


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FACTORS SUPPORTING FACULTY
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING


James W. Driscoll

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October 1975

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FACTORS SUPPORTING FACULTY
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316
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Abstract

This study clarified the factors leading individual faculty members to support faculty collective bargaining in higher education (FCB) (1) by simultaneously analyzing several factors identified in previous research and (2) by advancing two hypotheses based on a conceptualization of FCB as a change in the organizational decision-making process. The first, low participation in decision-making, reflects an integrative view of decision-making while the second, low trust in the outcomes of decisions relies on a distributive perspective. Three factors usefully predicted support for FCB: dissatisfaction with salary, low trust in the outcomes of organizational decision-making (thus supporting the distributive perspective), and a liberal political orientation. The implications of each factor are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

Faculty collective bargaining (FCB) is defined here as a system in which formal, exclusive recognition is granted by an institution of higher education to a bargaining agent representing a bargaining unit including faculty members (Aussieker and Garbarino, 1973). This bargaining agent meets and bargains with the administration of the institution to agree on a contract for wages, hours, and other conditions of employment involving the collective membership of the unit. For institutions of higher education FCB represents a fundamental change in current practices in employment relations. In late 1974, about one-fifth of the faculty members in the U.S. were represented by bargaining agents (Garbarino, 1975). Research had indicated demographic, ideological, position-related, and attitudinal predictors of interest in collective bargaining (Ladd and Lipset, 1973). The purpose of this study was to clarify the reasons why individual Faculty members support FCB and to test two hypotheses that rest on a conceptualization of FCB as a change in the organization's decision-making process.

EARLIER RESEARCH

Faculty collective bargaining can be viewed from either an institutional or an individual perspective. Institutions in which faculties have elected bargaining are disproportionately public, two-year institutions in states with legislation favoring collective bargaining by public employees. (Aussieker and Garbarino, 1973; Begin, 1974). Faculty members favor FCB most in institutions with small financial resources, few research expenditures and lower selection standards for students (Ladd and Lipset, 1973). Private, four-year institutions that have adopted FCB have fewer financial resources and lower faculty salary increases than similar institutions that have not adopted FCB. They are also smaller, less prestigious, and oriented to preparation of students for minor professional occupations rather than a more general academic education (Hardigan, 1975). Thus the decision of a faculty to adopt collective bargaining probably is related to the environment of its particular institution and the ability of the institution to obtain resources from that environment. Nonetheless an important psychological issue remains. Within any institution only certain faculty members support collective bargaining.

Collective bargaining has traditionally had liberal support in the United States, and supporters of FCB are political liberals (Ladd and Lipset, 1973). These authors also showed that across a variety of institutions, demographically, supporters of FCB tended to be young and Jewish and in a later study (1975) that both young and Jewish faculty were more liberal politically.

Faculty in the social sciences and the humanities also showed more support for FCB, a finding replicated in the present study (Ladd and Lipset, 1973).¹ Although males showed more support for collective bargaining in secondary education than females, Feuille and Blandin (1974) reported that males did not show more support for FCB in higher education, and that faculty members holding administrative positions also gave less support to FCB. Faculty members with lower salaries or lower academic rank have shown more support for FCB (Ladd and Lipset, 1973). Additudoinally, supporters of FCB were found to be dissatisfied with their institutions, especially with their governance procedures and with their current salary (Ladd and Lipset, 1973).

These findings have two shortcomings in describing a pattern of individual support for FCB: (1) They are univariate relationships for some of the variables are certainly more useful than others as predictors of support; (2) They were not derived from any theoretical framework and at best simply conceive of FCB as a change in the system. To increase understanding of why individuals favor FCB, this article (1) examines various simple predictors of support for FCB in a multivariate analysis, and (2) derives two additional predictors of support for FCB from the conceptualization of FCB as a change in the current organizational decision-making process of institutions of higher education.

¹ Faculty members in different academic discipline vary in their upbringing, orientation, and current work situation (Ladd and Lipset, 1975). In this study support for FCB varied by academic discipline but these differences did not usefully predict support for FCB when added to the other hypothesized variables presented below.

