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TWO CASE STUDIES*

James W. Driscoll**
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
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Why the employees in an organization want to form a union is a central question in labor relations. The recent growth of faculty unionism in higher education provides academics the opportunity to address that question in a spirit of self-inquiry. First, however, a qualification is in order. Most professional associations serving the faculty as unions do not describe themselves as unions, even though they engage in collective bargaining. Garbarino, for example, identified 400 academic institutions with collective bargaining agreements.¹ Previous research also identifies some characteristics of these institutions with such faculty unions, e.g. public control, favorable state legislation, and inclusion in a centrally administered system of several related units. Nonetheless, a psychological question remains: why do academics within any given institution want a union? This article assesses the usefulness of several current explanations of individual interest in faculty unionism: (1) organizational position, (2) personal background, (3) satisfaction with salary, (4) participation in decision making, and (5) trust in decision making.

Explanations of Individual Desire for a Faculty Union

In an early study of faculty in higher education across the nation, Ladd and Lipset emphasize two predictors of union interest: political liberalism and the status or prestige of the individual's institution.² According to a later study of the University of Vermont by Nixon, low status individuals within the institution hold more militant attitudes, where status includes

organizational rank, salary, publication record, and age.³ Kemerer and Baldridge provide the most extensive list of explanations of individual interest in faculty unions based on their national survey: low salary, high teaching load, low education, low rank, youth, humanities or social science discipline, liberal ideology, dissatisfaction with various aspects of the institution including salary levels and low trust in the administration.⁴ These explanations, then, fall into three categories: status or position with the institution, personal background of the individual, and individual attitudes towards the organization.

Additional explanations may also be derived from the relationship of collective bargaining to organizational decision making. Bargaining determines the terms of individual employment by formal, indirect representation of individuals in organizational decision making, usually under regulation by the state or federal government. Thus, an individual's view of the current decision-making process in his or her academic setting might make bargaining seem more or less attractive.

Substantial research in organizational psychology attempts to define and predict the effects of organizational decision making on individual employees.⁵ Most of that research focuses on different levels of personal participation in decision making and their effects on individual satisfaction and the quality of organizational decisions. Differential personal participation in decision making, for reasons described below, may also help explain an employee's desire to form a labor union. Participation, however, only describes an individual's input to decision making. The outcomes of decisions also affect individuals. Thus, an individual's description of current decision

making within the organization includes at least two aspects: a perception of personal participation and an assessment or trust in the likely consequences of decisions. The main purpose of this research is to explore the usefulness of both views of organizational decision making as explanations of interest in forming a faculty union.

First, individuals vary in their level of participation in decision making. Some academics can participate actively in the discussions leading to important decisions, while others must rely on conversations with influential colleagues or, in the extreme, remain completely isolated from these discussions. Lower levels of participation in decision making may provide little satisfaction for personal needs for control over the work environment. Indeed, Strauss has argued that college professors desire high participation more than the average worker.⁶ Low levels of participation may also violate professional expectations of faculty influence in institutions of higher education. Allutto and Belasco, for example, confirm the importance of meeting expectations of participation among teachers in earlier grades of education.⁷ By either argument, then, low personal participation in decision making is expected to be related to a greater desire for bargaining (Hypothesis 1).

Since organizational decisions vary in quality and produce different consequences for each academic, a second aspect of organizational decision making for individuals is the result of decisions. Individuals, therefore, may view decision making ranging from trust to suspicion or distrust. Gamson defines trust in any decision-making situation as the expectation that the process will result in decisions favoring or acceptable to the individual's interests.⁸ According to Gamson, level of trust determines the means of

influence adopted by different individuals and groups to change a decision-making system. High trust suggests persuading the authorities; neutrality suggests providing positive inducements to sway decision makers; low trust suggests making use of sanctions and the threat of penalties. We assume that collective bargaining implies to individual academics a rhetoric of demands and the use of threat because of its association, in both private industry and the public sector, with possible work stoppage. It is expected, therefore, that professors who have lower trust in current organization decision making will desire bargaining more (Hypothesis 2). Kemerer and Baldrige, for example, report that low trust in the administration predicts interest in bargaining, but they do not isolate trust from other explanations of union interest.⁹

If an individual's view of the current decision making process helps explain a desire for unionism as hypothesized, the next step is identifying decision issues typically associated with the desire for unionism. Perhaps the desire for change focuses on a subset of issues for decision, such as salary administration or personnel policies; alternatively, the faculty may seek reform of the whole governance system. Garbarino suggests three areas of concern associated with faculty unionism: governance, job security, and salary.¹⁰ A recent study by Herman and Skinner as well as a national survey of university presidents and local faculty heads reported by Kemerer and Baldrige both point to the importance of salary issues.¹² For this study, we include a range of issues concerned with governance, the grievance procedure and personnel practices (including retention of academic personnel and salary administration).

