The Golden Lariat: Explaining American Aid to Israel

by

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ABSTRACT

An observational study was conducted to determine the most likely explanation of American support for Israel. Several extant hypotheses were considered, most particularly, and at greatest length, that of a pro-Israel domestic lobby in the United States, but also that it had to do with Cold War containment, common values, or precedent.

It was ultimately concluded that the domestic lobby hypothesis could not account for American support, since the level of that support correlated negatively with the resources of the lobby, and because sudden, temporary changes in the level of American support did not coincide with any similar changes in the resources of the lobby. Furthermore, statistical analysis indicated that there was on balance no benefit for politicians who supported the lobby’s agenda, and no cost for those who opposed it.

Likewise, the other explanations also proved unsatisfactory. The containment hypothesis, for instance, could not explain why American support continued after the Cold War ended, while the common values hypothesis could not explain why American support did not begin until 1971, nor why it peaked in 1979 and began to decline in the eighties.

Finally, it was concluded that the best explanation of American support was that it gave the United States the leverage to restrain Israeli belligerence, for which the United States was blamed by the Arab states. In this way, the U.S. was able to minimize damage to its relations with the Arabs resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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I. Introduction

Why does the United States support Israel? It is widely believed that the United States supports Israel because of the efforts of pro-Israel lobbyists within American domestic politics.¹ There are, however, some dissenters from this conventional wisdom: one critic of the domestic-lobby hypothesis, A.F.K. Organski, has argued that the United States has supported Israel not because of the Israel lobby, but because of the well-established American desire to contain the expansion of Soviet influence during the Cold War.² Another critic, Michael Barnett, has argued that the foundation of the America-Israel alliance is a sense of shared norms and identity.³ Warren Bass, in his recent book on the history of the U.S.-Israel alliance, implies that the ongoing alliance is caused by a precedent set by the Kennedy administration.⁴ While it might seem that there is a surfeit

¹ I have relied on Edward Tivnan’s The Lobby, Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv’s Friends in Deed, and Steven Spiegel’s The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict as general histories of American support for Israel, and of lobbying efforts on Israel’s behalf in America. Tony Smith’s Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy is a study of domestic lobbies for foreign governments in general, although it not surprisingly gives much attention to the Israel lobby in specific. Conor Cruise O’Brien’s The Siege is a general history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but it also serves as an explication and advocate of the domestic-lobby hypothesis. Michael Lind’s “The Israel Lobby,” available on-line at http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DocID=779 and in the April 20, 2002 edition of Prospect, in addition to explicating very clearly the different elements of the domestic-lobby hypothesis, also exemplifies the criticisms often made of the lobby. Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer make an argument similar to Lind’s in their article “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” available at http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?Pubid=3670, and in their book of the same title. Fortune magazine’s “Power 25” survey, its list of Washington's most powerful lobbying groups, published May 28, 2001, places the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, as the fourth most influential lobby in Washington, behind only the National Rifle Association, the American Association of Retired Persons, and the National Federation of Independent Business. Former congressman Paul Findley has written two books advancing the lobby hypothesis, from a highly critical point of view: They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel’s Lobby, and Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts about the U.S.-Israeli Relationship. Richard H. Curtiss has made an argument similar to Findley’s in Stealth PACs: Lobbying Congress for Control of U.S. Middle East Policy.

² A. F. K. Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain. Also Michael Handel in “Israel’s Contribution to U.S. Interests in the Middle East,” in Israel, the Middle East, and U.S. Interests, Harry Allen and Ivan Volgyes, eds. Interestingly, Noam Chomsky, in The Fateful Triangle, makes an argument not dissimilar to Organski’s, although one that is obscured by his violently anti-Israel polemic.


of explanations, I would nevertheless propose another hypothesis, one which I believe better explains more of the phenomenon of American aid to Israel, that American support for Israel is a case of what Jeremy Pressman has termed “alliance restraint.”\(^5\) To wit, because the Arab governments decided to blame the United States for Israel’s actions, they gave the U.S. an incentive to restrain Israel in order to insure tolerably good relations with the Arabs, which in turn gave the U.S. the incentive to aid Israel in order to restrain it.\(^6\) There is also a sub-variant of this restraint hypothesis that holds that America wanted to restrain Israel in order to avoid war with the Soviet Union.

In order to test these competing hypotheses, I will first summarize the history of American aid to Israel. Then, I will treat each hypothesis in turn, laying out the causal logic behind each, and adducing thence additional empirical expectations or predictions each theory makes. I will then test each prediction against the historical record. I shall, however, be focusing primarily on the domestic lobby hypothesis. It is by far the most widely believed explanation, and at the same time the one that has generated the most controversy and debate. Most of this paper, therefore, will be devoted to testing the lobby hypothesis. After that, however, I shall offer an admittedly more cursory examination of the other hypotheses. First, however, I shall summarize each theory.

The domestic-lobby hypothesis holds that Americans who for reasons of ethnic or religious loyalty support Israel have organized politically to pressure the American government to aid Israel. The principal organs of this lobby are and have been the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, as well as various and sundry pro-

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6 Scott Lasensky has proposed a similar explanation in “Paying for Peace: The Oslo Process and the Limits of American Foreign Aid,” in *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 58, no. 2, but he is primarily interested in evaluating the results of American aid, not in explaining it.
Israel political action committees, or PACs. Supporters of the lobby donate money to these groups, which in turn use that money to support the election of pro-Israel politicians and oppose the election of neutral or anti-Israel politicians. Again, testing this theory is the primary purpose of this essay.

The containment hypothesis proposes that the United States allied with Israel in order to block or reverse the expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East. According to this argument, the United States was concerned that Soviet support for radical Arab regimes might imperil American access to the economically and strategically vital oil of the Persian Gulf, and therefore decided to aid Israel, already the bête noire of the Arab radicals, in order build up Israel as a counterweight to and check upon the Arab radicals, especially Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The shared-values hypothesis claims that the United States supports Israel out of a desire to aid a follow liberal democracy. In this view, values and ideals play a major role in American foreign policy, leading the United States to support democracies imperiled by dictatorships. Because Israel is such a democracy, while its enemies are dictatorships, it was only natural for America to support it. Alternately, it has been suggested that the United States aids Israel out of a sense of Christian guilt over the Holocaust or earlier Christian oppression of the Jews, although it must be noted that this is not Barnett's theory.

The precedent hypothesis asserts that the decision of the Kennedy administration to sell Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Israel in the sixties established a precedent for American support for Israel which subsequent administrations have had to follow. Once aid to Israel began, it naturally continued and increased. Bass himself does not say in his
book how he thinks precedent operates in this case, or in foreign policy more generally. I shall, however, in my discussion of his theory, propose a couple of ways in which precedent might operate. Among them are bureaucratization and institutional interests, concerns over reputation and prestige, and general honoring of tradition and custom.

The restraint hypothesis, in its primary variant, holds that the Arab governments decided, during and after the Six Day War, to blame falsely the United States for Israel’s actions. This made the Arab states’ posture toward America, and hence America’s access to oil, a function of Israel’s posture toward the Arabs, which gave the United States an incentive to restrain Israel. In order to gain the leverage necessary to restrain Israel, the United States began giving Israel aid. By partially alleviating Israel’s security concerns, this aid made Israelis less afraid, and therefore less hawkish toward the Arabs, which in turn better disposed them towards America.

In its secondary, Soviet-oriented variant, the restraint hypothesis holds that the United States was concerned that, because of Soviet support for Israel’s principal Arab foes, an Arab-Israeli war could escalate into a Soviet-Israeli war, in which case the Israelis would use nuclear weapons against the Soviets. Furthermore, the American government feared, with reason, that the Soviets would in that event retaliate not solely against Israel, but blaming the United States, again falsely, for Israel’s actions, against America as well. Consequently, the United States decided to aid Israel in order to restrain it vis-à-vis the Soviets, in order to avoid World War III.

I find that the lobby hypothesis unsatisfactory. It passes only a relative handful of the tests to which I subject it, and those it does pass tend to be the weaker of those tests. Even then, it generally does not pass those tests with the proverbial flying colors. As
such, I ultimately conclude that the lobby hypothesis can explain little if any of American support for Israel, and I therefore examine, again, less thoroughly, some of the alternative explanations.

Because the primary variant of the restraint hypothesis passes a much higher percentage of its tests than any of the competing hypotheses, and, more importantly, because those tests are relatively strong, I have concluded that it is the best available explanation of American aid to Israel, and that the other theories explain at most only a small percentage of American assistance. Of the other explanations, a combination of the containment hypothesis and the domestic-lobby hypothesis performs the best. The Soviet variant of the restraint hypothesis explains one, but only one instance of American aid quite well. The other explanations do not perform particularly well. Before turning to each hypothesis in detail, however, it is necessary to consider the history of American aid to Israel.

II. The History of American Aid to Israel
American aid to Israel only began in any serious way in the early to mid-1970s, as illustrated by chart 1.7 Obviously, a chart such as this one does not capture every aspect of aid or assistance, such as the Eisenhower administration’s assurances regarding the Strait of Tiran, or the Kennedy administration’s sale of Hawk missiles to Israel, or the Reagan administration’s free trade agreement with Israel. At the same time, this chart does not display American actions detrimental to Israel, such as arms sales to Israel’s neighbors. Nonetheless, since direct, in-cash aid to Israel is one of the principal forms which American aid to Israel has taken, it serves as a useful and easily measurable index of overall aid. It should be noted that financial aid was the first of only two ways that America supports Israel that Stephen Walt mentioned in a speech at MIT on the book

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7 Data on nominal U.S. aid to Israel were drawn from Clyde R. Mark’s “Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” an Issue Brief for Congress published by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress (order # IB85066). These data were adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) data available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/. I also looked at U.S. aid to Israel as a percentage of total U.S. foreign aid, using data drawn from Curt Tarnoff and Larry Nowels’ “Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs and Policy,” a CRS Report for Congress published by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress (order # 98-916); the results were quite similar; barring one additional spike in the late nineties, caused by a corresponding reduction in the level of total aid at that time, and which was in any case temporary.
he had co-authored with John Mearsheimer, implying that leading proponents of the lobby hypothesis see this as an important measure.\textsuperscript{8} I have also included a chart of American aid in three year averages, in order to more clearly illustrate the general trend of aid:

This chart reveals that American aid to Israel was negligible prior to 1971; one can reasonably speak of the alliance as having begun then. Indeed, this basic assessment was shared by Shai Feldman, who worked as an Israeli diplomat in the United States in the seventies, and studied the U.S.-Israel relationship as an academic for many years since then.\textsuperscript{9} Also, American aid to Israel peaked in the seventies, reaching an all-time high in 1979, having hit its third- and second-highest points in 1976 and 1974 respectively. It should be noted that the peak that occurred in 1974 actually happened mostly during October of the 1973 calendar year, which fell in the 1974 fiscal year; this spike represents the airlift of American supplies to Israel during the Yom Kippur War.

Although the '74 spike was consistently surpassed in nominal terms starting in 1984, with the '76 spike having been so since 1981, in real terms they were never exceeded after '79.

\textsuperscript{8} Stephen Walt, speech at MIT, October 3, 2007; available at http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/488
\textsuperscript{9} Shai Feldman, interview with author.
It is perhaps unsurprising that the biggest gap between the real and nominal amounts occurs in the 1970s, or that the gap shrinks as one approaches the present. By far the most important trend revealed by looking at the real amount is that, excepting temporary spikes in 1991 and 2000, American aid to Israel has been declining since 1986; starting in 1997, it appears to have begun declining even in nominal terms, although the rate of real decline did slow by about half following the spike of 1991.10 Any theory intended to explain American support for Israel should fit the trends illustrated in this chart: that the United States started supporting Israel in the seventies, and that that support declined in the eighties, and also that there have been spikes in support in certain years.

One might respond that, even if in-cash aid payments only became substantial in the early seventies, the United States has in fact consistently supported the state of Israel since its inception, and that therefore a different, or alternative measure of U.S. support for Israel should be used: diplomatic and rhetorical support, as measured by votes in the United Nations, friendly diplomatic demarches, or positive Congressional resolutions. According to this argument, America essentially midwifed the birth of the Jewish State, both by pushing through the 1947 partition resolution through the U.N. General Assembly, and by immediately recognizing Israeli independence as soon as it was declared.11 According to this traditional narrative of the history of the founding of Israel, Harry Truman’s former business partner, Eddie Jacobson, who was Jewish, prevailed upon the President to meet with Chaim Weizmann, who persuaded Truman that, in the wake of the Holocaust, a Jewish state was a moral necessity for the world. This personal appeal, combined with Truman’s fears that enough of the Jewish vote might defect to

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10 Niall Ferguson notes the same trend on p. 138 of Colossus: the Price of America’s Empire, but he traces the beginning of the decline to 1992.
11 O’Brien, Siege, pp. 279, 286; also, Melman and Raviv, Friends, ch. 3
Wallace to deliver New York, and with it the Presidency, to Dewey in ’48, prompted Truman to support the formation of the state of Israel. Truman himself, in a speech delivered to the Jewish Theological Seminary in 1953, said, “What do you mean, ‘helped create’? I am Cyrus,” in an allusion to the Persian king who had restored the Jews to their homeland following the first Exile. According, then, to the traditional narrative of U.S.-Israel relations, America has supported Israel from before its independence, but this is simply not so.

If one is to accept that American support for the partition resolution in the General Assembly was an example of significant support for Israel, then one must believe that the partition resolution was itself significant. Whatever the United Nations decided, however, the British had already decided to withdraw from the Mandate, and there was going to be a war between the Arabs and the Jews directly thereafter. To argue that the United States, either by pushing through the partition resolution, or by rapidly recognizing Israeli independence, was providing real support to Israel requires one to believe that the ’48 war would have gone differently otherwise. I know of no credible explanation for how some pieces of paper in New York and Washington fundamentally altered the balance of forces between the Arab and Jewish armies on the battlefields of the eastern Mediterranean coast. Paradoxically, Stalin, for all his literally genocidal hatred for Jews, better deserves the appellation Cyrus than does Truman, because the Soviet Union, acting through captive Czechoslovakia, actually sold weapons to Israel during the ’48 war, which the United States refused to do, and those arms sales actually did affect the correlation of forces.

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12 Bass, Support, p. 15
13 O’Brien, Siege, p. 295
III. The Domestic-Lobby Hypothesis

The most widely believed explanation of American support for Israel is that Americans who are sympathetic to Israel lobby through various means their own government to support Israel. Michael Lind argues that “US policy [in the Middle East has been] dominated by two US domestic lobbies, one ethnic and one economic—the Israel lobby and the oil industry (which occasionally clashed over issues like US weapons sales to Saudi Arabia),” and that “America’s Israel lobby...is not all-powerful, but it is still far too powerful for the good of the US and its alliances in the middle east and elsewhere.”14 According to former Congressman Paul Findley, “a small band of United States partisans for Israel marshaled self-discipline and commitment so effectively that they succeeded in ending free and open debate in America whenever Middle East issues are considered.”15 Furthermore, “these partisans forced a severe anti-Arab and anti-Muslim bias into U.S. Middle East policy that has since raised costly economic, political, and military barriers to the American national interest.”16 The principal organization that is the “Israel lobby” is, of course, the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, or AIPAC. According to Findley, “AIPAC is...the major lobby supporting Israel in the United States.”17 Lind is not quite as categorical, writing that “the Israel lobby...is a loose network of individuals and organizations, of which the most important are the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)...and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.”18 Walt and Mearsheimer essentially agree

14 Lind, “The Israel Lobby”
15 Findley, They Dare, p. vii
16 ibid, p. vii
17 Findley, Deceptions, p. 4, footnote
18 Lind, “The Israel Lobby”

To summarize, then, the causal logic underlying the domestic-lobby hypothesis, it is that AIPAC, along with various pro-Israel political action committees, or PACs, lobby Congress, and, perhaps to a lesser extent, the White House, to support Israel. These politicians then vote, under pressure from these lobbying groups, to give aid to Israel. This chain of causation yields several predictions by which the theory can be tested. First, we should see a correlation between the resources of the lobby and the level of aid to Israel. That is, if the lobby is causing the government to aid Israel, then the stronger the lobby, the more effectively it should be able to lobby politicians, and therefore the larger the amount of aid should be. Moreover, since AIPAC and the lobby more generally “is not primarily a traditional ethnic voter machine; it is an ethnic donor machine,” we should furthermore be able to measure the lobby’s resources by measuring AIPAC’s budget, as well as the budgets of pro-Israel PACs. One might also look at the size of AIPAC’s membership.

The second prediction is that not only should there be a general correlation between the resources of the lobby and the level of aid, but that any changes in the former should chronologically precede any changes in the latter. That is, if the lobby is causing aid to Israel, then if the lobby’s budget goes up, then aid to Israel should also go up not long thereafter, and vice versa. Conversely, if aid goes down, we should expect to find that the resources of the lobby had also gone down, in a similar way, not long before. This should apply both to long-term changes in the level of aid and the resources of the

19 Walt and Mearsheimer, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.”
21 Lind, “The Israel Lobby”
lobby, but also to short-term changes, that is, temporary spikes, in either. This prediction is distinct from the first one in that, even if we find a correlation, even a very close one, between the level of aid and the resources of the lobby, if we should also find that changes in the former occur before the corresponding changes in the latter, than it cannot be the case that the latter is causing the former, since cause must always precede effect in time.

The third prediction is that American politicians should be saying that they support Israel because of the efforts of AIPAC and other pro-Israel organizations. One might object that politicians would be reluctant to admit that this is their motivation, since it would carry with it the implication that they were selling out the national interest for campaign contributions. It is worth noting, however, that since aid to Israel began in the early seventies, thousands of people have served in Congress, and it seems likely that at least some of them would talk. Indeed, as shall be seen, I believe that there is a powerful reason why politicians might say that they were motivated by the Israel lobby even if it were not so.

The fourth prediction, or group of predictions, is that politicians who support what the lobby deems to be the pro-Israel side of a specific issue or issues of importance to the lobby ought to fare better politically than those who oppose that side. For example, if the Israel lobby were to decide to oppose a given arms sale by the United States to an Arab country, we should expect that those members of Congress who oppose the sale would tend to stay in office longer, be less likely to lose their seats in election challenges, and more likely to attain higher political office than those who support the sale. This measure is, admittedly, somewhat crude, in that a whole host of other factors can affect a
politician’s career. All else being equal, however, statistical analysis of the outcomes for Congress taken as a whole should reveal the effect of the lobby’s efforts, if any. To put it another way, an given individual politician may or may not have had his career impacted by his posture on an issue of importance to the lobby, and, in the former case, that impact may have been obscured by other factors, but any impact the lobby may have had should be apparent when looking at all of Congress together. The basis of statistical analysis, after all, is that, given a sufficiently large sample, the obscuring factors should cancel out. If not, we are no longer dealing with mere obscuring factors, but with some genuine countervailing force. In the event, we shall be looking at three such arms sales of importance to the Israel lobby, and using various statistical methods to analyze them: the 1975 I-HAWK sale to Jordan, the 1978 F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia, and the 1981 AWACS sale, also to Saudi Arabia.

*Summary Preview of Tests and Evidence*

To test the first two predictions, having already charted the levels of American aid to Israel over time, I shall also chart the resources of AIPAC and pro-Israel PACs over time, and then compare those values. I shall then use statistical tests to determine the degree of correlation that occurs between the resources of the Israel lobby and the level of American support for Israel. What we shall see is that the correlations are moderately negative, disconfirming the lobby hypothesis. We shall also see that no spikes occur in the resources of the lobby corresponding to the periodic spikes we have seen in the level of aid, which also tends to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis. These tests are, in my view, very powerful, probably the most powerful of all the tests I have run.
To test the third prediction, I shall examine some of the remarks made by members of Congress, their advisors and staffers, and members of the lobby itself, with respect to the influence of the lobby. What we shall see here is that there is indeed a great deal of speech evidence in favor of the lobby hypothesis. I tend to think that this is weak evidence, however, for two primary reasons. First, speech evidence is really only capturing the fact that many people believe that the lobby is powerful. It does not by itself demonstrate that this belief is correct. Second, many people may have motivated or cognitively biased reasons to believe that the lobby is powerful, or at least to say they believe so, even if that is not the case.

To test the fourth prediction, I have looked at three separate arms sales made to certain of the Arab states: the I-HAWK sale to Jordan in 1975, the F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia in 1978, and the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia in 1981. I have chosen those three cases for several reasons. First, there is general agreement that these were important events in the U.S.-Israel relationship, and that the lobby tried hard to block these sales, especially the AWACS sale.22 I have also chosen these cases in order to look where the proverbial light is. They were very public cases, and members of Congress spoke about them, sponsored resolutions about them, and, in the latter two cases, voted on them, giving us a fair amount of data with which to work.

I have gone through each of these three cases in turn, and, subsequently, looked at them in conjunction, in a variety of different ways. In each case, I looked separately at the Senate and at the House. I used three different metrics or indices for the independent

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22 Walt makes reference to the I-HAWK sale in *Origins of Alliances*, p. 128. More significantly, and more recently, Walt and Mearsheimer have cited the AWACS sale as an example of the power of the Israel lobby, as in their speech at the Politics and Prose bookstore on September 5, 2007, as reported here: http://www.wrmea.com/archives/November_2007/0711057.html; while they do not mention the 1978 sale, I include that one as well because it was the prelude to the 1981 sale.
variable, a politician's support for the Israel lobby's position, although not every metric was available in each case. For example, wherever possible, I first used the ultimate vote tallies on the arms sale as the index for a politician's position, although, because the issue only came to a vote in the Senate in 1978 and 1981, and in the House in 1981, that metric was not always available. But in each case where it was, I used it first, as it is, in my view, the best of the three. Secondly, in each case I counted the number of remarks each member of Congress made or later had inserted into the Record, which was available in each case. Lastly, I also used sponsorship of resolutions on the arms sales. This metric was available in every case except in the Senate in 1978, where there was only a single sponsor of all the resolutions. I shall now briefly summarize the cases and the tests I performed using them.

In the 1975 case, I tallied the number of speeches by each member of either house relative to the sale, using this as a metric for support or opposition thereto, and plotted that against his respective tenure in office, both in total and after the sale, using these as indices for political outcomes. I used regression analysis in all four of these instances to determine if there were any significant relationships between the independent and dependent variables. Later on, I repeated these tests for the 1978 and 1981 cases, and looking at all three cases together, for a total of sixteen such tests.

Because, as we shall see, relatively few members spoke on either side of the earlier sales, some of these twelve tests are rather weak, although by the 1981 case, we see a large percentage of both houses speaking, enough to be considered significant. Nevertheless, some might suggest that these tests were not worth doing, or, having done them, the results are not worth presenting. I would respond to this by pointing out that it
was impossible to know what the results would be before gathering all the data in the first place, and that, having gathered that data, there seemed no compelling reason not to present them. Granted, they are not the most powerful pieces of evidence. But let us consider one possible outcome of these tests, although, granted, not, as will be seen, the one that actually occurs. Suppose that all of these regression analyses of speech sums were to produce clearly significant positive trends, that is, that they all tended to confirm the lobby hypothesis.

Would that really not be worth knowing? Even if no one such test were to be particularly powerful by itself, if they all tended to confirm the lobby hypothesis, would that not be evidence of at least moderate strength in favor of that theory? That being the case, is it not worth knowing whether or not that is what we find? To put it another way, just because a single piece of evidence is not very strong, or even if it is particularly weak, it does not follow that it is of no value whatsoever. This is especially the case if that piece of evidence is considered as just one factor in a whole collection of evidence.

In the event, as I have already hinted, that is not what we find. In fact, for many of these regressions, the slope is flat, or even downward, whereas the lobby hypothesis would have predicted an upward trend. That being said, there were still some which showed an upward trend, especially when looking at time after the sales, and especially when looking at the Senate. More specifically, we see notable upward trends when looking at the House time after in 1975, the Senate, both total and after, in 1978, both House after and Senate after in 1981, and the Senate, both total and after, when looking at all three sales together. All the others either trended downward or were basically flat. While individually, these tests are not very strong, they do provide what might be
considered some straws in the wind. In general, though, these proverbial straws seem to be blown in different directions, or to just fall to the ground.

In treating each arms sale in turn, I also looked at resolutions sponsored on the sales. In the House in 1975, there were multiple resolutions, including one that I coded as being in favor of the sale, so I used regression once again, even though, granted, the relatively small sample size does not make for the strongest test. Again, though, this produced differing results depending on whether one looked at total tenure, in which case the slope was downward, tending to disconfirm the hypothesis, or just tenure after the sale, in which case the slope was upward, tending to confirm it. There was only one resolution in the Senate against the 1975 sale, so I treated resolution sponsorship as a binary variable and thus used a difference-of-means test on both total tenure in office and tenure after the sale. I was also looked at the probability of each Senator’s losing his seat in an election challenge as a function of resolution sponsorship using a goodness-of-fit test. All of these tests, as will be seen, tended to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, although only one, the regression of total tenure on resolution sponsorship for the House, produced a result directly opposite to that predicted by the lobby hypothesis.

I repeated these tests for the House in the 1978 and 1981 cases, and when looking at all three cases together. In addition, because it was possible to treat resolution sponsorship as a binary variable, I also conducted difference-of-means tests on the House data, again using tenure in office, both in total and after the sale, as the dependent variable. In addition, I also looked at the proportion of resolutions sponsors in the House in 1978, 1981, and all three together who either lost their seats in election challenges or later attained a higher political office, whether a Senate seat or a Governorship. I used
goodness-of-fit tests to determine if there was any significant difference as a result of
resolution sponsorship for any of these outcomes. Again, all of these tests yielded results
which tended to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis.

For the Senate, in the 1981 case I likewise used difference-of-means tests to
analyze whether resolution sponsorship had any effect on tenure, whether in total or
before the sale, and a goodness-of-fit test on whether it had any effect on a Senator’s
chances of losing his seat in an election challenge. Because there was only a single
sponsor in the Senate for 1978, meaningful statistical analysis was impossible in that
case, and because every Senator who sponsored the resolution of disapproval in 1975 was
out of office by 1981, there was no real point in looking at all three together. Again,
though, these tests all tended to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, meaning that all the
tests based on resolution sponsorship tended to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis.

Most importantly, when looking at the Senate in 1978, and then when looking at
both the House and the Senate in 1981, I looked first at the vote totals. I subsequently
looked at the results for the Senators who voted in both 1978 and 1981. I conducted
much the same kind of tests I did when looking at resolution sponsorship. In all cases, I
used goodness-of-fit tests to determine whether how one voted had any significant effect
on one’s probability of losing one’s seat to an election challenger. Also, for the House in
1981, I also used goodness-of-fit tests to determine if how a Representative voted had
any significant effect on his chances of later becoming a Senator or Governor. Also, in
all cases I used difference-of-means tests to determine if how one voted had any
significant effect on the length of one’s tenure in office, both in total and after the sale or
sales in question. Almost all of these tests yielded results that tended to disconfirm the
lobby hypothesis, with the exception of the difference-of-means tests for tenure in the Senate in the 1981 case; those two tests yielded positive results for the lobby hypothesis.

After testing each of these predictions in greater detail, I shall discuss how strong is the evidence provided by each test, but I shall first summarize that discussion here. The tests based on the first two predictions are, in my view, very strong, perhaps almost decisive on their own. To wit, no lobby can function without resources, and the fact that the Israel lobby had almost nothing in the way of resources at the time when American aid to Israel began, and, indeed, peaked, seems to me to be very strong evidence. Also, the fact that American aid to Israel began to decline when the resources of the lobby had become much greater is likewise a strong piece of evidence. By contrast, I think that speech evidence provides only weak evidence, for the reasons I have already said: all it really shows is that many people believe that the Israel lobby is powerful, not that it actually is. As for the tests based on the fourth prediction, I consider the tests based on the actual votes to be the strongest pieces of evidence, because they involve the largest sample sizes and involve the factor that the lobby would presumably care most about. The tests based on resolution sponsorship, by contrast, are only of middling strength, although some, the ones that involve the largest sample sizes, are definitely better than others. The tests based on the resolution in the Senate in 1981, which was sponsored by half the Senators, after all, is particularly strong. Lastly, the evidence based on the speech sums is rather weak, as I have already indicated, but it is, I believe, still worth considering.

I shall now turn to testing each of these predictions in greater detail. After that, however, I shall summarize the results again, and offer a more extended analysis of
which of the tests I have performed provide strong evidence, and which provide only weak evidence. I shall then discuss some of the counter-arguments or objections one might expect in response to these tests and their results.

Testing the Lobby Hypothesis

To test the first prediction, it is necessary, having already examined the record of American aid to Israel, to compare it to the record of the resources of the Israel lobby. What we find is that AIPAC’s budget in 1974 was less than $20,000, which was actually down from $50,000 in 1954.23 By 1980, AIPAC’s annual operating budget had swelled all the way to $1.4 million.24 In 1986, the budget had increased to $6 million.25 By 1993, AIPAC’s budget had reached $14 million.26 It was $16 million as of 1999.27 It then declined to $12 million by 2002.28 It then shot up to $40 million by 2004.29 It then rose to $60 million as of 2005.30 These budget increases over the course of the eighties were paralleled, and indeed, caused, by an increase in membership: in 1980 AIPAC had nine thousand members, and fifty-five thousand by 1986.31 Interestingly, the radical increases of the early-to-mid aughts were accompanied by only a modest increase in membership, to sixty-thousand as of 2005.32 Unfortunately, data is not available for AIPAC’s budget for every year of the relevant period. Still, certain trends are clear: AIPAC only became a serious force in the eighties.

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23 Tivnan, Lobby, pp. 39, 82
24 Melman and Raviv, Friends, pp. 307-308
26 Melman and Raviv, Friends, pp. 307-308, endnote p. 501
27 “Poll Shows Power of AIPAC Drops Slightly,” J. the Jewish news weekly of Northern California, 12/17/99-12/23/99
31 Shipler, “Middle East Policy,” Times, 7/6/1987
Indeed, AIPAC was at the nadir of its resources just as American aid to Israel was taking off. It is true that AIPAC’s resources increased between 1974 and 1980, but even by 1980 its budget was quite small, especially compared to the order of magnitude increases that occurred between 1980 and 1993, to say nothing of the radical increases since 2002.

