OUR MOSQUES ARE US: REWRITING NATIONAL HISTORY OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA THROUGH RELIGIOUS ARCHITECTURE

By

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Submitted to the Department of Architecture in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Architecture: History and Theory of Art at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines how Bosnian Muslims construct their identity through the lens of rebuilt or newly built mosques following the systematic destruction of religious architecture during the 1992-1995 War. The stylistic diversity of contemporary mosques in the region, I argue, reflects competing visions of how contemporary Bosnia should deal with its own history of coexistence and war. By examining different identity formation processes on three scales (the building process, the regional, and the global scale), the dissertation argues that, aside from its religious functions, the contemporary mosque has become the primary locus where the emerging Bosniak nation can visually and symbolically shape and express its visions of itself.

I begin by outlining how the cultural and political history of Bosnian Muslims has been "written" and "rewritten" through religious architecture since the fifteenth century. I then investigate how during the war of the 1990s the nationalist extremists instrumentalized religious architecture to facilitate the realization of their expansionist projects. While all ethno-national groups in Bosnia experienced significant war losses, Bosnian Muslims suffered the greatest human and architectural casualties. I argue that the extent and the genocidal nature of war violence against them has transformed the meaning of the mosque from that of a place of worship and of a signifier of religious-ethnic identity to that of the ethnic body of the Bosniak nation. The notion that the mosque stands in for the human body was internalized by Bosnian Muslims in the form of two novel and programmatically delineated mosque genres defined here as the Inat Mosque and the Memorial Mosque. The first results from identity construction in response to the national myths and territorial claims of the Serbs and Croats, while the second represents identity creation that is linked to the community’s own internal processes of commemoration. These regional negotiations of identity are challenged by two competing global imperial ideologies introduced to Bosnia by the Saudi and Turkish donors and manifest in monumental mosques they finance. As local builders compete with these supra-national Islamic networks, contemporary mosque architecture in Bosnia has become a site of negotiation and frictions between global and local interests. Throughout, the analysis highlights the significance of ethnic symbols, long-term cultural factors, and global cultural flows in the creation of contemporary nations.

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This dissertation is dedicated to the victims of the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia.
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INTRODUCTION

Pitao jednom tako jednoga vrlj pitac neki:  
A kto je ta sta je ta da prostis':  
Gdje li je ta  
Odakle je  
Kuda je ta  
Bosna  
Rekti

Once upon a time a worthy questioner asked:  
Forgive me who is and what sir  
Where is  
Whence and  
Whither sir  
Prithee sir  
Is this  
Bosnia

A zapitani odgovor njemu hitan tad dade:  
Bosna da prostis jedna zemlja imade  
I posna i bosa da prostiš  
I hladna i gladna  
I k tomu još  
Da prostiš  
Prkosna Od sna

The questioned swiftly replied in this wise:  
Forgive me there once was a land sir called  
Bosnia  
A fasting a frosty a  
Footsore a drossy a  
Land forgive me  
That wakes from sleep sir  
With a  
Defiant  
Sneer

— Mak Dizdar, Zapis o Zemlji [A Text about Land], 1966

This dissertation examines the new era of mosque building in post-socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina following the 1992-1995 war. In this period, the contemporary mosque, in all its formal variety, articulated through the vagaries of a rich and often tragic local history, was taken up by Bosnian Muslims as an instrument for exploring what it could mean for them, after being singled out for massacres and driven from their homes during the war, to be Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslim as a national identity) and Muslims in the religious sense, living as fellow citizens with some of the same people who had formerly attacked them. This question of identity was bound up with the Bosnian Islamic architectural and cultural heritage, which had been intentionally targeted for destruction during the war. In this dissertation, I examine the visual and architectural manifestations of this quest by analyzing certain rebuilt and new mosques erected in the politically unstable post-war context. The form of a resurgent Islamic identity is currently being negotiated in Bosnia through the architecture of mosques, I argue. Yet, unlike other periods in which identifiable styles, corresponding to the political regimes of the time (such as Ottoman or Austro-Hungarian) can be recognized in the appearance of the mosques built in those eras, the current period offers us no stylistic or ideological coherence among the newly built mosques, but an irreducible heterogeneity divided into different schools and types of architecture. While one mosque offers a tribute to the glorious Ottoman past with its double minarets, another reaches back to local traditions with its simplicity; the marble walls of yet another celebrate the pan-Islamic vision of its Saudi donors (Fig. 0.1). This diversity is less the effect of a tolerant pluralism than evidence of the strains of competing visions of how contemporary Bosnia should deal with its own history of coexistence, as the religious and national identities and loyalties of Bosnian Muslims in the post-war era remain in a state of flux.

2 From now on Bosnia and Herzegovina will usually be referred to in short form as Bosnia.
Thus, the hypothesis with which I began this dissertation is that, besides its religious functions, the Bosnian contemporary mosque also serves as the primary place where the emerging Bosniak nation is visually and symbolically expressing its vision of itself.

This stands in contrast to most of the recent history of Bosnia, from its incorporation into the Yugoslav Kingdom at the end of World War I up to the dissolution of Yugoslavia at the end of the twentieth century, an era during which mosques were relatively neglected in favor of secular buildings. The Communist Yugoslav regime under Josip Broz Tito stopped trying to classify Bosnian Muslims as Serbs or Croats and recognized Muslim as a separate national identity in the late 1960s. During this period, Yugoslavia was a leading member of the non-aligned movement and used its Muslim minority as a means to court Islamic countries in the Third World. Domestically, however, it continued to exert political pressure on the Muslim community and actively suppressed religious identity.

Contemporary mosque architecture in Bosnia is characterized by two related processes of transition that have occurred in the years since the end of communism. The first of these was the shift from a socialist regime to a multi-party democracy — which was accompanied by a corresponding ideological shift from the program of “Brotherhood and Unity” put forward by the Communist Party to the many competing religious and/or nationalist ideologies — the politics of Balkanization — promoted by post-communist parties which defined themselves on an ethnic and national basis. This transition occurred amidst the circumstances of war in the early 1990s. The second process of transition is the shift from war to peace. After the 1995 Dayton Accord ended

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3 Alija Izetbegović, who was the leading Muslim activist in Bosnia under Communist rule (1945-1992) and who later became the first president of independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, remarked with distaste in his prison notebooks: “One of the characteristics of socialist realism: pseudo-classic architecture, and enormous monuments, tastelessly pathetic and violently symbolic.” Alija Izetbegović, Izetbegović of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Notes from Prison, 1983-1988 (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002), 56.

the war, Bosnia’s post-war society faced a range of social, political, and economic challenges: a traumatized population, major demographic shifts, a decimated cultural and economic infrastructure, exiled intelligentsia, corruption at all institutional levels, and the loss of control by a weakened and disfunctional governing establishment to the increasing influence of global religious and corporate networks in the cultural, political, and economic spheres.

These two factors underlie the central predicaments of contemporary Bosnian identity: the post-socialist state of Bosnia-Herzegovina established by the Dayton Accords provides a geographic and legal framework for a divided population that has come to hold diametrically opposed views on the relationship between the state, territory, and national identity. As a consequence, they construe different Bosnias. Scattered among the different ethnic groups — Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks — are people who still believe in the multicultural Bosnia; yet others are in thrall to nationalistic visions of an external “motherland,” be it a Greater Serbia or a Greater Croatia. Among these groups, only the Bosnian Muslims, a plurality but not the majority of the country’s population, have no other national “motherland” to look to. They are the Bosniaks of Bosnia, many of whom see themselves as the keepers of what remains of Bosnia’s pluralistic promise.

It is precisely this dialectic between a history of coexistence defended by victims of ethnic irredentism and a resurgent nationalism that frames Bosnian Muslims’ present quest for identity, their yearning to demarcate their own boundaries as well as to transcend them. The first dilemma is how to define oneself religiously, culturally, and nationally in the context of the

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5 According to “The World Factbook” by the United States Central Intelligence Agency’s estimate from July 2011, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s population counted 4,622,163 people. Ethnic groups (in 2000): Bosniak 48%, Serb 37.1%, Croat 14.3%, other 0.6%. Religious ratio: Muslim 40% (ca. 1.5 million), Orthodox Christian 31% (ca. 1.18 million), Roman Catholic 15% (ca. 570,000), Protestant 4% (ca. 152,000), other 10%. “Bosnia and Herzegovina: People,” CIA - The World Factbook, n.d., https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html (accessed on May 25, 2011).
dissolution of the Yugoslav multi-national state, the series of internecine wars that were
generally brought to a close in the mid-1990s with the Dayton Accords, and the rise of ethnic and
religious identity politics in the new democratic state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For the Bosniak
citizen, another psychological-political dilemma concerns questions of forgiveness and
reconciliation: how is one to define oneself in response to the unresolved problems of the war, its
legacy of trauma and loss, and the discrediting of the old socialist credo of "Borderhood and
Unity," which embodied a theme of coexistence that had been part of the history of the Bosnian
Muslim community for more than four centuries. This dissertation explores how these two
dilemmas have played out in the post-war era and have found a fragile symbolic balance though
the program of building and reconstructing mosques. More specifically, it examines how this
symbolic function has been encoded in the architecture. The contemporary mosque, I would like
to propose, has taken on a paradoxical mission. In its function as spiritual space and community
center, it has allowed for the social revitalization of communities in the aftermath of war and
dislocation, as well as maintaining the Bosnian tradition of coexistence. As a form of
representation, it evidences the reconstruction of a history that came to a disastrous close during
the war, and in so doing tentatively recreates Bosnian Muslims' religious, ethnic, and national
identities, which had been challenged and repressed under Yugoslavia's non-communist (1918-
1941) and communist (1945-1992) regimes. As such, the post-war mosque has also become an
agent of political resistance in the unsettled ethnic conflict. Above all, the neighborhood mosque
has re-emerged from the ashes of the 1992-95 war as the symbolic source of social and political
power on the community level, which is a historically new responsibility.
1. Background

Since the arrival of Islam in the Western Balkans in the late fourteenth century, Bosnia’s mosque architecture has evolved in a complex and multiethnic cultural topography and under the successive regimes that ruled Bosnia for 500 years. The history of Islam in Bosnia-Herzegovina began with the four centuries of Ottoman rule (1463-1878), followed by the short period of Austro-Hungarian (1878-1918) colonial rule. When Bosnia emerged from World War I it was merged into the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, soon renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1941). Under Axis occupation during the Second World War, Bosnia was briefly part of the Nazi-created "Independent State of Croatia" (1941-1945). After the end of the war, Bosnia was once again part of a larger Yugoslavia, this time as one of six federal republics under the rule of Tito’s communist party (1945-1992). Finally, in the aftermath of the collapse of Yugoslavia, it became the multinational democratic state of Bosnia-Herzegovina (since 1992), although real independence only came about after the end of the war in 1996. The meanings, functions, and nature of conflicts about mosques in Bosnia have been changing throughout the years under these different political systems, reflecting changes in the socio-political standing of their patrons and communities.

The key to understanding the Bosnian Muslims’ present search for identity — religious, national, architectural — lies, I will argue, in the complex relationship between religious architecture, territory, and the Bosnian peoples’ diverging ethno-national genesis. Bosnia has always been a meeting place of different cultures. Much of the contemporary population in Bosnia descends from the polytheistic Slavs (Slaveni), who settled the region in the
sixth and seventh centuries. In the seventh century, the region was invaded by other tribes, the Croats and the Serbs, possibly led by Iranian clans, who merged with the Slavs. Most of the population was Christianized between the seventh and the ninth centuries; Christianization continued until the early tenth century and was influenced both by Eastern (Byzantine) and Western (Roman Catholic) traditions.

Prior to the arrival of the Ottomans in the fifteenth century, medieval Bosnia was an independent kingdom, but by the time it fell to the Ottomans it was undergoing an internal collapse. In Bosnia, unlike in Catholic Western Europe or Greek Orthodox Byzantium, not one but three Christian denominations competed with each other: Roman Catholicism, alongside Eastern Orthodoxy, and a schismatic, local Bosnian Church. None of these churches enjoyed the exclusive patronage of the state or of the great noble families. Medieval Bosnia was a land of great castles and fortresses, but its Christian religious monuments were relatively few and mostly modest. The wide-scale adoption of Islam among the local Christian population paralleled the consolidation of Ottoman rule in the region from the fifteenth to sixteenth centuries, a period during which the development of cities and mosque architecture played the role of a catalyst. Contrary to contemporary nationalist myths, the process of religious conversions under Ottoman rule was multidirectional and did not involve compulsion.

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7 Croats were Christianized by the end of 9th century, although Christianity was introduced among them as early as in the 7th century by missionaries from Rome. The ancestors of Serbs gradually accepted the Eastern Orthodoxy, which was preached by Cyril and Methodius in the 9th century. Francine Friedman notes that the acceptance of Catholic versus Orthodox religious rituals in this period, mirroring the split of the Roman Empire, “exacerbated the differentiation of the Serbs from the Croats that geographical and historical factors had already initiated.” Francine Friedman, *The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation* (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1996), 9.

8 The dominant Christian confessions in the fifteenth century Bosnia before the Ottoman conquest were Bogomilism, Orthodox Christianity, and Catholicism.
During the long period of Ottoman rule from 1463 to 1878, Bosnia was treated as a largely autonomous administrative unit. During these centuries, migrations and continued conversions contributed to the mixed character of the Bosnian population. Although Muslims in Bosnia were more privileged than non-Muslims, the Ottoman state system was tolerant for its time, allowing adherents of other confessions, in this case, Orthodox Christians, Catholics, and Jews, to worship in peace. These religious groups in Bosnia were organized into empire-wide religious communities (millets) and were under some restrictions, but were able to freely practice their religion and build their places of worship. This history of coexistence is reflected in the religious architecture: mosques, churches, and synagogues built in close proximity in the cities established under Ottoman rule bear testimony to the fact that their builders lived as neighbors. Even if that coexistence was not always peaceful, the presence of this vibrant, multi-religious architecture signals the fact that the region hosted a dynamic cross-cultural fertilization during this period.

Mosque architecture in Bosnia evolved in a multicultural environment from which it inevitably borrowed and was borrowed from in turn, adding a new component to the preexisting Roman and medieval Christian cultural heritage. The majority of mosques in Bosnia were erected between the fifteenth and the seventeenth centuries, with two distinct types predominating. The first type includes major congregational mosques in urban areas consisting of a single-dome structure with a stone minaret, usually funded by local wealthy benefactors. The largest and most prominent example is the Mosque of Gazi-Husrev Beg in Sarajevo (1531), designed by Esir Ali (or Adžemi Ali), one of the main Ottoman court architects. Other significant projects of this group include the Mosque of Muslihudin Čekrekčija (1526), and the Alipašina Mosque (1561) in Sarajevo, as well as the Aladža

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9 Ottoman defters (Ottoman tax records) from the 16th century also show that the number of Catholics decreased, while Orthodox Christianity gained adherents, despite losing some followers to Islam. The schismatic Bosnian Church had ceased to exist by the time of the Ottoman conquest. Consequently, the determination of the exact ancestry of contemporary Bosnians is very difficult (ancestors of a modern Orthodox Christian might not have had the same religion). Robert J. Donia and John V. A Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 73.

10 The largest and most prominent example is the Mosque of Gazi-Husrev Beg in Sarajevo (1531), designed by Esir Ali (or Adžemi Ali), one of the main Ottoman court architects. Other significant projects of this group include the Mosque of Muslihudin Čekrekčija (1526), and the Alipašina Mosque (1561) in Sarajevo, as well as the Aladža
The design of these domed mosques reflected the general Ottoman imperial architectural design of such structures. The second category is larger, and consists of neighborhood mosques built according to regional building traditions (Fig. 0.2). These are relatively inexpensive, smaller structures with pitched wooden roofs covered with tiles (or with stone slabs in Herzegovina), and with small wooden or stone minarets; they were built primarily in rural areas by local communities. Stylistically derived from the local residential architecture, these inexpensive neighborhood mosques point at the domestication of Islam in Bosnia during the Ottoman period and are representative of the Bosnian Muslim folk culture.

While the regional ethno-religious groups shared the same territory for centuries, the spread of nationalist ideology in Europe during the nineteenth century affected each group, creating a longing for an autonomous nationality dominating some well-defined national territory. Bosnian Muslims did not follow the same linear path of transformation from an ethno-religious to a national community as did Serbs and Croats, having a very different sense about the nature of the bonds of community. However, in all three cases religion became a driver and signifier of national identities: Orthodox Christians in Bosnia increasingly came to identify themselves as ethnic Serbs, while the Bosnian Catholics moved to define themselves as ethnic Croats. Both sides courted Bosnian Muslims, seeking to make them into a part of their respective nationalist projects. The first modern cultural and political movements emerged in the

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11 Typical examples from this category are numerous mahala (neighborhood) mosques in Sarajevo, such as the Brdo Džamija and the Sheikh Magribija Mosque, or the Ferhadija in the town of Tešanj, as well as the mosque in Ustikolina, the oldest known mosque in Bosnia dating from 1448. Ibid., 121-122. For a detailed study about mosques with traditional wooden minarets see: Madžida Bećirbegović, Džamije sa drvenom munarom u Bosni i Hercegovini [Mosques with Wooden Minarets in Bosnia and Herzegovina] (Sarajevo, Veselin Masleša, 1990).

Bosnian Muslim community in the Austro-Hungarian period (1878-1914), but they remained without a clearly defined national narrative. Thus, the nationalism question was not posed for Bosnia as a whole — that is, Bosnia, unlike Serbia and Croatia, never evolved a sense of its own territory as a nation state. The result of this absence of a common national project, as Amila Buturović points out, was to turn Bosnian Serbs and Croats towards projects that were “redirected to Serbia and Croatia,” respectively, whereas Bosnian Muslims’ identity became “aspatialized.” The ensuing uncertainty about the Bosnian identity, made this identity open to rival associations and political manipulations.

After the Second World War, Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized as one of the six constituent republics of the new Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Because it had the most mixed demographic constellation, it was regarded a microcosm of Yugoslavia. Its citizens committed to at least a dual political identity: they regarded themselves first and foremost as Yugoslavs, but also as members of one of the respective ethnic groups. During the first decades of communist rule, the state ideological and police apparatus dealt harshly with expressions of religious and national identity. While Serbs and Croats in Bosnia were recognized as members of Yugoslavia’s larger national groups, Bosnian Muslims were under pressure to identify as members of one of those two groups until the 1960s. In the 1953 Yugoslav census in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mitja Velikonja explains, “88.9 percent of the population claimed to be religious. Of those, 99.5 percent of the Orthodox declared they were Serbs, 98.1 percent of Catholics said

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13 Ibid.
14 Buturović, Stone Speaker, 128.
they were Croats, and 93.7 percent of Muslim believers identified themselves as "Yugoslavs undeclared."\textsuperscript{16}

The recognition of Muslims as a distinct ethnic group was initiated in the Yugoslav census of 1961, when the "Muslim" category was accepted as an ethnic, though not as a national, category.\textsuperscript{17} The status of Bosnian Muslims as equal to that of other nationality groups in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not accepted until 1968, when their status was approved by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as that of "Muslims in the national sense."\textsuperscript{18}

During this period — and in fact through almost the entirety of the twentieth century — entire generations were not able to build mosques. During the post-World War II Yugoslav period, the region was guided by the secularist principles of the communist regime, which regarded religion as not only backward but also as a threat to the ruling party's monopoly of ideology and power and as a potential stimulus to nationalist sentiments that could break Yugoslavia apart.\textsuperscript{19} The Communist Party's stance towards religion was particularly ruthless during the first decade after the Second World War, when religious institutions of all Bosnian denominations experienced repression and censorship of their activities. The state seized all assets of the various religious communities, limited or outlawed education programs associated with religious groups, and sought to control the coordinating bodies of the religious communities. At this point in time, construction of mosques was also forbidden. In the first

\textsuperscript{16} Mitja Velikonja, \textit{Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina} (College Station TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 189.

\textsuperscript{17} In the 1961 census, 840,000 individuals declared themselves as Muslims. Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, \textit{The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention} (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 41.


\textsuperscript{19} Mitja Velikonja notes that from the 1950s to the end of communist rule in Yugoslavia, "secularization — authoritarian because of the regime and "spontaneous" because of the global process of modernization — was having an increasingly palpable impact on all vital aspects of society. However, religious affiliation remained an important aspect of social and spiritual life in Yugoslavia." Velikonja, \textit{Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 188.
years of communist rule, Islamic personal law courts (Sharia courts) were abolished (1946), the veiling of Muslim women was forbidden (1950), and most Islamic cultural and educational institutions were closed down (by 1947). Furthermore, the publication of Islamic textbooks was completely stopped until 1964.

The attitude of the Communist Party towards Bosnian Muslims was somewhat modified after the Tito-Stalin split (1948) and the Informbiro period (1948-1955), during which Yugoslavia was officially in a state of conflict with the Soviet Union. It should be considered that Socialist Yugoslavia was not a part of the Eastern Bloc; it existed as a European anomaly during the Cold War, where it received aid from both sides. In 1956, Yugoslavia became one of the founding member-countries of the Non-Aligned Movement — a development from which some Bosnian Muslims benefited: the visible presence in Yugoslav embassies of communist diplomats with Muslim names was a useful means for strengthening the Tito government's political and trade connections with countries in the Islamic world.

The political trend toward decentralization in Yugoslavia from the 1960s to the 1980s was reinforced by the decline of the Yugoslav “self-management” economic system, the accumulation of national debt, and by the shock of Tito’s death in 1980. The subsequent economic crisis and the loss of a unifying leader-figure paved the way for power struggles between nationalist groups. The resurgence of nationalisms in the 1980s was reflected in the

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21 Ibid.
22 The Tito-Stalin Split resulted in the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) in 1948. Informbiro was then founded as the Yugoslav counterpart to Cominform, and the so-called Informbiro period (1948-1955) was characterized by poor relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.
23 On 18 July 1956, the Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito, the Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, and India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru issued a joint statement of “Non-Alignment.”
relaxation of state restrictions on religion and the revival of religious architecture in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The rise of nationalism, which instrumentalized religion for its ends, finally culminated in a brutal conflict between and within the former republics of Yugoslavia during the 1990s. The manner in which religious architecture was destroyed in the ensuing wars, and the extent of the destruction, represented an attempt to deny a historical fact — that a peaceful multiethnic and multi-religious coexistence had not only been possible, but historically prevalent in the Balkans. Standing as they did, side-by-side, mosques and churches in the region not only symbolized cultural détente, but were also a material evidence of this coexistence. As such, the mosques and churches of "others" also stood in the way of absorbing Bosnia-Herzegovina into either an envisaged Greater Serbia or a Greater Croatia after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In order to make this division work, Bosnia had first to be “ethnically cleansed” and then fragmented into small ethnically homogenous and mutually hostile cultural territories. This program was undertaken through the forced expulsion and mass murder of civilians based on their ethnic or religious affiliation, as well as though the eradication of their cultural traces. The systematic destruction of mosques and churches showed that nationalist extremists recognized their importance and targeted them specifically to erase the collective memory of Bosnia’s coexistence. While all three ethnic groups in Bosnia were affected by "ethnic cleansing" by various armed factions and suffered losses of their particular cultural legacies, it was Bosnian Muslims who proportionally suffered the largest casualties, both in human terms and in terms of cultural destruction; the number of mosques destroyed or damaged during the war in Bosnia is

far greater than the number of destroyed churches.\textsuperscript{25} In the end, approximately 1200 or over 72\% of mosques extant before the war were entirely destroyed or heavily damaged.\textsuperscript{26}

This dissertation focuses on mosque architecture not only for itself, but with regard to the way in which this wanton destruction created a rupture in the cultural continuity of Bosnian Muslims, and made its witnesses, and the next generation much more aware of the function of the mosque as a marker of cultural, spiritual and national identity. The lens through which I conduct my investigation are mosques built anew or rebuilt over the course of the past fifteen years. The extent of war destruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina combined with the long pre-war freeze on church and mosque building brought about a situation in which there was a pressing demand for new religious structures. To meet that demand, many new mosques (and churches) have been built in Bosnia since 1996. Yet, these edifices are neither used as purely religious sites, nor are they symbols of a great religious revival, contrary to the observations of some analysts who look at this process from an ethnographically naïve and historically impoverished viewpoint. Rather, I contend, the post-war mosques are increasingly performing as markers of national and trans-national identities — an architectural manifestation of the socio-political transformation processes that Yugoslavia underwent in the 1980s and 1990s.

The disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia liberated the Bosnian Muslims to the extent that they had a chance to establish, for the first time since the fifteenth century, a “Bosniak” nation under the sovereignty arrangement within the newly-created democratic state of Bosnia


\textsuperscript{26} This estimate is provided by the Center for Islamic Architecture (CIA) at the Rijaset (central administrative body of the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina) in Sarajevo, which concluded a preliminary survey of the state of destruction and rebuilding of mosques in the fall 2008. For more detailed information on this subject see Chapter One.
and Herzegovina. Of course, that liberation was followed by genocide and the systematic
destruction of Bosnia’s Islamic heritage during the war of the early 1990s, which has made the
Bosnian Muslims extremely sensitive to the question of identity and led to a hardening of
attitudes against the pluralistic system that had ruled for all practical purposes in the past.

In 1993, a decision made by the Bosniak Assembly (Matica Bošnjaka) replaced the rubric
‘Bosnian Muslims’, the name under which the community had been known in Yugoslavia, with
the name “Bosniaks.” The adoption of this name marked the secularization of Bosnian Muslims’
national identity. Hence, the Bosniak nation was established on the basis of ethnicity, which
in this region is presumed to be consonant with religion, apart from the variety other parameters
that may constitute it; the main distinguishing feature of Bosniaks, setting them apart from Serbs
and Croats, is the religion of Islam. Though the majority of Bosniaks are Sunni Hanafi Muslims,
this ethnic group also includes agnostics, deists, atheists, and a small number of Orthodox
Christians and Catholics — in short, people of non-Islamic religious and hybrid ethnic
backgrounds whose national identity does not necessarily intersect with Islam. In fact, many
Bosniaks feel closely affiliated with the secularist ideologies of the European Union countries.

The shadow of the longer history of Bosnian Muslims’ ethno-national genesis falls over
the post-socialist and the post-war states of transition, for even today the Bosnian (state) as one
semantic entity is entangled with the semantics of the term Bosniaks (ethno-national), which is
further entangled with the Islamic (religious) identity. I propose to develop a framework for
understanding this tangled bundle of meanings though religious architecture.

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The nationalist semiotics of religious architecture

While national and state affiliations of Bosnian people have shifted over time, the territorial boundaries of Bosnian identity have remained more or less consistent since the fifteenth century.\(^{28}\)

This changed with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord in 1995, which imposed an internal division that split the country into two different, ethnically-defined political entities: the Serb Republic and the Bosniak-Croat Federation (Fig.0.3). The latter is further divided into ten cantons; five of which have a Bosniak majority, three a Croat majority, while two are ethnically mixed. In addition, the territory around the northern city of Brčko, the so-called Brčko District, became a shared territory of both entities. Paradoxically, the compromise made for the sake of peace in Dayton was intended to maintain Bosnian unity, but in practice it induced an internal political fragmentation of the country at the same time. To be more precise, the Dayton Peace Accord simultaneously legalized the new demographically homogenized landscape that was created though “ethnic cleaning,” but then countermanded the “ethnic cleansing” by granting human rights to minorities and allowing all citizens, at least in principle, to return to their pre-war home towns (Fig.0.4).

This politically contradictory solution aggravated the ethnic nationalism in Bosnia, but, on the other hand, turned that nationalism away from violent conflict. Instead, it began to articulate itself in the domain of the aesthetic instrumentalization of cultural heritage, language, and religion. Lacking a dominant ethnic base to which to appeal, and the legal framework to forge state instruments to enforce their nationalist ideology, these groups focused on a sort of arms race within the cultural sphere, amplifying the claims of national consciousness and

\(^{28}\) Donald Edgar Pitcher, *An Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire from Earliest Times to the End of the Sixteenth Century* (Leiden: Brill, 1972), map XXVIII.
cohesion by strengthening their ethnic ties through cultural symbols. Although the country's many ethnicities — Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, and minorities — share a common history and territory, the crucial difference between them is each group’s myth of a unique national origin. While religion becomes crucial for generating cultural strength, it also tends to provide (or not provide) a framework for defining nationhood: Orthodox Christianity for Serbs, Catholicism for Croats, and Islam for Bosniaks. Religious architecture, in this context, not only articulates and reinforces the national sentiments of Bosnian ethnicities, but it also provides a cultural backdrop from which their national ideals can be fostered. As objects of shared memory and culture, mosques and churches incorporate the common myths and histories of these ethnic groups and at the same time operate to seal in those ethnic identities. These structures implicitly make specific territorial claims, as well as creating a face to face with other groups that distinguish one group from the other — in other words, they act as loyalty-makers. By providing a visual code for ethnic belonging, they also signal individual national and territorial claims. Ironically, after almost a century of secular repression, it is now religious architecture — more than any other type of architecture — that has become the great monumental marker of ethnic origin and history, becoming both the product and the producer of competing national discourses in Bosnia.

As minarets and church steeples now proliferate throughout the country, the building process is characterized by competitiveness for visibility and overt signaling of territorial dominance. In this context, the political role of mosque architecture within the early stage of


30 The idea of continuity with these assumed origins is central to the creation of national (imagined) communities. Therefore, the ethnic and religious bond with previous collective structures can reinforce Serb, Croat, and Bosniak group solidarities for their nations in the present. For more theoretical background to this idea see: Anthony D. Smith, “Culture, Community and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 72.3, Ethnicity and International Relations. (1996): 447.
state-formation in Bosnia-Herzegovina becomes clear: it serves as a visual apparatus for communicating the Bosniaks' national and ethnic claims within a multinational state, becoming itself a political agency and as such engaging in the discourse of power that traverses and is held between the internal political division of Bosnia.

The pressing question today is how the Bosniak nation will define itself in the post-socialist period as a part of Europe, or as a possible future member of the European Union. The Bosniaks' national question is further complicated by the pressures of global Islam, propagated through the ideological and financial might of Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries. Evidence that some expatriate diplomatic and missionary communities stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina are aiming to impose some kind of a pan-Islamic identity on the region's Islamic community and spread a more restrictive and puritanical interpretation of Islam is found in the way ostensibly humanitarian aid and aid to rebuild mosques has turned into a power grab that enforces the ideological agendas of their donors. Attempting to organize themselves politically around their alleged religious bonds with Bosnian Muslims, these communities erect mosques as architectural counter-statements to the European secular nationalist ideologies. The wide spectrum of rival religious and political identities articulated by contemporary local and expatriate builders and reinforced through mosques, encompasses very diverse people ranging from those who self-identify as Europeans to those who self identify primarily as Muslims, often in religious opposition to European secularism.

Such trans-national processes represent a great challenge to the locally defined religious, cultural, and territorial parameters of the Bosniak nation while having an impact on the power relationships within the local Islamic community as well. Many donations for mosque reconstructions are channeled through the recently founded Center for Islamic Architecture at the
Rijaset (the central administrative body of the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in Sarajevo). As a channel for the donations for mosque renovations, this institution has gained political and financial power that it did not have before the 1990s war. Yet it would be a mistake to see the mosque revival solely through the lens of the kind of Muslim expansionism exploited by panic-mongering anti-Islamic commentators with their various political agendas. The prominence of large-scale mosque projects supported by national and international elites should not overshadow the wide range of more ordinary, bottom-up informal building strategies being built informally by local communities, whose agendas do not fall within some organized discourse but address the identity crisis that succeeded the breakup of Yugoslavia in improvised and different ways.

2. Review of literature

The earliest accounts of mosque architecture in Bosnia are found in the travelogues of Ottoman and Western European travelers from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries. In the mid-sixteenth century, France began sending ambassadors and state officials to Ottoman Empire on different diplomatic missions. While traveling to Istanbul, some of these officials passed through Bosnia, leaving behind travelogues and journey documents that provide some insight into the social history of Bosnia at that time. Though these writings focus on descriptions of the

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31 France’s political interest in the Ottoman Empire intensified after the Ottoman agreement with Francis I in 1535, which settled the Ottoman and French joint ambitions against the Habsburgs.

32 In his research about French travelers in Bosnia from the 16th to 19th centuries, Midhat Šamić notes that some of the first French travelers (crusaders) already passed the Balkans in the Middle Ages on their way to Constantinople. Some French travelers and pilgrims are also known to have passed the region in the 15th ct., but not through BH. Midhat Šamić, Francuski putnici u Bosni na pragu XIX stoljeća i njihovi utisci o njoj (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1966), 14.
journeys, and the customs of people encountered, they also contain valuable information about
the number, size, and appearance of religious and civic monuments existing at the time. The
Bosnian historian Midhat Šamić, who has studied the travelogues of French officials who visited
Bosnia, questions their value as historical accounts, pointing out that their writers often lapsed
into fantasy and exaggeration. Exceptional events that happened in one place, for example, are
often generalized to appear as though they applied to the entire region. Šamić also shows that
many of these descriptive travelogues reveal a complete lack of geographic knowledge about the
region.

The quantity of travelogues written by Western Europeans is relatively large compared to
the number written by Ottoman visitors to the region. Two texts by Ottoman historians are,
however, noteworthy for their historical accounts of cities and architecture in seventeenth
century Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first is the geographical book *Mirror of the World (Jihan-
nama)* by Kâtîp Çelebi (1609–1657), a historian, geographer, and bibliographer from Istanbul,
also known as Haji Khalifa or Haji Kalfa. His description of Bosnia and Rumeli contains very
little information about religious architecture, but it provides some clues about their urban and

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33 The brief nature of architectural descriptions in French travelogues can be explained by the fact that none of these travelers conducted purposeful research trips to Bosnia; all of them inevitably had to pass through Bosnia if they chose to travel on the Dubrovnik trail, which was at that time the Balkans’ safest and most convenient path to Istanbul. Ibid., 51-52. These French travelers could choose between different travel routes: over the sea, through Hungary, or taking the Dubrovnik trail, which led from Dubrovnik, to Trebinje, Bileća, Gacko, Foća, Plevlje, Novi Pazar, Niš, and Sofia to Istanbul. Ibid., 15.

34 Most attention was given to Bosnia, and Herzegovina was almost completely disregarded. That social and political life in Bosnia seems to have been the primary interest of these writers, and that less attention was given to intellectual and cultural life is understandable given the travelers’ reasons were mainly political in nature. Ibid., 277, 278.

35 None of these travelers was or became particularly well known, and their travelogues were mostly published at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of twentieth centuries. Ibid., 51, 53.

36 His full name is Mustafa bin Abdallah Kâtîp Çelebi, in Bosnian: Hadži-Kalfa or Čatib-Çelebija; in Arabic: Khaṭīb Shalabī, or Ḥaǧī Khaḷīfa, Muṣṭafā ibn ‘abd Allāh.
geographic setting. The second notable Ottoman account of seventeenth century Bosnia, is the Seyahatname [Book of Travels], is a collection of notes by Evliya Çelebi (1611-1682) based on forty years of journeys though different regions of the Ottoman Empire and neighboring territories. The segment of his travelogue across Yugoslav lands was translated into Bosnian in 1967 by the historian Hazim Šabanović. Though we cannot rely on the accuracy of Evliya Çelebi’s accounts — many of his descriptions appear to be exaggerated or invented — his travelogue remains one of the most valuable sources of information about mosque architecture in Ottoman Bosnia during the seventeenth century, undelying its vital role in the urbanization and Islamization of the region.

**Early studies and interpretations**

The establishment of the Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia at the end of the nineteenth century was accompanied by a number of architectural and ethnographic surveys that provided the basis for implementing the monarchy’s colonial project. Among these were, Edmund Stix’s technical and statistical survey of Bosnia’s architecture published in 1887 and Carl Peez’s monograph about Mostar and its Islamic architecture published in 1891. Though not explicitly

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focused on mosques, these early architectural inventories marked the beginning of a more systematic surveying and documenting of Islamic religious architecture in the region.

The earliest detailed studies about mosques and other forms of Islamic architecture in the region started to appear around the turn of the twentieth century, under the Austro-Hungarian government, prompted by the foundation of the National Museum (Landesmuseum) in Sarajevo in 1888 and the appearance of the museum’s annual publications. The Croatian archeologist Čiro Truhelka (1865-1942), the first custos (curator) of the National Museum, was among the first to publish a scholarly investigation about mosques in Bosnia and the urban and cultural contexts in which they were built. Truhelka was also responsible for publishing the study about the Sarajevo’s mosques conducted by the Islamic scholar Sejfudin Fehmija ef. Kemura in the museum’s annual, *Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja*. As an imam and šeih (Sufi master) from Sarajevo, Kemura was both personally and professionally invested in mosque architecture. His concern with the increasing decay of the city’s heritage, which he equated with the loss of Bosnia’s Islamic history, prompted him to start documenting mosques in Sarajevo. Published in 1910, his survey includes fifty-five mahala mosques, presented with detailed descriptions and

Travelers also wrote accounts, such as: Maude M Holbach, *Bosnia and Herzegovina* (London: J. Lane, 1910); Heinrich Renner, *Durch Bosnien und die Herzegowina, kreuz und quer: Wanderungen*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: D. Reimer, 1897).

40 The foundation of the Museum evolved from the previous Museum Association in Sarajevo. The latter was founded in 1884 with the task to document and protect Bosnian cultural heritage. The National Museum is the oldest modern cultural and scientific institution in Bosnia. It has been publishing the annual journal *Glasnik Zemaljskog muzeja Bosne i Herzegovine* [The Annual of the National Museum of Bosnia and Herzegovina] since 1889, and published the annual journal *Wissenschaftliche Mitteilungen aus Bosnien und der Herzegowina* [Scientific notes from Bosnia and Herzegovina] from 1893 to 1916.

41 Čiro Truhelka, *Naši gradovi: Opis najljepših sredovječnih gradova Bosne i Herzegovine* (Sarajevo: Naklada knjižare J. Studnička i dr, 1904); Čiro Truhelka, *Gazi Husrefbeg, njegov život i njegovo doba* (Sarajevo: Zemaljska štamparija, 1912); Čiro Truhelka, “Naši gradovi Maglaj,” *Nada* (Sarajevo 1903); Čiro Truhelka, *Osvoj na sredovječne kulturne spomenike Bosne* (Sarajevo: Zemaljski muzej u Sarajevu, n.d.).

drawings, as well as several religious schools, Sufi hospices (tekije), mausoleums (turbeta), and other Islamic religious monuments in Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{43}

Non-Bosnian researchers began showing increased interest in Bosnia’s mosques in the period between World War I and World War II. They included Henry Minetti, the city architect of Kiel, Germany, whose book \textit{Osmanische provinziale Baukunst auf dem Balkan. Ein Beitrag zur Baugeschichte des Balkans} [Ottoman Provincial Architecture at the Balkans. A Contribution to the Architectural History of the Balkans] (1923) represents the first general survey of Bosnia’s Islamic architectural heritage from the Ottoman period.\textsuperscript{44} It features a typological analysis of mosques, with seventy pages text, a few photographs, and numerous drawings and plans that include information on elevations and structural details. Minetti’s study was also the first to situate Islamic architecture in Bosnia within the historical development of Ottoman architecture. In fact, as the architectural historian Andrej Andrejević notes, Minetti broke new ground by demonstrating that the golden age of Ottoman architecture expanded beyond Bursa and Istanbul to the larger cities of the Ottoman Balkan provinces, including Bosnia.\textsuperscript{45}

The next two decades saw the appearance of several descriptive explorations of individual mosques published in regional scientific journals and daily newspapers.\textsuperscript{46} Two shorter monographs from this period that deal with Bosnian mosques in a popular and essayist

\textsuperscript{43} Sejfudin F. Kemura Šejh, \textit{Sarajevske džamije i druge javne zgrade turske dobi} [Sarajevo mosques and other public buildings from the Turkish period] (Sarajevo: Žemaljska štamparija, 1910).

\textsuperscript{44} Minetti also analyzed several structures in Serbia and Macedonia, focusing on monuments in Niš, Skopje, Prilep and Veles. Henry Minetti, \textit{Osmanische Provinziale Baukunst Auf Dem Balkan: Ein Beitrag Zur Baugeschichte Des Balkans} (Hannover: H. Lafaire, 1923).


\textsuperscript{46} These publications include the \textit{Glasnik Zemaljskog Muzeja} [Annual of the National Museum], \textit{Skopsko Naučno Društvo} [Scientific Society of Skopje], \textit{Jugoslovensko profesorsko društvo} [Yugoslav Society of Professors], \textit{Islamska vjerska zajednica} [Islamic Religious Community], journals \textit{Južna Srbija} [Southern Serbia], Gajter, \textit{Novi Behar} [New Bloom], Beogradske opštinske novine [Belgrad District Newspaper], and daily newspapers in Sarajevo. Ibid.
manner are notable. The first is the 1929 essay *O muslimanskoj umjetnosti u Bosni* [On Muslim Art in Bosnia] by the Zagreb art historian Petar Knoll (1872–1943) which aimed to familiarize a non-professional audience with the concepts and forms of Islamic religious architecture. His assessment of Bosnian mosques represents a departure from the previous descriptive surveys towards an interpretative, yet Orientalist, direction. Besides the problematic privileging of domed (Ottoman) mosques over the pitched-roof mosques, Knoll deploys Orientalist rhetoric to doom Islam, Islamic civilization, and mosques as forced upon Bosnia, just as in any other place “conquered by Islam.”

The Bosnian Muslim storyteller and folklorist Alija Nametak (1906-1987) adopted an opposite tone in his book *Islamski kulturni spomenici turskog perioda u Bosni i Hercegovini* [Islamic Cultural Monuments of the Turkish Period in Bosnia and Herzegovina] published in 1939. Nametak appeals to a non-Muslim audience by pointing out, in an ethnographic mode, that Muslim patrons built more than just mosques. Their contributions included other socially beneficial structures that were useful to the “representatives of other faiths.” At the same time, Nametak draws attention to the deterioration of regional Islamic architecture due to neglect.

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49 Ibid, 450.

50 Alija Nametak, *Islamski kulturni spomenici turskog perioda u Bosni i Hercegovini. [Islamic Cultural Monuments of the Turkish Period in Bosnia and Herzegovina].* (Sarajevo: Državna Štamparija, 1939), 3-4.

51 Cultural heritage was mainly unprotected in the Yugoslav Kingdom.
Establishment of scientific infrastructure

Rigorous scholarly exploration of Bosnia’s mosque architecture began in the 1950s with the expansion of scientific infrastructure in Bosnia, including new academic, archival and research institutions, as well as scholarly journals. The University of Sarajevo and the Technical Faculty were established in 1949, followed by the Faculty of Philosophy one year later. The Institute for Protection of Cultural Monuments and Natural Rarities, which was founded in 1945 as a part of the National Museum, began publishing *Naše starine* [Our Antiquities - Annual Journal of the Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments of the People’s Republic of Bosna and Herzegovina] annually in 1953 (publication ceased in 1984). Another essential scientific and research institution established in this period was the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo. Its task was collecting, studying and publishing archival material in Arabic, Turkish, and Persian languages, including studies and documents about regional Islamic religious art.

The Oriental Institute’s publication *Prilozi za orijentalnu filologiju i istoriju jugoslovenskih naroda pod turskom vladavinom* [Contributions to Oriental Philology and the History of the Yugoslav Peoples under the Turkish Rule] featured a number of important studies that examined religious architecture in Bosnia. Among these is the foundational survey of Bosnian mosques *Spomenici osmanlijske arhitekture u Bosni i Hercegovini* [Monuments of the Ottoman Architecture in Bosnia and Herzegovina] by Alija Bejtić, a leading historian of Islamic architecture in Bosnia. Appearing in 1953, thirty years after Minetti’s book, Bejtić’s study represents the second attempt at a typological classification of Bosnia’s religious architecture.53

52 Post-graduate programs at the University of Sarajevo were founded between 1955 and 1969. The Universities in Banja Luka, Mostar and Tuzla were founded in the 1980s.

While Minetti’s study focused on domed mosques and other monumental Islamic structures, Bejtić’s work includes a much broader overview of regional architecture from the Ottoman period: religious, educational, communal, health, economic, memorial, military, and residential-housing structures.54

Bejtić’s principal argument, which he bases on a chronological categorization of Bosnia’s religious architecture, is that the stylistic developments of mosques in Bosnia followed the political evolution of the Ottoman Empire and its architectural trends. He identifies three main phases. Mosques built during the consolidation of the Ottoman regional power (that is, from the fifteenth century until the first half of the sixteenth century) are characterized as stylistically vague and reflecting a search for new forms of expression. The second phase coincides with the peak of the Classical Ottoman period (until the beginning of the eighteenth century) when the centralization of the state and institutionalization of its building industry is reflected in and reinforced through a distinguished, imperial mosque-building tradition. The stylistic clarity and standardization of forms developed in the center of the empire echoed in the province of Bosnia in the form of several sixteenth-century monumental mosques. Finally, the third phase in the development of Bosnia’s mosque architecture coincides with the so-called decline of the Ottoman Empire, with a notable decrease in the number of new mosques.

Bejtić’s periodization of mosque architecture in the Ottoman period represents a standard format for stylistic classification that was deployed by many non-Bosnian historians in their periodization of Ottoman mosque architecture. This approach has been criticized recently for its teleological view of Ottoman history. In her article “Changing Perceptions of the Ottoman Empire: The Early Centuries” (2004), Leslie Peirce points to the problematic tendency in

54 Ibid.
Ottoman historiography to characterize the early Ottoman centuries (1300-1600) as a single entity portrayed as time of institution building for what became known later as the “Ottoman Golden Age.”[^55] Pierce argues that by viewing individual periods of time as coherent units of a overarching narrative is misleading because it encourages a tendency to view them through the lens of the dynamism and stagnation of social change and cultural interactions. Such a “rise and fall” perspective negates the possibility that cultural dynamism can be found in equal amounts in all periods, Pierce points out.[^56]

Despite the waning of the universal acceptance of a Hegelian master narrative in the wake of post-colonial criticism, the view of history as linear progress still dominates the field of Islamic art and architecture. This understanding underlies numerous surveys of Ottoman architecture, whose periodization is often informed by the idea of progress and decline.[^57]

Thematically, Bejtić seeks to explain the transfer and the indigenization of architectural elements from one cultural, religious, or geographic context to another. In all three phases that he identifies, Bejtić argues that Ottoman architectural idioms were not merely transplanted from Istanbul to Bosnia but were assimilated and adapted to the local cultural and economy. Mosques were often constructed by local builders according to their taste and traditions, and Ottoman models acquired locally characteristic features.[^58] It is the hybridity of the imperial and the local building traditions, as Bejtić puts it, which makes Bosnia’s religious architecture unique and


[^56]: Ibid.

[^57]: The standard model of structuring the architectural developments in Ottoman history encompasses three main periods: 1) Period of Rise (early14th to early16th century), which embraces the early Ottoman architecture, while focusing on monuments in Bursa and Edirne; 2) The Classical Age or the Period of Apogee: Starting after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, including the ‘Golden Age’ under sultan Süleyman, and focusing on the works of the Ottoman grand architect Sinan; and 3) Period of Decline: from the wars in the 17th century onwards, including modernization and focusing on the increasing Western European influence on Ottoman architecture.

[^58]: Bejtić, 1953, p. 295.
distinguishable from religious architecture in other regions of Yugoslavia. Though Bejtić published several other articles in Naše starine, which appeared alongside the work of prominent historians Hamdija Kreševljaković and Mehmed Mujezinović, his study remains one of the most important foundational surveys of Bosnia’s Islamic religious architecture as it paved the way for expanded studies and encyclopedic entries in the 1960s and 1970s.

Bejtić’s derivative approach fits into the broader group of writings about Ottoman religious architecture that emphasizes elements in Ottoman architecture influenced by other Islamic and non-Islamic building traditions, such as Byzantine, Seljuk, Armenian (in Eastern Anatolia), and Western European (as in the later Ottoman mosques with Baroque and Rococo features). For example, Suut Kemal Yetkin in his article “The Evolution of Architectural Form in Turkish Mosques (1300-1700)” (1959) examines the elements of invention in the architecture of the Ottoman mosque in relationship to the earlier Anatolian Seljuk tradition. His typological survey reveals seven formal features through which the Ottoman monuments diverge from their Seljuk predecessors. Other scholars, such as Robert Ousterhout in his article “Ethnic Identity and Cultural Appropriation” (1995), examines how the Byzantine tradition informed early Ottoman architecture. For Ousterhout, structural similarities between Ottoman and Byzantine religious

59 Bejtić, 1953, p. 296.
monuments allow for an understanding of the fourteenth century building culture as a period of transformation for both the Ottomans and the Byzantines, revealing the integrative, rather than dominating, nature of early Ottoman society. While many scholars have explored the impact of Hagia Sophia on Ottoman imperial mosques — certainly a valuable point to be made — some Western scholars have designated them as mere copies of the Hagia Sophia (see, for example, Marin Charles' article "Hagia Sophia and the Great Imperial Mosques" from 1930).63

Other publications about mosque architecture in Bosnia from the 1950s follow an encyclopedic approach that is devoid of deeper analysis or contextualization. The Head Office of the Administration of Waqfs in Sarajevo (Vakufska Direkcija) published a short book about selected Islamic religious monuments in Sarajevo in 1957, in which the monuments are appreciated based on their size and durability. Because of its focus on the formal qualities of architecture, this book leads the reader to conclude that domed mosques and other buildings made of solid materials are more important and valuable than wooden and pitched-roof mosques.64 While mosques occupy a prominent place in this book, other structures with religious significance are also discussed, including those that are not usually included into typologies of Islamic religious architecture (i.e. clock towers, fountains, and libraries).

Architects Đurđe Bošković and Nikola Dobrović, both professors at the University of Belgrade, documented and published short encyclopedic summaries of regional Islamic architecture.65 Mosques are presented as facets of the rich and diverse Yugoslav cultural heritage. The Turkish

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64 (Bosnia and Hercegovina) Sarajevo, Die Wichtigsten Denkmuler Der Islamischen Kultur in Der Stadt Sarajewo (Sarajewo: Ausgabe der Vakufdirektion in Sarajewo, 1957).
65 Architect Đurđe Bošković published a chapter on Islamic societies in his book Osnove srednjevekovne arhitekture [Foundations of Medieval Architecture], in which he also notes examples from Yugoslavia. Đurđe Bošković, Osnove srednjevekovne arhitekture [Foundations of Medieval Architecture] (Belgrade: Centralno udruženje studenata tehnike, 1947); Nikola Dobrović called attention to the complete deficiency in studying this heritage. Nikola Dobrović, Urbanizam kroz vekove, 1950.
architectural historian Ekrem Hakki Ayverdi published two volumes on Bosnia’s Islamic monuments and pious endowments (vakufi), in which he “re-traveled” Evliya Çelebi’s path through the Balkans, comparing Evliya’s seventeenth century accounts of Islamic monuments to their modern condition.66 Ayverdi’s technical descriptions of monuments and their decoration, and particularly his photographic documentation, are highly valuable for students of Bosnian mosque architecture today, especially considering the fact that the majority of the monuments he documented in the 1970s have since been destroyed.

**Negotiation of identity in Bosnia’s mosque architecture**

The two decades of the 1960s and the 1970s saw the appearance of several publications that paved the ground for subsequent studies on Bosnia’s Islamic religious architecture. The first of these was a history of the Bosnian Eyalet, entitled *Bosanski Pašaluk* (1959), in which the historian Hazim Šabanović traces the establishment of the Ottoman rule in Bosnia.67 Šabanović’s main thesis holds that the formulation of the Ottoman authoritative structures in Bosnia was a gradual process that, in contrast with other Ottoman provinces, unfolded over a period of 150 years. Though Šabanović’s book focuses on political history, it provides architectural historians with the political and social context in which the first mosques were built in the region. The second important publication from this period is the survey *Islamska epigrafika Bosne i Hercegovine* [Islamic Epigraphy of Bosnia and Herzegovina] (1974–1982) by Mehmed Mujezinović, encompasses monuments from almost all of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Published in three volumes, Mujezinović’s work represents the most extensive survey of mosques and

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66 Ekrem Hakki Ayverdi, *Osmanlı Mi’mârisinin İlk Devri* (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1966); Ekrem Hakki Ayverdi, *Avrupa'da Osmanlı Mimârî Eserleri* (İstanbul: İstanbul Fethi Cemiyeti, 1977).

67 Šabanović, *Bosanski pašaluk; Postanak i upravna podjela*. 

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tombstones in the region to date. He was the first to pay close attention to small neighborhood and village mosques, which architectural historians had either neglected or dismissed as less important than the monumental Ottoman domed mosques. Mujezinović’s research shows that pitched roof mosques represent the predominant and indigenous form of Islamic religious architecture in the region. Finally, the third important survey from this period, Husref Redžić’s *Islamska umjetnost* [Islamic Art] (1967), starts with a general introduction to Ottoman art and architecture followed by a typological classification of Islamic monuments in Yugoslavia, in which he adopts Bejtić’s periodization. Building on Bejtić’s study, Redžić argues that the sixteenth-century monumental mosques in Yugoslavia were mostly designed by Ottoman architects, who followed architectural trends developed in the imperial capital cities. Further, he argues that locally specific features of mosques in Bosnia come to the fore in decorative art and ornaments.

This concern with the authenticity and uniqueness of Bosnian Islamic architecture found in the work of the leading Bosnian scholars in the field (Bejtić, Mujezinović, and Redžić) ties into a broader political task that Bosnian historians had been pursuing in the first two decades after World War II. In their attempts to legitimize and negotiate Islamic architecture against the claims of Serbian and Croat nationalisms, as well as against the anti-religious politics of the Yugoslav state, these historians emphasized Bosnia’s cultural hybridity that evolved though centuries of

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68 Each of the three volumes focuses on one region: volume one is on Sarajevo, volume two covers Eastern and Central Bosnia, and volume three deals with Bosanska Krajina, western Bosnia, and Herzegovina. The three volumes include introductions to each monument, photographs, facsimile of the inscription, its transcription, and a translation. Dates are recalculated according to the Gregorian calendar, and previous publications of these inscriptions are reevaluated. Mehmed Mujezinović, *Islamska Epigrafika u Bosni i Hercegovini*, Biblioteka Kulturno nasljeđe (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1974).


coexistence in the Ottoman period. They also point to the domestication of Islam among the local Slav population through material culture.

Abdulah Škaljić’s monumental work Turcizmi u srpskohrvatskom jeziku [Turkish Loanwords in the Serbo-Croatian Language] (1966) deserves mention in this context, both in terms of its political significance and its contributions to the understanding of the vernacular mosque architecture in Bosnia. Though actually a dictionary, this book applies the study of regional folk traditions and vernacular architecture; it provides original names and detailed descriptions for the Bosnian mosque’s different architectural elements, examples of their use, as well as these elements’ social and cultural implications. Reacting to evolving linguistic patriotism in Yugoslavia and the “cleansing” of the official Serbo-Croatian language from foreign influence, Škaljić asserts that no language can remain “clean” and “pure” and that a country’s attitude toward purifying its national language depended on whether the foreign in that language were adopted due to a forced influence or not. In this vein he explains the sympathetic attitude of some leading Serbian and Croatian linguists such as Vuk Stefanović Karadžić and Tomislav Maretić towards words adopted from Turkish than towards borrowings from German and other foreign languages. In this regard, Škaljić implies that German loanwords reflect a matter of foreign influence, while he simultaneously advocates for the Turkish adoptees, less alien because these leading Serbian and Croatian writers use them.

The equivalent predicament affected architectural discourse in Yugoslavia until the late 1960s, as evident from the impact of national politics on Sarajevo’s Old Market (Baščaršija) in the two decades after Second World War. Architectural historians Dijana Alić and Maryam

71 Abdulah Škaljić, Turcizmi u srpskohrvatskom jeziku (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1966).
72 Ibid., 13–14.
73 Abdulah Škaljić, Turcizmi u srpskohrvatskom jeziku, 6th ed. (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1989), 14.
Gusheh, who studied the history of Baščaršija, argue that the presence of religious symbols of all ethnic groups signified two dominant national narratives: the market epitomized Bosnia as a microcosm of multinational Yugoslavia, while it also represented Bosnia’s cultural uniqueness and distinctiveness from neighboring Serbia and Croatia.\textsuperscript{74} Despite its relevance for these national narratives, as Alić and Gusheh contend, the Market’s Ottoman structural inheritance clashed with the Serbian and Croatian nationalisms because of its link with the legacy of Ottoman domination.\textsuperscript{75} At the same time, the religious monuments in the market were not necessarily compatible with the Communist regime’s visions for the future of the city. The government proceeded to resolve these issues with a massive demolition of the Baščaršija area in 1945.\textsuperscript{76} Within this context, the prominent Croatian architect Juraj Neidhardt developed a revitalization project for the Market that negotiated that Ottoman heritage, making it compatible with the dominant politics of the period.\textsuperscript{77} Alić and Gusheh contend that Neidhardt’s unique and secularized reading of the Ottoman architectural heritage and its repositioning within the broader context of Modernist architecture allowed for reconciling these competing national narratives in post-World War II Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{78}

These competing visions of Bosnian national identity represent the political setting that affected the discourse of architectural history from the 1950s to 1970s. The persistent struggle of

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} In his book \textit{Bosnian Oriental Architecture and the Path into the Future} (1957), which features textual and graphic analysis of the Bosnian/Ottoman city and its parts, Neidhart demonstrates that the Bosnian Oriental house was not an alien form of architecture forced upon Bosnia by the Ottomans, but that it had evolved—under “Oriental” influences, as he admits—as an integral part of the local culture. Dušan Grabrijan and Juraj Neidhardt, \textit{Arhitektura Bosne i put u suvremeno. Architecture of Bosnia and the Way [towards]Modernity} (Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije, 1957).
\textsuperscript{78} Alić and Gusheh, \textit{Reconciling National Narratives in Socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina}, 6.
Sarajevo’s leading cultural protagonists for the preservation of Baščaršija eventually led to the establishment of a renovation fund for Sarajevo’s historic heritage in 1963. This fund, closed down in 1965, evolved into the Municipal Institute for Protection and Renovation of Cultural Monuments in Sarajevo, headed by the historian Alija Bejtijć until 1977. Bejtijć’s continued efforts to preserve and regenerate Sarajevo’s Ottoman city core resulted in two monographs on the subject, among the first to provide a contextual evaluation of small neighborhood mosques in Sarajevo and their embedding within the local urban and social milieus.79

Sarajevo, the capital city of Bosnia, and its Islamic architecture fell under the spotlight of political and academic interest; however, mosques in other cities started to receive more and more scholarly attention beginning in the 1970s. In fact, the field of Islamic architecture in Yugoslavia grew in the 1970s and 1980s in two directions. This involved, on the one hand, several encyclopedic studies that dealt with mosques on a more general level.80 Some of these encyclopedic studies follow a universalist approach, which tends to portray Islamic architecture as timeless and devoid of historical contexts. Yugoslav nationalism also posed limitations on some studies about Islamic religious architecture in the region, and they failed to historicize the monuments within the broader historical framework. On the other hand, the next generation of scholars produced more focused qualitative research in the form of typological surveys, and

79 Alija Bejtijć, Stara sarajevska Čaršija jučer, danas i sutra - osnove i smjernice za regeneraciju (Sarajevo: s.n., 1969); Alija Bejtijć, Ulice i trgovi Sarajeva – topografija, geneza, toponimija (Sarajevo: Muzej grada Sarajeva, 1973).

monographs on single monuments and individual cities.⁸¹ Andrej Andrejević’s detailed analysis of the Aladža Mosque in Foča (1972) offers particular value for us today, as this monument no longer exists.⁸²

The revival of mosque building activities in Bosnia beginning in the mid-1980s went hand in hand with the increased output of research on Bosnia’s Islamic architecture, culminating in several essential studies published just before the Yugoslav disintegration in 1990. Two reasons underlie this increased productivity: first, the new generation of architectural historians graduating from Yugoslav universities in Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo entered the scientific publication scene; and second, decentralization of Yugoslavia in this period alleviated the political constraints for research focusing on religious architecture or Ottoman history.

Most relevant academic publications from this period that provide the base for this dissertation include studies by Bosnian architectural historians such as Husref Redžić, Andrej Andrejević, Madžida Bećirbegović, Hivzija Hasandedić, and Amir Pašić. This dissertation embraces the contextualized reading of mosques in Bosnia by Husref Redžić in the book Studije o islamskoj arhitektonskoj baštini [Studies on the Islamic Architectural Heritage] (1983), which examines the varied socio-political and economic parameters that had shaped this architecture.⁸³ In 1984, Andrejević published a typological examination on sixteenth-century monumental

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⁸² Andrejević, Aladža Džamija u Foči.

⁸³ Redžić, Studije o islamskoj arhitektonskoj baštini.
mosques in Yugoslavia, investigating therein their types and sub-types. Andrejević demonstrated that a formal diversity exists within the single genre of the domed mosque.

Although Redžić’s and Andrejević’s approaches go beyond previous encyclopedic accounts of Bosnian Islamic architecture, they remain anchored in typological and stylistic forms of analysis. The same method of analysis continued to dominate scholarly approaches to Islamic architecture in Bosnia into the 1990s, as in the case of the previously mentioned typological exploration of Bosnian mosques with wooden minarets by Madžida Bećirbegović (1990). In its focus on vernacular mosque architecture, however, this book represents one of the foundation stones for this dissertation; building on Bećirbegović’s work allowed me to gauge how contemporary mosque architecture has changed from pre-war models. In this regard, I am also greatly indebted to the historian Hivzija Hasandedić for his surveys of vernacular mosque architecture in Herzegovina.