HYPOTHESES

Ten hypotheses, derived from a review of the literature were tested, both in isolation for replication, and in combination to identify the predictive usefulness of each hypothesized variable. The hypotheses stated that faculty members would support FCB more:

Hypothesis 1: If they were young.

Hypothesis 2: If they were male.

Hypothesis 3: If they were liberal politically.

Hypothesis 4: If they held lower academic ranks and received lower salaries.

Hypothesis 5: If they did not have administrative positions.

Hypothesis 6: If they were dissatisfied with their salary.

Beyond these common-sense predictions one can move toward conceptualization of FCB as a change in the current organizational decision-making process of an institution of higher education. By electing FCB, the individual members of the faculty formally associate in an organization, which acts as a bargaining agent to advance their collective interests. Their new organization takes part in negotiations resulting in binding decisions on salaries, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment. This activity by the bargaining agent changes the organization's decision-making process first in that the bargaining agent is a new party to employment decisions and second that a new set of rules now regulates the organizational decision-making process. These rules are established by agencies outside the university, either the National Labor Relations Board for private institutions or

a state labor relations board for public (statutory) institutions. As a consequence two different mechanisms are hypothesized as resulting in a faculty member supporting FCB.

Hypothesis 7: If there is low participation in the current decision-making process on faculty personnel appointments, salary increases, and budget allocations, then the individual will support FCB to change that process. This hypothesis assumes that faculty members desire participation in decision making and Stogdill (1974) reported that as a general tendency, individual participation in decision making was associated with satisfaction. This association was stronger for individuals with strong needs for autonomy (Vroom, 1969) or on decision issues that were important to them (Strauss, 1963). Perhaps faculty members select their occupations because of strong autonomy needs, or they may incorporate expectations of participation in a self-governing collegium during academic training. In either case, faculty members are often cited as individuals for whom participation in decision making will result in satisfaction (Strauss, 1963). DeVries and Snyder (1974), found that lower-ranking faculty who most supported FCB (Ladd and Lipset, 1973) also participated less in university decision-making.

Low participation reflects an integrative perspective on organizational decision making often found in the social sciences (Dahrendorf, 1959). Participation focuses on interaction patterns; that is, the behavioral decision-making process as a source of satisfaction, rather than on the outcomes of particular decisions. This focus assumes common goals and values for organizational members and neglects the fact that organizational

decisions are distributive. This means the decisions determine which organizational members and groups receive valued organizational prerogatives--discretion to act freely, commitment of organizational resources, and tangible financial rewards. From the conceptualization of FCB as a change in the decision-making process, but built upon this distributive perspective on decisions, one can hypothesize as follows.

Hypothesis 8: If an individual faculty member does not trust the current decision-making process to reach outcomes that favor his or her interests, then the individual will support FCB to change that process.

This second mechanism relies heavily on Gamson's (1968) general theory of political systems. For Gamson, a political system is composed of competing interest groups who attempt to influence the decision makers of the system to make decisions favoring particular interests of the groups. The level of trust in the political system determines whether the group or individual will try to influence the decision makers and what means of influence they will use. Gamson (1968: 54) defines trust as "the probability...that the political system (or some part of it) will produce preferred outcomes even if left untended." He indicates that both individuals and groups having low trust could be expected to attempt to change the decision-making process in order to increase the probability of decision outcomes that would favor their interests. In addition, collective bargaining allows the faculty to use the threat of penalties, either a labor strike or legal sanctions by outside agencies. For example, a labor relations board may direct a university administration to engage in good faith bargaining with the faculty. Gamson (1968) theorized that low-trust groups would be most likely to rely on the use of threats and sanctions as a means of influence, and Michener

and Zeller (1972) found empirical support for this aspect of Gamson's theory.

There is also support for this hypothesis in studies of FCB. In a study across institutions, Baldrige and others (1973) found an association between the level of trust held by a faculty and the level of faculty support for FCB. At the individual level, Feuille and Blandin (1974) found that faculty members who felt their interests were not represented in the campus administration or in various state agencies showed more support for FCB.

