Abstract – “Migration, Nativism, and Party System Change in Western Europe”

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This project explains the growth of the West European Radical Right in the late-1980s and early-1990s, using that explanation to model the growth of small, programmatically-focused (“niche”) parties in previously stable party systems.

I find that a key mechanism of niche party growth is the re-weighting of issue priorities or social identities generated by unanticipated, high impact events, such as a severe economic downturn, terror attack or ethnic riot. These “shocks” represent a perceived threat to the economic security, physical safety or group position of some individuals, increasing the attention (salience) they pay to a related issue or identity dimension, such as the economy, domestic security, or one’s feelings of national or religious belonging. Niche parties grow when 1) the salience of the dimension they emphasizes increases and 2) the distribution of voter preferences gives them a comparative advantage if the relevant dimension is salient (the niche party is an “issue owner” on the relevant dimension).

My analysis focuses on the growth of West European anti-immigrant (“nativist”) parties, the major subset of the Radical Right, in the late-1980s and early-1990s. Many countries in Western Europe were faced with unprecedented, unsolicited migration during this period, and immigration in these countries became a highly salient political issue. Nativist parties, with a popular stance on immigration, leveraged increased salience into significant electoral gains. The continued support for nativist parties, despite declines in immigration, represents a durable (though limited) political realignment along a new, ethnic dimension of political contestation, with nativist parties championing the demands of the “native” ethnic group.

To generate my hypotheses and causal mechanisms, I conducted two years of research in Germany and Austria, including an analysis of past public opinion research, a content analysis of four regional newspapers (1960-2005), 185 elite interviews (50 with nativist elites), and an analysis of nativist party literature. To test competing hypotheses I constructed a cross-national dataset of nativist support in Western Europe (1973-2006), as well as state- and local-level datasets in Germany and Austria.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Scope of Inquiry

The October 2007 national election in Switzerland saw the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) achieve the largest plurality (29%) of any Swiss party in the post-war era. What makes this result most significant was the SVP’s strategy during the election. The party’s signature campaign appeal was “Create Security,” featuring three white sheep kicking a black sheep from a Swiss flag. The appeal highlighted a proposal by the party to deport the families of underage immigrants convicted by a Swiss court. Detractors likened the policy to *Sippenhaft* under the German National Socialist regime and the Swiss President called it “inciting racial hatred.” A poster from a recent SVP campaign had shown several hands, yellow, brown or black, reaching into a candy bowl filled with Swiss passports. These messages were consistent with an evolution of the party’s central worldview and strategy from conservative and agrarian to conservative and xenophobic. The SVP consistently portrayed immigrants and immigration as destroying Swiss society and abusing Swiss generosity.

The SVP’s success, more than 25 years after the National Front first emerged as a significant actor in French politics, confirms the durability of the contemporary European Radical Right as a political phenomenon. By Right, I mean any party that is socially conservative for its national context; economic conceptions of the Right fail to capture the ideologies or strategies of many parties commonly associated with the Radical Right.

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1 The German word for sheep is “Schaf,” a play on “create” (schaffen). The German National Democrats (NPD) subsequently co-opted the image for a poster titled “We’ll tidy up” (“Wir räumen auf”).
2 *The Guardian*, “Swiss party accused of racist campaigning,” 9/1/07. Under *Sippenhaft*, or “kin liability,” relatives of the convicted were punished equally for any crimes committed.
3 The Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties of the 1970s are not defined as Radical Right by this project and their earlier successes are thus excluded; see Chapter 2.
4 Mudde (2007).
By Radical, I mean any party that advocates increasing the economic or social power of its support base by permanently reducing or eliminating the rights of some or all of its political or social opponents. In a liberal-democracy this includes parties that are entirely anti-democratic (authoritarian; monarchist; fascist; totalitarian) or opposed to co-operation or co-existence with some part of the population (religious fundamentalist; racist; exclusionary nationalist; anti-immigrant). The inclusion of monarchism and religious fundamentalism is a broader definition of the European Radical Right than the conventional literature, which focuses heavily on extreme nationalism and xenophobia. However, this definition builds a party family that bounds the phenomenon by identifying a series of characteristics that clearly and consistently separates the parties of common interest from all other parties.\(^5\)

It is puzzling that any Radical Right party emerged in Western Europe after 1945. Often associated in the public sphere with the democratic breakdowns of the 1930s and the horrors of the 1940s, parties making Radical Right appeals were broadly unsuccessful in Western Europe between 1950 and 1985. In some countries, these parties were stable but relatively small and marginalized (the Italian MSI). In others, brief electoral spikes were followed by a loss in support and organizational collapse or extended time in the electoral wilderness (the French Poujadists, Swiss National Action or German NPD). By 2000, however, Radical Right parties routinely received at least 10% of the national vote in six countries.\(^6\) This change in electoral fortunes was rapid and essentially simultaneous, taking place between 1986 and 1994, but it was also uneven. In some countries (Austria, Denmark, Norway) the Radical Right experienced significant growth,

\(^5\) Sartori (1976); von Beyme (1985).
\(^6\) Norway, Denmark, Austria, France, Belgium and Switzerland.
in others (Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom) it was entirely marginalized or never emerged. In still others (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden), brief spikes in Radical Right support were met with sharp reversals.

The issues bound in questions of Radical Right growth and success are about more than the ability of one political party, or even a group of similar parties constituting a party family, to pick up extra votes or seats. The growth of movements perceived as at their core xenophobic, in a time when Western Europe is undergoing significant transformations brought on by globalization, European integration and large-scale immigration, raises three possibilities, two of which are considered normatively troubling by many observers.

First, Radical or “extremist” parties, whether Left or Right, are commonly associated with political instability as both an independent and dependent variable. Scholars have long argued that the success of parties antagonistic toward liberal, pluralistic democracy contributes to cabinet instability, political violence and at the extreme political breakdown as these parties directly or indirectly undermine the functioning of democratic systems. However, Radical parties might also be a symptom of some acute or chronic dissatisfaction with the functioning of a political or social system, or the performance of its established political actors. Over the past generation Western Europe has seen indications of increased political instability. Electoral volatility has increased and partisan identification has declined; the days of a “cradle to grave” relationship between voters and parties appear over.\(^7\) While discontent with mass democracy has not noticeably increased in recent decades, 12% of the West European

\(^7\) Dalton and Wattenberg (Eds.) (2000).
public is entirely dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy and a further 30% generally dissatisfied.\(^8\) Popular discontent with the European Union is especially prevalent, as evidenced by the 2005 rejection through referendum of the EU Constitution in the Netherlands and France, despite the EU’s increasing influence on social, economic and foreign policy.

Second, it is possible that the recent growth of the Radical Right is not a cause or effect of political instability, but rather that political volatility and the growth of a group of parties with a similar set of campaign appeals across Western Europe are both symptoms of a political realignment, a significant and durable change in the distribution of party support. One form of realignment is a swing in support between major, established political forces (the American Republicans and Democrats; the German CDU-CSU and SPD). Another occurs when new or small parties, which describes the Radical Right’s position in the early 1980s, grows at the expense of some or all larger, established actors, at the extreme replacing one or more of them as a dominant political force.\(^9\)

The importance of small or “niche” parties is not limited to studies of the Radical Right. By *niche* parties I mean parties that target specific themes or vote bases, as opposed to broad, established, catch-all movements attempting to appeal to nearly all voters regardless of ideology or background.\(^10\) Niche parties sits at the heart of debates about short-run voting behavior and medium- or long-run party system change. How do

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\(^8\) *Eurobarometer* continuous reporting (1973-Present): “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?”

\(^9\) The largest pre-growth Radical Right party, the Swiss People’s Party, received roughly 10-12% of the vote before adopting appeals more consistent with the Radical Right and was only the fourth largest party in Switzerland.

niche parties, disadvantaged in terms of organization and resources vis-à-vis their established competitors, make electoral inroads? Does this growth represent a temporary expression of social frustration, or a permanent political realignment? What is the relative importance of “demand” factors, structures or processes exogenous to the political system, compared to “supply” factors, institutions or actor strategies endogenous to the political system? These questions speak to ongoing debates in the electoral politics literature, but also broader debates in political science about social movements, political development and the relative importance of actors, structures, institutions and culture.

Finally, what makes the growth of the Radical Right especially troubling to many observers is its frequent association with political or electoral appeals rooted in ethnicity, usually described as extreme nationalism, xenophobia or anti-immigrant sentiment. Ethnicity-based appeals divide society into categories based on traditionally descent-based attributes that are non-random and relatively difficult to change, such as race, nation, or religion, but not class or gender. Ethnic appeals are often associated theoretically with a number of unwelcome outcomes, including political violence and democratic breakdown. Specifically, scholars and policymakers worry that societies divided along unchanging ethnic lines lead to conflicts that “turn politics into a census” and are irresolvable by non-violent means.

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11 The “demand/supply” distinction comes from Eatwell, in Merkl and Weinberg (eds.) (2003).
12 Chandra (2005). “Non-random” refers to the probability that two individuals will always produce children that share an attribute. For example, the four children of two white, Jewish, American parents will be born as Jewish (religion and potentially nation), American (nation) and white (race) with a probability of 100%, but some children will be born as males and others females.
13 Rabushka and Shepsle (1972); Horowitz (1985). Chandra (2005), however, persuasively argues that many of these observed outcomes are probably some combination of ethnicity and an unspecified omitted variable or variables.
this project speaks to broader debates about how and when voters are motivated to support ethnic appeals, and what the implications are for politics and society when ethnic mobilizations occur. The ethnic politics literature on the developed world is sparse (excepting the United States), but a diversifying Europe makes a broader understanding of ethnic politics in advanced industrial countries increasingly relevant.

Moreover, most studies of ethnic politics focus on systems with a stable distribution of ethnic attributes, the descent-based characteristics associated with an ethnic identity or category. Recent research has convincingly shown that actors or institutions can construct or deconstruct ethnic categories, change the degree of ethnic salience in a society, or change the ethnic cleavages that are salient in politics. Yet absent mass displacement or mass killing the distribution of ethnic attributes should change relatively slowly, dependent on rates of ethnic exogamy and differential birthrates among the holders of various attributes. Immigration, however, can rapidly transform the distribution of ethnic attributes in a society, for example by changing a homogenous society into one where multiple ethnic categorizations can arise and persist. Immigration does not discriminate by region and is not a historically-specific phenomenon. It can affect any country, developed or developing, at any time with little or no warning. While most studies of ethnic politics are geared toward countries with latent or salient ethnic divisions, understanding how immigration can transform a polity or society is relevant to all countries.

Over the past 25 years in Western Europe, the relationship between natives and immigrants has noticeably deteriorated. In Germany dozens of Molotov cocktail attacks

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14 Chandra (2005).
15 Nobles (2000); Chandra (2004); Posner (2005); Yashar (2005).
were conducted against asylum centers and the homes of recent immigrants, with some leading to fatalities. At the extreme, events in the German cities of Hoyerswerda (1991) and Rostock (1992), in which thousands of rioters targeted asylum-seekers, resembled pogroms or ethnic cleansing. In October-November 2005, rioting broke out across France over the death of two Parisian, French-Tunisian teenagers avoiding what they thought to be police pursuit.\textsuperscript{16} The riots, which lasted three weeks and caused 200 million Euro in damages, hundreds of injuries and a national state of emergency, highlighted the deep rift between native French and recent immigrants of North African descent.\textsuperscript{17} In the Netherlands, long perceived as a bastion of tolerance, the 2004 assassination of controversial filmmaker Theo Van Gogh led to a year of tit-for-tat reprisals between Christians and Muslims, including arson attacks on mosques, churches and religious schools on both sides.

Despite the focus on Europe, there is nothing essentially European about the growth of Radical Right parties or niche parties; instances of niche party growth, political realignment, xenophobia or the Radical Right can be found on every continent, in developed and developing nations. Within 10 years of its formation the emergence of the United States Republicans, initially a niche party associated with the opposition to slavery, realigned the American political system and led to the replacement of one of the two established political forces. In India, the emergence and consolidation of the Hindu-nationalist BJP in the early 1990s ended the Congress Party’s 40-year dominance of national politics, leading to a durable political realignment and increased uncertainty about electoral outcomes. The 1990s also saw the emergence of New Zealand First, an


\textsuperscript{17} Days of riots erupted almost simultaneously on the beaches of Sydney, Australia, when a rumor was spread that several Middle Eastern youth had harassed and attacked natives.
anti-immigrant party ironically led by an indigenous Maori, Winston Peters. In South Africa, riots in May 2008 claimed several dozen lives; the perpetrators were natives motivated by resentment toward recent immigrants from Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Since the turn of the century, debates over immigration have flared up in the United States and Mexico, as both countries grapple with illegal immigration along their respective southern borders.

Understanding why Radical Right parties grow or shrink, succeed or fail therefore provides insight not only into events generating significant concern among European publics, but also broader processes of interest to political scientists. These include party competition, party system change, but also the growth of new social movements, as well as the determinants of ethnic mobilization and ethnic violence.

**Framing the Project: Nativist Parties**

This project explains both cross-time and cross-national variation in the growth of the West European Radical Right. Why did these parties rapidly grow when they did, and why they grow in some countries but not others? Despite a vast literature on the Radical Right, there is no consensus explanation, or even a consistently defined family of parties on which inquiries can be focused.\(^{18}\) The growth, emergence or *breakthrough* of Radical Right parties should not be confused with their *persistence*.\(^{19}\) This project is primarily interested in why Radical Right parties rapidly gain support in some countries and not others, not why some parties are better at retaining their newly-gained supporters than others. Moreover, growth is not synonymous with being large. By conceptualizing

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\(^{18}\) Mudde (2007).

\(^{19}\) Mudde (2007).
success as growth, a newly established party that gains 10% of the vote is conceptually equivalent to one that grows from 10% to 20% and conceptually distinct from a party that remains stable at 25% or declines from 30% to 25%. Parties might be large for a variety of historical and institutional reasons unrelated to their current growth.

To address questions of growth, I adopt a strategy increasingly common in studies of the Radical Right. This strategy acknowledges that the hypothesized party family is fairly diverse, with subsets whose growth or stability may each be best explained through its own variables or mechanisms. Specifically, I focus on the growth of nativist parties. Nativist parties a) explicitly promise to champion the interests of “natives” as an ethnic group, and make those appeals b) central to their strategy for mobilizing voters. While the concepts of central and explicit are explored in Chapter 2, suffice it to say that nativist parties frame themselves first and foremost as “the party of natives,” just as a Communist party might frame itself as the “party of the working class.”

Narrowing the focus from Radical Right to nativist parties serves two purposes. First, it captures most, but not all, of the prominent political movements associated with recent Radical Right growth, such as the French National Front, Austrian Freedom Party or Swiss People’s Party. In 1985, 11% of the seats in West European parliaments held by parties associated with the Radical Right were held by parties coded as nativist (7 of 64). By 2005 fully 62% of these seats, and 72% of the overall growth in the Radical Right, was attributable to nativist parties (181 of 291). Consequently, re-

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20 Golder (2003); Carter (2005).
21 See Appendix 1 for the full list.
22 Author calculations. The 2005 total is dominated by the Italian National Alliance (99 seats), which this project codes as neither nativist nor Radical Right; though using this project’s proposed definition, 94% seats held by the Radical Right in 2005 (181 of 192) were held by nativist parties. The Austrian Freedom
conceptualization does not rob this project of its ability to explain the changing fortunes of the broader Radical Right. Second, re-conceptualization focuses the inquiry. A unified explanation of the Radical Right would have to explain the growth of nativism, monarchism, neo-fascism and religious fundamentalism, though each process might be driven by its own explanatory variable(s). By limiting the focus to nativist parties, the inquiry is empirically more manageable and theoretically more parsimonious.

By Western Europe, I mean the 16 countries 1) with the majority of their landmass in the geographic area commonly associated with Europe (excluding Turkey or Israel, but including Ireland); that 2) remained free of Communist control from 1945 to 1990 (excluding Russia or the former East Germany, but including formerly authoritarian Spain or Greece); 3) with more than 1 million inhabitants (excluding Iceland, Luxembourg and Malta). In limiting the scope to Western Europe, I focus on “advanced industrial democracies,” that is 1) mass democracies with 2) strong rule of law and 3) an industrial or post-industrial economy. This has the advantage of controlling for a host of political, social, historical and cultural factors, for example the wide divergence in political, economic and social development between Western and Eastern Europe in the 20th Century that makes the comparability of political systems between regions significantly more complex.

The Dependent Variable: Changes in Support

My dependent variable is conceptualized as changes in nativist party support; departing from past scholars, I do not take a party’s size to be reflective of its fortunes.

The dependent variable is measured as the aggregate change in vote share for all nativist Party (12 seats) and the Swiss People’s Party (25 seats) were not included in the 1985 figure, as the 1985 iterations of those parties are not commonly coded as Radical Right.
parties in a geographic area over their support in the last election, whether or not they were a nativist party. I selected vote shares over seat shares, policy outcomes or public opinion as the most objective measure of a party's support. Unlike policy outcomes or public opinion, vote shares are readily accessible across countries and the degree of agreement on their measurement is high. Unlike seat shares, vote shares are a less distorted measure of a party's popular support. For example the French National Front held 15% of the vote in the 1990s but only one seat, while the Dutch Center Democrats held one seat with .8% of the vote.

In specifying the dependent variable as changes and moreover as aggregate changes in support within a group of parties, I avoid three pitfalls. First, for countries with multiple nativist parties much of the growth of any one party can be the result of intra-family competition, rather than broader systemic shifts, accounted for by taking aggregate trends. While voters might be switching between nativist parties and non-nativist parties of the Radical Right, or between nativist parties and non-nativist center-Right parties with similar appeals, this project is unable to systematically capture that movement.

Second, by taking into account a party's change in support whether or not they were nativist in the last election, I avoid conflating changes in support with changes in strategy. This distinction begins from the understanding that party classifications are not genetic.\textsuperscript{23} Parties can choose to change their appeals, and consequently might switch between the categories political scientists employ. For small or niche parties appeal switching should be especially easy, as they do not have to fear alienating their small

\textsuperscript{23} Mudde (2000).
support base and have much to gain from adding appeals capable of attracting new voters. While measuring changes in support disentangles shifts in support from shifts in strategy, measuring levels of support treats a party’s decision to enter an analytic category as a success, irrespective of their actual electoral situation, or captures parties when they were not part of the analytical category under observation. For example, in a system with only non-nativist parties one party decides to engage nativist appeals, because they believe it will be a superior strategy for mobilizing voters or through a takeover by a faction of nativist functionaries. In the next election they contest, their first as a nativist party, they have misread public opinion and lose support. To a scholar interested in levels, the election represents a significant increase in nativist party support. To a scholar interested in changes, the immediate consequence of the shift was failure, as it likely cost the party voters. In sum, the reasons for adopting a nativist appeal might be unrelated to the reasons that nativist appeals work. For example, it may be that nativist parties might adopt nativist appeals when there are many immigrants in the country, though the number of immigrants already in the country is not a factor in their growth.

Building on the second point, I make no claim that all of a party’s support is generated through the same process or set of processes. More specifically, because party classifications are changeable, the reasons for a nativist party’s recent size might be unrelated to the reasons for their current growth. This should generally not be a problem for studies of a party family or party category where all member parties, such as Socialist or Green parties in Western Europe, basically originate at the same point in time and have

24 Though the party’s shift in appeals may have resulted in vote gains that were offset by votes lost for unrelated reasons.
the same opportunities for growth, with only the crucial explanatory variable varying. The difficulty when studying nativist parties, or the Radical Right more broadly, is that assumptions of a common origin and exposure to common opportunities to grow do not hold. In some countries (Belgium, France, Germany), nativists built parties essentially from scratch, while in others (Austria, Norway, Switzerland) non-nativist parties with a substantial vote base were co-opted by nativist functionaries. Some nativist parties began as regional parties (Belgium; Italy), others as tax revolts (Norway, Denmark), and still others as conservative anti-Communists (France, Germany) or agrarians (Switzerland). In short, nativist parties in the 1980s had a great deal of variation in the size of their support base before their period of general growth. The method I utilize overcomes this pitfall by using changes in support across time as observations, essentially considering only the recent determinants of party growth. Moreover as these parties widely diverged in their initial endowment of organization and resources, measuring changes in support makes it possible to consider party organization as a competing explanatory variable.

**Variation on the Dependent Variable**

Nativist parties rapidly emerged in a number of West European states in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The idea of rapid emergence suggests that cross-time variation is at least as important as cross-sectional variation and furthermore that the variation is *discontinuous*; there is some equilibrium state, followed by a moment of change and then the establishment of a new equilibrium. Figure 1.1, capturing changes in support for nativist parties, suggests three periods in nativist party fortunes. The first (1946-1985)
was one of stagnation, though few parties contested on a nativist platform. The second (1986-1994), of the most interest to this study, is one of rapid and uninterrupted growth. The final period (1995-2007) is still one of net growth, but this growth is far less consistent. The spike in 2002, capturing the victory of the List Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands after its leader’s assassination during the campaign, is the exception rather than the rule.

**Figure 1.1: Average Change in West European Radical Right, Nativist Support**

Figure 1.2 displays this discrepancy as a rolling average of support for nativist and Radical Right parties in national elections. As Figure 1.2 indicates, the major period of nativist growth occurred in the late-1980s and early-1990s, when nativist party support increased from 1% to 5% on average. There was a smaller but still noticeable spike from 1997 until 2000 (5% to 7% on average), with growth from 2000 inconsistent and nativist parties across Western Europe averaging around 6%. While these figures seem low, they represent a 16-country average; in some countries nativist parties received 20-30% (Austria, Norway, or Switzerland) while in others they were well under 1% (Ireland, Portugal, or Spain).

**Figure 1.2: West European Radical Right, Nativist Support (16 Country Average)**

Nativist parties also showed noticeable cross-sectional variation within this period of change; in some countries (Austria, Norway) nativist parties saw exceptional growth, in others (Germany, the Netherlands) they exhibited only minor growth and in still others

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25 I show in Chapter 2, for example, that the Austrian Freedom Party was not contesting as a nativist party when it made its first significant gains in 1986.
26 Only parties defined as nativist parties at the time of the election are included; see Appendix 1 for a full list.
significant nativist parties failed to emerge. Figure 1.3 displays the relevant variation in nativist support between the beginning and end of the period of consistent nativist growth. To account for the possibility that processes of emergence and persistence might be operating over a short time frame, the maximum level of nativist support (rather than the end level) was captured. For example, Sweden had no identified nativist parties contesting elections until 1988. By 1995 two parties (the Sweden Democrats and New Democracy) stood at 1.49% of the vote, their 1994 combined election result. However, this obscures New Democracy’s dramatic rise in 1991, when the two parties received a combined 6.83%, up from 0.02% in 1988 when the Sweden Democrats contested alone. Nativist parties in Sweden experienced a breakthrough in 1991, followed for potentially unrelated reasons by a failure in persistence in 1994.

Figure 1.3: Changes in Nativist Party Support, (Max. Growth, 1988-94 vs. 1987)

The Argument in Brief

I use the specific case of nativist parties in post-war Western Europe to advance a general theory of niche party growth that explains discontinuities in support for new or small parties and, in doing so, provides insight into party system change in established mass democracies. I argue that a key mechanism of niche party growth and party system change is the rapid re-weighting of issue priorities or social identities generated by unpredictable, high impact events. The general theory can be summarized in two stages.

In the first stage some triggering event or Shock, such as a severe economic downturn, oil crisis, terror attack or ethnic riot, unsettles individual expectations about
Shocks are unanticipated events that deviate significantly from observed structural relationships, for example the rate of unemployment, the price of gas, or the frequency and severity of terror attacks or inter-ethnic violence. The unsettling generated by a Shock represents a threat (the prospect of negative consequences) and leads individuals to increase the weight, or salience, that they place on a related issue or identity dimension, such as the economy, energy policy, domestic security, or feelings of national or religious belonging.

In the second stage, some subset of the population finds their priorities sufficiently altered by the Shock to engage in acts of threat reduction. This might include social mobilization around a common concern or even increases in violence if the perceived threat is split along group lines, whether ethnic or non-ethnic. In a mass democracy with strong rule of law, a chief means of threat reduction is elections, which signals to established actors that some action is necessary or installs new actors promising to resolve the threat. In an election, changes in salience are factored into a voter’s decision to support a party. Re-weighted priorities result in increased electoral support for a niche party when 1) the salience of the dimension it emphasizes is high and 2) the distribution of voter preferences gives the party a comparative advantage if elections are contested on the relevant dimension; the niche party is an “issue owner” on the relevant dimension.28

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27 Kuran (1998); Taleb (2007).
28 For theories of issue ownership, see Budge and Farlie (1983), Petrocik (1996), or Meguid (2005).
My model is fundamentally structural, focusing on sudden events and their capacity to alter issue salience and voter calculations. The argument requires no change, short- or long-term, in individual preferences. Furthermore, while political or social elites may play a role in aggravating or mitigating a Shock's impact through the volume and tone of their narratives, I argue that elite strategies as highly constrained by exogenous events. Finally, while my primary interest is in Shock initiation and its effects on politics and society, I suggest that Shocks might terminate for exogenous or endogenous reasons. The triggering event might fade of its own accord, forces within the affected political system could end undertake action to end it, or a niche party might fully mobilize the voters capable of being convinced to support it as a consequence of the event. Should none of these mechanisms occur, a niche party would be expected to continue gaining support from the Shock in subsequent elections.

Figure 1.4: A Basic Shock Model of Niche Party Growth

Extending my argument to nativist parties Ethnic Shocks, seemingly unlikely, high impact events related to some ethnic identity dimension, unsettle individual expectations about the political, economic, social, or demographic dynamics between two or more ethnic groups. This unsettling represents a threat that triggers rapid and significant increases in the salience of the ethnic identity dimension (race; religion) itself, or indirectly through some issue or issues related to an ethnic identity dimension (such as immigration).

Specifically, I argue that a large, wholly unanticipated wave of migration to Western Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s represented a triggering event capable of generating an Ethnic Shock. This Shock unsettled the expectations of some subset of
natives about a host of economic, social and symbolic outcomes. It called into question native prospects in job and housing markets. It raised the specter of social instability through increased street crime, organized crime and political violence. At the extreme, it generated concerns that an increased recognition of immigrant minorities, combined with disadvantageous demographic trends, would lead to natives becoming "strangers in their own land" (Fremd im eigenen Land). As a result, immigration became one of, if not the, most salient political and social issues in a number of West European societies and dominated state and national campaigns during this period. Nativist parties, promising above all to preserve or enhance native privileges and position and holding a comparative advantage on immigration policy in surveys of public opinion, leveraged increased salience into significant electoral victories at the expense of established actors of the center-Right and center-Left. Nativist parties in countries that did not receive this new migration remained stagnant or did not form at all. The continued (if reduced) public awareness of immigration and immigrants, and the elevated but static level of nativist party support twenty years later, suggest that the Ethnic Shock had a durable effect on the distribution of party support and issue and identity salience in Western Europe.

A theory advancing a causal link between objective immigration processes and the growth of nativism seems initially intuitive, but must be placed in the context of the existing literature on the West European Radical Right. Much of this literature emphasizes the role of party competition (Kitschelt and McGann 1995), institutions and systemic opportunity structures (Carter 2005; Givens 2005; Norris 2005), or attitudes (van der Brug et. al 2005; Carter and Arzheimer 2006) over exogenous structural processes. Even demand-based explanations tend to focus on economic dynamics like
unemployment (Jackman and Volpert 1996), globalization (Swank and Betz 2003) or the emergence of post-industrial economies (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). With a few notable exceptions (Gibson 2002; Golder 2003), the literature on the Radical Right claims that objective immigration processes play no role in Radical Right success, or that immigration debates are a manifestation of underlying economic uncertainty or social frustration. Those works that do focus on immigration tend to think in terms of the size of the pre-existing immigrant population, which I argue is less important than how immigrant populations change over time.

I forward two crucial hypotheses about the effect of changing rates of net immigration on changes in nativist party support, based on the relationship between structures, salience and voting presented in Figure 1.4:

Hypothesis 1 (The "Indirect" Hypothesis): Increasing immigration leads to increasing support for nativist parties.

Hypothesis 2 (The "Direct" Hypothesis): The increasing salience of native/immigrant issue or identity dimensions leads to increasing support for nativist parties.

The salience hypothesis is labeled "direct" and the structural hypothesis "indirect" to distinguish between their relative positions in the causal chain. Not every structural change of the same magnitude will result in an equivalent change in salience. For example, simultaneous structural changes along two dimensions might influence the impact of each on the eventual change in salience, while any change in salience of the same magnitude is expected to have roughly the same impact on voting, holding institutions and actor strategies constant. Due to constraints in the availability of past data, this project’s systematic tests focus more heavily on Hypothesis 1.
I do not contest that other mechanisms of party system change (such as generational replacement, institutional change or actor strategies) exist, or that change is only driven by one mechanism. Nor do I argue that nativist parties benefit only from Ethnic Shocks, or that immigration is the only capable of triggering an Ethnic Shock. Rather, I argue that party system change can come from shifts in the distribution of priorities generated by a sudden event and that one such event, a wave of immigration to Western Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, did lead to significant increases in support for nativist parties.

Case Selection and Research Design

My project employs a nested analysis (Lieberman 2005), combining cross- and sub-national (state and local level) large-N datasets with in-depth national studies. Mixed research designs leverage the advantages of both approaches. A small-N analysis generates theoretical insights, addresses spurious relationships and establishes causal mechanisms, while large-N analyses quickly and systematically test alternative explanations and mitigate degree of freedom problems. Additionally, disaggregating cross-sectional observations into individual elections across time increases the number of observations, while disaggregating to a lower level of analysis addresses ecological fallacy. For example, if immigration drives nativist party support at the national level, the mechanism could be objective (increasing immigration triggers a threat among proximate natives) or perceptual (high immigration countries talk about immigration more, triggering a threat among natives with micro-level attributes unrelated to

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29 On the benefits of qualitative analysis, see Collier and Mahoney (1996) or Gerring (2007). On the benefits of quantitative analysis, see Lijphart (1971) or Geddes (1990).
proximity). Disaggregating to the state or local level allows me to address whether threat
generation is more likely to be a structural/demographic process, or whether it is
primarily attitudinal.

I chose Germany and Austria as the countries for closer study based on the
maximum growth in Radical Right electoral support from 1985 to 2000, representing
selection on the dependent variable. My subsequent choice to focus the study only on
nativist parties does not contradict the initial selection, as captured in Figure 1.3. Cases
were selected by period, rather than individual election, to capture trajectories of growth
and avoid selecting outliers. The German case, while not at the extreme low end of the
dependent variable, had several attractive characteristics. First, it had the least successful
nativist movement to credibly contest elections during this period (>1% support at any
point). Second, there was sufficient organizational history to produce a robust secondary
literature and media coverage, and sufficient organizational density to allow for
interviews with party supporters and elites. This significantly reduced the costs of
generating party histories and provided key insights into hypotheses and mechanisms.
Third, there was sufficient sub-national variation in Germany for sub-national case
selection. Finally, a cross-national quantitative analysis captures the countries that failed
to generate a credible nativist party, thereby testing the hypotheses on the full range of
observations.

The cross-national quantitative data covers approximately 160 elections in 16
countries from 1973 to 2006.\textsuperscript{31} 1973 represents the last year most West European
countries allowed large-scale, scheduled economic migration; this migration was

\textsuperscript{31} The list of elections, as well as some of the unemployment data, comes from Golder (2003).
perceived by European societies as controlled and theoretically reversible and consequently would not qualify as a Shock by my definition.³² Virtually all migration after 1973, however, was perceived as unexpected, permanent and non-beneficial. The cross-national dataset represents an improvement both in the analysis of new variables (notably crime rates, conceptually linked to the Radical Right but not systematically measured) and in its finer measurements of nativist party support and immigration, resulting in the metrics used more closely matching the concepts under investigation. In addition to the cross-national data, six sub-national datasets were constructed at the state and local levels in Germany and Austria, to address ecological fallacy and re-test the hypotheses using new data.³³ The state level datasets cover all Austrian and West German states, while the local datasets were constructed for the four states where fieldwork was concentrated. Each sub-national dataset is entirely original, constructed from official statistical websites and yearbooks and when necessary onsite research at state and local agencies. Due to data quality, each dataset covers national election results from roughly 1980 until 2005-2006.

The qualitative data was generated through 22 months of field research in Germany and Austria, spanning June 2004 through June 2007. The fieldwork focused on two states in each country (Baden-Wuerttemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz in Germany; Vienna and Styria in Austria), in addition to national level interviews. In Germany, states were selected based on nativist party success at the state level with an eye toward theory building. Baden-Wuerttemberg, the only Western state where nativists received at least

³² Messina (2007).
³³ "Local" in this case can mean electoral districts (Baden-Wuerttemberg), counties (Rheinland-Pfalz and Styria) or city wards (Vienna). The geographic demarcation chosen depended on how state agencies disaggregated the explanatory variables.
10% of the vote in a state election, was the “high” observation and Rheinland-Pfalz, where nativists never entered parliament or reached more than 5% of the state vote, was the “low” observation. Both states held state elections in March 2006, allowing for the direct observation of campaigns and rallies. East German states were excluded from the selection process and the analysis, as they are not Western Europe by my definition. In Austria, state selection occurred when the general theory was well established and was based on the volume of immigration in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the explanatory variable, with an eye toward mechanism building. Vienna represented a state with relatively high immigration during this period and Styria a state with relatively low immigration. Subsequent quantitative analyses at the state and local levels tested the project’s hypotheses and alternative explanations on the full set of observations.

In addition to a review of German-language secondary literature and a secondary analysis of prior survey research in both countries, original qualitative data collection focused on three efforts. The first was a content analysis of four regional newspapers (one in each state) during state and national election campaigns from 1960 to 2005. This analysis captured the salience of, and attitudes toward, immigration, as well as statements by nativist parties and their detractors. The media analysis also acted as a contemporary source to counteract retrospective bias. Second, several decades of nativist programs and several hundred campaign appeals made by nativist parties (posters and newspaper advertisements) were analyzed. Both programs and appeals provide a window into how

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34 Bavaria, an alternative high state, was the birthplace of the German Republikaner and represented an unusually strong organization; in every other state organizations were built from scratch at roughly the same time. Unlike other low states (Nordrhein-Westfalen, Lower Saxony), nativists in Rheinland-Pfalz were sufficiently organized to allow for interviews.
nativist parties frame politics, including whether they are nativist for any specific election.

The final qualitative evidence comes from participant interaction. First, 185 interviews were conducted with political and social elites, including academics, journalists, bureaucrats and representatives from social organizations, but primarily with the national, state and local members of every major political party. Roughly 50 interviews were conducted with past and present nativist elites, from local politicians to national party heads. Due to their traditionally antagonistic relationship with the media and academia, nativist party elites are a group rarely interviewed in large numbers for studies of the Radical Right. The interviews, semi-structured and lasting on average one hour, provided insight into actor strategies, generated alternative hypotheses, data sources and mechanisms and acted as a small survey of party perceptions of social priorities and their solutions. Finally, I conducted two dozen unstructured observations of nativist party events, from election night parties and local party meetings to mass rallies and international conferences. These meetings provided insight not only into nativist priorities and strategies, but also presented an opportunity for unstructured interactions with nativist voters.

Empirical Background

In this section I describe three German\textsuperscript{35} and two Austrian\textsuperscript{36} parties active since 1973 and coded as at least ambiguously nativist for at some or all of the period 1973-

\textsuperscript{35}At least two other German parties, the Hamburg-based “Foreigner-Stop Movement” of the 1980s and the Baden-Wuerttemberg-based “German League for Nation and Homeland (DLVH)” of the 1990s were too small and geographically focused to be of interest. Another candidate party, the Hamburg-based Schill movement notable for its 2001 showing in the 2001 local elections, was coded as non-nativist.
2006. The study of these parties and their fortunes represents the main thrust of my empirical research.

The National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands or NPD) was formed in 1964 from a number of small German-nationalist groups, primarily the German Empire Party (DRP). The NPD of the 1960s was German-nationalist and anti-Leftist (opposed to Communism and the “1968 Generation”). The party called for an end to military occupation by the Allied powers and USSR, a return to “law and order” and “traditional values,” and German Reunification, including East Germany but also territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line separating Germany from Poland. While the NPD entered a number of state parliaments in the late 1960s and nearly entered the national parliament in 1968, by the early 1970s it had collapsed as a national movement. In the late 1970s, the rejection of immigration became more prominent among NPD intellectuals and was a key component of NPD electoral campaigns by 1980. While its support increased slightly in the 1980s and 1990s in the former West Germany, the self-proclaimed “national, social” party remained marginalized except for a handful of local mandates and was overshadowed by the DVU and REP.

The second German party, the Republicans (Republikaner or REP), was founded in 1983 by two former national parliamentarians of the Bavarian conservative-confessional Christian Social Union (CSU). The two founders saw a loan by the West German government (which included the CSU) to East Germany as a violation of the

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36 Austria’s National Democratic Party (NDP), founded in 1967 as a mirror of the NPD and banned by the State in 1988 as an extremist organization, was too small to be relevant.

37 The DRP was notable as the home to many supporters of National Socialism who joined the NSDAP before the Hitler regime and was the primary German-nationalist party active in the 1950s.
party’s anti-Communist stance and sought to form a “true” conservative movement. By the mid-1980s the party leadership had been fully captured by Franz Schoenhuber, a journalist and television personality fired for writing a memoir perceived as overly sympathetic to the National Socialist era. Under Schoenhuber, the REP’s conservative platform (law and order, traditional values, anti-Communism) expanded to focus on an opposition to immigration and by 1989 had become the party’s chief identifiable position. While the REP never entered the national parliament, their 2.1% vote in 1990 represents the single best result for a nativist party in national elections since 1973. At the state level, the REP spent one year in the Berlin local parliament and two terms (1992-2001) in the Baden-Wuerttemberg parliament. Since its heyday (1989-1996) the party has become increasingly marginalized and by the 2005 national election was limited to a steady base of 0.6%, with its local mandates concentrated in urban areas in southern Germany with relatively large immigrant populations.

A third significant group, the German People’s Union (Deutsche Volksunion or DVU), only formally qualifies as a party. Founded in 1987 by multi-millionaire publisher and former NPD candidate Gerhard Frey, the DVU maintains no party organization outside of its parliamentary clubs and a national office in Munich, and largely exists as a vehicle for Frey to advance his German-nationalist, anti-immigration views. Though it only sporadically contests elections, the DVU has been represented in the Bremen parliament almost consistently since 1987 and gained representation in Schleswig-Holstein for one term in 1992, as well as being represented in two East German state parliaments for at least one term since 1998. From 2004 through at least 2008, the DVU and NPD maintained a coordination agreement in state and national
elections. While the REP consistently refused to take part in this coalition, leadership battles within the REP have exposed elements that support coordination.

In Austria, the chief nativist party, and one of the most prominent nativist parties in Europe, is the Austrian Freedom Party (*Freiheitliche Partei Oesterreichs* or FPOe). The FPOe was founded in 1956 from the remains of the Federation of Independents (*Verband der Unabhaengigen* or VdU), formed in 1949 as a “national-liberal” party representing National Socialists disenfranchised during denazification. The VdU and the FPOe after it sought to be a “third camp” (*Drittes Lager*) in Austrian politics, representing economic liberals and social conservatives (including German Nationalists) at odds with Christian-democracy of the Austrian People’s Party (OeVP) and the social-democracy of the Austrian Social Democrats (SPOe).

Throughout its history, the respective strengths of the national and liberal wings of the party ebbed and flowed and for its first 30 years, the party’s main goal was to secure enough votes to remain in the national parliament, which it did by consistently receiving 5-8% support. Notably, the party’s two moments of greatest influence before 1999 came during SPOe governments. From 1970 to 1971 the party, under the leadership of former Waffen-SS officer Friedrich Peter, supported (Jewish) Chancellor Bruno Kreisky’s minority government. From 1983 until 1986 the party, led by the liberal Norbert Steger, served as the junior partner in an SPOe-FPOe coalition.

With the 1986 election of Joerg Haider as party leader, the national wing won decisive control of the FPOe. Haider sabotaged the governing coalition by attacking the informal policy of patronage division between the two major parties (*Proporz*) and making new overtures to the party’s German-nationalist elites. This change in leadership
and strategy doubled the FPOe’s support in an early national election in 1986 and led to a string of strong showings in state elections from 1986 to 1989, culminating in Haider’s election as Governor of the state of Carinthia in 1989. In the 1990 national election Haider, recognizing the change in social priorities brought on by increased immigration to Austria, made the opposition to immigration a defining characteristic of the party. The move, which included the “Austria First!” referendum petition calling for an end to immigration, finally drove the liberal wing from the party to form the Liberal Forum in 1993 even as the FPOe’s attacks on immigration made inroads into the working class, robbing the OeVP and SPOe of supporters and swelling the party’s ranks further. In national elections in 1994, 1995 and 1999, the FPOe was sufficiently strong that Haider became a legitimate candidate for Chancellor, though the party’s support stabilized after 1994 at around 25% nationally. With the 1999 election the FPOe became the second largest party (by less than 1000 votes), entered a governing coalition as the junior partner to the smaller OeVP, where it remained from 1999 through 2005. The FPOe’s government experience was a disaster for the party and it fell to its 1986 level of support, roughly 10%, in the 2002 national election.

Moreover, this period led to deep internal divisions in the party between the strongly nationalist, nativist base (representing the mid-level functionaries) and the more office-seeking, ambiguously nativist leadership (representing Haider and the Government ministers). These divisions led Haider’s faction to leave the party in 2005 and form the Alliance for the Future of Austria (Buendnis Zukunft Oesterreich or BZOe). Though the “moderate” BZOe retained control of the Carinthian organization, where Haider had been re-elected Governor in 1999 after 8 years out of office, the “extremist” FPOe won the
immediate victory in terms of retained functionaries and voters. The FPOe arrested its
decline in state elections and bettered its national support in 2006, while the BZOe barely
entered the parliament with 4%, entirely on the strength of the Carinthian organization.
Both parties heavily emphasized immigration in 2006, though the BZOe chose to do so
late in the campaign and as of 2008 maintains an entirely non-nativist party program.
While the BZOe remained entrenched in the FPOe’s traditional Carinthian stronghold,
the FPOe evolved into an urban party strongest in the working class neighborhoods of
Vienna.

**Plan for the Dissertation**

The remainder of my dissertation is divided into two parts. The first chapters
(Chapters 2-3) comprise the more theoretical effort. Chapter 2 addresses issues of party
classification and categorization. It asks what a nativist party is, what it is not and how
scholars can identify a nativist party with a high degree of reliability. Despite the vast
literature on the hypothetical Radical Right party family and its subsets, party
classifications remain contested.\(^{38}\) Chapter 2 offers a set of consistent, time- and context-
sensitive coding rules for identifying nativist parties based on their platforms and
campaign appeals. The method is illustrated using programs and appeals by parties of the
Right in the 2005 and 2006 state and national elections in Germany and Austria, as well
as historical programs and appeals for the five significant parties identified as nativist.

Chapter 3 presents the Shock model of niche party growth in full detail. The first
half of Chapter 3 defines and explores the Shock concept and offers a general theory of
voting behavior, vote switching and party system change using concepts and examples

applicable to non-nativist parties. Niche parties increase their support when large, unanticipated events unsettle individual expectations about economic, physical or social outcomes, thereby generating threats. The second half of the chapter presents a specific argument for the regarding nativist parties, including a series of hypotheses regarding the expected political and social behavior of individuals affected by an Ethnic Shock. While primarily interested in Shock initiation in stable democracies with permissive electoral systems and strong rule of law, the chapter also offers several mechanisms for Shock termination and speculative hypotheses about the effects of Shocks in countries when the scope conditions are relaxed.

The next three chapters make up the more section of the dissertation. Chapter 4 explains the cross-time variation in changes in support for nativist parties in Austria and Germany. Through an analysis of immigration flows, media coverage, issue salience, anti-immigrant violence and election campaigns, the chapter argues that the unprecedented increase in unexpected immigration in the late 1980s led to a significant spike in the salience of immigration, which subsequently drove nativist victories in state and national elections. Nativist parties were the main beneficiary of this salience not out of protest, but because large sections of the population felt their positions on immigration were correct. Moreover, the chapter argues that changes in the salience of immigration were not driven by elites from nativist or non-nativist parties. While political elites may have aggravated voter concerns through their heavy emphasis of the issue during the immigration spike, they were in turn constrained by events and the reactions of voters to those events.
Chapter 5 explains the variation in cross-national changes in support for nativist parties in Austria and Germany during the observed immigration Shock. While both Germany and Austria received relatively high levels of immigration for Western Europe, the Austrian Freedom Party saw large, sustained increases in support, while the growth of German nativist parties was comparatively stunted and temporary. Adopting the demand/supply schema, the chapter uses survey research and elite interviews to identify three factors that provided an advantage for Austrian nativists. First, the FPOe had an additional advantage in issue demand (their attacks on Proporz), while in Germany a competing Shock (Reunification) dampened concerns with immigration at a crucial moment. Second, the capture of an established party organization (a supply factor) facilitated the ability of Austrian nativists to conduct campaigns and select promising functionaries. Finally, the decision of parties (on the Right and Left) to cooperate with the FPOe signaled to voters that it could reliably enact legislation and represent its constituents, whereas the hostility toward German nativists signaled that they were only a vehicle to express immediate discontent.

Chapter 6 systematically tests the relationship between immigration and nativist party support cross- and sub-nationally, controlling for other major issues (unemployment; crime) and political opportunity structures (electoral rules; incumbency) using the seven datasets constructed for this project. The analysis finds that while there is an objective link between changes in immigration flows and changes in nativist support and this relationship is confirmed at multiple levels of aggregation, there is no consistent link between changes in nativist support and the prior distribution of natives and immigrants. In addition, this chapter presents a competing measurement of immigration
that more closely captures the groups nativist parties mobilize against. Finally, Chapter 7 offers some extensions and broader implications for the model, offering some speculations about the cause of nativist trajectories beyond Germany and Austria, several predictions and policy implications for the future of nativist parties in Western Europe.
Chapter 1 Figures and Charts

Figure 1.1: Average Change in West European Radical Right, Nativist Support

Source: Author’s calculations from national election results.

Figure 1.2: West European Radical Right, Nativist Support (16 Country Average)

Source: Author’s calculations from national election results.
Figure 1.3: Changes in Nativist Party Support, (Maximum Growth, 1988-94 vs. 1987)

Source: Author’s calculations from national election results.

Figure 1.4: A Basic Shock Model of Niche Party Growth

Shock? (Y/N) \rightarrow \text{Shock (Y)} \rightarrow \uparrow \text{Salience} \rightarrow \uparrow \text{Niche Party} \rightarrow \text{Shock Termination? (Y/N)}
Chapter 2 – "Unser Volk Zuerst!" Conceptualizing and Coding Nativist Parties

At its core, an analysis of "Radical Right" growth is an analysis of a party family, an analytic category of political organizations connected conceptually by some minimum series of features distinguishing them from all other groupings of parties.39 An implicit understanding of what defines a party family and who its members are is present in any comparative research on parties. Parties selected for comparison across countries inevitably share some characteristic, whether distinguished by ideology, support base or strategy, motivating their selection as a pair or group over the selection of any other party or parties.40 Moreover, scholars studying cross-national party growth or success rely on family membership to obtain values on the dependent variable. Consequently, accurate classification becomes essential when choosing cases, minimizing measurement error or drawing conclusions about outcomes or effects.

This chapter addresses issues of classification through the construction of a consistent coding schema based on a party’s formal and expressed positions. The chapter proceeds in three sections. The first section explores the fallacies inherent in coding parties as "Radical Right." It considers and rejects a number of alternative defining characteristics before settling on two: the content of a candidate party’s social program and the candidate party’s approach toward its opponents.41 The second section conceptualizes and creates a consistent set of coding rules to identify one important

40 Mair and Mudde (1998).
41 For critiques in this vein, see Mudde (1995; 1996; 2000; 2007). Eatwell (1989) argues that it is "impossible to fit [the Radical Right] neatly" into a single classification. Von Beyme (1985) argues that while we cannot define why these parties are of a kind, we can generate a consistent list across scholars.
Radical Right subset: nativist parties, often referred to as “anti-immigrant” or “xenophobic” parties. Nativist parties a) explicitly promise to champion the interests of “natives” as an ethnic group, and those appeals are b) central to their mobilizing strategy. The final section uses a combination of campaign appeals and party programs to code parties of the Right in Germany and Austria as nativist or non-nativist. The evidence is drawn from contemporary party programs and campaign appeals expressed in elections in 2005 and 2006, as well as a historical analysis of programs and appeals for the five parties in these countries commonly identified as Radical Right.

What is the Radical Right?

Why should party classification matter? In individual studies, ad hoc- or misclassification affects how observations are selected and potentially introduces fatal errors into research findings. In the aggregate, if researchers cannot agree on how to measure the DV it becomes difficult to accumulate knowledge. Unfortunately, studies of the Radical Right often fail to justify why the parties being studied were chosen. Nearly every comparative study of the Radical Right today acknowledges this deficiency and attempts to resolve it.⁴²

Two fallacies are prevalent when classifying Radical Right parties without establishing a prior conceptual framework. The first is the fallacy of common sense, or “I know X when I see it.” This fallacy occurs when including or excluding parties based on what should be true, rather than proposing and defending objective classificatory criteria and testing parties against those criteria. The second is the fallacy of myopia, or “once X, always X.” This fallacy occurs when a party is classified for all iterations of its existence.

⁴² Gibson (2002); Golder (2003); Carter (2005); Mudde (2007).
based on observation at a fixed point, usually the present or recent past. Classifying a party based on an observation at a fixed point denies the possibility that changes to a party’s personnel, support base or the broader political or social system can influence party programs or appeals.

Why do these fallacies matter? The fallacy of common sense matters when classifying borderline observations. A study can survive small misclassifications or errors of omission; small parties are invariably missed even in single-country studies. But consider the “size of the country’s Radical Right” as a DV of interest. If one excludes the Swiss People’s Party, Switzerland’s Radical Right is exceptionally small by West European standards (<1%), but inclusion makes it the largest in Western Europe (>29% as of 2007). Does Portugal have a Radical Right? Including the “borderline” People’s Party, Portugal’s Radical Right is robust (7.3% as of 2005) while exclusion finds it non-existent (0.02%). Errors in classification affect how observations are selected and can ultimately introduce fatal error when explaining cross-national variation. Including the center-Right Spanish People’s Party, Portuguese People’s Party or Italian National Alliance under the Radical Right rubric would suggest that unemployment or an authoritarian legacy are critical for the Radical Right’s success. Excluding these parties could point to competing explanatory factors, like immigration or crime.

Failing to correctly classify parties across time introduces similar issues. For example, think of changes in Radical Right support between elections as the DV of interest. In 1973 the Danish Progress Party, formed to contest the election, went from 0% to 15.9% of the vote, the highest value of the DV since 1960. But in 1973 the Progress Party mobilized voters with anti-tax, anti-statist slogans, while immigration and “law and
order,” the issues most frequently associated with the contemporary Radical Right, were entirely absent.\textsuperscript{43} If being a member of the Radical Right requires an ardent nationalism or opposition to immigration, which the Progress Party would go on to adopt in the 1980s, the value of the DV for Denmark in 1973 is actually “0,” as the Progress Party was not a member of the party family. Even if parties that are neo-liberal or anti-immigrant are included under the Radical Right umbrella, including both sub-groups in the same empirical analysis makes little sense unless the same explanatory variables are believed to be driving both outcomes.

Past decision rules used to establish Radical Right membership uniformly suffer from one of three deficiencies: 1) they are atheoretic; 2) they contradict the actual appeals of the parties they identify; or 3) they fail to create mutually exclusive party families. The standard atheoretic classification relies on the placement of parties on a Left-Right scale by experts or surveys of public opinion.\textsuperscript{44} Spatial decision rules often suffer from the \textit{fallacy of common sense} and may as a whole be tautological. If most voters self-identify as being “moderate” and experts accept this assumption, any success by an “extreme” party could influence future evaluations of that party’s placement, rather than call into question voter placement or a unidimensional Left-Right continuum. Furthermore, spatial placements are not necessarily comparable across time or space. What is “extreme” in one country or time period can be “moderate” in another. The “fringe” ecological parties of the 1980s are established political actors today, though their appeals are not substantially different.

\textsuperscript{43} Andersen and Bjorklund, in Hainsworth (2000).

\textsuperscript{44} For example, Jackman and Volpert (1996) define the Radical Right as the party furthest to the right in a political system, as defined by country experts. This however created a category containing the majority, “center-right” Spanish Popular Party and the “neo-fascist” German NPD.
A second atheoretic decision rule looks at a party’s legacy, the organization the party claims to originate from, or the origin of its functionaries. In the case of the Radical Right, this equates to connections with the Fascist and National Socialist movements of the 1920s and 1930s. However, classification by legacy falls under the fallacy of myopia; there is no logical argument that today’s party organization should always bear a resemblance to prior iterations.

Most scholars agree that these atheoretic decision rules are insufficient or endogenous to the phenomenon and that party ideology, the collection of ideas through which parties view politics, or party strategy, the collection of appeals that parties utilize when contesting elections, are a better basis for a decision rule. Of course, what constitutes a Radical Right ideology is contested. Mudde (1995) identifies at least 26 different definitions of “Right Wing Extremism” using 58 identifiers, with only five mentioned in at least half the proposed definitions. But even the identifiers consistently mentioned frequently suffer from one of two shortcomings.

First, many popular identifiers fail to describe at least some of the parties commonly associated with the Radical Right, making these identifiers insufficient to describe the “family.” Over time “fascist,” “post-fascist,” or “neo-fascist” have been most frequently used identifiers. But fascist is itself a fuzzy classification containing a number of characteristics, including extreme nationalism, rejection of democracy,

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46 The five identifiers are nationalism, racism, xenophobia, rejection of democracy, and a strong state/law and order.
47 For example see Lipset (1960) or Ignazi (1992).
rejection of pluralism and egalitarianism, social conservatism and a state-centered, corporatist economy. ⁴⁸

Two features of fascism are especially absent among the target parties. First, few argue for a corporatist economic policy. For example, the Austrian Freedom Party or the Danish Progress Party have consistently advocated reducing state control over the economy, through the privatization of national industries. On the other hand, many paint the “new Radical Right” as “neo-liberal,” but this identifier is equally faulty. ⁴⁹ Most of the parties in question do not reject the welfare state, but rather are domestic and international welfare chauvinists. Welfare chauvinists argue that some portion of the population deserves full economic and social protection by the State, while the rest (foreigners or foreign capital) should be excluded to conserve scarce resources or ensure a strong, independent national economy. ⁵⁰

Second, “rejection of democracy” is both a component of fascism and a frequently mentioned identifier in its own right. ⁵¹ But opposition to democracy is illegal and punishable by party ban in a number of European states, making explicit appeals impossible for elites hoping to contest elections and avoid prison. Indeed, the parties in question often reaffirm their commitment to democracy to avoid proscription, rebut attacks from their detractors, or distance themselves from a frankly unpopular policy position. ⁵² While some argue that an anti-democratic discourse is implicit, imputing party intentions runs the risk of undermining falsifiability. Furthermore the explicit, if

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⁴⁸ Hagtvet (1994); Karapin (1998). While “nationalism” is a key feature of “Fascism,” “racism” or “ethnocentrism” are not. These are instead features of “National Socialism.”
⁵¹ Ignazi (1992); Merkl and Weinberg (1993); Fennema (1997); Fieschi (2000).
⁵² Karapin (1998); Mudde (2000); Bale (2003); Ignazi (2003).
anti-liberal or anti-plural, acceptance of democracy as the "rules of the game" even among "extremists" on "Left" and "Right" is an important development in European political culture worthy of explanation in its own right.  

Apart from fascism, "racism" and "xenophobia" are the most frequently named Radical Right identifiers. Probably no term is more frequently leveled than "racism," often used interchangeably with "xenophobia" or "ethnopluralism" despite the conceptual distinctiveness of each. This project conceives of "ethnopluralism" as the belief that ethnic nations carry unique biological and cultural traits and capacities. "Racism" is ethnopluralism with the additional belief that ethnic differences produce an inherent superiority or hierarchy. "Xenophobia" is the rejection of any elements deemed foreign or "strange," which might include immigrants, religious minorities, foreign capital, the homeless, gays and lesbians, the "counter culture," and so forth.

"Racism" as an idea in Western Europe shares a similar trajectory to "opposition to democracy": fashionable in the 1930s, discredited in the 1940s, proscribed post-war through laws against "inciting racial hatred" and subsequently taken off the table as a legitimate political appeal. Even so, Carter's (2005) review of past research on Radical Right ideology finds that certain parties, particularly fascist or post-fascist parties

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53 Mudde (2007) argues that Radical Right parties are not opposed to democracy, but rather to liberal democracy, with some minorities or "unwanted" elements stripped of the political rights and equal protection that the "good, pure" national majority receives in full.
55 Carter's (2005) definition of "racism," for example, is actually "ethnopluralism." "Incitement to racial hatred" is illegal in a number of states, but the conceptual difficulty in identifying the term has made successful prosecution difficult, despite nearly every major "Radical Right" party or its key functionaries being charged at some point in the last twenty years.
Southern Europe, are neither racist, nor ethnopluralist, nor xenophobic, making all three incapable of identifying a party family.

