AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM - SOUTH KOREA

by

RAYMOND H. GRENIER

B.S. Boston University (1958)

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

August, 1971

Signature of Author: Department of Political Science, August 18, 1971

Certified by: Thesis Supervisor

Accepted by: Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Students

Archives

SEP 17 1971
AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM - SOUTH KOREA

by

Raymond H. Grenier

Submitted to the Department of Political Science on August 1971 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science.

It is assumed that Military Assistance will continue to be a major foreign policy mechanism utilized by this country in promoting national interest. The large number and the dynamic nature of the programs now in being, and the high probability that new programs will be required in the near future, suggest that a detailed analysis of a model program would aid in understanding the value, potential, and problems of this activity. South Korea was chosen as the case study because it has received military assistance for several years, there is a viable threat to its security which acts as a stimulant to the program, the effectiveness of the forces has been tested in actual military operations, and because of personal experience with this particular program.

Chapter I
In this chapter the United States/South Korean dialogue following the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine is reviewed. The reaction and mood of South Korea is revealed through selected quotes of various national leaders. The development and nature of the compromise U.S. force reduction program is included.

Chapter II
This chapter includes overviews of the three main force elements which are integral to the development of the Military Assistance Plan in this area. These include the South Korean military forces, the U.S./U.S. forces maintained in country, and the North Korean forces who represent a direct threat to the security of the country.

Chapter III
A historical development of the U.S. Foreign Aid and Military Assistance programs and, in particular, those which are operative in South Korea is presented. The current varieties of military assistance are also discussed including a detailed analysis of the methods and techniques of military assistance planning and programming.

Chapter IV
A detailed discussion of the South Korean assistance programs including the political, economic, and military aspects is presented.
An attempt is made to evaluate the effectiveness of the program by reviewing the performance record of the South Koreans in Vietnam and in reacting to the DMZ violations and infiltrations of North Korea.

Chapter V
Areas other than purely operational which affect the effectiveness of the South Korean military are discussed. The broad subject of military support is reviewed in detail as it represents the most limiting facet of the South Korean forces, and as such provides indicators of how future MAP planning should be directed. The role of the military advisor is also discussed.

Chapter VI
This chapter consist of conclusions and recommendations concerning the value of the South Korean MAP as a model for future Military Assistance programs. Strengths and weaknesses discussed and the judgments offered are based on the data researched and on personal experiences in the field.

Thesis Supervisor: William W. Kaufmann
Title: Professor of Political Science
Table of Contents

ABSTRACT 2

INTRODUCTION 5

CHAPTER

I The Nixon Doctrine and South Korea 8
II Force Elements 15
III Foreign Aid and Military Assistance Overview 32
IV Analysis of the South Korean MAAG Effort 52
V Evaluation of the South Korean Military and MAAG 69
VI Conclusion and Observation 81

LIST OF TABLES

I Military Assistance Program
   Executive Branch Organization 42
II Summary of U.S. Economic Aid Received 45
III Korean Map and Excess Defense Articles By
   Fiscal Year 46
IIIA Incidents and Casualties Caused by North Korean
   Infiltration 57
IV Inducements Offered South Korean Defectors 60
V Results of Battle in Vietnam 65

BIBLIOGRAPHY 89
In 1969 President Nixon, in a major policy address delivered on the Island of Guam, outlined what has come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine. While the President carefully reassured his audience that this country would maintain its interest and commitments in Asia, he also expressed his belief that some Asian countries are now in a position to assume a larger share of the responsibility for the security of the area. Although the Nixon Doctrine deals with many facets of Asian policy much of its emphasis is directed to the status of military forces, both U.S. and indigenous. The doctrine calls for a retrenchment of conventional United States forces, phased so that they will be replaced by properly trained and equipped local forces. The President and other government officials have stated that the Military Assistance Program will be one of the vehicles used to bring about this more cooperative security environment. In light of this new emphasis, the purpose of this study is to examine Military Assistance within the context of one of the countries most affected by the Nixon Doctrine - South Korea.

South Korea was chosen for several reasons: It is one of the countries where the Nixon Doctrine has had immediate impact and where there has been a variety of reaction; because South Korea has had a large and active Military Assistance Program for several years and there is unclassified documentation available; because South Korea has a real threat to its security represented by North Korea and this threat is vividly dramatized on practically a daily basis; because several unique situations exist in South Korea which bear directly and indirectly on the Military Assistance Program; and finally because of
a personal interest in this particular area evolving from a recent assignment as a Military Advisor to the South Korean Air Force.

In organizing my research I attempted to isolate the following factors: 1) the direction that the Nixon Doctrine would drive the U.S./South Korea situation; 2) the extent that North Korea represents a viable threat to the security of South Korea, and the extent and direction that the threat is exercised; 3) documentation that would support arguments for or against the effectiveness of South Korean Armed Forces in various modes of military activity; 4) specifics about the evolution and character of the South Korean Military Assistance Program, and 5) commentary concerning the major component parts of the South Korean MAP.

Because of the constraints of Security Classifications, and limited time and research material, it was not possible to support some of the assumptions and observations made, which are based primarily on personal experience. In fact, commentary in the area of support capability and analysis, with the exception of training, is conspicuous by its absence. To have questioned more deeply into the support area would require access to material not available outside of the logistics channels of the U.S. Military Services.

The basic intent of this study can be summarized in the following manner. The Nixon Doctrine calls for Asian nations to carry a greater share of their defense while our share of the Asian Security responsibility calls for greater emphasis on Military Assistance Programs. If one assumes, as in the case of South Korea, that the American forces being withdrawn were originally sent to help counter the threat from North Korea, then it follows that the Administration feels that the South
Korean Armed Forces are capable of filling the void. Since the program most responsible for the condition of South Korean Armed Forces is the Military Assistance Program, it would be useful to identify those facets of the program which have been successful and, if possible, those which have not, so that the future programming of Military Assistance Aid might profit from the Korean experience.
CHAPTER I

THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND SOUTH KOREA

Because the Nixon Doctrine represents a major shift in U.S. Foreign Policy it has been the focus of a great deal of concern in this country as well as in those Asian countries which are directly involved.

President Nixon summarized the essence of the Doctrine in his 1970 Report to Congress in the following way:

The United States will keep all its treaty commitments. We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.

In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

He further amplified the above points by carefully emphasizing that this new policy

...requires our commitment to helping our partners develop their own strength. In doing so we must strike a careful balance. If we do too little to help them - and erode their belief in our commitments - they may lose the necessary will to conduct their own self-defense or become disheartened about prospects of development. Yet if we do too much, and American forces do what local forces can and should be doing, we promote dependence rather than independence.

In providing for a more responsible role for Asian nations in their own defense, the Nixon Doctrine means not only a more effective use of common resources,
but also an American policy which can best be sustained over the long run.

The implementation of the Nixon Doctrine from its announcement to the point where there has been actual restructuring of Military forces in affected Asian countries has been relatively swift. In Korea, the implementation has not only been rapid, but it has also been attended by a variety of reactions ranging from the threatened resignation of high government officials to the final acceptance of a compromise American troop reduction plan, the first since the Korean War.

In July 1970 the Pentagon announced that 20,000 American ground troops would be withdrawn from South Korea by mid-1971. However, this announcement had been preceded by a period of intense negotiation because of the violent objection among Korean officials. President Chung Hee Park and Prime Minister Chung Si Kwon berated the U.S. for the decision and the Prime Minister actually threatened to resign if the U.S. did not agree to delay the withdrawal until 1976 and pledge $1 billion in military aid spread over the five year period.

Following the initial announcement and its attendant turmoil in South Korea, President Nixon and several top administration spokesmen launched a campaign designed to explain the basic intent of the Doctrine with particular emphasis on reassuring the South Koreans. For instance, in an interview on the American Broadcasting Company's television and radio program "Issues and Answers" on January 18, 1970 Secretary of State Rogers, responding to a question about the country's position towards our existing defense commitment, stated:

....I think that is a question in the minds of many
Asians. I believe though, as a result of the trips by President Nixon, Vice President Agnew, and myself that we have tended to put their minds at ease. We can live up to our treaty responsibilities and still reduce our presence in Asia, and we are reducing our presence in Asia; and I think we have assured them to their satisfaction that we mean it. We are going to live up to our treaty obligations.

Responding to specific questions about the situation in South Korea, Secretary Rogers added:

.... we don't have any present plans to reduce our troops in South Korea, but undoubtedly the troops will be gradually reduced over a period of years. Now, that will be a decision the President has to make down the road a bit. But of course it does; it means we will gradually reduce our troop strength in some of these areas depending on the circumstances... We certainly have no intention of forever having troops in South Korea, but I wouldn't want to suggest we are going to take all of our troops out of South Korea in the foreseeable future as long as North Korea behaves the way they do.

At a press conference in July of 1970 Secretary Rogers again addressed himself to the South Korean situation, specifically to the threat of the Prime Minister that he and his staff would resign if the United States did not take measures to modernize the South Korean Army before any withdrawals were made. His reply indicated that several meetings had been held with the Foreign Minister of South Korea and assurances had been repeated by this government that we would do what we could to modernize their forces to fill the vacuum caused by U.S. troops withdrawals. He added that:

I think that they regret the decision, but I think that they realize that we are going to cooperate with them. We have reiterated that this is not in any way a lack of resolve on our part to live up to our treaty commitments, and we will do what we can to reassure them and to make it clear to the other side that we are going to remain strong and that the forces of the Republic of South Korea will remain strong."

10
Vice President Agnew was also called upon to reassure the Koreans and he included a visit to Seoul in the itinerary of his Asian tour in mid 1970. The report of his Korean visit contains some indication of how the negotiations between the United States and South Korea were progressing. He repeatedly reaffirmed our government's intent to honor the Mutual Defense Treaty, but also made it quite clear that American ground forces would be reduced. However, he did announce that a squadron of F-4 tactical fighter aircraft would be permanently stationed in Korea and that, as a counter to increased North Korean attempts to infiltrate from the sea, special radar equipped patrol aircraft would be made available to the South Korean Navy. He further stated that

I am here to assure you that in connection with our commitment to Korea, the United States intends to provide your Government with additional military assistance to substantially modernize the defense capability of your military. 8

Statements made by Prime Minister II Kwon Chung indicate that by this time the South Koreans were becoming resigned to the situation, and were satisfied that they were not being abandoned by the United States.

Vice President Agnew in a press briefing after having left Seoul admitted that a basic accord had been reached with the Koreans, but reaffirmed that the U.S. takes the position that the reduction is not contingent upon the modernization, nor is modernization contingent upon reduction. 9

In a message to Congress delivered on November 18, 1970 President Nixon requested a supplemental appropriation of economic and military
assistance funds required because of the impact of the Nixon Doctrine.

His comments concerning the Korean situation indicated in general terms the nature of the agreements between the two countries. He said:

I have announced our intentions to reduce by 20,000 the authorized level of United States forces in the Republic of Korea. This has placed a greater defense burden on the Koreans.

Our present assistance to Korea is mostly of operations-and-maintenance items for their military forces. These items do not help to modernize the Korean force structure as we must do if we are to help Korea improve its own defense capability.

I therefore request authority to transfer to Korea equipment currently being utilized by United States forces scheduled to be withdrawn.

Additional assistance is required this year as part of Korea's major five-year program to modernize its defense forces and to enable it to effectively meet outside threats as we reduce the level of direct U.S. involvement. These funds are needed now to insure that the needed equipment will be delivered in good time.