Indeed, if we were to plot AIPAC’s budget over time on the same graph as American aid to Israel for those same years, this would be clearly illustrated. It should be noted parenthetically, or nearly so, that, because U.S. aid to Israel is, depending on the year in question, two or three orders of magnitude larger than AIPAC’s budget, I have expressed the former in hundreds of thousands and the latter in thousands of dollars.
This graph shows pretty clearly, then that to the extent to which there is any correlation between these two variables, it is negative. Specifically, the statistical correlation between the two is -0.36, approximately. This is not a very strong inverse correlation, but it should be noted that a correlation with an absolute value of around 0.4 is considered moderate, so it would probably be reasonable to call this a modest negative correlation.33 One might object at this point and claim that the year 1974 on this graph is clearly an outlier, and that the correlation might be better if that year were excluded. This is a debatable argument, since it was hardly some random accident that aid to Israel was very high in the seventies. But even without 1974, the correlation is still -0.14; granted, a correlation with an absolute value of less than 0.2 is generally considered insignificant. Even so, the lobby hypothesis clearly predicts a significant positive correlation between AIPAC’s budget and aid to Israel, but the actual correlation is negative. It is not unfair,

33 Judgments about what constitutes significant correlation are based on a conversation with Prof. Stephen Ansolabehere.
then, to say that the domestic-lobby hypothesis flunks this first test, the more strongly when one looks at all the available data.

Of course, as AIPAC is constantly reminding people, it is not itself a political action committee, or PAC, and does not give contributions to political candidates. There are, of course, pro-Israel PACs that do, and for these, data from each election cycle from 1976 to 1996 are available.34

These data make possible another test of the first prediction, and a test of the second prediction. The first prediction would lead us to expect that, since aid to Israel began and peaked in the seventies, then the resources of pro-Israel PACs ought also to have been very great in the seventies. What we find, however, is that pro-Israel PACs could not have been anything but a negligible force in American politics throughout the seventies. Indeed, we can again illustrate this by plotting the funds PAC funds on the same graph as aid to Israel. Again, because aid to Israel is orders of magnitude higher than PAC funds, the former will be expressed in millions of dollars, the latter in thousands. Also, because

34 Curtiss, Stealth PACs, p. 244, chart 12. It should be noted that the values for 1976 and for total campaign expenditures in 1978 are not zero, but are low enough to appear to be zero on the scale of this chart. These data were adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) data available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.
we only have data on PAC funds for election years, we shall use averages of the corresponding and following year for aid to Israel.

What we can see from this graph is that the correlation between the campaign expenditures of pro-Israel PACs and aid to Israel was about -0.37, a value strikingly, if probably coincidentally, similar to the correlation between AIPAC's budget and aid levels. Again, this value for $r$ is indicative of a modest inverse correlation. If we turn now to the funds collected by the PACs, this variable has an even lower correlation with aid to Israel, approximately -0.49, which value lies almost directly between those considered moderate and good levels of correlation. One might object that the 1992-1993 period is an outlier for funds collected, and it is true that if we exclude that datum, the $r$-value rises to -0.44, which is nonetheless still indicative of a moderate inverse correlation. What is important, however, is that the lobby hypothesis predicts at least
reasonably good positive correlation between the funds of the pro-Israel PACs and aid to Israel. This test, or these two tests, if one prefers, tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis.

With reference to the second prediction, that changes in aid ought to be preceded by corresponding changes in the resources of pro-Israel PACs, we should have expected to see the PACs’ budgets and expenditures begin to take off in the late sixties or early seventies, but obviously this was not the case; in this regard, this test overlaps with the previous one. We should also expect, however, that the PACs’ resources would have begun to decline in or shortly before 1986, since that is when aid to Israel began its steady decline. Instead, however, we find that the PACs’ resources went up again after 1986, peaked in 1988, and only began to decline starting in the 1990 election cycle. The resources of AIPAC, on the other hand, declined only slightly in the late nineties, before rising to new heights in the mid-aughts. That is, the decline, if any, in the resources of the lobby appears to have begun three or four years after the decline in aid. Additionally, there do not appear to have been any spikes in the resources of the lobby prior to the spikes in aid that occurred in 1985-'86 or in 1991, while there were obviously no spikes in the PACs’ resources in the seventies. There was a spike in the funds collected by pro-Israel PACs in the 1992 election cycle, although this does not appear to have been reflected in any increase in campaign expenditures, but in any event, this spike happened just after the spike in aid that occurred in 1991, whereas we would have expected it to occur just before. It therefore appears that this second prediction flunks pretty severely.

Finally, with respect to the third prediction, we do find substantial speech evidence in favor of the domestic-lobby hypothesis. Obviously, there is the testimony,
already mentioned, of Paul Findley, himself a former member of Congress. Additionally, the aforementioned *Fortune* magazine “Power 25” surveys involved mailing surveys to “every member of Congress, senior Capitol Hill staffers, senior White House aides, professional lobbyists, and top-ranking officers of the largest lobbying groups in Washington. In all, 397 surveys—a respectable 13.4%—were completed and returned.”\(^{35}\) Again, the 1997 version of this survey placed AIPAC as the second-most powerful lobby in Washington, while the 2001 version of the survey placed it fourth.\(^{36}\) The *National Journal* also ranked AIPAC as the second strongest lobby in Washington.\(^{37}\) Lastly, AIPAC itself all but boasts of its importance in securing aid to Israel.

There may, however, be reasons to doubt this speech evidence.\(^{38}\) After all, if Congressmen would vote for aid to Israel for some other reason, they might nonetheless want the Israel lobby to believe that its campaign contributions are the reason, in order to ensure a steady supply of those contributions, there being nothing quite like getting paid for what you would do for free. Opponents of American aid to Israel also have incentives to claim that such aid is motivated by the Israel lobby, because it is then easier to argue that aid is not in America’s national interest. Also, losing a debate because the other side is better funded is less embarrassing than losing because you are wrong, the humiliation of the vanquished being inversely proportional to the power of the victor. One might add that a Congressman who has lost his seat due to the opposition of the Israel lobby also has a powerful reason to believe in the importance of the Israel lobby: since everyone

\(^{35}\) “Methodology: How the Washington Power 25 Was Assembled,” available at http://www.fortune.com/fortune/subs/article/0,15114,369001,00.html, although one must be a subscriber to *Fortune* to have full access.


\(^{37}\) *National Journal*, March 2005

\(^{38}\) Organski, *Bargain*, pp. 27-31; the arguments in this paragraph are paraphrased thence.
wants to believe in his own importance, a Congressman who has lost his seat must conclude that his defeat would be a decisive event, and that those responsible for his defeat must therefore wield a powerful influence on actual policy.

Also, there are reasons not to credit AIPAC’s own claims about its own importance: obviously, people who already believe in the lobby’s importance are more likely to go to work for it in the first place, and once working there, they will want to believe that there work is important, and they will also have an institutional-financial incentive to proclaim the importance of their work, in order to persuade potential donors that they should give.

On the other hand, it might be that this speech evidence is actually underreporting the importance of the Israel lobby in causing aid to Israel. One might argue that many politicians would fear being accused of anti-Jewish bigotry were they to claim that the Israel lobby were the cause of aid to Israel, and would therefore be reluctant to say so if that were the case. Conversely, members of AIPAC might also be reluctant to claim too much importance for their work, for fear of provoking anti-Jewish bigotry. If this were the case, then one might conclude that the various sources of speech evidence in favor of the domestic-lobby hypothesis are actually understating the lobby’s importance.

Given, however, the degree to which AIPAC does proclaim its own importance, one would assume that Congressmen and their aides would feel comfortable repeating the same sentiments, as clearly many do. At the same time, if AIPAC is itself understating its own importance, it is difficult to see how: AIPAC’s own website quotes a number of prominent American and Israeli politicians on the importance of AIPAC, as well as referring to AIPAC’s high ranking in Fortune’s “Power 25” survey, and quoting the New
York Times calling AIPAC “the most important organization affecting America’s relationship with Israel.”

Again, though, there are reasons to be skeptical of all these surveys, whether in Fortune or the National Journal, that purport to show the power of AIPAC. Consider first the fact that any of these surveys are not really measuring the power of AIPAC or the Israel lobby more generally, but the perception of the power of the lobby. But we already know that the lobby is widely perceived to be powerful. Does it necessarily follow that it is really powerful?

Secondly, the methodology, to the extent that either of these magazines publicized their methodologies, may be questionable. Consider once again that in the Fortune survey, at least the 2001 version, only 13.4% of the survey forms were returned. That may indeed be a “respectable” proportion, but the real issue is that it is clear that participation in this survey was voluntary. Of course, there is a major flaw with all voluntary surveys: those who bother to participate tend to be those with strong feelings on the issue, and often strong negative feelings, and this can easily throw off the results. As such, voluntary surveys are generally considered unscientific in the statistics field.

Tests Based on Arms Sales

There are other avenues by which it is possible to test the lobby hypothesis, which brings us to our fourth prediction, or rather group of predictions. One can examine votes in Congress that are supposed to have been important to the lobby, and I have chosen to examine three such votes in particular: the 1981 AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia, the 1978 F-15 sale to that same country, and the 1975 I-HAWK sale to Jordan. Each of these

39 http://www.aipac.org/documents/whoweare.html
incidents produced controversy in Congress and among the public, and the two Saudi deals were voted upon, although only the AWACS sale was voted upon in both Houses. This allows several tests to be performed.

First, one can simply ask whether the sales went through. The lobby hypothesis predicts, at least on a simple level, that the Israel lobby ought to be able to get its way on issues that it considers important. If so, it ought to be able to pressure Congress into blocking arms sales to Arab states that would be harmful to Israeli interests. If it were unable to do so, that would tend to call the strength of the lobby into question.

This test, however, is highly imperfect, for reasons I shall only summarize now but expand upon later. First, there is the very real possibility of selection biases, which might operate in several ways. The lobby might choose to intervene only in issues where it believes its chances of success are reasonably good; if so, then if we see a relatively high success rate for the lobby’s efforts, that might only show that the lobby is good at picking its battles. Conversely, it is possible that the Presidential administration in office at any given time might refrain from pushing policies it expects the Israel lobby to successfully block in Congress; if so, then if we see a relatively low rate of success for the lobby, that might only show that the lobby is stopping most of the measures it opposes before they ever get off the ground.

Fortunately, there are some ways around these problems. After all, if both effects do operate, then they ought to cancel each other out. If the administration only pushes for those policies it thinks the lobby will not oppose, or at least not successfully, and if the lobby only opposes those policies it thinks it can stop, and if both are able to make such calculations reasonably accurately, then we should expect to see mixed results in all the
controversies wherein the Israel lobby fought the White House, such as with the arms sales listed above. So if we were to find that one side consistently prevailed, then that would suggest that one of those three conditions is absent. This raises the question of what would qualify as mixed results in the three cases we are considering here. Since we are looking at only three cases, if both sides win at least one, that would probably qualify. We should also expect the vote tallies to be close in each case.

On the other hand, were one side to consistently prevail, we might expect to see the number of cases of this kind decrease in number, as the other side would presumably eventually learn the futility of contesting the issue. If the Israel lobby were to consistently succeed in blocking arms sales to Arab states, we should expect the Arab states to stop turning to the U.S. for weapons. Conversely, if the Israel lobby were to consistently fail at blocking arms sales, they would probably eventually give up.

There is, however, an obvious objection to using these cases as tests, at least of the kind of have heretofore outlined: they all occurred between the mid-seventies and the very early eighties. Since we have already seen that the Israel lobby had very few resources until the eighties, it would appear that I have deliberately stacked the deck against the lobby hypothesis. This is not, however, the case. First of all, it should be noted that many proponents of the lobby hypothesis use these cases, especially the AWACS sale, as evidence for the lobby hypothesis.

More importantly, I intend to get around this problem by conducting other tests using data gleaned from these cases. In particular, I intend to ask what happened to members of Congress depending on the positions they took on these arms sales. After all, proponents of the lobby hypothesis hold that the lobby works primarily by working to
keep in office or help to higher office those politicians who support its cause, and to remove from office those who oppose it. If the lobby hypothesis is true, we should expect to see those Representatives and Senators who supported the lobby benefiting politically as a result, while those who opposed it should suffer. In that respect, these cases are ideal, because they generated a great deal of attention and members of Congress went on the record, both in speeches and in their votes, with issues of great importance to the lobby, only a few years before the lobby gained great resources. It would have been simple, then, for the lobby to reward or punish its friends and its foes over the course of the succeeding years and decades, when the lobby would have had the resources to do so.

So we should expect to see that members of Congress who voted for, say, the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia in 1981, would have been more likely to lose their seats to challengers, whether in primaries or in general elections. Even those who did not lose their seats to challengers should have found themselves under greater pressure electoral pressure, and might therefore have been expected to retire earlier. Combined with those who did lose their seats, this should cause members of Congress who opposed the lobby to serve for shorter periods of time, on average. It is also worth considering that many politicians have greater ambitions than holding their current offices; it is particularly relevant for our purposes that many Representatives wish to become Senators. Of course, the lobby would have an interest in thwarting the ambitions of its opponents and assisting those of its allies. As a result, we should expect to see that Representatives who voted the lobby's way or otherwise supported its positions were more likely to become Senators, or otherwise receive political promotions, than those who opposed it.
There are of course multiple ways of measuring a politician's position on a given cause or measure. The most straightforward, of course, is the way in which that politician votes. Not every measure comes up for a vote, however, and not necessarily in both houses. Also, politicians can indicate their position in other ways. There is, for example, a difference between a Senator who votes a certain way on a certain bill or resolution but never speaks on the issue and one who votes the same way after delivering several addresses on the floor advocating that position. For this reason, we can also use speeches delivered in Congress as an index for support for or opposition to the lobby's goals. Another such index might be whether a given member co-sponsored a resolution. With arms sales, Congress need only offer its tacit approval, meaning that for the sale to be blocked, both houses must vote in favor of resolutions of disapproval. Whether a member co-sponsors one or several such resolutions, in addition to how that member votes on them, can also be a useful measure. As a result, it is possible to perform several different tests of several different kinds using these cases.

_The I-HAWK Debate in the House_

Getting down to cases then, we might as well begin with the 1975 sales of I-HAWK anti-aircraft missiles to Jordan. It might first be worth reviewing some of the background to this deal. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Israelis were at a disadvantage fighting the Syrians and the Egyptians because they possessed very effective anti-aircraft weapons which kept the Israeli Air Force at bay. Nonetheless, the Israelis were able to turn the tide on the Golan front by removing their last reserve division from the frontier with Jordan and sending it north to envelop the Syrian southern flank. When the Israeli general staff was considering this move, however, there was
some fear that this would leave the West Bank and central Israel vulnerable to a
Jordanian invasion. One of the major reasons the Israeli commanders ultimately decided
to disregard this worry was that the Jordanians did not possess a modern air-defense
system of the kind the Soviets had provided the Syrians and Egyptians, which meant that
in the event of a Jordanian crossing of the river, the IAF would have free rein to bomb
and strafe the Jordanian army at will. As a result, the Jordanians contributed to the Arab
war effort only by sending troops to the Golan front, but after the war, the Jordanians
went shopping in the U.S. for an equivalent to the Soviet SAMs.

Unsurprisingly, neither Israelis nor their partisans in the United States were
delighted at the prospects of Jordan acquiring such weapons, and so in 1975, the sale
came up for much debate in Congress. In the Senate, Clifford Case, later joined by Jacob
Javits, Philip Hart, Birch Bayh, Richard Stone, Walter Mondale, and Joseph Montoya as
cosponsors, introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 50, objecting to the sale, while in
the House, which operates under different rules, Jonathan Bingham introduced several
different resolutions, most with a whole host of cosponsors, against the sale. In the end,
however, Senator Case withdrew his opposition to the sale before the issue ever came up
for a vote, which ended any real chance of Resolution 50 winning in the Senate. Since
both houses were required to block the sale, at that point the opposition collapsed in the
House of Representatives, without any vote their either.

Because there was no vote taken in either house, I have chosen to use, first, the
speeches made by members of Congress as a proxy for their positions on the issue. I
used the index of the Congressional Record, checking under the headings of “Jordan,”
“Arab states,” “arms sales,” and “Middle East,” to comb through the record for every
speech, whether made on the floor or inserted later, on the subject of the I-HAWK sale to Jordan. Without undertaking the plainly Herculean task of reading every page in the record for 1975, it is of course impossible to be absolutely certain that I have found every last remark on the subject. This is due to the nature of the index: for example, some remarks were made as part of a long exchange between or among several speakers, going on for several pages in the Record, but the index might only reference a single page in the middle of the exchange. Nonetheless, I believe I have found every remark or speech made in Congress that year or inserted into the Record.

By my count, then, twenty-three separate remarks were made on the floor of the House on this issue in 1975, with another ten remarks inserted into the Record afterwards. Those remarks were made or inserted by fourteen separate Representatives. While these numbers are by no means very large, especially when compared to the numbers who became active in the later debates we shall consider, it is still worth looking at them. I have coded each speech, whether actually made on the floor or inserted later, as being in favor of the sale, against the sale, or neutral on the issue. In the vast majority of cases, coding was fairly straightforward, since the speaker would say explicitly, frequently at the very beginning of his remarks, what side of the issue he was speaking. In any event, by my reckoning, there were sixteen remarks made against the sale, with another nine inserted. Only three remarks were made for the sale, with none inserted; there were also four remarks, plus a fifth that was inserted, that I coded as neutral, either because they stated no clear position and could be interpreted either way, or were only requests for more information about the sale, or so forth. While it is abundantly clear that the overwhelming majority of speeches, and speakers, were against the sale, it should be
noted that nine of the speeches made against the sale on the floor were from only two Congressmen: Jonathan Bingham and Benjamin Rosenthal.

Did their vociferous objections to the I-HAWK sale help Bingham and Rosenthal politically? What about the other Congressmen who spoke out against the sale? Conversely, were Clement Zablocki, Robert Kastenmeier, and Paul Findley harmed by their speeches against the sale, as the latter certainly claims to have been? It should be noted parenthetically that Zablocki and Kastenmeier each made speeches, respectively, calling for blocking arms sales and reducing aid to Israel, but I have coded these as being for the I-HAWK sale, since they were both reacting to the protest against that sale, and it is reasonable to assume that the Israel lobby would have resisted such proposals.

I have chosen to use regression analysis as a way to address these questions. I have tallied the speeches made by each Congressman, counting each speech for the resolution of disapproval, that is, against the sale, as one, each speech against the resolution, or for the sale, as negative one, and each neutral speech as zero, and plotted those totals against the total amount of time each served in Congress, and against the amount of time each served after the sale. Because of the small number of speeches made, and since the overwhelming majority of Congressmen voiced no opinion about the sale, I have decided to count speeches made on the floor together with those inserted later; most importantly, though, most if not all of the latter were inserted because the Congressmen inserting them wished to make remarks on the floor but were unable to do so owing to insufficient time, and there is no reason to suppose that the Israel lobby
would count those any differently.

This graph plots the number of speeches for or against the arms sale made by each Congressman versus the total number of years that Congressman served in the House. The line represents the linear regression of the latter variable on the former. It might be worth explaining in further detail what this all means. To take an example, the right-most point on the graph represents Congressman Jonathan Bingham of New York. The foremost opponent of the I-HAWK sale in the House, he made six speeches against the sale on the floor and inserted a seventh into the Record. He joined Congress in 1965 and left eighteen years later in 1983. The next right-most point represents Benjamin Rosenthal, also of New York, who made three speeches on the floor against the sale, another two which took no clear position, and inserted two more against the sale into the Record, for a total of five against the sale. He entered the House in 1962 and served for approximately twenty-one years until his death in 1983. The left-most point represents Paul Findley of Illinois, who made two speeches in favor of the sale; he joined the House in 1961 and served until 1983, having been defeated in his reelection bid in 1982, for a total of approximately twenty-two years.
Several things are immediately apparent even from a casual perusal of these data. First, the vast majority of Congressmen did not speak out on this issue at all. Secondly, several more Representatives spoke against the arms sale than spoke in its favor. Thirdly, the slope of the regression line is very close to zero; in fact, it is approximately -0.046, which is to say it is nearly flat. It should be noted, however, that while nearly flat, it is slightly negative.

It might be worth digressing momentarily to explain what a regression line is. Suppose for example that one wished to study the relative efficacy of different dosages of a drug in treating a given disease. One might well graph each patient’s total recovery time as a function of the dosage that patient received. Of course, there will always be a certain amount of randomness in each patient’s recovery time. Regression analysis is a way of determining whether the treatment has had any significant observable effect on the time. To find the regression line, one simply finds that line such for which the sum of the squares of the deviations of each point on the graph from that line is smaller than for any other possible line.

In this case, one can think of the number of speeches each Representative made for or against the I-HAWKs sale as the treatment, and the time served as the outcome. Just as one might wish, in the above medical example, to test the hypothesis that higher doses of the treatment lead to shorter recovery times, here we wish to test whether speaking out in favor of the sale led to serving for less time in Congress, and speaking out against the sale led to serving for more time. After all, the lobby hypothesis holds that the lobby gets its way by helping the political careers of those who support its agenda and damaging the careers of those who oppose it. Logically, then, if the lobby is effective,
we should expect that those who opposed its agenda should have served for less time than those who supported its agenda, as the lobby worked to get rid of the former and keep the latter. If that were the case, we should then expect the trend-line to go upward.

It should also be noted that what constitutes a high or low slope for a regression line depends greatly on the data. Because the slope of any line is its vertical distance, or rise, over its horizontal distance, or run, the numerical value for its slope. For example, if we had measured time served in days, rather than in years, the value of the rise would be measured in the thousands, and as such be several orders of magnitude higher than the run. As a result, the slope of the regression line would have a much higher absolute value than is the case when time is measured in years, even though the real correlation between speech sums and time would not have changed. This will become important later on, when we have to evaluate what constitutes a high or low slope.

The fact that it is basically flat, then, would in this case tend to disconfirm the hypothesis. On which side, if either, one spoke in the House does not seem in this case to have affected how long one served. This would in turn suggest that the lobby was ineffective in removing those who opposed it and in keeping those who supported it. This is especially true since the trend is actually negative, however slightly. That would suggest that, if anything, one was better off speaking for the I-HAWKs sale than against it, although it is more likely that the slight downward trend was simply random chance at work, and that how one spoke on the issue had no real effect. But while this does tend to weaken the lobby hypothesis, there are reasons to think that this is not a very strong disconfirmation. For example, we have already seen that one major opponent of the sale, Benjamin Rosenthal, only left the House when he left this mortal coil, a variable over
which no lobby likely wields much influence. Paul Findley, the House’s most vociferous proponent of the sale, by contrast, left the House because he lost a reelection bid.

Another reason one might leave the lower chamber is that one might win election to the upper chamber or some other higher office. To have one’s tenure cut short by promotion is clearly a different matter than having it cut short by the loss of an election. If we were to find that those who sided with the lobby were more likely to leave the House by the latter means than the former, and vice versa, that would suggest the strength of the lobby and not its weakness. In this particular case the number of Congressmen who spoke is too small for significant or meaningful statistical analysis, although it will be otherwise with the later cases, but it is still worth bearing this issue in mind. Still, the fact that how one spoke had no apparent effect on how long one served in total does tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, even if only weakly.

One might also question this evidence, however, when looking at how long Representatives served after the I-HAWKs sale than how long they served in total:

![Chart 8: Speech Sums vs. Time After Sale](image)

This graph plots the speech sums for each Representative, which are of course the same as before, versus the time they served in the House after 1975. The reasoning here, simply put, is that if the Israel lobby were to attempt to harm those who spoke in favor of
the sale or help those who spoke against it, it could only do so after those speeches were made. The straight line is again, a linear regression or trend line. The slope of the trend line in this case is approximately 0.704, which, while perhaps not extraordinarily high, certainly demonstrates a significant upward trend. In other words, the treatment, that is, speaking against the I-HAWK sale, seems to have led to serving longer in the House thereafter. It should be remembered, however, that because we are measuring time in years, the scale of the y-axis, ranging as it does from zero to thirty-five, is an order of magnitude larger than the scale of the x-axis, which never goes above seven. That means that any slope below one is not very high.

There are nonetheless reasons to question this straightforward interpretation of the data. The first is apparent simply from looking at the data points: the two representing Rosenthal and Bingham are no higher on the y-axis than the two representing Findley and Zablocki, since all four of them left the House in 1983. The primary reason there is a positive trend to the regression line, then, is that Fortney Stark, represented by the higher of the points at two on the x-axis is still serving in the House today, with his current term not scheduled to end until January 3, 2011. This obviously makes him something of an outlier, since, whenever he does finally leave the House, he will have served longer in total than anyone else who spoke on the I-HAWK sale on either side, and much longer since the sale. If one were to remove this outlier from the data and then recalculate the regression line, one would find its slope is much reduced, to approximately 0.197, which, although still a positive value, suggests a significantly weaker effect.

Another issue is that, if those who spoke against the sale lasted no longer on average in total in the House, but did last longer after the sale, it implies that those who
spoke for the sale were around longer beforehand. That in turn indicates that long-
serving Congressmen were more likely, on balance, to oppose what the Israel lobby
wanted, while those who had been around only a little while were more likely to support
the lobby’s positions. There are several possible reasons for this, some of which might
militate in favor of the lobby hypothesis, others against it. One possibility is that those
who have been around longer feel more secure in their seats, and thus feel they can
oppose the wishes of an allegedly powerful lobby with less risk, an interpretation which
would support the lobby hypothesis. A caveat to that is that if this interpretation is
correct, those Congressmen would have been wrong to think that, which in turn suggests
a converse interpretation that militates against the lobby hypothesis.

It might be that political veterans would have had a better understanding of the
risks of opposing the Israel lobby, and concluded that opposing the Israel lobby was safe.
In this interpretation, those who spoke for the sale left the House sooner simply because,
on balance, the longer one has been in office, the sooner one is likely to leave office.
After all, in 1975, Paul Findley and Robert Kastenmeier had each already served for
sixteen years, and Clement Zablocki for twenty-six. There may be a simpler and more
parsimonious explanation for why Zablocki and Findley only served for another eight
years and Kastenmeier for another sixteen.

Another possibility is that those who had joined the House earlier had formed
their opinions about foreign policy at a time when the prevailing thinking about what
America’s posture toward the Middle East ought to be was less favorable toward Israeli
interests, and they had simply retained those beliefs which they had already formed.
Perhaps Congressmen who entered the House later did so after a shift had occurred in the prevailing opinion about America’s Middle East policy.

These interpretations are of course all highly speculative, and the research that might demonstrate which one was most accurate lies beyond the scope of this essay. What is important to note is that the fact that there is no visible trend with regard to total time may cast some doubt on the straightforward interpretation of the fact that there is a visible upward trend with regard to time after the sale. This latter fact might not indicate that the Israel lobby successfully shortened the tenures of the sale’s supporters or lengthened those of its opponents. This will prove important later on, since we shall see this variance between total time and time after repeated in the subsequent cases.

Nevertheless, this second test does tend to confirm the lobby hypothesis, but without too much force.

There is another way of measuring a Congressman’s support for the Israel lobby’s agenda with respect to the I-HAWKs sale: co-sponsorship of resolutions of disapproval of the sale. The premise behind this is simple: in order to block the sale, both houses of Congress had to approve resolutions of disapproval of the sale. While no such resolution ever came up for a vote in either chamber, several were proposed in the House, and many had several co-sponsors. Co-sponsoring a resolution would seem to be a clear statement of intent to vote for that resolution, and perhaps even to encourage others to do so. One might even reasonably infer that co-sponsoring multiple such resolutions would indicate an even stronger statement of intent. We can therefore expect that the Israel lobby would try to aid the political careers of those who co-sponsored such resolutions; as such, the
lobby hypothesis would seem to predict that those who sponsored such resolutions should serve longer in the House than those who did not.

In the event, nine separate resolutions of disapproval were sponsored in the House: House Concurrent Resolution (H. Con. Res.) 337, H. Con. Res. 343, H. Con. Res. 346, H. Con. Res. 350, H. Con. Res. 351, H. Con. Res. 352, H. Con. Res. 356, H. Con. Res. 359, and H. Con. Res. 382. There was also House Resolution (H. Res.) 552, which was a request for more information regarding the sale; although the sponsor of that resolution was Benjamin Rosenthal, who, as we have already seen, was one of the leaders of the opposition to the sale, I have not counted that resolution as being against the sale, since it was technically only a request for information. Lastly, there was H. Con. Res. 517, a resolution of disapproval of an F-15 sale to Israel, sponsored by Clement Zablocki. Since such a resolution seems pretty clearly to have been something that the Israel lobby would have opposed, and since Zablocki introduced the resolution in the context of the debate about the I-HAWK sale as a kind of dialectical rebuttal to the arguments against the sale to Jordan, I have counted that as a resolution for the I-HAWK sale.

I have chosen again to use regression analysis as a way of testing the general prediction that supporting the goals of the Israel lobby should help one’s political career and opposing said goals should harm one’s career. In this case, the treatment will be the number of resolutions each Representative sponsored against the sale, with resolutions for the sale being counted as negatives, such that Zablocki will be at negative one. I am again using tenure in the House, both in total and after the sale, as an index for measuring the effect on one’s political career. The hypothesis would seem to predict that the more resolutions an individual Congressman sponsored, the longer he ought to have served.
Even a cursory glance at the above graph indicates that this prediction was not borne out. In fact, as the downward slope of the trend-line indicates, supporting the lobby’s agenda was, if anything, damaging to one’s political career. Indeed, the regression line has a slope of approximately -0.709, which is, again, not enormous but significant. Moreover, this trend is actually enhanced if one were to remove Zablocki and Bingham, a sponsor of eight of the nine resolutions against the sale. In that case, the slope decreases, that is, becomes even steeper, at approximately -0.964, which indicates that the downward trend we have already observed is not a statistical artifact of Zablocki’s long total tenure or Bingham’s large number of resolutions. While none of this proves that sponsoring resolutions against the I-HAWK sale hurt one political career, it does show that if sponsorship had any effect on the sponsor’s total tenure in the House, that effect was negative, which does tend to weaken the lobby hypothesis.