Fascism, neo-liberalism, racism and xenophobia all fail to accurately identify a number of parties conventionally treated as Radical Right. But the identifiers that do accurately describe the Radical Right often fail to create mutually exclusive categories, meaning that members of one party family can be distinguished from members of all others.\textsuperscript{56} One set of identifiers fails to distinguish the Radical Right from the “Radical Left,” usually referring to Communist, anti-Globalization or Ecological movements. Identifiers such as “populist,” “anti-establishment,” or “anti-system” apply equally well to parties on the Left and Right.\textsuperscript{57} Such classifications have an additional weakness in that they identify a strategy rather than an ideology.\textsuperscript{58} Whether a party is “anti-system” or “populist” may be endogenous to their position in the political system...whether they are “outsiders” or “insiders” when it comes to forming governments or implementing policy. For example, after joining the government in 2000 the Austrian Freedom Party (FPOe) modified its attacks on its partner the OeVP and the political system it now represented.\textsuperscript{59} Like Left-Right placement, any identifier contingent on party success is unsatisfactory.

Another set of identifiers, falling under the rubric of “conservatism,” accurately captures the Radical Right; this includes terms such as “social conservative,” “ultra-conservative,” “family” or “traditional values,” or “law and order.” While relative

\textsuperscript{56} Carter (2005) applies this logic within the Radical Right “family,” but not externally.
\textsuperscript{57} Sartori (1976); Andersen (1992); Betz (1994a); Betz (1994b); Betz and Swank (1995); Taggart (1995); Kitschelt and McGann (1995, 2005); Betz and Immerfall (1998); Fieschi (2000); Ryndgren (2004). Sartori describes “anti-system” parties as those that go against the views of all other parties in the system.
\textsuperscript{58} Pfahl-Traughber (1993); Carter (2005).
\textsuperscript{59} Luther, in Merkl and Weinberg (eds) (1993).
conservatism might be a necessary condition, it is not sufficient, as it fails to distinguish
the Radical Right from other “Right” party groupings (Christian-democrats;
Conservatives; Liberals); for example, the programs of the Christian-democratic CSU
and the “Radical Right” Republikaner (REP) both criminalize abortion and oppose civil
unions for gay and lesbian couples.60 “Tough on crime” appeals, such as tougher
sentencing for drug dealers or child molesters, opposition to needle giveaways for heroin
addicts, or more police on the streets, are similarly common among center-Right or Right
parties. Similarly “nationalism” (not to be conflated with ethnic nationalism), “jingoism”
or “ultra-patriotism,” are not exclusively the domain of the Radical Right.61 For example,
in the 1960s and 1970s the Christian-democratic German CDU and CSU vehemently
attacked social-democratic SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, which tacitly
recognized the borders of the former West and East Germany, on the grounds that Brandt
was betraying German national interests.

I take a first cut at a Radical Right party family using two characteristics. First,
any candidate party has to be socially conservative for its national context, making it
“Right.” Economic identifiers are excluded as they consistently fail to capture the
ideologies or strategies of many parties commonly associated with the party family.62
Second, any candidate party must advocate increasing the economic or social power of its
supporters by permanently reducing or eliminating the basic rights of its opponents,
making it “Radical” or “Exclusionary.” This includes parties that are entirely anti-
democratic (authoritarian; monarchist; fascist; totalitarian) or opposed to co-operation or

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62 Mudde (2007).
co-existence with some part of the population (religious fundamentalist; racial exclusionary; exclusionary nationalist; anti-immigrant). This characteristic captures parties of the Right that challenge the “rules of the game,” whereas parties of the center-Right (whether classical Liberal or Conservative) accept that their opponents should share roughly the same basic set of rights and privileges as their supporters.63

The inclusion of monarchism and religious fundamentalism represents a broader definition of the European Radical Right than the existing literature, which focuses heavily on extreme nationalism and xenophobia. It also excludes some parties commonly associated with the Radical Right, like the populist anti-statist Danish Progress Party of the 1970s or hard line conservative Italian National Alliance. But this definition bounds the phenomenon in a way that clearly and consistently finds common cause for the parties within the party family, while building distinct barriers between the party family and all other groupings of parties. In contextualizing the appeals by a country’s status quo, this definition is applicable to parties across countries and across time. It captures the commonalities between the “old,” fascist or authoritarian Radical Right and the “modern,” anti-immigrant Radical Right, while still distinguishing these parties from the Radical Left and other parties of the Right.

What are “Nativist” Parties?

The diverse nature of the Radical Right party family has increasingly led scholars to recognize that the most fruitful avenue of research involves identifying one or more sub-groups, which are then studied in isolation to identify key causal factors.64 This

63 Mudde (2007).
64 Most scholars, such as Ignazi (1992), Betz (1994), Fennema (1997), Fieschi (2000), and Golder (2003) identify two sub-families, a “new” “neo-liberal”, “populist” Radical Right and an “old” “authoritarian”, 

section focuses on perhaps the prominent sub-group in the modern Radical Right: those parties making explicitly “anti-immigrant” appeals. This sub-group was chosen for two reasons. First, the “anti-immigrant” phenomenon carries its own important theoretical and policy implications. Second, the historically major “anti-immigrant” parties (the Austrian Freedom Party, French National Front, or Belgian Vlaams Blok) also drove the growth of the Radical Right from the 1980s. Explaining the success of “anti-immigrant” parties therefore explains much, but not all, of the increase in Radical Right support.

Rather than “anti-immigrant,” this party terms this subgroup “nativist.” Nativist parties are those parties that make appeals to natives as an ethnic category central and explicit in their campaigns and programs, primarily by offering to champion the interests of the native ethnic majority. An ethnic party, refers to a party that makes 1) championing an ethnic category (or categories) on an ethnic identity dimension central to how they conceptualize politics; 2) makes appeals to this category or categories explicit; and 3) excludes a salient ethnic category in their appeals. Centrality refers to appeals at the core of a party’s strategy or ideology; these appeals are not “lip service.” Explicit appeals are those with no or minimal ambiguity about the ethnic categories a party appeals to. An ethnic category “refers to the nominal members of an ascriptive category”

“fascist” Extreme Right. Kitschelt and McGann (1995) identify four categories (fascists, non-fascist xenophobes, a “New Radical Right” combining xenophobia and neo-liberalism, and anti-Statists) and Carter (2005) five, based on a combination of 1) racism; 2) xenophobia; or 3) anti-democratic appeals. Some scholars, such as Ignazi (1992) or Hainsworth (1992) have explicit expectations about which sub-family will do better, while others, such as Kitschelt and McGann (1995) or Golder (2003), argue that certain sub-categories will do better under certain conditions.

65 Minkenberg and Schain, in Merkl and Weinberg (eds) (2003), Carter (2005) and Muddde (2007) use identifiers similar to anti-pluralism, though Minkenberg and Schain refer to it as “ultra-homogenization,” while Carter calls it “anti-egalitarianism” (of which anti-pluralism is a sub-set) and adds an anti-democratic requirement.

66 Chandra (2004), pg. 2.
on a dimension of ethnic identity “such as race, language, caste, tribe, or religion.” An ethnic identity dimension represents a classification capable of capturing all conceptually linked categories under a single rubric (race, language, etc.). Individuals qualify for ethnic categories on a particular dimension by holding certain attributes; characteristics, usually acquired through descent (such as ancestry, birthplace, skin tone, etc.) that are commonly associated with an ethnic category. The nature of attributes is such that individuals might qualify for multiple categories. For example, a child with one black and one white parent may have attributes that qualify them as “white,” “black,” or “mixed” on a racial identity dimension. Attributes are also contextual; a category on one dimension might be an attribute on another. For example, “Prussian” is a historical category on the ethnic identity dimensions “regions” and “German regions,” while “Prussian” would also represent a qualifying attribute for the category “German” on a dimension capturing “nation.”

An ethnic party’s goals and strategy are straightforward: they explicitly offer to advance the interests of a particular ethnic category. Their goal is to convince as many members of category as possible to support the party, using negative or positive appeals. They can offer benefits (which might be material or symbolic) that leave their target voters no worse off in the aggregate than they were before the election. Or they can offer to ensure that other ethnic categories are no better off in the aggregate than they were before the election, thereby promising to make their target categories no worse off.

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67 As does Chandra (2004), I differentiate “category” from “group” as “group” implies conscious belonging, while “category” implies an attribution of belonging that can come from an individual or a political or social system.
An ethnic party is not synonymous with a nationalist party. An ethnic nation or nationality is a nominal aggregation of individuals larger than a single community or extended family sharing descent-based attributes associated with a common ancestral origin. This definition is similar to past definitions of an ethnie and ignores additional requirements, such as a shared culture, location, language or religion.\(^{69}\) It also allows for individuals to contextually associate with multiple nations. For example, a Christian from Flanders and a Jew from Wallonia may both identify as “Belgian,” despite lacking a shared language or religion, or they may choose to identify as “Flemish” or “Wallonian.”\(^{70}\)

A nation however represents a more or less static geographic space. Members of the nation are those individuals formally recognized as belonging to the nation, for example through citizenship. Irish-Americans, Japanese-Americans and Mexican-Americans are all nationalities within the nation that is the United States. An ethnic nationalist party in the United States might make appeals exclusively to Irish-Americans. A nationalist or jingoist party, however, utilizes unwavering patriotism to mobilize State and society (the “nation”), usually to overcome external threats. Jingoist parties can therefore appeal to a “nation” without specifying an ethnic requirement for belonging, a “civic” nationalism, determined by duration of residence in a particular territory or adherence to a particular ideal rather than a set of descent-based attributes.\(^{71}\) Indeed, internal ethnic divisions might be actively downplayed by a jingoist party to remove alternative sources of legitimacy to the State (“we need to set aside our differences for the

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\(^{69}\) Smith (1986).
\(^{70}\) As Gellner (1983) notes, there are far more potential than salient nationalities; today there are for example few or no individuals self-identifying as “Bohemians.”
\(^{71}\) Brubaker (1992); Snyder (2000).
good of the country”). Finally, the threat a jingoist party mobilizes against might be pitched in non-ethnic terms (“we must protect Germany against the threat of Communism”).

Of course, ethnic nationalists can also be jingoists, and vice-versa. Ethnic parties representing categories in control of the State can argue that ethnic minorities need to assimilate or be expelled to strengthen national unity. A party that is ethnic nationalist and jingoist could make appeals to co-ethnics in neighboring states, such as Russian parties promising to protect Russian minorities in South Ossetia. Finally, parties that are jingoist and ethnic nationalist can pitch the threat in ethnic terms. The German NSDAP made appeals to “Germans” as an ethnic category and pitching external threats on its eastern border in ethnic terms (Aryans vs. Slavs). While the parties in question frequently represent ethnic categories that control the levers of the State and are frequently jingoist as well as ethnic nationalist, these categories are not synonymous.

“Anti-immigrant” parties are further distinguished from other ethnic parties by the identifier “nativist.” Nativist is a term of American origin, describing parties mobilizing against Catholic and Irish immigrants in the 1830s. But “nativism” fits comfortably into an ethnic party schema. A nativist party is one that 1) makes the native ethnic category central to how they conceptualize politics; 2) makes their appeals to this category explicit; and 3) excludes some or all “non-natives” in their appeals. Like other ethnic parties, nativist parties promise to leave natives better off in the aggregate, or at least no worse off, than they were before the election.

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73 By promising to preserve the category’s group position; Blumer (1958) or Fry (2007).
Similarly, “native” as a concept fits into the dimension-category-attribute schema of identity, but unpacking which attributes constitute the native category is no small task. Is a native an individual with citizenship? An individual whose parents were born in a particular territory? This project takes a broad view, defining a native as any individual who holds attributes that most other individuals in a territory regard as common to the territory. These attributes almost certainly include birth in the territory or being descent from individuals born in that territory, but may additionally require a shared language, dialect, race, nationality, religion, culture, etc. This definition acknowledges that the native category is contextual; a native is anyone who would typically be identified as native by others (correctly or not) and not one definition will fit every context.

Moreover, like many ethnic categorizations native and immigrant are contested social constructions. Both natives and immigrants can use juridical or institutional means to officially revise who does or does not belong to a category, or they can use informal campaigns to alter public perceptions.

Other simpler, less ambiguous decision rules for identifying natives can be rejected on various grounds. Institutional categorizations, such as recognition of citizenship or permanent residence, are clearly insufficient by themselves. It is clear that naturalization is insufficient for nativist parties and their supporters to assuage their opposition to immigration, unless that naturalization is accompanied by a full cultural assimilation that borders on ethnic assimilation. Indeed, nativists often argue that naturalization laws are too relaxed and grant individuals who “do not belong” access to

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74 We also note that a category on certain identity dimensions might be an attribute on others. For example, “native” on a particular country’s identity dimension category might include the attribute “white”, while “white” is itself a category on the racial identity dimension.


76 Horowitz (1985).
the rights and resources of the State. Similarly, birthplace alone is insufficient to classify someone as a native. Individuals with attributes qualifying them for the racial category "black" or the national category "Japanese" might be a German citizen, born in Germany and fluent in German, though other Germans might regularly ask them "where [they] learned such good German!" The reverse is also true; the child of diplomats or soldiers could be born on foreign soil and raised abroad, only to be treated as a native when they return to their parents' country of origin years or decades later.

That such "false positives" and "false negatives" occur suggests a disconnect between the attributes held by individuals born in a territory and the attributes perceived by society to be native. Part of this disconnect comes from social lag: it takes time for the population to recognize that the attributes of a past migrant group are plausible for natives to hold. In the mid-19th Century the attribute "Irish" would unambiguously categorize someone in the United States as a "foreigner." By the mid-20th Century, however, "Irish" would be insufficient without appraising further attributes (accent or birthplace). It is likely that the more attributes one shares with other "natives," the better able they are to pass. An American with "Germanic" attributes (blond hair; blue eyes) living in Austria may be visually mistaken for an Austrian, but may still be categorized as foreign by language. A German in Austria might pass even under verbal scrutiny, unless differences in dialect are especially strong. Conversely there third generation Turks in Germany are often still perceived as foreign. Why certain categories are more readily identified as native and how that process occurs is beyond the scope of this project.77

77 It could be that the number of shared attributes matters, or the duration or volume with which those attributes are present in the main society, or that some attributes are more essential than others. Or it could be that attributes are evaluated by what percentage of their holders are recent immigrants versus tenured
Just as ethnic nationalism can be disentangled from jingoism, nativist parties are not necessarily ethnic nationalist or jingoist. Nationality refers to common descent and traditions, while nativeness is tied to issues of territory. Conceivably, two individuals could share a nationality but not a native land and nativists could mobilize against immigrants from a common nation, for example a Japanese party mobilizing against those returning from South America after several generations abroad. Weiner’s (1978) seminal work on nativism in India focused on processes that were entirely internal to one nation (India), as the residents one sub-national region mobilized against migrants from others …nativism sans jingoism. Again, while historical factors have created a situation where West European nativist parties are usually ethnic nationalist and jingoist parties, one categorization does not automatically imply the others.

Finally, while scholars can make clean and precise statements about what it means to be explicit regarding ethnic categories, the everyday social and political discourse is under no obligation to adhere to such decision rules. For example, the native/immigrant identity dimension should have at least two fairly straightforward categories, “natives” and “immigrants” or “foreigners.” However, consider three statements:

- “We should reserve jobs for Germans.”
- “German should be the national language.”
- “No minarets on Austrian soil. Islamists out!”

Each statement identifies categories on an ethnic identity dimension other than the native/immigrant (nationality, language and religion, respectively). But all three are also settlers. For example, though individuals of Mexican descent have lived in the United States for over 150 years, individuals with attributes identifying them as “Mexican” are often perceived as “immigrants” by the broader society.
attributes or nested categories associated with the native and immigrant categories in Germany and Austria. In the case of natives, this shorthand refers to attributes used to qualify for the native category, though these appeals might not exclude all immigrants. An appeal to German [language] would capture all natives, but also recent immigrants from Switzerland. Conversely, in the case of immigrants shorthand might refer to nested categories within the larger immigrant group (Russian immigrants, Muslim immigrants) that does not however exclude all immigrants. Finally, none of these appeals are coded. While none of them directly refer to natives and immigrants, at the same time none of them are ambiguously non-ethnic; the only decision to be made is which ethnic identity dimension they are appealing on.

The ability to engage in “obvious” or “shorthand” nativist appeals suggests four coding rules. First, if a category on the native/immigrant identity dimension is explicitly named (“native”; “immigrant”; “foreigner”; “asylum-seeker”), the appeal is coded as nativist. It is important to distinguish here between naming categories on this identity dimension and naming issues related to the identity dimension. Terms such as “immigration,” “asylum” or “migration” are coded as ambiguous without further context, as they refer to policies which may or may not have an ethnic component, rather than categories of people identified by their descent-based attributes. Second, if the appeal names a category on another ethnic identity dimension, but that category was not present in significant numbers before any of the current residents were born (that is, it could only refer to recent immigrants), the appeal is nativist (as well as ethnic on another identity
dimension). Appeals that do not meet this condition are non-nativist, but are still ethnic.

Third, if the appeal names a category on another ethnic identity dimension, but that category represents attributes held by virtually every member of a territory before any of the current residents were born (that is, attributes that could only be held by natives), I code it as nativist, except as specified under the final rule. Fourth and finally, when the formal name of a citizenry is synonymous with the name of an ethnic category ("German" [citizenship] vs. "German" [nationality]), it is coded as ambiguous and further modifiers are considered to establish whether it qualifies under rule #3. Specifically, if the appeal refers to external political considerations (such as defending Germans from Communism), it is coded as non-nativist but possibly ethnic (on another identity dimension), whereas if the appeal could only refer to internal political considerations (defending Germans from immigration), it is coded as nativist. If the appeal refers to the "citizenry" (Buerger), "population" (Bevoelkerung) or "people" (Menschen) it is coded as non-nativist, unless it refers to the Volk, which can mean nation as populace (non-ethnic) or as ethnie (ethnic); in this case it is coded as ambiguous without further context.

Rule #1 captures "obvious," non-contextual nativism. Rules #2 and #3 capture nativism that is not obvious to someone observing a society from afar, but at the same

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78 By this logic "Russian" or "Muslim" as excluded ethnic categories would be coded as nativist in Germany, but "Jew" or "Sorb" (historic, internal ethnic minorities) would not. "Significant" is admittedly contextual.

79 For example "German" [language]. On the other hand, "German" [nationality] in the former Austro-Hungarian empire would not be coded as nativist, as it excludes significant portions of the past population (such as Hungarians or Bohemians). One possible violation of this rule is the category Atheist [religion]; the emergence of Atheism as an identity alters a country’s religious demography, but does not require immigration. "Virtually every member" is contextual.
time is not coded for those living in the society; it captures shorthand nativism, where terms are used to refer to multiple dimensions of ethnicity. Rule #2 captures ethnic identifiers that could only be used to refer to recent immigrants, whereas Rule #3 captures ethnic identifiers that could only be relevant if changes to the distribution of ethnic attributes generated by immigration were recent or ongoing. Rule #4 is a special instance of rules #2 and #3. While complex, these four decision rules provide a basis for capturing both obvious and shorthand nativism. At the same time, these rules exclude more subjective coded appeals intended to activate ethnic frames, such as “drug dealers,” “welfare queens,” or “inner city youth.”

The nativist definition requires two further clarifications regarding the way ethnic parties (of which nativist parties are a subset) approach politics. First, ethnic parties are by no means “single-issue” parties. Indeed, they may formulate complicated economic, social or environmental policies; they simply frame some or all of these policies in ethnic terms. While a non-ethnic party might promise to combat unemployment by deficit spending, an ethnic party might promise to do so by giving job priority to co-ethnics. Both means are proposed to resolve the same problem, but they approach the problem in very different ways. Second, an ethnic party’s appeals should not be assumed to be wholly, or even primarily, negative; that is an ethnic party is not necessarily interested in denying other categories resources or rights for the sake of doing so. Instead, ethnic parties may see themselves as pro-ingroup, but competing in a zero-sum game between ethnic categories. While an appeal may reject social benefits for foreigners, it is also designed to preserve benefits for natives. Why negative or positive appeals are chosen when both are available on most issues is beyond the scope of the project.
My definition of nativism has three implications for the way Radical Right parties, ethnic parties and nativist parties overlap. First, not all Radical Right parties are nativist, or even ethnic. South European monarchist and "post-fascist" parties of the 1970s and 1980s might be Radical Right and might share certain traits (social conservatism, anti-pluralism) with nativist parties. But unless they forward policies based on a division of society into natives and immigrants, their success or failure would not be relevant to a study of nativism. By the same token, parties that abandon nativist appeals would no longer be considered nativist in subsequent elections, though the decision to abandon these appeals might itself be relevant. The reverse is also true: not all ethnic parties are Radical Right parties. The Scottish National Party in Great Britain or the South Schleswig Voters' Association (representing northern Germany's Danish minority) certainly proclaim to champion a specific ethnic category and their appeals are just as exclusive as other ethnic parties; they do not proclaim to represent the English, or Welsh, or Germans. The appeals these parties make however are not necessarily considered "radical" or "Right."

Finally, there is nothing preventing a party of the "Left" from adopting a nativist appeal, though due to historical circumstances in Western Europe this category is an empty set. For example, an indigenous ethnic category in South America with little economic power might make appeals against recent West European immigrants who monopolize a country's economic resources. The appeals these parties make could therefore be "ethnic" and "nativist" (championing the ethnic category "indigenous") but also "Marxist" or "socialist" (calling for economic redistribution).

Figure 2.1: Ethnic Parties and the Radical Right
In sum, nativism is an ethnicity-based movement with a worldview and appeals based at least partially on dividing society into the categories native and immigrant or foreigner. Natives and immigrants construct, and contest, the categories on the native/immigrant identity dimension based on some series of attributes, possibly including birthplace, ancestry, skin tone, religion, and/or language. Nativist parties promise to leave the native ethnic category no worse off in the aggregate than they were before an election. As a result of cultural and historical circumstances in Western Europe nativist parties are probably, but not necessarily, also jingoist, ethnic nationalist and socially conservative parties of the Right and possibly, but not necessarily, also fascist or neo-liberal parties.

The Radical Right in Germany and Austria as Nativist Parties

This section analyzes two sources of data to create objective and replicable standards for establishing whether a party is nativist. It establishes guidelines for coding a party using either one of two sources: 1) party programs or 2) campaign appeals. Considering the environment in which these parties operate (as the frequent targets of invective), statements by other parties or indirect quotes in the media do not constitute evidence. Evidence was collected for parties frequently associated with nativism. For both countries, the main Christian-democratic party (the CDU in Germany and the OeVP in Austria) was included as a contrasting observation.

One method for establishing a party’s credentials is to code its official party program.\(^{80}\) Party programs are formal, observable statements of intent that are approved by key functionaries and generally reflect the party’s ideology. Programs are often

\(^{80}\) Which is distinct from a party’s election program.
comprehensive, clearly explaining the party's worldview and policies on a range of subjects. Despite their current ease of accessibility on the Internet, however, party programs are not a document commonly transmitted to voters to establish the party's priorities. Indeed, in many countries party programs are entirely unrepresentative of a party's actual goals. Furthermore, programs tend to change slowly and may no longer properly represent the image a party hopes to communicate; the parties in this analysis publish a formal program of basic principles roughly once every two to three elections.

A preferred method of establishing a party's nativist credentials is to look at its campaign appeals, specifically posters and print-media advertisements. Campaign appeals are reevaluated by party functionaries every election and only emphasize the most important issues parties want to communicate to voters, thereby conveying the party's strategy but also its recent ideological innovations. There are three difficulties in coding campaign appeals. First, the limited space or time a party has to make an appeal lends itself to ambiguity. Second, parties frequently vary their appeals during an election, making them difficult to comprehensively catalog and evaluate. Finally, party appeals are more difficult to catalogue across time, whereas programs are documents that lend themselves to preservation by archives. To compensate for this last problem, historical primary and secondary sources were drawn on to provide as accurate a historical coding as possible for earlier election periods. For parties coded as contemporary nativist parties, a search was conducted to establish the earliest period for which they can be coded as a nativist party.

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81 For example, party programs are completely unrepresentative of party appeals in India; Chandra (2004).
82 The content of a party's radio or television transmissions could not be considered systematically across parties or across time.
Two criteria were evaluated for each source. First, is the native/immigrant identity dimension central to a party’s appeals? Does the party make this dimension a main focus of their ideology or campaign strategy? When considering campaign appeals, centrality was a question of volume and weight; how many of a party’s appeals reference the native/immigrant dimension and how prominent were those appeals in the campaign? Depending on the circumstances, one appeal might come to dominate a campaign despite a party’s effort to appeal to voters on multiple issues. When looking at party programs, centrality was established by looking at the program’s frame. A party’s frame appears in its opening statement refers to the context for the party’s foundation or its guiding principles; a frame is a kind of ideological “mission statement. For example, a party preamble that states the party was founded to “advance the cause of liberalism” should advocate policies generally consistent with that goal.

Second, does a party explicitly include or exclude categories on the native/immigrant identity dimension? Does a party purport to be the “party of natives” or pitch themselves as the only party that can “protect our country from foreigners?” Does the party use shorthand categories that could only refer to natives and recent immigrants, for example calling for the primacy of the German language or the repatriation of Muslim immigrants?

My analysis of a party’s campaign appeals and platforms identifies at least three distinct conceptual categories, presented in Table 2.1. Parties were coded using campaign appeals as the default source and party programs as a backup if insufficient information was available.
Table 2.1: Party Classifications Based on Nativist Content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nativist (Central and Explicit)</strong></td>
<td>The party frames its program or campaign in terms of the native/immigrant identity or issue dimension and the party explicitly names ethnic categories (either categories that it seeks to mobilize or categories that it seeks to exclude) when referencing native/immigrant issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ambiguously Nativist (Central or Explicit)</strong></td>
<td>1. The party frames its program or campaign in terms of the native/immigrant ethnic identity dimension, but does not reference specific categories in its policy appeals (for example, “we need a smart immigration policy” references the dimension but does not explicitly defend or attack ethnic categories) (Non-Explicit); or 2. The party does not frame politics in terms of the native/immigrant dimension, but refers to a policy or makes an appeal that explicitly targets ethnic categories on the native/immigrant identity dimension (“we need to reduce the number of foreigners”) (Non-Central).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Nativist</strong></td>
<td>1. The party frames politics with no reference to the native/immigrant identity dimension and the party does not name categories on the native/immigrant identity dimension (Non-Nativist 1); or 2. The party does name categories on the native/immigrant identity dimension, but the party does not exclude any category in its appeals (for example, “we believe all natives and immigrants should live in peace”) (Non-Nativist 2).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A party was coded as *nativist* for periods in which 1) its campaign appeals were nativist; or 2) its campaign appeals were ambiguous but its program nativist. In the second case, it may be that appeals are missing, which is especially likely for earlier elections, or that the party is interested in forwarding ambiguous formal appeals to prospective voters while remaining clear in its convictions to its base. A non-nativist program combined with nativist appeals was still sufficient to code a party as nativist; it may be that the program is unimportant, or was not updated to capture recent strategic or ideological shifts. Nativist is not meant to be pejorative; rather it is an accurate categorical descriptor of a party’s self-representation in its program or campaign appeals.

A party was coded as *ambiguously nativist* if its program and appeals were ambiguously nativist for a particular period, or if the party ran an entirely non-nativist
campaign while maintaining an unambiguously nativist program. Some parties might adopt a non-nativist worldview while at the same time strategically targeting nativist voters with ambiguous appeals. This strategy is intended to avoid alienating established supporters not interested in (or turned off by) nativist appeals while at the same time appealing voters who might otherwise support a nativist party. For other parties, the disconnect between program and appeals could suggest that the program is a relic of a past ideology, or that nativism is a latent aspect of the party’s views. While the cross-national data quality is insufficient for ambiguous parties to be disentangled from nativist or non-nativist parties in the empirical analysis in Chapter 6, these parties represent analytical categories that are theoretically possible and potentially quite important. For example, if a nativist party gains voters during elections in which the native/immigrant identity dimension is particularly salient, does an ambiguously nativist party reap the same benefit? If two parties are competing during an election, for example on nativist party and one ambiguously nativist party on the Center-Right, does the presence of the latter reduce the gains of the former?

Finally, a party was coded as unambiguously non-nativist if either its campaign appeals or program were entirely non-nativist and the other source no more than ambiguous. In both cases, a party might pay lip service to an issue or identity dimension salient in the public discourse, but have no strong conviction about their appeal or position. Or the party may choose to portray the native/immigrant dimension as entirely non-ethnic, which is coded as at most ambiguous [non-explicit], focusing on the objective economic, social or bureaucratic costs and benefits of immigration rather than targeting specific groups in their appeals for inclusion or exclusion. “Non-nativist” is a residual
category, capturing social-democrats, Christian-democrats, monarchists, ecologists, communists, fascists and neo-liberals. It also captures parties that are *multi-ethnic* (Chandra 2004) or *reconciliationist*, parties that recognize the native/immigrant identity dimension and make explicit appeals based on that dimension, but do not *exclude* any categories in their appeals. The CDU’s party program adopts a reconciliationist approach, as did campaign appeals in 2006 by the Austrian Greens (“We can live without hatred against foreigners”).

### Table 2.2: Assigning Values to Parties Based on Nativist Content

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign Program</th>
<th>Nativist</th>
<th>Ambiguous</th>
<th>Non-Nativist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Non-Nativist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Nativist</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>Non-Nativist</td>
<td>Non-Nativist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Campaign Appeals**

The primary evidence of campaign appeals comes from the 2005 German national election, the 2005 state election in Rheinland-Pfalz (Germany) and the 2006 Austrian national election. In each case, the collection of campaign materials was exhaustive. The German elections are considered together, as they were held within six months of one another and the appeals made during the national election remained fresh in the minds of voters. In addition, a historical database of campaign appeals by the five parties hypothesized to be nativist was constructed, consisting of approximately 500 campaign posters or print-media advertisements published since the late 1980s.  

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83 My three sources are 1) the Austrian National Library’s *Poster Database*, which has a large collection of political posters since roughly 1990; 2) four regional newspapers (two in Germany, two in Austria), as well as the FPO’s party newspaper, all but one of which ran advertisements by the target parties; and 3) evidence gathered by Verfassungsschutz reports in Germany. There are four imperfections in the data collected. First, roughly 70-80% of the posters come from the National Library’s database, and therefore it is heavily skewed toward the FPO. Second, none of the sources necessarily represents a comprehensive
For the 2005/2006 election cycle in Germany, the REP contested alone while the NPD and DVU formed a joint list for the federal election, the result of an alliance agreement signed in 2004; a similar offer to the REP was made and refused. Over the course of the federal and Rheinland-Pfalz elections, the REP and NPD/DVU released at least 8 posters each, and the CDU at least 20.

The posters of the CDU and REP/NPD-DVU show a wide disparity in volume and tone regarding native/immigrant issues. For the CDU, the federal election was contested on sweeping statements about a “need for change” and a “better,” “clearer course.” Of at least 14 posters published during the federal election only 5 advocated specific policies, with 4 targeting the economy. The CDU’s campaign in Rheinland-Pfalz was more content-based, with 4 of 6 offering specific policies (on employment, crime, and education). Only one of the 20 posters was even ambiguously nativist. Late in the Rheinland-Pfalz election, the CDU published a poster stating that naturalization would occur “only with course, test, oath,” referring to German-language courses, a test on German history and institutions, and a loyalty oath to the Federal Republic. All three measures were part of a broader discussion about integration in the wake of the 2000 immigration law, which eased the requirements for naturalization. The poster appeared toward the end of the 2006 state and local campaigns and political elites considered it a last-ditch effort by the CDU to siphon support from nativist parties. The poster itself refers to immigration policy without explicitly targeting recent immigrants. Overall, the native/immigrant dimension was neither particularly central nor explicit in the CDU’s campaigns, which were coded as non-nativist.
In contrast, the native/immigrant identity dimension was central and explicit in the campaign appeals of the REP and NPD/DVU. Of the eight appeals published by the NPD/DVU, three referenced the native/immigrant dimension, with the remainder attacking entrenched political elites, the EU, and the alliance between the post-Communist PDS (from the former East Germany) and the social-democratic SPD breakaway WASG (from the former West Germany). The potentially nativist appeals were:

- “Work for Germans!” (ambiguous; Rule #4)
- “Stop ‘Alien Workers’!” (nativist; Rule #1)
- “Have a good trip home!” (nativist; Rule #2)

Each appeal takes a different approach toward describing native/immigrant issues. The first represents a positive appeal to Germans, though it was coded as ambiguous as it could be referring to the state of the economy or to Germans as an ethnic category. The second is a negative appeal on the same issue, playing on a controversial and widely-discussed term (Fremdarbeiter) used by WASG leader Oskar Lafontaine during the national election.84 This appeal has two aims; it makes a policy promise to the native category (fewer foreign workers equaling more jobs for Germans), and it reminds voters that other parties are adopting what the NPD has argued for decades. While the first two appeals tied ethnicity to a specific issue, the third is a blanket rejection of at least some immigrants using visual shorthand. The slogan is accompanied by a picture of four obviously Muslim women; all four wear head scarves and non-Western dress. The message is clear...individuals of Muslim or Arabic/Turkish descent are not Germans, and Germany is not their home.

84 Controversial in that ‘alien workers’ (Fremdarbeiter) was a descriptive category used by the National Socialist regime.
Surprisingly, considering the REP’s German reputation as a “moderate” Radical Right party, compared to the “extremists” in the DVU and NPD, the REP focused even more heavily on immigration. Six of their eight published campaign appeals in 2005/2006 refer to native/immigrant issues:

- “Our Nation [Volk] First!” (ambiguous; Rule #4)
- “German is COOL!” (nativist; rule #3)
- “Islamists Out!” (nativist; Rule #2)
- “German instead of ‘don’t understand’.” (nativist; Rule #3)
- “Social state instead of immigration.” (ambiguous; Rule #1)
- Work for Olek – Hartz IV for Germans? (nativist; Rule #4 [excluded category named])

The REP exclusively used shorthand for their ethnic appeals, describing the native category by its linguistic or nationality-based attributes. When they refer to immigrants, the REP make ambiguous appeals (“immigration”), or they target groups based on specific issues. “Olek” (a traditional Polish name) is shorthand for “cheap Eastern European laborers,” reflecting German concerns in the wake of EU’s eastward expansion in 2004. The party also makes a blanket appeal against “Islamists,” shorthand for Muslim immigrants. Unlike the NPD/DVU, the REP are more likely to make positive appeals (German is good; our own people should come first). They are also more likely to make explicit comparisons between groups, or to identify what they want and what they hope to avoid; German is good because it facilitates communication, or Eastern Europeans are getting more jobs, while Germans are facing benefit cuts.85 Finally, the REP’s statements are zero-sum; one is for immigration or the welfare state.

Historically, nativist appeals by the three German parties go back at least to the late-1980s; this is sufficient for the DVU, which only began contesting elections in

85 “Hartz IV” refers to the fourth round of social welfare cuts (here targeting the long-term unemployed) as recommended by a labor commission led by Peter Hartz of Volkswagen.
In the 1988 state election in Baden-Wuerttemberg, both the REP and NPD published nativist advertisements in the regional Stuttgarter Zeitung. Of the party’s 15 statements, “law and order” (crime, security) and immigration were the party’s central appeals and references to the native/immigrant dimension were explicit:

- “Against the abuse of the Asylum law!” (ambiguous; rule #1)
- “Against voting rights for foreigners!” (nativist; rule #1)
- “For the preferential allocation of open jobs to German workers!” (nativist; rule #4 [explicitly internal politics])

Four days later, the NPD published 15 statements that closely mirrored the REP, down to the specific policies advocated and the wording of the statements:

- “Asylum only for the personally persecuted!” (ambiguous; rule #1)
- “Voting rights and right to Homeland (Heimat) for Germans only!” (nativist; rule #4 [explicitly internal politics])
- “Job preferences for Germans!” (nativist; rule #4 [explicitly internal politics])

The NPD’s nativist appeals certainly precede 1988. The title of the party’s 1980 federal election program was “Germany – A Land of Immigration?”, while their 1986 posters for the Bavarian election called for “Germany for the Germans” (Deutschland den Deutschen). The evidence suggests the NPD’s campaign appeals were nativist at least since 1980, the DVU from its inception in 1987 and the REP at least since 1988.

In Austria, both the FPOe and the BZOe contested the 2006 national election. During the campaign, the FPOe released at least eight posters, the OeVP at least seven and the BZOe at least three nationally. The Kaernten BZOe, led by Joerg Haider, produced several additional appeals and essentially ran a separate campaign. It was clear

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86 See for example the Verfassungsschutz Baden-Wuerttemberg (1987) section on the DVU.
88 Stuttgarter Zeitung, 3/15/88.
from the campaign that the OeVP had no interest in native/immigrant issues, which were never referenced. Indeed, the OeVP rarely mentioned specific issues, instead focusing on the personality of the incumbent Chancellor, Wolfgang Schuessel (“Schuessel: because he can”) and Austria as a land of prosperity (“Austria: things are going well here”).

In contrast, the native/immigrant identity dimension was central and explicit for the FPOe. At least five of the FPOe’s appeals referenced this dimension, and two explicitly referenced out-categories:

- “Duel over Austria: OeVP Schuessel and SPOe Gusenbauer: Mass immigration; record unemployment; Turkey in the EU; “HC Strache: Social security; immigration stop; secure jobs; prevent EU-entry.” (ambiguous; rule #1)
- “At home ['Daham,' colloquial Austrian for ‘Daheim’] instead of Islam.” (nativist; rule #2)
- “German instead of ‘don’t understand’.” (nativist; rule #3)
- “Secure pensions instead of Asylum-millions.” (ambiguous; rule #1)
- “Social state instead of immigration.” (ambiguous; rule #1)

The FPOe was even more likely than the REP to use the “instead of/or” formulation that combined positive and negative appeals. FPOe appeals were focused not only on informing voters about what they were against (immigration, Islam) but also what they supported (social pensions, cultural preservation). Each “instead of/or” formulation suggests that native/immigrant relations are a zero-sum game. Immigration and social welfare are incompatible. Islam and a feeling of being ‘at home’ in one’s (Western, Christian) country are incompatible. “Instead of” statements leaves no room for compromise. Two of the FPOe’s appeals are identical to those of the REP. Whether the FPOe borrowed from the REP or vice-versa is unclear, but the formulation suggests that nativist parties learn from one another cross-nationally. In short, though German Radical Right parties are perceived as being more “extreme” than their Austrian
counterparts and do significantly worse in elections, at least in 2005/2006 no meaningful difference in their campaign appeals despite substantial variation in their vote shares.

For the BZOe, one of its three national posters referenced the native/immigrant identity dimension, calling for a 30% reduction in the foreign-born population (explicitly "foreigners"), an end to asylum abuse, and the deportation of foreign criminals. The "minus 30%" appeal came to dominate the BZOe’s campaign in the late stages. Furthermore, the party’s 11-point electoral program placed native/immigrant issues first ("Austria First: Austria is not a country of immigration") and reiterated the "30% fewer foreigners" promise, to be accomplished through immigration restrictions and the deportation of foreigners who were 1) illegal; 2) criminal; 3) long-term unemployed; or 4) unwilling to integrate. The party argued that failing to control immigration and integrate Austria’s foreign residents would lead to conflicts threatening the entire Austrian society. The BZOe’s reliance in the 2006 national election on the “classic” themes of the FPOe constitutes a nativist strategy.

Historically, there has been a significant shift in the FPOe’s campaign appeals, based on roughly 350 historical FPO appeals collected from the Austrian dailies Kurier and Kleine Zeitung, the FPOe’s party paper (the Neue Freie Zeitung), and past campaign posters collected by the Austrian National Library. Throughout the 1980s the FPOe’s mainly attacked the privileges of the political ruling class (the two major parties) or called for lower taxes and a smaller state, an anti-statist or neo-liberal strategy. While the FPOe continued using anti-statist appeals during the 1990 federal election, an advertisement released in the daily Kurier expressed opposition to voting rights or early

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90 BZOe Wahlprogramm (2006), pg. 8.
91 BZOe Wahlprogramm (2006), pg. 6.
naturalization for "foreigners." Another advocated repatriating "more than 100,000 illegal foreigners" in order to aid in the rebuilding of post-Communist Poland. Indeed, discussions of native/immigrant issues featured prominently in 4 of the 6 editions of the party newspaper published (weekly) before the election and was a self-described "recurring theme" in the party's campaign speeches. During the 1986 national election and the 1987 round of state elections, native/immigrant issues were mentioned exactly in exactly one headline in the party paper. This suggests that the FPOe’s appeals were nativist at least from the 1990 federal election.

**Party Programs**

To conduct the analysis of party programs, the latest program was collected for each party under analysis. For the historical coding, secondary sources describing past programs or programmatic changes were used and earlier programs collected if possible. Yearly reports by the German *Verfassungsschutz* (Office of Constitutional Protection), which monitors potentially "extremist" movements in Germany, were especially useful.

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93 *Kurier*, 9/7/1990.
94 *Neue Freie Zeitung*, 9/27/90. The other themes named were taxes, fiscal austerity (deficits) and attacks on the "Social Partnership" system.
95 A database was assembled consisting of *Neue Freie Zeitung* headlines for every election period (the six weeks prior to an election) from 1981 to the present for national elections and state elections in Vienna and Styria.
96 As the definition of political extremism in Germany includes parties or groups making "racist," "nationalist" or "xenophobic" appeals, or those who "over emphasize the interests of a race-based 'ethnic community' [Volksgemeinschaft]," any party suspected of being nativist would almost certainly be observed by the *Verfassungsschutz*; Stoess (2005).
Table 2.3: Campaign Programs Used for Contemporary Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Latest Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REP (Germany)</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD (Germany)</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVU (Germany)</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPOe (Austria)</td>
<td>1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZOe (Austria)</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OeVP (Austria)</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU (Germany)</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The NPD is a classic nativist party when coded by party program. Preservation of the ethnic Nation (Volk or “ethnie”) against “foreign rule, over-foreignization [Ueberfremdung], exploitation and oppression” is central to the NPD’s statement of “Basic Principles.”

The Volk is a biological entity, perpetuated by its constituent cells (the family) through biological inheritance and cultural transmission. Members of the Volk are born, not made and the preservation of ethnic identity is of the highest human value, an “ethnopluralist” stance:

“National identity (Volkstum) and culture are the basis for the value of persons. Therefore the State, whose function is the protection of human dignity, is responsible to the Volk.”

“Nations (Voelker) are the bearers of culture. Voelker differentiate themselves through language, origin, historical experiences, religion, moral concepts and their self-awareness…. The preservation of Voelker is the preservation of culture. Societies whose highest value is material do not develop a culture, but at best a civilization. “Multi-cultural” societies are in reality societies without culture. The diversity of Voelker must be preserved…”

“Germany is the land of Germans and hence the home State of our Volk. The preservation of our Volk and the protection of its parts are the highest goals of German politics.” (Basic Principles and Chapter 1)

All but one of the program’s 11 sections (including the Basic Principles) refers to the native/immigrant identity dimension and the responsibility of political and social

97 NPD (1997).
elites to the German Volk. Though the NPD talks about the family, economy, crime, and the environment, all are referred to in an ethnic frame:

"The smallest community within our Volk is the family.... The family is the living connection to our traditions. In the family the mother tongue is taught and culture and customs transmitted. The family is the bearer of biological inheritance. A Volk that does nothing as the family is destroyed or loses its strength will perish, because without healthy families there is no healthy Volk." (Article 2)

"... the Volk does not serve the economy, but much more the economy must serve the Volk ...." (Article 4)

"Every German has the right to work. Jobs are to be allocated to Germans first." (Article 5)

"Foreigners are to be divested from German social insurance systems...." (Article 7)

"In countless cities foreigner ghettos are being built, in which the German remainder is becoming the minority in its own land. Life in these districts, their educational infrastructure and the social environment are becoming unbearable." (Article 8)

The NPD’s long history and close scrutiny by public authorities has generated a significant secondary literature on its past programs. The NPD recognized the native/immigrant identity dimension very early on. Their initial 1964 program associates the party with German Volk in opposition to “foreign interests” and “the over-foreignization through foreign Capital,” suggesting at least jingoism (and likely ethnic nationalism).\(^98\) By 1967 the NPD explicitly mentioned foreigners, rejecting parental subsidies for foreigners as well as demanding job priority for “German workers” as opposed to “foreign manpower.”\(^99\) The 1987 program (the first since 1973) was the first to identify the Volk as a biological construct.\(^100\) The program emphasized the “Ethnic Community” (Volksgemeinschaft) over the individual, taking a hard line on the “foreigner

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\(^100\) Reflecting the influence of the French and German “New Right” of the late 1970s, formed to provide a philosophical balance to the “New Left” of the 1960s. The “New Right” denied conventional “Left-Right” distinctions, though observers associate them with the Radical Right. The key characteristics of the New Right were ethnopluralism (recognizing inherent differences in ethnic nations and their capacities), ethnic nationalism (the Volksgemeinschaft as an organism that should organize society, in opposition to class conflict), environmentalism (out of respect for the Heimat) and welfare chauvinism (a “conservative socialism,” opposed to a pure market economy); Gessenharter and Pfeiffer (eds) (2004).
problem,” the Aussiedler (individuals of German descent who migrated to Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union in the 18th and 19th centuries) and “over-foreignizing” asylum seekers (Asylanten) in the name of “German interests.” The NPD’s program in 1964 is coded as ambiguously nativist, and nativist from 1967.

Similar to the NPD, the DVU and REP consider the native identity fundamental to their basic principles. For the DVU, the native/immigrant identity dimension is both central and explicit in the party’s statement of basic principles. The DVU preamble begins by referencing a national identity and claims that the main threat to that identity is the “foreign-born population”:

“Germany should remain the land of Germans. The German Volk must be entitled to the same rights as all other Voelker. This includes the right to the inherited land, the national identity and full self-determination…. From this follows: Limiting the foreign-born population, stopping the increasing immigrant inflow, accelerating the Asylum process, expulsion of criminal foreigners.” (Article 1)

Though the REP treats the basis of the Volk as historical and philosophical, they share the NPD’s belief that the Volk represents an actual entity. Composed of individual families, the Volk gives its individual members meaning, with the State and politics vehicles to carry out the Volk’s interests:

“The German Volk awoke in the wars of independence of 1813/1815 to political awareness. [T]he State is more than the sum of its citizens, namely an organism, from which the Volk builds a political community, having grown aware of their belonging to a Volk. Individuals are bound to the welfare and the moral law of this community.” (Chapter 1, Article 1)

“…[w]ithin the Volk people find coherence and solidarity…. In a conglomeration of people of different origins (multi-cultural society) there will be neither a sense of togetherness nor a readiness to work together….“ (Chapter 1, Article 5)

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101 Verfassungsschutz Baden-Wuerttemberg (1988), pg. 73. Opposition to the Aussiedler (literally “returnees”) are an excellent example of an appeal that is nativist but not ethnic nationalist; Aussiedler are part of the German Diaspora, but have not lived on German soil for at least several generations.
102 REP (2002), Chapter III, Article 3.
Like the NPD, the DVU and REP’s appeals to ethnicity run through many of the subsequent policy sections, though fewer sections explicitly reference ethnicity. In the DVU’s brief program, crime and unemployment are discussed without referencing foreigners. Whereas the NPD refers to Germans only as the “Volk,” the DVU will occasionally use Buerger (citizens) or Menschen (people).

A thread that runs through all three programs is the danger of the native category losing its “homeland” (Heimat, another ambiguously ethnic term), not to foreign conquest but to foreign infiltration. The REP deal with this issue in depth:

“One can be expelled from their Heimat without changing their location: Through cultural over-foreignization (Ueberfremdung) and the mass immigration of foreigners. Those that want the development of a ‘multi-cultural society’, because they give no value to Heimat, lack the authority to flout others’ right to Heimat.”

“Furthermore, from experience every multi-cultural society is a society of conflict.”

“Germany’s capacity has been crossed. The high share of foreigners has led in many cities and neighborhoods to Germans falling into the minority, school classes consisting only of foreigners and – above all with Turks – parallel societies developing. The absorption capacity of foreigners from foreign cultures is worn out, partly already crossed, and an integration has hardly taken place. Still more foreigners are especially unnecessary to compensate for the population decline in Germany or to save the social welfare system. In one of the most densely populated states in the world, facing large environmental problems, a decline in population density would in a sense be a blessing…. This is even more true, as foreigners do not relieve the burdens on the social system, but rather add to them.” (Chapter III, Article 1)

Unlike the NPD or DVU, which consider the rejection of foreigners a self-evident position to preserve the identity and privileges of the native category, the REP additionally use non-ethnic arguments (the environment, population density, the welfare state, the quality of education) to justify a similar goal.
According to the Verfassungsschutz, there have been no major changes to the DVU’s program since its foundation in 1987. The REP, however, has undergone at least a partial programmatic evolution over the course of at least five formal programs since 1983. Though the party’s first full program (1983) was not acquired (the REP were not monitored by the Verfassungsschutz until 1992), Mudde (2000) describes the document as jingoistic. That the REP further references the “foreigner problem,” makes the 1983 program ambiguously nativist (non-central), though the party appeared more concerned with external politics.

With the 1985 “Siegburger Manifest,” a partial program adopted at the party’s national conference, and certainly by the formal party program of 1987, the REP fully accepted the Volk concept and its party program can be coded as nativist:

“...the preservation of the continued existence and health of the German Volk and its ecological living space is the overriding goal of domestic politics.” (1987, Basic Principles, Article 2)

Furthermore, the native/immigrant identity dimension is explicit; by 1985, the foreigner “problem” has become the foreigner “flood,” though the prognosis for native/immigrant relations less grim than in later iterations of the program:

“Germany must not become a country of immigration.”

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103 “The program of the DVU-Liste-D is relatively sweeping and carefully formulated... Conspicuous remains in any event the Right-Extremist typical accentuation of “Germany First” (“Deutschland zuerst”) and the demands of actions against foreigners”; Verfassungsschutz Baden-Wuerttemberg 1987, pg. 96.
104 In Mudde’s words the program is “nationalist” for describing German Reunification the party’s central goal.
106 Siegburger Manifest, pg. 1; from Mudde (2000), pg. 43.
"Foreigners are guests.... This precludes....indefinite job contracts... long-term residence, family reunification and access to the social system."

"We reject voting rights and party membership for foreigners."

"Foreigners who violate the law will be, after a timely legal process, expelled without delay." (1987, Article 3 Key Point 10)

In contrast with the target German parties, both Austrian parties introduce a new concept into their basic frames: Freedom (Freiheit), a term associated with classical Liberal movements. Unlike Germany, where the FDP served as the post-war home for the Liberal movement, in Austria the VdU (later the FPOe) represented both Liberals and German nationalists. The tension between freedom of the individual and the Volkish organism has always been evident, as in the party’s most recent statement of principles:

"Freedom is a person’s highest commodity. Freedom means a maximum of guaranteed self-determination. Freedom precludes oppression, be it physical, mental, religious, political or economic, especially every form of State-based arbitrariness.” (Chapter 1 Article 1)

"Family and Voelker are organically grown conditions that must find consideration in politics. Voelker and ethnic groups are entitled to have their right to life guaranteed and to enable the development of their characteristics in a peaceful manner.” (Chapter 1 Article 2)

The FPOe’s policies are explicit in separating natives and immigrants. Unlike the German parties the FPOe relies on a legal justification, by arguing that the right to “homeland” (Heimat) includes the State’s indigenous nations. The State should thus protect the culture of the native ethnic majority as it would any minority group; Austrian law explicitly protects the right to culture and linguistic instruction for national minorities107:

“Our Heimat is understood as the democratic Republic of Austria and its states, its historical Voelker (Germans, Croatians, Roma, Slovaks, Slovenians, Czechs and Hungarians) and the resultant culture, whereby it is presupposed by the legal system that

107 "The idea of ‘Homeland’ will be defined by its territorial, ethnic (ethnisch) and cultural aspects”; FPO (1997), Chapter 4, Article 1, Section 1.
the overwhelming majority of Austrians belong to the German Volk.” (Chapter 4, Article 1)

“Thus the Heimat, its over centuries historically resident Voelker as well as their cultural traditions, achievements and accomplishments as culture-bearers are objects of protection.” (Chapter 4 Article 1 Section 2)

Like the REP, the FPOe combines right to Heimat and the need to protect the native culture with non-ethnic arguments justifying Austria’s incompatibility with permanent settlement by foreigners. Foreigners can become natives, but only through an assimilation process that affirms the supremacy of the native culture in everyday life. Though the FPOe refers to “immigration,” it removes any ambiguity by pitching the opposition to immigration in ethnic and cultural terms:

“The fundamental right to Heimat permits no unlimited and uncontrolled immigration to Austria. The fundamental right to Heimat further clearly demands, that due to Austria’s limited habitable space, its population density and its finite resources, it cannot be a land of immigration.” (Chapter 4 Article 4 Section 1)

“An unlimited migration would overburden the resident population with respect to their integration capacity and thereby endanger their right to ensure and protect their own Heimat. We reject multi-cultural experiments, as they will be laced with wanton social conflicts.” (Chapter 4 Article 4 Section 2)

“The wage pressure and the housing market inflation that uncontrolled immigration produces, constitutes a strain on the job and housing markets that endangers social peace. For seasonal enterprises a seasonal model of limited and temporary employment of foreigners should be possible.” (Chapter 10 Article 8)

Historically, the FPOe’s program underwent significant revisions. The 1964 “Salzburg Declaration” was predominantly anti-Statist, (opposing the post-sharing model the two major parties had instituted) and stressed the freedom of the individual. 108 The party declared itself as belonging to “the German national- and cultural community,” an

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108 Luther, in Dachs, Gerlich et al. (eds) (2006), pg. 377. Without explicit reference to immigrants and without a distinct immigrant community (unlike Germany, guest workers in 1964 were an insignificant minority in Austria), “German” no longer fulfills the conditions of Rule #3) and the FPOe’s 1964 program cannot be coded as nativist.
appeal that was ethnic nationalist but not nativist (fulfilling neither Rules #3 or #4). 109

The tension between the liberal and national elements remained in future iterations, with the 1973 “Manifesto of Social Policy” the first to explicitly reference the guest worker (Gastarbeiter) “problem,” pitching it ambiguously as a tradeoff between “momentary economic profits” and “long-term economic, social and demographic burdens.” The 1985 “Salzburg Program,” considered a Liberal victory, upheld the idea that one’s ethnic identity is an organic entity deserving of protection, but greatly condensed the discussion of guest workers and immigration.110 Paradoxically, though nativism was no longer explicit in the FPOe’s program it had become central. Consequently, the FPOe’s programs can be coded as ambiguous from 1973 onward and nativist from 1993 onward.

The BZOe’s lone official program is the only coding that disconfirms the initial hypothesis.111 Indeed, the BZOe’s program is conclusively non-nativist, reaffirming the difficulty of relying on a single source when coding parties. Like the FPOe, the BZOe focuses on the “Philosophy of Freedom” in political and social life, born in the national revolutions of 1848, as its organizing principle. References to the Volk are absent in the preamble. Indeed, the BZOe never references the native/immigrant identity dimension in its policy statements. Throughout the program, the BZOe refers to the “citizens” and occasionally the “people” rather than the Volk. The closest it comes to referencing

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109 As early as the 1968 party program, the FPOe speaks explicitly of the “South Tyrol” question, referring to the members of the German nationality living in the Italian province of Tyrol (Chapter: “Foreign Policy”). These appeals are sufficient to code them as ethnic nationalist.

110 To two pages in an 18 page broadsheet document with four columns; Luther, in Dachs, Gerlich et al. (2006), pg. 378. FPOe (1985), Part 1, Chapter 3 (“Volk und Heimat”). Again, the evolution of the FPOe toward an ethnonationalist stance on ethnic identity is the result of the New Right’s influence.

111 Another program was under discussion as of 2007-8.
ethnicity is its discussion of the need to “protect the Heimat” without, however, identifying the Heimat as an explicitly ethnic construct.112

The first contrasting example is the Austrian People’s Party (OeVP), Austria’s Christian-democratic party. While the OeVP’s 1995 statement of basic principles references the “Christian” principles behind the party, this appeal is at best ethnic (religious). Austria has a long tradition of endogenous religious minorities (Jews), disqualifying it from a nativist coding under Rule #3, and no explicitly immigrant oppositional identity (such as Muslims) is named:

“We ground our socio-political principles in the Christian commitment to the dignity of people…. We argue for the freedom of the individual and for the demand and recognition of personal achievement.” (Article 1 Section 1 Paragraph 1)

In the OeVP’s statement of policies, the OeVP refers to “cultural identity” as a fundamental human attribute, but this identity is balanced against tolerance and the “peaceful cooperation of the different sexes, cultures, religions, ethnic groups and lifestyles.”113 The party’s concept of “culture” is not biological, but rather something an individual can adopt over time, and the OeVP refers to “people” rather than the Volk. Finally, the OeVP refers to the family as the basis for society, but not as the basis for an ethnic category, a position distinct from that of nativist parties.

