POLITICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
A METHODOLOGY APPLIED TO JAPAN, TURKEY AND INDIA

by

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Submitted to the Department of Economics on January 9, 1961 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

This paper comprises a study of the interaction of certain political and economic variables during early phases of the development cycle. With respect to the three cases examined, it is shown that the actual rates of growth attained during the "Stages" of "Tradition" and "Preconditions" were to a large degree determined by policies established by political elite groups. The impact of political policy on the economic structure was initially somewhat fortuitous, however, for it is shown that the political elites in question long concerned themselves more with the preservation or enhancement of their own positions of political authority than with economic development per se. Nonetheless, since conditions in the economic system increasingly impinged on the effectiveness of the governments under investigation, the interplay of political and economic variables is shown to have grown in importance over time. Ultimately, the creation of policies specifically designed to bring about expansion of the capital stock came to be recognized as a desideratum by political elite groups anxious to buttress their positions of authority. From this point, attempts to move forward through "Take-Off" were assured.

An analytic framework is derived to encompass the historical experiences of Japan, India and Turkey. "High Tradition" is identified by the establishment of a political order in part based on functional and institutional rigidity. Since stability leads to population growth, the inhibitions on change imposed by the ruling elite ultimately induce a crisis arising from growing population pressure on the resource base. Threats from abroad may create an additional problem. During "Late Tradition", social malaise becomes sufficiently advanced to cause reformers within the historic elite to sponsor modification of the social system. These reforms introduce "Transition", at which time "new men" who are relatively skilled in advanced technologies begin to be absorbed into the political elite. But the "new men" soon develop a status-role schizophrenia, for they come to recognize: (a) that effective performance, and extension, of the modern sector is necessary to allay the population/
resource crisis and to quell foreign threats; and (b) that Traditionalist elite groups oppose further reform due to their desire to retain political leadership. Ambition, idealism and recognition of national necessity eventually conspire to lead the "new men" to try to wrest power from their erstwhile mentors. With a political act legally disestablishing the regionalist and particularist power bases of the historic ruling class, the "new men" usher in the phase of "Transformation". "Transformation" is a revolutionary epoch particularly because the "new men" are willing to jettison vestiges of the past whenever such action seems necessary for the fulfillment of national goals. The period is characterized by an increasing effort to enlarge the economic sector, in part because economic growth comes to be recognized as one technique for augmenting the power base of new elite groups. Once economic growth comes to be equated with political power and national prosperity, a successful "Take-Off becomes possible - though by no means certain.

The study as presented is tentative and does not represent an attempt to identify general causes of economic growth. No more is it claimed that conclusions drawn from Japanese, Turkish and Indian history can be universally applied. Accompanying the narrative will be found supporting documents; 23 Figures tracing out sectoral growth patterns; and statistical tables reflecting the scale of change occurring in output, investment, foreign trade, and the size and composition of the labor force.

Thesis Supervisor: Walt W. Rostow
Title : Professor of Economic History
PREFACE

Since I have chosen to place this study within a framework derived from Professor W.W. Rostow's "stages-of-growth" construct, it would be superfluous for me to comment on the "stages" as an instrument for analyzing the growth process. However, the extent of Professor Rostow's contribution goes far beyond methodology. Throughout my entire career at M.I.T., he has provided counsel and encouragement with a seeming total disregard for other commitments. I should like to believe that numerous graduate students have benefited as have I from the close and devoted guidance of their mentors. Those who have will understand why I feel this study to be a joint product in the best, teacher-student sense.

Of course, Professor Rostow bears no responsibility for my errors of omission and commission. Neither do the many others who have assisted me. Of this legion, I should like to give particular thanks to Nejat Bengul, Jerome Blum, Paul J. Braisted, Karl W. Deutsch, Everett E. Hagen, Marion J. Levy, Jr., William W. Lockwood, Max F. Millikan, Miss Mukul Mukherjee, Lucian W. Pye, Edwin O. Reischauer, Dankwart A. Rustow, and those members of the Center for International Studies who participated in an exploratory session during the winter of 1959.

The biographic data included in Appendix VI was compiled by Khee II Choi (Japan), A Haluk Ulman (Turkey), and Adhar S. Mirchandani (India). As the reader will discover, their work was crucial. To each I offer my deepest gratitude.
Financial aid was provided at various times by the Edward W. Hazen Foundation, M.I.T.'s Department of Economics and The Center for International Studies. The staff of the Center require special mention, for at all ranks they have been unfailingly helpful. I am grateful to the aforesaid, and also to the personnel of the M.I.T. and Harvard library systems.

Much of this manuscript was prepared by Mrs. Frances G. Postma. When she was forced to withdraw, Miss Elaine Evans and Mrs. Constance Boquist very kindly stepped into the breach and tapped a staccato against the impending deadline. To all three ladies, I offer many thanks.

A very special sort of debt is owed my wife, Barbara Malm Barss. She has had many months in which to weigh the relative merits of an absent, or an absent-minded, husband. Nonetheless, she has borne all with good humor, and has as well contributed signally to the body of this work. To her I dedicate this introductory effort.

The conclusions presented in this study are tentative. They are set forth by one who was led by the study of general economic phenomena to inquire specifically into the growth processes at work in three historic cases. I am a non-expert in Japanese, Turkish and Indian history. I have presumed to discuss these countries only because I believe that an attempt to develop a matrix demonstrably applicable in several instances is at this time a prerequisite to close analysis of the interaction which constantly takes place between the economic and political systems.

Belmont
30 December 1960

L.W.B.
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In this paper, we shall compare the histories of Japan, Turkey and India during the early stages of their respective growth cycles. The three countries are fundamentally different not only in geographic terms, but also with respect to a number of traditional institutions and value patterns. Evidence of similarity is therefore arresting. Around such evidence this study is organized.

The structure of the economic system will provide the basic framework for our exposition. Following Professor W.W. Rostow, I set this inquiry within a general matrix describing characteristics of the economy in each of several "stages of growth". The Rostowian "stages" will, however, be subdivided along lines suggested by investigation of patterns of interaction taking place between the economic and political systems at various points in the growth cycle.

The object of this paper is specifically to highlight politico-economic interplay at the national level as a means of suggesting the role of political change in economic development. My presentation will be partial and introductory. No claims are made as to its general relevance. The narrative will focus on those aspects of Japanese, Turkish and Indian history which show how modifications of the political system apparently helped to induce or crystalize change in the economic system - and vice versa. Analytic sections will investigate two small

---

segments of this phenomenon: the impact of governmental decision-making on the rate of economic growth; and the effect, on the locus and composition of political power, of changes in the national economic structure.

Since the study is grounded in prior acceptance of three basic postulates, the validity of the analysis must be held subject to critical scrutiny of these postulates. They are:

1) though human actions are to a large degree determined by choice, choice tends to be effectively limited by the individual's desire to maintain, regain or improve on the levels of comfort and well-being known to him in the past;
2) the politician's ultimate goal is to gain, and thereafter retain, power; and
3) economic "development" can occur only through an orderly progression of steps, since the utility of particular units of capital is determined by the availability of factor inputs, of motive power, and of markets for finished product.

It will be noted that these three postulates give rise to an implicit bias, for they can be transposed to show that political leaders will become receptive to economic development when conditions bringing power accretion (or economic growth) come to be analogous to conditions bringing economic growth (or power accretion). Such, in fact, is just what our reading of Japanese, Turkish and Indian history suggests.

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2 "Power" may here be defined as the ability to secure a desired objective within a specified period of time, provided that the securing of that objective is not incommensurable with the total (material and non-material) resource mix available to the actor or to some other competing agency.
Bias also may enter through the mechanism of a period-based analysis. Arbitrary segmentation of the warp of history perhaps should be avoided; but I know of no other way to bring the examination of several centuries of change in each of three countries into easy compass. I am satisfied, at least, that the characteristics we have noted in identifying specific growth periods for Japan, Turkey and India seem in a number of instances to be akin to the characteristics isolated by other writers in their analyses of the historical experiences of several other non-Western countries. ³

One particular weakness of period-based analysis is that inferences may be drawn suggesting that entry into one period predetermines sequential passage through subsequent phases. This, of course, need not be true; for history has a habit of confounding linear projections. I have chosen to segment the historical materials under examination solely because I feel that our understanding of the growth process may be aided thereby. But the arbitrary division of history set forth below is not in itself a theory of the causes of economic growth.

For present purposes, the Traditional Stage can be subdivided into three periods: Low, High and Late. The first need not concern us because it serves only to identify the bottom of a cycle. During the period of

³ For example, in The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism (Stanford University Press, 1957), M.C. Wright discusses conditions in China which sound remarkably similar to those we have found to apply in our three subject countries at the wane of Tradition and entry into the Transitional period of Preconditions.
High Tradition, relatively stable equilibrium conditions prevail due to the existence of constraints which the society cannot, or will not, remove. I call these constraints the physiographic and percipient parameters. There may be periodic fluctuation in the economic, social or political sectors; moreover, there may be slow mutation of functional relationships. But neither of these marginal departures is of an intensity sufficient to threaten the integrity of the basic amalgam of historically-sanctioned, traditional institutions.

During Late Tradition, however, stable equilibrium begins to give way under the impact of forces which affect not merely relationships within the traditional structure, but also the limiting constraints themselves. To varying degrees, institutions, attitudes, and activities move out of traditional molds. The viability of the existing polity comes into question as it begins to be recognized that a debilitating breakdown almost certainly impends if the traditionalist government fails to respond directly to the slow shifting of the society's fundamental

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4 The term "physiographic parameter" will be applied in subsequent chapters to identify the constraints imposed by nature and environment. Topography, climate, availability of natural resources, the degree of physical isolation of independent political communities at particular points in time: all of these factors are subsumed under the term.

"Percipient parameters" reflect the type and quantity of knowledge current at any particular moment within an individual society. Percipient parameters are, to a degree, analogous to behavioral propensities. At the same time, it is useful to consider information as a partially independent phenomenon, for the stock of knowledge and belief held by any culture at any time affects not only the amount and kind of new knowledge sequentially evolved, but also the community's receptivity to inferences which can be drawn from new evidence.
parameters. Late Tradition thus may be a precursor to entry into the stream of growth and modernization. Alternatively, it may prove to be no more than a chapter in a story of relatively stagnant circularity.

Differentiation between High and Late Tradition can be more than a descriptive device. One process through which the sequence of growth may come to be introduced is revealed by this distinction. It is possible to document a number of instances in which acts, undertaken or sanctioned by High Tradition's political elites, have proved, in their total consequence, to be profoundly and permanently destabilizing. This does not mean that Tradition's rulers are other than conservatively oriented. Often, they scarcely know enough to be anything else. But it does mean that the desire for power knows no time boundary; and that in their unceasing efforts to maintain or increase power, ruling elites may thrust tenaciously - albeit indirectly and unconsciously - at those very parametric checks which hitherto had secured an historic system of rule.

There exists a real possibility, therefore, that governmental attempts to extend the breadth and depth of High Traditional forms may themselves introduce many of the destabilizing conditions typically operative in Late Tradition.

But when does High give way to Late Tradition? In the case studies presented, we have chosen to assign movement from one period to the next

5 Such a result most typically can be perceived over a long period of time. The short-run effect of an act - such as famine relief - may be to re-introduce stability into an otherwise unbalanced situation. If overall parametric constraints also are affected (e.g., if famine relief leads to changes in the rate of population growth), the long-run effect probably will be destabilizing.
to roughly a forty year span. During this interval empirical evidence indicates: (a) that internal strains bearing on the maintenance of Traditional systems are increasing at a fairly regular rate; and (b) that significant shifts in governmental policies are being initiated which, though they lead to some modicum of short-run success, nonetheless contribute to the growth of endemic social crisis through their residual impact on basic parametric constraints. A more refined identification of the point of movement from High to Late Tradition is unnecessary, for our purpose in presenting separate chapters on the two periods is largely one of convenience. The chapters on High Tradition will describe political, economic and social systems within a frame indicating how particular Governments attempted to balance parametric constraints, social goals and value orientations in such fashion as to assure maintenance of the power functions of historic ruling groups. The rise of destabilizing elements will be considered in the Late Traditional chapters. These chapters also enquire into the range of options perceived and employed as each country tried to respond to parametric shifts; into those unreconciled or irreconcilable issues which ultimately led to movement into the Transitional phase of Preconditions; and into certain common characteristics of men associated with early reform activity.

The surrender of some basic governmental postulate, accompanied by alteration of a number of institutional or functional derivatives, attests, in this study, to each country's entry into Transition. A two-fold modification of Traditional political systems is seen to date from this surrender; for not only does power shift, in some degree,
away from the Regions (and from autonomous, state-wide institutions such as an established religion) to the agencies of the Central Government; but positions at the highest levels of government for the first time also begin to be opened regularly to "new men", representatives of Western-style occupations and professions. This latter phenomenon does not, however, presage wholesale introduction of change into the subject countries. For the surrender of custom had been initiated in order to maintain the integrity of the bulk of traditionalism, and this objective gains the explicit support of the "new men" once rank and power becomes theirs. Nonetheless, a certain antagonism is implicit to the variety of interests vested in the persons of the "new men". Their status ultimately depends on application of their particular technical skills. But modernization in any sector tends in some degree to endanger the historic power structure through which the "new men" have been raised to prominence. The period of Transition thus is seen to be one of crisis bred in the function-status schizophrenia of modernists within the ruling elite. It is intensified by the confusion of old-line leaders as they come more and more to face the implications of a society moving away from its traditional bases of power.

Resolution of the conflict between old and new begins to be made apparent by passage into Transformation. Transformation is identified historically by a political act shifting the balance of power to men and institutions which either exemplify, or are capable of gaining, a progressive cast. The society thus is provided with its first opportunity to move forward dynamically in all of its sectors. This develop-
ment is tangibly reflected in modification of the attitudes governing policy-making at the national level. Formerly, political elites felt it necessary to attempt to resolve national problems without jeopardizing the foundations of the traditional social order. Once Transformation begins, these same (or other) political leaders express a willingness to modify radically, or even jettison, vestiges of the past whenever such action seems essential for the securing of national goals. Transformation, then, is the period in which "new" societies truly begin to emerge as the conscious products of political policy-making. Why should this be so? A partial answer is provided by Professor Rostow's description of the Stage of Preconditions:

"Technically, the preconditions for sustained industrialization have generally required radical change in three non-industrial sectors. First, a build-up of social overhead capital, notably in transport. This build-up was necessary not merely to permit an economical national market to be created and to allow natural resources to be productively exploited, but also to permit the national government effectively to rule. Second, a technological revolution in agriculture. The process at work during the preconditions generally yielded both a general rise in population and a disproportionate rise in urban populations. Increased productivity in agriculture has been generally a necessary condition for preventing the process of modernization from being throttled. Third, an expansion in imports financed by the more efficient production and marketing of some natural resource plus, where possible, capital imports. Such increased access to foreign exchange was required to permit the less advanced region or nation to increase the supply of the equipment and industrial raw materials it could not then itself supply, as well as to preserve the level of real income while social overhead capital of long gestation period was being created. Framed by these three forms of sectoral development, yielding both new markets and new inputs for industry, the initially small enclaves of modern industrial activity could begin to expand, and then sustain expansion, mainly by the plough-back of profits." 6

Even so compressed a statement as this suggests the great range of changes at work during Preconditions not only in the economic system, but also within the social and political structures. Revolutionary mutation of percipient parameters is taking place. The physiographic parameters are being modified as well, though at a rate which is somewhat less rapid than the speed of change in knowledge and desire. A new level of material welfare becomes possible as formerly inhibiting physiographic parameters are brought nearer to heel. And just as the economy is responding to the three-fold growth process described by Professor Rostow, the power potentials associated with alternative political strategies also are changing their form. Coupled with present instability and future uncertainty, the accelerating dynamism of the social system leads to a multiplication both of critical national problems, and of policy alternatives apparently bearing high power potentials.

We have now arrived at that point at which nationally-planned attempts to achieve self-sustaining growth may be initiated. It should be noted that Professor Rostow's "three related conditions" for successful economic take-off⁷ have not yet come close to fruition.

⁷ "a. A rise in the rate of productive investment from (say) 5 per cent or less to over 10 per cent of national income (or net national product);

"b. The development of one or more substantial manufacturing or capital-intensive, primary product/sectors, with a high rate of growth;

"c. The existence or quick emergence of a political, social, and institutional framework which exploits the impulses to expansion in the modern sector and the potential external economy effects of the take-off and gives to growth an on-going character."

But economic growth programming may be instituted at any time. Sometimes, in fact, economic development is sought partially as a technique for revolutionizing those same popular attitudes and behavioral patterns which hitherto had militated against the development of a spontaneous Take-Off. Such has been true both in the Turkish growth efforts, and in the Indian Five Year Plans. Of the cases we shall present below, only Japan appears to have approached that element of self-generated spontaneity which might have allowed for a "natural" movement forward from Preconditions and into Take-Off. And even in Japan, it is questionable whether Take-Off would have occurred during the latter 19th Century had the Meiji reformers not come to equate economic progress with political survival. But this is a foretelling of history.

Individual chapters in Parts I through IV correspond to the politico-economic periods described above. These periods are broken down chronologically as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High Tradition</th>
<th>Transition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan - 17th to mid-18th Century</td>
<td>Japan - 1862-3 to 1871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey - 15th to mid-17th Century</td>
<td>Turkey - 1908 to 1922</td>
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<tr>
<td>India - 17th to late-18th Century;</td>
<td>India - 1885 to 1920;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Late Tradition</th>
<th>Transformation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan - mid-18th Century to 1862-3</td>
<td>Japan - 1871 to 1886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey - late-17th Century to 1908</td>
<td>Turkey - 1922 to 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India - late-18th Century to 1885;</td>
<td>India - 1920 to 1951/52.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part I

HIGH TRADITION’S EQUILIBRIUM SYSTEM

Chapter 2. - The Japanese Example (17th - mid-18th Century)

Chapter 3. - The Turkish Example (15th - late-17th Century)

Chapter 4. - The Indian Example (17th - late-18th Century)

Chapter 5. - Conclusions: Parametric Constraints and the Effects of Power Consolidation

In these chapters, the equilibrium systems of High Traditional Japan, Turkey and India are described, with particular emphasis being given to political success as a factor in the development of resource shortages. The analysis focusses on population growth, and on the constraining influence of the physiographic and percipient parameters. It is shown that limitations on growth potentials are imposed by the population/resource balance, the institutional structure, and the stock of knowledge available to any Traditional Stage society.
Chapter 2.

HIGH TRADITION: THE JAPANESE EXAMPLE

A. The Political Structure

At the beginning of the 17th Century, Japanese civil war was ended by the emergence of Tokugawa clan as the nation's dominant military power. Appointed Shoguns (military dictators, theoretically subject to the Emperor's will)\(^1\), the Tokugawa rapidly developed a system whereby the enforced demand that there be strict adherence to fiat law provided a lever for control over an older feudal polity. A Static State resulted. It was readily accepted by the Japanese, for justification of governmental rigidity was found in imported Chinese dogma stressing the rectitude of an absolutism interpreted by wise rulers. The political system created by the Tokugawa Shoguns thus superimposed dictatorship by the bakufu (administrative organ of the shogunate) upon a feudal system which in other respects closely resembled that of Medieval Europe.

That the Tokugawa Shoguns were able to oblige their vassals to accept a uniformity much more rigorous than that imposed in comparable Western countries may be attributed particularly to three factors. In the first place, Japan's insularity made possible a near complete limitation of contact with foreigners. Through edicts denying to their subjects freedom of intercourse with abroad, the Tokugawa exploited this

\(^1\) A Glossary of Recurring Japanese Terms is included \textit{infra}, Appendix I.1.
geographic advantage to the maximum. Second, Japan – unlike England or any other European monarchy – had known but one royal house in all its history. The Japanese therefore found it more natural to place a high value on loyalty to the ruler and his appointees than did Europeans, who were often forced to parcel out their loyalty between the competitive demands of secular and spiritual authorities. Finally, Tokugawa possessed an unusually large military potential within its immediate clan complex.

The Tokugawa shogunate’s fiefs produced nearly 30% of Japan’s total rice crop; and since rice revenues were the standard measure of wealth and power, the bakufu was able to field a considerably larger force of samurai (knights) than could any contesting daimyo (feudal magnate). In addition, the entire daimyo corps, which fluctuated in size between roughly 250 and 300 men, was divided by Tokugawa into three classes: shimpan (collateral members of the Tokugawa house); fudai (those who had shown an hereditary loyalty to the house of Tokugawa); and tozama (those who had accepted Tokugawan hegemony only after defeat in civil wars ending in 1615-16). Shimpan and fudai clans alone were allowed to hold responsible positions in the bakufu. Moreover, their han (fiefs) were strategically placed so as to flank tozama clan areas, or to protect the centers of Tokugawa power.

Though the tozama clans were isolated geographically and politically, they were not entirely neutralized as political entities, for, as part of Tokugawa’s initial settlement of power, the tozama daimyo had been guaranteed almost complete autonomy within their han in
exchange for declarations of fealty to the shogunate. Since various of the tozama daimyo ruled over unusually large fiefs,\(^2\) this provision left with the tozama clans a disruptive potential which conceivably might have been employed at any time to destabilize the social system and thus to endanger the hegemony of Tokugawa. The fudai clans posed less of a threat to the shogunate; but since the bakufu occasionally found it necessary to promulgate laws over the concerted opposition of fudai daimyo, their loyalty had to be considered a perishable commodity.

To try to control the dissidence potential of their vassals, the Tokugawa utilized a wide-ranging series of expedients. The divinity of the Tenno (Emperor) was specifically enjoined so that he might be used as a loyalty focus for Japanese of all classes and persuasions. At the same time, the Tenno was held virtually incommunicado at his Kyoto court, the grounds of which were patrolled by troops of proved devotion to the shogunate. If this were not enough to keep the Throne from becoming the rallying point for any anti-Tokugawa cabal, the bakufu could depend on its spies among the kuge (hereditary court nobility) to ferret out plans for revolt. And finally, there was always the possibility of bringing one of the Tenno's sons from Kyoto to Edo (Tokyo), the shogunate's capital city. Ostensibly, the Prince would be removed to become Lord Abbot of the Uyeno Temple. Actually, he was separated from his family to provide a hostage for use in case of need.

The hostage system served as a keystone in the Tokugawan system of rule. The practice was institutionalized through the development of

\(^2\) Several tozama daimyôs generated internal rice revenues equivalent to from two to five per cent of the total Japanese rice crop.
sankin kotai (alternate attendance), a system which not only forced all but the least significant daimyo to spend half their time at the Shogun's court but also required that the daimyo leave their families behind in Edo whenever they returned to their fiefs. Sankin kotai was effective beyond its direct control element; it acted indirectly as well by dissipating the wealth of the daimyo corps. Alternate attendance necessitated heavy expenditure on housing in the capital, for each daimyo came to court attended by samurai levies whose size reflected the master's stature. Yearly travel across Japan also proved costly, and the stylized pastimes and present-givings prescribed by court etiquette drew down residual cash reserves to a degree which could be specifically determined for particular daimyo by the Tokugawa rulers themselves.

The right to participate in Edo's court functions served as a patent of prestige which more than outweighed any latent antipathy for sankin kotai's hostage provisions. Through studied use of this status factor, the bakufu was able to achieve a desired end: attachment of the warrior class to that rigid socio-political system which undergirded the shogunate's absolutism. But the alliance of the warrior class was to prove over time a wounding element for Tokugawa. Unable to free

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3 This expense fell unusually heavily upon the tozama daimyo, for their clan capitals were all located in extreme southwestern Japan.

4 It has been estimated that at least 70% of the total outlays of fudai and tozama daimyo went to expenses related to the sankin kotai system. Kee II Choi, Shibusawa Eiichi and His Contemporaries (unpublished dissertation), Harvard University, 1958, pp. 14-19; quoting T.C. Tsukahira, The Sankin Kotai System of Tokugawa Japan.
itself from the constriction of a class for the most part irrevocably
wedded to the status quo, as High Tradition advanced, the bakufu
became progressively less able to respond systematically to rising
social and economic pressures. Difficulty of response grew vexatious
as Japan moved inexorably from localized agrarianism into a system based
on a partially-monetized national economy. For the fact that Tokugawa
had chosen to build a Static State, perpetuating the social conditions
of the early 17th Century, made it virtually impossible for succeeding
Governments to utilize the urban classes to the optimum, once national
economic interdependence had been introduced into the Japanese polity.

B. The Economic Structure

Though Japan, isolated from the rest of the world by its geographic
position, was thereby unified, internally it was extensively subdivided.
Not only were there the major island divisions; each one of the islands
was itself broken up into a series of narrow compartments bounded by
steep mountain walls.\footnote{Approximately 3/4 of Japan's total land surface is made up of rugged
hillside with slopes averaging more than 15°. Few plain areas exist
except in the alluvial lowlands, which early became centers of popula-
tion and therefore limited the area available for valley farming.
Even the largest plain (the Kwanto Plain centering on Tokyo), has an
area of only 5,000 square miles out of a total land surface of
147,492 square miles for Japan proper. G.T. Trewartha, Japan, A
Physical, Cultural and Regional Geography, Madison, Wisconsin, 1945,
pp. 6, 14, 18.} Even before Tokugawa, this internal isolation
had begun to be relieved by the construction of a considerable road
system. Under the bakufu, the Gokaido highways came to be extended and
improved, with Edo made their hub.6

Road development followed largely on political and military considerations. Sankin kotai, for example, would have been hard to establish had there not been an internal network of roads. But economic necessity also played its part, for as cities grew the need arose for transport to bring produce into urban areas. Bulk commodities were not much carried by road, since water transport was considerably more efficient. One of Japan's greatest advantages was provided by the fact that the Eastern Coastline, which boasted the most habitable terrain, was also bounded by the most easily navigated waters.7

Just as the growth of cities followed on the development of feudal

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6 Edo was little more than a village isolated in a swamp until the early 1600's. The Tokugawa chose it as their military headquarters for strategic reasons. After it had become the seat of the shogunate, a major road program was carried out and Edo was rapidly transformed into the largest city of the then world. The Gokaido had its Edo terminus at Nihon-bashi (The Bridge of Japan). The highway system consisted of the following trunks: "the Tokaido, Yedo [Edo] to Kyoto along the coast, 310 miles; the Nakasendo, Yedo to Kyoto through the interior, 324 miles; the Nikko-kaido, Yedo to Nikko, 89 miles; the Ushu-kaido [Oshu-kaido], Yedo to Aomori, 465 miles; and the Koshu-kaido, Yedo to Shimosuwas, 132 miles." ibid., p. 306.

During his residency in Japan (1690-92), the German E. Kaempfer noted that, "Tokaido ... is upon some days more crowded, than the public street in any of the most populous towns in Europe." Quoted in A.F. Thomas and Soji Koyama, Commercial History of Japan, Tokyo, 1936, p. 90fn.

7 Japan has an exceedingly long coastline, with one linear mile of ocean frontage for every 8.5 square miles of area. However, much of this coastline lies on geographical fault lines which deny easy access to the interior. On the Northwest, there is a relative paucity of good harbors and alluvial plains, thus tending to make Japan develop most rapidly on its Pacific flank. The ratio of Pacific Ocean frontage to Sea of Japan frontage is 3.7/1. G.T. Trewartha, op. cit., pp. 28-30.
castle towns, so development of Japanese shipping followed on the growth of cities. But the expansion of shipping posed a problem which reflected the difficulties implicit in maintaining a Static State. Like the traffic on the Gokaido, which was strictly regulated by bakufu inspectors in order to limit the possibility of insurrection, so too was there an attempt made to limit the size of ships. Theoretically, sea-going vessels were limited to one mast and a tonnage capacity of 500 koku (ca. 45 long tons) so that they might not be sufficiently seaworthy to enter the open ocean and thus break the isolation of Japan. But the need for coasters of large burthen increased as city populations soared; and for this reason, the bakufu relaxed its restrictions and allowed the building of two-masted merchantmen with carrying capacities of up to four times the "legal" limit.

8 It is reported that in 1726, Edo's daily import requirement included:

- Rice 861,893 bags
- Miso (bean-mush) 2,828 casks
- Shoyu (soy) 132,829 casks
- Fuel (firewood) 18,209,987 bundles
- Hair-oil 90,811 casks
- Salt 1,670,830 bales
- Cotton 36,135 bales
- Sake 795,856 casks

Source: A. F. Thomas and Soji Koyama, op. cit., p. 91.

9 Actually, many more road barriers (sekisho) existed at the beginning of the Tokugawan hegemony than at its end, for Tokugawa forced the closing of private barriers constructed as a means of coercing toll from travelers. C. D. Sheldon, Rise of the Merchant Class in Tokugawa Japan, Locust Valley, N.Y., 1958, pp. 12-13.
Food requirements of the booming cities provided a uniformly high level of demand for agricultural products. Intensive cultivation had been practiced from early times, with much use made of fertilizer and double cropping. In addition, the Japanese showed no hesitancy at planting new crops; the sweet potato and sugar cane, for example, were introduced early in the 18th Century and rapidly grew to significant harvest size. Moreover, the Tokugawa supported all efforts to increase total land area under cultivation. Not only was there continual improvement of hillside terraces; large-scale reclamation of the alluvial lowlands went forward as well. By these means, total farming area, which had amounted to some 3 2/3 million acres in early Tokugawa, doubled by the early 1700's, and redoubled by about 1880. No significant pastoral sector developed, but since every part of Japan is within approximately 150 miles of the sea, fisheries provided the protein content of diet.

Japan's climate is as varied as that of the eastern half of the United States (excluding Southern Florida). Being in the monsoon belt, highly diversified forests exist together with a great number of swiftly-flowing, non-navigable streams. Other resources sufficient for the

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1) So desirous were the Tokugawa to increase total land area, they allowed those who reclaimed lands to become in effect private landowners. This grant of de facto private property was extended even to the merchant class, which otherwise suffered extensively from discrimination.

needs of a pre-industrial society included: copper, gold, silver, iron, coal, zinc and lead. The mining of precious metals for export remained important down into the late 19th Century. Military supplies and luxury goods were taken in exchange, though imports of all types were discouraged by Tokugawa except insofar as they might be directly useful to the shogunate. Again, Static State policies proved the determinant. Japan's domestic economy centered on the preparation of such products as rice, textiles, paper, sugar, wax, indigo, marine products, sake, vegetable oil, fish fertilizer, lumber, pottery and hardware. Merchant guilds (kabunakama) monopolized much of the commercial, craft and transport sectors. As Tradition progressed, both the shogunate and the clans became increasingly dependent upon revenues raised through monopolistic guild licensing. Licensing held a further value in theory, for it was felt that price control might be effected through strict regulation of guild activities.

C. The Social Structure

Twin techniques were employed to buttress the static absolutism of Tokugawa. Internally, a fully articulated system of social organization was created. Its foundations lay in concepts of hierarchy and of irrevocable, hereditary class status. Since joint culpability (of family, occupational sub-group, clan, etc.) was applied, and since laws enforcing the static system were subjected to periodic refinement, patterns of conduct became increasingly

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12 Tsuchiya Takao, Development of Economic Life in Japan, Tokyo, 1937, p. 19.
uniform. Deportment, costume, even eating habits were susceptible to
dictation, with the probable result that changes in effective demand
became manifest less rapidly than did changes of personal taste per se.

Exclusionism served to complement the rigidity of internal social
organization. During the years 1638-1720, intercourse with abroad was
almost entirely cut off. Thereafter, the Exclusion Edicts were somewhat
modified, but they remained an inhibiting factor of major importance
down into the 19th Century.

It is important to note that the Exclusion Edicts were enacted in
the first instance less because of xenophobia than for reasons of
state security. As time elapsed, isolation gained a certain sanctity;
virtues lacking in the rest of the world were imputed to lonely Japan;
but this attitude did not bar a lively interest in abroad. Throughout
the centuries of seclusion, the bakufu employed Chinese and Dutch
traders sequestered on Deshima Island (Nagasaki Harbor) as rapporteurs
of the world beyond. "Dutch Studies" in Western astronomy, medicine,
mathematics, navigation and military science held considerable popularity;
and though non-officials generally had to pursue their very inexact
inquiries surreptitiously until the time of Late Tradition, the "Dutch
Studies" nonetheless helped keep alive a questing spirit throughout the
years of High Tradition.

The possibility of atrophy was implicit to the Tokugawan system,
for that system centered more on casuistical reinterpretation of the old
than on flexible response to change. Nowhere was this more apparent
than in the hardening of status rankings which occurred as the shogunate
extended its power. A social system common to many physiocratic societies applied in pre-Tokugawa Japan. The noble-warrior ranked first, for his function was to defend the public order. Priests, doctors, teachers and similar public servants approximated the status of the warrior, though this may have been due in part to the fact that professionals generally were themselves warrior-born, or else were associated with institutions (e.g., a monastic society) to which certain warriors pledged fealty.

Below the martial caste stood the peasant. His function as producer of staple necessaries made the peasant superior to the chonin (townsman). The chonin was said to lack a useful purpose, being concerned instead with the non-productive activity of profit making. At the bottom of society could be found pariah and helot groups, membership in which tended to be hereditary and to reflect an "inferior" ethnic background.

As late as 1586, it was conceivable that any brave man might gain entry into the ranks of the warriors. Because of martial prowess, for example, numbers of Kumaso and Ainu tribesmen\textsuperscript{13} apparently were absorbed into Japanese society as samurai despite ethnic backgrounds unlike the norm. But in 1587, a "sword hunt" was held, and in the centuries following no man of less than samurai rank was legally allowed to bear arms. Of course, peasants who chose to defy the law still might become skilled

\textsuperscript{13} The Kumaso and Ainu long contested the expansion of the so-called "Yamato" peoples (theoretically the forebears of today's Japanese) from Central Japan into the Southwest and Northeast respectively.
fighters, and as long as a large percentage of the *samurai* remained part-time farmers, opportunities for elevation from peasant to warrior rank remained in being. But refinement of military technique ended the overlapping of *samurai* and peasant occupations, for it led to the employment of *samurai* as permanent castle garrisons.

Growth of an alliance between *samurai* and *chonin* would have seemed a natural outgrowth of the warrior's removal to castle life, for neither the warrior nor the townsman could long prosper without the support of the other. Particularly after the institution of *sankin kotai* had sparked economic advance, the interdependence of the two classes became increasingly apparent. However, the *bakufu* chose to ignore the reality of changes in the social structure. Instead of reappraising the status rankings of differing occupations, it moved to enlarge the breach separating samuraihood from the lesser ranks.

Reappraisal of the functional importance of the various classes might well have led to the downgrading of petty *samurai* and a concurrent aggrandizement of leading *chonin* occupations. Such a policy, however, would have weakened the political taproots from which Tokugawa derived its power. As a compromise alternative, therefore, the *bakufu* encouraged creation of occupational sub-orderings within the warrior caste which made possible the utilization of "lesser" *samurai* in roles bordering on those of the *chonin*. This attempted rapprochement of

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14 The rise of a *samurai* sub-caste normally employed in civil administrative and functionary roles was not caused solely by the process described above. Instead, its genesis can be traced to the Tokugawa peace, for this led to an increasing institutionalization of the
old and new inevitably failed, for those who were cast in occupations bordering on the margins of class illegality suffered an accompanying loss of prestige within their peer group. The resulting dissatisfaction, coupled with a gradually increasing disparity between samurai incomes and the cost of living, led to dissipation of the warrior spirit as many of the "lesser" samurai chose to surrender their knightly status in order to enter commerce.¹⁵

Static State and hence created a demand for clan bureaucrats. Since there were considerably more samurai in being than was required for garrison duty, a supply of potential administrators—occupationally underemployed—was ready at hand.

¹⁵ This condition obtained as early as the first century of Tokugawa rule. For example, sometime before his death in 1690, Tokugawa Mitsukuni, daimyo of Mito and hence one of the three most important of the Tokugawa magnates, addressed his samurai as follows: "I do hope that all my retainers may be unselfish and manly. And when I bear in mind your ample yearly allowance of rice, this hope on my part seems not unreasonable. I cannot at all understand why some samurai, in spite of their being gentlemen of the exalted class, give up study and break their swords and arrows in order to take part, even without scales and other necessary appliances, in mercantile business." Quoted in J. Murdoch, A History of Japan (Vol. III), New York, 1926, p. 98.

Sheldon points out that: "The ranks of the merchants and artisans in the castle towns were swollen in large part by peasants, but also by samurai. Merchants of samurai descent were particularly numerous and successful during the last years of the sengoku period [i.e., late 16th Century] and the first years of the Tokugawa. Some examples are the houses of Suminokura and Chaya, who made their money in foreign trade. The Chaya were once drapers and purveyors of silks for Tokugawa Ieyasu. Other families who have continued to flourish are the Mitsui, Sumitomo and Konoike. Many of the merchants of Omi province who played such a leading role in the commerce of the Tokugawa period were descended from samurai." C. D. Sheldon, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
The effects of this process were manifold. On the one hand, the chonin class was invigorated by the entry of active men bearing the cultural imprint of the warrior elite. As time passed, rich merchants increasingly came to identify themselves with Tokugawan rigidity; this loyalty was rewarded by the noble classes, in fact if not by Law. At the same time, those who remained samurai at the expense of physical comfort became embittered towards the shogunate system. Instead of accepting the authoritarian society of the time, marginal samurai looked back and idealized the period of pre-Tokugawan regionalism when, because of civil wars, the importance of the warrior had been great. Finally, many of the "upper" samurai grew complacent. Having consolidated their power in a bureaucratized Static State, they expended their energies refining the status quo.

D. Conclusion

The shogunate's conscious exploitation of Japanese insularity was the most all-pervading event of High Tradition. There was political value in exclusionism, for it protected Japan from the infection of foreign influence. But over time, the benefits of quarantine did not equal its bane. The Exclusion Edicts brought crisis because, in limiting Japan's capacity to modify the percipient parameters, they made creative responses to new conditions difficult where not entirely impossible.

The dangers of isolation were long overlooked, for the Tokugawan system was established during a period of resource surplus. As we have seen, environment was kindly to Japan. Not only did the islands possess
an adequate resource base, their geographic configuration made socio-political integration and the creation of national markets relatively easy. Moreover, the Japan which Tokugawa inherited was underpopulated. The 16th Century wars of Sengoku Jidai ("the age of the country at war") had arrested Malthusian pressures.

The political value of exclusionism was two-fold. It buttressed Tokugawan postulates regarding absolutism by restricting the entry of possible competitor concepts. It provided as well a means for maintaining the rigidity of the Static State. For near a century, Tokugawa's rule brought little but good to Japan. The climax of High Tradition (1688-1703), was reached during a time which Sir George Sansom characterizes thus:

"The period called Genroku may be looked upon as the zenith of Tokugawa prosperity, and perhaps even the justification of feudal rule, for here was peace and plenty and a great flourishing of the arts - a happy society as human societies go." 16

This, then, was the direct effect of exclusionism and the Static State. It is not difficult to understand that those who managed it were more impressed by their success than by the five indirect and corrosive consequences of Tokugawa rule. But from the long perspective of history, the indirect effects are seen to have been of greatest importance for they were prominent among the causes of Tokugawa's decline. Insofar as disequilibrium in Japan's Late Traditional period was a product of endogenous factors, it was largely the result of:

1) steady population growth under the Tokugawa Peace;

2) movement of population to urban centers, and the development of a partially-monetized national economy closely related to Sankin Kōtai;

3) restriction of the Japanese capacity to respond to these phenomena due to attempted freezing of the percipient parameters in all areas except those related to war, navigation, medicine or theoretical investigation;

4) hierarchic rigidity, which made the warrior class a drain on national resources while at the same time preventing optimal utilization of the chōnin; and

5) growing disaffection among the samurai as marginal members were forced into denigrating occupations, and the standard of living of the entire class suffered relative to that of Merchant inferiors.

Thus, out of the system's success, the bases for crisis were created by the convergence of population growth, increasing resource shortage, and planned stabilization of the percipient parameters. Static State policies had brought all three conditions into existence. They also were responsible for most of the disaffection of the samurai as a class, and for that class' inability to conceive of reform as a step forward rather than back.
Chapter 3.

HIGH TRADITION: THE TURKISH EXAMPLE

A. The Political Structure

Operating in a Middle Eastern cockpit where geography itself denied the possibility of secure isolation, early Turkish Sultans could not help but strive after considerable fluidity in their methods of rule. This imperative of policy came to be further reinforced by the Turks' conversion to Islam, for a fundamental obligation of Muslim states was held to be territorial expansion for purposes of religious proselytization. At the same time, Islam possessed an inherent tendency toward rigidity in its response to environment (the percipient parameters), for the dogma which had been revealed to Muhammed was considered absolute and not susceptible to modifying interpretation. Faced therefore by elements in possible contradiction to one another, Turkish rulers found that maintenance of their hegemony necessitated continued political innovation within the outer limits set by religious constraint.

The first great change of ruling technique came to be applied as dominion was extended from hither Anatolia into the Levant and the Balkans. By this period, the Sultan had gone far toward deemphasizing that simple feudalism which had proved effective during earlier years of quasi-nomadism. As feudal relationships lost their central place, their position was filled by imperial methods borrowed from Byzantium and Persia. The resulting Ottoman Empire utilized confederative integration in order to hold together highly disparate peoples and political
forms. Allowance for the socio-religious identity of non-Muslim sects was recognized as a cornerstone of the derived system;\(^1\) to it was added provision for the retention of historical political systems amongst peoples falling only latterly to Ottoman suzerainty.

Though tribalism gave way to empire, no parallel change occurred in the method used to insure cohesion at the upper levels of government. Personal allegiance: be it that of the Turkish feudatory to his Sultan,\(^2\) of the Christian Exarch to his Padishah, or of the Muslim Paşa to his Caliph;\(^3\) remained the prime technique for control. Down into the 17th Century, the personal character of Ottoman government was particularly intense due to the practice of employing slaves of the Sultan's household at all levels of the secular bureaucracy. Slavery was not only efficient, but along with the residuary of feudal institutions it also served to reinforce the Islamic theory of monarchy's trusteeship over land and people for an ultimate, religious purpose.

As the foregoing passages suggest, complete Muslimization of the Empire was expected to occur only gradually. Toleration, therefore, was held a main tenet of government throughout High Tradition. Being

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1. Though Islam possessed a proselytizing mission, "The People of Scripture": Roman Catholics, Greek and Russian Orthodox, Syrian and United Chaldeans, Maronites, Protestants, Jews, Nestorian Christians, and sometimes Zoroastrians; were specifically exempted from forced conversion. This was due to their adherence to pre-Islamic creeds which later came to be incorporated into Muslim theology.

2. A Glossary of Recurring Turkish Terms is included infra, Appendix I.2.

3. In ensuing pages, we shall specifically differentiate between the roles played by Ottoman monarchs by use of the title most appropriate to the situation being described. As feudal Lord of the Turks, the monarch will be described as Sultan; as Emperor, he will be identified by Padishah; as spiritual leader of Islam, he will be termed Caliph.
viewed as eventual converts to Islam, "The People of Scripture" were not to be made to suffer unduly for any present lack of enlightenment. A comparable tolerance could not be found in any European country, and partly for this reason Christians and Jews living within the Ottoman Empire willingly gave their loyalty to the Muslim overlord. In lieu of military service, an unpopular head tax was imposed on members of the gaiur millets (non-Muslim religious communities); most of this and other tribute demanded by the Padishah went into provision of State services for Muslims rather than gaiur. However, these seemed insignificant annoyances to non-Muslim religious hierarchs, for leaders of the gaiur millets possessed exalted rank in Ottoman Governments and were allowed virtual carte blanche in ministering to their congregations. Public services such as schools, hospitals and the care of the poor were left up to religious officials; and in localities where dwelt large numbers of gaiur, other civic functions such as responsibility for public order often were assigned to relevant religious institutions.

A pyramidal form resulted from the integration of semi-autonomous communities through the mechanism of personal, leige-vassal relationships. This pyramid might at any time be segmented vertically, simply

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4 An important aspect of Ottoman toleration was the exemption of non-Muslims from required military service. This exemption arose out of a belief that non-Muslims might prove unreliable as soldiers, since the sword was looked upon as ultimately the servant of religion.

5 This was a standard practice which applied to the Islamic community as well as to the gaiur millets.
because no effort was (or, possibly, could be) made to establish a sense of socio-political community extending laterally across the confederated body at large. There did exist a spirit of internal loyalty within each organizational unit. But once the interests of a unit's leaders had diverged from those of their subordinates - or, alternatively, once an hierarch plus his congregation had come to develop community interests incommensurable with those of the Imperial Government - the only channels available for maintaining Ottoman cohesion were lost. Both intra-group and inter-group interests did in fact become fractured once the expansionist momentum of Islam had been stalled. That the Ottoman Empire remained in existence for more than two centuries thereafter was more the result of inertia, and of wrangling amongst the European Great Powers, than it was a testament to the loyalty or concern of the Ottoman peoples.

B. The Economic Structure

By the 17th Century, the Ottoman Empire had been pushed north through the Balkans and the Danube Basin, as well as northeast through the Ukraine and the Crimea. On the East, imperial boundaries had been run southward from the Caucasus, along the western margins of Persia and the Gulf, to the "Abode of Emptiness" of Arabia. In the South, Ottoman suzerainty was formally proclaimed as far west as Morocco. So varied were this confederacy's constituent parts, little of what might be presented regarding the economy of (say) Tunisia could be said to hold true as well within (for example) the Black Sea principalities. However, since our interest rests solely in factors affecting the development
of the 20th Century Turkish Republic, only a survey limited to the economy of that region needs here be made.

The geography of present-day Turkey can be said to include five distinct regional subdivisions: the Black Sea coastlands (which boast a rather narrow piedmont); the Aegean coastlands, Straits area and Thracian Turkey; the Mediterranean coastlands; the Central Plateau; and the Eastern Highlands. Temperatures other than in regions abutting the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, gravitate toward seasonal extremes. Except along the alluvial plains, rainfall generally is sparse. Parts of the Central Plateau are in fact desert.

Interior communication naturally is difficult in a country compartmentalized as is the Turkish Republic. It is made particularly so by Anatolia's rivers, for these tend not only to be non-navigable but also to have eroded beds which hinder the development of river-bank highways. Only five major highways existed in Asia-Minor Turkey as late as the 1920's, and several of these had been little improved over their ancient status as caravan trails. Coastal shipping might be expected to provide

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7 The five highways included:

(1) Black Sea to Baghdad Road: Samsun-Amasya-Tokat-Sivas-Diyarbakir, and thence down the Tigris Valley into Iraq;

(2) Eregli-Kayseri-Malatya-Diyarbakir road;

(3) Sivas-Kayseri road;

(4) Diyarbekir-Urfa-Aleppo road;

(5) Trabzon-Erzurum road.

The Trabzon-Erzurum road was an historic caravan trail. Graecophiles will note that Xenophon's Ten Thousand travelled up the Tigris Valley over part of the route later incorporated into the Black Sea-Baghdad Road. E. G. Mears (ed.), Modern Turkey: a Politico-Economic Interpretation (1908-1923), New York, 1924, pp. 218-19.
a substitute for intra-peninsular travel; but the Black Sea is relatively inhospitable to shipping, and the entire coastline of Turkey is notably devoid of natural anchorages. 8

During the Middle Ages, the Ottoman economy enjoyed considerable prosperity due to the Empire's position athwart the major caravan routes joining East and West. With the discovery of a sea passage around Africa, however, the wealth brought from transport services and travel tolls was lost. Some writers have contended that loss of her trading income dealt the Empire an irreparable blow. Such a position can be supported only if a further factor is taken into consideration: the ruling classes of the Empire did not cut back their personal demands for Eastern luxury goods after the Ottoman trade bottleneck had been broken by Portugal's navigators. Since by then it no longer was possible to finance imports of Chinese and Indian goods with funds drawn in turn from merchants bringing Asian products to Venice and Genoa across the imperial domain, Ottoman specie had to be drained to the East. For Asia desired little which the Ottomans produced. There were, of course, exceptions to this general condition: Turkish carpets and the Damascene blade had worldwide markets. But Ottoman industry was largely one of rough hand fabrication of locally produced raw materials. And neither Europe nor Asia needed much of the output of foreigners' village artisanry.

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8 From the Caucasus to Syria, the best harbor sites are at Trabzon, Samsun, Zonguldak, Eregli, Istanbul and the Straits area, Izmir, Mersin'and Iskendrûm.
Textile production dominated Ottoman industry. Based on sheep or goat herding, on sericulture, on cotton and flax production, the output of finished textiles such as carpeting was much sought both domestically and abroad. As a result, a number of hand-powered loom 'factories' were established in provincial towns and urban centers. The demands of the textile industry promoted the development of auxiliary trades: spinning, dyeing, embroidery making and the production of gold and silver thread. Other industrial products of the Empire included porcelain, pottery and brick, tanned fur, wood, smelted iron, wood and metal workings, salt, saltpetre, sal-ammoniac, tar and sugar.

Distillation of rose water and the production of oil and oil products was carried out partly in the countryside and partly in provincial capitals. Ancillary crafts resulting from oil production included soap and candle making. But most of the output of the agricultural sector went directly into consumption, either by the producer or in his immediate locale. This does not mean that no important trading and commercial sectors existed. A lively business was carried on within the bazaars of the various guilds, and itinerant peddlars augmented coastal shipping in moving finished products back and forth throughout the Empire. However, it is significant that pilgrims to Mecca and Medina, people who typically carried small quantities of their local products for bartering purposes along the route, accounted for much of the Empire's internal commerce. Since roads in general were poor, and since in addition both land and sea traffic was preyed on by bandits, a regularly-scheduled carrying trade never was developed.
It will be noted that the general configuration of the Ottoman economy holds several parallels to that of Tokugawa Japan. However, in one particularly salient aspect the two countries were totally dissimilar. For unlike the Japanese, the Ottomans found nothing degrading in commercial activity. Furthermore, until communal frictions had become endemic among the Ottoman peoples, there seems to have been little antipathy between competing businessmen of differing racial or religious backgrounds. For centuries, Greeks and Turks, for example, were members of the same commercial guilds. Though initiatory oaths might be changed in consideration of religious scruple, there was no social discrimination by the Muslim community against members of the Christian or Jewish faiths.

C. The Social Structure

Hereditary determination of status played an insignificant role in Ottoman society. Even within the Turkish feudal sector, it was impossible for the Sultan's vassals to have more than a small portion of their full estates placed under entail. Moreover, though slavery existed there was no institution of hereditary serfdom. Instead, an exceedingly open-ended system prevailed. Opportunities for vertical

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9 It was possible, however, for a family to retain permanent control of a fief by having it established as a "pious foundation". As such, derived incomes theoretically were utilized for the establishment and maintenance of mosques, hospitals, schools and the like. Over time, increasing numbers of venal feudatories - and corrupt religious societies - used spurious "pious foundations" as fronts for enduring alienations of property.
mobility never were officially limited; on the contrary, any man other
than a slave might be enfeoffed for service to the Sultan, and slaves
themselves possessed the opportunity to rise to imperial positions of
the highest influence and prestige.

Despite tacit acceptance of Islamic egalitarianism, leading officials
of various of the gaiur millets often dealt inequitably with members of
their congregations. Similarly, Islam's formal institutions showed a
proclivity towards some degree of nepotism and corruption. But other
channels for vertical mobility existed, particularly in those areas
related to warfare.

One of the anomalies of the situation arising out of the imperiali-
ization of the State was the shift which occurred in the relative impor-
tance of Turkish feudatories and Muslimized slaves. Empires require
permanent staffs of employees in the bureaucratic structure, as well as
a professional military force. But in part because vassals generally
did not wish to remove themselves permanently from their fiefs, and in
part because the Turkish tradition was one of extreme personal independ-
ence, the Ottomans found it impossible to staff the Empire from within
the feudal ranks alone. The establishment of slave government, which
we have already noted as being efficient, was thus an almost inevitable
outgrowth of Ottoman imperialism. Slaveocracy further possessed a

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10 Islam is congregational, being divided at the first instance into
the Sunni and Shi'ite (or, in Turkey, Alevi) branches. Furthermore,
esoteric Dervish Orders exist, many of which historically have come
to be identified with particular occupations and occupational groups.
Members of the Dervish Orders attempt to "look after their own"
much as do present-day Masonic Orders in the West.
theoretical justification: it recognized the autarchic Turkish feudatory's sense of the implicit equality of all free-born Muslims. No Turk need become the servitor of the Padishah. Though as vassal of the Sultan he was required to perform specified services from time to time, essentially he was a free man.

What we are speaking of may be termed a conscious abdication of function by the feudal class. The Sultan's vassals simply refused to perform their historic, nomads' roles as shepherds once the conditions of empire had changed the magnitude of shepherding required. Transfer of responsibility to a slave caste was the immediate result of this new temper. It brought, of course, a concurrent transfer of perquisites. At first, there appears to have been relatively little reaction to the growing rewards of slavery; feudatories went periodically to battle, seized booty, took on temporary jobs as governors of conquered territories, and then hurried home to their fiefs at the tithing season. But gradually a response started to become apparent: free-born Muslim boys, realizing that a greater chance for preferment existed within the imperial rather than the feudal system, began to secret themselves among the ranks of Christian youths being "harvested" and brought to Constantinople for enrollment as Muslimized slaves of the Padishah. In addition,  

11 There appears to have been no forced Muslimization of Christian boys entered on the Padishah's slave rosters. On the other hand, the boys were fully cut off from Christian services, and their new home was entirely Muslim. Under such circumstances, it would appear altogether natural for conversion to Islam to take place, particularly as advancement was infrequently (or never) made available to non-Muslim slaves.
Turkish vassals began to murmur against that imperial society which brought riches to slaves and spoke in belittling fashion of the feudal institution. The tax farmers of conquered territories, many of whom were Turkish feudatories, quickly became corrupted. Slave government began to go into decline. And finally, during the 17th Century, the imperial bureaucracy was opened and the treasures of Empire were offered up to free-born Muslim spoilsmen.

D. Conclusion

The Ottoman Turks' focus on conquest reflected both their tribal heritage and their conversion to Islam. The most significant outgrowth of this focus was a lack of interest in complex natural and social processes. It was left for others to develop human and material resource potentials. The Ottomans were to become affluent through booty and tribute, rather than through theoretical investigations and the application of new knowledge.

Their hussar's spirit at first gave the Ottomans a distinct advantage over more sedentary opponents, for the Turks were encumbered with little social overhead ballast. However, once the boundaries of territory had been extended into Europe, the Turks found that their historic failure to engage in rational inquiry introduced difficulties into the governmental process. Specifically, the ad hoc principles of shepherding by which they had ruled defeated tribes, were found by the Turks to be

ineffective in the government of entire peoples. For since the Ottomans had never sought to make conquered areas over into component parts of an integrated socio-political community, there was little common ground on which to build a sense of interdependence and loyalty.

Control difficulties resulting from the development of empire were initially resolved through the establishment of slaveocracy and the millet system in parallel with the nomadic, feudal base. Loyalty was gained through personal allegiance, which was structured vertically for want of any community spirit. But because of this very want of spirit, personal loyalties were themselves tenuous. The problem was resolved by substituting a community of interest in profit and power for loyalty based on more personal affinities. In effect, this made the Ottoman Empire's internal security a function of its ability to expand; for only expansion provided spoils for allocation.

Geography introduced weaknesses into the personal allegiance system, since the costs of communication and control increased geometrically as boundaries were pushed out from the court of the Sultan. The impact of physiographic parameters became apparent only after the Ottomans had spilled forth from the Anatolian plateau onto the Mediterranean littoral. But here, in replacing Byzantium, the Ottomans had come into possession of one of the most hotly contested areas of the globe. Moreover, since the Turks were not sailors, their imperial domain - which ran inland from the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts - lacked real geographic unity.13

13 In the 15th and 16th Centuries, the Ottomans tried to develop naval power. Their first, great Admiral was Khayr-ad-Din Barbarossa, a
Costs of government, therefore, were immense. They were made more so by the relatively low level of cultural vitality brought by the Turks to the imperial task.

The Ottoman Turks had been still in a stage of tribal nomadism when they were converted to Islam. In areas relating to personal conduct, great strength had resulted from the meld. However, because the Turks were an essentially primitive people when they first came to accept the preceptive rightness of Koranic dichta, Islamization imposed an extremely rigid set of percipient parameters upon the Ottoman system. The Koran may contain revelation, but nonetheless it is revelation sifted through the mind of a 7th Century desert Arab.

Since education in the Empire was left in the hands of religious functionaries, parametric rigidity made it impossible for Turkish Muslims to develop on the base of civilization inherited from Byzantium. Furthermore, being the cultural inferiors of the Byzantines, the Ottomans were not able to reproduce or replace much of what they had wrested during their conquest of the Levant. Not even the gaiur millets could alter the fact of shrinkage, for after they lost their independence, atrophy gradually set in. Imperial impoverishment thus became a fact to harass the minds of governors. Its coming was hastened by the loss of caravan tolls, and by the concurrent specie drain to the East.

Greek corsair. Thereafter, the Ottoman fleets were made up largely of non-Turkish mercenaries, or of the ships of imperial vassals like the Bey of Tunis. After defeat by a Venetian-Spanish-Papal fleet at Lepanto (October 1571), Ottoman concern with sea power went into decline.
The internal predicaments faced by the Ottomans were made grave by Europe's renaissance. For out of new knowledge came improved military technology: the capacity not only to halt, but even to throw back Ottoman levies. Internal crisis therefore was to become endemic during Late Tradition. It was largely the product of:

1) failure to create the self-sustaining elements of advanced civilization, coupled with the necessity born therefrom (and from Islam) for continual expansion;

2) lack of development of a sense of loyalty and community of interest among the confederated peoples of the Empire; and

3) resource shortage, as the surpluses gained through former conquests were used up.

All of these factors rebounded directly onto the political structure. Since ruling elite groups no longer were able to achieve satiety on the products of conquest, they turned like the fabled hyena and began feasting on the Empire's flesh. Popular disaffection set in particularly among the ga...ur, thus increasing the costs of policing. This in turn decreased resource availability and induced further rapacity among ruling elite groups. Nepotism, corruption and decay replaced the vitality of a people on the march. Late Tradition opened on a scene of internal decadence.
Chapter 4.

HIGH TRADITION: THE INDIAN EXAMPLE

A. The Political Structure

Until the East India Company had failed in its efforts to estab-
lish profitable commercial relationships with Melanesia, Britain's
interest in the subcontinent of India was almost nil. Even after the
mid-18th Century, when "John" Company replaced an hostile Bengali Nawab
with another more sympathetic to British interests, these interests did
not extend to empire. The English came to India for trade, not terri-
tory. With profit their object, Anglo-Indians concerned themselves as
little as they could afford to do with mundane matters relating to
governmental policy.

But "John" Company never found itself able to overlook government
easily, for the general debility of India's historic institutions
rebounded directly onto the Company's ledger books. Long before
Plassy,¹ whole segments of the Mughal Empire had disintegrated so far
as to threaten a complete breakdown of public order. In following
trade inland from their coastal factories, the British therefore found
it necessary to take to themselves much of the burden of Mughal politi-
cal administration.²

¹ Plassy was the battle, in 1757, which led to the East India Company's
enthronement of its first Bengali puppet.

² France's continuing effort to bring India into its own, rather than
Britain's, orbit further intensified the political imperative faced
by the East India Company.
Responsibility for political administration need not entail formal acquisition of political sovereignty. Balancing this fact alongside the known costs of empire, the Company's London Directors long remained adamant in their demand that sovereign responsibility be shunned wherever possible. The Directors were little inclined, therefore, to require that an administrative standard be established for uniform application throughout those areas which had been annexed to the Company. But the resulting ad hoc characteristic of "John" Company government in India was not simply an outgrowth of repugnance to the costs of empire. It represented as well the Company's interest in maintaining uninterrupted the continuity of India's historic political practices. Under these practices, the subcontinent had been viewed as an amalgam of separate principalities and kingdoms, not as a unitary state. In accepting this concept, the British made Indian political diversity the basic postulate on which their rule turned. Effective all-Indian government came slowly into existence nonetheless, for even though "John" Company's Directors chose not to recognize the country's implicit unity behind the Himalayas, geography tended to force integration of larger and larger segments within the British system. Governors-General became perforce imperialist. Men such as Wellesley and Napier brought Company rule from the South and East up to the Northwest frontier and finally into Sindh. Utilizing the doctrine of "Lapse", Lord Dalhousie

3 India's various languages, for example, did not as a rule possess terms meaning "India", "Indian" or "nation".
4 "Lapse" gave the Company the option of fully absorbing into British India Princely states in which the direct ruling line had died out.
lost no opportunity at a later period to increase the number of Princely States absorbed into the Company's territory.

Differentiation between the non- and neo-imperialist attitudes of the respective London and Calcutta headquarters of the East India Company presents only one aspect of the fundamental bifurcation of the Company's policy. A second is seen in the relationships the British Government in India entered into with the Indians themselves. On the one hand, the Company committed itself to support historic ruling institutions provided that the Indian Princes involved recognized British "paramouncy" and maintained stable internal governments. The Princely States thus were allowed to retain a degree of sovereignty in much the same fashion - to use an analogy much favored by 19th Century Englishmen - that defeated monarchs had been granted viceregal powers by the Roman Emperors, so that stability of government and society might not be jeopardized.

At the same time, the British were led by their own interests to change critically significant elements in Traditional Indian society. Two examples will suggest the revolutionary dimension of such changes. By trying to incorporate as much of India as possible into its market area, the Company inevitably acted to break down the isolation of the subcontinent's constituent regions. Recognition of India's essential unity doubtless would have been an eventual product of this search for profit, but the British proceeded to hasten the process immeasurably by a second act: the training of a functionary class of Indians in the English language. The new language furnished a lingua franca understood by governmental administrators throughout the entire subcontinent.
Educated Indians found themselves able for the first time to approach one another essentially as members of the same political community.

B. The Economic Structure

Size, irregularity of the monsoon, and socio-political disunity conspired against a rise in productivity by limiting markets in High Traditional India. Some 1.8 million square miles in extent, the Indian land mass extends south from a latitude roughly equivalent to that of the State of Virginia, to the Comorin Cape, 8.4° north of the Equator. The Indian Empire's northern-most provinces rise into the Himalayan massif, which sets the subcontinent off from the rest of Asia. Below the mountains lies Hindustan, the region of alluvial plains making up the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra river systems. Here centered the ancient civilizations of India, and only here is there an easy West-East route across the subcontinent. Running north and south below Hindustan is the eroded, relatively low Deccan Plateau. Its coastal strips, river deltas, and the Western and Eastern Ghat Mountains make up the Malabar and Coromandel Coasts: the fourth distinct physiographic region of the subcontinent.

Within India's very diverse reaches can be found particular areas which were possessed, during Tradition, of nearly all the natural resources then required for a high-level economic system. However, two

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5 Statements regarding India's size vary according to the number of political divisions included. Vera Anstey's figure, here quoted, is sufficiently accurate for our purposes. V. Anstey, The Economic Development of India (3rd Edition), London, 1942, p. 9. For comparison, the Indian area is roughly comparable to that of the U.S. in 1803 following the Louisiana Purchase. America's population at that time was approximately 5.5 million people.
very important resources then—as now—were rather generally lacking: a year-round sufficiency of water, and a climate fully hospitable to man. Among minerals utilized during High Tradition were deposits of iron, copper, zinc, lead, gold, saltpetre, nitre and borax. Crops, produced insofar as regional soil and climate allowed, included: rice, millet, wheat, barley, corn (introduced from America by the Portuguese) and pulses, as well as sugar cane, spices, tobacco, tea, coffee, indigo, vegetables for oil, cotton, jute and opium. Sericulture was important during Tradition, and a certain amount of organized timber and rubber production took place. Animals were raised, though interest in them centered more in their hides, milk, wool and motive power than in their flesh.

The central fact of agrarian India always has been the monsoon, which brings rain roughly through the months of June to October. November to March tends to be the most moderate period, and during these months a second, post-monsoon crop (frequently irrigated) is sewn and harvested. In April, May and June, land lies fallow under hot, dusty skies. During Tradition, the monsoon had a signal effect on transport and communication as well as on agriculture, for its seasonal floodings frequently prohibited transit across Hindustan. Coastal traffic also suffered heavily during the wet period, especially because of the

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6 Coal, mica, manganese, monazite and petroleum are among other natural resources which exist in some quantity in India. However, except for petroleum, which gained some importance during the 17th Century, these minerals were relatively little utilized during High Tradition.
prevalence of gales. Difficulty of movement during the rainy months thus tended to isolate village communities for more than one-quarter of the year; similarly, the monsoon militated against the establishment of large cities based more on resident than on transient populations. Restriction in the size of the market quite offset Traditional India's resource advantage, keeping the economy insular and backward. There were exceptions: fine textiles (cotton and silk), perfume, dye stuffs, gold ornaments and the like were produced according to guild regulation in establishments which sometimes employed a score or more workmen. But except in the case of easily-moved, non-perishable goods which could be carried inexpensively in national or international commerce, there was little development of regional or national marketing institutions. Instead, village communities jointly employed artisans to fabricate needed handicrafts out of locally-available resources. Extensive

7 Intercoastal traffic never has been easy in India, for not only does the monsoon intervene, the prevailing set of East Coast currents tends to choke harbor and river mouths with sand. Furthermore, India's total coastline, only about 3,500 miles long (compare with 24,816 miles of U.S. Eastern coastline) lacks a sufficiency of good harbors. The best natural anchorages are found at Karachi, Bombay, Goa, Madras and Calcutta.

8 Gadgil notes: "Most of the towns in India owed their existence to either of the three following reasons: (i) they were places of pilgrimage or sacred places of some sort; or (ii) they were the seat of a court, the capital of a province; or (iii) they were commercial depots, owing their importance to their peculiar position along trade routes. Of these reasons, the first two were by far the most important." He further notes the rapidity with which towns of the first two classes declined after the religious or courts with which they were associated went into decay. D.R. Gadgil, Industrial Evolution of India, Madras, 1924, pp. 7-9.
division of labor occurred within the village commercial sector, because occupation was largely determined by birth and caste.⁹

C. The Social Structure

Immobility was the prime characteristic of High Tradition's social institutions, and this was so for multiple reasons. Many of the religions of India stressed the meanness of temporal existence and adjured their communicants to live reflective rather than active lives. Geography reinforced this temper, for since physical isolation made difficult a standardized response to widespread social tensions, pressure for change tended to evaporate. India's hundreds of princely subdivisions acted to perpetuate this physical isolation. Similar inter-reinforcement resulted from ethnic and cultural diversity on the one hand, and linguistic disparity on the other. Religious institutions perhaps served to lessen the divergent strain; for loyalty to co-religionists typically was placed higher than loyalty to any political body beyond the village. But there was no dominant religious community: Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Parsis et cetera varied in relative strength from region to region. Though the Hindu community held an all-India majority in point of raw numbers, caste dissipated its sense of unity. Caste ordering was basically as follows: (1) Brahmin (priestly),

⁹ Among typical village artisans might be found the "carpenter, potter, washerman, blacksmith, goldsmith, weaver, dyer, tailor, shoemaker, and sweetmeat-maker." V. Anstey, op. cit., p. 104. See also D.R. Gadgil, op. cit., pp. 11-13.
(2) Kshatriya (warrior), (3) Vaisya (merchants, farmers), (4) Sudra (servants, menials). There was, however, an extraordinary proliferation of sub-castes, some of them based on ethnic similarity, regional contiguity, or political heritage, but others arising from the continued attempt of splinter groups to gain access to higher status through alliance with superior caste groups.\(^\text{10}\)

Insofar as they transcended ethnic, political or religious boundaries, the linguistic areas provided an additional divisive force within society. More than two hundred distinct dialects have been identified in India, the basic languages being sixteen.\(^\text{11}\) A third layer which in many instances paralleled the linguistic or religious was made up of those peoples who at one time had known a semblance of discrete identity and who, therefore, retained a particularist loyalty transcending that offered to India proper. Vestiges of sub-national consciousness still can be found among such groups as the Bengali, Gujarati, Khoja, Maharastrian, Parsi, Punjabi, Sikhs and Sindhi.

These social orderings have remained down to the present day, particularly because of the atomism and inertia of rural life. Pandit Nehru has stated that Hindu India's historic social structure was based on three concepts, none of which was directly tampered with by the

\(^{10}\) It is noteworthy that among Hindus, the merchant possessed rank equivalent to that of the peasant farmer. This was due in part, perhaps, to the religious functionalism which applied to all occupations: a functionalism which tended to limit initiative and the search for new methods of production or distribution. For an intensive analysis of the effect of Hinduism on the economic sector, see E.B. Mishra, Hinduism and Economic Growth (unpublished dissertation), London School of Economics, 1957.

\(^{11}\) Assamese, Bengali, Bihari, Gujarati, East and West Hindi, Hindustani, Hannada, Malayalam, Marathi, Panjabi, Pushtu, Sindhi, Tamil, Telegu and Urdu.
British during High Tradition. These included the autonomous village community governed by a *panchayat* (village council) which not only distributed the common land, but also collected taxes and formed the local judiciary; the idea of caste; and the joint [extended] family system.\(^\text{12}\) Though such a view perhaps may be called oversimplified, it nonetheless is suggestive of the isolation and constancy of life experienced by considerably over 90% of India's millions during High Tradition.\(^\text{13}\)

The English were anxious to impose certain Western concepts on a minority and therefore began training a minute functionary class of Anglicized Indians in towns such as Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. But the countryside was to retain its particular Indian cultures. Throughout all of rural India, there were posted only a few hundred Britishers, District Officers of the Indian Civil Service (I.C.S.). These men, trained according to the spirit of the Platonic Guardians, intervened little in local affairs except to secure domestic order and to maintain the tax flow at a constant rate. Thus, while change gradually came to be introduced to the handful who dwelt in Anglicized urban centers, the vast majority of India's people remained - even up to the present.


\(^{13}\) No accurate census of India was taken prior to 1881, at which time the figure given was 253.8 million. A partial census taken in 1872 listed 206.1 million souls. It has been estimated that India's total population during the late 16th Century was approximately 100 millions. V. Anstey, *op. cit.*, pp. 38 and 515.
generation - in a state of isolation and stability which exhibited only the smallest of changes from the social structuring of pre-British history.

D. Conclusion

The East India Company stemmed India's slide into decay by taking over a number of administrative and police functions from the decrepit Mughal Empire. Population levels were sure to respond in time. Insofar as population growth might bring pressure on historic output levels, crisis would result. For High Traditional India was rigidly circumscribed by both physiographic and percipient parameters.

In addition to bringing into question India's long-run ability to sustain itself materially, the mere fact of British presence introduced certain conditions of internal instability. "John" Company's intrusion determined that India's historic socio-economic structure was to be unbalanced through increased participation in world trade. Similarly, the training of Indians in English made certain the rise of socio-political disequilibrium. The impact of trade and language training remained marginal for generations; but since the extension of markets affected the physiographic parameters, and the English language, the percipient parameters, the Traditional system's basic postulate - India, diverse and disunited - was bound to experience some degree of alteration.

"John" Company attempted to ignore this fact. By restricting the scope of its non-economic intrusion and trying to govern primarily by techniques of "indirect rule", the East India Company helped to create
the following conditions presaging instability:

1) maintenance of vestiges of High Tradition's political system after its functional effectiveness had largely disappeared;

2) continued freezing of those percipient parameters affecting the average Indian's ability to sustain himself, due to British non-interference except in support of obsolescent methods and institutions of rule; and

3) creation of a class of Indians with a high potential for progress but which, because of inability to penetrate the upper reaches of the indigenous political structure, tended to identify itself more with British interests than with Indian well-being.

All of these conditions began to have critical effects as Britain's take-off, followed by advances in transport engineering, made increasing integration of India into the British imperial system both feasible and desirable. During Late Tradition, mutation of the physiographic parameters was to bring deepening poverty to the Indian countryside. At the same time, peace and public health would initiate an upward surge of population. Internal revolt resulted, and by the close of the 19th Century the interaction of resource shortage and population growth brought forth harrowing visitations of famine and plague.
Chapter 5.

CONCLUSIONS: PARAMETRIC CONSTRAINTS AND THE EFFECTS OF POWER CONSOLIDATION

In our three subject countries, the opening and closing of High Tradition approximately coincided with the following historic events. In Japan, creation of the Tokugawa shogunate (1615-16), and Shogun Yoshimune's anti-materialist Kyoho reforms (1716-35). In Turkey, the sack of Constantinople (1453), and the failure of the siege of Vienna (1683). In India, establishment of "John" Company factories near Bombay, Madras and Calcutta (by 1640), and "permanent settlement" of Bengali land rights (1793). Between these dates, institutional consolidation occurred as part of the process whereby newly dominant political elites moved to perpetuate their positions of power. In this chapter, we shall briefly examine how parametric constraints affected the derivation of High Tradition's institutional structures, and how the rule of the governments in question tended over time to introduce instability into societies hitherto in conditions of relatively stable equilibrium.

A. The Physiographic Parameters' Effect on...

i.) Derived Political Structures - Insularity basically determined the character of Tokugawa society. Not only was Japan's relative isolation a protection from the sort of boundary tension which harassed the Ottomans, it also made possible early integration of the various racial strains dwelling upon the islands. In addition, life on a remote archipelago implicitly unified the Japanese, producing a consciousness of
national identity even despite the centrifugal tendencies of feudalism.

The Ottomans could not turn to readily-defined geographic boundaries. They lived, moreover, in a region which was vulnerable both socially and politically. Sited at the land bridge between Europe, Asia and Africa, and having as their border the line of tangency between Christianity and Islam, the Ottomans remained perforce a quasi-martial society. But the fact of heterogeneity: ethnically, in religion, and in socio-political heritage; militated against the development of a community of interest based on lateral loyalty flows. Had this existed, the Ottomans might have established a Garrison State. But since the natural bases of unity did not apply, expansionism had to be utilized to induce a facsimile of native loyalty from political agents and slaves whose allegiance to the Padishah could be ultimately grounded on nothing more pervasive than booty and power.

The Mughal, and later the British, Empires in India resembled that of the Ottomans in that verticality again was stressed in political loyalty flows. Another factor, however, made India seem more like Japan than like Turkey, for politically and geographically the subcontinent possessed a natural isolation. At the same time, relatively easy access could be gained into India through its northern mountain passes. That there was no pressure of migratory peoples moving down towards Hindustan during the period of our interest gave to India's populace a sense of regional security roughly analogous to that felt by the Japanese down to the declining years of Tradition. But this security did not lead to any recognition of the unitary character of India as a whole. The
separate peoples residing within the subcontinent remained culturally and socially isolated from one another to a degree which possibly exceeded even that which was prevalent within the Ottoman confederacy.

**ii.) Derived Economic Structures** - It is not too great an over-simplification to state that geography was the ultimate determinant of Japan's early economic progress. Had the sea not provided an easy route for transport, no national market structure could have been developed. Furthermore, had it not been for the sea there would have been little need for economic integration. For integration occurred primarily as a consequence of population growth and shifting urban/rural ratios, and both these changes were direct results of that political centralization which itself followed from Japan's maritime character. Easy contrasts therefore can be drawn between Japan and India, for India was continental rather than maritime. Moreover, India was isolated at the local level during the monsoon season, and it did not experience the beneficent impact of political stability upon human longevity until - roughly - Late Tradition had begun.

Anatolian Turkey properly stands somewhere between the Japanese and Indian extremes. Its coastal regions and river valleys were partially integrated into a Mediterranean-Black Sea economic system which had its hub at Constantinope, but inland there was virtually no semblance of an intra-peninsular market structure. This may have been due in part to underpopulation or even to population decline, for it is posited by some that military service on the imperial frontiers began to decimate Anatolia's manpower not later than the early 17th Century. Be this as it may,
possibilities for market development were rather limited for purely physiographic reasons. Since the interior was neglected by the Turkish Sultans once they had become rulers of Byzantium, construction of the transport facilities needed to overcome Anatolia’s difficulties of terrain did not take place. Without such activity, development of an extensive Anatolian market structure was impossible.

Availability of natural resources further influenced the development of Japanese, Turkish and Indian economic institutions. As we have stressed, Japan was blessed with all the resources necessary for a high level of economic growth. They were present, moreover, in an archipelago of rather small size. India too was well-endowed, but it suffered from geographic spread, periodic flooding or water shortage, and extremes of climate. Nonetheless, the fact that India has been the seat of more than one highly-advanced civilization testifies to the adequacy of its resource base. Such cannot be said for Anatolia. Though the coastal regions often flourished, the interior typically was the home of tribal nomads. Water shortage, extreme shifts of temperature, and - with deforestation - infertility all served during the Traditional Stage to limit its economic development.

iii.) Derived Social Structures - The extent of the subcontinent precluded integration of India’s peoples, with the result that diversity governed in place of any standard structuring of society. Though the Ottoman Empire similarly spread over a vast expanse, the utilization of personal allegiances by a strong central government, and organization of subjects around religious cells, made it possible for Ottoman Governments (during the expansionist period) to insure that rough comparability of
institution and function was maintained throughout the imperial domains. The Mughals had attempted their organization of India in a fashion somewhat akin to that employed by the Ottomans. The pre-British breakdown of Mughal political control, resulting ultimately from attempted overextension of Empire, helped to enhance that Indian social diversity which "John" Company faced as it moved inland through Hindustan. And social diversity later was to become prominent in the Ottoman Empire as well, for as political control crumbled in face of the costs of unsuccessful military campaigns, centrifugal tendencies became more and more dominant within both the gaiur and Muslim segments of the Empire. Japan therefore was alone in its ability to establish and maintain standard social forms. Its isolation and small size made centralization of political control possible, and hardening of the social structure practicable.

B. The Freezing of the Percipient Parameters

We have noted that intellectual constraints deeply affected High Traditional Japan, Turkey and India. However, it must not be supposed that rigidity in the percipient parameters amounted to a constant function, operating in a standard fashion in all three cases.

In Japan, parametric rigidity was used as a means to the end of the good society. Knowledge itself was exploited by the bakufu in order to perpetuate Tokugawa's hegemony. Where politically desirable value was known to result from modification of the percipient parameters, the bakufu allowed change to occur. Deshima Island was kept open as a window on the world specifically for this purpose: after possibly
seditious materials were censored out, the residue of useful information brought in by the Chinese and the Dutch was transmitted to the shogunate. Thereafter it was disseminated among the populace and used to bring increased refinement of the High Traditional structure.

A basic weakness grew out of the limitation of free inquiry. As refinement of the Tokugawa system progressed, the areas in which new knowledge might be found to have possibly dangerous effects mounted. This helped to create that attitude of Japanese superiority to foreigners which became increasingly prevalent as institutional forms approached stylistic perfection. To use conventional terms, decreasing returns to scale set in. However, this must be distinguished from atrophy, that is, non-growth. Atrophy did not set into the Tokugawan system until after the close of High Tradition.

At a comparable period of development, India was deeply beset by atrophy. This was due to isolation, poverty, the otherworldly stress of Hindu value patterns, and the decline of Mughal socio-political institutions. It is noteworthy that by their entry into India, the British at first served to intensify the hold of rigidity. For by taking functional and administrative responsibilities unto themselves, they freed the Indian Princes from the necessity for creative action. Thus, a very significant difference existed in the Japanese and Indian experiences of High Tradition, for while Tokugawa did not so much court atrophy as gain it as the product of decreasing returns to scale, in India the Native Princes made little effort to break out of the slough of rigidity. It is true that the British slowly began training a class
of Anglicized Indians which was capable of making assaults on historic limitations of knowledge. But since this class was made alien to much of the indigenous culture, its presence posed no threat to either the Mughal political structure, or historic conditions of intellectual atrophy.

The Ottoman experience lies between those of Japan and Turkey. Since religious institutions were left in control of intellectual inquiry, and since they tended to be rigid due to their dependence upon revealed dogma, the possibility of atrophy was ever-present in the Ottoman Empire. However, political conditions necessitated a much more pragmatic approach at the governmental level; it led to increasing employment of foreign experts in military and administrative matters as the rate of imperial advance decreased. But in Turkey as Japan, decreasing returns to scale set in, for the failure to overcome rigidity at the local level made useful employment of foreign experts progressively more difficult as the innovations applied became increasingly complex.

C. Consolidation of Political Power as a Cause of Late Tradition's Disequilibrium

During the Traditional Stage, only two institutions of nation-wide scope generally exist. These are the political and the religious. Since the revelations upon which religions are founded usually are historic rather than contemporary, religions tend to be backward-looking. This leaves to the political sector prime responsibility for any conscious effort to move the society forward. But even if political
elite groups desire innovational change, they must subject this goal to the more immediate requirements of power creation and maintenance. In the chapters preceding, we have seen how consolidation of political power was undertaken in High Traditional Japan, Turkey and India. In Japan, a fully integrated Static State was sought after. A technique similar to the vertical-flow personal allegiance system of the Ottoman Empire was applied by "John" Company in India, though there it went under titles of paramountcy and indirect rule.

Internal disequilibrium was not the wish of any of the political elites examined. Nonetheless, instability was created - in a fundamental sense it was caused by political success. For while this success was measurable in terms of power creation, new increments of power did not reflect passage through the constraining walls of the percipient and physiographic parameters. On the contrary, power was the product of increasing exploitation of given resource bases. As resources began to go into short supply, instabilities arose. Crisis did not intrude in High Tradition. But during Late Tradition, disequilibrium in each of the three countries was to grow sufficiently strong to jeopardize the hegemony of Tradition's political elite groups.
Appendix I.1. (J.)

GLOSSARY OF RECURRING JAPANESE TERMS

Bakufu: administrative organ of the shogunate.

Bushido: "the way of the warrior".

Chihanj: han Governors.

Chonin: townsmen; commoners.

Daimyo: feudal magnate; Lord of a clan.

Fudai: clans showing an hereditary loyalty to the house of Tokugawa.

Han: fief.

Hansatsu: fiat money issued by the clans.

Karo: high officers of the clans.

Kobugattai: political federation of the Edo and Kyoto courts.

Koku: unit of measure: 1/10 ton shipping capacity; ca. 5 bushels.

Kuge: hereditary (pre-Tokugawa) court nobility.

Ronin: samurai whose bonds of fealty have been broken.

Samurai: feudal knights.

Sankin kotai: "alternate attendance". The system governing daimyo movements.

Shimpan: collaterals of the Tokugawa house.

Shogun: military dictator, theoretically subject to the Tenno.

Tairo: Regent.

Tenno: Emperor.

Tozama: those clans which had accepted Tokugawa rule only after defeat in civil wars ending 1615-16.
Appendix I.2.(T.)

GLOSSARY OF RECURRING TURKISH TERMS

Fetva: a decision on religious law.
Gaiur: non-Muslim.
Ghazi: roughly, 'Conqueror'.
Halk: folk; Turkish peoples.
Harsi millet: national culture.
Medrese: Islamic educational institution.
Millet: community; "nation".
Pasha: officer of high rank. A conferred title.
Seriat: Sacred Law.
Seyhül-Islam: Chief Jurisconsult of Islam.
Softa: Muslim religious student.
Tanzimat: Regulations.
Ulema: Islamic religious hierarchy.
Vatan: Fatherland.
Vilayet: Province.
Appendix I.3.(I.)

GLOSSARY OF RECURRING INDIAN TERMS

Bhadrolok: Anglo-educated Hindu Bengali.

Crore: 10,000,000.

Hartal: day of mourning.

Khadi (Khaddar): homespun.

Khilafat: Caliphate.

Lakh: 100,000.

Ryotwari: peasant cultivators.

Swadeshi: "of one's own country"; hence, support of indigenous goods.

Swaraj(ya): self-rule. Purna Swaraj meant to the Indians complete self-determination, including the right to opt out of the British Empire.

Zamindari: Tax farmers; landlords in areas of permanent settlement.
Part II

DISEQUILIBRIUM IN LATE TRADITION

Chapter 6. - The Japanese Example (mid-18th Century – 1862-3)
Chapter 7. - The Turkish Example (late 17th Century – 1908)
Chapter 8. - The Indian Example (late 18th Century – 1885)
Chapter 9. - Conclusions: Late Traditional Disequilibrium and Passage into the Transitional Period

In these chapters, disequilibrium caused by the impact of abroad is considered in addition to that induced by internal change. Efforts to respond to new conditions of instability are contrasted; and it is shown how movement out of the vicious circle of Traditional rise, magnificence and decline is made possible by the development of a technical capacity for change, and of political incentives for forward movement. Key variables for passage into Transition are shown to be: (a) creation of a modicum of modern capital, particularly in the transport sector; (b) training of a class able and eager to perform in enlarged domestic and foreign markets, and, to a degree, in capital-intensive industries as well; (c) surrender of some customary political postulate which had hitherto impeded an effective response to new problems, and which had prevented as well regular assimilation of modern-trained men into Tradition's political elite.

Beginning in Chapter 7, certain of the names included in the narrative are followed by an asterisk. This signifies that basic biographic data will be found infra, Appendix VI.
Chapter 6.

LATE TRADITION: THE JAPANESE EXAMPLE

A. The Impact of Abroad

Japanese intercourse with abroad was never entirely cut off, but as we have noted the period 1638-1720 was one of relatively complete isolation. Shogun Yoshimune's 1720 decree relaxing the restrictions on foreign book importation must, therefore, be included among the events signalling movement from High to Late Tradition. For the shogunate's new policy served in effect to widen the horizons of the Japanese people and thus assisted in bringing about gradual mutation of the percipient parameters.

Despite Yoshimune's edict, the direct impact of Western thought was small prior to the 19th Century. Both suspicion of Christianity, and the difficulties involved in translating Western documents, tended to inhibit the speed of absorption of European ideas. Thus it was the influence of China rather than the West which led to the first important manifestations of intellectual challenge to the Tokugawa Static State. Chinese influence on Japan had always existed in some degree: most of the neo-Chinese movements of which we here make note had roots well sunk even before a bakufu dictatorship had been created. But it was only during Late Tradition

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1 How imperfect was the knowledge of Rangakusha (Dutch Scholars) regarding the West is indicated by: G. Goodman, "A Translation of Otsuki Gentaku's Ransetsu Banwaku", Occasional Papers No. 3, Center for Japanese Studies, Univ. of Michigan, 1952, pp. 71-99. In the Otsuki work, which was prepared for publication in 1788, common Japanese misconceptions about Holland and the West are corrected.
that the implications of Chinese historiographic empiricism and ethical rationalism came to influence the course of politics, a fact which may be taken as both a result and a cause of shogunate debility.

The spirit of historical empiricism initially appeared in clan genealogies, preparation of which the shimpan houses themselves had been among the first to sponsor. The search for objective truth also led to a spate of inquiries into philology and archeology, and from these three strands was developed a renewed consciousness of the historic position of the Tenno. What generations of shogunate autocracy had obscured once again began to reassert itself. The Japanese began to realize that prior to the hegemony of Tokugawa, the semi-divine Emperor never had been forced into permanent social withdrawal.

Isolation of the Tenno was, of course, a prime tenet of Tokugawa policy. It was given legitimacy by the complex doctrinal forms of Japan's hyperorthodox religious bodies. But the formalism of State-supported orthodoxy itself came to be challenged as Chinese rationalist thought made inroads upon Japan. Dissenting Schools arose in opposition to the dictated elements of derived Confucianism and Buddhism. In the process, they stimulated a resurrection of that form of Shinto ancestriism which emphasizes a particularly intensive Emperor worship.² Resurrected Shinto, the

² Among the dissident Schools, those of Oyomei and shingaku were particularly significant. The Oyomei School was a transplant from China of the major precepts of Wang Yang-ming, a Ming Dynasty general and philosopher. Shingaku, which drew many followers from the merchant class, took its basic precepts from the Confucian ethic.
rationalist Schools, and historical empiricism complemented one another in providing an answer to the problems which came to beset Japan during Late Tradition. That answer was precisely this: the Tokugawa Shoguns were usurpers of imperial power who could not, by the very nature of things, properly govern Japan.

Just as Asia furnished the concepts for the first intellectual challenges to Tokugawa, it was the Mainland which provided the impetus for 18th and 19th Century efforts to open Japan. From about 1780, merchantmen and naval vessels of Russia's Asiatic Squadrons came to intrude with increasing frequency in the waters of North and Northeastern Japan. The flags of Western nations working up from Melanesia began to appear in the Southwest shortly after 1800. And from 1806 on, Japan was subjected to occasional armed raids, not only by Westerners, but also by the Chinese.

Japan's first response to foreign incursions was military. Coastal defenses were manned in force, and orders were sent down to resist all attempts to land. Such a policy soon proved untenable, for not only were the foreigners superior in military hardware, but the Japanese often displayed a marked absence of valor. Of necessity, the shogunate began to vacillate, moving slowly away from the demand for expulsion of the foreigner. Each new evidence of weakness in face of the enemy served to undermine the foundations of the Static State, for the full title of Japan's military dictators (Seii Tai Shogun: "Queller of Barbarians") was expressive of function. As the 19th Century progressed, opposition began to be raised against maintenance of the status quo even by members
of the shimpan clans. The core of High Tradition's power structure was beginning to dissolve. As it weakened, both the protagonists of the Tenno's cause and the unreconstructed tozama daimyo began to ready themselves for a struggle over the succession.

B. Change Internally Induced

The decline of the samurai as a military factor was attested by foreign raids on Japan early in the 19th Century. The causes of this weakness were three-fold. In the first place, foreigners possessed superior weapons; second, the Tokugawa Peace militated against perpetuation of the pre-Tokugawa samurai's warlike spirit. But neither of these conditions had so fundamental and pervasive an impact on warrior morale as sankin kotai, the growth of urban living and the monetization of the economy.

No hereditary military caste can maintain its vigor if its sense of raison d'etre and austere dedication are destroyed. Neither enforced indolence in a castle garrison, nor denigrating occupation with the han administration, could be expected to perpetuate the martial virtues. But these were not the only abrasives wearing down samurai morale; for as we have seen, from the beginning of High Tradition the shogunate encouraged conspicuous consumption at court as a means of draining off the funds of potential rivals. The ultimate effect of this policy was to corrupt the samurai class. Being frequently beset by ennui, it was particularly susceptible to wasteful diversion.

Because samurai prodigality exceeded the level desired by the bakufu, it periodically repeated the first Tokugawa Shogun's adjurations of
thrift and dedication, ordering the martial classes not to expose commoners to the evils of comfort and amusement. But such attempts invariably failed, for the demonstration effect of court life in Edo was considerably stronger than any admonitory tract.

Even before the end of High Tradition, it had become apparent that the bakufu's success in imposing immutable principles upon the political and social sectors tended to throw the economy out of balance. Changes in the character of demand, which the bakufu was increasingly unsuccessful in combating as income levels rose, called for changes in the supply of goods and services. Here, the restrictive practices imposed by the shogunate— isolation, obstruction of innovation and the like—could and did operate

3 In 1615, Ieyasu (the founder of the Tokugawa shogunate) set forth his Buke Hatto: "Law of the Military Houses". The first two and last of the thirteen articles order the military class to "devote themselves earnestly both to literature and arms", "to abstain from debauchery" and to practice frugality. G. B. Sansom, Japan: A Short Cultural History, New York, 1931, pp. 450-1. The full text of the Buke Hatto will be found in R. Tsunoda et al., Sources of the Japanese Tradition, New York, 1958, pp. 335ff.

4 This concern of the bakufu was not new in Late Tradition. For example, in 1680 regulations were passed which said in part: "In times of peace the people are apt to lead a luxurious life, and not labour so steadily as they would in hard times. Therefore, it is essential for the Government officials to see to it that the people never adopt luxurious methods of living." Quoted in E. Honjo, The Social and Economic History of Japan, Kyoto, 1935, p. 253.