I request that Congress provide 150 million dollars in support of this modernization of South Korea's defense.

The impact of the Nixon Doctrine on South Korea now seems to have stabilized. The violent objections with which the Korean Government initially reacted have calmed and troop realignments have begun.

The compromise which has mollified the Koreans includes: no withdrawals beyond the announced 20,000 men, the turnover of about $100 million worth of surplus United States military equipment which will be left behind by the returning troops, an additional $150 million of Military Assistance for the modernization of the Korean Armed Forces in addition to the regular military aid amounting to $140 million approved for this year, and the relocation of a tactical fighter wing from Japan to Korea.
Examples of news releases from Korea are indicators of the rapid pace that the military force structure is changing:

After 18 years troops of the U.S. Second Infantry Division are being withdrawn from an 18 mile sector of the Korean Demilitarized Zone.\textsuperscript{12}

An Air Force Wing of 54 F-4D Phantom fighter bombers has been permanently transferred to Kunson Air Base, 120 miles south of Seoul, from Japan.\textsuperscript{13}

The South Korean Government is considering the possibility of withdrawing the 50,000 South Korean troops now stationed in South Vietnam, and also increasing the size of the defense forces in order to offset the U.S. troop withdrawals.\textsuperscript{14}

Considering the intent of the Nixon Doctrine as described above, the context of the negotiated agreement between this government and South Korea, and actual conditions as they presently exist in South Korea today, it appears that the security of the area rests upon two pillars. The first consists of the South Korean military establishment bolstered by a large military assistance and advisory program. The second is implied in the pledge contained in the Mutual Defense Treaty, dynamically dramatized by the presence of a large U.S. force permanently stationed in South Korea. The Military Assistance Program affects and is affected by both of these major factors, and the whole force structure package is carefully tailored to the most immediate threat, North Korea. In order to place the military assistance program as it operates in South Korea in the proper perspective it is necessary to briefly review these three major force elements.
CHAPTER I - END NOTES

2. ibid, p. 294
5. The official announcement of the American Force Reduction of 20,000 men was made in July 1970
6. Rogers, William P., op. cit. in 4, p. 152
9. ibid, p. 382
12. "U.S. Troops to Withdraw from Truce Line in Korea", Christian Science Monitor, 10 Feb 1971
SOUTH KOREA

On the 5th of June 1950, when the Communist forces moved south across the 38th parallel with armor, heavy artillery and tactical aircraft, the ROK Army of 94,000 officers and men consisted of 8 understrength and poorly trained divisions and two separate regiments. Training during the preceding year had progressed only to the point where each soldier had fired a qualification course with his individual weapon, and only two regiments had completed the battalion phase of unit training.

The ROK Air Force consisted of twelve L-4 and L-5 type airplanes which had been furnished by the United States for liaison and artillery use, and ten AT-6 training ships purchased by the Korean Government.

The Navy consisted of a skeleton Coast Guard and one Marine regiment.

There was no field army or corps organizations and command and control could only be directed by ROK Headquarters.¹

Today the military establishment of the Republic of Korea is the second largest military force in the Far East, exceeded only by Communist China. The armed forces have a total personnel strength of about 670,000 which includes an Army of 570,000, an Air Force of 23,000, a
Navy of 50,000 and a Marine Corps of 33,000.²

The Army presently consists of 19 front line infantry divisions organized into the First Army deployed along the demilitarized zone dividing North and South Korea, and the Second Army made up of four military district commands and tasked primarily with the administration and training of the reserve force and recruits.³ Most of the Army's equipment is of U.S. origin and consists of modern hardware such as M-48 tanks, M-79 grenade launchers, and integrated military communications networks. There is one battalion of "Honest John" rockets, two squadrons with "Hawk" surface-to-air missiles, and one battalion of "Nike-Hercules" surface-to-air missiles.⁴ The total number of South Korean anti-aircraft missiles is reported to be 80.⁵

This equipment list is in the process of dynamic change as the U.S. forces, withdrawing from their positions on the DMZ, turn over their equipment to their South Korean replacements.

The ROK Army has maintained a sizeable force in Vietnam since 1964. Besides compiling an impressive combat record, the Korean army has profited from the Vietnam experience in that through the rotation of troops in Vietnam they have exposed and trained their cadre in modern combat techniques against an enemy equipped and trained much the same as the one they face in North Korea. The Vietnam situation will be more fully developed later.

The Chief of Staff of the Army commands all components of the Army; however, operational control of the field army, corps, division and AAA Brigade is exercised by the Commanding General 8th U.S. Army.

Training in the ROK Army is conducted at one Replacement Training
Center, 19 Service Schools including a Command and General Staff College, and the Korean Military Academy.

There are Korean Military Assistance Group detachments at each of the major ROKA commands and at other echelons down to and including the Corps and certain Military Districts.\(^6\)

The ROK Navy is mainly limited, because of its small size, to coastal patrol, mine sweeping and limited amphibious operations.

Recently expanded to a total strength of 50,000 because of the increased threat of North Korean infiltration by sea approaches, the Navy command and control structure consist of a fleet command, two combat groups, two independent squadrons, and a training group. They operate 3 destroyers, 4 destroyer escorts, 4 frigates, 15 coastal escorts, 3 fast transports, 11 coastal mine sweepers, 8 tank landing ships, 12 medium landing ships and 12 other ships.\(^7\)

Most of the officer personnel are procured from the Naval Academy, which conducts a four year course of instruction. In addition to these, and a number of officers obtained from the Merchant Marine Academy, a few are obtained from civilian universities and given 12 to 16 weeks course prior to commissioning. There is also a Naval War College for senior Navy officers.\(^8\)

The ROK Marine Corps is subordinated to the Navy, and consists of five brigades, with one, the 2nd "Blue Dragon" brigade, serving in Vietnam. The remaining brigades are tasked with the defense of the capital and the security of the islands off the west coast of Korea. Its equipment is modern and ROK marines are unusually well trained and motivated.
The ROK Air Force is the newest of the services, organized in May, 1948, as the Korean Air Base Group. It has a total strength of 23,000 and an equipment list consisting of 200 combat aircraft including 55 F-5 tactical fighters, 20 F-86D all weather interceptors armed with sidewinder missiles, 100 F-86F interceptors, 10 RF-86F reconnaissance aircraft, 29 C-46 and Aero Commander transports, 3 C-54 transports used in support of the Vietnam forces, T-33 and T-28 trainers and some Checkasaw and HU-1 helicopters used for liaison, counter-insurgency and priority material handling in support of remote operating locations. The Air Force also operates an aircraft control and warning network, and a modern microwave and tropo-scatter communications network. The U.S. Air Force Military Assistance and Advisory Group is completing the F-4 tactical fighter modernization program. A squadron of 15 of these aircraft was provided to the South Korean Air Force in order to bolster the defense against the MG-21's operated by North Korea.

The Chief of Staff of the ROK Air Force has full operational control, his post corresponding closely to that of the Chief of Staff of the USAF. His relationship with the chiefs of the ROK Army and the CNO are comparable to those of the U.S. services. Officers are obtained from the Air Force Academy and through Officer Candidate Schools for qualified college graduates. The 6146th Air Force Advisory group USAF provides advisors at all echelons from headquarters ROKAF down to Squadron level.

In addition to their obvious utility as indicators of military potential, the above lists of military hardware and, even to a greater degree the highly specialized and modern equipment being transferred by
the departing U.S. troops to their Korean replacements draw attention to the sophistication of the force. Equipment of this type places a heavy premium on maintenance, supply and training facilities, and this in direct proportion to the overall effectiveness of the Military. Since the South Korean military establishment is a technologically advanced military force it must provide the proper operations and training programs to its personnel. This is done both in country and outside as, either a feature of the military assistance program, or in a third country as a function of mutual defense agreements.

To use the Air Force as an example, the ROKAF training Command provides modern facilities for basic training and skill development. These facilities are modeled after USAF facilities and use much of the same training and course material. Instruction is provided in a variety of areas including air operations, basic flying instruction, aircraft maintenance, air traffic control, photographic interpretation, communications equipment operations and maintenance, and supply administration. Graduates of these centers are then exposed to on-the-job training at operational units until testing and performance indicates they are competent. In addition, instructors at these centers, and key supervisory NCO's receive training through the Military Assistance Program. Thousands of Korean military personnel have received training since the program was established. Selection for this training is competitive and opportunities are provided for language training centers.

Third country training, utilized when it becomes economically expedient to provide special training for a large number of personnel without consuming funds for travel to the continental U.S., is pos-
sible because many Asian countries have received similar equipment through the Military Assistance Program. Special courses on this equipment, or on procedures and tactics common to these countries can easily be organized using specially trained instructors or mobile training teams from the United States. Another dimension of the training program will be treated in a later chapter.

NORTH KOREA

The modern Korean People's Army was formally established on February 8, 1948. At the ceremony marking the foundation of the Army, Kim II - Sung reminded the nation of "...the task of strengthening military discipline, educating the soldiers in bravery and heroism and mastering Soviet military science, and the valuable combat experience of the Soviet Armed Forces."\(^{13}\) This task has been one of the central goals of the country since that time and at present the North Korean Military force is estimated to total approximately 400,000 including an Army of some 360,000, an Air Force of over 800 aircraft, and 30,000 men, a Navy with a defensive coastal fleet of about 160 small craft and 10,000 men. The regular forces are augmented by a civilian militia with a claimed strength of 1,200,000 making the size of the military establishment surpassed only by those of the Soviet Union and Communist China among the Communist Nations.\(^{14}\)

In structure and equipment the North Korean military is patterned after the two major communist powers. The equipment used by all
services is mostly of Russian manufacture and obtained through various foreign aid programs.

The Army has an estimated total strength of 360,000 men organized into 1 armoured division and 18 infantry divisions. There are also 5 independent infantry brigades. The Army is equipped with 800 Soviet tanks including PT-76's, T-34's, T-54's, and T-55's, 200 Su-76's, Su-100 and Su-57 self-propelled guns, and 5000 other artillery pieces up to 152 mm guns. They also have 15 SA-20 "guideline" surface-to-air missile sites with about 300 missiles. There are about 15,000 men in "special commando teams" who specialize in clandestine and insurgency activities. Members of this group carried out the attempted assassination of South Korean President Park in 1968.15

The North Korean Navy with a total strength of 10,000 operates 4 Soviet W class submarines, 10 fleet mine sweepers, 14 coastal escorts, 4 missile patrol boats, 21 motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons), 30 other small patrol boats and one slightly used U.S. intelligence boat.16

The Air Force derives its main strength from its more than 590 combat aircraft. These include 30 MiG-21 interceptors, 60 II-28 jet light-bombers, 50 MiG-19 interceptors, 450 MiG-17 and MiG-15 fighter bombers. They also operate 27 AN-2 and Li-2 transports, with 20 Mi-4 helicopters. Yak-9, Yak-11, Yak-18, MiG-15 and II-28 are used for pilot and crew training.17

Recently the South Korean Defense Minister announced in an interview that he had reason to believe that there were some MiG-23 aircraft in North Korea.18
The para-military, territorial militia is now reported to be over the million personnel mark and appears to be a formidable factor for domestic discipline and for organized wartime support. The Militia is composed of men and women including factory workers, farmers, intellectuals and others from all walks of life. Its members are organized into regiments composed of about 12 companies formed in factories, villages, cooperatives, and schools, and are sponsored and supervised by one of the Regular Army groups and by the Party as well.19

North Korea is also reported to have 19 factories capable of producing 73 million small-arms rounds, 6.5 million hand grenades, 650,000 artillery rounds, 14,000 tons of explosives, 150,000 rifles and 300 mortars a year.20

The bulk of enlisted personnel for the services are conscripted youth who are trained and administered by the relatively permanent cadre. Normal service is 3 years and six months for those in the Army and 4 years for the Navy and Air Force. Enlisted personnel may be discharged at any time for a variety of reasons including medical, ideological, and political. A vocational placement and guidance program is provided following discharge.

