

WHY FIGHT?
Examining Self-Interested versus Communally-Oriented Motivations in
Palestinian Resistance and Rebellion

by


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SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTERS OF SCIENCE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
AT THE
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

FEBRUARY 2009

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**Examining Self-Interested versus Communally-Oriented Motivations in
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T. Nichole Argo

Submitted to the Department of Political Science on
February 5, 2009, in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of Masters of Science in
Political Science

ABSTRACT

Why do individuals participate in weak-against-strong resistance, terror or insurgency? Drawing on rational choice theory, many claim that individuals join insurgent organizations for self-interested reasons, seeking status, money, protection, or rewards in the afterlife. Another line of research, largely ethnographic and social network based, suggests that prospective fighters are driven by social identity—they join out of an allegiance to communal values, norms of reciprocity, and an orientation towards process rather than outcome.

This project tested these two lines of argument against each other by directly linking values orientations in a refugee camp to *professed willingness to participate* in resistance or rebellion in two different contexts. Professed willingness to participate in resistance, and especially in violent rebellion, is positively correlated with communal orientation and negatively correlated with self-enhancement values. The strength of correlation grows—negatively for self-enhancement and positively for communal orientations—as anticipated sacrifice increases. Results are discussed.

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I. Introduction

Why do individuals participate in weak-against-strong resistance, terror or insurgency? Drawing on rational choice theory, many claim that individuals join insurgent organizations for self-interested reasons, seeking status, money, protection, or rewards in the afterlife. For instance, Dr. David Buklay notes that being a good Muslim is the way to get to heaven, writing, “Attention to [Islamic jihadis’] own justifications suggest that, for them, Islam and its call for jihad is the primary motivation.”¹ Another line of research, largely ethnographic and social network based, suggests that prospective fighters are driven by social identity—they join out of an allegiance to communal values, norms of reciprocity, and an orientation towards process rather than outcome.

This thesis will argue that survey data linking individual value orientations to participating behavior can contribute to the literature by offering *direct* motivational evidence, and in a way that is replicable and reliable across cultures. Additionally, this approach can offer students of conflict two means of assessing the impact of environmental or relational dynamics on identity. First, one-shot surveys can get at *motivational context* by tying participation questions to anchored vignettes. Second, a *longitudinal approach* can illumine important triggers will of identity change over time.

This thesis employs the first approach – motivational context. It describes data collected on value orientations and professed willingness to participate in violence from Balata Refugee Camp, Nablus, in the Palestinian Territories.

The thesis is laid out as follows. *Section II* juxtaposes the literature on collective action with the empirics on political violence. Two strains of theorizing emerge. One views motivations for rebellion as self-enhancing; the other views participation in costly rebellion as communally oriented. I probe ways in which communally motivated individuals appear to calculate differently than self-interested ones, invoking recent findings from cognitive neuroscience and social psychology that appear to parallel evidence from ethnographic reserach. Lastly, I argue that survey evidence fitting value orientation to participation would be a helpful contribution to scholarship.

Section III briefly considers the role of values in the literature on comparative politics. It then describes the conceptual background, content, and overarching value construction of the Schwartz Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ).

Section IV opens by demonstrating that evidence for both instrumental incentives and communal orientation exists in Palestine, making it a good test population. I then describe the survey instrument as it was employed in Balata Refugee Camp, as well as the survey method. The survey began by assessing the value priorities of each respondent (self-enhancing versus community-enhancing). Respondents were then asked to consider four resistance activities that varied on a scale of anticipated sacrifice. They rated how much they would feel like participating in the resistance activities in two different contexts: a) during a time of peace, and b) after a noncombatant from their neighborhood had been killed.

¹ David Bukay, “The Religious Foundations of Suicide Bombings: Islamist Ideology,” *Middle East Quarterly*, Fall 2006 (v.13, n.4), pp. 27-36.

Section V walks the reader through the survey results. The data suggest that Palestinians who score high on self-enhancing values feel less likely to participate in collective action in general, and costly resistance in particular. This is a marked contrast to those with high communal orientation scores. *Section VI* discusses implications and suggests several directions for future research.

II. Literature

Rebellion and the Collective Action Problem

Rebellion seems like a collective action problem. As with other forms of social mobilization, it makes little sense for individuals to join an insurgency: they will incur potentially great costs (i.e. time, risks, money, and effort), and even if they are successful in increasing the collective good, it will only have marginal payoff for themselves.² Theoretically, therefore, the rational individual is expected to ‘free-ride’ (or, in the case of rebellion, let others fight on his/her behalf).

Yet people often do not free-ride. That is, individuals participate in collective actions such as insurgency despite costs to themselves. In his seminal work on the subject, Mancur Olson sought to explain non-free-riding behavior. He proposed that *selective incentives* make individual investments in collective action rational by changing the payoff structure for individuals who participate. According to his theory, such selective incentives could include: coercion (the threat of punishment for not participating), monetary incentives, insurance plans, and price discounts.³ When one of these selected incentives accompanies the option of participating in a collective action, individuals weigh the costs and benefits of participating and act on the option according to the highest self-benefit.⁴ In the literature review below, I explore the relevance of these incentives to insurgent recruitment under the heading of “self-enhancement” motivations.

Olson’s work has been transformative, but importantly, his theories do not explain a wide array of mobilization.⁵ Does it explain insurgency—or, in this case—Palestinian insurgency? I argue that the collective action problem may not apply to some insurgencies or insurgent actions. This is because preferences in times of conflict may not be fixed. That is, perhaps insurgents are not acting differently based on different fixed preferences; instead, individual *preferences may be shifting*. In particular, structural or environmental conditions may help shift individual preferences from self- to communal-oriented.

This idea derives from a rich literature tradition recognizing that individual identities, emotions and values may be subsumed—in some fashion, some domains or at some times—

² Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1965).

³ In a footnote, Olson adds “erotic incentives, psychological incentives, moral incentives, and so on.” For decades this footnote was virtually ignored. However, at the time, Olson seemed to conceive of emotional incentives as personal, or self-oriented needs, rather than social effects or influences of any kind, e.g. social norms/networks. See Olson, p.61.

⁴ Benefit is a relative term which can include escape from anticipated risks and costs. Thus, “benefit” refers to relative benefit, meaning the most optimal anticipated outcome of two or more scenarios.

⁵ Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver, *The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993), p.8.

by our social identities.⁶ In the literature review below, I will address such motivations with the term “communal orientation.”

Conceptually, it may be helpful to think of self- and communally-oriented value priorities in terms of instrumental rationality and value rationality. Sociologist Max Weber was the first to differentiate between these terms. He characterized the former as *consequentialist*—that is, concerned more with ends than means, i.e. economic man. The latter are termed *deontological*, or concerned more with means than ends (i.e. social, or reciprocating man). Value-rational motivation is thus concerned with “doing the right thing” rather than producing the right outcome. It involves 'commands' or 'demands' which, in the actor's opinion, are binding on him.⁷ These commands or demands derive from a conscious ethical, religious or social belief and are thus somehow bound to the community. In sum, value rationality is means-oriented, fundamentally connected to and defined by one's social world, and perhaps most importantly, is meant to be pursued independently of its prospects of success.

Increasingly, empirical evidence supports the idea that people in a consequentialist versus deontologist mode calculate differently. Neuroimaging studies shed some light on how instrumentally-rational and value-rational processes may differ within the brain. In laboratory work on moral decision-making, for instance, most subjects prefer to let a trolley hit five people rather than to push one person onto the tracks, thereby saving four lives.⁸ These respondents are reacting almost viscerally to the social value of “don't kill,” and this response trumps the instrumental calculation. When these subjects are scanned within an fMRI while they responded to moral dilemmas, their value rational judgments (do not push one person to death, but let four die) are characterized by activation in the socio-emotional areas of the prefrontal cortex, whereas utilitarian judgments (push one person to death, save four lives) show stronger activation in areas of executive functioning, or pure cognition.⁹

While I am not arguing that there is a direct overlap between communal motivation and value rationality, it is worth noting that some of the socially-influenced, risk-insensitive

⁶ This tension between individual and social identity is not at all new to comparative politics; its implications for rationality have been considered across sub-disciplines, often in domains far more “settled” than conflict zones. For example, James March and Johan Olsen dropped the assumption of rationality in their analysis of organizations, believing people tend to operate out of a “logic of appropriateness.” See *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989). Similarly, sociological institutionalists W. Powell and P. DiMaggio see individuals as so imbedded within their cultural and historical frameworks that they cannot attempt to make the theoretical separation between universal tendencies for instrumental rationality and culturally informed notions of preferences and preferred strategies. See *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1991). Mark Ross argues that culture not only provides meaning and interpretation to actors, but it also provides the basis of social and political identity that affects how people group themselves. See “Culture and Identity in Comparative Political Analysis,” in *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure* (1997). Lastly, social movement scholar Doug McAdam argues that the problem with many rational choice theorists is that they place the individual prior to the group, when the group is in fact prior to the individual. See McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, *Comparative Perspective on Social Movements* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999).