The Studies

To explore these explanations of desire for faculty unionism and associated decision issues, the results of separate questionnaire surveys of academics in two upstate New York institutions are used here. The questionnaires include the extent of their individual desire for a faculty union and most explanations of such an interest listed by Kemerer and Baldrige. The first survey, in April, 1974, covers all the full-time faculty at Cornell University. Cornell is a large, research-oriented university including colleges under both private and New York State control. Despite its research orientation, Cornell is a complex, partly-public institution in a state with favorable legislation for public-employee unions. Thus, Cornell has many of the characteristics associated with union support. As of this writing, however, (in September, 1976) no union or professional association has attempted an organizing drive.

The second survey covers the full-time faculty at Ithaca College (IC), a small, private college primarily offering undergraduate courses in the liberal arts. Cornell and IC are located in the same upstate city, Ithaca, NY. The survey, in May 1975, came shortly after a collective bargaining representation election among the faculty supervised by the National Labor Relations Board. The faculty at IC, with an 84% turnout, rejected collective bargaining: 62% voted for no representation, 24% for the American Association of University Professors (A.A.U.P) and 15% for another faculty association that had obtained a place on the ballot after a faculty petition for an election on representation by the A.A.U.P.

The survey respondents at both institutions -- 56% (778) at Cornell and 39% (109) at IC -- are representative of the entire faculties in terms of academic rank and sex. A significantly larger proportion of respondents appears from the state - supported colleges at Cornell than from the private colleges. The same pattern of results appears in both public and private colleges, however.

Desire for unionism is measured by six questions in both institutions; the wording is identical except for the institution's name. Each individual's score is the number of questions answered reflecting a positive attitude towards unionism (Table 1). This dependent variable deserves attention for both conceptual and technical reasons.

First, the measure answers one criticism of the use of attitude surveys on faculty unionism. These six questions range from support for bargaining in general, e.g. is it "ever appropriate for college professors to go on strike," to support for bargaining at the two specific institutions, e.g. "would you vote for or against collective bargaining" at Cornell (or Ithaca College)? (Table 1). Garbarino emphasizes the importance of identifying interest in unionism at the individual's institution, in addition to the more general legitimacy of strikes or collective bargaining for academics.¹² Table 1 shows the importance of this distinction. While 45% of our Cornell respondents can envisage circumstances where strikes are appropriate, only 29% would vote for bargaining at Cornell. Moreover, in the Cornell study these six items form a Guttman scale (Coefficient of scalability = .70). The pattern in the Guttman scale is consistent with Garbarino's observation. Individuals who favor bargaining at their own institution also endorse the items

on the general acceptability of bargaining. Rarely do individuals endorse the specific items and reject the general principle. While the six items do not produce so elegant a scale at IC, the same pattern of higher acceptance of general statements also appears (Table 1). The difference in wording among the six questions may well clarify the paradox of attitude surveys cited by Garbarino, namely that bargaining exists in only a minority of institutions of higher education while a majority of individuals routinely endorse collective bargaining as a general principle. While other surveys have relied on general questions about the acceptability of collective bargaining, this study focuses on a desire for bargaining at these specific institutions.

Second, these six questions provide a reasonable measure of desire for unionism on psychometric grounds of internal consistency and validity. Besides the Guttman characteristics at Cornell, the items have high intercorrelations, ($r \geq .71$), in addition to this evidence of consistency, the six items also demonstrate concurrent validity in the Ithaca College survey where respondents describe their vote in the N.L.R.B. election. The six-item scale used in both these studies is strongly correlated ($r = .76$, $p < .001$) with the reported act of voting for either of the two potential bargaining agents in the IC election. At both Cornell and Ithaca the scores on this measure of desire for bargaining range from 0 to 6; the average score at Ithaca (2.93) is significantly greater than the average at Cornell (2.17) ($t = 2.97$, $p < .005$).