This evidence is subject to much the same criticisms that might have been raised regarding the speech data. After all, since most Representatives sponsored no resolutions, the total pool of data is small. It is therefore reasonable to question the significance of any trend observed. It might also be the case that those Representatives who felt most politically vulnerable at that time felt the most need to curry the favor of an
at least supposedly powerful lobby. If so, and if those who felt themselves vulnerable were correct in that assessment, then it is perhaps no surprise that they tended to serve for less time. That objection, while valid, is of limited impact, since it implies at the very least that currying the lobby’s favor could not have done that much good for vulnerable Congressmen, at least on balance, since they still served for less time in total, on average.

The strongest objection, however, is that, once again, the trend reverses itself if we only look at time served after the sale:

![Chart 10: Resolutions Sponsored vs. Time in House after Sale](image)

In this case, the slope of the trend-line is approximately 0.81, which is, again, certainly high enough to indicate a significant upward trend. If one were to once again exclude Zablocki and Bingham as outliers, the slope increases to approximately 1.374, a clearly significantly positive result. Again, a fairly straightforward interpretation of these data is that supporting the lobby’s agenda did have a positive effect on one’s tenure in office, but that this could only occur after the sale had taken place, which would tend to confirm the lobby hypothesis.

Again, though, the same caveats apply. After all, if sponsoring resolutions against the sale tended to shorten one’s total time in the House while lengthening one’s time after the sale, that in turn strongly implies that those who supported the lobby’s agenda tended
to be those who had only been in office a short time. Indeed, of the nine Representatives who sponsored two resolutions against the sale, only four had joined the House prior to the 1970's, and two of those, Michael Harrington and Donald Riegle, Jr., joined in 1969 and 1967, respectively. Zablocki, by contrast, had been around since 1949.

It is possible, of course, that the reason sponsoring resolutions against the sale shortened one’s total tenure while lengthening one’s tenure after the sale is that the lobby would only begin working in favor of any Congressman after he had sponsored a resolution. The problem with this interpretation is, again, that, all else being equal, if the Israel lobby were helping certain Congressmen but not others after 1975, but leaving them all alone before 1975, we would expect that resolution-sponsors would also serve more time in total. Since we have plainly observed the opposite trend, it is likewise plain that all else is not equal. This is especially true since, with the exception of Zablocki, no Congressman could be said to have a negative score on this index; the Israel lobby would presumably not attempt to harm Representatives who had simply refrained from sponsoring any resolutions against the sale, unless that Representative had otherwise made clear his opposition to the lobby’s goal. For some, such as Findley and Kastenmeier, that is doubtless the case, but since the vast majority made no speeches nor sponsored any resolutions, it seems likely that most presented themselves as essentially neutral.

While it should not be necessary to reiterate the possible explanations proposed above as to why the results are different when looking at total time and time after the sale, suffice it to say that the evidence from this case is ambiguous overall. When looking at total time in the House, there is either no significant trend, as with regard to
speeches, or a negative trend, as with regard to resolution sponsorship, both of which results tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis. When looking at time after the sale, there is a significant positive trend in both cases, which tends to confirm the hypothesis. Given, however, the relatively small sample sizes, since most Representatives neither spoke nor sponsored any resolutions, none of these results is particularly powerful in any case.

The I-HAWK Debate in the Senate

Dealing with the Senate is more difficult because the sample size for 1975 is so small. The I-HAWK debate did not formally begin in the upper house until July 10th, when John Sparkman of Alabama made the official announcement of the proposed sale.\(^{41}\) The next day, Clifford Case of New Jersey sponsored Senate Concurrent Resolution (S. Con. Res.) 50, objecting to the sale.\(^{42}\) Including those two, only eight Senators made or inserted speeches on the sale, the other six being Glenn Beal of Maryland and William Scott of Virginia, who each made a single speech for the sale, and Alan Cranston of California, Henry Jackson of Washington, and Walter Mondale of Minnesota, each of whom made a single speech against the sale, while Richard Stone of Florida made two.\(^{43}\) In addition, Case made another speech on September 17th in which he announced that, although he was still troubled by the sale, he had been persuaded not to oppose it any longer, and was therefore withdrawing S. Con. Res. 50, which I have coded as being for the sale.\(^{44}\) Granter, this means that Case has a speech sum of zero, which is perhaps odd for the leader of the opposition to the sale in the Senate, but it would be hard to code it

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\(^{41}\) Congression Record for 1975, pp. 22168-22169.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., pp. 22270-22271.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., pp. 23898-23899, 24095, 28180-28184, 28650-28652, 29036-29037, 29072-29073, 29246.

\(^{44}\) Ibid., pp. 29071-29072.
any other way. Finally, Harry Byrd of Virginia made a speech on May 22 calling for continuing arms transfers to Israel.\textsuperscript{45} Even though this occurred before the formal beginning of the debate in the Senate, it was after debate had begun in the House, and we can reasonably infer that this would have pleased the Israel lobby in this context, so I have coded this speech as being against the I-HAWK sale.

Even though this is not a trivial percentage of total Senators by any means, it is a small enough number of speakers in absolute terms that we must question the validity of any conclusions we might draw from these data. Still, we might as well look, beginning with a plot of total tenure in the Senate as a function of speech sums:

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart11.png}
\caption{Total Tenure vs. Speech Sums, 1975}
\end{figure}

There is a clear, if deceptively shallow in appearance in this graph, downward trend to the regression line. Indeed, its slope is -1.15, approximately. This does indicate that, on balance, speaking out against the sale, or on the side of the Israel lobby, was if anything more likely to shorten one’s time in the Senate. Given how far below the trend line are the two points representing Beal and Scott, both of whom served only a single term, it would seem to have been the case that the best option in this case was to say nothing.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p. 16117.
\textsuperscript{46} All data on Senator tenures are taken from the website bioguide.congress.gov.
Given how few Senators spoke, however, it is difficult to say how meaningful these results really are, if at all.

The same is necessarily true when we look at tenure after the sale as a function of speech sums, since of course the independent variable is unchanged:

There is, once again, a downward slope to the regression line, although in this case it is only -0.34, roughly. On the one hand, speaking against the sale, or with the lobby, seems to correlate with having served less time after the sale. On the other hand, that trend is definitely not as pronounced, which might indicate that the lobby was working to lengthen the tenure in office of those who supported its views and shorten the tenures of those opposed, but that this effect only operated after the sale. If so, then said effect must have been very weak, since the overall trend is still downward. Once again, moreover, the best bet would appear to have been saying nothing. Of course, given the small number of Senators who spoke on either side, it is also very possible that none of this means anything, and that this apparent trend is due to random chance.

That problem does not go away, moreover, when one looks at resolution sponsorship. A single resolution, the aforementioned S. Con. Res. 50, was introduced by Case and subsequently cosponsored by Stone and Mondale, as well as by Birch Bayh of
Indiana, Phil Hart of Michigan, Jacob Javits of New York, and Joseph Montoya of New Mexico. They had an average total tenure of approximately 16.14 years, or about two-and-two-thirds terms, as opposed to the average total for their colleagues of about 21.19 years, or a little more than three-and-a-half terms. Now, the mere fact that those who did not sponsor resolutions against the sale served longer, on average, than those who did might seem enough in itself to obviate the need for any complicated statistical tests. After all, the lobby hypothesis would appear to predict fairly clearly that those who do what the Israel lobby wants, in this case co-sponsoring the resolution against the I-HAWK sale, ought to serve for more time, but instead they served for less. It is still worth knowing, however, whether this difference was statistically significant. If so, that is a more powerful disconfirmation of the theory than if the difference could be more easily chalked up to random chance.

In this case, however, because there were no resolutions that could be characterized as being for the sale, and there was only one resolution against the sale one could co-sponsor, our independent variable is for all intents and purposes binary. That is, either a Senator co-sponsored S. Con. Res. 50 or he did not. Therefore, we shall use what is called a difference-of-means test, as opposed to regression analysis.

A difference-of-means test is exactly what it sounds like: it is a way of determining whether the difference in means between two groups with regard to some quantity is statistically significant. Suppose, for example, whether one wanted to know if being vaccinated against measles really did extend one’s life expectancy, and suppose further that one found that those who were vaccinated against measles did live 4.8 years longer, on average, than those who were not so vaccinated. A difference-of-means test,

47 Congression Record for 1975, pp. 22270-22271, 24055, 24618.
also known as a t-test, would determine whether that difference were statistically significant, or if it were more likely simply the result of randomness.

In this case, the variance of the mean, again 21.19 years, for those did not co-sponsor S. Con. Res. 50, was about 135.18, while the variance of the mean, 16.14 years, for those who did, was about 46.48, which values yield a t-statistic of approximately 1.85 with 98 degrees of freedom. That, interestingly enough, would not be enough to reject the null hypothesis at 95% certainty if we were doing a two-tailed test, that is, if we were only interested in whether the two means were significantly different. In this case, however, we are interested in whether the average tenure for those who did not sponsor S. Con. Res. 50 was significantly longer than the mean tenure for those who did, meaning we use a one-tailed test, which means we do reject the null hypothesis at the 95% certainty level. The reason we are using the 95% certainty level is that, generally in the social sciences, 95% is considered the normal threshold for rejecting a null hypothesis.\footnote{Conversation between author and Prof. Stephen Ansolabehere.} We can therefore say with some confidence that those who supported the lobby’s agenda served for less total time in the Senate on average, and that this difference was significant. This does tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, since it is the opposite of what that hypothesis would lead us to expect.

When we turn to look only at time served after the sale, this disconfirmation becomes even more powerful, because the average time served afterwards for the seven Senators who co-sponsored S. Con. Res. 50 was only 3.57 years, approximately, or a little more than half of one term, while the mean for those who did not was about 11.23 years, or almost two terms; the variances for these two means are approximately 101.42 and 4.95, respectively. With such a large difference, it might seem completely
unnecessary to perform a test to determine that difference’s statistical significance, but, in any case, those values yield a t-statistic of roughly 5.72, with, again, 98 degrees of freedom. Not only is that high enough to reject the null hypothesis at the 95% certainty level, it’s actually high enough to reject it at the 99.95% level. Unsurprisingly, then, we can say with great confidence that those who supported the lobby’s agenda served for significantly less time, on average, than those who did not. This is an even more powerful disconfirmation of the lobby hypothesis, since not only is it also the opposite result than what the hypothesis predicts, but it is both larger and after the sale, when the lobby ought to have been working in response to Senators’ behavior in response to the sale.

In addition to looking at tenure in the Senate, we might also look at the proportion of Senators who lost their seats to challengers, whether in primaries or general elections. After all, the lobby hypothesis predicts that one of the primary means by which the Israel lobby would work to strengthen those politicians who support its agenda would be to support them against any would-be challengers, and, inversely, that it would support challengers against politicians who opposed its agenda. If so, then we would expect that Senators who co-sponsored the resolution against the sale should have been less likely to lose their seats to primary or general election challengers than those who did not.

What we find is that of the seven Senators who co-sponsored S. Con. Res. 50, three, Birch, Montoya, and Stone, lost their seats to general election challenges, while another two, Case and Javits, were defeated in the primaries, for a total of five, or about 71% of the seven. By contrast, of the 93 Senators who did not co-sponsor S. Con. Res. 50, only one, Mike Gravel of Alaska, lost his seat to a primary challenge, while another
28 lost general elections, for a total of 29, or approximately 31% of the total 93. Since Senators who co-sponsored the resolution of disapproval were more than twice as likely to lose their seats, that in and of itself might be enough to falsify this prediction, and thereby further disconfirm the lobby hypothesis.

Nevertheless, it is still worth determining whether this difference is statistically significant; either result would tend to disconfirm the hypothesis, but finding that the difference is statistically significant would be a more powerful disconfirmation. We can do this by means of a chi-squared or goodness-of-fit test. The idea behind this is fairly simple: suppose one wished to know whether people with red hair were more likely to have green eyes. If so, then given that there is a certain proportion of the population that has red hair, and a certain proportion of the population that has green eyes, we should expect to find that a higher proportion of the redheads have green eyes than does the total population. Suppose, then, that having sampled a million people, we find that 21,873, or about 2.2%, have red hair, and 20,148, or about 2.0%, have green eyes. Suppose furthermore that 853 of the redheads, or about 3.9%, have green eyes, and that 806 of the green-eyed, or about 4.0%, have red hair.

Now, clearly, 3.9 and 4.0 are both bigger than 2.2 and 2.0, but are they so much bigger that we should conclude that there is a real association between the two features? After all, if one were to flip a coin a thousand times and get nine-hundred heads and only a hundred tails, one would probably assume that the coin was unbalanced somehow. But on the other hand, if one flipped a coin a thousand times and got 501 heads and 499 tails, that assumption would not be reasonable. But what if there are 550 heads and 450 tails? Is that enough to conclude the coin is unfair? The purpose of the chi-squared to test is to
answer that question, but it should be borne in mind that a chi-squared test can only tell us whether we ought to reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between what we observed and what we expected, not by itself which direction that difference lies in.

In this case, of course, we shall not be looking at physical features or coins, but at whether Senators sponsored S. Con. Res. 50 and whether they subsequently lost their seats. Since 34 out of 100 Senators lost their seats, the expected number of those who sponsored the resolution to lose their seats would be 2.38, as opposed to the observed value of five, while the expected value of those who did not lose their seats would be 4.62, as opposed to the observed value of two. Among the 93 who did not sponsor the resolution, we find the expected number of seat losers to be 31.62, as against the actual number of 29, while the expected number of non-losers is 61.38, as against the actual value of 64 non-losers. This yields a chi-squared value of roughly 4.7 with 1 degree of freedom. Since the value which the chi-squared must exceed to be significant at the 95% certainty level is 3.84, we can confidently say that those Senators who sponsored the resolution of disapproval were significantly more likely to lose their seats than those who did not. This is the opposite of what the lobby hypothesis predicts, which tends to further disconfirm the theory.

All that being said, it remains the case that none of these disconfirmations are very powerful. The plain fact is that because so few Senators spoke or sponsored the resolution of disapproval, it remains a real possibility that all the trends we have noted were the result of random chance. The one caveat to this is that they were all in the same direction; that is, they all tended to show that those who supported the lobby’s position
tended to serve for less time, both in total and after the sale, and were more likely to lose their seats. If this were all the result of random chance, we would not expect the same result, disconfirmation of the lobby hypothesis, each time.

The 1978 F-15 Sale in the Senate

Let us turn now to the 1978 F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia. As with the 1975 I-HAWK sale, we shall be using speeches and resolution sponsorship as proxies for support for or opposition to the lobby’s goals. In this case, however, we also have another piece of evidence that is in many respects more powerful: the issue actually went to a vote in the Senate on May 15th, 1978, when the resolution of disapproval was defeated by a vote of 54 to 44 with two abstentions.49 Because this vote recorded the position of every Senator, even, technically, those two who abstained, in a direct and unambiguous way, it allows more powerful evidence than speeches or resolutions. Also, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the lobby would be more concerned with how Senators actually voted than with what they said. For these reasons, we shall begin by analyzing what effect voting for or against the sale had on each Senator’s political fortunes.

First, however, we should summarize the case, just so that it will be clear why the Israel lobby cared about it. In 1978, the Carter administration decided to grant requests from Egypt and Saudi Arabia to purchase F-5E and F-15 warplanes, respectively, from the United States. The ostensible purpose to which these planes would be put would be to defend the Persian Gulf and the eastern Mediterranean from the threat of Soviet aggression. Many Israelis, along with their partisans in the United States, were skeptical of this explanation, fearing that it was more likely that the planes would be used against

49 Congressional Record for 1978, p. 13710.
Israel. The F-15s were of particular concern, because whereas the F-5Es were by that
time no longer state-of-the-art, the F-15 was the most advanced air superiority fighter
plane in the world. Moreover, it was at that time purely an air superiority plane, with for
all intents and purposes no ground-attack capability. Israelis were thus concerned that the
F-15 in Arab hands would likely be used to threaten Israel air superiority in the Near
East, which superiority the Israelis have historically regarded as essential to their
security. It was for this reason that the Israel lobby became involved in the debate in
Congress over the sale.

In determining whether the lobby’s involvement paid any dividends, we shall
begin by looking at the outcome of the vote in the Senate, since it is, as previously stated,
our strongest piece of evidence. Since how one voted is, with the exception of the two
abstentions, a binary choice, insofar as that one either voted for the resolution of
disapproval or against it, it makes sense to also compare it to a binary outcome: did the
Senator in question lose his seat to a primary or general election challenger? After all, if
the modus operandi of the lobby is to retain in power those politicians who vote its way
and attempt to unseat those who vote against it, it stands to reason that if the lobby is
effective, the latter should be more likely than the former to lose their seats to
challengers.

In order to test whether that was in fact the case, we shall again be using a chi-
squared goodness-of-fit test. What we find is that of the forty-four Senators who voted
for Senate Concurrent Resolution (S. Con. Res.) 86, which is to say against the F-15 sale,
eighteen, or approximately 41%, lost their seats, two of them, Clifford Case of New
Jersey and Jacob Javits of New York to primary challengers, and the other sixteen to
general election challenges. Of fifty-four Senators who voted against the resolution, and thus for the sale, eleven, or just under 20.4%, lost their seats, again two, Mike Gravel of Arkansas and Paul Hatfield of Montana, to primary challenges, while the other nine lost to general election challenges. Of the two who abstained, one, Walter Huddleston of Kentucky, lost his seat to a general election challenge.50

Now, many would suppose that the mere fact that Senators who voted with the Israel lobby, that is, against the sale, were just about twice as likely to lose their seats to challenges is enough in itself to reject the hypothesis that voting with the lobby on this issue would make one less likely to lose one’s seat, and that no complex statistical analysis is really necessary. They might be surprised to learn, however, that the chi-squared value in this case is approximately 5.26, which, at 2 degrees of freedom, is just low enough not to reject the null hypothesis at 95% certainty, although high enough to reject it with 90% certainty. Again, 95% is the generally accepted threshold, so that means we can continue to accept the null hypothesis that voting with the Israel lobby had no significant impact on one’s reelection chances. Should one decide, however, that 90% is a reasonable threshold, we would reject the null hypothesis, but in favor of the alternate hypothesis that voting against the Israel lobby improved one’s reelection chances, and that voting with the lobby hurt one’s chances.

50 All data on who lost seats to challenges were culled from the website bioguide.congress.gov. The Senators who voted against the sale and lost their seats to general election challengers were Wendell Anderson of Minnesota, Birch Bayh of Indiana, Edward Brooke of Massachusetts, Frank Church of Idaho, Richard Clark of Iowa, John Durkin and Thomas McIntyre of New Hampshire, Floyd Haskell of Colorado, William Hathaway of Maine, John Melcher of Montana, Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin, William Roth of Delaware, James Sasser of Tennessee, Richard Stone of Florida, Herman Talmadge of Georgia, and Lowell Weicker of Connecticut. The nine Senators who voted for the sale and lost their seats to general election challengers were Howard Cannon of Nevada, John Culver of Iowa, Robert Griffin of Michigan, George McGovern of South Dakota, Warren Magnuson of Washington, Robert Morgan of North Carolina, Charles Percy of Illinois, Harrison Schmitt of New Mexico, and Ted Stevens of Arkansas.
It should also be noted, however, that were we to ignore the two Senators who abstained, and only look at those who voted one way or another, then there would be only one degree of freedom, and this result would be significant. Such a step might be justified, since, as there were only two abstentions, if, as actually happened, either of them lost his seat, that would mean a 50% loss rate for the abstainers, which would perforce be disproportionately high. If neither had lost his seat, that would of course have meant a zero percent loss rate, which would have been disproportionately low. Either way, this throws off the results.

Another result we might expect if the lobby hypothesis were accurate would be that those who voted for the sale would have served less time in the Senate, on average, than those who voted against the sale, both in total and afterwards. Because we are once again dealing with an essentially binary independent variable, we shall again use a difference-of-means test, or t-test.

In this case, the fifty-four Senators who voted for the sale served, on average, for roughly 21.98 years in total, while the forty-four who voted against the sale served, on average, for approximately 20.41 years in total. The mere fact that those who voted for the sale served slightly longer on average might seem enough to disconfirm the prediction that they would have served for less time. Still, we may as well do the test; since we are testing a hypothesis that predicts a difference in only one direction, that is, it predicts that those who voted against the sale would have served for more time, we shall perform a one-tailed t-test. What we find is that our t-statistic has an absolute value of 0.6705, which, with 96 degrees of freedom, is not only low enough to reject the hypothesis that there is a significant difference between the means at the 95% certainty
level, which is, again, the norm in the social sciences, it is actually low enough, albeit just barely, to reject it at the 75% certainty level. We can conclude with no little confidence, then, that how a Senator voted on the F-15 sale had no significant effect on how long he served in the Senate in total.

When we perform the same test using the means for time served after the sale, what we find is that those who voted for the sale served for approximately 10.65 years, on average, after the sale, while those who voted against it served for approximately 11.43 years afterwards. In this case, the difference, such as it is, between the means is at least in the right direction according to the lobby hypothesis. When we perform the difference-of-means test, however, what we find is that the t-statistic has an absolute value of roughly 0.382, which, at 95 degrees of freedom, is clearly more than low enough to not reject the null hypothesis at the 75% certainty level, much less the 95% level. Since we continue to accept the null hypothesis that this difference is due to random chance, we can again conclude that there is no statistically significant difference between the Senators' tenures after the sale depending on how they voted.

These two difference-of-means tests tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, then, and with significant strength. The prediction that Senators who support the lobby would serve for more time, like the prediction that those who support it would be less likely to lose their seats to challengers, are fairly clear expectations of the lobby hypothesis. Furthermore, how Senators voted on this issue is, again, a fairly clear and explicit measurement of support for or opposition to the lobby. So these goodness-of-fit and difference-of-means tests provide reasonably strong disconfirmation of the lobby hypothesis.
We can also perform the same kind of tests, however, that we performed on the I-HAWKs sale. In this case, however, a much higher proportion of Senators and Representatives spoke on the issue, which makes the data somewhat stronger. Indeed, only forty-two Senators did not speak out on one side or the other, and of those, two, Daniel Inouye of Hawaii and John Heinz of Pennsylvania did make speeches, albeit ones that took no side.

This can be seen reflected in this graph of total tenure in the Senate as a function of speech sums, wherein only the plurality of points lie on the y-axis, meaning they represent Senators who did not speak out on one side or the other.

Of course, it can also be seen that there is a positive correlation between having spoken out against the sale and serving longer in the Senate, and vice versa. Indeed, the slope of the trend-line is approximately 0.894, which, again, is clearly significantly positive. How positive should not be overestimated, since, again, the scale of the y-axis is almost an order of magnitude larger than the scale for the x-axis, which never goes above ten in either direction. Even so, that there is a positive relationship between speaking out against the sale and serving longer in the Senate does seem apparent.
It should be noted, however, that much of this effect owes to the fact that a handful of Senators, namely Frank Church, Henry Jackson, Daniel Moynihan, Joe Biden, Jacob Javits, and Paul Sarbanes spoke out repeatedly against the sale and also served for a long time, with shortest-serving among them remaining in office for twenty-four years. Remove these six, and the slope drops to just below 0.500, and if one instead removes only Jackson, Biden, and Sarbanes, along with William Proxmire and Bob Dole, who both made four speeches against the sale and served thirty-two and twenty-seven years respectively, then the slope drops to approximately 0.305.

This is important when one considers that there might be another reason that those who spoke out repeatedly against the sale would have served for a very long time in total. Those who spoke out repeatedly tended to be those who were leading one side of the debate. Both houses of Congress, but especially the Senate, place a high value on seniority; as such, leaders on any issue tend to be those who have served a long time already. In that case, it might very well be that it was the long tenure of those Senators which caused them to speak out repeatedly, rather than vice versa. Of course, by that logic one might argue that Abraham Ribicoff, who is represented by the point at negative six on the x-axis, should also be excluded. Interestingly enough, that actually causes the slope to decrease still further, to just under 0.282, a slightly lower value then before. One might argue, of course, that this whole business of excluding outliers, even though it may be common practice in statistics, is intellectually dishonest. After all, one can always demonstrate any conclusion one wishes simply by excluding any data which militate against it. The point of statistical tests, however, is to detect a general trend in the data. If the removal of a handful of data points substantially alters the apparent trend, then that
implies that there is no real trend; that is, the treatment is not having the hypothesized effect. Rather, some other cause, or plain chance, has caused there to be a few outlying cases which distort the results.

In any case, what we are left with is a test which does tend to confirm the lobby hypothesis, but, again, not very strongly. The slope is not extremely high to begin with, and drops to a much lower value when a handful of data points are removed. This test is stronger, however, than the corresponding test performed with the 1975 speech data.

When we then turn to look at time served after the sale, what we find is that the slope has actually decreased to approximately 0.747, which, granted, is still positive, and does not represent a huge decrease:

It does, nevertheless, represent something of a decrease in the slope. What this shows is that whatever positive correlation may exist between the treatment, speaking for the lobby’s interests, and the result, serving longer in the Senate, is weaker when one only looks at how long each Senator serves after the treatment has been applied, so to speak. It should also be noted that the slope drops much more impressively, to roughly 0.172, if one removes only two outliers, Biden and Sarbanes, and still further to just under 0.017, a basically negligible amount, should one also remove Ribicoff.
This militates against the idea that this positive correlation could be the result of the Israel lobby's having helped the careers of its supporters and harmed the careers of its opponents. After all, we would, again, expect that the treatment could only have its effect after the treatment was applied, that is, after the sale. Just as the fact that there was a positive correlation between speech sums and time served after the I-HAWK sale tended to support the lobby hypothesis, and weaken the disconfirmation thereof implied by the lack of correlation between speech sums and total time, the fact that the correlation between speech sums and time served after the F-15 sale tends to weaken the confirmation of the lobby hypothesis provided by the correlation between speech sums and total time. This is especially true when one considers that what correlation does exist between speech sums and time served after basically disappears when one removes only three outliers. If the efforts of the Israel lobby were causing this positive correlation, it must have been the case that the lobby focused its efforts on only a few Senators, which seems unlikely to grant the lobby influence with Congress as a whole.

In short, then, regressing time served after the F-15 sale tends to confirm the lobby hypothesis weakly at best. While there is a positive correlation between the two variables, that correlation is weaker than that between total time served and speech sums. This implies, again, that the treatment was able to operate before it could have been applied, a clear impossibility. Secondly, even that positive correlation disappears with the removal of only a few outliers, implying that if the treatment had any effect, it operated on only a few Senators. It seems more likely that this correlation is spurious.

There is, however, another way we might use speech sums to test whether the lobby had any effect upon Congress in this case. The lobby, after all, can operate in two
ways. First, and with which we have been dealing heretofore, it can try to help the careers of its supporters and harm the careers of its opponents. But second, it can also use the promise and the threat of same to change the minds of its opponents. There are three ways we could detect a Senator, or Representative, for that matter, changing his mind. First, we might find one speaking first on one side of the issue and then later on the other side; this would not show up in the speech sum itself, but it would be revealed upon examination of the individual addends. Second, we might find a cosponsor of a resolution against the sale later speaking in favor of the sale, an issue we shall deal with when we discuss the issue of resolutions. Third, we might find someone who, having spoken one way on the issue then voted the other way.

If the Israel lobby was successful in changing people's minds, then what we should find is that more Senators changed from supporting the sale to opposing it than vice versa. What we find, however, is that not a single Senator spoke on one side and then later on the other. We do find, however, that two Senators, Ted Stevens of Alaska and Herman Talmadge of Georgia, spoke one way and then voted the other. On May 5th, 1978, Talmadge made a speech, the primary purpose of which was to insert into the Record an article by Robert Keatley and Karen Elliot House from the May 4th Wall Street Journal entitled "Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the F-15." I have coded this speech as being in favor of the sale because that is clearly the tone of the article, which Talmadge labels "the best analysis I have read of the proposed sale." Keatley and House state clearly that should the F-15 sale be blocked, the Saudis would simply buy comparable planes from the French, and that stopping the sale would be bad for both the United States and,
in the long run, Israel. And yet, in the end, Talmadge voted for the resolution of disapproval. Stevens, by contrast, inserted a single speech on May 15th in which, challenging Senator Ribicoff, he stated “that the total firepower which is going into [the Middle East] bothers me....Does it bother you [Ribicoff] that we are constantly escalating the numbers of these very sophisticated aircraft?” I coded this speech as negative, because he did seem to be questioning the wisdom of the sale, albeit in the context of questioning the wisdom of all American arms transfers to the Middle East. Stevens, however, ultimately voted against S. Con. Res. 86, or for the sale.

It would seem, then, that only two Senators showed any evidence of having changed their minds from the time the debate began. This is not to say that every Senator’s mind was made up from the very beginning. After all, a plurality of Senators never spoke on this issue at all. It may be that many of them simply had not made up their minds until the very end, while others simply chose not to speak, for whatever reason. But as far as Senators switching from one side to the other, there are only these two, and since they switched in opposite direction, it ended up being a wash, so to speak. As such, there is little evidence that the lobby was having much if any success changing Senators’ minds. Again, however, because it is difficult to know what those who spoke not at all, or who only made neutral remarks, were thinking in the months leading up to the vote, this evidence must be regarded as weak. Still, it does, however weakly, tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis.

In the case of the debate in the Senate in 1978, there were five resolutions that are of concern to us. The first four were Senate Concurrent Resolutions (S. Con. Res.) 81,

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53 Ibid., p. 13710.
54 Ibid., p. 13654.
55 Ibid., p. 13710.
objecting to the sale of fifty F-5 fighters to Egypt; 82 and 83, objecting to the sale of fifteen F-15 and seventy-five F-16 fighters, respectively, to Israel; 84, objecting to the sale of sixty F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia; and, finally, 86, the subsequent concatenation of the previous four into a single resolution.\textsuperscript{56} The first four were all sponsored by Proxmire, while the fifth, which, again, was simply the combination of Proxmire’s four, was reported out of committee by John Sparkman of Alabama, without a named sponsor. As far as I have been able to determine, none of these resolutions attracted any co-sponsors, and attempting any statistical analysis based solely on what happened to Proxmire would be meaningless, since we would be dealing with a sample size of one. As such, it is not practical to use resolution sponsorship as a measurement of support for the lobby’s position in this case.

