

A STUDY OF PROBLEMS IN NEW
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION:
THE CASE OF ABUJA THE NEW FEDERAL CAPITAL OF NIGERIA

by

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to evaluate the implementation experience of Nigeria's new capital city, Abuja. The study involves a retrospective assessment of the problems associated with the ideas as originally conceived, problems encountered in its construction, and problems that seem to emerge in the new capital's future development. We examine particular outcomes of the capital planning enterprise with special attention to those where there is a difference between the goals and the final result, and we look for explanations.

We evaluate the new capital enterprise by assessing critically the activities, operations, and performance of the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), the agency charged with executing the new capital policy. We contend that simple exercise of rational organizational structure or arrangement for project implementation as such, does not necessarily guarantee the desired goals and objectives. Successful outcomes, however rapidly they are desired, would seem to come about essentially through appropriate responses to demands posed by the project's social, political, economic, financial, and institutional characteristics.

From the results of our analysis, the conclusions are that in spite of considerable strides made in urban facilities development, the FCDA largely failed to meet its construction targets. The agency's processes of urban land and housing allocation, and the beneficiary distribution of these resources and facilities tended to be biased in favor of the upper-middle and high-income segment of the urban population.

The FCDA's performances were generally inhibited by four major factors some of which were beyond the agency's sphere of control. These were: (i) political intervention and the problems it created for the agency in terms of its ability to control its operations; (ii) inadequate funding; (iii) problems arising from management skills and competence or administrative efficiency as well as the integrity of the personnel; (iv) fast pace of construction. Although each of

the four problems listed above contributed to inhibiting the performance of the FCDA, it would seem that the problem of political intervention and control was pivotal in determining the degree of effectiveness.

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Ralph Gakenheimer
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To Rolph Engler and Maurice Linton, I am also very grateful.

TO MY SON JIDEOFOR

Born at the most critical
stage of this study

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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

The construction of new towns, for whatever reasons or purposes, involves long-term and complex processes. To translate the plan for a new town into built space, there is a need to marshal the necessary political, financial, natural, technical and managerial resources, and to organize a carefully orchestrated program of sequential, coordinated phases. The complexity of this process and the time pressure that often arises from the need for quick and fruitful results require definition of the critical activities, the time period necessary for accomplishment, and the appropriate sequences and lead times. ~~Other~~ significantly important problems that could be encountered in the process range from the mechanics of administration, financing, and development, to the problems of political conflicts and intriguing normative issues. Should such towns be built? How? What kinds of cities are desirable? How would the cost be borne? what kind of organizational structure can best guide their development? What should be their role and scope? How are policy and political conflicts resolved? How feasible is this goal of comprehensive planning of functions, growth, and efficiency? These and still other difficult questions face those who are bold enough to engage in new town planning and

development.(1)

In this thesis, we evaluate the implementation experience of Nigeria's new capital city, Abuja, in an effort to present the problems encountered during its construction, their causes, and consequences on the overall project construction. It is not a comprehensive history of new town development in Nigeria. Instead, it can be described as a case study of an important planning experience. It is a retrospective evaluation of the problems associated with the ideas as originally conceived, problems encountered in its implementation experience, and problems that seem to emerge in its future development.

In the thesis, we also examine particular outcomes of the capital planning enterprise with particular attention to those where there is a difference between the plan and the final result, and we look for explanations. These explanations come from pressures on implementation through environmental forces, economic change, financing mechanisms, and bureaucratic characteristics that were brought to bear on the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), a public agency empowered to execute the new capital project.

The problems of executing the new capital project are therefore studied by evaluating critically the operations and activities of this agency. It is argued that simple exercise of a rational organizational structure and

(1) Lloyd Rodwin, The British New Towns Policy: Problems and Implications. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1956.

arrangement for project implementation as such, does not necessarily bring about the desired goals and objectives. Appropriate and successful outcomes, however rapidly they are desired, would seem to come about essentially by adequate understanding and appropriate responses to the demands of the project's social, political, economic, financial, and institutional characteristics. Thus, a successful project would require an adequate and appropriate response to questions about the project in terms of: What problems are the planner or the government trying to solve? Are the problems properly defined? Is the project or program being designed to solve the problems the appropriate one? What are the distributional impacts (implications) on the various groups in the society? Do all or most of the groups affected share the project's goals? Who gains and who loses?

In conjunction with these, there are other questions that would also need to be addressed: Is the time allotted for the project's completion sufficient? Is there an adequate organizational capacity (skill, autonomy, manpower, management ability, etc.) to execute the project? How is the project to be financed? Through public funds, private funds, or both? Are the sources of funds reliable? All these questions and perhaps many more would have to be addressed in order for the desired outcomes of project implementation to be realized.

The problems or "failures" of the new capital project (Abuja Project) hinged on the inability of the project's

proponents (planners, government, and bureaucrats) to recognize and consider adequately, or respond to, most of these questions. Thus, the new capital's failures or problems can be traced through the pressures brought to bear on the execution agency through political forces, economic change, financial and organizational characteristics.

In spite of the FCDA's sweeping powers, its activities and operations were critically affected by the political and institutional conflict brought to bear on it by the nature of the country's multifarious and often contentious ethnic groups. The influence of ethnic conflicts is significant in the new capital's siting and the appointment of senior FCDA officers, as well as in the process of allocation of urban land and housing resources.

The evidence of political influence is also demonstrated by the short time span (eight years and later reduced to four by the politicians)(1) demanded by both the military leaders and the politicians for completing the project without effectively linking this time span with the available financial and organizational resources. The commencement of construction even before the Master Plan was drafted is a reflection of pressures brought to bear on construction as a result of this short time frame.

(1) The new capital construction was initially scheduled for completion in 1986 by the Murtala Muhammed administration. This time frame was however changed by the civilian government that was elected into office in 1979. This government, led by Alhaji Shehu Shagari, moved the completion date to 1982.

The influence of political forces is further reflected by the FCDA's ineffective role in steering the course of the new capital's construction in terms of decisions involving labour needs, infrastructure development, and land-use policies. The Agency's operations were also inhibited by ineffective linkage between the project's financial requirements and available funding sources, which were, in turn, nearly or entirely dependent on a weak federal revenue. The Agency's financial position was further worsened by its inability to exploit and manage effectively the project's internal revenue sources. Evidence of mismanagement is seen in the allocation and distribution of urban land resources, and inability to collect rents, pay contractors, and give approvals to applications for plots, contracts, etc., on time, and corruption.

The FCDA's poor attainments in the provision of urban housing, community facilities, utilities, and infrastructure, and in the overall allocation and distribution of urban resources, are an outcome of the interaction of these political, financial, and organizational forces

1.1 Purpose and Objectives of the Study

Using Nigeria's new capital city as a case study, the purpose of this thesis is to study the problems of implementation in developing countries. This study is, however, not aimed at developing an implementation theory. Rather, it is a study of an important planning experience.

It is believed that a case study of this one country's experience provides a more concrete basis for an in-depth analysis than a more general study would, to evaluate the problems of new urban construction in developing countries.

The findings of one particular agency will also be relevant in varying degrees to all other agencies. The FCDA is the first of such agencies set up to carry out the construction of a new urban development from scratch. Therefore, the experiences of this young agency could provide some valid generalizations and inferences upon which the performance of its future public role vis-a-vis new agencies could be predicated.

Finally, it has been rightly said that the reason that a question is good for inquiry is because it has consequences; and that a good research ought to have the potential for changing somebody's or an institutions behavior.(1) It is hoped that this case study will play some part in providing knowledge not only about the substance of Nigeria's new capital construction problems, but also provide information to help solve them.

This evaluation of Nigeria's new capital project involves an analysis of an evolving process--planning and implementation. As such, the objectives of the study are:

(1) A. Fleisher, "Seminar Discussions," October 1974. Cited in D.C. Okpala, The Potentials and Perils of Public Urban Land Ownership and Management, PhD Thesis, MIT, 1977, p. 10.

1. To examine critically the factors that led to the relocation of the capital. This objective is important in order to understand the problems relocation was designed to solve and the goals it was expected to achieve. Our analysis of these factors will reveal that problems of national development--colonially influenced urban patterns, unbalanced settlement, ethnic tensions, and poor conditions of urban life--provided acceptable, but not sufficient, force for relocation to take place. The radical changes that occurred during the past eighteen years in the Nigerian political, economic, and social environment provided the country with a need, the financial assets, and an appropriate leader to initiate a new capital project.
2. To evaluate critically the project's formulation or planning process. This objective enables us to understand how and why certain policy choices were made and not others; for example, why the new city was sited where it is, why and how particular infrastructure and housing policies were pursued, and who made those choices and their consequences on the overall project construction. It also enables us to assess the FCDA's effectiveness in controlling the planning decisions. Our discussion in the thesis will reveal that, due to a near-excessive control by the Federal Military Government, the FCDA, in spite of its sweeping powers, was unable to exert much influence over these choices or decisions.

3. To evaluate critically the project's funding mechanisms. This involves the assessment of the project's funding sources, in terms of their ability to provide adequate resources for the project's construction. The extent to which the FCDA managed effectively the project's internal sources of revenue is also examined.
4. To evaluate critically the FCDA's organizational structure, as well as its strengths and weaknesses on overall project execution. Essentially, the capacity of this agency to execute the project is assessed in light of government interventions, financial problems, and organizational instability, and corruption
5. To examine critically the FCDA's performance in urban development in light of the construction targets and goals set for the project. This is done by way of analyzing the first phase of the new capital construction, (commonly referred to in this thesis as Phase One,) which was targeted for completion in order to facilitate movement to the city in 1986.

The FCDA's performance is defined by the level of the agency's attainments in urban development in terms of construction and allocation of urban resources. While the assessment of the financial, organizational, and environmental elements, and the planning process, relies mainly upon documented evidence and library materials and interviews, the performance evaluation is carried out

using two criteria adopted (but modified by this writer) from the literature, on the methods for evaluating organizational effectiveness on urban resource allocation.

(1)

Using the first of the two criteria--The Target Achievement Criterion, we simply compare the FCDA's attainments with particular targets the Agency has set for itself for achieving the 1986 movement deadline. Using this criterion, we itemize the construction targets for housing and other urban facilities, amenities, and utilities required to achieve movement to the city in 1986, and compare them with the level of the FCDA's attainments.

With the second criterion--The Distributional Effectiveness Criterion--we take the FCDA's attainments in urban development and evaluate them in terms of their distributional implications on accessibility among socio-economic groups. Although the issue of equitable distribution of resources among socio-economic groups is not clearly spelled out as one of the objectives being pursued by the FCDA, we are of the opinion that an equitable distribution of the urban resources among socio-economic groups is equally important for the achievement of peace and tranquility which are vital for national unity.

(1) A similar method is used in Anthony Downs: "Evaluating the Allocations to Urban Development," in L. Rodwin (Ed.), Planning Urban Growth and Regional Development: The

Because of the difficulties of acquiring the relevant data, and because of the "indivisibility" nature of some urban facilities, and the fact that many of such facilities are still under construction, it is not feasible to evaluate in detail the distributional implications of all the urban resources among socio-economic groups. Hence, the application of the Distributional Effectiveness Criterion is limited to the assessment of urban land and housing resources.

Obviously, the restriction of our assessment to these two resources, may not provide generalizations upon which to draw conclusions about the FCDA's effectiveness in the allocation and distribution of urban resources. Furthermore, the FCDA is not necessarily concerned only with the construction and allocation of facilities. The agency is also involved in other procedural and administrative functions, which this thesis could not effectively cover. However, some aspects of these administrative and procedural functions are covered during the analysis of the financial and organizational mechanisms and the planning activities.

6. This thesis concludes by offering thoughts and new directions for improving the FCDA's effectiveness in overall project implementation.

This study is based upon documentary research, interviews, and field work. I spent three months at Abuja, from August to November of 1984. While there, I collected basic documents, interviewed FCDA officials and others, and made many trips to the considerable number of urban settlements (the development areas) of the federal territory in an effort to verify the present status of these development areas. The visit took me, also, to a number of sites where construction was still in progress, and others where work had not yet started although was scheduled to have been started or completed before my visit.

In addition to interviewing FCDA officials in Nigeria, I also had the opportunity to interview some members of the planning team--the International Planning Associates--who produced the Master Plan. With the interview of this team, the working relationships that existed between them and the Nigerian officials during the development of this Master Plan were recorded.

A study of this nature is prone to certain difficulties that can be transformed into weaknesses. First, very limited financial resources restricted the length of my stay at Abuja and perhaps the scope of this study as well. Nevertheless, this limitation does not in any discernible way compromise the quality and proficiency expected of this study. The limited financial resources, in short, made me aware of how efficiently and effectively I needed to use my time, what resources to look for, and how to go about obtaining them.

Secondly, the Abuja project is an ongoing project, so, while this thesis is being written, many developments are taking place at the site. Also, because it is still ongoing, already-compiled and neatly-assembled data are hard to come by. Thus, the researcher was faced with having to dig through raw data, and at times was forced to do his analysis physically at the site to observe what was going on. As challenging and exciting as on-site research may be, the process can render one's analysis more descriptive than perhaps desired.

Thirdly, Abuja is a highly sensitive project. Opponents of the project have capitalized on some of the mistakes in its execution to voice their protests. Many of the country's economic problems have been blamed on the project. Because of this, information, especially of the type that could make the project "look bad," is highly classified and difficult to obtain.

1.2 Background to Abuja: Arguments for the New Capital Project

The creation of a new capital has always been accompanied by much controversy. Even after so many years and the realization of the plans, there is yet to be formed a consensus on the absolute necessity for such new capitals as Brasilia and others.

On February 4, 1976, the Federal Government of Nigeria announced a plan for moving the federal capital from Lagos to

a new city to be built in the central part of the country. Figure 1.1 shows the location of the new federal capital territory within Nigeria. In this section, in order to understand the goals of the new capital project, we outline and discuss arguments for this decision. Understanding of the goals and aspirations is important for analyzing their implications on the construction process in terms of the strategies or policies designed to achieve these goals. For example, the need to build an 'ideal' capital city, which in the eyes of most Nigerians signifies modernism, must have affected the adoption of the high housing construction and plot development standards, and may also have led to the construction of facilities with 'sophisticated' technological attributes. By the same token, the emphasis on building a primarily administrative capital left the impression on the decision makers that mainly government workers would inhabit the city. Thus, most of the FCDA's efforts to provide housing were geared toward this group of the population. The large number of the city's residents which constituted non-government workers, especially the poor among them, were largely left on their own to provide housing for themselves.

Argument for Abuja

The proponents of Abuja based their arguments on many factors. To some, Abuja symbolizes Nigeria's coming of age, her initiation into mature nationhood, and a break from her colonial past into a future of pioneering growth in the

Figure 1.1 Location of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) within Nigeria



interior and in the realm of urban development. The capital symbolizes the optimistic mood of developments and is to be at the center of her multiferous and often contentious ethnic conglomerates.

The goal and expectation of the new capital is perhaps summed up by this memorandum of Dr. Okoro, a medical practitioner, to the Panel on Location of the Federal Capital:

...This new federal capital in its central location on de facto and de jure FEDERAL (not State) TERRITORY will constitute the heart of the nation in the heartland of the country. It will be every Nigerian's Mecca, inspiration, and pride. It will be a place where our diverse peoples can be blended into one people. It will be our symbol of unity. It will be our cultural, scientific and political show-piece.(1)

To Abuja's detractors, the city is a monumental urbanistic and social disaster, a venture into wasteful consumption on a national scale in the midst of hunger, poverty, slums, disease, corruption, and despair.

One way to understand why and how Abuja was constructed is to examine the public pronouncements of its promoters. While undoubtedly some of these arguments do not rise above propaganda of a rather trivial kind, others at least imply a more profound kind of social analysis.

(1) Dr. A.N. Okoro, Memorandum to the Panel on Location of the Federal Capital, 1975, p. 5.

The first motive was the conviction that the transfer of the capital was a means toward achieving long-sought national unity. This unity motive was given a strong push by the country's 1979 Draft Constitution, which called for a new federal capital to achieve a number of goals"

recognition of the diversity of the people, the promotion of national integration, the formation of national associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, or other sectorial barriers, and the fostering of a feeling of belonging, and of Nigerian Peoplehood.(1)

As Gandonu (1975) further wrote:

A new federal capital should aim at providing opportunity for all Nigerians to meet each other on equal footing without prejudice as to places of origin of individuals in the federation. It should be accessible to all ... and should be in every sense, a national symbol of pride to the Nigerians and a uniting factor in Nigeria's effort to leap from divisive ethnocentricity to national consciousness.(2)

The relation among the more than 250 ethnic groups in the country has been a strategic problem. One of a few of the latest and tragic manifestations of this problem was the civil war which was fought between 1967 and 1970. A new capital city, planned on an ethnically central location, was therefore seen as a panacea for this ethnic discord.

(1) Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 Draft Constitution
(2) Dr. A. Gandonu, "A Proper Federal Capital for Nigeria," text of a lecture at the Nigerian Centre, London, under the

Another motive was the conviction that the transfer of the capital was a means toward fulfilling Nigeria's 'continental destiny.' Thus, Gandonu wrote:

Whatever else Abuja may become or represent, it is important to recall that Abuja was conceived by its originators as one of the vital provisions towards political, socio-economic, and infrastructural restructuring of Nigeria in preparation for her new aspirant role as a decolonized and viable nation state in contemporary world politics.(1)

Large in area, Nigeria is nevertheless, in terms of urban population concentrations, a coastal country, most of her large urban centers being concentrated within a few-hundred miles of the Atlantic coast. Some supporters of Abuja advocated a northward location in order to counter this tendency of which Abuja was to be the center,

from which development should spread rapidly from the new federal capital in widening eddies to the farthest corners of the country rather than sluggishly in a circus movement around the lagoon.(2)

In accord with this idea, various important highways have been proposed, or are under construction, to link Abuja with

auspices of the Nigerian High Commission, April 29, 1975, p. 11.

(1) Dr. A. Gandonu, "Nigeria's Abuja. The Building of a New National Capital." Paper delivered at Harvard Africa Seminar, Harvard University, Cambridge, May 12, 1983, p. 2.

(2) Dr. A.N. Okoro, Memorandum to Panel on Federal Capital, 1975.

the major urban centers of the rest of the country. These major highways include: (a) the North artery, which connects the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) with Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, Katsina, and Minna; (b) the Southern artery, which connects the FCT with Akure, Benin City, and Warri, as well as with Owerri and Port Harcourt; (c) the East and Southeast artery, which connects the FCT with Jos, Bauchi, Maiduguri, and Yola, as well as with Makurdi, Enugu, Owerri, Port Harcourt, and Calabar; and (d) the Western artery, which connects the FCT with Ilorin, Abeokuta, Ibadan, and Lagos.(1)

But it was not merely the desire to achieve national unity and to open up the interior that the proponents of Abuja used to advance their proposal. There was also the idea of fleeing from the negative characteristics of the old capital, Lagos.

Lagos is a city crushed by a series of urban problems, some seemingly insoluble. Locked between the creeks and estuaries of the Atlantic Ocean, the city has seen its growth choked and distorted by the very geographical circumstances that gave it its magnificent pictorial charm. Instead of a starlike or a radial growth typical of large cities, Lagos has grown in space shaped like an amorphous strip development, increasing the distances, and the amount of money and effort spent on public works. Between 1973-75 alone, close to N2.6 billion (US \$3.6 billion) was spent on

(1) See Regional Development Plan for the Federal Capital Territory, Vol. 2 (Book 3): The Proposed Regional Plan and Appendices, p. 1128.

the construction of fly-overs, bridges, waterworks expansion, popular housing, and other civil works, but congestion and housing shortages still remain out of control.(1) Only in the northern suburbs (the Agege-Lagos transit line) has any kind of rapid transit system been put into operation, but the service is crowded, slow, and inefficient. The plan in 1975 to expand transit services in the city by the Lagos State and Federal Government was quickly overtaken by the proposal to move the Federal capital. Public utilities (electricity, water, sewage, telephones) are unable to keep pace with the city's growth, and combined with the jammed undisciplined traffic make the daily life of the citizens a constant struggle. Proponents thus hope to seize the opportunity offered by the new capital, to find answers to congestion, energy, and their land-use problems.(2)

If underground railways, monorails, suspended electrical cabin ways, multi-storied car parks, helicopters and other futuristic traffic systems will be required then, calculations for their development can be made now.(3)

(1) Dr. A. Gandonu "Abuja: Planning the Nation's Capital," in Development Planning in Nigeria: Planning Experience in a Developing Economy, Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 1983.

(2) The suggestion to use Abuja to find solutions to traffic congestion, land use, energy, and recreational problems, was offered by Professor Madu during a Workshop held at Ibadan, on "Policy Considerations" for building the new capital city. Various other Nigerian experts who were present offered further suggestions along Madu's view. For example, architect Onafowoka suggested that an underground transport system be developed in the the new city. See "Workshop on the Construction of Abuja," Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER), September 27-29, 1976.

(3) Dr. A.N. Okoro, Memorandum to the Panel on the Location of the Federal Capital, December 1975, p. 5.

In addition to the traffic problem, squatter settlements and run-down and overcrowded houses proliferate the city to the point where they may house more than half the population. Against this phenomenon some of the proponents suggest that:

FCDA should aim at developing an ideal city by providing essential services to all its dwellers. They should avoid building decent houses without access roads as are found in our towns today.

Others suggest that:

There should be a need for housing regulation in terms of number of people in a house, an establishment of shopping centers [in the new capital].(1)

In the face of all these problems, there were many who felt that whatever the possible solutions to the problems of Lagos, it would be best to move the national government to a made-to-order, modern, perhaps even utopian new capital.

Proponents of Abuja also argue that the capital's location in Lagos distorted the government's view of the nation. The old capital is very different from the interior. Many feel that Lagos is far too remote from the everyday life of the ordinary Nigerians, that its location makes for an insularity of the decision makers who rarely venture out to

(1) Workshop on "Policy Considerations for the Construction of Abuja," held under the auspices of the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Ibadan, September 27-29, 1976.

see the rest of the country. Perhaps an Emir(1) sums up this feeling most when he remarked during a welcoming ceremony for a federal commissioner that the federal government has the "traditional habit of seeing Nigeria as not extending beyond Carter Bridge"(2) (which joins Lagos Island with the rest of Nigeria).

But the desire to escape from the problems of Lagos had another aspect. Lagos, which is the largest industrial and commercial center of the country, is also one of the areas most politically unsafe for non-Yoruba politicians, especially during national elections. The premature celebration of the opening of the new federal capital in 1982, by the Shagari administration before its completion was seen by critics as a desperate effort to move the national government just before the upcoming national elections of 1983. Moore (1982) has noted that the hastened effort to move the capital even before its completion, was a desperate effort by Shagari to insulate his party from the hostile Yorubas.(3) The first general election in thirteen years of military rule was held while the military was still in power, thus security was not a problem. Now that the military had gone, the only way to insure a violence-free election was to move the electoral headquarters vis-a-vis Shagari's party to

(1) 'Emir' is a title given to the traditional leader (ruler) of a Muslim city in northern Nigeria.

(2) Cited in *West Africa*, December 13, 1976, p. 1923.

(3) J. Moore, "Planning Abuja: The Politics of New Capital Construction," B.S. Thesis, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 1982.

Abuja, which happened to be located in the Northern Region.

Equally convincing to some was the universally shared belief in the inefficiency of the federal bureaucracy in Lagos. The reputation of the civil servant among most Nigerians is very low. "Nigerians show a high degree of inefficiency in their attitude to work and we should try to find a solution for this." (1) This was an opinion expressed by Professor Udo at the Workshop organized by the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research to consider suggestions from Nigerian experts for developing the new capital. In other words, Abuja was not a place where bureaucratic inefficiency characteristic of many Nigerians should be tolerated. The problems of public administration seemed to many to be insoluble. The civil service is protected by a philosophy of 'acquired rights' by which a job in the federal or state government is considered to be virtually a piece of private property. A solution seriously proposed by the Murtala Muhammed military administration to ensure an efficient implementation of the new capital, was to create a new bureaucracy, rather than use any of the existing agencies. In other words, the move in space was seen as a relatively painless means of effecting a revolution in mentality and methods. It may be that the inefficiency of the civil service stems from political clientelism and the civil service's function as a dole for the middle class.

(1) FCDA Workshop on Policy Considerations, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, Section III, p. 2.

Many believed, however, that the move to Abuja, by itself, could produce a change in mentality. (As we will see in Chapter 7, even the new bureaucracy--the FCDA--was not free from the inefficiency problems which its creation was to solve.)

It was even argued that the transfer of the capital would be a weapon against unemployment problems facing the country.

Even if the cost of building the capital is high, we can afford it today. Much of what will be spent to build the capital will be expended in the country and so will generate secondary revenue and provide jobs rather than be a total loss, as if the money were hidden abroad.... While Lagos cannot be harmed significantly by a relocation, the new public projects that will accompany relocation would provide enormous job opportunities that will go some way towards alleviating our unemployment problems. also, the new location would provide a new growth point from which strong generative forces would radiate to surrounding areas.(1)

Even against the background that in this modern world a capital city located inland is no less vulnerable than one near the coast, proponents of Abuja still argue that a central location would provide an effective defense against external attack. As Gandonu wrote,

A new federal capital should be accessible to all, attractive in terms of climatic and physical surroundings, strategically safe in relative terms from external and internal

(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital, December 1975, pp. 55-56.

aggression--therefore, easily defended--and from such a capital all corners of the nation can be defended or brought under national control with minimum political, administrative, or military efforts.(1)

Finally, there was the conviction among much of the middle class that Nigeria is a country with a magnificent future. The need to affirm this optimism, combined with a reluctance to combat the structural obstacles to economic development, helps to explain the symbolic significance of the construction of Abuja for a large segment of the lower and middle class.

Although it is not within the scope of this thesis to analyze the merits and demerits of these public pronouncements, goals, and aspirations, it is still important to highlight some of the implicit assumptions of the proponents of the new capital project, for it is the inadequate consideration of these characteristics and their weaknesses that led to failures or problems of the new capital construction.

The great mistake of the new capital proponents is the assumption that funds would not be a problem. There was little or no conscious effort on the part of project proponents to consider the long-term impact of the new capital construction on the available funding sources. Even the Committee appointed by the military leaders to study the

(1) Dr. A. Gandonu, *A Proper Federal Capital for Nigeria*, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

new capital proposal overlooked this factor. According to this committee,

The argument that colossal sums of money would be involved in building up a new capital is attractive but unconvincing.... First, we must say that we are not economists, but we can see no justification for the pessimism displayed in the above quote [referring to critics' charge against the movement of the capital on cost grounds].... Even if the cost is high, we can afford it today.(1)

The other major mistake of the proposal was the assumption of adequate organizational capacity to execute the new capital construction. The problem of lack of skilled labor and bureaucratic inefficiencies in developing countries has been the focus of the development literature, and Nigeria is no exception to the problem. The proponents did, to a certain degree, also touch upon this problems when it was suggested by one of the new capital supporters that inefficiencies characteristic of the Nigerian civil service should be avoided or dealt with at Abuja. The creation of an entirely new agency, the FCDA, was perhaps a response to this problem. But any agency, irrespective of whether it is new or old, could not be expected to function efficiently if it still lacks the necessary prerequisites (skilled, experienced, and committed personnel and management ability and autonomy) to do so. In short, the FCDA exhibited a lack

(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital, 1975,p. 55.

of some of these qualities, which, in turn, led to mismanagement practices and misallocation of resources. Furthermore, as with other public agencies, the influence of governmental controls and interventions, the pressure to bow to political forces, and other social problems surrounding its operating environment, limited the FCDA's capacity to operate efficiently.

With the prescription for a modern or even a utopian city, the proponents also implicitly assumed that every Nigerian, irrespective of his or her ethnic background, income, or class, would be equitably benefited. In other words, movement in space was seen as coterminous with an egalitarian development. But evidence from the analysis of the policies and strategies adopted for project construction shows that these aspirations represented ideals rather than reality. The high standard adopted for housing construction and land development was one of such strategies that aided the displacement of the less privileged class from owning or leasing plots in the new capital city. These themes and other problems of the new capital construction will be fully examined in detail in the body of this thesis.

In Chapter 1, various theoretical perspectives on project implementation are reviewed. With the review, it is possible to trace the problems of Nigeria's new capital's construction, which is the subject of this thesis.

In Chapter 2, the nature and characteristics of Nigeria's urban and political environment are presented as a setting and background for understanding the factors that led to

relocating the country's capital city. The historical presentation in the chapter facilitates an understanding of the complexities of the FCDA's operating (external) environment and the effects they had on the activities of this agency.

We further examine the immediate forces that moved the new capital question from a matter of political contention to one of reality in Chapter 3. Essentially, the chapter traces new capital relocation through the (recent) dramatic developments in the country involving political changes, the civil war, and a sudden economic boom, each of which provided fresh impetus for relocation.

In Chapter 4, we examine the new capital's planning process, with particular attention given to the feasibility studies and site selection processes. This is done by evaluating the activities of the new capital's location committee appointed by the military leaders in 1976 to study the question of a new capital city for the country. The conclusions and some of the problems with this committee's recommendations, as well as their input on the new capital construction, are identified and analyzed.

In Chapter 5, an in-depth examination of the new capital project's planning process is carried out. The working relationships between the federal government, the planners hired to develop the master plan, and the FCDA, are particularly traced and analyzed. The extent of the FCDA's role in this process, as well as the problems encountered in this relationship and their impact on overall project construction are discussed.

In Chapter 6, we assess the FCDA's financial position with particular attention to its funding sources, the weaknesses of the sources, and their impacts on the new capital's construction.

In Chapter 7, the FCDA's organizational structure is examined in light of the sweeping powers given to the agency. The agency's capacity to execute the new capital project is assessed in light of these sweeping powers. We pay particular attention to individual problems (governmental intervention, inadequate manpower, corruption, organizational instability, etc.) facing the agency in spite of these powers. The sources and impacts of these problems are also identified and analyzed.

In Chapter 8, we assess the performance of the FCDA in urban development and construction. Specifically, the agency is assessed in terms of its effectiveness in achieving the construction targets (goals) that the agency set for itself for meeting the 1986 movement deadline. In addition, we analyze the distributional aspects of the FCDA's urban land and housing development. We also assess the impact of the agency's land and housing activities on the different income groups.

In Chapter 9, we conclude the thesis by recapitulating the main points of the thesis, presenting our thoughts on the subject of policy implementation and making suggestions for a better and more effective approach to the new capital project's implementation.

Chapter 1

PERSPECTIVES ON PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION: ASSUMPTIONS AND WEAKNESSES

1.1 Defining Implementation

Policy implementation as an area of study and analysis is in many ways still struggling to achieve a common body of theory.¹ This struggle lies in part on finding an appropriate or acceptable definition for the concept--implementation. Part of the definitional problem relates to the question of at what part in a project's development should the analysis or evaluation of policy implementation begin. Should such analysis begin before or after a project is adopted as a public policy, or at the point that project is adopted as a policy? What constitutes a project's successes or failures?

(1) See D. J. Palumbo and M. A. Harder (eds.), Implementing Public Policy, Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Co., Lexington, MA, 1981, p. ix.

In "On the Hazards of Selecting Intervention Points: Time Series Analysis of Mandated Policies," Michael C. Musheno discusses the problems of determining the initial implementation point for public policies. The difficulty as Musheno sees it, stems from the current lack of an implementation theory that tells us when implementation actually has occurred. The time taken between policy adoption and actual program implementation Musheno terms "implementation lag." (1) One way to begin our review of the literature on policy implementation is, therefore, to present a general definition of the subject using some perspectives shared by different authors in the field.

Grindle (1980, p. 6) defines implementation as the task of establishing a link that allows the goals of public policies to be realized as outcomes of governmental activity. It involves, therefore, the creation of a "policy delivery system," in which specific means are designed and pursued in the expectation of arriving at particular ends. (2) Public policy implementation--the art of putting policy into effect, as Barrett and Fudge (1981, p. 4) put it, requires, therefore, broad statements of goals, objectives, and means

(1) M.C. Musheno, "On the Hazards of Selecting Intervention Points: Time-Series Analysis of Mandated Policies," in D. Palumbo and M.A. Harder (Eds.), Implementing Public Policy, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., Lexington MA, 1981.

(2) D. Van Meter and C. Van Horn, The policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework, Administration and Society, 6, No. 4, February 1975, p. 446, cited in Merilee Grindle (ed) Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World, Princeton, 1980, p. 6.

which must be translated into action programs that aim to achieve the ends stated in the policy.(1)

It is apparent, then, from Grindle's definition, that a variety of programs may be developed in response to the same policy goals. Action programs themselves may be disaggregated into more specific projects to be administered. The intent of the action programs and individual projects is thus, to cause a change in the policy environment, a change that can be considered an outcome of the program.

The distinction made here between policy and program implies that policy implementation is a function of program implementation and is dependent upon its outcome. As a consequence, the study of the process of policy implementation almost necessarily involves investigation and analysis of concrete projects or action programs that have been designed as a means of achieving broader policy goals.

Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavksy (1974) make a distinction between project outputs and outcomes in an effort to shed some light on the problem of measuring implementation or even of recognizing it. They analyze the distribution of the outputs or products of school, street, and library departments and discuss the impacts of these distributions--their outcomes--on client groups. Outcomes, as they use the term, should be the concern of project implementation. Levy et al. (1974, p. 254) suggest that in

(1) M. Grindle, "Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World," p. 6.

order to alter outcomes, the stimuli to which bureaucrats respond must be changed or

they should be socialized through professional education and other means, to a new awareness of the effect on citizens of their actions in distribution outputs. Once we understand outcomes, there is less reason to leave them as unintended consequences.(1)

To some degree, Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky's definition is just as narrow as that of Grindle. Their emphasis is mainly on the distributional (output and outcomes) aspects of policy implementation. The definition does not tell us much about the policy delivery system, that is, the mechanics by which the policy is transformed into outcomes, and the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the policy that may also have affected the outputs and outcomes.

Edwards (1980), on the other hand, provides a much broader definition of policy implementation than either Grindle or Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky. According to Edwards:

Policy implementation is the stage of policy making between the establishment of policy, such as the passage of a legislative act, the issuing of an executive order, the handing down of a judicial decision, or the promulgation of a regulatory rule, and the consequences of the policy for the people whom it affects.(2)

(1) Levy, Meltsner, and Wildavsky (1974), p. 24.

(2) G.C. Edwards, "Implementing Public Policy," Washington

From Edwards' definition, it is, then, apparent that analysis of project implementation would include an evaluation of circumstances that led to the adoption of a policy (which Grindle neglected in her definition), an assessment of the policy delivery systems (suggested by Grindle), and the analysis of policy outcomes (suggested by Levy et al.). His represents closely the process we follow in analyzing the new capital construction. Not only are we examining the outcome (e.g., the distributional aspect of urban land resources) of the new capital construction, we are also examining the mechanics of the planning process by which the new capital policy was transformed into outcomes, as well as the historical factors leading to the relocation of the capital.

The definitions of policy implementation reviewed above have generally not shown us the factors that are critical to a project's successes or failures. Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983, p. ii) suggest three approaches generally followed in the literature to assess projects' successes. The first is to gauge the effectiveness of policy implementation against goals and objectives articulated in the policy. In another approach, the outcomes of the implementation process are judged by some external standard, despite the fact that such standards may not be reflected in the goals of a program as envisioned by policy makers. In this approach the analyst brings to bear his or her own normative values of what public

DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980, p. 1, cited in D.J Palumbo and M.A. Harder, Implementing Public Policy, Lexington Books, D.C. Heath, Lexington MA, 1981, p. xi.

programs ought to be accomplishing. A good example is the adoption of the Rawlsian criterion that the justification of any public program must be that it enhances the position of the least well-off persons in the society. The third approach is to view the formulation and enactment documents of a program not as a benchmark against which to assess the effectiveness of the implementation effort, but as a starting point of an unfolding process. From this perspective the articulation, clarity, and accomplishment of specific goals is less important than their symbolic import. The effectiveness of implementation is judged by a number of criteria pertinent to a particular site as the implementing agency finds its own way of responding to the generalized policy mandate of the program.

To a large degree, the three approaches identified above are adopted in this study. We begin the study of the new capital's implementation by examining the project in terms of what the project set out to accomplish, the mechanisms for accomplishing it, and the extent to which it is successful. This includes examining the project's funding situation and the organizational structure developed for executing the project. At the same time we develop a general criteria which we feel are important for assessing the distributional implications of the FCDA's attainments even though part of those criteria were not clearly spelled out by the new capital policy.

1.2 Theoretical Arguments

Our analysis of the theoretical underpinnings is divided into two major perspectives. The first of the two major perspectives is shared by the group we will refer to as the 'discrete theorists.' The other perspective is espoused by the second group, which we would refer to as 'structural theorists.'

The 'discrete theorists,' among them Sharkansky (1970), Smith (1973), Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), and Lipsky (1970) view organizations as discrete entities and posit that organizations, with their goals, resources, incentives, and standard operating procedures, are rational, and have the capacity to execute projects, plans, or policies as written. Implicitly, they assume that organizations operate in a stable environment free from factors such as pressures from: interest group politics, political instability (generally common in developing countries), ethnic or racial tensions, poverty, corruption, limited natural resources, etc., all of which can impinge upon organizational effectiveness.

On the other hand, the 'structural theorists,' among them Bardach (1977), Derthick (1972), Warwick (1978), Bryant and White (1982), and Katz and Kahn (1978), argue that the organization's external environment is what determines organizational outcomes. Implicitly, they assume that elements of the internal dynamics of organizations, such as management ability, financial resources, standard operating

procedures, etc., are inconsequential to organizational outcomes.

As the proceeding analysis will reveal, the views of these two groups of analysts are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather, each perspective can be said to begin where the other has left off. Thus, the relative strength of one can be said to be the relative weakness of the other.

In carrying out this admittedly subjective classification of the theorists, it is obviously difficult to assign many of the theoretical themes adequately into the two classifications. While some of the views fall neatly into one category or the other, others do not. In some cases, the views tend to bridge across the two classifications.

Mazmanian and Sabatier's (1983) views are particularly relevant in this regard. They develop three sets of factors that affect the success of project implementation which reflect the positions of either of the two groups of theorists. These are:

- (i) the inherent tractability of the program;
- (ii) the extent to which policy formulations legally structure the implementation process by establishing priorities of goals, the assignment of activities and powers to implementing agencies in order to ensure that goals will be accomplished, and the provisions for supportive constituencies to participate in policy administration;
- and (iii) factors such as the activities of relevant interest groups, the commitment and leadership of implementation officials, and the socio-economic connections within which implementation occurs.(1)

(1) D.A. Mazmanian and P.A. Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy, Scott Foresman, 1983, p. 6.

Our criterion for assigning a theorist to a particular group depends on which direction the theorist's position leans. For example, although Bardach (1977) also sees the success of policies to depend upon the organization's internal dynamic, his emphasis for ensuring success lies largely on the organization's external environment, as such, we classify him as structural theorist. The same principle we use for Grindle (1980) and Barret and Fudge (1981).

There are three main theories of the Discrete Theorists. The first of the three theories views implementation as a scientific, rational, or linear process, requiring only routine administration, the second as a bureaucratic process, while the third posits that implementation can be explained as the diffusion of knowledge or innovation (Yanow, 1982). According to the rational or linear point of view, implementation is not a problem. Rather, once a project is initiated, and the organizational structure for implementing it has been specified, the project is executed in a series of relatively straightforward and technical steps. With the focus on how decisions are made, or policies formulated, implementation is assumed to follow. Thus, Sharkansky wrote:

...It is the administrator who generally implements the precise statute that is enacted by the legislature or who makes the actual delivery of public services.(1)

(1) Public Administration (Chicago: Markham, 1970), p. 8; quoted in Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), p. 172.

And T.D. Smith:

Once a policy has been "made" by a government, the policy will be implemented and the desired results of the policy will be near those expected by the policy makers.(1)

With the failures of the Great Society Programs initiated by the Johnson Administration in the United States, critics discovered the 'missing link' in the linear project-outcome model. Hence, projects began to be seen as the outcome of a process--policy making--which involves many actors and action channels (Bardach, 1977), many decision points (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973), the issue of power and resources (Grindle, 1980), bargaining and negotiation (Rein and Rabinovitz, 1978; and Barrett and Fudge, 1981). Hence, outcome was discovered to be the result of a process--implementation--involving similar elements. Slippage between the expectations of the policy and its outcome could now be explained in terms of one or more implementation problem. Thus, as Yanow puts it:

The process of realizing policy outcomes can no longer be relegated to the downstairs arena of administrative housekeeping.(2)

(1) T.D. Smith (1973), pp. 197-198.

(2) The phrase is Hargrove's (1975). Cited in D.J. Yanow, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

The second theme of the discrete theorists focuses on the bureaucratic characteristic of the organization. To this group of analysts, project's successes can be explained by the hierarchical relationships in the organization. The bureaucratic point of view focuses on the policy maker or the agency's chief executive: she or he is the one who must exert control over the system, who must manage or direct subordinates and the organization. If the problem of project implementation is the fault of the subordinates who may not be implementing the project according to the intent of their superiors, the solution must be to increase the powers of the superiors, and/or to increase other constraints over their subordinates' discretion, to maximize consensus regarding the goals of the organization and commitment to them, and to minimize the possibility of intermediate discrepancies (Yanow, 1982).

Even though implementation analysis was shifted to bureaucratic relationships, the earlier rational, linear models continue to influence its conceptualization. One of these assumptions is that the concept of bureaucratic hierarchy describes reality rather than some Weberian ideal type of organizational form of behavior (Yanow, 1982). The other assumption is that projects will be executed according to the superior's orders and intent.

The issues of accountability, coordination, and control, when introduced as a means to improve implementation, may be seen as the fight against unintended consequences. Pressman

and Wildavsky (1973), while presenting primarily a descriptive analysis focusing on the multiplicity of actors and decision points and the complexity of joint action, nevertheless prescribed solutions to aid implementation.

Policy design and implementation should be brought closer together. Policy designers should consider more direct means of accomplishing their desired ends. Decision points should be minimized in order to shorten delay. And policy makers should spend time ensuring that initial agreements are followed up by the implementing agency.(1)

Eugene Bardach (1977), although generally belonging to the structural theorist group, also proposed a solution to problems of control: the 'fixer,' the legislator interested personally in the policy, who pilots it through the various intermediary actors and organizational levels until it is executed in accordance with the policy's intent.

In challenging the 'top-down' bureaucratic approach, Lipsky (1979) analyzed ways in which welfare workers, policy makers, teachers, and other social service deliverers, behaved in response to inadequate resources, challenges to their authority, and ambiguous role expectations during their face-to-face interactions with agency clients in the United States. As Prottas (1979) and Weatherly (1977) substantiated, their behavior modifications were often not in accordance with the intent of their superiors, producing

(1) J.L. Pressman and A. Wildavsky, *ibid.*, op. cit., pp. 145-46.

impacts on clients very different from the intent expressed in the written policy. Because discretion was structured into their roles, increasing organizational control in order to limit discretion would defeat the organizational purpose of employing 'street-level' bureaucrats.

These studies are an important departure from the top down, hierarchical assumptions of the earlier analyses. Rather than recommend bureaucratic paths to greater accountability and control, Lipsky moves toward the role of professional education as a workable control mechanism.

Arguing also in support of greater discretion for the 'street-level' bureaucrats, Palumbo and Harder (1981) further maintain that what is traditionally regarded as a slippage or failure in policy implementation is not necessarily bad. The slippage represents adjustments that are needed in order for the administrators (street-level bureaucrats) to turn a poorly conceived and badly designed policy into something that is relatively successful. According to Palumbo and Harder, "it is necessary for policies to be reinvented so that they better fit local needs."⁽¹⁾ The assumption here is that the administrators, when given enough discretion, will implement policies as written. Other assumptions which may not necessarily obtain in the real world from Palumbo and Harder's claim include: (i) all policies are badly designed (ii) administrators are always skillful and competent enough

(1) D.J. Palumbo and M.A. Harder, Implementing Public Policy, 1981, p. xi.

to recognize when policies are bad; (iii) no outside interest exists that can cause the administrators to abuse their discretion or that humans are always perfect and would not abuse their discretion.

In spite of the weaknesses of the above assumptions, however, having sufficient discretion can be useful, especially when certain amounts of flexibility are required for project implementation. In Chapter 7 of this study, where we emphasize giving the FCDA enough autonomy, we argue that because of the rigid guidelines and intervention from the Nigerian government, a great amount of delay is incurred by the agency. This has impacted the fast speed required for project implementation vis-a-vis meeting the deadline for project completion.

The third theme of the discrete group of theorists running through the literature, especially in its early years, is that implementation may be explained as the diffusion of innovation, knowledge, or information (Yanow, 1982). Bunker (1972) proposes such a model, although he also includes elements of political processes and administrative management. Central to realizing the adoption of a new policy is the application of persuasion to key leverage points throughout the headquarters field implementing context. Requisite interaction among these levels must be supported by "facile exchange of information" (Bunker, 1972).

Schon's (1971) "center-periphery" model is an extension of the communication, innovation-diffusions view. In his

view, the responsibility for policy definition and dissemination resides in the center, as it does at the top under the hierarchical model. In the various forms of implementation he describes, the center assumes that execution will follow exhortation automatically or it incorporates one or more constraints to encourage and enforce compliance.

The preceding models, while analyzing project implementation, have focused essentially on organization as a system for making decisions and accomplishing goals. For the most part, they are theories, which are concerned mainly with what goes on within the boundaries of the organization, with their emphasis on goals, choices, and incentives. The models examine the organization internally as a discrete body with its own dynamics, purposes, and methods to work more efficiently. They help us look at the internal dynamics of an agency and understand why it functions as it does and with what results for those who work in it. However, they have not sufficiently looked at project implementation in terms of organizational relationships with the outside world. The issues of interest-group politics, political instability, poverty, limited natural resources, and uncertainties, are a few of the environmental factors that can often change the course of project implementation, especially in the developing countries.

The attempt to incorporate environmental characteristics into the analysis of project implementation is the focus of

the 'structuralists'--the second group of implementation theorists. The focus of this group is on the extent to which organizations interact with their external environment. According to this group, organizations are limited by outside factors and can learn and incorporate strength from their environment (Bryant and White, 1982). In the case of a ministry, for example, this approach explains how and why it 'learns or fails to learn' from its interactions with other organizations and from the larger cultural environment.

One of the pioneering theories of this group of analysts concerns conflict-consensus behavior and focuses on negotiations and bargaining or interest group politics. The central contention of this group of theorists is that conflicts among individuals and organizational actors in the implementation scheme interfere with project execution, either by causing delays or by railroading the project entirely. The prescriptions, therefore, are for means to promote consensus.

Bardach's game theory (1977) is the most straightforward example of this group. His is a model of individual actors vying, through the strategies and tactics of games, to control over the implementation of a policy. Implementation games, Bardach wrote, are political games; fixing the game--his prescription for seeing a policy through to its implementation--is an activity for a coalition of players. Coalition-building requires negotiations and bargaining; and a coalition then becomes an interest group vying with other interested parties, be they individuals or groups.

Barrett and Fudge (1981) also emphasize the bargaining consensus approach. They write:

... much of the existing literature tends to take a "managerial" perspective; the problems of implementation are defined in terms of co-ordination, control or obtaining "compliance" with policy. Such a policy-centered or "top-down" view of the process treats implementers as "agents" for policy-makers and tends to play down issues such as power relations, conflicting interests, and value systems between individuals and agencies responsible for making policy and those responsible for taking action and response.(1)

Murphy's studies of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1971, 1976) in the U.S. and Derthick's New-Towns-In-Town (1972) are also representative of bargaining and interest-group theories. Murphy describes pressures and counterpressures of various groups and the ensuing cycle of delay; Derthick, bargaining through different levels of a federated government. Both represent a subgroup of the conflict-consensus assumption: federated governments, because of their varying competing levels of interest, generate too many obstacles to getting things done. (2) Conversely, the likelihood of a successful implementation would be greater in a centralized decisionmaking environment

(1) S. Barrett and C. Fudge (Eds.), Policy and Action, Essays on the Implementation of Public Policy, Methuen and Co., Ltd., New York, 1981, p. 4.

(2) A similar analogy could be applied to multiple agencies that share common responsibility for implementing a particular project. Delays then arise because of interorganizational conflicts about who does what and when.

than in an environment with a federated or "decentralized" form of decisionmaking.

To some degree, some of the tenets of the bargaining-consensus model were reflected at the various stages of Nigeria's new capital development. In other instances, the tenets were not reflected. The successful launching of the new capital, for example, as argued in Chapter 3, was largely attributed to the highly centralized military form of government at the time. Many of the decisions made by this government during the planning of the new city could not be challenged largely because of the isolated form of decisionmaking structure.

On the other hand, disagreements that arose among the members of the location panel during the new capital's siting was not solved through bargaining and coalition as suggested by the bargaining consensus theorists. Instead, a veto power implicitly provided by the military's presence was used to decide where the new capital territory was to be situated (Chapter 4).

Determining what parts of the external world are parts of an organizations's environment is a major administrative job. Donald Warwick (1978) suggests that any list should include influences from both the remote and more immediate environment. The remote environment "consists of those physical, historical, socio-cultural, ecological, and technological conditions with distant effects on

(1) D. Warwick (1978), p. 14.

planning."(1) To illustrate their impact, he describes an education-reform project in Peru. The government tried to install a bilingual education program to teach Spanish and the local dialect in the early grades. The assumption was that the dialect would give the children an easier entry to school and enhance pride in their own heritage.

This noble scheme, which seems to have been developed by the planners for the Indians, rather than with them, failed miserably for socio-cultural reasons.

...Since social and economic power was associated with the language of the elite, they actually approved of teaching the children in Spanish from the first day of school.... Only after they reached secure middle-class status did socially mobile Quecha speakers show interest in advertising their knowledge of the language.(1)

The immediate environment includes three factors. First, is the power setting, which means any groups or organizations that have some degree of power over an agency. Second is the issue context, which is concerned with how vital the organization is to the society. Are others very interested in its work, or does it have a low priority? And third, there is the operating environment, or the immediate circumstances, that influence the operation of an organization. An example of this would be a sudden change of political regime in a coup d'etat, which can bring about a total overhaul of the implementing agency.

(1) Cited in Smith, Lethem, and Tuoolen. Designer of Organizations, p. 8.

A second way of classifying environmental forces is provided by Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn (1978). They want to show how aspects of the environment are related to organizational tasks. First, they define sectors of the environment (see Table 1.1). Second, they examine four different dimensions of influence that these sectors have on organization: Do they increase its stability? Are they congruent with other influences? Do they occur randomly or are they organized? Finally, do they create scarcity?

Each of these conditions can be applied to conditions in the developing countries. Looking first at the 'Stability-turbulence' dimension, it is probably accurate to say that all of the sectors reflect turbulent conditions. Cultural values are changing, political regimes are fragile, labor is making increased demands, and the value of physical resources is constantly changing in the international arena.

Nations and communities vary, however, as to whether the environment generates uniformity or diversity, the second dimension of influence. Some countries have a diverse economic structure; other countries are tied to the export of a single commodity. Some have a much more pluralistic society; others have a single dominant culture or ethnic identity. This second factor has profound implications for organizations. Horowitz (1971) has shown that the extent to which different ethnic groups can enter the bureaucracy is a major determinant of conflict in a country. Some organizations have purposefully tried to recruit members from

Table 1-1

The Environment of Organizations

Environmental Sectors or Types of Functional Relationships	Stability- Turbulence	Uniformity- Diversity	Clustered- Random	Scarcity- Munificence
1. Societal values:				
Cultural Legit- imation				
2. Political: legal norms and statutes				
3. Economic: markets and labor				
4. Informational and technological				
5. Physical: geography and natural resources				

Source: Katz, Daniel and Kahn, Robert L. Social Psychology of Organizations, John Wiley and Sons, 1978 p. 125.

different ethnic groups; others have tried to insulate themselves and recruit from a single ethnic community. (In Chapter 7, we show the purposeful attempt by the federal government to achieve ethnic balance in the hiring of senior FCDA staff.)

The third dimension refers directly to the extent of organization within the polity, whether they are clustered or random. Almost by definition, developing countries have fewer organizations, weaker institutions, fewer mass communications, and less-extensive media resources, than do developed countries. In some countries the environment is virtually consumed by anarchy, whereas in others, the environment is rigidly controlled by highly authoritarian regimes.

The last dimension is 'scarcity-munificence.' Developing countries vary widely in the wealth of their natural resources. The physical geography also has a direct effect on the way organizations function. Geography influences communication networks and the possibilities of logistical support for projects.

In analyzing development administration in third-world countries, Bryant and White (1982) further emphasize the impact of an agency's external relations on project implementation. They point out that because scarcity, or poverty, and corruption are so pervasive in the third world, they have a special influence on organizational dynamics.(1)

(1) Ibid., p. 51.

One of the major responses to widespread poverty, as noted by Bryant and White, is to establish patron-client relationships. A patron-client relationship is an exchange that develops under many circumstances and takes on many implications. Poor peasants attach themselves to slightly wealthier peasants who can plead their cases to those more strategically located. Thus, in return for services or goods, the wealthier peasants will represent clients about school fees, licenses, or credit.

Although often thought of as political behavior, because of its relationship to access, this phenomenon is as much administrative as it is political. The organizational hierarchy may help those who negotiate such an arrangement. The lower-level administrator will undertake services for another (moving applications faster or processing his claims more expeditiously) in order to gain access to some services in return (Bryant and White, 1982).

Evidence of patron-client relationships was reported by Epstein in the construction of Brasilia. In describing the phenomenon, Epstein (1973) noted that the construction of Brasilia was a "spectacular opportunity for patronage, for rewarding one's clientele, and for promoting the interests of the members of one's political entourage." (1) A similar observation can be traced through the construction of Abuja where the patron-client phenomenon was facilitated by a

(1) David Epstein, Brasilia, Plan and Reality: A Study of Planned and Spontaneous Urban Development, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973, pp. 48-51.

resurgence of intense party politics after thirteen years of military rule in the country, as well as by the highly centralized and often inaccessible organizational structure developed for project implementation.

Although most would agree that corruption has a very debilitating effect, there is less agreement on the reasons why it is so prevalent in third-world countries.

Traditionally, corruption has been traced to such social factors as the lack of a commitment to the nation-state or the breakdown of traditional values (Bryant and White, 1982). In a contrasting argument, Scott (1967) contends that corruption is most usefully viewed as a means of political influence, rather than as an expression of moral degradation.

The problem is that the nature of political institutions in third world countries encourages certain kinds of influence rather than others. Whereas nations with more developed political institutions encourage the exercise of such influence before laws are made, in third world countries, where political opportunities are limited, this exertion is more apt to occur at the enforcement or implementation stage.(1)

1.3 Summary, Applications, and Conclusion

The implementation literature has been presented according to two views that are useful in focusing attention on the different aspects of the problem. The discrete theorists begin with a 'pre-implementation' theme whose

(1) James Scott, An Essay on the Political Functions of Corruption, Asian Studies 5:505 (1967).

administration model is based on a rational approach, characterized by the assumption that projects are routinely executed and by the assumption of intent to implement. Both assumptions focus our attention on the expected outcomes of projects as the yardstick against which implementation can be evaluated. After the 'missing link' is discovered, the routineness of project execution is no longer assumed. However, having understood the nature of the implementation problem, the next two groups of discrete theorists agree that the link needs analyzing and fixing.

The bureaucratic-hierarchy theorists support the assumption that projects are to be executed by subordinates on their superiors' orders. The street-level bureaucrat theorists, in challenging the operations of that model, move us away from the assumption that subordinates automatically comply with agency policy. Nevertheless, they retain the assumption that implementation ought to be made to comply with policy intent. The emphasis on increased control, even when it is to be exerted through professional loyalties, is still on narrowing the gap between goals and outcome. That normative purpose, to narrow the gap between project goal and outcome, also inspires even the later work of bureaucrat theorists, who argue that the gap need not be fixed. The third group of the discrete theorists, however, maintain that successful implementation would largely depend upon the ability of the center (presumably the decisionmakers) to communicate effectively to the subordinates (periphery) the project goals.

But the discrete theorists have focused largely on the internal dynamics of the execution agency, as if the institutional factors outside the boundaries of the organization that can impinge on project implementation, as well, did not matter. The position taken by the structural theorists is that due to the impact of institutional forces, project implementation can still be expected to fail.

While substantial elements of facts and realities are contained in each of these two views, it is more likely that the most desirable and acceptable position cannot lie wholly and exclusively with only one of these two views. In either case, some institutional factors that have serious potential social consequences are not fully taken into consideration by either set of theorists. While the discrete theorists can, for example, show that based on certain assumptions (rational behavior, and stable social, economic, political, and cultural environment) an agency can implement projects as designed, the immediate or remote environmental characteristics of the agency are neither always stable nor always favorable. For example, many projects' failures have been linked to the fragility of political institutions and uncertainties, especially in developing countries (Hirschman, 1967; Grindle, 1980; Bryant and White, 1982). In a similar situation, Nigeria's new capital project has been seriously affected by the country's political instability. Four political regimes, including civilian and military regimes, emerged since the construction of Abuja began in 1979. Each

of the four regimes exercised considerable influence on the activities and structure of the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), the agency responsible for executing the new capital project.

Related to the problem of political fragility is the fact that many of the governments in less developed countries (LDCs) are less reflective of democratic systems. In such situations, decision making is often centralized at the national level, and power concentrated on a few people, thereby making it relatively easier for one or a few interest groups to control or influence policy decisions at the center. The ability of Nigeria's Murtala Muhammed's regime, for example, to initiate successfully the relocation of the capital, has been attributed in part, to the project's strong support from the Kaduna Mafia--a relatively small but strong ethnic pressure group from northern Nigeria linked to the installation and control of Muhammed's (military) government.

