, on average, stronger familial bonds to the state apparatus, enforcing a commitment to Kemalism and a self-perception of social service. This also makes the officer corps highly connected to the government bureaucracy and thereby

⁴⁰ The ensuing discussion draws particularly from Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (ch. 12) and Gerasimos Karabelias, *Ho Rolos ton Enoplon Dynameon sten Politike Zoe tes Tourkias kai tes Helladas* [The Role of the Armed Forces in the Political Life of Greece and Turkey], (Athens: Hellenika Grammata, 2001), pp. 449-466.

effective in guarding its corporate interests and using this symbiosis to extract social benefits.⁴¹

Although the Turkish military has been better connected with bureaucratic elites, the opposite is true of party elites. Already from the 19th century, military involvement in Greek politics happened in cooperation with civilian groups, including the revolts against King Otto, and the National League, which was a mixed military-civilian group.⁴² Civilian collaboration was strong in all coups in Greece except 1925 and 1967. The former was a brief bid to power by one ambitious general and the latter can be explained by the near-monopolization of the military by the right after the Civil War. In Turkish history, civilian collaboration in coups has been limited or nil. The CUP was to some extent a mixed officer-civilian organization, but the military personalities were clearly dominant. Ataturk's revolutionary movement drew from the ranks of the Ottoman military and was only consequently civilianized; the 1960, 1971, and 1980 interventions were decided and executed without civilian allies, even if the military consequently appointed civilians in key positions.

It is a well known fact that the Turkish military has enjoyed an influential though often offstage role in domestic policy that the Greek military only had during the 1967-74 dictatorship. The main vehicle for this indirect exercise of power in periods of civilian rule has been the institution of the NSC.⁴³ As Umit Cizre Sakallioglu notes, the NSC's jurisdiction after 1980 has covered an incredibly extensive spectrum, from determining

⁴¹ James Brown, "Greece and Turkey: the Military and Social Integration," in *Ethnicity, Integration and the Military*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 89, 98; Vaner, "The Army," p. 243. Vaner reports that self-recruitment was even higher in the 1950s.

⁴² Gerozeses, pp. 223-225.

⁴³ Gareth Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, pp. 41-55.

school curriculums to abolishing the parliamentary immunity of Kurdish deputies.⁴⁴ In comparison, so strong has the anti-militarist attitude been in Greece after the junta, that a similar institution to the NSC created by past law had all but atrophied and was revived after the 1996 islet crisis with Turkey in order to provide a regular meeting forum for the chiefs of staff and the cabinet. In addition to exerting influence through the NSC, the Turkish military has maintained control of its budget, dictating spending priorities. A prominent Turkish journalist has observed that, “in Turkey, the defense budget has never been subject to parliamentary debate.”⁴⁵

Institutional autonomy vis-à-vis civilian elites has had a concomitant effect on internal structure. In Turkey, the army has generally enjoyed a high level of control over its internal promotions since the 1960 coup.⁴⁶ Although according to the constitution the chiefs of staff are appointed by the president—a post monopolized by former officers until the 1980s in any case—in practice it is common knowledge that the outgoing general chief of staff selects his own successor and announces this “suggestion” to the civilian leaders. The only civilian politician to have rejected this suggestion was the military’s trusted Turgut Ozal in 1987.⁴⁷

In Greece, the promotional prospects of officers typically depended on the political fortunes of their civilian patrons. Changing patrons was possible, the most famous case being that of Georgios Kondylis, who switched from being a staunch republican to a devout royalist in the 1930s. Greek officers were often driven more by ambition than ideology, but few had the guts or talent necessary to pull such swings of

⁴⁴ Umit Cizre Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military’s Political Autonomy,” *Comparative Politics*, v. 29 n. 2 (January 1997), p. 158.

⁴⁵ Mehmet Ali Birand, quote in Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy,” p. 160.

⁴⁶ Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, pp. 26-27.

loyalty. Most officers cling to their civilian or higher-ranked military patrons and followed them in conspiracies, promotions, and dismissals. With the exception of Papagos, no officer managed to be popular enough in his own right to carve out a successful independent career in politics.