Since the 1990s, scholars of Islamic heritage in Bosnia have become increasingly interested in identity politics in religious architecture and cross-cultural fertilization. Amir Pašić’s study of Ottoman heritage in Mostar, among other regions of Herzegovina, informed my examination of fluidity and rigidity of identity in religious architecture. Pašić based his research on Islamic architecture in Bosnia largely on Redžić’s work; his contribution to the field lies in his focus on Mostar and in demonstrating the area’s monuments’ complexity of influences and cultural hybridity. For example, he explains the presence of Islamic elements in Orthodox

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85 Bećirbegović, *Džamije sa drvenom munarom u Bosni i Hercegovini*.
Christian art and architecture by pointing out the involvement of the same artisans in the construction of religious monuments for different denominations. He also presents numerous examples of Christian elements in the mosque architecture of Herzegovina (for example, minarets that look like church towers, high pointed windows, and Renaissance and Baroque column capitals of mosque porticos), pointing at the dynamics of cultural exchange between different religious groups in Bosnia during the Ottoman period, and revealing the porosity of their denominational borders. As I argue in this dissertation, these borders are currently being recreated, and at times more fully established, though religious architecture in response to the war.

Bosnia's mosques within a broader framework of mosque architecture

Although some of the most significant mosques on European ground stood in Bosnia, they have yet to find a place in the curricula of architectural history. Perhaps their Islamic character or their Ottoman association bars them from the canon. In any case, their exclusion from the canon points to the hegemonic paradigms that dominate the discipline of architectural history.

Eurocentric narratives have received increasing criticism over the past several decades. Critical voices from the fields of identity politics, visual studies, postcolonial criticism, and other areas have also informed contemporary debates about the discipline of art and architectural history and contributed to the reevaluation of its foundational paradigms. One stream of scholarly critique is directed against the canonical approach to teaching survey courses in many

87 Pašić, Islamic Art in Yugoslavia, 114; Historian Machiel Kiel also examined this topic in his essay: "Islamic Influence on Christian Art: Ottoman Architecture and the Serbian Orthodox Monasteries of Northern Bosnia," in: Actes du Ve Congrès International d'archéologie Ottomane, ed. A. Temimi (Zaghouan 2003), 87-93.

88 Pašić, Islamic Art in Yugoslavia, 114–117.
departments of art and architectural history based on the Hegelian periodization of art history. While Western art and architecture are structured in temporal terms—Medieval, Renaissance, and Baroque, for example—non-Western art and architecture are organized by geography and culture (such as Islamic, Chinese, and Japanese). Such asymmetrical determinations imply that art and architecture have not progressed in the same manner in different parts of the world. This reveals an attitude towards non-Western art and architecture as potentially pre-historical or of less importance.

While the past 15 years have witnessed an increasing number of critical reevaluations of Ottoman architectural history and historiography, mosque architecture of Bosnia also occupies a marginal position in this field. Though classic surveys of Ottoman architecture such as Godfrey Goodwin’s *A History of Ottoman Architecture* (1971) and *The Mosque in Early Ottoman Architecture* by Aptullah Kuran (1968) have provided a valuable foundation for the study of Bosnian mosque architecture, their predominantly formalist approach problematically assumes an autonomous development of forms. Gülru Necipoğlu-Kafadar criticizes the focus on the typological and formal development of the mosque in Ottoman historiography as giving the impression that typological changes occur apart from historical and cultural contexts, and neglect

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89 A generation ago, the study of Ottoman architecture was most prominently encompassed by Godfrey Goodwin’s *A History of Ottoman Architecture*, published in 1971. Godfrey Goodwin, *A History of Ottoman Architecture* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971). This classic survey offers a chronological assessment of major monuments of predominantly Ottoman religious (and also some civic) architecture built between the 14th and 19th centuries and is illustrated with over 500 photographs and over 80 plans. Goodwin’s formalist chronological methodology is similarly applied in other survey books, such as *Turkish Islamic Architecture*, by Behzat Unsal (1959); *The Mosque in Early Ottoman Architecture*, by Aptullah Kuran (1968); the *Art and Architecture of Turkey*, by Ekrem Akurgal (1980); or *The Evolution of Turkish Art and Architecture* (1987), by Metin Sözen, to name just a few significant publications. Though these works trace the formal and typological evolution of Ottoman mosques and complexes since the early inverted T-shape (zaviya-type or Bursa-type) mosque, all of them have completely neglected mosque architecture in Bosnia. Behzat Unsal, *Turkish Islamic Architecture in Seljuk and Ottoman Times, 1071–1923* (London: A. Tiranti, 1959); Aptullah Kuran, *The Mosque in Early Ottoman Architecture*, Publications of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies no. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Ekrem Akurgal, ed., *Art and Architecture of Turkey* (Fribourg: Outlet, 1980); Metin Sözen, *The Evolution of Turkish Art and Architecture*, Aşit culture and tourism publications 2 (Istanbul, Turkey: Haşet Kitabevi, 1987).
the possible overlaps and anomalies within a type or legacy of a single architect. At the same time, Necipoğlu-Kafadar argues, the formalist approach tends to underplay the cultural significance of the monuments under examination. In her article on the Süleymaniye Complex in Istanbul (1985), she proposes a four-part methodology to examining various visual and ideological mechanisms which produce its manifold layers of meaning. Her investigative framework includes functional, connotative (cultural associations), formal (architecture, structure), and literal (inscriptions) levels of analysis. Taken together, these different layers of meaning allow for an understanding of the Süleymaniye Complex as a single, consistent political statement of power and legitimization.

Historians of waqf have drawn our attention to the Ottoman endowment system as it existed in different cultural contexts and how it was used for purposes beyond its religious functions. Those who used the waqf as a system of architectural patronage also used it to broadcast power and legitimate sovereignty of the sultan and the ruling elite. Critics of waqf have called attention to the fact that establishment of a waqf did not always reflect a pious act. Self-interest often lay behind establishment of a waqf, since it for circumventing the rules of inheritance. Amy Singer, in Constructing Ottoman Beneficence (2002), considers this critique misleading, for it ignore’s the complex nature of the waqf, as well as its changing functions and

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91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Handžić, A Survey of Islamic Cultural Monuments Until the End of the 19th Century in Bosnia; Redžić, Studije o islamskoj arhitektonskoj baštin: For a study of the institution of waqf and its role in building construction in one Ottoman Bosnian town, see: Hivžija Hasandedić, Mostarski vakifi i njihovi vakufi (Mostar: Medžlisa Islamske Zajednice Mostar, 2000).
meanings over time. Her understanding of the waqf views it as a “system of relations between properties and people,” and examines how this intricate web of affairs played a major role in the architectural production of the cities, as well as colonization of the newly conquered territories.

Such critical developments triggered a new set of approaches to Ottoman architectural history, as numerous publications and dissertations in the field over the past fifteen years have asserted. The formalist trend of the earlier generation (1950s–1980s) was succeeded since the 1980s with other analythical approaches, such as studies of iconography and semiotics. Recent scholarly work shows a tendency towards more textually based examinations, which provide further insights into the varied cultural contexts of Ottoman religious architecture and acknowledge its hybridity and heterogeneity.

Necipoğlu expands her criticism of formalist approaches in her more recent book *The Age of Sinan: Architectural Culture in the Ottoman Empire* (2005), in which she explores the reasons behind the visual and typological distinctions of sixteenth-century Ottoman mosques. She analyzes the aesthetic choices made by architects and patrons by relating them to their economic and political contexts. The exclusive category of architectural patronage, her main structuring device, is balanced with the concept of decorum, an unwritten social conduct expressed formally and visually and observed through religious architecture to express and produce social hierarchies of Ottoman imperialism. Necipoğlu’s use of endowment deeds (waqfiyya) represents an unprecedented example of how formalist critique could benefit from embracing other discourses that tackle the relationship between politics, economy, and architecture though the lens of Ottoman philanthropy.

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95 Ibid., 6.

96 Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan*. 

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Still, the scholars in this field need to further reveal the cross-cultural fertilizations that took place in Ottoman history through religious architecture, as well as to reevaluate the historiographic approaches conducted so far. With the burning of the Bosnian libraries and archives, access to Ottoman archives becomes even more important. The vast material that exists in Turkey—an important resource for historians of mosque architecture in Bosnia—has been well preserved and increasingly catalogued over the course of the twentieth century.

**Issue of identity in contemporary mosque architecture**

Diverging trends in contemporary mosque design in Bosnia reflect global architectural developments. Recent scholarship on contemporary mosque architecture has approached this formal diversity through a variety of methodologies, with categories frequently organized according to a mosque’s style, patronage, size, or function.

One set of approaches includes studies focused on the formal and stylistic aspects of the mosque. In their book, *Architecture of the Contemporary Mosque*, Ismail Serageldin and James Steele examine different case studies of mosques organized by region.\(^{97}\) Their mosque typology includes five stylistic categories, as well as a parallel classification according to mosque size and function.\(^{98}\) Serageldin stresses that an analysis of contemporary mosques needs to go beyond individual examples to define their formal patterns and design trends. For example, one might

\(^{97}\) Regions included here are i.e., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Maghreb, Turkey, Iran, and the West. See: Ismaïl Serageldin and James Steele, eds. *Architecture of the Contemporary Mosque* (London: Academy Editions, 1996).

study the emergence of the state mosque and its isolated social milieu or the separation of the prayer space from other social functions of the mosque. What requires further investigation — beyond the mosque itself — he contends, involves its physical, social, cultural, historical, and international context, as well as its impact on the local and regional intellectual debate.

Ihsan Fethi provides another formalist approach in his article “The Mosque Today.” Fethi suggests a similar stylistic approach to contemporary mosque architecture by considering five broad design developments over the course of the past four to five decades. For Fethi, the novel forms of mosque architecture evolved through the arrival of modern technology, which displaced traditional building techniques and allowed for “new permissiveness, stylistic transplants, and strange hybrids.” Fethi criticizes the development of Islamic culture with aesthetic values based on machine production, as opposed to (earlier) craft-based values. Holding the mode of production responsible for the loss of symbolism in contemporary mosque architecture, while promoting the idea of the “vanishing past,” Fethi comes across as somewhat nostalgic in his approach. His article invites us to question, however, how much and what kind of symbolism contemporary mosques really need and which decisions on the part of the patron/client, the designer, and the builder can lead to a successful design.

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99 Ibid., 15.
100 Ibid., 16–17.
102 Ibid.
103 He argues that the difference between these two modes of production is enormous — architecture based on craft is produced slowly and renders regionally highly recognizable features, whereas architecture produced with modern technologies tends to be more anonymous and devoid of any valid symbolism. Ibid., 53–63.
Renata Holod and Hasan-Uddin Khan take a different methodological position from Fethi and Serageldin and Steele by emphasizing the central role of clients in the construction of mosques. In their book *The Contemporary Mosque: Architects, Clients, and Designs Since the 1950s* (1997), Holod and Khan examine mosques built worldwide in the post-colonial era — the period when new, independent Muslim nation-states faced the challenge of representing themselves as modern through new forms in religious architecture. Understanding the mosque as a culture-bound place of worship, Holod and Khan propose a categorization according to patronage. The authors examine the process by which clients commission mosques exposing "the patterns of taste on the part of clients" and thus providing a broader understanding of the mechanisms of representation of state and authority.

What becomes clear from their analysis is that many contemporary mosque designs entail stylistic references to famous monuments from the past as a way to (re)create identities of their builders in the present. One of the most explicit examples of this phenomenon is the Mosque of Hassan II in Casablanca, Morocco. Built by the French architect Michel Pinseau for Morocco's Royal Dynasty in 1993, the Mosque of Hassan II visibly replicates architectural features perceived as traditional and Moroccan or even more generally Islamic, while pushing historicism to an extreme level of monumentality. This formal reference to the past can be seen

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106 Ibid.

107 Among the pioneers of the historicist trend in mosque design was the famous Egyptian architect Hasan Fathy (1899–1989), who propagated critical regionalism in architecture, for example, in his mosque project in New Gourna, Egypt.
as a way to claim ownership over a certain segment of history that legitimizes a nation’s historical origins.

The phenomenon of historicism has been strongly debated in current scholarship on contemporary mosque architecture. Most recently, architectural historians Nebahat Avcioglu in her article “Identity-as-Form: The Mosque in the West” (2007) and Christian Welzbacher in his book Die Architektur des Euro-Islam [The Architecture of Euro-Islam] (2008) argued against traditionalist and exoticizing design approaches, such as in recent mosque projects in Granada, Berlin-Neukölln, and Rotterdam. These mosques seem stylistically displaced from different cultural contexts and witness no integration in their new environment. For Welzbacher, such projects reveal more about their communities’ claims to attention and their yearning for homeland than about a constructive intercultural dialogue. As a positive contrast, Welzbacher draws attention to a range of planned contemporary mosques in Western Europe that provide playful links to history, while assimilating the architectural language of the local context.

Avcioglu theorized this type of architecture under the notion of what she calls the “Saidian turn,” pointing out its qualities in its ability to “contextualize 'otherness' not as a cultural dead-end burdened by an over-determining sense of identity but as an opportunity to participate in a material and openended becoming.”


109 In this context, Welzbacher questions whether the development of Islamic architecture in Europe has come to a dead end and whether only assimilated Muslims of the third or fourth generation would be able to create their own European mosque styles. Ibid.

110 Ibid.

111 Avcioglu, “Identity-as-Form,” 91.
Historian Omar Khalidi studied this issue by examining stylistic trends in American mosques in relationship to those in the original cultural contexts of their builders.\textsuperscript{112} Exploring a range of design choices for the purposely designed mosques, Khalidi embraced their inconsistent visual characteristics and came up with three basic stylistic categories: the imported, the adapted, and the innovative.\textsuperscript{113} Khalidi’s study has made evident that the notion of the American mosque cannot be described through a single building type. Rather, it should be understood as an overarching term standing for a wide range of religious, cultural, social, educational, financial, and organizational structures relevant to American Muslims.

Welzbacher’s and Khalidi’s approaches demonstrate that mosques in the West are more than centers for religious activities; they also represent and communicate their communities’ cultural and ethnic identities. We also learn from these studies that the function and the architectural design of the mosque in the West depend on a community’s size and local context. While large contemporary mosques serve mainly political and representational purposes, their function as providers of social service decreases. Smaller mosques, which act as small community centers, mainly meet social needs. Larger Islamic centers, however, bond Muslims together not only spatially but also through various cultural and social programs.\textsuperscript{114} Smaller prayer spaces — part of larger secular complexes — seem to encourage contact between Muslims and non-Muslims particularly well. While temporary or multipurpose use of space may

\textsuperscript{112} This study excludes buildings that have been reused or converted into mosques. See: Omar Khalidi, “Import, Adapt, Innovate,” Saudi Aramco World. (November/December 2001): 24–33.

\textsuperscript{113} Khalidi’s imported category includes mosques whose design was transplanted from one or several Islamic countries (i.e., the Islamic Cultural Center in Washington D.C. (1957) and the Islamic Center of Greater Toledo, Ohio (1983). Against this category, adapted mosques are often combined with elements of American architecture and represent reinterpretation of tradition into the contemporary and new geographical context (i.e., the Islamic Cultural Center in NYC (1991) and the Dar al-Islam in Abiquiu, New Mexico (1981). Finally, the innovative category includes designs with no historical or stylistic precedent (i.e., the Islamic Society of North America’s Headquarters in Plainfield, Indiana (1979), and the Islamic Center of Albuquerque, New Mexico (1981). Ibid.

represent a difficulty for building a long-term community, it also encourages meeting and interaction of diverse people.

3. Theoretical framework for the dissertation

Past and current scholarly research that employs formalist and typological approaches to the study of mosque architecture in Bosnia are problematic in relation to explaining the multifaceted meanings of mosques and the socio-political processes behind their construction. Formalist approaches tend to disregard the identity-making affordances of mosque architecture, disregarding its social meanings. Typological analysis operates at the classificatory level, but lacks analytic depth. It cannot explain the motives that inform the selection of one style over another or the meanings attached to the ordinary use of these styles and functions.

For this reason, my analysis of mosque architecture in Bosnia moves from the level of formal stylistic features to the level of cultural semiotics, that is, the way meaning is generated through the process of architectural production not just though an ideal vision of its outcome. Alongside the formal and stylistic analysis of mosques, it is important to examine the variety of factors that underscore architectural forms, including the organizational structures of mosque communities, the flow of local and global funding and resources, the personal tastes and ideological agendas of patrons, the legal framework, etc. This analysis yields a more fluid view of architecture that examines a temporary crystallization of multiple and often competing agendas instead of seeing it as a fixed signifier. Architecture is a process that operates at the level of ordinary life in alliance with other economic, ideological and aesthetic processes that coalesce to form social space.
The mosques that are subjects of my research represent an unexplored territory and lend themselves to discussion beyond the context of Bosnian Islamic architecture and, more broadly, beyond the field of religious architecture. My analytical framework encompasses political and cultural theories about “identity” that intersect with architectural history, appropriating them to frame the discourse on vernacular architecture, nationalism, and globalization. I argue that we can understand some of the dynamics of tradition at work within Bosnian culture by contextualizing the mosques to a discussion of vernacular architecture as well as the larger architectural conversation about modernity.

**Vernacular architecture and the critique of modernity**

While an interest in the “non-Western and non-classical buildings” of vernacular architecture emerged in the eighteenth century, the first scholarly evaluations of pre-industrial and rural architecture began to develop in the nineteenth century. These studies drew their inspiration from travel literature and were often nostalgic about vanishing folk traditions, even as they simultaneously praised them as sources of inspiration for contemporary architectural design. Accordingly, they emphasized the need to record and preserve historic vernacular environments. Intrigued by the spontaneity and supposed anonymity of vernacular architecture, these studies were often not very optimistic about the active role it would play in the future. For these scholars, vernacular architecture seemed destined to become extinct.

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Because the term vernacular references both locality and cultural identity, early scholars of vernacular architecture used it to critique modernity by considering the two as opposites. Related interests in the “anonymous, spontaneous, indigenous, [and] rural” architecture continued to inform some twentieth-century literature on vernacular built environments. One of the most influential of these is Bernard Rudofsky’s *Architecture Without Architects: A Short Introduction to Non-Pedigreed Architecture* (1964). Informal architecture appealed to Rudofsky for its absence of dogma and its immunity to fashion cycles; its presumed resistance to the “pursuit of profit and progress” that characterized the modern world offered him a position from which he could criticize modernity. By praising its humanness and its harmonious relationship to its natural surroundings, Rudofsky understood vernacular architecture as “the largest untapped source of architectural inspiration for industrial man.”

While Rudofsky’s photographic documentation of vernacular built environments across the world is fascinating, it provides no insight into the cultural and historical contexts of the examples he cites. In contrast, in *Native Genius in Anonymous Architecture* (1957), Sibyl Moholy-Nagy disapproves of modern architecture’s increasing concern with technology and comfort in service of consumerism. She argues that vernacular architecture fulfills a timeless and context-independent “ideal standard,” which, for her, represents its main value. Looking

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118 The book *Architecture Without Architects* was published to accompany a show at the MoMA, and as a preview to a subsequent book on the same topic, Bernard Rudofsky, *The Prodigious Builders: Notes Toward a Natural History of Architecture with Special Regard to Those Species That are Traditionally Neglected or Downright Ignorant* (New York and London: A Harvest/HBJ Book, 1977).
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid., 7.
122 Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, *Native Genius in Anonymous Architecture* (New York, Horizon Press, 1957), 20, 22. Sibyl Moholy-Nagy interprets vernacular architecture as being reflective of major socio-political shifts, such as the
beyond its formal qualities, Moholy-Nagy contends that vernacular architecture allows for an "understanding of the causes of architecture" — that is, providing shelter.123 While some "causes" are still applicable to contemporary architecture, she notes that present-day architects are challenged by new economic, cultural and aesthetic values: "the architect of today has to create an anonymous architecture for the anonymous men of the Industrial Age."124 Moholy-Nagy's shelter-centered assessment of architectural causes excludes vernacular religious architecture from the critique of modernity.

Although Moholy-Nagy's book anticipated Rudofsky's Architecture Without Architects, it did not attain the same prominence. However, both books generated a wider interest in vernacular building traditions in the late 1960s. These were followed by several seminal publications, which also reacted to rapid modernization, such as Amos Rapoport's House Form and Culture (1969) and Paul Oliver's Shelter and Society (1969).125 By historicizing and contextualizing vernacular architecture, this new wave of research identified its anonymous builders and provided a cultural perspective for its materialization. Moreover, they offered a new approach for studying vernacular architecture — one that moved away from associations with anonymity and timelessness and concentrated more on culturally-specific examinations.

And yet, in these and other publications emerging in the same period, vernacular architecture was primarily studied through the lens of home, shelter, and domestic space. In fact,

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123 Ibid., 20, 22.
124 Ibid., 22-23.
the issue of domesticity continues to dominate the discourse even today, although not necessarily as an antidote to modernity. This is not surprising, given the fact that the majority of the world’s population lives in vernacular built environments.

This thematic focus has been broadened by a new generation of architectural historians focusing on vernacular religious architecture in the late 1980s, by American architectural historians, such as Dell Upton’s *Holy Things and Profane: Anglican Parish Churches in Colonial Virginia* (1986), and also by Bosnian architectural historians, such as Madžida Bećirbegović’s *Džamije sa drvenom munarom u Bosni i Hercegovini* [*Mosques with Wooden Minarets in Bosnia and Herzegovina*] (1990). Recent scholarship has shifted the focus from the modernism-vernacular opposition to understanding the ways in which these are inter-related — an understanding that also underlies this dissertation’s analysis of mosque architecture.

**The dynamic nature of vernacular building traditions**

In *Vernacular Architecture in the Twenty-First Century: Theory, Education and Practice* (2006), Lindsay Asquith and Marcel Vellinga reevaluate the state of the field and question the future of vernacular architecture as both an object and field of study. They identify two major discourses with very little thematic or methodological overlap. One is concerned with “historical western traditions and the other with contemporary non-western ones.” While the first is primarily oriented towards “rural and pre-industrial building heritage” in Western Europe and

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North America, the second highlights the impact of modernization, globalization, and consumerism on the creation of contemporary regional identities in predominantly non-Western societies. The book presents a wide scope of architectural case studies across the globe and offers a cross-cultural perspective on vernacular architecture, suggesting different ways to incorporate it more fruitfully into the contemporary architectural curricula.

Nevertheless, the discourse on vernacular built environments still occupies a marginalized position within the field of architecture. Vernacular building traditions continue to be associated with the past and are often seen as impeding progress and development. Marcel Vellinga criticizes such assessments of the vernacular as the autonym of the modern as reductive, for they refer it back to the category of a pre-modern and unchanging past. Similarly, Jean-Paul Bourdier argues that the relationship between the traditional and the modern needs to be rethought. According to Bourdier, “Tradition identified as the past” is a modernist idea. "The same is true when vernacular is equated with low technology." Vellinga also asserts that the explorations of modern vernacular building traditions are rather rare. He contends that “what is generally perceived as authentic vernacular tradition is one that has not been ‘contaminated’ by the modern.” In this view, any foreign or novel influence that can advance or change an indigenous tradition represents a source of “contamination” and, therefore, threatens its destruction. To counter such “narratives of loss and decline,” a re-conceptualization of the

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129 Ibid., 5.
132 Ibidem.
134 Ibid., 85.
vernacular architecture as a continuously evolving "creative process" is needed. Vellinga contends that one can only fruitfully understand the conjunction of the vernacular and the modern and also counteract the anxieties about modernity's victimizing impact on the vernacular by revealing the "dynamic and processual nature" of vernacular building traditions. In this context, authors, such as Vellinga, Bourdier, or Upton, stress the importance of process-oriented studies over object-oriented studies. My dissertation aligns with this critique, revealing how vernacular traditions can be recognized and investigated as dynamic processes of cultural production. My analysis draws upon studies that stress the collaborative and process-based nature of building, with architecture as a medium restricted by certain rules that impinge upon its creators and its users.

In the literature on vernacular architecture, the concepts of tradition and the vernacular have been used interchangeably; this dissertation explores both concepts as a process of change within social history. From this perspective, I question how building tradition is capable of actively engaging the present and how it contributes to reviving the past in service of recreating identities in the present. In this respect, I embrace Paul Oliver's comprehension of tradition as the idea of the "handed down knowledge"; in his analysis of vernacular building traditions, he notes that tradition is kept alive by passing its fundamental elements from one generation to the next. In societies that rely primarily on the person-to-person transmission of knowledge, the

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135 Ibid., 89.
136 Ibid.
138 Paul Oliver's case studies of mud houses of the Husa village community in Nigeria and the tipis (traditional tents) of the Native American tribal communities of the Great American Plains demonstrate that the vernacular building processes in traditional societies are carried out by relying on oral transmission. Paul Oliver, "Handed-down Architecture: Tradition and Transmission," in Bourdier and AlSayyad, Dwellings, Settlements, and Tradition: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, 53.
community assumes the role of the source, the transmitter, and the receiver of information.\textsuperscript{139} As can be seen with Bosnian Muslims, the building practice is divided according to particular social practices, gender roles, and generational hierarchy. Dora Crouch and June Johnson argue that incorporating the building patterns established by one generation into the everyday life of the subsequent generation, allows for an understanding of tradition as a system of repetitive rules for social practices.\textsuperscript{140} In sum, these examples make it clear that tradition can be understood as a “bond between people and means by which they transmit the handed-down knowledge and social practices.”\textsuperscript{141} My dissertation examines the process of building and rebuilding mosque architecture as an informal practice that is contingent upon communication between people. As such, it aims to demonstrate how mosque building, as a form of person-to-person transmission of cultural knowledge, contributes to community making.

It is important to acknowledge that it is difficult to examine how oral tradition really operates and, thus, one can only address interpretations of it. Considering the different social and cultural contexts in which the informal building occurs, the process of passing on knowledge is a constant feature of vernacular architecture and it requires people as a medium. In this way, it always remains a social act. For Oliver, tradition is created by the actual process of knowledge transmission, not, necessarily, by the architectural outcome of the process. This refusal of the materiality of tradition leads Oliver to conclude that traditional buildings do not, as such, exist; there can only be “buildings that embody traditions.”\textsuperscript{142} While tradition represents a seemingly


\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., 29. Tradition is different from the notion of custom, which stands for the manner in which these practices are performed. Oliver, \textit{Shelter and Society}, 58.

\textsuperscript{141} Bourdier and AlSayyad, \textit{Dwellings, Settlements, and Tradition: Cross-Cultural Perspectives}, 35.

\textsuperscript{142} Oliver, \textit{Shelter and Society}, 74.
stable framework of social behavior, it also exists to be changed and modified. Arguing that “there can be no change without tradition,” Oliver reveals the paradoxical nature of tradition. On the one hand, it appears to be stable and unchanging, while on the other, it carries the “genetic code” of its own variation.143

This proposal of a constantly changing tradition parallels Eric Hobsbawm’s notion of “invented tradition.” For Hobsbawm, tradition is “a process of formalization and ritualization, characterized by reference to the past, if only by imposing repetition.”144 He distinguishes three intertwined types of invented traditions, based on their purpose for establishing: 1) group membership, 2) relations of authority, and 3) socialization.145 Operating with a certain set of behavioral rules, an individual conforms to one particular value system and, thus, becomes identified with that particular framework. Hobsbawm’s three categories of invented traditions involve strategies for framing identity that can be applied to the study of contemporary mosques in Bosnia. Within the process of designing and building mosques, the system of rules, with which a particular group identifies, implies the existence of selection criteria for determining who is included in the group and who is excluded from it. Repetition of rules of a design, or a building tradition, not only maintains the group’s cultural continuity, it also fosters the group’s social coherence. Following the regulations set forth by one generation links the next generation to the value system of its predecessors, thus establishing a dynamic link between the past and the present. The process of post-war mosque renovations in Bosnia has been evolving quickly, and

143 Ibid., 58.
145 Ibid., 9. As invented traditions are carried out repeatedly, they are linked to routine and conventions, which are motivated by ideology, rather than necessity. Hobsbawm and Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, 3.
to a wide-reaching extent, because it was important for the Muslim communities to reestablish the link that was broken during the war.

**Architecture, nationalism, and the native sense of place**

The utilization of social and cultural practices, as well as material culture, plays an important part in the politics of group identity, which aims, as Hobsbawm contends, to find "some certainty in an uncertain and shaking world." 146 My dissertation examines how invented traditions within Bosnian vernacular building culture allow for creating and mediating the social construction of the Bosniak nation. The past five centuries of the Ottoman Empire have left a significant imprint on Bosnian material culture. As a result, Ottoman imperial architecture has become the first, and the most common, frame of reference for current mosque design in the region. This is visible, for example, in the frequent choice of pencil-shaped minarets. However, Ottoman precedents are not simply reproduced; they also acquire new features that would be characterized as invented traditions. Although Bosnian contemporary mosques are primarily constructed in concrete, they often emulate the cascading domes — associated most famously with the work of the Ottoman architect Sinan — but without the structural necessity for the transference of the load. The choice of this, and other, Ottoman references signals the origins of Bosnian Muslim identity within the long-lasting Ottoman tradition, which automatically implies "continuity with a suitable past." 147 The use of the Ottoman-inspired designs communicates the claim of Bosnian Muslims for the continuation of their Ottoman Empire-identified tradition.


An approach that can be used to investigate the role of tradition and a local sense of place in a nation-building process is suggested in the book *Vernacular Modernism: Heimat, Globalization and the Built Environment* (2005), edited by Maiken Umbach and Bernd Hüppauf.\(^{148}\) The authors argue that, with the creation of nation-states, “the collective that once defined one’s identity” became an abstract term embodied in the concept of the nation.\(^{149}\) As a result, the collective became an *imagined community*\(^{150}\), reflecting Benedict Anderson’s concept of the nation, and “could not be experienced in concrete terms” any longer.\(^{151}\) The ability of the mental, emotional, and imaginary aspects of vernacular spaces to generate a local sense of place, as presented by Umbach and Hüppauf, can broaden the perspective on modernity by viewing them through the lens of “Heimat,” a German term analogous to the notion of the vernacular. *Heimat* means homeland, hometown, or the local place, and refers to a sense of belonging to a place physically, culturally, and/or emotionally.\(^{152}\) *Heimat* is related to the feeling of *heimisch* — a sense of being at home — as opposed to feeling *fremd*, alien to a place.\(^{153}\) Given its associations with feelings of security and familiarity, *Heimat*, like the term vernacular, represents a spatial concept that can be invested with the idea of resistance to the estrangement and isolation

\(^{148}\) Addressing the relationship between tradition, modernity, and place, the book regards vernacular as a space within the modern with the intention of reexamining the existing narratives of modernity. Umbach and Hüppauf, *Vernacular Modernism*, 1-2.

\(^{149}\) Ibid, 4.


\(^{151}\) These aspects are important because “progressive abstraction” represents one of the most crucial characteristics of modernity. Umbach and Hüppauf, *Vernacular Modernism*, 4.

\(^{152}\) Bernd Hüppauf, “Spaces of the Vernacular: Ernst Bloch’s Philosophy of Hope and the German Hometown,” in Umbach and Hüppauf, *Vernacular Modernism*, 86.

\(^{153}\) Ibid., 10.
brought about by industrialization. Yet, Heimat also carries a political burden, based on its connection with the process of identity creation of Großdeutschland (Greater Germany) and its service to the ideology of the Third Reich. In addition to the instrumental role vernacular architecture played in fascist propaganda, Umbach and Hüppauf warn against the essentialist definitions of Heimat, because such definitions are reductive, often arising from politics of segregation and xenophobia.

Umbach and Hüppauf’s argument builds on the recent Heimat debate instigated by Celia Applegate’s seminal book, A Nation of Provincials: The German Idea of Heimat (1990), In this book, Applegate explores the changing nature of the relationship between locality and the nation in German national history. Published at the timely moment of German reunification, she examines how Heimat-related politics in architecture contributed to the identity construction of the German nation. Applegate describes various “local efforts to appreciate provincial cultures and, simultaneously, celebrate German nationhood” as invented traditions. Her examination of Heimat as a concept is consistent with related arguments by Hobsbawm and Ranger; she understands it as a constantly evolving invented tradition whose evolution follows the changing perceptions of German nationhood. For Applegate, Heimat reveals the German people’s struggle

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154 Ibid.
155 Ibid., 11.
157 Applegate’s investigation of the evolution and history of the cultural meaning of the word Heimat shows that the translation of the word as “homeland” or “hometown” would be inadequate, for it can mean different things to different people. Her analysis reveals that the term reentered the German political vocabulary in the nineteenth century when Germany was going through a period of socio-political transformation brought about by industrialization. Ibid., 4.
158 Ibid. For Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, such invented traditions were likely to emerge “when a rapid transformation of society weakens or destroys the social patterns for which ‘old’ traditions had been designated, producing new ones to which they were not applicable.” Hobsbawm and Ranger, The Invention of Tradition, 4.
to create a single national identity out of a “provincially rooted society.”¹⁵⁹ It can be regarded as both a mental and a physical space — the latter may be embodied by vernacular architecture — that simultaneously embraces identity politics on various levels. As such, it has given Germans a possibility to reconcile locally diverse political positions with the “ideal of a single, transcendent nationality.”¹⁶⁰ According to Applegate, Heimat has never represented real social conditions and political situations; rather, it signifies an imaginary sense of place. This is true whether one evaluates the role Heimat has played in helping local communities deal with the increasing societal fragmentation and alienation brought about by modernization, whether one views it as a measure of forgiving and dealing with Nazi history, or whether one sees it as a way to participate in the discussion about the meaning of local traditions for the German nation.

The significance of culture, tradition, and territory in generating the coherence of imagined communities has been identified by theorists of nationalism, such as Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner, and Anthony D. Smith.¹⁶¹ Among other scholars, these three theorists have probed the junctions between ethnic, cultural, and educational patterns, as well as the territorial, visual, and symbolic manifestations of religion in relationship to the politics of nationalism. In this respect, they have stressed the importance of interdisciplinary approaches. These theorists understand nationalism as a specifically modern phenomenon. As such, they have provided different investigative frameworks for the causes and the political potency of nationalism that are critical to my study.

¹⁵⁹ Applegate, A Nation of Provincials, 19.
¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 11.
Vernacular mosque architecture, which arises from and affirms community bonds, thereby creating a culturally specific criterion of authenticity, lends itself as a heuristic object to theories of nationalism. My study of nationalism adheres to the ethno-symbolist approach as posited by the political theorist Anthony Smith, which foregrounds the role of culture — and in the case of this dissertation, religious architecture — in establishing the link between pre-modern ethnic ties and modern nations. This approach takes into account the long-term (pre-modern) cultural factors that affect the formation of nations. In doing so, it represents a critique of both perennialist and modernist perspectives on nations and nationalism. On one hand, it deconstructs the perennialist stance that nations are primordial structures appointed by nature; on the other hand, it allows for an examination of pre-modern roots of nations, an approach that is lacking in the classical modernist perspective (i.e., Gellner, Hobsbawm, Anderson).

Still, ethno-symbolism acknowledges some of the claims about nationalism made by classical modernist theories, which hold that both nation and nationalism are modern socio-political constructs and that both are products of modernization and the global move of states to the state of modernity. While ethno-symbolism acknowledges the embedded-ness of nation and nationalism in historical and geo-cultural terms, it contributes to the study of nationalism because it makes room for the explanation of the roots of nation and nationalism in pre-modern epochs. Furthermore, the ethno-symbolist approach shares the modernist perspective that nations are also real communities linked to a territory, culture and institutions, and that they are a product of a collective effort. This allows for an understanding of the reciprocal cause-effect


164 Ibid., 7.
relationship between nation and nationalism in the novel sense that nations are not simply constructed by elites, but may be also generated through bottom-up nationalism.

In Anthony D. Smith’s recent book, *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach* (2009), the author explores the politics of ethnicity by questioning the impact of politics on ethnicity and national identity, as well as the role culture and ethnicity play within state politics. Smith criticizes the state-centered approaches, used to examine these relationships, for being too focused on the role of political action in crystallizing ethnic and national sentiments. Instead, he argues that one needs to explore the relationship between pre-modern ethnic ties and modern nations through a cultural lens. He suggests that the influence of culture on politics and state formation can be explored through three historical trends: 1) the purification of culture, 2) the universalization of chosenness, and 3) the territorialization of memory.\(^\text{165}\) The recognition of the long history of ethnicity allows one to acknowledge nations as a modern phenomenon, while simultaneously explaining how these nations came to be without having to adopt the perennialist attitude.

This dissertation draws upon the ethno-symbolist approach to explain new models for, and narratives of, the Bosnian national history as it has been “written and rewritten” with mosque architecture. In light of the recent violent ethnic conflict, the massive destruction of the Bosnian cultural heritage, and the ongoing processes of rebuilding and reconciliation, this dissertation explores the types of challenges Bosnian Muslims face in defining their national identity. Notwithstanding the multilayered, fluid, and overlapping nature of identities that Gellner spotlights, this dissertation examines a historical moment — the (re)birth of a nation — in which Bosnian cultures are about to “harden.” In these historical moments, culture becomes the subject

\(^{165}\) Ibid., 448-449.
of the nation’s search for authenticity. Smith terms this process “purification of culture,” and outlines its three main phases as follows:

1. The first phase involves the rediscovery of ethnic past; the community reconstructs the image of its “native life,” thereby defining its cultural boundaries based on selected “shared codes.” The nation’s golden age becomes an “inspiration for contemporary aspirations.”

2. The second phase entails “authentication,” determining what is distinctive and indigenous in one’s culture, and what is not. In this selective process, what is “universal becomes particular.” Authentication is followed by what Smith calls, “possession through filiation, mine because of my ancestry.”

3. Finally, the third phase is based on “reappropriation” of what has been “authenticated.” As Smith notes, people are “encouraged to take possession of their authentic vernacular heritage and their genuine ethno-history.”

In this dissertation I argue that contemporary mosques in Bosnia have become the place where these three phases are simultaneously played out and negotiated. With the individual community’s choice of the mosque’s design, frequently inspired by historical precedents, the community is also selecting the shared codes from those segments of its ethnic past that it identifies as the “Golden Age.” Once selected, historical precedents are modified though design according to certain criteria that determine what is considered to be authentic to one’s culture. Once a mosque is erected, the reappropriation phase begins.

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166 Smith, “Culture, Community and Territory,” 450.

167 Ibid., 450, 451.
Vernacular traditions and globalization

Finally, my analysis of contemporary mosques aims to surpass the critique of globalization that accuses it of being the culprit behind cultural homogenization, thereby allowing for a better comprehension of a mutual interdependence between the local and the global. The homogenizing effect of globalization has been criticized by scholars, such as the American literary critic and political theorist Fredric Jameson, who notes that high capitalism leads to commodification of culture in the context of globalization.\textsuperscript{168} In his “Notes on Globalization as a Philosophical Issue” (1998), Jameson disapproves of the worldwide cultural dominance of the United States.\textsuperscript{169} He ascribes enormous power to commodities and understands cultural production as an entity that is in direct service to the marketplace. While Jameson’s assessment of the homogenizing effect of globalization is pertinent to the contemporary globalization of culture it still operates within the categories of binary oppositions of ‘us versus them’ — the very paradigms of the hegemonic discourse he aims to criticize. The problematic point in Jameson’s critique is the assumption of the center-periphery relationship between the West and the victimized rest of the world.

The popular dichotomies such as “East-West”, “center-periphery”, “developed-undeveloped”, etc., have already been questioned by sociologists, such as Janet L. Abu-Lughod. In Abu-Lughod’s article “Disappearing Dichotomies: First World-Third World; Traditional-Modern,” published in 1992, the author argues that the conditions of globalized divisions of labor in today’s world creates a “reduced congruence between spatial location and


\textsuperscript{169} Ibid.
social formation.” She notes that changes in the economic system are inevitably reflected in the built environment, whereby the taken-for-granted distinction between traditional and non-traditional architecture no longer makes sense. While calling for a dynamic approach to tradition, Abu-Lughod warns against the use and abuse of the concept of tradition. She contends that the built environment is reflective of traditional patterns of behavior and helps perpetuate those patterns. Consequently, “traditionalism” in architecture may also stand for defending the existing order of domination.

In the 1990s, the discourse on globalization took a new direction when sociologists, such as Manuel Castells (1997) and Roland Robertson (1995), began to theorize globalization, not from the perspective of vanishing local places, but by questioning how new forms of global interconnectedness and mobility affect social relations and the sense of local place. The key argument presented here is that globalization does not outdo the local; rather, it allows for new evaluation of the local though the lens of global connections. Castells defines globalization in terms of global information flows that are enabled by technological infrastructure that exists in tension with local (physically bound) information processes. The problem with this understanding of the global-local relationship is that it implies a unilinear impact of the global on the local, that is, local identities seem to be primarily formed in response to globalization.

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171 Ibid.

172 Ibid., 10.


Anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (1996) also understands social relations to be organized under conditions of constant flow and mobility conditioned by globalization, yet Appadurai applies a very different spin than Castells. According to Appadurai, the globalization of culture can no longer be understood in terms of the existing dichotomies of center-periphery, push-and-pull migration theory, economical surplus and deficits, or producers and consumers. Rather, it should be seen as a “complex, overlapping, disjunctive order” that implies a “new role for the imagination in social life.” The global cultural scenarios, most visible in the imaginary landscapes of the entertainment and leisure industries, are now characterized by revisions and transformations of historical imagination. Appadurai points to various examples of absorption and appropriation of globally dominating influences in a variety of local contexts. Appadurai’s main argument, to which I adhere, is that cultural globalization needs to be explored as a tension between two contradictory forces: homogenization and heterogenization. The friction between the two forces generates cultural hybridity. For example, globalization of culture has conditioned the emergence of new cultural spheres produced by diasporic communities. These phenomena are now increasingly blurring the distinctions between the ‘indigenous’ and ‘foreign’ cultural productions.

The ways in which the issues of cultural hybridity have become relevant to the discussion of vernacular building traditions are explored in Jane M. Jacobs’ essay “Tradition is (not)
Modern: Deterritorializing Globalization” (2004).178 By investigating how globalization has conditioned the emergence of specific tourist architecture, which is now named Aboriginal architecture, Jacobs argues that tradition is indeed modernity’s own invention.179 As a case study, she discusses the hybrid identity of a number of architectural elements that were constructed on Aboriginal lands during the 1990s in order to meet the needs of tourists. While these hotels and cultural centers were meant to express Aboriginal identity, they were not forced on the local Aboriginal community and they did not appropriate Aboriginal culture.180 In fact, the Aboriginal community commissioned the building of these structures. Jacobs refers to this building process as hybrid inventiveness, and she sees it as providing an outlook on how one might talk about the deteriorating effects of globalization, while simultaneously avoiding the “romantic notions of architectural hybridity” and the “cynical readings of appropriation” in vernacular architecture.181

This example demonstrates that vernacular architecture has taken on a novel appearance under the impact of globalization. Yet, the expanding market for consumption of vernacular traditions can also lead to an understanding of modern vernacular traditions as insufficiently authentic or archaic.182 Jacobs suggests that the idea of invented tradition can be a useful conceptual framework for better understanding modern traditions, but at the same time, it also leaves one with the feeling that there must once have been an ‘original’ tradition from which

179 Jacobs argues that modernity and tradition are not the opposites; rather, tradition is “brought into being by modernity’s own imaginary.” Ibid., 30, 31, 35.
180 Ibid., 41.
181 Ibid., 40.
182 Ibid., 32.
these modern traditions are derived.\textsuperscript{183} Nevertheless, for Jacobs, globalization has provided new conditions for the transference of tradition and new systems for its authorization. She embraces Appadurai's idea of the "process geographies" of the global flows of people and capital in order to assert that scholars need to move beyond the understanding of tradition as stasis, in favor of its "vibrating couplet" with modernity.\textsuperscript{184} With her paradoxical motto "tradition is (not) modern", Jacobs suggests that modernity and tradition are simultaneously mutually dependent and mutually exclusive.

While the contemporary technological outburst enables an easier movement of and communication between people, it simultaneously shortens the distance between cultural phenomena, creating new conditions of "neighborliness."\textsuperscript{185} Localities for Appadurai are not to be understood as context; rather, their boundaries are framed by contexts. To understand these new conditions of neighborliness in the context of Bosnian mosque architecture, I adopt the actor-network model rooted in the Actor-Network Theory (ANT).\textsuperscript{186} I transpose it from the realm of science studies and economic processes, with which it is usually associated, into the realm of architecture. According to this model, no single global entity exists that stands above the local; rather, there are only a countless number of relationships and links between a vast number of actors and actants that, together, constitute a material-semiotic network. While this approach allows for non-humans (actants) to have agency, and an actor to also be viewed as a singular network, the phenomenon, in one place, should not be analyzed through its relation or

\textsuperscript{183} Ibid., 33.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., 31; 33.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 29.
opposition to some larger global entity, but, rather, it should be evaluated in terms of its relation to other nodes.

As architectural critic Nezar AlSayyad suggests in The End of Tradition?, globalization has also made clear that culture has become increasingly placeless.\textsuperscript{187} While the local remains the main anchor of identity, to be played out in the context of globalization, it has now become problematic to relate identity and tradition to a place: As AlSayyad argues, “Hybrid people do not always create hybrid places,” and “hybrid places do not always accommodate hybrid people.”\textsuperscript{188} While the vernacular built environments have been evaluated as a form of resistance to or a critique of the homogenizing effect of globalization, they have also revealed a dynamic engagement with the constantly changing cultural identities. As such, they allow us to realize that what may be perceived as an indigenous landscape is inevitably a product of cultural globalization.

In conclusion, in reference to the global perspective on mosque building in Bosnia, this dissertation adheres to the “heterogenization” school of thought. This approach premises that homogenizing global trends, as they are introduced into particular cultures, undergo a process of indigenous stylization that, as anthropologist Arjun Appadurai notes, subsumes and differentiates them. Contemporary mosque architecture in Bosnia exemplifies both the local and the global tendencies that are inherent in today’s Islamic architecture, whereas the vernacular building traditions represent hybrid ‘laboratories’ of different identity-formation processes. While the pre-fabrication of minaret building elements has offered the local Bosnian communities the possibility of using affordable and quick means to rebuild their destroyed mosques, to some extent, it has also led to a standardization of certain architectural forms. At the same time, access

\textsuperscript{187} Nezar AlSayyad, “The End of Tradition, or the Tradition of Endings?” in The End of Tradition?, 11.

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid.
to visual information online, religious education, and modern materials and means of
collection have also allowed for a diversification of mosque designs. The argument posed in
my dissertation views mosque architecture as a medium for the creation of group identity
through the signals of religious and cultural difference. As such, it aims to demonstrate that
while mosques might be polyvalent, they can be understood as a tool used by Muslim
nationalists to strengthen Bosniak identity politics and smooth out local differences even as they
operate to critique the fixed cultural categories set by nationalists of other stripes.

4. Objectives, scope, and limitations

This dissertation has several objectives. The first issue I would like to draw attention to is the
problematic state of reconciliation and the still sharp and unresolved civil conflicts in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Did the Dayton Peace Accord of 1995 actually achieve peace in Bosnia and
provide for the political and economic stability in the region? Recent publications by historians
and political scientists have suggested that the compromise made for the sake of the Accord
deepened Bosnia-Herzegovina’s political and economic dependency on Western powers, and
confirmed its inferior position vis-à-vis the European Union.189 My dissertation aims to
contribute to this critique from a cultural perspective, by illuminating how the political conflicts
between the Bosnian ethnic groups have been restaged in the sphere of religious architecture.

189 Edin Šarčević, Dejtonski ustav: Karakteristike i karakteristični problemi (Sarajevo: Dondacija Konrad Adenauer
e.V., 2009); Forschungszentrum für Konstruktive Konfliktbearbeitung Berghof, Peacebuilding and Civil Society in
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ten Years After Dayton (Berlin: Lit, 2006); Sumantra Bose, Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist
Partition and International Intervention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); David Chandler, Bosnia:
Faking Democracy After Dayton, 2nd ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2000); Wolfgang Petritsch, Bosna i Hercegovina od
Daytona do Evrope (Svjetlost, 2002).
The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the recent bloodshed in the region has been frequently described as being based on “ancient ethnic hatreds.” Despite countering arguments by historians such as Ivo Banac and Noel Malcolm, who have made clear that these “hatreds” were produced in historical time by domestic agents with agendas in alliance with large states or empires with interests in the region, the well-established cliché of “ancient hatreds” continues to contribute to the stereotype of the Balkans as a source of instability in Europe. This dissertation aims to balance this view of the region’s history with the perspective of an “ancient comity,” held by historians Ivan Lovrenović, Robert J. Donia, and John V.A. Fine, by explaining how the Bosnian peoples of different religious and ethnic backgrounds lived together and learned from each other throughout history. Mosques, churches, and synagogues that stood next to each other for centuries (a situation unheard of in Europe at the time) were witness to the fact that a peaceful and mutually enriching coexistence of different ethnic groups was not only possible, but also prevalent in Bosnia.

This history was denied by nationalist extremists and by some groups of Western policymakers and scholars; its material traces were subjected to a massive campaign of erasure though the systematic destruction of cultural heritage during the recent war. In investigating this issue, I am deeply indebted to historian and bibliographer András Riedlmayer for sharing with me his research about the destruction of the regional religious architecture, along other

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192 Riedlmayer, “From Ashes: The Past and Future of Bosnia’s Cultural heritage,” 100.

193 Riedlmayer argues that religious sites were deliberately targeted by nationalist extremists during the war. The long-term goal of this destruction, Riedlmayer contends, was to construct the newly conquered territories as “ethically and religiously pure” within a politically charged discourse about the rights and wrongs of the war. For this reason, religious edifices were destroyed in such a way that future reconstruction would be almost impossible. Riedlmayer, “From Ashes: The Past and Future of Bosnia’s Cultural heritage,” 114.
material and suggestions relevant to my dissertation. Deepening the awareness about the long history of Bosnian coexistence is of particular importance for its ongoing survival. My dissertation aims to contribute to this agenda from the perspective of Islamic religious architecture, by building on the work of historians such as Alija Bejtić, Madžida Bećirbegović, Adem Handžić, Hivzija Hasandedić, Hamdija Kreševljaković, Faruk Muftić, Mehmed Mujezinović, Amir Pasić, Husref Redžić, and Hazim Šabanović, whose contributions to the field will be discussed in the literature review below. The work of these scholars provided the context within which I pursued my own research into the as yet neglected field of post-socialist Islamic religious architecture in Bosnia. My dissertation aims to reduce this lacuna. Learning from the work of historians and political scientists such as Aydin Babuna, Mustafa Imamović, and Francine Friedman, who have examined the ethno-national genesis of Bosnian Muslims, my project will also add to the missing component in the body of literature about the region’s political history, which so far has largely neglected religious architecture.194

The destructive impact of war on regional cultural heritage has already been studied by several Bosnian and international scholars, including Riedlmayer, Robert Bevan, Muharem Omerdić, Michael Sells, and Kemal Zukić, but much more research in this field remains to be done.195 Initial surveys about the war’s impact on the Islamic religious architecture primarily


cover the area of the Bosniak-Croat Federation; we still have only limited information about the state of destruction and rebuilding in Bosnia's Serb Republic. So far, neither quantitative nor qualitative studies have been conducted that would document and interpret how post-war mosque architecture has evolved in response to the war, and my dissertation is pioneering in this regard. As much more research remains to be done on the subject, I hope that my dissertation will trigger the interest of other researchers to understand the depth and breadth of what was forever destroyed in the war.

The contribution of this project to the field of architectural history and the humanities in general is manifold. It deals with a facet of Islamic architecture in the Western Balkans that has not yet been comprehensively tackled in American and European (or even in Bosnian) scholarship. My project will highlight the continuous impact of the Ottoman Empire and its dissolution on cultural and political life in the region. In this regard, my work aims to expand the canon of Islamic architecture, which foregrounds monuments from the capitals of the former Islamic heartlands. By pointing at the dynamic negotiation of identity politics within the sphere of mosque architecture, my dissertation also proposes that we broaden the canon of architectural history to position Islamic architecture more centrally.

Applying theories of nationalism and globalization, and discourses on identity and aesthetics, I will try, in the chapters that follow, to unveil the many levels on which identity is produced through built forms, giving insight into the relationship between culture and politics that ultimately goes far beyond the limits of a regional case study. In the light of the ongoing European discussions over religious and cultural pluralism, which concern the anxiety caused among non-Muslims by the visibility of Muslims and their mosques in public space in Europe, 

my dissertation is designed, partly, as an intervention in this topic, contextualizing the Bosnian experience as a part of a long history of the relations between an indigenous European Islam and a predominant Christian/secular European establishment.

Recent conflicts over the newly planned mosques in Europe reveal a very distorted and reductive idea of the mosque as a specific building type defined though a poor repertoire of forms. Such an understanding of the mosque, held by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, is actually contradicted when we look at vernacular mosques over the dozens of cultures in which Islam has some foothold: the mosque’s fluid conceptual definition and its multifaceted formal possibilities become even more prominent than its most notable and monumental examples. Just as all churches are not the Chartres Cathedral, not all mosques are the domed, minaretted structures of popular mythology. The region of Bosnia and Herzegovina is an interesting region to study in relation to these concerns not only because of its geo-political position as a “threshold” between Christian and Islamic worlds, but also because of its long history of multi-ethnic coexistence and cross-cultural fertilization, which is embodied in its extraordinarily diverse religious monuments. My exploration of this diversity shows that Islamic identities, just as identities of other world cultures, are multifaceted and local, demonstrating that people who associate themselves with Islam may have diametrically opposed worldviews.

My research is pioneering in a number of ways. This is the first qualitative survey of post-socialist mosque architecture in the country. I have studied a wide range of mosques which, due to their recent date of origin and informal manner of building or renovation, have not yet received any scholarly attention. The lack of plans, photographs, and other documentation necessitated my travel to the region, where I conducted on-site research in twenty different cities and villages. During my fieldwork I collected diverse primary materials, including photographs.
and documents of the mosques’ pre-war condition, war destruction, and post-war renovation, and interviewed persons who I identified as key informants including imams, members of mosque building committees, *jamaat* (congregation) members, construction workers, or architects. I set up a photographic database of 1043 religious monuments found throughout the entire country, covering 874 out of 1472 mosques, that is, approximately 70% of existing mosques in Bosnia (from the mosques registered at the Islamic Community). The database also contains documentation about 34 small neighborhood mosques (*mesdžidi*), 21 mausoleums (*turbeta*), and 16 Qur’an schools (*mektebi*), among other monuments.

My database combines different sources. It includes the records compiled by historian András Riedlmayer, who has generously shared with me his collection of documentation concerning the destruction or damage inflicted upon Bosnian religious architecture during the war (the database that he gave me covers 313 mosques, 4 Dervish lodges, and 67 Catholic churches, and some other monuments). Building on his work, the material in my database is organized so that it allows for a stylistic comparison between pre-war and post-war appearances of mosques. The majority of photographs were gathered from the Islamic Community, either from the archive of the Center Islamic Architecture at the Rijaset in Sarajevo, from websites of the Islamic Community’s district authorities (*medžlisi*) or from other Internet platforms. A small portion of my material comes from the Commission to Preserve National Monuments in Sarajevo. Historical information about mosques in my database is taken from the previous studies of Bosnian historians mentioned above.

I submitted my collected material to analysis via data-visualization software that is usually used for stock-market analysis, which represents a novel approach to the study of the

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subject. The application of this software has allowed me to compare the pre-war and the post-war stylistic trends in relation to specific geographic locations and to illustrate the systematic nature of war destruction. This quantitative aspect of my research is still in progress and is thus not included in this dissertation, but it has certainly influenced the qualitative analysis that I present in this dissertation.

Expanding on my initial survey of Bosnia’s post-war mosques, I selected a panel of case studies with exemplary features to answer the following questions: How has regional mosque architecture changed in response to the experience of war and destruction? What new mosque forms have evolved, and how are these related to the war trauma? What are the different motivations behind constructing mosques? How can the Muslims’ heightened sense of identity be theoretically and historically explained — is there a final defeat of coexistence or is there a chance that Bosnia will return to its historical path as a tolerant and multi-cultural national space? In what ways can mosque architecture provide answers to this larger question?

To begin with, post-war mosques point at the return of diasporas and the revitalization of Muslim communities after the war. Those who survived “ethnic cleansing” build or rebuild mosques as means of asserting material evidence of their existence, while simultaneously recovering from traumatic experiences. The process of building fosters regeneration of Muslims’ social networks. Second, reconstructing old mosques and building new ones are articulated as acts that specifically redefine the character of the nation born out of crisis. These processes inevitably operate within the parameters of collective memory and myth, which always determine the invention of traditions. This is most visible in mosque architecture, which now acts as a tool for “writing” a suitable national history. Third, mosques give visual form to the regional presence of Bosniak communities, demarcating their territories among and against their
Serbian and Croat neighbors. Utilized to inscribe land, mosques have indeed become an instrument for reclaiming post-Dayton territories, thus acting as a counter-discourse to the Serbian (Orthodox Christian) and Croatian nationalist (Roman Catholic) agendas. Fourth, mosques perform as markers of very specific interpretations of Islam — whether conservative or liberal — that define various communities. As such, they act as literal yardsticks of a community’s religiosity. Fifth, certain mosques have received their funding from foreign sources, pointing to the attempt of foreign Islamic networks to increase their presence and influence in Europe by utilizing their denominational links to Bosnian Muslims. It is often the case that the foreign donors also bring with them a sectarian agenda that can be at odds with local desires and traditions. The competition between contemporary international tastes and indigenous ones in mosque design points to the sometimes imperialist cultural effects of globalization on limiting and extinguishing vernacular traditions, but also their heterogenization.

While the resurgent Islamic and national identities are being negotiated through religious architecture, I contend that the negotiation of the many competing visions of these identities is reflected in a multitude of competing styles, whereby a single architectural referent may be utilized to communicate diametrically opposite ideas of selfhood. While functions and meanings of mosque architecture have been changing throughout time, I conclude that we are seeing something new in the post-war period in the degree to which mosques have crystallized and articulated national and religious identities.

Acknowledging that Islamic religious architecture in Bosnia encompasses a range of different structures, such as small neighborhood mosques (*mesdžidi*), Sufi dervish lodges (*tekije*), Qur’an schools (*mektebi*), higher religious educational institutions (*medrese*), Muslim cemeteries and mausolea (*turbeta*), time restrictions and the large scope of potentially relevant research
material played a role in my decision to focus my research on mosques, alongside their prominence as a form of community’s representation.

The focus of this study on vernacular architecture reflects the fact that majority of mosques in Bosnia are built informally, by community members themselves, using their own skills and locally available materials. The scope of my research includes regional mosque architecture since the fifteenth century, yet these enter into my focus only in as much as they intrude into the set of mosques built or restored in the post-socialist era, that is, the period after 1995 and before 2010. Given the recent timeframe of my study, I acknowledge that the identity-shaping processes examined in this dissertation are still ongoing and are subject to constant flux.

Though the issue of identity is given a prominent place in my study, I would like to stress that the meaning of contemporary mosques in Bosnia reaches far beyond a political reading — these mosques still primarily function as places of worship, and as a platform for diverse social services and secular activities. Contemporary mosque architecture in Bosnia, as I am trying to demonstrate, is not merely reducible to a stake in a political struggle. Rather, it is shaped by a multiplicity of motives and desires that inform its designers, implementers, users and critiques on different scales of engagement.

Within the course of my research, I have come to realize that it is much too strong to argue that different religious and political ideologies stand in a one to one relationship of determination with some correspondent architectural style; on the contrary, groups with the same ideological affiliation may express their identity in form of completely different architectural style. Because one and the same architectural style can be potentially utilized to express varied or even opposed agendas of their patrons, a stylistic categorization is not applicable to the study of these mosques. The meaning of post-war mosque architecture in Bosnia, as I argue in this
dissertation, evolves though a complex interplay of form, context, and process of architectural production.

5. Outline of the dissertation

Focusing on the term “identity”, which is employed with different connotations across different fields, I have taken an interdisciplinary approach to study contemporary mosque architecture, organizing my dissertation around three different scales on which identity is spatially produced. On each of these three scales, I argue, the frictions that operate between the local and global factors, as well as the top-down and bottom-up building strategies exercised by indigenous and expatriate builders, produce new meanings in mosque architecture. These novel functions and meanings of mosques exist in addition or parallel to their traditional religious and community functions.

My argument will be structured through the following four chapters: In the first chapter, entitled “Mosque Architecture, Coexistence, and War in Bosnia: A Brief History and Historiography,” I trace the changes in form, function, and meaning of mosques since the fifteenth century, analyzing how the cultural and political history of Bosnian Muslims has been “written” and “rewritten” through religious architecture. In the second part of this chapter, I explore the role of architecture in the process of fragmenting and altering collective memory of the Bosnian multicultural society during the war of 1992-1995. More specifically, I investigate how the nationalist extremists seized on cultural heritage — and religious monuments in particular — to facilitate the breakdown of Bosnia’s cosmopolitan society. This historical
background then informs the review of literature relevant to my research, which takes into account the discourses of vernacular architecture, nationalism, and globalization mentioned above.

Chapter Two (the regional scale), “Inat Mosque and Memorial Mosque,” traces two emerging genres of religious architecture that produce identity through a network of mosques that exhibit common features. The first is the genre of what I call the Inat Mosque (The Mosque of Defiance), which is defined not by style, but by the builder’s motivation for construction: to make a statement in response to the war and the denial of the “ethnic cleansing.” The second type, which I identify as Memorial Mosque, encompasses mosques and mosque-like structures that function primarily as commemorative place for war victims and martyrs. Taken together, Inat Mosque and the Memorial Mosque represent two new types of mosques, spatial instruments that aggrandize and strengthen the social and political standing of their builders in the context of an ongoing ethnic conflict that still rages on fifteen years after the war.

In Chapter Three (the scale of the building), “Authenticated Vernacular: Turhan Emin-beg Mosque in Ustikolina,” I examine the role of architectural design in promoting a sense of cultural distinctiveness, beginning with the observation that symbols of Bosnian Muslims’ ethnicity have been ostentatiously revived in post-war mosque architecture but that their meanings have been transformed in the service of finding national identity. In this respect, I outline a general dilemma that has been inflicted on many communities within the process of post-war renovation: different conceptions of “authenticity” have emerged and clashed, as in those conflicts that pit professional and informal renovation against each other. On the scale of the building, I conclude, the mosque physically links three central components of the Bosniak
national identity: religious distinctiveness, cultural rootedness, and the belonging to a “historic homeland.”