The two aspects of the individuals' views of organization decision making hypothesized to affect desire for bargaining -- personal participation and trust--are also measured by indices composed of several questions. First, the measure of personal participation includes several personnel and financial

decisions (e.g. hiring new faculty, promoting faculty, appointing department heads, determining salary increases, and allocating the institutional budget). For each decision, individuals select one of five descriptions of their participation, ranging from no input, through prior consultation with the decision maker, to a group decision by vote or consensus. Personal participation is the average description, where no input is assigned a value of "1" and group decision is "5". The nine decisions in the Cornell questionnaire have a weak median intercorrelation ($r = .16$, $p < .001$). The Ithaca College questionnaire only includes six of these questions and their median intercorrelation is somewhat stronger ($r = .37$, $p < .001$). Thus, in both institutions, personal participation varies between decisions. No single decision, however, is very strongly associated with desire for bargaining; the strongest correlation is $.17$ at Cornell ($p = .001$) and at $r = .27$ ($p = .01$) at Ithaca College. Although the relationship is only moderate, the decision where low personal participation is most strongly related to a desire for bargaining is the same at both institutions, namely allocation of the institutional budget. In order to test the hypothesized overall effect of personal participation at both institutions, the decisions are combined into a single measure rather than analyzed separately.

Next, trust in the decision-making process is measured by summing Likert-type questions. These items ask how frequently the individual academic can trust both the decision maker and decision procedures at each of three hierarchical levels to make decisions the individual considers appropriate. The hierarchical levels are department, college and university at Cornell and department, school, and college at IC. As with the participation measure, however, the number of questions is reduced between the Cornell and Ithaca

College surveys. The three questions referring to decision procedures in addition to decision makers appear only in the Cornell index. The median correlation among these questions is higher than for the participation questions at both Cornell ($r = .46$, $p < .001$) and Ithaca College ($r = .41$, $p < .001$). Lower trust in all three levels -- department to university -- is associated about equally with desire for bargaining at Cornell; the correlations range from .28 to .34. At Ithaca College, lower trust in the President of the institution has the strongest correlation ($r = .38$, $p < .001$), while lower trust in the department head is the weakest ($r = .14$, $p = .09$). In order to test the second hypothesis, these questions are summed into a single measure of trust in organizational decision making.

The questionnaires also include other explanations of desire for bargaining corresponding to the three categories of explanations from previous research: organizational position, personal characteristics, and organizational attitudes. First, as regards position in the organization, the organizational status of each academic is measured at Cornell by an index built by assigning numerical values to salary level, holding an administrative position, and academic rank. Administrative positions include department heads up to associate deans at Cornell, but only department heads at Ithaca College. These values are standardized to give each question equal weight and then summed. An index is used because salary level and rank are strongly correlated. At Ithaca College the same measure of organizational status is used, but organizational status is necessarily a less powerful explanation of support for bargaining at IC than at Cornell because academics at higher ranks show more support for bargaining at Ithaca College. Besides organizational status, an individual's academic discipline in the humanities or social sciences as opposed to biological or physical sciences is also included

as a position-related explanation of desire for bargaining.

Next, two characteristics of the academic's personal background are included as potential explanations of desire for unionism. Political liberalism is measured by identifying the individuals' preference in the 1976 Presidential election. Each of thirteen viable candidates as of 1974 and 1975 are assigned a numerical value from conservative to liberal based on the average ranking these candidates received in subsequent interviews with a randomly selected sample of the Cornell faculty. (Needless to say these lists of candidates quickly became outdated.) Those interviewees show moderate agreement on their rankings (Kendall's coefficient of concordance = .46, $p < .01$). In addition, the survey respondents also indicate their sex and age on the questionnaire. Because of its high correlation with rank and salary, age is not included in the data analysis, leaving sex and liberalism as personal factors.

Finally, each individual's organizational attitudes are also assessed in one critical area, dissatisfaction with current salary level. Besides these potential explanations of desire for bargaining, the questionnaires also examine faculty interest in a range of institutional decision issues. On a list of issues (Table 5), each respondent checked those issues where he or she felt some form of collective action by faculty (not necessarily unionism) is needed. Thus the surveys can also identify those specific decision issues where a felt need for collective action is most closely related to a desire for bargaining.

