SHELTERING STREET YOUTH IN RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL

by

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The thesis is dedicated to João Carlos and Josué,
two young friends with whom I enjoyed spending time.

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FREQUENTLY USED ABBREVIATIONS

CBIA — Brazilian Center for Childhood and Adolescence
Fundação Centro Brasileiro para a Infância e Adolescência

CEAP — Center for the Articulation of Marginalized Populations
Centro de Articulação de Populações Marginalizadas

CEDS — State Office for Social Development
Coordenadoria Estadual de Desenvolvimento Social

CRIAM — Center of Integrated Resources for Assistance to the Minor
Centro de Recursos Integrados de Atendimento ao Menor

FEBEM — State Minor's Welfare Foundation (in various states)
Fundação Estadual do Bem-Estar do Menor

FEEM — State Foundation for the Education of the Minor (Rio de Janeiro)
Fundação Estadual de Educação do Menor

FUNABEM — National Minor's Welfare Foundation
Fundação Nacional do Bem-Estar do Menor

IBGE — Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
Fundação Instituto Brasiliero de Geographia e Estatística

MNMMR — National Movement of Street Boys and Girls
Movimento Nacional de Meninos e Meninas de Rua

NGO — Non-governmental organization

PNBEM — National Minor's Welfare Policy
Política Nacional do Bem-Estar do Menor

SAM — Service of Assistance to the Minor
Serviço de Assistência ao Menor

Statute — Statute of the Child and Adolescent (1990)
Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente

SMDS — Municipal Office of Social Development
Secretaria Municipal de Desenvolvimento Social

UNICEF — United Nations Children's Fund

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ABSTRACT

Social service provision for youth living on the streets of Brazil's major cities is currently undergoing profound changes. Researchers heralded the proliferation of non-governmental programs, especially shelters, during the 1980s as an alternative to closed institutions in caring for youth. However, nobody has examined shelters, in practice, in order to determine if they actually possess advantages. This study describes the main characteristics of thirteen shelters in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and shows how they differ from institutions. It also investigates the potential for expansion of service through state and city government.

Shelter workers adhere to a set of principles designed to promote the personal development of the youth and avoid the problems of institutional care. Whereas institutions cared for youth in large groups, separated them from society, and often focused on controlling them with authoritarian methods, shelter staff attend to small groups of youth, seek to integrate them into the community, and base their socialization on a relationship of friendship and respect.

The positive aspects of shelters are not enough to ensure their increased use by government. A lack of strong arguments based on formal evaluation and of lobbying in favor of shelters leave them vulnerable to political change.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> You see him? He is now dead. That guy, I think he is dead too. This *moleque* [scoundrel] still lives on the street. She is a prostitute. This is a picture of me and him [referring to the boy sitting near me] . . . . I actually like living here. (Adolescent in shelter, 16 years, showing me photos taken by an educator on the street.)

Some youth living on the streets in Rio de Janeiro, ~il had the chance to leave the dangerous and exploitative environment of the stre~.s and took it. They moved into shelters. In general, shelters attempt to offer everything street youth[1] need because of the lack of contact with a family and home. They provide a place to live; basic necessities such as food and clothing; access to public and private health care, education, professionalization courses, job placement; counseling and educational reinforcement; legal documentation and protection; recreational activities; and a host of less tangible but equally important benefits, such as positive role models and affection. However, because of the limited number of shelters in Rio many youth do not have this opportunity to leave the street. This thesis examines shelters as a "model" of social service provision, compares them to the historically dominant means of social

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[1]In this study I am concerned mainly with children and adolescents under the age of eighteen who have little contact with their families and have lived on the street. I refer to them most often as "street youth" so as not to imply the exclusion of adolescents through the use of the term "street children." I refer to youth working on the streets and who maintain family contact as "working youth." Appendix 2 describes the difference between street and working youth in more detail. When referring to the literature, I maintain categories employed by the authors in the closest translation from Portuguese.

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assistance -- the closed institution,[2] and investigates the possibility of their expanded use.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) initiated shelters in Rio in the past few years in response to the increasing number of youth living on the streets. Of thirteen shelters identified within the metropolitan boundaries, NGOs operate eleven[3] (see Appendix 1). Both the city and state government started their own "pilot" shelters less than one year ago. The oldest shelter opened in 1986, and seven (54%) of them are less than two years old. The center and south zones of the city, where the majority of the city's street youth live, contain nine (69%) of the shelters.

The three principal NGOs operating shelters in Rio are:

1) the *Pastoral do Menor*, created by the Cardinal Archbishop of Rio de Janeiro in 1984 in order to stimulate and coordinate social assistance by the Catholic Church for poor youth;

2) the *Associação Beneficente São Martinho*, started in 1984 by Catholic volunteers and maintained by a Dutch religious order and funds from foreign donors, domestic and international businesses, and individual contributors; and,

3) the *Cruzada do Menor*, formed in 1986 when the *Cruzada Nacional contra a Tuberculose* (National Crusade against Tuberculosis) changed its name and emphasis of work. It receives funds primarily from domestic businesses but also from a few international donors and various individuals.

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[2]The closed institutions operated by the federal and state government and private organizations were a type of "total institution," which Goffman (1974, quoted in Campos 1984) defines as "a place of residence and work, where a large number of individuals with a similar situation, separated from broader society for a considerable period of time, lead a closed and formally administered life" (11). Examples are monasteries and convents, prisons, asylums, and orphanages.

[3]Valladares and Impelizieri (1992) listed twelve shelters operated by NGOs in Rio de Janeiro. One has closed since the time of their publication; two are outside the municipal boundary; and two actually occupy the same building, which I prefer to consider as one shelter. Also, three new ones, including two government shelters, opened since their research.

Valladares and Impelizieri (1992) refer to these NGOs as "umbrella organizations." They create their own projects, support the efforts of NGOs with comparatively fewer financial resources, and organize meetings and courses in which their workers, members of other NGOs, and government workers may participate. In addition to maintaining shelters, they also develop projects for poor youth with homes and shelter youth which include: income generation through production of small goods, job placement and professional training, and alternative education.

Even though entities -- various NGOs and the state and local government -- with very different origins and affiliations established shelters, similarities exist in the principles by which the shelters operate and the methods they employ. This is so much the case, that several authors describe them as an alternative to the traditional means of social assistance, the closed institution, provided by the state and civil organizations during the past century (Myers 1988; Rizzini and Wiik 1990; Valladares and Impelizieri 1992).

In fact, a new body of law, the 1990 Statute of the Child and Adolescent (*Estatuto da Criança e do Adolescente*, the Statute), restricts the use of institutional care and promotes the use of shelters in Brazil. Some important implications of the Statute are:

> 1) the abolition of the National Minor's Welfare Foundation (*Fundação Nacional do Bem-Estar do Menor*, FUNABEM), an agency of the federal government, founded in 1964, that implanted the National Minor's Welfare Policy (*Política Nacional do Bem-Estar do Menor*, PNBEM) and established a system of nine institutions in the city of Rio de Janeiro and three in the state of Minas Gerais that were to serve as a "model" on which the rest of the states could develop their own systems of institutional care;

2) the replacement of FUNABEM with the Brazilian Center for Childhood and Adolescence (*Fundação Centro Brasileiro para a Infância e Adolescência, FCBIA or CBIA*), whose mission is to implement policy established by the Statute, that supplants the old PNBEM, and provide financial and technical assistance to "socioeducational" programs developed by the states, cities, and NGOs;

3) the prohibition of CBIA from involvement in direct care to youth;

4) as expressed in Article 106 of the Statute, the use of deprivation of freedom for adolescents only when caught *flagrante delicto* (red-handed) in the act of crime, and in Article 122 of the Statute, the use of privation of liberty in closed institutions only for serious and repeat juvenile offenders;

5) placement of responsibility upon the states to reform their systems of institutional care, State Minor's Welfare Foundations (*Fundações Estaduais do Bem-Estar do Menor*, FEBEMs), to meet the stipulations of the Statute; and,

6) placement of responsibility on the cities and NGOs to develop direct service programs, such as shelters, for children and adolescents deprived of their fundamental rights.[4]

These changes signify nothing less than a new conceptualization of child welfare in Brazil. The proposals appear simple enough on paper, but putting them into practice is a slow process.

With the present demise of the institutional means of care that included street youth as part of its target population, the shelter stands as the most comprehensive type of service for youth that lack homes (see Appendix 2 for a summary of research on street youth in Rio and Brazil). Researchers and activists disesteemed institutions based on their inherent faults, and not necessarily because they had systematically

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[4]Article 227 of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution states: "It is the responsibility of the family, society, and the State to assure, with absolute priority, the rights of the child and adolescent to life, health, nourishment, leisure, professionalization, culture, dignity, respect, liberty, and family and community acceptance, besides placing them safe from all forms of negligence, discrimination, exploitation, violence, cruelty, and oppression."

evaluated another option and found it better. Nobody has investigated shelters with the same critical eye previously directed at institutions. This thesis describes how shelters differ from institutions and constitutes an initial effort to evaluate them. In practice, how do the shelters perform? Do they avoid certain problems faced by the institutions? Are there areas of work that formerly troubled the institutions and which the shelters do not handle any better? Do shelters face new challenges that institutions did not? How do the city and state governments view shelters, and is the creation of a network of government shelters a possibility in the future? This thesis contains information of interest to social service providers, policy-makers, and researchers in other cities in Brazil and the developing world where the phenomenon of street youth is a persistent and growing problem (Barker and Knaul 1992).

Shelters avoid many of the problems related to institutional care, but some of their features pose new challenges. Staff in shelters work with small groups of youth, try to integrate them into community schools and employment, and use non-violent methods. This differs from what occurred in many institutions, which treated the youth *en masse*, isolated them from the community, and controlled them with authoritarian and violent methods. But the open format of the shelters permits the youth more contact with the culture of youth still living on the streets. Also, the shelters, because of their location and open-door policy, must deal with community opposition.

In spite of the expectation that shelters would assume some of the care of street youth in the place of institutions, service will likely expand slowly. Limited access to

resources keep NGOs from opening more shelters on a large scale. Also, just because shelters possess some good qualities in relation to institutions does not mean that state and local government are anxious to open more of them as institutional care at the federal and state levels diminishes. Since street youth cannot demand service, they are a population that the government finds easy to overlook. Little lobbying for direct service occurs on their behalf, and the extension of a network of shelters by the government is not a priority.

The thesis contains five chapters. This chapter covers my methods of research and reviews the Brazilian literature on street youth. Chapter 2 reveals the problems inherent to closed institutions and provides a base of information for the following chapter. In Chapter 3, I draw on my observations from the field and show how shelters differ from institutions. Chapter 4 explores the possibility of the future use of shelters by the state and city governments. In the final chapter, I summarize the findings of the study.

Methods

To meaningfully appraise the shelter as a package of services, a standard of comparison is necessary. Evaluating shelters based on their goals is difficult because they rarely define specific, measurable goals. The standard of comparison that I chose is a different "model" of furnishing the same services, the closed institution. The lack of accurate data on the cost per capita to keep youth in institutions and follow-up data on the progress of the youth after they leave, makes a comparison with shelters

difficult on these important parameters. Moreover, only two years have passed since the majority of the shelters opened, meaning that even if the shelters kept longitudinal data on the youth, there would not be very much of it. In the absence of these types of quantitative data, I describe the important features of shelters and contrast them with institutions.

I completed research for the thesis during three months, from January through March of 1993, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The shelters in Rio originated from quite diverse efforts, but as a whole, share ideas distinct from the closed institutions. Rather than completing case studies of specific shelters, I looked for common characteristics that distinguish them from institutions. I attempted to determine which features and particular activities of the different shelters were strong and which were weak. Also, Rio was a good site for the research because it is the location of nine of the eleven closed institutions maintained by FUNABEM before 1990.

My methods included interviewing and participant-observation for gathering information in the shelters and at institutions that I visited. The three main NGOs and the state and local government that operated shelters also developed other types of projects; therefore, I interviewed administrators and policy-makers in the central offices as well as workers at the shelters. At the shelters, I spoke with staff including house coordinators, psychologists, social workers, and educators, and I talked with the youth living at them. I attended staff meetings and meetings of the youth at different shelters. Furthermore, I watched and, at times, took part in educational and recreational activities. I frequented one of the oldest shelters, the *Casa do Catete*,

operated by the *Pastoral do Menor*, several times a week. I became good friends with the youth there and learned about their lives by spending time with them: playing soccer and ping-pong, flying kites, going to the beach, eating with them, and talking late at night. I purposefully stopped by shelters at various times of the day and night and during the week and on weekends, often unannounced. In total, I spent time at nine of the thirteen shelters. One of the four that I did not visit opened the day I left, and the *Pastoral do Menor* managed two of the others. Hence, the sample was representative of all organizations operating shelters during the period of my fieldwork.

In addition to the shelters, I investigated the current state of FUNABEM's former institutions. I visited the *Quintino* complex of institutions in the *Quintino Bocaiúva* neighborhood of Rio, including the *Escola XV de Novembro*, the *Escola Eduardo Bartlet James*, and the *Escola Mário Altenfelder* as well as the following institutions which handle juvenile offenders: the *Instituto Padre Severino*, the *Escola João Luiz Alves*, both located on the "Governor's Island" (*Ilha do Governador*), and the Center of Integrated Resources for Assistance to the Minor (*Centro de Recursos Integrados de Atendimento ao Menor*, CRIAM) *Penha*. CBIA currently maintains all of these institutions, but is attempting to transfer them to state and local agencies and NGOs. I conversed with administrators, staff, and youth at these entities and also with policy-makers and researchers at the state office of CBIA in downtown Rio. At the city level, I spoke with officials from the Municipal Office of Social Development (*Secretaria Municipal de Desenvolvimento Social*, SMDS) about their projects

involving youth.

To understand the various types of action directed toward poor and street youth, I did not limit my fieldwork just to shelters and institutions. For example, I looked at preventative programs in poor communities.[5] These included crafts, or professional training, and education programs which stimulated community organization. Also, I accompanied "street educators" who work with youth living on the street and provide access to health and social services and information regarding drugs and sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS. Some of these educators develop recreational and artistic activities on the street with the youth.

I found most of the literature regarding street youth and institutions at the Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas at Austin, and through contacts at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (*Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro*, UFRJ), the State University of Rio de Janeiro (*Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro*, UERJ), the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (*Universidade Pontífica Católica*, PUC-RJ), and the University of Santa Úrsula (*Universidade Santa Úrsula*, USU). I talked with researchers from each of these entities as well as CBIA and the Center for the Articulation of Marginalized Populations (*Centro de Articulação de Populações Marginalizadas*, CEAP), and the UNICEF office in Brasília.