Chapters Two and Three illustrate the ways in which mosques are utilized to provide the Bosnian Muslims with a means of reclaiming territory, reshaping their collective memory, and rewriting their national history after the war. Although formally the main mission of the mosque is religious, these seemingly aleatory identity tasks are inscribed in common, bottom-up perceptions of the mosque as a Bosniak community symbol, which are shared by the mosque’s planners, designers, users, supporters and opponents. Thus, unlike the secular or state-centric architecture of the Yugoslav period, in the postwar period, the mosque has fostered the cultural identity upon which Bosniak national ideals are based, which puts it in an uneasy tension with the multi-national framework of the state. From this perspective, I suggest that the contemporary mosque architecture in post-war Bosnia can be understood as a counter-discourse to the Serbian and Croatian nationalist aspirations.

In the fourth chapter (the global scale), “The Neo-Ottoman vs. The Pan-Islamic Mosque: Tracing Global and Transnational Islamic Networks in Bosnia,” I investigate how these bottom-up visions of Bosnian, Bosniak, and Islamic identities are challenged by the top-down approaches to architectural production. By looking at mosques built from donations of international humanitarian organizations and designed by professional architects, I outline several novel phenomena in mosque program and patronage introduced after the war though donations from Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and other Islamic countries. I argue that the large-scale mosques and Islamic centers built by expatriate donors have had two major effects on the vernacular Islamic traditions. One has been to try to suppress traditional Bosnian Muslim belief and practice, through the proselytizing activity facilitated through well appointed Islamic Centers
which offer high-class educational and socially beneficial programs infused with the teachings of Wahhabi and Salafi Islam. The second is to introduce a conflict of scale and ornament into the domain of mosque construction: the mosques that are supported by the Arab Islamic states tend to be larger, built on the model of Ottoman mosques, and tendentiously barer, stripped of the various symbols typical of the Bosnian Islamic tradition in favor of the iconoclastic bareness favored by the Wahhabi views.

At all three scales of examination, I conclude, the mosque functions as a link between a certain vision of the ethnic past (often stripped of those features disliked by the nationalists) and the continuing creation of a post-Yugoslav identity. These are the stresses that are brought to bear on the different designs, which differently select and add to aspects of the Ottoman history to which they necessarily reach back (eliding the whole Yugoslav period) with the intent of guiding the ongoing process of national purification. The crux of the issue here is the negotiation of competing nationalist and religious ideologies in the realm of architecture, of a friction between global and local interests carried out within the cultural sphere of a single democratic state, often in the context of the built form of the mosque.
“Džamije lete” 197 “Mosques are blown up”

Jao, jadna Bosno suverena Oh, you poor sovereign Bosnia
Zbog Alije posta razorena Destroyed because of Alija [Izetbegović]
Što proglasi Bosnu suverenu Why did you declare an independent Bosnia
Ne imao glavu na ramenu May you have no head on your shoulders
Došlo vreme da se Srbi svete The time has come for Serbs to take revenge
Sve džamije u oblake lete All mosques are blown up to the skies
Nema Ante, Azema, i Tite There is no more Ante, Azem, or Tito
Da te opet od Srbina stite To protect you from the Serbs again
Daba Bosni Ramazanskog posta The Ramadan fast will do Bosnia no good
Ne spase te ni Alah ni Gospa Neither Allah nor Our Lady will save you
Jer Srbina nema nigde ravna Because no one is like the Serbs
Jer Srbine neće ničijega jarma Because the Serbs want no one’s yoke
Nećeš Aljo proći kao prije There is no getting away for you, oh Alija, this time
Ti na štapu nosićeš dimije Your dimije [female Muslim pantaloons] you will carry
Tvoja propast već je na vidiku on a beggar’s staff
Kad ti kcerka uci politiku Your downfall is already in sight
Now that your daughter is learning politics

1. Islam and coexistence in Bosnia

The domed and the pitched-roof mosque

Islam arrived to Bosnia in the course of the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans in the mid-fifteenth century. Prior to the arrival of the Ottomans, medieval Bosnia was an independent kingdom in a state of decline. The religious landscape of this kingdom was distinctive in Europe with its three Christian churches: Roman Catholicism was predominant, alongside the competing Eastern Orthodox and the schismatic Bosnian Church. None of the three Christian churches were well organized or had well educated clergy; nonetheless, late medieval Bosnia had a range of religious buildings: a number of churches, monasteries, and royal mausoleums existed within the walls of medieval fortifications and towns, mostly in those towns that were seats of Bosnian Kings and nobility (that is, Bobovac, Kreševo, Jajce, Kraljeva Sutjeska, and Visoki).198

The wide-scale adoption of Islam among the local Christian population paralleled the gradual consolidation of Ottoman rule in the region during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a process in which the development of cities and mosque architecture played the role of catalyst.

Mosque architecture, far from being simply a religious necessity, fueled a multipurpose strategy in Bosnia: it signaled the presence of Islam and declared the competence and grandeur of the Ottoman Empire, but in its more vernacular forms it provided social services and nucleated urbanism in a largely agrarian population.

198 Examples include the church of Kosača in the fortress of Sokol and the church of St. Luke in the town of Jajce. Franciscan monasteries were mainly placed at the margins of fortified towns and in proximity to the gates, as, for example, in Kraljeva Sutjeska, Olovo, Srebrenica, or Livno. Orthodox Christian monasteries were mainly located in the southern region of Hum (Herzegovina) and in the eastern region of Podrinje (around the river Drina). Although churches were continuously constructed throughout the Middle Ages, their architecture was modest, and only a few traces remain from them today. Mehmed Bublin, Gradovi Bosne i Hercegovine: Milenijum Razvoja i Godine Urbicida = The Cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Millenium of Development and the Years of Urbicide, 1st ed. (Sarajevo: Sarajevo Pub, 1999), 36-37. For more information about the medieval Bosnian fortresses, see Hamdija Kreševljaković, “Stari bosanski gradovi (Old Bosnian Fortresses),” Naše starine 1 (1953): 7-46.
Ottoman conquest of Bosnia and early mosque architecture in the region

The Ottoman conquest of the region was a gradual process; different areas in Bosnia were progressively conquered until the end of the sixteenth century. After the last Bosnian king, Stjepan Tomasević, refused to pay tribute to the Ottomans, a massive assault of the Ottoman army led by Sultan Mehmed II the Conqueror (reigned 1451-81) led to the fall of the Bosnian Kingdom in 1463. Subsequently, the region became part of a greater province (beglerbeglik) of Rumelia, the Ottoman Balkans, with the seat of the beglerbeg in Sofia. The area of contemporary Bosnia was politically organized into three districts (sandžaks): Bosna, Zvornik, and Herzegovina. In the late sixteenth century Bosnia was territorially expanded and upgraded to the status of a semiautonomous province under the rubric of beglerbeglik (later called “Beylik” and “Elayet”), which was headed by a beglerbeg. If the establishment of the Bosnian beglerbeglik is taken as the final stage of the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia it can be concluded, as historian Hazim Šabanović argues, that the establishment of imperial rule in the region was a gradual process that took more than 150 years to complete.

It was also with the arrival of Ottomans in the region that the first mosques began to appear in the landscape: they were built by and for the Ottoman army in conquered areas of east

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199 Herzegovina, for example, was seized in 1481. The city of Jajce, the residence of the last Bosnian king, was under permanent Ottoman siege from the 1520s. It managed to resist until 1527, thanks to occasional food supplies from Hungary, but was finally taken in 1527. Bihać in the far northwest was taken as late as 1592, when it became the seat of the Bihać Sandžak. The Ottomans set up a garrison in the pre-existing citadel, which was the most important fortification in Bosnia until the end of the eighteenth century. Jajce was taken 1463 and kept in Ottoman hand until the end of December the same year, after which Jajce became the seat of the Jajačka Banovina. After several unsuccessful attempts of seizure, Jajce finally fell after the Mohačka Battle in 1527. Kreševljaković, “Stari bosanski gradovi (Old Bosnian Towns),” 24. 31.

200 The governors of the three sandžaks (sandžak-begs) were appointed by the sultan, and directed from Istanbul. Around 1554, the seat of government was moved to Banja Luka.

201 The seat of the beglerbeg was later moved several times, first to Sarajevo in 1639, then to Travnik in 1697, and then again to Sarajevo in 1850. Zvornik and Herzegovina remained sandžaks under sandžak-begs for a while, but were legally controlled by the Bosnian vizier.

202 Hazim Šabanović, Bosanski pašaluk; Postanak i upravna podjela, Naučno društvo NR Bosne i Hercegovine. Djela knj. 14 (Sarajevo: Oslobodjenje, 1959).
and central Bosnia, as interpolations of the garrisoned medieval fortified towns and fortresses. Architectural historian Madžida Bećirbegović contends that many of these early mosques were modest, single-space structures with wooden minarets. Their construction was an integral part of structural adaptations of fortresses, which were made in order to satisfy the spiritual needs of the Ottoman garrisons. These fort-mosques were usually built either as separate buildings or pre-existing structures were transformed into mosques with the addition of a minaret. The typical placement of these fort-mosques in barely accessible locations or secured zones within the garrison was influenced by security issues and the unstable political circumstances in which they were built. A prominent example of this early mosque architecture in citadels stood in Kušlat, a medieval fort located on top of an almost vertical cliff in eastern Bosnia. This small wooden mosque was designed with a very steep wooden hipped roof and a wooden minaret (Fig. 1.1).

Apart from interpolations in forts, in a very few instances the early mosque in Bosnia took shape though conversions of pre-existing churches. The Fethija Mosque (Fethija džamija)

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203 Madžida Bećirbegović states that these early mosques were mainly modest single-space structures with wooden minarets. We have the least historical evidence about the fifteenth-century mosques, and the most about the sixteenth-century ones. Madžida Bećirbegović, Džamije sa drvenom munarom u Bosni i Hercegovini, Biblioteka Kulturno nasljede. (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1990), 13.

204 Other adaptations of fortifications involved erection of housing, munitions’ magazines, and other forms of infrastructure required for life in the garrison. Both the garrison crew salaries and the architectural changes made in the forts were financed by the state.

205 Their presence of a religious edifice in a military-administrative center was not an Ottoman novelty; many fortresses from the pre-Ottoman period had churches built in them. Adem Handžić notes that fragments of a church altar remained evident in the wall of the fortress at Kušlat until only recently. The mosque that was erected in the fortress stood in close proximity to these church relics. Adem Handžić, Tužla i njena okolina u XVI vijeku (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1975), 143. The destruction of this mosque by the Serb forces in February 1993 will be elaborated later in the chapter.

206 Given its prominent location, the mosque was later also used as a pilgrimage site. The mosque was rather small (ca. 6,5x6,8m). For a plan, section and a drawing, see: Madžida Bećirbegović, Džamije sa drvenom munarom u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1990), 110-114; According to the on-site research conducted by András Riedlmayer in July 2002, the Kušlat mosque was destroyed in February 1993 by Serb forces. The mosque ruins were entirely removed, including the foundation stones. Riedlmayer, “Database ‘The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1996: A Post-War Survey of Selected Municipalities’.”
in Bihać is one of the few known examples (Fig. 1.2). The mosque was converted from the Gothic Catholic church of St. Antony of Padua (Crkva Sv. Antuna Padovanskog, end of thirteenth / beginning of fourteenth century) following the Ottoman seizure of Bihać in 1592. The programmatic transformation of this church into a mosque was architecturally resolved with a few interventions, such as the construction of a mihrab (prayer niche) in the interior and the reuse of the church tower as a minaret. The elongated Gothic windows and the rose window above the entrance door are still part of this mosque. Similarly, the Fethija Mosque in Jajce (or Sulejman-hanova džamija) was transformed from the fifteenth century Catholic church of St. Mary. Here too, architectural adaptations were minimal; the church walls were rebuilt and the bell tower of St. Luke was reused as a minaret.

Seen from a political perspective, the transformation and renaming of the most monumental buildings in Bihać and Jajce symbolically underscored the proclamation of the Ottoman authority in these regions: the name given to both mosques was “Fethija,” which means “victory” or “conquest” in Arabic. These architectural proclamations of political power, Riedlmayer argues, need to be considered within the medieval context in which they took place, when religion and state were unified — the monumental religious monuments in a principal town were symbols of the ruler, including the Ottoman sultan. As the empire expanded, according to Riedlmayer, the Ottomans usually turned the major churches of cities that they conquered into

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207 For plans, section, and photos of the mosque see: Bečirbegović, Džamije sa drvenom munarom u Bosni i Hercegovini, 67-69.
mosques, but they left other smaller churches to the local Christians for their use. However, this practice was very rare in Bosnia, where most mosques were built anew.

The Dervish lodge and the Islamization of Bosnia

The Ottomans introduced a number of significant changes into the organization of social, political, and economic life. Among the most significant of these was a massive conversion of the local, previously Christian population to Islam. The reasons for the massive voluntary acceptance of Islam have been long debated, and most scholars today agree that the Islamization process proceeded gradually, over the course of several centuries, and that it was conditioned by a number of different social, economic, and political factors. The Islamization of the local, predominantly Christian population proceeded on a very large scale without forced conversions — an intriguing phenomenon that historian Noel Malcolm considers “the most distinctive and important feature of modern Bosnian history.”

Malcolm argues that the local Bosnian Church had been largely weak and defunct, even before the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia, and suggests that the rivalry between the Orthodox and

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210 Ibid.
211 In some instances Orthodox Churches have also been built on top of ruined Catholic Franciscan monasteries. Mustafa Imamović, Historija Bošnjaka (Sarajevo: BZK Preporod, 2006), 144.
212 Smail Balić notes that the Bosnians’ initial contacts with Islam may have occurred already in the period from the ninth to thirteenth centuries, upon the settling of some Muslims (later Christianized) from Turkic tribes in the Danube basin. Muslims settled primarily in the medieval Kingdom of Hungary, where they were called Ismailites and Maghrebes, worked primarily as soldiers, tradesmen, salt makers, and stock farmers. The names of the contemporary city of Kalesije (near Zvornik) and of the village of Kaloševići (near Tešanj) may refer to a group of Kaliz (medieval Muslims) employed by the Hungarian kings, and settled in Bosnia in the twelfth century. Smail Balić, Das unbekannte Bosnien: Europas Brücke zur islamischen Welt, Kölner Veröffentlichungen zur Religionsgeschichte Bd. 23 (Köln: Böhlau, 1992), 3.
213 Noel Malcolm notes that the evidence found in the Ottoman tax record shows that it took ca. 150 years for Muslims to become majority. Malcolm, Bosnia, 53, 54.
214 Ibid., 51-69.
Catholic Churches might have contributed to the success of a more monolithic Islam.\textsuperscript{215} Historian Mitja Velikonja concurs with Malcom’s point regarding the Bosnian Church’s weakness prior to the Turkish conquest of Bosnia.\textsuperscript{216} Additional factors of Islamization suggested by these and other historians include the settling of Vlachs, who were later Islamized, in abandoned, formerly Christian villages; the system of \textit{devşirme} (child tribute), which involved the conversion of Christian boys and young men drafted into the Janissary corps; the privileged legal and economic status of Muslims; slavery and the possibility for slaves to apply for freedom once they adopted Islam; and finally, the influx of already Islamized Slavs from regions outside of Bosnia (particularly in the late seventeenth century).\textsuperscript{217} Spiritual reasons also played a role in this process.

Historians Robert Donia and John Fine add that conversions in the Ottoman period were not only to Islam — the local population also converted to Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{218} Major shifts in demographics were notable too; for example, the individual religious groups had spread to regions where they had not been present during the Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{219} By accepting Islam, Bosnians did not break with their previous traditions, but continued to practice them in a syncretic fashion with Islam. Malcolm notes that many of the old Slav pagan practices were carried over into other religious traditions, via Christianity to Islam.\textsuperscript{220}

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., 56-57.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid.; Mitja Velikonja, \textit{Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 1st ed. (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2003), 64.
\textsuperscript{218} Donia and Fine, \textit{Bosnia and Hercegovina}, 36.
\textsuperscript{219} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{220} One example, as Malcolm notes, is the frequent “use of mountain-tops as places of worship.” Malcolm, \textit{Bosnia}, 9.
The promotion of Islam to the most remote villages would not have been possible without Sufi dervishes, who were already active as missionaries in the region in the pre-Ottoman period. They practiced different professions and handicrafts, through which they came into direct contact with various people. The Sufi mystics' reputed competence in healing, along with the magical powers that were often attributed to them, gained them respect and influence among people. Historian Adem Handžić notes that dervishes were also able to quickly establish relations to local Christian populations because their teachings often included a mixture of different religious traditions, including elements of Christianity.

Dervishes played an important role in the process of colonization of Bosnia, just as in Anatolia and other areas of the Ottoman Empire’s expansion. To initiate this process, dervishes received land grants in Bosnia from the sultans, upon which they erected Sufi hospices (zaviye). These were often placed on the major trade routes or within existing markets or settlements. Used for religious purposes, as well as for the accommodation and lodging of travelers, the zaviye contributed to developing and maintaining the flow of trade before Ottoman rule in the region was fully established. The earliest examples of these religious guesthouses existed in Zvornik, Sarajevo, Visoko, Prusac, and Rogatica.

The Sufi zavije constitutes the earliest forms of Islamic religious architecture in Bosnia. In its early phase of construction, it represented a form of infrastructure that attracted new

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223 For more information about Sufism in the Ottoman period, see The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Art, and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey, Comparative studies on Muslim societies 10 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
inhabitants to settle nearby, becoming the centers of new settlements. Most of the dervish-centers also pursued a social mission, such as care for the needy.224

The mosque as a medium of urbanization and Islamization

During the Ottoman period (1463-1878), Bosnia kept its historical name and distinct administration, which was unique among other conquered Balkan states.225 As the empire’s most western borderland, Bosnia provided a strategic base for the Ottomans’ military campaigns towards the north and west; as such, Bosnia was the key frontier province of the Ottoman Empire.226 Built in this constantly changing geopolitical setting, mosques and other religious structures in the region represented the Islamic identity of the Ottoman Empire towards different Christian empires in Europe. It is thus not surprising that construction of mosques was among the first structural interventions introduced into the region following the conquest, and that many of the mosques were built directly in border zones.227

The process of urbanization — that is, the development of interlinked townships and cities, with mosques, tekkes, madrasas, mektebs, mausolea, bezistans (covered bazaars), bridges,

224 The Isa-begova and Skender-pašina tekija (ca. 1500) in Sarajevo, for example, both had a soup kitchen (imarethana), which provided free food for the Dervishes, the travelers, and the poor. For more information about these two tekije, see Valerijan Žujo and ...[et.al.], eds., Isa-Begova tekija u Sarajevu [Zbornik radova i međunarodnog skupa “Obnova Isa-Begove tekije u Sarajevu” održanog 2. i 3. februara 2001. godine] (Sarajevo: Udruženje Obnova Isa-begove tekije, 2006).

225 Parts of Bosnian territory were captured before 1463, which was organized as a serhat (frontier administrative unit) headed by a frontiersmen. For example, the town of Vrhbosna, which will be called Sarajevo under the Ottomans, was captured in 1451. Bublin, Gradovi Bosne i Hercegovine, 55.

226 Bosnians themselves were often regarded as serhatlije, which could be translated as “guards of the Islamic Empire’s frontiers.” Bosnia kept its historical name and distinct administration during the Ottoman period, which was unique among other conquered Balkan states. It also differed from other Ottoman provinces in terms of its greater autonomy and high degree of Islamization. Velikonja, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 56.

and other religious and civic buildings — represented a vital factor in the establishment of
Ottoman power in the region. The foundation of cities in the early Ottoman period, as Adem
Handžić discovered when analyzing the Ottoman tax records (defters) of the fifteenth to
seventeenth centuries, was a result of a state policy planned according to different geopolitical
and military needs. The development of almost all settlements and cities in the Ottoman
period started with a foundation of a major mosque, frequently named after the ruling sultan.
Such imperial mosques, known as “Careva džamija” (“The Emperor’s Mosque”), were usually
built by direct orders of sultans and were maintained though state funds (Fig.1.3).

Most mosques in Bosnia, however, were built as pious endowments (vakuf from the
Arabic waqf) established by individuals. The endowers were not only members of the Ottoman
elite and high state officials, but also local merchants, imams, craftsmen, and others, including
women — the possibility of contributing to facilities of general benefit was open to all social
classes, regardless of gender or religious affiliation. In addition to founding a mosque, the
endowers (vakifi) usually also endowed shops, real estate, farmlands, and other sources of
income, from which the mosque’s maintenance and the salaries of its clergy and employees
could be funded. Historians such as Adem Handžić, Alija Bejić, and Mehmed Bublin have

228 Adem Handžić’s study of Ottoman tax records (defters) from the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries has shown
that, for example, the setting up of new settlements was particularly important in border areas, in which the cities
were meant to provide for military supply and security, particularly in areas troubled with outlaws (hajdući). Adem
Handžić, A Survey of Islamic Cultural Monuments Until the End of the 19th Century in Bosnia (Istanbul:
Organisation of the Islamic Conference, Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA), 1996).

229 For example, the Emperor’s Mosque in Stolac had no waqf that would provide for its maintenance. The Mosque
of Sultan Selim (Careva džamija or Čaršijska džamija) in Stolac (1519) was built as a tribute to the reign of Sultan
Bayezid’s son Selim. This mosque was one of the most prominent emperor’s mosques in the region and also one
of the three oldest mosques in Herzegovina. Hivžja Hasandedić, Muslimanska baština u Istočnoj Hercegovini,
Biblioteka Kulturna baština (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1990), 10. In the period from the fifteenth to seventeenth
centuries, each sultan built a series of emperor’s mosques throughout the region; for instance, Sultan Bayezid II built
mosques in Foča (built 1500/1 and located in the Careva mahala) and in Nevesinje (1485). Most of the emperor’s
mosques were built in the sixteenth century, during the reign of the Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent (1520 – 1566).

230 The pious will of the endower (vakif), along with the various terms of the endowment and its revenue, were
settled in a deed of the waqf called waqfnama. The endowment deeds that have survived to the present make it
stressed that the development of the settlements and cities in Bosnia is inseparable from the institution of the waqf; in fact, the pious endowments provided the initial infrastructure for the urbanization of the region. For instance, the first endowments of Gazi Isa-beg Isaković, built in 1457, allowed for the development of the city of Sarajevo and its market (Baščaršija). In the subsequent decades, Gazi Husrev-beg (1480-1541), grandson of Sultan Bayezid II and governor of Bosnia from 1521 until 1541, expanded the mission of Isa-beg Isaković, endowing the largest of all waqf in the region, including the Gazi Husrev-beg mosque complex in Sarajevo (1531), which until only recently was the largest mosque in Bosnia (Fig. 1.4).

The institution of the waqf provided the basis for the development of cities' public infrastructure. The architectural historian Husref Redžić contends that the mosque itself represented an infrastructural node within the two main zones of Ottoman cities: the commercial zone with the main market square (čaršija) and the residential areas (mahale) located around the
evident that the income of the waqf was most commonly dedicated to maintenance of the mosque and its personnel, and to other diverse religious, educative, or social purposes. For example, a vakif usually determined the height of the salaries for the imam and/or the muezzin, who, in turn, were required to pray for the souls of the dead (mostly for those of the vakifs themselves and their family). Some vakifs even specified the number, type, and repetition of such prayers and recitations (that is, reciting the Sura Ya Sin of the Qur'an on a daily basis). Apart from the salary of the imam and the mosque-estate manager (mutevelija), the waqf income was frequently spent on candles, alms for the poor, and upcoming mosque repairs.

Historians such as Adem Handžić, Alija Bejtija, and Mehmed Bublin, have stressed that the development of the settlements and cities in Bosnia is inseparable from the institution of the waqf. Some of the most important benefactors in other Bosnian cities were: Ferhad-bey Sokolović in Donji Šeher, Banja Luka, Mehmed-pasha Kukavica in Travnik, or Ali-pasha Rizvanbegović in Stolac. Handžić, A Survey of Islamic Cultural Monuments Until the End of the 19th Century in Bosnia, 1; Bublin, Gradovi Bosne i Hercegovine, 57.

Gazi Isabey built the Imperial Mosque, Kolobara han, a guest house, mills, a hamam, a bridge number of shops, from which his endowments could be maintained. Bečirbegović, Džamije sa drvenom munarom u Bosni i Hercegovini, 27.

Gazi Husrev-beg’s waqf numbered over two hundred buildings, including a library, a bezitan (covered bazaar), imaret, mekteb, several hans and masafirhanas, a hanikah, a hamam, and numerous mosques and other buildings in the city. For more information on the buildings of the Gazi Husrev-beg’s waqf, see for example Mate Bajlon, Arhitektonske osobine glavnih Gazi Husrevbegovih građevina. Spomenici Gazi Husrevbegove četristogodišnje. [Architecturalt Features of Gazi Husrevbeg’s Principal Buildings. Monuments of the 400th Jubilee of Gazi Husrevbeg] (Sarajevo, 1932); Nihad H. Čengić, Begova Džamija kao djelo umjetnosti; estetska metamorfoza kroz stoljeća i posljednje konzervacije originaliteta (Sarajevo: Sarajevo publishing, 2008).
market. At the čaršija, the mosque was frequently placed in the center or at an intersection of major streets. Because of the high frequency of visitors, the mosque provided an impulse for the growth of urban commercial areas around it (Fig. 1.5). Muslim residential quarters (mahale) usually had some thirty to forty houses. Each mahala had its own mosque, after which it was usually named (Fig. 1.6). Apart from being a place of worship, the mahala mosque also served as a community center, providing the neighboring residents with access to education (mekteb), a public fountain (šadrvan), food for the poor (imaret), and fresh produce. The courtyards around the mosque (haremi) were often used as graveyards, in which the mosque founder and other locally important personalities were buried. In short, public life in the mahala centered on the mosque.

As the nucleus of both the čaršija and the mahala, the mosque represented the defining unit of the Bosnian city in the Ottoman period, corresponding to the important role that churches played in cities elsewhere in Europe at the time. Beside its significance as an infrastructural node and community center, the mosque also affected the legal status, size, and economic importance of cities. In fact, the very existence of a mosque represented one of the preconditions for a city to acquire the status of a “kasaba,” a term which indicated the city’s classification in

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234 Husref Redžić notes that from the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries all settlements in the region, including Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Bosnia, were built according to this structure. Husref Redžić, Studije o islamskoj arhitektonskoj baštini, Biblioteka Kulturno nasljede (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1983), 87.

235 Amir Pašić, Islamic Art in Yugoslavia (Mostar, Yugoslavia: A. Pašić, 1990), 27-28; For example, the mahala around the Sultan-Selimova džamija or Careva džamija in Stolac (1519) was named Carina, and later Careva mahala. Hvizja Hasandedić, Muslimanska baština u Istočnoj Hercegovini, Biblioteka Kulturna baština (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1990), 9.

236 Amir Pasic noted that mahalas also had their own administrative and social insurance system, wealthier inhabitants would take care of the poorer ones. Pašić, Islamic Art in Yugoslavia, 27.

237 Tombstones were designed to represent the gender and status of the buried person. Ibid., 30. For an extensive study of Islamic tombstones, their epigraphy and mosque context, see Mehmed Mujezinović, Islamska epigrafika Bosne i Hercegovine, 3 vols., 2nd ed. (Sarajevo: Sarajevo-Publishing, 1998).

238 Moreover, as Amir Pašić notes, the mosque was the central public monument in the city unifying three main social spheres: the religious/ideological, the cultural/educational, and the political/representational. Amir Pašić, Islamic Art in Yugoslavia (Mostar, Yugoslavia: A. Pašić, 1990), 30.
terms of size and belonging to a legal category. Obtaining this status not only increased the importance of the city, but it also meant tax exemptions for its Muslim inhabitants. In this way, the legal framework provided an incentive for the individual communities to construct mosques, which points to the active role of the Ottoman state in the urbanization of Bosnia. The political and economic incentives for the construction of mosques, as a means of developing cities and consolidating Ottoman rule in the Balkans as a further consequence, stand in contrast to religious reasons, which were also expressed and documented in the pious endowments (waqfname).

**The domed versus the hipped-roof mosque**

The architecture of the mosque signaled the religiosity, wealth, and social status of patrons; the higher the patron’s position in the social hierarchy, the more generous waqf could be founded, from which the more monumental mosques could be funded. Because they were relatively difficult and expensive to construct, domed mosques were considered more

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239 Apart from having a mosque, to become recognized as a kasaba, several other criteria had to be fulfilled, i.e. the city needed to have a bazaar, a market day, and a majority of its population Muslim. Pašić, *Islamic Art in Yugoslavia*, 15.


241 Interrogating whether the construction of such imperial mosques was based on the founder’s pious will, or rather on the state policy, Adem Handžić argues that the role of the state rulers and waqf endowers in the foundation of cities was intertwined. His study of the Ottoman tax records (defters) from 15th to 17th centuries has shown that all the mosques listed as Sultan’s mosques in were built following the direct orders by the sultans, as well as from the state funds. Handžić, *A Survey of Islamic Cultural Monuments Until the End of the 19th Century in Bosnia*, 1-3.

242 All high-ranking officials endowed at least one mosque. Mehmed-beg Minetoović, the first Bosnian sandžak-beg (provincial governor), built one of the oldest mosques in Sarajevo in 1463 – 1464, which was named after him and built in the location of the contemporary Waqf Directorate. The first Sandžak-beg of Herzegovina also founded a small masjid in his city of residence Foča in 1470/1. Some of the other important vakifs included Mehmed-paša Sokolović (1505-1579), patron of the famous bridge in Višegrad from 1571; Ferhat-paša Sokolović, founder of the famous Ferhadija mosque (1579) in Banja Luka; Mehmed-paša Kukavica, who built a mosque (1751/52) and a madrasa in Foča at the time when Ottoman power was waning; and finally, Ali- paša Rizvanbegović (1783 – 1851), who erected numerous buildings in Herzegovina, particularly in Stolac.
monumental than the pitched-roof mosques and were therefore favored by the highest-ranking patrons, predominantly sultans and provincial governors.\textsuperscript{243}

Patrons and mosque builders in Bosnia might have been inspired by the mosque trends developed elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, to which they were exposed during their travels to Istanbul and other large cities in the empire, as well as during the pilgrimage to Mecca. The first to bring these architectural models to Bosnia were Turkish builders, who accompanied the Ottoman army along with other craftsmen. They were the primary mosque designers in the region at the early stage of Ottoman rule in Bosnia. Architectural paradigms from Istanbul were principally distributed to the periphery via a guild system, which operated in a highly centralized manner at the time. This system was directed through a special building department of the Ottoman government.\textsuperscript{244} Such a centrally directed organization of building practice not only brought about the increasing standardization of mosque designs, but it also allowed for a very complex exchange of resources, materials, and knowledge over the vast territory of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{245}

Construction of mosques in Bosnia was also institutionally supervised and regionally organized through the regional (sandžak) governments.\textsuperscript{246} Some architects (neimars) received

\textsuperscript{243} There are some exceptions, however. For example, the tradesman Buzadži hadži-Hasan built a large domed mosque in Sarajevo in 1555/56, which was named after him. Mehmed Mujezinović, Islamska epigrafika Bosne i Hercegovine, vol. 1, 3rd ed. (Sarajevo: Sarajevo-Publishing, 1998), 375-376.

\textsuperscript{244} This department was responsible for different types of building activities throughout the empire, including religious architecture. Husref Redžic noted that within the Ottoman state organization, special building department existed, which was responsible for different types of building activities, i.e. construction of bridges, or sacral architecture; in the Ottoman Court, one of the 12 most important councilors was the head of masons and gardeners, who also had the authority over the main state architect. Redžić, Studije o islamskoj arhitektonskoj baštini, 91.

\textsuperscript{245} Just the possibility of managing vast building operations across large distances, as they were conducted by the famous Ottoman state architect Koca Mimar Sinan (c. 1490 - 1588), reflected the wealth and power of the state. In 1538, Sinan was appointed Architect of the Abode of Felicity, and he became the director of the court Department of Buildings. For more information on his biography and architectural achievements, see Godfrey Goodwin, Sinan: Ottoman Architecture and Its Values Today (London: Saqi books, 1993).

\textsuperscript{246} Pašić, Islamic Art in Yugoslavia, 33.
land grants (*timars*) for their services. Craftsmen were organized into *esnafs* (guilds), an institution that had a great impact on the development of cities and religious architecture. In regard to mosques, particularly important were crafts that involved work with stone, metal, wood, or textiles.

The stylistic development of domed mosque architecture in Bosnia paralleled architectural tastes and trends in the center of the Ottoman Empire, though on a smaller scale. Thereby, as architectural historian Alija Bejić argues, the Ottoman architectural idioms were not just transplanted from Istanbul to Bosnia, but were also assimilated and adapted to local cultural and economic contexts.

Because of its geopolitical location at the border between the Islamic and Christian empires, Bosnia was continuously exposed to different cultural influences, which also informed its local building traditions. Thus, influences in mosque design in the region came not only from the east, but also from the neighboring regions to the south and the west, owing to the employment of builders from Dubrovnik and other towns on the Adriatic coast. Because these Dalmatian builders were experienced in constructing churches, they introduced elements from Christian religious architecture into the mosques they were commissioned to build. This is particularly evident in the design of square, stone minarets in Herzegovina, reminiscent of the campaniles of the Dalmatian churches.

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247 Redžić, *Studije o islamskoj arhitektonskoj baštini*, 91.

248 These were, for example *esnafs* of dunderi (builders capable of building an entire house), carpenters, masons, demirdžije (builders of iron fences), sujoldzije (water conduit makers), etc. Husref Redžić, *Studije o islamskoj arhitektonskoj baštini*, Biblioteka Kulturno nasljede (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1983), 93; Some highly developed guilds even had their own community-mosques, which, as Amir Pašić notes, was a unique phenomenon. One example is such as Tabačica mosque in Mostar, which was used primarily by members of the tanning craft. Pašić, *Islamic Art in Yugoslavia*, 33; For a more detailed study of the Tabačica mosque see: Hivzija Hasandedić, “Tabačica mosque in Mostar,” *Contributions to Oriental Philology / Revue de Philologie Orientale*, no. 50 (2000): 47-54.

249 Amir Pašić notes several prominent examples of such minarets in Bijeljani, Nevesinje, Plana, Dabrica, and Kotzi. Amir Pašić, *Islamic Architecture in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Studies on the history and culture of Bosnia
As local builders (dunderi and neimari) were increasingly commissioned for mosque construction projects, their involvement became evident through the proliferation of regionally specific designs, epitomized by the small mahala mosques with hipped roofs and wooden minarets. These mosques were notably influenced by local domestic architecture. In fact, without the wooden minarets protruding from the roofs, many such mosques would be hardly distinguishable from the residential buildings around them.

Apart from finding inspiration in the immediate vicinity of mosques, builders in neighboring cities often copied each other’s designs, whereby regionally specific mosque design trends emerged. For example, mosques in the Posavina region (the northern Bosnian area along the river Sava) are characterized by a hipped roof, a portico with stretched arches and rectangular columns, elongated windows, and a tall stone minaret (Fig.1.7). The resemblance of these architectural features throughout this region points to the fact that mosque builders were making their design decisions in relation to one another, through a comparative and imitative approach.

Another regionally characteristic mosque style can be found in the area around Bihać, where numerous village mosques were modeled after the Fethija Mosque, the converted

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250 Dunderi were craftsmen of all confessions who executed a wide range of building tasks in all settlements, ranging from masonry to woodwork in the interior. In larger cities they were organized into guilds. The architects (neimari or mimari) were responsible for the construction of larger public buildings and bridges, as well as for supervising handicraftsmen involved in construction. Each Ottoman sandžak had at least one neimar, who received a land grant (timar) as compensation for his service.

251 It is interesting to note in this context, is that Christian and Muslim houses also look very similar. In the urban context, the main point of differentiation is the openness to public space, whereby Muslim houses were more closed off to the street (i.e. with high garden walls and wooden window-screens called mashrabiyas), and density, whereby the Christian houses were more densely built. Pašić, Islamic Art in Yugoslavia, 32; Redžić, Studije o islamskoj arhitektonskoj baštini, 89.

252 Posavina is the area along the river Sava in the north of the country. Prototypical examples include the Atik džamija (Savska džamija, 1739) in Brčko, the Azizija džamija (1863) in Orašje, and the Azizija džamija (or Mir Ahmedova džamija, 1869) in Bosanski Šamac.
medieval Gothic church of St. Antony in the town of Bihać mentioned above. Because this monument was the most prestigious building in the region, the Fethija Mosque became a model for other local mosques, many of which have longitudinal prayer spaces and facades with elongated windows and *mahfils* (prayer gallery inside the mosque) on two floors.  

Regional similarities in local mosque architecture also emerged based on climatic conditions and available materials. This explains why the majority of mosques in Herzegovina, a region characterized by Mediterranean climate, limestone landscape, and sparse vegetation, are built entirely in limestone, including even the roof tiling (Fig. 1.8). On the other hand, vernacular mosques in Bosnia, a region rich with forests and with a continental and partly alpine climate, are built mainly as combinations of wood and stone structures, or sometimes entirely in wood. The architecture of the mosque has also been changing throughout time, as a consequence of repeated damages and repairs and rebuilding.

Another important factor of mosque design in the Ottoman period was the personal taste and financial potency of patrons. Although less wealthy patrons also strived for monumentality, they were mostly not able to afford the cost of building a domed mosque. As a compromise, some mosque builders translated the grandeur of a domed mosque into the interior design of their pitched-roof mosques through constructions of barrel-shaped ceilings, false interior domes made

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253 Pašić, *Islamic Architecture in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 64.
This 14th century church was transformed into a mosque following the seizure of Bihać in 1592, which involved only small architectural interventions, such as the construction of a mihrab in the interior and reuse of the church tower as a minaret. The elongated gothic windows and the rosette above the entrance door were kept and are still evident in this building. For plans and sections of this mosque see: Bećirbegović, *Džamije sa drvenom munarom u Bosni i Hercegovini*, 67-69.

of wood. When the capacity of a town was stretched to the maximum, and there was no available space for construction of new mosques, individual patrons looked for other means to express their wealth and status, by restoring existing mosques and adding fountains, mausolea, or other monumental elements to them. The monumental clock tower added in the 17th century to the courtyard of the Glavica Mosque (1562-74) in Livno is a case in point of the role of this type of personal identity politics in mosque architecture (Fig. 1.9).

Social interactions and religious customs also left their mark in the interiors of mosques, though accumulation of personal ritual objects that were continuously donated to the mosques over time. As a result of the layering of hand-woven carpets, for example, or the accumulation of prayer beads and other personal precious objects, the mosque itself became a repository of the community’s collective memory (Fig. 1.10). The mosque provided a space for a variety of social activities and religious customs. It brought families, friends, and neighbors together not only for prayer, but also for diverse customs, such as the celebration of birth and marriage, as well as commemoration of the dead. These three events, considered the most significant in the life of a person, were all ritually acknowledged or celebrated in the mosque. By spatially accommodating such events, not only did the mosque contribute to the social bonding of a community, but its space was also directly shaped by these social interactions.

Architectural historian Husref Redžić understands this phenomenon as a deviation from the most logical use of the wood, based on an understanding of religious space, for which the effect of a domed space matters more than the structural logic of the material. Redžić, Studije o islamskoj arhitektonskoj baštini, 127. Such barrel-shaped interior domes were built in mosques such as the Tabačica (sixteenth century) in Mostar, the Gazanferija (late sixteenth century) in Banja Luka, and the Magribija (mid-sixteenth century) in Sarajevo.

According to Bosnian Islamic tradition, the most precious possessions of a deceased person are given to the mosque – that is, to the community – in the form of a present or a waqf. Depending on the wealth of the deceased person, such gifts ranged from small contributions in the form of prayer beads or a Qur’an, to a larger gift in the form of carpets, mosque repairs, structural additions, or donations of real estate. Based on this custom, some mosques accumulated so many carpets over time that they needed to be arranged in multiple layers. Such carpets were often hand-woven by individual community members as an act of devotion.
Religious architecture and social relations

Throughout the Ottoman rule in Bosnia, Islam was the framework that unified various social classes under a single political and cultural umbrella. The ruling class was comprised of predominantly local Muslims, as well as Ottoman officials from other regions of the Empire. The Ottomans categorized people according to their religion (rather than ethnicity), and were tolerant of other religious groups. Orthodox Christians and Jews were recognized as members of millets, which were Empire-wide, self-governing religious communities. The Bosnian Catholics, who were not part of millet, received special charters from the Sultan defining their status and religious framework. A well-known example of such a charter—often cited as the oldest declaration of human rights—is the ahd-name (imperial decree), which was issued by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed Fatih in 1463 granting the Catholic Franciscan order of monks the right to practice their religion freely in Bosnia (Fig. 1.11).

The millet system can be credited with ensuring the survival of the various religious and ethnic groups within the administrative apparatus of the Ottoman Empire, by facilitating their participation in the dominant social structure. However, this autonomy also led to the separate development of religious groups, which helped prevent conflict. Mitja Velikonja argues that the millet system ultimately contributed to increasing the ethnic, cultural and religious differentiations in Bosnia.


258 Ibid., 1073. Orthodox Christians and Jews were recognized as members of Empire-wide millets (self-governing religious communities). Robert J. Donia and John V. A Fine, Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 64.

259 Mitja Velikonja, Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1st ed. (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2003), 64.
Although the official policy of tolerance was sometimes ignored, many individuals who converted from Christianity to Islam were able to climb up the social ladder and hold influential administrative positions, which benefitted their Christian families and communities. The most prominent was Mehmed Pasha Sokolović, born into an Orthodox Christian family from Višegrad, who was drafted into the Janissary corps, converted to Islam and were educated in Istanbul and later appointed the Grand Vizier of the Empire. He implemented reforms that benefitted the practice of Orthodox Christianity in Bosnia and in the region, and saw to it that a number of bishops and Orthodox patriarchs were appointed from his family.\(^{260}\)

Despite the fact that Ottoman law did not in theory allow for the construction of new churches, and a special permit was needed for repairing old ones, in practice the law was often bypassed and a considerable number of new Orthodox churches were built during the Ottoman period, such as the Old Orthodox Church in Sarajevo, which was completed in 1530 (Fig.1.12). Religious architecture in Ottoman Bosnia reflected the status and wealth of the individual communities. The Orthodox Patriarchate of Peć, for instance, was not only the center of one of the strongest Christian communities, but was one of the biggest landowning institutions in the Ottoman Balkans.\(^{261}\) The monumentality and luxury of the Liplje and Moštanica monasteries in Bosnia represented the prosperity of their communities and of their benefactors.\(^{262}\) Roman Catholics, whose religious center was outside of the Ottoman Empire and whose sole representatives in Bosnia during the Ottoman period were the Franciscans, could only repair old


\(^{261}\) According to Mustafa Imamović, the Peć Patriarchate had over forty metropolitans and bishops under Ottoman rule. Its jurisdiction included a large territory in the Balkans, used a feudal system and enjoyed different landowning privileges. Some Orthodox churches and monasteries in Ottoman Bosnia had printing houses, which were active in spreading liturgical books. Mustafa Imamović, *Historija Bošnjaka* (Sarajevo: BZK Preporod, 2006), 144.

churches, and did this with a great difficulty. This led to a decrease in the number of Franciscan monasteries.

The exceptions to such rules also applied to other communities. An example is a waqf established in 1580-81 by the Ottoman governor, Siyavuş Pasha (Sijavuš Paşa), which made provisions for the construction of the first synagogue in Sarajevo, together with a han (a large collective housing complex) for the poorest members of the Sephardic Jewish community, known as the “Sijavuš Pašina Daira.” Circumventing the legal limitations, Siyavuş Pasha allowed the construction of this synagogue by issuing a special permit.

This example not only demonstrates that Muslim patrons funded non-Islamic religious architecture, but it also points to the fluidity of patronage in religious architecture during the Ottoman period. The case of the Sephardic synagogue in Sarajevo was not a unique phenomenon. In other places, Muslim patrons built churches. Often former Christians from the region who converted to Islam made careers in the state service, while still keeping close ties to their Christian roots and relatives. One such patron was Hasan-Paşa Predojević, fifth beglerbeg of Bosnia (1591-1593), who was originally a Christian in Herzegovina and became the Ottoman conqueror of Bihać. He also sponsored the construction of both mosques and churches.

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263 Donia and Fine note that the Ottomans preferred the Orthodox Christians to the Catholics, in many other ways; part of the reason was that the Orthodox Patriarchate was part of the Empire with its seat in Istanbul, where it was easier to control. The Pope, in contrast, was in Rome and sponsored several crusades against the Ottomans. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 10,73. 64.

264 Mustafa Imamovic notes that before the Ottoman arrival, there were thirty nine Franciscan monasteries in Bosnia. In 1508 a Franciscan general counted ten Franciscan monasteries in Bosnia. Imamović, Historija Bošnjaka, 143.


266 According to oral traditions, Hasan-Paša Predojević funded both churches at the monasteries of Moštanica. He also founded the pitched-roof mosque in Polje, Plitina in 1572.
According to folk tradition, it was not uncommon for Muslim patrons to found churches for their Christian families or community members, apart from in addition to endowing mosques and other Islamic institutions in their home-regions.²⁶⁷

Although peaceful coexistence broke down at times during the Ottoman period over time, the different religious groups learned to live together through constructive inter-cultural dialogue. Western diplomats, who passed through the region on their way to Istanbul, provide some insights on the fluidity of cultural boundaries between the different religious groups in the sixteenth century. The French traveler, Pierre Lescalopier, who passed through the town of Foča on the river Drina in 1574, described the syncretic practices of Christians, Jews and Muslims with regard to honoring Saint Sava (Sveti Sava).²⁶⁸ Poullet, a French traveler who passed through the Ottoman Balkans in 1658 and visited Mostar and Sarajevo, admired the Old Bridge in Mostar, the beauty of the local women and expressed his wonder at the similarities and differences between the local Christian, Jewish and Islamic burial traditions.²⁶⁹ In 1626, the Dalmatian humanist, diplomat, translator and spy Athanasio Georgiceo visited Bosnia under the order of Habsburg Emperor Ferdinand II who requested that he receive a copy of the miraculous icon of the Virgin Mary from her sanctuary in the Franciscan monastery at Olovo.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁷ One folk tradition has it that a man named Avdo Avdić, a former Orthodox Christian who adopted Islam, founded both a mosque and a church for his mother in the village of Plana in the early 17th century. Both edifices stood 500 meters apart from each other. Another oral tradition has it that a man named Mehmed-spahića Zvizda from Gacko, also Christian convert, erected a mosque in his hometown, and a church in Mala Graćanica for his wife Sava, who did not want to adopt Islam and remained Christian all her life. According to a third oral tradition, Osman Paša Kazanac, a man born in a Christian family in the 17th century, apart from founding a mosque, mekteb and madrasa in Kazanći, and several mosques in the areas of Stolac, Sutjeska, and Gacko, he also founded a church for his Christian mother (another version of the story has it that the church was built by his brother, who did not want to adopt Islam). Hivzija Hasandedić, Muslimska baština u Istočnoj Hercegovini, Biblioteka Kulturna baština (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1990), 174, 184-185, 203.

²⁶⁸ Midhat Šamić, Francuski putnici u Bosni na pragu XIX stoljeća i njihovi utisci o njoj (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1966), 27.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., 40-43.

²⁷⁰ Athanasio Georgiceo was born around 1590 in Split. He studied in Graz at the Catholic University, and later law in Vienna. He died sometime after 1640. His name can be found in various versions as Atanazije Jurjević, Athanasio
described the syncretic practices of rural Muslim Slavs, who believed that their fields would be more fertile if the Franciscans blessed them, and therefore, donated money to the Franciscan monasteries. 271

Bosnia’s historical coexistence manifests itself in religious architecture in several ways. The fact that mosques, churches and synagogues have stood next to each other for centuries mirrors the historical coexistence of the congregations they served. The city of Sarajevo is widely known as the “Jerusalem of Europe” because of its long history of coexistence, evident in the old city core, which embraces four major houses of worship for four different religions built within a 500-meter radius (Fig.4.1). The placement of religious architecture, which can be seen as a deliberate political statement, shows that Bosnian Muslims and Christians of different denominations historically lived together on neighborly terms. 272 For example, in Bosanska Krupa, the town’s three main houses of worship—the Muslim mosque, the Catholic church and the Orthodox church—stand across the main square from one another (Fig.1.13), implying that their congregations interact before and after sermons on a regular basis. If these groups were not able to tolerate each other, they would not have built their places of worship in such close proximity. 273

While constructing these houses of worship, artisans of different religions worked side by side, which is evident in the use of non-Islamic elements in mosque architecture and likewise, the use of Byzantine, Gothic and Renaissance motifs, sometimes mixing them altogether in

271 Ibid., 103.

272 Riedlmayer, “From Ashes: The Past and Future of Bosnia’s Cultural heritage,” 104.

273 Ibid.
Christian churches. While working on a church from 1550-51, the well-known artisan, Dmitar of Lipovo, designed a reliquary that is decorated with not only Gothic, but also Ottoman and Moorish decorative elements. Architectural historian Andrej Andrejević notes that the Serbian Orthodox Church incorporated a number of different elements in its architectural repertoire, such as marquetry in the interior decoration, on the carpets and on various types of furniture.

2. Politicization of ethno-religious identities in the modern period

The Ottoman defeat at the gates of Vienna in 1683, which was followed by territorial losses, internal power struggles, and an increasing political and economic dependence on Europe marked the beginning of the political and economic decline of the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. The weakening of the Ottoman power in the Balkans during the late seventeenth century manifested itself in a series of military defeats, revolts in the provinces, and the penetration of the Austrian army deep into the region, as far as Kosovo. When the Austrian army, led by Prince Eugene of Savoy, raided Sarajevo in 1697, the entire city was set in flames, burning down numerous religious buildings, including mosques.

As European powers began to make inroads into the Ottoman Balkans, Bosnia’s importance as a front-line frontier province grew, and key figures involved in the local defense

274 Husref Redžić, Studije o islamskoj arhitektonskoj baštini, Biblioteka Kulturno nasljeđe (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1983), 144-145.
275 Andrej Andrejević, “Prilog proučavanju Islamskih uticaja na umetnost XVI. i XVII. veka kod Srba u Sarajevu i Bosni [A contribution to the study of Islamic influences on the art of the Serbs of Sarajevo and Bosnia in the 16th and 17th c.],” Prilozi za proučavanje istorije Sarajeva 1 (1963): 56.
276 Ibid.
against the Habsburgs began to play a progressively more critical role in local affairs. Bosnian kapetans (captains, or fortress commanders) and the local janissaries, by now a hereditary class, were able to increase their influence and property; some became very powerful as local lords, often exercising their power autonomously and as they pleased. In 1826 the janissary corps, which resisted the changes or reforms, was abolished by the sultan. The Ottoman attempt to create a new model army provoked an uprising and an 'autonomy movement' in Bosnia, led by Husein Kapetan Gradaščević, which was subdued only with difficulty after three years. The kapetanije (defense system of fortresses) were subsequently abolished in 1837.

Mosque building activity in the late Ottoman period in Bosnia was primarily focused on the renovation of old mosques and the erection of smaller, new structures. Mosques built during this period are artistically less monumental than their sixteenth-century precedents and they typify the Ottoman-Baroque style. Examples include the Husejnija Mosque in Gradačac (1826), founded by the rebel commander Husein Kapetan Gradaščević, and the Azizija Mosque in Brezovo Polje (1862) built by the Ottoman Sultan Abdülaziz (Fig. 1.14).

The nineteenth century program of administrative and military reforms of the Ottoman Empire led to an increasing number of conflicts between the state representatives and those Bosnians who saw their traditional privileges threatened by the changes. Local resistance and uprisings were met with force, and each intervention deepened the hostility between local elites.

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279 Ibid., 60-63.


281 Edin Jahić, “Karakteristike razvoja i elementi kontinuiteta sakralne arhitekture Islama sa posebnim naglaskom na džamije u Bosni i Hercegovini. [Characteristics of the development and the elements of continuity of Islamic religious architecture in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a special emphasis on mosques]” (MArch thesis, Sarajevo: University of Sarajevo, 2003), 126.
and the state. Although until the 1850s the conflicts in Bosnia were primarily about the local Muslims’ reaction and resistance to the modernizing attempts of the state, the nature of the conflict in Bosnia changed in the second half of the century. A combination of the reforms and local resistance had aggravated the position of the Christian peasantry, leading to a series of peasant uprisings against the local Bosnian Muslim landlords and state officials.\textsuperscript{282} The massive peasant revolt, which broke out in 1875, eventually led to the involvement of the Great Powers and brought about the end of Ottoman rule. An international congress meeting in Berlin in 1878 decided to put Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austro-Hungarian administration.\textsuperscript{283}

**Austro-Hungarian Period**

Following the Treaty of Berlin, Bosnia was occupied by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but kept an extraordinary status as an autonomous province under the nominal sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan until 1908.\textsuperscript{284} Roughly one hundred thousand Muslims, mainly peasants, preferred exile in other parts of the Ottoman Empire to Christian rule, while others remained in Bosnia in anticipation of an unpredictable future under the new regime.\textsuperscript{285} To the

\textsuperscript{282} Donia and Fine, *Bosnia and Hercegovina*, 62,63.
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid., 63.
\textsuperscript{284} The Austrian occupation was welcomed by most Catholics, but it encountered an unexpectedly strong and long-lasting guerilla-style resistance on the part of local Bosnian Muslims and Serbs. Resistance was particularly strong in Sarajevo, but fighting also took place in the countryside. The Habsburg monarchy was forced to mobilize around a third of its combat forces. The resistance was subdued after five months of struggle, and Bosnia’s administration was assigned to the Austro-Hungarian Joint Ministry of Finance. This was one of the three joint ministries shared by the monarchy’s two components, Austria and Hungary, linked only to the crown, a move that helped avoid an internal struggle over the newly acquired territory. Ibid., 93-96.
\textsuperscript{285} The exact number of émigrés who left in this period is unknown and is debated among scholars, with estimates ranging from ca. 60,000, as claimed in the Austro-Hungarian official records, to 300,000, as argued by some scholars. The estimate by Noel Malcolm, that roughly one hundred thousand left the country seems most convincing. The number of émigrés and the rationale for it are both controversial among scholars; nevertheless, the massive emigration of Muslims can be generally explained on both religious and economic grounds. Ilijas Bošnjović, “Demografska prošlost i budućnost Bošnjaka, Hrvata i Srba u Bosni i Hercegovini,” in *Forum Bosnae*, 2006, 78.
disappointment of most Christian peasants, the new political system did little to benefit their situation; hence, the “agrarian question” continued to provide the central source of contestation and conflict in Bosnia throughout the subsequent period. 286

As Bosnia became the Habsburg Empire’s first and only colony, the new administration was primarily invested in developing and modernizing those realms that would benefit the monarchy’s military or economy. Most notable changes affected the realms of industry, public infrastructure, education and religion. 287 These developments brought about a rapid growth of cities, such as Zenica and Sarajevo. In addition, an influx of new settlers and officials, most of them Catholics from other parts of the monarchy, altered the ethnic constellation of Bosnia’s cities, which brought about a growing challenge to the traditional Bosnian Muslim urban elites. 288

The large increase in the urban population prompted the development of an urban infrastructure, more employment opportunities, and more densely designed residential quarters in the cities. Thus, the appearance of cities underwent major transformation. 289 The result of this extensive urban renewal, as Mehmed Bublin explains, was that the urban street, with its

287 A new network of roads and railroads was built. Forestry, mining, and tobacco industries, among others, were upgraded and developed. The State educational system was introduced and a number of new schools were built. The existing denominational schools were improved too; each of the three main religious groups received state subsidies for their religious institutions and educational facilities.
289 At first, the Austro-Hungarian administration focused on refurbishing existing structures and introducing general regulation of building activities. To that end, a geodetic survey of the entire country was conducted. In addition, the Building Authority was founded as a part of the National Government in Sarajevo. The Ottoman Law on Construction from 1863, which was first reissued and then, in 1880, revised as a more comprehensive building code (Die Bauordnung). This building code regulated different aspects of urban development, such as the road system and structure of housing blocks, as well as the protection of monuments and cultural heritage. Mehmed Bublin, *Gradovi Bosne i Hercegovine: Milenijum Razvoja i Godine Urbicida = The Cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Millenium of Development and the Years of Urbicide*, 1st ed. (Sarajevo: Sarajevo Publishing, 1999), 92.
multistory apartment buildings, replaced the *mahala* as the principal urban unit (Fig. 1.15). In this context, the mosque lost its prominent role as the defining element of the commercial and residential quarters. It was now competing with Sarajevo’s modern cultural infrastructure: the theatre, the officers’ mess, the promenade, the parks, the social center, and the hippodrome.

Austrian policies toward Bosnian ethno-national groups varied over time in reaction to regional nationalist aspirations. At first, the monarchy hoped to discourage political activism by subsidizing local religious organizations, crystallizing their hierarchies, and fostering religious education. These policies had a visible effect on Christian religious architecture: numerous new churches, cathedrals, and religious schools were built, predominantly in the Gothic Revival style that was new to the local building culture. The number of newly built mosques was significantly smaller.

In addition to mosque-building built by local communities that are yet to be studied, there were two well-known Austro-Hungarian-era mosques built in the Moorish Revival style. On the one hand, the deployment of this style evolved from the encounter of cultures; on the other, it signalled a break from Ottoman building traditions and simultaneously announced the new

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290 The house with rental apartments was a new concept for Bosnia. Until the Austro-Hungarian period, most people lived in houses that they owned themselves, regardless of their social status. Mehmed Bublin, *Gradovi Bosne i Hercegovine*, 93.

291 Robert Donia and John Fine identified three phases of Austrian policies toward the Bosnian ethno-national groups: 1. the first phase (1878-1903) is marked by the revival of religious hierarchies; 2. the second phase (1903-1914) starts with the death of Kâllay with a notable liberalization of policies followed by the formal annexation of Bosnia and a brief constitutional era; and 3. the third (1914-1918) witnessed the repression of a single ethnic group—the Bosnian Serbs. Donia and Fine, *Bosnia and Hercegovina*, 97-100.

292 Ibid., 97, 101, 102.

293 Jahić, “Karakteristike razvoja i elementi kontinuiteta sakralne arhitekture Islama sa posebnim naglaskom na džamije u Bosni i Hercegovini. [Characteristics of the development and the elements of continuity of Islamic religious architecture in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a special emphasis on mosques],” 122.: According to a mosque statistic published by the Islamic Religious Community in 1933, in Bosnia Herzegovina, 36 out of the 1120 mosques were domed. Obviously, the remaining 1084 had a pitched roof, and 786 of them, mainly in Bosnia, had wooden minaret. *Glasnik Islamske Vjerske Zajednice*, no. 7 (1933): 54., quoted in Madžida Bećirbegović, *Džamije sa drvenom munarom u Bosni i Hercegovini* (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1990), 11 19.
Moorish Revival influences can be seen in the Mosque of Behrambeg or the Šarena Džamija in Tuzla (1888), which was designed by the architect Franc Mahnović featuring a Mamluk-inspired minaret (Fig. 1.16), and in the mahala-mosque in the Sarajevo suburb of Hrasnica (1895), with a hip-roof which, as architectural historian Edin Jahić notes, reveals the architect Ludwig Huber’s intention to bridge vernacular and colonial building cultures. 294

Austria’s fostering of the Christian churches in Bosnia (the Orthodox Church especially), led to their development into increasingly strong and autonomous institutions, which then however began promoting nationalist ideas based on religious and ethnic affiliations. These developments, among others, paved the way for the formation of the first modern political movements in Bosnia. 295 To counter the evolving Serb and Croat nationalism in Bosnia, which echoed the political movements in Serbia and Croatia proper, the head of the Austro-Hungarian Finance Ministry and the administrator of Bosnia (1882-1903) Benjámin von Kállay began promoting an alternative concept of a communal Bosnian patriotism, subsumed under the notion of Bošnjastvo (Bosnianism). 296 This idea did not, however, gain traction in Bosnia’s already ethnically differentiated population, and especially among Serbs and Croats, ethnically-based political movements along with their dreams of a united South Slav state continued to challenge Austrian authorities. 297

Austria-Hungary liberalized its policies in regard to local political activism after Kállay’s death in 1903, but continued keeping an eye on it within a carefully controlled political

294 Ibid., 138, 140.
295 Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 102.
296 Ibid., 97-99.
297 Ibid.
The Bosnian Muslims continued to agitate for more cultural and religious autonomy. The Islamic community's independence from Istanbul had already been established in 1882, soon after the Austrian occupation, with the foundation of the office of the Reis-ul-ulema headed by the Reis, which was responsible for the religious life and interests of Bosnia's Islamic community. In 1883, a Waqf Commission was established, which provided for a more centralized control over Muslim charitable institutions and their properties, and was to administer the properties of the pious endowments in Bosnia.

In 1908-9, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy formally annexed Bosnia, provoking a serious diplomatic crisis with the Great Powers and arousing strong opposition from local political parties. By 1910, Bosnia entered a short constitutional period (1910-1914), with an elected assembly through which Austria hoped to create a new political climate suitable to its interests — that is, to weaken Serb nationalism and pan-Slavic aspirations in general. The annexation of Bosnia led to tensions with Serb nationalists in Bosnia, and Serbia proper, which at that point had nearly doubled its territory in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. These tensions climaxed in the assassination of the Habsburg heir apparent, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914 by Gavrilo Princip, a young Serb nationalist and member of the

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298 Political parties established on the basis of ethno-religious identity were able to make frequent use the names of their nationalities. Cultural and educational institutions were founded, which published newspapers and journals, promoting a desire for more religious and cultural autonomy. Ibid., 99.

299 With some changes, these two institutions persist to the present date. By 1878, it was estimated that religious endowments (awqaf) owned nearly one third of the useable land in Bosnia. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 146.

300 The crisis, however, did not escalate into a war, and in the subsequent two years, the annexation was both internationally and locally acknowledged. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 99, 100.

301 The constellation of the local political parties representing the three ethno-religious groups in the Assembly (Sabor) enforced their “consensual tactics” in order to gain majority. Francine Friedman, The Bosnian Muslims: Denial of a Nation (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1996), 75.

302 In their suspicion that the Serb nationalists planned to overthrow the Austro-Hungarian rule, the Austrian authorities shifted their policies on nationalities to the disadvantage of Serbs. Donia and Fine, Bosnia and Hercegovina, 97-101.
student group *Mlada Bosna* (Young Bosnia). One month later, Austria declared war on Serbia, thus precipitating the chain of events that escalated into The Great War.