The level of living which was thought proper for the commoner classes is indicated by a proclamation of 1649 which orders peasants to work long hours, abstain from luxuries (including rice), and divorce their wives if they show any propensity for amusement. cf.: G.B. Sansom, Japan: A Short Cultural History, p. 457.
as a significantly limiting factor. The resulting dislocation of the economy washed back, eventually immersing both the political and social structures of Late Traditional Japan in problems which could not be resolved within the Traditional context. But before this had occurred, extensive functional mutation took place. Noteworthy in this regard were changes in the feudal sector. For many of the han converted their economies from barter agrarianism, to monetized, quasi-mercantilist structures.

The commercialization of the han mirrored the decline of autarchic feudalism, and the growth of division of labor. This shift in market structure had some harsh consequences. Despite continuing efforts to improve technology and extend the land under cultivation, population grew apace and consumed each new increment to the available food supply. Grain prices tended to fall, pauperizing not only marginal peasants and chonin but even members of the ruling military classes. To reestablish their former living standards, impoverished daimyo began to cut both ways: they diminished rice stipends to the samurai while at the same time increasing the tithe burdens on the peasantry. But daimyate absorption of enlarged percentages of the rice crop was not enough; more heroic measures had to be initiated. Paper money (hansatsu) began to be issued on the fiefs. Clan monopolies and barriers against the importation of extra-han goods were established. Some daimyo even went so far as to encourage their

5 The monopoly of intra-han trade was an early practice of many daimyo. Representative products in which production and sale were limited to han-chartered agents included:
samurai to engage in the production of monopolized products. In great entrepot cities such as Osaka, choninization of the military classes was particularly apparent; for there nobles petitioned commoners for loans, and samurai and chonin became closely associated in han business ventures as clan factors, warehouse managers, and the like.

By the process of inversion, the venality and commercialization of Late Tradition's feudal institution added lustre to the merchant's life. Riches brought a desire for grace and style; the mere acquisition of wealth no longer satisfied the Tokugawa chonin. To a large degree, the commoner thus came to replace the noble as the patron of arts and scholarship.

Either as a former samurai still following the code of bushido, or as a

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<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>Representative Clan(s) Holding Internal Monopoly</th>
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<td>Crepe</td>
<td>Nakahama</td>
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<tr>
<td>Faience</td>
<td>Kaga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>Matsue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lacquer</td>
<td>Kaga, Saga (Hizen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>Hamada, Tosa, Tsuwan, Uwajima, Yamaguchi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porcelain</td>
<td>Owari, Saga (Hizen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pottery</td>
<td>Yonezawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship Building</td>
<td>Satsuma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk Weaving</td>
<td>Kozuke, Shimotsuke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wax</td>
<td>Tottori, Uwajima, Yamaguchi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sheldon notes that at least 53 han (ca. 1/5 of total) practiced monopoly of one or another sort during the 18th and 19th Centuries. By and large, the tozama clans were more prone to monopolize, and more successful in their efforts, than the fudai clans. C.D. Sheldon, op. cit., p. 32; E.H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, New York, 1946, pp. 59, 67; E. Honjo, op. cit., p. 203.

6 It has been estimated that by 1850, 15/16 of all daimyo and samurai property had been mortgaged to chonin. R.K. Reischauer, Japan: Government, Politics, New York, 1939, p. 55.

7 This occurred even though: "samurai were absolutely forbidden to engage in any kind of commerce." C.D. Sheldon, op. cit., p. 32.
new man frankly patterning his life on bushido's commoner analogue, chonindo, many of the rich merchants of Osaka, Kyoto, and to a lesser extent Edo came to exemplify those virtues of loyalty, benevolence, obedience and self-discipline which had so strongly bound the samurai of former centuries.

As the institutional structure changed due to the monetization of the economy, those whose occupations dovetailed with new conditions were in a position to reap great benefit. The chonin were of this breed; as merchants prospered they came more and more to nurture the spirit of classic greatness which had been Tokugawa's toward the end of High Tradition. Functionally, samurai bureaucrats also were in a position to benefit. But having become impoverished, and having been forced to participate in denigrating employment, the samurai tended to develop a feeling of deep hostility toward the Tokugawan polity. From the ranks of the marginal samurai were to spring many of the leading reformers of the 1860's. Some of these men would want to go forward, others to return to pre-Tokugawa regionalism. But no matter what the direction, they all demanded change.

C. Ferment and Reform at the Wane of Tradition

i.) The Social and Political Sectors - Japan's political and social structures remained legally unchanged throughout the declining years of

8 Bushido: "the way of the warrior", and chonindo: "the way of the townsman", are fairly recently derived terms used to describe the general tenor of a number of ethical codes. An example of a particular code much favored by chonin would be that of the school of shingaku. cf.: C. D. Sheldon, op. cit., Chapter VII; E. Honjo, op. cit., pp. 265-6; I. Nitobe, The Japanese Nation, New York, 1912, Chapter VI.
Late Tradition. Nonetheless, there was de facto relaxation of much of traditionalism, particularly in areas relating to suppression of the chonin caste. Instances in which merchants openly flaunted their disregard for convention were numerous. But samurai were chary of administering summary punishment, in part because the martial class had fallen virtually entirely into the hands of chonin creditors. Moreover, in the guise of financial advisors, merchants seemed near to gaining a recognized position in deliberations over clan policy.

The bakufu found the sale of samurai rank to chonin a continuing bane during the waning years of Tradition. Assumption of warrior status apparently could be realized almost at will by successful merchant families. And though Tokugawa Governments officially tried to discourage the practice, the bakufu itself was within the vanguard of institutional bodies breaking down old concepts of hereditarily-determined social position. For as its fear of foreign invasion grew, the bakufu came to use skill rather than status as the criterion for appointment to technical positions.

The ease with which Britain defeated China in the Opium War (1839-42) left the bakufu truly aghast. In awakening to danger, the shogunate was much in advance of overall Japanese opinion, for exclusionist policies still impeded the entry of fresh information into Japan as a whole. Of course, the Government could end exclusionism the better to inform and

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9 Sale of rank was not new. As early as 1713, the bakufu found it necessary to issue a decree prohibiting outright sale of samuraihood. Sheldon points out that the cost of purchase of rank fluctuated with the business cycle. C. D. Sheldon, op. cit., p. 105fn.
prepare the citizenry, but such a policy would bear the threat of panic while at the same time furnishing critics of Tokugawa with new grounds for opposition. Still more fundamentally, abandonment of isolation could not help but lead to eventual overthrow of Static State concepts. The alternatives, then, were equally unpalatable. On the one hand, the bakufu could bring Japan slowly through the shroud of ignorance, hoping thereby to unify and prepare the nation for resistance to the expected incursions of Barbarian Europeans. From a military point of view, this seemed more promising than the alternative of tightened internal security combined with renewed efforts to blind the island kingdom to the world. But while the latter choice promised little in the way of security from foreign intervention, it alone seemed able to guarantee maintenance - albeit possibly transient maintenance - of the historic Tokugawa polity. It was largely due to the efforts of Ii Kamon no Kami, for seven years the most powerful member of the bakufu Council of State, that as the decade of the '50's advanced, Governmental opinion became increasingly weighted toward negotiation with abroad.¹⁰

Paradoxically, tozama clansmen - who not only had maintained surreptitious contacts with abroad throughout the 17th-19th Centuries, but who also would have been sure to profit vis-à-vis the shogunate from any relaxation of exclusionism - at first chose to oppose the new direction of Tokugawa's leadership. Despite this, they pursued policies within their han military and economic establishments which showed a great readiness to

¹⁰ In 1850, Ii had become daimyo of Omi (an important fudai clan). By 1853, he had become the dominant influence in the bakufu Council of State.
Willingness to emulate the West also characterized the house of Mito which, with Kii and Owari, made up the three major branches of Tokugawa clan. Mito was, however, less closely identified with support of bakufu dictatorship than were the other two Tokugawa branches.\textsuperscript{11} Both because of this and because of the alienation of the political chieftain of Mito, Tokugawa Nariaki\textsuperscript{12}, the Mito clan stood against the balance of policies being pursued by the bakufu in the early 1850's. Prominent among shimpan and fudai supporters of Mito in its struggle with the Government were the daimyo of Owari, Echizen and Sendai.

1853 proved a year of crisis for Japan. Not only did Commodore Perry bring the foreign challenge to the mouth of Edo Bay,\textsuperscript{13} but the issue of succession to the Shogun's office arose to become a matter of concern and preoccupation for both the supporters and opponents of bakufu dictatorship. Iyesuda, heir presumptive to the dying Shogun, was both physically weak and childless. There was a demand, therefore, that he adopt an "eldest son" from amongst the membership of the Tokugawa houses. But the issue

\textsuperscript{11} Mito, Kii and Owari all traced their lineage directly back to Ieyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa shogunate. However, while Shoguns were elevated from the Kii and Owari houses, Mito leaders traditionally held rank as chief advisors to the Shogun and thus were disqualified from election. In addition, the Mito house motto was "Loyalty knows no blood relationship": a phrase which signified Mito's tendency to place loyalty to the Tenno above that accorded to the various Shoguns. Okuma Shigenobu, \textit{Fifty Years of New Japan} (Vol. I), London, 1910, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{12} Nariaki had been forced to abdicate as daimyo in 1844, ostensibly because he had allowed the melting-down of Buddhist temple bells so that they might be recast as cannon. It appears that this event was used to mask a long-standing desire on the bakufu's part, for Nariaki was tied by bias and marriage to the Imperial Court and was as well an outspoken critic of governmental policies.

\textsuperscript{13} The American naval squadron hove to off Uraga on 8 July 1853.
of the succession masked a more fundamental question, that of national policy. For the young man accepted by Iyesuda as his heir would bring eventual control over Japanese Governments to whichever coalition had sponsored the successful candidate in the first place.

Tokugawa Nariaki of Mito presented his fourth son for adoption. Since, as Hitotsubashi Keiki, this son already had been formally adopted into one of the Kii branches of the Tokugawa house, he displayed acceptable patents as a candidate for the Shogun's office. If Keiki were accepted as the heir presumptive, kobu gattai (federation of the Edo and Kyoto courts) would follow, thereby bringing to an end the dictatorship of the bakufu. Sequentially, the nation might revert to the regionalism of pre-Tokugawa Japan, for though national policy would be determined by a central governmental council made up of leaders drawn from daimyo and kuge ranks, each clan would possess virtually complete autonomy over its own internal affairs. For the goal of kobu gattai, the leading tozama clans threw their weight to Mito and supported Keiki's candidacy.

The alternative candidate, Iyemochi of Kii, had been proposed by Ii Kamon no Kami; and by 1858, it appeared that Ii's party of orthodox bakufu dictatorship, and unorthodox negotiation with abroad, had won the field. During the Summer of that year, Ii was made Tairo (Regent) by a dying Shogun Iyesuda, who further adopted Ii's protégé as heir presumptive. On 14 August 1858, Iyemochi - a thirteen year old boy - succeeded to the shogunate. But opposition to the bakufu did not decline with the apparent eclipse of the Mito candidacy, for shortly after Iyemochi's accession Ii overruled timid counsel and struck directly at the heart of the anti-shogunate faction. Tokugawa Nariaki of Mito, Hitotsubashi Keiki and the
daimyo of Owari all were placed under house arrest in Edo, while several dozen of their subordinates were imprisoned or executed. In addition, the daimyo of Owari, Echizen, Tosa and Uwajima were forced to abdicate as clan Lords.

By these acts, Ii assured not only his own eventual downfall but also that of the policy of moderation in foreign affairs, for the Tairo was felt to have combined arbitrary harshness towards his fellow countrymen with a wheedling dishonesty in reports of his negotiations with the Barbarian Powers. To trace external affairs, we now return once more to the year 1853 and follow foreign policy from the arrival of the American squadron down to the treaty negotiations which occurred during Summer and early Fall, 1858. The reader is reminded that the events set forth hereafter coincided with the period of Tokugawa Nariaki's leadership of an anti-bakufu coalition. Domestic intrigue and foreign policy interacted on one another, making the events of the '50's considerably more confused than can be indicated in this brief narrative... 14

The arrival of Perry's steam frigates at first caused tightened ranks among the Japanese, fearful as they were of invasion. Most clans expected the shogunate to refuse to negotiate with the Americans unless they obeyed orders and sailed to Nagasaki. However, the military dictatorship was in no position to act positively against the intruders: it was near financial bankruptcy and scarcely more solvent in spirit. Possibly to measure the temper of public opinion, all ranks of society from the Tenno down to the

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14 An extended analysis of this period can be found in J. H. Gubbins, The Progress of Japan: 1853-71, Oxford, 1911.
commoner were invited to address the shogunate with plans for future action. If the bakufu hoped to draw support to itself thereby, it was soon disabused. For while the majority opinion was that American demands for negotiation should be refused, few of the clans demonstrated any willingness to fall in behind the bakufu in order forcefully to accomplish this objective. Instead, intrigues against the Edo Government gained strength, for the bakufu's willingness to consult with the public was taken as an unmistakable sign of weakness. Never before had Tokugawa shogunates deigned to consult with either the Tenno or the people at large.

Ii, of course, did negotiate with Perry.\(^{15}\) Limited rights of access to Japan were granted to the United States (March 1854), Great Britain (October 1854), Russia (February 1855) and Holland (November 1855).\(^{16}\) But since repeated assurances were given to the Tenno and the daimyo that the agreements would hold only until strength had been generated for an all-out exclusion effort, the shogunate's policy of concession did little immediate damage to its prestige. Though disaffection toward bakufu dictatorship remained strong, there was as yet little effective opposition to Tokugawa per se: growing clan support of kobu gattai, rather than outright overthrow of the shogunate, attested as much. Furthermore, Western actions in China quieted the opponents of a consiliatory foreign policy, for it came to be widely rumored in 1856 that an Anglo-French-American

\(^{15}\)The foreign policy position set forth by Ii in 1853 is reproduced infra., Appendix II.1(J).

\(^{16}\)Rights granted under these and subsequent Treaty documents are presented infra., Appendix II.2.(J).
naval squadron had levelled Canton simply because of Chinese failure to comply with treaty regulations.

The warning implicit in the Canton bombardment was no more lost on Ii than on the daimyo of the Mito clique. Unlike his fellow countrymen, however, Ii knew that while the Americans had joined in at Canton only when provoked by Chinese shore batteries, the French and British had in fact initiated the attack. Therefore, Ii chose to acquiesce to American demands for a new treaty relationship before any Anglo-French squadron could sail on the Japanese coast with force its mission. The American Consul General, Townsend Harris, was accorded the very unusual favor of an audience with the Shogun on 7 December 1857. Out of this audience grew the provisions for a new Japanese-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce.

During the Spring of 1858, a representative of the bakufu was dispatched to Kyoto to try to gain imperial consent for the proposed treaty with America. However, its major provisions: expansion of the number of ports open to foreign vessels; approval for private (rather than governmentally-controlled) import-export transactions; and the granting of extraterritorial rights to a much augmented American diplomatic staff; were anathema both to the Tenno Komei, and to a large number of his courtiers. Among the daimyo ranks no such rigidity was expressed except by the prime intriguers for Keiki, the leaders of Mito\textsuperscript{17} and Owari. Such men as the daimyo of Satsuma expressed qualified disapproval to the treaty. On the other hand, a large group led by the daimyo of Echizen, Sendai, Awa and

\textsuperscript{17} Mito's position is set forth in Tokugawa Nariaki's "14 Points" (16 July 1858), infra., Appendix II.3.(J).
Mikawa showed a willingness to compromise with abroad which exceeded in liberality the position taken by the Ii faction itself. As a result, Ii felt justified in having the treaty approved (though not yet ratified by the Tenno) on 29 July 1858.\footnote{We may now return to conditions immediately following Ii's suppression of the Mito faction. During the succeeding months, the cry of Sonno Joi ("Revere the Emperor; Expel the Barbarian") began to be raised even by nobles who formerly had been satisfied by less radical demands for kobu gattai and partial conciliation of abroad. For not only had there been the suppression of the Mito faction, there had as well been a pointed bakufu snub of the Tenno when he demanded information on the new treaties.\footnote{Accord between Edo and Kyoto was reestablished after three months of negotiation (early 1859). The foreign treaties thereupon were approved by the Tenno as temporary expedients to be honored only until the Barbarians could be expelled. External affairs being resolved, Ii then began to arrange a marriage between the Shogun and a young sister of the Tenno, Princess Kazunomiya. This seemed a belated recognition of the principle of kobu gattai and as such might have given the bakufu considerable latitude in policy formation had it been initiated earlier. As it was, however, the Taiko's conciliatory gesture was decidedly tardy. On 24 March 1860, Ii was assassinated by a party of Mito samurai as he approached the gates of the}}  

\footnote{Similar treaties with other foreign powers were signed as follows: with Holland, 18 August; with Russia, 19 August; with Great Britain, 26 August; and with France, 7 October. \textit{infra}, Appendix II.2.(J).} \footnote{That the Tenno should have had the temerity to demand such information in the first place was indicative of the decline of shogunate authority. Until Ii asked for counsel in 1853, the Emperor habitually was left uninformed regarding Tokugawa's policy.}
Shogun's castle.

Though Tokugawa Nariaki of Mito outlived his ancient adversary by only six months, the end of bakufu dictatorship was only a matter of time. Councillors more malleable than had been Ii came into office within the Edo Government. The center of gravity of Japanese politics shifted out of the Tokugawan capital and returned to the palace of the Emperor. Tenno-loyalists sat at the foot of the throne, and the bakufu did not dare to intervene.

Leadership of the Kyoto clique at first fell to the political chieftain of Satsuma, who was then replaced by the leader of the Choshu clan. Choshu clan policy was, at this time, distinctly xenophobic and anti-pathetic to Tokugawan hegemony. It was while Choshu's fractious and reactionary clansmen dominated the political scene that the long epoch of Japanese Tradition closed. In 1862, Hitotsubashi Keiki and the ex-daimyo of Echizen were respectively appointed Tairo, and president of the bakufu Council of State. Moreover, in October 1862 the hostage provisions of sankin kotai were suspended, relaxation of shogunate protocol was approved, and the length of time during which the daimyo were required to be in attendance at Edo decreased. These were the penultimate blows to that postulate of static absolutism which had undergirded Tokugawan rule. The finishing stroke occurred in March 1863, at which time Shogun Iyemochi acquiesced to Imperial command and arrived in Kyoto - the first Tokugawa Shogun ever to condescend to appear below the Imperial Throne - to consult with the Tenno, the kuge and the daimyo on matters relating to the security of Japan.
ii.) The Economic Sector - Business decline haunted Japan during the waning years of Tradition. Though general causes of this decline were inherent in Static State rigidity, specific policies may be pointed to as immediate causes of the economy's malaise. The first of these was the 1831-43 attempt to break the chonin guilds. The objectives sought through enforcement of this policy were exemplary, for guild monopolies had the usual damaging effects on price structure, product improvement, and occupational patterns at large. Moreover, the shogunate wished to end the guilds' practices of transferring the incidence of governmental levies through incremental increases in commodity prices. But bakufu efforts to curb inflation through the destruction of the guilds were inequitable at the very least, for clan monopolies were not similarly attacked. Moreover, shogunate fiscal irresponsibility and currency debasement were fully as much a cause of instability as were price increases. And since these increases often followed chonin forced loans to the han or, after 1831, the bakufu itself, the wisdom of anti-guild measures must be questioned.

As a result of bakufu anti-monopoly practices, money-lending and speculation on commodity futures came to be areas not only of great profit potential, but also of little greater risk than obtained in more stable commercial endeavors. This was the case because de facto expropriation of established enterprises often occurred under the guise of anti-monopoly activity. Thus, the first result of business reform policies was to increase the latent instability of a commercial sector already hamstrung by supply inelasticity. The second was to dampen whatever incentive may have existed among the chonin to utilize Western capital-intensive techniques in the
production of goods. A third result of bakufu guild-destruction was to threaten the life of the cities, for abolition of chonin monopolies led to disruption of the entire transport system. By 1851, the transport bottleneck had become critical. Accordingly, guild associations were legalized once again, though on less liberal terms than hitherto. Business recovery followed, but before the commercial establishment had fully regained its health a new crisis was caused by the opening of Japan to foreign trade.

The introduction of foreign products in 1858 caused irreparable damage to the indigenous handicrafts sector, for except in luxury items Japanese producers were unable to complete in quality or price with imports from abroad. Furthermore, Japan suffered from the pirating of its gold supply. Foreign arbitragers, attracted by the differentials in gold:silver ratios in Japan (1:5) and abroad (1:15) drew down the residual quantity of gold on hand. The opening of Japan therefore led to unusual hardship for all chonin except those specializing in mining, transport, money-lending or the marketing of agricultural staples. Japan's Traditional commercial base was being destroyed. In its place, the forerunners of a modern economic system emerged.

Japanese interest in Western technology was at least as old as the "Dutch Studies". By 1808 at the latest, this interest led to the creation of a shogunate translations bureau designed to make Western technical documents available in Japanese. Under the impact of the Opium War, a

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modest expansionary phase in Western-style industry was initiated by the clans and the bakufu. The following enumeration gives some insight into the dimension of growth of Japan's infant leading sectors: metallurgy and shipbuilding. These areas were, of course, crucial. They related directly to military defense:

Saga (Hizen Clan)/(tozama) - began trying to produce Western-type arms in 1842. In 1850, set up a reverberatory furnace for casting iron cannon.

Satsuma Clan/(tozama) - began construction of Western-style sailing vessels capable of mounting cannon as early as 1845. Two iron smelters were constructed in 1852, a reverberatory furnace in 1853, a blast furnace in 1854. Experiments with cannon-boring equipment were carried on intensively between 1854 and 1865.

Choshu Clan/(tozama) - established an iron foundry in 1854, a shipyard in 1857.

Mito Clan/(fudai) - set up both an iron foundry and a gunsmithy in 1854, a reverberatory furnace and iron boring equipment in 1855, and a blast furnace in 1858.

Shogunate - built a reverberatory furnace in 1853, a Western-style shipyard at Uraga in 1854, an iron foundry in 1855, a dockyard at Nagasaki in 1856. During the 1860's more dockyards were set up; down into the Meiji era, the bakufu's ship construction complex remained the largest industrial enterprise in Japan. 21

Development of other sectors did not keep pace with that taking place in metallurgy and shipbuilding. Though a number of new mines were opened during the wane of Tradition, Western techniques were not applied until 1868. Some interest in European textile processes was indicated, but it came to nothing until after the movement into Transition. On the other hand, a number of the inhibiting policies passed down from early Tokugawa

Governments were modified. In 1853, restrictions on arms development and ship construction was formally removed. The bakufu also supported the creation of Western-style military formations, and sponsored a school for the study of Western science. Dutch and French military equipment and technical specialists were brought to Japan, while young men were sent abroad to study Western ship construction. Thus Japan developed, during the waning days of Tradition, the nucleus of a modern industrial sector. Personnel and plant existed, though in microcosm. Insofar as the percipient parameters applied, the long drive out of stagnant circularity technically had now become possible.

D. Conclusion

Though Commodore Perry's Four Black Ships provided a catalytic agent in 1853, it appears that the days in which the shogunate would have been able to enforce static absolutism were in any case numbered. Agricultural staples were increasingly in short supply. The rigid institutional structures of High Tradition were no longer functionally relevant. And as autarchic feudalism gave way to a monetized economy: urban-based and employing division of labor; the shogunate lost its ability to respond to change without in the process damaging the polity established in 1615.

High Tradition's Static State had represented an attempt to freeze major physiographic and percipient parameters without in the process

22 This school grew to become the Imperial University of Tokyo.
destroying the entire dynamic of Japanese society. Even before the intrusion of abroad, unbalanced growth had resulted. Size of population, approximately 18 million at the beginning of High Tradition, had risen to a figure between 26 and 30 millions by the period's end. Cities had boomed, and particularly within their boundaries, occupational activities had become increasingly specialized.

Shifts in population size, in occupational structure and in urban/rural ratios, increased the interdependence of the city and the countryside, but legal restrictions imposed for purposes of political control limited Japan's capacity to adjust to these changes. Having reached the highest pinnacle of civilization capable of being sustained by the Tokugawa


24 "...no less than a dozen ports, posting stations and castle towns attained populations of between 20,000 and 60,000 before 1700." T. C. Smith, op. cit., pp. 13-14. At the beginning of the 18th Century, Edo had a population of 750,000 - 1,000,000, and Kyoto, a population of 350,986. Osaka's population, something over 35,000, had the following occupational breakdown during the Shotoku Era (1711-1715):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factors</td>
<td>5,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brokers</td>
<td>8,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various Merchants</td>
<td>2,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various Workmen</td>
<td>9,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purveyors to Castellans</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purveyors to Various Clans</td>
<td>483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>27,710</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cf.: A. F. Thomas and Soji Koyama, op. cit., p. 92; N.S. Smith, op. cit., pp. 36-7 (Vol. I.).
system, a decline set in. But for the foreign threat, this gradual down-
swing might have continued unchecked until, through disruption of Japanese 
social processes, the pressures of population on resource levels had been 
fully alleviated.

The impact of abroad accelerated and altered the endogenous forces 
at work in Japanese society. Late Traditional shogunates found that 
problems of external security as well as internal pressure necessitated 
increasing relaxation of the principle of exclusionism. The translations 
bureau, the training of Japanese in Western technology, and other acts 
surrendering some modicum of Japanese isolation all were designed to relieve 
Japan of the limits imposed by the percipient parameters so that the bakufu's 
ability to respond to situations threatening the maintenance of the 
Tokugawan hegemony might be improved. But still further modification of 
the Traditional system necessarily followed on the relaxation of exclusion-
ism, for within the Tokugawa matrix there was no provision made for regular 
absorption of technical experts into the ruling elite. The bakufu eventually 
resolved this problem by letting skill rather than status govern appoint-
ments to the specialist divisions of the shogunate bureaucracy. This put 
a clear premium on functional capacity and thereby threatened the concept-
ual foundations of Tradition's governing postulate: static absolutism 
interpreted by wise (not necessarily technically skilled) rulers. No more 
fundamental shift in the society's effective values could have occurred.

By its various reforms during the wane of Tradition, the shogunate 
provided Japan with the necessary prerequisites for social and economic 
development. However, in so doing the bakufu lost its dominance over 
political society. The implications of these two conditions were ominous;
for while the external threat to Japan could not be gainsaid, nor the possibility of internal breakdown overlooked, the drift of domestic politics tended to divert attention from the nature of the crisis to matters of political factionalism. Would Ii Kamon no Kami's earlier efforts to synthesize old and new be restored, or would xenophobic reaction dominate the political scene? How little mutation of social and economic institutions could be gotten away with? Questions of this nature distracted the Kyoto junto, for a time obscuring consideration of the central fact of the period. That central fact was that future well-being necessitated an end to every wasteful aspect of Traditional society so that Japan's shortage of resources, critical when measured against population increase, might begin to be brought under control.
A. The Impact of Abroad

Decline in the rate of expansion was followed during Late Tradition by an increasing incidence of Ottoman military defeats. Conquest no longer stood as the major objective; it had been replaced by the mission of holding fast. But the margins of empire nonetheless began to be chewed away, and as this happened domestic crisis became endemic.

The impact of the Christian powers was not limited to the field of battle. Nor were their military successes so immediately injurious to the Ottoman system as were the rights granted to the Great Powers under Instruments of Capitulation. As early as 1535, extra-territorial privileges had been offered to France in exchange for a Franco-Ottoman alliance against the Habsburg Empire. Subsequently, similar rights were extended to other European countries.

The effects of Capitulations appear to have been advantageous to the Ottomans throughout High Tradition. Not only were they useful for diplomatic negotiation, but the granting of extraordinary privileges to foreign residents of the Empire led to commercial development which might not otherwise have been achieved. Over the long run, however, the Capitulations clearly proved enfeebling. Socio-legal freedom was bestowed on private individuals and even on entire foreign communities domiciled within the imperial borders. Foreigners' Consuls exercised exclusive jurisdiction over their own nationals; and in cases of litigation between Ottomans and
Capitulary legatees, the latters' Consuls possessed a virtual veto power over the findings of Muslim courts. The Capitulations also gave to foreigners important commercial advantages, for European companies were allowed to carry on business with a minimum of Turkish interference and control. Moreover, tax privileges granted under capitulatory documents in effect made the non-citizen and his business favored wards of the Ottoman Government.¹

Damaging though the economic provisions of Capitulations came to be, still greater injury was caused by the Capitulations' influence on Muslim-gaiur relations. The system put non-Muslims in touch with their European co-religionists, and during the period of Empire contraction the gaiur

¹ The following list of commercial privileges enjoyed by foreigners was compiled in 1919 by the Ottoman Minister of Finance and appears in E.G. Mears, op. cit., p. 444fn.

"Particulars of Economic Capitulations"

"(1) Exemption from Djizizh & Kharaj (personal tribute paid by non-Muslim subjects of Islam) and exemption from general taxes.

"(2) Customs duties not exceeding the fixed rate; exemption from taxes such as excise, slaughter fees, Bidaat (not provided by the Canon Law), export duty, toll and yasakkol (night watchman tax).

"(3) Abolition of monopolies. [sic]

"Under the circumstances the Foreigners are liable only for the following taxes:

"(a) Taxes provided by Common Law such as tithe and sheep taxes;

"(b) Taxes for landed properties;

"(c) Customs duties not exceeding the fixed rates;

"(d) Taxes for special services such as lighthouse and cleaning.

"They are exempted even from principal taxes such as the profits tax and the road tax."
found the songs of other loyalties beginning to sound sweet indeed. It is virtually impossible to distinguish between those acts of intervention into the Empire which the European Great Powers undertook during Late Tradition in order to protect Capitulatory rights of the Christian and Jewish minority populations, and those acts which were initiated solely to weaken the Ottoman regime. Even had the Europeans felt no desire to split the Empire, it is obvious that their extra-territorial privileges alone would have intensified gaiur divisive tendencies. For Europeans received the constant protection of the Padishah, while the gaiur—especially during Late Tradition—found that as a general rule, if any Ottoman community was to be raided by Muslim spoilsmen, a gaiur community would be ravaged before that of a Muslim congregation.

Though the Great Powers' subversive intent cannot be accurately plotted, this much is sure: the complicity of Europeans proved an inestimable boon to gaiur (and, later, Young Turk) revolutionaries in the Balkans. Among the rights granted foreigners resident in the Empire were those permitting the establishment of entirely uncontrolled Great Power post offices, and exempting foreigners and their property from Ottoman police search. These privileges came more and more to be made available to revolutionaries by interested foreign agents. Without such protection from imperial spies, the Greek War of Independence might not have been successfully mounted early in the 19th Century. And had there been no Greek revolt, it is doubtful that Ottoman reformers would have gained sufficient strength to check temporarily the internal rot besetting Late Traditional society and government.
B. Change Internally Induced

During Late Tradition, the Sultanate achieved its greatest magnificence. The Imperial Court, axis of Ottoman decay, diverted material and human treasure from governmental tasks to private pleasure. Luxurious dalliance in the seraglio; segregation and imprisonment of presumptive rulers in a harem "Cage"; imperial policy established to appease personal favorites: these and similar manifestations of decadent opulence existed side by side with crisis bred of institutional atrophy and decay.

Corruption and malfeasance at the Padishah's court coexisted with a growing sense of atomism in the society at large. The gaiur found their rulers on the defensive against Christendom. Not wholly integrated into the Ottoman system, subjected to an increasing degree of pressure from Islam, they gave evidence of a deepening antipathy toward all things Ottoman. Such disaffection exacerbated Muslim feelings, for not only was Muslim blood being drained on the frontier to protect the homeland of all the millets, it was also noted that gaiur merchants and community leaders often enjoyed material comforts greatly in excess of those of the Islamic community.² Envy and misunderstanding led both sides to initiate raids and massacres. Out of religious intolerance there grew a steady deterioration of the social confederacy on which Ottoman rule was based.

² Foreign business and diplomatic establishments tended to favor Greek-Christian or Westernized-Jewish Ottomans in their business dealings with the indigenous peoples. This patronage led to virtual gaiur monopoly of many of the lucrative occupations servicing Capitulatory legates. Moreover, as the agents of Europeans, many gaiur claimed European citizenship as a means of avoiding Ottoman laws and taxes.
Intolerance was not, however, confined to the areas of Muslim-gaiur interaction, for within Islam itself the orthodox hierarchy was subjected to growing challenge from dissenter offshoots. In a number of instances, dissenting orders - puritanical and reactionary in certain areas of social conduct, while at the same time mystic and diffuse in matters of religion - came to be associated with particular occupational groups. This gave non-orthodox religious leaders an unusual degree of social control. The most infamous of occupational-religious ties was that binding the Janissaries to the Bektasi Order of Dervishes. The Janissaries, originally an elite corps of slave infantrymen, had degenerated by Late Tradition into a self-perpetuating phalanx of two to three hundred thousand men. Structurally, the corps resembled in some aspects a rabble, and in others a trade union.

During the period of Late Traditional decline, the Janissaries lost all value as a fighting force against the Europeans, for they refused to allow their tactics and hardware to be modernized. Nonetheless, in Constantinople the Janissaries formed a praetorian guard of the lowest sort. Periodically revolting against unpopular Governmental edicts, the Janissaries - plus such religious reactionaries as were allied - blocked myriad attempts at reform. But during the Greek War of Independence (1821-29) the erstwhile elite corps over-extended itself, for it chose to oppose the training of modern artillery formations by Prussian advisors. The ruling elite

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3 supra, p.48 fn. 10.

4 See J. K. Birge, The Bektashi Order of Dervishes, London, 1937, for a description of this, the most popular of the tarikats (mystic lodges).
was forced to make a decision: either the Janissaries could be appeased, in which case gaiur nationalists and their Great Power allies could be expected to overrun Constantinople and partition European Turkey amongst themselves; or the Janissaries could be destroyed. Even those members of the Muslim hierarchy who were antagonistic to modernization became convinced that the Janissaries had to be cut away from their stranglehold on the Government. This was done in 1826, when the new-style artillerists shot down the Janissaries in barracks.

The destruction of the Janissary Corps finally made possible an integrated reform effort throughout the Ottoman Empire. We shall discuss this movement in the section following. But it must be stressed in advance that the Islamic hierarchy's support of reform efforts did not represent a new interest in progress. On the contrary, the religious institution - whose power over the populace increased proportionately with the decline of the Imperial Government - supported modification of the Imperial system only in order to maintain the integrity of the Islamic State. Reform was not the objective. The objective was to buy time and hold on to the essentials of the Traditional structure.

C. Ferment and Reform at the Wane of Tradition

i.) The Social and Political Sectors - The reformist spirit of 19th Century Ottoman Governments was perhaps best expressed by the order handed down in the name of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-39) which decreed that henceforward all subjects of the Empire were to wear the Graeco-Venetian fez, rather than headdresses distinguishing separate religious affiliations.
Three ends were thus realized: (1) the possibility of indiscriminant Muslim attacks being made against individual gaiur was greatly lessened; (2) the Imperial will that all Ottomans be treated equally was made known; and (3) the Great Powers' claimed right of interference within the Empire in order to protect the gaiur millets was somewhat circumscribed.

The adoption of the fez put the finishing touch on Mahmud's achievement, which had begun with the destruction of the Janissary Corps and had gone on to include creation of a national gendarmerie to curb internal disorder, establishment of an inceptive Ottoman extractive and armaments sector, and development of a modicum of improvement in the Empire's educational, communications and public health facilities. Each of these acts was the product of Western assistance, for Mahmud employed European advisors in order to establish modern administrative bureaus in parallel with the traditional Ottoman bodies.

Impressive as Mahmud's reforms were it was the generation which followed which brought about the most striking progress, for the years of Tanzimat ("Regulations") were a time of renaissance in secular power. Tanzimat had been made possible by the Gülhane Decree of November 1839, which ordained the establishment of a Council of Judicial Ordinances with the authority to make Law subject only to the Sultan's personal veto. As a result of this decree, a Commercial Code based on the Code Napoléon, and Criminal and Maritime Codes also following the French, all were promulgated by 1864. Moreover, citizens' equality and the inviolability of private property were specifically affirmed; tax farming was ended (in theory); and the principle of salary payments for all imperial officials was established.
as a means of ending corruption in government.

Modernization of the Law did not, however, extend to those areas which related directly to Islam. On the contrary, between 1868 and 1874, recodification of ancient statute was undertaken so that the ulema (religious hierarchy) might be strengthened through a more precise delineation of Canon Law. This reaffirmation of Islam was the visible deficiency of Tanzimat: despite new jurisdiction in areas relatively peripheral to conventional Muslim life, the Ottoman peoples still were to follow religious direction in every-day activities. But in fact, the rejuvenation of the Seriat (Sacred Law) was no more than a manifestation of Tanzimat's still greater weakness. Even though the Gdhlane Decree specifically ordered punishment for all who might try to obstruct reform, nothing was done to limit the power of reactionaries who used Koranic dichta as a means of effectively circumventing this regulation.

A profligate Sultan, Abdflaziz, ascended the throne in 1861. In company with Islam-oriented reactionaries, he proceeded to exhaust the resources of the Treasury. In 1875, at a time when Bulgarian and Serb revolts were under way, the Government defaulted interest payments on its 200 million Pound Sterling foreign debt. Extensive foreign intervention appeared imminent. For this reason, a revolutionary clique including the Grant Vizier and high military and civil officials organized a coup d'état

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5 It should be noted that recodification of the Seriat occurred during Abdflaziz' reign.
which led, in August 1876, to the accession of Abdülhamid II. 6

The new Sultan's first major act seemed to resuscitate the spirit of Tanzimat. On 10 December 1876, while a council of Great Power ambassadors was engaged in drawing up a list of political changes required of the Ottoman Government, Abdülhamid promulgated a Constitution modelled on Western precedent. 7 Had the new Constitution been put into full operation, our criterion for judging the end of the Empire's Traditional Stage would have been realized, for a channel would have been provided allowing regular absorption into the elite of men hitherto denied preference because of social, occupational or regional background. But Abdülhamid prorogued the Parliament in 1878, and for the next 30 years the Empire was ruled by an autocrat. During this period, the Sultan showed no interest in bettering the condition of non-Muslims. Instead, he preached religious reaction and attempted to establish an Atlantic to Pacific Pan-Islamic State unifying the entire Community of True Believers.

6 A number of the members of the 1876 revolutionary clique formerly had been members of the secret Society of New Ottomans (1865-72). G. L. Lewis says of the Society: "its members numbered only 245, but most of them were men of influence. The prime mover was the great writer and patriot Namik Kemal. Two princes, the future Sultans Murad V and Abdülhamid II, were among those who followed its discussions." G. L. Lewis, Turkey, New York, 1955, p. 36.

7 The most important provisions of the 1876 Constitution guaranteed: a) security of personal life and property; b) administration of justice by judges on life tenure; c) abolition of torture; d) freedom of the Press; e) equality of all Ottoman subjects; f) freedom of worship for all, though Islam was to remain the official State religion; g) eligibility of all citizens for public office. A bicameral Legislature was to be established, with members of the Chamber of Deputies indirectly elected by the populace and members of the Senate appointed by the Sultan. For an analysis of the Constitution and its subsequent amendments, cf.: G. Jäschke, "Die Entwicklung des osmanischen Verfassungsstaates von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart", Die Welt des Islams, V (1917), pp. 5-56.
Dreams of Pan-Islam were frivolous; when made the object of Imperial design, they became pure folly. For not only would the Great Powers refuse to allow the feckless Ottomans to expand, but non-Muslim members of the Empire were totally opposed to any program engangering their own community interests. Moreover, even those Muslim Ottomans on whose attitudes future hopes rested had become infected by a virus of "cosmopolitanism" which made them immune to the exhortations of parochial Islam. Within the imperial training schools, where young civil servants studied Western techniques under European tutelage, sullen disobedience followed official demands that no Western documents be read excepting those which pertained directly to competence in professional specialities. Yet censorship seemed essential to orthodox proponents of Pan-Islam, for it was felt that non-Muslim thought had a corrupting influence on the potential leaders of Ottoman renaissance. Events proved this assumption entirely correct.

In 1889, a revolutionary cell modelled on the Italian Carbonari was formed at the Military Medical School (Constantinople). Membership soon was extended to students and staff of the Veterinary School, the Civil (Administrative) College, the Naval Academy, the Artillery and Engineering school, and also to employees of various governmental ministries. In 1891 or 1892, the revolutionary society (later to become famous as İttihat ve Terakki: "Union and Progress") was exposed to the police. Up to twenty of

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its members were arrested, while many of their fellow conspirators escaped to Paris or London.\(^9\) At home, clandestine activity continued nonetheless, for the organization of Union and Progress membership into small, semi-autonomous units meant that exposure of one cell did not endanger the entire society.

During the summer of 1896, the society made an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow Abdülhamid. Though the failure of the coup did not destroy the integrity of the Constantinope movement, those members who were able to remain unexposed in the capital were badly shaken. For this reason, the major center of revolutionary activity moved from the Empire to Paris and Geneva, where Ahmet Riza Bey\(^*\) and Murat Bey\(^*\) competed for the support of exiled Ottomans.\(^10\) In the summer of 1897, an agent of Abdülhamid induced Murat to repair to Constantinope. His defection cast a pall over the entire émigré community. Only when the Sultan's brother-in-law, Damat Mahmut Paşa, escaped to France along with two sons in January 1900 did the exile community regain the ebullience lost through Murat's treason.

After the Paşa's death in 1903, his son Prince Sabahattin\(^*\) tried to

\(^9\) A large percentage of these émigrés probably would have tried to go to the West eventually, whether or not their revolutionary activity had become known to the police. Study in European capitals was highly prized by Turkish professionals throughout the latter half of the 19th Century.

\(^10\) Murat Bey advocated violent overthrow of Abdülhamid, restitution of the Constitution of 1876, Ottomanization of the Empire, but as well, Pan-Islam. Ahmet Riza Bey opposed most of this platform, calling instead for reforms incorporating the West's technological progress, and legal equality for all Ottomans. "Order and Progress" was the motto of Ahmet Riza Bey's movement; the title indicates the generally conservative tendency of this group of exiles.
establish an all-Ottoman confederative organization including representatives of the gaiur millets as well as Muslim Turks. This group, the "League for Administrative Decentralization and Private Initiative", soon broke with Riza Bey's clique, for the latter had by now become proto-nationalist and would not accept Sabahattin's proposal that true equality and extensive autonomy be invested in each of the millets. For this reason, the effectiveness of the exile movement remained small throughout the first years of the new century. Factionalism dissipated the efforts of the exiles, and only when a new movement based on discipline and internal loyalty was established in the Levant did the forces opposing Abdülhamid regain the initiative lost in 1896.

In October 1906, a small group of Turkish army officers stationed at Damascus formed a revolutionary society called Vatan ("Fatherland"). Among Vatan's original membership was a young officer who, though only a year out of the General Staff Academy at Constantinople, already was carried on police files for seditious activity. This young Captain was Mustafa Kemal, later called Atatürk.

The Vatan movement grew rapidly through the Fall, drawing into its ranks officers of the 5th Army Corps and civil officials stationed in or near Damascus, Jaffa and Jerusalem. However, the region did not offer sufficient scope for Ottoman revolutionism, so the decision was taken to establish additional Vatan cells nearer the capital at Salonika. Kemal went

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11 Even the society's name was illegal. Such words as 'nation', 'fatherland', 'parliament' were outlawed for their obvious emotive appeal.
to Macedonia for this purpose, and in secret meetings recruited members of
the 3rd Army Corps and the civil administration of the vilavet (province).
New Union and Progress cells were being formed independently at the same time
among 3rd Corps units. When members of Kemal's Vatan ve Hürriyet (the word
'Liberty' had been added to the initial 'Fatherland') came in touch with
their counterparts in the Union and Progress movement during 1907, the two
groups combined to form a small, insular, yet powerful revolutionary confed-
eration.

The general growth of revolutionism in the military coincided with a
series of Army mutinies which, for the most part, reflected soldierly frus-
tration at the tardiness and inefficiency of the Army's Finance and Quarter-
master sections, rather than direct opposition to Abdülhamid. During 1907,
the civilian population of Anatolia also began to revolt against administra-
tive malfeasance; and in October, public riots occurred in Constantinope
itself. Probably for this reason, the unrest which persisted in Macedonia
through the Winter and Spring of 1908 was given relatively scant attention
by the capital. It was recognized that there was no shortage of reasons for
popular disaffection; still, since the Government had been able to quiet pub-
lic opposition in the past, foreign as well as Muslim observers assumed that
the Macedonian problem would become resolved in time.

Troubles in the European vilayets were, however, more critical than
had been former instances of civil and military unrest. The population was
exceedingly heterodox and included approximately equal numbers of Muslims
and gajur. Furthermore, ever since the Congress of Berlin (1878) had in
effect ceded Bosnia-Herzegovina and the sanjaq of Novibazir to Austria,
Great Power rivalry for control of the Balkans had intensified. In 1902, the Great Powers had presented a joint ultimatum to the Ottomans which demanded Macedonian fiscal reform and amelioration of the Christians' status. At the same time, foreign provocateurs attempted to nullify such good results as might come from the ultimatum by stirring up separatism and carrying out seditious acts. The state of crisis intensified during the next few years. It was brought to a head by an Austrian action taken early in 1908.

On 27 January 1908, Austria announced that it planned to extend its Balkan rail net from Sarajevo, through Novibazir and down to Salonika. Italy, France and Russia all vehemently opposed the project, from which Germany specifically disassociated itself. Anglo-Russian differences over the Middle East were hastily removed, for it appeared that war might break out at any moment. However, war rumblings were not the sole cause of the Young Turk revolt of July 1908, for amongst the 3rd Corps conspirators there was growing fear that their revolutionary movement was about to be exposed.

When the revolt began in July "like a crash of innocuous thunder", no one could predict its eventual course. The Young Turks had expected that bloody fighting and an integrated effort of all revolutionary cells would be required. As it happened, there was no central command for revolt. Instead, a few officers disappeared into the hills to avoid interrogation by the secret police. Şemsi Paşa, who had been despatched to Salonika to quell the dissident movement, was shot down in the street at Monastir on 7 July. One military unit after another then came out in favor of restitution of the

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Constitution; and when Abdüllhamid discovered that the supposedly loyal Asia Minor troops which he had ordered to Salonika similarly favored a return to Parliamentary rule, he suddenly acquiesced. On 24 July, after three decades of autocratic rule, the Ottoman Empire was declared once more to be a constitutional monarchy.

The reimposition of the 1876 Constitution proved the closing act of Tradition. Though the Sultan retained formal executive authority, his powers were circumscribed by the Legislature. In the application of the parliamentary system, and in the gradually rising prestige of Union and Progress leadership, there were evidenced the development of new techniques for absorbing able men into the Imperial hierarchy. The vertical mobility which had been characteristic of early Turkish nomadism once more was possible - at least for Muslims. If gaiur loyalty could be rekindled, and decline in the economic sector reversed, the Ottoman Empire might yet regain vitality.

ii.) The Economic Sector - The Turkish economy remained in a state of decline throughout Late Tradition. Stagnation and sequential reduction of population levels was a prime cause of this condition, for domestic demand gradually diminished. The Empire's share in world markets for finished goods also decreased. This was due in part to the shift of the center of international trade from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, for this shift placed the Imperial domains in a backwater. More important, however, was the force of Islam; by opposing change, religious institutions made it

13 supra, p.109, fn. 7.
increasingly difficult for the Ottomans to compete successfully with Western European countries. It will be remembered in this regard that while the 17th Century marked the rise of critical disequilibrium in the Ottoman Empire, among the Christian powers it signalled the beginning of the scientific and technological revolutions.

The economic policies of Late Traditional Ottoman Governments increased the magnitude of the crisis facing the Traditional handicrafts sectors, for from the beginning of the period, former programs designed to expand the urban industrial sector went into discard. Protection of domestic industry was given up, and Capitulatory legatees were allowed to import consumer items on increasingly favorable terms. The object of this shift was to build up the Empire's position as a raw material exporter in order to gain foreign exchange. In a short-run sense the policy was successful, but as Ottoman business failures increased, capital shortages began to damage not only the economy but also the Empire's military capacity.

Such capital creation as took place in Anatolia and the Straits area during the wane of Tradition was largely governmental and for a quasi-military purpose, or else the product of foreign investment under the Capitulations. German engineers finished laying the last of the Anatolian sections of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway in 1896. Its completion opened new markets to the extractive sector and led to the application of capital-intensive techniques, particularly in coal mining. Concurrently, a number of projects designed to bring about the modernization of Imperial shipyards

and arsenals were initiated. Though the extent of these innovations was small when measured against the total size of the Empire, they provided a kernal from which subsequent improvement of the economy might spring. This was true particularly because Western specialists were constantly engaged in rationalization of administrative procedures and managerial techniques in the public sector, and because increasingly heavy stress was placed on modern technical training for men newly recruited into the military and civil bureaucracy.

As the Imperial borders shrank, the Ottomans lost strategic resources, industrial plants, and their most aggressive gaiur commercial classes. This fact largely balanced out Late Tradition's development of a modernist group within the Muslim population, for it meant that the Empire's ability to respond effectively against foreign pressures was increasingly compromised. Thus, though there were to be found among the Young Turk Modernists both a taste for industrial civilization, and a level of skill which made attainment of that civilization conceptually possible, basic weaknesses in the economy jeopardized the Empire's defensive capabilities and rendered uncertain the maintenance of any facets of the Ottoman Traditional structure.

D. Conclusion

From the time of the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), the Ottoman Empire experienced fairly steady diminution of size. A respite occurred in the mid-18th Century, but thereafter the pressures exerted by Russia, Austria-Hungary and the other Great Powers increased. During the 19th Century, an additional source of trouble was provided by the gaiur communities of the Balkans. Aided by agents of various of the European powers, they began
to field para-military forces which were the equal of the Ottoman units sent
to suppress them. Retreat out of Europe was damaging for economic as well as
political reasons. For as withdrawal progressed, the Empire lost many of
the gaiur communities which in former centuries had not only invested most
heavily, but also had provided most of the entrepreneurship, for private
development activities.

The cost of almost continuous warfare made eventual bankruptcy certain,
for the Ottomans' ability to generate wealth without the assistance of the
European vilayets was negligible. Raw material exports and virtual sale
of Capitulatory concessions long helped to lessen budgetary deficits, but
financial crisis was only a matter of time. Public services were adversely
affected as a result. At the same time, governmental corruption increased
because of future uncertainties and the absence of other sources of spoils.
Both of these conditions rebounded on the Imperial image and the Ottoman
citizen's sense of loyalty to governmental institutions.

Tanzimat was, of course, an attempt to stem the rot. Guided by
European experts, the nucleus of an able, devoted class of Imperial civil
servants and military officers came into being. But the autocratic reaction-
ism of Abdüllhamid II forced this new class to divert its energies from
socio-economic reform to political revolutionism. At the same time,
Abdulhamid's Pan-Islamic dreams made reform more necessary than ever, for
the Sultan allowed religious reactionaries to determine much of governmental
policy.

So long as the Sultan's power remained unchecked, the proposals of Young
Turk progressives were consistently rejected. Thus, despite their technical
skills and their loyalty to the Empire, Europeanized Muslims were unable to
bring fruition any program designed to resuscitate the Empire through widespread application of new techniques. With the 1908 revolt, however, an opportunity for reform finally came through the reestablishment of constitutional monarchy. But the Empire was so weak materially and financially, its military position was so poor, and citizen loyalty was so low, it was uncertain whether any vestiges of the Ottoman system could survive. The Young Turks possessed a single strength in that one or another Great Power seemed continually prepared to offer its patronage in order to deny to other nations control over the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea approaches to Russia. Balanced against the disagreements over policy which fractured the Union and Progress movement during Transition, this strength was to be found inadequate.
Chapter 8.

LATE TRADITION: THE INDIAN EXAMPLE

A. The Impact of Abroad

Though Britain's entry into India was itself a destabilizing force, the East India Company's preoccupation with profit long tended to obscure the dimensions of incipient crisis. In a later section, we shall consider the truly revolutionary character of Britain's impact upon India society, but consideration of this problem seems well postponed. First, British influence had been established in India even before our inquiry begins. The destabilization of mores and occupations thus deserves to be handled as a domestically-induced problem. Second, the Directors of the East India Company long attempted to provoke as little social and political change within India as was felt to be feasible from an economic point of view.

There remain, however, two aspects of Western intrusion which deserve brief mention at this time, for both of them can be considered as phenomena separable from the mainstream of interaction between Anglo- and Native-Indians. The first of these, steady population growth, is believed to have begun in India approximately at the opening of Late Tradition. No conscious efforts to change the birth/death ratio were reflected in the population spurt. Rather, an increase in longevity followed on a combination of relatively fortuitous circumstances played out at the local or regional level. These included: domestic order as "John" Company extended the areas of its influence; growing protection from natural disaster within regions overseen by unusually able District Officers; the introduction of new crops (again under the aegis of particular District Officers); and finally, gradual
improvement of medical practices and public health techniques.

The second separable aspect of foreign intrusion existed in the field of education. During High Tradition, "John" Company Chaplains had established a number of charity schools which, because they provided training in the English language, markedly affected Indians within the Calcutta, Madras and Bombay regions. Private tutelage in English widened the base of the language revolution, so that by the beginning of Late Tradition a significant number of urban Indians had some degree of command of English. However, the impact of British education was considerably less pervasive than it might have been, particularly because the London Directors of "John" Company denied all requests to provide in the Company schools more than a Christianized English-language facsimile of the indigenous curriculum.

At the beginning of Late Tradition, "John" Company's conservative educational policies began to be challenged by American missionaries. Charged with "civilizing the heathen", the missionaries offered Western subjects in their schools. The efforts of the Americans gained the support of a number of British officials, who called on "John" Company to emulate American practices. But the purse-oriented, non-imperialist London Directors

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1 See for example the following 1824 Minute on Education composed by Mountstuart Elphinstone, Governor of Bombay from 1819 to 1827:

"It has been urged against our Indian Government that we have subverted the States of the East, and shut up all the sources from which the magnificence of the country was derived, and that we have not ourselves constructed a single work, either of utility or of splendour. It may be alleged with more justice that we have dried up the fountains of native talent, and that from the nature of our conquest, not only all encouragement to the advancement of knowledge is withdrawn, but even the actual learning of the nation is likely to be lost and the production of former genius to be forgotten. Something should surely be done to remove this
remained obdurate until, with the rise of Whig Liberalism in mid-19th Century England, "John" Company suddenly became infused with a sense of mission. Beginning in 1835, a new educational policy was enunciated which had as its purpose the Anglicization of a major portion of the Indian urban populace.

B. Change Internally Induced

The acceptance of administrative responsibility for much of Mughal India gave to the East India Company an unusual economic opportunity, for it provided the means whereby the indigenous economy might be made to conform specifically to English, rather than Indian, needs.² The silk weavers of Bengal were among the first to experience the studied use of governmental interference for economic purposes. As early as 1769, it became "John" Company policy on the one hand to discourage the production of finished silk except in certain Company factories, while at the same time efforts were made to encourage the export of raw silk to English weavers.³ The methods employed with regard to silk gradually were applied to other textiles as well, thereby hastening the decline of Traditional India's fine goods sectors.

² It must be stressed, however, that India's High and Late Traditional economic problems were not solely a thing of British making. In addition to transport bottlenecks and the continuance of inefficient practices in the village handicraft sector, there was as well growing moribundity within the highly-skilled, luxury goods industries. This was due in large part to uncertainties resulting from the breakdown of Mughal political institutions.

³ R. C. Dutt, op. cit., p. 45.
Village handicrafts were not much affected by English competition during High Tradition, for rural areas were beyond the range of "John" Company's established transport nets. However, the itinerant trader suffered heavily, for Company employees trading on private account set price levels which Indian competitors could not meet. "John" Company personnel often were able to sell cheap and buy dear because Company imports and exports were exempted from internal customs duties on Mughal order. Though it was not legal, it became established practice for Englishmen engaged in private commercial activities to declare that the products in their possession were owned by the East India Company and hence not taxable.

Decline in the indigenous economy did not reach crisis proportions until the wane of Tradition. However, social disintegration had begun to be a problem much earlier, for advances in public health, irrigation and the like not only expanded population growth rates, but also altered village living patterns. Here, the efficacy of "indirect rule" was brought into question. Precisely because the British tried not to interfere with historic social practices, the rural Indian was not able to adjust to those technological innovations which the British felt themselves required to make. Paradoxically, therefore, the introduction of each new component of technical "progress" brought harm rather than good to individual villagers. This may be an inevitable side effect of economic growth, but India - as a de facto and then de jure colony - lacked the distinguishing feature of independent nations which had gone through a comparable process of development. For in India, no indigenous authority was created capable of mitigating the extremes
of dislocation by bringing about a contemporaneous shift in the functioning of social institutions. And the British, on grounds of non-interference, chose not to provide this service themselves.

In few areas did blunders due to misunderstanding of historic social practices achieve anything like the tragic results which were caused by Britain's efforts to rationalize land holding procedures. In ancient India, possession of land had not been equivalent to an inalienable property right, for all land was seen as being ultimately the property of the State. However, the individual peasant cultivator was assured that his tenancy would not be disputed so long as a specified overload received a yearly enactment in kind. "John" Company unintentionally broke with historic precedent at the time of passage from High to Late Tradition by creating "permanent settlements" in parts of Bengal. Virtual private ownership was recognized in the "settled" areas, with the landlord assured absolute control over the land provided he forwarded an annual quitrent to the Government. Those who were recognized as landlords (e.g., the zamindari) thus were able to charge such

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4 The zamindari had been tax farmers under the Mughals, which accounts for British misunderstanding of their historic role. During earlier periods, the zamindari had furnished peasant cultivators with seed, farm implements, cattle, etc., but this made them no more the owners of the land than were the peasants themselves.

In Oudh and certain other regions, the institution of talukdari rather than zamindari had obtained. The talukdars were not believed to have any proprietary rights over the land, this being specifically the province of peasant cultivators. Often an institution such as the village panchayat served as talukdar. cf.: W. R. Smith, Nationalism and Reform in India, Yale University Press, 1938, pp. 171-2; H. H. Dodwell (ed.), Cambridge History of the British Empire (Vol. V, "Indian Empire 1858-1918"), New York, 1932, pp. 30, 257.
dues, and to expel such tenants, as they saw fit. 5

During the 19th Century, the method of "permanent settlement" was largely discarded. Instead, individuals or groups of peasant proprietors entered into direct relationships with the British Government. However, since cultivator-landlords often leased portions of their land to tenants, conditions such as held true in the zamindari areas often obtained as well in so-called ryotwari (peasant-cultivator) areas. Absentee ownership and rack renting became prevalent, bringing dispossession and penury to individual peasant-tenants. Over large geographic areas, historic rights of tenancy and cultivation were entirely overthrown. This held consequences as detrimental to economic development as to the social system. For within locales suffering from population pressure, the typical family was unable to extend it lease-land and had instead to divide and subdivide parcels among increasing numbers of people. Furthermore, with tenancy no longer certain, the Indian peasant lost the incentive to invest in irrigation or other land improvement techniques in order to increase the productivity of his holding.

C. Ferment and Reform at the Wane of Tradition

i.) The Social and Political Sectors - Despite the East India Company's

5 The quitrents established under "permanent settlement" were subject to periodic reassessment. Though the British directed the zamindari to give written leases to their tenants, few in fact did so. It was a relatively simple matter, therefore, for zamindari to dispossess those of their tenants who fell behind in rent payments, or to expel tenants paying at one rate if other cultivators offered to pay a higher rate for the same piece of land. As population levels rose, rack renting and summary ejection became fairly standard procedures. Since they generally had no written leases, individual peasants had little recourse to Law.
desire to avoid positive intrusion into the fabric of Indian life, the spirit of reform which swept through Britain from the third decade of the 19th Century entered India as well in the guise of humanitarian legislation. Singular changes were sure to result from acts such as these:

1) suppression of thuggee (1830's);
2) specific affirmation of the Indian's right to hold office within the Imperial structure (1833);
3) declaration of a Free Press (1836);
4) abolition of slavery (1843).

Still more important were the educational reforms which Macaulay sponsored, and which resulted in the decision taken on 7 March 1835 that henceforward an English, rather than indigenous, form of education was to be provided in institutions supported by public funds. Thereafter, preference in appointments to most competitive civil service posts was given to English-speaking Indians. A second revision of educational policy was enunciated on 19 July 1854. This had as objectives both the improvement of male and female literacy in the vernacular languages, and extension of the range of Western-type subjects made available at the higher levels of learning. In 1857, the University of Calcutta was founded. Over the following 30 years, additional public universities were established at Bombay, Madras, Lahore and Allahabad.

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6 The relevant 1833 Act stated in part: "no native of the said territory, nor any natural-born subject of His Majesty resident therein, shall by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office or employment within the Company". Quoted in W. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 12.
As a percent of total population, the number of Indians to whom Western knowledge was made available by the foregoing acts was small. But since both the Muslim community and the Hindu aristocracy remained largely aloof from European studies, a cohesive group of middle-class Hindus dominated Anglo-Indian educational facilities. This fact bore noteworthy portents, for it meant that a group with uniform upward-mobile tendencies was offered an area quite divorced from Traditionalism in which to rise. At the same time, since English education stressed cultural rather than vocational subjects, the establishment of public universities ill-prepared India's Westernized classes for action in the technical and scientific spheres. Law and the humanistic professions attracted Anglicized Hindus. Business, economics and the natural sciences did not.

Increasing contact with foreign thought sparked a 19th Century renaissance in Indian intellectual life. Significant manifestations first appeared in Bengal, where attempts were made to cross-fertilize Eastern and Western concepts. As early as 1828, Raja Ram Mohan Roy* founded the Brahmo Samaj, an upper-caste reform movement which, particularly under the influence of Devendranath Tagore, came to be associated with rationalism and social reform. The Prarthana Samaj, an offshoot of Brahmo Samaj, brought rationalism and social reformism to Maharashtra, and particularly to Bombay.

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7 Keshab Chandra Sen subsequently organized a progressive wing of this movement, which Tagore opposed. The Progressives' demands that child marriage and polygamy be abolished were instrumental in bringing about an Act of 1872 which prohibited further continuance of these practices. The Progressives were most radical in their conditional support of inter-caste marriage. cf.: R.C. Majumdar, H.C. Raychaudhuri & K. Datta, An Advanced History of India, London, 1948, pp. 877-80.
India's renaissance was not entirely modernist, however. Movements such as the Arya Samaj called for a return to unadulterated Hinduism as expressed in the Vedas. There was to be dislodgement of all elements of Indian life which were not specifically Hindu. Resurgent hyper-orthodoxy similarly affected groups such as the Sikhs and the Muslims. Since the development of ideas of separatist identity occurred in virtually all religious groups, communal tensions mounted. A climax was reached about the time of entry into Transition, when all India was rocked by intense outbursts of religious intolerance.

While communal strife was one result of the reactionary factor in India's renaissance, a second was the seeding of Indian proto-nationalist sentiment through heightened antipathy toward the British Raj. This affected segments of Traditional elite groups most immediately: feudal landlords, religious demagogues, tribal chieftains and free-lance warriors whose spendthrift propensities led to ruin as British law and order was extended across the subcontinent. These were the peoples most ready to support the Sepoy troops in their revolt of 1857-58. And these were the peoples who initially propagandized the populace most intensively regarding the evils of foreign intrusion.

Seeds of nationalism also arose within the third conceptual element of the Indian renaissance. This element, which attempted fully to come to grips with Western civilization, desired an India whose cultural heritage and present form could — and would — be accepted into full participant membership in the British imperial system. More secular than its parent religious-reform movements, it nonetheless accepted and extended the social welfare valuations of Hindu and Christian reformist opinion. The plight of the "Untouchables", 
a concern long peculiar to foreign missionary groups, early was taken up
by various Anglicized-Indian secular reformers. Acts such as this were of
extreme significance, for by attempting to modify the immemorial arrange-
ments of caste status, the secular reformers involved were contradicting in
detail Hinduism's debilitating, static concept of Dharma. In the gradual
spread of conviction that mankind possess the faculties and tools needed
for temporal improvement, a belief which Christian missionaries and "John"
Company officials both assiduously cultivated during the mid-decades of the
19th Century, Anglicized Indians developed a rationale which easily came to
be translated into demands for increased representation in "John" Company
political deliberations.

The first of the strictly political organizations was the British
India Association of Calcutta, founded in 1851 by zamindari of Bengal,
Bihar and Orissa. The Bengal National League followed not long after, its membership being made up largely of middle class Hindus. But further
development of Indian political activity was momentarily arrested by the
Mutiny of 1857, and by the Crown's subsequent assumption of full control over

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8 Dharma is the "order of the universe, which is conceived of as divine and
as governing even the gods". B.B. Mishra, op. cit., Appendix II (C), pp. 86ff. The concept of Dharma provided a relief from frustration,
particularly at the lower caste level - but it has also proven a restraint
on progress. ibid., p. 137.

9 This writer is uncertain of the founding date of the Bengal National
League, but takes it as having been earlier than the Mutiny on the basis
of materials presented in Sir C.Y. Chintamani, Indian Politics Since
In assuming the imperial mantle, the Victorian Government took cognizance of two salient facts: (1) that few of the leading Indian Princes had participated in the Mutiny, though a number of the second run of elitists had given it their support; (2) that the majority of Indian troops (except in the Bengal Army) had remained loyal to their officers throughout the Mutiny. Application of these facts to the accepted objective of eventual self-rule for India brought about a reversal of governmental policy. Instead of hostility toward the princely order, which had led to sustained efforts to annex the autonomous principalities during the last years of "John" Company hegemony, the new Government of India gave unqualified support to maintenance of the houses of loyal Princes. Moreover, the social reformism of the mid-decades was abandoned in favor of a conservatism non-deleterious to the Traditional prestige and power of second-run elitists such as the zamindari and members of the Brahmin caste. Thus, the interests of the Anglicized, urban middle class were surrendered in order to reward loyal elements of the Traditional ruling class, and to quiet the opposition of disaffected elitists.

In government, application of this policy soon revealed a number of internal contradictions. Through acts such as the Indian Councils Act of 1861, it became possible for British Governors to appoint a certain number of private citizens to legislative bodies established at both the viceroyal and presidency level. This, it was felt, would help prepare Indians for self-rule. But the Indians so appointed for the most part represented

loyal Traditionalist opinion, rather than that of the rising middle class. Being protected in their ancient prerogatives by the umbrella of British power, non-official members of Legislative Councils showed little inclination either to take such initiative, or to support such measures, as were necessary preconditions to the establishment of responsible All-Indian Governments. Even the idea of an All-Indian Government was foreign to the backward-looking legislators. Though the British had begun to view the areas under their control as potentially a single federation, their tutees in the legislative assemblies persisted in regarding India as diverse and unified only through the British connection.

Having been denied participation at the top levels of government, many of the politically-oriented middle class satisfied themselves with membership on municipal bodies, or on the Rural Boards established to join groups of villages to higher authority. However, these bodies had little real freedom in policy-making, for direct responsibility for local conditions rested not with them, but rather in the hands of the I.C.S. officials concerned. Particularly for this reason, commissioning in the I.C.S. came to be thought of as the best means available to bring about Anglicized-Indian participation in governmental policy-making.


11. The ending of Mughal shadow sovereignty had been one result of the Mutiny. As a result, from the Act of 1858 incorporating India into the British Empire, Englishmen began to consider British India a federated whole.
The first Indian to gain entrance into the I.C.S. was Satyendranath Tagore, a son of the leader of the Brahmo Samaj. Among those following were R. C. Dutt, Surendranath Banerjea* and K.G. Gupta. But admission was rare, as is indicated by the accompanying table;

**Table I**

Composition of the Indian Civil Service: 1859-1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Europeans</th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>846</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>907</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1,177</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>1,299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


and Banerjea further had the experience of being cashiered on what appears to have been a charge trumped up to cover the racial animosity toward Indians which characterized many of the British rulers. ¹² That Banerjea admitted of no anger towards his erstwhile persecutors has been frequently – and justifiably – remarked. Instead of reactive animosity for the Crown, he threw his considerable talents into middle class political activity.

After the shock of Mutiny had declined, Indian middle class efforts to form loyalist political associations had begun anew. Early in the 1870's, ¹² British hatred of Indians grew particularly as a result of experiences in the Mutiny.
the East Indian Association superseded the moribund Bengal National League, while comparable organizations were established in Bombay, Poona and Madras. But these were primarily regional in scope; it was not until 1876, when Banerjea founded the Indian Association of Calcutta, that a nation-wide political movement was attempted. The Indian Association of Calcutta "was to be the centre of an All-India movement [based] on the conception of a United India". It turned to the Anglicized-Indian middle class for members, and hoped through direct propaganda to be able to mold public opinion. 13

Banerjea's movement gained considerable momentum during 1877, for it led the protests of that year against the establishment of new rules governing recruitment to the I.C.S.14 But this issue was relatively peripheral, for after the 1872 assassination of Lord Mayo (Viceroy 1869-72), British-Indian relations had entered into an eight year phase of deterioration.15 Government of India fiscal policy was one of the major areas of dispute; Indians objected to being taxed for the costly 1877 Durbar celebrating

13 As in the case of the Young Turks, young India apparently turned to Italian experience for direction. The passage quoted above notes that Mazzini served as an "inspirational guide" for the Indian Association. R.C. Majumdar, H.C. Raychaudhuru & K. Datta, op. cit., p. 890.

14 The crux issue in dispute was the lowering of the maximum age limit for entrance from 21 to 19. Since Indian candidates had to travel to Great Britain to take the competitive examinations, and further found it virtually essential to cram for a period in England before taking the examinations, this rule was believed to all but nullify any future participation by Indians in the I.C.S.

15 Despite this growth of tension, the 1870's decade witnessed gradual extension of the movement toward provincial financial decentralization and local self-government. Moreover, during the 1870's a certain number of seats on local and municipal bodies were opened to contest by election. Feeling that representative democracy infringed on historic patents of rank, members of the Traditional elite began at this time to withdraw from active politics. Their places were filled thereafter by members of the Anglicized middle class - particularly Lawyers accredited to plead before G.O.I. courts.
Victoria's assumption of the title of Empress of India, and for the financing of the Second Afghan War (1878-79). Both of these events seemed to benefit British imperialism at the expense of India per se. Moreover, in the interests of Free Trade and Lancashire, protective tariffs gradually were being lifted. Most notable were the surrender of tariffs on cotton manufactures, but virtually all other imported items except commodities to which an internal excise was applied (e.g., salt, wine) were allowed to enter Indian markets duty free. The momentum of growth in India's infant industrial sector thus was being scotched while, at the same time, the demise of handicrafts industries was being hastened.

Though acts such as the foregoing dismayed loyal Indians of the middle class, none of them was as galling as were a series of events which appeared symptomatic of Britain's attitude of racial superiority to the colonial peoples. Sedition Laws were tightened to the relative detriment of Indians. Indians were denied the right to possess arms. From 1878 to 1882, press freedom was withdrawn from newspapers published in vernacular languages. And after British planters in Bengal and Bihar violently agitated against the Ilbert Bill of 1883, a compromise was introduced by the G.O.I. which effectively counteracted the principle originally set forth in the measure. That principle was that Indian Magistrates possessed the right to try Britishers charged with certain classes of misdemeanor.

Indians responded to British racialism in several fashions. On the one hand, Eastern civilization's moral superiority to much of Western life was asserted by groups such as the Ramakrishna Mission and the Theosophical
Both of these societies attempted to initiate worldwide movements of brotherhood and social reform. A second reaction to worsening race relations was introduced by extremist cults which stressed the primacy of Hindu (or Muslim, Sikh, etc.) culture not only generally, but also within the spectrum of Indian civilization. The second reaction thus bred strife among the Indians themselves. But the third response was nationalist rather than communalist. In about 1880, the Theosophical Society introduced the practice of holding national, rather than regional, assemblies. In 1883, the Brahma Samaj held a joint conference with several other religious bodies at which social reform and the possibility of Indian National Union both were discussed. Similar joint meetings were called during the two succeeding years. And while the Brahma Samaj assembly of 1885 was being held at Calcutta, a smaller conference was meeting independently in the Bombay Presidency. This latter conference became the founding meeting of the Indian National Congress.

Creation of the Congress was primarily the work of three men. Though Surendranath Banerjea was a prominent member of the All-India National Congress from its inception, credit for the design of the initial Congress

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16 Theosophy attracted a number of European adherents including Allan Octavian Hume and Mrs. Annie Besant, both important figures in the movement to gain political representation for Indians on a par with that obtaining in other British overseas territories.

17 Indian National Union was one component of the so-called "National Movement" which had as objects: "First, the fusion into one national whole of all the different elements that constitute the population of India; second, the gradual regeneration along all lines, spiritual, moral, social, and political, of the nation thus evolved; and third, the consolidation of the union between England and India, by securing the modification of such of its conditions as may be unjust or injurious." Sir William Wedderburn, Allan Octavian Hume, C.B., London, 1913, p. 47.
meeting must be given not to him, but rather to Allan Octavian Hume (a
retired I.C.S. officer), and to Lord Dufferin (Viceroy of India from
1884 to 1888).

Hume's initial intent in calling a conference at Poona for Christmas
Week 1885 was not to assist in the creation of an All-Indian political party,
for he felt political activity in his day to be primarily the responsibility
of provincial assemblies such as the Presidency Association of Bombay. Thus
it may be said that Hume lacked the breadth of view of a Banerjea; the
Englishman's career weighed too heavily with him. At the same time, Hume
clearly viewed Indians as members of a common society even if not yet of a
unified political community. Though the first meetings of the Congress would
be directed toward consideration of national social questions, Hume believed
that eventually an All-India political association would evolve. Like
Banerjea, however, Lord Dufferin desired more than Hume envisaged: as
Viceroy, Dufferin wished the Congress to assume a political character at the
outset so that a de facto Loyal Opposition might be created to monitor
Government of India activities. Hume readily deferred to his superior's
wishes, preparing the following notice for circulation:

18 Hume was educated at Haileybury, the East India Company training college,
and was first posted to India in 1849. Until his retirement from the
I.C.S. in 1882, he interested himself particularly in educational and
agricultural reform. From 1885 to 1908, Hume served as General Secretary
of the Congress.

19 Hume's attitude is seen in the following extract from a letter (1 March
1883) addressed by him to all graduates of the University of Calcutta.
The purpose of the letter was to call for fifty volunteers "to promote the
mental, moral, social and political regeneration of India. 'There are
aliens, like myself, who love India and her children ... but the real
work must be done by the people of the country themselves. ...If fifty
men cannot be found with sufficient power of self-sacrifice, sufficient
"A conference of the Indian National Union will be held at Poona from the 25th to the 31st December, 1885.

"The Conference will be composed of Delegates - leading politicians well-acquainted with the English Language - from all parts of the Bengal, Bombay and Madras Presidencies.

"The direct objects of the Conference will be: (1) to enable all the most earnest laboureres in the cause of national progress to become personally known to each other; (2) to discuss and decide upon the political operations to be undertaken during the ensuing year.

"Indirectly, this Conference will form the germ of a Native Parliament, and if properly conducted, will constitute in a few years an unanswerable reply to the assertion that India is still wholly unfit for any form of representative institutions. ..."

Establishment of the All-India Congress marked the surrender of Tradition's postulate of India, diverse and disunited. It is true that the ideal of Indian political unity was shallowly rooted at best. Moreover, since the formal structure of Indian government still maintained the Princely States, the concept of imperial India had not been officially set aside. At the same time, through the founding of the Congress a quasi-official body was created which allowed at least indirect participation in Government to

love for and pride in their country, sufficient genuine and unselfish patriotism to take the initiative and if needs be devote the rest of their lives to the Cause - then there is no hope for India. Her sons must and will remain mere humble and helpless instruments in the hands of foreign rulers. " R. Woodruff, op. cit., p. 165.


21 Writing in another context, Moreland and Chatterjee suggest a similar point of view: "The year 1885 may be taken as the first significant date in the history of Indian politics. In Mogul times, and earlier, there had been no scope for politics, in the sense of free and open discussion of public policy and voluntary organization of parties or groups for the expression of common views," W. H. Moreland and A.C. Chatterjee, A Short History of India (4th Edit.), New York, 1957.
India's new men: the Anglicized middle class. And since both the Government of India and the rising middle class were uniformly desirous of applying certain new methods in the social and/or economic spheres, direction was provided which enabled the subcontinent to break out of the circularity of Tradition and to move forward into the Transitional phase.

ii.) The Economic Sector - Semi-luxury grades of Indian cotton fabrics became fashionable in Europe after the Crystal Palace Exhibition of 1851. As no market developed for the finest grades of product, this did little to stay the decline of artistry in the indigenous sector. Moreover, as cheap manufactures continued to increase their share of the domestic market, the native cotton handloom industry remained in decline. Complete disruption of hand loom crafting was averted, however, by the gradual emergency of an integrated marketing system.

While textile exports increased during the latter half of the 19th Century, considerably more significant gains were made in the raw materials sector. Cotton boomed throughout the period of the U.S. Civil War; along with tea, coffee, indigo and indigo dye, jute, timber, rice, wheat and wool, cotton provided a volume of export which rose consistently in response to growing European demand. Improvements in ship construction

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22 Raw cotton prices, and exports to Great Britain, were as follows during the years 1859-65:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price (Annas/Lb)</th>
<th>Exports to G.B. (Bales)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1859</td>
<td>2-7</td>
<td>509,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>2-7</td>
<td>562,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>4-2</td>
<td>986,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>4-2</td>
<td>1,071,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>6-4</td>
<td>1,229,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>10-5</td>
<td>1,399,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>7-1</td>
<td>1,266,513</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and the 1869 opening of the Suez Canal made bulk exports from India increasingly feasible;\textsuperscript{23} with the creation of an internal transport net, large sections of India were transformed into primary product producers for European markets.

A consistently favorable trade balance resulted from India's integration into the European system. Foreign exchange surpluses were utilized in large part to service Governments' debt and to finance the creation of overhead capital. Conscientious efforts to enlarge India's capital base were initiated during Lord Dalhousie's tenure as Governor-General (1847-56). A Public Works Department was established which carried through the construction of numerous dams, irrigation canals, roads, bridges and buildings. It is significant that these latter included schools and dispensaries as well as more standard items of imperial plant such as barracks and government buildings. Other advances sponsored by Dalhousie included reform of the postal system, establishment of a telegraph grid, and after 1853, the development of a railroad network.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{23}See for example the jump in tea exports from 3.75 million pounds (1865) to 69.66 million pounds (1885-86). Or again, 16,632 cubic tons of timber were exported in 1868; by 1885-86, this figure had risen to 50,098 cubic tons. N.M. Pal, The Industrial Development of India, Calcutta, 1930, pp. 169, 205.

\textsuperscript{24}Dalhousie's 1853 Minute on Railways called for the construction of a 5,000 mile net with rail gauge standardized at 5'6". After 1870, the metre gauge came to be substituted to an increasing degree as an economy measure. Capitalization of the railroad system was achieved through the creation in London of a number of joint stock companies, which engaged to build the lines at a guaranteed interest rate of 5%, plus 1/2 of any additional profit. The earliest railways were as follows:

1) \textbf{East India Railway} - (The Calcutta-Delhi trunk, with a spur to Jubbulpore to connect with the Great Indian);

2) \textbf{Great Indian Peninsular Railway} - (Bombay to Jubbulpore);
Rail construction made India's major coal fields (the so-called "Gondwana System") accessible. The seams of the Raniganj district in Bengal were opened up during the mid-19th Century and thereafter provided a major portion of the power requirement of Calcutta's incipient Western-style industrial sector. Manufacture of jute products formed the center of Calcutta's capital-intensive industry. Begun in 1854, by the end of Tradition there were twenty jute mills in production in the Calcutta region.25 Bombay's cotton mill complex, which grew rapidly after the 1851 establishment of India's first successful cotton mill, at first did not utilize Bengali coal, for sea shipment from Europe and South Africa proved cheaper than rail shipment across India. Cotton textiles were, of course, India's most spectacularly growing manufacture during the wane of Tradition. By 1879-80, 58 mills had been established with more than 1.4 million spindles, and close to 13,000 looms, in operation.26

3) Madras Railway;
4) Bombay, Baroda + Central India Railway;
5) East Bengal Railway;
6) Sind, Punjab and Delhi Railway;
7) Oudh and Rohilkland Railway; and
8) South Indian Railways.

All of these lines were laid down before 1875. With the exception of the South Indian, the main trunks on all the lines were 5'6". V. Anstey, op. cit., pp.130ff; G.E. Monson, Railways in India, London, 1894, Chap. I.

25 The growth of jute fabrication is reflected in export figures. Bag production rose from 8.01 million to 63.76 million units over the decade 1875-85. Cloth exports rose from 5,000 yards to 20.15 million yards over the same period. Machine-produced goods are believed to have accounted for something over 90% of these figures. N.M. Pal, op. cit., pp. 36-7.

26 ibid., pp. 15-16.
The creation of skeletal transport and communications nets combined with the thriving light industrial sector and the growth of primary products to furnish India with a base on which further industrial expansion might be founded. In 1875, heavy manufacturing was introduced through construction of coal-fired iron smelters at the Government's Barakar Iron Works. Technically, therefore, India had developed the capacity necessary for the creation of a modern industrial base.

Three problems, however, tended to impede rapid movement forward. The most immediate of these was Great Britain's commitment to free trade (which denied protection to increasingly large segments of the Indian economy), and to the idea of India as a producer of primary products. The second problem related to Indian attitudes. Relatively few upper and middle class Hindus and Muslims were willing to engage in industrial management. The final problem has yet to be resolved: the increasing pressure of population on available resources.

D. Conclusion

Late Traditional India would have been unstable regardless of the methods of rule adopted by the East India Company. Because the Company's interest in the subcontinent was commercial, market-development policies would have been initiated no matter what the form of government established. And since extension of markets acted to destroy the isolation which hitherto had kept population and resources in balance, disequilibrium was an inevitable by-product of British intrusion.

Government by "indirect rule" intensified Britain's destabilizing impact, for both "John" Company and Traditional elite groups were allowed to enjoy
the privileges of power without being required to accept a full measure of the attendant responsibilities. Rural India was deeply harmed by this oversight, for while the local zamindar and the regional Nawab possessed neither the incentive nor the capacity to prepare the peasant for change, the East India Company chose not to do so as a matter of policy. And though this policy was somewhat modified during the quarter century preceding the Sepoy Mutiny, the effects of Whig Liberalism had little impact at the village level.

From the 1830's, "John" Company worked hard to train an Anglicized-Indian middle class as prospective successors to the Traditional elite. This new class, Hindu and city-based for the most part, in time might have come to provide the socio-political leadership required by a society in process of steady change. But the Mutiny intervened, and in the hostile and uncertain atmosphere which followed, the Government of India fell back on Traditional elite groups whose loyalty could be assured simply because they required British patronage in order to maintain their authority in changing India.

The Mutiny, renewed dependence on the Traditional elite, and the intensification both of British racialism and of Indian communal rivalries, left the Anglicized-Indian middle class unsure as to proper courses of action. Nevertheless, by 1880 the Government of India became convinced that the only hope of reestablishing domestic stability lay in renewed sponsorship of the Anglicized Indians. Britain's post-Mutiny dependence on the Traditional elite had failed. India's historic governing class had shown itself both incapable and uninterested in facing problems of growing social
dislocation, communal animosity and rural poverty.

Once the Government of India had decided to resurrect the British-middle class Indian ties of the 1830's and '40's, it adopted a more paternalistic policy than ever before. Tradition's governing postulate of India, diverse and disunited, was dropped insofar as the provinces of British India were concerned. Using the English language as a soldering agent, the Government began consciously to try to provide Anglicized Indians with the skills and attitudes necessary for participation under Britain in an evolving All-Indian governmental structure.

Lord Dufferin raised the new approach to its highest level by specifically requesting that the Congress form as a political, rather than social-reform body. That he must have agreed with Hume's vision of the Congress as "the germ of a Native Parliament" is suggested by the fact that he seriously considered accepting the position of presiding officer over the founding session. Thus, the new class of Anglicized-Indians was being brought forward, as a matter of Governmental policy, to a position of quasi-official status and influence.

There still remained disagreements, however, regarding the pace and direction of change. During Transition, policy conflicts would divide not only Englishmen and Indians, but also the Indians themselves. The Congress would become a focal point of these debates, which would grow increasingly intertwined with questions regarding the optimal form of institutional relationship to be established between Britain and India. The Congress' right to act as a formal spokesman of the Indian peoples would be challenged by Traditionalist bodies at the same time that Congress leaders were
attempting to influence British public opinion, for the fact that the Anglicized-Indians who made up the bulk of Congress membership were products more of British than of Indian society would be considered a vice by self-centered religious communities. This was the final consequence of India's peculiar experience as a colonial dependency. It would continue to affect political policies, and also economic development until independence had been finally achieved.
Chapter 9.

CONCLUSIONS: LATE TRADITIONAL DISEQUILIBRIUM AND PASSAGE INTO THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

This chapter compares the conditions which brought disequilibrium to Late Traditional Japan, Turkey and India. Certain materials hitherto set aside for narrative convenience are presented in order to round out and balance the analysis. Though the conditions to be examined brought instability, some of them served as well to help make passage into Transition technically possible. Actual forward momentum, however, required the existence of three additional factors: (1) the development of a class skilled in new technologies; (2) the creation of channels for regular assimilation of members of this new class into the historic elite; and (3) the growth of sufficient political unrest to make Tradition's rulers willing to entertain proposals entailing functional and institutional mutation in order to maintain their historic positions of power. The effect of these latter conditions will be considered in sections dealing with the surrender of basic postulates of Traditional government, characteristic traits of Late Traditional reformers, and economic changes made during the Late Traditional period.

A. The Traditionalist Polities of Japan, Turkey and India, and Their Impact On...

i.) Population Growth – Under the Tokugawa Peace, Japan's population level began to rise. By Late Tradition, total population is believed to have reached a marginal limit at which it varied with the size of the
harvest. Though the Malthusian limit was not similarly reached in India, pressure on the soil nevertheless became a major problem. This pressure was intensified by British commercial policies, which accelerated the decline of the indigenous commercial and handicrafts sectors, and forced growing numbers of people to depend entirely on agriculture for subsistence.

In Japan, political response to overpopulation included commercialization of the han and governmental sponsorship of land reclamation. In addition, social controls were employed by individuals despite sporadic efforts by post 1786 Governments to outlaw activities such as abortion and infant exposure. Roughly comparable social controls were practiced in India; and like various shogunates, the British Government in India tried to curb infanticide. It further attempted to end the abuses of child marriage.

Pressure on the land exacerbated communal tensions in India. Analogous problems arose both in Rumelia (European Turkey) and Anatolia, though their cause was not directly a result of population growth. On the contrary, during Late Tradition there was an actual decline of the Muslim citizenry due to military service, polygamy, venereal disease and abortion. But as deforestation and improper cultivation methods increased the amount of sub-marginal land, population shifts towards fertile river bottoms and the narrow coastal littoral occurred. Consequently, Muslim and gaiur peasants, brought into increasing proximity, contested for fertile acreage in a spirit of growing acerbity.

\[\text{cf.}: \text{T. Stoianovich, loc. cit., p. 250.}\]
ii.) Urban/Rural Ratios - The stability of the Traditional structure was also upset by the disproportionate growth of urban regions. In Japan, difficulties involved in sustaining booming city populations necessitated modifications of production techniques, the monetary system and the trading sector. These modifications damaged both historic social institutions, and the practice of autarkic feudalism. Since "John" Company disruption of pre-British religious and political institutions caused a decline of Indian city size well into Late Tradition, the subcontinent initially experienced nothing comparable to the Japanese case. Particularly after the 1857 Mutiny, however, railroadization and the construction of urban factory complexes led city populations to grow at a faster rate than did the population as a whole. In terms of the creation of an Anglicized-Indian

2 supra, p. fn. 8.
3 Since accurate census data was not compiled in India prior to the 1870's, the extent of urban growth is not known. Weber notes that the Presidencies and certain Princely State capitals (e.g., Lucknow, Hyderabad) grew more rapidly than did other cities, and that towards the end of the 19th Century the largest cities began to experience a population drain to suburban regions. This latter phenomenon probably accounts for that fact that, in the figures given below, cities of 75,000 and 100,000 do not appear to have grown as rapidly as cities of 20,000 and 50,000.

Between 1881 (Late Tradition) and 1891 (Transition) rates of increase in cities of various sizes were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classes of Cities</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100,000+</td>
<td>10.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>6.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>13.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>9.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>11.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>7.54</td>
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<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1.54</td>
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</tbody>
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Rate of increase in gross population during 1881-1891 was 9.6% (adjusted). V. Anstey, op. cit., p. 515.
middle class, this fact was exceedingly upsetting to the Traditional structure. But since Indian cities housed less than 10% of total population, even after completion of the main railroad trunks in the 1870's, it seems unlikely that Late Traditional India experienced so acutely Late Traditional Japan's problem of physically sustaining the city populace. Similar conclusions can be drawn regarding Late Traditional Turkey.

Even though there seems to have been no difficulty in sustaining city-dwellers in India and Turkey, the urban areas of these countries appear to have upset the stability of the Traditional structure by absorbing increasing percentages of gross national income. In the Turkish case, corruption of the ruling classes may have been a major cause of this condition, for corruption brought de facto peonage of peasant cultivators, an increased demand for luxury products by the urban upper classes, and a decline in the public services provided the countryside either by Government or by private charitable institutions. Great Britain's administration of land revenues may have had a roughly comparable effect in India, for it is probable that "John" Company's rationalization of tax gathering procedures led to a decrease in the amount of rural peculation. Moreover, British reassessments of land taxes frequently led to an increase in the gross sums due Government. Those sums which became "John" Company's portion of the receipts returned in only small part to the countryside. Much of gross revenue was used to finance Indo-British commercial relations, while additional increments were expended in support of the Company Establishment, or were

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4 Maintenance of the cities definitely became a problem, however, during early Transition's famine cycle.
returned to Britain for distribution as profit. After the transfer of power from the East India Company to the Crown, allocation of internal revenues changed somewhat. But with one significant exception - the programs for railroad and irrigation-works construction laid down before 1858 - the effect on rural finances of the transfer of power was minimal. Thus, both in Turkey and in India, urban sectors gained in wealth at the relative expense of the countryside. And as urban sectors became prosperous, shifts in demand patterns resulted. These shifts were most notably the growth of demand for fine-goods and then machine-goods (often imported) as against domestic handicrafts.

The shift of Japanese demand patterns was similar in many respects to that of Turkey and India. However, because Japan's population growth pushed the country to the Malthusian limit, staples played more significant roles in changing urban demand patterns than was the case in either of the other two countries.

iii.) The Economic Structure — Growth of the urban sector's economic importance affected the entire economic structures of Japan, Turkey and India. Mutation was most spectacular in Japan, where local isolation came to be widely replaced by regional autarky within the separate han, plus national integration of certain markets for the support of city multitudes. Forerunners of this new condition - along with its side effect in monetizing the economy - could be found in Turkey as well. Especially within locales affected by Capitulatory grants, there was evidence of significant progress away from High Traditional forms.
Two factors in particular bore on the pattern of economic development. First, Capitulatory companies, having been given preferential treatment, to a degree balanced out the dampening effect which was created in the indigenous sector by Islam's limitations on change. Second, largely because of their religious ties with Europeans and the (relative) latitude allowed Christian and Jewish entrepreneurs, the gaiur tended to enter newly-opened areas of economic endeavor faster than did their Muslim counterparts. This fact created a social distortion which caused grave difficulty for the Turks, for when the gaiur began to withdraw from the Empire, a shortage of Muslims trained in modern economic processes made it impossible to maintain the economy at its former level without becoming increasingly dependent upon Capitulatory legatees.

India's growth profile resembled that of the Ottoman Empire in that Mughal grants to "John" Company were closely akin to Capitulatory privileges. Moreover, the British established elements of a modern economy parallel to the handicrafts sector. However, insofar as the British competed with Indians for segments of the domestic market, the impact of Britain on India was much more critical to native industry than were the Capitulatory privileges on the Ottoman Empire. Under British aegis, extensive Indian transport improvement occurred during the latter days of Late Tradition. In Turkey, there was much less of a buildup; consequently, markets which had been supplied locally in High Tradition remained regional, due to the inaccessibility to foreign competitors.