Results

An academic's view of organizational decision making does help explain why they would want a union in an institution of higher education. Table

2 presents the correlations between desire for faculty bargaining and two aspects of organizational decision making from the individual's perspective--personal participation and trust. At both institutions, individuals who distrust the existing process of organizational decision making more, show significantly higher levels of interest in unionism than their more trusting colleagues. At Cornell, lower levels of personal participation in decisions are also associated with a greater desire for unionism. At both institutions, however, distrust is significantly more strongly associated with such desire than are low levels of personal participation (At Cornell $p < .001$, at IC $p < .006$).¹³

The relative importance of distrust in organizational decision making as an explanation of union interest also appears in Table 3. There, all the potential explanations of support for bargaining are included in a multiple regression analysis to determine the usefulness of each explanation--organizational status, academic discipline, sex, liberalism, and economic dissatisfaction. Distrust is a useful predictor of desire for bargaining at both institutions, even when the effects of all other explanations are statistically controlled. In contrast, the absence of a significant regression coefficient for personal participation in Table 3 shows that personal participation in decision making adds nothing to the other explanations of interest in bargaining. Therefore, the first hypothesis on the effects of personal participation on interest in unionism is not supported, while the second hypothesis on the role of trust is strongly supported.

Table 3 also provides the information from both surveys required to assess the usefulness of various other explanations of individual interest

in unionism developed in previous research. At Cornell, salary dissatisfaction and distrust in organizational decision making emerge as the best predictors in the multiple regression analysis. Besides their usefulness as the strongest explanations as indicated by the significance levels in Table 3, these two explanations also show the strongest simple correlation with desire for bargaining (Table 2). Political liberalism appears next in terms of usefulness as an explanation. Finally, a discipline of humanities or social sciences also adds significantly to the explanation of interest in unionism among the faculty. At Ithaca College, distrust and salary dissatisfaction are again most strongly correlated with a desire for bargaining (Table 2). In the more stringent multiple regression analysis (Table 3), however, of these two attitudinal explanations only distrust adds usefully to the prediction of desire for unionism. In addition, the academic disciplines of the humanities and social sciences also emerge as a more useful explanation at Ithaca College than at Cornell.

In summary, these results show some support for each of the three categories of explanations advanced in the earlier review of the literature. Organizational status and academic discipline, both aspects of the individual's position within the organization help explain a desire for unionism. Political liberalism, probably a reflection of the individual's personal background outside the institution, is independently associated with interest in unionism only at Cornell. Finally and most importantly, individual attitudes towards the organization also emerge in these studies as useful explanations of a desire for unionism. Salary dissatisfaction and distrust in decision making are most useful at Cornell and distrust again emerges at Ithaca College. Of the two aspects of the individual's view of the decision-

making process only this attitude of distrust and not low levels of perceived personal participation predict a desire for a faculty union.

From a psychological perspective, individual attitudes towards the organization, such as salary dissatisfaction and distrust, result from a combination of current organizational position and personal characteristics. For example, salary dissatisfaction reflects both current and desired salary levels. Similarly, distrust in decision making reflects not any particular policies or decision practices, but the individual's personal assessment of decision-making process.

This psychological process of assessment suggests that differences in organizational position or personal background may influence the desire for unionism either directly or indirectly through organizational attitudes. When the significant predictors from Table 3 are analyzed by multiple regression, both direct and indirect effects appear (Table 4). At Cornell, low organizational status and political liberalism directly predict a desire for unionism beyond the influence of organizational attitudes. In addition, low organizational status and an academic discipline in the humanities or social sciences also have indirect effects. Status differences predict the organizational attitudes of salary dissatisfaction; differences in both status and academic discipline predict distrust in decision making. These attitudinal differences in turn are related to a desire for a union. At Ithaca College, there are no indirect effects; academic discipline and distrust in decision making predict an interest in unionism directly.