(1)

Furthermore, the `rational` requirement of the discrete models assumes a completely informed set of decision-makers or executives whose decision process is based on maximizing the attainment of a set of goals and objectives defined through an identifiable public interest that guides the implementation process. But what has become increasingly clear in both developed and less-developed countries, as we

(1) Herbert Ekwe-ekwe, The Nigerian Plight: Shagari to Buhari. Third World Quarterly 2, July 1985.

have noted above in the case of Abuja, is that there are many groups that have an interest in public issues, and through legislation, court interpretation, or even through their positions in the society, can have access to and shape the decision-making process. The political pressures brought to bear on the new capital's construction in Nigeria, are perhaps one aspect of pressure exerted on the execution agency in terms of how it hired its personnel and who benefited from the distribution of urban land resources.

The rational approach has been criticized also for its requirements for comprehensive knowledge and the selection of the optimal strategies for achieving goals. To most observers, these requirements are rarely satisfied. In reality, the decision maker chooses alternatives that satisfy some minimum level of acceptability or which induce the least harm or disturbance while conveying some benefit. The search process in decision-making is thus best described as satisfying.

We cannot, within practical computational limits generate all the admissible alternatives and compare their relative merits. Nor can we recognize the best alternative, even if we are fortunate enough to generate it early, until we have seen all of them. We satisfy by looking for alternatives in such a way that we can generally find an acceptable one after only moderate search.(1)

(1) Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior. Macmillan, New York, 1947, p. 24.

Even in the satisfying model, however, the underlying basis for decision-making is rational choice, although rationality is limited by the resources and ability of the decision-maker to acquire and process information.

The weakness of the rational approach is perhaps reflected by the process followed by the Nigerian New Capital's Location Committee (appointed by the military leaders) to select a suitable location for the new capital city. Short of a broad public debate, General Murtala Muhammed, Nigeria's Head of State at the time, appointed a committee in August 1975 to analyze the options open to the government for relocating the capital city. The Committee was given five mandates.(1)

- (i) to examine the dual role of Lagos as a federal and state capital and advise on the desirability or otherwise of Lagos retaining that role;
- (ii) to recommend which of the two governments (Federal or State) should move to a new location (note that Lagos, by this time, had served as both Federal Capital of Nigeria and State Capital of Lagos State), in the event of the Committee finding that Lagos is unsuitable for such a role;
- (iii) to recommend a suitable alternative location, having regard to the need for easy accessibility to and from every part of the federation, in the event of the

(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital of Nigeria, December 1975, p. 9.

- Committee finding that the Federal Capital should move out of Lagos;
- (iv) to examine all other relevant factors which will assist the Federal Military Government in arriving at the right decision;
 - (v) to submit its recommendations to the Federal Military Government no later than December 31, 1975.

The above guidelines reflect quite closely the characteristics of rational decision making: The existence of a clearly defined chief executive--the head of the military government, a "rigorous and exhaustive" search by the Location Committee for the best alternative, and the final decision dependent upon the goals and objectives established in the Committee's mandates.

Without fully considering other alternative sites for locating the capital, this Committee chose a site that was central and that the Committee felt would satisfy the demand for an "ethnically-neutral" capital city. As Jonathan Moore observed about this process:

The Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital was supposedly established to pursue an open examination of the desirability of relocation. In actuality, the Committee developed practical rationales, based on developmental need for what was a predetermined politically motivated decision.(1)

(1) Jonathan Moore, Abuja: The Politics of New Capital Construction, 1982, p. 5.

He goes further to point out that:

The planning process of Abuja was not based on a systematic or analytical procedure. Instead, it was a reflection of political goals of the Military Government in the context of social and economic constraints.(1)

The weaknesses of the structuralists view, on the other hand, hinge on its shaky assumptions as well. The model posits that with a stable environmental condition project implementation can be expected to proceed successfully. In other words, stable organizational environment is coterminous with effective project execution. Issues of organizational capacity (skill, management ability, and personnel commitment) and financial resources are assumed to be inconsequential to the project's successes. But historical evidence has shown that problems of lack of skilled labor and inadequate capital resources have hampered project implementation, especially in the developing countries.(2) In Chapter 6 we will show that construction and relocation

(1) Ibid.

(2) Albert Hirschman cites an example of, how the Nigerian Government wanted to achieve a national balance after independence through a reorganization of the railway system which was previously run exclusively by one ethnic group. The reorganization interfered with the efficiency of the rail system and began to lose traffic to the trucks because the reorganization required that all segments (ethnic groups) of the population be represented in its administration. That led to the recruitment of both the "qualified and less qualified" personnel (to achieve integration) which, in turn, led to the mismanagement, and hence inefficiency of the railways. See Albert Hirschman, Development Projects Observed, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1967.

delays were caused mainly by lack of adequate financial resources and the inability of the FCDA to manage effectively other internal sources of revenue.

In conclusion, it is the position of this study that the views of both the structural and discrete theorists are important for analyzing and understanding the problems of the new capital construction. On the one hand, the failures or problems of the new capital's construction have hinged on management inefficiency, and lack of financial resources, both of which are critical elements to an organization's dynamics. On the other hand, the impact of political interventions, instability/uncertainties, corruption, and ethnic conflicts which were also critical factors in the FCDA's operating environment, were additional factors that led to inefficient management and misallocation of resources. Thus, there are situations where aspects of the two theoretical views apply to Abuja. There are other situations in which they do not apply. Although these varying situations will be evident in the subsequent chapters, we keep our final thoughts on the theoretical applications until the last chapter (9) of this thesis.

CHAPTER 2

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: FACTORS INFLUENCING RELOCATION

In introducing this study, we presented the hypothesis that the extent of the FCDA's effectiveness in developing the new capital depended not only on its organizational capacity and financial resources, but also on the characteristics of its operating environment. We pointed out that this operating environment included some of the pressures from the political system, ethnic tensions, and urbanizational problems. We also considered the arguments for the relocation of the federal capital, which essentially hinged on some of these factors in the FCDA's operating environment and also on the need to create a befitting capital for the country.

This chapter presents a background description of the characteristics of this environment. It is a description of the country's urban settlement pattern, ethnic composition and relations, and her political structure. Such background is useful in understanding factors that influenced relocation of the capital and the rationale for this decision.

The initial discussion concerns the developmental forces acting upon the country's unique urban conditions and settlement pattern. The second section of the chapter examines the dramatic social and political developments in the country in terms of her ethnic structure and relationships, the sources

of tensions, and their impact upon national decision-making. Finally, the proposal for a new capital is traced as a solution to the problems of the country's unbalanced settlement pattern, ethnic rivalries, and political instability. A knowledge of this complex history is important for understanding the magnitude of the problems relocation was designed to solve, as well as the difficulties of the FCDA's operating environment.

2.1 The Urban Settlement Pattern: Impact of Colonial Development (1900-1960)

The early stages of cities and towns in Nigeria, their form, function, and distribution have been well documented.¹ An account of the characteristics and patterns of towns that emerged due to the thrust of the British has also been documented. But it suffices to analyze the development of these towns and cities in the context of Nigeria's decision to build a new capital city. Such an analysis is important since the decision to move the capital was partly based on the intention of correcting a maldistribution arising from the colonially-influenced urban system.

With an estimated (1978) population of 80 million,² Nigeria occupies an area of approximately 900,000 square kilometers (sq. km). With only 18 percent of her population

(1) See Akin, L. Mabogunje: Urbanization in Nigeria, London Press Ltd., London, 1968.

(2) F.A. Olaloku: Structure of the Nigerian Economy, St. Martins Press, New York, 1979, p.4

urban, Nigeria is to a large extent still rural. Compared with some less developed countries (LDC's) such as Argentina which has 80 percent of her population living in urban areas, Mexico (63%), Brazil (59%), and Senegal (28%), Nigeria's level of urbanization is still fairly low.

The early forms of urbanization in parts of what later became Nigeria predated the colonial era. On the basis of population of 20,000 or more, as many as 23 towns and cities were known to exist before the arrival of the "imperialists depredators."¹ These settlements were known to serve various needs and purposes including defense, administration, and trading centers. However, as trade and politics changed in their emphasis, many new towns were created, some fell, stagnated, or declined. For example, trade with Western Sudan and North Africa initially boosted many towns in the North including Kano, Zaria, and Katsina. However, the Atlantic Coast-oriented trade which later developed, first in slaves and later in manufacturing, brought about the stagnation and decline of some of the Sahara-oriented towns in the North, while at the same time promoting others such as Lagos and Abeokuta in the South.

The initial thrust of colonialism on the country was from Lagos, the country's first contact point with formal sea-

(1) J.O.C. Omyemelukwe: "Urbanization in a Development Context: Patterns, Problems, and Prospects in Nigeria," in Urbanization and Nigerian Economic Development, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 1977.

borne political, economic, and cultural relations.¹

This thrust, among other things, set in motion far-reaching changes in the territory's political, economic, and spatial organization through its system of cities and towns. The "British bombardment" of Lagos marked the beginning of the end of pre-European urbanization in Nigeria. "For thereafter the British policy of political control and economic exploitation began to find expression in the subjugations of other urban centers in the name of Pax Britannica, and the disorganization of the existing system of urban hierarchy especially through the coast-to-interior rail route system."²

Because the rail routes established by the colonial government were designed to link up places with agricultural export crops and mining potentials, and not necessarily laid in the best interest of the existing system of towns, many of the towns were by-passed. While such by-passed towns like Sokoto, Yerwa (Maiduguri), Oyo, and Ijebu-Ode experienced rapid decline, new towns like Kaduna, Port Harcourt, Aba, Enugu, and Jos sprang into existence on the rail-route system later complemented with feeder motor roads. The pre-colonial towns, notably Ibadan, Kano, Zaria, Ilorin and Abeokuta given more growth impetus by their vantage location on the rail-route systems, grew relatively fast to lead the way in the articulation of regional trade.³

(1) J.O.C. Onyemelukwe: Ibid., p. 23.

(2) A.L. Mabogunje: Op. cit., p. 101.

(3) J.O.C. Onyemelukwe: Op. cit., p. 23.

This drastic reshuffling of the country's urban hierarchy as it seemed, is illustrated by the increase in population of Kano from 30,000 in the 1850's to 127,000 in 1952, and the decline of Sokoto from 120,000 in the 1850's to only 52,000 in 1952. On the other hand, other new towns such as Kaduna, Enugu, Port Harcourt, etc. which were not even on the map of Nigeria's pre-1900 urban systems attained the population of 45,000, 63,000, 72,000 respectively by 1952 (See Tables 2.1 and 2.2).

One important consequence of this era of urbanization was the two dimensional patterns of migration into the growing urban centers. One dimension was rural-urban, often involving occupational mobility from primary activity (agriculture, forestry, or fishing) to the secondary or service sectors. The other dimension was urban-urban not necessarily involving occupational mobility between economic sectors. With the improvement in modern transportation and monetized internal trade, the rising urban centers took on wider central place functions and thereby provided more incentive to migrants.¹ Table 2.3 shows the number of urban centers of 20,000 or more inhabitants and their rate of increase between 1952 and 1963.

The nature of the emerging urban pattern is better understood in light of the motives behind British settlement

(1) J.O.C. Onyemelukwe: Op. cit., p. 23.

Table 2.1

Population of Pre-Colonial Towns of 20,000 or More People
Estimated Prior to 1880

Town	Population(000)	Town	Population (000)
Sokoto	120	Ede	30-40
Ibadan	100	Argonon	30
Abeokuta	100	Addo	20
Ilorin	70	Deogoa	30
Zaria	40-50	Oke-Odan	20
Iwo	50	Baebarjie	20-25
Oyo	40	Dikwa	25
Ijebu-Ode	35	Isehin	20
Kano	30-40	Koso	20
Ijaiye	30	Epe	20
Ogbomosho	30	Wawa	20
Tabra	20	Lagos	20

Source: A.L. "Mabogunje, Urbanization in Nigeria," London 1968, in J.O.C. Onyemelukwe (ed.), Urbanization in a Development Context: Patterns, Problems and Prospects in Nigeria. Proceedings of the 1977 Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society, p. 23.

Table 2.2

Growth Rate of Selected Towns of 20,000 and Over from 1952/3-1963

Town	Population 1952/3 (000)	Population 1963 (000)	Growth Rate (%)
Lagos	267	665	9.5
Ibadan	459	627	3.1
Ogbomosho	140	320	8.6
Kano	127	295	8.7
Oshogbo	123	210	5.5
Ilorin	41	202	17.6
Abeokuta	84	187	8.3
P. Harcourt	72	180	9.5
Zaria	54	166	11.8
Ilesha	34	166	17.1
Onitsha	77	163	7.7
Iwo	100	159	4.7
Kaduan	45	150	12.8
Ado-Ekiti	25	158	20.2
Maiduguri	57	140	9.4
Aba	58	131	8.4
Owo	31	80	9.9
Ikirun	26	80	11.8
Calabar	47	76	4.9
Shaki	23	76	12.6
Jos	39	90	8.7
Ondo	36	74	7.4
Akure	39	71	6.1
Ijebu-Ode	24	69	11.1
Kumo	29	65	8.4
Oka	28	62	8.2
Ikare	25	61	9.3
Warri	20	55	0.6
Sokoto	52	90	5.7
Shagamu	30	51	5.4
Nnewi	28	44	4.6

Source: Onyemelukwe, J.O.C. Urbanization In A Development Context: Patterns, Problems and Prospects in Nigeria, 1977, p. 27.

Table 2.3

Urbanization in Nigeria 1890-1963

Date	<u>Changing Urban Frequency</u>		<u>Changing Share of Urban Pop.</u>	
	Urban Centers of 20,000 or more	% of Increase	Total Urban Pop. (000)	% of National Total
1890	25	---	939	---
1953	56	124	3,214	10.6
1963	184	228.5	10,745	19.3*

Source: Onyemelukwe J.O.C., "Urbanization in Development Context Patterns, Problems, and Prospects in Nigeria." In Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Nigerian Economic Society, 1977, p. 25.

* It must be mentioned that Onyemelukwe's figure for the percentage share of urban population in 1963 (19.3%) seems to contradict a World Bank's estimate of Nigeria's 1975 percentage share of urban population (18.2%). Or else, the urban population will be declining, which does not seem realistic. The disparity between the estimates may have arisen due to lack of census figures for Nigeria since 1963; the two estimates may have been made on the basis of different indicators.

Relying on Onyemelukwe's estimates implies that there has been an unprecedented rate of urbanization since 1952. In fact, Table 2.2 seems to support this speculation because most of the cities doubled their populations between 1952 and 1963.

in Nigeria. The guiding principle that motivated colonial policy can be traced to factors external to the Nigerian economy. Important among these external determinants of policy were British industrial input requirements and their quest for future markets. The demand created by European industrialization for tropical agricultural raw materials in the pre-20th century, and to a lesser extent, the need for potential markets for their manufactured goods were among the critical factors leading to the European acquisition of the Nigerian territory.¹ The achievement of these dual objectives (raw materials and markets) could not be envisaged without two related prerequisites: a political and administrative system to control foreign trade and the development of an exchange economy based on money. These constituted the nucleus from which colonial policy radiated. Economic development was primarily thought of in terms of policies associated with foreign trade. Local resource utilization was of little concern for such policies except to activate agriculture for the export sector. Agriculture accounted for as much as 90 percent of the national income in 1910, and less than 60 percent when Nigeria gained independence. Expansion of export volume was accompanied by expansion of the export structure. The exports of oil palm products, which clearly

(1)E.J. Usoro: "Colonial Economic Development Strategy in Nigeria 1919-1939: An Appraisal," Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies 19(1), March 1977.

dominated at the turn of the century and were produced chiefly in southern Nigeria, were joined by cocoa also produced in the south, ground nuts from the north, and to a lesser extent by hides, skins, and cotton, all produced in the north. A distinct regional specialization became noticeable in the production areas for agricultural export goods: ground nuts and cotton in the north; cocoa, palm kernels and palm oils in the south.

The British "dependency-oriented" economy was facilitated mostly by three independent yet internal activities: public sector capital expenditures on transportation, selective expenditures on experimental technological innovation in agriculture and the adaptation to the new economic opportunities by communities adequately endowed with needed resources.¹

The construction of the railways starting in Lagos between 1901 and 1930 provided an opportunity for realizing the desired market-oriented goals. None of the existing modes of transportation was as important as the railways in accelerating the expansion of market opportunities. Through the hauling by rail of cotton, groundnuts, hides, and skins from the North, cocoa and palm products from the South, exchange relations, mostly in monetary terms, were stimulated.

The activities and interaction in transport investment, administrative organization, trade and production promoted

(1)E.J. Usoro: Ibid., p. 124.

the growth of social overhead facilities, commerce, and urbanization. Thus, this type of colonial economic involvement and their preferred economic system laid the foundation for the subsequent growth and the type of urban pattern that emerged.

Social overhead facilities were located strategically at such seaports as Lagos, Calabar, Sapele, and Port Harcourt, along the rail line, and on major roads linked to the rail line, to facilitate the flow of the increased volume of exports and import trade. Lagos was designated the only 'first class' town in 1917 by the British, and it became the main focus of attention in social overhead investment. Lagos harbor was expanded to handle the incoming volume of export and import traffic.

The growth in port traffic not only induced a corresponding growth in employment opportunities, but also widened the scope for commercial activities. Expansion in employment through commerce and administration was not confined to Lagos, however, but spread throughout the country. Eighteen commercial and administrative towns, 12 in the south and 6 in the north, were located at strategic rail lines and at ports, and were by 1919 important enough to be classified as 'second class' towns.¹ The towns were Abeokuta, Calabar, Enugu, Ibadan, Forcados, Itu, Onitsha, Opobo, Port Harcourt, Sapele, and Warri in the

(1) A.L. Mabogunje, op. cit., p. 68.

south; Ilorin, Kaduna, Kano, Lokoja, Minna, and Zaria in the north. The British administration's criteria for the recognition and classification of towns were not population- or size-based, but their importance as contact centers between Nigerian and foreign merchants in the promotion of the export/import trade.¹ Fifty other towns, 38 in the south and 12 in the north, were recognized as government stations with small, but mixed, native population.

The classification and subsequent recognition of these towns into first-class or second-class townships had three very important consequences. First, it provided an opportunity for these towns to be provided with urban amenities--schools, water supply, health services, improved roads, housing etc. The presence of such facilities in turn attracted a number of modern businesses to such towns and with them employment opportunities. As Mabogunje (1968, p. 68) noted about the impact of these facilities: "Both the glammers of urban utilities and the new employment opportunities would exert a strong pull, drawing population to the urban centers." Second, the recognition of these towns implied that those not recognized were given less attention in terms of urban amenities, because the level of infrastructure provided to a town depended upon the class or category to which the town belonged. As a result, most of the towns not located by the rail line, which were in turn not

(1)A.L. Mabogunje, op. cit., p. 68.


among the classified towns, actually declined.¹ Third, the designation of towns led not only to a restructuring of the national space economy in terms of the location of facilities and amenities, but also has led to skewed distribution of urban centers towards the southern region of the country. A total of 51 out of 69 new towns created were located in the south.

The uneven distribution of urban centers was generally seen as accentuating the maldistribution of socio-economic welfare among the five regions (Northern, Eastern, Midwestern, and Western Regions and the Federal Territory of Lagos) that existed prior to 1964² (Figure 2.1). A casual assessment of these regions in terms of income distribution, and their levels of infrastructural endowment (Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6), show that the Federal Territory of Lagos (from now referred to as Lagos throughout this chapter) consistently commanded the largest per capita income, the highest level of infrastructure, and manufacturing industries. (Approximately 44 percent of the total manufacturing employment in the country is concentrated in Lagos.) From Table 2.4, it can be seen that the Western and Midwestern Regions, and Lagos (all

(1) A.L. Mabogunje, *ibid.*, p. 68.

(2) Before Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the country was divided into four politico-administrative regions--East, West, North, and the Federal Territory of Lagos. In 1963, the Midwest was carved out from the Western Region to bring the number of regions to five. In 1967, the formerly five administrative regions were eliminated. A twelve-state structure was adopted. The number of states was increased from twelve to nineteen in 1976.

Figure 2.1 Political Divisions of Nigeria (1955-1976)



Source: The Economist, 1984, p. 6.

Table 2.4

Gross Domestic Product (at Factor Cost) by Region, 1965

Region	1963 Population		Share of GDP		Per Capita	
	000 's	Percentage of Nigeria's Population	£ 'm	Percentage of total GDP	£	Index 1965=100
Northern	29,809	53.5	526.7	45.5	19.0	100
Eastern	12,395	22.3	256.6	20.7	20.0	105
Western	10,266	18.4	255.6	20.7	25.0	132
Mid-Western	2,536	4.6	79.4	6.4	31.0	163
Federal Territory of Lagos	665	1.2	82.0	6.7	123.0	647
Total	55,671	100.0	1236.3	100.0	22.0	116

Source: Teriba, O. and Philips A. O. "Income Distribution and National Integration." The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1971, pp. 82-85.

Table 2.5

Level of Infrastructure Endowment: Area, Population, and Roads by Region

Region	Area		1963 Population			Road Mileage	
	Square Miles	Percentage of total area	(000 's)	Percentage of Nigeria's population	Persons per square mile	Total	Percentage of total Nigeria
Northern	281,782	79.0	29,809	53.5	106	21,437	38.8
Eastern	29,484	8.3	12,395	22.3	420	18,184	32.9
Western	30,454	8.5	10,266	18.4	326	9,608	17.4
Mid-Western	14,922	4.2	2,536	4.6	170	5,820	10.5
Federal Territory of Lagos	27	..(a)	665	1.2	1,045	207	0.4
Nigeria	356,699	100.0	55,671	100.0	156	55,256	100.0

Source: Teriba, O., and Philips, A. O. "Income Distribution and National Integration." The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1971, pp. 82-85.

Table 2.6

Level of Infrastructural Endowment: Hospitals and Schools by Region

Region	Hospital Beds in all Medical Establishments per 1,000 population (1966)		Primary School Pupils per 1,000 Population (1966)		Secondary School Pupils per 1,000 Population (1966)	
	No.	Index 0.25=100	No.	Index 17=100	No.	Index 0.6=100
Northern	0.25	100	17	100	0.6	100
Eastern	0.92	368	100	588	5.5	917
Western	0.44	176	72	424	8.0	1,333
Mid-Western	0.53	212	153	900	11.2	1,867
Federal Territory of Lagos	4.0	1,600	214	1,259	21.2	3,533
Nigeria	0.49	196	54	318	3.8	633

Source: Teriba, O., and Philips, A. O. "Income Distribution and National Integration." The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1971.

located in the southern part of the country) accounted for a proportionately greater share of gross domestic product (GDP). Consequently, per capita income was highest in these three areas and generally above the national average. It was lowest in the North. The gap in per capita income in 1965 ranged between ₦19 in the North to ₦123 in the Federal Territory of Lagos.

The existence of developmental and social welfare gaps between the various regions is in itself a reflection of differences in regional resource endowments as well as of social and infrastructural services, some of which are shown in Table 2.5. Both the population density and the road mileage figures shown in the table are good indicators of the extent to which various regions have been opened up, which, in turn, is a possible indicator of the volume of trade and economic transactions. The North has a comparatively low population density, while at the same time accounting for only 39 percent of the total road mileage in the country in spite of its overwhelming land size. Its road mileage per 10 square miles of land area was half of the national average and one-eighth, one-fourth, and one-fifth of those of the Eastern, Western and Mid-Western regions respectively.

The gaps in the potential stock of human resources roughly indicated by differences in primary and secondary school population are shown in Table 2.6. In 1966, the

Midwest had nine times the number of primary school pupils per 1,000 population as compared with the North, while the Western and Eastern regions, respectively, had almost six and four times that of the North. This difference was more marked in secondary education, with the number of secondary school pupils per 1,000 population in the North being far below the national average.

The differences in socio-economic welfare and the gap in the level of infrastructure between the North and Southern regions of the country explain in part the relatively strong support for locating the new capital city in the Northern region. Figure 2.1 shows the position of the new Federal Capital Territory (FCT), which is bounded by the Plateau, Kwara, Niger, and Kaduna states, all in the former Northern region.

Opponents of the new capital project have, however, argued that, maybe, with slight adjustments in national policies and priorities, and with a sustained rural development effort, industrial dispersal, and further 'juggling' of political boundaries, the disparity in socio-economic welfare between the North and the rest of the country could, in the long run, be wiped out. These suggestions seem, however, to have been responded to, although unconsciously, by the federal government. Recently, the federal government has sited one of the largest oil refineries at Kaduna, in the north, and also built the nation's largest steel complex at

Ajaokuta. The government has also intensified its rural development effort, although with no preferential attention to the northern region.

In an effort to ease the impact of the maldistribution problem as well as to bring the decision-making apparatus as close as possible to the local level, the federal government, abjuring the five (colonial) regional structure, created a twelve-state regional (politico-administrative) structure in 1967 (Figure 2.1). Six of the 12 states (Benue-Plateau, Kano, Kwara, North-Central, North-Eastern, North-Western) were carved out of the former Northern region, and the other six (East-Central, Rivers, South-Eastern, Mid-Western, Western, and Lagos) from the former Southern regions including Western, Midwestern, and Lagos. The number of states was extended to 19 in 1976 (see Figure 2.1).¹

Although it may be too early to assess fully its impact, the new state structure seems to have exacerbated the regional disparity problem. The creation of the states in 1967 seemed to make very little difference in the economic unevenness in the country at that period. Indication of state disparities (after the creation of states) is reflected by the figures of per capita recurrent expenditures shown in Table 2.7. The Lagos state has the highest per capita government expenditures

(1) The creation of states was not consciously carried out in order to correct maldistribution of urban centers. However, it was expected that in addition to decentralizing decision making it would help to offset some of the negative externalities associated with the concentration of cities by stimulating the development of new growth points in the newly created states.

Table 2.7

Area Population and Public Expenditure Levels of the Twelve States of Nigeria

State	Area		1963 Population		Percentage of total Planned Public Investment 1970-74 (percent)	Per Capita Recurrent Government Expenditure (1968-69 Estimates) ₦	Index 0.9=100
	Square Miles	Percentage of total area (percent)	000 's	Percentage of Nigeria's Population (percent)			
Benue-Plateau	39,204	10.9	4,009	7.2	2.7	1.4	156
Kano	16,630	4.7	5,775	10.4	5.3	0.9	100
Kwara	28,672	8.0	2,399	4.3	2.3	2.2	244
North-Central	27,108	7.6	4,098	7.3	3.8	1.4	156
North-Eastern	105,025	29.4	7,793	14.0	3.6	0.9	100
North-Western	65,143	18.3	5,733	10.3	3.0	3.8	422
East-Central	8,746	2.5	6,223	11.2	5.1	N/A	--
Rivers	7,008	2.0	1,544	2.8	3.4	N/A	--
South-Eastern	13,730	3.8	4,626	8.3	3.0	1.4	156
Mid-Western	14,922	4.2	2,536	4.5	3.9	3.8	422
Western	29,100	8.2	9,488	17.0	8.7	2.1	233
Lagos	1,381	0.4	1,444	2.6	2.7	7.1	789
Nigeria	356,699	100.00**	55,670	100.0**	47.5*	0.0	--

N/A: not available

₦ 1.0 = ₦ 2.0 = U.S. \$2.80

* Federal government percentage of planned public investment expenditure is 52.5.

** Figures do not add up to 100 percent because of rounding.

Source: Teriba, O., and Philips, A. O. "Income Distribution and National Integration." The Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1971, pp. 82-85.

while the North-Eastern and Kano have the least.

In manufacturing employment, the overall regional distribution is still uneven, and as can be seen from Table 2.8, the greatest industrial concentration is in Lagos and the former Western region. Given that the North is larger than the rest of the country on both area and population, the disparity in industrial distribution may be greater than the table indicates.

The unique position of Lagos accounts largely for the concentration of industries in the Lagos State. Both the Federal government and the former Western Regional government concentrated the bulk of their development efforts in Lagos. The higher income per capita, the higher population density, and the higher level of infrastructural development encouraged industrial agglomeration. About 48 percent of labor employed in medium-scale and large-scale manufacturing in Nigeria is in Lagos, while 1.1 percent is in the North-Eastern states.¹

Because of lack of data, it is not possible to assess with a great deal of certainty the impact the expansion (to nineteen) of states may have had on the distribution of socio-economic welfare among the new states. However, if the geographical distribution of the population, industries, and primary and secondary enrollments shown in Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 are any indication to go by, it

(1) A. Adejugbe, "Manufacturing," in F.A. Olalokoy (Ed.), Structuring of the Nigerian Economy, St. Martins Press, New York, 1979, p. 30.

Table 2.8

Manufacturing Employment, Population Distribution
and Location Quotients, by State: 1966, 1973


States	Percent of Manufacturing Employment (1966)	*Percent of Total Population of Nigeria (1966)	Location Quotient (LQ) ^a
Lagos	31.4	2.6	17.51
Benue-Plateau	1.1	7.2	0.30
Kano	9.2	10.4	0.71
Kwara	2.8	4.3	0.70
North-Central	7.9	7.3	1.47
North-Eastern	2.6	14.0	0.08
North-Western	0.4	10.3	0.14
East-Central	13.0	11.2	0.47
Mid-Western	11.3	4.5	1.37
Rivers	8.1	2.8	0.52
South-Eastern	3.2	8.3	0.70
Western	9.2	17.0	0.48

a:
$$LQ = \frac{\text{Number Employed in Manufacturing in a State}}{\text{Number Employed in Manufacturing in Nigeria}} \cdot \frac{\text{State Population}}{\text{Population of Nigeria}}$$

* Teriba, O. and Philips, A. O. "Income Distribution and National Integration." Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Research, Vol. 13, No. 1, March 1971, p. 82.

Source: Adebayo Adejugbe "Manufacturing," in F. A. Olalokun (ed.) Structure of the Nigerian Economy, 1979, p. 43.

Figure 2.2 Population Density Distribution



Source: The Economist, 1984, p. 12.




Figure 2.3 Spatial Pattern of Industrial Structure

Source: The Economist 1984




Figure 2.4 Distribution of Primary and Secondary Students in the (nineteen) States

can be said that there is still a relatively significant gap in socio-economic infrastructure endowment between the northern and the southern regions of the country.

In conclusion, it can be noted that there is a relatively 'skewed' distribution of some of the socio-economic infrastructure towards the southern part of Nigeria. Many of the large cities, as well as industries, are concentrated mainly within this region of the country (Fig. 2.3). However, the question remains as to whether the 'skewed' distribution was sufficient to warrant the relocation of the capital to the northern region. Depending on what side of the argument the interested parties to the problem are, the answer is yes or no. The new capital supporters (as noted previously) believe that the new capital project could be used to open up the relatively undeveloped and sparsely populated parts of the northern region in order to counter the polarizing influence of the Lagos region, which, in turn, is critical to the overall integration of the country, and attainment of national unity. On the other hand, as we have earlier pointed out, opponents believe that building a new capital city was a wrong policy to pursue for three main reasons. First, they believe that the project is too costly. Secondly, the government has not sufficiently tried other policy instruments (such as an intensified rural development, industrial dispersal, etc.) which may be less expensive than the new capital project. Thirdly, the movement of the capital might

negatively affect the development of Lagos and other neighboring cities thereby reducing any potential benefits that could have been derived from relocation. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the merits and demerits of both sides of the argument. Within the scope of description of the situation presented, it is not sufficient to conclude either way. However, the new capital project was also expected to solve another national problem. In the following discussion the aspect of that problem (involving the contentious relationship among the country's ethnic groups) expected to be solved by the project is presented.

2.2 Ethno-Political Structure: Pattern and Sources of Tension

There is wide agreement that one of the most difficult problems facing the country was the relations among the country's ethnic groups.¹ Thus, when we consider the vital importance of the new capital city as a unifying factor for the country, an examination and adequate understanding of the ethno-political structure becomes very critical.

(1) See V. Olorunsola, "Patterns of Interaction Between Bureaucratic and Political Leaders: A Case Study," *J. Developing Areas* 3:52-53 (1968). See also: F.A. Schwatz, Jr., "Nigeria's Constitution and Economic Development," in Managing Economic Development in Africa, W.H. Hausman (ed.), p. 185. J. O'Connell and B. Dudley have made similar observations in their publications: J. O'Connell, "Political Parties in Nigeria," The Politics and Administration of Nigerian Government, L.F. Blitz (Ed.), London: Sweet and Maxwell (1965), p. 86; and B. Dudley, Nigerian Government and Politics, 1982, p. 36.

Before the penetration of the boundary of what later became known as Nigeria by the British, the settlement pattern was marked by a distribution of many ethnic groups. There are three major groups located in particular geographic regions of the country: the Hausa representing the Muslim Sudanic cultures (based on the early northern city states), the Ibo linked to the independent communities of numerous forest and coastal cultures, and the Yoruba representing the forest kingdoms of the Southwest. Splitting these groups are numerous smaller ethnic groups in the Middle Belt, along the Niger and Benue River valleys and in the Midwest sector (See Figure 2.5).

For much of the 19th century, what could be called a history of these ethnic groups was marked by a record of bitter internecine warfare between these different groups. Hence, the settlement of the smaller ethnic groups within the river valleys, and high plains was seen as an escape from constant warfare and the influences of the more dominant groups.¹

The British colonial rule accentuated tribal division. In order to be able to govern effectively the newly colonized territory, which became known as Nigeria, the colonial administration had to maintain these scattered conglomerates of ethnic groups into a pattern of an organized, politico-administrative framework.

(1)
Ajato Gandonu. "250 Nigerian Ethnic Groups: Realities and Assumptions," World Anthropology Series, 1973-78, pp. 243-79,

NIGERIAN ETHNIC GROUPS SURVEY 1972




Figure 2.5

Source: Gandonu, Ajato, 250 Nigerian Ethnic Groups: Realities and Assumptions. World Anthropological Series (1973-78). Reprints: pp. 243-279.

Thus, the country became divided into three regions along the three major ethnic lines--the North corresponding to the Hausa-Fulani group, the West consisting mainly of the Yorubas, and the East consisting mainly of the Ibos. With the imposition of colonial rule and the incorporation of the various groups into the new politico-administrative framework that became Nigeria, a new sense of identity began to form amongst the linked groups. Competition for differential rewards within the new administrative framework further encouraged the move towards greater cohesion, " a cohesion which increasingly took on the characteristics of a closed system as the regions sought to protect their respective power bases."¹

With the approach of independence, it became important for Nigerians to be actively involved in the management of their own affairs. The year 1946 marked the beginning of this new initiative. This year marked the introduction of the "Richards Constitution," so named after the man who was the Governor of Nigeria at the time, Sir Arthur Richards. It also marked the beginning of regionalism, which was to accentuate ethnic conflicts.² What is perhaps much more important is that it was the year when the administration of Northern Nigeria was brought into the general framework of the government of Nigeria. What today is known as Nigeria, is the product of the amalgamation in 1914 of the territories known as the

(1) B. Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics, Indiana University Press, 1982, p. 37.

(2) B. Dudley, *ibid.*, p. 43.

Northern and Southern provinces of Nigeria by Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugard. Though the two territories were supposed to have been amalgamated into one political unit, for all practical purposes they were administered as separate entities, more so after 1916 when Lugard left Nigeria.

Basically, the 1946 Richards Constitution provided for the establishment of regional assemblies in the three regions into which Nigeria had been divided in 1938, but in the North and West, besides the assemblies, there was to be a house of chiefs. The assemblies were composed of (a) representatives of the colonial administration, who formed the majority; and (b) nominated persons chosen from the various "native authorities" (local government units). The assemblies could discuss legislative proposals put before them by the administration, but could not pass these into law. For the latter purpose, a central legislature was created. This, like the regional assemblies was composed of designated officials and members nominated from the regions, but the North had fewer "representatives" than either the East or the West. The arguments in support of the new arrangement were that it would (a) enable each region to develop at the pace best suited to it; (b) provide a training ground for future political leaders; and (c) help to create a sense of belonging to a common nation.¹

But such a sense of belonging was not going to be realized in

(1) Ibid., p. 44.

a situation where each region was allowed to develop almost independently, instead of in harmony with each other.

Though the 1946 arrangement was supposed to last for nine years, by 1949 dissatisfaction with the Richards Constitution was so widespread that changes became inevitable. The dissatisfaction led to regional conferences being held, after which a general conference of delegates from the various regions was summoned which finally produced what came to be known (again after the Governor) as the "MacPherson Constitution." This came into effect in 1951, and its significance lies in six things:¹ (a) it gave to the regional assemblies the right, for the first time, to make laws for the region; (b) it provided, for the first time, for the election, admittedly indirectly, of the members of the regional assemblies; (c) it provided for the establishment of executive councils, composed of Ministers, in the various legislatures; (d) at the level of the central legislature it provided for an equality of representation among the three regions; (e) by providing for indirect elections, the MacPherson Constitution facilitated the process of political party formation; and (f) the regional conference leading to the MacPherson arrangement provided for the first time an opportunity for Nigerians not only to be involved in the discussion of the constitutional arrangement for their country, but also an opportunity to deliberate on the future of its national capital.

(1) B. Dudley, *ibid.*, p. 46.

Like the formation of the regions, the emergent political parties were largely ethnically constituted. The first of such parties to emerge was the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), which was formed in 1944, but only came into prominence between 1946 and 1947.¹ At first, the NCNC could largely have been described as a truly national party transcending all ethnic groups. In other words, it was meant to be an open party since its main focus of operation was the removal of the colonial administration. The NCNC was led by Herbert Macaulay, a veteran nationalist leader, and on his death in 1947, he was succeeded by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, an American-trained journalist and a newspaper proprietor.

The NCNC has been described as a "mass party" in that unlike "elite parties" its membership was open to everyone. The party derived its finances from the contributions of its members. In actual fact, however, all Nigerian parties have tended to rely either directly or indirectly on the government of the region they controlled to provide the bulk of their finances. In the case of NCNC the main source of its funds was "loans" from the African Continental Bank (ACB), a bank whose principal shareholder was Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and Zik Enterprises Ltd., (a company again largely owned by Azikiwe), but whose assets were later to be taken over by the East regional government when the ACB was almost on the point of liquidation.² From 1951 until the military coup of January 1966, the NCNC controlled the government of the Eastern region, and for much of the same

(1) Ibid., p. 46.

(2) Ibid., p. 47.

period formed the main opposition to the Western House of Assembly.

Unlike the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) and the Action Group (AG), the other two main parties of the first republic (1960-1965), the NCNC drew much of its electoral support from its association with various interest groups. In the East itself, it relied largely on the Ibo State Union, a federation of diverse clan unions of Ibo-speaking peoples, for mobilizing the electorate.¹ In the North its support derived from the alliance it formed with the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and with the Bornu Youth Movement (BYM). But the wide support NCNC enjoyed from all the regions did not last very long. As other parties which provided a more ethnic appeal to the various regions emerged, former supporters of NCNC naturally drifted to such parties. The first such party was the Action Group (AG) party, which was formed in 1948 and was itself an offshoot of the Yoruba cultural association, Egbe Omo Oduduwa (lit. association of the children of Oduduwa, the mythical ancestor of the Yoruba speaking peoples), started in London around 1945 by Chief Obafemi Awolowo who was then a law student.² Awolowo provided the rationale for the Egbe in his book "Path to Nigerian Freedom" (London; Faber and Faber, 1947). The argument was straightforward:

(1) Ibid., p. 48.

(2) Interpreted from: Chief O. Awolowo, Path to Nigerian Nationalism, Faber and Faber, London, 1947. Cited in B. Dudley, ibid., p. 50.

It was that in a heterogeneous society such as Nigeria's, political stability could be achieved only if ethnic conglomerates were grouped together to form a single self-administering political entity and only by such means can the cultural heritage of the different ethnic groups be protected and safeguarded and political advance assured.¹

But while such a move could assure the AG the prospect of control of the Yoruba-speaking areas, it was not likely to attract support from other ethnic groups.

The AG, however, has been described as a "caucus party", deriving its active support from the business class of merchants, transporters and contractors, and the educated class. It relied largely on the Yoruba-speaking peoples for mobilizing the electorate.

The third party, and one of the most influential parties to be formed was the Nigerian Peoples Congress (NPC), which was formed in 1951. Somewhat like the AG, NPC was an offshoot of a cultural association, the Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa (JMA) (lit.: the association of peoples of the North). The party was the only party with restricted membership, this being open only to "people of Northern Nigerian descent" as the party's constitution was later to specify; and as its motto proudly took: "One North; One People, Irrespective of Religion, Rank, or Tribe."

The NPC's leader, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sarduna of Sokoto, was Premier of the North until his death in the military coup of 1966; in this, the NPC was unlike the AG

(1) B. Dudley, op. cit, p. 50.

whose leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, left the premiership of the West regional government to become Leader of the Opposition in the federal legislature after the 1959 elections-- and the NCNC, whose leader, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, left the Premiership of the East regional government to become first leader of the Senate, the federal second chamber in 1960, then Governor-General in 1962, and a year later the first President of the Republic of Nigeria. The fact that Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello remained the Premier of the North gave his deputy, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the opportunity to become the first and only Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria, a position the latter held until his death in the military coup of 1966. From 1954 to 1966 the NPC remained the dominant coalition partner (with NCNC) in the federal government. But the preference of the leader of the party to remain Premier of the North showed where the NPC's priorities lay with respect to the Nigerian political process and also where the ultimate power in the federation resided: "that power resided in the North."¹

There were, besides the three main parties, numerous other smaller parties. But they were highly localized parties, based essentially on specific interests and whose main significance was that they provided avenues for one or the other of the three dominant parties, through alliances by means of which they could extend their electoral reach into ethnic groups outside their principal sphere of influence.

(1) Ibid., pp. 50-51.

The important thing to note from the foregoing description is that as parties emerged and gained control over the machinery of government, they increasingly became avenues through which ethnic consciousness and solidarity were largely espoused and maintained. This was not surprising, as these parties drew most of their power and financial support from their ethnic constituencies.

2.2.1 Regionalism and Problems of National Development

The MacPherson constitution marked the start of a full-scale swing towards regionalism. Between 1954 and 1959 the region became the principal arena of politics, "the field where the action was." Though the 1951 constitution had conferred on the regions the power to make their own laws, there still remained some constraints on that power. The difficulties which the constraints created led to demands for increased autonomy for the regions, a demand that was met with the introduction of a new constitution, the Lyttelton Constitution, in 1954. Included among the key points of this constitution were:

- (a) Nigeria was to be a federation made up of federal government and three regional governments, each with specified powers such that no one government could legislate on matters not allocated to it.
- (b) The federal legislature, to be composed of an equal number of members from each of the three regions, was to be directly elected, and whichever party won a majority of the seats in the federal legislature would form the federal government.
- (c) Each region was to have its own civil service which would be headed by the regional executive to which the

bureaucracy would be responsible. (e) Each region was to have the power to determine when it would become internally self-governing.¹

The increasing regionalization of functions and activities arising from the constitutions so to say, could not have occurred without a serious dent on overall balanced development. For example, the "regionalization" of the bureaucracy, and all the structural changes that went with it, meant that the civil servant no longer had the choice of what region he/she could serve in, or for the prospective civil servant, a choice in where to seek employment. The regionalization of the public service meant that the civil servant could now work, or seek employment only in his/her "region of origin," which also meant his/her ethnic origin. Easterners, the bulk of whom were Ibos, working in the West had perforce to move to the East or face a loss of employment, and what applied to the West applied equally to the other origins. The process did not stop with the main civil service; it extended to the corporations, the parastatals, and to a large extent, to the private sector. Furthermore, as an employee, these workers found that the level of their tax varied with the region in which they resided: they paid the most income tax if they resided in the East and the least if their residence were in the North.

(1) Ibid, p. 52.

Parents with children of school-going age found that if they resided in the West, they did not have to pay fees for their schoolchildren in primary schools, but they had to do so if their place of abode was in the East or in the North.

In light of this ethnically and regionally oriented political structure, development of an effective or efficient planning for an overall national development could not be guaranteed. As Aboyade (1968) noted in reference to the ethno-political scheme of things:

For purposes of planned development, there was not so much a government as a collection of regions at the center. [The Federal Government] was caught in the continuous struggle for regional economic advantage, especially as the resource picture became less promising as the years rolled by. This struggle for regional economic advantage, known in Nigerian journalistic parlance as "sharing the national cake," provides the key to understanding the economic planning strategy and plan implementation. The energies of the people were consumed by the politics of regional rivalry--the political game at the center received more than usual prominence among all regions.¹

A practical example of Aboyade's view can be shown by the problems experienced during the execution of the country's first National Development Plan (1962-1968). The

(1) O. Aboyade, "Relations Between Central and Local Institutions in the Developing Countries", cited in E. Dean, Plan Implementation in Nigeria 1962-1966. Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 52.

National Development Plan is a policy document prepared every five years by the central government. The aim of the National Development Plan is to take stock of previous performances of the national economy and the resources available to it, and with these set priorities in terms of the sectors where investments would go for the following five years. The 1962-1968 Plan is often referred to as the first of such plans, although a similar plan was started in 1946 by the British administration, but was never implemented.

Two central agencies--the National Economic Council (NEC) and the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) were responsible for coordinating the first plan. Each of the three regions was required to submit its own sub-plan, according to the national guidelines, which the two central agencies would coordinate into a national plan.

But the regional orientation of Nigerian politics conflicted with the attempt to implement the plan, and in particular with the attempt to implement the priorities set forth under the inspiration of the Federal planners.¹ Regional rivalries, and the difficulty of influencing the regions to implement the plan's policies and priorities, influenced the formulation of the plan itself. Each region attempted to secure the largest possible expenditure target

(1) E. Dean, Plan Implementation in Nigeria: 1962-1966. Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 53.

for its own plan, and, by implication, the largest federal financial support for its plan.¹ Thus, Clark (1965, p. 261) wrote:

The regional planning groups went about the planning exercise independently; each drew up its own program and employed its own method of review and evaluation. Only under strong pressure was a uniform sectoral format employed for the presentation of the regional plans in the national document.²

Clark further noted that rivalry among the governments often hindered the interchange of ideas, information, or personnel. Regional plans embodied an attempt to diversify exports on a regional basis. Some examples are the plan of the East to foster cocoa production, which was a specialty of the West, and the West's plan to encourage rubber and cotton, which were specialties of the Mid-West and North, respectively.³ Dean (1972, p. 54) has also emphasized: "the regionalization of the planning process simply provided no format for comparing benefit/cost ratios of potential projects within the sector." For example, there was no office in which the merits of an irrigation project in the North could be compared with the merits of farm settlements in the West.⁴

(1) Ibid., p. 54.

(2) P. Clark, "Economic Planning for a Country in Transition: Nigeria," in Edwin Dean (Ed.), *ibid.*, p. 54.

(3) Federal Republic of Nigeria: National Development Plan: 1962-1966, pp. 220, 229, 273, and 286.

(4) E. Dean (1972), *op. cit.*, p. 54.

The NEC and the JPC did not effectively coordinate regional and federal planning. This was partly because the decisions of these two agencies were not binding on the various governments, but also because in the middle nineteen-sixties, antagonistic regional leaders apparently were unable to agree on any other forum for the negotiation of major political compromises, so that NEC and JPC meetings were devoted to important political problems rather than planning.

Some specific instances of potential conflict between plan implementation and regionalism may be briefly examined. They involve the location of a proposed steel mill and national secondary schools. The proposed steel mill was the second largest project in the 1962-1966 plan, with an expected cost of £ 30 million, and it was probably the only major project that was held up because of regional rivalries. The NEC debated this project from 1959 until the fall of the civilian government in 1966, yet no firm decision was taken, partly because of the desire of each region to have the mill, and partly because of serious technical difficulties.¹ At one point, it appeared that the East and the North would each have separate integrated mills, while it was promised that consideration would be given to the establishment of a third mill in the West.²

(1) E. Dean, *ibid.*, p. 55.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 55.

In the case of national secondary schools, their siting was intended to foster political integration. Three ministers who were selected to decide their location came from Sokoto in the North, Warri in the Midwest, and Afikpo in the East: the three schools were allocated to Sokoto, Warri, and Afikpo.¹

Further events tend to support the view that relations among the regions were a strategic problem including the events relating to the campaign to create the Midwestern Region, a fourth region carved out of the Western region in 1963, and events relating to the dissatisfaction in the North and among the minority tribes, that is, the tribes other than the three largest. But the most dramatic reflection of the ethnic problems was provided by the events following the military coup of January 1966. This coup was initially regarded as a nationalist effort on the part of a nationalist army to end the instability of the old regime. But within a few months it was interpreted in ethnic terms. The second coup of July 1966 was followed by the massacre of the Easterners (Ibos) in the North, and finally, by the secession of Easterners in May 1967 resulting in the Civil War which lasted from 1967 until January 1970.

In conclusion, the regional and ethnic orientation of the political structure has led to the political struggle becoming a struggle among ethnic groups. Given this structure, the critical problem of each political regime, whether civilian

(1) Ibid., p. 56.

or military, is to distribute power among the ethnic groups, especially among the three dominant ones--Hausa-Fulani, Ibos, and Yorubas.

The efforts to decentralize administration close to these groups have been the focus of the subsequent military governments. Starting with the first military takeover of 1966, General Aguiyi Ironsi sought to replace the old regional structure with the earlier British-instituted provincial system. But his plans did not materialize as Ironsi himself was deposed in another military coup d'etat six months after he seized power. His successor, Lt. Colonel (and later, General) Yakubu Gowon from the Middle Belt in the Northern region, also made the unity of the country the center of his policy. The successful waging of the civil war, which prevented the secession of the Eastern region, and the creation of twelve states in 1967 in order to involve the minority groups to a greater extent, are a few examples of this effort.

In drafting the national constitution, which ushered in the civilian regime in 1979, the issue of national unity was again the central concern.

...national integration shall be actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, or religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited. (1979 Draft Constitution; Section 15(2)).

Part of how such a policy can be pursued is illustrated by the following:

The composition of the Government of the Federal or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria--there shall be no pre-dominance of persons from a few states, or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies. (1979 Draft Constitution; Section 14(13).)

The effectiveness of this constitutional provision for dealing with the ethnic situation was, perhaps, first put to test during the 1979 general election. The constitution stipulated that in order for any political party to win the electorate and thus control the national assembly, the party must win at least 25 percent of all votes cast in not less than two-thirds of the 19 states.

Six political parties contested the election. They included the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP), the United Party of Nigeria (UNP), the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), and the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP). The GNPP, PRP, and NPN are respectively led by Alhaji Ibrahim Waziri, Alhaji Aminu Kano, and Alhaji Shehu Shagari, former political 'bosses' from the former Northern region. In turn, the UPN was led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the former political boss of the banned Action Group (AG) of the Western Region. At the same time, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, also the former leader of the banned NCNC

party largely controlled by the East, became the new leader and presidential contender for the NPP party.

After the NPN, Shagari's party, had won the election, Awolowo, the leader and presidential contender for the UPN, would not concede victory to Alhaji Shehu Shagari (NPN's leader) even after the court had decided in favor of the NPN. But what was most remarkable was the voting pattern of that election (see Table 2.9). The UPN, which was an off-shoot of the former Action Group party in the former Western Region, carried only the states in the former Western Region. The GNPP, PRP, and NPN, all of which are Northern parties, also won most of their votes from the states in the former Northern Region. In a similar fashion, the NPP, an off-shoot of the former NCNC, got two of its three states from the former Eastern Region.

Another test of the constitutional provisions for ethnic balance is provided by the new capital construction. In Chapter 7 it is shown that, in spite of the requirement for balancing personnel appointments in governmental agencies, the pinnacle of political control at the FCDA was still largely dominated by one of the most powerful of all the ethnic groups--the Hausa-Fulani. It will also be evident that some of the instruments for implementing this goal of national unity were largely ineffective.

Table 2.9

Party Control of States
(1979 Presidential Election)

GNPP	UPN	NPN	PRP	NPP
Bornu (N)	Bendel (W)	Bauchi (N)	Kano (N)	Anambra (E)
Gongola (N)	Lagos (W)	Benue (N)		Imo (E)
	Ogun (W)	Kaduna (N)		Plateau (N)
	Ondo (W)	Kwara (N)		
	Oyo (W)	Cross River (E)		
		Niger (N)		
		Rivers (E)		
		Sokoto (N)		

N,W,E.... indicate the states that were carved out of the former Northern, Western, and Eastern regions respectively.

Source: Derived from: Dudley, Billy. An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics. Indiana University Press, 1982, p. 205.

In the discussion that follows, the history of the new capital relocation is traced in the context of this contentious ethnic environment. The discussion will again reveal that, as in other matters of national concern, the question of a new capital was mainly seen by the regions, later the states, and national leaders from the angle in which their ethnic groups would be benefited--and not necessarily in the interest of the whole country.

2.3 The History of Relocation: 1914-1975

The location of the capital of Nigeria is a question that has arisen periodically since 1914 when the Southern and Northern Nigerian Protectorates were amalgamated by the British to form the present geographic boundaries of Nigeria. The first proponent of moving the capital out of Lagos was the country's first colonial governor, Sir Frederick Lugard. The city of Lagos appalled Lugard. In 1914 he stated:

To the lagoons and swamps must be added the often laden skies reflected in the grey waters, the hot and heavy atmosphere during much of the year, and the vast maze of long established slums which, at a density of 30,000 to the square mile, in the hands of determined owners with the rights of British subjects, have been the despair of a long succession of town-planners and sanitary officers.¹

(1) Cited in T.N. Tamuno, "The Capital City in Modern Nigeria." Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, Vol. 14(1), March 1972, p. 96.

With the amalgamation of a "new Nigeria," in 1914 Lugard turned to the city of Kaduna as a logical location for a new capital. Here, he could "plan a capital on a virgin site with an eye to vistas, and express, on the grand scale, that soldiers love." Lugard's plans were never translated into action. The colonial office rejected his initial proposals. War broke out and the need for economic austerity damned the plan.

The questions about the status of Lagos and its role as capital were raised again during the 1950 constitutional conference. The delegates to this conference made up of representatives from the Western, Eastern, and Northern provinces and Lagos and colony, interested themselves in the position of the national capital city based on Lagos Island. Other aspects of the same question dealt with administrative and legislative arrangements for the adjoining "rural districts" of Ikeja, Badagry and Epe. Conflicts occurred over the position of Lagos. The Nigerian delegates who attended the joint Lagos and Colony conferences and those of the West regional conference in late 1949 decided that Lagos Island and the "rural districts" of the Colony be included in the Western Region for legislative and administrative purposes. But a majority of the delegates to the General Conference at Ibadan in January 1950 agreed that the "rural districts" should be merged with the Western Region provided that the municipality of Lagos, as Nigeria's

capital territory, was kept outside the Western region. That decision was opposed by the representatives from the Western Region, Lagos, and the Colony and by the British Secretary of State, James Griffiths. Griffiths recognized that the municipality and the Colony districts had for a long time been administered together.

While Griffiths welcomes that Lagos be merged with the Western Region for legislative and administrative purposes, he wanted to safeguard the position of the capital city. Accordingly, port facilities and expenses on Lagos as a capital city were to remain a central responsibility, and the Central Council of Ministers were to approve the annual estimates of the Lagos Town Council (LTC).¹

With the emergence of the country's political parties-- the NCNC, AG, and NPC, the position of Lagos became a subject of even greater contention. The emergence of these parties had coincided with what can generally be described as intensified "divisive ethnic politics," as each party leader supported national issues only to the extent that they benefited their ethno-regional constituencies. A brief description of what transpired between these parties on the position of the capital will help illuminate the point.

(1) T.N. Tamuno, *ibid.*, p. 97.

Before the 1953 Constitutional Conference in London, the leader of the NCNC party, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe had failed to win an election to the Western House of Assembly as a Lagos member of the House of Representatives. The AG charged that because of this failure, the NCNC, 'smarting' under Azikiwe's defeat, tried unsuccessfully in March and August 1952 to pass motions in the House of Representatives demanding the separation of Lagos from the Western Region. In another but similar move, the NPC which then controlled the Northern regional government, had demanded the separation of Lagos from the West because of a disagreement with the AG over the terms of the impending independence from Britain.¹ Thus, when these three parties and other delegates met in July and August of 1953 to discuss further the position of Lagos, at another constitutional conference, an agreement could not be reached. Again, the British Secretary of State, Oliver Lyttelton, was invited to decide the issue for them. This time, Lyttelton (later Lord Chados) reversed an earlier position of the British Government and favored making Lagos the commercial and political capital of Nigeria. Thereafter, the former Lagos municipality

(1) T.N. Tamuno had pointed out that AG ministers had resigned over a disagreement with NPC over a debate in the House of Representatives for self-government in 1956. Over this debate, the AG ministers in the Central Council of Ministers made public statements which "embarrassed" their former NPC colleagues. The NPC, which then controlled the Northern Regional government, negotiated with an Eight-Point Programme advocating a confederal arrangement for Nigeria, an arrangement which included the demand for the separation of Lagos from the Western Region.

was separated from the Western Region to become known as the federal territory.

There were two basic arguments which were more relevant to the controversial position of Lagos (Tamuno, 1972, p. 96). The first dealt with the contention of NPC leaders that the status of Lagos raised an economic, not a political, problem. The other argument, again, was that Nigeria, under a new federal constitution, should adopt the practice of making the federal capital city independent of any constituent unit of the federation, and merging Lagos with the Western Region would violate this principle. The economic argument had three other aspects, including the contention that administrative and legislative arrangements for the federal capital territory were connected with the other controversial issue of revenue allocation. Since 1947, the unsatisfactory principle of derivation had played a major part in revenue allocation in Nigeria. The excision of Lagos from the Western Region would therefore seriously affect the quota for that region. Another aspect dealt with the argument that Lagos, historically, had been developed with public funds and that such benefits should not be handed over to any region. Thirdly, there was the proposal that Lagos should mean more than the island, should extend to vital Apapa port, which Northern Nigeria then needed for easy access to the coast.¹

(1) Lyttleton's decision to excise Lagos according to Tamuno, was taken in order to (1) allay NPC's fears concerning Northern Nigeria's access to the sea, and (2) persuade NPC to drop its demand for a confederal state of Nigeria.