Officers receive their commissions via their individual services Officer Candidate Schools, or as graduates of the cademies. Some officers have risen from the ranks. There does not appear to be any favored or elite class dominating the officer ranks.21

Training in the North Korean Military has been tempered by both Soviet and Chinese advisory teams. Several training sites have been established including a military school system for the basic and
advanced training of officers and enlisted men. Judging from the sophistication and advanced technology of the equipment operated and maintained, and by the appearance and performance of units in parades and demonstrations it appears that the training program is quite successful.

As in all communist military establishments political training plays a major role in the development of personnel. Recruits find that the Party's indoctrination program is vigorously enforced and future promotion depends on successfully meeting political training goals.

A unique feature of the training system is the military instruction conducted at all colleges and universities. It is compulsory for all male students to undergo 200 hours of training each year in addition to his regular academic work. The military subjects are taught by active duty officers and students must pass their military subjects before they are allowed to take examinations in their academic subjects and those who fail, leave school. 22

Recently, because of reduced Soviet aid and Kim Il-Sung's added emphasis on military preparedness, the cost of maintaining the military absorbs a major portion of the national economy. Defense outlays for calendar year 1967 were raised sharply to 30.2 percent of the budget. In April 1968 a Cabinet minister announced an additional increase to 33 percent for military expenditures. 23

The announced intention of Kim Il-Sung to re-unify the country before his 60th birthday with its attendant expanded program of DMZ violations and attempted infiltration of agents into South Korea has placed
additional demands on the Military which will result in higher cost. There is also reason to believe that new problems requiring expanded military involvement are developing on the Chinese border. It was recently reported in an Indian newspaper that because of clashes along the 600 mile border between Manchuria and North Korea the Chinese have sealed the border. China has claimed a large strip of North Korea which includes a heavily guarded military zone defended by surface-to-air missiles, on the strength of its intervention in the Korea War.24

Since 1966 when it was decided to change the character of the economy and give greater attention to military preparedness, the role of the military in politics, has greatly expanded. Many officers hold key positions in both the Korean Workers Party and in the government. Most of the individuals who reach positions of power are those who have been closely associated with Premier Kim Il-Sung since WW II and who survived the purges following the Korean War. Until 1959 there was a dual political - military structure, of the model common in most communist countries. This system, because it caused conflicts between the professional military components, and the "political commissar" was reformed in order to tighten the party control over the military. A series of Party Committees and corresponding political offices have been established at all levels of command and is responsible for accommodating the political needs of the troops. The reorganization has also led to the expedient of combining the political and military functions in the same, properly conditioned, officer.
U.S. FORCES

The third major element involved in the total military posture in the area are the U.S. military forces permanently stationed in South Korea. In spite of the announced withdrawal of 20,000 men, the U.S. contingent is still a large force capable of quick reaction. Current plans call for the retrenchment of U.S. troops from the forward positions they have manned on the western end of the DMZ, to reserve position in the interior of the country. This will result in the disbanding of the U.S. 7th Infantry Division. After this reorganization, U.S. Forces in Korea will stabilize at about 43,000 Army personnel, assigned to the 2nd Infantry Division, the Headquarter Staff of the 8th U.S. Army, and various air defense, maintenance, and medical support organizations.

The recently assigned F-4E fighter wing will bolster USAF forces under the command of the 314th Air Division. Other Air Force units in country are tasked with air control and warning missions, and other tactical control functions.

Not included above are the Military Assistance Groups which will be covered later.

Although the U.S. forces in Korea and those on call in the immediate area are a substantial element in the total security equation there are, however, other relationships in the interface of South Korean and U.S. forces more germane to the basic concern of this study in that they bear directly on the effectiveness of the Military Assistance Program.

Perhaps the most significant of these second order relationships is the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army Program (KATUSA).
This program involves the assignment and integration of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) enlisted personnel into units of the Eighth U.S. Army. It has two basic purposes:

(1) Increasing the operating capability of the U.S. Army units to which these ROKA personnel "KATUSAs" are assigned.

(2) Providing additional well-trained personnel and skilled technicians for ROKA.

The program of augmenting U.S. military units with Korean troops began in 1950 as a field expedient. Today, it is a program of international cooperation through which extremely important contributions are made to the separate and collective needs of the U.S. and ROK Armies. The program permits the U.S. Army to maintain units of full strength and operating capability and, simultaneously, helps reduce the cost to the U.S. both in money and in manpower. It provides the U.S. units the tactical advantages that go along with assimilation of local troops into U.S. ranks. It has also helped to contribute to the building of an even more powerful allied army, for the Republic of Korea gains by means of this program, well trained personnel who will return to the ROKA and will be used as highly skilled trainers. At the same time, ROKA is spared some of the burdens of arming and supporting these men while they are attached to the U.S. units.

At present there are about 11,000 personnel in the KATUSA. To be selected an individual must have at least a 6th grade education and some English language training. Each man selected is provided a short familiarization program at the KATUSA training center prior to being assigned to an American unit. There are no commissioned or
warrant officers in this category and KATUSA personnel may not be assigned permanently as kitchen police, laborers, cargo carriers, houseboys, or other non-military tasks. This does not prohibit the rotation of KATUSA personnel, as individuals, to these housekeeping or guard and security details, to which American personnel are regularly detailed by unit duty rosters. Every effort is made to assimilate these augmentees into units as thoroughly as possible. There are cases where Korean NCO's are in supervisory positions over lower ranking U.S. troops; and further, because KATUSA have a permanency which the short tour length in Korea (13 months) denies Americans, there are examples where KATUSA's provide high quality on-the-job training for U.S. troops. This is particularly true in those operational centers where Korean and U.S. personnel work side by side and the Koreans, because of their familiarity with the country, language, and the various contingency plans, dampen the effect of the rapid turnover of U.S. troops.

Although the training offered the KATUSA should not be equated with the more formalized effort which is part of the Military Assistance Program, it does make a major contribution to general effectiveness of the South Korean forces and thus does parallel the basic intent of the Assistance Program.

Another spin off from the U.S. military forces in South Korea which affects the Assistance programs results because the U.S. presence provides a dynamic model against which the Korean Forces can compare their activities and even draw upon on occasion. There are many cases, especially during periods of increased alert such as following the
Pueblo seizure, when the rather slow mechanics of the Military Assistance Program could not meet immediate operational demands. During these times U.S. in-country maintenance, supply, and logistical resources can be used to supplement the Korean capability. This bypasses the long procurement lead times required for standard MAP programming by drawing on U.S. material and expertise because of overriding operational needs.

During joint exercises, ROK units operating side by side with U.S. units can compare their performance, witness advanced tactics being demonstrated, and observe how modern military equipment is used—all in the physical environment that the Korean forces must operate.

This unique characteristic of the Korean situation does have disadvantages. Very often inefficiencies in either the Military Assistance Program or in the ROK forces themselves are overlooked or tolerated because of the expedient of simply having the "Americans do it". This is particularly true in the area of supply and logistical support. Often high value items essential to the proper functioning of sophisticated equipment are not stocked in sufficient numbers because to do so would deplete funds from the limited resources available. The rationale justifying this practice being that if conditions deteriorate to the point where joint operations are affected the U.S. forces will intercede and by-pass the Assistance channel in order to expedite the fix.

Another possible negative effect develops whenever Koreans compare their forces with the obviously better equipped U.S. troops and assume from this a lack of confidence in their own military, and an overreliance on U.S. forces. This partially explains the violent reaction described earlier which followed the announcement of U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea.
The basic reason for presenting this brief overview of the major forces operating within the area is to dramatize the highly sophisticated environment within which the Military Assistance Program must operate. The size of these force elements, the types of equipments they utilize, and the integrated nature of many of the operations the South Korean and United States forces participate in to counter the North Korean threat, provide insights into the magnitude of the M.A.P. The following discussion will add another dimension to the development of the program.
CHAPTER II - END NOTES


3. U.S. Government, op.cit. in 1, p. 442


6. Choenski, Walter, op.cit., p.67


8. Choenski, Walter, op.cit. p.72


11. Choenski, Walter, op. cit., p. 72


15. ibid p. 64

16. ibid p. 65
17. ibid p. 65


19. Shinn, Rinn-Sup., op. cit., p.407


21. Shim, Rinn-Sup. op. cit., p.408

22. ibid p. 409

23. ibid p. 409


26. Choenski, Walter, op.cit., p.69
CHAPTER III

FOREIGN AID AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE OVERVIEW

In order to better appreciate and understand the impact of Military Assistance in South Korea, one must, as a minimum, consider the general background of the United States Foreign Assistance Program.

Technically, foreign aid can be defined as any contribution made by one economy on the behalf of another. In this broad sense, all forms of private investments and commercial trade may be labelled as foreign aid. Usually, however, the term refers to that aid which is generated at the governmental level and generally includes economic as well as military assistance. Therefore, it is adequate to limit this review to those programs beginning with the Lend Lease of World War II to appreciate the evolution of the program which now operates in South Korea, although as an interesting aside, the Korean government was one of the first governments to request military assistance from the United States. In correspondence from the then ambassador to Korea, Lucuus H. Foote to the Secretary of State dated October 19, 1883 is quoted an interview with the King of Korea where he requested the services of an American Military Officer to instruct and drill his troops. As a reward, he was willing to confer upon the officer the second highest military rank in the kingdom.¹
In a follow-up dispatch dated Sept. 3, 1884 the ambassador again referred to the request of the King describing the actions taken by the Korean government in anticipation of the arrival of the U.S. advisor in the following way:

Fourteen young Koreans educated in the Military School at Tokio are waiting to assist him and four thousand stand at arms, - breechloading rifles - purchased in the U.S., remain by order of his majesty undistributed until he shall arrive. Men of other nationalities, through the Officials of their respective governments are seeking these positions, and I would earnestly ask you to take immediate action in the matter.2

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

United States post war relief from 1946 to 1948 was given through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Program (UNRPP) which supplied emergency food, supplies, shelters, and clothing to Europe.

In 1948 the Economic Cooperation Act (ECA), commonly called the Marshall Plan, was launched for the reconstruction of western Europe. The ECA administered aid to Europe on a regional basis, aiming to increase agricultural and industrial production, eliminate intra-European trade barriers, reduce the "dollar gap", and achieve financial stability. The ECA program was later extended to include economic stabilization and development in non-European areas such as China, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma and the Philippines. The ECA goals were being accomplished, but, with the threat of Communist aggression in Greece and Turkey, Europe turned from reconstruction to rearmament. In 1948 aid was given Greece and Turkey which inaugurated the postwar U.S. foreign aid program as a vehicle to counter Soviet aggression using American money and material. The
Defense Assistance Program was initiated in 1949 to aid Europe in rearming without sacrificing its reconstruction program.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were established in 1949 as a joint U.S.-European response to the mounting possibility of Soviet aggression in Europe. The MDAP helped Europe in rearmament while NATO was a program of mutual defense with America agreeing to support Europe militarily if aggression occurred. Military Assistance was extended to some 40 countries in the Far East, Near East, South Asia, Africa and Latin America, mostly outside of NATO and Europe.