5 Islam impeded economic development most fundamentally (a) by stressing the permanent appropriateness of techniques described in the Koran, and (b) by trying to restrict borrowing at interest (usury).
B. Effects of Parametric Change on the Traditional Polity

Population shifts and structural changes in the economy made alteration of institutions and functions mandatory. In Turkey, response was uneven, being limited primarily to urban gaiur and resident foreigners. Indian response also was largely restricted to foreigners, or to Indians regularly engaged in dealing with foreigners. It is important to recognize that Traditional elite groups in Turkey and pre-Mutiny India were much less affected by the initial impact of parametric change than had been the case in Japan. For in Japan, the rigidities of the Tokugawa system were immediately strained both by internal shifts, which upset the functional relevance of samuraihood; and by incursions from abroad whose success brought directly into question the shogunate's fitness for rule. Thus the entire Tokugawa polity was subjected to a peculiarly acute challenge as Late Tradition advanced.

Compared to Japan, the effect of parametric change upon the Traditional Ottoman elite was rather small. It was limited primarily to cleavages of loyalty, which split the political system vertically along ethno-religious lines. Cleavages both of loyalty and of social goal arose in Late Traditional India. Their most significant manifestations during the Traditional period were in widening the horizontal gap separating the Anglicized-Indian middle class and historical elite groups. But in Japan, ruptures split the nation both horizontally and vertically. The intensity with which these parametric shifts made themselves felt was therefore greater in Japan than in Turkey or India. Consequently, Japan's initial remedial efforts had to be more extensive socially and economically - hence more
damaging to the Traditional fabric - than was at first required in Ottoman Turkey or British India.

C. The Surrender of a Basic Postulate of Traditional Government

In our analysis, surrender of a particular governmental postulate has been defined as an essential prerequisite to entry into Transition. In 1862, the Tokugawa formally discarded the postulate that the good society best could be achieved through the rectitude of an absolutism interpreted by wise rulers. It did so when the bakufu found itself no longer able to control the refractory daimyo. Problems of political control similarly induced the Ottomans to give up in 1908 their historic governmental postulate: namely that the confederated empire should be held together through a system of personal allegiance. When Abdilhamid turned legislative authority over to an elective body in which all millets were considered to be equal, he did so specifically to protect himself from revolutionary overthrow.

But the basic postulate of Traditional government need not be surrendered for reasons of immediate political danger. In India, suppression of the 1857 Mutiny had consolidated Britain's power sufficiently to free the Government of India from immediate concern with revolutionary overthrow. However, the traditional postulate -- India, diverse and disunited -- ceased to reflect actual conditions once sovereignty over British India had been assumed by the Crown. In addition, completion of the major telegraph and railway nets made a high degree of political and economic integration both practicable and inevitable. In a most fundamental sense, this was why the postulate of diversity in India - as of static absolutism in Japan, and
of personal allegiances in Turkey - had to be given up.

Though all of these postulates had had functional and institutional manifestations appropriate to the time of their creation, they ceased to be useful once the interplay of changes originating from both domestic and foreign sources had begun to affect the basic percipient and physiographic parameters of Traditional society. More than that, the governing postulates of High Tradition eventually were found to be in direct conflict with the ends sought by Late Traditional Governments. In such measure as they dissipated Governmental ability to achieve these ends (i.e., dissipated Governmental power), they brought danger to the positions of authority of Traditional elite groups. Essentially, then, the movement into Transition was the product of an effort by Traditional rulers to maintain the substance of power and viability even at the cost of radical political change, whose consequences they could neither fully perceive nor fully control.

The significance of the surrender of Traditional postulates lies particularly in the fact that the vicious circle of Traditional rise, magnificance and decline probably could not have been broken had the Traditional elite not been willing to allow modification of the conceptual foundations on which they based their rule. In the Japanese case, the idea of static absolutism had denied effective utilization of the classes functionally attuned to changing conditions in society and the outer world. Moreover, by perpetuating inter-clan rivalry as a method of control, the shogunate had made clan consensus on national policy virtually impossible at a time when only in union was there hope of resolving critical problems of domestic and foreign affair. The Ottoman postulate of personal allegiance had become
obsolescent when the size of the Empire grew beyond the physical capacity of the Sultan to act as direct ruler of his vassals. Furthermore, confederative integration had become a worthless concept both because of deteriorating Muslim-Christian relations, and because the Padishah acquiesced in domestic plunder, when the expansive momentum of the Empire had been halted. In the Indian case, we need only repeat that the Crown's acceptance of sovereign authority in 1858 legally ended disunion in British India, though the application of policies designed to mollify the Traditional elite for a time obscured this fact.

Once these governing postulates were given up, it became possible to initiate functional and institutional innovations which reinforced the authority of the Traditional elite. The technical capacity for progress hitherto developed in embryo could begin to be applied. At the same time, former limitations on the decision-making process having been relaxed, men skilled in the new techniques could begin to be absorbed into the Traditional elite's top policy groups. Thus both an incentive for change maintenance of power and the possibility of change had been realized.

D. Some Characteristics of Late Traditional Reformers

Though it is a commonplace that much of the catalytic force of socio-political change is provided by members of the lower-middle class, biographic data presented and analysed in Appendix VI suggests that such an axiom may

\[ \text{infra, "A Footnote on Characteristics of Representative Reform Leaders". The biographic material included therein was originally prepared by Messrs. Kee II Choi (Harvard University), A. Haluk Ulman (University of Ankara), and Adhar S. Mirchandani (National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi). These gentlemen bear no responsibility, however, for the form in which their data is presented, or for the conclusions drawn from this data.} \]
incorrectly describe the conditions which obtained in Late Traditional Japan, Turkey and India. On the basis of very incomplete evidence, we are drawn to the tentative conclusion that some 40 - 50% of the Fathers of Late Traditional Reformers were members of the upper or upper middle class; and that 75 - 80% of the Reformers themselves gained or maintained social status of an equivalent rank. However, a significant shifting of Father of Reformer/Reformer occupation can be found; for while almost none of the Fathers were engaged in service professions (other than government), over 50% of the Reformers were themselves trained in medicine, scholarship, journalism, law, religion or the military. In addition, at least 75% of the Reformers possessed some modicum of knowledge regarding the West and Western method.

Training in Western professional skills seems to have accounted for much of the social advance of the Reformers. The acquisition of these skills — and a compulsion to use them — presumably motivated the Reformers to some degree in pressing towards modernization of their society. However, there is almost nothing to indicate that any of the Reformers

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7 The biographic material presented is intended to be suggestive, rather than comprehensive. Only one criterion applied to the writer's choice of 300-odd names from which Messrs. Choi, Ulman and Mirchandani generated 116 biographies. That criterion was that the men included be sufficiently important to merit reference in standard historical texts. This, of course, led to a significant bias from the outset. For the most part, the biographies presented are of men of some note — leaders rather than followers. It would be rather difficult for members of the lower middle and lower classes to gain the forefront of reformist movements during Late Tradition, if only because they would tend to have few opportunities for exposure to advanced ideas and skills during their formative years.
consciously sought or wanted a wholesale overthrow of Tradition's political, social or economic systems. Doubtless because so many of them were of genteel heritage, the Reformers appear to have wished rectification of certain inequities and inefficiencies in historic institutions, rather than their destruction. The biographies suggest, therefore, that while vertical mobility may have been sought by Late Tradition's Reformers, their working objective was absorption into the upper reaches of the elite with which they identified, rather than replacement of that elite by a new class.

E. Economic Changes in the Late Traditional Period

The introduction of a nucleus of Western-style capital during Late Tradition relieved the pressure of parametric constraints by shifting outward the margins at which physiographic parameters imposed limits on economic expansion. The period's innovations were, however, too limited in scope to remove the threat of stagnation and decline through environmentally-created crisis. The application of modern technology was generally on a modest scale. In addition, Western plant was introduced for the most part in sectors which had not yet been fully integrated into the national economy; and its introduction did not immediately yield strong self-reinforcing economic impulses.

India's early economic buildup was in certain respects considerably more impressive than that of either of the other two subject countries. Overhead capital creation was rapid in the second half of the nineteenth century, particularly in transport, communications and land reclamation. Moreover, a light industrial sector was introduced through textiles; and
both mining and agricultural products were turned out by large-scale enterprises specializing, in the case of plantation industries, in production for export. The Japanese also expanded their production of raw materials; but unlike India, Japan did little in the way of modernizing the consumer goods sector. Instead, the Japanese—like the Ottoman Turks, to a lesser degree—placed primary stress on the creation of heavy industries such as metallurgical and marine works.

Differences in investment patterns were only peripherally the result of an "invisible hand". Capital creation in Japan was a direct reflection of military needs and was largely administered by political bodies whose concern with profit levels must be considered to have been minimal. Though it appears that the result was largely unintentional, the monetary and fiscal policies enforced by individual clans as well as by the shogunate tended to channel investment funds increasingly into the public sector. These funds were used to build up the defensive capacity of the State, particularly after China's defeat in the Opium War. It is noteworthy that, as the threat of foreign incursions grew, shogunate efforts to dissipate clan funds through ceremonial "public works" expenditures declined, while official sanction of investment in military hardware was given force by the decrees of 1853 ending historic restrictions on ship construction and armaments production. It is also noteworthy that forced loans and actions against guild monopolies tended to dampen further the long-standing reluctance of the chonin class to engage in novel forms of capital investment, while the close association of chonin bankers and the clans led to a channelling of private loanable funds to bodies which possessed a military and governmental function. A consistent economic
effort thus was made to prepare Japan for an all-out exclusion effort, or at least to save the Island Kingdom from the kind of humiliation imposed on China under the Open Door Policy. The goals of security and national dignity remained central down through the end of the Traditional period. They therefore biased the course of Japan's early industrial growth, focusing capital creation into areas which - in the case of armaments at least - possessed little generative capacity. This phase was not accompanied - as nearly as we can estimate - by a rise in per capita income.

Indian per capita income also showed little rise during Late Tradition; but this was more a function of population growth and the peculiarities of the colonial relationship than it was of conscious channelling of investment into non-productive military sectors. However, India suffered from an economic "drain": a certain (indeterminable) percentage of gross national income was turned back to England each year. Nonetheless, it appears that the net value of this flow was considerably less than nationalist Indians long were wont to claim, for it was primarily as a result of British investment that India was able to achieve an overhead capital base capable of supporting the creation of a modern economic system.

India's modern sector was slow in growing despite the creation of overhead capital. This was due in part to Britain's desire for a fruitful Anglo-Indian relationship based on Indian production of raw goods and consumption of final product, and on British fabrication in the Intermediate stage. Free trade policies intruded as well. They not only sent India's traditional crafts to the wall, but also dampened the incentive
toward private capital creation in India despite a level of consumer demand which rose with the upward curve of population. Textile development provided the only significant exception to this pattern. In addition to these immediate economic limitations on the pattern and momentum of Indian growth, the structure and values of the Indian elite did not then lend themselves to a vigorous exploitation of the potential spreading effects which might have flowed from the initial introduction of modern economic activity.

Ottoman Turkey experienced less economic development than did either Japan or India. It is true that railroadization occurred; but, since military considerations were held paramount in the location of trackage, the usefulness of the transport skeleton for commercial purposes was distinctly compromised. However, portions of the interior of Rumelia and Anatolia were opened by the lines laid down; and this fact made expansion possible in the mining and raw material export sectors. Nonetheless, since these were largely foreign owned and operated activities, relatively little direct benefit was gained by the Muslim segment of the Empire. Thus it was the military sector which in Turkey, as in Japan, made the most internally-significant economic progress during Late Tradition.

F. Conclusion: The Wane of Tradition and Passage into Transition

In the development of Western-style capital and of a modernist cadre capable of extending the degree of new technology applied, Late Traditional Japan, Turkey and India created the means to breach historic physiographic and percipient parameters, and thus to lessen the impact of disequilibria
caused endogoneously by the pressure of population on resource levels - and exogenously by the incursions of abroad. However, it was not until the power of historic elite groups had become severely compromised that the final prerequisite to forward movement was achieved through surrender of a basic governmental postulate of the Traditional Stage. In each case presented, this surrender was a conscious act initiated specifically to strengthen the position of the Traditional regime.

With the end of static absolutism in Japan, an opportunity was created for lesser samurai of the tozama clans to rise first to positions of leadership within their own han, and later to power as the oligarchs of Meiji reform. Similar results were achieved in Turkey as a result of surrender of the personal allegiance system, and in India through Britain's support of the Congress as a means of ending the spirit of subcontinental disunion and diversity. However, the surrender of a basic governmental postulate did not make self-sustaining growth either inevitable or immediate. Traditional influences remained great, for Transitional Governments were made up of progressive-conservative coalitions. Moreover, the progressives themselves were slow in recognizing the necessity for transformation of the entire socio-political structure.

In Part III, we shall see that Japanese clan loyalties remained strong throughout Transition, even within the ranks of samurai reformers. We shall see as well that the Young Turks readily accepted many of the secular aspects of Ottoman Tradition; and that within the Congress, representatives of special interest groups pleaded particularist causes despite consequent harm to the spirit of national unity.
Part III will consider initial attempts to create national unity, a desire for progress forward rather than back, and sufficient centralization of power to bring these two other objectives about. In the three cases to be analyzed, we shall find that none of these goals was easily attained; but that two factors ultimately brought success within striking distance. The first of these was political necessity: a threat to the nation so stark and immediate that it forced Transition's reformers to jettison partisan interest for national need. The second factor was in part dependent upon the first, but it was also the result of advances in modern technical skills and/or capital creation. This second factor was the shift of the locus of political power away from Tradition's semi-autonomous social and political institutions toward centers of strength which used Western techniques for generating, allocating and employing power.
Appendix II.1.(J.)

KAMON NO KAMI ON FOREIGN INTERCOURSE (1853)

"...Should a crisis [with abroad] occur now, I do not think that the peace of the country and the safety of the State can be assured by simply maintaining the old laws closing the sea to the navigation of our vessels, and in any case some time must elapse before measures for defence are complete. Since the destruction of all war vessels of 500 koku and over, we have no warships which could use heavy guns in a fight with foreigners....It is an old axiom that the advantage is with the side which attacks, and not with that which defends. Our ancestors passed a law closing the ocean to navigation by our ships, but they left a Chinese and Dutch bridge. This bridge will now be convenient to the government in carrying out its foreign policy. If we postpone hostilities for the present, a scheme to obtain certain victory and complete security may be devised. Coal, which America desires, is said to be abundant in Kiushiu [sic] ... if there is a surplus (not wanted by us), it should be given them; firewood and water too are things which we should not grudge. With regard to provisions, there are plenty and scarce years in all countries (and in the former, stores ought to be accumulated to provide for the latter), but these ought to be given to shipwrecked people. Moreover, with regard to castaways, these should be cared for, and restored to their homes, as has been done of late years.... Again, with regard to trade, there is a national prohibition, but there is a difference between the past and the present; to exchange what one has for what one has not is the law of the universe....

"...no longer should we remain excluded from the world, but [by becoming] completely equipped at home and abroad, the Imperial land (Empire) would be secure. This is my view. Let us go forward (to meet difficulties - not wait for them to come to us) and set to work at once. Having done this, the Government can, in accordance with circumstances, at any time prohibit intercourse as in the Kwanyei [sic] period and prevent foreigners from coming to Japan. This, I think, is a good plan. Again with regard to the prohibition of the strange teaching [Christianity], this should be maintained with the utmost strictness...."

Source: J. H. Gubbins, The Progress of Japan, 1853-1871, Appendix 15 (pp. 285-88); quoting from Kaikoku Shimatsu, "The Affair of the Opening of the Country".
Appendix II.2.(J)

CERTAIN REGULATIONS AGREED TO BY JAPAN AND FOREIGN POWERS:

1854—1858

(The materials presented have been extracted from the following 11 treaty conventions, signed by Japan and ...)

A) USA
   (signed: Kanagawa, 31/Mar/54),
B) USA
   (" Shimoda, 2/Sep/54),
C) GB
   (" Nagasaki, 14/Oct/54),
D) Russia
   (" Shimoda, 26/Jan/55),
E) GB
   (? 18/Oct/55),
F) Netherlands
   (" Nagasaki, 9/Nov/55),
G) Netherlands
   (" Nagasaki, 30/Jan/56),
H) USA
   (" Shimoda, 17/Jan/57),
I) Russia
   (" Nagasaki, 12/Oct/57),
J) Netherlands
   (" Nagasaki, 16/Oct/57),
K) USA
   (" Edo, 29/Jul/58).

The extracts are listed chronologically by category of concession, and they are referred by letter to the first of the treaty conventions in which the subject in question appears. Since "most favored nation" clauses early were incorporated into the treaties of Japan and all the Western Powers except the Netherlands (which maintained a special relationship with Japan until early 1856), it may be assumed that regulations agreed to by Japan and any individual nation held as well for all other nations involved in the "opening" of Japan.

I — Opening of Japanese Territory to Foreigners

1) Shimoda and Hakodate opened as ports at which foreigners can purchase naval stores. (A)
2) Nagasaki opened. Other ports may be used in cases of distress. (C)
3) "Ships of War have a general right to enter the ports of friendly Powers in the unavoidable performance of public duties." (E)
4) The following ports and cities due to be opened on the dates specified (though actually, postponements occurred): Kanagawa [Yokohama] (4/Jul/59), Nagasaki (4/Jul/59), Nee-e-gata (1/Jan/60), Edo (1/Jan/62), Hiogo (1/Jan/63), Osaka (1/Jan/63). In all cities other than Edo and Osaka, foreigners granted right to permanent residency and may buy land, build buildings (except fortifications), etc. (K)

II — Commercial Relations

1) Limited trading rights granted; the Japanese Government retains right to regulate any trade which occurs. (A)
2) Goods purchased in Japanese shops will not be turned over to foreigners direct. Rather, items will be sent to the government office and there be handed over on the receipt of the sales price. (B)
3) No limitation on the number of ships or amount of money employed in trade; "all commercial transactions will be done by the mutual consent of both parties". (I)
4) Custom-House cannot limit number of times unsold goods are offered for sale, or number of Japanese merchants attending such sales. (I)
5) Articles of war may be sold only to Japanese Government. (I)
6) Export from Japan of gold and silver coin and bars is prohibited (I). [This provision modified to allow export of coin in 1858. (J)]
7) Copper, all sorts of arms, harness, silk stuff, "Japanese brocade" can be exchanged only for objects ordered by the Japanese Government. (I)
8) Except for purchase for private use, rice, barley, wheat, beans, coals, certain types of writing paper, books, charts and copper only can be purchased from the Custom-House. (I)
9) In the case of smuggling in open ports, the goods involved alone will be confiscated. If smuggling takes place elsewhere, both goods and ship will be seized. This may not be done, however, until a joint decision has been reached by Japanese and foreign consular authorities. (I)
10) Import of opium into Japan prohibited. (I)
11) The Japanese Government reserves the right to forbid the export of food, wax and paper when these goods are domestically in short supply. (I)
12) After 4/Jul/72, renegotiation of all clauses can be initiated; prior notification of one year of desire so to do is, however, required. (K)

III-Tariff, Anchorage Fees, Tonnage Dues

1) Any merchantman remaining in a Japanese port for more than 48 hours (unless its visit is for repairs) will be subject to anchorage fees of "5 mace or 42 copecks for each ton, if the vessel is above 150 tons, and 1 mace or 9 copecks for every ton" if of a smaller size. This fee is to be charged only at the first port of call. (I)
2) The "existing" 35% import duty is noted at time of agreement (1857), but it is not to apply to goods purchased by the Custom-House. (I)
3) Tonnage duties replaced by entry and clearance charges ($15 for entry and $7 for clearance) plus charge of 1 1/2 dollars for every document required. (K)
4) Import duties (ad valorem):
   - free entry on gold, silver, personal property
   - 5% duty on sea stores, house timbers, rice, steam machinery, salted provisions, breadstuffs, living animals, coal, zinc, tin, lead, raw silk
   - 35% duty on all intoxicating liquors
   - 20% duty on all other goods. (K)
Export Duties (ad valorem):
   - Free export of gold and silver coin; bar copper
   - 5% duty on everything else. (K)
IV - Legal Rights of Foreigners

1) Foreign vessels and crewmen in shipwreck will be aided by the Japanese. In the event of being cast ashore, foreigners and their salvaged goods will be transported by the Japanese to Shimoda or Hakodate. (A)

2) Shipwrecked foreigners shall not be imprisoned "but shall be amenable to just laws". (A)

3) Restrictions on freedom of movement beyond the treaty ports specified. (A)

4) Those foreigners "transgressing Japanese laws may be apprehended by the police and taken on board their ships". (B)

5) Foreigners on shore may enter shops and temples at will; they must have specific permission before entering military establishments or private houses. (B)

6) If high officials or commanders break Japanese laws, the ports may be closed. However, no "acts of individuals, whether high or low, previously unauthorized or subsequently disapproved by Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain, can set aside the Convention" - even if ports are, for a time, closed. (C;E)

7) If persons of inferior rank break Japanese laws, they shall be turned over to their own superiors for punishment. (C)

8) Foreigners committing offenses in Japan to be tried by their own Consuls according to their own laws. (H)

9) The right of Consuls-General to go farther than the established radii surrounding the treaty ports recognized in principle. Consuls-General are, however, asked to delay using this right except in case of emergency. (H - see also section V, article 3 below.)

10) Families of foreigners to be allowed to enter Japan. (I)

11) Foreigners allowed to "practice their own or the Christian religion within their own buildings and at the burying-places appointed for them". (J)

12) In cases of dispute between foreigners, Japanese Government will not intervene. (J)

V - Establishment of Foreign Diplomatic Missions and Foreign Colonies

1) 18 months after signing of treaty (3/Mar/54), US consuls or agents may be permitted to reside at Shimoda, "provided that either of the two governments deem such arrangement necessary". (A)

2) Foreign citizens allowed to become permanent residents of Shimoda and Hakodate after 4/Jul/58. (H)

3) A Diplomatic Agent may reside at Edo, and Consuls or Consular Agents may reside in all ports opened for foreign commerce. The Diplomatic Agent and Consul-General may move freely throughout Japan. (K - see also section IV, article 3 above.)

Source: Gubbins; Progress of Japan; 227ff.
Appendix II.3.(J.)

SUMMARY OF TOKUGAWA NARIAKI OF MITO'S 14 POINTS (16 July 1858)

First Four Points

"The American barbarians made representations last winter, and after interviews had been held treaties were concluded. I understand it is the Shogun's intention to complete military preparations with the profit made out of commerce. In my opinion military preparations should be completed first. If this be done, commerce will be developed later. I beg the Government will consider this.

"It is said that the northern barbarians have made a request, and that, if this be not granted, all countries will unite and attack us. This is quite probable, but assisted only by hearsay, and maps, they will not be able easily to penetrate far into the interior of our country. Everything now is quiet, but by means of trade and their bad religion the barbarians will become intimate with our people, and they will learn thoroughly the geography of the country, and the feelings of the nation. Then, if war should break out, the situation will be much more dangerous. I beg the Government will consider this.

"It is said that a Minister is to be placed in Japan, and that he will have charge of all matters and communicate with the Minister in charge of foreign business. If this should happen, he will ask for changes in all sorts of things relating to foreign countries, besides commerce, which he may regard as inconvenient. And it is impossible to say what harm may not be done. They (the foreigners) say, that in the case of the opium war in China, the matter would have been amicably arranged had there been a Minister in Peking. But if there was not a Minister in Peking, there was one in China. I beg that the Government will deal with the matter after they have carefully examined the action taken by the Chinese Government. The foreigners ask a speedy decision, but I beg the Government will carefully consider this point.

"With regard to the request for the opening of several ports, is this only for the American barbarians? The others may come and say it is difficult for them to live in the same ports as the American barbarians, and may ask for more ports to be opened."

The Remaining Ten Points opposed: the geographic limits set by the treaties; foreigners' rights to build Christian churches; the loss of discipline and morale resulting from indiscriminate introduction of foreign learning.

Part III

THE RISE OF NATIONALISM IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD

Chapter 10. - Attempts at Reform of Japan's Traditional Polity

Chapter 11. - Turkish Nationalism Succeeds Ottoman Liberalism

Chapter 12. - Indians Seek Participant Membership in the British Empire

Chapter 13. - Conclusions: The Decision to Jettison Vestiges of the Past as a Means of Securing National Goals

The consequences of surrender of Tradition's basic governmental postulate are traced out in these chapters. It is shown that the conservative-progressive coalition which arises early in Transition has as its initial objective the revitalization of Tradition's power base by means which threaten none of the special interests represented by the coalition's individual members. However, several factors slowly make the modern-trained members of the coalition aware that they must free themselves from the inhibitions imposed by the Traditionalist element. One of these factors is personal ambition. Restrictions on innovation deny the progressives full scope for their talents and aspirations. A second factor is efficiency; for the establishment of modern institutions overlapping in function those retained from the Traditional period leads to waste, confusion and languishing power. A third factor is recognition of national necessity. As Transition moves forward, the progressive component of the ruling coalition comes to recognize that fundamental changes in both the political and social sectors must be initiated if the State is to remain viable.

As these and other factors coalesce, modernist members of the conservative-progressive coalition begin to undermine the foundations on which the Traditional elite had built its power. This is a radical trend which gains success only slowly. However, its significance is great. It testifies to the depth of the commitment of modern-trained classes to the effective performance of their society. It also reflects a shift in the locus of political power away from the Regions to the urbanized Center. This shift is both a result and a cause of economic growth.

**Statistical series relevant to Transition, Transformation and Take-Off will be found infra, Appendix V.**
Chapter 10.

ATTEMPTS AT REFORM OF JAPAN'S TRADITIONAL POLITY

During the closing years of Tradition, Japan created the nucleus of a modern sector in the economy. Adoption of policies basing employment on skill rather than status resulted in increasingly efficient utilization of this capacity. Particularly after the static absolutism of Tokugawa had been effectively abolished, a new opportunity for resolution and forceful political action was created. But for five years following the 1862 abrogation of sankin kotai's hostage provisions, caprice and vacillation dominated Japanese political activity.

This chapter will follow the steady rise to national executive authority of the young tozama samurai. It will show why domestic and foreign crisis slowly forced these samurai to develop programs inconsistent with the maintenance of the Traditional economic and political systems, and how indirection and ambiguity came to be employed by the Meiji reformers to increase the power of the Center at the expense of the Regions. The growing impact of modern technology upon political power will be considered, as will the ways national political institutions came to be utilized to increase the rate of modern capital development.

The accomplishments of Transition were not easily achieved. Domestic economic crisis, clan loyalties, and disagreement regarding goals for action all tended to dissipate energy and weaken social and political discipline. In addition, there was growing evidence of
foreign determination to intrude into Japan's internal affairs. The events of August 1862 had furnished a powerful illustration of this fact; for in that month a British naval squadron bombarded Kagoshima, the Satsuma capital, in reprisal for the murder of an Englishman by Satsuma samurai. But in Japanese eyes this murder had been justified. The Englishman in question had neglected to make the obeisance required of commoners when he was approached by Shimazu Saburo, the clan chieftain of Satsuma.

While the problem of foreign relations could not be overlooked during Transition, external affairs took in general a position ancillary to, and dependent upon, considerations relating to domestic reform. Here certain common factors determined the receptivity - both of individuals and of clans - to specific policy alternatives. These factors are set forth below, together with the dates during which each appears to have held primacy relative to the others in shaping the formation of transient political coalitions:

a) existence of historic and/or personal attachment to the offices of the Shogun or the Tenno (1862-64);
b) existence of historic antipathies between certain clans (1864-66);
c) identification with regional, or centralized, feudalism (1866-69);
d) social position, occupational experience and education of individuals supporting specific policy alternatives (1869-71).

It will be noted that, taken as isolated phenomena, a) and b) appear to reflect a preoccupation with questions of who should rule; c) relates more specifically to the institutions of government; and d), to social questions regarding function and status. On these three issues turned the historic events set forth below.
I - Creation of a New Political Structure (1862-1871)

A. Edo vs. Kyoto: The Contest for Loyalty (1862-1867)

i.) Internal Rivalries at the Tenno's Court - In part, the confusion which afflicted Kyoto in the first months following de facto abandonment of sankin kotai rested on the continuing self-identification of most daimyo with traditional patterns of regional separatism and strict leige-vassal relationship. Choshu and Satsuma much exacerbated this parochialism; for they were historic rivals in addition to being the primary contestants for leadership of the anti-Tokugawa forces.

Satsuma first gained the Tenno's favor, taking leadership of the Kyoto coalition as early as 1860. However, the Shimazu family, which had recently become allied to the Shogun through marriage, advocated a return to those confederative techniques of government which had been practiced during the century preceding Ieyasu's establishment of Tokugawan dictatorship. Certain of the fudai clansmen were sympathetic to the amalgamation of the Edo and Kyoto courts (kobu gattai); so too were a large party of kuge as well as most of the tozama daimyo actually present at the Imperial seat. But a number of clansmen suspected that Shimazu Saburo desired to reassert the primacy of the shogunate - a Satsuma shogunate. This prospect was disquieting not only to imperial loyalists but also to the nominal allies of the

1 supra, p. 93.
Shimazu family, for a Satsuma shogunate might prove exceptionally powerful. Few of the other clans could equal Satsuma either in terms of the traditional measures of wealth and power, or in the extent to which novel Western technologies had been applied internally to han military and economic endeavors. And fear of Satsuma went still deeper than this. For particularly after the bombardment of Kagoshima, Satsuma's clan bureaucrats had begun to show a disconcerting proclivity to side with the bakufu on matters of foreign relations.

Choshu and its loyalist adherents appeared more dependable to conservative advisors of the Tenno. True, Choshu samurai were not entirely dedicated to the Traditional political structure, but the clan as a whole stood firmly behind the Kyoto court in its contest with Edo. In addition, supporters of Choshu leadership - ronin who had been enrolled in Choshu's military levies; advocates of Shinto; kuge intriguing to reassert their ancient power - were sufficiently influential to ensure the ascendancy of Exclusionism within clan councils. It was presumably for this reason that Choshu decided to ignore a change in bakufu policy, and in June 1863 to attack Western vessels broaching the Shimonoseki Strait despite Kyoto's decision to delay.²

² Shortly after the Shogun made his memorable entrance into Kyoto in April 1863, the decision was taken to expel the Barbarians, by force if necessary, after 24/25 June. Just before the deadline, the bakufu's position that expulsion could not certainly be achieved came to be accepted by the Tenno. It was therefore decided to delay the beginning of the expulsion operation.
Though a French landing party destroyed one Choshu battery on 20 July, the Straits remained closed to Barbarian shipping for over a year. Finally in September 1864 a joint squadron of American, British, Dutch and French men o'war attacked Shomonoseki and spiked or removed all the remaining Choshu guns. The implications of this defeat were not lost on the clan, but embroilment in anti-shogunate intrigues served for a time to nullify their effectiveness. On 19 August 1864, Choshu clansmen had revolted in Kyoto against the "evil advices" of those recommending modification of the court's exclusionist policies; and in the months which followed, the Choshu daimyate was invaded by a shogunate-organized force comprising large numbers of Aizu, Echizen, Hikone, Owari and Satsuma samurai under the general field command of the ex-daimyo of Owari.

The first invasion of Choshu temporarily resolved the problem of ultimate loyalty, for kobu gattai seemed to be being put into practice. However, the question of political leadership over the confederated government still was unsettled. Both the Tenno and the Shogun reigned ever though they little ruled. Until the mantle of authority could be unambiguously placed on one institution, continued internecine strife appeared inevitable. While preparing to support the primacy either of the military dictator or of the Emperor, the clans found opportunity to settle old scores among themselves.

ii.) Clan Warfare and the Defeat of Tokugawa - Had the shogunate been willing merely to exact a nominal punishment on the prostrate Choshu rebels, conditions at the end of the revolt might have reverted
essentially to the same position they had been in during early 1863.
However, the Mito group controlling the bakufu apparently decided to
destroy their ancient rivals permanently once it came to be known that
antipathy toward the shogunate continued to dominate Choshu clan
councils. A new expedition was therefore ordered, but this time there
was widespread opposition among the daimyo clustered around the Edo
and Kyoto courts. The ex-daimyo of Owari declared that "it was not
right to take up arms without manifest cause". The ex-daimyo of
Echizen concurred, and so too did a number of other prominent clans-
men including the leaders of Satsuma.

Satsuma's cordiality towards Choshu was, on the face of it,
exceptional, for added to the historic enmity of the two clans there
were the exacerbations of early Transition. That Emperor Komei had
transferred his favor from Satsuma to Choshu did not sit well with
the former clan; neither did Choshu's studied opposition to most of
Satsuma's policy proposals. Later events served to further increase
the two clans' mutual antipathies. Satsuma did not readily excuse the
accidental sinking of one of her foreign-built steamers by Choshu
gunners guarding the Shimonoseki Straits. Choshu for her part did not
forgive Satsuma's role as a defender of the "evil advices" of postponed
exclusionism, a role which began in the Imperial Council and led to
a contest of arms between the samurai of the two clans during Choshu's
August 1864 raid on Kyoto. But the victory of the allied fleet at

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Shimonoseki taught Choshu the lesson which Satsuma had learned two years earlier at Kagoshima. Thus leadership in clan deliberations shifted from loyalist reactionaries to loyalist progressives. This modification lessened the policy differences separating Satsuma and Choshu. In addition, because Choshu men wounded in the Kyoto attack apparently were well treated by Satsuma defenders, the personal dislikes of Satsuma and Choshu clansmen for each other were lessened.

Mito's proposal of a second expedition against Choshu ended Satsuma's championship of kobu gattai. As a result, when the shogunate army finally attacked Choshu's forces near Hiroshima in July, 1866, the defending clan was more than a match for its opponents. Satsuma secretly purchased foreign arms for the Choshu samurai; and though this helped tip the scales to the defenders, defeat of the shogunate forces probably would have been assured under any circumstances. For the shogunate army raised for the second expedition against Choshu lacked many of the best combat formations of the former war. Missing were the troops of clans which, like Satsuma, saw the campaign as one designed to reestablish shogunate dictatorship rather than to punish a recalcitrant member of the national confederation.

The rout of the units marching on Hiroshima was a great blow to Edo's prestige, for the Shogun himself was in nominal command of the operation. However, before the shogunate troops could be thrown back to their base of operations at Osaka, Shogun Iyemochi died (September

\[ ^{4} \text{ibid., p. 163-4.} \]
1866). Keiki succeeded to the office for which he had been proposed more than a decade earlier, and in accordance with customary practice a truce was declared in the field. Then the Tenno died, on 3 February 1867. This event furnished the occasion for a general disbanding of the contesting armies as a symbol of the nation's mourning.

The accession of Emperor Mutsuhito (posthumously called "Meiji" after the title ascribed to his reign) led to a change in Imperial attitude towards foreign affairs. Unlike Komei, the new Tenno had no hatred for foreigners and their ways. This fact inevitably strengthened the position of modernist reformers who wanted governmental sponsorship of a progressive effort. But more immediately, the progressives were aided by the shogunate's Hiroshima defeat; for not only the tozama clans, but a number of hitherto quiescent fudai clans now felt it possible to defy Edo at will. This defiance was at first most pronounced in continuing refusals to accede to the bakufu's effort (begun in 1865) to reintroduce sankin kotai. Recognizing the virtual impotence of his office, and being, as well, personally loyal to the Tenno, Shogun Keiki offered his resignation on 8 November 1867. In so doing, he yielded to the demands of Japan's

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5 Meiji means "enlightened government".

6 Part of Keiki's resignation manifesto states that: "...my ancestor received special favour from the Throne (by being appointed Shogun), and his descendants have succeeded him for over 200 years. Though I fill the same office, the laws are often improperly administered, and I confess with shame that the condition of affairs today shows my incapacity. Now that foreign intercourse becomes daily more extensive, unless the Government is directed from one central point, the basis of administration will fall to pieces. If, therefore, the old order of things be changed, and the administrative authority be restored to the Imperial Court, if national deliberations be
new power coalition, which was created by young samurai of Tosa, Satsuma, Choshu and Hizen and based its authority on the military potential of these four clans.

B. Changes in the Process of Government (1867-1871)

i.) Establishment of a New Governmental Form - The specific considerations which led to the formation of the Satcho-Hito alliance are unknown, but we may conjecture that three basic factors were instrumental in creating a desire for rapprochement. The first of these was the foreign threat. Through their bombardments of Kagoshima and Shimonoseki, the foreigners convinced the Satcho-Hito clans that the attempts at weapons improvement which had been initiated during the 1840's were insufficient to protect Japan from foreign incursions and that more intensive Westernization of physical plant was necessary. The policy of Exclusionism thus became a dead letter on the tozama han, though xenophobia remained deeply imbedded in the substrata of conservative beliefs. Perhaps the attitude of the Emperor Meiji should be added as a determinant of the new tozama

conducted on an extensive scale, and the Imperial decision then invited, and if the Empire be protected with united hearts and combined effort, our country will hold its own with all the nations of the world. This is our one duty to our country, but if any persons have other views on the subject they should be stated without reserve." J. H. Gubbins, The Progress of Japan, p. 305.

7 "Satcho-Hito" derives from Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen and Tosa. From the first, the Satcho element was the stronger of the two and eventually forced many of the representatives of Hito to surrender their governmental positions.
policy position; for the Emperor did have the loyalty of Satcho-Hito, and he chose not to express antipathy toward things Western.

The second factor was the demise of hopes that kobu gattai might be achieved. By calling for reinvasion of Choshu, the shogunate not only discredited itself, but also focussed attention on the bakufu's desire to reassert its authority over the separate clans. The attempt to reestablish sankin kotai already had betokened the intransigency of Edo. To this the second Choshu campaign added a threat that invasion might be ordered against any clan which failed to accept the dictates of the shogunate.

The final factor was the growth of lateral communication among lesser samurai of the Satcho-Hito clans. In all four han, men trained in the "Dutch Knowledge" already had risen to positions of influence within clan councils because of their technical skills and proper forecasts of foreign capacity to breach Japanese defenses. As clan interaction for the purpose of assuring both internal and external security increased, opportunities for inter-clan intercourse widened at the lesser clan-bureaucrat level. However, it would be straining the facts to assert that the lesser samurai of Satcho-Hito alone brought Japan into its modernization phase, for the daimyo still officially enunciated clan policy. Japan was not yet beyond its feudal institutions, nor even beyond the administrative dominance of the bakufu.

Though Keiki's resignation was formally accepted by the Tenno on 12 November 1867, the ex-Shogun was asked to retain control of
the national executive until a new, provisional administration could be formed. Both Keiki and his opponents believed that this request signified Imperial intent to employ the Tokugawa family within any new governmental structure. Such a prospect was anathema to the enemies of Mito, who intrigued to force an open irreparable breach between Edo and Kyoto. The first fruits of this effort were realized on 3 January 1868, when the Aizu clan (fudai) was relieved by court order of its former duties as the Imperial Guard. At the same time, the office of Shogun was abolished, Choshu was pardoned for its recent insurrection, and Choshu clansmen were allowed to return to the capital.

Keiki's immediate response to these directives was merely to enter a formal protest and to withdraw from Kyoto to Osaka. However, the progress of events soon convinced him that the well-being of his direct retainers was becoming endangered. Accordingly, he mounted

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8 The shogunate was replaced by the Sanshoku (offices of the Central Government). Its initial structure included:

(a) The Sosai (President): Prince Arisugawa
Deputies: the Kuge Sanjo and Iwakura;

(b) The Gijo (Councillors of the First Class): 2 Princes of the Blood, 3 kuge and the daimyo of Owari, Echizen, Aki, Tosa and Satsuma;

(c) The Sanyo (Councillors of the Second Class): 5 kuge, and 15 samurai drawn from the clans represented in (b).

On 10 February 1868, Seven Ka /Ka/ (Departments of State) were added. These included (in order of precedence) the Departments of: Shinto Religion, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Army and Navy, Finance, Justice and Legislation. On 25 February, the Sanshoku was revised through amalgamation of the Presidency and the Seven Ka into the Eight Kyoku, a form of government modelled on early Chinese institutions. W.W. McLaren, "Japanese Government Documents", Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 1st ser., Vol. XLll, Part I, 1914, pp. 4.-6. Hereafter, the McLaren work will be identified as W.W. McLaren, Japanese Government Documents.
an attack on Kyoto late in January. Half way between Osaka and
Kyoto, the weak Tokugawa force was repulsed and Keiki found it
necessary to withdraw first to Osaka, and then by sea to the bastion
at Edo. Finally, the last of the Tokugawa was forced to retire by
sea to Ezo (Hokkaido). Though guerrilla warfare continued in North-
eastern Honshu and on Ezo into the Spring of 1869, the restoration
of power to the Imperial Court was largely completed during the
Spring of 1868.

McLaren notes that "among the actual promoters of the movement
for the Emperor's restoration there were two very different views of
its meaning. To the Conservatives it was a return to antiquity
(Fukko), to the Radicals a /novel/ renovation (Isshin)." This
dichotomy of attitude persisted long after the defeat of Keiki and
considerably enhanced the dangers facing a political structure whose
very existence was constantly jeopardized not only by threatened
foreign intervention, but also by domestic social imbalance, and by
endemic budgetary crisis.

At the moment of Restoration, the Throne was assured of only
those paltry revenues which had been granted it under Tokugawa in
order to maintain the Kyoto court. Former shogunate funds became
available to the new Government as Transition sputtered toward its
close; but even these sums were scarcely sufficient to cover minimum
costs of defence and administration. 10 Thus a fiscal strait jacket

9 W.W. McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era,
1867-1912, New York, 1916, p. 15. See also G.E. Uyehara, The

10 Accurate figures are not available for early Restoration finances.
Gubbins suggests that total shogunate income from land revenue
probably did not exceed ¥ 4,000,000 yearly. J. H. Gubbins, The
Progress of Japan, pp. 191-2.
girdled Kyoto. The Restoration Government could exist only on the sufferance of rich chonin (who provided liquid funds) and the major clans (which furnished both revenues and personnel for national service). Merchant gifts were relatively easy to obtain since most of the leading chonin houses long had made it a practice to contribute funds to governments in being in order to protect their business endeavors. But the support of the major clans was not yet fully assured.

As the McLaren quotation suggests, policy disagreements split reactionary and progressive elements throughout Japan. On the han, lesser samurai often acted as the major disputants regarding specific courses of action while their elders, who retained nominal control and ultimate veto over clan policy-making, remained outwardly neutral. This neutrality sometimes masked great indecision, for the daimyo desired both regional autonomy and national strength. Since intra-clan loyalty and discipline remained relatively strong and specific, while the spirit of obedience to central authority still was of a most nebulous and rudimentary character, the Kyoto Government could not overlook the possibility of revolts led by daimyo anxious to protect their clan's independence and able to demand from their subordinates a degree of compliance totally beyond the Central Government's ability to emulate. 

11 This may be partly attributed to the fact that Mutsuhito "ruled" little more than had his predecessor Komei during the years which shall be covered in this study. Of course, since the Meiji Emperor was only fifteen at the time of his accession in 1868, there can be no surprise at his relative quiescence during the period here discussed. Be that as it may, there remained sufficient disparity between the Tenno and those who governed in
continued unopposed. Even the likelihood that internal reform would be impeded thereby was not strong enough to induce the young progressive-nationalist samurai, who quickly rose to prominence in Meiji Governments, to attempt a direct blow at han authority in the first months following the Restoration.

The net effect of poverty, clanism, diversity of attitude and similar constraints was to create a situation in which indirection and ambiguity were the best servants of reform and progress. This is nowhere better shown than in the Emperor's Charter Oath of 6 April 1868, a document which was in part made deliberately obscure. Thus it was possible for Mitsuho to establish precedents for reform and progress at the opening of his reign without in the process stirring up the opposition of conservatives among the daimyo and samurai. Most revolutionary in a hitherto feudal-hierarchical society were the Tenno's:

(a) Promise to be receptive to public wishes (Article 1). Though the "public" involved apparently included only those of the samurai and higher rank, the idea nonetheless was potentially explosive;

(b) Recognition that commoners have "rights", or at least "legitimate desires" (Article 3);

his name to make it possible for opponents of Satcho to claim that they, rather than the Government, "properly" interpreted the Emperor's will. This situation did not end even with the coming of Transformation, as will be shown in Chapter 14.

12 G.B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan, pp. 311-12, 320. Part of the ambiguity of the Charter Oath resulted from difficulties of translation, for neither the ideograph nor the Japanese kana were easily adapted to the communication of novel ideas or Western concepts such as "liberty" and "equality". Five separate versions of the Charter Oath are presented infra, Appendix III.1.(J.).
(c) Proposal to do away with "uncivilized" or "absurd" customs: customs, that is, which were nothing if not civilized in the context of traditional Japanese experience (Article 4); and

(d) Demand that foreign knowledge be sought and applied within Japan (Article 5).

As early as 23 March 1868, the Tenno had shown his determination to destroy the isolationist mentality by granting an audience to representatives of foreign powers. That such an occasion confounded loyal traditionalists can be readily imagined; historically, all efforts had been bent toward the objective of keeping Barbarians away from the Imperial Presence. In June, additional modification of the traditional polity was inaugurated through a new revision of the Imperial Constitution. Because further innovations took place throughout the next several decades, no effort here will be made to spell out the Constitution in detail. Instead, we shall note only the following:

"The administrative authority was centered in one body called the Dajokwan, or Council of State, which was divided into seven departments: --

"1. The deliberative chamber (Sei-in), which took over the duties of the former Legislative Department, consisting of an upper and a lower house... ." The Lower House first met in 1869. Its ineffectiveness as a "popular" assembly led to its abolition in 1873.

"2. The office of the Lords President of the Council, which had functions combining those of the former Department of Supreme Administration and Home Department, which it replaced.

"3. The five other departments were, as before, those of the Shinto religion, Finance, War, Foreign Affairs, and Justice."13

Certain additional particulars are worthy of comment, particularly for the insights they provide into the intent of the progressive faction within the new Government:

(a) Representation in the Lower House was to include members for Kyoto, Edo, Osaka and the Imperial (i.e. formerly Tokugawa) Territory, as well as for each of the separate han (Article V);

(b) The status rankings associated with different offices were mentioned to make the "relative importance" of each position known, rather than to bring contempt on lesser ranks. Moreover, great display in the public appearances of nobles was outlawed "to prevent the existence of a barrier between the classes" (Articles VI and VII);

(c) A new, direct tax in the form of "tribute" was imposed (Article X); and

(d) The right of coinage and the conduct of foreign affairs were specifically reserved to the Central Government (Article XI).

These various provisions suggest that the Government was prepared to conciliate the chonin class (Articles V-VII), and that it was anxious to increase its financial and political independence of the han (Articles X-XI). In fact, though the feudal system was not done away with, han autonomy was directly threatened by a further provision in Article XI, which demanded that all administrative units conduct their governmental affairs "in accordance with the principles laid down in the Imperial Oath". But that certain of the clans did not obey the monitory provision of Article XI is indicated by the promulgation of an additional act on 11 December 1868 calling for standardization of han administrative procedures.¹⁴

¹⁴ W.W. McLaren, Japanese Government Documents, pp. 26-27. Even despite the acts of 1868 and the abolition of feudalism in 1871, clan localism persisted in a number of areas. For example, in his Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era, McLaren
Even had there been full compliance with the 11 December law, its provisions for the retention of vestiges of the feudal institution would have proved anachronistic during the development of a new, centralized Japan. Appreciation of the contradictions of local and national initiative impressed itself with ever-increasing force on the bureaucrats of the Restoration Government, who therefore began to try to convince leading clansmen that the freedom of action customarily reserved to themselves by the separate han should be finally and fully surrendered to the Tenno. On 5 March 1869 these efforts bore fruit; the daimyo of Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen and Tosa offered to return their land and population registers to the Throne so that there might be "one central governing body, and one universal authority". Most of the other clans followed suit by offering up their rolls during the later Spring. There were those who initially refused, however. On 25 July, they were notified that former distinctions between court and feudal nobility no longer applied, and also that those who refused to surrender their clan registers would be compelled to do so.

ii.) The Tactics of Reform: Piecemeal Subversion of the Past

The threat of forceful recovery of the last clan registers notes that: "In the Tokugawa period an official of the Shogun's Government entered the territory of the Shimadzu [sic] family at peril of his life, and the same was almost as true of Satsuma until after 1877." (p. 91).

indicated the young Meiji bureaucrats' final and total commitment to the goal of political centralization. There were a number of reasons for this engagement: need for rationalization of functions and policy-making procedures; loyalty to the Emperor; fear lest Japan prove too weak to withstand foreign pressures. But personal ambition played a significant role as well. The Meiji bureaucrats had a stake in success not only because of the power and position which would accrue to members of any consolidated central regime, but also because unsuccessful attempts to weaken the clans presumably would lead to the downfall of the Restoration Government. Moreover, failure of the Government might well bring sequential vilification or punishment of the Meiji bureaucrats. This would occur not because they had let the Emperor down, but rather because their efforts in behalf of the Center suggested disloyalty to the clans. Ambition, then, counselled a strategy of indirection. The tactics employed from the time of the writing of the Charter Oath remained in effect.

Application of these tactics during the 1869 clan registers' affair was indeed masterly. The considerations which were stated by the Satcho-Hito daimyo to have led them to offer up their rolls were national necessity and personal loyalty. But since the return of the registers would end the formal political authority, and also the assured personal incomes of the daimyo, it is unlikely that these factors alone induced the surrender of clan insignia. Instead, there is reason to believe that the Satcho-Hito daimyo accepted the proposition of the Meiji bureaucrats in part because they were convinced that their traditional status and authority would be
perpetuated if they supported the Central Government. This may have
required the offering of specific guarantees by the Meiji bureau-
crats; but, if so, the general gain was well worth the immediate
concession. Once Satcho-Hito patronage had been given to the Center,
the other clans had little recourse but to surrender their own clan
registers. Not only was the Restoration Government an institutional
manifestation of the Tenno's will, but the military potential of
the Center when assisted by the four tozama clans was virtually
incontestable.

No matter how great the power position of the Restoration
Government, it would not have been irrational for any daimyo to assume
that he might consolidate his personal position within the evolving
governmental structure by giving up his rolls. Emotional ties to
class and clan remained strong within the Meiji bureaucracy. More-
over, the Central Government lacked personnel sufficient to handle
domestic administration unaided. This problem was at first resolved
through the appointment of ex-daimyo as Chihanji (han Governors), an
action which appeared to prove correct the daimyos' suppositions
regarding Meiji intent. Though now made subject to the national
administration (at least in theory), the ex-daimyo continued to
function much as before.

The return of clan registers made clan revenues the direct
property of the Tenno. Using portions of these funds, the Central
Government provided the Chihanji with stipends amounting to one-half
the rice revenues "normal" in times past. In fact, the real incomes
of a great many ex-daimyo were raised by this arrangement, for the Central Government absorbed the costs of domestic political administration and began to assume responsibility for samurai allowances. Thus the return of the clan registers improved the financial position of clan lords while at the same time furnishing them with status rankings roughly equivalent to those which had been customary during the Traditional era. Only the most astute (or suspicious) of the Chihanji recognized the implications of the new procedure. But by making the ex-daimyo financially dependent upon the Center, rather than vice versa, the Meiji bureaucrats had moved far toward true centralization of power.

Though the Chihanji found little to criticize, samurai support of the new administration declined in the months following the return of clan registers. Many samurai found that their status suffered under the Chihanji system. This problem became more intense as the Center began assuming responsibility for warrior stipends. Moreover, fear of unemployment grew with the progress of reform. In August 1869, Omura Masujiro, the Minister of Military Affairs, was assassinated by a party of Choshu samurai who had heard that he wished to conscript commoners into the Army and thus deny to the

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16 The figure ½ of normal rice revenues appears in most standard treatises on the history of Japan during the 1860's. Some writers suggest, however, that the stipends furnished by early Meiji Governments amounted to only 1/10 of incomes formerly received. These differences presumably reflect different basing points from which computations were made. No matter which figure is taken, the conclusions presented above are generally agreed to.

nobility their ancient monopoly of the military arts. This in fact was the Government's intent. A national conscription law was promulgated in 1870 which enabled Japan to field a modern army by 1873. However, the samurai fear of displacement was inappropriate, for the Meiji bureaucrats never forgot their membership in the warrior class. Rather than create a commoner army in order to destroy the samurai, the Restoration Government instituted its revolutionary military policy as a protection against those hard core reactionaries who refused to participate in a modern military organization while at the same time threatening to rise against the new bureaucracy.

Rebellion was mooted by some samurai on grounds of loyalty to the Restoration. Expulsion of the Barbarians was not being considered in Government Councils; a true return to the ancient past was not attempted. Governmental handling of Tokugawa rebels suggested the ultimate in disloyalty, for while Keiki's followers had revolted directly against the Emperor, no wholesale meting out of the punishments established by precedent was attempted. Rather than traditional penalties - expropriation, banishment or death - the Meiji bureaucrats satisfied themselves with confiscation of the territories of the two leading rebel daimyo, abdication of a few other rebel chiefs, and transfer to inferior fiefs of those who had formerly occupied important areas.

Antipathy for the new regime gradually infected conservative ex-daimyo in addition to men of lesser rank. Jealousy swept the han as regional officials realized that power was being concentrated into the hands of a relatively small clique of samurai oligarchs at
the Center. In addition, the entire substructure of Traditional society was being gently nudged off its foundations. Legal distinctions between social classes were disappearing; free entry into hitherto restricted trades and professions was being discussed; and on various of the Throne lands, freedom of cropping and the right to private land ownership were being recognized.

Reactionaries particularly resented the decision which had been taken on 3 September 1869 to remove the Imperial Court to Tokyo "Eastern Capital"; formerly Edo) in order to escape the intrigues of Kyoto. During the winter of 1870, the Tenno took up residence in the old fortress of the Shoguns. However, armed intervention in opposition to this new subversion of Tradition seemed unwise, for the Satcho-Hito chieftains had recently placed certain of their feudal levies at the disposal of the Tokyo Government. On 20 December 1870, the Meiji bureaucrats acted to improve their military position yet again by ordering that henceforth, no clan leader enlist more than 60 men per 10,000 koku of han revenue into his private army. But in the meantime, Satsuma had felt justified in asking to be allowed to withdraw its troops from the Imperial Garrison. The stated reason for this request was financial expense. Antagonism to the drift of Governmental policies is believed to have been the basic reason.

This movement had been foreshadowed by certain events in the latter days of the shogunate. cf.: E. Honjo, op. cit., p. 195.

This was in fact due to a wish to provide the samurai with an opportunity to establish themselves as productive members of society.
The withdrawal of Satsuma troops foreshadowed a crisis which matured during the Spring of 1871. The future of reform was in question, for the tozama clan leaders appeared to be preparing to withdraw their support from the Restoration Government. In order to heal the breach, the Center resorted to personal appeals in the Tenno's name. Prince Iwakura, acting as the Emperor's deputy, joined Okubo at the head of a party sent to Kagoshima to confer with Shimazu and Saigo Takamori, the Satsuma clan leaders. At the same time, Kido led a mission to Yamaguchi, the home of the Mori daimyo of Choshu. Later, Okubo and Kido went on to Kochi to confer with Tosa's leading samurai, Itagaki and Fukuoka; while at the same time Iwakura visited the daimyo of the Hikone and Owari clans. The results of these missions were sufficient to ensure the hegemony of the Center, for not only did the daimyo of Satsuma, Choshu and Tosa assent to permanent removal to Tokyo, all five clans agreed to turn permanent command of some 8-9,000 troops over to the Central Government. In return, Saigo, Itagaki and Okuma were given posts in the national administration; but these were very small concessions indeed. For on 29 August 1871, feudalism was abolished in all its forms and Japan entered the period of Transformation.

For clan identification of the personages identified in this passage, see Table II, "43 Leading Statesmen of Various Meiji Governments", infra, p. 191.
### TABLE II

**Leading Statesmen of Various Meiji Governments: 1869-89**

1. **Imperial Princes and Kuge (Total: 6)**
   - Sanjo Saneyoshi; Great Minister of the Right (Udaijin): 1869-71
   - Iwakura Tomoyoshi; Udaijin: 1871-83
   - Taruhito-Shinno; Great Minister of the Left (Sadaijin): 1874-75
   - Sawa Nobuyoshi; Minister of a department (Daijin): 1 other Imperial Prince and 1 other Kuge served as Daijin

2. **Former shogunate officers or sons of officials (2)**
   - Katsu Yasuyoshi; Imperial Advisor (Sangi)
   - Enomoto Buyo; Daijin

3. **Tokugawa or fudai clansmen (4)**
   - Date Muneki (daimyo of Iyo); Daijin
   - Matsudaira Yoshinaga (daimyo of Echizen); Daijin
   - Tanaka Fujimaro (samurai of Owari); Daijin
   - Yoshikawa Kensai (of Awa in Shikoku); Daijin

4. **Satsuma clansmen (11)**
   - Shimazu Hisamitsu (daimyo); Sadaijin
   - Okubo Toshimitsu*; Saigo Takamori*; Terajima Munenori; Ijichi
   - Nasa Hari; Kuroda Kiyotaka; Saigo Tsugumichi; Kawamura Sumiyoshi; -- Sangi
   - Matsukata Masyoshi*; Mori Arinori, Oyama Iwao; -- Daijin

5. **Choshu clansmen (8)**
   - Maebara Issei; Hirosawa Saneomi; Kido Koin; Ito Hirobumi*
   - Yamagata Aritomo*; Yamada Akiyoshi; Inoue Kaoru*; -- Sangi
   - Yamao Yozo; Daijin

6. **Hizen clansmen (5)**
   - Soejima Taneomi; Okuma Shigenobu*; Oki Takata; Eto Shimpei; -- Sangi
   - Sano Tsunetami; Daijin

7. **Tosa clansmen (7)**
   - Itagaki Taisuke*; Goto Shojiro*; Sasaki Takayuki; Fukuoka Kotei; -- Sangi
   - Tani Kanjo; Hajikata Hisamoto; Kono Togama; -- Daijin

**Not all Sangi and Daijin held office continually throughout the period. Data compiled from R. K. Reischauer, op. cit., p. 64 fn.**
II - The Social and Economic Sectors

A. Status, Role and the Modernist Spirit

A theme recurring throughout the sections preceding has been the impact of modern ideas on Japanese politics, particularly due to the activities of warriors who had been thwarted by status or circumstance from successful realization of their personal ambitions. Though such a statement is consistent with the facts, it is insufficiently precise to explain why centralization and socio-economic mutation in particular ultimately triumphed over the other policy options which were available to Transition's reformers.

In this regard, it is instructive to compare the disparate careers of two highly ambitious samurai: Okuni Takamasa* of Tsuwano, and Okuma Shigenobu* of Saga (Hizen). Okuni was an expert in "National Studies"; Okuma, a student of Dutch and English. Both men agitated for reform, but while Okuni's political activities gained the patronage of his daimyo, Okuma's Western-oriented extremism so incensed his superiors that he found it necessary to dissolve clan ties in order to escape punishment. Both Okuni and Okuma were rewarded at the Restoration for their parts in anti-bakufu intrigues: the former was made a high official in the Department of Shinto Religion; the latter, a deputy successively in the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Finance. Angered by the drift of policy, however, Okuni resigned his post before Transition was completed. Okuma on the other hand stayed with the Government, and eventually rose to the Prime Ministership.
A number of points of interest are raised by these two biographies. Few of the Satcho-Hito bureaucrats favored Okuma's type of extremism prior to the Restoration. Instead, they displayed predilections similar to Okuni's and called for Tenno loyalty, clan autonomy and xenophobia despite any professional interest they may have had in "Dutch Studies". Okuni's reform prescriptions were similarly approved in principle by most of the anti-bakufu daimyo - the same men who sponsored experimental application of Western military and industrial techniques.

If we are to make personal ambition the sole key to samurai bias, daimyo opinion may be presumed to have had no little bearing on the patterns of reform called for by aspirant samurai. It was from the hands of the daimyo and his karo (clan elders) that promotion came. Since high clan officials tended to be conservative and regionalist, ambition counselled moderation in the reforms individual samurai proposed. Throughout most of Transitional Japan, therefore, lesser samurai, hopeful of rising through the favor of clan leaders, typically supported only those reforms which were amenable to the maintenance of feudalistic practices.

There were other elements in the warrior class' conservative spirit, as well. Sincere adulation of the Emperor was one, as was idealization of the samurai's role in ancient times. Moreover, there were cogent reasons for not wanting radical reform, for when measured by Japanese standards the Barbarians appeared uncouth and disreputable no matter how great their skills in technology.

Among the causes of the Satcho-Hito alliance were fear of foreigners and of a resurgent Tokugawa, desire to cement the new-found power of
the tozama coalition, and loyalty to the Emperor. Conservatives and progressives of the anti-bakufu han alike gave loyalty to the Restoration Government at its inception. But achievement of the first three goals required continuing development of Western technology, as well as some degree of centralized control. Technical progress and political centralization inevitably stimulated opposition among both social reactionaries and regionalists on the han, so gradually there developed a multi-pronged goad driving the Meiji bureaucrats forward. Most immediately, an expanding Center provided opportunities for advancement which many Satcho-Hito samurai hitherto had not been able to find in the Regions. Unlike clan governments which were stable and fully staffed, the Meiji Government was institutionally dynamic and consequently needed men. An additional incentive was provided for those visionaries who, like Okuma, had publically declared for policies detrimental to the maintenance of Traditional socio-political forms. They knew that if they failed to make the Center dominant, their clans would not hesitate to retaliate for evidences of disloyalty. And finally, there was recognition of national necessity. We do not know how rapidly experience in the Restoration Government was translated by the Satcho-Hito bureaucrats into a sense of identification with the Nation per se, rather than with individual Regions. But it is probable that loyalty to the Tenno, Keiki's revolt, and the demonstration effect of Barbarian power had crystallized by Spring 1869 into a nation-state orientation which was fundamentally anti-theetical to feudalism. Thereafter, all efforts were bent toward a
shifting of independent power sources to the Center, so that regionalism and social reaction no longer could present a challenge.

Ambition thus helped bring on Japan's advance into Transformation. But such might not have been the case had no foreign threat been present, or had there not been well-established regional institutions in competition with the Center. It must be remembered that ambition akin to that which thrust the typical Meiji bureaucrat forward tended to make comparable samurai, who had gained the patronage of conservative daimyo on the han, into opponents of socio-political progress. Similarly, the fact must not be overlooked that socio-political conservatism was not necessarily an analogue of economic reaction. This is well exemplified by the case of Satsuma, which was one of the most progressive clans in terms of development of modern, capital-intensive equipment even though it came to be more stubbornly opposed to the events of Transformation than almost any other clan.

B. The Progress of Industrialization

The economic crisis which arose during Late Tradition was not checked until after the establishment of the Restoration Government. Typical manifestations of instability were present throughout the mid-19th Century. They included widespread business failure, endemic peasant unrest, violent fluctuation in commodity prices, and spasmodic debasement of the currency.21 Japan's entry into international trade

21Responsibility for currency problems lay with the clans as well as with the shogunate. By 1867, 1894 varieties of hansatsu and banknotes were in circulation in Japan. E.H. Norman, op.cit., p. 98.
served to intensify the economic malaise, particularly as prices offered in world markets generally exceeded those which had hitherto been available domestically. But the fundamental cause of Japan's crisis was not world trade. It was a structural imbalance which resulted from the historic practices of non-innovation and forced fragmentation of markets.

Market fragmentation was valued as a socio-political regulatory measure. Restrictions on occupation, production practice, freedom of movement and the like made for a static system easily controllable by traditional political bodies. In addition, the policy was found to have important financial ramifications. Guild licensing and the granting of monopoly privileges were useful sources of revenue; application of mercantilist theories stimulated the development of highly profitable clan (including the Tokugawa clans) enterprises.22

As was shown in an earlier section, Japanese population growth during Late Tradition made for the gradual emergence of a sellers' market. When international demand emerged during the period 1854-58, the inelasticity of supply which resulted from Tradition's restrictions on business enterprise threatened to bring extreme hardship to all levels of Japanese society. Fear that necessaries such as food, gold, silver, wax and paper might go into short supply

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22 The growth of clan-directed economic activities was particularly noteworthy during the 19th Century. By 1858, for example, Satsuma han employed more than 1200 people in the production of iron products. T.C. Smith, op. cit., p. 5.
led the bakufu to try to limit their export. Cotton, silk, hemp, indigo, minerals and lacquer also found ready overseas markets as did many forms of luxury goods. The composition of the major classes of export during Transition and Transformation are set forth in the accompanying Table.

Table III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Classes of Export</th>
<th>1868-72</th>
<th>1873-77</th>
<th>1878-82</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw Silk</td>
<td>56.89</td>
<td>45.97</td>
<td>43.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>24.48</td>
<td>25.86</td>
<td>21.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Products</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>6.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals &amp; Grains</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: T.C. Smith, op. cit., Table XI.

Profits from trade increases went largely to middlemen handling storage, transport, marketing and the financing of commodity futures, rather than to ultimate producers. Thus, though the general price level increased throughout the waning years of feudalism, received incomes for the mass of the population (employed either individually, in guilds, or through han-enterprises) remained stable where they did not actually decline. The agricultural sector was greatly damaged. The introduction of cheap finished goods ruined Japan's handicrafts industry and thus led to underemployment of many workers who formerly

\[\text{23 infra, Appendix II.2. (J.), Section II, "Commercial Relations".}\]

\[\text{24 The foreign demand for raw silk, silkworm eggs, and mulberry leaves was particularly great during the years 1859-66 because of an attack of silkworm blight in the French and Italian silkworm industries.}\]
had engaged in cottage production during the periods between harvests and plantings. Japanese sugar production promptly fell in the face of outside competition; it was followed rapidly by cotton textiles and other soft goods.

Table IV

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chief Items of Import: % of Total Imports by Value: 1868-82</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868-72        1873-77        1878-82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar &amp; Sugar Products        9.37          10.67          11.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton &amp; Other Yarns           19.29         16.73          23.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Cloth                   16.39         18.93          15.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woolen Cloth                   15.97         16.74          14.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metals                         2.30          4.63           6.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: T.C. Smith, op. cit., Table II.

The entire governmental process was jeopardized by Japan's reentry into international affairs; for while the structure of the economy was changing and the Center's ordinary revenues decreased in real value, the level of appropriations thought desirable for defence, internal control and the creation of modern capital increased at an alarming rate. As a result, both the shogunate and its successor found it necessary virtually to expropriate chonin funds through forced loans in order to cover budgetary deficits. However, the Restoration Government attempted to conciliate its creditors by compensating the merchant class as a whole. Those sections of the 1868 Constitution which contained an implied promise of social amelioration for the chonin served this end, as did the Government's later assumption of responsibility for clan debts incurred
since 1843. It is uncertain just how effective such measures were in bringing chonin support to the Restoration, but there is no reason to assume that they did not have some degree of positive effect.

The support of the Satcho-Hito clans proved an important avenue toward fiscal betterment. Even though the direct monetary contributions of these clans were comparatively small, their provision of services and particularly patronage eased problems of defense and domestic control. At the time of the clan registers incident this support was crucial; it was so again in 1871 when Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa - and also Hikone and Owari - agreed to place troops under a Center command. However, neither clan support nor chonin aid fully alleviated the need for liquid capital above and beyond that which was available through feudal land taxes. Consequently approximately 48 millions of fiat money were issued in 1868-69. And approximately 5 million was borrowed through London in the years down to the end of Transition.

Both the money issues of 1868-69 and the foreign loans were used in large part to stimulate economic development. Considering Japan's long-standing monetary crisis, growth had been impressive throughout the early years of Transition. A number of new mines were

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25 These debts amounted to at least ¥34,860,000. S. Tsuru, The Development of Capitalism and Business Cycles in Japan, 1868-1897 (unpublished dissertation), Harvard University, 1940, p. 52.

26 Feudal land taxes amounted to almost 80% of ordinary revenues throughout much of Transition.

27 S. Tsuru, op. cit., pp. 52-3, 59.
opened, and in 1868 Saga introduced Western techniques in its Takashima coal mine. Satsuma built Japan's first spinning mill at Kagoshima in 1863, and a second at Sakai in 1870.\textsuperscript{28} In addition, Satsuma laid down a dockyard in 1863 and continued development of Western-style ships as well as military armaments. At least thirteen other clans also established dockyards or repair facilities during the years immediately prior to the Restoration; by the end of Tokugawa the aggregate total of Western-style vessels owned by the anti-bakufu clans amounted to 94 (most of them sail, and a number bought abroad), as against 44 for Tokugawa. On the other hand, the bakufu laid down its first shipyard in 1863 and from it launched the first steamship to be entirely fabricated on Japanese soil three years later.\textsuperscript{29}

The foregoing examples of industrial progress are significant more because of the technology applied than because of the output which resulted.\textsuperscript{30} A socio-economic revolution was occurring, and

\textsuperscript{28} The Kagoshima mill used equipment of English make and included 100 looms and 2,640 spindles. T.C. Smith, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 11.


\textsuperscript{30} Tsuru notes that new factories were established as follows from the time of the Restoration to the end of Transition:

\begin{itemize}
  \item 1868 - 24 new factories
  \item 69 - 17 “ “
  \item 70 - 33 “ “
  \item 71 - 12 “ “
\end{itemize}

However, he gives no figures regarding either output or employment. See S. Tsuru, \textit{op. cit.}, Table 8.
though its direct social effects were to be limited to the feudal caste, both the late shogunate and the Meiji Governments were anxious to speed the course of overall economic change. However, since the officers of the last bakufu administrations were too bemused by political problems to markedly affect growth on a national scale, it took the Restoration Government with its specific political objective of attainment of material strength to institute national planning for economic development.

The first major economic problem to be systematically attacked by the Meiji bureaucrats was that of market fragmentation, insofar as it resulted from bottlenecks in the transport and communications sectors. Beginning in July 1868, and progressively during the seven months succeeding, guard houses and feudal barriers were taken down from Japanese highroads. In August 1869, the telegraph was introduced. An experimental line was laid between Tokyo and Yokohama the following December and installation of a national grid was begun the year following. Since telegraph communication was seen to have an important bearing on internal security, it was reserved for State ownership. Railroadization was initiated with the establishment of a Railway Affairs Bureau on 19 April 1870. Over the next two years, trackage was laid down between Tokyo and Yokohama, but subsequent expansion of the net was impeded by the Government's determination to build railways without extensive foreign aid. Finally, the old postal

31 Well-connected chonin and certain rich peasants also were offered an opportunity to study and to engage in new technologies. However, relatively few chose to do so.

32 "...the Restoration Government, which regarded the railroad as an important instrument for national unification, set out with a strict resolve not to have it built as a private enterprise." S. Tsuru, op. cit., p. 98.
courier system was revised. Beginning in May 1871, the Post became a government enterprise in principle; by 1873, operation by the State was fully achieved.

Table V
Number of Government Post Offices in Operation: 1871-74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Post Offices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>1,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>1,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>3,245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The problem of finding useful occupations for the samurai was carried forward concurrently with planning for economic progress and involved the employment of former warriors in government jobs as well as the development of national educational facilities. In 1868, a program was established to colonize Hokkaido with samurai who would then exploit its coal mining, farming and grazing potentials.33 Recruitment into a national army was offered beginning in 1870; and as positions in the lesser civil service were opened up, members of the samurai class were given priority in employment.34 More ambitious samurai were provided opportunities to learn new technical skills.

33 This policy could not be put into effect until after the Tokugawa rebels had been suppressed.

34 87% of the national government's officials were ex-samurai in 1872; 74% of both national and local government officials were ex-samurai in 1880. C. Yanaga, Japanese People and Politics, New York, 1956, p. 26.
through on-the-job training, schooling abroad, or enrollment in the national educational establishment. A chemical institute was opened at Osaka in 1868; two years later it merged with an institute of physics. In August 1871, a technical school (kogakuryo) was established whose immediate purpose was to train an industrial managerial class. Efforts of this nature were, however, of considerably less long-run significance than was the program of national education instituted by the Department of Education at its inception in 1870. Under this program, a national university was to be established in Tokyo. This university would have administrative and curricular control over the large number of middle and elementary schools which were due to be built throughout Japan. Less than a month after feudalism's abolition, the size of projected educational plant was sharply revised upward. Despite their allegiance to the warrior class, the Satcho bureaucrats established universal education as a policy goal.

Administrative direction of economic growth projects was first placed in the hands of the Department of Civil Affairs (established May 20, 1869), which included Bureaus of Justice, Communications, Public Works and Production. However, the magnitude of desired growth necessitated the establishment of a separate planning and administrative agency, and consequently on 13 December 1870 the Department of Public Works and Industry (Kobusho) was created. The various missions of the Department, whose first head was Okuma Shigenobu*, included the following:

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*Between Keiki's resignation and the abolition of feudalism, over ¥4 million was expended in capitalization of government enterprises.
"a) To provide (an institution for) enlightenment in technology /this led to the establishment of kogakuryo/. 
"b) To encourage various industrial arts with proper reward and to make industrial production prosper.
"c) To supervise, and thus to manage, all the mines.
"d) To construct, and to repair, railroads, telegraph, and light-houses.
"e) To build, and to repair, commercial and warships.
"f) To process (refining and casting) copper, iron, and lead ores for the use in various manufactures, and to engage in the construction of machines.
"g) To survey land and sea." 36

These remained the province of Kobusho with relatively little change throughout Transition and Transformation. In 1885, as Japan began Take-Off, the Department was abolished.

III - Conclusion: The Emergence of Positive Direction under Restoration Governments

The primary goals of the Restoration Government were to strengthen Japan's sovereign authority, and to assist the dissident clans in their parochial struggle with Keiki's partisans. Achievement of these goals initially was thought to be relatively easy for Emperor loyalty, the aspirations of individuals, and consensus among the anti-Tokugawa clans all seemed to converge. Therefore, in Spring 1868 there were few who correctly assessed the magnitude of the task facing the Restoration. Even the Meiji bureaucrats seem to have had no expectation that only 40 months after the Charter Oath, the feudal institution would be discarded.

Both personal ambition and fear of reprisals pressed the Meiji

bureaucrats forward on the road toward centralization. But these considerations alone scarcely could have brought an end to regionalism, for the military power which was used to secure the position of the Center was itself regional. Assurances frequently had to be given to clan leaders, therefore, that the Restoration boded no ill: that the reforms which were being initiated in no wise threatened the position or authority of the feudal magnates. Tactically, the methods used to enspirit the *daimyo* - or Chiha[n][j]i - were masterly; they included indirection, dissimulation, the generation of high expectations, and practices of divide and conquer.

Perhaps we give the Meiji bureaucrats too much credit; for during their first months in office they operated pragmatically rather than according to preconceived plan. Problems of capital and technical shortage were attacked through early efforts to introduce new efficiencies into old institutions. Elasticity was sought by the abandonment of policies which fragmented the national markets. Procedures for the mobilization of capital were revised through the return of clan registers, an event which greatly increased the financial and political independence of the Center. But experience proved these reforms insufficient for the rapid development of national power. For this reason, in particular, the idea of national planning gradually gained favor.

The first areas in which programmed development were instituted were those of transport, communications and education. Soon after, the stress on revision of old institutions gave way to a *de facto*
revolutionism which accepted in principle the destruction of any
institution incapable of modernization. This new policy (which did
not become fully operative until the abolition of feudalism) brought
the establishment of the Kobusho. It gained support in Governmental
councils both because progress on the economic front brought in-
creasing political reaction, and because the inherited social
rigidities of Tradition made balanced growth impossible in an
undirected State.

Once recognized necessity had led the Meiji bureaucrats to accept
a policy of basic socio-political change, no chance was missed to
convince the Satcho-Hito clans both of the need for centralization
in order to achieve national strength - and of the opportunities for
clan aggrandizement which would follow on centralization. Presumably,
members of the Government exploited changes of policy in order to
gain personal stature and authority, but it is important to recognize
that the Meiji bureaucrats did not try to dispossess the leaders of
feudalism simply because they formerly had held considerable power.
On the contrary, the Restoration Government made it a policy to give
preferment to the warrior caste insofar as daimyo, samurai and ronin
indicated their willingness to engage in productive activity under
the evolving centralized system.

Momentum was introduced into the economic sector by the reforms
of 1868-71. This momentum was employed to create modern forms of
national strength and thus to substitute a sense of purpose and
prospect for the weakness and uncertainty of late shogunate rule. But
the new modernist attitude could not have been achieved had the Satcho-Hito political coalition failed to offer its patronage during the suppression of the Tokugawa rebels, again during the period of the return of clan registers, and finally (in a modified coalition) during Summer 1871. Partly because of this, but also because the Meiji bureaucrats were conscious of their *samurai* heritage, the novel social and political forms which were introduced at Transformation represented not so much a new beginning as they did a revival of that semi-mythical past in which the *samurai* had acted as prime functionaries of an active, powerful Empire.
Chapter 11.

TURKISH NATIONALISM SUCCEEDS OTTOMAN LIBERALISM

Popular enthusiasm for Young Turk success could not long obscure the fact that neither the Revolution of July 1908, nor Abdülhamid’s subsequent reestablishment of constitutional monarchy, had resolved the key issues of the time. These included: whether and how to modernize; which faction(s) should rule; the position of religion in Ottoman society; and the role of the Empire in international politics. By late 1912, it was apparent that parliamentarianism itself could not bring solution any closer; for efforts to marry orderly debate with the policy prescriptions of numerous, highly volatile splinter groups had failed. Thereupon, the secret Central Committee of the Union and Progress staged a coup d'état and began an effort to substitute centralized efficiency and secular Pan-Turanism (expansion through Central Asia) in place of the uncertain Islamic-Christian confederacy. This effort also failed, a fact which was attributable more to the continued relevance of the issues of 1908 than to the Ottoman defeat in World War I.

In this chapter's outline of the events of 1908-1922, the political sector will receive primary attention. Continuing military and political defeat hammered the Islamic community throughout Transition. Gradually, Muslim loyalties were tempered into a sense of Turkishness. In Anatolia, Mustafa Kemal* moulded this spirit until it had become proto-republican. Despite the opposition of Muslim reactionaries, and notwithstanding a critical shortage of industrial
plant and military equipment, Kemal's revolutionary cohorts slowly expelled the European invaders. Military victory established the legitimacy of the Ankara Government and made it possible for Kemal to dictate abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate. With this act, the Transformational phase began.

In the sections following, we shall contrast Union and Progress weakness with Kemalist strength. We shall see that the revolutionary movement established by Kemal in the interior of Anatolia succeeded particularly due to the fact that it was virtually the first movement in Turkish experience which called for introversion and a husbanding of strength, rather than for expansion and a concurrent impoverishment of the Turkish fibre. Defeat in the World War had provided the occasion for this change of goal. Mustafa Kemal seized on the contraction of the Ottoman Empire as both a reason for, and an event requiring, the casting off of debilitating and irrelevant vestiges of Traditionalism. The significance of Turkey's move into Transformation will be shown to have lain particularly in the fact that the Kemalists chose to devote their energies to the creation of an independent, modern nation instead of continuing an historic and feckless struggle for Empire.

I - The Decline of Ottoman Liberalism (1908-1918)

A. The Inability to Achieve Consensus (1908-1912)

The Young Turk revolution lacked sufficient backing among the Muslim peasantry and the Army's enlisted ranks for its leaders to
attempt to depose Abdüllahmid, or even to muzzle the ulema as a quasi-political body. Thus two of the primary objectives of the revolt were compromised from the outset. The dismay of the gaiur was marked. On 28 August and 5 October, Montenegro and Bulgaria declared their respective separations from the Empire, and on 7 October Austria asserted full sovereignty over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Loss of European territory demonstrated the impotence of Pan-Ottomanism as an adjunct of imperialism. But both because large gaiur minorities remained throughout the Empire, and because the July Revolution had been led for the most part by men with a European-Rumelian, rather than Anatolian-Asiatic orientation, the Pan-Ottoman goals of proportional representation and socio-political equality continued to be the bases on which the new parliamentary system was founded.

Union and Progress members dominated the Parliament which was convened on 10 December 1908. However, a number of the U. and P. Deputies reflected gaiur opinion and as such refused to support policies not based on full assimilation of all minority groups. Other Deputies opposed Pan-Ottomanism, while still others aimed to free themselves from Central Committee dictation so that they might work towards objectives which had been formulated during European exile. The rise of splinter groups therefore coincided with the seating of Parliament. By 14 February 1909, these splinter groups had brought the fall of the first Union and Progress Ministry. Cause of the no confidence vote lay not in policy dispute, but rather in personal rivalry and
political duplicity.

During the weeks after parliamentary ineptitude had been so aptly demonstrated, rioting mobs made up of Muslim reactionaries and the proponents of various brands of reform roamed Constantinople unhindered. When on 5 April the editor of *Serbesti* was shot down in the street, the public attributed his assassination to Young Turk terrorists. The moment for counter-revolution had come. On 13 April, a mob incited by *softas* (Muslim religious students) and including troops garrisoned in Constantinople rose against the Revolution and demanded the return of full sovereignty to the Sultan under feudal and Islamic precedent. Defeat of the counter-revolution was not secured until a Young Turk relief force marched in from Macedonia on 25 April. Martial Law was established, soon being followed by press censorship and the suppression of opposition parties. In addition, Abdülhamid was deposed. Since Constitutional amendments limiting the power of the Sultanate were approved, the authority of Mehmed V as the new Sultan was more ceremonial than actual.¹

During 1910 and 1911, reforms were initiated despite deepening strife within the Union and Progress movement. The school system was improved through the enlargement of primary facilities throughout the Empire, the addition of Western subjects to the curricula of the mosque

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¹ The 1909 Amendments led to the adoption of forms similar to the English system of party government and ministerial responsibility. Though the Sultan was allowed a limited veto (which could be overturned by a 2/3 vote of the Chamber), he lost the right to dismiss Ministers or to dissolve Parliament at will. Furthermore, since it was specifically established that Parliament was to convene every 1 November, it became impossible for the Sultan to rule - as had Abdülhamid from 1876 to 1908 - without consultation with the Chamber. For discussions of the 1909 amendments, cf.: G. Jäschke, loc. cit.; O. Redjai, *L'Évolution Constitutionnelle en Turquie et L'organisation politique Actuelle*, Librarie Universitaire d'Alsace, 1934.
schools, and the establishment of new normal schools, Lycees, and institutions of advanced professional training. In Constantinople, the University was reorganized and enlarged under the direction of scholars brought in from Germany. Similar improvements were made in the capital's separate colleges of Arts and of Commerce, as well as in institutions directly related to military and civil-administrative training. Government departments and the military establishment also were overhauled by Western advisors; it is significant that Budgetary data, inaccurate though it was, began to be published during this period.

Reforms such as these could be handled largely through administrative agencies and thus were immune from parliamentary vacillation. Moreover, Westernization was popular both among the gaïur and within the factions of the Union and Progress movement. Dissatisfaction with the Government increased nonetheless. By 1911 it had become fully apparent that an Army-centred group, willing to use authoritarian methods to insure reform, had taken control of the Chamber entirely away from those of their civilian colleagues who wished to transplant Anglo-French liberalism to Ottoman soil. In April 1911, a Parliamentary crisis split the Union and Progress Deputies, finally bringing about a clear division between the Prussian-oriented militarists, and a coalition made up of civilian Liberals and supporters of traditional Ottoman-Muslim institutions. This latter group increased in strength in the early Fall when Italy's invasion of Tripoli (Italo-Turkish War:

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2 It was at this time that the triumverate which ruled Turkey during the War: Enver, Tâlât and Djemal; began to emerge as dominant figures in Turkish politics.
29 September 1911 - 15 October 1912) gave new impetus to reactionary claims that Ottoman salvation rested solely in allegiance to the Sultan and Islam. Fearful of Muslim reaction, Union and Progress civilian dissidents formed a Liberal Union on 21 November 1911 in conjunction with representatives of the Albanian, Armenian, Bulgarian and Greek minorities. The Young Turk militants thereupon moved for a general election.

When a new Parliament convened in April 1912, its packed Chamber approved ex post facto those extra-legal measures which the Young Turks had employed to bring about the end of the former legislative body. But the troubles of the authoritarian faction still did not end. Public opposition, forcefully cadenced by the mutiny of certain Army units in June, led to the fall of the Union and Progress Cabinet and its replacement by a "Great Cabinet" of moderate liberals. When defeat in the war with Italy was followed by a rout as Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria joined together to attack their former master (First Balkan War: 8 October - 3 December 1912), reactionary forces in the Chamber turned imperial catastrophe into partisan victory. The "Great Cabinet" was overthrown on a confidence vote, and with its fall all hope of a democratic evolution was swept away.

**B. Reform Efforts of the Young Turk Regime (1913-1918)**

i.) Pan-Turansim - In January 1913, when Enver*, Talât*, Djemal and their associates carried through a Young Turk coup d'état, they brought with them not Pan-Ottoman liberalism, but rather Pan-Turanian
radicalism. Since much of the non-imperialist aspect of Pan-Turanism was incorporated into Mustafa Kemal's national revolution, the ideology of the movement had profound influence on the forms taken not only during Transition, but also into Turkey's Transformational era.

Much of the theoretical content of Pan-Turanism was developed by Ziya Gokalp*. First as a contributor to literary journals, and later as a Professor of Sociology at the University of Constantinople, Gokalp presented a theory of society which borrowed both from the French intellectual tradition of Rousseau, Comte, Fouillee and Durkheim, and from the nomadic precepts of early Turkish life. For Gokalp, abnegation of selfish individualism was the first requirement, since only in the social collectivism of ethnic nationalities could there be found Truth, Justice and The Good. A recurrent theme ran through all Gokalp's writings: the Halq (Turkish peasantry) and the harsi millet (national culture) were spiritually superior to the West, even though the Great Powers had achieved a temporary, material-based dominance.

Following Durkheim, Gokalp viewed social development as rising first from primitive tribal unity to community based on ethnic similarity. At the next stage, a common religion served to cement society, though it soon came to be replaced by cultural (not mere political) unity. Three outgrowths of cultural community could be discerned: a) revolt against a feudal and theocratic past; b) revolt

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*Turan refers to an amorphous area of Central Asia from whence came the Seljuk and Osmanli (Ottoman) nomads. A Pan-Turanian empire would meld Thracians, Anatolians, Azerbaijani, Crimeans, Turcomans, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Kipchaks and all other Turco-Tartar minorities including even the non-Muslim Yakuts of China's border.
against foreign intervention; and c) development of an egalitarian movement. Since the first two of these "outgrowths" were translated by Enver and Talat into a specific program for State action, the later activities of the Young Turks can be considered in light of Gokalp's theory.4

ii.) Revolt Against Feudalism and Theocracy - The early course of Young Turk revolt against a feudal and theocratic past already has been stated. It constituted the anti-Hamidian movement as expressed in the July Revolution and subsequent Constitutional Amendments. After they overturned the reactionary Cabinet in January 1913, the Young Turk militants at first masked their desire to annul the remaining vestiges of Sultanate-Caliphate power. Mahmud Sevket Pasa, commander of the troops which had put down the counter-revolution in 1909, was made Grand Vizier as a front for the regime. In Parliament, token opposition by reactionary forces continued to be sanctioned. However, after the Pasa was assassinated in June 1913, the Enver clique hastened to exile its most troublesome opponents. Talat was raised to the rank of Minister of the Interior, thus giving him personal control over internal security. In January 1914, Enver seized the office of Minister of War, while Djemal was appointed military commandant of the Constantinople District. Thus only the ulema remained as a national institution beyond the direct control of the Triumverate.

Measures to limit the power of the ulema had been progressing since Tanzimat. The entire spirit of constitutional government was contrary

to Muslim tradition. Even more fundamental opposition was implicit in the gradual Westernization of the educational system. New subjects in the curriculum taught scientific reasoning; and coeducation was applied after 1908 despite the traditionally inferior status of women in the Muslim cosmos. During World War I, the position of women was ameliorated still further. They began to be regularly employed outside the home; and the Family Laws of 1916-17 restricted the husband's right to practice polygamy without his wife's consent, or to divorce his spouse through a simple statement of intent.

In 1914, the Young Turks attacked the hard core of religious agitators by making theological students eligible for military conscription. Two years later, the Triumverate (with Talat now Grand Vizier) moved to strike directly at Islamic power. Administration of the Şeriat Courts (religious courts handling Civil cases) was to become the province of the secular Ministry of Justice, while supervisory responsibility over the Islamic medreses was to be placed in the secular Ministry of Education. In addition, both the office of Seyhül-Islam (Chief Jurisconsult of Islam) and the Ministry of Pious Foundations were scheduled for curtailments of power tantamount to virtual abolition. None of these administrative changes were fully realized, however, before the War's end brought a reestablishment of reactionary governmental methods.

iii.) Revolt Against Foreign Incursions - Gökalp's second "outgrowth" of cultural community led to Turkey's association with the Central Powers at the time of World War I. Turkish-Turanist racism
provided one dimension of this association. Since Prussia was reputedly contesting the efforts of the West to impose liberalism on the German peoples, a natural community of interest existed between Germany and the Ottoman Empire. However, association with the Central Powers did not much help the Young Turks in realizing the economic dimension of their revolt against foreign incursions. Immediately after the War began, the Turkish Government announced the abrogation of all former Capitulatory agreements. In future, foreigners were to be subjected to domestic taxation at the standard rates. *Ad valorem* customs duties were to be replaced by a differentiated tariff designed to protect agriculture and industry, and also to make the Empire an attractive market for foreign producers of capital equipment. But Germany refused to accept Turkey's unilateral decision until 1916, when it gave provisional recognition to the Empire's sovereignty in the matter. 5

The laggard and grudging manner in which their allies thus acquiesced caused considerable resentment in Turkey, for it was remembered that in August 1914, the Triple Entente had offered to cancel the economic (but not judicial) clauses of the Capitulations in return for Turkish neutrality. Germany's unwillingness to relieve the Empire of what the Young Turks considered their most deep-rooted weakness 6 seemed to give credence to rumors that the Kaiser proposed to make Turkey a "German Egypt": a satellite within Pan-Germany which would be useful as a stepping stone to the Nile and India.

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5 As a result, it became possible for the Ottoman Empire to publish its first tariff based on specific rates of 3 March 1916.

6 Foreign Minister Halil Bey is reported to have declared, "Even if we were to win all of Egypt and half of Russia, we should still lose the war if the Capitulations remained in effect." Ernst Jäckh, *The Rising Crescent*, New York, 1944, p. 131.
iv.) Failure to Develop Egalitarianism - Gökalp's final "outgrowth" of cultural community was the development of egalitarianism. That such did not occur under the Triumverate was symptomatic of the central weakness of the Pan-Turanist doctrine as applied by the Young Turks. Enver himself apparently enjoyed political power in part for the social status which accompanied it. Marrying the Sultan's daughter, hobnobbing with courtiers and those of the Traditional bureaucracy who had been absorbed into the new administrative system, he showed little desire to revolutionize the secular bases of Ottoman life. But Enver's personal prejudices may have had less fundamental bearing on the course of egalitarianism than did the conservative political influence of much of the military wing of the Union and Progress. These officers preached paternalism. Though they disliked many members of the German colony in Turkey, frequent German references to the advantages of an enlightened despotism had a profound impact on the Turkish military.

The German influence presumably would not have been so great had the Young Turks been able to cast off their imperialist orientation. But like their Central European Allies, the Empire was on the march eastward. During the early phase of World War I, the Triumverate surrendered an initial strategic advantage in Syria and Mesopotamia in order to attempt an ill-conceived adventure into the Caucasus. At Sarikamış, the 9th Corps' 40,000 troops were virtually annihilated by a combination of General Yudenitch's Czarist forces, logistical failures in the Turkish command, and freezing cold. By this folly, the South was opened up to Pan-Arab revolt and the one real chance the Empire had
of contesting Britain's hold over Suez was frittered away.