⁷ Max Weber in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1946), p.56. Ashutosh Varshney revived the concept in his 2004 article, “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality,” *Perspectives on Politics*, v.1, n.1.

⁸ Josh Greene, “An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment,” *Science* (2001), v.293, n.5537, pp. 2105-2108. Haidt et al., “The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social-Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment,” *Psychological Review*, (2001) v.108, n.4, pp. 814-834.

⁹ Greene, *ibid.* There is no such thing as “pure” cognition, as affect appears to play a role at various levels of brain processing. I use the term here for simplicity's sake.

decisions taken by people with communal orientations appears similar. If this is the case, then traditional Olsonian paradigms would not pertain to individuals with strong communal orientation. Individuals with strong self-enhancement priorities may think in terms of risks, costs and benefits, but those with communal orientations would calculate in terms of justice, dignity and an orientation towards process.

Below, I examine the literature on participation in violent resistance according to the self-enhancement and communal paradigms above. In the first category, individuals are treated as instrumentally rational actors who only contribute to costly political violence if they receive individual benefits (or escape harm) because of that participation. In the communal perspective, the distinction between the individual and the group is lost. Individuals identify so strongly with their group that they internalize group goals as their own, and are motivated to participate in collective action by social norms, obligation, or moral emotion. These individuals are free of the collective action problem as they are focused more on the appropriateness of means rather than the costs or benefits of outcome.

Rebellion: Arguments for the Self-Interested Warrior

To the extent that political science research on insurgency, terrorism and civil war has examined insurgent recruitment, it has treated it as a collective action problem. For the most part, the media has also appropriated the cost-benefit assumptions of instrumental rationality and selective incentives, though they do not use the same language.

Consider the stories of coerced recruitment that exist within almost every insurgency. Insurgent recruits in Iraq are said to be lured into militant organizations and then threatened (harm to self or loved ones) if they attempt to defect. At one point, U.S. military officials attested that many Iraqi car bombers had been tied to their cars, or blackmailed, implying that they did not willingly take on the mission.¹⁰ In coercive contexts such as these, the selective incentive being offered to a recruit is escape from punishment. But this calculus can obtain even without an insurgent organization. For instance, Stathis Kalyvas has recently argued that it becomes rational to participate in resistance when indiscriminate counterinsurgency tactics are employed against the population—taking up arms is the only recourse one has to protect self and family.¹¹

Another popular hypothesis is that religious extremism drives insurgents to great sacrifice in the name of God. Jeremy Weinstein contends that religious or ideological fervor can produce seemingly “irrational” devotion to rebellion via a rational calculus: if one’s religious beliefs about the afterlife are construed as goals, then all risks and sacrifices in the here and now are rational means to that end.¹² Sunni extremists, for example, are said to be indoctrinated in madrassas, where they come to believe that salvation and virgins will await them if they sacrifice in the jihadi cause.¹³

¹⁰ With Iraqi bombers now taking more and more of the missions, this claim may be losing validity. See Carol Williams, “Suicide Attacks Rising Rapidly: Increasingly, the bombers are Iraqis instead of foreign infiltrators. Civilians and police, not GIs, are the prime targets,” *LA Times*, June 5, 2005.

¹¹ See Kalyvas and Kocher, “How ‘Free’ Is Free Riding in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem,” *World Politics*, v.59, n.2, 2007. See also Robert Pape, *Dying to Win* (New York: Random House, 2005).

¹² Jeremy Weinstein, *On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security* (Washington, DC: The Center for Global Development, 2004).

¹³ Zafar Abbas, “Pakistan’s schisms spill into present,” *BBC*, 7 October 2004.

Stories of status-seeking, deprivation (frustration-aggression) and revenge can also be depicted as self-interested motivations. The status-seeker boosts his ego by knowing he will die a death superior to that of most in society—a martyr. The deprived strikes out in rage for his or her personal injustices and indignities.¹⁴ Lastly, the avenger settles a score for personal loss.¹⁵ In each of these scenarios, an emotional action-tendency is conceptualized as a goal; the act fulfills an emotional urge on behalf of an individual. The individual is not acting on a ‘command’ or ‘demand’ s/he believes to be placed on him/her by society.

But while these theories of self-oriented motivations are plausible, they do not bear out in the terrorism data. For instance, measures of deprivation such as low education and poverty do not predict terrorism or insurgency,¹⁶ and neither does personal exposure to repression.¹⁷ In addition, organizational coercion and indoctrination do not appear to play a strong role. Almost ninety-five percent of Marc Sageman and Scott Atran’s 1000+ Sunni extremist network “enlisted” in the jihad through friends or family.¹⁸ A similar trend of volunteering rather than recruitment or indoctrination existed in a 2003-2004 study of 15 would-be Palestinian suicide bombers.¹⁹

In sum, the literature establishes that Olsonian incentives can and do exist within various rebellions and insurgencies today—as coercion, monetary reward, ideological belief, etc. But rational choice accounts for participation in violence only offer *indirect* evidence in support of self-enhancement, e.g. ‘if recruits are poor and if monetary incentives exist, then individuals join for money.’ This is a “just so” account: the existence of poverty and/or payments does not prove that the individuals in question are actually motivated by them, it assumes it. To prove motivation one way or the other, we need to link individuals’ motivating values to their behavior.

Rebellion: The Warrior of and for the People

Communal motivations may include the emotional satisfaction that comes from acting with or for others as well as moral feelings of self-satisfaction derived from doing the right thing. Above, I noted that communal motivations appear to be more socio-emotional than cognitive, more concerned with means than ends, and sometimes, cost-insensitive.

Is there evidence to support this proposition? Social psychological survey evidence demonstrates that costly cooperation is linked to high in-group identification,²⁰ and that

¹⁴ This is the mechanism offered by Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty, Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?” Working Thesis 9074, National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2002. Available at www.nber.org/thesiss/w9074.

¹⁵ Revenge is often cited as a motivation for terror recruits. Mia Bloom discusses revenge in the cases of Chechnya, Sri Lanka and Palestine in *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia UP, 2004).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ See Scott Atran, “The Genesis of Suicide Terrorism,” *Science Magazine* No. 299 (March 2003): 1534-1539.

¹⁸ See Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004). Also, Nichole Argo, “Report of the Workshop on Transnational Violence,” Center for International Studies, April 2006, MIT.

¹⁹ Nichole Argo, “A Palestinian Martyrdom Complex,” Paper Presented to the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 2004.

²⁰ Van Vugt & Hart, “Social identity as social glue: The origins of group loyalty.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* (2004), v. 86.

identification with a collective is a reliable predictor of protest participation.²¹ This is useful, but the surveys were done in peacetime locations. Is it possible that the increased costs of collective action during war time would yield different results? Maybe not. Elizabeth Wood's field interviews with insurgents seem to support these findings. She identified solidary motivations among insurgent campesinos in El Salvador, describing "a deeply felt sense of pleasure experienced together by participants, [in their] public assertion of dignity, self-worth, and insurgent collective identity."²² She continues, "[The] value [they attributed to participation] was not contingent on success..."²³

Ashutosh Varshney also suggests that dignity and expressions of self-respect are among the most foundational elements of nationalism:

Most of the time and in most places, ethnic or national mobilization cannot begin without value-rational microfoundations ...*Dignity and self-respect form the microfoundations* of ... nationalism or ethnic behavior. Driven by such values, resisting nationalists are willing to endure very high costs—and for long periods of time.²⁴

To Varshney, the nationalist's need for expressive purpose may help to explain his willingness to accept high costs.