Lyttleton's decision was vehemently opposed by AG, as was evident in a memorandum it published on their return from London. The memorandum reads: "...To the people of the Western Region, however, Lagos is precisely what the head is to the body of an individual." In other words, if membership of the Nigerian community would mean the cutting off of that head, they would prefer to keep out of Nigeria, and remain an independent member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Put differently, the surest way of driving the Western Region into demanding secession and assenting it in due course of time is to sever Lagos from it.¹

At this point the AG elected as an alternative to the decision, supporting a new federal capital located at a more central position. As its memorandum continues, "...Lagos is not a suitable place for the capital of Federal Nigeria." Strategically, Lagos was vulnerable; nor was it geographically central. Lagos, as the powerhouse of Nigerian nationalism and radicalism, could not be made safe for the NPC leaders who disliked the hooliganism of young Lagosians. A safer place, the AG argued, should be found elsewhere, preferably "near Kafanchan which is almost central geographically and strategically comparatively safe, for the purposes of building a new and neutral capital."²

(1) Action Group. "Lagos Belongs to the West," Ibid., 1953, p. 10.

(2) Action Group, Ibid., pp. 15-16.

This support for building a new capital elsewhere by the West should be noted, for when the issue to move the capital from Lagos came up finally in 1976, the Western State was one of the three states that strongly opposed the movement. The factors influencing this later position will be dealt with in detail in Chapter 4.

At another constitutional review of 1957, the future role of Lagos once again became a subject of confrontation. Various parties put forward different suggestions for the proper future role of Lagos. It was finally decided that in the general interest of Nigeria, the existing status of the city would remain unchanged.

Although the constitutional conferences held during the late 1940's and 1950's did not elect to relocate the capital city, they paved the way to Nigerian independence under a federal constitution in October 1960. With independence, the new capital development became strictly a Nigerian issue, and the question was no longer subject to the views or interests of British government officials. The question of relocating the capital was considered by the 1962 United Nations study on "Metropolitan Lagos." In the study, it was stated that the federal government's role as an employer had increased substantially by 1962 and that this might justify the removal of the federal capital from Lagos. It also outlined the fact that a transfer of the capital would take six to ten years, that the attractions of Lagos would

still draw people, and that regardless of the location of the capital, major infrastructure improvements were needed in Lagos. After considering the cost of a new capital, the authors of the study decided against the removal of the federal capital because "the benefits which might be derived from such a step are not commensurate with the capital expenditure involved."¹

In 1965 the management of the Lagos Executive Development Board (LEDB) proposed to the Federal Government that the federal secretariat should be moved to Otta, an area 23 miles north of Lagos. The ministry charged with land control in Lagos ruled in opposition to such a relocation. Two years later the following statement was delivered to the Sagoe Commission of Enquiry looking into the affairs of the defunct LEDB:

A paper entitled Roles of Master Plans for Metropolitan Lagos 1965-75 is now being submitted to the tribunal by a Senior Planning Officer. I [Fadahunsi] am in agreement with most of what is included in the paper but would like to state that very serious consideration should be given at this stage to the relocation of the federal government offices on the mainland.²

By this time broad changes were occurring in Nigerian politics that were central to the development of a new

⁽¹⁾ United Nations, Report on Metropolitan Lagos, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1963.

⁽²⁾ Cited in J. Moore, "Planning Abuja: The Politics of New Capital Construction," B.S. Thesis, Princeton University, 1982, p. 23.

capital. The civilian government that had held power from 1960-1966 was toppled in January 1966 by a coup, leading to a military government led by General Ironsi. In July of that year a countercoup occurred, and General Gowon became head of the Federal Military Government. On May 30, 1967 the Eastern Region seceded from the rest of the country and declared itself the sovereign republic of Biafra. Just six days later the federal army initiated an attack on the new Republic of Biafra, the opening phase of a civil war that would last until January 1970. This bloody conflict would serve to change the entire perspective on the new capital issue.

2.4 Summary

In this chapter we examined some of the characteristics of the problems that relocation of the capital was expected to solve. We noted that these problems hinged on: the uneven urban distributional pattern, and a long-term ethnic and political disunity. We then traced the history of relocation in light of these two major circumstances. The history of relocation prior to 1960 reveals that the issue did not have sufficient political support to be translated into action. The major factors prohibiting the relocation of the capital city were ethnic and regional political effects. Social, political, and economic changes took place after 1967 which converted the general need for an improved capital into

a determined political decision backed by economic vitality aimed at securing a new level of social and national stability. The discussions of the nature and characteristics of the socio-economic and political changes and how they affected the relocation question are the subject of Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 3

FORCES OF RELOCATION: IMMEDIATE FACTORS

The discussion in this chapter focuses exclusively on the immediate circumstances that brought a fresh and added pressure to move finally the capital city. The immediate factors hinge on: first, the position of Lagos in terms of problems of political control and its urban growth dynamics and physical planning needs. The second set of factors hinges on the radical developments that occurred on the country's economic and political scene without which many analysts believed relocation would not have been possible. These two factors, although not necessarily new problems, contributed to bringing fresh attention and urgency to the new capital's supporters when the issue of relocation was brought up once more.

3.1 The Position of Lagos: Problems of Political Control and Urban Growth Dynamics

Apart from the regional problems arising from the national urban development pattern discussed in the last chapter, there were other factors at the micro-level that gave further impetus to the relocation of the capital. These factors relate to the problem associated with the physical, demographic, and ethnic characteristics of the former capital city, Lagos. Proponents of the new capital have argued that Lagos could no longer function effectively as a national

capital because of these problems. An examination of these characteristics will help to illuminate the magnitude and nature of the problems and their impact on the relocation question.

3.1.1 An Overview of Lagos

The city of Lagos is located at the southwest corner of the country on the Atlantic coast (Figure 1.1). As noted in Chapter 2, the city was mainly oriented towards Europe and North America, "serving essentially as a transmission center for the dispatch of primary raw materials and slaves." (1)

Among the towns considered to become the capital of the newly created Southern Nigeria in 1906, Lagos was chosen because of its eminent position as a trading town with easy communication with Europe and with the interior parts of the country through the railways, which had been commenced from Lagos before the end of the nineteenth century. (2) The other factor favoring the choice of Lagos as the capital was the existence of some rudimentary infrastructure, such as water and electricity supply. Even at that time, the possibility of removing the center of administration from Lagos to elsewhere was considered by the British.

At the time of amalgamation in 1914 of the Northern and Southern Provinces of Nigeria, Lagos was, for the same

(1) A.T. Salau, "A New Capital for Nigeria: Planning, Problems, and Prospects," *Africa Today* 24(4), 1977, p. 11.

(2) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital of Nigeria, December 1975, p. 10.

reasons given above, preferred over such towns as Calabar, Port Harcourt, and Kaduna. Consequently, Lagos continued to be better developed than other towns and cities within the country. In 1915 Lagos was provided with pipe-borne water. In 1917 it was declared a first-class township, and had elected representatives on its municipal council in 1920. Eight years later, in 1928, a development board, the Lagos Executive Development Board, was set up with the general duty of planning the city and reclaiming some of the nearby swamps. As noted in Chapter 2, the position of Lagos had become one of the most controversial issues among political parties existing within the country when the British government decided that Lagos should remain the federal capital and that the municipal area of Lagos should become federal Territory and should come directly under the administration of the federal government. Thus, the Lagos municipal area was excised from the existing Western Region and declared the Federal territory under the administration of the Federal Government. This position became crystallized under the 1960 Independence Constitution which declared that "Nigeria shall consist of three Regions and the Federal Territory."

With the creation of states on May 27, 1967, the Federation of Nigeria was divided into twelve states, one of which is Lagos State which includes the area previously referred to as the Federal Territory. Thus, the

administration of what had previously been Federal Territory came directly under a State Government, namely the Lagos State Government. But Lagos continued to serve as the capital of Nigeria. In addition, it was to serve as the capital of the newly created Lagos State Government.

The location of Lagos at the southwest corner of the country presented problems of political control and administration. This problem coincides with what Hamden (1964) termed the major problems of coastal location of capital cities in Africa: "the difficulty of political control, the weakened grip of the capital on the distant provinces, and its failure to strike a balance between the component regions of the state."(1)

The problem of insularity of decision makers may be seen to be exacerbated by inadequate communication networks (telephone, transportation, etc.) joining the capital and the rest of the country, especially given that the distances from Lagos to many of the state capitals are long. For example, four of the nine state capitals in the North are located at distances of more than 2,000 kilometers from Lagos. Thus, siting the capital at a more equidistant location from all the states not only would cut the distances, but also was expected to exert its influence to these states much more effectively.

(1) G. Hamden, "Capitals of New Africa," *Economic Geography* 40(3), 1964, p. 239.

3.1.2 Lagos: Urban Growth Pressure

The increased attention brought upon Lagos by its dual status as both the federal capital and a state capital, as well as its disproportionate share of the national infrastructure, continued to fuel its growth. Lagos is the most populated city in the country. With a 1978 population of nearly four million, and an average growth rate of 9.5 percent between 1963 and 1968 (Table 3.1), it is considered to be one of the fastest growing cities in Nigeria.

But the importance of the city's development lies in its triple role as the main administrative, commercial, and industrial center of the country. Since the administrative reform of 1967 resulted in the creation of states, the importance of the function of the city has been magnified by its double role as both the federal and state capitals.

Its importance as the chief commercial center is manifested in its control of the largest seaports and airports, the central bank as well as the largest number of foreign and indigenous banks in the country. The Lagos Port handles about 80 percent of the imports, and about 70 percent of the exports of the country. As noted in Chapter 2, Lagos accounts for approximately 44 percent of the total manufacturing employment in the country. The high per capita income, high level of infrastructure, and its large population density make it particularly attractive for industries to locate in Lagos.

Table 3.1

POPULATION GROWTH OF LAGOS, 1866-1963

Intercensal increase or decrease

Year of Census ^a	Total Population	Number	Percent	Area Covered by Census ^b (in square miles)
1866	25,083	-	-	c
1871	28,518	3,435	14	1.55
1881	37,452	8,934	31	1.55
1891 ^d	32,508	-4,944	-13	1.55
1901	41,847	9,339	29	c
1911	73,788	31,919	76	18.00
1921	99,690	25,924	35	20.17
1931	126,108	26,318	27	25.59
1950 ^e	230,256	104,148	83	27.20
1952 ^f	267,407	37,151	16	27.20
1962	449,500	182,093	68	27.20
1963 ^g	665,246	215,746	48	27.20
*1967	1,499,200	833,954	125	48.00
*1975	3,000,000	1,500,800	100	60.00
*1978	4,000,000	1,000,000	33	62.00

* Estimates, projections and field surveys (no census) reported in:
 (1) Amos, A. (1974). Land Use and Industrialization in Lagos, Vol. 3.
 (2) Abstracts from Lagos Master Plan Project Unit-Qualitative Land Use Survey, 1976

a The first decennial census of Lagos was taken in 1871; the first enumeration for registration of births and deaths was taken in 1866.

b Before 1901, the census area included only that part of Lagos Island West of Macgregor Canal, i.e., all of Lagos Island except Ikoyi. In 1901 Ebute Metta was included. The total area covered by the 1901 census can be estimated at 3.85 square miles, the area of the island (1.55 sq. mi.) plus Ebute Metta west of Denton Street (2.30 sq.mi.).

Table 3.1 continued

In 1911 the boundaries of the town were defined according to the Sanitary District of Lagos, which nearly coincided with the town boundaries fixed in 1917. This township boundary was used for the 1921 census, but was expanded in 1927, bringing the 1931 census area to slightly more than 25 square miles.

By 1950 minor boundary changes had again been made; since then the area has remained at a total of 27.20 square miles.

- c Not available (see note ^b).
- d The 1891 census showed a decrease because it counted only those persons "ordinarily resident" in the houses visited, whereas the 1881 census had enumerated "all persons" in Lagos. Moreover, the 1881 enumerators were paid on a per entry basis, whereas in 1891 they were paid on a daily or job basis and hence might have been less assiduous in registering names.
- e No census was taken in the 1940's because of the war, but one was needed in 1950 in order to compile voters' lists for Lagos Town Council election. The 1950 census covered Lagos only.
- f Because Lagos was included in the Western Region count in the 1952 census, occasional discrepancies appear in the reported figures. Some sources put the city's population at 272,000 instead of 267,407, but the Federal Office of Statistics in Lagos has confirmed the lower figure.
- g Because the 1962 national census was widely disputed, a new census was taken a year later. The 1963 census is believed to be more accurate, especially for Lagos.

SOURCES: (1) P.A. Talbot, The Peoples of Southern Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), vol. 4; Population Census of Lagos, 1931 (Lagos: Federal Office of Statistics, 1931); Population Census of Lagos, 1950 (Lagos: Federal Office of Statistics, 1950); Population Census of the Western Region of Nigeria, 1952 (Lagos: Government Statistician, 1953-54); Population Census of Lagos, 1963 (Lagos: Federal Office of Statistics, 1963).

Apart from the economic and administrative function, the city is also the social and cultural center of Nigeria. This is so, partly because of its 'lead factor' over the rest of the country as a result of its being the capital of the federation, and partly because of the concentration of political and economic activities there. For example, Lagos now houses a multimillion Naira cultural center and sports stadium, both of which are designed to provide a lead to the rest of Nigeria.(1)

The concentration of activities detrimentally affects both the functioning of Lagos proper and the balance of Nigeria's urban development. Because of its attractiveness in job opportunities, amenities, etc., Lagos creates many 'pull factors' which draw people to it particularly from rural areas. Consequently, the city witnesses a dramatic increase in population, such that, by 1972, migrant population accounted for 75 percent of its total population increase.(2)

The consequence of the rapid population increase is reflected in slums, overcrowding, squatter settlements, traffic congestion, acute shortage of housing, and breakdown of power and sanitary services. For example, despite its low level of car ownership (22 per 1,000 population by 1974), Lagos is considered one of the most congested cities in the

(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

(2) S.K. Mehta, "Some Demographic and Economic Correlates of Primate Cities: A Case for Re-evaluation," *Demography* 1(1), 1964, p. 136.

world.(1) With an average of 3.8 persons per room, it ranks as the most crowded city in Nigeria (Table 3.2). It is estimated that there is a shortage of over 40,000 housing units in Lagos, which means that approximately 300,000 people have no regular habitation.(2) The magnitude of its urban problem is perhaps best summed up by a comment from a prominent newspaper:

The problems of Lagos as a national and state capital, chief sea and airport, and main industrial and commercial center were becoming too complex and intractable. Particularly the end of the civil war and the oil boom of the early seventies had unleashed on the city such an unprecedented influx of people and had raised the tempo of economic activity to such level that it made the city seem overburdened. Perennial traffic jams, intolerable congestion, chaotic sanitary situation, inadequate social amenities, an alarming crime rate, had become its trademark defying all solutions.(3)

A weekly magazine, West Africa, contains further information on some problems in Lagos:

...Those who officially have a roof over their heads often have little more ... and pay outrageously for what they have.... Public transport is inadequate and costly. Some workers spend up to four or five hours a day travelling to and from their work and spend as much as 25 percent of their incomes for the privileges.(4)

(1) The New Nigeria, January 11, 1982, p. 11.

(2) See West Africa, December 13, 1976, p. 1923.

(3) The New Nigeria, *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

(4) West Africa, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 1923.

Table 3.2

Housing Conditions in Selected Nigerian Towns

Town	Percentage of households occupying one room	Average number of persons per room	Percentage of houses with pipe-borne water	Percentage of houses with flush toilet	Percentage of houses with electricity
Lagos	72.5	3.8	71.7	43.5	93.2
Port Harcourt	51.5	2.4	75.0	18.6	81.4
Benin	48.0	2.2	24.9	4.0	59.3
Warri	59.9	2.6	62.4	10.9	89.7
Kaduna	63.9	2.1	40.3	14.1	53.3
Kano	69.1	2.4	26.1	1.8	69.1
Ilorin	23.9	1.6	30.7	10.3	28.4
Ibadan	47.3	2.1	33.4	25.2	56.1
Onitsha	-	3.6	72.7	4.5	-

Source: Adejuwon, Adeniran. Assessment of Low Cost Housing Program in Nigeria. Unpublished MSC Thesis. Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, 1979, p. 8.

Because of the urban problems touched upon above, the most common argument has been that Lagos has lost its effectiveness as a capital and has become an embarrassment to the country. In its report, the Panel set up by the federal government to study the feasibility of retaining Lagos or creating a new capital, flatly asserted that:

Lagos remains one of the dirtiest capitals in the world, as most parts of the city suffer from perennial stench ... apart from the fact that these conditions are a disgrace to a country like Nigeria, they do not in any way enhance efficient administration of the country.(1)

In addition to the demographic problems, administrative problems have also emerged between the federal and Lagos state governments as a result of the city's dual status as both the seat of Lagos state and the federal government. These conflicts have arisen in areas of fisheries development, housing, municipal affairs, land tenure, etc. For example, although the responsibility for fisheries was specifically allocated to the Lagos state government by Government notice No. 992 of 1967, the power given to the federal government under Fisheries Decree No 30 of 1971 has been used to deprive the Lagos state government of the responsibility for the licensing of trawlers landing in Lagos. This has led to some controversy and loss of income to the Lagos state government.

(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

The difficulty of the Lagos state government in getting the federal government establishments to comply with housing and town planning regulations of the Lagos state government has contributed to what the Panel on the Location of the Federal Capital termed "the planning confusion in Metropolitan Lagos." (1) In other instances, the federal government has interfered with the Lagos State government regarding the affairs of the Lagos City Transport Service, which it insists must be run as a social service. Specifically, the federal government has overruled or curtailed proposed fare increases without giving sufficient grants to cover the necessary rise in operational costs. This has put the Lagos City Transport Service in great financial strain.

Land tenure control is yet another major area of conflict. Although land is an exclusive responsibility of the Lagos state government (as it is of all other states within their areas of jurisdiction), the dire need of the federal government for land for its services and the scarcity of land has sometimes led to appropriation of land vested in the Lagos state, especially within Lagos without adequate consultation. (2)

(1) Ibid., p. 32.

(2) Ibid., p. 32.

3.1.3 Physical Planning Needs

One of the major contributing factors to the urban growth problems in Lagos is a lack of adequate land space for expansion. The city occupies approximately 62 square miles in area and has an average density of 65,000 persons per square mile. In some parts of the city, however, such as Shomolu, the density is over 100,000 persons per square mile (Table 3.1).

The high density results in overload of public facilities such as water, electricity, and telecommunications, schools, etc. The large increase in population puts extra pressure on the existing administrative and management machineries. The large densities also contribute to general environmental degradations. It is within this small span of land (62 square miles) that most of the federal and Lagos state government establishments, embassies, and most of the commercial and industrial activities are located. Approximately one million persons are employed by the federal government and its agencies in Lagos.(1) It is estimated that 77.6 square miles of land is required to adequately accommodate these persons in addition to the present office space occupied by federal government agencies.(2)

Because of the lack of land space in a city that is fully urbanized, it is often difficult to plan effectively

(1) Ibid., p. 33.

(2) Ibid., p. 33.

for infrastructural expansion. Even where vertical expansion is contemplated, technological know-how is not enough advanced as to facilitate such efforts.

In addition to land space constraints, the topography of Lagos is almost flat, thus making drainage difficult. As the Panel on the Location of the Federal Capital noted:

It will be a matter of some considerable difficulty and expense to have a modern system of drainage throughout the city.... For several months of the year, especially during the period of heavy rainfall, it becomes impossible for pedestrians to walk along some major streets without removing their shoes and pulling up their trousers and skirts as water in the streets will be knee-deep.(1)

In the context of these problems, perhaps a valid question to ask is, to what extent has the government attempted to deal with them? In other words, has there been at any time a conscious and deliberate effort on the part of the federal government to formulate a long-term and comprehensive plan to deal with these problems? Perhaps, a good way to respond to the above question is to take a look at the history of planning in Lagos.

As already stated, Lagos was just another town in an isolated British colony. But the constitutional changes that in 1914 brought about the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern protectorates, giving birth to Nigeria, conferred on the city the status of a Federal capital. It is doubtful

(1) Ibid., p. 35

that the colonial rulers considered the long-run implications of making a very small island with physical handicaps the capital of a very large country. For a long time no serious attempts were made to confront many important planning issues facing this capital of a growing country.

It was not until the end of the bubonic plague which ravaged the city in 1929, that any attempt, for example, was made to think of real development aimed at improvement of the environment of Lagos. The incidence of the plague led to the creation of the Lagos Executive Development Board (LEDB), a planning agency which orchestrated the first slum clearance in Isale-Eko, the residential quarters of earlier Lagosian settlers. The slum clearance also resulted in the development of the first housing estate, the Yaba Housing Estate, in which the displaced dwellers of Isale Eko were resettled.

Between 1945 and 1955, at the end of World War II, various development plans were drawn up to aid the resettlement of war veterans who were migrating in large numbers to the city. But the programs developed within these plans were only partially implemented. Thus, until October 1960, when Nigeria gained her independence from Britain, Lagos had only benefited from "ad hoc planning." No long-range comprehensive plans were developed. In 1963, a team of experts from the United Nations (UN) was brought in to analyze the problems facing Lagos. Among the problems identified twenty-two years ago by this team, were (a)

competition for land, (b) housing shortage, (c) growth of slums, and (d) traffic and parking problems.(1) But a number of recommendations made to combat these problems including the need for a metropolitan government whose jurisdiction would cover the administration of the entire federal territory, were never implemented.

A major obstacle to the solutions of some of the problems was a lack of an institutional framework within which these solutions could be effected. The absence of a viable institutional unit could be shown by the fact that, for example, any agency involved in the problem of sewage disposal in Lagos had to approach at least four agencies, none of which was in a position to make a permanent and binding decision.(2)

3.1.4 Lagos Ethnic Composition

One of the main criticisms against retaining Lagos as the federal capital is that the city did not reflect the nation's ethnic diversity. The Yorubas make up 72 percent of all the ethnic groups in Lagos (Table 3.3). To supporters of Abuja, that situation is inconsistent with a long sought-for national unity. Thus, the Panel on the Location of the Federal Capital wrote:

(1) C. Abrams, S. Kobe, O. Koenisberger, M. Shapiro, and M. Wheeler, Metropolitan Lagos, New York, United Nations, 1964, p. 56.

(2) S.O. Fadahunsi, "Lagos and its Dual Role as a Capital." Daily Times, Lagos, September 11, 1975, p. 7. Cited in T.S. Ademola, "A New Capital for Nigeria: Problems and Prospects." Africa Today 24(4), October-December 1977.

Table 3.3
Ethnic Group of Nigerians in the City of Lagos (1963)

Ethnic Group	Total Population	Percent of Total Population (Nigerians)
1. Yoruba	465,406	72.20
2. Ibo	99,638	15.46
3. Edo	20,450	3.17
4. Hausa	13,225	2.05
5. Efik	12,606	1.96
6. Ijaw	11,754	1.82
7. Urhobo	7,171	1.11
8. Ibibia	5,819	0.90
9. Itsekiri	2,703	0.42
10. Isoko	1,785	0.28
11. Ekoi	658	0.10
12. Nupe	556	0.09
13. Tiv	555	0.09
14. Idoma	485	0.08
15. Fulani	434	0.07
16. Igala	220	0.04
17. Annang	204	0.03
18. Igbirra	193	0.03
19. Poli	100	0.02
20. Yalla	67	0.001
21. Ogoni	65	0.001
22. Others	515	0.08
 Total	 664,609	

Source: National Census of Population, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, 1963.

In our view the circumstances of Nigeria demand that the capital be not situated within a city of the type of Lagos with a strong connection with one of the major ethnic groups.... The present Lagos State is predominantly a Yoruba state. The vast majority of the people speak the same language and have the same or similar cultures and traditions.... It is true in the legal sense that the indigenes of Lagos are, like other Nigerians, citizens of Nigeria, but any capital of Nigeria should be a place where every citizen of Nigeria can lay claim to every available right and privilege on equal footing with any other citizen.... If we were to recommend that Lagos should continue as the capital for the federal government this will not in our view augur well for the unity of the country.(1)

The dominance of the Yorubas in Lagos is further reflected by this group's share of landed assets in the city. Table 3.4 shows the distribution of ethnic origins of landlords in Lagos residential areas. The table indicates that 12 of the 25 residential districts have exclusively Yoruba landlords. These districts include Idumagbo, Ebute-Ero, Idunshagbe, Isalegangan-Aroloya and Idunmota-Alakaro. Other districts are Offin-Itolo, Olowogbowo, Ereko-Agarawa, Lafiaji, Ebute Metta East and West, and Yaba East. Even in other districts, non-Yoruba landlords represent a negligible proportion.

The insignificant number of non-Yorubas owning property may be due to the nature of Nigeria's land tenure system. In Southern Nigeria, in which Lagos is located, land is owned by

(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the federal capital, *ibid.*, op. cit., p. 35.

Table 3.4

Ethnic Origins of Landlords in Lagos Residential Areas, 1960

Residential area	Lagosian	Egba	Ijebu	Other Yoruba	Total Yoruba	Ibo	Other Nigerian	Non-Nigerian
Idumagbo	75	--	15	10	100	--	--	--
Ebute-Ero	63	25	--	12	100	--	--	--
Idunshagbe	73	18	9	--	100	--	--	--
Oke Awo	18	11	35	18	82	--	--	18(D)
Isalegangan-Aroloya	46	29	17	8	100	--	--	--
Idunmota-Alakaro	60	10	10	20	100	--	--	--
Offin-Itolo	40	20	10	30	100	--	--	--
Olowogbowo	56	11	11	22	100	--	--	--
Ereko-Agarawa	29	57	--	14	100	--	--	--
Okepopo	42	16	16	24	98	--	--	2(T)
Epetedo	86	7	--	--	93	--	4(B)	3(G)
Faji	47	16	5	16	84	--	5(I)	11(D)
Brazilian Quarter	56	33	--	--	89	--	--	11(T)
Lafiaji	--	66	--	31	100	--	--	11(T)
Okesuna	11	25	39	12	88	--	--	12(G)
Araromi	--	18	55	27	100	--	--	--
Obalende	9	6	13	23	52	13	3(H)	33(TG)
Ebute Metta East	--	35	18	47	100	--	--	--
Yaba	--	48	25	25	98	2	--	--
Ebute Metta West	--	37	36	27	100	--	--	--
Ojuelegba	--	21	42	17	80	8	4(E)	8(T)
Yaba East	16	34	34	16	100	--	--	--
Musnin	11	36	17	28	92	4	4	--
Shomolu	--	18	35	39	92	8	--	--
Surulere	--	31	23	19	93	23	4(E)	--

Key: B - Bini D - Dahomian E - Efik G - Ghanian H - Hausa I - Itsekiri T - Togolese
 Source: Mabogunje, A. L. "Lagos," A Study in Urban Geography (Ph.D. dissertation, London University, 1961), p. 144. Cited in Baker, P.: Urbanization and Political Change: The Politics of Lagos, 1917-1967. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1974, p. 86.

the family unit or the community, which, in turn, forbids the sale of such lands to nonmembers of the family or community who are often regarded as 'strangers.'⁽¹⁾ In other parts of the country, land is often held for sacred reasons, and the disposal of such land is often believed to constitute a sacrilegious act. This situation may have made it difficult for the non-Yorubas to gain access to land. What this means, is that, even moving the capital to a non-Yoruba territory may not necessarily eliminate accessibility problems unless there were governmental intervention to ensure transferability of land.

Whatever the cause of lack of access to land resources may be, the Abuja supporters believe that the mere fact that Lagos does not reflect the ethnic diversity of the country makes the city incapable of contributing to the integration of the country. It may be that proponents of relocation (who happen to be mainly non-Yorubas) are spiteful or envious because the capital was not located in their ethnic territory. After all, there is no piece of land in Nigeria (except, perhaps a few government lands) that was not owned by either an individual, group, or community by 1978 when all the land in the country became public lands. The analysis of the new capital's planning process (in Chapter 4) will, in fact, reveal that most of the new capital's supporters when asked where to locate the capital, named their own states or

(1) D.I. Okpala, "The Potentials and Perils of Public Land Ownership and Management: The Case of the Lagos Executive Development Board." PhD Thesis, MIT, 1977, p. 33.

at the most, their 'backyards' as the best place to build the new capital city.

3.1.5 Conclusion

The problems just reviewed are not necessarily peculiar to Lagos. Other Nigerian cities as well are experiencing tremendous urban growth pressure. There are evidences of overcrowding, traffic congestion, slums, and inadequate public facilities and utilities. Table 3.2 shows that while Lagos may be regarded as the most crowded city in the country in terms of the number of persons living in one room, other cities, such as Onitsha with 3.6 persons per room, Warri (2.6 persons per room), and Kano (2.4 persons per room), are following Lagos very closely.

In terms of ethnic distribution, there is hardly any town in Nigeria that is ethnically balanced or neutral. Most of the cities are usually dominated by persons from the city's ethnic territory. In Onitsha, for example, more than two-thirds of its city's population are Ibos. the same is true for Kaduna, Kano, and Sokoto, where the Hausa-Fulani groups are the most dominant, and in Calabar where the Efiks and Ibibios are the dominant groups.

What this situation implies, is that no matter where the new capital is built, the problems that the decision-makers want to avoid may likely reappear. As critics of relocation have argued:

The movement of one or both of the capitals out of Lagos has therefore become a desideratum, some people argued. Whilst this argument is valid, it has to be accepted that the new capital wherever it is located would in due course be faced with this problem.(1)

Others went further to argue that:

... the federal capital should be retained in Lagos. We must make all efforts to solve the problems of Lagos ... because you do not solve a problem by running away from it.(2)

In the following section, the second set of factors that finally gave an impetus to relocation is reviewed. As we noted earlier, these factors relate to the radical developments on the country's politics and economic scene. They are: the civil war of 1967-1970, the sudden change of government from a democratically elected system to a prolonged military rule, which, in turn, brought on increased centralization of decision making, and the sudden but short-lived economic boom due to oil revenues.(3)

3.2 Forces of Relocation: Radical Developments from 1967-1975

(1) Western State Government Memorandum to the Panel on the Location of the federal capital, 1975, p. 1.

(2) The view was that of the Rivers State Government reported in Report of the Committee on the Location of the federal capital, op. cit., p. 38.

(3) See J. Moore (1982), op. cit., p. 23-29.

Three major events occurred in the period from 1967-1975 that brought new meaning and support to the forces of relocation established in the preceding half-century. First, from 1967-1970 a brutal civil war fought along ethnic lines split the country. Second, in 1973 the economy received an unexpected and dramatic boost with the rapid increase of oil revenues. Finally, in 1975 there was the development of a military government with the power and conviction to locate a new federal capital outside Lagos. The events of 1914-1967 showed sufficient cause for relocation. The events of the turbulent years between 1967-1975 provided the conditions necessary for capital construction to move from a need to a reality.(1)

3.2.1 The Civil War: 1967-1970

As pointed out earlier, in 1966 Lieutenant Colonel Yakuba Gowon, a Christian from the Middle Belt, toppled General Ironsi in another military coup to become the head of the Federal Military Government (FMG). Gowon faced a country divided into ethnic groups on the verge of war. Violent dissension existed among the Northern, Western, and Eastern Regions. In September and October the Northerners launched an attack against Easterners (the Ibos) living in the north in an effort to crush Ibo's economic power. Fatalities were estimated at between 10,000 and 30,000. The army was divided into eastern and northern regiments, leaving no base for

(1) Ibid., p. 25.

national unity. In light of continued dissension, the leaders of the north, with the support of smaller ethnic groups, proposed, the formation of a multi-state country and offered to give up regional unity for the strength of the federation. This offer was accepted by the Yoruba in the West but was not well received among the Ibos. On May 26th, the Eastern Region, not willing to accept the north's offer, voted to secede. But before that, Gowon had announced a state of emergency and at the same time divided the regions of Nigeria into twelve states. This was an effort to break down the sharp ethnic cleavages, and at the same time to deprive the Ibo heartland of its control over the eastern oil fields and prohibit their access to the sea. On May 30th, 1967, the Ibo leader, Lieutenant Colonel C.O. Ojukwu, announced the formation of the independent republic of Biafra.

In the next thirty months, the bloody civil war raged and an estimated one million Easterners died from either malnutrition or the violent conflict. The federal troops overcame the secessionists in January 1970, ending the civil war. The Gowon administration adopted a post-war campaign to integrate the Ibo and reconstruct a strong and unified Nigeria. This bitter civil war became a central force behind the decision to relocate the capital as the war changed dramatically the context of the new capital issue from one of practical necessity to one of political survival for the existing military government. No longer did relocation mean

simply the establishment of a more central capital. Now it meant a capital located in an ethnically-neutral ground from which it was feasible to administer the country.(1)

The dynamic change in the distribution problem was accompanied by a change in the philosophical attitude adopted by the Gowon administration and its successors that urged the country to take whatever measures were necessary to avoid another civil war. The conflict brought attention and political significance to any decision that enabled the formation of a harmonious, unified Nigeria.

I. J. Ebong, a former permanent secretary, recalled that the concept of a new capital had vast support in the early '70's.(2) In 1972 Ebong paid an official visit to the new capital city of Brasilia. On his return from this trip he delivered a report to Gowon that outlined the nature of Brasilia and suggested that such a project was advisable for Nigeria. According to Ebong, Gowon "bought the idea" as he was intrigued by the concept of a new capital city on a virgin site outside the dominance of a single ethnic group.(3)

As early as 1965, even before Ebong's visit to Brasilia, some scholars such as Dr. Ajato Amos had begun to advocate for a new capital as a solution to the ethnic problems, but the political climate at the time precluded any meaningful

(1) J. Moore, 1982, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 27.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 28.

discussion of the issue.(1)

At the end of the war the majority of political power was vested in the Federal Military Government (FMG). None of the three major ethnic groups had significant control of the government. The geographic division of the Northern Region into six states and the East and West into three states, respectively, contributed to the breaking up of the former base of power. With the decline in influence of the major northern, southern, and eastern ethnic groups, a new force developed in Nigerian politics. A major share of the political power and an important voice in the executive were given to the smaller ethnic groups, particularly the Ijaw and Ibibio from the east, the Tiv, the Nupe, and other Middle Belt peoples.(2) The new groups had felt geographically isolated from the present capital of Lagos. Thus, they must have seen a new capital as a means of linking themselves geographically to their new power. The large representation of these groups in the armed forces and in areas with significant oil production must have given added influence to their political views.

However, these new political forces alone were not sufficient to propel Nigeria to construct a new capital. The

(1) See A. Gandonu, *A Proper federal capital for Nigeria*, Text of a Lecture at the Nigeria Centre, London, under the Auspices of the Nigerian High Commission, April 29, 1975.

(2) One of the positive consequences of the creation of states is that it helped to give administrative form to the minority areas--the non-Yoruba, non-Hausa, and non-Ibo ethnic groups which included Ijaws, Ibibio, Effik, Tiv, Nupe, and others.

decision to relocate was not made until 1975. This delay can be explained in part by economic conditions in Nigeria. In 1970 the country was in shambles. By 1975 changes in global oil prices brought to Nigeria the revenue and the optimistic ideology necessary to support a new capital.

3.2.2 Economic Boom and the Oil Money

The Nigerian economy is heavily dependent on the export of oil. The dramatic rise in oil prices in 1973-74 resulted in a surge of revenue from the government-run oil industry. The net effect was that "Government oil revenues shot up from 160 million in September 1973 to a peak of 770 million in May 1978." (1)

According to an economic theory developed by the economist Sayre Schatz, there is a lag between the time the magnitude of increased revenue is realized and the time when the government increases its expenditures. "As a result, substantial surpluses accrue in the government budget and the balance of payments." (2) The figures generated by Schatz on government surplus are phenomenal; these are: a surplus of 58.6 million naira (N) in 1972-73, N285.5 million in 1973-74, and "an historically huge surplus of N1850.9 million in 1974-75" (Table 3.5). Once the government realized it had accumulated large surpluses it acted quickly in support of relocation.

(1) Federal Republic of Nigeria: Second National Development Plan 1970-1975, Third National Development Plan 1975-1980.

(2) S. Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism, University of California

Table 3.5
Nigerian Federal Government Revenues and Expenditures
1972/73-1980
(₦ millions)

Fiscal Year	Total Federally Collected Revenues	Total Federal Expenditures ^a	Allocations to State and Local Governments ^b	Federal Surplus or (Deficit) ^c
1972/73	1,389.9	1,009.0	322.3	58.6
1973/74	2,171.4	1,562.1	328.8	285.5
1974/75	5,171.1	2,492.5	833.7	1,850.9
1975/76	5,861.5	6,289.3	963.1	(1,390.9)
1976/77	7,076.6	7,071.7	1,414.9	(1,460.0)
1977/78	8,359.0	8,560.5	1,491.8	(1,693.3)
1978/79 ^d	6,800.0	8,000.0	1,750.0	(2,950.0)
1979/80 ^e	8,800.0	9,500.0	2,500.0	(3,200.0)
1980 ^f	11,859.0	10,011.0	2,819.0	(971.0)

- a: Total Federal Expenditures do not include statutory allocations to state and local governments, which are shown in column 4, but do include non-statutory appropriations for state and local governments.
- b: These are statutory allocations and do not include non-statutory appropriations, nor are federal loans to state and local governments included.
- c: Equals Total Federally Collected Revenues minus Total Federal Expenditures and Allocations to State and Local Governments. Deficits are shown in parentheses.
- d: 1978/79 figures are estimates made in March, 1979, for the preceding fiscal year. The 1979 Budget Speech provided figures for columns 2 and 4. The figure for column 3 comes from The 1979 Budget Speech (for recurrent expenditures) and Rupley (for capital expenditures).
- e: 1979/80 figures are budgeted figures presented in The 1979 Budget Speech for the forthcoming fiscal year.
- f: The 1980 fiscal year is only 9 months, April 1 to December 31, 1980. The figures are estimates presented in The 1980 Budget Speech.
- g: Figures for the last three years must be considered highly unreliable.

Sources: Lawrence A. Rupley, "Why Nigerian Spending Has Grown," West Africa, June 4, 1979, pp. 977-980; Federal Republic of Nigeria, Economic Indicators, January 1975; The 1979 Budget Speech; The 1980 Budget Speech. Cited in Moore, Jonathan (1982), p. 30.

In addition to the short-term excess in government revenue, the oil-boom fluctuation led to the new philosophical attitude that Nigeria was a wealthy country. The surplus revenue created an artificial barrier to proper economic consideration of the national effect of costly projects. The new revenue figures were used to defend the government against opposition forces that argued that the country could not afford a development project the magnitude of a new capital city.

A secondary effect of the oil boom was that leading government officials were recipients of rising federal expenditures. Those in power also gained increased personal prosperity through ties with oil industry contractors and held the opinion that the entire country was wealthy.⁽¹⁾ Their perspective on Lagos as the capital city was radically altered. These leaders now could not conceive of a rich and powerful country with a "dirty and ill-planned city" as its capital. This economic and philosophical change coincided with the rise to power of a new Nigerian leader who was capable of initiating a new capital project.

3.2.3 Impact of New Political (Military) Leaders

In his essay titled "Corrective Government," Dent argues that there is an incompatibility between the goals of reform and the political nature of a permanent government. He cites

Press, Berkeley, 1977. Cited in J. Moore, *ibid.*, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

(1) J. Moore, *ibid.*, p. 31.

the example of an elected civilian government that uses a non-representative figure to support his philosophy on an issue likely to spark contention.

The secret of this kind of action [reform in a democratic system] is that the unpopular authority is outside the system and, having no permanent position to maintain, does not have to worry about making friends and avoiding enemies. But once let him have a permanent position in the system to maintain, he will normally become far less ruthless in corrective action.
(1)

This principle is even more apparent in a military regime. The unique qualities of military government with a limited mandate result in a great ability to implement projects requiring centralized decisions. (The more decentralized implementation, the harder it is in a military regime.) However, a military government that has an unlimited mandate and is concerned with self-preservation, acts in a far more circumspect manner and loses those very qualities of military promptness and precision that are its real justification in military corrective government.

The Gowon regime that ruled Nigeria from 1966-75 is seen by many analysts as representational of a military government concerned more with preservation than reformation. Under the Gowon government there was neither the return to stability, nor a transfer out of military rule. The government has been

(1) M. Dent, "Corrective Government," p. 10. Cited in J. Moore, *ibid.*, p. 31.

compared to a colonial power that was preparing a country for independence, yet was not willing to disassociate itself. As a result, few policy changes or decisions were made. The question of relocating the capital was actually considered on a number of occasions, but the issue never left Gowon's desk. No committee was ever formed to evaluate relocation. Gowon's inaction can be explained in part by his close association with the Western Region. The West had joined Gowon in waging the civil war against the secessionist Biafra. For him to move the capital would have been tantamount to 'cutting off the fingers that fed him' since Lagos (as noted in Chapter 2) "was to the West what the head was to the body."

Gowon was clearly not operating a government with a limited mandate. His promise of a return to civilian rule in 1976 was not kept, and instead the exact date for the transfer of power was postponed indefinitely. On July 29, 1975, nine years to the day after Gowon had come to power by means of a coup, he himself fell to a coup.

Twelve hours after the fall of the Gowon regime, Brigadier General Murtala Muhammed became the head of state. According to the criteria established by Dent, the Muhammed regime was a perfect instrument for change. Above all else, the new leader was an able man of action. In contrast to his predecessor, Muhammed gave his government a clear and limited mandate (three years). The combination of a firm decision to give up power in a period of three years with an equally firm decision to act with vigor to make the necessary

reforms during the three-year period has been the strength of the military government, both before and after the death of Muhammed.

Muhammed acted quickly and decisively on two issues of fundamental importance to the political structure of Nigeria. The first was the creation of additional states. Gowon's division of Nigeria, as discussed above, was made in 1967 on the eve of the Biafran secession. The divisions were made in a haste with the belief that they would later be refined by boundary adjustments and the creation of new states. It was the action-oriented Muhammed who in 1975 appointed a five man advisory committee to gather evidence from the states and to make recommendations to the Supreme Military Council (SMC), which summarily decided to increase the number of states to nineteen.

The second issue was the location of the federal capital. Muhammed appointed a committee on the location of the federal capital and as a result, sixty years after it was first considered, the concept of a new federal capital for Nigeria reached the planning stage necessary to initiate construction.

3.3 Summary

In this chapter we have examined some of the factors that gave rise, finally, to moving the capital city. These factors included, among others, the pressures from rapid urban growth exerted on the old capital city, Lagos. The

pressures were reflected in inadequate land space for expansion, traffic congestion, poor housing conditions, problems of political and administrative conflict between the city's administration and that of the Federal Government, and a lack of ethnic balance in the city. We pointed out, however, that the problems listed above are not necessarily peculiar to Lagos. Instead, they are problems which are generally characteristic of many of the country's urban centers. As such, moving the capital on the basis of these problems alone, would not necessarily eliminate the problems from the new capital city.

In conjunction with the problems noted above, it was also pointed out that the impetus to move the capital was additionally provided by: the Nigerian civil war which brought an added emphasis on the need for a national unity; the increase in government revenue due to the 'oil boom' which provided the necessary capital to embark upon construction; and the emergence of a determined and purposeful military leadership which formed a committee to evaluate the prospects of a new capital city in the country.

In the following chapter, the activities of this committee, as well as the general planning process of the new capital city, are evaluated. Also, the outcome of the process and its consequences on the overall project construction are identified and analyzed.

CHAPTER 4

PLANNING THE NEW CAPITAL CITY: FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS

In this chapter, we analyze the characteristics of the first stage of the new capital's planning exercise. This analysis enables us to understand how some of the goals noted earlier in the thesis were incorporated into this planning exercise, the kinds of policy choices or strategies that were adopted for realizing project goals, how these choices were made, and their assumptions and their impact on overall project construction.

The planning model adopted for Abuja involved essentially two major activities--a feasibility study and a master plan. The feasibility study can, in turn, be broken into two main activities: the first involves the appointment of a committee that studied the question of a new capital; the second involves the site selection process, also carried out by this same committee.

The masterplanning aspect resulted in a Masterplan--a policy document that would guide the development of the city. This aspect of planning was contracted out to a consortium of American planning firms--The International Planning Associates (IPA). This second phase of the planning activities is analyzed in Chapter 5.

The analysis in this chapter focuses on the feasibility studies. Essentially, the feasibility studies are examined by: (i) assessing the activities of this government-appointed

committee in terms of the strategies they used for evaluating the question of a new capital city, as well as the conclusions reached by this committee; and (ii) analyzing the criteria adopted for choosing the site for the new capital territory as well as the problems emanating from the poor locational decision of this committee.

The analysis in this chapter will reveal that the panel, in supposedly studying the question (feasibility) of a new capital city, essentially developed practical rationales for what was a predisposed politically motivated decision. This would contradict some of the assumptions of the rational process model we examined earlier, in Chapter 1. In that chapter, we argued that decision makers whose decision process is based on maximizing the attainment of a set of goals and objectives defined through an identifiable public interest, do not exist in reality. We further noted that the rational model's requirements for a comprehensive knowledge and the selection of the optimal strategies or best alternatives for achieving goals are rarely satisfied in reality. Instead, the decision makers often choose alternatives that satisfy some minimum level of acceptability that induces the least harm or disturbance while conveying some benefit.

The Muhammed regime was determined to move the capital city. After all, the environment was ripe. The 'oil money' was available (see Table 3.5 for revenue surpluses). The country had just emerged from a bitter civil war, after which

it had begun to yearn for political unity. The government was an authoritarian regime. At the same time, the regime had a limited mandate (three years). This meant that if relocation were to take place, it must be done very quickly. Thus, the Location Committee was given only four months to study the feasibility and at the same time select a site for the new capital. This short time span, in conjunction with the inexperience of this panel in large-scale urban development, explains in part the committee's ineffectiveness. No alternative sites for relocation were considered. No feasibility studies or analyses of costs/benefits were executed.

An analysis of the site-selection process further reveals that the criteria for choosing a 'proper location' for the new capital territory shifted to the criteria (centrality, health and climate, land availability, water supply, etc.) that would bring about a 'functional city,' rather than the conditions that would mainly bring about national unity, which was one of the central goals of relocation. This shift in criteria is reflected in Table 4.2, which shows that 'ethnic accord' was given the lowest score among the 13 requirements posited for choosing the site for the new capital territory.

The economic impact of Abuja's construction on Lagos, site of the existing federal capital, was not considered in the planning process. The Report on the Location of the Federal Capital published by the panel noted that the

relocation of the government will have only positive effects on Lagos. The negative impact that could accompany or weaken existing businesses was not considered in the feasibility studies.

The interaction among the members of the Location Committee is worth noting, for it brought again into focus one of the critical elements (ethnic rivalries) that had historically hindered the development of an acceptable capital to the country. The members of this committee, due to loyalties to their ethnic groups, could not agree on the proper location for the capital territory. The disagreement among them, which was spawned mainly by ethnic sentiments, resulted in a choice of a less suitable site, which later created construction difficulties, such as land use and resettlement problems. This particular situation reflects in part the adverse impact of Nigeria's ethnic relations on the new capital project, as pointed out in Chapter 1.

4.1 Feasibility Studies: Committee on the Location of Abuja

From our discussion in Chapter 2 of the contentious social and political relations among the Nigerian states vis-a-vis the ethnic groups, it seemed that relocation of the capital could only be possible through a strongly committed and purposeful government. The Murtala Muhammed regime provided such an opportunity. As noted earlier, Muhammed had on July 29, 1975, just overthrown his predecessor and had promised to hand over power to a democratically elected

civilian government in 1979. With a limited mandate, relocation plans would have to be started immediately, lest it might be overtaken by the country's ever-changing political circumstances. (Recall that in the past there had been coups and countercoups d'etat.) Muhammed acted very quickly. On August 9, 1975 he appointed an eight-person Location Committee to study the feasibility of a new capital for the country (only seven of the members participated in the study). As pointed out in Chapter 1, the Committee was given four mandates: (1) to examine the effectiveness of Lagos in playing a double role as the capital of both the nation and Lagos state; (2) if Lagos were ineffective in playing the role, to recommend which of the governments (Federal or Lagos state) should move its headquarters; (3) if it is the federal government, to recommend a suitable location; and (4) to examine other relevant factors that would assist the government in its decision. The Committee was given four months to present its findings to the military government.

In this section, we critically evaluate the effectiveness of the strategies used by the Location Committee for studying the feasibilities of a new capital city for Nigeria. Essentially, four main strategies were adopted by the committee.

- (1) The Committee sent out for opinions (memoranda) from the Nigerian public on the subject. This was essential in order to test the acceptability of the new capital project among the general public.

- (2) The Committee contacted the State governments to solicit their opinions about relocating the capital.
- (3) The Committee took a tour of some African and overseas countries which have in the past relocated their capitals. This would enable the Committee, supposedly, to learn from these countries' mistakes, and to minimize or eliminate such mistakes from Abuja.
- (4) The Committee toured the Nigerian State Capitals and interviewed a number of selected personalities and organizations in order to solicit their opinions on the subject.

4.1.1 The Location Committee: Request for Memoranda from the General Public

The request by the Location Committee for opinions on the subject was made through the Nigerian newspapers. The advertisement specifically called for written representations from individuals, groups of persons, associations, etc. to submit materials on the four mandates issued to the Committee. All representations were to be submitted in fifteen copies to the Secretary, Panel on Location of the Federal Capital, no later than the 30th of September, 1975.

The response to this advertisement was expectedly low. About 258 persons representing less than 0.0003 percent of the population responded to the advertisement. Nevertheless, the proponents of Abuja still celebrated this turnout which they claimed indicated mass support for the new capital

project.(1)

The low response could have resulted from any of the following: (a) the quality of the Nigerian mail delivery system is very poor. In some instances, it takes more than six weeks for letters to travel from one corner of the country to the other, (b) the time allotted to the advertisement (30 days) seems too short in light of such mail delivery problems, and (c), more than half the population cannot read or write. Therefore, the persons likely to have responded quickly, would have been the literates. But this group of people is too small to represent a generally meaningful consensus.

4.1.2 The Location Committee: Contact with State Governments

The second strategy used by the committee to solicit the public's view about a new capital was to contact certain persons and bodies. The selection of these persons and bodies was arbitrary. However, an examination of their profile reveals that they consisted mainly of government functionaries and representatives of the twelve state governments.

A large number of individuals and groups contacted did not submit memoranda. It is not clear why this was the case.

(1) In the Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital, there was no indication of the percentage of those who opposed the new capital project. Most views in the Report emphasized reasons for the necessity for the move.

Some of the reasons for failure to submit memoranda may hinge on the reasons stated in Section 4.1.1--poor communication, short time frame, and inability to read or write. It is also possible that those who failed to submit, did not do so out of sheer apathy, or simply because they might be opposed to the project. Because the Committee was soliciting opinions from a position in which they were seen as proponents of the project, these individuals might be unwilling to submit views that would openly oppose the military government.(1)

Table 4.1 represents the responses from the twelve state governments regarding their views about moving the capital. Five general conclusions can be derived from this table.

First, all states in the former Northern Region supported moving the capital. The sites selected by these states for locating the new capital coincided with the areas in the Northern Region. The present position of these states thus, matches the position held by the Northern Region in the 1950's regarding the status of a federal capital (see discussion in Section 3.3).

Second, the Western State Government, an offshoot of the former Western Region, did not support relocation. Recall also that in the 1950's, severance of Lagos as a federal capital was strongly opposed by the Western Region. However, at that time the West had noted that it would contribute to

(1) There is often a general trend in the country for people not to speak up against military regimes. And since the proposal for a new capital came from the military establishment, it is highly unlikely that individuals would oppose such a proposal openly, even if they wanted to do so.

Table 4.1

Position of the 12 State Governments with Respect
to the Location of the Capital

State	Support Movement	Suggested Site	Remarks
Lagos	Not Clear	-----	Lagos State Government was less open about its position. But from its analysis of the problem it seemed inclined to oppose movement. To her, if movement should occur, it should have been within a "short range" from Lagos.
North Western	Yes	Abuja	Before it was incorporated into the new federal territory, Abuja was originally a town in the North Western State
Kano	Yes	Minna	Minna town is located in Kano State
North Eastern	Yes	Kaduna	-----
North Central	Yes	Kafanchan Kontagora and Minna	
Benue Plateau	Yes	Area adjoining Benue Plateau North Central and North Western	
Kwara	Yes	Lokoja	
Western	No		The Western State recommended expanding Lagos to include adjoining areas
Bendel State	Yes		Some officials of this government recommended Benin City which is the capital of the Bendel State.

Table 4.1 Continued

State	Support Movement	Suggested Site	Remarks
East Central	Yes	Kwara, Benue Plateau, North Central	
South Eastern	Yes	Auchi-Ida Nsukka Axis	
Rivers State	No		

Source: Compiled from Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital of Nigeria, December 1975.

constructing a new capital elsewhere. The Western Government's support for building a new capital then was probably because it felt that the government was not ready financially and politically to build a new capital. Now that the environment is conducive, the state has opposed such construction on cost grounds. Proponents believe that the Western State's opposition to a new capital stems from its substantial investments in Lagos (see discussion in Section 2.1). A United Nations survey of households and businesses in Lagos (1976) noted that nearly 67 percent of businesses indicated willingness to move to or locate their branches at Abuja.(1) To the Western State Government, this could mean a substantial loss of income.

Third, all the minority states (that is, states comprised mostly of the minority tribes) except the Rivers State supported moving the capital. Their support may be in keeping with the general belief that allocation of resources has often catered to the interest of the 'super-tribes.' Thus, they might have seen relocation as an opportunity to voice their opposition to the general scheme of things, as well as the opportunity to participate in a major decision-making. After all, their participation offered the opportunity to even site their own states as the best location for the new capital.

(1) See Economic Commission for Africa: Report on Survey of Industrial, Commercial and other Non-public Service Establishments in Metropolitan Lagos, United Nations, New York, December 1980.

Fourth, the states that supported movement indicated ethnic accord (national unity) as their main concern. But their concern for a national unity did not match with the sites they suggested for the location of the new capital. Most of them, for example, the North Western, North Eastern, Kano, North Central, Benue Plateau, Kwara, and the Bendel States, chose sites within their own states, or at best, in neighboring states. The choice of their own state seems natural and may indicate that they place greater priority on their state's welfare than on the entire nation. As we shall also see in the subsequent sections, ethnic accord although widely recognized by the states as the major problem that the new capital's location should address, occupied very low priority in the criteria for final selection of the site.

Fifth, those states opposing movement (Western and Rivers) did so for cost reasons. As we maintained earlier, cost considerations were given hardly any attention in planning the new city. But most of the major failures--inability to meet deadlines, lack of adequate housing, reorganizations, etc., have been affected in part by shortage of financial resources.

In all, it can be generalized that responses from the state governments were favorable to relocation. However, it must be remembered that the state governments were then administered by military governors appointed by the Central Military government whose disposition was to relocate the capital. Under this situation it was highly unlikely that a

significantly different response could have been expected from the respondents. As discussed later in this chapter, the sites chosen by the twelve states were not evaluated by the Location Committee. The committee, having been appointed by the national military government that generally wanted a central location, must have felt inclined to be more responsive to the national government's position than to that of the states. Hence, the new capital territory was positioned in a geographic center of the country (Figure 1.1). A detailed discussion of how the committee agreed on this site is presented in Section 4.3.

4.1.3 The Location Committee: Tour of African and Overseas Countries and Cities

The other strategy used by the Location Committee to study the new capital's feasibility was to tour some African and overseas countries that had recently built new capitals or relocated their capitals in the past. The tour would familiarize the committee with some of the problems encountered by these foreign governments during the construction of their capitals. Learning of these problems would, supposedly, help the Committee to minimize or avoid similar mistakes at Abuja. One measure of the Committee's success is, therefore, to examine the extent to which it incorporated its learning into the construction of Abuja.

Among the cities visited were Nairobi and Mombasa (Kenya), Lusaka (Zambia), Gaborone (Botswana), and Dar-es-Salaam and Dodoma (Tanzania). Others include

Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Karachi (Pakistan), New Delhi (India), Sydney and Canberra (Australia), and Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia (Brazil). The Committee's tour of these cities took 29 days (from August 31 to September 9, 1975 for the African countries, and from September 18 to October 18, 1975 for the remainder). There is hardly any question that the time allotted to the tour would be inadequate to define and comprehend all the problems of these cities that required study. Nevertheless, the Committee was able to gather useful information in terms of the problems confronted during and after the construction of these cities. The Committee, in its report, noted that the cities had confronted at least one of the following problems.

Urban Problems Confronted by the Cities Visited by the Location Committee

1. Migration. Almost all the new cities had experienced near-excessive migration. In Gaborone (Botswana), for example, a ten-year projection figure of the population for the city was achieved in less than five years. The population, only 8,000 in 1971, had by 1975 jumped to 25,000. A similar problem is being experienced by older cities such as Nairobi (Kenya), Lusaka (Zambia), and New Delhi (India). In New Delhi the pressure was so great that the government decided to develop smaller cities a few miles around the capital and establish industries in the areas so as to relieve the pressure from New Delhi.

In Nairobi (Kenya), the population now grows by 7-1/2 percent every year. This has resulted in congestion in the schools, hospitals, and housing estates.(1) The city council and the government are trying to encourage the people to return to their lands, but with little success. Therefore, the government now encourages the erection of more industries in rural areas outside Nairobi, so that people can secure employment there and still live not too far from the city.

