



Week 3: The Urban Housing Market, Structures and Density.

- Hedonic Regression Analysis.
- Shadow “prices” versus marginal costs.
- Land value maximizing FAR.
- FAR and Urban Redevelopment.
- Land Use competition: Highest Price for Housing – versus – highest use for land



Urban Housing

- Great diversity from historical evolution, changes in technology and tastes.
- Multiple attributes to each house: size, baths, exterior material, style....location
- Consumers value each of these attributes with the normal law of micro-economics: diminishing marginal utility.
- Huge industry has evolved to applying statistical models to understand and predict diverse house prices:
 - Property Tax appraisals.
 - Automatic Valuation Services for lenders, brokers...



Hedonic Regression Analysis

1). Linear:

$$R = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \dots$$

X's are structural, location attributes

2). Log Linear:

$$R = e^{[\alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \dots]}$$

$$\ln(R) = \alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \dots$$

3). Log Log:

$$R = \alpha X_1^{\beta_1} X_2^{\beta_2} X_3^{\beta_3} \dots$$

$$\ln(R) = \ln(\alpha) + \beta_1 \ln(X_1) + \beta_2 \ln(X_2) + \dots$$



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Dallas apartment rent Hedonic equation: 1998

| Regression Statistics | |
|-----------------------|------------|
| Multiple R | 0.90518672 |
| R Square | 0.819363 |
| Adjusted R Square | 0.81899567 |
| Standard Error | 0.14378576 |
| Observations | 7885 |

ANOVA

| | df | SS | MS | F | Significance F |
|------------|------|-------------|----------|----------|----------------|
| Regression | 16 | 737.8460495 | 46.11538 | 2230.561 | 0 |
| Residual | 7868 | 162.6657463 | 0.020674 | | |
| Total | 7884 | 900.5117958 | | | |

| | Coefficients | Standard Error | t Stat | P-value | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Lower 95% over 95.0 | Upper 95% over 95.0 |
|-----------|--------------|----------------|----------|----------|------------|-----------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Intercept | -0.57141659 | 0.176232118 | -3.24241 | 0.00119 | -0.9168784 | -0.22595 | -0.91688 | |
| #BED | -0.00076159 | 0.004946816 | -0.15395 | 0.877649 | -0.0104587 | 0.008935 | -0.01046 | |
| #BATH | 0.04799528 | 0.005624626 | 8.533063 | 1.69E-17 | 0.0369695 | 0.059021 | 0.03697 | |
| LnSQFT | 0.6432852 | 0.012443205 | 51.69771 | 0 | 0.6188932 | 0.667677 | 0.618893 | |
| 1/FAR | 0.09504048 | 0.005839225 | 16.27621 | 1.31E-58 | 0.083594 | 0.106487 | 0.083594 | |
| LnAGE | -0.08762126 | 0.00195439 | -44.8331 | 0 | -0.0914524 | -0.08379 | -0.09145 | |
| LnPARK | 0.09666656 | 0.00533756 | 18.11063 | 7.46E-72 | 0.0862035 | 0.10713 | 0.086204 | |
| #POOL | -0.03185748 | 0.001586528 | -20.08 | 1.67E-87 | -0.0349675 | -0.02875 | -0.03497 | |
| RCA | 0.00732288 | 0.000715092 | 10.24048 | 1.86E-24 | 0.0059211 | 0.008725 | 0.005921 | |
| SEC | 0.01631909 | 0.002140012 | 7.625699 | 2.71E-14 | 0.0121241 | 0.020514 | 0.012124 | |
| WD | 0.00775154 | 0.002556777 | 3.031761 | 0.002439 | 0.0027396 | 0.012764 | 0.00274 | |
| APP | 0.02115624 | 0.001660838 | 12.73829 | 8.35E-37 | 0.0179006 | 0.024412 | 0.017901 | |
| FP | 0.0181616 | 0.004472787 | 4.060466 | 4.94E-05 | 0.0093937 | 0.026929 | 0.009394 | |
| DEN | 0.02276466 | 0.006928009 | 3.285888 | 0.001021 | 0.0091839 | 0.036345 | 0.009184 | |
| INT | 0.00872255 | 0.001784347 | 4.88837 | 1.04E-06 | 0.0052248 | 0.01222 | 0.005225 | |
| LnHome\$ | 0.17170179 | 0.005361375 | 32.0257 | 1.2E-211 | 0.1611921 | 0.182212 | 0.161192 | |
| LnSAT | 0.01175916 | 0.019835531 | 0.592833 | 0.55331 | -0.0271238 | 0.050642 | -0.02712 | |

LOG/LOG; verify White Settlement, Rockwall and Ft. Worth HOME\$; all observations;



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
Optimizing House Configuration

- Builders and developers compare the incremental value of additional house features against their incremental cost.
- Profit maximizing house: where the cost of an additional square foot, bath, fireplace falls to the marginal cost of construction.
- But what about land, lot size, density or FAR?
 - FAR: floor area ratio (ratio of floor to land area).
 - Density: units per acre.
 - Density x unit floor area = FAR
 - % of lot “open” = $1 - (\text{FAR}/\text{stories})$ (stories > FAR)



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Optimizing House price (P) minus construction cost (C) as a function of square feet





$$1). P = \alpha - \beta F$$

Optimizing FAR

α = all housing and location factors
besides FAR

F = FAR

β = marginal impact of FAR on price
per square foot.