The different nature of military involvement in politics is also evident in the area of veterans holding top public office. In Greece, ex-officers have served in the highest government positions after periods of great wars (Constantine Kanaris in the 1840s, Pavlos Koundouriotis in the 1920s, Alexandros Papagos in the early 1950s) or during dictatorships (Pangalos, Metaxas, Papadopoulos). Among them, only Papadopoulos held power for a significant time frame without royal or civilian party support. The 1967-74 period is the aberration in modern Greek history, the only time when the military (clumsily) ruled by itself and not as an ally of another political agent. Since 1974, all prime ministers and presidents have been civilians. In Turkey, in the period between the revolution of 1908 and democratization in 1950, government was dominated by active or retired officers. Between 1961 and 1989 it was tacitly understood that the president would always be a retired general. This tradition was interrupted by the Democrat Party interlude of the 1950s—which was in turn suppressed by the 1960 coup—and ended by Ozal’s daring move to leap to the presidency in 1989. In Turkey, until recently, periods of complete civilian control of high government positions were the exception, not the rule.⁴⁸ Elite cooptation served different ends in each country: in Greece, victorious civilian leaders typically rewarded their officer supporters by giving them public office;

⁴⁷ Sakallioğlu, “The Anatomy,” pp. 161-162.

⁴⁸ See Table 2, list of Greek and Turkish heads of state.

in Turkey, civilian elites appeased and reassured the military by awarding its leadership public office.

In Turkey, Kemalism, despite its various nuances, has provided a unifying ideological umbrella for the military, instilled to cadets through an elaborate recruiting system beginning at high school age.⁴⁹ The Turkish military has conducted thorough purges as late as the 1990s to exclude those suspected of Islamist tendencies.⁵⁰ The high command repeatedly isolated those officers who favored a permanent military take-over (in 1960 and 1971), and maintained a rather consistent stance in persecuting Islamists, communists, and separatists and arranging a return to a Kemalist-style controlled democracy. The importance of early socialization and Kemalist education for the preservation of ideological and corporate cohesion are commonly agreed by experts on the Turkish military. To borrow the words of Orhan Erkanli, one of the protagonists of the 1960 coup, “in Turkey there is a military class, just as there is a workers’ and peasants’ class, and the officer corps constitutes the backbone of this class.”⁵¹ Elsewhere in his memoirs, Erkanli argues that

The education and training of Turkish officers does not resemble that of other armies. In those armies, officership is perceived as a professional job the same as that of civil servants. For us, on the other hand, it is held in high esteem. It is not only a professional job but also a national duty, guardianship of the state.⁵²

⁴⁹ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, pp. 320-323; Vaner, “The Army,” p. 244.

⁵⁰ Gareth Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military in Politics* (Adelphi Paper 337; London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), pp. 28-35.

⁵¹ Quoted in Gerasimos Karabelias, “The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Post-war Turkey, 1980-95,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 35, n. 4 (October 1999), p. 139.

⁵² Quoted in Tanel Demirel, “The Turkish Military’s Decision to Intervene: 12 September 1980,” *Armed Forces and Society*, v. 29, no. 2 (Winter 2003), pp. 255-256.

In Greece, no such unifying creed existed within the officer corps. The Greek military has been as ideologically diverse as the country's civilian political spectrum, with the exception of the post-civil war period, during which a climate of anti-communism prevailed. Anti-communism by itself, however, proved incapable of providing the military with a common agenda for action or political reform after the 1967 coup. Compared with Turkey, the Greek military's interventions in politics were much more undisciplined and loaded with personal feuds and aspirations. As a Greek general of the interwar period put it in his memoirs, "there is no real comradeship among cadets, which is why later in life the brittle bonds of friendship among [academy] graduates are easily destroyed by the slightest rivalry."⁵³