The OeVP does, however, explicitly reference the native/immigrant identity dimension, and this discussion does qualify as exclusionary:

“We want to guarantee with our politics the right of Austrians to Heimat, cultural identity and security. At the same time however we have in our society an appreciation for the need to ensure the respect and compassion for foreigners and non-natives.” (Article 6 Section 6 Paragraph 1)

112 BZOe (2005), Section: “Austria and Europe: Our Homeland.”
“The right to integration for foreigners living in Austria sets forward however also the acceptance of responsibilities. For instance the command of our language as well as integration requirements such as the adherence to the Constitution and laws as well as social mores and customs.” (Article 6 Section 6 Paragraphs 7-8)

While the OeVP makes statements that call for the peaceful coexistence of natives and foreigners, they also lay out explicit responsibilities for foreigners to integrate and accept Austrian rules, without detailing the responsibilities of Austrians for accommodating new residents. The contemporary OeVP program is therefore coded as ambiguously nativist by program.

In contrast to the OeVP, the German CDU (Germany’s Christian-democratic party) fully confirms the hypothesized non-nativist coding. Like the OeVP, the CDU sees itself as a party whose principles go back to a “Christian understanding of people and their accountability before God.” However, the CDU explicitly explains that non-Christians can subscribe to its politics:

“From the call to Christian convictions does not follow for us the claim, that within the [CDU] only Christian accountability has an impact on our politics. The CDU is open for anyone, who accepts the dignity and freedom of all people and hence the derived principles of our politics. This is the basis for the mutual action of Christians and non-Christians in the CDU.” (Chapter 1 Section 1 Paragraph 2)

In its statement of policies on the native/immigrant identity dimension (which comes 3/4ths of the way through its long program), the CDU goes a step further than the OeVP:

“We exert ourselves for the peaceful coexistence of Germans and foreign fellow citizens (Mitbuerger)…. Integration means for us, that people of other backgrounds fulfill the requirements of coexistence in our society, and that the wish, one’s own cultural, linguistic identity and lifestyle to value, will be respected as a basic human concern. All must be ready for integration and tolerance.”

“The contributions of our foreign fellow citizens enrich our lives…. We have to combat the causes of violence between Germans and foreigners. We are decidedly against any form of discrimination and violence against foreigners…personal contact and exchange is important.” (Chapter 4 Section 3 Paragraph 117-118)

114 CDU (1994), Chapter 1, Section 1, Paragraph 1.
The CDU statements on native/immigrant relations separate themselves from the OeVP by laying out the rights and responsibilities of both groups, explaining that both groups have obligations for reaching an ideal coexistence and emphasizing that the immigrant category has something valuable to contribute to German social life. The CDU’s program is therefore coded as non-nativist.

**Conclusion**

My analysis of campaign appeals and party programs distinguishes the hypothesized nativist parties from other parties of the Right in their respective countries. For an area of the world where there is a strong reluctance to discuss politics in terms of “race,” the appeals made by nativist parties are surprisingly explicit, freely naming ethnic categories (particularly shorthand appeals referring to natives and immigrants by their linguistic, religious or national attributes), as opposed to using coded (“the criminal element”) or ambiguous (“immigration reform”) phrases. This strategy fits in well with a self-portrayal as “taboo breakers” or parties willing to “say what others are thinking” and is certainly not the catch-all strategy of parties like the OeVP or CDU. Nativist parties were however by no means “single-issue” in their appeals; though immigration and ethnicity were the main thrust of their campaigns, they consistently produced robust and comprehensive programs and appeals addressing law and order and the economy.
Table 2.4: Coding Parties in Austria and Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>2008 Coding</th>
<th>Historical Coding (1960-2008)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPD (Germany)</td>
<td>Program: Nativist</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>1964-1966: non-Nativist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appeals: Nativist</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>1967-1979: Ambiguous [^115]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1980-: Nativist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVU (Germany)</td>
<td>Program: Nativist</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>1987-Present: Nativist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REP (Germany)</td>
<td>Program: Nativist</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>1983-1985: non-Nativist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appeals: Nativist</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>1986-1987: Ambiguous [^116]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1988-: Nativist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPOe (Austria)</td>
<td>Program: Nativist</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>1960-1989: non-Nativist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appeals: Nativist</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>1990-: Nativist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BZOe (Austria)</td>
<td>Program: non-Nativist</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>2005: non-Nativist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appeals: Nativist</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>2006-: Nativist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OeVP (Austria)</td>
<td>Program: Ambiguous</td>
<td>non-</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appeals: non-Nativist</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU (Germany)</td>
<td>Program: non-Nativist</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appeals: non-Nativist</td>
<td>Nativist</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4 displays the current and historical coding for each of the parties under consideration. Of the five parties, the BZOe’s coding is the most tenuous. Its 2005 program represented a clear break from the nativist politics of its predecessor, yet it quickly returned to the well of nativist politics when a non-nativist strategy was not resonating with voters in the 2006 national election. The BZOe’s *Grundsatzpapier*, published in November 2006 as a response to the new Grand Coalition, once again placed native/immigrant issues in a subordinate role and did not refer to explicit categories. While there is no question that the REP, NPD, DVU and FPOe are and will remain committed nativists, the BZOe may continue its move towards an economically Liberal, socially conservative party of “oversight and fairness.” However, it could be that the party’s attempts to “modernize”\[^117\] its appeals will see further backsliding if no dedicated

\[^115\] In campaigns from 1967-1979, no evidence was found suggesting that the NPD focused on native/immigrant issues, despite the presence of unambiguous nativism in its program.

\[^116\] Insufficient information was available on the REP’s appeals in the 1986 Bavarian state election to confirm the party as nativist.

\[^117\] As expressed in interviews with Haider’s then Carinthian Press Secretary and later BZOe General-Secretary, Stefan Petzner, 6/6/2007.
vote base interested in a non-nativist, conservative alternative to the OeVP and FPOe presents itself.

More generally, in this chapter I have classified the “anti-immigrant Radical Right” as a group of nativist parties on two grounds. First, the classification is precise; it uses objective, observable features to create an analytical category. Nativist parties are distinct from non-nativist parties in their core focus on a specific ethnic identity dimension. Unlike most decision rules used to describe these parties, the goals nativists profess and the appeals they make are visible and consistent. Nativist parties promise to champion the position of the native ethnic category relative to all non-native ethnic categories and their appeals (reserving resources for natives; removing problematic non-native elements) further this agenda.

Second, while some or all of these parties might also qualify for other analytical categories (ethnic nationalist; Radical Right; etc.), the nativist classification allows the project to address the broader question of Radical Right growth in a manner that is theoretically and temporally bounded. Rather than attempting to explain the growth of Scandinavian anti-tax parties in the 1970s, post-authoritarian parties in Southern Europe in the late 1970s and anti-immigrant parties in the 1980s and 1990s, the inquiry can focus on establishing independent variables and causal mechanisms for explaining the growth of one potential sub-group. As this sub-group likely represents the lion’s share of Radical Right growth in contemporary Western Europe, this analysis solves one puzzle while shedding light on another.
Chapter 2 Figures and Charts

Figure 2.1: Ethnic Parties and the Radical Right

**Ethnic Parties**
- Nativists
  - French National Front
  - Austrian Freedom Party (1990-Present)
  - Flemish Bloc (Belgium)

**The “Radical Right”**
- Non-Nativist, Ethnic Radical Right
  - Non-Nativist Ethnic Nationalists
  - Religious Fundamentalists

**Non-Radical Right**
- Anti-Statists
  - Scandinavian Progress Parties (1970s)
- Non-Ethnic Fascist or Post-Fascist
  - Spanish Falange
  - Italian MSI
- Non-Ethnic, Non-Fascist Authoritarian
  - Monarchists
  - Junta supporters
- Conservatives
  - Italian National Alliance

**Non-Radical Right Ethnic Parties**
- Scottish National Party
- Black Panther Party
- South Schleswig Voters’ Association
Chapter 3 – A Shock Model of Niche Party Growth and Party System Change

Duverger (1959) conceived of “minor” parties as those parties unable to form a Government or capture 10% of the vote. More recently, Meguid (2005) identified “niche” parties as new or small parties focusing on narrow issues that have been ignored by the major, established actors, such as the environment or immigration. Minor or niche parties lack access to the levers of power available to major, established parties, resources that allow those parties to build durable relationships with constituents and interest groups. Moreover, minor or niche parties lack the organization and funding of their major, established competitors, hampering their ability to wage expansive, professional election campaigns. How then do niche parties, at a significant disadvantage in an established party system, gain new supporters? How do niche parties grow?

This chapter models party switching and party system change through the growth of niche parties. Grounded in the American and European literature on voting behavior, the model argues that niche parties rapidly gain support during Shocks. Shocks are large, rapid, unanticipated events that unsettle individual expectations about some aspect of their environment and, in doing so, re-weight voters’ political or social priorities. A niche party gains support when these new or latent priorities become highly salient and are inadequately represented by established actors. Voters may select a niche party to signal displeasure and express a preferred policy direction or to directly influence policy by using their support to help a niche party expand their formal influence. Over time this process can lead to durable party system change, as the niche party establishes a relationship with its new supporters.
While the model can be applied to niche parties generally, I make a specific argument explaining the growth of West European nativist parties, a subset of the Radical Right. I argue that the growth of nativist parties is one, arguably the main, consequences of a new, highly salient dimension of political contestation. I argue that changes in the salience of issues or identities related to the native/immigrant dynamic are driven by large, rapid, unanticipated changes in ethnic demography, a type of Shock. Re-weighted priorities make nativist parties more attractive to some subset of voters who hold proximate preferences on the relevant dimension but did not previously consider it important, inducing party switching in subsequent elections. Events exogenous or endogenous to the political system eventually terminate the Shock, stabilizing nativist parties at a new level of support. Figure 3.1 illustrates the basic Shock model of niche party growth.

**Figure 3.1: A Basic Shock Model of Niche Party Growth**

The next section reviews traditional models of party system change and Radical Right growth. The third section uses those approaches to build a Shock model of niche party growth and explore its implications for electoral competition. The fourth section details the logic and properties of Shocks and argues that large, rapid immigration, an event linked to the dimensions nativist parties contest on, can fulfill the prerequisites for a Shock. Section five develops a series of hypotheses about the relationship between changing immigration rates and support for nativist parties. Section six offers possible mechanisms of Shock termination, while section seven suggests extensions of the model to countries where the background conditions present in contemporary Western Europe are absent. The final section provides a summary and some basic conclusions.
Theories of Party System Change

There are two broad approaches to party system change, which can then be used to frame theories of niche party growth. This section lays out those competing approaches and derives their predictions about when and why contemporary Radical Right (and by extension nativist) parties grow in some contexts and not others. While the approaches presented are not incompatible and many studies, including this one, borrow from both, this review emphasizes their crucial differences.

The first theoretical approach is demand driven. In a demand model individual preferences, or the salience of competing preferences, are altered by events exogenous to the political system. Some subset of voters subsequently switches parties based on these altered preferences or priorities. Demand models can be divided further into the type of changes they privilege: long or short.

Long changes are rare, slow and essentially unidirectional, taking decades or even centuries to develop. In the literature on Europe, the major long process is modernization, where progressive changes to technology and social organization (industrialization, urbanization, etc.) reshape social cleavages and consequently the issues organizing political competition. More recently, scholars have argued that advanced industrial societies undergo a later post-industrial or post-modern transformation. Here

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118 Eatwell, in Merkel and Weinberg (eds) (2003), was the first to frame Radical Right growth in terms of demand and supply factors.
119 Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) major revolutions, the centralization of State authority and industrialization, are aspects of modernization. See also Rostow (1960), Deutsch (1966), Pye (1966) or Inglehart (1997) for formulations of Modernization theory. Modernization theory dates back at least to Marx’s Kapital, with the modernization of the means of production the determining factor in changing social relationships; pp. 296-300 in Tucker (1978).
120 Theories of post-industrial change are very much a continuation of Modernization theory. Bell (1973) privileges the effect of changing means of production on political sophistication, as “manual” factory workers are replaced by “intellectual” travel agents or doctors, while Inglehart (1977, 1990, 1997) focuses
some combination of increasing affluence, access to tertiary education or a transition to service economies replace broad material issues (economic security, working conditions) with narrower post-material issues (environmentalism, cultural identity). In a post-modern party system, organizationally dense, bureaucratic parties are out-competed by leaner, narrowly focused movements better adapted to capture voters who no longer maintain a “cradle to grave” relationship with a social milieu. In a long-process model, party system change comes rarely and from very few sources, but the effects of those changes reshape the entire society.

In the 1990s, long process theories had the most influence on theories of Radical Right growth. Some saw these parties as an expression of post-industrial politics, a coalition of economic neo-liberals and blue collar welfare chauvinists brought on by changing preferences. To others they were short-term reactions to post-industrial politics, a reaffirmation of traditional values in times of increasing uncertainty. However, long process models suffer from distinct empirical problems. The “New” Radical Right’s hypothesized strategy of economic neo-liberalism and social conservatism has not been necessary for Radical Right success. Indeed, many parties that experienced growth in the early 1990s abandoned neo-liberalism without suffering negative consequences. Furthermore, Radical Right support bases increasingly

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121 Betz and Swank (2003) see Radical Right growth as the result of economic insecurity caused by globalization; Ignazi (1992), Betz (1994), Kitschelt and McGann (1995; 2005), Inglehart (1997) and Minkenberg (2000) see Radical Right parties benefiting in some way from value change and/or the emergence of post-industrial society.
123 Ignazi (1992), Inglehart (1997). Kitschelt and McGann (1995) reject this premise, but accept that hostility to post-material values makes up a portion of the Radical Right’s appeals.
124 For example the French National Front, Danish People’s Party and Belgian Vlaams Belaang all favor “national” or “neo-mercantilist” policies, including protectionism and increased social welfare spending.
resembled homogenous, blue-collar parties rather than interest coalitions, though they saw no decline in support; as white-collar voters fled these parties in the late 1990s, they were replaced by new blue collar voters.\textsuperscript{125} Finally, long process models cannot account for the timing of changes in Radical Right support. Radical Right parties grew simultaneously, despite post-industrial processes that started in the 1960s in some countries and the 1980s in others.

In contrast, \textit{short} process theories offer a far more discontinuous model of party system change. Short processes are those exogenous events that produce effects over one or a few electoral periods. These critical periods of brief but sharp change interrupt longer periods of stability and realign political systems by altering voter priorities through the introduction new or previously latent dimensions of conflict.\textsuperscript{126} If no established party takes advantage of the emerging dimension, niche parties fill the gap and gain votes at their expense.\textsuperscript{127} The system reaches a new equilibrium over several elections as the voters who would realign do so and establish loyalties to their new party.

Not all new or newly salient issues are realigning. An issue must be significant to at least a portion of the electorate. It must cut across support bases and contradict the position of established actors in a way that cannot be subsumed under the current political alignment or resolved through consensus.\textsuperscript{128} Established actors must fail to resolve the

\textsuperscript{125} Ivarsflaten (2005); Mudde (2007). Eurobarometer surveys in 2004 indicated that manual workers and low-education individuals are the most likely to rate economic policy as insufficiently protectionist.
\textsuperscript{126} Key (1955); Sundquist (1973); Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale (1980). Mayhew (2002) offers a critique, but not a dismissal, of the “critical elections” literature. Mayhew refutes the periodicity of realignments (that they occur every 30-40 years) and the idea that critical issues slowly accumulate through the system, as opposed to quickly overwhelming them. For example, the Great Depression of 1929 realigned the American political system in 1932.
\textsuperscript{127} For example if all established parties support the status quo, creating significant dissatisfaction within each party but no established outlet for their concerns; Burnham (1970) or Sundquist (1973).
\textsuperscript{128} Schattschneider (1960); Sundquist (1973).
issue in a timely fashion because they are divided, lack information about the distribution of preferences, or cannot reach an acceptable solution before an election allows niche parties to benefit from their failures. Finally, while niche parties have an advantage in the lack of an established record to be held accountable to, they can also face significant electoral, legal or financial barriers to party entry or party competition.

While Realignment theory and Modernization theory are not incompatible (most of the identified critical junctures in the American literature are implicitly driven by modernization), these models allow for any number of events (a Depression; a catastrophic defeat in war; widespread corruption) to generate challenges sufficient to realign the political order. In sum, short process models treat party system change as potentially frequent and rapid, taking years rather than decades. Changes come from many different sources and may be seemingly random, but they are neither necessarily systematic (only a portion of the electorate may be affected) nor inevitable (not all issues are realigning).

Realignment theories are best represented by models of Radical Right growth that privilege changes in key structural variables, such as crime, immigration or unemployment. High unemployment or conditions of depression, high crime rates or endemic corruption, or high immigration rates generate dissatisfaction among voters, inducing switching to niche parties if no established party is able or willing to resolve

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129 Sundquist (1973) or Rosenstone et al. (1984). Mair, in Mair (ed) (1990) argues that rapid events have a greater capacity to overwhelm established elites than long-term, predictable systemic tensions.

130 Wolinetz, in Mair (1990). At the extreme, barriers to entry might include physical or social intimidation; Rosenstone et al. (1984) or Art (2006).

131 While the major issue during the American political realignment of the 1850s was slavery, the slavery debate was itself partly driven by differential modernization; see Burnham (1970) or Sundquist (1973). Duverger (1959), pg. 312 provides examples of Shocks unrelated to modernization.
them. Besides points of disagreement about which factors are significant, short process explanations generally fail to specify causal mechanisms. If voters are responding to anti-immigrant appeals, are they doing so out of a perception of ethnic threat, diffuse protest, scapegoating, or something else? If they perceive immigration as some sort of threat, are they responding to economic concerns, cultural concerns, or both?

Thus far the emphasis has been on exogenous changes. Supply approaches focus on endogenous changes, the “opportunity structures” that shape political competition. In a supply model, no individual preference is altered. Rather, something endogenous to the political system re-weights the attractiveness of niche parties. Switching might be driven by institutional changes, changes to the composition of the electorate or the changing strategies of political actors. A supply side model would argue that changing institutions or party strategies makes niche party entry rational or increase the reservoir of voters willing to support the party. Supply side theories considers party system change to be potentially frequent, depending on the fixity of institutions, and treats party systems as relatively weak and unstable, especially in models privileging party strategies and competition.

133 Downs (1957) or Cox (1997) argue that proportional electoral rules increase the willingness to support narrowly focused parties.
134 Such as the expansion of the franchise in Europe in the early 20th century (Downs 1957; Sundquist 1973), changes to a state’s boundaries or waves of recently naturalized immigrant voters (Ware 1996).
135 In the Conditional Party Government (CPG) literature, parties alienate voters by implementing an agenda reflecting the median of the governing party rather than the electorate, overshooting their mandate. Subsequent elections are course corrections; Aldrich and Rohde (2000); Aldrich et al. (2002); Erikson et al., in MacKuen and Rabinowitz (eds) (2003); Aldrich et al. (2004).
Endogenous theories of Radical Right growth focusing on political opportunity structures have become increasingly popular in recent years. Some models argue that the Radical Right takes advantage of the convergence of established parties, attacking their flanks. Others argue that electoral rules, historical-cultural factors, or the prevalence of certain individual-level characteristics make some Radical Right parties more successful than others. Finally, some argue that Radical Right entrepreneurs take advantage of diffuse, short-term protest without regard to the appeals offered.

While the opportunity structures literature offers appealing insights, most supply models suffer from one of three basic deficiencies when trying to explain growth, and not just differential levels of support. First, institutions and voter characteristics change too infrequently to account for the size or scope of the observed changes. Second, many opportunity structure models presuppose an exogenous shock; they explain why some parties do better than others, but fail to address why the Radical Right emerges at all. Finally, some opportunity structure models are threatened by endogeneity. Convergence theories for example assume that voters decide to vote for a Radical Right party after other parties converge, rather than perceiving the convergence of other parties based on

136 Political opportunity structures are “specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization” (Tarrow 1994).
139 Knigge (1998) or Betz (2002).
the emergence of a strong Radical Right actor with substantially different policies on a host of issues.\textsuperscript{141}

\textbf{A Shock Model of Niche Party Growth}

This model niche party growth represents a short process demand approach. Specifically, party switching and party system change are driven by shifts in the salience of issue dimensions or social identities, while shifts in salience are generated by Shocks. Shocks, explored in the next section, are large, rapid, unanticipated events that challenge individual expectations about their environment and increase the attention devoted to understanding or resolving the relevant issue or identity dimension. Niche parties take advantage of the shifts in salience generated by Shocks when established parties are unwilling or unable to address them; in this respect, the model agrees with Realignment theories. Unlike long process models, which assume that changes are inevitable and unidirectional, a Shock model does not treat party system change as teleological. Unlike many Realignment models, a Shock model does not consider party system change to be cyclical or critical issues to be a one-time conflict. Any election could be altered by a Shock, while a system may undergo a Shock in one period and resolve it, only to undergo a new Shock on the same dimension several elections later.

At the system level, the model assumes mass suffrage and strong rule of law. Expectations about outcomes when these assumptions are relaxed are considered in a later section on antecedent conditions.

\textsuperscript{141} For example, in 1990 the German Republikaner were given the same score on a Left-Right scale as the conservative CSU in 1987 in Politbarometer public opinion surveys, with the CSU perceived as closer to the center in 1990. This convergence might have occurred because voters (and experts) do not consider contemporary parties in a historical or theoretical context, or restrict their evaluations to a fixed scale. It was not necessarily true that the CSU moderated its program, but rather that before 1990 voters did not imagine a significant party to the right of the CSU on a fixed 10-point scale.
At the individual level, each voter is assumed to have a most favored position or preference on each dimension.\textsuperscript{142} Each voter assigns each dimension a salience, the weight given to that dimension relative to all others. Voters have a limited capacity to juggle and process information and therefore tend to focus on some subset of all possible dimensions when making decisions.\textsuperscript{143} For example, voters in Germany in the 1960s likely emphasized the economy far more than abortion in their voting decisions, though they presumably had preferences on both. Because the capacity to process information is limited, increasing the emphasis on any one dimension should reduce the emphasis on all others. In an election, individuals generate a utility function for each party by aggregating their preferences, weighted for salience, and comparing these preferences to each party’s package of stated policies and appeals.

Each party in the system is assumed to take a position on some or all dimensions of contestation to appeal to voters.\textsuperscript{144} On each dimension, the party or parties benefiting the most if the election were only fought on that dimension are the “issue owner(s).”\textsuperscript{145} If preferences on a dimension are clustered rather than distributed, multiple parties might own a dimension; a nativist party could hold the most popular anti-immigrant position, while another owns the pro-immigrant position. While an optimal strategy would be to assume a median (or at least modal) position on every dimension, parties are constrained by the preferences of their internal interests and by their past actions.\textsuperscript{146} Voters can take

\begin{itemize}
\item Preferences might be continuous (immigration should be 10% lower) or more directional and ordinal (immigration should be lower); Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989).
\item Converse (1964); Converse (2000); Chong and Druckman (2007).
\item Presumably voters have shortcuts for imputing party positions on salient dimensions when parties are not explicit in their position, such as letting other parties or the media define that position.
\item This is a departure from the issue ownership literature (Petrocik 1996; Meguid 2005; Belanger and Meguid 2008). What Meguid calls “competence” this project considers the degree of agreement between voter and party preferences, which is closer to Van der Brug’s (2004) conception.
\item Fiorina (1981); Enelow and Hinich (1984); Bowler (1990); Iversen (1994).
\end{itemize}
into account the credibility of appeals and even if all parties announce the same position one or more parties can benefit, at least in the short-term, from a comparative advantage on a dimension of contestation.\textsuperscript{147}

Besides considering a party’s positions, voters are assumed to evaluate parties in two additional ways. First, voters assign some \textit{discount factor} to each party’s ability to implement its proposals. Voters might discount a party’s proposals due to pre-electoral constraints like electoral rules, or post-election factors like coalition bargaining or legislative effectiveness.\textsuperscript{148} Second, voters assign each party some \textit{partisanship} valence, the preference for that party relative to all others.\textsuperscript{149} While partisanship can be established through early socialization,\textsuperscript{150} it can also increase or decrease over time as a party succeeds or fails in representing an individual’s preferences; voters can keep a “running tally” of party performance.\textsuperscript{151} Voters reward parties that successfully represent them with increased confidence in their future performance, and punish them for past failures.\textsuperscript{152} A partisanship bonus is therefore thought to accrue the longer an individual sees their party as the party best able to represent their interests.

\textsuperscript{147} Budge and Farlie, in Daalder and Mair (1982); Bowler (1990). Bowler resolves the credibility gap by introducing time horizons. Voters assess credibility based on the past few periods, while parties change their positions and accept short-term punishment in the form of discounting in the hopes of long-term gains.\textsuperscript{148} On pre-electoral factors, see Cox (1997). On post-electoral factors, see Grofman (1985) or Bargsted and Kedar (Forthcoming).
\textsuperscript{149} This model broadly resembles Adams et al.’s (2005) “unified” model of voting. Voters care about policies and weight those policies based on their importance, but they also care about non-policy factors, such as partisan ties or social identities. In contrast, this model treats issue and identity dimensions as interchangeable, rather than two categories competing for attention.\textsuperscript{150} Campbell et al. (1960); Niemi and Jennings (1991). Socialization refers broadly to upbringing, including both child-parent relationships and the groups or identities an individual acquires early on. Changes in identity or group affiliation later in life might result in preference change through re-socialization.\textsuperscript{151} Fiorina (1981); Rosenstone et al. (1984); MacKuen et al. (1989); Popkin (1994).
\textsuperscript{152} Fiorina (1981). Voters are primarily interested in future decisions, but their best signal of a party’s likely performance is its past behavior.
Four intuitions can be drawn from the model presented above. While the first two are applicable to voting in general, the last two are especially relevant to the growth of niche parties. For the sake of parsimony, it is assumed that all parties are fully able to implement their appeals (there is no discounting); expectations about outcomes when there is discounting are considered in the section on antecedent conditions.

First, if all dimensions are weighted equally a voter supports the party closest to them in the aggregate, which agrees with the broader literature on voting behavior. Second, the stronger a voter’s partisanship, the easier it is to ignore differences in preferences, though no assumption is made about the relative weights of partisanship and preferences.¹⁵³

Coming to the third intuition, if one dimension is sufficiently salient, a voter will support a party distant from them on all other dimensions so long as it is closest on that dimension. The voter has preferences, but values agreement on important dimensions over disagreement on unimportant dimensions. This intuition is essential for the growth of niche parties. As the salience of issues or identities relevant to the niche party increase, established party voters or non-voters that agree with the niche party on those dimensions but disagree with them on all others will switch to the niche party. No change in preferences is necessary; changes in salience alone are sufficient to induce party switching.

¹⁵³ Campbell et al. (1960) acknowledge that events generating significant deviations between party and voter preferences lead to party switching. While dealignment (Dalton et al. 1984) might facilitate switching by breaking down partisanship, it is neither necessary nor sufficient. It is not necessary, as sufficiently large deviations between parties and voters induce switching regardless. It is not sufficient, as it cannot explain why voters switch in a systematic fashion. Like electoral rules dealignment facilitates or constrains, but does not drive, niche party growth.
Finally, the longer a voter and its new party are aligned in their preferences, the greater the partisanship valence that party acquires. This allows party switching to be durable even if the salience of a dimension declines and preferences are fixed. The niche party can attract voters based on a re-weighting of preferences, but lock them in through increased partisanship as established relationships develop.

These four intuitions provide a basic model of rapid party system change. Party systems can change slowly, as preferences shift with voter replacement or long structural changes, for example increasing access to tertiary education, accrue over time. Party systems can change with altered institutions, making some parties more or less attractive. But party systems can also change rapidly, as events re-weight the dimensions voters consider important.

Consider a stylized example of niche party growth, divided into three stages. The model takes place across three elections and assumes that nothing varies besides the salience of a single dimension relevant to the niche party’s appeals.

- **Event**: In an election at T=0, the relevant dimension sits at a fixed level of salience and the niche party registers static support. At T=0<X<1, some exogenous event (the Shock) increases the salience of the relevant dimension. Preference re-weighting through increased salience induces some subset of voters to prefer the niche party, which has a comparative advantage on the relevant dimension, over its competitors.\(^\text{154}\)
- **Election**: Increased niche party support through increased salience on the relevant dimension is registered in an election at T=1. Niche parties in systems that do not experience the event see no change in support.
- **Extinction**: Niche party support continues increasing as more individuals become concerned with the event until T=1<Y<2, when the event ends. The new, stable level of support is registered in an election at T=2.

\(^{154}\) Niche support is treated as increasing throughout the duration of the Shock, as the duration itself (or witnessing other voters “tip”) might be sufficient to induce further shifts in salience. See the discussion of tipping models in the section on Shock termination.
While the model only considers salience change on one dimension, what if this condition is relaxed? The baseline reaction to the event, described above, is represented by Country B1 in Figure 3.2. When the salience of other dimensions varies, the crucial intuition is that events on one dimension can be offset or reinforced by events on others. For example two Shocks, a migration wave and an unrelated foreign policy crisis, occur during the same election, while the niche party only holds a comparative advantage on migration policy. While migration would dominate the election if it occurred in isolation, voters must weigh the crises against one other, blunting the impact of migration (Country B2) unless preferences on the two dimensions are perfectly uncorrelated and the voters concerned with the foreign policy crisis would not have been attracted to the niche party in any event.

Moreover, systems are dynamic. New concerns come to the fore, reducing the importance of past issues or conflicts. These could be the emergence of latent dimensions or the return of previously salient dimensions; with the migration crisis resolved, concerns about the economy reassert themselves. Consequently, the salience of the niche dimension might decline over time, leading some voters to lose interest in the niche party after the event subsides (Country B3). Of course, either situation might benefit a niche party. If the niche party holds a popular position on both the migration and foreign-policy dimensions and preferences on those dimensions are not perfectly correlated, they could attract more new voters than if the migration crises had occurred in isolation (Country B4). As other dimensions become less important, for example through a sudden improvement in the economy, the niche party’s dimension could become more important without any objective event occurring.
Figure 3.2: Expanded Niche Party Outcomes

The remainder of the section unpacks four assumptions implicit in the model. The first considers the relationship between issues and identities, the second the relationship between issues and elites, the third the relationship between preferences and salience and the fourth the relationship between parties and preferences.

First, dimensions of political contestation can be issue-based (the economy, the environment) and relatively continuous in the positions parties and voters can take. Or they can be identity-based (native, worker, Catholic) and relatively ordinal or dichotomous. All individuals qualify for a category on each identity dimension; an individual is at least “X” (1) or “not X” (0). All individuals have multiple identities (one can be white, American, atheist and an academic with equal truth) and may even qualify for multiple identities on the same dimension. For example, an individual with one white and one black parent can identify as white, black, bi-racial, mixed, or brown. Identities are consistent or contextual, and are constructed by the bearer and society to a greater or lesser extent. The above individual can choose to emphasize their whiteness or blackness depending on their environment, though other members of society can contest that categorization based on their own evaluation of the individual’s attributes.

Identities can be latent and have no salience (an individual qualifies for an identity but does not consciously recognize it) or active, with some non-zero salience and a preference regarding that identity. For example, an individual is probably not conscious of their “native-ness” in an environment without immigrants, while they are

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156 Kasfir (1979); Fearon (1999); Chandra (2001, 2004).
aware and more or less favorable toward their "white-ness" and "Catholic-ness." This nominally white, strongly Catholic individual could be opposed to a White Power party but receptive to a Christian-democratic party, though both identities are salient.

Why are issue dimensions insufficient to understand voter motivations?
Fundamentally, active identities can influence preferences on issue dimensions and in doing so influence vote choice.\textsuperscript{157} An individual’s "native-ness" might influence their view on immigration or social welfare (if the two are seen as correlated), just as an individual’s "Catholic-ness" can influence their views on abortion or war. As a shortcut, entrepreneurs can appeal directly to identities to bundle multiple issues into a single appeal. By the same token, increased concern with an issue might heighten the salience of a corresponding identity. Individuals concerned with immigration could come to perceive a more fundamental threat to their native identity, just as adversarial labor relations might influence an individual’s identity as a worker.

In sum, identity dimensions and issue dimensions are comparable when establishing individual utility and party preferences; a voter might support a party because it emphasizes issue positions they support and consider important, identities they support and consider important, or both. Conceptually, an event can affect vote choice by changing the salience of an identity or the salience of an issue dimension related to that identity, without scholars or the individual recognizing the exact process.

Second, the model assumes that preferences and salience are at least partly exogenous to political competition. Preferences are probably formed to some degree by

\textsuperscript{157} Lipset and Rokkan (1967) or Lazarsfeld et al. (1968). For a model in which identities are funneled through partisan affiliation to affect preferences, see Campbell et al. (1960).
an individual’s interactions with their environment, their socio-economic attributes or group affiliations, and not solely by receiving signals from politicians or the media about how they should interpret their environment.\textsuperscript{158} The implication is that events, and not just appeals, influence voter calculations about what is optimal (preferences) and important (salience).\textsuperscript{159}

However, individual might have fixed preferences on some dimensions and weak or no preferences on others, for example because they have fewer cues generated through their background or experiences.\textsuperscript{160} Here the role of opinion leaders or elites (specifically the media or political entrepreneurs) in preference or salience formation is of increased importance.\textsuperscript{161} Elites transmit information to the public about a dimension, suggesting its importance (priming through the volume of discourse) and how an individual should feel about that dimension (framing through the tone of discourse).\textsuperscript{162} In short, elites likely have some capacity to construct narratives that alter preferences or salience.

Most likely, events and appeals interact and elite capacities vary with an event’s magnitude. Elites are likely constrained by massive events, where direct experiences or

\textsuperscript{158} The role of experience is well established in the cognitive science literature (Druckman and Lupia 2000). An experience-based theory of preference formation fits on-line models in political science (Lodge et al. 1989). Wildavsky, in Berger (ed) (1989) argues for a “cultural” theory of preference formation that emphasizes the role of identities and social groups.

\textsuperscript{159} This model gives elites considerably less agency than Meguid (2005). Meguid argues that niche party support declines if elites (meaning established parties) uniformly ignore a niche dimension (a dismissive strategy; Table 2, pg. 350). I argue that a dismissive strategy is overwhelmed by sufficiently large events. Second, Meguid argues that niche party support declines if established parties co-opt niche positions (an accommodative strategy). I argue that co-opting raises a dimension’s salience by signaling its importance, increasing niche party support if they are the issue owner, in line with Belanger and Meguid (2008).

\textsuperscript{160} Zaller (1992); Druckman (2004).

\textsuperscript{161} In an accessibility model of preference formation, individuals do not have many established attitudes, except for dimensions that are or have recently been salient: Iyengar and Kinder (1987); Aldrich et al. (1989); Iyengar (1990); Kuklinski and Hurley, in Mutz et al. (eds) (1996).

\textsuperscript{162} Iyengar and Kinder (1987); Page and Shapiro (1992); Zaller (1992); Lupia and McCubbins (1998). Essentially, public conceptions about politics come from elites and are internalized; an individual might have socio-economic, cultural or psychological attributes that predispose them to nativism, but what nativism entails is constructed by elites.
the volume of alternative narratives limits their options. While elites might be able to convince the public that terrorism is not a major concern in the wake of an event the magnitude of the 2001 anthrax attacks, it is unlikely they could do so in the wake of an event the magnitude of September 11th. On the other hand, elites in mass democracies are unlikely to be able to construct narratives from non-events, where they are constrained by the free flow of information. While elites might be able to convincingly portray Iran or Iraq as a significant threat, it is unlikely they could do so with Canada. Recent work suggests that the elite capacity to frame narratives is far stronger when the discourse is uniform; when the discourse is divided, individuals can seek information that reflects their prior beliefs. 163

Lastly, elites are not wholly exogenous to their political system. Elites are also individuals, and their priorities will also be susceptible to influence by events. Furthermore, unless elites are completely unresponsive to public opinion, increases in the concern with certain issues or identities should provide an incentive for elites to alter the volume and tone of their discourse, in the hope of acquiring some advantage vis-à-vis their competitors. This advantage might mean more voters, by increasing the discourse on the economy, immigration, or foreign policy, or more readers or viewers, by tackling the issues or identities media consumers are interested in. Figure 3.3 presents a Shock model of niche party growth that integrates elites and causal mechanisms.

**Figure 3.3: A Full Shock Model of Niche Party Growth**

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163 Berinsky (2007). The literature on confirmation bias finds that individuals search for information that confirms existing beliefs, rather than weighing confirming and disconfirming information equally; Lodge et al. (1999).
Third, the model assumes that preferences and salience are at least partially independent; individuals can take a position on a dimension, without the prevalence or extremity of that position driving its importance.\(^{164}\) For example, an individual can be strongly opposed to abortion, but emphasize the economy or foreign policy in their voting decisions. They might do so out of necessity (an economic crisis is more pressing), or because their views are already formally established as law. In terms of nativist parties, if salience does not have an independent effect on vote choice nativist support should reflect the presence of xenophobic attitudes, regardless of changes in salience brought on by exogenous events. But the portion of the population attributing feelings of insecurity to ethnic minorities in the EU in 2000 was a relatively weak \((r = 0.21)\) cross-national predictor of nativist party support.\(^{165}\)

This does not imply that salience and preferences are completely independent. Events certainly influence a dimension’s salience, but they are also an experience and might therefore also influence preferences. Consider an individual with no or weak preferences on counter-terrorism funding. A major terror attack might not only make terrorism highly salient, but also shift the preference on funding.

Finally, parties may act as an information shortcut facilitating preference formation; parties are a type of affiliation and can conceivably influence preferences by socializing supporters.\(^{166}\) If niche party growth is initially driven by salience, the intuition is that this support will be more stable even if salience declines, as niche parties

\(^{164}\) Erikson and Romero (1990); Edwards et al. (1995).

\(^{165}\) Attitudes: Eurobarometer 138 (2001), 4.2.2 Table 16; voting: author calculations from election results. The Eurobarometer only covered EU-15 countries. The cross-national data on attitudes is admittedly too sporadic and temporally bounded to offer a more systematic analysis; there were only three rounds of questions on xenophobia from 1988 to 2000.

\(^{166}\) Campbell et al. (1960); Butler and Stokes (1969); Franklin (1984); Bartels (2002); Carsey and Layman (2006).
lock in new voters by increasing their partisanship, but also by using that partisanship to align preferences on other dimensions. For example, a new niche party voter has strong preferences on immigration, weak preferences on crime and does not care about the economy. The niche party attempts to educate the voter about the party’s positions, counting on their affinity (partisanship) to make them a valued source of information. Of the three, preferences on crime are the most susceptible to change; the voter already has strong preferences on immigration and is wholly indifferent to the economy.\footnote{This can be interpreted as preferences updating; Zaller (1992) or Carsey and Layman (2006).}

Summarizing the four assumptions, while changes in salience generated by events are sufficient to induce party switching without changes in preferences and despite elite narratives, elite narratives, partisanship and the impact of events on preferences may facilitate or constrain an event’s impact. Figure 3.4 provides a graphical representation of this discussion.

**Figure 3.4: How Nice Parties Gain and Retain Supporters**

**What are Shocks?**

In this section, I explicitly define and expand on the concept of “Shocks”: when and why do changing conditions re-weight salience? How are Shocks identified without engaging in circular reasoning...how are they identified \textit{a priori}?\footnote{Taleb (2007) describes these events as “black swans,” seemingly improbable or unthinkable events with high systemic impact.}

In economics, a Shock is some large, sudden, seemingly unpredictable event, such as the sharp increases in oil prices in 1973, 1979, and 2007. More generally, Shocks are \textit{events that unsettle individual expectations about some aspect of their environment}. Implicit in this statement are assumptions about how individuals evaluate their...
environment. Individuals are assumed to generate, through constant experience and stimulus, some set of expectations about their surroundings, such as “do I expect there to be a Yugoslavia tomorrow?” or “do I expect gas prices to change?” For any single expectation, individuals have a belief about the distribution of future outcomes based on past experiences, with expectations updated as new information is acquired. Not all new information is necessarily used for updating; individuals might choose to ignore outliers, or information that contradicts established biases. In this model, Shocks are events occurring “at the tails” of models of expectations. While individuals understand that their models cannot perfectly predict outcomes, they tend to overestimate the completeness of the information available to them. Consequently, individuals still widely overestimate their predictive ability and are surprised by what they perceive as unlikely events.¹⁶⁹

To be more specific, I conceive of an event as requiring three properties before it qualifies as a Shock capable of affecting political or social outcomes. First, as discussed above the event must be a significant deviation from established patterns; there must be some reason to believe that the population perceives the event as noteworthy. A Shock’s unpredictability does not prevent it from being measured. For example, individuals have some expectation about how gas prices change. In the last 20 periods (however defined), gas prices were observed to increase by an average of $0.20 per gallon, with a standard deviation of $0.05. While increasing gas prices (or crime rates, or terror attacks) might not be optimal, past experiences have conditioned individuals to consider increases normal. How should the individual react to changes in the next period? While they probably will not distinguish between increases of $0.20 and $0.25, individuals will

¹⁶⁹ In sum, individuals are bad at “predicting the unpredictable”; Taleb (2007).
certainly notice a large deviation, such as an increase of $1.35. Though inter-ethnic relations or inter-ethnic violence might seem less predictable than gas prices, they are just as measurable through official statistics or personal observation. As with gas prices, individuals have some expectation about the level of ethnic heterogeneity or inter-ethnic animosity in their environment. They should further recognize when these dynamics deviate from established patterns, for example during an ethnic riot.

Second, the event must have a perceived negative impact for some or all individuals...it must represent a perceived threat. Political competition generally comes in two “flavors,” the material and the symbolic, and either can generate a perceived threat. Material threats have some tangible negative impact on an individual. This impact could be economic, such as job loss or higher prices. Or it could be physical, the threat to physical safety generated by crime, ethnic violence, terrorism or environmental degradation.

Symbolic politics refers to dimensions of political contestation with no material stakes for a conflict’s participants. Whereas individuals engage in material politics to maximize their economic or physical wellbeing, they engage in symbolic politics to ensure that their environment reflects their beliefs about what is “good,” “clean,” or “right.” Individuals receive benefits (conceptualized as self-esteem or psychic benefits) from knowing the State they live in reflects their culture, identities, norms or values, or conversely that it does not widely deviate from closely-held values or

170 Horowitz (1985); Sniderman et al. (2000).
172 Gusfield (1963); Sears et al. (1979); Citrin et al. (1990a and 1990b).
norms. For example, while most individuals have a preference on the legality of same-sex marriage, the material impact is minimal or nil for 95% of the population. Debates about same sex marriage, or the death penalty or the presence of the Ten Commandments in a courthouse, are debates about norms and values. Symbolic threats therefore have a perceived negative impact on the congruence between the values of an individual and their political or social system.

However, the outcome a symbolic debate also signals the status of the debate’s participants, their relative rank in a hierarchy of prestige. Status, which political authorities confer, is a valued object of political competition that carries cognitive and material benefits. Political authorities can determine the degree of permissible Socialist association, the legality of alcohol, beef, or pork, or the language(s) of political and business dealings. These cues signal the degree to which a State values a group’s traditions or norms, but also that group’s ability to acquire political power or economic security. Symbolic debates can therefore become larger debates about inter-group position and material competition. While the proposed ban on Socialist affiliation in Imperial Germany in the 1880s was not directly material, it stood to significantly influence the bargaining power of Capital and Labor. Official language laws or religion-

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174 Cognitive Dissonance theory argues that individuals seek to act in ways consistent with their beliefs, values or norms (Festinger 1957). As the State is an extension of its citizens, cognitive dissonance extends to State actions. For example, individuals can refuse to pay taxes in opposition to a military conflict, arguing that their funds are indirectly implicating them in an immoral act.

175 Ridgeway and Walker (1995). The Social Identity experiments of the 1970s found that individuals engaged in favoritism toward in-groups constructed for the experiment, even if it left the in-group worse off (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel et al. 1971; Turner 1975). Key (1949) found that poor Southern whites accepted disenfranchisement through poll or literacy taxes with the understanding that doing so would maintain the aggregate status of whites over blacks.

176 Brodie (1996). See also Lijphart (1968), Schmitter (1974), or Nevitte and Kennedy (eds) (1986) for the State’s role in conferring status in consociational, economic or ethnic conflicts (respectively).

177 There are economic, sexual and prestige advantages to being high status, which high status individuals are well aware of; Lin (1990); Hacker (1992); Feagin and Feagin (1999); or Thye (2000). Because status carries objective benefits, defending or overcoming the status barriers between groups is an object of political competition (Park 1950).
based prohibitions can asymmetrically influence the material prospects of ethnic groups, such as those disproportionately involved in pork production or brewing in societies with large Muslim populations. Politics come therefore in three flavors: the material, the symbolic, and those with a mixture of both.

Returning to the initial discussion, if gas prices fall by $1.35 or ethnic groups in conflict reach an accord, most individuals would recognize these events as significant but would not consider them problematic or worthy of further attention. At the same time, threats are contextual; while voters in Germany (an oil importer) would welcome falling gas prices, they might seriously concern voters in Norway (an oil exporter). Regardless, individuals have a rational incentive to resolve perceived threats. In an established democracy with strong rule of law where parties can implement their proposals, the most effective and efficient means of threat reduction on most dimensions will come from controlling or influencing political institutions, with elections the most basic means for individuals to signal their preferences or enact preferred changes.

Moving on to the third property required for a Shock, the event cannot be the outcome of some consensual process on the part of most or all social forces in the population. If a society broadly supports a $1.35 increase in gas prices as part of a conservation tax, they have decided that the threat of change on one dimension is outweighed by a greater benefit on others. Moreover, because it is controlled this sort of event might be perceived even by its opponents as a one-off and ignored when generating expectations about future changes. Figure 3.5 presents graphically what a Shock might look like based on an individual’s distribution of expectations for a particular dynamic.

Figure 3.5: Conceptualizing Shocks
Finally, not all shocks will benefit niche parties. Established parties can take positions on an emerging dimension in a manner that incorporates them into pre-existing political conflicts. Established parties might recognize the Shock’s threat to their political position early on and resolve it quickly and consensually before niche parties have an opportunity to benefit. A Shock might shift salience in a manner disadvantageous to the niche party, if they are not an issue owner, and not every individual experiencing increased salience will have their priorities sufficiently altered to influence their voting behavior. Conceptually then, there exists some set of events in the world. Of these events, some subset qualify as Shocks but do not realign a political system, some smaller subset realign the system but do not benefit niche parties, and some final, even smaller, subset realign a system and do benefit niche parties.

**Can Immigration be a Shock?**

As developed in Chapter 2, nativist parties champion the interests of a State’s native residents and in doing so organize politics around a particular understanding of ethnic identity. This is not to say these are single-issue parties. Rather, nativist parties frame multiple issue dimensions through the interests of a narrow identity category. But is the native/immigrant dynamic really comparable to the economy, national security, or the environment? Can immigration processes generate a Shock comparable to an oil crisis?¹⁷⁸

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¹⁷⁸ Kuran (1998) argues that economic, technological or demographic Shocks increase the utility of ethnic appeals. Sniderman et al. (2000) concludes that exogenous shocks influence prejudice, though they were unable to identify or measure the Shock. Olzak (1992) and Quillian (1995) argue that changing economies or increasing migration trigger ethnic resentment and inter-ethnic competition, while Citrin et al. (1990) on the English-first movement in the US and Lubbers and Scheepers (2000) on Republikaner growth in Germany focus on changes in immigration rates.
As argued above, an event is a Shock if it is 1) a significant deviation from past experiences; that 2) threatens some or all in the population with the promise of a negative outcome; and 3) was not the result of a consensus decision. Under certain circumstances immigration can fulfill all three conditions, even in countries with strong borders and restrictive immigration regimes.

While advanced industrial countries have relatively strong border integrity and complex regulatory schemes governing migration and the resources to maintain their border integrity, they can still be overwhelmed by illegal or legal migration. For example, countries have regulations governing political asylum and family reunification, but incomplete information about the demand for entry. Demand forecasts can be faulty for normative or positive reasons; there can be incorrect expectations about preferences ("migrants prefer to return rather than send for their families") or a failure to predict events with ramifications for immigration flows (a civil war or the fall of the Iron Curtain). Compounding forecasting failures poor information, veto points or competing interests can slow the legislative or executive action necessary to adapt to a changing environment.\(^{179}\) Finally, not all migration is regulated at the national level. International accords prevent signatories from blocking the entry of refugees, or engaging in involuntary repatriation; even if a petition for asylum is rejected, the receiving country may still be obligated to retain and support the applicant.\(^{180}\)

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\(^{179}\) For example, business leaders on the Right support immigration as a means of decreasing labor costs (Money 1997), while Left-Libertarians support the promotion of multi-culturalism; both are likely to oppose restrictions on immigration or immigrants, though for different reasons.

\(^{180}\) The principle of \textit{non-refoulement} was first implemented into the Geneva Accords on the Protection of Refugees; Muenz and Ulrich (1997).
Furthermore, immigration conceivably generates all three categories of perceived threats. Spikes in immigration might create resource pressure on natives, or at least the perception of such pressure.\(^{181}\) This is particularly true for natives in low-demand occupations at a competitive disadvantage with immigrants who have similar qualifications but lower wage expectations. Though population increases generate growth in the long-run by increasing the demand for goods and services, in the short-run the number of jobs is fixed and particularly low-skill or involuntary immigrants have few resources for consumption, meaning competition between natives and immigrants should increase so long as labor markets are not perfectly ethnically segmented.\(^{182}\) Other resources, such as housing or social welfare, are finite in the short-term and become increasingly scarce during rapid demographic shifts.\(^{183}\) The resources immigrants tend to compete for (low-income housing, unemployment benefits) are also the least attractive to provide, particularly if the group controlling distribution believes that outgroups benefit disproportionately from their provision.\(^{184}\) Natives with reduced resource access might resent that scarce goods are being provided to groups that have not “earned” the privilege through birth or tenure in a territory.\(^{185}\) Alternately, they might feel that removing a perceived source of competition is the best means of reducing resource pressure.

Finally, natives might perceive immigrants as a source of physical insecurity. Members of minority groups (internal or external) are often portrayed as the bearers of

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1\(^{181}\) Wiener’s (1978) study of internal Indian migration found that natives in one state would mobilize against migrants who they perceived as economic competitors, despite a shared national identity.

1\(^{182}\) Angenendt (1997), pg. 61.

1\(^{183}\) Olzak (1992).

1\(^{184}\) For this argument as it relates to social welfare or public goods provision in societies where multiple ethnicities are salient, see Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) or Alesina et al. (2001).

1\(^{185}\) Perea, Ch. 1 in Perea (ed.) (1997). Ethnic groups frequently assert their legitimacy though a connection to the soil; Horowitz (1985). Groups may claim tenure through the duration of settlement, or argue for legitimacy based on the amount they’ve invested in that land; this Locke-ian argument was made for example by early US immigrants vis-à-vis Native Americans; see Toft (2003).
crime, disease or political instability. Any increase in immigration could therefore be considered “importing instability” by concerned natives.

Second, natives might perceive immigrants, frequently the bearers of a foreign religion, language and cultural traditions, as a threat to their values or norms. Whether school serves pork at lunch, a neighborhood is thought of as Chinatown or religious symbols can be worn by civil servants has no material impact on most natives. But these issues carry symbolic weight; for some, increasing ethnic or cultural diversity calls into question a society’s ability to cohere in times of crisis or maintain its cherished values and traditions in times of peace.

Finally, some symbolic policies can carry tangible material effects. Growing immigrant communities might call for instruction in their native language or bilingual civil servants. To a native either could be perceived as an inefficient allocation of resources or as competition, though the changes are primarily aimed at increasing the symbolic representation of a minority. Bilingual education reallocates scarce resources to a service most natives cannot benefit from. Bilingual civil servants create a barrier to economic advancement for some natives by adding job requirements they cannot or will not meet. In sum, there is an argument for perceiving threats that are material, symbolic and a mixture of both in native concerns with immigration. At the extreme, some natives may conclude that changes in demography or differential birthrates signal a status

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186 Higham (1955); Husbands, in Hainsworth (ed) (1992); Panayi (2000); Sniderman et al. (2000). This perception extends to endogenous, low-status ethnic categories (Brown and Warner 1992; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000).

reversal and will relegate them to “strangers in their own land,” no longer valued by their own political or social system.\textsuperscript{188}

This is not to say that immigration always represents a shock. If immigration is perceived as fundamentally threatening by many individuals, heavy out-migration should generally be perceived as a positive outcome. Even if increasing immigration rates significantly deviate from past observations, it could be that the immigration was solicited and consensual. For example, a receiving society might use scheduled or temporary migration to overcome a labor shortage and sustain high economic growth despite concerns about the cultural or physical impact. In sum, 100,000 immigrants arriving as scheduled guest workers will not be treated the same by the receiving country as 100,000 unanticipated refugees.

Whether and why immigration is perceived as threatening speaks to debates about the motivations for ethnic mobilization. Implicit primordialists and soft constructivists treat ethnicity as basically fixed and exogenous, the result of some distant past conflict, historical process or institutional decision.\textsuperscript{189} Immigrants are threatening \textit{qua} immigrants. In contrast, hard constructivists argue that ethnicity is fluid and endogenous to political processes. Ethnic mobilizations occur when the benefits provided by

\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Status reversal} is the idea that one group’s increase in social or economic standing necessarily means that another’s decline; Tajfel (1971) or Horowitz (1985). \quotefrom{remd im eigenen Land} is a classic refrain of German nativists. Whether or not rational, threatened individuals may fear they will be “swamped” by an ethnic outgroup, that their group will become hierarchically subordinate, and eventually that they will be extinguished through violence or assimilation when relegated to the minority; see Horowitz (1985), pp. 175-189.

\textsuperscript{189} For examples of implicit primordialism, see Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), Geertz (1973), or Kaplan (1993). For examples of soft constructivism, see Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983), Horowitz (1985), Laitin (1986), or Huntington (2004).
distributive coalitions along ethnic lines crosses some threshold. There is evidence to support both claims. On the one hand, nativist parties argue that reducing immigration will provide demonstrable benefits. The juridical assignment of “native” and “immigrant” is a particularly convenient decision rule, as promising to redistribute from individuals without voting rights can attract voters set to benefit without threatening vote loss from the target population. Moreover, despite their blanket statements nativist parties do not mobilize against all immigrants, but target the flows most associated with negative outcomes. On the other hand, the categories and potential for expropriation associated with natives and immigrants has been available to, and used by, West European entrepreneurs for decades, yet the utilization of these appeals has only resulted in success under specific structural conditions. This suggests that the change in demand for certain appeals is at least as important as the change in supply of those appeals.

For individuals who see immigration or immigrants as a pressing threat, there are a number of political mechanisms for implementing threat reduction. Natives could use legislation to increase their share of a country’s resources through re-distribution, whether positive (implementing programs with a preference for natives) or negative (cutting programs perceived as benefiting immigrants). They could raise the barriers to naturalization, stalling immigrant access to citizen-specific resources, or they could erect barriers to preserve their status by restricting voting rights or making the native language the official language of commerce or government. Natives can also use political

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191 Gibson (2002). See also Chapters 2 and 6 in this project.

192 Nativist mobilizations in the United Kingdom (National Front) and Switzerland (National Action) used the same basic argumentation in the late 1960s.
institutions to gain a demographic advantage by increasing their numbers or decreasing the number of immigrants. They could raise the barriers to immigration or close loopholes, provide incentives to increase the native birth rate, push assimilationist policies, or physically reduce the immigrant population by carrot (economic incentives for voluntary return) or stick (lowering the bar for deportation).

Most of these measures serve a dual purpose. They address the current threat, but they also reduce the probability of future threats, whether exogenous (by strengthening external barriers against future immigration) or endogenous (by decreasing the power, status, or number of resident immigrants). Should the native/immigrant dynamic become salient and established parties unable or unwilling to engage in an individual’s preferred response, party switching to signal dissatisfaction or to increase the influence of sympathetic actors becomes a rational response to a perceived threat.

**Project Hypotheses**

A Shock model of party system change generates four hypotheses about the effects of immigration on nativist party support. The first hypothesis is the most basic and the key hypothesis explored in this project.

**Hypothesis 1 (The “Indirect” Hypothesis):** Increasing immigration leads to increasing support for nativist parties.\(^{194}\)

Hypothesis 1 assumes that natives can identify changes in ethnic distributions, that they perceive unsolicited increases in non-natives as threatening and that larger

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\(^{193}\) Power is an instrument to secure benefits and a benefit unto itself, a means to prevent future threats; Horowitz (1985), pg. 187. For an example of endogenous threat reduction, assume that ethnic group A associates crime or inter-ethnic violence with ethnic group B. One means of reducing the expected amount of crime or violence is simply to reduce the number of Bs in the area.

\(^{194}\) Net immigration is used rather than gross immigration, as net immigration is a better indicator of impact if immigrants are considered interchangeable. For example, 200,000 immigrants entering and 400,000 exiting in a year is conceptually different than 200,000 entering with none exiting.
changes are more likely to be perceived as threatening than smaller changes. Evaluations of changing distributions are considered independent across periods; a change in the immigrant population from 7-8% before the election at time_{t+1} will be equivalent to a change from 6-7% before the election at time_{t}. Hypothesis 1 is "indirect" as the model expects the effects of changes in objective conditions to be mediated by issue salience. If there is no relationship between objective structural processes and party support, then Shocks are either the result of elite manipulation (Hypothesis 2) or have no role to play in the growth of nativist parties (if Hypotheses 1 and 2 are disconfirmed).