So far we have survey evidence that in-group identification predicts costly collective action, and descriptions of insurgent interviews that seem to support it. But it is social network analyses have best been able to link these two types of evidence together, showing how communal motivation drives enlistment in insurgency. Political scientist Michael Taylor first offered a theoretical framework to understand the socio-emotional process: Once first-actors take daring or heroic action in the name of resistance, their acts draw others into high-risk resistance via *norms of reciprocity*: X resists because Y resisted and now X feels obligated.²⁵ For these individuals, risks, costs and personal benefits are not the primary calculus. Instead, they are driven by feelings of social obligation and/or a feeling of moral self-satisfaction from doing the right thing.²⁶ This was exactly what Roger Petersen showed in his study of Lithuanian communities that did and did not rebel against Soviet occupiers in the 1940s. Rebellious communities were strong: they had social structures that fostered close group ties, and thus, norms of reciprocity.²⁷ Similar enlistment patterns were found in communist and fascist organizations decades ago.²⁸ Perhaps it should come as no surprise, therefore, that one predictor of terror participation is affiliation to a sports team or informal

²¹ See Sturmer and Simon, "Collective Action: Towards a Dual-Pathway Model," *European Review of Social Psychology* (2004), v.15.

²² Elizabeth Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003), p.236.

²³ *Ibid*, p.233.

²⁴ Varshney, 2003, p.86.

²⁵ Michael Taylor, "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action," in *Rationality and Revolution*, ed. Michael Taylor (New York: Cambridge UP, 1988), pp.63-97; Roger Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001).

²⁶ Marwell and Oliver call these *solidary incentives* (including social obligations and acceptance) which arise from action with others, and *moral/purposive incentives*, a feeling of moral self-satisfaction from doing the right thing (p.7).

²⁷ *Ibid*.

²⁸ Donatella Della Porta, *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1995).

communal association—these are the types of friendship relations that constitute strong community and norms of reciprocity.²⁹

It appears that communal orientation may be necessary to inspire collective action at increasing levels of sacrifice. But is it sufficient? Individuals who care about the conflict because of their identification with the collective may still respond to selective incentives, although they may not tell a researcher. Moreover, given the difficulty of intensive field research within conflict zones, it may be hard to collect the kind of detailed interview and social network data necessary for extensive cross-case analysis of insurgents, terrorists or the civilian motivations. While norms of reciprocity (the mechanism of social networks) are not values – they refer to more specific actions and situations – they are related. If an individual places a high value on reciprocal behavior at a given time, this should be observed in their communal value orientation. In areas where a full social network analysis cannot be attained, therefore, a value survey would be useful triangulating data in addition to interviews. In short, a survey able to link value orientations to participation behavior or civilian support for violence would help to triangulate evidence.

Given the debate on motivations for participation in rebellion, it may seem surprising that very few surveys dealing with protest, other forms of resistance or rebellion have measured both self-enhancement and communal motivations. Among those that have,³⁰ they have two limitations. First, they use a multiple choice offering, and it may exclude a host of participation rationales that may exist. Second, arguably the greatest contribution of the past fifty years of psychology is that humans do not act for the reasons that we think we do, i.e. respondents themselves may not know what initially drove them to join. Answers to a multiple choice offering are certainly a chance to create or control a narrative about why and what one did in a rebel group, but it is not a valid test of real-time motivations.

A psychometric survey may provide conflict researchers an opportunity to collect data on motivations in real time, and to collect motivational data in a way that the respondent can less easily control. Ginges and Merari recently appropriated the Schwartz value survey for this purpose, analyzing the extent to which communal vs. self-enhancement value priorities predicted Israeli settlers would protest or take up violence against Palestinians (this was during the settler expulsions of the late 1990s).³¹ They found that the willingness of settlers to participate in legal protests and illegal violence (against both Israelis and Palestinians) was predicted by communal motivations rather than self-interested ones.

Are the Ginges and Merari findings generalizable beyond the Israeli settler experience? One reason they may not be is that the settlers were in the early stages of response to Israeli government policies at that time, and had not fully developed a recruitment mechanism. It is therefore unclear that instrumental incentives—such as organized payment, status or even threats—existed in the movement at that time. A good next test would be to run a similar design in a resistance movement that is more developed and

²⁹ Scott Atran, presentation based on database of 500+ Sunni extremists, MIT's Workshop on Transnational Violence, April 2006.

³⁰ See, for example, James Fearon, Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy Weinstein. "Liberia 2006 Lofa County" (IRC Baseline Survey and Manual). Others available at: <http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/XCSURVEYS/>.

³¹ Ginges, J. and Atran, S. (in press). What motivates participation in violent political action: selective incentives or parochial altruism? *Annals of the New York Academy of Science*.

where selective incentives are known to exist. Below, I will argue that the Palestine is such a case, but first let us discuss the history of values survey research in political science, and how this project can avoid some of the pitfalls that have plagued past surveys.

III. Values, Surveys, and Behavior

This section will briefly discuss why values matter in social science, the problems inherent to measurement of values, and the reasons why the Schwartz value construct and measure was chosen for this study.

What are Values? Why do they Matter? Values have been defined and measured in many ways—as beliefs linked inextricably to affect, desirable goals, allegiances that transcend specific actions and situations (distinguishing them from norms and attitudes), and standards or criteria for behavior.³² To Weber and Durkheim, values mattered because they motivated people’s behaviors. Indeed, according to this logic, Weber attributed America’s rapid economic development to the Protestant work ethic.

The simplicity of the ‘values-as-goals leads to behavior’ argument, for the most part, has not borne out in empirical work. Sociologist Ann Swidler demonstrated that peoples’ values do not actually explain how they behave—as seen by the choices made by individuals living in poverty, as well as the inconsistent output over time and space that accompanied the protestant work ethic. To Swidler, therefore, it was *beliefs* about if one could and how one should pursue their values/goals that determined actual behaviors.³³

Importantly, experimental research in psychology has shown even the link between goals, beliefs and behaviors to be unreliable.³⁴ Instead, a rich theoretical tradition in social psychology suggests that norms powerfully predict behavior.³⁵ The theory relates beliefs and norms, suggesting that individuals actually value knowledge of a social norm more highly than their own personal belief.³⁶ (With the exception of individuals who overestimate the number of people who actually share their beliefs.)³⁷

³² See Allport, 1961; Inglehart 1997; Rokeach 1973.

³³ Ann Swidler (1986). “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategy” *American Sociological Review*.

³⁴ See Wicker (1969). “Attitudes versus actions: The relationship of verbal and overt behavioral responses to attitude objects,” *Journal of Social Issues*, v.25, pp. 41-78. Also, Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji (2007). *Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: 3. Meta-analysis of predictive validity*. Manuscript submitted for publication.

³⁵ See Kallgren, C.A., Reno, R.R., & Cialdini, R.B. (2000). A focus theory of normative conduct: When norms do and do not affect behavior. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 26(8), 1002-1012. Also, as relates to intergroup relations: see Allport, G. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley; Asch, S. (1958). Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments. In E.E. Macoby et al. (Eds.) *Readings in Social Psychology*, (3rd ed., pp.174-183). New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston; and Crandall, C.S., & Stangor, C. (2005), “Conformity and Prejudice,” in Dovidio, J.F., Glick, P., & Rudman, L.A. (Eds.), *On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty years after Allport*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

³⁶ Kuran, T. (1995). *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Miller, D.T., Monin, B., & Prentice, D.A., (2000). Pluralistic ignorance and inconsistency private attitudes and public behaviors. In D.J Terry & M.A. Hogg (Eds.), *Attitudes, Behavior, and Social Context: The role of norms and group membership*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Stangor, C., Sechrist, G. B., & Jost, J. T. (2001). Changing racial beliefs by providing consensus information. *Personality and Social Psychological Bulletin*, 27, 484-494.

³⁷ See Monin, B., & Norton, M.I. (2003). “Perceptions of a fluid consensus: Uniqueness bias, false consensus, false polarization, and pluralistic ignorance in a water conservation crisis.” *Personality and Social Psychology*

Given the complex array of concepts associated with values, the prominent values surveys used today tend to include items representing many or all of the above measures: beliefs, attitudes, norms, social networks, and worldviews.³⁸

Within political science, most researchers have tended to use *societal or religious* values, i.e. culture, to explain cross- or intra-national outcomes like stable democracy,³⁹ economic development,⁴⁰ provision of public goods,⁴¹ and civil war.⁴² Many of these studies have faced severe criticisms.

Problems of Political Research Using Measures of Societal Values. As mentioned above, one challenge in political value research is that there are so many operationalizations incorporating values that they do not necessarily speak to one another. An agreed upon metric would be helpful. But values survey research has been plagued by other issues, including measurement validity and statistical problems and inferential challenges.