In 1950 the first Act of Internal Development under the Point IV Program was passed offering technical skills and knowledge to underdeveloped nations. With the outbreak of the Korean War that same year, the U.S. aid program was restructured into the military oriented supporting assistance concept. The ECA was terminated and replaced by the Mutual Security Administration (MSA) in 1951. The MSA also provided material help and technical advice to hasten the economic development of underdeveloped nations with a substantial part of the economic aid used for defense support.

The Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) was established in 1953 to succeed the MSA and administer all non-military assistance, along with relieving the State Department of technical assistance while military assistance remained under the Secretary of Defense.

In 1954 the United States began programs in which surplus agricultural products were exported by sale or grants to less developed nations under Public Law 480 which became the Food for Peace
and Freedom Program. The Commodity Credit Corporation made available surplus agricultural products under Title I, for sale for overseas currency at current world market prices; Title II, as grants to meet famine or other relief; and Title III, as donations for volunteer non-profit agencies and inter-governmental agencies.

It was planned in the Mutual Security Act of 1953 that economic aid be terminated in two years and military aid in three, however, the Mutual Security Act of 1954 recognized that some aid might have to be extended and the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) was created in 1955. The ICA centralized operations as under the FOA and was the successor of MSA.

With the formation of the Development Loan Fund in 1957, an increasing emphasis on long-term, low-interest loans replacing grants took place. This fund made loans for economically sound development projects in the less-developed countries available when the projects did not qualify for loans from private sources.

A critical review of our foreign aid program took place in 1961. Europe had economically recovered from the war, the need for large scale military assistance was greatly decreased and a new approach to the problem of communism became necessary along with a new approach to economic development.

To meet these needed revisions, Congress enacted the Foreign Assistance Act which enabled the U.S. to improve and adapt new methods in administering aid. The Agency for International Development (AID) was established as the central administrator for coordinating economic assistance. The five points stressing the U.S. shift of emphasis
in the new foreign aid policy were: (1) long-range development assistance, based on well-conceived plans prepared by the developing country in cooperation with the U.S., aimed at self-sustaining growth of that country; (2) ability and willingness on the part of the developing country to help itself; (3) Aid programs are tailored to the developing country's capacity to use them effectively and the existing threat of communism, depending on the situation of the particular country; (4) long-term, low-interest loans replacing grants to encourage self-help, with repayment in dollars rather than local currency; (5) increase the share of other developed countries in aiding the less-developed countries.

An extensive reorganization of the administrative machinery took place establishing an administrator who was in charge of four regional bureaus representing Latin America, Europe and Africa, the Near East and South Asia and Far East. Supporting offices were created to handle the different phases of assistance along with a Program Review and coordination Staff for agency-wide program and policy planning, economic analysis, and to review and coordinate all AID programs as well as military assistance activities.

There are two other operations, the Peace Corps and the Export-Import Bank, which are not a part of the AID organization but are closely related to it. The Peace Corps, an agency of the Department of State, supplies volunteer manpower for a "people-to-people" program to fill the existing gap between technical experts and unskilled populations of many countries. Loans repayable in dollars for procurement of U.S. goods are made by the Export-Import Bank for projects.
that directly earn or create income in the country of the borrower.  

Other legislative milestones are the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) 1969 which provides the authority for the U.S. to implement its foreign, economic, and military assistance program in fiscal year 1970. In his comments during the signing of the Act, President Nixon referred to upcoming changes in the foreign assistance program through the efforts of a Task Force which he had recently appointed.

He stated that the Task Force had been instructed to intensively examine U.S. assistance programs both past and present. The recommendations of the Task Force were submitted to the President on March 8, 1970 by the Chairman Rudolph A. Peterson, President of the Bank of America. The report concluded, among other things, that changes in the organization and management of U.S. security programs would contribute to their effectiveness, clarify their relationship to U.S. foreign policy, and make our objectives and rationale more understandable to the Congress and the American public. Accordingly, the Task Force recommended: That security assistance programs be combined in one piece of legislation - an International Security Cooperation Act - separate from international development assistance. This Act should cover foreign military sales and grants, surplus military stocks, supporting assistance, public safety programs, and the Contingency Fund; that responsibility be assigned to the Department of State for setting policy and for directing and coordinating security assistance programs. In carrying out this policy, the State Department should relate security programs to U.S. foreign policy, to global strategies, to changing military technologies, and to the financial

37
capabilities of receiving countries. Administration of military grant and credit sales programs should remain with the Department of Defense, supporting assistance, public safety programs and the contingency fund should be administered by the Department of State.\(^4\)

The President emphasized that it was essential to maintain an adequate level of foreign assistance while a new program was being formulated. This caution because Congress had substantially reduced his request, which was already the lowest in history, in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969.

Another major Act was enacted on 22 October 1968 by Congress. This was the Foreign Military Sales Act which consolidated and revised into a single act legislation to authorize sales of defense articles and services by the U.S. Government to friendly foreign countries and international organizations. The act itself, and subsequent instructions issued by the Secretary of Defense, includes clear and precise instructions as to how this activity will be conducted. It prohibits sales to countries where funds for development assistance are directed to military expenditures, encourages unclassified defense equipment sales by private industry whenever possible, provided the arrangements are approved and consistent with the foreign policy interest of the U.S., and through controls and reviews attempt to control the impact of these sales on social and economic development and on arms races.\(^5\)

The Ship Loan Legislation enacted on 10 March 1951 provides Congress with another control device. This act provides that no transfer of major combatant naval vessel, i.e., battleships, carriers,
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, can be made without the specific approval of Congress. In effect this provides a dual check in that equipment of this type authorized under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) cannot be transferred until it is also authorized under the Ship Loan Act. 6

Aside from the legislation detailed above there are other forms of guidance directly bearing on Military Assistance. These are primarily in the form of international agreements and necessarily cover a broad range of subjects, and vary from country to country. One such class of agreements of particular interest because it is the form which operates between the U.S. and South Korea is the type known as Grant Aid Bilateral Agreements. These agreements are the vehicle which provides the U.S. with the assurances which we feel protect our interest. For instance, these agreements usually contain clauses which obligate the recipient countries to obtain the consent of the President of the United States before they: (1) permit any use of MAP equipment by anyone other than an officer, employee, or agent of that country; (2) transfer such articles by gift, sale, or otherwise; (3) use such equipment for purposes other than those for which furnished.

The agreements also demand that the recipient countries provide security for the equipment, permit inspection of the equipment by agents of the U.S., and return the equipment to the U.S. for disposition unless a waiver is considered in the best interest of the United States. 7

Other forms of agreements which usually cover special cases are:
Special Grant Aid Agreements, when it is felt that aid is in the best interest of the U.S., but the recipient does not wish to enter into a bilateral agreement with the U.S.; Mutual Security Agreements; Foreign Military Sales Bilateral Agreements; Cost-Sharing Agreements, pertaining to those cases where material could be procured either indigenously or in the U.S., with cost involved being charged by pre-arranged formula to MAP funds and to the country in question such as the case of shipbuilding in Norway and aircraft production in Japan; Facilities Assistance Agreements, covering the situation where facilities were provided at MAP expense, but the recipient agreed to furnish the product, usually propellants and explosives, upon request to other NATO members and other free world nations at a fair and reasonable prices and not to discriminate in terms of price and quality, time of delivery or performance; Mutual Defense Treaties; Atomic Energy Treaties; Patent Agreements; and Tax Relief Agreements.8

PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING.

Within the legislative constraints outlined above, the planning of the military assistance program is based on comprehensive guidance from the Department of Defense, the Department of State and AID - the administrator of AID is responsible for coordinating MAP with economic aid; and DOD provides guidance setting forth U.S. policy objectives and dollar guidelines for future planning for each country, as well as specifying the military tasks which require emphasis in AID programming. Within this framework, the planning of five year military assistance programs on a regional and country-by-country basis also
depends on military requirements planning as visualized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 9

On the basis of the JCS force goals and base requirements, and the country dollar guidelines, the in-country Military Assistance and Advisory Groups (MAAG) prepare and submit their proposed five year equipment and training plan for the forces of recipient countries. These plans are first submitted to the Unified Commander and include both the dollar costs of equipment programmed under MAP, and the total estimated local defense budget cost with which the dollar programs are associated. Total defense costs are subdivided into those to be financed by the country itself, and those for which foreign assistance is required. 10

The MAAG submission also includes a notation concerning expected shortfalls between the JCS goals and the programmed funds, if any, and an evaluation of the effect of these shortfalls to U.S. objectives and the anticipated threat. The MAAG proposal is reviewed or modified by the Unified Commander and submitted to the Department of Defense.

The DOD review procedure includes a variety of steps designed to accommodate the MAAG submission to the various executive, legislative, and political guidelines available. Following this review the programs are submitted to the administrator of AID in his role as foreign aid coordinator, and then to the Bureau of the Budget who in turn request an allotment to implement the operating program for the current fiscal year, and approves the basic estimates of the full term five year plan. 12

After action by the Budget Bureau and further DOD coordination with the Unified Commander and the local MAAGs, any necessary program
revisions are made so that the current program can be implemented. Table I shows a schematic representation of this process.

TABLE I

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE BRANCH: ORGANIZATION

Direction

Coordination

The Secretary of Defense operates with the foreign and fiscal policy guidelines laid down by the Secretaries of State and Treasury, respectively.
U.S. FOREIGN AID FOR KOREA

Having reviewed the legislative and procedural facets of foreign aid it is now possible to examine the details of how this program has been applied in the case of South Korea.

Following the Japanese surrender offer of August 10, 1945, prompt arrangements were necessary for the surrender of Japanese forces in the Pacific and Asiatic theaters, including Korea. The decisions were incorporated in General Order No. 1, which defined areas of responsibility for accepting surrender of all Japanese military forces. As regards Korea, the order provided that Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel were to surrender to the Soviet commanders, while those south of that line surrender to the United States commanders. This was culminated September 9, 1945.13

The main objective of the United States was to help make Korea a free and independent nation. As commissioned by the United Nations, the United States first facilitated the surrender of the Japanese forces, then attempted to "reestablish Korea as an independent state" through the Moscow Agreement of 1945. This agreement called for a joint Soviet-U.S. Commission which was to assist in forming a provisional Korean democratic government, but, after two meetings, failed to agree on any major issues. On September 17, 1947, the United States submitted the Korean problem to the United Nations.14

From the beginning of the occupation through 1948 the United States Government spent $300 million for relief and rehabilitation of South Korea. Only about 10 percent of this amount was used for development projects while the rest was used for supplies needed for relief.
On December 10, 1948 an economic aid agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States was signed with the administration of American foreign aid entrusted to the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). The terms of this agreement were designed to enable the ECA to see that the aid given was being used to the best advantage of the Korean Government for economic development. The emphasis of American aid was thereby shifted from that of relief to economic development in South Korea. Furthermore, the United States, under the Initial Financial and Property Settlement Agreement of September 11, 1948, gave as a gift to the Republic miscellaneous assets, including 101 locomotives valued at $7.07 million, various capital improvements valued at over $32 million and various surplus military supplies. Twenty-four million dollars was also credited to the Korean Government in payment for debts incurred by the United States forces during the three years of occupation, and all foreign exchange created during the occupation was turned over to the Republic of Korea by the United States. Also under the agreement was the settlement of the $25 million Foreign Liquidation Commission Loan made by the United States to Korea; the terms provided, inter alia, for the creation of an education fund to be administered jointly by Korean and American governments.15

With the foundation being laid for economic stabilization, one could have looked forward to vast economic reconstruction, but the Korean War started forcing these aims to the future.