To enhance my background knowledge, I read the Brazilian literature on issues

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[5]"Preventative" programs attempt to avert the youth's progression to the street, treating some of the "causes" of this phenomenon. An example is a day-care center that feeds children and thus removes pressure placed on them by the family to go to the streets and bring home money. I also refer to "curative" programs, which address the "symptoms" of the problem, in this case, the youth already living on the street. An example is the shelter.

including violence toward youth, child labor, education, NGO activity, social policy, and the provision of social services. I had access to statistical and project documents through the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (*Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística*, IBGE) and the Rio de Janeiro City Planning Institute (*Instituto de Planejamento Municipal*, IPLAN-RIO).

CHAPTER 2

A STANDARD: THE CLOSED INSTITUTION

Look, I can say that I would not want for my child nor the child of anyone to pass through a closed institution . . . . They still function, but I do not suggest it. I do not think any child should be interned.[6]

This testimony, given by the highest ranking representative of CBIA in Rio, reflects the shift in thought embodied in the 1990 Statute of the Child and Adolescent. The Statute not only changed the role of FUNABEM, today CBIA, but also restricts institutional care. In this chapter, I will introduce some of the implications which this possesses for the current operation of FUNABEM's old institutions.

The chapter possesses three principal sections: a brief history of the development of the institutional system, a description of the current state of the former institutions of FUNABEM, and a review of the psychosocial literature supporting deinstitutionalization. In the literature analysis, I draw out the main issues regarding institutions to serve as a base of information when I describe shelters in the next chapter. In all of the studies discussed in this chapter, researchers used the same methods of qualitative data collection: interviews and observation. Analysis of follow-up data maintained by the institutions regarding the progress of their "alumni" was not an attractive option because, generally, the data did not exist. For example, Campos (1984) expressed this clearly: "It is apparent once again that the vision that the institution has of the youth's departure is difficult to examine, because of the

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[6]Paulo Rios, State Superintendent of CBIA in Rio de Janeiro, personal interview, 17 February 1993.

inexistence of documentation over the process" (122).

The Institutional Setting

The closed institution has been the primary format used to attend to poor youth through both public and private channels. During the 18th and 19th Centuries, orphanages and closed schools were charitable in nature and almost inevitably linked to the Catholic Church. Not until the turn of the last century did a system of care based on "scientific" principles replace the prevailing one founded on religious ideals. Irma Rizzini (1990) refers to these systems as the philanthropy and charity models, respectively. With the advent of the philanthropy model, institutions became concerned with health and hygiene, eschewed barbaric corporal means of discipline, and expanded education to include topics other than religious ones. In her article, Rizzini describes the *Instituto João Pinheiro*, known as the "Scholar's Republic," which existed around the turn of the last century and which specialists and former student-residents praised highly. It utilized no physical punishment and possessed a governing structure in which the students could participate. Unfortunately, cases such as this were apparently rare in Brazil's history.

The state consolidated its efforts for poor children with the establishment of the Minor's Judge in 1923 and the first Legal Code of the Minor in 1927.[7] The

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[7]The 1927 Code recognized two categories of minors which concerned the legal system: "abandoned" minors and delinquent minors. The Minor's Judge, directed these minors to schools of "protection" and reform schools, respectively. The Code was revised in 1979 to allow the Minor's Judge to intervene in cases of minors in "irregular situations" -- when they were "deprived of conditions essential for their survival, health, and obligatory instruction" (quoted in Júnior 1992). This essentially qualified much of the poor juvenile population for institutionalization.

formation of the Service of Assistance to the Minor (*Serviço de Assistência ao Menor*, SAM), linked to the Ministry of Justice, in 1940 reveals the importance of the problem of poor youth in the national conscience, especially in the sense of potential juvenile crime. SAM installed a system of institutions in Rio de Janeiro which over the years received accusations of corruption and inhumane practices with regards to their wards. In 1964, with the advent of the military junta, FUNABEM assumed the place of SAM.

FUNABEM espoused new methods and a new mission. It used the physical structures inherited from SAM to create a system of closed institutions which emphasized education and professional training of the abandoned and delinquent minor and served as a model for the creation of corresponding foundations (FEBEMs) in various states. Also, it implanted the National Minor's Welfare Policy (PNBEM) and passed information and resources to the state foundations. A FUNABEM office located in each state facilitated these processes and funded private institutions caring for poor children. Since FUNABEM was already responsible for juvenile delinquents, the State Foundation for Education of the Minor (*Fundação Estadual de Educação do Menor*, FEEM) in Rio de Janeiro emphasized care for poor and abandoned youth through ten of its own institutions and over one-hundred contracted ones (FEEM 1985).

Youth arrived at these institutions in several different ways. Parents often interned their younger children in order to ensure the satisfaction of their material needs. They also submitted their older children to the institutions because of behavioral problems. Police turned youth over to the courts for reasons including

breaking of the law, suspected breaking of the law, and "wandering" or "vagrancy."

The 1979 Legal Code of the Minor made it very easy for the state to direct youth in

"irregular situations" to the institutional system.[8] At times, street youth interned

themselves, weary of life on the streets and attracted by the promise of regular meals

and other material comforts.

The system of closed institutions embraced all minors in irregular situations,

which included street youth. The federal and state institutions are more relevant to the

case of street youth because they actually received youth off the streets, unlike many

private institutions which, like an orphanage, mainly accepted children at a very young

age. Alvim and Valladares (1988) state that, "The literature concerning the

'institutionalized minor' frequently refers to the 'street child' category that constituted

a large part of its potential, when not actual, clientele. Appearing analytically

separated, such children constitute the same social group, differing only in the

perspective of the researcher, that now studies the minor *in* the street, now the minor

in the institution." (20) This generally holds true because the bulk of the literature

focuses on government institutions with the exception of notable pieces by Rizzini

(1985) and Altoé (1990a).

Thus, the studies of youth in the institutions showed that they possessed the

same profile as youth on the street (see Appendix 2 for a summary of the

characteristics of youth living on the streets). Youth in the institutions came primarily

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[8]Alvim and Valladares (1988) succinctly described the process: ". . . [The minors] after being picked up by the police, pass through the police stations, courts, entities of reception, entities of division, arriving finally at the specialized institutions where they are separated according to sex, age range, and motive of internment" (19,20).

from less-structured families[9] within the poorer classes of society. Furthermore, 90% of the 323 minors over the age of ten in FEBEM/PE were male (Vainsencher 1989). Regarding race, most of the youth were black or mulatto, 30% and 39%, respectively, as found in three private institutions in Rio de Janeiro (Rizzini 1985).

In sum, the issue of youth living and working on the street is not new, and the federal and state government and private organizations mainly used the closed institution as a means of caring for those youth on the streets: who committed small crimes to survive, who committed serious offenses, and who judges felt lived in some form of neglect. Under old laws, a large proportion of the juvenile population from the poorer classes of society could actually be institutionalized. In 1990, the enactment of the Statute created changes in the previous state of child welfare; the next section addresses some of the effects on government institutions.

Overview of the Current State of FUNABEM Institutions in Rio

The Statute resulted in the replacement of FUNABEM with CBIA and the prohibition of the delivery of direct care by CBIA. As a result, it is in the process of transferring all of the old FUNABEM institutions to the state, city, and NGOs. For example, CBIA is shifting administrative and financial responsibility of the four

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[9]The absence of the father appears to be a determining factor in the presence of the youth on the streets or in the institutions. For example, in the six institutions of FEBEM/PE (Pernambuco), 72% of the interns over the age of ten did not have and/or did not know their father (Vainsencher 1989).

CRIAMs[10] within the city of Rio to the state government. The *Pastoral Penal -*

Sociedade São Dimas, which operates one shelter for juvenile offenders, currently

manages two of the CRIAMs.[11] Until they complete the transfer of their other

institutions, CBIA is operating them differently than did FUNABEM. The *Escola XV*

de Novembro, which was a closed institution, now offers classes to poor and street

youth in an environment where they are free to come and go. But despite these

changes in the national child welfare organ, FEEM and private entities receiving

finances from the government still operate institutions, revealing that in some states,

the old approach changes more slowly than in others.[12]

In this time of uncertainty for CBIA's old institutions and CRIAMs, the staff

often feel demoralized. The director of one entity bitterly related to me the fact that

money never arrived without "many problems," and that in the last five years, five

different foundations had been responsible for distributing the funds. Without a signed

commitment by the state government to assume funding, the staff presently wonders if

its work will continue in the future. The director feels that "the human potential [at

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[10]Beginning in 1988, FUNABEM constructed fifteen CRIAMs in the state of Rio de Janeiro (four are within the city). FUNABEM designed these entities to avoid treatment *en masse* and to house, at most, thirty-two minors. Applicants for the twenty-two employment positions available at each entity earned their jobs through written and oral tests, a rarity in the closed institutions at the time. The CRIAMs work with juvenile offenders in a "semi-open" environment where they have much more access to the community than in the closed institutions. The CRIAMs were part of FUNABEM's plan to "decentralize" and utilize "community participation" through its campaign "Modernize in order to Function" (internal documents of FUNABEM).

[11]Sonia Azevedo, Director of CRIAM *Penha*, personal interview, 26 March 1993; Father Bruno Trombeta, Director of the *Pastoral Penal*, personal interview, 18 March 1993.

[12]The institutional approach has been slow to die in Rio de Janeiro as opposed to states, like Goiás and Rio Grande do Sul, where the institutions of the FEBEMs have already been reformed and opened (Zaluar et al. 1990).

the entity] is very great . . . . We were hired through a competitive process, but we are stigmatized just like the youth [juvenile offenders] with whom we work . . . . We are treated like garbage."

In the closed institutions for juvenile offenders, in some senses conditions of life have improved since the 1980s, but in others they have deteriorated. Fewer youth now live in them, which according to some researchers, equates to an improvement.[13] For example, 138 youth presently live in the *Escola João Luis Alves*, whereas in 1988, 230 lived there. On the other hand, some of the educational and professionalization activities have now weakened. During my visit at one institution, about fifty youth gathered about a single television while the rest lay about the patio. A few made masks of *papier-mâché* in a "professionalization" office. At another institution, an instructor in a professionalization office said he had not had any students in two weeks and lacked materials to teach his soldering course. The main administrator did not know. Many of the other courses no longer functioned.

Generally, many workers seemed to be "going through the motions." Since they are "servants" of the Union, they cannot be fired, only transferred to another area of activity. CBIA has a hiring freeze and is reducing its staff only through their retirement process.

In sum, the lack of materials and funds and the demoralization of the staff are largely symptoms of the uncertain future and impending transfer of the entities to state

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[13]Several researchers showed that the large size of the institutions had a negative influence on the personal development of the residents (Altoé 1990b, Campos 1984). In the next section, I demonstrate why they asserted this idea.

and local government and NGOs. There is no reason why institutions should not be improved as a means of care for juvenile offenders, but the tradition of institutional care reveals many problems. The next section summarizes the aspects of institutions that researchers identified as having negative influences on the youth who lived in them.

Issues Regarding Institutionalization

The psycho-social research on institutionalized youth revealed that many considered the institution good because it sustained them in the absence of their families. Campos (1984) interviewed thirty "students" and twenty "alumni" of the *Escola XV de Novembro* of FUNABEM in Rio de Janeiro and concluded that the residents felt the institution provided for their basic necessities but not their emotional needs (61). Moreover, Violante (1982), after working with minors in FEBEM/SP (São Paulo), felt that "the assistance entities . . . provide them, precariously, the material base for their physical survival, but not that necessary for their psychological development, neither at the cognitive level nor at the affective and emotional level" (47). In the institutions of FEBEM/PE (Pernambuco), 54% of the minors said life was good, of which 16% specified that the institution supplied for their basic needs and 7% that it allowed them to leave the streets.

Size, Other Characteristics, and Methods

Despite these positive aspects of institutions, many problems existed, some of

which were related to the large size of the institutions. The government institutions cared most about equality in resource distribution and treatment. This combination of equality and mass treatment of individuals stifled personal development and created a system of norms different from those of the outside world. In the FUNABEM institution, Campos (1984) observed that all material items belonged to the institution, not the youth. All school materials were guarded in the classroom, and the youth could not even possess the uniforms they wore. They could exchange their uniforms for clean ones twice a week, but rarely received back the ones they had submitted to the laundry. If a youth lacked something, such as a shirt, he could simply "grab" one that belonged to someone else. Staff never punished this behavior, and in this manner, "theft" actually became a daily aspect of the institutional culture. Finally, the staff called the youth by number instead of name. All of these practices of the institution eroded the ability of the youth to construct a sense of self. Altoé (1990b) agreed: "He [the minor] is made infantile the whole time, because this facilitates the control, the homogeneity, the service *en masse* . . . . He is not given any responsibility, no right to think and contest . . . ." (69)

Other characteristics and methods of the institutions damaged the youth in various ways. The institutions were often located far from the origin of the youth, making visits by family members difficult. Rizzini (1985) showed that this contributed to the breakdown of contact between the youth and parents and eventually led to the abandonment of the youth by the parent(s). Furthermore, the frequent transfer of youth from one institution to another, especially in the government

scenario, broke friendships with other youth and at times, special relationships built

with staff (Altoé 1990b; Campos 1984, 72,77-78). Violent discipline aimed at

establishing control and submission bears multiple negative effects. Possibly in the

least harmful sense "the very rigid discipline, the submission to order without right to

question does not educate and does not form individuals" (Altoé 1990b, 59).

Adolescents reacted against repressive treatment, creating a rebellious identity opposite

to that desired (Violante 1982, 189).

Often, youth stayed for several years in entities designed to accommodate only

a short stay (FEEM 1985; Vainsencher 1989). These entities, by law, were to

complete within three months of the youths' arrival, a study of their health and social

situation and then send them back to their families, to foster families, or to an

institution to live. In one of these FEEM units in Niterói,[14] intended to handle 350

youth, there lived over six hundred because of inefficient handling of cases by the

staff. The sanitary and health conditions were shocking, with "the constant existence

of cases of hepatitis, scabies, chickenpox, meningitis, and leprosy" (FEEM 1985, 22).

Since planners did not originally designate these institutions for "permanent" residence,

there were virtually no activities to occupy the youth as they awaited transfer to other

institutions.