2. Growth of squatter settlements.

Squatter settlements are features peculiar to most of the capital cities visited by the committee. The settlement has grown as a result of a lack of adequate provision for low-income housing. In the case of Brasilia, for example, the planners had made the most glaring oversight of making no provision for temporary housing. The Costa Plan was unable to integrate the migrant workers drawn to Brasilia harmoniously into the urban form. Improvised situations were necessary for the thousands of workers on the site who had no place to live. Outside the pilot-plan area, a temporary settlement called Ciadade Livre was established. Within this town, land was made available free with the understanding that once Brasilia was completed, the town would be demolished (Epstein, 1973). However, the town became a commercial center and a base for the informal

(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital of Nigeria, December 1975, p. 14.

activity so prevalent in developing countries. Much to the dismay of planners, the town has become a satellite community. As Ciadade Livre became filled, numerous other satellite towns were formed. These communities are not self-sufficient and serve mainly as a base for the people who must work in Brasilia, but cannot find affordable housing there. Epstein (1973) has made an interesting correlation between the central problems of Brasilia and more general national conflicts. He sees a similarity between the social structure of Brazil and "the contrast between the planned area of apartment houses and the squatter settlements and satellite towns, almost a caricature of the social structure of Brazil as a whole."

2. Failure to locate housing areas of low-income group nearer the center of the town. This particular problem makes it difficult for the low-income group to have easy access to government offices and employment opportunities within the city center. Alternatively, they will have to pay substantial transport costs to get to the center. Most of the cities visited by the Location Committee experienced this problem.

3. A general lack of adequate accommodation. This aspect of the problem makes workers and thousands of officials live in outlying towns. In Islamabad (Pakistan) for example, thousands of government officials and others who work in the city still live in Rawalpindi. This has contributed

to spontaneous (squatter) and unplanned developments in and around the city.

4. Ghost city phenomenon. The term 'ghost city' relates to a situation whereby workers deserted the city at the end of the workday or workweek. Brasilia is a typical example of a new capital city that suffered from this phenomenon.
5. Lack of funds. Lack of funds was the major constraint on the quick implementation of the Capital Development Project for Islamabad.(1)

One way to evaluate the effectiveness of the committee's tour of the foreign cities, as discussed earlier, is to assess the extent to which its experiences with regard to the problems of these cities have been avoided in the construction of Abuja. From personal observations, most of the problems just outlined have begun to emerge at Abuja. The emergence of these problems would suggest that the Location Committee's tour made little or no significant impact on the new capital's planning process in terms of alleviating the problems. Some of the problems being experience already include the following:

(a) As in some of the capitals visited by the Location Committee, there was an upsurge in population during the early stages of Abuja's construction. The upsurge has led to the spilling over of population to the adjoining towns such

(1) Ibid., p. 13.

as Suleja, Nyanya, Garki, Kari, and Gwagwalada. For example, Suleja, which had only 10,000 residents in 1977, swelled to nearly half a million population in 1983.(1) Except for a few workers' camps, originally designed to accommodate construction workers but later converted for housing of top officials of the FCDA and private contractors, and the residential housing built exclusively for the FCDA employees and other government workers, the rest of the workers live outside the city from where they are hauled on trailer trucks to and from work. Although the increase in population tapered off in 1984 as a result of the slack in construction, the trend may continue as soon as construction picks up or when the official movement to the new city begins.

(b) Most of the low-income housing is developed outside the city and at distances far from the city, which is the main center of employment. For example, junior civil servants (Grade levels 01 to 06) are assigned housing at such places as Gwagwalada, Karshi, Kuje, and Bwari, which are, respectively, 52 km, 31 km, 72 km, and 43 km from the city. In short, there is a general lack of adequate accommodation even for government employees. However, the situation may improve as soon as most of the buildings scheduled for completion in 1986 are built.

(1) Ajato Gandonu. Implementing Abuja: 1975-1983. A Commissioned Paper for the United Nations University, Tokyo, and NISER Workshop on New Capital Cities in Developing Countries, held at Abuja, 5-9 March, 1985, p. 9.

(c) Already, squatter (spontaneous) developments have begun to appear in the new capital city, especially around the villages originally earmarked for relocation. The population of these areas has grown rapidly, so that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the FCDA to evacuate them. Appendix I shows some of those settlements bordering the central area of the city.

(d) Lack of funds to pay for both the completed projects and the new ones has drastically slowed the pace of construction. Many of the contractors have not received payments on work completed as far back as two years. The situation has forced the government to reschedule some of FCDA's debts.

(e) Until the construction is completed and official movement to the city begins, it is hard to say with certainty whether Abuja, like its contemporary, Brasilia, will become a ghost city. From this writer's experience, the streets of Abuja are essentially empty both day and night except for a few cars racing down the newly built expressways and arterial streets. The emptiness could be attributed to any one or more of the following: (a) The city is not yet fully operational. (b) There are very few recreational spots to keep people on the streets. (c) The city is automobile oriented. Moving from one zone to the next requires (in the absence of public transportation) private transport, which very few can afford. (d) Mainly government workers live in the city. Because these workers are by law not allowed to

engage in other income-earning activities, and because there are few or no spaces allotted for informal activities, it is unlikely that the kind of atmosphere necessary to support maximum interaction among residents can be sustained.

What is important to note in this part of our analysis of the committee's study strategy is that, its experiences with respect to the problems of other capital cities seemed to provide little or no aid in avoiding similar problems at Abuja.

4.1.4 The Location Committee: Interview with Selected Personalities and Organizations

The fourth and final strategy used by the Location Committee to study the feasibility of the new capital project was to tour the Nigerian state capitals, and to interview selected personalities and organizations. Again, the committee restricted its meetings to top-level government officials and well-placed individuals in the states. The committee did not consult with other segments of the society, such as the association of market women, petty traders, labor organizations, etc. Talking to these groups would have meant not only that their inputs would be solicited, but would have shown that as many groups as possible participated in the new capital's planning process. It is likely that their participation would have given greater support to the project, as well as bring attention to the special needs of these groups in the new capital. Participation of the market

women and petty traders, for example, might have brought to the attention of planners the need to provide adequate traditional open-market stalls, which are lacking in the new city.

4.2 The Committee's Findings and Recommendations

In this section we analyze the findings or conclusions and recommendations reached by the panel on the mandates provided by the military leaders at the beginning of its study, and incorporate some of our thoughts on the general effectiveness of this committee. Recall that the first mandate was to examine the dual role of Lagos as a federal and state capital and to advise on how effective Lagos is in playing that role. Second, in the event that the city is not effective, to recommend which of the two governments should move out of Lagos.

In addressing the first part of the mandate--effectiveness of Lagos as a dual capital--the committee concluded that the city was unsuitable as a dual capital. This conclusion was based on the constraints imposed by the present urban setting of Lagos, some of which we have discussed in Chapter 3. These include:

- (i) Conflicts between the federal and Lagos state governments regarding the control and management of certain functions in the city.
- (ii) Inadequacy of land space;

- (iii) inadequacy of security: the committee notes that because Lagos is located on the coast, it is vulnerable to external aggression;
- (iv) Inadequacy of infrastructure, such as transport facilities, buildings, and other related facilities: the situation is worsened by inadequate land space.
- (v) Inadequacy of topography: Lagos is considered flat, which makes it difficult to drain and to implement sewerage systems.
- (vi) Population growth pressures arising from the concentration of activities and industries, which, in turn, make the city attractive for migrants.
- (vii) Inadequacy of physical resources--water supply, electricity supply, telephone services, etc.

It is worthwhile to note that the ethnic constraint was not among the factors picked up by the committee. However, this factor was important in deciding which of the two governments, federal or state, should move out of Lagos. The committee recommended that the federal government should move out of Lagos. This decision was based on three main factors: inadequacy of land space for the two governments; ethnicity pattern of Lagos which reflects mainly one ethnic group, the Yorubas; and security.

The choice of these three factors would imply that the location of the new capital must involve a site that would provide for an adequate land space, an ethnically-balanced urban environment, and security against external aggression.

But as we argue in Section 4.3, not only was the site selection done without giving priorities to these elements, the site for the location of the new federal capital territory could not be chosen because of ethnic rivalries among the members of the Location Committee. The 'sub-optimal' location has resulted in many construction problems involving land-use and resettlement difficulties.

From the review of the first two parts of the mandates given to the Location Committee, the military leaders have assumed a priori that the only solution to the administrative conflict between the Lagos state and the federal government, as well as the urban pressures posed by the situation in Lagos and the demand for physical resources, lies in moving one of the two governments and not necessarily in a better management. From such a perspective, the Location Committee had thought of their function as mainly determining an alternative location for the capital. The committee was therefore required to develop practical rationales to support this motive. These practical rationales were formed through feasibility studies that centered first on advocating for memoranda from the general public, touring national capitals of countries that have relocated their capital cities recently or that have built one in the past, and meeting mainly with government functionaries.

Another indication of the determination to move the capital at any cost is related to the committee's belligerent use of words when responding to criticism or divergent

opinions on a number of issues about the proposed movement. One of such comments relates to the committee's response to a criticism from the Western State, to the effect that moving the capital might cost the federal government as much as N100 billion, which the economy could not afford. The Location Committee's response was:

There is no doubt that the arguments along the line of the quote above [referring to the Western State argument] would impress a large number of the population, but whilst such arguments have our sympathy, we do not consider them strong enough to turn the balance against our conclusions and recommendations.(1)

Other such pronouncements read:

We have no doubts in our minds that it is most undesirable that Lagos should continue to retain its dual role as a capital for the Federation of Nigeria and also as a state capital.... Our conclusion is based upon our overall view of Lagos as a city. After stating our conclusion above, it is only necessary to state that a large majority of people who presented reasoned memoranda to us, probably between 85 and 90 percent, urged it upon us to arrive at this conclusion.
(2)

The last statement would indicate that the so-called reasoned memoranda submitted by the general public were only used to support a predetermined decision--hence the phrase " after stating our conclusion above, it is only necessary to state...."

(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital, Ibid., op. cit., p. 56.

(2) Ibid., p. 36.

A further indication of a predetermined effort to move the capital is related to a lack of interest in a detailed analysis of the financial cost of the capital before the committee's decision. Furthermore, the committee made no effort to assess the negative impacts of relocation on Lagos, nor on the overall economy. Most of the committee's report centered on the positive attributes of building a new capital city--having a 'befitting' capital, employment creation from construction, etc.

In addition to not analyzing the financial aspect of relocation, the committee would not study the detailed (root) causes of problems associated with the capital city. Why is the city growing very rapidly? What are the best alternatives for curbing this growth? Why is it not possible for other ethnic groups to be assimilated in Lagos? It is only after a full consideration of these kinds of questions and many more, that the committee might have been able to make the most rational judgement as to whether the best solution was to move the federal capital or to embark upon other less costly policies. For example, in Chapters 2 and 3, we noted that Lagos controls nearly 44 percent of the total national manufacturing employment in the country. The city is attractive to migrants and industries because of the concentration of jobs and other amenities. Maybe the solution to easing some of the growth pressures is to embark

on a drastic industrial dispersal. This effort will not only ease pressures on Lagos, but may contribute to improving other regions from which most of the migrants come. This proposal does not suggest that industrial dispersal is the most optimal solution. However, it is argued that a consideration of such alternative is one way of arriving at an optimum solution to the Lagos problem. Sometimes a combination of a number of alternatives--for example, industrial dispersal, sustained rural development schemes, including provision of amenities and other facilities, may be required. These facilities may, in turn, make it possible for industries and other employment generators to locate in these areas.

On the other hand, the federal government can embark upon decentralizing some of its functions. There is no reason for every person who needs a passport, for example, to go to Lagos to obtain it. It should be possible to issue passports in the state capitals and other major urban centers. Nor, must individuals always travel to Lagos in order to obtain their foreign exchange for fee payment, import licenses, and other related services?

In terms of the ethnic question, we have also noted in Chapter 3 that the problem should be seen as a lack of access to resources, rather than just sheer domination of one ethnic group (in terms of numbers) by another. We pointed out that in Lagos, for example, the Yorubas control most of the land resources, and that non-transference of lands to non-Yorubas

may stem from the characteristics of the traditional land tenure system which prohibits (in many parts of the country as well) transfer of such lands to 'strangers.' If that were the situation, then maybe the solution to the problem lies in reallocation of resources through efficient land tenure systems. The 1978 Federal Land Use Decree, which automatically vests all urban land on the respective state governments, may be one way of averting this problem. However, in order for this kind of strategy to be effective, it must be strictly enforced.

4.3 Site Selection Process, Ethnic Conflicts, and Consequences

Having critically reviewed the strategies used by the Location Committee to reach its decisions, this section analyzes the methods used by the Location Committee for choosing the appropriate site for the new capital territory. In the discussion, particular emphasis is given to the conflicts that developed among the members of the Location Committee, how the conflict was played out, its impact on the site selection process, and the consequences on the overall project construction.

A total of thirteen criteria were developed by the Location Committee for choosing the best location for the new capital territory (Table 4.2) The site chosen, shown in Fig. 1.1, which is equidistant from almost all the state capitals, covers 3,600 square miles (8,000 square

Table 4.2

Criteria for Site Selection

Positions	Criterion	Weight attached by percent
1	Centrality	22
2	Health and Climate	12
3	Land Availability and Use	10
4	Water Supply	10
5	Multi-Access Possibilities	7
6	Security	6
7	Existence of Building Materials Locally	6
8	Low Population Density	6
9	Power Resources	5
10	Drainage	5
11	Soil	4
12	Physical Planning Convenience	4
13	Ethnic Accord	3

Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria: Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital of Nigeria, December 1975, p. 47.

kilometers). It is bounded by Niger, Kaduna, Plateau, and Kwara states. As shown, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) is central to Nigeria. The criteria for choosing this site include, in order of priority and weighting points, the following: centrality (22 points), health and climate (12), land availability and use (10), water supply (10), multi-access possibilities (7), security (6), existence of local building materials (6), low population density (6), power resources (5), drainage (5), soil (4), physical planning convenience (4), and ethnic accord (3).

As pointed out earlier, two of the three main elements--inadequacy of land, ethnicity problems, and security--which had guided the committee's decision to relocate the capital, were among the lowest priorities. In fact, as Table 4.2 indicates, ethnic accord scored the least points. It is not certain why the three elements were given lower priorities. One of the reasons may be, as in the case of ethnic accord, the realization that there is no site in the country that is ethnically-neutral.

The other reason for low priority points for the security criterion may be that, since the committee was predisposed to locate the new territory in a central area, it must have felt that it was unnecessary to raise this element's (security) score points, because a geographically-central position was assumed to provide automatically for the security of the nation.

The need for adequate land space was, however, given a relatively high priority scoring (10 points), behind health and climate (12 points) and centrality (22 points). It is important to note that centrality scored the highest (22 points). This score would practically eliminate all other sites that are not geographically central to the country. The reason for the very high score of centrality may be due to the third part of the Committee's mandate, which required that: "In the event of the Committee finding that the Federal Capital should move out of Lagos, to recommend suitable alternative locations, having regard for the need for easy accessibility to and from every part of the Federation." Thus, the Location Committee must have interpreted this to mean a central position. Also, choosing a central position would again mean that the Location Committee was not being responsive to the general wishes of the states, because many of them, as pointed out above, did not recommend a central location.

It is significant to note also that no alternative sites were considered by the committee. The lack of consideration of alternative sites meant that there was no way of comparing the performance of this selected site with other sites. It is possible that comparable or even better sites existed elsewhere. Thus the committee wrote:

After full and careful consideration of all relevant questions, we have arrived at the decision that it will be to the best interest of the country that we recommend an area of land to be designated as the National Capital Territory. Having done this, we do

not see any further necessity for suggesting alternative locations. Applying the criteria catalogued above [referring to our Table 4.2], we have come to the unanimous decision as to a particular area, the question of alternative location does not arise.(1)

But a rational site analysis (feasibilities studies) should have considered alternative sites, especially those that were suggested in the memoranda submitted by the various groups, individuals, and state governments. Many of such sites were: Achi-Okene-Osara, Agena-Buga, Ife-Agege area, area between Kafanchan and Makurdi, Kafanchan-Zungeru, and Kagoro-Kafanchan. Others included the area south and west of Kachia, the area around Lokaja, Ife, between Agege and Abeokuta, Ibadan, Ogbomosho, Jos, Zaria, Calabar, Benin City, etc.

It was probably not feasible to analyze all these locations, given the limited resources (time, funds, etc.) that were available to the committee. However, a few of these locations could have been isolated and studied in order to choose the best location suited to the overall goal of the new capital city.

Three major factors prevented an effective examination of alternative sites. The first factor relates to the limited time allowed for the feasibility studies. The military government wanted the committee to select, "with precision," a proper location for the new federal capital.

(1) Ibid., op. cit., p. 48.

For such to be possible, many sites would have to be considered. But the committee was given only four months to complete its work. Out of the four months, the tour of African and overseas capital cities took nearly one month. The remainder was devoted to the tour of state capitals and the analysis of memoranda from the general public.

The limited time for site analysis was further worsened by the inexperience of the committee members in large-scale urban development. The members consisted of a businessman, a judge, a professor of gynecology, an army chaplain, a legal practitioner, a secondary school principal, and a geographer, all with very little or no experience in urban planning. They saw their function as a political one. This perspective explains in part the disagreement that erupted among them that would finally determine where the new capital territory was to be situated.

The next factor that prevented effective site analysis relates to the internal rivalries just mentioned above. This factor is very critical, in that it led finally to the choice of a site that has been considered to be "very poor."⁽¹⁾ As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the conflict among the members of the Location Committee was largely ethnically-motivated. Some members of the committee wanted the new capital to be positioned within or very near to their ethnic territory or state of origin.

(1) See Ajato Gandonu. Implementing Abuja: 1975-1983, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 5-15.

The sources of the committee's disagreements can be better understood by examining the backgrounds of the members in terms of their positions with regard to moving the federal capital before their appointment to the committee. The analysis will reveal that some of the members were already concerned, before their appointment to the panel, about relocating the capital to a different region or ethnic territory. Thus, as Gandonu wrote:

Never did Muhammed interfere with the panel of these seven eminent and individually quite obstinate characters who initially held divergent views on both the fate of Lagos and the location of a new national capital. Thus, Aguda, Fiebai, Gandonu, Isma, Martins, Ogan, and Solarin had to battle it out among themselves and submit a reasonable recommendation to the Supreme Military Council of that time.(1)

Perhaps the best point to start the analysis of the backgrounds of the Committee members is with its chairman. The chairman of the panel, Dr. Justice T. Akinola Aguda, was in 1975 the Chief Judge of the Western State. Prior to his appointment to the panel, he was not in support of moving the capital from Lagos. The pressure not to support relocation increased during the Committee's tour of the Western State to solicit that state's views (opinion) about moving the capital. Recall that the Western State was one of only two states to oppose relocation (see Table 4.1.). According to one member of the panel, Aguda was under so much pressure

(1) Gandonu (1984), op. cit., p. 2

from his home state that he "promised to ensure that the new capital location was no further removed than a few kilometers from the Western State border."(1)

The second member of the committee, Dr. Tai Solarin, was a school principal, also from the Western State. Before his appointment to the Panel, Solarin did not support relocation. This lack of support is attributed to his close association with Chief Awolowo (the often-acclaimed leader of the Yorubas), who since the 1950s had strongly opposed the moving of the federal capital. He had advocated locating the capital as close as possible to the Yoruba territory.

The next member of the location panel was Dr. Ajato Gandonu, a geographer, who had been a strong advocate of a new capital city. He was often considered to be one of the most nationalistic among the group. As early as 1965, while still studying in England, Gandonu had begun to advocate for a federal capital that would reflect the ethnic diversity of the country. In 1974, he presented a proposal to General Gowon, then the Head of State, for moving the capital to the

(1) The pressure from Aguda's home state was confirmed during this writer's interview with one of the members of the Panel in September 1984. Being Chief Judge of the Western State which strongly opposes relocation, and at the same time Chairman of the Location Committee appointed by the Military government which wanted a new capital city, seemed to represent a conflict of interest. On the one hand, Aguda could not oppose the Military's conviction that a new capital should be built and at the same time be the Chairman and on the other hand, he could not disappoint his home state by supporting relocation. Thus, Aguda resolved the dilemma by ensuring that the new capital city was located as far south as possible so that the Westerners would not feel that they lost totally in the whole process.

northern region, very close to where Abuja, the new capital, is presently located. According to Gandonu, Gowon "bought the idea." Gowon's approval was however killed when he presented a proposal to his new cabinet, which consisted then mostly of Yorubas. Nevertheless, Gandonu, still determined to 'sell' his idea, published the proposal in the Daily Times (see Daily Times, July 9, 1975). Shortly afterwards, on 29 July 1975, General Gowon was toppled in a military coup d'etat, after which General Murtala Muhammed became head of a new military government. It was thereafter that Dr. Gandonu was invited to serve on the Location Panel appointed by Muhammed.

Thus from Gandonu's previous position he was very much in support of locating the capital in an ethnically-neutral territory. However, his strong conviction of the need for a neutral capital tended to obstruct his view from those that seemed counter to his, even when such views might have been useful for a proper planning of the new capital. In fact, as his quotation, above, would indicate, he generally saw these other opposing members as a threat to his idea and not necessarily as members who may hold important, though divergent, views from his own. An example of Gandonu's intolerance was his insistence that the location of the capital should move as far north as possible to incorporate Suleja, the largest and nearest city to the north of the federal territory. His opponents disagreed because of the city's existing infrastructure and large population

threshold. The opponents argued that incorporating Suleja would lead to increased resettlement costs and would spur migration to the city, thereby making planning more difficult. As noted in Section 4.1, the excision of Suleja from the rest of the territory would not, however, stop migration to the city. The city's population by 1981 reached nearly half a million.

Another member of the committee, Colonel Monsignor Pedro Martins, an army chaplain, was from Lagos State. Like that of his home state, Martins' position with regards to whether the city should be relocated was unclear. However, given that he was part of the military establishment, he might have been inclined to relocating the capital.

The fifth member of the panel, Alhaji Muhammed Musa Isma, a wealthy businessman, was from Kano State. Isma supported relocating the federal capital from Lagos. He also wanted the capital to be located in the north.

Chief Owen Fiebai, a legal practitioner, was a close associate of General Theophilus Danjuma, the Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters at the time. Fiebai was from the Rivers State, which had opposed moving the capital. His support for the movement was therefore seen as contrary to the position of his home state. It is likely that his close association with the army might have influenced his position. He wanted the new capital sited in a central location.

Professor O.K. Ogan, a professor of medicine, who was the seventh member of the panel, was from the Eastern State. He also supported a central location of the capital.

This brief profile of the committee members indicates that the criteria developed for choosing the site had very little relevance to the site selected, as the majority of the members went into the Committee with a predetermined position of where (if at all) the new capital should be located. The analysis suggests that some of the members preferred a central location, others wanted the site moved further north to include Suleja, and the remaining members favored a location as far south as possible to include Yoruba territory. In a democratic process, the boundary dispute could have been resolved through bargaining, negotiation, or voting among the disagreeing members. That did not, however, happen. Justice Aguda was chairman of the panel. Being appointed to that position by the military leaders, he had the veto power. Because it was his conviction (as well as that of a few others) that the new capital territory should be located further south, he acted accordingly to implement his position. Thus the new capital territory was extended southward (excising Suleja in the north) to include much undevelopable land in Kwara and Plateau States.

The exercise of choosing the site for the new capital was therefore not seen as a process of constructive analysis whereby the best site in terms of overall national interest and construction quality should be selected. As Gandonu noted about the problems of the site:

The shape and delineation of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) posed, and will continue to pose,

serious physical planning and political problems in the implementation efforts for this project. In particular, the artificial "V" feature carved into the northern part of the FCT and meant for excising Suleja from an otherwise ideal contiguous territory, plus the marginal transgression into Kwara and Plateau States, thereby excluding the recommended area farther south than considered ideal, were to create planning and resettlement problems of long-term consequences.(1)

Gandonu further wrote:

The position of the Federal Territory has narrowed the options for locating the capital city where it might have maximized the advantages set out in the acclaimed criteria for locating the capital (as set out in Table 4.2). With the constraint caused by the "V" excision, the planners have had to sacrifice more ideal locational options for the capital city. The incursion into Kwara and Plateau States brought in less desirable parts such as the lands south of Kwali and increased resettlement problems.

In the following discussion, we examine the nature of these problems posed by the committee's poor locational decision. The analysis will also help to shed light on the consequences of the problems on the overall project construction.

The problems posed by the new FCT site can be grouped into two major categories. They include: (i) physical planning problems that are related to soil, water, and land use and (ii) resettlement problems.

(1) Ajato Gandonu. Implementing Abuja: 1975-1983, *ibid.*, p.

4.3.1 Physical Planning Problems


The choice of the 3,600 square miles of the FCT included a site for locating the Federal Capital City (FCC). The physical planning problem seemed to be most serious in choosing this site. Ideally, every part of the FCT should provide a suitable site on which to locate the FCC. But because of soil difficulties, only the northeastern quadrangle of the territory was found suitable for locating urban development (see the position of the FCC in Fig. 4.1). The process for identifying candidate locations and finally selecting the capital city itself was based on a detailed description and evaluation of the natural and man-made environment of the Federal Territory undertaken by the IPA as an initial step in the master planning process. The site selection of the capital city site was based on an evaluation and ranking of each of the candidate locations according to three major criteria: urban suitability, visual amenity, and man-made constraints.(1)

Urban Suitability

Urban suitability was defined by a combination of environmental factors, including soils and characteristics, vegetation quality, geologic characteristics, probable conservation zones, quality of climate, and suitability of terrain. Because no environmental factor is particularly

(1) The Master Plan for Abuja, the New Federal Capital of Nigeria, February 1979, pp. 30-54.

Figure 4.1 Federal Capital Territory, Showing the Capital City



meaningful by itself, to determine sites for urban suitability, interpretation and correlation were required to transform them into useful measures for site evaluation. Key positive and negative criteria were therefore employed by the IPA. A set of most important positive qualities for the capital city site include:

- the most comfortable and healthful climate available;
- sufficient size to accommodate future growth;
- configuration to allow maximum choice in urban form;
- minimum topographic restrictions including the possibility of an efficient transportation system and organization of land uses;
- building soils and geologic conditions not requiring unusual or heroic engineering measures for construction;
- unique or exploitable natural features for urban design purposes.(1)

By the same token there are certain negative site qualities that can present hazards to development or make the cost of construction so high as to make them undesirable for urban development. Such negative criteria include:

- flood plain terraces;
- slopes over 15 percent;
- soils having many laterites, variable draining, medium draining density, or propensity to erosion;
- riverine and rain forest, swamps;

(1) Ibid., p. 32.

- geologic faults, joints, or shear zone.(1)

Using the positive and negative criteria, the IPA investigated three sites in the territory (Fig. 4.2).

Site 1 (Northeastern quadrangle) was chosen as offering the best potential for maximizing the positive criteria and the best potential for minimizing the negative criteria. This writer has no way of obtaining the actual scores of these three sites. However, what is important is that in spite of the Northeast quadrangle having the best potential for urban development, the site still posed difficult problems during construction.

During the Master Planning process it was found inevitable to designate 33 percent of the entire city site for open spaces because of mainly terrain difficulties.(2) Most of the open space area was found to be unable to sustain residential development. In a similar situation, the population of 230,000 inhabitants projected for the first phase of the project could not be realized because a detailed planning process had identified more undevelopable land in Phase One area. As a result, Phase One's target population was cut by approximately 22 percent to 190,000. It was later discovered that this population would still not be accommodated because some residential plots in Garki and

(1) Ibid., p. 32

(2) Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago. "Implementing a Master Plan: The Abuja Experience," paper presented at the workshop on The Planning of New Capital Cities in Developing Countries, held at Abuja, Nigeria under the auspices of the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, NISER Ibadan, and the FCDA. March 5-9, 1984.

Figure 4.2 Federal Capital City: Candidate Sites



Source: The Master Plan for Abuja, The New Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, February 1979.

Asokoro districts were found undevelopable during the physical setting out on the ground.(1) This latest discovery led to a further reduction of the Phase One population to 150,000. Such plots had to be merged to form larger plots or converted to non-residential uses, such as open spaces.

The evaluation of the three candidate sites based on the two remaining criteria--visual amenity, and man-made constraints, also favored the choice of the north-east quadrangle (Site 1) of the capital territory.(2) However, even with this site being favored on the basis of the two criteria, two additional problems were encountered at the site during construction.

The first problem relates to the inability of the FCDA to control or coordinate developments outside the new capital territory. The Niger state government, for example, has taken undue advantage of its proximity to the territory to construct an International Hotel near the territory without reference to the FCDA.(3) There is a potential for conflict with this government whereby planning control to preserve such national monuments as the Zuma Rock is being torn down

(1) Ibid., p. 10.

(2) Visual amenity pertains to unique natural features or general attractiveness of the environment. Man-made constraints relate to regulatory procedures, airport approach and departure zones, highway corridors, probable size of urbanized areas, and water, power, and waste disposal requirements of the new capital. For a detailed description of the characteristics of the visual amenity and man-made constraints see Master Plan for Abuja (1979), *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 37-45.

(3) Ajato Gandonu. Implementing Abuja: 1975-1983. *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

by the Niger state government in order to make way for the international hotel.

The second problem relates to the potential for an acute scarcity of water in the territory. Available data suggest that the probability of large supplies from groundwater sources in the territory is low.(1) Surface water in the territory itself is also not particularly promising. While there are several large rivers in the territory, namely the Gurara, Usuman, and Afara-Bokwoi, their flows are highly variable, according to season, with few opportunities for appropriate dam sites for water-impoundment purposes in the territory. Rather, small watersheds, high evaporative loss, and entrophication and disease vector problems also minimize potential reliance on surface water.(2) Because of this lack of reliable water-supply sources within the territory, it was necessary to develop water supply schemes outside for both interim and ultimate water supply to the city. The schemes include a proposal for three dams or reservoirs to be constructed on the River Usuma and a pipeline to be laid from the Shiroro Hydroelectricity Dam being undertaken by the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) on the River Kaduna to the Lower Usuma Dam. This was to draw water from the Kaduna river to supplement the Lower Usuma Dam Reservoir. The Shiroro piping scheme was found to be uneconomical because of the long distance involved in moving the water

(1)The Master Plan for Abuja. Ibid., op. cit., p. 37.

(2) Ibid., p. 38.

(via pipeline) to the territory and potential maintenance problems in the future. The NEPA too objected to the proposal, for the scheme would affect the generating capacity of the Shiroro Hydro-electricity scheme. In the case of the network of three reservoirs to be constructed on the River Usuma, just work on the Lower Usuma Dam was embarked upon. This dam was completed in 1984. The project has a capacity to cater to just the 230,000 inhabitants projected for Phase One of the city. For the ultimate water supply to the 3.1 million inhabitants of the FCC, another joint scheme was being planned for harnessing the River Gurara for hydroelectricity and water supply.

The two Upper Usuma Dams, scheduled in the Master Plan to supplement the Lower Usuma Dam, which were to have preceded it, were abandoned after it was discovered in 1979 that there were many more villages and towns than originally anticipated that needed to be relocated, and, compensated. Thus by August 1984 when this writer visited the new FCC, work on these two dams had not begun.

When it became obvious that the Lower Usuma Dam would not be ready before the commencement of the rescheduled movement of the city in 1982 by the defunct civilian administration, it became necessary to embark on an alternative interim water supply scheme. This was what gave birth to yet another dam, the Jabbi dam. The project was commissioned towards the end of 1981. The location of the dam, however, falls within the Phase II development of the

city scheduled to start after 1986, and the larger part of the catchment area for the dam also falls within the city land. There is also the fact that the catchment areas will eventually be developed into residential areas. The dam reservoir also cuts across the alignment of one of the major expressways (Northern Parkway) in the city. The design for this road had in fact been completed by the FCDA. A special bridge would therefore have to be built over the dam when the Northern Parkway is to be constructed in Phase Two. There would also be some problems with the laying of the water main carrying water from the Jabbi Treatment Plant to the reservoir at the Asokoro area, which presently feeds Garki and Wuse Districts of Phase I. This water pipe cuts across other land uses, such as residential plots in Wuse, Maitama, parts of Asokoro, the State House (Presidential Complex), and the National Assembly. Before such buildings are erected, it may be necessary to realign the pipes.

The point being emphasized here is that the poor locational choice of the Territory has exacerbated the problems of building the capital in terms of construction costs, administration, and delays. Lack of reliable water sources, as we have shown, meant transporting water long distances into the territory. At the same time, it has necessitated building a series of dams, which in turn have required the alteration of the land use pattern. All these mean that funds that could have been devoted to other things will have to be spent on water supply (see Table 4.3).

Table 4.3

Lower Usuma and Jabbi Dam Projects

Scheme	sums (in millions ₦)	Treatment capacity	Length of Dam	Completion date	Remarks
Lower Usuma	₦ 145 million	24 million gallons/day	1350 meters	June 1981	To cater to 230,000 population target for FCC, Phase I expected by 1986
Jabbi Dam	₦ 14.99 million	1.86 million gallons/day	1100 meters	Oct. 1981	Presently serving Garki, Wuse, and contractors in the Life Camps

Source: Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago. "Implementing a Master Plan; the Abuja Experience." Paper presented at the Workshop on The Planning of New Capital Cities in Developing Countries, held at Abuja, Nigeria, under the auspices of the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, NISER, Ibadan, and the FCDA, March 5-9, 1984.

4.3.2 Resettlement Problems

As noted above (Section 4.3), the main contention for excising Suleja from the rest of the territory (as argued by some members of the Location Committee) was to minimize resettlement costs that would be involved if this city were to be incorporated within the territory. Hence, it was felt by the committee that by moving the territory further south, it would be possible not only to avoid Suleja but also to avoid many other towns and villages, thereby minimizing the total potential displacement costs.

On completing this study, the committee members had estimated that approximately 50,000 inhabitants would be affected (displaced) by the new capital project. But as it turned out during implementation, when a detailed study of the territory was conducted, the number of inhabitants that would actually be affected or displaced by construction stood at 150,000.(1) This latest revelation had several consequences.

First, the government had to alter its resettlement policy in order to accommodate the increased number of displaced persons. Before the discovery that many more villages than originally planned for would be displaced, the government's policy was to resettle the earlier estimate of 50,000 inhabitants in the areas (states) of their choice

(1) Memorandum on the Progress Report of Resettlement Schemes, Federal Capital Development Authority, August 20, 1984.

outside the new capital territory so that construction would proceed on a virgin land. But on discovering the new figure the government changed its policy to resettle all affected persons within the new capital territory. This policy change now meant that the responsibility for resettling most of the inhabitants would fall on the FCDA, thereby impinging on the agency's generally weak administrative capacity.

Another major implication of the increased number of displaced persons was that more funds were needed for resettlement. The total allocation, in fact, increased from barely N6.5 million to N117 million (Table 4.4).

The third implication of the resettlement problem is that because of the change in policy to resettle everyone who chose to stay within the FCT and others in their states of origin, confusion has arisen because of the FCDA's inability to coordinate effectively the resettlement exercise. Some states have taken undue advantage of the situation to request more money than their original allocation when, in fact, the number of persons needing rehabilitation in these states should be decreasing. As a result, there has been a sharp increase (rather than decrease) in total funds allocated to the states for resettlement purposes (Table 4.4).

Finally, the change in policy to resettle all the former inhabitants within the territory has contributed in part to the slumification of the villages in the territory, because immigrants have seized the opportunity to invade such areas. This has created serious planning problems for the FCDA in

Table 4.4

Total Allocation Due to the States
for Resettlement Purposes

States	Budget Allocation for Resettlement of Original Estimate of 50,000 inhabitants (₦ million)	Budget Allocation for New ^b Estimate of 150,000 inhabitants (₦ million)	Percentage Increase (%)
Niger State	4.00	54.72	1268
Plateau State	1.50	19.82	1221
Kwara State	1.00	0.83	- 17
Federal Capital Territory	0.00	41.50	---
Total	6.50	116.87	1698

- a: Estimate provided by the Location Committee (1975)
b: Estimate derived after a more detailed study at the site by the FCDA (1979)

Source: Compiled from: Memorandum on the Progress Report on Resettlement Schemes, FCDA, August, 1984.

terms of being able to provide sufficient infrastructure for these people.

4.4 Summary

In this chapter, we examined two important stages of the new capital's development involving: (1) the activities of the Panel appointed by the Military government to examine the feasibility of a new capital city for the country, and (2) the site selection activity also carried out by this Panel. We noted that the outcome of the two activities was largely influenced by the military leaders who were bent on building the new capital city. Also significant was the fact that the committee's performance was inhibited by the very problem (ethnic cleavages) which relocation was designed to eliminate. Hence, the choice of an appropriate location precluded a rational analysis of alternative and adequate sites for locating the new capital. This has resulted in part to water supply problems and land use problems, all of which have added to overall cost of building the capital.

CHAPTER 5

THE MASTERPLANNING ENTERPRISE

In this chapter, the second phase of the new capital's planning enterprise, involving the masterplanning process, is examined. Three major actors were essentially involved in this aspect of the planning enterprise. They are the Nigerian military leaders, the International Planning Associates (IPA) which developed the Master Plan, and the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA). This stage marks the beginning of the FCDA's involvement in overall project development. The job of the Location Committee had ended before the beginning of the phase, although two of its members were later appointed to the Board of Directors of the FCDA. The FCDA served mainly as a medium through which the IPA interacted with the military government.

The interaction among the three actors is examined in order to understand the kinds of policy decisions made, and their overall impact on project construction. Our analysis will reveal that contrary to accepted rational planning principles, the military government once more, dictated the "tempo" of planning, while the IPA developed mainly technical solutions to match their demands.

The planning and construction of a new city is a long-term process. Yet, the construction of a capital city designed to accommodate an initial population of nearly a quarter of a million people was to be completed in less than eight years, a

timeframe demanded by the military leaders. A result of this fast pace was that the IPA had to develop a "fast track" strategy (whereby actual construction would begin at the site before the completion of the Master Plan) to meet this government demand. The entire masterplanning exercise was completed in less than two years. Another result of the fast pace was the failure of IPA to take into account many of the fundamental issues also omitted during the feasibility studies. The planners did not examine the dramatic effect the new capital's construction would have on the existing financial resources and organizational capacity. During his meeting with the IPA, Dr. Sayre Schatz, an expert on Nigerian economic development, expressed the opinion that the new capital project was too large and too costly for the present Nigerian economy. It was not in IPA's interest to consider this opinion themselves, or to pass the comment on to the Nigerian government which was already bent on building a capital city.(1) (Recall that the feasibility studies had already been completed, the decision to build a new capital made, and the site for locating the new city identified : therefore, it was highly unlikely that any pressure would have deterred the military government from building the new city.) In no section of the Master Plan is there a discussion of the financing aspect of the plan.

The domination of the planning process by the military

(1) J. Moore. Planning Abuja : The Politics of New Capital Construction. B.A. Thesis Princeton University, 1982, p. 95.

government is further reflected in the selection of appropriate infrastructure and housing strategies. The inclination to build a "befitting" capital has contributed in part to the selection of infrastructure with relatively high-standard technological attributes. This inclination is evident in the construction of sewerage and transportation systems. Furthermore, the intention to build an administrative capital left the impression that mainly government employees would inhabit the city. Thus, housing strategies have been developed mainly with this group of residents in mind. The result has been that a very large segment of non-government workers, including the poor, has been left to find their own housing in the open market.

Finally, the government's decision to have the new capital designed by expatriates, and the nature of their selection process, was another indication of political constraint on the new capital's construction. The selection of an expatriate firm can be attributed, in part, to the need to further insulate the plan from internal political pressure. The organizational structure of the FCDA and IPA and the planner-client relationship established between these two groups demonstrates the evolution of such political priorities.

5.1 Choice of Expatriate Firm, the Nature of IPA / Nigerian Relationship

In late 1976 the FCDA held an international competition

among a select group of expatriate firms to award the contract for the comprehensive planning of the new federal capital. At that time Nigeria was operating under a military/civilian dyarchy. The military and civilian leaders concurred in the selection of non-Nigerian planners. Two major factors were responsible for the choice of expatriate planners. First, the military government involved in the initial stages of the planning process had limited experience in large-scale urban development. This government, as explained in Chapter 3, was oriented to action. Military leaders stated that to achieve a maximum level of efficiency the project should be turned over to experts who could complete the planning process as quickly as possible. (1) Because Abuja was being planned to imitate western capitals, the military government must have felt that expatriate (western) planners would be in a better position to produce its design.

A second motive behind the military's selection of an expatriate planning team was related to the need to insulate the plan as much as possible from the dynamic forces of the opposition. As we noted in Chapter 4, the panel on the location of the capital did not make an adequate evaluation of the new capital question. A large majority of organizations and private groups were not consulted by the committee. The committee was largely used to find practical rationales for what was largely a predetermined political decision. Many people, including professional bodies in Nigeria held

(1) Ibid, p. 47.

opposition views on the form and role of the new city.(1) In the memoranda of the FCDA/NISER workshop, numerous arguments were given in support of using Nigerian planners to build the new capital. Moore (1982) has noted however, that the use of Nigerian experts would have permitted each step of the planning process to be subject to internal political pressures. By isolating the planning process within the decision making structure of a foreign firm, internal questioning could be avoided. The more deliberation and consultation involved in a project, the longer it takes to make and implement planning decisions.(2) In the Nigerian context, with numerous competing ethnic groups, contesting political organizations, and conflicting opinions on the new capital's proper role, the use of indigeneous experts was likely to subject it to immense political opposition.

The military's justification for the use of expatriate planners is expounded by Mr. Ebong, a civil servant and the first executive secretary of the FCDA.(3) As quoted in Moore's thesis, "Ebong argued that the decision to hold a limited competition was based on purely analytical criteria." In Ebong's words, "the project of planning the new capital was not within indigenous capabilities" and the Nigerians did not have the necessary

(1) See Excerpts from the FCDA Workshop on "Policy Considerations" For the Construction of Abuja, held under the Auspices of the Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Ibadem. 27-29th September 1976.

(2) J. Moore, Ibid, opp. cit., p. 48.

(3) Ibid, p. 48-49

"technical expertise". (1) Ebong did not mention that other Nigerians felt strongly that the new capital "should be a Nigerian city built by Nigerians." But Ebong viewed the FCDA/NISER workshop as an opportunity for diverse groups to express their opinions without fully integrating them into the planning process. In the final analysis Ebong believed that, surpassing all political questions, the city had to function, and he felt the only way to achieve this was by asking the leading international planners to submit proposals. (2)

The selection of planners was a policy decision in which both the military leaders and the civilians (involving mostly Nigerian professionals) argue about the use of an expatriate firm. In this situation it is not difficult to ascertain whose views would be more influential. According to Bienen (1981), while Nigeria operates with civilians in executive positions, neither the military nor the civilian participants were in any doubt as to the source of authority in the system. It is the military. Had Ebong chosen not to hire an expatriate firm and awarded the contract to indigenous professionals, the military government would have been in a position to reverse this decision. In this case, since there existed military/civilian harmony, Ebong and the FCDA were given the freedom to select, within a limited scope, the planning firm for the new capital project.

(1) Ibid, p. 48.

(2) Ibid, p. 48.

The international competition of planning firms led to the selection of an American consortium, International Planning Associates (IPA). The IPA team was a joint venture of Archisystems Inc.; Wallace, McHarg, Roberts and Todd; and Planning Research Corporation. The rationalization of the military government's selection of an expatriate firm to plan the city is clarified and elaborated in the working relationship and organizational structure of the IPA-FCDA partnership.

The political priorities of the military government were discernible in three stages of the Masterplanning process : preparation, formulation and finalization.(1) In the preparation stage, important assumptions and decisions were made prior to the awarding of the planning contract to IPA. By examining the planner-client relationship established during the formulation period of the master plan Moore (1982), noted that the planning team was organized according to political constraints and personal ideology, not planning theory. "The final stage of development is a politically designed process of consultation, contrived to minimize protest against the project and to insure the implementation of the master plan."

(2)

The response by the IPA planners to the political

(1) The three stages of the masterplanning process are adopted (but modified by this writer) from : Moore (1982), Ibid, opp. cit., p. 50.

(2) J. Moore, Ibid, opp. cit., p. 50.

constraints imposed by the presence of the Nigerian military government seems to satisfy one of the tenets of the structural theorists who argue (as we noted in Chapter 1) that the success of any plan implementation activity depends on an organization's (in this case the IPA team) relationship with the outside actors (the military government). As it is going to be evident in the following discussion, the IPA planners, inspite of their expertise, were largely controlled by the dictates of Nigerian military leaders. Hardly anywhere in the process did this team question or argue with the Nigerian leaders about some of their decisions or demands, even when such decisions would affect adversely the process of project implementation.

Preparation

The American consortium awarded the contract for planning the new capital of Nigeria, was given four firm guidelines prior to the initiation of their work. These were : "1. The new capital city must be located within the 8,000 sq. km. area of central Nigeria designated the Federal Capital Territory. 2. The new capital city is to be ready for initial occupation by 1986. 3. The new capital city is to be an administrative city with a minimal amount of industry. 4. The new capital city should be able to accomodate a population of up to 3 million."

(1)

According to rational planning methods, such guidelines should be established only after a long series of analytical

(1) Ibid, p. 50.

studies and should be accompanied by a number of acceptable alternatives. As noted in section 4.3, Guideline 1, the location decision, was crudely arrived at, with inadequate or proper site analysis. Alternative sites for the Federal Capital Territory were never considered. No analysis was ever made by IPA whether the site (the entire territory) selected was appropriate as it was not within the scope of the contractual arrangement. According to Dr. A. Gandonu, one of the members of the Location Committee who opposes the present location of the Federal Territory, "a more effective location would be further to the north and east", yet because the site was specified, IPA had to work within this parameter. Clearly, the location of the capital was isolated from the planning process, and whether site selection was made by the Committee on the Location of the Capital, or imposed by political constraints, the qualities of the selected site were never carefully and adequately evaluated.

A similar process was reflected in the selection of the size, the form, and the schedule for development of the new capital. The population figure given to IPA was a maximum of 3 million residents in the new capital. It is not certain how this figure was arrived at. It was not considered during feasibility studies by the Location Committee.

The third guideline given to the IPA team designated the administrative nature of the city and outlined the basic economic structure. This decision is fundamental to the operational effectiveness of the new capital. However, without

even a limited study of the city's economics, it was decided that large-scale industry would not be permitted in Abuja. The decision on the city's economic form has implications for determining which levels of Nigerian society would inhabit the city as well as its general land-use pattern.

The fourth guideline was the timetable for completing the Master plan (2 years) and the city (8 years). The failure to develop a realistic schedule is attributable to the fact that the Nigerian military government was operating under a limited mandate. All planning decisions were made with the knowledge that within three years there would be a return to civilian rule. It was imperative that a significant portion of the city be planned before the advent of civilian elections and multi-party competition.

These four guidelines are fundamental to the design process established for the new capital. They demonstrate the case in which functional decisions were subordinate to the political priorities of the military government.

Formulation

The formulation of the master plan was exclusively the work of the IPA and the FCDA. Only after examining the organizational structure of the FCDA and the IPA is it possible to discuss the interaction of these groups and the effect of this symbiotic relationship on the development of the master plan.

The FCDA, from its inception through the completion of the master plan, was chaired by Mr. Mobolaji Ajose-Adeogun.

Adeogun and the seven members of the authority were appointed by the Supreme Military Council. The five major responsibilities of the FCDA according to its constitutional decree were : (1)

- 1) The choice of site for the location of the capital city within the Capital Territory;
- 2) The preparation of a master plan for the capital city and of land use with respect to town and country planning within the rest of the Capital Territory;
- 3) The provision of municipal services within the Capital Territory;
- 4) The establishment of infrastructural services in accordance with the master plan referred above;
- 5) The coordination of the activities of all ministries, departments and agencies of the Government of the Federation within the Capital Territory.

The organizational structure of the FCDA is shown schematically in Figure 7-1 of Chapter 7. At the top of the decision-making framework is the Board of Directors. The Chairman (Adeogun), an ex-Mobil executive, had no background in urban planning. Next in command was the executive Secretary. As previously mentioned, the first man to hold this position was I. J. Ebong. Characterized as a bright and efficient administrator, Ebong had been one of the many powerful civil servants in Nigeria, serving as a permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Economic Development prior to his appointment with the FCDA. The nature of the decision-making hierarchy is represented by the working relationship established between Adeogun and Ebong. There was a great deal

(1) Federal Capital Territory Decree, No 6, 1976.

of conflict between the two; Ebong was in favor of competitive procurement, while it is reported that Adeogun generally awarded contracts to "friends." (1) The tension is traced back to the decision supported by Ebong to hold a competition for the job of planning the capital. Adeogun would have preferred to decide on the planning firm. Ultimately, Ebong was asked to step down from his position while Adeogun remained in power.

The lower level of the FCDA's organizational structure is divided into five departments : Administration, Finance and Economic Planning, Physical Planning and Architecture, Development and Engineering Services, and the Department of Estate. Department-level operations were run according to two principles outlined by Ebong's successor, Alhaji Abu-bakar Koko. In a long memo Koko states that in the current Nigerian situation "many town planning initiatives can be translated into action with speed, without having to go through a very long chain of public inquiry or consultation." (2)

The first operating principle of the FCDA was to proceed without delay with the planning and construction of the new capital. The second principle enunciated by Koko is that the FCDA must act to ensure "that every section of the Nigerian society becomes involved with the new city." It is against this background that it is considered necessary to evolve an organizational structure and to develop management practices that are flexible enough to meet the current and future needs on the project." (Moore, 1982, p. 56)

These two principles characterize the nature of the FCDA. The

(1) J. Moore, Ibid, opp. cit., p. 54.

(2) Cited in J. Moore, Ibid, p. 56.

FCDA was often described as an agency far removed from the actual planning process which "only served as a propaganda device for the Nigerian voice" channeling Nigerian participation through a superficial level."⁽¹⁾ This operational position of the FCDA has been confirmed by members of the FCDA and the IPA. The IPA planners have argued at length that the FCDA's lower-level departments did not play an active part in planning, an opinion supported by the FCDA planning staff during this writer's interview with some of the FCDA's officials. Plans or other tasks that could have been equally well carried out by the FCDA staff were assigned to the Western planners.

Again, the inadequate involvement of the FCDA's staff may have also stemmed from their lack of experience already stressed above or simply from the political need to allow an inconsequential level of Nigerian participation in the planning process.

The decision making structure of the FCDA, combined with the inexperience of Nigerians working for the Authority, insured that the high-speed production schedule of the IPA would not be challenged by excessive indigenous input. The ineffectiveness of the FCDA is matched by misconceptions and weaknesses of the IPA inherent in a situation in which the IPA was made to remain as dependent as possible on the specifications of the military government.

(1) Ibid, p. 56

There were other weaknesses apparent in the operational structure of the American consortium. The IPA planners were primarily concerned with fulfilling their contractual arrangement with the Nigerian government. This is not to imply that the planning team had little or no regard for developing an efficient urban development plan (Master Plan). The point is that given the position in which the IPA had to depend on the federal government for most of its guidelines and specifications, the IPA had very little leverage with which to perform their function effectively.

The IPA did most of its design work abroad and not in Nigeria. The long distance that separated the planners from the site has thus helped in the accomplishment of the government's goal of isolating the plan's development from the forces of Nigerian politics (Moore, 1982, p. 58).

An examination of the interaction that took place between the FCDA and the IPA reveals that such interaction occurred mainly at the highest levels of the decision-making structure. Top-ranking members of the FCDA and powerful military personnel were actively involved in the formulation of plans for the new capital. The interaction that took place at this level alone could not but have serious ramifications for the new capital's execution process. First, the government and its agencies must be responsible to the public, must be answerable to the public, and must account for its actions to the public. It is therefore essential that not only the government and the FCDA, but also the lower and middle level staff, and the general public must know and

accept what the FCDA's responsibilities are. Second, if substantial agreement on a feasible and desirable course of action is to be achieved, each of the various levels of officials of the FCDA, the government and the general public must see something desirable in the contemplated action, hence, the need for the participation of all levels in the planning process. The two categories -- responsibility and responsiveness -- embody the strategy for achieving a constructive input from the general public. This enhances the likelihood of success in carrying out the agency's responsibilities and responding to the public's expectations and can be thought of as achieving effectiveness objective. In Chapter 7, it is noted that lack of full involvement or participation of all levels of FCDA's staff leads to a number of problems including lack of personnel commitment, loss of potential on-the-job experience, and corruption, which impinge upon the success of the project.

An American planner recounted an incident when IPA delivered a presentation outlining the estimated costs of the project to a number of military officials at Dodan Barracks in Lagos. The military men were generally oblivious to the figures. (1) Cost, to the majority of the military leaders and even to the Location Committee, was not a factor worthy of major concern. The economic boom brought on by the rise in oil revenues had brought with it a mistaken perception that Nigeria was a wealthy country.

(1) Ibid, p. 57.

A lack of concern for the cost problem is perhaps better reflected in the exchange between the opponents of the new capital who had argued that the new capital's construction would cost some N 100 billion, and the Location Committee. Opponents argued that even if the N 100 billion was spread over a generation, the mere size of it would have the following implications :

- a) it would involve the expenditure of a huge amount of money during the construction period, worsening the inflationary spiral, first in the construction sector and ultimately in the entire economy;
- b) it would increase greatly the cost of building materials;
- c) it would create a great obstacle to the successful completion of Third National Development Plan; the nation's attention would be diverted from other more important matters, such as the provision of basic needs and the greatest happiness of the greatest number, to a project that by its very nature has very few spread effects on the local economy itself;
- d) it would further increase Nigeria's propensity to import because a large proportion of the material, expertise, and other facilities that would be required in the new capital would have to be imported and paid for in hard currency. (1)

(1) Report of the Committee on the Location of the Federal Capital, December 1975, p. 56.

They have further argued that in spite of the oil boom, the country has still not been able to provide certain services -- free education, health care services; it has not been able to clear its slums and provide a healthy environment to all citizens. The urban centers are in a deplorable condition, and communication facilities, potable water, and electricity are yet to get to the majority of the towns and villages. (1)

In response to these charges, the Location Committee maintained (as we noted in Chapter 4) that the opponents' argument represents only a sign of pessimism. The committee maintained that such an argument would not alter its conclusions and recommendations for moving the capital.

On numerous occasions during the formulation of the Master Plan, IPA staff met with representatives of the FCDA and presented alternative proposals for the construction of the capital. At these meetings it became apparent that accompanying the requirements of having the capital built quickly, there was a broad feeling that the city should be a proud reflection of Nigeria's wealth and power. (2) (Recall the argument similar to this feeling, presented in Chapter 1, from the Abuja supporters.) Moore (1982) points out that the FCDA's tour of some Western capitals had reinforced the policy that only a city of similar qualities to those visited would

(1) Ibid, p. 57.

(2) J. Moore, Ibid, opp. cit., p. 60.

be acceptable to Nigeria. In the following section, the examples of how this input affected the city's design are presented. (1) The examples involve the plans for waste-water treatment, transportation development, housing strategies, and the general land use organization.

5.2 Selection of Appropriate Strategies : The Case of Housing, Sewerage, Land Use and Transport Systems

IPA, in developing a sanitary sewerage system for the new capital, made a number of recommendations. The most important of these is that :

the system should be a gravity collection system, with no lift stations, force mains or other powered devices. This type of system presents a number of advantages : it is low in construction cost; in addition, the long lead time (up to three years) required for the purchase and installation of large pumps is eliminated together with their high cost. The operational and maintenance costs are much lower than for pumped systems; the probability of a "catastrophic" type of system failure is extremely low; energy requirements are nil. (2)

In light of these objectives, and with the consideration that IPA had to work in the absence of detailed information regarding soil, depths to bedrock, topography, demand distribution, etc, four alternative systems were identified. The systems vary in the complexity of their technology from an anaerobic-oxidation system, and an anaerobic-aerated pond

(1) A full discussion of the overall impact of the Nigerian government's inclination towards the construction of the "western-type" capital city is presented in Moore (1982), Ibid, Chapter III, p. 46-78.

(2) The Master Plan, Ibid, opp. cit., p. 200.

system to a "standard" activated-sludge, secondary treatment system and/or advanced waste-water treatment system (AWT), the latter being the most sophisticated in terms of technology, but also the most costly.

The concept of anaerobic ponds was strongly supported by IPA planners. These ponds are constructed relatively deep (+ 8 feet), and

solid materials settle to the bottom of the pond to decompose. The depth of water and turbidity prevent penetration of sunlight and thus growth of algae and aquatic plants, maintaining the pond's anaerobic condition... because water conditions effectively prevent plant growth, maintenance of anaerobic ponds and their surroundings is relatively easy. Access to the ponds is restricted to prevent stirring of the water. (1)

Oxidation ponds are shallow constructions, which permit the sunlight to penetrate the surface. "Algae growth is thus supported, generating oxygen to support oxidation of sewage water." (2) The aerated pond is very similar to the oxidation pond except for the fact that oxygen is introduced mechanically.

The waste-water system selected by IPA for the capital city was the anaerobic pond system (anaerobic ponds followed by oxidation). This system, which is suited to the climatological setting of the FCT, is capable of meeting treatment requirements with a minimal commitment to mechanical equipment.

IPA also demonstrates that the cost of the selected

(1) Ibid, p. 201.

