Blue Helmed Dragons: Explaining China’s Participation in United Nations Peace Operations

by

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Blue-Helmeted Dragons
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Abstract

China’s personnel contributions to United Nations peace operations has significantly increased in the first decade of the twenty-first century, however little academic or policy attention has been given to examining patterns of Chinese participation. Most current literature examines China’s voting behavior on peace operations in the UN Security Council.

This thesis employs a research design that combines quantitative and qualitative approaches to assess the drivers behind China’s personnel contributions to peace operations. Specifically, the thesis examines the factors that lead China to deploy large contingents of peacekeepers to some missions and smaller numbers or none to others. The thesis posits that China’s personnel contributions will be higher in peace operations taking place in states that have a high strategic value to China. That is, the peace operation host state is important to China because of the presence of natural resources, Chinese investment, diplomatic interests, or a variety of other factors. The thesis finds that China’s participation in peace operations after 2000 is guided by a realist motivation that seeks to maximize access to commercial and diplomatic interests, with higher levels of participation in states with high strategic values. Prior to 2000, fewer Chinese personnel were deployed to peace operations, and the states where they were deployed often had little strategic value to China. These findings suggest that the calculus behind China’s peace operations participation, and perhaps China’s foreign policy, shifted from improving China’s international image to supporting China’s economic and diplomatic development.

Understanding China’s participation in peace operations is important as it may shed light on broader concepts in Chinese foreign and military policy. An enhanced understanding of the motivations guiding China’s participation may provide academics and policymakers with deeper insight into Chinese foreign policy that may help shape future interaction with the People’s Republic of China.

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Common Acronyms and Definitions

CPA: Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan, 2005)
CNPC: China National Petroleum Corporation
EU: European Union
EUFOR: European Union Force
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment
FPU: Formed Police Unit
GoS: Government of Sudan
JEM: Justice and Equality Movement (Sudan)
MINUSTAH: UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUC: UN Organizational Mission in the DRC
OMA: UN Office of Military Affairs
ONUB: UN Operation in Burundi
ONUMOZ: UN Operation in Mozambique
PKO: Peacekeeping operation
PLA: People’s Liberation Army (People’s Republic of China)
SPLM/A: Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
UN: United Nations
UNAMID: AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMSIL: UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNIFIL: UN Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKOM: UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNOCI: UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
UNOMIL: UN Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL: UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNMEE: UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIBH: UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK: UN Interim Administration in Kosovo
UNMIL: UN Mission in Liberia
UNMISS: UN Mission in the Sudan
UNMIT: UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNTAC: UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET: UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTSO: UN Truce Supervision Organization
ZPEB: Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau

Mission Country: The primary unit of analysis in this thesis. Many UN operations occur in more than one state, resulting in multiple mission countries for each operation. For instance two mission-countries make up the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Ethiopia is viewed as one mission country and Eritrea is treated as a separate case. This both expands the universe of cases and allows for the explanatory variable to be coded for each peace operation host state instead of being averaged across multiple mission countries.
Introduction and Summary Findings

"The major powers are withdrawing from the peacekeeping role.... China felt it is the right time for us to fill this vacuum. We want to play our role."

-Wang Guangya
China's Permanent Representative to the UN

Introduction

China’s personnel contributions to United Nations peace operations have drastically increased since Beijing deployed its first two military observers to the Middle East in 1990. Between 2000 and 2008 alone, the number of Chinese forces supporting United Nations operations jumped from just 53 to over 2000, with Chinese observers, troops and police deployed on missions throughout the world. Although China’s contributions still represent only a fraction of the total United Nations peace operations force, China’s increased participation has garnered the attention of policymakers and analysts, some who view China’s peacekeeping as one method of expanding Beijing’s international access and influence.1 Despite the policy implications of China’s international development, and subsequent academic attention, no published research examines the strategic rationale for China’s participation in peace operations. Existing literature concentrates on the various political considerations that have led to expanded Chinese participation in United Nations peace operations, but does not attempt to explain the relationship between realist strategic factors like the presence of natural resources in a peace operations host state and China’s deployment of peacekeepers there.

This thesis attempts to fill this gap in the literature by asking the question: what factors drive China’s participation in United Nations peace operations? Is China

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motivated by protecting markets for Chinese goods, securing access to natural resources, and developing its own sphere of influence? Or do these realist considerations have little to do with China’s peace operation participation calculus? This thesis examines China’s participation by first clarifying a realist explanatory theory for China’s peace operations contributions and then tests the theory empirically. The theory posited in this work suggests that China’s personnel contributions to a given United Nations peace operation are positively related to the strategic value of the mission host state, which is measured using indicators for resource wealth, economic ties with China, and other security or influence based indicators. The theory is derived from western analysis of China’s growing international roles and further developed by integrating concepts from Chinese government documents and publications by Chinese academics. This theory is then tested using a unique triangulation method that includes statistical analysis, medium-N analysis, and case studies, which allows for a study of both general trends and causal linkages.

Given the lack of complete information and the role of individual decision making elites in the policy process, it is virtually impossible for an academic study to capture all of the factors that may influence China’s peacekeeping policy. Thus, this thesis examines peace operation participation using factors that have been discussed as drivers of China’s foreign policy in existing literature.

The theory proposed in this thesis has substantial relevance in both international relations and policymaking, and spans across the subfields of international relations, security studies, and international political economy. While peace operations are a relatively minor activity in the realm of international security, China’s increasing participation is notable for a variety of reasons that make the issue worthy of study. First,
the decision by a nation to put its military and police personnel in harm’s way sheds light on a state’s interests. A government will likely deploy its service members to a potentially hostile environment only if their presence will serve some interest of the deploying state. Second, studying China’s participation in peace operations enhances academic understanding of China’s foreign and military policies. Although the Chinese government has made significant progress in increasing transparency in recent years, many military issues are still cloaked in secrecy. While information about Chinese military assistance, training exercises, and deployments is generally scarce, the location, number, and types of personnel China deploys on United Nations peace operations is publicly available through the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This information can be examined along with other publicly available information to allow outsiders to investigate Chinese foreign policy motivations. Third, identifying the strategic considerations that guide China’s peacekeeping calculus will help researchers and policymakers better understand why China deploys its peacekeeping forces. This deeper understanding potentially allows for prediction of China’s participation in future peace operations, although predicting and explaining interventions is admittedly a difficult task that lacks parsimony.

Summary Findings

The statistical analysis, medium-N analysis, and case studies all indicate that China’s participation in United Nations peace operations in the twenty-first century is

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2 China understands the risks involved with deploying its forces on peace operations. Eight Chinese soldiers have been killed in the line of duty and many others have been injured since China began its peace operation participation in 1990. See Su Qiang and Le Tian, “Peacekeeping – a rising role for China’s PLA” China Daily, 24 July 2007.


guided by China’s desire to enhance its global diplomatic and commercial access as part of China’s peaceful development. Strategic drivers such as the presence of oil reserves, trade, and the ability to exert diplomatic influence in a peace operation host state tend to result in the deployment of Chinese peacekeepers. Although the statistical analysis fails to produce substantive and significant findings, it does identify trends of larger personnel contributions to missions in states with higher strategic values. The medium-N analysis, however, finds that potential strategic drivers are absent from many of the states where China deploys peacekeepers prior to 2000, suggesting that China had a different rationale for peace operations participation during that period. Additionally, the analysis finds that pre-2000 deployments consist primarily of military observers while significantly larger post-2000 contributions include troops and police in addition to military observers. These findings imply that China’s post-2000 participation may be driven by a realpolitik motivation aimed at securing access to commercial or diplomatic interests in a peace operation host state, while pre-2000 participation was based less on strategic drivers than on a desire to demonstrate that China was a responsible actor in the international community.

**Overview**

The first chapter of this thesis offers a brief historical discussion of China’s participation in UN peace operations. Historical accounts combined with primary sources such as media reports and speeches provide readers with an overview of China’s past and current interventions. This overview outlines the missions in which China has deployed its peace operations forces and discusses the changing composition of these forces over time. The second chapter reviews existing literature on general peace operations theory and
China-specific peace operations theory and provides the foundation for the alternate theory for China’s contributions to UN peace operations. The realist theory is presented in Chapter Three and is informed by western and Chinese academic and policy literature on China’s “peaceful development” and Chinese government white papers. The fourth chapter describes the methodological approach of the empirical analysis. It presents the research design and includes a discussion of this project’s scope conditions and identifies key variables, variable measures, data sources, and case selection for each component of the triangulation method. The fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters discuss the findings of the statistical analysis, medium-N study, and case studies, respectively. Both the medium-N analysis and case studies offer a more nuanced examination of causal mechanisms that explain the trends found by regression analysis in chapter five. The eighth and final chapter summarizes the findings of this thesis and offers policy implications for the international community and pathways for future research.
Chapter One

A Brief History of China’s Participation in UN Peace Operations

The People’s Republic of China joined the United Nations in 1971 but avoided voting for, or participating in peace operations, which it viewed as an infringement on the sovereignty of states. This position was largely fueled by China’s “victim mentality” complex in which China viewed itself as being the target of great power aggression and exploitation. China argued that their position was consistent with the UN Charter, which states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” China also feared that UN peace operations would set the stage for further intervention by world powers. Huang Hua, China’s first delegate to the United Nations after Beijing regained its seat in 1971 believed that peace operations such as the United Nations Emergency Force would bring “infinite evil consequences in its wake and pave the way for further international intervention in the Middle East with superpowers as behind the scene bosses.” Additionally, resource constraints limited China’s potential participation in peace operations during this time. Throughout the 1970s, China’s resources were allocated to providing defensive capabilities against a possible attack from the Soviet Union as well as delivering aid to the Third World.

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8 Yin 2007: 19.
Over time, however, China shifted its position on peace operations from non-voting and principled opposition to voting with principled opposition through abstention. Vetoing missions could have compromised China’s relations with Third World countries by obstructing missions that could potentially help them, while voting in favor of missions could compromise China’s positions on state sovereignty and non-intervention.\(^9\) In 1981, China voted for the first time to support a peacekeeping force when it supported the extension of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. China justified this decision by arguing that a strengthened United Nations was critical as the international situation became more tumultuous and unstable.\(^10\) The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh National Conference of the Communist Party of China in 1978 had adopted a policy of opening up and reform, which led to greater engagement in international issues and multilateral diplomacy.\(^11\) Despite its growing support of UN peace operations, China did not deploy its forces on peace operations until 1990. As with earlier periods, China’s actions were constrained by resource limitations. Throughout the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping focused China’s development on economic reforms, allocating most resources for economic development, leaving little funding for contributions to peace operations.\(^12\)

By 1990, China had been admitted to the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping and had deployed its first military observers to the United Nations Truce Supervision in the Middle East. China’s first deployment of military units on a peace operation occurred between April 1992 and September 1993 when China sent a total of 800 engineering troops to the United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Mission Date</th>
<th>China Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO: UN Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>1948-1990</td>
<td>1990-</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMOGIP: UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</td>
<td>1949-</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFICYP: UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</td>
<td>1964-</td>
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<td>UNDOF: UN Disengagement Force</td>
<td>1974-</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIFIL: UN Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
<td>1978-2006</td>
<td>2006-</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGOMAP: UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
<td>1988-1990</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAG: UN Transition Assistance Group</td>
<td>1989-1990</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUCA: UN Observer Group in Central America</td>
<td>1989-1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAVEM II: UN Angola Verification Mission II</td>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMTC: UN Advance Mission in Cambodia</td>
<td>1991-1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II: UN Operation in Somalia II</td>
<td>1993-1995</td>
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<td>UNOMIG: UN Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
<td>1993-</td>
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<td>UNMIH: UN Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>1993-1996</td>
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<td>UNAMIR: UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
<td>1993-1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCR: UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia</td>
<td>1995-1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPREDEP: UN Preventive Deployment Force</td>
<td>1995-1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIBH: UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1995-2002</td>
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<td>UNTAES: UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Branja, and Western Sirium</td>
<td>1996-1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMOP: UN Mission of Observers in Prevalla</td>
<td>1996-2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUGUA: UN Verification Mission in Guatemala</td>
<td>1997-1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTMH: UN Transition Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>1997-1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINOPUH: UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK: UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
<td>1999-2004</td>
<td>2004-</td>
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<td>MONUC: UN Organization Mission in the DRC</td>
<td>2000-2001</td>
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<td>UNMIL: UN Mission in Liberia</td>
<td>2003-2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI: UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>2004-2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH: UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>2004-2004</td>
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<td>UNMIS: UN Mission in the Sudan</td>
<td>2005-2005</td>
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<td>UNAMID/ AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
<td>2007-2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>MINURCAT: UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
<td>2007-</td>
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Note: Missions with no end date are ongoing as of December 2008.
The number of Chinese forces deployed on peace operations decreased after that with China concentrating on smaller deployments of observers and civilian police officers rather than formed military units. However the start of the 21st century marked a significant shift in China's contributions to UN peace operations. China drastically increased its contributions to peace operations, and the composition of China's contributions shifted from military observers to police and military units. Graph 1, above, displays the deployment of Chinese and United Nations forces from 2000 to 2008 and Table 1, above displays the missions where China has deployed forces since 1990. As of December 2008, China had more than 2000 personnel deployed on UN peace operations throughout the world, a majority of which serve in Africa.

Another significant trend in China's peace operations contributions is a shift in the type of personnel China deploys on UN missions. Graph 2, below, displays the shift from unarmed military observers and civilian police to military troops that has occurred since 2000. Although China generally deploys engineering, transportation, and medical military units rather than combat forces like infantry, the presence of formed military units is likely more visible in the host state and may enable China to influence the host state government.

The quantitative increase in forces, the shift in Chinese peace force composition, and potential policy implications makes this currently understudied area well-suited for research that attempts to explain how Beijing decides where to deploy its peace forces.

Chapter Two

Review of Existing Literature Review

Despite a sizeable body of literature on United Nations peace operations and China’s growing global influence, existing literature does not explain the link between strategic drivers of China’s rise and its participation in United Nations peace operations. Current literature on the rise of China focuses primarily on military modernization and expanded ties with the developing world, largely neglecting the role of peace operations. The limited literature that does touch upon the area focuses largely on assessing China’s PKO participation based on China’s acceptance of international norms and the mandate of a mission, rather than on the strategic considerations that may influence China to participate in certain PKOs while refraining from deploying personnel in others. Additionally, the body of literature on peace operations today is generally concentrated on analyzing mission effectiveness and focuses on policymaking rather than drawing connections to international relations theory. This thesis attempts to address both policy and theory by drawing on IR theory and empirical and case study analysis to explain China’s peacekeeping policies.

Chinese peacekeeping practitioners suggest that China’s policy toward participation in the UN peacekeeping regime is guided by China’s national interests and comprehensive national capabilities—in other words, its grand strategy.\textsuperscript{14} China’s participation in UN peace operations increases its influence both in the United Nations and in weak regions of the world, where China’s presence in peacekeeping missions may

\textsuperscript{14} Yin, 2007: 14.
discourage Taiwan from using financial incentives to gain diplomatic recognition.  

Active participation in peace operations also lessens the fear of a potential China threat by projecting an image of China as a responsible actor to the governments of both developing and developed nations. Participation also balances against the United States by promoting multilateralism in international security efforts. Deploying peacekeeping personnel also allows China’s military and police forces to gain first-hand experience at a very low cost.

Since the end of the Cold War there have been fifty-four UN peace operations, of which China has participated in twenty-two. The expansion of UN peace operations has increased the UN’s demand for trained troops, civilian police, and military observers. However, since the UN does not maintain a standing army, it must solicit contributions of personnel and equipment from member states. To do this, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations considers factors such as geographic balance, political neutrality and past peacekeeping record of various member states, and drafts a list of potential contributors. Member states then make the decision on whether to participate.

Two competing arguments attempt to explain states participation in peace operations. The first suggests that states peacekeep not for out of state level motivations reasons, but instead do so in the interest of the international community. This idealist view suggests that peacekeeping participation transcends self-interested national objectives and argues that states will participate in UN peacekeeping missions out of an obligation to

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16 Yin, 2007: 11.
17 Yin, 2007: 11.
18 Thompson, 2007.
preserve peace and international norms, even when doing so conflicts with national interests. The realist argument, on the other hand, posits that states participate in the UN peacekeeping regime out of self-interest. Participation in UN peace operations allows a state to protect or attain its current or desired position in the international system or to benefit from access to a set of private goods. Realist drivers for China include balancing against the power of the United States, improving China’s power projection, building China’s international influence, and securing access to critical private goods such as energy resources. As discussed earlier, this thesis tests the realist theory behind China’s peacekeeping participation.

If China’s peacekeeping policy is driven by realist motivations, it should not participate in peace operations purely for altruistic reasons. China selectively engages in peace operations, choosing to participate in missions that are in line with China’s grand strategy and promote China’s interests. Miller (1998) cites intrinsic interests including the geostrategic importance of the region, the economic resources located there, and the importance of the region for trade and investments as factors that drive a state to intervene. Extrinsic interests are based on the geographical proximity of the potential intervention host state and the intervening power. Boulding (1962) offers the concept of a “loss of strength gradient” in which states receive a lower marginal utility from

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21 Ibid: 181-196
22 Yin, 2007: 11.
25 Ibid: 82. Although Miller focuses on interventions by the United States, general concepts are applicable to actors other than the United States.
dominating a region that is farther from an intrinsically important state. Miller argues that although extrinsic interests are important, intrinsic interests are the most vital form of interests to the potential intervener as they have the potential to affect the global balance of power. States that lack extrinsic and intrinsic interests are considered to be low-interest regions as they are far from the hegemon and lack geostrategic and economic importance. While a state may intervene in regions that lack intrinsic or extrinsic value to defend its international reputation, the intervention is likely to be limited at most. Norms and idealist interests however can be used to legitimize more realist interventions that are designed to secure and protect intrinsic and extrinsic interests.

Participation in peace operations can also provide China with a variety of private goods such as access to natural resources, diplomatic influence, and markets for produced goods. Bobrow and Boyer (1997) find that through peacekeeping large powers may gain access to conducive economic and commercial conditions, increased national status, training benefits from military participation in a peace operation, and reimbursement in hard currency for troops. Neack (1995) suggests that many nations peacekeep to spread or maintain their spheres of influence. For instance, the United States discouraged UN peacekeeping in Central American and the Caribbean until the late 1980s in order to minimize foreign influence in the region. China’s personnel contributions to peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and East Timor may be explained by Beijing’s

desire to increase its regional influence, while more recent missions in Africa may reflect China’s growing interest in a region currently outside the influence of any major power.

Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin build on the regional influence explanation for participating in peace operations. While Bellamy and his co-authors explain why an individual state would act unilaterally, as a pivotal actor, in a peace operation, their theory may also explain why a state chooses to participate in peace operations carried out by an international organization. First, regional hegemons may take part in peacekeeping in order to “press their own claims to territory, economic benefits or access to natural resources, or support the socio-political ambitions of allies.” Second, concerned neighbors might intervene as pivotal states when internal conflict occurs in their own backyard to prevent a spill-over effect that could decrease regional stability. Lastly, great powers might act as pivotal states in initiating and leading peace operations in order to maintain their position in the international status quo.  

In addition to the private goods gained through peace operations participation, Bobrow and Boyer suggest that peacekeeping is an “impure public good” that provides states with additional benefits. Peace operations meet the traditional definition of a public good in that peacekeeping is non-excludable; all nations can participate and benefit from peacekeeping. However, unlike traditional public goods like those defined by Mancur Olson, peacekeeping is impure because certain states receive a higher level of benefit, and are therefore more likely to participate when there is a higher level of benefit associated with participation than with non-participation.  

While all states theoretically benefit from the lower levels of violence that can follow successful peace operations, states with

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greater economic or political interests in a peace operation host nation have the potential to earn a higher payoff from the stability in that country. Thus, according to this theory, stability serves as both an idealist and realist motivator that promotes international norms of human rights while facilitating commercial and economic development for the intervening power.

China’s growing participation in international and regional organizations has been explained as part of China’s attempts to become a responsible actor in international society. China initially opposed many international organizations, which it viewed as being controlled by the two Cold War superpowers. China’s conception of these organizations has changed drastically since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Initially, China did not meet all the criteria required of a responsible actor in the global community, which include good governance, willingness to engage in humanitarian intervention, and the protection of human rights. Over time, however, China attempted to change its international image, developing diplomatic relations with other states and playing a more active role in the international community. China’s continuing integration into the international community may lead it to weaken its traditional concept of national sovereignty.

Current literature on China’s PKO participation is limited to a handful of articles that primarily rely on case studies to explain the political and international norm based considerations of peace operations participation. These articles generally focus on China’s Security Council voting behavior on peace operations, and not on personnel contributions.

33 Ibid: 3.
Historically, China has generally voted for traditional peacekeeping operations and opposed nontraditional peace enforcement operations.\textsuperscript{35} China's rationale for this is shaped by Beijing's conception of national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{36} Chinese leaders fear that the United Nations could become a "supra-national government" that could usurp power from sovereign states. Thus, China opposed nontraditional peacekeeping, which Beijing viewed as impinging on state sovereignty by violating the principles of nonviolence, host state consent to a peace operation, and impartiality of peacekeeping forces.\textsuperscript{37} China may fear that voting for nontraditional PKOs could set a precedent that would allow for foreign intervention if ethnic violence erupted in minority areas of China like Tibet and Xinjiang.\textsuperscript{38} Given these concerns and China's support for state sovereignty, China is reluctant to participate in or support non-traditional PKOs that fail to uphold this holy trinity of peacekeeping.

Despite China's strong support for state sovereignty, there has been a transition in Beijing's attitude in this regard. Gill and Reilly (2000) argue that because of increasing global economic integration and interdependence, China's notions of state sovereignty may be made subordinate to advancing China's overall national interests.\textsuperscript{39} Thus, if China hopes to improve its "comprehensive national power," it must cooperate with the international society and modify its views on national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{40} China has

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Fravel, 1996: 1109.
\item Gill and Reilly, 2000: 43.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
demonstrated a shift in this direction in its peacekeeping policy, particularly in the types of cases subject to intervention, the acceptable levels of force, and justifiable objectives.\textsuperscript{41} Gill and Reilly find substantial evidence for these paradigmatic shifts in China’s 1998 White Paper on National Defense. The White Paper suggests that it is not necessary for all parties in a host state to consent to UN involvement and also does not explicitly exclude the use of force in peace operations.\textsuperscript{42} This flexibility enabled China to support and participate in missions that deviated from traditional peace operations.