Besides identifying the individual's distrust in organizational decision making as an important explanation of desire for unionism, these surveys also

explore the specific decision issues associated with such interest listed in Table 5. The issues of high faculty discontent vary between the two institutions. At Cornell, the largest proportion of respondents report a felt need for some collective action on the issue of salary administration (42%). At Ithaca College, ten issues registered at least that same level of expressed discontent. This widespread dissatisfaction no doubt stimulated the faculty's request for a referendum on the issue of representation by a collective bargaining agent, the A.A.U.P. The single issue most frequently cited as needing change at Ithaca College, however, is not salary administration, but the decision making practices of the administration, a more generalized complaint. Despite this difference in salient issues at the two institutions, desire for bargaining does show a consistent pattern in both schools. Salary administration is the issue most strongly associated with desire for unionism among both faculties (Table 5). Salary administration is a significantly better predictor of interest in unionism than is a general item referring to the decision making practices of the administration (Table 5).

Discussion

These studies highlight the importance of an individual's view of the current process of organizational decision making as a reason to favor the introduction of faculty unionism in an institution of higher education. Collective bargaining constitutes one system of individual participation in organizational decision making, namely indirect representation. Those people who experience little direct personal participation in current decision making were hypothesized to desire collective bargaining in order to change the existing decision system. Only distrust in the current

decision making system, however, rather than low levels of personal participation, emerges as a useful predictor of support for bargaining. People with more trust in the existing decision process favor bargaining less regardless of their personal participation in decisions. This finding substantiates and clarifies the high correlation between trust in the administration and opposition to bargaining reported in their national sample by Kemerer and Baldrige.¹⁴ Distrust is associated with a desire for bargaining even when level of participation in decision making and a range of position-related and personal explanations are controlled statistically.

Since low personal participation has little direct influence on bargaining attitudes, administrative attempts to defuse faculty support for unionism by opening decision processes to individual participation may have little value. In theory, trust refers specifically to anticipated satisfaction with the results of organizational decision making rather than to involvement in the decision process.¹⁵ Distrust as an explanation of support for bargaining therefore suggests a political analysis of organizational policies. Until institutions change objectionable policies to favor (or at least become acceptable to) the individual interests of academics, the desire for a union by some faculty members will endure. It should be noted, however, that while personal participation has little importance across the entire faculty, at least for this range of decisions, past research on its other effects suggests that some individuals may respond more favorably to increased participation.¹⁶

The desire for unions at these two institutions also reflects the drive for economic self-improvement as an explanation of unionism. Dissatisfaction with salary is the most useful explanation for interest in bargaining at

Cornell; it correlates significantly with such interest at both Cornell and Ithaca College. Because academics are often alleged to attach more value to noneconomic rewards from their work (such as freedom or a sense of accomplishment) compared to most other workers, these studies provide a stringent test of the economic explanation for employees' turning to unionism. These results strongly support the popular and theoretical importance attached to the economic explanations of individual interest in unions. Relatedly, a felt need for some form of collective action on salary administration more than on any other decision issue predicts interest in bargaining at both schools.

The two institutions in the present study, while not necessarily representative of all higher education, sound a warning both for private, four-year colleges like Ithaca College and for wealthy, research institutions like Cornell. Ladd and Lipset's early study might suggest that faculty members will resist bargaining indefinitely in some high-status sectors of higher education.¹⁷ In the present studies, desire for bargaining emerges as a selective interest in organizational change focussed on economic issues and reflecting distrust in the administration. In a continuing financial squeeze, a growing number of the individuals in any institution may turn to collective bargaining simply to improve their economic positions. In this respect, a study of individual attitudes leads us to expect a wider spread to faculty unionism.

The range of potential explanations for individuals turning to unionism in these institutions suggest a general two-stage causal process to explain individual interest in unionism.¹⁸ In the first place, certain organizational

positions condition employees to favor unionism. As Nixon found at Vermont, holding lower organizational status is associated with a desire for bargaining. The effect of organizational position, however, may vary between institutions. For example, at Ithaca College, higher academic rank predicts support for bargaining, perhaps as a defensive strategy to preserve their advantages. Like organizational positions, personal individual characteristics also condition desire for unionism. Faculty with liberal political opinions show more interest.