Thanos Veremes, the primary scholar on the history of Greek civil-military relations, argues that, "professionalism and hierarchy were seriously impaired in the Greek army because of the corruption of its organizational patterns by clientelism."⁵⁴ Until the turn of the 20th century, the Greek military was small and patronage networks were fairly flexible, with the king and princes maintaining a prominent role. The influx of reserve officers granted regular commissions between 1912 and 1919, coupled with the polarization of the Greek party system along royalist and republican lines in the same period forever changed the picture. The situation reached outrageous proportions between 1917 and 1935, as each party's alternation in power was followed either by dismissals or retrospective changes in the seniority list based on political criteria.⁵⁵ During this period patronage networks became less flexible; individual officers were almost driven to coup conspiracies by professional necessity, since supporting their

⁵³ General Mazarakis quoted in Veremes, *The Military in Greek Politics*, p. 77.

⁵⁴ Veremes, *The Military in Greek Politics*, p. 72.

civilian political camp was the only way to ensure eventual promotion and timely retirement. From the Metaxas dictatorship to the junta, military patronage was again dominated by the king and the right.

The post-World War II coups in Turkey were approved at the highest level of the military command. The size of the Turkish military, and particularly the relative size of the army, dooms any coup attempt to failure unless it is centrally planned and supported by the land forces.⁵⁶ Greece's geography and relatively smaller size of the army have allowed smaller, tightly-knit groups of middle-ranking officers to conspire and carry out coups, also allowing a role to the navy.⁵⁷ Furthermore, Greece confirms the stereotype that holds navies to be less authoritarian than armies. The Greek Navy was generally pro-republican, sided with the Venizelists in coups from 1916 to 1935, and tried unsuccessfully to topple the army-dominated junta in 1973.

The role of international actors is a further point worth considering. Although the United States has been blamed for supporting authoritarian regimes as bulwarks against communism during the Cold War, there is no evidence of direct US involvement in any of the coups in Greece or Turkey. There were clear indications of US approval for the Greek junta and the Turkish military's interventions, so one may speak of a permitting international circumstance.⁵⁸ However, the Cold War does not constitute a discontinuity with the previous historical period, during which military interventions were also tolerated or even encouraged by great powers. Britain, in particular, supported the Metaxas regime in Greece and Ataturk's transformation of Turkey was positively viewed

⁵⁵ Veremes, *The Military in Greek Politics*, pp. 70-81, 90-98.

⁵⁶ Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military*, ch. 12.

⁵⁷ Karabelias, p. 457.

⁵⁸ Karabelias, pp. 464-465.

in the West. The real discontinuity at the international level happened towards the end of the Cold War, when the West's concerns for democratization and human rights came unconditionally to the fore.⁵⁹ By formally requiring that its members be democratic, NATO precluded any outright lapses to military rule, while the European Union has set membership criteria that specifically call for a high level of civilian control of the military. Greece had successfully transitioned to democracy before this shift in the international environment took place, but Turkey's bid for EU membership has provided the main impetus for reforming civil-military relations in the last few years.

Overall, Greece has been a more democratic country than Turkey in the past two centuries; in the 20th century alone, it spent eighteen years under authoritarian rule contrasted with Turkey's forty-eight.⁶⁰ However, this longer democratic tradition did not translate into better civilian control over the military. Not only did Greece experience more coups, but its record of military interventions actually worsened in the 20th century, after six decades of virtually uninterrupted parliamentary rule (1844-1909), at about the same time that Turkey's military became dominant in politics (1908). The beginning of the 20th century is the only period when an indirect interaction effect between the two countries can be observed due to the role they were playing in each other's security environment. The influence of the 1908 Young Turk revolution on the 1909 Goudi pronunciamento is undeniable. The CUP's declarations of reforms alarmed Greek military and civilian circles because they threatened Greece's prospects of profiting from the Ottoman Empire's expected collapse. Both the Ottoman Empire and Greece seriously

⁵⁹ European pressure was allegedly a factor contributing to the prompt return to civilian rule in Turkey in the 1980s. See Ihsan Dagi, "Democratic Transition in Turkey, 1980-83: the Impact of European Diplomacy," *Middle Eastern Studies*, v. 32 (April 1996): 124-41.

began to modernize and expand their military in the late 19th century responding to mutual external security pressures—fear of partition and fear of inability to realize irredentist dreams respectively. It was only in the timing of this modernization effort that Greece and Turkey indirectly influenced each other. However, the different political contexts under which this modernization took place dictated different institutional futures for their military organizations.