Another factor influencing the shift in China’s position on peace operations that has allowed China to participate in a wider spectrum of non-traditional missions is the evolution of the domestic decision making environment.\textsuperscript{43} One school of thought is that China has internalized changes in international norms. Chen (2009) suggests that China’s increased participation in non-traditional peace operations comes as a result of China internalizing and institutionalizing a shift in international norms that today prioritizes human rights rather than sovereignty.\textsuperscript{44} Another complementary theory is that a new cadre of peacekeeping proponents has emerged within various government ministries in China and has promoted China’s expanded role in peace operations.\textsuperscript{45}

China has participated in over a dozen peacekeeping and observer missions since it deployed its first observers in 1989. Of these missions, current literature on China’s peacekeeping participation discusses the same set of examples: Cambodia, East Timor,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Gill and Reilly, 2000: 44.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Gill and Reilly, 2000 and Carlson, 2004 offer variants of this argument.
\item \textsuperscript{44} See Jing Chen, “Explaining the Change in China’s Attitude toward UN Peacekeeping: A Norm Driven Perspective” Journal of Contemporary China 18 (2009).
\item \textsuperscript{45} See Gill and Reilly, 2000 and Chen, 2009.
\end{itemize}
Cambodia is analyzed because it was China’s first large scale deployment of peacekeeping forces. East Timor is a recent example of China’s PKO participation in a traditional peacekeeping environment. Kosovo is used as an example of a PKO that China viewed as violating the holy trinity of peacekeeping and opposed, and Somalia is a rare exception where China supported—but did not contribute personnel to—an operation that was carried out without host nation consent.

In the Cambodian case, China deployed as part of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). China deployed 450 personnel including troops and military observers to help demobilize warring factions, repatriate refugees, and supervise the 1993 national elections. China’s leaders praised UNTAC as a highly successful example of peacefully resolving regional conflicts. Fravel (1996) notes, however, that the image of UNTAC as a success does not imply China’s endorsement of similar operations in other countries, because UNTAC was not a traditional PKO. The mission was established with the consent of the four belligerents and adhered to the principles of non-violence and peacekeeper neutrality, but it infringed on the sovereignty of the Cambodian government by assuming many governmental roles. Fravel (1996) argues that China likely participated to improve its international reputation and regain the trust of Southeast Asian nations after the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Additional possible explanations not discussed by Fravel include China’s desire to limit instability and project power in its periphery. These factors could be analyzed as part of this research design because maintaining regional stability can be considered a strategic objective of a state.

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46 See Carlson, Fravel, Gill and Reilly, Choeden.
47 Fravel, 1996: 1110.
48 Fravel, 1996: 1109.
Most scholars describe the UN Mission in East Timor as a case where China played a pivotal role in a PKO, once Indonesian consent was received. China sent election observers, supported a multinational non-UN force to quell violence, and contributed civilian police to the UN mission. China cited the humanitarian crisis as one of the primary reasons why it chose to support a PKO in East Timor, possibly indicating that China was trying to solidify its position as a responsible regional actor. Scholars further suggest that the close proximity of the conflict to China influenced China's decision to undertake an active role in this PKO.\(^49\) The proximity of a nation to China should therefore be considered a factor that contributes to a country’s strategic value to China. China’s decision to peacekeep because of the geographic proximity of East Timor to China in this case helps to emphasize the realist nature of China’s peacekeeping.

On the other hand, China was strongly opposed to the UN mission in Kosovo because it viewed the conflict as a domestic one. China fears that intervening in domestic disputes could lead other powers to threaten to intervene in internal Chinese disputes. China’s opposition to the intervention in the Kosovo conflict grew when NATO bypassed the Security Council and launched air strikes against Serbian targets. In the eyes of China’s policy makers, this operation violated all elements of the peacekeeping trinity. It violated the sovereignty of a state, relied on military force, and lacked neutrality because it bypassed the UN Security Council.\(^50\)

China’s decision to support peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in Somalia was a departure from the traditional Chinese position to avoid PKOs that violated the trinity of peacekeeping. Choeden (2005) notes that the use of force to try to establish


\(^{50}\) Gill and Reilly, 2000:47.
peace was an ‘exceptional action.’ China justified Chinese support for this mission by suggesting that there was no violation of state sovereignty since there was no stable government in place at the time of the peacekeeping operation. After the operation, Chinese UN representatives argued that the most effective way to settle conflict is through peaceful means.

China’s participation or non-participation in recent peace operations is explained in current literature largely as the result of the political or norms characteristics of the peacekeeping mission. This explanation appears to assume that China’s policy makers are only concerned with promoting state sovereignty or international norms, and not with broader strategic factors. Yet such an assumption seems to contradict the theory that China’s participation in international peacekeeping is a critical component of China’s economic development and growth and its overall grand strategy.

China’s participation in peacekeeping is a constantly evolving field that demands continual academic attention in order to keep pace with China’s expanding and evolving role. Thus, even though most China-focused literature on peacekeeping was published within the last decade, much of it is already dated. One key example of this is the 2000 finding that “China has repeatedly used its UN veto to block the implementation of PKOs in states that established diplomatic ties with Taiwan.” While China has and still attempts to block some PKOs in states with diplomatic relations with Taiwan, in 2004, China deployed one of its most heavily armed peacekeeping forces to Haiti, a country that has recognized Taipei since 1956. China’s participation and support of PKOs in countries with

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51 Choeden, 2005: 47.
53 Gill and Reilly, 2000: 46.
ties to Taiwan may indicate a new strategic focus in China’s PKO participation policy that is analyzed in this thesis.

This thesis moves beyond the current literature explaining China’s participation in peacekeeping in several ways. First, it presents a new, yet complementary, theory based on conventional wisdom that treats China as a realist actor seeking to maximize its global access and influence through participation in UN peacekeeping missions. Second, this thesis closely examines the relationship between China’s peacekeeping calculus and strategic drivers such as natural resources and regional security. And third, this thesis offers the first known quantitative empirical analysis of the peacekeeping participation.
Chapter Three

Theory

There is no question that the current research on China’s shift in peacekeeping policy explains Beijing’s willingness to contribute personnel to a wider range of UN missions. While the current theories offer explanations for the increased potential for China to participate in peace operations, they do not tell us why China contributes forces to some missions and not to others. Drawing from Chinese academic and policy publications and Miller’s theories of intrinsic and extrinsic interests, this thesis proposes an alternative theory for China’s peacekeeping contributions. This new theory, which examines China’s peace operations contributions through a realist lens is compatible with the existing theories. Whereas current theories explain how China justifies participation in the UN peace operations regime, this new theory explains how China decides to contribute forces to some missions and not others.

During the 1990s, China appeared to be developing a new security concept where security included not only military power but also non-military components such as economic growth and security.54 In late 2003, Zheng Bijian, the former Vice Principal of China’s Central Party School, built upon this security concept when he defined China’s peaceful rise.55 The theory argues that despite the historical precedent for conflict during power transition, China would develop peacefully and cooperate with other countries as it

55 In recent years, the phrase peaceful rise has been largely replaced by the phrase peaceful development.
developed "a new international political and economic order." By late 2004, Chinese leaders had replaced the term 'peaceful rise' with 'peaceful development.' The shift was merely a change in terminology designed to better reassure other nations of China's non-threatening intentions, and the fundamental strategy remained unchanged. The spirit of China’s peaceful development is captured by China’s 2005 white paper on its peaceful development.

While seeking development by relying primarily on its own strength, China sticks to the policy of opening-up, engages in extensive international economic and technological cooperation, and shares with all other countries the fruits of mankind's civilization; respects and gives consideration to others' interests, works with other countries to solve the disputes and problems cropping up in cooperation, and strives to achieve mutual benefit and common development; abides by its international obligations and commitments, actively participates in international systems and world affairs, and endeavors to play a constructive and locomotive role.

Increased participation in the international community and economic growth are key components of China’s development. Thus, the Communist Party of China has made economic development its central task, with all their other work subordinate to and serving this goal. In its development, however, China faces a number of challenges including securing international trading partners and ensuring access to critical energy resources to fuel its growth. The Chinese government believes that achieving these goals is closely tied to both internal and external harmony. This argument is echoed by

60 China’s Peaceful Development Road, Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 12 December 2005.
Chinese scholars who suggest that China will be unable to concentrate on development without a peaceful and stable international environment.61

Additionally, the significant increase in China’s peace operation deployments in the early 2000s coincides with the announcement of China’s “going out policy.” In 2002, the Chinese government launched an official campaign urging firms to “go out” and increase investment overseas.62 The campaign was initiated partly in response to China’s growing demand for natural resources and raw materials that were needed to fuel China’s domestic modernization and growth. Due to the size of its population and resource constraints on the Chinese mainland, China was unable to meet these demands through domestic production. The increase in Chinese peace operations deployments following the announcement of the going out policy lends additional support to the argument that China’s participation in peace operations is partially motivated by a desire to secure resource inputs and markets overseas.

Another key component of China’s peaceful development is the principle of win-win cooperation and mutual benefit.63 According to this ideology, which is based in part on China’s perception of long being exploited and humiliated by imperialist “big powers,” China will modernize and expand its global power without taking advantage of potential trade partners.64 Beijing will expand its market access while also “support[ing] international efforts to help developing countries to strengthen capacity for independent

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63 China’s Peaceful Development Road.
64 China’s Peaceful Development Road.
development and improving the lives of their peoples.” While current discussion of win-win cooperation in Chinese and international media has focused primarily on Chinese-funded public works projects in exchange for resource extraction concessions, the promise of stability offered by a robust peacekeeping force may be seen as a potential “win” or benefit for a peace operation host state. In exchange for offering a state the opportunity for a more stable future, China can benefit from increased trade and resource access or enhanced diplomatic relations. The quid pro quo exchange of a large Chinese peacekeeping deployment for diplomatic recognition was demonstrated in 2003 when China withheld deploying its peacekeepers to the UN Mission in Liberia until that country broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

Elements of China’s peaceful development have also been described as part of China’s post-Cold War grand strategy. This speculative grand strategy features four notional axioms: avoiding conflict, building comprehensive national power, advancing incrementally, and maintaining stability, defending sovereignty, achieving preeminence, and pursuing parity. China’s participation in peace operations is in line with each of these four principles. Chinese support of peace operations allows Beijing to avoid direct conflict with the United States by demonstrating its commitment to becoming a responsible actor in the international system while avoiding large deployments to focal points of United States foreign policy, like Southwest Asia. Chinese participation in peace operations also allows China to build its comprehensive national power, a measure of economic, military, and technological capabilities that Chinese strategists use to

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67 The large deployment of Chinese peacekeeping forces to Lebanon in 2006 is an exception to the rule.
measure the relative strength of nations. Deploying peacekeepers improves military readiness by offering hands-on training to Chinese peacekeeper and allows them to test their skills and equipment in an operational environment. Chinese participation in peace operations also provides China with a means to incrementally advance its global status. An analyst at the Central Party School, the high-level institution which trains Chinese Communist Party officials, suggested that the post-September 11th environment has created a period of strategic opportunity for China as the United States focuses on waging the Global War on Terrorism. According to the Central Party School analyst, China must use this opportunity to improve US-Sino relations and "create favorable conditions for the creation of an external environment for China after the 'period of strategic opportunity.'" Part of creating a favorable 'external environment,' includes building diplomatic and economic ties. In recent years, China has used the promise of providing peacekeeping forces to gain diplomatic recognition from peace operation host states, such as Liberia, which broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan after China threatened to withhold deploying peacekeepers to the UN Mission in Liberia. Participating in peace operations also allow China to ensure a favorable international environment, thereby maintaining stability.

Participation in peace operations is therefore very much in accord with China’s peaceful development and the overall national strategy of China given Beijing’s desire for growth and the necessity for a stable international environment to enable the country’s rise. China’s 2005 peaceful development white paper stresses the importance of participating in a "new security concept...to safeguard world peace, security and stability"

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and emphasizes China’s growing participation in peacekeeping. By contributing forces to peace operations, China not only enhances stability and appears to the world as a responsible actor, but also gains access to the impure public goods and private goods that Bobrow and Boyer describe as an incentive for peacekeeping participation. China’s participation may allow it to increase its political influence, gain access to new markets or sources of natural resources, and improve its international reputation by demonstrating its commitment to international organizations and human rights. Thus, China is able to integrate both idealist and realist concepts in facets of its peaceful development, including peace operations participation. China ostensibly pursues an idealist agenda by promoting a peaceful international environment, but acts as a realist in promoting this harmonious world so that it can pursue its own national interests.

The theory proposed in this thesis posits that China’s peacekeeping contributions are motivated by ensuring a stable environment in a peace operation host state so that China can benefit from access to markets, resources, increased influence and soft power projection. In order to operationalize and test the theory, this thesis treats each peace operation host state as having a specific strategic value to China. This strategic value is based on key measurable intrinsic interests, such as trade and the host state’s energy resource endowment, and the extrinsic interest of geographic proximity. The theory suggests that these interests help shape China’s peacekeeping calculus. Academic articles published by former Chinese diplomats and policymakers capture this sentiment. Pei Yuanying, a former Chinese ambassador to India and Poland, suggests that “Diplomatic strategy requires distinguishing between core interests, important interests and general

71 China’s Peaceful Development Road.
interests, between immediate interests and long-term interests, and between local interests and overall interests. *The core interests, long-term interests and overall interests of our country should be the starting point and end result of our foreign policy.*”

Based on the theory posited above, this thesis hypothesizes that China is a realist actor that is likely to deploy a larger number of personnel to peace operations in countries that are more economically or diplomatically valuable to China, either now or in the foreseeable future. Arguably every UN member state is diplomatically important to China because of their votes at the UN. The importance China places on winning the support of these states is made clear by Beijing’s recent diplomatic and economic overtures to small, resource scarce states. While China has provided developmental assistance and diplomatic recognition to these states, China will likely be more willing to deploy personnel to a state where they will receive a larger payoff than a UN vote. Deploying peace operations forces helps to establish regional stability, which may be a precondition to accessing markets or resource concessions. In addition to increased stability, a force contributor may hope to enhance their relation with the government of the peace operation host state. The large-N, medium-N, and case study analysis attempts to address this hypothesis and causal mechanisms.

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73 Pei, 2006: 122.
74 Beijing has gained diplomatic recognition of small Caribbean states such as Grenada.
Chapter Four

Methodology

The relative paucity of data related to China’s participation in peace operations leads to the use of a triangulated research design to test the realist theory proposed in this thesis. The limited availability of complete data on China’s personnel contributions to UN peace operations combined with missing data on key indicators of the explanatory variable makes a large-N analysis alone a weak test for the theory proposed by this research. This thesis strengthens this test by triangulating the findings of regression analysis with a qualitative medium-N analysis and a set of case studies. The large-N component of the research is designed to capture general trends and relationships between the strategic value to China of a peace operation host state with the level of China’s participation in the peace operation in the given state. The medium-N analysis seeks to clarify causal mechanisms by more closely examining the various indicators of the explanatory variables, while the case studies allow for closer examination of details in significant cases of Chinese participation. The analysis conducted in this thesis is organized so the large-N analysis provides a general trend, while the following two forms of analysis provide a greater level of detail and insight.

The universe of cases for this thesis consists of the fifty-four UN peace operations that were either ongoing in 1990 or launched since 1990 through December 2008, as listed
by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008 List of Operations.\textsuperscript{76} This includes 24 missions where China has contributed forces and 30 missions where China does not contribute forces. Both interventions and non-interventions are included in the large and medium-N studies because China, which began playing a more active role in the UN peace operations regime at the end of the Cold War in 1990, could have potentially contributed personnel to any of the missions from 1990 until December 2008. Including cases of non-intervention in the analysis allows for examination of variation on indicators for the explanatory variable to determine if low measures of strategic value result in a non or low intervention. Cases are examined at the mission-country level, meaning that each of the 54 missions is broken into an observation for each mission host state. Thus, there is one observation for missions deployed to intrastate conflict zones and multiple observations for those deployed to interstate conflict zones. The explanatory variables are measured for each individual host state, while the independent variable is measured for the total UN mission. Although there are justifiable concerns about the disaggregating of data on the explanatory and independent variables, it allows for a better examination of the relationship between the strategic value of a host state and China’s personnel contribution level as China may deploy its forces on a mission following an interstate conflict where one of the host states has a high strategic importance and the other does not. Additionally, this technique increases the number of total observations.

4.1 Statistical Analysis

The large-N analysis in this thesis includes roughly 70 observations that fall into the universe of cases described above. Given the relatively small number of observations,
this analysis does not have the statistical strength to serve as a stand-alone study. However, it is valuable to use this method, which is generally associated with analyzing a larger number of observations, to identify trends that can then be further studied by the more nuanced qualitative components of the triangulated research design.

This thesis uses two ordinary least squares regression models to examine the relationship between the strategic value of a peace operation host state and China’s personnel contribution to the operation. In the first model, referred to as the binary model, the dependent variable is coded simply as 1 if China contributes forces, regardless of the number and type of forces. The ordinary least squares method does not produce the best linear unbiased estimator for binary variables due to the nonlinearity of binary dependent variables, which makes it difficult to interpret results. The model is included solely as a reference and basis of comparison with the more appropriate second model. In the second, or percent participation model, the dependent variable is defined as the percent of a given mission made up of Chinese forces over the length of the mission:

\[
\text{ChineseContribution} = \frac{\sum \text{ChineseMissionContribution}}{\sum \text{MissionSize}}
\]

The mission length is defined as the total number of months the mission was in place between January 1990 and December 2008, regardless of whether the mission began and terminated within that period. Mission length is truncated if the mission began prior to 1990 or has yet to terminate. The starting date of the universe of cases coincides with the first year China deployed peace operations forces, while the end date allows analysis through the most recent complete year at the time of writing. Measuring the average

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percent of a force comprised of Chinese forces is a better measure of China’s interest in a mission than using only the Chinese contribution without taking the mission size into account; a deployment of 10 Chinese observers to a mission of 20 total UN personnel is more significant than a deployment of 10 Chinese observes to a mission of 5000 total UN personnel. Admittedly, there are shortcomings to this percent-based measure that could potentially jeopardize the significance of findings. First, the truncation of missions excludes potential future contributions to ongoing missions that could increase the level of Chinese participation. However, truncating the scope of the research is necessary in order to establish an endpoint that allows analysis of the most recent complete year, and existing data should be sufficient for determining trends. Additionally, the percent of a force comprised of Chinese peacekeepers could be artificially low if China waited until the latter portion of the scope of the investigation to deploy personnel to a mission that was launched during the earlier years of the scope of the investigation. For example, China first deployed personnel to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 2006, twenty-eight years after the mission started. Due to the scope of this study, China would have no force contributions from 1990 through 2006, driving down its percent contribution. An alternative method that would eliminate this later concern is to measure the percentage of the total mission force comprised of Chinese forces in the month of peak Chinese contribution. While this would likely lead to a slightly higher percent of Chinese personnel in a given mission force, it is not necessarily representative of Chinese contributions over time.

Data for the personnel contributions to all UN peace operations is gathered from two primary sources. Total Chinese contributions for missions between 1990 and 2004 are
listed in the *White Paper on China's National Defense in 2004*, while the total mission force is obtained from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Data for operations launched since 2005 are available from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in its monthly “Country-Mission” reports, which list the number of civilian police, military observers, and troops deployed on a given mission from each contributing nation. This thesis treats the deployment of Chinese personnel on each mission collectively, rather than separating civilian police, observe and troop deployments. Admittedly, the deployment of troops is far different from the deployment of unarmed military observers and may have different implications for China’s ability to project influence. However, disaggregating the data would result in even fewer observations in an already small sample size. The sample is partitioned by contribution type in the medium-N chapter of this thesis. The length of missions is obtained from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation’s *2008 List of Operations*.

The explanatory variable in this analysis is China’s strategic value for a peace operation host state. Existing literature reveals that China’s strategic interests are driven by the concept of comprehensiveness (quan mian hua), a three-dimensional view that includes the military (security), economic and political spheres.\(^{78}\) Since China’s security strategy is motivated by these areas, this thesis posits that factors related to the three realms determine the “strategic value” that China assigns to a potential PKO-host state. The indicators used to proxy strategic value in this thesis capture measures of key drivers, as identified by current literature, in each of the three areas of security. The security component is proxied by an indicator for the protection of China and its periphery from external intervention, the economic sphere is represented by indicators that measure

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\(^{78}\) Ong, 2007: 12
China’s ability to develop overseas markets or secure inputs for its expanding economy, and the political sphere concentrates on indicators that measure conditions that potentially enable Beijing to expand its political influence globally.  

In an effort to reduce endogeneity, data for explanatory variable indicators is lagged by one year prior to the deployment of Chinese personnel for cases where China intervenes, and by one year prior to the start of the mission for cases where China does not intervene.

**Security Interests**

Current discussion of China’s desire to protect its territory and periphery from US encroachment and intervention focuses primarily on its greater involvement with regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization combined with the development of anti-access capabilities such as diesel-electric submarines and anti-ship missiles. While these are important components of China’s regional security strategy, China may also be able to expand its regional influence and limit the potential encroachment of non-Asian actors, such as the United States, by deploying forces to peace operations that ensure stability in China’s periphery. Preventing the spillover of a crisis or the influx of refugees into China is also a potential security concern.

**Geographic Distance**

The distance between China and a peace operation host nation is one indicator for the security component of a state’s strategic value. China seeks to develop a security environment that will be conducive to its peaceful development and protect itself from

what it views as a possible US encroachment strategy. Accordingly, China has launched diplomatic efforts in its periphery to maximize its regional influence and has ostensibly focused much of its military development on preparing for “local wars.” If China applies this strategy to its peace operations participation calculus, China should represent a large share of total UN personnel deployed to peace operations hosted by countries in its periphery. By filling a high level of the mission force, China can maximize its influence while reducing the potential influence of outside actors who might otherwise fill the open billets in the mission. Thus we expect a strong positive relationship between the geographic proximity of a peace operations host state to China and the level of China’s peacekeeping participation.

\[ H_{\text{distavg}} = \text{China will contribute a higher level of Chinese peace personnel to missions that are geographically closer to China.} \]

Geographic distance is measured using the CEPII Distance Database. CEPII (Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales) is a French economic research center that focuses on the development of databases and analysis of the world economy. The database includes bilateral distances for 225 countries, which is measured in two ways: the variable \( dist \) is the distance between the most important cities in terms of 2004 population and \( dist\text{cap} \) is the distance between capital cities in a given dyad. This thesis averages the distance between capitals and the most important cities, using the variable \( dist\text{avg} \), to capture elements of influence and security. Despite the availability of these data, the measures are less than perfect as the averaged distance may actually be greater than the distance between the closest borders of China and a peace operation host

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nation. For instance, the distance between the Cambodian and Chinese borders is far less
than the distance between Beijing and Phnom Penh. However, attempting to determine the
closest points between two nations using software such as Google Earth proved to be
difficult and highly unreliable with a low degree of inter-coder consistency.