In a second stage, beyond the direct effects of organizational position or personal background, these factors may act indirectly on desire for bargaining through their effect on mediating organizational attitudes such as dissatisfaction with salary or distrust in the administration. At Cornell, for example, low organizational status has a strong indirect influence on the desire for a union through its effect on both distrust in decision making and dissatisfaction with salary. These mediating organizational attitudes logically reflect a process of comparison: dissatisfaction with salary assesses current salary against some standard; distrust indicates that organizational decisions fail to satisfy particular personal interests. An adequate understanding of the individual's desire for a union must move beyond cataloging predictors of interest in bargaining to a better understanding of these dynamic comparisons.

Relative to other members of the American work force, we probably have more information on why academics want faculty unions in higher education. The present surveys suggests that some individuals would bring a faculty union

on campus for similar reasons in the two institutions under investigation. In both cases dissatisfaction with salary and distrust in organizational decision making play central roles in explaining the desire for unionism.

FOOTNOTES

1. Garbarino, Joseph W., "Faculty union activity in higher education -1975," Industrial Relations, Volume 15, Number 1 (February, 1976) page 119. Garbarino and Kemerer and Baldrige describe the pattern of interest in faculty collective bargaining both among institutions and among individuals within a given institution. The purpose of this report is to extend and clarify the latter pattern. Joseph W. Garbarino, in association with Bill Aussieker, Faculty Bargaining, Change and Conflict (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1975); Frank R. Kemerer and J. Victor Baldrige, Unions on Campus (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975).
2. Ladd, Everett Carll, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset, Professors, Unions, and American Higher Education (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Domestic Affairs Study 16, August, 1973).
3. Howard L. Nixon, II, "Faculty support of university authority," Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 20, Number 1 (March, 1975), pp. 114-123.
4. Kemerer and Baldrige provide the most complete listing of factors associated with an individual academic's desire for unionism. Other studies of single institutions identified a subset of predictors consistent with this listing. To date, no study has used multivariate analysis to assess simultaneously a number of the alternative, but clearly interrelated factors. Kemerer and Baldrige, Unions on Campus; Peter Feuille and James Blandin, "Faculty job satisfaction and bargaining sentiments: a case study," Academy of Management Journal, Volume 14, Number 4 (December, 1974) pp. 678-692; Victor E. Flango, "Faculty attitudes and the election of a bargaining agent in the Pennsylvania State College System -I," Journal of Collective Negotiation in the Public Sector, Volume 4,

Number 2, 1975, pp. 157-174; Jan P. Muczyk, Richard T. Hise and Martin J. Gannon, "Faculty attitudes and the election of a bargaining agent in the Pennsylvania State College System-II," Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector, Volume 4, Number 2, 1975, pp. 175-189; Joel Seidman, Alfred G. Edge, and Lane Kelley, "Attitudes of Hawaiian higher education faculty towards unionism and collective bargaining," Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector, Volume 3, Number 2 (Spring, 1974), pp. 91-119.

5. George Strauss has analyzed the effect of individual participation in organizational decision making and alternative explanations of those effects. Stogdill recently summarized the research on these effects and Ritchie has described the factors moderating the effects of participation. As an initial explanation of desire for collective bargaining, this research investigates only the direct and universal effects of participation. George Strauss, "Some notes on power equalization," pp. 39-84, in Harold J. Leavitt (ed.) The Social Science of Organization (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Ralph M. Stogdill, Handbook of Leadership: A Survey of Theory and Research (New York: Free Press, 1974); J. B. Ritchie, "Supervision." In G. Strauss, R.E. Miles, C.C. Snow and A. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Organizational Behavior: Research and Issues (Madison, Wisconsin: Industrial Relations Research Association, 1974).
6. Strauss, "Some notes on power equalization."
7. J. Alutto and J. Belasco, "A typology for participation in organizational decision making," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 17 (1972), pp. 117-125.
8. William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey, 1968).