The small Greek military evolved in the context of a largely mono-ethnic but politically pluralistic state. It participated in or spearheaded popular revolutions until 1909. It began to transform into a modern force in the 1880s and much more intensely so around 1910, in a country with a parliamentary political culture. Between World War I and 1974, the military became caught up in the partisan struggles between the Greek left and right. In this period, NCOs, who had formed the bulk of the officer corps in the 19th century, were gradually eclipsed by academy graduates.⁶¹ Following the 1974 disaster, the Greek civilian elites agreed to push the military out of politics.

The Ottoman military, on the other hand, began its training and technological modernization even earlier than its Greek counterpart, but did so in an authoritarian political environment. It became a focus of political dissent within the Ottoman Empire and, through the legacy of the Young Turk movement, the CUP, and the Kemalist revolution, it undertook a nation building project in Turkey between 1908 and 1923. During the single-party era, the army was symbiotic with the Kemalist state. After gradual democratization from 1946 on, the military retained this Kemalist tradition and

⁶⁰ Counting 1922-24, 1925-26, 1936-44, 1967-74 for Greece and 1900-08, 1912-46, 1960-63, 1980-83 for Turkey. Including the 19th century would make Greece's record look far better.

⁶¹ Gerozeses, pp. 465-516 and annexes passim.

remained an autonomous political actor, distanced from and sometimes fiercely opposed to the new forces that appeared in Turkey's political spectrum. Optimists believe that Turkey's path to EU accession will cause its military to give up this political role, leading it to a convergence in outlook with its Greek neighbor.

INSTITUTIONAL SEQUENCING IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

Based on the preceding empirical observations, it is possible to put forward a general theoretical proposition explaining consistent patterns of civil-military collision versus collusion. As the examples of Greece and Turkey indicated, it is difficult to mold each country's history so that it neatly fits one or the other model exactly. Nevertheless, I believe that two distinctly divergent processes took place in Greece and the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the last century, which had their rough equivalents in much of the world during the modern period.

Creating or expanding the officer corps in countries concurrently experiencing economic modernization and external security pressures amounts to vesting young men from rising social classes with increased power and responsibility in a volatile political environment. How this latent potential will play out depends on larger societal conditions. Due to the nature of the military profession, it is normal to expect such a budding officer corps in times of crisis to simultaneously agonize over the nation's precarious future and its own career prospects. If one ideology dominates both politics and the military, or if competing civilian groups can reach a power-sharing consensus, the state will escape a civil-military clash. Few modernizing countries, however, are able

to achieve this. Two other scenarios are more likely. Either rival civilian elites with possibly conflicting foreign policy visions will expand their competition within the military; or, if civilian elites are small, weak, or unconsolidated, the military will become a hotbed of political activism on its own right and take it upon itself to intervene in and properly run politics. The former is what happened in Greece, the latter what happened in Turkey.

The telltale difference was one of institutional timing: the earlier maturation of competitive civilian political elites in Greece coupled with the late development of a professional military.⁶² The rise of representative institutions played a major role in this direction. Greek revolutionary congresses met in the 1820s before a regular army or even a state existed; rudimentary political parties arose when the state's military was just a palace guard; and by the time the military was expanding, allowing young men of humble origins to enter this profession, a two-party system had taken shape. It was the parties themselves who thus "democratized" the Greek officer corps. In the Ottoman Empire, the timing was reverse: the military opened its professional gates at a time when civilian political activity was very restricted; political agitation in the army began before there was any representative government; and the first Turkish political party was created from the army's ranks.