Since 1945 assistance from the United States has been of two types-economic aid and military aid. The greater portion of U.S. economic
aid has consisted of grant-type aid and deliveries of surplus agricultural commodities under Title I of Plan 480.\textsuperscript{16} During the period 1946 to 1967 the United States assistance to the Republic of Korea totalled $6,070 million, of which $4,020 million was economic aid and $2,050 million military aid. Since 1958 the United States has placed increasing emphasis on AID loans while the amount of grants has been decreased. Table II is a summary of American economic aid received by South Korea from 1953 to 1967.

### Table II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Calendar Year</th>
<th>Under AID</th>
<th>Under Title I</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>5,571</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>82,437</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>82,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>205,815</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>205,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>271,049</td>
<td>32,955</td>
<td>304,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>323,268</td>
<td>45,522</td>
<td>368,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>265,629</td>
<td>47,896</td>
<td>313,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>208,297</td>
<td>11,436</td>
<td>219,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>225,237</td>
<td>19,913</td>
<td>245,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>154,519</td>
<td>44,926</td>
<td>199,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>165,001</td>
<td>67,508</td>
<td>232,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>119,659</td>
<td>96,824</td>
<td>216,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>88,346</td>
<td>60,985</td>
<td>149,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>71,904</td>
<td>59,537</td>
<td>131,441a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>65,310</td>
<td>37,951</td>
<td>103,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>52,640</td>
<td>44,293</td>
<td>96,933b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Korea, Major Economic Indicator 1957-58, Republic of Korea, 1968), p. 80
TABLE III is a summary of the Military Assistance to South Korea from 1950 to 1969. It includes the dollar value of all deliveries and expenditures for this period and in addition includes a detail of the value of deliveries of excess defense articles delivered to Korea. Defense stocks in long supply and excess are sometimes used to meet valid MAP requirements without reimbursement. While they are put to good use, they cannot be depended upon to meet specific needs that must be filled on a real time basis, because in most cases this excess supply will not be predictable, or in sufficient quantity or type to justify routine or programmed supply action. Nor can they be expected to supply newer types of equipment to service the old equipment often in use in foreign countries. Much of the equipment supplied requires major repair efforts before it can be used and in many cases is useable only as a source of spare parts. Although this category has only a marginal utility value, its issue falls within the purview of the same criteria and legislative restrictions which cover all MAP grant aid.

TABLE III
KOREAN MAP AND EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES BY FISCAL YEARS
(In Missions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAP deliveries</td>
<td>1,830.6</td>
<td>173.1</td>
<td>153.1</td>
<td>149.8</td>
<td>197.4</td>
<td>210.0</td>
<td>2,714.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess Articles(a)</td>
<td>150.7</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>215.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Value is UTILITY VALUE computed to be 30% or real value

Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts
March, 1970 pp. 12-14
It was recently announced that as of 1 April 1971 the functions of the Army, Navy and Air Force Advisory Groups will be consolidated under a single headquarters to be called the Joint United States Military Assistance Group, Korea (JUSMAG-K). The Commander of the JUSMAG-K will report directly to the commander of U.S. Forces Korea.\textsuperscript{17}

At the service level each MAAG is divided into two major divisions - the programming, charged with providing the input described in detail above, and the advisory staff charged with a variety of duties and dealing directly with their counterparts in the ROK forces.

All services have training programs for each group in either formal schools such as the Army Advisory Institute at Fort Bragg, N.C. and the Air Force Advisory courses at the Special Air Warfare School, Hurlbert Field, Fla., or through training manuals detailing the various job requirements and techniques which are made available to those not able to attend the formal schools.\textsuperscript{18}

During the past several years the total number of advisors assigned to South Korea has stabilized at about 1200.\textsuperscript{19} The number of advisors is sensitive to the MAP appropriations and also fluctuates as special programs develop.

In addition to the programming and advisory activities another of the major functions of the MAAG is to manage the implementation of the MAP training program. This program has proved to be one of the most effective facets of Korean Military Assistance. Besides the obvious technical value of the training given to selected personnel, the orientation visits to the United States help create strong bonds of
friendship and understanding.

Between fiscal year 1950 to 1969 a total of 29,808 Korean nationals have received MAP funded training. Of these 20,688 have received their training at military and civilian training centers in the U.S. while 9,120 participated in training programs conducted at other overseas locations.20 The basic criteria for selection for one of the training programs is that the selectee should be eligible and qualified for instructor duty, have at least two times the length of the course of retainability in the military - some special courses require up to five years of retainability, and have some English language training. The final selection is made by the Chief of MAAG. Another variant of the MAP training program consists of orientation tours for selected key senior military personnel. These tours consist of visits to U.S. military centers and demonstrations of various types of equipment and tactics.

While the majority of U.S. assistance for Korea is in the form of Military Assistance Grant Aid, two other aid forms previously mentioned operate in Korea and should be mentioned. PL 480 Title I surplus agricultural produce are provided to the government and sold in the local economy. Funds realized, called the WON Budget, are used to procure equipment, material, facilities and services for defense. Twenty percent of the funds are reserved for U.S. use, i.e., embassy operating expenses and USIA operations. Korea uses mostly wheat and cotton. In 1966 the total of PL. 480 funds was 104.1 million.21

The other source of income is called Supporting Assistance or Counterpart Funds, about 50 million a year was made available to finance the
purchase of raw materials and other essential imports through routine commercial channels. The exporter is paid in dollars and the local importer pays the government in local currency. These funds are then used to finance defense or other programs. \textsuperscript{22}
CHAPTER III - END NOTES


2. ibid, p. 54


5. ibid, p.6

6. ibid, p.7

7. ibid, p.8

8. ibid, pp. 9-10


10. ibid, p.7

11. ibid, p.7

12. ibid, p. 8


18. For an example of these manuals see the series published by the U.S. Strike Command, Mac Gill A.F.B., Florida
19. Refson, Jacob S., op. cit. p.5


22. ibid
CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTH KOREAN MAAG EFFORT

To attempt an analysis of such a program it is imperative to first define as accurately as possible exactly what military assistance is.

The specific objectives of any Military Assistance Program are threefold: political, economic, and military.

In the political area the program is intended not to win friends or generate gratitude on the part of our allies - but, first and foremost, to serve our own national self-interest. The aim is to encourage a commitment to collective security among recipient countries which parallel our view concerning existing threats. This, in order to create political conditions where free world peoples may be in a position to resist encroachments on their freedoms, particularly in those areas which lack the means to carry the burden of this security without assistance.

The Military Assistance Program promotes this country's economic interest in several ways. Indigenous forces are encouraged to share their resources and skills, provided and developed in many cases by the MAP, with the local population. This infusion of skill and material in underdeveloped areas raises the overall economic condition of the area and helps to bring about self-sufficiency more quickly. There
are many examples of this in Korea where equipment and manpower are active in a number of "civic action" programs.

As the MAP matures and the recipient countries become more self-sufficient, they are encouraged to contribute a larger share of their resources to supporting the security establishment, and ultimately this cost sharing is extended to their less developed neighbors so that the responsibility for providing for the secure environment necessary for continued prosperity becomes less of a burden on anyone member. This evolution is the basis of the Nixon Doctrine, and can be witnessed in operation in Korea today.

Foreign Military Sales, another facet of Military Assistance, is also economically beneficial to the U.S. By encouraging the purchase of military equipment by free world nations who can afford them, we are able to ease the problems of balance of payments and the gold flow.

The military objectives of the assistance program are perhaps easier to define. Clearly contributions which support an indigenous military capability which will deter overt aggression, or failing that, will provide a buffer necessary to implement our own contingency plans; or operate to contain insurgency and other covert threats to internal security, thus minimizing the need for direct military support by us or other free world nations - a formula which has become increasingly unpopular and expensive - cannot be achieved more reliably and at less expense and risk through any means other than the Military Assistance Program.¹

The Korean case follows the above definition quite closely and while it is difficult to evaluate the program without access to

53
classified material, it is possible to draw conclusions about its overall effectiveness by analysing the performance of the Korean forces in the two areas where they have been tested - against the threat from North Korea and as active participants in the Vietnam war.

The threat from North Korea pre-dates the Korean War. In fact, it was the liquidation of a North Korean insurgency plot designed to overthrow the Syngman Rhee regime which is said to have lead to the conventional attack across the 38th Parallel in June 1950. Following the war in the mid 1950's another campaign of psychological warfare accompanied by the despatch of agents into the South was launched by Kim II Sung. This campaign was punctuated by a "confederation plan" for unity in the year following Syngman Rhee's overthrow in April 1960 and the military takeover in Seoul in May, 1961.

All through the early 1960's there were a series of proposals for Korean unification emanating from Pyongyang. A confederation of the North and South has been proposed, as well as cultural and economic exchanges, arms curtailment agreements, resumption of postal services, and free elections (i.e. unsupervised). The essence of the North Korean view is that unification has to come about through Korean-to-Korean talks, that the U.N. must have no part in the unification, that U.S. troops must first withdraw from South Korea; but if all the above cannot be accomplished at once, North Korea would promote various interchange between the north and south and in the meantime, North Korea will furnish aid to the South.
To all of these conditions the ROK has said no. Therefore, in the view of the north the rejection of these proposals for unification has meant that, "broad sections of the South Korean people are now waging vigorously the anti-U.S. national salvation struggle."\textsuperscript{6}

The increased militancy of North Korea, from which we can draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the South Korean military and coincidentally the U.S. Military Assistance Program, can be traced to a shift in policy announced by Kim Il Sung at the Party conference of Oct. 1966. During this speech Kim stated that the U.S. and its South Korean puppets were preparing a new war against the north, and explicitly called for an intensification of the struggle against the South.\textsuperscript{7}

In December of 1967 Premier Kim Il Sung again restated the policy of North Korea when he addressed the Supreme People's Assembly as follows:

The entire people in the northern half of the Republic bear the heavy responsibility for carrying the South Korean revolution to completion.

The accomplishment of the great cause of the liberation of South Korea and the unification of the fatherland at the earliest possible date, depends not only on the revolutionary organizations and revolutionaries in South Korea to expand and strengthen the revolutionary forces and how they fight the enemy, but, in a large measure, on how the people in the northern half of the Republic prepare themselves to greet the great revolutionary event.

The people in the northern half of the Republic should always remember the brothers in the south and have a revolutionary determination to liberate them at all cost; they should be firmly prepared ideologically so that they may be mobilized to a decisive struggle to accomplish the cause of
unification of the fatherland by joining hands with the South Korean people whenever called upon to come to their aid as the struggle of the people surges forward, and the revolutionary situation opens in South Korea.