(2) Ibid, p. 201.

system is far less than that of a more standard, mechanically operated sewage system. Estimates of the relative operating costs of the standard secondary type systems indicate that they are five- to fifteen-fold greater in cost than an anaerobic pond system. Further reasons that these costly systems were not suggested relate to the relative sludge generation rates and the energy requirements of sewage treatment. The sludge generation of the standard secondary and AWT system is 30- to 100-fold greater, respectively (Table 5.1). As a final note on the alternatives, the size and skill levels of the operating and maintenance staff, and the need for repair facilities and replacement parts inventories will increase for the mechanical systems on the same relative scale as does the sludge generation.

In direct contradiction to the policy guidelines of the IPA, the FCDA selected the standard secondary treatment system. The FCDA acted with the belief that Nigeria as an advanced country should have the most advanced system of waste-water treatment comparable to other Western capitals (Moore, 1982). Included in the final master plan is a table summarizing IPA's observations and conclusions on the relative aspects of the different systems. The table has a blank space where figures for relative costs should be listed. Leaving this blank space was probably a deliberate decision to avoid debate over the costly nature of the selected system. Regardless, it is clear that the unrealistic goals of the FCDA and the top decision makers adversely affected the planning of

Table 5.1

Alternative Waste Water Treatment Technologies
for 1.6 Million Interim Design Population

Alternative Technology	Land Area Requirement (hectares) ¹	Site* development	Total* Capital	Operating*	Relative* Sludge Generation	Electrical Energy Requirement (kw)
1. Pond System (anaerobic ponds followed by Oxidation Ponds)	1900	10	1	1	1	100
2. Aerated Pond System (anaerobic ponds followed by Oxidation Ditch System)	375	2	1.2	2	5	2200
3. Standard Secondary Treatment System (Activated Sludge System)	150	1	2	5	30	3300
4. Advanced Wastewater Treatment System (for Urban Water re-uses Only)	300	2	5	15	100	3800

1: Includes area allowances for irregular terrain and buffer zones.

* Units are used only for comparing the relative standing of each treatment system with the other. For example, because land area requirements is an important factor in estimating the relative total capital cost of each system, site development (excavation plus underground piping) costs are estimated to be ten-fold greater for the anaerobic pond-oxidation pond systems than for the standard secondary system.


Source: The Master Plan for Abuja: The New Federal Capital of Nigeria, (FCDA), February 15, 1979, p. 201.

the new capital city. As of November 1984, the contract for this selected treatment plant has not been awarded due in part to the exorbitant cost required. The contemplation now is whether to revert to one of the cheaper alternatives recommended in the Master Plan. As a result, no treatment plant is in place in the capital city. The FCDA has resorted to providing temporary septic tanks and soakways to the completed houses both in Garki and Wuse Districts as well as at Karu New town and Gwagwalada in order to make such houses inhabitable. The soakways and septic tanks are presenting environmental problems because of stench and odours leaking from the tanks. Furthermore, the use of temporary tanks is adding to the cost of providing the treatment facility.

The attitude of the FCDA staff had a similar effect on transportation planning. The "compressed radial form" designed by IPA staff for Abuja conforms to a transportation system based on efficiency and simplicity. The evolution of the compressed-radial form for the City, in combination with the socio-economic realities of the anticipated population in the new city, lead to a configuration of four major transport spines, extending the length of each corridor of the city. The planners estimated the cost of different transportation systems for Abuja. The major considerations were bus or rail systems. Based on cost-benefit analyses (Figure 5-1) and the level of technological development in Nigeria (i.e., their ability to operate a sophisticated transportation network), IPA suggested a bus system. IPA staff noted that in the early phases of the Federal Capital Development, the transit spine

FIGURE 5-1

COMPARATIVE BUS AND RAIL COSTS



Source: The Master Plan for Abuja, the New Federal Capital of Nigeria, Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), February, 1979, p. 139.

will operate as a busway, and at later stages, might incorporate a higher capacity transit mode. The more likely alternatives are rapid transit, and light-rail transit. Members of the planning team said this was a ploy and the IPA staff actually thought that a rail system would be a failure.⁽¹⁾ Unfortunately, the FCDA was not to be stopped by cost-benefit analyses. After the IPA ended its contract with FCDA, a French corporation was hired to plan an underground rail system for the city. This extremely expensive (Abuja is located on bedrock) and inefficient system was deemed necessary probably because the major cities that they strive to emulate (Paris, London and Washington, for example) all have underground transportation networks.

A detailed examination of development of a housing program for Abuja further demonstrates the nature of Nigerian-American interaction. IPA submitted their original proposals for housing on May 20, 1978. The draft plan first examines the cost and affordability of housing for the new capital. The cost of housing is the sum of the individual cost of land, infrastructure, and construction management. Because the land is owned by the Federal Government, it is not a large cost. Investment in infrastructure is estimated to be 20-45 percent of the total housing development costs. The single largest factor is building, management, and maintenance costs, approximately 50-60 percent of development investment.

(1) J. Moore, *Ibid*, opp. cit., p. 64.

The cost of housing is dependent on the method of construction. The draft plan sets out a number of ways to keep these costs at a minimum. These are : 1) reducing the amount of imported materials used; 2) modifying the building subsystem mix by changing building materials or omitting portions of building construction that are less important; and 3) relying on more self-help housing. These cost factors are then used in combination with Nigerian income levels to develop a housing program that is harmonious with the anticipated income of Abuja's residents.

The draft outlines four basic income groups that are expected to inhabit the new capital. These are : (1)

- 1) a high income group with minimum annual incomes of approximately N 5,600 and comprising an estimated 2.2 percent of all households in the new capital;
- 2) a middle income group comprising approximately 10 percent of households and having incomes of N 1,600 to N 5,600;
- 3) a low-income group having incomes between N 770 and N 1,200 and representing 58 percent of all households; and
- 4) a transient group having unstable incomes of at least N 600 and comprising about 30 percent of all households.

The Nigerian government has established standards for

(1) Draft Master Plan in Abuja, The Federal Capital of Nigeria. Report submitted by IFA to AA. Koko (FCDA), May 20, 1978, p. 126.

the rents that income groups should pay for housing in Abuja. The government's position is that citizens should not have to pay more than 20 percent of their income in rents. For low-income earners, rents are designed to be even lower, between 10 percent and 15 percent of income. There is a large contradiction between this goal and affordable housing. Cost analysis reveals that if 20 percent of the income of a new capital resident earning money in the 50 percent range is capitalized over a 25-year period at economic repayment terms, it yields between N 3,000 and N 4,000. The draft plan points out that this is far short of the cost of building a standard house (estimated cost N 10,000). This demonstrates the large gap between the amount of disposable income available for housing and the cost of housing. The draft suggests that the FCDA operate cognizant of this cost/affordability problem and develop innovative housing to overcome such a problem.

IPA proposed four types of housing for Abuja (Table 5-2). Historical overview has demonstrated that the largest housing problems in new capitals occur in relation to the lowest income group. The living space allocated for this group is minimal yet the cost is still too high. The IPA report states that "to bring costs within affordability, substantial amounts of self-help are required."

IPA proposed six housing program options (Table 5-3) that were differentiated according to the amount of subsidies they provided. Program A, the most expensive, necessitated N 513.5 million in subsidies to make housing affordable to every

Table 5.2

Principal Types of Dwelling Units

Housing Type	Sub-Type	Plot Area per Household	Built Space per Household
I. Detached/ Semi- Detached	A. Large	1,000 m ²	120-160m ²
	B. Medium	100-800m ²	70-100m ²
	C. Small	75-100m ²	30-60m ²
II. Service Land	A. Large	1,000m ²	100m ²
	B. Medium	400m ²	
III. Flats	A. Large	80m ²	100m ²
	B. Medium	60-80m ²	85-100m ²
	C. Small	35-60m ²	45-70m ²
IV. Multi- Family	A. 2-3 Family	12-150m ² a	40-75m ²
	B. 4 Family	180m ² a	60-80m ²
	*C. Transitional	240m ² a	60-80m ²

a: Represents Total Plot Area

*: Represents temporary housing for migrant workers to be upgraded or eliminated in the future.

m² = Square meters

Source: The Master Plan for Abuja, the New Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, February 1979, p. 177.

Table 5.3
Housing Program Options

Option	Detached/ Semi- Detached	Serviced Land	Flats	Multi- Family	Total Capital Cost ^b (N million)	Subsidy Included ^b (N million)
A. High Standard, Single-Family, Detached	L, M, S	L, M		T	3,125	1,514
B. Detached, Reduced Standards	L, M, S	L		T	2,119	564
C. Higher Density, No Subsidy	S	L, M	L, M, S	M, S, T	1,502	
D. Reduced Density & Infrastructure, Low Subsidy	L, M, S	L, M	M, S	M, S, T	1,751	61
E. Mixed, Low Subsidy	L, M, S	L, M	M, S	M, S, T	1,813	127
F. Mixed, Moderate Subsidy	L, M, S	L, M	M, S	M, S, T	1,932	186

L = Large; M = Medium; S = Small; T = Transitional (refer to Table 5.2)

b: Costs and subsidy are total present value of costs and payments incurred over 20-40 years.

Source: The Master Plan for Abuja, the New Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, February 1979, p. 180.

income group, and approximately N 3,124.8 million in initial capital costs. The option recommended by IPA was Program F. This provided 95,000 single family detached housing units for all income groups, 11,200 serviced plots, 5,500 flats and 117,700 low income multi-family dwellings. Migrants were allocated an additional 19,000 transient housing units.(1)

The IPA cost approximations are likely underestimated. They do not include the historically proven need for price contingencies of at least 25 percent added to the total costs of these options to account for variations in estimating costs. To make matters even more uncertain, inflationary cost, lack of construction materials locally, and the weakness of implementation strategy in developing countries will undoubtedly lead to even greater total costs.

The housing designed by IPA planners for the new capital came under substantial criticism when reviewed by the FCDA. The most common objections centered on the issue of using self-help housing as a means for reducing housing cost for the low-income group. Critics offered examples of the unsuccessful use of this housing strategy and argued that low-income workers would not have the energy, after a hard day's work, to make contributions to their housing. Instead, the FCDA preferred to plan for low-income housing provided by public and private efforts.

Stephen Lockwood, one of the IPA's project managers, responded to this criticism in a memo to the Chairman of the FCDA. In his memo Lockwood states that the new capital residents,

(1) Ibid, p. 130.

even those employed by the government, will not have high incomes. Studies using the 1978 civil service salary structure tended to bear this out (1), as shown in Table 5-4.

A few days after Lockwood's memo was sent to the chairman of the FCDA, Lockwood also sent a memo to the IPA workers. This clarified some of the problems covered in his memo to the FCDA. He stated that it was clear that the FCDA, if not IPA, has a naive knowledge of what the city will look like if it provides home ownership to the maximum income spread possible. "It cannot look like a European city in Africa, not with 70 percent of the households earning less than N 3,000 per year." (2) In addition, Lockwood states that the FCDA continues to act unaware of the problems in building housing. The chairman of the FCDA indicated that he wanted 8,000 units of housing constructed in only 15 months. Thus, political demands for completing the project quickly were dominating wishes for housing harmonious with the socio-economic characteristics of Nigeria.

A further reflection of the government's policy of building a city of Western quality is provided by the general land-use organizational plan. Table 5-5 shows the distribution of land uses in the capital city. The largest proportion of land (49 percent) is set aside for residential purposes. The open space/recreation sector is allocated 33 percent of the

(1) Cited in J. Moore, *Ibid*, opp. cit., p. 75.

(2) *Ibid*, p. 75.

Table 5.4*

Civil Servant Income Available for Housing

Income and Finance	Grade Level				
	01-04	05-07	08-10	11-13	14-16
Annual Income (₦)	₦768- 1,452	1,476- 3,252	3,264- 6,432	6,444- 8,724	8,868- 12,420
25% of Income for Housing* (₦)	192- 363	369- 813	816- 2,608	1,611- 2,181	2,217- 3,105
3% Financing for 15 Years (₦)	2,880- 5,445	5,535- 12,195	12,240- 24,120	24,165- 32,715	33,255- 46,575

Cost of Current Housing Being Constructed
(Satellite Town)

Category A	2 bedroom	Cost	₦14,625
Category B	3 bedroom	Cost	₦21,300
Category C	4 bedroom	Cost	₦28,500

*The civil service salary structure has changed following the 1981 minimum wage act. Effective September 1981, the starting salary level (minimum wage) is ₦1,500/yr. Even if the new salary structure is used to recompute the money available for housing, it is unlikely that the results obtained would change significantly given that the cost of housing has also increased dramatically over the years.

Source: "Key Issues in FCDA Housing Policy Development," memorandum from Stephen Lockwood (IPA) to A. A. Koko (FCDA), November 24, 1978, p. 10, cited in Moore (1982, Ibid., p. 74.

Table 5.5

Distribution of Land Use in the Capital City

Land Use Activity	Area in hectares	Percent of Total Area
Governmental Activity	500	2
Services	891	3
Residential	12,486	49
Light Industry	920	4
Transport-Infrastructure	1,840	7
Commercial	561	2
Open Space and Recreation	8,300	33
Total	25,498	100%

Source: The Master Plan for Abuja, the New Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, February 1979, p. 76.

available land. The rest of the other activities are to share the remaining 18 percent of the total land. Within the remaining group of activities, transport-infrastructure is allocated 7 percent, light industry 4 percent, service 3 percent, governmental activity 2 percent, and commercial activity 2 percent.

The lack of emphasis on commercial and industrial activities is a further reflection of the government's policy of constructing strictly an administrative capital that would accommodate mainly civil servants. Exclusion of large industries and other commercial activities would minimize activities, considered to be obnoxious by the government, and will, in turn, make it easier to maintain a cleaner and more attractive environment than the old capital city, Lagos. The maintenance of an attractive environment is to be further sustained by the requirement for a low-density residential development. The average residential density allowed in the Phase One area of the city is 26 dwellings per hectare. In some parts of the city the density is as low as 10 houses per hectare.

Finalization : The Role of Consultants

Early in the project's history two independent groups, a three-member International Review Panel (IRP) and a 27-member Technical Assessment Panel (TAP), were formed to serve as consultants and advisors to the FCDA-IPA planning team. The IRP was composed of international experts in new capital

planning. The TAP members were Nigerian professionals including urban planners, geographers, engineers, architects, doctors and political scientists. The members were appointed by the Supreme Military Council. The panels are listed in the FCDA organizational structure as "Special Advisors." It was not until after the master plan had been completed that these two panels were asked to submit evaluations of the project. Thus, it would seem that the TAP and IRP were used only to verify that the Nigerians had purchased a valid plan for a new capital.

5.3 Implementation Approach, Fast-Track Strategy, and Impacts of Timing

Part of the masterplanning process was the requirement for a formal guideline detailing the sequences for implementing the elements in the master plan. The development of this guideline was again, largely influenced by the government's demand that required completion of the city in eight years. In order to meet the demand, a "fast-track strategy" was developed by the IPA.

Fast-tracking refers to an approach to planning, design, and construction that segments the process so as to permit some components of the master plan to enter into the construction stage while others were still in the planning and design stage. This contradicts the conventional approach whereby the master plan must be completed and followed by detailed site development planning prior to engineering design and construction, or where all infrastructure must be complete

prior to building construction.

To facilitate the implementation of this strategy, IPA segmented all the activities into six broad areas. Each activity was to be completed within a scheduled time frame to enable the commencement and completion of the next stage of activity. Table 5-6 shows schematically the sequences of these activities. They include : (1) base technical studies, planning/architecture/engineering, logistics/staffing, regional infrastructure development, finance/management activity, and the Phase One Capital City construction. A careful look at the table shows that work on majority of the activities was expected to begin in 1978, one year before the master plan was completed. The table also shows that most of the activities scheduled for completion as early as 1982 have not been completed as of this writer's visit at the site between August and November 1984.

5.3.1 Implications of Timing Policy

Advantages

There are perhaps two major advantages to the relatively short time period devoted for the project's completion. The first is that it can provide for a considerable amount of savings in labor and material costs. In developing countries where building materials costs increase very rapidly,

(1) The Master Plan for Abuja. Ibid, opp. cit., p. 261.

Table 5.6

Required FCDA Activities in the Fast-Track Strategy

Activities	Expected Time of Completion	Present Situation ^a
Base Technical Studies	1978-1980 (2 years)	Not yet completed for Satellite Towns and New Towns
Planning/Architecture/Engineering	1978-1982 (4 years)	Only completed for some parts of Garki and Wuse Districts, Phase One and the Presidential complex and Maitama district
Logistics/Staffing	1978-1981 (3 years)	Completed although quite a lot of reshuffling of staff going on because of political changes
Regional Infrastructure involves essentially: --regional highway access --topographical mapping --regional water system --interim water system --regional power transmission --construction of airport	1978-1981 (3 years)	Regional highway access and the airport are completed. But the required power transmission and water are incomplete. For example, Nyanya, which is one of the few priority satellite towns, has no pipe-borne water.
Finance/Management	Continuous till 1986	
Phase One Capital City Construction	All activities in elements above are fast-tracked to meet 1986 occupancy	

a: Remarks based on the author's visit to the site in November 1984.

Source: Compiled from: The Master Plan for Abuja, the Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, February 15, 1979, p. 262.

shortening the construction time may save these ever-rapidly increasing materials costs. However, such savings must be weighed against the potential adverse consequences of the policy (See examples from discussions below).

The other major advantage of the relatively short time span is that it can save or minimize a project's future uncertainties. We have noted that this policy has enabled the construction of Abuja to commence immediately, thereby saving the project from potential adversaries who would have wanted to stop the project.

Disadvantages

The disadvantages of the timing policy, however, hinge on the weaknesses of its assumptions. Implicitly the policy assumes first, the availability of already-compiled (sufficient) data to facilitate some basic groundwork to begin. The weakness of this particular assumption is attested to by the serious data problems encountered during the development of the master plan (Recall the absence of hydrological information for the new capital territory site). Similar problems were encountered during the detailed site planning and actual laying out on the ground. There were no large-scale topographical maps to assess the amount of developable land. A detailed survey on the ground revealed later that more villages would have to be relocated than originally accounted for. A national census has not been conducted in Nigeria since 1963 ! Second, the short period

alloted for construction assumes availability of sufficient funds to accommodate additional projects that would have to be brought forward because of the limited time span for their implementation. The tenacity of this assumption is explored in detail in Chapter 6; nevertheless, it is important to highlight here some of the consequences of this assumption.

In order to maintain the limited time schedule, many projects that could have been scheduled for future construction have to be brought forward. This, in turn, requires that more funds be channeled into the implementation activities during the construction period. The channeling of more funds than would have been necessary means that other competing demands on the available funds are neglected.

The next assumption of the policy is the availability of adequate organizational capacity, to coordinate, manage, and administer the potential construction boom that would arise from implementation. Bringing forward more projects than would be necessary, means that an elaborate and efficient organizational structure would have to be set up to manage the activities. In a situation where skilled and experienced personnel are few, managing the activities was a major problem. In Chapter 7 it is shown that, in fact, an elaborate organizational structure was developed to facilitate efficient implementation, which hardly ever materialized. There were coordination problems and misappropriation of funds.

The fourth assumption of the timing policy which is also tenacious, is the availability of building materials locally to sustain intense construction activities. The fact is that

many of the building materials, except for doors, paint, and, to a small extent, exterior wall cladding, are not manufactured in large quantities in Nigeria. As such, import was required for a significant portion of the building construction demand. Importation of cement, one of the major components of building materials in the country, for example, accounted for 84 percent of total domestic supply of cement in 1977.(1) Also, in 1975 plans were only announced for a steel complex at Ajaokuta with an annual capacity of 1.5 million tons of steel, using domestic iron and coal, and two direct reduction plants. One of the two reduction plants was only commissioned in 1981. Even then, the plant relies on imported materials. The three rolling mills also went into service just in 1983. It is estimated that the demand for virtually all materials would rise drastically over the period 1980-1986, because of the construction boom.(2) This means that increased importation would be necessary in order to meet the demand imposed by the relatively short construction period. Many of the buildings that were not completed have been abandoned by contractors, in part, because of lack of building materials.(3)

Another serious consequence of the timing policy relates

(1) The Economist. "The Political Economy of Nigeria." 1984, p. 19.

(2) The Master Plan for Abuja. Ibid, opp. cit., p. 263.

(3) This observation was confirmed by some members of the staff of the FCDA during an interview with them. (August to November 1984).

to the increased migratory trend that accompanied the construction boom. We have noted (Section 4.1) the effect of this phenomenon on the villages within and around the new capital territory. The other effect of the boom phenomenon was the structural unemployment that resulted as soon as construction slacked. A massive lay-off had resulted because many of the contractors (who could not be paid by the government) could not pay their workers. The result was for some of these laid-off workers to seek alternative trade -- petty trading. Evidence of this activity is seen within and around the city where informal activities have been on the rise. (Appendix II)

5.4 Summary and Conclusion

In the chapter, we examined the second (and final) phase of the new capital's planning enterprise. We paid particular attention to the characteristics and outcome of the working relationship among the three major actors in the planning process. The three actors included the Nigerian military leaders, the Federal Capital Development Authority given the responsibility for executing the capital project, and the International Planning Associates hired to develop the master plan. A review of the planning activity showed that the Nigerian military leaders played the most dominant role among the three major actors. The FCDA's role as we pointed out, was mainly a secondary one, and so was the IPA's role. The IPA planners provided mainly technical solutions to essentially

political demands from the Nigerian Government. We also noted that to the extent that the Planners were able to incorporate these political constraints to produce an efficient plan (the master plan), the planners had satisfied one of the tenets of the structural theorists' argument. This group as we noted in Chapter 1, maintains that the success of any plan implementation activity depends largely on an organization's (for example, the IPA) ability to learn and incorporate the factors in its external environment, in this case, the Nigerian actors. Thus, the outcome of the planning activity, which in this case, was the master plan, can be said to be successful. However, we noted also that there were some "slippages" (problems or failures) in the planning process, a situation created mainly by the Nigerian political environment. This environment as we pointed out, necessitated that not only that the capital be moved, but also that it be completed very quickly. Consequently, the overall success of the project has been impacted because the time frame demanded by the politicians did not match with the available financial, administrative, and managerial resources.

The FCDA's position in the overall project planning was similar to that of the IPA planners, this agency was in a relatively weak position to control the planning activity because it had to respond to the dictates of the military government as well. In this situation, it can also be said that its activity was largely controlled by factors outside the domain of its influence. This is not to suggest that without this external influence, the agency would have all the

necessary management and professional expertise to develop the master plan. After all, it was due to a lack of such expertise, in part, that an expatriate firm was hired in the first place. However, given the nature of the working relationships described in the chapter, it was obvious that the FCDA would not have played a dominant role even if it had all the resources. The main point to note in the preceding analysis is that the political control of planning activity, while it may have contributed to a successful completion of the master plan (by isolating it from potential oppositions), was also instrumental for triggering off and creating obstacles to the project's successful implementation.

CHAPTER 6

FINANCING THE PLAN

One of the implicit assumptions in the development of the new capital is that there would be sufficient funds to execute the project to allow for a timely movement to the new city in 1986. The result of this assumption has been to neglect adequate analysis of the new capital's financial requirements.

In this chapter, the weakness of this assumption of adequate financial resources is demonstrated by analyzing the project's (FCDA's) financial structure. Our analysis will reveal that the FCDA's financial position is generally weak. The weak position is indicated by the relatively higher level of capital expenditure than revenues, a high proportion of debt owed to contractors, and the low proportion of funding released to the agency in comparison with the total amount allocated to the project annually.

The project's weak financial situation can be attributed principally to four major factors: (i) the relatively fast pace of construction necessitated by the need to meet a new deadline (1982) set by the civilian government that came to power in 1979; this latest demand set in place, a spiral of reorganization problems which caused funding delays; (ii) the weak federal government revenue sources and the FCDA's inability to generate internally other substantial revenue;

and (iii) a result of general management incompetence, high overheads, bureaucratic red tape or levity of the FCDA's administration. This is most apparent in the agency's laxity in collecting rents, paying contractors, coordinating projects, and granting approvals.

The impact of the weak financial situation is felt in four major areas: (i) It affected the ability of the FCDA to pay contractors; (ii) it has resulted in a major reorganization and reduction of the FCDA's staff; (iii) it has resulted in the FCDA's inability to meet construction targets; (iv) it has resulted in part, to the postponement of the movement of the national seat of government until 1990.

6.1. FCDA: The Project's Financial Structure

The capital expenditure and revenue income pattern shown in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 are one indication of the project's financial standing. Whereas the 1979 to 1983 figures represent actual capital expenses and revenue incomes, the figures for the period 1984 to 1990 are projections for the period. Except for the years 1980 and 1984, the capital expenditures have consistently exceeded revenue incomes. The higher revenue income over capital expenditure for 1980 may have marked the beginning of construction, which started in 1979. Similarly, the high proportion of capital expenditures, vis-a-vis revenues for

Table 6.1
Capital Expenditure and Revenue* Income of the FCDA
(₦ millions)

Year	Capital Expenditures ^a	Revenue Income ^b	Revenue income as a Percentage of Capital Expenditure (percent)
1979	N/A	113.48	N/A
1980	92.50	187.33	203
1981	839.03	438.55	52
1982	1640.12	526.60	32
1983	N/A	313.18	N/A
1984 ^c	108.55	162.90	150
1985 ^c	810.38	155.32	19
1986 ^c	927.49	159.38	17
1987 ^c	930.00	162.39	17
1988 ^c	738.99	160.16	22
1989 ^c	742.74	156.32	21
1990 ^c	894.94	154.11	17
Total ₦:	7,724.74	2,689.72	35

*Represents annual federal government allocations
N/A = Not available

- a: represents capital expenditure on the entire Abuja project
b: represents revenue income for the entire project except revenue from internal sources and municipal appropriations
c: projections


Sources: The 1979-1980 capital expenditure is from Approved Estimates for 1982, Dept. of Finance, FCDA; 1984 to 1985 capital expenditure projections are from the Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the Abuja Project, August, 1984. The 1979 to 1983 revenue incomes are from: Alhaji Sabo Ago, Implementing a Master Plan: The Abuja Experience, FCDA, March 1984. The revenue income projections for 1984-1990 are from The Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the Abuja Project, FCDA, August 1984, p. 21.

Figure 6.1

Capital Expenditures and Revenues

Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, As of 1984

(\$ million)



the period 1981 to 1983 coincides with the period of intense activities following the civilian government's commitment to move to the new capital city in October, 1982.¹ Because the 1984 figure is a projection, it may be premature to assume that the total projected revenue for that year would actually be realized. On the average, however, FCDA's revenue income has represented 35 percent of the total capital expenditure, an indication that FCDA would have difficulties meeting its short-term obligations.

The projections (1984-1990) in Table 6.1 were recommended by an Interministerial Committee set up by the Buhari government, which has just toppled the civilian government in another military coup in December of 1983, after it was apparent that a total movement to the capital would not be possible by 1986.² On that belief, Buhari's military government decided after a careful study of the new capital project in 1984, to extend the date of movement to 1990 and to reschedule the entire financing structure. Movement was to occur in phases rather than a one-time movement as originally conceived by the preceding regimes. Thus, the

(1) Shagari's proposal to move the capital in 1982, four years earlier than scheduled, was followed with increased government funding between 1981 and 1982. This has, consequently, accounted for the relatively high revenue income to the FCDA in that period.

(2) Since 1979 to date (1985) there has been four successive governments--the Murtala Muhammed/Obasanjo's regime which handed power over to the civilians in October 1979; the Shagari's (civilian) government which lasted from October 1979 to December 1983; the Buhari's regime which lasted from December 1983 to July 1985; and Babangida who just seized power in August 1985.

projections represent the new military government's effort to rationalize the new capital's funding process. Even so, the projection shows that at no period except in 1984, would FCDA's revenue incomes exceed or equal its capital expenditures.

The figures in the table do not, however, include revenues from internally-generated sources, such as rents, fees, charges, etc. But given the low proportion of such revenue from the internally-generated sources, as shown later in Table 6.8, and given that the amount realizable from these sources in turn, depends very much on this government's funding, the ability of the FCDA to collect such revenue, the intensity of activities, and the public's willingness to pay rents, it is unlikely that the amount from the internal sources would contribute significantly (at least in the short run) to the total revenue available to the FCDA.

Another indication of the FCDA's weak financial structure is provided by Table 6.2. The table contains the budget allocation for the Abuja project and the level of funds actually released to the FCDA. The table shows that barely half of the annual budgets allocated for the project was being released to the FCDA, which is another imposition of serious financial constraint on the operations of this agency. Of a total of ₦305 million budgeted for the project in 1980, only 61 percent of this amount was actually disbursed to the FCDA.

Table 6.2

Capital Budget (Revenues) Allocated and the Actual Amount
(Receipts) Released to Abuja Project 1976-1983 (₦ millions)

Year	Amount Budgeted (₦ million)	Amount Released (₦ million)	Amount Released as a Percent of Amount Budgeted (%)
1976	N/A*	2.8	N/A
1977	N/A	72.58	N/A
1978	N/A	98.18	N/A
1979	N/A	113.48	N/A
1980	305.33 ^a	187.33	61
1981	723.74 ^b	438.55	61
1982	932.42 ^b	526.60	56
1983	878.26 ^b	313.18	36
Total		1752.7	Average 54% for 1980-1983

N/A: Not available

a: Amount includes (₦ 118.00 m) allocated to the FCT from the 1980 Federal Government Budget quoted in Abu Ibrahim, Director of Administration: "Abuja Expenditure," FCDA, 1983. The remaining ₦ 187.33 million represents direct funds to FCDA.

b: The figures include amount budgeted as statutory allocation to Abuja as a state and FCT's share as a Ministry. The direct subvention to FCC as a local government in 1983 is not included.

- Sources:
1. The Fourth National Development Plan 1980-85, Ministry of National Planning, Lagos, 1980.
 2. Abu Ibrahim (Director of Administration, FCDA): Report on Abuja Expenditure, FCDA, 1983.
 3. Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago (Director of Planning and Survey, FCDA): Implementing a Master Plan: The Abuja Experience, FCDA, March, 1984.

A similar situation occurred in 1981. In 1982 and 1983, the proportion of funds disbursed actually declined to 56 and 36 percent of the budgets, respectively. On the average, the proportion of funds disbursed to the FCDA is less than 55 percent. If the agency yearly collects only about half of its annual funding as shown, it implies that the FCDA may not be able to meet its construction targets especially, if such targets were tied to the expectation of a full collection of its annual allocations. In short, this has been one of the dilemmas facing FCDA, because, it prepares its annual expenditure plan based on the expectation that it would be making a full collection of its annual receipts from the federal government in the same year. Consequently, the delays in making a full collection, results in part to non-payment of contractors, and prevents the agency from starting construction of new projects.

A further reflection of the FCDA's weak financial situation is indicated by the proportion of debt (N 1392 million) owed to contractors (which results in part from the slowness in releasing funds to the Agency), compared with the total contract commitments (N 1967 million) as of June 1984 (Table 6.3). Table 6.3 shows that none of the Departments of the FCDA have been able to pay half of its outstanding contract obligations. As of 1984, the Departments of Engineering and Estate Services had paid off less than 30 percent of their outstanding debts. The Department of Finance and Economic Development had paid off less than 50

Table 6.3

Summary of FCDA's Commitments as of June 1984

(in ₦ millions)

Departments	Contract <u>Sum</u> 1 (₦ million)	Amount <u>paid</u> 2 (₦ million)	(2) as percent of (1) 3 (%)	Amount <u>outstanding</u> 4 (₦ million)	(4) as percent of (1) 5 (%)
a) Engineering and Estate Services	820.91	173.74	21.0%	647.17	70.0%
b) Finance and Economic Development	37.14	18.01	48.5%	19.13	51.5%
c) Planning & Surveys/ Resettlement	139.64	14.37	10.0%	124.27	90.0%
d) Administration/ FCT projects	86.98	35.64	41.0%	51.34	59.0%
e) Building	882.55	333.88	38.0%	548.63	62.0%
Total	1967.22	575.64	29.0% Average	1391.58	71.0% Average

Source: Compiled from: Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of Abuja Project, FCDA, August 1984, p. 29.

percent, Planning and Surveys 10 percent, Administration 41 percent, and Building 38 percent. In total, the departments have not paid off nearly 71 percent of their total obligations.

Finally, the high proportion of uncompleted projects compared with the total number required to ensure movement to the new city in 1986, as shown later, also indicates that the FCDA may be in deeper financial trouble than the preceding tables have indicated. A detailed analysis of the FCDA's attainments in Chapter 8 will help illuminate the problem.

6.2 Factors Affecting FCDA's Financial Position

The generally weak revenue income situation of the FCDA is explained principally by three basic factors:

- (i) the fast pace of construction necessitated by the demand that the project be completed in a relatively short time (8 years). The pressure arising from this time, although previously imposed during the master planning process, was worsened by the civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari. Shagari demanded that instead of moving the national government to Abuja in 1986, as originally planned, that it be moved in 1982. This

new demand set in motion serious reorganization problems that affected the FCDA's financial position.

- (ii) the project's near-total dependence on weak federal government revenue sources, that relied largely on the oil revenue, and the inability of the FCDA to generate internally other substantial revenue.
- (iii) the lack of general management competence, high overheads, bureaucratic red tape or levity of the FCDA's administration. This was most apparent in the Agency's laxity in collecting rents, coordinating projects, and the inability to grant approvals on time.

6.2.1 Conflicting Objectives and the New Capital's Funding

As demonstrated in Chapter 5, the master plan for Abuja was born of military leaders that had just gained control of the government. Nigerian politics changed rapidly during the time that the plan was being developed in an isolated environment. On February 13, 1976, General Muhammed was assassinated in a coup attempt. The death of Muhammed did not affect the relocation plans, as his successor, General Obasanjo continued to proceed along the same path. As noted in Chapter 3, the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime had given a

mandate for a return to civilian rule. The process of replacing the military government with a civilian government developed steadily throughout the planning period. In September 1976, the Constitutional Drafting Committee submitted its final report to the Federal Military Government. On August 31, 1977, elections were held for positions in a Constituent Assembly. A constitution was presented to the head of state on August 29, 1978, and it was promulgated on September 21. A little less than a year later, a Presidential election was held and in October 1979, the military government withdrew, allowing for the election and inauguration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari as the President of the Second Republic.

The inauguration of a new civilian government in 1979 coincided with what could be described as the beginning of the new capital's actual construction process, because the completed Master Plan was submitted to the government only in February of that year. (But recall that some construction had already begun by 1978). President Shagari, although a wholehearted supporter of the new capital, was the head of a civilian regime. The new president had to conform his desire for relocation within the framework of a new political process. The insulated environment of the military period had been replaced by the contentious environment of party politics. Ethnic groups clinging to party loyalties accentuated the political division of the

country.¹

The nature of political integration in the country was abruptly transformed by this sudden advent of democracy. At each level of decision making, the new capital project had faced the conflicting and sometimes hostile objections of the country's numerous parties. Some of the top politicians, for example, the leader of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) had threatened to stop the new capital project if elected to office.² Shagari's primary goal in this situation was survival. In order to lead the country he had to maintain his elected position. To this end, the new capital project was to be altered to a great extent, to reflect his priorities. That change in priorities is reflected by Shagari's decision to move the capital officially to Abuja in 1982 instead of the 1986 deadline.

Critics had charged that because of Shagari's weak and constantly changing coalition, and the impending reelection in 1983, the president sensing a possible shift in the country's balance of power to the North (away from the Yoruba South), realized that conducting the election from Lagos would be extremely dangerous.³ (The 1979 elections were run by the military; therefore, security was never

(1) Recall that in Chapters 2 and 3 it has been demonstrated that the formation of political parties was largely carried out along ethnic lines; the situation did not change during the second Republic as demonstrated by the 1979 presidential election results (See Table 2.9).

(2) Ajato Gandonu (1984), "Implementing Abuja: 1975-1983;" Ibid., op. cit., p. 10.

(3) Jonathan Moore (1984), Planning Abuja: The Politics of New Capital Construction; Ibid., op. cit., p. 102.

threatened). For this reason Shagari announced the move to Abuja earlier (in 1982) than scheduled.

As Moore (1982) noted about the political developments and the sudden change of the deadline:

Locating a new capital by 1986 would have been difficult; accomplishing this by 1982 is inconceivable. Yet the political importance of holding elections vis-a-vis survival took precedence over the problems inherent in moving the capital to a virgin site in such an extremely short period of time.¹

The changing time frame exemplifies how a plan produced by the military under complete control was altered by the political realities of Nigerian development. The optimal political structure for the new capital's construction had been replaced, yet the project survived.

To meet the 1982 deadline, the new civilian administration orchestrated an elaborate organizational structure that had on its payroll 2,500 persons, thus altering the original structure of FCDA established by the military. In addition to expanding the FCDA, two additional new agencies--the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory (MFCT) and the Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) were created to quicken the pace of implementation. Expansion of the FCDA to incorporate many more departments was done to encourage the division of labor, which was to facilitate efficient and faster project execution. Also, an involvement of two additional agencies was to relieve FCDA of

(1) Jonathan Moore, *ibid.*, p. 104.

certain territorial functions so that FCDA would concentrate on executing projects within the Federal Capital City (FCC) and thus, facilitate the anticipated movement in 1982.

Table 6.4 shows the amounts released to Abuja as a consequence of this new organizational structure. The injection of funds over and above the figures stipulated in the Fourth National Development Plan reflects this political mood of the civilian administration for quick movement to the new capital.

From Table 6.4 it can be shown that over 56 percent of the total funds released to the entire project between 1976 and 1985 came within the two-year period of 1980 to 1982.

A more serious impact of this new organizational structure is probably the cost of maintaining it. For example, nearly 40 percent of the funds released to the FCDA in 1982 was devoted to paying salaries and overhead costs.¹ In addition to financing the elaborate organizational structure, the introduction of many departments had created coordination and management problems, as many decision points, involving bureaucratic red tapes have developed. (See Section 6.3.)

Another major impact of this new organizational set-up

(1) The 40 percent is derived by dividing ₦ 99.18 million (representing expenditures on salaries and overhead costs derived from the 1982 FCDA's Approved Estimates) by the proportion of funds actually released to the agency in that year. The actual amount released to the agency is derived by multiplying ₦ 485.41 million, the total budget allocation in 1982, by 54 percent which is the (average) percent generally released to the FCDA each year (Table 6.2).

Table 6.4

Funds Released for Abuja Projects from 1976-1985

(# million)

Year	Fourth National Development Plan ¹ Allocation	Amount Released ²
1976	2.80 ^a	2.80 ^a
1977	N/A	72.55
1978	N/A	98.18
1979	N/A	113.48
1980	118.00 ^b	187.33
1981	364.03	438.55
1982	485.61	526.60
1983	485.61	313.18
1984	533.93	162.90 ^c
1985	558.19	155.32 ^c

a: This amount was set aside in the Third National Development Plan in 1975, at a time when the Master Plan for Abuja was still being drafted.

N/A: The budgeted allocations are not available, and this may be because the Master Plan for Abuja was not yet completed by the time the Third National Development Plan was being prepared.

b: The amount represents FCT's share of the 1980 Federal budget: quoted in Abu Ibrahim, Director of Administration: "Report on Abuja Expenditure, FCDA, 1982.


c: Represents projected allocations after the military take-over of December 1983.

- Sources:
1. Fourth National Development Plan 1980-1985.
 2. Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago (Director of Planning and Surveys). Implementing a Master Plan: The Abuja Experience. FCDA, March 5, 1984.

is reflected in the FCDA's weak funding relationship with the two new agencies--MFCT and FCTA. During the military regime (that is, before 1979), funding was forwarded directly to the FCDA as a parastatal by way of direct subvention from the federal government. (Figure 6.2.) But with the creation of the MFCT, this direct relationship with the federal government was changed, as shown in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. With this new arrangement, two constraints were additionally imposed on the FCDA. First, FCDA, although allowed to prepare its budget based on needs, must now submit budgets for approval through the MFCT, thus creating an additional channel through which budgets must pass before approval. This often resulted in serious delays in getting funds to the FCDA. Second, while the FCDA had to operate within the financial and budgeting constraints of the federal government, the FCTA obtained its financial resources as a statutory allocation from the Federation Account.¹ Thus, the Federal Capital Territory Administration was relatively surer of funds than the FCDA. This arrangement had implications for the implementation of the Abuja project. While the development of the whole territory proceeded without inhibition, that of the city was severely constrained by shortage or delay of funds. As both the FCDA and FCTA were engaged in the provision of houses and other


(1) The Federal Capital Territory is also entitled to statutory allocations. From this account, the FCTA can receive its funds directly from the MFCT rather than from the federal government accounts.

Figure 6.2. Schematic Representation of the Funding Structure
For Abuja during the Civilian Administration (1980-83)



Source: Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the Abuja Project, Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), August, 1980, p. 25.

Figure 6.3. Interim Modification of the Funding Structure in late 1983



Source: Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the Abuja Project, Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA), August, 1984, p. 26.

infrastructure, the former within the city, and the latter within the Territory, it meant that the funds for the physical implementation of the "Abuja Project" were shared between the Federal Capital City (FCC) and the entire Territory. But because the FCTA, within the new organizational structure, is able to obtain its funds much more quickly than the FCDA, the agency has been able to provide substantial infrastructure to the FCT. On the other hand, the FCDA which is constrained by the new funding structure, has been unable to provide significant infrastructure and services to the FCC. Consequently, there is a substantial gap between the amount of infrastructure built in the FCT and the FCC even though the latter should receive greater priority than the former because it was targeted for completion in 1986. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 show respectively the quality of houses completed or under construction within the FCC in comparison with the rest of the Territory (the Federal Capital Territory). A comparison of the two tables indicates that while a total of 9,931 housing units have been contracted out for construction in the FCT, only 7,851 units have been awarded in the FCC. Out of all the units awarded for construction, 7,002 units (or 71 percent) of those in the FCT have been completed, while only 3,524 (or 45 percent) of those units in the FCC have been completed.

Obviously, a rapid development of housing in the FCT can be helpful in supplementing housing at the FCC, but when

Table 6.5

Housing Construction in FCC Phase I, Abuja

Serial No.	District	Total No. of Houses (Contract Awarded)	Total No. Completed	Total No. Under Construction	Percent Completion	Remarks
1.	Garki	3,793	2,647	1,146	70%	Almost all of them have completed services
2.	Asokoro	149	nil	149	0%	Senior Executive Houses
3.	Wuse	3,869	877	2,992	23%	Without services
4.	Maitama	40	nil	40	0%	Minister's House
Total		7,851	3,524	4,327	15%	

Source: Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the Abuja Project, FCDA, August 1984, p. 15.

Table 6.6

Housing Construction in the FCT

LOCATION	TOTAL # OF HOUSES AWARDED ON CONTRACT	TOTAL # COMPLETED	TOTAL # UNDER CONSTRUCTION	REMARKS
1. Gwagwalada	898	406	492	
2. Karu New Town	775	466	309	
3. Nyanya Worker's Camp	7,232	5,950	1,282	
4. Karshi Dev. Area	170	31	139	
5. Bwari Dev. Area	165	64	101	
6. Kuje Dev. Area	200	31	169	
7. Kwali Dev. Area	175	55	120	
8. Yaba Dev. Area	89	21	68	
9. Abaji Dev. Area	137	55	82	
10. Rubochi Dev. Area	90	23	57	
TOTAL	9,931	7,002	2,929	

Source: Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the Abuga Project, FCDA, August 1984, p. 16.

it is realized that such houses are being developed at great distances from the FCC (See Table 6.7), coupled with the problems of inadequate transportation between such areas and the FCC, their utility in supplementing the FCC becomes doubtful. This writer (1984) observed that while there was a shortage of housing at the FCC, many of the housing units developed in the FCT (for example, at Gwagwalada) remain unoccupied, in part because of their great distance from the FCC.¹

The need for further rationalization of the administrative structure for the implementation of the "Abuja Project" made the government scrap the FCTA in 1984.² Its responsibilities are now shared between the MFCT and the nine Local Government Areas (including Abuja Municipal Government). In reality, however, the distribution of available resources between the territory on the one hand and the city on the other remains the same. With the new structure, FCDA is still required to submit its budgets through MFCT, which forwards it to the federal government for approval. In addition, the amount of funds received by FCDA still depends on the proportion of the total revenue retained by the federal government. In other words, (as in the former structure, Figure 6.2), the available FCDA funds

(1) Shortage of housing at FCC has led to housing many of the FCDA workers at Nyanya and Life Camps which were originally designated for housing the contractors and their employees.

(2) Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Reviews of the Abuja Project, FCDA, August, 1984, p. 26.

Table 6.7

Distances of the FCDA's Housing Estates
from the Capital City

<u>Location of Housing Estate</u>	<u>Distance from Abuja</u>
Karshi	31 km
Bwari	43 km
Gwagwalada	52 km
Kuje	72 km
Rubochi	131 km
Abaji	117 km
Yaba	112 km
Kwali	68 km

Source: Compiled from the Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the Abuja Project, FCDA, August 1984, p. 17.

will depend on other competing demands on this federally-retained revenue, as well as the extent to which such revenue is realizable. In the following section, the implication of this dependence on the federal revenue is further explored.

6.2.2 Problems of Project's Dependency on Public Funding

As pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, one of the factors contributing to the new capital's financial weaknesses is the project's near-total dependence on a weak federal government revenue and the inability of the FCDA to generate internally other substantial revenue. The objective of this section is to examine and assess the nature and impacts of this phenomenon.

Being a quasi-governmental agency, FCDA is being principally financed from public funds consisting essentially, of direct federal government subvention. As Table 6.8 indicates, the federal government's subvention provided approximately 97 percent of FCDA's revenue in 1980, and 99 percent of the revenue in 1981, and again 97 percent in 1982. Although the figures for internally generated revenues for the periods 1976 to 1979 are not available, it is unlikely that the pattern of revenue sources shown in the table could have been significantly different, given that those years marked the period of little activity in terms of implementation. Table 6.8 also shows that internally-

Table 6.8

FCDA's Revenue Sources 1980-1982 (₦ million)

Internally Generated Revenue from the Departments of:	1980	1981 ^a	1982 ^b
Finance and Economic Development	2,299	1,766	2,818
Administration	70	120	96
Engineering Services	8	16	17
Planning and Surveys	925	4,001	6,355
Subtotal.....	3,302	5,903	9,286
Subvention from the Fed'l Gov't*	94,400	609,000	271,000
Gross Total.....	97,702	614,903	280,286
% Internally Generated Revenue	3%	1%	3%
% Fedreal Government Subvention	97%	99%	97%

* In addition to the subvention, FCDA would benefit from the Federal appropriation to the FCC as a municipal government in 1983.

a: Approved Estimates for 1981

b: Estimates for 1982

Source: Compiled from: Approved Estimates for the Year 1982, Department of Finance, FCDA, 1983.

generated revenue for the periods 1980, 1981, and 1982 represented only 3 percent, 1 percent, and 3 percent respectively, of the FCDA's total revenue. Loans (external and domestic) are not yet being utilized, although negotiation has begun of a possible ₦281.2 million loan offer from Britain, ₦260.56 million from the United States, and ₦41 million from France.¹ But it is too early to build such offers into the estimate of funds available for implementing the new capital project. FCDA, however, has no power to negotiate commercial loans. Such loans were required to be guaranteed by the federal government, which is often not disposed to give the FCDA a wide discretion or free rein to negotiate for loans, perhaps in order to retain and ensure strict government financial control, or possibly because the government had not judged the Agency as being capable of handling such loans efficiently. The sources of internally-generated revenue include interest on bank deposits, interest on loans for housing, vehicles, etc., dividends from investments, rents from housing quarters, restaurants, shopping center, club house etc., sales of publications, maps, unserviceable assets, fees and charges for land application, registration, certificates of occupancy, etc. The proportional contribution of these sources to FCDA's revenue is shown in Table 6.9. In 1980, internal revenue sources generated approximately ₦2.4 million. Out of this amount, interest on bank deposits alone contributed approxi-

(1) Ibid., p. 38.

Table 6.9

FCDA's Internally-Generated Revenue Sources (₱)

Source	1980	1981	1982
1. Interest on Bank Deposits	2,200,000 (92%)	1,000,000 (23%)	1,392,932 (20.7%)
2. Interest on Loans (Housing, vehicles, etc.)	700 (.03%)	5,800 (.1%)	8,000 (.1%)
3. Dividends from Investments	---	600,000 (14%)	1,207,068 (17.9%)
4. Rents from: (Quarters, restaurants, ground, shopping center, club house, etc.)	73,700 (3%)	250,000 (6%)	450,000 (6.7%)
5. Loans	---	---	---
6. Sales of: (Publications, maps, unserviceable assets, petrol, etc.)	31,000 (1%)	45,000 (1%)	91,000 (1.4%)
7. Fees and Charges: (Tender fees, Guest studio charges, land application fees, service charges, certificate of occupancy, search fees, workshop, etc.)	84,200 (4%)	2,501,500 (56.8%)	3,565,900 (53%)
Total	2,389,600 (100%)	4,402,300 (100%)	6,714,900 (100%)

Source: Compiled from: Approved Estimates for the Year 1982, Department of Finance, FCDA, 1982.

mately ₦2.2 or 92 percent. Fees and charges followed only by ₦84,200 or 4 percent. Amounts generated from other sources (rents, dividends, sales, etc.) were very insignificant. In 1981 the situation in terms of the proportion of funds generated from the internal sources changed considerably. The amount generated from interest on bank deposits declined significantly to ₦1 million (or 23 percent) of the total sources, while fees and charges picked up to more than ₦2.5 million, (or 56.8 percent) of the total contribution from all sources. Rents (although doubled) and sales still remained low at approximately 6 percent and 1 percent, respectively, of the total sources. Dividends from investments, which was a new source of revenue in 1981, generated 14 percent of the total funds.

In 1982, a pattern similar to that of 1981 was repeated except that rents picked up very slightly to 6.7 percent, fees/charges and interest on bank deposits declined slightly (although increased in absolute terms) to 53 percent and 20.7 percent, respectively. Dividends from investments also increased to 17.9 percent.

In general, interest on bank deposits, fees/charges, and dividends represented the main three sources of internally-generated revenue from 1980 to 1982. Given that interest on bank deposits and dividends are likely to depend on annual allocation from the federal government, these two sources may be highly unreliable as an internal source of revenue, because there is a great inconsistency in the

amount and frequency of such funds from the federal government. Thus, the two sources (interest on bank deposits and dividends) may not be reliable in predicting accruable revenues from internal sources.

The high proportion of fees and charges occurred in 1981 and 1982. These two periods (as may be recalled) marked the period of intense activity when movement to the new capital was anticipated. Depending on the level of activity, it is likely to remain the major source of internally-generated revenue at the new capital.

As already stated, the rent contribution to the internal sources of revenue was very small: 3 percent in 1980, 6 percent in 1981, and 6.7 percent in 1982. The low proportion of total rents collected is due largely to:

(a) a lack of a sufficient number of completed rent-yielding projects. For example, only 3,254 units out of 25,000 units of housing required for movement to the FCC in 1986 have been completed. (See Table 5.3.) Furthermore, a high proportion of completed housing units within the FCT, which could provide a source of rents, lay unoccupied.

(b) a concentration of construction of long-term and non-rent yielding assets (except where the assets are already being used by individuals) e.g., water resources, sewers, electricity, schools, roads, etc.

(c) laxity on the part of the agency in collecting such rents, as well as a corresponding unenthusiastic and lax attitude of the general populace to debts owed to the government or its agencies. People do not feel much pressure paying debts to the government, and the indebtedness to the agency by the public at any given time could be substantial. For example, out of approximately twenty residents (including non-FCDA workers) this writer talked to during his study visits to Abuja, none had paid any rents to FCDA at all.

Complementing this laxity is a lack of adequate records as to who assigns the completed quarters, who lives in them and the number allocated. Depending on the position of officials in FCDA and in FCT's organizational hierarchy, officers could randomly assign living quarters to prospective tenants. For example, the military attache to the MFCT could, without proper consultation, overturn allocations made by the Department of Administration, which is officially charged with allocating housing units. This writer witnessed an incident when a military colonel went to evict residents in one of the residential areas of the new city, even though the residents were legally assigned to these residential flats. In another incident, a professor this writer was lodging with, had to vacate his flat and move to a new location. Six persons showed up with duly-signed papers from six different officers claiming that they had been allocated the same flat. In yet another confusing

situation, the professor noted above had just obtained an extension of stay permitting him to remain in his flat for another week to enable him to get adequately ready before moving to his new location. The next day after he received this permission, the military ordered him to vacate the flat. The professor went back to the Department of Administration to report the incident, but was told that the department had nothing to do with the military's orders. He must obey the orders.

Granted that this kind of confusion in terms of who does what, when, and how was likely to emerge in a relatively young agency of the FCDA's type, such confusion may not augur well with an efficient administration, which is required to implement housing control and rent policies. Potential rent evaders will take advantage of the situation, and not pay rents, or those who assign the units will be inclined to misappropriate such rents.

Because rents are likely to provide a much more stable source of revenue (internally) than, say, interest on bank loans or dividends from investments (which rely heavily on government funding), their significance among the internal sources of revenue to FCDA will depend to a large degree on the extent to which they can be collected.

The ability of the Abuja project to continue to receive funding would depend upon the reliability of the federal revenue sources, the number of other competing demands on such sources, and the federal government's priorities.

Thus, any fluctuation or decline in federal revenue income could be expected to adversely affect the project's funding. In short, this has been the fate of Abuja's funding, which has depended largely on the unreliable oil revenue sources.

Since the 1970's, the federal revenue source has depended heavily on oil revenue (See Table 6.10). From 1973 on, oil has remained practically Nigeria's chief merchandise export and the major source of the government's current revenue. According to the Fourth National Development Plan, the oil subsector accounted for 89 percent of the value added of the mining and quarrying sector, which contributed nearly one-quarter of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during the period 1975 to 1980 of the Third Plan.¹ As a matter of fact, the production of crude petroleum rose steadily between 1975 and 1979 except for a slight drop in 1978. The drop in output was attributed largely to the fall in demand in the world market. More specifically:

- (i) production increased from 651 million barrels in 1975 (approximately 1.8 million barrels a day (m.b.d.)) to 757 million barrels in 1976 (2.1 m.b.d.) and 765 million barrels in 1977 (again approximately 2.1 m.b.d.);
- (ii) in 1978 production dropped to 692 million barrels (1.9 m.b.d.). In 1979, however, it rose to a

(1) Fourth National Development Plan (1981 to 1985).

Table 6.10

Profile of an Oil Economy

Oil as a percent of:			
Year	Gross Domestic Product	Government Current Revenue	Merchandise Export
1970	10	46 ^b	58
1973	23	67	85
1974	22	81	93
1975	18	79	93
1976	18	78	96
1977	17	74	96
1978	21	68	89
1979	24	82	94
1980	26	84 ^c	96

a = figures for financial year beginning in year indicated

b = average 1970-1 to 1972-3

c = calendar year

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria: Ministry of Finance, Lagos

record level of 841 million barrels (2.3 m.b.d.).¹

The Fourth Plan projections of the GDP for the period 1980 to 1985 were based on the assumption that petroleum production would remain constant at about 2 m.b.d., while the price would be around \$38 per barrel in constant 1980 prices.² Thus, any decline in the oil revenue could be expected to have serious consequences for both the growth of the GDP and the government's ability to finance various programs and projects. In fact, oil production dropped in August of 1981 to 0.7 m.b.d., while the price (at current prices) was \$34 per barrel.³ In December 1981 production had risen again to 1.8 m.b.d. at a price of \$34 per barrel and has presently (March 1986) remained approximately at 1.5 m.b.d at \$15 per barrel. The "roller coaster" of oil prices and production has correspondingly affected the levels of federally collected revenue (Table 6.11) as well as the level of funding for the Abuja project.⁴ The decline in oil revenue has forced the government to reschedule some of FCDA's short-term debts and reduce the average annual

(1) Regional Development Plan For the Federal Capital Territory, Vol. 2 Book 3, Final Report submitted to the FCDA by Doxiadis Associates (Nigeria) Ltd., January 1983.

(2) Fourth National Development Plan, 1981-1985.

(3) Regional Development Plan for the Federal Capital Territory, Ibid., p. 1346.

(4) The future revenue incomes and capital expenditures presented in Table 6.1 were estimated by the Interministerial Committee on the Review of Abuja Projects, and are based on the levels of future oil productions and revenues. See Report of the Interministerial Committee in the Review of the Abuja Project, FCDA, August 1984.

Table 6.11
 Federally Collected Revenue (1979/80-1983)
 (₦ million)

Year	Sources			Petroleum as a Percent of Total (%)
	<u>Petroleum</u>	<u>Other*</u> (₦ million)	<u>Total</u>	
1979-80	10,100.4	2,171.8	12,272.2	82
1980 4/1-12/31	9,486.8	2,108.4	11,595.2	82
1981 ^a	11,562.3	3,183.4	14,745.7	78
1982 ^b	5,143.9	3,780.3	8,924.2	58
1983 ^b	5,111.9	3,443.2	8,555.1	60

*: Includes Customs and Exise Tax, company tax, etc.
 a: Estimates
 b: Revised Estimates

Source: Report on the Nigerian Economy and Statistical Review, Ministry of National Planning, Lagos, 1983, pp. 11-12.

commitment on the new capital project.¹ (See Table 6.12).

The high level of funding maintained between 1981-1983 in Table 6.12, despite the decline in oil revenue during this period, as shown in Table 6.11, may be due to: first, the lag between the time the decline in revenue actually occurs and the time it takes the federal government to adjust to such decline; secondly, the continued high level of funding was due to the determined effort (commitment) of the government to move the capital by 1982. The table, however, shows a sharp decline in funding after 1983. The projected capital expenditure on Abuja from 1984 to 1990 was based on the anticipated level of oil production and prices, which the government expected to remain fairly constant at 1.3 m.b.d. and \$30 per barrel respectively, and the contribution of other sources of revenue.² This implies that the current reduction in oil revenue could further jeopardize the chances of a steady funding for the new capital project.