**World War I and the Interwar Yugoslavia**

When the First World War began in the Balkans, the local population was courted by both sides seeking soldiers. The Bosnian Muslims' allegiances to the warring parties diverged; some pro-Serb Muslims fought on the side of Serbia, but many supported the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, fighting in the Austrian-sponsored Schutzkorps. While the region itself did not become a primary battleground, thousands of Bosnians were killed both on foreign territories and in the region. For the first time in Bosnian history, many of them fought and were killed on the basis of their ethnic, religious or national affiliation. Growing violence of Serb peasants against Muslims was particularly evident in eastern Herzegovina, where attacks on Muslims and takeovers of their property were recorded. During World War I, many mosques in Bosnia were plundered and destroyed, especially in eastern Bosnia, which was invaded by the Montenegrin army in 1914. Other mosques witnessed different forms of war-related damage. Some of the historic domed mosques in Sarajevo were damaged by the Austro-Hungarian authorities, who, in search of raw materials for the war effort, requisitioned and stripped the lead covering the domes. In these cases, the mosques decayed due to the weather and environmental conditions until and unless the domes were repaired after the war.

Following the collapse of Austria-Hungary at the end of the war in 1918, the pan-Slav vision took shape in the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, which was initially

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303 Friedman, *The Bosnian Muslims*, 78.
305 Ibid., 122.
conceived as a federation of South Slavs united as equal partners in a democratic parliamentary monarchy. Headed by Serbia's Karadordević dynasty, the new Kingdom was confronted by political problems arising from the clashing interests of the Serbs and Croats, and their diverging nationalist ambitions. For Serb nationalists, the new South Slav kingdom represented the “dream-come-true” of a Greater Serbia, in which Bosnia was claimed as an integral part of Serbian territory. Bosnian Muslims were not recognized in national terms (therefore they are not present in the very name of the new state), and were regarded either as Muslim Serbs or as Muslim Croats. Muslims in the new state took part in coalition politics by entering into alliances with Serb and Croat nationalist parties. A majority of Muslims supported the Yugoslav Muslim Organization — a party formed to defend the interests mainly of Muslim landowners and of the urban middle-class.  

The era of royal parliamentarianism ended in 1929, in favor of royal dictatorship of the Serbian King Alexander, who suspended the parliament, banned all political parties, and renamed the state the “Kingdom of Yugoslavia.” Bosnia and Herzegovina was erased from the map and partitioned among four out of the Kingdom's nine newly-created provinces, called banovinas. The Serb-centered politics of the new Yugoslavia were manifested in Serb dominance in all areas of administration and government. In the Banovina capitals, such as Banja Luka, the Yugoslav government built governor’s palaces (banski dvor) and new Serbian Orthodox cathedrals. The Great Depression worsened the agricultural economy in the country and increased poverty. Growing internal tensions culminated in 1934, when King Alexander was assassinated in a plot organized by Croat fascists (known as Ustašas), who were aspiring for the full independence of Croatia. Following King Alexander’s death, there was a move towards

306 Ibid., 125.
power-sharing between Serbs and Croats at the expense of other groups. With the Cvetković-Maček Agreement of 1939, Bosnia was once again divided, between a newly-created Croatian banovina and several Serb-controlled provinces.

**Worl War II and the Yugoslav Period (1945-1990)**

Hitler’s invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941 started with the bombardment of Belgrade. Within two weeks, the king had fled into exile and the government was forced to capitulate. The country was divided between Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, the Nazi-controlled “Independent State of Croatia” and a German-appointed Quisling regime in Serbia. In World War II, Bosnia found itself at the center of a multidimensional conflict, which involved several different types of intertwined struggles involving various Yugoslav resistance movements and the Axis occupation forces. Among the former, the Croat and Serb nationalist forces (known as Ustaše and Četnici) conducted “ethnic cleansing” according to their respective ideologies, while the communist-led Partisans engaged in their own revolutionary quest for a general social and political transformation. The scale of the destruction, including the destruction of religious monuments, and the number of victims was unprecedented, especially in atrocities committed by the various ethnically-based militias. 307

At the end of the war, the Yugoslav Communist Party, headed by Josip Broz Tito, who was backed by the Allied military aid, emerged as the sole leader of the newly formed Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Herzegovina had its pre-1918 borders restored and became one of Yugoslavia’s six constituent republics. The new regime promoted itself by

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307 The fascist regime in Croatia assumed the “ethnic cleansing” of Serbs, Gypsies, and Jews and deported them to concentration camps. Muslims were declared to be Muslim Croats, and were not systematically persecuted in the first wave of killing. Ibid., 136.
promises of social equality and the “state’s openness to people”. Nonetheless, some people were “more equal” than others, which was evident from the regime’s primary openness to supporters of the dominant state ideology. In the first decades of the post-war era, Bosnian Muslims continued to be denied the status of a national group, and were recognized only as members of the Serb, Croat, or Yugoslav nation. In 1968, Bosnian Muslims were finally recognized as a constituent nationality by a decision of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite the fact that a religion-based nationality appeared to contradict the very principles of the anti-religious, communist regime. 308

Activated by this political shift, the architecture of mosques built during the subsequent decades was given a new stylistic stimulus. 309 Two significant projects from the 1980s point at a twofold proliferation of mosque structures — one with conscious references to the Ottoman building traditions, as exemplified by the Islamic Center of Zagreb (1987), and the other directed towards Western European architectural trends, as rendered by Šerefudin’s White Mosque in Visoko (1980), which was designed by the architect Zlatko Ugljen and received the Aga Khan Award for architecture in 1983. The Islamic Center in Zagreb, designed by the architects Mirza Gološ and Džemal Čelić, signaled Muslim presence in the center of traditionally Catholic Croatia with a monumental and revivalist approach to classical Ottoman mosque architecture (Fig. 1.17). By contrast, the White Mosque in Visoko, is influenced by the architectural language of the

308 Noel Malcolm argues that this drive for the national recognition of Bosnian Muslims in the socialist federation was not based exclusively on an Islamic religious movement. Rather, it evolved through two simultaneous religious and political trends: first, the movement of secular “Muslim nationalism” led by Communists and secularized Muslims, and second, a “separate revival of Islamic religious belief.” Malcolm, Bosnia, 198-200.

309 The “Non-Aligned” politics of Yugoslavia also increased its contacts with other Islamic countries, which might have had an influence on the religious architecture in this period.
International Style, and represents one of the most distinguished examples of contemporary mosque architecture in the world (Fig. 1.18).  

3. Architecture of Enemies — Enemies of Architecture

After Slobodan Milošević came to power in Serbia in 1987, the Republic of Serbia increasingly came to dominate the political landscape of all of Yugoslavia. The result was a growth of ethnic tensions. During the 1980s, Croat and Serb nationalists in Bosnia became ever more vocal in expressing concerns about an eventual “Muslim domination” of Bosnia. Such concerns went hand in hand with these nationalists’ territorial claims on Bosnia as part of an envisioned Greater Serbia or Greater Croatia. While Serb and Croat nationalists’ propaganda about the “threat of Islamic fundamentalism” in Bosnia was used for the mobilization of the Bosnian Serb and Croat population on behalf of the corresponding nationalist expansionist projects, such claims seemed particularly ironic and inappropriate at time when Bosnian Muslims were among the most secularized Muslims in the world.  

In 1989, Serbian President Milošević deprived the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina of their political autonomy and tried to seize control of federal structures, thereby

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310 Jahić, “Karakteristike razvoja i elementi kontinuiteta sakralne arhitekture Islama sa posebnim naglaskom na džamije u Bosni i Hercegovini. [Characteristics of the development and the elements of continuity of Islamic religious architecture in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a special emphasis on mosques].” 145-147.

311 Malcolm, Bosnia, 221.
laying the basis for a wider conflict. The unavoidable breakup of Yugoslavia started in 1991 as first Slovenia, followed by Croatia and then Bosnia-Herzegovina, declared their independence.³¹²

With the end of the socialist era, the collapse of Yugoslavia affected Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 1992, when fighting began on the heels of the declaration of Bosnia’s sovereignty in October 1991.³¹³ A referendum on independence for Bosnia and Herzegovina was held on February 29 and March 1, 1992. While a great majority of Bosnian Serbs boycotted the referendum, the general turnout was 64%. Of those voting, 99.4% were in favor of independence, which was subsequently declared on March 6. Meanwhile, Bosnian Serb activists had already proclaimed a separate "Republic of the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

The subsequent period of tensions and military incidents finally culminated in open warfare in Sarajevo, which was attacked on April 6, 1992 by the Serb-controlled Yugoslav National Army. On the same day Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized as an independent state by the European Community. On May 22, 1992, Bosnia was admitted as a member state of the United Nations. But the descent into war continued. The “Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosna,” a Croat-nationalist counterpart to the Serb Republic, was proclaimed in July 1992.³¹⁴

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³¹⁴ Noel Malcolm or Aydin Babuna, have noted that the Bosnian Muslim leadership – Alija Izetbegovic and his Party of Democratic Action – followed a twofold strategic and mostly pragmatic “survival policy” in response to Milošević’s and Tudman’s ambitions in that period. Bosniak politics included both, the strengthening of the Bosnian Muslims’ own nationalism, through an emphasis on its distinctive Islamic component, and also on the “preservation of Bosnia’s unique character as a multi-national, multi-religious republic.” Malcolm, Bosnia, 218,219; It is important to note, that the Bosnian Muslim leadership never proclaimed a “policy of one nation in one state”, since the only political option for Muslims’ survival was to keep the territorial integrity and the multiethnic character of BH. Ibid., 213-252; Ivan Lovrenović, Bosnia: A Cultural History (London: Saqi, 2001), 195.
The violent ethnic conflict that followed was predominantly carried out between forces led by the country's ethnically (and religiously) defined parties: Serbs (Orthodox Christians), Croats (Catholics), and Bosniaks (Muslims). Amid the fluctuating goals and alliances, the concrete territorial line of separation that emerged was created by means of massive population displacement and so-called “ethnic cleansing,” carried out mainly by Serb and Croat nationalist extremists. It involved the dispossession, expulsion and mass murder of civilians — identified as enemies because of their ethnicity and religion — accompanied by the systematic destruction of their cultural and historical traces.

This process of territorial and cultural “decontamination,” which proceeded unhindered in the presence of international peace-keeping forces for over three and a half years, resulted in more than 100,000 deaths, the forcible displacement of more than half of the country's 4 million people, and the destruction of some seventy percent of the area’s significant cultural monuments and institutions. In a report in early 1993 the Council of Europe characterized the destruction as a "cultural catastrophe in the heart of Europe."

315 These parties however also included some people from “mixed” backgrounds and other minorities.


317 Given the fact that many deaths occurred without being recorded, and that the process of recording went chaotic and uncontrolled during the war, it is very difficult to provide an exact number of victims. According to the research conducted by demographic experts from the International Criminal Tribunal “the number of war-related deaths in Bosnia and Herzegovina can be estimated as 102,622 individuals, of which 47,360 (46%) are military victims and about 55,261 (54%) are civilian war-related deaths.” The same experts contend that “the size of emigration from Bosnia (forced and voluntary) at the end of the Bosnian war has been estimated by UNHCR at approximately 1.2 million persons.” Ewa Tabeau and Jakub Bijak, “War-related Deaths in the 1992–1995 Armed Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and Recent Results,” European Journal of Population / Revue européenne de Demographie 21, no. 2-3 (June 2005): 207, 210. This data excludes a great number of Muslims who could not become refugees, as they were imprisoned in concentration camps, where they suffered physical and psychological damage through torture, mass rapes, and other violations of human rights.

318 Ibid.
According to the Alliance of Detainees of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 520 camps and detention facilities in 50 municipalities were operating under Serb control in the period from 1992-95. A minimum of 100,000 and a maximum of 200,000 people were imprisoned in these camps entirely on the basis of having a non-Serb ethnicity. Forced displacement of population, concentration camps, mass rape, and other human rights violations were endured by the Bosnian population. Although this affected other warring parties to some degree, Muslims suffered the greatest casualties during the war. Shocking images, shown on television worldwide, of starved and terrified men standing behind barbed wire only give us a glimpse of the torture, killing and rape in these camps. Those imprisoned in the camps of Bosanski Šamac, Brčko and Bijeljina, were beaten day and night with implements such as "rifles, metal bars, baseball bats, metal chains, police batons, and chair legs." At times, the inmates were beaten in the crotch; one victim who endured such an assault was told "Muslims should not propagate." These "beatings were applied," as Thomas M. Franck states, "by paramilitary forces from Serbia, local policemen, and members of the JNA." The leaders of the Bosnian Muslim community were targeted for the "worst atrocities and elimination."

Women and girls were tortured, sexually assaulted and systematically raped. An estimated number of 20,000 - 50,000 women of all ethnicities fell victim to rape as a weapon of

320 Ibid.
321 Ibid., 40.
322 Ibid., 40.
323 Ibid., 40.
324 Ibid., 43.
An overwhelming majority of victims were Muslim, and most perpetrators were ethnic Serbs.

The war lasted until late 1995, when NATO intervention against the Bosnian Serb military forces brought an end the armed conflict. The ethnic violence finally ended with the signing of the General Framework Agreement Dayton Peace Agreement in mid December 1995. The compromise for peace included further division of the country into two ethnically homogenized entities: one controlled by Bosnian Serbs under the title of Republic; the other, tensely governed by the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks, under the title of Federation.

**Destruction of cultural heritage**

The destruction of Bosnia’s cultural heritage took in a wide range of historic monuments and landmarks, including mosques, churches, synagogues, graveyards, major libraries, archives and manuscript collections, museums, schools, offices. The thread linking these targets was their association with the identity and presence of ethnic groups that were to be “ethnically cleansed” from a region.

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325 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ITCY) has recognized rape as a crime against humanity and that it may constitute torture. Though the ITCY has dealt with rape as in the past, the *Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic case* represents the first instance in the judicial history that a conviction was made for rape as a crime against humanity. Dragoljub Kunarac was sentenced to 28 years, Radomir Kovač to 20 years, and Zoran Vuković to 12 years. The presiding Judge Florence Mumba concluded that the evidence presented before the Criminal Tribunal demonstrated that: “[The accused] knew that one of the main purposes of that campaign was to drive the Muslims out of the region. They knew that one way to achieve this was to terrorise the Muslim civilian population in a manner that would make it impossible for them ever to return. They also knew of the general pattern of crimes, especially of detaining women and girls in different locations where they would be raped. The actions of all three accused, as will be described below, show beyond any doubt their knowledge of the detention centres, and of the practice of systematically transferring the women and girls to locations where they would be abused by Serb men. The three accused were not just following orders, if there were such orders, to rape Muslim women. The evidence shows free will on their part. Of the women and girls so detained, one was a child of only 12 years at the time. She has not been heard of since she was sold by one of the accused. The women and girls were either lent or "rented out" to other soldiers for the sole purpose of being ravaged and abused. Some of the women and girls were kept in servitude for months on end.” Judgement of Trial Chamber II in the *Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic Case*. The Hague, 22 February 2001, JL/P.I.S./566-e http://www.icty.org/sid/8018
The city of Sarajevo was under siege for three and a half years by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), which in May 1992 transferred its personnel and armaments in Bosnia to the newly created Bosnian Serb Army (VRS). Trapped as if in a ghetto, Sarajevo’s inhabitants were constantly endangered by sniper fire from the hills surrounding the city. Over 10,000 residents of the Bosnian capital were killed and more than 60,000 were injured during the siege. An estimated 1,400 of those killed were children under the age of fifteen. In addition to targeting the residents the forces besieging the city also aimed at the historic legacy of the buildings and cultural institutions that gave witness to more than 500 years of cohabitation.

The National Library (Vijecnica) in Sarajevo, an extraordinary example of the Moorish Revival architecture in Bosnia built during the Austro-Hungarian period (1896), located in the heart of the Old City (Baščaršija), was among the targets (Fig. 1.19). The bombardment of the library with incendiary munitions started in the evening of 25 August 1992, and lasted until both the building and its priceless contents had been consumed by the flames. The targeting of the National Library was deliberate and precise: while the surrounding buildings were not hit,

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327 The siege of Sarajevo took place from 5 April 1992 to 29 February 1996. It was the longest siege of a capital city in the modern history of warfare.


329 Inaugurated in 1896, Vijecnica initially functioned as a City Hall, housing the city administration, district court and in 1910 Bosnia’s first elected National Assembly. In 1949, the building became the home of Bosnia’s National Library. For more information about Vijecnica and its architecture see: Robert J. Donia, “Fin-de-Siècle Sarajevo: Habsburška transformacija osmanskom grada,” Prilozi, no. 32 (2003): 149-178; Ibrahim Krzović, Arhitektura Secesije u Bosni i Hercegovini, Biblioteka Kulturno nasljeđe (Sarajevo: Sarajevo Publishing, 2004); Mehmed Bublin, Sarajevo Throughout the History: From the Neolithic Settlement to a Metropolis (Sarajevo: Buybook, 2008), 112-120; Nedžad Kurto, Arhitektura Bosne i Hercegovine: Razvoj Bosanskog Stila (Sarajevo: Sarajevo Publishing, 1998).

330 In his testimony as an expert witness before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), presented on July 8, 2003, András Riedlmayer explained that he had “talked to members of the fire brigade that were called out – found itself under fire with anti-personnel weapons, such as heavy machine-guns. The city water supply had been cut off just prior to the shelling, and in short, the building burned for nearly three days and close to 90 per cent of the collection was destroyed.” Transcript of the Milosevic Trial in the ITCY, The Hague, 2003, 23796-23797, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/trans/en/030708ED.htm.
library was hit by more than forty incendiary shells.\textsuperscript{331} As Sarajevo residents formed a human chain to rescue books from the burning library, Serbian Army snipers created a no go zone for firefighting operations. \textsuperscript{332} Thus, Bosnia, and the world’s cultures, endured the loss of 1.5 million volumes, 155,000 rare books and manuscripts, the main research collections of the Sarajevo University, as well as the collection of record of books, periodicals, and other publications printed in Bosnia since the mid-nineteenth century. The ashes of the National Library blanketed the city like black snow for days.\textsuperscript{333} András Riedlmayer has described this event as “the largest single incident of deliberate book burning in modern history.”\textsuperscript{334}

This was simply the most notable of the Serbiannationalists’ deliberate targetings of other important libraries and archives: these included the archives and library of the Provincial House and Convent of the Roman Catholic women’s religious order of the Handmaids of the Child Jesus in Sarajevo; Roman Catholic parish archives in Brčko and Doboj; and the Islamic libraries in Janja (Bijeljina municipality), Foča, Ključ, Prijedor, and Sanski Most.\textsuperscript{335} On the night of 17 May 1992, the Serb-led Yugoslav army shelled the Institute of Oriental Studies in Sarajevo, erasing one of the richest archives of Islamic manuscripts in the Balkans, with 5363 codices in Arabic, Ottoman Turkish, Persian and vernacular Bosnian literature written in Arabic script

\textsuperscript{331} András J Riedlmayer, “From Ashes: The Past and Future of Bosnia’s Cultural heritage,” 110.

\textsuperscript{332} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{333} Serb nationalist extremists also targeted other important libraries and archives such as the library of the Franciscan Theological Seminary in Sarajevo-Nedžarići, which was looted and destroyed together with the church and the monastery of the complex, as well as the Regional Archives of Herzegovina in Mostar, which was partly destroyed. Ibid., 114.

\textsuperscript{334} András. Riedlmayer, “Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace,” 110.


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Almost the complete archive with irreplaceable documents dating from the eleventh to the twentieth century was burned down in less than 24 hours.  

The full extent of the loss cannot even be estimated, as many of the burned manuscripts had never been registered in the Institute’s published catalogues or studied.

Elsewhere in Bosnia, mosques and churches were singled out as targets, since they were the most prominent symbols of groups identified as enemies. Among the most important mosques that were destroyed in the war were the Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka (1579) and the Aladža Mosque (1550) in Foča. Both mosques and their surrounding buildings were entirely destroyed, and all of the building materials were removed from the site. Later in this chapter, I will survey the damage and destruction of Islamic religious architecture in Bosnia at closer range. Roman Catholic monuments were systematically targeted as well. Examples include the local parish churches in Bosanski Šamac, Doboj, Ključ, Nevesinje, Prijedor, and Sanski Most. All of the aforementioned churches were completely razed to the

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337 Ibid.; Riedlmayer notes that the Institute for Oriental Studies was shelled with incendiary munitions, and that similar to the destruction of the National Library, surrounding structures remained standing. Riedlmayer, “From Ashes: The Past and Future of Bosnia’s Cultural heritage,” 112.


339 The stones of the destroyed Aladža Mosque were dumped into a nearby river, while Ferhadija’s ruins are still being collected from several different locations around the city, mainly from a rubbish dump at Ramići. András Riedlmayer, Database “The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1996: A Post-War Survey of Selected Municipalities” (András J. Riedlmayer, c/ Fine Arts Library, Harvard University, 2002).

ground. Though the damage to Orthodox Christian heritage sites was smaller, in the early phase of conflict in Herzegovina, a number of Orthodox churches and monasteries were also targeted. For example, Croat extremists blew up the Serb Orthodox church in Mostar in June 1992, in apparent revenge for the destruction of the city's Catholic churches by the Serb-led JNA, which had shelled and besieged Mostar in the spring of 1992. Another example is the ancient Žitomislić Monastery (1606) of the Serbian Orthodox Church, deliberately destroyed in the summer of 1992 by a group of Croat extremists from Medugorje. Bosnia's Jewish heritage also suffered in the war; Sarajevo's Old Jewish Cemetery (17th c.) and its cemetery chapel (1924) were badly damaged during the siege, when the cemetery formed part of the front line.

Expert reports presented to the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague and the Council of Europe confirmed the systematic and deliberate nature of destruction. In his 2002 report presented in the Milošević trial, András Riedlmayer investigated 392 Christian and Islamic monuments damaged or destroyed in 19 different municipalities (districts) across Bosnia, demonstrating that mosques and churches were systematically targeted in a very precise manner.

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341 The demolition of the Catholic Church in Bosanski Šamac reportedly took place in a slow and gradual process from January to March 1993 – the destroyers proceeded slowly and carefully in order to prevent damaging the Serbian Orthodox church standing across the street. Ibid. For more information about the destruction of Roman Catholic churches in Bosnia see: Ilija Živković, ed., Raspeta crkva u Bosni i Hercegovini: uništavanje katoličkih sakralnih objekata u Bosni i Hercegovini (1991.-1996) (Banja Luka, Mostar, Sarajevo: Hrvatska matica iseljenika Bosne i Hercegovine; Zagreb: Hrvatski informativni centar, 1997).


343 The Brdjanin trial chamber found that destruction significant religious and cultural monuments was particularly intense in the summer of 1992, which represents the significant period of damage to Islamic and Roman Catholic institutions. The trial chamber concluded that this destruction was "targeted, controlled and deliberate." Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, No. IT-99-36-T, (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia) (September 1, 2004), para. 642.
to smash certain carefully selected monuments, while oftentimes other structures in the same neighborhood were left completely intact.\(^\text{344}\)

In the same study, Riedlmayer used five categories to classify the different degrees of destruction undergone by the monuments.\(^\text{345}\) Of the 277 mosques that he examined, not a single one remained undamaged. Most of the monuments that were classified as "Totally Destroyed" or "Heavily Damaged" were located in areas controlled by Serb forces during the war.\(^\text{346}\) The 22 mosques assessed as "Lightly Damaged" were for the most part in areas controlled by Bosnian government, but close to the front lines. Intriguingly, the "Lightly Damaged" mosques in Serb-controlled areas were all unfinished structures, which led Riedlmayer to infer that these mosques may not have been targeted for the reason that they had not yet been recorded on official lists\(^\text{347}\) While it is possible that some of these unfinished structures were not yet recognizable as mosques, it is more likely an indication that the targeting of religious buildings was carried out according to a plan. Riedlmayer contends:

Unfinished houses of worship of the non-Serb communities — both mosques and Roman Catholic churches — seem to have been frequent targets of vandalism and looting of building materials during the war, but were rarely destroyed. This odd selectivity suggests that those involved in tearing down mosques, an activity that requires some advance organization and planning (explosives, equipment, personnel), may have been working from prepared lists, which would

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\(^\text{345}\) These categories are: Completely Destroyed, Almost Destroyed, Heavily Damaged, Lightly Damaged and In Good Condition.


\(^\text{347}\) Ibid.
not have included religious buildings that were under construction and not yet in active use.\textsuperscript{348}

While there was some deliberate destruction of cultural heritage attributable to all parties in the conflict, Serb nationalist forces were the ones engaged in the most systematic form of cultural warfare. While the Bosnian government acknowledged that there had been damage and loss of the monuments of all ethnic groups in Bosnia, no Bosniak politician had publicly encouraged such attacks in the war.\textsuperscript{349} A statement made by Haris Silajdžić in 1995, the Bosnian Prime Minister at the time, in response to a question concerning the safety of Serbs in the Federation expresses the Bosnian government's official position:

Our history is our guarantee. Our credibility is our history, this history, the history of this conflict in which these authorities have demonstrated maximum tolerance even at the most difficult moments [...] I visited Bosanska Krupa following its liberation. In one small area there had been a Catholic church, a mosque and an Orthodox church. When I visited Krupa, the Catholic church and the mosque had been destroyed. The Orthodox church was intact. This is our credibility and this is not just the way things are around Sarajevo. This is the case everywhere. There are probably some exceptions that only confirm the rule.\textsuperscript{350} 

In the parts of Bosnia controlled by the Serb military forces, by contrast, even in areas where there was no armed conflict, the destruction of religious structures of the non-Serb communities was systematic and publicly applauded by the authorities.\textsuperscript{351} For example, mosques in towns such Bijeljina, Foča, Banja Luka, Sanski Most, or Zvornik were destroyed at times

\textsuperscript{348} Ibid., 9-10.
\textsuperscript{349} Dauban, "Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 58.
\textsuperscript{350} Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, in Serbo-Croat, 1900 GMT, 7 December 1995., quoted Dauban, "Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 58.
\textsuperscript{351} Dauban, "Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina."
when these cities were firmly under the control of Serb forces and when no fighting was taking place. The two mosques in the town of Bosanski Petrovac were destroyed during the Serb takeover of the city, which occurred without significant resistance, let alone resistance that could have caused these monuments’ destruction as damage incidental to the fighting.

Evidence of the targeted and systematic destruction of cultural heritage and religious monuments has made an important contribution to convicting war crimes suspects on charges of persecution as a crime against humanity. The deliberate destruction of cultural heritage in the absence of imperative military necessity represents a violation of international law protecting cultural heritage during armed conflicts. For this reason, the evidence of the systematic and deliberate nature of cultural warfare in Bosnia represents a highly political issue — it can verify that the destruction of cultural heritage represented an integral aspect of “ethnic cleansing” and genocide. Proving that the deliberate destruction of architecture went hand in hand with the

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354 Andras Riedlmayer notes that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ITCY) is increasingly responsive to this issue, treating the destruction of cultural property as a "serious war crime and by doing so it is breaking new legal ground." The notion of "cultural genocide," a term frequently used in media and academic writing in relation to the destruction of Bosnia’s cultural heritage, is not a legal concept. Riedlmayer, “Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace,” 126.
355 The Hague Convention of 14 May 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict is one of the most important instruments for protection of cultural heritage in international law. According to this convention, cultural heritage of one country is a matter of entire humanity, not just a concern of the particular state, on whose territory that heritage is located. As such, all cultural heritage necessitates an international protection. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, 1954, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13637&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
356 The term genocide was first coined by the legal scholar Rafael Lemkin in 1944: “Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the group itself. The objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic coexistence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups.” Lori Lyman Bruun “Beyond the 1948 Convention: Emerging Principles of Genocide in Customary International Law”, Maryland Journal of International Law and Trade 17, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 193-226. It was on Lemkin’s initiative that the Convention for
mass-murder and expulsion of civilians represents an important foundation for legitimating the
future of peace, justice, and multicultural coexistence in the region, as well as bringing
transparency to Bosnia’s history.

The trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) has legally confirmed these claims in several recent trials. In the case of Radoslav
Brdanin, for example, the Trial Chamber was "satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was
willful damage done to both Muslim and Roman Catholic religious buildings and institutions in
the relevant municipalities by Bosnian Serb forces."\textsuperscript{357} In the case of Dušan Tadić, the Tribunal
concluded that "[n]on-Serb cultural and religious symbols throughout the region [of Banja Luka]
were targeted for destruction."\textsuperscript{358} In reviewing the indictments of Radovan Karadžić and Ratko
Mladić the Trial Chamber issued the following statement:

Throughout the territory of Bosnian and Herzegovina under their control, Bosnian Serb forces [...] destroyed, quasi-systematically, the Muslim and Catholic cultural heritage, in particular, sacred sites. According to estimates provided at the hearing by an expert witness, Dr. Kaiser, a total of 1,123 mosques, 504 Catholic churches and five synagogues were destroyed or damaged, for the most part, in the absence of military activity or after the cessation thereof [...]. Aside from churches and mosques, other religious and cultural symbols like cemeteries and monasteries were targets of the attacks.\textsuperscript{359}

\textsuperscript{357} \textit{Prosecutor v. Brdjanin} (International Criminal Tribunal, No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, 1 September 2004), paras. 640 and 658.

\textsuperscript{358} \textit{Prosecutor v. Tadic} (International Criminal Tribunal, No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 7 May 1997), para. 149.

It should be considered that Colin Kaiser’s study mentioned here was focused on Islamic and Roman Catholic sites in just six Bosnian municipalities. Though several studies have been conducted by local and international organizations, legal and religious institutions, to this day we have no comprehensive survey of the entire extent of the demolition of civic and religious monuments in Bosnia. Riedlmayer provides a different estimate, stating that “ca. 1,200 mosques, 200 churches (mostly Catholic, some Orthodox), and over 1,000 other historic buildings have been targeted by nationalist forces.” While the numbers point to the fact that places of worship were of particular interest for the “ethnic cleansers,” it is notable that the number of ruined mosques is far in excess of the number of ruined churches for reasons I will examine later.

**Destruction of mosques**

To date, several studies have been conducted by both local and international scholars and institutions to examine the extent and manner of destruction of Islamic religious architecture, yet
a comprehensive countrywide survey is lacking. Also, the individual results are not always comparable, since each study applied a different methodology.

The survey used for Rijaset’s official records was conducted by Muharem ef. Omerdić, a leading official in the Theological-Educational Section of the Rijaset, published in 1999. In this countrywide survey, monuments affected by the war are classified as either destroyed (standing for a complete destruction of a building) or damaged (encompassing a range of damage, from light to heavy) (Fig.1.22). In all, Omerdić concludes that 921 (81%) mosques, 259 (47%) prayer rooms/small mosques (mesdzid), 87 (9%) Qur’an-readers’ schools and 9 (60%) dervish lodges were either completely destroyed or damaged. Omerdić’s investigation also includes charts that correlate destruction to different occupying or besieging military forces (Fig.1.6). According to Omerdić, the Army of the Serb Republic (VRS) and related forces were responsible for the destruction of 534 mosques, 175 prayer rooms, 55 Qur’an schools, 3 dervish lodges, 34 mausoleums, and 345 waqf buildings, while the Croat Defense Council (HVO) and related forces contributed to the destruction of 80 mosques, 43 small neighborhood prayer rooms, 14 Qur’an-readers' schools, 1 dervish lodge, 3 mausoleums, and 60 waqf buildings.

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364 Omerdić’s list of destroyed monuments includes: 614 or 54% mosques, 218 or 39% prayer rooms, 69 or 7% of Qur’an-readers’ schools, 4 or 27% of dervish lodges, 37 or 41% of Isamic mausoleums, and 405 or 28% of other waqf-owned buildings. The list of damaged monuments includes: 307 or 27% of mosques, 41 or 7% of prayer rooms, 18 or 2% of community religious schools, 5 or 33% of tekkes, 7 or 8% of mausoleums and 149 or 10% of other waqf buildings. Ibid.
365 Ibid.
366 Ibid.
In an article published in 2002, András Riedlmayer slightly amended Omerdić’s findings, based on information gathered from additional sources (Fig. 1.23). Riedlmayer estimated that total destruction or damage affected 927 (81%) mosques and 259 (46%) of small prayer rooms, 87 (9%) Qur’an-readers' schools, 9 (60%) dervish lodges, 44 (49%) mausoleums and shrines, and 554 (39%) waqf-owned buildings. According to Riedlmayer, a total of 1186 (70%) mosques and small prayer rooms were completely destroyed or damaged.

In the fall 2008, the Center for Islamic Architecture (CIA) at the Rijaset in Sarajevo, conducted another examination about the state of destruction and rebuilding of Islamic monuments during the war (Fig. 1.24). According to CIA/Rijaset, a total number of 1370 mosques and 333 small prayer spaces existed in Bosnia after the Second World War and before 1992. During the war of 1992-95, total destruction affected 584 (43%) mosques and 111 (33%) of small prayer spaces. 417 (31%) of mosques and 78 (23%) of small prayer spaces were damaged. In total, approximately 72% of all mosques and 56% of prayer rooms in Bosnia were totally destroyed or were damaged during the war of 1992-95 according to CIA/Rijaset. It should be noted that the numbers presented here can give us only an approximate estimate of the

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367 This study was “based on the data from the Institute for Protection of Cultural, Historical and Natural Heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina, A Report on the Devastation of Cultural, Historical and Natural Heritage of the Republic/Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (from April 5, 1992 until September 5, 1995) (Sarajevo, 1995), and supplemented with information from the incidents database of the State Commission for the Documentation of War Crimes on the Territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Državna komisija za prikupljanje činjenica o ratnim zločinima na području Republike Bosne i Hercegovine), the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other sources.” András J. Riedlmayer, “From Ashes: The Past and Future of Bosnia’s Cultural heritage.” 99.

368 Ibid.

369 Ibid. I have brought down the percentages to a round number.

370 The Rijaset differentiates between mosques and small prayer spaces based on the existence of a minaret, whereby a mosque (džamija) is defined as a prayer space with a minaret, and a small prayer space (mesdžid) is a building without the minaret. Source: Center for Islamic Architecture (CIA/Rijaset), Rijaset Islamske Zajednice u Sarajevu, 2008.
buildings’ actual condition, since their classification as “totally destroyed” or “damaged” was not applied according to consistent criteria.  

Beside the surveys mentioned above, numerous attempts were made by individual Bosnians to recover, at least digitally, what has been lost in the war, as evident from the numerous mosque database-websites and photo-collections in the Internet (i.e. www.dzamije.info)

Kaiser, Riedlmayer, Omerdić, Zukić, among other scholars and experts argue that the wartime targeting of religious architecture (particularly Islamic and Catholic monuments) was deliberate and systematic, as evident from different patterns of destruction. For example, most mosques were destroyed according to the same pattern: they were first looted, then burned, and subsequently mined. If dates of destructions are taken into account, it is clear that these destructions occurred in a sequence correlated to the movements of particular military forces moving from place to place as a brigade dedicated to cultural destruction, bringing down several monuments in one region in a single day.

The information about many monuments in CIA/Rijaset’s “mosque data sheets” were provided by local imams and clerks in local religious authorities (medžilisi). All regional religious councils (medžilisi) were approached by the CIA/Rijaset after the war to complete the “mosque data sheets.” These “data sheets” include the basic information about the origin of mosques and their founders, dates and manner of repairs, state of destruction during the war of 1992-95. In most cases, the written data filled in the form was accompanied by photographs or postcards, showing the pre-war and post-war appearance of monuments and their remains, as well as newspaper accounts and first hand reports from local community members. Because the forms were filled out by a great number of people, the information provided in these sheets varies in its extent from place to place and according to the personal perceptions of the individual clerks. The photographic documentation in CIA/Rijaset’s survey was assembled by the architect Kemal Zukić, former Director of the Center for Islamic Architecture at the Rijaset since 1996. This documentation provides clues about the state of affairs immediately in the first years after the war, often before the jamaat members even had the chance to return to their villages or start rebuilding mosques. Zukić assembled some of his research into a publication: Kemal Zukić, Slike zlodina: rušenje islamskih vjerskih objekata u Bosni i Hercegovini [The evidence of crime: the destruction of Islamic buildings in Bosnia and Herzegovina] (Sarajevo: Centar za islamsku arhitekturu, 1999).

Mosque data sheets, Center for Islamic Architecture, Rijaset Sarajevo.

Riedlmayer and Kaiser both presented evidence that mosques that were destroyed were targeted in a manner that would maximize the destructive impact of shelling or mining. In many cases, minarets were toppled in such a way that their broken parts would fall onto the mosque’s roof, thus causing additional damage or even destruction of the entire mosque. The fifteenth-century Sheikh Magribija Mosque in Sarajevo, for example, was heavily damaged in accordance with this tactic. The minaret was toppled in May 1992, causing significant damage to both the roof and the interior of the mosque. Furthermore, sniper fire made it impossible to effect repairs to the mosque until after the war. This amplified the damage, since the roofless mosque was open to the sky and was thus further damaged by exposure to the elements. The violence targeted against minarets transformed these into instruments of violence; falling minarets hit not only other buildings surrounding the mosques, but also people. At the Donja Puharska Mosque (1977) site, in Prijedor Municipality, for example, the minaret that was mined on 31 August 1992 in the middle of the night fell onto the neighboring house of the imam, Osman ef. Kusuran, killing his son and daughter-in-law.

The extent of mosque destruction in some regions, particularly eastern and northern Bosnia, is tightly linked with “ethnic cleansing” — places that were cleansed of Muslims, were also “cleansed” of mosques and all other Islamic monuments. In some cities, such as in Prijedor, Zvornik, Banja Luka or Foća — notably all in the territories held by the Serb forces (JNA/VRS)

374 Examples of such a destruction include several mosques in Prijedor Municipality, such as the mosques in Kevljan (19th c.) and in Trnopolje (19th c., rest. 1970), and the Town Mosque (1736) in Kozarac, Ljubija Mosque (1960), Češeci Mosque (1936), Kozaruša Mosque (dated mid. 18th c., rest. 1950). Mosque data sheets, Center for Islamic Architecture, Rijaset Sarajevo.

375 The minaret was shelled in May 1992 and the mosque in August the same year. Said Jamaković, interviewed by Azra Akšamija on 17 June 2008.

376 The same rationale was behind numerous other buildings in the city, whose roofs and facades were hit by grenades, and could not be repaired during the war. Ibid.

377 The minaret was mined at 0:55am in the morning. The rubble of the mosque was later removed from the site, together with the foundation stones. Mosque data sheets, Center for Islamic Architecture, Rijaset Sarajevo.
all Islamic monuments were destroyed. The local Muslim population was killed, imprisoned, or forcefully expelled.

In Zvornik, Serb forces destroyed all five of the city’s mosques. A total of forty-six Islamic sites disappeared in towns and villages in this municipality, including thirty-six mosques. The eradication of all Islamic cultural traces was part of the program under which targeted ethnic groups were eliminated from a region, in this case eastern Bosnia. A widely cited wartime statement by the Mayor of Zvornik, Branko Grujić, affirms this point; in several interviews by international reporters he claimed that “there were never any mosques in Zvornik.” This account is, of course, a lie, as the photographic and textual evidence can prove (Fig. 1.25). In a later interview for Chicago Tribune, Grujić clarified what he meant to say with his false version of Zvornik’s history — Muslims might have had a legitimate claim to live in the region, but that things look different today, given the new demographics:

Zvornik once had a population of almost 70,000 — with more than 60 per cent being Muslims. Today, the mosque has been blown up, and the city is more than 90 per cent Serb, maybe even 99.9 per cent Serb.  

Grujić’s statements reveal the motivations behind the destruction of mosques and other historic religious monuments, which went hand in hand with the elimination of the people associated with those monuments: the eradication of non-Serb inhabitants and of their material traces in the

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territories conquered by the JNA/VRS allowed for the redefinition of these territories as ethnically pure Serb land.

We should not forget that this re-creation of Bosnia as a "pure Serb" or "pure Croat" land was not a collective dream held by all Bosnian Serbs or Croats. In his self-published book *Banjalučka Ferhadija. Ljepotica koju su ubili [Banja Luka’s Ferhadija. A Destroyed Beauty]* (1996), the author Aleksandar Aco Ravlić, a non-Muslim (Bosnian Croat) native of Banja Luka, documented the destruction of the city’s Ferhad Pasha Mosque and of the town’s other mosques, providing us with touching evidence how some Serbs and Croats felt about the destruction of Bosnian coexistence. He writes:

Banja Luka without the Ferhadija and Arnaudija, and so many other mosques, the clock-tower, Islamic tombs and graveyards is not the Banja Luka that we loved. [...] Instead of Banja Luka that we loved, we got a Banja Luka that Serbian extremists wanted and announced in the exhibition “Banja Luka — The Center of Vrbas Banovina 1921-1941”  

The exhibition that Ravlić mentions here was held in the city in 1994, organized by the Archive of the Bosanska Krajina (named after the region of western Bosnia) and the Museum of the Bosanska Krajina (later renamed as the Archive and the Museum of the Serb Republic, respectively). To the Ravlić’s great dismay, mosques had no place anymore in this portrait of the city from the 1920s and 1930s, an era in which the city had at least thirty mosques. He noted that not a single minaret could be seen in any of the exhibited period photographs. They had all been airbrushed out. The fact that such an exhibition was organized by two scientific and

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381 Ibid.
382 Ibid.; also quoted by Riedlmayer, “From Ashes: The Past and Future of Bosnia’s Cultural heritage,” 122.
cultural institutions represents, Ravlić points out, the betrayal of the mission and integrity of such institutions:

What remains is an open question of what type of history we will be presented with by such historians who readily became members of Serbian Chauvinists and extremists. How will they explain the disappearance of such a large number of religious monuments of two peoples — Bosniaks and Croats, that is Muslim and Roman Catholic people, how will they explain their massive expulsion from Banja Luka in which they lived for centuries, how will they explain, as it cannot be hidden, why so many people were harassed and abused for years, how they were made citizens outside the rule of law, just because they are not Serbs [?] 383

In reconfiguring Banja Luka’s demographic constellation, as well as of other regions, the ethnic cleansers needed to eradicate all indications that the land they “purified” had ever been inhabited by anyone else but their own people — the primary goal here was to keep these territories ethnically and religiously pure. This type of agenda undermines the possibility for any coexistence by destroying community roots in the past. History, however, provides evidence that the coexistence of peoples was, contrary to the chauvinistic claim, one of the great historical achievements of the region. Mosques and churches that traditionally faced each other in main squares of cities embodied Bosnia’s history of coexistence. As Riedlmayer notes, religious architecture provided evidence for the fact that peaceful coexistence was once not only possible, but also prevalent in Bosnia. 384 Because this multicultural aspect of Bosnia history was not suitable for nationalists’ visions of Bosnian identity, collective memory was surgically altered to suit the nationalists’ divisions along ethnic lines by the removals of peoples and their monuments, places of worship, records of their history, and their art.

383 Ravlić, Banjalučka Ferhadija, 57.
Forgetting and violence, as Ernest Renan reminds us, are integral to national formation:

Forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for [the principle of] nationality. Indeed, historical enquiry brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political formations, even of those whose consequences have been altogether beneficial. Unity is always effected by means of brutality. 385

The enforcement of forgetting in service of nationalist division of Bosnia was architecturally implemented in great detail and elaborateness. To prevent the expelled population from returning, the nationalist extremists pursued a twofold strategy. The first was to annihilate all material and textual evidence that could prove the historical claims of people to a land, while the second line of attack was based on the premise that traumatizing and antagonizing particular populations within a multi-ethnic enclave would forever extinguish the desire for coexistence — people who survived torture, rape, and humiliation can hardly be expected to want to live as neighbors of their persecutors. The next section explores these two strategies.

Revising memories, reframing territories

The revision of collective memory involved visually reframing landscapes though the removal of recognizable symbols of other ethnic groups’ presence. The elimination of a minaret, for example, not only completely changes the appearance of the landscape in which it once stood.

stood, but it also visually uproots the Muslims' attachment to that territory, while creating a disorientation among the Muslims' neighbors that can lead to acceptance of the newly revised status quo. This explains why experts have found that minarets were almost always destroyed, even if the mosques were damaged and remained standing. It is significant that Ravlić, above, speaks of the city that “we loved” in relation to the buildings that were erased both in the present and in the edited photographs of the past, since what was erased was the affective human geography of these communities, over which was imposed a violent immersion into a chauvinistic Serbian vision of the organic community.

In many places, this program succeeded in erasing all cultural traces of undesired unwanted ethnic groups, along with the populations themselves. The ethnic cleansing of Foča Municipality and the destruction of Islamic monuments is a case study in accelerated mass murder and cultural extinction. In his oral pleadings before the International Court of Justice presented on March 1, 2006, Thomas M. Franck, Professor of Law Emeritus of the New York School of Law, represented Bosnia-Herzegovina, stating:

The main Serb attack on Foca town focused on the Muslim areas of the town and started on 8 April 1992. The Serb forces included soldiers from Montenegro and Yugoslavia, and in particular a paramilitary formation known as the White Eagles as well as local Serb forces. After the takeover of the town, Muslims were referred to as “balija”, they couldn’t work, they couldn’t meet, their telephone lines were cut, their homes were searched, their businesses were looted or burned and their equipment was seized. Their neighborhoods were systematically destroyed. As Muslim houses burned, fire engines protected Serb houses. The Muslim civilian

386 Dauban, "Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 56.
population, including women and children, was brutalized and killed or detained. Their mosques were blown up or burned.\textsuperscript{388}

A total of thirty-three Islamic sites were destroyed in the municipality of Foča; twenty-four of these were mosques, three were Sufi shrines and one was a historic Sufi monastery of the Naqshbandi dervish order.\textsuperscript{389} In the city of Foča itself, all eleven mosques were destroyed in the spring and summer of 1992; eight of these had survived since the sixteenth century. The most prominent among these mosques, and the last one left standing in Foča, was the Aladža mosque (1550), which was dynamited on 1 August 1992, at a time when the town was fully under the control of Serb forces.\textsuperscript{390} After all traces of Islamic life in Foča had been eradicated, the city was renamed “Srbinje” — literally “Serb Town” — a name that emphasizes the city’s newly created ethnically pure identity.\textsuperscript{391} Sadly, as Foča’s chronicler Faruk Muftić notes, no mosque remained standing in the city that could prove that Muslims had ever lived there.\textsuperscript{392}

The chauvinist pursuit of territorial sanitation went beyond the logic of pure destruction to embrace a kind of mysticism of ethnic cleansing: not only were mosques blown up and their surrounding graveyards leveled, but also their rubble was removed from the sites. Even the foundation stones were frequently dug out and carried away. We find evidence of such actions in Foča, Banja Luka, Donji Vakuf, Rijeka, Kotor Varoš, Zvornik, among numerous other places.


\textsuperscript{389} Dauban, “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 50.; Ten houses owned by the Islamic Community were also smashed. Faruk Muftić, \textit{Foča: 1470-1996} (Sarajevo: TKP “Šahinpašić,” 1997), 62.

\textsuperscript{390} ICTY, \textit{Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al.}, (International Criminal Tribunal, No. IT-96-23&23/1, Judgment, 22 February 2001), para. 44.

\textsuperscript{391} Dauban, “Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 50.

\textsuperscript{392} Muftić, \textit{Foča}, 63.
Once the mosques were made to disappear, their empty lots were further degraded by being turned into lowly sites like parking lots or garbage hips.\(^{393}\)

This process of purging territories of the religious architecture of the non-Serb communities continued even after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord, as happened in the case of the Kušlat Mosque (1478; rebuilt 18th c.), one of the oldest mosques in the country (Fig.0.1). While the Serb forces had destroyed the wooden mosque already in February 1993, they came for its rubble after Dayton. The ruins that remained after destruction, were removed.\(^{394}\) This vanished monument was not only a pilgrimage site, but also one of the rare remaining examples of the so-called fortress-mosque, the earliest form of mosque architecture in Bosnia erected by the Ottoman army in medieval castles.\(^{395}\) To destroy the mosque in such an inaccessible location — the mosque stood on top of an almost vertical cliff, approximately one hundred meters high above the confluence of the river Jadar and the river Drinjača — not to mention the removal of its rubble from the site, required resources and planning adding to the evidence of the deliberate and systematic nature of destruction.

\(^{393}\) The Market Mosque (Hadži Mahmudova džamija or Čaršijska džamija, dated 1650), a listed monument located in the center of the town of Zvornik, was entirely destroyed in 1992. After the rubble was removed, the empty mosque site was turned into a parking lot. The mosque of Ibrahim-beg Malkočević (Baš džamija, dated 1572) in Donji Vakuf shared a similar destiny; even its foundations were dug out and carried away. Mosque data sheets, Center for Islamic Architecture, Rijaset Sarajevo.


\(^{395}\) This well-known cliff-top mosque crowned the top of the cliff, enhancing its already prominent location with a very steep wooden hipped-roof and a wooden minaret. The presence of a religious edifice in a military-administrative center was not a novelty brought to Bosnia by the Ottomans; many Bosnian fortresses from the pre-Ottoman period used to have churches built in them. Adem Handžić notes that fragments of a church altar remained evident in the wall of the fortress at Kušlat until only recently. The mosque that was erected in the fortress stood in close proximity to these church relics. Adem Handžić, Tuzla i njena okolina u XVI vijeku (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1975), 143.; Given its prominent location, the mosque was later also used as a pilgrimage site. The mosque was rather small (ca. 6.5x6.8m). For a plan, section and a drawing, see: Madžida Bečirbegović, Džamije sa drvenom munarom u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo: Veselin Masleša, 1990), 110-114; According to the on-site research conducted by András Riedlmayer in July 2002, the Kušlat mosque was destroyed in February 1993 by Serb forces. The mosque ruins were entirely removed. Riedlmayer, Database “The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1996: A Post-War Survey of Selected Municipalities.”
Symbolic dimension of violence

In late August 1992, Ranko had a friend over for a few drinks. His friend belonged to a military demolition team that had received orders that night to blow up a mosque in central Prijedor. Ranko's friend invited him to go with the team, about a dozen boys. At around midnight they set off for the Muslim temple, which Ranko tells me, 'was about 200 years old. I don't know, they all look the same — cheap.' They battered the door down and began smashing up the mosque, downing more rejki as they looted and destroyed. One of the boys started playing Iron Maiden and Nirvana over the loudspeakers that had once broadcast the muezzin calling the faithful to prayer. Then they lit a bonfire of carpets and tables in the middle of the mosque and bored holes in the walls by the light of the fire. They wired up the charges, dismantled and took the sound system and gathered outside to watch the walls crumble in a single cloudy explosion, singing and laughing. I asked Ranko if he felt ashamed. 'Why? I did two djamijas [mosques] the same way. If you destroy their djamijas, they never come back.'

Ranko’s story about how he and his comrades sought to prevent the Muslims from coming back to Prijedor reveals disturbing aspects of cultural warfare in Bosnia. The metaphorical act of starting the bonfire of carpets while playing heavy metal and rock music — as if they were on a camping vacation — suggests that the violence was aimed at humiliating the targeted groups while at the same time numbing the perpetrators to the meaning of their actions.

What happened in Prijedor was one incident in a vast system of such atrocities. In numerous Bosnian cities and villages, places of worship were demolished in ways that were meant to signify more than the mere blowing up of buildings: the symbolism of the acts of destruction was meant to utterly pollute the religious sites, and in this way harm the populations

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targeted by the chauvinist militias both materially and emotionally. The oddly religious attack on religious symbols — with the attackers operating in a sort of trance of blasphemy — and the transgressing of cultural taboos represented an integral part of warfare in Bosnia. Cultural symbols were, in fact, weapons of war.

To understand the instrumentalization of culture in the war, we need to examine the underlying ideological motivations that drove the conflict. It is useful to use anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s understanding of ideology as a cultural system that operates in terms of “discrimination of its social and psychological contexts.” Geertz identified two main approaches to the study of ideology: the interest theory and the strain theory. The interest theory can point out how people adhere to certain groups, classes or parties based on their common interest. When the groups aim for institutionalization of what they consider to be a more beneficial reality, their ideas can turn into weapons for capturing and enforcing the group’s political agenda. Against this context, the strain theory can reflect the state of the “personal tension” of individuals, but it can also describe “the condition of societal dislocation” of the collectivity. The former explains the expectations that make sense of the tactics people use to pursue power, and the latter concerns their escape from fear into anger. Geertz criticizes both theories for their lack of understanding of the systematic interaction of the symbols through which ideology has to do its work. Instead of looking to interest or to sheer affectivity, one needs to examine “how symbols symbolize, how they function to mediate the meanings” in

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398 Ibid., 201.
399 Ibid., 202.
400 Ibid.
401 Ibid., 203.
402 Ibid., 207.
terms of symbolic actions that transforms an ideological attitude into a meaningful consequence. The function of ideology in this context, to use Geertz’s words, would be “to make an autonomous politics possible by providing the authoritative concepts that render it meaningful.”

This religiously “authorized” violence underlies the symbolically charged dates chosen for executions and destructions. In a number of places in Bosnia, destruction was performed on specific religious holidays, both Islamic and Christian, in order to add symbolic weight to the act of violence. For example, the Hrvaćani Mosque (19th c., rebuilt 1981) in Kotor Varoš municipality, was heavily damaged by multiple projectile impacts fired in June 1992 during the Hadžijski Bajram (Eid-al Adha or “Festival of the Sacrifice”), an important Islamic holiday celebrated annually after the conclusion of the Hajj (Fig. 1.25). The entire village was burned down on this occasion. On 27 January 1993, Serb irredentist militias in Trebinje celebrated the fest of Saint Sava (1169-1235), the first archbishop and founder of the Serbian Orthodox church, by burning down the oldest mosque in the city and by expelling all Muslims from the city.

The ritual form of killing represented another aspect of cultural warfare. Consider, for example the crucifixion of the imam in the village of Ahmići on the portal of the shattered mosque (Fig. 1.26). This village in Vitez municipality was attacked by Croat nationalist forces on

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403 Ibid., 208.
404 Ibid., 218.
405 Mosque data sheets, Center for Islamic Architecture, Rijaset Sarajevo.
406 Ibid.
The village's two mosques and hundred-fifty houses of its Muslim residents were destroyed that day. One hundred and sixteen Muslim inhabitants of Ahmići were killed. The application of this ancient form of painful execution was meant not only to induce a slow and agonizing death of the imam, but also to humiliate the entire community though the public display of their spiritual leader's mortification and suffering. As leaders of their communities, imams (Muslim clergymen) were often the targets of such ritualized killings. A massacre that took place in the village of Ćarakovo, Prijedor Municipality on 23 July 1992 provides another example: on that day, Serb nationalist forces executed eighteen Muslim villagers in front of the mosque. The village imam, Sulejman ef. Dizdarević was wrapped up in a prayer carpet which was set on fire, burning him to death. To finish off the assault, the soldiers burned down the mosque and blew up the minaret.  

The physical context in which violence was performed also played a role in enhancing the impact of these humiliation scenarios designed to terrify onlookers and murder selected targets. The new mosque in the village of Novoseoci (built 1990), in Rogatica municipality, was attacked on 22 September 1992 by soldiers of the 2nd Romanija Brigade of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS). The destruction of the mosque was also chosen as the occasion for the killing of its jamaat members: forty-five Muslim men were lined up in front of the mosque and shot. Their bodies were later found, buried under the rubble of the mosque, in a municipal garbage dump at

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408 This information was conveyed to me in the interview with an eye witnesses from the village of Ahmići, whose identity will not be disclosed here for privacy reasons. Anonymous, Interview by Azra Akšamija on 9 July 2009.


410 Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, case No. IT-00-39-T, testimony of Milan Tupajić, 29 June 2005., as cited by Dauban, "Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina," 50. Records of the Center for Islamic Architecture at the Rijaset indicate that the destroyed mosque was built just before the war, after thirty years of waiting for a building permit. The new mosque that was inaugurated in 1990 was built in place of a mosque that had been destroyed in World War II. Fifteen years after its destruction the Novoseoci mosque was rebuilt, and was inaugurated on 25 August 2007. Mosque data sheets, Center for Islamic Architecture, Rijaset Sarajevo.
Ivan Polje, six kilometers away from Novoseoci. Each of the victims had been hit by six to eight bullets (Fig. 1.27). 411

There is something uncanny about the way the dead bodies and the mosque rubble were both disposed of at the garbage dump, piling over each other — it implies that for the “ethnic cleansers,” the mosque was a synecdoche for the Muslims themselves. We find evidence of this symbolic trashing of bodies and rubble throughout Bosnia. The ruin material of the previously mentioned Aladža Mosque (1550) in Foča, for example, was transported to the neighboring river bank, where it was scattered on top of a mass grave (Fig. 1.28). 412 After the eighteenth-century Savska mosque in Brčko was blown up by Serb forces, its rubble was “mixed with tons of garbage then dumped on top of a mass grave site and used to cover remains of Muslim civilians from Brčko killed by Serb forces and buried on the outskirts of the town.” 413 The symbolism of disposing mosque fragments together with the dead bodies of the congregation went beyond the rationality of removing mosque rubble simply to erase Islamic life and tradition in the region; it was clearly meant to be a form of punishment for having a “wrong” ethnicity or religion. The stones and the bones were mixed and deposited as one big pile of garbage, as if the human bones and the mosque’s stones were the same, and all of it was waste.

411 Explaining how difficult it was to uncover the mass grave, because 15-ton heavy chunks of mosque fragments and rubble had to be removed, Amor Masović, Head of the Bosnian Missing Persons Agency states: “Only military trucks could have carried those huge chunks of the mosque. This was a deliberate, organized act of terror, not war.” Mort Rosemblum, “41 Muslims Finally Buried in Bosnia”, Associated Press, 5 November 2000, as cited by Dauban, "Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina.,” 50-51.


Beside garbage dumps, another symbolic form of degradation of religious sites involved the erection of pig stalls on the empty sites of destroyed mosques. In the central Bosnian village of Srednje, for instance, a pig stall was erected on top of the ruined mosque, which had been burned down by the Serb forces in June 1992. While the eating of pork is forbidden to Muslims by their religion, many Muslims consider pigs to be “impure” animals. This dietary constraint also represents the major distinction between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs in their otherwise shared traditional cuisine. By putting a pig stall on top of the ruined mosque, Serb nationalists aimed to desecrate the Muslim place of worship as part of a program of humiliating and annihilating the Muslim population and its personal and cultural goods.

During the war, the pig was a recurrent theme in symbolic actions during various execution rituals. A young man from the same village, who survived the imprisonment and brutal daily beatings in the Manjača concentration camp said he suffered his greatest trauma from being forced to watch his friends being killed in the way pigs are usually slaughtered on the eve of major Serbian Orthodox religious festivities. When forced to watch the torture of friends and relatives, an individual’s pain transcends personal experience and becomes part of a collective agony.

The Manjača detention camp, known as the “camp of hunger,” began its operations on May 15, 1992 and was one of the most notorious Serb-run detention camps in the Banja Luka

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414 For example, the sites of destroyed Islamic monuments in Foča, such as the Mosque of Sultan Bayezid II (1501), the Madrasa of Hadži Mehmed Paša Kukavica (1758; rebuilt 1899), the Mosque of Hadži Mustafa (16th c.), were completely leveled after destruction and then used as sites for dumping garbage. Riedlmayer notes that, at the time of his survey (2002), the sites of the mosques were being used as rubbish tips. Riedlmayer, “Database ‘The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1996: A Post-War Survey of Selected Municipalities’.”; Mosque data sheets, Center for Islamic Architecture, Rijaset Sarajevo.


416 The victim is now undergoing treatment in a psychiatric recovery program in Norway. This information was conveyed to me in the interview with an eyewitness from the village of Ahmići, whose identity will not be disclosed here for privacy reasons. Anonymous, Interview by Azra Akšamija on 30 July 2005.

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municipality. The majority of the inmates, predominantly Bosnian Muslim men and minors, whose numbers ranged from 3,600 to 5,434 during the time that the camp was in operation, were imprisoned in inhumane and unhygienic conditions; they were tortured and starved, most of them losing 20 to 30 kilograms during their imprisonment (Fig. 1.29). Those who survived will surely be haunted by their experiences for a long time afterwards — many are still silenced by their traumatic war experiences.

Slaughtering Muslims in the same way as pigs, as in the Manjača camp, enhances the impact of violence though its cultural context — the victims’ humiliation is symbolically amplified as they are placed on an equal footing with that which they consider to be dirty or impure.

Executions by means of throat cutting are evocative of the ritualistic slaughtering of pigs for religious festivities. The symbolic form of butchering humans as animals likens executions to a religious celebration. The ritualistic aspect of murder suggests that religious and nationalistic ideology provided a motivation for violence as well as validation for the very act of slaughter.

**Transformative Violence**

The accounts in Srednje, Foča, Brčko, Kotor Varoš, Čarakovo, Ahmići and Novoseoci highlight the intertwined relationship between nationalist ideology, genocidal violence and architectural symbols. Symbolic acts of humiliation such as ritualistic killing, destroying places of worship and instrumentalizing religious and cultural taboos as a means to degrade both

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418 Ibid.

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Muslims and their mosques, suggest that the perpetrators understood the mosque as an embodiment of their enemies' image — in other words, architecture assumed a human quality.

The idea that a building substitutes a group of people is rooted in a long history of anthropomorphous buildings, particularly in the case of religious architecture. The Roman Catholic tradition provides the most explicit precursors. Based on the cosmological idea that man is created in god’s image, Renaissance architects believed that religious architecture needed to follow the ideal human proportions, which were considered divine. Therefore, the house of God was built in reference to the human body. Accordingly, the Italian painter, sculptor and architect, Francesco di Giorgio Martini (1439-1502), believed that the human head provided the measure for the entablatures of classical temples, as he demonstrated in his drawings (Fig.1.30). Another well-known example from the Roman Catholic tradition is the Piazza San Pietro (St. Peter’s Square), which stands in front of the Papal Basilica of Saint Peter (1506-1626) in the Vatican. The piazza’s oval colonnades, designed by the celebrated baroque artist Giovanni Lorenzo Bernini (1598-1680), represent “the motherly arms of the Church” that invite and protect their worshipers (Fig.1.31).