Commercial and Economic Interests

Resources

Much current literature suggests that China is attempting to gain a foothold in
Africa and other developing regions to secure access to critical natural resources such as
oil and gas to fuel its growing population and economy.83 This allows the thesis to test the
theory that China will contribute personnel to peace operations in resource rich states in
order to ensure a stable and secure environment in which Beijing can potentially gain
access to resource wealth. Proven reserves of oil are and gas are used as measures of
resource wealth. Humphreys suggests that third parties may intervene in intrastate wars to
make conflicts short so they can reap the benefits of oil production.84 Although
Humphreys’ research examines past resource production in addition to proven reserves,
and suggests a causal mechanism based on the provision of partial military assistance to
one of the warring parties during a conflict, the same general theory may apply to peace
operations where states may intervene to ensure sufficient stability for the extraction of
energy resources. Proven reserves are used in this thesis because they represent a source of
resources that a nation can gain access to in the future. China has sought immediate access
to energy resources in existing gas and oil extraction zones, but has also demonstrated its

83 David Zweig and Bi Jianhai, “China’s Global Hunt for Energy,” Foreign Affairs 84 No. 5
(September/October 2005): 25-38
84 Macartan Humphreys, “Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution: Uncovering the
propensity make large capital investments to extract and secure material resources in regions without significant past production.\footnote{For example, in November 2008, China announced final plans for the construction of a $2.5 billion oil and gas pipeline through Myanmar, connecting the deepwater port of Sittwe to Kunming in China's southwestern Yunnan province. This pipeline was one project of the $10.5 billion recently invested or allocated in energy projects in Yunnan.}

The regression analysis includes proven gas and oil reserves, which are the estimated quantities of gas and crude oil that are potentially recoverable. These are represented by the variables \textit{gas\_res} and \textit{oil\_res}, which are measured in the year prior to Chinese force deployment or the year prior to the start of the UN mission. Data on energy resources comes from two sources: the US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration (EIA) World Energy Reserves Database and the British Petroleum \textit{Statistical Review of World Energy 2008}. Both the World Energy Reserves Database and the \textit{Statistical Review} track resource production and reserve information by state over time. When quantities differ between the two sources, an average between the two sources is used. In cases where data is missing in both datasets, the approximate quantity is mathematically imputed. All data is converted so that oil is measured in billions of barrels and gas is measured in trillions of cubic feet.

If China's participation in peace operations is driven by a utility maximizing realist rationale, there should be a positive relationship between the quantity of energy resources in a peace operation host state and the level of Chinese peacekeeping there. We therefore hypothesize:

\[ H_{\text{gas\_res}} = \text{Higher levels of proven gas reserves in a peace operation host state will lead to higher levels of Chinese peace personnel contribution in the peace operation.} \]
$H_{oil\_res}$=Higher levels of proven oil reserves in a peace operation host state will lead to higher levels of Chinese peace personnel contribution in the peace operation.

**Trade**

In addition to securing energy resource inputs for its growing economy, existing literature discusses China’s objective of seeking markets for its consumer goods. This reasoning leads to the hypothesis that:

$H_{trade}$=Higher levels of bilateral trade between China and a peace operation host state will lead to higher levels of Chinese peace personnel contribution in the peace operation.

Thus, this thesis analyzes the impact that bilateral trade between China and peace operations host states has on the level of Chinese force contributions. Trade data is obtained from *the Correlates of War Bilateral Trade Data Set v2.01*, which measures bilateral trade flow from 1870 to 2006. Although this data set does not include data through the end of the 2008 end date for this thesis’ research scope, it is suitable as no UN peace operations were launched in 2008, nor was a new Chinese deployment made since 2007. Thus, the existing data through 2006 is sufficient for the time-lagged regression used in this analysis.

Admittedly bilateral trade between China and a peace operation host state may increase after the deployment of Chinese personnel, however measuring the level of trade ex ante will capture whether or not Chinese personnel are deployed to protect existing markets. Future comparative analysis could examine Chinese peace personnel contributions on trade by comparing bilateral trade levels between China and peace
operations host states in the year prior to the Chinese intervention with trade levels two years after the initial Chinese deployment. Two years is chosen as the time interval simply for data availability. The Bilateral Trade Data Set runs through 2006, and China launched multiple peace operation deployments in 2004. One year is likely too short to see any significant changes in trade levels, but two years is the maximum period of observation allowed by the constraints of the data set. Ideally a longer observation period would be desirable.

*Political Interests*

*Diplomatic Relations*

Much existing literature states that as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China uses both its veto power and contributions to peace operations as a means of coercing peace operations host nations to weaken diplomatic relations with Taiwan. During the Kosovo crisis, China vetoed a resolution to extend the UN mission protecting Macedonia’s borders after Macedonia established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. More recently, China deployed its forces to the UN Mission in Liberia in March 2004, just six months after China and Liberia reestablished diplomatic ties. The recent deployment of Chinese forces to Haiti, a country that recognizes the Republic of China, challenges this wisdom. In the analysis an indicator variable is used to identify whether countries maintain diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or with the Republic of China (ROC). An examination of data on diplomatic relations in the *Correlates of War Diplomatic Exchange Data Set*, which provides data on diplomatic relations for the entire set of nations in this study reveals that including this variable in regression analysis would not yield any significant results. Given the small number of

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86 Gill and Reilly, 2000: 46.
nations that recognize the Republic of China, this variable was considered, but omitted from the regression analysis.

*Overseas Chinese Population*

Overseas Chinese are ethnic Han individuals who are either Chinese-born or of Chinese ancestry living outside the Chinese mainland. Overseas Chinese play an important role in China and there are cabinet level positions reserved for Overseas Chinese in the Chinese government. Additionally, two of China’s largest peacekeeping deployments were to East Timor and Cambodia, states with large Chinese diasporas. It is possible that China seeks to protect the lives of its citizens living outside of the Greater China region and will increase peacekeeping participation in states with high overseas Chinese populations. Given this reasoning, this thesis hypothesizes:

\[ H_{\text{overseas}} = \text{China will deploy higher levels of Chinese peace personnel in states with a larger Overseas Chinese population.} \]

Data on Overseas Chinese populations was gathered from a dataset maintained by the Shao Overseas Chinese Research Center at Ohio University. While the dataset lacks entries for the Overseas Chinese population in some host states in the year prior to the start of the mission, we examine media reports from the *International Herald Tribune* and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service to look for indications of anti-immigrant acts or large scale immigration from China, which could result in significant changes in the Overseas Chinese population. This project measures Overseas Chinese population using ordinal measures for small, medium, or large based on the Overseas Chinese population in a host state relative to Overseas Population in other countries. The regression model controls for whether the mission host state is in Asia, as contribution levels could be
driven by the state’s presence in China’s Asian periphery, where states tend to have larger Chinese populations

4.2 Medium-N Analysis

Medium-N analysis is a unique form of qualitative analysis that retains properties of both case studies and statistical analysis, while focusing specifically on the causal linkages between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. The medium-N analysis conducted in this thesis is a modification on a method developed by Michael Ross (2004). In his work on the influence of natural resources in civil war, Ross tests a number of hypothesis using anecdotal and historical observations from multiple cases of civil wars. The medium-N approach in this thesis includes the same 54 cases and explanatory variables as the large-N regression analysis. For each observation, the hypotheses tested in the regression analysis are again tested using a qualitative medium-N test. Medium-N analysis alone has a number of important limitations, such as sacrificing the level of detail traditionally found in comprehensive case studies, leaves little room for counterfactuals, and does not identify correlations across a large number of observations as regressions are able to. Still, the medium-N analysis provides a vital link between the general trends captured by the large-N analysis and the case studies. It serves to clarify causal linkages by concentrating on the case-specific factors that are generally lost in regression analysis.

4.3 Case Studies

In this thesis, case studies serve three important purposes. First, they are used to examine variation between the level of peace operation participation in states where China intervenes. The large and medium-N analyses only capture general trends and do not allow for differentiation between states where China commits a large number of forces
from a state where total Chinese participation is low. Second, case studies illustrate that the theory proposed in this thesis is falsifiable and allows us to discuss alternative explanations. Lastly, case studies allow for a closer analysis of China’s contributions to Africa, where much of China’s peacekeeping efforts have focused.

A comparative case study using a method of difference between China’s peace operation participation in the Sudan and Chad serves the first purpose. The two countries are similar geographically and demographically and are both host states to UN peace operations launched between 2005 and 2007, respectively. Despite these similarities, China deployed forces to Sudan but not to Chad. An in-depth analysis will attempt to identify any variation in the explanatory variable indicators that led to the different levels of participation. A case study of Haiti examines a situation that does not appear to follow the model. According to the coding used in this thesis, Haiti has a low strategic value to China, yet China has deployed a sizeable and well armed force to the UN mission there. Case study analysis will allow for the discussion of alternative explanations for China’s participation. Potential challenges including the external validity of findings gathered from region specific case studies is a valid concern, however triangulation with the statistical and medium-N methods allows for a more robust test.
Chapter Five

Statistical Analysis: Findings and Discussion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2. Summary Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Imports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Chinese</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linear regression analysis of strategic value indicators, described in chapter four, and Chinese participation in United Nations peace operations reveal few substantive and significant relationships. This lack of statistical significance stems largely from the small sample size of seventy-six country-missions. The number of mission-countries is further truncated by missing data on both the dependent and independent variables. In some regression models, there are just twenty-eight mission-countries, far smaller than the sample sizes generally associated with large-N statistical analysis. For this reason, multivariate regressions including controls for factors such as time are generally not run, as the small sample size would render statistical analysis virtually meaningless. Although the lack of statistically significant findings limits the conclusions that can be drawn from the data, coefficients are generally in the expected directions, suggesting a positive relationship between factors such as trade flows and oil reserves with China’s peace operations participation and consistent with the hypotheses above. Coefficients in both the binary model and the percentage participation model, are in the same direction for all six indicators except for one, the overseas Chinese population in a peace operation host state.
### TABLE 3. Chinese Peace Operations Participation and Strategic Value (Binary Model)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>11</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-.192</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>-.399</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Exports</td>
<td>.841</td>
<td>(.258)</td>
<td>(.376)</td>
<td>(.276)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Imports</td>
<td>.661</td>
<td>(.359)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Reserves</td>
<td>.213</td>
<td>(.254)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Reserves</td>
<td>-.325</td>
<td>(.498)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Chinese</td>
<td>-.096</td>
<td>-.206</td>
<td>(.346)</td>
<td>(.364)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>.195</td>
<td>(.177)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>(.122)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.491</td>
<td>.239</td>
<td>.532</td>
<td>.314</td>
<td>.324</td>
<td>.276</td>
<td>.393</td>
<td>.455</td>
<td>.402</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>49</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4. Chinese Contribution Level and Strategic Value (Percent Participation Model)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
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<th>11</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>-.048</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>-.125</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chinese Exports</td>
<td>.600</td>
<td>(.125)</td>
<td>(.185)</td>
<td>(.133)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Imports</td>
<td>.697</td>
<td>(.141)***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Reserves</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>(.108)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas Reserves</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>(.224)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Chinese</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>(.190)</td>
<td>(.205)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>(.092)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>(.060)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.129</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.064</td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Commercial and Economic Interests**

**Chinese Imports and Exports**

Trade related indicators are the most substantive and significant drivers of China’s participation and level of contribution in peace operations. In the binary model, Chinese exports to peace operation host states are the most substantive indicator with a coefficient of .84. Exports from China to a peace operation host state, are the second most substantive
driver in the percent participation model, where the coefficient is .60. In both the binary and participation percent models, coefficients on the export indicator are statistically significant with \( p = .052 \) and \( p = .002 \), respectively. Chinese imports from mission countries also appear to be substantive and significant in both the binary and percent participation model with coefficients of .661 (\( p = .070 \)) and .697 (\( p = .000 \)). Both the import and export related relationships are strongly driven by Chinese force contributions to the two UN missions in Sudan. China has deployed some of its largest contingents to Sudan, a nation with which it maintained the largest bilateral trade flows of any mission-country since 1990. When the two missions in Sudan are dropped from the dataset, the coefficient on normalized Chinese exports in the percent participation model drops to .22 and loses statistical significance (\( p = .575 \)). The coefficient on the binary model surprisingly increases to .965, but loses statistical significance (\( p = .353 \)). Coefficients for imports also decrease significantly when the two Sudanese cases are dropped. In the percent participation model, the coefficient drops to .167 (\( p = .789 \)) while in the binary model, the coefficient is no longer consistent with the hypothesis and becomes negative with a value of -.480 (\( p = .763 \)).

*Oil and Gas Reserves*

The mercantilist argument for Chinese peace operations participation discussed in many media and policy circles often examines the role of China’s peacekeeping in the context of gaining access to natural resources. While China has deployed sizeable peace operations contingents to missions in countries with large resource reserves like Sudan, Chinese personnel have also been deployed in large numbers to countries with limited or nonexistent oil and gas reserves including Lebanon and Liberia. This suggests that China
treats each potential mission on a case-by-case basis, assessing a spectrum of factors in addition to oil and gas reserves. The limited sample size for analysis of gas and oil reserves in both the binary and percent participation model, in which n was always less than 40 causes findings to be largely insignificant. The dearth of data on oil and gas reserves, which contributes to the small sample size, may stem in part from the lack of accurate resource reporting mechanisms in failed states and states in the midst of conflict, where peace operations are most likely to occur.

Given these limitations, coefficients are neither substantive nor significant, but do illustrate the lack of any clear trend that would fully support the mercantilist view of Chinese peace operations. In both models there is a weakly positive but insignificant relationship between the size of a state’s oil reserves and Chinese peacekeeping efforts there. The coefficient of .213 (p=.406) in the binary model is substantially higher than the percent participation model coefficient of .079 (p=.471) because the binary model codes any deployment, regardless of size, as “1.” Thus, extremely small deployments of Chinese observers to missions in oil rich areas, such as the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), are treated identically to deployments of nearly 1000 personnel to missions in other oil rich states.

Surprisingly the coefficient on gas reserves in both models is weakly negative, which contradicts the hypothesis that there would be higher levels of peace operation participation in states with greater proven gas reserves. The sample size in both cases is less than 32, far less than required for traditional large-N analysis. The small sample size allows trends to be shaped largely by a few outliers. For instance, in the universe of all peace operation host states since 1990, Iran has by far the largest proven reserves of gas,
yet China deployed no personnel there. Additionally, even if China had chosen to deploy personnel, the total number and type of personnel they could have contributed would have been limited, as the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was authorized to be composed primarily of military observers.87 Thus, the percent participation of Chinese personnel in this type of mission would likely remain fixed at a low level due to the nature of the mission.

**Security Interests**

**Distance**

At initial inspection, the relationship between distance and both participation and the level of China’s contributions appear to be consistent with the hypothesis that larger contributions and participation decrease as geographic distance between China and a peace operation host state increases. There is a weak negative relationship with distance in both the binary and percent participation models, with coefficients of -.192 (p=.460) and -.048 (p=.701), respectively. However, this relationship is neither substantive nor significant. Relatively large deployments of Chinese peace operations personnel to UN missions in Africa and the Middle East, regions that are geographically distant from China, appear to contradict the coefficient of the regression analysis. While China has deployed some of its largest peace operations contingents to missions in East Timor and Cambodia, large deployments to non-Asian states suggests that China examines a broad variety of factors in each potential mission before contributing personnel.

**Overseas Chinese Population**

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The population of overseas Chinese in peace operation host states is the only variable where coefficients in the two models are in opposite directions. In the binary model, the variable has a coefficient of -0.096 (p=.783), while in the percent participation model it is 0.053 (p=.784). In both models the population of overseas Chinese is the least substantive and significant variable. The thesis initially hypothesized that higher overseas Chinese populations could lead states to have a higher strategic value. Analysis of data, however, reveals no relationship between overseas populations and Chinese participation or their level of contributions to peace operations. While China has deployed sizeable peace operations contingents to states with large Chinese populations like East Timor and Cambodia, there are even larger Chinese contingents in Sudan, Liberia, and Lebanon, which have relatively small Chinese populations. The presence of overseas Chinese residents in an unstable state would likely be insufficient in itself to warrant Chinese personnel contributions to a peace operation because of the costs, logistical complexities, and other challenges associated with deploying personnel. The Chinese government would more likely evacuate Chinese citizens from a potentially dangerous area in order to rapidly and directly protect overseas Chinese. Indeed, China, like many other nations, has previously evacuated its citizens from dangerously unstable nations including Lebanon and East Timor. China considered these evacuations as a means of “putting people first” and “exercising the state power for the benefit of the people,” demonstrating China’s commitment to protecting overseas Chinese, albeit without the deployment of Chinese personnel.

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peace operations forces. These evacuations might not include all those who fall under the umbrella designation of overseas Chinese, but would undoubtedly evacuate all Chinese nationals and residents of the Special Administrative Regions of Macao and Hong Kong. Evacuating Taiwanese nationals would also not be out of the question as China has offered protection to citizens of Taiwan in recent years, including the protection of Taiwan-owned ships in the Gulf of Aden.

Conclusion

The data reveal few significant and substantive relationships between the indicators of strategic value and Chinese peacekeeping contributions. While this may initially appear to demonstrate that China is less of a realist actor in its peacekeeping decisions than hypothesized, the small sample size makes it difficult to draw significant conclusions from the statistical analysis. Despite not being statistically significant or substantive, the weak presence of trends that are in the generally in the same direction as hypothesized warrants further analysis using alternate methods that will more effectively examine casual mechanisms and relationships.

89 "Official of the Department of Consular Affairs Takes an Interview on the Evacuation of Chinese Citizens from Lebanon."
Chapter Six

Medium-N Analysis and Findings

The statistical analysis reveals positive trends in the relationship between a state's oil reserves, trade, and overseas Chinese population and China's personnel contributions to UN peace operations there. However, given the small sample size that comprises the universe of cases, regressions alone do little to identify and examine the causal mechanisms that explain variation in the level of Chinese troop contributions to peace operations in different countries. Relying on case studies alone would also be insufficient; even though they can be highly internally valid, they do not necessarily reveal generalizable causal mechanisms because single case analysis fails to capture trends. Thus, to identify these mechanisms, as well as to address problems of endogeneity, this thesis relies on a "medium-N" approach. The findings of the medium-N analysis support the argument proposed in this thesis that China's peace operation participation is driven by a desire to further China's commercial and diplomatic interests. However, the analysis also reveals an apparent shift in the drivers behind China's participation that occurs in 2000. Prior to this point, China's deployments tend to be smaller in size and less driven by elements, like oil reserves and trade flows, which make up a state's strategic value. After 2000, Chinese personnel contributions increase, as does the number of strategic drivers in each case. This provides empirical support for the theory of China's peaceful development in the 2000s.

This chapter begins by explaining the medium-N methodology and the selection of cases. It then offers three general hypotheses that may explain the causal relationship between a state's strategic value and the level of China's personnel contribution there, and
offers observable implications of each causal relationship. The section then offers aggregate results from the medium-N analysis.

The medium-N method aggregates qualitative data on causal mechanisms from a sample of case studies in order to draw inferences and identify trends. In doing this, the method retains important properties of case studies such as "close attention to the validity of concepts and to causal linkages; a capacity to account for variables that are difficult to measure; and a sensitivity to case-specific factors."\(^90\) At the same time medium-N analysis maintains a concern for generality and an explicit, replicable method, which are both characteristic of large-N statistical analysis. Michael Ross (2004) defines five steps in his medium-N approach to hypothesis-testing.\(^91\) First, a researcher must determine general and falsifiable hypotheses about causal relationships. Next, they must determine observable implications of each hypothesis. These implications are observations that should be expected in the case studies if the hypothesis is true. After this, the researcher must select cases. Fourth, each case is studied to determine the presence or absence of the observable implications. Finally, the results are aggregated and the researcher uses the sample to draw inferences about the larger population of cases. The medium-N method used in this thesis differs slightly from Ross’s original design as it not only looks at individual causal mechanisms across cases, but also examines the interaction of various causal mechanisms within each case. This potentially allows us to see whether multiple causal mechanisms are at play in a single case, and how this interaction impacts China’s level of personnel contribution. Admittedly, many of the observable implications are related, but there is sufficient distinction to conduct this analysis.

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\(^91\) Ibid: 36-37.
While the medium-N method is an effective tool for examining causal mechanisms, there are numerous shortcomings to the approach. By aggregating multiple case studies, the medium-N approach loses a degree of detail and the capacity to fully disentangle the relevant mechanisms at play. That is in turn rectified through an examination of individual case studies. This thesis attempts to provide additional detail using comprehensive single case and comparative case studies in the following chapter. Additionally, since the approach is qualitative in nature, it cannot identify partial correlations across a large number of observations. Also, without extensive primary research on each peace operation, there may not be identifiable and observable phenomena that explain each causal relationship. Despite these limitations, the medium-N approach provides a degree of insight into causal mechanisms that is not achievable using either case studies or large-N analysis alone.

The twenty-eight cases selected for the medium-N analysis are all UNDPKO mission-countries where China has contributed personnel. This smaller sample, which constitutes twenty-two distinct missions is used instead of the universe of all UNDPKO cases since 1990 because by examining only the cases where China has participated, the thesis is able to identify and analyze observable implications that result in varying levels of personnel contribution between cases. When applied to this thesis, there are specific shortcomings to the medium-N method in addition to those previously described. Most important among these is that the analysis suffers from incomplete information. To locate observable implications, this thesis relies on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, the home pages of various Chinese embassies, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development foreign direct investment database, and two online archives of
translated international newspaper and press service content: LexisNexis Academic and World News Connection. We limit observations from LexisNexis Academic and World News Connection to Chinese government and media sources in order to ensure the observable implications capture the stated position of the Chinese government; publications by Xinhua and China Daily are assumed to reflect the views of the Chinese government.