One major critique of values surveys, for instance, is the questionable validity and reliability of survey indicators, given the problem of apples and oranges.⁴³ Arriving at functionally similar indicators for domains such as culture or values can be difficult given their subjective nature. For example, early work by Inglehart made cross-national comparisons based on a religiosity indicator, but his measurement for religiosity was the number of times a person attended a religious service. In some Buddhist countries, however, such as Japan, religious people do not attend services; they simply pray at their home alter every morning.

Another problem has to do with ways in which individual questions/indicators have been aggregated to form overarching value composites. For instance, Jackman and Ross

Bulletin, 29(5), 559-567. See also, Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The false consensus phenomenon: An attributional bias in self-perception and social-perception processes. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 68(3), 279-301.

³⁸ The World Values Survey includes a variety of questions getting at these variations.

³⁹ Almond and Verba's *The Civic Culture* was the earliest effort to systematically analyze *political culture* and use it to explain why democracy didn't emerge as easily in the developing world and in Germany and Italy after WWI. "Political culture" was defined as an aggregation of individuals' awareness of and attitudes towards their government, a mix of emotions and what they called "cognitive orientation". They argued that, for the five nations they studied, democratic instability was caused by a mismatch between a culture and a government (e.g. imposing participatory government on parochial people). Reviews excoriated the statistical analysis, but lauded the research question. See Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture Revisited: An Analytic Study* (New York: Little and Brown, 1980).

⁴⁰ See Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review* 82, 1988. Inglehart expanded on Almond and Verba's dependent variable to include economic development. He argued that "civic culture," an aggregate of three basic values—satisfaction with life, satisfaction with politics, and levels of interpersonal trust—causes both democratic stability and econ development. In *Making Democracy Work*, Robert Putnam also used surveyed measures of trust to explain why Italy's north experienced greater rates of economic development than most of Western Europe, while its south languished in poverty.

⁴¹ See Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003).

⁴² See Samuel Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998). Huntington operationalized culture as language and religion, arguing modernization had created a cultural resurgence (via nationalism). Civil wars, he said, were caused by the different resurgent civilizations within countries.

⁴³ See Richard Locke and Kathleen Thelen, "Problems of Equivalence in Comparative Politics: Apples and Oranges, Again," APSA-CP Newsletter, (Winter 1998), pp. 9-12.

argued that neither Putnam's nor Inglehart's composite variables (e.g. "political culture" or "societal trust") formed coherent general structures.⁴⁴ The individual items comprising the composites were often differentially sensitive to other variables and since the composite variables were not unidimensional, they were not valid representatives of the concepts they were trying to represent, such as "societal trust."

Lastly, efforts to use values as variables have faced inferential challenges. Generally, it is very difficult to explicate culture's relationship to structural/institutional or psychological variables when interpreting the cause of political outcomes.⁴⁵ Does structure create identity/civic malaise or is it the other way around? For a while, mainstream political scientists advocated that researchers should "forget culture, and instead, look at institutions."⁴⁶

In sum, at least in the world of political science, values surveys have a spotty record. I have already argued for the need to establish a replicable, psychometric, motivational test that would link participating behavior to motivations. But would such an instrument fall into the same pitfalls as noted above?

Schwartz Value Survey. As argued above, there is a need for a replicable survey instrument that can ascertain value orientations and motivations in the midst of conflict. To do so reliably, such an instrument would need to: measure or encompass a variety of operationalizations of "values"; overcome the problem of apples and oranges; and create reliable composites for self- and communal-orientations. The Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ) may be a solution.

The conception of values used in the PVQ incorporates numerous operationalizations of the term. PVQ items represent values as: beliefs (inextricably linked to affect), goals that motivate action, orientations that transcend specific situations (such as norms and attitudes), and standards or criteria for evaluating actions.⁴⁷ Schwartz identifies ten motivationally distinct value orientations⁴⁸: self-direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity and tradition.⁴⁹ Figure 1, below, offers a short description of each value.

⁴⁴ See Robert Jackman and Ross Miller, "A Renaissance of Political Culture?" *American Journal of Political Science*, 1996.

⁴⁵ See Elkins and Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Pol Culture Explain?" *Comparative Politics*, 1979.

⁴⁶ Jackman and Miller, "A Renaissance of Political Culture?"

⁴⁷ Ibid, p.252.

⁴⁸ These are more likely to be universal because they are grounded in one or more of three universal requirements of human existence: 1) the needs of individuals as biological organisms, 2) the requisites of coordinated social interaction, and 3) the survival and welfare needs of the group. See Shalom Schwartz, *Les valeurs de base de la personne: Théorie, mesures et applications* [Basic human values: Theory, measurement, and applications]. *Revue française de sociologie*, 42,(2006), pp. 249-288.

⁴⁹ For a full explanation of their theoretical derivation and implications, see Schwartz 2006.

Figure 1. Description of Schwartz Values and Sample Questionnaire Questions.

Value	Defining goal
<i>Self-direction</i>	Independent thought and action. Need for control and mastery
<i>Stimulation</i>	Excitement, novelty, challenges.
<i>Hedonism</i>	Pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself
<i>Achievement</i>	Personal success through demonstrating competence to social standards. Focus on social esteem.
<i>Power</i>	Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources. Focus on social esteem.
<i>Security</i>	Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self.
<i>Conformity</i>	Restraint of actions and inclinations, likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.
<i>Tradition</i>	Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture provides.
<i>Benevolence</i>	Preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact (the in-group).
<i>Universalism</i>	Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature (the out-group)


The PVQ addresses the problem of cross-cultural validity, or apples and oranges, by offering short verbal portraits of 40 different people, gender-matched to the respondent. Each portrait describes a person's goals, aspirations, or wishes that point to the importance of a value. For each portrait, respondents answer: "How much like you is this person?" Responses are: very much like me, like me, somewhat like me, a little like me, not like me, and not like me at all. While some individuals (or cultures) might be inclined to use the middle of the response scale more than the extremes, this does not affect overall scores because *responses are scaled to measure the relative importance of the different values* – not the absolute importance of any one value.

Lastly, this thesis is focused on self-enhancement versus communal orientation values. How were these created from the ten values listed above, and how do we know they are valid composites?

The answer lies in the preexisting *structure of dynamic relations* among the ten values listed above. The ten values are a motivational continuum. They constitute a circular structure which portrays a universal pattern of conflict and congruence among the values (Figure 2, below). When one is dominant in one value, we would predict him to have a relatively weaker score in a conflicting value. For instance, pursuing achievement values typically conflicts with pursuing benevolence values, and thus achievement and benevolence oppose each other on the wheel. In contrast, achievement and power values tend to go together, and are congruent to each other on the wheel. Tradition and security are next to one another on the wheel because they both seek to preserve the existing social arrangements that give certainty to life.

As you look at the circle below, note that the self-enhancement and communal orientations are naturally existing overarching composites. Self-enhancement includes the self-relevant values of achievement and power; communal orientation includes social values of security, conformity and tradition.

Figure 2. Relations among ten motivational types of value



This *structure* of values has held up across 70 diverse cultures, although individuals and groups differ substantially in the relative importance they attribute to the respective values. That is, both individuals and groups have different value “priorities” or “hierarchies,” and these differences allow investigators to test competing hypotheses regarding the motivational origins of behavioral choices.

Schwartz value priorities have been used as instruments to predict voting intentions,⁵⁰ voting behavior,⁵¹ readiness for out-group contact,⁵² and trust in social situations.⁵³

IV. Values and Participation Survey, Balata Refugee Camp

The previous section situated the PVQ within a long line of values survey research in political science, discussed its structure and content, and described how the overarching values of “self-enhancement” and “communal orientation” were derived. But before the PVQ can be applied in the Palestinian case, we must show that both instrumental and communal incentives exist in collective action there.

Appropriateness of the Palestinian Case

The second Palestinian intifada is home to both instrumental and communal incentives. Moreover, given that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been going on for decades, most Palestinians have engaged in some form of resistance—violent or nonviolent—against Israel, and are therefore aware of these incentives.

Resistance can comprise activities with few (if any) sacrifices, such as visiting injured people in the hospital, throwing stones, disobeying a soldier, or rallying in the streets during a curfew.⁵⁴ However, since the outbreak of the second intifada, resistance tactics have become increasingly violent. Today, Palestinian resistance is often costly, including high-sacrifice measures such as defense of the community during Israeli incursions, offensive gun attacks against the IDF or Israeli settlers, and or even total sacrifice as an *istish’hadi*, or human bomb. Thus, resistance in Palestine exists along an established spectrum of anticipated sacrifice, and the public is familiar with all activities along the spectrum.