Besides testing these last two hypotheses, we also wish to assess the usefulness of conceptualizing FCB as a change in the decision-making process. Therefore a multivariate analysis was made to determine the association between FCB support and these decision-making predictors when demographic predispositions (age and sex), ideological bias (political liberalism), and both positional and attitudinal indicators of economic self interest (salary level, academic rank, and dissatisfaction with salary) were controlled statistically. It was hypothesized therefore, that faculty members will support FCB independently of other factors,

Hypothesis 9: If they have low participation in the decision-making process.

Hypothesis 10: If they have low trust in the decision-making process.

METHOD

Data Collection

The data for this study were gathered in a questionnaire survey of the faculty of Cornell University in Ithaca, New York, during April 1974.

The sample consisted of members on the list of the Dean of the Faculty at that time, except for instructors and lecturers; visiting, adjunct, part-time, and emeritus professors; the faculty of the Medical College in New York City and the Agricultural Station at Geneva; the president, provosts and vice-provosts, and all deans; the staff of the medical clinic at the Ithaca campus; and all military personnel. With these exceptions to obtain comparability with an earlier study conducted at Cornell in November 1972, 1394 questionnaires were mailed.

The questionnaire was administered first to the faculty of the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, the Graduate School of Business and Public Administration, and the Psychology Department of the College of Arts and Sciences in late March, 1974, as a pretest. The main questionnaire with three additional items was distributed three weeks after the pretest to the rest of the units listed in Table 1. The pretest returns were analyzed together with the returns from the main questionnaire.

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Both questionnaires were distributed through the campus mail system under a covering letter describing the questionnaire as a continuing academic study. A preaddressed envelope of the campus-mail system accompanied each questionnaire.

Respondents

Of the faculty members contacted, 778 (56 percent) returned questionnaires. Only those respondents who gave complete information on all variables were included in the data analysis, which reduced the sample size from 778 to 578. The respondents did not differ from

the official faculty totals in rank or college affiliation; however, significantly more professors in the statutory units responded than in the endowed units (Table 1). Separate analysis of these two groups did not differ from the overall pattern of results. Therefore only the overall results are discussed.

Dependent Variable: Support for Faculty Collective Bargaining

Support for FCB was measured by the sum of six items listed in Table 2 taken from Haehn's (1970) study in the California state colleges. Analysis showed that the six items formed a Guttman scale, the

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

scale of support for faculty collective bargaining with a coefficient of reproducibility of .89, minimal marginal reproducibility of .64, a percentage of improvement of .25 and a coefficient of scalability of .70. These statistics indicate a substantial predictability in the patterns of responses to these 6 items. They also indicate that these items measure a single dimension which runs from the least to the most frequently endorsed items of the six.

Table 2 gives the percentage of responses in the categories considered positive in constructing the scale. The most frequently endorsed items refer to the acceptability of strikes and collective bargaining for college professors. The least frequently endorsed item was whether faculty members would vote for FCB in a referendum at Cornell. Thus, the dimension underlying the scale extended from a favorable attitude towards FCB as an abstract issue not specifically associated with Cornell to support for FCB at Cornell including the

specific action of voting in favor of it. The same scale ordering and nearly identical characteristic statistics appeared in an earlier survey of the Cornell faculty in 1972 (Driscoll, Gruenfeld, and MacEachron, 1974). That study also provided concurrent validity for the measure. The scale distinguished respondents who were members of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) from those who did not indicate membership in any faculty association. The difference was moderately significant in the predicted direction ($p = .10$, one-tailed). The AAUP has supported FCB at its national conventions (AAUP Bulletin, 1972).

Predictor Variables

Demographic. Respondents indicated their age and sex on the questionnaire, and the distribution of the sample on these variables

INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

is shown in Table 3. Table 4 shows the relation of age, sex and other predictor variables to the questionnaire items.

INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Political liberalism. To express political liberalism, the respondent was asked to endorse a preference for President of the United States in 1976 from thirteen alternatives. After the survey, a sample of 23 faculty members selected to represent different academic departments at Cornell ranked the same candidates from liberal to conservative in a short interview. This sample showed a significant agreement on their rankings (Kendall's coefficient of concordance, .46 with $p < .01$). The average rank assigned each candidate by the interview sample was used

as an index of the liberalism of each professor in his or her choice in the survey. These average rankings correlated significantly with the rankings in Spring, 1974, of the nine United States Senators on the list by the Americans for Democratic Action, a liberal political organization (Spearman's $\rho = .72$, $p = .05$) (Congressional Quarterly, 1974).

Salary and academic rank. To index disadvantaged organizational position, the salary level and academic rank given by each respondent were standardized and summed. A low-paid assistant professor would score highest on this index. An index was used because these variables correlate highly ($r = .79$) and separate analyses of the type performed here would have concealed the impact of each variable.

Absence of administrative position. All respondents indicated whether they held administrative positions. The analysis included professors with administrative positions (19.2 percent) and those without such positions (73 percent). The remaining respondents (7.8 percent) did not answer this question.

Dissatisfaction with salary. A single Likert-type item with seven response alternatives indexed salary dissatisfaction. Significantly more dissatisfaction with salary was reported by low-ranking ($r = .26$) and lower-salaried ($r = .41$) professors. Both correlations were significant at the .001 level.

Participation in decision making. Participation in university decision-making was measured by an index summing nine items, each with

six response alternatives, to describe the participation of the individual faculty member in decision making. Decision issues covered personnel actions (appointments of new faculty, department heads and deans, faculty promotions, and salary increases), budget allocations, and University admission standards and enrollment goals. The response alternatives were generated after interviews with 22 Cornell professors (also selected to represent different academic departments) to describe the decision-making processes within the University. They ranged from: "I have no input to this decision." to "I participate in a group making this decision (by vote or consensus)".

These items provided behavioral description of particular interaction patterns focusing on specific behavior rather than a global description of participation. The index had a Kuder-Richardson internal consistency reliability of .58. As evidence for its validity, it significantly distinguished between faculty holding administrative positions and others who would average less participation.

Trust in the decision-making process. Trust was measured by an index summing six items referring to the administrative heads at three levels: department, college and university, and the decision-making procedures at each level. Seven responses ranging from "Never" to "Always" indexed answers to questions like the following: "I can trust the Dean of my College to make decisions which I consider appropriate" and "The procedures for decision making at this level produce results which I consider acceptable." The Kuder-Richardson estimate of internal-consistency reliability for this index was .80.

Faculty members trusted department heads more than deans, and deans more than the president and the central administration of the university. The means, based on a scale of 7, were 5.21 for department heads, 4.87 for deans, and 4.55 respectively for the president. All differences were significant by t-tests.

RESULTS

Predictor Variables

Table 5 presents the correlation matrix among each of the hypothesized predictor variables and the dependent variable, support for faculty

INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

collective bargaining. Of the replication hypotheses, faculty who are younger ($r = .21$), politically liberal ($r = .15$), with low salary and rank ($r = .28$), without administrative positions ($r = .11$), and dissatisfied with their salary ($r = .41$) all tended to support FCB; only sex was not significantly correlated with FCB support. Both the hypotheses about the decision-making process are also supported. Faculty members with low participation in the decision-making process ($r = .21$) and with low trust in that process ($r = .39$) supported FCB. Dissatisfaction with salary was the best single predictor of support for FCB followed closely by low trust in the decision-making process.