Even with a rigorous search of sources, it is highly probable that some observable implications were overlooked or miscoded. Cases where observable implications are explicitly discussed in the sources listed above are coded in the medium-N analysis chart (Table 5, below) as a positive implication. Observations are coded as missing only if no information on the observable implication is available and if it cannot be inferred from other data. For instance the search of sources revealed no reports of existing Chinese resource extraction agreements in Iraq in 1990 and in Kosovo in 2004. The analysis coded Iraq as a missing observation because Iraq has large oil reserves that China could have potentially drawn from, however the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have an online country profile for Iraq. Even if an extraction agreement with Iraq existed, it did not appear in the sources used in this analysis. The case is therefore coded as missing. Kosovo, on the other hand, was coded as not having any resource extraction agreements with China. This coding was inferred from the lack of any significant extractable resources in the region based on highly regarded data from British Petroleum, making an extraction agreement highly unlikely.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>Mission-Country</th>
<th>China Start Date</th>
<th>Force Type</th>
<th>Trade Interests</th>
<th>Diplomatic Interests</th>
<th>Resource Wealth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO: UN Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>April 1990</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N - Y N N</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>N N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO: UN Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>April 1990</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N - N N</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>N N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO: UN Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>April 1990</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N - N N</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>N N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO: UN Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>April 1990</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N - Y N N</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>N N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO: UN Truce Supervision Organization</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>April 1990</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N - Y N N</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>N N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL: UN Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>March 2006</td>
<td>O, T</td>
<td>N - N N</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>N N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM: UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>April 1991</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N - Y N N</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO: UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>September 1991</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N - N/A</td>
<td>N N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC: UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>March 1992</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>N - N(?) N Y 0 N N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMOUQ: UN Operation in Mozambique</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>June 1993</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N N N N</td>
<td>2 N N</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIL: UN Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>November 1993</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N Y N(?) Y N 0 N N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMBH: UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>January 2001</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N N Y N N 2 N N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISI: UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>July 1998</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N Y Y N N 1 N N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIKOM: UN Interim Administration in Kosovo</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Y Y N N N 0 N N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEF: UN Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>October 1999</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Y Y Y Y N N 0 N N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAEY: UN Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>January 2000</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N N N Y N Y 1 N N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC: UN Observer Mission in the DRC</td>
<td>D.R.C</td>
<td>April 2001</td>
<td>O, T</td>
<td>Y Y Y Y N N 4 -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS: UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>October 2000</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N N Y N N 2 4 Oil</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNE: UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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<td>October 2000</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Y Y Y Y N N 4 Oil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE: UN Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>May 2002</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>Y Y N Y Y 0 Timber</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL: UN Mission in Liberia</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>October 2003</td>
<td>O, T, P</td>
<td>N Y Y N N 3 Oil</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMEC: UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>March 2004</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N Y Y N N 3 Oil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH: UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>N N - Y N N 0 N N</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUB: UN Operation in Burundi</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>N Y Y N N 2 Oil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS: UN Mission in the Sudan</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>May 2005</td>
<td>O, T, P</td>
<td>N Y Y N N 2 Oil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAM: UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>October 2006</td>
<td>O, P</td>
<td>Y Y Y Y N N 2 Oil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID: AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>December 2007</td>
<td>O, T</td>
<td>Y Y Y Y N 4 Oil</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*UNCTAD Data indicates inward FDI flow from China to Ethiopia in 1995, but has not other data. We assume that inflows continued.*

=Country gained recognition after gaining independence. Does not signify a switch in recognition from ROC to PRC.

=PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have an openly available list for these countries; information gathered from media reports.

=Observers, P=Civilian Police, T=Troops

= Missing Observation

N = No Observable Implication (Not Missing Observation)

#### Notes

1. UNCTAD Data indicates inward FDI flow from China to Ethiopia in 1995, but has not other data. We assume that inflows continued.
2. *=Country gained recognition after gaining independence. Does not signify a switch in recognition from ROC to PRC.
3. ^=PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have an openly available list for these countries; information gathered from media reports.
4. O=Observers, P=Civilian Police, T=Troops
Hypotheses and Observable Implications

A nation's strategic value may influence the level of Chinese contribution to a peace operation in numerous ways. The hypotheses described below are extrapolated from the Chinese literature and academic research described earlier in the theory section. For the medium-N tests, this thesis associates explicit causal mechanisms and motivators with the established hypotheses. Some of the indicators used in the statistical analysis have been aggregated into categories that encompass the driving forces of China's peace operations policy and allow the thesis to explicitly state casual mechanisms. For instance, instead of examining oil and gas reserves directly, the medium-N analysis looks at the presence of Chinese resource extraction agreements in a state, as it potentially provides a driver for Chinese peace operations in the country. The causal mechanisms are therefore divided into three categories: commercial and economic interests, resource wealth, and diplomatic interests. Some of the hypotheses are similar and others may interact. However, each set of hypotheses is examined individually to more clearly test causal mechanisms.

Commercial and Economic Interests

Hypothesis:

Strong trade and investment relationships between China and the peace operation host state should lead to increased Chinese personnel contributions because China seeks to protect Chinese infrastructure, ensure continued production of exportable items in peace operation host nations and maintain secure port and transportation infrastructure, while at the same time building China's soft power in the peace operation host nation.
If this mechanism is true, we should observe Chinese discussion of the need for stability to ensure economic development and to protect Chinese owned investment. This might be reflected as criticism that the conflict is hampering trade and production of goods. While closely related to resource wealth extraction, trade and investment is included as a distinct category in this medium-N analysis as it includes trade and Chinese outward foreign direct investment in areas other than natural resources.

**Evidence:**

*Discussion of Economic Development*

The survey of government press releases and Chinese media reports searched for the terms "economic," "stability," and "development," along with "China" and the name of the peace operation host state in the two years prior to China’s first personnel contribution to the mission. The articles and releases were then read to ensure that they discussed a Chinese desire for economic development and stability in the peace operation host state. This eliminated unrelated articles found by the search because of the presence of the search terms. Cases where discussion of economic development was present were coded as a "Yes" in the medium-N analysis chart. When no media or government discussion was found, the case was coded as a "No" in the analysis chart, implying that there were no observable implications.

Concerns surrounding economic development likely contributed to the Chinese decision to deploy peacekeepers in eight distinct missions of the twenty-eight mission countries (twenty-two distinct missions), or thirty-seven percent of the missions where China deployed. There was virtually no government or press discussion that explicitly promoted the protection of Chinese interests in peace operation host states, but Chinese
media and government sources discussed the need for stability and general economic growth in eight of the twenty-two missions. Eight of these observations were in peace operations where China first deployed personnel after 2000. Discussion related to economic factors is generally not found in cases prior to 2000, which was also an era when China primarily deployed military observers. These observations were generally not found in articles or announcements focused on the deployment of a Chinese peacekeeping contingent, but rather were discussed in articles that described conditions within the peace operations host nation. The only observed case where China specifically discussed the need to protect Chinese interests was during the civil war in Burundi. In this case, the foreign ministry announcement dealt not with the protection of commercial interests, but rather of the Chinese Embassy in Bujumbura, which had been accidentally shelled in November 2003 during fighting between the army and rebels.

Discussion of the need for stability in order to promote economic growth and development was first observed in government and press sources prior to China’s deployment to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in October 1999. Discussion of the importance of economic development in peace operation host states increases after 2000, with observations of such commentary in all but five of thirteen post-2000 missions where China has participated. Economic development is not mentioned in Chinese discussion of UN missions in Burundi, Lebanon, Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Haiti, and the first UN mission in East Timor. The increased attention to economic development in peace operation host states roughly corresponds with the announcement of China’s “Going Out” policy in 2002 and China’s increased international economic presence.

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92 The eight missions are: UNMIK, UAMSIL, MONUC, UNMEE, UNMISET, UNMIS, UNMIT, and UNAMID.
93 “China urges Burundi to ensure safety of diplomats after accidental shelling,” Xinhua. 11 November 2003.
Chinese leadership affirmed the importance of economic stability in Sierra Leone one year later, shortly before the more robust UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) replaced UNOMSIL. In a meeting with President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone, President Jiang Zemin stated, “there is great potential for economic and trade cooperation between the nations,” and offered to encourage Chinese firms to enter into “mutually beneficial initiatives” with Sierra Leone as the country worked its way toward political stability. During the same meeting, China and Sierra Leone signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation. China had previously provided significant assistance with construction and development projects that could improve the economy of Sierra Leone. These projects include building power generation and transmission infrastructure, roads, and facilities for teaching rice and sugar cultivation techniques.

China stated its commitment to stabilizing and improving the East Timorese economy prior to its participation in the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) in May 2002 and again in the years prior to China’s participation in the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) in October 2006. Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan met with East Timor’s senior minister for foreign affairs in May 2002, two days prior to the date of East Timor’s official independence. During this conference, Tang stressed that China would develop “good neighborly relations” with East Timor and would implement arrangements for economic and technical cooperation. That same month, China contributed 69 police personnel to UNMISET, a mission intended to ensure the security of the newly independent state. The mission mandate tasked the force with

providing interim law enforcement and public security, developing an East Timor Police Service, and contributing to the external and internal security of East Timor.\(^\text{97}\) Over the course of the mission China provided an additional 138 police officers. Two years later, Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan praised the “momentum of developing bilateral ties” with East Timor and the “fruitful achievements in promoting...social stability and economic growth.”\(^\text{98}\) China’s continued interest in the wellbeing of East Timor’s economy may have led to China’s participation in UNMIT, where China has contributed about 40 police officers and observers. Despite a rigorous search, no sources purely discussing economic development prior to China’s contribution of observers to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) could be found. Media reporting focuses primarily on stating China’s commitment to aiding in East Timor’s stable transition.\(^\text{99}\) It is possible that China avoided publicly discussing economic development with East Timor prior to its official date of independence for fear of appearing to support a sub-national political entity.

China also expressed the importance of economic stability prior to making personnel contributions to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). The UN Security Council established UNMEE in 2000 to monitor the ceasefire between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The mandate recommended that the mission consist of over 200 military observers and three infantry battalions at a given time.\(^\text{100}\) Over the course of the mission, which ended in August 2008, China provided a total of 49 military observers.


Interestingly, China expressed an interest in the economic stability of Ethiopia, but not Eritrea, suggesting that China may contribute personnel even if only one of the host states in a multi-state peace operation has strategic value. During a meeting with the Vice-Premier of Ethiopia that was held the day the Ethiopia-Eritrea war began, the Chinese Foreign Trade minister spoke about the prospects for Sino-Ethiopinan economic coordination.\(^{101}\) China’s support for Ethiopian economic development continued throughout the war. In December 1999, Chinese Assistant Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, Xu Bingjin traveled to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to deliver a grant and interest-free loan, part of which was to be used to purchase machinery, spare parts, and equipment for a textile factory.\(^{102}\)

China’s first deployment of troops on a UN peace operation outside of Asia was to the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). Since April 2001, China has deployed over 2000 troops and military observers to the region, most of which serve in medical or engineering companies.\(^{103}\) In a speech to the Security Council a year prior to China’s MONUC deployment, China’s permanent representative to the United Nation, Qin Huasun, urged greater UN action in resolving the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during a speech to the Security Council a year prior to the first Chinese deployment to MONUC.\(^{104}\) Qin argued that stability and economic development we intertwined, stating that, “the fundamental way...for the DRC to be able to enjoy lasting peace and stability is for the international community to...develop the


\(^{104}\) "China’s UN envoy calls for UN action to end DR Congo war," *Xinhua.* 26 January 2000.
While this statement suggests that economic development will lead to stability, it also implies that relation between stability and economic development. In the year prior to China’s first MONUC deployment, bilateral trade between Congo and China amounted to $332.67 million dollars. Of this amount, roughly $9 million were Chinese exports to Congo, consisting primarily of Chinese machinery and light industry products. Key exports from Congo to China included mineral ores of cobalt, zinc, and copper.

In late 2003, China announced its hopes for a quick resolution of the “Kosovo issue.” China hoped the United Nations would be able to improve the economy, combat organized crime, and establish government organizations, with the ultimate goal of making “comprehensive progress in its government, economy, society, and other areas” in order to promote reconciliation in the region. While these statements encourage economic development and stability, this example must be treated differently from the other cases, as Kosovo was not an independent state when these comments were made. China would not likely attempt to develop sub-national economic ties without the permission of the Serbian government. Thus, it is unclear whether economic motives drove China’s participation in the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). Nevertheless, China has deployed over 70 civilian police officers to the mission since April 2004.

Of the countries where China has deployed peace operations forces, it is likely most economically connected to Sudan. While most Sino-Sudanese economic and trade relations surround China’s growing presence in the Sudanese oil sector, China also

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105 Ibid.
107 “PRC Deputy Representative to UN Hopes for Early Resolution of Kosovo Issue,” originally in Chinese, Beijing Zhongguou Xinwen She, translated by FBIS. 31 October 2003.
maintains considerable export flows to Sudan. In 2004, the year prior to China’s first deployment to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), Chinese exports to Sudan amounted to $531 million of roughly $2.2 billion in bilateral trade. By 2006, the year prior to China’s participation in the African Union-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), Chinese exports to Sudan made up just under half of the $3.5 billion in trade. Given Sudan’s position as China’s largest trading partner of the mission countries where China has deployed forces, it is no surprise that Chinese leadership has openly voiced their interest in the stability and development of the Sudanese economy. Prior to the first deployment of Chinese forces to UNMIS, Chinese press described the “mutually-beneficial cooperation between the two countries” and how it has led to “fruitful results” in the economic and trade sectors. President Hu Jintao also announced that China was deploying peacekeepers to Sudan in order to provide a guarantee for the peace process between the Government of Sudan and southern rebel groups in order to bring stability and development to the Sudanese people. Sudanese government officials also praised Chinese support for Sudan’s economic development. Prior to Chinese president Hu Jintao’s 2007 visit to Sudan, the Sudanese Minster of Information and Communications stated that “China was not only supporting Sudan in the economic field for the sake of take-off of the Sudanese economy... but was also a good and strong supporter of Sudan in the political domain.”

No discussion concerning the importance of economic development and stability was found in the cases of Lebanon, Liberia, the Ivory Coast, and Haiti. These three

109 “Chinese, Sudanese leaders agree on further expanding ties,” Xinhua. 23 April 2005.
110 Ibid.
111 “Sudan minister hails Chinese leader’s visit,” Xinhua. 31 January 2007.
countries all maintain non-negligible trade flows with China. In the year prior to the first Chinese deployment in each respective state, China maintained bilateral trade flows of $573.4 million with Lebanon, $96.4 million with Liberia, and $161.3 million with the Ivory Coast. China’s contributions to some of the missions, particularly the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), far exceeds missions where Chinese media and government sources discuss the importance of economic stability and development. Thus, lack of economic oriented discussion does not imply a lack of economic importance in these cases, but rather suggests the possibility that articles and announcements focused on these mission countries were not included in the media content archives used in this thesis.

The lack of economic concern surrounding Haiti is not surprising. Chinese trade with Haiti was minimal in the year prior to the first Chinese deployment amounting to just over $20 million. Lack of trade between the two nations is likely the result of poor economic conditions following decades of instability on the island nation. Haiti is the least-developed country in the Western Hemisphere with more than eighty-percent of the population living below the poverty line, making the nation a poor market for Chinese manufactured goods. Additionally, primarily exports are limited to a small amount of agricultural commodities such as coffee and sugarcane.\(^\text{112}\) The absence of significant trade ties justifies the lack of economic development themed discussion, and suggests that China deployed personnel to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) for other than trade related reasons. China’s participation in MINUSTAH is described in greater detail using a case study in Chapter Seven of this thesis.

\(^{112}\) "Haiti," The 2008 CIA World Factbook.
Joint Ventures and Chinese Foreign Direct Investment

The discussion above reveals the importance that China attaches to economic stability and development in peace operation host states, potentially revealing an economic motive behind China’s personnel contributions. The thesis examines whether China is more willing to contribute its forces to missions in states where enhanced stability offers the possibility of protecting infrastructure owned or manned by Chinese nationals. While open discussion of economic matters was observed in only eight of the twenty-eight mission countries, China maintained joint ventures and foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks in at least eleven distinct missions where China has participated. Data on the presence of joint ventures and Chinese FDI in five cases was not located, leaving seventeen remaining cases. Of these seventeen, eleven missions or sixty-five percent were launched in countries where China had FDI or joint ventures. The medium-N analysis of FDI and joint ventures relies on data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), country overviews from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and foreign direct investment data issued by China’s Ministry of Commerce.

The changing status of Liberia’s diplomatic relations with China, which shifted numerous times between recognition of Taipei and Beijing, limited the extent of continuous joint ventures and large scale foreign direct investment. Chinese companies were present in the Liberian labor market prior to China’s contribution of 33 military observers to the UN Observer Mission in Liberia between November 1993 and September 1997. However, due to the lack of Sino-Liberian ties prior to 1993, this activity was dwarfed by investment from Taiwan. In 1993, Chinese FDI inflows stood at $3.6 million,
amounting to just one third of FDI inflows from Taiwan during this era. Information concerning joint ventures and Chinese FDI between 1993 and 2003, when China deployed a large troop contingent to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), is limited. In 2001, Chinese firms were absent from the list of Liberia’s top twenty-five foreign business affiliates. Japanese-owned sea freight transport companies that maintained significant investments or sales in Liberia dominated this list. In 2003, Chinese foreign directed investment inflows amounted to $5.8 million.

Minimal levels of Chinese commercial cooperation with Sierra Leone began in 1984, fourteen years before China deployed observers to the UN Mission in Sierra Leone and the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone. The first reported case of economic cooperation between the states took place in 1984 when the Chinese state-owned Fujian-Africa Fishing Company signed a fishing cooperation contract with the Okeky Agent Company of Sierra Leone. The first joint venture and Chinese FDI-stocks in appeared in 1985, however the first large scale Chinese investments in Sierra Leone appear in the 2000s. The minimal level of investment prior to the deployment of Chinese personnel makes it unlikely that the desire to protect Chinese owned and invested infrastructure was a key driving force in the decision to contribute forces there. Interestingly, Chinese investment in the country seems to increase after the start of Chinese personnel contributions, which spanned from 1998 until 2005. For example, a Chinese development firm signed an agreement with the National Tourist Board of Sierra Leone in 2004 for the

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114 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
construction of a $266 million beach resort complex. Given the small number of observers deployed, it is quite unlikely that the investments were a direct result of the presence of Chinese forces alone, but perhaps China was benefitting from the additional stability provided by the peace operations force. Admittedly, it is virtually impossible to distinguish development and investment that is the result of improved stability in Sierra Leone from generally increasing participation of Chinese firms countries throughout Africa during this time period.

China launched its first joint ventures and fully owned companies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the early 1980s. The first joint firms concentrated on agricultural development, while later firms such as the Huamao Forest and Timber Company and the New Oasis Coffee Company were entirely Chinese owned.118 China continued to make investments in the country throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s despite the relative instability of the country. In 2000, a Chinese based telecommunications company received an 80 million RMB preferential loan issued by the China Import and Export Bank to set up the China Telecommunications Company in Congo. The firm, which is majority owned by China’s ZTE Telecom, is a joint venture with Congo’s Ministry of Communications and provides mobile and landline communication in Congo.119 China’s first deployment to the UN Mission in Congo (MONUC) was the contribution of 10 military observers and troops in the spring of 2001. It was not until 2003 that China greatly increased its contributions by deploying larger Chinese engineering and medical units. The first large deployment coincides

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approximately with the announcement of China’s going out policy and the growth of Chinese investment in the Congo. In 2003, Chinese FDI inflows amounted to just $240,000. The following year, investment had jumped to $15.69 million. By the end of 2007, Chinese inflows were valued in excess of $100 million.\textsuperscript{120} Much of this increase was due to investment in mining Congo’s rich mineral wealth, which may have come about due to the increased stability provided by MONUC, a mission with the mandate of implementing the ceasefire following the Congolese Civil War.\textsuperscript{121}

China first deployed personnel to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea in fall 2000 and contributed a total of 49 military observers before the mission ended in 2008.\textsuperscript{122} Economic and technological exchange between Ethiopia and China began in 1971, with Chinese firms first entering Ethiopia in 1986.\textsuperscript{123} Throughout the 1990s, Chinese companies were involved in a variety of industries and projects in Ethiopia, including bridge engineering, hydropower, and construction. The total value of these cooperative endeavors was over $710 million by the end of 2002.\textsuperscript{124} More significant investment in Ethiopia was launched during the early 2000s. For instance, in 2004, Sinopec’s Zhongyuan Petroleum Prospecting established an Ethiopian subsidiary that launched operations in Ethiopia. The Chinese-owned firm, which included Chinese nationals working in Addis Ababa, conducted seismic surveys in the Gambella Block.\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{120} 2007 \textit{Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment}.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{125} Information on ZPEB is available at http://www.zpebint.com/en/foreigncompany/Ethiopia.jsp.
In 2004, China made its first contribution of forces to the UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire. By December 2008, China had deployed 33 military observers to the mission.\textsuperscript{126} A year prior to the arrival of Chinese observers, Chinese FDI inflow to Cote d’Ivoire was $8.05 million, an amount that increased to $29.11 million by the end of 2005.\textsuperscript{127} Much of this growth in investment is likely the result of China’s growing role in oil exploration, including partial Chinese ownership of an oil field, which is discussed in greater detail below. While there was significant growth in FDI Significant Chinese joint ventures were established in Cote d’Ivoire as early as 1997. These included the Hua-Ke Vehicles Company, the Agro-machinery Assembling Company.\textsuperscript{128} A third joint venture, the Qingke Chocolate Food Company, was based in China but relied on large cocoa exports from Cote d’Ivoire.\textsuperscript{129}

China’s participation in the UN Operation in Burundi spanned from June 2004 to September 2006, during which China contributed a total of just six military observers. The size of this deployment makes it extremely unlikely that China was attempting to protect any infrastructure or investments. Chinese investment in Burundi appears to focus largely on infrastructural development rather than significant commercial development.\textsuperscript{130} Minimal values of Chinese FDI inflows reflect this lack of large-scale industrial development. There was no reported 2003 FDI data for Burundi, but investments in 2004 were just $20,000.\textsuperscript{131} By 2007, this amount had grown, but only to just over $1 million.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{126} China’s National Defense in 2008.
\textsuperscript{127} 2007 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} 2007 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
China’s personnel contribution to the two UN missions in Sudan represents China’s largest current deployment of personnel to a peace operation. At the end of 2008, more than 800 Chinese peacekeepers were operating on the ground throughout Sudan. Sudan is also the largest recipient of Chinese FDI of the countries where China has deployed peace operations forces. In 2004, these investments were valued at $171.61 million, and climbed to nearly $575 million by the end of 2007. Much of this investment is concentrated in the energy sector, which is discussed in greater detail later in this section and in the case studies in chapter seven. A website describing bilateral relations between China and Sudan, which would include a description of joint ventures and Chinese investment in Sudan, is noticeably missing from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, likely due to the sensitive political nature of Sino-Sudanese relations. Even with the lack of specific industry related information, China’s force contributions in Sudan appear to be highly correlated with investment, but there are likely many additional confounding variables.