It is also easy to identify the presence of selective incentives in Palestine. For instance, there are material incentives for joining militant organizations. As in the U.S. Army, payments are given to insurgents or their families—for their service, for injury, and even for death. Some claim that Hamas uses its social welfare apparatus to reward those who participate in the movement, and likewise deny social benefits to those who do not. Saddam Hussein is known to have sent up to \$25k to the families of suicide bombers through organizations such as Hamas and Fateh, and the Arab Bank has recently been charged for

⁵⁰ See Barnea & Schwartz, “Values and voting,” *Political Psychology*, 19 (1998), 17-40.

⁵¹ Verplanken & Holland. (2002). “Motivated Decision Making: The effect of activation and self-centrality of values on choices and behavior,” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. Vol 82(3), Mar, 434-447.

⁵² See Schwartz, S.H., and Sagiv, L. (1995). “Identifying culture specifics in the content and structure of values.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 26, 92-116.

⁵³ DeVos, T., Spini, D., and Schwartz, S. H. (2003). Conflicts among human values and trust in institutions. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 41, 481-494.

⁵⁴ Brian Barber, “Political violence, social integration, and youth functioning: Palestinian youth from the Intifada,” *Journal of Community Psychology*, v.29, n.3, 2001.

assisting families of bombers.⁵⁵ Many in the West also believe that religious zealotry—the want of virgins in heaven, and the desire to meet Allah—drive Palestinian resistance. Others conclude that young men enlist in militant organizations to earn esteem and status, since the conditions of life in the Territories are so harsh that traditional means of self-esteem are unavailable (i.e. jobs, money, and therefore, marriage).

A real test requires that both selective incentives and value rationality exist in one setting. Is there evidence to suggest that value rationality is at play in Palestinian resistance motivations? Interviews with bombers and militants reveal moral outrage in response to Israeli actions more than—or instead of—instrumental incentives. Asked to explain what led him to choose to enlist in a mission, for instance, one militant responded, “There were a few factors...the stress created by the occupation, the humiliation by the search of a female relative, the killing and crimes executed against kids....”⁵⁶ Civilian death, and specifically the death of children, became a recurring theme:

Pictures of dead kids had a major affect on me. Many were killed before me, like my friend whom I had to carry in my own arms.⁵⁷

The killing of the kids is the thing that affected my decision a lot.⁵⁸

Interviews have also suggested the importance of feeling empowered through the act of resistance. Speaking from prison in 2003, one preempted bomber told me, “The most important thing was that we [the Palestinian people] should make the operation in the heart of Israel after the penetration in order to prove that we were not influenced by the military attack.”⁵⁹ This will to retaliate was, in militant minds, a social good. Asked how the Palestinian public perceived the missions, another reported, “The people were happy after each mission, because they proved [sic] the Jews that they are strong, that they can react.”⁶⁰ Polls of the general public bear this out: Throughout the 2nd intifada, Palestinians viewed retaliatory violence as just/appropriate even if they generally disagreed with the tactic in which it was pursued.⁶¹

In accordance with experimental studies, the value-rational mindset characteristic of the interviewees appeared insensitive to costs and outcomes, and focused on justice—in this case, punishment. Khalil, a 37 year old Gazan who drove a bomber to a mission on Passover in 2003, stated: “I am not a political man and I didn’t think of the benefits [strategically, of the mission]. Like they kill us, I wanted them to hurt as much as we do.”⁶² Another interviewee, a preempted bomber, focused on the emotional rewards that came from the assertion of control and power:

That we are able to react against their bombing and their killing of inhabitants of the camp is important. My mission made them [the camp] happy, also women and children. *Even if* the inhabitants were punished a lot in Jenin. The land and trees and houses were punished; nothing remains that they did not punish.

⁵⁵ Christoph Schult, “Life Insurance for the Families of Suicide Bombers,” *Speigel*, February 9, 2007.

⁵⁶ Moad, 21. His mission was on behalf of Islamic Jihad, but he did not join the organization—he is a member of Fateh.

⁵⁷ Moad, 21.

⁵⁸ Khalil, 37, no org., first to do this mission.

⁵⁹ Hassan, 18.

⁶⁰ Moad, 21, on Jenin.

⁶¹ PCSR surveys, 2000-2005.

⁶² Khalil, 37.

Recent survey work by Atran, Ginges and Shikaki illuminated a norm among the Palestinian public – it explicitly rewarded communal but not self-interested motivations for rebellion too. Survey respondents were angered by vignettes of individuals who joined the struggle for monetary benefit.⁶³ That is, even if the act of rebellion leads to the same outcome for the individual who does it for money and the individual who does it for God and community, the Palestinian public condemns the act made by the one who does it for money.

The purpose of this sub-section was to show that both self-enhancing and communal motivations exist today in Palestine. The question is which ones are most likely to motivate persons who would participate in resistance and rebellion?

To measure how individual versus communal incentives influence participation in resistance, I correlated individuals' scores on the PVQ with their professed willingness to participate in low- to high-sacrifice resistance and rebellion.

The PVQ

The study aimed to investigate how self-interested versus communal value priorities influenced Palestinians' willingness to participate in resistance. It did so by using the PVQ to collect data on two sets of values: self-enhancement (achievement, power and security) and communal orientation (security, conformity and tradition).

The **communal orientation** scale captures values of “security” (family security, national security),⁶⁴ “tradition” (accepting life, religion)⁶⁵ and “conformity” (obedience)⁶⁶ values. High scores on this scale signify a commitment to the values of one's group. Thus, if the “selfless” or value rationality perspective is correct and resistance is motivated by a commitment to the group, communal orientation will be positively related to the dependent variable.

Values prioritizing self-enhancement motives are captured by the **self-enhancement** scale in Schwartz's survey: they are represented by questions dealing with individual power (social power, authority and wealth)⁶⁷ and achievement (personal success, ambition).⁶⁸ If selective incentives exist and cost-benefit rationales are motivating resistance participation, then self-enhancement scores should be negatively correlated with anticipated resistance.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variable in this study is willingness to participate in four types of resistance, each representing activities that increase according to anticipated sacrifice.

⁶³ Jeremy Ginges, Scott Atran, Doug Medin, and Khalil Shikaki, “Sacred Bounds on the Rational Resolution of Violent Political Conflict,” *PNAS* (May 2007), v. 104, n.18, pp. 7357-7360.

⁶⁴ These are questions #4, 10, 16, 24, and 26 on Appendix B.

⁶⁵ These are questions #7, 15, 20 and 28 on Appendix B.

⁶⁶ These are questions #5, 11, 22, and 27 on Appendix B.


⁶⁷ These are questions #1, 12, and 29 on Appendix B.

⁶⁸ These are questions #3, 9, 17 and 19 on Appendix B.

Resistance and Rebellion. Social psychologist Brian Barber identified over 80 means of resistance during his field work in Gaza during the first intifada.⁶⁹ But the nature of Palestinian resistance changed with the outbreak of the second intifada. With the help of four Palestinian research assistants, therefore, I augmented the list to include gun attacks and suicide bombings. The research assistants independently rated the resistance activities according to sacrifice level, and mean scores were used to select representative actions for this thesis.

As shown in Figure 3, the resistance activities used as dependent variables in this analysis are: 1) visiting a person injured by Israel in the 2nd intifada; 2) participating in a rally during a curfew; 3) taking up arms to defend the neighborhood when Israel enters at night; and 4) becoming a human bomb (*istish'hadi*).

Figure 3. Resistance Activities According to Expected Sacrifice.



A brief description of each activity will help to explain its placement on the continuum. At the left end of the spectrum, where the only cost is that of time, is “visiting a person injured by the IDF.” Virtually every Palestinian has known someone injured during the conflict, so this act is familiar to all.

Second from the left is “rally during curfew.” If there is a curfew, it means that the IDF are within town and have asked all civilians to stay inside their homes during specific time periods. Attending a rally during curfew entails potential sacrifices (e.g. the IDF may arrest or shoot into the crowd), and is thus a risk. But given the size of the crowd and a history of few deaths/injuries per curfew rally, this activity is perceived to be low anticipated sacrifice.

The next activity, “defend the neighborhood when the IDF comes in,” entails very high risk. The IDF enters Palestinian neighborhoods to search for wanted individuals, and almost always come during the night. Some neighborhoods have a nonpartisan “defense force” comprising young and middle aged adult men. There is a local cache of weapons, and men from the households converge at a pre-designated location, where they fall into a hierarchy of command. During the chaotic moments of Israeli entry, this makeshift defense force gives and returns fire. Palestinian casualties are commonplace; deaths are frequent.