In concluding the analysis of the impact of the project's dependency on the federal government sources, a relevant question to raise and address is: suppose that the oil revenue projections were realized, and suppose that all the annual allocations for the project were actually disbursed to the FCDA, would the agency still have been able to meet its construction targets? It is difficult to speculate the right answer to this question, however, in

(1) Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the Abuja Project, Ibid., p. 37.

(2) Ibid., p. 33.

Table 6.12

Summary of Public Sector (Federal Government) Financing;
Abuja Project 1976 to 1990 (₦ million)

Year	Total Funding
1976	2.8
1977	72.58
1978	98.18
1979	113.48
1980	187.33
1981	438.55
1982	526.60
1983	313.18
1984 ^a	162.90
1985 ^a	155.32
1986 ^a	159.38
1987 ^a	162.39
1988 ^a	160.16
1989 ^a	156.32
1990 ^a	154.11

a: projected figures

- Sources: (1) Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago: Implementation A Master Plan: The Abuja Experience, FCDA, March 1984, p. 41-42.
- (2) Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the Abuja Project, FCDA, August 1984, p. 28.

light of the other factors involving political problems identified and discussed earlier in the chapter, it is unlikely that realizing the oil revenue projections and giving the agency its full annual allocations would have made much difference. In the following discussion, we argue that FCDA's financial position was also weakened by management inefficiency.

6.2.3 The Problem of Management Inefficiency

The other factor in the relatively weak financial position of the FCDA can be attributed to a general management incompetence, high overheads, bureaucratic red tape or levity of its administration, also characteristics of many public agencies. This is most apparent in the FCDA's laxity in enforcing and collecting rents (as we have already noted) and in the inability to manage all its contracts.

The inability to manage the contracts can be explained in part by the weaknesses of the official government guidelines for administering the projects. A brief description of the nature of this guideline will help illuminate its weaknesses.

Prior to 1979, when the civilian administration was voted into office, the military government had established a committee to oversee, manage and administer all the contracts awarded by the FCDA. This committee--the Executive Management Committee (EMC)--consisted of all the directors

of the various departments in the FCDA's administration. In 1980, this structure for administering the contracts was expanded by the civilian administration which had just been voted in in October of 1979. A three-tier organizational structure was set up. The first, which is still the EMC, consisted of all the department heads (directors) of the FCDA, as well as the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory (MFCT). (Recall that at this point the MFCT had been created as an umbrella agency housing the FCDA and the FCTA). This time, the EMC was authorized to review and approve all the contracts that were less than ₦ 0.5 million.

The next higher level for contract review was the FCDA Board of Directors. The members of this board were appointed by the President. The permanent secretary to the MFCT was also required to participate at this level. The FCDA Board of Directors was authorized to review contracts worth between ₦ .5 to ₦ 1 million.

The third level of contract review panel, which is the highest level in the hierarchy, is the Presidential Ministerial Council (PMC). The members of this panel included all the various ministers from the federal ministries. Note that the appointment of ministers was the exclusive responsibility of the President with the approval of the national assembly. Thus, the President was practically in control of the two highest levels (the FCDA's Board of Directors and the PMC) of the contract review structure.

The PMC was responsible for reviewing and approving all contracts worth more than ₦ 1 million.

The contract review structure just described has the following implication on the financial position of the new capital project: (i) While the FCDA was authorized to execute the projects, the agency was not actively participating in the review of projects and selection of contractors except those not exceeding ₦ .5 million. Given that the FCDA's professional expertise was not being fully utilized, the review of projects and selection of contractors became largely based on the discretion of the president and his appointees. Because these appointees were politicians, largely inexperienced in urban planning and project financing, the selection of contractors became, for the most part, based on political criteria rather than on the contractor's ability to do the work and his costing proposals. The large-scale abandonment of projects halfway has been attributed in part to the general incompetence of such contractors.¹ In other situations, such contractors have sold their contract leases to entirely different contractors who often executed the project without being detected. Professional incompetence is reflected in some of the completed structures in Phase One, where some of the housing units have cracked walls, and floors, and falling fixtures. (ii) The new (expanded) review structure has contributed to

(1) The abandonment of projects have also been attributed to non-payment of contractors and lack of building materials to complete the projects.

execution delays. Because of many decision points and power plays, a longer time is now required to review certain projects than before. The non-execution of the Upper Usman Dam project has been attributed in part to this factor.

(iii) Because the FCDA's participation in the contract review was limited, it led to laxity or lack of interest on the part of the agency to effectively supervise the activities of the contractors. Similarly, the payment of such contractors was delayed except where the contractors would offer favors in return for such payments. (iv) Finally, the involvement of the three tiers requires additional maintenance and overhead costs in terms of emoluments and other fringe benefits. As Gandonu (1984) has noted about the cost of maintaining public officials in the Abuja projects:

It is not often realized by cost analysts on this and other Nigerian projects that while personal emoluments or salaries could constitute less than 10 percent of the actual costs on staffing, the enormous invisible costs peculiarly taken for granted in Nigeria, go into the provision of accommodation, health care, free travel/transportation, and assorted fringe benefits.¹

In addition to the institutional structure set up to ensure an efficient management of Abuja contracts, the government's guideline also requires that a 10 percent mobilization fee be paid out to indigenous contractors as soon as they are awarded contracts. This would encourage

(1) Ajato Gandonu, "Abuja: Planning the Nation's Capital," (in Development Planning in Nigeria: Planning Experience in Developing Economy, (to be published) by NISER, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 1984.

the participation of indigenous contractors, by providing them with initial capital to start off their projects immediately and minimize delay in overall project execution. On paper, this policy seemed well and good, but in practice, many of the contractors actually abandoned their projects or at best resold their contract lease (again) to different contractors.

In order to secure the mobilization fee, many such contractors presented false credentials to the officials, who in turn, were unable to detect such falsification.

The ability of the contractors to secure contracts fraudulently and also resell them without detection, can be attributed to the weaknesses in FCDA's management, to the incompetence of its personnel, to the corruptibility of its officials, and to the general public's attitude that fraudulence was the only way through which they would possibly benefit from the entire project. Many of the housing projects did not get off the ground or have been abandoned half-way, also, because of this particular problem.

In Chapter 7 the analysis of the FCDA's capacity to manage and administer the new capital project is investigated further. We will reveal further aspects of management inefficiencies, their sources, and their impact on overall project construction.

6.3 Summary: Consequences of the Financial Weaknesses

We have provided a profile of the financial structure of the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) in an effort to identify and analyze some of the financial problems of this agency. The circumstances that necessitated the financial problems were also outlined and discussed.

It was noted that the FCDA's financial position is relatively weak. The relatively weak position is attributed principally to the fast pace of construction, which brought reorganization problems that affected the FCDA's funding position, its near-excessive dependence on a weak federal government revenue, and the inability of the agency to exploit other internal sources of revenue, and a resulting general management inefficiency.

There are four consequences of the financial problems. First, it has affected the FCDA's ability to pay its contractors. We noted that the FCDA, as of 1984, had not paid nearly 71 percent of its total debt to the contractors. When these contractors are paid, they are often paid after long delays.

The non-payment of contractors has affected the pace of the new capital construction. The contractors, especially the indigenous ones, rely heavily on such payments, to pay their workers, pay for equipment and materials, and finance additional (future) contracts. Furthermore, the long delays

in paying the contractors have often resulted in giving or demanding favors by officials, especially by those who were inclined to seek such favors. (In Chapter 7, the causes and consequences of this particular problem are explored in detail since it is also manifest in other activities of the agency.)

Second, the financial problems have resulted in part in the reorganization of the overall project implementation structure. Although such reorganization had some political overtones, it is believed that the project's weak financial position has contributed to the situation.

Third, the consequence of the FCDA's financial weaknesses is heavily felt in its inability to meet its construction targets for the 1986 deadline. Most of the housing infrastructure and amenities have not been built. For example, there is at present no sewage treatment system; the city center has not been built; only 15 percent of the housing units required to accommodate the expected 150,000 population has been completed. There are an insufficient number of office spaces. The hospital complex, primary school, and other amenities are still under construction. The full details of these features and problems are the subject of our discussion in Chapter 8.

Fourth, because the necessary facilities required to sustain the seat of government, public servants, and other functionaries are inadequate, the Buhari Administration has opted to organize movement to the new city in phases, in

contrast to the originally planned one-phase movement. Starting in late 1986, the first phase of movement will start with about six federal ministries and departments. In 1988, an additional nine ministries and departments are expected to move. The final phase of movement (Phase III) will occur in 1990.¹

The ability to meet these deadlines will obviously depend upon the level of facilities and infrastructure provided, which depends on the project's general funding characteristics, the reliability of the federal revenue, and the general political mood of the country.

(1) Report of the Interministerial Review Committee on the Review of the Abuja Project, *Ibid.*, op. cit., p. 57-59.

CHAPTER 7

FCDA: ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY AND PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

One of the two major (implicit) assumptions of the new capital's planning process is the availability of adequate organizational capacity to implement the new capital project. The other assumption relates to the belief that there would be adequate financial resources to execute the project. In the last chapter we examined the FCDA in terms of its financial structure and noted that its financial position was weak. This chapter is an extension of Chapter 6, in that it provides a deeper background for understanding additional organizational problems that inhibited or obstructed effective project implementation. The origin, objectives, functions, and processes of the FCDA will be examined, as well as the effectiveness of its legal powers with respect to ensuring a successful implementation. The evidence on the practical effectiveness of the enabling legal authority is that, in spite of its sweeping powers, the agency's capacity to carry out its functions and operations was inhibited by four general problems not uncommon in many public agencies.

They were:

- (i) a general lack of management and administrative autonomy;
- (ii) a lack of organizational stability, reflected in high turnover of the FCDA staff due to rapid change of governments and priorities;
- (iii) a lack of sufficient and skilled labor and committed staff, a problem generally affected by the 'federal character' policy; and

(iv) a lack of sufficient financial capacity--already examined in Chapter 6.

The agency could not control effectively, its activities because of constant interference from the federal government. In addition, the FCDA could not effectively play its coordinative role because of counter provisions in the Federal Capital Territory Decree, which made it easy for the federal government to intervene almost at will. An example was the sudden creation of a complementary agency to the FCDA, the Federal Capital Territory Administration, which practically took over the administration and provision of infrastructural facilities to the entire territory. While the creation of this agency was designed to relieve the FCDA of some of its functions, in order to quicken project implementation, the creation of this agency, together with the MFCT, often resulted to organizational conflicts in terms of who was in charge of what, how, and where. As a result, it was difficult to give the Federal Capital City (FCC) the kind of attention it deserved because greater emphasis was laid on providing infrastructure to the territorial districts than to the FCC. Other frequent intrusions by the government have also hampered effective implementation. The freedom to intervene at will, and unexpectedly to change adopted or existing policies, did not facilitate fast implementation either.

The rapid, and often unexpected, structural changes experienced by the FCDA in its eight years of existence, have also inhibited operational efficiency as well as the opportunity for an accumulation of on-the-job experience needed by the

agency's relatively inexperienced staff. This would, in turn, exacerbate the problem of inadequate labor. The inadequacy is borne out by the fact that many of the agency's activities including site analysis, building design, layout plans, mapping, demographic studies, etc., were being contracted to outside consultants and contractors.

The project's organizational structure and process left many loopholes for both financial and political corruption. Examples related to the project's highly centralized decision-making and power structure, which created accessibility problems, especially for the less privileged; ethnic bias, which has influenced top level appointments in the agency; and bureaucratic red tape, that has often led to frustration and delays, thereby creating the avenues for graft, especially for those inclined to become corrupt. The characteristics and magnitude of the impact of these problems will become fully evident as we examine in detail the FCDA's organizational structure in terms of the goals, objectives, and administrative control mechanisms.

7.1 Federal Capital Development Authority: Origin, Goals, and Objectives

The Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) was born out of a military decree--The Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Decree, No. 6 of 1976. Specifically in that decree, the FCDA was given several powers (some of which we have noted in Chapter 5), including:(1)

(1) Federal Capital Territory Decree No. 6. Supplement to

- (i) the choice of site for the location of the capital city within the capital territory;
- (ii) the preparation of a Master Plan for the capital city and of land use with respect to town and country planning within the rest of the capital territory;
- (iii) the provision of municipal services within the capital territory;
- (iv) the establishment of infrastructural services in accordance with the Master Plan referred to above; and
- (v) the coordination of the activities of all ministries, departments, and agencies of the government of the Federation within the capital territory.

In addition to these responsibilities, the FCDA was empowered to "do anything which in its opinion is calculated to facilitate the carrying on of its activities including, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, power":(1)

- (i) to sue and be sued in its corporate name;
- (ii) to construct and maintain such roads, railways, sidings, tramways, bridges, reservoirs, water courses, buildings, plant and machinery, and such other works "as may be necessary for, or conducive to, the discharge of its functions under the decree";
- (iii) to purchase or otherwise acquire or take over any asset, business, property, privilege, contract, right, obligation,

Official Gazette Extraordinary No. 7, Vol. 63. February 5, 1986, Part A.

(1) Ibid., p. 9

- and liability of any person or body (whether corporate or incorporate) in furtherance of its activities;
- (iv) to enter into contracts or partnerships with any person or body, that in the opinion of the authority, will facilitate the discharge of its functions;
 - (v) to train managerial and technical staff for the purpose of carrying out its functions
 - (vi) to exercise such other powers as are necessary or expedient for giving full effect to the provisions of the decree.

However, "except with the general or special approval of the Head of the Federal Military Government," the FCDA does not have the power to borrow money or to dispose of any property.(1)

To enable the authority to carry out the responsibilities (functions) specified in the decree, an eight-member Board of Directors, headed by a chairman, was appointed by the Supreme Military Council. In addition, an executive secretary (the chief executive officer of the Authority) "charged with the day to day running of the Authority" was also appointed by the Supreme Military Council (SMC). All other officers were appointed by the FCDA after consulting with the Federal Commissioner for Establishments.

The overriding powers of the FCDA over practically everything and everybody (except the Federal Military Government) would seem to make execution of the new capital projects, or, at least, the rationalization of the implementation process, easier.

(1) Ibid., p. 11

This is more so considering the provisions in Section 7 of the Decree that gave blanket powers to the FCDA to take full control of all developments within the Capital Territory. But all too often, the confirmation of legal powers are far different from the probabilities of the realization of the intents and objectives of these powers. The legal powers of the FCDA over the Abuja project were not an exception to this. Despite these sweeping powers, the Authority did not seem to find it easy to carry out its operations without a frequent and often excessive interference from the federal government (see the discussion in Section 7.2).

Furthermore, it is not certain that the federal military government intended these powers to be used because some of the powers appeared contradictory. Effective implementation was therefore impractical in light of these powers. The provision that FCDA "should do everything which in its opinion is calculated to facilitate the carrying on of its activities," for example, conflicts with another provision that requires that the FCDA not enter into any loan negotiations, or increase certain rents and fees, or conduct sales of any kind, without the approval of the federal military government, even under severe financial crisis; the provision that FCDA can "enter into contracts or partnerships with any person or body which in the opinion of the Authority will facilitate the discharge of its functions" is contradicted by another provision that stops the agency from approving and awarding certain categories of contracts, as discussed in Chapter 6.

Furthermore, the provision for FCDA "to coordinate all the activities of all the ministries, departments, and agencies of the Government of the Federation within the Capital Territory" is contradicted by the limited management ability of FCDA, as well as its limited power over some of the agencies that were created after the civilians took over in 1979. For example, as noted in Chapter 6, the creation in 1979 of the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory (MFCT) automatically made FCDA subordinate to that ministry. Furthermore, because this ministry and other agencies such as the Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) had their specific and enabling powers to carry out certain developments within the federal territory, FCDA had very limited power to stop them even if these agencies were 'going overboard' with their activities. A specific example of this dilemma is the situation in which housing estates and infrastructural facilities were being developed extensively in the federal territory (by the FCTA) without full consultation with the FCDA. The result has been that, while attention in terms of providing such facilities and housing has been focused on the FCT, the Federal Capital City (FCC) to which movement was to occur in 1986, was being neglected. In this regard the FCDA has not been effective in coordinating the territorial activities with those of the FCC, because the agency could not do anything to stop or control such developments.

There are other problems inhibiting the activities of the FCDA. The problems hinge on the weaknesses of the assumptions inherent in the agency's powers and authorities. In creating the

agency and expanding the authority and scope of functions of the FCDA and endowing it with the powers, the military government presumably acted as if:

- (i) the Agency would be free from the bureaucratic red tape and inefficiency characteristics of many public agencies. This particular assumption (as noted in Chapter 1) had a strong influence in using a new agency, rather than an existing one, to implement the new capital project.
- (ii) the agency would be granted adequate autonomy to carry out its functions. The weaknesses of this assumption are evident in almost every aspect of the agency's operations: financing, land matters, housing policies, etc.
- (iii) the agency would have adequate and sufficient labor in terms of skill, management ability, and commitment to execute the project.
- (iv) the agency would be organizationally stable so as to enable it to acquire the necessary and sufficient experience. The stability factor is important for a relatively young agency like the FCDA in order to acquire on-the-job experience that would augment its capacity for urban development purposes.

The weaknesses and failures of the FCDA as a public agency hinged on the shaky foundations of some of these assumptions, as will be evident from the following discussion and analysis.


7.2 FCDA Management: Autonomy versus Political Control

The magnitude of the weaknesses of the assumption that the FCDA would be granted sufficient autonomy to exercise all its powers can be understood by examining the pattern of the agency's authority structure. An examination of the authority structure is provided at three levels: first, the structure of the FCDA from 1976 to September 1979, which was created by the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime; second, the structure adopted by the Civilian Administration from October 1979 to December 1983 when this government was toppled; third, the structure adopted by the Buhari Administration which succeeded the civilian government--January 1984 to August 1985.

Figure 7.1 shows a general structure represented by the first level of this analysis--the pattern provided by the Muhammed/Obasanjo regime--created out of the FCT Decree, No. 6, of 1976. The figure shows essentially that, hierarchically, the Supreme Military Council (SMC), which was then the central decision-making body of the Federal Military Government, represented the highest level of authority even though it was not formally designed to be part of the FCDA's organizational structure. The second in order of authority is the Board of Directors, followed by the Executive Secretary/Permanent Secretary and the various departmental heads or directors. Policy issues followed this line of authority relation in which the final decisions are generally made at the topmost level of the hierarchy involving the SMC.

Figure 7.1

FEDERAL CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE (1976-79)



SOURCE: Federal Capital Development Authority, "Organizational Structure and Management Style of the Federal Capital Development Authority" (unpublished, Lagos, August 6, 1978)

In October 1979, a new organizational arrangement for the entire project was formed by Alhaji Shehu Shagari. This new arrangement, which corresponds to our second level of analysis, is shown in Figure 7.2. The organizational structure would represent a decentralization, so to speak, of execution activities. Here, a new organization--the Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA)--was created. The Ministry of Federal Capital Territory was also created to serve as an umbrella agency for the FCDA and FCTA.


Some new departments were created and existing ones expanded. The new departments include, the Departments of District Administration, Legal, Medical Services, and Works.

In the new arrangement, a permanent Secretary replaces the Executive Secretary. A new set of members was appointed to the FCDA's Board of Directors. Rather than being responsible to the highest level of authority as in the case of the military model, the FCDA's Board of Directors now reports to the Minister of the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory. The Minister, in turn, reports to the President.

For the first time, the Legislature was brought into the process of project implementation. Its role in the process was limited to major policy decisions such as when to move to the new city and how much funding would be allocated to the project.

By decentralizing and expanding the execution functions, the Shagari's administration expected that the new arrangement would quicken the pace of project implementation in order to facilitate movement to the new city by 1982 (the new timetable set by

Figure 7.2 Basic Organizational Structure for the Abuja Project under Civilian Administration, October 1979-September 1983.



*Development Area Council

Source: Ajato Gandonu. "Abuja: Planning the Nation's Capital." In Development Planning in Nigeria; Planning Experience in Developing Countries. To be published by NISER, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 1984.

Shagari). But more importantly, the new arrangement enabled the President to exert a direct control over the entire project. This was achieved by introducing an amendment to the Federal Capital Decree, which made it possible for the project's organizational status to be changed to that of a Ministry rather than a parastatal as it originally operated before the civilian government. A switch to a ministerial arrangement gave the President the power (as in other ministries) to appoint the minister for the Federal Capital Territory. In addition, he also had the power to appoint all the members of the FCDA's Board of Directors.

The power to appoint the Minister, the members of the FCDA's Board, and to some degree influence the appointment of the Permanent Secretary, implies that the President virtually runs the new capital project. Although the new civilian model seems to decentralize the activities for project implementation, it weakened the FCDA's control in the sense that the FCDA could no longer take certain decisions without the approval of the MFCT. We have noted in Chapter 6 the impact of this situation, in the case of application for funds that must now go through the MFCT (an additional decision point), which then passes the application to the Federal Government for approval.(1) Furthermore, with the creation of the MFCT and FCTA, the FCDA was now in a tighter corner because the FCDA has to compete with these additional

(1) Although the FCDA must pass its application or requests through the MFCT, the agency still retains the power to prepare its budget based on needs. However, passing the application through the MFCT creates additional bureaucratic red tape.

implementing units for the limited financial resources. In addition, the situation created organizational conflict between the FCDA and these units, especially with the FCTA, over whose activities the FCDA had very little leverage to control.

The military model of 1976 to 1979 shows a relatively high degree of centralization of authority at the top (the SMC) of the organizational hierarchy. Although the structure seems to eliminate many decision points, thereby facilitating quicker decision making vis-a-vis project implementation, it has the potential of alienating other (middle and lower) levels of the FCDA. We have noted in Chapter 5 the incidence of this problem, in which a large majority of the FCDA personnel was largely neglected during the Master-planning process.


By the same token, the modification of the organizational structure by the civilian administration has not provided adequate autonomy to the agency. Even though, for example, the new arrangement would seem to have decentralized organizational activities, the control of the agency was still vested on the President. Evidences of this governmental (both SMC and civilian government) control are manifested in areas of personnel appointments, contract review and approval, land matters, and land use control. Before we discuss the characteristics and impacts of some of the control, let us first examine the third level of organizational arrangement for project implementation. As pointed out earlier, this third arrangement was adopted from January 1984, following the overthrow in December 1983 of the civilian government. This arrangement is still in operation at the time of this writing.

The organizational model presently under operation is shown in Fig. 7.3. This model, which is similar to the civilian model, was adopted by the Buhari administration. The main difference between Buhari's model and that of his predecessor is that the FCTA has been eliminated in Buhari's model. In addition, some departments have been either merged or eliminated. A new set of members have been appointed to the FCDA's Board of Directors.

7.2.1 Impact of Governmental Control: The Case of Personnel Appointment

In spite of the provision in the FCT Decree that empowers the FCDA to appoint all personnel except the Board of Directors, Permanent Secretary, and Executive Secretary, the three administrations (including the two military and civilian regimes) have had a relatively strong influence on the appointment of other top-ranking officers of the agency. The impetus for this influence arises from two factors. The first factor arises from the provision in the 1976 FCT Decree, which requires the FCDA to appoint its officers, but at the same time is countered by another provision in the same decree that requires the approval of the Federal Commissioner of Establishments. Thus, there are two bodies actually making decisions on personnel appointments--one which is the FCDA located at Abuja, and the other is the Federal Ministry of Establishments located in Lagos nearly 800 kilometers from Abuja. Note that the Federal Commissioner of Minister is appointed by either the military government, if the military is in power, or the President, if

Figure 7.3 FCDA Organizational Structure (1984)



Source: FCDA, Department of Planning and Surveys, November, 1984

civilians are in office. This means that either the SMC or the President has considerable control over who may be appointed at other levels of the FCDA's organizational structure.

The other source of governmental intervention is the 1979 Constitution, which introduced a new policy for recruiting public officials into government agencies. The provision in the Constitution has emerged from the need to minimize nepotism (or to eliminate it entirely) and to foster ethnic balance in the public service. To recapitulate what was noted in Chapter 2 about this constitutional provision: "a national integration must be actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on the grounds of place of origin, sex, or religion, status, or ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited."(1) The directive principle of how such a policy can be pursued, in the case of public appointments, requires that: "the composition of the government of the federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria.... There shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies."(2)

To understand the implications of this federal policy (or the "federal character principle"(3) as it is generally referred

(1) The 1979 Draft Constitution: Section 15(2).

(2) Ibid., Section 14.

(3) The federal character principle was to some degree, also, adopted by Mohammed's regime in making certain key appointments in the public service, but with its incorporation into the Constitution, it became fully accepted as a matter of rational policy during and after the civilian administration.

to in the country) on the FCDA, it is important to recall that many of the key appointments, including those of the minister, the board of directors, and to some degree, the executive secretary, and the directors of the various departments of the agency were made or influenced by one man, the President, or the supreme military council. The significance of this appointment procedure is that it gives enormous power to the President or the military leader over the control of the agency. In that situation, it is difficult without additional mechanisms, to expect a fair application of the federal character principle that would adequately ensure the attainment of ethnic parity. In short, this has been one of the problems of implementing the "federal character policy" in the FCDA where such mechanisms for enforcement are very weak.

The structural character (whereby either the president or the military had the ultimate power over the agency's appointments) had significant consequences during the civilian regime. Because the ultimate power was largely vested upon one person, the president, many of the key positions in the project's implementation structure were filled either by the President's party supporters or by persons of the same ethnic (Hausa/Fulani) group.(1) For example, six of the seven chairmen appointed by the president to head the Development Area Councils of the FCTA, including the FCTA chairman, were of the Hausa/Fulani--the President's--ethnic group. As Gandonu (1984, p. 11) noted about the weakness of this appointment:

(1) See Ajato Gandonu. Abuja: Planning the Nation's Capital. Ibid., op. cit., p. 23..

the FCTA as an institution for developing the Abuja project is further weakened by insensitively appointing to its key personnel staff who do not reflect the national or neutral image of the Federal Capital Territory.... No effort was made to reflect a national character which would really be appropriate for this project. This was a dangerous oversight which enemies of the Abuja project could exploit.
(1)

Dr. Gandonu further wrote:

One hopes that the Government in general will see to it that the original intention of neutralizing the FCT for all Nigerians is not compromised. It is one sure means of proving to otherwise sceptical Nigerians that Abuja is truly for all Nigerians, and also remind ethnocentric political malefactors that Abuja is not the preserve of any ethnic group.(2)

While Gandonu's remark seems important to the credibility of the project, he fails to realize that as long as the ultimate power for appointments lies with the President or any group of individuals who may belong to the same ethnic group or share similar ideologies, and as long as there is a lack of adequate mechanisms to check the appointment process, there is a high probability that the personnel recruited would reflect interests of those who hold the ultimate power.

Although there was an attempt by the Buhari Administration to minimize inefficiencies in the FCDA by reducing the number of departments and top staff positions, it is not certain that its

(1) Ibid., p. 23

(2) Ibid., p. 24.

central goal was to distribute the remaining key positions in such a way as to ensure ethnic balance. For example, 8 out of 10 key positions in the FCDA (including the Minister, the Permanent Secretary, and the Managing Directors) are held by persons from the Northern States. This imbalance would seem to contradict one of the central goals of the new capital project, that of national integration.

Compounding the problem of inadequate mechanism for enforcing the federal character policy is the fuzziness of the concept. It is not clear at which level a particular department of the FCDA can be considered dominated by one ethnic group or the other. The existence of nineteen states in the federation also seems to complicate the situation. Not all states in the federation, for example, are capable of providing highly qualified personnel at the time the state's quota may be open. Thus, if the principle is to be adopted at its face value, a position would have to remain vacant until the state is able to produce such an individual. Alternatively, an incompetent individual may be hired in order to fill the state's quota.

To some degree, there is evidence that some of the problems highlighted above affected the recruitment of personnel in the FCDA. There was a general belief among some of the FCDA's officers, when interviewed by this writer, that certain positions have been filled by incompetent personnel in order to meet the federal character policy. This was done either through a rapid promotion of such officers or by recruiting such officers through their state's public service. Obviously, it is difficult to

assess with certainty (unless with a very thorough analysis of the personnel information which is highly classified) the validity of the situation and how widespread it was. Suffice it to say that the fact that this general feeling about the "wrong officers for the right jobs" exists within the FCDA means that the process of personnel appointments in conjunction with the "federal character principle" would have to be reviewed. Some officers are already expressing feelings of apathy and helplessness from the belief that they are being denied their due share of promotions and other remunerations, which some get "without working for them." This kind of feeling of helplessness and apathy obviously cannot sustain effective project implementation, because it may lead to weak commitment and other inefficiencies on the part of the agency staff. As one of the officers put it, "you cannot expect me to lose both ways ... not getting my due promotion, and at the same time, spending all my energies."

The essential point to note here is the weakness of this federal government intervention through its federal character policy and appointments. Not only is its implementation difficult, the policy, even when rightly implemented (that is, when ethnic balance is achieved) may sacrifice efficiency, which is a vital ingredient for an effective project implementation.

7.2.2 Impact of Governmental Control: The Case of Plot Distribution

Another impact of political and/or governmental intervention in the affairs of the FCDA is witnessed in the distribution of plots. The 1976 FCT Decree did not specifically identify how and by whom the distribution of such plots should take place. However, the authority to allocate or distribute lands could be subsumed within the general provisions in the decree, which gave the FCDA blanket powers to deal with all land-use matters in the capital territory. The power to allocate plots to individuals or groups willing to develop them therefore falls within the province of the agency.

In 1978, this power or authority of the FCDA was weakened by the introduction of a new Land Use Decree. This decree required that all lands be kept under the trust of the federal military government. However, the new federal capital territory had already been acquired through eminent domain by the federal government, which means that the new Land Use decree would have insignificant impact on the position of the federal territory. Nevertheless, the fact that the decree places all the land within the national boundary of Nigeria under the management and control of the federal government implied that the decree had provided a tool to those in power (military or civilian) for intervening in the administration of such lands.

In 1980, during the civilian administration, the Land Use Decree was superseded by a Land Use Act. Like the preceding decree, the 1980 Land Use Act entrusted the control and management of all lands in the federation to the federal government and gave the civilian executive president the powers

to administer such lands.(1)

The 1980 Land Use Act thus provided the avenue for the president to control all the lands in the country, including those of the new federal capital territory. As a result, even though the FCDA was formally responsible for administering all the lands in the territory, in reality, the president could override the agency on any decisions pertaining to land matters in the territory.

Land allocation in the new capital city did not begin until 1981. By 1983, approximately 3,282 plots (including residential, commercial, and industrial plots) assembled by the FCDA were ready for distribution. The guideline or principle for allocating the plots was again dictated by the general objective principle of achieving ethnic integration.

Because there are more than 250 ethnic groups in the country, the application of this "parity principle" was not workable. A more workable approach was to allocate the plots according to the states. As noted above, there are currently 19 states in the country. The states are partitioned generally along ethnic lines, although most of the states include more than one ethnic group.

The allocation of plots along state lines did not eliminate necessarily, management and political problems. These problems hinged on mainly the weaknesses of the procedures and institutional mechanisms set up by the federal government for allocating the plots.

(1) See the 1978 Land Use Decree, Section 2(2)

To accomplish the objective set down by the government for allocating plots, a 19-member Land Use Allocation Committee (LUAC) was appointed by the President. The establishment of this committee according to the Minister for the FCT, "was necessitated by the need to establish such a committee of wise men under Section 2(2) of the Land Use Decree of 1978, to advise the President in all matters relating to control and management of all lands in the urban areas of the Federal Capital City, Abuja, and Gwagwalada New Town."(1)

The members of the LUAC were appointed in such a way that every state in the federation would be represented. The committee met once a month at Abuja to allocate the assembled plots. The prospective applicants for the plots are selected from the list compiled by the FCDA according to state of origin.

Although the framework for the allocation of plots on paper would seem to sustain the "federal character principle," in reality it failed to address some of the management and political issues in the scheme which hinged on the weaknesses of the assumptions in the allocation principle. In providing the framework for plot allocation, the government had implicitly assumed that:

- (i) plots would always be readily available for distribution at the time the committee was convened;
- (ii) corruptibility or lack of integrity of public officials (including all the actors involved in the allocation of plots) would not be a problem;

(1) New Nigerian. "Focus On Abuja--the New Federal Capital." Monday January 11, 1982.

- (iii) efficient administration of the scheme would be guaranteed;
- (iv) involvement of the LUAC would ensure an equitable distribution of plots.

As noted above, by 1983 only a total of 3,282 plots had been assembled by the FCDA. Consequently, in the three-year period 1981-1983, the average number of plots available each month was 91. This is the number of plots that the 19-member LUAC convened to allocate. There were months they convened without plots to distribute.

The significantly small number of plots available for allocation meant that the capacity of the committee was not being effectively utilized. This problem is significant in that a considerable amount of resources were being expended to maintain the committee. If the total number of plots prepared and assembled were 91 per month, there would be little or no reason why the FCDA could not have distributed the plots because the agency prepared and assembled the plots anyway.

Related to the wasted resources tied to maintaining the LUAC, was the problem of inadequate monitoring of the process. Because the responsibility for allocating the plots shifted to the LUAC, whose members were appointed by the President, it became difficult for the FCDA to monitor effectively the program because its powers over this matter were now overshadowed by those of the Land Use Allocation Committee.

Furthermore, the integrity of the LUAC members was questionable since their appointments were politically based. In

a period of intense and contentious party politics the President was likely to appoint those who would ensure continued control over the operations of the new capital project. For example, the chairman of the committee, Alhaji Jibrin Mariga, the Emir of Nazarawa, was one of the President's closest associates.(1) An appointment of party loyalists would, in turn, dictate who gets plots and how. An interview with some of the FCDA officers who participated in assembling the plots confirmed that the ability of most individuals to secure plots at Abuja was largely dependent on their political party affiliation and ethnic identity. Where these two criteria failed, the individual must be willing to "bribe his way through" in order to obtain plots. Obviously, other elements such as the high cost of procuring the plots, and bureaucratic red tape, could have prevented other people, especially the poor, from acquiring plots. As we shall see in Chapter 8, these characteristics have adversely affected accessibility for the poor to urban land and housing resources.

Although there are no statistical data to confirm the notion of fraudulent practices, the 1984 decision by the Buhari administration to confiscate all "illegally acquired" plots at Abuja, tends to confirm the corrupt nature of the whole land allocation exercise.(2)

(1) Ibid., p. 11

(2) The FCDA would not release any information about the personal characteristics of plot recipients at Abuja. Such information was treated as strictly classified. Because of this, it is difficult to assess with certainty the degree of fraudulent practices in the land allocation process.

Other aspects in which governmental control has not sustained effective project implementation include financing, contract award, and land-use policies. The problems with respect to project financing and contract award have already been extensively discussed in Chapter 6.

The case of land-use control involves a periodic and often unexpected intrusion by the government to alter adopted land-use plans. A case in point relates to a 1982 order from the President to convert a primary school site for the construction of a mosque in the Garki District of the Phase One area. As a result of this sudden and late change of land use, the school children became subjected to crossing heavy traffic on the expressway in order to walk to the next available primary school located at Jabbi, which is nearly 12 kilometers from the Garki district. The ability of the President to influence arbitrarily the conversion of this site, obviously shows where the power point within the FCDA's authority relations, as well as where the President's priority lay.

In conclusion, it can be argued that none of the three organizational models (two military and one civilian) seem to have given sufficient autonomy to the FCDA to carry out its functions. But in order to ensure a successful implementation, recalling Palumbo and Harder's argument noted in Chapter 1, sufficient discretion should be given the FCDA. The lack of such discretion or autonomy as we maintained in the preceding analyses, has led to "failures" or "slippages" in project implementation. These failures are reflected in various

inefficiencies in the management of the land distribution program and non-achievement of ethnic balance in the agency. Although the civilian model was expanded to accommodate intense construction activities necessitated by the need to move the capital by 1982, the structure never really meant more than an involvement of additional execution units and personnel, rather than a well-intentioned plan by the government to decentralize power. Even the involvement of additional personnel slowed project implementation because decisions had to pass through several points which often caused delays. In addition, the high cost of maintaining the expanded structure (as noted in Chapter 6) has not facilitated an efficient project implementation. On the other hand, although the military models minimized the number of decision points, many of the FCDA's policies could easily be overturned by the military government.

7.3 FCDA: Other Organizational Problems

Other factors affecting the capacity of the FCDA to execute the new capital project relate to adverse effects of rapid structural changes in the agency, corruption, and an inadequate labor force.

7.3.1 Effect of Organizational Metamorphosis

Since its establishment, the FCDA has undergone several changes in both its structure and workforce. Although the pattern of power relations seems to have remained fairly stable, the individuals or officers (from the president to the directors)

in control of such powers have changed very rapidly during the last eight years of the agency's existence. As our discussion will reveal, the rapid, and often unexpected, changes or turnover have not provided an adequate ground for a sustained accumulation of experience necessary for such a young agency. Associated with the high turnover is a high probability of insecurity and low morale among the agency staff.

In the past eight years, the FCDA has had five different permanent secretaries. Thus, in the eight-year period 1976-84, the average span of a permanent secretary was less than a year-and-a-half.

Just as Permanent Secretaries have changed, so also has the Board of Directors. In the eight-year period, membership on the Board has changed too frequently. On some occasions, only a few members have been replaced; on others, an entirely new Board of Directors was chosen. The departmental units were no exception to the rapid changes. For example, the Department of Architecture has been reorganized at least four times; five directors have headed the department. Other departments have either been expanded, merged, or been scrapped. As the various departments have come and gone, so have their various directors.

The rapid organizational changes have been precipitated by three major factors: (i) the impact of the rapid political changes in the country; (ii) the project's weakening financial position; and (iii) the age of the agency.

The organizational models shown in Figures 7.1 to 7.3 reflect the impact of the rapid political changes. Since the new

capital project was initiated in 1975, four different political (civilian and military) regimes have emerged. The three models are byproducts of three regimes.

Most of the structural changes occurred during the civilian regime (1979 to 1983). The civilian government created the Ministry of the Federal Capital Territory (MFCT) and the Federal Capital Territory Administration. It was also during the civilian administration that most changes involving the FCDA's personnel occurred. In the nearly five-year period, the agency witnessed four Permanent Secretaries including an executive secretary. Almost all members of the Board of Directors from the preceding regime were replaced by the civilian government. New departments were also created (e.g. District Development, Legal Services, Medical Services, etc.) and old departments were scrapped.

The rapid structural changes were largely reflective of the respective goals or priorities of the three political regimes. The organizational model adopted by the Muhammed regime was developed in anticipation that completion of the new capital project would take nearly 15 years. Thus, the organizational span was much narrower or more streamlined than the one adopted by the civilian government. Probably because of the longer time (15 years) budgeted for implementation, the Muhammed Model had also avoided carefully many departmental units. A lesser number of units would facilitate a precise and quick decision making process, which is often characteristic of the military. On the other hand, the civilian model was designed to accommodate the

added demand from increased construction activities arising from the shortened time frame, four years, stipulated by the civilian government for relocating the capital.

There is also a general belief that the project's organizational structure was expanded by the civilian government in order to facilitate political patronage. Recall the appointment by the President of party loyalists into the administrative cadre of the FCTA and the Land Use Allocation Committee.

The expansion of the new capital project's organizational structure was yet influenced by other factors. The first of such factors was the relatively strong federal revenue provided by the oil resources. The oil revenue reached its peak between 1978 and 1981, and had generated revenue surpluses to the federal government (Table 3.5). This, in turn, had made it relatively easy to fund the new capital project.

However, in 1984, the size of the FCDA including that of the MFCT was 'trimmed' by the Buhari administration as part of a general austerity measure to improve the general economic problems in the country. Some of the departmental units inherited from the previous civilian administration were either eliminated or merged. The changes, however, brought in a new set of top-ranking officers, including a managing director, to the agency. There were new directors in the Departments of Administration, Finance, Estate and Quartering, Mechanical Engineering, Civil Engineering, and Building Services. In addition, the funds available to the FCDA from the federal government was drastically reduced (Table 6.1).

Finally, the fact that the FCDA is a relatively young agency may have contributed to the structural changes. As pointed out earlier, the FCDA was created in 1976. It is therefore possible that it is only after many structural adjustments that an optimal organizational structure can be built.

Whatever the causes of the changes, the rapid and often unexpected transformations of the FCDA's structure have affected the agency's capacity to execute the new capital project in two major ways. First, because the agency is relatively young, the rapid changes have not facilitated a long and sustained accumulation of urban development experience needed by the agency for effective project implementation. In other words, a high turnover rate of officers has not allowed the agency to exploit potential benefits associated with on-the-job experience effectively. In this regard, the high turnover could have worsened, rather than improved, the problem of skilled labor shortage.

Second, the rapid turnover of officers has generally lead to low employee morale and insecurity, especially because the turnover is largely motivated by political forces, rather than by the need to improve organizational effectiveness and efficiency. This observation is based upon this writer's experience at the site in 1984. Many FCDA officers complained that "things" (referring to both the staff changes and new orders that ensue from the changes) changed so quickly that it was difficult to predict what was going to happen next.

A corollary to the feeling of insecurity is the probability of such insecurity leading to lack of commitment. This, in turn, may lead to additional problems such as laxity and corruption.(1)

7.3.2 Problem of Shortage of Skilled Labor

In spite of the opinion of the chief personnel officer (expressed during an interview) that the FCDA has sufficient personnel, there is some evidence to suggest that there is a shortage of skilled personnel. More than 70 percent of the 2,500 persons employed in the FCDA consist of the lower-grade (levels 01 to 6) officers. The remaining less than 30 percent are in grade levels 7 and above categories. Very few of these officers have had extensive experience in large-scale urban development. The inexperience problem is likely to be exacerbated by the high turnover of officers.

A further indication of insufficient skilled personnel is reflected in part by the limited use of the FCDA's in-house staff for many of the agency's projects and services. A good number of projects (including site analysis and surveys, mapping, site design, demographic studies, and project construction involving roads, housing, etc.) are done mainly through the services of outside consultants and contractors.

(1) There is a probability that someone whose position is uncertain is likely to take advantage of every opportunity to exploit any loopholes that may exist in the working environment, including taking bribery especially, if he was inclined to do so.

7.3.3 Problem of Public Corruption

Although most would agree that corruption has a very debilitating effect, there is less agreement on the reasons why it is so prevalent. Traditionally, corruption has been traced to such social factors as the lack of a commitment to the nation state, or the breakdown of traditional values (Bryant and White, 1982). In a contrasting argument, James Scott contends that corruption is mostly viewed as a means of political influence, rather than as an expression of moral degradation.(1) Whereas nations with more developed political institutions encourage the exercise of such influence before laws are made, in third-world countries, where political opportunities are limited, this exertion is more apt to occur at the enforcement or implementation stage. Scott says, for example, "where organizational skills are scarce and where, as a result, interest group associations are either weak or nonexistent, the corruption of law enforcement may be a more economizing way to exert influence over policy outcomes."(2) To the extent that bribery requires less effort and fewer resources, it is a more rational form of political influence.

To some degree, cases reflecting Scott's argument can be observed in the construction of Abuja as well as in other Nigerian cities. A case in point relates to the development of temporary market shacks in most major cities in the country in

(1) James Scott, "An Essay on the Political Functions of Corruption," Asian Studies, Vol. 5, 1967, p. 505.

(2) Ibid., p. 505.

which informal activities (petty trading) take place in most of the available public open spaces including the streets because of lack of cheap and convenient commercial areas. Because the conventional shopping areas and plazas often preferred by planners (government and bureaucrats) are unresponsive to the needs of these informal activities in terms of the high cost of renting the spaces, and convenience, the petty traders often resort to building make-shift shades and stalls, preferably along city streets, as an alternative to the government-preferred and often expensive-to-rent modern shopping facilities. Given that these shacks constitute illegal structures, they are often torn down by the government unless the traders affected can organize to bring pressure on the municipal authority. Quite often, this may not be possible because they lack the political clout to do so. The next alternative, as in the case of Nigeria, is for these traders to 'see the Ogas' directly responsible for the demolition of the illegal structures.

Seeing the Oga in the context of influencing certain public policy often ends up implying offering some favor (usually bribery) to a public official in charge of executing a particular policy or someone around him who holds a similar or higher authority with respect to such policy in return for protection from possible prosecution or as in the case of illegal shacks, to prevent him from destroying the structures. Usually, the 'Oga' should be seen periodically by members of a coalition of petty traders (which is usually a weak coalition) in order to prevent the 'Oga' (the officer-in-charge) from tearing down their

makeshift structures. This mode of action (i.e., offering a bribe to the 'Oga') at the policy's implementation stage rather than when the policy is being formulated, is perhaps the least costly way (using Scott's argument) by which the petty traders can influence the policy of non-provision of adequate commercial (market) spaces. In other words, because the petty traders generally lacked the power to influence the city's land-use policy specifying how spaces should be allocated, building temporary shacks and offering bribery to sustain them, becomes the most economical way through which the traders can bargain or demand for their share of space.

The act of 'seeing the Ogas' has been an effective mode used by groups of petty traders in maintaining a steady control of illegal markets in many of the Nigerian cities. In Lagos, for example, a group of petty traders for many years were able to resist the Lagos City Council Ordinance disallowing street trading along Tejuoso Road, Yaba, because they were able to organize this kind of network (although weak) through which they influenced public officials.(1) At Onitsha also, the Ojanja Market which formerly witnessed constant raids from the municipal authority (the Oga Afias) has remained relatively calm partly because of the traders' ability to appease some members of the municipal authority.

(1) Due in part to the resistance of the petty traders and the high traffic congestion generated by the informal activities, the municipal authority was compelled to build a permanent market--the Tejuoso New market to accommodate the trading activities.

Although the phenomena just described are not yet prevalent at Abuja, many loopholes that can give rise to this kind of problem have begun to emerge. For example, so far in the Phase One area of the new capital, no known single facility has been provided for the more traditional market activities. Although the Maser Plan contained a recommendation that each District Center be provided with facilities for open-market activities, the construction of the new capital has so far neglected this recommendation. In keeping perhaps with the 'prestigious image' expected of the new capital city, the planners have emphasized the construction of a more modern and sophisticated shopping plaza, rather than the provision of facilities for the traditional, cheap-to-rent, and more familiar open market activities. Consequently, illegal markets (structures) have developed around strategic locations (at Wuse, Garki, the Secretariat, and the A-2 junction) within the city (see Appendix II). Already, as we noted for other cities, the FCDA has embarked upon a periodic 'bulldozing' of the illegal markets, which are quickly rebuilt by their owners. Some of the traders have been able to maintain these structures, especially those around the Secretariat, because they know or have 'seen the public officials.' Thus, depending on how widespread 'seeing the public official' is, the illegal market may remain a permanent feature of the new capital city.

Another source of corruption is related to the largely inaccessible bureaucracy. The episode in which this writer waited for ten days for a Director before he could receive

authorization to make xerox copies of the 1981-83 budget estimates, when, in fact, such authorization could have been given by the Assistant Director who was available at the time, brings attention to the bureaucratic red tape characteristic of the agency. Every guideline is applied to the strictest rule of the agency even when certain decisions require a flexible, immediate, and common sense attention. The head person must always give his approval or stamp his signature before an approval for something could be granted.

Because of the delays that are associated with the red tape, individuals often become frustrated and because it is more economical for them to offer a bribe in order to get what they want on time, rather than to wait indefinitely, bribery often becomes a mode for getting things done.

An example where there is a high potential for the problem described to occur relates to the approval of building plans, permits, applications for plots, review of contracts, and payment of the contractors. In many cases applications for these activities take over a year to process, thus leaving open the avenue for bribery. For example, this writer talked to a contractor who was only able to collect part of his payment which was two years overdue because he was able to 'see the ogas.' As noted in Chapter 6, close to N1.4 billion are still owed to the contractors as of June 1984 partly due to bureaucratic red tape and due to shortage of funds.

The other possible source of corruption (related to the impenetrable bureaucracy described above) is the highly

centralized form of decision making and power structure described in Sections 7.1 and 7.2. Because power is concentrated generally on a few individuals at the top, and because there are no existing or strong counter-balancing mechanisms to check potential excesses of such individuals, it is relatively easier for the individuals to manipulate existing policy instruments or adopt new ones, generally in favor of particular interests both within and outside the organizational structure. For example, because the president had the ultimate control of the Abuja project (as pointed out earlier), he could afford to appoint members of his ethnic group to head the various units of the FCTA irrespective of the constitutional requirement for ethnic balancing.

The impacts of corruption described are generally felt in three major aspects of the project's development. The first aspect relates to substantial financial loss that resulted from corruptive transactions. It was reported in 1981, for example, that nearly N2 billion have been lost due to corruption in the FCDA.(1) From this writer's estimate, however, this amount almost exceeds the total amount of money released to the new capital project between 1976 and 1981 (Table 6.2), which means that the financial loss may have been exaggerated. Nevertheless, the Buhari's government, in 1984, had instituted an inquiry into the allegation of a widespread corruption in the agency. At the time of this writing, the results of investigation has not been

(1) See the West African Economic Digest, Vol. 2, No. 16, November 1981.

made public. However, a large number of personnel suspected by the government of being involved in corruption have either been laid off or suspended, pending the end of that investigation.

The financial losses have contributed to the generally weak financial position of the FCDA. This has, in turn, contributed to the inability of the agency to meet its construction targets (see Chapter 6).

Another impact of corruption relates to inefficiencies that are generally associated with the problem. Inefficiencies can result where incompetent persons, for example (because of their connections), are appointed to key positions or incompetent contractors are awarded contracts. We have, again, noted the incidence of this problem and its impact with regard to some of the contractors who were awarded contracts because of their connections or through falsification of documents, but abandoned their work half-way.

In addition to the inefficiency problem, corruption can undermine the ability of the agency to enforce effectively construction standards and guidelines. In other words, if some of the illegal practices were condoned or supported by agency officials, it is very unlikely that these same officials would be in a strong position to bring sanctions or penalties to the same individuals who they have helped to defraud the agency should they fail to meet the stipulated construction quality guidelines. The effect of this particular problem described, is reflected in the poor quality construction characteristic of many of the residential buildings in the Phase One area, as pointed out in Chapter 4.

Finally, corruptive practices are likely to jeopardize the attainment of the overall project goal. If for example land is distributed on the basis of connections, rather than on the basis of achieving ethnic parity in the new capital city, then, the probability of achieving the overall goal of national integration would be very low.

7.4 Summary

In the chapter we carried out further, an in depth examination of the FCDA's organizational structure in order to identify additional problems that prevented effective project implementation. The origin, objectives, and processes of the agency were examined, as well as the effectiveness of its legal powers with respect to ensuring effective implementation.

From the analysis, we were able to identify four major factors that inhibited the agency's operations. The factors included a general lack of management and administrative autonomy, organizational instability, insufficient skilled personnel, and corruption.

We pointed out that the FCDA could not control its activities because of constant federal government intervention. The intervention seemed to be worsened by political instability which brought at least four political regimes in the eight-year history of the agency. Our analysis of organizational models adopted by the respective regime showed that consistently, each had very strong control over the agency's operations and activities.

The emergence of the various political regimes also contributed significantly to the rapid structural changes in the FCDA's organizational structure. Such rapid changes were reflected in a relatively high turnover of the agency's staff. The high turnover as we pointed out, contributed in part to the relatively inexperience of the agency and short supply of skilled personnel. Because of the relatively short supply of skilled labor, the agency had to rely heavily on the services of outside consultants and contractors.

Finally, we noted in the chapter that the highly inaccessible bureaucracy as well as the highly centralized form of decision-making and power structure adopted for project implementation, generally led to misallocation of resources, inequities and corruption.

CHAPTER 8

FCDA: ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE AND PLAN EFFECTIVENESS

Chapters 6 and 7 have focused exclusively on the examination of the Federal Capital Development authority (FCDA) in terms of its funding mechanisms and general organizational structure and processes. In Chapter 6 we noted the relatively weak financial position of the agency, which resulted from a number of factors including the fast pace of project construction, the FCDA's dependence on weak federal revenue sources, the agency's inability to internally generate substantial revenue, and a general management inefficiency. In Chapter 7, the FCDA's organizational structure was reviewed, with particular attention to some factors that impinged on the agency's ability to carry out its functions. The factors were examined in light of a near-excessive governmental control, rapid structural changes, corruption, and insufficient skilled personnel.

In this chapter, we evaluate the FCDA's performance in urban development. As noted in the general introduction, the FCDA's performance is defined by the level of the agency's attainments in facilities' constructions and allocation of urban resources.

The performance evaluation is done using the two criteria (Target Achievement and Distributional Effectiveness) developed earlier. The target achievement criterion is used to compare the FCDA's attainments with the agency's targets for housing and other urban facilities and amenities for meeting the

1986 movement deadline. The distributional effectiveness criterion assesses the FCDA's attainments in urban development in terms of their distributional implications on accessibility among socio-economic groups.

The distributional effectiveness analysis is carried out only for the urban land and housing resources. The restriction of our analysis to these two resources is necessitated by lack of data, as well as by the indivisibility nature of most of the other urban resources.

Our evaluation of the FCDA's performance is restricted to the first phase of the new capital construction--Phase One. Phase One was targeted for completion in March 1986.

We do not purport to provide a test of the arguments given in preceding chapters of the FCDA's performance; however, evidence of the result of the interactive factors discussed earlier is, sort of, supported by the analysis in this chapter. Our assessment of the FCDA's performance will reveal that the agency has largely failed to meet the majority of its construction targets. The failures are most significant in housing and construction of institutional facilities and in some aspects of community facilities. However, the agency has made significant progress in the construction of water-supply systems, sewer lines, roads, and health facilities, and police and fire stations. We will further reveal that the FCDA's beneficiary distribution of its land and housing resources was significantly regressive, and the forms of development involved significant inefficiencies in the use of urban land.

8.1 FCDA: Phase One Area Development

To facilitate the construction of the new capital, the project was divided into six major phases. Phase One was targeted for completion in March 1986, in order to facilitate relocation of the national seat of government to the city in October of that year. The construction of the second phase was to follow immediately after Phase One, and was scheduled for completion in 1990. Subsequent phases were to follow, with the final phase completed by the year 2000. But, due to the political situation, completion of Phase One was rescheduled by the Shagari Administration for 1982 to enable relocation of the national government to the city in the same year.


As indicated earlier, completion of Phase One was not possible and movement to the new city did not occur, except for a few subsidiaries of government functionaries relocated to the city for the continuation of work at the site. The analysis in this chapter is nevertheless geared towards the objective of building the capital city or completing the first phase by the original schedule of 1986 because the subsequent military government that succeeded the civilian administration has maintained the 1986 deadline.

The new capital city as conceived in the Master Plan is to start with the smallest unit termed the neighborhood, which then graduates to the district and the city center. Each neighborhood is given a neighborhood center, which provides neighborhood facilities and services, such as a primary school, corner shops,

dispensary or clinic, postal agency, a community hall, etc. The neighborhood is also allotted a population target of 4,000 to 5,000, a threshold large enough to sustain its center facilities. This prescription also holds for each district. However, among the district-center facilities are included a health center, secondary school, market, shopping center, police and fire stations, post offices, etc. The population target at the district level is 40,000 to 60,000. The final unit in the hierarchy is the city center, generally referred to here as the Central Area, whose functions include: (i) the locations for the State House, national assembly, and Supreme Court; (ii) the ministerial zone where the building for all the federal government ministries and parastatals and state government liaison offices were to be located; (iii) the cultural zone where all cultural edifices, such as national library, national museum, national cathedral, national mosque, international conference center, etc., are to be located. Included in the central area is also the Central Business District (CBD), which was also assigned a city hospital and a transportation terminal.

The boundaries of the Phase One area are shown in Fig. 8.1. This area lies to the eastern part of the Federal Capital, bounded by the Peripheral Expressways to the east and the Western Expressways to the west. The population for this Phase One was projected at 230,000 in the Master Plan but was scaled down to 150,000 during construction because of undevelopable terrain encountered (see Chapter 5). It contains the Central Area, with predominantly residential areas to the north and south.

Figure 8.1



The Phase One area is 11 kilometers from north to south and 8 kilometers from east to west. It covers about 5,500 hectares of both developable and undevelopable land, with the Central Area covering nearly 30 percent (1,658 hectares) of the entire area. The Central Area is the one dominant center of both this area and the entire Federal Capital City. All affairs in the city and the nation will focus on it. It will also be the center to which representatives of other nations will come and therefore "will symbolize Nigeria to the world." (1) This role gives the Central Area a very important one, which had to be reflected in its development. Also, it was important that construction targeted for this area be completed by the 1986 deadline.

In terms of overall apportionment of the Phase One area, the land budget distribution is shown in Table 8-1. The residential sector is divided into four major districts: Garki and Wuse in the south, and Asokoro and Maitama in the north. In addition to supporting a hierarchy of commercial, community, and utility services, each of the four districts was expected to support a mixture of housing types and densities. Based on the original 230,000 population projected in the Master Plan, the proposals for the residential sector were that the northern area (Asokoro and Maitama districts) will accommodate 120,000 people out of this population, and the southern area (Garki and Wuse districts) 80,000. The additional 30,000 people needed to make up the Master Plan target would be accommodated in the Central Area.

(1) The Master Plan to Abuja, the new Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, February 1979, p. 79.