This setting forced youth of different ages and backgrounds to live in the same

place, which was a source of turmoil for many of them. Particularly, the youth

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[14]Niterói is a city across the Bay of Guanabara from Rio de Janeiro and forms part of the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan region.

interned since birth did not know the streets as did those who were interned by the courts at an older age. According to Campos (1984), "This fact seems to convey a forced 'contamination', conducive to the learning of those [anti-social] acts [of the streets], which are reinforced for not being punished . . . . Some [minors], when they left on the weekends, practiced thefts, maintained contacts with bandits and used drugs, carrying all to within the institution, for contact with the younger ones . . . ." (101) Moreover, the younger residents were victims of physical, oftentimes sexual, violence at the hands of the older ones. For example, in the institutions of FEBEM/PE, the staff prohibited sexual relations, but a great deal of homosexual activity actually existed, which most often resulted in the older boys forcing sex on the younger ones (Vainsencher 1989).

The socioeconomic gap between the life outside and inside the institutions caused various perturbations in the lives of the youth. They gained a desire to consume goods available to the middle class which they would generally never be able to access. Also, the institutions gave them such things as good food, clean clothes, and an ordered lifestyle, which they would have to struggle to gain outside the institution. In certain cases, they expressed frustration that the teachers and some of the technical staff in the institutions were there only to earn their salaries and did not know how to work with youth, at least ones like themselves who had come from deprived settings (Campos 1984; Vainsencher 1989).

Education, Professionalization, and Departure

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The fact that the institutions were paternalistic in nature would not have had

such a negative effect on the youth if the institutions had provided an education and/or

professional training that would have allowed them to maintain a reasonable minimum

standard of living upon their departure at age eighteen. Unfortunately, the education

in the institutions was of low quality. Even in the FUNABEM "pilot school," *Escola*

XV de Novembro, Campos (1984) decided that "the problems of diligence and

performance owed in large part to a certain apathy of the teachers and to a total

disinterest of the students" (67). In FEBEM/PE 60% of the students had repeated

grades, the principal motive being a lack of interest in the classes (Vainsencher 1989).

Whether the blame falls on the student, the institution, or both, the fact remained that

the students acquired a poor education at the institutions.

The professionalization courses and the development of a positive attitude

toward work suffered from problems similar to those which afflicted education.

Campos (1984) noted that the climate in the professionalization offices was better than

in the classrooms, but many students did not frequent the offices nor the classes and

spent many hours lazily on the patio. The situation of a "flagship" Pernambuco

government institution was typical in that it offered 11 courses,[15] but at the time of

the researcher's inquiry, very few were functioning (Vainsencher 1989). Some of the

staff responsible for the Professionalization Section in FEBEM/SP even said that the

professional education had no value in terms of employing the minor in the future

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[15]The courses were the following: cabinet-making, baking, typography, mechanics, lampmaking, hat-making, electric repair, plumbing, general repair, laboratory, and refrigeration.

(Violante 1982, 65). In fact, in Rio de Janeiro, the Alumni Association of FUNABEM (ASSEAF) maintained that only about 3% of the alumni worked in the profession which they had studied at the institution (Campos 1984, 133). Furthermore, while at the institution, the youth completed little physical work, and when they did, it was done slowly and frequently associated with punishment, which created a negative attitude toward work.

Upon departure from the institutions at age 18,[16] many ex-residents encountered tremendous difficulty integrating into society, only in part because of the precarious nature of the education and professionalization courses. The alumni often left the institution without a job, social network, family, or institutional support (Altoé 1990b). This essentially represented a transition from an environment of paternalism to one of complete abandonment.

FUNABEM attempted to assist the alumni in one of three ways when they left: reintegration into their original or substitute family, enlistment in the military, or placement in a hostel and payment of the rent for one month (three in exceptional cases) (Campos 1984); however, these efforts were usually futile. Contact with the family decayed while the youth lived in the institution, and the youth grew accustomed to certain lifestyle standards that the family could never achieve. These factors made placement in the family a less appealing option, but no records were kept regarding the rate of success. Scarcely 10% of the youth who applied for military service gained

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[16]The Statute defines the child "as the person who has not yet completed twelve years of age and the adolescent as that between twelve and eighteen years of age." The Legal Code before the Statute also defined adulthood at age eighteen, and FUNABEM ended care for people at this age.

entry; the military rejected most of them because of their race, physical or mental health problems, or homosexuality (Campos 1984, 121). Finally, those placed in a hostel seemed to rarely secure and keep a formal job. The effects of these rejections were particularly acute for those alumni who had lived at the institutions since birth and thought that the skills learned within the institution would allow them to live reasonably in the outside world.

Cases of success were few, and no researcher has identified a pattern among them. Campos (1984) resorts to the following generalization: ". . . [A] minority achieve 'exit' in society. This 'exit' varies from underemployment to attendance and graduation from a university. One can justify this 'individual success' through the personal characteristics of the students (interest, dedication, ease of learning) and through the aid of a person within or outside the institution, that permits him to succeed, despite the stigma of FUNABEM." (133)

Not only did the alumni lack preparation to confront life after the institution, but they also suffered discrimination for having passed through government institutions. Since the government system treated juvenile delinquents as well as poor youth through the same organ,[17] most people considered any alumnus a potential threat. Violante (1982) wrote that "his age, color, gestures, clothes, and the fact of having egressed from FEBEM, stigmatized him, impeding his acceptance into the 'normal' world, whether at work, in the street, in the community . . ." (189). Several

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[17]At the federal level, FUNABEM handled both juvenile offenders and poor youth in Rio de Janeiro. In each state, the FEBEM did the same.

authors employed marginality theory[18] to explain the stigma attached to these youth,

arguing that the causes of poverty and marginality lay in the structure of society and

economic processes rather than in personal and psychological factors of the individual

(Violante 1982, 22). The government institutions were not the ultimate cause of

marginality but went about reproducing it among the youth for whom they cared

(Campos 1984; Edmundo 1987; Violante 1982; Vainsencher 1989).

In conclusion, the literature on institutionalization exposes many negative

characteristics of institutional care, including care for large groups of youth in a

depersonalized manner, isolation of the youth from their families and "society," and

lack of adequate preparation for their departure. The identification of factors such as

these contributed to the formation of the Statute, which restricts the use of closed

institutions for juvenile offenders and sets guidelines for improving the environment in

the institutions. The next chapter describes the shelter, using the institution as a point

of reference.

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[18]Violante (1982) defines marginality in the following way: "Marginal is the type of insertion in the labor market of these segments of the working population. It is characterized by underemployment, by intermittent employment and by unemployment. Marginal is not a personality trait . . . ." (21)

CHAPTER 3

SHELTERS: ADVANTAGES AND CHALLENGES

> When they first came here, they were very accustomed to life on the street.
> They would take their food and go sit on the ground against the wall. They
> would eat with their hands or use a spoon. One of the first things we taught
> them was to sit at the table and use a knife and fork. They used to defecate on
> the ground in the bathroom but then became familiar with the toilet . . . .
> Some of the older adolescents show infantile behavior and play with dolls.
> They never had a childhood. (Social worker in shelter.)

> One of the kids living in our house has worked at Cesar Park [a five-star hotel]
> for a year and they really like him. He studies and has made progress, but it is
> a constant struggle, the street is just a step out that door. (House
> Coordinator.)

Shelters confront the same challenge as did the institutions -- working with

youth who lived on the street for part of their lives (see Appendix 2).[19] However,

shelters have different characteristics than institutions, and their workers employ

distinct ways of interacting with street youth. NGOs were instrumental in developing

the 1990 Statute, which reflects the values that serve as a base for their programs,

including shelters, and distinguish them from closed institutions. Article 92 of the

Statute states:

> The entities that develop shelter programs should adopt the following
> principles: I - preservation of family bonds; II - integration in a foster family,
> when the maintenance resources of the family of origin have been exhausted;
> III - personalized treatment in small groups; IV - development of activities in a
> context of coeducation; V - nonseparation of groups of siblings; VI - whenever
> possible, avoid the transfer of sheltered children and adolescents to other
> entities; VII - participation in local community life; VIII - gradual preparation

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[19]Institutions also cared for other groups of youth including youth interned at birth or a very young age,
youth with and without family contact, and juvenile offenders.

for severance from the entity; IX - participation of persons from the community in the educational process.

Writers of the Statute created these principles precisely because researchers felt that closed institutions, by acting in a way contrary to that expressed by the principles, caused harm to the youth.

Shelters follow the principles to the extent which they can, but whether the resulting differences in care, in relation to institutions, have positive effects on the youth is difficult to determine. Institutions maintained insufficient data on the fate of the youth after they left, and shelters are not showing any effort to alter this precedent. The shelters have also only operated for a few years, meaning that even if they did keep records on the youth that left, there would not be very much data. Furthermore, lack of access to information on how much it cost to operate institutions made a cost per youth comparison between shelters and institutions impossible (see Appendix 3).

Given the lack of longitudinal and economic data, in this chapter, I make a qualitative comparison between shelters and institutions on several issues: size, selection of beneficiaries, open-door policy, educational approaches, placement of youth in employment, returning youth to their families and use of non-violent methods, working conditions, and community opposition. I describe how the characteristics of shelters distinguish them from institutions, referring to the information on institutions summarized in the previous chapter. Some features of shelters are advantageous compared to those of institutions. For example, it is hard to argue against personalized treatment in small groups and use of non-violent methods, considering that the youth lack families and were often physically abused. But

shelters also have problems that institutions did not.

The Smaller, The Better

> Eleven children live here. I believe in creating a type of family. I have been criticized for having a large team for such a small group, but each child has problems and needs a lot of attention. (NGO Director and House Supervisor.)

The shelters are generally smaller than the institutions on a variety of parameters: physical space, number of youth living there, and number of staff and administrators. Whereas the institutions often housed several hundred youth, the average number of youth living in the thirteen shelters in Rio was approximately twenty-one (see Appendix 1). The number of youth living in the shelters ranged from eight to forty-four. Furthermore, the largest number sleeping in the same room was about ten. In the institutions, two or three large dormitory style rooms held the whole population, often numbering several hundred youth.

The small-scale environment in shelters contributes to the development and retention of a positive self identity for the youth, which the large institutions made difficult (see Altoé 1990a,b; Campos 1984). In a setting where only ten to twenty youth live together, there is less of a need to systematize treatment for the sake of equality, for example, by using uniforms, calling the youth by numbers, and enforcing the same rigid schedule indiscriminately. The shelter can accommodate specific needs, make exceptions, and encourage the expression of individuality among the youth. Furthermore, even if only two educators are on duty, this signifies a fairly high ratio

of staff to youth and an increased capacity for tailored care.

Some social service workers feel that the larger shelters are still too big, and that the best living arrangement, especially for adolescents, is one in which several youth live in a small house. As one educator stated, "The youth still has a preoccupation to survive with his own individuality, living with thirty others. The large shelter also makes behavior change [in the youth] more difficult."

Two NGOs have compensated for large shelters through programs that progress through stages involving increasingly smaller groups of youth. The four steps in the programs consist of: 1) encountering and developing activities on the streets with street youth; 2) encouraging them to visit and participate in other activities at a day center; 3) placement in a large shelter in addition to school and work or professionalization courses; and 4) depending on their age and/or success in the previous stage, selection to live in a smaller house where staff focus on the youths' construction of independence and "self-sufficiency." Two houses are used: a large one for the children and a smaller one for adolescents. The adolescents "graduate" from the larger house for the children, where about thirty live, to the smaller house, where fifteen live, two to four in each room.

All of the shelters meet the goal of personalized treatment in small groups, expressed as principle III of Article 92 of the Statute. In doing so, they avoid the problems resulting from treatment *en masse* observed in the institutions (Altoé 1990a,b; Campos 1984; FEEM 1985). Two of the NGOs developed a program structure that strives to achieve even smaller groupings of youth to more closely

approximate a family environment.

Entry and Exit

Those youth that enter and remain in shelters are a special subgroup of those who live on the street. They adapt to the shelter environment and stay, or they return to the street. This implies that some self-selection of beneficiaries occurs. Also, shelter staff select youth that they feel will be able to benefit from shelter life. Both of these types of selection result from the "open-door" policy that shelters maintain. I discuss these ideas in the two subsections that follow.

Self-Selection and Selection of "Clients"

The two programs that use the four steps discussed in the previous section avoid the situation where youth take advantage of shelters just to receive food and a temporary break from the streets. Each step requires more commitment from the youth and demands a greater change from their previous life. As a result, the process filters out those youth who want to leave the street and are able to adapt to shelter life from the larger pool of youth living on the streets.

According to Lipsky and Smith (1989-90), this use of "natural" barriers to create a "rationing impact" on clients is one of the ways in which NGOs act when "freeloaders" threaten "advantage-taking" of their social services.[20] They give the

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[20]The NGO can react to the threat of advantage-taking in several ways, which include acceptance of the advantage-taking because of high costs associated with stopping it, the use of natural barriers to clients seeking aid, reducing service accessibility by raising the eligibility standards, and limiting client intake to those deriving from a certain geographic area or compatible with the service mission of the

example that "entry into the orbit of a homeless shelter . . . may mean losing privacy, agreeing to accept counseling, taking a make-work job, giving up one's weapon, or exposing oneself to a religious message" (633). This is analogous to the situation of a street youth entering a shelter, who, in order to stay there, must comply with several rules which usually include: no use of drugs, no stealing, no sexual abuse, fulfillment of house responsibilities, attendance at school and a professionalization course or work, and entrance by a certain hour at night.

The natural mechanism of "creaming off" those whom are easiest with which to work reflects the shelters' ability to define their clientele more narrowly than did FUNABEM, a government agency. Lipsky and Smith (1989-90) state that the government, when it develops its own programs, feels impelled to make the appearance that it offers equal service to all who may need it. On the other hand, the shelters do not have the capability to take every youth off the street and "reform" them, as FUNABEM officials would have liked to have done in their old approach involving institutions under the PNBEM and the 1979 Legal Code of the Minor. Through the NGO's screening, the "excluded or hardest-to-reach clients are deemed to be the responsibility of the public sector" (Lipsky and Smith 1989-90, 631). A CBIA (and former FUNABEM) official confirmed this: "Most NGOs do not work with juvenile offenders. Certainly, some of the youth attending the programs commit small offenses, but the NGOs have the excuse that working with delinquents is the

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organization. The authors do not mention program design specifically, but the process used by the Brazilian NGOs matches the second category (use of natural barriers) and essentially represents a type of selection, or "creaming" of clients.

responsibility of the state. I agree."[21]

Despite the fact that shelters generally serve a self-selecting clientele, those willing to abide by certain rules, some outside observers criticize shelters when they surpass this passive mode of selection and actively discriminate their clientele on age or behavioral problems. Such was the case with one shelter which culled the majority of its youth from the lower age brackets. The same government official claimed, "The shelter began to concern itself more with the child than the adolescent, but who needs more attention? The adolescent is running more risk than the child . . . . They eject certain youth [from the shelter]. They cannot continue with this type of work."