In Mustafa Kemal*, Turkey found a great war hero. For his Gallipoli defence he was made a Paşa; from his Spring 1918 victories at Bitlis and Muş sprang that Anatolian loyalty which was to become the bedrock of Turkey's national revolution. But the lonely victories of one man could not counteract the massive ineptitude of the Young Turk Triumverate. On 30 October 1918, Turkey accepted the Mudros Armistice and left the War. Enver, Talât and other high officials of the War Government fled to Berlin on 1 November. However, as the Union and Progress still held a majority in the Chamber, the Parliament was dissolved on 21 December and an extra-constitutional "Liberal Entente" Cabinet of reactionaries took over the governmental function. Grand Vizier of this Cabinet was Damat Ferid Paşa, brother-in-law of Vahdettin (Mehmed VI) who had succeeded to the Sultanate in July 1918.

II. First Phase of the National Revolution: The Attempt to Gain Legitimacy (1919-1922)

A. Creation of An Anatolian Resistance Movement

Major terms of the Mudros Armistice included the following: a) demobilization of all Ottoman troops except for those forces needed to preserve order; arms to be turned in to Allied supply depots; b) cessation of all relations between Turkey and the Central Powers; c) opening of the Straits to the Allies; d) establishment of Allied military control over all Ottoman possessions outside of Eastern Thrace and Anatolia; e) occupation of Straits fortifications by Allied troops. Under Article VII, the Allies were given "the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies". This provision subsequently was used to justify Allied interference during the National Revolution. For further discussion of the Mudros Armistice, cf.: H.N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey, A Diplomatic History, 1913-23, Oklahoma University Press, 1931, pp. 206-09; G.L. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 46-7.
When Allied occupation of Turkey began, the Empire's Armenian and Greek minorities seized the occasion to rise against their late oppressors. During 1916, the Triumverate had ordered a systematic massacre of scores of gaiur together with forced deportations of entire Christian villages from Eastern Anatolia to Syria and Mesopotamia. Now these crimes were to be repaid by attacks on the Muslim peasantry. Concurrently, partition of Asia Minor was begun. On 15 May 1919, French, British and American naval vessels lay off shore at Izmir (Smyrna) while a Greek military detachment disembarked. This was to be the first step in Greek acquisition of Western Anatolia. The Izmir landing soon deteriorated into mass murder of the Turks by the Greeks.

Four days after the Izmir incident, Mustafa Kemal Paşa* arrived at Sansum, whence he had been posted as Inspector General of the Third Army (Eastern Anatolia). In one sense, the Izmir tragedy served both Kemal and Turkish nationalism well. Greek depredations catalysed Muslim opinion and seared the Anatolian Turks with a determination to resist further Allied occupation at all costs. Since Kemal was intent on developing resistance against the Mudros

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8 During the War, plans for the division of the Ottoman Empire amongst England, France, Russia and Italy had been set forward in The Constantinople Agreement (18 March 1915), the Secret Treaty of London (26 April 1915), the Sykes-Picot Agreement (16 May 1916) and the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement (17 April 1917). These commitments had been voided in part by the fall of Czarist Russia. After the War, Britain, France and Italy all sought dominance over the Middle East. But because of public clamorings for rapid demobilization, these three countries failed to consolidate their military positions in much of Asia Minor and at the same time acceded to the offer of Premier Venizelos of Greece to provide military units for the occupation of Western Anatolia.
Armistice, nothing could have been more adventitious to his cause than arrival in Anatolia just when emotion and despair had had the effect of partially subverting loyal allegiances to the Sultan.

Immediately on his arrival at Sansum, Kemal set to work drawing together the various local and regional Turkish-nationalist organizations which had arisen spontaneously, largely as a result of the Armenian uprisings. Using the Army command net, Kemal despatched broadsides of telegrams. His correspondence was exceptionally well-prepared: at times his statements edged on treason, at others they were expressive of loyalty both to the person and to the objectives of the Sultan-Caliph. From the beginning, therefore, Kemal attempted to be all things to all men while at the same time moving inexorably toward the separation of Anatolia from the Sultan's policies.

On 5 June 1919, Kemal was ordered to return to the capital. Refusing, he instead called for a conference at Sivas, convened after the close of a scheduled mid-July meeting at Erzerum of "The League for the Defence of the National Rights of the Eastern Provinces". For his action, Kemal was declared an outlaw by the Constantinople Government. This, however, served only to add to the stature of the Papa, who was elected Chairman of both the Erzerum and Sivas meetings.

Out of the Erzerum-Sivas meetings came the formation of a Representative Committee under Kemal, whose purpose was to prepare a Government in opposition to the Constantinople regime - if not against the Sultan himself. But the ultimate decision was to be left with Vahdettin. If he chose to replace the Damat Ferid Papa Cabinet
with another representing the policy objectives of Anatolia, he could expect the rekindled support of his people.

B. Establishment of the Ankara Government

i.) The Temporary Victory of Ottoman Reaction - Kemal himself apparently had little wish to achieve rapprochement with Constantinople. Not only had he been a nationalist since studenthood, he also stood to gain considerable personal power from any successful revolutionary movement. Moreover, it has been asserted that the Pasa's sense of personal allegiance to the Sultanate and Islam always left a great deal to be desired. To all these factors was added suspicion when announcement came of the formation of a new Constantinople Government. Declaring support of the Erzerum-Sivas Resolutions, the Constantinople Grand Vizier, Ali Riza Pasa, called for General Elections to a new Ottoman Parliament.

Kemal wished to block Nationalist participation in the new Parliament. Personal considerations aside, he considered it unwise to establish any liberal Government in Constantinople because of the presence there of Entente troops. Kemal's fears were proved correct on 16 March 1920, when forty-odd of those Nationalist Delegates who had refused to join their leader in boycotting the new session from Ankara were rounded up by occupation forces and deported to Malta. Because the Parliamentary rump would not disavow Kemalist policy, it was dissolved on 11 April and a new reactionary Cabinet under Damat Ferid Pasa was installed. At the same time, the Nationalist

9 cf.: G.L. Lewis, op. cit., p. 54.
movement was declared a heresy by the Şeyhül-Islam, who condemned the Nationalists in the following manner. "Question: Is it permissible to kill these rebels? Answer: It is a duty to do so."10

ii.) Formation of the Grand National Assembly - The 11 April fetva brought the full force of Sultanate-Caliphate reaction against Kemal's movement and therefore created the likelihood of Muslim peasant attacks on the Nationalists within their Anatolian headquarters. Kemal, however, already had taken measures to weaken the force of any Constantinople religious declaration by addressing a proclamation to the Turkish people which ended as follows:

"We shall have won the applause of mankind and shall pave the road to liberation which the Islamic world is yearning for, if we deliver the seat of the Caliphate from foreign influence and defend it with religious fidelity in a manner worthy of our glory and realize the independence of the nation. God is with us in the Holy War which we have entered upon for the independence of our country." 11

This phrasing was important, for Kemal attempted the radical tactic of making loyalty to God equivalent to allegiance to the Nation. The concept of nationality did not exist in Islamic theology, but exploitation of the experience of Turkey in the years subsequent to 1914 made it possible for the Pasa to synthesize the two images. By so doing the Nationalist movement was able to benefit from a degree of partisanship which could not have been generated by appeal to

10 ibid., p. 60.
either the secular or spiritual component alone.

Shortly after his God-Nation proclamation, Kemal called for General Elections to choose delegates to a national assembly "endowed with extraordinary powers".\textsuperscript{12} Response to this directive was mixed, with troops of the 15th Division and civil authorities at Dersim, Malatia, Konia, Diarbekir and Trebizond specifically opposing the proposed government.\textsuperscript{13} To buttress his position with traditionalist Muslims, Kemal despatched a telegram on 21 April 1920 which began and ended as follows:

"1. On Friday, 23rd April, after prayer, the Grand National Assembly, if God be willing, will be opened. ...

"6. We pray God to grant that we may be successful." \textsuperscript{14}

This telegram was addressed to all Magistrates, vilayets and independent districts, to headquarters of "Union for the Defence of Rights" branches, and to military units stationed throughout Anatolia.

\textsuperscript{12} Kemal had wished to use the term "Constitutional Assembly", but the opposition of a number of his associates forced him to settle on the less strong term. Both the quotation and the material in this footnote are drawn, \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 364-5.

\textsuperscript{13} During the confused days of 1920, areas loyal to Constantinople formed a scimitar with its blade directed toward Ankara: from the Dardanelles east through Anatolia, along the Greek Pontus and down to Cappadocia along the border of Armenia. When one adds in the territories occupied by Greek, Italian and French forces, the feat of the Nationalists in gaining victory is seen to have been truly extraordinary. Kemal lists districts which opposed him in 1920, \textit{Ibid.}, p. 383.

\textsuperscript{14} The full text of this extraordinary document is included \textit{infra.}, Appendix III.2.(T). Since Kemal was personally irreligious, the extent to which orthodoxy was enjoined at the inception of the Ankara regime is extremely significant.
On 23 April, the Grand National Assembly opened as planned.

Its first business was to enact the following resolution:

"1. The founding of a government is absolutely necessary.

"2. It is not permissible to recognize a provisional chief of state nor to establish a regency.

"3. It is fundamental to recognize that the real authority in the country is the national will as represented by the Assembly. There is no power superior to the Grand National Assembly.

"4. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey embraces both the executive and legislative functions. A council of state, chosen from the membership of the Assembly and responsible to it, conducts the affairs of state. The president of the Assembly is ex officio president of the Council.

"Note: The Sultan-Kalif, as soon as he is free from the coercion to which he submits, shall take his place within the constitutional system in the manner to be determined by the Assembly." 15

Neither the fact that Kemal was elected President of the Assembly (24 April 1920) rather than of the nation at large, nor the limitations which were placed on his authority by Article 2, much pleased the Paşa. However, opposition to the Ankara regime still was too broad to allow for lengthy disputation over these points. The Assembly had to turn its attention to national defence.

15 D.E. Webster, op. cit., p. 56; quoting Tarih IV, p. 52. The text of this resolution as presented in Kemal's Speech (page 380) translates Article 2 as follows: "We cannot allow the chief of the Government to be defined as provisional, or a regency to be established." However, this (significant) discrepancy appears to have been due to mistranslation from the original, or possibly because the Speech was at several points falsified to make Kemal's position before his fellows stronger than was historically justified.
iii.) The War of National Liberation - In the Spring of 1920, the military situation in Anatolia may be summarized as follows. On the Northeast, Armenian forces held the Trans-Caucasus to a point slightly west of Sarikamis. On the South, British units occupied positions roughly along what is now the Turco-Iraqi border, while French troops were in possession of much of Cilicia. On the Southwest, Italy held the Antalya region; and on the West, Greek forces were massed to break out from the Izmir-Aydin-Manisa triangle. During Summer 1920, the Greeks launched an attack which brought most of northwestern Anatolia and Thrace under their control. However, a second Greek offensive, begun 23 March 1921, was broken by the magnificent stand of Turkish Nationalist troops along the Sakarya River (24 August - 13 September 1921). Since the Armenian insurrection had been suppressed during the previous Fall, and since Italian and French troops left Anatolia during the Summer and Fall of 1921, the victory at Sakarya proved the turning point of the war. Nonetheless, the Turks spent nearly a year in preparation for their decisive counter offensive against the Greeks. At last, in the middle of August 1922, Turkish reconnaissance probed a weak spot in the Greek line, a combat mission was ordered and then, through execution of a brilliant flanking movement, Afyonkarahisar was reoccupied. On 1 September, Kemal ordered his troops forward. Nine days later, the Greeks were pushed into the sea.

The liberation of Anatolia secured the position of Kemal's regime and made it possible for him at last to concentrate on revolutionary change. In the section which follows, we shall see how
he brought on Transformation by successively winning popular support away from Constantinople, stabilizing the legislative techniques of the Grand National Assembly, and finally causing the abolition of the office of Sultan.

C. Progressive Disestablishment of the Traditional Structure

i.) The Contest for Public Allegiance - The Nationalists placed ultimate dependence on military success as a means of wooing the Muslim citizenry away from allegiance to Constantinople. In addition, heavy stress was placed on the religious nature of Turkish nationalism, which was contrasted with the captive cosmopolitanism of the Sultan's Government. Thus, when Entente aircraft had dropped copies of the April 1920 fetva (supra, page 243) on towns throughout the interior of Anatolia, the Ankara regime called on religious leaders loyal to Turkish nationalism to reply. The fact that a counter-fetva was felt necessary is important, but no more so than was the terminology of the document. "Question: Are the fetvas issued by a government under foreign duress binding, according to the sacred law, upon Muslims? - Answer: No."16

To reinforce the Ankara regime's claim to legitimacy, every effort was made to bring members of the Constantinople Chamber of Deputies to Ankara. This was hard to accomplish both because members of the Nationalist movement were held to be traitors to the Sultan-Caliph, and because Loyalist irregulars, calling themselves "The Army

16 G.L. Lewis, op. cit., p. 61.
of the Caliphate", controlled much of the route from the Marmara to Ankara. Moreover, through the presence of former Constantinople Deputies\(^{17}\) in the Grand National Assembly added to the latter body's stature, many of these refugees from the capital displayed an ambivalence toward the Ankara Government which in fact hindered the creation of public sentiment in its favor.

In other areas of attitude creation, the Ankara regime experienced somewhat greater success. Shortly after her arrival at Ankara in April 1920, Halide Edib\(^{18}\) established an official Anatolian Agency for news dissemination. The Nationalist position was spread widely thereafter, bulletins being despatched to all telegraph offices for transcription and posting as broadsides.\(^{19}\) In addition, a newspaper was founded at Ankara; and the famous poet Mehmet Emin was sent about the countryside in the company of a military aide to recite his heroic

\[^{17}\] The most famous of the early escapees to Ankara was Djelaleddin Arif Bey, who had been President of the Constantinople Chamber of Deputies. Though he was installed as Vice President of the Grand National Assembly, and Minister of Justice, he was antagonistic toward Kemal from the beginning of his sojourn in Ankara.

\[^{18}\] The prominence of a woman in the upper ranks of the Ankara hierarchy met with mixed response throughout Turkey. The Constantinople Government asserted falsely that a Cabinet post had been given to a woman and tried to capitalize on the allegation as an indication that the Nationalists were Godless. On the other hand, the fact that Halide Edib was a prominent novelist, a long-time advocate of Turkishness, and a leader in the movement for women's rights made her support of Ankara very significant in the eyes of the Turkish intelligentsia.

\[^{19}\] Telegraph operators occupied a critical position in rural Turkey and consequently possessed no small degree of local status. The widespread allegiance of telegraphers to Ankara thus was an important factor in the propaganda phase of the Ottoman-Nationalist contest.
verses as a symbol of Nationalist prestige. One further element of
the propaganda campaign was noteworthy for both its short- and long-
run impact. Kazim Karabekir Paşa,* the hero of the 1920 military
campaign against Armenia, "adopted" some two thousand Turkish orphans
aged four to fourteen. These children were housed, fed, clothed and
educated under the auspices of the Paşa's military command, though
they were sent home to their natal villages (or to relatives) every
summer. Much of the schooling given to these children pertained to
public hygiene and love for the Turkish Nation, and classroom lessons
were applied during summer in village anti-disease and propaganda
rallies. 20

ii.) Regulation of the Legislative Process - At its inception,
the Grand National Assembly operated without documents relating to
formal organization and procedure. This short-coming scarcely
hampered governmental efficiency, for not only did Kemal benefit
from the intense devotion of his close associates, but the Ankara
regime was administered more as a military command than as a represen-
tative institution. Only three times did the Assembly signal intrude on the course of affairs during its first nine months in
office. A rigorous treason law was passed, as well as legislation
establishing judicial "Tribunals of Independence". In form, these
Tribunals resembled courts martial; in operation, they occasionally
imitated the methods of kangaroo courts. Finally, a Council of State

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20 For further discussion of early Nationalist propaganda efforts,
cf.: D.E. Webster, op. cit., p. 183; H. Edib, The Turkish Ordeal,
was established. It is important to note that, despite propaganda on its religious orientation, the Council was formed in such fashion as to reestablish the secularization of State functions which had been attempted by the Young Turks during the World War.

During the late Summer of 1920, debate was begun in the Assembly on a draft relating to "legal provisions concerning the constitution and character of the Grand National Assembly". Two areas of disagreement arose: whether or not the life of the Assembly was contingent upon reestablishment of peaceful independence throughout the nation; and whether or not the constitutional articles should express loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph, or to the Caliph alone. The degree of permanence of the Ankara Government was sidestepped through reference to Article 3 or the 23 April 1920 Resolution (supra, page 2-58). The problem of the Sultan-Caliph was laid to rest by Kemal personally:

"It is not necessary that the Turkish Nation and the High Assembly should occupy themselves so minutely with the Caliphate and the Monarchy, with the Caliph and the Sultan, while we are struggling to secure the existence and independence of our country. Our higher interests demand that we should not discuss this at all at the present moment. If the question should arise as to whether we ought to remain loyal and true to the present Caliph and Sultan - well, this man is a traitor, he is a tool of the enemy employed against our country and our nation. If the nation considers him in the light of Caliph and Sultan, it will be obliged to obey his orders and thereby realize the enemy's plans and designs. Moreover, a personage who would be a traitor and could be prevented from exercising his authority and making use of the power bestowed upon him by his position, could not hold the exalted title of Caliph or Sultan. If you want to say: 'Let us depose him and choose someone else in his place,' this would lead to no way out of the difficulty, because the present state of affairs and conditions prevailing at this hour would not allow of it being done. . .

"If we would undertake the task of finally settling this problem, we would not succeed in this present moment; but the hour for that will come later."
"The legal foundations that we want to lay today will establish and guarantee the necessary authority for the purpose of strengthening the National Assembly and the National Government which will save our existence and secure our independence." 21

Four months later, on 20 January 1921, the "Fundamental Articles of the Constitutional Act of the Government of the Grand National Assembly" were laid down. Except for minor amendment in May 1921, these principles were officially adhered to until 20 April 1924.

Basic provisions of the constitutional document included the following:

(a) "Sovereignty belongs without reserve to the nation" (Article 1);

(b) The Grand National Assembly governs the Turkish State, combining in its being all executive and legislative functions (Articles 2 & 3);

(c) "The religious and juridicial provisions of laws enacted shall be such as best conform to the public opinion, and the needs of the times as well as established customs." (Article 7) Here was provided an escape clause from religious dominance. 22

iii.) The Growth of Factions in the Ankara Regime - During the months of debate on Constitutional structure, semi-formal political alliances began to appear. On the Right, religious functionaries banded together with moderate conservatives anxious to maintain the forms of Tradition. The Assembly's majority, personally loyal to Kemal and composed primarily of representatives of committees for "The Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia", stood just to the

21 M. Kemal, op. cit., pp. 480-481.
22 The text of the Act as amended will be found infra., Appendix III.3.(T).
Left of Center. On the far Left could be found Communists and their fellow travellers. By mid-Fall 1921, certain of the political factions took official titles and attempted to enforce party discipline on their memberships. Their efforts were, however, largely unsuccessful.

Several factors account for the failure of the Assembly's first political parties. In the first place, the Ankara Deputies possessed no tradition of successful representative government. The Ottoman Chamber of Deputies never had been able to operate for extended periods under the application of democratic rules. Second, due to the Malta deportation, many of the Nationalists who had had legislative experience were absent from Ankara. As a result, the largest occupational groups represented in the Grand National Assembly were the military and the ulema. A third cause of party ineffectiveness may be summarized as "the human factor". The Deputies were rebels against the Sultan and thus suffered from pressures damaging to the maintenance of legislative discipline. In many instances, Deputies'...

23 Kemal sponsored the formation of a Communist Party in July, 1920, requesting certain of his adherents to establish a nucleus. This apparently was done for two reasons: Kemal wished to indicate to the Bolshevik Government that he dealt with them in good faith; and he also wanted to be able to control Communist activity - however indirectly - within Turkey.

24 Eleanor Bisbee notes that the first Grand National Assembly was made up of 56 military men, 46 "notables", and then in order religious functionaries, provincial governors, Pasas, doctors and journalists. A few financiers, poets and former ambassadors also were included. Dankurt Rustow, however, notes that 73 clerics including 14 Mufti and 8 leading members of various religious orders actually participated in the Assembly. E. Bisbee, The New Turks, Pioneers of the Republic 1920-1950, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951, pp. 212-13; and D. Rustow, "Politics and Islam in Turkey 1920-1955", in R. N. Frye (ed.), Islam and The West, The Hague, 1957, p. 73 fn.
families remained in areas occupied by the Entente. What would happen to them if the revolution failed was uncertain. Moreover, the Deputies were ambitious, and each hoped either for new prominence, or for the retention of the status attained in former Ottoman life. This stimulated opposition to Kemal the hero and authoritarian leader, opposition which was strengthened by certain unattractive traits in the Pasa's personal conduct. The fourth and final cause of the failure of representative government arose out of tragic uncertainty regarding Turkey's future. Was it to be independent? Would it become a lay republic, or would it revert back to Islamic monarchy? Should efforts be made to turn the country toward the West, or should the new Turkey be Eastern in orientation? Solution to these problems would have to wait on a military victory which could be attained only through the unqualified support of large segments of the Anatolian populace. But how could loyalty be assured if the Assembly postponed debate of basic issues until after military victory? And how could victory be gained if the Assembly debated controversial issues while Greek troops still remained on Turkish soil?

Troubled by the ineffectiveness of the Grand National Assembly, Kemal decided early in May 1921 to enforce rigid discipline on his personal adherents, whom he joined together in "The Defence of Rights Group". The fact that Kemal allowed himself to be made chairman of this Party while still serving as non-partisan President of the Assembly profoundly distressed a number of his associates. Anxiety became more marked in July 1921. Before he would accept responsibility for Turkey's last-ditch defence on the Sakarya River, Kemal demanded - and received over great protest - absolute power and authority over the conduct of
government. Even the magnificent Sakarya victory, for which a grateful Assembly awarded him the titles of "Marshall" and "Ghazi" (roughly, "Conqueror"), did not mitigate the growing dread of Kemal as a political autocrat. It was even rumored that the new Ghazi aspired to the office of Sultan-Caliph.

During the Fall of 1921, members of the National group which had been interned on Malta began to trickle into Ankara. Among their numbers was Rauf Bey*, naval hero during the Balkan Wars, signer of the Mudros Armistice, popular idol of Western Anatolia and Thrace, and until he went to Constantinople as a Deputy in the fated session of 1920 a close personal associate of Kemal. Around Rauf there gradually assembled a coalition including anti-Kemalist Deputies,25 returnees from Malta,26 and those members of the Assembly who were anxious for Kemal to follow up on the Sakarya victory with a rapid, new offensive. In early January 1922, this coalition brought passage of a bill granting the Assembly authority to initiate the election of new Commissars (cabinet members) at will. Kemal has specifically opposed the measure, but his defeat was as nothing when compared to the composition of the new Council of State elected under the bill. For on 12 July 1922, a new Government under Rauf Bey's Premiership was voted into office. And four of the eleven lesser cabinet members

25 All of the anti-Kemalist faction, which took as its title the "Second Group" (of The Defence of Rights Group) were purged in the next general election, which took place in June 1923.

26 The Malta returnees had expected to be welcomed in Ankara as heroes. However, Kemal cold-shouldered them from the outset not only because they had gone to Constantinople against his advice, but also because they had allowed themselves to be captured during the Entente cleanup. This coolness on the Ghazi's part induced studied resentment among the men of Malta.
were former high officials of the 1908-1918 Union and Progress Association.

iv.) Settlement of the Sultanate Question - The new challenge to Kemal's authority was weakened by a completely unrelated incident. On 28 October 1922, the Entente Powers sent duplicate invitations to Constantinople and Ankara, asking each to participate at a peace conference to be held at Lausanne. Politicking in the Grand National Assembly was suspended. It became mandatory to reach an immediate decision regarding the position of the Sultan-Caliph in any future Turkish State. During the last three days of October, private meetings, Assembly sessions and a caucus of the Defence of Rights Party were held to debate the issue. Finally it was turned over to the Constitutional, Şeriat and Justice Committees of the Assembly. Meeting jointly, the three committees began by discussing a proposal of the Ghazi that the Sultanate and the Caliphate be separated institutionally, and that the former be abolished. For a time, Kemal listened in silence to debate on his measure. Then, asking to be allowed to make a statement, he rose and declared that "Sovereignty is acquired by force, by power and by violence". He would be happy to see the Sultanate abolished by legislative action, but such action would do no more than reinforce the "reality" of the situation. If this "reality" were not recognized, "it is possible that some heads will be cut off..." 27 The Committee was not insensible to the implied threat. To Kemal's continuing peroration, the chairman replied, "Pardon me, we had

27 The full text of Kemal's speech appears in M. Kemal, op. cit., p. 578.
regarded the matter in a different light. Now we are informed.\textsuperscript{28}

One day later, Vahdettin was deprived of the Sultanate,\textsuperscript{29} being left with his title of Caliph. Though the use of religious orthodoxy as a propaganda gambit during the War of Independence made it impossible for the Nationalists to attack Vahdettin as an Islamic leader, the Assembly moved to undercut even this facet of prestige by charging the Caliph and his entire Cabinet with treason. Fearing assassination, Vahdettin applied for British protection and on 17 November boarded HMS Malaya for passage to safety on Malta. His defection greatly damaged any residue of popularity held by the Osmanli House. When Vahdettin's cousin, Abdülmejid, was elected Caliph by the Grand National Assembly (18 November 1922), it was made entirely apparent that Tradition's governmental forms no longer held sway in Turkey. By the same token, the ease with which Kemal had stage-managed the events of the previous fortnight proved indisputably the Ghazi's right to precedence in the Nation and the National Assembly.

III. Characteristics of Reform Leaders

A number of leaders of Tanzimat had been scions of the Ottoman hierarchy. Their successors, both those who ruled Turkey down to the Mudros Armistice and those who subsequently contested that Armistice

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 578.

\textsuperscript{29} The date of abolition of the Sultanate was made retroactive to 16 March 1920, the day of Entente occupation of government office buildings in Constantinople.
from Ankara, were largely of middle to lower-middle class origin. Mustafa Kemal* was himself the son of a one-time Customs official and timber merchant, Ali Riza Efendi. But if Kemal's heritage was middle class, the death of his Father while Kemal was still a child brought the perils of impoverishment to his family.

Kemal's background can well be contrasted with those of two of his early political competitors. Enver Pasa* under whom Kemal grudgingly served during the First World War, was the son of a bridge keeper. Until 1918 Rauf Bey*, the leader of the Grand National Assembly's "Second Group", followed in the Navy footsteps of his Father, a Vice Admiral who concurrently held a seat in the appointive Ottoman Senate.

Enver and Rauf were born in Constantinople in 1881. This was the year of Kemal's birth in Salonica. The Rumelian birthplace of these men (and of many other Young Turks as well) is significant. It helps to account for the European orientation of early Union and Progress Governments. Moreover, it is probable that geography of birth contributed to the growth of a nationalist spirit among those men who came to be called Young Turks, for in both the major breeding grounds of Young Turk sentiment-Rumelia and Eastern Anatolia-gaiur nationalist separatism had its most profound impact on the Muslim consciousness.

As were the founders of the Union and Progress Association, a high percentage of successor anti-Sultanate groups were professionally schooled in Constantinople.30 Some of those who became revolutionaries developed

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30 In addition, some 2,000 Turkish students studied in Berlin during the years 1908-1918 under the aegis of the Turkish-German Association. Considering the size of the Ottoman middle class during the period under discussion, the number of Turks trained by the Germans becomes a sizeable proportion of all Turks schooled in European methods. See E. Jähn, op. cit., p. 27fn.
their bias in favor of European civilization as a result of study of European methods during their training as military doctors, or in army or naval academies. However, the development of Western attitudes of mind was not universally a product of professional training. There were in the first place students of Rumelian parentage; some of whom had responded to the demonstration effects of European progress during their early formative years. In addition, there were men who, like Ziya Gökalg*, matriculated at Sultanate training schools specifically because these provided the Empire's most Europeanized curricula. 

Though a Western orientation was not solely the product of professional training, desire to extend Western techniques grew with experience in the military or civil service. The disparity between Ottoman and Western power potentials was often remarked by foreign advisors attached to Imperial Departments. This disparity was poignantly highlighted by virtually all of the Empire's 19th and early-20th Century scrimmages with Europe's military or diplomatic forces. And just as each defeat intensified the desire to ape Western method as a means of power creation, each defeat also served to intensify revolutionism. During the years 1878-1908 in which xenophobia swayed the Ruler, and again from 1914 to 1922 when Turkish sovereignty seemed to be being bartered for European patronage, Muslim Turks who gloried in either the Imperial or Turkish heritage turned increasingly to revolution as a means of bringing rejuvenation.

31 Webster notes that Gökalg attended the Veterinary College in Constantinople because of a desire to study Western science. D. Webster, op. cit., pp. 139-141.
Loyalty to the State was a much greater cause of Young Turk revolutionism than were any desires of individuals to gain prestige and power through overthrow of the ancien regime. Even during the last half-century of Tradition, absorption into the Ottoman hierarchy could be attained through skill in one of the Westernized professions, and these professions were open to all ranks of Muslim society. Lack of a wish for personal preferment at the expense of the Empire is seen in the conduct of the 3rd Corps officers who engineered the 1908 Revolution. In the first weeks following their success, the majority enjoined against military participation in subsequent Civil Governments. Kemal concurred with the thinking of the majority at this time. He specifically believed that the sole mission of the Revolution had been to bring reinstatement of the Constitution of 1876, so that political collapse of the Empire might be averted.

Enver, of course, used the 1908 Revolution as a stepping stone to power. Whether he had had this goal in mind when revolution was first broached is uncertain, although we do know that he was among the group which supported the use of the Union and Progress Central Committee as a means of insuring parliamentary discipline. Moreover, his rivalry with Kemal arose partly out of disagreement regarding the posture the Union and Progress military wing should take with respect to the political

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32 It is true, of course, that absorption into the hierarchy did not give right of policy initiative during the years 1878-1908. Moreover, utilization of the opportunity for vertical mobility was rather uneven. Particularly among rural folk and the orthodox, there was a lag in efforts to gain improved status through the development of new skills.
organization of Ottoman Governments. But Enver was something of an opportunist. After his failure in Turkey he drifted to Russia and eventually died at Bukhara while leading an army of Turanists who were contesting Bolshevik efforts to assimilate the Turkish minorities of Russia's Southern border into the USSR.

Kemal resembled Enver superficially in that he used the National Revolution of 1919 - 1922 as a means of achieving dictatorship. There the resemblance ended. Not only did Kemal employ dictatorship as a means to the end of Turkish republicanism, he also possessed a view of himself which gave him a missionary responsibility for Turkey. The differences in motivation of Enver and Kemal found tangible expression in their styles of living while in power. Enver was addicted to great public display. Kemal on the other hand, maintained a rather austere household down into the 1930's.

In summary, then, the following traits appear to have been characteristic of the young military officers who participated in Transition's efforts at reform. They came from families in moderate circumstances, and many of them grew up in areas affected by gaiur separatist discontent. They were loyal to their heritage, anxious to graft certain aspects of Europe onto Muslim or Turkish cultural roots. Disagreements existed regarding long-term objectives, but there was universal agreement regarding the need to generate modern forms of State power. During the years 1908-1918, one group of officers (which apparently included both Rauf and Kemal) was attracted by the liberal creeds of Britain and France. Another, under the effective leadership of Enver, extolled the efficient paternalism of Prussia. After defeat in the World War, centralization of power was found necessary by those leading the War of Independence. However, there still
remained disagreement regarding the degree of one-man rule to be accepted, and whether the secular Turkish State should try to follow the "Western" (Liberal) or "Eastern" (Dictatorial-Socialist) ideal.33

Islam lost much of its repressive hold on the person of the Young Turks. Nonetheless there remained a fairly wide-ranging desire to rework Tradition's ethical system so that it might be incorporated into the evolving value system of Turkism. The problem of dichotomy therefore rose to trouble both Union and Progress and, later, Nationalist Governments; for State power was a secular objective wholly foreign to the theocratic traditions of Islam. Enver and his associates perhaps were on the way to resolving this problem in 1916-1917, since the demands of war made secularization a categorical necessity. But Kemal had to skirt the issue during 1919-1922. He lacked sufficient strength to win freedom without the support of orthodox Anatolian peasants. On the other hand, that nation-centred Young Turkism which was characteristic of the leaders of the War of Independence possessed inherent advantages over the imperialist bias of earlier Pan-Ottoman and Pan-Turanian Governments. The introspection which typified the Kemalists during the last four years of Transition made it possible to mobilize resources for the main task; that is, development of those conditions within the national borders from which the wellsprings of modern civilization flow.

IV. Conclusion: End of Cosmopolitanism as a Precursor to Modernization

On balance, the demise of the Pan-Ottoman ideal strengthened the

33 cf.: H. Edib, op. cit., pp. 170-76.
Turks. It made possible attempts at development of a new loyalty focus to replace the confederative associations of the past. One of the most long-standing of the Empire's difficulties thus was done away with. On the other hand, a problem comparable in effect - the view of the State as theocratic - could not be directly attacked during Transition. Each act bringing subordination of Islamic agencies to civil authority was met with a resistance which increasingly polarized Turkey between spiritual and secular loyalties. The end of efforts to assimilate minority groups therefore served in part to direct Muslim attention toward theocratic-Statist incompatibilities.

The decline of Constantinople and the abolition of the Sultanate went far to resurrect the Turkish political system. Return of government to the interior of Anatolia symbolized the end of imperial goals. Social maladjustments resulting from the Levantine bias of former rulers were cast aside as Turks replaced Ottoman cosmopolitans in policy positions. And since the expansionist mission which had saddled the Empire from the days of Tradition was cut away, the human and physical resources of Asia Minor were released for development of the heartland instead of the imperial borders.

In entering Transformation, Kemal and his fellow countrymen had not resolved all the problems likely to hinder the creation of a modern nation. There was need for a new delineation of goals, and this delineation would necessarily have to face thorny problems relating to Islam. What were to be the functions performed by the Caliph in the new society? How great a force should religion play in secular life? The decisive criterion would, of necessity, have to be socio-political efficiency; but how
was one to determine where ethical values impinged dangerously on the course of progress?

Questions such as these could not easily be resolved without a considerably greater degree of Parliamentary discipline than had obtained in any Constantinople or Ankara Government of the Transitional period. The questions enumerated were crucial, for they affected the fundamental substructure of Muslim life. Dictatorship could be resorted to in order to gain a semblance of Assembly acceptance of legislation designed to settle the Islamic issue. Kemal's actions from the time of the Sakarya River defence suggested more and more that he believed such a technique the only one available to him. But if Kemal chose dictatorship, he would alienate many of the progressives on whose support the Turkish nation ultimately was based.

Even if Parliamentary consensus could be achieved in favor of secularist legislation, there still would remain the problem of gaining public favor. The success of plans for modernization would be determined by the response of the people, and a very large percentage of rural Anatolians were devout Muslims. Thus a second range of critical problems remained for solution in Transformation. These were problems relating to the creation of a purely secular, instead of spiritual-secular, concept of national loyalty. But secularization in any form was closely related to solution of Turkey's economic crisis. If the nation could increase its overhead capital, the hold of Muslim reaction would relax.

During the years 1908-1918, sporadic attempts had been made to enlarge the industrial (particularly military-industrial) base of the Ottoman Empire. However, especially as a result of devastation in the War of
Independence, Nationalist troops were detailed to tear up sections of railway so that the tracks could be recast as bayonets.

Other conditions bearing on Turkey’s economic health included the loss of valuable territory such as the oil fields near the disputed Turco-Iraqi border; a shortage of technical personnel despite aid furnished by the U.S.S.R.; and decimation of the labor force. The population problem had two dimensions. On the one hand, whole classes of Turkish conscripts had been destroyed by the continuing warfare of Transition. Agricultural and raw material production grievously suffered in consequence. On the other hand, the termination after 1912 of all efforts to assimilate the gaiur in accordance with Pan-Ottoman concepts left Turkey bereft of much of its historic business class.

Before Turkey could resolve its economic problems, Islam's inhibitions on change had to be overcome in order to raise productivity sufficiently to finance the creation of modern capital. Capital had to be generated largely out of domestic surplus. The Kemalists wanted neither Capitulations nor any foreign investments which might jeopardize State security.

Border defence never was far from the minds of the Turkish Nationalists. Preoccupation with military security brought attention to the economic sector. But there the essential tasks quite escaped most of the early leaders of Kemalist revolt. Lacking experience in an industrial society, they tended to view the economy as the handmaiden of arms. As is suggested by the tale of rails into bayonets, the young officers who staffed most of the important political posts in the Ankara Government tended to express a view of State power in which productive capacity took on a very secondary role. This phenomenon was somewhat balanced out by
one man, Mustafa Kemal. Ruthless and intelligent, the Ghazi took a very practical view to problems and always reverted to the basic question: "how"? Kemal's leadership, which had proved the greatest resource of Turkey during Transition, was therefore to become the major determinant of the direction of Turkey's thrust forward through Transformation.
INDIANS SEEK PARTICIPANT MEMBERSHIP IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE

Because of a cholera outbreak in Poona, the founding session of the organization which came to be known as the All-India National Congress was moved to Bombay. Represented by the seventy-two participants were those service professions which it was Britain's pride to nurture. Lawyers, teachers and journalists predominated, though a scattering of landlords, religious leaders, doctors and merchants were in attendance as well. The occupational distribution of the Congress suggested a weakness which would hamper its effectiveness throughout Transition. For in a land which was over 90% rural, only a few zamindari and religious reformers were able - or wished - to act as representatives of the countryside.

An additional indication of the narrow range of opinion represented by early Congresses was the fact that English was spoken at annual sessions. Use of English was necessary, for it was the only language held in common by all the delegations. However, speeches in the colonial tongue echoed the basic fact that the Congress' unifying mission was foreign to virtually all groups other than the Anglicized-Indian middle class. How representative could the Congress claim to be if its objectives were not the objectives of the majority of Indians? And since it was not even representative of India's religious sects, how could

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1 Parsi participation was scant at the first Congress, but even so it far outweighed that of the Muslims. Only 2 Muslims attended the opening session, though by 1890, 156 Muslims (22% of the total) were listed as delegates. Nonetheless, the apparent vast Hindu majority was somewhat illusory, for it represented numerous combinations of caste, regional and occupational bias. cf.: B.P. Sitaramaya, op. cit. (Vol. I.), p. 19.
the Congress legitimately claim to reflect the attitudes of India's major social communities?

As will be shown in this chapter, problems related to social attitude and loyalty focus were to provide the key issues of Transition. The first Congress was unified only in a limited sense. Few of the delegations could agree on fundamental social issues. Desire for personal and political dignity comparable to that accorded white Colonials gave cohesion to the session; but otherwise there were relatively few specifics with which to hold it together. Even amelioration of socio-legal status was invoked more for the benefit of the Anglicized-Indian middle class than for Indians as a whole. It may be questioned whether the Congress would have been able to hold together through Transition had it not been for the moderating influence of the corporal's guard of Englishmen who became devoted to the Indian cause.

How then could the Congress prove Indian readiness for participant membership in the British Empire? From 1885 to 1907, parliamentarianism was attempted in the belief that Britain would respond sympathetically to indications that its political institutions had been successfully transplanted. However, after certain political changes were imposed by the Viceroy in 1905, radical leaders began to receive wide popular support for the doctrine of violent insurrection. Moderates and radicals then split, leading to a decline in Congress influence during the years 1907-15. Nevertheless, Governmental reforms continued to be initiated; but with the exception of the Indian Councils Act of 1909 they were instituted by the British largely to placate specific regional or communal special-interest groups. The World War ended most of the
terrorist effort, and from 1914 to 1919 India exemplified the European ideal of a loyal colony. Unfortunately, the British of the period failed to recognize adequately that the Indian peoples were loyal because they were bouyed up by expectations of self-rule after the War. Once it was realized that this hope would not materialize, and after a British General had imposed laws in the Punjab derogating the character of the entire Indian peoples, the Congress recovered its sense of urgent mission. Actively contesting Britain's right to deny the Indians home rule, the Congress' new leader, Mahatma Gandhi*, thrust India headlong into Transformation. The step -forward was partly symbolic: it incorporated formal adoption of India's vernacular languages in place of English as the tongue of Congress provincial bodies. But this change was made for more than symbolic purpose, for it was part of a program to reorganize the Congress Party so that its membership would become representative of all classes and occupations, of village India as well as of the urbanized minority. More important, the new goal of the Congress was to include in its membership all peoples potentially capable of viewing India as a unified and independent nation, rather than as a qualitatively inferior adjunct of the British imperial system.

I - Decline of Faith in British Good Intentions
A. - Attempts to Prove India Ready for Self-Government (1885-1907)
   i.) Requests for Political Representation - It was not solely a lack of native precedent which led early Congress members, when presenting resolutions for debate, to turn to English constitutional authority for substantiation of their briefs. There was a genuine desire among many Congressmen to prove that "a more honest or sturdy nation does
not exist under the sun than this English nation"; and that the Congress was "the greatest glory of British rule in this country". Even when a decision was taken in 1888 to go to the people for support of Congress reform proposals, the tactics employed were specifically British and had as their model the Anti-Corn Law League agitation of Bright and Cobden. For Congress leaders looked on the party as a Loyal Opposition. As such, its methods were to approximate those of English democracy.

At the first Congress session, resolutions were introduced requesting abolition of the India Councils and amendment of the Indian Councils Act of 1861 so that elected Indians might participate in viceregal and provincial government. These requests were not initially accepted by the Government of India and therefore brought about the propaganda agitation of 1888. Modest progress finally came under provisions of the Indian Councils Act of 1892, which made it possible for Municipalities, Chambers of Commerce, Universities and the like to elect a few Indians to membership on Councils at all levels of Government. Since Councillors simultaneously were granted permission to discuss (but not vote on) the

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2 The first quotation is drawn from an address by the 1896 President of the Congress, Mohammed Rahmittulla Sayani; the second from an address given, as 1893 Chairman of the Congress Reception Committee, by Sardar Dyal Singh Majithia. Both statements are quoted, ibid., p. 61.

3 The India Council's membership being largely representative of the conservative opinion of retired Indian Civil Service officers, it tended to prejudice the Parliament against reforms desired by Indians.

4 Supra, p. 130.

5 The objective of the agitation was to lead to changes of membership qualifications for the Central and Provincial Legislative Councils such that $\frac{1}{3}$ of the seats would be contested by election, $\frac{1}{4}$ would be held by Government of India officials, and $\frac{1}{4}$ would be filled by Indians nominated by the Government.
Budget, and to address the Viceroy on "matters of public concern", the absolute authority of the Government of India was ever so slightly checked.6

In addition to calling for constitutional reform, the first Congress requested that examinations for admittance to the Civil Service be given concurrently in India and England. Acceptance of this proposal would do much to allay the handicap of distance, which hitherto had greatly limited the number of Indians able to present themselves as candidates for commissioning in the Indian Civil Service. Lord Dufferin responded sympathetically to the Congress' request and appointed a Public Services Commission to review appointment procedures. The report of the Commission (1886) was not, however, satisfactory to Indian evolutionists; for rather than accepting the idea of simultaneous examination, the Commissioners proposed establishment of several classes of civil service officer. "Imperial" Civil Servants would continue to be recruited in England, while inferior "Provincial" Civil Servants would be raised by each Province on its home grounds. A still lower classification, the Subordinate Civil Service, was to be organized after the fashion of the Provincial Civil Service.

A British Committee of the Congress was organized in 1889 specifically to lobby for Congress interests within the halls of Westminster. In 1893, Committee activity brought passage in the Commons of a resolution in favor of simultaneous examinations. However, because the

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Government of India chose not to act on the Resolution, the proposals set in practice under the 1886 Minute of the Public Services Commission remained in being.

ii.) The Pull of Special Interests - Large numbers of the Indian public favored simultaneous examinations because of belief that racial discrimination lay at the root of the established system of appointment. Congress interest in the composition of the Indian Civil Service was at first, however, very largely a product of middle-class Hindu pressure. Membership in the I.C.S. was a patent of rank. Anglicized Indians therefore saw the commission as a means to improve status within the Traditional social structure. Since equivalent results might be obtained through the establishment of elective legislative offices, part of the concurrent demand for increased self-government related purely to job and status hunger.7

Any extension of Indian participation in the governmental process would inevitably lead to increased communal tensions. Recognition of this fact was one of the reasons the Government of India chose to ignore the Commons' Resolution on simultaneous examinations. For non-Hindu communities would be virtually excluded thereby, since all communities except the Hindu historically had demonstrated a lack of interest in the Western-style education necessary for success on I.C.S. exams. Questions of governmental reform thus were intertwined with problems of communal rivalry.

As early as 1883, the influential Muslim Leader Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had used communalism as his reason for opposing the establishment of elective assemblies:

"The system of representation by election means the representation of the views and interests of the majority of the population.... In a country like India, where class distinctions still flourish and where religious differences are still violent, where education in the modern sense has not made an equal or proportionate progress amongst all sections of the population, I am convinced that the introduction of the principle of election pure and simple, for the representation of various interests on local boards and district councils, would be attended with evils of greater significance than purely economic considerations.... The larger community would totally over-ride the interests of the smaller community."8

This position was not mere obstructionism. To help Muslims prepare for active participation in evolving India, Sir Syed Ahmad founded The Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental College (now Aligarh University) in 1888. Moreover, he attempted to reverse the growing British antipathy toward the Muslim community,9 first by founding a Muslim-Hindu association whose patriotic devotion to British rule would (it was hoped) act as a counterweight to the Congress; and later by establishing a society focussed strictly on Anglo-Muslim joint interests.10

Sir Syed Ahmad frequently advised his co-religionists to boycott the Congress, an association which he viewed as dangerous both to maintenance of British hegemony, and to the special interests of the Muslim community. A number of prominent Muslims joined the Congress notwithstanding. They recognized that these fears were less than

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9 British hatred of Muslim Indians burgeoned during and after the Mutiny of 1857, which had been begun by Muslim sepoys.
justified. Not only were Congressmen loyalist in the main; from the beginning, extensive efforts had been made by Congress leaders to insure protection of the rights of the Muslim bloc. Though a minority, Muslims were regularly elected to high Party office. And as early as 1888, a precedent was established whereby near-unanimous opposition by either Hindu or Muslim delegations led to the tabling in committee of any controversial Resolution. Unfortunately, neither of these conditions was sufficient to soften the impact of the hammer blows of 1905.

On 16 October 1905, Bengal was partitioned into Eastern and Western provinces. This was the culmination of a series of actions by the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, which outraged Indian opinion. Viewed solely as an administrative reform, there was much to commend in partition. However, the effect of the measure was to place Hindus in a minority in East Bengal, and this condition was anathema not only to the peasants of the new province but also the the bhadrolok: the Anglo-educated Hindu Bengalis who formerly had dominated indigenous political and social life in the region. Under the inspirational leadership of members of the Tilak family, terrorist organizations containing both Hindu peasants, students, and the educated unemployed began to resist partition by force. Hindu-Muslim relations suffered as a consequence, with the result that, as anti-British sentiment swept from Bengal across India, new communal tensions were carried in its train. A direct result of this

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11 Lord Curzon made himself unpopular not only by impugning the honesty of Indians, but also by saddling them with costs of an unpopular Durbar and a military expedition into Tibet. Moreover, acts such as the Universities Act and the Calcutta Municipal Act angered the Anglicized middle class. cf.: B.P. Sitaramaya, op. cit. (Vol. I), p. 67; W.R. Smith, op. cit., p. 51.
sequence was the establishment of the All-India Muslim League in December 1906.

iii.) Demands for Social Justice Bring Division of the Congress

Many Indians saw in the Bengal Partition proof of British determination to suppress their subjects indefinitely. This conclusion appeared to be validated by the persistence with which the Government of India had maintained a policy of racial discrimination despite Anglicized Indian requests for reform. Particularly noxious to Congressmen was the administration of justice. As early as 1886, annual Congress sessions had begun to ask for equality before the Law, but to no avail. On the contrary, conditions became worse in 1897, at which time an act allowing the deportation of Indians without trial began to be applied.

Congress demands for social justice were not limited to the Law. Here we need only suggest their scope, which extended from prohibition on the one hand, to abolition of forced labor on the other. These demands extended beyond the Indian borders. Beginning in 1894, the Congress made annual demands for improvement in the treatment accorded to indentured Indians domiciled in other colonial possessions of Great Britain. All of these were, however, positions taken by a body which represented Anglicized Indian opinion; and they reflected Western concepts of value and social justice. The social justice requested by orthodox

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12 Indians frequently were subjected to trial by magistrate, rather than to trial by jury. Even where jury trials obtained, court testimony was made subject to review by Sessions Judges and High Courts, who were authorized to reverse jury verdicts and to impose increased sentences without retrial.

13 More extensive presentation of Congress demands will be found in Appendix III.4.(I), "Major Areas of Congress Concern during Transition"; and Appendix III.5.(I), "Congress Demands Not Met During Transition".
Orthodox reactionism grew rapidly during Transition, in part because of British racial policies. Individual communities such as the Sikhs responded to discrimination by extolling their own separateness and distinction. Though the growth of particularism was thus intimately connected with British rule, its most damaging effects occurred in areas of indigenous living. Hindus demanded Government of India assistance in stamping out the "vile" Muslim practice of animal slaughter. Muslims looked to Government aid in abolishing certain aspects of caste - and so the process went. However, the Government was itself not exempt from orthodox criticism. Attempts to raise public morals through reform of "uncivilized" practices, and attempts to improve public health through the control of disease, were felt by Orthodox Traditionalists to be particularly abominable. To mention but two notable instances of reputedly unwarranted and unjust British invasion of private rights, the Age of Consent Bill of 1891 was violently attacked as damaging to the Hindu family system. Its purpose was to raise the minimum age of female consent to twelve years in order to lessen the abuses of child marriage. Similarly, military inspection of Indian homes during an 1897 outbreak of plague appeared indecent to all who kept their womenfolk in purdah. But actions of the sort noted were as nothing when compared to the catalyst provided by the 1905 partition of Bengal. On this occasion, both orthodox and Anglicized Indians found grounds for bitter complaint.

Within Congress, a resolution for Swaraj ("self-rule") was passed at the 1906 session. The exact meaning of the term was deliberately

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14 The major resolutions of the 1906 Calcutta Congress will be found, infra, Appendix III.6.(I.).
left obscure; for while revolutionary extremists desired full independence from England, the evolutionist majority desired only an autonomous Indian administration set within the British imperial structure. Three further resolutions outlined the tactics to be employed to gain Swaraj: (1) there was to be a boycott of British institutions and commercial products;\(^{15}\) (2) Swadeshi ("of one's own country" - hence, support of domestically-produced goods) was to be promoted; and (3) a "national" educational system was to be established under which boys and girls might be trained untainted by the administrative control, and idea manipulation, of the British.

The resolution in favor of "national" education was significant, for its purpose was largely reactionary. Like the other major resolutions of the 1906 sessions, it reflected a growing feeling of revulsion away from the West. This sentiment was coupled with a new idealization of the pre-British heritage of India. But backward turning was contrary to the self-interest of the Anglicized-Indian majority in the Congress, which spent the months following the 1906 session preparing to contest the temporary ascendancy of the nationalist-extremist wing. At the Surat session of 1907, the moderates regained control and pushed through a resolution stating that the goal of the Congress was the attainment of self-government within the Empire through constitutional means. The revolutionary wing then had no option but to withdraw, taking with it the popular backing which had accrued to the Congress over the two years previous.

\(^{15}\) Large-scale boycott of British goods had been begun in parts of India on 7 August 1905.
B. The Growth of Nationalist Sentiment (1907-1914)

i.) Political Representation as a Technique of Control - At Allahabad in 1908, amendment was made to the 1899 Congress Constitution. In the former document, the object of the Congress had been stated to be "to promote by constitutional means the interests and well-being of the people of the Indian Empire". In its new form, the "objects" clause read as follows:

"The objects of the Indian National Congress are the attainment by the people of India of a system of government similar to that enjoyed by the self-governing members of the British Empire and a participation by them in the rights and responsibilities of the Empire on equal terms with those members. These objects are to be achieved by constitutional means by bringing about a steady reform of the existing system of administration and by promoting national unity, fostering public spirit and developing and organizing the intellectual, moral, economic and industrial resources of the country." 17

The 1908 "objects" clause was drafted in the form quoted particularly in order to prevent resurgence of extremist-nationalist agitation within the Congress' membership. But the document accomplished more than this, for its restraint convinced both the Secretary of State for India and the Viceroy, Lords Morley and Minto respectively, that further modification of legislative method would in no wise jeopardize British interests: that increased representation of non-official Indians would actually strengthen Britain's hold on the subcontinent. Accordingly, the Indian Councils Act of 1909 was promulgaged, raising the number of

17 Quoted in V.P. Menon, op. cit., p. 11.
Indians participating in both provincial and central Councils and expanding the areas of policy on which the Councils might debate. It is noteworthy that the Morley-Minto reforms for the first time gave official British credence to the policy of communal representation.¹⁸

Not a few Indians interpreted the reforms of 1909 as an indication of further modifications to come. A new Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, took a similar view. In a Despatch dated 25 August 1911, he called for continuing devolution of power "until at last India would consist of a number of administrations, autonomous in all provincial affairs, with the Government of India above...".¹⁹ Debate in the Commons scotched this proposal. It was pointed out that the purpose of the Morley-Minto reforms had been to strengthen rather than weaken Imperial rule. Inclusion of Indians in the legislative process had gone as far as was safe from the point of view of continued British hegemony.

ii.) Repression as a Technique of Control - The vehemence with which members of His Majesty's Government attacked Lord Hardinge's minute was in part a reflection of British repugnance to the claims made and the tactics used by members of Indian terrorist organizations. Some of the social 'injustices' which agitators wanted rectified seemed to the European eye to be wholly humane. Moreover, a degree of heartsickness affected Englishmen who heard disasters such as the Bombay Famine

and Plague of 1896-97, the Great Indian Famine of 1899-1900, and the United Provinces Famine of 1907-08 termed indisputable proof of the studied malevolence of the British Raj. Only repression seemed adequate as a means of quelling inflammatory statement. During the year 1908, the Government suppressed the three leading journals of nationalist extremism. In addition, acts defining illegality in Seditious Meetings, Explosives Substances, and Incitement to Offences were drawn up. The stringency with which repressive measures were applied is suggested by the terms of the Indian Press Act of 1910: any article was deemed seditious which "had a tendency, directly or indirectly, by influence, suggestion, allusion, metaphor, implication, or otherwise, to bring into hatred or contempt the Government of India or any class of people in British India." Agitation and terrorism increased despite these strictures, however. They eventually culminated in an attempt on the life of the popular Lord Hardinge.

C. Attempts to Find New Bases for Relationship (1914-1920)

1.) Hindu-Muslim Rapprochement - The Hardinge assassination plot had a profound effect on public opinion not only because of the Hindu's ethical revulsion toward physical violence, but also because the Viceroy forebore from imposing any sort of retaliation upon the Indian populace. Hardinge's tenure as Viceroy lasted until 1916, and though his final years were somewhat marred by the introduction of extensive security measures for the Viceroy's protection, the magnanimity with which he despatched his office did much to convince Indians that Imperial Britain

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20 W. R. Smith, op. cit., p. 244.
was grand enough to merit loyalty in the Great War. Hindus and Muslims alike responded to the need of England despite fundamental reasons for neutrality.

The internal conflict of the Hindu was epitomized by the 1914-1918 recruiting campaigns conducted by Mohandas K. Gandhi*. Though a pacifist, the Mahatma called for support of Britain's war effort as an obligation of Indians who sought participant membership in the British Empire. Similar reasoning impelled Muslim support of Britain despite tormented knowledge that the Ottoman Caliph had declared Holy War against the Triple Entente.

That both the Muslim League and the Congress gave full support to Britain tended somewhat to lessen the breach hitherto dividing the two parties. So too did the Gallipoli Campaign; for the Anglo-Muslim unity which Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had attempted to stimulate could not wholly withstand the strain of battle at the Dardanelles. Consequently, at the annual sessions of the Congress and the Muslim League in 1915, each party enacted resolutions proposing inter-community discussion of schemes for reform. One year later, the Congress and the League held their annual sessions concurrently at Lucknow (December 1916), and there both supported a joint resolution addressed to the Crown asking British acceptance of Dominion Home Rule as India's ultimate political goal. As initial steps toward this end, the resolution proposed increase of the number of Council offices to be filled by elected Indians, and extension of subjects approved for Council debate to include everything except foreign affairs and the political relations of India (i.e., the
relations of the Government of India and the autonomous Princely States). Significantly, the resolution proposed representation of Muslims through the establishment of separate electorates according to the following proportions.

**Table VI-(I.)**

**Congress - Muslim League Plan for Distribution of Seats (1916)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislative Body</th>
<th>Lucknow Pact Distribution of Seats to Muslims by %</th>
<th>1921 % of Muslims to Total Population of Electoral Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengal</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Provinces</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bihar &amp; Orissa</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Provinces</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madras</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombay</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Legislative Assembly</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: W.R. Smith, op. cit., p. 85.

**ii.) Loyalty to Britain is Made Conditional** - Despite its moderate tone, the Lucknow Pact of 1916 testified to a growing awareness throughout the subcontinent of the fundamental similarity of all Indians. Indian nationalism had gone far beyond the stage of germination. It blossomed not only in the Muslim League - Congress agreement to compromise on matters of political representation, but also in the 1916 establishment of an All-India Home Rule League. Demands for home rule were not, in themselves, new. They long had been a standard component of the platforms of separatist groups promoting regional, caste or class interests. However, by changing the tenor of agitation, Lokamaya Tilak, Mrs. Annie Besant and B.P. Wadia welded a countrywide, inter-interest political
coalition. Many Anglicized Indians, who formerly had been appalled by
the xenophobic slogans of home rule propagandists, now found themselves
in sympathy with the Home Rule League's demand for Dominion Status rather
than outright independence. Separatist groups similarly responded to the
movement, for the League required immediate political reform as a condi-
tion of future loyalty to Great Britain.

The growing importance of conditionalist policies had become apparent
as early as 1915, at which time the Congress modified its Constitution
slightly in order to make reentry of the nationalist-extremist wing
possible. By 1917, Lala Lajpat Rai,* C.R. Das* and Mrs. Besant (1917
Congress President) had wrested Congress control away from the gradual
evolutionist group which, following the example of Surandranath Banerjea*,
long had sought ways to meld the interests and attitudes of Englishman
and Indian. Following the shift in the power balance, the "Liberals" of
Banerjea's ilk began to withdraw from active participation in Congress
deliberations. Their withdrawal became more rapid after publication of
the Montagu-Chelmsford Report in July 1918.

In one sense, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report represented Britain's
desire to buttress the moderate position expressed in documents such
as the Lucknow Pact against the extremism of certain Home Rule agitators.
But the Report reflected still more, for His Majesty's Government
genuinely aimed to reward those millions of Indians who had responded
loyalty to the Imperial cause in 1914, and who continued to do so in
1917 even though it appeared likely that a German expedition to "liberate"
India might move forward through South Russia.
The genesis of the Report can be traced back to November 1916, at which time the Government of India (Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy) proposed some form of self-government as an eventual goal for India. When E.S. Montagu became Secretary of State for India (July 1917), he referred to the G.O.I. document in drafting a new statement on Indian policy for presentation to the Parliament 20 August 1917:

"The policy of His Majesty's Government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire. . . . I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by successive stages."21

During the Spring of 1918, Montagu and Chelmsford made a tour of inquiry across India. While their investigations were in progress, all major political bodies agreed to a temporary moratorium on public dispute, but after the Report was published (July 1918) criticism no longer remained muted. In the Congress, a split occurred between those favoring the Report despite its shortcomings, and those who felt either that it should be rejected out of hand, or that it should be modified before gaining conditional acceptance. The decisive provisions, subsequently incorporated into the Government of India Act of 1919, included the following:

1) All governmental changes were to be provisional. After five years' operation, the Act of 1919 would be reviewed by the Government of India in order to determine whether any modifications were required. Thereafter, a Royal Commission would investigate the Indian governmental system every twelve years in order to determine whether, and how, further revision could be brought about.

21 V.P. Menon, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
2) The elective franchise was restricted to holders of "substantial" real or personal property.  

3) The Governor-General (Viceroy) was responsible to the English Parliament, rather than to the Indian Legislature.

4) Under the principle of "dyarchy" in the Provincial executive function, the Governor and his Executive Council retained control over "reserved subjects" (e.g., justice, irrigation, land-revenue administration), being responsible for these to the Government of India. Only for "transferred subjects" (e.g., education, public health, agriculture, industrial development) were Provincial Ministers other than the Governor responsible to Provincial Legislatures.

The Congress' split over the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was of far-reaching consequence, for a number of gradual evolutionists withdrew and, in conjunction with those who had earlier retired, formed a National Liberal Federation under the leadership of Surendranath Banerjea,* Tejbahadur Sapru* and V.S. Srinivasa Sastri. The new coalition was not designed to provide a permanent alternative to Congress membership, but such in fact occurred. Thus the gradualist element of earlier Congresses lost most of its popular significance, becoming more and more a splinter group representative of conservative, Anglicized-Indian special interests. Behind it in the Congress there remained an uneasy coalition of partisan extremists and nationalistic members of the middle class. Included in this latter group were those Anglicized Indians who no longer found it possible to reconcile personal attainment of English mores with loyalty.

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22 As this provision worked out in practice, only 8.2 million males in British India were adjudged in 1925-26 to be qualified electors to the Provincial Legislative Councils (the most representative of the various legislative bodies). Populations exceeding 240 millions would be governed by these Councils.

to the political system in being in India.

The problem of India's relationship with Britain was, at its base, racial, cultural, and social rather than political. Despite the moderation and "civilization" of most Congressmen, neither the Parliament, the Government of India, nor most of the Britishers resident in India showed real enthusiasm for the Indians' desire for racial equality. Moreover, racial discrimination extended broadly throughout the Empire. The living conditions of Indians in Natal remained close to those of slavery; if Indians were better off in other Dominions this was negated in large degree by policies restricting emigration from the subcontinent. Nationalist spirit intensified as World War I progressed, in part because English journals eulogized the loyal Indian for his magnificent response to England's peril; in part because of the humanitarian goals outlined by the Western Allies in 1917-1918; and in part because the talk of political representation incorporated in Montagu's 1917 report to Parliament led Indians to dizzy heights of expectation. Living conditions deteriorated in late 1918. An influenza epidemic combined with price inflation and a medium-scale famine to bring hardship to much of India. This fact, combined with concern over Britain's apparent plan to renge on supposed promises of self-government, led to a growing spirit of disaffection.

On 18 March 1919, the Government of India enacted the Rowlatt Act, which was designed to handle cases of revolutionary crime. Since this act gave the Executive extensive power to govern by decree in times of insurrection, its passage seemed to prove that even the Montagu-Chelmsford Report's promise of gradually increasing self-government was equivocal. Though the Rowlatt Act never came to be applied, violent agitation
against it took place in Delhi and the Punjab. For the first time coming
to the forefront of Congress leadership, Mahatma Gandhi* proposed a
series of nation-wide hartals ("day of mourning": a spiritualized version
of a general strike) in opposition to the Act. At Amritsar in the
Punjab, hartals were instituted on 30 March, 6 April and 9 April 1919.
Growing in intensity with each repetition, they flamed into riots and
the tragic "Amritsar Massacre" of 13 April which brought death or injury
to something more than a thousand Indians.

Martial Law was imposed throughout Amritsar, Lahore, Gujranwala,
Gujerat and Lyallpur Districts on 15 April. During the six weeks follow-
ing, indiscriminate mass punishments seemingly designed to denigrate the
cracter of the Indian peoples were meted out. These events, subse-
quently equated in the popular mind with Britain's actions against the
defeated Ottoman Sultan-Caliph, served to freeze India's political
complexion. Hindus and Muslims who had gained experience and a modicum
of social acceptance as members of various Governmental Councils tended
to side with the British Raj. The Hindu-Muslim majority, however, had
reached the breaking point. It no longer was willing to believe unsupported
testaments of good faith and became unbending in its demand either for
immediate political representation as an autonomous Dominion, or else for
the forceful expulsion of British government.

The new mood was reflected in the Congress Party, which may therefore
be said to have begun moving into Transformation. The Hindu middle
class no longer measured self-aggrandizement in terms of British favor.
Instead, under the emerging guidance of Gandhiji it took the prime
objective of the Muslim community as its own, and in conjunction with
the Khilafat (Caliphate) Committee called both for self-government in
one year, and for restitution to the Caliph. To give force to these
demands, passive resistance, non-violent civil disobedience, and boycott
of the first elections to be held under the terms of the 1919 Government
of India Act were variously proposed. Finally, at the Nagpur Session
(26 - 31 December 1920), the Congress’ Constitution was revised. In
its newest form, the "objects" clause became as follows:

"Article I - The object of the Indian National Congress is the
attainment of Swarajya [freedom] by the people of India by all
legitimate and peaceful means."\(^{24}\)

II - The Social and Economic Sectors

A. Changes in the Composition of the Congress Party

It will be remembered that A.O. Hume’s circular announcing the
first meeting of the Congress had stated that "this Conference will
form the germ of a Native Parliament..."\(^{25}\). Gradual evolution of parlia-
mentary forms was a specific objective of the vast majority of middle
class Hindu participants. They saw in the emergence of representative
government’s institutions a means for aggrandizement of the individual,
a technique for cultural renaissance, and an indication of Britain’s
desire to assist in the regeneration of Indian society. Typical of men
of this sentiment was Surendranath Banerjea*. A Kulin Brahmin and son
of one of Bengal’s leading Allopathic Doctors, young Surendranath was
schooled for service to Anglo-Indian union. Banerjea was among the

\(^{24}\) It is useful to compare this statement with the "objects" clause of
the 1908 (Allahabad) Constitution, supra, p.\(^{25}\). Article I of the
Nagpur Constitution is quoted in: All India Congress Committee,
The Indian National Congress, 1920-1923, Allahabad Law Journal Press,
Allahabad, 1924. Additional sections of the Nagpur document are
reproduced infra, Appendix III.7.(I.).

\(^{25}\) supra, p. 137.
earliest Indians to matriculate at an English university, a fact which was noteworthy particularly because orthodox religious leaders inveighed against voyages across the open ocean. That the Banerjea family took no heed of superstition was, of course, not surprising. The Banerjeas were of the bhadrolok, and as such they long had identified themselves with British rule, a synthesis of old and new, and biracial society.

Presumably, Surendranath Banerjea's ideal goal, an India "civilized" according to Western standards while yet remaining true to its traditional ethos, animated most of the other members of early Congresses as well. However, the ideal was not entirely altruistic. Not only did it relate to desire for personal advancement, it also was non-egalitarian. If the goal of the gradual evolutionists were realized, social and community stratification would remain in being. Only in abolition of the color bar at the upper levels of the socio-political structure would there be any marked divergence from the past.

Through its reforms increasing Indian participation in Legislative Councils, the Government of India attempted to honor the aspirations of gradual evolutionists. But since the number of Indians who could be incorporated into any Anglo-Indian political elite remained small, the sum total of reforms promulgated during the entire Transitional phase had little impact on Indian thinking as a whole. Particularly as racial tension grew towards a point necessitating outright repression and indiscriminate punishment of the Indian peoples, the belief spread that Britain had no interest in ameliorating conditions of racial bias operating at any level of society.
Indians were justified in castigating many Englishmen as proponents of white supremacy. However, color racialism was not the sole cause of the colonizer's attitude, for it incorporated as well questions of power politics and the profit motive. Moreover, part of the cooling of relations between Indian and Englishman was specifically a product of declining efficiency in the Indian Civil Service. This decline was reported in the following terms by one District Officer:

"As matters stand at present early 1900's, we are neglecting the work which matters most because neglect does not show; and in order that we may do the work which is intrinsically of no greater importance, but which must have the preference because it comes more immediately to the notice of the government...."

Desire to alleviate administrative pressure so that the District Officer once more might become a combined supervisory executive and paternalistic councillor had been behind Lord Curzon's decision to partition Bengal. But since partition stirred up communal strife on the one hand, and, on the other, threatened the socio-political authority of those groups which hitherto had most nearly equated their own interests with those of the British, the net results were a worsening of Anglo-Indian relations, an increase in the problems demanding District Officer attention, and a growth of nationalist sentiment.

The spirit of nationalism did not arise solely out of India's domestic crisis. British actions in the Sudan (1883-1898) and in the Boer War (1899-1902) raised question as to whether Victorian society

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was in fact founded on the moral principles attributed to it. Subsequently, the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) was remarked as proof that the East possessed the capacity to meet the West on even terms: that the Indian's long-standing inferiority complex vis à vis Europe was unfounded both in terms of civilization and in terms of military potential. Views of this nature affected many second generation Congress leaders. Nonetheless, a salient factor must not be overlooked. Those who entered the Congress after its establishment by gradual evolutionists, did so in part because the Congress appeared to offer a channel for vertical mobility. Even among conditional loyalists, therefore, self-interest militated against outright revolutionism because the Congress based its importance on its Anglo-Indian character.

The conflict of motive which harried the second generation of Congress leaders brought particularly extreme vexation to Bal Gangadhar Tilak*. A Chitpawan Brahmin and the scion of a famous Maharastrian family, young Tilak grew up in a household peripherally associated with the British Raj. However, association did not preclude thought of an end to English rule. As an educational administrator Tilak's Father presumably would have been able to achieve higher position in a purely Indian society than in any colonial structure. It is not surprising, therefore, that no attempt was made to Anglicize B.G. Tilak beyond the minimum necessary for acceptance at the Bar.

A deeply ambivalent attitude regarding India's British connection was revealed by Tilak's conduct in maturity. Slow in calling for outright expulsion of the British, Tilak nonetheless maintained that Indian civilization was fundamentally superior to that of the West.
Xenophobia thus was implicit in his thinking. By challenging British efforts to modify traditional patterns, Tilak more than once found himself jailed for seditious utterance. Even so, Tilak allied himself with Gandhi in 1918, speaking out against those who proposed that the Congress make a blanket condemnation of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.

But if second generation Congress leaders of Tilak’s type preferred not to demand forceful expulsion of the British Raj, how did India come to enter the Transformational Phase? Some growth of revolutionary sentiment was inevitable, for colonialism tends to be possessed of internal tension. But an anti-colonial movement can be backward- as well as forward-looking. Why in the Indian case did a modernist view prevail? Partial answers to this question become apparent when one reconsiders Britain’s role in India’s Late Traditional- Transitional development.

During the years of Whig liberalism, the East India Company sponsored the rise of a Westernized middle class. This class was prepared to identify with British rule so long as provision was made for its absorption into a germinal Anglo-Indian society. However, the type of training offered in India’s Western-style educational establishments was humanistic rather than technical. While this served to isolate Anglicized-Indians from much of their cultural heritage, the very success of Indian university education worked over time to create a surplus of potential administrators, jurists- and the like. Having fashioned men in their own administrative image, the English fashioned men able to perform those same functions which hitherto had been the sole responsibility of English immigrants. Direct Anglo-Indian competition for jobs inevitably resulted, bringing with it a decline - which may have been largely unconscious -
in the Englishman's willingness to integrate Indians into governing institutions.

At first, increase in job competition brought only communal rivalry. Government of India policy tacitly exploited this condition as a means of political control. But the effects of inter-community discrimination and of decreasing willingness to promote Indians to the ruling elite gradually became a stimulus for Hindu-Muslim rapprochement. Since cross-community alliance was consistent in effect with the Government's adoption of a policy of indiscriminate punishment for the maintenance of public order, nationalist sentiment rapidly increased.

For most of the second generation of Transitional politicians, the new nationalism was relatively little tinged by xenophobia. The protagonists of Swaraj were, after all, trained largely in British institutions, building their movement on British as well as Indian values. On the other hand, the political leaders of Transition's last years had placed conditions on their loyalty. But this was not surprising, for after the withdrawal of the gradual evolutionists there was no one to be represented but those Anglicized-Indian professionals who wished to replace the persons, though not the basic processes, of the British Raj.

B. Mixed Progress in the Economy

i.) Political Action's Effect on Growth - The Hindu middle class' extreme sensitivity to problems of politics and social reform damped the rate of economic growth during the Transition. Many who might otherwise have participated in modern economic activity spent their energies
instead on economically non-productive endeavors.\textsuperscript{27} Moreover, the typical Congress politician's lack of executive or administrative experience, his community welfare bias, and his ingenuousness in matters relating to political economy, led to criticisms of Government of India economic policy which in addition to being unjust were costly in the sense of being diversionary.

A prime example of misconstruction of fact may be seen in the Congress' obsession with the so-called "drain" of revenues to England.\textsuperscript{28} It is true that "Home Charges" led annually to the transfer of some millions of Pounds Sterling to British accounts, but since the larger percentage of these transfers were used to service debts incurred for overhead capital development and famine relief, the "drain" was not as damaging to India as claimed. At the same time, there can be little criticism of the Congress' complaints about monetary and fiscal policy in general, for Indians had no control over the Budget. One is tempted, therefore, to sympathize with those few, economically-acute Congressmen who tied the "drain" to questions of resource allocation by pointing out that the Government's high military expenditures made the financing of capital creation on current account needlessly difficult.

An additional area in which the Congressman's lack of technical training was exposed lay in his opposition to expansion of the export trade in agricultural produce. It was not true, as often claimed, that

\textsuperscript{27} It is important to note, however, that the Hindu's historic concern with other-worldly matters relatively little affected Transition's Anglicized-Indian middle class. B.B. Mishra, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 187-88.

\textsuperscript{28} cf: V. Anstey, \textit{op. cit.}, Appendix G.
famine was a specific by-product of agricultural export. Quite the contrary: a rising overseas demand for staples led to increases in acreage reclaimed and sown, and hence added to India's total food crop. There may have been lags on particular occasions; but since agricultural exports were diverted to relief depots during famine, the fact of a large export trade in agricultural staples served to increase the amount of food available for famine relief.

Further enumeration of misread fact is unnecessary for present purposes. What is important to note is: first, that political agitation specifically directed against Government of India economic policy was instrumental in mobilizing public opinion against the British connection; and, second, that resulting public disaffections proved of great cost in both human and material terms.

ii.) Agriculture and Irrigation - Completion of the major railroad trunks in the mid-'70's had made large-scale export of agricultural produce possible. Market areas having been newly enlarged, Indian farmers were relatively less hurt by the Great Depression of 1873-96 than were the farmers of many lands abroad. Not only was there a new source of demand, but the commodities offered for export (e.g. tea, indigo) did not add to the existing international glut, which was mainly confined to grain. Thus profit potentials were high and stimulated the development of regional crop specialization.

Among plantation crops, tea had established a large foreign market even before railroadization. Throughout Transition, it benefited from steadily increasing demand levels. Indigo was at first relatively stable, but after an export peak was reached in 1894-95 it went into a gradual
decline. Coffee, on the other hand, suffered from the violent fluctuations of an unstable world market.

Of the non-plantation staples, wheat, cotton, rice, jute and oilseeds all increased their export markets through 1895, and again in the closing years of Transition. Regional crop specialization, improvements in cultivation methods, and the extension of irrigated areas conspired to bring slow increases of yield per acre.

Major problems nonetheless continued to harass the non-plantation sector. Manure had to be used for fuel, thus causing a shortage of fertilizer. The poverty and ignorance of the peasantry also hindered efficient utilization of the soil. Spasmodic efforts were made on the Provincial level to alleviate these conditions, but until the appointment and creation of an (All-India) Inspector General of Agriculture (1901), and of an Imperial Institute of Agriculture (1904), little real progress was made. 1904 also saw passage of a Co-operative Societies Act primarily designed to alleviate the shortage of investable funds in the agricultural sector, but until this Act was amended in 1912 it did little to mitigate the financial difficulties of the small-holder.

Enlargement of areas under irrigation went forward throughout Transition. Around the turn of the Century, the following major irrigation projects were nearing completion: the Sutlej and Chenab Canals in the

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29 In Transitional British India, something less than 10% of the land was forested. Mrs. Anstey gives a figure of 7.8% for the early '20's (i.e., early Transformation). V. Anstey, op. cit., p. 174.

30 Poverty in the areas of Permanent Settlement was increased by the fact that the Government of India had reassessed land values during the period of the U.S. Civil War cotton boom. After the end of the War, land taxes were not adjusted relative to decline in agricultural price levels.
Punjab; a chain of navigable canals between Cuttack and Hooghly; and the Lower Ganges and Betwa canal systems. During the remaining years of Transition, the Punjab acted as the focus of most large-scale irrigation development.

A series of monsoon failures followed by famine and plague occurred during the years 1895-1908. These disasters nullified much of the progress made during the first decade of Transition. They not only wiped out rural savings, but they also led to a reversal of the trend toward regional crop specialization. The full effect of the years of poverty can only be conjectured, but it seems possible that India might have entered into a Transitional Period agricultural revolution had there been no disaster decade. The British were anxious to stimulate agricultural growth; and even in areas of small-holdings, crop specialization might have produced many of the same effects as an enclosure movement. The G.O.I. persisted in its efforts to spur agricultural progress throughout Transition, but these efforts came to little because the peasantry withdrew into reaction after the frightful experiences of 1895-1908. As has been noted, political agitators placed the blame for famine directly at the feet of the British Raj. Their arguments must have been persuasive, for in the declining years of Transition there was a perceptible slackening in the rate of agricultural development.

31 Since few irrigation canals were designed to fulfill a transport function, the Cuttack-Hooghly canal system was particularly noteworthy.

32 By the end of Transition, 48.9 million acres (approximately 20% of cultivated land) was under irrigation. At the beginning of the Period, only 10-12% of cultivated acreage had been so watered. See P.P. Pillai, op. cit., p. 86; V. Amstey, op. cit., pp. 160ff. and Table X; D.R. Gadgil, op. cit., pp. 153-154.
attributable to private endeavors.

iii.) Industrial Progress - The years of famine and plague damaged industrial as well as agricultural growth. Demand for finished goods was cut to the bone, and for a time, flight from the cities created a labor shortage. Rail transport and coal mining were the only sectors fully to escape recession; but since they would have been early Transition's most significant areas of industrial advance under any circumstance, the fact that railroads were called into heavy service for famine relief - and thereby increased the market for bunkering coal - was simply fortuitous.

Completion of the trunk lines running from the major ports inland through primary products producing areas had brought a steadily increasing demand for traffic. Shortly after 1900, the railroads began to show a profit. Higher rates of return would have been realized subsequently had finances been available for augmentation of the rolling stock. But reinvested profits went largely into trackage, for famine experience had shown that the trunks needed extensions, and that a greater degree of lateral tie-up across India was essential.

Mining output increased in step with railroad growth and development of the Calcutta industrial complex. New fields were long ignored, for simply by stepping up production in going mines it was possible nearly to double output in the years 1896-1900 over that of the five years previous. Annual coal output, less than 2 million tons at the beginning of Transition, rose to almost 19 million tons by the Period's close.

The manufacture of cotton and jute also increased markedly during Transition. The former industry, centered in Bombay and Ahmedabad,
trebled in number of plants during the thirty-five years from 1885 to 1920. The Calcutta jute complex almost doubled in factory size. Woollens and paper manufacture, petroleum production (Assam and Burma), and the mining of manganese ore increased as well, though at a considerably lesser rate than that of cotton and jute textiles. Finally, the Tata Iron and Steel Company, established in 1907, began producing iron in 1911 and steel in January 1913. 33

Tata was aided from its inception by governmental concessions. Credit for this aid is due Lord Curzon, for it was during his forceful tenure in Viceregal office that the Government of India first instituted policies designed to bring India balanced economic growth. But this new approach was symptomatic as well of fundamental shifts in Westminster, where a new stress on full integration of the Empire was coming to replace the mercantilist and free trade views which formerly had provided rationales for imperial economic policy. Thus Britain's Traditional concern for maintenance of the discrete character of India was by now radically altered in all dimensions.

In essence, England's Traditionalist orientation had begun to be discarded from the time of the pre-Mutiny educational reforms. The modernist trend was reinforced over the years 1858-1885 by the establishment of new political institutions. With the imposition of a small protective

tariff in 1894,\textsuperscript{34} the Government of India demonstrated its total abandonment of former policies designed to keep ancient institutions intact. In the last years of Transition, Britain offered India full economic integration into the imperial system, plus junior partnership in a bi-racial society. The gradual evolutionist wing of the Congress was satisfied, but the majority of Indians were not. Acts of political repression which appeared denigrations of the character and capacity of the Indian people caused Swaraj and personal dignity to be valued higher than apprenticeship in representative government and material progress.

\textbf{III. Conclusion: The Rise of Indian Nationalism}

The outstanding characteristic of Transitional India was the growth of national consciousness. This consciousness did not approach modern, Statist nationalism except within a small, highly articulate, segment of the populace. Parochial ties to locality, religious community, class or ethnic sub-group were much more immediate than was any sense of basic, All-Indian unity. Nonetheless, even Indians within some of the Princely States were becoming aware of the fact that the Indian subcontinent made up a unitary entity.

There were numerous causes for the development of this attitude. Widening knowledge of English extended the horizons of easy interpersonal communication. The telegraph, the railroad and the popular press further

\textsuperscript{34} Import duties of 5\% ad valorem were established at this time. To aid Lancashire, an equivalent excise tax was levied on India cotton manufactures; but it is significant that this excise was strongly opposed by the Government of India.
contributed to the destruction of Tradition's sense of atomism. Finally, there were the British. The Government of India's increasing dependence upon blanket racial policies served to focus attention on India's oneness in the eyes of the outside world.

Those relatively few Indians who developed an approximation of Western-style nationalism before the end of Transition came to this spirit along a number of paths. First of all, there was a desire to reestablish the level of cultural vitality known to India prior to its late-Mughal slide into moral decay. Social reformism led easily to a view embracing all of India. Second, self-rule became a specific goal for many whose personal aspirations had been fired by Western training and the demonstration effect of the British Raj. The desire to replace foreigners either to improve on their rule, or alternatively in order to enhance personal power, created a particularly virile form of nationalist sentiment. Most important, there was the felt need to be recognized by the English on merit: to have skills and station replace skin pigmentation as the criterion of social acceptance. This powerful aspiration led directly to nationalism.

The first generation of Congressmen sought evolutionary progress. This was due both to the Anglicized-Indian middle class's self-identification with England's political and social goals, and to that class' wish to reap power benefits from its show of loyalty to the Crown. But particularly under Lord Curzon, the Government of India seemed prepared not only to withdraw support from those Westernized groups which it had recently sponsored, but even to repudiate the liberal ideals which the Congress associated with British rule. The disillusionment which accompanied the
partition of Bengal thus carried a double significance. It destroyed gradual evolutionism as an effective political credo and at the same time raised questions as to Britain’s ultimate objectives in India.

The middle years of Transition witnessed a debilitating contest between Indian Traditionalists anxious to restore historic positions of authority, and modernists desiring realization of the social promise which they felt could be attained through a proper melding of Eastern and Western cultures. Simultaneously, popular outbursts against Governmental actions forced the British to employ increasingly repressive measures as a means of social control. This latter fact slowly rose to overshadow the antagonisms of groups such as the Congress, the Muslim League, and particularist religious communities. Gradually, a new political coalition came into being which had as its objective the freedom both of India and of the Ottoman Empire from the untoward interference of England. With the sequential withdrawal of gradual evolutionists from the Congress and the establishment of policies designed to widen that organization’s popular base, passage forward into Transformation was initiated.

What sort of prospects did Transformational India have of gaining some form of political autonomy? One extraordinary asset existed in the person of Mahatma Gandhi, who succeeded more than any other man in moderating extremism of action and objective, and who thus made it possible for national consciousness to seem for a time identical with national unity. But how long could unity exist in a country strained by communalism, and tangibly drawn together only in its desire for release from specific British policies? The expulsion of the Crown was neither
foreordained nor universally desired. No more was there agreement regarding the types of political, social and economic institution to be sought in the India of the future.

As we shall see in Chapter 16, India's movement forward through Transformation was partly induced by sentiments of Western-type nationalism. But these and other modernist ideals and attitudes were rooted only in urban soil. Much more important, therefore, were the essentially synthetic impetus provided by the Government of India's continuing existence as a symbol of political unity, and by the physical extension of that unity through market expansion, development of social overhead capital, and the creation of a modern industrial base. Britain was more responsible for these latter developments than was India; for preoccupation with immediate political questions distracted the attention of most of the Indian elite from the crucial role played by economic development in the creation of effective nationhood.
CONCLUSIONS: THE DECISION TO JETTISON VESTIGES OF THE PAST AS A MEANS OF SECURING NATIONAL GOALS

In Chapter 9, passage forward out of the Traditional Stage is said to be partly dependent upon: (1) the existence of a class skilled in new technologies; (2) assimilation of members of this class into the historic elite; and (3) sufficient political unrest to make Traditionalist rulers willing supporters of innovational reforms designed to buttress their historic positions of power.\(^1\) The first two of these conditions remain effective throughout Transition, growing in importance as the period develops. The third, however, becomes greatly modified as "new men" who enter Transition's political elite begin to realize that retention of various Traditionalist forms is not only anachronistic and dangerous to their own authority, but also that vestiges of the past pose a major threat to the security of the State. Coincidentally, the "new men" come to appreciate that the balance of power is slowly shifting in their direction due to functional and institutional mutation, and that rather than being the wards of the historic elite, the Western-trained class is nearly its equal in power. Thereafter, this emerging modern class bends its efforts towards overthrow of Traditionalist institutions so that the State can be freed of elements inhibiting progress.

Three of the instruments which may be used in this effort at modernization are: (1) appeal to a spirit of nationalism; (2) development

\(^1\) *supra*, p. 145.
of the economic sector both to make the nation's interdependence increasingly tangible, and to enhance the power of the Central Government; and (3) populist propaganda encouraging and idealizing progressive, rather than retrogressive, change.

In this chapter, we shall first review the reasons for the development of revolutionary attitudes within the rising, Westernized class. Next we shall compare the techniques employed by Japan's lesser samurai, the Turkish Kemalists, and the conditional loyalists of India's Congress Party, in trying to bring unfettered power to themselves. Finally, we shall note the critical issues left unresolved at the time of entry into Transformation.

A. The Composition and Objectives of Early Transitional Political Coalitions.

The political coalitions created out of the surrender of Tradition's basic governmental postulate brought Traditionalists and progressives into a working relationship established for essentially conservative purposes.

In Japan, the anti-bakufu clans joined together primarily to assert their separate determinations to be free of coercion from the Center. In addition, they allied themselves with one another in order to replace Tokugawa's vacillation with a more active direction of programs designed to resist the incursions of abroad. Lesser samurai functioned as the administrators and planners of these efforts, but for the most part they could not directly determine policy until some time after the Meiji Restoration. For feudal practices remained intact within most of the clans, and the daimyo and karo therefore retained ultimate authority over
decision making.

The social rigidity of Japan's early Transition political coalition stands in marked contrast with that which existed in the 1908-12 Ottoman Empire. Here, the Army and the various millets provided the only effective institutions of power. But there was little consensus on policy objectives except for those dealing with restitution of the 1876 Constitution. And the beneficiaries of that restitution - the Young Turk officers, liberal members of the Traditional aristocracy, gaiur hierarchs, returned civilian exiles and Islamic revivalists who composed the Ottoman Parliament - were much too disputatious to turn the reestablishment of Constitutionalism to good effect. Consequently, as early as the 1909 suppression of an ultra-reactionary Muslim uprising, the Young Turk progressives began to try to enforce Parliamentary discipline and hence to take decision-making power to themselves. They did this primarily for one purpose - to maintain the Empire's Traditional integrity in face of growing internal unrest, and mounting foreign pressure.

Conditions arising from India's colonial status made for differences in detail, but the Congress Party - British Raj association which grew out of Britain's training of an Anglicized-Indian middle class was created for purposes fundamentally as conservative as were the alliances formed at comparable stages of development in both Japan and Turkey. The British wished to perpetuate their rule, and they found that this could be done most efficiently through the creation of an indigenous class prepared to act within a Westernized frame of reference. This emerging elite would then lead other Indians out of their socio-political
One of the differences in detail referred to above existed in the nature of the threat posed to India's Tradition-oriented political authority. There was no danger of foreign intervention. The primary challenge to Transition's progressive-conservative ruling coalition was provided by just that view of a diverse and disunited subcontinent which "John" Company Governments had themselves attempted to sustain well into the 19th Century. Through institutional manifestations such as communalism, localism and linguistic multiplicity, this attitude of mind increased administrative costs while at the same time inhibiting both the Government's power to effect change, and the Congress' ability to represent All-Indian opinion. Since population rise placed increasing pressure on available resource levels and hence tended to exacerbate antagonisms existing within India's various communities, the need to replace Tradition's particularist loyalties with a sense of national identify became yearly more acute.

B. Factors Leading to the Breakdown of Progressive-Conservative Alliances

The foreign danger was one of several factors leading young Meiji bureaucrats to turn against feudal institutions over the years 1869-71. In Turkey, presence of foreigners on the soil provided the single, overriding determinant both of the establishment and of the success of Kemal's

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2 There was, of course, a large measure of idealism involved in the British effort. But idealism was a significant component in Transitional Japan's Emperor loyalty and Transitional Turkey's Pan-Ottomanism and Pan-Turkism as well. Thus, the "civilizing" mission of Victorian Englishmen need not be mentioned as a basic distinction separating the three cases.
Anatolian revolution. And "foreign" threats were to become important even in colonial India, for as British Governments found it necessary to employ increasingly indiscriminate racial policies as a means of maintaining social order, Congressmen became alienated from their white associates and began to think of the Government of India less as a patron than as an intruder.

The estrangement of the Congress from British rule thus resulted primarily from certain sociological phenomena. Sociological considerations were less a factor in Turkey, though the problem of disparate value patterns separating Islam from Kemal's national movement did sharpen the animosities arising between conservatives and progressives during both the Union and Progress and the Nationalist phases of Transition. But this was due particularly to the fact that the Ottoman Empire historically had been theocratic. Divergencies in value patterns therefore bore directly on questions of political power. Problems relating to the gaiur, for example, had split the first Union and Progress Governments even though assimilation of the Christian and Jewish minorities was less immediately a political than a social issue at the time. Similarly, the hold which Islamic reactionaries maintained over the Anatolian peasantry gravely jeopardized the Ankara regime during its early days of struggle. And these reactionaries were opposed to Kemal not because he was attempting to reestablish vitality in Turkish political processes, but rather because certain of the innovations he proposed threatened Islamic dogma regarding value patterns and personal conduct.

In racialism and Muslim reaction, Indian and Turkish progressives found ample reason for trying to break with their conservative partners.
Both of these problems, it will be noted, directly affected the population at large. Restoration Japan largely escaped from populist agitation on matters of conduct and belief, for the rigid hierarchic structure which had continued in existence for over two centuries made commoners socially insignificant and politically docile. On the other hand, Japan experienced peasant uprisings caused by price inflation and commodity shortage throughout the wane of Tradition and the Transitional period. Population pressure was critical; solution of the population/resource crisis was essential for the maintenance of social order. But as the Meiji bureaucrats gradually learned, economic betterment could not be assured so long as feudal practices existed to impede the entry of modern innovations and the rationalization of historic techniques.