"Time warp" arguments, analyzing later development as path dependent to an early formative period, are common in comparative politics, e.g. in explaining party

⁶² By "professional military" here I mean not the tautological definition regarding civil-military relations proposed by Huntington in *The Soldier and the State*, but a non-class-based dedicated service whose members are full-time state employees receiving modern training and equipment.

cleavages.⁶³ An equivalent typology here would categorize countries as having a truly *political* or a simply *politicized* military. Societies with politicized militaries, like Greece, are characterized by vertical alliances cutting across civilian and military elites. Their main attribute is the existence of strong civilian groups who feel the need to maintain officer clients in order to pursue their goals or ensure their survival. Societies with political militaries, like Turkey, preserve a sharper horizontal distinction between military and civilian politicians. A political military may suppress internal officer minorities, favor a civilian party or set up its own party, but it remains an autonomous political actor, usually the most important one, with a dominant ideology.

In modern history, societies displaying broadly similar features to Greece are France, Spain, Portugal, and many Latin American countries in the 19th century. Those similar to Turkey include Egypt, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, Ethiopia, and pre-World War II Japan. The function of coups is not distinguishable between the two groups; coups may aim at annulling an electoral result or legislative decision (veto), taking over and trying to restructure politics by passing a new constitution (holding) or even assuming control indefinitely (permanent).⁶⁴ What is important to arrive at a pattern similar to Greece's is a history of competitive politics with only intermediate levels of political violence. Total elimination of adversaries by one party in a civil war or the development of a dominant-party system may lead to politicized militaries with excellent civilian control—as in the cases of Russia and India. A weakness of the paired comparison between Greece and Turkey is that it offers little variation on the dimension

⁶³ Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan eds, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

of ethnic composition: Greece is almost mono-ethnic and Turkey has an overwhelmingly dominant ethnic group. Multi-ethnic states without a decisively dominant majority group may be inherently incapable of developing an independently political military if ethnic divisions have become entrenched at an early stage of their history.

A common denominator between Greece and Turkey in much of the 20th century was a continuing crisis of legitimacy, a high level of dissensus as classic authors like Finer and Huntington would have described it.⁶⁵ In Greece it was a largely dichotomous division centered primarily on the monarchic institution, whereas in Turkey it was a more complex conflict between several political forces as society made the transition from absolute monarchy to multiparty democracy. Although this kind of wider discord has long been recognized as a prerequisite for coups in addition to all other evils of civil strife, it is exogenous to civil-military relations per se. Many modernizing societies have faced tantalizing dilemmas regarding their form of government or foreign policy, the specifics being particular to each case but the pattern generic enough to all. This common characteristic of societies in turmoil does not explain why civilians would be pulling the strings in some cases and officers in others.

Two other standard concepts from the civil-military relations literature, culture and external threat, similarly offer little help. Arguments about culture rely on some essentialist trait that supposedly affects civil-military relations by operating at the

⁶⁴ Here, I am borrowing terms introduced by Finer and Nordlinger in *The Man on Horseback: the Role of the Military in Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 249-253, and *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977) respectively.

⁶⁵ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 427-455; S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, pp. 240-248.

collective level, shaping political norms.⁶⁶ And yet, Greece and Turkey have a common cultural background in the Ottoman past, one that authors on Greece often evoke to explain rampant distrust in the state, the importance of personal connections, patronage and corruption.⁶⁷ Even if it is particularly Islam that is ill-disposed to democracy, it is not clear why Turkish history should not have evolved in a series of confrontations between secularist and Islamic politicians and their allies within the military, to mirror the pattern of Greece. Michael Desch has argued that the level of external threat partly determines whether civilian and military elites will collaborate or clash.⁶⁸ But Turkey's security situation progressively improved after the end of the Cold War, in parallel with the military's gradual return to the barracks, while Greece's security environment before 1974 was equally if not more threatening than afterwards. Greek politics were most bitterly divisive around the two world wars, when external threat was the highest.