Table 8.1

Land Budget for the Phase One Area

Type or Category	Land Allotted (hectares)	Plan Population
Central Area (City Center)	1,658	30,000
Garki (1) District (Formerly Area ADCP)	365	26,000
Wuse (1) District (Formerly Area G and H)	630	34,000
Asokoro District (Formerly Areas DEF)	897	30,000
Wuse (2) District (Formerly Areas IJKL)	900	35,000
Maitama District	1,050	35,000
Totals	5,500 ^a	190,000 ^b

a: The area of 5,500 hectares includes both developable and undevelopable lands.

b: The target of 190,000 inhabitants was arrived at during a detailed urban design of the Central Area and the five residential districts, but falls short of the Master Plan projection of 230,000 persons. Even at that, the 190,000 inhabitants could not be achieved during the physical setting-out on the ground because some residential plots in Garki and Asokoro Districts were found to be undevelopable.

Source: Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago: "Implementing A Master Plan, The Abuja Experience." Paper presented at a workshop on The Planning of New Capital Cities in Developing Countries, held at Abuja, Nigeria, March 5-9, 1984, p. 6.

An overall average density of 26 dwellings per hectare for Phase One was recommended in the Master Plan.(1) Approximately 1,542 hectares of developable land (939 hectares in the north and 603 in the south) were made available for residential purposes.(2) After about 17 percent of the available land is deducted for supporting facilities and collector roads, 1,280 hectares remain for housing. Nearly 20 percent of this available land was proposed for a low average density of 10 dwellings per hectare, while the remaining 80 percent was to be developed at a higher average density of 30 dwellings per hectare.(3) In total, therefore, the residential sector would support at least 33,280 dwellings or at least 200,000 population at six persons per dwelling. This would give an overall average of 26 dwellings per hectare.(4)

The Phase One housing development has been planned to take advantage of the two major land characteristics:(5) (i) land that has no major constraints and is therefore available and suitable for the normal ranges of housing densities; and (ii), land that due to its "sensitive location," its relative inaccessibility, or its steepness or woods is suitable for low-density housing plots. The majority of the housing land (80 percent) falls into the former category. It was planned so as

(2) Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria: Phase 1 Area Final Report, Land Use and Infrastructure Proposals, FCDA, September 1979, p. 37.

(1) Ibid., p. 37.

(2) Ibid., p. 36.

(3) Ibid., p. 36.

(4) Ibid., p. 38.

(5) Ibid., p. 38.

to take maximum advantage of the opportunities afforded by the natural features of this area. Dominant in this area are the three major river valleys and their numerous tributaries. Most of them have gently sloping sides and are ideal for housing. These housing areas are capable of a range of housing densities responding to the local land form and landscape. The remainder of the housing land falls into the latter, low-density category. There are five major areas; of these, two of them form a semi-circle to the east of the Senate area utilizing the attractive hilly, wooded area to the south and the peninsular sites overlooking the golf course in the north. Some embassies and official residences are expected to locate in these areas.

Two other low-density housing areas exist in the north in an area of steep valleys, hills, and woods. These areas are less accessible than most of the Phase One area.

The fifth area of low-density housing is that already developed in the Accelerated District, containing some parts of Garki and Wuse. This utilizes the opportunity provided by the south-facing slopes overlooking the Parkway and the valley.

There is little or no question that the overall density adopted for housing development in Phase One is low. In general, this low density, as we shall argue in Section 8.3, has contributed to inaccessibility problems to urban land resources among low-income inhabitants of the city.

8.1.2 Program Targets and Objectives

Measuring and analyzing the FCDA's performance in developing Phase One will not provide sufficient grounds for evaluating that performance, no matter how accurate the measures are, because every evaluation consists essentially of comparing an actual performance (or a measure of it) with some standard of 'what ought to be.' Without a standard it is impossible to arrive at conclusions about whether a performance has been adequate or inadequate, efficient or inefficient, or even desirable or undesirable. For example, the fact that close to 3,524 housing units have been constructed in the FCC (Phase One) from 1979 to 1984 does not in itself allow for any conclusions about the quality of the FCDA's performance concerning housing. There must also be a standard for assessing the number of units needed, as well as the distributional beneficiaries, before an adequate evaluation can be made.

To enable an adequate evaluation of the FCDA's attainments in urban development, this section outlines and discusses the targets and objectives for the Phase One area development.

The development of the entire capital city has been guided by four main objectives:

- (i) coherence - The phasing of the capital should ensure that at all stages of its growth the completed development and infrastructure should create a coherent city, with clear and logical form of development and movement corridors.
- (ii) efficiency - The phasing of the capital should be such that investment is used efficiently and cost effectively.

Therefore infrastructure should be used reasonably soon

after its completion and its catchment should be developed as quickly as possible compatible with other aims.

- (iii) flexibility - The program should be flexible to allow for unforeseen changes and different rates of growth.
- (iv) balance - A city consists of many land uses and facilities which support and complement each other. This balance needed to be maintained during the development of Abuja. The programs of housing, employment, facilities, and infrastructure are therefore interrelated.(1)

On the basis of the preceding objectives, the targets that would ensure for a realization of these objectives regarding the Central Area, Residential Sector, and infrastructure were set for the Phase One area. Table 8.2, column 3, shows construction targets required to build a coherent, efficient, and balanced city necessary to sustain an initial population of 150,000.(2) The targets include the construction of approximately 232,000 square meters of office space, four primary health centers, a 250-bed hospital, one central market, and two shopping centers. Others include 40 kilometers of regional roads, sewerage trunk lines, a treatment plant, water supply schemes, electricity supply, two post offices, and 25,000 units of housing, etc.

In general the construction targets are to be distributed as follows:

(1) Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria: Phase 1 Final Report, Implementation Strategy, FCDA, September 1979, p. 9.

(2) Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the Abuja Projects, August 1979, pp. 21-23.

Table 8.2

Schedule of Infrastructural Requirement in Abuja to Enable
Movement in 1986
(as of observed August 1984)

Type of Infrastructure	Amount in Place	Amount Required for 1986 Movement	Amount Under Construction	Amount of Additional Infra-structure Required to Make Up for 1986
<u>Office Space</u>	--	2,500 offices (232,500 sq.m.)	323 offices (30,000 sq.m.)	2177 offices (202,500 sq.m.)
<u>Schools</u>				
Primary	--	4 of 4 streams each	1	3
Junior secondary	--	1 of 800 students	(Located outside the Phase One area)	--
Senior secondary	--	1 of 800 students	--	--
<u>Health Center</u>	--	2	2	--
250 Bed Hospital	--	1	1	--
<u>Commercial</u>				
Market	--	1	1	--
Shopping Centers	--	2	2	--
<u>Roads</u>				
Regional (Expressionways)	40 km	40 km	N/A	N/A
District Roads	sub- districts	4 Districts: Garki, Wuse, Maitama, Asokoro	Garki 1 Wuse 1	N/A
<u>Sewage</u>				
Trunk lines	Com- pleted	Completed	Completed	Completed
Treatment Plant collector	-- Com- pleted	1 Completed	-- Completed	1 --
interceptor	2	2	2	--

Table 8.2 Continued

Type of Infrastructure	Amount in Place	Amount Required for 1986 Movement	Amount Under Construction	Amount of Additional Infrastructure Required to Make Up for 1986
<u>Water Supply</u>				
Source	1	1	1	1
Treatment facilities	1	1	1	1
Reservoirs	2	2	2	2
Secondary mains Distribution network	-- Completed	2 lines Completed	-- Completed	-- --
<u>Electricity</u>				
133 KVA network	Com- Garki 1 Wuse 1	Completed Garki 2 Wuse 2 Maitama 1&2 Asokoro 1&2	Completed Garki 1 Wuse 1	-- Garki 1 Wuse 1
<u>Housing</u>	3,524	25,000 units	4,327 units	14,149 units
<u>Post and Telegraph</u>				
Post office	--	2	2	2
Cable Network	2,000 lines	--	--	4,000 lines more
<u>Police Station</u>	2	2	2	--
Fire Station	--	2	2	--
<u>Office Space</u>	--	2,500 offices (232,500 sq.m.)	323 offices (30,000 sq.m.)	2,177 offices (202,500 sq.m.)

Table 8.2 Continued

Type of Infrastructure	Amount in Place	Amount Required for 1986 Movement	Amount Under Construction	Amount of Additional Infrastructure Required to Make Up for 1986
*Central Area				
National Assembly/Senate	--	1 (20,000m ²)	1	--
Presidential Residence	--	1 (2,000m ²)	1	--
Executive Office Building	--	1 (40,000m ²)	--	1
National Monument	--	1	N/A	N/A
Legislative Office Building	--	1 (40,000m ²)	--	1
Justice Building	--	1 (32,000m ²)	--	1
Municipal Administration Complex	--	1 (20,000m ²)	--	1
Embassies	--	20 (1,000m ²)	--	20
Hotel, Retail Space	--	4	4	--
Sports Stadium	1	100,000 seats	1	--

N/A: Not Available

--: None

*: Derived from Master Plan for Abuja, the Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, February 1979, p. 265.

Source: Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the Abuja Project, August 1984, pp. 21-24.

The Central Area. The fundamental target for Abuja was to have the National Government Center, which might be called the hub of the Central Area, well established in the new capital before 1986.(1) This would attract people who require housing and back-up commercial and community facilities and services. This development obviously requires infrastructure to be provided before it can take place.

The growth of the city also required a 'balanced' employment, housing, facilities, and infrastructure program. All of these were to be led and the growth of the city determined, by the establishment of the National Government Center and the other components of the Central Area. By 1986, it was intended to have completed the Senate Area, five ministries, and the Supreme Court in the National Government Center, a significant number of the major institutional uses, the central market, four retail and four office schemes in the commercial area, and some of the housing areas.(2) Allowance was also made for some additional uses in the Central Area apart from those recommended in the Master Plan. These include state liaison offices, television and radio station, and a national visitors center. Also, some of the Central Area uses were brought forward to 1986 for construction. This was because it was decided that some job opportunities should be established earlier to support and balance the target rate of population growth.(3)

(1) Ibid., p. 4

(2) Ibid., p. 5.

(3) The Master Plan estimated the by 1981, at least 30,000 people would be living at Abuja. These people consisted mainly of

Housing. The target for the growth rate of Abuja is that there should be 150,000 population by 1986. At a household size of six persons per dwelling unit projected by the Master Plan, a total of 25,000 dwellings was required to house this population. However, the construction program would take some time to build up to the level of construction activity necessary for the growth rate of the capital. This is because the basic infrastructure needs to be provided, a construction labor force established, and local building materials made available. Thus, the development of housing between 1980 and 1986 was concentrated in the later years of this period. With this in mind, the FCDA developed a housing-construction target that emphasized increased construction at a later stage of the Phase One development. Table 8.3 shows these construction targets for housing development.

The annual targets and program are defined for financial rather than calendar years. The annual targets included 400 dwelling units to be completed during FY 1980-81, 2,000 during the 1981-82 period, 3,600 in 1982-83, 5,700 during the 1983-84 period, 6,600 during 1984-85, and 6,000 during the 1985-86 period, making a total of 25,000 units. If these annual targets are met, the target of housing of the 150,000 population will be achieved by the end of March 1986.

This population will be accommodated in the Residential Sector and the Central Area. The target of an ultimate

construction workers and federal government personnel including the FCDA staff.

Table 8.3

Housing Construction Targets
(Dwelling Units)

(Phase One)

Date	<u>Residential Area</u>		<u>Central Area</u>		Total	Cumulative
	Annual	Cumulative	Annual	Cumulative		
1980/81	400	400	---	---	400	400
1981/82	2,000	2,400	---	---	2,000	2,400
1982/83	3,600	5,000	---	---	3,600	6,000
1983/84	5,300	11,300	400	400	5,700	11,700
1984/85	6,200	17,500	400	800	6,600	18,300
1985/86	6,000	23,500	700	1,500	6,700	25,000

Source: "Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria, Phase 1 Final Report, Implementation Strategy." A report submitted to F. C. Obinani, FCDA Project Coordinator by Milton Keynes Development Corporation, September 1979, p. 6.

population of 30,000 in the Central Area would require 5,000 dwellings; however, only 1,500 dwellings were targeted for this area by 1986.

Infrastructure and Community Facilities. The provision of infrastructure and community facilities is vital for the achievement of the overall programs. Any delay in the construction of the infrastructure will inevitably delay other schemes. In order to reduce the risk of delays, certain types of infrastructure were programmed for completion some months before it would actually be used. Among the infrastructure and community facilities targeted for completion before 1986 were the water-supply systems, sewage/waste water systems, roads, power lines, health facilities, schools, police and fire stations, etc. (see Table 8.2).

8.1.3 FCDA: Level of Attainments in Urban Development (Phase One)

Table 8.2 shows a comparison of the FCDA's attainments as of 1984, with the targets required to meet the 1986 deadline. The data in this table are supported by the author's personal observation at the site. The table shows that a majority of the facilities and amenities are still under construction, while construction of others is yet to begin. The facilities most significantly affected include the construction of housing and the Central Area. Construction of the institutional buildings targeted for completion in 1986 for the Central Area has either

not begun or is still underway. These include: the national assembly, executive office building, the federal secretariat, the justice building, and the municipal administrative complex. Other facilities that have not yet been started include the sewerage treatment plant and three of the four primary schools. The development of housing has also proceeded slowly. Only 3,524 housing units out of a total of 25,000 units targeted for completion have been completed.

Given the present level of attainment, it is unlikely that a full realization of the infrastructure facilities requirements projected for 1986 would be achieved. For example, if about 15 percent (3,524 units) of the total housing units (25,000 units) targeted for 1986 took nearly five years (1979-1984) to complete, it is highly probable that the remaining 85 percent of the housing units would not be completed by 1986 unless there is: (1) an increase in the level of funding over and above its present level; (2) an increase in the amount and quality of labor employed; (3) an increased availability of construction materials and equipment; and (4) a minimization of the present level of 'politicization' of the entire project. But none of these four goals seems feasible at the present. As we have noted in preceding chapters, the level of the new capital's funding has been drastically reduced (see Chapter 6). In addition, the quality of executive capacity for project implementation has been largely weakened by a number of problems, including bureaucratic and political factors (see Chapter 7). Recently (August 1985), another military coup has taken place, which is another

indication of unpredictability of the political situation that has critically affected the FCDA. Furthermore, construction materials are scarce (see Chapter 5). This scarcity has been accentuated by the present economic crisis, which has led to a drastic curtailment of importation on which the majority of construction materials depend.

In spite of the relatively low level of attainment, the FCDA, however, has made remarkable strides in the construction of some infrastructure and community facilities, especially the following:

1. Central Area. A number of achievements have been recorded in the Central Area. The presidential complex is nearing completion and so are the hotel complexes, stadium, the central hospital, shopping center, and some of the district roads.

When it became clear that permanent offices for the federal government ministries being designed for construction in the city center would not be ready to meet the demand of the six ministries scheduled for movement to Abuja in 1982, the FCDA embarked on the provision of eight blocks of four-story office buildings to be used as temporary facilities for those ministries. In addition, there are other office facilities under construction in the two district centers in Garki and Wuse. In all, some 68,180 square meters of office floor area will be made available when all the present office blocks under construction are completed.

2. Housing, Infrastructure, and Community Facilities. Despite the relatively poor achievement in housing development in the Phase One area of the city, the FCDA has developed a number of housing estates at various locations within the Federal Capital Territory areas. Over 2,204 houses, ranging from two to six bedrooms have been constructed in these areas.(1) Such projects include the Nyanya Workers Settlement, Karu New Town, and the Karshi Development Area (Table 8-4). In addition, a large number of low-income housing units have been developed at Gwagwalada, Abaji, Kuje, and Sheda Kwali (Table 8-5). However, as discussed in Chapter 6, the distances from these housing complexes to the city are so great as to offset the potential benefits of such housing developments, especially since these houses were being designed mainly for the low-income group.

The provision of infrastructural facilities, such as water, electricity, roads, and telephone lines, etc., have thus far been limited to Garki(1) and the Wuse(1) Districts and a few roads now under construction in the Central Area. The first phase of the Ring Road 1 has been completed. The construction of the outer Northern Expressway has also gone a long way. Table 8-6 shows the extent of road construction in the Phase One Area.

The FCDA has also made a remarkable amount of progress in the development of water schemes, electricity supply, parks, and gardens. The water schemes targeted for 1986 included a network of three dams or reservoirs to be constructed on the River Usuna

(1) Ibid., p. 14

Table 8.4

Number of Houses by Type, Locations and Stages of Construction in the Federal Capital Territory Being Provided by the Ministry of Federal Capital Territory

Location	Type	Total No.	Completed	Under Construction
Gwagwalada	6 BR	27	4	23
	4 BR	79	40	39
	3 BR	57	37	20
	2 BR (SR)	150	111	139
	2 BR (JR)	<u>585</u>	<u>214</u>	<u>371</u>
		<u>898</u>	<u>406</u>	<u>492</u>
Karu New Town	2 BR (Row House)	598	400	198
	3 BR (Bungalow)			
	4 BR (Single Story)	<u>75</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>59</u>
		<u>775</u>	<u>466</u>	<u>309</u>
Nyanya Workers Camp	1 Room	6112	5040	1072
	2 Room	<u>1120</u>	<u>910</u>	<u>210</u>
		<u>7232</u>	<u>5950</u>	<u>1282</u>
Karshi Devel. Area	6 BR	2	-	2
	4 BR	23	2	21
	3 BR	40	6	34
	2 BR (SR)	74	20	54
	2 BR (JR)	<u>31</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>28</u>
		<u>170</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>139</u>
Bwari Dev. Area	2 BR (SR)	14	4	10
	2 BR (JR)	82	43	39
	3 BR	52	12	40
	4 BR	<u>17</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>12</u>
		<u>165</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>101</u>

Table 8.4 Continued

Location	Type	Total No.	Completed	Under Construction
Yaba Dev. Area	1 BR		12	
	2 BR	89	7	68
	3 BR		<u>2</u>	
			<u>21</u>	
Rubochi Dev. Area	2 BR	43	16	27
	Jr.9r.	4	1	3
	3 BR	36	6	30
	4 BR	<u>7</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>7</u>
		<u>90</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>67</u>
Kwali Dev. Area	2 BR	83	44	39
	3 BR	58	1	57
	4 BR	33	10	23
	6 BR	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>
		<u>175</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>120</u>
Kuje Dev. Area	2 BR	81	12	69
	3 BR	42	8	34
	4 BR	34	6	28
	6 BR	4	-	4
	Jr. 9r.	<u>39</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>34</u>
		<u>200</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>169</u>
Abaji Dev. Area	2 BR	37	14	23
	3 BR	36	3	33
	4 BR	23	1	22
	2 BR	<u>41</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>4</u>
		<u>137</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>82</u>

BR = Bedroom

Source: Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago, "Implementing a Master Plan: The Abuja Experience." Paper presented at the Workshop on The Planning of New Capital Cities in Developing Countries, Under the Auspices of the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, held at the Abuja, March 5-9, 1984.

Table 8.5

Federal Low Cost Housing Program in the Federal Capital Territory

Location	Type and No. of Units Available		Type and No. of Units Completed		Type and Units in Progress		Type and No. of Units not Started	
	1 BR	3 BR	1 BR	3 BR	1 BR	3 BR	1 BR	3 BR
Gwagwalada	890	80	628	34	242	36	20	10
Abaji	404	74	304	58	100	16	--	--
Sheda	174	16	40	--	84	8	50	8
Kuje	144	6	56	--	76	2	12	4
Rubochi	50	6	--	--	50	6	--	--
Kwali	48	6	--	--	48	6	--	--
Karshi	50	4	--	--	50	4	--	--
Bwari	40	8	40	--	--	--	--	--
Total	1,800	200	1,068	92	650	78	82	22

BR = Bedroom

Source: Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago. "Implementing a Master Plan: The Abuja Experience." Paper presented at the Workshop on The Planning of New Capital Cities in Developing Countries, Under the Auspices of the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, held at Abuja, March 5-9, 1984.

Table 8.6

Extent of Road Development As of August 1984

Roads	Percent Completed	Remarks
Garki (I)	75%	All contracts in very advanced stages of completion. The work involves the construction of 11 kilometers of dual carriage ways with 7 meter wide carriage ways. There are also 3 meter wide verges and 3-5 meter wide footpaths outside the local streets and access roads and about 93,800 square meters of parking areas.
Wuse (I)	95%	Contracts for power supply yet to be awarded. The works now in progress are as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Two-lane dual carriage ways, approximately 10 kilometers long; b. About 60 kilometers of road networks; c. 4 road bridges about 25 meters long each; d. 6 footbridges; e. 2 subways; f. Precast concrete curbs totalling approximately 93 kilometers in length; g. About 45 kilometers of piped trunk-sewer drain and enclosed surface water drainage system; h. Pipe culverts of up to 1'200 millimeter diameter, totalling about 2'500 meters in length; i. Provision of Post and Telecommunication cables, street lighting, etc.; j. Water-main pipe-work, approximately 100 kilometers in length, including all valves and fittings, etc.

Table 8.6 Continued

Roads	Percent Completed	Remarks
Outer Northern Expressway	85%	Involves a 40 kilometer long stretch with 4-lane dual carriage way
Ring Road -1	100%	Involves a 20.4 kilometer long stretch with 2-lane service carriage way.
Airport Expressway	90%	Involves a 44 kilometer long stretch with 2-lane main carriage way
Central Area Roads and Bridges	25%	-----

Source: Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago. "Implementing A Master Plan: The Abuja Experience." Paper presented at the Workshop on The Planning of New Capital Cities in Developing Countries, Under the Auspices of the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, held at Abuja, March 5-9, 1984.

and a pipeline to be laid from the Shiroro Hydroelectric Dam. The Lower Usman Dam and Jabbi Dam have been completed. It has a capacity to cater to the 150,000 inhabitants of Phase One of the city when Phase One has been fully developed.

A contract for the construction of interception sewer lines for the whole of Phase One was awarded in 1982, and nearly 50 percent of the work has been undertaken.⁽¹⁾ A contract for the supply and installation of the sewage treatment plant for Phase One, as we noted in Chapter 5, has, however, not been awarded. As a result, septic tanks and soakaways have been provided on a temporary basis to completed houses in the Garki and Wuse Districts, as well as at Karu New Town and Gwagwalada.

The Posts and Telegraphs Department has already commissioned its first exchange in Abuja. Thus, both the city and Gwagwalada enjoy telephone services. The first post office has also been opened at a temporary location in the Neighborhood Center at Garki. Radio and television started transmission services in 1981.

Electricity supply has been provided to some of the completed developments. However, this has been done on a temporary basis through the use of generators and overhead cables, contrary to underground cables recommended in the the Master Plan. Most of the housing developments in the Wuse Districts are as yet without electricity. However, the Nigerian Electric Power Authority (NEPA) has commissioned to transmit 132

(1) Ibid., p. 18

KVA from Minna to Abuja as well as 132 KVA (substation) in Garki. Parts of the Garki District where underground cabling had been completed are already served with NEPA supplies.

A total of 2,582 residential and 121 commercial plots have been assembled and distributed in the Phase One area (Table 8-7).

In conclusion it can be noted that the FCDA has made some remarkable progress, as far as the provision of certain infrastructural and community facilities were concerned. However, at the level of Phase One's present developments, it is unlikely that the FCDA would be able to meet all its construction targets for 1986, given (as we have noted) the present and future construction constraints the agency must face in terms of funding, construction materials, organizational capacity, and political uncertainties.

In the following section, the distributional implications of the FCDA's attainments on urban land and housing allocations among beneficiary groups are analyzed in order to understand further the agency's effectiveness in urban development. We assess the FCDA's attainments, using the second criterion, distributional effectiveness criterion, presented earlier in this chapter.

8.2 Urban Land: Processes of their Allocation and Distributional Implications for Accessibility among Income Groups

With the introduction of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Decree of 1976, as we pointed in Chapter 7, all lands in the new

Table 8.7

Plot Allocations by Land-Use Categories and Locations

Location	Industrial	Commercial	Residential
Central Area (Phase 1)	--	68	--
Wuse District (Phase 1)	--	31	875
Garki District (Phase 1)	--	8	383
Asokoro District (Phase 1)	--	--	416
Maitama District (Phase 1)	--	14	903
Karu New Town	--	4	--
Gwagwalada	124	--	--
IDU (Industrial Park)	85	--	--
Gaube (Industrial Park)	--	--	--
Total	209	125	2,582

Source: Alhaji Usman Sabo Ago. "Implementing A Master Plan: The Abuja Experience." Paper presented at the Workshop on The Planning of New Capital Cities in Developing Countries, Under the Auspices of the United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan, held at Abuja, March 5-9, 1984.

capital territory were converted to public land. One of the goals of this public acquisition was to facilitate a better distribution of such lands among all competing factions including the socio-economic and ethnic groups in the territory. Thus, governmental intervention in the management and control of lands, in this respect, would be seen as an effort to remove accessibility problems for both the institutions, socio-economic groups, and all ethnic groups.

In Chapter 7 we noted that the institutional mechanism established by the government to ensure equitable distribution of plots among ethnic groups, was relatively ineffective. In this section, the way in which urban land distribution and government interventions in the process has determined urban land alternatives for the new capital city's residents, in general, and the urban poor in particular, is analyzed and discussed. The character of the government's land use policy for FCDA plots is examined along with the criteria and processes of allocation of the agency's plots to beneficiaries. The implications of the allocation criteria and processes (which define who benefits from the FCDA lands) on the distributional accessibility of the agency's land resources among income groups is also analyzed.

8.2.1 Criteria and Processes of Beneficiary Allocation

Generally, one or all of three factors would define who (what type of people) benefits from the FCDA land: (1) the government's land-use policy objectives; (2) the criteria for allocating the plots and housing; (3) the FCDA's conditions for

allocation and the terms of the covenant that the prospective beneficiary is expected to fulfill.

The Government's Land-Use Policy Objective

As noted earlier, one of the principal arguments for a new capital city was for the development of an urban environment that would cater to Nigerians of all walks of life, and socio-economic background. Implicit in the goal is that such a city must provide for an equitable access to all its land resources for all the groups in the city. A not surprising experience, however, is that there is always a wide gap between the official stated goal and the actual realization of those goals, particularly with respect to the low-income group.

Even though the government's intention was to build a new city that would be accessible in terms of its resources, including land, to everyone, the character of its land use policies tends to contradict this objective. One policy points to the general government inclination towards building a new capital city comparable with most of the Western cities. While a city of comparable quality with the Western ones may be something good to aspire for, its construction requires generally sophisticated infrastructural amenities, which are often beyond the financial capacity of the poor residents. We have noted the influence of this policy attitude (attitude towards building a high-class city) on the development of transport infrastructure and sewerage treatment facilities in Chapter 5; and it will also be apparent in this analysis on the development of urban land.

According to the policy, one of the means to escape from the crowded and squalid environment of the former capital, Lagos, was to build sophisticated amenities and adopt a 'high standard' of development. This general attitude is perhaps best reflected in a warning echoed during a workshop on the Planning of New Capital Cities, by Dr. Ajato Gandonu, one of the earlier supporters of the new capital project. He wrote:

Higher standards of housing construction and space must be enforced beyond the poor performance so far at the Accelerated District, which appears to duplicate the crowded conditions from which Lagos evacuees expected to be freed. There is enough space at the new site for a more pleasant environment and Abuja must set the standard for the improved development of other Nigerian cities.¹

Given this general attitude for high development standards, which is shared by many of the new capital supporters including the government, it is doubtful that the government intended to develop a city that would cater seriously to the interest of the poor.

(1) Ajato Gandonu: "Abuja: Planning the Nation's Capital," a paper presented at the Workshop on Planning of New Capital Cities in Developing Countries, held at Abuja Nigeria, March 5-9, 1984, p. 42.

Some of the land-use policies adopted by the FCDA at Abuja point in the direction of the above observation. A low density (average of 26 dwellings per hectare) is adopted for the Phase One area development. Critics have argued that at this rate of low-density development, it would be nearly impossible for the poor to acquire plots, let alone develop them, without substantial subsidies from the government. This is because at such low density the unit cost (which typically accounts for between 20 and 45 percent of total residential costs) allocatable to individual households for providing infrastructural services will be so high as to make it unaffordable to most poor households.¹ The costs of road networks and surface drainage, for example, change substantially with different plot sizes and planning configurations. As a result, the areas where infrastructure costs can be reduced in residential developments are: by reducing the standards of infrastructure, primarily road networks and surface drainage, or by increasing the number of households bearing those costs, through more efficient planning (in this case by increasing the existing densities); or more likely, through a combination of the above.

(1) See the Master Plan for Abuja, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

But because the standards for infrastructural development housing, and for plot development are relatively high, costs allocatable to households would be high and potentially beyond the financial capacities of most of the poor urban households.

Table 8-8 shows the average sizes (in area) of plots and the maximum ground coverage and building stories adopted for some of the plots allocated thus far in the Phase One area. The plots range in size from an average of 428 square meters to 604 square meters (M²). The required maximum average ground coverage for the plots is 35 percent. None of the buildings on these plots is to exceed three stories high.¹

In designing the plots, there has not been a conscious effort on the part of the FCDA or the government to develop plots that are affordable to the poor. In other words, the low-income group was assumed to be able to compete effectively with the high income groups for these plots. This attitude of the government is supported by FCDA's allocation criteria and other conditions for acquiring these plots, as we shall see later. If a uniform

(1) Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria: Development Control Documents for the Plot Areas in the Accelerated District, FCDA, March 1980, p. 18.

Table 8.8

Average Plot Sizes at Selected Locations in the Phase One Area

Area Location in Phase One	Average Area (size) of plots (m ²)	Average Maximum ground coverage (%)	Maximum number of stories permitted
A 1	502	35	2-3
A 2	428	35	2-3
A 3	---	--	---
A 4	567	35	2-3
A 5	604	35	2
A 6	456	35	2

m²: square meters

*: subdivisions

Source: Computed from: "Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria: Development Control Documents for the Plot Areas in Accelerated District, Phase One." Report submitted to the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) by Milton Keynes Development Corporation, March 1980.

standard of plots should be developed for both the low- and high-income groups at Abuja, then a look at standards adopted in other developing countries for low-income families shows that the plots designed for Abuja residents are of by far higher standards than those in these countries (Table 8-9). For example, while plot sizes at Abuja range from 428 m² to 604 m², those in other countries range from 60 m² in India to 300 m² in Egypt and Sudan. (1) In Latin America, for instance in Brazil and Argentina, the officially accepted plot size for low-income people is 200 m², while in the "Villa Miseria" or favelas (slums), plot sizes per dwelling are often less than 20 m². In Asia, the official standard for the low-income groups tends to be even smaller and to vary from city to city even within the same country. In India, for example, the sizes are 95 m² in Madras, 66 m² in Delhi, and go as low as 60 m² in Hyderabad.(2) In the Philippines the official standard is 90 m² and in Malaysia, 123 m².

In terms of accessibility to urban land resources, the FCDA has not provided cheap and affordable plots for the poor, especially when the standards of plots are matched with the incomes of the poor residents.

The second factor that influenced the beneficiary distribution of the FCDA's land resources was the criterion of allocation for such resources. This factor is closely related to

(1) Magogunje, A.L., Hardoy, J.E., and Misra, R.P., Shelter Provision in Developing Countries, John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., NY, 1978, pp. 10-15.

(2) Ibid., p. 10.

Table 8.9

Officially Accepted Plot Sizes from Selected Countries
for Low-Income Groups

Country	Average Plot Size (m ²)
Sudan	300
Egypt	300
Brazil	200
Argentina	200
India*	75
Philippines	90
Malaysia	123

*: Average for Madras, Delhi, and Hyderabad only.

Source: Computed from: A. L. Mabogunje, J. E. Hardoy, and R. P. Misra. Shelter Provision in Developing Countries. John Wiley and Son, Ltd., N.Y., 1978, pp. 10-12.

the first in that it lays out the principles on which the allocation of plots at Abuja would be based, thereby attempting to further the land use goals and objectives of the government. The allocation principles were based on: (a) promotion of national integration; (b) ensuring that the population of the new capital city is federal in character; (c) capacity/ability to build or develop; and (d) 'first come, first served.' (1)

The first two principles attempt to minimize ethnic monopoly of the new capital's land resources, that was common in the former capital city (Lagos) where one of the three major ethnic groups mainly controlled ownership of most of the land resources. Already, as noted in Chapter 7, the government has been ineffective in trying to minimize ethnic monopoly of the land resources because of the weak institutional structure established to oversee the implementation of this goal.

The last two principles--capacity/ability to develop and 'first come, first served'--implicitly identify the category of persons that should benefit from land allocation. The principles have not, however, spelled out any guidelines for involving an effective participation of the poor in the allocation of the urban land resources. Basing allocation of land on the ability/capacity to develop the plot, and first come, first served, means that the poor are left on their own to compete with the high-income groups for land.

By the government not encouraging the poor to participate in the urban land allocation through some kind of subsidy or

(1) See New Nigeria, "Focus on Abuja," January 11, 1982, p. 8.

criterion that help them, it means that one of the central goals of integration of all socio-economic groups is being neglected because the poor cannot ordinarily compete effectively with the high - income groups. The position of the poor in the whole situation is further worsened by the high standards adopted for the plots, as demonstrated earlier, as well as other conditions (fee charges and bureaucratic processes), as we shall show later, expected of plot beneficiaries to fulfill before plots can be allocated to them.

The ability to develop and 'first-come, first-served' assume a 'perfect market' situation whereby individuals with ability to develop and who have applied first will get the plots. This assumption is obviously weak in this case where the distribution or allocation of plots depends very much on one's ethnic or political party affiliation and one's connections.

Even if the urban 'land market' were 'perfect' such that people competed fairly with each other for land, the poor would still be constrained by two major handicaps:

- (1) their relatively meager incomes: they cannot pay for the acquisition of plots nor for other development charges and fees;
- (2) their inability to obtain financial loans from the financial market.

Table 8-10 shows the income distribution structure of expected inhabitants at the new capital city. As shown, nearly 10 percent of households in income category I are expected to earn a median income of approximately N600 (US \$840) annually.

Table 8.10

Number of Household and Income Distribution

Income Group	Median ³ Income ₦/year	W A G E E A R N E R S									
		Public Sector ¹		Industrial Sector		Service Sector ²		Total Employees (1000)	Percent household	Number of households by income of head	Percent of households by income of head
		Percent of household	Number of Em- ployees (1000)	Percent household	Number of Em- ployees (1000)	Percent house- hold	Number of Em ployees (1000)				
I	600	0	0	10	9.5	20	86.8	96.3	10	9.6	3.4
II	1,200	42	68.8	40	38.0	30	130.2	235.0	30	70.6	25.4
III	1,500	40	63.6	27	25.7	27	117.2	206.5	45	92.9	33.4
IV	2,600	10	15.9	11	10.5	11	47.7	74.1	55	40.9	14.7
V	6,100	7	11.1	9	8.6	9	39.1	58.8	80	47.1	16.9
VI	10,000	1	1.6	3	2.7	3	13.0	17.3	100	17.3	6.2
Total		100	159.0	100	95.0	100	434.0	688.0		278.4	100.0

1. Public Sector employment excludes the military employment which has previously been allocated to the cantonment outside the New Federal Capital City.
2. Service Sector employment includes all formal employment and the estimated income earning informal sector employment.
3. Income groups refer to the median income of head of household.

Source: The Master Plan for Abuja, the New Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, February 1979.

Approximately 37 percent of households in category II are expected to earn nearly N1,200 annually, and 31 percent (category III) will earn N1500. The figures for categories IV, V, and VI are, respectively, N2,600, N6,100, and N10,000, which will be earned by only 11, 8, and 2 percent of households, respectively. Nearly 77 percent of total households (which depend on just the income of the head of the household) belonging to Groups I to IV could be classified as poor. These groups are expected to earn less than N2,600 annually.

Juxtaposing the income ceilings of the respective income groups I to IV on Table 8-11, which shows plot acquisition costs and charges, we show in Table 9-12 the amount required to acquire plots by persons (households) in each income group, which is an indication of the degree of accessibility to urban land resources among the various groups. We assume that members of the low-income groups I-IV will be rational and acquire plots from the high-density areas rather than from medium or low-density areas, the central areas, and other areas because urban land acquisition cost and charges in these areas are greater than in the high-density areas.

Also, we assume that the high income groups (V and VI) would tend to acquire plots from medium- to low-density areas given their relative income and the probability that this group would be much more apt to choose a low-density living condition than a high-density environment. However, this assumption about the high-income groups may break down because persons in Group V income category, those earning approximately N6,100 annually,

Table 8.11

Plot Acquisition Cost, Development Charges and Fees

Type of Plot	Application Fee (₪)	Layout Fee (₪)	Operational Deposit (₪)	Initial Ground Rent (₪)	Total*
<u>Residential Plots</u>					
Low Density	250	1,000	1,000	400	2,650
Medium Density	250	750	1,000	300	2,300
High Density	250	500	1,000	200	1,950
<u>Commercial Plots</u>					
Central Area	500	5,000	2,500	1,000	9,000
Other Area	500	2,500	2,500	700	6,200
<u>Plots-Places of</u>					
<u>Worship, Schools</u>	500	250	1,000	50	1,800

*: Assumes that initial ground rent will be charged the same year, because the FCDA requires this payment to be made immediately when the beneficiary is issued a certificate of occupancy.

Source: "Development Control Documents for the Plot Areas in Accelerated District, Phase One." Report submitted to the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) by Milton Keynes Development Corporation, March 1980.

Table 8.12

Proportion of Annual Income Committed by Different Socio-Economic Groups to Urban Land Acquisition

Group Category	Median Income ₱/year	Percent of Households	PROPORTION OF INCOME COMMITTED TO LAND ACQUISITION AT DIFFERENT LOCATIONS					
			HIGH-DENSITY AREAS		MEDIUM DENSITY AREAS		LOW DENSITY AREAS	
			Development Cost (₱)	Percent of Income Committed	Development Cost (₱)	Percent of Income Committed	Development Cost (₱)	Percent of Income Committed
I	600	10%	1,950	325%	2,300	383%	2,650	442%
II	1,200	38%	1,950	163%	2,300	192%	2,650	221%
III	1,500	31%	1,950	130%	2,300	153%	2,650	177%
IV	2,600	11%	1,950	75%	2,300	84%	2,650	102%
V	6,100	8%	1,950	32%	2,300	38%	2,650	43%
IV	10,000	2%	1,950	20%	2,300	23%	2,650	27%

Source: Computed from Tables 8.10 and 8.11.

will need to commit at least 38 percent and 43 percent of their yearly income to acquire plots from the medium- and low-density areas (Table 8-12). By the same token, the highest income group (VI) will also need to commit at least 23 and 27 percent of their annual income to acquire plots from the medium- and low-density areas, respectively. Given as it were that human beings are almost always economically rational, and given that there are no restrictions (policy) stopping them from acquiring plots from any part of the city, the high income groups may opt to acquire land wherever it is more economical for them to do so. In that case, these groups may choose to even buy plots from the high-density areas, the most likely location for low-income groups to live. If this should happen, then the poor are presented with an even tighter or stiffer competition than before for the available land in high-density areas.

But even with the low-income groups sticking with the high-density area plots, and the high-income groups choosing from low-density areas, the majority of low-income households (nearly 77 percent) will still be automatically priced out of the urban land market at an acquisition cost of N1,950. As Table 8-12 indicates, those in the median-income range of N600 per annum (Group I) would require nearly three years of their total income to be able to pay even for the initial acquisition cost. Those in Group II will require more than one and a half times their total annual income to pay for the acquisition cost, while those in Group III will require at least one year of earnings to pay for plot acquisition and development costs. Those in Group IV will need to commit at least 75 percent of their income also.

The above analysis has not considered additional costs for plot development, involving housing construction. When such cost is added onto the plot acquisition cost, then the total cost of acquiring and developing a plot in the new city could be astronomical, and way beyond the capacity of the poor, who constitute nearly 90 percent of the expected population in the city.

Certainly, the financial constraints being espoused above could be overcome through other forms of credit financing. But, quite often, this option is not readily available to the poor. Housing development finance from commercial banks or other private sector commercial credit institutions is practically non-existent, and the trickle that exists in the public sector is restricted to a very small segment of the civil service. Housing finance is generally not available because the commercial credit institutions and other creditors are reluctant to advance loans for housing and other land-development activities because of the insecurity of titles in land, nor do they accept land as security or collateral on loans for the same reason.⁽¹⁾ Although all lands in the New Capital Territory belong to the federal government and are only leased (on a 99-year basis) to potential developers, in which case security of titles may not be a problem, there remains a high degree of uncertainty associated with land development. The uncertainty arises from the fact that

(1) D.I. Okpala, "The Potentials and Perils of Public Land Ownership and Management: A Case Study of the Lagos Executive Development Board (Nigeria), 1928-1972," Ph.D. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1979, p. 60.

the future (positive potentials) of the new capital city cannot yet be ascertained by the commercial banks until perhaps the city is fully developed or there are positive indications that it will develop into a full-fledged urban center.

The third set of factors that determines the beneficiary distribution configuration of the FCDA;s land is the agency's conditions for allocation and the terms of the covenant that the prospective beneficiary is expected to fulfill.

After land for residential development has been surveyed and mapped, the building plots are demarcated, prepared, and assembled for distribution by the Land Use and Allocation Committee (LUAC) under the auspices of the Minister for the Federal Capital Territory. All applications for plots are made through the Permanent Secretary of FCT on the prescribed form.

Ostensibly, any member of the public can apply and be allocated a plot, but in practice the conditions and criteria of allocation definitely exclude by implication certain economic groups from obtaining land. The prospective applicant is required to fill out an application form with the following information:

- (i) nationality and state of origin;
- (ii) occupation and post held;
- (iii) size of building plots being requested;
- (iv) particular plot or location of plot in area.

Generally, in selecting applicants to be allocated plots of

land, each applicant is invited for an interview,(1) to determine:

- (a) age and qualification (that s/he is over age 21 and has good references);
- (b) ability and willingness to build within a given period;
- (c) financial circumstances including tax position (an applicant must produce photocopies of the last three years of income tax receipts);
- (d) seriousness of his or her proposal.

The rationale for these requirements is to ensure that development of the plots proceeds as rapidly as possible in order to enable movement to the new city by 1986. While this rationale may be justified under this political goal for "rapid movement" as well as to ensure that mainly those capable of developing the plots and that tax-paying Nigerians obtain them, the principle violates one of the major goals of the new capital construction, which calls for the participation of all Nigerians irrespective of socio-economic group in the distribution of all land resources at the new federal capital. Because the majority of the poor may be unable to pay the plot acquisition cost, let alone develop it given their financial position, it is obvious that most members of this group will be excluded from owning plots in the city. Furthermore, it is generally more difficult for low-income groups to obtain acceptable references and tax clearances in Nigeria due to to difficult bureaucratic hurdles required to obtain such

(1) Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria. Development Control Documents for the Plot Areas. Ibid., op. cit., p. 23.

receipts, and also partly because the majority of the poor participate in informal activities that are generally not easy to assess for tax purposes.

Having satisfied themselves on the above requirements, the Ministry will then make an offer of a right of occupancy over the relevant plot. Within one month of the date of this offer, the applicant must formally accept or reject the offer. Details of the procedure that must be followed in proceeding with plot acquisition and development are given in Table 8-13.

If the applicant accepts the offer of a plot, arrangements are made for preliminary plans to be drawn up and submitted to the FCDA within three months of the offer of the right of occupancy. The Agency will normally make a decision as to whether they approve the plans within one month of receiving them.

The applicant then has a further four months in which to submit more detailed plans, and again the FCDA will normally make a decision on these within one month. Once the final plans are approved, the applicant must submit the appropriate layout fee and the operational deposit to the FCDA, which will then issue a Certificate of Occupancy. This will enable the applicant to raise loans and start building.

Two years after receiving the initial offer of right of occupancy, the applicant should have completed the building to a standard acceptable to the FCDA. The FCDA staff will arrange for the work to be inspected and for a completing certificate to be sent to the applicant.

Table 8.13

Procedural Steps for Acquisition and Development
of Plots at Abuja

Date (months)	FCT Ministry/FCDA Actions	Beneficiary Actions
- 6		Apply for plot
0	Offer of Right of Occupancy	
1		Formal Acceptance of offer of Right of Occupancy Submission of Preliminary Plans
3		
4	Approval of preliminary plans	
8		Submission final plans
9	Approval of final plans	
10		Pay layout fee and Operational Deposit
11	Issue Certificate of Occupancy in evidence of the right of occupancy granted	
12		Start construction on site
24		Complete building
25	Inspection of Building	
26	Grant Completion Certificate	

Source: "Development Control Documents for the Plot Areas in Accelerated District, Phase One." Report submitted to the Federal Capital Development Authority (FCDA) by Milton Keynes Development Corporation, March 1980.

The conditions for being allocated a plot by the Authority can therefore be summarized as follows:

- (i) The applicant must have the ability to pay the development charges, and fees of up to N1,950 for the high density areas, N2,300 for the medium density areas, and N2,650 for the low density areas (see Table 8-10).
- (ii) The applicant should preferably be of a high-income status. This is because the high-income earner is the one more likely to pay the development charges and invariably develop the lot as quickly as the FCDA wanted. Where s/he is not able to develop the plot using his/her income alone, s/he is more likely eligible for a loan credit for housing. The mortgage and other housing credit facilities in the country are designed for the benefit of wage or salaried earners (mainly of the high-income category) because most of these are government-sponsored or guaranteed.⁽¹⁾ The position or post held requested of applicants to furnish when applying for plots will perhaps help the FCDA better to sort out this category (high income) of individuals.
- (iii) The applicant must be 21 years of age and have good references. As stated above, those who are likely to have good references are persons of middle to high income. And in Nigeria, those with good references are the ones likely to secure loans and credits.
- (iv) The applicant must have paid taxes for at least the past three years. This condition means that most of the civil

(1) D.I. Okpala, *ibid.*, op. cit., p. 249.

servants can be eligible since their taxes are automatically deducted from their salaries. Individuals such as those who are self-employed often owe taxes because of inadequate record-keeping on the part of the government and difficulty of assessing this group of persons.

Thus, an applicant who is of low income, who is not a wage or salary earner nor wealthy self-employed, requires a guarantor with acceptable collaterals, which in most cases are simply either not available or are not acceptable to the FCDA. The very low, limited amount of credit available to would-be low-income land purchasers therefore contributed powerfully to limiting their access to the urban land opportunities offered by the Agency.

In addition to the requirements for obtaining the Authority's lands, the FCDA stipulates the specifications (covenants) to be complied with by the recipient, conditions some of which further constrain or limit the beneficiary types and define the form and type of development required by the Authority. Some of these conditions include provisions that require the beneficiary:

- (1) to agree to pay the required charges and fees. Four types of charges are made for the plots, an application fee, a layout fee or premium, an operational deposit, and a ground rent (Table 8-10). All charges depend on the use to which the plot is to be put. An application fee is charged before an application form is processed and 80 percent of this would be refunded after five years if the application is unsuccessful.

A layout fee would be charged before beneficiaries take physical possession of the plot allocated to them. An operational deposit is required to cover damages by the beneficiary or his agents to roads, services, fences, landscaping, and trees. An annual ground rent is charged in compliance with the Land Use Decree of 1978, Section 16. As noted above, the sum total of these charges exceeded the capacities of most low-income households.

- (2) to agree to build within a fixed timescale. Approximately two years was slotted by the FCDA for completion of both land acquisition processes and plot development. In a situation where bureaucratic red tape is minimal, construction materials available, and adequate financing is easy to obtain, two years would probably be sufficient to complete the two activities. But as noted in Chapter 5, most construction materials are imported. Even those that are manufactured locally are hauled long distances from places of manufacture. In Chapter 7 we also noted the inherent inefficiencies of the bureaucracy with regard to the FCDA. Because of the inefficiencies, to get the Rights of Occupancy which the Authority specified would take as little as one month could take as long as one year to obtain. Also, the approval of final plans, which a beneficiary should expect at the fourth month after his approval of the preliminary plans, could take six to twelve months or longer. In this chapter we have also noted the difficulty of obtaining housing loans, especially for low-income earners. Thus, in these

circumstances the two-year time scale could be said to be too short to expect a full development of the plot.

- (3) to agree to submit plans to the FCDA and obtain approval before work starts. A beneficiary is required to submit three copies of the following plans to the FCDA:

Preliminary Plans: (i) Preliminary plans to a scale of 1:100 showing proposed elevations, sections, and house plans; (ii) preliminary plans to a scale of 1:500 showing proposed layout, access, and service connections.

Final Plans: (i) Detailed plans to a scale of 1:100 showing proposed elevations, sections, and house plans; (ii) detailed plans to a scale of 1:500 showing proposed layout, access details, and service connections; (iii) specification of method of construction and materials; (iv) plan at 1:100 scale and specification of proposed landscape treatment at the front of the plot. These plans are to be approved by the FCDA before work can start on the site. The FCDA informs the recipient of its decision within one month of the submission. But as noted above, the approval of these plans often takes as long as six months.

The plans will not be approved if they do not conform to the following constraints:

Site Constraints

(a) Permitted uses. The permitted uses include: residential, mosque/church, school/nursery, professional office including medical/clinic, embassy/consulate, and other federal and

state offices. No corner shops or canopies related to informal activities such as crafts, dressmaking, shoe repair, etc., were permitted. But these happen to be most of the activities carried out in the residential areas of the urban poor.

(b) Building zone. All development must be in the building zone, as shown in the schedule of plots.

(c) Ground cover ratio. The total ground floor area of all buildings must not exceed the ground cover stipulated in the schedule of plots. As noted above, these ranged from 30 to 40 percent, with the buildings rising to a maximum of two to three stories in height.

Building Constraints

Plans will not be approved if they do not conform to the following building constraints:

(a) Type of development. A single building with garage and outbuildings. This can be any one of the permitted uses listed in site constraints above. In the case of residential use, it can be a self-contained dwelling or a group of flats. Each flat must be no less than 50 m².

(b) Story height. All development is required to have a maximum number of stories as given in the Schedule of Plots (see Table 8-8).

(c) Parking. All development is required to incorporate space for car parking on the following basis: at least two spaces for a self-contained dwelling; at least one space per flat unit; at least one space per 75 m² for commercial uses.

This requirement automatically assumes that all residents, including low income, own a car.

(d) Materials. All buildings are required to be finished in white paint though areas of brick or local stone would be permitted. The roofs are to be constructed of asbestos, cement or metal sheeting. (Asbestos and metal sheeting are imported materials.) All gates are to be of metal.

(e) Landscaping. Final plans are required to include a plan and specification of the proposed landscaping treatment of the plot and should include details of all trees to be preserved and planted.

(f) Design. "All designs would be examined to ensure that the required high standard of development in the Federal Capital City is maintained." (1)

(g) Signs. Only one permanent sign per plot is permitted. This should not exceed 1.5 m in height and 2 m² in surface area.

(4) To agree to conform to building regulations and by-laws as laid down by the Minister for the Federal Capital Territory.

(5) To agree to construction conditions:

(a) The recipient should not carry out alterations to any building without the approval of the FCDA.

(b) The recipient should not substitute any of the materials specified in the final plans without the approval of the FCDA.

(1) Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria: Development Control Documents, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

(c) The recipient should conform to all the building regulations including that: the developer ensure for structural safety, adherence to fire regulations; to make good any damage to the roads, services, fences, and landscaping; to undertake to plant and maintain all trees and landscaping as set out in the final plans.

(d) The recipient should not complete any sublease, mortgage, assignment or other disposal of the property (until the grant of the completion certificate) without the prior consent of the FCDA.

From the foregoing conditions for allocation, it is clear that a prospective beneficiary has to have a fairly strong resource base to meet these conditions and qualify for allocation. Most of the FCDA's plots were designed for people with the ability to pay, which may be reasonable ordinarily. The point in this case, however, is that given that all lands in the Federal Territory belongs to the general public in which case they are by definition subsidized, and this beneficiary class of people is proportionally very small in relation to the rest of the expected urban population, and if the criterion of access in public ownership and management is that of the 'highest bidder wins' or 'ability to pay,' then the poor or low-income person is disproportionately bearing the burden of developing the new capital city.

Thus, from the point of view of the resolution of the objective problem--the amelioration of the urban land accessibility problem and improvement of its quality--the various

restrictive conditions imposed on those who got the plots with respect to the type of development and standards, worked against the achievement of such objective. The constraints placed on the plots development and government policies would tend to constrain the maximizing of land availability vis-a-vis housing production, which could have an adverse impact on the quantity of housing units at the new capital city. Further impacts of this limited accessibility on the low-income sector will become evident as we review the FCDA's processes of allocations of housing and their distributional implications among socio-economic groups.

8.3 Housing: Processes of Allocation and Distributional Implications among Socio-economic Groups

Just as the FCDA or the government was directly involved in the distribution of urban lands (although without a conscious effort to provide affordable land to the low income), so was it actively involved in production and allocation of housing. The FCDA's action in this regard was guided by the federal government's overall goal of providing adequate housing for all the city's inhabitants. This broad goal was, however, marred by three often conflicting housing objectives requiring:

- (a) that the FCDA be directly engaged in housing construction for its workers as well as for all federal civil servants including ministers, senators, and others.
- (b) that none of the residents be committed to spending more than 20 percent of his or her income on housing consumption.

(This is part of the overall national housing goal, and not just for Abuja alone.)

(c) that residents be encouraged to rely on their resources to provide their own housing.

An examination of these objective reveals that the way in which these government objectives have determined housing alternative for the city's residents, in general, and the poor, in particular, shows that the FCDA's beneficiary distribution of its housing resources was, as in the case of land resources, significantly regressive and the forms of housing development involved significant inefficiencies as well.

The form of the FCDA or government's direct involvement in housing development involves construction and renting of houses to all the federal civil servants (including the parastatals and those involved in city administration, and the Police) at rents no more than 20 percent of their monthly income.

The government's estimated cost of providing an additional 15,000 units of such housing needed by 1986 was N353 million.(1) From this estimate we have deduced that approximately N600 million would be required to build the 25,000 units of the government housing programmed for the Phase One Area development. At this cost the per capita expenditure on every civil servant for housing development stands at nearly N29,000.(2) At rents of no more than 20 percent of the civil servant's income, the total revenue generated from most of the civil servants' rents would

(1) Report of the Interministerial Committee on the Review of the Abuja Project, FCDA, August 1984, p. 21.

(2) Approximately 21,000 civil servants consisting of federal (11,300) federal parastatals (8,800), and city administration and police (1,000), are expected to live in the city in 1986.

not be enough to offset the cost of providing such housing even after 15 years. This would represent a disproportionate share of housing benefits by the civil servants, because the rest of the city's residents (non-government employees) including the poor, are left to provide housing on their own. However, given that the families and dependents of these civil servants may indirectly benefit from this housing development, the overall benefit of this housing program may go beyond just the civil servants.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that this governmental housing excludes a large proportion of population who may be either non-civil servants employed or unemployed in other sectors of the city. The exclusion of this group means that they would have to provide their own housing using their own means and resources. While some of the well-paid workers among this excluded group may be able to afford their own housing, a large proportion of them would be excluded from the housing market, especially because of their low level of income and the cost and high standard of development adopted for housing development in the city. We have noted in Chapter 5 that the FCDA had rejected a housing proposal that would have incorporated sites and services to provide cheap and serviced lands to the poor to develop their own housing. We noted also that the standard of plots being developed as well as the criteria and conditions for plot acquisition fall beyond the financial capacity of most urban residents.

The magnitude of the plight of this excluded poor-income group from the governmental housing is better appreciated by reflecting on the characteristics of this group's position relative to that of the civil servants. The city's population and employment characteristics (see Table 8-14) shows that at the projected 1986 population of 150,000, the ratio of non-government employees to federal civil servants (including parastatals and city administration) would be 7:1. In the year 2000 when an ultimate population of 1.6 million is expected, the ratio is even higher at 10:1. Table 8-10 indicates that nearly 77 percent of households (by income of the head of household) will earn less than N1,500 annually. At this level of income, we showed that none of these households would be able to acquire a plot in the new city, let alone develop it (see Table 8-12). Of a total employment of approximately 110,000 projected for 1986, 11,100 or 10 percent will be working in the informal sector. The number working in the informal sector is expected to increase (by the year 2000) to nearly 361,000 or 42 percent of the total employed. With this category of people generally belonging to the income group earning less than N1,500 annually, it is difficult to imagine how they would be able to provide their own housing with no governmental assistance.

The other implication of the FCDA's direct involvement in housing construction relates to the inefficiencies often associated with the government or its agency in implementing such projects. Historically governments or their agencies are not

Table 8.14

Distribution of Total Labor Force by Sector and Type (1981-2000)

Sector	1981	1986	<u>Employment</u> 1990	1995	2000
<u>Public Sector</u>					
Federal Civil Service	500	11,300	30,100	45,600	60,300
Federal Corporation	--	8,800	33,600	55,700	65,000
City Administration & Police	--	1,000	6,100	14,600	21,900
Military	500	3,000	5,600	9,100	12,500
State Government					
Liaison	--	1,800	3,000	5,800	7,600
International Diplomatic Corps	--	700	3,000	4,000	4,000
Subtotal	<u>1,000</u>	<u>26,600</u>	<u>81,400</u>	<u>134,800</u>	<u>171,300</u>
<u>Industrial Sector</u>	25,000	44,100	47,000	62,700	84,200
<u>Services Sector</u>	4,500	28,100	68,900	150,280	241,850
Total Formal Employment	30,500	98,800	197,300	347,780	497,350
Informal Employment	3,200	11,100	118,380	235,600	361,000
Total Labor Force	33,700	109,900	315,680	583,380	858,350
% of Total Population	85%	70%	65%	58%	52%
Total Population	39,050	157,750	485,660	1,005,800	1,642,100

Source: Master Plan for Abuja, the Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, February 1979, p. 60.

known to be the most efficient provider of low-cost housing.(1) This is because of high standards and sophisticated techniques and materials often used to build these houses, which add to the difficulty of providing cheap and affordable housing as well as the fact that these houses often end up being invaded by the middle- and upper-income people. Efficiency in housing development can therefore be achieved by adopting proper cost-saving strategies, which are generally related to the components of housing costs, such as labor, materials, standards, and techniques. The inefficiency of the FCDA housing development hinged on its lack of incorporation or adoption of some of these cost-saving strategies as shown.