The fact ultimately leading to the breakdown of early Transition's progressive-conservative coalition was the same in Japan, Turkey and India. Maintenance of the power base of the Traditional elite required the perpetuation of institutions and functions whose nature prevented the introduction of essential changes into society. Progressives saw the State's - and hence their own - future security threatened. The fact that support of obsolescent institutions was mandatory detracted from the effectiveness with which the "new men" could perform the roles assigned to them by their conservative associates. These roles had to be performed - and well - because most of the critical weaknesses inherited from Tradition continued to endanger the country.³

³This view differs greatly from an alternative hypothesis which has much present currency: i.e., that progressive social change is particularly the product of actions initiated by subordinated individuals and groups. Cf.: E.E. Hagen, "How Economic Growth Begins: A General Theory
In India, Britain's persistent refusal to allow Indians full membership in top policy councils made it impossible for the Congress to operate as an effective Loyal Opposition. It further denied Congressmen that final cachet of British support needed to give the Anglicized-Indian middle class stature within the indigenous community, and to stabilize its function as the representative agency of All-Indian opinion. Thus, the view of India as diverse and disunited was perpetuated, even though this view was contrary to the basic interests of the conservative Government of India. An analogous situation existed in Japan, for even after the return of clan registers, decisions handed down by modernists at the Center could be obstructed - even contested by force of arms - by Traditionalist Chihanji in the Regions. Consequently, active direction had not surely replaced the passive responsiveness of Late Traditional bakufu administrations even though internal and external threats to Japanese security remained legion. And in Turkey, the veto power possessed by the Islamic institution (and hence by the Sultan-Caliph) was sufficiently influential to threaten progressives within successive Union and Progress, Post-War Constantinople, and Ankara Governments with

Applied to Japan", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 3. (Fall 1958)]. While this writer does not wish to dispute the group subordination view particularly with regard to the sources of entrepreneurial talent, he would like to point to biographic data presented infra, Appendix VI, which suggests that a significant number of reform leaders may be motivated more by a desire to increase or maintain the high level of power and status already achieved within an existing socio-political structure, than by a desire to overturn that structure entire.
mass disobedience to any legislation endangering the historic attitudes or prerogatives of the Islamic hierarchy. During the period of Kemal's War of Independence, this meant that Ankara faced Muslim opposition within Anatolia itself, not because Kemal aimed to restore the political sovereignty of Turkey, but rather because he wished to create a modern spirit of secular nationalism. Neither Vahdettin nor the Constantinople Şeyhül-Islam who proclaimed Holy War against Kemal's nationalists wanted to contribute to the destruction of the Empire, but Vahdettin was prepared to retain his throne even at the cost of becoming a pensioner of England, and the Islamic hierarchy similarly wished to protect its historic authority over the Muslim masses even if by so doing it denied those masses the opportunity of regaining political independence.

C. Tactics Employed by Modernists Against Their Reactionary Adversaries

The Meiji bureaucrats appealed directly to portions of the Traditionalist element in order to tip the balance of power in their favor. The Satcho-Hito clans, for example, were used again and again to force changes upon the feudal institution. In varying coalitions, most of these clans figured prominently in the return of clan registers, the move of the capital to Tokyo, and the abolition of feudalism. However, the Satcho-Hito Traditionalists on the han never were able to turn their support of Meiji to major partisan advantage, for the Satcho-Hito modernists who staffed the national bureaucracy employed techniques of divide and rule. For example, the loyalty of the Tokugawa clans was bought by the Meiji bureaucrats after the failure of Keiki's revolt.
This provided a fudai han counterweight against the divisive threats of such tozama stalwarts as Satsuma. This was risky business at best, but the lesser samurai who had come to power in the Meiji oligarchy ultimately won their game by exploiting historic inter-clan rivalries and this preventing the formation of an effective dissident faction.

Kemal used similar tactics in his attempt to replace the Ottoman Sultanate-Caliphate. He appealed to the Muslim peasantry of Anatolia by contending that his movement was more orthodox than the Government sitting in Constantinople. When doubters rose to question whether he had truly accepted the mission of reestablishing Islam, he directed their attention to the fact that only Ankara was attempting to assure the physical independence of Turkey. By winning battles and extolling Allah, Kemal drove a wedge between the Traditionalist hierarchy of Constantinople and their most devoted supporters - the Muslim peasants of Anatolia.

In India, the Congress likewise appealed to portions of the Traditionalist element. These groups comprised the ultra-reactionary religious communities which Britain had attempted to appease in the disturbed period following the partition of Bengal. During the years 1906-14, the Government of India had experienced considerable success in turning Muslim antagonisms, smoldering since 1857, away from the Crown and onto the Hindu populace. Just how conscious this effort was is indeterminable, but it is known that the Muslim League received considerable British favor from the time of its creation in 1906, for the British recognized that the Muslim community required G.O.I. rule
in order to protect its particularist community rights.

Though the Government of India gave patronage to the Muslims, it also employed increasingly indiscriminate racial policies. This provided Muslims and Hindus with a community of interest which was successfully transformed into the Lucknow Pact of 1916. Thereafter, the Congress brought further reactionar support to itself through such events as the nation-wide hartals over the Rowlatt Act, the melding of Khilafat (Caliphate) and self-rule agitation, and the establishment of a new program to integrate the peasantry into political activity.

Divide and rule and appeals to Traditionalists were not the only tactics employed by Japanese, Turkish and Indian progressives in their attempts to bring the power balance to themselves. In Japan, for example, the Meiji bureaucrats tried to ameliorate the condition of the samurai and to gain the support of those chonin who would willingly support attempts at economic development. Loyalty to Kemal as a charismatic leader was consciously developed in Turkey, and in India the saintliness of Mahatma Gandhi was much stressed. Each one of these methods proved useful in bringing power to progressive leaders. But not all of them were to serve equally well in the development of a modern national State.

Behind the range of tactics by which the progressive leaders seduced, muted or defeated their Traditionalist antagonists lay the elements of modern technology and of an emerging national sentiment. The "new men" moved from junior to senior political status because only they could, or would, promise to deal with economic crisis and the external threat to Japan, with post-War military incursions on Turkish soil, and with
the presence in India of the British Raj. The powerful appeal of the
Traditional past - feudal, regionalized Japan; Islamic Turkey; diverse
India - could not hold back the "new men" - because historic institutions
could not solve the problems which Transition had made central to
political life.

Conclusion: Nationalism and Economic Growth - Joint Determinants of
the Success of Attempts at Modernization

Nationalism and aspirant idealism grew strong on the Anatolian
battleground. The sense of isolation which hitherto had been a charac-
teristic of life on the Central Plateau was greatly lessened, and so
was that passive-acceptance of kismet: destiny, which generations of
Muslim scribes had taught to be the godly way of life. But would these
new attitudes hold? Could a program to transform the entire character
of Turkish society depend on the support of new value patterns, or
would Muslim conservatism and peasant superstition impede progress
once the synthetic enthusiasms of wartime no longer held relevance?
This has become the prime question of Turkish republicanism. But
during Transformation its pertinence was largely obscured by the
charisma surrounding Mustafa Kemal. For the Ghazi was the demiurge
of Turkish nationalism, and while he lived his pagan attraction over-
shadowed for the peasant majority most of the demurs of Islam.

Gandhi performed a similar function in Transformational India.
Furthermore, there existed throughout the country a unifying desire
for self-rule. But the experiences of Transformational India and
Turkey were to be scarcely identical. In the first place, communal
divisiveness was largely resolved for the Turkish nation by the War of
Independence and the subsequent exchange of Graeco-Turkish minorities. Religious animosities still harass the Indian peoples. In the second place, while Turkey was laggard in creating the infrastructure (particularly in transport) upon which modern society depends, Indian Governments saw to the creation of most of the social overhead necessary for development during the eighty years following the Sepoy Mutiny. This was not felt by Indians to be an unmitigated boon. As we shall see, during Transformation one of the political issues on which the Congress could not agree was whether or not India should accept Western material progress as a goal of the State.

Mahatma Gandhi was one of the leaders of the anti-materialist view. In this he was opposed by his young lieutenant, Jawaharlal Nehru*, who correctly perceived that the Traditionalist vision of India as diverse and disunited could not be overcome unless there was developed a distinct, national style through socio-economic as well as political integration. Similar insights were gained by the Satcho-Hito bureaucrats of Meiji Japan, and to this end they launched ambitious programs such as the national education scheme which was to be controlled from the Center, and the economic growth program which was made the responsibility of the Kobusho.

Of course, economic development was consciously sought in Japan partly to alleviate critical resource shortages, and partly to build up the State's defensive capacity. But the economic policies of early Meiji Governments were initiated as well to try to break clannism and make the emergence of a true spirit of nationalism possible. For while the Japanese historically had possessed a greater sense of cultural
identity than had either the Turks or the Indians, and while the Japanese had in the Emperor's person a unifying force of the first magnitude, clan loyalties were more immediate to individual Japanese than was any sense of allegiance to the Central Government.

In the section which follows, we shall trace the progress of Japanese, Turkish and Indian modernists in their efforts to build progress into society. We shall see the ruthlessness with which they pursued policies designed to disestablish inhibiting vestiges of the past, and how their determination to succeed created new political strains. Finally, we shall take them to entry into attempted Take-Off. We shall find that none of these Take-Offs was spontaneous, but rather that it each was induced by policies of ruling political coalitions established as much to buttress their positions of power as to bring economic growth per se.
Appendix III.1.(J.)

FIVE VERSIONS OF THE CHARTER OATH (6 April 1868)

These translations are presented as follows: The first sentence quoted in each section is that of Hodzumi; the second is by Ukita; the third and the fourth both appear in McLaren; the fifth is by Uyehara. Sources for the versions are as follows, Versions 1 and 2: G.B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan, p. 318; Version 3 and 4: W.W. McLaren, Japanese Government Documents, pp. 8 and 8fn; Version 5: G.E. Uyehara, op.cit., p. 57.

Article I.

1. Deliberative assemblies shall be established on an extensive scale and all measures of government shall be decided by public opinion.

2. Public councils shall be organized and all government affairs shall be decided by general discussion.

3. The practice of discussion and debate shall be universally adopted, and all measures shall be decided by public agreement.

4. An Assembly widely convoked shall be established, and thus great stress shall be laid upon public opinion.

5. An Assembly widely convoked shall be established, and all affairs of State shall be decided by impartial discussion.

Article II.

1. All classes, high and low, shall unite in vigorously carrying out the plan of government.

2. All classes, both rules and ruled, shall with one heart devote themselves to the advancement of the national interests.

3. High and low shall be of one mind, and social order shall thereby be perfectly maintained.

4. The welfare of the whole nation shall be promoted by the everlasting efforts of both/governing and the governed classes.

5. All administrative matters of State shall be conducted by the cooperative efforts of the governing and the governed.
Article III.

1. All classes of the people shall be allowed to fulfill their just desires as far as possible so that there may not be any discontent among them or...

All classes of the people shall be allowed to fulfill their just aspirations so that there may be no discontent.

2. All the civil and military officials and all the common people shall be allowed to realize their own aspirations and to evince their active characteristics.

3. It is necessary that the civil and military powers be concentrated in a single whole, the rights of all classes be assured, and the national mind be completely satisfied.

4. All subjects, civil and military officers, as well as other people shall do their best, and never grow weary in accomplishing their legitimate purpose.

5. All the people—officials, soldiers, and others—ought to be prevented from becoming idle and discontented by encouraging the achievement of their legitimate desires.

Article IV.

1. Uncivilized customs of former times shall be broken through and everything shall be based upon just and equitable principles of nature.

2. All base customs of former times shall be abolished, and justice and equity as they are universally recognized shall be followed.

3. The uncivilized customs of former times shall be broken through, and the impartiality and justice displayed in the workings of nature be adopted as a basis of action.

4. All absurd usages shall be abandoned; justice and righteousness shall regulate all actions.

5. All absurd old usages shall be abandoned, and justice and righteousness shall regulate all actions.

Article V.

1. Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world, so that the welfare of the Empire may be promoted.

2. Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world and thus the foundations of the Empire shall be extended.
3. Intellect and learning shall be sought for throughout the world, in order to establish the foundations of the Empire.

4. Knowledge shall be sought for all over the world; and thus shall be strengthened the foundations of the Imperial Polity.

5. Knowledge and learning shall be sought for all over the world, and thus the foundations of the imperial polity be greatly strengthened.
Appendix III.2.(T.)

KEMAL'S 21 APRIL 1920 TELEGRAM DESCRIBING

THE FIRST MEETING OF THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

"I. On Friday, 23rd April, after prayer, the Grand National Assembly, if God be willing, will be opened.

"2. As the duties of the National Assembly will be of vital description and of the upmost importance - such as, for instance, securing the independence of our country and the deliverance of the seat of the Caliphate and the Sultanate from the hands of our enemies - and as it will be opened of a Friday, the solemn character of this day will be profited by for offering solemn prayer, before the opening, in the Hadji Beiram Mosque. All the honorable deputies will take part in this prayer, in the course of which the light of the Koran and the call to prayer will be poured forth over all the believers.

"When the prayer is over, we shall move to the place of meeting specially decorated with the sacred flag and the holy relic. Before entering the building, a prayer of thanksgiving will be said and sheep will be sacrificed as a thankoffering.

"During this ceremony, the troops belonging to the Army Corps will line the road leading from the Mosque to the building and will take up special positions en route.

"3. In order to emphasize the sacred character of this day, the reading of the whole of the Koran and the Buchari containing the tradition of the Prophet will begin at the chief town in the province under the supervision of the Vali of the Vilayet, and the last portions will be read for the devotion of the people in front of the building where the Assembly will meet when the Friday prayer is over.

"4. In every part of our sacred, suffering country the reading of the Koran and the Buchari will begin from today onward, and before Friday prayer the solemn call to prayer is to be intoned from the minarets. When during the Khutbah the Imperial title of His Majesty our Sultan and Caliph will be pronounced, special prayers and petitions will be offered, begging that within a short space of time His Sublime Person, His Imperial States and all his oppressed subjects may regain freedom and happiness. The reading of the Koran being finished at the end of the Friday prayer, sermons will be delivered on the importance and sacred character of the national endeavours which aim at the liberation of the seat of the Caliph and
Sultan and every part of our country. Sermons will also be delivered on the obligation of everyone to do his patriotic duty, which will be pointed out to him by the Grand National Assembly that comprises representatives of the whole nation. Prayers will then be said for the deliverance, salvation and independence of our Caliphate and Sultanate, of our Faith and our Empire, of our Country and our Nation.

"After these religious and patriotic observances have terminated and having left the mosque, a solemn ceremony of congratulation will take place in all the Ottoman towns and seats of the highest authority to commemorate the opening of the National Assembly. After Friday prayer the Mevlud will be read everywhere.

"5. You are requested to use every possible means to spread the foregoing communication without delay to the remotest villages, among the smallest units of troops, among all the organisations and institutions in the country. It is to be printed in heavy type and placarded publically. In places where this is not possible, it is to be printed and distributed gratis.

"6. We pray God to grant that we may be successful."

Source: M. Kemal, op. cit., pp. 373-74.
Appendix III.3.(T.)

"FUNDAMENTAL ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACT
OF THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY" (20 JANUARY 1921)

"I. Sovereignty belongs without reserve to the nation. The system of administration is based on the principle that the people personally and effectively direct their own destinies.

"2. The executive and legislative functions are combined in the Grand National Assembly as the true and only representative of the nation.

"3. The Turkish State is governed by the Grand National Assembly; its government is called the "Government of the Grand National Assembly."

"4. The Grand National Assembly is composed of members elected by the people of the vilayets.

"5. The elections of the Grand National Assembly are held every two years. Members are elected for two years but may be reelected. The retiring body continues its functions until the sitting of the new body. In case elections cannot be held, the term of the incumbent legislature may be prolonged only one year. Each member of the Grand National Assembly represents not the province which elects him but the entire nation.

"6. The entire Assembly convenes the first of November without summons.

"7. The basic rights of the application of religious laws (already in force), the promulgation and modification or abrogation of laws, the making of conventions and peace treaties, and the proclamation of the defense of the homeland belong to the Grand National Assembly. The religious and juridical provisions of laws enacted shall be such as best conform to the public opinion, and the needs of the times as well as established customs. The functions and responsibilities of the Cabinet shall be fixed by special law.

"8. The Grand National Assembly administers the branches of the government through its appointees, who are under its direction, responsible to it, and replaced if need be.

"9. The President elected by the Grand National Assembly in general session is its President throughout the term of the Parliament."
In this capacity he is authorized to sign in the name of the Assembly and to ratify decisions of the Cabinet. The Cabinet elects one of its own members its Chairman. But the President of the Grand National Assembly is ex officio President of the Cabinet.

"10. The provisions of the Constitution (1876, 1908) which are not contradictory to the principles herein remain in effect."

Source: D.E. Webster, op. cit., pp. 97-8, quoting Tarih IV, pp. 55ff. This translation may be compared against that given by Kemal in his Speech. See Kemal, op. cit., pp. 477-78.
Appendix III.4.(I.)

MAJOR AREAS OF CONGRESS CONCERN DURING TRANSITION

1) Modification of the Council of the Secretary of State for India
   a) to get Congress actions and opinions on record
   b) to get non-official, elected (by Indian Governments) members, as well as appointed, former official members
   c) to make the Council advisory, rather than administrative

2) Constitutional Changes
   a) to increase the size of the Indian Assemblies through the addition of elected members
   b) to make the Budget a subject for Indian Councils' scrutiny, with right of interpretation granted
   c) to get a Standing Committee of M.P.'s to whom the Indians might have redress if a majority of Council members opposed acts of the Government of India
   d) to increase the number of elected members of Assemblies, conceding the right of special representation to local governments, Chambers of Commerce, Universities
   e) to extend the areas of British India ruled by the Governor in Council
   f) request for direct representation in Commons at the rate of 2 M.P.'s per province; (first raised, 1904)

3) Request that India be ruled in the same fashion as the self-governing Dominions; (first raised, 1906)

4) Resolutions Dealing with the Morley-Minto Reforms
   a) oppose creation of separate electorates based on religion
   b) ask for extension of the number of Executive Councils
   c) request for elected majorities in Imperial Legislative Council and all Provincial Councils (first raised, 1912)
      these majorities for the most part to be directly elected by and to include as members only those speaking English

5) All-India Federation

6) Public Services
   a) simultaneous examinations in England and India for Covenanted Civil Servants
   b) raising of the age limit for candidates
   c) guarantee of the right of Indians to hold high-level posts in education, public works, medical service, railway, opium service, and customs and telegraphs

7) Military
   a) opposition to support of troops not used for the defense of India alone
   b) establishment of Military Colleges in India
   c) commissions for Indians in the higher military grades

8) Legal and Judicial Problems
   a) abolition of procedure whereby Sessions Judges and High Courts could revoke acquittal verdicts granted by Juries
   b) opposition to Sedition Laws and Regulation III (1818, re-applied in 1897) allowing deportation without trial. Congress claimed these laws to be contrary to the Indian's birthright to Habeas Corpus and the principles of Magna Carta.
9) Permanent Settlement, Use Taxes and Cesses, Poverty and Famines
   a) request fixity and permanence of land charges
   b) National Banks requested to aid finance in rural sector
      (first raised, 1892)
   c) request for Famine Insurance Fund, permanent settlement throughout British India, agricultural banks, technical schools
   d) request that land revenue be recognized as of the nature of rent, rather than tax (1906)

10) Forest Laws
    a) Forest Laws should be administered to aid conservation, not to provide revenue

11) Commerce and Industry
    a) protest excise on cottons manufactured in British India (first raised, 1894)
    b) request for Government sponsorship of village industry (first raised, 1898)
    c) establishment of an annual Industrial Exhibition of Indian-produced Goods in conjunction with annual Congress (1901 et seq.)

12) Swadeshi, Boycott and Swaraj
    a) measures proposed at time of Bengal Partition, but only intermittently invoked until 1920

13) Communal Representation
    a) problem grows intense from time of Bengal Partition; Congress therefore calls for meetings to promote communal harmony (1910)
    b) Lucknow Pact of 1916

14) Demand for Amelioration of Conditions of Indians Abroad

15) Opposition to Salt Tax

16) Social Welfare
    a) local option regarding prohibition
    b) improvement of womens' conditions; womens' suffrage (first raised, 1917)
    c) improvement of conditions of "Depressed Classes"
    d) sanitation legislation and public health
    e) extension of education
    f) improvement of prison conditions

17) Provincial and Imperial Monetary and Fiscal Policy

Appendix III.5.(I.)

CONGRESS DEMANDS NOT MET DURING TRANSITION

"(1) Abolition of India Council (1885);
(2) Simultaneous examinations (1885);
(3) Equitable apportionment of military expenditure between India and England (1885);
(4) Extension of trial by Jury (1886);
(5) Finality given to the Verdicts of Juries (1886);
(6) Enabling accused persons in warrant cases, to demand that instead of being tried by the Magistrate, they be committed to the Court of Sessions (1886);
(7) Separation of Judicial from Executive Functions (1886);
(8) Volunteering for Army among Indians (1887);
(9) Establishment of Military Colleges in India for the training of Indians as Officers (1887);
(10) Amendment of the Arms Act and Rules (1887);
(11) An active policy of technical education and industrial development (1888);
(12) Reform of the Land Revenue Policy of Government (1889);
(13) Re. Currency Policy (1892);
(14) Constitution of an independent Civil Medical Service in India (1893);
(15) Abolition of Exchange of Compensation Allowance (1893);
(16) Abolition of 'Begar' (forced labour) and 'Rasad' (forced contributions of supplies) (1893);
(17) Reduction of "Home Charges" (N.D.);
(18) Repeal of the Cotton Excise Duty (1893);
(19) Recruitment of the higher Judiciary from the Bar (1894);
(20) Condition of Indians in the Colonies (1894);
(21) Repeal of the Government of India's notification of 1891 relating to the Press in Indian States (1894);
(22) Measures for the relief of agricultural indebtedness (1895);
(23) Improvement in the conditions of third class railway travelling (1895);
(24) Financial independence to Provinces (1896);
(25) Reorganization of the Educational Services... (1896);
(26) Repeal of the Regulations allowing deportation without trial (1897);
(27) Re. the Sedition Act of 1898 (1897);
(28) Re. the Criminal Procedure Code Amendment Act of 1898 (1897);
(29) Re. the Lucknow Municipal Act of 1899 (1898);
(30) Re. the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900 (1898);
(31) Inquiry into the economic condition of the people of India (1900);
(32) Larger employment of Indians in the minor Civil Services (1900);
(33) Restriction of the employment of Indians in the superior offices of the Public Works Department (1900);
(34) Admission of Indians to the Police competitive examination in England and their larger employment in the higher ranks of the Police (1901);
Re. the increase of £786,000 per annum in the capitation charges borne by India on account of the British forces in this country (1902);

Re. the recommendations of the Indian Universities Commission (1902);

Re. the Indian Universities Act of 1904 (1903);

Re. the Official Secrets Act of 1904 (1903);

Cost of the India Office and the salary of the Secretary of State (1904);

Revival of periodical Parliamentary inquiries into Indian Affairs (1905);

Advance in Local Self-Government (1905);

Re. the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908 (1908);

Re. the Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Act of 1908 (1908);

Free and compulsory primary education (1908);

Reform of Legislative Councils Regulations (1909);

Inquiry into the system of administration of the Northwest Frontier Province (1909);

To throw open the office of Law Member to advocates, vakils and attorneys (1910);

Re. the Seditious Meetings Act (1910);

Re. the Indian Press Act (1910);

Inquiry into the growth of public expenditure (1910);

Amnesty to political prisoners (1910);

Mr. Gokhale's Elementary Education Bill (1910);

Governor-in-Council for the United Provinces (1911);

Constitution of an Executive Council in the Punjab (1911);

Reform of the India Council (1913);

Re. the Indian students in England (1915)."

Appendix III.6.(I.)

MAJOR RESOLUTIONS OF THE CALCUTTA CONGRESS (1906)

"Self Government"

I. Resolved that this Congress is of opinion that the system of Government obtaining in the Self-Governing British Colonies should be extended to India and that, as steps leading to it, it urges that the following reforms should be immediately carried out:

(a) all examinations held in England only should be simultaneously held in India and in England, and that all higher appointments which are made in India should be by competitive examination only.

(b) The adequate representation of Indians in the Council of the Secretary of State and the Executive Councils of the Governors of Madras and Bombay.

(c) The expansion of the Supreme and Provincial Legislative Councils, allowing for a larger and truly effective representation of the peoples and a larger control over the financial and executive administration of the country.

(d) The powers of local and municipal bodies should be extended and official control over them should not be more than what is exercised by the Local Government Board in England over similar bodies.

"Boycott Movement"

II. Resolved that having regard to the fact that the people of this country have little or no voice in its administration, and their representations to the Government do not receive due consideration, this Congress is of opinion that the boycott movement inaugurated in Bengal by way of protest against the partition of that Province was, and is, legitimate.

"Swadeshi"

III. Resolved that this Congress accords its most cordial support to the Swadeshi movement and calls upon the people of the country to labour for its success, by making earnest and sustained efforts to promote the growth of indigenous industries and to stimulate the production of indigenous articles by giving them preference over imported commodities, even at some sacrifice.

"National Education"

IV. Resolved that in the opinion of this Congress the time has arrived for the people all over the country earnestly to take up the question of national education for both boys and girls, and organize a system of education, literary, scientific and technical, suited to the requirements of the country on National lines and under National control.

Appendix III.7.(I.)

PORTIONS OF THE CONGRESS' NAGPUR CONSTITUTION (1920)

Article I - "The object of the Indian National Congress is the attainment of Swarajya by the people of India by all legitimate and peaceful means."

Article VIII - "Each Provincial Congress Committee shall be responsible for the election of delegates to the Congress. No one shall be qualified for election who does not subscribe to the Congress creed. Each Provincial Congress Committee shall frame rules for the election of delegates, due regard being had to the return of women delegates and representation of minorities, special interests or classes needing special protection."

Article XXIX - "No subject shall be ... allowed to be discussed at any Congress by the President thereof, to the introduction of which the Hindu or Mahomedan delegates, as a body, object by a majority of 3/4ths of their number, and if, after the discussion of any subject which has been admitted for discussion, it shall appear that the Hindu or Mahomedan delegates, as a body, are, by a majority of 3/4ths of their number, opposed to the resolution which it is proposed to pass thereon, such resolution shall be dropped."

POLITICAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:
A METHODOLOGY APPLIED TO JAPAN, TURKEY AND INDIA

by

Lawrence Whitcomb Barss

(Volume II)
Part IV.
THE GROWTH OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTERACTION DURING TRANSFORMATION

Chapter 14. - The Victory of Meiji Progressivism
Chapter 15. - Radical Reform and the Modernization of The Turkish State
Chapter 16. - The Victorious Struggle for Indian Freedom
Chapter 17. - Conclusions: The Emergent Modernism of Transformation

In these chapters are traced out the techniques employed by the victorious progressives of Japan, Turkey, and India, in order to consolidate their political authority and to relax basic constraints hitherto inhibiting solution of long-standing critical problems. It is shown that the new governing elites gradually learn that conscientious development of the economy affords great opportunities for power consolidation and rational attainment of non-economic objectives, and that thereafter the new leaders begin to equate their political fortunes with an increasing degree of economic progress. Exploitation of the modern base thus becomes attractive for both economic and socio-political reasons. At the same time, as the economy grows, conditions in that sector become progressively more intrusive on the workings of the political system, with the effect that by Transformation's close, the political and economic systems are interwoven to a degree which makes each partially a function of the other.
Chapter 14.

THE VICTORY OF MEIJI PROGRESSIVISM

As the Restoration Government prospered, it experienced increasing disagreement from within its own membership. The basic matters at issue were two: Who should dominate the ruling coalition? How radical should be the reforms undertaken to assure Japanese sovereignty?

Restoration conservatives demanded that the Central Government act as the agent of the victorious clans, rather than as a new bakufu. In this role, the State should initiate programs designed to increase national power. But desired power creation could justify no heedless disregard of Japan's ancient traditions. The objectives of reform were to be Imperial security and resurrection of a semi-mythical past. To gain the first through sacrifice of the second would do violence to the entire spirit of the Restoration.

Of themselves, the conservative wing's propositions had considerable force. Since they were supported by Saigo Takamori*, many samurai viewed them as irrefutable. The great Satsuma general was the Restoration coalition's closest approximation to a charismatic leader. Strong, courageous, magnetic, his brilliance as a tactician had been largely responsible for the easy conquest of Keiki's partisans.

Contesting the Saigo viewpoint were progressive lesser bureaucrats within the Restoration Government. Their leaders were Kido (Choshu) and Okubo* (Satsuma). One of the causes of intra-Governmental friction was just this fact; for Saigo was envious of Okubo's growing national
prominence. But conservative-progressive disagreement would have been inevitable in any event. The progressive wing was opportunistic rather than dogmatic. It was more xenophile than xenophobe. And it was so strongly committed to modernization of the State, it was willing to cast away any inheritance which seemed to threaten realization of the major goal.

Singlemindedness of purpose, dissimulation, and opportunism brought national leadership to the progressive wing during the first four years of Meiji rule. The Restoration conservatives found themselves constantly out-maneuvered. Finally, in Summer 1871 even their right to authority on the han was factually abolished. It seems unlikely that the Meiji progressives had foreseen the necessity for this event, or even that they wholly welcomed it when it occurred. Until they learned that, under a confederative system, there could be no security either for the State or for themselves, the progressives remained loyal to the interests of clan and class.

With the abolition of feudalism, it became possible for the Central Government to begin to utilize the entire economy as an engine of national power. In the sections below, we shall trace the Meiji Oligarchs' attempt to induce growth through the demonstration effect of State-owned plants, paternalism, and discrimination in favor of private business houses allied to members of the ruling clique. These efforts did not go unchallenged; but partly because of the employment of modern economic techniques, the Meiji progressives were able to consolidate their personal authority and to destroy every significant vestige of regionalist reaction. By 1878 it was certain that Japan would no more court the past, but would rather attempt to create new
political, social and economic institutions synthesizing Eastern and Western practice.

As we know today, this new synthesis was to become authoritarian. Though by no means the only reason for the evolution of autocratic forms, the economic policies we shall consider below must be numbered among the leading causes of this drift. Though public ownership was given up in many industries during the years 1881-85, the private combines which succeeded were so closely associated with the Meiji Oligarchs, collusion of a most refined nature emerged. Since these combines had gained State patronage in the first instance because of their owners' support of the Meiji progressives' vision of a powerful, centrally-directed nation, the result was the creation of a new Japan in which the leaders of the public and private sectors acted in tandem to impose their wishes on the nation at large.

I - Consolidation of Power by the Satcho Oligarchs

A. Reconstitution of the Power Base

1. Destruction of the Restoration's Conservative-Progressive Coalition - Shortly after the 29 August 1871 rescript abolishing feudalism, the Meiji Government ordered all former daimyo to leave their estates and settle in Tokyo. Concurrently, the Government undertook responsibility for all ascertainable han debts incurred since 1843. Added to the cost of the pension schemes for Tradition's noble classes, the expense of these charges placed an immense strain on the Exchequer. Feudal debts alone amount to 34,860,000. S. Tsuru, op. cit., p. 52.
current expenditures, the Government decided to send a mission abroad in order to solicit foreign agreement to a revision of import and export duties.\(^3\)

In December, 1871, Iwakura, Kido, Okubo\(^*\) and Ito\(^*\) set sail at the head of a large delegation. Their departure occurred at a particularly critical time, for early in the Fall a reorganization of the Government had been initiated which increased the power, both of the Center against the former feudal regions, and of the Oligarchs within the central administration itself.\(^4\) New authority thus was being shifted to the Satcho-iito coalition just as its most enlightened leaders, Kido and Okubo, were departing for foreign shores.

Strain on the Restoration coalition was increased by the need to carry through reforms disestablishing the Traditional social structure. While Kido and Okubo were away, disputes boiled up within Tokyo's caretaker Government. Lines were drawn which went far beyond the sympathetic allegiances of clansmen for their regional fellows; for the Meiji Oligarchs left at home had split into progressive and conservative factions. Relations with Korea provoked the final rupture. Since the Hermit Kingdom had repeatedly insulted Japan due to Meiji's "alliance" with foreign barbarians, the conservative wing

\(^3\)Duty levels had been frozen at roughly 5% ad valorem on all goods commonly traded in 1858. *Supra, Appendix III.2.(J.), Section III.4.\

\(^4\)In the new administrative setup, government was divided between:
(a) the Sei-in (Central Board of the Council of State), which handled most executive and policy-making functions. Its personnel was drawn largely from the Satcho bureaucrats;
(b) the U-in (Right Board of the Council of State), which concerned itself primarily with administration. Part of its personnel was drawn from the Sei-in.

The Sa-in (Left Board of the Council of State) was set up as a last shadow of 1868's "representative assembly". It lacked any substantial authority, serving only to advise the Sei-in on legal matters.
demanded in July 1872 that Korea's disrespect no longer go unavenged. Partly because of this, and partly to lessen the hardship of adjustment imposed on the samurai by Meiji reforms, a punitive expedition against Korea was suggested. Saigo Takamori* of Satsuma, Itagaki* of Tosa, Soejima, Eto and Okuma* of Hizen all gave their support to the war party. Accordingly, during the winter of 1872-73, plans were laid and troops mobilized for expeditions against both Korea and Formosa (where cannibals endangered Satsuman interests).

Word of the militarist policy being followed at home caught up with the emissaries to Europe not long after all hope of tariff revision had been lost. Hastening their return, the leaders of the Satcho progressive wing regained Tokyo before either expeditionary force had been fully mounted. War therefore was averted, but at the cost of the Restoration coalition. In October 1873, Saigo, Itagaki, Goto*, Eto, Soejima and their adherents (i.e., the conservative wing of Satcho, plus most of the representatives of Hito) withdrew from the Government. Princes Iwakura and Sanjo remained in the major titular offices of the administration, with Okubo of Satsuma, Kido and Ito of Choshu, and Okuma and Katsu Awa filling out the other most important posts.

The failure of the war party added to the friction between the Center and disaffected samurai. Matters were made still worse when, on 27 December 1873, the Government announced its willingness to capitalize samurai pensions. The scheme had been worked out to try to ease the difficulties faced by samurai engaged in the transition to productive employment. It bore the additional virtue of releasing investable funds to the private sector, for instead of life pensions the Government offered a cash and bond grant to all applicants.
However, the offer was not well received. On 21 January 1874, nine Tosa samurai tried unsuccessfully to assassinate Prince Iwakura.

More important than the assassination attempt was an event which had preceded it by four days. For on 17 January 1874, a Memorial was issued by nine samurai including Soejima and Eto of Hizen, and Goto and Itagaki of Tosa. The first sentence of the document read:

"When we humbly reflect upon the quarter in which the governing power lies, we find that it lies not with the Crown (the Imperial House) on the one hand, nor with the people on the other, but with the officials alone."  

The Memorial goes on to state that "the people whose duty it is to pay taxes to the government possess the right of sharing in their government's affairs"; therefore, a popular assembly should be established. Though the Sa-in ("Left Board"; the lower house of government) approved the Memorial, the Oligarchs repudiated it through the agency of a well-known conservative scholar.

To have employed a conservative rebuttalist was an effective riposte, for tactic recognition was thereby given to the basic matter at issue. Almost none of the leaders of Satcho or Hito - whether in or out of the Meiji Government - wanted the development of truly representative forms of rule.  

The text of the entire Memorial is included in:  
It is noteworthy that Saigo Takamori did not subscribe to this Memorial.  

Itagaki appears to have been the single prominent exception.
Council of State.

With the failure of the Memorial, the men who had withdrawn from the Satcho-Hito coalition over the Korean issue turned to direct action against the Center. Eto Shimpei organized a small rebellion at Saga which quickly failed, bringing his execution along with those of eleven other plotters. Other samurai uprisings took place in Choshu and Higo; and in Tosa, Itagaki busily occupied himself with the schooling of an opposition political party. Concurrently, Saigo Takamori drilled some 7,000 dissident samurai in Satsuma for possible use against Tokyo. The progress of events soon became sufficiently worrisome to induce the Oligarchs to compromise: an expeditionary force of 3,000 men was dispatched against the Formosan aborigines. 7

The Formosa campaign was ordered against the express wishes of Kido, on whom the European sojourn of the tariff-revision embassy had had a profound effect. Believing that Japan should focus its entire resource capacity on internal development in order to achieve strength comparable to that of Western nations, he withdrew in protest from active participation in governmental affairs. 8 Added to the past defections of Saigo, Goto and Itagaki, Kido's estrangement gravely endangered the political power of the Satcho Oligarchs. Accordingly, at the "Osaka Conference" of early 1875, Okubo, Ito and Inoue* made concessions

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7 For some time, Formosan cannibals had preyed on Ryukyu Island fishermen, who were direct dependents of Satsuma. China claimed tributary authority over Formosa, but in this instance a compromise was reached in advance allowing Japanese troops to invade Formosa without involving China and Japan in war.

8 Kido's 1873 Discourse on requirements for reform is included in: W.W. McLaren, Japanese Government Documents, pp. 567ff.
designed to reinvoke the loyalty of disaffected elements. In addition to the creation of an Assembly of Prefectural Governors\(^9\), it was proposed that there be established:

1) a Senate (Genro-in) which, though it would have little substantive power in legislation, would act as a first step toward the election of Cabinet rank officials;

2) a Supreme Court (Daishin-in). Though subject to the control of the Council of State through the Department of Justice, the Court nonetheless would separate the Legislative from the Judiciary;

3) a further subdivision of administrative Departments.\(^{10}\)

Itagaki at first refused to be reconciled by these proposals, but after receiving a direct appeal from the Tenno he reentered the Government. Kido returned as well, though only as a Court Concillor. Thus, reconstitution of the power base was attained on a progressive-moderate base. Traditionalist sentiment was no more represented.

ii.) The End of Reactionary Influence - On 5 August 1876, the Government announced plans for compulsory commutation of feudal pensions. Five months later, an edict was promulgated denying private citizens

\(^9\)Regulations governing the Prefectural Assembly were promulgated 2 May 1874, and the first session was called for 10 September. However, because of domestic crisis the first meeting of the Assembly was postponed to 26 June 1875.

\(^{10}\)As these reforms became operative, the Sa-in and U-in would be abolished. G.E. Uyehara, The Political Development of Japan, New York, 1910, pp. 81-82. For political documents involved, see W.W. McLaren, Japanese Government Documents, pp. 41ff.
the right to wear swords. These two acts were taken to be final proof of the Government's ill-faith. In Satsuma, Saigo Takamori's private army - now 30,000 strong - rose in revolt (February 1877). For a little more than six months, the island of Kyushu was engulfed. Certain critics assert that Saigo made a strategic error in not invading the main island and marching on Tokyo directly; for samurai dissidence was so general, a bold invasion of Honshu would have brought to the Satsuma banner an invincible army of rebellion. Be this as it may, the 60,000 man volunteer and conscript army of Meiji fought with a valiance totally disproving reactionaries' assertions that chonin and peasants could not be brave. One-time feudatories of the shimpan and fudai clans gave particularly good accounts of themselves, for they had old scores to settle. Saigo's forces therefore met their match. After the leader was wounded (September 1877), he was decapitated by one of his staff and the revolt died.

The failure of the Satsuma revolt marked the end of Traditionalist political power in Japan. Henceforth, it no longer was possible for opposition samurai to claim a monopoly of martial prowess or of "true" loyalty to the Emperor. Mutsuhito had publically supported the action against Satsuma, thereby showing his favor for the modernization programs initiated by the Satcho Oligarchs. Subsequently, he entirely acquiesced to the Oligarchy's moderate treatment of former rebels. Though Shimazu Saburō left Tokyo never to return to public office, and though the great Saigo was himself dead, the men of Satsuma were allowed to emerge from the Rebellion of 1877 in positions of greater national prominence.

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11 Though the samurai had been given the option of leaving off their swords in 1871, few on the fiefs had chosen to do so. The right to wear two swords was, after all, the samurai's major status symbol.
than ever before. This left to the representatives of Hito only one tactic by which to oppose the dominant Satcho clique. In the years following Saigo's revolt, Hito leaders and popular agitators both turned away from reactionary battlecries and exegeses on the decadent modernism of Meiji reform. Instead, they called for further and faster change: for the development of a truly representative Government. This demand bore muted echoes of old-time clan rivalry, since by the end of the seventies only Okuma - onetime scapegrace radical of Hizen - remained in office as a prominent representative of the Hito clans. But a significant change had occurred nonetheless, for with the failure of Saigo's rebellion there disappeared the last effective vestiges of regionalism in Japanese politics. The centralist objective sought through the return of clan registers in 1869 had been fully achieved. A progressive paternalism had taken root in Japan.

B. Modification of the Social System

A document published in 1897 by the Office of the Minister President of State declared that a fixed purpose had attended all governmental actions undertaken since the Restoration. All policy had been oriented so as to:

"... strengthen the vitality of the nation, to assert our national rights, to promote the happiness of the people, and to lay a permanent basis to work upon, thereby bequeathing to posterity a line of policy to be forever pursued." (These objectives had been attained without doing violence to) "the historical traditions of the country and the principles that had been handed down by the Imperial Ancestors." 12

This statement is instructive, for while it reflects the Meiji Oligarchs' determination to modernize, it reveals as well that a rather limited

form of modernization was envisaged. The long-frozen social system was to be thawed so that the occupational rigidity which had benumbed Tokugawa no longer would jeopardize the State. At the same time, Tradition's hierarchic, disciplined social patterns were not to be discarded out of hand. They were simply to be modified so that those activities which most benefitted the state would receive the greatest public recognition.

We have already noted certain characteristics of this new approach. The program to introduce compulsory education was only slowly applied, but its effect was nonetheless destructive of Traditional views of class ordering. So too were the 1871 regulations allowing samurai to leave off their swords if they so desired, and granting freedom of occupation to citizens of every rank who were not on Government service. On the other hand, there was to be no headlong thrust into the future. In 1871 the Meiji Oligarchs published an admonitory edict stating that "antiques and old articles should be respected and preserved." Rationalization of occupational patterns was not to lead to wholesale overthrow of the past.

During the twenty-one months of the Kido-Okubo foreign mission (1871-73) a number of reforms effecting the entire social fabric were imposed. Among the most pervasive were:

a) revision of ancient sumptuary laws, a reform ending the restrictions which hitherto had made class status apparent in dress, equipage, diet, etc.;

b) modification of hair styles whereby the traditional topknot

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came to be replaced by foreign haircuts;

c) adoption of Western-style dress on official occasions by military and court officers;

d) effectuation of earlier acts, and addition of new ones, substituting new titles and social rankings for old. The new titles included: kwazoku (peer) in place of kuge and daimyo; shizoku (gentry) in place of samurai, ronin, etc.; heimin (commoner) in place of townsman, peasant and "outcast" rankings;

e) demotion of Shinto's primacy as a State religion. First, the Department of Shinto Religion was absorbed into a new Department for Religion (21 April 1872). Next the Department for Religion was itself downgraded through amalgamation with the Department of Education (25 November 1872);

f) introduction of the Gregorian Calendar (1 January 1873).

Acts such as these were opposed by Traditionalists generally, no matter what their former rank. Reactionary samurai, for example, were no more outraged by the loss of status which was felt to attend the new "gentry" designation than were the peasants, who were incensed by the raising of eta and hinin outcasts to positions of legal sanction. By the same token, the new "commoner" classes were no more happy about universal conscription than were the samurai. While the latter felt the end of the samurai's monopoly of arms amounted to a conscious denigration of their importance to Japan, the former felt a comparable injury, for they believed that conscription was equivalent to death.

14For consistency and ease of reading, we shall continue to use the Traditional titles for the balance of this paper.
Though reform legislation was not imposed maliciously, every possible effort was made to transform social change into material increase. Thus, in 1872, it was made lawful to pay land taxes in currency rather than rice. This was part of the program developed to end feudalist vestiges and to free the peasant from his historic peonage. However, a revised tax system and a new land survey were introduced in 1873, at which time money payment of land taxes was made obligatory rather than optional. The effect of the survey was to increase the tax burden imposed on a large percentage of the peasantry. Since the revised tax system pegged taxes to land value rather than crop yield, the danger of bankruptcy during years of poor harvest became a constant threat to the small farmer. As a consequence of these reforms, over 20% of Japan's peasants moved from feudal peonage to tenant farming within the first generation of post-feudal social institutions. The peasants were legally free, but their economic bondage was often as stringent as it had been under Tokugawa.\(^{15}\)

A similar ruthlessness characterized the Oligarchs' approach to their peers among the samurai. As has been noted,\(^{16}\) programs designed to enable the samurai to find useful occupations were initiated at the time of the Restoration. Moreover, samurai were given preference in the filling of civil service posts. But those who failed to avail themselves of opportunities for productive employment were not to be suffered indefinitely. In 1876, forced commutation of governmental pensions was begun. ¥247,532,000 was divided among roughly 400,000 ex-samurai.

\(^{15}\) cf.; Yamaguchi Kazuo, "Development of Agricultural and Marine Industries", in Shibusawa Keizo (ed.), op.cit., Chapter Nine.

\(^{16}\) Supra, Chapter 10.
families, but at least 96% of the recipients were so ill-rewarded, they were thrust headlong into the work force. This effect was as desired. Though the Meiji Oligarchs remained loyal to their peers, they were nonetheless determined to exploit every available avenue to new State power.

II - The Meiji Equation: Industrial Progress = Military Power

A. The State as Entrepreneur (1871-1881)

1. The Rationale of Meiji Economic Policy - An American visitor to Meiji Japan observed that "...even a naval officer of high rank has considered it not beneath his dignity to tell his countrymen that they can only become a great nation by development of trade, and that trade is as worthy of their best efforts as war." The trade-wareanalogy was but one aspect of the Satcho Oligarchs' effort to stimulate public interest in economic progress, an effort which was rendered in slogans such as "Fukoku Kyōhei (Wealth and Military Power of the State) and

17"Approximately 400,000 families were involved in commutation: only 519, mostly former clan lords, received a significantly large sum, approximately ¥60,000 per person; and about 15,000 came next with the average of ¥1,600. The rest were small recipients in whose hands even the relatively high interest rates of 7% and 10% could hardly be sufficient to sustain the life of a single man. Meanwhile, the revision of the National Bank Act in 1876, which coincided with issue of the Kinrokuz bonds (the largest batch of commutation bonds ¥173,903,000), provided large holders of the bonds with a profitable outlet for them."
S. Tsuru, op.cit., p. 60.

Shokusan Kogyo (Increase of Industrial Production)".¹⁹

The military-statist orientation of Meiji economic policy had been apparent from the time of the Restoration. Until the Kobusho was established as an autonomous development agency in 1870, industrial policy was largely determined through reference to defence needs. Even after Kobusho's creation, Army and Navy requirements continued to be given priority in production planning. Foreign trade, light industry, and extractive sector policies similarly related narrowly to military or more broadly to statist considerations. Since the Oligarchs felt that extensive foreign borrowing would endanger Japan's independence, a conscientious effort was made to increase the production of goods and materials in demand abroad. Foreign exchange was required specifically to pay for capital imports; and capital imports were felt necessary to increase the power base of the State. On these grounds, it is not too great a generalization to assert that Japan's economic growth ultimately stemmed more from a desire for political power than from a search for economic profit. The Meiji Oligarchs sponsored economic development because they believed that industrial growth would enhance national strength, and that national strength would lead to political success both for the Japanese State and - not unimportantly - for themselves as well.²⁰

¹⁹Tsuchiya Takao, "Transition and Development of Economic Policy", Chapter Three of Shibusawa Keizo (ed.), op.cit. The cited slogans will be found on p. 103.

²⁰It is rather instructive in this regard to note Shibusawa Eiichi's 1895 analysis of Japan's economic development: "All the industries in Japan are of post-Restoration growth. If you ask, however, whether this development was commercially spontaneous or politically artificial, I do not know. I rather suspect, indeed, I am afraid, that it was the latter. Thus in the field of sea transportation I must say that the progress was pushed quite a bit by political force, although an element of commercial necessity and emulation was not entirely lacking." S. Tsuru, op.cit., p.101fn; quoting Seiven Sensei 60-nen Shi, Vol. 1, p. 869. This observation may well be contrasted with H.V. Johnson's somewhat more optimistic one.
The use of the economy for political purposes was not, of course, unique to the Meiji Oligarchs. Particularly in the years subsequent to the Opium War, both the clans and the shogunate sought material strength as a method of achieving political power. However, a fundamental difference in Transitional and Transformational economic policies can be perceived in the fact that, while the bakufu long attempted to fragment the economy for purposes of political control, Meiji centralized the economy for exactly the same purpose. Of course, from the time of the reforms of 1853, the bakufu had given up a number of fragmentation policies. But a consistent effort to achieve national economic progress remained impossible until, through political disestablishment of feudalism, the Center gained the capacity to both mobilize and direct full resource range existing within the social and economic sectors.

ii.) Creation of Social Overhead Capital - Shortly before the abolition of the shogunate, an American syndicate was licensed to introduce the railroad to Japan. Since this right was voided at the time of the Restoration, it was not until 1870 that trackage actually began to be laid for an 18 mile line from Tokyo to Yokohama. The Tokyo-Yokohama railway, which was opened in 1872, was the product of English engineering and was financed through a ¥4,782,400 bond issue floated in London. Before 1881, additional railways had been opened from Osaka to Kobe, and from Osaka to Kyoto.21

Since the Government was determined to control internal transport

21 Kajinishi Mitsuhaya, "Development of Transportation and Communication Systems", In Shibusawa Keizo (ed.), op. cit.; pp. 369-70. Transport and communications statistics will be found infra, statistical appendix V.2.(J.).
for reasons of national security, offers of foreign capital were rejected after the Tokyo-Yokohama railway line had been completed. However, full State ownership was found to be impracticable because of the costs involved, and consequently domestic venture capital was sought. A number of private syndicates were created during the 1870's to finance railroad building, but none of them actually progressed to the construction stage. Finally in 1881, and with Governmental assistance extending even to the assignment of the Ministry of Industry as a construction subcontractor, the private Nihon Tetsudo Kaisha began work on a 529 mile Tokyo-Aomori line. The success of this venture brought a rush of private capital into the field, and by 1893 private companies operated approximately three times as much railway trackage as did the Government.

Like railroads, the telegraph was seen to have potential value as an instrument of national defense. Consequently, the Meiji Oligarchs remained determined to complete a national net as rapidly as was financially practicable even though Traditionalist statesmen opposed the plan, and superstitious peasants were frightened by telegraph wire. No foreign telegraphic investment was allowed; and though a certain number of private lines apparently were sanctioned, they were rigidly controlled by the Government. During the Satsuma Rebellion, the Oligarchs'...
decision to promote telegraphic development despite widespread popular resistance was fully vindicated. Meiji military commanders coordinated troop movements by telegraph and thus found it relatively easy to out-manoeuvre Saigo's forces.

In part because desire for internal control impeded the rate of railroadization within Japan, cabotage remained an exceedingly important transport medium well into the 20th Century. This was so despite the relatively small burden of the average Japanese coaster. Governmental sponsorship of shipping was comprehensive, and in the techniques employed there can be seen one of the first examples of that collusion between Government officials and private business interests which the Meiji Oligarchs increasingly employed as a means of stimulating economic growth. The shipyards, which had been Japan's most heavily capitalized sector during early Transition, were nationalized over the period 1868-1871. Subsequently, a number of them were assigned to private shipping companies, or leased to them at a nominal fee. In addition, the Government purchased commercial vessels from abroad and leased or gave them outright to private concerns. Mitsubishi was the prime early beneficiary of this form of development stimulant. At the time of the expedition against the Formosan cannibals, thirteen foreign steamships were bought by the Government and transferred - later given outright - to the Mitsubishi Company. Thereafter, Mitsubishi was subsidized by the Government in order to end the intrusion of The American Pacific Mail Company, which was competing for control of Japan's coastal, Chinese and Formosan trades.

Foreign Captains commanded the Mitsubishi vessels and trained their crews in modern ship-handling. This form of practical, on-the-job
education became increasingly popular as Transformation advanced, though it was a general policy of the Government to replace foreigners with nationals as soon as adequate cadres of Japanese instructors had been created. Some 5,000 foreign experts were, at the peak, employed in Japan. For the creation of urban classes capable of manning the nation's rising industrial complex, the combination of on-the-job training, foreign study, and a steadily developing base of advanced educational institutions more than balanced out the deliberately slow pace with which the Government moved forward toward full implementation of its universal education program.\(^{25}\)

iii.) Measures to Increase Productivity in Agriculture and Mining -

The agricultural sector's importance as a revenue-producing agency is indicated by the fact that, until 1896, land taxes provided more than 50% of total tax revenue.\(^{26}\) This was one of the primary considerations leading to reforms in 1873 whereby taxes in kind based on crop yield were replaced with money taxes based on land value. The Oligarchs being engaged in costly modernization projects, they could not afford to have a large percentage of ordinary revenues tied to the vagaries of the harvest.


\(^{26}\) From a base of 63.7% in 1868, the land tax rose to a peak of 93% of total tax revenue in 1873 and then gradually declined. Land tax figures are not fully comparable throughout, however, for from the time of the 1873 tax reforms, taxed real estate included residential as well as farming areas. For year-by-year figures of land tax as a percent of total tax revenue, see S. Tsuru, op.cit., Table 10.: "Public Finance Statistics".
Programs to stimulate productivity increase were introduced shortly after the abolition of feudalism. The foci of these activities were the agricultural experiment stations founded by the Department of Civil Engineering (Mimbusho). Foreign advisors were hired, and especial attention was given to improvement of silk, tea, and seed strains, to stock raising, and to land reclamation. Refinement of land utilization technique was so successful, crop areas sewn to rice were increased by approximately 7% between 1878-82 and 1888-92. Rice yields increased at least 21% over the same period.

Though Meiji Government interest in agricultural productivity was most intimately related to fiscal requirements, the value of agriculture as a means of earning foreign exchange was also well-recognized. Not infrequently, Government agents went into the market to buy up stocks of rice or marine products for resale abroad on Government account. Agriculture thus bore a dual relationship to capital creation in Meiji Japan.

In Table III. (supra, Chapter 10), it was shown that raw silk and tea accounted for more than 80% of total exports over the years 1868-72. This figure diminished in the years following, but even so the aforementioned commodities - plus cereals and grain - made up slightly more than 70% of the export market in the years 1878-82. Tables III and IV also bear on the role of minerals in Meiji foreign trade. While mineral exports decreased, mineral imports increased during the course of Transformation. This trend mirrored both the development of Japanese


28 W.W. Lockwood, op.cit., p. 18, gives the figures quoted. The Tsuru figures of rice production included infra, statistical appendix V.1.(J), are somewhat higher.
metallurgy, and the decline of gold and silver exports as precious metals came to be absorbed domestically.

Meiji policy with respect to mineral exploitation was highly dynamic and changed with political and economic conditions. Shogunate mines were taken over by the Restoration Government as the Tokugawa rebels were forced northward out of Honshu. However, there still remained a critical shortage of precious metal, particularly because of the depredations of foreign arbitragers, and so the Government decided to extend nationalization to all gold, silver and copper mines. At its creation, the Kobusho was given mineral development as one of its missions, but not until feudalism had been outlawed could the Government take possession of all, or even most, of Japan's specie-producing mines.

After the abolition of feudalism, the Meiji Oligarchs decided to bring nationalization to all mineral reserves. This decision was taken particularly because survey reports made by foreign experts indicated that greatly increased yields could be obtained through the application of improved technology. Under the Mining Act of 1873, State ownership was affirmed. Nonetheless, the State made no attempt to operate all of the extant mines, though the most productive apparently were placed under Kobusho management both as a revenue-producing scheme, and to demonstrate techniques for mine improvement. Of the mines operated by the State, those listed in Table VII were the most important.

\[29\] Ando states that 37 foreign mining engineers were hired to help modernize Japanese mining. Ando Yoshio, "Development of Mining Industry", in Shibusawa Keizo (ed.), op.cit., p. 351.
Table VII

Mines Operated by the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Yield</th>
<th>State Began Operation In:</th>
<th>Amount of State Capital Invested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ikuno</td>
<td>silver</td>
<td>1868</td>
<td>¥ 1,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sado</td>
<td>gold</td>
<td>1869</td>
<td>1,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosaka</td>
<td>silver</td>
<td>1869</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okazura</td>
<td>gold</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike</td>
<td>coal</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takashima</td>
<td>coal</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamaisha</td>
<td>iron</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td>2,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innai</td>
<td>silver</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ani</td>
<td>copper</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>1,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakakosaka</td>
<td>iron</td>
<td>1878</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yudo</td>
<td>coal</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horonai</td>
<td>coal</td>
<td>1879</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: S. Tsuru, op.cit., p. 104.

Among industrial minerals, only copper and coal offered the Japanese a significant potential. Nonetheless, throughout most of Transformation, a shortage of coking coal limited the scale of mining operations. Particularly in the refining of ores, low yields resulted from the necessity of depending on firewood for fuel. However, even before capital-intensive equipment had come to be widely used in the extractive sector, marginal improvements in mining technique had begun to pay spectacular dividends. Over the six years 1874-80, coal and lead production quadrupled, iron trebled, and copper output doubled.\(^{30}\)

iv.) Mechanization of Industry - Japan's premier attempts to mechanize were treated in earlier Chapters.\(^{31}\) Most of the 1840's-1860's factory schemes were sponsored by political units and had a single

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\(^{30}\)See infra, statistical appendix V.3. (J.)

\(^{31}\)Supra, Chapter 6, C/ii; Chapter 10, II/B.
objective: the enhancement of military power. After the Restoration, the need for development of heavy industry to support the military establishment remained a prime concern of the Meiji Oligarchs. Parallel creation of light industry was not ignored, but since major interest in consumer goods centered in their possible employment as a means of lessening adverse trade balances, buildup of the light industrial establishment was adjudged second in importance to securing the sovereign integrity of the State.

Engineering works created by the shogunate during the wane of Tradition provided the basic capital for Meiji Government arsenals and shipyards. With the abolition of feudalism, the Government was able to gain control of the greater portion of heavy engineering plants. Not until after the defeat of Saigo's forces, however, was nationalization completed.

Foreign experts directed Meiji industrialization efforts. The most important heavy-goods plants to be constructed during the Transformation included the following:

1) The Sekiguchi Arsenal (Tokyo) - Founded as a powder mill by the bakufu, reorganization and development was initiated in 1870. By 1875, the arsenal had become an enlarged complex administratively incorporating a puddling plant, smithy, small arms factory, powder plant, wood-working plant, and saddle leather factory. By 1882, a reverberatory furnace had been installed.

2) The Osaka Arsenal - Opened in 1870, using the equipment and labor force of the bakufu's former Nagasaki Iron Works. In 1872, French-type mountain guns were produced. Thereafter, the Osaka Arsenal was developed as the chief producer of artillery pieces; and powder plants at Wakayama, Kogoshima and Iwahana were sequentially brought under its control.

3) The Yokosuka Shipyard - Formerly, the bakufu's largest shipyard. By 1871, the yard included puddling plants, a foundry, docking facilities, an arsenal. In 1872, control over the yard was transferred to the Navy, but private orders for mining equipment, steam engines, boilers, etc. continued to be accepted.
4) The Nagasaki Shipyard - On the grounds of a former shogunate iron works and shipyard whose equipment and labor had been cannibalized for the Osaka Arsenal. Installation of new equipment ordered by the Kobusho. By 1875, the yard included a foundry, smithies for iron and copper, a 50 ton crane, riveting machinery and a steam hammer.

5) The Hyogo Shipyard - Using iron-working equipment acquired from a private firm at the time of the Restoration, this yard became operative in 1875. It specialized in the production of marine hardware and had one of Japan's first modern drydocks.

6) The Tsukijo Naval Arsenal - Fully equipped by 1878, its basic capital had been transferred from the (Mito) Ishikawajima Shipyard and the Kagoshima Dockyard. A Krupp crucible furnace was installed in 1880. Beginning in 1882, crucible steel for armor plate and naval rifles was produced.

7) The Kamaisha Iron Refinery - Construction started in 1875 by the Kobusho. A blast furnace producing 7 tons of pig iron per day came into operation in 1880.32

Since short-run development of light industry was looked on primarily as a means of lessening Japan's unfavorable trade balance, it is not surprising that silk was the first soft good to command the Oligarchs' attention. Foreign consumption of Japanese silk threatened to grow at a considerably lesser rate than the increase of domestic output, for Japan's historic hand-reeling techniques could not be held at former standards of quality as output increased. Consequently, the Government imported French reeling equipment in 1870, and by 1872 the Fukuoka Model Filature Plant began operation. Other model plants using French, Italian or Swiss filatures were established during the early 1870's at Tomioka and Maebashi. However, foreign methods were not copied by private firms until 1877; and as late as 1893, hand-reeled silk thread continued to exceed that produced by machine. Machine weaving of silk textiles was introduced experimentally in 1873, but throughout the fourteen years following the

output of hand looms remained greater than that produced by machine.

Three cotton spinning mills using imported machinery of pre-Restoration design were in operation in the early 1870's. That at Sakai was purchased by the Government in 1872 to operate as a model factory. But the spindles in place at all of these plants were designed for long-staple, rather than Japanese short-staple, cotton. New machinery began to be imported in the late 1870's; and by 1880, a total of twelve 10,000 spindle machines had been imported from England. Ten of these were sold by the Government to private firms at ten years, interest-free purchase. Mechanized cotton looms also had been introduced experimentally in the early 1870's. During the inflationary boom which occurred at the time of the Satsuma Rebellion, permanent installations began to be made. Since a business recession set in in 1881, interest in further development of the cotton industry waned. However, in 1883 Shibusawa Eiichi* established the Osaka Spinning Company. This mill, whose 150,000 spindles were steam-driven rather than water-powered, was exceedingly successful. Consequently, at the end of the period of structural readjustment (1881-85), considerable private investment in cotton textiles was begun.

Other industrial beneficiaries of Governmental sponsorship included porcelain, cement, woollens, paper and chemicals. Not all of these sectors could be operated profitably given the then-development of Japan. One of the primary reasons for the Meiji Government's post-1880 casting off of its entrepreneurial role was that a goodly percentage of the 60-odd factories owned by the State consistently operated at a
B. Inflationary Pressure and Structural Readjustment (1877-1885)

1.) The Inflationary Crisis (1877-80) - Almost one-quarter of the Meiji Government expenditures made during the period from the Restoration to June 1881 were financed by ¥200.3 million of extraordinary revenues. Of this sum, approximately one-half was accounted for by the issuance of inconvertible paper money. Currency depreciation was extreme as early as 1869, for both the Center and the han relied heavily on fiat money during the first year of Meiji rule. Consequently, at the Takanawa Conference of July 1869, the envoys of Japan's leading overseas trading partners demanded monetary reform. Though the Restoration Government asserted its willingness to establish a gold standard and to retire the inconvertible notes, subsequent preoccupation with capital creation led to vacillation and postponement. As samurai pensions were funded and a national banking system was established, a measure of stability came to be introduced into the monetary system. Then came the Satsuma Rebellion and a new inflationary cycle stemming both from over-issuance of paper money, and from the first public offering of Government bonds (1878).

Though the events of 1877-78 led to a building boom, they led as well to an increasing degree of public unrest. Owners of marginal


34 These figures are spelled out in T.C. Smith, op.cit., Table XVI, Principal Sources of Extraordinary Revenue: December 1867 - June 1881"; and S. Tsuru, op.cit., Table 10, "Public Finance Statistics".
factories, tenant farmers, the urban sector and most of the ex-samurai were particularly hurt. Public outcry could not be effectively controlled despite rigorous application of Press censorship; laws restricting freedom of assembly and of association; and laws denying all right to attend political meetings to members of the military, the Government and the educational establishment (both teachers and students). Since popular inquietude would not down, on 22 July 1878 the Government published rules governing the election of popular representatives to Prefectural Assemblies. The new reform was clearly intended to be a sop for the people; for not only were rights of initiation and of veto assigned to Prefecture Governors, few bills other than those relating to prefectural finance could be brought before the Assemblies. Opposition to the Government therefore persisted, and even though popular assemblies were established on the local level in 1880, a major crisis threatened the Satcho Oligarchy.

The crisis broke in July 1881 when Kuroda Kiyotaka (Satsuma), director of the State-owned Hokkaido Colonization Commission, proposed that the Government sell its plant and equipment on the northern island at a fraction of its book value. Purchasers were to be a private company formed by Kuroda and several other members of the Commission. The Government made preparations to accept until Okuma, deep in a political intrigue against his Satcho colleagues in the Government, leaked word of the "scandal" to the newspapers. Public response was immediate. Their


36 The proposed sale price was ¥300,000. Estimates of Government investment o. Hokkaido vary from ¥10 million to ¥21 million. cf.: H. Borton, op.cit. p. 123; W.W. McLaren, A Political History of Japan During The Meiji Era, p.15
political authority in the gravest jeopardy, the Satsuma-Choshu clique within the Oligarchy resorted to a wide range of expedients. Okuma was manoeuvred out of the Government. Police power over public meetings was increased. The introduction of Western-style legal reforms was speeded up, and on 12 October the Emperor announced his intention of establishing a constitutional monarchy by 1890. None of these measures, however, were nearly so all-pervasive in the short-run as were the decision taken in November 1880 to end the State's entrepreneurial function in non-strategic industries, and Matsukata Masoyoshi's* accession to the Finance Ministry in Spring 1881.

ii.) Structural Readjustment (1881-85) - Various considerations have been put forth to account for the Oligarchs' decision to sell State-owned plants to the private sector:

a) The State was losing money as an entrepreneur. Deficits in the operation of public plants totalled ¥18 million in the years 1877-85 alone.

b) Transfer of ownership was seen to provide a simple method for retiring over-issuances of paper currency.

c) The Oligarchs wished to devote more of their energies to national power creation than was possible while the distractions of

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37 The text of the Imperial Rescript of 12 October 1881 is reproduced in W.W. McLaren, *Japanese Government Documents*, pp. 86-7. In this retelling of the Hokkaido Scandal, we make no attempt to discuss the nature of Okuma's political challenge. However, a very good presentation is made in H. Borton, op.cit., pp. 93ff. and especially pp. 118-124.

the non-strategic sector remained.  

d) The Satcho clique wished to free itself from charges of nepotism and corruption, for popular pressures led by Okuma and Itagaki were beginning to threaten the dominance of Satsuma and Choshu interests.  

Presumably all of these factors entered into the Oligarchs' determination to divest the Government of its role as entrepreneur. However, the transfer of public property did not end the close association of the Oligarchs and the industrial sector, for those firms which were lucky enough to purchase State-owned plant (generally at a fraction of its value) were for the most part allied to the Oligarchs through personal ties.  

Thus, in the liquidation of publically-owned property, the Meiji Oligarchs achieved full measure of their desires. The emergence of zaibatsu (huge, family-run firms usually combining banking and industrial  

39 From November 1882, expansion of armaments (especially naval) became a primary concern of the Government. The instability of the Korean Government was a major cause of this buildup, for China, Japan and Russia all wished to dominate the peninsula. Military expenditures rose from 16.6% of Governmental expenditures in 1881, to 26.1% in 1885. S. Tsuru, op.cit., p. 77.  


41 For example, Inoue Kaoru, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce (1888-90), Minister without Portfolio (1891) and soon to become Minister of Interior accepted an additional post in 1891 and became chief advisor to the Mitsui combine. Writing to Yamagata and Matsukata about his appointment, Inoue observed that: "The Mitsuis and our economy are very closely related; if failure were to overtake the Mitsuis, the repercussions on our economy would be small. Therefore, although their request to become the top advisor is burdensome to me, I do not believe that I have any alternative but to accept. E.M. Hadley, Concentrated Business Power in Japan (unpublished dissertation), Radcliffe College, 1949, p. 133; quoting text of Tsuchiya, Chuo Koron, September 1947, p. 57.
functions) provided Japan with private concerns strong enough to stand on their own feet, and yet malleable enough to be willing to perform in fashions adjudged most appropriate to the aggrandizement of the State.

In April 1881, the Noshomusho (Department of Agriculture and Commerce) was created to supervise the transfer of State plant to private hands. Over the next twelve years, the following major properties were disposed of:

- **to the Mitsui combine:**
  - Miike coal mine
  - Horonai coal mine
  - Shinmachi cotton spinning mill
  - Tomioka cotton spinning mill;

- **to the Mitsubishi combine:**
  - Nagasaki dockyard
  - Takashima coal mine;

- **to the Asano combine:**
  - Fukagawa cement plant
  - Shirakawa white tile factory;

- **to other companies or Prefectures:**
  - Kosaka silver mine
  - Nakakosaka iron mine
  - Shinagawa glass factory
  - Hiroshima cotton spinning mill
  - Aichi cotton spinning mill. 42

While the liquidation of non-strategic State properties was going on, Matsukata's program of fiscal retrenchment was being implemented. A central bank, The Bank of Japan, was opened in October 1882. 50% of its capital was subscribed by the public. At the same time, a number of new excise taxes were imposed on consumption items such as sake. In addition to cutting back demand levels, these taxes generated an increasingly large proportion of total State revenue. By 1885, roughly 23% of tax

42 S. Tsuru, op.cit., p. 110. Shibusawa Keizo (ed.), op.cit., pp. 116-17, 317ff., lists additional transferred to private hands during the years following 1881.
revenue was produced by excise.

On the other side of the ledger, State expenditures were brought under control. Total Government spending rose from ¥48.4 million to ¥83.1 over the years 1877-83. Two years later, they had declined to ¥61.1 million. Deflation was a factor in this downturn, and so too were the austerity budgets of Government Departments.

During 1885, the Kobusho was abolished; and by the end of the year, Matsukata's policies were adjudged sufficiently successful to enable the establishment of full paper/silver currency convertibility. The drain of money into unprofitable (public and private) business ventures was largely ended, as also was the specie drain abroad hitherto created by adverse trade balances. Structural readjustment had been completed; and though marginal farmers and businessmen were ruined in the process, the economic position of Japan was stronger than it had been since the early 18th Century. The interest rate was lowered in 1886, and with this new incentive private investment shot upward. Rails, textiles, and Government purchases of military equipment led the way as a new upward cycle - the Take-Off - was initiated.

III - Conclusion:-The Creation of Monolithic Direction by the State

Saigo Takamori died nine years and ten months after the date of Keiki's abdication. Between these two events, much of Japan's socio-political structure was revolutionized. Within the economy, experiments with Western technology began to bear fruit. Only an additional nine

\[43\] In the conclusions, sections of Chapters 14, 15, and 16, little will be found regarding sectoral trends during Transformation. Consideration of this topic is postponed to Chapter 18 "The Economics of Modernization".
years would be required to prepare the private sector for major participation in economic development.

Japan's successful progress forward through Transformation was due very largely to the skill and dedication to the Meiji Oligarchs. Though responsive to change and anxious to exploit its every nuance, the Oligarchs remained steadfastly determined to make the State all-powerful. Five themes were interwoven to this end; and though no one of them ever became irrelevant, it is possible to note a chronological pattern in which first one and then another theme was dominant. During the last three years of Transition, centralization of power had been the primary motif. The next five years were devoted especially to the introduction of reforms designed to free Japan from Traditionalist impediments and to accelerate the pace of modernization. In 1876 and 1877, attention was diverted to suppression of the opponents of reform; and from then into 1881, the Satcho clique was hard put insuring its own primacy within the progressivist Meiji Government. The fifth theme, which was dominant from 1881 to 1886, was narrowly economic. It involved structural readjustment so that private industry might respond to new demand potentials and begin creating the physical capacity for self-generative growth.

The total effect of these various themes was, of course, to enhance the power of Japan. But if we look at the tactical employments which provided a counterpoint to each, we find that the methods used to develop the State served as well to increase the Meiji Oligarchy's entrenchment as the nation's dominant political influence. Since it is certain that the Oligarchs did not act from the first according to any
preconceived and interwoven plan, it is the more noteworthy that throughout the years 1868-1885, there was constant utilization of certain tactics:

1) In measures designed to increase political centralization, every opportunity was exploited both to build up the Boy Emperor as a focus for popular loyalties and to project an image of Matsuhito as a ruler actively participating in the formulation of basic policy. The Meiji Emperor thus performed two functions. He drew public favor to reform measures while at the same time diverting a certain amount of reactionary opposition away from the actual makers of policy.

2) Despite the progressivist intent of reform legislation, individual acts were phrased and introduced in such fashion as to allow for progress without bringing concurrent weakening of historic value patterns extolling social discipline and acquiescence to superior authority.

3) Popular participation in the governmental process was used as a method of courting favor or quelling dissidence without endangering the Satcho faction's control over policy creation. Those concessions which were made by constitutional revision of governmental reorganization generally involved the inclusion of Rito or Traditionalist personnel either in minority roles on policy-making bodies, or else in majority roles on non-policy-making bodies.

These tactical characteristics of the Oligarchy's rule lapped over into the techniques employed to implement the equation; industrial progress = military power:

1) Power was developed for purposes of State security and aggrandizement. But particular economic policies were oriented so as to enhance the power of the Satcho faction along with that of the State per se. An outstanding example of this dual process lies revealed in the original plan for liquidation of the Hokkaido Colonization Commission.

2) Though private initiative was welcomed, it was the Traditional "classes" rather than the Traditional "masses" whose efforts were encouraged. The peasant serfs of Tokugawa became the tenant farmers of Meiji. Those members of historic upper classes who attempted to reestablish themselves within the emerging modernist elite received special Governmental favor.

3) Through collusion and official discrimination, the Oligarchs purchased the allegiance of modernist business houses, always making certain that the combines so benefited accepted both the ends sought, and the means used, by the autocratic progressives of the Meiji Government.
Chapter 15.

RADICAL REFORM AND THE MODERNIZATION OF THE TURKISH STATE

Though the members of the 1922 Grand National Assembly were in general agreement that there was need for resolution of problems relating to State security, reconstruction of war damage, and Church-State relationships; consensus was lacking with respect to specific measures for reform. Like France’s Third Republic, the Ankara Government had almost as many prescriptive proposals as it had Deputies. If Turkey were to avoid the French spectacle satirically referred to as “the waltz of the cabinets”, a firm dancing master was required. Such a personnage was available in Ghazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa.

Kemal dominated the Assembly so completely, he provoked the antagonism of many Westernized Turks and thus lost the support of a number of his most capable associates. In succeeding sections, we shall trace the political event by which the Ghazi became an autocrat. Though judgement of the wisdom of Kemal’s suppression of the liberal parliamentarian wing is not in order, it is entirely appropriate to note that the estrangement of persons like Rauf Bay* and Halide Edib* increased Turkey’s shortage of skilled manpower and thereby partially determined the new directions taken in middle Transformation with regard to political and economic reform.

Perhaps Kemal could not have avoided the creation of opposition to his leadership. As an individual, he outshone most of his contemporaries both in terms of determination and experience, and in terms
of personal magnetism. Moreover, so long as the Grand National Assembly remained in Ankara, its members were constantly reminded of the Ghazi's power. For the remote city on the Anatolian Plateau owed its prominence and its new vitality entirely to the Ghazi. A Deputy walking through the lower (new) town might justifiably have felt the trespassor's twinge of discomfort on realizing that he had entered on another man's demesne.

As we shall see, Kemal refused to allow a return of the seat of Government to the Straits. To him, Ankara represented a new beginning: the turning of Turkey back onto itself so that it might emerge in time as an Eastern bastion of Western civilization, a nation representative of the best of both cultures. This desire to assimilate and synthesize had been a characteristic of Meiji Japan as well, but in most other regards the two countries stood in sharp contrast to one another. The Satcho Oligarchs had attempted to circumscribe the forces of modernization operative within the social system so that certain useful patterns might be retained. Transformational Turkey was to court wholesale overthrow of the Ottoman and Islamic inheritance. In Japan, the Meiji Government moved toward Prussian forms of paternalist autocracy. Kemal desired to reverse the process. Though he established a dictatorship for reasons of expediency and power, his later years were spent in trying to increase popular participation in Government. Finally, though both the Japanese and the Turks desired to secure their sovereignty against foreign incursions, the two nations went at the process in very different fashions. Japan put its greatest Trans-
formational stress on the creation of an industrial complex capable of supporting modern military formations. The Turks did not neglect the material requirements of their Army, but nonetheless their first attempts at programmed economic growth were intended considerably more to end Turkey's dependence on imported consumer goods than they were to build up the State's capital creation sectors. Thus, though we may say that the Satcho Oligarchs and the Kemalists had fundamentally similar objectives - State power; national security; maintenance of the political supremacy of their factions - both the means and the intermediate ends in view diverged in Transformational Turkey from the patterns which had been created by Japan at a similar level of development.

I - Consolidation of Kemalist Government (1923-1930)

A. The Ghazi Becomes an Autocrat

1. Stabilization of Foreign Relations - Peace negotiations at Lausanne commenced on 20 November 1922. Success was absolutely essential to Kemal, for his recent highhandedness in bringing about the abolition of the Sultanate had incensed both orthodox Muslims, and parliamentary liberals who wished the executive and judicial functions to be made subject to Legislative control. Nonetheless, Kemal was not prepared to trade Turkey's national interest for the political advantages which would result from a hastily secured peace. The Turkish Delegation, under Ismet İnönü, was instructed to make absolutely no concessions on its own initiative.
On 4 February 1923, the British chief delegate, Lord Curzon, broke off discussions due to Turkey's unwillingness to negotiate economic clauses. This act, which in fact amounted to an external attempt to discredit the Kemalist regime, totally failed as a political manoeuvre. Moreover, since the Turks retaliated by using economic blackmail of a type directly threatening Britain's commercial interests in the Near East, Curzon was forced to recognize the Ankara Government as a powerful, fully effective adversary. Negotiations were resumed on 23 April, and when the Lausanne Treaty was signed on 24 July, Turkey had achieved an almost total victory. The Capitulations were abolished (Article 28), and the Ottoman Public Debt was apportioned among the successor States to the old Empire (Article 38).

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1 On 11 April 1923, the Ankara Government gave tentative approval to the so-called Chester Concessions, which granted Americans the right to develop certain economic resources in Anatolia. Though the Chester concessions had been drafted in 1908, failure of ratification at that time led them to conflict, in 1923, with other rights granted by Ottoman Governments to England, France and Czarist Russia. After the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty, the Turks annulled the Chester Concessions.

Other tactics employed by Kemal's Government included the planting of a rumour that Turkey intended to impose a retaliatory tariff against the Western Powers if they proved intransigent at Lausanne; and also the suspension by the Turks of interest payments (raised through tolls on the Galata Bridge) to overseas bondholders of the 1909 Constantinople Municipal Loan.

Though Turkey was required to hold to her customs schedule of 1 September 1916, this restriction was to be voided at the end of five years (Commercial Convention, Articles 1, 2, 18). Business concessions granted prior to World War I were to be recognized, but those of a later date were made subject to review (Protocol on Concessions). Finally, it was agreed that Greek and Turkish nationals domiciled outside the treaty borders should be repatriated to their respective homelands (Convention Concerning Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations).\(^2\)

In only four areas was Turkey unable to achieve its maximum objectives. The Straits were largely demilitarized and placed under international supervision. Certain Aegean Islands were permanently lost by Turkey. Greek reparation for damages caused during the War of Independence was much reduced. And right of possession of the Mosul oil fields on the Turco-Iraqi border was left for future adjudication. When this last problem was resolved (to Turkey's disadvantage) on 5 June 1926, borders were stabilized at positions which have since remained largely unchanged.

\textit{ii.}) The Neutralization of anti-Kemalist Power Centers - Throughout the period of negotiations at Lausanne, Turkey's domestic politics were in a turmoil. On 7 December 1922, Kemal had announced his intention of founding a new party, the \textit{Halk Firkasi} (People's Party). Then,\(^2\)

during the early weeks of 1923, he stumped much of the country, interviewing local groups and presenting in general outline his beliefs regarding the proper course for further governmental action. This speaking tour was a vast personal success for the Ghazi, who built up so much popular support, virtually no other public figure could hope to be successful in going before the people if he did not bear the stamp of Kemalist approval. But when a General Election was called on 1 April 1923, Kemal refused to endorse anyone who would not subscribe to the following nine "Principles":

"(1) reform of the Laws and the Courts,
(2) modification of the tithe-tax,
(3) strengthening of the national banks,
(4) construction of new railways,
(5) unification of the schools system,
(6) reduction of the period of military service,
(7) financial, (8) economic, and (9) administrative independence."

Kemal's People's Party swept the June elections." But opposition to the Ghazi would not down, for his imperiousness repelled many who were otherwise his faithful supporters. Various bellweathers of impending dictatorship were remarked, as for example Kemal's moves to suppress independent trade unions. In an attempt to strengthen parliamentary discipline, Kemal had the following proviso included in

3 D.E. Webster, op. cit., p. 104. See also, M. Kemal, op. cit., p. 598.


a People's Party document of August, 1923:

"In the course of discussions in the Grand National Assembly only the Leader and his deputies may speak in the name of the Party. Other members will approve and support from their places, and by brief utterances, the words of their chiefs."6

The idea of limited debate was anathema to former members of the liberal parliamentarian wing of the Union and Progress. When a motion was introduced to restore the seat of government toConstantinople, the issue was supported with extreme fervor by those who wanted to reestablish Legislative ascendancy. A return to the Straits, they felt, would be symbolic of the continuity of Turkish Governments. Once the Constantinople Chamber of Deputies was reoccupied, the Ghazi's authoritarianism could be checkreined.

Kemal and his close supporters were equally obdurate in their wish to keep the capital at Ankara. In addition to concern regarding the difficulty of securing Constantinople from attack, there was as well a determination to rule Turkey from the Anatolian plateau in order to prevent any recrudescence of Levantine cosmopolitanism. Though Kemal's supporters won in the vote of 13 October, opposition did not subside. Accordingly, a synthetic parliamentary crisis was precipitated, and the anti-Kemalists were instructed to bring its resolution. When their efforts failed, the Assembly turned to the Ghazi for advice. He suggested that the crisis of government could be resolved through the simple, yet radical, tactics of declaring Turkey to be a Republic, and of granting the President of the Republic authority to preside.

6 The Times, 17 August 1923, p. 8.
over the Assembly and a Council of Ministers whose composition he could effectively determine. These amendments to the 1921 "Fundamental Articles of the Constitutional Act" were accepted on 29 October 1923 by considerably less than a unanimous vote. Immediately thereafter, Mustafa Kemal was elected President of the Republic by a vote of 158 in favor, 129 abstaining.

Temporarily secure in his dominance over the Assembly, Kemal moved rapidly against the hard core of political opposition. Rauf Bey*, leader of the liberal parliamentarian and Ottoman moderate factions in the People's Party, and as well a popular hero second only to Kemal, was publically humiliated in November. Certain therefore that no political leader would dare stand to contradict him, the Ghazi began attacking the Caliphate as anti-Republican. After assuring himself of Army support, Kemal formally demanded separation of Church and State. On 3 March 1924, a docile Assembly passed legislation:

1) deposing Caliph Abdülmeclid and banishing all members of the Osmanli (Ottoman Imperial) family;
2) abolishing the Caliphate;
3) placing all Turkish educational institutions under the authority of the Ministry of Public Instruction;

The tactics employed by Kemal during the Fall 1923 crisis were masterly. At one and the same time, he reasserted his power over the Council of Ministers - and particularly Rauf Bey - and thrust Turkey forward into republicanism. To accomplish both objectives at the same time seems the more impressive when it is remembered that Kemal's control of the Council of Ministers had been broken in January 1922 by anti-authoritarian factions within the Grand National Assembly. For a more complete discussion of the events leading up to the establishment of the Turkish Republic cf.: G.L. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 77-78; N. Kemal, op. cit., pp. 644ff.
4) incorporating into the Government's budget all revenues from Pious Foundations (Evkaf) formerly used to support the Islamic medreses;

5) abolishing the Ministry of the Seriat and Evkaf, and replacing these with a Directorate of Religious Affairs in the Prime Minister's office, and with a Directorate of Pious Foundations.

The tide of anti-Muslim legislation did not ebb following passage of these acts. On 7 March, the Grand National Assembly ordered that all mention of the Caliph be dropped from mosque prayers. Prayers were to be offered for the republican government and Turkish nation instead. On the same day, it was decreed that all schools must remove such portraits of the Osmanlis as hung on their walls. On 12 March, the Government announced its intention (idolatrous in view of Muslims) of erecting a statue of the Ghazi in remembrance of his victory in the War of Independence. Three days later, Constantinople's theological schools were ordered to close their doors, and their students were required to stop wearing ecclesiastical dress. Less than a month went by before the Assembly administered the coup de grâce. On 8 April, all medreses were closed, the religious courts were abolished, and the adjudication of family, marriage, estate and similar law was transferred to the civil courts.

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9 There may have been a direct relationship between the announcement regarding construction of a statue of Kemal and the closing of the Constantinople medreses. For statuary was excoriated by orthodox Muslims, and Constantinople medreses were famous as agitators against change.
The speed with which these various acts were promulgated completely confounded the Ghazi's opponents. Capitalizing on their disorganization, Kemal next moved to make permanent the secularization trend. Though moderates within the Assembly succeeded in blocking passage of certain extreme provisions, a revised Constitution (24 April 1924) broke with almost all vestiges of Ottoman tradition. One exception was that the Islamic character of the State continued to be enjoined (Section I, Article 2), but since the secular Executive was granted virtually dictatorial powers (Section III), this clause was effectively nullified.

iii.) The First Social Reforms - During the months following enactment of the 1924 Constitution, both liberal parliamentarians and Muslim reactionaries attempted to challenge the Ghazi's leadership. The liberals were the more easily dispersed. Through demands for absolute party discipline, and when these failed through drum-

10 Relevant sections of the 1924 Constitution will be found infra, Appendix IV.3. (T.).

11 Revised rules of the People's Party included the following: "No interpellation will be allowed either in party or meetings of the Grand National Assembly without the previous consent of the party, and no question will be allowed to become an interpellation without similar consent." Moreover, Party members were forbidden to "make any declaration, or publish anything contrary to the principles and decisions of the party". The Times, 12 November 1924, p. 13.
head law, Kemal was able to silence his most prominent adversaries. But though the liberal parliamentarians were discomfited, Muslim reactionaries were not. From 11 February to 28 April 1925, Kurdish tribesmen and their pro-Caliphate allies held large blocks of Eastern Anatolia against the Ankara Government. Late in the same year, peasants in the region of Erzerum, Trebizond and Samsun likewise revolted; and during the following half decade, reactionary movements were suppressed at Izmir (1926), Bursa (1928, 1929), in Kurdistan (1930), and at Meneman (1930). Reactionary goals fell largely into three categories. Revolutionaries such as the Kurds desired independence of the Center. Others sought reestablishment of the Sultanate-Caliphate; or merely to impede the progress of devrim (revolutionary reform) which Kemal introduced with his famous "Hat Act" of 1925.

12 For contemporary accounts of the Independence Tribunals held to try reputed members of the Izmir Conspiracy (a plan to assassinate Kemal which was exposed on 15 June 1926), cf.: Current History, Vol. XXIV (Sept. 1926), p. 980; and Vol XXV (Oct. 1926), p. 149.

13 Rauf Bey was banished from Turkey, while Dr. Adnan-Adivar and his wife, Halide Edib Adivar, went into self-imposed exile despite acquittal of complicity in the Izmir plot. Likewise acquitted were Kâzım Karabekir Paşa, Refet Paşa and Ali Fuad Paşa, but they were nonetheless brought to heel. It is noteworthy that most of the members of the Assembly who were falsely accused of participation in the Izmir plot had been leaders of the Progressive Party, which was formed on 17 November 1924 in opposition to the 24 April 1924 Constitution and to Kemalist dictatorship.

14 There were as well a number of trials brought against both Islamic moderates and Communists during this same half decade. One of the most notable features of this entire period of suppression was that, though convictions were easily obtained by the Tribunals of Independence, sentences were relatively light.
During August 1925, the Ghazi made a tour of the Black Sea coast wearing - as did all the members of his entourage - a Panama hat. Delivering speeches at Kastamonu and Inebolu, he spoke of the need for modernization both of dress and of society: for the putting off of outmoded and uneconomical Turkish garments which were not in keeping with Turkey's new status as a member of civilized Europe. In particular, Kemal suggested that the fez and the veiling of women be abolished. Before a religious opposition to these proposals could be formed, Kemal attacked again. On 7 September it was declared a criminal offence for any Turk to wear ecclesiastical garb unless he had been appointed to a religious office by the national government. And on 30 September, Kemal returned to Kastamonu to state that:

"The aim of the revolutionary measures we have been and are taking, is to bring the people of the Turkish Republic into a state of society which is entirely modern and civilized, in every sense and in every way....It is essential that we bring about the utter rout of mentalities incapable of accepting this fact."15

Adoption, on 1 January 1926, of the Gregorian Calendar and of midnight to midnight reckoning of days initiated a phase of institutional reform. On 17 February 1926, a revised Civil Code was enacted which was based on Swiss precedent. On 8 March, a Debts Law also duplicating Swiss statute was promulgated; it was soon followed by an Italianate Penal Code (13 March), and a German-type

Commercial Code (28 June).\(^{16}\) To cap the series of legal reforms, a Law School was opened in Ankara on 5 November to train lawyers in the new regulations.

Following the enactment of legal codes, the pace of headlong reform slackened. However, three highly significant events occurred during 1928: on 10 April, the Constitution was amended in such fashion as to formally disestablish Islam as the State religion; on 24 May, Arabic numerals were adopted; and on 3 November a new alphabet was introduced.\(^{17}\) These acts closed the first period of Kemalist


\(^{17}\) The significance of alphabet reform needs special stress. Since many viewed the former alphabet as a sacred component of Islam, religious tradition was directly challenged. Moreover, from the point of view of government control over the population, the establishment of an entirely new alphabet served an exceedingly useful purpose. Access to the literature of the past was denied to the young generation, for it was not trained in the ancient script. The number of marginal journals - typically, among the most critical opponents of the Kemalist regime - was cut down, for few of them could afford to purchase the new type. And while members of the public who knew the old script were trying to learn the new, public knowledge of governmental activities sharply lessened. Thus popular criticism was for a time silenced.

In addition to these negative factors, the new alphabet performed one very positive service. For the new script was much simpler than the old and hence easier, and cheaper, to teach. For a detailed commentary on Turkey's linguistic controversy, cf.: U. Heyd, Language Reform in Modern Turkey, Israel Oriental Society, 1954.
reform.

B. Vacillation in the Economic Sector

1.) The Rationale of Étatisme - Despite the fiscal and commercial stringencies of the Lausanne Conventions, the Ankara Government attempted from the beginning of its office to bring some measure of improvement to the Turkish economy. Étatisme: extensive governmental participation in, and direction of, the economic sector; served as the guiding principle of these efforts. In 1923, Kemal defined étatisme as a mixture of public and private endeavors in which private initiative would be supplemented by public action wherever needed for the good of the nation. The system was doctrinaire only in its stress on national welfare as the ultimate criterion.18

Étatisme reflected the views of its soldier creators, for it was pragmatically concerned with the development of a strong industrial

18 "... le système étatiste que la Turquie applique n'est pas un système adopté et traduit des idées invoquées par les théoriciens du socialisme depuis le XIX siècle. Né des besoins de la Turquie, c'est un système propre à la Turquie.

"Selon nous, L'expression de l'étatisme est la suivant:

"Tenir pour base les initiatives privées et les activités personnelles des particuliers; mais, tenant compte de tous les besoins d'une grande nation et d'un vaste pays, et du fait que de nombreuses choses ne sont pas accomplies, mettre l'économie du pays dans la main de l'Etat.

"L'Etat de la République de Turquie a voulu réaliser au plus, tôt les choses qui n'ont, depuis des siècles, pas été accomplis au moyen des initiatives privées et individuelles, et comme on l'a vu, il a réussi à le faire dans un temps très court.