⁶⁹ Barber, 2001.

Furthest to the right is the act of becoming an *istish'hadi*, or human bomb. This act assures one's death and thereby entails the premeditated decision to sacrifice one's life for the cause.

Survey respondents were asked to indicate whether they would feel like participating in each activity: a) during a time of peace where both sides were living up to the agreement, and b) the morning after Israeli troops had invaded their neighborhood and killed a 3 year old girl.⁷⁰ These questions were meant to induce situationally-based emotions, and capture some of the promise of using anchored vignettes.⁷¹ (See Appendix for actual survey questions.) Answers were coded on a 0-1 scale where "0" stood for "no" and "1" stood for "yes."

Sample Population: Balata Refugee Camp

The survey sample consisted of 351 Muslim Palestinians living in Balata Refugee Camp (pop. 21,903), Nablus, the West Bank. Respondents ranged from age 15 to 65, with a mean of 31 years. On average, they reported personally knowing three Palestinians who had been killed in the conflict with Israel.⁷² The survey did not ask about political affiliations, however Balata is known to have active followings in Fatah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Balata's 22,000 inhabitants live within two square kilometers, making it one of the most densely populated places on Earth. It is also amongst the poorest areas within the city of Nablus, and is known by Palestinians as a center of rebellion against Israel (to Israelis, it is one center of terror activities in the West Bank).

This survey took place in early February 2007.⁷³ At the time of the survey, there was a ceasefire between Palestinian factions and Israel, and weekly efforts to bring all parties to the table for peace talks. Israel had opened ten percent of the checkpoints in the West Bank, many of which had previously blocked travel between Palestinian Cities. Travel was therefore much easier. However, while residents of Nablus experienced a general Israeli presence less than before, the IDF still entered Balata Refugee Camp approximately 2-3 times per week to carry out arrests or targeted killings. The two situational measures of our dependent variable—peacetime versus the morning after a noncombatant was killed in one's neighborhood—were therefore salient.

Sampling Procedure

Palestinians are sensitive to the possibility of infiltration by the Shin Bet, the CIA, or collaborators, and are therefore wary of outsiders. On the other hand, they are not new to outsider interventions: UNRWA has extensive operations within Palestinian refugee camps, and

⁷⁰ In the instructions, we emphasized that the response did not indicate that they would act in such a way, only that the situation would make them feel like doing so.

⁷¹ Gary King and Jonathan Wand. "Comparing Incomparable Survey Responses: New Tools for Anchoring Vignettes," *Political Analysis*, 15, 1 (Winter, 2007).

⁷² They were coded as "personally knowing" victims if the victim was in a friend, family member, or neighbor.

⁷³ Coding was completed in Palestine on April 15, 2007.


has been even more active since the Hamas elections, after which foreign aid was halted and the economy fell. With this in mind, we did not expect resistance to the idea of a survey, but we did expect suspicion regarding its intentions. In response, we framed the survey as an attempt to “understand daily Palestinian life in the 2nd intifada.”

400 Arabic surveys were delivered by hand to every 50th household in Balata. Deliveries were made by a team of four research assistants (RAs), two men and two women, who were trained in sample selection, personability during household interaction, and the content of the survey. The RAs explained the survey objectives and assured each respondent that survey answers would remain anonymous. To emphasize this, the surveyors carried a large cardboard box, and illustrated how the respondent’s survey would, upon pickup, be randomly inserted by the respondent into the pile and then shuffled. If a member of the household agreed to the survey, they were informed that the surveyors would return in 2-3 hours to pick it up. 351 out of 400 surveys were submitted, a return rate of 88%.

IV. Results and Discussion

Figure 4 represents the percentage of the population willing to engage in each act under conditions of peace or war, respectively.

Figure 4. Percentage of population that would feel like participating in specific acts of resistance under conditions of recent noncombatant loss versus peace.



As would be expected, more people reported willingness to help the injured and rally under curfew than violently defend the neighborhood or become an *istish'hadi*. Respondents were far more likely to participate in resistance at all levels of anticipated sacrifice following a


noncombatant death than during peace, but it is unclear what this measure is capturing since conflict-related injuries, curfews and defense should not be necessary during a time of peace.

The numbers of respondents willing to participate in violent activities against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) following noncombatant casualties was small (4 per cent for defense and 2 percent for *istish'had*). However, if we were to extrapolate the findings to the rest of the Palestinian population, the issue begins to look more serious. In Balata's population of 22,000,⁷⁴ willingness to participate in defense comes to 840—a significant counterinsurgency challenge given the extremely dense housing conditions, where narrow alleys pass for roads and public space is teeming with civilians. The number of individuals reporting a willingness to become a human bomb in Balata is 420. Extrapolating those figures to the West Bank, we get 56,400 for defense and 28,200 for *istish'had*. Upon inclusion of Gaza (total population is 2.6 million), figures grow to 104,000 and 52,000, respectively.⁷⁵

Is participation motivated by selfish values or a commitment to group values?

Next, I investigated the relationship between value priorities—communal orientation and self-enhancement—and willingness to participate in resistance at various levels of anticipated sacrifice. The results of the correlations are shown here, and in Figure 5.

Figure 5. General value orientation per resistance activity.



⁷⁴ All figures from the Palestinian National Information Center, 2005.

⁷⁵ A stronger case could be made if actual arrest and participation figures from Balata matched these figures, but I was unable to get these from Israeli military or political officials.

As shown in Figures 5-6, communal orientation correlated positively with willingness to participate, while self-enhancement correlated negatively. This supports the value rational perspective. Individuals who espoused “self-enhancement” priorities were unlikely to participate in collective action in general (during peace or war), and appeared less likely to participate as the anticipated sacrifices of resistance increased. Figure 6 illustrates this in a more accessible manner.

Figure 6. Communal orientation and Self-enhancement: Correlation by Resistance Activity




Figure 6 displays each correlation in exactly the predicted direction and intensity of value rational motivations. That is, self-enhancement correlated positively with no sacrifice activities, i.e. visiting injured people in the hospital, during a time of peace but not during a time of war. Additionally, we see that as anticipated sacrifice intensifies, self-enhancement grows increasingly negative. Communal orientation values correlate positively in every case except one—rallying during a time of peace—presumably because that would not appear to be in the interests of the collective. As anticipated sacrifice increases, positive correlations grow.

Limitations and Discussion

There are important limitations on what can be inferred from this survey.

First, as most political scientists will ask, is professed willingness to participate a true measure of future participation? The answer is simply no. But not only because it may be easier to pledge future participation than to do it (in general, humans are not good at accurately forecasting their future feelings and decisions).⁷⁶ This inability to forecast goes both ways—

⁷⁶ This inability to forecast future feelings and situations afflicts all of us, no matter the stakes. See Rose McDermott. (2004). “The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science,” *Perspectives on Politics*, 2:4, pp. 691-706.

nonpolitical, risk-averse individuals may find themselves involved in things they had not foreseen. Moreover, those who have participated in high-sacrifice resistance in the past, and may therefore be seen to offer more valid answers, may also feel the most pressure to hide their true intentions. Whichever way it falls, there is no way to get around this validity problem. The survey offers a proxy for motivations that are often not explored at all, and it can certainly represent attitudes and intentions, but it does not claim to predict the future.⁷⁷

Perhaps the most important limitation is that we are unable to infer causation from the survey. The relationship reported here between communal orientation and professed willingness to participate in violent resistance or even *istish*'had following a child's death is correlational. Neither OLS nor logistic regression revealed a causal relationship between the values and respondents' anticipated behavior. Communal values did not cause respondents' professed willingness to fight.

The literature on rebellion suggests several stories that would explain why a causal relationship was not found. One possibility is that *past participation* (for which data could not be collected) was driving both willingness to fight and the communal orientations associated with it. Several strains of research support this idea. For instance, Mark Beissinger showed that involvement and even proximity to contentious events in last days of the Soviet Union led to nationalist support, and the idea that communal orientation derives from a dynamic process is also found in Libby Wood's treatment of the El Salvadoran insurgency.⁷⁸ A more basic argument is found in the idea of cognitive consistency—people have a motivational drive to reduce dissonance, in this case by changing their attitudes and beliefs to fit a participatory behavior.⁷⁹ The causal arrow may flow both ways, what is unclear is in which direction it flows stronger and what started it in the first place.