\textit{The House Debate on the F-15 Sale}

The House never voted on the 1978 F-15 sale. Because both houses had to vote against the sale in order to block it, and because S. Con. Res. 86 had already been voted down, the issue was ultimately dropped in the House. We can, however, make use of the same evidence, speeches and resolution sponsorship, that we used with regard to the I-HAWK sale. With regard to the former, what we find via regression of total time served in the House on speech sums is that there was a negative correlation between speaking against the sale and how long one served:

\textsuperscript{56} Congressional Record for 1978, pp. 11904, 13402.
Indeed, the slope of the regression line is roughly -0.606, which, while far from astonishingly small, does clearly suggest a downward trend. What we find, then, in short, is that if speaking out against the F-15 sale had any effect on one’s political fortunes, it was to shorten one’s career, which could hardly be expected to incentivize other politicians to speak out in support of the Israel lobby’s positions.

There are a few other points that should be noted about these data. First, fifty Representatives spoke on the issue, about three-and-a-half times as many as spoke on the I-HAWK sale; while this clearly still a minority, it nonetheless represents a substantially larger percentage of the House, making our data more reliable. Second, there are no obvious outliers. The five Congressmen who spoke for the sale, Robert Leggett and James Lloyd of California, Robert Sikes of Florida, Gerry Studds of Massachusetts, and Clement Zablocki of Wisconsin are all fairly evenly distributed in the lengths of their respective tenures, as the graph shows. One might suppose that Joshua Eilberg of Pennsylvania, who made five speeches against the sale, and Benjamin Rosenthal of New York, who made six, and who are represented by the two right-most points on the graph, might be outliers. If one were to remove those two points, however, the slope of the
trend-line would fall to approximately -0.821, an even lower amount. In other words, the negative correlation would actually become a little over a third stronger. That is still not very strong, but it is significant. All this, then, does tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis.

This disconfirmation is strengthened when one regresses tenure after the sale on speech totals:

Two facts become immediately apparent from this graph. First, the slope of the trend line is still negative, but second, that it is not as negative. In fact, at -0.078, it is nearly flat. One might conclude from this that the treatment was having an effect after it was applied, and that is why the slope is higher than when looking only at total time served. If so, however, the effect of said treatment must have been quite weak, since the correlation is basically flat while technically still negative. In short, if the Israel lobby was working after 1978 to lengthen the careers of those who spoke against the F-15 sale, and shorten the careers of those who spoke for it, the best that can be said for its results is that the
lobby almost succeeded in making it a matter of indifference on which side one spoke. That is not really consistent with the idea of the Israel lobby as being very powerful.

We can also look at resolution sponsorship in the House in 1978. In this case, there were nineteen concurrent resolutions proposed in the House of concern to us: House Concurrent Resolutions (H. Con. Res.) 480, against the sale of sixty F-15s to Saudi Arabia and H. Con. Res. 481, against the sale of fifty F-5s to Egypt, both proposed by William Lehman of Florida on February 15; H. Con. Res. 482 against the sales to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, proposed by Norman Lent of New York, also on the fifteenth; H. Con. Res. 484, also by Lent, introduced on the 21st, against the sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia; H. Con. Res. 499 against the sale to Egypt and H. Con. Res. 500 against the sale to Saudi Arabia, both introduced by Claude Pepper of Florida on March 3; H. Con. Res. 585 and 586, against the sale of F-16s and F-15s, respectively, to Israel, 587, against the sale of F-5s to Egypt, and 588, against the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia, all proposed by David Obey of Wisconsin on May 1; H. Con. Res. 590 against all the sales, co-sponsored by Clarence Long of Maryland, Lester Wolff of New York, Charles Whalen of Ohio, Parren Mitchell of Maryland, Jim Santini of Nevada, and Edward Madigan of Illinois, also on May 1; H. Con. Res. 593, against all the sales, also co-sponsored on May 1 by Whalen, Long, and Millicent Fenwick of New Jersey; H. Con. Res. 594, 595, 596, and 597, sponsored by Whalen on that same day against the two sales to Israel, the sale to Egypt, and the sale to Saudi Arabia, respectively; H. Con. Res. 598, against the sale to Saudi Arabia, co-sponsored by Wolff, Long, Cardiss Collins of Illinois, Benjamin Gilman of New York, Robert Nix of Pennsylvania, Jerome Ambro of New York, and Thomas Luken of Ohio, still on May 1; H. Con. Res. 602 against all the
sales, co-sponsored the next day by Dante Fascell, Herbert Burke, and Andy Ireland of Florida, Edward Derwinski of Illinois, Benjamin Rosenthal, Benjamin Gilman, Jonathan Bingham, and Stephen Solarz of New York, Michael Harrington of Massachusetts, Tennyson Guyer of Ohio, Wyche Fowler of Georgia, Donald Fraser of Minnesota, Gus Yatron of Pennsylvania, Robert Lagomarsino and Anthony Beilenson of California, Larry Winn of Kansas, Don Bonker of Washington, John Cavanaugh of Nebraska, along with Collins, Whalen, Long, Wolff, Nix, and Fenwick; H. Con. Res. 615, against all the sales, sponsored on May 9 by James Tucker of Arizona; and, finally, H. Con. Res. 620, also against all the sales, co-sponsored on May 11 by Fascell, Derwinski, Tucker, Robert Drinan of Massachusetts, Robert Kasten of Wisconsin, and Romano Mazzoli of Kentucky.  

This list does present us some problems of analysis, for several reasons. First, many of the resolutions against the sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia were also against the sales to Israel, while some of the Congressmen who sponsored resolutions against the sales to the Arab states also sponsored resolutions against the sales to Israel. At the same time, it is very clear that the Israelis and their partisans in the U.S. were more concerned about the F-15 sale to the Saudis than the F-5 sale to the Egyptians, both because the F-5 was not as advanced a plane as the F-15 and because Israel had better relations with Egypt than with Saudi Arabia by that point. This raises the question of whether sponsorship of resolutions against the F-5 sale should count for as much with respect to currying favor with the Israel lobby as sponsoring resolutions against the F-15 sale. I have chosen to deal with these issues in the following ways: first, since everyone who sponsored resolutions against the sales to Israel also sponsored resolutions against the

57 Ibid., pp. 3486, 3912, 5522, 12010-12012, 12127, 13103, 13368.
sales to the Arabs, and since the sales to Israel were primarily intended to offset any changes in the balance of power that would result from the sales to the Arabs, I have chosen to disregard those resolutions. Likewise, I have chosen to count resolutions against all the sales in the same way I have counted resolutions just against sales to the Arabs. Also, because those who sponsored resolutions against the F-5 sale also tended to sponsor resolutions against the F-15 sale, and because the Israel lobby, while not as opposed as to the F-15 sale, was nonetheless still against the F-5 sale, I have chosen to count resolutions against the Egyptian sale in the same way as the Saudi sale. For these reasons, then, and for the sake of simplicity, I have elected to count sponsorship of each resolution as one, except for resolutions only against the sales to Israel, which I have counted as zero.

Plotting the number of resolutions sponsored against tenure in the House, both in total and after the sale, produces the following graph:
In the interests of brevity, I have plotted both total tenure and tenure after the sale on the same graph. As can be seen, the trend-lines for both are very nearly flat. The upper line, which represents the regression of total time on the number of resolutions sponsored, has a slope of just under 0.15, which represents an upward trend which is probably too small to be of much significance. The lower line, which represents the regression of time after the sale on resolutions sponsored, has a slope of approximately 0.006, which is clearly insignificant. Since we would expect any effect of the lobby’s efforts in reaction to events of 1978 to only occur after 1978, we can reasonably conclude that there is no meaningful trend here. Sponsoring resolutions against the arms sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia appears to have no correlation with how long one was likely to serve in the House.

We get a similar result by using difference of means tests. If we were to divide the House into those 37 Representatives who sponsored at least one resolution against the arms sales and the 398 who did not, we find that the former group served for approximately 17.14 years on average in total, and 9.30 years afterwards, while the latter served for 17.96 years on average in total and 9.08 afterwards, with variances of 75.45, 57.95, 107.35, and 66.55, respectively. These values yield a t-statistic of about 0.54 for total tenure and 0.17 afterwards. At 433 degrees of freedom, neither of those values is significant even at the 75% certainty level, much less the 95% level. We can therefore say with real confidence that sponsoring resolutions against the arms sales to the Arabs in 1978 had no observable effect on how long one served in the House, whether in total or after the sale.
One could argue, of course, that what matters is not how long one lasted in office but the circumstances under which one left. That is, were Representatives who sponsored resolutions against the sale less likely to lose their seats to primary or general election challengers? What we find is that, of the 37 Representatives who sponsored at least one resolution against the sale, four, Derwinski, Lagomarsino, Nix, and Solarz, lost their seats to primary challengers, while another four, Ambro, Burke, Long, and Wolff, lost their seats to general election challengers, for total of eight, or approximately 21.62% of all sponsors. Of the 398 Representatives who did not sponsor any resolutions, twenty lost their seats to primary challenges while another seventy-eight lost to general election challengers, for a total of ninety-eight, or approximately 24.62% of all non-sponsors. Obviously, a higher proportion of non-sponsors lost their seats, but is this a statistically significant difference?

Since a total of 106 Representatives out of 435, or about 24.37%, lost their seats, the expected value for seat-losers for sponsors and non-sponsors would be roughly 9.02 and 96.98, respectively, while the expected values for non-losers would be about 27.98 and 301.02, respectively. These yield a chi-squared statistic of approximately 0.166 at one degree of freedom. That is well below the 3.84 required to be significant at the 95% certainty level; in fact, it is well below the 0.45 required for significance the 50% level. We can with great confidence, then, not reject the null hypothesis that there was no significant difference in a Congressman’s chances of losing his seat depending on whether he sponsored a resolution or not. This tends to agree with our previous findings regarding resolution sponsorship in that it disconfirms the lobby hypothesis.
There is, however, another metric we can use in looking at the House that was not available to us when looking at the Senate. We can reasonably presume that the Israel lobby would attempt to prevent those politicians who oppose its interests from moving into positions of greater power, and, conversely, would want to support those politicians who vote its way in running for higher office. Of course, the higher office for which a member of the House is most likely to run is a seat in the Senate; additionally, a politician known to be friendly is likely to be more useful to the lobby in the Senate than in any other office, and one known to be unfriendly is likely to be more damaging there. That is why it is not really practical to look at promotions when looking at the Senate. One might object that Senators can and do run for President, and that surely the Israel lobby would have an interest in that. Nevertheless, too few Senators ever get elected to that office to say anything statistically useful about it. It should be noted, however, that I have also counted the number of Representatives who were later elected state governors, even though I am unsure about what the lobby hypothesis would predict in this regard. On the one hand, a governorship is generally regarded as a promotion over a House seat, but on the other hand, any state position would probably be far less useful to the lobby. So I have decided to run the test once counting only promotions to the Senate, and again counting both promotions to the Senate and to governorships.

In the first instance, only two of the Representatives who sponsored at least one resolution, Fowler and Kasten, later became Senators, or about 5.4% of the 37 sponsors. By contrast, twenty-four of the non-sponsors later became Senators, which is about 6.0% of the 398 non-sponsors. Those percentages are fairly close, although a slightly higher proportion of non-sponsors became Senators. The chi-squared value in this case is
approximately 0.024 with one degree of freedom. Not only is that not significant at the 95% certainty level, it’s not even significant at the 15% level, so we can with great confidence not reject the null hypothesis; sponsoring a resolution in disapproval of the arms sales in 1978 had no significant effect on a Representative’s chances of becoming a Senator.

When we add in Representatives who later became state Governors, we find that none of the sponsors became Governors, so the number and percentage of total promotions is unchanged for them. Six of the non-sponsors became Governors, bringing their total up to thirty, or about 7.5% of the total. Clearly, this is not what the lobby hypothesis would lead us to expect. This also raises the chi-squared value to 0.22, but with one degree of freedom that is still not significant even at the 40% certainty level, to say nothing of the 95% level. We can once again have great confidence in not rejecting the null hypothesis: sponsoring resolutions against the arms sales to Egypt and Saudi Arabia had no significant impact on a Representative’s chances of attaining a higher office.

*The 1981 AWACS Sale in the Senate*

This brings us, then, to our analysis of the 1981 AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia. Again, some background on this event is merited: in 1978, the Carter administration, in order to secure Congressional support for the F-15 sale, promised that certain other items that would make the F-15s more dangerous, including the Airborne Warning and Control Systems, or AWACS, would not be included with the sale. A year later, however, the Shah of Iran was overthrown, and a government bitterly hostile to the United States came to power across the Persian Gulf from Saudi Arabia. There was resulting fear in
Washington both of the prospect of Iranian aggression and for the internal stability of the house of Saud. It was in this context that the Reagan administration decided to sell to the Saudis the package of upgrades that the Carter administration had promised would not be sold. This package included the AWACS, but also the AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missile, and the FAST packs, which are conformal fuel tanks which significantly extend the range of the plane. In fact, when debate about the sale began in Congress in late January of 1981, it was primarily about the latter two items. It was not until April 2\textsuperscript{nd} that the debate began to center around the AWACS. As with the I-HAWK and the original F-15 sale, the issue at the heart of this debate was the fear of Israelis and their partisans in the U.S. that these weapons might be used against Israel and erode that country’s air superiority.

In this case, the issue ultimately went to a vote in both Houses, as the House passed House Concurrent Resolution (H. Con. Res.) 194 on October 14 by a vote of 301 in favor, 111 against, 1 present, and 20 not voting.\textsuperscript{58} This sent the matter to the Senate, which voted down the resolution on October 28 by a vote of 52 to 48. Additionally, as will be seen in greater detail, there was more debate in both houses than over either previous arms sale. Consequently, the evidence in this case is generally stronger than in either of the previous cases. This case is also important because both sides of the debate over the Israel lobby make so much of it. Those who, like Walt and Mearsheimer, or Lind, who believe in the power of the lobby argue that the lobby's alleged near success in blocking the AWACS sale shows its fundamental strength while deterring future sales, while those who disagree with the lobby hypothesis argue that the lobby ultimately failed to block the sale, showing that even when it goes all-out, the lobby ultimately cannot get

\textsuperscript{58} Congressional Record for 1981, p. 23872.
its way on important issues. It is therefore important to look at this case in greater detail to determine what influence the lobby actually had.

Beginning with the vote in the Senate, we can perform the same kind of chi-squared test we performed on the 1978 vote. Of the 48 Senators who voted against the sale, nine, or 18.75%, lost their seats, all but one, Alan Dixon of Illinois, to general election challengers. Of the 52 who voted for the sale, 12, or approximately 23.08%, lost their seats to general election challengers, and none to primary challengers. Of course, a number of Senators who were on the list of seat-losers in 1978 were nevertheless still in office in 1981, and so appear on the list for that year as well; later on, we shall look at what happened to Senators based on how they voted in both of these cases. In any case, it is of course clear that a larger proportion of those who voted for the sale lost their seats. But is this a significant difference, or simply the artifact of random chance? The chi-squared value in this case is roughly 0.282, but since no one abstained or voted present, there is only one degree of freedom. This is not high enough to reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference even at 50% certainty, much less 95%, which is, again, the generally accepted level of significance. In short, this is almost certainly not a significant difference. The lobby hypothesis, which predicts a significant difference, is disconfirmed quite strongly by this test.

59 Again, all data on who lost seats to challenges are from bioguide.congress.gov. The eight Senators who voted against the sale and lost their seats to general election challenges were Rudy Boschwitz of Minnesota, Howard Cannon of Nevada again, Al D'Amato of New York, Paula Hawkins of Florida, Robert Kasten of Wisconsin, William Roth of Delaware again, James Sasser of Tennessee again, and Lowell Weicker of Connecticut again. The twelve who voted for the sale and lost their seats were James Abdnor and Larry Pressler of South Dakota, Mark Andrews of North Dakota, Jeremiah Denton of Alabama, Slade Gorton of Washington, Walter Huddleston of Kentucky, Roger Jepsen of Iowa, Mack Mattingly of Georgia, John Melcher of Montana again, Charles Percy of Illinois again, Harrison Schmitt of New Mexico again, and Ted Stevens of Arkansas again.
The reason the disconfirmation is so strong, again, is that the sample size is large, consisting as it does of the entire Senate, and the prediction is very clear. For the lobby hypothesis, at least as generally formulated, to be valid, the lobby had to impose costs on those who voted against its wishes and offer benefits to those who voted with them. This is especially true because the AWACS sale was such a major event, garnering a great deal of attention. Still, one might take issue with this conclusion by asking whether it is enough to look at the percentage of Senators who lost their seats to challengers. After all, one could argue that the Israel lobby might mount enough of a threat to hostile incumbents that some might decide to take early retirement and not run again. As such, they would not register in the prior metric, even as their careers were shortened by the work of the Israel lobby.

We can deal with this problem, however, by performing the same kind of difference-of-means test we did on the 1978 data. After all, the lobby hypothesis, especially in light of the aforementioned critique, surely predicts that those who voted with the lobby ought to have had statistically significantly longer tenures in office than those who voted against it. What we find, in this case, is that the forty-eight Senators who voted against the sale served for approximately 24.27 years total on average, while the fifty-two who voted for the sale served roughly 20.02 years total on average; the former value having a variance of about 110.46, and the latter having about 119.23 for a variance. The difference between the two means, then, is about four years and three months, not an extraordinarily long amount of time, but about four-fifths of a single term, so not a trivial amount either. In any case, the means and the variances produce a t-statistic of approximately 1.9836, which, at 98 degrees of freedom, would be just barely
low enough not to discard the null hypothesis at 95% certainty if we were performing a
two-tailed test. In this case, however, we are only interested in whether those who voted
against the sale served for a different amount of time in one direction, that is, if they
served longer. As such, we perform a one-tailed test, which, at 98 degrees of freedom,
means that t must only exceed 1.66, which it easily does. As such, we can reject the null
hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the means at 95% certainty, and
should accept the alternate hypothesis that those voting with the lobby served
significantly longer.

Clearly, this result supports the lobby hypothesis, and with some force as well.
After all, the sample size consists of the whole Senate, and is therefore large, and the
lobby hypothesis necessarily implies the prediction in question. Still, we should not
overstate the case either. Four years and three months is still not an enormous amount of
time, and the variances were also very large, suggesting that while voting with the lobby
may have been more likely to help a Senator than not, that help was not necessarily very
reliable. It should be noted as well that while the lobby hypothesis definitely predicts that
those who voted with the lobby ought to serve longer in total on average, it does not
uniquely predict that.

In any event, we should also look, as we have before, at average time after the
sale as well as at total time. What we find in this case is that those who voted against the
sale served about 15.92 years after the sale on average, while those who voted for it
served roughly 12.96 years after the sale on average, a difference of about three years, or
half of one term. The variances for the two averages were about 75.14 and 77.06,
respectively. This produces a t-statistic of approximately 1.69, which is just above 1.66,
the value below which we would not, at 98 degrees of freedom, reject the null hypothesis at 95% certainty. We should therefore technically accept the alternate hypothesis that there is a significant difference in how long on average Senators served after the sale depending upon how they voted.

Does this really confirm the lobby hypothesis, however? After all, while the t-statistic is technically high enough to reject the null hypothesis, it is just barely high enough, whereas the t-statistic for total mean time was comfortably higher than the critical value. In short, we can more confidently say that there was a significant difference in mean total tenure than in mean tenure after the sale. This is an important caveat, because according to the lobby hypothesis, the reverse ought to be true. That is, if voting with the lobby tended to increase one’s tenure in the Senate, it ought to have increased it after one voted with the lobby, not before. What we should expect from the lobby hypothesis, then, is a clearly significant difference in mean tenure after the sale, with also a significant difference in mean total tenure, albeit perhaps a less clearly significant one. That we see the reverse implies that there may be a different explanation for these results.

One possibility is that those who had served longer in the Senate by the time of the sale were more likely to vote against it. Indeed, we find that the average entrance year for the forty-eight Senators who voted against the sale was 1972.65, roughly, and that the average entrance year for the fifty-two who voted for the sale was approximately 1973.94, a difference of about a year and three-and-a-half months. Is this difference significant? The variances for these averages were about 58.6 and 72.4, respectively. This yields a t-statistic of about 0.8 with, again, 98 degrees of freedom, or less than half
the value at which we reject the null hypothesis at 95% certainty. Indeed, it is so low that we would still reject the null hypothesis at 22% certainty. Clearly, we can confidently ascribe this difference to random chance. Yet this difference, most probably random in its origins, accounts for more than a third of the difference between the difference-of-means for total tenure and tenure afterwards.

This is not to say that these two tests do not confirm the lobby hypothesis at all. But their confirmation is not as powerful as it might be. Again, what we would expect if the lobby hypothesis were true is that, after the sale, the lobby would work successfully to lengthen the tenures of Senators who voted against the sale and to shorten the tenures of those who voted for it. In that case, what we would then expect is a significant difference in mean tenures after the sale depending on how Senators voted, with a less significant difference in total tenure. Instead what we find is a very significant difference in total and a barely significant one when just looking at time afterwards. As such, this does tend to lessen the confirmation of the lobby hypothesis provided by these tests.

We see something a little different when we look at the speeches made in the Senate on the AWACS sale and their relationship to tenure in office. Again, I have coded what I believe to be every speech made on the floor of the Senate or subsequently inserted into the record, totaled the number of speeches made for and against the sale by each Senator, and cross-referenced those totals with each Senator’s tenure, both in total and after the sale.
Even before looking at the regression analysis, it would seem that we are looking at a fairly random cloud of data points; certainly no obvious trend jumps out at us. And indeed, upon performing the regression analysis, what we find is that our trend line has a slope of approximately 0.06, a number which, while positive, is too small to be of much significance.

A few points should be interjected here regarding the large number of speeches some Senators gave, most notably John Tower of Texas, who made 35 remarks for the sale on the floor and inserted three more, in addition to eight remarks he made which took no side, and is represented by the left-most point on the graph, and at the other end by Bob Packwood of Washington and Pat Moynihan of New York. Moynihan made twelve remarks against the sale and inserted five more, and is represented by the right-most point on the graph, while Packwood made fifteen remarks against the sale and is represented by the next right-most. One of the reasons these three made so many remarks on the floor is that they were essentially the managers of the debate, especially Tower and Packwood. When other Senators wished to speak on the issue, it was frequently on time
yielded to them for that purpose by one of these three, and these three would often interject brief remarks, or sometimes not so brief remarks, in between other speakers. One might question, therefore, the way I have coded these speeches; one could argue that they should not all be counted as separate statements, and that doing so inflates the speech totals for these three.

I believe my coding decision justified, however, by the fact that these three were the leaders of the two sides of the debate in the Senate. Their totals’ high absolute values capture their prominent role in the debate. It is reasonable to infer that any effort by the Israel lobby to punish those who supported the sale and reward those who opposed it would attach a high priority to the fates of these three. What we find, though, is that Moynihan and Tower both served for 24 years, while Packwood hung on for only slightly longer at 26 years.\textsuperscript{60} More generally, we simply do not see enough of a correlation to infer any significant relationship between how one spoke on the AWACS sale and one’s total tenure in the office.

A different picture emerges, however, when we look only at tenure after the sale:

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
What we see here is a fairly clear positive correlation, with a trend line whose slope is about 0.33, which, while not, again, extraordinarily high, does represent a non-trivial effect for the treatment. It should also be noted that there are no obvious outliers. Removing Tower, Packwood, Moynihan, and Carl Levin of Michigan, who, having made six remarks against the sale and inserted another two, and who will have served for 33 years after the sale upon the end of his current term, might also be thought of as something of an outlier, raises the slope of the regression line to roughly 0.37, which is not a very meaningful change. We can as such feel some confidence that we are looking at a modest but genuine trend.

For the first time, then, we are seeing results very much like what the lobby hypothesis would have us expect. There was a very slight positive correlation between speech sums and total tenure, one most likely due to random chance, but a larger and more clearly significant trend positive trend when looking only at time served after the sale. This is consistent with the proposition that starting in 1981, the Israel lobby worked effectively to shorten the tenures in office of Senators who spoke in favor of the AWACS
sale and lengthen the tenures of those who spoke against it. It must be noted, however, that while these results do tend to confirm the lobby hypothesis, they do not do so overwhelmingly by any means. An upward slope of one-third is clearly positive, but it is, again, hardly overwhelmingly so. If we were to conclude from this evidence that the Israel lobby’s efforts were bearing fruit, then we would also need to conclude that this fruit was a modest harvest at best.

When we turn to look at resolution sponsorship in the Senate, what we find is that there were two resolutions sponsored against the AWACS sale, S. Con. Res. 35, which was subsequently replaced by S. Con. Res. 37. Both resolutions were co-sponsored by the same fifty senators, while the other half of the Senate did not sponsor either one. Interestingly, of the fifty who co-sponsored the two resolutions of disapproval, eight ultimately voted against them and for the sale: Mark Andrews of North Dakota, William Cohen of Maine, Slade Gorton of Washington, Orrin Hatch of Utah, Roger Jepsen of Iowa, Larry Pressler of South Dakota, Alan Simpson of Wyoming, and Edward Zorinsky of Nebraska. Of the fifty who did not co-sponsor the two resolutions, six ultimately voted against the sale anyway: Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, Robert Byrd of West Virginia, John Glenn of Ohio, Mark Hatfield of Oregon, Ernest Hollings of South Carolina, and Patrick Leahy of Vermont. We shall examine later on what that says about the likelihood of Senators on either side changing their minds.

First, however, we shall compare the tenure in office of those who sponsored the two resolutions and those who did not. The fifty co-sponsors served, on average, for 21.82 years, or a little over three-and-a-half terms, with an approximate variance of 97.86, while the fifty non-sponsors served, again on average, 22.3 years with an
approximate variance of 141.28, meaning that those who did not sponsor the resolutions of disapproval served a little bit longer on average, but with almost half again as much variation from the mean. In any case, the mere fact that non-sponsors served longer on average is enough to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, but by how much? A difference-of-means test in this case yields a t-statistic of roughly 0.22 with 98 degrees of freedom. This is far below the value of 1.66 that would imply a statistically significant difference at the 95% certainty level. In fact, this is not even high enough to reject the null hypothesis at the 50% certainty level with a one-tailed test. In short, we can say with great confidence that there was no significant difference between total tenures in the Senate depending on whether or not one sponsored the two resolutions. While that is certainly not what the lobby hypothesis predicts, we cannot say with any real confidence that those who did not sponsor the resolutions against the sale served significantly longer, which would of course be an even more powerful disconfirmation of the lobby hypothesis.

When we look at tenure after the sale, what we find is that those who sponsored the resolutions served, on average, for 14.86 years after 1981, or almost two-and-a-half terms, with a variance of 73.18, roughly. By contrast, those who did not sponsor the resolutions served for only 13.9 years after 1981, with a variance of 83.07, approximately. In this case, we can at least say that the theory’s most basic prediction has come true: those who sponsored a resolution that the Israel lobby surely would have favored did serve for more time thereafter. But was this difference significant, or more likely the product of random chance? In this case, our difference-of-means test yields a value for t of approximately 0.54 with, again, 98 degrees of freedom. While that is
certainly higher than before, it is still nowhere near high enough to be significant at the 95% certainty level, even with a one-tailed test; in fact, it is not significant even at the 75% certainty level, meaning that we can confidently not reject the null hypothesis. In short, it is far more likely that any difference here is simply the result of random chance, and not any influence of the Israel lobby.

Of course, we can also look at whether resolution-sponsors were more or less likely to lose their seats to primary or general election challenges. What we find is that, of the fifty co-sponsors, twelve, Paula Hawkins of Florida, Robert Kasten of Wisconsin, Rudy Boschwitz of Minnesota, Lowell Weicker of Connecticut, James Sasser of Tennessee, Al D’Amato of New York, Howard Cannon of Nevada, and William Roth of Delaware, along with Andrews, Jepsen, Pressler, and Gorton, lost their seats to general election challenges, while a thirteenth, Alan Dixon of Illinois, lost to a primary challenge. By contrast, only eight of the non-sponsors lost their seats to general election challenges: Harrison Schmitt of New Mexico, James Abdnor of South Dakota, Jeremiah Denton of Alabama, Mack Mattingly of Georgia, Walter Huddleston of Kentucky, John Melcher of Montana, Charles Percy of Illinois, and Ted Stevens of Alaska; no non-sponsors lost to a primary challenge. Again, the mere fact that more sponsors lost their seats would be enough to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, but is this difference significant? A chi-squared goodness-of-fit test using these data produces a chi-squared statistic of approximately 1.51 with one degree of freedom. That is not high enough to reject the null hypothesis at 95% or even 90% certainty, so we can with good confidence say that the observed difference is in all likelihood statistically insignificant. But remember, this
still disconfirms the lobby hypothesis, since it implies that it made no difference one way or another whether a Senator put his name on the two resolutions of disapproval.

We can use the resolution-sponsorship data in another way as well: by cross-referencing it with the final vote, we can track who changed his mind over the course of the debate. After all, the lobby hypothesis would presumably imply that the lobby should work to change the minds of politicians in power, and should be at least somewhat successful in so doing. We have already noted, however, that more Senators switched from co-sponsoring the resolutions of disapproval to voting against those same resolutions than vice versa. This is the opposite, or so it would appear, of what the lobby hypothesis would predict. But again, is this a statistically significant difference? In this case, since eight of the fifty sponsors switched sides, while six of the non-sponsors switched, we get a chi-squared value of about 0.33 with one degree of freedom. Needless to say, this is not significant at the 95% certainty level, nor, for that matter, at the 50% certainty level. While we cannot therefore say that Senators were more likely to switch sides from opposing the sale to supporting it, we also cannot say the reverse with any real confidence. This does tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, since we would expect that the Israel lobby ought to have had some significant success in changing Senators’ minds to support of its position.