The escalation of activities has been most intense in the increase of DMZ incidents. Table (III-A) shows the scope of these activities during the period prior to the policy shift and the dramatic change immediately following. The United Nations Command reported a total of 445 serious incidents in the DMZ for 1967 and a total of 543 for 1968. Concerning infiltrations, both by land through the DMZ and those by sea, it was reported that from Aug. 1, 1967 to Aug. 21, 1968 there were 154 North Koreans killed, 19 wounded and 15 captured while attempting to infiltrate through the DMZ. Between Oct. 30, 1968 and Nov. 2, 1968 110 North Koreans were killed and 7 captured while infiltrating by sea. Prisoner interrogation revealed that North Korea was training 8,000 commandos in special camps, with units assigned to each ROK province. North Korean activity reached a peak during 1968 beginning on January 2nd when a 31 man assassination commando of the North Korean 124th Army Unit got within 500 yards of the presidential palace.

On January 26 1968 the USS Pueblo, along with her crew, was seized while on an intelligence mission off the coast of North Korea. During this same year the armed forces and police intercepted a number of armed agents as well as previously planted cells. The following is a resume of the major incidents of 1968 which dramatize the nature, scope and methods typical of the threat situation against which South Korea must defend itself.
TABLE III-A

INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES CAUSED BY NORTH KOREAN INFILTRATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>To October 18, 1965</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1967</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Significant Incidents, DMZ Area</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant Incidents, interior of ROK</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanges of Fire, DMZ</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchanges of Fire, interior of ROK</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties, N.K. killed in ROK</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties, N.K. captured in ROK</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC, Killed ROK</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNC Wounded ROK</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Nat.Police and other Civ.Killed</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK Nat.Police and other Civ.Wounded</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Korea Annual 1968, Hapdong News Agency
COMANDO RAID ON SEOUL. A 31 man North Korean armed commando infiltrated deep into the northern suburbs of Seoul on Jan. 21.

RADIO AGENTS. The CIA announced on Feb. 1 that it rounded up a 32 man North Korean espionage ring which had been operating in Seoul, Taegu and Pusan for more than two years.

The spy ring collected military secrets of Korea and the United States. Information on South Korean political and economic situations was released via a clandestine radio link with North Korea. They also organized an underground Communist Party cell.

PLANTED AGENTS. The Seoul Police cracked down on a Communist espionage ring on March 25.

ARMED AGENTS. Four North Korean communist agents landed on March 26 in Kunja. Spotted by fisherman and reported.

FAMILY AGENTS. The National Police broke up a six member family spy ring on April 20 in Seoul.

BAJA ISLAND AGENTS. The CIA rounded up 27 communist agents July 20 who had been operating in Seoul and other areas under the direction of a Red underground post located in Imj-do.

HOSA ISLAND AGENTS. Joint military and police force shot and killed two armed agents in a mountain near Mokpo on July 29.

COMANDO AGENTS. A combined counter - espionage task force smashed a 14 man North Korean commando team in a pre-dawn fight on Aug. 21 on the southern shore of Cheju-do.
U.R.P. AGENTS. The CIA crushed a 158 member North Korean espionage ring, named the Unification Revolutionary Party which attempted to instigate civil insurgency and topple the government.

ULCHIN - SAMCHOK ARMED AGENTS. About 30 communist armed agents landed at Ulchin on Nov. 5.

Prompted by this stepped up activity the ROK government took many unprecedented actions in order to tighten security. Counter espionage activity was re-organized under a unified military police command, all possible infiltrations routes were blocked and patrols of sea approaches were increased, and the rewards for information leading to the arrest of suspected North Korean agents was raised from 200,000 won to up to 1 million won.13

The North Koreans are also active on the propaganda front and via the "South Korean Liberation Radio" which broadcasts from North Korea and using other conventional propaganda media, South Korean military personnel are encouraged to defect. The defectors are promised a variety of incentives including general amnesty, special commendations, equal rank and jobs in the North Korean military, education opportunities and financial rewards. Table (IV) indicates typical rewards offered to defectors who turn over items of equipment. These rewards are broadcast over radio and public address announcements directed to troops on patrol duty on the DMZ.14
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inducements Offered South Korean Defectors.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Battleship (big and small ship) 200,000 to 5,000,000 won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Note 1 North Korean Won = 40¢)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Jet Aircraft 30,000 to 500,000 won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Guided Missile 30,000 to 100,000 won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Propeller Aircraft 5,000 to 30,000 won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Tank 5,000 to 10,000 won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Cannons 400 to 2,000 won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Heavy Machine guns 900 to 1,000 won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Light Machine guns 350 to 500 won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. M-14 Rifles 500 won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Short Machine gun 200 to 250 won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Infantryman's rifle 50 to 300 won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Pistol 200 won</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Radio 400 to 800 won (8 to 16 months salary of worker)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering the above mentioned incidents as well as numerous similar provocations repeated on an almost daily basis two points are clear. First, the security of South Korea is threatened by an enemy which has both the means and the will to sustain the threat; and second, the responsibility of countering the threat requires constant effort on the part of each branch of the South Korean military. Their performance can be interpreted as a measure of how well they have assimilated the equipment and training provided by the Military Assistance Program, because one of the major goals of the program is to interpret the threat and provide the proper mix of hardware and training required for an effective counter.

Therefore, considering the threat and the counter measures, the following factors are germane: The morale of the ROK military is very high, and although North Korean infiltrators have managed to cross the INZ on several occasions they are almost always caught within a matter of days. Since 1968 DMZ security has been increased with the introduction of sophisticated electronic and infrared devices and although the attempted DMZ penetrations remain high, the number succeeding has been reduced. The North Korean counter to improved DMZ security has been an increase in sea infiltration attempts. Here again the threat has been met by improved tactics, coordination, and equipment for air and naval forces. The announced U.S. withdrawal from the 18 mile sector of the DMZ and their replacement by ROK troops indicates a level of confidence in the ability of the ROK military to fill the gap in that a large complement of U.S. forces will remain in rear areas, somewhat dependent
on protection and warning provided by the ROK army.

The dynamic expansion of the South Korean economy is also a viable indicator of the security provided by the military. During the 1960's the economy advanced at an average rate of 10-11% per year. Bank of Korea figures indicate that for 1968 the growth rate was over 13%, based on the 1965 constant, thus allowing for inflation. The ROK gross national product in 1967 was $4.6 billion, and South Korean exports totalled $455 million in 1968, compared with $33 million in 1960, and the figure reached a billion dollars in 1970.\textsuperscript{15}

During 1968 more than 50 large factories began operation producing automobiles, fertilizer, cement, petro-chemicals and electronic components.\textsuperscript{16}

On February 13, 1971 Deputy Premier Kim Hak-Yul announced the nation's third 5 year economic plan calling for an average annual growth rate of 8.6% from 1972 to 1976.

The goals of the new plan include a 25% annual rise in commodity exports to $3.5 billion in 1976 and increase of GNP to $13.3 billion.\textsuperscript{17}

Another economic indicator supporting the high level of confidence in the ability of the military to provide security is the large amount of foreign investment attracted to South Korea. Japan, West Germany, Britain and U.S. investors are quite active in Korea and the trend is increasing. For instance the Greyhound Bus company recently announced an arrangement with a Korean transportation company to utilize excess U.S. equipment and take advantage of the rapidly expanding highway systems.\textsuperscript{18}

Another demonstration of the high confidence in internal security
is indicated by the renewed political activity in South Korea. Since the military coup d'état on May 16, 1961 the country has been directed by President Park Chung Hee, the original leader of the coup, and the electoral process has been limited to a more or less one party system. However, more conventional political activity has returned and the campaigning attendant to the general elections scheduled this year is replete with those activities generally associated with free democratic elections.

THE VIET NAM TEST

The second area which offers a realistic test situation against which the Korean military, and vicariously the Korean MA.P, can be evaluated is the Korean involvement in Vietnam.

Recently Lt. Gen. Si Ho Lee, the Korean commander in Vietnam, announced that a total of 230,000 Korean servicemen had served in Vietnam. He further observed that: "The reservoir of combat-experienced troops represents a significant power superiority over the North Koreans who have not had combat experience since July 1953." The deployment of Korean units began in 1964 - the first time Korean units had been dispatched overseas and consisted of a field surgery and a group of tachwondo (a Korean form of self-defense) instructors. They were soon joined in Feb. 1965 by a 2,000 man non-combat unit called the "Dove" units. This group included engineers and security forces and their mission was to participate in rehabilitation and "civic action" type projects. Then, in Oct. 1965, upon official request from the South Vietnamese government, a divisional strength group of Korean combat troops was added to the Vietnam force.
At the time South Korean officials commented that the action was in part to repay the "moral debts" to the United States and the rest of the free world owed since the Korean War. This contingent consisted of the "Fierce Tiger Unit" composed of two regiments from the Army Capital Division and the Second Marine Brigade called the "Blue Dragon Unit." In Aug. 1966 the authorized strength of the South Korean forces in Vietnam was raised to 47,872 men with the addition of the "White Horse" division. The total authorized strength total has remained constant up to the present time. 20

The practical combat experience referred to by General Lee has been quite extensive and impressive. During the three year period from Sept. 1965 to Oct. 1968 the ROK combat forces are credited with 19,175 enemy killed, 3,551 enemy captured, and 7,993 individual weapons, 687 group weapons, 788,796 rounds of ammunition, 14,551 grenades, 147 communications sets, and 43,226 enemy documents captured.

Table (V) is a breakdown of South Korean combat activity by major units. It also includes the number of engagements in which the statistics were compiled which gives some indication of the type of experience Vietnam is for the Korean forces.
TABLE V

RESULTS OF BATTLES IN VIETNAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Tiger</th>
<th>W. Horse</th>
<th>Dragons</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Killed</td>
<td>20,780</td>
<td>10,097</td>
<td>5,263</td>
<td>5,303</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy Captured</td>
<td>3,765</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrendered</td>
<td>2,062</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Cap. (ind)</td>
<td>8,663</td>
<td>4,155</td>
<td>2,504</td>
<td>1,956</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons Cap. (group)</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of engagements</td>
<td>2,334</td>
<td>1,353</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source - Korea Annual 1969

The Civic Action and pacification activity has also been extensive. A total of 108 bridges, 125 schoolrooms, 328 kilometers of roads, 1,134 houses and 58 pagodas and churches were built for the local Vietnamese population. 21

As of February 1970 the cumulative South Korean casualties in Vietnam were 3,094 killed, 6,057 wounded and four missing in action. 22

Although South Korean troops are serving in Vietnam at the invitation of the government, the entire cost is being subsidized by the United States and is not charged against the Military Assistance Program of Korea. The U.S. has expended $927.5 million to support the Korean
force for the period 1965-1970. This includes $130.2 million "over-
seas allowance" and $10.2 million death and disability compensations
according to testimony by State and Defense Department officials before
a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee hearing on the U.S. security
agreement with South Korea. 23

Besides combat experience the Vietnam experience has also profited
South Korea in that most of the support for these troops is furnished
by contractors in South Korea. For instance uniforms are produced in
South Korea and paid for by the U.S. The same is true for most of
the estimated $5,000 annual support cost for each South Korean
soldier in Vietnam. 24

The combat experience is the main issue however, and both the
statistics cited in Table V and the fact that comments concerning
the performance of South Korean forces have generally been quite favor-
able, are indicators of the efficiency of the MAP furnished training
which has been instrumental in allowing these forces to integrate so
well in the combined theater type operations in Vietnam.