**Hypothesis 1a (The "Additional Effects" Hypothesis):** Increasing immigration leads to increases in non-electoral forms of nativist activity, such as social group formation, social group participation, or anti-immigrant violence.

Hypothesis 1a assumes that there are mechanisms of threat reduction that do not require the ballot box. Some individuals could form pressure groups to influence politicians, or build social organizations to provide co-ethnics with material benefits and a sense of shared identity. Others might choose to engage in vandalism or violence against perceived immigrants.\(^{195}\) Ethnic violence is not exclusively the release of personal frustration or scapegoating, though it may be that as well. While attacking members of other ethnic categories to engage in forced redistribution or remake ethnic demography is a high risk venture with little expectation of reward in societies with strong rule of law,\(^{196}\) it can still be a prophylactic against demographic or status

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\(^{195}\) Perceived, as ethnic violence often relies on visual cues, which can result in false positives.

\(^{196}\) Gurr (1970); Bates, Greif and Singh (2002); Acemoglu and Robinson (2006); Kalyvas (2006). The ability to act without being punished is fundamental to the willingness to engage in violence, whether ethnic (Horowitz 2001; Varshney 2002) or non-ethnic (Petersen 2001).
Areas with high, persistent levels of ethnic victimization can develop into no-go zones or “spaces of fear” for the victimized category, preserving native position even at the expense of the economic or social benefits of internal or external immigration. While violence may not be strong enough to generate a full-scale security dilemma between ethnic groups, it can certainly influence individual decisions.

Hypothesis 1a is “additional” as electoral competition is considered the crucial mechanism for individuals to express dissatisfaction with native/immigrant dynamics in West European societies. As discussed below, when the scope conditions operating in Western Europe are relaxed non-electoral activities might dominate the native reaction. These additional effects are dependent variables, and not explanatory variables, as the processes and mechanisms hypothesized to bring them about are the same. Different nativist reactions (parties, social groups and violence) might not be independent, and furthermore might be dependent in ways that aggravate or mitigate one another. Political parties or social groups could direct ethnic violence, or successful social groups could form a political party (and vice versa). On the other hand, the perceived effectiveness of, or opportunity to engage in, one type of reaction might reduce the need for others. If

197 Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) treat all political violence as re-distributive. Lake and Rothchild (1996), Fearon (1998) and Slack and Doyon (2001) consider ethnic violence, particularly in the former Yugoslavia, as prophylactic. For Woodward (1974) or Olzak (1992), high status groups use violence as a last resort for preserving established hierarchies.

198 A high probability of being attacked or seeing economic gains dashed, such as through harassment, Vandalism or arson, should see most individuals unwilling to assume these risks. The concept of spaces of fear comes from an interview with Thomas Buerk-Matsunami of the Institute for European Ethnology in Berlin, 7/23/05.

199 Whether localized violence escalates seems to depend on the State’s ability to guarantee internal security (Fearon 1996). If the State is a) impartial and b) effective at enforcement, groups can use the State as a credible commitment to peace. Widespread, uncontrolled inter-group violence can rapidly make the relevant cleavage salient for all group members, as the expected disutility (death or serious injury) from failing to treat that identity as salient easily outweighs the cost of preparing for conflict (Weingast 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2000; Kydd and Walter 2002).

200 Of course, violence caused by immigrants could represent a Shock, as could social movements organized by immigrants. In this project, actions natives take are considered dependent variables, while actions that immigrants take are considered explanatory variables.
natives feel they can achieve their goals through a low risk, low effort activity like voting, there may be no need to engage in social group formation (low risk, high effort) or violence (high risk, high effort). For this reason, failing to confirm Hypothesis 1a is not fatal to the model as presented.

Hypothesis 2 represents a hypothesis designed to test the relationship between issue salience and nativist party support.

**Hypothesis 2 (The “Direct” Hypothesis):** The increasing salience of native/immigrant issue or identity dimensions leads to increasing support for nativist parties.

Hypotheses 1 and 2 are closely related. Hypothesis 2 is “direct” as compared to objective demographic changes, there are fewer intervening variables between issue salience and changes in party support; if there was perfect information on both changes in salience and changes in demography, salience would be the better predictor of support. This will be true as long the relationship of structural to salience changes is not perfect. Unfortunately, compared to objective structural changes the data on issue or identity salience is significantly weaker and any tests will necessarily be less systematic.

Finally, Hypothesis 3 considers the effect of the prior size of the immigrant population on nativist party growth. While not crucial to the model (which privileges changes, not levels), it addresses an interesting question: are changes in nativist party support conditional not just on changes in the native/immigrant distribution, but also on the prior distribution?

**Hypothesis 3 (The “Xenophobia vs. Fertile Ground” Hypothesis):**
Increasing immigration leads to greater increases in support for nativist parties depending on the size of the prior immigrant population.

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Unlike Hypotheses 1 and 2, there could be conflicting mechanisms at work in Hypothesis 3. On the one hand, areas with previously low ethnic heterogeneity might be more prone to reject ethnic groups they have no prior experience with, and nativist parties should find more success in areas of low native/immigrant heterogeneity, holding net migration constant (the xenophobia mechanism). On the other hand, areas of high heterogeneity increase the frequency of cursory contact, such as interactions in a market or neighborhood, as opposed to friendships or family ties, which could allow economic and social frictions to develop without developing mechanisms for increasing tolerance (the fertile ground mechanism). Consequently, nativist parties should find more success in areas of high prior native/immigrant heterogeneity, holding net migration constant.

Why do Shocks End?

Once a Shock unsettles expectations, how or why does it ever end? How or why does niche party support ever stabilize again? This section briefly considers several mechanisms of Shock termination. First, considering the hypothesized distribution of individual expectations described earlier, a Shock ends when individuals observe the relevant dimension as returning to something like their prior expectations. Eventually, gas prices stop increasing, a major terrorist campaign ends or immigration declines to

203 Allport (1954). Indeed, areas with high ethnic heterogeneity should be more prone to Shocks, as they create additional opportunities for triggering events, such as inter-ethnic violence. Fearon and Latin (1996) argue that inter-ethnic interactions lack the ability to acquire information about, and sanction, non-cooperative ingroup members. Allport (1954) and Pettigrew (1998), find that equal status is important for enhancing non-cursory inter-ethnic contact and reducing inter-ethnic tension.
204 In terms of ethnic politics, this question directly addresses ethnic outbidding models, in which the introduction of ethnic politics into a political system leads ethnic groups to engage in progressively more extreme and exclusionary actions until violence breaks out and the political system breaks down. See Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) or Horowitz (1985).
previous levels. Of course it may also be that expectations are updated over time to accommodate the new environment; individuals might become accustomed to terror attacks or gas rationing.

For nearly any Shock, there might be exogenous or endogenous mechanisms of termination. Immigration’s push factors (famine, civil war, asymmetric economic growth) could end, or the flow of individuals willing or able to migrate could be exhausted. On the other hand, new laws or enhanced enforcement could reduce immigration flows. There can be sincere and strategic incentives for established actors to end a Shock as quickly as possible. Sincerely, established actors have their own preferences and might see the Shock as a threat. Strategically, if established actors are at a comparative disadvantage on the relevant dimension, additional delay will result in lost votes and seats, which translates into lost financing, power and prestige. If they begin with a comparative advantage, delays in resolving the Shock can erode their credibility and open them to attacks by niche competitors.

Alternately, support for the niche party could stabilize when some natural threshold is reached, as the willingness to re-weight salience or shift preferences might not be infinitely flexible. Some individuals, such as pro-migrant activists, naturalized immigrants or natives with immigrant spouses or children from mixed marriages, might be unwilling to vote for a nativist party in a democratic system. Others might be persuaded to switch their vote through a combination of their own concerns and the recognition of the concerns in enough other, similar voters. Concern might also increase with the duration of the Shock, as established actors seem increasingly incapable of resolving the triggering event. The result is a “tipping” model, in which vote switching
becomes self-reinforcing until some threshold is reached or the Shock ends.\textsuperscript{205} For example, all of a country’s meatpackers might have a similar but non-identical willingness to tip. Some are motivated to switch through concerns about job loss, while others tip after recognizing the growing concern among their colleagues. The actions of meatpackers might have an influence on steelworkers, who recognize the potential for similar conflicts, but not on the actions of lawyers, who see these concerns as too removed to represent a significant threat.\textsuperscript{206}

Finally, when the organizing conflict is focused on groups, an outgroup presence might depress niche party support at the local level, even if that outgroup cannot vote. For example, if primarily low-skill, blue-collar workers support nativist parties and all the unmobilized low-skill residents in a district are immigrants (as a result of “white flight,” chain migration, or ethnically-concentrated housing), nativists will eventually reach a point where they are unable to mobilize new supporters.

\textbf{Antecedent Conditions}

Four antecedent conditions explicitly or implicitly delineate the model’s external validity: the archetypal system described above is thought to be 1) a mass suffrage democracy with 2) strong rule of law and 3) proportional electoral rules where 4) parties are efficacious at implementing their policies. With minimal exceptions, such as the United Kingdom’s majoritarian electoral system, these four conditions describe post-war

\textsuperscript{205} Kuran (1998).
\textsuperscript{206} An example of this logic is Petersen’s (2001) study of cascade effects during insurgent mobilization in the Baltics. In Petersen’s model, villagers fell into groups (such as disaffected young men or clergymen) with similar preferences and a tipping point based on the percentage of other villagers who mobilized. If one cluster was large enough to cross the tipping threshold of the next, that cluster would mobilize and so on, until there were no unmobilized villagers or the percentage of mobilized villagers failed to reach the tipping threshold of unmobilized clusters.
Western Europe. However, the processes identified here are neither historically nor geographically bounded, and this section identifies expected outcomes when one or more of these antecedent conditions does not obtain.

**Non-Democracy/No Mass Suffrage**

Mass democracies produce a relatively accurate pictures of public preferences, though non-voting admittedly tends to be correlated with certain socio-economic attributes. In non-democracies, there is no expectation that the Government or distribution of legislative seats will reflect the views of the public. Consequently, there is less likelihood that a Shock will be reflected in electoral results. On the other hand, centralized systems provide a greater capacity for elites to manipulate information, which could lead to increased public concern over non-events. Non-democratic regimes might also facilitate violence against outgroups if they relax the penalties for engaging in that violence. Finally, non-democracies unencumbered by veto points or competing interests might be more effective at confronting Shocks quickly, before they can translate into broader public concerns. All three intuitions should be applicable, albeit to a lesser degree, in democracies with a limited franchise or limited civil liberties. In elite democracies, the political system does not represent the full range of preferences held by the public. If the excluded voting population is somehow correlated with a group particularly likely to be affected by a Shock, there should be no or a reduced effect.

**Weak Rule of Law**

In societies with strong rule of law, parties are assumed to be able implement their issue positions and the positions they take are therefore meaningful to voters. In weak rule of law societies, however, voters assume that parties are incapable of implementing
formal policies and discount the issue positions parties take.\textsuperscript{207} For Shocks generally, one would expect that voters see parties as a poor outlet for their concerns and that social mobilization or violence are more fruitful channels for engaging in threat reduction. Violence might be especially pernicious in weak rule of law societies, where the benefits are higher (permanent redistribution becomes possible) and the costs lower (it is less likely the State can prosecute perpetrators).

For Shocks that impact identity categories asymmetrically, however, parties may still have something to offer voters in a weak rule of law society. As post-election spoils cannot be reliably distributed by elites through formal, indiscriminate policies, parties are often only able to promise some coalition of voters preferential treatment (patronage) in exchange for their vote. Under these conditions, identity categorizations, particularly ethnic categorizations, are an effective technology for politicians to identify insiders and outsiders when providing patronage, and for voters to identify credible promises when evaluating parties.\textsuperscript{208} In Shock conditions, then, niche parties could prove attractive by promising to preserve or increase the patronage funneled to a threatened identity.

**Majoritarian Electoral Rules**

In systems with low barriers to party entry or favorable formulas for translating votes into seats, as in proportional representation systems, new or small parties should have no difficulty forming or finding new supporters. In systems with high barriers to party entry or majoritarian apportionment formulas, voters tend to defect from parties

\textsuperscript{207} On this point and more generally on the distinction between strong and weak rule of law societies, this project is indebted to Ziegfeld (Dissertation).

\textsuperscript{208} Fearon (1999); Chandra (2004); Caselli and Coleman (Working Paper).
unlikely to win seats. Majoritarian electoral rules should therefore reduce a niche party’s ability to attract new voters, as individuals heavily discount the party’s ability to implements its policies by exerting legislative influence. One possible outcome is that niche actors will form a faction aimed at affecting the policy of one or more established parties, rather than engaging in party formation. Another is that niche party success will vary with the level of aggregation; in regions or localities where the individuals most impacted by a Shock are sufficiently concentrated, niche parties may operate as though electoral rules were proportional. Finally, niche actors might decide to express themselves outside of political competition, by forming interest groups or social movements, or engaging in violence.

**Non-Systematic Efficacy**

Finally, rule of law assumes systematic party efficacy; all parties are equally capable or incapable of implementing their stated positions. Efficacy, however, could be non-systematic across parties in a system, or across parties in multiple systems. For example, parties forming the Government tend to be more efficacious than parties in the opposition. Due to the distribution of preferences or the nature of Government formation, one or more parties might be consistently less effective at implementing their policies, as they can never hope to be more than a junior partner in Government or might be excluded from possible coalitions altogether. This could decrease niche party support through strategic voting, or increase it as voters engage in compensatory voting to give the niche party more bargaining power in a potential coalition. The balance between

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210 Fiorina (1996) and Kedar (2005) find that voters modify their policy expectations based on a party’s expected influence in office.
the two mechanisms likely shifts as the size of the niche party or the likelihood of entering a coalition increases.

Political competition might also make a niche party more or less efficacious. One established party could attempt to undercut a niche competitor to preserve their own support, while another attempts to strengthen them to weaken an established competitor.211 Some niche parties might hold positions normatively or strategically unacceptable to all established actors and be entirely frozen out of the political system, with established party signaling to voters that the niche party will be wholly ineffective if elected. These “stigmatized” parties could still see their support increase during Shocks as they serve in the short-term as a potent signal to established parties, who suffer losses in funding and seats as niche parties succeed.212

The main intuition, however, is that stigmatized niche parties will have difficulty retaining new supporters in the long-term. During a Shock, salience on the relevant dimension could overwhelm the stigmatized party’s high discount factor. Voters realize that someone in the political system will record their displeasure and implement threat reduction, but might not do so without punishment. That same discount factor makes the niche party unattractive when the Shock subsides however; voters learn that the stigmatized party is incapable of representing them in day-to-day matters. Stigmatized parties could also find their gains from a Shock lower than expected if voters look perceive a future inefficacy or fear the social pressure associated voting with a party that is “beyond the pale.” Finally, stigmatized parties could have difficulties attracting competent, ambitious elites or running competitive campaigns, further reducing their

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211 Meguid (2005).
212 In most European countries, parties are financed primarily by the State based on vote and seat shares.
perceived efficacy and their ability to run credible elections. Figure 3.6 displays the expectations for niche parties that are perceived as inefficacious.

Figure 3.6: Niche Party Outcomes (Party Efficacy)

Conclusions

This chapter presented a theoretical framework for understanding one model of niche party growth and party system change. High impact, unanticipated events (Shocks) rapidly increase the salience of some dimension of political contestation for some subset of voters that perceive the event as a threat to their material or symbolic well being. Niche parties benefit from this salience increase when their position on that dimension make them sufficiently attractive to the subset of individuals to induce vote switching from an established party to the niche party, or from “non-voter” to the niche party.

Specifically, I argued that the growth of nativist parties can be explained by the changing salience of dimensions of contestation related to the native/immigrant dynamic. While I focused on one potential Shock (large, rapid, unanticipated immigration flows), one can imagine multiple potential salience-altering events related to the native/immigrant dynamic, such as increases in inter-ethnic violence, or major revisions to immigration policy or the status recognition provided to natives or immigrants. Moreover, the theory does not deny that other structural or historical processes, such as electoral de-alignment or generational change, might facilitate party switching to nativist parties, though it does contend that these processes are neither necessary nor sufficient, while Shocks are both.

213 On these mechanisms as they relate to Radical Right parties, see Minkenberg (1998) or Art (2006).
At its core, the idea is highly parsimonious, requiring only the reasonable belief that unusual events raise interest in the issues or identities related to those events, and that elections are a key means of resolving political or social concerns. If good public opinion data on individual salience, preferences, assumed party positions and partisanship were available across elections, changes in salience would be sufficient to explain some variation in observed vote switching, and changes in salience would in turn be explained by some measurable, objective structural process. The model is not infirmed if weak preferences do change with salience or elites are able to facilitate or constrain changes, though these possibilities raise questions which attributes make certain individuals more susceptible to preference change or elite narratives.

A Shock model of party system change and political competition is a compelling advance in its comprehensiveness and flexibility. It explains periods of equilibrium and disequilibrium. It emphasizes the possibility of multiple explanations for a party or a system, rather than historically bounded, teleological processes. A Shock model can explain the emergence and re-emergence of similar movements across a wide variety of regional, institutional and temporal conditions. Finally, because the model is dynamic and the competition between parties ongoing, there is no end state. Today’s failed or marginal niche party could succeed tomorrow under the right conditions, while structural or institutional factors could rob today’s successful niche party of support in future elections.
Chapter 3 Figures and Charts

Figure 3.1: A Basic Shock Model of Niche Party Growth

Figure 3.2: Expanded Niche Party Outcomes
Figure 3.3: A Full Shock Model of Niche Party Growth

Mechanism: Perceived Material or Symbolic Threat

Mechanism: Re-Weighted Voter Utility


Mechanism: Framing, Priming

Shock (Y) → ↑ Elite Discourse

Figure 3.4: How Nice Parties Gain and Retain Supporters

Votes gained with increased salience (elite discourse constant).

Support if salience remains constant.

Votes lost through salience decline.

Votes kept through:
- Increased partisanship?
- Preference change?
- Party socialization?

Support if salience declines, all other factors constant.

Niche Party Support

Shock

Shock Ends

Time
**Figure 3.5: Conceptualizing Shocks**

- **"Significant" Change, Non-Threatening**
- **"Normal" Change**
- **"Significant" Change, Threatening**

Assumed Frequency

Observed Change over Last Period

**Figure 3.6: Niche Party Outcomes (Party Efficacy)**

- No Shock
- Efficacious Party, Salience Stable
- Efficacious Party, Salience Declines
- Inefficacious Party, Salience Declines
Chapter 4 – Earthquake: Explaining Cross-Time Nativist Success in Austria and Germany

Thus far largely theoretical and conceptual, the next three chapters of my dissertation turn to the data used to generate and further test my working theory. This chapter focuses on the evolution of political processes in Austria and Germany after the 1973 oil crisis ended large-scale scheduled migration to Western Europe. In this chapter I advance two related arguments. First, a spike in immigration in the late 1980s and early 1990s represented a Shock with far-reaching and measurable effects on both societies. Before the late 1980s, Austrian and German elites rarely discussed immigration and the public in both countries considered it a non-issue. At the height of the Shock, however, more than 40% of the German and Austrian publics named immigration as the most important national issue and immigration dominated the political discourse. Furthermore, the Shock’s effects on discourse persist despite a subsequent decline in immigration, suggesting durable changes in the political and social salience of immigration in both countries.

Second, I argue that the increase in salience of immigration generated by the Shock drove some subset of natives to address their concerns by switching their support to nativist parties in state and national elections. Increases in nativist party support track empirically with cross-time variation in immigration and the salience of immigration in both countries. It was exactly those elections where immigration was the most salient that nativist parties saw their greatest increases in support. Nativist parties succeeded in these elections because a significant portion of the population that had not previously supported nativist appeals felt these parties were the best suited to deal with the emerging
immigration issue. Changes in crime rates, unemployment, or party organization are insufficient to explain the variation in nativist party growth across time.

The chapter proceeds in three sections. The first section describes patterns of nativist party support in Germany and Austria since 1973. The second section establishes the scope of the proposed Shock and connects it to three reactions in the native population: a general increase in the salience of immigration, a significant increase in support for nativist parties and a significant increase in anti-immigrant violence. Finally, I consider the role of changes in the elite discourse about immigration in Germany and Austria. I will argue that changes in elite discourse were driven by objective events and, though this discourse probably acted as an intervening variable that increased public concerns about immigration, these concerns were not the result of elite manipulation. An explanation for the cross-national variation in the fortunes of nativist parties in Germany and Austria is explored in the next chapter, while a systematic quantitative analysis of nativist party support (cross- and sub-national) is presented in Chapter 6.

Patterns of Party Support

The dependent variable for this project is changes in nativist party support. Variation on the dependent variable in both Austria and Germany is predominantly temporal. Support for nativist parties in national elections reflected their average support across state and European elections at the time; there was no systematic bias to suggest that nativist voters used a particular administrative level for policy balancing or signaling.\textsuperscript{214} Nativist parties in Germany succeeded in the Protestant north (Schleswig-Holstein) and the Catholic south (Baden-Wuerttemberg). They saw above average

\textsuperscript{214} Kedar (2006).
growth in areas where National Socialists in the 1930s had done poorly, such as industrial
cities like Mannheim, and failed in areas where they had done exceptionally well, such as
agricultural Lower Saxony. Nativist parties in Austria similarly succeeded in the Left-
leaning, Catholic east (Vienna) and the Right-leaning, more Protestant west (Carinthia).
Indeed, the only relevant geographic variation was an urban/rural split; nativist parties in
Germany and Austria tended to do better in metropolitan (Vienna, Frankfurt, Berlin) than
rural areas (Burgenland, Lower Saxony). This sort of variation fits well with a story
about immigration; immigration to Germany and Austria was overwhelmingly urban,
areas where immigrants could acquire low- or unskilled service or manufacturing jobs.
Even asylum-seekers, initially restricted in movement and occupation by the government,
had an incentive to migrate to the cities once their restrictions on work were lifted.

Cross-time patterns of electoral support for the five identified nativist parties (the
REP, NPD and DVU in Germany; the FPOe and BZOe in Austria) can be divided into
three periods in both countries over the past 35 years. In the first period, from the early
1970s through about 1986, these parties existed in an electoral wilderness. Since its
founding in the 1950s, the FPOe experienced a consistent decline in support and by 1986
was very close to the national electoral threshold (4%). The NDP, a small movement
founded in the 1960s to re-create the German NPD’s success, never gained more than
.1% of the vote. In the former West Germany, the NPD never recovered from internal
crises preceding the 1972 national election. Their decision to engage in nativist
appeals from about 1980 improved the party’s fortunes but failed to push it above the .5%
necessary to recoup election costs through public campaign financing. The REP and

215 The NPD nearly reached the 5% threshold in the 1968 federal election, but initially chose not to contest
elections in 1972 to present a “unified front” against Willy Brandt’s national SPD government.
DVU were nascent parties in these years, with the only election seriously contested by either a state election in the REP’s home of Bavaria in 1986.

In the second period, from 1986/1987 until 1994, nativist parties in both countries saw a rapid expansion in support. This success was more pronounced in Austria, where the FPOe, despite remaining the third largest party, was the big winner of the 1986, 1990 and 1994 national elections and formed the government in the state of Carinthia in 1989. In West (later western) Germany, the REP and DVU entered 4 of the 11 West German state parliaments between 1987 and 1993 and narrowly missed entering two others, but failed to enter the national parliament in 1990 or 1994. Even the NPD saw its best returns since the 1960s, gaining more than .5% in some state elections despite an unaltered message or leadership. Unlike Austria, the success of nativist parties in Germany was bi-modal, lasting from September 1987 (Bremen) to January 1989 (Berlin, the year’s only election) and again from September 1991 (Bremen) through 1993.

Finally, from 1994 in Germany and 1995 in Austria nativist parties entered a period of consolidation or marked decline. In Austria the FPOe experienced continued but reduced growth, with a brief surge in 1999 resulting in the formation of a national government with the OeVP. From 2000 until 2005, the party collapsed to its 1986 level of support in a series of disastrous setbacks. In the former West Germany, the REP re-entered the parliament in Baden-Wuerttemberg in 1996, but the general trend since 1997 has been a decline into irrelevance. Only the NPD’s recent successes in East Germany have kept that party a relevant political actor nationally, while the DVU’s existence relies

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216 With party leader Joerg Haider elected governor through the backing of the Christian-democratic OeVP.
217 The four were Berlin (REP; 1989), Bremen (DVU; 1991), Baden-Wuerttemberg (REP; 1992) and Schleswig-Holstein (DVU; 1992). Nativist parties just missed entering the parliament in Bavaria (REP; 1990) and Hamburg (REP and DVU; 1993).
entirely on its aging founder, publisher Gerhard Frey, and his willingness to outspend the other parties in targeted elections. The FPOe’s defeats were concurrent with its time in government and were only arrested in 2005 with the FPOe/BZOe split (and the FPOe’s subsequent return to the opposition), strongly suggesting that it was hampered by its government responsibilities.\(^{218}\) Though I am primarily interested in explaining the shift from the first period to the second, an argument for the FPOe’s persistence and REP’s decline after 1994, grounded in supply-side explanations of party organization and party competition, is advanced in the next chapter.

One plausible alternative explanation is that nativist parties were simply better organized in the late-1980s. But in Austria, the states where the FPOe saw the greatest growth initially had some of the weakest party organizations. Vienna had the lowest density of FPOe party members to population of any state in 1986.\(^{219}\) Moreover, that organization was badly split by the 1986 national leadership conflict between the national-liberal Haider and the classical liberal Norbert Steger, the Vienna party chair, to the degree that Steger essentially ran a separate campaign in Vienna during the 1986 national election against Haider’s preferred candidate, Helene Partik-Pable.\(^{220}\) Yet Vienna, along with Carinthia (Haider’s stronghold) saw by far the largest gains for the FPOe at the state and national level, to the degree that Vienna is today the FPOe’s primary support base. It was not that the Viennese organization had previously lacked the resources to contest elections, but rather that some exogenous factor made the party more attractive to the Viennese, increasing both its votes and its ability to invest in infrastructure. In Germany, nativist parties were equally disorganized across states.

\(^{218}\) Luther, in Dachs et al. (eds) (2006).
\(^{219}\) FPOe membership from Luther, in Dachs et al. (eds) (2006); Austrian population from the 1991 census.
\(^{220}\) FPOe campaign ads, Kurier, 11/18/86 and 11/20/86.
Aside from Berlin (where the party was banned), the NPD was equally weak across West Germany. With the exception of Bavaria, where they originally formed in 1983 after splitting from the CSU, the REP created state organizations more or less simultaneously in 1987 and 1988. The DVU never bothered to engage in organization building, running all local campaigns from Frey’s office in Munich. Indeed, both the REP and DVU only invested resources in a state after they won an election, usually by margins that surprised even party elites.

The Shock and its Effects

Having framed the outcome of interest, this section argues that patterns of changing nativist party support are best explained by extreme increases in unsolicited net migration to Germany and Austria in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The section proceeds in four parts. Part one describes the dimensions of this event, and suggests that it was unique for the post-war period. Part two argues that this event led to a sharp increase in the public’s concern with immigration as an issue, an increase in the salience of immigration. Part three connects changes in net migration and changes in the salience of immigration to nativist party support. Part four connects changes in net migration and the salience of immigration to a second outcome, increases in anti-immigrant violence.

The Shock

Migration to Germany and Austria in the post-war period can be separated into periods, which vary by flow and intent. This section will briefly argue that only one of these flows contained the properties I associate with a Shock in Chapter 3.
First, in the late-1940s approximately 12 million German “expellees” (*Vertriebene*) fled or were repatriated from former German territories in Eastern Europe (today parts of Poland, the Czech Republic and Russia) for West Germany, East Germany and Austria. After the initial expulsion 3.9 million East Germans fled west between 1949 and 1961, precipitating construction of the Berlin Wall.\(^{221}\) Between 1/4\(^{th}\) and 1/3\(^{rd}\) of West Germans were a *Vertriebene* or an *Uebersiedler* by 1961, but as recent German citizens who were linguistically, culturally and economically indistinct from their fellow citizens, the *Vertriebene* and *Uebersiedler* were accepted or even welcomed by their co-ethnics. *Uebersiedler* in Germany received compensation for their lost property, subsidized housing and education, professional retraining, and were even entitled to pensions based on their previous employment in the GDR.\(^{222}\) Moreover the *Uebersiedler* offered political benefits, as their flight undermined the legitimacy of the East German regime.\(^{223}\)

By the 1950s, labor shortages in West Germany and Austria, previously met by taking in *Uebersiedler*, were threatening to slow Central Europe’s economic recovery (the “economic miracle” or *Wirtschaftswunder*). The solution in both countries was to agree to official quotas for temporary guest workers (*Gastarbeiter*) with Mediterranean countries that had an oversupply of labor.\(^{224}\) These laborers were primarily employed in “3D” (dirty, dangerous, demeaning) jobs, such as textiles, heavy manufacturing, mining,

\(^{224}\) Green (2004), pg. 32. The primary sending countries were Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia.
construction, grave digging or sanitation. The guest worker period was, proportionate to the population, the greatest non-Germanic migration of the post-war period; in all, Germany’s foreign population grew from 700,000 in 1961 (1.2%) to nearly 4 million in 1973 (6.4%). Austria experienced a smaller proportionate migration, though its foreign population tripled to 270,000 (3.9%) between 1961 and 1973. The agreements lasted until the end of 1973, when they were promptly suspended during the first Oil Shock.

The native community did not accept the newcomers unreservedly. In 1964, two-thirds of the respondents to a German survey agreed that they would accept a one-hour increase in the work week if it meant no more guest workers were accepted. But despite the size and pace of the guest worker migration it never aroused a significant level of opposition from the public or from political actors. Even the NPD was silent; while they criticized the necessity of these “visitors” in German society, the guest workers played only a small role in the party’s platform and appeals; the party was much more interested in debt relief for farmers, opposition to the Left (both Communists and the “1968 Generation”), the return of territories lost during World War II, and the return of Germany as a Third Way between the United States and Soviet Union.

I would argue that the failure of the guest workers to arouse native concerns comes back to the nature of the migration. First, all of the relevant social actors (the Government, trade unions and employers’ associations) agreed to the program and had

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input into its eventual shape. These agreements particularly took into account concerns about job competition; the trade unions agreed to the programs on the condition that all workers in an industry were paid equal wages regardless of their origin and that no guest worker replaced a native worker.\textsuperscript{230} The belief was that while the guest workers were not the optimal solution, they were necessary to maintain Central Europe’s high growth rate; the Austrian daily \textit{Die Presse} argued just a month before the Oil Shock in 1973 that “without the guest workers, [a high growth rate and a productive economy] can’t happen.”\textsuperscript{231} The guest workers took jobs for wages or conditions that most natives would not accept and contributed to social welfare schemes without the expectation that they themselves could benefit from unemployment or retirement insurance.\textsuperscript{232}

Second, natives believed that the guest workers were only temporary and would leave when the agreements ended.\textsuperscript{233} The German daily \textit{FAZ} stated in 1959 that guest workers were a positive development, as “by their eventual unemployment they can be sent back.”\textsuperscript{234} Just a year before the Oil Shock, German papers still stated that the guest workers would only be allowed to stay in the receiving country so long as they were economically beneficial.\textsuperscript{235} The native population shared this view, whether it was the government, the press, the employers or the unions.\textsuperscript{236} Natives believed that once the supply of work dried up, guest workers would have no incentive to pay the more expensive cost of living and would choose return. These assumptions were for the most

\textsuperscript{230} Holzinger (1997), pg. 55.
\textsuperscript{231} \textit{Die Presse}, “Ohne Gastarbeiter geht es nicht,” 9/11/73.
\textsuperscript{232} Meier-Braun (2002), pp. 35-6.
\textsuperscript{233} Joppke (1999), pg. 65.
\textsuperscript{236} Interview, Dr. Rainer Bauboeck, Institute for European Integration Research, 12/04/06; Interview, August Gaechter, Centre for Social Innovation, 4/2/07.
party correct...of the 14 million guest workers who entered Germany 11 million (nearly 4/5ths) returned after two to three years.\textsuperscript{237}

Ironically, it was the unintended consequences of certain native decisions that made return less likely. Both the employers and the trade unions fought for longer contracts and residence permits decoupled from employment; employers did not want to engage in frequent re-training, while the unions feared that shorter contracts would lead to wage competition.\textsuperscript{238} Second, restrictions on movement after 1973 made family reunification the optimal compromise between access to a superior job market and the desire to marry and raise children among co-ethnics. Both provisions created incentives for migrants become long-term residents and in effect settle in the receiving country:

"[In 1974] the government decided that any non-Austrian leaving country couldn't come back if they had [a certain type of passport]. Construction workers used to leave for the winter, then get a reemployment certificate. People realized they couldn't leave easily, so they would just bring their families. The government didn't catch on until much later. They didn't understand how their own regulations worked."\textsuperscript{239}

While large scale economic migration to Western Europe effectively ended in 1973, three channels of migration to Germany and Austria were not closed off for political or legal reasons. First, both countries had a legal obligation to permit legal residents to send for their immediate family. Second, both countries were signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention protocols governing refugees, and had formal programs for the acceptance of asylum seekers.\textsuperscript{240} Countries under the agreement are liable to provide

\textsuperscript{237} Green (2004), pg. 33.
\textsuperscript{238} Green (2004), pg. 34. The workers themselves were interested in longer stays, as they found they were unable to save as much as they had hoped in only one or two years; Muenz and Ulrich, pg. 82 in Bade and Weiner (eds) (1997).
\textsuperscript{239} Interview, August Gaechter, 4/2/07.
\textsuperscript{240} The groups are not equivalent: asylum seekers are victimized by their government by their political or religious grounds, and their acceptance is determined on an individual basis. Refugees are those fleeing an
for refugees, even if they are not accepted as asylum seekers. Finally, in Germany
Article 116 of the Basic Law guaranteed citizenship to any individual who could prove
descent from citizens living within Germany’s 1937 borders, as well as start-up funds,
education and job training to facilitate their integration. The more time that passed since
1945, the less these Aussiedler (returnees) resembled the average native German and the
more tenuous their linguistic and cultural connection to Germany became.241 For
example, Article 116 allowed for the return of the Volga Germans, who had settled in
Russia and the Ukraine in the 18th Century. Despite their claimed ethnic connection, the
Aussiedler were thought of as “Russen-Deutschen” (Russian-Germans) by natives, or
more often just “Russians.”

Over time, individuals utilized all three mechanisms in ever greater numbers.
From 1973, family reunification offset guest worker out-migration and fundamentally
changed the character of the immigrant population from a temporary, economic migration
to a permanent, settler migration. Between 1973 and 1980 the number of foreigners in
Germany increased from 4 to 4.5 million, while the number of foreign laborers decreased
from 2.6 to 2.1 million.242 Between 1953 and 1987, West Germany took in 37,000
Aussiedler a year, with the majority coming from Poland (62%) and Romania (15%).243
From 1953 until 1975, they averaged a bit more than 5000 asylum applications each year,
including spikes during the crises in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968-9).
Asylum seeking increased rapidly from 1976, when applications hit 10,000 for the first
time and briefly spiked at 100,000 in 1980, with the military coup in Turkey and the

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241 Joppke (1999), pg. 96.
242 Joppke (1999), pg. 78.
imposition of martial law in Poland 100,000. Austria, with 1/8th Germany’s population, averaged about 4000 asylum applications between 1961 and 1980 and roughly 35,000 in 1981.

An even greater movement to both countries began in the 1980s, before accelerating beyond all expectations with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and Yugoslavia between 1988 and 1993. Asylum applications did not return to previous levels after the 1980-1 peak; applicants to Austria from 1982 to 1987 more than doubled to 8900 annually, while the average application rate to Germany increased ten-fold to 50,000, with peaks of 70,000 and then 100,000 in 1985 and 1986. What the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet Union and Yugoslavia meant for Germany and Austria was a massive wave of asylum seekers, refugees and Aussiedler on top of these already elevated numbers. From 1988 until 1993, Germany received 1.4 million applications for asylum, twice as many as the entire period 1953-1987. Austria only saw 110,000 new applications (compared to 160,000 from 1961-1987) during this period, but received 80,000 refugees Yugoslavian refugees (primarily Bosniaks), equal to 1% of its total population.\textsuperscript{244} Between 1988 and 1994, 1.9 million Aussiedler entered Germany, 50% more than the entire period since 1953. These newcomers came primarily from the former Soviet Union (57%), Poland (32%) and Romania (11%).\textsuperscript{245}

The net effect of this movement was the greatest non-Germanic migration to Austria in at least 100 years, and the most rapid non-Germanic migration in modern German history. Net migration to Austria in 1991 (+77,000) was equal to any two previous post-war years combined, and each year from 1989 to 1993 was greater than the

\textsuperscript{244} Fassmann and Muenz, pg. 37 (1995).
\textsuperscript{245} Muenz and Ulrich, pg. 71 in Bade and Weiner (eds) (1997).
entire period from 1974 to 1987; overall, net migration from 1989 to 1993 (285,000) was substantially larger than the entire period from 1961 to 1988 (180,000). In Germany, net migration from 1988 to 1993 (3.6 million) was nearly as large as the entire guest worker period (1955 to 1973; 3.7 million), with the years 1989 through 1992 setting consecutive single-year records.\footnote{All figures come from the respective federal statistical authorities. These figures exclude refugees from the former East Germany, who were classified separately. Despite the similar aggregate numbers, net migration to Germany was proportionately greater during the guest worker period.} Net migration each year from 1988 to 1993 was greater than all net migration from 1971 to 1987 combined.

Compared to migration at other times since 1973, migration in the late-1980s and early-1990s represented a significant departure from established patterns. As Figure 4.1 indicates, this movement resulted in yearly net migrations of \(0.8\%\) the total population, at times reaching \(1\%\). In comparison, legal and illegal migration to the United States in the early-1990s and first years of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century generated significant public debate despite a yearly per capita increase of \(0.3\% - 0.5\%\); the United States last saw net migration of \(1\%\) before World War I.\footnote{Calculations based on US Department of Homeland Security (2007).} Compared to a migration that produced notable political and social consequences for the quintessential “country of immigration,” two “countries of non-immigration” received two to three times the inflow of new foreigners during beginning in the late-1990s.\footnote{Germany formally stated that it was “not a country of immigration” in its naturalization requirements in 1977; Geddes (2003), pg. 80.}

\textbf{Figure 4.1: Net Migration, 1974-2006}

Another way to think about this migration is in relation to past trends. Figure 4.2 transforms Figure 4.1 by taking a 20-year rolling mean of per capita net migration, then
calculates the standard deviation from that mean.\textsuperscript{249} This produces a sense of just how unusual each year’s migration is. Figure 4.2 indicates that migration in the late-1980s and early-1990s was extraordinary even when taking into account recent guest worker migration, while earlier and later migrations fell below expectations by comparison. Net migration to Germany from 1988 to 1993 was on average 1.43 standard deviations above the rolling mean; no other year was more than 0.51 above average. Net migration to Austria during this period was even more exceptional, on average 1.86 standard deviations above the mean from 1989 to 1993.

\textbf{Figure 4.2: Relative Net Migration, 1974-2006}

Though this migration was legal, unlike the guest workers it was neither consensual nor controlled. While Germany had rules governing the acceptance of the Aussiedler, it could not anticipate demand \textit{a priori}, and the established parties could only agree to require these Spaetaussiedler ("late returnees") to apply from their country of origin and eventually passed a high (225,000) yearly quota in 1992.\textsuperscript{250} Particularly the CDU-CSU resisted further restrictions, seeing themselves as the party of returnees and expellees. The German and Austrian governments were even more constrained by the rules governing asylum and refugees. Once a refugee was on a country’s soil, they were that country’s responsibility by international law.

Moreover, with full employment a thing of the past there was no demand for un- or low-skilled labor, and migration in the late-1980s and early-1990s was perceived as a material and a symbolic threat to the native population. While the effect of migration on

\textsuperscript{249} Due to data availability, the Austrian average begins at 13 years in 1974, increasing until there are 20 years of data.

\textsuperscript{250} Geddes (2003), pg. 85. Even then, the Spaetaussiedler quota was met year until the late-1990s; Jung et al. (2000), pg. 20.
wage competition is debatable,\textsuperscript{251} in a 1997 Eurobarometer poll 65% of the EU-15’s respondents believed that immigrants took jobs from natives.\textsuperscript{252} Moreover, unlike the guest workers the newcomers were perceived as a net drain on social welfare. Governments were responsible for feeding, clothing and housing asylum applicants, refugees and the Aussiedler, paid for by native taxes.\textsuperscript{253} To prevent “asylum abuse,” asylum seekers and refugees were not legally permitted to work for the first several years of residence, adding the perception that they were living off the native population.\textsuperscript{254} Unable to house the newcomers, state and local governments were required to rent hotel rooms, gymnasiums and riverboats. Worst were the hastily-constructed “container communities,” shipping containers modified as living quarters, which furthered the perception that the new migrants were fundamentally separated from the native society.\textsuperscript{255} Once allowed free movement, the new migrants became competition for subsidized government housing in a scarce market, with Germany already in need of 3 million units and Austria 200,000.\textsuperscript{256} Even in the mid-1970s, Germans were worried about the impact of migration on native resources and quality of life:

“More foreigners mean not only more apartments, schools, hospitals and so on, but also for example more cars, air pollution, noise, traffic jams, roads, more garbage, more sewage and so on.”\textsuperscript{257}

\textsuperscript{251} Grossman (1982) and Borjas (1987) find that migrants have a small but significant impact on the wages of natives, but a large impact on the wages of other immigrants. Chiswick (1989) finds that migrants decrease the wages of some natives, but provide indirect economic benefits to others. Winter-Ebmer and Zweimueler (1996) find that migration has the strongest economic impact on geographically-fixed natives. 
\textsuperscript{252} Eurobarometer 47.1, “Racism and Xenophobia,” 12/97.
\textsuperscript{253} Geddes (2003), pg. 84.
\textsuperscript{254} Jung et al. (2000), pg. 23.
\textsuperscript{255} Joppke (1999), pg. 91.
\textsuperscript{257} Bavarian state minister Berta Huber, quoted from Meier-Braun (2002), pg. 43.
Finally, unlike the (temporary) guest workers or the (German) *Vertriebene*, the newcomers in the late-1980s and early-1990s were seen as a culturally foreign group that would lead to permanent social problems through the creation of a “parallel society.”

In a 1994 Austrian survey, 66% believed that bringing different cultures into contact had negative consequences, and 43% of Germans in a 1991 Politbarometer survey believed that migrants literally contributed to *Ueberfremdung* (over-foreignization or cultural dilution). The newcomers were also associated with more pressing social concerns such as increased crime, particularly petty theft, drug crime and organized crime; in the 2002 *European Social Survey*, a majority of the respondents across 18 countries agreed that migrants increased crime. Natives also feared that migration imported ethnic and political conflicts from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. In Germany, a large influx of politically active Kurds led to a number of street battles, riots and organized civil disturbances in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly after the banning of the Kurdish Worker’s Party in 1993.

In sum, the nature of migration to Western Europe in the late-1980s and early-1990s was essentially unprecedented in modern times, combining an atypically high volume with the perception that the newcomers represented permanent material and social threats and not temporary economic inputs. Returning to the theory introduced in Chapter 3, niche parties benefit electorally when Shocks, events that unsettle individual expectations about some aspect of the environment and lead concerned individuals to re-evaluate their political and social priorities, coincide with a niche party’s focus. While

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258 Jung et al. (2000), pg. 24.
259 The Austrian survey is cited in Holzinger (1997), pg. 165; the German data comes from *Politbarometer 1977-2002.*
most every advanced industrial country receives positive net migration each year, the late 1980s and early 1990s represented a strong departure from past trends in both Germany and Austria.

**Salience**

Moreover, this migration led to significant changes in the perception of immigration as a political and social priority. The remainder of this section considers changes to public salience and connects those changes to net migration and increased nativist party support, while also exploring changing patterns of anti-immigrant violence. Violence, like voting, is one potential means of addressing social concerns and one that understandably receives significant attention from scholars and policymakers.\(^{261}\)

Measuring public opinion is crucial when connecting plausible explanatory events to electoral outcomes. If immigration spikes and the public fails to react, it is unlikely that nativist parties generate support from increased concerns about immigration, despite their campaign appeals. On the other hand, if there is no Shock but a significant increase in public concerns, nativist voters might be reacting to the manipulation of public opinion by elites. Public opinion was captured along two dimensions using established survey research. First, surveys measured how the public perceives an issue or group (positive, negative, or indifferent), thereby capturing *attitudes*. Second, surveys measured how important the public regards a particular issue, thereby capturing *salience*.

\(^{261}\) A third means of establishing a public-level reaction was to examine changes in the volume or tone of social movements (Tarrow 1994). Nativist social movements in both Germany and Austria emerged in the early 1980s. However, these movements were either primarily intellectual or heavily penetrated by nativist party elites to de-link appeals from unpopular party labels. As Putnam (2000) notes, associational belonging is generally declining in advanced industrial countries and the failure of a significant nativist social movement to emerge in either country may not be indicative of broader trends.
German survey data comes from Politbarometer continuous reporting conducted by the Elections Research Group (*Forschungsgruppe Wahlen*) of Mannheim. Since February 1986, Politbarometer has asked respondents to name the two most important issues in Germany. As the question is open, it provides a good comparison of salience before, during and after a Shock. Figure 4.3 displays the relationship between net migration to Germany and the salience of immigration. As Figure 4.3 indicates, the salience of immigration increased significantly in 1989 and again in the summer of 1991, before finally declining in late 1993 and 1994. Throughout 1989, and from September 1991 until July 1993, immigration was ranked the single most important issue facing Germany. Furthermore, the salience of immigration declined much more slowly than it increased; from 1986 to 1988 the average percentage of respondents calling immigration important was 4.5%; that percentage did not drop below 10% until 2003 and immigration remained one of the top three issues through 1996.

Increases in salience in Germany, particularly in the late 1980s, track with net migration. The relationship is strong (yearly $r=0.57$) and would likely be stronger due to missing data; Politbarometer only provided measurements for early 1988, though immigration was far more salient at the end of the year. Part of this discrepancy, however, had to do with competing social priorities. At any moment an individual might be confronted with the state of the economy, pensions, health care, the environment, crime, immigration or foreign policy. If multiple significant events occur simultaneously, individuals might prioritize one to the exclusion of another. The relatively low salience of immigration in 1990 and 1991 is probably best explained by German reunification, to

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262 “Immigration” is an aggregate of several possible responses, including asylum/asylum-seeking, *Aussiedler*, immigration or “foreigners.”
be sure an extraordinary event. Reunification was the most important issue for Germans in 1990 and early 1991.263

**Figure 4.3: Net Migration and Issue Salience, Germany**

In Austria, the private survey firm FESSEL-GfK (now GfK Austria) has measured issue salience for the past 25 years.264 Immigration emerged as a salient theme in Austria in 1990. From 1990 through 1993, approximately 40% of the population considered immigration an important issue, and the salience of immigration tracks well with changes in net migration (yearly $r=0.67$ for the period 1990-2002).265 While there is no data on the salience of immigration before the Shock, there is also no evidence to suggest that immigration was a salient theme prior to the initial wave of new migrants in late 1989. As in Germany, the decline in the salience of immigration in Austria was slower than its increase; immigration remained one of the 10 most important political themes until roughly 2000, and the portion of the public naming immigration as important did not drop below 15%. While immigration was never ranked higher than #2 among all political themes, FESSEL asks respondents for three (sometimes four) themes in their survey, compared to two in Germany. As a result, rankings in Austria and Germany cannot be directly compared; those choosing immigration might consistently rank it #1, while an issue ranked higher in the aggregate might consistently be ranked #4.

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263 And likely kept the REP from entering federal parliament; see Chapter 5.
264 While this data is not available to the public, many thanks are in order to Professor Peter Ulram for releasing the aggregate trends. The 1999 figure was interpolated based on reporting in 1998 and 2000.
265 Data: 1990: FESSEL-GfK, “Immigration Problem” (Auslaenderprobleme) telephone survey, taking the percent referring to immigration and asylum as “very important”; 1992-2002: FESSEL-GfK, “Representative Surveys” (Representative Umfragen) surveys, percent referring to immigration as an important theme. Without the 1990 or 1991 figures, which come from a focused rather than an open-ended survey, the correlation between salience and net migration is 0.42. The 1991 figure was interpolated based on reporting in 1990 and 1992.
In contrast to the findings on salience, the findings on attitudes are mixed. The fundamental problem when measuring attitudes on a new dimension is that detailed questions are generally not asked until it becomes salient. It is therefore difficult to test the degree to which attitude formation is independent of a particular event.

What is known is that during the Shock, significant parts of the population in both countries held negative attitudes toward the new arrivals. In Germany, Politbarometer surveys in 1989 found that 86% of the population felt there were too many asylum-seekers entering the country and 58% too many Aussiedler, theoretically ethnic Germans. Half the West Germans surveyed in August 1991 were generally dissatisfied with the immigration situation.\textsuperscript{266} Over time, however, the population expressing dissatisfaction consistently decreased, to 30% by 1995. Much of the movement occurred between September (50%) and October (34%) 1992, concurrent with increased violence against foreigners. This shift could be sincere or strategic; it could be that the anti-immigrant actions generated sympathy for foreigners, or that it became socially unacceptable to openly express anti-immigrant sentiment. In either case, throughout the 1990s a third of the West German population maintained a consistently negative attitude toward all immigrants, a significant reservoir for nativist parties to draw from.

As in Germany, attitudes in Austria softened over time. FESSEL interviews found that initial enthusiasm for the new immigrants gave way by early 1990 to concerns about increased crime, illegal employment and failures in the State’s ability to manage immigration.\textsuperscript{267} FESSEL-GfK reported that in 1990, 38% of the population strongly

\textsuperscript{266} Politbarometer survey instrument (1989, 1991-3, 1995): “Many foreigners live in Germany. Do you find this situation [in order] [not in order] [no answer/no opinion].”

agreed that there were too many foreigners in Austria (67% at least somewhat agreed); by 2001 these figures had dropped to 26% and 59%, respectively. Again, these numbers suggest a significant target audience for nativist appeals, though not every new FPOe voter was necessarily concerned with immigration and clearly not every voter concerned with immigration switched to the FPOe. Paradoxically, areas with some of the lowest levels of anti-immigrant attitudes (Vienna, Berlin, Baden-Wuerttemberg) saw the greatest increases in nativist party support, suggesting the distribution of attitudes is insufficient to explain the sub-national variation in outcomes.268

Migration, Salience and Party Support

Extending the comparisons to include support for nativist parties indicates that trends in nativist growth mirror trends in net migration and the salience of immigration in both countries. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 display changes in nativist support compared to net migration. Changes in party support are measured as the average change in support for elections held during that year.

Figures 4.4–4.5: Net Migration and Changes in Nativist Support, 1980-2005

As shown here, nativist parties were failing in the 1980s and succeeding in the early 1990s as expected, with three caveats. First, support for the FPOe increased earlier than it would have if the party relied solely on immigration for new supporters.269 Second, German parties were less successful than expected in 1990 and 1991, which can be explained by concerns with German reunification; these concerns dampened the

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269 Though the Freedom Party before 1990 does not qualify as a nativist party, one must still consider their electoral fortunes during that period to determine whether other causal factors are at work.
willingness of voters to make decisions based on issues of immigration. Finally, the discrepancy between migration and nativist support in Austria after 1999 is particularly strong and likely driven by the FPOe’s stint in government, which began in early 2000. An increase in immigration while the anti-immigration party was in power would likely have been received poorly by the party’s supporters. In Germany, the yearly correlation between changes in nativist support and changes in net migration between 1982 and 2005 was 0.59; excluding the FPOe’s time in government, the correlation in Austria was 0.74.

Moving on to the relationship between public opinion and nativist party support, in Germany, Politbarometer tracks the declared support for political parties. The monthly correlation between declared support for nativist parties and the salience of immigration is strong ($r = 0.75$) and a gap in the data from March 1988 to February 1989, just as nativist parties began consistently increasing their support, suggests that this relationship is underestimated. This finding provides an insight into the failure of nativist parties after 1993 and their unexpectedly poor showing in 1990 and early 1991; nativist fortunes declined with a decline in the salience of immigration. Based on month by month trends in late 1991 and early 1992, increases in nativist party support lag behind salience, suggesting that nativist parties are not driving concerns with immigration. Figure 4.6 tracks the salience of immigration and unemployment, as well as declared nativist support, on a month to month basis in Germany from 1986 to 2003.

**Figure 4.6: Issue Salience and Declared Nativist Support (Western Germany)**

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270 No state or national elections were held in Austria in 1992.
271 All credit on this point to Juergen Falter (1994), the first to note this empirical pattern.
Disaggregating public opinion using Forschungsgruppe Wahlen exit polls from state elections, Nativist parties did exceptionally well in elections where immigration was a salient theme \( (r=0.61). \) Figure 4.7 displays the relationship between the salience of immigration and changes in nativist support in German state elections. Regressing the salience of immigration on changing nativist support in state elections from 1986 until 2003 indicates that, on average, for every 6% of voters who considered immigration salient nativist party support increased by 1%.\(^{272}\) There is still a positive, significant relationship between changes in nativist party support and changes in the size of the immigrant population but the causal effect is, as expected, reduced.\(^{273}\) Normalizing both variables, moving from the lowest level of salience to the highest results in a highly significant 8.55% positive change in nativist support, while moving from the lowest to highest level of net migration results in a still significant 4.22% increase in support.

Returning to the 1980 election, in which objective flows increased but nativist party support did not, only 3.4% of exit poll respondents identified immigration as the most important issue.\(^{274}\) It is an open question whether concerns with immigration were overridden by concerns about the economy or the Cold War, or whether elites were able to successfully defuse the issue. Considering the lag between increased net migration and increased public concern in the late 1980s (a few months in Austria; up to two years in Germany), it may also be that the spike in asylum flows was perceived as too temporary or situational to generate public concern.

\(^{272}\) \( N = 50; \beta = 0.16; p = 0.00, r^2 = 0.37; \) nativist party support constant\( = -1.17. \) Removing the two observations where immigration was exceptionally salient (Baden-Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein in 1992) reduces the correlation to \( r=0.42 \) and \( r^2 \) to 0.17, but does not alter the significance or size of the effect (the coefficient drops from 0.17 to 0.16).

\(^{273}\) When net migration (foreign population) is specified as the explanatory variable, \( \beta = 0.57 \) (with a standard error of .29), \( p = 0.06 \) and \( r^2 = 0.07. \)

\(^{274}\) Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (1980).
In Austria, the increase in salience from 1990 to 1992 coincides with the period of greatest growth for the FPOe. As the refugee situation became increasingly acute in early 1990, the FPOe’s declared support jumped from 7% (January) to 12% (March). Three of the four state elections held in 1990 and 1991 were among the FPOe’s four largest electoral victories (in terms of increased vote share) from 1980 to 2006. The party’s average increase in support was almost 11% in these elections, and 1991 represented the single most successful year for the FPOe in terms of the average change in vote share (9.7%). Though no monthly data exists, the yearly correlation between nativist support and the salience of immigration was 0.67 from 1990 to 2002.

In contrast, public concerns about the economy in both countries were at their lowest from 1989 to 1993. In Germany, the Politbarometer data indicates a negative relationship between the salience of unemployment and the monthly declared support for nativist parties ($r = -0.44$). In Austria, the late-1980s and early-1990s was the only time unemployment was not ranked the most important issue facing the country; in 1990 it was not even in the top three.

Trends in the salience of the economy match trends in objective economic conditions in both countries; the moment when the German and Austrian economies were at their strongest after 1973 was also the moment where nativist parties saw their greatest growth. Austria’s economy grew an average 3% between 1988 and 1992; the average between 1974 and 1987 was 2.2%. In Germany, the mean GDP growth (3.8%) was more

than double the post-oil crisis period (1.6%).\textsuperscript{277} Indeed, 1988-1990 represented the three years of highest economic growth since 1980 in Austria, as did 1989-1991 in Germany. While the economic situation of the late-1980s was certainly not that of the 1950s or 1960s, full employment in advanced industrial countries has the exception rather than the rule. Unemployment in Germany in 1990 and 1991 dropped below 5% for the first time since 1980 (and the last time since). In Austria, one of the strongest economies in Europe, unemployment was closer to 3.5%. Economic scarcity is a constant feature even among the relatively wealthy and equal populations of Western Europe, yet nativist parties seemed to grow when these countries were at their most prosperous.

In short, if economic scapegoating was driving native concerns, structural crises in the early-1980s the late-1990s were far better environments for nativist growth. These results do not imply that individuals could not have been concerned with immigration and the economy, or that nativist voters were not primarily concerned with material competition with immigrants. But they do suggest that absent actual changes in demographic structures those concerns were not expressed as increased nativist support.