The human body’s association with religious architecture is common in many religious traditions, ranging from Roman Catholicism (the cross form of a church’s floor plan symbolizes Jesus’ crucifixion), to Orthodox Christianity (centralized plans of Orthodox churches go back to saints’ martyrria and pagan tombs), to Hinduism (for Tamils, the temple is the body, the soul is

419 There is a vast literature on this subject ranging from Renaissance architectural treatises to contemporary theories of anthropomorphous architecture. See, for example, Kent C Bloomer, Body, Memory, and Architecture, A Yale paperbound (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Body and Building: Essays on the Changing Relation of Body and Architecture (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2002); Günther Feuerstein, Biomorphic Architecture: Human and Animal Forms in Architecture (Stuttgart: Axel Menges, 2002).

420 Trattati di architettura di Francesco di Giorgio Martini

God) and Buddhism (the temple structure translates into the structure of the human chakras).  

In Islam, the body is the defining spatial parameter of the mosque, at least conceptually, as the human body frames the mosque’s minimal space while prayers are performed (Fig. 1.32). 

Such examples, which span various religious traditions, demonstrate how religious architecture today has come to represent not only God, but also God through people. This widely established analogy of the human body as a temple has certainly played an important role in the destruction of Bosnian mosques.

This analogy was extensively analyzed within the field of construction — the body of literature that deals with the anthropomorphous aspects of religious architecture literature and highlights the temple as a metaphor for men. Violence that is directed toward architecture takes this analogy to another level. The perpetrator targets architecture because it stands for their enemy — past, present and the future — thus, transforming the religious architecture into the enemy’s substitute. The deliberate and systematic form of violence directed at Bosnian Muslims and their religious monuments shifted the mosque’s meaning from a metaphor for Muslims to a material substitute for their existence.

As demonstrated through the executions and destructions of mosques described above, this transformation of mosque’s meaning is not the result of military maneuvers or the typical material damage that occurs within a conflict. Rather, targeted and symbolic forms of violence aimed at dehumanizing, terrorizing and eliminating a group of people who are represented by a piece of architecture results in transformation. The burning of 191 and demolishing of 76

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422 The plan for the Universal Center in Vienna (Universelles Zentum Wien), for instance, is designed as a metonym of the human body, that is, the aura of the human body as a clairvoyant sees it. The seven chief energy centers (chakras) in the temple are both spatially and functionally arranged in correspondence to the human body. "Universelles Zentrum Wien - Chakren," Arquitecto, n.d., http://www.arquitecto.co.uk/1365.0.html.

synagogues during the Kristallnacht, is an example for this type of violence.\textsuperscript{424} Although the attack on the architectural presence of Jews in Germany was a “rehearsal” or a “softening-up process” for the assault that would follow, architectural critic, Robert Bevan, argues that it “was also an act of cultural genocide in its own right. It was central to making the Reich \textit{judenrein}.”\textsuperscript{425}

Sadistic acts against people and symbolic sadism directed against architecture, as witnessed in Bosnia, represent a form of genocidal violence that aims to eliminate ethnically defined enemies as well as any material traces that they ever existed. Robert Bevan regards the violence in Bosnia as a “war against architecture,” whose aim is,

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\text{[...]} \text{not the rout of an opposing army — it is a tactic often conducted well away from any front line — but the pursuit of ethnic cleansing or genocide by other means, or the rewriting of history in the interests of a victor reinforcing his conquests. Here architecture takes on a totemic quality: a mosque, for example is not simply a mosque; it represents to its enemies the presence of a community marked for erasure.}\textsuperscript{426}
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While exposing the “totemic quality” of the mosque, Bevan describes the conversion of the mosque’s meaning. Through destruction, the productive aspects of violence are uncovered: by reframing the meaning of a destroyed object, violence attaches new meanings to that objects. Architectural historian Andrew Herscher argues that the target of violence is often defined by that violence, and the status of the architecture as a symbol, heritage or embodied memory


\textsuperscript{426} Ibid., 8.
changes after it has been attacked. “Violence against architecture,” he states, “transforms, often fundamentally, the values, meanings and identities of architecture.”

To understand the transformation of meaning in violence directed at architecture, Herscher argues that both the destructive act of violence and its outcomes need to be examined in their own terms. The process of examining this violence can be grouped into two categories. The first approach is introduced by the architect Bogdan Bogdanović with the notion of “urbicide,” which portrays destruction as an opposition to urban culture and as an irrational antagonism to civilization more broadly. The second category, as elaborated by Robert Bevan, is summarized by the phrase “war against architecture,” and exposes the destruction of architecture as a rational form of deliberate, politically motivated iconoclasm. While these two approaches either irrationalize or rationalize the act of destruction, Herscher claims that both approaches deny the ruins “the autonomy that critical interpretation would grant any cultural phenomenon.” Herscher argues that the destruction of architecture needs to be treated as an independent cultural phenomenon. Through his so-called “Warchitectural Theory” that he derived from the concept of an exhibition entitled “Warchitecture” held in Sarajevo in 1993, Herscher proposes that destruction may be understood as “targeting of culture and a cultural form in itself.”

428 Ibid., 40.
429 Bogdan Bogdanović, Die Stadt und der Tod (Wieser, 1994).
431 Ibid.
432 “Warchitecture” exhibition was organized by the Sarajevo Association of Architects during the siege in 1993. Ibid.
This dissertation examines the architectural evolution of “warchitecture” after and in response to destruction. It traces the architectural responses to the violence of war — both in physical and symbolic forms — specifically by examining Bosnian religious architecture. While the systematic destruction of cultural heritage conditioned the erasure of collective memory, the process of renovation allows for that memory’s recollection, but also for its revision. The transformation of post-war mosques from their pre-destruction appearances provides insights into the shifting meanings of mosques caused by violence. By acknowledging that the mosque has always played a vital role in creating different forms of Bosnian Muslims’ identities, I argue that the systematic and genocidal nature of the mosques’ destruction during the war was the catalyst for their transformation from a religious and ethnic signifier to being perceived as the ethnic body of the Bosniak nation.

In her study on violence, memory and nationalism among Hutu refugees in Tanzania, anthropologist Liisa Malkki argues, “through violence, bodies of individual persons become metamorphosed into specimens of the ethnic category for which they are supposed to stand.”433 Along this line of argumentation, anthropologist Allen Feldman demonstrates through his examination of the cultural construction of violence, body and history in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1986 that “the ethnicity of the body is built in its dismemberment and disfigurement. Violence constructs the ethnic body as a metonym of sectarian social space.”434 I draw from Malkki’s and Feldman’s arguments in my proposal that the violence of war produced an equivalent effect in Bosnia’s mosque architecture: targeted because they stood for the presence of Bosnian Muslims and history of coexistence, they also represent an instrument for


Bosnian Muslims to reinsert their presence and rewrite Bosnia’s history as non-multicultural. In this dissertation I will argue that post-war mosques have become the primary *specimens* for finding the lost identity.
CHAPTER TWO - REGIONAL SCALE

Inat Mosque and Memorial Mosque

What matters [...] is that the memory of what happened in Omarska not be allowed to disappear. That there must be something to say ‘this happened’, and this was the place. Something to which we can go each year, to show the children, lay flowers. Something that future generations can learn from, so that it does not happen again.435

— Edin Kararić (survivor of the Omarska concentration camp), 2004

Omarska, a small town near Prijedor in northwestern Bosnia, is known as the site of one of the most brutal “death camps” set up by the Serb nationalists between around 25 May and 30 August 1992 to “ethnically cleanse” the region of its non-Serb population. In this camp, located in the administrative headquarters of an iron ore mine a few kilometers from Omarska, Serb forces held captive more than 3,000 Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat civilians from the Prijedor region for over three months.436 Imprisoned solely on the basis of their ethnic and religious affiliations, these civilians were subject to severe beatings, rape and sexual assaults,


torture, and murder.\textsuperscript{437} The bloodiest spaces of the Omarska mining complex were the so-called “White House,” a small building where brutal beatings of prisoners took place, and the “Red House,” from which most prisoners never emerged alive.\textsuperscript{438}

In 2004, twelve years after the camp closed, a small group of Bosniak survivors from the region returned to this place of their worst nightmares, the place where they had lost family members and friends. Though remembrance was their primary motivation, they also wanted to express defiance: by walking around Omarska, the survivors wished to demonstrate that their persecutors — men whom they now encountered on the streets of Omarska — did not achieve their goal of allowing only other Serbs to remain alive in the region.\textsuperscript{439} The survivors’ return also addressed the disturbing fact that Omarska and Prijedor officially became parts of the Serb Republic in 1995 (a kind of political “ethnic” victory); their stubborn perambulation also called attention to the Serb nationalists’ ongoing denial of the genocide and other crimes against humanity — as documented by the Hague War Tribunal.\textsuperscript{440}

Though a memorial to the Omarska victims had long been under discussion by survivors, instead of commemorating those victims and acknowledging the war crimes endured by the


\textsuperscript{439} Sabaduhin Garibovid, head of the Concentration Camp Survivors’ Association (CCSA) explained: “We are doing this […] to show the Serbs who evicted us that they did not entirely succeed. That we can come back. They never thought they would see it. They cannot fathom what we are doing.” Ed Vulliamy, “We can’t forget,” \textit{The Guardian}, September 1, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/sep/01/warcrimes.balkans.

\textsuperscript{440} Unlike the Nazi concentration camps, no records were kept in the Omarska camp that would help determine how many people were imprisoned and killed there. Samuel Totten and Paul R. Bartrop note that several concentration camp commanders were indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Samuel Totten and Paul R. Bartrop, \textit{Dictionary of Genocide} (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 2008), 82-83.
Muslim and Catholic civilians, the local authorities chose to create a memorial park in the town’s center honoring fallen Serb soldiers (Fig. 2.1.). An unequivocal proclamation of Serb nationalism and a slap in the face to the local survivors of the genocide, the memorial featured a large-scale metal sculpture of the Serbian 4-S symbol that stands for the nationalists’ motto “Samo Sloga Srbina Spašava” (“Only Unity Saves the Serbs”).

In 2005, a memorial project for the Omarska victims was finally approved by the Serb authorities to be sited at the Omarska mine where the atrocities had happened. This, however, was not a sign of a sudden insight or long overdue repentance. Instead, the project was being funded by the Indian-British corporation Mittal Steel Europe, the world’s largest steel company. Planning to reactivate mining activity, Mittal had purchased over 50% of the mine’s shares in 2005. Unsurprisingly, Mittal’s decision to finance the erection of a memorial site met with many objections by the local authorities. After all, many members of the regional forces who were directly or indirectly involved in the ethnic cleansing still lived in the immediate area.

Memory became a matter of bargaining: instead of instigating the process of coming to terms with the past by erecting the memorial — as initially promised by the company when it bought a controlling interest — Mittal believed that it had to negotiate with the Serb authorities. The result was that Mittal agreed that the reopened mine would give hiring preference to Serbs over Bosniaks and Croats. The urgently needed mining jobs that Mittal promised to create for all

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441 Erich Rathfelder reports that the memorial was to encompass 34,000 m$^2$ of the premises. An oval plateau was to provide place for reflection and commemoration of the victims, whose names were to be engraved on the walls surrounding the plateau. The “White House” was to become a museum; the notorious “Red House” was not included in the memorial project. Erich Rathfelder, “Versöhnung nach Regeln des Kapitals,” TAZ. Die Tageszeitung (Berlin), December 22, 2005, http://www.taz.de/pt/2005/12/22/a0172.1/text. To implement the project, Mittal Steel hired the British human rights organization “Soul of Europe.” See: http://www.soulofeurope.org/gallery7.htm

442 Ibid.

443 Ibid.
thus only came to discriminate against and deepen the wounds of an already heavily abused population. In the end, the memorial was never built.

Such denial of commemoration in places such as Omarska became widespread in the post-Dayton epoch. It was this pattern that prompted Muslims across Bosnia to seek out alternative means of claiming justice and seeking remembrance. This chapter examines how post-war mosque architecture came to be the site of such claims, constituting the Muslims’ response to these pressing concerns.

The chapter consists of three parts. I begin by outlining the general processes of mosque reconstruction throughout the country, demonstrating how the rebuilding of mosques fostered the social revitalization of communities and provided an outlet for otherwise thwarted commemorative impulses. In the second and third parts, I discuss the two new phenomena that have arisen in Bosnia’s post-war mosque architecture: what I term the “Inat Mosque” (mosques of defiance) and the “Memorial Mosque.”

The Inat mosque represents an evolving genre of religious architecture in Bosnia and Herzegovina that foregrounds the symbolic aspect of the mosque as a marker of the Muslims’ survival and of their territorial claims. This genre is defined not by style, but by the builder’s motivation for construction: expressing defiance against the war and its transfigured continuation after Dayton. By analyzing representative case studies of “defiant mosques” throughout the country, in addition to conflicts over mosque renovations in Eastern Bosnia, my aim is to demonstrate that religious architecture has provided agency for strengthening the social and political standing of its patrons — in this case the Bosnian Muslims — in the context of an ongoing ethnic conflict that still continues (albeit in a different guise) fifteen years after the war. By examining the phenomenon of the “Memorial mosque,” I discuss how the construction of
national identity has been carried out though commemoration in mosques. I focus on post-war mosque architecture in Cazinska Krajina, the westernmost region of Bosnia, to show how religious architecture has functioned to allow for the restoration of collective memory and for the healing of war trauma.

In conclusion, I suggest that these two new phenomena in Bosnian mosque architecture reveal that the Bosniaks’ identity-formation on the regional scale follows a dual direction: one that has evolved in response to the war and the post-war actions of other ethno-national groups, as embodied by the Inat mosque, and the other — exemplified by the Memorial mosque — that stands for the negotiation of identity within a community itself.

1. Mosque rebuilding and social revitalization

The very act of rebuilding a mosque — countering destruction with reconstruction — represented a form of resistance against the aims of nationalist extremists from the very beginning of the postwar period. Since mosques in Bosnia were destroyed because they were symbols of their communities, rebuilding them indicate that these communities had managed to survive the war. It is thus not surprising that, as of 2010, the process of post-war reconstruction of mosques was well underway: according to the records of the Islamic Community, approximately 70% of all mosques and small prayer spaces (mesdžidi) had been renovated or rebuilt only twelve years after the end of the war. This process of regeneration, I will argue, has allowed for the renewal of communities’ social structures.
Restoring a community’s physical and social makeup starts with the tedious process of cleaning up the ruins. In Bosnia, this activity could be very dangerous, since mines that were used by all sides for combat were often placed into ruins after a monument was destroyed — camouflaged as everyday objects or children’s toys and hidden under the rubble — with the intention of killing those who returned. Despite such life-threatening risks, Muslim returnees usually start clearing out ruined mosques immediately after the basic living conditions in their hometowns were established. *Imams* and other respected community members are the first to initiate this process by organizing collective cleaning efforts. Because of the poverty of the returnees, hiring professional construction companies to do the work was not an option. Operations were voluntary, involving *jamaat* members of all age groups (Fig. 2.2), who bond this way across different generations.

Collective clean-up and building efforts could become gratifying social events, at which men and women frequently socialize over coffee breaks and shared meals. Taking place at least twice a day, the coffee ritual represents a vital component of a community’s daily life. Socializing this way is not about consumption — the traditional Bosnian coffee ceremony is all about spending time together and enjoying the company of others. Beside coffee breaks, hard work is occasionally rewarded with a lamb roast, a regionally characteristic outdoor meal prepared on the occasion of large family gatherings and communal celebrations. All these

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444 The majority of the mines in Bosnia remain from the 1992-1995 war, but some areas were mined after the war in order to prevent the return of the refugees. During the war, Bosnia became the world capital of booby traps. Lydia Monin, and Andrew Gallimore. *The Devil's Gardens. A History of Landmines* (London: Pimlico, 2002), 139, 143.

shared activities that accompany mosque renovations represent an important contribution to the process of regeneration of the communities’ social coherence.

Mosque renovations also stimulate community-making through the formation of different organizational structures needed for project implementation. Because the activities of fundraising, planning, administering, or constructing require the existence of representative legal bodies, all mosque construction projects begin with the formation of what is usually called the Mosque Building Committee, typically consisting of the imam and three to seven other authoritative individuals from the community. This group meets on a regular basis to discuss all upcoming tasks — financial and practical.\textsuperscript{446} The legal framework in which mosque building occurs thus not only conditions, but also clarifies a community’s leadership.

The process of fundraising for mosque renovations represents another type of activity that fosters community-making. Most Muslim communities in Bosnia finance these projects through donations collected from local individuals and companies, as well as from the jamaat members abroad and from different international organizations. Since financing mosque rebuilding is usually more affordable for diasporic communities than for the returnees, the expatriates play a vital role in sponsorship. However, fundraising from émigrés around the world poses logistical problems regarding international money transfers and the need for transparency in the overall donation process. Depending on the skills and technical equipment available to the project initiators, international fundraising is often run through the Internet. To that end, the jamaats and the regional higher religious authorities (medžlisi) create homepages to advertise their calls for donations. Such fundraising homepages also provide important information about the project’s initiators and patrons, with the names of all benefactors listed together with the

\textsuperscript{446} The Mosque Building Committee is the primary decision makers during the design process, through some design features may be improvised by craftsmen. Members of the Mosque Building Committee often work as builders themselves. Kemal Zukić, interview by Azra Akšamija on June 18, 2008.
amounts they donated. The necessity to acknowledge the locally and internationally-based donors has brought about a new type of patron-plate — a “digital tarih” — that supplements, in the virtual space, the traditional carved patron-plates from the mosque entrances.\textsuperscript{447}

The “call-for-donations” homepages facilitate communication between local and expatriate community members; blogs and posts allow for efficient spreading of news about the community, for sharing of memories about hometowns, and for providing updates on the mosque renovation progress, or videos from mosque inaugurations.\textsuperscript{448} Some communities proudly document each phase of mosque building with photographs and comments posted online, thus transforming the fundraising blogs into types of mosque renovation diaries. These public chronicles bear testimony to a passionate devotion to mosque building, making public the emotional aspects of architecture that go beyond the physical participation in the building process.\textsuperscript{449} With these websites accessed by community members worldwide, the Internet has certainly become an integral part of the architectural process. On the one hand, it is utilized as a logistical apparatus for fundraising; at the same time, it provides an online platform for social networking, which helps connect the local and diasporic communities.


\textsuperscript{449}For example, builders take pride in the results of their efforts by praising their mosques on websites; mosques are typically described as a “ljepotica” (“a beauty”) of a specific region. For an example of such online stories see “Povratičke priče (kroz slike i textove),” FORUM Tužlarije, n.d., http://www.bhstring.net/tuzlauslikama/tuzlarije/forum/viewtopic.php?TopicID=816292&page=18. (accessed on 27 March 2011); Image gallery of the Medžlis Islameke Zajednice Bijeljina, MIZ Bijeljina n.d., http://www.mizbijeljina.com/galerija/thumbnails.php?album=11 (accessed on 27 March 2011)
Because of budgetary limitations, architects or professional restoration companies cannot be hired for mosque projects. Thus, the semi-official processes of building with the jamaat's own means represents the most common approach to mosque rebuilding in Bosnia. The funds collected typically suffice only for the construction material; consequently, the process of building itself depends entirely on the voluntary work of the community members. From pouring out concrete foundations to laying brick, most phases of mosque construction are carried out by local people from all age groups. Since the elderly, adults, youth, and children all work together, the process allows for imparting knowledge and skills from one generation to another. This way, the communal effort of constructing contributes to keeping the vernacular building traditions concrete.

Limited funding resources, coupled with the lack of institutional supervision, have enabled the emergence of new privately-owned construction companies specializing in inexpensive ready-made minarets. For instance, the minarets of the mosques in Ustikolina, Srednje, or Miljanovci Novi, among numerous other places, were built by a private company owned by hadži-Muharem Krusko, a muezzin of the mosque in Miljanovci Novi, in the Municipality of Tešanj (Fig 2.3). Krusko has built over a hundred minarets throughout the country and is known for his prefabricated concrete minaret parts. Instead of a "catalogue" from which a client can choose a minaret design, individual communities select elements they like from the mosques in the neighboring villages. Striving for the most beautiful design, individual jamaats imitate each other's mosques; this process allows for the emergence of regionally characteristic minaret trends. Descending from a family of imams, hadži-Muharem Krusko is an active member of the local Islamic Community; his familiarity with local building needs allowed him to identify a gap in the market for minarets that can be easily constructed by amateurs in the
absence of professional supervision. Kruško’s success in bridging this gap attests to the fact that the countrywide process of post-war mosque renovations benefits the local construction firms. It should be noted, however, that many grassroots companies and craftsmen provide their services for free or at lower rates as a form of pious alms giving (zekat), in addition to giving monetary donations.

At this point, the spiritual dimension of mosque building should also be acknowledged as an important factor in the revitalization and strengthening of communities. Mosque building can in fact be understood as a religious act as well — a spiritual fulfillment for the builders — that aims to contribute to the psychological recovery of communities traumatized by war. One such community is the central-Bosnian village of Srednje, where the imam Avdo ef. Hasanović initiated the renovation of the local mosque as a way of instigating the social healing of his flock.450 The community of Srednje greatly suffered during the war, as many of its members were imprisoned and tortured in the concentration camp of Manajča (see Chapter One).451 Moreover, the local mosque was burned down by the Serb forces in June 1992, after which a pig stall was erected on its ruins to forever despoil the religious site.452 Following the return of refugees to Srednje after the war, the imam managed to motivate the village’s youth to start rebuilding the mosque with hopes that this voluntary collective work would help in overcoming their traumatic memories (Fig. 2.4).453 It is difficult to assess whether the imam’s efforts will bear any fruits, but his attempt to help in this unconventional way is worth mentioning, given the

450 Avdo ef. Hasanović, interview by Azra Akšamija on July 30, 2005. The village of Srednje is located near Sarajevo and counts some two hundred households.


453 The new mosque was rebuilt next to the site where the old one once stood, perhaps because the ruin was despoiled because of the pig stall.
unfortunate fact that only a very small percentage of traumatized war victims ever receive professional help. Mosque-building in a community thus may represent for many the only way of dealing with their traumatic past.\textsuperscript{454}

Finally, the mosque — in its primary function as a space for congregation and collective prayer — provides a space for long-term social healing though spirituality. Beside its religious role, moreover, the mosque represents a vital component of public infrastructure in cities and villages, facilitating diverse social gatherings, religious and cultural festivities, birth, marriage, and mourning ceremonies, educational and other non-religious events. In fact, in most small towns and villages, the mosque represents the only form of communal public space where Muslims can meet, exchange experiences and discuss current social and political issues.

In sum, the therapeutic aspects of the mosque are, on the one hand, related to its religious functions and the spiritual fulfillment it provides for the members of a community. On the other hand, it is the collective nature of building mosques that fosters community making. In the economically difficult post-war situation in Bosnia in particular, mosque renovations rely to a large extent on voluntary community work. Collective efforts such as the clean-up of ruins, fundraising, and building contribute to the reconnecting of war-damaged social networks.

\textsuperscript{454} The son of a woman I interviewed is a survivor of the concentration camp of Manjača. Not only was he brutally beaten every day, but he also suffered the greatest trauma from being forced to watch his friends being killed in the way pigs are usually slaughtered for Serbian religious festivities. After his imprisonment and forced work as a cook, he is currently being treated in a psychiatric recovery program in Norway. This information comes from a confidential interview with a woman from Sređnje, who must remain anonymous in respect for her privacy. Anonymous, interview by Azra Akšamija on July 30, 2005.
2. The *Inat* mosque

Beside allowing for social recovery of communities through the process of building itself, mosque architecture also provides for internal strengthening of communities through its symbolic significance, which will be discussed in this section. I will begin by examining the concept of *inat* (defiance) as related to architecture and outlining its defining parameters. I will then proceed to analyze the relationship between architecture and the politics of nonviolence, arguing that *inat* architecture can be understood as a form of "nonviolent action," as this phenomenon is labeled in political theory. Finally, I will explore how the notion of *inat* applies to mosque architecture in post-war Bosnia, focusing specifically on regions that have been "ethnically cleansed" during the war. My case studies aim to demonstrate that, in the context of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, *inat* mosques stand for the Bosnian Muslims' counter-discourse to Serb and Croat nationalism.

The conditions for and the principles of *inat* architecture

The word "*inat*" was adopted in the Bosnian language from the Turkish and the Arabic and translates as "an opposition with obstinacy" or "persistence or endurance resembling obstinacy." As an attribute in architecture, the term denotes buildings that were erected as expressions of defiance, refusal, or obstinate reaction to offensive and threatening actions or phenomena.

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455 To do something with (or out of) *inat* would mean to "deny, refuse, or dispute with obstinacy." Sir James William Redhouse, *A Turkish and English Lexicon: Shewing* [comment CJ]in English the Significations of the Turkish Terms (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1996), 1323. [See comment nasser]
The best-known example of such “architecture of defiance” in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the so-called Inat Kuća (Spite House) in Sarajevo (Fig. 2.5). Originally a residence, it is now a well-known restaurant serving traditional Bosnian cuisine. The house’s name, according to a legend, goes back to the end of the nineteenth century, when its owner refused to conform to the large-scale urban interventions of the Austro-Hungarian government in the Old City.456 The house had originally been located on the right side of the river Miljacka, in a prominent location at the point of entrance to the city, which the government chose as the site for its new showcase project: the Neo-Moorish city hall (Vijećnica).457 The house’s owner, a man named Benderija, stubbornly refused the repeated requests for the house’s demolition; he may have been bothered by the monumental scale of the new government’s civic project, or perhaps simply did not want to move and have his life and habits disturbed. In 1895, after months of long and difficult negotiations, Benderija finally gave in. As compensation, he asked for a bagful of ducats and requested that his house be rebuilt exactly as it was, stone by stone, on the opposite side of the river. The government apparently agreed to this unusual request, and the house’s new incarnation on the left bank of the river Miljacka came to be known as the Inat Kuća.

Even through the Inat Kuća is mainly admired today as a symbol of Bosnian pride and stubbornness, the legend surrounding its genesis highlights a different essential point: inat architecture does not emerge out of pure spite or stubbornness, but rather out of the builder’s or the owner’s need to address a deeper concern. The premise of inat architecture is therefore some sort of social, political, or economic conflict in which one or several parties feel disadvantaged.

456 For the transformation of the city of Sarajevo in the Austro-Hungarian period see: Donia, “Fin-de-Siècle Sarajevo: Habsburška transformacija osmanskog grada”; Krzović, Arhitektura Secesije u Bosni i Hercegovini; Bublin, Sarajevo throughout the History, 112-120; Kurto, Arhitektura Bosne i Hercegovine.

or unfairly treated. In this context, *inat* architecture materializes as a form of the disadvantaged side’s insistence on justice. Since they are products of reactive activities, the different manifestations of *inat* architecture are best understood in the specific contexts in which they occur, as well as through the human relations that shape them.

To begin, the actors involved in the making of *inat* architecture may be individuals or groups of people not different from those involved in the construction of any other edifice. In fact, *inat* architecture is not differentiated by the human participants themselves, but by the conflictual relationship between them — it is this antagonistic rapport that prompts the act of building itself. Also, *inat* architecture does not depend on a specific building program. Spatial expressions of *inat* can be found across residential, commercial, religious, and other public spheres. Finally, *inat* architecture may be found in diverse historical, geographical, and cultural contexts. For example, in addition to several cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an array of residential buildings, usually called “spite houses,” also exists in the United States. Some

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458 One well-known expression of *inat* in religious architecture in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the Old Mosque (1660) in Fazlagića Kula in the Gacko municipality, also known as the Inat Džamija (The Mosque of Defiance). The mosque’s name, as Hivzija Hasandedić explains, goes back to an anecdote: before the mosque was erected, the inhabitants of Kula used to go to the neighboring city of Ključ for the Friday prayer and for other special prayers during the religious holiday of *Bajram* (Eid ul-Fitr). Following the *Bajram* prayer, they were always invited to a lunch in Ključ. A sarcastic comment made by someone on one of these occasions -- that the inhabitants of Kula only come to Ključ for free lunch -- incited them to construct a mosque in their own city out of *inat*, and thus stop going to Ključ for prayer. The mosque was founded by Mehmed-bajraktar Fazlagić and located in Sopot. The date of the mosque’s foundation is unclear, as the inscription plaque (*tarih*) disappeared during Second World War. Hivzija Hasandedić dates the building to 1660. He describes the mosque as a very small stone structure (65 square meters), covered with a hipped roof and featuring a small cylindrical minaret in stone. The mosque was heavily damaged in Second World War and subsequently restored in 1965. The old minaret was replaced with a new rocket-shaped tower in 1976. Hivzija Hasandedić, *Muslimanska baština u istočnoj Hercegovini* (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1990), 212-213.

459 A few key examples are the Old Spite House of Marblehead, Massachusetts (1716), the Richardson Spite House in New York City (built 1882, demolished 1915), the Skinny House in Boston (1874), and the Alameda Spite House, California (early twentieth century). For the Old Spite House of Marblehead, see Russell F. Whitehead and Frank Chouteau Brown, eds., *Early Homes of Massachusetts: From Material originally Published as the White Pine Series of Architectural Monographs* (New York: Arno Press and Crown Publishers, c1977). For the Richardson Spite House in New York City, see Benjamin Albert Botkin, *New York City Folklore: Legends, Tall Tales, Anecdotes, Stories, Sagas, Heroes and Characters, Customs, Traditions, and Sayings* (New York, Random House, 1956).
of these houses were built as a reaction to family arguments over inheritance, some to block a
neighbor’s view following a dispute, and others to physically defy some undesired urban
development. Yet, while the actual triggers for their construction may differ, the common
feature of all “spite houses” is their builders’ pursuit of justice through the very act of building.
The primary point of all inat structures is therefore symbolic.

Still, inat architecture is more than a mere symbol: it also accommodates different
programs and is usually fully functional in everyday life. Since signaling defiance tends to
overshadow functionality, inat buildings frequently take on unusual forms and occupy awkward
locations. The mid-seventeenth century stone bridge in Stolac in southern Herzegovina — the
so-called Inat Ćuprija (The Bridge of Defiance) — exemplifies this peculiar aesthetics through
its asymmetrical arches (Fig. 2.6).460 This structural asymmetry was a deliberate expression of
defiance: according to legend, the craftsman who erected the bridge consciously made each arch
a different size out of revenge against his unfair master. Another example of inat architecture’s
eccentric appearance is the Skinny House on Hull Street in Boston (1874), a functioning
residential building that is only three meters wide (Fig. 2.7).461 The house’s narrow shape is the
result of a dispute between two brothers over family inheritance. According to local lore, while
one brother was away in the military, the other built a large house only for himself on almost the
entire shared property. When the soldier brother returned, he made his objection known by
erecting another house on the remaining fragment of the land parcel in order to prevent the
sunlight from reaching the windows of his brother's house. The resulting Skinny House is so

460 “Inat Ćuprija” is one of the oldest stone bridges in Stolac. The bridge is also called Gornja čuprija (Upper Bridge)
or just Ćuprija (The Bridge). For history of bridges in Stolac see: Muhamed Elezović, “Legende o Stolačkim
čuprijama,” Most - časopis za obrazovanje, nauku i kulturu, no. 199 (110 - new series) (June 31, 2006),

461 Robert Todd Felton, Walking Boston: 36 Tours Through Beantown’s Cobblestone Streets, Historic Districts,
slim that, at its narrowest point (1.8 m), a person standing in the middle of the interior with their hands outstretched can touch both sides of the building.462

What these two examples have in common is that inat was expressed through an “error” consciously built into the design. The phenomenon of the integrated flaw — such as the strange shapes or sizes — reveals the notion of disfigurement as an intrinsic quality of inat buildings. The importance of their visual distinctiveness is clear: if a structure is erected as an expression of defiance, the meaning of the builder’s message needs to be conveyed unequivocally. Hence, the design of inat architecture is targeted at challenging a situation that its builder perceives as unjust. What matters the most for inat architecture then is not a specific architectural form or style, but rather the building’s consciously emphasized visual difference from other structures.

This discrepancy has historically been achieved in three ways. The first involves architectural means such as a deliberate deviation in style, color, size, or shape (for example, the narrowness of the Skinny House dramatically sets it apart from the surrounding family homes). It is the visual uniqueness of inat buildings that carries their message of defiance. The second rests on the choice of the location for an inat edifice, which is determined according to the particular agenda of the builder (for example, the placement of the Skinny House was predicated on its effectiveness in obstructing the neighbor’s view and sunlight). The third concerns the very process of construction, which may be obstructive or more labor-intensive than necessary to communicate defiance (for example, the Inat Kuća in Sarajevo was created through the strenuous process of dismantling, moving, and rebuilding — stone by stone — the original structure).

In sum, the concept of inat architecture does not refer to a distinctive architectural typology, style, or program, but rather to a genre of buildings distinguished though their very

462 Ibid.
cause of creation — that is, a defiant response to a conflict. While spatial expressions of defiance may occur in different contexts, the effectiveness of inat buildings to communicate their builder's agenda depends on three spatial parameters: their design, their location, and their mode of construction. Above all, the appearance of inat architecture is contingent upon the nature of the underlying conflict. The next section will explore the principles of conflicts that have prompted the emergence of inat architecture.

Inat architecture as agent of political resistance?

Inat architecture emerges out of actions and reactions between two or more conflicting parties. As stated earlier, its origin is a conflict in which one party — the builder or the patron — is disadvantaged or feels unfairly treated. His or her objection is then expressed through an action, such as erecting a structure that communicates inat. Because the act of constructing represents a nonviolent form of engagement in a conflict, inat architecture too can be understood as a form of nonviolent action.

In political theory, the notion of non-violent action is a concept that describes a way of engaging in a struggle without resorting to violence. As Gene Sharp argues in his seminal work on the topic, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (1973),

Nonviolent action is a generic term covering dozens of specific methods of protest, noncooperation and intervention, in all of which the actionists conduct the conflict by doing — or refusing to do — certain things without using physical violence. As a technique, therefore, nonviolent action is not passive. It is not inaction. It is action that is nonviolent.463

According to Sharp, nonviolence can be used by the disadvantaged parties in a conflict as means of both empowerment and fighting.\textsuperscript{464} In his view, a crucial characteristic of conflicts in which nonviolent action occurs is that the conflicting parties do not hold equal positions of power. The reason why the less powerful side chooses nonviolent action in the first place is the prospect of increasing its strength within such a conflict, while simultaneously delegitimizing the power of its opponent. If applied skillfully, Sharp argues, the nonviolent means of engagement in a conflict are likely to lead to success:

[...] nonviolent action tends to turn the opponent's violence and repression against his own power position, weakening it and at the same time strengthening the nonviolent group. Because violent action and nonviolent action possess quite different mechanisms, and induce differing forces of change in the society, the opponent’s repression [...] can never really come to grips with the kind of power wielded by the nonviolent actionists.\textsuperscript{465}

Sharp’s theory of nonviolent action is based on his understanding of political power as pluralistic and dispersed across society (as opposed to a monolithic notion of power that is held only at the top of the social hierarchy).\textsuperscript{466} Political power, according to Sharp, is possessed by those who obey, meaning that the power of a ruler is based on the continued obedience of his subjects. In other words, power is shaped by social relations. When the ruled come to understand the


pluralistic nature of political power, Sharp contends, they can also influence and shape power relations in their societies; they can even undermine the power of the ruler by discontinuing obedience.467

What are the implications of Sharp’s theory for the present concern with inat architecture? Relating nonviolent action to architecture allows for an understanding of inat buildings as instruments of social or political pressure within an acute conflict. Nonviolent action, as author Ronald M. McCarthy argues, “implies an active process of bringing pressure to bear (even if it is emotional or moral pressure) in wielding influence in a dispute-ridden and contentious relationship between groups.”468 Inat architecture, in this context, can be seen as a medium for conflicting parties to influence the final outcome by strengthening their position through nonviolent means. Architecture is thereby used not only to communicate opposition, but also to appeal to the opponent, and ideally, to change the opponent’s behavior in favor of one’s own interests.469

As a form of nonviolent action, inat architecture represents a powerful agency for individuals to assert their position against the greater and more dominant social, political, or economic interests. The many legends about the diverse inat buildings and spite houses are told and liked precisely because they highlight the possibility of empowerment for those who are disadvantaged, discriminated against, or repressed. In fact, what makes the example of the Inat Kuća in Sarajevo appealing to this day is the fact that the tedious removal of Benderija’s house to a new location stands for a single man’s ability to stand up to a much stronger opponent.

467 Ibid.
Although Benderija obviously did not win the dispute (his house was indeed removed from its original location), the fact that the government did agree to his unusual demand for compensation and reconstruction of his house on a different site confirms his success in claiming some justice for himself in a situation in which he had no chance of coming off as a winner. As a form of nonviolent action, inat architecture thus allows for strengthening and exercising of a degree — no matter how small or insignificant — of social and political power.

The capacity of inat architecture to fulfill this task relies on several factors. The first factor is spatial; it concerns the architectural design, the mode of construction, and the choice of location, as discussed above. Because the builder's intention is to demonstrate that injustice exists, a successful delivery of this message depends on the appearance of inat architecture in the public sphere. It is essential that the expression of inat is carried out in the open: by publically exposing the unfair behavior of the opponent, the builder hopes to win sympathy and support from others. Architecture as a means of representation lends itself well to this purpose.

The second factor is the political/legal framework within which a building is constructed, which conditions both the nature of the conflict from which an inat structure evolves, as well as the possibilities for its architectural design. Nonviolent actions, as we learn from Sharp, are more likely to take place in situations in which conventional political and legal channels are inaccessible or ineffective (e.g. in dictatorships or in other cases of socio-political instability). The impossibility to pursue one's objective in a conventional institutionalized way — for example though a lawsuit — may necessitate the search for an alternative way to act. This is not

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to say, however, that nonviolent actions are illegal by definition — \textit{inat} architecture is above all a form of creative engagement with the legal framework of society through spatial means.\textsuperscript{471} 

The third factor that affects the social and political potency of \textit{inat} architecture rests on the relationship between the actors involved in the larger process of building, which Sharp recognizes as the “structural condition” of actors undertaking nonviolent action.\textsuperscript{472} First of all, the quantity of participants matters, as well as the degree of their “internal strength and vitality,” as Sharp phrases it.\textsuperscript{473} One person or a small group may be able to build a structure that addresses a specific cause, but if larger sociopolitical issues are to be challenged, a broader collective effort may be much more effective. Second, the relationship between actors engaged in building \textit{inat} architecture is important, particularly if they are after a common objective. The crucial issue here is not necessarily that a mass of actors exists, but that they are well coordinated and able to conduct an organized campaign for their cause.\textsuperscript{474} A smaller group of well-coordinated “\textit{inat} builders” is more likely to change the course of a conflict, or even take off as a social or political movement, than a multitude of disjointed individuals. Finally, if the relationship between the builders of \textit{inat} architecture and their opponents is considered, the builders’ triumph depends entirely on their ability to act independently from their opponent, and in the face of the different legal or political obstacles that may be imposed on them.\textsuperscript{475}

\textsuperscript{471} Ronald M. McCarthy, Gene Sharp and Brad Bennett point out that the notion of “nonviolence” needs contextual clarification. Nonviolence has several different meanings. For example, there is a difference between nonviolent crime and nonviolent protest. McCarthy, “The Possibilities of Research on Nonviolent Action. Introduction to,” xviii.


\textsuperscript{473} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{474} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{475} Ibid.
Sharp’s theory also reveals some problematic implications for inat architecture. Though understood as a method of nonviolent action, inat architecture still represents a form of active participation in a struggle, rather than of peacemaking. The relationship between nonviolent action and peace building, as Sharp makes clear, is double-edged: although nonviolent action is certainly preferable to open violence, it is only partly conciliatory. The implication of this two-sided relationship exposes one of the pitfalls of inat architecture — that even if the builder’s pursuit of justice can be considered justifiable, the act of building may also contribute to the deepening of the conflict, rather than to its resolution.

Other studies of nonviolent action have shown that it is more likely to be chosen only by one party in the conflict — mostly the weaker one — and is often met with violence from the stronger party. This asymmetry of the means of combat (violence versus nonviolence), as Sharp notes, is crucial for the functioning of nonviolent action. Hence, effective inat architecture requires both persistence on the part of the builder and their willingness to accept the risk that suppressive counter-actions may follow.

To conclude, because inat architecture is built to strengthen the position of its builder who has been disadvantaged in a conflict, this form of nonviolent action may, at times, stimulate opposition and intensify conflict. How these issues apply to the contemporary mosque architecture in Bosnia and Herzegovina will be explored in the following section of this chapter.

476 Ibid., 3-6; 40.
477 Ibid.
Inat mosque in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina

To understand the conflict that conditions the emergence of the Inat mosque, one should first consider the instrumental role that religious architecture has played within the contest for political hegemony in post-war Bosnia. The ongoing political tensions in the region are aggravated by ethnic nationalism, manifesting themselves through an aesthetic misuse of cultural heritage, language, and religion for political purposes. As the country is currently witnessing the construction and reconstruction of its religious monuments on a broad scale, the process of building is characterized by overt competitiveness for visibility in the service of signaling territorial dominance.

This competition affects both mosques and churches and it is carried out though three types of architectural tactics of defiance. The first tactic is to insist on the implementation of the legal framework agreed upon in Dayton by defying the corruption and political manipulation of the justice system in post-war Bosnia. The second is related to the locations of the inat mosques which, historically justified, is chosen to boost the patron’s message of defiance. The third tactic relies on the appearance of the inat mosques, whose design is aimed at enhancing the buildings’ visibility and uniqueness. Taking these three tactics allow the builders of inat mosques to both physically and symbolically reclaim territories from which they had been forcefully expelled during the war. In so doing, they simultaneously engage in the post-war contest for territories by recreating political boundaries through architectural means.
Inat through the insistence on the legal framework

When they came back to their home villages and cities, returnees faced the challenge of how to secure their existence in a politically and economically difficult situation as well as begin the process of retrieving their expropriated property. While the Annex VII of the Dayton Peace Accord grants all refugees the right to return to their pre-war places of residence and regain their private property, exercising these rights entails sometimes difficult and costly legal proceedings. In fact, the returnee’s rights are often deliberately curtailed by Serbs in power who place numerous obstacles in the way of repossessing or rebuilding property. Politically, the returnees are often in a weak position to sustain clashes with more powerful interests, although ideally the legal framework is supposed to provide the essential mediating ground for these post-war conflicts. We can take religious architecture as an index of the de facto implementation of the rule of law, as it was put into place by the Dayton Peace Agreement in post-war Bosnia.

An exemplary instance of the kind of problems returnees run into is provided by the narrative of Fata Orlović, an elderly Muslim widow from the village of Konjević Polje, eastern Bosnia, whose decade-long struggle to regain her property through legal means has become well known in the region. The village of Konjević Polje was “ethnically cleansed” by the Serb

478 According to the fact sheet released by the Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State released on December 11, 1995, the Annex 7: Refugees and Displaced Persons entails following points: “Annex 7: Refugees and Displaced Persons: The agreement grants refugees and displaced persons the right to return home safely and either regain lost property or obtain just compensation; A Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees will decide on return of real property or compensation, with the authority to issue final decisions; * All persons are granted the right to move freely throughout the country, without harassment or discrimination; and The parties commit to cooperate with the ICRC in finding all missing persons.” “Summary of The Dayton Peace Agreement. Fact sheet released by the Bureau of Public Affairs,” U.S. Department of State, December 11, 1995, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayton.html.

nationalist forces in the spring of 1993.\footnote{András J. Riedlmayer, “Database ‘The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1996: A Post-War Survey of Selected Municipalities’” (András J. Riedlmayer, c/ Fine Arts Library, Harvard University, 2002).} On 15 March of that year, the local mosque was shelled by several tanks of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) joining with the Army of the Serb Republic (VRS), resulting in its total destruction.\footnote{An eye-witness of the mosque’s destruction from Konjević Polje, Džemail Bećirević, testified at the trial of Slobodan Milošević, at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Hague on 9 May 2003: “I was present – actually, I was just a couple of hundred metres away when the tanks arrived, to within 50 metres of the mosque, and they pointed their barrels in the direction of the mosque and started shooting at the mosque, and it was bullet-ridden by these shells from the tank. Q. The tanks that damaged the mosque, were you able to identify what unit or what army they were from? A. Your Honours, they were tanks belonging to the Yugoslav People's Army. They were olive-green in colour, and they were tanks which we referred to as the 84s, the tank 84.” Džemail Bećirević, testimony at the trial of Slobodan Milošević, 9 May 2003, Transcript pp. 20524-20525. \url{http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milošević/trans/en/030509IT.htm} (23 March 2011). András Riedlmayer notes that the mosque was “completely leveled, building materials removed, tall weeds growing on site; however the foundations of the destroyed building can still be clearly seen.” Ibid.} Many villagers were killed, while others were forced to flee, leaving behind all of their belongings, which were then, of course, vulnerable to theft and destruction. Many refugees fled eastwards to the neighboring town of Srebrenica, the UN protected and besieged Muslim enclave at the time — which, tragically, was overrun by units of the Army of the Serb Republic under command of General Ratko Mladić in July, 1995, who then organized the systematic killing of over eight thousand Muslim men and boys.\footnote{For more information on the Srebrenica genocide, see for example: \textit{The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society} (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007); Smail Čekić, Muhamad Kreso, and Befir Macić, eds., \textit{Genocide in Srebrenica, United Nations “safe Area”, in July 1995} (Sarajevo: Institute for the Research Crimes Against Humanity and International Law, 2001); Jan Willem Honig, \textit{Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime} (London: Penguin, 1996); Velid Šabić, \textit{Genocid U Srednjem Podrinju 1992.-1995} (Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, 2008); Hamed Salihović-Sado, \textit{Srebrenica 1993.-1995.: Ratni Dnevnik Rahmetli Hameda Salihovića-Sade} (Sarajevo: Udruženje građana Majke Srebrenice i Podrinja, 2009); Michael Anthony Sells, “Religion, History, and Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” in \textit{Religion and Justice in the War over Bosnia}, ed. Scott G. Davis (New York: Routledge, 1996), 22-43.} Fata Orlović’s husband Šačir was one of the victims. Fata herself and her seven children were expelled from Konjević Polje. Her house, stables, and all other possessions were looted and destroyed. Five years passed until the Dayton accords made it safe for Muslim refugees to return to the Serb Republic, Fata Orlović among them. She found that nothing remained of her
property but the ruins of her house and stables. However, to her great surprise, standing literally a few meters in front of her destroyed house was a newly built Orthodox Church (Fig. 2.8). This church was built in 1996, one year after the Dayton Peace Accord set up a protocol for Bosnian Serb refugees from other regions, who had settled in Konjević Polje during the war and had illegally seized the property and possessions of the village’s former Muslim inhabitants.

Fata Orlović immediately set to work to reclaim her property and demolish or remove the church from her land. Yet no legal institution was able to resolve her case. Instead, Fata Orlović’s struggle has taken painfully personal forms. She was even accused of stirring nationalistic hatred — all because of her persistent insistence on her legal rights. Orlović has publicly stated that she wants the church to be removed not because it is a church, but because

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484 Andris Riedlmayer, e-mail message to the author, March 02, 2011.


486 Sakib Smajlović, “Policajac uvrnuo Fati Orlović ruku,” Oslobodenje, 11 September 2008, 8.; Faruk Borić, “Fata,” Oslobodenje, 14 September 2008, 10. Sadik Pazarac reported for the Institute of War & Peace Reporting that the “The dispute has rumbled on for several months. After an earlier, less serious, incident in April, the RS authorities decided to close the church on a temporary basis until the court case ended. But the truce stemming from that decision lasted only until September 12, when several Orthodox priests arrived in the village intending to conduct a service, accompanied by 10 Serbian youngsters, singing nationalist songs. Orlovic confronted them on their arrival in her yard. But after the youngsters pushed her out of the away, the police — instead of intervening to defend her — are alleged to have struck her. Sadik Pazarac, “Bosnia: Fight Over Church Spreads Tension - Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Balkan Crisis Report No. 521”, February 21, 2005, http://iwpr.net/report-news/bosnia-fight-over-church-spreads-tension.; The account of the same incident in the newspaper Nezavisne Novine portrayed Fata as the attacker. Reportedly, the Orthodox priests came with the police to prepare the church on Fata’s property for a religious festivity. Outraged by this action, Fata came out of the house carrying scissors and with the intention to hit one of the policemen. According to the police report, not surprisingly, Fata was the attacker, and the policeman acted in self-defense, just taking away the scissors from her, without harming her. Asked why she did not report this incident or filed a lawsuit, Fata answered: “To whom should I complain? To the same police that came to beat me up?” Jasmina Sarac, “Fata Orlović se sukobila s policajcem” Nezavisne Novine, 11 September 2008, 3 (translation by Azra Akšamija).

487 Ibid. Advised by her lawyer to file charges against her harassers, Orlović answered: “We should let things go now, it is the smartest thing to do. I am hurt, but I cannot hurt anymore. I am proud of myself and of my children, and of my smart but agonized people. I want to say to them: ‘If you are not a good person, become one! Eventually we will die, so it is better to die as a good person than as a bad one’ claims Fata Orlović. Before the war, Fata had four houses and four stables. Jusi-Sofi, “Beaten Then Offered Millions - Interview with Fata Orlovic.” (accessed November 20, 2010).
the church occupies her own yard. Far from making a nationalist statement and she has said that she would also object to any other invasive structure in her yard, even if it were a mosque.\footnote{Ibid.}

Orlović’s cause was supported by committed local and international media, pressuring the local authorities to implement the provisions of Dayton and remove the church.\footnote{For some reports in English, see for example: “Bosnian Muslim returnee faces trial for instigation of ethnic, religious hatred,” BBC Monitoring European, February 14, 2007, http://listserv.buffalo.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0702&L=JUSTWATCH-L&P=R35951&D=1&H=0&O=D&T=0; “Serbs to move church from Bosnian Muslim land | Reuters”, July 9, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/06/09/idUSLO9408380; “Bosnian Muslim Widow Sentenced For Interrupting Church Service,” Radio Free Europe, January 29, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/Content/BosnianMuslim_Widow_Sentenced_For_Interrupting_Church_Service/1376524.html; “Agreement On Konjevic Polje Church Must Be Implemented,” OHR Press Release, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Office of the High Representative., September 10, 2008, http://www.ohr.int/print/?contentid=42268.} In 2004, the spotlight of publicity finally led the government of the Serb Republic to make a decision and order the churches’ removal to another location.\footnote{Ibid. The media coverage enabled Orlović to gain sympathy among other returnees who faced similar problems. Support also came from numerous journalists who testified on her behalf at court hearings and who continue to publicize her case.} Yet, no action followed.

Finally, in 2007, when Orlović was proclaimed “personality of the year” by the Bosniak newspapers \textit{Dnevni Avaz} and \textit{Preporod}, the government approved KM 160,000 (ca. $115,500) for the churches’ removal and relocation. Once again the action was never implemented, as the price of the property in Konjević Polje had allegedly increased, which somehow provided an excuse for the church to remain standing in Orlović’s garden. In May 2010, the Srebrenica Basic Court concluded that the “eparchy did not bear responsibility for confiscating private property and illegally constructing a church [...]. The judge ruled that Fata Orlović should have submitted her case within three years of the church being built.”\footnote{“International Religious Freedom Report 2010. Bosnia and Herzegovina,” U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor., n.d., http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148920.htm.} This was obviously impossible, given that she had only returned to the village after this statute of limitations had passed.
Fata Orlović’s children, who now live in the United States, have pressed her to leave, but she insists that she wants to remain on her property. Instead of taking two million dollars, which she was reportedly offered as compensation, and moving to the United States to be with her children, Fata Orlović stubbornly insists on living a poor farm life in Konjević Polje, in the Serb Republic — why?

On the personal level, Orlović’s struggle is about reclaiming her home, the place where she lived for decades — the place where she raised her children, and lost her husband. On the political level, however, Orlović’s struggle has larger implications for basic human rights and the rule of law in Bosnia. At this point, it should be noted that Konjević Polje was almost exclusively populated by Muslims before the war. The village had one mosque (built in 1985) and a shrine of Dervish Hamza Dede Orlović (Turbe and Musafirhana of Hamza Dede Orlović and his son Dervish Mustafa, built in 1573, restored in the eighteenth century), a prominent local sixteenth century mystic whose association with the village is widely known. The targeted destruction of the mosque and the shrine in 1993 represented an attempt on the part of Serb nationalist extremists to erase all historical evidence that this area has been inhabited by Muslims for more than four centuries. More to the point, the construction of the Orthodox Church in Orlović’s garden was a nationalistic move, flagging the Serbs’ takeover of the territory.

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492 In this regard, Fata Orlović explained: “I say a prayer for myself and fall asleep. I am not scared at all. When all of this started, my children asked me to go to America. I told them: ‘May they kill me. I am not leaving this place!’ I sustained curses and beatings, and my children could not handle that. I was offered two million dollars for the church and the land. I told them that it is just paper to me, and that I am not leaving my place.” Jusi-Sofi, “Beaten Then Offered Millions - Interview with Fata Orlovic.”


While the Dayton Peace Accord did confirm Konjević Polje as a part of the Serb Republic, it also gave Muslims the right to retrieve their private properties. As Muslims returned, most Serbs moved away. Today, the church is mainly closed, opening only on holidays and special events, when Serbs from the neighboring areas are driven into Konjević Polje in busses. Since no Orthodox Christians live in the village who would worship on a regular basis, the church now primarily functions as a marker of Serbian political power over this Muslim village in the middle of the Serb Republic. 495

Obviously, Orlović’s inat is not necessarily about reclaiming property and material values, but rather about the pursuit of justice after a political conflict that cannot be won. With her persistent confidence in the rule of law, Orlović hopes to teach her persecutors a lesson, and idealistically change their attitude, creating a better future in which the human rights of all are respected. The many problems that make this such a charged case are emblematic both of the inefficiency of the rule of law in post-war Bosnia and the resistance offered by the suppressed population, in the person of the fearless “nana Fata” (“Granny Fata”), as Orlović has become widely known. She puts a human face on the returnees’ attempts to reclaim territory, history, power, and identity.

As human rights reports have pointed out, the tactic of building religious structures or monuments on the private properties of minority believers is not unique to Fata Orlović’s case; in many other places in Bosnia, religious architecture is used as an instrument for squatting. Yet unlike the powerless connotations of that term, these squats attempt a reconfirmation of the ethnically homogenized territories after Dayton. The International Religious Freedom Report 2007 submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate found that “a

495 András Riedlmayer, e-mail message to author, March 2, 2011.
number of controversial and highly politicized cases involving the illegal construction of religious buildings or monuments on private or government-owned land” in Bosnia were “built to send a political message to minority believers about the dominance of the majority group in that area, creating ethnic tensions and impeding the process of reconciliation.”

One prominent example, which has been compared to Orlović’s case, is the Serbian Orthodox church in the village of Divič in eastern Bosnia. In 1997, the church was erected on the very spot where the local mosque had been located until it was destroyed in 1992. This was the Divič Mosque, built in 1550 and rebuilt in 1936. After its destruction, its rubble was removed from the site and in 1996, one year after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord, the Municipality of Zvornik expropriated the Islamic Community’s ownership of property in Divič, allocating the mosque site to the Serbian Orthodox Church. This decision provided the political excuse for the subsequent construction of the church on the waqf land, despite protests by the Islamic Community that the procedure had been illegal. Following the latter’s decade long efforts to reclaim its property, a compromise was finally reached: representatives of the Islamic Community (Muftijstvo Tuzlansko) and the Serbian Orthodox Church (Zvorničko-Tuzlanska eparchija) agreed that the church be dismantled and moved to another location. Yet, the Islamic Community had to agree to carry the costs of the church’s removal from their own property, which amounted to ca. KM 380,000 (ca. $274,500). Subsequently, the Municipality of Zvornik made the decision on 24 February 2009 that the confiscated waqf land be returned to its

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497 András Riedlmayer’s account about the destruction of the Divič Mosque describes: “Mosque completely destroyed, building materials removed, its site levelled. Old Muslim graveyard next to the mosque has also been leveled. The village of Divic (which in the 1991 pre-war census had 1388 Muslim and 4 Serb residents) was renamed “Sveti Stefan” (St. Stephen) after the expulsion of the Muslim population and the destruction of the village mosque.” Riedlmayer, “Database ‘The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1996: A Post-War Survey of Selected Municipalities’.”
pre-war owner, that is, the Islamic community. The church was dismantled in March 2009. The
construction of the new Divič mosque in the same spot started immediately and the new mosque
was completed in 2010.

Not surprisingly, the strategy of politically-motivated illegal architecture also came to
include a single case of a mosque that was instrumentalized to “squat” upon a Serb property.
This was the Bradina Mosque, erected in a municipality of Konjic in central Bosnia. The
mosque was built by the Bosniak army during the war (between 1994 and 1995) partly upon the
private property of Bogdan Kureš, a local Serb retiree who was killed in the war. In 1999,
Kureš’s family filed a request to reclaim their private property. Countering the Kureš argument,
the Muslims in Konjic argued that the mosque has been built on a waqf estate, which had been
nationalized by the Yugoslav state after Second World War. Serbs, in turn, complained that
Muslims had squatted on “Serbian land” with the mosque in order to prevent Serbs from
returning to Bradina. 498 Since one corner of the mosque indeed stood on Kureš’s private
property, the Rijaset decided that the mosque should be dismantled and removed to a different
location. Seid ef. Smajkić, the mufti of Mostar, explained that this decision was made to
demonstrate that neither a mosque nor a minaret should be dedicated to expressing inat. 499
Despite intense objections by the local Muslims, the Rijaset’s decision was implemented. The
demolition of the mosque was completed in 2008 (Fig. 2.9).

Besides “squatting,” the spectrum of tactics deployed to prevent/allow for the visibility of
returnees in their hometowns encompasses different forms of legal manipulation, from changing
zoning plans and building regulations so as to prevent the reconstruction of mosques to actual

498 Kemal Zukić [who is this?], interview by Azra Akšamija on June 18, 2008.
physical attacks on religious sites. Furthermore, as other structures have often been built on the site of destroyed mosques, it is physically impossible to rebuild them until these structures are taken down, a demolition project that often runs into insurmountable legal difficulties. The east Bosnian city of Zvornik, today a part of the Serb Republic, is perhaps the area most affected by this struggle. Zvornik was a majority Muslim city before the war, and hosted three mosques, all of which were destroyed in 1992. Only one mosque, the Begsuja Mosque (1776, rebuilt in 2004), has been restored since the Dayton Accord, and today it serves approximately two thousand jamaat members. So far, the Islamic Community has not succeeded in making headway towards the reconstruction of the other two mosques, being blocked by legal, physical and financial obstacles. For example, the municipal authorities in Zvornik designated the site of the destroyed Market Mosque (Riječanska džamija or Čaršijska džamija, built in 1858, rebuilt in 1985) as a parking lot and a flea market, allowing for a new neighboring building to intrude on parts of the mosque’s site. The parcel of the property of the Zamlaz Mosque (1803), formerly the oldest mosque in the city, is now occupied by an illegally built four-story apartment building. In fact, the local municipal authorities permitted that the apartment building be erected on the very site of the mosque in 1998, despite a ruling by the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia-Herzegovina that confirmed the Islamic Community’s ownership of the estate.

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500 Kemal Zukić, interview by Azra Akšamija on June 18, 2008.
501 In 1991, Zvornik had the total number of 14,584 inhabitants: 8,854 Bosniak (60.71%), 4,235 Serb (29.04%), 76 Croat (0.52%), 944 Yugoslav (6.47%), 475 Others (3.13%). *Ethnic composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina population, by municipalities and settlements, 1991. census*, vol. 234 (Sarajevo: Zavod za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine, 1991).
502 The Market Mosque in Zvornik was entirely destroyed in 1992, the rubble was removed and the site was leveled and surfaced with gravel. Riedlmayer, “Database ‘The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1996: A Post-War Survey of Selected Municipalities’.”
503 Andráš J. Riedlmayer states that the mosque “was destroyed in April 1992 and its ruins were leveled by bulldozer along with the adjacent Muslim graveyard.” Ibid.
504 Andráš Riedlmayer notes that this decision was made “disregarding the legal objections filed by the Islamic Community and despite a ruling from the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which upheld the Islamic Community’s claim to the site.” Ibid.
Although Zvornik is leading in terms of the returnees’ numbers, the process of refugee return to the region is very difficult. Mustafa ef. Muharemović, historian and imam of the Begsuja Mosque, reported that Muslims in Zvornik shared the fortunes of their Serb fellow citizens, but that the latter continued to attack Begsuja Mosque in accordance with nationalist propaganda.\textsuperscript{505} The record of incidents on the mosque includes stones being thrown on the mosque, windows being broken, walls sprayed with graffiti, garbage placed in front of the mosque’s entrance, and the announcement posters of the Islamic Community being torn down.\textsuperscript{506} One of the worst acts against the jamaat occurred at the very start of the Begsuja’s reconstruction when, according to Ef. Muharemović, someone had placed a dead pig onto the mosque’s foundation.\textsuperscript{507}

The idea behind all these insults and obstacles in Zvornik is to show returning refugees that they are not welcome back. The underlying tension is directly related to the compromise made for peace in Dayton: the signing of the Peace Accord did not produce a clear winner or loser — on the contrary, each side feels compromised. While the Accord legitimized the existence of the Serb Republic, a geo-political entity created through “ethnic cleansing,” Annex VII of the Accord legally grants the expelled the right to return home and regain private property, although, as discussed above, these rights cannot be fully exercised. The experiences of Fata Orlović, among other Muslims in eastern Bosnia, sheds light on the inability or unwillingness of the Bosnian state to protect minority rights, an injustice that is amplified by the inefficient bureaucracy and institutional corruption that block minority returns to some

\textsuperscript{505} For instance, regardless if a soccer game is won or lost, Muslims get to feel it through verbal insults or damages of the Begsuja Mosque after the game. Ef. Muharemović explained that the community got used to all these insults over the course of time. Mustafa ef. Muharemović, interview by Azra Akšamija on July 12, 2008.