9. Kemerer and Baldrige, Unions on Campus.
10. Garbarino, Faculty Bargaining: Change and Conflict.
11. E.E. Herman, and G.S. Skinner, "Faculty representation: the vote at Cinnicinati," Monthly Labor Review Volume 9, Number 3 (March, 1976), pp 44-48; Kemerer and Baldrige, Unions on Campus.
12. Garbarino, Faculty Bargaining: Change and Conflict, page 53.
Ladd and Lipset, for example report the percentages who disagree with the following question, "Collective bargaining by faculty members has no place in a college or university." Ladd and Lipset, page 27.
13. The significance test for the difference among two correlations, both involving a common variable is given by Darlington. Richard B. Darlington, Radicals and Squares and other Statistical Procedures for Behavioral Sciences (Ithaca, N.Y.: Logan Hill, 1974), page 507.
14. Kemerer and Baldrige, Unions on Campus.
15. Although Gamson notes trust may vary with efficacy or perceived ability to influence decisions, his analysis refers to beliefs about the outputs of a political system. Gamson, Power and Discontent.
16. Ritchie recently summarized the conditions where participation in decision making by subordinates in organizations was more likely to have positive effects, when: 1) they had relevant skills and information; 2) they perceived that their involvement would affect outcomes; 3) they were motivated to participate and thereby achieve outcomes; 4) they felt that participation was legitimate; 5) the status difference or expertise difference between participants was low; 6) the trust and support exhibited by their supervisor was high. Ritchie, "Supervision."

17. Ladd and Lipset, Professors, Unions and American Higher Education.
18. Hellriegel, French, and Peterson have developed a similar model of attitudes towards collective negotiations among secondary school teachers. They expect that satisfaction as an organizational attitude mediates the effect of the institutional and environmental context on teachers' attitudes. As an example, they report that dissatisfaction with salary is the best predictor, in terms of Pearson correlations, of support for teachers strikes. Don Hellriegel, Wendall French, and Richard Peterson, "Collective negotiations and teachers: a behavioral analysis," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Volume 23, Number 3 (1970) pp. 380-396.

Table 1: Desire for Bargaining: Percentages Favoring Faculty Bargaining on Questionnaire Items a,b,c,

Questionnaire Items

1. Do you think it would ever be appropriate for college professors to go on strike?	Cornell Ithaca	Yes $\frac{45}{55}$	No $\frac{45}{34}$	Don't Know $\frac{10}{11}$			
2. Is collective bargaining consistent with the professional standing of college professors?	Cornell Ithaca	Yes $\frac{44}{56}$	No $\frac{48}{36}$	Don't Know $\frac{9}{8}$			
3. Would collective bargaining raise or lower the professional status of Cornell/Ithaca College professors?	Cornell Ithaca	Raise $\frac{8}{22}$	Neither $\frac{48}{34}$	Lower $\frac{28}{33}$	Don't Know $\frac{17}{11}$		
4. Would collective bargaining have a positive or negative effect on higher education at Cornell/Ithaca College?	Cornell Ithaca	Positive $\frac{14}{28}$	No Effect at All $\frac{19}{10}$	Negative $\frac{51}{44}$	No Opinion $\frac{16}{17}$		
5. Are you in favor, or opposed to, collective bargaining for Cornell/Ithaca College faculty?	Cornell Ithaca	Strongly in Favor $\frac{12}{26}$	Moderately in Favor $\frac{20}{17}$	Uncertain $\frac{14}{9}$	Moderately Opposed $\frac{24}{20}$	Strongly Opposed $\frac{28}{24}$	No Opinion $\frac{2}{0}$
6. If a referendum were held to ascertain if faculty were interested in collective bargaining, would you vote?	Cornell Ithaca	For Collective Bargaining $\frac{29}{43}$	Against Collective Bargaining $\frac{49}{48}$	Undecided $\frac{22}{9}$			

a. Questions are ordered here according to the percentage responding favorably at Cornell. In the questionnaires, the order of question was 2,1,3,4,5,6.

b. Positive responses were grouped on analytical grounds.

c. Percentages refer to those respondents answering each question. Due to incomplete questionnaires, the number of responses varies from 746 to 766 at Cornell and from 107 to 109 at Ithaca.

TABLE 2

Correlations among Predictors of Desire for Bargaining:
Cornell University ($N \geq 653$) and, in parentheses,
Ithaca College ($N \geq 92$)