The 1981 AWACS Sale in the House

In turning now to look at the House of Representatives, we shall begin the same way as we did with the Senate: by looking at the proportion of Congressmen who lost their seats to election challenges. In the House, 301 Representatives voted for H. Con. Res. 194, or against the sale, and 111 voted against the resolution and for the sale.
Another twenty did not vote at all, and one, Douglas Barnard of Georgia, voted present. Additionally, not vote was recorded in the Record for Thomas O’Neill of Massachusetts, then the Speaker of the House.\footnote{Congressional Record for 1981, p. 23872.} This, of course, only accounts for 434 Representatives, when the House normally consists of 435 members. The missing member was William Cotter of Connecticut who had died on September 8, 1981, a month and six days before the vote, and was not replaced by Barbara Kennelly until January 12, 1982.\footnote{Again, these data are from the bioguide.congress.gov website.}

Of the 301 who voted against the sale, sixty-six, or about 22%, lost their seats to election challenges, sixteen of those to primary challenges and the other fifty to general election challenges.\footnote{Ibid.} Of the 111 who voted for the sale, twenty-eight, or about 25%, lost their seats, eight of them in primaries and the other twenty in general elections. Of the twenty who voted present, five, or 25% again, lost their seats, only one, Gus Savage of Illinois, in a primary, and the other four in general elections. Neither Barnard nor O’Neill were defeated by challengers.\footnote{Ibid.} I should mention one caveat in the way these data are recorded: Bob Dornan of California, who voted against the sale, was not a candidate in 1982, but successfully ran again in 1984, and served until his defeat in 1996.\footnote{Ibid.} Likewise, Bill Hendon of North Carolina, who also voted against the sale, was defeated in 1982, but ran again in 1984 and served until he was defeated again in 1986.\footnote{Ibid.} I have coded Hendon as having lost his seat, but not Dornan, because that was not why he left the first time after the sale, and the second time he left was quite a while afterwards. If I were to code him as having lost his seat, the percentage of those who voted against the sale and lost
their seats would rise to about 22.3%, not much of an increase, but one which would make the difference between the percentages less likely to be significant; coding Dornan as not having lost his seat is thus a little bit charitable to the lobby hypothesis.

In the end, however, it makes no difference, because these proportions produce a chi-squared value of 1.15, approximately. With four degrees of freedom, that is not only not significant at the 95% certainty level, it is not even significant at the 25% level.

Some might object, however, on the grounds that adding the other categories besides for and against somewhat artificially increases the degrees of freedom. The truth is, though, that even at one degree of freedom, the difference would still be insignificant at the 75% certainty level, to say nothing of the 95% level. Ergo, we can confidently not reject the null hypothesis, and thus conclude that how a Representative voted on the AWACS sale had no real effect on his chances of losing his seat to a challenger. The lobby hypothesis, then, is disconfirmed, and again rather strongly, by this test.

Again, though, when looking at the House, we should also look at whether supporting the Israel lobby’s agenda had any observable effect on Representatives chances of moving on to a higher office. We would expect to find that if the lobby hypothesis were accurate, those Representatives who voted against the AWACS sale would be more likely than those who did not to subsequently get elected to higher office. Again, of course, the higher office for which a member of the House is most likely to run is a seat in the Senate; additionally, a politician known to be friendly is likely to be more useful to the lobby in the Senate than in any other office, and one known to be unfriendly is likely to be more damaging there. I have once again, though, counted the number of Representatives who were later elected state governors, and run the test once counting
only promotions to the Senate, and again counting both promotions to the Senate and to governorships.

What we find is that, of the 301 Representatives who voted against the sale, eighteen, or about 6%, were subsequently elected to the Senate. Of the 111 who voted for the sale, five, or about 4.5%, were later elected to the Senate. Of the twenty who did not vote, one, Wyche Fowler of Georgia, or 5%, was elected to the Senate. Neither Barnaby nor O’Neill later became Senators. These numbers yield a chi-squared value of approximately 0.47, with, again, 4 degrees of freedom. Clearly, this is nowhere near high enough to reject the null hypothesis at 95% certainty; in fact, it is not high enough to reject the null hypothesis with even as little as 2.5% certainty. And even if one were to object to the use of 4 degrees of freedom and insist on only 1 degree of freedom, that would still just barely be enough to reject the null hypothesis with 50% certainty, but not anything higher, and certainly not at the 95% level. We can therefore very confidently not reject the null hypothesis that how one voted on the AWACS sale had no bearing on one’s chances of later becoming a Senator.

If we also look at governorships, what we find is that four of the Congressmen who voted against the sale were later elected to governorships, for a total of 22 promotions, or about 7.3% from that category. Of those who voted for the sale, one, Carroll Campbell of South Carolina, was elected governor, for a total of six promotions, or about 5.4% of that category. No one from any of the other categories was elected governor. These revised values yield a chi-squared statistic of about 0.71, which is indeed a little bit higher. Indeed, with 4 degrees of freedom, it is just about exactly high

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67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
enough to reject the null hypothesis with about 5% certainty, but no more, and again nowhere near 95% certainty. Even with only 1 degree of freedom, we would not reject the null hypothesis at the 75% certainty level, much less the 95% level. We can therefore again confidently not reject the null hypothesis that how one voted on the AWACS sale had no effect on one’s chances for promotion from the House of Representatives.

This test, or these two tests if one wishes to think of promotions to the Senate and total promotions separately, although I would not, clearly disconfirms the lobby hypothesis. The Israel lobby, to be effective, would have to prevent its opponents from moving to positions of greater influence, and would likewise be very wise to move its supporters to such positions. And yet what we have found is that there is no evidence that the lobby had any success in doing so following a vote that all agree was of great importance to the lobby. Instead, the data indicate that a Representative’s chances of being promoted were completely independent of how he voted on the AWACS sale. This is a significant failure for the lobby hypothesis.

We shall now turn our attention to how long Representatives served depending on how they voted, since, again, pressure from the lobby might induce a Congressman to retire early even if he were never defeated in an election. What we find is that those who voted against the sale served for approximately 17.87 years on average, or nearly nine full terms; the variance was rather large at approximately 103.97, which is not too surprising when one considers that fourteen of these Representatives served only a single term, while, at the other extreme, John Dingell of Michigan will have served for 56 years as of the end of his current term, which for all we know may not be his last.69 On the other hand, Representatives who voted for the AWACS sale served for approximately

69 Ibid.
17.66 years on average, or about seventy-seven days less; the variance in this case is also
less, albeit still quite large, at about 86.48, which is again not all that surprising
considering that four Representatives from this group served only a single term, while at
the other extreme Jamie Whitten of Missouri served 54 years. With means this close
together and variances this large, it is likewise not surprising that we get a t-statistic of
roughly 0.2, which, at 214 degrees of freedom, is not only nowhere near 1.65 needed to
be significant at the 95% level, it is not even enough to be significant at the 25% level.
Once again, we can have great confidence in our decision not to reject the null
hypothesis.

When we look at how long Representatives served after the sale, what we find is
that the mean tenure after the sale of those who voted against it was approximately 11.1
years, or a little more than five-and-a-half terms; the variance in this case was of course
also lower than before, at about 64.16, which is nevertheless still large compared to the
mean tenure. The mean tenure afterwards of those who voted for the sale was exactly ten
years, or five terms, with a variance of about 51.07, which is again, smaller than before,
but still large relative to the mean. In any case, these means and variances yield a value
for t of roughly 1.34, which, while more than six times the value for t for total tenure, is
still substantially less than the 1.65 we would need to reject the null hypothesis at the
95% confidence level.

Given that there is a much larger difference between the means afterwards than
the total means, four hundred days versus about seventy-seven days, this result is not too
surprising. Moreover, on one level, this result does accord with what we would expect
from the lobby hypothesis: a greater difference of mean time afterwards than for total

70 Ibid.
time. Nonetheless, in neither case is the difference statistically significant. It must therefore be said that the lobby hypothesis is disconfirmed by these two tests as well. One might object that this test is not particularly conclusive, because there are, after all, many ways one might leave the House prematurely; there is a big difference between leaving the House to join the Senate and leaving because one has lost a reelection bid. This objection would have power, though, only if we had not already found that there were no statistically significant differences on either of those scores. As such, if the lobby hypothesis were true, than we should expect that the Israel lobby would effectively help those who voted with it to serve longer while successfully shortening the tenures of its opponents; what we have found is that any such efforts on the lobby’s part made no discernible impact that is not more likely to have been caused by random chance.

Next, we should also look at speech totals and tenure in the House. We shall start, again, by plotting total tenure in the House as a function of speech sums.
Again, as with the results for the Senate, a much larger proportion of the House spoke out on the AWACS sale than on the previous two sales we have looked at. Unlike what we saw with the Senate, there were no Representatives who spoke dozens of more times than almost any of their peers; consequently, the scale of the x-axis is much smaller.

Nevertheless, a few members did make themselves heard more frequently than most: Clement Zablocki of Wisconsin made six remarks against the sale, plus another three that I coded as neutral, for a speech sum of -6; Chuck Schumer of New York made six remarks against the sale plus another four that he inserted, for a speech sum of ten; and Jack Kemp, also of New York, made eleven speeches against the sale, for a speech sum of eleven.

Most importantly, though, what we see from this graph is that there was a clear, albeit slight, downward, that is negative, slope to the regression line. Indeed, the slope of the trend line is roughly -0.18, which, while again not extremely large, does suggest that speaking out against the sale correlated with a shorter total tenure in the House, and, inversely, that speaking out for the sale tended to correlate with a longer tenure. It must be noted, however, that Zablocki does represent something of an outlier in this case, to the point that if we were to remove him from the analysis, the slope of the trend line would rise to -0.065, a level which is much less clear in its significance. It should be noted that neither Schumer nor Kemp represent outliers in this case, as the points representing them are very close to the line; remove them along with Zablocki, and the slope falls slightly to -0.093, roughly, still basically a flat line. All in all, though, these results do tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, since they mean that, at best, the lobby was not able to produce any noticeable effect on the tenures in office of Representatives,
or that, at worst, it was not even able to overcome whatever may have been causing the tenures of those who spoke for the sale to be longer, on average, than those who spoke against it.

We see a rather different picture, however, when we look only at tenure after the sale as a function of speech sums:

![Chart 21: Tenure after AWACS sale vs. Speech Sums](chart.png)

In this case, we see a clear upward trend; the slope of the regression line is about 0.27, which, while certainly not very high, is pretty clearly significant. This result does tend to confirm the lobby hypothesis, because this is the result it would predict: supporting the lobby’s position tended to lengthen one’s time in office after the sale. This confirmation is limited, however, by two factors: first, there is again the plain fact that if this positive result was the work of the Israel lobby, then it is nonetheless the case that the lobby was not able to lengthen the tenure of Representatives after the sale enough to give them longer total tenures, on average. That in turn suggests that we may yet again be seeing the phenomenon that short-timers in Congress may have been more likely to take the side
favored by the Israel lobby, while veterans may have been more likely to oppose that side.

The second factor is, again, that removing only a few outliers does significantly change the results. If we were to remove Zablocki again, along with Barney Frank of Massachusetts, who made three speeches against the sale and inserted three more and who will have served for 29 years after the sale as of his next election, and Tom Lantos of California, who made four remarks against the sale and inserted a fifth and who served for 27 years after the sale, then we find that the slope drops to the insignificant, if still positive level of approximately 0.02, which would be essentially a flat line. In other words, the bulk of the observed positive trend seems to be a statistical artifact of only three Representatives out of the whole House. It could well be that it was just a matter of random chance that two of the Representatives who were very vociferously against the sale happened to have been elected to very safe seats just that previous November, while the Representative most vocally for the sale had been in office since 1949.

In sum, then, the results from looking at how Representatives spoke on the AWACS sale are mixed. On the one hand, because a much higher proportion of the House spoke on the issue than on the previous two sales, the results have greater significance. On the other hand, we see a negative trend for total time as a function of speech sums, but a positive trend for time afterwards. Both trends are small but still clearly significant, which in and of itself might imply that the Israel lobby was able to have an effect, but one not large enough to offset the fact that those who spoke for the sale were likely to have served for longer in total. But since both trends for all intents and purposes disappear upon the removal of only a few outliers, it may be more likely
that both were simply random accidents, and not indicative of anything important. If so, that would not be consistent with the lobby hypothesis.

When we turn to look at resolution sponsorship in the House of Representatives on the subject of the AWACS sale, we find, in contradistinction to the previous two sales, only a single example, House Concurrent Resolution (H. Con. Res.) 194, which was co-sponsored by twenty-four Congressmen. Because of this, we are dealing with an essentially binary variable: either a Representative co-sponsored this resolution or he did not. As such, regression analysis would not be appropriate in this case, but we can perform difference-of-means tests to determine whether those who sponsored the resolution of disapproval served significantly longer on average, as well as goodness-of-fit tests to determine whether H. Con. Res. 194 co-sponsors were significantly less likely to lose their seats to election challengers, and significantly more likely to get promoted, whether to the Senate or to Governorships.

What we find in the first case is that the twenty-four co-sponsors of H. Con. Res. 194 served, on average, about 16.58 years, or about eight-and-one-quarter terms, in the House in total, while their colleagues who did not sponsor the resolution served about 17.78 years, or just a few months shy of nine terms, on average. The variances in each case were approximately 89.99 and 101.86, respectively. It should be noted, of course, that those who did not sponsor the resolution of disapproval served for more time, on average, than those who did, which is clearly not what the lobby hypothesis would have predicted. Our t-test, however, yields a value for t of approximately 0.60, with 439 degrees of freedom. This is not significant even at the 75% certainty level, much less the 95% level, which suggests that we are dealing with no significant difference in mean total
tenure. This is not, then, the opposite of what the lobby hypothesis would have led us to expect, but it still tends to disconfirm said hypothesis, which would have led us to expect that those who sponsored the resolution of disapproval would have served longer, on average.

A similar picture emerges when we only look at tenure after the sale. What we find is that the twenty-four co-sponsors served for approximately 10.29 years after 1981 on average, while their colleagues served for roughly 10.50 years on average, or a little more than five terms in both cases. The variances were also quite close in this case, at about 61.00 and 60.57, respectively. Again, then, those who did not sponsor the resolution of disapproval served longer on average, although in this case the difference was very small. So small, in fact, that we get a value for t of only 0.13, approximately, with of course the same number of degrees of freedom. This result is not even significant at the 60% level, much less the 95% level, so we can with high confidence not reject the null hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the means. Again, this is different from what the lobby hypothesis would have led us to expect, since it would have predicted that those who sponsored the resolution of disapproval ought to have lasted longer in office. This test, too, then, disconfirms the lobby hypothesis.

Turning now to look at what caused Representatives’ tenures to end, we find that seven of the twenty-four sponsors of H. Con. Res. 194, or about 29%, lost their seats to election challenges, five in general elections and two in primaries. By contrast, 92 out of their 417 colleagues, or about 22%, lost their seats, 69 in general elections and 23 in primaries. Since those who did not sponsor the resolution against the sale were less likely to lose their seats, it remains only to determine whether this was a statistically
significant difference. What we find for our chi-squared value is approximately 0.66 with one degree of freedom. This is not statistically significant even at the 60% certainty level, much less the 95% level, so we can one again with some confidence not discard the null hypothesis. Even though we should probably therefore not conclude that those who sponsored the resolution were more likely to lose their seats, this still disconfirms the lobby hypothesis, since it predicts that those who sponsored the resolution would be less likely to lose their seats. Instead, we have found no significant difference.

When we look at whether sponsors of the resolution were more likely to become Senators later on, we find that of them, only Olympia Snowe of Maine, for a proportion of about 4.2%, later moved to the upper house, while about 5.5%, or twenty-three of the non-sponsors, later became Senators. Again, this would appear to be the opposite of what the lobby hypothesis would lead us to expect, but it is still worth asking if this difference is statistically significant. What we find for chi-squared is approximately 0.08, with again only a single degree of freedom. As such, this difference cannot even be said to be statistically significant with 25% certainty, to say nothing of 95% certainty. As such, we can confidently not reject the null hypothesis. Once again, this still disconfirms the lobby hypothesis, since it suggests that sponsoring a resolution that the Israel lobby appears to have vociferously supported had no effect on one’s chances of later becoming a Senator.

These results hardly improve when we add in those who later moved into Governorships as well as into Senate seats, because while five members of the House in 1981 later became Governors, none of them were sponsors of H. Con. Res. 194, meaning that when we look at total number and proportion of promotions, we find that while still
only 4.1% of sponsors were promoted, 6.7%, roughly, of non-sponsors were. This causes our chi-squared value to increase to about 0.24, with still only a single degree of freedom. This is clearly a larger value, but still not significant at 40% certainty, much less 95% certainty. We should still, therefore, not reject the null hypothesis. We can reasonably conclude, as such, that sponsoring the resolution of disapproval had no effect on one’s odds of moving to a higher office.

Results for All Sales Concatenated

It should by this point be apparent that many Senators and Representatives were in office during more than one of the three arms sales we have been looking at. This should hardly be surprising, considering that only six years, or the length of a single Senate term, passed between the I-HAWK sale in 1975 and the AWACS sale in 1981. One might object, though, that even if a Senator or Representative’s position on a single one of these sales might have had little or no effect on his career, perhaps there would be some observable effect if we looked at our putative member of Congress’ overall track record on these arms sales. The premise of this objection would presumably be that the Israel lobby might choose only to act for or against a particular politician based on some kind of consistent pattern of behavior for said politician, not on the basis of a single policy decision. I shall endeavor now to address this objection by examining how members of Congress acted with regard to all the sales together.

If we continue to assume that the thing the lobby cared about the most was how each member of Congress actually voted, then we are faced with the unfortunate fact that the House only voted on one of the arms sales, and the Senate only on two. Still, it is worth looking at those two votes in the Senate together. What we find first of all is that,
of the one hundred Senators who were in office in 1978, only sixty-two were still in the Senate in 1981; this represents a fairly substantial turnover, since only a third of the Senate faces reelection every two years, but this can be explained by the Republican takeover of the upper house in the 1980 elections. In any case, of the sixty-two who voted on both the original F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia and the AWACS add-on, fifteen, or just over 24%, changed sides.

Of those fifteen, five, Bob Dole of Kansas, Pete Domenici of New Mexico, John Melcher of Montana, Sam Nunn of Georgia, and Edward Zorinsky of Nebraska, went from voting against the F-15 sale to voting for the AWACS sale. The other ten, Lloyd Bentsen of Texas, Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, Bob Byrd of West Virginia, Howard Cannon of Nevada, John Danforth and Thomas Eagleton of Missouri, John Glenn of Ohio, Ernest Hollings of South Carolina, Daniel Inouye of Hawaii, and Pat Leahy of Vermont, all switched from voting for the F-15 sale to voting against the AWACS sale. Also, Walter Huddleston of Kentucky and Paul Laxalt of Nevada, who did not vote on the F-15 sale, both voted for the AWACS sale. Everyone else voted the same way on both sales.

There are several ways of interpreting these data. One might suppose, for instance, that the fact that twice as many Senators switched from voting for to against as vice versa might indicate the success of the lobby in wooing or intimidating Senators into supporting its positions. There is, however, an alternate explanation: almost all of those who switched from supporting the F-15 sale in 1978 to opposing the AWACS sale in 1981 were Democrats; John Danforth was the only Republican among the ten.

Considering that the President who proposed the F-15 sale was a Democrat, while his
successor who proposed the AWACS sale was a Republican, it might be that simple partisan politics was at work; Democrats might be more likely to support a controversial arms sale by a Democrat than by a Republican. It should also be noted, though, that the majority of those who switched in the other direction, from opposing the F-15 sale to supporting the AWACS sale were also Democrats; only two of those five, Dole and Domenici, were Republicans. Of the two who went from not voting to voting for the AWACS sale, Huddleston was a Democrat and Laxalt a Republican.

In any case, we should also look at what happened to Senators based on how they voted in both cases. Of course, this presents a coding problem: while it is fairly obvious how to code those who voted the same way on each sale, how should we look at those who switched? One point of view might hold that voting a different way each time might be seen by the lobby as a wash, and it would therefore be indifferent toward those Senators. Alternatively, it is possible that the lobby would see those who switched from opposing the 1978 sale to supporting the 1981 sale as traitors, who ought to be treated doubly harshly, while those who switched in the opposite direction might be seen as new converts who ought especially to be encouraged. On the other hand, perhaps the lobby would see this latter group as unreliable friends, to be helped, perhaps, all else being equal, but not with anything like the priority of its more faithful supporters. Likewise, perhaps the lobby would see the former group as supporters who had merely gone temporarily astray, and who ought therefore not to be treated too harshly. Or, quite possibly, the lobby itself might not be sure how to treat this group. As such, I plan to deal with the statistical analyses in two ways: first, I shall perform each analysis while
simply disregarding the switchers; then, where appropriate or possible, I shall look at the
data again while including the switchers, to see if any kind of different picture emerges.

To begin with, then, we ask what if any effect a Senator's cumulative voting
pattern had on his reelection chances. What we find is that of the twenty-two Senators
who voted for both sales, three, Charles Percy of Illinois, Harrison Schmitt of New
Mexico, and Ted Stevens of Alaska, or approximately 13.3%, lost their seats to general
election challenges, none to primary challenges. The same number, and thus nearly the
same proportion, of the twenty-three Senators who voted against both sales lost their
seats to general election and primary challenges; the three in this case were William Roth
of Delaware, James Sasser of Tennessee, and Lowell Weicker of Connecticut, which
producing a proportion of just over 13% in this case. Of the five who voted against and
then for, only Melcher lost his seat, in a general election, or 20% of the total. Of the ten
for voted for and then against, only Cannon lost his seat, again in a general election,
producing a proportion this time of 10% only. By contrast, of the two who did not vote
in 1978 and voted for the AWACS sale, 50% lost their seats, since Huddleston was
defeated in a general election.

With respect to the two consistent groups, the proportions are very nearly
identical; it is not at all unlikely that this small difference is due to random chance.
Looking at the other groups, although the proportions fluctuate more widely, this is
probably still due to random chance, simply because the groups themselves are much
smaller. Indeed, when we perform a goodness-of-fit test using all five groups, we get a
value of approximately 2.37 for our chi-squared value. With four degrees of freedom,
this is not only not significant at the 95% certainty level, it is not even significant at the
50% certainty level. We can thus with great confidence not discard the null hypothesis, and should therefore conclude that it is most likely that how one voted on both of these two sales had no significant impact on one’s reelection chances.

Of course, if we only look at those who voted the same way each time, the degrees of freedom drops to merely one, but the chi-squared value drops to 0.0034, roughly speaking, which is hardly surprising given how close the two proportions are. Not only is this value nowhere near significant at the 95% level, it is not even significant at the 5% level, even with only one degree of freedom. This is a remarkable level of insignificance; we can therefore conclude with even greater confidence that voting for both sales or neither had no effect on one’s reelection chances. This is strongly disconfirming of the lobby hypothesis, since it suggests that committed opponents and committed supporters of the lobby’s positions had just as much of a chance of losing their seats to election challengers. This implies that the lobby had no success in affecting election outcomes, which is not what the lobby hypothesis would predict.

We should also look at what effect, if any, voting for or against both sales had on a Senator’s tenure in office. After all, if consistent supporters of the lobby’s positions tended to serve for significantly longer than consistent opponents thereof, that would still tend to confirm the lobby hypothesis. Since we shall be using a difference-of-means test, we shall perforce only be comparing the average tenures of consistent supporters and consistent opponents. Also, because we are looking at the effects of voting the same way both times, we shall look at total tenure and tenure after the 1981 sale.

What we find in the former case is that the twenty-three Senators who voted against both the F-15 sale and the AWACS sale served, on average, for approximately
25.04 years, or about four terms and one year, in total. Their colleagues who voted for both sales served, on average, for approximately 24.95 years, or, again, about a year more than four terms. While these means are clearly very close, it must be pointed out that their variances are rather different: approximately 79.68 and 137.18, respectively. This yields a value for t of approximately 0.03 with 43 degrees of freedom. This is not even significant at the 60% certainty level, much less the 95% level. We can thus with high confidence not discard the null hypothesis that there is no real difference in mean total tenure. This again tends to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, since it would predict that consistent supporters of its positions would tend to serve for more time.

That being said, note should be made of the fact that, not for the first time, we observe a noticeably higher variance in the mean for supporters of the sale or sales. This implies that even though they were serving for approximately the same time on average, their individual tenures were much more widely distributed. It is not entirely clear what, if anything, this might signify. It is not at all clear, for instance, that this state of affairs would benefit the lobby, since it necessitates that for every supporter of the arms sales to the Saudis who left the Senate unusually quickly, another stayed on for an unusually long time, an important consideration in a body like the Senate where seniority is of importance. In short, I do not know that this is a matter of importance for the question under consideration, but it ought to be noted once again.

In any case, what we find when we look only at tenure after both sales had been voted upon, that is, after 1981, what we find is that Senators who voted against both sales served, on average, for about 13.87 years, or just under two-and-a-third terms after 1981, while their colleagues who voted for both served, on average, for roughly 11.82, or just
under two terms after the AWACS sale. Unsurprisingly, the variances of the two means are further apart, being about 56.21 and 92.06, respectively. More importantly, the difference of the means in this case is just about two years, or a third of a term. While this is obviously a much larger difference than before, it yields a t-statistic of only about 0.80, still less than half of what would be required, with 43 degrees of freedom, to be significant at the 95% level. Indeed, it is not quite high enough to be significant at the 80% level either. While we cannot then have quite as much confidence in not discarding the null hypothesis, we can still have fairly reasonable confidence in not discarding it. It is still likely that the difference we have observed owes to simple random chance. Once again, then, this tends to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis.

What we have found, then, is that how a Senator voted on both the 1978 and 1981 arms sales, when looked at together, produced no statistically significant effect upon that Senator’s reelection chances, nor upon his tenure in office, whether in total or after the two sales had both been voted upon. This is important, because we would expect that the Israel lobby would be especially concerned with those politicians who showed a consistent pattern of supporting or opposing its goals. That being said, it might be argued that those Senators who were in office long enough to vote on both sales might be expected to be less susceptible to the efforts of the lobby, one way or the other, by simple dint of the fact that they had already shown themselves to be survivors. While that argument may have some merit, it should also be remembered that only about half a single Senate term passed between the two sales. That argument may have greater merit, however, when we look at the effects of supporting resolutions and making speeches with respect to all three sales. This is especially so when looking at the House of
Representatives, where the span from the I-HAWK sale in 1975 to the AWACS sale in 1981 would have been the equivalent of three terms, as opposed to just one for the Senate.

As far as looking at the fates of those who sponsored resolutions regarding all three sales, we shall not bother with the Senate, for the following reason: every Senator who co-sponsored the resolution of disapproval against the I-HAWK sale was out of office by the time the AWACS sale came up for debate, and we have already seen that there was only a single sponsor in the Senate, William Proxmire, of the resolution of disapproval in 1978. As such, we would essentially be duplicating our examination of the effects of resolution sponsorship in 1981, and would learn nothing new. Also, we have already seen the outcome of the effects of resolution sponsorship in 1975. While it is worth reiterating that none of the sponsors in 1975 were still in office by 1981, we need not repeat our analysis of that. We shall turn instead to looking at speech sums over the course of all three sales.

Before proceeding to our analysis, however, it must be noted that one might reasonably ask whether speeches should be weighted differently depending upon what year they were made in, and in response to which sale. Some might argue that the lobby would have cared more about more recent speeches, and therefore those from 1981 should be weighted more heavily than those from the prior two sales. On the other hand, that would lead us into largely reproducing the analysis of speeches from 1981, when the whole point of this particular inquiry is to look at the cumulative effect of speeches on all three sales. By contrast, one might argue that since there were fewer speeches in general made in the earlier debates, especially in 1975, those should be weighted more heavily,
since they probably would have made a larger impression, rather than be drowned out by all the other speeches. On the other hand, the fact that fewer speeches were being made in general might indicate that people cared less in general, and that the speeches that were made then should be weighted less. I am rather unsure how to resolve these questions, but I have decided to go with the simplest solution and just weight them all the same. Of course, this means that Senators who changed their minds from one sale to the next will have low totals even if they spoke a lot, but this should actually capture the ambivalence we might expect the lobby to feel about such politicians. In general though, these are yet more reasons why I consider evidence from speeches to be less powerful than that from the actual votes.

In any case, what we find is that, as can be seen in the following graph, there is a positive correlation between speech totals, that is, the total of each Senator’s speech sums for all three sales, and total tenure in the Senate. This trend is even more pronounced when looking only at tenure after all three sales.
For brevity’s sake, I have included the plots of both total tenure and tenure after 1981 on a single graph. In both cases, we see a rather wide scattering of points, but again, in both cases regression analysis does indicate an upward trend. In neither case, however, is the trend extremely strong. For total tenure, regression upon speech totals produces a regression line with a slope of approximately 0.12, while regression upon speech totals of time after 1981 yields a higher slope of 0.26, roughly. So on the one hand, we see the results predicted by the lobby hypothesis: Senators with a record of speaking on balance against arms sales to the Arab states tended to serve longer than their colleagues with a record of speaking on balance in favor of such sales in total, and even more so when looking only at how long they served after all three sales. On the other hand, the effect is fairly weak in both cases, and it is clear just from looking at the wild scattering of points that there was a great deal of variation in both cases. So this test, or rather these two tests tend to confirm the lobby hypothesis, but only weakly.

We shall now turn to look at the House of Representatives. Since the lower chamber came to a vote only on the AWACS sale, and not on the previous two sales, we shall only be able to look at speech sums and resolution sponsorship. We should first note that two-hundred and twenty-three Representatives were in the House during all three debates. Of those, the majority, one-hundred and thirty-one, to be exact, gave no speeches on either side of any of the sales; it should also be noted that they were the only ones who had speech totals of zero. That is, no one made a speech on one side of one sale and then on the other side of a later one; in fact, no one spoke one way on one sale and another way on a later sale, suggesting little changing of minds in either direction by those who were in the House for all three sales, although obviously there were many who
spoke one way on one or two sales but made no remarks on the other one or two. In any case, those with positive speech totals were the next largest group, numbering seventy-six, while those with negative speech totals made up the remaining sixteen. The question we then ask is how long did each Representative serve, both in total and after 1981 as a function of how he spoke on the three sales:

As can be seen from this graph, the overall trend in both cases is downward, although more pronouncedly so in the case of total time. Indeed, regression analysis of total tenure on speech totals produces a trend line with a slope of -0.35, approximately, while regression of tenure after 1981 on speech totals yields a slope of the -0.01, roughly, for the trend line, which is for all intents and purposes flat.