China reports minimal foreign direct investment in East Timor. Between 2003 and 2007, China reported just $10,000 of investments. Much of China’s recent investment in China has been not from the commercial sector, but rather donations and construction projects sponsored by the Chinese government. Most of these investment projects including the construction of a $7 million presidential palace and a $6 million headquarters building for the defense forces, began after China deployed forces there. The largest of these projects was launched in 2008, when the Government of East Timor

awarded the Chinese Nuclear Industry 22nd Construction Company a contract to build two heavy oil power plants and a national power grid.

China’s contribution of a contingent of roughly 400 troops to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon beginning in March 2006 is likely tied to political reasons and not Chinese investment there. The minimal levels of Chinese investment, which amounted to just $20,000 in 2004 and none reported in 2005 clearly suggest that other factors are at play. The contribution of forces to the mission marked China’s first large scale deployment to the Middle East, a region firmly outside of China’s sphere of influence. The mission has a mandate of restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of effective authority in the area. Additionally, China pledged to increase its force contribution in Lebanon to 1000 troops shortly after Lieutenant Colonel Du Zhaoyu, a Chinese peacekeeper assigned as an observer to UNIFIL was killed by an Israeli air strike in July 2006. This deployment potentially represents a mission where China’s participation was guided by diplomatic interests and not by trade or investments. Statements by Chinese leaders suggest that China may have hoped to portray itself as an actor concerned about stability in a region that had garnered significant attention. Indeed, UN diplomats and world leaders saw China’s participation in UNIFIL as a step toward becoming a more responsible international actor.

137 China’s initial deployment to UNIFIL included just under 200 troops, but this number eventually grew to approximately 400 by December 2008.
141 Ibid. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stated, “China is very concerned about the situation in Lebanon and hopes it can be fundamentally resolved.”
142 Ibid. Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi was visiting Beijing when China announced its decision to contribute more forces and stated, “China is assuming more and more international responsibility.”
While a relationship between the level of foreign direct investment and the level of Chinese peace operations participation may exist, the exact correlation is difficult to determine. Although the presence of higher investments in the years prior to Chinese force deployments is associated with higher level of troop contributions in countries like Sudan, China has also deployed large numbers of forces to missions in countries where China has minimal levels of investment, such as Lebanon. This variation suggests that Beijing looks at a broad spectrum of factors in determining their contribution level, and not solely FDI. The analysis also reveals growth in the level of Chinese FDI in the years following China’s first peace operations deployment in a peace operations host state. It is difficult, however, to differentiate the factors that lead to this growth. China’s international investments increased worldwide throughout the early 2000s, and the deployment of relatively small numbers of peacekeeping forces would not necessarily lead to increased FDI. However, the stability brought about by peace operations may have led to improved conditions for investment.

Bilateral Trade Agreements

Another observable indicator used in the medium-N analysis is the existence of bilateral trade or investment agreements between China and the peace operation host state. Bilateral agreements exist in at least fourteen of the twenty-eight cases, or in eleven separate missions. Although the existence of trade agreements is present in half of the missions where China has contributed personnel, the agreements alone are likely an insufficient proxy for the desire to protect Chinese trade. Simply signing a trade agreement does not reflect the actual level of trade flows that China may want to protect,

143 The eleven missions are: UNTSO, UNIKOM, UNMIBH, UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL, MONUC, UNMEE, UNOCI, ONUB, UNMIS, and UNAMID.
nor does the existence of a trade agreement correspond to a higher level of Chinese participation in a peace operation in that country versus a country without a trade agreement with China. For instance, China maintains a trade agreement with Cote d’Ivoire, but none with Haiti. Chinese personnel, however, comprise roughly 1.7-percent of the MINUSTAH force in Haiti, and just .08-percent of the UNOCI force in Cote d’Ivoire.

Resource Wealth

Hypothesis:

The regression analysis shows a positive trend between the presence of oil reserves in a state and the level of Chinese contribution to peace operations there. The presence of large proven energy resource reserves may result in higher levels of Chinese contributions because China may hope that deploying forces will help create a stable physical and political environment. A stable environment would ensure the safety of existing resource extraction infrastructure and agreements, and potentially enable future access to resource exports or extraction agreements.

If this hypothesis is correct, we should observe Chinese media or government discussing the need to ensure security of oil or gas supply in the peace operation host nation. While statements regarding resource supply do not definitively prove that China's peace operation participation is motivated by resource wealth, it does imply Chinese salience of the issue. We should also observe existing Chinese resource extraction or exploration agreements with the peace operation host state as well as the establishment of additional resource extraction agreements that go into effect within a year of the arrival of Chinese personnel. The thesis assumes a one-year window for new extraction agreements
to “appear” because negotiations for concessions or exploration are generally lengthy and may begin prior to the deployment of forces, without a finalized agreement being established until after the mission is launched. The hypothesis would also be supported if Chinese troop deployments are near important oil and gas extraction or transport sites in the peace operation host nations. Troop contributing countries have significant influence over the deployment of their personnel in UN missions, so it is not unreasonable to assume that China specifies where its forces will operate within a given mission. ¹⁴⁴

Evidence:

Relatively few observable implications were located for this portion of the medium-N analysis. China became a net importer of oil in 1993.¹⁴⁵ Therefore, Chinese demand for foreign oil prior to 1993 is far less than it is today, leading to fewer international resource extraction and exploration agreements. While no definitive list of Chinese extraction agreements was located, the thesis examined printed media archives, bilateral relationship information pages from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and websites of major Chinese energy firms for information on extraction agreements. When no information could be found, the mission countries were generally coded as having no resource extraction agreements with China. The lack of extractable resources in some peace operations host states (i.e. Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the launch of missions prior to 1993 provide additional evidence that China did not have had resource extraction agreements in many of the cases.

¹⁴⁴ Information concerning influence of troop contributing nations over the employment of their personnel is from an interview with a US military officer assigned to the Military Staff Committee at the US Mission to the United Nations. Interview conducted 3 April 2009.
In an attempt to examine additional information on China’s views of energy security, the thesis examined English language publications by Chinese authors writing on energy issues. There are also very few published pieces on security of energy supply that mention stability in specific supply-side countries. A notable exception is a 2006 *China Daily* article that argues that “China currently does not face an oil supply problem or oil security concerns[,]” however tension in resource producing states like Nigeria, Sudan, and Iran has contributed to the “current oil and gas crunch and price hikes.” At a minimum, this article hints at Chinese salience of the connection between instability and energy resource supply shocks. The Chinese government clearly recognizes the importance of energy security and has sponsored workshops on the issue. Despite the importance of the issue and its potential impact on China’s participation in peace operations, the dearth of publications linking security of supply concerns with specific conflicts makes analysis difficult.

This analysis finds that resource extraction agreements, both de facto and de jure, are present in seven of the twenty distinct missions where China has launched peacekeeping missions since 1990. Interestingly, China’s contributions to nearly all of these missions begin after 2002, when the Going Out policy was announced. Not all of China’s post-2002 missions, however, are to states where China had resource extraction agreements. China deployed forces to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in March 2006 and to the UN Interim Administration (UNMIK) in 2004.

In three of the seven missions where resource extraction agreements exist, China deployed its personnel in close geographic proximity to resource extraction locations. Of

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147 The six missions are UNMEE, UNMSET, UNMIL, UNOCI, UNMIS, UNMIT, and UNAMID.
the four missions where Chinese forces were not observed near resource extraction sites, two had no associated UN military map as the missions had been terminated prior to the writing of this thesis (UNMISET and UNMEE).\textsuperscript{148} It is unlikely, however, that Chinese troops could have been deployed near extraction and processing sites during the UN Mission of Support in East Timor as China was engaged in off-shore oil exploration. China’s contribution to the other two missions (UNMIT and UNOCI) consisted of military observers and civilian police. UN military maps generally do not disaggregate observer and civilian police positions by nationality as most are integrated, multi-national forces, compared to troops and formed police units which generally maintain their existing single-nation organizational structure. In the medium-N analysis chart, we assume that troops are not deployed near resource extraction and processing sites in mission countries without existing resource extraction/exploration agreements.

China’s deployment of military observers to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was the first instance in the universe of cases where China contributed personnel to a mission country where it had a resource extraction agreement. In 1997, the Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau (ZPEB) and Ethiopia’s Kalub Gas Share Company signed an agreement on the production of gas in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Under the agreement, ZPEB would “undertake work” on eight of ten wells to allow Ethiopia to produce diesel, kerosene, gas, and petroleum.\textsuperscript{149} It is unclear whether the joint Chinese-Ethiopian project was still active when China deployed its military observers to the mission in October 2000, however ZPEB was still involved in Ethiopia as late as

\textsuperscript{148} The UN only releases maps of ongoing missions. Attempts to obtain older maps from the UN Cartographic Office and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations were unsuccessful.

\textsuperscript{149} “Gas production accord signed with Chinese firms,” \textit{Xinhua}. 27 May 1997.
It is also unknown if the agreement provided fuel for domestic Ethiopian consumption or export to China.

In May 2002, China deployed a contingent of civilian police officers to the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). Three months later, the Timorese government granted the China International Petroleum and Natural Gas Company a contract to explore offshore gas fields in the Australia-Indonesia Joint Development Area, which includes the Bayu-Undan and Greater Sunrise Gas Fields. In 2005, one year prior to China's first contribution to the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), PetroChina conducted a $1.6 million seismic study of East Timor's onshore reserves, but failed to secure an extraction agreement.

In 2005, Sinopec, one of China's state-owned petroleum enterprises took 27-percent ownership in Block CI-112, an oil field off the western Coast of Côte d'Ivoire that is supposedly the site of more than 2.7 billion barrels of oil. In addition to oil, Côte d'Ivoire is also a large exporter of lumber and tropical wood. A restriction on domestic logging enacted by the Chinese government in 1998 has driven Chinese demand for foreign lumber. In 2003 and 2004, the years prior to China's deployment of military observers to the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire, China exported approximately a quarter of the log harvest from Côte d'Ivoire and Congo River Basin regions of west and central

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150 In April 2007, rebel fighters attacked a ZPEB-run oil facility in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.
152 Storey, 2009: 2.
Africa. These numbers suggest that at least some timber was exported to China even though there were no direct observations of Chinese timber extraction agreements with Côte d’Ivoire.

In recent years, China has received substantial negative global attention for its support of the Sudanese government and President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir. China has been criticized for arming and supporting al-Bashir’s government, which has been accused crimes against humanity, in exchange for access to Sudan’s vast oil reserves. The state-owned firms China National Petroleum Corporation and PetroChina maintain either partial or full ownership over multiple oil fields, refineries and offshore exploration rights in Sudan. China currently contributes military observers, troops, and civilian police to the two UN missions in Sudan. As of December 2008, China had more peacekeepers deployed to Sudan than to any other peace operation host nation. Chinese troops assigned to the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) are based primarily in the cities of Nyala and Wau, close to oil fields where China maintains partial control. Maintaining troops near oil fields helps to ensure local stability and security. Without a monitoring force on the ground, rebels would likely have an increased opportunity to attack oil infrastructure, potentially jeopardizing the flow of oil to China. Rebel groups in Sudan have previously attacked Chinese owned oil fields and

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taken oil workers hostage.157 A more in-depth case study comparing China’s troop contributions in Sudan and non-participation in Chad is presented in chapter seven.

The case of Liberia is unique in that no official resource extraction agreement between China and Liberia was in place prior to China’s October 2003 contribution of military observers, troops, and civilian police to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Instead, China appears to have been importing large amounts of Liberian timber. While most academic and media attention on conflict resources focuses on diamonds, the illegal export of timber undoubtedly helped to fuel the civil wars in Liberia and neighboring Sierra Leone. Charles Taylor allegedly used timber sales to fund his government as well as the Revolutionary United Front, which was fighting a war with the UN-backed government in Sierra Leone.158 In the first six months of 2000 alone, China reportedly imported just under half of all Liberian timber exports, worth about $13 million.159 By 2001, China was Liberia’s largest buyer of wood products, importing some $52 million worth of logs.160 Much of the exported wood was bartered directly for arms and ammunition in Liberian ports.161 In 2003, the United Nations imposed sanctions on the export of Liberian timber.162 While China appeared to abide by the sanctions by not importing Liberian logs in the first half of 2004, UN maps indicate that Chinese peacekeepers are deployed in regions close to major wood producing forests.163 Sanctions on Liberian timber were dropped in 2006, potentially suggesting that Chinese troops are

159 Mike Blanchfield, “France, China keep war alive in Africa: MP: David Pratt blasts nations for blocking UN effort to cut funds fuelling African war,” The Ottawa Citizen. 7 September 2001.
160 Ibid.
163 Thornton testimony.
deployed to regions where logging will soon recommence. As of February 2009, a PLA medical company and engineering company are deployed in the eastern city of Zwedru, a city surrounded by forests, while a transportation company is deployed to Liberia’s capital, the port city of Monrovia.164

Although gathering data may not be feasibly, future analysis could attempt to make the medium-N analysis more robust by quantifying the extraction and exploration agreements, potentially by the size of concessions or annual production from extraction sites. This would allow future research to determine if a higher degree of extraction or potential extraction leads to higher levels of troop contribution.

**Diplomatic Influence**

**Hypothesis:**

China is likely to deploy peace operations personnel to nations where China hopes to establish diplomatic ties or to nations where China is attempting to significantly improve its diplomatic standing. This suggests that the promise of deploying troops can be used either as an incentive for peace operation host states seeking stability or as an attempt by China to gain diplomatic recognition in a post-conflict environment. In both of these cases, the peace operation host state must be willing to shift its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing, as diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of China and any other nation are conditional on the severance of ties with Taiwan and the recognition of only “one” China. In an earlier era, before China began contributing personnel to UN missions, Beijing used its position on the Security Council to veto the

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extension of peacekeeping operations due to peace operation host state relations with Taiwan. In January 1997, China vetoed the extension of a peacekeeping mission in Guatemala, and in February 1999, China voted against extending a mission in Macedonia. In both of these cases, host state relations with Taiwan ostensibly led to China’s vetoes.\textsuperscript{165}

Given the relative importance of the one-China policy in Beijing’s diplomatic strategy, China use peace operations participation as a diplomatic tool.

If this mechanism is true, we should observe China using the promise of deploying peace operations forces as a diplomatic bargaining chip. For instance, China should delay deploying or renewing troop deployments until the peace operation host nation breaks diplomatic ties with the Republic of China in exchange for a Chinese peacekeeping contingent.

If China uses peacekeeping as a diplomatic tool, there should also be a higher level of personnel contribution to missions located in countries that China has proclaimed to be strategically important. Deploying Chinese personnel would allow for enhanced stability in these regions and could potentially limit the ability of other actors to exert influence there.\textsuperscript{166} A potential shortcoming of this observable implication is that Chinese government and media sources may not openly name the nations that they deem to be strategically important. The number of high level diplomatic visits at the minister level or above in the two years prior to China’s first contribution of personnel to a mission may serve as a proxy if there are an insufficient number of statements concerning the strategic importance of peace operation host states.


\textsuperscript{166} In 2007, a Central Party School publication stated that China’s participation in UN peacekeeping gives Taiwan “less room to breathe.” Zhao Lei, “Come for Peace – Analysis of China’s Peacekeeping Operations in Africa,” Central Party School, Foreign Policy Commentary, no. 94 (February 2007) cited in China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping. This concept could be applied to other international actors as well.
Evidence:

*Diplomatic Relations*

There are five cases where China has contributed personnel to missions in countries that recognized the Republic of China or in countries that established diplomatic ties with Beijing in the two years prior to China’s first personnel deployment there. Two of these missions were in Liberia, another two were UN operations in East Timor, and the final case was China’s contribution of personnel to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The Liberian and East Timorese cases are addressed in this section, however, the case of Haiti is analyzed in greater detail in chapter 8. The contribution of a Chinese formed police unit to the mission in Haiti represents the first time China has deployed a sizeable force to a country with which it does not maintain diplomatic ties.

China has contributed personnel to two UN missions in Liberia. Each of these deployments coincides with distinct events in Sino-Liberian diplomatic relations. The People’s Republic of China first established diplomatic ties with Liberia on 17 February 1977. Beijing and Monrovia maintained relations until 10 October 1989 when Liberian President Samuel Doe signed “The Joint Communique on the Reestablishment of Diplomatic Relations” with Taiwan. On 10 August 1993, Beijing reestablished diplomatic ties with Liberia, making Monrovia the only state to recognize both Chinas. Just three months later, China deployed military observers to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). Between November 1993 and September 1997, China contributed thirty-three military observers to the mission. The mission’s mandate ended in September 1997.

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UNOMIL was replaced by a post-conflict peace-building support offices intended to strengthen and harmonize UN peace-building efforts. Coincidentally, Liberian President Charles Taylor announced his country’s recognition of “two Chinas” on 5 September 1997. Beijing suspended diplomatic ties with Liberia four days later.

China’s second mission in Liberia began in October 2003, when China pledged to contribute roughly 500 troops, observers, and civilian police to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The mission was established on 19 September 2003 with a mandate that included monitoring ceasefire agreements, assisting with the disarmament of ex-combatants, and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance. China allegedly threatened to block a $250 million budget for the peacekeeping operation if Liberia did not switch its diplomatic allegiance. On 12 October, Liberia announced that it would break diplomatic ties with Taiwan and reestablish relations with Beijing. Taiwan’s Foreign Minister, Eugene Chien, accused China of using its influence in the UN along with the promise of reconstruction assistance to establish ties with Liberia. By the end of October, China had deployed four troops to UNMIL, likely as an advance team. By December, over 70 Chinese personnel were in Liberia, with the remainder of the force arriving in early 2004.

East Timor was officially recognized as an independent nation in May 2002. In the months surrounding East Timor’s independence, Chinese politicians and diplomats

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173 Ibid.
made numerous public statements pledging their support to the new state, and reinforcing China’s commitment to developing “good neighborly relations” with East Timor.175 China deployed its first civilian police contingent to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in January 2000 and a second contingent in May 2002 to the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). China also contributed military observers and police to the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste in October 2006, but this was more than four years after East Timor gained recognition as an independent nation. China may have contributed peace operations personnel to missions in East Timor to demonstrate Beijing’s support for the new nation and to assure that the Timorese government would recognize Beijing rather than Taipei. China’s support for peace operations in East Timor was coupled with significant financial and developmental assistance.

Both East Timor and Liberia established diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China shortly after China promised to contribute peace operations forces. Certainly, deploying peace operations personnel was not the sole factor that led these states to recognize Beijing, as both states also received large economic aid packages. While Taipei and Beijing both practice dollar diplomacy, using large grants to attract diplomatic partners, China’s ability to deploy peacekeepers to states seeking stability provides it with an additional advantage over Taiwan that will be unable to contribute personnel to peace operations as long as it remains a non-UN member state.

Public Statements on Host State Strategic Importance

Relying on published media and government press releases that proclaim the strategic importance of a country may significantly under represent the number of nations

that China views as strategically important. Statements made by government officials in private settings will not make it to public presses, leaving few observable implications for researchers. A search of archival content databases for the term “strategic” combined with China and the peace operation host state name in the two years prior to the deployment of Chinese forces reveals just four observations. Admittedly, terms or phrases other than “strategic” can capture the same concept, potentially leading the omission of published reports describing the strategic value of a given peace operation host state.

Given the conditions described above, there are four observable cases where Chinese media sources discuss the strategic importance of specific peace operation host states. The four missions are, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Both Cambodia and East Timor were described as important due to their geographic proximity.176 The importance of Sino-Sudanese ties was mentioned only in relation to China’s goal of establishing strategic partnerships with African nations. During an April 2005 meeting with his Sudanese counterpart, Hu Jintao stated that, “the Chinese government attaches importance to the development of relations with Sudan, and is willing to work with Sudan to push forward bilateral friendly and cooperative ties to a new stage.”177 China deployed relatively large missions to each of these missions, however a dearth of public discussion on the strategic importance of states greatly limits the value of any apparent relationships between public statements of strategic importance and the level of China’s peace operations participation.

177 “Chinese, Sudanese leaders agree on further expanding ties,” Xinhua. 23 April 2005.
Significant Diplomatic Visits

Analysis of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports and newspaper articles indicates that exchanges of high-level officials occurred in at least twenty-one of the twenty-eight mission countries. This includes visits by Chinese officials at the minister level and above to a peace operation host state in the two years prior to China’s first personnel contribution, as well as visits by host state officials to China. Diplomatic exchanges between China and peace operation host states occurred in seventeen of the twenty-two missions where China has participated. The five cases with no recorded visits are missions in countries with which China did not maintain diplomatic ties in the two years preceding its first troop contribution. This includes two missions in Liberia, a mission in Kosovo, a mission in Haiti, and a mission in the Western Sahara. Given the lack of variation in the number of diplomatic visits between mission countries where China has deployed larger number personnel and those where China’s contribution is limited to small numbers of observers, this observable implication is perhaps not an ideal indicator for diplomatic interests. This is possibly because visits include not only trips made by foreign ministers and presidents, but also exchanges of ministers of defense, agriculture, and commerce that often coincide with the signing of trade and assistance agreements. These visits also include host state official attendance at large conferences, such as the conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, in China.