$$2). C = \mu + \tau F$$

μ = “baseline” cost of “stick” SFU
construction

τ = marginal impact of FAR on cost per
square foot



If each unit of floor area is unprofitable then so is land – regardless of FAR. As FAR approaches zero, land profit is zero no matter how profitable floor area.





$$3). p = F [P - C] = F[\alpha - \mu] - F^2[\beta + \tau]$$

$$4). \partial p / \partial F = [\alpha - \mu] - 2F[\beta + \tau] = 0, \text{ or}$$

$$F^* = [\alpha - \mu] / 2[\beta + \tau], \text{ and}$$


$$p^* = [\alpha - \mu]^2 / 4[\beta + \tau]$$

5). How do prices and FAR vary by:

- Location
- Other factors that shift the parameters



At “better” locations, the price of housing at any FAR is higher. This yields a substitution of capital for land and the optimal FAR rises.





Boston Back Bay Condominium Example

- From 1984 regression: $R = 222 - 1.48F$, for new 2-bed, 2-bath with parking on Beacon hill. ($178 - 1.48F$ for end of Commonwealth Ave.)
- Construction costs: $C = 100 + 2F$
- $F^* = 17.5$, $p^* = 46\text{million}$ (per acre)
- At F of 4.0, 2-bed, 2-bath existing land has value of 10.6 million (1/4 as much!)




How does land use “evolve”?

- **City Development evolves from the center outward – on vacant land at the edge.**
- **At each time period, there is a “shadow” value for interior land that is already built upon.**
- **When does that “shadow” value exceed the entire value of the existing structures?**
- **Fires, disasters create vacant land – shaping development**
- **Gentrification? [Helms]**



The spatial Pattern of Economic Redevelopment





Economic Redevelopment

- 6). The sunk cost of existing structures generates a barrier to the smooth adjustment of FAR.
- 7). Rarely do we see incremental FAR increases. Rather old uses are destroyed and replaced with new.
- 8). Existing “older” structures:

$$P_0 = \alpha_0 - \beta F_0$$

δ = demolition cost per square foot

F_0 = FAR of existing use

$p_0 = F_0 [\alpha_0 - \beta F_0]$: land acquisition cost



9). $p^* - p_0 > \delta F_0$ implies

$$F^*(\alpha - \beta F^*) - F_0(\alpha_0 - \beta F_0) > \delta F_0 + \\ F^*(\mu + \tau F^*)$$

“increase in value of land and capital” > “demolition plus development cost”

Most likely if $\alpha > \alpha_0$ (existing capital deteriorated)

$F^* > F_0$ (new use much more dense)

See: [Rosenthal and Helsley].



Boston Back Bay Condominium Example (continued)

- Assume that historic properties have 75% of the structure value versus new. Hence the value of 1 acre of 4-story brownstones is:

$$4 \times [166.5 - 1.48 \times 4] \times 43560 = 27m$$

- Thus even with significant demolition costs the current historic stock might be ready for “market demolition”.
- Ocean Front in LA? Mid Ring Tokyo?
- The lower existing FAR – the less the opportunity cost of redevelopment.



Land competition between groups

$$10). P_i = \alpha - k_i d - \beta_i F$$

d = distance from desirable location

F = FAR

$i = 1, 2$ (different household types)

$$k_1 > k_2, \beta_1 > \beta_2$$

i.e. 1's value location more and mind FAR more (value lot size more).

$$11). \frac{\partial P_i}{\partial d} = -k_i \text{ hence } P_1 \text{ steeper than } P_2$$

(previous lecture on location of groups)



$$11). p_i = \max_F: F[\alpha - k_i d - \beta_i F - (\mu + \tau F)]$$

$$F_i^* = [\alpha - k_i d - \mu] / 2[\beta_i + \tau],$$

$$p_i^* = [\alpha - k_i d - \mu] F_i^* / 2$$


since $\beta_1 > \beta_2$, $F_1^* < F_2^*$

$$12). \frac{\partial p_i^*}{\partial d} = -k_i F_i^*$$

Even though P_1 is steeper than P_2 it could be the case that p_1^* is less steep than p_2^*



Group 1 is willing to pay the most for houses (P) near the center, but group 2 is willing to pay the most for central land (p) - it is the most profitable group to develop central land for.





Examples of location and land bidding between groups

- Miami Waterfront has high rise condos populated by elderly who are never on the beach. Those on the beach (younger families) live inland!
- Why would wealthy families live in the center of Paris or Rome, but at the edge of Boston or Atlanta (with a few exceptions)?



NY Land Residuals: Highest Use?

| <u>Location</u> | <u>Office</u> | | | | <u>Condo</u> | | | |
|-----------------|---------------|----------|----------|----------|--------------|----------|----------|----------|
| | <i>F</i> | <i>P</i> | <i>C</i> | <i>p</i> | <i>F</i> | <i>P</i> | <i>C</i> | <i>p</i> |
| Downtown | 20 | 220 | 250 | (-) | 6 | 524 | 350 | 1050 |
| Midtown | 20 | 376 | 250 | 2500 | 20 | 594 | 350 | 4800 |
| Conn | 4 | 225 | 150 | 300 | 2 | 350 | 200 | 300 |
| NNJ | 4 | 180 | 150 | 120 | 2 | 242 | 200 | 84 |

Sales data from the Internet, Costs from RS Means.