Many of these predictor variables are correlated among themselves. For example older faculty members are more likely to have higher salaries and rank ($r = .68$) and faculty members with lower salaries and rank are more likely to feel dissatisfied with their salary ($r = .38$)

and distrust the decision-making process ($r = .29$). To assess the usefulness of each hypothesized variable in predicting support for FCB, the partial correlations were obtained between these variables and the scale of FCB support controlling in each case for the other seven predictor variables of the eight hypothesized as shown in Table 6. Only dissatisfaction with salary ($r = .27$), low trust in the decision-making process ($r = .28$) and political liberalism ($r = .14$) were useful predictors of support for FCB when the other predictor variables were controlled. A faculty member's age, sex, and having either high salary and rank or an administrative position were not useful predictors of support for FCB, when the other predictor variables in this study were controlled. Predictive usefulness is the increase in prediction due to a particular variable when it is added to a set of variables already used to predict the dependent variable (Darlington, 1968). In the present case, a partial correlation measured the usefulness of each predictor variable when added to the set of variables partialled out of the relationship between each predictor and the dependent variable.

Decision-making Process

Of the two hypotheses related to the decision-making process, only low trust in the decision-making process was a useful predictor of FCB support when predictors identified in previous research were controlled ($r = .23$). Low participation in decision making by individual faculty members was not related to support for FCB when those other predictor variables were controlled ($r = .02$).

Comparison of Administrative Units

The partial correlations shown in Table 6 also tested the generalizability

INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

of these findings in different administrative units within each of four colleges in the university. To present differences in setting, two endowed and two statutory colleges were included, one large ($N > 100$) and one small ($N < 100$) college in each category.

The same three variables--dissatisfaction with salary, low trust in the decision-making process, and political liberalism generally appeared as useful predictors in these four colleges (Table 6). Two differences, however were found, both in the smaller colleges. In the College of Engineering, holding an administrative position also emerged as a useful predictor; in the College of Human Ecology, only a faculty member's political liberalism was a significantly useful predictor of support for FCB.

Useful Predictors and Antecedent Variables

These partial correlations in all cases simply measure the incremental ability of each hypothesized variable to predict support for FCB beyond the level of prediction one would obtain using the other hypothesized variables; they do not indicate the causal effect of predictor variables. Indeed, the two most useful predictors of support for FCB, dissatisfaction with salary and low trust in the decision-making process were significantly and independently associated with certain other logically antecedent predictor variables (age, sex, political liberalism, salary and rank, and lacking administrative position), which may have a causal effect

on dissatisfaction with salary and low trust and thereby an indirect effect on support for FCB.

INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

Table 7 presents the partial correlations between these two useful predictors of FCB and the antecedent demographic and organizational position variables included in this study. Faculty who are female or have low salary and rank were more dissatisfied with their salaries when their other characteristics are controlled. Similarly, faculty with low salaries or rank or lacking administrative positions had less trust in the decision-making process.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Predictor Variables and FCB

The findings suggest that individuals supported FCB because they were dissatisfied with their salary and because they did not trust the existing decision-making process to favor their interests. As Nixon's study at the University of Vermont (1975) indicated, the salary issue has a strong impact even on high-minded professors within the ivory tower. This study clearly supports the importance of the salary issue and generalized distrust in the current decision-making process as factors associated with support for FCB.

The overall pattern of critical variables in this study is consistent with previous research, but further clarifies the causes of individual support for FCB. As indicated in previous research, younger and politically liberal faculty members favor FCB; however, age, in addition to other predictors in this study, has no useful association with

support for FCB. And age is not independently associated with the useful predictor variables, dissatisfaction with salary and low trust. Political liberalism, however, is a useful, although weak predictor of support for FCB. Ladd and Lipset (1973) argued that support for FCB was a political decision as well as a reaction to organizational circumstances. Such extraorganizational predispositions as political ideology certainly affect organizational attitudes more often than appears in existing organizational research. Neither low salary and low rank nor lacking administrative position were useful predictors of support for FCB when added to the other variables in this study. Instead, these differences in organizational position can indirectly affect support for FCB through faculty subjective reactions to these differences in position such as dissatisfaction with salary and low trust in the decision-making process.