Finally, Turkey's difference from Greece might arguably be not one of belated, but of weaker parties. Some criteria for assessing the strength of parties are size and retention of membership, organizational assets, ideological coherence, and longevity. In terms of longevity, some Turkish parties have indeed had shorter life spans, particularly the Islamists who were repeatedly closed down from the 1960s on. But Greek parties were also dismantled and resurrected with new names and organizational structures after the Civil War and the junta, just like the Turkish parties were after coups. Defections of deputies have been much more common in Turkish parliament, but although rarer, they have played a critical role in Greece, as in the fall of the Center Union government in

⁶⁶ For example, see Brian Loveman and Thomas Davies Jr., "Instability, Violence, and the Age of the Caudillos," in *The Politics of Anti-Politics: the Military in Latin America* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1997), pp. 15-28.

⁶⁷ Clogg, *A Concise History of Greece*, pp. 59-61.

1965. The durability of the Turkish RPP can only be matched in Greece by the Communist KKE. Parties do not have to persist for their political spaces to do so, and political spaces in the broader sense have been fairly stable in both countries for decades.

The early existence of a parliament and political parties seems to have been a key factor in societies developing politicized militaries. The contribution of parliamentarism is not so much in the area of establishing norms of civilian government control—these proved to be weak in most cases—but in creating civilian political channels for ambitious individuals and institutionalizing civilian patronage. The centrality of the elected politician as a dispenser of patronage in the early stages of democracy becomes even more crucial if the military is originally small or institutionally weak, lacking rules of meritocracy. The militaries of newly established states (like 19th century Greece and much of Latin America) or states recovering from major social upheaval (like post-Napoleonic France and Spain) often display such characteristics. If strong competing civilian elites coexist with and dominate an institutionally weak military for one generation, a future path similar to Greece's should be expected. The extent of suffrage may not be important and in some cases even the existence of a parliament may not be a necessary condition if coherent rival civilian groups have formed within society at an early stage (as for example, with Liberals and Conservatives in 19th century Portugal, or Republicans and Conservatives in 19th century Brazil).

Roughly grouped together, the countries of Latin America and “Latin Europe” had an early experience with constitutional revolutions within decades of the year 1800 and saw subsequent civil strife between opposing civilian groups expressing broad social

⁶⁸ Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: the Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

class coalitions and ideological cleavages (Blancos and Colorados in Uruguay, Conservatives and Liberals in Colombia, Unitarians and Federalists in Argentina, republicans and royalists in France and Greece). The content and structure of the civilian party system may have changed over the decades, but civilian groups held the reins of their military clients in these societies until the period of the Cold War. The Cold War presents an interesting anomaly to the theory, because, as in Greece in 1967, Latin American militaries often launched coups and established dictatorships at their own initiative in the 1960s and 1970s with only tacit civilian support.

A distinguishing characteristic of the Cold War was the emergence of a communist or far leftist party in the political arena. In most cases, communists were isolated and were not seen as viable coalition partners by the other parties. With the onset of the Cold War, anti-communist phobia led to purges of leftist officers, often associated with insurgencies, and the granting of widespread internal security and intelligence roles to the military. One is reminded here that the Greek Civil War was waged by a coalition of royalists and (less enthusiastic but definitely cooperative) republicans against Greek communists. Except in rare occasions, the communist parties either did not attempt to or failed to create a friendly faction within the officer corps.⁶⁹ This failure may be attributed to two reasons. First, communist parties in general believe in the eventuality of a mass revolution by workers or peasants; a strictly military coup does not figure in orthodox Marxist theory. Second, far leftist parties typically use internationalist rhetoric and often recruit among oppressed ethnic minorities (indigenous groups in Latin America, Macedonian Slavs in Greece). Both of these strategies make

them repugnant to the expectedly nationalistic mindset of the average officer. Thus, by a combination of fervent anti-communism, US influence, and inherent ideological constraints, leftist and far leftist parties were left without military clients in the Cold War and, even if elected to office, they were ousted by right-wing military coups.