Conclusion

The analysis above examines various potential drivers across the twenty-two missions and twenty-eight mission countries where China has contributed peace operations personnel. Examination of qualitative evidence finds that discussion of
economic development and the presence of Chinese FDI and joint ventures are present in a significant percentage of cases where China contributes forces. Resource extraction agreements with peace operation host states are also present in seven of the fifteen missions where China began contributing troops after 2000. These trends suggest that strategic drivers play some role in influencing Chinese peace operation participation. More complete information, possibly obtained by broadening the sources of information, would greatly strengthen this analysis by eliminating the need to infer and assume so many observable implications.

While trends appear to indicate a realist motivator for participation, China has contributed personnel to missions with seemingly few observable implications of strategic value. Six of the fifteen mission countries where China began contributing personnel after 2000 have less than four positive observable implications. There were only three positive observable implications in the case of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), two in Eritrea prior to China’s contributions to the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), two prior to the deployment to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and just one positive observable implication in the case of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and in the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK). The observable implication missing in the UNTAET case that is present in the two later missions in East Timor, UNMISET and UNMIT, is the existence of a resource extraction agreement. It is possible that in the case of UNTAET, China sought to capture a new diplomatic in an early stage of East Timor’s transition to independent statehood, rather than gain access to resource reserves. The smaller number of positive observable

178 Of these fifteen missions, nine were established after 2000. China’s contributions in the post-2000 period include deployments to six missions that were launched before 2000.
implications in Eritrea may be balanced by the presence of four observable implications in Ethiopia, once again suggesting that China may determine their personnel contributions based on the strategic value of only one state in a multistate peace operation. The deployment of a relatively large and well-armed police contingent despite the lack of significant positive observable implications make China’s participation in MINUSTAH an ideal case study in chapter seven of this thesis.

Although cross case analysis provides valuable insight, examining trends within individual missions sheds additional light on the factors that lead to variation in the level of Chinese contributions. To perform this analysis, the total number of observable implications in each mission is summed. Each positive observation (coded with a Y in Table 5) and any significant diplomatic visits receive a value of “1.” Negative observable implications receive a value of 0. Unfortunately missing observations cannot be included in the sum, which degrades the effectiveness of the analysis. Still, this case level analysis reveals two potentially related trends. First, the sum of observable implications is higher in missions launched after 2000 than it is in earlier missions. Secondly, there seems to be a weak correlation between a higher total number of observable implications and Chinese contributions of troops, which generally indicates larger Chinese contributions. However, since higher personnel contributions seem correlated with more observable implications, higher force contributions may be the result of China’s enhanced post-2000 participation in peace operations. Alternatively, since the observable implications rely in part on examining Chinese newspaper and media archives, it is possible that enhanced press coverage or improved digitization of documents after 2000 skewed the findings.
Most mission countries to which China deployed troops prior to 2000 have a total of one or two positive observable implications, whereas missions launched after 2000 generally have at least four positive observable implications. The greater number of observable implications in post-2000 cases suggests that strategic motivations have had a greater influence on China’s more recent peace operations participation than in earlier cases. The lack of observable indicators in pre-2000 cases along with small deployments primarily of military observers may indicate that China’s participation in earlier peace operations was not driven by a realist desire to maximize access to strategically important commercial and diplomatic interests in peace operation host states. Instead, China may have been attempting to secure for itself an image as a responsible actor during much of the 1990s.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6. Type of Chinese Forces Deployed</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTSO: UN Truce Supervision Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIKOM: UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission</td>
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<td>MINURSO: UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
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<td>UNTAC: UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
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<td>UNOMOZ: UN Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<td>UNOMIL: UN Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNOMSIL: UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNAMSIL: UN Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNTAET: UN Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNMEE: UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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<td>UNMIBH: UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>MONUC: UN Organization Mission in the DRC</td>
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<td>UNMISET: UN Mission of Support in East Timor</td>
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<td>UNMIL: UN Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNOCI: UN Mission in Cote d'Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIK: UN Interim Administration in Kosovo</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH: UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>UNUB: UN Operation in Burundi</td>
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<td>UNMIS: UN Mission in the Sudan</td>
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<td>UNIFIL: UN Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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<td>UNMIT: UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID: AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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* During the initial phase of UNIKOM only, the mission included five infantry companies
^ Mission mandate included 5 military liaison personnel

Data Sources: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations mission websites, China's National Defense in 2008.

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Table 6, above, shows the type of forces China contributed to each of the twenty-two missions where it participated. Cells shaded in grey signify that the mission mandate did not authorize or request the contribution of certain categories of forces. For instance, the civilian police cell for the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) is shaded grey since the mission mandate did not call for civilian police. As described earlier, most of China’s early participation in peace operations was in the form of military observers. Even when given the opportunity to deploy police and troops, China elected to contribute only small numbers of observers. It was not until 2000 that China deployed its first contingent of civilian police, and 2001 when China deployed its troops to a peace operation for the first time since its deployment of engineering troops to Cambodia in 1992 as part of UNTAC. While the deployment of larger force contingents and the decision to contribute troops to more missions could represent China’s growing acceptance of UN peace operations and international institutions, as argued by some analysts, the increase largely coincides with greater observable implications of strategic interests in the post-2000 period. Small deployments of observers to key UN missions, such as UNTSO, prior to 2000 were well suited for building China’s image as a responsible actor. In fact, China began participating in peace operations in April 1990, less than a year after the international community condemned China for killing civilians during the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989. Larger deployments better suited for exerting Chinese influence began in 2000, as China began its peaceful development.
Chapter Seven

Case Studies

The statistical analysis in chapter four reveals few substantive and significant trends in China’s peace operation participation, suggesting that Chinese decision makers determine participation on a case-by-case basis. The medium-N chapter offers a more in-depth examination of the twenty missions where China has contributed personnel, and again offers few significant trends. Instead, it reveals characteristics that appear in multiple cases where China has deployed peace operations personnel. The analysis finds discussion of economic development in eight mission countries, the presence of joint ventures and Chinese direct investment in eleven, shifts in diplomatic recognition in five mission countries, and resource extraction agreements in six. In light of what appears to be an ad hoc peace operation participation calculus influenced by a mix of diplomatic, geopolitical, and economic drivers, this thesis analyzes three cases to better examine how various factors influence China’s decision to contribute personnel to UN peace operations.

The three cases analyzed in this thesis are the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), and the two missions in Sudan: the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and the AU/UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Haiti is selected for case level analysis because of the sizeable and well-armed Chinese deployment there, despite the nation’s seemingly low strategic value to China and the lack of diplomatic ties between the two nations. Haiti is also one of six mission countries that had just one positive observable implication in the medium-N analysis. Deployments to the other five mission countries with one positive
observable implication consisted either of military observers or far smaller numbers of civilian police, compared to a 125-member formed police unit in Haiti. 179 Haiti is analyzed as an individual case that examines the diplomatic drivers that appear to have been the key motivators in China’s decision to contribute forces.

Sudan has the highest number of positive observable implications in the medium-N study and is home to two United Nations missions where China has contributed significant numbers of personnel. In December 2008, more Chinese personnel were deployed to Sudan than to any other peace operation host state. Additionally, China’s diplomatic and commercial involvement with Sudan has garnered significant media and political attention in the west. Therefore, a case study of China’s peace operation deployments in Sudan may inform concerned policymakers. China’s participation in the two missions in Sudan are examined vis-à-vis China’s nonparticipation in MINURCAT in a comparative case study that relies on the method of difference. Despite not sharing all of the characteristics of the missions in Sudan, MINURCAT is selected as a case for comparison because both Sudanese missions and MINURCAT occurred in the same geographic area, were launched in roughly the same time period, and were launched primarily to respond to conflicts stemming from fighting in Sudan. Additionally, MINURCAT is the only peace operation in Africa launched after 2000 where China chose not to contribute personnel.

Haiti

China’s decision to deploy a peacekeeping contingent to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is perhaps the most perplexing case of Chinese peace

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179 China deployed military observers to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (Jordan and Lebanon both had one positive observable implication), the UN Operation in Mozambique, the UN Observer Mission in Liberia, and deployed civilian police to the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo. See Table 5, page 63, for a chart of the observable implications in all mission countries where China has deployed personnel.
operation participation. Haiti has virtually no extractable resources or significant industry and offers a relatively small market for Chinese goods. Additionally, unlike the host states of the twenty-one other missions where China has deployed personnel, Haiti does not maintain diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. However, in June 2004, China deployed roughly 125 civilian police officers to MINUSTAH. Over the course of the next four years, China deployed nearly 1000 peacekeepers to Haiti, with roughly 140 Chinese personnel in Haiti at any given time.\textsuperscript{180} At the time of this writing, Chinese participation in MINUSTAH continues. This case study begins by offering a brief background of MINUSTAH and the composition of UN forces assigned to the mission, with special attention given to Chinese forces. The thesis then examines Chinese and Haitian media, Chinese government press releases, primary sources from the United Nations, and historical and policy analysis to demonstrate that China's personnel contribution to MINUSTAH was driven primarily by China's desire to develop a means of diplomatic control and influence over the Haitian government. The case study then explains why China deployed the type of forces it did and concludes by offering predictions on Chinese behavior in future missions of a similar nature.

\textit{Mission Background}

MINUSTAH was established in April 2004 by UN Security Council Resolution 1542. The UN mission replaced the US-led Multinational Interim Force that was deployed to Haiti in March 2004 after tension surrounding the contested 2000 election of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide erupted into violence.\textsuperscript{181} An armed rebellion against Aristide's government peaked in February 2004, when the National Revolutionary Front for the

\textsuperscript{180} \textit{China's National Defense in 2008: Appendix III.}
\textsuperscript{181} See \textit{Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008} (London: Center on International Cooperation, 2008) for additional background on MINUSTAH.
Liberation of Haiti took control of Gonaïves, the nation’s fourth largest city.\textsuperscript{182} The rebels were followers of Buteur Metayer, who was attempting to avenge the murder of his brother, Amiot Metayer.\textsuperscript{183} Amiot, the leader of the pro-Aristide Cannibal Army, a gang that harassed government opponents, was brutally murdered in September 2003.\textsuperscript{184} Some opposition politicians believed that Aristide was responsible for the murder because Metayer had potentially damaging information about the government.\textsuperscript{185} By the end of February, Metayer’s rebels along with members of other groups had advanced within miles of the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince. In the early morning of 29 February, Aristide resigned and fled to Africa, in an escape plan formulated by the United States government.\textsuperscript{186} In response to a request for assistance issued by the interim Haitian government the same day, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1529. Resolution 1529 authorized the deployment of a Multinational Interim Force for a period of not more than three months to “contribute to a secure and stable environment in the Haitian capital and elsewhere in the country” by facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance and establishing law and order.\textsuperscript{187} A force of 1000 United States Marines along with Canadian, Chilean, and French troops operating as Combined Joint Task Force Haiti (CJTF-Haiti) arrived later that week with the task of executing the mandate outlined in Resolution 1529.\textsuperscript{188}

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{184} “Police, protestors clash over killing of gang leader: Haitian president losing support. Some suggest government was involved in slaying because of fugitive’s knowledge,” Associated Press. 25 September 2003.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{186} David Adams, “Aristide’s last days,” St. Petersburg Times (Florida). 28 February 2006:1A.
MINUSTAH was established by Security Council Resolution 1542 on 30 April 2004 to replace the Multinational Interim Force with a long-term stabilization force. The initial six-month mission mandate called for a civilian and military mission consisting of a maximum of 1622 civilian police and a military component of 6700 troops. The mission was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, allowing the use of military force to execute its mandate of ensuring a secure and stable environment, supporting the political process, and promoting human rights. MINUSTAH was specifically tasked with assisting the transitional Haitian government in supporting and training the National Police, assisting in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups, protecting UN personnel and assets, and protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. Additionally, the mission was responsible for supporting and fostering democratic governance by providing administrative assistance to the Transitional Government as well as monitoring the human rights situation. On 1 June 2004, authority was transferred from the Multinational Interim Force to MINUSTAH.

At the start of the mission in June 2004, China was one of twenty-two troop contributing countries to MINUSTAH. Contributors included countries from around the world including nine from the Americas, six from Africa, four from Europe, one from the Middle East, and two from Asia. More than ninety-seven percent of the 2148 personnel deployed came from Latin and North American nations, with Brazil contributing more than half of the personnel initially assigned to the mission. The initial dominance of

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190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
192 Ibid.
Western Hemisphere forces on the mission was largely the result of planning for the Multinational Interim Force in which the United States had made informal calls to potential troop contributors to facilitate the deployment of personnel.\textsuperscript{194} Indeed, at the start of the mission, Multinational Interim Force participants Canada and Chile were among the largest troop contributors.\textsuperscript{195} At the time, China’s contribution was just one civilian police officer who was likely deployed as an advanced reconnaissance team to prepare for the arrival of additional Chinese forces.\textsuperscript{196} By October 2004, an entire Chinese Formed Police Unit was on the ground in Port-au-Prince.\textsuperscript{197} In the roughly four years between the launch of the mission and December 2008, the number of troop contributing countries and troops increased to forty-seven and 9,089, respectively, with China providing a 143-member police unit.

\textit{China’s Participation}

MINUSTAH is an outlier that shares little in common with the other missions where China has contributed large numbers of personnel. Haiti produces no critical resources, has minimal trade with China, hosts a virtually nonexistent Overseas Chinese population, and is geographically distant from China. Despite Haiti’s seemingly low strategic value to China, Beijing has maintained a formed police unit of roughly 150 troops in Port-au-Prince since the summer of 2004. Given Haiti’s low strategic value, why does China deploy such a heavily armed force that is China’s fifth largest mission in terms of personnel, of the twenty-two missions where China has contributed personnel?

\textsuperscript{194} Napoli, 2007: 40.
\textsuperscript{195} June 2004 Monthly Summary of Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations.
\textsuperscript{196} Interview with US military officer assigned to the Military Staff Committee of the US Mission to the UN, 4 April 2009. The officer described the planning and force generation process of UN peace operations.
China claims that its participation in MINUSTAH was guided by the norm-based principles discussed earlier in this thesis and by China’s “active stance...in safeguarding world peace and regional stability.”\(^{198}\) At a press conference prior to the deployment of the Chinese police unit to Haiti, Chinese officials specifically cited the principle of respect for national sovereignty, the principle of neutrality, prior agreement to the peace operation, and the preferred use of negotiations instead of coercion and force as the guiding principles behind China’s peace operations deployments.\(^{199}\) This explanation omits any form of realist driver and paints China as participating in peace operations as long as these conditions are met. Given the absence of any significant economic interests or extractable resources in Haiti, it may initially appear that China’s participation is largely, as the Chinese government claims, a means of demonstrating its position as a responsible actor in the UN Security Council and the international community.\(^{200}\)

As described in the medium-N analysis, there is minimal Chinese direct investment, bilateral trade, resources, and a negligible overseas Chinese population in Haiti. However, Haiti is one of twenty-three nations that diplomatically recognize the Republic of China, and the only peace operation host state among Taiwan’s diplomatic partners. China may therefore seek to use its participation in MINUSTAH as a means of exerting influence over Haiti’s foreign policy or to demonstrate Beijing’s willingness to contribute government personnel to a state with which it does not maintain diplomatic ties. China has previously used support for peace operations as a coercive diplomatic tool in

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\(^{199}\) Ibid.

\(^{200}\) Ibid.
shaping or punishing the actions of states that maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

China has a history of threatening to use its veto power to block the establishment or extension of peacekeeping missions when peace operation host states appear to be strengthening ties with the Republic of China. In February 1996, after Haiti invited Taiwan’s Vice-President to its presidential inauguration, China held up the extension of the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). The visit was the first high-level trip of a Republic of China official to Haiti in more than twenty years, and was intended to “reinforce the already cordial ties” between the two countries.201 The visit was viewed as a provocative move by Beijing, which then refused to approve a resolution to extend the UNMIH mandate. The initial draft resolution would have scaled down the operation to 2,500 troops for four additional months, however Chinese diplomats stated they would approve no more than 1,500 total personnel.202 In response to China’s demands, a group of Latin American and Caribbean nations, including Cuba, appealed to the Security Council to end Chinese obstruction of the proposed extension of the mission.203 China eventually agreed to a four-month extension with 1,200 troops and 300 civilian police officers.204 Western diplomats criticized China’s actions claiming that, “the Chinese held this peacekeeping mission hostage to send a political message on Taiwan, putting the mission in jeopardy and a UN success at risk…. [It was] especially galling because China portrays itself as the champion of the downtrodden and a leader of the developing nations, which it stiffed

201 "Vice-President Li arrives in Haiti for four-day official visit," Central News Agency-Taipei. 6 February 1996.
202 "UN Peace Force in Haiti May End Due to Chinese Objections," Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 28 February 1996.
In December 1996, China along with Russia insisted that UNMIH be terminated. The Chinese representative to the UN Security Council, Qin Huasun, argued that the mission should be terminated due to enhanced Haitian law enforcement capabilities and the need for economic reconstruction rather than peacekeeping. While China’s calls for termination of this mission do not appear to be directly associated with a provocative act by the Haitian government, they demonstrate China’s lack of full support to a mission in a peace operation host state that recognizes Taiwan.

China has also used its veto power to block proposed UN peacekeeping missions in countries other than Haiti. In January 1997, China vetoed a UN mission in Central America due to Guatemala’s diplomatic recognition of the Republic of China. China’s representative to the Security Council stated that the veto was “not a situation we would have liked to see. It was caused entirely by the erroneous acts of the Government of Guatemala…[which]for four consecutive years, unscrupulously supported activities aimed at splitting China at the United Nations….It was furthermore bent on inviting, in disregard of the solemn warnings of the Chinese Government, the authorities of Taiwan to the signing ceremony of the peace Agreement in Guatemala, thereby providing them with a venue for secessionist activities against China.” China offered to reconsider the authorization of the deployment of military observers to Guatemala if the Government of Guatemala “moves to remove the obstacles.” China approved the mission ten days later, even though Guatemala maintained diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

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205 Ibid.
proposed extension to the UNPREDEP, the UN force protecting Macedonia’s borders, after that country established diplomatic ties with Taiwan in January 1997.\textsuperscript{209}

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan responded to Chinese participation in MINUSTAH by accusing Beijing of using the extension of the mission as “leverage to strengthen its relations with the Haitian government.” The press release blames China for using the “extension issue to try to stop our senior government officials from attending the inauguration of Mr. Rene Preval as President of the Republic of Haiti...[and for] boycotting the extension appeal several times during discussions in the United Nations Security Council to show its displeasure over the Representative to Haiti speaking on Taiwan’s behalf at the UN General Committee.”\textsuperscript{210} Despite these issues, the Government of Taiwan insists that its ties with Haiti remain strong and that “Haiti has on countless occasions reiterated its unswerving commitment to relations with the Taiwan government.”\textsuperscript{211}

Interestingly, Taiwan focuses much of its criticism of MINUSTAH on China’s threat to not vote for an extension of the mission mandate, rather than on the contribution of Chinese personnel. Perhaps this signals that Taipei views China’s use of its Security Council veto power to coerce states aligned with Taiwan as a more pressing concern than the mere presence of Chinese personnel on the ground. In the case of Haiti, this is a logical position for Taiwan as the Chinese FPU makes up only a small fraction of the force and their deployment offers China little additional leverage over the Haitian government.

\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
Additionally, China’s interference in earlier missions in Haiti, Guatemala, and Macedonia demonstrates China’s ability to make political statements when voting for or vetoing peace operations. Given China’s ability to coerce decision makers and shape the Haitian policy through its veto power alone, China appears to gain little diplomatic advantage from its deployment of personnel other than making a political statement that it is willing to have a physical presence in a country that maintains diplomatic ties with Taipei.

*Chinese MINUSTAH Force Structure Analysis*

China publicly states that the deployment of a Chinese police unit to Haiti was a result of a United Nations request.\(^{212}\) It is important to note, however, that the Military Planning Services division of the UN Office of Military Affairs (OMA) generally issues force generation requests for peace operations to all member states, who then offer their personnel and assets in exchange for payment by the UN.\(^{213}\) Force requests are typically not made to specific members states. This suggests that in the case of MINUSTAH, China chose to offer its personnel in response to a general force request issued by the OMA. While the force requirement lists are not made public, analysis of MINUSTAH mission maps from the United Nations Cartographic Office reveals the number and types of units requested by the OMA. The OMA likely requested at least nine formed police units along with numerous infantry units supported by aviation, medical, and engineering units.\(^{214}\) Notably, China provides forces for just one formed police unit. The lack of additional Chinese forces is discussed later in this section.

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\(^{213}\) Interview with US military officer assigned to the Military Staff Committee of the US Mission to the UN, 4 April 2009.

China’s mission to Haiti is a civilian police deployment of anti-riot police officers from China’s Ministry of Public Safety (MPS). The 1.7 million officers of the MPS (renmin jingcha) fall under the control of the State Council and are primarily responsible for domestic law enforcement operations. In China, duties of the MPS include domestic patrol, detective work, traffic enforcement, anti-terrorism, and anti-riot response. In 2001, the MPS ordered major cities to establish anti-riot forces of at least 300 personnel, or 200 in provincial capitals. Personnel selected from these anti-riots units make up the bulk of China’s force in Haiti. The personnel selected for the mission in Haiti ostensibly represent the elite of the MPS. Candidates are required to have at least an associate’s degree, three years of work experience in public security, and proficiency in oral and written English, along with a variety of other health and knowledge requirements. Upon selection, members of the team attend a three-month training that focuses on tactics, command, Haitian geography and culture, and international law. Additionally, commanders and selected riot police officers received English and French training, while the bulk of the force was took part only in English training. The rigorous selection requirements and the in-depth pre-deployment reflects the importance China places in using its peace operations forces to positively represent China and “win hearts and minds” in peace operation host states.

The deployment to Haiti represents the first and only time China has deployed an integrated riot police unit on a UN mission. When deploying civilian police on UN peace

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217 The initial deployment included personnel from the riot police units of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing. Speech by Tan Jun, 29 September 2004.
219 Speech by Tan Jun, 29 September 2004.
operations, China traditionally sends smaller numbers of officers who are then integrated into teams made up of personnel from other contributing states.\textsuperscript{220} The Chinese riot police team in Haiti, however, is a formed police unit (FPU), a specialized single nation contingent that is generally tasked with supplying rapid response and high-risk police capabilities that require a high degree of unit cohesiveness.\textsuperscript{221} Deployed FPUs often provide security support to local law enforcement agencies by participating in show of force missions and joint patrols and training, protect UN personnel and facilities and other key individuals and facilities designated by the Special Representative of the Secretary General in a peace operation host state, assist in crowd and riot control, and carry out high risk arrests.\textsuperscript{222} When China first deployed its FPU, it was one of two FPUs in Haiti. Today, China’s force in Haiti is one of nine FPUs. Other FPU contributors to Haiti are India, Nepal, Nigeria, and Senegal with one FPU each, and Jordan and Pakistan, which each maintain two FPUs in Haiti.\textsuperscript{223} The Chinese force is deployed in Port-Au-Prince, along with six other FPUs.