Another variable possibility that the survey did not explicitly collect data on is *reactive emotions of anger or outrage*. This was a survey design flaw.⁸⁰ Recall that the questionnaire asked respondents if they would feel like participating in each of the four sacrifice events a) during a time of peace when both sides were keeping their promises, and b) after a three year old was killed during an Israeli incursion into the neighborhood the previous night. The latter scenario potentially angered or even outraged respondents. Professed willingness to fight could therefore depend on an interaction between communal orientation and momentary anger/outrage; alternatively, the correlation between values and willingness to fight could be spurious, i.e. anger/outrage might have caused *both* sacrifice and communal orientation. As above, there is evidence to support both of these mechanisms. At an individual level, anger has been shown to cause greater risk-taking behavior,⁸¹ lead to blame attributions,⁸² and, in intergroup interactions,

⁷⁷ It would be ideal to compare the numbers of respondents who say they would be involved in “defense” to the actual number of wanted or arrested individuals from the Balata area. I was unable to access this data.

⁷⁸ Mark Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004). See also, Wood, 2003.

⁷⁹ Leon Festinger, *A theory of cognitive dissonance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957).

⁸⁰ The Balata survey was a pilot.

⁸¹ Jennifer Lerner and Dacher Keltner, “Fear, Anger and Risk,” 2008.

<http://hss.cmu.edu/departments/sds/BDRauthors/fear.pdf>

⁸² Averill, J.R. (1982). *Anger and Aggression: An Essay on Emotion*. New York: Springer.

can foster retributive tendencies towards an out-group⁸³ and serve as a focal point for action.⁸⁴ Moreover, laboratory studies show that individuals exposed to in-group mortality or images of violence perpetrated against their group become more communally oriented.⁸⁵ These laboratory findings are being investigated at higher levels of analysis. Sambanis and Zinn (2005) argue that repression enrages citizens, prompting a shift in tactics or compelling challengers to redouble their efforts.⁸⁶

The survey design was flawed in three other important ways. First, it omitted PVQ items representing a potentially important value, *stimulation*. The stimulation measures risk- and thrill-seeking propensities. Although no individual traits have been found to predict participation in terrorism (which may or may not hold for individuals involved in non-terror insurgencies), this value should be included in future surveys using the PVQ to get at motivations for joining rebellion. Second, the survey vignette was ambiguous at one point. Respondents were asked, “Would you feel like rallying during a curfew *during peacetime*?” While this is indeed a possible scenario in the West Bank—Israel has been in and out of Nablus regularly the past year despite no mention of it in the Western press—it creates problematic ambiguity. During peacetime, the Israelis may or may not be present to enforce a curfew, thus this question, and several others, leave potentially important scenario parameters to the individual imagination. It is difficult to know how respondents were conceiving the question. Lastly, willingness to participate in resistance or rebellion was coded as 0 or 1 here (respondents just checked a box if they would participate); the lack of unit variation made analysis difficult. Future surveys should include a 1-4 scale.

The last limitation regards generalizability. Palestine is unique. It is rife with conditions that would seem to support value-rational living. For starters, Palestinians have endured generations of occupation⁸⁷ and watched infinite ceasefires and peace accords with Israel burn. These two types of experiences can make the experience of conflict, perhaps to both sides, feel timeless and unchangeable.⁸⁸ In addition, death due to the conflict is a frequent occurrence. According to terror management theory, this constant mortality salience would cause a general shift from instrumental to collective orientation. Add to this that Palestine is in the throes of

⁸³ Lickel, B., Miller, N., Stenstrom, DM, Denson TF, and Schmader, T. (2006). Vicarious Retribution: The Role of Collective Blame in Intergroup Aggression,” *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 10, 371-390. See also, Mackie, DM, Devos T, and Smith ER. (2000). Intergroup Emotions: Explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79, 602-616.

⁸⁴ Pyszczynski T, Solomon S, Greenberg J, *In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2002).

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ See Sambanis, N. and Zinn, “From Protest To Violence: An Analysis of Conflict Escalation with an Application to Self-Determination,” Manuscript, 2005.

⁸⁷ Length of occupation is a variable for predicting rebellion and stability. See Carmela Lutmar, “Military Occupations and Regime Changes: an Empirical Examination 1914-2004” Thesis presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 2008.

⁸⁸ Juergensmeyer theorizes about how this future orientation changes decision calculi. See *Terror in the Mind of God* (Los Angeles: UC Press, 2003). Importantly, the British occupied the West Bank before the Israelis. Amongst Palestinian elders, this is still remembered. I once interviewed the very old mother of a suicide bomber who mentioned that the Israelis did many covert things to destabilize their life, in addition to the violence that was reported. When I asked, “Can you give examples?” she replied, “They switch our sugar with our salt.” At this point, her husband interrupted, saying, “No, that was the British. She is confusing the occupations.”

economic despair, such that personal goals like attaining wealth or even a family are stymied. In such conditions, both communal orientation and value rationality—a focus on means (e.g. reciprocity) over ends (always uncertain)—might be evolutionary *rational*. When you cannot trust the environment, fitness is more about who has your back (and reciprocally, whose back you have).

Even within Palestine, it is difficult to generalize claims. Balata is the poorest, most densely populated, and most rebellious camp in Palestine. Further surveys in Palestinian populations selected for their variation in grievance and community structure would help to establish generalizability, and potentially causality.

V. Conclusion

This thesis sought to compare self-interested and communal explanations for why people participate in resistance. It argued that the Schwartz Portrait Value Questionnaire could contribute to the literature on motivations by directly linking self- vs. communal orientations to violent participation and/or attitudes towards violent participation. It then piloted such a survey in Balata Refugee Camp, Nablus, The West Bank.

The survey produced two findings worthy of note. First, Palestinian willingness to participate in resistance, and especially in violent rebellion, is positively correlated with communal orientation and negatively correlated with self-enhancement values. The strength of correlation grows—negatively for self-enhancement and positively for communal orientations—as anticipated sacrifice increases. Selective incentives such as money, status, and rewards in the afterlife are offered to militants in Palestine today. The fact that respondents whose relative value score was high in self-enhancement still did not report willingness to participate in high-sacrifice resistance implies that instrumental incentives are not motivating most Palestinian insurgents.

Second, even within a long-standing conflict with high levels of dehumanization, dynamic context matters. In particular, communally-oriented respondents' willingness to participate in defense during an incursion, or even become an *istish'hadi*, was largely a response to the vignette which read “during an Israeli incursion the night before, a four-year-old girl is killed.” This data lends support to the thesis that conflict dynamics—including repression or other violent violations of proprietary values—may lead to outrage which causes participants to redouble their efforts. Further work on the micro-foundations of conflict is essential, specifically the potential role that intergroup events play in preference formation and intergroup behavior. It appears that potential insurgents come in more than two flavors—self- and communally-oriented. Instead, identity is a continuum and conflict dynamics work to shift it to varying degrees.

Implications for Policy

Within Balata, these correlational findings offer a stark message: when it comes to rebellion, terror or insurgency, self-interested individuals appear to see the conflict mostly in terms of risk and sacrifice, and therefore stay away. In contrast, communally oriented individuals seem to view the conflict in terms of justice, with a process orientation that cares more about doing the

right thing that getting a particular outcome. Theoretically, within such a frame, tactics of cost-manipulation such as deterrence would be rendered almost useless.

Although causal relationships were not defined, communal orientation is clearly related to participation in rebellion. As discussed in the literature review at the beginning of this thesis, communal orientation appears relatively cost-insensitive, driven as by group norms and a focus on process rather than outcome. For policy makers interested in defusing the will of a value rational warrior, therefore, it may be useful to consider the burgeoning literature on protected, or sacred, values. *Sacred values* are defined as “any value that a moral community implicitly or explicitly treats as possessing infinite and transcendental significance that precludes comparisons, tradeoffs, or indeed any other mingling with bounded or secular values.”⁸⁹ Both laboratory work and recent field experiments in Israel and Palestine have shown that individuals respond with outrage and disgust (i.e. operationalized in the field survey as an emotional measure, as well as support for suicide bombing or violent punishment) when material rewards are offered for concessions in sacred values.⁹⁰ The only thing that decreased outrage and support for violence among those with sacred values was the other side’s symbolic concession on one of their sacred values (i.e. recognizing the historic legitimacy of the Palestinian’s right of return, or of Israel’s claim to the West Bank). Once this symbolic recognition occurred, negotiation could begin.