It should also be noted that while in Vietnam the ROK forces
participate in operations, both joint and local, under control of
a centralized command, and utilize the most advanced forms of close
air and other types of combat support. Upon return to Korea, these
veterans form the nucleus of the ROK home defense forces and are able
to upgrade their training programs and exercises from first hand
experience.
CHAPTER IV - END NOTES

1. Dept. of Defense, Military Assistance Date for Debate, Director of Military Assistance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., June 1966, pp 1-3


3. ibid p.9

4. ibid p.9

5. Dept. of Defense, "Note on North Korea", Department of the Army, extracted from a letter from Kim H. Sung to Kim Yong Su dated 8 Jan 1965, Japan 1966, p. 40


7. ibid p.10


10. ibid p. 19

11. Rees, David, op. cit. p. 10

12. ibid p.10

13. Department of State, op.cit. in 8 p.33


15. Department of Defense, op.cit. in 5, p. 44


21. ibid p.119
22. Korea Week, 15 Sept 1970, p.1
23. ibid, p.3
24. ibid p.4
CHAPTER V

All military personnel who are selected to become advisors or programers in the Military Assistance Program are told that the ultimate success is to have worked themselves out of a job. By interpolation then, the MAP itself should be finite and at some point in time simply cease to be required.

In the Korean case it has been shown that when measured against actual combat criteria South Korean military forces have been quite effective. They are able to utilize modern equipment and tactics which have neutralized specific threats. However, before accepting the performance of the South Korean military forces in the DMZ and Vietnam examples as conclusive indicators of their overall capabilities, and from this conclude that the MAP has completed its task, these examples should be examined in an expanded perspective.

All modern military forces depend heavily on a large support base. Furthermore, the combat effectiveness of the force is directly proportional to the efficiency of the support mechanism.

The DMZ and Vietnam examples, although both are reliable indicators of combat effectiveness, do not completely test the entire spectrum of military requirements, and if taken at face value can disguise
some serious problem areas concerning both the South Korean military and the U.S. M.A.P.

All of the incidents along the DMZ, and the counter insurgency operations in South Korea have been relatively small and of short duration. They have been conducted in an environment most favorable to the government forces. The operations are conducted in familiar terrain with extremely good intelligence available. The forces have access to both electronic and air reconnaissance, and whenever operations extend away from the immediate area of the DMZ, they enjoy the full cooperation of the local population.

Since the operations are limited in scope, they have the advantage of being able to bring all available resources to bear on the situation. Small scale activity also impose no unusual strain on logistics, maintenance, and supply support so that problems which might exist in these critical areas do not develop or compromise the mission.

In Vietnam, operations are on a much larger scale and are conducted over extended periods. But here again, because of the agreements under which these forces were committed, the United States supplies or funds all material, ammunition, rations, and even the pay and allowances of the troops. The United States also furnishes combat assistance by providing close air support, reconnaissance, and off shore naval fire support for Korean operations, but it should be noted that the MAP has concentrated on equipping and training the ROK military as a defensive force only. This is clearly evident in the type of equipment which has been provided in the past, and it is
only recently, as a part of the compromise agreements for the withdrawing of American forces from South Korea, that some exceptions have been made.

It is, in fact, in this critical area of support that serious questions exist about the ROK military forces, and where the effectiveness of the MAP can be challenged. The following discussion should also indicate that there exist, and will continue to exist for quite some time, a need for military assistance.

The area of primary concern, and what is probably the weakest link in the South Korean security chain is that which can be broadly included under the heading of material which, in the military context, includes supply, maintenance and logistics activities. The problems are not new, in a report on Military Assistance prepared by a staff of the Committee on Foreign Affairs who visited Korea in 1960, material was the only area which received unfavorable comments. The criticisms of the staff survey team in 1960 could easily apply today except that in today's environment and dealing with far more complex equipment, the effects are far greater. 1

As the South Korean military establishment has grown and adjusted to the demands generated by the dynamic nature of the North Korean threat, the priorities for the limited resources have not favored the material area. Real, and sometimes imagined, requirements for new equipment have often been satisfied at the expense of resources which should have been used to develop material support. But rather, new equipment enters the inventory and the already critically overloaded material systems is required to meet additional demands.
Besides the process described above, another practice exists in South Korea which compounds the problem and by nature is diametrically opposed to the basic intent of the MAP. This develops whenever some dramatic event, such as the Pueblo incident, focuses attention on the lack of certain types of armaments thereby causing large amounts of money to be made available. In this case $100 million of special military assistance was immediately approved for the purchase of equipment, and again, more recently, as part of a compromise plan concerning the withdrawal of U.S. troops, $150 million of modernization funds as well as $100 million of surplus equipment is to be released to the ROK.

This massive and unprogrammed infusion of funds and new equipment is totally outside of the normal 5 year MAP programming cycle. Because of this, the support base is not developed, maintenance personnel are not trained, stock list and supplies are not available in the depot, nor is the pipeline to U.S. supply sources established.

The cause and effect relationship of material problems can best be demonstrated within the context of a hypothetical example.

As part of the total Air Defense environment, South Korea maintains a network of Aircraft Control and Warning radar sites. These sites are remote and access is at best difficult, and at times impossible, except by helicopter. During periods of bad flying weather, common in the winter, the sites are inaccessible. The sites are equipped with very modern and sophisticated radar and communication equipment, and each site is theoretically capable of all levels of maintenance up to depot level overhaul. All such installations have some high-value items which are critical to the operation of the site such as
radar magnetrons and power generators. Because these sites provide strategic coverage, and because the facilities are used for both South Korean and U.S. areal maneuvers, it is essential that the outage times be kept to a minimum. It is when there is a failure of one of the high value critical items that the inherent weaknesses of the material systems are exposed.

First, one discovers that the quality of maintenance personnel is questionable. Because of limited funds, training programs are inadequate and airmen are sent to the field with little, if any, actual equipment experience. Their lack of training, and the high priority of the service, force supervisory personnel to be reluctant to allow them on-the-job experience opportunities. At best they are allowed to look over someone's shoulder while work is being done. The supervisors on the other hand, well trained and competent because of MAP furnished stateside training and long experience with the equipment, dislike the remoteness and hardships of the radar sites and work diligently to obtain assignments to more comfortable installation. Failing this, many leave the service for one of the many tempting job opportunities available in the expanding economy.

When the fault is eventually diagnosed, the problem enters the supply phase. The failed component is requested from the on-site supply facility, but at most operating locations, because adequate stock levels represent a huge investment, one finds that the spare parts inventories have been allowed to deplete, and high value items with long replacement lead time are not ordered.
It is now necessary to refer the problem to the depot where supplies have been concentrated and the mechanism for obtaining parts from the source has been centralized.

Assuming the best case, the part will be available, but in order to effect the repair, either the part or the faulty sub-system must enter the logistic network. If truck transport is used, the cheapest and most available, the component must be subjected to several hours of some of the world's worst roads. In the case of high-value delicate components they often arrive at their destination in unserviceable condition. To avoid this, and because of pressure to return a system to operation, helicopter transport is requested and the overall maintenance cost is driven still higher because of this special handling.

Assuming another case, often it is determined that failed components cannot be repaired at the operating location. The most common reason for this is that either qualified maintenance personnel, or the test equipment essential for proper trouble shooting, but also very expensive and generally suffers the same neglect as the prime equipment, are simply often not available. The component itself must then be transported to the depot for service. The depot, normally intended to perform scheduled overhaul, must shift its emphasis from normal work in order to do that which properly belongs at the operating location.

As a final assumption, let the failed component belong to a class other than the standard military type for which catalogues and stock-list are available and identification and procurement are normal. In South Korea it is a common practice to contract for MAP furnished
systems. These systems are therefore made up of off-the-shelf components which do not have military style stocklist and catalogues. For instance, at the typical radar site mentioned above, the power generators are commercial models and further, because the procurement contracts were written at different times, they might not even be the same series of a given type. For economy reasons, the modems (modulator-demodulator) of the communication equipment were manufactured in Belgium. The radar sets themselves are a type designed and manufactured for MAP recipients only and are not part of the U.S. military inventory.

It is not necessary to detail the problems that this practice generates, however, anyone familiar with the problems of maintaining a vintage foreign car will recognize obvious similarities.

Another major support area which has been mentioned previously, but primarily in a quantitative rather than qualitative sense, is training. There exist much documentation and discussion about this area, however, the bulk of the commentary is primarily concerned with the total number of students trained, the various types of training programs available, the retention rate of graduates, stateside vs. in country quotas, and other similar issues.

In a series of hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, on the subject of Military Assistance Training, several expert witnesses generally agreed that the training programs, both technical and professional, were of high quality and were well managed. They further agreed that the direct and the spin-off benefits of MAP sponsored training justified the cost
of the program.\textsuperscript{4}

In South Korea it has been pointed out that over the years a large training establishment has been developed, and that at the present time the majority of military training is done in country. Those ROK personnel which are sent to U.S. schools are required to become instructors so as to fully exploit and justify the cost of their training.

But in the in country technical training program the same constraints operate as were described in the material area, and even assuming the very best quality and exceptionally motivated instructors, these constraints seriously limit the effectiveness of the program. Students simply do not get practical experience. Technicians are sent into the field without ever having touched the equipment they are supposed to maintain. The entire experience consists of lectures and perhaps the opportunity to observe an instructor while he manipulates test equipment and makes adjustments. Because many of the systems in use are procured from commercial sources, training mockups are not available, maintenance manuals are either not available or not translated, and the special test equipment required for these systems is in such limited supply that none can be spared for the training center.

To the casual observer the South Korean training apparatus would appear as a strong, self-sustaining foundation which will fill the current and future needs of the military. But since the quality of the lower ranking trainees is questionable for the reasons suggested, much depends on the regular input of U.S. trained instructors and
supervisors. As the incentives to leave the service, i.e. competition from the rapidly expanding economy, job dissatisfaction, low pay, etc., increase and erodes the available resources, one is faced with two alternatives: sustain or increase MAP training programs, or re-evaluate the priorities and attempt to reverse the current trends.

The role of the advisor is another subject which has received a great deal of consideration, but again the main emphasis of most of these investigations is concerned with the numbers of advisors and the cost of the advisory mission. There is also valuable documentation concerning the vital relationship of the advisor and his counterpart. Problems such as language, disparity of rank, and short tours are well documented. While these considerations are important and are integral to the overall effectiveness of the MAP, there are other issues, more subjective and not as easily quantified, which also operate.

Military advisors for South Korea are selected because of their technical expertise, demonstrated by their effectiveness in U.S. military organizations. At present very few receive any special preparation for their assignment such as what was offered by the Military Assistance Institute before it was discontinued in 1969 for economy reasons. Recently the U.S. Army and the Air Force have re-established formal training programs, but these are very limited in time and size so that relatively few advisors will benefit from the experience.

Assuming that the new schools will be patterned after the Military Advisory Institute model, one can expect that the student advisor
will be exposed to two major courses. One dealing with the admin-
istrative and programming details of the MAP, and the other featuring
specialized country study for the area to which he has been assigned.