China’s decision to deploy a formed police unit is a significant deviation from its past peace operations deployments. As mentioned earlier, China’s police deployments to peace operations have traditionally been relatively small contingents of civilian police, while the majority of large Chinese deployments have consisted of non-combat People’s Liberation Army troops such as engineers, transportation specialists, and medical personnel. Analysis of UN maps reveals that MINUSTAH forces are composed almost

\textsuperscript{220} Based on comparison of Chinese list of contributions published in \textit{China’s National Defense in 2008} and UN mission maps which list non-formed police units as “CIVPOL” units.

\textsuperscript{221} \textit{Formed Police Unit Tasks.} (International Network to Promote the Rule of Law, 2007): 1-9.

\textsuperscript{222} Ibid: 1-9.

\textsuperscript{223} United Nations Map No. 4224, Rev 23. \textit{MINUSTAH.} (United Nations Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section, March 2009)
entirely of formed police and infantry units.224 While China could have potentially contributed engineers or medical personnel, as it typically does, these support units are manned by Latin American militaries.225 As of early 2009, the two engineer companies assigned to MINUSTAH were manned by Chile and Brazil, the sole medical unit was run by Argentina and the three aviation units were provided by Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay.226 Chile was a large contributor to the Multinational Interim Force while Brazil served a key role in the formation and leadership of MINUSTAH.227 The position of these two nations in the history and leadership of MINUSTAH may have allowed them greater access to the support units that China may have otherwise filled. The remaining support units were two aviation flights and an aviation squadron based in Port-au-Prince.228 China has yet to contribute aviation units to any peace operation, despite calls from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations urging China to contribute force enablers such as aviation transport units.229 It is questionable whether China would be willing or able to contribute helicopters or transport aircraft to a mission so far from China. China has relatively few military helicopters. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force operates less than 100 transport and utility helicopters, while the Army operates roughly 340

224 In addition to the nine formed police units, there are more than thirty infantry units of varying sizes deployed throughout Haiti.
225 United Nations Map No. 4224, Rev 23. MINUSTAH. (United Nations Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section, March 2009). Despite multiple requests, the United Nations Cartographic Office did not provide the author with historical mission maps that allow for the examination of the initial MINUSTAH force structure. Current maps, however, are suitable for this analysis as they reflect various types of personnel that China could theoretically contribute.
226 Ibid.
227 Napoli, 2007: 46-47.
228 United Nations Map No. 4224, Rev 23. (United Nations Department of Field Support, Cartographic Section, March 2009).
support and utility helicopters. Logistical difficulties associated with a long-range deployment as well as a lack of English language skills could complicate or hamper an aviation deployment. If deployed to Haiti, Chinese aircraft would be operating in airspace crowded with civilian and military aircraft, requiring Chinese military aircrews to communicate in English, the universal language of aviation. Complications or potential mishaps stemming from poor communication could potentially tarnish China’s image as a well-trained and disciplined troop contributor. These limitations offer China few options other than either contributing an infantry or formed police unit. China has not yet contributed infantry forces to a UN operation; doing so could potentially generate concerns of a China threat, particularly if they were deployed to the Caribbean, a region thought to be well within the US sphere of influence. Critics have previously applied the “China threat” concept to Chinese peacekeeping efforts.

The presence of nine formed police units suggests that the OMA force requirement called for at least that many units. If the argument that China uses its deployment of personnel to MINUSTAH to influence Haiti’s diplomatic actions holds true, it is certainly surprising that China did not try to build a larger presence by filling the additional formed police unit requirements.

**Findings and Predictions**

China’s contribution of nearly 1000 civilian police officers to MINUSTAH over the course of four years demonstrates China’s willingness to participate in peace

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232 See Yin, 2007: 61 for a summary of cases where the China Threat theory has been applied to Chinese peace operation participation.
operations in states where the potential economic gain is greatly outweighed by political benefits. This is evident in the number of Chinese personnel deployed to MINUSTAH. The cumulative total of Chinese police officers deployed to Haiti between June 2004 and December 2008 is the fifth largest contribution of Chinese personnel to a UN mission, behind contributions to missions in Liberia, the Congo, Sudan, and Lebanon. The case of Haiti clearly demonstrates how the desire for an enhanced diplomatic position can drive China’s peace operation participation. The deployment of a relatively large Chinese force despite the lack of any other apparent Chinese economic, strategic, or commercial interest in Haiti supports the theory that China analyzes potential peace operations on a case-by-case basis where one driver alone can shape China’s participation.

China’s participation in MINUSTAH offers some predictive power for Chinese behavior in future peace operations. China’s relatively large commitment of peace operations forces to gain what appears to be coercive diplomatic influence in a state that maintains diplomatic ties with Taiwan demonstrates Beijing’s willingness to use peace operations forces as a diplomatic tool. Although the states that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan are all relatively stable, China would potentially deploy a symbolic peace operations contingent if deteriorating conditions led to the establishment of a UN peace operation there.

**Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic**

China’s contribution of an FPU to Haiti represents a mission where China’s peace operation participation was guided by a desire to make a political statement and gain diplomatic access in a state that maintains ties with Taiwan. While the Haitian case identifies diplomatic and political drivers behind China’s peace operation participation, it

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233 *China’s National Defense in 2008.*
does not analyze potential commercial and economic motivations. A comparative case study that examines China’s significant personnel contributions in the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) vis-à-vis the absence of Chinese participation in the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) provides insight into the more realist commercial and economic drivers of Chinese peacekeeping. The comparative case study provides context to the relationship between China’s peace operations contributions and both oil reserves and trade in a peace operation host state that was identified by the regression analysis in chapter five. It also provides more detailed analysis of economic and commercial issues than the brief overviews in the medium-N chapter. Additionally, this case study relies on a method of difference analysis to determine what factors led China to contribute forces in Sudan, but not in neighboring Chad or the Central African Republic.

Sudan Mission Background

The United Nations currently maintains two peacekeeping operations in Sudan. The first, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was founded following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1547 in June 2004. The AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was initially launched by the African Union, but came under the auspices of the United Nations in July 2007 through the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1769.

UNMIS was established with the initial mandate of preparing for a peace support mission that would be deployed following the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in January 2005, was meant to end the two-decade long Second Civil Sudanese War between the GoS and the SPLM/A. While a complete description of the conflict is beyond the scope of this thesis, the war stemmed from a variety of factors including ethnic and religious issues, allocation of resource wealth, and control over arable land. Shortly after the CPA was signed, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1590, which shifted the UNMIS mandate to supporting the implementation of the CPA by monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire agreement between the GoS and the SPLM/A, monitoring the movement and redeployment of forces, assisting in the implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program, and helping to restructure various components of the post-conflict government in Sudan.

The United Nations Security Council formally approved UNAMID on 31 July 2007 with the goal of bringing stability to the western Sudanese region of Darfur. Since 2003, the region has been plagued by an ethnically motivated armed conflict over land resources. The Sudanese government has been accused of allying with African-Arab militias in carrying out crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur. The mission is tasked primarily with the protection of civilians, but also contributes to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying the implementation of agreements,

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assisting the development of an inclusive political process, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic.239

*China's Peacekeeping Participation in Sudan*

China has contributed large numbers of forces to both missions in Sudan. Between April 2005 and December 2008, China contributed 1875 troops, civilian police, and military observers to UNMIS, and deployed another 422 troops and observers to UNAMID between November 2007 and December 2008. Combined, this represents the second largest Chinese deployment of peace operations personnel to a given country, behind the contribution of over 4000 peacekeepers to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) between October 2003 and December 2008.240 The Chinese troop contribution to UNMIS consists of one engineering unit of roughly 275 personnel, one Level II medical hospital manned by 60 Chinese personnel, and one 100-man transportation unit.241 China has also contributed a total of 47 civilian police officers to UNMIS.242 In UNAMID, China deployed an engineering company and a transportation unit.243 At the end of 2008, China was the second largest non-African contributor to UNAMID and the forth-largest non-African contributor to UNMIS.244 The Chinese troops in Sudan have reportedly

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240 *China's National Defense in 2008,* Appendix III.
241 E-mail correspondence with Chinese military officers assigned to the Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations, 15 April 2008. A Level-II hospital provides advanced life support, basic surgery, and intensive care. It may be supported by a laboratory and radiology facility, and is generally required in regions where there is no ready access to modern hospital facilities. Source: Benjamin Seet, “Levels of medical support for United Nations peacekeeping operations,” *Military Medicine* (July 1999).
242 *China's National Defense in 2008,* Appendix III.
243 E-mail correspondence with Chinese military officers assigned to the Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations, 15 April 2008. Also, UN Map No 4327, Rev 3. UNAMID Mission Map. (UN Department of Field Support, January 2009).
244 *UN Mission Contributions by Country.* UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. 31 December 2008.
demonstrated high levels of performance and have been awarded certificates of merit and unit citations and UNMIS senior leadership.\textsuperscript{245}

Like its participation in MINUSTAH, China claimed that its contributions to the missions in Sudan were the result of United Nations requests.\textsuperscript{246} As previously discussed, the United Nations Office of Military Affairs typically does not request contributions from specific troop contributing nations. Instead, China likely responded to a general request for forces, indicating that China elected to participate in the missions in Sudan. Chinese officials also issued the same general explanation for participation that is generally provided before China deploys personnel to any UN mission, stating that China supports UN peacekeeping missions and seeks to help promote peace and stability in Sudan.\textsuperscript{247} However, given China’s considerable commercial interests in Sudan, it seems unlikely that Beijing’s decision to contribute such a sizeable peacekeeping contingent was driven by pure altruism.

Much media and policy interest concerning China’s peacekeeping participation and interaction with Sudan focuses on the involvement of China’s growing investment in underdeveloped resource-rich states, like Sudan, which are often governed by regimes that the West does not approve of.\textsuperscript{248} Much of this attention paints China as a mercantilist actor that uses state power and resources to enhance the ability of Chinese firms to access Sudan’s resource wealth. Numerous non-governmental organizations have protested China’s commercial relations with Sudan, believing that China’s desire to maintain close

\textsuperscript{245} "Chinese Peacekeepers in Sudan Honored for Prominent Performance," \textit{Xinhua} as reported by BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 13 September 2007.
\textsuperscript{246} "China to join UN peacekeeping operation in Sudan," \textit{Xinhua} as reported by BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 30 March 2005.
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{248} \textit{China’s Thirst for Oil}. (New York: International Crisis Group, 2008), 12.
commercial ties may lead China to downplay the Government of Sudan’s role in the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, which has displaced 2.5 million and killed 300,000 people.\textsuperscript{249} These criticisms are not unfounded given the extent of Chinese investment in Sudan’s oil sector.

\textit{China’s Commercial Involvement in Sudan}

In 1959, Sudan became the fourth African nation to diplomatically recognize Beijing. The two nations have generally maintained good relations despite shifts in the government in Khartoum. Between 1959 and 1989, China was one of Sudan’s many diplomatic partners, and while not playing a significant role in Sudan’s foreign relations, the two nations developed trade, aid, cultural, political, and military links, many of which remain in place today.\textsuperscript{250} China continued to maintain relations with Sudan following the June 1989 military coup that placed Omar Hassan al-Bashir in power. In 1994, the Government of Sudan expressed interest in Chinese development of Sudan’s oil sector.\textsuperscript{251} Two years later, the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) won its first tender for an oil extraction project in Sudan.\textsuperscript{252} In 1998, China began construction of the Khartoum Refinery, a joint venture with the Sudanese Ministry of Energy and Mining.\textsuperscript{253} China’s involvement in Sudan’s oil sector continued to grow with CNPC taking on additional roles in oilfield services, engineering, and construction, including building and maintaining a 1,506-kilometer oil pipeline linking the Heglig Oilfield to Port

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\item \textsuperscript{251} Ibid, 278.
\item \textsuperscript{253} Ibid.
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Sudan. In August 1999, Sudan became an oil exporter, thanks in large part to Chinese development of oil fields and pipelines. Since then, China has expanded its oil extraction presence in Sudan, and by 2000, petroleum products amounted to ninety-eight percent of Sudan’s exports to China. By 2002, nine-percent of all Chinese oil imports came from Sudan. China’s economic and commercial ties with Sudan continued after the signing of the CPA, with China gaining access to additional oil concessions in 2005 and 2007.

China’s participation in Sudan’s oil sector differs significantly from that of most other multinational energy corporations. CNPC has stated that security of China’s energy supply trumps company interests, meaning that corporate policy may seek to secure access to international oil reserves and not necessarily profits. As a state-owned firm carrying out state objectives, CNPC can pursue high-risk investments that many other multinational firms would avoid. Additionally, the strategic nature of CNPC’s mission in Sudan has led China to use state power and resources to reinforce ties with Khartoum. Indeed, China has demonstrated this mercantilist approach in Sudan as its involvement in the oil sector has been combined with humanitarian aid, military assistance, and preferential loan agreements. For instance, China’s Export-Import (Exim) Bank offered reduced rate loans to the Bank of Sudan to help fuel development and construction in the oil sector.

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254 Ibid.
255 Large 2008, 280. Also, “CNPC in Sudan.”
257 Large 2008, 280.
258 “CNPC in Sudan.”
260 Patey 2006.
261 Patey 2006.
262 Large 2008, 278.
Explaining China's Participation in Sudan

Despite China’s stated agenda of deploying peacekeepers to promote peace and stability in Sudan, many of Beijing’s dealings with Khartoum enhance Sudan’s ability to wage war, both materially and politically. China vocally advocates for international respect of Sudan’s sovereignty, blocking sanctions that could cut the oil profits which support the Sudanese government and criticizing moves to prosecute Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for genocide.\(^{263}\) China also provides advanced weaponry, including ground attack aircraft, and military training to the Sudanese armed forces.\(^{264}\) At the same time, China commits large numbers of troops, observers, and police officers to missions aimed at ending civil war and domestic strife, resulting in a strategic dichotomy in which Beijing appears to simultaneously promote both peace and war. China’s continued political, financial, and military support for the Government of Sudan despite international condemnation for Sudan’s acts raises questions about Beijing’s idealist justification for its contribution to UNMIS and UNAMID.

Given China’s significant stake in Sudan’s oil industry, it is clear that Beijing wants to ensure that its flow of oil from Sudan continues uninterrupted. The presence of large oil reserves increases Sudan’s strategic value to China, and therefore provides a set of intrinsic interests and private goods for China to access and protect. The question remaining to be answered is what specific causal factors lead China to deploy peacekeeping forces to Sudan. While Beijing seeks to protect its access to Sudan’s oil by deploying peacekeeping forces, does China contribute forces to physically protect its oil

\(^{263}\) Peter Walker and Julian Borger, “China may veto attempt to arrest Sudanese president on genocide charges,” *The Guardian (UK).* 15 July 2008.

infrastructure? Does it deploy to provide a stable environment in which oil extraction can continue? Or, does China support and participate in peace operations to ensure the international community does not enact further sanctions that could block its access to Sudan’s oil?

The first potential motivation behind China’s deployments to UNMIS and UNAMID is the “physical protection” mechanism. This mechanism posits that China deploys its forces to physically protect Chinese oil infrastructure in Sudan. China has significant oil interests spread throughout the country, with Chinese investment in eight of Sudan’s twenty-three oil concession blocks.\footnote{Oil Map of Sudan. European Coalition on Oil in Sudan. 2007. Available online: <http://www.ecosonline.org>.
} This infrastructure has previously been attacked by Sudanese rebel groups such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), which labeled China as “a partner for [the] genocidal government in Khartoum.”\footnote{“Rebels tell China ‘leave Sudan,’” BBC News. 25 October 2007. Available online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7061066.stm>.
} The rebel group has demanded that China withdraw its support for the Sudanese government, arguing that oil revenues benefit the Sudanese government rather than the people of Sudan. JEM leadership say that attacks against oil facilities are used to coerce Chinese firms into leaving Sudan.\footnote{“Sudan rebels ‘attack oil field,’” BBC News. 11 December 2007. Available online: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7138226.stm>.
} Chinese-owned oil facilities have reportedly been attacked and seized on multiple occasions, potentially providing China with a desire to physically protect its oil infrastructure.

While China could potentially use the forces it has deployed to Sudan to protect its oil infrastructure, the “physical protection” mechanism seems unlikely on a number of grounds. First, the voluntary nature of personnel contributions to UN peace operations...
allows contributing nations to withdraw their forces at any time, however China will probably not redeploy its troops in Sudan to defend oil infrastructure. China has not deployed combat arms units, such as infantry troops, to Sudan that would be capable of protecting oil fields and other facilities from attacks by relatively well-armed rebels equipped with rocket propelled grenades and machine guns.\footnote{Media reports often describe rocket and grenade attacks carried out by rebels in Sudan.} Instead, it has contributed engineering, medical, and transportation units, which have specific supporting roles in UNMIS and UNAMID, and are poorly suited and equipped for physical protection missions. Second, the Sudanese Armed Forces seem to provide security for most oil related infrastructure. News reports indicate that 1200 government troops helped defend a Chinese-run oil facility in the Kordofan state of Sudan before it was allegedly overrun by JEM rebels, and the Sudanese army assigns troops to protect high risk oil facilities, including facilities in concession blocks where China’s CNPC maintains significant shares.\footnote{Ibid. Also, \textit{Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights} (Brussels: Human Rights Watch, 2003): 284.} These guards are often armed with weapons and equipment provided by China.\footnote{Hilary Andersson, “China is ‘fuelling war in Darfur,’” \textit{BBC News}. 13 July 2008. Available online: \url{http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7503428.stm}.} The security guarantees provided by the GoS offers more security than could be provided by the few hundred non-combat troops China has deployed. Given the lack of Chinese combat capabilities in Sudan and the use of GoS forces to protect oil infrastructure, the proximity of Chinese deployments to oil extraction sites, as described in the medium-N analysis, does not necessarily correlate with a desire to use Chinese forces to protect oil interests. Furthermore, the large swaths of Sudan that fall into oil concession blocks makes it difficult to distinguish if the proximity of Chinese deployments to oil...
fields is coincidental. In light of this evidence, the physical protection mechanism is likely not the key driver for China’s contribution to the mission in Sudan.

A second potential driver for China’s personnel contributions is the “continued access” mechanism. This mechanism suggests that China’s contributions to UNMIS and UNAMID were intended to ensure continued political access to Sudan’s oil supply. That is, China hoped to prevent potential sanctions that could block its continued legal access to Sudanese oil by reassuring the international community that Sudan was becoming a more responsible actor due to Khartoum’s acceptance of two United Nations peace operations.

Significant evidence points to the continued access mechanism and suggests that upper levels of the Chinese government encouraged the mission to ensure that China would be able to maintain its Sudanese oil flow. To demonstrate its support for peace in Sudan, the Chinese ambassador to the UN helped broker a compromise plan that called for an enhanced UN peacekeeping role in Darfur during a November 2006 conference in Addis Ababa.\footnote{Large, 2008: 289.} Shortly after the conference in Addis Ababa, China’s ambassador to the United Nations, Wang Guanya said, “Usually China doesn’t send messages, but this time they did. It was a clear strong message that the proposal from Kofi Annan is a good one and Sudan has to accept it.”\footnote{“China told Sudan to adopt UN’s Darfur plan – envoy,” Bloomberg. 7 February 2007.} This demonstrates a significant departure from China’s traditional behavior of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states, signaling the importance that China placed on ensuring the presence of a peace operation in Sudan.

Interestingly, despite advocating for a UN force in Darfur, China abstained from voting on Resolution 1706 which authorized the extension of UNMIS peacekeeping force into Darfur. China abstained from voting as it believed that implementing the resolution...
without ensuring that the mission came with the “consent of the Government of National Unity” could lead to further confrontation and potentially endanger the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.273 However, China voted in support of Resolution 1769 on 31 July 2007, which officially authorized the UNAMID force. Not coincidentally, China’s last day of the rotating presidency of the Security Council was 31 July 2007. China reportedly used its influence to ensure the resolution’s passing.274 China’s efforts to make the mission mandate more politically acceptable to the Sudanese government is a clear reflection of Beijing’s desire to portray itself as a responsible actor while also appealing to the Government of Sudan.

The timing of China’s calls for Sudan also seems to be quite calculated. China went to great lengths to promote its responsible role over Sudan in the months leading up to the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. In response to China’s ties with Sudan, many activist groups called for boycotts of the Beijing games. These boycotts could have damaged China’s reputation.275 The added attention surrounding China in the months leading up to the Olympics resulted in increased scrutiny and international condemnation of China’s seemingly unwavering support for the Government of Sudan, which could have led to sanctions on Sudanese oil on top of potential boycotts of the Olympic games. These actions would have damaged China’s national pride and its energy security.

China’s peacekeeping participation in Sudan can be viewed as a component of a broader Chinese government agenda to secure continued access to Sudanese oil. Peacekeeping is only one component of a spectrum of Chinese government involvement in Sudan that includes investment, construction assistance, preferential rate loans, military

274 Large, 2008: 290.
275 Ibid: 290.
assistance, and humanitarian aid. This assistance paints China as a mercantilist actor in Sudan, using various elements of state power to enhance ties with the Sudanese government. Although China’s involvement with Sudan is multifaceted, some policy analysis claims that a lack of coordination between the different arms of the Chinese government apparatus has prevented peacekeeping and overseas investment efforts from strategically converging.\textsuperscript{276} This certainly does not appear to be the case with China’s participation in Sudan where officials in Beijing have gone against China’s policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states to strongly encourage peace operations in Sudan in order to counter significant criticism from the international community over its oil investment in Sudan.