"Le système que nous suivons est, comme on le voit, un système autre que le libéralisme,"

From a speech by Kemal delivered at the Izmir International Fair, 1923. Quoted in S.E. Özbek, La Sümër Bank et l'Industrialisation de la Turquie sous la République, Lyon, 1938, pp. 149-50fn.
base and found ultimate dependence upon the State an expedient means of assuring rapid economic growth. The interests of no particular group or groups were to be promoted, though anyone able to advance himself in the course of advancing the nation was to be given ample scope for personal initiative. One great virtue of early étatisme was its flexibility. Though application was fluid, the policy's strict adherence to national development as a goal acted as a constraining factor and theoretically limited the possibility of misallocation of resources. A great shortcoming existed, however, in the calibre of the administrative bureaucracy charged with applying étatist doctrines. Since the program was neither monolithically directed, nor even based on an integrated blueprint of national objectives, administrative officials innocent of training in the complex interaction of the economy's various sectors made a number of costly errors. But these errors could not be rectified by the marketplace, for the economy was too rigidly controlled to make direct response to shifts in supply or demand possible. By 1930, the mixture of public and private enterprise was adjudged a failure, and during the next six years a more arbitrary program evolved which in appearance somewhat resembled that of Italian Fascism. 19

ii.) Monetary and Fiscal Reform — Ankara faced a continuing financial crisis. Immense sums were needed for reconstruction, to service the Ottoman foreign debt, and to redress that imbalance in

19 See infra, Appendix IV. 4 (T.): The Organization of Quasi-Public Business Enterprises in Turkey.
the Turkish economy which had resulted from the paring down of Empire. Moreover, the Army continued to absorb large portions of the Governmental budget, and Kemal was desirous of stimulating some measure of economic progress.

Revenues to meet these needs were scanty for several reasons. The tithe remained the major source of funds despite its weakness as a fiscal device. The (extra-national) Council of Public Debt continued to absorb certain taxes and most of Turkey's revenue from Customs, employing these funds to service overseas debt. Domestic production had declined during the years 1915-1922 and thus generated relatively small amounts of excise. However, because of the Lausanne stipulations, protectionism could not be introduced either to stimulate Turkish industry or to provide new revenues for the Government.

In order to keep free of any possible "foreign exploitation", the Turkish Government chose to finance its needs out of current income. 20

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20 This policy evolved only gradually, as is indicated by a series of news releases published in The Times during 1923. The first quotes a statement by Kemal to the effect that, "Unless this country is reconstructed, the Turkish people cannot live; and in order to reconstruct it we need the assistance of foreign specialists." This statement caused deep concern among those fearful of the reestablishment of extra-territorial privileges. Despite the opposition of a vocal public mobilized by the newspaper Vatan, the Fethi Cabinet proposed in Fall 1923 that foreign aid be considered for overhead capital development. Throughout the balance of the 1920's, foreign firms entered into lengthy negotiations with Ankara in attempts to establish some form of credit-concession relationship with Turkey. But each one of these attempts fell through, either because foreigners demanded interest rates which the Turks considered excessive, or because the Turks refused at the last moment to concede rights for foreigner exploitation of resources. On the Kemal statement and the events down through the 1923 trial balloon on direct foreign aid, cf.: The Times, 25 January 1923, p. 9; 23 March 1923, p. 12; and 7 September 1923, p. 9.
This policy seemed exemplary both because of Turkey's former experience with Capitulations, and because the cost of servicing the Ottoman public debt put a sharp crimp in governmental budgets. Moreover, from the time of the abrogation of the Galata Bridge tolls both foreign and domestic investors demanded exceedingly high interest rates to cover the risk of credit advances to the Ankara Government.

An important change in fiscal operations occurred in mid-April 1924, when Ankara ordered that revenue formerly paid into the (extra-national) Council of Public Debt be paid instead directly into the Turkish Treasury. On 17 February 1925, the 12½% tithe was abolished. To maintain a steady flow of revenue from agriculture, a 10% money tax was instituted in its stead, but since this took the form of a transactions tax generally paid by the commercial carrier, the peasant was directly aided. In 1926, new general tax schedules began to be promulgated. All vestiges of the tithe were dropped on 10 February, though the cattle tax remained. Major sources of new revenue raised through direct taxation included:

a) tax on professional profits (27 February 1926). Liable were employees of private business, members of commercial cooperatives, financiers, professionals and the self-employed. Exempted were employees of the State or of State enterprises, agricultural laborers, rural health personnel and the like;

b) property transfer tax (3 April 1926);

\[21\] supra, p. 347.

c) agricultural property tax (13 June 1926);  
d) business property tax (14 June 1926). 23

Additional revenues were raised through indirect taxes. As State monopolies proliferated, this method became increasingly popular due to the ease of collection. A standard for consumption taxes was set on 1 June 1927. Under this schedule, all manufactured or imported goods were made subject to a 6% ad valorem levy unless included in a rather limited exclusions list. 24 In addition, such disparate items as amusements, restaurant meals and hunting licenses were made subject to excise, and turnover taxes were established for business and service transactions generally. 25 The final step in fiscal reform took place on 7 June 1929 when, due to the ending of commercial restrictions under the Lausanne Conventions, new tariff schedules of a generally protectionist character were announced. 26

Throughout the period of fiscal reform, analogous activities were initiated in the monetary sector. The prime objective of the monetary reforms was to increase the flow of currency, which hitherto had been

23 ibid., pp. 84ff.
24 Excluded were such items as essential fuels, the products of certain State monopolies, and books.
impeded as much by a shortage of domestic banking facilities as by the Government's hard money policy. An Agricultural Bank had been in existence since 1888, but since it provided little other than crop loans, its impact on the total economy was negligible. The only other major credit institutions were a National Credit Bank, founded in 1917, which was insufficiently capitalized to fill industrial needs; and The Ottoman Bank which, being foreign owned, was not allowed to become an adjunct of national monetary policy. Only in 1930 was a Turkish-owned Central Bank created.27

The first new credit source established by the Turkish Republic was the İş Bankası (Bank of Affairs), founded 26 August 1924 to provide loans for private business. Capitalized at £1,000,000, it was able to do relatively little for the private sector. On the 19th April following, the Sanayi ve Maadin Bankası (Bank for Mining and Industry) was founded, with one of its functions that of providing normal commercial banking facilities to private business. However, this service of the new bank was considered to be ancillary to its other functions as a semi-autonomous administrative institution. For the Bank was to direct certain

27 The Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası (Central Bank of the Republic) was founded on 11 June 1930 as the bank of issue and reserve of the Turkish Republic. In 1938, its charter was modified to make the bank guarantor of all State agricultural and commercial enterprises of an economic character.
State industrial and mining enterprises, and to act as well as the governmental partner in semi-private Turkish corporations. These latter two activities totally overshadowed the first, and loans from the Sanayi Bankasi were channelled almost entirely into the seventeen semi-public corporations, plus various State enterprises, in which the Bank was engaged. 28

Currency reform was the second element of the monetary program undertaken by Ankara. The objective here was not to inflate the currency, but only to shake free peasant hordes. On 1 December 1927, new paper money was prepared for issuance at par against Ottoman notes. The exchange, which was begun 5 December, put into circulation 150 million new-style Turkish Lira engraved with the Republican seal and pictures of the Ghazi and other prominent members of the Government. The note issue was not a wholehearted success. Hoarding began again and thus contributed to a reoccurrence in late Summer 1928 of the historic post-harvest currency shortage. Moreover, pious Turks who accepted Koranic prescriptions against the "idolatrous" practice of portraiture, destroyed a large percentage of the new issue by poking out the eyes of those portrayed on the banknotes. 29

28 Most of the State enterprises related to the production of consumer goods such as textiles, sugar and shoes. cf: S.E. Özbek, op. cit., pp. 42-3, 48.

The final act of monetary reform was to bring about the regularization of service on the Ottoman Debt. Negotiations were carried forward intermittently from the time of Lausanne until 13 June 1928, when at Paris it was agreed that the £96,000,000 debt was to be paid off according to the following schedule. An annuity of £T2,000,000 (gold) was to be paid in the first year; in the years following to 1952, this sum was gradually to rise to a maximum of £T3,400,000 (gold) and then to decrease until the total debt was paid. Though Turkey met its first installments on the Debt, the Crash caused Ankara to default in 1930.

In 1933, a new debt formula was established. Based on a principal reduced to £T7,000,000 (gold), Turkey was obligated to fixed payments of £T700,000 (gold) per annum with interest set at 7.5%. The Ottoman Debt finally retired in 1949.30

iii.) Measures to Improve Agricultural Productivity - Ankara's innocence regarding economic processes was nowhere so apparent as in its failure to recognize the earning potential of agricultural exports. Direct investment in agriculture lagged throughout the 1920's, though attempts were made to increase the productivity of small holdings. As early as 2 March 1923, the Government reduced the cattle tithe as a means of providing incentive for the repopulation of herds decimated by the War of Independence. In addition, a program was initiated to distribute improved seed strains to the peasantry, and the vilayets

were instructed to carry out labor-intensive irrigation projects.

During 1924, particular stress began to be placed on long-term rural improvement. A law was enacted 14 February ordering instruction in modern farming methods for Army conscripts drawn from rural areas. Five weeks later, a new Köy Kanunu (Village Law) was enunciated. It contained provisions relating not only to the election and conduct of local officials, but also to village government responsibilities for overhead capital creation. Among these were instructions regarding water purification and swamp drainage, garbage collection and sewage disposal, additional public health measures, forest conservation, and the construction and maintenance of a village crafts shop, dispensary, school and playground. Finally, it was ordered that groups of villages band together to purchase steam disinfecting equipment. 31

Abolition of the tithe in 1925 was soon followed by Kemal's establishment of a model farm near Ankara. This land, purchased May 1925, included roughly 140,000 acres, of which something over 80,000 acres were arable. Modern methods of cultivation were demonstrated on the farm, with particular emphasis being placed on seed usage, crop rotation, animal husbandry and the employment of mechanized equipment. Since its land lay athwart the tracks of the Ankara railway, the Ghazi's farm was well adapted both to its educational and commercial functions. 32

31 cf D.F. Webster, op. cit., pp. 133, 263-4; H.E. Allen, The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development, University of Chicago Press, 1935, p. 111. Turkey's 1924 Law merits comparison with the Community Development Program which India initiated 2 October 1952. This latter not only was much more costly than the Turkish program, it also has involved a much more intensive effort to modernize the peasantry.

32 The Times, 30 November 1925, p. 13.
Despite the example of Kemal's farm and the instructions of the 1924 Village Law, Turkey's peasants were slow to respond to new techniques. However, even if there had been wide interest in modernization, rapid development of most of the agricultural sector would have been impossible. Inadequate transport facilities limited market size in most inland regions. The low level of farm incomes resulting prevented rapid capitalization. Moreover, historic practices of strip farming impeded efficient utilization of the land.

Strip planting, rural isolation and low profit levels all conspired to prevent rapid recovery of the agricultural sector until 1925, when cereal output rose markedly. Other market crops, and particularly those industrial raw materials produced in the rich Izmir hinterland, continued to stand below prewar levels. In 1926, a drought began which lasted until the Summer of 1929. The Government attempted to lessen the impact of this disaster by offering, in 1927, to absorb half the cost of

33 As a result, Turkey was in the anomalous position of being an agrarian nation unable to achieve self-sufficiency in foodstuffs until the 1950's.

34 Living within a semi-patriarchal society, the Turkish peasant landholder long has turned to his wife (or wives), his sons plus their families, and to his unmarried daughters for field labor. When the male parent dies, the heirs may agree to some sort of ad hoc communal arrangement; but because no child automatically accedes to the position of patriarch, there is a tendency for such agreements eventually to break down and for the land to be divided among the survivors. As a result, strip planting is prevalent in Turkey, and only urban market gardeners or industrial crop producers are likely to cultivate as much as twenty acres of land. For information on inheritance procedures, cf.: UNESCO, International Social Science Bulletin (Vol. IX, No. 1), "The Reception of Foreign Law in Turkey", 1957, pp. 24-5. Estimates on average size of landholdings are presented in J. Parker and C. Smith, Modern Turkey, London, 1940, p. 81.
all tractors bought for farming. Much attention also was given to programs designed to stimulate the formation of Kombinats (joint holding companies for agricultural machinery) and farm cooperatives. During the Winter 1927-28, a severe cold wave struck. Added to the drought, it drove many farm families, particularly those of the Konya Plain, off the land. Even the good harvest of 1929 did not end the agricultural depression, for the Stock Market Crash brought about a decline in world demand for primary products. As a raw material producer, Turkey's exports fell 40% below imports; as its currency depreciated, a political crisis began to build.

The beginning of the Depression forced Turkey to increase its efforts to achieve internal self-sufficiency. Tariff duties on imports were raised. President Kemal called for a boycott of foreign goods and declared that Christmas 1929 should be spent in studying how to do without imports, rather than in present giving. The Government promised to expand bank credits during the coming year, and to begin new construction and irrigation projects. Austerity was invoked; but since the Turks had known austerity since the World War, the effect of such a program could do little within the consumer-goods sector - and might create great political harm. Thus entry into the 1930's forced Kemal to reassess the value of a mixed economy under statisme, and to introduce

35 The New York Times, 18 February 1927, p. 39
36 See infra, statistical appendix V.6.(T.).
new methods to bring economic progress.

iv.) Development of the Infrastructure - Between 1923 and 1929 the Turkish Government invested relatively little in overhead capital. Railroad construction proved the major exception, but this was due in part to the fact that Anatolia's railroad base - almost 1500 miles in 1909 - had been so badly damaged during the War of Independence, only 855 miles were in operation in 1924-25.

Most of the rail net inherited by the Republic initially had been built by Capitulatory legates. Ankara wished to nationalize these railroads, but only out of current revenues. As a consequence, the purchase of foreign-owned lines went forward piecemeal and was not completed until shortly after World War II.

Nationalized railways were placed under the Devlet Demir Yollari ve Limanlari (Directorate-General of State Railways and Ports), a semi-autonomous institution established within the Ministry of Communications. Even though this agency controlled all railway development, no attempt was made to establish a national trunk. Down through the end of Transformation, serious problems also arose from a shortage of double tracking and feeder lines. Lack of a single standard gauge created additional difficulties down into the 1950's.

Harbor development and road construction lagged behind the railway program. Several tentative agreements on port development were established between Ankara and foreign construction firms during the 1920's.

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37 T.G.A. Muntz, Turkey: Economic and Social Conditions, New York, 1951, p. 89.
Table VIII

Anatolian Railroads, 1909, and Their Extension, 1924-1936

a) 1912 Base

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Mileage Open</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haidar - Ankara</td>
<td>358 mi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eskişehir - Konya</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mudanya - Bursa</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İzmir - Kasaba</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alâşehir - Afyonkarahisar</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>İzmir - Aydın</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konya - Ereğli</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercin - Adana</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,474 mi.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b) Objectives of Railroad Legislation, 1924-26

1) line from Ankara via Sivas to Samsun;
2) spur from this line to Baghdad Railway and the Mediterranean between Mercin and Adana;
3) extension of Baghdad Railway to Kurdistan in the East;
4) line between Ankara and Ereğli;
5) connection between Ankara - Eskişehir - Konya line by spur to İzmir - Bandırma Railway;
6) line from Eskişehir - Konya Railway to South near Antalya.

c) Railroad Construction, 1924-36

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Mileage</th>
<th>Years of Construction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ankara - Kayseri</td>
<td>236 mi.</td>
<td>1925-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayseri - Sivas</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1928-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kütahya - Balikesir</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>1930-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boğazköyprü - Ulukişla</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1932-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samsun - Kalin (Sivas)</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>1926-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fevzi Paşa - Malatya - Ergani - Diyarbekir</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>1929-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yolcati - Elazig</td>
<td>15½</td>
<td>)---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irmak - Filios</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>1931-36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

but revenue shortages led to the voiding of each. During this period, however, a certain amount of road building actually took place. Except in the few instances where showcase highways were desired (e.g., the Istanbul - Ankara highway), very few capital-intensive projects were set up. Most of the roadbuilding undertaken during Transformation was carried forward under a law enacted during the winter of 1924-25, which decreed that all male Turks between eighteen and sixty should work from six to twelve days annually on public roads. 38

In other areas of social overhead, the telegraph system was improved and somewhat lengthened, though its fairly high level of development under the Ottomans obviated a major expansion effort. Public health and education were left largely to local governments and continued to be rather primitive. Local governments also took responsibility for power creation; during the years 1923 - 1935, generating capacity rose from 33,000 kw. to 126,000 kw.

Industrial Development - To achieve the nation-centered objectives of étatisme, the Kemalists deliberately endeavored to force withdrawal of foreign businesses established in Turkey under Ottoman Capitulations. As early as 1923, foreign service agencies began to leave Turkey because of threats of repressive taxation. Departures increased as new tax schedules and laws relating to business conduct were published. The most far-reaching of these latter was promulgated 1 March 1926, when it was decreed that all door-keepers, hall porters, chauffeurs and

38 *The Times*, 3 January 1925, p. 9.
bargemen had to be Turkish subjects, and further that up to 50% of the employees of any concern had to be of Turkish nationality. Later in the same year, rights of cabotage were denied to foreign vessels.\textsuperscript{39} The exodus of leading foreign businessmen was made nearly complete by laws passed in 1927 and 1929, which respectively required that all official business correspondence henceforth be written in Turkish, and that Turkish nationals be given priority rights in the issuance of licenses to carry on professional services.

Despite opposition to foreign firms long established within Turkey, the Ankara Government remained in negotiation throughout the 1920's with a number of foreign combines wishing to engage in capital development projects. At about the same time as the voiding of the Chester Concessions,\textsuperscript{40} discussions were begun with an Austrian-Swiss syndicate which proposed to furnish credit for transportation projects. Swedish, Belgian and American companies sent representatives to Ankara during the waning years of the decade, and though rumors spread periodically that the Turks were at last ready to enter into loan agreements, all approaches to the Kemalists failed once the negotiators came to the sticking point: interest charges. Foreign firms were engaged by the Turks to carry out heavy industry projects, most notably on the railroads; but these were financed out of current revenues.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{39} Since the Turkish merchant marine was totally inadequate to the task of handling intracoastal shipping, internal transport costs rose markedly, and business losses due to transport damage skyrocketed.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{supra}, p. 347.

\textsuperscript{41} The Turks apparently preferred to do their business with the nationals
Aid to private industry was initiated through the creation in 1924 of the **I§ Bankasi** (Bank of Affairs) and of a special bureau within the Ministry of Commerce devoted exclusively to the problems of private business. In addition, specific inducements were offered to new enterprises, particularly through a law enacted 28 May 1927 which offered concessions in terms of cheap land, remission of certain taxes and duties, and reduction in transport rates to private entrepreneurs. Though the number of industrial organizations qualifying under the 1927 law quadrupled by 1933, the private sector developed slowly. Shortages of credit and of entrepreneurial talent were among the causes of this lassitude, but a more important factor probably was the bias of most governmental administrators toward public ownership. State monopolies were established in a number of highly profitable light industries; elsewhere where public firms were developed to compete with private businesses, Governmental discrimination against the latter forced a series of private business failures. Consequently, despite the non-doctrinaire character of theoretical **étatsme**, a true mixed economy did not arise. The combination of bureaucratic ineptitude and

of small or "non-imperialist" countries. For details of proposals for foreign economic development of Turkish resources, cf.: The New York Times, 25 July 1923, p. 28; 29 May 1927, p. 4; 10 March 1928, p. 23.

Only one foreign loan (raised in the U.S.S.R.) was floated by Turkey between 1923 and 1938.

personal bias in day-to-day business activities pushed the State toward continually increasing degrees of public ownership.

Ever since the Ottomans introduced agencies such as the Salt Monopoly and the Tobacco Regie, publically-owned businesses had existed in Turkey. Ankara's entry into industry and commerce was not, therefore, novel. To Kemalist administrators, public ownership was attractive both because of ease of regulation, and because of the profits which accrued to the State. There was in addition a conviction that the State held direct responsibility for national well-being. Where private businesses failed to satisfy popular demands, it became mandatory for governmental agencies to step in and rectify the error. From this attitude arose Ankara's early concern with consumer products, a concern which led the Government to establish monopolies in the first three years of republicanism either in the import, production, sale - or all three - of the following classes of consumption item:

a) matches (1 March 1924);
b) revolvers, cartridges, powder and explosives (28 November 1925);
c) sugar (25 January 1926);
d) gasoline and benzine (25 November 1926);
e) alcoholic beverages (22 March 1926); and
f) playing cards (30 June 1927). 43

43 In addition, the State retained monopolies in salt and tobacco products. It is instructive to consider these monopolies in relation to political events. The firearms monopoly, for example, was created at the first session of the Grand National Assembly following the Spring 1925 Kurdish revolt. The development of State control of alcoholic beverages was widely criticized by orthodox Muslims, who wished for prohibition in accordance with Koranic dichta. For further discussion of the monopoly program, cf.: T. Mouhiddin, op. cit., pp. 143ff.
By 1929, State-owned plants produced (relatively) sizeable quantities of gasoline, sugar, textiles, opium, paraffin, tobacco products and building materials. There was little attempt made, however, to coordinate the activities of the public sector - or even of State firms operating within a single industry. As the political and economic ramifications of the Stock Market Crash became understood, the Government began to consider methods for achieving internal self-sufficiency and for ending waste of resources in the economy. These investigations led to the amalgamation of formerly autonomous public production agencies into a succession of control institutions, and ultimately to the attempt to achieve economic development through national planning.

II - National Planning, 1930-1938

A. Programming Growth in the Extractive and Industrial Sectors

In a significant modification of economic policy, Ankara closed the semi-autonomous Bank for Mining and Industry shortly after the Crash. It was replaced by an Industrial Office of the State within the Ministry of Economics. The purpose of the new Office was to assist in the planning and establishment of State and semi-private industries, and to regulate those industries formerly managed by the Bank for Mining and Industry. A separate agency, The Turkish Bank for Industrial Credit, was created to provide funds for private firms engaged in capital creation projects.

Neither of these agencies proved more successful than their 1925

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S. E. Özbek, op. cit.: pp. 73ff.
predecessor. As a result, through a law passed 11 July 1933 the autonomous Sümer Bankasi (or Sümerbank) was founded as successor to both. On 9 January 1934, the new institution was given the mission of administering a five year development program whose general outlines had been largely worked out by Russian and American experts formerly hired by the Industrial Office of the State.

It will be noted that support of the individual entrepreneur was not included among the responsibilities of the Sümerbank. State sponsorship of the private sector was now at an end. Throughout the remaining years of Transformation, the only consistent effort made by Ankara in behalf of private business was socio-legal. Public education in commercial subjects was introduced, and the laws of 1926-29 against foreign businesses were reiterated and extended. Reservation of particular occupations to Turkish nationals was in fact damaging to economic development, for those Muslim Turks interested in business life were more attracted by governmental employ than by private ventures. Once absorbed into State agencies, their effectiveness often declined. Through the Republic's Jewish population moved in to fill part of the vacuum caused by the mid-1930's exodus of foreign businessmen, in numbers, experience, and financial resources the Jews were unable to balance out the loss of foreign entrepreneurs.

45 Down into the very recent past, most public administrative agencies in Turkey suffered from extreme rigidity, red tape, and "empire building".
i.) The Sümer and Eti Bank Plans - The proximate objective of the Sümerbank was to increase output in textiles, mining, cellulose derivatives, chemicals and the ceramics industry so that total imports could be reduced 40-50%. This mission, of course, reflected the world's preoccupation with protectionism during the 1930's. However, to this minimum objective was added the ultimate goal of sufficient internal development to make the entire economy modern and self-sustaining. Development priorities were established as follows:

1) industries which, through the employment of domestic raw materials, could produce goods hitherto in short supply on the home market were to be granted top priority;

2) second priority was given to export industries producing finished and semi-finished goods which could draw on current surpluses of domestic raw materials;

3) third priority went to industries in part dependent upon imports which could, through expansion, fulfill the nation's entire demand for a finished product and/or draw in time entirely on domestic sources for factor inputs;

4) lowest in rank were to be industries using imported raw materials but which, through development, would have useful external economy effects on other sectors. 46

It is important to note that, with the exception of priority #2's provision for increasing the markets of domestic raw material surpluses, no formal attempt was to be made to enlarge exports. Only in part can this be attributed to the abnormal conditions of the 1930's. As we have seen, even before the Crash the Turks were so intent on erasing the imprint of foreign economic domination, they preferred to finance

46 S.E. Özbek, op. cit., p. 91.
unavoidable imports out of domestically generated revenues, rather than
to open themselves to any possibility of exploitation from overseas.
This does not mean that Kemal preached autarky as an ideal goal.
Reference to the statistical tables of Appendix VI will indicate that
foreign trade figured prominently throughout Kemal's tenure in office,
and that except in 1929 and 1938, a positive trade balance was main-
tained from the time of Turkey's first protective tariff (1929) to 1947.
However, it is significant that the negative balances obtaining after
World War II were caused largely by capital imports under the Marshall
Plan. On these grounds, it may be deduced that Turkey's unwillingness
to enlarge its foreign debt, coupled with the First Five Year Plan's
general undervaluation of export as a foreign exchange earning mechanism,
impeded the rate of capital formation during the years of the Plan's
operation.

Construction initiated under Sümerbank direction included the following:

a) Textiles: cotton spinning and weaving mills were established
at Kayseri, Nazili, Malatya and Eregli. Existing plant at Bakirköy was
enlarged. The objective of this program was to raise annual cotton
output from 13 to 35 million pounds by 1937.48

b) Cellulose, Paper and Rayon: were to be produced by a new
factory complex at Izmit.

47 Unfortunately, Turkish industrial statistics down to 1938 are too
imprecise for inclusion. Consequently, we cannot trace the direct
impact of the building here listed on total output.

48 Domestic consumption of cotton textiles amounted to 53 million
pounds annually.
c) Mining: A coking plant was established at Zonguldak. Copper and sulphur factories were built near mines at Ergani and Keciborlu. In 1937, construction was begun on two furnaces, a rolling and tube-making mill and attendant steel-making equipment near Karabük.49

d) Ceramics: a porcelain factory was established in Kütahya, and a bottle and glassware factory at Paşabagçe.

e) Chemicals: a refinery and distillery for attar of roses was built in Isparta. Alcohol distilleries and factories for the production of sulphuric acid, caustic soda, sulphates, superphosphates and chlorine were established at several points.50

49 The Karabük complex is 45 miles away from its coal supply (the Ereğli-Zonguldak-İmasra region), but over 600 miles away from the iron-ore-producing region at Divrik. Çamdağ, the other major ore-producing region, is 200 miles from Karabük. Explanations for the mislocation of Turkey's iron and steel complex vary. Blame is placed by some on the foreign engineers who cited the plant, by others on the desire of Turkish military interests to keep heavy industry away from the coast. A third, and more logical, explanation is that the Karabük furnaces were located so as to be near coal, and that neither the Divrik nor the Çamdağ deposits were known at the time of construction of the smelters.


(footnotes for next page)

51 For the composition and location of Turkish mineral deposits, cf.: W.B. Fisher, op. cit., pp. 322ff.

52 In conjunction with the Isbank, the Etibank also was given the mission of overseeing power production and the development of national electrification.
At the time of its creation, the Sümmerbank was given responsibility for exploitation of Turkey's iron, coal, lignite, copper and sulphur reserves. A second agency, the Etibank, was created to take over this responsibility in 1934, though the fabrication of mineral products remained within the Sümmerbank's purviews.

ii.) Social Overhead and Social Change - As we have seen, the goal of domestic self-sufficiency was applied to the social as well as the economic sector. Social goals intruded even into the 1933 statement of Sümmerbank missions, for within its overall program the Bank was given responsibility for the establishment of technical and professional schools related to its various industrial enterprises; for the support of scholarship; and for the execution of studies on economic development. But neither these educative tasks nor the investment criteria set forth as priorities for Sümmerbank development programming reflected more than a small segment of the total rationale behind the 1934-38 Plan.

Among the basic goals of the First Plan was the industrial development of Central and Eastern Anatolia. This region was adjudged suitable for manufacture less because of the location of factor inputs or market centers than because of its unfitness for large-scale agriculture. Particularly to stimulate the industrialization of the Plateau, the Plan called for railway extension and allocation of funds for building construction in Ankara, the provincial capitals, and certain of the larger municipalities. This effort may have been criticized on technical grounds. But apparently, any opposition which may have been raised for

53 The attempt to build up the Anatolian plateau through industrial-
economic reasons was overruled by considerations of a military and socio-political nature. The Army counselled removal to the interior as a defense measure. And Kemal's associates were peculiarly receptive to this proposal, for they saw the hinterlands as the bastion of republican strength.\(^{54}\)

The manipulative attempt to industrialize the nationalistic East and Center as a political balance for the cosmopolitan West was one manifestation of the policy and technique known as Devrimcilik ("reformism"). Webster has captured a sense of its urgent vitality:

"...The main force of the theory and of the movement is to change customs and institutions, conduct and interests, by fiat. There is insufficient time to wait for the culmination of slow processes of evolution. Man must use his energy and his will to force every material ingredient of life through modern molds into modern patterns. Likewise, every non-material culture trait must be Turkified. Under the inspiration and insistence of the Great Chief (to whose magnificent determination and dynamic, none has reason to doubt, must be attributed Turkey's independence and much of her progress) it is natural to find general acceptance of the conviction that progress is something created - generated - by human efforts.\(^{55}\)

Devrimcilik had effectively predated national economic planning, for industrialization has led to the separation of a good many industrial plants both from the sources of their labor and raw material supplies, and from their largest market regions.

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\(^{54}\) Kemal is believed to have held a personal aversion towards the Mediterranean-oriented portions of Turkey. This was made manifest as early as 6 October 1923, when he refused to lead the "Iron Brigade" of the Ankara Army in its ceremonial occupation of Constantinople. The Ghazi would not even attend the take-over of the Ottoman capital.

\(^{55}\) D.F. Webster, *op. cit.*, p. 171.
throughout the 1920's the task of inducing national consciousness and a progressive spirit had preoccupied Kemal. However, formal attempts at attitude manipulation were relatively small until 23 March 1931, when a comprehensive school law was enacted. Under the 1931 regulations, all primary education was reserved to the Turkish republican school system. Moreover, at all grades below the university, history, geography, civics, and study of the Turkish language and literature were to be given by Turkish nationals employing official Turkish texts. Higher education received similar treatment in 1933, when the University of Istanbul was reorganized, and again two years later. Under the 1935 reforms, the Ankara Law School was advanced to university status, and the War College and School for Civil Servants were transferred from Istanbul to Ankara in order to focus attention on Ankara's national importance, and to increase the parochial nationalist influences playing on future Governmental officers.

To speed the indoctrination of the peasantry, the Türk Ocak ("Turkish Hearth" Society) had been reorganized as early as 1924, adding nationalist propaganda dissemination to its former cultural and public welfare missions. Four years later, the Ocak served as model for the formation of Millet Mektepleri ("Folk Schools"), which were created particularly to teach minimum comprehension of the new alphabet. On 19 February 1932, the Ocak organization was formally converted into Halkevleri ("Folk Houses"), which rose in number from 34 (1932) to over 200 (1939). 56

B. Extension of Popular Participation in Government

An important aspect of the attempt to Turkify and modernize the nation was the effort made to enlarge popular participation in the governmental process. Women were the first to benefit. Through the Municipalities Act of 16 April 1930, female suffrage was allowed in local elections. Shortly thereafter, the first woman judge was appointed. On 5 December 1934, women were given full suffrage, including the right to stand for election. As a result, in the General Election of February 1935, 17 women were raised to seats in the Grand National Assembly.

The second area through which popular participation was enjoined was the ill-starred attempt made in 1930 to develop a loyal opposition within the Grand National Assembly. Fethi Bey*, a long-time associate of Kemal, announced his intention of contesting the 1930 elections through a new organization, the Liberal Party. Whether Fethi's party was created at the specific behest of the Ghazi is unknown, though Kemal definitely gave his consent to its organization. Unfortunately, the Liberal Party was viewed as a haven by Muslim reactionaries, and consequently Fethi felt constrained to dissolve it on 17 November 1930.

Despite the failure of the Liberal Party, Kemal remained anxious to foster an increase in constructive debate of Governmental policies. Shortly after the Liberal Party had been disbanded, he ordered an internal division of the People's Party into Left, Right, and Center. Furthermore, Kemal decided that a certain number of able, patriotic Turks should be encouraged to enter the Assembly as Independents. In the elections of 1935, sixteen seats were reserved for this purpose. It was stipulated
that two of these seats should be occupied by representatives of the Greek community, and that the Armenian and Jewish communities should hold one seat apiece. 57

The third aspect of the attempt to increase popular participation in government was the effort made to enlarge the scope and membership of the Popular Party itself. By 1938, the Government and the Party had become practically one; ca. 8% of the entire population had been entered on Party rosters; and the Turkish Constitution had been amended (5 February 1937) so as to incorporate the six basic principles of the People's Party. These are republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, secularism and revolutionism. 58

III - Conclusion: The Evolution of Kemalist Centralism

From the time of the New Ottoman movement of the mid-19th Century, many Turks had assumed that freedom from foreign intervention, coupled with the establishment of Western governmental forms, would automatically lead to a renaissance of Turkish vitality. Kemal may himself have held just such beliefs during the heady weeks of Summer 1908, but if so he was later disabused by the events of 1919-1922. As theoretician, executive and supreme commander of the nationalists, he shouldered full responsibility for the success of the Anatolian rebellion. While winning a war, he gained unparalleled instruction in government.

58 The estimate of 8% membership in the People's Party is presented in: J. Parker and C. Smith, op.cit., p. 69. The "Programme Accepted by the Fourth Grand Congress of the Party" (May 1935), will be found ibid., pp. 235ff.

We know that the Kemal of Transformation was fully prepared to disfranchise the past. The abolition of the Sultanate had already proven as much. But whether he recognized the degree of radical reform which would become necessary before new Turkey could be called secure is a matter of conjecture.\textsuperscript{59} Examination of the chronology of Ankara's reforms suggests that the Ghazi had no set pattern in mind.

From 1922 to 1924, Kemal gave particular attention to suppression of his parliamentary opponents. This effort was necessary very largely because the liberal parliamentarian wing, which lacked Kemal's extensive experience in statecraft, failed to recognize the urgent need for despatch and direction in the establishment of new political forms. There were as well contests of personality and motive; but Kemal commanded such loyalty as a leader, it seems unlikely that Turkish liberals would have considered plans to strip the Ghazi of direction over policy determination had he been less abrupt and domineering in his relations with the Assembly. This abruptness is believed to have been most directly a product of impatience with Assembly vacillation.

During the period of intra-party contest, the Ghazi made full use of his popularity with the peasants and the Army's lesser ranks. Only when his faction's dominance in Ankara was assured did he initiate extensive socio-legal reforms. A number of the changes introduced during the years 1924-1928 may have been in the Ghazi's mind for years.

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{cf.}: D.A. Rustow, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 70-1.
There were precedents, after all, in the acts of the Ottoman War Government. But even though Kemal's skill in ordering his reform program scarcely could have been improved upon, there still is no evidence to suggest that progress from the "Hat Act", through legal reform, to language reform was the product of any more specific programming than was set forth in the "Nine Principles" of 1923.

Rapidly changing economic policies suggest that until 1933-34, the Kemalists remained highly experimental with respect to utilization of the nation's material resources. Etatisme as initially expounded had been scarcely sophisticated; though it had as its objective fulfillment of national need, no more specific programme was set forth than cooperative interaction between the public and the private sectors. Even the Sümer and Eti Bank Plans failed to reveal a comprehension of the total interaction of the economy equal to that which had been a characteristic of the Meiji Oligarchs.

But though Kemal in 1922 may have had no more specific goals in view than the creation of a sovereign, somehow Europeanized Turkey dominated by himself and men of similar attitude, a certain tactical consistency emerged in his Governmental programmes, just as earlier had been the case in Meiji Japan. With regard to the political sector:

1) The cult of Kemal was developed and employed to make the Ghazi a focus for nationalistic loyalties. During the years 1919-1924, secularists feared that Kemal might try to establish himself as a new Sultan-Caliph. Ten years later, he was to be officially glorified by the Grand National Assembly, which gave him the surname Atatürk ("Father of the Turks") and began referring to him by sobriquets such as "Eternal Chief". Kemal and the Turkish Republic thus were made essentially identical in the public eye.
2) The reforms initiated by the Ankara Government were entirely antithetical to the confederative and anti-secular value patterns of Tradition's Islamic Ottoman Empire. For the most part, Ankara’s reformism closely paralleled the secular nationalism and “Turkism” which had been transliterated by Ziya Gökalp from the French, Rousseau-Durkheim tradition.

3) The political system was used as an educational medium. The Grand National Assembly intruded little in the formation of policy, though it was allowed to discuss policy alternatives presented by Kemalist Ministers. In similar fashion, popular participation in government was fostered to increase the public’s understanding of Ankara's policies. Efforts to enlarge the roster of members of the People's Party were not accompanied, however, by efforts to enhance popular initiative in the formation of policy.

In the socio-economic realm certain tactical analogies to the above can be perceived:

1) All aspects of personal life were increasingly directed toward statist orientations and objectives. This even applied with respect to essentially non-political institutions. For example, Kemal personally founded a Turkish Language Society in 1932 and through it dragooned the nation's philologists into presenting a specious "Sun Language" theory which claimed to prove Turkish - but not Islamic - importance in the development of Indo-European civilization.

2) Economic policies established throughout Transformation tended to benefit Turks as against foreigners, the Traditional poor as against the Traditional rich, and parochial Eastern and Central Anatolian vilayets as against the cosmopolitan regions of Western Turkey.

3) The economic system, which was developed along lines placing autarky and immediate military requirements above the creation of self-generative capital, gradually was brought under virtually full State control in all sectors other than agriculture, handicrafts, and small trading.
Chapter 16

THE VICTORIOUS STRUGGLE FOR INDIAN FREEDOM

We have so far considered two cases in which Transformational Governments sponsored economic growth programming as a means of increasing both the State's power, and their own faction's political authority. To most of Transformational India's Congress leaders, attempts to use growth for power would have seemed not only futile, but also inappropriate within the colonial context. Whenever Congresses of the interwar period concerned themselves with the growth potential of the economy, dismay was the dominant theme. Less rather than more economic growth was favored, for it was believed that a weakening of the modern sector would help Traditional handicrafts and thus allay poverty in rural areas. Moreover, some degree of disintegration of the economic structure was courted by laissez-faire Congress industrialists and Ghandians, since each faction favored devolution of political power.

The idea of planned economic development began to attract significant numbers of Congress adherents from about 1937. Interest in planning was related to the struggle for political independence, and reflected as well a growing awareness of the possibility of programming economic development into channels benefiting all segments of the populace. This was to the Congress a truly revolutionary concept, for historically, most Indians had placed blame for declining living standards on Britain's introduction of Western technology and a national marketing system.

Even recognition of the material advantages which could be gained
through economic development did not bring wholehearted support to planned growth. Mahatma Gandhi opposed the materialism of the Western world; in speaking out against luxury and softness, he reinforced the demands for simplicity, piety and self-denial which had been advanced for more than a century by Indian religious leaders, Hindu social reformers, and Christian missionaries. True wealth was to the Mahatma a spiritual manifestation rather than a physical commodity. Economic development thus might be damaging - instead of helpful - to the amelioration of Indian living standards.

Even if no moral arguments had been presented against the efficacy of economic growth, it is uncertain whether the Congress ever would have given its support to efforts at planned development had the anti-materialist Mahatma not made the unorthodox Socialist, Jawaharlal Nehru, his protégé. By virtue of this patronage, Nehru was able to rise to the forefront of the Congress even though his personal prescriptions for economic reform were unpopular with most of the rest of the party's leadership. As we shall see below, Gandhi threw his support to Nehru in 1936 because he feared that otherwise the Congress might disintegrate. Again in 1946, the Mahatma's favor brought Nehru leadership of the Congress and hence the premiership of the evolving Republic of India. Thus arose the anomalous situation whereby Gandhi indirectly aided in bringing India to the concept of planning for economic growth.

From the point of view of the present study, the fact that Nehru twice provided the sticking agent which held the Congress Party intact is extremely significant. For it suggests that even in Transformational
India, where preoccupation with the achievement of freedom dominated Congress political activity, questions regarding the modernization of the economy came to have crucial significance. This conclusion arises from the fact that Nehru's peculiar virtue as a political conciliator was based on his ability to hold the loyalties of urban groups who demanded economic progress while still not antagonising the rural radical majority which shared Gandhi's scepticism of industrial growth. Since it was Gandhi who brought Nehru to leadership, we may say that the Mahatma in some sense utilized the economic situation for the purpose of maintaining his own authority within the Congress, and the Congress' authority within the general Indian movement for Independence.

I - The Struggle for Independence

A. The Years of Perplexity (1920-1930)

1. Reconstitution of the Congress as a Mass Organization

Gandhi's influence grew rapidly in the months after the Amritsar Massacre. By the time of the Calcutta Special Session of the Congress (September 1920), his was the most powerful voice in the national movement. Nehru describes Gandhi's impact thus:

"...the whole look of the Congress changed; European clothes vanished and soon only Khadi (home-spun) was to be seen; a new class of delegate, chiefly drawn from the lower middle class, became the type of Congressman; the language used became increasingly Hindustani, or sometimes the language of the province where the session was held, as many delegates did not understand English, and there was also a growing prejudice against using a foreign language in our national work; and a new life and enthusiasm and earnestness became evident in Congress gatherings." 1

Writing elsewhere, Nehru remarks that under Gandhi's leadership, "the peasants rolled in, and the Congress began to assume the look of a vast agrarian organization with a strong sprinkling of the middle classes. ...Industrial workers also came in, but as individuals..."\(^2\)

Substance was given to the Congress' new form by the Nagpur Constitution (December 1920), for this document divided India into twenty-two linguistically delineated "Provinces"; provided for the election of Congress representatives at every level of organization from the village on up; and required that minority groups be included in Provincial delegations to the All-India Congress. The fostering of a parochial Indian orientation in place of that of the Anglicized Indians continued to concern the Congress leadership throughout 1921-22. In January 1921, the Congress provincial structure was revised so as to incorporate into British-Indian "Provinces" contiguous Princely States with which there were language ties.\(^3\) Moreover, it was directed that Congress activities at all levels below the national be conducted in local vernaculars. However, the Congress Working Committee (i.e., the national executive) stated in November 1921 that, though use of Hindustani was desirable in All-India Congress activities, it was "premature" as yet to impose such rigidity at the national level.\(^4\)

\(^2\) J. Nehru, The Discovery of India, p. 363.

\(^3\) All India Congress Committee, The Indian National Congress 1920-22, Allahabad, 1924, p. 81.

\(^4\) ibid., p. 139.
The problem of language ultimately resolved down into one of efficiency. Stress on the vernacular was clever politically, for by so doing the Congress asserted its sense of independence from Britain and kept gradual-evolutionist Liberals estranged from the evolving movement. However, a great many Congress leaders were, like Jawaharlal Nehru, virtually illiterate in India's native languages. Moreover, the vernaculars drove wedges between Indians of dissimilar linguistic communities; and few of the nation's languages possessed vocabularies adequately symbolizing modern technical and abstract concepts.

The linguistic problem served as one of the major factors impeding actual peasant integration into Congress offices above the district level. While the middle class was not conversant in vernacular dialects, peasant leaders were equally at sea in speaking English. As a consequence, Transformation's Congresses developed a peculiar characteristic whereby Anglicized Indians, fired by the Mahatma's idealistic exhortations, moved resolutions in committee for those reforms of rural social practice

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5 "The village work frightens us. We who are town-bred find it trying to take to the village life. Our bodies in many cases do not respond to the hard life. But it is a difficulty which we have to face boldly, even heroically. If our desire is to establish Swaraj for the people, not substitute one class rule by another, which may be even worse. Hitherto the villagers have died in the thousands so that we might live. Now we might have to die so that they may live. The difference will be fundamental. The former have died unknowingly and involuntarily. Their enforced sacrifice has degraded us. If now we die knowingly and willingly, our sacrifice will ennoble us and the whole nation. Let us not flinch from the necessary sacrifice, if we will live as an independent self-respecting nation." Statement published by Gandhi 17 April 1924 in Young India newspaper. M.K. Gandhi, Young India: 1924-1926, New York, 1927, p. 229.
which ought to take place, even though the peasantry did not fully understand - and often was not sympathetic to - the changes proposed. The Congress then proceeded to act as though reform resolutions were binding, but since they neither had the coercive force of law nor were carried forward by officials fully cognizant of the intent of the initial motions, a great deal of confusion resulted. Out of this confusion there grew that lack of civil discipline in the countryside which at crucial junctures rang the knell on Congress programs for political or social progress.

The absence of peasant-bred political leaders at the provincial and national level caused an additional problem during the perplexed '20's. The goal of social egalitarianism was a cornerstone of Gandhi's program but it was hampered in the specifics of implementation by Congress petty officials affected by the sense of class superiority which was typical to urban, and particularly English-trained, Indians. Among the top levels of the Congress hierarchy, however, Gandhi was remarkably successful in imbuing others with his own sense of social responsibility.6 One of the most striking examples of Gandhi's influence occurred at the Congress Working Committee session of 20 - 22 April 1922, where it was moved that:

6 Jawaharlal Nehru often returns to the problem of class consciousness in his An Autobiography. For one example, see p. 48. On the other hand, in The Discovery of India, pp. 364-5, Nehru presents a vivid example of Gandhi's success in teaching his lieutenants to be sensitive to rural needs.
"...in order to make the Congress organization more democratic and representative, special efforts should be made to enrol a large number of members of the depressed and working classes on the Congress Register."

This was an entire reversal of the paternalistic, elitist orientation which had pervaded the Congress movement from its inception until the withdrawal of the gradual evolutionists. Since contact with both menials and untouchables was psychologically, even physically offensive to many Indians, the import of the Resolution cannot be overstated.

The Attempt to Achieve Swaraj — Gandhi's determination to achieve brotherhood and social betterment was in the tradition of such 19th Century reform movements as the Brahmo Samaj. However, the Mahatma's programme was a considerable advance over its predecessors, for the new reformism he sponsored during Transformation incorporated political and economic, as well as purely social or moral, planks. Furthermore, the Mahatma's support of Khilafat activities brought Muslims and Hindus into much closer alliance than had any former social movement.

All India Congress Committee, op. cit., p. 194.

As early as 1920, the Congress had declared that the ending of untouchability was to be viewed as a political, rather than simply as a social, issue. Furthermore, the Nagpur Constitution had specified that minorities should be included in provincial delegations to the national Congress. There was a great deal of difference, however, between a policy indicating willingness to accept the overtures of the lesser castes and social classes, and a policy actively designed to court them.

Gandhi's sponsorship of Muslim goals eventually brought him a large measure of criticism from fellow Hindus, for after communal tensions reasserted themselves many claimed that Gandhi had done more than any one man to awaken the Muslim peasantry to political consciousness.
success Gandhi's brotherhood programme was potentially capable of generating is impossible to determine. Social reform had been tied to political success, and by the Fall of 1921 it began to become apparent that the Mahatma's plan to gain Swaraj through non-violent non-cooperation might not succeed.

The non-cooperation movement had been launched at the Calcutta Special Session of the Congress (4 - 9 September 1920). It was put into operation during the elections of November-December 1920, at which time the Government of India Act of 1919 was first applied. Boycott of the election was only partially effective, for while Congressmen and members of the Khilafat association refused to stand for office, Liberals felt no compunctions against so doing. Consequently, the Councils were staffed - and by men considerably more sympathetic to the British position than presumably would have been the case if non-cooperators had chosen to contest the election.

The possible effects of non-cooperation began to be brought home to the Government with telling force during the Summer of 1921. In July, two national leaders of the Khilafat movement were jailed for

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10 Resolution V. (The Non-cooperation Resolution of the Calcutta Congress), plus a listing of the watering down amendments enacted at the Nagpur Congress (December 1920) are reproduced infra, Appendix IV.5. (I.).

11 55% of qualified electors voted for the Council of State; 25% for the Legislative Assembly; and 22.5% to 39.7% for the Provincial Councils. W.R. Smith, op. cit., p. 118. See also V.P. Menon, op. cit., pp. 28-9.
seditious utterance. This event, coupled with Britain's depredations in Turkey, brought Muslim opinion to fever pitch. A series of essays at non-violent non-cooperation in Malabar flared up, on 21 August, into the "Moplah Rebellion". Though the British were the first targets, communal rioting followed as Muslims tried to force conversion onto their Hindu fellows. Before the Rebellion was put down in February 1922, some 10,000 casualties had been reported.

The Moplah tragedy could in part be accounted for by Muslim ignorance and the fact that non-violence was less akin to Muslim religious precepts than to Hindu. Nonetheless, Gandhi and his lieutenants were conscious of a failure of communication and were deeply grieved by the Congress' and the Khilafat movement's failures to imbue a spirit of peacefulness among either the Hindu or the Muslim populations of South India. It was recognized that inability to transmit the Mahatma's sense of non-cooperation as a frame of mind renouncing all forms of permanently destructive action, might endanger the prospects of gaining Swaraj by peaceful action.

12 Non-cooperation "presupposes humility. It is a truthful struggle and consciousness of truth should give us firmness. We are not out to destroy men. We own no enemy. We have no ill-will against a single soul on earth. We mean to convert by our suffering. I do not despair of converting the hardest-hearted or most selfish Englishman. Every opportunity of meeting him is therefore welcome to me. "Let me distinguish. Non-violent non-cooperation means renunciation of the benefits of a system with which we non-cooperate. We therefore renounce the benefits of schools, courts, titles, legislatures and offices set up under the system. The most extensive and permanent part of our non-cooperation consists in the renunciation of foreign cloth..." M.K. Gandhi, op. cit., p. 312.
The events in Malabar did not, however, cause a slackening of the non-cooperation effort. During November 1921, while The Prince of Wales was making a State Visit to India, Gandhi’s renunciatory movement reached peak effectiveness. Neither members of the Congress nor members of the Khilafat association agreed to participate in the events of welcome. Instead, a series of nation-wide hartals were staged and the Prince’s public appearances were boycotted. The purpose of these measures, the Mahatma was explicit in stating, was not to show emnity towards The Royal Family. Rather, non-cooperation was being imposed because the British Government refused to honor Indian “rights”.

Even the snubbing of the Prince appeared to have no effect on Parliament. Since Gandhi’s promise to bring Swaraj in one year by non-violent means seemed in danger of being proven hollow, preparations were made to move from non-cooperation into non-violent civil disobedience. Tentative plans had been laid during Spring 1921 for the opening of a civil disobedience campaign. However, this programme was seen to be dangerous; being more coercive in tone than was simple non-cooperation, it might lead to acts of violence. In its most innocuous guise, civil disobedience would involve refusal to pay taxes. More provocatively, however, the programme would entail mass picketing and refusal to move even despite police orders to disperse. To ask a mob to stand impassive in face of a charge of mounted policemen swinging lathis (essentially, sawed-off polo mallets) was asking a degree of self-will which might well be beyond the capacity of the Indian people.

Since communal riots occurred in Bombay after the Prince of Wales'
visit, Gandhi asked for postponement of civil disobedience. However, on 4 February 1922, the Mahatma finally ordered the opening of the new phase. Once again, failure to communicate the spirit of the programme brought its defeat. At Chauri Chauri (United Provinces) a civil disobedience demonstration of Hindu peasants deteriorated into a riot and culminated in the trapping of a police inspector and 21 constables in a police station, which was then burned to the ground. In the depths of depression, the Mahatma called off the civil disobedience programme and even mused publically over the worth of personal acts of non-cooperation. Indians, it seemed, were not yet morally good enough to act with a requisite degree of courage and restraint.

Gandhi's failure to win Swaraj led to a temporary diminution of his public stature. The British seized the opportunity and put the Mahatma in jail (18 March 1922), where he joined most of the rest of Congress officialdom. Leaderless, conscious that Swaraj could not be gained during the foreseeable future by those programmes which had been followed over the eighteen months previous, a number of alternative schemes were advanced to the Congress. Gandhi from jail remained true to his demand for moral reform. Since Indians were not yet good enough to succeed in non-violence, they must court self-abnegation and courage through acts such as the production of khaddar, and the removal of the

13 The first of many mass treks of Congressmen to jail occurred during the period of The Prince of Wales' visit. Non-cooperation, and later civil disobedience, were used in part as techniques to court arrest. For it was felt that martyrdom, or suffering of any form, would in time shame the British into acceptance of Indian self-rule.
stigmas which attached to members of the depressed castes. Other proposals included a building up of the village organizations and the panchayats so that more effective integration of Congress activities might be obtained; the creation of universal literacy; and either violent or non-violent civil disobedience. None of these programmes were suggested as being equally applicable to Hindus and non-Congress Muslims, for the inter-communal alliance was no longer operative. Since Kemal had secured his authority over most of Anatolia, the Khilafat movement had lost its purpose. And without the Khilafat movement, there was no effective goal on which to build Hindu-Muslim unity.

In the latter months of 1922, C.R. Das* and Pandit Motilal Nehru* took leadership of a faction within the Congress which came to be known as the "pro-changers". Their position was that, since Gandhi's program had been unsuccessful, a change toward activism should be attempted. Specifically, the pro-changers called for participation in Indian elections so that Congress majorities could be established in Governmental Councils. Through obstructionism, these majorities would wreck the legislative process and thus force the British to grant Swaraj. The pro-change position gained wide acceptance among urban Congressmen: the Anglicized-Indian middle class which had fought for participant membership in Indian Governments over the previous half-century. A considerable body of Muslims gave their support as well, but the pro-changers were in a Congress minority notwithstanding. Unable to gain support for its position at the Gaya Congress (December 1922), the Das-Nehru faction reconstituted itself as the Swaraj Party - but remained within the Congress organization.
The "no-changer" majority, led by C. Rajagopalacharia and Rajendra Prasad* during the Mahatma's incarceration, called for a continuance of individual acts of non-cooperation plus furtherance of Gandhi's moralistic "constructive programme". However, the "constructive programme" was too individualistic, disinterested and oblique to remain totally attractive during the long months of Gandhi's prison silence. Demoralized, the "no changers" gave their support to a Swarajist resolution offered at the Delhi Special Session of the Congress (September 1923) which declared that:

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14 In one of his most comprehensive statements on techniques for gaining Swaraj, Gandhi wrote as follows: "The boycott is the negative, though on that account none the less useful, part of our programme. Khaddar, national schools, panchayats, Hindu-Muslim unity, and uplift of the untouchable, the drunkard and the opium eater, is the constructive part of our programme. The greater our progress in it, the greater will be the progress towards the boycott and therefore, towards Swaraj. Nature abhors a vacuum. Therefore, construction must keep pace with destruction. Even if all the titled friends gave up their titles, and if schools, courts and Councils were entirely deserted, and being thus embarrassed the Government abdicated in our favour, and if we had no constructive work to our credit, we should not conduct Swaraj. We should be entirely helpless. I often wonder whether it is sufficiently realized that our movement is not one for mere change of personnel but for change of the system and the methods. Full Khaddar programme is, therefore, to me full Swaraj. The English interest in India is selfish and in conflict with the national interest. It is anti-national, because of the illegitimate cotton interest. To boycott, therefore, foreign cloth is to sterilize the English and all other foreign interests. Boycott merely of British cloth may harm the British, but can lead to no construction in India. Boycott of British cloth will be a jump out of the frying pan into the fire. Not before the foreign piece-goods trade is entirely replaced by home-spun, will the bleeding process cease. Boycott of foreign cloth, therefore, is the centre of our boycott program. This central boycott cannot succeed until we universalize khaddar. In order to achieve the desirable end we will need to apply all our resources to the fullest extent. We shall need men, money, machinery, i.e., organization. We cannot universalize Khaddar without Hindu-Muslim unity, without removing untouchability. To make Khaddar successful is to demonstrate our capacity for self-government..." M.K. Gandhi, op. cit., pp. 232-3.
"While reaffirming its adherence to the principle of non-violent non-cooperation, this Congress declares that such congressmen as have no religious or other conscientious objections against entering the legislatures are at liberty to stand as candidates and to exercise their right of voting in the forthcoming elections..."15

In the elections of November-December 1923, Swarajists, Liberals and a number of Independents campaigned for office. The Swarajist platform centered on an ultimatum; if home rule were not immediately granted to the Indian people, obstruction would be employed in Councils to destroy the effectiveness of the legislative process. Though the Swaraj Party gained a plurality throughout India as a whole, it failed to receive a clear majority except in the Provincial Councils of Berar and the Central Provinces. However, by coalescing with the Independents, it was possible for the Swarajists to begin obstructing legislation on 18 February 1924. The effort was soon proven to be fruitless; for not only did the Government fall back on its emergency powers and begin ruling India by directive, the Swarajists also found themselves unable to oppose passage of a G.O.I. measure calling for modest protection of the steel industry.

Gandhi had been released from prison in February 1924. The Swarajists' boggle before the Government's appeal to bourgeois economic nationalism made him doubly determined to reestablish his ascendancy over the independence movement. During the Spring and Summer, he tried to win support for a revision of Congress membership laws which would make it impossible for anyone to remain in the Congress who refused to

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15 All India Congress Committee, op. cit., p. 299.
to produce 2,000 yards of home-spun yarn per month. Moreover, he desired to make Swarajists reiterate their support of non-violence. Fragmentation of the Congress threatened. Finally, after a series of conferences between Gandhi and the Swarajist leaders, a compromise was reached on 6 November 1924:

"...The Congress should suspend the programme of non-cooperation as the national programme, except in so far as it relates to the refusal to use or wear cloth made out of India.

"The Congress should further resolve that different classes of work of the Congress may be done, as may be found necessary, by the different sections within the Congress and should resolve that the spread of handspinning, handweaving and all the antecedant progress toward and the spread of handspun and handwoven Khaddar and the promotion of unity between different communities, specially between the Hindus and Mussalmans, and the removal of untouchability by the Hindus from amongst them should be carried on by all sections within the Congress, and the work in connection with the Central and Provincial Legislatures should be carried on by the Swaraj Party on behalf of the Congress and as an integral part of the Congress organization....In as much as experience has shown that without universal spinning India cannot become self supporting regarding her clothing requirements, and in as much as handspinning is the best and most tangible method of establishing a visible and tangible bond between the masses and the Congressmen and women, in order to popularize handspinning and its products the Congress should repeal Article VII of the Congress Constitution and should substitute the following therefor:

16 The purpose of this proposal was two-fold. On the one hand, a shortage of home-spun yarn impeded his efforts to rebuild the cottage weaving industry. On the other, the Mahatma believed that: "the charkha, the spinning wheel - is a symbol of simplicity, self-reliance, self-control, voluntary cooperation among millions." M.K. Gandhi, op. cit., p. 63.

17 During the Spring of 1924, proposals for violent civil disobedience began to gain strength outside of the traditional centers of revolutionary nationalism. For one example of extremist reasoning, see "An Appeal to the Nation", reproduced ibid., pp. 361-63. This document is particularly interesting for its anti-European form of xenophobia.
"No one shall be a member of any Congress Committee or organization who is not of the age of 18 and who does not wear hand-spun and handwoven khaddar at political and Congress functions or while engaged in Congress business, and does not make a contribution of 2,000 yards of evenly spun yarn per month of his or her own spinning or in case of illness, unwillingness or any such causes a like quantity of yarn spun by any other person." 18

iii.) Conflicts of the Eastern and Western Views - There was uncertainty whether the no-changers would accept Gandhi's compromise. While the Mahatma was sufficiently pragmatic and Western-oriented to appreciate the attitude of mind which made Swarajists unwilling to accept the quasi-mystical importance attached to the act of hand spinning, the great body of no-changers were men steeped in the Indian, rather than Anglicized-Indian, tradition. To these latter, the Congress movement and Swaraj had decidedly religious overtones. A mission having been forged, there could be no sidestepping pietistic responsibility.

The Government of India itself probably merited major, if unintended, credit for averting a split between no-changers and pro-changers in 1924-5. The factor which had been most largely responsible for the successful compromise measure of 6 November had been passage of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance a fortnight earlier. Over the subsequent six months, the Government appeared so determined to reconjugate the entire grammar of colonial repression, differences within the Congress movement were temporarily shelved. In face of the common enemy, Westernized pro-changers and parochial no-changers found it easy to pull together. But though the British recurrently provided timely issues with which to draw together Indian public opinion, the fact that the Congress

18 ibid., pp. 395-96.
was able to remain an organization effectively uniting numerous shades of opinion throughout more than three decades of frustration was primarily a reflection on the extraordinary personality and skill of Mahatma Gandhi.

Though cruel, Winston Churchill's characterization of Gandhiji may not have been wide of the mark. In a sense, he was:

"...this one-time Inner Temple Lawyer, now seditious fakir, striding half-naked up the steps of the Viceroy's palace, there to negotiate and to parley on equal terms with the representative of the King-Emperor." 19

Possessed of dual sensitivities, Gandhi was able to hold the attention of Anglicized-Indians and illiterate peasants alike. His command of the West's legal tradition and political ideals gave force to his proposals for secular reform. At the same time, these proposals had moment for the Indian peasantry since they were posed in terms of simplicity, piety and self-denial.

There was, of course, a great deal more involved in Gandhi's success as a national leader. Writing in 1938, W.R. Smith remarked that:

"The chief secret of Gandhi's hold on the popular imagination is the fact that, while he would be the last person in the world to encourage any kind of racial bigotry, he really personifies, more than anyone else, the racial and cultural antagonism of Indians toward Europeans...." 20

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20 W.R. Smith, op. cit., p. 115. The remainder of the passage is as follows: "In spite of his broad human sympathies, he represents the exaggerated nationalism which afflicts India as well as the rest of the world. He is also, and again without very much conscious effort
While this characterization may have been appropriate to the Mahatma in his role as charismatic leader of the peasantry, it certainly does not explain Gandhi's influence over Westernized Congressmen. Here, Jawaharlal Nehru's analysis of Gandhi's force as a politician provides the explanation:

"Always we had the feeling that while we might be more logical, Gandhi knew India far better than we did, and a man who could command such tremendous devotion and loyalty must have something in him that corresponded to the needs and aspirations of the masses. If we could convert him, we felt we could also convert these masses." 21

We have stressed the personality of the Mahatma because in himself he exemplified something of both the Eastern and Western views. In addition, through his mastery of compromise Gandhi served to mark out common ground on which Indians of all persuasions could carry forward joint efforts. This does not mean that the Mahatma's prescriptions were uniformly accepted. They were not; but since Gandhi eschewed coercion, disagreement with his personal opinions did not provoke reactive antagonism. Thus it was possible for men deeply opposed to

on his part, an exceedingly clever politician. During the years /1920-1923/, he held the upper classes by advocating swaraj (Home Rule), the lower classes by advocating the removal of untouchability, the factory workmen by his efforts to improve their industrial and social position, the peasants by trying to revive the cottage textile industry as a subsidiary employment in the slack seasons, and the mill owners by urging the people to boycott British cloth. He won the Moslems by his support of the Caliphate movement, and all classes and creeds by his denunciations of the 'atrocities' in the Punjab."

the Mahatma in certain particulars to work in harmony with him for the general goal of Indian Swaraj.

Gandhi rejected much that was Western. Pro-changers were in many instances dismayed by this, and more particularly by the Mahatma's apparent desire to turn India back toward simple agrarianism and low levels of technology. In his opposition to materialism, Gandhi made many Indians "critical of the machine and all its consequences".22 Such an attitude was characteristic of the no-changers. But the parochial views of the no-change faction were not represented in the Mahatma's willingness to retain the British connection "on absolutely honourable and equal terms".23 This was an attitude more consistent with the value patterns of Anglicized-Indian pro-changers. For though the Westernized middle class contained many of India's most ardent nationalists, this nationalism was more the product of experienced socio-legal inequality under British Governments than it was a reflection of xenophobia.

Gandhi probably deviated most notably from both the no-changer and pro-changer factions of 1924-28 in his gradualism. Both groups had the impatience of despair. Swaraj was nowhere in view; Indian social conditions remained abysmal; communal tensions were mounting rapidly. But because the Mahatma measured success in terms of the absolute rightness of each act and demanded that any program he supported contribute

22 ibid., p. 77.
to individual moral betterment, he refused to be a party to any measures which seemed to him to be of possibly destructive consequence. After achievement of the 6 November 1924 compromise, Gandhi found himself a leader without a significant following. Therefore, he temporarily withdrew from the political arena and, at the head of a small body of devoted supporters, directed his efforts toward implementation of his "constructive programme" for social regeneration.

During the three years of Gandhi's semi-retirement, Pandit Motilal Nehru attempted to revitalize the Congress' cadres and to overcome the sense of exhaustion which had overspread the national movement. Until the arrival of the Simon Commission on 3 February 1928, his efforts were largely unavailing. But since the Simon Commission, which was responsible for overhauling the Indian Constitution, included no Indian on its roster, popular opinion was outraged. Overnight the Congress regained energy, for the most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the arrival of a Commission of English M.P.'s was that Britain still was determined to deny Indians the right of self-determination.

iv.) The All-Parties Conferences and The Congress Declaration of Independence - The first All-Parties Conference was held on 13-22 February 1928. Its purpose was to bring Indians of all shades of opinion into agreement on desired directions of constitutional change. Since consensus was not immediately obtainable, a subcommittee was established to search for compromises on areas of basic dispute. This "Committee of Ten" met some 25 times during the Spring and early Summer, but with no success. Differences regarding communal representation, and disagreement whether
India should seek Dominion Status or complete independence, could not be resolved. However, the subcommittee did prepare a series of compromise proposals for presentation to an All-Parties Convention. On the crux issues, the subcommittee suggested that India's goals be defined as Dominion Status and proportional representation in Government of all major communities.\(^24\)

Since the Muslim League refused to accept the subcommittee's draft programme, the hoped for All-Indian front did not materialize. However, at the regular Congress Session (held immediately following the All-Parties Convention), Dominion Status was definitely accepted as a goal. This occurred over the strong opposition of Jawaharlal Nehru\(^*\) and Subhas Chadra Bose\(^*\), who had hastily formed an "Independence for India League" within the Congress organization.\(^25\)

A stipulation of the Dominion Status resolution was that, if Britain failed to accede to the Congress demand within one year, civil disobedience


\(^{25}\) The Independence League had a second objective as well, and that was to bring Congress support to Western-type social welfare proposals. A draft programme for the League was prepared but not issued. Its main provisions were as follows: "...The League aims at a Social Democratic State ... and State control of the means of production and distribution.\' More specifically, it called for steeply graduated income and inheritance taxes; universal, free, and compulsory education; adult suffrage; a minimum living wage; excess profits taxes; support for trade unions; unemployment insurance; an eight-hour working-day; the abolition of untouchability; equal status for the sexes; and far-reaching land reform - removal of intermediaries, partial annulment of debts, creation of small holdings." M. Brecher, Nehru; A Political Biography, New York, 1959, p. 130.
should be initiated. The Viceroy, Lord Irwin, was most anxious to comply. But since the British Parliament refused to make any guarantees whatsoever, a Gandhian motion for *purna swaraj* (complete self-determination, including the right to withdraw from the Empire at will) was carried by the Lahore Congress of December 1929. During the early weeks of January, copies of an "Independence Day Oath" were circulated throughout India, and on 26 January 1930 hundreds of thousands of persons swore allegiance to *purna swaraj*. On command of the Mahatma, civil disobedience would begin.

B. The Years of Smoldering Revolution (1930-1947)

1. The Long Stalemate—On 12 March 1930, Mahatma Gandhi and 78 hand-picked disciples began the "Salt March": the 241 mile trek from Ahmedabad to the Arabian Sea. At Dandi on 5 April, the Mahatma initiated civil disobedience by ceremonially taking salt from the sea. The C.D. campaign was suspended from March 1931 to January 1932 while efforts were made to resolve British and Indian differences. However, on 4 January 1932, the Congress leadership was jailed, and the organization was temporarily proscribed. Though prospects of an Anglo-Indian understanding brightened periodically, from 1932 to the victory of the British Labor Party in 1945, a full-scale insurrection of the people of British

26 Portions of the 1930 Independence Day Oath, and the 1938 amended version thereof, are included *infra*, Appendix IV.6 (I).

27 The Government of India monopolized salt production as a revenue-producing scheme.
India remained a constant possibility. India lived much of this time in a state of siege. Only dedication to non-violence appears to have kept the Indians from bloody revolt.

Retelling of the political manoeuvrings of the Congress and the Government of India during the years of stalemate has no place in this narrative. However, it is noteworthy that, as animosity towards Britain deepened, radical programs for social and political reform gained increasing popularity. During the '30's, a new generation of Congress leaders rose to the fore. These men, though loyal to Gandhi as a spiritual leader, opposed his anti-materialism and his stress on devolution. Strangers both to the Manchester Liberal orientation of early Congressmen, and to the Traditionalist aspects of the Mahatma's creed, men like Jawaharlal Nehru* and Subhas Chandra Bose* tried to introduce a Marxist cast into Congress deliberations.

ii.) The Growth of Western Socialist Objectives - The Independence for India League was mentioned above on page 4\(\frac{1}{2}\). Though the League was disbanded after the passage of the 1929 *purna swaraj* resolution, Nehru and Bose continued their propaganda efforts in support of Western-type social welfare propositions. Gandhi had little sympathy for any doctrine smacking of economic determinism, but he was nonetheless in favor of Nehru-Bose demands that poverty be ended. Consequently, the Mahatma made no effort to stop the inclusion of economic planks within a Swarajya Resolution enacted by the Karachi Congress in March 1931. The fact that economic provisions were included in a document on political liberty is significant. Though it testifies to the effectiveness of
Nehru and Bose, it also suggests something of the Depression's impact on India.\(^{28}\)

If the Swarajya Resolution had been allowed to stand unmodified, it would have marked a fundamental departure from former Congress policies. Within the preamble it was stated that "political freedom must include real economic freedom of the starving masses", and that this freedom should be attained through the imposition of a sharply graduated income tax on landed properties (Article 9)\(^{29}\) and "control by the State of key industries and mineral resources" (Article 19). Though the Resolution was watered down during the Summer to show that Congress did not propose wholesale expropriation of land-holdings, it was not until June 1934 that conservative Congressmen in the Working Committee were able to have the economic clauses revoked.\(^{30}\) Still, there was nothing in the revocation to suggest blanket approval of *laissez faire* capitalism. The economic clauses were abrogated specifically because they implied usage of means at variance with the Congress' non-violence credo.

While the Working Committee was busy emasculating the quasi-Marxist

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\(^{28}\) Portions of this resolution will be found *infra*, Appendix IV.7. (I.).

\(^{29}\) Though a modest tax on non-agricultural income had been imposed from 1860 to 1865, in 1867, 1869, and from 1886 on, land-holdings had never been considered for inclusion. Instead of proposing an income tax on landed property, Congresses prior to 1931 had proposed abolition of all income tax.

\(^{30}\) Since the Congress was under interdict much of the time from 1932 to 1934, it is possible that revocation might have occurred earlier in less troubled times. However, it is the writer's understanding that motions to revoke the economic clauses failed of passage in 1932-33.
sections of the Swarajya Resolution, young radicals were equally busy establishing a Congress Socialist Party (C.S.P.). An eventual clash between the Congress leadership and its radical wing appeared inevitable. Among the Congress Old Guard, there was a moving to the Right. "Responsivist" sentiment, which called for a matching of British compromise with Indian compromise, was gaining a new hearing. In addition, peasant uprisings and industrial strikes were casting the sympathies of middle-class Congressmen toward positions espoused by the Government of India. Both aspects of this trend alienated the young urban and rural radicals. Imperialism in any form was held to be mankind's prime enemy. The Government of India was accused of sponsoring planned economic exploitation of the masses.

Though he was the inspirational and intellectual parent of the C.S.P., Jawaharlal Nehru never actually joined the Party. These facts, coupled with his long record of devoted apprenticeship to the Mahatma, recommended Nehru's election as President of the Congress during the critical year 1936. Heated controversy was certain to arise with respect to the posture the Congress should take regarding the Government of India Act of 1935. Moreover, the C.S.P. minority was known to be engaged in an intrigue against the Congress leadership.

Knowing that few of the Old Guard were in sympathy with his Socialist objectives, Nehru at first tried to disqualify himself from consider-

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31 The G.O.I. Act of 1935 proposed creation of a Federation of British-India and the Princely States. Within broad limits, the separate States and Provinces would exercise full autonomy. cf: V.P. Menon, op. cit., pp. 51ff.
ation for the Presidency. At the same time, he was impressed by the
growth of Leftist sentiment within India as a whole and felt impelled
to try to bring the Congress into a worldwide Popular Front against
Fascism and imperialism. In addition, Gandhi wished Nehru to run, for
the Mahatma felt that no man was more esteemed by both the Right and
Left wings of the Congress than was his young protégé. At his chief's
urging, Nehru accepted nomination and was duly elected President of the
1936 Congress. 32

During his term of office, Nehru spent most of his time trying to
reconcile the Gandhian and C.S.P. wings while at the same time nudging
the Congress as a whole toward the Left. These efforts failed. On the
one hand, Nehru could not induce the C.S.P. to surrender its European-
type of doctrine in favor of a program more appropriate to Indian
conditions. On the other, Nehru failed to get the Mahatma's support
for a proposal to affiliate the Congress with India's trade unions and
peasant leagues. 33 As a result, Socialist delegates remained a minority
within the Congress.

Though Nehru's term in office was not a wholehearted success, the
legislative output of the 1936 Congress was impressive. The Congress'
Agrarian Programme (Lucknow Congress, April 1936) demanded peasant

32 Nehru's description of these events will be found in J. Nehru, The
Unity of India, London, 1941, pp. 94ff.

33 Since these groups occasionally employed - and would not disavow -
violence, they were not considered acceptable for alliance to the
Congress.
emancipation from feudalist levies (Article 4) and State aid for the villages (Article 6). Peasants and farm laborers were to be granted the right to organize (Article 1), and efforts were to be made to promote cottage industry (Article 9). However, no specific programme was set forth with regard to general economic policy, though the Congress Election Manifesto (22 August 1936) did reaffirm the spirit of the Karachi Swarajya Resolution and called in addition for an urban labor programme based on a living wage, fair labor practices, and the workers' right to organize and strike. Notably absent from the Manifesto were any demands for the nationalization of basic industries.

Much of the Election Manifesto of 1936 is taken up with problems of international affairs. The deepening shadows - Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain - profoundly affected Indian opinion and tended to divert energies hitherto spent on domestic socio-political issues toward new problems of worldwide scope. However, one occurrence of the year 1936 served in part to balance out this trend. On 25 November, the U.S.S.R. published a new Constitution whose terms, together with Russian successes in industrializing, seemed to offer India both an incentive and a guide for new initiatives. Anxious to realize the egalitarian society proclaimed by the Russian Constitution, many Indians began to study the methods used to bring this society about. What impressed them most was that the U.S.S.R.

34 cf.: J. Nehru, The Unity of India, Appendix A-3
35 cf.: ibid., Appendix A-1.
had employed centralized economic planning.\textsuperscript{36}

\textbf{II - The Evolution of Congress Economic Policy}

\textbf{A. The Protectionist and Agrarian Phases (1885-1936)}

\textit{i.) Transition's Middle Class Orientation} - Few delegates to early Congresses had more than the most rudimentary knowledge of the national economic process. Thus, though the Congress regularly requested economic reforms, these requests were more of a remedial than of a developmental nature.

Agricultural problems were among the first to be explored. Beginning with the 1892 session, attempts were made to have land taxes fixed in perpetuity in regions of "permanent settlement". The 1896 Congress diminished the time scale, requesting that reassessments of land value take place no oftener than once every sixty years. Ten years later, however, the perpetuity idea revived. The Congress asserted that fees paid on land-holdings were in the nature of a rent, rather than a tax, and therefore not subject to statutory reassessment. Other proposals regarding the rural sector sprang up during the harvest failures at the turn of the Century. Famine insurance, agricultural banks, and Governmental training of farm specialists all were repeatedly proposed in the years following 1896.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{36} It is worth noting that the U.S.S.R.'s experiences of 1928-1936 similarly impressed many Turkish Kemalists.

\textsuperscript{37} This listing of Transitional economic proposals is largely abstracted from Appendix III.4. (I.), "Major Areas of Congress Concern During Transition".
Industrial and commercial policies began to be enunciated around 1894. Initial concern focussed on British discrimination against the Indian machine textile industry, but from 1898, resolutions began to be moved calling for Governmental support of indigenous handicrafts. In 1896, an Industrial Exhibition of Indian goods was set up in conjunction with the Congress session; and from 1901, Industrial Exhibitions became annual affairs. At the time of the Bengal Partition, Congress gave its support to swadeshi and the boycott of British goods. These policies remained at least tacitly in being throughout the succeeding decades of nationalist agitation.

Proposals for monetary and fiscal reform were made yearly by Transitional Congresses. The most fundamental requests were that Legislatures be allowed to debate the Budget and that sums allocated for the military, Home Charges, and the maintenance of English personnel within the Governmental structure be sharply reduced. In 1888, resolutions were first offered against the Salt Tax. Congress policy thereafter was that both the Salt Tax and the Income Tax should be abolished.\textsuperscript{38}

\textit{\textbf{ii.) The Conservative-Gandhian Balance of Transformational Congresses}} - Transformational Congresses generally attempted to phrase all their resolutions in terms which would be acceptable both to the group of Transitional Congressmen who had remained within the organ-

\textsuperscript{38} We have noted that land-holdings were exempted from income taxation. This tended to skew the direction of investment flows away from industrial capital and onto the land.
ization after the withdrawal of the gradual evolutionists, and to the new rural radicals who were recruited when the Congress became a mass movement. This seemingly thankless task actually posed few problems in the generation of economic policies, for all Congress factions found self-protection implicit within the Congress' principle of non-violence. Zamindari and businessmen, for example, were able to equate their personal economic interest with that of the people at large, for they believed that if the Congress ever came to power its dedication to non-violent means would insulate private property-holders from the possibility of State expropriation. For the same reason, Congress conservatives showed little aversion to voting for certain types of social welfare program. They knew that the masses would be placated thereby - and that, if actual implementation ever were attempted, they could temporize and procrastinate with impunity. The Mahatma never would condone mob action against them.  

Despite the ease with which consensus could be attained, Transformation Congresses long failed to essay new departures in the field of economic policy. One striking consequence was the fact that, until late in the 1930's, no attempt was made to develop an integrated programme relating to the functioning of the economy as a whole. This lapse can be attributed to a number of factors. In the first place, India's frontiers were secure simply because they were defended by the

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39 This analysis perhaps does insufficient justice to the Congress conservatives, whose hopes for India were no less exalted than those of any other group. However, our concern here is in explaining why Transformation Congresses were laggard in turning to problems of economic growth, and this matter requires treatment such as is being given.
British Empire. There was, therefore, no incentive in creating economic power for political uses. India's colonial status had further effects. Since the Congress did not rule the nation, its leaders did not have to conciliate a demanding electorate. On the other hand, since Congress activities were dependent upon a full Treasury, businessman contributors did have to be satisfied. Swaraj, after all, was the prime issue. Until Indians became responsible for the conduct of their Government, compromises designed to strengthen the national movement were not only sensible, they were also mandatory.

In many respects, Congressmen found political irresponsibility quite comfortable. Special interest groups within the movement did not have to surrender to the nation's will on pain of being branded anti-social. Almost any form of selfishness could be whitewashed, since it was a very simple matter to transfer blame to the British Raj. Moreover, since Indians did not have to bear the full responsibilities of government, they could indulge the delusion that once Swaraj had been attained, all domestic problems would magically disappear.

The outcome of these various factors was the Transformational Congress' practice of offering reform proposals on economic issues which were essentially identical to those which had been presented over the pre-war years. This had gravely damaging repercussions, for under provisions of the Government of India Act of 1919, control over most agricultural, industrial, public health and educational policy had been transferred from the Center to the Provinces. 40 Since the

40 Though the Congress was dismayed by the G.O.I. Act of 1919, this particular facet of the Act was received with pleasure by both conservative businessmen and Gandhian radicals.
Government of India had lost the capacity to programme All-Indian growth, the Congress' failure to set out integrated programmes for economic development had the effect of constricting markets, introducing inefficiency, and otherwise placing dampers on India's potential for economic progress.

Insofar as Mahatma Gandhi influenced the opinions of individual Congressmen, lack of industrial progress may have been adjudged a good thing. The Mahatma himself possessed a highly ambivalent attitude toward economic development of any kind. In addition to his Hinduist other-worldliness there was as well his deep concern for peasant welfare. Observing that rural workers generally were idle from three to nine months out of the year, Gandhi favored retrogression to a simpler life in which individual craftsmen would fabricate needed products, and rural underemployment would become irrelevant.

The Mahatma never cast off his vision, or its expression in the prescriptions of the "constructive programme". He slowly became aware, however, that his programme would never be implemented by a responsible Indian Government; and further that the factionalism of the Congress could be checked only by strong leadership. Consequently, in 1942 Gandhi publically designated Jawaharlal Nehru his successor despite the latter's stated opposition to rustic idylls as political goals. Nehru was, after all, the only candidate acceptable to all Congress wings. Again, in 1946 Gandhi gave support to Nehru's election as Congress President, knowing that by so doing he was assuring Nehru's dominance over the emerging Indian Republic. Contesting the 1946
election was V.J. Patel*, favorite of the Congress bureaucracy and a leading Gandhian conservative.

B. The Scale of Economic Change during Transformation

i.) Some Effects of Colonialism on India's Growth Rate - In Chapter 12, it was asserted that from about 1900, the Government of India attempted to stimulate balanced economic growth within the subcontinent. This statement is so unlike most analyses of the course of Indian development from 1900 to 1950, further elucidation is necessary. As an introductory apostrophe, let it be noted that our present concern rests with discovering why India grew as it did. Most other critical studies of Indian economics address themselves to a very different problem; why did not India grow more rapidly than historically was the case? As often happens, conclusions drawn from our chronological analysis differ in detail with conclusions drawn from reconstructive observations set so as to furnish definitive answers of a remedial nature. We here concern ourselves only with the actual. Speculations regarding "ideal" or "optimal" conditions would lead to very different conclusions.

Those who contend that Britain consciously impeded India's economic growth do so particularly on the following grounds:

1) fiscal and monetary policies led to a drain of investable funds from India to Great Britain;

2) tariff policies prior to 1922 not only failed to protect Indian industries, they actively discriminated in favor

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41 For a more orthodox analysis - one which is both comprehensive and concise - cf.: Helen Lamb, "The 'State' and Economic Development in India"; in S.S. Kuznets, W.E. Moore and J.J. Spengler (eds.), Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan; Duke University Press, pp. 464-95
of British manufactures;

3) the costs of maintaining British military and civil service personnel were excessive;

4) no attempt was made until 1931 to assist Indian industry through State patronage.42 No attempt was made at any time to foster the growth of the economy as an autonomous unit.

Each one of these propositions is correct - if we choose to ask why India as a discrete economy failed to advance spectacularly during the last half century of British rule.43 However, the British did not wish to think of India as a discrete economy once the transfer of power to the Crown, and the cotton famine during the U.S. Civil War, had served notice of the degree of interdependency which had emerged. From Curzon's time, it became official policy to increase this interdependence: to fully integrate India into the imperial economic system. But note - full integration would not have led to rapid buildup of a modern industrial complex, for it was not here that India's comparative advantage vis à vis other members of the Empire lay. The "balanced growth" which

42 Rules first applied on 1 January 1931 required the Indian Stores Department to purchase "stores for the public service in such manner as to encourage the development of industries in India to the utmost possible extent consistent with economy and efficiency." (Quoted in W.R. Smith, op. cit., p. 147.) Hitherto, there had been no attempt made to exploit the sequential stimulative potential of State investment in particular sectors. For example, the laying down of railroads had no effect on the development of an Indian steel industry, for rail iron was imported from Britain as a matter of policy.

43 They are, moreover, chronologically correct with regard to the period of "John" Company hegemony. Therefore, insofar as imperial India was saddled with debts accrued because of the application of policies similar to those cited in the text, there can be no disputing the conclusions of remedial investigation on empirical grounds.
Curzon and his successors had in mind entailed expansion of social overhead capital, raw material producing sectors, and only those derivative industries potentially capable of overcoming supply shortages or otherwise markedly decreasing costs. "Balanced growth", then, was not a synonym for full-scale industrial development. The object sought was not increased productive capacity for India alone, but rather increased levels of gross income for all the Empire through maximum exploitation of India's raw material potential.

The desire to integrate India into a larger imperial system was a radical reversal of Britain's Traditional policy of non-interference into indigenous life. The new policy had important social and political ramifications, and of these the Congress in particular disapproved. This does not mean, however, that an independent Indian Republic necessarily would have established economic programmes any more conducive to industrial growth than did the British. The examples provided by Japan and Turkey suggest that in time such might have occurred, but there is no certainty to this proposition. India's businessmen were if anything more particularistic and devoted to freedom from State intervention than were their British counterparts. Both in theory and in application, Hinduism presented major obstacles to economic progress. And so long as Mahatma Gandhi remained an effective political leader, his abhorrence of coercion, materialism, and centralized power would have erected a number of stony impediments in the path of planners attempting to implement programs for State-sponsored economic growth.

Partly because of the "balanced growth" policies of the Transformational Government of India, the Indian economy failed to gain momentum adequate to sustain a growing population. Indians themselves
also contributed to this phenomenon, which was played out in terms of increasing stagnation in the private sector. This was one of the factors accounting for Jawaharlal Nehru's importance as an historical figure. He correctly perceived that the form of "balanced growth" intended for India by Britain would not resolve the growing pressure of population on the resource base. For this reason (and for others) he demanded full severance of the colonial tie. At the same time, since Nehru was the only modernist leader within the Congress who throughout Transformation was consistently able to retain the confidence of both the Gandhian faction and the non-violent Left, he was peculiarly able to bring majority support to his policy prescriptions. One of these prescriptions was national planning for economic development.

ii.) Congress' Conversion to National Planning - We have already made note of early Bose-Nehru attempts to bring Socialism to India. After his frustrations as 1936 Congress President, Nehru modified his tactics. He muted his demand for expropriation of certain classes of private capital, turning instead to the problem of programming development. At Nehru's urging, during Summer 1937 the All-India Congress Committee requested Congress-dominated Governments in Provincial Legislatures to utilize expert advice in setting out plans for regional

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See tables, statistical appendices V.I., (2., 3., 5.) (I.).

Perhaps the first lengthy inquiry into national planning as it might be applied to India was presented by Sir M. Visvesaraya, Planned Economy for India (1934). See P.A. Wadia and K.T. Merchant, Our Economic Problem (special Foreign Edition), Bombay, 1957, pp. 16-17.
development. Shortly thereafter, a National Planning Committee was set up by the Congress, with Nehru as its Chairman. Though this committee had little substantive impact, it was exceedingly useful as a propaganda organ and helped make Indians receptive to the idea of planning. Moreover, the Committee was largely responsible for the preparation of a memorandum directing Congressmen within the Legislatures to introduce bills relating to facilitation of the collection of statistics, enlargement of coverage under the Factories Act, extension of social welfare benefits and minimum wage coverage, and improvement of the legal stature of trade unions.

As Congress President for 1938, S.C. Bose used his office to increase the Congress' commitment to national planning. In a statement of May 1938, he declared that:

"There was no conflict between cottage industries and large-scale industries, but the nation must reconcile itself to industrial revolution on the one hand and determine which industries should be developed on a cottage basis and which on a large-scale basis. He succinctly laid down the principles of national planning which consisted in:

(1) aiming at National autonomy in our principal needs,
(2) development of power supply, metal production, machines and tool manufacture, essential chemicals, transport and communication industries, etc.,

46 M. Brecher, op. cit., p. 238.
48 Bose was widely considered Nehru's peer in the days down to World War II. However, he finally cast off from the conservative majority and on 6 April 1940 initiated a civil disobedience campaign despite Congress decisions to delay. Later, he actively fought against both the British and the Congress. A brief biography is included infra, Appendix VI.7. (I.).
(3) tackling the problem of technical education and technical research,
(4) a permanent national research council,
(5) economic survey of the present industrial position.

"From these principles would arise the following problems:—

(1) a proper economic survey of each province,
(2) co-ordination between cottage industries and large-scale industries with a view to prevent overlapping,
(3) the advisability of having a regional distribution of industries,
(4) technical training of students in India and abroad,
(5) provisions for technical research, and
(6) a committee of experts to advise on the problems of industrialization."49

Though the Expert Committee convened on 2 October 1938 in order to explore the possibility of an All-India Industrial Plan, no concrete programme materialized. And for the next ten years, Indian attention was diverted to war, independence (15 August 1947), and problems relating to the Indo-Pakistani Partition.

The Partition seemed to make irrelevant most of the proposals which had been put forward in earlier reports by the Congress' Expert Committee, and by the Planning and Development Department of the Government of India.50 During the tragic months of intercommunal warfare, well-established economic policies were capriciously overturned. In agriculture for example, the "Grow More Food Campaign" of 1942-47 was renewed for an additional five years; but at the behest of Gandhi and the devolution faction, decontrol of the food marketing mechanism was

50 Established in June 1944, the Department was superseded by an Advisory Planning Board in 1946.
allowed. So grave were the dislocations resulting, a rigid programme
for control of agricultural production and marketing had to be intro-
duced in 1949. Vacillation with regard to the degree of State Regula-
tion to be allowed was a characteristic of all economic policies during
the early days of Republican government, for though India was suffering
from a major economic crisis she was also free. And in free India, the
millenial schemes of numerous competing factions were offered up as at
last both feasible and imperative.

Uncertainty regarding future Government policy had particularly
deleterious effects upon private enterprise. Large capital investment
was urgently needed for the replacement of obsolescent machinery, but
fears of expropriation made private businessmen hold back. Entreprene-
urs were little pleased by the first Industrial Policy Resolution of
the Parliament (6 April 1948). Its statement that "the State must play
a progressively active role in the development of industries" suggested
that protection and subsidy might become Government policy. On the other
hand, since all industrial policy was to assist in bringing about "a
social order where justice and equality of opportunity shall be secured
to all the people",\(^\text{51}\) rigid national control seemed more likely. On 6
April 1949, legislation was enacted making 25 basic industries subject
to State regulation or full nationalization. On 25 June, Government

policy with respect to these industries was defined as nationalization within ten years’ time.\textsuperscript{52}

At the opening session of the 1950 Parliament, the Government proposed the establishment of a central planning commission and a central statistical organization.\textsuperscript{53} Private business expressed dismay, for both the ten years’ nationalization policy and the Government’s intrusion into private sector trading of grains, coal, steel and textiles seemed to indicate that full nationalization of the private sector was soon to occur. Perhaps because of fiscal weakness - since Partition, more than 50% of State expenditures had had to be channelled to the military - Nehru assured the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce on 11 March that no violent economic upheaval was in prospect.\textsuperscript{54} This statement was proven at least partially correct by the absence of any specific nationalization clause in the 15 March 1950 Resolution establishing a National Planning Commission. The purpose of the Commission was to plan: "to promote a rapid rise in the standard of living of the people by efficient exploitation of the resources of the country, increasing production and offering opportunities to all for employment in the service of the community."\textsuperscript{55} On 16 October 1951, the Parliament

\textsuperscript{52} The New York Times, 7 April 1949, p. 19; 26 June 1949, p. 21.


\textsuperscript{54} The New York Times, 12 March 1950, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{55} The New York Times, 16 March 1950, p. 15. The full Resolution establishing the Planning Commission is reproduced infra, Appendix IV,8. (I.).
accepted the Planning Commission's draft proposal for the First Five Year Plan (1951-52 to 1955-56) by a vote of 190 to 117.\textsuperscript{56} Under this proposal, efforts were to be made to raise the rate of net investment from 5% to 20% over the years 1951-1969. The attempt to induce an Indian Take-Off was about to begin.

III - Conclusion: The Acceptance of National Planning in India

The struggle for self-government dominated Indian politics throughout most of Transformation. This fact made for marked differences between the experience of India and that of Japan or Turkey. Because of the prolongation of the British connection, Indians did not have to act responsibly. Organizations such as the Congress and the Muslim League were able to indulge special interests without detracting from the effectiveness of Government. Particularly in the case of the Congress, indulgence was felt to be an essential policy, for the Congress' special claim was that it was representative of all India. To support that claim, it needed an heterogeneous membership.