**Violence**

Not all individuals react to changing social environments at the ballot box. The final part of this section considers one non-electoral means of expressing dissatisfaction with an uncertain environment: violence. Violence is a clear if crude signal of social frustration with a situation or group. But it can also be used to achieve micro- (individual) and macro- (group) level social goals. Recent work on civil war (Kalyvas 2006) has found that violence is an excellent tool for achieving personal material or

\textsuperscript{277} Data from the University of Pennsylvania *Penn World Table.*
political aims. Even in periods of relatively strong rule of law, geographically 
concentrated violence can guarantee a group’s material and symbolic position (as in the 
American South from 1865 to 1965) or act as a prophylactic against further change.

In Germany, many immigrants and their descendents remain afraid to migrate to 
the former East Germany, which has acquired a reputation ranging from unfriendly to 
physically dangerous as gangs of young nativists (unaffiliated with any party) have used 
attacks on foreigners to declare “national liberation zones” (National befreite Zone), areas 
where ethnic homogeneity is enforced through intimidation and violence. One federal 
bureaucrat in Berlin with a migration background stated that when they visit family in 
western Germany, they lock their doors and do not stop for gas until reaching the old 
international border.278 Similarly, a proposal to move the Green Party’s political 
foundation (the Heinrich Boell Stiftung) to the east Berlin suburb of Friedrichshain was 
met with protests by its employees with migrant backgrounds, concerned for their safety 
though the move would only have been a few miles east in the same city.279

Increasing concern with immigration should therefore lead to increases in anti-
immigrant violence, as some individuals attempt to prevent changes to their environment 
through non-electoral means. This does not imply that violence is politically directed; 
any party to do so in Germany and Austria would be proscribed by the State, and studies 
have found that most violence against immigrants in Germany is spontaneous and carried 
out by groups of young, apolitical males.280 Furthermore, not every individual who 
commits violence against immigrants does so out of a nativist impulse; some may use the

278 Interview, German Federal Ministry of Refugees and Immigrants, 8/13/04.
279 Interview, Heinrich Boell Stiftung, 8/17/04.
public opposition to immigrants to increase the acceptability of their actions, or reduce the expected sanctions.

Reactions to the National Socialist past make Germany and Austria two of the best countries in Europe at capturing ethnic violence. Both maintain an apparatus monitoring right-wing extremist violence and an official component of right-wing extremism is the willingness to evaluate an individual based on their “ethnicity, nation or race....” Consequently, nearly any crime against immigrants that references their ethnicity, whether defacing a store with “Foreigners Out!” or coupling an assault with ethnic slurs, is recorded by the State. Germany, with a longer history of significant domestic political violence, has better longitudinal data, though Austria has disaggregated data by the type of incident (violent, xenophobic, etc.) since 1992. Due to differences in reporting, the German statistics capture physical violence, while the Austrian statistics include all xenophobic incidents.

Trends in violence strongly resemble trends in net migration and the salience of immigration. Between 1987 and 1992, the former West Germany saw a 15-fold increase in anti-immigrant violence, from just under 100 attacks per year to nearly 1500; every West German state except Bremen saw anti-immigrant violence peak in 1991 and 1992. While violence subsequently declined, it still occurs at roughly twice the rate of the pre-1991 period, even excluding the former East Germany. Moreover, though right-wing violence generally increased between 1980 and 2005, it was also increasingly anti-

281 Verfassungsschutz (2006), pg. 46.
282 Per capita, an immigrant is far more likely to be the victim of xenophobic violence in the former East Germany; Verfassungsschutz (2005).
immigrant; xenophobic violence made up 50% of all attacks from 1982-1990 but 81% between 1991 and 1993, before declining to 58% since 1994.

Since Austria began explicitly tracking xenophobic crimes in 1992, the total number of incidents (including violence) has never topped 73 (in 1995). While data from the 1980s is not available, authorities describe a “new quality” to Austrian violence with the new immigration in 1989, specifically attacks on asylum seekers, foreigners and their property. Unlike Germany, where arson attacks against asylum seekers were noted in the press from about 1980, coverage of significant attacks against immigrants did not appear in the Austrian media prior to the early 1990s, nor have references to past significant attacks been unearthed. In both countries, spikes in violence appear to be driven in part by triggering events; the ethnic riots in Hoyerswerda (1991) and Rostock (1992) in Germany and the letter bomb campaign of Franz Fuchs in Austria, peaking with the death of four Roma in 1995.

Cross-nationally, anti-immigrant crimes were undeniably less frequent in Austria than Germany, though across time they tracked well with net migration. From 1994 to 2005 Baden-Wuerttemberg, with a similar population and economic structure, averaged nearly twice as many violent xenophobic incidents (70) as Austria did all incidents (38). This discrepancy supports Minkenberg’s (1998) thesis that responses to social change are dependent on exogenous forces and on one another. While violence does track with changes in migration, in countries where the perceived efficacy of nativist parties is high (Austria), the incentive to engage in protest or violence declines and the per capita

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283 Verfassungsschutz Austria (1997), pg. 18.
285 Interview, Verfassungsschutz Baden-Wuerttemberg, 10/25/05.
increase is lower. In a country (Germany) where the perceived efficacy of nativist parties is low, violence becomes a more attractive outlet for frustration.

**Elites as Intervening Variable...Elites as Cause?**

This section addresses the role of elites in reacting to and interpreting the new immigration in the late-1980s and early-1990s. Elites refer to persons in positions of political or social importance, here media sources and mid- to high-level functionaries in political parties. The section has two aims. The first is to reinforce the idea that this movement represented a Shock to German and Austrian societies. It does so by presenting evidence that net migration took a latent dimension and pushed the issues surrounding it to the forefront of elite discourse. Moreover, the dimension remained active after net migration faded; 15 years later immigration remains a theme in the media and election campaigns. At the same time, this section considers whether elites were a cause of the Shock, entirely or in part. Elites are opinion leaders on political and social issues and changes in the volume or tone of elite messages are one mechanism for objective events to be transmitted to the public, who might have poor or imperfect information. This section argues that elites represent an intervening, but not an explanatory, variable; they may have framed the immigration debate, but in doing so they were also constrained by exogenous events.

**Media Coverage**

As part of this project four regional newspapers were analyzed for their coverage of immigration and nativist parties in state and national election campaigns from 1960 to
2006. 286 The papers chosen were the chief print media in their respective states and represent a broad spectrum of political opinion. 287 While an alternative strategy would have been to analyze the “boulevard press” (*Bild* in Germany; *Kronen Zeitung* in Austria), these are the papers expected to heavily cover immigration, either to forward an editorial predisposition or to play on potential fears to sell papers. If the mainstream press exhibits a similar trend, there is less reason to suspect elite manipulation and more to suspect that elites are building on or reacting to exogenous events.

The coverage of immigration was measured along two dimensions. The first is *volume*, capturing salience. To measure volume, every article was counted that had a title or sub-title explicitly referencing immigration, integration, or asylum, or that named a domestic ethnic group made up predominantly of recent immigrants. 288 References to *Uebersiedler* (immigrants from the former East Germany) were excluded, on the grounds that they were 1) co-ethnics 2) living in a territory the German public identified as German. The assumption is that *Uebersiedler* were not considered immigrants at all, but rather prisoners of an occupying power. The second dimension is *tone*, capturing attitudes. Attitudes were measured based on the content of articles referencing immigration, coded as negative, indifferent or positive. Broadly, positive stories focused on the material or social benefits of immigration or successes in integration, negative stories on the problems or costs associated with immigration, and indifferent articles

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286 Coverage was analyzed for the six weeks prior to the election. This represents the “hot phase” of German and Austrian campaigns, the time when voters pay the most attention to elite statements and issues. Sundays were not considered, as only some papers published Sunday editions.

287 They were the *Stuttgarter Zeitung* (Baden-Wuerttemberg), the *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Rheinland-Pfalz), the *Kurier* (Vienna) and the *Kleine Zeitung* (Styria). National elections were analyzed for each paper, while state elections were only analyzed in the corresponding regional paper. The *Kleine* is Christian-Democratic, founded by a Catholic association, the *Stuttgarter* leans toward the economically liberal, socially centrist FDP and the *Allgemeine* and *Kurier* are centrist or slightly left-populist.

288 See the Appendix for a comprehensive list and justification.
offered statistics or statements without referencing costs or benefits. If the article contained both statistics and a statement of costs or benefits, it was coded with a bias against indifference.

In Austria, changes in volume strongly resemble patterns of immigration. In Vienna, the most multi-cultural state in Austria, immigration and immigrants were barely mentioned in the 1980s, but received almost three articles of coverage per day in 1990, with coverage remaining relatively high through the 1994 national election. In contrast, German coverage increases over time. After a spike in coverage generated by significant events, here questions about the role of guest workers as economies slowed in the 1970s, the asylum movement of 1980-1981, and immigration in the late 1980s and early 1990s, coverage declines but does not return to its prior level. This broadly agrees with the idea that there was no concept of Austria as a country of immigration before the immigration spike and that net migration represented more of a shock to Austria than Germany. Figure 4.8 displays variation in the coverage of immigration in state and national elections from 1960 until 2002.

**Figure 4.8: Media Coverage of Immigration (Elections 1960-2002)**

Coverage also varied between “high” and “low” immigration states within each country; during state and national election campaigns held from 1987 to 1994, the Vienna paper averaged 2.05 articles on immigration each day and the Styrian paper 0.83, the Baden-Wuerttemberg paper 1.73 articles, compared to 0.85 in Rheinland-Pfalz. While

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289 See the Appendix for examples of each type of story.
290 Author’s calculations.
every regional paper covers the same major national stories, regions more heavily impacted by immigration have a local interest in, and capacity for, additional coverage.

In terms of tone, the main finding is the absence of change. As a sample of media coverage across different periods indicates in Figure 4.9, the mainstream print media (and not just the boulevard press) always portrayed immigrants in a negative light. In the 1960s, the dominant narrative in the mainstream media was that the guest workers were wild and aggressive, physically and sexually. In a typical article in the 1960s a guest worker, identified by their nationality even when irrelevant, would engage in some form of robbery or violence, often against a “countryman” over a personal matter, such as a fight over a woman.291 Narratives in the 1970s and 1980s, while more sophisticated, were equally dire; German coverage emphasized problems with integration (poor prospects for immigrants or language deficits in schools) or alarming trends in asylum seeking. In Austria, crime and illegal employment remained the dominant themes throughout the 1970s and 1980s, though coverage was sparse.

Figure 4.9: Media Attitudes towards Immigration and Immigrants (1970-2000)

In contrast, articles covering the Uebersiedler emphasized 1) the bravery of individuals escaping an authoritarian regime, often including descriptions of the guards, checkpoints or minefields evaded and 2) the generosity of the host society, which frequently held fundraisers, donated goods or even willed their belongings to the new arrivals. While asylum seekers escaping civil wars in Sri Lanka or Afghanistan faced situations at least as perilous as the average East German, their stories inevitably begin at

the European border when they made demands on the receiving society. Media coverage (particularly in Austria) became more positive over time, though in both countries positive narratives remained the exception.

Coverage of immigration during the Shock was a continuation of existing trends, though new narratives emerged. Both countries were “boats,” “fortresses,” or “blessed islands” (Inseln der Seligen) beset by “invasions,” “waves,” or “floods” of undesirable newcomers overtaxing the social system. Coverage also emphasized failures in State capacity. The unexpected volume of the migration, coupled with the dependence of many immigrants on State resources led to a breakdown in the ability to process applications or settle new arrivals; stories abounded of asylum seekers and Aussiedler housed in hotels, jails, barracks, riverboats or entire communities constructed from shipping containers modified for habitability. These stories only furthered the perception that the new migrants were somehow fundamentally separated from the native society. In Austria, capacity also meant the State’s inability to guard the “green border” against a sharp increase in illegal crossings. Crime remained a salient theme throughout the 1990s. In Germany, crime increasingly meant Kurdish political unrest and later the threat of domestic Islamic terrorism. In Austria, the narratives focused on drug crime, organized crime and human trafficking. Even when anti-immigrant violence was the focus, media coverage consistently brought up themes of abuse of social services and crime committed by foreigners, suggesting complicity in their victimization.

293 Joppke (1999), pg. 91.
294 Jaeger and Link (1993), pg. 234.
Political Discourse

The political discourse regarding immigration in both countries can be separated into three periods. The evidence, collected from contemporary media coverage, secondary sources and elite interviews, suggests that immigration and asylum were at the forefront of the elections where nativist parties were most successful, but that elites were reacting to structural changes rather than creating public opinion.

In the first period, lasting until the mid-1980s in Germany (1990 in Austria), there was a consensus on the part of non-nativist elites that immigration was an economic phenomenon with no place in politics.295 After the October 1973 oil crisis, Social-democratic governments in both countries promptly suspended their guest worker programs, long before immigration could become socially contentious.296 Even with asylum increasing during the 1980 national election, the major German parties agreed that immigration was a bureaucratic and not a campaign issue,297 though leading politicians publicly acknowledged that asylum needed to be addressed after the election.298 While immigration was not a campaign theme in the early-1980s it was still contentious; from the early 1980s the CDU-CSU openly discussed changing the national immigration policy and the CDU-CSU, social-democratic SPD and FDP debated whether Germany had become a “country of immigration.”299 In Austria, with its smaller immigrant population, there is no evidence that any discussion took place until late 1989.

295 Hammar (1985); Messina (2007).
Beginning in the late 1980s, political actors in both countries integrated immigration into their campaign appeals to the degree that the issue completely dominated a number of elections. Each country is considered in turn.

The Discourse in Germany

With the Bavarian state election in 1986, the conservative CSU began calling for immigration restrictions and in the 1987 national election the CSU and more centrist CDU (representing Germany’s non-Bavarian Christian-democrats) explicitly called for a revision to the Basic Law (the German constitution) with regard to asylum, which the SPD, FDP and Greens rejected. The CDU-CSU’s emphasis on immigration declined in 1990 and 1991, but would return at a fever pitch in 1992.

As they had since 1980, nativist parties in the late-1980s continued to utilize immigration in their campaigns. The REP, NPD, DVU and Baden-Wuerttemberg-based German League for People and Homeland (DLVH) concentrated almost exclusively on this issue, with crime a subordinate but notable theme. However, unlike elections in the late 1980s, where immigration and asylum were referenced but unemployment and the environment were the central issues, by the 1992 state campaigns immigration and asylum had become the dominant election themes. High net migration, media coverage, public concern, nativist party victories in 1991 and a sharp increase in anti-immigrant violence all contributed to the emerging “asylum debate” between the CDU-CSU, SPD and FDP.

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300 Jaschke (1990), pg. 67; Stuttgarter Zeitung, “Koalition weiterhin ueber Asylrecht uneins,” 1/9/87.
In 1992, the Baden-Wuerttemberg CDU opened the “hot phase” of the election by officially placing immigration at the center of its campaign, while downplaying the chances that a debate would benefit its nativist competitors.\textsuperscript{303} The CDU’s appeals, emphasizing the costs of asylum abuse, intensified as the campaign drew to an end when it became apparent that the REP might enter parliament.\textsuperscript{304} In response the SPD, FDP and Greens attacked the CDU (and the media) for politicizing immigration.\textsuperscript{305} The SPD’s explicit strategy was to demobilize voters by ignoring the issue, as their “experience from earlier campaigns was that the [nativist party] strategy was... to maneuver themselves into an underdog situation...to appeal to voters, that themselves often feel like underdogs.”\textsuperscript{306} The FDP saw the CDU’s campaign as legitimizing nativist parties through similar appeals.\textsuperscript{307} In contrast, the CDU’s strategy was designed to co-opt potential nativist voters, assuming that a failure to address an important issue “on the streets” would allow nativist parties to expand beyond an “extremist” core.\textsuperscript{308}

Both strategies failed. The 1992 elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein were a “fiasco” for the CDU and an “earthquake” for the German political system.\textsuperscript{309} Nativist parties in Baden-Wuerttemberg achieved the single best state-level result for the German Radical Right since 1945 (over 12%) and the REP and DVU (in Schleswig-Holstein) entered state parliament. The Baden-Wuerttemberg result was the worst for the CDU in 30 years and necessitated the formation of a Grand

\textsuperscript{304} Huh (1996), pg. 46.
\textsuperscript{306} Schmidt (1997), pg. 91, quoting the SPD Chief of Staff in Schleswig-Holstein.
\textsuperscript{307} Schmidt (1997), pg. 92, quoting the FDP Chief of Staff in Schleswig-Holstein.
\textsuperscript{309} Stuttgarter Zeitung, “Erdbeben,” 4/6/92.
Coalition with the SPD. Both the REP and DVU were disproportionately strong in urban areas with low- or unskilled workers and significant immigrant populations.\textsuperscript{310} Exit polling by Forschungsgruppe Wahlen found that immigration was the election’s salient theme; 43% of all voters in Baden-Wuerttemberg and 75% of REP voters called it important.\textsuperscript{311}

With varying degrees of reluctance, the 1992 elections convinced the major parties to end their stalemate on asylum, leading to a revision of federal asylum laws finalized in July 1993 (the “Asylum Compromise”). To the established parties, the results confirmed that voters perceived them as unwilling or unable to solve a major social issue.\textsuperscript{312} Especially chastised were the SPD; after the election, SPD voters confronted party elites for their failure to propose a solution to immigration.\textsuperscript{313} Both the major parties and the media saw the results as part of a broader European protest; the fear of economic insecurity among low-skilled workers combined with increasing competition with immigrants for jobs and housing.\textsuperscript{314}

\textbf{The Discourse in Austria}

In Austria, the first major debates over immigration did not come until the end of 1989 and were only fully realized in the 1990 national election; indeed, these debates were entirely absent from the Austrian political landscape until this moment.\textsuperscript{315} From the

\textsuperscript{310} Such as the industrial town of Pforzheim, where Nativist parties received over 20%; \\textit{Stuttgarter Zeitung}, “‘Republikaner’ nur in Suedbaden schwach,” 4/7/92.

\textsuperscript{311} Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (1992), pg. 46.


\textsuperscript{313} \\textit{Stuttgarter Zeitung}, “‘Wo war unser Asyl-Plakat?’” 4/9/92.

\textsuperscript{314} \\textit{Stuttgarter Zeitung}, “Rechte setzen auf Aengste und haben Erfolg,” 4/6/92.

\textsuperscript{315} Reinfeldt (2000), pg. 139.
beginning of the 1990 campaign the media saw the “foreigner discussion” as objectively important, especially in Vienna (close to the border and the most attractive economic environment for immigrant settlement) and especially as it related to crime and illegal entry.\textsuperscript{316} Stories were published daily on the increase in illegal crossings, with flows peaking at least at 200 daily, the equivalent of 1% of the national population every six weeks.

Though Austrian elections in 1990 and 1991 continued existing trends of FPOe growth, there was a shift both in the party’s strategy and its support base. Specifically, the FPOe moved away from promoting itself as a party of “fresh air,” attacking the corruption and waste of the established parties, and toward advocating explicit policy goals and making inroads into traditional social-democratic strongholds.\textsuperscript{317} Specifically, the FPOe brought immigration to the fore of their 1990 campaign. Throughout the 1990 national election, the FPOe attacked the other parties on immigration. For example, when Interior Minister Loeschnak (of the SPOe) implemented a mandatory visa for Polish citizens in the opening days of the campaign, the FPOe immediately took credit for advancing the proposal a year earlier.\textsuperscript{318}

Indeed, after the FPOe, the SPOe was the party most visibly critical of the new immigration, with the party’s then-General Secretary Marizzi claiming “the boat is full.”\textsuperscript{319} As the head party in a Grand Coalition, the SPOe’s strategy was to use action by the Executive to increase its perceived bureaucratic competence without proposing

\textsuperscript{316} Kurier, “Auslaenderdiskussion wird wieder heiss,” 8/31/90.
\textsuperscript{317} Kraeh (1996); Plasser and Ulram, in Scharsach (2000); Minich (2003).
\textsuperscript{318} Kurier, “Massnahmenpaket gegen Zuwanderer,” 9/5/90; FPO ad (Kurier), “Endlich Visapflicht fuer Polen!” 9/7/90.
significant policy changes. At the beginning of September, the Interior Ministry sent Army units to reinforce local border authorities and at the beginning of October (two weeks before the election), the Ministry emphasized its efforts to prevent “foreigner crimes” through a series of new police actions.320 The Christian-democratic OeVP, the coalition’s junior partner, took a neutral position, attacking the SPOe for its failure to control immigration, while not proposing an immigration policy of its own.321 The Greens were the only openly pro-immigrant party, calling for every community to take in 1% of their population in refugees each year.322 The results of the election saw the FPOe make by far the greatest gains of any party, with those gains concentrated in Carinthia (where Haider was Governor) and Vienna.323 At the local level, the FPOe tended to gain the most support in metropolitan areas (the Ballungszentrum) and along the eastern border, areas where immigration was the “explosive” theme.324

As the center of immigration to Austria, the 1991 state election in Vienna only magnified the immigration debate. From the beginning the FPOe seized the issue that “really touched the voters,” calling for zero immigration until housing shortages and unemployment were reduced.325 Unlike 1990, the OeVP increased its profile on immigration by taking a more vocal stance. The FPOe and OeVP’s immigration proposals did not discriminate by the origin of the immigration; proposed quotas placed refugees and asylum seekers in direct competition with foreign doctors or students.326

322 *Kurier,* “Gruene kritisieren Auslaenderpolitik,” 8/29/90.
The FPOe attacked the OeVP for its “hypocrisy” (attacking the FPOe as xenophobes while proposing similar policies) and for their failure to address immigration earlier. The SPOe’s retained its national strategy; acknowledging the issue and offering a bureaucratic response. After the FPOe won two state elections in two weeks in Styria and Upper Austria just prior to the Viennese election, the national Government promised to reform existing immigration laws, particularly related to asylum, in early 1992.327

The three state elections in 1991, and particularly the Viennese election, were described as an “earthquake” by political commentators. The FPOe became the second largest party in the city and the SPOe failed to achieve an absolute majority in votes for the first time since 1949.328 More respondents called immigration an important theme for the election than any other issue (63%).329 The four greatest increases in FPOe support came in areas with a disproportionately large immigrant population (Rudolfsheim, Ottakring, Leopoldstadt and Favoriten).330 While the OeVP blamed the results in Vienna on the Grand Coalition, the SPOe interpreted them as a signal that the major parties needed to address immigration and hardened their stance, leading to a series of changes to immigration and asylum laws over the next two years.331 After the Viennese election, one SPOe functionary opined that the major parties needed to begin dealing with salient issues like immigration “more than six weeks before the election.”332

Elites in both countries acknowledged that the new immigration raised immediate (how to deal with the newcomers?) and long-term (how to integrate them?) concerns,
though at the same time they blamed the media or each other for using immigration instrumentally:

“We went from the end of Western Europe to the gateway. Vienna especially was overrun by Czechs, Hungarians...100,000 people would come in a weekend. Really they were just walking around, enjoying the city. But for the people of Vienna this was frightful. There was a fear of what these events would mean.... The FPO picked up on this mood, supported by the Kronen.... Then the 1991 war in Yugoslavia brought 80-100,000 refugees...and the Government didn't know how to deal with them...”

“At the same time [as Reunification], there was a massive storm of Asylum seekers, up to 250,000 [yearly]. There were massive problems with people from the East Bloc, Uebersiedler, Russendeutschen. And there was simply a reaction.... The perception of the public was ‘You talk a lot, but do nothing’.”

Events in both countries present a very different picture than convergence theories of niche party growth, which would argue that niche parties succeed as established party policies become less indistinguishable. While the major parties in Germany and Austria may have converged on policy overall since the 1970s, they diverged on immigration as it became more salient in the late-1980s and early-1990s. In both countries the Center-Right’s policy became more restrictive, while the Center-Left tried to de-politicize immigration until election results suggested this stance was untenable. Both co-option and de-politicization were clearly ineffective strategies in stymieing support for nativist parties. While the latter’s failure might be the result of mixed signals, with the Center-Right giving the issue credibility by emphasizing it, why did efforts to co-opt nativist positions fail? Why would voters consistently choose a smaller party with more

333 Interview, Anneliese Rohrer (domestic politics editor for Die Presse 1987-2001), 11/27/06.
334 Interview, FDP Baden-Wuerttemberg, 10/31/05.
“extreme” views but less likelihood of enacting their policies over a major party promising “moderate” restrictions more likely to be passed?

The answer in Germany and Austria is that many voters simply preferred the nativist party’s position or felt their appeals were more credible, making them the “issue owner” of the contra-immigration stance.335 The survey evidence in both countries suggests that nativist parties were considered credible on immigration policy by far more than their hardcore supporters. As Table 1 indicates, with the exception of 1990 the FPOe was rated the party best able to deal with immigration, receiving a bonus far in excess of its voter base.336 As noted earlier, the changing salience of immigration in 1990 makes this figure suspect; immigration became more salient as the year progressed. Voters may have been indifferent to the parties on immigration early, when it was not salient, with the FPOe’s bonus emerging as voters started paying attention when the issue’s salience increased. During the 1991 Viennese election, 49% of survey respondents called the FPOe the most competent party on immigration.337 While the FPOe was awarded a competence bonus on immigration policy and fighting corruption by the Austrian electorate, they were unsuccessful in persuading prospective voters of their competence on crime, the economy or taxes, all campaign themes in the 1990s.

335 Petrocik (1996); Meguid (2005). “Issue ownership” models of voting argue that parties have “comparative advantages” with the electorate on certain political issues. Empirically, candidates tend to focus on the issues of the day regardless of their advantage (Aldrich and Griffin 2003).
336 FESSEL-GfK Representative Surveys 1987-1999 (N=1-2,000).
Table 4.1: FPOe Issue Competence (in %, rank among parties)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption/Privileges</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>35% (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>33% (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>36% (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste of public funds</td>
<td>23% (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>24% (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>29% (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>30% (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant</td>
<td>16% (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>29% (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>33% (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>38% (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>18% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>18% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Share</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>27%</td>
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</table>


In Germany survey researchers tend to exclude nativist parties on questions of party competence. However, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen’s 1989 Berlin local election survey asked voters if they agreed with the REP’s immigration policy; 13% did, though only 7.5% voted for the party. In 1998, respondents were again asked to choose the best immigration policy; 5% responded REP and a further 1% “other” (possibly including the DVU and NPD), though nativist parties were polling roughly 2% nationally.

In sum, for many voters concerned with and opposed to immigration, nativist parties represented the most attractive alternative. In Austria, the FPOe was large enough from 1990 to have a real chance of entering or even forming a Government and implementing its policies. Even if the Center-Right refused to work with the FPOe, REP or DVU, support for these parties served as the ultimate poll on immigration policy, a signal with tangible penalties for the failure to act. For the Center-Left and Center-Right

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338 Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (ZA Nr. 1766) (1989), variable 40: “And how do you feel about the foreigner policy of the Republikaner?”
339 Politbarometer (1998), variable 179: “Which party’s immigration policy makes the most sense to you?”
every election without addressing immigration was another election of lost votes, which meant lost seats, less maneuverability in forming a government or enacting their preferred policies (by increasing the size of parties they preferred not to work with) and lost state financing. Nativist parties were likely only aided by the attacks of their detractors; being consistently portrayed as the “anti-immigrant” party served as an additional signal to concerned voters that only nativist parties were truly interested in addressing immigration.

**Political Discourse as Cause?**

The elite discourse on immigration clearly shifted in the late 1980s and early 1990s. But were changes in public salience during these elections in part or in whole the result of elite manipulation, the changing strategies of political actors? After all, significant actors in both countries made a decision to emphasize immigration in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when public salience did change, but not in the 1980 German elections, when objective flows changed but there was no nativist mobilization. While the changing elite discourse probably aggravated existing concerns, there is reason to believe that elites were at the same time constrained by and reacting to exogenous events.

In Germany, the Center-Right preferred not to emphasize immigration, except as a reaction to public concerns or an emerging nativist party perceived to be a direct competitor. In Germany, the same leadership that introduced immigration as an issue in the late 1980s (Helmut Kohl; Franz Josef Strauss) explicitly chose not to do so in the early 1980s. When that leadership did integrate immigration into its 1987 campaign, it
produced no visible effect on the salience of immigration. Immigration was absent from the CDU-CSU’s national election campaign in 1990, which focused instead on concerns with reunification and CDU Chancellor Kohl’s competence. The only incentive for the CDU-CSU to emphasize immigration came from the challenge posed by the REP. The CSU began emphasizing immigration with a strong REP challenge at the state level in 1986, and the CDU after the shocking REP victory in Berlin in 1989 and in anticipation of a strong REP challenge in 1992. In Austria, there was an obvious incentive for the Center-Right to politicize immigration; the OeVP could have used the issue to try to overtake the SPOe and form a government in 1990. But party leaders failed to utilize the issue until after the election, when it became apparent that they were losing votes to the FPOe. In both Germany and Austria, the decision to change immigration policy came reluctantly, and only after significant defeats at the hands of nativist challengers sent an undeniable signal on the popular mood.

Nor was it the introduction of immigration into electoral campaigns by nativist parties that motivated the public. The REP had engaged in the same campaigns with the same political entrepreneurs since 1986. Their turning point was the 1989 Berlin election (7.5%), where they were outspent by the CDU 5.8 million to 200,000 DM. The REP spent a similar amount per resident in Bavaria in the state election in 1986, where they were best organized, yet only received 3% of the vote. The REP’s transformative anti-immigrant TV advertisement during the Berlin election captured the electorate’s fears, rather than creating them. Moreover, any success on the REP’s part after early 1989 came despite their inability to influence public opinion through the media. While the

342 Calculated from campaign finance reports mandated by the Federal Republic.
media initially covered the REP after their January 1989 victory in Berlin, from April 1989 the German press reached a tacit consensus to only focus on the party's scandals and internal conflicts.\textsuperscript{343}

For Haider’s FPOe, so consistently willing to look elsewhere for political innovation, the decision not to emphasize immigration before late 1989 suggests the party was taking advantage of exogenous events, rather than trying to shape public opinion.\textsuperscript{344}

The French National Front (1986, 1988), the REP (early 1989) and the Danish (1988) and Norwegian Progress parties (1989) had all shown that immigration could be a vote-winning issue in state or national elections. Yet the FPOe waited until structural conditions in Austria were favorable before emphasizing immigration:

"Vienna was a pleasant surprise [for the FPOe] in 1990. Haider realized there was a potential that he'd missed before in those districts with lots of immigration.”\textsuperscript{345}

Moreover, if concerns about immigration were purely elite driven, salience should have remained elevated after net migration declined as elites continued bringing immigration into campaigns. With the September 11\textsuperscript{th} terrorist attacks fresh in the public memory (several of the hijackers had lived in Hamburg), the SPD-controlled German Interior Ministry conducted a series of raids against groups and individuals with suspected ties to Islamic extremism three days before the 2002 national election.\textsuperscript{346}

During the 2006 state and local elections, the CDU in Hessen and Baden-Wuerttemberg called for strict integration tests for potential citizens ("Naturalization only with Course,

\textsuperscript{343} Albes (1999).
\textsuperscript{344} For example the influence of United States Congressional Republicans on the 1995 “Contract with Austria.”
\textsuperscript{345} Interview, Lothar Hoebelt, 12/22/06.
\textsuperscript{346} Stuttgarter Zeitung, “Schily geht gegen Islamisten vor,” 9/20/92.
Nativist parties remained active during these elections; the REP were a significant actor in Baden-Wuerttemberg at least until 2001 and the FPOe continued transmitting essentially the same appeals with a higher public profile. That similar campaigns across elections were not matched by similar levels of salience suggests that appeals alone were insufficient to trigger public concern.

The media coverage of immigration confirms this trend. Every article that referenced immigration was coded to determine whether the impetus for the article was a statement or appeal by a political party. For example, stories focusing on a party’s call for a 50% reduction in immigration or a State Minister’s call for official action on immigration were coded as political, while an article seeking a party’s reaction to immigration numbers or covering the scheduled report by a state or national agency were not. As Figure 4.10 indicates, the politicization of immigration in the media (measured as a percentage of all articles) did not decline after the immigration spike, and in Germany it increased.

Figure 4.10: The Politicization of Immigration, 1970-2000

In conclusion, while the willingness of political elites to engage in immigration debates possibly aggravated public concerns, elites themselves were constrained by exogenous factors. Nativist parties in Germany that manufactured immigration as an issue early on did not see their greatest success until structural conditions were more favorable. Nativist parties in Austria never thought to emphasize immigration until there was some belief that it was a pressing theme that could win votes. The volume and tone

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347 Die Zeit Online, “30 Fragen fuer den Pass,” 2/06.
348 The 1980 numbers in both countries can be discounted, as parties were explicitly depoliticizing immigration; in Austria the percentage is a function of the low volume (seven articles total).
of the discourse from non-nativist parties reflected a reaction to ongoing events, popular concerns and nativist successes in the early going, rather than a predatory, pre-emptive public opinion strategy.

Conclusions

This chapter presented two arguments, both related to the impact of immigration on contemporary German and Austrian politics and societies. First, I argued that a spike in immigration in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to significant and durable changes in the way those societies perceived the immigration issue dimension at the elite and public levels. In the 1970s and 1980s, the native/immigrant dynamic remained latent. The seeds for conflict certainly existed in areas with an oversupply of low- or unskilled labor, an undersupply of affordable housing and the failure to sufficiently develop plans for integrating existing immigrant communities. But neither elites nor the public saw native/immigrant issues as pressing in a time of economic restructuring, emerging environmental awareness and a still-relevant Cold War.

With an immigration-generated Shock in the late 1980s, the perception of immigrants and immigration changed dramatically; immigration was or was one of the top issues motivating elites and the public between 1989 and 1994. Its emergence as an issue can be readily observed in radically altered media coverage, public opinion and the conduct of election campaigns. Even the decline of immigration from the mid-1990s was insufficient to erase the issue dimension from the public consciousness. Though it receded in importance, issues related to the relationship between natives and immigrants (asylum and entry quotas, but also integration, crime and racial profiling, religious
tolerance and the threat of domestic terrorism) remain durable themes for politicians, the press and the person on the street.

Second, this chapter presented evidence that nativist parties in both countries directly benefitted from the emergence of immigration as a salient theme. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, nativist parties were broadly unsuccessful, remaining small or losing votes. What the Shock did was provide these parties with an issue that they could "own," an issue on which they best represented the views of some voters who had not previously supported them. In the state and national elections where nativist parties saw their greatest gains between 1989 and 1994, immigration was the salient theme. With the end of the Shock in the mid-1990s, these parties were no longer able to generate the same level of electoral enthusiasm, though the FPOe successfully maintained their base and to a lesser extent increased their vote share in 1999. In sum, the fundamental impact of the Shock was to take a latent social issue in Austria and Germany, dramatically increase its salience and durably reorganize some aspects of political contestation, voting behavior and social priorities.
Chapter 4 Figures and Charts

**Figure 4.1: Net Migration (1974-2006)**

![Net Migration Chart](image)

Source: German and Austrian Federal Statistical Offices.

**Figure 4.2: Relative Net Migration (1974-2006)**

![Relative Net Migration Chart](image)

Source: Calculations from German and Austrian Federal Statistical Offices.
Figure 4.3: Net Migration and Issue Salience, Germany

Source: German Federal Statistical Office (Migration) and Politbarometer cumulative reporting (Salience).

Figure 4.4: Net Migration and Changes in Nativist Support, Austria (1982-2005)

Source: Austrian Federal Statistical Office (Migration) and federal and state Statistical Yearbooks (Elections).
Figure 4.5: Net Migration and Changes in Nativist Support, Germany (1982-2005)

Source: Federal Statistical Office (Migration) and various Statistical Yearbooks (Elections).

Figure 4.6: Issue Salience and Declared Nativist Support (Western Germany)

Source: Politbarometer cumulative reporting.
Figure 4.7: Immigration Salience and Nativist Support
German State Elections, 1986-2000

Source: Exit Polls, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen.

Figure 4.8: Media Coverage of Immigration
(Elections 1960-2002)

Source: Author calculations from Stuttgarter Zeitung and Kurier coverage.
Figure 4.9: Media Attitudes Towards Immigration & Immigrants (1970-2000)

Source: Author calculations from Stuttgarter Zeitung and Kleine Zeitung coverage.

Figure 4.10: Politicization of Immigration Coverage, 1970-2000

Source: Author calculations from Kurier and Kleine Zeitung coverage.
Chapter 5 – Riding the Wave: Explaining Cross-National Variation in Nativist Support in Austria and Germany

Cross-National Variation: A Puzzle

The cross-time variation in nativist party support in Austria and Germany shows that sharp increases in support followed massive increases in unsolicited migration in the late-1980s and early-1990s. This rapid growth in native/immigrant heterogeneity increased the salience of the native/immigrant dynamic for voters in both countries. For many voters concerned with and opposed to the new migration, nativist parties were considered the most compelling electoral alternative and their vote shares increased.

In this chapter, I address two questions. First, what explains variation in the growth of nativist parties in Austria and Germany? As Figure 5.1 indicates, patterns of migration explain some of this variation. Controlling for parties that were making both a nativist and a regionalist appeal (the Lega Nord; the Vlaams Blok), a very limited (N=16) linear regression suggest that changes in ethnic heterogeneity account for 46% of the cross-national variation in nativist growth in the late-1980s and early-1990s.349

Figure 5.1: Cross-National Nativist Party Growth, 1987-1995

Though Austria received approximately 33% more net migration per capita than Germany, given the West European average migration to both countries was relatively high during this period. Yet while the Austrian Freedom Party (FPOe) predictably saw the greatest nativist growth of any West European country given their high rate of

349 β= 2.21; P-Value= 0.059. The regression specified as OLS in Stata 9, with robust standard errors. Removing the Austrian case, the coefficient remains positive but is significantly reduced (.62) and is no longer significant.
migration (indeed they outperformed their predicted growth), Germany’s nativist parties were less successful at achieving growth than those in any other country where nativism emerged, despite a more favorable migration environment than any country other than Austria. Why then was the FPOe so much better at taking advantage of the new migration than its German counterparts?

Second, even after a disastrous tenure in government from 2000 to 2006 and a split with the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZOe) in 2005, the FPOe and BZOe were still polling 15% in the 2006 election, up from 10% in 1986. In western Germany, nativist parties, which entered four western German state parliaments between 1987 and 1992, lost their parliamentary footholds and were marginal political actors in the former West Germany by 2002. Why were nativist parties in Austria far better at consolidating their gains, at *persisting*, than their German counterparts?

Though cross-time patterns in nativist support in both countries are best explained by changing patterns of migration, following Art (2006) I argue that the most compelling explanation for the cross-national divergence in nativist party growth and persistence is the configuration of *opportunity structures* in each society. By opportunity structures, I mean factors largely endogenous to the political system that facilitate or constrain the ability of political or social actors to achieve their goals. The classic example of an opportunity structure is electoral rules; the electoral system chosen by a country affects the ability of new or small parties find voters, functionaries or funding.  

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350 Only in Bremen did nativists consistently enter parliament, due to a favorable electoral system; even under these conditions, they have been limited to one seat (of 80-100) over the past 15 years and play no role in the legislature.  
351 Cox (1997).
Focusing on Austria and Germany, Art (2006) argues that debates in the 1980s about the National Socialist past “shaped the reactions of political parties, the media, and civil society” to the Radical Right. In Germany, mainstream elites reached a consensus that a clear rejection of the National Socialist past (and ultra-nationalism more generally) was fundamental to the German conception of democracy. In contrast, in Austria elites were divided on the lessons to be learned from the past and no unified norm rejecting ultra-nationalism emerged. When Radical Right parties came onto the scene in the late-1980s, the media and the Center-Right in Austria facilitated the Freedom Party’s success by failing to condemn them (and in the case of the Kronen Zeitung serving as free advertising) while the unified response of mainstream actors in Germany prevented the Radical Right from achieving a permanent foothold.

In this chapter I depart from Art’s argument in two respects. First, while Art treats the configuration of opportunity structures in western Germany and Austria as a political culture that arose from ideological debates in the 1980s, I argue that they were actually informal strategic institutions that emerged in the immediate post-war period and evolved into Art’s norms over time. Elites in Germany and Austria faced two challenges at the end of World War II. First, they had to construct a system of norms and institutions to manage the domestic conflicts between the Left and Right during the interwar years, which contributed to democratic breakdown and a disastrous war. Furthermore, both countries faced the prospect of indefinite occupation or division by the Allies, and domestic elites sought to design a system capable of minimizing external influence. The prerequisites for minimizing this influence were convincing the Allies

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352 Art (2006), pg. 9.
that they could 1) minimize their domestic conflicts and 2) manage the nationalist forces
which had initiated a global war.

Elites in Austria and West Germany developed two very different systems for
dealing with these challenges, partly to fulfill their own goals and partly due to the
international constraints they faced. Germany’s size and the Allied judgment that it was
solely responsible for the crimes of National Socialism made a continued Allied presence
a fact beyond the control of domestic elites.353 Moreover, as the leaders of the National
Socialist regime originated in Germany and their rise was seen as aided by the presence
of anti-democratic forces on the Left, West German elites felt a responsibility to
aggressively defend their conception of liberal democracy to preserve the new Federal
Republic. The confluence of these two factors was a system where political and social
groups associated with extremism (on Left and Right) were aggressively combated
through formal institutions, including reducing the proportionality of the electoral system
and liberal laws for banning extremist groups, and informal agreements among the
established elites. At the same time, the guaranteed presence of 200,000 American
occupation troops meant there was no need for a broader set of institutions to manage
conflicts between mainstream conservatives and social-democrats.354

In Austria, the situation was exactly reversed. Austria’s small size and the
agreement at the 3rd Moscow Conference in 1943 that it was National Socialism’s “first
victim” rather than a willing participant meant that a continued Allied presence was

354 Heritage Foundation, “US Troop Deployment Dataset,”
possible but not assured. Moreover, because National Socialism was considered a German political movement, Austrian elites felt no responsibility to deny Radical Right elements a role in everyday politics. As a result, Austrian elites developed a system with minimal formal or informal constraints on nationalist actors, though they were still required by the Allies to ban explicitly National Socialist or fascist successor parties.

Though they might have found the politics of Radical Right parties distasteful and some mainstream political actors were more reluctant to cooperate than others, in general elites from the established parties cooperated with the Radical Right when they felt there was some benefit in doing so. However, because they preferred not to have a continued Allied presence to ensure stability and because they feared the broad social divisions of the interwar period, Austrian elites instituted an informal system of consensus designed to minimize the conflict between the Catholic and socialist milieus.

Second, whereas Art only considers the effects of broad systemic norms on Radical Right success, I argue that there were actually three separate factors, all generated by early post-war decisions, that independently affected nativist fortunes in Germany and Austria. I conceptualize these factors along two axes. First, following Eatwell (2003) some factors are largely exogenous to the political system (the demand factors that shape individual preferences or priorities), while others are largely endogenous to the political system (the supply factors that increase the willingness to vote for a party, without altering individual priorities). Second, following Mudde (2007) some factors contribute to a party’s ability to grow while others contribute to its ability to persist when the conditions for growth are absent.

356 This requirement was formalized in the 1995 State Treaty, which returned Austrian sovereignty.
The first factor I identify is the favorability of the immediate issue environment: are the issues that nativist parties emphasize salient, and is the nativist party considered the party most competent to address those issues? In addition to migration, discussed at length in Chapter 4, I emphasize two issues that were a legacy of the early post-war period: the presence and continued functioning of a system of patronage, and concerns about German reunification. Both issues were generated by elite decisions in the early post-war era to manage domestic conflict and to prevent the return of a system-threatening Germany military, respectively.

While the issue environment depends on the public's preferences and priorities (a demand-side consideration), the remaining factors focus on the characteristics of the nativist parties and their party systems (supply-side considerations). The second factor is the strength of organization transmitting the nativist appeal, which I divide into two arenas. On the one hand, parties with plentiful resources before an election (good funding, many dedicated activists) are in a better position to transmit their message when the issue environment is favorable. On the other hand, a stable of professional functionaries socialized to agree with the party’s agenda are essential for avoiding infighting and charges of incompetence, keeping the party functioning when the issue environment is no longer favorable. The final factor I identify is the strategy other parties in the system adopt with respect to the nativist party, affecting its ability to represent its voters and advance the careers of its functionaries. In Germany and Austria, these strategies were part of a stance toward nationalist appeals decided upon by elites from the established parties in the early post-war period. The placement of these factors based on the schema I constructed above is presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Variables Influencing Nativist Party Success in Austria and Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Growth</th>
<th>Persistence</th>
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<tr>
<td>Demand</td>
<td>Issue Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Patronage Politics</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- German Reunification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Party Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Funding, Activists)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opponent Strategy</td>
<td>- Functionary Recruitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Policy Opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Functionary Opportunities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first three discuss each factor as it appeared in Germany and Austria in the 1980s and 1990s. The fourth analyzes the relationship between two of these factors and argues that a party's organization in one period is partly a legacy of opponent strategies in the past, taking the Radical Right in Germany and Austria in the 1950s and 1960s as an example. The conclusion considers about the generalizability of these factors beyond the German and Austrian cases.

Critical Issues: Patronage Politics and German Reunification

Chapter 3 presented a model in which changes to an environment caused by some triggering event or process alter the importance given to an issue or identity in political and social decisions. Political systems are complex, and multiple aspects of the environment might change simultaneously, for example a country facing an economic crisis and a foreign policy crisis at the same time. For a niche party, the simultaneous variance of multiple aspects of the environment during a period of growth might hamper or augment their fortunes. It might hamper their fortunes if a voter considers different
parties the most competent (or the best signal) to address different issues, with one event muting concerns with the other. It might augment their fortunes if the same party is considered competent on different issues by non-overlapping sets of voters, giving them a greater increase in support than if either event had occurred in isolation.

This section argues that in addition to immigration, two factors associated with their early post-war legacies affected nativist fortunes in Austria and Germany, facilitating the growth of the FPOe and hampering the growth of its German counterparts. The augmenting event was the accelerated decline of an entrenched system of patronage, which Austria had and Germany did not. The dampening event was the sudden reunification of territories divided in the early post-war period, which affected Germany but not Austria.

**The FPOe and Proporz**

In Chapter 4 I presented evidence on the FPOe’s perceived issue competence in the 1990s; in addition to immigration policy the FPOe was considered the most competent to combat patronage and government waste. Throughout the 1990s, between 30% and 40% of the population considered the FPOe the party most qualified to deal with immigration and corruption.\(^{358}\) In terms of issue salience, discussions of Austria’s patronage system and a “culture of scandal” dominated Austrian politics from the mid- to late-1980s, and early on these issues were seen as augmenting the FPOe’s chances.\(^{359}\)

Austria’s system of patronage dates back to the initiation of the *Proporz* (proportionality) system in the early post-war period, intended by domestic elites to

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\(^{359}\) Plasser and Sommer, pp. 44-46 *OJP 1989.*
ensure social stability.\textsuperscript{360} Under Proporz, public posts were apportioned according to the relative strength of the Christian-democratic OeVP and the social-democratic SPOe to reduce interparty competition and conflict. The system was intended to ensure consensus on the most important decisions; for example, the national cabinet was assigned proportionally and each minister given an undersecretary from the other party.\textsuperscript{361} In reality, Proporz was omnipresent and regulated appointments to the judiciary, the banks, the national radio and television companies, and even teaching posts. In addition, the National Socialist regime built a great deal of heavy industry that was nationalized by the state after the war, giving the government control of the country’s manufacturing jobs. In 1972, 20% of Austria’s GNP was produced by the public sector, employing 29% of its labor force and 2/3\textsuperscript{rd}s of its manufacturing jobs.\textsuperscript{362} Qualifying for a public sector job in Austria often required formal party membership (the Parteibuchwirtschaft or “party book economy”). In a 1980 survey, 37% said they joined a party to gain “professional benefits” and 24% to gain subsidized housing.\textsuperscript{363} Though much of the adult population was a member of one of the two major parties, some Austrians were unsympathetic to either ideology and resented the barriers to advancement, and these voters formed the FPOe’s base in its first decades.

A major shift came in the late-1970s and early-1980s, as structural transformations across advanced industrial countries threatened the manufacturing sector. In Austria, these problems were particularly acute as the threatened industries, such as VOEST-Alpine (then the United Austrian Iron and Steel Works, Austria’s largest

\textsuperscript{360} Lijphart (1977) identified Austria as a case of consociationalism.
\textsuperscript{361} Jelavich (1987), pg. 274.
\textsuperscript{363} Kraeh (1996), pg. 50.
employer), were publicly owned and played a role in the distribution of patronage. The
government was more interested in VOEST’s ability to ensure social peace than its
profitability and responded with deficit spending, delaying rationalization and increased
the pressure on the Austrian taxpayer.\textsuperscript{364} In addition, the benefits (or abuses of power)
granted the elites who controlled Proporz became harder to dismiss as the system’s
benefits failed to trickle down to the average Austrian. By putting a strain on the Proporz
system, deindustrialization reduced the opportunities for patronage, increased the
disconnect between elites and the public and left more Austrians receptive to an
alternative system of distributing public spoils.\textsuperscript{365} Back to the late-1970s, surveys by
FESSEL-GfK found that preventing the waste of public funds was named a top priority
by 3/4ths of the population.\textsuperscript{366}

The FPOe’s major rhetorical and ideological shift in 1986 was to attack Proporz,
with new leader Joerg Haider championing the “little man” against the “old party bosses”
that ruled the country.\textsuperscript{367} Excluded from the Proporz system over the past 40 years, the
FPOe was best situated to assume this role. In the early going, the FPOe promised above
all fewer abuses of power, lower taxes and less bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{368} This move had already
been attempted with some success under the brief Chairmanship of Alexander Goetz in
1979, but it was more successful in the mid-1980s, as more voters felt excluded from the
Proporz umbrella.\textsuperscript{369} The opposition to Proporz was not something that Haider invented,

\textsuperscript{364} Jelavich (1987), pg. 313. Chancellor Kreisky famously proclaimed that he “preferred deficits to
unemployment”; Rauscher, pg. 31 in Scharsach (2000).
\textsuperscript{366} Based on data from FESSEL surveys since 1976, provided by Prof. Dr. Peter Ulram. By the early-
1990s, these numbers had dropped below 40%.
\textsuperscript{367} Plasser and Ulram, pg. 130 in Scharsach (ed) (2000).
\textsuperscript{368} Hoebelt (2003), pg. 50.
\textsuperscript{369} When Goetz took over the FPOe in 1978, he oriented the party toward a coalition with the OeVP and a
smaller bureaucracy during the 1979 election, making an enemy of SPOe Chancellor Kreisky. As the
but rather an increasingly salient issue unaddressed by the established parties or the previously dominant faction in his party.

For challenging the system, the major parties excluded the FPOe from national decisions, a policy of *Ausgrenzung*. The SPOe ended the three year-old SPOe-FPOe government and formed a Grand Coalition, which would last the next 13 years. Haider traded immediate government access for the prospect of increased support from the growing resentment toward *Proporz*. If the goal of the *Ausgrenzung* was to wait Haider out, the Grand Coalition failed for two reasons. First, it was perceived as a perpetuation of the cartel politics the FPOe was railing against, reinforcing the “party boss” narrative. Second, in times of crisis Grand Coalitions might be advantageous to create consensus on the most important political decisions, such as Britain’s Grand Coalition from 1931-45. In a time of peace in Austria, the Grand Coalition was associated with gridlock and ineffective government, increasing voter dissatisfaction and strengthening the support for the FPOe in opposition. In short, the FPOe was able to gain support from the mid 1980s by drawing on the increased demand for anti-patronage appeals.

In the late-1980s, the FPOe attracted self-employed and well-educated voters who were upset with the system, mainly taking votes from the OeVP. In Vienna, Haider excelled in the well-off 1st and 4th districts, but lost votes in the city’s low-income public housing. Some (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Betz and Immerfall 1998) argue that the Mayor of Graz he was reluctant to spend more time in Vienna and gave up his post in 1979, with his follower Norbert Steger preferring to maintain strong ties with the SPOe; interview, Lothar Hoebelt, 12/22/06.

Kraeh (1996), pg. 47.

Plasser and Ulram (eds) (2002), pg. 85; Stoess (2005), pg. 120.

Kraeh (1996), pg. 220.

Hoebelt (2003), pg. 50.
FPOe’s growth was the result of this resentment, or some sort of values realignment toward neo-liberalism, and that migration played little or no role.

However, beginning in 1990 the FPOe attracted large numbers of blue-collar workers, especially in working class urban areas like Vienna’s 10th, 11th and 15th districts, as the party made immigration its primary campaign theme. From 1990-1999, the FPOe gained approximately 500,000 blue-collar voters but only 100,000 self-employed. By 1999 the FPOe were the number one party among blue-collar voters (with 45-50% support), but were only the second party among white-collar workers (with 33%). Blue-collar voters are the least receptive to calls for less market regulation, though this does not preclude opposition to a patronage system that they feel excludes them. In elections in the 1990s approximately 2/3rds of those switching to the FPOe called scandals and patronage a motivating factor (but not taxes, the economy, or deregulation), 50% said they were interested in “teaching [the Government] a lesson” (Denkzettel) and 1/3rd said they were switching out of concerns over immigration. Migration played the greatest role in Vienna, the state most affected by the new arrivals; in the 1991 Viennese

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375 Ivarsflaten (2005) found that nativist voters in Denmark and France are less economically liberal than members of other parties of the right but far more exclusionary with regard to immigration, and that small business owners are significantly more economically liberal than blue-collar workers, though both disproportionately supported nativist parties.
376 Plasser et al., in OJP 1990; Plasser and Ulram, in OJP 1990; Plasser et al., in OJP 1994; Plasser et al., in OJP 1999. There are two difficulties when interpreting data on motivation. The first is ecological; respondents were allowed to report more than one justification for switching, so it is unclear how much overlap there is between the three categories and how voters would rank them in importance. Second, “teaching a lesson” is a highly ambiguous term; some or all voters might have been sending their signal based on their dissatisfaction with immigration policy, but were reluctant to express open nativism in the survey. In short, anywhere from 0% (all those answering immigration also answered scandals, but ranked immigration lower) to 85% might have been voting for the party primarily out of immigration.
state election approximately 60% of those switching to the FPOe called immigration an important factor in their decision.\textsuperscript{377}

**German Nativists and Reunification**

In contrast to Austria, Germany did not establish a consensus system in the post-war period and patronage never became a major theme in elections. In *Politbarometer* surveys, corruption was considered an important issue by less than 5% of the population from 1986 through 1992 and less than 10% from 1993 to 1999, similar to the lack of concern with crime.\textsuperscript{378} While there were individual scandals, there was no broad perception that the system was broken and no reservoir of discontent for nativist parties to latch onto. Nativist parties in Germany instead concentrated on immigration, crime and an aggressive anti-Communist foreign policy, including strong support for German reunification. Indeed, the *Republikaner* were founded over the question of reunification.

For German nativist parties, *de facto* reunification with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was a double blow to their fortunes. First, the end of the Cold War robbed anti-Communism of its power as a political appeal.\textsuperscript{379} Second, reunification came at a time when the major issue nativist parties drew support from, migration, was highly salient. West Germans from the beginning were concerned about Reunification’s costs; the country’s population was increasing by 25%, with many of those newcomers requiring social insurance. All issues but Reunification receded in importance...shortly before a national election.\textsuperscript{380} As Figure 5.2 indicates, concerns about Reunification was

\textsuperscript{377} Plasser and Ulram, in *OJP 1990*.
\textsuperscript{378} *Politbarometer 1977-2002*.
\textsuperscript{379} Stoess (2005), pg. 61.
\textsuperscript{380} Cheles et al. (1994), pg. 304.
inversely correlated with concerns about migration on a monthly basis between August 1989 and December 1993 ($r = -0.72$).\footnote{Calculations from \textit{Politbarometer} 1977-2002; $N=49$.}

\textbf{Figure 5.2: The Salience of Reunification & Immigration, Germany 1989-93}

Through the summer of 1989, before reunification became a pressing concern, the REP averaged 5.5\% in \textit{Politbarometer} polls of vote intention, enough to enter the federal parliament.\footnote{\textit{Politbarometer} 1977-2002.} By January 1990 their support had declined to 2.5\% and by the end of 1990 1.5\%, not far from their final vote share. This suggests that without reunification, the REP had a strong chance of entering the national parliament in elections originally scheduled for 1991, assuming the new migration issue remained unresolved by the established parties.

In addition to the emergence of immigration as a salient issue, the FPOe was able to build on a second “owned” issue in the 1980s, its opposition to patronage. In contrast, German nativist parties were hampered by the absence of patronage as a relevant issue, as well as German reunification, which depressed their support at a crucial moment. This configuration of issues in the late-1980s and early-1990s explains why the FPOe experienced so much more growth than their German counterparts, but it leaves open the question of why the FPOe was so much better at retaining their supporters. The next two sections argue that the explanation for this phenomenon lies in the opportunity structures present in both countries. Even if reunification had not been a theme and the REP had entered the national parliament, other factors would likely have made their tenure brief.

\textbf{Party Organization: Party Capture vs. Party Building}
Mudde (2007) suggests that two types of opportunity structures influence a party's ability to grow or persist. He splits these factors into the *internal supply-side* (the features of a party) and the *external supply-side* (the features of the political system). I argue that two supply-side factors, one internal (party organization) and one external (opponent strategies), contributed to the divergence in outcomes in Austria and Germany. I focus on three comparisons, between nativist parties in Germany and Austria, between iterations of the FPOe across time, and between nativist parties in the German states of Baden-Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein. Three comparisons are necessary to parse the effect of the hypothesized processes, as opponent strategies do not vary across countries. The comparison between Baden-Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein focuses on parties with different degrees of organization entering parliament at the same moment in 1992, which controls for national contextual factors. The comparison between iterations of the FPOe is attractive as that party was the only relevant nativist actor in Austria, but its degree of organization varied over time.