On the other hand, most countries similar to Turkey—except Pakistan and Burma—display a totally different historical pattern: that of a non-Western Asian or African empire simultaneously resisting colonization and attempting social and economic modernization without granting political representation. This is the story of the Ottoman Empire, Thailand, Japan, and Egypt. As in Imperial Japan, the military was typically shielded from civilian oversight while being expanded and modernized for at least one generation before constitutionalism and parties emerged.⁷⁰ These countries had a very brief or no experience with genuine parliamentarism before entering a period of military rule. The levels of external security threat and domestic disaffection with the monarch or any existent weak civilian government influenced the timing of the first major military incursion in politics (1931 for Japan, 1932 for Thailand, 1952 for Egypt, 1974 for Ethiopia). Before intervening, the officer corps in these societies commonly became fixated with intellectual debates about the country's future. Even if coherent civilian parties later emerged, the military remained a separate actor in politics, often the most important one. If it had not been for its defeat in World War II and the subsequent US occupation that arrested this process, it is quite likely that Japan's regime today would resemble more that of Egypt or at least Thailand or Turkey.

⁶⁹ Individual cases like Sarafis are attributable to personal conversion to leftist ideologies. The 1935 communist insurrection in Brazil, the abortive 1965 communist coup in Indonesia, and the 1944 Greek mutinies in the Middle East are notable exceptions.

The observation then is that a significant lag in either direction between the development of a professional military and competent civilian elites explains the difference between political and politicized militaries. Ultimately, the substantive mechanism may be the acquisition of an early advantage in recruitment. Societies with modernizing militaries and tightly controlled politics recruited their future Atatürks, Nassers, Pibuls, and Katsura Taros in the officer corps. In societies with established or promising civilian politics, parties had the early recruiting edge and dominated the formulation of political ideologies and the manufacture of professional careers in civil service. Societies with an almost simultaneous development of strong military and parliamentary structures, like Israel, present a gray area for the theory. Pakistan and Burma probably followed Turkey's path because the nationalist leaders who pioneered their independence (Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Aung San respectively) died soon thereafter, before they were able to establish civilian party rule.

If civilian control of the military is essentially a norm that all advanced democracies adopt, the study of Greece and Turkey highlights the problem of the norm's locus. In countries with politicized militaries, the problem does not lie as much with the officer corps as with civilian elites. If civilians can reach a power-sharing consensus between them, they can agree to exclude the military from politics. In the case of Greece, this was achieved thanks to an external shock, which is a favorable but not sufficient condition for re-democratization.⁷¹ States with genuinely political militaries pose the true problem of military withdrawal. In them, the military has to be separately persuaded to

⁷⁰ Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2000), pp. 590-604; James L. McClain, *Japan: a Modern History* (London and New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2002), pp. 318-332, 422-425.

⁷¹ External shock meaning defeat in an international war without invoking foreign occupation.

extricate itself from politics. The process may seem simplified if the regime has been thoroughly civilianized, but as the case of Turkey attests, civilianization does not equal the establishment of a non-intervention norm. As long as the officer corps preserves a prerogative, constitutional or ideational, over internal government and holds its own opinions about which civilian elites are acceptable to rule and which are not, politics will remain a military affair.

TABLE 1

Political alignments of Greek officers, 1909-1949




TABLE 2

List of Greek and Turkish heads of state in the republican periods

PRESIDENTS OF TURKEY

(Bold indicates military background)

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1923-1938)

Ismet İnönü (1938-1950)

Celal Bayar (1950-1960)

Cemal Gürsel (1961-1966)

Cevdet Sunay (1966-1973)

Fahri Korotürk (1973-1980)

Kenan Evren (1982-1989)

Turgut Özal (1989-1993)

Süleyman Demirel (1993-2000)

Ahmet Necdet Sezer (2000-)

PRESIDENTS OF GREECE

(Bold indicates military background, underlined for periods of dictatorial rule)

Pavlos Koundouriotis (1924-1926, 1926-1929)

Theodoros Pangalos (1926)

Alexandros Zaimis (1929-1935)

Georgios Papadopoulos (1973)

Phaidon Gizikis (1973-1974)

Mikhail Stasinopoulos (1974-1975)

Constantinos Tsatsos (1975-1980)

Constantinos Karamanlis (1980-1985, 1990-1995)

Christos Sartzetakis (1985-1990)

Kostis Stephanopoulos (1995-)

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