Its universality was for the Congress both a bane and a blessing. Lacking the power to force resolution of the Traditionalist-modernist split, harassed by the ever-present danger that some large faction might withdraw and thus reduce the movement to the level of a particularist organism, Congress leaders were peculiarly susceptible to the requirement that all member interests be conciliated. On the other hand, so

\textsuperscript{56} The New York Times, 24 October 1951, p. 4.
long as conciliation regarding secondary points was effective, the Congress remained capable of wielding greater force in the nationalist quest than could any competing political body. Mahatma Gandhi was entirely suited for the role of Transformational Congress leader, for he gave to concession a moral aura which made the occasion of compromise a victory for all, rather than a defeat for some special interest. It is true, of course, that Gandhi slowed down the rate of change operative within the Congress and possibly throughout India at large. But his policy of conciliation may have saved the Congress, and it certainly lessened the amount of blood shed for freedom. Moreover, through the example of his disinterested courage and extraordinary virtue, the Mahatma changed the tenor of much of the nationalist movement. Self-government was sought not to benefit a class as had been partially the case during Transition, nor even to enhance the power of some specific interest. The end of svaraj was not power in any coercive sense at all. It was rather human betterment.

Was there, then, any consistency in the tactics employed to achieve svaraj?

1) No compromise was allowed to detract from the carefully projected image of the Indian nation as an egalitarian collectivity. Even the seeming particularism of the stress on vernaculars was directed toward this end. Language diversity was recognized as being a part of Indian life. If no tongue were imposed on speakers of any other, no feeling of antagonism would be created - and in addition, through the use of vernaculars the numbers of people conscious of, and dedicated to, the idea of All-India could be increased. This tactical stress also benefitted the Congress, since during Transformation it justified its claim as representative of the Indian peoples on its universal character.

2) Violence was totally eschewed, but a very subtle form of moral and physical coercion was continually employed. Non-cooperation, civil disobedience, and the boycott were applied at irregular intervals. When they were not officially in force, other forms of personal obstructionism and affront were utilized to remind the British of the costs of
their Government in spiritual and material terms.

3) Popular participation in government was sought as an end in itself and as part of the egalitarian objective of Indian nationalism. However, popular participation in colonial government was considered unsatisfactory to these purposes and was therefore utilized only with obstructive intent.
Chapter 17.

CONCLUSIONS: THE EMERGENT MODERNISM OF TRANSFORMATION

Proto-modern forms arose during Transformation in Japan, Turkey and India. Within the political system, regionalism gave way to centralized institutions of government. Men skilled in modern techniques controlled these institutions and thereby set the tone of urban life. By virtue of their political power, members of the modernist elite were able to exert a degree of social influence which was greater than that wielded by the leadership of any other secular group. Even in the countryside, the vital impact of the new elite was sufficiently comprehensive to challenge historic value patterns despite the continuing strength of Traditionalist religious authorities.

Though their success in the political arena largely determined the new leaders' effectiveness as transformers of society, political ascendancy was interwoven with economic change to a degree in which each operated as a function of the other. The socio-economic crises which had brought the surrender of Tradition's basic governmental postulates were not yet fully overcome. This fact made continuing change politically imperative, for not until long-standing critical problems had been resolved could the new elites feel secure in their positions of power. Political and economic interaction operated on a more immediate level as well. By mid-Transformation, sufficient development of the modern sector had taken place to disrupt Traditional processes on the one hand, and on the other to provide a foundation of basic capital from which further economic growth might spring. Since exploitation of the modern base provided greater opportunities for
power consolidation and the attainment of non-economic objectives than did attempted resuscitation of the Traditional structure, conscientious development of the economy held a dual attractiveness. With regard to both the short- and the long-run, the new leaders of Japan, Turkey and India came to equate their political fortunes with some further degree of economic growth.

In this chapter we shall contrast certain elements of the political processes which unfolded in Transformational Japan, Turkey and India. Great diversity existed in the goals sought through nationhood, and in the attitudes typical to the ruling elites. As a result, highly divergent tactics were employed by the elites in question. Disparities revealed are of signal importance because despite them, the Meiji Oligarchs, Turkish Kemalists and Indian Congressmen all came at the last to hold to a uniform objective: self-sustaining economic growth. This was a profound resultant. In this and succeeding chapters, we shall point up several of the factors which bore on Japanese, Turkish and Indian decisions to pursue economic growth as a means of attaining other political and social objectives.

A. The New Nationalisms of Transformation

The Statist orientations of Transformational Japanese and Turks were comparable in that each looked to integration of all facets of social existence as a means of creating national power. The need for power stemmed in both instances from similarly experienced infringements of national sovereignty by the countries of the West.

Despite the existence of comparable drives toward State power, the leaders of Japan and Turkey had fundamentally different long-term goals in view. The Turks hoped to utilize national strength in order
to achieve a new civilization amalgamating Eastern and Western values. The Meiji Oligarchs wished to employ Western methods only as a means of revitalizing Japan's ancient culture. The Kemalists had billboards posted which were emblazoned with the slogan, "I am a Turk. I come from the East. I go to the West".\textsuperscript{1} The Meiji progressives, on the other hand, were content to declare that their reforms were true to "the historic traditions of the country and the principles that had been handed down by the Imperial Ancestors".\textsuperscript{2}

India, of course, experienced more complete domination by a Western power than did either Japan or Turkey. In their turn, many Indians developed a strong feeling of nationalism. But this sentiment was virtually entirely a product of British teaching, and as such it reflected the value patterns of the humanitarian reformers who revolutionized Indian thought during the mid-19th Century. When nationalism came to India, it came in the guise of swaraj, self-rule. Swaraj had nothing to do with looked for increases in State power. Instead, it mirrored liberal conceptions of perfectability, human dignity and inter-racial brotherhood. Thus the new nationalisms of Japan, Turkey and India were dissimilar in that only the two former countries evidenced significant concern with national power \textit{per se}, and only the two latter possessed leaderships desirous of fostering anything approaching a liberal social ideal.

B. Attitudes Typical to Ruling Elites

Japan's reactive nationalism, Turkey's aspirant nationalism, and

\textsuperscript{1} This slogan was based on a couplet which GoKalp popularized. \textit{cf.:} Halide Edib, \textit{Turkey Faces West}, Yale University Press, 1930, p. 5

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{supra}, p. 310.
India's nationalistic idealism bred - and were bred by - leaders of very different sorts. In Japan, the emergent elite of Transformation was made up of groups which, though technically skilled in Western method, nonetheless bore the imprint of bushido. A sense of heritage and of a tradition of political responsibility was intrinsic to the Meiji rulers. An analyst might have found in them motivational characteristics melding in some sense the traits of Prussian Junkers and younger sons of noble lineage in Victorian England. By no means all the leaders of Meiji Japan came to their samurai orientation by birth. Moreover, as is shown by the biographic data presented in Appendix VI, a large proportion of the born samurai of Transformation's elite were at best only marginal members of the "exalted class". But the marginalists gained their sense of bushido through ascription, and their samurai consciousness was as prominently displayed as the aspidistras which grace Kensington's shabby gentility.

Like the leaders of Meiji Japan, the Kemalis possessed a notable spirit of self-dedication. And again like their Japanese counterparts, elite groups in Transformational Turkey were for the most part drawn from those professional and service classes which had performed State functions during Late Tradition and Transition. However, since social mobility and a spirit of egalitarianism always have been considerably more apparent in Turkey than in Japan, the Kemalist Government did not exhibit the Meiji Oligarchs' sense of class and of class loyalty. During the middle years of Transformation, the Oligarchy reinstated the Japanese peerage (using Prussian rankings as a model) in order to increase socio-political stratification. The Turks on the other hand, tried to wipe away all vestiges of class
distinction based on heredity or social background.

In terms of social attitude, Transformation's Congress Indians were spiritually more closely akin to the Turks than to the Japanese. Nonetheless, Indians and Turks were very different, for while the Kemalists were egalitarian in that Western Romantic tradition which makes all men equal because equally embraced by the State, Indians affected either by Gandhian precepts, or by comparable forms of Eastern and Western humanism, based their suppositions of equality on individualistic grounds. One cannot discount the existence of numerous Congressmen who did not conform to this generalized pattern of idealism; but as Transformation progressed, their numbers and influence decreased. In large part, this was due to Ganhiji's example, for he demanded a higher level of self-abnegation than did either the Meiji Oligarchs or Kemal Ataturk. The character of the Indian national movement also served as an important influence, for throughout the long years of stalemate Congressmen were required to practice non-violence while sacrificing their comforts - sometimes their lives - in furtherance of a struggle whose end was not assured.

C. Strategies and Tactics of Emergent Elites

The tactics employed by the Transformational leaderships of Japan, Turkey and India were dissimilar in part because of the following basic differences in value orientation and political objective:

1) Coercion was shunned by the Congress but regularly exercised by Kemalists and the Meiji Oligarchs;

2) Increases in per capita income were desired by the Congress and to a lesser degree, by the Kemalists. Amelioration of peasant
living conditions was not an independent objective of the Oligarchs;

3) Japan's spiritual and secular institutions were allied in terms of their joint dedication to the Emperor. In Turkey and India, religious leaders competed with politicians for the allegiance of the populace;

4) In India, though national union was an objective, centralization of coercive state power was opposed by Gandhians and by Indian industrialists. In Turkey and Japan, the political hierarchy's ability to command total obedience was taken to be a measure of national progress;

5) The end product of national sovereignty in Japan was to be the creation of a powerful State utilizing modern techniques while nonetheless retaining Traditional values of social discipline, self-restraint, and loyalty to the immediate superior. Turkish nationalism was to breed a similar spirit of discipline and restraint, but loyalty was to go to the commonalty as representative of the State entire. This loyalty focus was novel when compared with the Ottoman millet system and Islamic precepts. Therefore, Turkey's Traditional value patterns had to be ruthlessly expunged.

   In India, many historic values needed to be jettisoned, for the orientation of Traditional life had been toward caste, community and region rather than to India and All Indians. The end product of national sovereignty in India was to be the creation of a society based on equality of opportunity and in which social welfare would rise transcendent. In contrast
to the Japanese and Turks, who hoped to build up State power as a means of effecting social, political and economic change; Congressmen believed that State power should be restricted so that it could not infringe on the attainment of individual liberties or social equality.

A summary statement such as is the foregoing must necessarily be inexact and deficient. Nonetheless, the propositions set forth are adequate for the purpose of drawing rough distinctions between the specific tactical patterns enumerated in the conclusions sections of the three chapters preceding. They are noteworthy as well because of the insights they provide into motivations and techniques applying in attempts at Take-Off. Economic development can become a policy objective because of a desire to build the material power of the State. As easily, growth can be sought to benefit individuals both materially and in the intangible components of personal well-being. In operation, attempts to induce growth can involve public sponsorship of the private sector once basic capital has been created (as in Meiji Japan); or State discrimination against private initiative, plus a concurrent dependence upon public agencies (as in Kemalist Turkey); or joint public-private endeavors (as has increasingly become the case in Congress India). The alternatives chosen in the three cases under consideration reflected political necessity, value patterns, and long-term socio-political goals. In a later section, we shall explore whether any more abstract laissez-faire or totalitarian dialectic can be made to apply.
Appendix IV.1.(J)

THE IMPERIAL RESCRIPT ABOLISHING FEUDALISM (29 August 1871)

"We are of the opinion that in a time of radical reform like the present, if We desire by its means to give protection and tranquility to the people at home, and abroad to maintain equality with foreign nations, words must be made to mean in reality what they claim to signify, and the government of the country must centre in a single authority.

"Some time ago We gave Our sanction to the scheme by which all clans restored to Us their registers; We appointed Chiji (Governors) for the first time, each to perform the duties of his office.

"But owing to the lengthened endurance of the old system during several hundred years, there have been cases where the word only was pronounced and the reality not performed. How is it possible for Us, under such circumstances, to give protection and tranquility to the people, and to maintain equality with foreign nations?

"Profoundly regretting this condition of affairs, We now completely abolish the Clans (Han) and convert them into Domains (Ken), with the object of diligently retrenching expenditure and of arriving at convenience of working, of getting rid of the unreality of names and of abolishing the disease of government proceeding from multiform centers."

Appendix IV.2 (T)

THE LAUSANNE CONVENTIONS OF 24 JULY 1923

(A) - Relevant Sections of the Treaty

"Article 28. Each of the High Contracting Parties hereby accepts, in so far as it is concerned, the complete abolition of the Capitations in Turkey in every respect."

"Article 38. The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

"All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals.

"Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defence, or for the maintenance of public order."

"Article 39. Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and political rights as Moslems." . . .

"Article 46. The Ottoman Public Debt . . . shall be distributed under the conditions laid down in the present Section between Turkey, the States in favour of which territory has been detached from the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the States to which the islands referred to in Articles 12 and 15 of the present Treaty and the territory referred to in the last paragraph of the present Article have been attributed, and the States newly created in territories in Asia which are detached from the Ottoman Empire under the present Treaty. All the above States shall also participate . . . in the annual charges for the service of the Ottoman Public Debt." . . .

"Article 69. No charge, tax or surtax to which, by virtue of the privileges which they enjoyed on the 1st August, 1914, Allied nationals and their property were not subject, shall be collected from Allied subjects or their property in respect of the financial years earlier than the financial year 1922-23." . . .
(B) - Relevant Sections of the Convention Respecting Conditions of Residence and Business and Jurisdiction

"Article 5. In Turkey, commercial, industrial and financial corporations including transport and insurance corporations, which are regularly incorporated on the territory of any one of the other Contracting Powers, shall be recognized.

"In all matters relating to their constitution, their legal capacity and their right to sue and be sued, they will be treated in accordance with their national law." . . .

"Article 8. Nationals of the Contracting Powers, other than Turkey, shall not be subjected to any charge, tax or impost of any kind or under any description whatsoever, other or higher than those which may be imposed on Turkish nationals, in respect of their stay or residence in Turkish territory, or in respect of the exercise of any form of commerce, profession, industry, enterprise or activity of whatever kind in Turkey which is open to them in accordance with the provisions of Article 4." . . .

"The property, rights and interests in Turkish territory of the nationals of the said Powers shall not be subjected to any impost, tax or charge, direct or indirect, other or higher than those which may be imposed on the property, rights and interests of Turkish nationals, whether as regards the acquisition, possession or enjoyment of the said property, or as regards its transfer by grant, exchange or succession."

"Article 9. Commercial, industrial or financial corporations, including transport and insurance corporations which are incorporated in accordance with the law of one of the other contracting countries, and which, in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, establish themselves in Turkey or carry on their affairs there, shall not be subjected to any impost, tax or charge, of any kind or under any description whatsoever, to which corporations of the same kind incorporated under Turkish law are not subjected." . . .

"Article 14. In Turkey the nationals of the other Contracting Powers, and reciprocally Turkish nations in the territories of the said Powers, will have free access to the courts of the country, and may sue and be sued in the same conditions in all respects as nationals of the country, subject to the provisions of Article 18."

"Article 16. In matters of personal status, ... ; and family law in general, it is agreed between Turkey and the other Contracting Powers that, as regards non-Moslem nationals of such Powers in Turkey, the national tribunals or other competent national authorities
established in the country of which the party whose personal status is in question will alone have jurisdiction." . . .

"By way of exception . . ., the Turkish courts will also have jurisdiction in the matters referred to therein, if all the parties to the case submit in writing to the jurisdiction of the said courts. In such case the Turkish courts will apply the national law of the parties."

"Article 20. The present Convention is concluded for a period of seven years from its coming into force.". . . But Convention is to be automatically renewed unless and until it is denounced.

(C) - Relevant Sections of the Commercial Convention

"Article 1. From the coming into force of the present Convention, the tariffs applicable on the importation into Turkey of the produce or manufactures originating and emanating from the territories of the other contracting countries shall be those of the Turkish specific tariff which came into operation on the 1st September, 1916."

"Article 2. The duties prescribed by the Turkish tariff of the 1st September, 1916, in Turkish paper money, will be subjected to coefficients of increase periodically adjusted according to the rate of exchange under the conditions hereinafter provided.". . .

"Article 3. Turkey undertakes to abolish from the coming into force of the present Convention, and not to re-establish during its continuance, all prohibitions or import and export, except those which may be necessary: -

(1) to maintain the resources indispensable for the food of the people, and to safeguard the economic activity of the nation;

(2) to ensure the security of the State;

(3) to protect persons, animals and plants against contagious diseases, epizooties and epiphytles;

(4) to prevent the use of opium and other poisons;

(5) to prohibit the import of alcoholic products, the use of which is forbidden in Turkey;

(6) to prevent the export of gold money or gold metal;

(7) to establish or support State monopolies." . . .
"Article 4. Subject to reciprocity, no consumption or excise duty shall be applicable in Turkey to goods originating or emanating from the other contracting countries except to the extent to which it is exacted in respect of identical or similar articles produced in Turkey." . . .

"Article 9. Turkey undertakes, on condition that reciprocity is accorded in this matter, to grant the ships of the other Contracting Powers a treatment equal to that which she grants to national ships, or any more favorable treatment that she grants or may grant to the ships of any other Power.

"Turkey retains, as regards each of the other Contracting Powers, and each of these Powers retains as regards Turkey the right of reserving to the national flag fishing, maritime cabotage, that is to say, transport by sea of goods and passengers embarked in one port of its territory for another port in the same territory, and port services, that is to say, towage, pilotage and all interior services of whatever nature they may be."

"Article 10. . . . Turkey also undertakes, on condition of reciprocity, not to subject imported or exported goods to any differential due, surtax, or increase of any nature or kind based on the flag of the ship by which the goods are imported or exported, on the ports of arrival or departure, on the voyage of the ship or the ports at which it has called, the dues and taxes leviable on goods imported or exported being determined only in their origin or their destination, and being applied equally as regards all the other Contracting Powers in accordance with the provisions of Section I."

"Article 18. The present Convention will remain in force for a period of five years." . . .

(D) - Relevant Sections of the Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations; (signed 30 January 1923)

"Article 1. As from the 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory.

"These persons shall not live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorisation of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively."

"Article 2. The following persons shall not be included in the exchange provided for in Article 1: -
(a) The Greek inhabitants of Constantinople.
(b) The Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.

"All Greeks who were already established before the 30th October, 1918, within the areas under the Prefecture of the City of Constantinople ... shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of Constantinople.

"All Moslems established in the region to the east of the frontier line laid down in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest shall be considered as Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace."

(E) - Relevant Sections of the Protocol relating to Certain Concessions granted in the Ottoman Empire

"Article 1. Concessionary contracts and subsequent agreement relating thereto, duly entered into before the 29th October, 1914, between the Ottoman Government or any local authority, on the one hand, and nationals (including Companies) of the Contracting Powers, other than Turkey, on the other hand, are maintained."

"Article 6. Beneficiaries under concessionary contracts referred to in Article 1, which have not, on the date of this Protocol, begun to be put into operation, cannot avail themselves of the provisions of this Protocol relating to re-adaptation." . . .

"Article 7. Agreements entered into between the 30th October, 1918, and the 1st November, 1922, between the Ottoman Government and beneficiaries under contracts and concessions referred to in Article 1, . . . ., shall remain in force until they have received the approval of the Turkish Government. If this approval should not be granted, compensation shall, if there is ground for it, be paid to the concessionaires in respect of the loss actually suffered, the amount being fixed by experts appointed as provided in Article 5." . . .

Source: Cmd. 1929; Treaty of Peace with Turkey
Appendix IV. 3(T)

RELEVANT SECTIONS OF THE TURKISH CONSTITUTION (1924),
WITH AMENDMENTS THROUGH 1945

Section I - Fundamental Provisions

Article 1 - The Turkish State is a Republic.
Article 2 - The religion of the Turkish State is Islam; the official language is Turkish; the seat of government is Angora.
(1928 amendment) - The official language of the Turkish State is Turkish; its seat is the city of Ankara.
(1937 amendment) - The Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist, etatist, laique, and revolutionist. The official language of the State is Turkish, its capital is the city of Ankara.
Article 3 - Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation.
Article 4 - The Grand National Assembly of Turkey is the sole lawful representative of the nation, and exercises sovereignty in the name of the nation. NB - This means that the GNA cannot be dissolved by the President.
Article 5 - The legislative function and executive power are manifest and concentrated in the Grand National Assembly.
Article 6 - The Assembly exercises its legislative function directly.
Article 7 - The Assembly exercises the executive power through the intermediary of the President of the Republic, whom it elects, and through a Cabinet chosen by him. The Assembly controls the acts of the government and may at any time withdraw power from it.
Article 8 - The judicial power is exercised in the name of the Assembly by independent tribunals constituted in accordance with the law.

Section II - The Legislative Function

Article 10 - Every male Turk who has completed his eighteenth year has the right to vote in elections to the Parliament.
(1934 amendment) - grants female suffrage and raises minimum voting age to twenty-two.
Article 11 - Every male Turk at least thirty years of age is eligible for election as a deputy.
(1934 amendment) - includes women and reduces age to twenty-two.
(1945 Law) - raises minimum age of deputies to 30.
Article 13 - Legislative elections take place every four years. . . .
In case it is impossible to proceed to legislative elections, the session of the legislature may be prolonged one year.
Article 14 - The Grand National Assembly convenes annually on the first of November without being convoked.

The Assembly cannot recess for more than six months each year to permit its members to tour the country for purposes of inspection, contact with their electorate, and recreation.

Article 23 - No person may hold any other government office while he is a deputy.

Article 24 - The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, in its plenary session on the first of November shall elect a president and three vice presidents for one year.

Article 26 - The Grand National Assembly itself executes the holy law; makes, amends, interprets and abrogates laws; concludes conventions and treaties of peace with other states; declares war; examines and ratifies laws drafted by the Commission on the Budget; coins money; accepts or rejects all contracts or concessions involving financial responsibility; decrees partial or general amnesty; mitigates sentences and grants pardons; expedites judicial investigations and penalties; executes definitive sentences of capital punishment handed down by the courts.

(1928 amendment) - excludes clause relating to the holy law.

Section III - The Executive Function

Article 32 - The President of the Republic is the head of the State; in this capacity he presides over the Assembly on ceremonial occasions and in case of necessity over the cabinet. During his entire term of office the President of the Republic may not take part in the discussions or in the deliberations of the Assembly and may not vote.

Article 35 - The President of the Republic shall promulgate within ten days of its enactment any law voted by the Assembly.

The President of the Republic must return within ten days any law which he does not consider worthy of promulgation, together with a statement of his reasons, for consideration by the Assembly; amendments to the Constitution and legislation concerning the Budget are not subject to the President's suspensive veto.

The President is obliged to promulgate any law which is enacted by majority vote of the Assembly after reconsideration.

Article 40 - Supreme command of the army is vested in the Grand National Assembly, which is represented by the President of the Republic.

Article 44 - The Prime Minister is chosen by the President of the Republic from among the Deputies.

The other Cabinet members are chosen from among the Deputies by the Premier, who, with the approval of the President of the Republic, submits the Cabinet list to the Assembly.

If the Assembly be not in session, this is done upon its convening.
The Government within one week shall submit its policy to the Assembly.

(1937 amendment) - The Premier chooses the political Under-Secretaries of State from the membership of the Assembly and presents the choices for the approval of the President of the Republic.

(1945 Law) - The Prime Minister is appointed by the President of the Republic from among the members of the Assembly. The other Ministers are chosen by the Prime Minister from among the members of the Assembly and presented collectively to a plenary session of the Assembly, with the approval of the President of the Republic.

If the Assembly is not in session, the presentation is postponed until the meeting of the Assembly.

The Government must submit its programme and policy to the Assembly within one week at most, and seek a vote of confidence.

**Article 45.** The Ministers, under the presidency of the Prime Minister, constitute the Cabinet.

**Article 46.** The members of the Cabinet are collectively responsible for the general policies of the government.

Each member, individually, is likewise responsible within the scope of his authority for the general character of his policy and for the actions of his subordinates.

**Article 51.** There shall be established a Council of State which shall be called upon to decide administrative controversies and to give its advice on contracts, concessions and proposed laws drafted and presented by the Government, and to perform specific duties which may be determined by law. The Council of State shall be composed of persons chosen by the Grand National Assembly, from among those who have held important posts, who possess great experience, who are specialists, or who are otherwise qualified.

**Article 52.** With the advice of the Council of State, the Cabinet shall promulgate regulations for the administration and execution of the law, provided that such regulations shall not contain new clauses.

These proclamations shall be published over the signature of the President of the Republic.

When the regulations are alleged to be contradictory to the law, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey is empowered to adjudicate the matter.

**Section IV - The Judicial Function**

**Article 54.** Judges are independent in the conduct of trials and in the rendering of their judgments. They shall be protected from any sort of intervention and are subject only to the law.

(1945 Law) - Judges are independent in the trial and judgment of all cases; they are free from every kind of interference and are subject only to the law. Neither the Grand National Assembly
Article 55 - Judges may be recalled only in conformity with the procedure determined by law.

Article 57 - Judges may not assume any public or private office aside from that intrusted to them by law.

The High Court

Article 61 - A High Court shall be constituted, the jurisdiction of which shall include the trial of members of the Cabinet, members of the Council of State, the Attorney-General, and members of the Court of Appeals in all questions pertaining to the performance of their duties.

Article 62 - The High Court shall be composed of twenty-one members, eleven of whom are chosen from among the members of the Court of Appeals and ten from among the members of the Council of State. The said members are elected by secret ballot by the plenary assemblies of these bodies.

The members of the High Court elect by the same procedure a president and a vice-president.

Article 65 - The decisions of the High Court are absolutely final.

Section V - The Common Law of the Turks

Article 68 - Every Turk is born free and free he lives. Liberty consists in the right to live and enjoy life without offense or injury to others. The only limitations on liberty - which is one of the natural rights of all - are those imposed in the interest of the rights and liberties of others. Such limitations on personal liberty shall be defined only in strict accordance with the law.

Article 69 - All Turks are equal before the law and are obliged to respect the law. All privileges of whatever description claimed by groups, classes, families and individuals are abolished and forbidden.

Article 70 - Inviolability of person; freedom of conscience, of thought, of speech, of press; freedom of travel and of contract; freedom of labor; freedom of private property, of assembly, of association; freedom of incorporation, are among the natural rights of Turks.

Article 71 - The life, the property, the honor, and the home of each and all are inviolable.

Article 72 - No one shall be arrested or deprived of his goods and chattels except by due process of law.

Article 75 - No one may be molested on account of his religion, his sect, his ritual, or his philosophic convictions. All religious
observances shall be free on condition that they do not disturb the public peace, or shock public decency or exist in violation of social conventions or the law.

(1937 amendment strikes out word "sect".)

**Article 77** - The press is free within the limits of the law and shall not be submitted to any censorship previous to publication.

**Article 79** - Limitations upon freedom of contract, labor, property, assembly and incorporation shall be determined by law.

**Article 86** - When the Cabinet takes cognizance of the danger or imminence of war, or of internal sedition or conspiracy or intrigues directed against the nation or against the Republic, it may decree martial law, which shall not exceed the duration of one month, in all or part of the Turkish territory. This measure shall then be submitted to the Assembly for its approval as soon as possible. The Assembly may prolong or diminish the duration of martial law...

**Article 87** - Primary education is obligatory for all Turks and shall be gratuitous in the government schools.
Appendix IV.4.(T.)

THE ORGANIZATION OF QUASI-PUBLIC BUSINESS ENTERPRISES IN TURKEY

"Generally speaking, three types of organization are to be found in the administration of publicly owned economic enterprises in Turkey. They are all in the main the result of Turkish experience proper, for no suitable Western pattern was available at the time when public enterprises started in Turkey.

"One type is the affiliated enterprise. Most public utility enterprises owned by the municipalities are organized in this form. This is due, on the one hand, to the lack of a general legal authorization to create autonomous public units. But it is mostly due to the fact that small municipalities find it too costly to multiply their organization. The resulting difficulties are partly met by some legal provisions, which, on the one hand, permit the appropriation to such enterprises of working capital exempt from public financial procedure and, on the other hand, declare private law to be applicable to their relations.

"Most public enterprises, however, are run either by autonomous public agencies or by mixed companies. Both types are exempted from parliamentary control and are governed by private law. Most mixed companies are established by an ad hoc law which confers upon the Government the ultimate power of control, as the ordinary company law puts a narrow limit upon the right of control by one shareholder.

"The form of public agency is not limited to state enterprises. It is also applied to the municipal enterprises of certain big towns, such as Istanbul and Ankara. As regards the form of autonomous agency applied to State enterprises, experience gathered before 1937 has since resulted in a general pattern of which the following is an outline. A range of economic enterprises is entrusted to a central agency attached to a ministry. The latter has the task of creating and subsequently of administering them through an autonomous establishment under its control. A central committee of control consisting of specialists provides the supervision of all such agencies and their dependencies. The final supervision is entrusted to a special mixed committee composed of the ministers concerned, a number of members of parliament and the chief managers of the agencies as well as of the national banks. The committee is the result of a compromise between the tendency of parliament to extend its control over such agencies and the desire of the Government to avoid this. The control by the Government is legally limited, but in practice it is large. This form of agency is not confined to economic enterprises, it is also applied with justification in the case of certain social institutions."

THE NON-COOPERATION RESOLUTION OF THE CALCUTTA CONGRESS (4-9 SEPTEMBER 1920); WITH PRECIS OF AMENDMENTS PASSED BY THE NAGPUR CONGRESS (26-31 DECEMBER 1920)

"In view of the fact that on the Khilafat question both the Indian and Imperial Governments have signally failed in their duty towards the Mussalmans of India, and the Prime Minister has deliberately broken his pledged word given to them, and that it is the duty of every non-moslem Indian in every legitimate manner to assist his Mussalman brother in his attempt to remove the religious calamity that has overtaken him;

"And in view of the fact that in the matter of the events of the April of 1919 both the said Governments have grossly neglected or failed to protect the innocent people of the Punjab, and punish officers guilty of unsoldierly and barbarous behaviour towards them, and have exonerated Sir Michael O'Dwyer who proved himself, directly or indirectly, responsible for most of the official crimes, and callous to the sufferings of the people placed under his administration, and that the debate in the House of Commons and specifically in the House of Lords betrayed a woeful lack of sympathy with the people of India, and showed virtual support of the systematic terrorism and frightfulness adopted in the Punjab, and that the latest Viceregal pronouncement is proof of entire absence of repentance in the matters of the Khilafat and the Punjab;

"This Congress is of opinion that there can be no contentment in India without redress of the two aforementioned wrongs and that the only effectual means to vindicate national honour and to prevent a repetition of similar wrongs in future is the establishment of Swarajya. This Congress is further of opinion that there is no course left open for the people of India but to approve of and adopt the policy of progress, non-Violent Non-co-operation inaugurated by Mr. Gandhi until the said wrongs are righted and Swarajya is established;

"And in as much as a beginning should be made by the classes who have hitherto moulded and represented public opinion, and in as much as Government consolidates its power through titles and honours bestowed on the people, through schools controlled by it, its law courts, and its legislative councils, and in as much as it is desirable in the prosecution of the movement to take the minimum risk and to call for the least sacrifice, compatible with the attainment of the desired object, this Congress earnestly advises -

(a) surrender of titles and honourary offices and resignation from nominated seats in local bodies.
(b) refusal to attend Government Levees, Durbars, and other official and semi-official functions held by Government officials or in their honour;
(c) gradual withdrawal of children from schools and colleges owned, aided or controlled by Government, and in place of such schools and colleges, establishment of National Schools and Colleges in the various provinces;
(d) gradual boycott of British courts by lawyers and litigants, and establishment of private arbitration courts by their aid, for the settlement of private disputes;
(e) refusal on the part of the military, clerical and labouring classes to offer themselves as recruits for service in Mesopotamia;
(f) withdrawal by candidates of their candidature for election to the Reformed Councils, and refusal on the part of the voters to vote for any candidate who may, despite the Congress advice, offer himself for election;
(g) boycott of foreign goods.

"And in as much as Non-co-operation has been conceived as a measure of discipline and self-sacrifice without which no nation can make real progress, and in as much as an opportunity should be given in the very first stage of Non-co-operation to every man, woman and child, for such discipline and self-sacrifice, this Congress advises adoption of Swadeshi in piece-goods on a vast scale; and in as much as the existing mills of India with indigenous capital and control do not manufacture sufficient yarn and sufficient cloth for the requirements of the nation, and are not likely to do so for a long time to come, the Congress advises immediate stimulation of further manufacture on a large scale means of reviving hand-spinning in every home and hand-weaving on the part of the millions of weavers who have abandoned their ancient and honourable calling for want of encouragement."

(Nagpur Congress Amendments)

Rather than call for full and immediate non-Violent Non-co-operation, at Nagpur the Congress proposed that the following steps be taken immediately:
(a) school boycott and establishment of National Schools;
(b) boycott of courts;
(c) hand-spinning and hand-weaving
(d) organization of committees down to and including the village level to lead non-co-operation efforts; and
(e) organization of a service group to be called the Indian National Service.

If these steps proved insufficient, "renunciation of voluntary association with the present Government" and non-payment of taxes might be considered.

Appendix IV.6.(I.)

RELEVANT PORTIONS OF THE 1930 INDEPENDENCE DAY OATH

"We believe that it is the inalienable right of the Indian people, as of any other people, to have freedom and to enjoy the fruits of their toil and have the necessities of life, so that they may have full opportunities of growth. We believe also that if any government deprives a people of these rights and oppresses them, the people have a further right to alter it or to abolish it. The British Government in India has not only deprived the Indian people of their freedom but has based itself on the exploitation of the masses, and has ruined India economically, politically, culturally, and spiritually. We believe, therefore, that India must sever the British connection and attain Purna Swaraj of Complete Independence...

"We hold it to be a crime against man and God to submit any longer to a rule that has caused this fourfold disaster to our country. We recognize, however, that the most effective way of gaining our freedom is not through violence. We will therefore prepare ourselves by withdrawing, so far as we can, all voluntary association from the British Government, and will prepare for civil disobedience, including non-payment of taxes. We are convinced that if we can but withdraw our voluntary help and stop payment of taxes without doing violence, even under provocation, the end of this inhuman rule is assured. We therefore hereby solemnly resolve to carry out the Congress instructions issued from time to time for the purpose of establishing Purna Swaraj."

(Revision of the 2nd Paragraph, 1938 Independence Day Oath)

"We recognize that the most effective way of gaining our freedom is not through violence. India has gained strength and self-reliance and marched a long way to Swaraj following peaceful and legitimate methods, and it is by adhering to these methods that our country will attain independence.

"We pledge ourselves anew to the Independence of India and solemnly resolve to carry on non-violently the struggle for freedom till Purna Swaraj is attained."

PORTIONS OF THE SWARAJYA RESOLUTION (KARACHI CONGRESS, 1931)

"This Congress is of opinion that in order to end the exploitation of the masses, political freedom must include real economic freedom of the starving masses . . . The Congress therefore declares that any constitution that may be agreed to on its behalf, should include the following items, or should give the ability to the Swaraj Government to provide for them.

1. Fundamental rights of the people such as
   i. Freedom of association and combination.
   ii. Freedom of speech and press.
   iii. Freedom of conscience and ... religion, subject to public order and morality.
   iv. No disability to attach to any person of religion, caste or creed . . .
   v. Equal rights and obligations of all citizens. No civic bar on account of sex . . .

2. Religious neutrality on the part of the state.

3. A living wage for industrial workers, limited hours of labour, healthy conditions of work, protection against the economic consequences of old age, sickness and unemployment.

4. Labour to be freed from serfdom or conditions bordering on serfdom.

5. Protection of women workers, and specially adequate provisions for leave during maternity period.

6. Prohibition against employment of children of school-going age in factories.

7. Right of labour to form unions to protect their interests with suitable machinery for settlement of disputes by arbitration.

8. Substantial reduction of land revenue and rent and in case of uneconomic holdings exemption from rent for such period as may be necessary.

9. Imposition of a progressive income-tax on agricultural income above a fixed income.

10. A graduate income tax.

11. Adult suffrage.

12. Free Primary education . . .

13. Military expenditure to be reduced by at least one-half of the present scale.

14. Expenditure and salaries in civil departments to be largely reduced . . .

15. Protection of indigenous cloth by the exclusion of foreign cloth and foreign yarn from the country.

16. Total prohibition of intoxicating drinks and drugs.

17. No duty on salt.

18. State regulation of the exchange ratio so as to help . . . Indian industries and bring relief to the masses.

19. Control by the state of key industries and mineral resources.

20. Control of usury - direct or indirect."

Source: All India National Congress, Report of the 45th Indian National Congress. Karachi: Bharat, 1932, pp. 139-141.
Appendix IV.8.(I.)

RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA PLANNING COMMISSION (15 March 1950)

"The Constitution of India has guaranteed certain Fundamental Rights to the citizens of India and enunciated certain Directive Principles of State Policy, in particular, that the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life, and shall direct its policy towards securing, among other things,--

(a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means of livelihood;
(b) that the ownership and control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as best to subserve the common good; and
(c) that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment.

"Having regard to these rights and in furtherance of these principles as well as of the declared objective of the Government to promote a rapid rise in the standard of living of the people by efficient exploitation of the resources of the country, increasing production, and offering opportunities to all for employment in the services of the community.

The Planning Commission will:
(1) make an assessment of the material, capital and human resources of the country, including technical personnel, and investigate the possibilities of augmenting such of these resources as are found to be deficient in relation to the nation's requirements;
(2) formulate a Plan for the most effective and balanced utilisation of the country's resources;
(3) on a determination of priorities, define the stages in which the Plan should be carried out and propose the allocation of resources for the due completion of each stage;
(4) indicate the factors which are tending to retard economic development and determine the conditions which, in view of the current social and political situation, should be established for the successful execution of the Plan;
(5) determine the nature of the machinery which will be necessary for securing the successful implementation of each stage of the Plan in all its aspects;
(6) appraise from time to time the progress achieved in the execution of each stage of the Plan and recommend the adjustments of policy and measures that such appraisal may show to be necessary; and
(7) make such interim or ancillary recommendations as appear to it to be appropriate, either for facilitating the discharge of the duties assigned to it; or, on a consideration of the prevailing economic conditions, current policies, measures and development programmes; or on an examination of such specific problems as may be referred to it for advice by Central or State Governments."

Part V

CONCLUSION: POLITICAL GROWTH AND ECONOMIC CHANGE

Chapter 18. - The Economics of Modernization

Chapter 19. - The Search for Power as a Cause of Growth
Chapter 18.

THE ECONOMICS OF MODERNIZATION

This chapter opens with a comparative examination of changes in the rate of sectoral growth during Transition and Transformation. The purpose of this exposition is to introduce raw economic data so that we may contrast the sequences in Japanese, Turkish and Indian history by which individual economic sectors responded to shifts in effective demand, production functions, and/or factor supply. In addition, the chapter will attempt to demonstrate the value of applying the "Take-Off" concept\(^1\) to inquiries such as the present study.

Though the chapter's main focus is on long period sectoral trends, we shall note the influence of specific events whenever they appear to have significantly altered growth rates over the short run. However, we shall attempt neither to isolate nor to analyse factors bearing on fluctuations of the business cycle, for our present concern lies solely with examination of the long-run growth process.

A graphical presentation such as is employed in the pages following is usefully provocative even though the charted figures have their limitations. Of these limiting features, the first is weakness in the statistical material available.\(^2\) In the Japanese case, a fair degree of accuracy can be assumed for the years given; but equally valid statistics do not appear to exist for earlier years. Consequently, we can specify entire Transitional-Transformational rates of growth in only

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\(^2\) Notes on statistical sources will be found *infra*, Appendix V.
a few instances. Turkish data are available for a time-span even more limited than obtains in the Japanese case. Moreover, such material as is presented for Turkey must be held in some question. The Turkish figures quoted are for the most part official, however, and it is hoped that any tendency toward under- or over-enumeration of the census is relatively constant over the time periods covered. On the other hand, since improvement in data-gathering techniques generally accompanies industrialization, it is possible that a slight bias may intrude into the Turkish figures - and also the Japanese and Indian - particularly during the periods we have tentatively identified as the Take-Off.

Setting aside the problem of statistical enumeration, there still remain problems relating to the graphical representation of trend lines. As much as possible, we have established trends by plotting eight-year overlapping averages by quinquennia (e.g., 1904-11 is plotted at 1910; 1909-16 is plotted at 1915). However, since the statistics used in the plots at the beginning and end of the various series often do not allow for a full eight-year average, there may be biased weighting toward later years in the census at the beginning of the trend line plots; and conversely toward earlier years in the census, at the end of the trend line plots.

A final problem applies specifically to the Indian case. Under terms of the Burma Act of 1935, India and Burma were separated administratively over the years 1935-37. Again, in 1947 India and Pakistan were divided. Official British statistics for the mid-30's do not always make clear whether figures given include or exclude Burma. For this reason, we stop plotting Indian trend lines in 1936; and with the
occasional exception of a benchmark placed at about the beginning of World War II, we take up the plots again only at the end of the War. In postwar data, only annual citations or estimates are used.³

I - Sectoral Growth Patterns

A. Agricultural Production (Figures 1-3)

Japan, it will be seen, experienced a fairly consistent increase both in its rice staple output and in indexed agricultural production throughout Transformation and early Take-Off. Since population increased at roughly 1% per annum during the early post-feudal years, the fact that agricultural output rose at an annual rate close to 1.4% assured the existence of a surplus increment continually available for consumption or export. Through changes in the tax structure as well as through compulsory commutation of feudal pensions, the Meiji bureaucrats initially held down consumption and forced increasing commercialization of the agricultural sector. The effects of these policies, combined with application of new techniques developed at State-sponsored agricultural experiment stations, are indicated by a slight lag of rice staples as against total indexed output. Moreover, data presented in Figure 15 reflect a steady shift in the composition of exports as technological progress and domestic demand lags allowed the Japanese to release an increasing percentage of cereals and grains to the export market.

In contrast to Japan, Turkey's agricultural sector appears to have

³In all three cases, if data presented are given for a fiscal rather than a calendar year, they are enumerated in the statistical tables and presented on the charts as of the second of the calendar years involved.
Figure 2: Turkey: Agricultural Production

- A = Total Grains (Unit: metric tons/ten thousand)
- B = Trend Line (5 yrs. overlap)
- C = Animal & Poultry Meat (Unit: Hundreds)
- D = Trend Line (5 yrs. overlap)
- E = Total Potatoes (Unit: metric tons/ten thousand)
- F = Trend Line (5 yrs. overlap)
- G = Cotton lint (Unit: metric tons/thousand)
- H = Trend Line (5 yrs. overlap)
Figure 2.

Index: Agricultural Production

- A: Wheat (Unit = tons/thousand)
- B: Jute (Unit = 400 lb. bales/thousand)
- C: Cotton to 1945 (Unit = 100 lb. bales/thousand)
- D: 1945-60 (Unit = 200 lb. bales/thousand)
- E: Rice (Unit = tons/hundred thousand)

* to 1945, third lines (3 yr. average)
1952 benchmark
1962-66 actual situations

1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
experienced regular upward movement only in the years after World War II. The trend line for goat herding may be considered representative of the entire agricultural sector during Transition insofar as it indicates an initial recovery after the establishment of the Republic, followed by a sharp slump as Turkey suffered the full impact of the Depression. Figure 16 gives supplementary confirmation to this latter phenomenon: total export value declined, after a peak in 1928, until at the 1934 trough it was only 53% of the former figure. Since agricultural produce accounted for at least 83% of total export value, the Depression's effect on Turkish farm profits was obviously catastrophic.

Though dislocation of international trade contributed to the malaise of Turkish agriculture, other considerations were probably of more fundamental importance. The first of these was the Kemalist Government's failure to integrate the rural sector into its economic planning. As was shown in earlier chapters, Turkish farming suffered from an endemic capital shortage, and this shortage led to soil depletion through erosion, deforestation and the like. In addition, efforts to increase storage capacity for market crops were largely overlooked until after World War II; and though early Kemalist Governments entered into an extensive program of railroadization (Figure 8), trackage was laid with reference more to strategic necessity than to the needs of the farm population. This latter phenomenon reflects the fact that Turkey has never run up against the Malthusian limit. Though very heavy population density is found in some of the fertile coastal areas, a large proportion of the interior is made up of land which, though marginal, nonetheless can sustain individual peasant families unable to maintain a foothold
in the more productive lands of the Piedmont.

Stagnation overtook Indian agriculture at about the time of entry into Transformation and remained in being throughout most of the Inter-war years. Foodstuffs suffered particularly. Index number estimates using 1893/4 - 1895/6 as a base (= 100) indicate that while per capita output of all crops had declined to 80 by the years 1936/7 - 1945/6, food crops had dropped to 68.\(^4\) Part of agriculture's decline can be attributed to a shifting in the terms of trade against world raw material exporters over roughly the years 1920-36. However, since Indian population was growing at an increasing rate throughout most of the same period, it clearly would be inappropriate to associate trouble within the agricultural sector solely to a weakening of export markets. On the other hand, if population growth and political crisis are discussed in conjunction with shifts in the terms of trade, we may arrive at general conclusions reflecting the full spectrum of influences which weakened the agricultural sector.

During the present century, products of agriculture have consistently provided India's major foreign exchange earning capacity (Figure 17). So long as foreign demand remained high, the Government of India continued to try to stimulate productivity increases. With a declining overseas market following World War I, and with political crisis as governmental responsibility was given (under terms of the G.O.I. Act of 1919) to often-recalcitrant Indian legislators, Government investment in rural sector social overhead temporarily tapered off. Recovery followed

during the latter 1920's, but after the bottom dropped out of world markets, Government funds allocated to the agricultural sector were sharply cut (Figure 11).

Private investment also declined during the Interwar years. Part of this reflected movements in the business cycle, but an additional cause was provided by a slackening of foreign investment in agriculture due to uncertainty regarding India's political future. Indians themselves could not wholly counteract this trend; for while sinking overseas demand snuffed out surplus profits in agricultural raw materials, Indian population grew at an increasing rate and thus drained income into direct consumption. Soil depletion was an inevitable result of the confluence of Governments', private-foreign, and private-domestic failures to maintain the level of investment.

In summary, we may say that Indian agriculture entered into a surge of rapid development earlier in the growth cycle than did either Japan or Turkey. This development was very largely a by-product of external economies. State-supported creation of transport capacity, irrigation works, and similar capital improvements opened the interior and allowed India's resource potential to be tapped at an increasingly rapid rate. However, Indian agriculture suffered from sectoral stagnation throughout most of Transformation. Turkey also experienced a Transformation phase of agricultural decline; for during the Interwar years most raw material exporters suffered from softness in world markets. But during the late 1930's when the terms of trade shifted back in favor of primary products, Turkish farms continued in a state of underdevelopment; for the Anatolian interior had not experienced
during Transition-Transformation the beneficent effects of progressive governmental assistance to the rural sector. Nonetheless, despite the relatively low level of Turkish agricultural productivity down into attempted Take-Off, Republican Turkey escaped those dire social consequences which were India's during its years of sectoral decline. Even though the potential of the land was not exploited to an optimum degree, Transformational Turkey avoided the wracking problems which attend excessive population pressure on the resources base.

Turkey could by and large feed itself. On the other hand, the Kemalists' failure to promote increases in per capita agricultural output made it impossible for Transformational Turkey to realize the economic benefit which had accrued to Meiji Japan; that is the creation of a farm surplus which could earn foreign exchange. Shortage of transport and of storage capacity locked up much of the product of good harvest years. Profits were held in check; the possibility of soil reclamation and productivity increase were strictly limited well through Transformation.

B. Mineral Production (Figures 4-6)

As with agriculture, the period of India's first great mineral surge was initiated during the latter half of the 19th Century. It was followed by a gradual tapering off during the Interwar years. Causes of this decline included both a softening of overseas demand, and laggard growth of domestic producer-good capacity. Even coal production fell during the Depression when tonnage carried by Indian railroads slipped back, and the Calcutta light industrial complex faltered.
Figure 1: Japan: Mineral Production

A. Coal (Unit: Tons/Thousands)
B. Trend Line (2 yr. overlap)
C. Index of Mineral Production (Base Figures on 1921-25
Base Line)
D. Trend Line (5 yr. overlap)
Figure 3: Turkey: Mineral Production

A: Chrome, monthly averages (Unit = tons/tons)

A': Chrome, annual figures (Unit = tons/tons)

B: Unwashed Coal, monthly averages (Unit = tons/hundred)

B': Unwashed Coal, annual figures (Unit = tons/hundred)

C: Copper, monthly averages (Unit = tons)

C': Copper, annual figures (Unit = tons/hundred)

D: Iron Ore, monthly averages (Unit = tons/hundred)

Monthly averages and annual figures are not comparable.
Figure 6.
Indian Mineral Production

A. Coal (Unit: tons/100 thousand)
B. Manganese (Unit: tons/hundred)
C. Iron Ore (Unit: tons/100 thousand)

* In 1935, trend lines (5 yr. averages)
1940 benchmark (coal)
1950 benchmark (iron ore)
1960 pt. seq., annual sitations

Transition
Transformation
Take-off?
Though we lack adequate statistical data for Transformational Turkey, we know that mineral output slumped badly at the time of the National Revolution. Both managerial talent and funds for capital formation were drained off by foreign enterprises withdrawing from Turkey. Shortages of capital and talent were gradually overcome, but success in these areas was achieved only when the Depression had approached its trough. Thus, Republican Turkey was for sometime unable to tap potential export demand for minerals as fully as had been the case before 1918. It was, in fact, not until the Sümer and Eti Bank plans had created new domestic requirements that the Turkish mineral sector as a whole moved into a high rate of growth. Coal provided the most striking exception to this pattern, for Turkish collieries benefitted throughout the Depression from repair and extension of the Anatolian rail net. Chrome ore also found a growing market as rearmament began in Nazi Germany.

Of the three subject countries, Japan alone experienced a consistently high growth rate of mineral output during Transition and Transformation. In marked contradistinction to the relative passivity of Kemalist Governments down into the Depression, and of Indian Governments at least until the Indian Stores Act of 1931, both Tokugawa and Meiji Governments made a distinct effort throughout Transition and Transformation to stimulate the growth of heavy goods sectors. A strong domestic demand for minerals thus was assured to the Japanese irrespective of fluctuations in foreign markets. Since changes in the rates of development of the agricultural, as well as the mineral, sectors of all three countries closely paralleled shifts in basic government
economic policies, there is seen to have been a high degree of correlation between the actions of Japanese, Turkish and Indian political bodies, and the rates of growth achieved in raw material production.

C. Creation of Social Overhead Capital (Figures 7-11)

Certain of the reasons for Governments' effect on the rate of primary product growth during Transition and Transformation are recorded in the charts on social overhead capital. Figures 10 and 11 are particularly instructive. Figure 11 shows that Government of India total expenditure levels increased at a very low rate except during the period of World War I (and World War II). As a result, while Indian population figures for 1931 surpassed those of the 1921 census by 12%, total annual charges against revenues had increased in the same period by an increment of no more than 3%. By contrast, Meiji Government slackened high investment rates only during the years of abrogation of feudal pensions, the Satsuma Rebellion, and of Matsukata's deflationary finance policies. Consequently, while trend line averages for Japan show population increases amounting to roughly 4% between 1875 and 1880, and again between 1880 and 1885, total Central Government investment rose over the respective periods by increments of 14% and 6%, or by 11% and 4% if transport investment is eliminated.

Transport development, of course, should not be discounted. The results of Japanese, Turkish and Indian dissimilarity in investment orientation with respect to railroads may be viewed symbolically by referring to differences in those trend lines on Figures 7, 8 and 9 which relate to the growth of railroad trackage. However, too close a
Figure 7. Japan: Communication and Transport

A. Railroad Trackage in Operation (Unit = Miles)
B. Trend Line (5 yr. overlaps)
C. Length of Steamships (Unit = Tons/Year)
D. Length of Telegraph Wire (Unit = Mi.)

Transition  Transformation  Take-Off
1870  1875  1880  1885  1890
Figure 2: Turkey: Communication and Transport

Social Development

A. - Main Line Railroad Trackage: Trend Line to 1930; 1943 (Km.

annual citations [Unit = Km.
B. - Railroad Traffic: Net Tonnage Carried per 10,000 Km. [Unit =

tons/hundred]
C. - Total Road and Track (Unit = Km./ten)
D. - Internal Message Units/Month: Telegraph & Wireless (Unit = thousand)
E. - Number of Schools (Unit = ten)
F. - Number of Radios (Unit = hundred)

Transformation Take-Off (√)

1930 1935 1940 1945 1950
Figure 10: Japan's Government Investment Patterns

A. - Total State Expenditure (Unit = Yen/Thousand)
B. - Total Central Government Investment (Unit = Yen/Thousand)
C. - Total Military Investment (Unit = Yen/Thousand)
D. - Central Government Investment in Transport, especially
    Railroads (Unit = Yen/Thousand)
E. - Capital Creation: School Buildings (Public and Private)
    (Unit = Yen/Thousand)
F. - Central Government Road and Bridge Construction
    (Unit = Yen/Thousand)

- Trend lines (10 yr. overlap)

Transition
Transformation
Take-Off

1870 1875 1880 1885 1890
comparison must not be drawn, for both India and Turkey began constructing railroads earlier than is shown on the charts, while the Japanese trend line traces the initiating stages of Japan's railroad building. Moreover, contrasts drawn between India and Turkey are likely to be somewhat misleading; for a portion of Turkey's apparent railroad extension during the 1920's represented not new roadbed, but rather the repair of lines damaged during the National Revolution.

Since Government of India total expenditures increased at a rather low annual rate throughout most of Transformation, the trend line on education (Figure 11) holds particular significance. From roughly the turn of the Century, the education wage bill grew at a higher pace than any other expenditure plotted with but one exception: the World War I military budget. And during the years immediately following the Crash, Indian educational expenditures continued to advance, though all other plotted expenditures declined.

Turkish figures on school building (Figure 8) do not take us back earlier than 1939, but since most primary and secondary education was left to local initiative during the 1930's there seems no reason to assume that a markedly greater rate of increase would be shown in a backward projection to 1923 than is seen on the chart for the years of Take-Off. Of course, a good deal of educational development had been initiated by Young Turk Governments, but the dislocations of World War I and the National Revolution temporarily halted further growth. Still, since the Kemalists began early an extensive program of adult education, it is possible that a backward projection of the charted figure on school construction would fail to give an adequate indication of the scale of
increase involved in Turkey's post-Language Reform educational effort.

Material presented in Chapters 14 and 15 clearly suggests that the Kemalist Turks in fact invested more heavily in mass education than did the Meiji Oligarchs; but it seems unlikely that the Turks spent nearly as large a percentage of total public revenues on the development of broad public education as did India's Transformational governments.

In long-run terms, Japan's relatively slow development of mass education may have had detrimental effects both politically and socially. In the short-run, however, the Japanese benefitted greatly from the training of an elite of technical specialists. This professional class made possible the rapid utilization of new technologies in developing Japan. At the same time, since the popular majority was only peripherally effected, demonstration effects from abroad were narrowly channelled: demand for shifts in the composition of consumer products was held down. 5

As a consequence, Japan moved forward through the post-feudal era with greater industrial stress being placed on buildup of producer goods or foreign exchange earners than on creation of the capacity to produce entirely new consumer goods for domestic consumption.

D. Industrial Production (Figures 12-14)

The plotted figures symbolizing change in the scale of Japanese

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5 A notable exception to the general rule of sustained patterns of consumer behavior took place in the area of textiles. After the opening of Japan to foreign trade, Western machined cottons and woollens rapidly flooded the domestic market. Of higher quality and lower price than most Japanese textiles, they quickly destroyed large segments of the domestic handicrafts industry. To attempt to end this particular form of specie drain, the Meiji Oligarchs attempted to establish modern cotton and woollen industries as import substitutes. Highly successful in ending the competition of imported cotton textiles, the Japanese were unable to compete successfully with imported woollens.
Figure 13: Turkey: Industry Production (trend lines: 3 yr. overlap)

A. Steel Production (Unit = tons/hundred)
B. Cotton Yarn Production in Public Sector Plants (Unit = metres/hundred)
C. Glass Bottle Production: monthly averages (Unit = tons)
D. Lignite Coal's Output & Steel Production: monthly averages
   (Unit = tons/hundred)
* = year 1940 individually plotted
E. Cement Production: monthly averages (Unit = tons)
F. Coke Production: monthly averages (Unit = tons/thousand)
* = year 1938 individually plotted
Figure 14: Industrial Production

- A: Textile Production (Unit: pounds/hundred thousand)
- B: Paper Production (Unit: pounds/hundred thousand)
- C: Steel ingot Production (Unit: tons/thousand)
- D: Cement Production (Unit: tons/thousands)

**A**: not comparable with A. Unit for A: yards/million
industrial activity suggest that heavy plant making use of imported materiel moved into a stage of rapid construction at least as early as 1875. This we know to be true. In addition to expansion of the infrastructure, machine shops, dockyards and arsenals all were enlarged rapidly throughout the Transformational period. With the exception of a temporary private-sector setback during the years of structural readjustment, this steady increase in buildup of capital goods and equipment continued largely unchecked well into Take-Off. 6

Sums expended by the Japanese on imports of capital stock increased so rapidly, the average value of metals and metal manufacturers imported during 1883-90 was more than twice what it had been over the years 1873-82. 7 Moreover, during the same periods, the composition of imported metal goods changed markedly. While plate and sheet iron accounted for a steady 7-8% of total metals import value throughout both periods, the import value of rails rose from 2.6% of total in 1873-82, to more than 16% of total during 1883-90.

Heavy goods sectors provided the major stimuli to Japanese capital creation during most of Transformation. After 1882, however, machine textiles production began a spectacular climb. Cotton yarn output, which had averaged approximately 2.8 thousand kori over the years 1874-82, jumped to 7.5 thousand in 1882 and then achieved an annual average of 35.4 thousand kori during the years 1883-90. This increase,

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6 The classification "arms, ammunition, clocks, instruments, apparatus, tools & machineries" of the Japanese Financial Annual shows that the average expenditure on these items rose 15.8% for the years 1874-81 over the years 1868-76. The 1874-81 figure declined by about 8% over the next period, 1879-86. Unfortunately, there is insufficient breakdown of categories to make these figures particularly useful. Department of Finance, Financial Annual of Japan #1, Tokyo, 1901, p. 50.

largely reflective of Shibusawa Eiichi's example of creative entrepreneurship, made it possible for the Japanese to hold cotton yarn imports at approximately the same level of 17% of total import commodity value during the eight years 1883-90 as over the preceding fifteen years, 1868-82.

Transformational Japan attempted to increase producer and consumer goods capacity concurrently so that the total industrial posture of the State might be strengthened. In India, an entirely contrary phenomenon existed. With the exception of social overhead capital, there was no significant Indian investment in heavy goods prior to mid-Transition. The founding of the Tata enterprises dented this pattern; but not until the impact of capital goods shortages was experienced during World War I did either the Indian business community, or the Government of India, become truly aware of the dangers arising out of an unbalanced industrial complex. Thereafter, sporadic efforts were made to expand the metallurgical industries and to create in India shops capable of repairing major capital goods. Despite the introduction of protective tariffs, however, development of producer goods capacity lagged well through Transformation. It is significant that until the mid-1930's, steel production remained too small to warrant sectoral inclusion in most official statistical annuals.

Indian consumer goods capacity had developed at a fairly rapid rate during the last three decades of the 19th Century. As is shown in Figure 14, textile production did not falter until the period of World War I. Thereafter, Indian textiles slowed in their rate of increase as continued dependence on obsolescent equipment lessened sectoral productivity and damaged Indian machined fabrics' competitive position both domestically
and in world markets. Uncertainty regarding India's political future seems to have borne heavily on this sectoral weakness by lessening the willingness of investors to support rejuvenation programmes in either the cotton or jute industries. The Congress' boycott of machined fabrics is therefore seen to have acted as a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it induced millions of Indians to forego all but homespun and thus cut profit levels in the soft goods industry. On the other, through its political effectiveness it adversely affected all industry by raising uncertainties as to the future status of private property.

The development of industry in Transformational Turkey bore features suggesting elements of both the Japanese and Indian cases. As in both other countries, rather low levels of growth obtained in Turkey so long as capital creation in the industrial sector was left primarily in the hands of private entrepreneurs. After 1930, however, the Kemalists attempted to stimulate growth in ways reminiscent of those employed by the Meiji Oligarchs during the early years of the post-feudal era. However, two significant differences existed between the Turkish and Japanese cases. Many Turkish government officials suffered from a feeling of doctrinaire antagonism toward the private sector. In Japan on the other hand, positive collusion between the Oligarchs and leading merchant families was the rule. Furthermore, in Turkey as in India, State sponsorship of industrial growth initially applied more to consumer than to the capital-goods sectors. A marked change of emphasis took place during the last years of Turkey's Transformation; but this change was more directly the result of world political affairs than it
was a product of new insights into the workings of the economy. Only when deterioration of international relations had clearly raised the threat of war did Turkey turn its resource capacity toward the stimulation of a capital goods buildup comparable to that which had taken place in the light industry and mineral product sectors under the direction of the Sumer and Eti Banks.

E. Foreign Trade and Vital Statistics (Figures 15-20)

We have hitherto made sufficient reference to foreign trade data to obviate the need for lengthy comment here. The figures dealing with population growth and occupational change similarly need little textual accompaniment, though certain salient features are worthy of particular comment.

Figure 19 dramatizes the weakness experienced during Turkey's Transformational and early Take-Off development cycle. Growth did take place, but a disproportionate percentage of the work force was diverted out of direct production into service roles. Perhaps for this reason, it is inappropriate to attribute the initiation of Take-Off to the year 1938. This problem will be discussed in a subsequent section.

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8 In the Indian material presented in Figure 17, the 1951 occupational breakdown is given in terms of percentages because of uncertainty whether a graphical plot would accurately reflect changes in the composition of the work force. Shifts in the methods of enumeration used in the 1951 census raise questions as to the comparability of post-war and pre-war data. The printed estimate of percentage change 1931-51 is, we believe, essentially correct - but it is not necessarily exact.

9 Because of insufficient information on prices, net barter terms of trade figures cannot be derived. Gross barter figures might have been substituted, but for purposes of this study it was felt that value and composition data such as are employed in Figures 15-17 would be more satisfactory.
Figure 10.

Value of Imports by Commodity Group (% of Total Import Value)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity Group</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950-54</th>
<th>1955-56</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction Materials</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery &amp; Equipment</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption Goods</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Materials</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Value of Exports by Commodity Group (% of Total Export Value)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity Group</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1950-54</th>
<th>1955-56</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Products</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Products</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Raw Materials</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Products &amp; Semi-Products</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transformation, Take Off (?)
Figure 18: Japan: Population and Vital Statistics

A. Total Population (Unit = ten thousand)
B. Population Engaged in Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries
   (Unit = ten thousand)
C. Population Engaged in Manufacture
   (Unit = thousand)
D. Population Engaged in Building (Unit = thousand)
E. Population Engaged in Transport (Unit = thousand)
F. Population Engaged in Mining (Unit = thousand)

Time (1875-1910)
Figure 10: Labor Force Population and Vital Statistics

1. Total Population (Unit = Ten thousand)
2. Teachers, Physicians, Nurses, Foresters (Unit = Ten thousand)
3. Craftsmen and Production Workers (Unit = thousand)
4. Professional, Technical, Managerial, Clerical & Administrative Personnel (Unit = thousand)
5. Transport and Communications Workers (Unit = thousand)
6. Mining and Quarrying Workers (Unit = thousand)

1930 1935 1940 1945 1950
Figure 28. India: Population and Vital Statistics (Unit = million)

1. Total Population
2. Population Engaged in Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing
3. Population Engaged in Manufacture, Mining, Construction
4. Population Engaged in Transport and Other Services
5. Population Engaged in General Labour
6. Population Engaged in Trade

Occupational Distribution, 1961

% of pop. Estimate of Change since
1951

Calculators of Land: 10.6
Agricultural Labourers: 12.0
Land Owners: 3.4
Production other than: 1.3
Cultivation: 19.0

Transport: 1.5
Other: 12.0

Despite Turkey's waste of manpower during the period of Transformation, the Turkish experience as graphed appears to have been more conducive to development of a modern-oriented labor force than has been India's. However, the slopes found on Figure 20 cannot be taken at face value, for occupational classifications as given are somewhat ambiguous. The sharp decline of population engaged in manufacture, mining and construction, for example, cannot be taken as an indication of a marked shift out of modern industry. What is exhibited is the net effect of the decline of traditional manufacturers in the face of the rise of national markets for machined goods. The rapid growth of trading as an occupation during early Transition can be partially attributed to this marketing phenomenon, and insofar as a rise in the trade sector reflected an extension of a money economy into the hinterland, prospects for economic growth cannot be said to have suffered during the pre World War I years. On the other hand, it will be noted that an increasing percentage of the labor force was consistently being thrown on the land during Transition and early Transformation. This fact, plus the rise in the number of general laborers during Transformation, show that industrial stagnation and agricultural underemployment went forward hand in hand during the Interwar years.

II - The End of Transformation and Initiation of Take-Off Attempts

It would be beyond the proper scope of this paper to comment on Professor W.W. Rostow's Take-Off construct as a general phenomenon.\[^{10}\]

However, as we shall attempt to demonstrate below, the countries presently under study all appear to have moved into at least attempted Take-Off as a consequence of an identifiable process of evolution occurring during the periods we call Transition and Transformation. We believe, therefore, that we can isolate within broad limits certain historical changes which made possible and probable the late 19th Century Japanese, and the contemporary Turkish and Indian, efforts to achieve self-sustaining economic growth.

What are characteristic features distinguishing Transition-Transformation—i.e., Rostow's "Stage" of "Preconditions"—from the "Stage" of "Take-Off"? A rough differentiation can be established by contrasting the two Stages' sources of creative entrepreneurship in non-primary product growth sectors. As was shown in earlier chapters, Preconditions Japan, Turkey and India were similar with respect to growth rates in only one regard. All three societies made sustained efforts to increase their stocks of overhead capital. This phenomenon must necessarily hold true in newly developing societies. The creation of new capacity in transport, public health, and education, is required before the conditions are met which make maintenance of a high rate of growth in manufacturers possible. But had it not been for governmental activity either as direct creator of new plant, or as an agency subsidizing and hence inducing private development of the infrastructure, rapid growth of social overhead capital would not have taken place in any of our

11 cf.: W.W. Rostow's forthcoming "Leading Sectors and the Take-Off", to be published as part of the proceedings of the International Economic Association's 2-11 September 1960 meeting at Kostanz on the topic: "The Economics of 'Take-Off' into Sustained Growth".
subject countries. Therefore, it may be said that, during the Preconditions phases of Japanese, Turkish and Indian history, creative entrepreneurship in key growth sectors was largely a function of public institutions.

As is amply demonstrated by the Japanese case, economic growth directly attributable to public initiative may well decline during the Stage of Take-Off. Development of the infrastructure increases the options available to the private entrepreneur notably by extending the range of potentially profitable investment opportunities and by diminishing the amount of sunk capital which must be created before return on investment can begin. Import substitutes in heavy goods sectors may be established, for the needs of Government (e.g., for military equipment) and the needs of the rapidly burgeoning infrastructure (e.g., the railroads) may stimulate investments in basic industry. At the same time, external economies derived particularly through the expansion of transport, communications and power cut costs, open new markets of factor supply and product demand, and thereby markedly increase the yield potentials available to those who invest

12 We make this statement as an empirical observation. In terms of the development of transport, for example, we find in Japan that railroadization was initiated by the Restoration Government, and that the creation of a steam-powered merchant marine depended upon direct Governmental subsidy of Mitsubishi. Turkey's railroads were built either by Capitulatory legatees, or by foreign agencies under contract to the Ottoman Government. The idea of railroadization in India was conceived by the Government of India, and though part of the railnet was constructed by private agencies, these agencies were guaranteed profits of a stated level by the G.O.I.
capital within a wide range of consumption items. During Take-Off, therefore, the economy begins to gain the ability to grow of its own dynamics. Creative entrepreneurship on a large scale can begin to become a function of private, rather than public, institutions.13

This condition needs strong emphasis. In none of the cases presently under study do we have evidence suggesting that rapid growth of the infrastructure would have been attained without extensive State intervention during Preconditions. In all the cases studied, we begin to see shifts in the composition and magnitude of demand during Take-Off, and these shifts moderate the hitherto dominating relative importance of Government's entrepreneurial role. The economy, in short, is beginning to grow specifically because profit possibilities increase and are exploited with expansion of the basic capital stock.

Our initial differentiation of Preconditions and Take-Off is far from precise. Though we shall draw attention to additional qualitative and quantitative distinctions in the passages following, at the end of the chapter our analysis will still remain highly partial. We believe categorically that this must be so. The magnitude of the problem involved in full identification of necessary and sufficient conditions for growth (or for passage into any one of the growth phases considered in this study) may exceed the present capacity of social science technique. Even if we have the tools to handle the problem, prudence

13 Obviously, the fact that the crucial role of Government may decline during Take-Off does not necessarily mean that it inevitably will decline. National planning may be resorted to, as in fact has been the case in both Turkish and Indian history. But where this planning has not been muddied by doctrinaire considerations, it has been based on technical short-run assumptions which make no automatic denial of the possibility that private initiative may become increasingly central to the growth process over time.
calls for a very tentative sort of analysis until the body of refined, country-by-country data in hand has considerably augmented our knowledge of the growth process as a socio-psychological and political, as well as an economic, phenomenon.\textsuperscript{14}

A. The Watershed Separating Transformation and Attempted Take-Off

In view of our earlier identification of characteristics of the years of Transformation, we may tentatively say that the period closes only when the following conditions obtain:

1) the capacity to support a national market structure has been achieved through: political unification and power centralization; creation of requisite quanta of social overhead capital; establishment of a uniform currency; and development of financial institutions capable of mobilizing large amounts of savings for allocation into investment;

\textsuperscript{14}If we attempt to derive a fully dynamic, instead of period-based growth model, the problem immediately becomes considerably more complex. As an example of the difficulties involved, let us reconsider the Transitional-Transformational evolution of Japan . . .

The historical cases on which the present study is founded suggest that self-sustaining economic growth cannot be achieved in a country where the Regions hold the power of effective veto over the policy decisions of the Center. If this be true, then the abolition of feudalist vestiges in 1871 was a necessary precondition to Japan's ultimate Take-Off. But abolition of feudalism in 1871 might not have occurred had either kobu gattai, or the creation of a shogunate successor to that of Tokugawa, been achieved. Why did not either of these possible events transpire? Apparently, the creation of a Satcho-Hito alliance was a major determinant. But why did that alliance come into being? Two seemingly fortuitous events may have been crucial: Satsuma's provision of good treatment to Chosu samurai captured during the latter clan's August 1864 raid on Kyoto; the bakufu's persistence in mounting a second invasion of Chosu in July 1866, despite the opposition of most of the major fudai and tozama clans. Events of this nature are not easily taken into account by dynamical models, but at least the major factors likely to bring them about should be if the model is to have general utility.
2) a sense of national identity has been established at least throughout the urban sector;

3) the ruling elite has become ready, or has actually begun, to initiate and support policies directed toward the introduction of rapid economic growth either in order to achieve growth per se, or for the purpose of realizing some other ultimate objective;

4) the ruling elite's desire to see the range of modern technology extended is supported by an effective popular majority in the urban sector (at least).

This catalogue of necessary conditions requires successful consolidation of political power by the modernist elite. At the same time, it indicates that the three related conditions which Professor Rostow stipulates as being essential components of Take-Off can be realized. 15

By associating our quadrangular yardstick with specific events, we can establish the following as watershed dates indicating passage from Transformation into Take-Off:

1) For Japan, 1886. The twelvemonth previous had witnessed abolition of the Kobusho, an event by which the Government officially gave up its role as creative entrepreneur in non-strategic industries. Additionally, during 1885 full paper/silver convertibility had been established. With the lowering of the interest rate in 1886, structural readjustment was completed and the Take-Off could begin.

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15 For the present purposes the take-off is defined as requiring all three of the following related conditions:
(a) a rise in the rate of productive investment from (say) 5 percent or less to over 10 per cent of national income (or net national product);
(b) the development of one or more substantial manufacturing sectors, with a high rate of growth;
(c) the existence or quick emergence of a political, social and institutional framework which exploits the impulses to expansion in the modern sector and the potential external economy effects of the take-off and gives to growth an on-going character.” W.W. Rostow, “The Take-Off into Self-Sustained Growth”, loc. cit., p. 32.
2) For Turkey, 1938. On 1 November 1937, Atatürk had initiated a three year mining development programme in order to increase the supply of coal, oil, copper, lead, silver and iron available for both domestic and foreign markets. The prospective Second Five Year Plan (which was never fully drafted due to the onrush of World War II) possessed the following tentative objectives: in addition to mining development under the 1937 revision of the Eti Bank's administrative responsibility, regional electric grids were to be established, plant for the production of chemicals, metals and household fuels was to be created, and both agricultural product and shipping were to be increased. This last component is exceedingly significant, for it indicates the end of Turkey's preoccupation with the creation of import substitutes. Unlike the semi-autarky of the Sumer and Eti Bank Plans of 1914-38, the Second Plan rationale explicitly courted the idea of development of export surpluses in minerals and agriculture in order to increase the rate at which foreign capital goods could be imported into the country.16

3) For India, 1951. During 1950, India had participated in creation of the Colombo Plan, whose purpose was to establish channels for joint assistance as a means of aiding Asian members of the British Commonwealth in their efforts to achieve economic progress. The Indian Parliament's acceptance, in July 1951, of the G.O.I. Planning Commission's comprehensive draft proposals for a First Five Year Plan signified India's passage into attempted Take-Off. The First Plan had as its proximate objectives the restoration of pre-War quantities of essential consumer goods available per capita, and the speeding up of India's investment rate through centralized control of resource allocations. More explicit longer-run goals were worked out subsequently. These included a doubling of national income (1950/51 - 1967/68) and of per capita income (1950/51 - 1973/74); and a reduction of the proportion of the population dependent upon agriculture from approximately 71 to 60 per cent of total over the years 1951/52 to 1975/76.17

It will be noted that, in each instance, a modification of established Governmental economic policy is used to signify the bridging of the Transformation/Take-Off watershed. No contingent relationship is to be

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17 cf.: G.O.I. Planning Commission, The First Five Year Plan; A Draft Outline, New Delhi, July 1951, p. 37. An extensive exegesis relating to planning goals was set forth in The Draft for the Second Plan (1956). However, much of the Socialist dogma invoked in this document has more recently been jettisoned.
inferred; the fact that we have found an economic, rather than political, event closing off the period of Transformation does no more than reinforce our observation that political consolidation and power centralization apparently must precede marked upward shifting in the rate of growth of net national product. But does fulfillment of our catalogue of quadrangular conditions guarantee successful Take-Off? We think not, for we believe that a critical problem may arise in those cases where the success of attempts to raise the rate of net investment are partially determined by the degree of success achieved in concurrently realizing Professor Rostow's "third related condition": the portmanteau factor which requires a positive social, psychological and political response to objective economic possibilities for sustained growth.

B. Spontaneous and Induced Take-Offs: A Tentative Appraisal (Figures 21-23)

A distinction can be drawn between those countries whose rapid growth during Take-Off is largely a product of creative entrepreneurship within the private sector; and those other countries in which the public sector leads either through direct investment, or through national planning of resource allocation. We shall call a Take-Off derived through the former means "spontaneous". In the latter instance, rapid growth clearly is "induced".

The course of Japanese economic development during the last fifteen years of the 19th Century provides a model example of one form of spontaneity in growth during Take-Off. It is true that the Imperial Government continued to support private agencies to the extent of completing its obligations as a construction agent for a private firm. At
Japan: The Takeoff

1. National Income at Current Prices (Unit: yen/hundred thousand)
2. National Income at 1923-25 Prices (Unit: yen/hundred thousand)
3. Central Government Investment (Unit: yen/hundred thousand)
4. Railroad Traffic (Unit: miles)
5. Cotton Yarn Production (Unit: kgs/hundred)
6. Steel Supply (Unit: metric tons)
7. Minerals Production (Unit: total index numbers x ten)
8. Agricultural Production (Unit: total index numbers)
9. Total Population (Unit: thousands)

Transition 1879 1875 1880 1885 1890 Transformation Take-off
Figure G1: The Take-off

1. Cotton Textile Production (Unit = pounds/bushel)
2. Cotton Hectar Production (Unit = hectar/1000)
3. Railroad Trackage (Unit = miles/1000)
4. Coal Production (Unit = tons/1000)
5. National Income, actual (Unit = Rs./100 million)
6. National Income, targets (Unit = Rs./100 million)
7. Manufacturing Production (Unit = tons/1000)
8. Cotton Production (Unit = bales/1000)
9. Steel Ingots Production (Unit = tons/1000)

Transition, Transformation, Take-Off (9)
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
the same time, with the exception of buildup of certain strategic industries, private initiative and finance operated as the chief engines of change. Particularly within transport and textiles, two of the early leading sectors of Japanese Take-Off, private agencies mobilized and invested the bulk of funds allocated to capital creation.

Beginning in 1882, of course, the Meiji Oligarchs had begun investing heavily in naval armaments. Along with a potential demand for rails and rolling stock, the Government's new requirement for engineering products called forth in the 1890's a heavy stress on private establishment of firms dealing in the fabrication of metals and metal goods. The Government's decision to intrude into Korea's (and China's) internal affairs thus provided a galvanic stimulus to economic growth. But this factor must be measured in its relation to Japanese attitudes: attitudes which were becoming intensely nationalistic, and which equated industrial development with State power. Moreover, the stimulus provided by the flowering of Meiji imperialism needs to be superimposed on a background social system in which both paternalistic autocracy and formal collusion between Government and Big Business were approaching maturity, and in which the social and political institutions developed during Transformation were being buttressed by relatively steady increases in output per capita. Nearly complete realization of Rostow's third "related condition" had already occurred, therefore, before passage into the Take-Off stage had begun.

In contradistinction to Japan, India's post World War I Transformational experience was largely one of declining per capita productivity.
Furthermore, that growing popular idealization of democratic and humanistic values which characterized the years of Gandhiji's ascendancy in the Congress militated against acceptance of any political programme recognizing the de facto perpetuation of helot classes. In coming together, these economic and sociological factors compelled Indian development planners to concern themselves from the first with social welfare as well as with growth per se. Instead of attempting to build a modern economic superstructure on the base of a stagnant rural economy, there have been concerted efforts made to enlarge the capital stock while concurrently increasing the level of consumption throughout society.

Technical economic reasoning was not overlooked in the decision to make the Five Year Plans perform a dual function. Given the extreme poverty of India particularly within the rural sector, there exists the requirement that some degree of social amelioration be achieved merely to satisfy the requirements for a skilled labor force, and to insure the emergence of internal markets for increases in domestic product. But behind such considerations lies the fundamental condition that the Congress is committed by its past to democracy and peaceful methods. The synthetic stimuli to development existing in police or garrison states are thereby denied to present-day Congress leaders intent on maintenance of their political power. To insure the continuation of a democratic political system whose viability must remain in question until per capita income has markedly increased, the Congress has been forced to allocate funds concurrently to both social welfare measures and capital buildup.
Failure to realize marked change in the Rostow portmanteau factor during Transformation forces countries such as India to attempt to induce Take-Off. But the possibility for success in these efforts - particularly in the contemporary situation wherein growth is typically being sought by nations suffering from foreign exchange crisis and extreme population pressure on the resource base - remains moot. Even if an unlimited stock of capital were to be made available to nations entering Take-Off, uncertainty would still remain as to their prospects for achieving self-sustained growth. For at present, since prescriptions detailing methods for successful economic development are insufficiently advanced to enable the projection of political and social prospects in train with predictions of an economic nature, we cannot be confident before the fact that Rostow's first and third "related conditions" will be jointly realized.

Some of the uncertainty surrounding efforts to induce growth may be reduced, however, if empirical studies begin to be made specifically differentiating between the experiences of countries in which Government has played a central role during Take-Off, and those relatively few other cases in which rapid growth has occurred largely as an autonomous phenomenon. Comparative analyses based on this distinction can be useful not only for the insights which should be provided thereby into conditions requisite for the achievement of self-sustained growth, but also because inquiries of this nature may carry specific benefits to planners on the ground. By reviewing Professor Rostow's rule of thumb regarding the rate of net investment essential for Take-Off, we can perceive one area in which analyses differentiating between "spontaneous"
and "induced" Take-Offs may positively assist in the formulation of investment criteria relating to particular growth programmes.

Professor Rostow explicitly identifies his 10% net investment threshold to self-sustained growth as the product of an arithmetic exercise directed toward 2% per annum increase in NNP per capita, and based on assumptions regarding both the aggregate marginal capital: output ratio, and the rate of population increase. Fundamental difficulties are nonetheless involved in direct translation of the Rostow formula into explicit, Take-Off inducing, growth programmes; for the aggregate marginal capital: output ratio will vary in the quality and extent of its impact both through the forms of capital outlay made, and as regards the strength of these outlays' manipulative influence on the portmanteau factor. This is perhaps one reason for some popular confusion regarding Professor Rostow's first "related condition". As is made clear in Rostow's first Take-Off article (1956), historical cases can be found in which passage through Take-Off seems to have required a net investment rate of less than 10% of NNP. Close examination of these cases is likely to show that the portmanteau factor had been largely realized before the Transformational era closed. Conversely, achievement of a net investment rate substantially in excess of 10% of NNP has not always assured successful passage through the Take-Off. In such historical instances, it appears that insufficient investment may have taken place to bring about both a sustained increase in size of the capital stock and a marked change in the third "related condition" of Take-Off.

Advances in analytic technique have made it possible to identify

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with some accuracy both average, and marginal, capital: output ratios prospectively obtaining within specific industries. However, estimates of capital: output ratios applying across an entire growth programme may not prove useful in practice if they represent more aggregations of discrete industrial ratios. This would hold true in the "induced" case even if complementary or external economy effects were specifically taken into account, for in cases of "induced" Take-Off critical importance attends the fact that capital outlays can affect growth prospects in any one of three ways. Each increment of funds expended under a Plan may either: (1) enter into consumption, in which instance its effect on both behavioral change and the size of the capital stock will be infinitesimal or at best indirect; or (2) it may lead to increases in the size of the capital stock while having no short-run manipulative effect on Rostow's portmanteau factor; or (3) it may have a joint product effect in the short-run and change conditions subsumed under both the first and third of Professor Rostow's "related conditions".

19 cf.: George Rosen, Industrial Change In India, Glencoe, Ill., 1958. In Chapters 4 and 5, Dr. Rosen derives average and marginal capital: output ratios for five major Indian industries.

20 We can draw a rough, exemplary differentiation among these three forms of investment effect by considering the balance of resource allocations made in India during the First Five Year Plan. For simplicity, we shall assume that the rural sector alone fails to fulfill Professor Rostow's third "related condition" and that industrial investments take place only within the urban sector.

As percentages of total net investment made during the years 1951/52-1955/56, sectoral allocations were planned as follows: Agriculture, 14.8%; Irrigation and Power, 16.9%; Transport and Commerce, 18.0%; Industry, 22.3%; Social Services, Rehabilitation and Miscellaneous, 28.0%. (N. Malenbaum & A. Eckstein, India and China: A Study in Contrasting Patterns of Economic Development (mimeographed working draft), Center for International Studies, M.I.T., 1954). If we assume that the 28.0% laid out for social services goes solely into consumption and has no effect on behavioral conditions, our prediction of necessary investment levels will have to be somewhat higher than will be the case if we assume that allocations for social services somehow influence behavior patterns in the short-run and therefore can be added to allocations for Agriculture, Irrigation and Power, and Transport and Commerce to provide joint
Since all three of Professor Rostow's "related conditions" must be realized before Take-Off can be completed, and since the first and third "related conditions" are interdependent to a degree so far undetermined, failure to programme outlays in such fashion as to bring about not only quantitative change in the size of the capital stock, but also qualitative change in the social system, may prevent successful passage through Take-Off. We believe that this fact alone testifies to the need for disaggregative analysis based on historical differentiation between "spontaneous" and "induced" Take-Offs. But the usefulness of such an approach need not stop here, for it should become possible in time to identify a number of forms of investment likely to carry short-run dual product effects. Application of this new stock of knowledge in specific instances could greatly increase the full value received from investment outlays and hence either lower the base costs of Take-Off; or increase the pace at which self-sustained growth comes to be attained.

product effects both on the size of the capital stock, and on short-run behavioral patterns. In either instance, however, and relative to the capital intensity of particular investments, we can assume that insofar as the C:O ratio implies a behavioral as well as a raw capital impact, the C:O ratios derived for investments bearing on the rural sector will be smaller than will be those affecting the urban sector: Irrigation and Power, Transport and Commerce, that portion of Agricultural investment which brings increases of industrial raw materials, and Industry. For industrial buildup by our definition has no influence on realization of Rostow's portmanteau factor and hence fails to exhibit the dual product characteristics of all the other allocations save (possibly) expenditures on Social Services.
Chapter 19

THE SEARCH FOR POWER AS A CAUSE OF GROWTH

A. The Political Factor in Economic Growth

In preceding chapters, materials were presented which dealt with the interaction of certain political and economic variables, and which related this interaction to the processes by which Japan, Turkey and India progressed over time from Tradition on into Take-Off. The form of exposition employed in these chapters was fundamentally influenced by W.W. Rostow's concept of economic growth stages. It was partially determined as well by acceptance of basic postulates relating to human behavior, the struggle for political power, and the existence of irreversibilities in economic development. But the study's structure was not merely the product of deductive reasoning. Its final form was established as a result of empirical investigations which revealed substantial degrees of comparability in the historical experiences of all three countries under examination. Using events indicative of major change as a matrix, an expository framework was derived and applied to the three cases in order to highlight the interplay of political and economic variables, and to show how intimately the struggle for political power appears to have influenced the pace at which economic growth was introduced into Japan, Turkey and India. In the passages following, we shall review certain characteristics of this framework.

The creation of stable socio-political institutions was found to have been a method used by the High Traditional governments in question to improve living standards throughout large portions of their respective
societies while concurrently enhancing their own positions of political power. However, because political actions initiated during High Tradition served to make rigid functional and institutional relationships, neither the Tokugawa shogunate, the Ottoman Sultanate, nor "John" Company's British Government in India was able to respond effectively once the development of internal stability had introduced a new problem in the guise of deepening population pressure on the resource base. Bound by the constraining influence of certain physiographic parameters, Japan, Turkey and India all began to experience conditions leading to a decline in the levels of living common to members of particular social classes. Attempts at redress were insufficient to the need, for while it may have been recognized that the population-resource crisis only could be fully resolved through conquest of the limits historically imposed by the percipient parameters, governmental supports of new inquiry stopped short of the point of application. Rigid concepts provided the substructure of the Traditional elite's power. The demands of power conservation therefore prohibited large-scale introduction of new forms of knowledge, and the application of new policies.

Disruption of orderly social processes became a characteristic phenomenon during the period we have chosen to identify as Late Tradition. In the three historic cases, endogenous factors were not alone in providing cause for change. Japan and Turkey both found the pressure of resource shortage considerably augmented by increasing pressure from abroad. Though the political integrity of India was assured by "John" Company's presence, the extension of British power (hence of Western culture) inland along the major river systems proved itself a destabilizing element.
Though creative response to long-standing problems does not necessarily occur during Late Tradition, in all the cases presently under consideration such an event did take place. During the sub-phase which we have called the "wane" of Tradition, far-sighted members of the bakufu, the Sultanate hierarchy, and the British elite in India began to support marginal social and economic changes, specifically because therein they perceived a method which bore promise of reintroducing vitality into historic governmental institutions. But the reforms of the wane of Tradition were directed toward a very limited end. Believing loss of governmental initiative to be a cause of lagging power rather than a particular manifestation of governmental obsolescence, the three countries' Traditionalist elites postponed fundamental reforms until direct challenges had been made to their authority. In Japan, this challenge was offered by a coalition of Emperor-loyalist daimyo, kuge and samurai. In the Ottoman Empire, Young Turk officers joined with Francophiles and gaiur separatists in a heterogeneous movement against Hamidian autocracy. And in India, first Sepoy troops and the middle ranks of Mughal officialdom, and later Anglicized Indians antagonized by evidences of British racial animosity, rose to threaten the peaceful dominion of the foreigner.

Surrender of some fundamental postulate of the Traditional political system marked passage out of Tradition and into the Transitional phase. Since this surrender was accompanied by alteration of a number of institutional and functional derivatives, policies for the redress of critical problems could for the first time be implemented in depth. Two shifts of a fundamental nature were seen to be characteristic of the period of Transition. On the one hand, men interested and (relatively)
skilled in the application of advanced technologies began to be absorbed into the political hierarchy. On the other, the locus of socio-political power slowly shifted from regional institutions such as the Japanese han, or from particularist groups such as the Islamic functionaries of the Ottoman Empire, to the agencies of the central government.

Despite these changes, members of Traditional elite groups continued to dominate governmental councils during most of the Transitional phase. A profound weakness resulted from this fact; for though measures for gradual alleviation of crisis no longer were beyond the technical capacity of the societies in question, the political weight of conservative interests tended to limit new departures in State policy to those areas which did not appear to jeopardize Traditional patterns of power. Initially, most "new men" members of Transitional governments were themselves dedicated to maintenance of the relics of the past. Having been invited into junior partnership by the historic ruling classes, the "new men" associated their recent preferment with ancient institutions, as well as with modern skills. However, it gradually became apparent to the "new men" that they must free themselves from the regionalist and particularist inhibitions imposed by their conservative superiors. Many considerations may have contributed to the development of this attitude; ambition, operational efficiency, and recognition of national necessity were singled out in the preceding narratives. In terms of its effect on prospect for further growth, the last factor was found to be particularly important. At least by the times of the Kagoshima and Shimonoseki bombardments in Japan, the Greek invasion of
Anatolia in 1919, and the Montagu-Chelmsford Report - "Amritsar Massacre" sequence in India, it had become poignantly evident to the "new men" that hopes for sovereign integrity could not be sustained if the historic prerogatives of special-interest groups were to be nurtured more carefully than was the power of the nation as a whole.

In Japan and Turkey, passage into Transformation was identified by an act disestablishing the institutional foundations from which particularist groups hitherto had made their sorties onto the national scene. India, a special case not only because of its colonial character, but also because of the democratic aspirations of its Anglicized Indian progressives, was said to have entered Transformation when constitutional changes opened Congress membership to the vernacular-speaking populace and swarajya was made official Congress policy. In all three cases, the beginning of Transformation also marked the assumption of political leadership by modernist elements more deeply committed to effective national performance than to the interests of any sub-national group.

Traditional power did not evaporate simply because of passage into the Transformational phase. A number of representatives of historic elite groups were incorporated into the first Governments established by the Satcho Oligarchs and Kemal Ataturk; and in India, Gandhi continually tried to come to terms with the leaders of particularistic social and political organizations. But coalitions incorporating progressives and reactionaries were doomed from the start of Transformation, for each side participated less to benefit the government than to exploit the other's power potential. Progressives wished to canalize the reservoirs of power residing in sub-national groupings into the mainstream of nationalist endeavor. Conversely, reactionaries entered
national government specifically because they hoped to make the nation an umbrella under which their special interests could flourish undisturbed.

Antagonisms between progressives and reactionaries were made more strident by the instability of the Transformational phase. In all three countries, modernist leaders found themselves harassed by persistent resource shortages; popular disaffections resulting from the over-expectation which (particularly in Turkey and India) dated back to late Transition; foreign pressure; and by social flux, as the vestiges of past institutions were successively cast off. In addition, backward-looking members of the political elites in question resorted more and more to obstructionism in political councils.