FCB as Change in Decision-making Process

The two hypotheses derived from a conceptualization of FCB as a change in the decision-making process, low individual participation in decision making and low trust in the decision-making process, both predicted support for FCB. This indicates the importance of considering support for FCB as an interest in changing the organizational process, in addition to its traditional role as a means of increasing salary levels. However, low individual participation which conceptualized decision making as an interpersonal interaction based on common goals, was not related to support for FCB, when other predictor variables were controlled. In contrast, low trust in the decision-making process

conceptualized as a means of representing groups with conflicting interests in a competition for organizational prerogatives was a useful predictor. This relative importance of trust indicates that FCB is not important as a means to increase individual involvement in university decision making, but as a means to represent the interests of powerless faculty members.

The importance of trust as a predictor of FCB support has two further implications. Practically, attempts by practitioners, either proponents or opponents of FCB, should focus their arguments on the expected outcomes of decision-making for the faculty and not on governance and increased participation in the decision-making process. On a theoretical level, when considered together with the importance of dissatisfaction with salary it suggests that future research should focus on university decision making as a political process that distributes scarce resources among its members. Contrary to past descriptions of faculty members as unique and especially concerned with participation in decision making, their interest in this distributive process largely explains their support for FCB.

The pattern influencing support for FCB derived from this study must be validated in other settings as well. The results of this study within the College of Human Ecology indicate that there may be certain units, which deviate from this overall pattern.

Table 1. Comparison of Respondents with Total Population on College Affiliation, Rank, and Organizational Unit.

Variables	Population		Respondents*		Respondents as percentage of population
	<u>N</u>	%	<u>N</u>	%	
<u>College Affiliation</u> ^t					
College of Agriculture and Life Sciences [‡]	397	28.5	248	31.8	62.5
College of Architecture and Planning	55	3.9	22	2.8	40.0
College of Arts & Sciences	459	32.9	210	27.0	45.8
Graduate School of Business and Public Administration	32	2.3	17	2.2	53.1
College of Engineering	183	13.1	99	12.7	54.1
School of Hotel Administration	21	1.5	11	1.4	52.4
School of Human Ecology [‡]	90	6.5	51	6.5	56.7
School of Industrial and Labor Relations	47	3.4	30	3.9	63.8
Graduate School of Nutrition	10	0.1	4	0.5	40.0
Law School	24	1.7	8	1.0	33.3
Veterinary College [‡]	<u>76</u>	<u>5.5</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>6.5</u>	<u>64.5</u>
TOTAL	1394	100.0	749*	100.0	
<u>Rank</u> ^{§§}					
Professors	670	48.1	364	47.6	54.3
Associate Professors	366	26.3	205	26.8	56.0
Assistant Professors	<u>358</u>	<u>25.7</u>	<u>196</u>	25.6	54.7
<u>Organizational Unit</u> ^{II}	1394		765*		
Statutory	610	43.7	378	50.5	62.0
Endowed	<u>684</u>	<u>56.2</u>	<u>371</u>	<u>49.5</u>	48.5
TOTAL	1394	100.0	749*	100.0	

* Less than 778 because of missing information.

^t $\chi^2 = 17.9, .10 < p < .05$

[‡] Statutory units at Cornell University administered under contract with the State of New York

[§] $\chi^2 = .12$ n.s.

^{II} $\chi^2 = 10.6, p = .005$

Table 2. Questionnaire Items on Support for FCB, Categories for Positive Response, and Percentage of Positive Response to Items.

Questionnaire items	Cutting point for positive response	Positive response percentage
1. Do you think it would ever be appropriate for college professors to go on strike?	Yes	44
2. Is collective bargaining consistent with the professional standing of college professors?	Yes	43
3. Would collective bargaining raise or lower the professional status of Cornell University professors?	Raise or neither	35
4. Would collective bargaining have a positive or negative effect on higher education at Cornell University?	Positive or no effect	31
5. Are you in favor, or opposed to, collective bargaining for Cornell University faculty?	Strongly or moderately in favor	31
6. If a referendum were held to ascertain if faculty were interested in collective bargaining, would you vote?	For	28