1. Planning. Efficient layout can increase the number of housing units sharing a given quantity of road and drainage construction. Similarly, sharing utilities (water toilets, kitchens) can reduce costs as shown in Table 8-15. (Today 70 to 80 percent(2) of Lagos residents share such facilities.) In this chapter we have noted the low density (26 dwellings per hectare) adopted for the overall development in Phase One and also pointed out that at this level of density costs of infrastructure allocatable to each plot would be high, thereby raising the overall cost of housing development. Also, most so-called low-income housing being developed in the outlying areas have not

(1) O.F. Grimes, Jr., Housing for Low Income Urban Families; Economics and Policy in the Developing World, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1976, pp. 3-9.

(2) See Economic Commission for Africa, "Report on Demographic Survey of Households, Housing and Living Conditions in Lagos," United Nations, New York, 1980.

Table 8.15

Building Construction Costs (Naira/One square meter)

<u>Construction Standard</u>	<u>Cost</u>
1. Standard Urban Construction	₦130
2. Reduced Internal Finish	₦107
3. Minimal with W.C. and shower	₦ 90
4. Self-help/indigenous material	₦ 60

Source: The Master Plan for Abuja, the Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, February 15, 1979, p. 175.

incorporated this form of cost-saving measure , especially the one related to sharing utilities, such as toilets, kitchens, and water services.

2. Materials. Experience in West African countries shows that cost reductions of as much as 30 percent can be achieved by using domestic materials such as locally manufactured roofing materials.(1) However, the feasibility of using locally produced materials will depend on whether the local materials can be produced at costs lower than imported materials.

As discussed in Chapter 5, the construction of the city has relied essentially on imported building materials. Where local building materials were used, they often had to be hauled from long distances to the city.(2) Because the city is located on a non-existing major highway network or river transport, the high cost of transporting such materials could add to the overall cost of housing development.

3. Subsystem Mix. Omitting superfluous portions of the building or those parts that can be later upgraded (such as interior doors, or reducing the level of finish on floors, walls, and ceilings) or using locally manufactured fittings can also lead to substantial savings in housing cost. Table 8-15 shows that considerable savings could be achieved by adopting any one of the

(1) Quoted in the Master Plan for Abuja, the New Federal Capital of Nigeria, *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

(2) Although some of the newly developed industrial complexes within the FCT have started production of construction materials, their outputs are still fairly low. Furthermore, some of the plants rely on imported materials.

three cost-reduction strategies. For example, nearly N23 per square meter can be saved in construction cost by moving from a standard urban construction (includes all the internal finish, W.C., and shower) to housing that reduces its internal finished.(1) As much as N40 per square meter can also be saved by building a house that relies on minimal standards of plot size with W.C. and shower. But the FCDA housing has relied mainly on the standard urban construction technique, which implies that even a somewhat modern smaller house of 60 square meters would cost nearly N8,000 (60xN130 per square meter).

Certainly, there is a potential risk in building housing with reduced internal finish. The unfinished portion of such a house may remain so for a long time, especially if the poor should be relied upon to upgrade at a later date. This may, in turn, contribute to the deterioration of the housing unit and to the environment (if there are many of such unfinished structures). Such deterioration would run counter to the government's policy or expectation of a "high standard urban environment."

4. Infrastructure. Additional cost reductions may be achieved by building infrastructure to lower initial standards. The Master Plan shows that lower road paving and width standards and reducing the quantity of finished drainage channels may reduce on-site costs to these elements by up to 50 percent(2) (Table 8-16).

(1) The Master Plan for Abuja, *ibid.*, op. cit., p. 176.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 175.

Table 8.16

Infrastructure Costs in Naira/One Square Meter of Housing

	<u>Infrastructure Standards</u>	<u>Costs</u>
1.	High	₦ 45
2.	Paved Roads--Surface Drainage	32
3.	Unpaved Roads--Reduced Surface Drainage	22
4.	Share Infrastructure	13

Source: The Master Plan for Abuja, the Federal Capital of Nigeria, FCDA, February 15, 1979, p. 175.

5. Self-help. Self-help housing incorporates a 'sites and services' approach that involves public provision of subdivided land, major infrastructure and often small core houses with shared or individual water, kitchen, toilets, etc. Given security of tenure, access to credit, and a good access and infrastructure plan, owners (or long-term lessees) can be relied upon to improve their dwelling.

Owner-built or self-help construction reduces costs by removing contractor overheads and profits and by incorporating only the skilled labor portion of construction costs.

The IPA had estimated that the incorporation of the 'self-help' technique into the new capital's total housing program would have saved the FCDA more than 10 percent in total governmental subsidy. But the FCDA had rejected the idea.

The overall political demand for having the new city completed as quickly as possible has also necessitated, in part, the rejection of the self-help strategy. The idea of involving the low-income group, which did not have adequate financial capacity to begin with, to meet the overall fast pace of construction was likely to produce uncompleted structures which would obliterate the high standard expected of the new capital city.

Closely related to the question of inefficient housing construction techniques, is the density of development adopted for the Phase One area development. Generally, the lower the density, the greater the amount of land needed for a given quantity of housing. Conversely, the higher the density, the

smaller the amount of land needed for a given quantity of housing. Within reasonable limits, higher residential densities would mean more efficient use of land. The criteria and conditions for obtaining land from the FCDA emphasize development on such lands of owner-occupied single family houses and flats. The agency's direct involvement also emphasizes the construction of mainly detached/semi-detached single family housing and flats (Table 5.2). Ostensibly, the FCDA was pursuing a policy of developing a relatively high quality housing in the new capital city. As overcrowding was the most serious housing problem in the former capital city, the agency might have thought that low density forms of development were an effective way to improve housing quality. In a situation of limited financial resources and acute housing shortage, however, improvements in housing standards are generally possible only when the production of new housing has caught up with the housing deficit. Moreover, in addition to physical shortages of housing, as such, the housing problem is often essentially an income problem, and one of the major goals of direct government or public involvement has generally been to facilitate access to urban land and housing resources for those with income problems.

The FCDA's conception of land development and its appreciation of the problem of access were by implication best demonstrated in the lands and houses it developed and constructed itself. In most of these developments, as has been pointed out, the middle and high income sectors were the major groups by virtue of the costs of plot acquisition in relation to

the general income levels and the characteristics of the housing options adopted for the development of the new capital city. Some details of the housing option are demonstrated by the housing strategy adopted for the Accelerated District (later Garki District) of the Phase One area. The strategy involved the construction of 4,700 dwelling units and preparation of 1,000 plots to be allocated to individuals or private groups. The plots are primarily intended for residential use (self-contained dwellings, detached/semi-detached houses, and flats) but can also be used for embassies or consulates, federal or state offices, or professional offices including clinics, religious buildings, and nursery schools.(1) The dwellings comply with the following house size and type mixes:

House size:	1 bedroom unit	47.5%
	2 bedroom unit	30 %
	3 bedroom unit	15 %
	4 bedroom unit	7.5%

Dwelling Type: Both houses and flats but not more than 50% of flats
(2)

The plots comply with the following plot mix:(3)

	Minimum Plot Area M	Maximum Ground Floor Area M	Proportion of Total Plot Area %
Type A	600	200	70
Type B	900	300	20
Type C	1350	450	10

(1) Abuja, New Federal Capital of Nigeria. District Plan for the North West District Final Plan, Report submitted to FCDA by Milton Keynes Development Corporation, October 1980, pp. 12-14.

(2)

Ibid., p. 12.

(3)

Ibid., p. 13

The price for a typical two bedroom house (approximately N15,000 excluding land cost) was higher than the annual income of nearly 97% of the expected city's population (a careful observation of Table 8.10 shows that approximately 97% of the city's total work force earned below N10,000 (US \$14,000)). Also the cost of acquiring a plot of land in a typical high density area (N1,950) of the city was higher than the annual income of nearly 80 percent of the city's population (Tables 8.10, 8.11, and 8.12).

Public involvement in urban land management is said to make for efficiency on land use and management--efficiency in this context implying the necessity of maximizing the use of the quantity of land available without increasing environmental dangers (Okpala, 1977, p. 294). Higher residential densities could be maintained without necessarily endangering the environment. Low densities are not necessarily synonymous with good quality environment. Greater efficiency in land development and housing units production could have been achieved by devoting more land to higher density development than the FCDA did.


The degree of inefficiency involved in the agency's forms and types of development can be inferred from a comparison of the FCDA's adopted housing types and residential densities, and the standard densities (that are obtainable from other housing types and characters) for conventionally acceptable aesthetic and environmental qualities. As discussed above, 1280 hectares of land (3,200 acres) were designated for residential housing. Of this total, 20 percent (256 hectares; 640 acres) was committed to

low density housing with an average density of 10 dwellings per hectare (4 dwelling units per acre). The remaining 80 percent (1024 hectares; 2560 acres) were designated for high density development at an average of 30 dwelling units per hectare (12 units per acre). A comparison of these housing densities with the conventionally accepted standards shows that the FCDA's adopted housing density standards are higher than the conventionally accepted standards. Figure 8.2 shows housing types and their conventionally associated densities in dwelling units per acre. It shows that the one-family detached house types give about 5 dwelling units per acre (approximately 13 units per hectare); one-family semi-detached house types give about 15 dwelling units per acre (38 units per hectare); one-family attached house types give about 20 dwelling units per acre (50 units per hectare), two-family detached house types give about 10 dwelling units per acre; and two-family semi-detached, 20 dwelling units per acre (50 units per hectare).

In the case of multi-family housing, Figure 8.2 shows that two-story (garden apartment) flats would give about 30 dwelling units per acre (75 units per hectare) and three-story, about 45 dwellings per acre (113 per hectare).

On the basis of these standards, it is possible to calculate an index of land waste or inefficiency in the FCDA's forms of residential developments, as follows.

Figure 8.2
Housing Types and their Associated Densities



NOTE: All densities indicated are approximate and should be used as a guide only.

Source: DeChiara, J. and Koppelman, L.: Manual of Housing Planning and Design Criteria (Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, (p. 79).

$$\frac{Wx - Dx}{Wx} \times 100\%$$

where Wx is the number of dwelling units per hectare obtainable under the most efficient (economical) housing type, and Dx is the number of dwelling units per hectare obtainable under the particular FCDA housing types and form of development.

Using this formula and using various actual predominant development densities (10, 30) and using various 'possible' densities based on Figure 8.2, Table 8.17 shows the relative amount of inefficiency (waste) involved in some of the FCDA forms or densities of development.

The table shows that these 'indices of waste or inefficiency' varied between 23 and 80 percent on the average. This implies that 23-80 percent more housing units per hectare could be provided from given FCDA housing scheme in the Phase One area.

Since an occupancy rate of six persons per dwelling unit was adopted for the entire city, population loss due to inefficient use of space in the Phase One area can be calculated as follows:

Given possible (average) density (Table 8.17) = 53.4 d.u/hectare*
 Assuming FCDA (average) density = 26 d.u/hectare
 Waste in space consumption:
 Given possible density - Assuming FCDA density = 27.4 d.u/hectare
 Possible population loss per hectare = 27.4x6 = 164.4 persons/hectare

* d.u = dwelling unit

Table 8.17

FCDA Actual Densities or Forms of Development Compared with
"Possible" Densities, as Index of Efficiency

Form of Development	Possible* Densities no. of housing units per hectare	Assuming FCDA Den- sities in Phase One housing of units per hectare	Index of Waste in FCDA Form of Devel- opment (percent)
Assuming 1 Family Detached	13	10	23.0
Assuming 1 Family Semi-detached	38	10	73.7
Assuming 1 Family Attached	50	10	80.0
Assuming 2 Family Detached	35	10	71.4
Assuming 2 Family Semi-Detached	50	30	40.0
Assuming 2 Story Apt. (Flats)	75	30	60.0
Assuming 3 Story Apt. (Flats)	113	30	73.5

*Acceptable limit of density that is possible without sacrificing environmental quality.

Assuming FCDA total area for residential development in Phase One to be 1280 hectares, possible total population loss in Phase one:

$$164.4 \times 1280 = 210,432 \text{ persons.}$$

Thus, if the population of 210,432 persons is added to the 150,000 projected for the Phase One area, the total population that could have been accommodated in Phase One, without jeopardizing environmental quality would have been 360,432. At this population, the Phase One could have conveniently accommodated the original 230,000 estimated in the Master Plan that was scaled down to 150,000 due to terrain difficulties (see discussion of terrain problems in Chapter 4).

8.4 Summary

Our assessment of the FCDA's effectiveness in urban development shows that the agency has largely failed to meet its construction targets. Construction of many of the urban facilities has yet to be started, or if started are at the preliminary stages of development. The agency has, however, made significant progress in the construction of some aspects of the urban facilities.

The conditions and criteria of the FCDA land allocations were restrictive of accessibility to the general population. The agency's land development policy emphasis was unduly oriented in favor of the upper-middle and upper-income groups, who could afford to pay the agency's prices and meet the high development requirements. Considering the general income levels and

distribution structure, the FCDA's land development practices were not favorable to the overwhelming majority of the expected urban population who were low income earners and who had limited, if any, access to credit facilities.

Where the FCDA constructed housing, the emphases too, were on low density single-family type houses averaging 10 dwelling units per hectare (4 per acre) and flats averaging 30 dwelling units per hectare (12 per acre). Obviously these low density developments involved large uneconomical use of land in the order of 23-80 percent wastage rate. The population potentially lost to Phase One from this wastage of land is nearly 200,000.

The FCDA's land management practices therefore were hardly addressed to the priority problem areas--that of producing as many plots and housing units as possible (in the face of limited financial resources) that would make them accessible to a majority of the people. (Nearly 8,000 applications were received for less than 2,000 plots available for distribution in 1981.) (1) Rather, the agency's management practices were geared mainly to the creation of housing opportunities for the middle and high income families in luxury subdivisions. The FCDA, however, seems to be mirroring the government's mood (policy) for high quality urban environment which it thought was synonymous with the low density development.

(1) New Nigeria, "Spotlight on Abuja," January 11, 1982, p. 8.

CHAPTER 9

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Having examined the problems associated with the construction of Abuja, and all the Federal Capital Development Authority's (FCDA's) involvement in this project, we will now recapitulate the main themes of this thesis and the lessons drawn from the results of the foregoing analyses. We also provide a review of the theories of implementation discussed in Chapter 1 and the relation those theories have to the project. We also suggest directions for a more effective approach to the implementation of the new capital project. We begin by summarizing the impacts of the FCDA on the construction of the new capital project.

9.1 Impacts of the FCDA on Project Implementation

In spite of the problems (caused mainly by the institutional climate within which it had to operate and its shortage of operating funds) and its weaknesses (caused mainly by its shortage of management skills, and organizational instability), the FCDA made some noticeable and commendable progress on the implementation of the new capital project. Various residential schemes have been developed by the agency and its role in the development of some basic urban infrastructure had been remarkable.

Generally, more than 50 percent of the agency's budget has been devoted to the provision of basic urban infrastructure, services, and related facilities. The FCDA has completed approximately 3,524 units of housing in Garki, Asokoro, Wuse, and Maitama districts of the Phase One area (Table 6.5). An additional 7,000 units, including low income housing, have been built in other areas of the Federal Territory (Table 6.6). Close to 4,000 units and 3,000 units of housing respectively, are also under construction in the Phase One area and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). The agency has prepared and distributed nearly 2,600 residential, 209 industrial, and 125 commercial plots of land to private developers, house-holders, and industrialists (Table 8.7).

In addition to these, there are other aspects of the project's achievements (tangible and intangible, some of which are outside the domain of our analysis) that the FCDA could also lay claim to in its eight years of existence. Major studies and surveys have been accomplished at the site. The master plan has been prepared and put into operation. Workable structural organization has been evolved. Other commendable achievements include: Air traffic into the FCT has been inaugurated by putting the FCDA air strip into operation as early as 1977. An international airport was opened in the territory by 1982. This large airport is already revolutionizing the pattern of transportation in Nigeria by providing useful options to

travellers in the long-isolated middlebelt areas and easing communication between the North and South, particularly in the harmattan season when the Kaduna and Kano airports become difficult to use.

Abuja hosted the very successful celebration of Nigeria's twenty-second independence anniversary on October 1, 1982. It was the first grand opportunity for many Nigerians and foreigners to see Abuja and "taste her promise." The FCDA has acquired vast experience in contract affairs from this project. The Abuja project represented the largest single construction project anywhere in the world today. As such, it has attracted many contractors and consultants from all over the world.

Although the FCDA has made some important contributions, the agency has nevertheless been unable to meet most of its construction targets that would be needed for the movement of the national seat of government in March, 1986. Of nearly 18,000 housing units required in the Phase One area by 1985, for example, only 19 percent or 3,500 units have been completed (see Tables 6.5 and 8.3). Most of the houses completed in parts of the Phase One and the FCT areas are still without electricity and water service. The construction of the Central Area, that was to serve as a spin-off for the growth and development of the entire city has progressed rather slowly. Many of the Central Area facilities have not been built, and others whose contracts have been awarded, are at the preliminary stages of con-

struction, thereby making it difficult to achieve the 1986 deadline.

In addition, the FCDA's contributions in urban development were not without substantial costs in resources, efficiency, and equity. The unintended negative effects of its activities, sometimes, to a great extent, adversely affected the very goals the new capital project was expected to achieve. In this regard, it can be said that although its activities were to a significant extent inhibited by institutional factors and problems of inadequate funding-- which were essentially external to it, its internal problems of management competence and administrative efficiency were substantially responsible for some of its conceptual and operational problems and failures.

Certain concepts of the FCDA's land development practices, for example, were particularly counter-productive to the expected general development goals of the new capital city. Among these, two were particularly outstanding:

- (i) the "first come first served and ability to develop" concept adopted for the allocation of land--which implied that the general public (irrespective of anyone's financial strength, including the poor) was to compete for plots of land in the city; and as a corollary,
- (ii) the generally low-density development emphasis-- emphasis placed on low-lying, detached and semidetached, and executive-flat-type houses.

By the "first come first served and ability to develop" concept, the FCDA's plots of land were largely accessible to those who could afford to pay the relatively high development plot charges and fees and meet the stringent conditions reserved for land development. This group constituted of largely the upper-middle and high-income segment of the society. Because the distribution of plots also depended largely on plot recipient's connections, the poor's accessibility to land resources became even further constrained in that they were the least likely to have such connections.

By pursuing this policy of first-come, first-served, and ability to develop, the FCDA excluded a high proportion of the city's expected population from leasing plots in the capital city (nearly 80 percent of the expected households would earn less than ₦2,600 per annum; see Table 8.10). This implies that the development of residential housing (including owner-occupied and rentable flats) will fall on the remaining relatively small (wealthy) segment of the population. This will, in turn, result in exclusive possession of land by these relatively few people. As maximum profit will be the guiding operating principle, land and housing will be available to those who can pay the price. This will mean overcrowding in the relatively fewer houses at the lower end of the quality scale, thus resulting in a city residentially segregated along economic lines. This system, too, will tend to ignore the broader desirable social goal--national integration (which the new capital project seeks to accom-

plish), which is necessary for the peace and stability of the country.

The corollary concept of "low-density development" has the effect of making such housing development more costly than would be the case with alternative (higher density) forms of development, because low-density development has the tendency to be relatively lavish with land; therefore, it involves spending more for land. The fact that land for low-density residential development is more expensive than land for high-density development is fully recognized and practiced by the FCDA itself in its land-disposal practices. It, for example, charged a total of ₱2,650 (including applications and layout fees, operational deposit, and initial ground rent) per plot for the low-density areas, ₱2,300 for the medium-density areas, and ₱1,950 for the high-density areas (Table 8.11). Furthermore, the proportions of land and infrastructure costs in the total housing development costs is often higher in low-density developments because the cost of raw land and infrastructure is generally dependent on the lot size. In apartment type developments, for example, more units are produced on a given piece of land, and more families are able to live on the same piece of land that otherwise would have been occupied by only one family in one housing unit. This would distribute the cost of land and infrastructure over many more housing units, thus reducing the per unit cost of land and infrastructure and at the same time accommodating more

families.

Also, given the inordinately high-quality standards of these land developments and their high cost, they were accessible only to a very small proportion of the population. This small proportion is generally not the strata of the population where the quantitative demand is most acute.

It could be said that the FCDA's mode of land allocation and housing production has aided the development of squatter housing that has begun to emerge around the new capital city (see Chapter 4). This has resulted from the agency having in its possession and control large tracts of land, but producing very limited numbers of housing units and housing plots from them. This meant withdrawing housing land from its most efficient potential use and forestalling whatever might have been produced (by these individuals who resorted to building temporary shelters for themselves) if such lands were not pre-empted by the FCDA. The result has been that many people are beginning to construct temporary shelters, thus increasing the potential for development and environmental deterioration of the city--evils which could have been minimized by allocating sufficient land for low-income housing.

9.2 Summary: FCDA's Effectiveness in Urban Development

Given the significance of the FCDA's role in the new capital construction, we summarize the general effectiveness (performance) of this agency so far in terms of the new

capital's urban development goal. It has been noted earlier that one of the main (national) goals of the new capital construction was to create an urban environment where a national integration of Nigerians of all walks of life, ethnic groups, and socio-economic backgrounds could take place. Because this goal is broad, we convert it into an analytically feasible framework involving a set of categories of urban development objectives (attainment objectives) with which we measure the FCDA's effectiveness. Attainment objectives, we refer to as those sub-goals related to the substantive contents of development (such as how many houses are built or kilometers of roads constructed) needed to achieve the overall goal.

Given that a task as complex as building a city involves multiple objectives that are always in partial if not full conflict at least at the margins, it is frequently necessary to make decisions affecting two or more conflicting objectives. In order to analyze how these decisions contribute most toward the primary goal, we assign priorities, by creating a hierarchy of objectives to facilitate this. A priority rating of objectives is prepared by classifying all items according to three categories: "A" for critical objectives, "B" for important but not critical objectives, and "C" for the rest. We use these priority ratings as subjective judgments of the relation of each objective to the primary urban development goal.

In addition, we divide the attainment goals into three

main types. Each component of a city usually serves only certain segments of the population, or serves different segments in diverse ways. Moreover, various groups have dissimilar objectives regarding any one component of the city (such as housing). Thus, the objectives of urban development can best be stated in terms of the aspirations and needs of specific groups of people rather than in terms of the requirements of the population as a whole. While the city can be divided into many groups, we believe that a two-way breakdown is adequate for setting general attainment objectives. These two groups are (i) the low-income (earning less than or equal to ₦2,600 per year), and (ii) the middle/high income group (earning over ₦2,600 annually). (The two categories are derived from the income distribution pattern in Table 8.10.)

Because the objectives formulated are stated in broad terms rather than quantitatively, it is possible to make only a general evaluation of the "adequacy" of urban development attainments related to them. In making this admittedly subjective evaluation, we use the following classifications: "A" for excellent or good progress toward achieving objectives, "B" for fair progress, and "C" for poor progress.

Comparison of the priority ratings with the performance ratings for the attainment objectives is summarized in Table 9.1. The table sets forth (1) the urban development objectives we formulated, (2) the priority ratings assigned

Table 9.1
Priority and Performance Ratings
of Urban Development Objectives by Income Groups

Low Income Groups (Income ≤ ₦2,600)

Urban Development Category	Attainment Objective	Priority Rating	Performance Rating	Comments/Remarks
1. Land	Provide land at a cheap and affordable cost to this group	A	C	Plots of land provided on a first-come first-served and ability to develop basis
2. Utilitiies	Provide at least minimum standards of water, sewage, and electric service to the greatest number of households	A	B	Low cost housing at Nyanya and other areas in the FCT still lack pipe borne water and sewerage services, but majority of low-income areas are hooked into these services
3. Transportation and Communication	Develop systems (transport) that provide adequate services at low cost to users	A	C	Although many district roads are completed, there is yet no public transport, such as public buses, in the city

(table cont'd)

Table 9.1 (cont'd)

Low Income Groups (cont'd)				
Urban Development Category	Attainment Objective	Priority Rating	Performance Rating	Comments/Remarks
4. Educational Facilities	Provide facilities for elementary education, secondary and post-secondary	B	C	There are elementary, secondary and post-secondary educational facilities located in the FCT but not inside the city
5. Health	Provide adequate public hospitals, clinics	A	C	Only one health clinic located at a temporary site in Gark is operational. This clinic caters to nearly 30,000 inhabitants of the city as well as an additional 50,000 living in outlying areas such as Svleja, Gwagwalada, Nyanya, etc.
6. Housing	Provide properly-located housing sites with minimum standards that would facilitate accessibility to housing	A	C	Most of the low-income housing is located at estates far from the city. The standards of low-income housing are also generally very high.
7. Social, Cultural, and Recreational Facilities	Provide facilities for activities that will satisfy the leisure time needs of these people	C	C	

(table cont'd)

Table 9.1 (cont'd)

Low Income Groups (cont'd)

Urban Development Category	Attainment Objective	Priority Rating	Performance Rating	Comments/Remarks
8. Commercial Facilities	Provide land for low-cost stores, services, and open market areas convenient and affordable to this group	A	C	Greater emphasis is given to the development of 'modern' shopping centers than to the development of more familiar traditional open market centers

Middle/Upper Income Groups (Income ≥ ₦2,600)

1. Land	Provide adequate and properly located housing for this group	A	B	
2. Utilities	Provide good quality water, sewage, and electric service to households	A	B	Except for Wuse District in the FCC which is currently not served with electricity, the rest of the middle/high income housing areas are served with relatively good quality utilities
3. Transportation and Communication System	Maximize convenience and minimize time at reasonable cost. Provide high quality telephone service to all households	B	B	

(table cont'd)

Table 9.1 (cont'd)

Middle/Upper Income Groups (cont'd)

Urban Development Category	Attainment Objectives	Priority Rating	Performance Rating	Comments/Remarks
4. Educational Facilities	Establish good-quality facilities at elementary, secondary, and college levels	A	C	The middle-upper income group is affected in the same way as the low-income group by lack of educational facilities
5. Health	Provide both public and private hospitals, clinics, and other health facilities of the high quality devised by this group	A	C	Members of this group are served as well by the single clinic at the Garki District
6. Housing	Provide medium- and high-quality housing in desirable locations	A	A	The housing schemes developed thus far for this group are well located (see discussion, Chapter 8)
7. Social, Cultural, and Recreational Facilities	Provide facilities to house all the social functions, theater, and other entertainment and recreational activities deemed desirable by this group	B	C	
8. Commerical Facilities	Provide medium- and high-quality shopping areas convenient to middle- and upper-income housing areas	B	A	

to them, and (3) our subjective ratings of actual performance for each.

From Table 9.2 it is very significant that we rated the FCDA's performance poor (C) in 11 of the 16 attainment objectives. Of the 11 objectives rated critical to urban development, we rated FCDA's performance excellent in only 1, involving the provision of medium- and high-quality housing to the middle/upper-income group. However, we also rated the agency fair in 3 of these 11 critical objectives. Thus, in total, the FCDA's performance is rated fair or excellent in 4 of the 11 critical attainment objectives involving: the provision of adequate and properly located housing areas, for the middle/upper-income group; provision of good quality water, sewage, and electric services to households for the middle/upper-income group; provisions of medium- and high-quality housing in desirable locations for the middle/upper-income group; and provisions of minimum standards of utilities for the low-income group.

It is also significant that there is a differential gap in level of attainments between the low-income and middle/upper-income groups. Of the 6 attainment objectives rated critical for the low income group, we rated the FCDA's performance fair in only 1, while its performance is rated fair or excellent for the middle/upper-income group in 3 of the 6 objectives rated critical to urban development. Aspects where the low-income group was seriously affected include, the provision of cheap and affordable land,

Table 9.2

Distribution of Performance Scores
among the Socio-Economic Groups

<u>Performance Rating</u>	<u>Critical (A)</u>	<u>Important (B)</u>	<u>Other (C)</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>Low-Income Group</u>				
Good (A)	0	0	0	0
Fair (B)	1	0	0	1
Poor (C)	5	1	1	7
TOTAL	6	1	1	8
<u>Middle- and Upper-Income Group</u>				
Good (A)	1	1	0	2
Fair (B)	2	1	0	3
Poor (C)	2	1	0	3
TOTAL	5	3	0	8
<u>Overall Scores Among the Two Groups</u>				
Good (A)	1	1	0	2
Fair (B)	3	1	0	4
Poor (C)	7	2	1	11
TOTAL	11	4	1	16

provision of adequate and cheap transportation services, adequate health services, commercial facilities, and the provision of cheap and affordable housing.

The foregoing summary, while providing a framework for understanding the FCDA's general performance, has omitted other critical elements that can also be useful for assessing adequately this agency's overall performance. The elements include the impact of the agency's activities or operations on other segments of the society (e.g., the ethnic groups) which are expected to benefit from the construction of the new capital project. Nevertheless, the scheme presented in Tables 9.1 and 9.2 can be expanded to include such elements. This has, however, not been done in the preceding analysis because of lack of adequate data and resources to do so.

The advantage of the scheme, however, in addition to its potential for expanded analysis, is that it can be useful for identifying where resources are being over-expended or under-expended. In other words, the scheme can make it easier for the FCDA to identify (although subjectively) areas that are being neglected or over-attended to in the overall urban development activity. That way, it is possible to adjust the allocation of resources accordingly. For example, the fact that FCDA's performance is rated poor in most of the critical objectives (elements) related to the low-income group, may call for a rechanneling of resources to this segment of the population. Conversely, the fact that

the FCDA's performance is rated excellent in the provision of medium/high quality shopping areas for the middle/upper-income group in spite of the low priority of this particular objective for achieving the overall goals, may imply that greater than necessary resources are being expended for the achievement of this particular urban development (attainment) objective.

9.3 Implementation Theory Revisited: Some Concluding Thoughts

In carrying out this study, we accept in principle the construction of a new capital city in Nigeria. We contend, however, that the success in realizing the goals of construction is by no means a given. Much would generally depend on the "quality" of the political (institutional) environment, the financial resources and mechanisms available, and the quality of the administration and arrangement charged with the implementation of the new capital project. We also recognize that the appropriate processes and mechanisms employed in a particular aspect or aspects of the project varies with the goals and objectives in view. In any case, the realization of the goals or potentials of the new capital project should not be taken for granted.

Having examined the theories of project implementation (Chapter 1), and having profiled the FCDA as an instrument for implementing the new capital project, and having also

analyzed its operations and activities and noted its achievements and failures, the question becomes: What is the relationship between the theories so reviewed, and the FCDA's effectiveness in project implementation? What inferences, if any, can be drawn from these theories of implementation? In order to address these questions adequately, we will first recapitulate some of the main themes of the implementation theorists, as well as the major sources of the FCDA's problems and weaknesses.

In analyzing the various perspectives on project implementation, we classified the theorists into two major groups--the discrete theorists, and the structural theorists. The discrete theorists as we noted, argue that the success of any policy will generally depend on the agency's internal management efficiency. In other words, with clearly defined goals, standard operating procedures, clearly defined roles and authority relationships, and other internal resources, an agency will generally implement policies as written, or policy goals will be realized as intended. The issues of interest group pressure, political instability, etc. which may be beyond the agency's control, are assumed by the discrete theorists to be inconsequential to the agency's effectiveness.

The structural theorists, on the other hand, argue that organizational effectiveness or "successes" are mostly determined by factors external to the agency. Such factors which include social, economic, political, and environmental

factors, the structural theorists argue, are what determine organizational outcomes. Thus, the success of any policy implementation will depend, according to this group of analysts, on the ability of the implementing agency to learn and incorporate strength from these factors into the process of project implementation. By focusing most of their emphasis on the agency's external environment, the structural theorists assume implicitly that management efficiency (the focus of the discrete theorists) is inconsequential to organizational outcomes.

We argued in Chapter 1 that while the two theoretical perspectives have useful insights for examining the implementation of the new capital project, it is more likely that the most acceptable position cannot lie wholly or exclusively with only one of the two perspectives. In either case, as pointed out, some institutional factors with serious potential social consequences are not fully taken into consideration by either set of theorists. While the discrete theorists can, for example, show that based on some assumptions (stable social, economic, political, and cultural environment), an agency can execute projects as designed, the immediate or remote environmental situation of an agency is not always stable. Similarly, there are weaknesses of the structuralists' view. The issue of management skill, ability, and personal commitment, financial resources, etc., that this group of theorists view as

unimportant for projects' successes, have led to many projects' failures, as we pointed out in Chapter 1.

Using the results from our analysis of the FCDA's activities in the preceding chapters, we can draw some inferences from the two theoretical perspectives on project implementation. In order to do so, we first summarize some of the problems that affected the agency's operations.

From the analyses of the FCDA's activities, we identify at least 8 variables/factors that impinge upon the FCDA's effectiveness. These variables are:

1. Political control/intervention;
2. Ethnic conflict;
3. Political (national) instability;
4. Organizational instability;
5. Inadequate financial resources;
6. Management inefficiency;
7. Corruption;
8. Fast pace of construction.

By political control/intervention is meant the ability of outside interests including the military and civilian leaders, any arm of the government, politicians, or ethnic group, to influence the activities, policies, and operations of the FCDA thereby affecting, adversely, the outcome of project implementation. Although each of the eight problem-areas listed above has contributed to inhibiting the performance of the FCDA, it would seem that the problem of

political intervention and control was pivotal in determining the degree of success. This is in the sense that if the FCDA had sufficient autonomy, that is, if it often did not have to operate under the weight of this political control, problems arising from most of the seven problem areas could have been handled with more resourcefulness, and better initiative could have minimized the degree of adverse impacts or effects of these on the operations and success of the FCDA.

In order to draw adequately the relationship between the theoretical perspectives and the variables listed above, we subjectively classify these variables according to whether they are generally attributed to factors outside the FCDA's formal organizational structure or whether the variables are induced by factors from within the agency's internal (structural) environment. Those variables that are essentially attributed to factors outside the agency's formal corporate boundary, we classify as externally-induced, and those that generally resulted from within, we classify as internally-induced variables. Because all the variables may not neatly fit into the two classifications, we develop a third classification--externally/internally-induced category. This category represents those variables that may be attributed to factors that are both within and outside the agency's boundary, that cannot easily be identified with either one of the other two classifications.

In carrying out our classifications, we assume that the FCDA has very little or no control over the factors outside its organizational boundary, even when such factors may adversely affect its operations. However, we assume that the FCDA does or should have control over all the intervening factors within its organizational boundary. We, therefore, assume that the presence of externally-induced variables will imply that the views of the structural theorists are upheld. This group of theorists, as can be recalled, argue that organizational outcomes (in this case, the FCDA's failures or problems) depend largely on the presence or absence of external variables. Similarly, the presence of internally-induced variables will indicate that the discrete view is sustained. The discrete theorists, as we also noted, maintain that organizational outcomes depend mainly on an agency's internal management effectiveness.

Using our classifications and assumptions above, we present a distribution of the variables in Table 9.3. Columns 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the table represent the problem variables, the externally-induced, internally-induced, and externally/internally-induced variables respectively. The table shows that out of the 8 variables, 5 are externally-induced, and 3 externally/internally-induced. None of the variables is internally-induced. The externally-induced variables include: political (national) instability; organizational instability; and fast pace of construction.

Table 9.3 Distribution of Problem Variables by Sources

Problem, Variable (1)	Externally- Induced (2)	Internally- Induced (3)	Externally/ Internally- Induced (4)
Political Control/Inter- vention	X		
Ethnic Conflict	X		
Political (National) Instability	X		
Organizational Instability	X		
Management Inefficiency			X
Inadequate Financial Resources			X
Corruption			X
Fast Pace of Construction	X		

X: Indicates "yes," the variable is either externally-induced, internally-induced, or externally/internally-induced.

Those in the externally/internally-induced column are: management inefficiency; inadequate financial resources; and corruption.

It is significant to note from Table 9.3 that the majority of the variables (5) are externally-induced. This will generally imply that most of the FCDA's problems are attributable to external factors. The solutions for the agency's problems will, therefore, focus mainly on the external factors. This tends to support the structuralists' position. Similarly, the presence of externally/internally-induced variables tends to support our earlier hypothesis that an acceptable position in terms of the theoretical perspectives cannot lie entirely or exclusively with only one of the two theoretical views.

The fact that there are no internally-induced variables in the table does not necessarily imply that the discrete theorists' argument has no relevance to our study. After all, we showed in Chapter 6 that some of the FCDA's financial difficulties were attributed to internal management difficulties. Also, in Chapter 8, we noted that the relatively high level of waste in urban land and housing development was largely due to internal management inefficiency.

The absence of (exclusively) internally-induced variables in the table may be due to the way the variables are classified. We have included a third classification--externally/internally induced column which tends to pick up

some of the variables that could have appeared under the internally-induced variable column. Management inefficiency, for example, while essentially an internally-induced problem, appears in Column 4 because the problem is also contributed by external factors.

It is, nevertheless, significant that we classified management inefficiency as an externally/internally-induced variable. This would imply that management inefficiency, thought of as an exclusively internal organizational problem by the discrete theorists, may not necessarily be so. In other words, the problem can also result from pressures or influences exerted from outside the boundaries of the agency. We noted such pressure in Chapter 6 and the inefficiencies that resulted from involving incompetent contractors by politicians for project construction. Similarly, allocation of urban land and housing resources as we noted in Chapter 8, was fraught with inefficiencies (wastes) that largely resulted from governmental (externally-induced) policies.

In concluding this section, three main points should be noted from our analysis. The first is that the outcome of project implementation is a function of both externally-induced and internally-induced factors. Second, it is generally difficult to define appropriately the boundary between the two variables. In other words, the extent of the impact or influence of the two factors cannot be defined with great certainty. Thirdly, the problem of management

inefficiency, often thought of as exclusively internal organizational problems of public agencies, can also result from factors outside the control of the agency as demonstrated by the case of the FCDA.

9.4 Improving the FCDA's Effectiveness: Some Suggestions

Having analyzed the FCDA's operations and noted its strengths and weaknesses, the relevant question then becomes: How could the FCDA (or any similar agency in such a society's context) have been made to function better and more effectively. In what directions could the agency go operationally and structurally to improve its effectiveness.¹

The FCDA's problems, as we noted in the preceding section, resulted from eight major factors: (i) political control/intervention; (ii) ethnic conflict; (iii) political (national) instability; (iv) organizational instability; (v) inadequate financial resources; (vi) management inefficiency; (vii) corruption; and (viii) fast pace of construction. A careful examination of the eight problem areas shows that some of them are interconnected. The problems resulting from ethnic conflicts, political instability, organization instability, and to some degree, fast pace of

(1) By "improving effectiveness," is meant meeting FCDA's construction targets for housing and other urban facilities, and improving access to these resources for all income segments of the population and ethnic groups.

construction, for example, may not necessarily have affected the FCDA without the ability of the federal government and other outside interests to control or intervene in the operations of the agency. This is in the sense that if the problem of political control/intervention could be minimized or eliminated, problems arising from these areas noted above could be eliminated.

Similarly, the problem of corruption, although noted as resulting also from outside political intervention, was (as we noted in Chapter 7) essentially a management problem. Thus, in the sense that management inefficiencies could be eliminated, problems resulting from corruption could also be greatly reduced.

Because the problems are generally interrelated, we rearrange them into four major areas as follows:

- (i) political control/intervention and the problems it created for the agency in terms of its ability to control its general destiny;
- (ii) inadequate funding;
- (iii) problems arising from management skills and competence or administrative efficiency as well as the integrity of the personnel involved or charged with project execution;
- (iv) fast pace of construction.

Suggestions for improving the effectiveness of the agency would then have to solve the above-listed problems--minimizing or eliminating them, as well as redefining the

scope of functions, objectives, and goals of the agency. Various alternatives are possible.

A. Problem of Political Control/Intervention

There were two main sources of political control and intervention problems. One source relates to the control exerted on the FCDA by the federal government through the military and civilian leaders and their policies. Evidence of this control was reflected in the ability of these leaders to arbitrarily step in and change the agency's operating rules or impose a new set of operating principles on the agency. The creation of the FCTA to oversee the construction and management of territorial infrastructure, formerly the responsibility of the FCDA, and the shifting of completion deadlines are a few examples of this sudden change of operational policies (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7). Another evidence of governmental control and intervention was reflected in the ability of the same government leaders to "sweep out" the entire membership of the FCDA's Board of Directors or the department heads, thereby creating organizational instability and insecurity among the agency's staff. Because the FCDA is tied to this political control mechanism, it must often operate under some of the rigid policies, even if detrimental, set for it by the government. An example of such policy was the requirement that the FCDA

should not enter into any loan negotiations even in times of financial crisis (see Chapter 7).

The other source of political control and influence relates to the type exerted on the agency for reasons of ethnic discord. Because this problem (ethnic group influence) permeates the entire political system and the society as a whole, it is generally difficult to measure adequately its impacts on the agency. One way to view the problem is that, given that the political power was concentrated at the top of the FCDA's organizational hierarchy (as we have noted in Chapter 7), and was controlled or dominated by one ethnic group, it was almost inevitable (given the ethnic rivalries and tensions that exist in the country) that the interest of that particular ethnic group would be protected in the distribution of resources in the agency. The case of the President appointing members of his own ethnic group to head the FCTA's departments and the Land Use Allocations Committee is an example of this situation. Similarly, during the time of Buhari's Administration, most of the department heads, including the minister of the Federal Capital Territory as well as the Managing Director of the FCDA, were of northern states origin.

However, since the influence of ethnic group pressure is generally transmitted through the people in power, it is felt that minimizing governmental intervention and control, which was our first source of political problem, would reduce the impact of this ethnic group influence. The

question then is, how can this governmental control be minimized? Because the solution to the problem lies almost entirely outside the domain of the FCDA, and because political problems are generally human problems requiring gradual solutions, and also because this problem permeates the entire society, it is difficult to formulate a feasible solution or solutions. Nevertheless, four possibilities are considered.

1. Our first option for reducing the impact of political intervention/control would be for the FCDA to continue along lines of its present relationship with the federal government, but to improve the FCDA's management and administrative mechanisms and its goal priorities to accommodate this federal government's role in the overall project implementation. Adopting this strategy may not, however, eliminate the problem, since the problem of the FCDA's management inefficiencies and incompetence is also closely linked to the impact of governmental intervention. It is, for example, the military and civilian leaders who appointed members of the FCDA's Board of Directors and the minister of the Federal Capital Territory, and also generally directed the appointment of other top-ranking personnel of the agency, including the permanent secretary and department heads. Thus, if the appointment of these person-

nel was based on political objectives rather than on management competence (which was sometimes the case), it would be generally difficult to expect an efficient administration of the agency, which means that the adverse impact of political control could remain unabated. An example of an (adverse) outcome of the political control, as noted in Chapter 6, relates to the case of contract review in which the President appointed his committee to be in charge of certain categories of projects and select contractors. We noted that some of the contractors were generally selected for mainly political reasons rather than on their competence. In addition, the FCDA had little or no power to question their selection. This means that even if the FCDA's management inefficiencies were to be "straightened out," the agency could still not have been able to control the incompetence (nor the resulting inefficiencies) of such contractors. In any case, it is felt that if the politicians (government leaders) are told about the negative impacts of some of their behaviors or actions (using one of the prescriptions of the communication theorists in Chapter 1), they may be willing to release some of their grip on the FCDA's activities because it is to their advantage that project execution succeeds.

2. The second possible alternative to deal with the political control/intervention problem is to "autonomize" the FCDA. This would completely eliminate potential interferences from the federal government. The FCDA would then operate almost as a private agency depending on itself for all the resources--financial, personnel, etc., that it needed for project execution. The advantage of this position is that it would eliminate governmental interferences, and could make the agency more stable. This strategy may not however be a feasible alternative for various reasons. The first relates to political inertia. Politicians may not be willing to completely relinquish the control of the agency because of personal interest in the project. Secondly, the withdrawal of federal control would mean a loss of governmental funding, and the FCDA is not in a financial position to cover the loss. Thirdly, there are certain societal goals other than efficient management and administration which the FCDA is pursuing. The goals, which include an equitable distribution of resources among competing societal groups, may not be adequately pursued without governmental control or presence. The fourth is that in order for the FCDA to operate as a private agency, there are certain constitutional changes

that may be necessary in order to effect the change of the FCDA's status from that of a public agency to a private one. Because other parastatals (of the FCDA's type) are experiencing similar problems (governmental control problems), it is unlikely that such constitutional change would take place just for the FCDA.

3. The third alternative for addressing the political control/intervention problem is probably to involve greater private-sector participation and expect that this would cushion the impact of governmental control. Presently, the FCDA is nearly 100 percent-funded by the federal government. This situation makes it almost inevitable that the federal government should exercise full control over the agency in order to ensure that its resources are expended judiciously. By involving the private sector, it is felt that it would attract some capital to the agency. Because the private sector is generally often profit-oriented, it is likely that its presence would bring about some measure of management efficiency, which is usually required to sustain sufficient profit returns to the private sector. Also, for sufficient returns to be guaranteed to the private sector, it would have to be involved in some aspects of the decision-making affecting the

general development of the capital. This way, it is likely that its presence would minimize some of the impacts of the political control problem, that also impinged on management efficiency.

This third alternative (private sector participation) seems most feasible of the three alternatives proposed so far, for three reasons. The first reason is that unlike the first and second alternatives, here, the government retains some degree of control of the agency (although not entirely), because the private sector would have now to be involved in the decision-making. The second advantage is that, it is likely to bring about some degree of management efficiency, as noted above. Third, private sector participation is likely to bring in development (investment) capital to the agency, which would, in turn, relieve the government of some of the financial burden of building the new capital city. (Already, we have noted that government allocation to the project has been declining because of the general economic (financial) problems in the country. Thus, it is almost inevitable that the FCDA would have to look at additional sources for funding anyway.)

4. The final alternative for addressing the political control problem is to expect that the politicians

and military leaders would realize that their "near excessive" control of the FCDA has indeed adversely affected the FCDA's ability to execute the new capital project. By recommending this strategy, as pointed out earlier, it is assumed that it would be to the interest of the politicians that the project succeeds. Given that the failure of the project may likely decrease the politicians' reputation as well as reduce the chances of carrying out similar projects in the future, it would be to their advantage to do whatever may be necessary, including giving adequate autonomy to the FCDA. Given also, as noted in Chapter 4, that opponents of the new capital have often capitalized on some of its implementation mistakes, it becomes even more pressing for the politicians to support some form of authority.

In fact, this last strategy would form the basis for adopting any one of the other three alternatives. This is because, before the government would opt to minimize its dominance of the FCDA, it must first come to the realization that the project must succeed in order to retain its credibility.

B. The Problem of Inadequate Funding

Our analysis revealed, in Chapter 6, that federal government revenues were declining, and with them the level of the new capital's funding. As such, the FCDA in addition to retaining the relatively small annual allocation from the federal government, would have to look at additional options to deal with its relatively weak financial situation. Four main options/strategies are presented, which could be implemented by combining some or all of them.

The first of such options is for the FCDA to seek external (including foreign) loans, which the agency has already begun to negotiate through the federal government. The difficulty with foreign loans is that the federal government whose foreign reserves have been depleted over the years would have to guarantee such loans. Also, the policy emphasis of the federal government has been shifting to agriculture, food production, and industrial production. Thus, the federal government may not support such loans at the present time. However, it is felt that the federal government should see it as in its interest to support any FCDA action (including application for loan) that would be necessary to complete the new capital construction. Stoppage of construction would imply that some of the potential benefits of the project would be lost because nearly \$2 billion have been sunk already into the development of infrastructure that would be lying idle.

The second option for improving FCDA's financial position is to float general obligation bonds. Such bonds should be guaranteed by the federal government. The time for their maturity, interest payments, and other features should be spelled out by the FCDA. The income from such bonds should be used for the development of infrastructure--roads, water, sewerage, and other urban facilities. Interest payments on the bonds should be made using charges, rents, and fees generated from land, housing, commercial, industrial development, and the infrastructural facilities. The advantage of a public bond is that, unlike foreign loans, they rely on an internal (within the country) form of financing. This is not to suggest that foreign loans cannot be sought in conjunction with floating public bonds.

A third option is to encourage more participation of private developers, as recommended earlier. We believe that increased participation of private developers would relieve the FCDA of some of the obligation of having to build most of the facilities by itself. Presently, the FCDA is responsible for building and managing all the housing units for the federal civil servants, providing most of the urban infrastructural facilities--roads, water, sewerage, health, educational facilities, and commercial facilities. Given its limited financial resources, there is little or no strong reason why the FCDA cannot release the construction and development of some of the facilities (including housing

and commercial facilities, especially shopping centers), to households and private developers.

The FCDA should transfer the development of some aspects of low-income housing development to individual households including the civil servants. This could be done through the use of sites and services housing strategy. In this case, the FCDA designates the housing areas, prepares the plots (at standards much lower than the present sizes of the plots), provides the necessary infrastructure and leases them out to individual households. This way, the agency would be saving the money that would have been committed to building the housing structure. The advantage also in implementing this strategy (providing sites and services) is that the problem of access to housing would be minimized because this process is likely to make housing development cheap and affordable especially for the low-income people.

In the case of commercial facilities, private developers can be invited to develop the shopping centers. Income generated from such development can be channeled back to the development of other facilities. Another advantage of this transfer of activities to private developers, is that it would ease the problem of the FCDA having to develop and manage, and administer, the projects all at the same time, because the agency would now concentrate mainly on management rather than on both construction and management. This would relatively reduce the chances of management inefficiencies.

However, because the private developer is likely to rent his shopping/market spaces to the highest bidder in order to maximize profit, it is likely that the relatively poor-income groups may be displaced from the shopping spaces. The inaccessibility problem can be minimized, however, by requiring the developer to allocate a certain minimum number of units of space for the low-income sector or by the agency setting rent ceilings for the spaces.

There are still other problems the FCDA must face. Abuja is a new urban development whose future potentials cannot be fully nor adequately assessed by investors at the present stage of its development. Movement to the city has been rescheduled to occur in phases instead of in a one-shot movement scheduled originally for 1986. Most of the infrastructural facilities (roads, water, sewerage, electricity) have not been extended to the areas designated for private development. Given this situation, developers may be reluctant to invest in the city without the facilities being in place, and adequate commitment and assurance from the government, as to when the national seat of government would be finally moved to the city. What this means, is that in addition to providing infrastructural facilities, the government must openly declare its total commitment to the project. Again, the question becomes, how can the facilities be built without adequate financial resources? This question can be addressed by making use of the first and second strategies involving debt financing--loan and

general bonds application--and the annual allocations from the government.

The fourth option that would help improve the FCDA's financial situation is to reduce some of the relatively high development standards adopted for the development of various infrastructures, including housing and plots. In Chapter 8, we demonstrated that the agency's standards for plots and housing development, for example, are relatively high, and we noted that many more people than were originally planned for in the city could actually be adequately accommodated without jeopardizing environmental quality. Thus reducing the plot sizes, for example, would not only ensure that greater access to land and housing resources would be provided, but would also make it relatively cheaper to provide infrastructural services, because per capita expenditure on infrastructure would then be smaller given the larger number of people that would now be accommodated. In turn, this greater number of people would imply higher revenue incomes from user charges and development fees for the FCDA.

Lowering the standards may be resisted by the politicians in that it probably would impinge on the "grandeur" image originally expected of the new city. However, it is believed that given the choice between two evils in terms of whether to maintain the relatively high standard and not complete the new capital project, or reduce the standard in order to complete it, the choice would be obvious--reducing

the standards in order to complete the project. There are numerous cost-saving measures and techniques in housing construction that have been itemized and discussed in Chapter 8. Those techniques, including efficient planning, use of local building materials, etc., should be carefully considered by the agency, especially for the development of the so-called low-income housing.

C. Problem of Management Efficiency

Generally, the question of management competence and efficient administration, as well as problems of political control, are essentially human as opposed to technical ones, and therefore have no easy or straightforward equation for solution. Improvement in this area will inevitably be gradual and incremental. Perhaps a set of mechanisms and instruments to bring about periodic public accountability of the agency and its key executives is necessary with the expectation that the awareness of such public accounting might help keep them and the operation of the FCDA within lines of better efficiency and integrity.

In addition to the mechanisms for improving the FCDA's financial and land management situation discussed above, it is important also for the agency to improve its record keeping and accounting mechanisms. Generally, the agency's records were kept in scattered forms and in some situations may not exist at all. Better record keeping and accounting

would help the agency identify immediately where and how wastages of resources have occurred or are going to occur.

Related to proper record keeping is the need for the agency appropriately to define and recognize authority roles of the various units in the agency. In Chapter 6 we pointed out that it was often difficult to ascertain which department was responsible for assigning housing units to applicants, for example. Any department was in a position to overturn decisions made by another unit legally-designated to take the decisions. It is important that conflicts of this nature be minimized in order to facilitate faster project execution and potential wastes of resources that can result from such conflicts.

Furthermore, it is important to note that some of the bureaucratic red tapes or delays, which are often characteristic of many public agencies, often stifled the speed required for rapid project execution and should be avoided. Because the agency is expected to operate under the hood of the civil services rules which often bring about such delays, the agency can seek special permission from the government for exemption from some of these rules. If the objective of government's policy is to complete the construction of the new capital project within a stipulated length of time, we can make a case for granting special permission that would enable the agency to carry out its operations speedily. For example, the FCDA instead of having to go through the Federal Commission for Establish-

ments before recruiting its personnel, can seek special permission that can exempt the agency from this requirement.

D. The Problem of Fast Pace of Construction

A relatively large part of the FCDA's financial and organizational problems have been noted to hinge on this aspect of implementation problem (see discussions in Chapters 5, 6, and 7). Emanating from the political control problem, the problem of fast pace of construction falls outside the domain of the FCDA's control. The fast pace of construction, as we have noted, is related to the relatively short span of time demanded by the military and civilian leaders for the completion of the new capital project. This short time (eight years, later reduced to four years) as we noted, has not taken adequately into consideration FCDA's relatively weak financial, management and administrative capacity.

Two options for dealing with the fast pace of construction can be considered. The first is to maintain the relatively short time span but increase the resources of the agency to enable it to meet its deadline. This option seems to be difficult to attain, judging from our analysis of the FCDA's financial and organizational resources. The agency's current financial situation is poor, and with it the federal revenue sources which have supported the agency all along. Hence, the agency's allocations have been drastically

reduced. Its management capacity, as we also noted, is inefficient and since improvement of such efficiency involves a gradual process, it is not therefore feasible to expect an increase in the agency's resources in the near future. This means that the option of maintaining a relatively short time span cannot be sustained. This leaves us with a second option that will involve the extension of the construction period. But more than just extending the time period, the FCDA must prioritize its objectives in terms of the general urban development goal that the new capital project was intended to achieve. Such prioritization of urban development objectives which can also be classified as attainment objectives should be carried out for various categories of urban development schemes involving land and housing, utilities, transport and communications, commercial facilities, educational and health facilities, social, cultural, and recreational facilities development. An example of how the prioritization scheme should be pursued is similar to the one presented in Section 9.2.

Finally, it is important for the politicians, governments, bureaucrats, and planners who set the time table to note that cities do not operate like machines that their parts can be fitted, and keys turned on and they begin to function. Cities evolve. Such evolution is a gradual process. As such, even the city's construction must be gradual in order to accommodate many emerging and unforeseen

circumstances which often accompany this evolutionary process. Buhari's Administration seems to recognize this characteristic when it decided to reschedule the movement to Abuja in phases rather than in a one-shot movement originally planned for 1986. However, simply phasing the movement is not sufficient. To realize the potentials of such phased movement vis-a-vis the goals of the new capital project, its construction must properly accommodate the constraints imposed by limited financial, organizational, and political resources.

It is important to note that in our evaluation of the movement of Nigeria's capital city, we were unable to deal effectively with a number of issues. These issues can form a research agenda for future studies. There is a need, for example, to link the various tenets of implementation theories with reality. Some of the theoretical views examined in the thesis were relevant in a limited way to our analyses of the new capital construction; however, others were inadequate for evaluating the implementation activity. What is needed, therefore, is a more effective approach for linking the various theoretical perspectives with actual practice, especially in developing countries.

Another critical area for further investigation relates to the economic and social implications of the new capital

project. The construction of Abuja was started in the mid-1970s when the Nigerian government had revenue surpluses due to oil income. At that time, no one predicted the present downturn of oil prices; instead, analysts (including proponents of the new capital) believed that oil revenues would remain steady, or even increase, over the years. The relevant question now is, given the current oil market situation, and the subsequent decline in government revenues, what effects will all these developments have on the new capital construction?

We noted in Chapter 6 the decline in projected federal government allocations to the project caused by the falling oil revenues. But those projections were based on the expectation of oil prices remaining steady at \$30 a barrel. Given that this price has drastically declined to approximately \$15 a barrel (March 1986), a number of questions arise. What effect will this have on the national budget as well as the new capital project? What will be the opportunity cost in both the short run and the long run of continued government funding of Abuja? What will be the distributional implications of continued funding (in light of the economic changes) among the various sectors and regions of the economy? What will be the impact on the various ethnic groups in light of the general ethnic tensions reviewed in the earlier chapters? In other words, what impact will continued funding have on ethno-regional conflicts? Given that Abuja is located in the northern states, and given the serious economic and financial situation, it is likely that a continued emphasis on the project may bring about

increased tensions, and may actually exacerbate, rather than improve, the regional conflicts expected to be resolved by the new capital construction. These are but a few of the important social, cultural, economic, and political issues that could form the basis for continued research.

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APPENDIX I
Settlements Bordering the Central Area of the Federal Capital Territory



APPENDIX II

Makeshift Markets Within the Federal Capital Territory