\textsuperscript{506} Ibid. Mustafa ef. Muharemović noted that he keeps a diary to record every experience of the refugees’ return to Zvornik. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{507} Ibid.
regions. The lack of protection of individuals by the state prompts many returnees to seek moral support though public media. Yet, when mass media publicizes such conflicts the resulting controversies often feed in unexpected ways into the frenzy of nationalist politics.

_Inat through the choice of a location_

The unreliability of the legal system and the unpredictability of the media have prompted the emergence of the _Inat_ mosque one way in which individuals may pursue their rights, or at least testify to their claims. Rebuilding a mosque, in this context, signals the return of Muslim refugees to regions from which they were forcefully expelled. The reconstruction of a religious edifice in an ethnically cleansed region can, at times, also indicate that Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs have managed to live together again as neighbors. The possibility of a renewed peaceful coexistence, in turn, makes _inat_ a viable strategy to use against the war-made division of regional ethno-national groups. Fadil Banjanović, the leader of the returnees in Kozluk, a village in the Municipality of Zvornik, puts this as follows:

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509 Along the same lines, András Riedlmayer argues that the destruction of both mosques and churches represented a deliberate act of violence on the part of nationalist extremists with the aim of eradicating any material evidence that a peaceful multicultural coexistence in Bosnia-Herzegovina had ever been possible. See Riedlmayer, “From Ashes: The Past and Future of Bosnia’s Cultural heritage.” In _Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States_. Edited by Maya Shatzmiller, 98-135 (Montréal; Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 114.
Return home means failure for the big nationalists, because it disturbs their plans if I live together with Serbs and Croats. The people who created the war divided Bosnia, and then they did everything they could to prevent people's return. But they couldn't stop it, because the desire of people to be near their hearth, and near their ancestors' cemeteries, was too strong.\footnote{510}

\textit{Inat} mosques built by people with a similar attitude militantly counter the nationalist project erasing both the historical traces of Muslims in a region and the history of Bosnian coexistence.\footnote{511} Both threaten the nationalist imaginary, and its projection of an ethnically pure history.

The terms of the Dayton territorial arrangement provide another motivation to build \textit{inat} mosques. Returnees are, after all, reclaiming their rights, and in so doing are pointing out that they were unjustly persecuted or the victims of theft. Thus, in addition to coping with human and material loss, the return itself represents a difficult endeavor, especially in regions such as eastern Bosnia, which had been ethnically cleansed in the war, and which the post-war authorities want to keep as such.\footnote{512} Religious architecture thus is enrolled as the primary instrument of this struggle.

\footnote{510}{Before the war, Kozluk was dominated by Bosniak population. After the war, the village became part of the Serb Republic. The organized return of refugees went on from 2001 until 2003. Fadil Banjanović notes that “[...] there has been return to around 50 villages in Zvornik municipality. In the region of northeastern Bosnia, there has been two-way return to around 600 localities.” Peter Lippman, “Kozluk: A Bosnian Story of Refugee Return,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Special Report, March 2009, 34-35. <http://www.washington-report.org/archives/March_2009/0903034.html> (accessed February 2, 2010)}

\footnote{511}{The long-term goal of the aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Riedlmayer contends, was to produce the newly conquered territories as “ethnically and religiously pure.” For this reason, religious edifices were destroyed in such a way that future reconstruction would be almost impossible. Riedlmayer, “From Ashes,” 114.}

\footnote{512}{For an examination of “localized geopolitics of wartime displacement and postwar returns” in Zvornik in and Jajce, see Carl Dahlman and Gearóid Ó Tuathail (Gerard Toal), “Broken Bosnia: The Localized Geopolitics of Displacement and Return in Two Bosnian Places,” \textit{Annals of the Association of American Geographers} 95, no. 3 (September 2005): 644-662.}
While the Inat mosque represents a means for Bosnian Muslims to reinsert their presence in such regions, they are also part of a larger, country-wide trend to demarcate or claim ethno-national territories by using identifying religious symbols. Mosques and churches, among other religious and national monuments, are often placed on noteworthy spots in the landscape, on hilltops, political boundaries, historic sites, or in the immediate neighborhood of the other ethnic group’s religious monuments.513

Consider, for example, the Serbian Orthodox church in the township of Jezero, which marks the presence of the Serb population in the region (Fig. 2.10). The church is neither finished nor consecrated, but the completion of its bell-tower was treated as a priority because of its visibility from the main traffic route. For the same reasons, the new Serbian Orthodox Church of Saint George (2002) in Sokolac was designed in such way that one cannot avoid seeing it from the main traffic route on the mountain Romanija; the church stands out from the surrounding countryside with its immaculate whitewashed façade (Fig. 2.11). That the church’s gigantic scale strikes the observer as exceedingly out of proportion with the population it serves in the rural setting of the Romanija mountain can be explained by its particular location: the church is placed directly on the border between the Serb Republic and the Bosniak-Croat Federation, and functions as the identifying portal to Serb territory. Similarly, explicit signals of ethnic supremacy over a territory can be observed in the silhouette of Mostar, where the gigantic bell tower attached to the Franciscan church of Saints Peter and Paul (1872) presently dominates the skyline of the old city (Fig. 2.12).514 To underscore Croatian territorial domination beyond Mostar’s periphery, a colossal cross that is lit up at night has been erected illegally on a

513 This is not a contemporary phenomenon, mosques and churches are traditionally positioned in locations that guarantee best visibility. The contemporary religious architecture of inat continues this trend.
514 For more information about this monument, see the section about the controversy surrounding the Turhan Emin-beg mosque’s post-war renovation in Chapter Three.
neighboring hilltop of Hum, the highest point in the region (Fig. 2.13). In response, the jamaat of Vrapčići, a suburb of Mostar, monumentalized their regional ancestry by building a mosque with two minarets whose stylistic elements advertise the imperial Ottoman heritage (Fig. 2.14). While in the Ottoman context the implementation of the double minaret refers to the royal patronage of mosques built outside of Bosnia, Vrapčići’s mosque’s builders ignored this historic allusion in favor of a contemporary monumental impact.

Indeed, minarets and church towers throughout Bosnia appear to have, in many cases, replaced the abundance of national flags that marked the territorial control by some ethnic groups in the period immediately after the war. As flags made of stone, as it were, the newly built and rebuilt religious edifices are ceding their solely religious meaning to political meaning in the ongoing power struggles in Bosnia, indicating the contamination of religious space by secular political boundary marking.

**Inat though design**

Besides the physical setting, the message of defiance encoded in inat architecture is a function of these buildings visual uniqueness. This principle implies that the design of the Inat mosque necessitates some form of stylistic anomaly or visual differentiation to set it apart from all other mosques. For this reason, mosque builders in Bosnia and Herzegovina utilize different rhetorical gestures in design. The same competitive visuality organizes Orthodox and Catholic church architecture since the war. The visual elements include:

1. Monumentalizing — disproportionally enhancing the overall building’s volume, such as has been done to the Centar Mosque in Živinice, the new Catholic church of Holy Family at Kupres, the Orthodox monastery complex of St. Vasilije of Ostrog in Bijeljina (Fig.
or increasing the minaret’s or the building’s height, such as in the case of Mosque of Sultan Mehmed Fatih in Donji Kamengrad, the Franciscan church of Saints Peter and Paul in Mostar, and the Orthodox Church of Christ the Savior in Banja Luka (Fig. 2.16).

2. Prioritizing the visually striking — renovating those building elements that are most prominent to the onlooker, such as the minaret, examples being the mosque in Donji Potok, Srebrenik Municipality, the Orthodox Church in Šešlije, and the New Orthodox Church in Doboj (Fig. 2.17).

3. Multiplying — enforcing the impression of monumentality by increasing the number of prominent building features, such as increasing the number of minarets from one (typical for pre-war mosques) to two or four (trend in post-war mosques), or multiplying the number of minaret balconies (šerefer) from one (pre-war) to two, three, or four, depending on the minaret’s height. Examples include Hamzi-begova Mosque in Sanski Most (initially planned with one minaret, which was later added three more minarets, and the mosque in the village of Sjenina, near Doboj, which has four balconies (Fig. 2.18).

4. Pigmenting — increasing visibility through the application of intense coloring to the façade, such as the Orthodox Church in Potočari, Donja Džamija (Lower Mosque) and clock tower in Doboj, Catholic chapel in Lug, near Derventa, and the Baš mosque in Donji Vakuf (Fig. 2.19).

5. Illuminating — the use of lighting at night to create dramatic nighttime profiles, a technique being employed at almost all religious structures across the country (Fig. 2.20).

All these rhetorical gestures emerged after the 1990s war, evidently as a part of a continuing competition between communities of faith and ethnicity. Although, to be sure, monumental religious buildings had been built both in the Ottoman and the modern periods, reflecting the
vagaries of military and political triumphs of different historical epochs, the scales, shapes, and colors of religious structures that appear today are unprecedented in their theatrical intrusiveness. Extruded with the help of reinforced concrete and accentuated with modern spotlights and vivid coating, mosques and churches have come to serve as a visual means for communicating territorial claims within the multi-ethnic framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Considering the fact that any type of architecture — be it a residence, a religious monument or a commercial building — can be considered a territorial marker thrust up by the builder, the issue of this frenzy for bold demarcating statements does not of itself define the theme of this chapter. Rather, it is the question of why religious architecture has taken on the function of symbolizing identity. What are the separate motivations behind building and rebuilding places of worship, mosques and churches, in the context of ethnic conflict? And does the palette of features we have described above reflect an increased religious fervor, or a sublimation of post-bellum aggressions?

Islamic literary scholar Amila Buturović’s argument that the current impulse to monumentalize religious architecture reflects the “unresolved tension between cultural practices and institutional demands” is highly persuasive. This unresolved tension, according to Buturović, is based on the “paradox in Bosnian identity” — to be “territorially Bosnian, but nationally non-Bosnian” at the same time — meaning that the Bosnian nation does not exist in the normal sense, in as much as it is made up of three different ethnic groups with the same goal of self-determination. In other words, current political affairs in Bosnia are in a persistent, sometimes underground, sometimes overt conflict, with the state forcefully holding together

516 This paradox, Buturović continues, evolved from the non-linear path of the Bosnian national developments and is now reflected in the “internal nationalization” of Bosnia. Ibid., 2, 18.
people from different ethnic backgrounds who have diametrically opposite conceptions of political identity. We can roughly identify two factions, one of which is composed of those who do want to live in a multi-ethnic and multi-national state defined through a unity of territory and citizenship, and the other wants to live in a state (or part of a mother nation-state of Greater Serbia or Greater Croatia) that consists of a unified territory occupied by a single ethnic, religious, and/or national group, thereby denying the entitlement of other groups to the title of citizen or the right to residence. In this context, it should be emphasized, Muslims are the only ethnic group not fantasizing about a separate Muslim nation-state.

Depending on the particular political self-conception of a group, religious architecture — including mosques, churches, and other religious structures and symbols — may be built or rebuilt to express opposite messages corresponding to opposite positions within the social fabric: for the majority, as a means of reconfirming the demographically homogenous territories created through ethnic cleansing and officialized though the Dayton Peace Accord, or conversely, as a means of opposing the existing territorial divisions. Postwar religious architecture, by encoding these contradictory agendas, bore a political as well as a religious message, becoming the theater upon which ethnic conflict could be acted out by ostensibly peaceful means.

Inat mosques, in this context, give visual form to the regional presence of Muslims, demarcating their territories among and against Serb and Croat territorial claims and national aspirations. The emergence of an Inat mosque movement was never planned or centrally organized, but expressed, spontaneously, the Muslims’ desire not only to reclaim their property but also to visually reassert their presence in previously ethnically cleansed territories. The different visual gestures of the inat mosques work synergistically with other expressions of the

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517 The ethnic maps of Bosnia from 1991 and 1996 (before and after the war) clearly indicate a tremendous shift from ethnically very mixed to highly consolidated and homogeneous territories.
Muslim community’s increasing vocalness to assert their presence among other ethnic groups and facilitate individual acts of rebuilding and reclaiming, which in turn bound together the community’s internal structures.

I would like to suggest that, within the context of the competing ambitions for the future of the Bosnian state, the Inat mosque performs a two-fold mission — as an instrument of nonviolent action, reaction, and protest, it is created to strengthen the Bosniaks’ position in countering the present and future territorial ambitions of Croats and Serbs; as a religious and social center, it simultaneously allows for strengthening the community’s internal bonds after the war.
3. The Memorial mosque

This section traces two different approaches Bosnian Muslims have taken to deal with their traumatic memories as expressed by the architecture of mosques throughout the country. The first approach is to preserve the ruined mosque or its damaged parts as a warning to future generations of the violence the community had endured and could, in the future, still undergo if vigilance is allowed to slacken. The second approach is to rework traumatic war memories in form of memorials that commemorate war victims and martyrs within mosque complexes. To analyze this trend, I focus on post-war mosque architecture in the region of Cazinska Krajina, northwestern Bosnia, which has witnessed the construction of interesting war memorials built within mosque complexes. The dialectic relationship between the warning to the future and the mourning for the past has produced a new form of a national/religious monument in the Cazin region, one that hybridizes secular and religious forms of public commemoration: a monument that takes on the traditional form of the mosque, but without its religious functions. I term this new phenomenon the Memorial Mosque.

Unintentional monuments

A ruin can evoke the forces that, unleashed in the past, warn future generations to be on guard against their repetition — and it is in accordance with this symbolic power that some mosque communities preserve their mosque’s ruins rather than repairing them.518 One example

is the minaret of the Junuz Čauš Mosque (Čaršijska Džamija, mid sixteenth century) in Konjic, central Bosnia, the top part of which collapsed as a result of a targeted artillery shelling in the war. The jamaat of Konjic, in the postwar period, decided not to repair the damaged minaret, but to keep it as a reminder of the violence that the community had experienced (Fig. 2.21).

Consequently, the minaret’s fragmented roof was sealed and cemented for weather protection, creating a visually powerful effect of a “beheaded” tower. The absence of the traditional copper roof (alem) creates the symbol of a violently broken wholeness that warns future generations that this happened and could happen again. For the same reason, the broken part of the minaret in Mahmutovići, District of Zvornik, was left standing in the mosque’s garden (Fig. 2.22). A piece of the minaret was left in the same position in which it fell in December 1993, when the mosque was shelled. This broken fragment was transformed into a memorial after the war, and a commemorative plaque was attached to it.

The idea of transforming ruins into inat-memorials is not only limited to minarets. The façade of the old mosque in Jezero, District of Bihać, for example, was restored in such a way to maintain the crater made by the projectile that had pierced the façade (Fig. 2.23). While the shell hole was transformed into a window, the crater remained unpainted, thus visually highlighting the contrast between the whitewashed facade and the stone structure of the crater. Through this contrast, the mosque façade appears as a “skin” that has been damaged by the projectile.

This architectural metaphor of “piercing” the façade designates the mosque as a “wounded body,” which is both programmatically and symbolically linked to the new function of the mosque as a memorial for human victims of the war who suffered precisely in this way, as

well as others. Notably, this memorial with the metaphoric title “Plateau of Martyrs” (“Plato šehida”) was created though reprogramming of the old Jezero mosque for commemorative purposes — honored are three hundred and seventy one martyrs and nine civilians from the Unsko-sanski Canton, all of whom died in the region of the Grmuško-srbljanski plateau.520

The interior walls of the ruined mosque were left unpainted exposing the stone structure of the walls as they were “flayed” through the destruction. The names of the dead are presented to the visitor in form of white marble commemorative plaques placed in a row in front of the qibla wall (the wall facing Mecca). As this row curves inward with the wall towards the center of the space, reflecting the explosion of the projectile that struck the wall, the visitor is visually and symbolically embraced by the cenotaphs when looking or praying towards them (Fig. 2.24).

Such reprogramming of damaged mosques into war memorials represents an innovation in Bosnian mosque architecture; the phenomenon of a ruin becoming a memorial, however, has numerous well-documented precedents in other geographic and historical contexts. In the first years after the Second World War, for example, war survivors in countries such as England, Germany, Poland, France or Japan, wanted to eliminate the vast fields of ruins as quickly as possible, but at the same time, some buildings were left untouched to become memorials, or were integrated as monuments into new buildings.521


521 In his essay “Die Ruine als Gedenkstätte und Mahnmal” [“The Ruin as a Memorial and a Warning to Future Generations”], Eugeniusz Gasiorowski describes the different procedures for handling destroyed buildings in these countries after the war, which ranged from the strict preservation of ruins, over their reuse for new purposes, to their inclusion into new architectural contexts. Eugeniusz Gasiorowski, „Die Ruine als Gedenkstätte und Mahnmal,“ Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kunst und Denkmalpflege 33 (1979): 81-90.
By transforming these ruins into memorials, the “unintentional monuments” — according to Alois Riegl’s definition of monuments — are transformed into “intentional monuments.” Yet, whose responsibility it is to select which of the unintentional monuments are to be made into intentional ones? Who decides how to remember past?

Riegl took an organicist view of the community, which somehow collectively selects which unintentional monuments are to be made into intentional ones, selectively deciding when a ruin is the effect of neglect and when it is the effect of a decision. In so doing, the community selects what things to remember about its past. He states:

Both intentional and unintentional monuments are characterized by commemorative value, and in both instances we are interested in their original, uncorrupted appearance as they emerged from the hands of their maker and to which we seek by whatever means to restore them. In the case of an intentional monument, its commemorative value has been determined by the makers, while we have defined the value of the unintentional ones.

Procedures for handling the ruins of Second World War worldwide were mostly set in place by the individual national institutions. The decision about what ruins to restore and what to leave as monuments depended on what the different meanings these ruins were meant to convey — whether to symbolize a total destruction (as in Hiroshima), to recall the Holocaust, to evoke a struggle for freedom, or to commemorate the dead. Aside from commemoration, ruins were

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chosen to become monuments for reasons of reconciliation, atonement and accusation.\textsuperscript{525} Thus, the ruin itself has no straightforward commemorative meaning independently of the history and its interpretation that it emerges from. Whether the ruins of Second World War were left standing or were partly restored for protection against the ravages of time, these structures were not meant to function simply as war memorials. Rather, they were regarded as expressions of the rejection of war — as political statements aimed at shaping the post-war political future. Surely this imposes too unilateral a view of the ruin — they could also be regarded as expressions of not being lax in the face of an enemy, which is not an anti-war statement, but its opposite — an admonition to prepare for war, or for defending oneself.

In Bosnia, this decision-making process is different than experienced in Europe after either of the world wars, because the Bosnian war did not produce any clear “winners” who would determine the writing of history: sadly, the memory of war has been put into the service of the continuing ethnic conflict of the post-war period. There is no shared decision about how the Bosnian war victims are to be commemorated — as there is no common viewpoint on the common memory. Thus, the past is revived and trauma metabolized in a fragmented way, by small groups of people on the local scale.

\textsuperscript{525} The buildings mentioned by Gasiorowski include the Coventry Cathedral, Church of the Holy Cross in Southampton, Schwanenwerder near Berlin, Marienkirche (Church of Our Lady) in Lübeck, Aegidienkirche (Aegidien-Church) in Hannover, St. Nikolai Church in Hamburg, Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gedächtnis-Kirche (Kaiser Wilhelm Memorial Church) in West-Berlin, St.Alban memorial and St.Columba Parish Church in Cologne, Jewish Community Center in Berlin, etc. Eugeniusz Gasiorowski, “Die Ruine als Gedenkstätte und Mahnmal.” \textit{Österreichische Zeitschrift für Kunst und Denkmalpflege} 33 (1979), 88-89.
Intentional monuments

The second and much more common approach in post-war Bosnia is simply to rebuild the damaged mosque as quickly as possible, erecting a separate memorial within the mosque complex. Traumatic memories are thereby represented in the form of commemorative fountains, mausoleums (turbe), or cenotaphs decorated with religious and national symbols. While these memorials come in a variety of designs and styles, certain trends are observable, the most notable of which is the prominence of religious versus the national symbols. Favoring the one over the other elevates the war victims to the status of religious martyrs, and secondarily, national heroes.

I took as my example of these new architectural phenomena all seventeen post-war memorials erected within mosque complexes in the District of Cazin, northwest Bosnia.\textsuperscript{526} I identified the main design elements of these memorials, arranging them into a matrix, which shows the presence and the prominence of the religious versus the political design elements (Fig. 2.25).

The recognized religious features include the memorial’s function as a fountain (šadrvan), stylistic references to traditional Islamic tombstones or mausoleums (turbe), religious inscriptions in Latin and/or Arabic script, cenotaphs, the crescent-star symbols, and the white marble, material traditionally used for Islamic tombstones. The non-religious political identifiers include the Bosnian state flags on poles, the Bosnian coats of arms, the geographic outlines of the Bosnian state, the fleur-de-lys (stylized lily, or “zlatni ljiljan”), the engraved portraits of victims, the military form of the Islamic tombstone, the list of names (typical for war memorials

and different from the traditional religious cenotaph), and the use of black marble, material traditionally used in non-Islamic funerary architecture and secular war memorials.

The matrix that emerges from my collating of memorial designs in Cazin reveals several interesting patterns. To begin with, the three most popular features of all memorials include use of white marble, the crescent-star symbol and the lily. Overall, white marble is more popular than the black. The religious form of epigraphy and the more “secular” list of names are equally present in cenotaphs. Surprisingly, Arabic script is rarely used, given that it is characteristic for the traditional martyr-tombstones. The appearance of the engraved victims’ portraits represents a novelty in the Islamic memorial architecture in Bosnia; such depictions are typical for Christian tombstones and memorials in the region, from which they were likely borrowed and incorporated as a personal touch in the post-war memorials in the mosques.

Grouping the memorials’ religious and political elements shows another common trend: those memorials that highlight religious symbolism in their design are less likely to feature any political elements. By contrast, memorials that emphasize political symbolism in their design do incorporate religious symbols as well to a greater or a lesser extent. This asymmetry could be understood as a reflection of the categorical difference between religious martyrs and national heroes; while religious martyrs are not viewed as national heroes, victims commemorated as national heroes are likely to be seen as religious martyrs as well. Hence, the perception of the Bosniak national identity in Cazin, as evident from the regional memorials, is tightly linked to religious identity, but not vice versa.

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527 For a detailed study of Islamic epigraphy in Bosnia, see Mehmed Mujezinović, *Islamska epigrafika Bosne i Hercegovine*, 3 vols., 2nd ed. (Sarajevo: Sarajevo-Publishing, 1998).
The “religious” spectrum of memorials

The designs of memorials in the “religious” segment of my sample, such as in villages of Puškari, Tržac, Čajijići or Majetići, usually emulate the forms of traditional fountains or mausoleums (Fig. 2.26). They are built exclusively in white marble, featuring a cenotaph. In some cases, such as in Donja Koprivna and in Ostrožac, the entire memorial consists of a cenotaph displaying a list of names and some small crescent-star symbols (Fig. 2.27).

This and similarly designed memorials with religious character are in the tradition of previous commutative traditions. There are three main types of traditional Bosnian memorials (turbe), according to architectural historian Alija Bejići. The first type includes closed domed mausoleums with octagonal base and stone structure. Placed in courtyards of mosques, such mausoleums were rare (they appeared only in the sixteenth century) and the primarily erected to commemorate pashas, sheikhs, and other dignitaries or wealthy individuals. The second type is the most frequent, featuring the common form of martyr commemoration (šehidsko turbe). These memorials are designed as an open tent-like structure with a square base and a dome supported by four columns, and was primarily used for ... individuals. Finally, a third, mainly rural type consists of vernacular hut-shrines erected in honor of dervishes. These shrines are modest wooden-clay brick structures square with a square plan and a tent roof. The religious memorials in Cazin are all derived from Bejići’s second type: tent-like structures and pavilions in combination with cenotaphs and water fountains, sometimes decorated with a few crescent-star symbols.

529 Ibid., 290-291.
530 Ibid., 292.
The “national” spectrum of memorials

The other side of the memorial design spectrum includes memorials that emphasize national symbolism, as evident in the villages of Prošići, Ostredak, Čoralići, or Podgredina (Fig. 2.28). The design of the memorials in Bajrići and Glogovac is particularly interesting because they show how the vocabulary of explicitly secular national war memorials can be re-conceptualized into a religious context (Fig. 2.29). Both memorials are designed as triangular black marble slabs with an inscribed list of victims’ names. The Bajrići memorial is placed on a pedestal consisting of three steps, which supports four torch-like lamps and two white military tombstones placed on each side of the slab. The monument is topped by a white marble lily. The Glogovac memorial is built on similar lines but lacks the torch-lamps and the lily.

Both memorials make a clear visual reference to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington D.C. (1982) designed by the artist and architect Maya Lin. The Vietnam Veterans Memorial represents a significant contribution of minimalism to the issues of national commemoration — Lin’s design was very different from other visualizations of mass deaths from the past: her proposal introduced a novel dimension into the national memorial discourse, for she recreated the breathtaking effect of the “sea of graves” of a mass cemetery in form of the list — an equally powerful, yet minimal form representation (Fig. 2.30). The minimalist idiom that stripped the glorification of war from its memorials had an influence beyond the Vietnam Veterans Memorial and certain Holocaust memorials that were built in the same period.

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531 Maya Lin won the design competition in 1980, her polished black granite walls with a list naming 57,000 names. The monument later became the paradigm of American monument building. The Vietnam War Memorial appears as a slab of black stone cutting into the landscape. In addition to evoking the wound metaphor, walking along this wall exposes the slab as consisting of many smaller slabs, whereas their stacking paraphrases the multitude of graves in a cemetery in a compressed way. As symbols of collective tragedy, both the cemetery and the list operate on a grid system. In the horizontal web of names, the directory of the list references the rectangular record of gravestones and crosses in a cemetery. Both kinds of expressions aim for an immortal incarnation of the dead embodied in an eternal memorial. Kirk Savage, Monument Wars: Washington, D.C., the National Mall, and the Transformation of the Memorial Landscape (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).
Through the compression of the multitude of graves into a dense agglomeration of names, the list gains a symbolic meaning precisely through the reduction of the mass, as well as through the solidification of fragments into one condensed symbol. Expressing the same need for listing and understanding the immensity of loss, the list not only allows for a very somber process of commemoration, but also provides an understanding of how its visual power gains authority through minimalism. In this context, Maya Lin stated that she was influenced by World War I memorials, which were “the first to acknowledge the sacrifice made by individual soldiers.”

Maya Lin’s memorial is tonally different from the two Cazin memorials in that it intentionally commemorates the victims in a most “neutral” way, with the list and the time-line that ordered the deaths in a chronological sequence. In fact, Lin’s list “neutralizes” religious, ethnic, and racial backgrounds of the names. Given the increasing process of secularization — the separation of the domains of the Church and the state — in the twenty-first century, the list became an optimal expression of a distinctly national civic memorial.

While the language of minimalism allowed Maya Lin to design representations of loss devoid of religious/ethnic/national connotations, the copying and transplanting the language of this civic minimalist memorial back into a religious setting in Bosnia was subversive of Lin’s own intended “neutrality”. The transposition of contexts radically transforms the connotative effect of the list — from being conciliatory, it becomes accusatory.

Notwithstanding the fact that there has been a long tradition of listing of names in religious architecture, and that both the Bajrići and the Glogovac memorials are very plain, if not

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533 Daniel Abramson notes that, although names mostly indicate gender or cultural origin, Lin’s list eradicated religious symbols and any other elements that could reveal identity, which allowed her to invent a “new type of monumental representation of history,” one “without narrativity and moralizing.” Daniel Abramson,“Maya Lin and the 1960s: monuments, time lines, and minimalism,” *Critical inquiry* 22.4 (1996): 697.
Minimalist, it must be acknowledged that there is something strange about this transposition. Since Maya Lin’s design, the list of names engraved on the black marble has been largely taken out of the religious realm once and for all. By adopting the visual language of Lin’s list, both the Bajrići and Glogovac memorials undermine the idea of a secular war memorial that is devoid of religious and ethnic connotations, and keep open the tensions within the national community instead of bridging them. Thereby Bosniak national symbols are brought in close proximity to the religious sphere (the memorials are located in the courtyards of mosques), but they are not merged with it in terms of design (the memorials do not feature any religious symbols).

Between the “religious” and “national” spectrums

At the center of the spectrum of memorial designs I am examining are hybrid memorials that mix religious and national symbolism into a unified creation. The memorial erected in front of the Čizmići mosque in Cazin (2006), is among the best examples for this hybridization of Islamic and Bosniak national iconography (Fig. 2.31). The memorial is shaped as a sculptural crescent-star symbol made of white marble. Both the star and the crescent serve as fountains and carriers of different symbols. The star is designed as a marble basin, with a fountain-pipe protruding half a meter from the center, and topped with a small steel lily. An additional national symbol, the Bosnian coat of arms, is placed on the very front edge of the star; this is the first symbol that faces the visitor who approaches the memorial. The marble crescent fountain is positioned behind the star in a somewhat higher position. The difference between the two fountains is that star is decorative and the crescent is more functional, as evident from the arrangement of pipes that are suitable for ablution. As the crescent is skewed towards the star, its top surface serves as a display of twelve commemorative plaques. The top center edge of the
crescent features a relief of a lily in white marble. An additional and larger yellow lily, printed on gray metal plate, is placed immediately above this white marble lily in the top center of the crescent.

While the star-crescent symbol dominates the overall structure, interestingly, the repeating lily is the symbol that seems most intended to strike the onlooker who gazes at this awkward monument. Not only does the lily represent a novel appearance in Bosnian mosque architecture, but its appearance is even more meaningful when interpreted against the shifting manifestations and meanings of the Bosnian state emblems. In 1992, when the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina was initially formed, the lily was adopted as symbol that would represent the multi-ethnic character of the Bosnian state. It was chosen in reference to the way the lily was used in the medieval Bosnian Kingdom as a royal emblem, appearing on many stećci, or tombstones, of the period. It was chosen to lend the nascent state a connection to the vanished medieval one without having to denote any particular ethnic group. During the war, the lily had become laden with the symbolic cause of the multi-ethnic, unified Bosnian state. However, in this struggle, the nationalist agendas of the Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks in the war forcefully divested the lily of its “multi-ethnic” role, and associated the lily more with the Bosniak Muslims. As such, this symbol was purged from official post-Dayton representations of the Bosnian state as being too ethnically determined. In 1998, following the insistence of the International Community and the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Carlos Westendorp (appointed from 06/1997 until 08/1999), the Bosnian national symbols had to be changed and Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks were forced to adopt a new flag design that was abstract enough to make no reference to any particular ethno-national group, nor to their

coexistence in a common state, or to their individual/shared cultural heritage (Fig. 2.32).\textsuperscript{535} The re-appearance and insistence on the lily in the design of war memorials in Cazin thus makes a clear political statement that the commemorated had died because they were Bosniak and mutely argues for the idea of a unified multiethnic Bosnia with a history stretching back to the middle ages prior to Ottoman rule. Adhering to the post-Dayton symbolism of the flags of Bosnia, three flagpoles in the back of the memorial bear silent testimony to the victims as casualties of the contemporary political struggle.

The yellow lily, with its nearly golden color, bears the added symbolic weight of its association with the “Golden Lily” award, which is the highest recognition of selected war veterans. It is as if the Muslim community had awarded the golden lilies themselves in this and other mosque memorials since no Muslim individuals received this high honor by the state.

The overall arrangement of the fountain is designed in such a way that it guides the eye from one lily to another, starting from the lowest and most anterior position of the Bosnian coat of arms, which bears five tiny lilies, over to the small steel lily on top of the star fountain, and then to the white marble lily on the crescent fountain, and finally, to the highest and largest golden lily. The mosque itself provides the background for the overall memorial scenery.

By guiding the visitor’s view from the star, over the crescent, to the mosque, or otherwise, from the coat of arms, over the metal and white lilies, to the golden lily, and finally to the mosque, the memorial constructs a narrative to commemorate the victims through an interplay of religious and national symbols. The fact that they are commemorated in a religious

\textsuperscript{535} Ibid. The post-Dayton state flag of Bosnia features a dark-blue background, which symbolizes Bosnia’s aspiration to belong to united Europe. A yellow triangle placed in the middle represents the abstract shape of the state, but also the source of light and life. Along the diagonal, a row of small white starts symbolizes stability and longevity. Hence, the new state flag makes no reference to history, only to the future. This rejection of history faced serious objections among Bosnian intellectuals, however to no avail. Ibid., 124.
setting implies that these victims are thought of as martyrs of a holy war. Having their names integrated within the fountain suggests that the souls of these martyrs are purified with the water and the prayers of those who come to pray in the mosque. The national symbols attached to the fountain assure, once again, that the spectator understands the political connotation of their martyrdom, and the sacrifice they made for their country or nation. The power of awarding the “Golden Lily” is thus abrogated by the community, who honor the dead the state refuses to honor. The growing size of lilies, which increases gradually as one walks through the mosque, implies that the “national pride” metaphorically grows towards its religious origin, as embodied in the mosque itself.

**Memorial mosque**

The logic of the dialectical relationship between the “unintentional” and “intentional” monuments, as I have described it, has resulted in a new form of memorial that departs both structurally and stylistically from the preceding types of Islamic memorials in Bosnia. The third type of memorial merges the form of the mosque or its elements (without its function as a prayer space) and the concept of the mausoleum (without the tomb and the tombstone). I call this new type the “Memorial Mosque.”

The phenomenon of the Memorial Mosque evolved from reprogramming old mosques for commemorative purposes. In Gornja Koprivna, for example, this reprogramming was achieved with minimal means through the insertion of wooden display cabinets in the interior, which show photographs of martyrs (Fig. 2.33). These cabinets are arranged in a row along the walls of the former prayer space. In each cabinet fourteen portraits of the martyrs are displayed. The photographs are placed on the traditional green felt, in seven columns and two rows, and
protected with glass. The mosque in Polje was transformed into a Memorial mosque in a similar manner. Here, the display case with photographs has replaced the wooden case (*kubura*) of traditional mausoleums. The exterior appearance of the mosque, including its minaret, remains the same.

Because photographs are installed in the interior, praying inside such a mosque would imply that one is worshipping the martyrs instead of God. For this reason, once a mosque is reprogrammed into a Memorial mosque, it can no longer be used for daily ritual worship. In both villages, Gornja Koprivna and Polje, programmatic transformations of existing mosques were made possible because new and larger mosques were erected close by. From the official point of view of the *jamaat*, the phenomenon of the Memorial mosque emerged spontaneously, based on the need for more spacious mosques. As new mosques made the old ones obsolete, the oversupply of prayer space allowed older mosques to be re-used as new cultic spaces, giving way to the phenomenon described here. The parallel existence of old and new mosques standing literally next to each other produces an effect of “double-mosque,” which is unique to the northwestern region of Cazinska Krajina (Fig. 2.34). This effect is, on the one hand, related to financial resources of this agriculturally fertile region, which has traditionally been more prosperous than the rest of Bosnia. On the other hand, it should be noted that Cazin did not

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536 Such coffin-like cases were usually covered with green felt and carpets, and decorated with prayer beads.

537 There are numerous historical examples in Bosnia in which mausolea and prayer coexisted within mosque complexes, as for example in the Gazi Husrev-beg’s mosque complex in Sarajevo. The placement of martyrs’ photographs in prayer spaces, however, is a novel phenomenon in Bosnia that occurred only after the 1992-1995 war.

witness the same type of systematic destruction of mosques as the east of the country; most mosques in Cazin remained intact during and after the war.539

As new mosques are built and the old ones are diverted into commemorative spaces, the Bosnian martyr memorial has been ‘elevated’ from a tent-like open structure, which is distinctly Ottoman in origin, to a mosque-like edifice. This symbolic and stylistic “upgrade” provided the basis for new architectural developments of the Memorial mosque: such memorials are now created not only through transformations of old mosques, but they are also purposefully built — as mosque-like edifices serving exclusively commemorative proposes and without the mosque’s traditional function as a prayer space. One example for this new development is the Memorial mosque in Stijena (2001), designed as a single-story building with two domes (Fig. 2.35). The building has no minaret, but its upward arched soffit and its domed portico provided a clear stylistic reference to the mosque and the Islamic center of Zagreb (1987) (Fig. 2.35). On both sides of the portico, the entire entrance façade is covered with a giant cenotaph listing the names of the dead (Fig. 2.36). The title of the list states:

In the Name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful
The Brave Sons of the Local Community of Stijena Fought and Gave Their Lives in the Homeland War of 1992-1995 against the Serbian-Četnik Aggressor and the Betrayers of their Own People.

By using the term “Homeland War” (“Domovinski Rat”), which could be also translated as the “Fatherland War” or “Civil War,” this inscription connotes the internal character of the

539 For the history of the Krajina region, see Radoslav Lopašić, Bihać i Bihačka Krajina: mjestopisne i poviestne crte (Bihać: DINA, 1991).

540 The Islamic Center of Zagreb was designed by Sarajevo-based architects Mirza Gološ and Džemal Čelić. The mosque is located in Zagreb’s quarter of Trstik and was completed in 1987. The complex encompasses a surface of ca. 10,000 square meters. Beside the prayer spaces, it includes different social facilities such as a library, an Islamic high school, and administrative and residential spaces.
conflict. Such a connotation applies to the Cazinska and Bihaćka Krajina, since the region was not only attacked by Serbian forces from both Bosnia and Croatia, but there was also an internal conflict between Bosniaks between 1993 and 1995, in which the official antagonists were the Bosnian government and the short-lived Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia.  

Inscribing the cenotaph with the words “betrayers of their own people,” the memorial makes a political accusation against the internal division of the Bosniak community and war crimes performed by Muslims on Muslims.

It is perhaps Krajina’s insular position during the war, as well as its historic geo-political position as a borderland between Ottoman and Habsburg Empires that created the conditions under which there was a flowering of new kinds of memorial architecture innovations in this region of Bosnia.  

This history provided the ground of possibility out of which arose the Memorial mosque, which takes on the form of the traditional mosque, but — uniquely in the history of Bosnia - does not function as a prayer space.

This new memorial concept first crystallized, it seems, in Vrbanja, a city quarter of Bugojno in central Bosnia, where a memorial in the shape of a freestanding minaret was erected to commemorate forty five Bosniaks killed in July 1993 (Fig. 2.37). While this memorial enacts the most explicit formal and symbolic reference to mosque architecture, it is programmatically

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541 The Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia was an unrecognized mini-state consisting of the city of Velika Kladuša and several surrounding villages. The Province was headed by the local Muslim businessman Fikret Abdić, who gained notoriety in the 1980s as one of the key figures in the Agrokomerc food company embezzlement scandal. In 2002, Fikret Abdić was sentenced for twenty years in prison for the war crimes committed against Muslims in western Bosnia.

542 During the war, the Bosniak stronghold of Krajina, including the cities of Bihać, Cazin, and Budžim, was entirely surrounded by opposing sides: in the south and southeast, it was bordering with the Serb Republic; in the south, west and north, it was bordered by the Republic of Serbian Krajina (part of Croatia); and finally, in the northwest, it was clashing with the autonomous territory controlled by Fikret Abdić’s forces.
removed from it at the same time, having no traditional use function for the worshipper. Rather, its cultic form is merged with its commemorative function.

The presence of very different approaches to commemoration within a single municipality points to the ongoing search among Bosnian Muslims to decide on unified symbols, and finding an appropriate way to overcome memories of war and loss. The overcoming conjoins traumatic memory, which one wants to forget, and the memory of past loved ones, which one has a duty not to forget. To arrive at a resolution satisfactory to both impulses is usually the entrusted to the distance of time, which softens the edges of the trauma. However, in Bosnia, time is not allowed to pass peacefully, because the post-war period has merely extended the contest for control over territory, history, and memory by means other than war. It is thus that in intentional and unintentional monuments, in memorials in mosques, and in the new form of Memorial mosques such as those in Cazin, we observe a community creating a locus for their shared war experience that has the feeling of a business that is still not finished. These various spaces and structures stimulate recreation of collective memories, linking them to religious and/or national identity, but these memories have still not been absorbed in one canonical national narrative.

Conclusion

The case studies and problems related to post-war mosque architecture analyzed in this chapter shed light on different types of social dynamics in Bosnia. One type of social dynamic evolves from the contested relationship between the different ethnic groups in Bosnia; the other is endogenous to the Islamic community, which, while presenting a homogenous front to the world, is animated by different attitudes and factions in its situated locales.
This social network of different protagonists and their diverging agendas is encoded in a spatial system that is divided between those regions where Muslims are the dominant demographic and political entities and those where they are a minority presence. In both, mosques have been built or reconstructed. In the state, the fact of building a mosque is in itself a message demonstrating the determination of the Islamic community not to disappear or be intimidated. These two dimensions — the social and the spatial — provide the basis for the formation of a new formal language in post-war mosque architecture, a language with a dual effect.

The first level of effect consists of a coded symbolic language aimed at communicating certain messages to those within the Islamic community. As demonstrated by the examples of Cazin memorials and Memorial Mosques, this language is currently being formed through a search for a consistent system of references and symbols, drawn either from the history of Islamic architecture in the region or from other geographic and cultural contexts, or the combination thereof.

The second level of effect is performative; it draws from the physical presence of a structure in landscape, the manner in which a religious structure is positioned or confronted with its context in order to enact the argument made by its builders. The ability of the Inat mosques to enforce the defiant agenda of their builders depends, as demonstrated in the first part of the chapter, on the ability to enforce the legal system, and on the spatial parameters of the choice of location and the design. Thus, a successful inat design does not exclusively rely upon the system of historical references or stylistic codes that is its speech act, but relies as well on the visual
distinctiveness of the mosque, which is a matter of the situation in which the speech act is made\textsuperscript{543}.

The contrast between the two systems of mosque design, as rendered by the Memorial mosque and the Inat mosque — the former being primarily a symbol and the latter performing as a physical confrontation — highlights the role of religious architecture as a vital agent in an acute ethnic conflict. The multifaceted levels on which the mosque building provides for the post-war revitalization of communities point to the restorative feature of the mosque as a spatial source of social recovery and healing. From this perspective, both the Memorial mosque and the Inat mosque can be interpreted as indicators of social power. From the political perspective, however, these new genres of mosques diverge in their contributing to construction of Bosniak national identity: the Inat mosque foregrounds territory as the most prominent framer of identity, while the Memorial Mosque highlights collective memory as the crucial ingredient of the Bosniak national mythology. Linked together, the Memorial and Inat mosques intervene within the post-war landscape to express and shape a cultural attitude to the community’s self-preservation.

CHAPTER THREE — THE SCALE OF THE BUILDING

Purification of Culture: Turhan Emin-beg Mosque in Ustikolina

It is not unusual that this mosque was destroyed several times and it is not unusual that we re-erected it over and over again. Here are our roots and our veins that make us who we are. I would like to congratulate you on coming to water these roots on which our homeland, our faith, our honor, and our pride rest.544

— Raisu-l-Ulama Dr. Mustafa ef. Cerić at Ustikolina, 7 July 2007

With these words, the Raisu-l-Ulama Dr. Mustafa ef. Cerić greeted several thousand people at the inauguration of the newly rebuilt Turhan Emin-beg Mosque in Ustikolina (Fig. 3.1).545 What the Grand Mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina metaphorically referred to as “roots and veins” were the foundation stones of the mid fifteenth-century mosque believed to have been the oldest in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most likely founded in 1448 by Turhan Emin-beg, an Ottoman military officer after whom it was named, the mosque had marked the arrival of the Ottomans and the establishment of Islam in Bosnia. Precisely because of its historical and political significance and despite its protected status as a registered cultural heritage landmark,

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545 Raisu-l-Ulama Mustafa ef. Cerić heads the Rijaset, the main executive body of the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ICBH). He represents the supreme authority of the ICBH. For history of the Rijaset see: Enes Durmišević, Uspostava i pravni položaj Rijaseta Islamske Zajednice u Bosni i Herzegovini: 1882-1899, Editio Memoria iuris knj. 2 (Sarajevo: Magistrat, 2002).
the Turhan Emin-beg mosque recently fell victim to the Serbian nationalist extremists, who razed it to the ground in 1992. Yet, it was not this and other major acts of sectarian violence that brought Ustikolina into the spotlight; rather, the mosque’s destruction was overshadowed by controversies surrounding its post-war renovation, especially regarding its minaret. Built anew in 2002 at almost twice the height of the one it replaced (Fig. 3.2), this sixty meters tall whitewashed concrete tower now holds the notorious title of the highest minaret in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Fig. 3.3).

Unsurprisingly, the minaret’s monumental dimensions instantly triggered a heated public debate that centered on two issues: the inadequacy of the post-war reconstruction of registered landmark buildings and the illegal construction of contentious religious and national symbol, often on or around those heritage buildings themselves. The polemic has delayed the minaret’s demolition and contributed to a complete lack of clarity regarding its future. These complex debates will provide the point of departure for my examination of the architectural and symbolic bonds between the pre-modern ethnic groups and the modern nation state that are the primary theoretical concern of this case study. In analyzing the architecture of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque and its history, my aim will be to demonstrate how the Bosniak national identity is also shaped on the scale of a single building, and how a single mosque can represent a fundamental node within a wider symbolic and ideological network of Islamic religious structures in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This chapter is divided into three parts. I will begin by outlining the history of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque and delve into the controversies surrounding its post-war renovation. In the second part, I will explore the multifaceted meanings of the mosque’s dramatically changed post-war appearance. The oversized minaret in Ustikolina takes part in a country-wide trend to
demarcate ethno-national territories through monumental religious architecture. At the same time, it is a symbol of the Muslim population’s survival and an indicator of the return of the refugees to the ethnically cleansed Eastern Bosnia. In the third part, I will examine how the rebuilt Turhan Emin-beg mosque facilitates the fusion of the four central components that make up the Bosniak ethnic and national identity, that is, religion, culture, history, and territory. I will argue that the changes introduced to the design of the mosque and its minaret represent an attempt to communicate the deep cultural rootedness of the Bosniak nation. In the context of the politically and historically charged territory of the Drina valley, the Turhan Emin-beg mosque legitimizes and marks this territory as the territory of the Bosniaks’ historic homeland. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s resurrected oldest mosque has thus come to symbolize the ethnic body of the Bosniak nation.

1. A brief history of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque

Foundation

Oral tradition holds the Turhan Emin-beg Mosque as the oldest mosque in Bosnia; however, surviving historical records cannot sufficiently support this widely accepted belief. In fact, only a few scholarly attempts have been made thus far to determine the mosque’s origins and find additional facts about its founder. Miron Zarzycki was among the first to study the

546 Historical evidence about fifteenth-century Ustikolina is generally very meager. We know that it was an important town in the Ottoman period, sometimes referred to as a “şcher” and sometimes as a “kasaba.” Zarzycki notes that the city got its name from the mouth of the river Koluna, which at this point flows into the river in Drina (“ušće” of Koluna = Ustikolina). Miron Zarzycki, “Variošca Ustikolina,” Glasnik zemaljskog muzeja Sarajevo 2, no. 3 (1891): 209. According to Mehmed Mujezinović, who researched the first written sources about Ustikolina, the city is first mentioned in 895-896 CE in the chronicle of Pope Dukljanin. In 1399, there is evidence of a Ragusan colony in Ustikolina. A customs house is mentioned in the written sources in 1413. The Ottomans took Ustikolina and the surrounding region soon after 1441, which is the last time the township is mentioned in known sources. Mehmed Mujezinović and Evangelos Dimitrijević, “Džamija na Ustikolinu,” Naše starine, no. 2 (1954): 137.
tomb epitaphs at the nearby Presjeka cemetery in 1891, in the hopes of finding the tomb of Turhan Emin-beg, the mosque’s supposed founder.\textsuperscript{547} Zarzycki suggested that the mosque had been built sometime between 1461/62 and 1464/65 CE (or between 866 and 869 AH).\textsuperscript{548} Forty years after Zarzycki, Omer Zuhrić examined the surviving facsimile of the mosque’s metal \textit{tarih} (inscription plaque), which had disappeared in Second World War. Based on the data it provided, Zuhrić concluded that the mosque was founded by Turhan Emin-beg in 852 AH, which he then incorrectly converted into year 1446 on the Gregorian calendar (the correct conversion would be 1448/49 CE).\textsuperscript{549}

The next scholar to research the origins of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque was the renowned Bosnian historian and expert in Islamic epigraphy, Mehmed Mujezinović. In 1954, Mujezinović reevaluated Zarzycki’s and Zuhrić’s sources and their reliance on oral transmissions.\textsuperscript{550} He argued that the person buried at the Presjeka cemetery could have indeed been named “Turhan,” but that the language, style, and structure of the inscription as a whole

\textsuperscript{547}Zarzycki, “Varošica Ustikolina,” 209-213.

\textsuperscript{548}As parts of the tomb epitaph were missing when Zarzycki did his research, he had to rely on an oral report by a local resident Muhammed-beg Čengić to determine the name and the death date of the person buried in the tomb. Čengić reported that around 1850, when the epitaph was still intact, he was able to read the name “Turhan Emin-beg” and the date of 869 AH (= 1464/65 CE). Based on this information, and the fact that the Sultan Mehmed Fatih arrived to Bosnia in 866 AH (1461/2 CE), Zarzycki concluded that Turhan Emin-beg mosque must have been built between 866 and 869 AH (1461/62 and 1464/65 CE). Ibid., 212.

\textsuperscript{549}The Hijri year 852 converts into 1448/49 if the following conversion formula is used: \( G = 0.97023 \times H + 621.57 \). Omer Zuhrić wrote that, some time before 1896, kadi Mulabdić and muderiz Hafiz Hamid Muftić, both from Foča, identified a tomb epitaph with the name of Turhan Emin-beg, and a death date of 852 AH. The original \textit{tarih} (inscription) plaque for the mosque did not survive. At the end of the nineteenth century, a new mosque inscription text was written by muderiz Muftić based on the information from the \textit{bašluk} (wooden tombstone inscription) discovered at the Prejeka cemetery. This information was transcribed onto a metal plate, which was kept in the mosque as a reference to the missing \textit{tarih}. The \textit{bašluk} itself was destroyed; according to Zuhrić, it was broken by a number of “drunken Orthodox Christian peasants” at some point and thrown into “Jezera” (ponds) near the village Lokve. Omer Zuhrić, “Najstarija džamija u Bosni,” Novi Behar, vol. 4, no. 23-23 (1930-31): 330, 331. Quoting Zuhrić, Mehmed Mujezinović noted that this metal plate disappeared in the Second World War, but that a transcript of it was saved, from which we know that the mosque was founded by Turhan Emin-beg in 852 AH (Mujezinović also used the incorrectly converted year of 1446). Mujezinović and Dimitrijević, “Džamija na Ustikolini,” 138. For a transcript of the mosque’s inscription with the date of 1448/49 see Faruk Muftić, \textit{Foča: 1470-1996} (Sarajevo: TKP “Šahinpašić”, 1997), 173.

\textsuperscript{550}Mujezinović and Dimitrijević, “Džamija na Ustikolini,” 137.
were much more typical of sixteenth-century tombstones. To reconcile his findings with the oral tradition, Mujezinović suggested that the mosque may have been built by someone else, but that, throughout time, Turhan Emin-beg’s name had become closely associated with the mosque’s foundation. Even though scholars could not exactly date the mosque’s origin, the widely accepted foundation year (also found in the records of the Islamic Community in Sarajevo), taken from the mosque’s plaque inscription facsimile, is now the year 852 AH or 1448/49 CE. 

The original appearance of the fifteenth-century Turhan Emin-beg’s mosque is equally uncertain. Considering the period of its likely construction and the political circumstances surrounding the Ottomans’ initial penetration into Bosnia, it can be assumed that the building was a modest rectangular single-story structure, possibly with a wooden minaret. We can also assume that the mosque’s appearance has changed significantly over time as a result of damages, repairs, and partial rebuilding. A major renovation probably took place at the end of the nineteenth century, following the 1882 visit to Ustikolina of Benjamin von Kállay, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Finance and Governor of Bosnia, and his donation for this purpose.

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551 Ibid., 140.
552 Mujezinović argued that the death date cannot possibly be the year 869, but that it was rather the year 969 (= A.D. 1561/62). He also argues that the language, style, and structure of the inscription is typical of sixteenth-century tombstones. Therefore, Mujezinović concludes, if the mosque really is the oldest one in Bosnia, it could not have been built by Turhan Emin-beg who died in 1561/62 CE. Ibid., 140, 143.
553 Mosque data sheets, Center for Islamic Architecture, Rijaset Sarajevo, unpaginated.
554 Madžida Bećirbegović, Džamije sa drvenom munarom u Bosni i Hercegovini. [Mosques with Wooden Minarets in Bosnia-Hercegovina] (Sarajevo, Veselin Masleša, 1990), 14.
555 According to a report in “Sarajevski List” from 10 September 1882, Benjamin von Kállay visited Ustikolina and donated 100 forints for the renovation of the mosque, a gesture greeted with joy and gratitude by local Muslims. Reportedly, he also donated 500 forints to the poor in Foća, and 60 forints to a hadžija (a man who went on the pilgrimage to Mecca), whose han (hostel) was burned down by hajduks (bandits). Ilijas Hadžibegović, Bosanskohercegovački Gradovi na razmeđu 19. i 20. stoljeća. [Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Cities between the 19th to 20th Centuries] (Sarajevo: Institut za Istoriju u Sarajevu, 2004), 123.
According to Zarzycki, by the end of the nineteenth century the mosque had a cubic shape, a hipped roof, and a stone minaret (Fig. 3.4). Each of the four white-washed stone walls had four windows in the “Arabic style”, as Zarzycki describes them, referring to their pointed arches. Zarzycki also notes that, although the roof may have been rebuilt several times, the walls of the original mosque remained intact. Neither the interior nor the exterior of the mosque was decorated, except for some ornamental carvings on the stone minbar (raised platform from which imams deliver their sermons) and for muqarnas on the minaret’s balcony.

Mujezinović’s drawings from the 1950s corroborate Zarzycki’s account that the mosque was, at the time, a simple stone structure covered with a hipped roof (Fig. 3.5). His plans show a square-based prayer space with the dimensions of 13,80 x 14,50 meters. Attached to the mosque was a remarkable minaret noted for its intricate stone and wood structure. Its stone slabs were layered in a way that intertwined the spiral steps of the minaret with the surrounding structural wall, thus forming a unified and solid whole. Although it is unknown when exactly this thirty-six meters high minaret was built, it is likely that it dated to the mid-sixteenth century, as it was constructed using the same techniques as those employed for the minaret of the Aladža Mosque in Foča (1550/1 CE), one of the most prominent Ottoman monuments in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Fig. 3.6).

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556 Zarzycki probably meant to say that the windows were shaped as pointed arches. They were placed in two rows, directly above each other. The windows on the upper row were slightly smaller than the ones on the lower one. Zarzycki, “Varošica Ustikolina,” 11.
557 The roofs of the mosque and the minaret were covered with lead, and that of the front portico was tiled. Ibid.
558 Ibid.
560 Mujezinović and Dimitrijević, “Džamija na Ustikolini,” 143.
561 Mehmed Mujezinović and Evangelos Dimitrijević, “Džamija na Ustikolini,” Naše Starine, no. 2 (1954): 143; For more information about the Aladža Mosque in Foča see: Andrej Andrejević, Aladža Džamija U Foči (Beograd:
The mosque’s destruction over the course of its recent history

The Turhan Emin-beg mosque was destroyed and rebuilt several times. In 1941, it burned down in a fire set by Draža Mihajlović’s Četniks; the entire wooden structure, including the roof, was lost, the portico was severely damaged, and the minbar smashed. The minaret and the outer walls survived both this and a later Četnik attack in 1942, yet on that occasion one part of the minaret’s balcony and several pieces of the muqarnas were broken off (Fig. 3.7). After Second World War, the inhabitants of Ustikolina urged for the mosque’s quick renovation, but, because of the importance of the monument, the project had to await the approval of the Institute for Protection of Cultural Monuments and Natural Rarities in Sarajevo (IPM). Conservation work on the mosque finally took place in 1953/54. At this point, beside the reconstruction of the mosque and its minaret, two additional buildings for communal functions were erected close by. The reconstructed mosque was subsequently registered as a monument of primary cultural importance in 1954 (Fig. 3.8).

Ironically, this protected status made the mosque even more attractive as a target for Serbian nationalist extremists in the 1990s war; in April 1992, the entire mosque and all of its

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562 Until First World War, the mosque was covered with a lead roof cover, which was replaced with tar paper after the war, and subsequently with roof tiles. Mujezinović and Dimitrijević, “Džamija na Ustikolini,” 143; Zuhrić, “Najstarija džamija u Bosni,” 331.

563 See Chapter One for more information on the Četnik movement in Second World War.


565 Mujezinović and Dimitrijević, “Džamija na Ustikolini,” 143.

566 Ibid.

567 The adjacent buildings accommodated various communal functions, such as those of the abdesthana (ablution space), the gasulhana (space for ritual washing of the dead), and of office spaces of the Islamic Community. Another building was constructed some time later encompassing a mekteb (religious primary school) and an apartment for the imam. Muftić, Foča: 1470-1996, 176.

accompanying buildings were looted and set on fire. On June 17 of the same year the mosque, including the minaret, was blown up and completely destroyed (Fig. 3.9).\textsuperscript{569} According to Faruk Muftić, a chronicler of war destructions in Foča and other cities in East Bosnia, everything found inside — such as valuable hand-woven carpets and prayer rugs — was plundered during these raids.\textsuperscript{570} What was left standing in Ustikolina after the war, besides some five hundred ruined houses, were the rubble and the wall fragments of the mosque;\textsuperscript{571} they remained buried under a heap of garbage left after the “ethnic cleansers” finished their work.\textsuperscript{572} Lying amidst the mosque’s ruins and the garbage were also the cases of nine anti-tank mines — remains of the weapons used to blow up the mosque.\textsuperscript{573} Faruk Muftić returned to Ustikolina in March 1996, and provided the following impressions upon visiting the ruined mosque (Fig. 3.10):

The Turhan Emin-beg mosque has turned into a pile of rubble — this is unbelievable. I found the \textit{alem} [the metal tip of the minaret] in that pile of rubble; I erected it and took a picture. It is incredible that such a precious monument has turned into nothing.\textsuperscript{574}


\textsuperscript{570} Muftić, \textit{Foća: 1470-1996}, 176. This is why Reis Cerić also emphasized that the return of refugees to the Drina region is crucial for the survival of Muslims in that area. Alen Bajramović, “Reis Cerić: Ovdje su nasi korijeni…,” 8.


\textsuperscript{573} Safet Jahić, an elderly member of the IC Ustikolina Executive Committee, who served as a temporary \textit{imam} in Ustikolina immediately after the war, reported to have found those mine shells amidst the rubble of the mosque. According to Jahić, these anti-tank mines could not have been left there by the Muslims, as no Muslims were in town at the time when the mosque was blown up. Safet Jahić, Interview by Azra Akšamija on 9 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{574} Faruk Muftić, \textit{Šeher Ustikolina} (Sarajevo: DES, 2006), 207.
The post-war rebuilding

The post-war restoration of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque was initiated and funded by the Islamic community of Ustikolina, starting roughly around 2002. Suvad Bašić, President of the Mosque Building Committee, explained that the jamaat had been waiting for the authorities to initiate or finance the mosque’s reconstruction for several years. Needing a place of worship while waiting for institutional action, the community had to use the local school as a temporary prayer space. After six years under these conditions the jamaat lost its patience and decided to start rebuilding the mosque with its own means.

This account may not be altogether accurate. Professor Muhamed Hamidović, former Director of the Institute for the Protection of Monuments (IPM), the very institution the jamaat had been waiting for to respond, reported that the Institute had indeed developed a project and initiated a fundraising campaign for a supervised reconstruction before the community started rebuilding the mosque on its own. In preparation for the reconstruction, Hamidović contended, preliminary site-research had been conducted and ancient stones taken out from rubble, numbered, and arranged on the site. The official reconstruction project was developed under the supervision of specialists from the Institute for the Protection of Monuments, as well as

576 Suvad Bašić, the owner of the company “Baša d.o.o.” and president of the mosque’s building committee, stated that the members of the committee went to Sarajevo at least four to five times to consult with the Department for Protection of Monuments, the Rijaset of the Islamic Community, the Federal Ministry for Regional and Environmental Planning, and other institutions, on initiating the rebuilding of the mosque, but, as he explained, only Reis ef. Cerić was appreciative of the džemati’s concern. The information that the mosque building committee received from the Department for Protection of Monuments was that the mosque was number 20 on the list for future reconstruction projects, for which there were no funds at the time. They were only offered help in preserving, that is “freezing”, the existing ruin’s condition. After renovating the turbe, the džemati was driven out from the school, which it used for prayer. Mustafa Borović, “Ministarstvo između križa i polumjeseca,” 25-26.
577 Muhamed Hamidović, Interview by Azra Akšamija on 8 April 2009.
with other prominent local architectural historians, such as Madžida Bećirbegović, Ismet Tahirovic, and Nedžad Kurto (Fig. 3.11.a and 3.11.b).⁵⁷⁸

Yet, when the initial project funds were finally collected, the jamaat ignored the Institute’s project, using the available funds to build the imam’s house before rebuilding the mosque itself (Fig. 3.12). This prioritization protracted the renovation of the mosque, Hamidović explained, and the community was left without either a steady place for worship or the funds for the renovation of the mosque.⁵⁷⁹ Hamidović also noted that discussions about the new mosque resumed after the imam’s house was built.⁵⁸⁰ Some argued for a reconstruction true to the pre-war model, while others preferred a new, larger mosque that could accommodate at least two thousand worshipers. Some even suggested that both options could be realized: that a larger mosque could be built too, but in a different location.⁵⁸¹

Safet Jahić, a member of the IC Ustikolina Executive Committee, confirmed that the Institute had initiated the unrealized reconstruction project, one that he personally would have favored. He noted, however, that the estimated cost of over one million euros would have greatly strained the limited resources of the community. Lacking the support of the authorities while in “urgent need of a mosque, and not a monument,” as Jahić put it, the jamaat decided to start rebuilding the mosque on its own (Fig. 3.13).⁵⁸² What might have contributed to this decision was a general mistrust of the rule of law and of the ability of state institutions to actually

⁵⁷⁸ Muftić, Šeher Ustikolina, 226.
⁵⁷⁹ Ibid.
⁵⁸⁰ Ibid.
⁵⁸¹ Ibid.
⁵⁸² Safet Jahić, Interview by Azra Akšamija on 9 April 2009. Among the chief protagonists involved in the reconstruction were Begzudin ef. Jusić, the main imam of Ustikolina; Džemal Omerbašić, the president of the Executive Board of the Islamic Community of Ustikolina (ICU) and Chair of the Assembly of the Medžlis ICU; Suvad Bašić, owner of the company “Baša d.o.o.” and president of the Mosque Building Committee; and finally, Rešad Karović, owner of the company “Braća Karović” and president of the Initiative Committee for the Mosque Renovation. Mustafa Borović, “Ministarstvo između križa i polumjeseca,” 25.
protect or restore monuments — understandably so, since the protected status neither helped prevent the mosque’s destruction during the war, nor made possible a timely professional reconstruction after the war was over.583

The “home-made” renovation by the jamaat eventually resulted in a prayer space relatively similar to that of the previous structure (Fig. 3.14). Small changes were introduced to the design of the pointed arch-shaped windows, which used to have wooden frames and iron lattices and were arranged on two levels, with larger windows on the lower one. The new mosque has ready-made windows all the same size and with plastic white frames (Fig. 3.15). A visual link to the pre-war façade is established through the zigzag pattern of stones around the windows, which imitates the window framing of the pre-war mosque. A more substantial change affected the renovation of the entrance portico (sofe): the previous open-air single-story sofe were replaced with an enclosed two-story rectangular foyer (Fig. 3.16).584 The rebuilding of the mosque’s roof brought about some small changes too: while the pre-war mosque had a hipped roof that covered both the prayer space and the sofe together, the new roof consists of two connected roofs, one for the prayer space and the other for the foyer. The choice of the “mission” clay roofing tiles remained consistent with the pre-war roofing tiles (Fig. 3.17).585

The most notable transformation concerned the minaret, whose height was increased from thirty-six to sixty meters (ca. 197 ft). In addition, the number of minaret balconies (šerefe)

583 The reasons for this inefficiency are varied, ranging from the overwhelming amount of destroyed monuments in need of professional renovation, to the inefficiency of post-war state institutions due to the overall state of corruption on all levels, to the political obstacles that affect every segment of Bosnian society.