Table 3. Distribution of Respondents by Age and Sex

Variable	
<u>Age</u> [*]	Percentage
25-29	5.1
30-34	16.9
35-39	12.6
40-44	15.1
45-49	13.4
50-54	11.9
55-59	9.6
60-64	6.4
65 or over	1.2
<u>Sex</u> ^t	
Male	90.0
Female	8.3

* Missing data 7.7%

^t Missing data 1.6%

Table 4. Percentage of Positive Response to Questionnaire Items by
Predictor Variables

Predictor variables	Questionnaire items*					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
<u>Age</u>						
< 45 years	48	49	39	38	38	34
≥ 45 years	36	36	30	26	23	21
<u>Sex</u>						
Male	46	44	35	32	31	28
Female	34	42	37	39	37	31
<u>Liberalism</u>						
More	56	52	39	35	35	32
Less	36	37	33	30	29	27
<u>Salary</u>						
< \$20,000	55	54	45	42	45	39
≥ \$20,000	38	37	29	26	23	22
<u>Academic Rank</u>						
Professor	39	37	29	24	23	21
Associate Professor	47	44	35	32	31	29
Assistant Professor	53	56	48	48	50	44
<u>Administrative Position</u>						
No	44	46	38	35	35	30
Yes	40	32	26	23	20	21
<u>Dissatisfaction with Salary</u>						
High	58	60	50	50	52	46
Low	36	32	26	20	18	17
<u>Participation in Decision Making</u>						
Low	48	50	42	42	41	39
High	41	37	28	23	22	18
<u>Trust in Decision-Making Process</u>						
Low	60	59	48	49	48	46
High	34	32	26	21	20	16

* See Table 2 for wording of items.

Table 5. Correlation Matrix for Questionnaire Items, Dependent Variables,
and Predictor Variables ($N = 578$).

Item	Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1.	Support for FCB									
2.	Age	.21***								
3.	Sex (male = 0, female = 1)	.01	-.04							
4.	Political liberalism	.15***	.11**	-.03						
5.	Low salary and rank	.28***	.68***	.12**	-.12*					
6.	Lack of administrative position	.11**	.10**	.02	.02	.28***				
7.	Dissatisfac- tion with salary	.41***	.24***	-.05	.01	.38***	.15***			
8.	Low partici- pation in decision- making process	.21***	.23***	.04	.01	.36***	.29***	.29***		
9.	Low trust in decision-making process	.39***	.22***	.01	.09*	.29***	.16***	.40***	.33***	

*** $p \leq .001$

** $p \leq .01$

* $p \leq .05$

Table 6. Partial Correlations Between Support for FCB and Predictor Variables, Controlling for Other Predictors in the Entire Sample and in Four Major University Units

	Entire sample (<u>N</u> = 578)	College of Arts and Sciences (<u>N</u> = 200)	College of Engineering (<u>N</u> = 90)	College of Agriculture & Life Sciences (<u>N</u> = 239)	College of Human Ecology (<u>N</u> = 42)
Age	.02	.10	.06	-.05	.24
Sex (male = 0, female = 1)	.02	.13	.09	.09	-.11
Political liberalism	.14***	.07	.24*	.10	.35*
Low salary and rank	.04	.08	.09	.03	.11
Lack of administrative position	.01	-.03	-.22*	.01	-.08
Dissatisfaction with salary	.27***	.26***	.23*	.32***	-.02
Low participation in the decision-making process	.02	.05	-.01	.06	-.05
Low trust in the decision-making process	.23***	.17*	.23*	.20**	.23

*** $p \leq .001$

** $p \leq .01$

* $p \leq .05$

Table 7. Partial Correlations Between Antecedent Variables and Useful Predictors of Support for FCB, Controlling for Antecedent Variables ($N = 578$)

Antecedent variables	Predictors of support for FCB	
	Dissatisfaction with salary	Low Trust in decision-making process
Age	-.04	.04
Sex (male = 0, female = 1)	-.11**	-.02
Political liberalism	-.06	.06
Salary and rank	.31***	.16***
Lacking administrative position	.04	.10*

*** $p \leq .001$

** $p \leq .01$

* $p \leq .05$

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
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