However, this single shelter with limited resources felt it was doing the most sensible thing when it chose to work with more "salvageable" youth, who in a few years might be more ingrained in street life. The coordinator of the shelter told me that she thought the staff could accomplish more with youth who had been on the street less time. Also, since the youth normally leaves at age eighteen, the staff could work with a younger child for a longer period of time.

In sum, shelter staff state they do not refuse help to any youth who requests it, yet some self-selection and selection by staff has determined which youth now fill the shelters. Since the shelters do not reach the toughest cases, they remain on the streets and the government can "treat" them only if the police catch them in the process of an illegal act. Clearly, shelters cannot completely replace closed institutions, and the

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[21]Luiz Paschoal Marra, Consultant to CBIA in the area of juvenile offenders, personal interview, 6 February 1993.

Statute reserves institutional care just for those youth who the shelters do not reach and who commit serious or repeat crimes. Shelters and reformed, closed institutions for juvenile offenders actually complement each other in this sense. If evaluators were ever to measure "success" of the youth on certain variables, they would surely need to consider that the youth in shelters were those who chose to leave the street and participate in shelter life. The process of self-selection by the youth has much to do with the "open-door" policy, addressed in the next section.

Both Sides of the Open Door

Shelters -- in contrast to institutions -- maintain an "open door" policy, such that youth cannot be kept there against their will. Youth would often flee government institutions, and the police would take them back or they would return to stay for a while and receive the benefits of life there, only to flee again when they wanted a break in the routine (FEEM 1985; Fonseca 1987 cited in Rizzini and Rizzini 1991, 72). In the institutions of FEBEM/PE, over half of the youth had fled at least once, some so many times that they had "lost count" (Vainsencher 1989).

At times, youth leave the shelters for a few days and return, but this practice is rare, as most of them live there because they want to leave the streets. In order to stay in the shelter, they have to accept several rules and certain responsibilities. A youth who does not agree to them leaves the shelter. As one house coordinator put it: "Some cannot adapt to the house. There is really no expulsion; the youth can leave if he wants to do so."

But for those youth recently initiated in shelter life, the open door policy allows them to have more contact with "street culture," those norms and values developed by youth living on the street. According to recent work by anthropologists in Goiânia,[22] it is impossible for a youth to live on the street without being incorporated into a band, or gang (Vogel and Mello 1991). In fact, the bands often recruited new members from the pool of working youth in the city. Those youth from non-functional homes, characterized by any combination of poverty, violence, and emotional vacancy, often perceived life with the band as more attractive than life at home and made the transition from working to street youth. Life with the street band, despite its hardships and danger, offers freedom of time and space, the opportunity to experience sex and drugs, adventure, and access to consumer goods through theft. The band "recycles the resentment and revolt originating through the collapse of the family" (Vogel and Mello 1991, 149) into solidarity and loyalty to the band.

A street educator in Rio called these bands, "cells of reception" because they oriented new youth arriving on the street and taught them such practicalities as "where to eat and sleep, how to obtain money, and who to pay so as not to be beaten. The youth go through a 'baptism' of the street and obey the orders of the cell leader." The educator thought that any work with street youth must account for the cell because new arrivals cannot survive without it. One shelter placed a team of educators in the city center at the terminal train station in order to intercept children arriving from the urban periphery before they were integrated into a band.

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[22]Goiânia is a city of about 1.5 million inhabitants, and the capital of the inland state of Goiás.

New members of shelters may actually oscillate between the shelter and the street, producing a "game" for the shelter to gain their loyalty. I observed a group of three youth between the ages of ten and thirteen living on the street in the vicinity of a shelter. They survived principally by begging at local restaurants and knew many of the restaurant workers and street vendors. I saw them several times playing with the boys from the shelter, and near the end of my stay, they moved into the shelter. An educator informed me later that another organization had sent them to the shelter and they had stayed a little while and then returned to the street. When I had first asked him about this group, he did not want me to know that the shelter had temporarily "lost" them.

Thus, the shelters, when they first open and later during their operation when they accept new youth, must deal with the strong behavioral patterns that they bring from the street. The process of encouraging the youth to meet accepted goals, such as attendance at school, attainment of employment, or something seemingly simple, like caring for personal belongings, is slow and challenging. This led one shelter, shortly after it opened, to temporarily restrict the freedom of the youth for which it had responsibility.[23] The staff felt that this period was necessary in order to "break" the culture of the streets and establish a change in the behavior of the youth. Swift (1991) recognized a similar exceptional situation in a night shelter in Goiânia, where only "the few who were really trusted" were allowed to go out (26).

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[23]Other shelters harshly criticized the one which implemented this policy, which was reminiscent of the closed institutions and contrary to the ideals expressed in the Statute. The shelter ended the practice soon thereafter.

The open-door policy of shelters reflects the stipulation in the Statute that freedom can only be taken away from youth through the use of closed institutions for juvenile offenders. Furthermore, the open nature of shelters aims to promote the participation of the youth in local community life (principle VII of Article 92 of the Statute). These ideas derive from studies on residents and ex-residents of institutions. Researchers judged the residents as unsuited to support themselves on departure.[24] Moreover, the researchers interviewed ex-residents of the institutions and found that many survived by completing odd-jobs, some participated in criminal activity, and others ended up in jail (Altoé 1990b; Campos 1984). The studies blamed the institutions for preparing the youth inadequately through education and professional training, but also for not allowing them to learn what they faced upon departure by keeping them segregated from the "outside world."

Despite the humanitarian appeal of the open-door policy, in that it deprives no youth of their liberty, and the practical aspect, in that it allows them to remain in contact with the urban environment, it creates the challenge of altering the youths' behavior when they first join and have access to the street. Whether the policy has good or bad effects on the future performance of shelter youth in any aspect of their lives when they leave is yet to be demonstrated. Any type of measurement of the effect of the policy would require a longitudinal follow-up of youth leaving the shelters. But the differences between selective and inclusive, or open and closed, are

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[24]For example, Vainsencher (1989) asked youth in FEBEM/PE how they imagined their future. Many cried, some took a very long time to respond, and 12% of the sample were unable to speak (102). Many did not know the meaning of the word "future," and could only respond after the interviewer posed the question differently.

not the only differences between shelters and the old institutions. Other differences could also have a great impact on the performance of the youth on different variables.

In sum, shelters select those youth able to function within their service format, and the rest remain on the street or in the institutions for offenders. The open-door policy -- which is part of the selection process in that it helps create "self-selection" -- has developmental significance that contrasts shelters and institutions. It leaves the choice to enter and stay up to the youth and places some responsibility on them during the process of entry, where depriving them of freedom in an institutional setting does not.

New Pedagogic Approaches and Integration into Community Schools

As seen in the previous section, shelter staff attempt to expose youth to the community rather than resocialize them in an institution which is closed to it. Unlike many of the youth in institutions who were not prepared for life in a poor, urban environment, youth in shelters gain hands-on experience in the community every day. One way in which the youth do this is by attending community schools. A house coordinator stated, "Once the boys are with us, they are no longer street children. We try to place them in formal state or city schools rather than ones for street children."

Despite this, perhaps the toughest challenge to the shelters is the provision of formal education to youth in their care, a goal many shelters hold. The youth see school as something beyond their reach, because, at a certain point in their lives, they

had foregone it out of the need to work.[25] In one of the rare documents written on the relationship between street and working children and school, Leite (1991) confirms this: "School for them represented a very strong symbol that needed to be appropriated, but that was always seen with disbelief and distrust" (83). Statements given by poor, working youth showed that many of them had contact with school or at least felt it was important, which conforms to the dominant societal opinion (Rizzini and Rizzini 1991). However, street youth, while living with the street band, lose whatever links they previously had with school when working and consolidate their rebellion against many societal institutions, including school, the law, family, and work (Lusk 1989; Rizzini 1992, 28 reviewing FLACSO/UNICEF study).

Given the fragile bonds of the former street youth with school, a debate exists as to whether to offer them formal education or "alternative" education that is specially designed for their needs. Most shelter workers would ideally like to ensure the formal education of the youth but realize that only a few may obtain it. The staff of at least one shelter attempts to place all of the youth in local state,[26] municipal, or

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[25]One of the primary determinants of inequality in education among youth is the level of family income. For instance, 97% of the youth from seven to fourteen years of age in Brazil that belong to families where the monthly income is above two minimum salaries per capita attend school, whereas this percentage falls to 74.5% among those families whose income is below the poverty level (1/2 minimum salary per capita). These rates of enrollment reveal little about what is eventually learned by the students. Thus, despite high enrollment of seven to fourteen year olds in school in the Southeast during the 1980s (89.2% in 1990), only 31% of those who started the first grade ever finished the eighth grade (based on 1978/88 data). Furthermore, 13.9% of them never completed the fourth grade, that level of education deemed necessary in order to read and write (IBGE, 1992).

[26]During his 1983-1987 term, Governor Leonel Brizola built several hundred "Integrated Centers of Public Education" (Centros Integrados de Educação Popular, CIEPs) throughout the state of Rio de Janeiro. These CIEPs function during the day and at night, offer directed study, meals, medical and dental care, and cultural, athletic, and leisure activities (see Júnior 1988 for a critical historical analysis; Leite 1991).

private schools, and other shelters do the same with some of the youth. In a sense, this provides them with an "equal opportunity" to access everything potentially available from an education, such as formal employment and even a higher socio-economic position.

Some manage to advance in this academic setting, but the reality for most of the former street youth is different partially because they suffer discrimination from teachers and other students. Also, Leite (1991) states that one of the fundamental characteristics of the street youth as students is their desire to establish immediate interaction in all aspects of the educational process. Many of the educators with whom I spoke confirmed that street youth usually have an attention span shorter than most youth and need frequent change and stimulation to maintain interest in a given activity. For all of these reasons, they do not respond well to the traditional classroom environment.

Thus, many educators argue that the youth need an education with a pedagogic approach tailored to their needs. The premier educational effort directed toward very poor youth, some of whom actually still lived on the street, was the *Escola Municipal Tia Ciata*, which operated under a unique philosophy from 1985 until early 1989, when the election of a new mayor ended support for the project.

The school's principal aim was to ensure literacy among its students. The teachers allowed the students to participate interactively in the daily construction of the curriculum through the explanation of their life histories and issues of importance to them. The proposal of the school "was precisely not to domesticate the students, so

that they could more creatively confront the resistance that society demonstrated in accepting them" (Leite 1991, 95). Assuming that school could not alter the social standing of the youth -- their vertical mobility in society -- the school founders emphasized horizontal mobility, the learning of life skills that would help the youth in their fight for survival. Other "alternative" education efforts throughout Brazil took this idea to an extreme, teaching working youth on the streets about hygiene, for example, by showing them that they would sell more ice cream if they were clean.[27]

Although very practically oriented, these ventures run a certain risk. For example, in placing a large group of former street youth in one school, the whole school can become stigmatized by the surrounding community, as occurred with the *Escola Municipal Tia Ciata* and the other major school in Rio with a similar plan, the *Escola XV de Novembro*.[28] Moreover, the schools can compromise their standards, essentially providing a lower tier of education for poor youth. The education has an excuse for being bad because observers can easily blame students for their own failure. CBIA officials with whom I spoke recognized the weak performance of the *Escola XV de Novembro*, showing me that during 1992, the school eliminated over 35% of 1,400 matriculated students because of too many absences.

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[27]Lívia Penna Cavalcanti, Lawyer and Former Consultant to UNICEF on the "Alternative Services to Street Children Project," personal interview, 18 March 1993.

[28]Formerly a closed institution in FUNABEM's *Quintino* complex, the *Escola XV de Novembro* now offers courses for poor, working youth and street youth. Another well known "alternative" education project for street youth, supported by many domestic and international organizations (including UNICEF), involved "culturally-appropriate" education, the formation of a *samba* club, and the construction of material used during *Carnaval*. This school closed temporarily due to a "scandal" involving a staff member and an adolescent girl.

Although these two approaches -- placing the youth in regular or specialized schools -- are new, relative to those of the closed institutions, the overall educational profile of youth in the shelters is not much better in comparison. Most of the youth, including many of the adolescents, are matriculated in the first few grades of primary school, and only exceptional cases progress beyond this level. Local schools offer sessions lasting a few hours in the afternoon or at night. The youth say they "study" at school, and "homework" does not really exist. According to a house coordinator, "The difficulty lies less in securing a spot for the youth in school than in getting them to frequent school." Many of the former street youth staying at the shelters are not unlike other youth who may periodically skip school to do things such as going to the beach, and this is often exactly what they do.

But once the shelter workers gain the respect and friendship of the youth, they can place a lot of pressure on them to attend school, and one of the older shelters has a disciplined group of adolescents that go on a regular basis. The staff in one shelter described how the youth liked to go to school now because they had uniforms like the other children and a *kombi*, a van, to take them to and from their various schools. Usually the shelter staff develops educational reinforcement activities at the shelter to complement what occurs at school. Since many of the shelters opened only recently, they may find the youth improve in school after they acclimate further to life off of the street.

The idea of integrating shelter youth into community schools is appealing because it offers them a chance to access education available to youth who never lived

on the street. Workers in one shelter obtained several positions in one of the better academies in Rio's South Zone, the *Colégio Santo Inácio*. Only exceptional youth take advantage of this opportunity, while the workers guide the rest to public schools of lower quality. In comparison, the education in the *Escola XV de Novembro*, operated under its old format by FUNABEM, produced students who went on to college but also ones who never learned how to read and write very well. The effort to encourage youth to attend class was inconsistent in the institutions,[29] as it is now in the shelters. Thus, even with new methods of offering an education to the youth, shelters exhibit the same variability in its provision as did the institutions.