In neither case is this what the lobby hypothesis would have led us to expect. Rather, it would have predicted that Representatives who consistently spoke in favor of the lobby’s positions would have served for more time, both in total and after all three sales, than those who consistently spoke against the lobby’s positions. Instead, we find
that those who consistently opposed the lobby’s views tended to serve longer, on balance, both in total and afterwards, although only in the former case is that trend significant. In the latter case, of tenure after the sale, the basic trend appears to have been that how one spoke had no effect on one’s survival thereafter.

One could argue that this provides some support for the lobby hypothesis, since the downward total trend disappears when we just look at time after the sale, and the hypothesis of course only predicts that the lobby should react to Congressmens’ speeches after they are made. This argument is reasonable as far as it goes, but it does not go very far at all. The simple fact is that all that this would indicate is that all the lobby’s efforts on behalf of its supporters and against its opponents had been just strong enough to make which side a Congressman spoke on a matter of indifference to his political longevity. This is hardly a sign of a powerful and effective lobbying group.

One could also argue, and hardly for the first time, that the best course for those who wanted to stay in office the longest, would have been to say nothing, as those who took no side seem to have survived the longest. It must be noted that this may just be a statistical artifact of the fact there are many more Representatives who said nothing either way, and so we expect a greater distribution of tenures among them, at both ends of the scale. But even if we really are seeing a significant fact, that fact is bad enough in itself for the lobby hypothesis, since it would indicate that one was better off keeping one’s mouth shut than speaking up on the same side as the Israel lobby. The one caveat to bear in mind is that speech-making is not as strong an independent variable as actual voting, or even resolution sponsorship, so even though the lobby hypothesis cannot be said to have
passed either of these tests, these failures are not very important, at least not by themselves.

In any case, turning to the issue of resolution sponsorship, what we find first is that of the 223 Representatives who were in office during the debates on all three arms sales, 86 sponsored at least one resolution of disapproval. Plotting the number of resolutions sponsored by each Congressman against his tenure in the House, both in total and after all three sales should show us any trends that emerge:

![Chart 24: Tenure in House as a Function of Total Resolution Sponsorships](chart)

We see that once again there is a fairly wide scattering of points, indicating that even if sponsoring resolutions against the arms sales to the Arab states did tend to lengthen a Representative’s time in office, it did so unreliably. In fact, though, when regress total time served in the House on the total number of resolutions co-sponsored by each Representative, we get a trend-line with a slightly downward slope of -0.07, approximately. This, represented by the solid line in the above graph, is essentially flat, indicating no real trend. This is, again, not the result predicted by the lobby hypothesis.
When we regress time served after 1981, however, a rather different picture emerges. In this case, we get a regression line, represented by the dotted line on the graph above, with a slope of about 0.56, which represents a meaningful, albeit hardly enormous, upward trend. That is, there does appear to be some direct correlation between sponsoring resolutions against arms sales to the Arab states and serving longer in the House. This does tend to provide some confirmation to the lobby hypothesis.

The degree of this confirmation should not, however, be overstated, considering two caveats that merit mention. First, let us assume that the Israel lobby was in fact able, after 1981, to keep Representatives who had supported its agenda in office longer. Even accepting that premise, we must necessarily conclude that this effect was a weak one, since we have already seen that the lobby was not able to lengthen the tenures of its partisans overall. Had the lobby been able to produce a larger effect, one would expect it to show up even in the overall tenures.

Second, there is the simple fact that if we remove only two outliers, John Dingell of Michigan and Henry Waxman of California, the slope of the regression line falls to just under 0.02, which is essentially a flat line. That does suggest, at the very least, that if the lobby was generating any effect, it was doing so by means of aiding only one or two friendly members of the House a great deal. Would that translate into influence over the House as a whole? So while regressing time served after 1981 on total resolutions does tend to confirm the lobby hypothesis, it does not do so very powerfully.

There is, however, another way of looking at these same data that might clarify the situation, if we treat resolution sponsorship as a binary variable, meaning that each Congressman is coded as either having sponsored at least one resolution against at least
one sale or not having done so, we can then perform a difference-of-means test to compare the average tenures of sponsors and non-sponsors. Since the two groups had average total tenures of approximately 22.07 and 22.18, respectively, with corresponding variances of 90.37 and 98.74, we get a value for t for total tenure of approximately 0.08 with 221 degrees of freedom. This is not only not significant at the 95% certainty level, but also not at the 55% level, indicating that we can have real confidence in not rejecting the null hypothesis. This corresponds to what we found with our regression analysis; those who did not sponsor any resolutions did serve a little longer on average, but not statistically significantly so. This does therefore tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis.

Performing the same test using tenure after 1981, we find that the averages for the two groups fall to roughly 10.49 and 9.21, respectively, with corresponding variances of 51.78 and 54.05, approximately. This yields a t-statistic of just under 1.28 with again 221 degrees of freedom. This clearly much higher value for t is still not significant at the 95% certainty level, and it is in fact just barely low enough to still be insignificant at the 90% level. This again comports with what we found with our regression analysis: the difference in means is greater, but still not significant at the level of certainty generally accepted in statistical research. We can have sufficient confidence, therefore, to not reject the null hypothesis, which of course tends to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis.

Turning now to the issue of whether resolution sponsors were more or less likely to lose their seats in election challenges, we find that eighteen of the eighty-six Representatives, just under 21%, who sponsored at least one resolution of disapproval lost their seats to election challenges, three of them in primaries and the rest in general elections. Of their colleagues, twenty-nine of one-hundred thirty-seven, or just over 21%,
lost their seats, nine of them in primaries and the rest in general elections. Given such similar proportions, it is not surprising that we get a value of chi-squared of only 0.0018, rounding up. Even with only a single degree of freedom, that is not even significant at the 5% certainty level, much less the 95% level. We can therefore with great confidence not reject the null hypothesis that there is no real difference in the probability of a Representative losing a reelection bid depending on whether he sponsored any of these resolutions. This again tends to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis.

We see a similar result when we look at the proportions of Representatives who later won election to the Senate. Of the eighty-six sponsors, three, Paul Simon, James Jeffords, and Timothy Wirth, or just under 3.5%, were later elected to the Senate, while among their colleagues, four, John Breaux, James Broyhill, Trent Lott, and Tom Harkin, or just under 3%, later won a seat in the upper chamber. This produces a somewhat greater value for chi-squared, 0.056, approximately, but one which, even at one degree of freedom, is still not significant at the 20% level, much less the 95% level. We can once again have great confidence, albeit not quite as great, in saying that sponsoring a resolution of disapproval had no discernible impact on one’s chances of eventually making it to the Senate.

Something curious occurs, however, when we add in those elected to Governorships to the above analysis. An additional three of the sponsors, James Florio, James Martin, and James Blanchard, were later elected to Governorships, bringing the proportion of sponsors to be promoted up to almost 7%, while none of their colleagues became Governors, leaving their proportion unchanged. This in turn increases the chi-squared value to just over 2.03, still with only a single degree of freedom. Although
quite a bit higher, that is still not significant at the 95%, or even the 90% level of certainty, although it is just significant at the 85% level. Still, this does enable us not to reject the null hypothesis with enough confidence. It is still likely, then that this imbalance in the number of Governorships won by sponsors and non-sponsors is due to chance.

Summary of Arms Sales Data

It is probably worth summarizing the results gleaned from our analysis of these three arms sales and the debates around them. We have examined, both individually and collectively, three major arms sales to the Arab states, each opposed by the Israel lobby, and observed what became of the political careers of members of Congress depending on whether they sided with or against the lobby. We have used three separate indices to track their positions on the sales: how they spoke, what if any resolutions they sponsored, and how they voted. We then used four separate metrics for what happened to them politically: how long they served in office in total, how long they served after the sale, whether they lost their seats to election challenges, and, in the case of Representatives, whether they were subsequently elected to higher office, particularly the Senate. The lobby hypothesis clearly predicts that opponents of the sales would have served longer, at least on average, been less likely to lose their seats, and more likely to get promoted, than would their colleagues who supported the sales. Obviously, however, not every index or metric used for the independent variable could be measured against every single one used for the dependent variable.

With respect to the 1975 I-HAWK sale, how one spoke appears not to have confirmed the lobby hypothesis’s predictions. Regression analysis of how long
Representatives served in total on their respective speech sums produced a trend-line that was essentially flat, that is, with a slope close to zero. Regression of tenure after the sale for the House did produce a noticeable positive trend; even this, however, largely disappeared with the removal of a single outlier, indicating the trend was hardly a very widespread one. For the upper house, regression of speech sums on how long Senators served, both in total and after the sale, produced trend-lines that were noticeably negative, especially, although by no means only, in the former case. These two results stand in direct contradiction to the lobby hypothesis. That being said, these are not at all strong tests, mostly because only a relative handful of members in either chamber spoke on the issue at all; as such, they will only have much value as evidence if they reinforce other, stronger data, but if they are contradicted by stronger data, we would rightly disregard them.

Looking instead at resolution sponsorship in 1975, regression of the number of resolutions of disapproval co-sponsored by each Representative on how long each Representative served, both in total and after the sale, produced a mixed result: in the former case, there was a clear negative trend, but in the latter case, a clear positive one. When looking at resolution sponsorship in the Senate, we were dealing with a binary variable, and so used a difference-of-means test instead of regression analysis. What we found is that Senators who sponsored the resolution of disapproval served, on average, for significantly less time than their colleagues who did not, both in total and after the sale, but especially the latter. The results for the House are clearly ambiguous, but the results for the Senate both tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis. Again, these data are rather weak, and since the House data are ambiguous in any case, cannot tell us very
much. The Senate data, on the other hand, are at least consistent, and therefore have some probative value, especially when considered together with the other evidence taken from the Senate in this case.

One of the advantages to dealing with a binary variable with the Senate is that it also enables us to easily perform a goodness-of-fit test to determine whether resolution-sponsors were less likely to lose their seats to election challengers, as the lobby hypothesis predicts they would have been. What we find is that the proportion of resolution-sponsors who lost their seats was actually greater than the proportion of non-sponsors, and that this difference was statistically significant. This also tends to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis. Again, these data are not very strong evidence by themselves, but, together with the aforementioned data from the difference-of-means tests on tenure in the Senate, do reinforce the overall picture that emerges.

Turning to the 1978 F-15 sale, looking at speechmaking in the House of Representatives, we found when we regressed speech sums on tenure in the House, both in total and after the sale, we found in the former instance a modest but clear negative trend, and, in the latter, an essentially flat line with a slightly negative slope. Both of these results tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, which predicts a positive trend in both cases. In the Senate, on the other hand, we found such positive trends, again, clear if not enormous, in both instances. The only problem is that the positive slope was actually steeper in the former instance, that is, with respect to total tenure. This is important, because it suggests that if these positive trends were the work of the Israel lobby, then the lobby was able to react to Senators’ speeches before they were made; this might be possible, though, if the lobby knew who its allies and enemies were before-hand. In any
case, these data are rather stronger than the similar tests from 1975, for the simple reason that a much higher percentage of both chambers spoke on the issue. This is not to say that these tests are so powerful as to be decisive on their own, especially since the House and Senate data contradict one another. Again, though, they serve as elements within a larger body of evidence.

When it comes to resolution-sponsorship in the House in 1978, regression of both total tenure and tenure afterwards on number of resolutions sponsored produced in both instances essentially flat trend-lines, not the upward slopes predicted by the lobby hypothesis. By then treating resolution sponsorship as a binary variable, that is, rather than counting each resolution, simply dividing the House into sponsors and non-sponsors, we were then able to perform the same kind of tests we used in looking at the Senate in 1975. Difference-of-means tests indicated that there was no significant difference in how long, on average, sponsors and non-sponsors served after the sale. Likewise, goodness-of-fit tests demonstrated that there was no significant difference in sponsors’ and non-sponsors’ chances of losing their seats in election challenges, or of being elected to higher office. All of these results tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis. Because they all produce the same result, despite using different measures and testing methods, taken together they are a significant piece of evidence.

Only a single Senator sponsored all of the relevant resolutions in the upper house in 1978, so using resolution-sponsorship as a metric was impractical in that case. The Senate, however, actually came to a vote in 1978, which is the best of all possible measure of where Senators stood. First, we performed a goodness-of-fit test which indicated that, although Senators who voted against the sale were approximately twice as
likely to lose their seats in election challenges as those who voted for the sale, this was not a significant difference so long as we included the two Senators who abstained. Excluding those two, however, reduced the degrees of freedom of the test and thereby made the results significant. Both results tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis; the question is by how much. Difference-of-means tests for how long Senators served, both in total and after the sale, depending on how they voted, indicated no significant difference in either case. This also tends to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, which predicted clear differences, with the Senators who voted for the sale serving for significantly less time on average in both cases. These data form strong pieces of evidence, even taken individually, since tests of actual votes are, after all, tests of the entire chamber using the most important metric. Considering that the results all reinforce each other, these are a very strong piece of evidence.

With respect to the AWACS sale in 1981, we found that regression of total tenure in the House on speech sums tended to produce a small but not trivial downward-sloping trend-line, but that the slope became essentially flat upon the removal of a single outlier. Using time after the sale instead produced a trend-line with a small but noticeable upward trend; that too, however, disappeared with the removal of a few outliers. The former result tended, then to weakly disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, while the latter tended to weakly confirm it. With the Senate, interestingly enough, regression of speech sums on both total time and time afterwards produced upward-sloping trend-lines, trivially so in the former case, but significantly, if modestly, so in the latter. Moreover, these trends did not go away with the removal of a few outliers. As such, this tends to confirm the lobby hypothesis. None of these tests are very strong, although, since a higher proportion, a
majority, in fact, of both houses spoke than in either of the previous sales, they are not trivial or meaningless tests either, although they are the weakest tests performed in the 1981 case.

Turning to resolution sponsorship, we found that in the House, there was only a single resolution sponsored against the AWACS sale; there were two in the Senate, but both were co-sponsored by the same fifty Senators. As such, in both cases we were dealing with essentially binary variables, ruling out regression analysis, but simplifying difference-of-means and goodness-of-fit tests. In the House, the twenty-four co-sponsors served for slightly less time on average, both in total and after the sale, than the non-sponsors, but goodness-of-fits tests indicated that neither difference was significant. This still tends to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, since it would have predicted significant differences in the opposite direction. Likewise, a greater proportion of co-sponsors lost their seats to election challenges, while a lesser proportion later attained higher office, especially if we include governorships. Goodness-of-fit tests indicate again that these are not significant differences, but, again, the lobby hypothesis would have led us to expect significant differences in the opposite direction. Again, because these tests, using different metrics and methods, produce concurrent results, they are, taken together, of significant probative value.

We found similar results for the Senate: Senators who sponsored the two resolutions of disapproval served for less average time in total, albeit for more time after the sale. In neither case, however, was the difference significant. Likewise, a greater proportion of sponsors than non-sponsors lost their seats to election challenges, although, again, this was not a statistically significant result. All the same, these tests still tend to
disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, since it would have predicted significant differences, and, with the exception of time after the sale, in the opposite direction. These tests are quite strong, since half the Senate sponsored the resolutions, giving us a large sample size; taken together, they are stronger still.

Both chambers voted in 1981, and looking at the vote in the House, what we found was that while those who voted against the sale were slightly less likely to lose their seats to election challengers, slightly more likely to attain higher office, in neither case were these differences statistically significant. Likewise, while those who voted against the sale served longer on average, especially when counting only time after the sale, in neither case were these differences statistically significant. These tests, then, tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis. Again, moreover, tests based on actual votes are among the strongest possible, so these data are quite strong, especially since they tend to reinforce one another.

With respect to the vote in the Senate, we found that while those who voted for the sale were somewhat more likely to lose their seats to election challenges, this difference was insignificant. On the other hand, when we look at average time served in the Senate, both in total and after the sale, we found that those who voted for the sale served for less time in both cases, and that these differences were statistically significant. The only caveat to this would be that the difference was more significant in the former case, when one might have expected the latter. These results are mixed, then, with the goodness-of-fit test of losses of seats tending to disconfirm the hypothesis, but the difference-of-means test of tenures in office tending to confirm it. It is perhaps especially
difficult to know what to make of this because, again, these data are quite strong, being based on an actual vote.

Finally, we looked at the effects of how members of Congress behaved with regard to all the sales. Regression of tenure in office on speech sums over the course of all three sales produced in the House downward-sloping trend-lines for both total tenure and tenure after all three sales, although in the former case the line was essentially flat. The same analysis in the Senate produced somewhat upward-sloping trend-lines in both cases, more pronouncedly with time after. Even this result was not particularly strong, though. In any case, the House results tended to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis, while the Senate results tended to confirm it. These tests, again, are not very strong, although they are perhaps a little stronger than when looking at speeches for individual sales.

While analysis of resolution-sponsorship in the Senate over the course of all three sales would not produce meaningful results, in the House we found that such regression produced an essentially flat line for total tenure, but an upward sloping line for tenure afterwards. This upward trend basically disappears, however, with the removal of only two outliers. As such, any confirmation it provides of the hypothesis must be considered rather weak, while the regression of total tenure tended to disconfirm the hypothesis.

Treating resolution-sponsorship across all three sales as a binary variable, we again conducted difference-of-means tests for both total tenure and tenure after all three sales, and again we found no significant difference, disconfirming the hypothesis. Likewise, goodness-of-fit tests indicated that there were no significant differences in a Congressman's chances of losing an election challenge or of attaining higher office, even counting governorships, depending on whether he sponsored any resolutions. This too
tends to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis. Again, the data from these tests, including the regression analyses as well as the difference-of-means and goodness-of-fit tests, of resolution sponsorship may be considered to be of moderate strength, but stronger when taken all together.

Finally, while the House voted only on the last sale, the Senate voted in 1978 and 1981, and so we considered the effects of those two votes together. What we found was that how one voted on the two sales had no statistically significant effect on one’s reelection chances, nor on one’s tenure, either in total or after 1981. These results again tend to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis. Also, these results are especially strong, being based on two votes taken together.

In short, then the weight of the evidence is against the lobby hypothesis. Granted, some of the tests did produce results that tended to confirm the hypothesis, but they tended to be the weaker tests, and even then, most of them did not quite produce the expected result. Many more tests, by contrast, showed no significant effect of siding with the lobby or against it, and some showed a result the opposite of what we would have expected based on the lobby hypothesis. This is especially true when one considers that the strongest evidence, that based on the votes, in almost all cases tended to disconfirm the lobby hypothesis.

There are, however, some major criticisms of all this evidence that must be addressed. One is that we have already seen that the Israel lobby had very few resources in the seventies or even in the early eighties, and only grew very large over the course of that decade. By contrast, the last of these three sales was voted upon in 1981. There would be no reason to expect the lobby to wield much influence then.
This argument, however, has two major flaws. The first lies in the idea that the lobby had to make its influence felt at that moment to be effective. But all of the tests we have run assume the ability of the lobby to punish or reward politicians after the fact, even many years after. And this is hardly unreasonable. After all, even a lobby with very few resources would have little difficulty keeping track of or looking up what side different politicians took on debates of relevance to the lobby. To be blunt, it was not all that difficult, all things considered, for me to find out. In other words, the lobby could easily have reacted in 1988 or 1990 to how someone voted in 1978 or 1981.

The second flaw, however, is even worse: the argument, premised as it is on the lobby’s weakness as of 1981, concedes too much. If the lobby was indeed weak as of that time, then it could not have caused the U.S. to begin supporting Israel a decade earlier. In that case, our putative proponent of the lobby hypothesis has conceded that the lobby cannot explain the origins of U.S. support for Israel, nor of that support’s peak. At best, then, it can explain only the level of support that still existed in and after the middle of the eighties. In that case, our lobby-proponent must also then give us some reason to accept that whatever was causing U.S. support for Israel in the seventies went away but was then replaced by the lobby. At the very least, then, we need an alternative explanation for at least that first decade of U.S. support for Israel.

Another possible objection is that one might ask, in effect, what about famous cases, like the aforementioned Paul Findley, Representative Pete McCloskey, Senator Charles Percy, Senator Roger Jepson, or, more recently, Representatives Cynthia McKinney and Earl Hilliard, all supposedly defeated in reelection bids, or otherwise thwarted in their political careers, by the Israel lobby. One possible answer to this would
be to point out that these are just anecdotes, and unproven ones at that. To take one example, Charles Percy, in his 1978 reelection bid, was nearly beaten by a previously unknown challenger, Alex Seith, who self-financed his campaign, and, despite being a Democrat, ran to the right of Percy.71 Is it so hard to believe that a more credible candidate could unseat Percy only six years later, even without the intervention of the Israel lobby? But even if we were to accept, for the sake of argument, that the Israel lobby really was responsible for the defeat of all these members of Congress, that would still only be a relative handful of politicians. More to the point, with the exceptions of McKinney and Hilliard, all of these examples were included in the data from the arms sales in the seventies and early eighties. If the Israel lobby was really causing their defeats, why is that not reflected in the relevant statistical analyses? It might be that there were just too few such instances to make much impact, or perhaps supporting the Israel lobby’s agenda also imposes costs on politicians, but ones that are less readily apparent.

Another possible objection one might raise is that the Israel lobby might know, in advance of any speeches, resolution sponsorships, or votes, who its allies and opponents are. This question, though, is not too problematic. Even if the Israel lobby knew with perfect certainty what side every member of Congress would take on every issue, the votes and other metrics would still reveal that to us. The Israel lobby would still be reacting to how members of Congress spoke, voted, and so forth, but it would be able to start doing so before those votes and such actually happened. This might explain why, in some of the regression analyses we ran, we appeared to see more of an effect when looking at total time than when looking at time after, but, otherwise, this is not really an issue.

Summary of Lobby Hypothesis and Other Possible Objections

What we have found, then, is that the domestic-lobby hypothesis flunks the first test critically: where the hypothesis predicts significant positive correlations, we find instead moderate negative correlations. The second test also flunks, since the level of aid began to take off about a decade before the budget of pro-Israel PACs, which began to decline only three or four years after aid to Israel did. Also, there were no spikes in the PACs’ budgets prior to any of the spikes in aid. These two tests, it may bear reiterating, are especially strong. The lobby hypothesis does pass the speech-evidence test, although there may exist some reason to question the strength of that test. Finally, the lobby hypothesis flunks most of the fourth group of tests, and of those it passes, it does only weakly at best for most, and those tend to be the weaker tests. Most of the tests within the fourth group that are of moderate or great strength, it flunks.

The balance of the evidence, then, weighs against the lobby hypothesis. What we can conclude from this is that the domestic lobby could not have been the cause of aid during the seventies, and, while it might have played some role later on, there must, at a minimum, have been other factors at work, since, if nothing else, some other factor or factors must have caused the spikes in aid that the domestic-lobby hypothesis seems unable to account for. Also, something must have caused the level of aid to start dropping when the resources of the lobby were still increasing. Still, there is not, at this point, sufficient reason to discard the lobby hypothesis altogether: it is of course true that many phenomena begin for one reason and then continue for some other reason; for
example, NATO, which most people would agree began as an alliance against the Soviets but which nonetheless continued for some other reason even after the USSR imploded.\textsuperscript{72}

To take this analogy seriously, however, it must be pointed out that the only reason it has generally been concluded that there must now be some other reason for NATO is that the Soviet Union is in fact gone; if the Cold War were still going strong, I suspect most people would be quite satisfied with the old explanation for NATO. Similarly, given that to have anything approaching a complete understanding of American support to Israel, one must be able to account for aid that occurred during the seventies, we might also therefore conclude that it is only necessary to assign credence to the domestic-lobby hypothesis if, having found the cause of aid in the seventies, we also find reason to believe that that cause ceased to operate in the later period. In general, though, we must at this point be at least somewhat dissatisfied with the account of American support provided by the lobby hypothesis.

Another possible objection would be to concede that, yes, the Israel lobby may not have been responsible for American support in the seventies or eighties, but perhaps in the last two decades, that has changed. According to this argument, since the late eighties or so, American policy toward the Near East has increasingly been pushed off the rails, in Israel’s favor. Probably the epitome of this argument is Walt and Mearsheimer’s claim that the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 at the behest of the Israel lobby.\textsuperscript{73} Other claims made by this argument include the contention that American support for increased Israeli settlement in the territories since the end of the eighties, or hard-line Israeli positions in peace negotiations with the Palestinians or Syrians in the

\textsuperscript{72} Prof. Stephen Van Evera, in conversation with author
\textsuperscript{73} Walt and Mearsheimer, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.”
nineties and aughts, are the result of the Israel lobby’s efforts. It must be conceded that one could find some basis of support for the contention that the Israel lobby has become genuinely powerful in recent years in the data already presented: after declining during the late nineties and early aughts, AIPAC’s budget did shoot to new highs in the mid aughts.

Nevertheless, there are serious problems with this argument, not least of which is that its factual claims are at least questionable. For example, did the United States support hard-line Israeli negotiating positions during peace negotiations with the Arabs during the nineties? After all, did not the Clinton administration actively and openly support Ehud Baraq’s candidacy to unseat from Israel’s Prime Ministry the more hard-line Benjamin Netanyahu? And hadn’t the Clinton administration earlier supported Shimon Peres in his campaign to retain the Prime Ministry against Netanyahu? As for settlements, did not Baraq, having become Prime Minister, offer to withdraw all Jewish settlements from the Golan Heights and return the Heights to Syria as part of a peace offer, encouraged by the Clinton administration, to the Syrians? Also, didn’t Israel itself remove, unilaterally and under a right-wing government, all the Jewish settlers from Gaza in the mid-aughts? As for the claim that the Israel lobby caused the American invasion of Iraq, it is absurd on its face. It is worth noting that Walt and Mearsheimer’s only evidence for this contention seems to be that many of the supporters of the invasion in the Bush administration were also pro-Israel.

But even if one were to concede that there is some merit to the general contention that, in the last two decades or so, American policy has moved more in favor of Israel, what evidence is there that this is the result of lobbying on Israel’s behalf? We have
already seen that, yes, AIPAC’s budget did shoot upwards in the mid-aughts, but that was after declining in the nineties. Moreover, the budgets of pro-Israel PACs also declined in the nineties, and even more sharply. Likewise, we have also seen that the lobby was not able, over the course of the eighties, to have a statistically significant effect on the political careers of politicians who supported or opposed its agenda. Whence, then, came this newfound power of the Israel lobby’s at the end of the eighties? And if the lobby did become powerful at that time, why wasn’t that power reflected in increased financial aid to Israel? We have already seen that aid to Israel declined steadily from the late eighties onward. Did the newly powerful Israel lobby not care about that?

One could answer that last question with a variant of this criticism, that the Israel lobby may have prevented aid to Israel from declining even faster, and otherwise reducing American support for Israel. This argument contends that there may have been some other reason for American support for Israel in the seventies and into the eighties, but that reason went away or at least declined, but the Israel lobby arose to maintain American support, or at least slow its decline. The problem with this argument is that we have, again, already seen that the Israel lobby’s own resources, after taking off in the eighties, were declining over the nineties and early aughts; in particular, the resources of the pro-Israel PACs declined radically during the nineties. If this contention were true, we would expect to see slow decline of aid to Israel in the eighties, and then rapid decline in the nineties and early aughts. Instead, we have already seen that while aid did continue declining in the nineties, the rate of real decline slowed by about half after 1991. Furthermore, this argument, again, concedes too much, in that it implicitly admits that the lobby hypothesis cannot explain American support for Israel before the end of the
eighties, and that there must thus be some other explanation. Why should we *a priori* believe that, whatever the explanation for American support in the seventies and eighties may have been, it cannot also account for the continuation of that support in the nineties and aughts? To address that issue, we must examine, at least in brief, some other possible explanations for American support for Israel.

IV. The Common-Values Hypothesis

Michael Barnett has proposed that America supports Israel for ideological or ideational reasons. "The oft-heard mantras—'the only democracy in the Middle East,' and 'shared values and principles'—signify something substantial and causal and gives meaning and substance to the term *special relationship.*"⁷⁴ According to this argument, America supports Israel because Israel is a fellow democracy, and because Americans want to support democracy, especially in a part of the world where democracy is rare—indeed, until recently, unique—and at risk. The causal logic of this theory, then, is that America values democracy and therefore wants to support fellow democracies around the world, especially those which are threatened, and, seeing Israel as such a democracy, America chooses to support Israel. After consider Barnett’s theory, I shall also examine an alternative values-based hypothesis, that American support for Israel is motivated by guilt over the Holocaust.

This theory would lead us to make four main predictions. First, there should be a correlation between how much a given administration values the promotion of American values in its foreign policy-making and its level of support for Israel; that is, administrations that care a great deal about supporting democracy should support Israel a lot, while administrations who value the promotion of American material interests over

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abstract values should support Israel less. Second, there should be a correlation between just how highly an American leader esteems Israel as a democracy and that leader's level of support for Israel; that is, leaders who see Israel as only a highly imperfect democracy should support Israel less, and vice versa. Third, American leaders should say that this is why they are supporting Israel.

Fourth, American leaders should say that they want to support democracy, that they see Israel as a democracy, and we should see aid to Israel begin soon after both those conditions are met; it might reasonably be argued that this is really three predictions, but the first two are trivial. This is so because, while every American President since FDR has assigned at least some importance to supporting democracy, and every President since Truman has recognized Israel as being at least some form of democracy, we should expect that if these factors are really the cause of aid to Israel, aid should have begun soon after both were in place. If, on the other hand, we see aid to Israel begin only long after American Presidents began talking about supporting democracy and started describing Israel as a democracy, we might reasonably wonder if the need to support democracy was the true reason.

The difficulty with the first prediction is that almost every American President of the postwar period has placed some value on the promotion of democracy in its foreign policy, but there is one notable exception. The Nixon administration is known for having been self-consciously and explicitly committed to a Realist foreign policy, predicated on the pursuit and protection of American interests, not American values. Consequently, if American aid to Israel really were motivated by American values, the Nixon administration would be the last one we would expect to have been the originator of aid
to Israel. That, however, is exactly what we find: American aid, as we have seen, began in the early seventies, under Nixon.