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.
1. Desire for Bargaining							
2. Organizational status (low)	.23 ^{**} (.19)						
3. Academic discipline (humanities or social sciences)	.15 ^{**} (.30 ^{**})	.10 ^{**} (-.08)					
4. Sex (female)	-.01 (.10)	.10 ^{**} (.28 ^{**})	.16 ^{**} (-.14)				
5. Political liberalism	.16 ^{**} (.02)	.11 ^{**} (.05)	.12 ^{**} (.18)	-.03 (-.18)			
6. Personal participation in decision making (low)	.22 ^{**} (.01)	.32 ^{**} (.09)	-.08 (-.14)	.03 (.04)	-.02 (-.29) [*]		
7. Trust in decision making (low)	.41 ^{**} (.38 ^{**})	.25 ^{**} (.03)	.11 ^{**} (-.02)	.05 (.13)	.08 [*] (-.04)	.30 ^{**} (.27 [*])	
8. Dissatisfaction with salary	.43 ^{**} (.36 ^{**})	.30 ^{**} (.17)	.09 [*] (.09)	.01 (-.05)	.00 (.04)	.27 ^{**} (.11)	.40 ^{**} (.47 ^{**})

* Indicates significance at $p \leq .05$.

** Indicates significance at $p \leq .01$.

Table 3: Multiple Regression Weights for Prediction of Desire for Bargaining.

	<u>Cornell</u> (N=610) ^a	<u>Ithaca College</u> (N=89) ^b
1. Organizational status (low)	.07	.04
2. Academic discipline (humanities or social sciences)	.07 [*]	.29 ^{**}
3. Sex (female)	.00	.09
4. Political liberalism	.13 ^{**}	-.02
5. Personal participation in decision making (low)	.04	-.07
6. Trust in decision making (low)	.25 ^{**}	.26 [*]
7. Dissatisfaction with salary	.28 ^{**}	.20

* Indicates significance at $p \leq .05$.

** Indicates significance at $p \leq .001$.

a. The multiple correlation at Cornell is .53 ($p < .001$).

b. The multiple correlation at Ithaca College is .51 ($p < .001$).

Table 4: Simplified Model of Significant Predictors
of Desire for Bargaining

	<u>Cornell University</u>	<u>Ithaca College</u>
Direct effects	Low organizational status Political liberalism	Academic dis- cipline (Human- ities or Social Sciences)
Organizational attitudes	Distrust in decision making Dissatisfaction with salary	Distrust in decision making
Indirect effects mediated by or- ganization attitudes	Low organizational status Academic discipline (Humanities or Social Sciences)	

Table 5: Correlations Between Perceived Need for Action
on Specific Decision Issues and Desire for Bargaining^a

On what issues, if any, do you believe that some form of collective action by the Cornell/Ithaca College faculty is needed?

	Cornell University (N = 716)	Ithaca College (N = 109)
<u>Personnel Practices</u>		
Salary administration	.68 ^{****,***}	.52 ^{**,*}
Fringe benefit policies	.49	.39
Sabbatical and other leave policies	.37	.16
Personnel policies and policies of retention, promotion, etc.	.41	.28
Academic working conditions, e.g. course loads, class size, etc.	.34	.33
Related working conditions office and secretarial allotment, etc.,	.42	.38
<u>Grievance Procedures</u>		
Grievance procedures	.35	.45
Due process	.27	.34
<u>Governance Practices</u>		
Budget development	.33	.35
Type of personnel in administrative positions	.18	.38
Number of faculty in decision making procedures	.31	.41
University governance procedures	.25 ^{****}	.32 ^{**}
Decision-making practices of the administration	.28 ^{***}	.34 [*]

^{****}Z² = 37.68, p < .01; Hotteling-Williams test for difference between correlations

^{***}Z² = 22.18, p < .01; Hotteling-Williams test for difference between correlations



^{**}Z² = 5.64, p = .04; Hotteling-Williams test for difference between correlations

^{*}Z² = 3.37, p = .07; Hotteling-Williams test for difference between correlations

(a) These correlations are based on respondents providing complete information on these questions.

BASEMENT

Date Due

OCT 20 '78	JAN 13 1986
MAR 20 '79	MAR 04 '87
	DEC 30 1991
NOV 14 '80	
FEB 06 '81	
	
	
DEC 7 1984	
DEC 16 1985	

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Lorange, Peter/Diagnosis and design of
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Lorange, Peter/Strategic planning syst
7300557 D*BKS 00031730



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Welsch, Roy E/Comparing relative and
7300577 D*BKS 00031729



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Von Hippel, Er/Successful and failing
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Choffray, Jean/Industrial adoption of
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Driscoll, Jame/Why individual academic
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Morgan, Sandra/Career orientation of u
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