Placement in Employment and Skills Training

In addition to concerning themselves with the education of the residents of their shelters, three of the NGOs have developed job training and work placement programs over the past few years that incorporate youth from several shelters as well as poor, working youth from surrounding communities.[30] The city and state shelters, both of which opened within the last year, currently emphasize the resocialization, and to a certain extent, the education of the youth more than their introduction to formal employment. The NGOs have been very creative, searching out various employers,

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[29]Both Campos (1984) and Vainsencher (1989) describe the education in institutions as very weak. Many residents did not attend classes, and the monitors did not force them to go as long as they did not cause trouble.

[30]Of course, the programs adhere to Article 60 of the Statute which states that "work is prohibited to minors of less than fourteen years of age, except as apprentices."

from municipal agencies to large businesses.[31] Unfortunately, the placement of adolescent shelter youth in jobs is rare because employers are wary to hire them, and the youth are often unprepared to bear the responsibility which a job holds. This means that most of the employment placement projects serve the poor, community youth as opposed to the street youth from the shelters. Exceptions do exist, and one NGO has been successful in placing a number of shelter youth as workers in hotels. Also, some hold jobs as gardeners in the city parks department, as workers for the shelters in which they live, or lived before age eighteen, and as office boys in large downtown businesses and banks.

"Internships" in companies are more accessible to shelter youth than formal jobs. One NGO monitors the performance of youth in part-time positions with various entities. The city government offers 250 "scholarships" so that the youth can work in the company or government agency for four hours of the day and still attend school on a flexible schedule. The NGOs maintain responsibility for the youth, who are able to gain some work experience. Youth from several shelters and poor youth from the community participate in this program.

Many of the street youth, however, are not employed and merely take skills training courses. The courses are offered at preventative projects placed in poor communities by the NGOs, sometimes at the shelters, and at the professionalization

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[31]The NGOs have not extensively sought opportunities for employment in small, neighborhood businesses. At first, this seems strange, given the emphasis of the shelters on community integration; however, it is a result of the fact that they have been able to secure more positions at large enterprises, such as the Bank of Brazil (*Banco do Brasil*, and city and state agencies with less effort. Canvassing local businesses can take a lot of time and may not produce many positions.

workshops of the *Quintino* complex.[32] Examples of courses and activities include

broom-making, baking pastries and bread, ceramics, and sewing. The following

excerpt from a dissertation on the education of street youth reveals the dubious value

of these courses in terms of the future employment of the youth:

> Later on, Elba speaks regarding work and a profession and says that she would
> like to be a seamstress, but had already completed various courses for this at
> "Organization B." She continued, then, explaining the "countless difficulties"
> for one to secure a job as a seamstress. An account like this questions, in my
> point of view, the investments of the organization in professionalization
> courses, indicating their insufficiency and divergence in relation to the
> expectations and values of these adolescents. In the same way, the
> professionalization linked to placement in the formal work market seems to be
> a questionable alternative. The pedagogic process of professional preparation
> of these adolescents seems to need other more complex and "artisanally
> educative" investments than courses and listings of jobs. (Rocha 1992, 275.)

In fact, some of the shelter workers implied that the courses kept the youth away from

the negative environment of the street while offering them some skills. The literature

encouraging deinstitutionalization criticized the workshops in the institutions for doing

the same thing -- just keeping the youth busy.

The professionalization courses offered by the NGOs are not very different

than those offered in the institutions, and some shelters actually send youth to the old

professionalization offices of FUNABEM at the *Quintino* complex. The shelters do

possess an advantage over the institutions in the internship and job placement

programs that the NGOs developed. Yet in a situation similar to that seen in the

provision of education, in the employment programs, only a small percentage of the

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[32]Whereas the workshops at the *Quintino* complex originally catered only to the youth interned there
under the administration of FUNABEM, they now function in an open context. Youth from surrounding
communities can participate as well as youth from the shelters; however, only two of the shelters
actually direct their youth to these courses.

youth actually receive benefits -- in this case, of holding a job and feeling the responsibility of earning their own money.

Progressive Methods

In working with youth, shelter educators use progressive methods in comparison to those employed in institutions. In place of using violence as a form of discipline, they attempt to establish a relationship of respect, friendship, and affection that they use in "resocializing" the youth. Whereas judges often unnecessarily placed youth with family connections in institutions, which resulted in the deterioration of these connections (FEEM 1985; Rizzini 1985), workers in the shelters emphasize family contact, when possible.

The educators in shelters never use repression and violence in their daily contact with the youth. Rocha (1992) asserts that most street educators "gain the respect of the youth not through authoritarian, arbitrary, or violent attitudes, but through learning a few of their rules" (273). The reason for the lack of physical punishment according to an educator is simple: "These boys are abused all their lives in one way or another, and the moment you raise your hand to strike one, everything for which you worked is lost." This approach stands in contrast to the one found in the literature on institutions where the inspectors, or monitors, used violence and degradation in an attempt to induce submissive behavior from the youth (Altoé 1990b; Campos 1984; FEEM 1985; Violante 1982).

The shelters establish rules based on the "common good" of the group and

societal norms. Thus, breaking these rules is an "anti-social" act by nature. When a youth breaks a rule, the bond with the educators and the house is inherently threatened. The educators respond by expressing displeasure and withholding affection, as would a parent, until the youth and educator reach an understanding. This resocialization mechanism functions like that of a family. I observed that when the youth knows the rules in advance, then a feeling of guilt often leads to reconciliation.

The educators and youth form a relationship based on mutual respect and friendship. Rocha (1992) feels that the educators earn the confidence of the youth only after passing countless tests confirming friendship, commitment, a non-discriminatory stance, and knowledge regarding life on the streets (274). In many cases, once a relationship is established, the youth begin to view the educator as a positive role model. The assertion of an adolescent (15 years) confirms this: "Do you know who a good friend is, someone who always helps me with my problems? Josué [an educator]. He is preparing me because he will not always be by my side, and then I will be alone again."

Many of the children develop strong bonds of affection with the educators. I heard from several shelter staff that the youth often "transfer" to the educators the figure of the mother or father that they lacked. A house coordinator told me that some of the youth in the shelter often sought him out for advice, and ended up "creating" his affection for them by saying things like "my father never spoke like this to me." Moreover, I observed frequent and comfortable physical contact between the

smaller children and educators.

When contact with the family[33] of the youth is possible, then the shelter encourages it. In fact, the social workers initially attempt to return the youth to their families. While this is often unsuccessful due to fractured family relationships, at times, the contact is helpful. For example, a social assistant described a situation in which the workers brought the mother of a girl from a nearby *favela* to discipline her daughter for sniffing glue in the shelter. According to the assistant, "She [the mother] was the only one who could get the bag of glue away from the girl." Another mother living on the streets also kept contact with her daughter at this shelter. They had lived together on the street before the girl moved into the shelter.

In sum, shelters avoid one of the main criticisms that authors aimed at institutions: the harm caused by their use of violent and degrading methods. Also, nobody can criticize shelters for breaking youths' links with their families. This is because the shelters define their target population as street youth, those youth living on the street and possessing weak family bonds. Shelter workers sometimes succeed in returning youth to their parent(s), but other parent(s) reject the youth (Vogel and Mello 1991) and/or simply do not possess the resources to avert their return to the street in an attempt to gain more resources than the family has to offer. Therefore, the staff keeps in the shelter those youth who do not have the option of living with their family. Moreover, shelter staff attempt to preserve bonds between these youth and

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[33]Most often, the mother is the most significant member of the family. The father is rarely a figure present in the lives of the youth (see Appendix 2 and Chapter 2). Contact with extended family was also rare among institutionalized youth (Campos 1984).

their families while they are living there (principle I of Article 92 of the Statute).

On the other hand, institutions received youth that had intact family contacts from juvenile court judges. The judges often viewed the families of poor youth as incapable of caring for their children and sent the youth -- brought in by the police -- to institutions. Once the youth were in the institutions, family contact often broke down. The institution workers treated the visiting parent(s) poorly and made visits difficult by limiting them to certain days and for pre-determined amounts of time (Rizzini 1984). Also, the mere cost of going to the institution on public transportation was prohibitive for many poor parents.

Working in the Shelter

Operation of a shelter requires administrative and shelter staff. The NGOs, as well as the state and city, normally have one or two administrators for their shelters. Depending upon the particular NGO's activities, the administrators may hold responsibility for other programs in addition to the shelter. This is also the case with both the city and state shelters. Since the shelters are small, they are fairly easy to manage, and I never heard complaints from the shelter staff regarding administrative difficulties, such as lack of supplies or late pay.

Core shelter staff normally includes a psychologist, a social worker, a house coordinator, several educators (or a resident couple), and a cook. Generally, the "professionals," the psychologist and social worker(s) possess college degrees and work part-time. The house coordinator usually has at least a high-school level

education and some previous management experience. The educators vary in their

qualifications and educational level. At the very least, the educator must be literate

and like working with youth. The educator is the most important member of this staff,

in the sense that he/she has the most daily contact with the youth. Diverse people

make good educators as long as they possess the base of consistency and knowledge

that is necessary to construct positive relationships with the youth. It was my

observation that some of the most popular and effective educators were those sharing a

similar socio-economic background to the youth or those capable of demonstrating a

profound understanding of it.

Working with the youth, especially those who lived on the street for a long

time and those new to the shelter, on a daily basis is not an easy task. Each youth

requires attention and affection, both of which they often lacked earlier in their lives.

Furthermore, the adolescents are initially rebellious and, at times, aggressive. One

worker made the interesting observation that "the youth are generally calmer on the

street, but here [in the shelter] they feel safe and show the aggression and anger which

they have built. Only after they have been here for some time do they settle down."

Thus, commitment to their work is an important quality of shelter staff.

Keeping in mind that well over half of the shelters were established within the last

two years, I found that, by nature, the most committed staff were the ones who had

been there the longest. The difficulty of the work, combined with the low pay[34]

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[34]The NGO shelters generally pay professional staff between 1.5 and 2 MS and the educators between 1
and 1.5 MS. The salaries are higher in the state and city shelters.

simply means that only the most dedicated remained. In speaking with people who had worked at a shelter for a long time, I noticed their drive to help improve the lives of the youth, a sense of injustice or outrage at society, and some sort of affection for the youth. Some administrators and supervisors referred to these workers as *militantes*, or militants.

As for those educators attracted merely for the salary, they never last very long. When I went to dinner at a shelter which had opened two years earlier, several of the youth asked me if I were to be a new educator. One of the educators, who had been there for a year, explained that some twenty people had gone through the other educator spot. This shelter catered to adolescent offenders and was probably the most difficult one in which to work, but workers in other shelters also mentioned a fairly high turnover in educators. A house coordinator said that "some people came in with good intentions as educators but could not handle the conflicting emotions, stress, and the feeling that their work is never complete" (Carlos). Only those who have some type of link to the work remain, and to the others it is not worth the low salary.

In sum, shelters seem to avoid some negative aspects of working in institutions. In FEBEM/PE, the workers cited the two most important ways of improving the institutions as: 1) strengthening support from the administration, and 2) hiring better personnel that liked to work with youth (Vainsencher 1989, 55,56). In contrast, shelters rarely encounter administrative problems because of their small size. Also, although difficult to identify differences between institution and shelter staff from the literature on institutions and my interviews with shelter workers, I observed a pattern

of high turnover among educators in the shelters, with those who remained expressing commitment to their work. On my visits to the closed institutions for juvenile offenders and CRIAM, the demoralization of the staff, lack of communication between administrators and workers, lack of materials, and shortage of staff all reflected the impending transfer of the entities to the other governing organs; hence, they do not serve as good grounds on which to base a comparison with shelters.

Location and Community Opposition

The NGOs and government founded the thirteen shelters in residential and mixed business/residential neighborhoods in various areas of the city. They bought, rented, or accepted donated structures, usually old, two or three-story houses. These houses, for the most part, accommodate the needs of the residents and staff for space and the separation of activities. Two of the operating entities actually constructed shelters on acquired land.[35]

The organizations established almost all of their shelters in areas containing a large target population. The city center contains over half of the shelters, and this is where most of the street youth live. Two shelters in the *Tijuca* region of the north zone, close to the city center, drew their residents from the population of street youth living near the busy *Praça Saenz Pena* (Saenz Pena Square). The south zone

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[35]The *Pastoral do Menor* and the state government, through the *Coordenadoria Estadual de Desenvolvimento Social* (CEDS) both built their shelters from pre-fabricated concrete used by the city and state in the construction of public schools and day-care centers. The low material costs make this type of construction very inexpensive. The state also constructed a day activity house in another location where the girls from the shelter go for lunch and to participate in activities, and it is building a third structure for pregnant girls and young mothers.

possesses only one shelter with twenty-five spaces, but the street youth in this area number in the hundreds.

Despite the need to locate in the busy center and south zones of the city to be near their target population, two NGOs expressed a desire to move the youth to calmer areas of the city where they would have less contact with youth still living on the street. One NGO transferred all of the members of a shelter to a new one which it opened in a donated house in a rural part of the city's west zone. Another NGO director plans to relocate the youth in his shelter to a small farm after a volunteer team finishes constructing the buildings there.

Community opposition poses a threat to the ability of the NGOs and government to place shelters where they please. Both the specific location and size of the shelter, along with a host of other factors such as the behavior of the youth, influences whether or not this threat ever turns into action. Generally, some individuals voice the greatest dissatisfaction when they discover that an organization intends to locate a shelter near their homes or shops; however, the neighbors have never organized to stop a shelter from locating in their area or to force one to move.[36] After the shelter operates for a while, the neighbors' initial misconceptions

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[36]One exceptional case does exist. The pastor of a church let an NGO use a small house to shelter about ten youth, but then forced them to leave after the congregation complained about the "dirty youth that spit and urinated near the church." The NGO director referred to the church as a "house without God" for "rejecting such impoverished children." In the only other incident of organized community opposition that I discovered, a large group of armed members of the surrounding community invaded the main complex of an NGO with the intention of "disciplining" the youth who went there during the day, but who had already left. This, however, was not a shelter, but a program that develops educational and recreational activities and that serves food, at times, to over one hundred youth per day. The large number of youth, the prominent location of the main building, and a high incidence of crime in the area had all contributed to the neighbors' negative perception of the program.

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about the youth can change. A shelter coordinator recounted what she viewed as a great breakthrough:

> At first the residents [of the adjacent high-rise apartment complex] threw water and garbage down at the youth when they played in the side yard. After they realized that the youth were not causing any problems, relations improved. Just the other day, youth from the apartments came over to play soccer and fly kites with our youth.