The strategy of road blocking became, during Transformation, the only method short of complete rupture open to representatives of historic privilege intent on protecting their special interests. This was due to the fact that the locus of political power had slowly shifted away from the Regions to the Center; and though modernist elements were not yet secure in their political primacy, they had nonetheless wrested control over policy initiative away from the groups which had initially introduced the "new men" into roles of political influence. It is perhaps ironic that attempts to establish a reform spirit in Japan, Turkey, and India got so out of hand as eventually to strike down the initial patrons of (limited) progress. In Japan, the Satcho Oligarchs gradually turned on those proposing revitalization of samuraihood and the clan institution. In India, the Congress became antagonistic toward both the Anglicized Indians who had established the Party, and the Britishers who had been their mentors in the Westernizing process. And in Turkey,
though conditions were profoundly changed by events at the end of World War I, the lineal descendants of the New Ottoman Movement and of Young Turk constitutionalism found themselves similarly rebuffed by the leadership in Ankara.

It was noted in earlier chapters that during Preconditions, the rulers of Japan and Turkey used economic development as a major instrument of political change. In India, the G.O.I. had sponsored creation of social overhead as early as Late Tradition not only to benefit English trading interests, but also as a means of control and social amelioration. We have not differentiated precisely between the degree of governmental sponsorship of the economy which may be attributed to particular desires for popular welfare, national security, profit, or some other material or non-economic end. But certain general conclusions nonetheless seem appropriate to our study:

1) The creation in embryo of modern economic institutions may have been the result of private initiatives to a significant degree; but in the three historic cases set forth here, there is little evidence suggesting that creation of capital on a large scale would have taken place without direct governmental intervention, particularly in the Preconditions Stage.

2) From the first, governmental sponsorship of economic growth was closely tied to considerations of political power.

3) As economic growth took place, both the locus of political power, and the relative effectiveness of antagonists in the political arena were gradually altered. The Regions lost power to the Center, just as representatives of the Traditional structure declined in influence in face of the growing importance and power of men skilled in new techniques.

4) A self-generative tendency slowly became built into the three countries' economic systems, in part because of the interaction between politics and economics. New strength in the productive capacity of each country added to the power of emerging modernist elites. At the same time, the desire of these groups to augment their social and political leadership led them to become increasingly receptive to policies designed to hasten the rate of growth of their respective nations.
We do not mean to suggest that, simply because the political success of modernist elites is ineradicably interwoven with conditions in the economy, modernization and development will automatically be attempted by public officials if the private sector fails to respond to growth potentials. But we do think that the evidence of Japanese, Turkish and Indian history suggests that failure to attempt economic growth is not the result of oversight; and conversely that successful economic growth requires a degree of governmental intervention which never declines to zero, but whose magnitude may vary according to the extent of the private sector's capacity to finance capital formation and establish profitable markets of national or international scope.

B. A Short Note on Dogma

Economic development is a technical phenomenon which may occur as a result either of public, or of public and private, initiative. Particularly because of social overhead capital's cost, long gestation, and resultantly low rates of private sector return relative to alternative investment possibilities, it seems unlikely that any country can progress through Preconditions into Take-Off without a large measure of governmental action. Indian history gives specific weight to this conclusion. Even though the Indian railroads were built during the heyday of laissez-faire capitalism, the G.O.I. found it necessary to guarantee minimum returns on equity in order to stimulate private investment in railroads.

Though public intervention seems essential during the Preconditions Stage, private activity appears to gain in possible importance when
higher levels of development are reached. The private sector contributed mightily to Japan's Take-Off. In Turkey, individual initiative has increased rapidly since 1950. India's experience is interesting particularly because of the sympathy toward Socialist goals which long characterized a major portion of the Congress. We have seen that as late as Spring 1949, a bill was passed by the Indian Parliament granting the Republic the right to regulate or expropriate twenty-five basic industries. In June of the same year, a ten year reprieve was given to the owners of private capital. But anti-capitalist sentiment did not moderate, and the Second Plan bore a specifically Socialist overtone. The Third Plan has reversed this trend and, harking back to Prime Minister Nehru's 1951 directive that private enterprise and the essentials of Socialism be employed jointly to bring public welfare, has called for increased private initiative.

It is unfortunate that political dogma is so often confused with economic fact. The historical evidence put forward in the present study fails to support those who assert that private enterprise necessarily must lead in the growth effort. Neither does it show  

1 supra, p. 15.

2 The New York Times, 8 July 1951, p. 15. It is interesting that Russia's current experimentation with novel forms of industrial organization indicates a similar desire to apply Adam Smithian precepts that the wealth of nations benefits from the creative self-interest of individuals. According to a new policy established by the Soviet Central Committee during its meetings of 13-16 July 1960, "a 'socialist dividend' (is) to be paid to industrial managements and regional economic councils for a more efficient utilization of the funds entrusted to them, for turning out goods of higher quality and producing a more complete assortment of goods instead of asserting there has been plan fulfillment because one line of production has been boosted." Paul Wohl, "Reds Experiment With Economy", The Christian Science Monitor, 30 July 1960, p. 1.
that the private sector is incapable of sparking growth, or that Take-Offs led by individual entrepreneurs inevitably must be accompanied by exploitation of the masses.

Though growth may occur irrespective of the existence of Socialist or (mixed) Capitalist institutions, it seems clear that in the contemporary world "induced" Take-Offs are likely to be considerably more prevalent than "spontaneous" Take-Offs. This raises political problems fully distinguishable from the technical problems involved in growth planning. For with "induced" Take-Off, the possibility arises that planning agencies may be created which show no responsiveness to popular will. Insofar as modernist elites may choose to use economic development as a means of increasing their personal positions of power, the hazard becomes great that the economic mechanism may be perverted into a tool for popular suppression. This, we submit, is a much more critical problem than any arising out of a dogmatic interpretation of the growth process. The issue which is significant is not whether private or public institutions provide the chief engines of change, but rather whether the political power created by induced Take-Offs can be harnessed to benefit men at large rather than the practitioners of dictatorial method.
Appendix V. Illustrative Statistics

of Patterns of Growth

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V.2.       Communication & Transport Statistics

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<td>Railroad Traffic: Tonnage Carried</td>
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<td>V.2.-6</td>
<td>Total Radios</td>
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* Sources for all series are listed separately at the end of the Indian tables.
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Communication & Transport Statistics

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Extractive Sector Statistics

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* Thousand Yen

** Million Yen

***New Series
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#### Industrial Production Statistics

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**V.5.-7(J)**

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### Tables V.5.-9, 10 (Japan)

#### Industrial Production Statistics

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(million Yen)
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Tables V.7.-2c, 2d, 2e (Japan)

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### Tables V.1-1, 2, 6, 7 (Turkey)

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### Table V.1-8, 9, 10 (Turkey)

#### Agricultural Statistics

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### Tables V.2.-1, 3, 4 (Turkey)

**Communication & Transport Statistics**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Internal Message Units: Telegraph &amp; Wireless/Mo.</th>
<th>Main Line RR Track (Km.)</th>
<th>Net Tonnage Carried (1000 Km.)</th>
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## Communication & Transport Statistics

### V.2.-6. (T)

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<th>Total Number of Radios (Units)</th>
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### V.2.-7. (T)

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<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total Roads &amp; Track (Km.)</th>
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### V.2.-8. (T)

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<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Total Number of Schools (all kinds)</th>
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<td>1947</td>
<td>17,921 Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>1948</td>
<td>18,211 Fiscal Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>18,336 Fiscal Year</td>
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- The data represents the total number of radios and roads in Turkey over the years 1938 to 1954. The total number of schools is also listed for fiscal years 1938 to 1954.
### Extractive Sector Statistics

**Tables V.3.-1a, 1b, 2a, 2b (Turkey)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chrome (1000 Tons)</th>
<th>Chrome (Monthly averages in Tons)</th>
<th>Unwashed Coal (1000 tons)</th>
<th>Coal Monthly Averages in Tons</th>
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# Extractive Sector Statistics

## Tables V.3.-3a, 3b, 5 (Turkey)

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Copper: State-Owned Mines (1000 tons)</th>
<th>Copper (Monthly Averages in Tons)</th>
<th>Iron Ore (Monthly Averages in Tons)</th>
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### Table: Turkey Financial Statistics

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<th>Net National Product (Million T.L.)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Cement Production (in tons)</td>
<td>Coke Production (in 1000 tons)</td>
</tr>
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<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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### Industrial Production Statistics

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<th>V.5.-9(T)</th>
<th>V.5.-11(T)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ingots &amp; Steel for Casting: Karabük Complex (Monthly Averages in Tons)</td>
<td>Pig Iron: Karabük Complex (Monthly Averages in Tons)</td>
<td>Sugar Production (Tons)</td>
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## International Trade Statistics

### V.6.-1 (T)

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### Tables V.7.-1, 2a, 2b (Turkey)

#### Population & Vital Statistics

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<td><strong>Mining &amp; Quarrying (thousands)</strong></td>
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Tables V.1.-2, 4, 5, 10 (India)

Agricultural Statistics

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<th>Rice (Cleaned CWT.)</th>
<th>Wheat (Tons/Thous.)</th>
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### Tables V.1.-2. 4, 5, 10 (India)

#### Agricultural Statistics

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<td>Rice (Cleaned)</td>
<td>Wheat (Tons/Thous.)</td>
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**Target 3rd Plan**
- 7,200
- 6,500
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Net Plan: 7,200  6,500
### Tables V.2.-1, 3, 4 (India)

#### Communication & Transport Statistics

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### Tables V.2.-1, 3, 4 (India)

**Communication & Transport Statistics**

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**Tables V.3.-2, 5, 7 (India)**

**Extractive Sector Statistics**

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### Tables V.4.-2, 3 (India)

#### Financial Statistics

**V.4.-2.(I)**

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**Notes:**
- Figures are in Rs. (India Rupees).
- N.A. indicates Not Available.
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### Tables V.4.-9 (India)

#### Financial Statistics

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### Financial Statistics

#### Tables V.4.8, 9 (India)

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Target: 14.0

3rd Plan
### Tables V.5.-1, 3, 6 (India)

**Industrial Production Statistics**

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### Industrial Production Statistics

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## Tables V.5–8.9 (India)

### Industrial Production Statistics

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<tr>
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<td>1,540,716</td>
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### Tables V.5-8, 9 (India)

#### Industrial Production Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Paper (tons)</th>
<th>Pig Iron (tons)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,575,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
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<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>97,905</td>
<td>1,405,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>103,194</td>
<td>1,528,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>108,907</td>
<td>1,563,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>131,915</td>
<td>1,708,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>137,504</td>
<td>1,578,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>139,704</td>
<td>1,507,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>155,328</td>
<td>1,685,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>184,885</td>
<td>1,704,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>193,401</td>
<td>1,738,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>210,132</td>
<td>1,715,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60/61</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>9,500,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>3rd Plan</td>
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## Tables V.6.-1, 2 (India)

### International Trade Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports to British India (Rs./10,000)</th>
<th>Exports from British India (Rs./10,000)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>69,591</td>
<td>85,225</td>
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<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>71,133</td>
<td>84,989</td>
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<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>72,830</td>
<td>90,190</td>
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<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>78,830</td>
<td>92,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>83,285</td>
<td>98,833</td>
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<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>86,656</td>
<td>105,366</td>
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<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>93,909</td>
<td>110,190</td>
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<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>84,155</td>
<td>113,354</td>
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<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>95,482</td>
<td>110,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>105,304</td>
<td>111,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>93,275</td>
<td>117,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>89,201</td>
<td>118,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>94,127 (1/1000)</td>
<td>108,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>59,998</td>
<td>80,140</td>
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<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>64,185</td>
<td>78,026</td>
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<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>70,314</td>
<td>81,297</td>
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<td>72,921</td>
<td>90,910</td>
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<td>02</td>
<td>74,132</td>
<td>92,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>87,412</td>
<td>112,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>95,947</td>
<td>116,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>95,843</td>
<td>118,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06</td>
<td>107,881</td>
<td>121,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07</td>
<td>119,288</td>
<td>121,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08</td>
<td>101,020</td>
<td>106,308</td>
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<td>09</td>
<td>106,783</td>
<td>129,578</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>115,687</td>
<td>114,725</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>131,684</td>
<td>158,909</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>152,307</td>
<td>171,233</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>156,498</td>
<td>170,726</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>111,159</td>
<td>124,976</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>92,646 (Rs. 100,000)</td>
<td>138,470 (Rs. 100,000)</td>
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<td>1,98,70</td>
<td>2,53,79</td>
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<td>2,16,11</td>
<td>2,52,44</td>
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<td>2,59,92</td>
<td>2,64,31</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,99,24</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>3,82,33</td>
<td>2,93,93</td>
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<td>3,13,89</td>
<td>2,65,72</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Imports to British India (Rs./100,000)</td>
<td>Exports from British India (Rs./100,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>3,09,77</td>
<td>3,19,08</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>2,90,38</td>
<td>3,67,04</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>3,52,56</td>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>3,90,65</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>2,82,35</td>
<td>3,13,26</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>2,96,41</td>
<td>3,33,39</td>
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<td>3,00,69</td>
<td>3,45,50</td>
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<td>2,77,53</td>
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<td>36</td>
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Estimated Averages, 2nd Five Year Plan:
- Imports to British India: 5,93,00
- Exports from British India: 8,68,00
### Tables V.7.-1, 2a, 2b (India)

#### Population and Vital Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Census Figures (thousand)</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
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<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>255,166</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>257,380</td>
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<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>285,288</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>302,985</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>305,679</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>338,171</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>388,988</td>
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</table>

(million)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
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<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>391</td>
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<tr>
<td>61</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>480</td>
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<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>528</td>
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<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>568</td>
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### Tables V.7.-2c, 2d, 2e (India)

#### Population and Vital Statistics

<table>
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<th>% of Population</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
<th>% of Population</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>5.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
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<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix V: Statistical Sources

A. Japanese Statistics

V.1. - Agricultural Statistics


V.2. - Communication and Transport Statistics


V.3. - Extractive Sector Statistics

2) Uyehara, op.cit., p. 194.

V.4. - Financial Statistics


V.5. - Industrial Production Statistics


V.6. - International Trade Statistics


V.7. - Population and Vital Statistics


2) Kazushi Ohkawa, op.cit., Appendix Table 2.
B. Turkish Statistics

V.1. - Agricultural Statistics


2) 6) 7) Republic of Turkey (Central Statistical Office), Pub.#372;
10)

V.2. - Communication and Transport Statistics


4) 6) Republic of Turkey (Central Statistical Office), #44,45.
7)

V.3. - Extractive Sector Statistics

1) 2)- (monthly averages): Republic of Turkey (Central Statistical Office), #44,45. (annual output), Economic Mission to Turkey, 3) The Economy of Turkey. I.B.R.D., 1951, Table VIII.

V.4. - Financial Statistics


V.5. - Industrial Production Statistics

1) 2) 3) Republic of Turkey (Central Statistical Office), #44,45.
5) 6) 9)
11) Republic of Turkey (Ministry of Finance), op.cit.

V.6. - International Trade Statistics

1) ibid.

V.7. - Population and Vital Statistics

C. Indian Statistics

(N.B. - Except where otherwise noted below, all the material presented in the Indian series is drawn from: H.M. Stationery Office, Statistical Abstract Relating to British India, No. 30 et.seq.; and from G.O.I., Statistical Abstract, India. Additional sources are as follows.)

V.1. - Agricultural Statistics

V.2. - Communication and Transport Statistics
(Plan Targets): Third Five Year Plan, pp. 243-246.

V.3. - Extractive Sector Statistics
7- (Plan Targets): as V.3.2.

V.4. - Financial Statistics
8- (Plan Targets): Third Five Year Plan, pp. 233, 239.

V.5. - Industrial Production Statistics
5- (Plan Targets): Third Five Year Plan, pp. 233, 239.
8- (Plan Targets): Third Five Year Plan, pp. 233, 239.

V.7. - Population and Vital Statistics
Appendix VI.

A Footnote on Characteristics of Representative Reform Leaders

The crux matter at issue in the study of revolutionary political groups is whether or not the desire for change is accompanied by a desire to destroy the Traditional social order. In the instance of "disadvantaged groups", there may well be a deep-set antagonism towards past forms. But in the present paper, we are concerning ourselves with men who typically rose within the Traditional social structure, and whose revolutionary efforts to a large degree evolved out of Traditional institutions. Well through Transition, most of the subjects of our study evinced a high degree of loyalty to their heritage. They may have proposed reform, but the reforms proposed appear to have been designed particularly to serve remedial purposes. Only with the development of a large, urban labor force (Transformation and Take-Off) do we find in Japan, Turkey or India the establishment of revolutionary movements basing their appeal on the call for disestablishment, rather than on a cry for reform. This does not mean, of course, that efforts to overthrow the Traditional structure were lacking in earlier phases of development. But it does suggest that where revolution was attempted (e.g., by the Young Turks in 1908), the goal of conspiratorial groups was one of resurrection rather than one of progress.

Material in the biographies is organized as follows: (1) date of birth (Turkey, India), birth and death (Japan); (2) social rank (Japan), religion (Turkey, India); (3) clan membership (Japan), family background (Turkey, India); (4) father's occupation (Japan, Turkey), education (India); (5) education (Japan, Turkey), subject's occupation (India); (6) chronology of representative activities; (7) indication of influence by the West.
Appendix VI.1. (J)

LIST OF BIOGRAPHIES OF REPRESENTATIVE JAPANESE LEADERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>Representative of Leaders of:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VI.2.</td>
<td>Goto Shojiro (1838-1897)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.3.</td>
<td>Inoue Kaoru (1835-1915)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.4.</td>
<td>Itagaki Taisuke (1837-1919)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.5.</td>
<td>Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.6.</td>
<td>Iwazaki Yataro (1834-1901)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.7.</td>
<td>Hira Toshiaki (1838-1878)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.8.</td>
<td>Masuda Takashi (1848-1938)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.9.</td>
<td>Matsukata Masyoshi (1835-1924)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.10.</td>
<td>Minomura Rizaemon (1820-1877)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.11.</td>
<td>Nakamigawa Hikojiro (1854-1901)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>VI.12.</td>
<td>Okubo Toshimitsu (1830-1878)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VI.13.</td>
<td>Okuma Shigenobu (1838-1922)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.14.</td>
<td>Okuni Takamasa (1792-1871)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.15.</td>
<td>Ota Kurotomoo (1835-1876)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.16.</td>
<td>Saigo Takamori (1827-1877)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>VI.17.</td>
<td>Sakuma Shozan (1811-1864)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>VI.18.</td>
<td>Sato Shinen (1769-     )</td>
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<tr>
<td>VI.19.</td>
<td>Shibuzawa Eiichi (1840-1931)</td>
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<td>VI.20.</td>
<td>Takano Choei (1804-1850)</td>
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<td>VI.21.</td>
<td>Tamamatsu Misa (1810-1872)</td>
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<td>VI.22.</td>
<td>Watanabe Kazan (1793-1841)</td>
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<td>VI.23.</td>
<td>Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922)</td>
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<td>VI.24.</td>
<td>Yano Harumichi (1823-1887)</td>
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<td>VI.25.</td>
<td>Yasuda Zenjiro (1838-1921)</td>
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<td>VI.26.</td>
<td>Yokoi Shonan (1809-1869)</td>
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</table>
VI.2.(J.)

Goto Shojiro (Transition-Transformation)
1. 1838-1897
2. upper samurai
3. Tosa
4. Unknown, but presumably a high clan official
5. N.A.
6. 1862, studied English; 1866 head of han trading company at Nagasaki; 1868, "foreign minister" of Restoration leaders; 1871, Vice Minister of Industry; 1873, withdrew from Government after defeat of war party; 1889, Minister of Communication; 1892, Minister of Commerce and Agriculture.

VI.3.(J.)

Inoue Kaoru (Transition-Transformation)
1. 1835-1915
2. lower or lower-middle samurai
3. Choshu
4. Father a goshi (rustic samurai) and probably a farmer
5. N.A.
6. 1854, secretary of daimyo; 1862, participated in burning down of British Legation; 1863, sent to England to study navigation; 1864, returned to Japan and became influential within clan; 1868, member of Meiji Government; 1871-3, vice minister of Finance; 1871, founded Senshu Company (forerunner of Mitsui Trading Company); 1876, special envoy to Korea; 1878, Minister of Industry; 1884, special envoy to Korea; 1885, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
7. studied in Britain, 1863-64. From this time, he wished to ape the West in economic growth.

VI.4.(J.)

Itagaki Taisuke (Transition-Transformation)
1. 1837-1919
2. upper middle samurai
3. Tosa
4. N.A.
5. N.A.
6. 1862, secretary of daimyo; 1865, studied Dutch military science; 1867, fought against bakufu; 1868, member of the new regime; 1871, Minister of Industry; 1873, organized a political party at Tosa after failure of war party within Meiji Government; 1880, led the movement demanding parliamentary institutions; 1881, formed Liberal Party; 1896, Minister of Industry.
7. Travelled in Europe and America, 1881.
VI.5.(J.)
Ito Hirobumi (Transition-Transformation)
1. 1841-1909
2. lower samurai
3. Choshu
4. Father a poor peasant who became a samurai in 1853
5. 1857; enrolled in Yoshida School
6. initially a house servant to a samurai family; 1858, to Tokyo as a han political agent; 1862, participated in burning down of British legation; 1863, made clandestine visit to Great Britain; 1864, returned to Choshu and became influential within clan; 1868, member of Meiji Government; 1869, Vice Minister of Finance; 1870, went to U.S. to study banking system; 1871, on tariff mission to Europe; 1873, Minister of Industry; 1890, Prime Minister
7. In the West during 1863 (when he became a modernizer); later trips in 1870-73, and 1882.

VI.6.(J.)
Iwasaki Yataro (Transformation)
1. 1834-1885
2. semi-samurai, then made samurai
3. Tosa
4. uncertain; little better than peasant
5. trained in Chinese classics
6. 1853, to Edo to study; jailed by clan; 1867, head of clan trading office in Nagasaki, then shifted to Osaka as ship dealer; 1869, founded Tosa Company (later Mitsubishi combine); 1871, became owner of Tosa Company with abolition of feudalism
7. Sent to Nagasaki to study Dutch Studies

VI.7.(J.)
Kirino Toshiaki (Transition-Transformation)
1. 1838-1878
2. Lower samurai
3. Satsuma
4. N.A.
5. N.A.
6. as chief aide of Saigo Takamori, briefly a General in Japanese Army; deprived of his rank because of opposition to the Meiji Oligarchs, he participated in Saigo's revolt in 1877
7. N.A.
VI.8.(J.)

Masuda Takashi (Transformation)
1. 1848-1938
2. samurai
3. N.A. (fudai clan)
4. samurai-doctor; in bakufu Foreign Office
5. both Chinese Classics and English
6. at 15, employed as a Page in Foreign Office; late a house-boy for Townsend Harris; unemployed after Restoration, so became interpreter for Japanese merchants; later became protege of Inoue; 1872, head of Meiji Currency Bureau (because of knowledge of West and English); later, a Vice President of Mitsui combine
7. student of English, etc.

VI.9.(J.)

Matsukata Masyoshi (Transition-Transformation)
1. 1835-1924
2. lower samurai
3. Satsuma
4. Father a peasant
5. N.A.
6. (a protege of Okubo from boyhood); 1869, member of the new regime; 1871, Assistant Minister of Finance; 1878, Vice-Minister of Finance; 1881, Minister of Finance; 1891, Prime Minister; 1895, Minister of Finance; 1898, Prime Minister
7. 1877, in Europe

VI.10.(J.)

Minomura Rizaemon (Transformation)
1. 1820-1877
2. Chonin
3. N.A.
4. small businessman; died when Minomura was young
5. N.A.
6. 1839, a shopkeeper; later, a servant for a Minister of the bakufu; adopted son of retail merchant; starts money exchange business; lobbyist for Mitsui in bakufu; 1873, General Manager of Mitsui especially because of personal ties with Inoue, Okuma, Okubo, Ito, etc.
7. N.A.
VI.11. (J.)

Nakamigawa Hikojiro (Transformation)
1. 1854-1901
2. middle rank samurai
3. Nakatsu
4. N.A.
5. studied Chinese classics; graduated from Keio University (Westernized) 1867
6. 1877, taught at Keio; 1878, member of Industry Bureau; 1879, resigned from Government and became head of newspaper; 1888, President of Sanyo Railway Co.; 1891, joined Mitsui
7. English language training; taught English; in Europe from 1874-77.

VI.12. (J.)

Okubo Toshimitsu (Transition-Transformation)
1. 1830-1878
2. lower samurai
3. Satsuma
4. Father a doctor, but punished for a political offense
5. influenced by Oyomei School
6. an errand boy at 17, became protege of Shimasu Hisamitsu, Satsuma political chief; 1861, to Edo as clan political agent; 1867, assisted in creating Choshu-Satsuma alliance; 1868, a leading member of new regime; 1871, Minister of Finance; 1873, Minister of Interior; 1874, to death, dominant figure in Government
7. 1871-3, member of mission to Europe and U.S. From this time, seems to have become a modernizer.

VI.13. (J.)

Okuma Shigenobu (Transition-Transformation)
1. 1838-1922
2. middle rank samurai
3. Saga (Hizen)
4. Father in charge of clan cannons; died while Okuma young
5. educated in han school, but opposed to Confucian teaching; 1856, enrolled in han's Dutch Studies school
6. 1860, lectured before his daimyo on Dutch Constitution; 1861, opened school in English at Nagasaki; 1866, became revolutionary in Kyoto and Edo, breaking his clan ties to do so; 1869, in charge of foreign affairs at Nagasaki; 1869, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs; 1869, Vice Minister of Finance; 1871, Minister of Finance; 1882, organized a Political Party; 1888, Minister of Foreign Affairs; 1914, Prime Minister
7. Student of Western languages and governments.
Okuni Takamasa (Tradition-Transition)
1. 1792-1871
2. samurai
3. Tsuwano
4. N.A.
5. Student of National Studies
6. Lectured before his Lord on National Studies; high official in Shinto Bureau in Restoration Government; retired to academic job as modernization progressed
7. N.A.

Ota Kurotomoo (Transition-Transformation)
1. 1835-1876
2. samurai
3. Kumamoto
4. N.A.
5. Student of National Studies
6. 1873, Governor of his native state; opposing Westernization, he revolted and died, 1876.
7. N.A.

Saigo Takamori (Transition-Transformation)
1. 1827-1877
2. lower middle samurai
3. Satsuma
4. Father was poor, a bookkeeper in the han Treasury
5. 1842, an errand boy of han government; 1854, in Lord's train on excursion to Edo, where he acted as a political secretary to his Lord; 1861, Hisamitsu became daimyo, imprisoned Saigo; 1862-64, in and out of prison; 1867, major leader of anti-bakufu forces; 1871, member of Council of State and Commander in Chief of Army; 1873, resigned from Government over failure of war party; 1874, founded school patronized by reactionary samurai; 1877, led revolt against Government
VI.17.(J.)

Sakuma Shozan (Tradition)
1. 1811-1864
2. lower samurai
3. Matsushiro
4. N.A.
5. 1833-35, studied at Saito school in Edo. Saito believed to have been strongly influenced by Oyomei doctrine. 1840, began study of Dutch in Edo. 1845, studied Dutch gunnery methods.
6. 1833, educational advisor to heir of clan Lord; 1848, began to cast cannon; 1853, military advisor to his clan, which was assigned to guard Yokahama.
7. Student of Western languages and science.

VI.18.(J.)

Sato Shinen (Tradition)
1. 1769 -
2. son of a Dutch doctor
3. 1787, made samurai by daimyo of Tsuyama
4. Doctor
5. N.A.
6. 1792, practiced medicine in Edo. 1808, lectured on military science as aide of Tokushima Lord. Thereafter, made cannon; advised various clans on military and financial matters; wrote books on political economy; practiced medicine.
7. 1839, forced to go into hiding because of his association with Tokano Choei, Watanabe Aritomo, and other leaders of the Dutch Studies.

VI.19.(J.)

Shibuzawa Eiichi (Transformation)
1. 1840-1931
2. 1862-3, made samurai
3. N.A.
4. wealthy farmer near Edo.
5. Training in Chinese classics, Confucian ethics; 1860, went to Edo to study
6. commercial crops wholesaler, money-lender; early 1860's became a revolutionary in Edo; made samurai by an aide of Keiki; placed in minor post of bakufu; 1869, high official in Treasury (due to knowledge of West); associated with Inoue Kaoru, becomes President of Daiich National Bank; leading entrepreneur, associated both with Satcho Oligarchs and with Mitsui family (probably)
7. 1867, in France as a secretary of one of Keiki's younger brothers.
Tokano Choei (Tradition)
1. 1804-1850
2. samurai
3. Sendai
4. third son of a doctor-samurai, later adopted by Takano, a doctor-samurai
5. studied under Sugita, Dutch doctor for the Sendai daimyo; 1820-23, studied Dutch in Edo; 1825, studied in Nagasaki.
6. student, doctor, teacher, he was imprisoned in 1839 for the seditious quality of his book, Dream Story. 1850, committed suicide.
7. Translated Dutch books into Japanese. Persecuted as a Dutch scholar.

Tamamatsu Misao (Transition)
1. 1810-1872
2. monk
3. N.A.
4. N.A.
5. National Studies; anti-Western, pro-Tenno, anti-bakufu
6. As a monk before the Restoration, influenced Prince Iwakura. 1868-69, member of Restoration Government, but he resigned because of opposition to trend of policies.
7. strongly anti-Western

Watanabe Kazan (Tradition)
1. 1793-1841
2. samurai
3. Tahara
4. Karo, but because Tahara was small han, relatively poor.
5. 1830's, associated with Takano Choie and other Dutch scholars
6. 1832, karō of clan, stationed in Edo; responsible for military affairs of clan. 1839, imprisoned by bakufu for subversive activities; 1840, returned to home town and went into seclusion; 1841, committed suicide.
7. Persecuted as a Dutch Scholar.
VI.23.(J.)

Yamagata Aritomo (Transformation)
1. 1838-1922.
2. lowest rank samurai
3. Choshu
4. N.A.
5. studied under Yoshida School
6. 1858, to Edo in Lord's entourage; 1869, to Europe; 1872, Vice Minister of Army; 1873, Minister of Army; 1883, Minister of Interior; 1888, Prime Minister
7. Became a progressive particularly as a result of his experience in Europe.

VI.24.(J.)

Yano Harumichi (Transition-Transformation)
1. 1823-1887
2. chonin
3. N.A.
4. N.A.
5. Training in National Studies, influenced by Tamamatsu
6. A revolutionary prior to the Restoration, he was given a high post in the Department of the Shinto Religion in 1867-8. He subsequently withdrew from public affairs as a result of the Westernizing trend of Meiji Governments. For the remainder of his life he followed scholarly pursuits and did research on the Imperial household.
7. Strongly anti-Western

VI.25.(J.)

Yasuda Zenjiro (Transformation)
1. 1838-1921
2. lower samurai
3. Toyama Prefecture
4. a merchant who purchased samurai status
5. poorly educated
6. 1850, a peddler; 1855-61, clerk in various stores; 1863, set self up as money-lender, and over next six years made a fortune through arbitrage and speculation on Government notes; 1872, financial agent to several Government Departments; 1875, founded Third National Bank; 1880, founded Yasuda Bank; 1882, one of two private Trustees of Bank of Japan; 1884, organized Yasuda Zaibatsu (financial); thereafter, a leading figure in Japanese financial activities
7. N.A.
VI.26 (J.)

Yokoi Shonan (Tradition-Transition)
1. 1809-1869
2. middle samurai
3. Kumamoto
4. Governor of a county, but not wealthy
5. 1839, sent to Edo to study
6. Opened own school on his han (which was pro-bakufu), but since he opposed the status quo and taught "practicalism", he was much opposed; 1851, travelled throughout Japan and then became foreign affairs and economic advisor to Fukui han; 1863, deprived of samurai status by Kumamoto clan; 1867, high official of Meiji Government, specializing in economic affairs; 1869, assassinated.
7. N.A.
# Appendix VI.1.(T)

## LIST OF BIOGRAPHIES OF REPRESENTATIVE TURKISH LEADERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Birth</th>
<th>Representative of Leaders of:</th>
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<tr>
<td>VI.2. (T)</td>
<td>Dr. Abdülhak Adnan-Adivar (1882)</td>
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<td>VI.3. (T)</td>
<td>Abdullah Cevdet (1856)</td>
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<td>VI.4. (T)</td>
<td>Ağah Efendi (Çapanzade) (1832)</td>
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<td>VI.5. (T)</td>
<td>Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869)</td>
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<td>VI.6. (T)</td>
<td>Ahmet Riza Bey (1857)</td>
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<td>VI.7. (T)</td>
<td>Ali Fuat Cebesoy (1883)</td>
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<td>VI.8. (T)</td>
<td>Ali Süavi Efendi (1839)</td>
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<td>VI.9. (T)</td>
<td>Bekir Sami (1862)</td>
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<td>VI.10. (T)</td>
<td>Cavt Bey (1875)</td>
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<td>VI.11. (T)</td>
<td>Colonel Cemal Bey (1872)</td>
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<td>VI.12. (T)</td>
<td>Cemil Uybadin Bey (1880)</td>
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<td>VI.13. (T)</td>
<td>Enver Bey (1881)</td>
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<td>VI.14. (T)</td>
<td>Fetih Oktar (1880)</td>
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<td>Fevzi Çakmak (1867)</td>
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<td>VI.16. (T)</td>
<td>Dr. Haci Mustafa Cantekin (1878)</td>
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<td>VI.17. (T)</td>
<td>Halide Edip Adivar (1884)</td>
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<td>Ibrahim Temo (1865)</td>
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<td>Mûfit Öndeş (1877)</td>
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<td>Murat Bey (Mizanci) (1879)</td>
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<td>VI.26. (T)</td>
<td>Mustafa Fazil Paşa (1829)</td>
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<td>Mustafa Kemal (1881)</td>
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<td>Namik Kemal Bey (1840)</td>
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<td>VI.29. (T)</td>
<td>Nuri Bey (Menapirzade) (1845)</td>
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<td>VI.30. (T)</td>
<td>Rauf Orbay (1881)</td>
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<td>VI.31. (T)</td>
<td>Reşat Bey (Kayalizade) (1844)</td>
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<td>VI.32. (T)</td>
<td>Rifat Bey (Kânpaçaçade) (1884)</td>
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<td>VI.33. (T)</td>
<td>Prince Sabahattin (1877)</td>
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<td>VI.34. (T)</td>
<td>Talât Paşa (1874)</td>
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<td>VI.35. (T)</td>
<td>Ziya Gökâl (1875)</td>
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<td>VI.36. (T)</td>
<td>Ziya Paşa (1825)</td>
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Appendix VI.1.(T)
(cont.)

LEXICON OF TURKISH TERMS APPEARING BELOW

1. **Askerî Rüşdiye**: See Rüşdiye
2. **Kadi**: Moslem judge, judge in the Ottoman courts where the Islam law was prevailing.
3. **Mabeyin**: The private apartments of the Palace where the Sultan usually received his visitors.
4. **Mekteb-i Bahriye**: Naval Academy
5. **Mekteb-i Harbiye**: Military Academy
6. **Mekteb-i Mülkiye**: Civil College
8. **Mekteb-i Tibbiye**: Medical School.
   **Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Askerîye**: Military Medical School.
9. **Mutasarriff**: Governor of sanjak (province).
10. **Müneccim**: astrologer, who can reveal the happenings in the future by examining the stars, ( başı: chief astrologer).
11. **Müstantik**: examining magistrate, "juge d' instruction".
12. **Nazîr**: Minister.
13. **Rüşdiye**: High school. (Askerî : Military h.s.)
14. **Valî**: Governor of vilâyet.
Dr. Abdülhak Adnan-Adivar (Transformation)
1. Born 1882, Gelibolu (Gallipoli).
2. Muslim
3. N.A.
4. N.A.
5. He was graduated from Mekteb-i Tibbiye; later became interested in social sciences and philosophy.
6. He was a medical doctor.
7. Competency in English, French and German. After escaping to Europe in 1926, he lived in France and England for thirteen years.

Abdullah Cevdet (Late Tradition)
1. Born 1856, Arapkir (Eastern Anatolia).
2. Muslim. Later atheist.
3. His parents were from Eastern Anatolia. Abdullah Cevdet came to Istanbul at the age of 15.
4. His father, Haci Ömer Efendi, was a tabur katibi (a military official).
5. He was graduated from Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Askeriye.
6. Trained as a doctor, he went into politics very early and spent most of his life in exile. He published several newspapers and periodicals.
7. Competency in French, English and German.

He lived in Switzerland, Austria and Egypt for many years.

Agâh Efendi (Çapanzade) (Late Tradition)
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were from Yozgat (Central Anatolia).
4. N.A.
5. He studied at Mekteb-i Tibbiye for a few years but did not finish.
6. After leaving school, he worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was appointed to the Ottoman
Embassy in Paris. Subsequently returned to Istanbul, where he occupied several governmental posts at the Ministry of Mails. In addition, he published the first privately owned Turkish newspaper, "Tercüman-i Ahval". In 1867 he went to Paris as a fugitive; in 1871 he returned to Istanbul. Then he was sent to various provinces as a mutasarrif in order to be kept away from Istanbul. In his last years, he was appointed as Turkish Ambassador to Athens.

7. Competency in French.

He lived two years in Paris as a Secretary of Embassy, and four years as a fugitive. Also lived in England and Belgium; and as Turkish Ambassador, he stayed in Athens for two years.

Vl.5.(T)

Ahmet Ağaoğlu (Transition; Transformation)
1. Born 1869, Suşa (in Azerbaidzhan).
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were from Azerbaidzhan.
4. N.A.
5. He was graduated from the high-school of Tbilisi and did his further studies in Paris in the "Collège de France" and the Faculty of Law.
6. Returning from Paris to Azerbaidzhan, he became a teacher in the schools of Tbilisi and Baku. Then he came to Istanbul and occupied important posts in the Ministry of Education.
7. Competency in Russian and French.

Vl.6.(T)

Ahmet Riza Bey (Tradition - Transition)
2. Muslim.
3. His mother was from Vienna. She was converted to Islam after her marriage to Ali Bey, whose parents were from Istanbul.
4. Ali Bey was known as Ingiliz Ali Bey because he spoke English very well and was an anglophile. He occupied many posts in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was once a member of the Council of State.

5. Ahmet Riza Bey was graduated from Mekteb-i Sultani and did his further studies in Paris, at the School of Agriculture.

6. Went into politics very early and, after escaping from Istanbul, stayed in Paris until 1908. After the revolution of 1908 he was elected to Ottoman Assembly as a deputy of Istanbul. Then he was appointed to the Senate as the first chairman.

7. Competency in French.

VI.7.(T)

Ali Fuat Cebeşoy (Bey) (Transition - Transformation)
2. Muslim
3. His parents were from Istanbul.
4. His father, Ismail Fazil Paşa, was a general in the Ottoman Army.
5. He was graduated from Mekteb-i Harbiye.
6. He was an army officer. Before the first World War he was Turkish military attaché in Rome. In the World War and the War of Turkish Independence he held important military posts. After the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, he retired from Army and assumed administrative positions in the Turkish Embassy (Moscow) and the Ministries of Reconstruction and Communications.

7. Competency in French and English.

VI.8.(T)

Ali Süavi Efendi (Late Tradition)
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were from Çankiri (Central Anatolia).
4. His father was a paper burnisher.
5. He was graduated from Rüşdiye of Davutpaşa (Istanbul).
6. At one time, a teacher in the Rüşdiye of Bursa; also a preacher in the mosques of Istanbul. Then, at the age of 27, he went into politics and became a journalist.

7. Competency in French.

After he was exiled from Istanbul, he went to Paris.
with Ziya Paşa, Namık Kemal and Agâh Efendi on the invitation of Mustafa Fazil Paşa. Ali Süavi Efendi lived in Europe for nine years (1867-1876).

Vl.9.(T)
Bekir Sami (Transition - Transformation)
1. Born 1862, Sivas (Central Anatolia).
2. Muslim
3. N.A.
4. N.A.
5. He was graduated from Mekteb-i Sultanî. 
6. Before the War of Independence, he was the vali of the provinces of Trabzon, Beirut and Haleb. He was the Minister of Foreign Affairs during the War of Independence.
7. Competency in French.

Vl.10(T)
Cavit Bey (Transition)
1. Born 1875, Salonica.
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were from Salonica.
4. His father, Recep Naim Efendi, was a merchant.
5. He was graduated from Mekteb-i Mülkiye.
6. After graduating from Mülkiye, he worked at the Ministry of Education as a governmental official. Then, in 1902, he went to Salonica and participated in the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti ("Union and Progress"). After the revolution of 1908 he was elected to the Ottoman Assembly as a deputy of Salonika and in 1909 he assumed the Ministry of Finance. He was at this post during the first World War.
7. N.A.
VI.11.(T)

Colonel Cemal Bey (later Paşa) (Late Tradition-Transition)
2. Muslim
3. His parents were probably from Istanbul.
4. N.A.
5. He was graduated from Mekteb-i Harbiye.
6. He was an army officer, but he also occupied many governmental posts (e.g. Governor of Adana, then Bagdat; Minister of Navy).
7. N.A.

VI.12.(T)

Cemil Uybadin Bey (Transition-Transformation)
2. Muslim.
3. Parents probably from Anatolia.
4. N.A.
5. Graduated from Mekteb-i Harbiye.
6. An army officer, he subsequently was elected to the Grand National Assembly as a deputy for Tekirdağ (Thrace).
7. N.A.

VI.13.(T)

Enver Bey (later Paşa) (Late Tradition-Transition)
1. 1881, Istanbul.
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were from Istanbul.
4. His father, Ahmet Bey (later Paşa), was a government official.
5. Enver Bey was graduated from Mekteb-i Harbiye.
6. He was an officer, and one of the most important military leaders of the revolution of 1908. Thereafter, he devoted himself to politics and, in 1914 he assumed the Ministry of War. He was the Minister of War of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War.
7. Competency in French; as a military attache, he lived in Berlin for a short time.
VI.14.(T)

Fethi Okyar (Bey) (Transition - Transformation)
1. Born 1880, Pirlepe (Western Macedonia).
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were from Western Macedonia.
4. The name of his father was Ismail Bey, but his occupation is unknown. He was probably a government official or a landlord.
5. Fethi Bey was graduated from Mekteb-i Harbiye.
6. He was an Army officer. Retired in 1911 he went into politics and became the Turkish Ambassador in Sofia (1912-1913), Paris (1925-1930) and London (1935-1939).
7. Competency in French and English.

VI.15.(T)

Fevzi Çakmak (Pasha) (Transformation)
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were probably from Istanbul.
4. His father, Ali Bey, was a Colonel of artillery.
5. He was graduated from Mekteb-i Harbiye.
6. He always occupied military positions. In the War of Independence he was the Minister of National Defense and then the Prime Minister for a short time. In 1922 he was appointed as the head of Turkish General Staff and he held this position until 1944, when he retired.
7. Competency in French.

VI.16.(T)

Dr. Haci Mustafa Cantekin (Transition)
1. Born 1878, Çorum (Central Anatolia).
2. Muslim.
3. N.A.
4. N.A.
5. He was graduated from Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Askeriye.
6. He was a medical doctor.
7. N.A.
VI.17.(T)

Halide Edip Adivar (Transformation)
1. 1884, Istanbul.
2. Muslim.
3. Her parents were from Istanbul.
4. Her father, Mehmet Edip Bey, was a governmental official who occupied important posts in the Serail and the Board of Customs.
5. She was graduated from the American Girls College of Istanbul.
6. She is a journalist and professor of English literature.
7. Competency in English.

VI.18.(T)

Ibrahim Temo (Late Tradition)
1. Born 1865, Ohri (Albania).
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were Albanians.
4. N.A.
5. He was graduated from Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Askeriye.
6. He was a medical doctor.
7. Competency in French.

It is known that Temo, who spent his vacations in Albania or Italy, was greatly influenced by Italian revolutionists.

VI.19.(T)

Ishak Süktü (Late Tradition)
1. 1868, Diyaribekir (Eastern Anatolia).
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were from Eastern Anatolia.
4. N.A.
5. He was graduated from Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Askeriye.
6. He was a medical doctor. In 1895 he escaped to Europe and published a newspaper in Switzerland.
7. N.A.
VI.20. (T)

Ismail Canbulat Bey (Transition - Transformation)
1. 1880, Istanbul
2. Muslim
3. N.A.
4. N.A.
5. Graduated from Mekteb-i Harbiye.
6. He was a military officer and a member of the 1908 Salonika Union and Progress movement. Hanged in 1926 for revolutionism.
7. N.A.

VI.21. (T)

İsmet İnönü (Transformation)
1. 1884, İzmir.
2. Muslim.
3. His mother was from Razgrad (Actually in Bulgaria, on the north of the Balkan Mountains) and his father was from Malatya (Central Anatolia).
4. His father, Haci Reşid Bey, held judicial positions in several cities of Anatolia.
5. İsmet İnönü was graduated from Mekteb-i Harbiye.
6. He was an officer. After the War of Independence, he became the Prime Minister of the Turkish Republic. Between 1939 and 1950 he was the President of the Republic.
7. Competency in French and English.

VI.22. (T)

Kâzım Karabekir (Paşa) (Transition - Transformation)
1. 1882, İstanbul.
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were from Konya (Central Anatolia).
4. His father, Mehmet Emin Paşa, was a general in the Ottoman Army.
5. Kâzım Karabekir was graduated from Mekteb-i Harbiye.
6. He was an officer. Before and during the War of Independence he held important military posts. After the War, he retired from Army and went into politics.
7. He had competency in French and English.
VI.23.(T)

Mehmet Resit (Late Tradition - Transition)
1. Born 1872, Caucasus.
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were from the Caucasus. They came to Istanbul when Mehmet Resit was a child.
4. N.A.
5. He is graduated from Mekteb-i Tibbiye-i Askeriye.
6. He was a medical doctor. In 1897 he was exiled to Tripoli in Africa. He returned to Istanbul after the 1908 revolution and then, resigning from the Medical Corps, was appointed vali of various provinces (e.g. Ankara and Diyaribekir).
7. N.A.

VI.24.(T)

Mufit Özdeş (Transition)
1. Born 1877, Kirşehir (Central Anatolia).
2. Muslim.
3. His father's parents, known as Garibogullari, were from Kirşehir.
4. N.A.
5. He was graduated from Mekteb-i Harbiye.
6. He was an Army officer. Later he retired and went into politics.
7. N.A.

VI.25.(T)

Murat Bey (Known as Mizanci) (Late Tradition)
1. His date of birth is unknown. He was born in Tiflis (Tbilisi).
2. Muslim.
3. He was the son of a Georgian family.
4. N.A.
5. He matriculated at the University of St. Petersburg, but the field of his studies is unknown. Probably, he studied social sciences and history.
6. When he came to Istanbul, he was appointed as a teacher of history to the Mekteb-i Mü kościye. Then he escaped to Europe and published his famous newspaper, the "Mizan" (Scales or Balance). Returning to Istanbul in 1897, he was appointed to membership on the Council of State.
7. Competency in Russian and French. He was raised in Russia and lived for many years in Europe.
VI.26.(T)

Mustafa Fazil Paşa (Late Tradition)
1. Born 1829, Cairo.
2. Muslim.
3. He was a grandson of Kavalali Mehmet Ali Paşa, who came from Kavala (a city in the Southern Macedonia) and who is known as the head of the Khedival family.
4. His father was Ibrahim Paşa, Khedive of Egypt.
5. He probably had a private education in his father's Serail.
6. He worked at Bab-i 'A'i (Sublime Porte) as a government official. After quarreling with Abdül Aziz, he escaped to Paris. In 1867, he invited New Ottomans including Namik Kemal, Ziya Paşa, Ağib Efendi and Ali Süavi to Paris and thereafter gave them moral and financial assistance. In 1876, after making up with the Sultan, he returned to Istanbul and assumed the Ministries of Finance and Justice.
7. He lived in Paris for a long time and had many friends in Europe.

VI.27.(T)

Mustafa Kemal (Late Tradition - Transition - Transformation)
1. Born 1881, Salonica.
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were from Salonica.
4. His father, son of a school teacher, was a customs officer in Salonica, and then a timber merchant.
5. Mustafa Kemal was graduated from Mekteb-i Harbiye.
6. He was an Army officer before he went into politics.
7. Competency in French; visited Germany during World War I.

VI.28.(T)

Namik Kemal Bey (Late Tradition)
1. Born 1840, Tekirdag (Thrace).
2. Muslim
3. His mother's parents were from Koritsa (Albania) and his father's from Konya (Central Anatolia).
He was the grandson of Abdül Latif Paşa (an Albanian) who served the Sultan as a mutasarrif and vali in many places.

4. Mustafa Asim Bey, his father, dealt in history and astrology. He was once the Münecimbâşı of Abdülahmid II.

5. Namik Kemal was raised by his grandfather, Abdül Latif Paşa, and had a private education in his house.

6. He worked at the Ministries of Customs and the Foreign Affairs for a short time and then became a journalist. He has a very important place in Turkish literature. After a period in European exile, he was sent to various provinces as a mutasarrif in order to be kept away from Istanbul.

7. Competency in French.
   He lived in Paris and London for two years.

VI.29.(T)

Nuri Bey (Menapirzade) (Late Tradition)
1. Born 1845, Maraş (Southern Anatolia).
2. Muslim.
3. His parents came from Gürcistan (Georgia).
4. His father, Gürcü Yusuf Paşa (a Georgian), was one of the vizirs of the Sultan.
5. He was raised with Abdül Hamit in the Serail and was graduated from Rüşdiye of Beyazid (Istanbul).
6. He worked as a government official at Bab-i Altı (Sublime Porte). In 1867 he escaped to Paris with other New Ottomans. Coming back to Istanbul after five years of exile, he assumed new posts in the Serail and in the Board of Monopolies.
7. Competency in French.
   He lived in Paris and London for five years.

VI.30.(T)

Rauf Orbay (Bey) (Transition - Transformation)
2. Moslem.
3. N.A.
4. His father, Mehmet Muzaffer Paşa, was a vice-admiral in the Ottoman Navy and concurrently a member of the Senate.
5. Rauf Bey was graduated from Mekteb-i Bahriye.
6. Trained as a naval officer, he retired from the Navy and went into politics very early.
7. Competency in French and English.

VI.31.(T)

Reşat Bey (Kayalizade) (Late Tradition)
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were from Eastern Anatolia.
4. His father, Kayazade Iskender Bey, was the mutasarrif of Yozgat (a big city in Central Anatolia).
5. N.A.
6. He escaped to Europe with the New Ottomans. Returning to Istanbul after the death of Abdülmaziz, he was sent to the provinces as a mutasarrif to be kept away from Istanbul.
7. He lived in Paris and London during his exile.

VI.32.(T)

Rifat Bey (Kânipaşazade) (Late Tradition)
1. Born 1884, (birth-place unknown, probably in one of the provinces where his father was vali).
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were of a Crimean family.
4. His father, Kâni Paşa, was mutasarrif and vali in various provinces and was once a Nazir.
5. N.A.
6. He joined the New Ottoman movement in Paris, where he was a secretary in the Ottoman Embassy.
7. He lived a number of years in Paris and London.

VI.33.(T)

Prince Sabahattin (Late Tradition)
2. Muslim
3. His mother was a sister of Abdülmâmîd II. His Father's family initially was from Gürcistan (Georgia).
4. His father, Damat Mahmût Paşa, was a member of the Council of State and for a short time the
Minister of Justice. However, after quarrelling with Abdülhamid II because of his liberal tendencies, Damat Mahmut Paşa escaped to Europe with his two sons in 1899.


6. No profession other than politics.


VI.34.(T)

Talat Paşa (Late Tradition - Transition)

1. 1874, Edirne (Thrace).
2. Muslim.
3. His mother's family was from Cisir Mustafa Paşa (a little town in Southern Macedonia), and his father's from Kirca Ali (also a little town in Southern Macedonia).
4. His father, Ahmet Vasif Efendi, was kadi and miýantik in Edirne.
5. He was graduated from Askerî Rusdiye of Edirne. He matriculated at the Law School of Salonica but did not finish.
6. Until 1908, he worked in the post-offices of Edirne and Salonica. After 1908, he was elected as deputy of Edirne to the Ottoman Assembly, later assuming the Ministry of Mails and the Ministry of the Interior. During the First World War, he was the Prime Minister.
7. Competency in French and Greek. In the last years of his life, he learned a little English too.

VI.35.(T)

Ziya Gökcalp (Transition)

1. Born 1875, Diyaribekir (Eastern Anatolia).
2. Muslim.
3. His parents were from Eastern Anatolia.
4. His father, Mehmet Tevfik Efendi, was the director of the archives of Diyaribekir. He was also a writer.
5. Ziya Gökcalp was graduated from the Askerî Rusdiye of Diyaribekir. Coming to Istanbul, he matriculated at the Veterinary School (Mektebi Baytariye), but did not finish.
6. An academician, holder of the first chair in Sociology at the University of Constantinople. He became deeply involved in Transitional politics and was the intellectual leader of the Young Turks. However, his influence declined after the establishment of the Ankara Government.

7. Competency in French, and a disciple of Durkheim.

VI.36.(T)

Ziya Paşa (Late Tradition)
2. Muslim.
3. His mother's parents were from the Caucasus, and his father's from Istanbul.
4. His father, Feridddin Efendi, was a government official in the Customs of Istanbul.
5. He was graduated from Nişdiye of Beyazit (Istanbul).
6. He worked in the Private Secretariat of the Prime Minister for 11 years and then was appointed as third secretary to Mabeyin. An exile during Abdülaziz' reign, he later returned from Europe and was sent to various provinces as a mutasarrif in order to be kept away from Istanbul. He occupies a very important place in Turkish literature.

## Appendix VI.1.(I)

**LIST OF BIOGRAPHIES OF REPRESENTATIVE INDIAN LEADERS**

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VI.2.(I)

Maulana Muhammad Ali (Transition-Transformation)
1. Born 1878, Rampur State.
2. Muslim
3. His grandfather held a top post in Rampur State. For his services to the British in 1857, he was awarded a large rent free Jagir. His father was Abdul Ali Khan who also held an important place in Rampur. The family became poor when father died and Ali was very small.
4. He went to Collegiate school and Aligargh College. Also to Lincoln's Inn at Oxford for 4 years where he studied literary subjects.
5. Journalist and political reformer.
6. a) Moderate (self government along with other communities).
   b) 1906 one of founders of Muslim League; 1911, started Comrade, a Muslim English Political Weekly; 1911, started Hamdard - an Urdu Political Weekly. He was the principle Khilafat leader and sided with Gandhi for Turks. 1920 he led a deputation to Europe to represent views of Indian Muslims and Khilafat Movement. Joined with Gandhi on non-cooperation movement.
7. Studied in U.K. Visited European countries. Interests seem to have been expounding his causes rather than learning about West.

VI.3.(I)

Syed Amir Ali (Transition)
1. Born 1849 at Chinsura (a quondam Dutch settlement) on the Hoogly River in Bengal.
2. Belonged to the Syed family (Muslim).
3. His family were in service of the Mughal Emperor. They traced descent to the Prophet Muhammad. His father, Saadat Ali, rose to distinction under the Nawab Vizier of Oudh.
4. He got a modern education at Hoogly College, obtaining his M.A. in history and political economy, and B.L. in law. Later went to U.K. and joined the Inner Temple where he was called to the Bar in 1873.
5. Jurist and social reformer.
6. Politically a Conservative.
   1876, founded Central National Mahomedan Association.
   1909, first Indian to be appointed to the Privy Council.
7. He retired and settled in the U.K. His interests were communal and Islamic rather than national or Western.
VI.4.(I)
Abdul Kalam Azad (Transition-Transformation)
1. Born 1889 in Mecca.
2. Muslim.
3. He came from a prominent family of Delhi, settled in Calcutta. His father was a well-known scholar, author and religious leader with many disciples in Iraq, Turkey, Palestine and Egypt.
4. He studied Arabic and Oriental Studies privately until 14 years and completed his studies at Al Azhar, Cairo.
5. Religious leader, Urdu journalist, political reformer.
6. A) No changer (follower of Gandhi).

VI.5.(I)
Surendranath Banerjea (Late Tradition-Transition)
1. Born 1848 in Calcutta.
2. His family were Bengali Kulin Brahmins.
3. His father was Babu Durga Charan Banerjea, one of the leading Allopathic practitioners in Bengal.
4. At 7 years he entered Doveton College, an Anglo Indian school. Studied English and Sanskrit at London University. Passed I.C.S. examination in London, but was later expelled from I.C.S.
5. Political and social reformer.
6. A) Politically a Conservative.
   B) President Indian National Congress 1895 and 1902.
7. He was widely read on English authors. Visited the U.K. many times.

VI.6.(I)
Kali Charan Banerjee (Late Tradition-Transition)
1. Born 1847.
2. Belonged to a family of Kulin Brahmins. Later became a Christian.
3. His father, Harra Chandra Banerjee, was very poor.
4. He had his education in Calcutta along modern lines and got his M.A. in mental and moral philosophy.
5. Religious and social leader (Christo Samaj).
6. A) N.A.
   B) Bengal Legislative Council; President National Missionary sic. 1890, formed Indian delegation to represent Congress views in U.K. 1893, at 9th Congress, he moved to separate Judiciary from Executive. 1899, stood up for citizens' rights in Congress.
7. Visited U.S.A. to explain Hinduism.

VI.7.(I)

Womesh Chandra Bonnerjee (Transition)
1. Born 1844 in Kiderpore in Bengal.
2. Of a Bengali Christian family.
3. Belonged to a family of lawyers. His grandfather, Pittambar Bonnerjee, was attached to a Calcutta firm of attorneys. His father also practiced law.
4. He studied at the Oriental Seminary and the Hindu school. Later studied law in U.K. at Middle Temple on a scholarship.
5. Lawyer and political reformer.
6. A) Politically a Conservative.
   B) 1885, 1892 President of Indian National Congress.
7. Spent nearly half his life in the U.K. His children were educated and brought up in U.K.

VI.8.(I)

Subhas Chandra Bose (Transformation)
1. Born 1897 in the village of Kodalia.
2. Of a Bengali family.
3. His father was Janki Nath Bose, a fairly wealthy and prosperous lawyer in Cuttack.
4. Studied at Scottish Church College, Calcutta, where he got his B.A. in philosophy. He later studied at Cambridge and sat for the I.C.S. examination.
5. Political reformer and leader.
6. A) Extremist.
   B) President of All India Trade Union Congress; Founder the Forward Bloc; belonged to Indian Independence League and Indian National Army.
7. Studied in England, but did not seem to have any specific interest in the West.
VI.9.(I)

Chitta Ranjan Das (Transition-Transformation)
1. Born 1870 in Calcutta.
2. Belonged to a well-known Vaidya family.
3. His father, Bhubon Mohan Das, was a solicitor and journalist from Vikampur in the District of Dacca. He edited Brahmo Public Opinion, the weekly newspaper of the Brahmo Samaj. He later started and edited Bengal Public Opinion.
5. Lawyer and political reformer.
6. A) Was a "pro-changer" and probably a Moderate in so far as Dominion Status was concerned.
   B) 1908, defended Aurobindo, Ghose; 1917, President, Bengal Provincial Conference; 1920, opposed non-cooperation program of Gandhi; 1921, involved with Congress and Khilaphat; 1922, imprisoned. Presided over Congress and formed Swaraj Party.
7. Educated In England and well read on English authors.

VI.10.(I)

Bhulabhai J. Desai (Transformation)
1. Born 1877 in a small village in Gujerat.
2. Of a poor Gujerati family.
3. His father, Jewanji, was a poor man of a small village.
4. He went to Village School, Elphinstone College, Bombay, and Government Law College, Bombay, where he got his L.L.B.
5. Lawyer and political reformer.
6. A) Pro-changer.
7. Traveled widely in the West and a great admirer of the French.

VI.11.(I)

Romesh Chandra Dutt (Late Tradition-Transition)
1. Born 1848 in Calcutta.
2. Belonged to Bengali family.
3. He came from the prominent Dutt family of Rambagan, Calcutta.
4. Studied at Hare School and Presidency College in Calcutta, and University College in London. Came 3rd in the Indian Civil Service examination.

5. Civil servant and author (historian).

6. A) Politically a Conservative.
   B) 1898, presided over Indian National Congress.

7. Wrote a novel interpreting the East to the West; close friend of Professor Max Muller; wrote a book Three Years in Europe. In 1890, lectured on Indian history at London University.

VI.12(I)

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (Transition-Transformation)
1. Born 1869 in Porbandar, Kathiawar.
2. Of a Gujerati family of noble lineage.
3. His father, Karam Chand, was Prime Minister to the Thakur Sahib of Rajkot. His grandfather was Dewan (Minister) of the Rana of Porbandar.
4. He went to vernacular school and later to Kathiawar High School. Got his Bar-at-Law from Inner Temple, U.K.
5. Political and social reformer.
6. A) Politically he may be called a Moderate. He was the no-changer leader.
   B) Started and led the Satyagraha Movement, 1918-19; Participated in Khilaphat Agitation, 1919-21; President of Indian National Congress, 1929; Civil Disobedience and Salt March, 1930; Delegate Round Table Conference, 1931; Truce with Lord Irwin of British Government, 1931; Inaugurated Civil Disobedience Campaign, 1940.
7. Studied and visited in West. Had extensive knowledge although no special interest in foreign countries.

VI.13(I)

Aurobindo Ghosh (Transition)
2. Belonged to an Anglicized Bengali family.
3. His grandfather on his mother's side was Raj Narayan Bose, a famous patriot. His father was Dr. K.D. Ghosh of the Indian Medical Service, England trained and with a large professional income.
4. He went to St. Paul's School, Darjeeling, was privately educated in Manchester and then sent to St. Paul's

5. Religious and political leader.

6. A) Politically he may be called an extremist -- he led the Nationalist Party against the Moderates in Congress.
   B) 1905, principal of National College, Calcutta - a liberal college. 1907, he broke with Moderates. 1905, arrested on a charge dealing with a bombing incident. After release, he retired.

7. Lived 14 years in England. Spoke English and Greek fluently. In his later years he wrote on the East and West.

VI.14.(I)

Ram Gopal Ghosh (Late Tradition)
1. Born 1815 in Calcutta.
2. Belonged to a poor Bengali family.
3. His father was Gobind Chandra Ghosh, a petty shopkeeper.
4. He had his early education at the Hare Prep. School. At 9 years he joined Hindu College. Studied European authors and philosophers. Left school to work at 17 years.
5. Public leader.
6. A) Politically a conservative.
   B) 1849, supported four Government of India reform acts which were opposed by the European community.
   1861, was nominated a member of the Bengal Legislative Council.
7. Knew English well and did some translations from English.

VI.15.(I)

G.K. Gokhale (Transition)
1. Born 1866 in Kolhapur in Bombay Province.
2. Of a family of Maharashtrian Brahmans.
3. His family were of humble means. His father held a small post in Kagal, a State in Kolhapur.
4. The indications are that he had his pre-university education in a semi-modern state school. Got his B.A. at Elphinstone College, Bombay.
5. Educator, Academic (political economist).
6. A) Politically he may be called a moderate.
   B) 1905, went to U.K. with L.L. Rai. 1906, President of Indian National Congress.
7. Represented Bombay at Welby Commission in U.K. Visited U.K. a number of times for interviews with English liberals on political reforms and Public Service Commission. Visited South Africa. Read English authors, especially Historians.
VI.16.(I)

Altaf Hussain Hali (Late Tradition)
1. Born 1637 at Panipat.
2. Muslim.
3. Came from a poor but respectable family.
4. Had little and unsystematic schooling. Attracted by and became the student of the poet Ghalib (Urdu poet).
5. Urdu poet and Islamic Saint.
6. A) He was a follower of Syed Ahmad Khan. Communally rather than nationally oriented.
    B) He was a communalist within Hindu-Muslim India.
7. Knew no English and little of the West.

VI.17.(I)

Sir Muhammad Iqbal (Transformation)
2.Descended from an ancient family of Kashmiri Pundits of the name of Sapru. His forefathers embraced Islam 200 years ago.
3. Little is known about his immediate family except that they were poor and Iqbal was helped along by scholarships.
4. He was sent to a Maktab (elementary school) and Scotch Mission College, Sailkot. Got his M.A. from Govt. College, Lahore; did research at Cambridge, U.K.; and got his Ph.D. at Munich, for a thesis on the history of metaphysics.
5. Indian poet and philosopher.
6. A) Politically he was conservatively inclined. (He believed in religious reforms rather than nationalism.) Later a moderate.
    B) 1926, was a member of Punjab Legislative Council; 1930, at All-India Muslim League he advocated the separate goal of Pakistan; 1931, attended Round Table Conference.
7. Well versed in knowledge of foreign countries. Spent his student days there and also visited foreign countries later in his life.

VI.16.(I)

Mukind R. Jayarkar (Transformation)
1. N.A.
2. Hindu
3. N.A.

5. Lawyer and Political reformer.

6. A) Hindu Mahasabha.
   B) Leader of Nationalist Party, 1927-1930; Leader of Opposition in 1930 Simla Conference; Delegate Round Table Conferences in London; Member, Constituent Assembly.

7. His interests are Indian. Has written a book on Vedanta philosophy.

VI.19.(I)

Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Transition-Transformation)

1. Born 1876 in Karachi.
2. Of a Khoja family of Kathiawar.
3. His family belonged to business community of Kathiawar. His father was a rich Khoja merchant.
4. Studied at the local Madrassah and Mission school. Went to Lincoln's Inn (U.K.) to study law and stayed there for 4 years.
5. Lawyer and political reformer.
6. A) Moderate.
   B) 1913, joined All India Muslim League. (He first worked for Hindu-Muslim self-government and later became founder of Pakistan.) 1918, led the anti-Willingdon Memorial Agitation; 1919, resigned from Imperial Legislative Council; 1920, he broke with Home Rule League and Hindi Muslim Unity.

VI.20.(I)

Narayan Malhar Joshi (Transition, Transformation)

1. Born 1879 at Poona.
2. Father an orthodox Maharashtrian Brahmin.
3. Family probably middle class, for Joshi was a school teacher for 5 years.
4. He studied at Poona New English School; B.A., Deccan College, Poona.
5. Labor Leader and Social Reformer (Servants of India Society)
6. A.
   B. Servants of India Society, 1909-1940; General Secretary, All-India Trades Union Congress, 1925-1929
and 1940-1948; Deputy Member of the Governing Body of the I.L.O., 1922-24; Member of the Governing Body of the I.L.O., 1934-44 and 1946-48; Atterdad Round Table Conference, 1930-31 and 1932; Member of Congress National Planning Committee.

7. Sixteen trips to Europe and one to U.S.A.

VI.21.(I)

Aga Khan (Transition-Transformation)

2. Of a family which was head of Ismaili Muslims.
4. He studied Arabic, Persian literature and history before 10 years. After that he studied under English tutors.
5. Religious leader and political reformer.
6. A) His political goals were those of a moderate.
   B) President, All India Muslim League; President, League of Nations, 1937; Present at Round Table Conference representing Muslim interests.
7. Lived and traveled extensively in Europe.

VI.22.(I)

Lia Quat Ali Khan (Transformation)

2. Of a Muslim aristocratic family. With descent from an Iranian King.
3. His father was a wealthy landowner. Aristocratic and feudal.
5. Lawyer, zamidar and politician.
6. A) Politically a Moderate.
   B) M.P. Legislative Council, 1926, 1930; Central Legislative Assembly, 1940; Honorary Secretary, All-India Muslim League, 1936-37; Prime Minister of Pakistan, 1946-51.
7. Educated in England but did not seem to have had any special interest in the West.
VI.23.(I)

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (Late Tradition - Transition)
1. Born 1817 in Delhi.
2. He came from a Wahhabi Muslim family.
3. His family was wealthy and learned with many ancestral ranks and titles. His grandfather was a military commander in the Mogul Court. His father was Mir Muttagi, a religious recluse who claimed like all of the Syed family to be descended from the Prophet Mohammed. After his father's death in 1839 the family became poor at the hands of the Government of India.
4. He had an orthodox education at home. Studied three oriental languages, poetry and religion.
5. Administrator and educator (founded Mahomedan Anglo-Oriental college).
6. A) Politically he was conservatively inclined. He was interested in communal rather than national matters.
7. Did not know English till 1869. He did however promote Western arts and sciences. Visited U.K. in 1869.

VI.24.(I)

Diwan Chamal Lal (Transformation)
1. Born 1892.
2. N.A.
3. Son of Diwan Bahadur Diwan Donlat Rai, C.I.E. & Dr. Helen Khan, M.B.B.S.
4. B.A. (Oxon.); Barrister of Middle Temple.
5. Politician and Labor Leader.
6. A) N.A.
   B) Founder, A.I.T.U.C., 1920; President, A.I.T.U.C., 1927; Led Indian Delegation to I.L.O. Conference (Montreal), 1946; Member, Central Legislative Assembly, 1924-31 and 1944-46; Member, Constituent Assembly of India, 1946-48. Member, All-India Congress Committee, 1938 - ; Ambassador to Turkey, 1948-50.
VI.25.(I)

Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya (Transition-Transformation)
1. Born 1861 in Allahabad.
2. Of an Orthodox Brahmin family.
3. His family were renowned Sanskrit scholars and authors for several generations. His father was Pandit Braj Nath a preacher and author -- never very rich.
4. Had his primary education in Sanskrit Pathashales (schools) and later in a modern (English) school and Muir Central College. Got his L.L.B. from Allahabad University.
5. Political reformer (Congress and Hindu Mahasabha) and educationist.
6. A) Politically a Conservative.
   B) 1902-12 President Indian National Congress. 1923, 24, 34 President of the Hindu Mahasabha.
7. No indication of interest or knowledge of West.

VI.26.(I)

Sir Pherozesha Mehta (Transition)
1. Born 1845 at Bombay.
2. Of a Parsi family.
3. His father was a merchant, a partner of Messrs. Cama and Company. He was described as a "well-to-do man of sound commercial instincts and fine literary tastes."
4. He went to a Modern school and passed his matric in 1861. Entered Elphinstone College and got his M.A. there. Studied at Lincoln's Inn in U.K. and was called to the Bar in 1868.
5. Lawyer and public servant (administrator).
6. A) Politically a Conservative.
   B) 1890, Presided over Indian National Congress. 1892, member of Bombay Legislative Council.
7. Educated in U.K. and lived there for a few years.

VI.27.(I)

Syamaprasad Mookerjee (Transformation)
1. Born 1901, probably in Calcutta because his father was Chancellor of Calcutta University.)
2. Of a Bengali Hindu family.
3. His father was Asutosh Mookerjee, a great scholar, an eminent jurist and educationist. For many years he
was head of Calcutta University. The family was wealthy and Anglicized.

4. He studied at an Indian modern school and the Mitra Institution at Bhowanipur and Presidency College, Calcutta.

5. Educationist and political leader.

6. A) B) 1934, Vice Chancellor, Calcutta University; 1943, President, All-India Hindu Mahasabha.

7. His knowledge and interests were mainly Indian and more specifically communal.

VI.28.(I)

Ranganath Narsingh Mudholkar (Transition)


2. Belonged to a Maharashtrian family.

3. In the days of the Maharastrian Empire his ancestors had the Vakilship of the Mudhol State. His grandfather was a Mamlatdar in Khandesh. His father, Narasingh Rao Krishna, was a recordkeeper (clerk) of the District Judge’s Court, Khandesh.

4. He passed his matriculation examination from the Dhulia High School and got his B.A. and L.L.B. from Elphinstone College.

5. Economic administrator and reformer.

6. A) Politically a moderate (although he did not openly express views).

B) Presided over Provincial Industrial Conferences 1905, 1906. 1890 Congress Delegate to U.K. with S.N. Banerjea.

7. Congress Delegate to U.K. 1890.

VI.29.(I)

Harish Chandra Mukerjee (Late Tradition)

1. Born 1824 in the town of Bhowanipur near Calcutta.

2. Belonged to a high caste Kulin Brahmin family.

3. His family were in poor circumstances. He was the son of Ram Dhun Mukerjee by his third wife and was brought up in the house of his maternal uncles.

4. He had his primary education in a village school and as a charity boy in the Union School. He left school at 14 years in search of employment.

5. Journalist - editor of the Patriot.

6. A) Politically a Conservative.
B) 1856, sided with reformers in widow-remarriage question. 1857, he analyzed Indian Mutiny and relation between the ruled and the rulers.

7. Read many English magazines and books at the Calcutta Public Library.

VI.30.(I)

Mohsin Ul Mulk (Transition)
1. Born 1837 at Etawah.
2. Came from a famous Muslim family.
3. His father was Mir Zamin Ali who belonged to the famous Syed family of Etawah, which were connected with the Mogul Dynasty. He was, however, a poor man.
4. He studied Persian and Arabic at home. Later he studied under Moulana Irayat Hussain, a scholar of repute. In short he had a Muslim Orthodox education.
5. Administrator (Hyderabad State) and educationist (Aligarh College).
6. A) Politically he was a conservative. His views were communal rather than national.
   B) Fought for Muslim representation and the Urdu Movement. Organized the Muslim Political Association in 1906 at Dacca, where the decision was taken to form the Muslim League. Drafted League's constitution with Viquar-Ul-Mulk.
7. He modernized Muslim education along Western lines. His interests were communally oriented.

VI.31.(I)

Viquar-Ul-Mulk (Transition)
1. Born 1841 in a village in the Moradabad District of U.P.
2. He came from a Muslim family.
3. Little is known about his family. He was born in a small village and his family was poor, for he started his first job early as a temporary assistant teacher at a low salary.
4. He had a Muslim Orthodox education and was a follower of Sir Syed Ahmed.
5. Administrator (Hyderabad State) and educator (1907, Honorary Sec. of Aligarh College).
6. A) Politically he could be called a Conservative -- he was communally rather than nationally oriented.
B) Agitated for Urdu Movement. Formed Muslim Political Conference in Lucknow, 1901. He pinned his faith in Hindu-Muslim understanding with Muslim identity.

7. No particular knowledge of West.

VI.32.(I)

Dadabhai Naorji (Transition)
1. Born 1821 in the City of Bombay.
2. Of a Parsi family.
3. His ancestors were priests for six centuries. His immediate family were poor but respectable.
4. He studied at a Government school and Elphinstone College, Bombay, where he got his B.A.
5. Professor and social reformer in India. Political reformer in U.K.
6. A) Politically a Conservative.
   B) Presided over Indian National Congress in 1886, 1893, 1906. 1892 he became a liberal MP in House of Commons.
7. Was interested and had read most English liberals. Spent a large part of his life in U.K. presenting the need for political reforms in India.

VI.33.(I)

Deva Acharya Narendra (Transformation)
1. N.A.
2. Hindu
3. Son of Babu Baldeu Parasad.
4. Educated at Allahabad and Benares. M.A., L.L.B.
5. Lawyer, educator, politician.
6. A) N.A.
   B) Joined Congress, 1916; gave up law practice to participate in Non-Cooperation Movement, 1920; Founding Member, Indian Socialist Party; Member, Working Committee, Congress, 1936-38; Vice-Chancellor, Benares University.
7. N.A.

VI.34.(I)

Khurshed Framji Nariman (Transformation)
1. Born 1886.
2. Of a Parsee family.
3. N.A.
4. He has his B.A. and L.L.B. degrees.
5. Public servant in Bombay.
6. A) Follower of Gandhi.
   B) Member of Congress Working Committee (1930); Mayor of Bombay; Started Youth Leagues in Bombay.
7. No indication of any special knowledge of foreign countries.

VI.35.(I)

Pundit Ajudhya Nath (Late Tradition - Transition)
1. Born 1840 at Agra.
2. Belonged to a Kashmiri Brahmin family.
3. His father was Kedar Nath, a merchant prince at Agra; he was also for some time Prime Minister to the Nawab of Jaffhar.
4. He learned Persian and Arabic when young. At 13 yrs. he joined Agra College. Left College when 22 and joined the Bar.
5. Lawyer and Political Reformer.
6. A) N.A.
   B) One of the founders of the Congress Party. First Indian from N.W.F.P. on whom the British conferred honors.
7. He is noted to have read many English authors.

VI.36.(I)

Jawaharlal Nehru (Transformation)
1. Born 1889 in Allahabad.
2. Of a Kashmiri Brahmin family.
3. His father was Motilal Nehru, a wealthy and Anglicized lawyer and political reformer. Famous for associations with Congress and Swarajya Party.
5. Political reformer and leader.
6. A) He was an extremist (independence was his goal);
   B) 1916, Secretary, Home Rule League; 1929, Secretary, All India Congress Committee; 1930, President, Indian National Congress; 1936, 1937, 1946, President, I.N.C.; 1947, Prime Minister, Government of India.
7. Widely traveled and read on nearly all countries in the world.
VI.37.(I)

Pandit Motilal Nehru (Transition-Transformation)

1. Born in Agra, 1861.
2. Of a Kashmiri Brahmin family.
3. His grandfather was Pandit Lakshmi Narayan, a lawyer attached to the East India Company at the court of the Mogul Emperor. His father was Pandit Ganga Dhar Nehru -- a kotwal -- or police officer in charge of the city of Delhi. He died before Motilal was born.
4. He studied Persian and Arabic. Went to school in Kanpur and Allahabad. At Muir Central College in Allahabad he came under influence of British professors. Passed the High Court Vakils (Pleaders) examination.
5. Lawyer and political reformer.
6. A) Moderate and later extremist. A pro-changer.
   B) 1906 attended session of Indian National Congress.
   Follower of Mahatma Gandhi.
7. Entertained Englishmen often in India. Westernized in manner. Insisted on his son, Jawaharlal, having a totally English education.

VI.38.(I)

Nimbkar, R.S. (Transformation)

1. Born 1899.
2. Of a Maharastrian family.
3. N.A.
4. Educated at Wilson College, Bombay.
5. Labor leader, editor of Maharashtrian Weeklies.
6. A) Follower of Gandhi and participated in Satyagraha Movement.
   B) 1923, Sec. Maharashtra Provincial Congress Committee; 1926-29, All India Congress Committee; 1933, resigned Communist Party.
7. No indication of any special knowledge of foreign countries.

VI.39.(I)

Maulana Shibli Nornani (Transition)

1. Born 1857 in a village near Azamgarg.
2. Of a Muslim family.
3. His father was a prominent member of the Bar, a big Zamidar and an industrialist.
4. He received his education at the old Islamic Madrasas and was deeply influenced by Maulana Mohammed Farruq (a celebrated scholar opposed to Sir Syed). He refused to learn English or go to the U.K.
5. Arabic scholar and religious leader.
6. A) He did not express his views in national terms. Was for a revival of old Muslim traditions.
7. Knew little of the West.

VI.40. (I)

Bepin Chandra Pal (Transition)
1. Born 1858 in the District of Sylhet in Bengal.
2. Of a Bengali Brahmin family.
3. His father was Babu Ramachandra, a District Munsiff. (Indian judge subordinate to an English District judge.)
4. He went to a modern school and matriculated very young. Left college in Calcutta to join the Brahmo Samaj Movement. In 1900 went to Oxford with the aid of a scholarship to study comparative theology.
5. Political reformer.
6. A) Politically a Moderate.
    B) 1906, at Congress Session he spoke for passive resistance and extended meaning of boycott.

VI.41. (I)

Rajendra Prasad (Transition - Transformation)
1. Born 1884 in the Saran District of Behar.
2. Of a Hindu family.
3. His family was well-to-do, but he was brought up to lead a simple life.
4. He studied at Calcutta University where he got his M.A., M.L., L.L.D.
5. Lawyer and Political Reformer.
6. A) No changer.
7. Went to England once in 1928. His interests seem to be totally Indian.
VI.42.(I)

Vallabhai J. Patel (Transition-Transformation)
1. Born 1875 in the Kaira District in the Province of Bombay.
2. Of a Gujarati family.
3. His father, Javerbhai, had become famous by fighting against the British in 1857. His father called himself "a simple farmer." Did not have enough money for Vallabhai's English education.
4. Went to England to study law. Called to the Bar at Middle Temple.
5. Political organizer for which he earned title of Sardar.
6. A) A pro-changer.
   B) 1916, entered public life as an associate of Gandhi. Satyagraha leader at Kaira and then Bardoli; 1931, President of Indian National Congress; 1935-42, Chairman, Congress Parliamentary Sub-Committee through which he controlled seven out of eleven ministries in Indian provinces.
7. Studied in U.K. Does not seem to have had any special interest in West.

VI.43.(I)

Lala Lajpat Rai (Transition-Transformation)
2. Came from an old Agarvara Baniya family.
3. His father Munshi Radha Krishen Lal was a teacher of Urdu and Persian in a Government school. Was under the influence of Dayananda Saraswati. In later days he carried on a small business in Jargaon.
5. Lawyer, educator, banker (which gave him title of Lala), social reformer (Arya Samaj).
6. A) Politically an Extremist -- asked Indians to serve mother country.
   B) 1906 went with Gokhale and Indian Delegation to U.K. Deported and harassed by C.I.D. (Indian F.B.I.). 1920, President of Indian National Congress and broke with the non-cooperationists.
7. Visited the U.S. in 1906 and went with the Indian Delegation and Gokhale to U.K. in the same year.
Mahadev Govind Ranade (Late Tradition)
1. Born 1842.
2. Belonged to a middle class Chitpawan Brahmin Maharashtrian family.
3. His great grandfather was a vakil (pleader) of the State of Sangli. His grandfather was a mamlatdar (collector) in the district of Poona. His father was head clerk to a Mamlatdar of Niphad in the district of Nasik.
4. He went to Vernacular school and later Kolhapur high school. He got his B.A. (English), M.A. (History) L.L.B. (Law) from Elphinstone College, Bombay.
5. Judge and social reformer.
6. A) Politically he was a conservative.
   B) N.A.
7. Studied and wrote on laissez faire doctrine and other topics in political economy.

Manavendra Nath Roy (Transformation)
1. Born 1893 in Dehra Dun, U.P.
2. N.A.
3. N.A.
4. Left school very young to become political agitator.
5. Political agitator.
6. A) Extremist (communist and Radical Democrat Parties)
   B) Joined revolutionary movement, 1903; prosecuted for political decoity, 1906; involved in Howva Conspiracy case, 1908; helped establish Communist party, Mexico, World War I; later associated with Lenin in Russia; returned to India, 1930; 1937, founder of Radical Democrat Party, 1937.
7. Spent most of period 1914-1930 in West.

Raja Ram Mohan Roy (Late Tradition)
1. Born 1772 in Radhanagore in the Hughly District in Bengal.
2. Belonged to a Bengali Brahman family.
3. His father, Ramkanta Roy, was first in the service of the Nawab of Moorshabad and subsequently employed as Manager of some of the estates of the Maharaja of Burdwan.
4. He studied Bengali, Persian, Arabic and Sanscrit and
only started learning English when he was 22 years old.
5. Religious and Social Reformer.
6. A) Politically he was a Conservative.
   B) 1828, founded the Brahmo Samaj (reformed Hinduism).
Met many important Kings, Philosophers, Authors abroad.

VI.47.(I)

Sir Tejbahadur Sapru (Transition - Transformation)
1. Born 1875.
2. Kashmiri Pandit community of U.P.
3. N.A.
4. Studied at Agra College where he got his B.A. At Oxford he got his Doctor of Law, D.C.L., at Allahabad University his L.L.D.
5. Constituional lawyer.
6. A) Believed like Gokhale in evolutionary process through Constitutional means - makes him some sort of a conservative-moderate in so far as independence is concerned. He wanted Indian equality with other constituent parts of the Empire.
   B) 1913, entered U.P. Legislative Council; 1916, submitted reforms of Constitution Law Member, Viceroy's Executive Council; 1924, member of the Reforms Enquiry Committee under Sir Alexander Muddiman; 1927, boycotted Simon Commission; 1928, authored part of Nehru Report on blueprint for Constitution; attended the 3 Round Table Conferences; 1941, organized Non-Party Leaders Conference; 1942, President, Non-Party Leaders Conference.
7. Educated and studied in J.K. His knowledge and interests seem to relate mainly to law.

VI.48.(I)

Binayak Damodar Savarkar (Transition - Transformation)
1. Born 1883 at Bhagur, a village near Nasik.
2. Of a Maharastrian Chitapavan Brahmin family.
3. The Savarkars originally were Jahgirdars of a small village, Rahuri, in the time of the Peshwas. His father was Damodarpant Savarkar, who had an English education and was of a religious and poetical turn of mind. No mention of his profession.
4. He studied at Fergusson College, Poona, and Bombay University. Got a scholarship to go to U.K. to study law.

5. Political terrorist and political author.

6. A) Extremist (Hindu Mahasabha).
   B) 1906, set up "New India Society" in Bombay; organized meetings; published articles and his followers committed Terrorist Acts till 1930's; 1937, President, Hindu Mahasabha.

7. Studies and lived in U.K. for over a decade. His interests seem to have been nationally directed.

VI.49.(I)

Keshab Chandra Sen (Late Tradition)
2. Belonged to a Bengali family of the Vaidya caste.
3. His family claimed descent from an ancient dynasty of Sena Rajas. His grandfather was Raj Kamal Sen, a self-made man, who became Dewan (chief adviser) of the Bank of Bengal and had a large income. His father was Peary Mohan Sen, sometime Dewan of the Calcutta Mint.
4. He had a few years vernacular education followed by a modern school education. He later entered Hindu College and studied mental and moral philosophy till he was 22 years.
5. Religious reformer.
6. A) Politically a Conservative.
   B) 7. Associated with missionaries and is noted for having organized Shakespearian Plays. Lectured on Religion in U.K. in 1870.

VI.50.(I)

Sir Chimanlal Setalvad (Transition - Transformation)
1. Born in 1865 in Broach.
2. N.A.
3. His grandfather was Ambashankar, a Judge at Ahmedabad. His father studied law and became a subordinate judge and later the Dewan (minister) of the State of Limbdi in Kathiawar.
4. He attended school at Umreth in the Kaira District and studied at Elphinstone College, Bombay where he got his L.L.D.
5. Lawyer.
   B) 1921-23, member, Exec. Council of the Governor of Bombay; 1931, 1930, Round Table Conference.

VI.51.(I)

Sir Muhammad Shafi (Transition)
1. Born 1869.
2. Of a Muslim family.
3. Belonged to a well-known Mian family of Baghanpur in the District of Lahore. Family was well off and owned extensive landed and house property. His father was Mian Din Muhammad.
4. He was first placed in Mosque under Maulvi Alah Din to study the Quran and Muslim theology. Then he entered a village school. At Lahore he joined Central Model School. After matriculation, joined Government College at Lahore. Later went to Middle Temple, U.K.
5. Lawyer, educator and government servant.
6. A) N.A.
   B) Helped form All-India Muslim League.
7. Educated in U.K. but did not have any special interest or knowledge of Western matters.

VI.52.(I)

Rabindranath Tagore (Transition)
2. Belonged to a prominent Bengali family.
3. His father was Debendranath Tagore, one of the founders of the Brahmo Samaj. His family was wealthy, prominent and literary.
4. He had his pre-university schooling at a modern Calcutta school. At 17 years he went to University College, England to study law. He decided law did not suit him, so he returned to India.
5. Poet.
6. A) Politically a Conservative.
   B) 1905, he campaigned vigorously against the partition of Bengal. 1919, he renounced his knighthood in protest of the Jalianwala Bagh incident.
7. Traveled, wrote and had extensive knowledge of the East and West.
VI.53.(I)

Kashinath Trimback Telang (Late Tradition - Transition)
3. His father was Babu Ramachandra Telang -- a respectable Hindu patriarch.
4. He received his vernacular education in the Amarchand Wadi School. At 9 years he joined Elphinstone High School. At 14 years he joined Elphinstone College, Bombay and received B.A. in 1866; M.A. in 1868; L.L.B. in 1870; Advocates Exam in 1872.
5. Lawyer-Judge, sometime politician and social reformer.
6. A) Politically a Conservative.
   B) 1873 protested against Salt Bill. 1885 helped A.O. Hume organize the Indian National Congress.
7. Read English literature and philosophy with great interest. Translated Gita into English.

VI.54.(I)

Bal Gangadhar Tilak (Transition)
1. Was born at Ratnagiri, 1856.
2. Of a Maharastrian Chitpawan Brahmin family.
3. His ancestors were famous in Maharastrian history. His father, Gangadhar Ramachandra Tilak, was first an Assistant Teacher at Ratnagiri and later the Deputy Educational Inspector at Thana and Poona.
4. He studied at Deccan College and got his B.A. and L.L.B.
5. Journalist and lawyer.
   B) Went to prison several times.
7. Knew little about West and was not affected by Western civilization. In fact he decried Western methods.

VI.55.(I)

Budrudin Tyabji (Late Tradition-Transition)
2. Of an Arab family settled in Bombay.
3. His father was Tyabji Bhai Miyan Saheb "a prosperous merchant and cultured gentleman with refined tastes."
4. He was educated in Urdu and Persian at Dada Makhra's Madrassa (traditional Muslim school). Joined Elphinstone College, Bombay and later in 1860 joined Newbury High Park College, London, and matriculated from London University. Joined the Middle Temple and was called to the Bar in April 1867.
5. Lawyer, political reformer, social reformer.
6. A) B) 1879, protested against import duties on Manchester goods. 1887, President of Indian National Congress. 1903, presided over Muslim Educational Conference.
7. Visited U.K. a number of times.

VI.56.(I)

Isvar Chandra Vidyasagar (Late Tradition)
1. Born 1820 in a small village in Midnapur.
2. He belonged to a Kulin Brahmin family.
3. His grandfather was Ramjaya Banerjee, an itinerant monk and his father was Thakurdas Banerjee, an Indian merchant's clerk on a monthly salary of Rs. 10.
4. He had his primary education in a small village school.
   At 8 years he went to Sanskrit College in Calcutta. Studied Sanskrit, literature, Astronomy, Law and Philosophy. At 19 years he passed an examination in Hindu law and obtained the title of "Vidyasagar".
5. Educationist, School and Social Reformer.
6. A) Politically he was a conservative.
   B) 1887, he received a certificate of honor at the Calcutta Durbar. 1890, he was made a Companion of the Order of the Indian Empire.
7. Learned a little English at 19.

VI.57.(I)

Swami Vivekananda (Late Tradition - Transition)
1. Born 1862 in Calcutta.
2. Belonged to a Kshatriya family.
3. His family is described as old, simple and religiously devout. His father, Vishvanatha Datta was an attorney of law of the Calcutta High Court.
4. He went to Scottish Church College and got his B.A. He later became a student and disciple of Shree Ramakrishna.
5. Religious Leader.
6. A) N.A.
   B) N.A.

7. Studied Western philosophers. Wrote to Herbert Spencer while still in school. Visited U.S. in 1893. Knew a lot about West and Christianity.

VI.58.(I)

Sir Dinshaw Edulji Wacha (Transition)
2. Belonged to a Parsi family.
3. His father belonged to a respectable middle class family and was engaged in trade.
4. He went to Elphinstone Institute and had a modern education. He did not get any degrees, being placed by his father in his commercial business before he could finish his course.
5. Economic administrator and public servant.
6. A) Moderate (wanted self-government within Empire).
   B) 1897 one of 5 Indians to give evidence before the Royal Commission of Indian Expenditure. Presiding Officer, Calcutta Congress, 1901.
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IV. General


Biographical Note

Lawrence Whitcomb Barss was born at Boston, Massachusetts, on 28 February 1928. His secondary schooling was at Phillips Academy, Andover. He matriculated at Princeton University in February 1946, and received the A.B. magna cum laude in History in June 1950. After doing independent research in political theory, he was drafted in January 1951. He served in Korea and was separated from the Army as a First Lieutenant, Infantry, in August 1953. During Winter 1954, he taught briefly at Andover and then became associated with the Overseas Division of the National City Bank of New York. In February 1955, he enrolled at M.I.T. During Summer 1955, he attended Harvard. Since 1958, he has been an Instructor of History, Department of Humanities, M.I.T.