In all fairness, it should be noted that Nixon did in 1969 write a memorandum, since made famous by Thomas Friedman, to Kissinger which read: “[The Israelis] must recognize that our interests are basically pro-freedom and not just pro-Israel because of the Jewish vote. . . . [Golda] Meir . . . must trust [Nixon] completely.”75 Certainly, one could interpret Nixon’s words to mean that America should aid Israel for ideational or “pro-freedom” reasons, although it should be noted that Nixon did not begin aiding Israel until two years after these words were written, despite no change in Israel’s status as a democracy during that time frame. Also, one could just as easily interpret Nixon’s words later in that same memo, that “unless [Israelis] understand it, and act as if they understood it right now, they are down the tubes,” as a threat that the United States would abandon Israel if Israel did not rapidly change its behavior, that is, its policies, not its identity or essential nature.76

The first prediction does perform better in the later seventies, under Carter, who, in contradistinction to the Realism of Nixon and Kissinger, pledged to put American values, especially human rights, at the forefront of his foreign policy. Since aid to Israel reached its all-time high under Carter, this might well be interpreted as confirming the values hypothesis, at least during the late seventies.

The problem is that, while the first prediction is borne out under Carter, the second performs quite poorly; Carter seems to have a very dim view of Israel as a democracy, especially with regard to its human-rights record. According to Jay

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76 Friedman, ibid.
Nordlinger, Carter told his biographer Douglas Brinkley that he considered Israel's treatment of the Palestinians to be comparable to Bull Connor's treatment of Black protesters in Birmingham, Alabama during the civil-rights movement. Although that comment was made after the fact, and referred to specific events that occurred after Carter was out of office, such an attitude hardly seems consistent, in general, with the theory that Carter increased aid to Israel because of moral sympathy for the Israelis.

The third prediction does pass. There is significant speech evidence from American Presidents and Congressmen in favor of the common-values hypothesis. We have already seen one example of it in the memorandum from Nixon. Another significant example is the statement from the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives: “America’s links with Israel are...based on shared values, common interests, and a commitment to democracy, rule of law, and freedom.”

The fourth prediction can only be said to flunk. With the aforementioned caveats about Nixon and Carter aside, American administrations since Franklin Roosevelt's have consistently proclaimed the need for America to support other democracies, and every President since Truman has acknowledged Israel to be a democracy. As we have seen, however, aid to Israel only began in the early seventies, whereas we would expect, under this hypothesis, for it to have begun in the late forties.

While there is some data to support the common-values hypothesis, the weight of evidence militates against it. If the United States supports Israel because Israel is a democracy, why did American support only begin twenty-two years after Israel became a democracy upon achieving independence? Moreover, why did that support begin under

78 Cited in Barnett, “Identity,” p. 441
the American administration most committed to a Realist foreign policy in the entire postwar period? Finally, why did that support peak under a President who saw Israel as only a highly flawed democracy at best?

As for the alternate values-based hypothesis, that guilt over the Holocaust or earlier oppression of Jews motivates American support for Israel, there are a few key predictions one might expect from this theory. First, one would expect that American support should begin shortly after the Holocaust and steadily decline thereafter as the Holocaust faded into history. Secondly, one should expect temporary spikes in aid immediately following events that restored the Holocaust to public consciousness. Thirdly, one would expect that other nations that were directly involved in the Holocaust, and with therefore more reason to feel intense guilt, should be even more pro-Israel than the United States. Fourthly, one should expect to hear American leaders invoke the Holocaust as the reason for American support for Israel.

The first prediction, which is a powerful one, clearly flunks. American support for Israel, again, did not begin until the seventies, almost a quarter of a century after the Holocaust ended. The reason this is a powerful test, simply put, is that it raises a very difficult question to answer: why would America only start feeling guilt a quarter of a century after the fact, when a new generation which had not been in power at the time, had risen to prominence?

The second prediction, also a potentially powerful one, is perhaps somewhat harder to test, since we must first determine what might constitute an event that would restore the Holocaust to prominence in public consciousness or discourse. One clear such example, though, might be the release of the film Schindler’s List, which in less than a
year following its release in December of 1993, grossed almost hundred million dollars domestically, which is especially high considering the film’s running time of just under three-and-a-quarter hours. Since the film is widely regarded as a powerful and moving story about the Holocaust, one might reasonably conclude that the Holocaust would have been much more in the public mind in 1994 or so. Yet we see no visible spike in aid in the mid-nineties. This prediction is not as strong, simply because, to really test it thoroughly, we would need an exhaustive list of every event that might have raised the Holocaust in the public’s mind, and we would need some way of demonstrating that it had actually done so. Still, the theory cannot be said to pass this back-of-the-envelope version of this test.

The third prediction, only of moderate power, mostly flunks. There were reparations payments by Germany, the country with the most reason to feel guilt over the Holocaust, to Israel early on, and Germany remains one of the more pro-Israel countries in Europe. Nevertheless, it is clear that the United States is by far Israel’s staunchest ally in the world. Still, this test is not very powerful, because it is possible that something in American culture makes Americans more prone to feelings of guilt or to acting on that guilt.

The fourth prediction, that we would find speech evidence explaining American support for Israel in terms of the Holocaust, does pass, at least to some degree. Just to cite one example, James Inhofe, Republican from Oklahoma, made a speech to the Senate in which he listed the oppression of the Jews in the diaspora, particularly in Russia and during the Holocaust, as one of seven justifications for Israel’s existence. Still, this is a

79 http://boxofficemojo.com/movies/?id=schindlerslist.htm
rather weak test; just because a politician makes a moral argument for something does not mean that the real reasons for the policy are not based on some calculation of self-interest.

In short, then, the Christian guilt theory does not seem very persuasive either. It flunks three out of four tests, and the one it passes is the weakest of the lot. Granted, one could test it more thoroughly, but there is no *prima facie* reason to suppose that would yield different results.

V. The Precedent Hypothesis

Warren Bass, in his recent book *Support Any Friend: Kennedy's Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel Alliance*, argues that American support for Israel began in the early sixties, not the early seventies. He argues that the origins of the American-Israel alliance lie in the decision by the Kennedy administration to sell Hawk anti-aircraft missiles to Israel. This arms sale, in Bass' view, set a precedent which the United States was thereafter compelled to follow; having helped Israel once, even in a rather modest fashion, America felt a need to help Israel more in the future. According to Bass, the Kennedy administration was willing to sell the Hawks to Israel largely because of the perception that, because of Soviet arms shipments to Egypt, the balance of power was shifting against Israel, and that, specifically, there was a danger that the Egyptian air force would be able to disable Israel's air force with a first strike, paving the way for an Arab invasion. 81 It is therefore true that the Hawks had some limited significance in themselves. According to Bass, though, the real importance of the Hawk sale lay in the precedent it established for American arms sales to Israel, putting the United States on

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81 Bass, *Support*, pp. 148-149
the road toward becoming Israel’s principal arms supplier. Of course, if the American-Israel alliance was caused by this one arms sale, the question then becomes why this arms sale was made in the first place.

Bass, it must be noted, does not specify how exactly precedent would operate or have force in American foreign policy. One can infer, however, at least three possibilities. One possibility might be that once a policy is enacted, it becomes institutionalized. That is, bureaucracies come into being to carry out the policy, and they then develop a bureaucratic interest in continuing the policy, and the continuation of that policy becomes their standard operating procedure. Alternately, precedent might be about concern for reputation or prestige. That is, American leaders, having begun to aid Israel, might fear that, should fear that halting support for Israel might lead other countries to question American resolve, thereby encouraging America’s enemies and discouraging her allies. Finally, it might be that Americans simply love tradition and custom.

All versions of the precedent hypothesis yield the same two general predictions, although the resulting tests will take different specific forms. First, we should expect to see that precedent is a powerful force in international politics generally or least in American foreign policy specifically. What we should therefore expect to find is that once a country, or once America has taken one step in a certain direction, it will continue in that direction indefinitely, changing course, if ever, only under great pressure. The second prediction, of course, is that we should expect to see American leaders explaining American support for Israel in these terms. I shall first examine these two general predictions, then look at the specific forms that precedent might take.

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82 Ibid, pp. 144-145, passim
With regard to the former, there is little evidence that precedent seems to matter much in other countries’ foreign policies, at least with respect to this issue. After all, Great Britain, France, and, as previously mentioned, even the Soviet Union all made major arms sales to Israel, or otherwise supported Israel, at one time or another, but all three would later on change sides and become, at various times, among Israel’s most bitter opponents outside the Arab world. Generally speaking, then, precedent does not seem to matter much when it comes to supporting Israel.

With regard to the second general prediction, there is little speech evidence in favor of the precedent hypothesis. American politicians generally do not argue that earlier support for Israel is the reason for current and future support. In all fairness to this hypothesis, however, politicians might be reluctant to say such things, for fear that the public might not respond favorably to the suggestion that, having helped another country once, America must always help that country in the future. This is especially true if the public is more isolationist than the politicians, since a more isolationist public might be willing to tolerate a certain limited level of intervention in foreign matters, so long as it believes that the intervention will go no further, but if the public comes to believe that politicians are using limited interventions in order to draw the country into higher levels of involvement, the voters might well balk at even very small interventions.

When we look at the specific forms that precedent may take, however, a somewhat different picture emerges. There are cases, outside the U.S.-Israel alliance, that one could point to as support for the contention that once a policy, and specifically, a policy of alliance or support for another country, becomes institutionalized, it can continue even after the initial reason for the alliance is gone. To take again the example
of NATO, America’s security guarantee to Europe, and its troop presence there, has continued long past the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, a strong argument can be made that bureaucratization played an important role in that continuation: NATO, after all, is perhaps the most heavily institutionalized and bureaucratized alliance in history, and also one of the longest enduring, even prior to the end of the Cold War. The careers of any number of officials within the American defense bureaucracy were and are in varying degrees tied to NATO. Also, the North Atlantic Treaty itself, having been ratified by the Senate, has the force of law within the United States. Moreover, after roughly forty years, the massive bureaucracy that is the Pentagon had become used to maintaining a certain number of troops in Europe year in, year out. If Robert Jervis is correct about the influence of bureaucratic politics on foreign policy, then there is a good prima facie case to be made for the idea that the bureaucratization of NATO played a key role in its post-Cold War survival. If we were to see a similar level of bureaucratization of the U.S.-Israel alliance, that would tend to confirm this hypothesis; failure to see that, however, would definitively disconfirm it.

It must be acknowledged, after all, that NATO is perhaps the easiest case for the continuation of an alliance due to bureaucratization. This is because, again, NATO is perhaps the most heavily institutionalized and bureaucratized alliance in diplomatic history. It is certainly rather different from a single arms sale that was itself never institutionalized or bureaucratized. For that matter, the U.S.-Israel alliance is still not very bureaucratized or institutionalized. It has never been formalized by treaty, nor is there any organization within the machinery of the federal government specifically

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responsible for or corporately interested in American support for Israel. This is important, because the bureaucratization version of the precedent hypothesis necessarily predicts such heavy institutionalization. The fact that we do not see such is sufficient, by itself, to reject this version of the theory.

Turning instead to the reputation version of the hypothesis, we can again say that clearly, American political leaders, like their counterparts in every country, worry about their nation’s reputation for resolve. To take yet again the example of NATO after the Cold War, many Americans in and out of the government seem to have been concerned that for America to suddenly declare, after forty years, that the U.S. was withdrawing from NATO and bringing its troops home, would have been an additional shock to an already discombobulated international system. It may have just seemed easier and safer to continue on the course that had been followed for four decades. Again, though, NATO is rather different from the U.S.-Israel alliance; after all, the U.S. had, and still has, a solemn treaty commitment to treat any attack on any member of NATO as an attack on America. What this theory predicts for that case is that we should see the U.S. making a similarly serious commitment to Israel, and, in the event that any American commitment to Israel were ever tested, America should honor that commitment.

What we see, however, is that, although American politicians talk about an American security guarantee to Israel, there really is no such guarantee. At any rate, there is no formal treaty pledging American assistance to Israel in the event of an attack.

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Moreover, whereas with NATO, or America’s other major alliances, such as with South Korea or Japan, American stationed substantial numbers of American troops in the threatened countries as a sign of American commitment, there is no such commitment of American troops to Israel. Furthermore, to address Bass’ contention more specifically, it is difficult to see how the sale of HAWK missiles to Israel could have constituted staking America’s reputation.

There was one occasion, however, when the United States did make a formal guarantee to Israel: in 1957, the Eisenhower administration pledged that, should anyone ever blockade the Strait of Tiran to Israel, the United States would open the Strait, one way or another.\(^8^6\) In the event, however, when Egypt did blockade the Strait in 1967, the United States ultimately went back on this commitment. If the United States was willing to go back on a formal promise of that kind, why would the United States feel bound by any sense that it might have pledged its reputation for resolve through the HAWK sale? This version of the precedent hypothesis also flunks its key predictions, then.

It is not precisely clear what specific empirical expectations might flow from the idea that Americans love custom and tradition. Generally speaking, however, we should expect to see American society as one very much bound by tradition and custom. We should also see this reverence for tradition carried over into American foreign policy in general, making American foreign policy highly resistant to change. The first prediction clearly fails. American society is highly innovative, and Americans tend to assume that change means improvement; for example, American political candidates frequently promise change without feeling the need to specify that they mean change for the better.

Looking at the second prediction, we clearly see that there is a record of change in

\(^8^6\) Walt, *Origins*, p. 64
American foreign policy; after all, America changed from not supporting Israel before 1970 to supporting Israel afterward. To take other examples, during both World Wars, America changed from policies of isolationism at the outset to interventionism later on. These tests, then, are also failed.

The evidence for the precedent hypothesis, in all its variations, seems rather weak. Other countries do not seem to be bound by precedent in the way that Bass suggests the United States to be, and even the U.S. seems to be bound by precedent to a limited degree or in special cases. Furthermore, it is not clear why the particular precedent set by the HAWK sale would engage America’s reputation or institutionalize American support for Israel. There is also a dearth of speech evidence in favor of the precedent hypothesis, although this dearth might be explicable even if the theory were true.

Finally though, even if the precedent hypothesis were true, it would still be necessary to explain why the United States took the initial action that set the precedent in the first place. Even if Bass is correct that Kennedy’s military advisers perceived that Hawk antiaircraft missiles could make Israel more secure from an Egyptian attack, it is not clear why the United States would have cared. After all, for the argument that Israel needed the Hawks to have carried any weight, one has to presuppose that the United States or the Kennedy administration had some interest in meeting Israel’s needs. In other words, without knowing why America set the purported precedent in the first place, we cannot claim to fully understand American aid to Israel.

VI. The Containment Hypothesis

A.F.K. Organski makes another argument: he claims that American support for Israel was a product of America’s rivalry with the Soviet Union. Since the Soviets were
supporting Israel’s two principal opponents, Egypt and Syria, it made sense for the United States to support Israel in order to oppose the Soviets. “The U.S. leadership at least since the Nixon administration has felt the need for a reliable fighting force in the Middle East to obstruct [Soviet] expansion;” aid to Israel not only blocked Soviet expansion, but rolled it back: “Second, Israeli arms have proven themselves to be an important instrument to pry loose Soviet Arab allies from their ties with the Soviet Union.” It is important to note that certain elements of the containment theory overlap with the restraint hypothesis: “Only the United States seems to have sufficient influence with Israel to make it give back at least part of what it has conquered....To get the Israelis to withdraw, and soothe some very acute Israeli anxieties, the United States gave the Israelis arms. It was a crude trade-off of security by arms in exchange for security by buffer-zone.” The critical difference is that Organski believed that America wanted to restrain Israel in order to woo various Arab states, most importantly Egypt, out of the Soviet orbit, whereas I argue that America has desired tolerably good relations with the Arabs regardless of the Soviet Union.

The containment hypothesis yields six predictions. First, American leaders should say that they see Israel as a potential counter to the threat of Soviet expansion in the Middle East, and second, American aid should begin shortly after American leaders began saying so. Third, there should be a correlation between the level of tension in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship and the level of American aid to Israel. Fourth, once the Soviet Union disappeared altogether, aid to Israel should also end; one might object that this is really just a special case of the third prediction, and while that is not an

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87 Organski, Bargain, p. 178
88 ibid, p. 178
unreasonable point of view, it seems to me that the difference of degree between periods of relaxed tensions in the Cold War and the outright end thereof is great enough to be considered a difference in kind. Fifth, we should see Arab governments switching from the Soviet to the American side in the Cold War as a result of American aid to Israel. Sixth, we should find American leaders saying that this is why America supports Israel; this is different from the first prediction in that the first only says that American leaders should be saying that aid to Israel could potentially produce the effect of blocking the Soviets, without that necessarily being the reason for the aid, while this prediction entails American leaders saying that this is actually why they are aiding Israel.

The first prediction clearly passes, as there are a number of instances of American leaders claiming that Israel’s military strength could be useful at keeping the Soviets out of the Middle East. For example, a little over a year before his election to the Presidency, Ronald Reagan called Israel “a military offset to the Soviet Union” and continued that “in a moment of crisis the knowledge that [the Israeli] air force can create a zone of danger and uncertainty to the U.S.S.R. must greatly restrict Soviet options and thereby facilitate the tasks of American planners.” Organski himself claims that, following the Six Day War of 1967, American military planners found in “Israel a credible deterrent against the expansion of Soviet influence in the region,” although it must be noted that Organski does not actually cite a source for that contention. Even earlier, in a briefing for the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1952, General of the Army Omar Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, estimated that it would take nineteen divisions to block a Soviet incursion into the Middle East, and that Israel could provide two of those divisions.

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90 Organski, *Bargain*, p. 33
divisions, as well as eighty of the 620 airplanes that would be available for such a contingency.91

The second prediction is more problematic, for the very reason just cited. That is, if American military planners were advising America’s civilian leaders as early as 1952 that Israel could play a key role in the defense of the Middle East against the Soviet Union, why did American support for Israel only begin almost two decades later? This is perhaps especially curious given how highly Bradley was regarded for his role in the Second World War, including by Dwight Eisenhower, who had called Bradley “the master tactician of our forces,” and “America's foremost battle leader.”92 When one considers that Eisenhower had been elected President only weeks before Bradley gave the aforementioned briefing, and would take office only a couple of months later, one might expect Bradley’s opinion on this matter to have carried particular weight. If the American government did then believe, as early as the fifties, that Israel could be useful as a counterweight to Soviet influence in the Middle East, why would the United States have waited another eighteen years to start aiding Israel? The second prediction, then, must be said to flunk.

The third prediction also does not perform well. We have already seen that Ronald Reagan viewed Israel as a useful ally against the Soviet Union. In fact, in the same article cited above, he implicitly criticized Carter for not supporting Israel enough, and thereby permitting the growth of Soviet influence in the region.93 It is therefore perhaps somewhat ironic that, as we have also already seen, with the exception of 1981,

92 http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/omarnels.htm
when aid to Israel was slightly higher than in 1980, aid to Israel was lower throughout Reagan’s first term than at any time during the Carter administration. This was despite the fact that Carter had pursued a much more dovish line toward the Soviets than Reagan did. It is true that aid to Israel did increase significantly in the first two years of Reagan’s second term, but it then began dropping again. It is also worth noting that the seventies, even before Carter, were in general a period of greater dovishness toward the Soviet Union: Nixon and Kissinger had instituted a policy of détente with the U.S.S.R. Despite this, it was precisely under Nixon that aid to Israel really began. While it is true that Reagan did other things to help Israel aside from sending aid, such as signing a free-trade agreement and instituting consultations between U.S. and Israeli militaries, such factors are to some degree cancelled out by other things that Reagan did that the Israelis considered quite detrimental to their security, such as selling AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. On the whole, then, the third prediction must also be said to flunk.

The fourth prediction appears to be a very clear flunk. Indeed, Organski himself acknowledged that “if the USSR ceases to be perceived (and to act) as an expansionist power by top U.S. foreign policy elites....One would expect [aid to Israel] would be seriously reduced.”94 Yet in 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to be anything, and yet aid to Israel continued, and even spiked in that very same year, and again in 2000. In all fairness, however, it must be admitted that aside from these spikes, aid to Israel did begin dropping gradually but consistently starting in 1987, and while this was a few years before the final end of the Cold War, U.S.-Soviet tensions were already declining rapidly. This might indicate that the containment hypothesis does in fact explain part of the phenomenon, and the disappearance of the Soviet factor has caused aid to decline. Still,

94 Organski, Bargain, pp. 216-217
that would establish a relatively low upper bound on for how much of aid this hypothesis can account. One might also add that the United States continued other Cold War alliances, such as, again, NATO, even after the Soviet threat was gone. On the other hand, there were few analysts who argued that America’s involvement in NATO was the cause of major terror attacks against America, implying that continued involvement in NATO was much less costly than continued aid to Israel. It is therefore harder to chalk up the lingering on of aid to Israel in the post-Cold War world to mere bureaucratic-political inertia. We are therefore left with the conclusion that this prediction flunks pretty seriously, at least for the period after the disappearance of the Soviet Union.

On the fifth prediction, the containment hypothesis scores better, in that American support for Israel did play a key role in Egypt’s decision to switch from the Soviet to the American side in the Cold War.\(^{95}\) In other words, American aid to Israel had the effect that Organski claims it was intended to produce: it compelled the Arabs, or at least the Egyptians, to switch sides. While there can be little doubt that American leaders were pleased with Egypt’s realignment, this alone does not prove that this was the intention of the policy, rather than a pleasant side effect. For example, if American support for Israel really had been the result of a domestic lobby, such support would still have had the same effect upon Egypt. This test, then, is not a strong one.

The final prediction also passes. In his article in the *Post*, Reagan not only argued that Israel could be a useful counter to the Soviets, but that America should support Israel for this very reason: "Only by full appreciation of the critical role the State of Israel plays in our strategic calculus can we build the foundation for thwarting Moscow’s designs on

territories and resources vital to our security and our national well-being.”\(^96\)

Additionally, William Quandt, who as a member of the National Security Council for the Middle East throughout much of the seventies took part in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel, referred to an American desire that “Soviet prestige was to remain low” during the ‘Second Sinai’ negotiations.\(^97\) A few years before that, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when the United States was debating whether to airlift supplies to Israel, with the Soviets already having begun airlifting supplies to the Arabs, “Kissinger...wanted the American airlift to be visible as a ‘demonstrative counter’ to the Soviet airlift....‘Once a great nation commits itself,’ he would write, ‘it must prevail.’”\(^98\)

There is clearly significant speech evidence in favor of the containment hypothesis. At the same time, however, America’s actions do not appear to have been entirely consistent with the words of her leaders. Despite recognition by America’s military leadership as early as 1952 of Israel’s potential as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, America did not begin aiding Israel for another eighteen years. When America did begin aiding Israel, it was during a period of reduced tensions with Soviets; indeed, aid peaked during that period, and when tensions began to increase again in the eighties, aid actually went down. Finally, and this is perhaps the strongest point against this theory, aid continued in substantial amounts well after the Soviet Union disappeared.

The containment hypothesis does not do a great job of explaining aid to Israel at any time, and does a particularly poor job of explaining aid after 1991.

Combining the Containment and Lobby Hypotheses

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\(^98\) Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter that Transformed the Middle East, (New York: Random House, Inc. 2004) p. 325
One might suggest, however, that perhaps we can gain a more or less complete understanding of aid to Israel by combining the containment hypothesis with the domestic-lobby hypothesis. After all, if the lobby hypothesis cannot provide a good explanation for earlier aid, and the containment hypothesis cannot provide a good explanation for later aid, perhaps they can supply one another’s deficiencies. That is, perhaps aid began in the seventies as part of the Cold War, and then, once the Israel lobby began to grow in strength in the eighties, the lobby essentially took over, and maintained aid to Israel even after the Cold War ended.

Certainly, the two explanations work better together than either does separately, but there are three problems with this argument. First, it is not very parsimonious, since it requires two hypotheses to account for a single phenomenon. This is not in itself a fatal flaw, but it does make this explanation weaker, all else being equal, than any single theory that could explain aid throughout the entire period. Second, while the containment hypothesis does predict the spikes in aid that occurred in the seventies, as part of the effort to win over Egypt, neither theory predicts the spikes that occurred in the eighties, nineties, and aughts. Again, this leaves part of the phenomenon unexplained, which again leaves this explanation weaker, all else being equal, than any theory that could explain those spikes. Third, the two hypotheses would predict that aid should have peaked in the eighties. After all, that was when the Israel lobby really took off, and when the Cold War was still going strong, stronger than in the seventies, in fact. Perhaps we do see this in the spike in aid of the mid-eighties, but we should expect, with these two factors working in concert, a bigger spike than that; after all, there was a much bigger
spike in ’79, when there was no lobby and Carter was still in power. There is reason, therefore, to look for another explanation.

VII. The Restraint Hypothesis

Another explanation for American aid to Israel is that, starting in the late sixties, the Arab states decided to blame, unfairly, Israel’s actions, and indeed, Israel’s very existence, on the United States. Because the United States has long been dependent on oil supplied by the Arabs, and therefore desires at least tolerably good relations with the Arabs, this gave America an incentive to restrain Israel’s actions in the future. In essence, the Arabs made their posture toward America a function of Israel’s posture toward them, which in turn made it in the interest of the United States to secure as positive a posture as possible from the Israelis toward the Arabs. In order to gain the leverage necessary to restrain Israel, the United States started giving Israel aid.

This theory makes seven predictions. First, Arab leaders should have been publicly blaming the United States for Israeli actions, and, second, that this blaming should have posed a threat to America’s access to oil. Third, American aid to Israel, if it really was in response to this threat, should have begun just shortly after the threat was first posed. Fourth, aid should begin to drop when and if America became less concerned about access to oil from the Middle East. Fifth, spikes in aid should correlate or coincide with specific instances when the United States was trying to induce some particular concession from Israel to the Arabs. Sixth, we should expect to find American leaders saying that they wanted to restrain Israel in order to secure access to oil. More specifically, we should see American leaders saying that America should aid Israel to
restrain it. Seventh, we should find instances of America using its support for Israel coercively.

Before moving on to test those predictions, it may be necessary to say more about that last point: American support for Israel can be used to restrain Israel in two ways. First, American support may make Israel more secure, thereby lessening Israelis’ need, or perceived need, to assure their security through belligerency toward the Arabs. Secondly, as suggested by the aforementioned seventh prediction, America can threaten to withdraw or withhold support if the Israelis do not adopt a more conciliatory or less bellicose posture toward the Arabs. It must be noted, however, that these two means are not mutually exclusive; both can operate. America can say to Israel, in effect, ‘we shall help solve your security problems so that you will not feel the need to be belligerent toward the Arabs, but if you behave in ways we don’t like, we shall withdraw our help, leaving you less secure.’ Moreover, they generally yield the same predictions; only the seventh prediction is yielded only by the coercive version. In testing the hypothesis then, we should bear in mind that if we do not see the seventh prediction borne out, it does not automatically disprove the hypothesis.

*Blaming American First*

With regard to the first prediction, we do indeed find, after, and indeed during, the Six Day War of 1967, Arab leaders falsely claiming that it was the United States that was responsible for their defeat. In a phone call to King Hussein of Jordan on the second day of the war, Gamel Abdel Nasser, the ruler of Egypt, asked him, “Will we say that the U.S. and Britain [launched the airstrikes that destroyed the Arab air forces] or just the United States?” to which Hussein answered, “United States and England.” Nasser in turn
replied that Egypt, Jordan, and Syria would all announce that “American and British airplanes are taking part against us from aircraft carriers.” This lie had actually already begun to spread on the first day of the war: “Radio Amman claimed that three American aircraft carriers were operating off Israel’s coast. American warships were reportedly sighted off Port Said, in Haifa harbor, and blocking the entrance to the Canal.” At the same time, “Other sources spoke of Israelis piloting American planes with CIA-supplied maps of Egypt and of American pilots flying incognito for Israel....Israel, which had attacked Egypt with 1,200 jets, could not possibly have acted alone—so the argument ran.” It is not hard to guess at the reason why Arab leaders spread this story: being beaten by the United States was less embarrassing than being beaten by Israel, the humiliation of the vanquished being inversely proportional, again, to the power the victor. Passing this test, however, is necessary but not sufficient for the restraint hypothesis; by itself, then, this is only circumstantial evidence.

**Oil Markets**

The second prediction is also confirmed, in that negative consequences for American interests in the Middle East were not long in coming: “Within hours of the broadcast, mobs attacked American embassies and consulates throughout the Middle East. In Baghdad and Basra, Aleppo, Alexandria, and Algiers, even in congenial cities such as Tunis and Benghazi, American diplomats barricaded themselves in their compounds and prepared for the worst.” Additionally, seven Arab states, Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Mauritania, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen all formally severed diplomatic

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100 ibid, pp. 217
101 ibid, pp. 217
102 ibid, pp. 217
relations with the United States. Most important of all, however, was the danger to America’s supply of oil: ten of the oil-producing Arab countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, embargoed oil exports to both the United States and Great Britain, while Iraq and Libya shut down their oil production altogether. It is true that the actual effect on oil prices of this embargo was not very large, but this embargo was a harbinger of things to come: when another oil embargo was imposed during the 1973 war, oil prices skyrocketed. The threat to the oil supply, however, was in place in 1967. The decision by Nasser and the other Arab leaders to falsely blame the United States for Israel’s victory in 1967 did real harm to American interests throughout the Middle East. Again, though, this is necessary, not sufficient.

Given that this threat began to emerge in the late sixties, we can conclude that the third prediction is also borne out. That is, we would expect that, if aid to Israel was a response to the Arab threat to America’s access to oil, aid should have begun shortly after that threat was first made. As we have already seen, American aid began in 1971, only a few years after the Six Day War. This is still circumstantial evidence, but it is strong circumstantial evidence; the fact that aid began at the predicted time indicates that this theory has real explanatory power.