By party organization, I mean the degree to which a party has systematized and routinized its functions (campaigning, recruitment) and the resources (financial and human) at its disposal. I argue that party organization can affect the ability to grow or to persist, though a different mechanism is at work in each case. In terms of growth, parties that are well-funded or have extensive networks of activists have the ability to easily reach new voters when the issue environment is favorable, while parties that are underfunded or understaffed spend their critical elections fighting for ballot access or delegating their candidates to administrative tasks rather than rallies or constituent outreach. In terms of persistence, strong organizations have established mechanisms for
identifying and training competent, professional functionaries capable strengthening the bond with supporters through legislation or constituent service in times when the issue environment is unfavorable. Weak party organizations are unable to properly identify or train functionaries and give power to the ineffective, incompetent, disloyal or corrupt. Even if a party lacks a formal organization, there might exist a disciplined or well-funded sub-culture that maintains organizations and socializes or trains functionaries who can then make the jump into politics (Art 2008).

The FPOe: Party Capacity

Joerg Haider’s ascension as party leader of the FPOe in 1986 provided access to substantial resources with which to advance his agenda. Though a number of Haider’s high-level opponents left the party after the vote the result was legal and uncontested, accomplished through backroom negotiations with the party’s nationalist wing. Relative to other parties in Western Europe, Austria’s traditional parties (the OeVP, SPOe and FPOe) are very large and well-funded. The FPOe had approximately 37,000 dues paying members in 1986 and received 65 million Austrian Schillings ($6.25 million in 1986 USD) in public support. In contrast, in 2008 the German FDP had 66,000 members and received $13 million (in 2006 USD), despite a vote share twice as large in a country ten times as big. Permanent political parties also employ an administrative middle stratum, the staff who handle the day-to-day business of constituent service,

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383 Haider defeated the then-Chair Norbert Steger with 59.5% of the vote; Bail et al., pg. 115 in Scharsach (ed) (2000).
384 36 prominent party members left in the early period of Haider’s Chairmanship; Stimmann, pg. 171 in the OJP 1987. The Carinthian, Styrian, and parts of the Upper Austrian organizations were particularly disaffected with Steger, who came up through the Viennese party organization and was a classical liberal unsympathetic to their more conservative, nationalist views; Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer (1997), pp. 33-35.
385 Membership: Hoebelt (2003); Finances: Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer (1997), pg. 44.
386 “Freie Demokratische Partei [Deutschland],” de.wikipedia.org.
election and executive administration. The FPOe’s mid-level bureaucracy remained essentially intact after Haider’s election.387

**The FPOe: Functionary Recruitment**

Haider’s takeover did not (initially) compromise the FPOe’s established channels for identifying and training professional, loyal functionaries. As an established party, the FPOe had a number of auxiliary organizations (two youth organizations; a business association; a farmer’s association) and was entrenched in state and local politics across Austria, meaning that they were in a position to choose the most promising or competent functionaries for higher office. Despite his image as an “outsider,” Haider was a professional politician. Between 1970 and 1986, the 36-year old Haider had spent 14 years in politics: four as chair of the RFJ, the FPOe’s youth movement, followed by seven as a state party functionary (*Landesparteisekretaer*) overlapping with four as a national MP and finally three as the head of a state party organization and member of a state cabinet (*Landesregierung*).388 Many of the party’s national MPs after the 1986 national election had a long background in the party, and several had served in the outgoing SPOe-FPOe government. The median incoming FPOe MP in 1986 had 11 years of political experience: a term in the national parliament, a term at the state or local level and several years as a member of a state or local party organization.

Haider used the party’s continued success in the late-1980s to centralize his authority, with the selection of the party’s higher functionaries relying less on established

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387 Interview, Lothar Hoebelt, 12/22/06.
channels than his personal decisions. Haider moved away from promotion through the ranks in favor of the big splash, finding prominent public advocates (Heide Schmidt), industrialists (Thomas Prinzhorn), journalists (Hans Pretterebner) and athletes (Patrick Ortlieb) and immediately granting these “career jumpers” (Quereinsteiger) positions of great authority. Heide Schmidt, a television personality through her work with the national Ombudsman (Volksanwaltschaft), was brought directly into politics as a member of the national upper chamber of parliament (the Bundesrat) and a year later became the party’s General Secretary. Industrialist Thomas Prinzhorn was a national MP for two years before he was a member of the party. Haider also had a penchant for promoting young, handsome men, and the FPOe came to be known as the “boys’ party” (Buberlpartie). Peter Westenthaler became the parliamentary club’s press secretary at 22, after a year in the party. Karl-Heinz Grasser became the 25-year old deputy Governor of Carinthia in 1994, after two years in the party.

Haider’s overall method was to create a party structure dependent on and beholden to him. But his centralization of the recruitment and promotion process also allowed less competent and (ironically) less loyal individuals into the party’s upper echelons. Routinized channels of recruitment and promotion ideally identify functionaries who are incompetent or disagree with the party line early and prevent them from advancing further in the party. Ignoring these channels increases the risk that more prominent scandals or rifts will occur high up in the party, where they will receive more media attention and have a greater ability to disrupt the party. For example, of the seven

389 “I thought we could wait out his breakthrough, but Haider brought his own people with him. Haider made sure that only people close to him kept their positions. People became dependent on him.... Haider became the sole leader through his success. It’s hopeless to oppose him internally when he wins elections.” Interview, Friedhelm Frischenschlager (former FPOe MP), 12/1/06.
MPs who left the FPOe for the Liberal Forum in the early-1990s, three had no political experience before the 1990 election and two more were Quereinsteiger placed directly into the Bundesrat in the late-1980s. The Liberal Forum defectors supported the FPOe’s liberalism but not its nativism, and for the FPOe’s anti-immigrant “Austria First” initiative in 1992 represented the transformation of the party into a nationalist force with a liberal facade.\(^ {390}\) Functionaries who came up through the party were opponents of Proporz because it excluded their sub-culture, but had to be willing or eager to accept nationalism and ethnic chauvinism to advance through the party. Similarly the functionaries who left the FPOe for the BZOe in 2005, such as Westenthaler or Grasser (who became an independent) had few connections to the party sub-culture itself, or a connection with Haider or his Carinthian organization.\(^ {391}\) Of the 18 FPOe MPs in 2002 legislative session, 16 left for the BZOe. Of those, 13 joined the party after Haider became leader. Two of the three pre-Haider MPs were part of a Carinthian party organization that Haider had controlled for 20 years; nearly the entire Carinthian party defected to the BZOe.\(^ {392}\) Some of Haider’s selections were simply not qualified for political life. In 1991 Haider recruited his personal bodyguard for the upper house; unable to deal with position’s responsibilities, he committed suicide after resigning in 1993.\(^ {393}\)

What distinguished the functionaries who stayed with the FPOe in 2005 were their roots in Austria’s nationalist sub-culture and a lack of connection to Carinthia.

Federal MP Barbara Rosenkranz’s husband Horst was a member of the National

\(^{390}\) Interview correspondence, Dr. Heide Schmidt (founder of the Liberal Forum), 12/12/06.

\(^{391}\) Interview, Dr. Kurt Richard Luther, 3/14/07.


Democrats (NDP), a party banned in the late-1980s as a successor to the NSDAP. The other federal MP who stayed, Reinhard Boesch, was prominent in the fraternal association (*Burschenschaft*) “Teutonia.” Heinz-Christian Strache, head of the Vieninense party and Haider’s eventual replacement as party chair, is prominent in the “Vandalia” *Burschenschaft* in Vienna and to a daughter of Norbert Burger, the NDP’s founder. Andreas Moelzer, the FPOe’s chief ideologue during the height of its nativist appeals in the early-1990s and now the party’s European MP, was a member of the “Corps Vandalia” *Burschenschaft* in Graz. Though he controlled appointments to the cabinet, the federal parliamentary group, the national steering committee and (at times) the state party heads, Haider was unable or unwilling to completely purge the party of potential opponents. It was these local- and state-level functionaries, professionalized through local and state parliaments and below Haider’s field of vision, that opposed Haider in 2005 and returned the FPOe to success when he left the party.

The effect of Haider’s centralization of power was evident more generally in the composition and stability of the party’s parliamentary and cabinet groups. Using the Austrian National Parliament’s biography system (www.parlament.gv.at), which posts a *résumé* for every Austrian politician since 1918, I have constructed a database collecting the political experience of every legislator or cabinet member for the FPOe or its predecessor party, the VdU, who began a parliamentary session in office. During the

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394 In contrast to fraternities in the United States, membership in certain *Burschenschaften* in Austria is a symbol of a conservative or nationalist socialization. Some have longstanding connections to national-liberal and German-national circles; many of the more nationalist *Burschenschaften* were banned in Germany after World War II. Certain *Burschenschaften* are prominent recruitment centers for the FPOe and members of these societies overwhelmingly stayed with the party after the BZOe split.

395 The 1994-95 session was excluded due to its brevity. “Political Experience” includes time in elected office, but also time as an official functionary in a national, state or local party organization. I count as a failure any MP who defected from the party, who was thrown out of the party, or who rotated out of the
four parliamentary sessions where Haider had complete control of the functionary selection process (1990, 1994, 1999 and 2002), the political experience of the FPOe’s average parliamentary was 30% lower than the four sessions before or the one session after (8.4 years vs. 12), as Haider rotated untested functionaries into the parliamentary group. Moreover, the percentage of FPOe MPs who failed to complete their term in office, because they defected to another party, were caught in a scandal, or were demoted or stripped of their power in an internal struggle, markedly increased to an average of 30.4% in those four sessions, compared to 9.2% in the four sessions below and the one session after. 396

The de-routinization of the recruitment process was especially noticeable during the FPOe’s first coalition with the OeVP. After entering government, the professionalism of the FPOe’s electoral campaigns receded in importance and its administrative capacity came to the fore. Yet, Haider populated the cabinet with relatively untested functionaries; Haider’s average cabinet choice had less office-holding experience than the average MP (5.5 years vs. 7). 397 Though there were a number of MPs with 15 or even 20 years of office-holding experience in the party, the most experienced appointee had 9. In contrast, the OeVP’s average cabinet appointee had spent 10 years in office. Of Haider’s eight appointees, three had to be replaced during the first session (all in the first year) as

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396 Functionaries were coded as demoted if they left parliament before their term expired, but failed to take a post of equal or greater value, such as a position in a state cabinet, the leadership of a state party, or an appointed role in the federal government. Functionaries who died were coded as completing the session. Changes in party membership are available as part of the biography, and scandals were established through outside media searches.

397 Though Susanne Riess-Passer was the de jure chair of the FPOe in 2000, there was no doubt that Haider remained in charge of the party.
All four were placed into positions of importance by Haider without rising through the party ranks. Additionally, Vice-Chancellor Susanne Riess-Passer and Finance Minister Karl-Heinz Grasser had a falling out with Haider, the so-called “Knittelfeld Putsch,” that led to the fall of the first government and their separation from the party after the 2005 election. Of the 18 FPOe-backed ministers who served in the two FPOe-OeVP governments, 10 left their post over a scandal or due to inner-party strife, or left the party over an ideological disagreement or power struggle. Of the 15 OeVP-backed ministers who served in the two OeVP-FPOe governments only one, Interior Minister Erwin Strasser, left his post over the reorganization of the national police. During the FPOe’s last term in Government (1983-6), the average cabinet member had 7 years of office-holding experience, and only one of six failed to survive the term.

German Nativists: Organizational Resources

While Joerg Haider captured a party with many resources and an initially strong functionary base, nativists in Germany in the late-1980s needed to divide their attention, building party organizations during the period most favorable for growth. Though the three major nativist actors in Germany (the NPD, DVU and REP) faced a similar challenge, the parties varied in their ability to generate a party capacity, affecting their

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398 After 25 days in office, Justice Minister Michael Krueger was replaced in part over a sexually explicit interview with the news magazine profil. Krueger resigned for “health reasons”; Falter 33/02, 8/14/02. Michael Schmid (Transportation) and Elisabeth Sickl (Social Security) left at the request of the party; during Schmid’s tenure the Austrian rail service (OeBB) went on strike for the first time in 35 years. 399 Krueger’s first position was as a federal MP in 1994, Schmid’s as the head of the state party organization in Styria, and Sickl and Monika Forstinger (Schmid’s replacement) were placed directly into a state parliament with no prior experience. 400 Grasser would go on to be a de facto OVP member and Finance Minister in the second Schuessel government. 401 Defense Minister Friedhelm Frischenschlager was replaced over the “Reder Affair,” in which Frischenschlager was forced to resign his cabinet post after shaking hands with convicted war criminal Walter Reder upon his return from prison in Italy in 1985.
ability to grow, and in their willingness to recruit a professional functionary base, affecting their ability to persist once in parliament.

Of the three parties in West Germany in the late-1980s, only the NPD lacked the funds and activist base necessary to make a serious push for growth. Under surveillance by German authorities as a potential extremist group and banned in Berlin by the Allied authorities, the NPD was only relevant in the communities where individual personalities had retained local mandates since the 1970s. Though these functionaries, such as Chair Martin Mussgnug or his successor, Guenter Deckert, had been active in the party since the 1960s, the party’s collapse (from 28,000 members in 1969 to 6000 in 1987) meant that those who remained were the residue of the movement’s formation and not part of a functioning, regenerating party structure.

In contrast to the NPD, the DVU and REP each had something resembling a functioning organization in the 1980s, though both were far weaker than the FPOe and the strengths of the two parties were very different. Though the DVU claimed more than 20,000 members in 1989, most were official (subscribers to founder Gerhard Frey’s newspapers) rather than active. While political parties in Germany and Austria have state and local organizations that hold monthly meetings and special events throughout the year, the DVU’s only real structure was the party headquarters in Munich, and the only outreach the few rallies held before elections. The DVU was for all intents and purposes a one man show, with leader Gerhard Frey in control of every decision at every

404 Schmidt (1997), pg. 59.
level of parliament.\textsuperscript{405} The DVU’s organizational strength was financial; a multimillionaire, Frey readily “donated” millions to the DVU’s election campaigns. In the 1987 local election in Bremen, the DVU spent 1.9 million DM to obtain 3.4% of the vote and one seat...more than the Greens (440,000 DM, 10.2%, 10 seats) and the FDP (275,000 DM, 10%, 10 seats) combined.\textsuperscript{406}

Originating in Bavaria in 1984, the REP established organizations in every state within its first four years, though they were not sufficiently organized to contest the 1987 federal election. While there were constant leadership disputes in its first decade of existence, as a party not yet under the microscope of domestic authorities the REP were the most attractive movement for conservative-national functionaries interested in a respectable yet aggressively nativist and nationalist party.\textsuperscript{407} The REP were especially successful at recruiting from the police and military, from disaffected CSU functionaries (in Bavaria) who felt that party had become too moderate and from the expellee subculture (East German \textit{Uebersiedler} and \textit{Vertriebene} from Poland and the Czech Republic). At their height in 1989 the REP had approximately 25,000 members, compared to 45,000 for the Greens in 2008.\textsuperscript{408} Activists from the NPD switched to the REP in the late-1980s in such numbers that the REP banned further defections in October 1989 to counteract the perception that they were the extremists’ new flag bearer.\textsuperscript{409} High rates of defection in the other direction did not occur until the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century, when the

\textsuperscript{405} Schmidt (1997), pg. 52.  
\textsuperscript{406} From German federal campaign finance reporting for 1987.  
\textsuperscript{407} In the REP’s early years, the “triumvirate” of Franz Schoenhuber, Franz Handlos and Ekkehard Voight had a leadership struggle in the first two years that resulted in the later two leaving the party. The party’s current chair, Rolf Schlierer, left the party briefly in the late-1980s over concerns that the party was becoming too extreme.  
\textsuperscript{408} Neubacher (2001 Dissertation), pp. 49-51. The REP’s membership at the beginning of 1989 was closer to 8500.  
\textsuperscript{409} Veen et al. (1993), pg. 22. In 1993, 15 of the REP’s 26-member national committee had some past association with a party or social group to the “right” of the REP, including the NPD.
NPD's organizational base in eastern Germany and its alliance with the DVU allowed it to supplant the REP as Germany's chief Radical Right party, suggesting that nativist activists tended to gravitate toward the most promising organization. In the late-1980s, this meant the REP.410

Did the degree of party organization give some parties an advantage? Within western Germany, the NPD was certainly the least organized party and the only party not to enter a state parliament. While their skeletal organization did comparatively well in state elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein in 1988, where they were the only or most organized nativist party on the ballot and migration was starting to become salient, with the REP's emergence in 1989 they were distinctly the third preference; the NPD received 1/7th the votes of the REP in the 1990 national election. Between the DVU and REP it is more difficult to draw a distinction. The DVU was strong where the REP was weak (Bremen and Schleswig-Holstein), and failed to contest states (Baden-Wuerttemberg and Bavaria) where the REP was strong. The REP's ceiling when they had a strong activist base but not a great deal of funding (7.5% in Berlin in 1989) was nearly identical to the DVU (6.3% in Schleswig-Holstein in 1992), who had the funding but never the activist base.

Cross-nationally, the effect of party organization faces a "degrees of freedom" problem; the FPOe might have benefitted from a better organization, but Austria also received more migration per capita and had a reservoir of dissatisfaction with the Proporz system. Nativist functionaries in Germany certainly felt that their weaker party structures

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410 Franz Schoenhuber, Chair of the REP for its first 10 years, ran on the NPD-DVU's joint ticket during the 2005 national election. Members of the REP did defect to the DVU in the late-1980s, primarily in Bremen where the party held a seat in parliament; Fascher (1994), pg. 135.
made campaigning difficult. Some *Kreis*-level organizations (equivalent to a county) would have four to six volunteers, including the candidate, for a population of 250,000. Candidates often found themselves not only campaigning, but personally devoting energy to basic administrative tasks like collecting signatures to qualify for the ballot or putting up election posters.\footnote{Interview, Guenter Deckert (former Federal Chair of the NPD), 10/21/05. Interview, REP (Gross-Gerau, Hessen), 5/26/06.} Despite their organizational weakness, however, the REP and DVU achieved growth in elections surpassing other, better organized minor parties in Germany. Before German reunification the REP were polling 5-7% in 1989, which put them above the Greens. The DVU in 1992 received more votes than the FDP or Greens in Schleswig-Holstein, as did the REP in Baden-Wuerttemberg. Both succeeded despite being heavily downplayed by the media, a form of free funding available to most parties in a political system.\footnote{While the REP were treated as something of a newsworthy oddity in Berlin in January 1989, by the European Elections later that year the media had reached an explicit or tacit consensus that the party was dangerous and would not receive positive coverage; Albes (1999).} This suggests that a wide variation in party organization was sufficient for growth. Moreover, no one aspect of party organization seemed to dominate; while the DVU’s successes came from their campaign expenditures, the REP in Berlin (1989) and Baden-Wuerttemberg (1992) spent the least per voter of any party entering parliament.\footnote{Calculated by federal campaign finance reports.}

**German Nativists: Channels of Recruitment**

While underdeveloped organizations did not appear to infirm the ability of nativist parties to grow in Germany, the evidence suggests that underdeveloped functionary channels hampered the ability of one party (the DVU) to persist. Compared to their counterparts in Austria, nativist functionaries in Germany were relatively...
inexperienced. As essentially new parties that convinced few functionaries from the established parties to join their cause, nativist parties in Germany usually seated candidates who had only been in the party for a handful of years and who had little or no office-holding experience. Unlike the FPOe, the REP and DVU had no inner-party mechanism for selecting promising functionaries and unlike a party like the Belgian Vlaams Blok no extra-party sub-culture for identifying new functionaries. While all three parties had official auxiliary organizations (for youth, women and seniors), they were shell organizations incapable of attracting new members or reliably identifying promising functionaries. The REP was so successful in the early going that they frequently had more mandates to fill than candidates contesting the election and in many cases this lack of political experience led to the rapid collapse of their parliamentary groups through in-fighting or a lack of competence. Of the 163 REP parliamentary groups in existence in 1990, 63 (39%) had collapsed by the end of 1992.

Not all nativist parliamentary groups were equally inexperienced. In Baden-Wuerttemberg and Schleswig-Holstein, two nativist parties were elected to the state legislature on the same day in 1992. The REP entered the Baden-Wuerttemberg parliament in 1992 with 15 parliamentarians. Having secured office in local elections in 1989, state party leader (and future national party leader) Rolf Schlierer had an opportunity to select the most promising local functionaries for the state parliamentary group. While not as experienced as the FPOe, the average REP functionary in Baden-

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414 For example, the REP’s youth organization in Baden-Wuerttemberg constantly faced internal divisions and undependable functionaries; in March 1993 the Land Chair had to give up his post after being indicted for a “politically motivated crime,” Verfassungsschutz Baden-Wuerttemberg, Verfassungsschutzbericht 1993, pg. 51.

415 Bergsdorf (2001), pg. 208.

416 Neubacher (Dissertation 2001), pg. 89.
Wuerttemberg in 1992 had 5.6 years of political experience; two (Lothar Koenig and Karl-August Schaal) had spent more than a decade in local parliaments for the FDP and the Free Voters (Freie Waehler) respectively. Only one REP MP (Wili Auer) failed to finish the first term, resigning for “health reasons” after being accused of shoplifting in a perfume store. The REP remained in parliament after elections in 1996 with the loss of one mandate (to 14), before losing half their votes and falling out of parliament in 2001. Despite a leadership struggle between Schlierer and deputy leader Christian Kaes (who preferred cooperation with the DVU) during the second term, Kaes kept his seat and the REP group remained intact until 2001. Indeed, the conflict was a consequence of the REP’s fading fortunes rather than its cause; Kaes saw the DVU’s resources as the only way to keep the party relevant.

In contrast, the DVU essentially picked its functionaries in a contest. A call for candidates was sent through Frey’s National-Zeitung, with applications reviewed by the national office. Of the six MPs who entered parliament in Schleswig-Holstein in 1992, none had any political experience. Unlike the REP or FPOe, not even the past careers of the DVU MPs signaled promise. Schlierer was trained as a doctor and both Schlierer and Kaes were lawyers, whereas the candidates for the DVU were predominantly non-descript blue-collar workers. The DVU’s time in parliament was a catastrophe and the parliamentary group disintegrated within a year, with half the parliamentarians defecting to another party (the German League for Nation and Homeland, DLVH). The defections

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417 Freie Waehler refers to a list of independent candidates who associate with one another in local or state elections but do not officially form a party.
418 Neubacher (2001 Dissertation), pg. 129. Auer’s replacement, Bernhard Amann, would himself leave the parliamentary group in 1994 over the leadership struggle between Schlierer and party Chair Franz Schoenhuber; Verfassungsschutz Baden-Wuerttemberg, Verfassungsschutzbericht 1994.
419 Schmidt (1997), pg. 87.
came over the faction’s bitter fights with the central office in Munich over autonomy, and accusations on the party of the national office of abuse of party funds by faction leader Ingo Stawitz.\textsuperscript{420} In 1993, the defection of half the DVU’s parliamentarians in Bremen over similar conflicts destroyed that party’s faction after two years in parliament.\textsuperscript{421}

When the nationalist wing of the FPOe captured the party in 1986 and instituted an anti-system (later a nativist) agenda, they inherited a robust and credible party organization with significant resources. Capturing a party organization provided these activists (at least initially) with a reservoir of proven functionaries, allowing them to maintain their support when the issue environment became less favorable in the mid-1990s. Only Haider’s change to the FPOe’s system of recruitment eroded this capacity, compounded with a shift in responsibility from a party in opposition to a party in government (which the FPOe’s functionaries were unprepared for). As an opposition party in the government, the FPOe’s leaders realized that some decline was inevitable, though they could not anticipate falling from 27\% to 10\% of the vote.\textsuperscript{422} However, the FPOe’s strong reservoir of state and local functionaries prevented the party from completely disintegrating.

In Germany, nativist elites were forced to build party infrastructure and establish their credibility even as they waged elections. Of the three nativist parties operating in Germany, the NPD was the only one that failed to generate a new stream of functionaries or a source of funding, and ultimately was the only party not to enter parliament. In

\textsuperscript{420} Schmidt (1997), pg. 135. Frey also accused Stawitz of making statements that crossed the line into right-extremism and threatened the party with a ban, though ironically those statements were made in Frey’s own paper.

\textsuperscript{421} Schmidt (1997), pg. 179.

\textsuperscript{422} “We knew that we couldn’t maintain our high vote level. You can’t keep protest votes in a government. We knew that we’d lose 6-7\% no matter what. We saw 18-20\% as our stabilization point.” Interview, Peter Westenthaler (head of the FPOe parliamentary faction, 1999-2002), 5/31/2007.
contrast, the REP and DVU showed that a new party without an entrenched organization could succeed in individual elections. Furthermore, all three parties lacked a stable of competent functionaries or the mechanisms to select them, and much of the representation they secured subsequently fell apart over personality conflicts and or incompetence. This failing was particularly evident in the DVU, which made no effort to recruit promising functionaries, or REP factions in places like Berlin, where the party was not able to identify its best functionaries through lower-order elections.

The most successful nativist parliamentary group in Germany, the REP in Baden-Wuerttemberg, persisted as long as they did largely due to the professionalism of their parliamentarians, who were selected with an eye toward performance after a trial period in local parliaments. But despite their relative stability in Germany, the REP in Baden-Wuerttemberg only remained in the legislature for two sessions. The next section will argue that no matter the competence of the incoming parliamentary group, conditions external to the party were such that it was likely to fail not long after its motivating issue, migration, disappeared from the public consciousness.

**Opponent Strategies: Outside Allies vs. Mortal Enemies**

One way to interpret vote choice is that voters support parties with the expectation of representation (Fiorina 1981; Przeworski et al. 1999). In the short run the link between support and representation might be direct, the expectation that a party enact some desired change, or indirect, the expectation that signaling support for a particular change will spur the legislature or Government to action. In the long run, however, the parties that survive have should be those that consistently display an efficacy in
representing their supporters.\textsuperscript{423} In this section I argue that if a nativist party in Germany or Austria, with little expectation of forming a Government and implementing change on their own, hopes to persist by displaying efficacy, it is crucial to have a larger, established political ally willing to trade nativist support for the implementation of some nativist goals through legislative agreements, seat-sharing arrangements or a coalition government. Other parties in the system can therefore implement at least two strategies with respect to nativist parties. Established parties could ally with a nativist party for their own purposes, enhancing their efficacy, or they could seek their destruction through non-cooperation designed to minimize nativist efficacy.

The effect of an opponent’s strategy on party growth when conditions are favorable is theoretically minimal, as supporting a nativist party in this environment can still have an \textit{indirect} impact if established actors are convinced that their refusal to change their behavior will result in further electoral punishment. But opponent strategies should have a strong effect on a nativist party’s ability to persist. When a favorable environment for growth is absent, sympathetic allies facilitate a nativist party’s ability to establish their competence on everyday issues or to build longstanding relationships with particular interests by granting them greater access to public resources in exchange for their continued support. For nativist parties operating in environments where only opponents are present, other political actors signal to voters that the nativist party will have no effect on everyday decisions about policy or the distribution of spoils. Without allies willing to give them responsibility or access to public resources, the nativist party cannot establish their efficacy and will be abandoned in short order once the initial

\textsuperscript{423} Lawson, in Lawson and Merkl (eds) (1988).
motivation for supporting them fades. Franz Pappi refers to this dynamic as “rational” or “directional” protest, whereby voters temporarily and strategically support a party over a specific issue.\textsuperscript{424}

Just as there is a logic informing voter decisions, opponent strategies affect the calculations of prospective functionaries. Functionaries presumably support a party because they expect it to meaningfully advance their interests, whether those interests are office-seeking or ideological. In systems where they know they will have willing allies, functionaries who prefer to join a nativist party have no disincentive to do so. In contrast, functionaries in systems where nativist parties have nothing but opponents have a significant disincentive (professionally and potentially personally) to joining a nativist party. More office-seeking functionaries might prefer to join an ideologically-close party where they know they can succeed, while all but the most ideological functionaries might prefer to stay out of politics entirely. Opponent strategies can therefore hamper a nativist party’s ability to persist directly, by reducing their efficacy, and indirectly, by reducing the quality of the functionaries willing to join the party.

**Opportunities for Cooperation: 1986-1999**

To begin, I turn to state and federal elections from 1986 to 1999 where parties of the Center-Right (the CDU-CSU in Germany; the OeVP in Austria) could have allied with a nativist party to secure the most optimal outcome for themselves. Following a literature which finds that parties prefer to form coalitions that 1) minimize the size of the coalition and 2) minimize the policy distance of the coalition partners (Budge and Laver 1986, 1993), I assume that the Center-Right prefers to govern alone with a single-party

\textsuperscript{424} Holtmann (2002), pg. 70.
majority, followed by a Center-Right "minimum connected winning coalition," followed by all other coalition possibilities.\textsuperscript{425} In Germany, state and federal governments are built through legislative coalitions. In many Austrian states during this period only the Governor (\textit{Landeshauptmann}) was chosen by the legislature, with the remainder of the cabinet assigned by the Governor proportionally, though there was still some bargaining necessary to determine which parties received which portfolios. I assume that nativist parties prefer a Center-Right minimum connected winning coalition, followed by a Center-Right single-party majority, followed by all other outcomes.

Based on the initial distribution of seats in state and national elections, there were thirteen instances where cooperation would have been optimal in Austria and one in Germany.\textsuperscript{426} Table 2 presents the Government outcome and the degree of cooperation between nativist parties and the Center-Right. There were three possible outcomes in each instance: cooperation, aborted cooperation and conflict. In instances of cooperation, the Center-Right and the nativist party engaged in some explicit or tacit exchange. In instances of aborted cooperation, the Center-Right and the nativist party attempted coordination but failed. In instances of conflict, the Center-Right refused to cooperate with the nativist party and accepted a less optimal outcome. While tacit cooperation might seem like stretching the concept, the argument is that in cases in conflict, the Center-Right would rather give up its ability to form a government than rely on a nativist opponent for support, as the OeVP did at the national level on four occasions from 1986 to 1995.

\textsuperscript{425} In Germany, the smaller coalition between the CDU-FDP and CDU-REP was considered the more optimal, with ties going to the FDP.
\textsuperscript{426} The REP and FDP tied with 14 seats in the 1996 Baden-Wuerttemberg election.
Table 5.2: Nativist Coalition Opportunities, 1986-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Government Outcome</th>
<th>Cooperation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Austria</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (1986)</td>
<td>SPOe-OeVP</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgenland (1987)</td>
<td>SPOe</td>
<td>Aborted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carinthia (1989)</td>
<td>FPÖe</td>
<td>Yes (Explicit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (1990)</td>
<td>SPOe-OeVP</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgenland (1991)</td>
<td>ÖVP</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carinthia (1994)</td>
<td>ÖVP</td>
<td>Aborted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salzburg (1994)</td>
<td>ÖVP</td>
<td>Likely (Tacit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (1994)</td>
<td>SPOe-OeVP</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Styria (1995)</td>
<td>ÖVP</td>
<td>Yes (Explicit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (1995)</td>
<td>SPOe-OeVP</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgenland (1996)</td>
<td>ÖVP</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carinthia (1999)</td>
<td>FPÖe</td>
<td>Yes (Tacit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (1999)</td>
<td>ÖVP-FPÖe</td>
<td>Yes (Explicit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Germany</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Wuerttemberg (1992)</td>
<td>CDU-SPD</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 5.2 indicates, the ÖVP and FPÖe cooperated or attempted to cooperate in almost half the instances where such cooperation would have been optimal, while the Center-Right in Germany refused to use a nativist party to achieve a more optimal outcome. The best known instance of cooperation in Austria was the Carinthian state election in 1989, when the ÖVP supported Haider for Governor to break nearly 45 years of SPOe control. The coalition only fell apart when the major parties used Haider’s 1991 remarks praising the “orderly employment policies” of the National Socialist regime to replace him with the ÖVP’s Christoph Zernatto. Later elections suggest the ÖVP was only interested in improving their position and punishing Haider personally. After

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427 “Government outcome” refers to the cabinet at the national level in Austria and in Germany, and the Governor at the state level in Austria.

428 The Burgenland election was seen as an important step toward legitimizing Haider’s version of the party in the Austrian political system. The FPÖe agreed to vote for the ÖVP in return for a seat in the state cabinet. One FPÖe legislator, Gregor Munzenrieder, voted for SPOe candidate Johann Sipoetz instead, making him Governor of Burgenland. Munzenrieder was expelled from the FPÖe for his action; Kurier, “VP stellt bald einen siebenten Landeschef,” 10/21/87; Kurier, “FP-Hirnschall: Markierte Stimmzettel als ‘Selbstschutz der Mandatäre,’” 11/1/87; Kurier, “Munzenrieder kämpft um Wahlwiederholung,” 11/3/87.

429 Hoebelt (2003), pg. 72.
the 1994 election, Zernatto proposed a deal to remain Governor in exchange for giving the FPOe most of the prime cabinet positions, but opposition at the federal level and within the state OeVP forced him to abort the agreement and form a coalition with the SPOe. The next year, the FPOe agreed to support Waltraud Klasnic, the OeVP’s candidate for Governor in Styria, in return for supporting the FPOe’s Wilhelm Brauneder as 3rd President of the Austrian National Parliament. By 1999, even Haider’s exclusion had ended. Despite promising not to support his bid to return as Governor, federal OeVP leader Wolfgang Schuessel tacitly supported the FPOe by allowing his party to abstain from the vote, giving the FPOe control of Carinthia and serving as a preview of the 1999 national coalition.

In contrast, nativist parties in Germany clearly had no allies they could rely on for access to power or policy, and any actors who suggested cooperation were heavily sanctioned by their party. In the 1992 state election in Baden-Wuerttemberg, the Christian-democratic CDU had three choices. The party could form a Grand Coalition with the SPD, receiving half the portfolios but risking significant ideological disputes, or form a coalition with the FDP and Greens (a Black-Yellow-Green “Jamaica” coalition), getting most of the portfolios but even more significant ideological divisions that threaten the Government’s stability. Finally, the CDU could form a minimum connected winning coalition with the REP, getting nearly all of the portfolios with minimal policy divergence, considering the CDU and REP fought the election on the same issue.

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431 Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer (1997), pg. 134. The President of the Nationalrat (National Council) and their two deputies (the 2nd and 3rd President) oversee the business of the parliament, akin to the American Speaker of the House.
433 Veen et al. (1993), pg. 5.
(immigration). The CDU’s strategy before and after the election is indicative of its thinking. State party leader Erwin Teufel stated before the election that they would speak to every party about a coalition but the REP.\textsuperscript{434} After the election, the party formed a Grand Coalition with the SPD, though it meant a less optimal outcome. The REP’s chances were not much better at the local level. For example, in one Kreis (county) parliament in eastern Baden-Wuerttemberg, the CDU gave up a governing majority rather than rely on the REP’s support.\textsuperscript{435}

Without being able to hold out the hope of forming a majority coalition, there was little opportunity for nativist parties in Germany to display their legislative competence. With the exception of joint proposals, opposition proposals in national parliaments are generally rejected. This dynamic is less pronounced at the state level and even less so at the local level, as “street cars and swimming pools aren’t ideological matters.”\textsuperscript{436} In Austria, the FPOe faction was able to pass initiatives in the SPOe’s stronghold of Vienna in the early-1990s. Some of these initiatives were proposed alone and others with coalitions of other parties, including the SPOe.\textsuperscript{437} The FPOe was able to achieve some legislative success at the state level even during the height of their national exclusion in Austria, signaling that they were a party that would be treated as a legitimate actor by other members of the political system.

\textsuperscript{434} Stuttgarter Zeitung, “Fiasko fuer CDU – Triumph der “Republikaner’,” 4/6/92.
\textsuperscript{435} Interview, CDU (Ostalb Kreis, Baden-Wuerttemberg), 11/24/05.
\textsuperscript{436} Interview, BZOe (Schaerding, Upper Austria), 3/17/07. A national FPOe MP with experience at both levels described it this way: “Media interest is higher at the national level. In local parliaments decisions are almost always unanimous. In the national parliament it’s almost never the case. It’s rare that our proposals are supported. If they aren’t unanimous, 90% are rejected. At the local level, 90% are passed, depending on the ideological basis of the proposal. Other opposition parties are treated the same”; interview, FPOe (Knittelfeld, Styria), 3/26/07.
\textsuperscript{437} Based on a search of the parliamentary archive held in the Informationsdatenbank des Wiener Landtages und Gemeinderates. www.wien.gov.at/infodata/advgliwww.
In contrast, legislative for the REP was endemic at the state level and even in local parliaments. While a few REP MPs had individual, isolated successes at the local level, as a rule their proposals were rejected by the other parties automatically and without discussion.\textsuperscript{438} At best, an identical proposal would be made weeks or months later by another party and passed.\textsuperscript{439} The pressure not to support REP initiatives was intense; one local functionary noted that “one time years ago CDU voted for us. We didn’t get a majority. The next day the CDU was killed in the media.”\textsuperscript{440} For local parliamentary factions, the prospect of needing the REP to pass their own legislative agenda was just as bad; one REP MP in a local parliament noted that “when we are necessary for a majority they pull the proposal.”\textsuperscript{441} Even basic legislative courtesies were denied the REP. In state and national parliaments, the FPOe was included on pieces of legislation jointly presented by members of every party, some of which were procedural. In Baden-Wuerttemberg, the REP was the only party excluded from such proposals, suggesting that they were not seen as a legitimate part of the legislature.\textsuperscript{442} Generally, the REP’s role in legislatures was as a signaling mechanism. The only REP proposals the other parties would take were those they thought had enough widespread support that inaction would result in electoral punishment.\textsuperscript{443} The most obvious example was in

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{438} One REP functionary noted that he could periodically pass a local initiative, but only after a significant fight; REP (Aachen, Nordrhein-Westfalen), 5/17/06. Another noted that “we’ve had two proposals rejected but taken up by the [city] administration…. We theoretically have good proposals. It isn’t about the content, but the fight against the Republikaner. I would say 70% are rejected and 30% are stalled in committee”; interview, REP (Mainz, Rheinland-Pfalz), 5/26/06.
  \item \textsuperscript{439} “When it’s [about] security, S-Bahn [streetcar] issues they try and have a compromise. We’ll take our proposal back, they bring the same forward”; Interview, REP (Stuttgart, Baden-Wuerttemberg), 10/25/05.
  \item \textsuperscript{440} Interview, REP (Offenbach, Hessen), 5/10/06.
  \item \textsuperscript{441} Interview, REP (Frankfurt am Roemer, Hessen), 3/26/06.
  \item \textsuperscript{443} Interview, REP (Wiesbaden, Hessen), 4/13/06.
\end{itemize}
revisions to the laws governing foreigners and asylum, which followed significant
nativist victories in 1991 (Austria) and 1992 (Germany).

The degree of cooperation at the national level in Austria tended to be a function
of who was in charge of the OeVP at the time and what their motivations were, though
expressing a desire to cooperate with the FPOe carried no tangible penalty. Erhard
Busek, Vice-Chancellor and the OeVP’s leader from 1991 to 1995, was a staunch
opponent of the FPOe and feared what its inclusion in a government could mean for
Austria’s standing in Europe and the international community. In contrast Josef
Hoechtl, a member of the national leadership who knew Haider from in the 1970s as head
of the OeVP’s youth wing, supported a governing coalition. In the late 1990s OeVP
parliamentary club leader Andreas Khol stated that while he did not consider the FPOe an
acceptable governing partner, “that doesn’t have any influence on parliamentary
cooperation.” For Wolfgang Schuessel, who replaced Busek, the strategic calculus had
shifted by 1999: the OeVP could re-enter the Grand Coalition and possibly disappear as a
relevant political force, or it could form a Center-Right coalition with FPOe and be a
clear alternative to the Center-Left.

In Carinthia, Zernatto’s attempt to work with the FPOe three years after the most
shameful public statement in Haider’s career only resulted in a rebuke and a minor revolt,
but no lasting sanctions. In Germany, Center-Right functionaries who openly suggested

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444 "It was never formally decided that we would not work together. But there was always an eye toward
our international standing. At lower levels, the personal ties allowed for cooperation. At the federal level
no.... In 1994 [after the elections], there was no discussion. We were about to enter the EU and it would
have looked terrible [to have an anti-EU part in the government]." Interview, Dr. Erhard Busek (former
federal Chair of the OeVP), 1/9/07.
445 Hoebelt (2003), pg. 28.
446 Profil, 1.7.1997, as cited by Baier-Galanda and Neugebauer (1997), pg. 135.
cooperation with the REP were pulled from their position or removed from the party.

Rudolf Krause, a federal CDU MP from Sachsen-Anhalt, joined the REP in 1993 after he was thrown out of the CDU for suggesting an alliance. As one CDU functionary put it: “If [a CDU functionary] starts to support [the REP’s] positions, we talk about sanctions, with the strongest being expulsion.”

The rejection of collaboration was just as strong in the FDP. In 1992 the FDP’s district head in Bad Cannstatt, a Stuttgart neighborhood and REP stronghold, invited Haider to speak, but the national leadership killed the event and the functionary was expelled from the party; national leader Otto Graf Lambsdorff stated that Haider had no business with the FDP or their campaigns. The Bad Cannstatt invitation reflected a historical conflict between the FDP’s liberal and national wings. This debate took on new life in the 1990s as the FDP entered an electoral trough. The nationalist elements in the FDP hoped to appropriate the FPOe’s appeals not only to survive, but to create a third major party. The pushback from the FDP’s liberals was intense and definitive. Members of the FDP in Berlin, where the nationalists made some of their greatest advances, were unwilling to trade their principles even for political survival. These “principles” were not idiosyncratic. In Germany, functionaries in the post-war period were conditioned to see certain forms of politics as entirely unacceptable; in Austria the liberal elites in the FPOe went along with Haider’s ascension because the only relevant factor was the

448 Bergsdorf (2001), pg. 209.
449 Interview, CDU (Ludwigsburg, Baden-Wuerttemberg), 10/4/05.
451 There had long been disagreements about the FDP’s direction. From 1952-3 the “Naumann Circle” of former National Socialists attempted to capture the Nordrhein-Westfalen FDP. Members of the FDP were among the founders of the NPD; Fascher (1994), pg. 37. Siegfried Zoglmann, a Sudeten German and eventual defector to the CSU and later the REP, left the party in 1970 over its decision to enter into a left-liberal coalition with the SPD and remained committed to a more aggressive foreign policy (including the return of lands beyond East Germany); Neubacher (2001 dissertation), pg. 49.
electoral costs and benefits for the party. The major functionaries in the FDP’s nationalist movement were removed from their posts, and left to form minor parties or retired from politics.

Opportunities for Nativist Functionaries

Just as nativist parties in Germany faced greater obstacles in parliament, the norm against nativist cooperation in Germany meant that functionaries faced much greater disincentives to joining nativist parties out of parliament. These disincentives did not necessarily vary at the level of party life. Functionaries from all four nativist parties interviewed (the BZOe, FPOe, NPD, and REP) described difficulties in the conduct of election campaigns that exceeded what was normal in politics. The most ubiquitous complaint was the destruction of campaign posters and the disruption of rallies or information stands by protesters; small informational posters (Plakate) and personal party/voter interactions are important components of European campaigns. A REP functionary stated that their Plakate would be destroyed the next day; an FPOe functionary said that sometimes it only took an hour. Several functionaries from the FPOe and the REP described disturbances during rallies, mostly thrown objects but occasionally physical altercations. The FPOe felt that their situation improved markedly during their time in government, despite hundreds of thousands marching against the

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453 "Haider was the only successful leader in the party (through his results in Carinthia), so these [party] careerists gravitated to him. I thought Haider was at least smart, a good speaker…populist, but smart enough to be pragmatic"; Interview, former FPOe national MP, 12/1/06.

454 Manfred Brunner, former chair of the Bavarian party organization and Heiner Kappel, Vice-Chair of the FDP faction in the Hessen parliament, left the FDP in the 1990s for the Bund Freier Bürger (League of Free Citizens). Kappel later re-founded the German Party (Deutsche Partei).

455 I observed the 2005 national election from the city of Mannheim. Taking a street car to the University in the center of town, one could see a row of Republikaner Plakate had been erected. The very next day they had been torn to shreds, and were not replaced for the duration of the campaign. Similar events occurred in Mainz during the 2006 state election in Rheinland-Pfalz; Plakate that had been hung on light poles 15 feet off the ground to prevent easy access were destroyed using what looked to be paint-filled balloons.
party early 2000, then deteriorated again when the party returned to the opposition after the FPOe/BZOe split in 2005 (though not to the same extent as the 1990s).456

Rather, the major difference in disincentives was the degree of social pressure placed on functionaries in their personal and professional lives in Germany. Certain disincentives were uniform across parties. Union members who ran for a nativist party faced expulsion, civil servants found they had a harder time getting promoted and some had difficulties finding a new job or suffering from lost business once their candidacy became known. The difference was that in Germany established elites chose to reject the radical nationalism of the previous period through the active defense of the “free democratic order” (freiheitliche demokratische Grundordnung). Article 21 of the German Basic Law banned any party found to threaten these principles by the Federal Constitutional Court, while Austrian law only prohibited overt successor parties to the NSDAP.457 In the 1950s German authorities established an “Office of Constitutional Protection” (Verfassungsschutz) at the national and state levels to observe groups and parties in preparation for sending a motion to ban; Austria first formed a Verfassungsschutz in the late-1990s, after the major upsurge in Extreme Right activity.

Pressure from domestic authorities meant that members of nativist parties in Germany had no future in the civil service, including teachers and police officers, cutting off a major source of functionary recruitment.458 By 1992, all three German nativist

456 In Vienna’s 3rd district in early 2007, some individual put a brick through the window of the FPOe’s district headquarters (where party leader Heinz-Christian Strache got his start); the district head said that this was the third such incident in a year.
457 First enshrined in Article 9 of the 1955 State Treaty.
458 Civil servants tend to become politicians in Germany and Austria because their posts are reserved for them while in office, whereas members of the private sector have a much greater opportunity cost. Additionally, campaigns in Germany and Austria are financed by the party, not the candidate, which allows many more individuals who are not already wealthy to enter politics.
parties were under observation by the Verfassungsschutz, though in 2006 it was decided that observation against the REP was no longer necessary. For NPD functionaries their political activities meant expulsion from the civil service; Guenter Deckert (chair of the NPD in the late-1980s and early-1990s) had been a high school teacher in Mannheim, and one of his deputies stated that he had to leave the military. For the REP, this meant that:

"...almost all civil servants have problems. Most were met with disciplinary actions, though we won all the [court] cases. Eventually the authorities stopped trying. People were suspended, no longer promoted. Civil servants no longer come to us. It's hardest on the lower officials, who would have problems if they couldn't get promoted." 

Herbert Bastl and Bernd Mayer, two REP functionaries in eastern Baden-Wuerttemberg, kept their posts but spent several years in a military court after they were told that their party activities were incompatible with military service. A REP functionary on a city council in Hessen noted that he could no longer get public contracts for his printing business. Most civil servants decided that their party membership was worth less than their livelihood and left the party; whereas the functionary base in 1989 included a large number of police and military, by 1994 it was filled with pensioners, small businessmen and other individuals who could afford the professional costs.

The pressure from above was met by pressure from below. Petersen’s (2001) work on social resistance argues that certain actions become more likely when as the potential for punishment from above declines; an explicit or implicit official sanction

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460 Interview, NPD (Rhein-Neckar, Baden-Wuerttemberg), 10/11/05.
461 Interview, REP (Frankfurt am Romer, Hessen), 3/26/06.
462 *Junge Freiheit*, “Treu zur Verfassung,” 12/7/01.
463 Interview, REP (Hanau, Hessen), 4/18/06.
464 Interview, REP (Aachen, Nordrhein-Westfalen), 5/17/06.
should have a similar effect. With nativist parties in Germany treated as outside the
democratic system, they became the target of behavior that would not be socially
acceptable when used against other political actors. Nativist functionaries described their
difficulty getting advertisements for the party in newspapers, and open members of
nativist youth organizations found that they had trouble at university. At the extreme,
vandalism and violence against nativist functionaries in their everyday lives was a
possibility. One REP functionary in Hessen had his house vandalized with paint-filled
balloons. Another described how in 1998 “my car was set on fire with gasoline… [the
state party chair’s] car was burned by a Molotov cocktail that just missed it. Since then
I’ve been rejected by three or four car insurance agencies as ‘high risk’.” Another
functionary in the REP state party in Hessen, 62 years old, was beaten unconscious by
two men that allegedly referred to his political activities during the attack. Asked in
my semi-structured interviews whether they or their colleagues had had personal or
professional difficulties as a result of their party membership, 33% of the FPOe asked the
question said yes (N=18), compared to 77% of the REP (N=11).

Like the unwillingness to cooperate with nativist parties in parliament, the
personal pressure placed on nativist functionaries in Germany was generated by a social
consensus that nativist parties were “beyond the pale”; such actions were either legally
mandated or considered beyond the reproach of legal authorities. The unwillingness to
cooperate with nativist parties created the perception that they were ineffective as a

465 “We get a rejection from somewhere up the chain when they find out it’s from us. They would give us
no grounds so we can’t take them to court”; interview, REP (Offenbach, Hessen), 5/10/06.
466 Interview with the Junge Nationaldemokraten (Young National Democrats, the NPD’s youth
organization) (Rhein-Neckar, Baden-Wuerttemberg), 5/18/06.
467 Interview, REP (Hanau, Hessen), 4/18/06.
468 Interview, REP (Gross-Gerau, Hessen), 5/26/06.
469 Junge Freiheit, “’Jetzt erst recht!’,” 12/20/02.
signaling mechanism, which facilitated their abandonment by voters when migration faded as an issue. At the same time, social pressure made it more attractive for functionaries who thinking about a nativist party to stay out of politics or look to other parties where they could still succeed. This ultimately reduced the overall quality of nativist functionaries and reinforced the perception that they were political “nobodies.”


One could argue that the Center-Right in Germany only excluded the REP because they were too small to be a useful ally, whereas the FPOe was too successful to ignore. In this world, opponent strategies and nativist party persistence are driven by party organization. But Radical Right parties in Western Europe are nothing new, and this section argues that party organization in the 1980s was driven in part by opponent strategies in earlier periods. Opponent strategies therefore have a direct effect on party persistence, by signaling a party’s efficacy, as well as an indirect effect by minimizing the opportunity for nativist functionaries to maintain stable organizations. In Austria and Germany, party organization and opponent strategies were both legacies of courses of action chosen by domestic elites in the early post-war period.

Though the overt racism and authoritarianism of National Socialism was ideologically delegitimized by the war and outlawed by Allied authorities, in the early post-war period there was an interest in both countries in some continuation of an alternative, German-nationalist appeal. In Austria, this resulted in the formation of the Federation of Independents (VdU) in 1949, which sought to represent the 500,000 Austrians (15-20% of the voting population) temporarily disenfranchised during de-Nazification, but also those in society favoring economic and social liberalism and
opposed to Socialism, Clericalism and *Proporz*.\(^{470}\) The disintegration of the VdU in 1955 over a leadership struggle led to its re-founding as the FPOe the next year. While the VdU drew 12% of the electorate in 1949, by the mid-1960s the FPOe was at the cusp of the electoral threshold and in dire financial straits.

In Germany two noteworthy parties formed in the early period, the Social Empire Party (SRP) and the German Empire Party (DRP). While neither secured national representation, the SRP entered parliament in the two elections it contested (Lower Saxony and Bremen, in 1951), and the DRP entered parliament in Lower Saxony in 1951 and 1955 and gained one seat in Rheinland-Pfalz in 1959. Both parties received votes primarily from the Protestant northwest, an NSDAP stronghold before the war, but also found support among the *Vertriebene*, former prisoners of war and individuals affected by de-Nazification.\(^{471}\) The DRP would go on to provide the main reservoir of functionaries for the NPD upon its formation in 1964. Between 1966 and 1968, the NPD entered seven state parliaments and looked likely to cross the 5% threshold and enter the national parliament in the 1969 election. Unlike the SRP or DRP, the NPD did well throughout West Germany, especially among farmers, blue-collar workers and the self-employed.\(^{472}\) The NPD’s voters were disaffected with the Grand Coalition, nervous about student unrest on the Left and angry about the Government’s failure to provide agricultural debt relief.\(^{473}\)

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\(^{470}\) Jelavich (1987), pg. 253.

\(^{471}\) Stoess (2005), pg. 119.

\(^{472}\) Stoess (2005), pg. 120; Fascher (1994), pg. 66.

As Table 5.3 indicates, there were ten elections from 1945 through 1970 where Center-Right elites in Austria could have used the Radical Right to secure a more optimal outcome for themselves, and two in Germany (both in Lower Saxony). As in the 1980s and 1990s, elites cooperated with the Radical Right in Austria but not Germany. The early history of the relationship with the VdU is a classic example of parties motivated primarily by their electoral interests. The SPOe supported the formation of the VdU in 1949, with the expectation that it would split the conservative vote.\(^{474}\) Once the VdU formed, it was the OeVP who spoke with the VdU over the SPOe's opposition; after the 1953 election the OeVP attempted to bring the VdU into the Grand Coalition to weaken the SPOe, but they were overruled by the Austrian President (formerly of the SPOe) and the Allied Council.\(^{475}\)

### Table 5.3: Nativist Coalition Opportunities, 1948-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observation</th>
<th>Government Outcome</th>
<th>Evidence of Cooperation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Austria</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (1949)</td>
<td>OeVP-SPOe</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carinthia (1949)</td>
<td>SPOe</td>
<td>Aborted(^{476})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Styria (1953)</td>
<td>OeVP</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (1953)</td>
<td>OeVP-SPOe</td>
<td>Aborted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (1956)</td>
<td>OeVP-SPOe</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (1959)</td>
<td>OeVP-SPOe</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (1962)</td>
<td>OeVP-SPOe</td>
<td>Yes (Explicit, SPOe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Austria (1967)</td>
<td>OeVP</td>
<td>Likely (Tacit)(^{477})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salzburg (1969)</td>
<td>OeVP</td>
<td>Likely (Tacit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (1970)</td>
<td>SPOe (Minority)</td>
<td>Yes (Explicit, SPOe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Saxony (1951)</td>
<td>SPD-GB/BHE-Zentrum</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Saxony (1967)</td>
<td>SPD-CDU</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{474}\) Bailer-Galanda and Neugebauer (1997).


\(^{477}\) Likely in that an OeVP outcome was impossible without the support of the FPOe, based on the distribution of seats.
Even more persuasive is the FPOe’s relationship with the SPOe during this period. By the mid-1960s, the OeVP had led the federal government since the founding of the Second Republic. The SPOe saw the FPOe as a potential coalition partner or a vehicle to weaken the OeVP by creating a viable conservative alternative.\textsuperscript{478} Cooperation between the two parties seemed highly implausible. The leader of the FPOe, Friedrich Peter, was a former Waffen-SS officer. Bruno Kreisky, head of the SPOe from 1967, was Jewish and spent the war in exile in Sweden while Franz Olah, head of the Federation of Trade Unions (OeGB) in the early-1960s, was confined to the Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps. Both men nonetheless attempted to coordinate with the FPOe. During the 1962 election Olah secretly “donated” one million Austrian Schillings to the FPOe’s campaign using OeGB funds, which kept the cash-strapped party solvent and possibly ensured their survival as a national force.\textsuperscript{479} Functionaries in the SPOe heavily protested the action, and Olah was eventually expelled from the party and placed on trial for abuse of funds.

The second attempt at cooperation was more successful. In return for supporting his minority Government after the 1970 election, Chancellor Kreisky increased the number of seats in the legislature and reformed the electoral system to strengthen the representation of small parties…which only the FPOe stood to benefit from. Kreisky preferred to form a coalition with the FPOe in 1970, but the party publicly maintained it would remain in opposition before the election.\textsuperscript{480} Kreisky paved the way for a potential coalition throughout the 1970s by minimizing his attacks on the FPOe, though the

\textsuperscript{478} Pelinka, pg. 53 in Scharsach (ed) (2000).
\textsuperscript{479} While he was Minister of the Interior in the 1960s, Olah openly called for a coalition with the FPOe; interview, Kurt Piringer (former FPOe member and party historian), 6/11/2007.
\textsuperscript{480} Jelavich (1987), pg. 302.
SPOe’s absolute majorities from 1971 to 1983 made negotiations unnecessary. Indeed, when famed Austrian Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal revealed in 1975 that Peter’s SS unit had been implicated in widespread atrocities on the Eastern Front, threatening a potential SPOe-FPOe coalition, Kreisky defended the FPOe chair and attacked Wiesenthal for his “mafia methods.”

In Germany the established parties signaled that any party of the Right perceived as threatening Germany’s liberal-democratic system would be excluded from political life. The decision to ignore the SRP in 1951 was not difficult; they were an avowed successor to the NSDAP and their slogans, which netted them 16 seats in Lower Saxony and 8 in Bremen, included “True to the Empire (Reich)” and a call for solving the “Jewish Question.” The party was banned in 1952. The DRP, while never banned, was also too small to be seen as a relevant coalition partner.