China’s support and personnel contributions for UN missions in Sudan appear to have two intended goals in securing continued access to Sudanese oil. First, by publically supporting peace operations in Sudan, China portrayed itself as a responsible global actor while also encouraging Sudan to accept a UN peacekeeping mission. This action may have prevented calls for sanctions on Sudanese oil exports that could have endangered China’s energy security and damaged China’s status in the months prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Second, supporting peace operations in Sudan may have been intended to appease Darfuri rebel groups who viewed China as a primary enemy due to its close relationship with the Government of Sudan. While China has been largely successful at preventing sanctions that could block its access to Sudan’s oil, it has failed at winning over rebel opinion, as groups such as JEM still view China as supporting the Sudanese government’s war against them.\textsuperscript{277}

\textsuperscript{276} China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, 2009: 16.
\textsuperscript{277} “Sudan rebels ‘attack oil field,’” \textit{BBC News}. 11 December 2007.
The continued access mechanism demonstrates a realist motivation for China’s support and personnel contributions to UNMIS and UNAMID. China used its government influence in the United Nations and the deployment of Chinese military and police personnel to ensure its petroleum companies could continue operating in Sudan. Chinese leaders, however, strongly deny that China is a mercantilist actor, with Premier Wen Jiabao publically stating that, “Neo-colonialism is not a label for China.”  China claims that its diplomatic and commercial involvement in Africa is “win-win” in nature, benefiting both China and developing African nations. It views its participation as a means of assisting African development. Despite these claims, many Africans, including some in Sudan, argue that China’s participation is not win-win and actually damages local economies by flooding markets with cheap Chinese products and by exploiting African workers. Regardless of whether Chinese investment and interaction benefits African nations, it demonstrates China’s mercantilist behavior in which it uses state resources to gain commercial access to African nations.

The Case of MINURCAT

While Chinese forces were deployed to Sudan in relatively large numbers, Beijing chose not to deploy any personnel to the United Nations operation in neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic. The United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) was established by Security Council Resolution 1778 in September 2007 in response to “the activities of armed groups and other attacks in

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eastern Chad, the north-eastern Central African Republic and western Sudan which threaten the security of the civilian population, the conduct of humanitarian operations in those areas and the stability of those countries.\textsuperscript{282} This instability stemmed largely from a spillover of the conflict in Darfur, as Sudanese rebels attacked Darfurian refugees seeking sanctuary in Chad and the Central African Republic. The MINUCAT mandate tasked the mission with helping to create security conditions conducive to a voluntary, secure and sustainable return of refugees and displaced persons by training the Chadian police and security forces, relocating refugee camps that are close to the border, liaising with various governments and regional organizations, and assisting the governments of Chad and the Central African Republic promote rule of law and human rights.\textsuperscript{283}

The European Union (EU) supported the creation of a peace operation aimed at improving the security of refugees and displaced persons, and pledged to provide additional forces to the mission.\textsuperscript{284} As a result, the United Nations, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorized the EU to deploy forces and take all necessary measures to improve the security environment in eastern Chad and the north-eastern Central African Republic.\textsuperscript{285} Thus, the military observers and police deployed under the MINURCAT mandate were to be supported by over 4000 troops from the EU. The European Union Force (EUFOR) and MINURCAT are two separate organizations, but operate under the same Security Council Resolution. While MINURCAT concentrates its efforts on strengthening governance and security institutions in Chad and the Central

\textsuperscript{283} "Resolution 1778."
\textsuperscript{285} "Resolution 1778."
African Republic, EUFOR is an armed force tasked with preventing rebel incursions from Sudan and protecting refugee camps.\textsuperscript{286}

Despite having the opportunity to contribute forces to MINURCAT, China elected not to do so, making MINURCAT the only current UN mission in Africa without Chinese participation. While the mission mandate for MINURCAT called for fewer personnel than the mandates for either UNMIS and UNAMID, offering China fewer opportunities to participate, the mission requirement of up to 350 police and observers in Chad and the Central African Republic has never been fully filled, leaving China the ability to contribute personnel to the mission. Additionally, Chinese media reported that the EU consulted with potential third party contributors, suggesting that the EU would allow non-members to contribute forces to EUFOR.\textsuperscript{287} It is unlikely, however, that China would submit large contingents of its personnel to EU command, even if given the opportunity to do so. While China has deployed troops to UN missions with non-Chinese mission commanders, China avoids participating in non-UN operations. For instance, China chose not to participate in any of the multinational missions carrying out anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden stating that China would not accept assignments from “other regional organizations or countries.”\textsuperscript{288} As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has a level of influence over mission mandates that it likely would not have if it participated in an operation planned largely by a non-UN force. Even though EUFOR operated under the auspices of a UN mandate, the mandate was very broad in scope,

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\item \textsuperscript{288} “Backgrounder: Chinese Navy sends most sophisticated ships on escort mission off Somalia,” Xinhua. 26 December 2008.
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authorizing the EU to take any actions necessary to enhance regional security. As a non-EU member, China would likely have little say in the planning of the EUFOR mission and would likely be forced to accept EU decisions if it participated. While the conditions for contributing large numbers of forces to the EU mission were not ideal, China could have contributed observers or police to the MINURCAT mission.

* A Comparison of Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic

The lack of Chinese participation in MINURCAT is surprising given that conditions in at least one of the mission countries, Chad, have some commonalities with mission countries where China has contributed peace operations personnel. The two most apparent similarities between Chad and other peace operations host states are the presence of resource wealth and Chad’s diplomatic switch in August 2006 in which it shifted its diplomatic ties from Taipei to Beijing. The diplomatic switch alone may have warranted Chinese contributions to the state as it presented Beijing with 289 The differences that exist between Chad and Sudan likely play some role in China’s decision to not contribute forces.

While oil is present in both Chad and Sudan, proven oil reserves in 2006, the year prior to the launch of both UNAMID and MINURCAT, are far higher in Sudan (6.6 billion barrels) than in Chad (900 million barrels). 290 Additionally, China’s investment in Sudan’s oil sector in 2006 was significantly greater than in Chad. While China maintained significant extraction agreements in Sudan and was invested in multiple oil fields and facilities, China’s oil interests in Chad were limited to technical services such as

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289 Large, 2008: 290. Large suggests that Beijing’s new diplomatic ties with Chad may have increased the importance of regional stability, but viewed the new diplomatic ties as a potential driver of Chinese support for peace operations in neighboring Sudan.
geophysical prospecting, well drilling and logging in one oil field.\textsuperscript{291} The lack of significant existing oil infrastructure agreements with Chad may have led China to decide against deploying personnel there. Despite a potential interest in regional stability, China may have viewed its contributions to the missions in Sudan as sufficient given the lack of a vested interest in protecting oil flows from Chad to China. Some analysts believe that China may invest in Chad's nascent oil industry and possibly link the countries' oilfields to Sudan via a pipeline, allowing for exports by sea.\textsuperscript{292} Additional investment in Chad's oil industry could potentially lead to Chinese contributions to MINURCAT.

Another factor not present in Sudan was international pressure for China to take action. The mission in Chad and the Central African Republic was aimed largely at protecting Darfurian refugees and local civilians from attacks by Sudanese rebels. This differed substantially from the missions in Sudan, particularly UNAMID, where the Sudanese government and its proxies were accused of attacking civilians within the country's borders, often with weapons provided by China. Many international activists viewed China as a mercantilist actor concerned purely with maintaining its access to Sudan's oil wealth with little regard for the humanitarian crisis. Given the lack of significant oil investment in Chad and the Central African Republic, China could not be viewed as a mercantilist power in those states, and therefore did not receive the same global pressure to participate.

Comparing factors such as Chinese foreign direct investment and Chinese trade with Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic would provide little additional

\textsuperscript{291} Soares de Oliveira, 2008: 94.

\textsuperscript{292} Thomas Pearmain, "Chad Chooses China; Future of Chad's Energy Sector Likely to Change Dramatically," \textit{Global Insight Daily Analysis}. 9 August 2006. Available online: \url{<http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03.cfm?nav03=48872&nav02=43782&nav01=43092>}. 131
analytical value because China’s FDI and trade flows with Sudan consist largely of oil related investment and exchanges. Absent significant oil extraction agreements in the Central African Republic and Chad, FDI and trade flows in these states remain far lower than they are in Sudan. Variation in levels of FDI and trade flows between China and the three African states can therefore be considered the result of China’s oil investment in Sudan, and cannot be analyzed independent of this fact.

Findings

China’s peacekeeping participation in Sudan demonstrates a case where China contributed personnel to ensure continued access to a critical strategic resource. The deployment of Chinese personnel does not appear as if it were meant to physically defend Chinese-invested oil facilities, but rather to ensure that political conditions, both internationally and within Sudan, would allow for continued oil exports to China. Peacekeeping participation in Sudan appears to be one component of a broader government objective of maintaining both international and Sudanese support, and demonstrates a realist set of drivers for China’s participation.

While the potential presence of oil reserves and the recent diplomatic shift in Chad should have made MINURCAT an attractive contributing opportunity for China, Beijing chose not to participate in the mission. This suggests that one of the drivers behind China’s contributions to the missions in Sudan but not to MINURCAT is the presence of existing oil extraction agreements as opposed to potential future extraction. Additionally, the high profile nature of the case in Sudan and international criticism of China’s mercantilist involvement in Sudan prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympics may have encouraged China’s contributions there but not to the mission in neighboring Chad and the
Central African Republic, which had garnered less media attention due to the lack of significant Chinese commercial investment and government human rights offenses in those countries.

Conclusion

The two sets of case studies presented in this thesis offer insight into the calculus that may drive China’s contributions to peace operations. China’s deployment of a formed police unit to MINUSTAH represents a case where China used its state resources to make a political statement and exert limited diplomatic influence over a state that maintains ties with Taiwan, even in the absence of any extractable goods in the peace operation host state. Despite the lack of natural resources or potential markets, Haiti is strategically important to China because it is one of few remaining states that do not recognize the People’s Republic of China. The mission was also China’s first peacekeeping deployment to the Americas, signaling that China no longer confines itself to operating in regions not dominated by western actors.

China’s substantial personnel contributions to the missions in Sudan are cases where China participates in peace operations that enable it to secure access to strategically important resources. The deployment of Chinese forces and China’s public support for UNMIS and UNAMID allow China to portray itself as a responsible actor concerned about stability in Sudan, thereby downplaying the view of China as a mercantilist actor that disregards the human suffering in Sudan. This is very much a realist move as China’s encouragement for Sudan to accept a peacekeeping force potentially reduces the likelihood of additional sanctions that could cut off China’s ability to legally obtain Sudanese oil. At the same time, China’s deployments and its willingness to use its position
in the UN Security Council to ensure that missions do not severely infringe upon Sudan’s sovereignty likely improve Beijing’s position with Khartoum.

In both cases, China used participation in peace operations to further its own interests, suggesting a policy guided by realist drivers aimed at enhancing China’s access to diplomatic influence and strategic resources.
Chapter Eight

Conclusion

As China progresses along its path of economic and diplomatic development, Chinese decision makers will likely continue to use participation in peace operations as a means of furthering China’s commercial and diplomatic interests, while at the same time, pursuing an image of a responsible actor committed to ensuring stability and international peace. These dual objectives offer China the opportunity to play a larger role in international institutions, something expected from world powers, while following a largely realpolitik foreign policy aimed at enhancing China’s access to critically important natural resources and diplomatic partners.

The triangulation research design used in this thesis helps compensate for a small universe of cases. While slightly unorthodox in nature, the methodology allows for analysis of trends and potential causal mechanisms, and examines details that can only be revealed in case studies. The first and most general component of the design, statistical analysis, reveals trends that support a hypothesis that Chinese forces tend to contribute higher levels of forces in states with higher strategic values. That is, a mission in a peace operation host state rich in resources, with high levels of trade with China, or that is geographically near China, will be composed of a higher percentage of Chinese forces than states with lower strategic values. Admittedly the sample size, which is never larger than 76 mission-countries, is far smaller than number of cases generally associated with large-N studies. However the statistical analysis revealed trends that led to closer examination in the medium-N component of the thesis.
Using a largely qualitative approach that relies on examining observable implications of potential strategic drivers behind China’s peacekeeping participation, the medium-N study generally supported the findings of the statistical analysis. The medium-N analysis examine variation in the subset of the twenty-two missions where China has contributed personnel, and found a weak relationship between the type of forces China deployed to a peace operation host state and the total number of observable implications in that state. Observable implications included a variety of indicators such as the presence of oil extraction agreements, high level diplomatic exchanges, and foreign direct investment. China generally deployed troops to missions in states with higher numbers of total observable implications, which can interpreted as states with a higher strategic value. China generally deployed smaller contingents of military observers and civilian police in cases that did not exhibit large numbers of observable implications. The study also revealed three notable findings that did not emerge in the statistical analysis. First, the study identified that China primarily deployed military observers prior to 2000, while the contribution of troops began in the 2000s. The one notable outlier to this trend is China’s deployment of engineering troops to Cambodia in 1993. This deployment, however, can be justified by the close proximity of Cambodia to the Chinese mainland. Second, the medium-N study finds that there are greater numbers of observable implications associated with missions where China begins its participation after 2000 than in cases where China launches its participation prior to 2000. This suggests that strategic drivers behind Chinese deployments may begin playing a role in the early 2000s, which corresponds with China’s first large scale deployment of troops on peace operations outside of Asia. Third, the medium-N study reveals two significant outliers to the post-
2000 trends in Chinese deployments. Both deployments are to host states with low strategic values, based on the number of observable implications, yet include relatively sizeable deployments. While a case study reveals that diplomatic, and not economic, interests drove China to participate in Haiti, it remains largely unclear why China deployed a large contingent of troops to Lebanon, although China may have increased its participation in Lebanon after one of its observers was killed in July 2006.

The third component of the triangulation method features two sets of case studies. The first is an individual case study of China’s participation in the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), while the second set of case studies is a comparative analysis of China’s participation in the two UN missions in Sudan and China’s non-participation in the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). These cases were selected as they are outliers that are considerably different from China’s participation in other peace operations.

The first case study finds that China deployed a formed police unit to Haiti, a country with a low strategic value to China, in an attempt to gain limited diplomatic leverage over one of the few states that continues to recognize the Republic of China. The case study also examines why China deployed a heavily armed formed police unit to Haiti instead of a civilian police unit or an enabling military unit such as a transportation, medical, or engineering company, as they have traditionally done. UN documentation and historical analysis reveal that there was no requirement for traditional civilian police in MINUSTAH and that troop contributing nations from the Western Hemisphere already occupied most of the roles that China typically fills in peace operations, leaving China to choose between sending contributing a formed police unit, infantry, or aviation. China has
never contributed infantry or aviation forces to a peace operation, and Chinese concerns about providing fodder for westerners who support a China threat theory would have surely prevented the deployment of an infantry or military aviation unit into America’s backyard.

The second set of case studies examines China’s significant personnel contributions to missions in Sudan compared to China’s non-participation in the United Nations mission in neighboring Chad and the Central African Republic. The case studies find that China’s commercial ties with Sudan are far greater than those with either Chad or the Central African Republic. The analysis argues that China’s support for UNMIS and UNAMID help Beijing paint an image of itself as a responsible international actor instead of a mercantilist power, while at the same time ensuring its continued access to Sudanese oil wealth.

The findings of this thesis generally support the theory that China is a realist and potentially mercantilist actor, whose contributions to peace operations appear to be driven by a desire to further Beijing’s commercial and diplomatic interests. The findings also suggest a shift in the drivers behind China’s peace operations participation, which may tell a broader story about China’s foreign policy interests. Prior to 2000, China generally deployed small contingents of military observers and civilian police to nations that had a low strategic value to China. The lack of a sizeable Chinese force on the ground along with the minimal strategic value of most pre-2000 peace operation host states suggests that China was not motivated by a desire to secure access to resources or influence host state policies. Instead, China contributed personnel primarily to observer missions where Beijing could demonstrate its commitment to global stability and international institutions,
perhaps in an attempt to rebuild its reputation, and potentially the PLA’s international reputation, following the killing of civilians during the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989.

In the early 2000s, China began contributing more forces including military units and sizeable police contingents to missions distant from China. In the post-2000 period, China has contributed forces to all but one of the ten missions launched since 2000. China also began deploying forces to certain missions launched prior to 2000, where China had not previously participated. Many of these missions were in states with proven oil reserves or states where China had existing resource extraction and exploration agreements. Additionally, all but three of the twelve missions China joined since 2000 were in Africa. The increased participation of Chinese forces in Africa and in states with high strategic values coincides with China’s announcement of the “Going Out” policy and suggests that the motivation behind China’s participation in peace operations shifted to a more realpolitik policy aimed at securing access to critical resources, gaining diplomatic partners, and building spheres of influence. Current Chinese deployments reveal that any one of these strategic drivers could lead China to contribute forces to a mission, and that multiple drivers are not required to warrant a Chinese contribution. The deployment to Haiti is a key example of this, as Haiti offers China no resources and only provides an opportunity for China to exert influence over a state that recognizes Taipei rather than Beijing.

While this thesis proposes that China’s peace operations participation is driven by a realpolitik calculus that supports Chinese foreign policy objectives, there are alternative explanations for China’s participation. The primary alternative explanation, which is
commonly proclaimed by the Chinese government, supports an idealist argument by suggesting that China participates for the purpose of promoting international stability. While China’s participation likely contributes to enhanced security in peace operation host states, China’s participation is clearly not driven solely by this ideational concept. If China were driven entirely by a desire to be a benevolent actor, it should have participated in more missions and should have been more receptive to demands by the United Nations to contribute more resources, including infantry and aviation units, something China has not done. China’s idealist justification, however, could potentially be encompassed by the realist explanation posited in this thesis. By claiming to be interested in promoting international stability and by deploying forces to peace operations, China helps build its image as a responsible actor, even if Beijing has additional motives for its contributions. In turn, this enhanced image reinforces China’s status as a responsible power in the international community, a goal of decision makers in Beijing.\textsuperscript{293} This enhanced status serves China’s diplomatic interests by placing it in a league alongside other “responsible global actors.”

\textit{Policy Implications}

China’s participation in UN peace operations represents Beijing’s increased willingness to more actively take part in international institutions. Although the motives behind China’s troop contributions may not be entirely altruistic, China’s role in supporting peace operations should not be condemned. Instead it should be supported. Chinese participation provides the international community with an ideal venue in which to engage China and help influence its military development. As described in an earlier chapter, Chinese peacekeepers acquire operational lessons by working with their

\textsuperscript{293} China’s proclaimed “Peaceful Development” concept supports this statement.
international counterparts in peace operations. Officers practice their leadership experiences and learn how to integrate military and civilian activities and police learn alternative policing techniques from foreign police forces such as humane treatment and the use of force.\textsuperscript{294} States participating in peace operations can share their techniques with their Chinese counterparts. Additionally, states like the United Kingdom have already taken the opportunity to help train Chinese peacekeepers in formal schools like China's Civilian Peacekeeping Police Training Center. Other UN members could follow the British and offer training assistance that will not only make Chinese peacekeepers more capable of carrying out their duties, but will also potentially influence the future development of China's security institutions. Since Chinese peacekeepers are drawn from the best police and military personnel, former peacekeepers may one day hold command positions within their respective organizations. The lessons learned during peace operations that they bring to their new positions in the Ministry of Public Security and the PLA will help shape the future development of China's defense and security apparatus.

While China should be peacefully engaged, the international community must also keep a close watch over China's peace operations to ensure that the presence of Chinese peacekeepers helps to further peace instead of prolonging conflict. China's dual interests in promoting peace while also securing access to critical resources and diplomatic influence potentially leads to a conflict of interests. China has been criticized as a biased actor that emboldens the actions of leaders of war-torn nations who ignore demands from UN officials who believe that Chinese support allows them to act with impunity.\textsuperscript{295}

\textsuperscript{294} Interviews with Chinese officials cited in International Crisis Group (2009), 14-15.
\textsuperscript{295} International Crisis Group, 16. President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo ignored demands from UN officials to act with restrain in the conflict in North Kivu after China signed a $9.25 billion deal for copper and cobalt with the DRC.
China’s participation in peace operations should be encouraged as long as a Chinese presence helps contribute to enhanced stability and security.

Future Avenues for Research

The continuing rise of China’s participation in peace operations, and more broadly, in military operations other than war (MOOTW), allows for considerable future research opportunities. Most current academic and policy examination of China’s military operations focuses on the PLA’s development of advanced technologies and strategies that could be employed in traditional conflicts such as a theater war in the Taiwan Straits or a confrontation with the United States. This analysis tends to avoid studying smaller and seemingly less exciting or significant MOOTW operations. Additional research in this understudied area, however, is warranted, as China has demonstrated its increasing willingness to employ military forces in non-traditional missions that support Chinese interests in locales far from the Chinese periphery. Chinese MOOTW operations seem more likely than large-scale conflict in today’s security environment. Further research of China’s MOOTW participation may reveal trends in Chinese foreign policy or may allow for analysis of Chinese military capabilities and operations.

Additional empirical research would undoubtedly build on the findings of this thesis. This thesis illustrate a shift in the Chinese foreign policy drivers behind China’s peacekeeping participation from a policy aimed at improving its international reputation to one with the goal of gaining commercial and political access in peace operation host states. While the statistical and medium-N analysis offer a variety of tests for realist explanatory variables, including those related to resource wealth, trade, and diplomatic influence, they offer no empirical test of ideational explanations for China’s participation.
in peace operations. Determining a robust and measurable indicator that could test the idealist explanation would add to the value of future research.

Future research could also rely on methodology other than the triangulation approach used in this thesis. While the methodology used in this thesis provides an explanation for China’s peace operations participation using data and empirical evidence from government reports, press releases and secondary sources, alternative research designs might allow for a more in-depth analysis. A research design that included interviews with decision makers and practitioners in the Chinese government and international organizations might provide greater insight into the relatively hidden decision making process behind China’s peace operations participation. While gaining access to Chinese decision makers may prove difficult and their answers potentially biased, such insight could better inform the findings of future research.

Final Thoughts

Ideally, this thesis offered an initial step toward explaining China’s increasing participation in peace operations. By doing so, it hopefully sheds light on issues far broader in scope than the deployment of small numbers of peacekeeping forces. China’s participation in UN peace operations potentially tells a larger story about Beijing’s employment of military forces, China’s view on access to strategically important states and resources, and trends in Chinese foreign policy.

China’s contributions to peace operations and other military operations other than war are constantly changing, and China continues to develop as an ever more important actor in the international community. Understanding the motivations behind China’s participation in peace operations must therefore be continually developed. An enhanced
understanding in this relatively small field of study will provide academics, researchers, and policymakers with deeper insight into Chinese foreign policy that may help to shape future interaction with the People’s Republic of China.
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