Some shelters even achieve their goal of the participation of community members when people volunteer to help, for example, by offering materials or time.

Community opposition is a problem faced by shelters; however, shelter workers have, so far, avoided serious confrontations with community members. The opposition of individuals arises because of the open nature of the shelters. Residents in the community initially see the youth as a potential threat. Only after residents realize that the youth represent less of a threat while living in the shelters as opposed to the streets do they begin to accept the work of the shelters.

Whereas the shelters are situated in predominantly middle and upper class areas of the city, FUNABEM located its institutions in two peripheral areas, where the institutions of SAM had existed since the 1940s. Also, the institutions were closed to society. Residents did not have to concern themselves with what occurred in them because it did not directly affect their lives.

Conclusion

In practice, shelters differ from institutions in several main ways. They: 1) are smaller; 2) define their target population more narrowly and serve those youth who

can best adapt to shelter life; 3) maintain an open-door policy; 4) attempt to integrate youth into local schools; 5) place youth in a variety of jobs in the community through several NGO programs; 6) use no violent discipline; 7) seem to possess fewer administrative problems and highly committed staffs; and 8) must handle community opposition because of their location and open nature. Furthermore, they are each currently intended and best suited to serve different segments of the street youth population.

Shelters truly evade some of the major criticisms that researchers aimed at institutions, but this alone does not mean that the youth living in shelters would necessarily measure better on any test or variable than those who lived in institutions. Also, some principles of the Statute, evident in the shelters' operation, carry possible drawbacks along with their "humanitarian" appeal. For example, treatment of youth in small groups likely has good effects on their personal development, but it risks the loss of economies of scale. Also, not depriving them of their liberty and trying to integrate them into community schools and jobs constitutes an affront to some middle and upper class citizens who hold these youth in low esteem. Issues such as these combined with a lack of profound and consistently recognized "success" create an uncertain future with regard to the expanded use of shelters. Furthermore, weighing qualitative information in order to judge shelters in relation to institutions introduces values, opinions, and emotions into the comparative process. This possesses profound consequences with regards to the decisions made by government policy-makers. The next chapter addresses the issue of further government involvement in using shelters.

CHAPTER 4

A NETWORK OF SHELTERS?

> The shelters represent a case of adaptation, new experience. Clearly, we do not have a model. We are searching to make a model, and when you search to find a new model, you commit errors . . . . I think that the NGOs should be supported, respected. They are not perfect. A perfect model does not exist in Rio de Janeiro.[37]

> The action of the NGOs is paradoxical in that it reinforces the status quo by not lobbying the government for service provision; however, at the same time it alleviates the misery of certain individuals.[38]

Existing shelters operate at full capacity and do not reach all youth who could adapt to and benefit from shelter life. The target population of shelters are youth that live on the street without strong links to their families, youth whom shelter workers view as existing in a situation of greater risk than the masses of poor, working youth that actually live with their families. No one knows how many youth live on the streets of Rio, because no one has completed any systematic surveys. Also, many technical difficulties exist in undertaking such surveys, not the least of which is distinguishing youth who live on the street from those who work there (see Júnior and Drska 1992). When one defines street youth as those who sleep consistently on the street, then repeated counting of them could provide an estimate of their numbers.[39]

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[37]Rios, personal interview.

[38]Jorge Barros, Sociologist and Coordinator of the Center of Documentation for CEAP, personal interview, 17 March 1993.

[39]In order to gain a reliable figure of how many youth sleep consistently on the streets, researchers would need to conduct repeat counts. Problems with this method are that an unknown number of youth have access to areas off the street to sleep (see *Centro João XXIII*) and that some poor youth who still

In the lack of repeated counts, one can only guess the number, based on the few surveys that exist (IBASE 1986; IBASE 1992) and that placed it in the thousands. In its documents on the issue, the city government has used a number around three thousand, which is really just an informed guess. The shelters examined in this study provide together less than three hundred spaces, leaving most youth on the street. The problem is too large for the NGOs by themselves, but not too large to think in terms of expanding service through the government.

The shortage of service for a population in such clear need of it shows that street youth lack the ability to demand service and/or that agencies are unwilling to provide it. Unlike other populations in urban Brazil that effectively lobby government service agencies for extensions or improvements of service, street youth essentially have no collective "voice."[40] One of the only ways that the street youth call attention to their plight is through individual acts of violence, such as robbing members of higher socio-economic classes.

At least one NGO effectively organized street youth in the past. During the mid 1980s, a UNICEF/FUNABEM project (Cavalcanti et al. 1988) encouraged the formation of voluntary local and state commissions of NGO street educators, about three thousand in total (Heringer 1992), throughout Brazil which composed the

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have a lot of family contact may periodically stay on the streets because their work activities keep them there late. For example, some youth who collect scrap paper stay on the streets until early morning when buyers pick up their collections (Marra, personal interview). Thus, the task of making an accurate count is very complicated.

[40]See Watson (1992), for example, regarding the success of *favela* dwellers in demanding water and sewerage provision from service agencies in São Paulo. The study indicates the important role played by reformists in small agencies capable of expanding service under difficult technical conditions.

"National Movement of Street Boys and Girls" (*Movimento Nacional de Meninos e Meninas de Rua*, MNMMR). The MNMMR held several national conferences in Brasília. At one of the conferences, some of the several thousand youth in attendance invaded the Senate during session in order to call attention to the importance of the Statute, which the Senate had not yet passed. One sociologist feels that "the Movement lost steam after 'winning' the Statute. Now government ignores them, society ignores them, and the children feel frustrated."[41] Furthermore, the MNMMR now acts at the local level principally by holding one or two city "gatherings" per year, but the organizers develop mainly cultural and artistic, as opposed to political, activities with the youth.[42]

The success of the MNMMR as a political force at the national level has not been paralleled at the local level in Rio. Also, none of the other large NGOs in Rio with interests regarding children and adolescents specifically emphasize organizing to lobby for direct service. The three principal NGOs that operate shelters concentrate on their own work and have not concerned themselves with the activities of the government. Several observers see this passive stance and feel the NGOs should assume a more active role:

They [the NGOs] focus on their own work.[43]

The NGOs involved in direct service lack a political component, a political

[41]Barros, personal interview.

[42]Antônio Futuro, Coordinator of the MNMMR in Rio de Janeiro, personal interview, 5 February 1993.

[43]Sonia Maria da Silva, former FUNABEM official and Consultant to UNICEF on the "Alternative Services to Street Children Project," personal interview, 23 March 1993.

interest . . . . They should exert pressure on the government.[44]

The NGOs should not concentrate so much on direct service but should be
fighting for action from the government . . . . I have never seen a concerted
act of denunciation against the state on the part of the NGOs. I would like to
see more lobbying and presentation of proposals. For example, we need this
many youth housed in this specific area, etc.[45]

Thus, a gap exists in demanding direct service from the government, and some people

believe that the NGOs should fill it by applying pressure on the appropriate city and

state agencies. The statements above refer to the limited role of the NGOs in

supplying direct service and the need for government action.

Unless the city or state government makes an effort to expand service, youth

will remain living on the street, subject to their daily fare of abuse, violence,

exploitation, and degradation. Furthermore, some of them will continue and others

will start attempting to survive through means, such as armed assault, that endangers

not only their own lives, but also the lives of other people. This chapter examines the

options of how government can address the issue of direct service to street youth,

explains why it can and should expand the use of shelters, and identifies limitations to

actually accomplishing it.

How to Act?

The official stance exhibited by the Municipal Office of Social Development

(SMDS) under the new administration of Mayor Cesar Maia, who assumed office in

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[44]Barros, personal interview.

[45]Estela Scheinwar, Sociologist at the Center of Studies of CBIA, personal interview, 26 February 1993.

January of 1993, emphasizes investment in preventative projects as opposed to curative ones. One of the most effective arguments against curative measures such as shelters, or institutions, is that they address the problem, street youth, only after it exists but do not provide means to prevent it from occurring in the first place. Critics argue that money is better spent in stopping the problem from ever starting. According to a representative at SMDS, "If you don't work with the family, you don't resolve the problem. This needs to be demystified." The SMDS says that it prefers to direct funds toward day-care centers, schools, and community aid centers.

Ideally, families in difficult circumstances might benefit from preventative mechanisms which allow them to remain together. Day care centers and schools that attend to and feed youth during the day, or part of it, can relieve some of the pressure placed on the youth by their families to bring home an income. In the large families of the poorer classes, the income of the youth can be a sizeable proportion of the family budget, especially if the father is absent or unemployed. Even if a youth is only gaining between 1/2 and 1 1/2 minimum salaries, he or she is more or less paying for his or her own sustenance in a family where the monthly income per capita is less than or equal to 1/2 of a minimum salary. Thus, schools need to feed very poor youth in order to account for the "opportunity cost" of not working.

The preventative argument appears sound, but at least two ideas challenge it. First, just providing a school where the child can eat does not ensure the cohesion of the family. Poverty seems to be a necessary but not determining factor in the formation of street youth, and many poor families manage to keep their children (see

Appendix 2; FLACSO/UNICEF 1991). Second, and even more damaging to the

preventative argument is that most of the street youth come from the poorer cities of

the Baixada in the metropolitan periphery. The city of Rio could direct money toward

preventative efforts within its municipal boundaries indefinitely without confronting

the main source of the problem.[46] In order to work properly, the preventative efforts

need to be located in the communities from which the street youth originate.

But an administration that does not like the idea of shelters, for whatever

reason, can say that it would rather invest in preventative programs, thus providing an

excuse for not confronting the issue of direct service to street youth. Since

preventative programs represent an infinite "sink" for investment, the Mayor's Office

can essentially ignore curative programs such as shelters. Moreover, no studies exist

regarding the effects on the "formation" of street youth of the preventative programs,

such as schools that serve lunches, using as controls ones that do not.[47] Finally,

because the problem addressed here is youth already living on the street, preventative

efforts will have no effect on it. Investment in preventative programs would be an

essential part of a strategy over the long run, but a solution is necessary for a

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[46]A plan for a system of shelters, produced by the Mayor's Cabinet of Marcello Alencar and released in April 1992, mentions this issue: "The peripheral cities - Duque de Caxias, São João de Meriti, Nilópolis, Nova Iguaçu, São Gonçalo, and Niterói - through their explosive growth and absence of basic urban and social infrastructure, transfer a good part of the misery and problems of their populations to the City of Rio de Janeiro. Thus, we consider that, to obtain success with the Children's Republic Project (*Projeto República das Crianças*), its simultaneous extension to the six municipalities mentioned above is necessary, in a combined action of the government of the Metropolitan Region of the State of Rio de Janeiro." (*Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro* 1992, 2,3) Although discussing a curative project, this idea is even more relevant for preventative ones.

[47]The schools in peripheral areas are often of such low quality that the children rarely stay in them beyond the first few grades (Alves 1991; Leite 1991).

population in drastic need of service now and will continue to be necessary even with preventative programs in place.

The available curative service options for these youth are shelters and institutions. As evident in the last chapter, shelters follow principles that help them deflect criticism that researchers directed at institutions. They care for small groups of youth, integrate them into the community, and use non-violent methods. Thus, in principle and in practice, they may provide for more effective personal development of the youth, although nobody has actually defined and measured this. But closed institutions are still necessary under the Statute as a means of care only for repeat or serious juvenile offenders. Hopefully, with the transfer of the institutions to other administrative entities, care will improve. But, unless the Statute were changed, shelters are the only option that provides comprehensive services for those youth still living on the street. The next section explains why the government is an appropriate actor to develop a network of shelters.

From Micro to Macro

Several authors heralded the NGOs, which proliferated during the 1980s, as an alternative to the government in providing direct services for street youth (Cavalcanti et al. 1988; UNICEF 1987).[48] Jorge Barros, sociologist for CEAP, believes that, "The government feels some of the pressure for direct service [to street youth] taken

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[48]See, also, Fernandes 1988 and Landim 1988 for a discussion of the role of NGOs, not limited to the area of children and adolescents.

off by the NGOs dealing with this problem."[49] However, the NGOs do not have the resources to provide services effectively on a larger scale. Although the amounts of money which the different NGOs secure and allocate to their shelter projects vary, most of the shelters operate on a very low budget. Opening new shelters is a slow and difficult endeavor and often requires a large initial investment of money.[50] Furthermore, the NGOs do not view themselves as a substitute for the action of the state: "Non-governmental actors do not propose [to] -- and could not -- totally substitute the state, but perform a crucial role in the face of inefficient and insufficient government attention to the multiple dimensions of the street children problem (Valladares and Impelizieri 1992, 39)."

The NGOs have acted in a vanguard, or pioneer, role in the sense of defining an underserved population, street youth, and catering service to them through a new method, the shelter.[51] They have, independently of each other, put a new idea into practice. If it were a priority, the city, through the SMDS, could adopt and expand the use of shelters, creating a network of them in the city.[52] The "state" represents a way to transform the "micro into the macro" in this type of project (Landim 1988, 47).

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[49]Barros, personal interview.

[50]Many of the NGOs could not have opened shelters without the help of outside actors. For example, one NGO was given the use of a house by CBIA. Another one received the use of a large house with low rent from an owner who was sympathetic to its cause.

[51]Lícia Prado Valladares and Flávia Impelizieri, researchers for IUPERJ, personal interview, 2 March 1993.

[52]See Kramer (1981) for a discussion of the traditional view of the NGOs as "trailblazers" in developing services. He describes several reasons why the government may not adopt and expand innovative programs originated by NGOs which include "inappropriate size, unacceptable values, low priority, and lack of administrative, fiscal, and political feasibility (192)."

Although the NGOs have generally perceived this as a "type of heresy" (ibid.), many would like the state to help solve the problem in Rio. One NGO worker expressed this idea quite simply, "We don't have conditions to address the problem of street youth in the whole city. We are happy when someone else does good work *with* children, not *for* or *through* them, whatever the initiative."

The opening and operation of shelters by the city or state government, combined with the access of NGOs to more government resources with the establishment of accountability mechanisms, holds the promise of improved shelter performance. Different levels of accessibility to funds results in a range in the physical quality of current NGO projects (Landim 1988; Valladares and Impelizieri 1992).[53] With more funds evenly distributed among a network of shelters, variation in physical quality and the quality of services would be less of a concern.

Through a shelter system, the government could extend service to more of those who desire it. Most of the existing shelters operate at full capacity and cannot receive more youth without compromising the quality of service as a result of overcrowding. As seen in the previous chapter, a result of this is "discrimination in the choice of youth, by the single shelter of the city government as much as in those operated by the NGOs."[54] Clearly, shelter services do not reach all youth that need them, especially those more ingrained in street life.