The NPD was different. Their anti-Communist, socially conservative appeals enjoyed strong support in the late-1960s. But in the four years (1966-1969) where the NPD looked like a relevant political force, established actors on the Center-Right and Center-Left reacted with nothing but hostility. Hans Filbinger, head of the Baden-Wuerttemberg CDU, stated that no democratic party could work with the NPD, and Chancellor Hans-Georg Kiesinger (CDU) refused cooperation in the run-up to the 1969 election. The only concession the CDU made to the NPD was to incorporate its harsh

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481 Barker (1973), pg. 263.
482 Article 31 of the German Basic Law permits the Federal Constitutional Court to ban parties or groups opposed to the “fundamental democratic consensus.”
483 Fascher (1994), pg. 104.
criticism of the SPD’s foreign policy. Both major parties spoke of banning the NPD, as they would with the REP and DVU in the 1990s, though no case was brought against them until 2001. Along with the pronouncements of non-cooperation by the established parties, the threat of a ban was used to signal that the NPD’s voters were supporting an ultimately ineffective party. Support for the NPD collapsed shortly after the 1969 election, but some of their demands (the end of the Grand Coalition; a more anti-Communist foreign policy on the part of the CDU) had been met.

The FPOe survived into the 1980s and ultimately benefited from the weakening of the Proporz system and emergence of immigration as a crucial issue because established political actors chose not to attack them at a vulnerable moment in the 1960. Established parties, particularly the SPOe, allowed the FPOe to survive because the early post-war consensus dictated that it was legitimate political actor and a useful strategic partner, despite the background of its functionaries. In contrast, the NPD failed to survive because established actors chose to attack them even though they were on the rise. The early post-war consensus in Germany dictated that the established parties consistently attack Radical Right organizations as they appeared. Consequently, there was no organization capable of producing professional nativist functionaries when immigration became a salient issue, which ultimately constrained their ability to grow. Moreover, opponent strategies in Germany signaled to opportunistic elites inside the established parties, like the FDP, that switching to a nativist strategy would result in significant political (and personal) costs.

485 Jaschke (1990), pg. 17.
487 Cheles et al. (1994), pg. 295.
Conclusion: Looking Beyond Germany and Austria

This chapter explained variation in the growth and persistence of nativist parties in Austria and Germany in the late-1980s and early-1990s, despite similar levels of net migration. Nativist parties grew depending on the interaction of three prominent issues during this period, including migration but also two tied to decisions made in the early post war years. While Austrian nativists were able to attack a failing patronage system, German nativists had no system to rail against and were further hampered by public concerns over German reunification, which supplanted migration as a salient issue at a critical moment. In addition, nativist parties were constrained or facilitated in their growth by the degree of organization prior to the critical moment. Parties with a strong activist base (the REP) or with a strong source of funding (the DVU) were capable of besting fully organized parties in elections where conditions were favorable, while parties without either (the NPD) were hampered by their lack of organization. Table 5.4 displays the variation in the factors conducive to growth, as well as the outcome for each party.

In terms of party persistence, two factors played a role in the ability of some nativist parties to retain voters once their popular themes receded. First, the competence of a party’s functionaries, established through routinized channels of recruitment and promotion, heavily influenced nativist fortunes. Haider's abandonment of institutionalized recruitment and promotion contributed to the FPOe’s major setbacks during his tenure, and the reliance on past experience for identifying functionaries for higher office contributed to the greater persistence of the REP in Baden-Wuerttemberg when compared to the DVU in Schleswig-Holstein. Second, the FPOe could count on other parties in the system as tactical allies when pursuing their goals and were able to
develop a reputation as an effective alternative to Austria’s major parties. In contrast, the REP were shunned by all other political actors, unable to pass legislation or acquire executive power, and acquired a reputation as parties useful only as a signaling mechanism when specific issues were salient. This variation in perceived efficacy explains the FPOe’s ability to persist in Austria (despite their setbacks) and the REP’s failure after two terms in parliament in Baden-Württemberg; the REP were riding the wave of opposition to immigration and when that wave subsided, the party’s momentum was irrevocably stalled.

If the explanation in this chapter so deeply rooted in particular events in German and Austrian history, how applicable can it be to a broader explanation of nativist party behavior? While the factors here were directly or indirectly the result of a specific set of decisions at a specific point in time, I have tried to emphasize that these processes can be thought of in terms of explanatory variables. The degree of party organization or the degree of dissatisfaction with patronage or corruption might be the result of very different processes in Austria, Finland or Spain, but it should be possible to measure the presence and degree of each in all three cases and make claims about their causal effect.

Consider two well-known examples of Radical Right growth in the early-1990s. First, in 1992 Judge Antonio Di Pietro began the Mani pulite (clean hands) investigations into domestic political corruption in Italy. Throughout 1992 and 1993 prominent industrialists and political figures from the major parties were indicted, notably former Prime Minister and Socialist party leader Bettino Craxi. With the constant stream of new allegations and revelations, disaffection with corruption was so widespread that the three largest parties in Italy collapsed as they were abandoned over their complicity in the
system. The Radical Right, including the new regionalist, nativist Northern League (LN) and the 45 year-old “post-fascist” Italian Social Movement (MSI), were largely untouched by the investigations due to their historic exclusion from political power. These parties gained a new legitimacy and new supporters from the old parties. In elections in 1992 and 1994, the LN and the MSI (rebranded the National Alliance or AN) increased their collective share of the vote from 6.4% in 1987 to 13.2% in 1992 and finally 21.9% in 1994. As in Austria, the increased salience of patronage and corruption in Italy significantly benefitted parties that could credibly take an anti-corruption stance.

Second, six months before the 1991 Swedish national election two wealthy entrepreneurs (Bert Karlsson, the prominent owner of a major theme park, and Count Ian Wachtmeister) formed the party New Democracy from scratch. The founders believed that their appeals, grounded in neo-liberalism and nativism, captured the Scandinavian zeitgeist considering recent success by similar parties in Norway and Denmark. New Democracy received 6.7% of the national vote in election, putting it on par with the Christian Democrats and the Socialists. But the party’s greatest advantage, its wealthy founders, ended up the root of its downfall; Karlsson and Wachtmeister had a falling out and the party collapsed without them in the 1994 election. The immediate parallel is the DVU; a party with no organized base but tremendous resources captured the public mood and then failed due to deficiencies in internal party organization. In sum, while the differences in nativist success in Germany and Austria had deep roots in a particular time period and set of circumstances, the processes identified using these cases can be transported across countries and across time.

Chapter 5 Figures and Charts

Figure 5.1: Cross-National Nativist Party Growth
(Maximum Growth, 1987-1995 vs. 1986)

Source: Author calculations.

Figure 5.2: The Salience of Reunification & Immigration, Germany 1989-93

Source: Politbarometer (continuous reporting).
Chapter 6 – “You were Welcome Before You Came”: The Effect of Immigration on Nativist Party Support

In the last two chapters I constructed a narrative to explain the effect of changes in migration and changes in the salience of immigration on support for nativist parties in Germany and Austria. In Chapter 4 I argued that a rapid increase in net migration led to a large, rapid increase in the salience of immigration and consequently significant increases in support for nativist parties in both countries. In Chapter 5 I argued that the failure of German nativist parties to benefit from changing immigration rates to the same degree as their Austrian counterparts was due to variation in social priorities, party organization and the strategies of non-nativist parties; all three factors benefitted the FPOe and infirmed nativist parties in Germany.

This chapter broadens my inquiry into migration’s effect on nativist party support through a quantitative analysis that systematically expands the breadth and depth of the data presented in Chapter 6 to answer the following question: What is the effect of changes in native/immigrant heterogeneity on nativist party support in West European elections? I argue that nativist parties in contemporary Western Europe grow in part due to changes in immigration rates, which drive some subset of voters both opposed to and concerned with immigration to support parties offering to address what they perceived to be a salient threat.

Debates about the relative impact of migration on the fortunes of the Radical Right, of which nativist parties are a crucial subset (Mudde 2007), remain an open question. Much of this literature emphasizes the role of factors endogenous to the political system, such as party competition (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Meguid 2005),
institutions and other opportunity structures (Carter 2005; Givens 2005; Norris 2005), or attitudes (van der Brug et. al 2005; Carter and Arzheimer 2006). Exogenous explanations tend to focus on economic dynamics like unemployment (Jackman and Volpert 1996), globalization (Swank and Betz 2003) or the emergence of post-industrial economies (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). With a few notable exceptions, studies claim that migration processes play no role in Radical Right growth, or that immigration debates are a manifestation of underlying economic uncertainty or social frustration. In contrast, I argue that even the studies that do recognize the role of immigration (Gibson 2002; Golder 2003) tend to misspecify the crucial causal relationship, emphasizing pre-existing heterogeneity rather than how that heterogeneity changes over time.

The chapter proceeds in five sections. The first offers two hypotheses about the relationship between changes in immigration and changes in nativist party support. The second section provides coding criteria for identifying nativist parties, generalized from Chapter 2 to reflect the reduced information available when conducting a cross-national, cross-time analysis. The section also argues that by focusing on levels in nativist party support, rather than changes, past studies have specified the dependent variable in a way that misses important aspects of party competition. Section three argues that there has been a disconnect between concept and measurement when trying to capture immigration as an explanatory variable, and offers an advancement over past measurements by accounting for 1) naturalization and 2) region of origin. The net effect is to more closely measure the type of immigration that nativist parties mobilize against: “non-Western” immigrants perceived by some in the host society as materially or culturally threatening.
The final two sections represent the analysis. The first is a cross-national analysis of approximately 150 national elections in 16 West European countries between 1974 and 2006. I find that changes in the size of the immigrant population, rather than their prior level, have a significant effect on nativist party growth. The second analytical section extends the identified cross-national relationships to the sub-national level by conducting a state-level analysis of national elections in Germany and Austria between 1980 and 2000, as well as a local-level analysis of those elections in two states in each country. The six sub-national datasets are wholly original, collected from local universities, libraries and state agencies in Germany and Austria between 2005 and 2007.490

Hypotheses

I offer a general model of new or small party growth (so-called “niche” parties; Meguid 2005) rooted in Black swan theory (Taleb 2007) and the American politics literature on discontinuous electoral change (Key 1955; Schattschneider 1960; Burnham 1970; Sundquist 1973). In my model unexpected changes to some structural dynamic in society unsettles an individual’s expectations about some aspect of their environment, resulting in an increase in the salience of a related dimension of political contestation. The structural changes that lead to this increase will be those that are 1) relatively large, 2) relatively unanticipated and 3) perceived as threatening, meaning they hold the promise of some negative material, physical or symbolic impact on the individual. Classic examples this type of change include a defeat in war or significant economic downturn, but might also include a major terror attack, change in oil prices, outbreak of ethnic violence or environmental catastrophe. The increase in salience generated by

490 See the Appendix for the sources used in constructing these datasets.
these events, which I term "Shocks," is sufficient to induce some individuals to switch
their vote in a subsequent election, increasing the support for a niche party in the
aggregate 1) when the dimension they emphasize becomes salient and 2) when the niche
party is an "issue owner" on the relevant dimension, that is public opinion establishes
beforehand that they are seen as the party most competent to deal with the emerging
issue.\textsuperscript{491}

In the case of nativist parties in Western Europe, I contend that the structural
process which generated a Shock was a rapid change in native/immigrant heterogeneity
in the late-1980s and early-1990s, leading to an observable increase in the salience of the
native/immigrant dynamic and an increase in support for parties that promised to
champion of native interests. While the direct causal relationship in this story is between
issue salience and party support, there is not enough systematic data (cross-sectional or
cross-time) to build a dataset specifying salience as the explanatory variable.\textsuperscript{492}

Therefore, I analyze the relationship between nativist party support and changes in the
size of the immigrant population. Events and salience are not perfectly correlated and the
prediction is therefore probabilistic; not every change in immigration will lead to the
equivalent change in the salience of immigration, for example because other events are
competing for an individual's attention. Any model using events as the explanatory
variable will therefore explain less than a model specifying issue salience, though such a
model can still identify a statistically significant relationship. Furthermore, only one

\textsuperscript{491} Petrocik (1996); Meguid (2005). One can conceive of multiple issue owners on a single dimension; for
example a religious dimension where one party is the owner of the Catholic position and another the owner
of the Protestant position.

\textsuperscript{492} Moreover, public opinion can be left-censored; unless open-ended, surveys only tend to ask about
native/immigrant issues once they have become salient.
be that the salience of the native/immigrant dynamic is a function of migration, but also
inter-ethnic violence and hotly contested legislative debates, though only the first
processes is being systematically documented. By necessarily restricting the set of
processes that could trigger a Shock due to data constraints, the correlation between
events and salience is further reduced.

Keeping data constraints in mind, in this chapter I systematically test two
hypotheses. The first is a re-statement of the theoretical argument regarding the effect of
migration on nativist party support:

**Hypothesis 1 (The Changes Hypothesis):** *Increases in native/immigrant
heterogeneity lead to increases in nativist party support.*

The explanatory variable is measured as the change between elections in the size of a
country’s immigration population, as a percentage of the total population; for example, a
change in the immigrant population from 1% of the total population to 5% in one election
results in a value of “4.”

While the first hypothesis considers the effect of changing distributions of natives
and immigrants on changes in nativist party support, I present a secondary hypothesis
which tests whether changes in support are contingent on the size of the immigrant
population. Unlike Hypothesis 1, there are theoretical mechanisms suggesting the effect
could run in either direction. In times of uncertainty individuals might be more prone to
reject ethnic groups they have no prior experience with (a “xenophobia” mechanism).

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493 Net immigration is used rather than gross immigration, as net immigration is a better indicator of
immigration’s actual impact. A situation where 400,000 immigrate and 800,000 emigrate has far different
effects than a system where 400,000 immigrate and none emigrate, if immigrants are perceived as
essentially interchangeable.

On the other hand, high native/immigrant heterogeneity increases the frequency of cursory contact, such as interactions in a market or neighborhood, without necessarily increasing the sorts of contact (friendship, marriage) thought to facilitate inter-ethnic understanding. High heterogeneity could therefore generate economic and social friction (a “fertile ground” mechanism):

**Hypothesis 2 (The Levels Hypothesis):** Increases in nativist party support are greater when native/immigrant heterogeneity is high or low.

In sum, natives are hypothesized to make two evaluations about the native/immigrant dynamic when determining its importance in their voting decisions; one regarding the native/immigrant distribution, and one regarding the perceived change in that distribution.

**Measuring Changes in Nativist Support**

The next two sections aim to generate consistent, valid coding rules and justifiable operationalizations of the key concepts I have presented. This section considers the dependent variable, which I operationalize as the change in vote share for all parties making nativist appeals since the last election, whether or not they were nativist parties in the last election.

Operationalizing the dependent variable as changes in support for nativist parties, rather than all Radical Right parties, rests on a fundamental lack of agreement about which parties make up the Radical Right, or whether the growth of every party in the hypothesized party family is driven by the same causal process (Mudde 2007).

Following recent scholarship (Golder 2003; Carter 2005), I focus the analysis on my

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495 Allport (1954).
analytically coherent sub-category of the Radical Right: nativist parties. Nativist parties make appeals that are central to their mobilizing strategy which explicitly promise to champion the interests of “natives” as an ethnic group. This creates four relevant conceptual categories: 1) nativist parties, 2) non-nativist Radical Right parties, 3) non-Radical Right nativist parties and 4) non-nativist, non-Radical Right parties. Nativist parties include the anti-immigrant Radical Right, but exclude authoritarian or neo-fascist parties making no reference to immigration. For cultural and historical reasons, the third category is an empty set in Western Europe, though a Leftist nativist party is theoretically possible.

I code a party as nativist in a particular election if their campaign or platform was described as “heavily” (centrally) focused on “anti-immigrant” or “xenophobic” appeals (explicit). I coded parties in three rounds. First, I consulted party descriptions in the annual Political Handbook of the World (PHW) since 1973. As a yearly volume, the PHW avoids retrospective bias by identifying contemporary programmatic changes. Second, I referred borderline cases to the excellent historical country surveys in Hainsworth (1992, 2000). Again, the inquiry was to determine if and when the native/immigrant dynamic became central to a party’s campaigns or program. Finally, for exceptionally small parties I consulted the “Elections Wiki” section of wikipedia.org. Though the source quality drops in this round, the parties captured generally received less than 0.5% of the vote. Any measurement error will be small,

496 Nativist parties are therefore a subset of ethnic parties; Chandra (2004).
497 For example, an indigenous movement in South America could mobilize against moneyed interests by arguing that as the descendents of immigrants, their control over the State’s resources are illegitimate. Historically parties of the Left in Western Europe have attempted to minimize ethnic differences in their political appeals.
compared to the benefit of efficiently surveying a number of parties across multiple elections.\footnote{A country-by-country list of nativist parties can be found in the Appendix.}

Specifying the dependent variable as changes in support, whether or not they were nativist in the last election, has two advantages over the established strategy, which measures the level of support for all declared nativist parties at each election. First, this method is sensitive to changes in a party’s message or ideology, whereas most studies code parties as having one fixed ideology. Unlike Christian-democrats or social-democrats, a number of parties in Western Europe have adopted or shed radical and nativist appeals. For example, the Austrian Freedom Party (FPOe) presented itself as a Liberal party under the leadership of Friedrich Peter and Norbert Steger from the mid-1960s until the mid-1990s, an anti-statist, non-nativist Radical Right party under Joerg Haider from 1986 to 1989 and an anti-immigrant, nativist party under Haider from 1990. After being rehabilitated by the Center-Right in the early 1990s as a potential coalition partner, the leaders of the Italian Social Movement (MSI; later the National Alliance, or AN) saw an opportunity to broaden their support base. In 1995 the party severed ties with their neo-Fascist roots (a non-nativist Radical Right strategy) in favor of a more traditional conservative profile focusing on crime or family values (a non-Radical Right strategy).

Furthermore, measuring levels of nativist party support conflates changes in support with changes in strategy. For example, a stagnating Liberal party (15% of the vote) adopts nativism between elections in an attempt to attract new supporters. In the next election, their support declines to 10%. Depending on the measurement used, the
change looks like a stunning success or a relative failure. In a dataset only interested in declared nativist parties at each election, nativist support grew from 0% to 10%. Using a measure sensitive to parties entering and exiting the dataset, however, all else being equal the new nativist party was unsuccessful.

Second, party growth and party size are not equivalent concepts, especially for parties drawing on multiple, unrelated appeals over the course of their existence. In the case of nativist parties, some began with a significant established vote base, generated through campaigns unrelated to nativism, while others were nativist parties constructed from scratch. The Swiss People’s Party consistently recorded vote shares of 11-12%, mainly attracting conservatives in rural areas, before adopting nativist appeals, while Sweden’s New Democracy was six months old at their point of takeoff. It is not a puzzle that the People’s Party’s was larger than New Democracy. It is puzzling that New Democracy experienced significant growth in 1991 (+6.7%) while the People’s Party was essentially stagnant (+0.9%).

My coding strategy for the dependent variable has its deficiencies. A lack of detailed information on party programs and appeals makes it impossible to make finer distinctions than nativist and non-nativist. A nativist coding only captures parties that make the immigration central and explicit in their appeals, but not every party that takes a position on immigration is a nativist party. If non-nativist parties of the Center-Right (such as the French UPM or the British Conservatives) win voters by making coded appeals designed to capture nativist voters (“immigration reform”), my strategy does not capture their growth. Moreover, this method is better at capturing large changes in
strategy than multiple switches; party reputations might prove sticky even for sources considering only contemporary programs or appeals.

**Conceptualizing and Measuring Immigration**

My main explanatory variable is the change in the size of immigrant population between elections. When measuring immigration, past studies of the Radical Right have employed one of two measurement strategies. In this section I argue that both are flawed and a more conceptually valid alternative measurement exists.

The first strategy measures the number of asylum seekers entering the country. While this captures a group targeted by nativist parties in their electoral appeals, nativists also run campaigns against East European labor and the social and cultural concerns about Islam. Furthermore, while the number of asylum seekers varies widely across time, even at its peak in the early 1990s they never represented a majority of the immigrant flow to Western Europe. Far more important, at least numerically, were processes such as family reunification.

The second strategy measures the size of the foreign population, which captures a country's non-naturalized resident immigrants. While the foreign population captures changes in the entire migrant population, it suffers from two conceptual deficiencies. First, focusing on levels of heterogeneity rather than changes runs into similar conceptual difficulties as the dependent variable. Scholars tend to treat all immigrant populations as the same, but these populations can be generated through very different processes. Some migrant populations accrue through slow, controlled colonial migration (the Netherlands,

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500 Swank and Betz (2003); van der Brug et al. (2005); Carter and Arzheimer (2006).
501 Asylum-seeking was 40% of all flows in 1992 and 30% by 2000; OECD (2002).
502 Knigge (1998); Golder (2003); Gibson (2004).
the UK) or solicited guest worker programs (Germany). Other migrant populations are generated by rapid, significant increases in unsolicited refugees (Austria, Norway, or Denmark). If the level of heterogeneity is the key variable, then countries in the first case should be at risk of nativist growth as inter-ethnic tensions boil over, similar to the argument made by Allport (1954). In contrast, if changes in heterogeneity are the key process, then countries in the second case should be at greater risk regardless of their preexisting heterogeneity, similar to the argument made by Olzak (1992). Studies of the Radical Right consistently conflate these very different concepts.

Second, the foreign population as a measure suffers from "false negatives" and "false positives." Positives and negatives refer to the ability of a measurement to accurately capture how individuals identify one another, in this case as natives or immigrants. The problem of false positives reflects the disconnect between concepts of citizenship and "nativeness." Specifically, being or becoming a citizen is frequently insufficient to erase a legacy of immigration, which skin tone, language, mode of dress or custom can all quickly betray. Nativist parties are quick to point out that naturalization does not make an immigrant "native" and indeed frequently oppose relaxing naturalization restrictions on the ground that citizenship grants access to political and social benefits which can only be earned through ethnic belonging. Measures of the foreign population therefore consistently underestimate heterogeneity and changes in heterogeneity by counting naturalized immigrants as natives. For example, the foreign population in France decreased from 6.3% in 1990 to 5.6% in 1999, despite 900,000 new immigrants (OECD 2002). In the French case, the relatively high rate of naturalization

\[ \text{503 The correlation between the size of the foreign population and changes in the foreign population in the cross-national dataset, described below, is only a moderate .53.} \]
masked an increasing immigrant population. In France or the United Kingdom, measuring the foreign population can also miss immigration where a colonial subject begins as a citizen despite being readily identifiable as an immigrant.

Moreover, rates of naturalization vary across countries and across time, making it impossible to factor in the discrepancy based on data from one year or country. Countries with relatively relaxed naturalization laws or legacies of colonial migration have far more naturalized citizens relative to their foreign population than countries where large-scale migration is a new phenomenon. This disparity becomes larger over time as more immigrants naturalize. For example, the ratio of foreign to foreign-born went from .76 to .6 in Norway between 1990 and 2000; roughly 15% of the Norwegian immigrant population disappeared from the sample in one decade.

Figure 6.1: Ratio, Foreign to Foreign-Born Population

False negatives are created by a similar disconnect between measurement and reality: for some individuals, such as an Austrian in Germany, the probability of passing for native is so high that regardless of their legal status other natives will tend to perceive them as a native based on cursory ascriptive cues. This distinction is quite important, as nativists consider some immigrants distinctly more “threatening” than others. Both my and Gibson’s (2002) surveys of anti-immigrant elites found that “Western” immigrants were thought of as economically and socially unproblematic. *Western* refers to immigrants from countries with 1) similar socio-economic characteristics and 2) some minimal shared culture, here including Western Europe (as defined below) and the former British settler colonies. Western migrants pose none of material or symbolic threats nativist parties associate with immigrants. Parallel standards of living suggest that
citizens of other Western countries have no incentive to migrate in large numbers and compete with natives by accepting lower wages. At the same time, shared traditions and norms suggest that the social and cultural disruptions natives associate with immigrants (such as increased crime or religious conflicts) are minimized.

If distributions in the country of origin were equivalent across Western Europe, false negatives would not be an issue, but these distributions vary significantly between countries and across time. The OECD's Database on Immigrants and Expatriates (2006), which disaggregates immigrants and natives based on country of origin for the latest census round, captures the variation in the relative size of the non-Western immigrant population:

Figure 6.2: Non-Western Immigrants as Portion of Foreign-Born

There is a large disparity between Austria or the Netherlands, where 80% of the immigrant population is non-Western, and Ireland, where that population is closer to 20%. This occurs because different legacies of immigration alter the composition of immigrant populations. In France, where migration was largely colonial, or Austria, where migrants were mainly guest-workers and refugees from Yugoslavia, the resultant immigrant populations have been predominantly non-Western. In contrast, immigrants to Ireland have been predominantly American or British, as that economy grew in the late-1990s. In short, though the Netherlands and Ireland both had a foreign-born population of 10% at their last census, the perceived threat generated by those immigrant populations should be significantly different.

The Western/non-Western ratio also changes over time. Since the 1970s the percentage of non-Western immigrants has risen sharply with the collapse of the Soviet
Union and a general increase in South to North asylum seeking. Concurrently, Western guest workers returned in large numbers as their host economies contracted and their home economies expanded, a less attractive option for guest workers from politically or economically unstable countries like Turkey. A country's 5% immigrant population in 1970 looked much different than its 10% immigrant population in 2000. For example, the percentage of non-Western immigrants as a share of all immigrants in Denmark increased from 37.5% in 1980 to 73% in 1995. These shifts from Western to non-Western also varied across countries; the composition of immigrant populations in the United Kingdom or France, with long post-war histories of non-Western immigration, changed much more gradually than Austria or Denmark, where non-Western migration was far more recent and rapid.

Admittedly, the Western/non-Western distinction ignores mixed cases: is it more threatening to be perceived as materially or symbolically disruptive? What of culturally similar cases that converged with the economic core of Western Europe over time, such as Italy, Portugal, or Ireland? What of Eastern Europe or South America, with shared traditions but significant economic disparities? As a coarse rule, I code immigrant flows as non-Western, or threatening, using an "or" operator. An immigrant is perceived as threatening if they come from a different culture, meaning any country that is not geographically Europe or not settled predominantly by Europeans (such as the United States). Or an immigrant is perceived as threatening if there is a significant disparity in real GDP per capita, operationalized as 50% of the receiving country's real GDP in 1973. A 50% distinction includes countries such as Italy or Spain, which were not substantially

504 Messina (2007).
poorer Germany or Belgium even in the 1970s, while excluding countries like Japan (economically similar but culturally distant) or Argentina (culturally similar but economically distant).\textsuperscript{505} The threatening/non-threatening distinction is dichotomous due to information constraints. For a host of factors some inflows might be perceived as more threatening than others, but weighting the level of threat posed by each group in each country for each election is beyond the capacity of this project.

Despite failing to capture illegal migration, a measurement capturing only individuals who are non-Western foreign-born is a significant conceptual advance in its sensitivity to variation across time and countries and because it minimizes false negatives and false positives, thereby capturing only those immigrants that nativist parties mobilize against.\textsuperscript{506} This measurement was constructed in two steps. First, I measure the foreign-born population, capturing all 1\textsuperscript{st} generation immigrants and consequently eliminating false positives.\textsuperscript{507} For some countries, sufficient reporting was available to provide yearly data or data at 5 to 10 year intervals, with interpolation possible.\textsuperscript{508} For the remaining countries, the data comes from the UN Population Division's \textit{World Migrant}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{505} An exception is made in the case of Spain, which received substantial political migration from Argentina and Chile in the 1970s and 1980s, when those countries were economically more advanced. Immigrants to Spain from these countries were coded as “non-threatening.”

\textsuperscript{506} No 35-year, cross-national measurement of illegal immigration exists. Moreover, there is no obvious way to impute illegal immigration; it affects the eastern borders of Western Europe as well as the South and unlike the United States, the country of entry is not always the final destination. To the extent that illegal immigration almost certainly increased as large-scale economic migration was ended in the 1970s and asylum restricted in the 1990s, any migration measure becomes increasingly inaccurate over time.

\textsuperscript{507} While the foreign-born population fails to capture second or even third generation immigrants who might register as “positives” to the Subject, the data on such individuals is exceptionally poor across countries.

\textsuperscript{508} Country-by-country procedures are available in the Appendix.
\end{footnotesize}
Stock reporting series, which measures the foreign-born population (in percent) at five-year intervals based on their review of national sources.509

As the UN does not measure immigrant populations by country, the Western/non-Western distinction was based on OECD sources on the origin of the foreign population and imputed to the foreign-born population. The OECD collects this data at 5 to 10 year intervals and a constant rate of change was assumed within periods. Where only one anchor point was available, with no data before 1980 the most common issue, changes were estimated using a function generated by observed migration patterns in countries where data was available.510 In most cases the potential for error is minimal; a difference of .1% or .2% is a minor distinction considering the empirical range of the explanatory variable. Of course, there might be a systematic bias. Many non-Western immigrants have significantly less attractive exit options than their Western counterparts and should have a greater incentive to secure their situation, or even physical safety, through naturalization, and consequently the non-Western foreign-born population should be larger than its share of the foreign population. As non-Western migration and changes in support for nativist parties are both higher in later periods, any bias on the effect of immigration on nativist support will be downward.

Figure 6.3: Competing Concepts for Measuring Immigration

Scope and Data

509 The UN figures usually capture the foreign-born (and not foreign) population. Where possible OECD or national sources were consulted to ensure that the available foreign-born data matched the UN figures. 510 Specifically, 1) with few exceptions, the non-Western population increased over time; and 2) the non-Western population was generally 20-80% of all immigrants. This generated a “20/80” rule; if the non-Western portion was between 20% and 80% and only one anchor point was available, an absolute increase of 1% yearly was assumed (for example, 26% to 27%). If the non-Western proportion was outside this range, a yearly .1% increase was assumed.
Inquiry Scope

The cross-national data covers all West European national elections from 1974 to 2000, as permitted by data quality.\(^{511}\) Western Europe includes all countries 1) with the majority of their landmass in the geographic area commonly associated with “Europe” (excluding Turkey or Israel, but including Ireland); that 2) remained free of Communist control from 1945 to 1990 (excluding Ukraine or the former East Germany, but including formerly authoritarian Spain or Greece); 3) with more than 1 million inhabitants (excluding the “micro-states” of Iceland, Luxembourg, Malta).\(^{512}\) The goal of these decision rules was to maximize comparability across cases.

A breakpoint of 1973 was chosen as it was the last year West European countries allowed large-scale guest worker migration. The guest workers were perceived as necessary, temporary economic inputs and consequently as non-threatening.\(^{513}\) Post-1973 migration, however, was a mainly function of two more or less permanent processes: family reunification (uncontrolled, politically invisible and large) and asylum-seekers and refugees (uncontrolled, politically salient and moderate).\(^{514}\) If individuals perceive permanent or unsolicited migration as threatening, virtually all non-Western migration after 1973 would fall into this category, while most non-Western migration before 1973 would be considered non-threatening.

Explanatory Variables

\(^{511}\) There instances (the UK in 1974, Greece in 1989 and Ireland in 1982) where multiple elections were held in the same year. In each case, the elections results were averaged and treated as a single observation, as there was no data on the change to the independent variables for periods of less than one year.

\(^{512}\) The first two rules are implicit in Golder (2003).

\(^{513}\) See for example Messina (2007).

\(^{514}\) Countries also engaged in specific migration flows, such as colonial migration to the Netherlands or United Kingdom, or the return of Eastern Europeans of German descent to Germany.
The variables included in my analysis cluster alternative explanations into two groups, loosely those exogenous *structural* changes that might increase the demand for nativist parties and those *opportunity structures* that might improve the fortunes of nativist parties as a result of actions or decisions endogenous to the political system (the political "supply side").

Structures represent those socio-demographic processes hypothesized in the literature to have an effect on Radical Right support, including immigration but also changes in unemployment, crime rates, globalization (measured as the ratio of trade to GDP) and de-industrialization (measured the changes in proportion of the workforce employed in manufacturing). Though an important component of Radical Right appeals crime rates, with the exception of Gibson’s (2002) analysis (limited in the number of countries and years considered), have never been systematically tested as a determinant of nativist or Radical Right support. In addition, certain parties combine nativist appeals with regionalist appeals (in Italy and Belgium); these parties might be generating support from either appeal, and a regionalist dummy variable was included in these two cases. Further structural explanations, such as the size of the welfare state (Betz and Swank 2003) or the degree of corruption or anti-statist sentiment (Kitschelt and McGann 1995) present during the election, were not included due to data limitations.

The second cluster of alternative explanations captures opportunity structures related both to party competition in general and factors specific to nativist parties in the

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515 The sources for each variable can be found in the Appendix.
516 European crime rates are not standardized, though when possible traffic offenses were excluded. Re-running the analysis without crime rates does not alter the findings. Betz and Swank (2003) privilege globalization, while Kitschelt and McGann (1995; 2005) and Inglehart (1997) privilege changes in the sectoral makeup of the economy.
517 Crime reporting changed significantly between 1993 and 1995 in Belgium, and this change is represented by a dummy variable for the 1995 election.
system. First, following a long literature on party competition (Duverger 1959; Cox 1997) I expect voters to be more willing to support new or small parties in systems with more proportional electoral rules, where smaller parties are more likely to survive the initial vote (gaining seats or moving on to the next round of a multi-round election). I initially measure electoral rules by taking the mean district magnitude. However, it might be that voters are more interested in large than small differences in electoral systems; they might worry about the effects of single- versus multi-member districts on a small party’s chances, but might not distinguish between systems using different forms of proportional representation, for example multi-member districts versus a country-wide list. I therefore create a second, coarser measurement: the proportion of contests that send only one party to the next round for seat apportionment; elections with multiple rounds are not treated as “majoritarian” by this measure when using first-round election results. Second, I capture the presence of an incumbent Grand Coalition using a dummy variable. As Radical Right parties are thought to generate support in part from amorphous protest, they should be particularly likely to gain support during Grand Coalitions, which I expect to benefit all opposition parties by increasing the frustration with the regime through an increase in gridlock, while at the same time reducing a frustrated voter’s options for punishment.

518 Mudde (2007).
519 Measured as the number of seats divided by the number of districts. France is measured using the first electoral round (where two candidates advance) rather than the second (where one receives a seat). Scholars often assign France a district magnitude of “1” but use the first round results, when voters have less of a disincentive to support small parties.
520 As a result, France’s “majoritarian” score is a “0” throughout the dataset.
521 No Grand Coalitions in this sample were constructed during times of significant crisis (as in the United Kingdom in the 1930s and 1940s). I do not expect incumbents to be punished for cohering in times of crisis.
While I would have liked to have captured the willingness of mainstream parties
to cooperate with nativist parties in the same political system to measure the degree to
which nativist strategies of exclusion harm nativist fortunes (Art 2006), collecting that
data was beyond the scope of this project. I do however include two variables designed
to capture features specific to a country’s nativist parties. First, the presence of nativist
parties as incumbents (Responsibility) was measured as the maximum percentage of
government portfolios held by nativist parties during the previous electoral period, if any.
A percentage was used rather than a dichotomous variable as while voters might
generally punish incumbents, parties in a coalition have the option of blaming their
partners, with less responsibility serving as additional political cover.\footnote{522}

Second, I measure party organization with the intention of constructing a finer,
less endogenous measurement than past studies. The best measure thus far comes from
Carter (2005), who treats party organization as a dummy variable based on whether they
are 1) well-led, 2) unified and 3) well-organized; Carter does find that party organization
has an effect on a Radical Right party’s vote share. However, there are significant
endogeneity concerns when basing a party’s strength on its leadership or unity. Andreas
Moelzer, the FPOe’s MP in the European Parliament, described former party leader Joerg
Haider as a “pseudo-charismatic” leader, though he “used to leave out the ‘pseudo’.”\footnote{523}
As Moelzer’s statement suggests, leaders tend to be measured by their past success.
Similarly, the direction of causality between party size and factionalism is suspect.

\footnote{522} Switzerland is a special case. Switzerland’s executive has historically been a four-party Grand
Coalition that includes the nativist Swiss People’s Party (SVP). However, factionalism within the SVP has
led to its “nationalist” wing running as a \textit{de facto} opposition since 1995. Consequently, Responsibility for
Switzerland is coded as “0.” No nativist party has served as a government’s \textit{formateur}.
\footnote{523} Interview, Andreas Moelzer, 6/25/07.
Parties might fail because their leaders squabble, despite examples in Austria (1993), Germany (1990), Denmark (1995) and France (1998) in which the defection of significant functionaries or entire factions were followed by greater nativist success. Party elites might also squabble because they are failing; when no successful strategy has emerged, every elite might feel that they know what ails the party.

My strategy is to measure party organization based on the average of the last three election results for declared nativist parties in an election, whether or not they were nativist in those past elections. Though it does not delve into the intricacies of candidate nomination or the delegation of authority, I find this measurement conceptually appealing on two grounds. First, it is reasonable to expect that parties which were larger in the past should have greater resources (activists, funding) at their disposal when contesting the current election. The Swiss People’s Party or Austrian Freedom Party, with an established presence in the popular eye through long tenures in parliament and dues-paying activists in every locality, should have an easier time attracting voters than the Irish Immigration Control Platform of 2007, which had three candidates and a handful of activists to contest a national election. Furthermore, my measurement discounts the sudden success of new parties, such as Sweden’s New Democracy or the Dutch List Pim Fortuyn. New parties might have less developed structures for functionary recruitment or authority delegation, making them more susceptible internecine struggles or being overwhelmed by their new responsibilities. One deficiency of this measurement is that in basing it solely on vote share, I ignore the possibility that significant extra-political organizations can cross over into electoral politics, for example the Belgian nationalist
movement's transformation into the Vlaams Blok (Art 2008). Unfortunately, the data necessary for a finder coding is beyond the scope of this project.

Cross-National Analysis

All models were run as a pooled time-series analysis using the *xtreg* function in STATA 9, specifying random effects and Huber-White robust standard errors clustered by country to address within-country correlation. Standard errors are rounded to the nearest one-hundredth, unless otherwise indicated. I have added a lagged dependent variable to control for regression to the mean after exceptionally large successes or failures. Before undertaking the analysis, all explanatory variables were analyzed to identify potential outliers; an outlier was any observation more than five standard deviations from the variable mean. Table 6.1 summarizes the identified observations. Dummy variables were included when the relevant explanatory variable was specified in a model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.1: Identified Cross-National Outliers</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Δ Foreign-Born Population</td>
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<td>Responsibility</td>
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The first test evaluates the effect on nativist support of the three competing measures immigration discussed earlier: the foreign population, the foreign-born population and the non-Western foreign-born population. The expectation is that the non-Western population will have a strongest effect on nativist party growth, even. Data on the foreign population was taken from the OECD’s *Trends in International Migration*

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524 Hausman tests on each model suggest random effects are an appropriate specification.
525 A t-test of means finds that the foreign-born and non-Western foreign-born populations are significantly different than the foreign population, though the foreign-born and non-Western populations were not significantly different.
series and when necessary Golder (2003). As data on the foreign-born and non-Western populations were generated using additional sources, additional observations are included in those models.

Table 6.2: Cross-National Results, Competing Measures of Immigration

The results presented in Column 1 of Table 6.2 suggest that changes in immigration generally have a significant, positive effect on support for nativist parties regardless of the measurement used, and explain roughly the same variance in outcomes. However, the strength of the effect of immigration, represented by the coefficient, varies with the measurement used. On average, every one percentage point increase in the non-Western immigrant population between elections leads to in a 1.2 percentage point increase in nativist party support, compared to a .7-.75 percentage point increase on average for the other measurements. The main intuition is that alternative measures of immigration have different “signal-to-noise” ratios which make some better than others at capturing the effect of immigration, though all three correctly identify the broader relationship. Here, the signal is the increase in immigrants seen as threatening, while the noise is the false negatives the alternate measures capture and the false positives they ignore.

Figure 6.4: Plot, Cross-National Changes in Immigration and Nativist Support

In the second stage of the analysis I specify a series of models which include the alternate explanations discussed above. The findings are presented in Table 6.3. Several

526 Though changes in migration explain less than 10% of the variance in outcomes on their own, changing structures are assumed to be an imperfect proxy for changing salience, which should have a direct effect, and it is further unclear how much of changes in vote support should be thought of as random error.

527 Without the Spain 2004 dummy variable, the effect of changes in the non-Western population remains significant at the 10% level ($B=0.8; P=.076$) though changes in the foreign-born population falls outside conventional tests of significance ($B=.46; P=.142$)
observations are lost at this stage of the analysis due to missing data. In addition to the two outlier dummies specified above, I include a dummy for the Dutch 2002 election, the only instance in which a nativist leader (Pim Fortuyn) was assassinated during an election campaign, and the assassination possibly improved the fortunes of the party in the subsequent election.

Table 6.3: Cross-National Results with Alternate Explanations

First, I note that the finding regarding changes in native/immigrant heterogeneity is replicated from Table 6.1: a one percentage point increase in the non-Western population increases nativist party support by 1.25 to 1.3 percentage points on average.\textsuperscript{528} None of the alternative structural explanations are significant. That some issues (immigration) seem to benefit nativist parties while others (unemployment) do not is consistent with a model of issue ownership (Petrocik 1996; Meguid 2005), in which voters support a party when the issues they care about match the issues the party is perceived as competent to address. Specifying the dependent variable as the change in Radical Right support, using Golder’s (2003) list of Radical Right parties and including the Swiss People’s Party (from 1999) and the new parties I identified for the post-2000 elections not included in the Golder study, does not infirm the significance of changes in the non-Western population ($B=1.61; P=0.003$). In sum, my methodology for coding a party as nativist is not driving my main finding.

In contrast to the weakness of alternative structural explanations in Column 1, several of the opportunity structures report significant coefficients in the expected

\textsuperscript{528} Removing the three outlier controls from Column 1, the P-values of the significant variables increase, though they all remain significant at least at the 10\% level (for example, the coefficient for the non-Western .85 with a P-value of .07). Without outlier controls the $R^2$ in Column 1 drops to .40.
direction. As expected, parties with a regional focus in addition to a nativist focus gained an additional 1.37 percentage points on average, suggesting that regionalism was drawing additional voters to these parties. My variable for party organization was significant and in the expected direction, suggesting that an established party with 7% of the vote in the past three elections would have gained on average an additional one percentage point in vote share, all other factors equal. The variable capturing nativist incumbency is highly significant in the expected direction, suggesting that nativist parties are heavily punished for their time in parliament even accounting for drastic losses by the incumbent Freedom Party in 2002. However, the presence of a Grand Coalition was not significant. 529

Even more surprising, the effect of mean district magnitude was significant and ran in the opposite of the expected direction. This result is due to the presence of the Netherlands, with some of the world’s most proportional electoral rules (one nationwide district with 150 seats) and historically unsuccessful nativist parties; removing the Netherlands flips the sign but the coefficient is fairly weak and just fails conventional tests of significance ($B=.03$ with a P-value of .113). One possibility is that the effect of electoral rules is instead captured by past party organization, but even without the Netherlands there is no relationship between the two variables ($r=-.16$). Another possibility is that voters are more concerned with large than small differences in electoral rules. Column 2 integrates my broader measure of the total share of contests that are immediately resolved through single-member districts and finds a coefficient that is significant and in the expected direction. In general, I find that nativist parties tend to gain more support in systems that are more proportional, but their voters do not appear to

529 Whether the Government in the past legislative period was led by the Right or Left was also considered. No significant effects were found, nor did the variable influence the other findings.
discriminate between forms of proportionality. Normalizing the immigration and party organization variables from Column 2, so that all of the significant variables run from 0 to 1, allows us to compare the relative effect of the significant coefficients. Doing so reports coefficients of 5.71 for changes in immigration and 3.64 for the degree of prior party organization, suggesting that objective changes in demography have the greatest significant positive effect on nativist growth.

Column 3 in Table 6.3 tests my second hypothesis, that the level of immigration or my alternative structural variables have a significant effect on changes in nativist support. Surprisingly, I find no statistically significant relationship between changes in nativist support and the level of immigration, or any other structural variable, though most of the structural variables run in the expected direction and the opportunity structures that were significant in Column 1 remain significant in Column 3. To account for the possibility that both the xenophobia and fertile ground mechanisms are at work, I re-measured my immigration variable as the squared difference of the mean level of non-Western immigration. Re-running Column 3, the coefficient was negative (-.004) but not significant. These results suggest that nativist voters at the national level are reacting to changes in immigration (confirming Hypothesis 1), but not levels (disconfirming Hypothesis 2).

Sub-National Analysis

Scope and Data

I now switch to a sub-national analysis that considers trends at the state- and local-level, restricted to the countries where I have undertaken major fieldwork. The

530 Four additional observations are gained by not taking first differences.
state-level analysis consists of national elections results by state in Austria and Germany. The former East Germany is excluded, as they are not Western Europe by my definition; the tremendous and enduring post-war differences in political socialization and economic development lead me to treat the former East and West Germany as two separate countries. As the major German party in the 1970s and 1980s (the NPD) was banned from participating in elections in Berlin until 1989, Berlin’s observations before 1990 were dropped from the dataset.

The local-level analysis consists of national election results at the district level for two states each in Germany and Austria.\textsuperscript{531} Due to the necessity of on-site data collection, local-level data was only collected for states where I conducted fieldwork.\textsuperscript{532} Each dataset considers elections from roughly 1980 until 2005-6, as data quality below the national levels drops significantly when compared to the national level. Most of the competing explanatory variables are not included in the sub-national analysis, either because there was no meaningful sub-national variation (electoral rules) or there was insufficient data (globalization). The main alternative explanations I explore are unemployment and crime. In Austria, I include variables capturing nativist incumbency (in 2002 and 2006) and the presence of a Grand Coalition (from elections in 1990 through 1999) as are relevant. I have also included a dummy variable for the Baden-Wuerttemberg district of Rastatt in my local analysis for elections in 1994 and 1998. Rastatt temporarily housed a temporary processing center for incoming East European

\textsuperscript{531} In Baden-Wuerttemberg, the electoral district; in Rheinland-Pfalz and Styria, the county (which overlaps with the electoral district); in Vienna, the ward or neighborhood.

\textsuperscript{532} The national and state observations were initially selected with an interest in identifying causal processes and generating plausible causal mechanisms (Gerring 2007). In each case, data was collected through country or state statistical yearbooks, national or state statistical websites and when necessary onsite research at state statistical offices; see the Appendix.
and post-Soviet migrants of German descent (the *Aussiedler*) and was an outlier on all measures of changes in immigration.\(^{533}\)

The sub-national analysis serves two purposes. First, additional tests of the same variables using new data can strengthen support for the initial findings. Second, a meso-level analysis is a means of addressing ecological fallacy. It might be that immigrants are attracted to wealthy societies but nativist voters are actually reacting to the emergence of post-material politics, a process concentrated in wealthier, post-industrial societies. Or it might be that individual concerns about immigration are largely perceptual and driven by national processes (media effects or elite issue frames), which are triggered by changes in national heterogeneity. In either case, I would not expect changes in immigration to have a significant effect on nativist support. However, there might be an *objective* link between demographic changes and nativist support... nativist voters might be reacting to an increase in immigrants in their geographic space.

**Results**

Tables 6.4 (state-level) and 6.5 (local level) report the findings for the sub-national analysis, which focuses on changes in the non-Western immigrant population. The basic finding regarding immigration is confirmed: changes in native/immigrant heterogeneity at the state and local level have an effect on support for parties campaigning on explicitly nativist platforms. The effect in each of the six geographic contexts (two countries, four states) was significant at the 1% level.

**Tables 6.4-6.5: Sub-National Results (State and Local Level)**

\(^{533}\) Based on an e-mail exchange with the Statistical Office of Baden-Wuerttemberg.
In Austria, both the percentage of government portfolios held by nativist parties and the presence of a Grand Coalition were significant and ran in the expected direction, with nativist incumbency having a particularly strong negative effect. As Figure 6.5 displays, the 2002 Austrian election displayed exactly the opposite relationship between changes in immigration and changes in nativist support. One possible explanation for this result is that nativist voters will express their disapproval with a party that promises and fails to control immigration. The Grand Coalition finding contradicts the cross-national results. One possible interpretation is that voters in Austria are reacting to another variable correlated with the presence of a Grand Coalition, such as the degree of voter dissatisfaction with Austria’s system of patronage, which reached its peak in the late-1980s and early-1990s (Kitschelt and McGann 1995, or Chapter 5 of this volume).

While the Grand Coalition variable, as well as changes in unemployment in Vienna, are significant and initially seem to have a larger effect (report a larger coefficient) than changes in the size of the immigrant population, normalizing all three variables reverses the effect; moving from the smallest change in the size of the immigrant population to the largest change has an effect between two and four times as great as the other factors. For example, normalizing changes in immigration and unemployment in Vienna generates coefficients of 17.24 and 8.18, respectively.

**Figure 6.5: Nativist Party Support in Austria, 1970-2006**

In the second portion of my sub-national analysis, I consider the effect of the level of immigration, unemployment and crime on changes in nativist support at the state and local levels. As Tables 6.4 and 6.5 indicate, none of the three variables are consistently significant. In terms of the level of migration, there is some evidence to suggest that sub-
nationwide the xenophobia mechanism I specified in Hypothesis 2 is operating. Squaring the term to determine whether both mechanisms might be operating does not return a significant coefficient. While nativist voters primarily respond to changing native/immigrant heterogeneity in their immediate geographic area, they seem to be more willing to do so in areas where heterogeneity is low.

Conclusions

In this chapter I have tested two hypotheses concerning the relationship between immigration and changes in nativist party support. In addition, I have addressed significant theoretical deficiencies in past measurements of the dependent variable and the relevant explanatory variable, while offering an analytically defensible coding for the former and two advancements over conventional measurements of the later by accounting for naturalization and region of origin. Finally, I have engaged in a data collection effort that represents a significant advance in the knowledge available to the sub-field. Radical Right parties are consistently associated with law and order appeals (Mudde 2000; Carter 2005) but crime rates are almost never included in empirical analyses.

First and foremost, my analysis found that objective changes in the size of the immigrant population have a consistent, positive effect on the growth of nativist parties, cross- and sub-nationally. Furthermore, how migration is measured affects the strength of this relationship; as the measure used more closely approximates the population nativist parties mobilize against, the strength of the effect on nativist support increased. However, there was no evidence to suggest that nativist growth was being driven by the size of the immigrant population. Indeed, there is some sub-national evidence that less heterogeneous areas that see large changes in the size of the immigrant population react
more strongly to those changes. Contrary to the findings of past scholars, countries with some immigrants but large changes to their immigrant population are much more likely to see nativist growth than countries with many immigrants but a stable native/immigrant distribution.

In addition, I found that certain opportunity structures, such as the proportionality of the electoral system or the ability of a party to bring to bear an established party organization to bear in critical elections facilitate nativist growth. In contrast another opportunity structures, the presence in Government, has a strong negative impact on growth. I would note, however, that of the variables which have a significant effect on nativist party growth, none is stronger than objective changes in immigration.

While the analysis suggests that some alternative explanations (such as the role of unemployment) are highly implausible, it does not eliminate others, for example those variables that could not be collected due to data constraints. For example, future analyses will need to develop a coding strategy for identifying the historical degree of cooperation between nativist and mainstream actors, or the degree of discontent with corruption. Both of which have been identified by past scholars as affecting Radical Right support, though neither has been systematically measured across Western Europe. Moreover, the sub-national results presented thus far do not completely eliminate concerns about ecological fallacy. For example, it may be that areas with more immigrants also contain more natives with attitudes pre-disposing them toward nativist parties. However, while multi-level models can test structural- versus individual-level arguments, the lack of cross-sectional, cross-time individual-level data creates a tradeoff between inquiry scope and inquiry depth. Despite these reservations, my findings strongly suggest that nativist
parties in contemporary Western Europe benefited greatly from increased migration flows in the late-1980s and early-1990s, a process that fundamentally challenged the notion that Western Europe would continue to be a series of homogenous nation states.
Chapter 6 Figures and Charts

Figure 6.1: Ratio, Foreign to Foreign-Born Population


Figure 6.2: "Non-Western" as Portion of Foreign-Born

Source: Calculated from OECD, "Database on Foreign-born and Expatriates" (2006).
Figure 6.3: Competing Concepts for Measuring Immigration

All First Generation Immigrants

Western, Not Naturalized
(2, 3)
("False Negative")

Western, Naturalized
(3)
("False Negative")

Non-Western, Not Naturalized
(2, 3, 4)

Non-Western, Naturalized
(3, 4)
("False Positive")

Asylum-Seekers
(1, 2, 3, 4)

Legal Status
(Naturalized Y/N)

Groups Captured by Measurement:
1. Asylum-Seekers
2. Foreign Population
3. Foreign-Born Population
Table 6.2: Testing Competing Measures of Immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Δ Nativist Party Support</th>
<th>Unit of Analysis: Country-Election Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Δ Foreign Pop.</td>
<td>.69**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Foreign-Born Pop.</td>
<td>.76*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Non-Western Pop.</td>
<td>1.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance Level: *10%; **5%; ***1%. Standard errors are in parentheses. All tests for significance are two-tailed. Additional Controls: Spain 2004 outlier dummy (foreign-born population and non-Western population).

Figure 6.4: Cross-National Changes in Immigration, Nativist Support (West European National Elections, 1974-2006)

Excludes outlier (Spain 2004).
Source: National election authorities; author calculations from UN, OECD (Immigration).
Table 6.3: Cross-National Results with Alternate Explanations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable: Δ Nativist Party Support</th>
<th>Unit of Analysis: Country-Election Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) Changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western Pop.</td>
<td>1.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Rate</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Globalization</td>
<td>-17.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean District Mag.</td>
<td>-.008***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. Majoritarian</td>
<td>.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Org.</td>
<td>1.37***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalism</td>
<td>-17.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>-.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significance Level: *10%; **5%; ***1%.
Additional Controls (all): lagged dependent variable.
Outlier Controls: Austria 2002 (government responsibility); Holland 2002 (assassination); Spain 2004 (column 1).
Table 6.4: Sub-National Results (State Level)

Dependent Variable: Δ Nativist Party Support
Unit of Analysis: State-Election Year (National Elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Germany</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Changes)</td>
<td>(Levels)</td>
<td>(Changes)</td>
<td>(Levels)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Non-Western</td>
<td>1.45***</td>
<td>.49***</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.32)</td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Unemployment</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.06***</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.25)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Crime Rate</td>
<td>.0001</td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td>.0002</td>
<td>-.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0003)</td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
<td>(.0002)</td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.03***</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.01)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.0002</td>
<td>-.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
<td>(.0002)</td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Rate</td>
<td>.0002</td>
<td>-.0001</td>
<td>.0002</td>
<td>-.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0003)</td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
<td>(.0002)</td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>-30.00***</td>
<td>-27.76***</td>
<td>4.70***</td>
<td>5.95***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.62)</td>
<td>(2.38)</td>
<td>(.49)</td>
<td>(.63)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²: .92 .90 .53 .27
N: 72 72 84 84

Significance Levels: *10%; **5%; ***1%.
Additional Controls: lagged dependent variable.

Figure 6.5: Changes in Austrian Nativist Support, 1979-2006
(State Results in National Elections)

Source: Austrian Federal Statistical Office.
### Table 6.5: Sub-National Results (Local Level)

**Dependent Variable:** Δ Nativist Party Support  
**Unit of Analysis:** District-Election Year (National Elections)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Styria</th>
<th>Baden-Wuerttemberg</th>
<th>Rheinland-Pfalz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Δ Non-West</td>
<td>1.46***</td>
<td>.89**</td>
<td>.95***</td>
<td>.33***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.36)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Unemp.</td>
<td>1.62***</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Crime</td>
<td>.00005*</td>
<td>.0008**</td>
<td>-.0003**</td>
<td>-.0002***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.00002)</td>
<td>(.0003)</td>
<td>(.0002)</td>
<td>(.00007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.07***</td>
<td>-.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.09)</td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemp.</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
<td>-.18***</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.07)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Rate</td>
<td>-.0001**</td>
<td>-.0007</td>
<td>.00008**</td>
<td>-.00002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.567)</td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
<td>(.00003)</td>
<td>(.00002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>-25.00***</td>
<td>-31.51***</td>
<td>-29.44***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
<td>(.62)</td>
<td>(.94)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Coalition</td>
<td>4.34***</td>
<td>6.10***</td>
<td>6.90***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.35)</td>
<td>(.44)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**R²** | .89 | .76 | .93 | .91 | .49 | .31 | .35 | .19  
**N**  | 161 | 161 | 119 | 119 | 222 | 222 | 216 | 216  

Significance Levels: *10%; **5%; ***1%.  
Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Implications
Explaining Niche Party Growth

The central aim of this project has been to offer insight into the rapid and significant growth of Radical Right parties in post-war Western Europe. No group of political actors has generated a greater interest among European scholars or politicians over the past 25 years. As parties stridently opposed to immigration and multiculturalism, critics fear that Radical Right reflect, or lead to, increasing legal or social discrimination or even violence against Europe’s ethnic minorities. As parties that are stridently nationalist and have moved toward economic protectionism, critics fear that the Radical Right threatens European integration and economic globalization. Radical Right parties were the primary opponents of the EU’s expansion into Eastern Europe in 2004, arguing that it would lead to uncontrolled migration, wage dumping and significant transfers to the developing east, money better spent dealing with problems at home.