Whatever the preparation of the advisor, when he arrives in South
Korea he is faced with the same problem which limit the Koreans them-
selves. His utility, therefore, is based, not primarily on his tech-
nical skill, but on his ability to adapt to a variety of demands which
for most advisors are totally new experiences for which he has had
no preparation. He generally finds that his counterparts have years
of experience in the assigned equipment, and have often received more
formal training than he has. Since most advisors are genuinely
conscientious and closely identify with the units to which they are
assigned, they apply themselves to solving or working around the
problems which do affect the organization. Often this results in
fixes which are contrary to the intent of the MAP, but justified in
terms of operational efficiency. The advisor becomes a go-between
for his Korean unit and U.S. forces who are concerned about service
which may not be up to U.S. standards. He must acquaint himself with
the details of those support areas which are at the root of the problem.
He must develop those diplomatic skills necessary to persuade his
counterpart to bring pressure on support agencies, very difficult
because of the Korean reluctance to inconvenience a classmate or
friend. He must learn how and which operating practice to by-pass when
it becomes obvious that not to do so would compromise MAP goals.

The successful advisor has in fact developed a whole new expertise,
but because the learning process has been long and obtuse, he finds
himself rotated just as he reaches the peak of his productivity. Because few individual serve more than one MAAG tour, the acquired skill is lost and the whole process must be repeated with his replacement.

The above briefly describes irregularities in three important components of the support area. Although the views expressed are representative of the Communications/Electronics area primarily based on personal experience, they are consistent with all support areas. Furthermore, the practice of generating funds for new capital investment by the methods described is not limited to the support areas. Operational training exercises of all three services are conducted under the same constraints.

While these practices result in inefficiencies and wasted effort for both South Korean and U.S. personnel, they are manageable on a day by day basis. It is when one considers the basic question of South Korean self-sufficiency with less than the present level of U.S. involvement that it becomes obvious that much additional study and investigation is required to determine the future direction and intensity of the MAP.


CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS:

In the introduction to this paper I expressed concern that the value of this investigation would be limited because of the constraint of security classification, and limited time and research material. These factors have in fact been limiting, however, I feel I have included sufficient documentation to support some observations which may not be conclusive in themselves, but do serve to highlight some of the problems and some of the successful features of the South Korean M.A.P.

I feel that the turmoil following the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine described at length in Chapter I is significant in that it is an indicator of the degree of self-confidence the South Koreans have in their Military establishment. The extreme language in which South Korean officials dramatized their concern over implied withdrawal of U.S. forces is surely not consistent with the demonstrated capabilities of the ROK forces in Vietnam and along the DMZ. There is, of course, the possibility that this concern was merely an effort to continue the status quo for reasons other than defense, but this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this exercise.

One of the reasons for selecting South Korea as my model was that there exists an actual threat to the security of the country. I feel this is important because an analysis of the threat, its viability and
the effectiveness of the response, will provide a perspective for evaluating the military establishment. That North Korea provides a real threat is clear, even though the threat has been primarily exercised through low level DMZ actions and agent infiltration, there does exist the potential for escalating this level of activity into more conventional and sustained military action. The documentation reveals that against the present type of North Korean activity, the South has been very successful in applying proper and effective counters. Further analysis of the threat aspect reveals specific areas which require emphasis in current and future MAAG planning. For instance, the North Koreans have a decided advantage in air power; demonstrated by their quantitative and, excepting South Korea's F-5's and the recently acquired F-4's, qualitative superiority in aircraft. One should expect to see emphasis to counter this threat within the South Korean military, the MAAG, and the U.S. forces. In fact, the extensive Air Defense system in the south, and the recent transfer of F-4 aircraft from Japan to South Korea demonstrate this point.

To the limited extent that threat analysis was attempted in this study, it appears that in terms of North Korea versus South Korea, the South Korean military has matured into an effective force equal to the tactics that North Korea has demonstrated and has the potential of mounting, but that this capability is very sensitive to the duration of any action and to outside intervention from third parties.

Because of the conditions and problems in the support area, any protracted operations would be seriously compromised unless there was U.S.
augmentation and direct support. Although the Nixon Doctrine does allow for support assistance, the weak support base which exists in South Korea has a direct effect on the combat effectiveness of the forces except in short, limited actions such as those in Vietnam and on the D.M.Z.

It should be emphasized that in discussing the support area the basic problem is in philosophy rather than mechanics. The support structure which has been built up over the years is clearly adequate to sustain the military if it were allowed to operate as designed. The schools are large enough and cover the range of military skills adequately. The maintenance depots, and field maintenance organizations are well manned and organized properly. The supply system is modern, even automated in some areas, and if time were not a critical factor, logistics could be managed using the existing networks of roads, rail, and air transportation. However, each of these cited functions is hampered and sometimes totally compromised because of the existing priorities governing the distribution of resources, procurement policies, and the reliance on U.S. intervention to resolve crisis situations.

In my opinion the above comments reflect both the strength of the South Korean MAAG program, and the direction which future management should be directed in order to fully maximize our investment and efforts. For this, one should separate the MAAG program into two categories. The first would include all the unprogrammed, crisis oriented actions described earlier as our response to the Pueblo incident and other specific provocations. The second, and that which I feel deserves most
attention, concerns the routine, programmed M.A.P. activities. In this area several changes could be made which might help to eliminate the support type problems described in earlier chapters, and which have direct impact on the ability of the South Korean military to counter the actual and potential threats.

From my personal experience, and from discussions with several officers with experience in other MAAG's, the problems in the support area are not unique to South Korea. This suggests that policy changes at the highest level are in order. These changes should include personnel, logistics, supply, procurement, maintenance, and training policies.

In the personnel area, while the advisory role of the MAAG should remain dominant, the selection and preparation of personnel for MAAG assignments should perhaps consider different expertise and skills than the criteria now in use. It has been demonstrated how diverse the demands on the advisor are, and how the success of the advisor is determined by his adaptability and adjustment of these demands. Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect greater utility from individuals who have demonstrated their ability to perform successfully under these conditions. At present an individual rarely is selected for more than one MAAG assignment. His experience and potential in those special areas critical to the advisory role are lost because of this policy. I feel that many individuals who have found themselves well adapted to the MAAG mission would welcome the opportunity to refine their skill by being identified as career Military Advisors. In this way the particular skill and technique learned in the field
could be utilized in billets created to interface with the overseas operating locations.

A Military Advisor career field with specified prerequisites required of applicants, formal training at various levels of management, and the various other upgrading methods common in other specialized skill areas, would eliminate the inefficiency which is the result of current personnel policies.

Supply, maintenance, logistics and procurement could be immeasurably improved by the simple expedient of using only standard U.S. military equipment, or only those commercial systems which have been documented using the standard federal stock number system. This policy would raise initial investment cost, but this increase would be quickly amortized through savings in the supply and training areas.

Many of the problems in these areas are also generated by the practice of maintaining obsolete equipment in the inventory. For example, the South Korean Air Force maintains a large fleet of F-86 aircraft. While it can be argued that this aircraft is still adequate in the close air support role in which they are utilized, the cost of maintaining these aircraft in operational status is very high. Because these aircraft have been out of production for several years, much of the maintenance cost is generated by special handling and procurement actions required to obtain needed parts. The cost of these extra efforts, and the delays in returning equipment to operational ready status which results in a degraded defense posture, seems out of proportion to the utility of this particular weapon system. It would be impractical, if not impossible,
to replace all obsolete MAP furnished equipment, however, since the support problems increase logarithmically as the equipment ages, setting a mandatory cut off date for U.S. furnished support assistance for individual weapon systems should be considered. In addition to halting the support cost spiral, this could allow for more orderly program management which in turn would preclude the need for emergency stop-gap procurement which, in the South Korean case, is partially responsible for the excessive variety of systems in the inventory.

Another departure from current policies which I feel would resolve some of the problems described would be a major effort to redefine the goals of a MAP program. Because of the lack of specific goals, there does not appear to be any beginning or end to various program elements. For example, in South Korea thousands of personnel have been trained in U.S. military training centers at the basic skill level. Yet the system continues to input new students for U.S. basic training. It is not clear if there is an operational reason that all basic type training can not be performed in country or if the practice continues simply because of inertia. There are other examples of perpetual programs which consume MAP funds at the expense of resources which are desperately needed for capital investment and O&M items.

The stop-gap, crisis oriented, procurement practice mentioned above and earlier, should also be closely re-examined. That there should be a mechanism to allow for quick response to emergency situation is vital. But the practice of inputting highly sophisticated equipment into the South Korean inventory as was the case in the
Pueblo example and others, so disrupts the MAP routine over an extended period that one wonders if more harm is being done than good. While one can argue that in a crisis situation the quickest response will probably be the best, but if the ultimate good of a MAP is the self-sufficiency of the indigenous military forces, then to periodically de-stabilize the program by huge, unprogrammed equipment transfers is surely counter productive. As recommended above, if practical goals based on a reasonable assessment of a country's capabilities were used to develop the type and extent of a MAP, crisis response could be managed completely outside the MAP structure. For example, if the total response to the Pueblo situation would have been exclusively by U.S. forces; a reaction implemented to meet the crisis, then re-called when conditions normalized, the South Korean MAP would not be faced with the type of support problem which limit their effectiveness and them so dependent on us. On our part, this practice forces us to commit huge amount yearly simply to protect our investment.

Since most of the logistics problems described in Chapter V result from problems in the supply and maintenance area, if the above recommendations were successful, there would be proportional improvement in logistics.

It seems quite certain that Military Assistance Programs will continue to be an important facet of our foreign diplomacy. The thrust of the Nixon Doctrine and our Vietnamization program are recent indicators of the continuing importance of Military Assistance.

I feel that the South Korean model I have presented in detail offers a good example of a well established Military Assistance Program. On the
one hand South Korea has, in spite of a well demonstrated threat preserved its security, developed one of the most dramatic economic growth profiles in the world, built a very impressive and proven military establishments from very humble beginnings and resources, and has politically stabilized as demonstrated by the recent elections and their attendant activity. These developments have certainly been enhanced as a result of the security provided to a great extent by the South Korean M.A.P.

On the other hand the South Korean M.A.P. has created many problem situations which clearly limit the return on our investment as well as the potential effectiveness of the South Korean military.

These problems, duplicated in many of the MAAG missions to which this country is committed, represent a substantial investment in money, man-power and effort.

South Korea provides a well defined model from which one may study programs which produce high returns, as well as those which have limited or even negative payoffs. I feel that additional research would provide supportive data which would validate my observations and defend my recommendations. I would also hope that the rather general areas I have defined could be more clearly detailed and that more specific recommendations might result.

Military Assistance Programs can produce results. There appears to be a current and continuing need for these programs, and world events and situations are evolving to which our optimum response may be the establishment of new programs. I feel the South Korean model does provide insights into what one might expect from Military Assistance programs and techniques, and that these lessons, if applied, can result in greater and more effective returns on our investments, enhance our national interest, and be a major factor in establishing peace.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Publications


Riddleberger, Peter B., Military Roles in Developing Countries: An Inventory of Past Research and Analysis, American University, Washington, D.C., 1965.


________________, Major Economic Indicators 1957-58, Republic of Korea, 1968.

Periodical Articles


Speeches


Government Publications


U.S. Department of State, Highlights of President Kennedy's New Act for International Development, Washington, D.C.


U.S. Department of State, Korean American Relations, Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the U.S., Department of State, Volume I, 1883-1886, Washington, D.C.

Department of State, Korea 1945-1948, Washington, D.C.


U.S. Department of Defense, Military Assistance Institute training material, unpublished.

U.S. Department of Defense, Note on North Korea, Department of the Army, Japan 1966.