Consideration of the involvement of city or state government is not so quixotic,

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[53]Silva, personal interview.

[54]Marra, personal interview.

given the fact that they both opened one shelter each and have worked on plans for a network of shelters.[55] The next section examines why the existing government shelters are politically vulnerable and why the government may not use shelters more extensively in the future.

The Political Context of Expanding Shelters

The history of the city's involvement with plans for shelters shows change corresponding to different political administrations. The state shelter does not receive unanimous support from the State Office of Social Development (*Coordenoria Estadual de Desenvolvimento Social*, CEDS). Both cases indicate that there is a largely political debate underlying government decisions to use shelters. This section briefly examines these cases and their implications for future use of shelters by the government.

The opinion of the city government on shelters has varied under several different administrations. In November of 1986, the administration of Mayor Roberto Saturnino Braga (1985-88), through the Municipal Secretary of Planning, produced a plan for seven shelters on plots of land owned by the city (*Prefeitura Municipal do Rio de Janeiro* 1986). The administration never constructed the shelters, but in May of 1991, the Mayor's Cabinet of Marcello Alencar (1981-84; 1989-92) resurrected an elaborated version of the plan, complete with a $3.7 million sports and education

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[55]Also, other city and state governments in Brazil have used shelters: under its progressive mayor Jaime Lerner, the city of Curitiba opened a system of shelters (Curitiba Municipal Authority et al. 1992), and the state Secretary of the Minor in São Paulo created fourteen shelters in the city of São Paulo and one in the nearby city of Campinas (*Secretaria do Menor* 1992).

complex (*Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro* 1991). Finally, in April of 1992, a

scaled-down plan, developed with the help of NGO street and shelter educators,

combined the efforts of state and city teams, both of which had been working on

similar but separate plans (*Prefeitura da Cidade do Rio de Janeiro* 1992). This

endeavor resulted in the opening of only one shelter in June of 1992. The official

stance of Mayor Cesar Maia, who assumed office in January of 1993, is against

shelters, and the one shelter started under his predecessor faces financial

uncertainty.[56]

This case of the city government demonstrates the vulnerability of social

programs to political change, which some argue is especially acute in Brazil:

> Social policies in Brazil are subordinated to clientelistic objectives . . . . They
> are marked by an accentuated lack of continuity. In some countries, political
> changes do not affect so profoundly the continuity of public administration as
> in Brazil, where even a primary school teacher of the interior can lose his or
> her job because of changes in the government . . . . (NGO Director quoted in
> Landim 1988, 46.)

The recently elected mayor appointed a new president for the city foundation that

funded the shelter. This president then terminated the legal affiliation of the shelter

with the foundation.[57] Thus, the change of the mayor threatens the existence of the

shelter and at least ended the initial plan for more of them.

The state shelter houses street girls, that small portion (see Appendix 2) of the

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[56]Penélope Duarte dos Santos, Maria Regina Erich Leemos, Paulo Roberto dos Santos, Coordinators and Administrators of the República das Crianças, personal interview, 8 March 1993.

[57]Maria do Amparo de Araújo Cunha, Director of the Department of Support to Children and Adolescents of the SMDS, personal interview, 25 March 1993; Professor Sérgio Nogueira Lopes, President of the *Fundação Municipal Lar Escola Francisco de Paula*, personal interview, 20 March 1993.

street population that is especially stigmatized. According to a social worker at the shelter, they suffer three types of stigma: "First, most of them are black. Second, they are women. Third, they are black, women, and *on the street.*" An inevitable association is that they are involved in prostitution to survive (see CEAP 1993). Most of them are adolescents (several are age seventeen and eighteen) who have lived on the streets for several years. Two or three of them have babies and at least one is pregnant. The girls are familiar with a life of abuse on the streets and some exhibit aggressive behavior in the shelter. Social workers stated that it took months for the girls to adapt to shelter life and begin meeting goals, such as washing their clothes or caring for themselves hygienically, that the staff held for them. The staff valued the importance of small changes and realized that a long time would be necessary to reach other goals, like the girls' consistent attendance at school so they could read and write; however, officials who want "big" results rapidly dismiss the shelter work as insignificant.

Although established directly by the wife of state governor Leonel Brizola, the state shelter engenders resistance from some members of the CEDS. It opened only a year ago but is already struggling to maintain its political support. This results from the fact that there is no uniformly accepted statement on what the CEDS wants from the shelter. Thus, informal evaluative visits disappoint people unfamiliar with or insensitive to the shelter environment.

What is known about the "political meaning" of street youth and shelters? Public opinion polls in the mid-1980s revealed that "abandoned minors" were a major

concern of the population of Rio, ranking even above unemployment (quoted in Sanders 1987, 6), but while public opinion may be important, its influence on political action remains beyond the scope of this study. No advocacy groups apply strong pressure on the government to use shelters. Furthermore, shelters could even represent a political liability, because of community resistance, to an administration attempting to place them throughout the city. International concern regarding street youth has centered on violence and human rights abuses (Amnesty International 1990), generates response mainly at the federal level of government (see Ministry of Justice 1992), and largely neglects the issue of direct service at the local level. Even though shelters try to avoid problems in the care of youth associated with closed institutions, this in itself is not enough to secure their political support. The lack of comparative evaluation of shelters with institutions and well-defined evaluation based on pre-determined indicators makes it easy for politicians to dismiss shelters. Since shelters do not garner support on their own merit, politicians may not want to become involved in their use unless constituency groups strongly advocate them.

Conclusion

Shelters are one practical option in providing expanded service to a population in great need, given that institutions now play a limited role. NGOs have been pioneers in establishing shelters, but their limited access to capital limits their ability to open more of them on a large scale (Valladares and Impelizieri 1992). The state and local governments have the capability to found a network of shelters while the

NGOs do not. The opening of shelters by both levels of government indicates that the possibility of expansion exists; however, the shelters are controversial and do not hold widespread support. Furthermore, government shelters are very vulnerable to political change and opinions developed without pre-defined goals. The political importance of street youth and shelters seems small. Unless the government feels more pressure, the NGOs will continue in the role at which they have proved particularly adept, assisting an extremely marginalized population that government is uncommitted, unable, or hesitant to serve. While NGOs may extend service incrementally, a larger network of shelters appears unlikely in the near future.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Welfare services for poor youth in Brazil changed radically over the past decade. The psycho-social literature regarding the ill effects of institutions on the youth who lived in them was one of the factors contributing to the development of a new body of law, the 1990 Statute of the Child and Adolescent (the Statute), regarding the rights of youth and means of caring for them. The Statute prohibits the national child welfare agency (CBIA), formerly FUNABEM, from implementing direct care, and it is attempting to pass the institutions previously maintained by FUNABEM to agencies within the state and city and to NGOs. Also, the Statute now limits the use of closed institutions for juvenile offenders only. CBIA has placed responsibility on each state to reform its child welfare agency -- FEBEM (FEEM in the case of Rio de Janeiro) -- and on the municipalities and NGOs to develop programs of direct assistance. Given this climate of change, this thesis explores the shelter, the most comprehensive type of service offered to street youth. The thesis outlines which problems of the institutions the shelters avoid and what new challenges they encounter. It also investigates the possibility of more extensive government use of shelters.

The Institutions

The literature promoting deinstitutionalization in Brazil revealed that many youth living in institutions felt they were good because they provided for the basic,

unmet needs of the youth; however, institutions prejudiced the development of the youth in various ways. Treatment of large groups of youth and the emphasis on equality stifled creation of independence and a sense of self (Altoé 1990b; Campos 1984). The distant location of institutions from the youth's communities of origin often resulted in the abandonment of the youth by their families, and the frequent transfer of youth between government institutions broke established relationships. Staff having daily contact with the youth, including the inspectors, often concentrated on controlling the youth by using authoritarian methods and violence. The mixing of youth of various ages and backgrounds created conflict and situations conducive to abuse.

The institutions satisfied the physical needs of the youth without giving them responsibility and sufficient educational and professional preparation. Quality of education varied, but even in FUNABEM's "model" institutional school, educational materials were of poor quality and the teachers, often of higher socio-economic standing, treated youth poorly and seemed to work primarily just to gain their salary (Campos 1984). Youth often took more interest in the professionalization workshops; however, the skills learned in them had little relevance for their future employment. Social workers kept few records on the activity of the "alumni" after their departure at age eighteen, but authors indicate that cases of "success" were rare and that many alumni continued their lives in other institutional formats, mainly prison (Altoé 1990b).

As evident not only in practice, but also in theory, the institutional model

aimed at social control of poor and delinquent minors through social "reintegration" based on the use of authority, privation of liberty, and separation from society. Bazílio (1985), in an analysis of documents produced by FUNABEM, concluded that between 1965 and 1978, the Foundation "rapidly inserted itself in the authoritarian logic of National Security held by the [military] State (72)" and developed by the Superior School of War, that "Institute of High Studies responsible for the planning and administration of National Security (34)."

The Shelters

The thirteen shelters in Rio de Janeiro reflect a different approach in working with poor youth. The NGOs operating shelters adhere to principles, expressed in the Statute, designed to prevent problems encountered in institutional care. Social workers initially attempt to return youth to their families, and the ones who cannot return remain in the shelters. The small size of the shelters allows personalized care and more flexibility in working with different youth. Shelters maintain an open-door policy and a set of rules for the youth that live in them. This creates a system of choice in which only those youth who are willing to accept the rules move into the shelter. The staff of some shelters recruit, from the street or larger NGO programs that feed and develop activities with street youth, those youth who they feel will adapt to shelter life. The staff members do not control and repress the youth with authoritarian methods, but rather establish relationships of friendship, trust, and mutual respect with them. The educators "use" this type of relationship to advance the social

development of the youth, who often want to gain the support and approval of an adult which they lacked on the street and which the educator offers. The shelter workers emphasize the integration of the youth into the community by attempting to place them in community schools and employment.

The staff of shelters also face challenges in their work. Since the youth come straight off the street, changing their behavior from established patterns does not always occur as rapidly as the staff hopes. The shelter youth have more access to the street and the culture of the youth still living there. Unfortunately, some of the youth encounter various difficulties in both school and work, ranging from their lack of experience in these environments to discrimination on the part of teachers and employers. Social workers indicate that employment positions are difficult to locate, but ironically, this prepares the youth for the reality of underemployment that they may face upon leaving the shelter. Even though NGOs have creatively sought different employment and training positions for the youth ranging from internships in government agencies to formal positions in hotels, they must try to expand these opportunities to more of the shelter youth and improve their performance. Also, because the founding organizations located many of the shelters in residential and business areas, the staff must promote its work with initially skeptical and alarmed neighbors.

In spite of these difficulties, several positive ideas characterize shelters: identity, choice, respect, and integration. The shelters give the youth an option, a chance, and if they accept it, they must also bear a certain amount of responsibility.

In this sense the shelters represent a legitimate system of authority for the youth that live in them, one which they have opted to accept. If they do not want to enter this system, no one forces them to do so. Also, as one house coordinator told me, the shelters do not really expel youth. If they cannot adjust to the environment, then they leave.

The current level of direct service provision in Rio leaves many youth on the streets. Preventative programs do not reach much of the poor population in the extremely poor, peripheral cities of the Baixada, and they do not address the existing problem of youth living on the street. Current law intends shelters and institutions to perform complementary roles. Closed institutions handle serious juvenile offenders while shelters work with those youth from the street who social workers cannot return to their families. But the NGOs lack resources to open new shelters on a large scale. They work incrementally, opening new shelters as funds become available or when they access houses with low rent provided by individuals disposed to their work. The city and state government, upon which the Statute places responsibility to develop programs of direct assistance, both possess the ability to use shelters more extensively as a service tool.

Despite the opening of shelters by both levels of government and the fact that shelters provide a positive environment for the youth, their expanded use by government depends upon complex political and economic factors. The government shelters and previous plans to extend service show susceptibility to political change and opinions based on premature, informal evaluation. In the absence of demands

aimed at politicians and government agency staff, these actors find it easy to ignore the "voiceless" population of street youth.

Future Research

Comparative evaluation would be necessary in order to definitively state that shelters "do a better job" working with youth than institutions did; however, defining a variable and measuring it with quantitative data from institutions and shelters is difficult, due to their lack of records. Moreover, the population in institutions differed from that in shelters, making comparison even more complicated. Institutions housed poor youth with and without families, juvenile offenders, youth interned at birth or at a very young age, as well as youth directly off the street. In contrast, shelters reach out to one group of youth -- those who usually spent the early years of their lives with their parent(s) but then went to the streets. Given the difficult context of comparison, this thesis showed how shelters and institutions differ and suggested which ideas and methods of shelters offer benefits.

But other types of formal evaluation should still occur so that officials can make informed decisions regarding shelters.[58] First, evaluators need to clearly identify program goals in order to define success. In an article on policy and program evaluation, Salamon (1979) shows the divergence in objectives held by different actors -- in his example, the United States Congress and specialized agency staff -- in regards

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[58]See UNICEF (1990) for suggestions on the evaluation of projects assisting working and street children.

to a social program. Once the actors decide on the goals of the program, a secondary step is to measure chosen indicators of success.

Despite the need for evaluation, its time has possibly not yet arrived for the city and state shelters and others founded only recently. Salamon warns that premature evaluation underestimates some of the more profound effects of certain programs:

> Somewhat different is the situation where a program seeks to alter the values or personalities of participants. In such programs the immediate impact may be minimal, but latent effects may be present that emerge forcefully once the program's message sinks in. (180)

Since influencing the behavior of youth from the streets is a slow process, it may take several years before the staff reaches the pre-determined level of "success" with the youth. However, shelter workers and researchers should begin planning now in order to develop stronger arguments, based on evaluation, in favor of the shelter service format.[59]

The opening of more shelters by the government in Rio depends not only on information to aid decision-making, but also on pressures that the government feels to address the issue of street youth and service provision. Research into the following questions would help construct a better understanding of what shapes the current hesitance of government in expanding the use of shelters: How does public opinion and the opinion of constituency groups affect political action? Why do the NGOs not

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[59]One group of researchers is currently considering how to determine which NGO programs involving poor and street youth are most successful (Valladares and Impelizieri, personal interview). This effort follows their initial research that catalogued the various NGO programs operating in the city of Rio de Janeiro (1992).

lobby the government to invest more in shelters? During the past decade, how have different administrations handled the issues? Also, comparative research between cities might reveal factors as to why the government in Rio has not used shelters extensively while those in Curitiba (city) and São Paulo (state) have.