In explaining the growth of the Radical Right, I have focused on the most important subset of this loose party family: anti-immigrant or “nativist” parties, parties that champion the interests of an ethnic group delineated by their relationship to a particular territory. In Chapter 2 of this volume I argued that the major development in the Radical Right from the late-1970s onward was the adoption of nativist appeals in their campaigns and programs. In some cases (such as the German NPD), parties that were already Radical Right shifted their focus from extreme nationalism and anti-Communism to nativism. In others (such as the German DVU or

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534 For example in the “Three Wise Men” report (2000) examining the OeVP-FPOe government and the FPOe’s past behavior, in light of the decision by Austria’s fellow EU members to levy sanctions over the FPOe’s inclusion in government, “the commitment of the Austrian Government to the common European values, in particular concerning the rights of minorities, refugees and immigrants” was the main thrust of the commission’s inquiry.

535 For example, the FPOe’s made opposition to eastward expansion one of its key themes in the 2002 national election, calling itself (in the party paper, the Neue Freie Zeitung) the only party putting the interest of Austrians first; NFZ, “FPOe bleibt ‘Oesterreich-Partei’,” 10/30/02.
Sweden's New Democracy), new parties formed to take advantage of what they saw as an emerging social issue. Still other parties (such as the Austrian FPOe or the Scandinavia Progress parties) were initially liberal, neo-liberal or anti-statist but joined the Radical Right by adopting nativism in the late-1980s. I further found that while the appeals made by Austria's very successful nativist parties and German's very unsuccessful nativist parties varied little, there was a significant difference in the appeals made by these parties when compared to other parties of the Right; while the extremity of a nativist party's appeals cannot account for its success, the presence of these appeals distinguishes parties we think of as "anti-immigrant Radical Right" from all others.

In explaining the growth of the Radical Right, however, my project speaks to more general questions about how party systems and issue agendas in advanced industrial democracies change. How do new issues emerge? When do they result in the growth of new or small "niche" parties, when do they durably alter the support bases of the established parties, and when are they ignored entirely?

In Chapter 3 of this volume, I suggested a tension between two schools of thought regarding issue evolution and political change in established industrial democracies. The first focuses on long, slow changes to a country's social or economic organization, which translates over time into changing political preferences across an entire population and the emergence of new parties to represent those preferences. The clearest expression of this school is Modernization Theory (and later "post-Modernization Theory"), in which political preferences and issues are organized around the major sector of employment (agricultural, industrial or
service-based). But long, slow theories seem inadequate to explain changes driven by largely exogenous events, such as the September 11th terrorist attacks. My research has shown that the emergence of immigration as an issue and anti-immigrant parties as a force in Austria and Germany in the late-1980s and early-1990s was essentially spontaneous, occurring within a few months or years. Moreover, the refugees who fled to Germany and Austria in the 1980s and 1990s from Sri Lanka, Yugoslavia, or Iraq, in part triggering the emergence of immigration as an issue, were not driven primarily by economic motives spurred by differential modernization, but by a desire for physical safety.

A second school of thought represents a “punctuated equilibrium” view of political change, in which rapid shifts in issue priorities or political preferences brought on by some event or process reweight the aggregate support for various political appeals, to the benefit of an already established party or a new or minor political actor. This school shares the most in common with the “Realignment” literature of the American politics subfield, in which a new issue or issue dimension comes to the fore (within a few years or a few generations) and the Government, unable or unwilling to deal with the new issue, is swept out of power in favor of the established opposition or an entirely new party. Though the basic concept behind Realignment Theory is attractive in the flexibility with which it can describe rapid or gradual political change, which may or may not be related to processes of Modernization and may or may not affect an entire society, the literature it is not without problems. Mayhew’s (2002) critique notes that most of the specific claims made by the literature, particularly the periodicity

536 The core concepts driving Modernization Theory date back at least to Marx (1867 [1978]) and Durkheim (1893 [1984]). Modern expressions of Modernization Theory in political science include Rostow (1960) or Deutsch (1966). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) see industrialization (synonymous with modernization) as an essential determinant of European party systems. The main statements of post-Modernization Theory are Bell (1973), who focuses on “post-industrial society,” or Inglehart (1977, 1997), who focuses on “value change.”
537 See Key (1955); Key (1959); Schattschneider (1960); Burnham (1970); or Sundquist (1973).
of realignment in American politics, cannot be substantiated. I would further suggest that
realignment in American politics, cannot be substantiated. I would further suggest that
Realignment Theory offers no causal mechanisms and no systematic approach to identifying
realigning issues. How can we identify events or processes capable of realigning priorities or
party systems in a manner that is not ad hoc, and why do certain individuals choose to shift their
political priorities and preferences, but not others?

I have proposed a “Shock Theory” of political change and niche party growth to fill this
gap, which can be summarized in two stages. In the first stage some unanticipated triggering
event, deviating from established structural or social patterns, unsettles individual expectations
for some part of the population. This unsettling represents a threat (the prospect of negative
consequences) and leads individuals to increase the weight, or salience, placed on a related issue
or identity dimension. In the second stage, some subset of the population finds their priorities
sufficiently altered to engage in acts of threat reduction. This might mean forming or joining a
social group, engaging in violence against a group perceived as the threat’s cause, or switching
their vote in an election to a party that better matches their new distribution of priorities. I argue
that re-weighted priorities result in increased electoral support for a niche party in the aggregate
when 1) the salience of the issue dimension they emphasize increases and 2) the niche party is
seen by voters affected by the Shock as most competent to deal with the emergent threat...they
are an “issue owner” on the relevant issue or identity dimension.

I do not argue that changes in issue salience generated by Shocks inevitably improve the
fortunes of niche parties, or even that they necessarily alter the balance of power among the
established parties. Consider two examples of prominent crises from modern American history.
At the beginning of 1929, few in the industrialized world believed they were on the precipice of
the world’s greatest modern financial crisis. In late 1929, Yale economist Irving Fisher declared
that stock prices had "reached what looks like a permanently high plateau." After a slowdown in employment and growth in the summer of 1929 investors began selling their stocks at the beginning of October, with a panic that accelerated suddenly from late October ("Black Tuesday") until mid-November, when the American stock market lost 40% of its value; by late 1930 it was clear that the United States economy faced an economic crisis far beyond a recession. From late-1929 through 1933, the American stock market lost 70% of its value, the United States 30% of GNP, wholesale goods deflated by 30%, and unemployment increased from 3.2% to 24%. While this period predates modern public opinion polling by several years, the Great Depression was a negative, unpredicted, significant deviation from established economic trends that rapidly refocused the priorities of voters not only in America, but across the industrial world.

In the United States, the varied response to the onset of the Depression significantly affected the fortunes of the major parties. A Republican-controlled government did not just preside over the worst of the Depression and fail to resolve it; they approached the crisis with the same *laissez-faire* economic policy of the 1920s. In December 1929 President Hoover successfully pushed through a tax cut, and when the crisis deepened in the early-1930s he raised taxes and cut spending with an eye toward balancing the budget, rather than increasing spending to stimulate demand. While they offered no consistent program in the 1932 presidential campaign, the Roosevelt-led Democrats promised a consistent economic *philosophy* that included using the government to generate demand or provide relief. By 1932, the Republican

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538 Galbraith (1961).
539 Garraty (1986).
541 Berman (1997).
competence to deal with the economy had been thoroughly delegitimized in the eyes of voters. In two elections from 1928 to 1932, the Democrats increased their legislative vote share from 37.7% to 71.9%, a net seat gain of 197 in a legislature of 435. The Presidential election of 1932 resulted in nearly a 17-point swing (40.8% to 57.4%) for Roosevelt’s Democrats.

The realignment of interests generated by the Great Depression not only gave the Democrats a significant temporary boost in support, it created a political coalition of urban labor unions, progressive farmers, ethnic and religious minorities and Southern Whites that dominated the United States legislature for 56 of the next 60 years. Moreover, the Great Depression left a lasting imprint on American domestic policy through the significant expansion of the federal government. For example, Roosevelt’s policies let to the creation of America’s first widespread social insurance system (Social Security), which remains an issue in American politics 80 years later.

In a Gallup poll taken from September 7th-10th 2001, where respondents were asked to name the most important problem facing the country, less than 1% replied terrorism and national security. On September 11th an essentially random, significant deviation from the United States’ recent experience with terrorism and domestic security radically altered the issue priorities of its citizens. In polling from October 11th-14th, 46% called terrorism the most important problem and a further 8% national security more generally. Historically, the American public had rated the Republican Party the more competent to deal with issues of national security. For example, in an October 2000 CBS News poll, 43% believed that George W. Bush would strengthen the

544 Though Southern whites increasingly defected to the Republicans beginning in the 1960s over their opposition to Civil Rights legislation.
545 *Gallup*, “Terrorism Most Important Problem, But Americans Remain Upbeat,” 10/18/01; www.gallup.com/poll/4996.
United States’ defenses against international terrorism, while only 19% believe the same of Democratic candidate Al Gore. The immediate response by the Republican-led government did nothing to dampen this advantage; a January 2002 CBS News Poll found that 57% believed the Republican Party was better able to deal with terrorism, compared to 15% for the Democrats.

Cursory evidence suggests that the Shock generated by the September 11th attacks improved the immediate fortunes of the Republican Party, seen as the most competent to deal with a new, highly salient issue. Between polling ending on September 10th 2001 and beginning on January 11th 2002, the Republicans’ favorability rating improved from 47% to 61%, while the Democrats’ rating remained unchanged (moving from 56% to 55%). In elections in 2002 and 2004, the Republicans gained an aggregate 3% at the Presidential and legislative levels. While the major parties were seen as equally competent in Gallup surveys to deal with the economy and the Iraq War in the 2002 legislative elections, 81% of voters who called terrorism the most important issue (14% of all voters) intended to vote Republican. Hillygus and Shields (2005) find that concerns with terrorism played a significant role in the 2004 Presidential election, and voters concerned with terrorism overwhelmingly supported George W. Bush. Though many of these voters may already have been Republicans for other reasons (national security; taxes), it is likely they gained undecided voters or Democrats who became concerned with terrorism.

The failure of the Republicans to consolidate their national security advantage, as evidenced by the loss of the Presidency and both houses of the legislature between 2006 and

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547 CBS News/New York Times, 10/18/00-10/21/00; taken from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research’s “iPoll” polling database. In a CNN Poll from the same period, 62% believed Bush was the better candidate when it came to maintaining military preparedness, compared to 33% for Gore.
548 CBS News/New York Times, 1/21/02-1/24/02; taken from iPoll.
2008, is not a repudiation of the claim that the September 11th attacks durably altered political priorities in the United States. As with immigration in Austria and Germany, the salience of terrorism declined slowly in the United States. Terrorism remained one of the 10 most important problems until March 2008, and seven years after the September 11th attacks, 38% of the population was worried that someone in their family would be affected by a domestic terrorist attack ... up from 24% in April 2000 but down from 58% in the immediate aftermath of September 11th.\(^{551}\) In terms of policy output, the attacks led to significant and durable increases in the power of the federal government, particularly in respect to its ability to surveil and detain US citizens (the PATRIOT Act), that remain a point of political contention.

Despite a durable change in political priorities, the Republicans failed to maintain a hold on power for two reasons. First, by 2006 the Republican competence edge had been erased, with 46% in an October Gallup poll calling the Democrats the most capable of dealing with terrorism (compared to 41% for the Republicans).\(^{552}\) Moreover, by 2008 issues of national security had been replaced by a rapid increase in concerns with the economy, with the Republicans again losing the debate about how to deal with a major economic crisis to the more interventionist Democratic Party in the 2008 Presidential election.\(^{553}\) In short, concerns with national security and terrorism were overwritten by concerns with a global economic Shock that some have argued is “every bit as big as the Great Depression shock of 1929-30.”\(^{554}\)

Both the September 11th attacks and the onset of the Great Depression represented archetypal Shocks... large, unanticipated events that reframed a society’s political priorities. In the first case, the de-legitimation of the incumbent’s stance on the economy, combined with the

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\(^{552}\) Collected from 10/6/06 to 10/08/06; taken from iPoll.

\(^{553}\) Gallup, “Fuel Prices Now Clearly Americans’ No. 2 Concern,” 6/17/08; www.gallup.com/poll/108067.

\(^{554}\) Eichengreen and Kevin O’Rourke (Working Paper 2009).
presence of an opposition offering a popular stance and the lack of a viable 3rd party alternative, led to a re-weighting of the electoral balance between the established parties. In the second case, the established distribution of perceived party competence temporarily reinforced the position of the incumbent established party.

This is not to say that the Shock I identify in this project is the only instance of a Shock improving the fortunes of a niche party, or even that the same Shock affects all countries in the same way. As in the United States, the Great Depression was the worst economic crisis in modern German history. As in the United States, the established Right lacked answers to the crisis, at a time when German unemployment had shot past 40%, focusing instead on nationalism and the construction of an authoritarian state. However, unlike the United States the established Left’s economic policy also suffered a legitimacy deficit; the German Social Democrats proposed no additional role for the State during periods of economic crisis and saw capitalism as a flawed but self-regulating system. Combined with the Weimar Republic’s highly proportional electoral rules, facilitating the formation of new parties and the perpetuation of very small parties, there was ample opportunity for a party with new ideas to come to the fore.

That party was ultimately the previously marginalized National Socialists, who received just 2.6% of the vote in 1928 making highly nationalist, anti-Semitic and anti-Communist appeals. Of the parties contesting the last democratic parliamentary elections in Weimar Germany from 1930-1932, it was the National Socialists who were the most successful in advocating an economic policy designed to create work and alleviate the suffering of the Depression (especially for the hard-hit agricultural sector) through government intervention.

557 Hamilton (1982); Berman (1998), pg. 394.
By the end of 1932, the National Socialists had increased their vote share to 38%; Hamilton notes that voters in one German town were supporting the party’s economic policy despite their continued use of anti-Semitism, which they “ignored or rationalized...just as they ignored other unpleasant aspects of the Nazi movement.”

Explaining Nativist Party Growth

Following from my general theory, I advance a “punctuated equilibrium” or “crisis” explanation (Mudde 2007) for the growth of nativist parties in Western Europe. I argue that nativist parties grow when changes to the established relationship between natives and immigrants unsettle individual expectations about political, economic, social, or demographic outcomes, triggering feelings of threat among some in the native population and increasing the salience of issues or identities related to the native/immigrant dynamic. In Western Europe a large, unanticipated and unsolicited wave of non-Western migration in the late-1980s and early-1990s made immigration a highly salient political and social issue in a number of societies. Through their appeals and the failure of established parties to deal with this new migration, nativist parties positioned themselves as the issue owners of the pro-native, anti-migration stance and attracted new voters who both agreed with their position and felt migration was a pressing concern. I explore the dimensions of this migration and its effects on both the public and the party system in Austria and Germany in Chapter 4, before testing the effect of migration on nativist party support across Western Europe more generally in Chapter 6.

While my explanation is straightforward, it has not been systematically advanced in the previous literature and therefore represents a significant advance in our understanding of the Radical Right. As with the broader literature on political change in advanced industrial societies,

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the major theories of Radical Right success focus on the role of high or increasing economic insecurity caused by unemployment, deindustrialization or globalization (Betz 1994; Swank and Betz 2003) or an evolution in preferences brought on by changes in the composition of advanced industrial economies from industrial to post-industrial (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Inglehart 1997).

In contrast, I argue that the health or composition of European economies was irrelevant when it came to the growth of nativist parties. While electoral dealignment in the 1970s and 1980s, seen as one consequence of a post-modern capitalist society (Dalton et al. 1984), may have facilitated the switch to nativist parties by weakening traditional bonds between the major parties and their voters, dealignment cannot explain why voters across a number of countries switched to similar parties within a relatively short time frame (1986-1999). Moreover, though significant migration in the 1960s did not trigger a nativist reaction during a period of economic prosperity, suggesting that migration was necessary but not sufficient to induce nativist growth, this migration was in fact solicited to maintain the exceptionally high growth of the period (Messina 2007). Once full employment ended with the 1973 oil crises, the perceived costs of migration (competition for low-skilled jobs, social welfare and housing; social instability through increased crime; the construction of parallel societies through integration failures) outweighed the perceived benefits of a cheap labor force that could (theoretically) be sent back as necessary and were willing to undertake the most undesirable jobs, and further newcomers were rejected. Though full employment and high growth may have been enough for West European societies to willingly take in new migrants, these conditions have been the exception rather than the rule. Nativist parties made electoral gains in a period of strong growth (nearly 4% in Austria and Germany) and low unemployment (3-6%) in the late-1980s and early-1990s, while the weakest
economies (such as Ireland, Spain, or Finland) saw the least nativist growth, as they were passed over in favor of countries where migrants, even political refugees, could eventually find employment. My research suggests that the emphasis on economics and the long-term composition of economies in explaining political processes cannot account for significant developments in recent European political dynamics, and scholars should be more open to explanations privileging short-term social, cultural or demographic dynamics.

The recent failure of nativist parties to emerge in Western Europe's new migration states (such as Ireland, Portugal or Spain) can be interpreted in this light. With rapid economic growth in the late-1990s, these countries received net migration for the first time in the post-World War II era. Though asylum seeking increased, by and large this new migration was driven by improved economic opportunities. Ireland's spectacular economic growth in the 1990s (averaging 8.4% from 1994 to 2000) created a tremendous demand for new labor, and Ireland was one of three EU countries not to place restrictions on labor market access for the EU's new, East European member states in 2004.\(^{559}\) Drawing on the experiences of their workers in the 1960s, over the past decade both Portugal and Spain implemented guest worker programs to meet labor shortages in construction, agriculture, fishing and domestic help.\(^{560}\) My research suggests that the real challenge for these countries is yet to come: how will they react when their demand for labor subsides, but their economies make further migration attractive?

In addition, my research represents a conceptual advance in its measurement of both the dependent and independent variables. Past scholars, even those who attribute the success of the Radical Right to immigration (Gibson 2002; Golder 2003), focus on the level of support and


\(^{560}\) *Inter Press Service*, “Portugal Opens Doors, Bucks EU Trend,” 8/10/06; *Christian Science Monitor*, “Spain's new want ad: Moroccan mothers to pick strawberries,” 3/29/07.
privilege the size of the immigrant population; these parties are large where immigrant populations are large. But immigrant populations are generated through many processes, which I argue are not equivalent in the reactions they generate. Instead, I argue that we should focus on how and why immigrant populations are changing to look for signs of a favorable environment for nativist parties to grow. I expect that large immigrant populations generated slowly and consensually are less likely to display nativist growth than smaller populations generated through rapid, unexpected and unsolicited growth. Furthermore, by focusing on the size of a Radical Right party, scholars tend to confuse changes in support with changes in strategy. Nativist parties can have many supporters for reasons unrelated to their current strategy or growth, for example because a non-nativist party retained its old supporters after adopting nativist appeals.\footnote{On this point Kitschelt and McGann (1995) are correct: the largest nativist movements are those that mobilize coalitions of voters. The FPOe/BZOe successfully combined anti-statism and nativism, while the Swiss People’s Party combined their traditional rural conservative support with a new, urban nativism.} I argue that what is most important is to understand how a party’s immediate strategy and environment influence its fortunes if we hope to understand why some parties grow and others do not.

My argument is by no means a complete explanation of nativist growth. All else equal, I expect significant increases in the size of the immigrant population to lead to increases in support for nativist parties, but in Chapters 3 and 5 I point to three additional factors that I believe influence nativist growth. First, though their appeals and programs heavily focus on threat posed by migration and immigrants, nativist parties can benefit from “owning” multiple issues. For example, as I note in Chapter 5 the FPOe (as well as Radical Right parties in Italy) benefitted from concerns with patronage and corruption, though not all of these voters were necessarily interested in nativism. At the same time, competing issues can blunt the urgency of immigration, as reunification did in Germany in 1990 and 1991.
Second, I argue that for a nativist party to take advantage of a favorable issue environment they need some organizational resources, either a base of established activists or a significant funding source. Parties like the FPOe, Swiss People’s Party or Danish Progress Party benefitted from co-opting an established organization; nativist activists simply took over existing structures and changed the party’s strategy. Parties like the Vlaams Blok had a more difficult challenge, laying the foundations for success over 10 or 15 years of organization building and identifying promising functionaries through connections to local social organizations (Art 2008). Parties like the German DVU or Sweden’s New Democracy were able to grow despite having no functionary base by counting on the significant resources of their founders. It was parties like the German NPD or Sweden Democrats, which lacked a significant activist base or source of funding, that were the least successful in the late-1980s and early-1990s, despite operating in an environment where their issues were highly salient.

Third, my argument is sensitive to the role of electoral rules, which influence the number and type of parties contesting elections especially at the district level (Cox 1997). Nativist parties, which in Western Europe uniformly began as smaller (<15% of the vote) parties with focused appeals, should be at a disadvantage in single-member district systems, where the electoral politics literature expects them to be strategically abandoned for parties with a greater chance of winning a seat.

The failure of significant (>1% of the vote) nativist parties to emerge in the United Kingdom or the United States (or, going back to my earlier discussion, the lack of a credible 3rd alternative during the Presidential election of 1932) were almost certainly due to restrictive electoral rules. In the early-1990s and again in the early-2000s the United States experienced a sharp increase in unsolicited net migration, particularly illegal migration. In both instances this
increase generated intense public debate, a rash of local ordinances denying illegal immigrants access to jobs, housing or public services, the formation of social movements (the Minuteman Project) and the transformation of politicians in one major party (former Colorado Representative Tom Tancredo; former California Governor Pete Wilson) into *de facto* nativists. Yet the US Constitution Party, with the largest number of registered members outside the two major parties, managed just 0.2% of the vote in the 2006 legislative elections.

In the United Kingdom, the British National Party has never reached 1% of the national vote, though it has done markedly better in local elections where multi-member districts are used to elect representatives. As in the United States, some of the most prominent opponents of immigration in the United Kingdom have come from the mainstream right. Conservative MP Enoch Powell’s famous “rivers of blood” speech in 1968 arguably initiated the modern immigration debate in the UK and preceded the growth of British nativist parties; in 2008 the British National Party still sold Enoch Powell t-shirts. In the run up to the 1979 election, Prime Minister candidate Margaret Thatcher played to immigration opponents by claiming that there was a fear of being “swamped” by people of different cultures.

In both the United States and United Kingdom, some of the most vocal expressions of nativism are found inside the mainstream conservative parties, as their electoral rules have made parties that focus on a specific issue dimension a losing proposition. At the same time, these

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562 Tancredo’s minor candidacy for the Republican Party was intended specifically to raise the immigration issue, which he said threatened job losses, an increase in violent crime and the prospect of terrorist attacks. During a televised June 2007 debate among Republican Presidential candidates, Tancredo was the only participant to support an end to all legal immigration; *The Moderate Voice*, “Tancredo Says: Stop All Legal Immigration,” 06/05/07, http://themoderatevoice.com/13281. Wilson based his 1994 gubernatorial campaign on two issues (one nativist and both ethnic) an end to social services for illegal immigrants and an end to “Affirmative Action” programs for ethnic minorities; Tolbert and Hero (1996).

563 Minuteman co-founder Jim Gilchrist managed 14.8% of the vote in a 2005 House of Representatives by-election in San Diego, a border area heavily touched by issues of illegal immigration.

564 In 2008, the BNP held 56 local council seats.


mainstream parties are not nativist; their nativist factions have to struggle against other internal factions to control the party’s direction (nativism is not central to their message, though it can be explicit), including a business-first faction that wants immigration to reduce the cost of labor (Money 1997).

I do not argue that large, rapid events that re-weight issue priorities or introduce essentially new dimensions of politics are the only mechanism by which party systems change. Change can conceivably come from a gradual shift in preferences brought on by generational replacement, through changes to the composition of the electorate through addition (enfranchisement, unification) or subtraction (disenfranchisement, secession), or through changes to a polity’s electoral rules that make certain strategies more or less successful. Rather, I argue that party systems can change as the result of large, essentially random events that rapidly alter the salience of certain issues or identities. In the case of nativist parties, this version of events is more compelling than theories relying on slower generational changes, as the German and Austrian publics were simply not concerned with immigration until specific events triggered a discussion.

Moreover, my theory does not suggest that political elites are unimportant in mediating changes in issue salience. The FPOe’s decision to mobilize against the Proporz system when they did depended on the ascendancy of the anti-statist wing of the party under Joerg Haider in a closely contested leadership election. Similarly, the American response to the September 11th terrorist attacks, particularly with regard to the decision to link a war in Iraq to the broader war on Islamic terrorism, depended heavily on who won the razor thin 2000 Presidential election.567

567 In a speech given to the Commonwealth Club on 9/22/02, before the outbreak of hostilities in Iraq, Gore was highly critical of the President’s decision to pursue an invasion of Iraq, and endorsed Howard Dean in the 2004
I find, however, that actors are also highly constrained by exogenous events, both in their ability to bring new issues or identities into the public discourse. While Joerg Haider effectively used a Shock to increase his support, he only did so in response to major events, and was not the only prominent member of his party to share his views. Haider adopted new appeals strategically, looking for issues that were already in the public sphere but unexpressed by the established parties. Parties that adopted nativism early, like the Belgian Vlaams Blok, tellingly failed to see their vote share increase until structural conditions became more favorable in the late-1980s.

I also find that during a Shock actors are significantly constrained in the policies they can propose once new issues or identities become salient. A “windows of opportunity” theory (Cortell and Petersen 1999) would argue that policy change occurs when 1) some event leads political elites 2) with enough institutional influence to 3) enact a preferred policy. I note that this theory excludes an important actor: the public, and how their preferences and priorities constrain what political elites can propose and what they can enact. In Austria and Germany, immigration policy changed despite the wishes of most established actors in the system, because they recognized the risk of further lost support by retaining their current policy. In both Germany and Austria the Center-Left could have used its position to block a more restrictive policy indefinitely, but caved out of the fear of further electoral punishment. The only actors to support the change in policy direction, the nativist parties themselves, had no institutional position from which to push their claims and could only exert pressure through elections. Moreover, parties in both systems were limited in the proposals they could make if they hoped to retain voters. With the exception of the Greens, who were possibly trying to carve out a clientele among naturalized immigrants, none of the established parties in either country considered

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Presidential election over his former running-mate, Joe Lieberman, over Dean’s opposition and Lieberman’s support for the war; New York Observer, “Look Who’s Back,” 6/19/08.
liberalizing immigration policy. Similarly, while George W. Bush or Al Gore might have had some latitude in their response to the September 11th attacks, public opinion made some options (such as ignoring terrorism or cutting counter-terrorism funding) impossible.

**Explaining Nativist Persistence**

While one aspect of party system change is the growth or breakthrough of new parties, *durable* party system change requires newly emergent actors to retain their new supporters, to persist. Empirically, most voters in established democracies vote for the party they supported in the last election. Even in the volatile Austrian elections of the 1990s, on average 81% of the electorate supported their old party.568 Perceived as reservoirs of protest, nativist parties were not necessarily less adept at keeping their new voters. In 1999, the FPOe was as good at retaining its old supporters as the established major parties, and better than other minor parties in the system.569 By the late 1990s, the French National Front commanded the most loyal supporters of any French party.570 Why then are some parties able to consolidate their gains while others return to their previous level of support or disappear entirely?

In the 1990s there were 16 nativist parties that received at least 1% of the vote in national elections.571 Of those parties, nine remained above that 1% threshold in 2008 and all nine were larger than they had been before they began growing in the late-1980s or early-1990s. Of the seven instances of nativist failure, nearly half can be explained by intra-movement competition, as multiple parties in the same system struggled to determine which would become the nativist

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568 Mueller, pg. 18 in Plasser et al. (2000). This accounting does not include individuals who moved in or out of the “non-voter” category.
569 Plasser et. al., pg. 58 in OJP 1999 (2000). The FPOe retained 70% of their previous supporters, the OeVP 75%, the SPOe 70%, the Greens 59% and the Liberal Forum 51%. Calculated by taking exit polls on the composition of each party’s support based on their support in the last election.
571 In West European countries with 1 million or more inhabitants.
standard bearer. For example, once nativists co-opted the Swiss People’s Party, which already held 11% of the vote and perpetual access to the Swiss federal executive (due to Switzerland’s framework of consensual government), voters abandoned the smaller Freedom Party and the Swiss Democrats for the larger party with better access to public resources and a greater capacity to influence decision-making. Taking these trends into account, I believe the relevant question is not why some nativist or niche parties persist, but what internal pathologies of those parties or features of their political environment make persistence unachievable.

My comparison of nativist parties within and between Austria and Germany in Chapter 5 suggests that parties fail to persist for two reasons, one internal to the party and one internal to the party system.\textsuperscript{572} I argue that both pathologies come back to a party’s failure to convey its efficacy to voters. Niche parties gain voters by persuading them that they are capable of representing them on some emergent issue or representing some emergent identity, or at least that they best signal the urgency of these issue or identity demands. Niche parties retain voters by conveying that they are more than a signaling device...that they can continue to represent their voters in day-to-day affairs after their critical issue fades from importance.

First, I find that some parties fail to routinize the processes by which new functionaries are recruited, promoted, professionalized, or delegated authority, making them more likely to implode through in-fighting or because they are unprepared to fulfill their functions in parliament or government...the party is a victim of its own sudden success. The nativist parties that survived their first electoral period followed one of three trajectories: they co-opted a party with established, professional functionaries (the Austrian Freedom Party), they were a splinter of another organizations with a stable of trained functionaries (the Belgian Vlaams Blok), or they

\textsuperscript{572} Following Mudde’s (2007) typology.
used previous elections to professionalize credible leaders (the REP in Baden-Wuerttemberg). The nativist parties that failed, like the German DVU relied on a heavily centralized authority, which then alienated the party’s parliamentary leaders when they realized they did not control their own factions. Both the DVU and certain factions of the REP in the late-1980s were unable or unwilling to recruit or train functionaries before entering parliament, and this failure to identify competent agents quickly resulted in gaffs, scandals, and in-fighting.

Second, as new or small parties that can join, but not form, a government, I argue that a niche party’s perceived efficacy depends on the presence of allies among other established parties. When niche parties are part of the governing majority, they signal efficacy by acquiring cabinet posts, policy concessions, or access to patronage in return for their continued support for the government. When niche parties are in the opposition, they signal prospective efficacy by maintaining strong ties to a potential majority, for example by forming alliances at the provincial or local level. In Germany, the most professional REP organization (in Baden-Wuerttemberg) was entirely cut off from executive and legislative access and treated from the start as an illegitimate actor; even at the local level, the established parties agreed to block the REP’s proposals, no matter how innocuous. Consequently, the state faction survived only two elections where immigration was named an important issue by more than 5% of the state’s voters; when the issue faded, so did the party. In contrast, despite protestations by the national leaders of the established parties in Austria the center-right OeVP continued to enter into agreements with the FPOe at the state level throughout the 1990s and was willing to cooperate on legislation at the national level.

The totality of the political exclusion faced by nativist parties in Germany exceeded even that facing many Communist parties during the Cold War. Though the French Communist Party (PCF) was isolated from the late-1940s (as part of Charles de Gaulle’s unity government) until 1981 (when they were granted leadership posts by the Socialist President Francois Mitterrand), this exclusion was limited to the national level. From 1967 onward, the PCF entered a general seat-sharing agreement with the Center-Left, led by Mitterrand, and presented a joint presidential candidate (Mitterrand) in 1965 and 1974. At the local level, relations between the Center-Left and PCF were entirely normal. For example, in the 1965 local elections the PCF presented a joint electoral list in 48% of France’s cities, and the party still controlled nearly 1/3rd of French cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants in the late-1970s. Similarly, though the Christian Democrats (DC) continuously blocked the Italian Communist Party (PCI) from joining a national government, the PCI formed governments at the regional level and frequently collaborated with the Socialists (PSI) at the local level on legislation and joint electoral lists. Successful cooperation at lower levels of government meant that the Communists could reliably provide their supporters with benefits, while arguing that a similar outcome at the national level was possible.

Whether the strategies designed to starve nativist parties of their support by denying them the basic tools of representation are ultimately sustainable is an open question. In Germany, the norms that have emerged to make nativism difficult to propagate were the result of an incredibly powerful series of events (World War II; the Holocaust) that deeply influenced elite decisions about which political appeals were and were not acceptable. As the memory of these events fades, it may be that the norms that produced them also seem less self-evident, and that a nativist...

575 Lange, pg. 264 in Blackmer and Tarrow (1975).
party will be able to find a permanent niche in the political system in the wake of some future spike in the salience of native/immigrant relations. I will argue briefly in closing that such a spike is in fact likely.

**Moving Forward: Prospects for Western Europe**

While some who have written on the Radical Right expect these parties to fade with the economic dislocations caused by post-industrial transformations or globalization, I am considerably more pessimistic. In closing, I would like to offer two reasons why we should not expect nativist parties in Western Europe to disappear in the near future.

First, trends in advanced industrial democracies suggest that Western Europe will continue to be exposed to significant migration in the coming decades. Particularly as the “baby boomer” generation ages, advanced industrial countries are faced with a dilemma: more individuals are retiring and increasing European social insurance obligations, but low birthrates mean their tax contributions are not being replaced in the workforce. A 2001 report by the UN Population Division calculated that the portion of older Europeans out of the workforce (65 and older) would essentially double between 2000 and 2050.577

In the absence of a revolution in the willingness of Europeans to reproduce, the main alternative for stemming this process would be to engage in replacement migration. However, the UN report found that just to maintain its population, Germany would need to increase its net migration to half its 1988-93 “Shock period” average (600,000 per year) by 2015 (300,000 per year) and two-thirds (400,000 per year) by 2030. To maintain a “potential support ratio” (the proportion of workers 15-64 to non-workers 65 and above) of three to one in 2050, Germany

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577 UN Population Division (2001), pg. 8.
would need to nearly triple even this maintenance migration. My work suggests that unless West Europeans are willing to deal with markedly increased social insurance pressures and a decline in tax revenue brought on by declining populations, or unless they are convinced that heavy replacement migration will be beneficial, Western Europe could be in for significant nativist reactions if governments attempt the later without engaging in a debate about the costs and benefits of immigration with their publics. Hopefully, this project will provide those policymakers with a better understanding of the root causes of nativist concerns when formulating migration policy.

Second, nativist parties in Western Europe remain parties focused on acquiring new “niches” to increase their support, as opposed to “catch-all” parties interested in building the broad, sometimes conflicting coalitions that give them the numerical edge necessary to win elections and form governments. Consequently, I believe nativist parties will continue to be flexible and innovative in their appeals in the coming years, to exhibit the capacity to out-maneuver larger parties and take ownership of new or newly salient issues. Some nativists have relied on their ability to repurpose new events to emphasize the conflict between natives and immigrants. Part of the success of Pim Fortuyn’s movement in 2002 was its ability to use the September 11th attacks to play on concerns about the relationship between Christians/natives and Muslims/immigrants. Some argue that Fortuyn introduced a new social cleavage, while others would argue that he just benefitted from the re-activation of an issue created by migration in the early-1990s, which the defunct Center Democrats failed to capitalize on due to norms of tolerance in Holland that thought to be comparable to Germany. Either scenario would

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578 In 1995, the EU’s PSR was 4.3 to 1. All figures are taken from the Germany statistical annex; UN Population Division (2001).
579 Pellikaan et al. (2007).
indicate that multiple vectors (migration, but also events raising concerns about integration) can increase the salience of the same issue or set of identities, to the benefit of nativist parties.

Other nativist movements have shown that they are by no means “single issue” parties, that they are adept at taking new or unrelated issues to create a semi-coherent worldview. The Austrian Freedom Party of the 1990s was successfully able to combine calls for a reduced role of the state, by dismantling the established system of patronage, with greater state intervention and more social protection for natives (welfare chauvinism). Each appeal was directed at a particular clientele that the established parties had alienated or ignored... white-collar neo-liberals in the former case and blue-collar nativists in the latter. As the 1990s wore on, nativist parties in Western Europe abandoned neo-liberalism in favor of two emerging perceived threats: European integration and the recognition of an accelerated economic and cultural globalization. By the end of the century, one could accurately call nativist parties the only organized political opposition to either process in Europe.\(^{581}\)

While neither EU integration nor globalization was interpreted in terms of native/immigrant relations (unlike September 11\(^{th}\)), migration, integration and globalization all spoke to the same complex of fears and resentments by the working class (and the shrinking middle class) about the loss of resources and prestige at the hands of immigrants, Brussels, multi-national corporations and Austria’s unconcerned elites.\(^{582}\) In the final Act of his political career as head of the BZOe, the late Joerg Haider believed that particularly the increased resentment with global capitalism held the promise of attracting new voters in the future. In the

\(^{581}\) Zaslove (2008).

\(^{582}\) Integration should not be confused with expansion; both EU expansion eastward and the prospect of Turkey’s addition to the EU have been discussed by nativist parties in terms of native/immigrant relations, particularly the introduction of cheap East European labor and culturally non-Western Turkish immigrants.
summer of 2007 Stefan Petzner, Haider’s press secretary, summarized the BZOe’s strategy going forward:

“Globalization and capitalism are going to be the new big themes. Social justice. Economic speculation. Money is going into the economy, but not getting back to the People. The pendulum is swinging back to the Left now.”

The FPOe and BZOe used this strategy to great effect in attaining a combined 28% of the vote in a national election in the fall of 2008, gaining back the voters lost by the then unified “third camp” in 2002 as well as new support. During the campaign, both parties strongly attacked immigration and multi-culturalism\(^{584}\) and the EU\(^{585}\) while promising to protect the middle class and Austria’s social standards.\(^{586}\)

In closing, I would emphasize that the dynamics I explore are not historically or geographically bounded. Migration is fundamental to the human condition (we are nearly all the descendents of migrants) and ethnic mobilization, of which nativist mobilization is a subset, can be found on all six inhabitable continents, at all stages of economic development. Though processes of modernization and state-building were supposed to erase ethnic differences, they have proven inadequate to the task in the United States, to say nothing of Yugoslavia or the Ukraine. That much of Western Europe lacked what Americans might consider “racial” (or Ukrainians “national”) politics for much of the 20\(^{th}\) Century was the result of states deliberately carved to be mono-ethnic, as Austria was in 1918. What migration in the late-1980s and early-1990s did was make clear that West European countries were now ethnically heterogeneous

\(^{583}\) Interview, Stefan Petzner, 6/6/07.

\(^{584}\) An FPOe poster during the election stated that “Asylum fraud means flight back home,” which was also used by the NPD and DVU in the 2005 German elections; a BZOe poster called for “Austria for the Austrians!”

\(^{585}\) An FPOe poster called for “Representatives of the People instead of EU traitors.” Both parties attacked the OeVP-SPOe government for making policies at the expense of their population; Die Presse, “Hitzige Debatte ueber neue EU-Linie der SPOe,” 7/10/08.

\(^{586}\) FPOe posters: “Social security for our people” and “Homeland needs middle class”; BZOe poster: “Go the social way! For your sake.”
societies, where different ethnic groups with sometimes competing material or symbolic claims were expected to share a geographic space, a feature of political life much of the world has long been familiar with. The persistence of nativist parties in the coming decades, or even their emergence in European states where nativism generated no support or failed to take hold the first time around, is a very real prospect. At the same time, political trajectories are not unidirectional. It could be that in the coming decades European conceptions of what it means to be a native gradually alter, blurring the lines that nativist parties try to draw, or that some new Shock could come along, again refocusing the priorities of voters who identified as “workers” or “businessmen” in the 1980s but “Germans” or “natives” in the 1990s.
Appendix A – Nativist and Non-Nativist Radical Right Parties Contesting National Elections, 1965-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nativist Parties (Included in Columns 2 &amp; 3)</th>
<th>The “conventional” Radical Right</th>
<th>Parties this Project Codes as Radical Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Austria</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Alliance for the Future of Austria (2006-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belgium</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Flemish Bloc/Flemish Movement (1985-)</td>
<td>-Flemish Bloc (1978-81)</td>
<td>-Democratic Union for the Respect of Labor (1978-91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-National Front (1985-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Flemish Bloc (1978-81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Progress Party (1987-2001)</td>
<td>-Progress Party (1973-84)</td>
<td>-None (see fn. 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-People’s Party (1998-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Finland</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Finish People’s Blue-Whites (2003-)</td>
<td>-None</td>
<td>-None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-“Other Far Right” (1997-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Movement for France (2002-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-National Republican Movement (2002-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

587 Parties were only coded by election year, explaining gaps in coding for parties that switched from “Radical Right” to “nativist” or were founded before they contested their first election.

588 Parties typically coded as Radical Right, using Golder’s (2003) coding. These parties make up the “Radical Right” variable in Chapter 6.

589 Returning to my definition in the Introduction, by “Right,” I mean any party that is socially conservative for its national context; economic conceptions of the Right fail to capture the ideologies or strategies of many parties commonly associated with the Radical Right. By Radical, I mean any party that advocates permanently reducing or eliminating the rights of its political or social opponents. In a liberal-democracy this includes parties that are entirely anti-democratic (authoritarian; monarchist; fascist; totalitarian) or opposed to co-operation or co-existence with some part of the population (religious fundamentalist; racist; exclusionary nationalist; anti-immigrant).


591 Local politicians from the party began attacking immigrants in 1979, a position that party leader Mogens Glistrup supported, though it does not appear to have been a prominent aspect of Progress Party elections until 1987. I code the Progress Party for this period as neo-liberal and anti-statist, but not “Radical” as they were as a party not overtly anti-system, anti-democratic or nativist; Andersen, in Hainsworth (ed) 1992.

592 Members of the True Finns, such as Tommy Halme of Helsinki, has shown nativist tendencies in local elections, though they did not represent the party line as of 2006; Wikipedia, “True Finns,” www.wikipedia.org.

593 “Ironically, in view of the party's successful mobilization around this issue, the early FN placed relatively little policy emphasis on the theme of immigration. Anti-communism was a much more prominent component in the Front's discourse.” “In the late 1970s, immigration began to preoccupy the party more, especially with Jean-Pierre Stirbois's recruitment to and ascent within the party.” From Hainsworth, in Hainsworth (ed) (2000).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-The Republicans (1990-)</td>
<td>-German People's Union (1998, 2005-)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Front Line (2000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Popular Orthodox Rally (2004-)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>-Immigration Control Platform (2002-)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Social Movement-Tricolor Flame (1996-Present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-Social Alternative (2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-Dutch People's Union (1977-81)</td>
<td>-None</td>
<td>-Farmer's Party (1967-81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Center Party/Center Party '86 (1981-94)</td>
<td>-None</td>
<td>-Political Reformed Party (1967- )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-List Pim Fortuyn (2002-06)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-Reformed Political Federation (1977-98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>-Progress Party (1989- )</td>
<td>-None</td>
<td>-None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-Democrats (2006)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

594 There is also a splinter of the Popular Orthodox Rally, the Patriotic Alliance, which is nativist but had not contested national elections as of 2006.

595 There is sufficient evidence that the National Alliance broke with fascism in 1995 to no longer categorize it as "Radical Right"; Gallagher, in Hainsworth (ed) (2000).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Nativist?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Spain 2000 (2000-)</td>
<td>Falange (various) (1977-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Party of Union (1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Association of New Political Forces (1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Alliance for National Unity (1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Social Republican Movement (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Sweden Democrats (1988-)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Democrats (2002-)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Socialist Front (2006)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Action for Nation and Homeland/Swiss Democrats (1967-)</td>
<td>Evangelical People’s Party (1967-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>British National Front (1970-83, 1992-)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

597 Golder (2003) does not consider the Swiss People’s Party to be nativist.
Appendix B – Coding Procedures for Chapter 6

General Rules

All electronic information is valid as of 11/01/07.

When possible, each independent variable was collected for the election year in question. When that data was not available, 1) interpolation was used (for example, taking half the difference between the crime rates in 1983 and 1985 for 1984), or 2) when anchor points were not available, data within one year of the election year was used (for example, using 1985’s crime figures for 1984).

For specific inquiries regarding the original data or sourcing, contact the author.

Cross-National Coding

Coding Parties

The methodology for coding parties is described in the main paper. Party descriptions were drawn from the following sources:


Though the Political Handbook only goes back to 1975, it often contained information on party programs from the previous election, and the Hainsworth edited volumes consistently described those earlier elections.

Election Results

National election results were primarily drawn from two databases:


Both accumulate election results from cited national statistical web-sites and election offices. These sources were usually sufficient for all parties receiving more than 2% of the vote in any national election; in most cases the primary sources themselves were used to capture smaller parties. Some individual countries required additional sourcing to capture smaller parties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1966-1979</td>
<td>David Boothroyd, “United Kingdom Election Results,” <a href="http://www.election.demon.co.uk">www.election.demon.co.uk</a>.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Immigration**

All three immigration measures are coded by treating the % of the population as an absolute value (for example, a 10% foreign-born population is a unit value of 10 for variables that capture levels; a change from 10% to 12% is a unit value of 2 for variables that capture changes).

Much of the data on the foreign and foreign-born populations (from 1980 onward) was drawn national statistical agencies or one of the following sources:


All three draw on national sources.
Much of the data on the foreign population from 1970 to 1980, as well as data for the Greek foreign population until 1996 was originally compiled and later made public by Matt Golder:


The procedure for generating the three migration measures was as follows:

1. Data on the foreign and foreign-born populations were taken with a preference for national sources, then UN sources, then OECD, then the Migration Policy Institute, and finally the Golder data if necessary.
2. Where exact figures were not available, the non-Western foreign-born population was generated by taking the known non-Western percentage of the foreign population and applying that percentage to the foreign-born population.
3. For missing data, interpolation was used if two data points were known.
4. When data on the foreign or foreign-born populations for a particular year was not available and interpolation was not possible, data from the year after was used. If this was not available, the year before was used. If neither was available, the data was treated as missing.
5. When all else failed, I employed a “20/80 Rule”: if there was missing data on the Western/non-Western distribution and interpolation was impossible, a simple function was used based on known migration patterns. The known patterns were 1) that the non-Western portion of the population tended to increase from 1973 onward, even when the total immigrant population shrank and 2) these populations grew much less rapidly when they were very low or very high.

Therefore, if the non-Western portion was between 20% and 80%, a 1 percentage point yearly increase was assumed; otherwise a .1 percentage point yearly increase was assumed. If a country crossed the 20/80 threshold within a period of extrapolation, the new coding year was applied from the year after the threshold was crossed.

This method was most frequently used to determine the non-Western population before 1980. As non-Western immigrant populations were generally smaller in this period, even a relatively large measurement error would only result in a .1 or .2 unit discrepancy (less than 1/3rd of a standard deviation for these variables).

Country-by-country coding procedures are detailed below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Foreign Population</th>
<th>Foreign-Born Population</th>
<th>Non-Western Foreign-Born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Statistics Austria.</td>
<td>Generated using the OECD's FBP data, working backward based on the known net migration rate, collected by Statistics Austria.</td>
<td>1971-2000: OECD data based on FP by country origin. Post-2001: based on known rate of change in the Western/non-Western ratio from 1991-2001 as provided by Migration Information Source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Source(s)</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Statistics Netherlands.</td>
<td>Generated using FP and naturalization data from <em>Statistics Netherlands.</em></td>
<td><em>Statistics Netherlands.</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Unemployment**

Levels and changes in unemployment are measured in the same fashion as immigration (see above). Most data for the period 1973-1990 come from:


Data from 1992 onward collected through Eurostat, the source for the OECD’s standardized figures:


**Crime**

Crime is measured as the crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants. Figures from 1973-99 come from Interpol’s continuous reporting system:


From 2001, this data was collected from various national web-sites (generally the national statistical office or national interior ministry).

**Globalization**

Globalization is measured as the ratio imports and exports to total GDP (with parity = 100) using the Penn World Table:


**Sectoral Employment**

Sectoral employment is measured in the same fashion as immigration and unemployment (see above).

In addition to the Irish National Statistical Office web-site, the following sources were used to acquire figures on sectoral employment (the percentage of the workforce employed in agriculture, manufacturing, and services):


**Electoral Institutions**

The number of districts and seats were taken from:


The mean district magnitude is measured as the division of total districts by total seats. All seats are included in the calculations, whether or not the relevant parties contested them.

**Sub-National Coding**

The six relevant state and national statistical web sites were the primary source of sub-national data, along with their annual national and state statistical yearbooks:


Additional sources are described below. For some variables in the late-1970s/early-1980s, data had to be generated by taking aggregate changes at the State level and imputing
based on the last known district level data. For example, doubling the unemployment rate from 1979 to 1983 in Vienna would double it in each Viennese district, though one district might go from 4-8% and another from 8-16%; as the measurements were taken in terms of absolute values, there is still variation on the relevant explanatory variables.

Additional sources are listed below:

**Elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(district level)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Immigration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(district level)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Unemployment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(district level)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Crime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Wuerttemberg (district level)</td>
<td>Data provided by request to the Landeskriminalamt Baden-Wuerttemberg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steiermark (district level)</td>
<td>Data provided by request to the Landeskriminalamt Steiermark.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C – Interviews and Event Observations

Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany – 92</th>
<th>Austria – 88</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6/04-8/04; 6/05-11/05; 2/06-5/06)</td>
<td>(9/06-6/07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians</td>
<td>Nativist 22</td>
<td>Nativist 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(NPD 8)</td>
<td>(BZOe 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(REP 14)</td>
<td>(FPOe 21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Nativist 43</td>
<td>Non-Nativist 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(CDU 10)</td>
<td>(Greens 13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(FDP 6)</td>
<td>(LiP 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Greens 14)</td>
<td>(KPOe 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(PDS/Left Party 4)</td>
<td>(OeVP 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(SPD 9)</td>
<td>(SPOe 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State/federal officials</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(immigration authorities; security services [Verfassungsschutz])</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social actors</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Unions; churches; immigrant community organizations; groups advocating ethnic tolerance)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academics</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Professors; public opinion researchers)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Event Observations (in which nativist actors took part or organized)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany – 14</th>
<th>Austria – 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REP – 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Election rallies/infostands – 4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Election rallies/infostands – 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(District party meetings – 3)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(District party meetings – 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Parliamentary sessions – 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(International nativist conferences – 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD – 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Demonstrations – 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Election Rallies – 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Counter-Demonstrations – 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Party Days – 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unaffiliated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Movements – 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Joint/Unaffiliated – 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Demonstrations – 4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Conferences – 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Parliamentary sessions – 1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Parliamentary sessions – 1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D – Coding Newspapers

Coding Volume

Newspapers included in the various media analyses were searched for a six-week period before each relevant state or national election. Six weeks represents the outer boundary of the “hot phase” of elections in Austria and Germany, the period when voters are most likely to pay attention to campaign appeals.

For each election period, I collected all articles that included reference to parties that were or would become nativist.

I also collected all articles with titles or sub-titles that made reference to migration and issues related to migration, or that referred to domestic ethnic groups associated with immigrant minorities. I collected this data to represent as a proxy for the salience of immigration in each country for each election period. References to migration or ethnic groups were only included in the count if they referenced events in the country in question; articles about Turks in Germany were counted, but articles about Turkey were not.

A list of search terms (not necessarily comprehensive) is included below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration</th>
<th>Asyl/Asylbewerber (asylum/asylum-seekers); Einwanderer/Einwanderung (immigrant/immigration); Zuwanderer/Zuwanderung (migrant/migration).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issues Related to Migration</td>
<td>Aussiedler/Spaetaussiedler (returnees/late returnees); Gastarbeiter/Gastarbeiter (guest workers); Grune Grenze (what Austrians call their border); Integration; Islam; Moschee (mosque); Multikultural (multi-cultural); Schlepper (smugglers, referring to human trafficking); Schwarzarbeit (illegal employment, which is limited to immigrants).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Minorities</td>
<td>Bosnien (Bosnian); Fremde/Fremd (foreigner/foreign); Italiener (Italian); Kurd; Minderheit (minority); Russen/Russendeutschen (Russians/Russian Germans); Suedlaender (Southerners, usually referring to Yugoslavs); Ueberfremdung (over-foreignization).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coding Content

In addition to volume, I coded the content of the news stories to determine whether recent migrants were being portrayed in a positive, negative, or indifferent light.

Broadly, positive stories focused on the material or social benefits of immigration or successes in integration, negative stories on the problems or costs associated with immigration, and indifferent articles offered statistics or statements without referencing costs or benefits. If the article contained both statistics and a statement of costs or benefits, it was coded with a bias against indifference. Instances of each type of article are included below:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>“African saves German boy.”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Christians in dialogue with Muslims.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Germany needs young foreigners.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indifferent</td>
<td>“Fire in asylum home.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Foreigner discussion again becomes contentious.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Host families sought for foreign students.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“2,000 asylum applicants in April.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>“Army stops refugee invasion.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Counties protest federal law: communities refuse to accept burdens from migration and social insurance.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Muslims warn against spiraling violence.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Jacket thief shoots passerby: 10 years prison for Czech.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Coding Political Content

Finally, I coded the articles to determine whether the stories were initiated by or heavily emphasized political actors. I coded an article as “political” if it was written in response to an action or statement made by a political actor. Articles seeking a politician’s reaction to immigration numbers or covering a scheduled report by a state or national agencies were not coded as political. I coded articles this way to test the alternative hypothesis that domestic elites were driving the change in immigration coverage in the late-1980s and early-1990s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th>“The Union [CDU] wants ‘consequential deportation’ for all foreigners without residence rights.”</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Freedom Party proposes visa restrictions.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Hessen’s Interior Minister warns about Islamists.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Political</td>
<td>“Count of naturalizations doubles: 7.3 million foreigners in Germany.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Female foreigners sprayed with gas.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“New citizens tend toward major parties.”</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Each election is reported using up to three delimitations: support for nativist parties, support for parties “conventionally” coded as Radical Right (using Golder’s [2003] coding), and support for parties I would code as Radical Right. When all three codings would likely agree, only one is presented. When the Radical Right columns would likely agree, only two are presented. Elections where no parties contested have been excluded. For the sources used to accumulate the election results, see Appendix C.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.108%</td>
<td>.682%</td>
<td>.168%</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>.3%</td>
<td>.13%</td>
<td>.14%</td>
<td>.07%; .49%</td>
<td>.18%; .27%</td>
<td>.23%</td>
<td>.07%</td>
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</table>

598 Two elections were held in 1989, though Radical Right parties only contested the first.
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Switzerland</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
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<td>.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.83%</td>
<td>7.6%; 7.6%; 9.7%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.49%</td>
<td>5.5%; 5.5%; 7.5%</td>
<td>.25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.52%</td>
<td>2%; 2%; 4.2%</td>
<td>.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.65%</td>
<td>3.5%; 3.5%; 5.6%</td>
<td>.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.02%</td>
<td>5.5%; 5.5%; 7.8%</td>
<td>.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.04%</td>
<td>8.5%; 8.5%; 10.4%</td>
<td>.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.04%; .13%</td>
<td>22%; 7.1%; 23.8%</td>
<td>.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.05%; .22%</td>
<td>25.2%; 2.7%; 27.02%</td>
<td>.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.07%</td>
<td>27.89%; 1.16%; 30.17%</td>
<td>.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3.02%</td>
<td>25.2%; 2.7%; 27.02%</td>
<td>.76%</td>
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</table>
Appendix F – Net Migration to Germany and Austria

Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net Migration</th>
<th>Per Capita Migration</th>
<th>20 Year Mean 20 Year Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Deviation from 20 Year Mean</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>1950</td>
<td>17,992</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>-20,665</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>-24,722</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>-9,056</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>-9,015</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>26,971</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>50,655</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>48,736</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>222,887</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>240,126</td>
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<td>0.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>240,842</td>
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<td>0.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>302,234</td>
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<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>93,562</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>-204,808</td>
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<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
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<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>544,046</td>
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<td>0.13</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>547,085</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>382,069</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>283,939</td>
<td>0.46</td>
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<td>1973</td>
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</tr>
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<td>0.32</td>
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<td>0.32</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>1978</td>
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<td>0.39</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>193,247</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

599 Total population data taken from the Federal Statistical Office (www.destatis.org); migration data taken from the Bundesauslaenderbeauftragte, “Cross-border-migration of non-nationals.”

600 The first mean averages the first 10 years, the second 11 and so on until 20 years of observations are available. Afterward, the 20-year rolling mean is taken.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net Migration</th>
<th>Per Capita Migration</th>
<th>20 Year Per Capita Mean</th>
<th>20 Year Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Deviation from 20 Year Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>0.69</td>
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<td>314,998</td>
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<td>-0.32</td>
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<td>0.34</td>
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<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

601 The first mean averages the first 10 years, the second 11 and so on until 20 years of observations are available. Afterward, the 20-year rolling mean is taken.

### Austria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Net Migration</th>
<th>Per-Capita Migration</th>
<th>20 Year Mean Per Capita Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Deviation from 20 Year Mean</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0.26</td>
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<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.35</td>
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<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>36,297</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.29</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>50,582</td>
<td>0.62</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>49,172</td>
<td>0.60</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>27,477</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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604 The first data point averages the first 10 years, the second 11 and so on until 20 years of observations are available. Afterward, the 20-year rolling mean is taken.
Bibliography I – Primary/Non-academic Sources (Chapters 1-5, 7)

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