584 Upon entering on the lower level, the foyer opens into a wide space with shiny black marble floor, which is partially covered with patches of pink industrial carpets and several machine-woven oriental rugs. In the right corner of the foyer, four levels of wooden shelves are available for storing the worshipers’ shoes. In the center of the same space, three steps lead down to the entrance to the prayer space. In the left corner of the sofe, black marble stairs lead to the sofe’s upper level and the female prayer gallery.

585 “Mission” clay roofing tiles are typical for Mediterranean architecture, as they are more resistant to wind and climatic conditions in the region.
was multiplied from one to three (Fig. 3.18). A roofed and elaborately designed gallery with a white concrete balustrade frames the minaret’s entrance at the bottom of the structure. This balcony also connects the minaret to the second floor of the mosque (Fig. 3.19).

According to Safet Jahić, who was involved in the rebuilding process, the minaret’s soaring height was reached rather accidentally — it resulted from a chaotic process of fundraising. The donations were collected among the community members and regional companies⁵⁸⁶ and the numerous donors were initially very generous in pledging their contributions per meter of height of the minaret (one meter cost 500 Euros at the time).⁵⁸⁷ In the end, however, though a tall minaret was erected counting on all the pledges, some donors neglected to pay what they had promised,⁵⁸⁸ leaving the community with a substantial debt. These financial woes notwithstanding, the jamaat was nevertheless very proud of its new minaret from which “adhan can be heard as far as Serbia.”⁵⁸⁹

The post-renovation controversy

Reactions to the highest minaret in Bosnia-Herzegovina were mixed. While many admired its monumental design, numerous newspapers criticized it as an icon of nationalism, comparing it to other contentious religious and national symbols built throughout the country after the war.⁵⁹⁰ Prominent examples linked in controversy with Ustikolina’s minaret were, for

⁵⁸⁶ According to a newspaper report in Oslobodenje from 8 January 2005, ca. 200,000 euros were invested in the reconstruction of the mosque up to that date. At this point the rebuilding of the mosque was still not finished. “Rušenje munare 19. januara?,” Oslobodenje, 8 January 2005, 7.
⁵⁸⁷ Safet Jahić, interview by Azra Aksamija on April 9, 2009.
⁵⁸⁸ Ibid.
⁵⁸⁹ Ibid.
instance, the bell tower adjacent to the Franciscan church of Saints Peter and Paul (1872) in Mostar (Fig. 3.20), which similarly doubled in height following its renovation, and the fifteen Catholic crosses that were erected without permit in the monument-protected zone of the fortress of Stolac (Fig. 3.21), home to a primarily Muslim population prior to the war.\footnote{The Commission to Preserve National Monuments of Bosnia and Herzegovina has described the illegal erection of fifteen crosses in the monument-protected zone as follows: “Fourteen wooden crosses have been erected within the protected site and a stone cross more than 4 m high on the plateau in the middle of the town with parts of the lower stone wall around the cross; both the stone cross and parts of the walls around it have been constructed from stones taken from the ramparts of the fortress. The protected site is endangered by new and inappropriate construction in the immediate protected area.” BH Commission to Preserve National Monuments, <http://www.anekskomisija.com.ba/main.php?mod=vijesti&extra=projekti&id_vijesti=244&lang=1&&&action=gestExternal&id=168> (15 April 2009)}

As was the case with the Turhan Emin-beg Mosque, the Franciscan church in Mostar was almost completely destroyed by the combined forces of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and the Army of the Serb Republic (VRS) in May 1992; its post-war renovation also focused on a new monumental tower. Unlike the minaret in Ustikolina, however, the bell tower in Mostar was not destroyed in the war and had remained intact until 1997 (Fig. 3.22). When the funds for the church’s renovation became available, the local Catholic community decided to tear down the bell tower together with the remaining church walls, and replace them with much larger concrete structures.\footnote{Emily Gunzburger Makaš, who has studied the transformation of this church in detail, notes that the planning was initiated and almost fully financed by the local Croat/Catholic community. Emily Gunzburger Makaš, “Representing Competing Identities: Building and Rebuilding in Postwar Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina” (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 2007), 261-262.} The new \textit{campanile}, completed in 1998, was extended to 107.2 meters, more than twice its original height.\footnote{Ibid., 260-268.} This gigantic structure, praised in the local press as the tallest Croat church tower in the Balkans (and even as the tallest one in Europe),\footnote{The church and the \textit{campanile} were constructed in 1998; the interior was finished six years later. Makaš notes that Mostar’s \textit{campanile} was built one meter taller than the bell towers of the Cathedral in Zagreb: “In purposefully exceeding the mother church of Croat Catholicism, the patrons of the bell tower – who were Croats living outside of the homeland and Franciscans operating outside of the regular church hierarchy – appeared to be trying to prove themselves more Croat and more Catholic than the center.” The renovation of the church was extensively criticized} now dominates the skyline.
of Mostar, notably exceeding in height all the Ottoman minarets in the old city center (Fig. 3.23). As an icon of Croat ethnic supremacy, it also overshadows the famous Old Bridge (Stari Most), the world-renowned symbol of the city’s long history of peaceful multiethnic coexistence.595

An analogous effort in visual domination of one ethno-religious group over another in this region had already taken place in 1993, when fifteen large crosses were erected in the famous Vidoška fortress, an emblem of the city of Stolac and a registered heritage monument with remains from the Roman, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian periods (Fig. 3.21).596 As the Islamic scientist and literary critic Michael Sells explains, fourteen of these crosses were placed along a path leading to the top of the fortress, following the “ethnic cleansing” of all that was not Croat or Catholic in the city.597 Each cross marked one station along the pilgrimage route, whose final destination, in the center of the fortress, was the fifteenth and the largest cross, made of stones taken from the fortress itself.598 Refashioned as a conceptual simulacrum of the Via Dolorosa in the Old City of Jerusalem, the Vidoška fortress was appropriately renamed “Križevac” (“Hill of Crosses”).599

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595 Mostar’s Old Bridge (1566) was one of the most remarkable monuments from the Ottoman period in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The architect of the bridge was Mimar Hajruddin, a student of the famed Ottoman architect Mimar Sinan. The Old Bridge was targeted and deliberately destroyed by the HVO forces on 9 November 1993. The subsequent reconstruction involved the coming together of many different organizations, among which the World Bank, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Aga Khan Trust for Culture, and the World Monuments Fund. The reconstruction also represented an attempt to symbolically reconnect the divided city. For more information about the history of Mostar’s Old Bridge and its reconstruction, see Amir Pašić, The Old Bridge in Mostar (Gračanica: Grin, 2006); Sabine Bieberstein, Kornélia Buday, and Ursula Rapp, eds., Building bridges in a multifaceted Europe: Religious Origins, Traditions, Contexts and Identities (Leuven; Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2006); and “Conservation of Mostar Old Town.” In Space for Freedom, edited by Ismaïl Serageldin (London: Butterworth Architecture, 1989).


597 Ibid.

598 Ibid.

599 Ibid., 325.
Though the political contexts and motivations for post-war intrusions into protected monument sites in Mostar, Stolac, and Ustikolina were different, in the eyes of the BH Commission to Preserve National Monuments all three instances represented a form of destruction of cultural heritage. For this reason, the official response of the Commission was to include both the Old Town of Stolac and the Turhan Emin-beg Mosque on the “Priority List of Endangered Monuments” and to add the cloister of the Franciscan monastery in Mostar, the only surviving part of the religious complex from the nineteenth century, to the “Provisional List of National Monuments of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” As a result, the Federal Ministry for Regional and Environmental Planning filed a lawsuit in June 2004 and the Federal Inspector for Building subsequently issued a decree to pull down several illegally built religious structures, including both the minaret in Ustikolina and the crosses in Stolac. Regarding the Turhan Emin-beg mosque, the plan was to reinitiate a supervised reconstruction of the entire monument to its pre-war appearance. This would have involved some small interventions on the mosque, including minor changes to the roof and the incorporation of original mosque stones into the façade. The minaret, however, was to be torn down and built anew at much-decreased height.

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600 The Old Town of Stolac was declared a national monument at the meeting of the Commission to Preserve National Monuments of Bosnia and Herzegovina held in Sarajevo on 21-27 January 2003. The official decision was published in "Službeni glasniku BiH", nr. 15/03. 

601 BH Commission to Preserve National Monuments, 

602 With regards to the minaret in Ustikolina, this decree followed a lawsuit filed by the Federal Ministry for the Regional and Environmental Planning (FMREP or “Federalno ministarstvo za prostorno uređenje i okoliš”) in June 2005. The lawsuit went ahead after several unsuccessful attempts to stop the unsupervised rebuilding of the mosque. In an interview in Ljiljan in 2004, Ramiz Mehmedić, the Federal Minister for Regional and Environmental Planning, stated that the Ministry had already reacted in July 2002, after concrete foundations for the new structure were poured. An official protocol document was issued by the inspector Dragica Ćurak Filipović, which was signed by the jammat representatives responsible for the reconstruction of the mosque and the Minister of the Bosnian Podrinje Canton, Smajo Sijerčić. Mehmedić adds that the Ministry intervened two more times in vain, when the construction of the mosque’s roof was underway. Mustafa Borović, “Ministarstvo između križa i polumjeseca,” 27.

603 In an interview for “Ljiljan” in 2004, Mehmedić emphasized the importance of a quick institutional intervention, which was to rescue the monument’s remains. He stated that the Ministry was ready to provide funds (ca. 25,000
This plan, however, was never executed owing to deep objections of the members of Ustikolina's *jamaat* — in addition to those of the wider Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as abroad — who understood the intended pulling down of the minaret as a political provocation.604 As Džemal Omerbašić, president of the Executive Board of the Islamic Community of Ustikolina (ICU) and Chair of the Assembly of the Medžlis ICU, explained:

[...] people are more than rancorous. They waited for six years for the Institute for the Protection of Monuments and the Ministry in Sarajevo to take action, provide funding or experts to build the mosque according to their terms, but nothing happened. They [the authorities] only remembered the “laws” and the “protection of monuments” now that our people, the poor returnees, [...] have constructed the mosque with their own means — now they want to destroy it. This will not happen for sure. They should know that we will defend the mosque regardless of the price. Obviously, it is in someone’s interest that an incident should happen, from which a political scandal could be constructed, or that this small number of Muslims who remained in the Drina valley gets expelled.605

What the *jamaat* members found particularly offensive was that the Ministry’s decision, in their view, equated the minaret in Ustikolina with the crosses in Stolac, as if both were the same type of expressions of nationalistic dominance. The head *imam* of Ustikolina at the time, Begzudin ef. Jusid, argued that any comparison of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque “[...] with some other buildings in the Federation of BiH, which were built more or less yesterday, and as offsprings of genocide and ethnic cleansing, is an additional humiliation and insult for all Muslims in the

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604 Muslims from outside the country also took offense at the plans to demolish the minaret. Ševko ef. Omerbašić, the Mufti of Croatia and Slovenia, vehemently rebuked the Ministry’s decision, stating that “with this act not only the mosque or the minaret are demolished, but also the whole system of a place that has been massacred and burned in the recent war.” Ibid., Translation by Azra Aksamija.

Podrinje region. Jusić emphasized that the Turhan Emin-beg mosque was erected on a waqf estate and in the very place in which it had stood for over five centuries.

The reaction of the Ministry to these reproofs was to criticize the political instrumentalization of Ustikolina’s minaret, which had led to a polarization of both the jamaat and the public into two camps — those arguing for the minaret’s “authentic” reconstruction and those favoring its current appearance. For the Federal Minister Ramiz Mehmedić, there could be no dilemma on this issue. The citizens of Ustikolina, he argued, had to understand that what the mosque’s devastators wanted to annihilate was the building’s very authenticity. Any reconstruction project that differed from the mosque’s pre-war appearance contributed in his view to the agenda of those who wanted to erase all historical evidence of the long Islamic presence in the region. Professor Muhamed Hamidović sided with this critique, describing the mosque’s reconstruction as a “triumph of pragmatism” over professionally-supervised renovation.

Considered in legislative terms, however, the problem of Stolac and Ustikolina were the same for the Federal Minister Mehmedić, since both structures had been erected illegally in monument-protected settings. Conversely, Mehmedić simultaneously emphasized that the Ministry did not intend to equate the mosque of Ustikolina with the crosses of Stolac, because it understood that “the mosque is one of the most important cultural monuments in Bosnia and

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606 Ibid.
608 Borović, “Ministarstvo između križa i polumjeseca,” 27.
609 Ibid.
610 Ibid.
611 In Hamidović’s opinion, a reconstruction of the mosque to its pre-war appearance could have represented a means of countering the “ethnic cleanser’s” attempts to rewrite Bosnian history. Muhamed Hamidović, Interview by Azra Akšamija on 8 April 2009.
Herzegovina, a witness to the fact that Islam had arrived to this region much earlier than the Turks.\textsuperscript{612} With this contradictory declaration, Mehmedić also revealed his understanding of the mosque’s value not as a “seed of Islam” in Bosnia, but as a marker of a “native” Bosnian Islam which, in his understanding, started to prosper in the region even in the pre-Ottoman period.

At this point in 2004, the conflict had not been entirely resolved, but the \textit{jamaat} agreed to a compromise with the Federal Ministry, if the government would finance the demolition and reconstruction of the mosque and its minaret (estimated at ca. KM 2.5 million or $1.7 million), and provide a temporary prayer space while the construction was underway.\textsuperscript{613}

Nevertheless, a new quarrel broke out one year later when the newspapers announced the date for the minaret’s demolition. Provocatively, the date of 19 January 2005 coincided with the \textit{Day of Arafat}, one of the key concluding events of the \textit{Hajj} and a holiday of great importance for Muslims. \textit{Imam} Jusić thus felt that the very choice of the date one day before the \textit{Eid-al-Adha} was “a serious and rude provocation targeted against Muslims.”\textsuperscript{614} Unsurprisingly, when the demolition day finally arrived, several hundred people from Ustikolina and its surroundings gathered around the mosque, many of them ready to physically defend the minaret.\textsuperscript{615} Yet, the conflict never escalated, since no demolition occurred that day. In fact, the controversially high minaret in Ustikolina still remains in its place today.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{612} Borović, “Ministarstvo između križa i polumjeseca,” 27.
\textsuperscript{613} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{614} Begzudin ef. Jusić stated in Oslobodenje: “This move is a serious and rude provocation targeted against Muslims, especially because of its planned date and the forthcoming Eid-al-Adha...... This is when the Hajj pilgrims go to Mount Arafat and pray to Allah (p.b.u.h.), and others fast on this day, for it is a day before the sacrifice and the Eid-al-Adha. This is why we could not but understand this news as an attack on Muslims.” Anonymous, “Rušenje munare 19. januara?,” Oslobodenje, 8 January 2005, 7, translation by Azra Akšamija.
\end{footnotesize}
Though the various stages of the minaret conflict have been extensively covered in the media, a comprehensive examination of the mosque’s history, its repeated destruction, and the complex conditions that had led to the minaret’s exaggerated height have essentially been ignored. The culprits for the Turhan Emin-beg mosque’s demolition in 1992 have still not been captured nor held accountable for their actions. Until that happens, the deliberate and nationally-driven targeted destruction of the mosque of Ustikolina will remain filed under the vague category of collateral damage.

A more nuanced critique of the mosque’s rebuilding process might have helped avoid the effect of “equalizing of guilt” — an effect produced in biased media reports, in which the victims of “ethnic cleansing” were set on equal footing with nationalist extremists who had persecuted them. In fact, the emphasis in reports on the emotional aspects of the conflict conditioned the jamaat’s resistance to the authorities, consequently undermining the possibility for constructive dialogue and conflict resolution.

Less evident in this controversy is the fact that two very different problems were conflated into one. The first regards the country-wide trend in illegal construction of provocative religious and national symbols, particularly on sites of protected monuments. The Turhan Emin-beg mosque was “found guilty” of this trend based on the size of its new minaret. The second problem regards the diverging conceptions of a monument’s authenticity, which leads to different approaches to its architectural preservation. The informal renovation of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque by the town’s jamaat has been perceived as an inadequate form of restoration of a protected heritage monument. The conflation of these two issues has partly contributed to the escalation of the conflict surrounding the mosque, widening the gap between Muslims with different views of how their collective memory should be preserved. Addressing these two
problems separately in the next section of this chapter, I will examine the different meanings of the Ustikolina minaret, contextualizing it within the broader trend in Bosnian religious architecture to demarcate ethno-national territories, and interpreting it as a symbol of survival and of the return of refugees.

2. Reasserting presence, reclaiming territory

Why does a small town in rural Eastern Bosnia such as Ustikolina need such a tall minaret?

Considered from a more general perspective of architectural history, one traditional function of the minaret has been to provide an elevated place from which the adhan (the call to prayer), could be heard from afar. The height and appearance of the minaret, however, were not theologically determined; in fact, minaret design is mentioned neither in the Quran, nor in the Hadith (narrations about the deeds and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad). Historians of Islamic architecture, such as Jonathan M. Bloom, have traced the origins of the mosque and the adhan to the time of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century, showing that the minaret as a built structure did not exist during his lifetime, but was introduced almost a century later. Since its first appearance on the Great Mosque of Damascus in the early eighth century, the design of the minaret developed throughout the world in a wide range of typologies, styles, and regionally characteristic features. The world’s tallest minaret today can be found adjacent to the

Mosque of King Hassan II (1986-93) in Casablanca, Morocco, with its 210-meter apex visible from any point in the city. Analogous examples in other parts of the world point to the minaret’s primary function as a symbol of Islamic presence which for some people may be more important than the actual place of worship. In some places, however, Muslims have entirely given up on the minaret and use computers and cell phone adhan-alarms — electronic versions of the minaret — instead of the towers. The muezzin of the Turhan Emin-Beg mosque in Ustikolina relies on modern technology too: without having to strain his voice or climb up to one of the three balconies, he calls worshippers to prayer from several speakers attached to the minaret.617

Since religious and functional necessities were clearly not a determining factor behind this minaret’s design, the reasons for its exaggerated height should be sought in its symbolic function as a visual marker of Islamic presence and identity. The most obvious interpretation of the minaret’s appearance is related to the geo-political setting of the mosque, which sits on the Bosniak side of the border between the Bosniak-Croat Federation and the Serb Republic, where it flags the Federation’s territory. As a symbol of Bosniak ethnicity, the mosque also signals the Bosniaks’ presence in the Podrinje Canton, a peninsula of the Bosniak-Croat Federation, which is almost entirely surrounded by lands ceded to the Serb Republic at Dayton (Fig. 3.24).618 Given the gigantic size of the minaret and its location, the Turhan Emin-beg mosque does indeed take part in the country-wide trend for ethno-national demarcation of territories. Yet, if the extent of the war atrocities against both humans and cultural property in this region is taken into consideration, the architecture of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque can hardly be compared in intention to other controversial sites with provocative religious markers, such as the “Hill of

617 Such stereo-adhans are not unusual today; in fact, the advantages of modern technology have made minarets useful in many new ways – some, for example, generate revenue for their mosques by carrying telecom antennas.

618 The Podrinje Canton consists of the municipalities of Goražde, Pale-Prača, and Foča-Ustikolina.
Crosses” in Stolac or the bell-tower in Mostar. The minaret in Ustikolina, as I will argue below, stands for a symbolic reassertion of Muslims’ presence in Eastern Bosnia after a war in which this particular population was faced with nearly complete annihilation.

A symbol of survival

Though all ethnic groups suffered losses of human life and cultural heritage during the Bosnian war, the Muslim population of the municipalities of Srebrenica, Višegrad, and Foča were subject to some of the most horrific massacres, sexual abuse, and various forms of torture in the entire country. Among the smaller towns and villages in the municipality of Foča, Ustikolina counted the highest number of losses. Reportedly, one hundred and ninety-nine civilians were killed in the city and its surrounding villages in the period of 1992-1995; they were slaughtered, burned alive in their houses, or shot to death. Victims were chosen regardless of their gender, age, and occupation — the principal criterion was their non-Serb ethnicity. Most victims were brutally tortured before being killed. Many locals were also


621 Ibid.

622 Ibid. A local resident, Rasim Halilagić, explains that the particularly high number of victims in the region by the fact that many inhabitants did not leave their homes when the war started; they thought that they would not be harmed since they were neither involved in any political or military activity, nor could they have suspected that their neighbors would want to harm them. Rasim Halilagić, Foča 1992-1995: žrtve genocida (Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava Univerziteta u Sarajevu , 2008), 340.

623 Tafro and Macić, Genocid nad Bošnjacima, 149.
tortured and murdered in the concentration camp “Kazneno-popravni Dom” in Foća, which operated from 17 April 1992 until 10 October 1994.624

Aside from these human victims, assaults on the cities and villages of Eastern Bosnia were equally deliberate and systematic; over two-dozen mosques were razed to the ground in the district of Foća alone.625 Among the blown-up and bulldozed religious monuments was also the Aladža Mosque (1550/1), one of the most significant examples of sixteenth-century Ottoman architecture in the Balkans, whose foundations were even dug up and removed from the site as to ensure complete obliteration (Fig. 3.25).626 In fact, not a single Islamic religious monument remained in all of Foća — all of the city’s mosques were destroyed and their rubble removed to cover up the traces of previous Islamic presence in the region.

624 Forms of torture performed on Muslims in this concentration camp, as Preljub Tafro and Bećir Macić, researchers at the Institute for Research of Crimes against Humanity and International Law, record, included the use of prisoners as “living shields” in battlefields, forced labor, blood extraction, sending of prisoners into mine fields to “demine” them by stepping on the mines, throwing of bodies into the river Drina, beating during interrogations, and other forms of torment. Reportedly, 404 prisoners “disappeared” in the course of the prisoner exchange; their destiny remains unknown. Ibid., 11.

625 Andris Riedlmayer lists the following mosques in the district of Foća as completely or heavily damaged. In the city of Foća itself: Mosque of Atik Ali-Pasha (1546) and its Mekteb, Mosque of Dev Sulejman-beg (1663), Aladža Mosque (1550), Mosque of Kadi Osman-efendija (1593), Mosque of Ali Čehodarev (17c.), Emperor’s Mosque or Mosque of Sultan-Bajazit Veli (1501), Mosque of Mehemd-Pasha Kukavica (1751), Masjod of Hadži Mustafa (16th ct), Mosque of Deferdhar-Pasha (ca. 1569), Tabaka Mosque (16th ct), Tekke of Bajezid-baba (17th c.). In Višegrad: Mosque of Gazanfer-beg (1590), Emperor’s Mosque (1571). In other cities and villages of the Foća district: Mosque in jamaat Godijeno (20th c.), Mosque in Slatina (1484), Masjid in jamaat Borovnica (20th c.), Mesdžid in the village of Susješna (20th c.), Mosque and Mekteb in the village of Daničići (20th c.), Mosque at Izbišno (1908), Kratine Mosque (18th c.), Jeleč Mosque (1477), Mosque in Sadići (19th/20th c.), Mosque of Kodža Musa-Pasha in Višegrad (1609), Old Mosque at Jabuka (1576). Andris Riedlmayer, Database “The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1996. A Post-War Survey of Selected Municipalities,” (accessed on November 26, 2010).

626 Andris Riedlmayer notes that the Aladža Mosque was destroyed with explosives placed in its foundations in May 1992 and the site was bulldozed over in August of the same year. Subsequently, all rubble was removed and dumped into the nearby river. The mosque has still not been reconstructed. Riedlmayer also notes that the “Circular base of ablution fountain and scattered bits of smashed stone are all that remains on the mosque site. Site is being used as a parking lot for buses and is littered with rubbish. Imam’s house adjacent to mosque site burned out. Other houses in neighborhood appear to be intact.” Andrs Riedlmayer, Database “The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1996. A Post-War Survey of Selected Municipalities,” (entry “Aladža džamija in Foća,” accessed on November 26, 2010). For more information about the Aladža Mosque in Foća, including plans and photographs, see Andrej Andrejević, Aladža džamija u Foći (Beograd: Faculté de Philosophie, Institut d’histoire de l’art, 1972); Faruk Muftić. Ranjeni grad Foća: sve džamije su porašene (Sarajevo: Bosnački institut, 2003): 39-54.; Šemso Tucaković, Aladža džamija: fočanski biser (Sarajevo: El Kalem, 1991); Šemso Tucaković, Aladža džamija: ubijeni monument [Aladža Mosque: A Murdered Monument] (Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, 1998).
Beside the Turhan Emin-beg mosque, the list of destroyed Islamic monuments and institutions in Ustikolina included the building for religious instruction of children (mejtef), mausoleums (turbe), the ablution space (abdesthana), the mortuary (gasulhana), all administrative buildings of the Islamic Community, as well as all residencies of regional imams. In addition to the destruction of all Muslim homes in the city, numerous public buildings in the city were completely razed or heavily damaged, including the local school, the bank, the post office, the police station, the hospital, electrical stations, shops and restaurants, and the bridges over the river Drina (Fig. 3.26). The only building that remained intact after the war in Ustikolina was the Serb Orthodox Church.

Reconstructing the mosque after such a collective tragedy was certainly symbolic of survival: the rebuilt mosque and its minaret allowed the community to assert new material evidence of its continued existence. The minaret’s height, in this context, can be understood as an expression of the survivors’ defiance of the violence they suffered. Symbolically proportionate to the extent of war atrocities in Eastern Bosnia, the sixty meters-high minaret allowed the jamaat of Ustikolina to proclaim that it had survived, that it had returned, and that it was back to reclaim and rebuild its land and religion in spite of everything it had endured.

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627 Muftić, "Šher“– Ustikolina,” 211. Zukić notes that the imam’s apartment and the mekteb were heavily damaged from detonations caused by the explosion of the adjacent Turhan Emin-beg mosque. He also reports major destructions in the neighboring township of Jabuka, where the old stone mosque was razed down to its foundations, and the abdesthana, the imam’s apartment and the mekteb were also destroyed. In the village of Ilovača near Ustikolina, the mosque was damaged by artillery fire, but was not mined. The walls and the minaret were damaged, but remained standing. The mosque in the village of Rešetnica, also in the vicinity of Ustikolina, was damaged by a single shell to the minaret, but it was not entirely destroyed. Kemal Zukić, Slike Zlodina. Rusenje islamiskih objekata u BiH [The Evidence of Crime: The Destruction of Islamic Buildings in B&H] (Rijaset Sarajevo: Centar za Islamsku Arhitekturu, 2006), 56-57.

628 Muftić, "Šher“– Ustikolina,” 211.

629 Faruk Muftić, who visited the city shortly after the war, on 19 March 1996, reports that the church was still standing, but that there was no clergy in Ustikolina at the time. He also notes that all Bosniak houses were destroyed, and that the Serbs took down their own homes as they withdrew from Ustikolina, taking all the useable building material with them to Foča. Ibid., 212.
A symbol of return

The Turhan Emin-beg mosque also symbolizes the Bosniaks’ regaining of the city of Ustikolina, which, by the end of the war in 1995, was controlled by the Serb forces. As such, Ustikolina and other East Bosnian municipalities including Zvornik, Višegrad, and Foča were likely to become part of the Serb Republic after the end of the conflict (Fig. 3.27). The city of Ustikolina only became part of the Federation with the Dayton Peace Agreement, after which a small northern portion of the Foča Municipality was divided in two parts and annexed to the Bosniak-Croat Federation as the Canton of Foča-Ustikolina.\textsuperscript{630}

During the US-brokered negotiations in Dayton in 1995, one of the key territorial issues that needed to be resolved was how to connect Goražde, a city located halfway between Foča and Višegrad, and close to Ustikolina, to the rest of the Federation.\textsuperscript{631} Goražde was an isolated Bosnian stronghold, which, at the time of the Dayton peace negotiations, was entirely surrounded by the Serb forces (Fig. 3.27). A solution discussed in this regard was that Goražde would be accessed through a narrow land corridor, consisting of the federal road and a tiny stripe of land around it (Fig. 3.28). Negotiating for the Bosnian side, Haris Silajdžić, the Prime Minister at the time and member of the Bosnian delegation at Dayton, demanded a twenty-kilometer long stretch of land along the river Drina from the Serbian President Slobodan Milosević (Fig. 3.29). The political scientist Laura Silber and the BBC correspondent Allan Little recorded their give-and-take discussion:


\textsuperscript{631} Because it was well armed, this Bosnian enclave made it dangerous and difficult for Serbs to communicate between their two surrounding territories. Laura Silber and Allan Little note that “Serbs had identified Goražde as the link through which Sarajevo would forge a land-bridge to Sandžak, a Muslim-populated region of southern Serbia and Montenegro, and from there, to Turkey. The ‘green transversal’ as the ideologues of greater Serbia called it, would be the land link through which Muslims would push an Islamic arrowhead into the heart of Europe.” Laura Silber and Allan Little, \textit{Yugoslavia: death of a nation}. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 325.
There is a very old mosque there, the oldest in Bosnia, it's a symbol of the Bosnian presidency. Milošević said, 'But you know, the Serbs have destroyed it, those fools have destroyed it, so there is nothing there.'...[Silajdžić] said, there is sacred ground there.

Milošević's response, 'in a typical Belgrade slang: Daj bre Harise, isti si kao Karadžić!' ('Enough, Haris, you're just like Karadžić!).

Hence, the idea of a "sacred ground" in Ustikolina was officially articulated. Eventually, the city and its surrounding territory (the corridor via Grepko) did indeed become part of the Bosniak-Croat Federation when the Dayton Peace Accord was implemented (Fig. 3.30). Yet, before the city was handed over to the Federation authorities in the spring of 1996, the Serb forces plundered and destroyed all remaining structures in the city. Everything that could be removed from buildings — such as roof tiles, furniture, bathroom fixtures, fences, and even trees — was ripped out and taken away (Fig. 3.26). Faruk Muftić visited Ustikolina on 19 March 1996, right after the Serb forces' withdrawal; in his notebook, he noted a one-word impression of the city: "ghostly."

Remarkably, it was the "sacred ground" of the ancient mosque that became the first gathering point for the returning refugees. On 22 March 1996, only three days after the return to Ustikolina was possible, a large number of men congregated on the site (Fig. 3.31). The Friday Prayer (jummah or džuma), led by the Mufti of Goražde Hamed ef. Efendić, consisted of men standing side by side on the rubble of the mosque covered with blankets. Faruk Muftić recalls:

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632 Ibid., 375.
633 Muftić, "Đehar" – Ustikolina," 211.
634 Ibid., 213.
635 Ibid., 214.
Everyone wanted to take part in the Friday Prayer [...] right at the site of fire, at the very site of the oldest mosque in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bosniaks’ pride and joy, and the hope for a better future could be felt in the souls and hearts of everyone present.636

The feeling of pride and hope that the jamaat felt on this occasion highlights the symbolic aspect of communal prayer on the ruins of the mosque: worship was a proclamation of the community’s return.

In fact, it was the potential of the mosque to encourage the return of other dispersed Muslims to the region that may have further supported the Ustikolina jamaat’s decision to build a monumental minaret. One of Reis Cerić’s speeches supports this point: during his visit to the village of Kramer, near Rogatica, on 9 June 2006, he stressed the importance of refugee return to the Drina valley:

Does the importance of return to the Drina [valley] need to be explained to anyone? It seems that this still needs to be made clear to some: there is no bigger interest, no superior honor, no greater pride for every Muslim in Bosnia and Herzegovina than returning to his or her home and homeland, especially to East Bosnia and to the Drina valley. [...] the number of returnees to the Pordinje region and the Nereva valley is the lowest in the country, one could say, it is an embarrassment. The reasons for this are twofold: on the one hand, the state is too negligent or inefficient to secure their return; on the other, a strong initiative and will [to return] is lacking on the part of those who had been expelled or exiled from Drina or Neretva valleys.

For us Muslims, the return represents the main concern… to abandon Drina’s beauty is a sin. It is also a sin not to rebuild destroyed mosques, to abandon neglected cemeteries, to forget Foča and Čajniče. For this reason, and without our return to the Drina valley, our hearts and souls will not be able to rest in peace. Therefore, may Allah free

636 Ibid., 214. Translation by Azra Aksamija.
those who help the [refugees'] return to Drina from fear of evil people, may Allah help them fulfill their personal interests, and may this deed be their honor and pride wherever they are, as well as their salvation and reward in the afterlife.637

The promise of rewards in the afterlife notwithstanding, the return of refugees to Eastern and Northern Bosnia still proceeds at a very slow pace.638 Weak economy, destroyed public infrastructure, political and ethnic discrimination on the job market, presence of mine fields — all these obstacles make it very difficult for those who return to re-establish a basis for existential normalcy in their hometowns. For example, many years after the Bosniak refugees returned to the village of Kozluk, today part of the Serb Republic, they still find it nearly impossible to find work.639 In addition to the regional economy being generally very bad, the few functioning companies that operate in the region prefer to hire Serbs.640 Moreover, as the American journalist and aid worker Peter Lippman notes, “reconstruction of services such as roads and water supply to returned Bosniak settlements is a widespread problem, due to the apartheid-like conditions under which the majority of the returning population lives.”641 Managing to rebuild a mosque despite such difficult political and economic conditions indicates that the returnees have
nevertheless gained ground and established a financial base for permanent stay. In the intricate territorial context of the Pordinje Canton — an island of the Bosniak-Croat Federation almost entirely surrounded by the Serb Republic — the sixty meters-high minaret makes that island visible from a great distance, signaling that Muslims have indeed begun to return to the Serb-occupied formerly Muslim villages of the Drina valley.

3. **Inscribing territory, rewriting history**

The informal process of reconstruction of the Ustikolina mosque set the stage for a heated polemic between the proponents of professional versus informal approaches to architectural conservation that derived from their opposing views on the value of monuments. The first approach, promoted chiefly by academically-trained architectural conservationists, sees the value of a monument in its authenticity, described by Alois Riegl as the monument’s “historical value.” The second view, upheld by the majority of informal mosque builders across the country, recognizes the value of a monument in its “aged” state, which Riegl understood as its “age value,” and the anthropologist William Lipe described as the “associative” or “symbolic value.”

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642 In his seminal work “The Modern Cult of Monuments,” “It is probably fair to say that ruins appear more picturesque the more advanced their state of decay: as decay progresses, age-value becomes less extensive, that is to say, evoked less and less by fewer and fewer remains, but is therefore all the more intensive in its impact on the beholder... From the standpoint of age-value, one need not worry about the eternal preservation of monuments... Age-value manifests itself immediately through visual perception and appeals directly to our emotions.” Ibid., 32-33; William D. Lipe, “Value and Meaning in Cultural Resources,” in *Approaches to the Archaeological Heritage: A Comparative Study of World Cultural Resource Management Systems*, ed. Henry Cleere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 4-6.

According to Riegl, underlying “historical value” is the need “to maintain as genuine as possible a document for future art-historical research.”\textsuperscript{644} Such an understanding of a monument’s value provides the basis for the “purist” approach to architectural conservation, to borrow the term used by the architectural conservationist Pamela Jerome.\textsuperscript{645} This approach insists on incorporating original fragments into the restored monument, as in the case of the ongoing restoration of the Ferhadija Mosque (The Mosque of Ferhad Pasha Sokolović from 1579) in Banja Luka.\textsuperscript{646} This mosque was razed to the ground by the Serb military forces on 6 May 1993, and its rubble removed from the site and scattered around the different dumping grounds around the city. The restoration team is currently going through the laborious and costly process of digging up the stones of several mosques from various garbage dumps in Banja Luka, buried under mounds of trash that have piled up there over the course of the past ten years.\textsuperscript{647} The stones of sixteen different mosques are separated and, once identified, scanned and incorporated into digital models. It is thanks to this three-dimensional puzzle of fragments that the Ferhadija Mosque will be rebuilt true to its original.


\textsuperscript{647} Muhamed Hamidović, Interview by Azra Akšamija on 8 April 2009.
Clearly, this type of restoration cannot be applied to every single destroyed monument in Bosnia; only those recognized as significant based on their historic and artistic value get the attention of professional conservators. The Turhan Emin-beg mosque is one of those monuments, with its Rieglian “historical value” preserved only in the form of its broken stones. For this reason, architectural conservators who were initially involved in its rebuilding emphasized the need for the recovery of the original stones that, in their view, would have given the “historical value” back to the entire new monument. Perhaps because it was unclear whether those stones had ever been part of the ancient mosque erected in the fifteenth century — after all, the pre-war Turhan Emin-beg mosque had been destroyed and rebuilt many times throughout its history — the jamaat members did not consider them to be the primary depository of the monument’s value. Insisting that the jaamat was in need of a place of worship, and not of a monument, the builders in Ustikolina valued the “use” and the “age value” of the mosque above all else.

In the end, it was this preference for the “use” and the “age values” instead of the “historic value” that pushed through the informal rebuilding of the mosque. The same attitude also explains the post-war reuse of the mosque’s “protected” remains: when the jamaat began reconstructing the mosque on its own, some community members appropriated some of its rubble for the rebuilding of their houses and gardens. More recently, another violation of the monument’s protected status has proceeded without consequences: the French SFOR reused some of the mosque’s original stones for the construction of a local road and a bridge. 

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All of these actions indicate these builders’ perception of a monument as a moldable manifestation of its history, implying moreover an understanding of its shifting authenticity.\textsuperscript{650} This dynamic conception provides the basis for what the Nara Document on Authenticity (1994) recognized as the “progressive authenticity” approach to preservation.\textsuperscript{651} Such an approach can be found, for example, in the reconstruction of Shinto shrines in Japan, where authenticity is seen to reside in the building tradition, not in the building material. Temple buildings at the Ise Grand Shrine, for instance, are dismantled and reconstructed every twenty years to underscore the metaphysical notions of death and regeneration in nature. As old materials are replaced with new ones, traditional building techniques are passed on from one generation to the next. It is precisely this dynamic preservation of an ancient building tradition that allows these shrines to be valued for their authenticity.\textsuperscript{652} Indeed, such “progressively authentistic” approach to conservation allows for an appreciation of monuments as simultaneously old and new: the monuments’ “age” or “symbolic” value can be recovered regardless of the use of original materials or building techniques.

Unlike the Shinto shrines where dismantling and reconstruction perpetuate the same look of the new/old monument, mosques in Bosnia often change their appearances dramatically due to restoration. While the primary concern of the Ustikolina’s jamaat was to reclaim the symbolic value of the monument as the oldest mosque in the country, this value was understood to be linked not to the mosque’s ancient stones but to the location of the original edifice. Such value

\textsuperscript{650} Ibid., 4.

\textsuperscript{651} Ibid. The Nara Document on Authenticity, produced at the conference organized in 1994 by the Government of Japan and the International Council on Monuments and Sites, together with the World Heritage Committee, acknowledges the diverging conceptions of authenticity in different cultures.

of the site as the primary carrier of a monument’s “symbolic” and “age value” is not unique to the case of Ustikolina: many *jamaats* across the country share the same views in this regard. For this reason, informal mosque builders do not hesitate to tear down ancient mosques and replace them with new ones, even when they are only slightly damaged and can be repaired easily. Since site is the primary carrier of “symbolic” and the “age value,” the actual age of a monument is not central — regardless of their being old or new, monuments symbolically embody significant historical moments of a particular site. Tellingly, mosque foundation dates recorded in the Rijaset’s official documentation are always based on the year of the initial construction, even for mosques that were subsequently destroyed or rebuilt.653

In sum, the process of post-war renovation of religious architecture in Bosnia and Herzegovina reveals two competing approaches that diverge in their perception of monuments as either fixed or alternatively dynamic records of history. As suggested earlier, the “purist” approach to conservation favors the reconstruction of monuments as faithfully as possible to their pre-war condition. This approach is based on the appreciation of the monuments’ “historic” value. Pre-war mosques are thereby understood as records of a linear history, whose key moments can be recovered through the reconstruction of their material and stylistic characteristics. Conversely, the “progressive authenticity” approach is not dependent on reconstructing monuments to their pre-war condition, but rather on bringing them to a different ideal state — one that enhances the monument’s “age value” or its symbolic significance. Considering the site as the primary carrier of a monument’s meaning, the role of mosque architecture in this instance is to make evident and to enhance the site’s “age” and symbolic values. Mosques are thus understood as tools for writing and rewriting history. Subsequently,

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653 Mosque Data sheets at the Center for Islamic Architecture, Rijaset, Sarajevo.
changing the design of a mosque during rebuilding or renovation allows not only for recreation of history, but also for its reinvention.

Changes in the design of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque, I would thus like to argue, are a result of a selective design process in which builders themselves determined what was authentic to their own culture and tradition. The political theorist Anthony Smith, as described in the first chapter, calls such a selective process “purification of culture.” The next section will explore how the new Turhan Emin-beg mosque came to represent the Ustikolina jamaat’s vision of the purified Bosniak culture. I will argue that the changes to the mosque’s original design allowed its builders to revise and authenticate their collective memories in order to promote a sense of cultural distinctiveness and national unity.

654 Smith, “Culture, Community and Territory,” 449-451; Smith, Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism, 94-97.
Like mosques in other towns, the Turhan Emin-beg mosque in Ustikolina represents a repository of the local community’s shared memory and culture. As such, it incorporates the its common myths and histories and relates those to a specific territory. Simultaneously, the mosque stands for the community’s unique religious identity.655 Indeed, the first and foremost marker of distinctiveness between Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats is religion: as expressed though the architecture of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque, Islam is established as the Bosniaks’ ethnic base in the region, apart from the Serbs and the Croats. As a prototypical form of a specifically “Islamic” edifice, the mosque signals the religious affiliation of the jamaat members and their belonging to the Bosniak nation.

The second marker of distinctiveness among the different ethnic groups in the region is their cultural uniqueness, which is visually accentuated through an authentication of vernacular forms. In this sense, stylistic changes introduced to the design of the rebuilt Turhan Emin-beg mosque signal the jamaat’s understanding of Bosniaks’ authenticity as rooted in both local and imperial Ottoman traditions. As noted earlier in this chapter, the new mosque remained relatively similar to the previous structure, except that the entrance area with a portico (sofe) was walled up and transformed into a closed two-story foyer.656 Nevertheless, the overall size and appearance of the mosque remained true to the typology of Bosnian vernacular mosque

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656 The closing of the portico is a general trend in post-war renovations of mosques. Many communities find it more practical to have the portico transformed into a closed foyer, which allows for this space to be used as an extended prayer area throughout the year. Black marble tiles chosen for the floors in the portico area may have seemed especially luxurious to the builders, yet without a floor heating this floor is too cold for a longer sitting. The entrance foyer of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque is used for prayer only on special occasions.
architecture, characterized by modestly sized single or two-story buildings with a rectangular base and a hipped roof, as discussed in the first chapter. Stylistically related to local residential architecture, the Turhan Emin-beg mosque blends into the surrounding neighborhood and as such it is immediately recognizable as a typical vernacular mahala mosque. 657

The design of the minaret, by contrast, represents a much more poignant deviation from the vernacular building tradition. While the minarets of neighborhood mosques were traditionally built in wood or stone with a single balcony, the overall height of the post-war minaret in Ustikolina represents an unprecedented novelty in Bosnian mosque architecture. 658 Its height was made possible through the application of new structural methods, such as the use of prefabricated elements and the incorporation of steel spiral stairs, a light-weight structural element in the minaret’s interior, which replaced the heavy stone stairs characteristic of Ottoman minarets. The non-traditional mode of construction, in turn, allowed the minaret to remain remarkably slender, despite its exaggerated height.

The crowning of the minaret with three balconies (šerefe) represents yet another novelty in Bosnian mosque architecture. The Üç Serefeli Camii (“Three Balcony Mosque”) in Edirne, one of the most prominent fifteenth-century Ottoman mosques, was one possible historical model for this innovation. Built under Sultan Murat II between 1438 and 1447 (notably, the Turhan Emin-beg mosque dates from the same period), the Üç Serefeli Camii was the first

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657 For more information on the local mahala-type mosques, see Bećirbegović, “Džamije sa drvenom munarom.”

658 Before the 1990s war, there were the following types of minarets: 1. Small wooden minarets, protruding from the roof, typically attached to small vernacular mahala mosques; 2. Stone minarets cylindrical in shape with a single balcony (šerefe), usually attached to larger mosques in cities; and 3. square or rectangle-based minarets, which evolved in imitation of church bell towers, and were often found in Herzegovina (i.e. village mosques of Predojevic-Bileca, Plana, Dabriva, Bijeljani, Kotezi, etc.). Amir Pašić, Islamic Architecture in Yugoslavia. (Mostar: [A. Pašić], 1990), 116-118. The concrete and ready-made minarets had already been introduced to this formal repertoire in the Yugoslav period. The forms and heights of such concrete minarets, however, remained close to those of their Ottoman predecessors.
Ottoman mosque with multiple balconies on a single minaret (Fig. 3.32). However, some of the creators of the Ustikolina minaret explained that they were not aware of this particular monument, but were trying to emulate the monumentality of other well-known Ottoman monuments from the classical period, such as the Selimiye (1568-1574) or the Süleymaniye (1550-1558) mosques (Fig. 3.33).

Regardless of its specific model, the design of Ustikolina’s pencil-shaped slender minaret with three balconies establishes a stylistic link with the imperial Ottoman past. While monumentality was obviously important to the mosque builders in Ustikolina, the new Turhan Emin-beg minaret was not modeled after the principal mosques in Bosnia itself; instead, it looked to the royal mosques built during the golden age of the Ottoman Empire in its capital cities such as in Istanbul and Edirne. These stylistic references on the minaret thus symbolically anchored the origins of Bosniak national identity in the Ottoman imperial past. At the same time, the design of the building itself remained identifiable as that of a typical mahala mosque, communicating the local rootedness and uniqueness of the Bosniak culture.

The new architecture of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque demonstrates how the process of post-war renovation can give the individual jamaats in Bosnia an opportunity to question, trace, and recreate the memories of their ethnic past and its key moments through religious architecture. Vernacular mosques, in this context, are simultaneously a subject of and a medium for ethno-national authentication. Yet, to become national, as Antony Smith argues, these shared memories need to become attached to a specific territory.

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660 Safet Jahić, Interview by Azra Akšamija on April 9, 2009.

661 Anthony D. Smith, “Culture, Community and Territory,” 453.
The process by which certain kinds of shared memories are attached to particular territories so that the former become ethnic landscapes (or ethnoscapes) and the latter become historic homelands, can be called “territorialization of memory.”

The next section will explore the ways in which the Turhan Emin-beg mosque contributes to the territorialization of the Bosniaks’ collective memory in the hard-fought border zone around the river Drina. By linking an authenticated vernacular identity to this region, the Turhan Emin-beg mosque, I will argue, designates the Drina valley as the Bosniaks’ historic homeland.

**The Drina valley as the Bosniaks’ historic homeland**

Just as any other religious edifice in the country, the Turhan Emin-beg mosque is a monument that encapsulates the shared memory and culture of the Bosnian Muslims and links them to a specific territory. To understand how the Turhan Emin-beg mosque designates the Drina valley as the Bosniak’s historic homeland, it is imperative to consider what types of collective memories are associated with this region.

Between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries, the Drina valley suffered repeated attacks of bandits (*hajduks*) and raiders from Serbia and Montenegro. In this period, as Faruk Muftić explains, Muslim villages around Foča were frequently plundered by Montenegrin outlaws. In 1663-64, for example, the notorious Bajo Pivljanin invaded the villages of Grdjevići and Kunovo, killing numerous inhabitants and burning down both villages’

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662 Ibid., 453-454.
mosques. The same villages were attacked and plundered again in 1711 by another Montenegrin hajduk, Mija Radović. Several Muslims were killed, while both newly rebuilt mosques were burned down again. As a result, the Muslim population started withdrawing from the region following the third assault on the same villages in 1861 by yet another Montenegrin hajduk, Novica Cerović. In 1875, Montenegrin bandits penetrated into the region closer to Foća, raiding the villages of Šadići, Igoče, Izbišno, Popov Most, Rataj and Jeleč, plundering and burning down everything they encountered, including the local mosques. The memories of these frequent attacks in the region during the second half of the nineteenth century still survive in the sayings of the local population, who refer to this period as “the time when Župa was burning.”

At the very beginning of the First World War, the region of Foća became a war zone. The 1914 Serbian and Montenegrin military offensive on south-eastern Bosnia, caused the Bosnian Muslim population from the areas of Foća, Čajniče, Višegrad and Rogatica to flee en masse. At this point, and throughout the First World War, several Islamic religious sites were destroyed, such as the seventeen-century Naqshbandi Tekke of Bayezid Baba (Naksibendijska

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664 Ibid. Some of the mosques were later destroyed several times. The mosque in Šadići, for example, was rebuilt in 1929-30, and was plundered and burned down in Second World War, again by the Četniks. Muftić, Ranjeni grad Foća, 106-107. The Sinan-beg’s mosque (1477) in Jeleč was destroyed in 1875, then built anew in 1920, then destroyed again in 1941, repaired in 1961, and finally burned down and mined in 1992. Muftić, Ranjeni grad Foća, 96-103.

665 Muftić, Foća 1470-1996, 35.

666 Ibid.

667 Ibid.

668 The specific event referred to here is the raid of Župa and other villages around Višegrad by the Serbian komite in 1876, recorded in the interviews led by Ibrahim Hodžić, an imam from Godomilje (near Rogatica), with the elderly local inhabitants. Ibrahim Hodžić himself lived through a horrific tragedy of having most of his family killed by the Četniks in Second World War. Ibrahim Hodžić, Četnicaesto stoljeće: stradanja Muslimana u rogatičkom kraju u Drugom svjetskom ratu. [The Fourteenth Century: Suffering of Muslims in Rogatica Region in the Second World War.] (Visoko: Uduženje uleme u Bosni i Hercegovini El-Hidaje, 1996), 28-29.

669 Ilijas Hadžibegović, Bosanskohercegovački Gradovi na razmeđu 19. i 20. stoljeća. [Bosnia and Hercegovina's Cities between the 19th to 20th Centuries] (Sarajevo: Institut za Istoriju u Sarajevu, 2004), 126-127.
Tekija, 17th ct.) in Foča, the mosques in villages of Igoće and Jeleč, the mausoleum (turbe) in the village of Rataji, and other significant monuments. An especially tragic time for the Muslims of the Drina valley was the beginning of the Second World War. Tens of thousands of people were persecuted by Draža Mihajlović’s Serb nationalist Četnik militia because they lived on a territory that Mihajlović had envisioned as an integral part of a Greater Serbia. In fact, the elimination of Muslims from these areas, as historians Smail Čekić, Šemso Tuckanović, Vladimir Dedijer and Antun Miletić point out, was part of the Četnik’s strategic program for the creation of an ethnically homogenous Greater Serbia populated exclusively by Serbs.

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670 The tekke was destroyed again in Second World War. Muftić, Ranjeni grad Foča, 19, 20, 122, 123.


672 Čekić, Agresija na Bosnu i genocid nad Bošnjacima, 18. Noel Malcolm argues that there is no definitive evidence that Mihajlović ever explicitly called for ethnic cleansing. Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 179. Smail Čekić, however, mentions the Četnik program of Draža Mihajlović from September 1941, which includes objectives such as defining the Serbian land and making it exclusively populated by Serbs. Special emphasis is placed on the “cleansing” of cities and their populating with the new Serbian population. Čekić also mentions different goals in Draža Mihajlović’s “Instruction” from 20 Dec. 1941:1. Making of the Greater Yugoslavia, and within it ethnically clean Greater Serbia within borders of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Srem, Banat and Bačka; 2. Cleansing of that territory of all ethnic and national minorities; 3. Ethnic cleansing of Bosnia-Herzegovina of Muslims and Croats, 4. Cleansing of Kosovo from Albanians, 5. Settling of the cleansed areas with population from Montenegro, etc. Čekić, Agresija na Bosnu i genocid nad Bošnjacima, 11. For a full copy of this document, see Tucaković, Srpski zločini nad Bošnjacima-Muslimanim 1941-1945, 188-192.

Concrete plans for the realization of this scheme were spelled out in the writings of the leading Četnik ideologists, Stevan Moljević and Draža Mihajlović.\footnote{In his text "Homogena Srbija" ("Homogenous Serbia") from 1941, for example, Moljević writes that the country needed to be "cleansed of all non-Serb elements," which was to be achieved through death-penalties or forced expulsion of Muslims to Turkey or Albania. Mustafa Imamović, \textit{Historija Bošnjaka} (Sarajevo: BZK Preporod, 2006), 537. The "Muslim question," according to Mihajlović, was a "particularly difficult problem" which was to be "resolved" through the creation of an ethnically homogenous Serbia. Cited in Tucaković, \textit{Srpski zločini nad Bošnjacima-Muslimanima 1941-1945}, 188. According to Tucaković, Stevan Moljević was born 1883 in Rudo. He was a lawyer and president of the Serbian Cultural Club in Banja Luka. He was also member of the Četnik political leadership and vice-president of the Central National Committee from June 1944 until May 1945. During Second World War, Moljević was active in realization of the Greater Serbian platform and in the extermination of Muslims. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison after Second World War, but was released after only a few years of serving the sentence. Tucaković, \textit{Srpski zločini nad Bošnjacima-Muslimanima 1941-1945}, 10. On 20 December 1941, Mihajlović issued an additional "Instruction" document directed to the major Dorde Lašić, commander of Četnik units in Montenegro, and to the captain Pavle Đurišić, commander of the Yugoslav Army's units from Lim. He emphasized the different goals of the Četnik movement, such as creation of the Greater Yugoslavia, and within it, an ethnically pure Greater Serbia within the borders of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srem, Banat and Bačka; the cleansing of the country's territory of all ethnic and national minorities; ethnic cleansing of Sandžak of Muslims and of Bosnia and Herzegovina of Muslims and Croats; ethnic cleansing of Kosovo from Albanians; populating of the "cleansed" areas with Montenegrin families, etc. Cited in Tucaković, \textit{Srpski zločini nad Bošnjacima-Muslimanima 1941-1945}, 189-192.} Moljević’s and Mihajlović’s vision was gradually implemented from August 1941 until the end of 1943 when, as Smail Čekić estimates, between 19,200 and 27,700 local Muslims had been killed.\footnote{Čekić, \textit{Agresija na Bosnu i genocid nad Bošnjacima}, 20. While the exact number of victims will probably never be determined, the historian Mustafa Imamović estimates the total number of Muslim victims in Second World War at 103,000. Imamović, \textit{Historija Bošnjaka}, 537.} The majority of the victims were women and children.\footnote{These numbers are an estimate of the historian Smail Čekić, Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences and Director of the Institute for Research of Crimes Against Humanity and International Law of University of Sarajevo. Čekić, \textit{Agresija na Bosnu i genocid nad Bošnjacima}, 20.} Čekić shows that the Četniks attacked Eastern Bosnia in three major phases, subjecting the Muslim population there to murder, torture, and rape.\footnote{Women and girls were often raped in front of their families, husbands, fathers, and children, and then killed. Ibid., 21.} The first set of raids took place between June 1941 and February 1942. At this point, approximately 8,000 Muslims from the areas of Foča, Goražde, and Višegrad, were killed.\footnote{Most of the killing occurred after the Italian agreement with the Četniks in December 1941. Ibid., 18.} The massacres usually took place at night and on the five bridges over the river Drina; the victims were chained together in groups, slaughtered with butcher knives, and then —
whether dead or still alive — thrown into the river.\textsuperscript{679} The second series of attacks took place from February until the end of 1942, with 3,500 to 5,000 Muslims murdered. The heaviest massacres occurred in the areas of Foča, Ustikolina, and Jahorina where, in August 1942, the Četniks slaughtered between 2,000 and 3,500 Muslims.\textsuperscript{680} The final wave of raids against the Muslim population took place at the beginning of 1943.\textsuperscript{681}

In all three phases of the genocide, numerous mosques were plundered, damaged, or burned down, including the mosques in the villages of Šahbegovići-Sokolac, Foča-Izbišno, Rudo-Sokolovići, and Novoseoci-Sokolac.\textsuperscript{682} The Turhan Emin-beg mosque in Ustikolina was also burned down, while the Aladža mosque in Foča was looted and heavily damaged by the local and Montenegrin Četniks, only to be used for horse stables by the Italian occupation forces.\textsuperscript{683} The Italians, moreover, converted the Atik Ali-pasha’s (Musluk) mosque in Foča (1546) into a Catholic church.\textsuperscript{684} The memory of these Second World War atrocities in Eastern Bosnia was still very much alive among the elderly survivors of the massacres when the pattern of violence repeated itself in the early 1990s on an even greater scale of systematic exterminations of the local people and this time the destruction of all of their mosques.\textsuperscript{685}

\textsuperscript{679} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{680} Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{681} Imamović, \textit{Historija Bošnjaka}, 538-539. Most of the crimes were committed in Eastern Bosnia and Sandžak. Čekić, \textit{Agresija na Bosnu i genocid nad Bošnjacima}, 18.
\textsuperscript{682} Mosque Data sheets at the Center for Islamic Architecture, Rijaset, Sarajevo.
\textsuperscript{683} Muftić, \textit{Foča 1470 – 1996}, 133.
\textsuperscript{684} Tucaković notes that a large cross was erected at the entrance to the mosque; also, paintings of St. Catherine of Siena and St. Saint Francis of Assisi were placed on both sides of the mihrab. The mosque’s minbar was cut into pieces and buried under ground. Tucaković, \textit{Srpski zločini nad Bošnjacima-Muslimanima 1941-1945}, 128.
\textsuperscript{685} Preljub Tafro and Bećir Macić, \textit{Genocid nad Bošnjacima na području Općine Foča 1992.-199XXX: prilog utvrđivanju žrtava} (Sarajevo: Institut za istraživanje zločina protiv čovječnosti i međunarodnog prava, 2004), 412. During these attacks, Ustikolina also provided shelter to many refugees from other neighboring villages. For more details about the genocide in Bosnia see: Samantha Power, \textit{“A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide} (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Allen, \textit{Rape warfare}; Smail Čekić, Muhamet Kreso, and Bećir Macić, eds., \textit{Genocide in Srebrenica, United Nations “safe Area”, in July 1995} (Sarajevo: Institute for the Research Crimes Against Humanity and International Law, 2001); Grace Halsell, \textit{“A Genocide of Muslims: Bosnia and Beyond,” The
As the oldest mosque in the country, the Turhan Emin-beg mosque is a silent witness to a tragic history of Eastern Bosnian Muslims. Its repeated destruction and rebuilding have come to symbolically represent the destinies of other jamaat s in Eastern Bosnia and their common suffering during the past wars. The newly resurrected Turhan Emin-beg mosque and its minaret symbolically defy the violence that the Muslims in the region have had to endure since the mid-seventeenth century. The act of the mosque’s rebuilding can be interpreted as an attempt to reassure the Muslims of Eastern Bosnia of the community’s ongoing presence in the region despite the ongoing threats to its survival over the course of its history. Reis Mustafa ef. Cerić emphasized this particular point in his speech at the inauguration of the new Turhan Emin-beg mosque quoted at the beginning of this chapter.\textsuperscript{686} His comparison of the mosque’s foundations to the nation’s “roots” — roots from which the Bosniaks’ “homeland,” “faith,” “honor,” and “pride” grow — suggests that the Turhan Emin-beg mosque is seen to symbolically embody the Bosniak nation.

In fact, implied in Cerić’s speech is the idea that the repeated acts of rebuilding of the mosque stand for the repeated acts of reconstitution of the Bosniak nation, The Turhan Emin-beg mosque, whose tall minaret reflects the growing national pride of Bosniaks, has become a symbol of identity that is linked to certain moments in the nation’s history — that is, to the moments of suffering. Notwithstanding the fact that the three ethno-national groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina — the Bosniaks, the Serbs, and the Croats — had also lived together peacefully for centuries, it is the history of torment and struggle for identity that is emphasized today as a way of increasing the political significance of the historic site of the oldest mosque in Bosnia.

\textsuperscript{686} Bajramović, “Reis Cerić: Ovdje su nasi korijeni koji nas čine onim sto mi jesmo,” 8.
The Turhan Emin-beg mosque has in fact become one of the key “sacred sites” for the creation of the Bosniak national narrative.