Despite the hope that the rise of NGO efforts during the 1980s would alleviate some of the need for service, the problem of youth living on the streets persists. Shelters, in both a practical and legal sense, represent the future of service provision for the underserved population of street youth. Although institutions still care for juvenile offenders, this thesis shows that in practice, shelters are a preferable type of service for those youth that can adapt to them. In order to improve and expand the shelter as a means of service, further research is necessary to empower the NGOs in a lobbying role and to allow officials to make informed decisions.

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APPENDIX 1

Inventory of Shelters in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

#	Shelter Name	Affiliation	Location		Date Shelter Founded	Youth			
			Address & Neighborhood	City Zone		No. in Shelter	Ages	Sex M	F
1	Albergue do 6° Batahão de Policia Milítar	Centro de Assistencia ao Menor Nossa Senhora da Acolhida	Rua Baráo Mesquita, 164 — Tijuca	North Zone	1986	8	11-17	8	—
2	Casa das Meninas [1]	Coordenadoria Estadual de Desenvolvimento Social - State	Rua Joaquim Palhares, at Rua João Paulo II — Cidade Nova	Center	May 1992	21	adole-scents	—	21
3	Casa de Acolhida de Campinho	Pastoral do Menor	Rua Comendador Pinto, N° 2 — Campinho	West Zone	May 1992	44	7-18	NA	NA
4	Casa de Acolhida do Catete [2]	Pastoral do Menor	Rua do Catete, 195 — Glória	Center	March 1986	19	7-17	19	—
5	Casa de Acolhida Noturna	Associação Beneficente São Martinho	Rua Silvio Romero, 49 — Centro	Center	May 1992	26	6-12 (14)	26	—
6	Casa e Compania	Cruzada do Menor	Rua Saint Romain, 226 — Copacabana	South Zone	Dec 1991	25	adole-scents	22	3
7	Casa Irmão Sol	Pastoral do Menor	Rua do Sanatório, 310/A — Madureira	North Zone	June 1987	29	NA	29	—
8	Casa Meu Lar do Movimento Fé e Amor	Cruzada do Menor and Pastoral do Menor	Rua do Senado, 306 — Centro	Center	Sept 1987	15	adole-scents	14	1
9	Casa Residencia Masculina/ Feminina	Associação Beneficente São Martinho	Rua Santo Amaro, 116 — Glória	Center	March 1992	17	14-18	9	8
10	Casa São Domingo Sávio [3]	Pastoral Penal — Sociedade São Dimas	Rua Conselheiro Ferraz, 54— Lins de Vasconcelos	North Zone	Jan 1991	17	12-18	9	8
11	Refúgio de Meninos e Meninas de Rua - REMER	independent, with tenuous link to Pastoral do Menor	Rua da América, 60— Santo Cristo	Center	June 1988	11	6-18	3	8
12	República	Cruzada do Menor	Rua do Resende, 12 — Centro	Center	March 1993	15	adole-scents	NA	NA
13	República das Crianças	Prefeitura do Município (da Cidade do Rio) SMDS - City	Rua Desembargador Isidro, 48 — Tijuca	North Zone	June 1992	36	NA	NA	NA

SOURCES: Personal interviews with NGO and shelter staff; project documents and annual statements of NGOs; Valladares and Impelizieri 1992.

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[1] This shelter houses street girls. Most of them do not yet attend school, and during the day, they eat lunch and participate in recreational activities at a center located on Rua São Salvador in Laranjeiras.

[2] The *Pastoral do Menor* transferred the team and youth that were living in this shelter to the *Casa de Campinho* when it opened in 1992. The *Pastoral* reformed the physical structure of the shelter and reopened it on July 23, 1992. The shelter quickly filled with a new group of youth from the street.

[3] This shelter cares for juvenile infractors.

APPENDIX 2

What Have Researchers Revealed about Street Youth in Rio and Brazil?

Street youth have constantly represented a challenge to those interested in bringing them off the street, including the state and private social-service providers. As early as the 1730s the Catholic Church constructed an establishment in Rio to accommodate orphans and abandoned children (Pereira 1992). The perceived needs of service in the past, such as education and professionalization, are the same as those today. For example, a shelter for orphans inaugurated in 1875 offered primary education and professional training in tailoring and shoe-making (Pereira 1992, 64). Comparable contemporary projects include clothes-making courses and shoe-shine cooperatives.

The issue of poor youth has deep historical roots and society recognized it as a serious social problem in the late 1970s and the 1980s. At this time there was an unprecedented explosion in literature and action. An analysis of the production of literature on the topic from 1960 through 1987 showed that it increased exponentially over the period (Alvim and Valladares 1988). Also, the number of organizations involved in the social movement surrounding poor youth grew rapidly during the 1980s. Out of a sample of 119[1] institutions offering services to children and adolescents in Rio, nearly 30% were founded between 1980 and 1987 (calculated from Rizzini and Wiik 1990, 29).

The increase in concern regarding the issue corresponds in time to the process of political democratization, or *abertura* (opening), during the early and mid-1980s and to the perception of a larger number of youth living on the streets. The first IBGE (1987) report publicized the fact that over half of the children and adolescents in Brazil belonged to families living in poverty during the early 1980s. Nobody knows the exact number of youth living on the streets of Rio, or other Brazilian cities for that matter, but a recent survey at least offers an estimate for Rio. In early 1992 a research team registered approximately 1,050 youth on the streets of the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan region at 11:00 p.m. and 797 at 4:00 a.m. (IBASE, 1992). The team was unable to count youth having access to places off of the street, such as abandoned buildings. Some authors cite the bad economic conditions in the 1980s (Chahad and Cervini 1988) and the continued growth of peripheral municipalities (Valladares and Impelizieri 1990) as prerequisites for the perceived increase in youth living and working on the street.

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[1]The authors took the sample from a total of 502 institutions, including both governmental and non-governmental institutions, identified in the municipality in 1987.

The academic documents of the late 1970s employed a new term, "street children,"[2] to describe poor youth on the streets (Ferreira 1979; see Rizzini and Rizzini 1991). The popular media quickly adopted the phrase, in part due to a UNICEF supported project (UNICEF 1987), and the Brazilians integrated it into their household vocabulary over the subsequent decade. During this time authors began using such terms in place of the denotation "minor" which had accumulated stigmatory and discriminatory connotations over the years through its use in legal contexts (Alvim and Valladares 1988; Rizzini and Rizzini 1991, 71).

The new research regarding poor youth on the street helped to characterize a population about which very little was previously known. Not every poor youth on the street is simply abandoned; the majority have a family and home to which to return. Rizzini (1986) found that 70% of three hundred youth interviewed on the streets of the central and south zones of Rio work[3] on the streets during the day and sleep at home with their families. Thus, investigators began to make the distinction between youth *on* the streets, those who work on the streets and return to their families at night (working youth), and youth *of* the street, those who work and live on the streets and keep little or no contact with their families (street youth). Lusk (1989) opts for a finer system of classification based on degree of family contact. His fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro yielded the following four categories: family-based street workers, independent street workers (family contact is breaking down), children of the streets, and children of street families.

These groups of youth have some characteristics in common. The great majority of youth on the streets, with the possible exception of children of street families, are male.[4] The age range of youth encountered in various studies is between seven and seventeen years, with a predominance of those from age ten to fourteen (70% of the sample in Rizzini 1986). No research has shown what happens to this population after adolescence; however, characteristic patterns of life on the street seem

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[2]This is a translation from the Portuguese phrase "*meninos de rua*," or literally, children of the street.

[3]Work refers almost exclusively to activities in the informal sector of the urban economy which typically include: selling small goods while walking, shining shoes, guarding and washing cars, and carrying sacks at markets. Generally, as youth lose contact with their families, they become more involved with the "culture of the street" and alternative, often illegal means of generating income such as begging, theft, armed robbery, and prostitution. Weak contacts with school are often completely broken and the use of drugs, most often shoe-glue and marijuana, becomes prevalent.

[4]Males averaged 89% of the samples in seven studies of working and street youth throughout the country (calculated from Rizzini and Rizzini 1991, 77). The relative lack of girls on the streets could result from a desire by the parent(s) to keep them in the home for domestic work or to prevent prostitution, one of the major ways in which they can earn money (ibid.; CEAP, 1993). Barros and Mendonça (1991) mention that the same factors help explain higher rates of female attendance in school and lower participation in the work market.

to change as the youth matures.[5] Most of the youth are black or mulatto.[6] For example, in Rizzini's (1986) research, only 28% of the sample was white.

The fact that any of these youth are on the street attempting to gain money to aid their families or sustain themselves independently is a direct corollary to the poverty in which they live (see Barros and Santos 1991). Although the southeast region of Brazil, which includes the states of Espírito Santo, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo, is the wealthiest and most industrialized in the country, in 1990, 38.5% of its population under the age of eighteen pertained to families whose monthly per capita income rested at or below one-half minimum salary, the defined poverty line in this case (IBGE 1992). The metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro alone harbors approximately 2.25 million persons living in poverty, representing one-quarter of the entire metropolitan poverty in Brazil (Silva 1989 quoted in Valladares and Impelizieri 1990). Also, the inequality in the distribution of income is very high in the state of Rio de Janeiro; the Gini coefficient in 1989 was about 0.66 (SECPLAN 1990/91).

The "clientele" of the shelters consists almost entirely of street youth as opposed to working youth. In Rio, they come mainly from the Baixada Fluminense,[7] the region north of the city boundaries which contains several sprawling, poor cities. In a study in which researchers interviewed 235 children in twenty-one different programs throughout the city (Carvalho et al. 1988), the vast majority of the seventy street children indicated their place of origin as the Baixada (74.3%), followed by the poor "suburbs" (14.3%), the favelas[8] of the center and south zone (4.3%), and other parts of the state or country (7.1%). For the remaining 165 poor children, the corresponding percentages were: Baixada, 16.4%; suburbs, 56.4%; center and south

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[5]Probably a large portion of the "hard-core" street youth end up in jail or are killed. See Amnesty International 1990, CEAP 1988, and Dimenstein 1991 for information regarding the murder of street youth by "death squads." Also, working youth realize they cannot continue in some of their former activities like being an ambulatory shoe-shine boy. Many integrate more fully into the informal sector economy in such diverse activities as camelos (sidewalk sellers of different goods), car-washers, and odd laborers.

[6]Authors inevitably group blacks and mulattos together, reflecting the reality that skin color relates to socio-economic standing. Non-whites suffer on a number of variables such as income and access to formal employment. See, for example, Barros and Santos (1991) regarding the nature of the relationship between employment and skin color.

[7]Street youth and shelter workers with whom I spoke overwhelmingly gave this response.

[8]Favela is the Brazilian term that refers to squatter settlements usually built on illegally occupied land. The housing is most often self-built by the resident with materials at hand or with bricks bought at a supply store. IPLAN-RIO (1992) estimates that in 1991 almost 20% of the 5.5 million inhabitants of the city of Rio de Janeiro lived in favelas.

zones, 26.1%; other, 1.1%. The youth come to the wealthy areas of the city because of perceptions about gaining money and attractions such as urban activity and the beach (see Vogel and Mello 1991).

It is not surprising that many street youth originate in the Baixada because there is such a large pool of poor people living there. In the Rio de Janeiro metropolitan region, the peripheral municipalities grew at a rate double that of the core municipality from 1970 to 1980 (Valladares and Impelizieri 1990), absorbing poor migrants from rural areas and other parts of the country. The periphery is dramatically underserved with urban infrastructure. For example, in 1980 while 92.8% of the dwellings in the core municipality received running water, the corresponding figure for the metropolitan periphery was 53.6% (ibid.).

However, this scenario of poverty alone cannot explain the existence of street youth. Many poor youth who work on the streets are able to preserve links with their families while others are not. The first investigation to address this difference in detail (FLACSO/UNICEF 1991) compared a group of street minors to four distinct groups of working minors in order to identify causal mechanisms in the break with the family. The quality of interaction among family members proved to be a key factor in determining whether or not the youth traded life with the family for life on the streets. In the families of street minors, the fathers exhibited higher rates of unemployment and illiteracy, and the mothers were more often the primary economic providers. The street minors mentioned their fathers less frequently as someone they had trusted, with whom they could have talked, and who would have helped them before they had left for the streets. They also claimed to be victims of corporal punishment at a much higher rate. The Carvalho (1988) study in Rio found that differences also existed between the structures of the families of street children and poor children: whereas 76.4% of the poor children said they had both a mother and father, 55.7% of the street children claimed to have only a mother. This indicates essentially the same factor as does the FLACSO/UNICEF research in the "creation" of the street youth: the absence of a strong father figure, corresponding to an increased need for the mother and her children to work and the subsequent deterioration of their relationship.

APPENDIX 3

The Cost of Care in Shelters

Some simple calculations indicate that shelters may cost less to operate in comparison to government institutions. For example, one shelter with eleven youth and six workers has a monthly operating budget of $1,200, and the SMDS pays for the food. Another shelter cares for nineteen youth and has a total staff of eleven, and its monthly budget is $4,165. The NGOs had already bought both structures. Thus, in these two shelters, the cost to maintain each youth ranged from about $110.00 to twice that, $220.00, per month. Since the monthly minimum salary (MS) is currently about $63.00,[9] it costs between 1.7 and 2.4 MSs for each youth in the shelter. This is less expensive than keeping the youth in institutions, which FEEM (1985) estimated to cost at least three MSs per month. Moreover, Sanders (1987) claims that the FUNABEM institutions spent up to seven MSs per capita.

There are several reasons why one should not assume that shelters are necessarily less expensive based on this small amount of data. First, NGOs operate the two shelters used in the example, and the budgets of these shelters are very small. They are likely below the average cost per capita for all thirteen shelters in Rio. Second, the figures for the costs in the institutions come from documents that do not clearly show how the authors obtained them. Although people working in the area of service provision to poor youth commonly state that government institutions were expensive because of a weighty administrative bureaucracy, little analysis exists to support this assertion. Finally, one of the strongest logical arguments counter to the lower cost of shelters is that service *en masse* -- as practiced in the institutions -- can save money through economies of scale. Clearly, only further research and analysis of cost data can resolve the question.

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[9] I made these "back of the envelope" calculations from minimum salary and exchange information provided daily in the *Jornal do Brasil.*