Future Research

A causal relationship between communal value orientation and professed willingness to participate in resistance or rebellion was not identified in this analysis. Communal orientation is obviously important, but how?

What starting points do we have for investigating events that trigger shifts from self-enhancement to communal orientations? At the local group level, one answer is entrance into a tight social network, or strong community. But, communal proclivities appear to be prompted at a societal level as well. Experiments show that reminders of mortality, violence and threat in general engender shifts from instrumental- to community-oriented behavior in individuals.⁹¹ Subjects report stronger feelings of affiliation to their social group, and make value-oriented decisions that are less sensitive to individual costs and benefits. In short, their preferences change from those focusing on their individual well-being to preference geared towards group well-being. Moreover, when subjects attribute blame for the violence to an out-group, they often consider innocent members of that out-group to be vicariously responsible (thus rendering them worthy of punishment).⁹² This leads to some testable questions, where communal orientation would become an independent variable: Can we identify differences in self-enhancement versus communal value orientations based upon the amount or type of grievance individuals within a population, or populations as a whole, have suffered?

⁸⁹ Tetlock, P, Kristel, O., Elson, S., Green, M., Lerner, J. (2000). “The psychology of the unthinkable: Taboo tradeoffs, forbidden base rates, and heretical counterfactuals.” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. Vol 78(5), May, 853-870.

⁹⁰ Ginges et al, “Sacred bounds on the rational resolution of violent conflict.”

⁹¹ Pyszczynski et al, *In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror*.

⁹² Lickel et al, “Vicarious Retribution.”

At a more foundational level, three variables were identified that might affect both communal orientation and participating behavior: 1) past participation in rebellion, or perhaps even proximity to it; 2) reactive anger or outrage, prompted by the vignette about the innocent death of a small child; and 3) mortality salience, the cornerstone of terror management theory. What is interesting is that *all three of these possibilities are driven by emotion*. Past participation or proximity to participation may be considered a structural variable (via its implication of social networks and spatial luck), but it operates according to social norms and/or the need for cognitive consistency— affective mechanisms. Reactive anger is an emotional response to an event or structure. The crux of terror management theory is esteem—reminders of mortality (a consequence of conflict zones, considered here as “structure”) are seen as esteem threats, which create anxiety and motivate us towards communal orientations and strongly buffered in-group worldviews. In terms of micro-foundations, models of rationality and emotion during times of conflict and insecurity may be utterly different than those used during times of continuity.⁹³ To the extent that we can identify systematic effects of and conditions for communal orientation, anger/outrage in the context of intergroup violence, and terror management theory, we should be modeling it. Rigorous transdisciplinary work incorporating lab and field experimentation into game theoretic models is being done,⁹⁴ and should be furthered.

In this thesis, I have argued that survey methodology is an important but underutilized means for capturing the shifts in individual value orientations that likely accompany cost-insensitive participation in violent conflicts. Such surveys could be useful in identifying the triggers of value shifts, and possibly, as in the case of Ginges et al.’s field experiment on sacred values, novel mechanistic approaches to conflict resolution. Value research may also offer identity theorists seeking to better understand when and how identities transform. Lisa Wedeen notes ethnic identity is not fixed, but should be conceived of in terms of intensity. Longitudinal value surveys could be one agreed-upon metric for the dependent variable—identity.⁹⁵

Data from future surveys within Palestine, corrected for the current design flaws, would be one step towards establishing causal relationships between the variables discussed above—anger/outrage, beliefs, past participation, community structure and social networks, value orientation and professed willingness to participate in rebellion (or at least condone it). Survey sites could be selected based on variation in grievance and community structure.

Given the uniqueness of Palestinian society, similar endeavors in a variety of other areas would be interesting. For instance, would occupation versus non-occupation cases see different results? On the one hand, an occupation serves as an obvious focal point for blame, anger and resistance, at least as time passes. However, a sense of unfair “dominance” and is a key group narrative in many ethnic and civil rebellions; it may be that the official trappings matter little.⁹⁶ To address conflict dynamics, future surveys might also choose samples from comparable

⁹³ Swidler, “Culture in Action.”

⁹⁴ See Michael Bacharach. (2006). *Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory* (Princeton: Princeton UP); and, Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd and Ernst Fehr, eds., *Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

⁹⁵ See Lisa Wedeen, “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science,” *American Political Science Review* (2002), 96:4:713-728.

⁹⁶ See Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (California: UC Press, 1995).

conflicts where the state represses versus where it does not. Lastly, to better understand the relationship between structure and culture, it would be interesting to see what societal value structures (and sacrificial proclivities) exist in insecure places that are not suffering from political conflict.

APPENDIX A: DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Instructions: Below is a list of resistance activities that have been part of the second intifada. For each activity, the second column asks if you have participated in it at least once during the 2nd intifada (for dangerous activities, we do not allow you to answer). The third column asks if you would participate in that activity if innocent civilians from your neighborhood were killed by Israeli forces.

*Note: The last column asks if you would participate in each activity. If you say yes in the last column, it does **not** mean you are going to do it; it means that the situation makes you feel like you could do it.*

	Activity	I have participated in this activity at least once during the 2nd intifada. Check (✓) for yes	I would participate if: <i>A 3 yr. old noncombatant in or from my neighborhood was killed by Israeli forces during an overnight raid.</i> Check (✓) for yes.	I would participate if: <i>There was a time of peace and both sides were upholding their commitments.</i> Check (✓) for yes.
1.	A rally or protest			
2.	A rally or protest <i>during a curfew</i>			
3.	An istish'hadi operation	XXXXXXXXXXXXX		
4.	Care for injured			
5.	Defending my neighborhood during an Israeli invasion	XXXXXXXXXXXXX		
6.	Be a part of a human shield to protect leaders or wanted people			
7.	Protecting someone from the IDF	XXXXXXXXXXXXX		
8.	Bring supplies for participants			
9.	Burn tires			
10.	Hang posters			
11.	Throw stones			
12.	Inform on a collaborator	XXXXXXXXXXXXX		
13.	Join militant organization	XXXXXXXXXXXXX		
14.	An operation against Israeli soldiers or settlers, using a gun, where I would not die in the process.	XXXXXXXXXXXXX		
15.	Not obeying orders of soldiers at the checkpoint			
16.	Distributing leaflets			
17.	Obeying leaflets			
18.	Write slogans			
19.	Erecting a barricade			
20.	Throw a Molotov cocktail			
21.	Distract the soldiers			
22.	Visit a family of a martyr			

APPENDIX B: INDEPENDENT VARIABLE

Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how much each person is or is not like you. Put an X in the box to the right that shows how much the person in the description is like you.

HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSON?	Very much like me	like me	some- what like me	a little like me	not like me	not like me at all
1. It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive things.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2. He thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3. It's very important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he does.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4. It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might endanger his safety.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5. He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6. It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7. He thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you have. He believes that people should be satisfied with what they have.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8. It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for their well-being.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9. Being very successful is important to him. He likes to impress other people.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10. It is very important to him that his country be safe. He thinks the state must be on watch against threats from within and without.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11. It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12. It is important to him to be in charge and tell others what to do. He wants people to do what he says.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13. It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people close to him.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14. He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environment is important to him.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15. Religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do what his religion requires.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSON?

	Very much like me	like me	some- what like me	a little like me	not like me	not like me at all
16. It is important to him that things be organized and clean. He really does not like things to be a mess.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17. He thinks it's important to be interested in things. He likes to be curious and to try to understand all sorts of things.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18. He believes all the worlds' people should live in harmony. Promoting peace among all groups in the world is important to him.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19. He thinks it is important to be ambitious. He wants to show how capable he is.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20. He thinks it is best to do things in traditional ways. It is important to him to keep up the customs he has learned.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21. It is important to him to respond to the needs of others. He tries to support those he knows.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22. He believes he should always show respect to his parents and to older people. It is important to him to be obedient.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23. He wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he doesn't know. It is important to him to protect the weak in society.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24. He tries hard to avoid getting sick. Staying healthy is very important to him.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
25. Forgiving people who have hurt him is important to him. He tries to see what is good in them and not to hold a grudge.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26. Having a stable government is important to him. He is concerned that the social order be protected.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27. It is important to him to be polite to other people all the time. He tries never to disturb or irritate others.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28. It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to himself.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
29. He always wants to be the one who makes the decisions. He likes to be the leader.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
30. It is important to him to adapt to nature and to fit into it. He believes that people should not change nature.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

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