The fourth prediction, that should America become less concerned about access to oil, it will have less need to restrain Israel, and therefore aid to Israel will drop, is also confirmed. By the eighties, America’s vulnerability to a possible Arab oil embargo had decreased, due in large part to the fact that higher oil prices in the seventies

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103 ibid, pp. 218
104 ibid, pp. 217-218
had prompted exploration for and development of alternative sources of petroleum, causing oil prices to decline.\textsuperscript{105} As can be seen, although oil prices had begun to fall gradually from their peak in 1981, it was in 1986 that they collapsed to levels not seen since the early seventies. Given that, there would simply have been less need for the United States to restrain Israel’s behavior toward the Arabs, since the Arabs’ ability to harm the American economy in retaliation for Israeli behavior had declined. As we have already seen, American aid to Israel was generally lower in first part of the eighties than in the seventies, and began to decline steadily, albeit gradually, in 1987, just after oil prices collapsed. The gradualness of this decline is not a real problem, as long as one supposes that American leaders would have still worried at least somewhat about access to oil even after ’86, and would have wanted to hedge their bets. The fourth prediction, then, is confirmed. The fact that the decline in aid begins at the time predicted by the theory indicates that this theory has substantial explanatory power; while still circumstantial, and not decisive by itself, this is still moderately strong evidence.

\textit{Land for Aid}

The fifth prediction, that spikes in aid to Israel should coincide with specific instances when the United States was trying to win particular concessions from Israel to

\textsuperscript{105} Data in chart five is drawn from the Annual Energy Review 2003 of the Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy, specifically table 5.18, Crude Oil Domestic First Purchase Prices, 1949-2003.
the Arabs, is also borne out. Of the six spikes in aid to Israel that have occurred since 1970, each has coincided with efforts by the United States either to restrain Israel from taking some belligerent action toward the Arabs, or to actually induce the Israelis to make concessions to the Arabs. Although I will consider each spike separately in greater detail, I will summarize the data here. The most recent spike, in 2000, was in exchange for Israeli military withdrawals from the West Bank under the Wye Agreement. The spike that occurred in 1991 was in exchange for Israel not retaliating against Iraqi Scud missile attacks during the Gulf War. The spike that occurred from 1985 to 1986 coincided with Israel’s withdrawal from most of Lebanon. The spike in 1979 was in compensation for Israel’s surrender of the Sinai under the American-brokered peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. Prior to that, the spike in 1976 was in exchange for the Israeli withdrawal from the Gidi and Mitla passes. The first spike, in fiscal 1974, but calendar 1973, was offered to the Israelis as an alternative to using nuclear weapons on Cairo and Damascus.

The spike in aid that is recorded as having occurred in 2000, in the amount of $1.2 billion, was in exchange for Israel’s agreement to the 1998 Wye Accords. The specific reason given was to pay for the redeployment of Israeli forces out of the territories.\textsuperscript{106} One might object that the Israelis never actually carried out all the withdrawals they had agreed to at Wye, and that it is therefore probable that, whatever the stated reason for the increase in aid, the real motive was not compensation for concessions which never occurred. This ignores, however, the fact that the Wye accords were overtaken by events. In 2000, the United States was preparing to ask the Israelis for still further, and indeed unprecedented, concessions, and it is reasonable to infer that the

\textsuperscript{106} Mark, “Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” p. 2
Clinton administration would have been reluctant to cancel the additional aid at that
juncture.

The previous spike, in 1991, occurred during, and as a result of, the 1991 Persian
Gulf War. Following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United States
established a coalition with a number of Arab states, including most importantly Saudi
Arabia, to liberate Kuwait. In an effort to sabotage this alliance, Hussein attempted to
transform the conflict into an Arab-Israeli war by firing Scud missiles at Israel,
calculating that if the Israelis shot back, the Coalition would collapse, because no Arab
government could afford to be seen as being on the same side as Israel in an Arab-Israeli
war. The United States decided that the only way to prevent this was to persuade the
Israelis not to fire back at the Iraqis. Following talks between the American and Israeli
governments, the United States decided to conduct, once the war began, air raids over
western Iraq in an effort to destroy Scud missiles on the ground, and to send Patriot
missile batteries to Israel in the hope of shooting down any Scuds that were launched,
and, lastly, to offer Israel badly needed loan guarantees as a form of overall
compensation.\footnote{Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, \textit{The Generals’ War: the Inside Story of the Conflict in the
Gulf}, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), p. 71} In short, the United States offered substantial aid to Israel in order to
keep the Israelis from entering the Gulf War, and thereby wrecking the U.S.-Arab
alliance; in order to maintain tolerably good relations with the Arabs, the United States
had to support Israel.

The prior spike occurred over the period from 1985 to 1986 when Israel was
withdrawing from most of Lebanon. The record of American efforts to negotiate an
Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and a peace treaty between the two countries, provides
some support for the contention that the timing of the additional aid was not coincidental. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon had been causing the deterioration of America’s diplomatic position in the Arab world, and America had responded initially by restricting the supply of arms it would make available to Israel. Later, the United States attempted to broker a peace agreement between Lebanon and Israel in order to induce the Israelis to withdraw. As part of this effort, the United States sought concessions, specifically formal peace and diplomatic recognition, from Lebanon to Israel in order to induce the Israelis to withdraw. These efforts failed, however, because the Syrians refused to withdraw from Lebanon as well. This in turn prompted an improvement in relations between America and Israel, and the Reagan administration renewed arms sales to Israel. 108

It must be acknowledged that this is still all circumstantial evidence for the restraint theory, but it is certainly consistent with the available evidence, if interpreted as follows: when it became apparent that the Syrians would block any Lebanese concessions, the Reagan administration decided that securing Israeli withdrawal was important enough that the United States itself should offer inducements, in the form of increased aid, to secure that withdrawal. Because the United States was blamed by much of the Arab world, to say nothing of the rest of the world, for the Israeli intervention in Lebanon, the United States had an interest in securing Israel’s withdrawal, which in turn required giving Israel more aid, in the amount of about $2.5 billion more, in 2002 dollars, over the two years from ’85 to ’86, compared with the levels over ’83 to ’84, and ’87 to ’88.

Step-by-Step

The biggest spike of all occurred in 1979, the year that Israel and Egypt ratified their peace treaty, under the terms of which Israel returned to Egypt the entirety of the Sinai Peninsula and forsook all claims thereto. Additionally, the Israelis agreed to take the painful and risky step of dismantling the Jewish settlements in the Sinai. The almost $5 billion in American aid that went to Israel in that year was compensation for these concessions by Israel. It should be noted that, on this point, the restraint hypothesis is actually quite close to the containment hypothesis, in that the latter also holds that the aid Israel received as part of the Camp David Accord was in compensation for giving up the Sinai. The distinction, subtle though it is, is that, where the containment theory claims that America’s principal motive in wanting peace was the desire to woo Egypt away from the Soviets, the restraint hypothesis avers that it was principally the need to avoid further Arab-Israeli general wars that would harm U.S.-Arab relations.

What is clear is that the additional American aid to Israel in 1979 was compensation for Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. According to William Quandt, the Israelis wanted “$3.37 billion from the United States to help finance the withdrawal from Sinai, including the removal of the settlers.” Ultimately, the U.S. agreed to offer “$3 billion to help construct new airfields in the Negev [to replace the airbases in the Sinai that Israel was losing and]….to act positively on a number of weapons systems that had been requested earlier.” Even if the United States was partly motivated by the hope of wooing the Egyptians away from the Soviets, it is nonetheless the case that the purpose of

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109 Organski, *Bargain*, p. 169
111 ibid, pp. 313-314
the additional aid given to Israel in 1979 was compensation for Israeli concessions to the Arabs, specifically the Egyptians.

The prior spike occurred in 1976, as a result of the “Second Sinai” agreement that was signed September 4, 1975. Second Sinai was a key intermediate step in what has been referred to as the “step-by-step” diplomacy whereby the United States negotiated peace between Israel and Egypt. Specifically, Second Sinai was the agreement under which Israel agreed to withdraw from the Gidi and Mitla passes in the Sinai Peninsula, leaving them as part of a demilitarized zone. Consequently, the American reasons for wanting Israeli consent to Second Sinai were basically the same as the reasons for wanting Israel to withdraw from the Sinai altogether in 1979. That is, the United States wanted to avoid another general Arab-Israeli war, with attendant nuclear confrontation, and wanted to avoid another Arab oil embargo. Quandt, in reference to the earlier “First Sinai” agreement between Israel and Egypt that occurred just after the 1973 war, wrote: “If the oil boycott was to be lifted, it would also be in return for American success in promoting agreement [between Egypt and Israel].” Again, we have already seen that Quandt also made remarks supportive of the containment hypothesis. In any case, though, the purpose of the additional aid to Israel in 1976 was clearly in compensation for the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai passes.

The Airlift

The previous spike occurred during the Yom Kippur War in October of 1973, and consisted mostly of the airlift of arms and materiel that the United States shipped to Israel.

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112 O’Brien, Siege, p. 549
114 ibid, p. 273
during the war. There remains some debate over why the United States sent the airlift. O’Brien seems to imply that the Nixon administration was motivated by the Israel lobby. He suggests that it was when Israel felt it could wait no longer, and “felt a need to bypass Henry Kissinger” by appealing directly to Nixon, it was the threat of the unleashing of the Israel lobby that insured the airlift. If this indeed is what O’Brien is saying, then he contradicts what he says later on, when he writes: “In conditions of military emergency...Israel’s needs are of great urgency, while the lobby takes time to mobilize and make its weight felt.” Furthermore, it does seem incredible that in October of 1973, in the middle of the Watergate scandal, with the infamous “Saturday Night Massacre” only days away, that Nixon could really have been worried about the Israel lobby, of all things. Especially since, as we have seen, the lobby was weak before the 1980s. The Israel lobby, then, can be rejected as the cause of the airlift. We have also already seen that there is some evidence that the airlift was caused by the containment hypothesis.

Another possibility, consistent with the restraint hypothesis, is suggested by Seymour Hersh: that, at the nadir of its military fortunes during the war, “The Israeli leadership...would arm and target its nuclear arsenal in the event of total collapse and subsequent need for the Samson Option; and, finally, it would inform Washington of its unprecedented nuclear action—and unprecedented peril—and demand that the United States begin an emergency airlift of replacement arms and ammunition needed to sustain

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115 O’Brien, Siege, pp. 525-526
116 ibid, p. 527
117 ibid, p. 546
an extended all-out war effort.” If this was the reason that the United States sent the airlift, then it is clear that the United States was aiding Israel in order to restrain it vis-à-vis the Arabs. In support of his contention, Hersh cites the recollections of Hermann F. Eilts, the American ambassador to Egypt, James Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense, and William Colby, the Director of the CIA: “And then, in a sort of casual reference,’ Eilts said, ‘Henry [Kissinger] threw in that there was concern that the Israelis might go nuclear. There had been intimations that if they didn’t get military equipment, and quickly, they might go nuclear.’” James Schlesinger, the then-Secretary of Defense, also supported Hersh’ claims: “Kissinger just turned around totally. He got a little hysterical [about the need to airlift supplies to Israel]....Henry seemed to be more concerned than I was over the possibility of a nuclear exchange.” Lastly, Nixon’s Director of Central Intelligence, William E. Colby, told Hersh: “We were afraid Israel might go for broke.” This puts Kissinger’s insistence that the United States had to send aid to Israel in order to confront the Soviets in a very different light. If Kissinger did not want just then to reveal the Israeli threat to go nuclear, or if his colleagues were, as Schlesinger and Colby seem to have been, more sanguine about the prospect of nuclear war, he may have used the Cold War and the need to confront the Soviets as an excuse. In any case, there does seem to be strong evidence that the United States aided the Israelis in order to restrain them from taking a highly aggressive move against the Arabs.

The great spikes in aid that occurred in 1979, 1976, and 1973 fit the forecasts of both the containment and restraint hypotheses. Since the two explanations are not

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119 ibid, p. 230
120 ibid, p. 230
121 ibid, p. 230
mutually exclusive, and even overlap significantly with respect to the later two spikes, it could be that both theories are accurate, and that both causes were operating to produce American aid to Israel. On the other hand, Organski’s theory clearly cannot explain the spikes in aid that occurred in 1991 and 2000, or any aid for that matter following the end of the Cold War. The restraint theory, therefore, would appear to have more explanatory power. It may be that both theories are needed for a full understanding of the phenomenon, but the restraint hypothesis does seem to fit more of the available data.

Pre-1970 Aid

As mentioned before, although American aid to Israel only began in substantial quantities in the early seventies, there were two incidents of significant American support for Israel before then. The more recent was the sale to Israel by the Kennedy administration of Hawk antiaircraft missiles, which Bass discusses. As Bass documents, the principal argument for the sale within the Kennedy administration was the concern that, without them, the Israeli Air Force might be vulnerable to an Egyptian first strike.¹²² The Israelis of course launched their own preemptive strike first, but it should be remembered that if either side has a first-mover advantage, then both do, awareness of which only increases both sides’ temptation to strike first.¹²³ This of course makes war more likely. It therefore follows that one can reduce the likelihood of war by making either side less vulnerable to a first strike. In other words, the Kennedy administration may have wanted to provide Israel with Hawk missiles to protect Israel from an Egyptian first strike in order partly to reduce Egypt’s incentive to attempt such a strike, but perhaps more to reduce Israel’s incentive to launch a first strike of its own. If this was the goal,

then it must be called a failure, but, given that Thomas Schelling, the scholar who proposed the idea of stability theory, worked in the Kennedy administration, it seems not too unlikely that the Kennedy administration may have been thinking in these terms. Admittedly, this is only circumstantial evidence, but it does show that the Hawk sale was at least consistent with the restraint hypothesis.

The other case of pre-1970 support for Israel came during, or rather in the dénouement of the 1956 Suez War. In order to persuade the Israelis to withdraw from the Sinai, the Eisenhower administration gave Israel a “pledge to guarantee free passage to Israeli ships through the Straits of Tiran.” This pledge turned out, in the event, to not be worth as much as it might have initially appeared, since the United States in 1967 decided not to do anything about the renewed Egyptian blockade of Tiran. What is critical, however, is the fact that the reason the United States gave the pledge was clear: it was to induce the Israelis to make concessions to Egypt. Indeed, it was America’s failure to honor this pledge that induced Israel to go to war in ’67; in other words, it was the lack of American support that prompted Israeli belligerency.

The fifth prediction, then is confirmed. Moreover, this is very strong evidence for the restraint hypothesis. That every spike in aid can be accounted for by the restraint hypothesis, and clearly so, in most cases, indicates that this theory has a great deal of explanatory power.

*Speech Evidence for the Restraint Hypothesis*

We have seen, then, that, as predicted, spikes in aid do correlate with particular Israeli concessions, and in the process have already seen that there is some speech

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124 Walt, *Origins*, p. 64
125 Oren, *Six Days*, p. 12
evidence for the restraint hypothesis as well. To reiterate, there were comments by various members of the Nixon administration that the purpose of the 1973 airlift was to dissuade the Israelis from using nuclear weapons. Also, there were the remarks by Quandt that the reason for the spikes in aid in '76 and '79 was the need to induce the Israelis to withdraw from the Sinai, and that this was necessary, in the first instance to end the oil embargo, and to avoid future embargoes. There were also statements by members of the American government during the '90-'91 Gulf War, including then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and his then-Undersecretary, Paul Wolfowitz that the reason for sending the Patriot missile batteries and other aid was to induce Israel not to fire back at Iraq.\footnote{Gordon and Trainor, \textit{The Generals' War}, p. 71} Also, the official explanation in the US federal budget for the extra aid in 2000 was that it was in exchange for the Israeli redeployments.\footnote{Mark, \textit{“Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance,”} p. 2} There is, then, some speech evidence that at least some of the spikes in aid were in exchange for Israeli concessions or restraint.

I was not able to find, with one exception, speech evidence to the effect that the reason for aid in general was to induce Israeli restraint, and the one exception I did find, moreover, is a negative one. That is, it is speech evidence that implies awareness by the American government that not aiding Israel is bad for American interests in the Middle East. During the crisis prior to the Six Day War, after Nasser had blockaded Tiran, the Israelis requested that the United States honor its commitment, given in 1957, to open the Strait. The Johnson administration, consumed with the Vietnam War, felt unable to keep its commitment, even though the administration, including Johnson himself, seemed aware that the Israelis would have no choice but to go to war in the absence of American

\begin{flushright}\ootnotesize\textit{Gordon and Trainor, \textit{The Generals' War}, p. 71}\ootnotesize\textit{Mark, \textit{“Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance,”} p. 2}\end{flushright}
assistance. Prior to a meeting with Israel’s foreign minister Abba Eban, during which Eban would ask Johnson for a clear American commitment to act, Johnson asked his advisors “If you were in Eban’s place and we told you we were relying on the UN and a group of maritime powers [a reference to the Regatta plan], would that be enough to satisfy you? Will I regret on Monday not giving Eban more today? [emphasis added]”¹²⁸

Later in the crisis, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol wrote President Johnson, “Reminding the president that his promise to use ‘all and every measure to open the Straits’ had dissuaded his [Eshkol’s] government from voting for war,” and that “Israel was ‘approaching a point at which counsels of restraint would lack any moral or logical basis.’”¹²⁹ Johnson’s National Security Advisor Walt Rostow would subsequently write “Whoever is the bigger winner [in the crisis], we are the sure loser.”¹³⁰ This is negative evidence, in that it suggests that the American government, at least at that time, was aware that support for Israel was necessary if Israel was to be restrained, and that failure to restrain Israel would redound to the detriment of the United States. One might conclude from this that later administrations would seek to avoid such negative outcomes by aiding Israel. Still, this is not as strong as would be instances of American leaders saying that the reason for aiding Israel in general is to restrain Israel vis-à-vis the Arabs. Furthermore, it does not amount to American leaders saying that they should aid Israel to restrain it. The sixth prediction, then, is confirmed only weakly.

Sticks and Carrots

This brings us to the seventh prediction, that we should expect to see America using support for Israel coercively. We do see some cases of this. For example, in 1992,

¹²⁸ Oren, Six Days, p. 113
¹²⁹ ibid, p. 139
¹³⁰ ibid, p. 150
the administration of Bush the Elder, contemplating a ten billion dollar loan guarantee to
Israel, initially refused to go through with the guarantee as long as Israeli settlement
activity in the territories continued, and ultimately insisted that any amount of money
Israel used to build settlements would be deducted from the guarantee, a policy continued
by the Clinton administration. This led to the reduction of approximately $774 million
from the loan guarantees.\footnote{Mark, “Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance,” Issue Brief for Congress.}

Earlier, in 1970, during the War of Attrition of Canal War
between Israel and Egypt, the Nixon administration delayed the shipment of arms which
Israel had purchased in order to induce the Meir administration to agree to a ceasefire.\footnote{O’Brien, Siege, pp. 498-501.}

So we do see, then, some examples of this phenomenon, indicating that the restraint
hypothesis does pass this test, at least to some extent. The question is, how many
examples of this are needed to say that the hypothesis has passed very well or even
completely? Since the coercive use of aid is only one mechanism by which American
support can restrain Israel, probably not that many, since it could be that more of the
work is being done by the other mechanism. We can say, then, that the restraint
hypothesis passes this test well enough, but this is not strong evidence.

\textit{Criticism of the Restraint Hypothesis}

There exists an obvious criticism of the restraint hypothesis that must be
addressed: it is after all conventional wisdom that American support for Israel enflames
Arab public opinion \textit{against} the United States, even provoking Arab terrorism against
America. Who could argue that the first major act of Arab terrorism against the United
States, the assassination of Robert Kennedy by Sirhan Sirhan, was not motivated by
anger over American support for Israel, when Sirhan himself gave that as his motive?
The only problem with this is that said assassination occurred in 1968, only a year after the Six Day War in which the United States had remained neutral, and another two years before American support for Israel would begin in earnest.

It might be more accurate, then, to say that it was the perception of American support for Israel, during and after the Six Day War, that motivated Sirhan. Would eliminating that support then eliminate that perception, or does the perception, even if it became accurate after 1970, have independent reasons for its existence? If the latter, then this suggests that it is not the actual level of American support for Israel that motivates Arab anger at the United States.

VIII. Restraint viv-à-vis the Soviets

There is a sub-variant of the restraint hypothesis which holds that the United States has been aiding Israel to restrain it, but with regard to the Soviets, not the Arabs. In this version, the United States was worried that fighting between Arabs and Israelis might somehow lead to a nuclear exchange between Israel and the Arabs’ Soviet ally, and that, in such an event, the Soviets would also launch nuclear weapons at the United States. The reason that Arab-Israeli fighting might have led to Soviet-Israeli fighting was that the Soviets might decide to intervene directly on behalf of their Arab allies, and might indeed intervene with nuclear weapons, or the Israelis might feel unable to counter a Soviet conventional intervention without using nuclear weapons. It was furthermore feared that the Soviets would retaliate to an Israeli nuclear attack not only against Israel, but against the United States, whether because the Soviets themselves might have believed that America was responsible for Israel’s actions, or because they knew that others so believed.
This theory makes five predictions. First, that American aid to Israel should begin shortly after Israel acquired nuclear weapons, but not before. Second, American leaders should treat Arab-Israeli wars as nuclear crises, and third, spikes in US aid should correlate with cases when Israel was threatening that it might use nuclear weapons. Fourth, aid should end when the Soviet Union disappears, a prediction which is obviously shared with the containment hypothesis. Fifth, American leaders should say that this is why they support Israel.

The first prediction is borne out, insofar as Israel built its first nuclear weapons not long before the 1967 War.133 This was only a few years before American aid began in 1971. It must be noted, however, that the United States decided not to aid Israel in 1967, even though Israel by that time had the bomb. It is possible, though, that the American government was not yet aware at that time that Israel had at least one nuclear weapon, or, even if the Johnson administration was so aware, they may not yet have grasped the full implications of that development, or they may not have yet formulated a response to said development. Still, this prediction is conferment, albeit with one small caveat.

The second prediction is also confirmed, but only for one case. During the 1973 War, when the Soviets threatened direct intervention in order to save the Egyptian Third Army from destruction, the United States military went to Defense Condition (DefCon) 3, a state of alert between DefCon 5, normal circumstances, and DefCon 1, all-out war with the Soviets. During no other Arab-Israeli war does the United States appear to have increased its alert level.

133 Bass, Support, p. 252
The third prediction is likewise borne out, but only for the 1973 case. That is, we have already seen that the Israelis threatened to use nuclear weapons during the Yom Kippur War, and that seems to have played a role in the Nixon administration’s decision to airlift supplies to Israel. Since there do not appear to have been any other cases when the Israelis threatened to use nuclear weapons, this prediction does seem to come true in every case where it applies. That is, every time—although there has been only one such time—Israel has threatened to use nuclear weapons, the United States has offered additional aid. The converse, however, is not true: there have been many other spikes in aid to Israel when Israel did not make any such threat.

The fourth prediction, we have already seen, is false. The Soviet Union is gone, meaning that it is no longer any real danger that the Arab-Israeli conflict could escalate into a full-scale nuclear war between superpowers. Aid to Israel, however, has continued, as has already been shown.

With regard to the fifth prediction, there is the aforementioned comments, cited by Hersh, that indicate that Kissinger was afraid of a “nuclear exchange” in 1973. I was not, however, able to find any similar comments during other periods. It must be noted, however, that politicians might have an incentive not to say that this was their motive, even if it actually was. It has generally been considered diplomatically impolite to talk to publicly about Israel’s nuclear arsenal, and it might be especially impolite to suggest that the Israelis might use their arsenal to threaten World War Three in order to give the rest of the world a stake in Israel’s survival.
What we find, on balance, is that the Soviet variant of the restraint hypothesis might very well have contributed to America’s decision to send the airlift during the Yom Kippur War, but it does not seem credible that it was a major factor at other times.

IX. Conclusion

Evaluating the Hypotheses

Of all the theories that attempt to explain American support for Israel, the main, or Arab, variant of the restraint hypothesis seems to be the best supported by the evidence, while also being more parsimonious than its strongest rival. It not only passes more of its tests than its rivals, but it also passes some strong and demanding tests, particularly in its ability to explain the timing and occurrence of spikes in aid. The argument that it is the Israel lobby that causes aid cannot explain why aid began and peaked in the seventies, when the Israel lobby, for all intents and purposes, did not exist, nor why aid began to decline while the resources of the lobby were still growing, nor why supporting the lobby’s positions does not seem to have correlated at all well with political success for members of Congress. The containment hypothesis, which claims that the United States aided Israel to block the Soviets, cannot explain why aid began only eighteen years after the American government first realized that Israel could be used in that way, and certainly cannot explain why aid continued in substantial quantity, with two major spikes, after the Soviet Union was gone. The other rival hypotheses perform even worse: the moral values argument cannot explain why aid began under an administration that did not care about values very much in foreign policy, nor why aid peaked under a President who did not hold an especially high opinion of Israel’s moral worth. The guilt hypothesis likewise cannot explain why American support began twenty-five years after
the Holocaust. The precedent hypothesis, in all its versions seems at odds with the normal patterns of international politics and American foreign policy, and lacks any specific evidence in its favor. The claim that America desired to restrain Israel with respect to the Soviets seems a credible explanation of the ’73 airlift, but not of the rest of the data.

The Arab variant of the restraint hypothesis, however, explains why aid began shortly after the ’67 War, when the Arab governments decided to blame the United States for Israel’s victory, thereby threatening America’s access to oil. It explains why aid began to decline after 1986, when oil prices collapsed, making America less concerned about access to oil. And it, basically alone of all the theories, accounts for the several spikes in aid that have occurred. These are all strong pieces of evidence, especially this last one. Even combining the domestic-lobby and containment hypotheses does not account for the data as well, and is less parsimonious.

The Future of U.S.-Israel Relations

Shortly after the failure of the Camp David conference in the summer of 2000, but also shortly before the outbreak of violence, in a meeting with the then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and one of his aides, I was told that, had Clinton actually succeeded in securing the assent of the Palestinians, or, for that matter, of the Syrians to Ehud Baraq’s earlier proposed return of the Golan Heights, such deals would still have failed, because Congress would have been highly unlikely to agree to the massive increases in aid that the proposed deals entailed.\textsuperscript{134} The American government is therefore unlikely to agree to reverse the ongoing decline in the level of American aid to Israel. Also, while American aid to Israel has been more or less constant in nominal

\textsuperscript{134} Sen. Jesse Helms and aide, meeting with author, September 12, 2000
dollars since 1987, with the exceptions of 1991 and 2000, the real value of that aid has fallen. Because of inflation, $3 billion in 2002 was worth only about as much as $1.9 billion would have been in 1987, a decline of approximately one-third.\footnote{Consumer Price Index (CPI) data available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website: http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.} At the same time, Israel’s GDP has increased substantially since 1987.\footnote{Data on Israel’s GDP were drawn from the Statistical Abstract of Israel 2003 No. 54, Central Bureau of Statistics, tables 14.1, 14.2. Data on American aid to Israel were drawn from Mark, “Israel: U.S. Foreign Assistance.”}

![Chart 26: U.S. Aid to Israel as a Percentage of Israel's GDP](chart26)

From a high of approximately 23% in 1979, American aid has fallen to just above 2.2% of Israel’s GDP in 2002. Because American aid represents a shrinking proportion of Israel’s GDP, it may be reasonably inferred that the marginal value of such aid to Israel has fallen. As a consequence, American leverage over Israel has presumably been gradually dropping as well, and will probably continue to do so.

On the other hand, it is worth noting that, following a meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and US President George W. Bush in the Spring of 2005, news reports indicated that the United States might offer Israel an additional $500 million in aid to compensate Israel for the expulsion of Jewish residents from the Gaza Strip.\footnote{Larry Derfner, “Rattling the Cage: Welfare State,” \textit{Jerusalem Post}, April 14, 2005} It might be noted that restraint hypothesis, and only the restraint hypothesis, would have predicted such an offer. At the same time, it indicates that while American aid to Israel is...
likely to continue, both in absolute and relative value, it is unlikely to stop altogether, and there will probably be future spikes in aid.

Policy Prescription

Opponents of American aid to Israel typically claim that it is aid to Israel which inflames public opinion in the Arab world, to say nothing of the rest of the world, toward the United States. According to this argument, if only America would end its misguided support for Israel, the Arabs would cease to be angry at the United States, and the threat to America from al-Qaeda would cease. This argument is misguided for a number of reasons.

First, most of the Arab world apparently perceives American aid to Israel as being much greater than it actually is. The Arabs are hardly alone in this, since much of the rest of the world, including many Americans, also seems to overestimate the scale and effect of American aid to Israel, but it is Arab opinion that is relevant to this issue. Recall that during the Six Day War, most of the Arab world believed that it was the American air force and navy that had attacked them. Arab public opinion today appears to hold that if only American aid to Israel were withdrawn, the balance of power would shift fundamentally against the Israelis. As we have seen, however, as of 2002, American aid was only a little more than 2.2% of Israel’s GDP. Its loss would be painful, at least for a little while, but it would not be decisive. Given, moreover, the currency in the Arab world of conspiracy theories involving Israel and the United States, it seems reasonable to predict that most of the Arab world would interpret the fact that the public withdrawal of American aid had not tipped the balance of power as simply proving that American aid had continued in secret.
Second, the Israelis, while hardly crippled by the loss of American aid, would be hurt by it, and their security would be materially degraded. Greater still, however, would be the psychological impact on Israelis’ perception of their security situation. Being somewhat less secure, and feeling much less secure, the Israelis would move to the right on foreign policy, becoming more hawkish toward the Arabs.

This is an important point, since there are those who argue that, while the restraint hypothesis might very well be correct, the fact that America only uses aid to achieve restraint, as opposed to using threats as well, that is, only carrots and never sticks, is a result of the Israel lobby. First of all, it is not quite true that America has never used sticks on Israel: for example, the Reagan administration did embargo arms shipments to Israel in an effort to get the Israelis to withdraw from Lebanon. As we have seen, this was not effective in securing Israel’s withdrawal. This is not surprising when one considers that Israelis already feel intensely threatened and isolated, and that this is why they are belligerent. Making them feel more threatened and isolated is not likely to have positive results.

Underlying both the forgoing factors, there remains the fact that the Arab governments would still have an incentive to blame Israel’s actions and existence on the United States, just as they had an incentive to do so in 1967. As long as that is the case, abandoning Israel would aggravate, not alleviate, America’s relations with the Arab world.

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