The mosque’s site gains additional meaning though yet another set of memories related to the two previously mentioned framers of Bosniak national identity: the glorious imperial Ottoman past, which forms the backbone of the nation’s “golden age,” and the religion of Islam, with the idea that the first mosque was the seed for its spread throughout the region. Significantly, Ustikolina’s mosque is located on the left bank of the river Drina, approximately twenty-two kilometers south of Goražde, in a setting known as the historical boundary between Bosnia and Serbia, and as the crossroads between the East and the West.687 For the Bosniak national history, the site is particularly important as a place of national origins: it is widely believed that the Sultan Mehmed Fatih crossed the river Drina in 1459 right in Ustikolina.688 According to oral tradition, janissaries welcomed him by building a small wooden mosque — reportedly, this mosque was the one later rebuilt and enlarged by Turhan Emin-beg, after whom it was eventually named.689 Another tale has it that it was in this area that the Ottoman army had slain the local army, clearing the path for its penetration into the territory of Bosnia.690 According to Zarzycki, the numerous tombstones at the Presjeka cemetery that date from this period attest to this historic battle (Presjeka comes from the verb “presjeći,” which in Bosnian means “to interrupt,” or “to cut”).691 Regardless of the exact historical occurrences, both tales

688 Muftić notes that the sultan came from the place called Cviline, on the right bank of the river Drina. Muftić, “Šeher” – Ustikolina”, 224.
689 Ibid.
690 Zarzycki, “Varošica Ustikolina,” 212.
691 Ibid.
reveal the widespread belief that it was in Ustikolina that the Ottoman Empire and the religion of Islam symbolically “entered” Bosnia.

Conclusion

By signaling the presence of Muslims in the region, the Turhan Emin-beg mosque takes part in the countrywide trend to express ethno-national territorial claims through monumentalized architectural forms. The highly assertive form of the minaret represents one of the many signifiers Muslims have chosen to signal their survival after the war and encourage further return of refugees to Eastern Bosnia. The rebuilt mosque, in this context, represents a bottom-up instrument in the hands of the local jamaat — an instrument that challenges the unfavorable post-war political and demographic landscape.

At the same time, changes introduced to the design of the mosque during its reconstruction reveal an attempt on the part of the jamaat to authenticate its collective memory in order to propose its own vision of the Bosniak ethnic and national identity. The resulting design of the mosque underpins the wider process of determining what is unique to Bosniak culture and signals the cultural rootedness of the Bosniak nation though a hybridizing of the vernacular and the imperial Ottoman building traditions.

The effect of this revision of collective memory is twofold. Stylistic references introduced to the new design have allowed for a rediscovery and reappropriation of an ethnic past. This newly authenticated history gains new meanings though its physical association with the Drina valley. The linking of an authenticated vernacular religious architecture with the history of violence in the Drina valley designates this region as the Bosniaks’ historic homeland
the Turhan Emin-beg mosque was resurrected from this blood-soaked historic homeland, the
"sacred ground" where Islam had first arrived to Bosnia, as the new/old ethnic body of the
Bosniak nation.
CHAPTER FOUR — THE GLOBAL SCALE

Imperial Imagineries:

Tracing Global and Supra-national Islamic Networks in Bosnia

Once we donate the money, why shouldn’t we give an idea about how the mosque should look? 692

— Walid al-Omran, Supervisor of the social programs, the Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo and Chechnya, 2001

For more than four centuries Gazi Hustrev-beg’s Mosque (1531) in Sarajevo was the largest and surely the most important mosque in Bosnia (Fig.4.1). 693 Set at the very heart of Old Town (Baščaršija), the mosque gave the impetus to the development of the city around it.

However, the status of the mosque in the city has diminished since the war’s end in 1996, for in the post-war period, new colossal mosques were erected in the western part of the city, funded

693 The mosque was founded by Gazi Hustrev-beg (1480 – 1541), a Bosnian Muslim, on his mother’s side grandson of Sultan Bayezid II, who served as governor of Bosnia from 1521 until 1541, and endowed the largest of all foundations in the province, expanding the mission of Ottoman Sarajevo’s founder Isa-beg Isaković. Gazi Hustrev-beg’s awqaq comprised over two hundred buildings, including a library, a covered bazaar (bezistan), soup kitchen (imaret), mekteb, several hostels (hanovi and musafirhane), a Sufi hospice (hanikah), a public bath (hamam), and numerous mosques and other buildings in the city, while the Mosque Complex in Sarajevo (1531) included the Kuršumlija Madrasa (1537). For more information on the buildings of the Gazi Hustrev-beg’s awqaq see, for example: Mate Bajlon, Arhitektonske osobine glavnih Gazi Hustrevbegovih građevina.Spomenici Gazi Husrevbegove četristogodišnjice. [Architectural Features of the Gazi Hustrevbeg’s Main Buildings. Monuments of the 400th Jubilee of Gazi Husrevbeg] (Sarajevo, 1932); Nihad H Čengić, Begova džamija kao djelo umjetnosti: Estetska metamorfoza kroz stoljeća i posljednje konzervacije originaliteta (Sarajevo: Sarajevo publishing, 2008).
by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Indonesia. The most prominent among them, and not incidentally, now the largest mosque in the Balkans, is the King Fahd Mosque, which opened together with the “King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud” Cultural Center in 2000 (Fig.4.2). This marble-clad mega-mosque, with an enormous Ottoman-style dome and two 49m-high minarets, is a striking representation of pan-Islamic ambition in Bosnia.

In conformity to its official mission statement, which proclaims the need to promote the intercultural exchange between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Bosnia, the King Fahd mosque complex offers a wide range of educational and cultural programs and events. Yet despite these socially beneficial services that are in principle open to all Bosnian citizens, the King Fahd Mosque has staked its claim on the psychogeographic landscape as a symbol of Wahhabism and other radical neo-fundamentalist interpretations of Islam. The humanitarian and missionary activities of Saudi Arabia and of a number of other Islamic countries that have struck roots in Bosnia since the 1990s war have contributed to a politicization of the Islamic religious identity.

This chapter examines the dynamic of change in local identity in post-war Bosnia as seen through the lens of global relationships. Multiple causal factors will come under our purview, in particular the rise of globalization which facilitated, through new, globally encircling communications networks, the transformation of transnational Islamic networks — grounded, however, in funding that has its source in the “old” economy of primary products, notably petroleum. The aim of the chapter is to capture the reach of global Islam though an examination of selected mosques in Sarajevo and in other large cities, taking these structures, in their entirety (their sponsorship, siting, architecture and use) as nodes within which the Bosnian Islamic identity has been variously challenged and revived.
The chapter is divided into two parts. I begin by examining the involvement of different global and supra-national Islamic actors and networks in post-war Bosnia. Mosque building has traditionally been one of the objectives of international Islamic organizations, such as the Muslim World League, which began a concerted effort in the seventies to build mosques in Europe for Europe’s Muslim guest workers, and which has heavily promoted mosque building programs in the post-Communist world wherever there are concentrations of Muslims (as, for instance, in the Crimea). Mosques play a vital role as a mediator of its patrons’ ideological and sectarian agendas, facilitating their missionary programs, while representing their religious ideas and cultural identities to people in Bosnia, Europe and the world at large.

The influence of the Saudi Arabian network will be at the center of this part of my chapter, since the Kingdom has been the most prominent sponsor of mosque renovation and construction in post-war Bosnia. I will argue that the Kingdom’s humanitarian activities have had a dual effect on local Islamic tradition. On the one hand, the funds that it provides for the establishment of numerous programs and facilities for the Islamic community fostered that community’s revival after the war. But the humanitarian appearance covers its missionary agenda, for on the other hand, just as in many other places around the world in which a vulnerable Muslim community is in particular need of sponsors, the Gulf-Arab sponsors have an agenda, planting the seed for development of Wahhabi and other radical fundamentalist Islamic communities in Bosnia, which have become ideological rivals to the traditional Sunni Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence previously dominant in Bosnia. Thus, these charities function as

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much to supplant older forms of Islamic religious practice with favored new ones as to provide
religious infrastructure for a previously oppressed Islamic community, and in this respect it
presents a new kind of challenge to the moderate Bosnian Islam leadership.

After exploring the effects of this new supra-national player in the Bosnian scene, I
broaden my account in the second part of this chapter to examine three domains of social friction
— the interpretative, the administrative and the representational — which emerged after the
war.695 In these domains, we can trace the logic of the activities of the global and supra-national
actors in Bosnia, especially in relation to an establishment that was battered by the war. Within
what political scientist Eldar Sarajlić called the interpretative domain, I analyze the clash
between different Islamic sects (Sunni vs. Shia Islam) and schools of jurisprudence (Hanafi vs.
Hanbali); in the administrative domain, I consider the politics involved in the Islamic
Community maintaining its sole authority over Bosnian Muslims’ religious affairs and pious
estates; and finally, in the third, representational domain, I analyze the most visible and
everyday intervention in Islamic life through conflicts concerning the Ottoman imperial legacy in
mosque designs.696 The architectural form of the mosque, in this regard, becomes crucial for
articulating and translating an actor’s ideology from the global to the local context, and vice
versa. The insistence on monumentality and the pervasive stylistic references to Ottoman
mosques highlight the central role played by Islam as well as the ‘usable tradition’ of the
Ottoman past to legitimate the claims of various patrons in their struggle for the leadership of
the Bosnian community in the era of the post-war reorganization of the state and society. My

695 With the interpretative, the administrative and the representational framework, Here, I am building on the
arguments by Eldar Sarajlić Eldar Sarajlić, “The Return of the Consuls: Islamic Networks and Foreign Policy
Perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (presented at the conference “After the Wahabi Mirage: Islam, Politics and
International Networks in the Balkans,” European Studies Centre and the Programme for Southeast European

696 Sarajlić, “The Return of the Consuls: Islamic Networks and Foreign Policy Perspectives in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.”
central contention is that the ideological rivalries between different global, supra-national, and local actors, reflecting a wide-ranging competition for control over the place of Islam in Bosnia, Europe and the world, has been encoded in and mediated through styles of mosque architecture. In the end, the fashion for the dined style in mosque design in post-war Bosnia is driven by these extra-urbanist factors.

1. Global and transnational Islamic actors and networks in Bosnia

Wahhabism, and other radical, neo-fundamentalist interpretations of Islam entered the Bosnian scene during the Balkan war of the 1990s, coming on the heels of the arrival of Islamist volunteers and mujahideen from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Jordan, and Egypt. \(^{697}\) Alarmed that genocide was taking place in Bosnia against Muslims, these volunteer-fighters came to defend them; this pan-Islamic reaction was, in a sense, prepared for by the networks established during the long war in Afghanistan. Afghanistan in the 1980s and Bosnia in the 1990s were two phases in the mobilization of an “international jihad.”\(^{698}\) An estimated six to

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seven hundred foreign Muslim fighters fought as volunteers in the Bosnian war - the actual number is still unknown and is subject of political manipulations and propaganda.\footnote{This is an estimate by Haris Silajdžić, wartime member of the Bosnian state presidency and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Sadović, “Bosnia: The Mujahedin Unmasked,” IWPR Institute for War & Peace Reporting; The total number of Mujahideen is still not entirely known, as political scientist Harun Karčić puts forward, who estimates their number to 600-700. He notes that their presence has been repeatedly manipulated for purposes of Serbian nationalist propaganda. Particularly after 9/11, Karčić contends, Serbian media was naming absurd figures of Mujahideen, ranging from 5,000 to 10,000. Karčić, “Islamic Revival in Post-Socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 53.}

It should be noted that the Bosnian government never asked the Islamic countries for mujahideen volunteers as a form of military support (though it did ask them for weapons).\footnote{Sadović, “Bosnia: The Mujahedin Unmasked,” IWPR Institute for War & Peace Reporting. The phenomenon of voluntary soldiers in the recent Balkan war was not limited to Afghan-Arab fighters; Greek, Russian, and Ukrainian mercenary soldiers also took part in the war in support of Serb nationalist forces.} However, once these well-trained fighters, many of them veterans in battles against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, arrived, they provided welcome support in combat. In fact, the Bosnian Army desperately needed any form of military aid, especially at the early stages of the Bosnian war, when it was overwhelmed by Serbian forces that were able to use the capabilities and munitions of the former Yugoslav National Army.\footnote{The arms embargo that was imposed upon Yugoslavia by the United Nations on 25 September 1991 had put the Bosnian Army in an inferior position against the Serb and Croat forces. Serbia, and with it, the Army of Republika Srpska, had seized the largest share of the Yugoslav National Army’s materiel, which largely freed them from dependence on munitions supplied from abroad.}

Though helpful in combat, the mujahideen also harmed the Bosnian cause, in so far as the struggle was about defending the country’s multiethnic coexistence. Lacking military discipline and knowledge about the local inter-ethnic relationships, some mujahideen committed war crimes, such as were common in the Afghan struggle: for instance, they staged executions of captured Serb and Croat civilians. Later, Bosniak military commanders were held responsible for these acts in court at The Hague.\footnote{Karčić, “Islamic Revival in Post-Socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 526.; Imamović, “Wahhabism in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 55.} As the numbers of these voluntary foreign warriors grew, the Bosnian Army tried to control them by integrating them into its corpus and organizing
separate army units, such as the “El Mujahid.” Still, with their propensity for committing crimes against non-Muslim Bosnians, they soiled the image of the Bosnian Army and Bosnian Muslims.

Many of these foreign fighters (the majority of whom were Saudis) used their presence in Bosnia as an opportunity to proselytize Bosnian Muslims. According to political scientist Harun Karčić, “in their view, [Bosnian Muslims] had adopted un-Islamic ways or were simply ‘bad’ Muslims.” Mujahideen capitalized on the state of emergency to freely spread the Wahhabi interpretations of Islam dominant in Saudi Arabia. In the extreme circumstances of war, and exposed to continuous existential risks, some Bosnian Muslim soldiers proved to be receptive to the religious message of these Afghani-Arab missionaries. The latter were able to win some followers among the local population. Their influence, however, faded away after the war, mainly because of the international community’s involvement, and the fact that Saudi government was not willing to support them as much, since the Bosnians seemed unappreciative. Many of them left Bosnia after the Dayton Peace Accords had been signed; one of the provisions of the Accords mandated the withdrawal of foreign militias from Bosnia and Herzegovina. A smaller number of them stayed by permission or connivance of local Bosnian officials, marrying Bosnian women and forming small and isolated communities in a

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704 Ibid.
705 Alma Imamović argues that young Bosnian Muslim men who were particularly prone to these new influences were as they were both inferior to the experienced foreign fighters in combat and impressed by them. Growing up in the secular milieu of pre-war Bosnia, many of these young men knew very little about Islam and its local traditions, which made them additionally exposed to religious indoctrination. Imamović, “Wahhabism in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 55.
707 Scholars who studied the subject have generally agreed that religion did indeed come to represent one of the strongest motivators for soldiers during the war, allowing for radical interpretations of Islam to gain their momentum at the time of crisis, but that this influence declined after the war.
handful of villages such as Bočinja and Guča Gora in central Bosnia. In a nutshell, it can be concluded that the mujahideen’s persistent attempts to impose a radical Islamic life-style on Bosnian Muslims on the model of Saudi Arabia (or at the model of Shi’a states such as Iran) was a failure.

However, the war in Bosnia did put the Muslim population there back into closer contact with the international Muslim community and the rivalries that traversed it. Thus, the propagation of Wahhabism in Bosnia, along with other forms of Sunni and Shi’a Islam, continued in the post-war period, with the chosen instrument being programs of diverse humanitarian aid from global Islamic organizations. These programs were implemented through the involvement of heterogeneous and overlapping networks of governmental and non-governmental organizations from Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and United Arab Emirates, among other countries. However, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey were the only countries to provide relief on a state level.

Though diverging in their religious zeal and political agendas, actors from all of the three latter countries pursued the goal of “correcting” Bosnian Islam to make it more compatible with their own world views. To that end, each network engaged in implementing various kinds of missionary programs, ranging in orientation from religious and educational to cultural and social. The activities of the Iranian network have, for instance, been directed towards promoting the influence of Shi’a Islam though cultural and academic exchange between Iran and Bosnia. The Turkish network has worked to expand Turkey’s political and economic influence in the region, while at the same time “shielding” Sunni Islam in the Balkans from the Wahhabi Islam that the

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708 Political scientist Eldar Sarajlić suggests that up to 4,000 Mujahideen from Afghanistan and Arab countries who fought in Bosnia from 1992-1995. Some 1,300 stayed in the country after the war, acquiring Bosnian citizenship. By 2010, Sarajlić estimates, no more than 200 of these former Mujahideen are recorded to live in Bosnia. Sarajlić, “The Return of the Consuls: Islamic Networks and Foreign Policy Perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 20.
Saudi network, with its vast resources, has promoted.\textsuperscript{709} The next section explores the activities of these three networks in Bosnia.

\textbf{Turkish Network}

The Turkish network has taken the same route to influence in Bosnia as the Iranians: supporting cultural exchange and higher education. It is considerably invested in sponsoring schools and colleges in the region. Yet, in distinction from the Iranian network, which does not engage in mosque building in Bosnia, Turkish-associated groups have sponsored the restoration of several destroyed mosques, as well as construction of two new large mosques.

Before taking a closer look at these Turkish-sponsored mosques, we need to first briefly consider the overall activities of the Turkish agents of influence in Bosnia. First of all, it should be noted that the presence of the Turkish humanitarian organizations in the Balkans is quite recent. In comparison to the interest taken by other Islamic countries in the plight of Bosnian Muslims during the war and its aftermath, Turkey was aloof, save for accepting some war refugees. It was only a decade after the war, when politics within Turkey itself took a moderately Islamicist turn, that Turkish governmental bodies and NGOs began to sponsor various educational institutions and other projects in Bosnia. Since 2009, Turkey has taken in the lead in mediating political agreements in the western Balkans. Among its major achievements in the process of post-war reconciliation between Bosnia and Serbia, for example, were the signing of the Srebrenica Resolution by the Serbian Parliament, as well as the signing of the “Istanbul Declaration” by Turkey, Bosnia, and Serbia on 24 April 2010, in which the three

\textsuperscript{709} For a more extensive study of the Turkish network’s activities in the region see: Anna Ross Solberg, “The Role of Turkish Islamic Networks in the Western Balkans,” \textit{Sudosteuropa (South Eastern Europe)} 55, no. 4 (2007): 429–462(accessed on 25 May 2011).
countries agreed to advocate peace and economic development in the region as a necessary step toward the common goal of integration into the European Union. Political scientist Eldar Sarajlić explains this activity as coherent with other shifts in Turkey’s foreign policy and the “strategic change brought by Ahmet Davutoğlu’s appointment as the country's Foreign Minister in 2009.” According to Sarajlić, Turkey is now tacitly building a zone of influence in the region, appealing to “local spirits around the concept of ‘neo-Ottomanism’ to strengthen its political ties with, among others, Bosnia.

On the governmental level, Turkey supports two major programs within Bosnia, one through the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) and the other through the Diyanet, Turkey’s Supreme Religious Council. But Turkey also exercises ‘soft power’ through nongovernmental religious organizations and neo-Sufi communities (cemaat) networks, which, partly in response to and in competition with the aggressive proselytizing of Wahhabi groups, have become increasingly transnationally active. In the Balkans, these organizations present themselves as the protectors of the Sunni Hanafi tradition from Wahhabi influences. There is an irony in this: the cemaats evolved from diverse Sufi orders that were banned in Turkey by Atatürk in 1925. Their return is a signal of changes not only in Turkey’s foreign policy, but in its domestic politics as well. Anne Ross Solberg classifies them into two

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710 Karčić, “Islamic Revival in Post-Socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 529.


712 Ibid.

713 The Diyanet has been active in the Balkans since 1990s, when it started establishing offices and religious coordinators in the region, including Bosnia. The Diyanet is mainly linked with local religious institutions, but it also sends its own imams to serve Turkish-speaking congregations in countries such as Bulgaria, Rumania, Macedonia, and Kosovo. Turkish state aid to Bosnia mainly takes shape in form of education, for example though scholarships for students from Bosnia, and also foundation of school and colleges in Bosnian cities. Karčić, “Islamic Revival in Post-Socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 527.

714 Allievi and Nielsen, Muslim networks and transnational communities in and across Europe.
main types: first, the traditional Sufi networks that are associated with a specific order (Naqshbandi, Kadiri, Halveti), and second, the revivalist Islamic movements whose beliefs are rooted in Sufism, but not associated with a particular order. The second group includes the Nurcus (followers of Said Nursi) and Fethullahçis (followers of Fetullah Gülen and the Süleymançis (followers of Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan). All three are active in Bosnia and other regions at the Balkans. Their activities are mostly confined to the educational sphere; they run schools and colleges, student dormitories (Süleymançis), and are active in translating books from Turkish into Bosnian that promote the teachings of the groups’ respective founders.

The Gülen movement, also known as the movement of the Fethullahçis, is the most influential vehicle of Turkish influence in the Western Balkans. It has been active in Bosnia since 1998, with the establishment of the Bosna Sema Educational Institution, which has founded eight educational institutions in Bosnia on both elementary and academic levels. The second Turkish educational network is organized around the Foundation for Education Development Sarajevo, a non-governmental organization that founded the International University of Sarajevo in 2004.

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715 Ross Solberg, “The Role of Turkish Islamic Networks in the Western Balkans,” 440.
716 Karčić, “Islamic Revival in Post-Socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 528.
717 Sarajlić, “The Return of the Consuls: Islamic Networks and Foreign Policy Perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 24; Anne Ross Solberg describes this network as a “vast transnational network of schools, media outlets, publishing houses, financial institutions, foundations and associations.” Ross Solberg, “The Role of Turkish Islamic Networks in the Western Balkans,” 442.
718 According to its homepage, the Bosna Sema Educational Institution “has founded eight educational institutions: Sarajevo College, Una-Sana College, International elementary schools in Sarajevo, Tuzla and Zenica, International Burch University which consists of three faculties – Education, Economics and Faculty for Engineering and IT studies. International High schools in Sarajevo and Tuzla started in the 2010/2011 school year.” “Bosna Sema Educational Institutions”, n.d., http://www.bosnasema.com/index.php?p=11. The teaching language in Sema’s schools is English, their program is secular, but Islamic traditions and norms are present, as evident, for example, from the profile of students, majority of whom are Muslim (more than 70% of female students are veiled), the gender separation of students at the college level, and existence of prayer facilities in schools. Sarajlić, “The Return of the Consuls: Islamic Networks and Foreign Policy Perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 24.
719 The actors in this network include Turkish businessmen and Bosnian intellectuals, with ties to Turkish charity organizations such as Deniz Feneri, Erkenköy and the Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Foundation. The teaching language at
The activities of Turkish organizations are aimed at strengthening the cultural and religious links between Turkey and Bosnia by calling upon the historical commonalities of the Ottoman past and the contemporary alignment of religious sects in Bosnia and Turkey. This bonding process is articulated architecturally through a mosque architecture that ostensibly references Ottoman styles, as in the case of the two gigantic mosques that Turkey donated to Bosnian towns of Goražde and Maglaj.

The Kayseri Mosque (Džamija Kajserija, 2008) in Goražde was the first mosque to be erected with Turkish donations in Bosnia, and it was also the first post-war mosque to be erected on the right bank of the Drina river (Fig.4.3). Costing approximately 950,000 Euros to build, all of which was apparently covered though donations provided by the citizens of the Turkish city of Kayseri and the company “Biat” from Istanbul, the gigantic mosque features fourteen small domes, eight small half cupolas, four large half domes, a large central dome and two forty four meters high minarets, each bearing two balconies. The architectural style of the mosque features references to the Şehzade Mosque (1548) and the Sultan Ahmed Mosque (1609-17) in Istanbul (Fig.4.4).

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721 The Kayseri Mosque was inaugurated on 14 August 2008. It provides prayer space for one thousand worshippers (prayer space is ca. 755 m²). There are plans for the addition of office spaces for the Goražde Muftijstvo (regional mufti’s office) and Medžlis (coordinating council of Islamic congregation), a library and a reading room, youth center, apartments for the imams, as well as waqf shops, all of which will be built in the next building phase, which will essentially give Goražde a new Islamic Center. “Džamija Kajserija - Biser kraj Drine,” Općina Goražde, August 15, 2009, http://www.gorazde.ba/index.php?view=article&catid=27:vijesti&id=261:damija-kajserija-biser-kraj-drine&option=com_content&Itemid=34.
722 The initial plans for the construction of the mosque were begun in 1999, and the ground was broken to begin the project in 2001. After the visit of a Turkish delegation from Kayseri to Goražde in 2007, the local community received the funds necessary for construction; Muftijstvo from Kayseri is the donor of the mosque, while the Muftijstvo of Goražde is its owner. The Turkish firm “Biat” was commissioned for the construction. Construction of commercial buildings is also planned, which will be used to generate income for the mosque. Ibid.
The construction of the Vali Recep Yazıcıoğlu Mosque on the left bank of the river Bosna in Maglaj (Fig. 4.5), which cost approximately 1.5 million Euros, was financed by the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA).\footnote{Focusing mainly on commercial, cultural, and educational realms, this agency implemented over thirty projects in Bosnia, including the restoration of a hospital in Gorazde and the foundation of numerous educational facilities that promote Turkish culture and language. The website of the Turkish Government’s Development Cooperation Agency provides the following information: “TIKA has coordination offices in 20 countries and operates in many countries across Africa, Asia and Europe, delivering development assistance to partner countries through its projects and activities. […] TIKA was formed under the ordinance of Act 480 as an organization linked to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on a Cabinet decision on January 24, 1992 and published in the Official Gazette No: 21114 on January 27, 1992. It was linked to the Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry on May 28, 1999. […] TIKA was formed on the basis of providing development assistance foremost to developing countries where Turkish is spoken and countries that border Turkey as well as improving cooperation through projects and programs in economic, commercial, technical, social, cultural and educational arenas.” “TIKA: Turkish International Cooperation & Development Agency”, n.d., http://www.tika.gov.tr/EN/Icerik.ASP?ID=345.} The mosque was inaugurated jointly by the Turkish and Bosnian Grand Muftis on 14 August 2009, after eleven months of construction. The collaboration of the religious heads of the two countries highlights the collaboration of the Bosnian Islamic establishment and Turkey, which is facilitated by the generosity of Turkish donors, who contribute to the building of denominational, cultural, political, and economic ties with Bosnian Muslims.\footnote{All the construction work for the Vali Recep Yazıcıoğlu Mosque was conducted by the company “Famous” from the Bosnian city of Tesanj; however, the interior decoration and paintings were produced by Turkish craftsmen. Approximately 30,000 visitors attended the festive ceremony led jointly by the Turkish and the Bosnian Reis-ul-Ulema. For photo documentation of the inauguration ceremony see: “Otviranje ‘Vali Recep Yazıcıoğlu’ džamije u Maglaju, nove fotografije iz sata u sat,” Internet servis grada Maglaja, August 14, 2009, http://maglaj.net/maglajn.php?akcija=vise&id=764&jezik=1.} These are not hidden ties: on the contrary, they are proclaimed by all parties. The mosque’s very foundation was an initiative of representatives of the city of Erzincan, the “sister city” of Maglaj. The mosque is named after the recently deceased Turkish governor from Denizli, Recep Yazıcıoğlu, who had strong family ties to the political and religious top in Turkey.\footnote{Yazıcıoğlu’s brother is Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu, Minister of State of Turkey, Deputy Prime Minister and Professor of Religious Studies at Ankara University. He was appointed president of Religious Affairs 1987-1992, and was also responsible for religious affairs in the Erdogan administration.} At the mosque’s inauguration, a helpful billboard of gigantic dimensions was attached to the mosque’s façade, displaying the governor’s
portrait and short biography (Fig.4.6). Finally, the festive program of the mosque’s inauguration was staged as a mixture of Turkish and Bosnian traditions, including the joint prayers of Turkish and Bosnian guests, and performances of the Turkish Mehter Troop (Mehter Bölüği), a marching band by the Turkish Army that is a revival of a janissary band in historic dress. The religious festivity dedicating the mosque (mevlud) was held along Bosnian Ottoman lines, and guests were treated a performance and zikr by the Mevlevi dervishes from Konya (Fig.4.7).

The facade of the Vali Recep Yazıcıoğlu Mosque presents us with a modernized version of the neo-classical imperial mosque architecture (Fig.4.5). The prayer space is covered by a compound dome (Fig.4.8); but, in distinction from classical Ottoman mosque architecture, the pendentives reach directly to the ground, rather than to the walls of the cubical prayer space. The four façades of the prayer space are each shaped as segments of a circle, consisting of three large concrete arches that are interlaced with bands of windows. This type of structure is strongly reminiscent of the typology of the classical Ottoman mosque, which consists of a cubical space and a dome, transforming it into a structure that appears to be enclosed entirely by a giant dome. This emphasis on the dome and the arch draws from two architectural precedents: the first is the Dolmabahçe Mosque (1852-53) in Istanbul, which features a compound dome and

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726 The poster was accompanied by the following text: “Recep Yazıcıoğlu was born in 2 June 1948 in the town Sümene, Trabzon municipality. He completed his studies at the Law Faculty in Ankara. 1984, when he was thirty six years old, he became the youngest governor and started to work in the city of Tokat. After that he was also governor in the cities of Aydin, Erzincan, and Denzli. During his tenure as the Governor of Denzli, he was involved in a car accident on 2 September 2003 on the road Eskisehheir – Ankara, and six days after, on 8 September 2003 he died [said of a Muslim] in Ibn-i Sına Hospital in Ankara. The dženaza [Islamic funeral] was held in Seke, Aydın municipality, on 11 September 2003. He leaves behind a wife and two children.” Translation by Azra Akşamija.

727 This festive program started with prayers (Kur'ani-kerim), followed by the Friday Prayer (džuma namaz). The evening program included the performance of the Turkish Mehter Troop, the Evening Prayer (akşam namaz), a Bosnian-Turkish religious festivity (mevlud) accompanied by imams of the Maglaj Medžlis and the female ilahi and kasida (religious ode) choir “Revda,” Turkish guests, lecture by Prof. Dr. Halil ef. Mehtić.

http://maglaj.net/maglajn.php?akcija=vise&id=742&jezik=1
a façade similarly structured in a sequence of stone and window arches (Fig.4.9); the second is the contemporary Şakirin Mosque (2009) in Istanbul, whose prayer space is covered by the so-called “sail dome” (sail vault or pendentive dome) and is flooded with light from the glass facade (Fig.4.10).

Both the Kayseri Mosque in Gorazde and the Vali Recep Yazicioğlu Mosque in Maglaj are gigantic in size, and designed so as to remind the observer of the symbolic historical bonds between Turkey and Bosnian Muslims, the legacy of four centuries of the Ottoman imperial rule in the region. The design of these two mosques with the large central dome points to the twofold reappraisal of the Ottoman heritage, once maligned in Kemalist Turkey as decadent and in Socialist Yugoslavia as barbaric: the first, embodied by the Kayseri Mosque (2008) in Gorazde, mixes and transplants the architectural vocabulary of the Ottoman mosques from the Classical Period (1437-1703); the second, exemplified by the Vali Recep Yazicioğlu Mosque (2009) in Maglaj, draws from the neo-classical mosque style of the Empire Period (1808-1876). In both cases, the stylistic references to the Ottoman heritage and glorification of the common Ottoman past gives point to the contemporary links between Turkey and Bosnia at present, especially as they share a denominational bond that Saudi Arabia cannot match.

**Saudi Arabian network**

The religious/political goals of the Turkish and Iranian networks overlap with that of the Saudi Arabian network, which is the oldest, best financed, and most globally spread. Saudi

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728 Dolmabahçe Mosque (1852-53) in Istanbul was commissioned by Bezmialem Valide Sultan, mother of Sultan Abdülmecid I (1823 – 1861) in 1853, and completed in 1855.

729 The Şakirin Mosque (2009) in Istanbul was designed by a female architect Zeynep Fadilioglu, and financed by the Semiha Şakir Foundation in memory of Ibrahim Şakir and Semiha Şakir.
foundations are also the most financially and architecturally influential in Bosnia. It is due to the Saudis that Wahhabism now has a strong presence on the Bosnian scene.

Wahhabism emerged in the Arabian peninsula in the mid eighteenth century, at the time when the Ottoman Empire was at crisis. It is based on the interpretations and teachings of the Hanbali preacher Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792) who, to put it simply, claimed that the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad are the only valid authorities in Islam and advocated the return to what he claimed was a more pure and orthodox form of Islam. Ibn ‘Abd Al-Wahhab’s reform did away with certain long-held practices, such as the veneration of saints and holy men, which he saw as a form of polytheism (shirk); he also rejected Sufi mysticism, which had long been favored by the Ottoman Sultans, and held that the devotional visits to tombstones and mausoleums was idolatry.

Wahhabism grew in conjunction with a turning point in the balance of political power in the Arabian peninsula since the eighteenth century. Yet, it was not until the Ottoman Empire

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732 Ibid.

733 In 1745, Abd al-’Aziz Ibn Sa’ud, chief of a tribal community in central Arabia, embraced Abd al-Wahhab’s discourse and promoted his vision as a binding force to unite the tribes in central Arabia. In the movement away from the foreign domination of the Turks, Wahhabism proved a powerful vehicle that was used to unite the disparate tribes of the region in the second half of the eighteenth century, leading to the formation of the First Saudi State. In the early nineteenth century, the Arabian peninsula became the stage for a power struggle between the Saudi clan (which headed the First and Second Saudi States), the Egyptians, the Ottoman Empire and, lastly, other local tribes. To summarize the most critical junctures, as outlined by Ira Lapidus: in 1773, the unified tribes led by Ibn Sa’ud conquered Riyadh and made it their capital. In 1803, Ibn Sa’ud and his followers occupied Mecca, but were repelled by Muhammad ‘Ali of Egypt from 1812-1813. The latter was able to recapture Mecca and Medina in 1818, when he destroyed the Saudi power. Saudi clan remained in control over a small tribal principedom for the most of the nineteenth century. In 1902, ‘Abd al-’Aziz Ibn Sa’ud regained control over Riyadh, restoring Saudi Kingdom and proclaiming himself as a Wahhabi imam. He was successful in unifying the tribes in central and eastern Arabia,
was dissolved, at the end of the First World War, that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia became a reality. The region seemed too poor to be of interest to the imperial powers, until 1933, when oil was discovered. With the creation of OPEC and the short lived oil boycott, the oil producing states finally began to realize their economic power. Meanwhile, the oil price revolution of the 1970s flooded Saudi Arabia with cash and, given the lack of restraints on the Saudi government, gave high placed royals and their associates enormous amounts to spend as they pleased.

Despite the major social, cultural and demographic changes that came with the massive and rapid accumulation of financial resources, the Saudi court and Saudi Arabian society continued to commit themselves to promote the puritan precepts of Wahhabi Islam, the dominant Islamic faction in Saudi Arabia today. Its adherents do not call themselves signing treaties with neighboring countries, which will give territorial shape to contemporary Saudi Arabia. By 1925, Ibn Sa’ud was in control of the Hijaz region and the Holy Cities. Ibid.

The monarchy was officially established in 1932 through unification of the Nejd and Hijaz regions, which the self-appointed Saudi King Abdul Aziz Al-Saud had captured between 1913 and 1926. Ibid.

The first concessions, in 1939, were made with the Standard Oil Company. The World War intervened; however, as the Cold War started up, the West, and particularly America, curried favor with the Saudis. American companies initiated the more intense oil exploration and production, but the terms of the petroleum concession were such that the Saudis did not start accruing real wealth until the 1970s.

Social anthropologist Michael Laguerre explains the contemporary predominance of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia in terms of “a genealogy of rejected knowledge.” He states: From the perspective of the practitioners, rejected knowledge is knowledge that was once dominant, but became peripheral or subaltern over time because of other truth claims by people in power. According to these practitioners, with the seizing the nation’s leadership and the help of oil resources, this rejected knowledge can now make a spectacular comeback and regain its lost center-stage position. In this scenario, Wahhabism has evolved from center to periphery and back to the center. Laguerre, Network Governance of Global Religions, 93.

This commitment proved to be strategically useful as the Royal House fought off the challenge of the Islamic revolution mounted in Iran in 1979. At the same time, as America’s ally in the Cold War, Wahhabi fundamentalism proved to be useful in two ways: first, it was used as an ideological cover for the struggle against secular Arab nationalism, which both the Saudis and the Americans opposed as both Soviet oriented and posing a threat to the international structure of petroleum production; and secondly, as a driver for motivating pan-Islamic resistance to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. In addition, with the Saudis facing threats from the revival of Shi’a militarism in Iran, the best strategy for the Saudis seemed to be to embrace Wahhabi prescriptions even more fervently. As David Dean Commins has remarked, the political scientists of the 1970s and 1980s expected Saudi Arabia to follow the classic path of modernization and become more secular; but in fact the reverse happened. David Dean Commins, The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia (New York and London: I.B.Tauris, 2006), 104-113.
Wahhabis, of course, but claim the title of true Muslims. The “Wahhabi” label is considered to be a derogatory term given to them by either “misguided” Muslims or unenlightened infidels.\textsuperscript{738}

The Kingdom’s increasing economic power over the course of the past four decades allowed for the resources to export Wahhabism on a worldwide scale, importing it as the only correct interpretation of Islam into places where it was either unknown or certainly minor, as for instance Indonesia and the Turkic regions of the former Soviet Union, like Chechnya.\textsuperscript{739} Saudi Arabia has further capitalized on its position as the gate keeper of the Muslims’ holy sites of Mecca and Medina to strengthen its hand vis-à-vis its Islamic rivals. For these reasons, Saudi Arabia today is the base of a growing proselytizing network dedicated to the global spread of Wahhabi Islam.

The ruling family, whose seat is in Riyadh, has cast itself as the protector of the restorationist Islam and the tribal values. In this sense, the ulama (religious-legal elite) is appointed by the King who, in turn, is granted legitimacy for his claim to power through religious backing. This intertwined relationship of political and religious structures, both of which draw power from the Kingdom’s rich financial resources and the Hanbali school of jurisprudence, maintains the Saudi order in Saudi Arabia in the face of any manifestation of popular discontent with the policies of the Royals.\textsuperscript{740}

The entanglement of religious and political structures described above has conditioned the Saudi Arabia’s rhizomatic form of governance that Laguerre characterizes as a “distributed cellular network […]], which seeks interpenetration of the secular state and the faith” on the

\textsuperscript{738} Michel S. Laguerre, \textit{Network Governance of Global Religions} (New York: Routledge, 2011), 93.


\textsuperscript{740} Laguerre, \textit{Network Governance of Global Religion}, 94.
global scale.\textsuperscript{741} The main characteristic of such distributed cellular network governance, according to Laguerre, is the pluralist and autonomous nature of its nodes, whose operational strategies are contingent upon site-specific perceptions in regard to foreign policy and national security.\textsuperscript{742} These individual “extraterritorial tentacles” of Saudi Arabia, to use Laguerre’s phrase, act both independently and interdependently with one another.\textsuperscript{743} The network’s operational course allows the individual nodes to both adjust themselves to the endogenous legal boundaries in place in the sites they inhabit, to make appeals to local cultural and religious sentiments, and to contribute to and benefit from the network’s global interconnectedness and financial resources.

As this distributed cellular network allows the Saudis to export potential domestic dissidents and pursue Wahhabi missionarism elsewhere, Saudi Arabia has become the most influential global Islamic actor in the twentieth century. The global dissemination of Wahhabi Islam, in this context, is channeled through the strategically deployed web of agents and agencies. These are, as it were, missionaries who have been cultivating their ideas via educational institutions, publications, charitable organizations, and last but not least, religious architecture. It is thus important to recognize that the mosque is another apparatus through which the Saudi network mediates its ideological mission worldwide.

To understand this global network, one must understand its nodes. The next section examines some of this network’s nodes in Bosnia, which can aid us in seeing the operational strategies common to the wider system.

\textsuperscript{741} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{742} Ibid., 95.
\textsuperscript{743} Ibid., 95, 97.
Pan-Islamic Acros and Actants

The propagation of Wahhabi Islam in Bosnia is inextricably associated with charitable organizations funded and run by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf-Arab states. These instruments of humanitarian aid are vehicles for the proselytizing program. In May 1992, in response to news about the initial attacks on Bosnian Muslims, the Government of Saudi Arabia launched a large-scale humanitarian relief fund headed by Prince Salman bin Abdul-Aziz, the Governor of the Riyadh province in Saudi Arabia. The High Saudi Committee for Relief of Bosnia and Herzegovina (short HSC or Visoki Saudijski Komitet za Pomoć BiH) was established to collect and coordinate private donations from the Kingdom’s citizens. Donations amounted to approximately $450 million, which was then channeled, for humanitarian purposes, through fourteen offices located in different Bosnian cities.\textsuperscript{744}

The High Committee financed orphanages, clinics, schools, the rebuilding of water supplies and other infrastructure, the restoration of houses and, most significantly, the restoration and construction of mosques, making itself one of the most important players in the post-war reconstruction of Bosnian Muslim society. The price the Saudis exacted was the freedom to promote their brand of reform Islam, which was seen as a way of “correcting” Bosnian Muslims’ “misdirected” fate.\textsuperscript{745}

The Kingdom’s proselytizing strategy was implemented through a number of different media and methods. For example, health care and food donations were at times conditional upon


\textsuperscript{745} Political scientist Alma Imamović, who researched the appearance of Wahhabism in Bosnia, argues that Wahhabi missionaries were actively supported by this organization. Imamović, “Wahhabism in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” 59.
converting to Wahhabi Islam. Information pamphlets were distributed among Bosnian women, trying to persuade them to adopt Saudi ideas about the need for an Islamic dress code, and ostensibly “enlightening” them about “proper” gender relationship as practiced in Saudi Arabia.

This type of persuasion had a visible effect on the Bosnian public space: veiling was prohibited in communist Yugoslavia, but reappeared and increased substantially after the end of the 1992-1995 war. To be fair, the new popularity of veiling was not simply the result of Saudi proselytism, but was an effect of the overall resurgence of religion in Bosnia after the fall of Socialism, when the quest for a religious/ethnic/national identity brought back the veil as a yardstick of women’s religiosity. One can be more confident that the emergence of extreme forms of veiling, such as the niqab, the black veil that covers a woman’s face, and sometimes also the eyes and hands, was due to the influence of the Saudis. Through full-body veiling of Muslim women has some roots in the local Islamic history (i.e. the wearing of the zar), Bosnian women had not veiled at least since the Yugoslav prohibition of the veil in 1950. Niqab has never been an element of the Islamic dress code in Bosnia. It only appeared after the war, and was evidently incited by the Saudi ideas regarding the religious duties of women. Men who adopted Wahhabi Islam in Bosnia also changed their appearance and clothing, favoring ankle length trousers and long beards. They also do not shake hands with women.

Religious education and book publishing took Saudi proselytism to another level. From 1993 to 1998, the High Committee supported 128 sharia courses, and also numerous Qur’an

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746 Ibid., 59-60.
747 Ibid., 59.
748 Rumors have been spread that Muslim women were being paid to veil in the first decade following the war, and many accepted this due to financial needs. These accusations, however, have never been backed up by any concrete evidence.
classes, in which Bosnians were introduced to reform Islam. The fashion for reprinting or translating works of historically important Muslim authors and publishing books about Islamic history and the life of the Prophet Muhammad was supported by both the Bosnian Islamic Community and the Kingdom’s charitable organizations and NGOs. While the sponsors of the outpouring of these publications wanted to educate a Bosnian Muslim community that had been cut off from religion by decades of officially sanctioned secularism, in effect, many of these publications opened the door for promoting Wahhabism. For example, the High Committee published a series entitled “Family Library,” with approximately twenty titles, all of which expressed the Wahhabi viewpoint on various issues; they were all distributed for free. The role of publications in Committee’s missionary activities, as political scientist Amila Imamović points out, was vital in re-Islamicizing Bosnian Muslims after the war: 1,533,695 books on Islam and 550,000 Qur’ans were translated to Bosnian and printed, and over 200,000 audio tapes with Islamic lectures were circulated throughout the country. This dissemination of free Qur’an copies is typical of the Saudi Kingdom’s worldwide strategy of religious promotion. Over the course of the past decade, the Kingdom has published about ten million copies of the Qur’an


750 Sarajlić, “The Return of the Consuls: Islamic Networks and Foreign Policy Perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 15.


752 Sarajlić, “The Return of the Consuls: Islamic Networks and Foreign Policy Perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 15.


754 Sometimes, free copies of the Qur’an are sent to one country only, and other times, several countries are reached simultaneously. Ibid., 59.
annually, in languages that range from Arabic, French, and English to Chinese, Turkish, and Urdu.\textsuperscript{755}

Another avenue of religious influence in Bosnia was pursued through channels of higher education, in form of scholarships for Bosnian students to study in Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{756} Again, the pattern of Saudi charity, here, is not limited to Bosnia — students from other parts of the world are offered similar financial incentives to study in Saudi Arabia, where they can be exposed to teachings of Wahhabi Islam.\textsuperscript{757}

Though a number of Bosnian Muslim students had studied in Islamic countries during the last decades of the Yugoslav period, the outflow increased significantly after the war.\textsuperscript{758} In fact, the new generation of imams and Islamic scientists who have been trained abroad equates the number of those who graduated from Bosnian madrasas and from the Faculty of Islamic Studies (FIN) in Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{759} Returning to Bosnia, these newly trained young professionals found employment with Bosnian jamaats and the Islamic Community. Their educational background, professional links to potential donors, and knowledge of Arabic language, as political scientist Eldar Sarajlić notes, represent a “potential channel for exerting influence by the countries where they had received their education.”\textsuperscript{760}

The Internet represents a vital instrument for propagation of missionary program through cyberspace-based religious pedagogy; post-war Bosnia witnessed an absolute increase in online

\textsuperscript{755} Laguerre, \textit{Network Governance of Global Religions}, 98.

\textsuperscript{756} Imamović, “Wahhabism in Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 59-60.

\textsuperscript{757} Laguerre, \textit{Network Governance of Global Religions}, 99.

\textsuperscript{758} Eldar Sarajlić notes that a number of Bosnian students graduated from the universities such as Al-Azhar in Egypt because Yugoslavia lacked appropriate facilities for higher education in the period from 1945 to 1977. They studied in countries such as in Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey and Iran. Sarajlić, “The Return of the Consuls: Islamic Networks and Foreign Policy Perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 14.

\textsuperscript{759} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{760} Ibid., 14-15.
activities, of which one can reasonably speculate a large percentage was dedicated to “electronic religiosity” — as sociologist Jocelyn Cesari calls new modes global spreading of audio and video religious material. This has become one of the central vehicles for broadcasting different religious and cultural framings across the globe, and it is much cheaper to maintain. Islamic websites, blogs, discussion forums, and other online platforms provide an effective medium through which proponents of Wahhabi Islam participate in and shape the religious discourse in Bosnia.

Young users, who are overrepresented in the Internet user demographic, are the central target group for Wahhabi proselytism in Bosnia. It should be mentioned, in this context, that the High Committee supports a number of religious youth organizations, such as the Active Islamic Youth (AIO) and Furqan. These organizations are, as well, loci for the staging of Shari’a courses, discussions, and seminars, replete with Wahhabi inclinations and anti-American rhetoric. The pro-Wahhabi organization Active Islamic Youth represents one of the best organized Islamic youth associations in Bosnia and since 1997 has published the monthly magazine SAFF (prayer row). At its peak in 2005, SAFF claimed that a circulation of 9000 copies. Its members include former mujahideen who stayed in Bosnia as well as Bosnian students who were educated in Islamic countries.

Since the events of September 11, 2001, the High Committee and other Saudi organizations in Bosnia were put under close examination by Bosnian authorities and by SFOR (the Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina), under pressure from the Americans and

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762 Ibid.
764 Ibid.
NATO. The media linked the High Committee and the two local organizations that it sponsored (the Active Islamic Youth and Furqan) with religious extremism. In the ensuing crackdown, some members and employees of these organizations were arrested and questioned in regard to their supposed links to terrorist networks. Under this pressure, Furqan closed. In the wake of the broad, indiscriminate sweep of Muslim activists who were alleged to have had contact with Al Qaeda by the Bush administration, six Bosnian citizens of Algerian background, were seized by American troops in 2002 and transported to Guantanamo; bank accounts of ten humanitarian organizations were frozen. The King Fahd Center distanced itself from the “alternative” religious circles in Bosnia. The High Saudi Committee was also closed down, with an explanation that the mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been accomplished in terms of post-war humanitarian aid and projects.

Impact of the Saudi Arabian network on Bosnian mosque architecture

The impact of the High Saudi Committee for Relief of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the restoration of destroyed Bosnian mosques was extensive. By financing the partial or full renovation of approximately two hundred mosques in Bosnia, the Committee aided the quick and wide-spread revitalization of communities’ physical and social structures. Certainly without these donations, the pace of the renovation of Bosnian mosques would have been slowed or even arrested.

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765 Alibasić, “Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
766 Ibid.
The kind of mosque constructions and renovations the Saudis promoted in Bosnia are typical of the Kingdom’s strategy for promoting Wahhabi Islam on a global scale. According to the data provided at the website of the Saudi embassy in Washington D.C., the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has built 1359 mosques and 210 Islamic centers worldwide.\textsuperscript{768} Financing the construction of mosques and Islamic centers overseas involves a variety of institutions from Saudi Arabia, such as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, Ministries of Saudi government, members of the royal family, and a number of charitable institutions.\textsuperscript{769} The Saudi embassies sometimes take on the role of regional coordinator.

The problematic impact of the Saudi humanitarian aid, both in its non-neutrality and the decisions that are made about mosque architecture and use, comes to the fore when looking at the projects that were restored or realized through the direct involvement of Saudi charitable organizations. In Bosnia, as the Saudis took control of projects they exerted their power to purify the Bosnian Ottoman architectural heritage of the Ottoman “taint” (for instance, of traces of Sufism), trying to fit Bosnian Islam into the framework of Wahhabi doctrine. This sectarian aim took shape through three forms of architectural intervention: bulldozing damaged historic mosques and graveyards, whitewashing the interior decorations of mosques (a gesture against

\textsuperscript{768} The website also notes that “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz, has played a significant role in establishing a large number of Islamic Centers and Mosques all over the world. [...] Among the most prominent European projects are the center in Geneva, which cost SR 16 million (U.S. $ 4.3 million); the grand mosque in Madrid, the largest Islamic complex in Europe with buildings housing cultural, educational, and sports facilities; the mosque in London which was set up at a total cost of about SR 43 million (U.S. $ 11.5 million); the grand mosque in Brussels which was designed to accommodate 4000 worshipers at a cost of about SR 20 million (U.S. $ 5.3 million); and the Islamic Center in Rome, also with a capacity for 4000 worshipers, which was opened last year. There are also mosques in Zagreb and in Lisbon. The Kingdom has sponsored mosques in many parts of the United States, including Maryland, Virginia, and Ohio, as well as in Washington DC; and in Canada, Australia, and countries along the Pacific Rim, in addition to a total of twelve in Latin America. Saudi Arabia has also established four schools, including the Islamic Saudi Academy in Northern Virginia which opened in 1984, and the King Fahd Academy in London, set up in 1985. The other two are the recently-established King Fahd Academy in Moscow, and the King Fahd Academy in Bonn which opened in 1995.” “Islamic projects sponsored by Saudi Arabia,” Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington D.C., August 9, 1996, http://www.saudiembassy.net/archive/1996/news/page100.aspx.

\textsuperscript{769} Laguerre, \textit{Network Governance of Global Religions}, 98-99.
“idolatry”), and erecting large-scale Islamic Centers with large domes and interiors sparse of decorations. These characteristics pop up wherever in the Balkans the sponsor of the project is either Saudi Arabian or tied to Saudi Arabia.

An emblematic case of the whitewashing approach to architectural preservation is that of the Gazi Husrev-beg Mosque in Sarajevo, mentioned above (Fig.4.11). While the minaret was damaged through targeted shelling during the siege of Sarajevo, the mosque itself survived slightly damaged, only to become a casualty of the second “cleansing” of Bosnian heritage after the war: as a result of the renovation begun in 1996 and paid for by the Saudi Government. In the process, all Ottoman tile work and the intricate interior decorations and calligraphic inscriptions were taken off and plastered white. Even the stone minaret was bleached white.770

A number of mosques whose renovation was financed through Saudi donations bear a similar “signature” of their patrons: they were stripped of their traditional decoration and painted white. The Junuz-čauš Mosque (16th c.) in Konjic, for example, witnessed several interventions in its interior and exterior between 2004 and 2006. These included the elimination of the portico (mahfil) and its decorations, removal of all color from mihrab and minbar and their whitewashing, as well as plastering of the entire interior in pure white.771 These restoration works were financed by the International Islamic Relief Organization from Saudi Arabia (IGASA).772

771 According to the records of the Commission to Preserve National Monuments, the mosque was damaged and repaired several times in history; the last renovation before the war took place in 1989. The mosque and the minaret were deliberately targeted and hit with several artillery shells in the war of the 1992-95, which caused damage to roof structure, interior and walls. “Graditeljska cjelina– Čarijska (Junuz-čauš) džamija u Konjicu se proglašava nacionalnim spomenikom Bosne i Hercegovine. Broj: 07.2-02-02-602/03-12,” Komisija za očuvanje nacionalnih spomenika, March 15, 2006, http://www.kons.gov.ba/main.php?id_struct=6&lang=1&action=view&id=2809.
772 Ibid.
In many other towns and villages, Saudi, Kuwaiti, and other institutions from the Arabian Peninsula sponsored mosque renovations that removed and whitewashed the colorful traditional interior decorations. In some places, as Islamic scientist Michael Sells observes, funds for renovation of destroyed old mosques were promised to villagers under condition that Saudis would be given the control over the renovation process.\footnote{Michael A. Sells, “Erasing Culture: Wahhabism, Buddhism, Balkan Mosques,” \textit{The Turkish Times}, March 14, 2001, http://www.theturkishtimes.com/archive/02/01_15/culture.html.}

Elsewhere in the Balkans, as in Kosovo, the sectarian zeal for purification of the Ottoman heritage took an even more extreme character in form of bulldozing of Ottoman-era mosques and tombstones that have traditionally been an integral part of mosque courtyards.\footnote{In Kosovo, the Saudi Joint Relief for the People of Kosovo and Chechnya spent approximately hundred and fifty million dollars in Kosovo on construction of hospitals, schools, houses and rebuilding of mosques. Ford, “Second casualty of war: historic architectural sites.”} As previously mentioned, it is a Wahhabi tenet that tombs are “un-Islamic.” Thus, as historian András Riedlmayer notes, Saudis consider these gravestones to be idolatrous.\footnote{Naegele, “Saudi Wahhabi Aid Workers Bulldoze Balkan Monuments.”} These iconoclastic activities resulted, in many cases, in demolition of undamaged or partially damaged historic mosques that could have been easily restored. The 18th century Kater Llula Mosque in Priština, Kosovo, for example, which remained undamaged in the war, was dismantled by Committee-paid contractors, in order to make place for a new mosque (atop a shopping mall) built in the same spot; the new mosque, of course, lacked any decoration.\footnote{The Head of Priština’s Institute for Protection of Historic Monuments, Hadji Mehmetai, complained that both local Islamic Saudi donors just ignored any of the Institute’s decrees to protect historic buildings. Ford, “Second casualty of war: historic architectural sites.”} In 2000, the Saudi aided renovation of the Hadum Mosque (1594-95) in Djakovica, Kosovo, resulted in removing the Library of Hadum Suleiman Efendi (1733), the Qur’an school facing the mosque, and bulldozing

\footnote{774 In Kosovo, the Saudi Joint Relief for the People of Kosovo and Chechnya spent approximately hundred and fifty million dollars in Kosovo on construction of hospitals, schools, houses and rebuilding of mosques. Ford, “Second casualty of war: historic architectural sites.”}
\footnote{775 Naegele, “Saudi Wahhabi Aid Workers Bulldoze Balkan Monuments.”}
\footnote{776 The Head of Priština’s Institute for Protection of Historic Monuments, Hadji Mehmetai, complained that both local Islamic Saudi donors just ignored any of the Institute’s decrees to protect historic buildings. Ford, “Second casualty of war: historic architectural sites.”}
of ancient gravestones in the mosque’s courtyard (Fig.4.12). The NATO-led KFOR were reportedly unable to intervene in this destruction because Saudi restorers had shown authorized documents. Actually, examination of the permit showed that it was issued to authorize the restoration of the sixteenth century mosque, which is the task the Saudi restorers had initially applied for, but in fact they constructed a new concrete Islamic center to replace the damaged mosque, instead of restoring it. In this way, mosques that had escaped the deliberate war-time shelling of Serb artillery fell victim to post-war “tradition cleansing” of the regional heritage by Wahhabi patrons seeking to destroy the impure and unorthodox as seen from their “true” version of the faith.

We find the same obsession with fighting idolatry in other places, even in Islam’s holiest sites in Mecca and Medina, cities whose historic cores are under threat of being entirely wiped out. Over the course of few past decades, these cities have been subject to an unprecedented assault on historic heritage; buildings and important monuments that date back to the seventh or eighth centuries have been systematically removed because of their alleged potential to become sites of pilgrimage. Ironically, shortly after the bulldozing, commercial developers filled the

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777 The mosque’s porch and minaret were damaged by NATO aerial bombardment in 1999, but the mosque itself remained largely intact. The Library of Hadum Suleiman Efendi (1733) and the Qur’an school were burned down by Serb police and military forces in March 1999. Naegele, “Saudi Wahhabi Aid Workers Bulldoze Balkan Monuments.”

778 Ibid.

779 Jolyon Naegele reports that an order has been issued to stop further destruction of the mosque. Saudi agency was asked to undo the damage and restore the building as true as possible to the pre-war condition. Ibid. However, the Saudis refused to comply and instead withdrew from the project.


781 According to Daniel Howden, the list of eradicated landmarks includes the house the Prophet’s wife Khadijah, which was replaced by public restrooms, the house of the Prophet’s companion Abu-Balkr, which has become the

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void in Mecca’s Old City with new lucrative multi-story hotels, restaurants, shopping malls, and luxury apartment buildings with a view on Kaaba.\textsuperscript{782} The holiest site in Islam was just recently overshadowed by the world’s largest clock attached to the world’s second tallest building (601 m), which underlines Saudi wealth, power, and taste for sheer size (Fig.4.13). The clock tower rises up over the gigantic Abraj al-Bait complex, which encompasses hotels, shopping malls, and conference centers, all of which are located in the immediate proximity of Kaaba (Fig.4.14).\textsuperscript{783} The four clock units, placed on the four sides of the tower, each span a diameter of ca. 43 meters. They are decorated with a gigantic calligraphic inscription “Allah” and illuminated with twenty-six thousand LED lights. Visible from thirty kilometers away, this megalomaniac project is meant to promote Mecca Standard Time as an alternative to Greenwich Mean Time.\textsuperscript{784}

Today, fewer than twenty structures remain in Mecca that date back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century.\textsuperscript{785} While the deliberate dynamiting of the ancient Buddhas of Bamiyan statues in Afghanistan by Taliban in March 2001 triggered a worldwide condemnation and outrage, the Saudi regime has mainly escaped any significant international criticism for bulldozing historic monuments.\textsuperscript{786} Protests by local intellectuals against the petrodollar-sponsored systematic erasure of historic sites in Mecca and Medina are without avail: in systematically erasing monuments in these cities, the Saudi elite is rewriting a history that is

\begin{itemize}
\item local Hilton hotel, the house of the Prophet’s grandson Ali-Oraid, and the Mosque of abu-Qubais in Mecca, which is replaced by King’s palace. Howden, “Shame of the House of Saud: Shadows over Mecca.”
\item Howden, “The destruction of Mecca: Saudi hardliners are wiping out their own heritage.”
\item Howden, “Shame of the House of Saud: Shadows over Mecca.”
\item Ibid.; Howden, “The destruction of Mecca: Saudi hardliners are wiping out their own heritage.”
\end{itemize}
the joint heritage of all Muslims worldwide, including Bosnian Muslims, and not only the contemporary property custodians of Mecca and Medina.

How many Islamic monuments have been erased in Bosnia for similar reasons is unknown. But what we can say with certainty today is that a double standard applies to the Wahhabi battle against idolatry. Indeed, a new form of idolatry, a sort of brand idolatry, is the mark of the work of the Saudi restorers. While decorations and graves are banished from mosques, Saudi donated carpets are decorated with the logo of the High Committee. This logo is placed on the top of the prayer rug, exactly in the place where worshipers’ heads touch the ground when worshippers kneel down in prayer (Fig. 4.15). Thus the design of the carpet links the worshippers’ most devotional and meaningful posture of prostration in front of God (in Sajda / Sujud position) with the provider of the place of worship, which under the puritan precepts of Wahhabi Islam could certainly be considered a form of idolatry. After all, the bending and prostrating towards the logo may also be understood as a form of worshiping the carpets’ donors. These industrial “Islamically” green carpets have replaced many of the traditional Bosnian hand-woven kilims (flat-weave wool carpet), which have survived the war and are now often considered valueless because they are old — despite the fact that their value actually grows over time, not to speak of the fact that they are a legacy of the entire community.787

**King Fahd Mosque and Cultural Center in Sarajevo**

In addition to the whitewashing and bulldozing, the Saudi Arabian presence in Bosnia is signaled by the appearance of several new large-scale mosques and Islamic centers. The most monumental among them is the King Fahd Mosque (2000). Adjacent to the mosque is the “King

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787 According to the Bosnian tradition, when a person dies in a community, the family of the diseased makes a precious gift to the local mosque, the most valuable of which is a carpet.
Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud Cultural Center,” founded by the President of the High Saudi Committee, Selman Ibn Abdul-Aziz, emir of the Province of Riyadh. These two buildings jointly form the King Fahd Islamic Center, the chief religious and cultural node of the Saudi Arabian network in Bosnia.

Built to promote cultural, scientific, and educational exchange between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Bosnia, the King Fahd Islamic Center offers courses in Arabic and English language and information technology, seminars in management and science, summer schools, religious education, lectures, book promotions, exhibitions, sport events and competitions, and evening meals (iftars) during Ramadan. All these services are offered for free and are open to all citizens of Bosnia, without regard to gender, nationality, or political or religious affiliation.

The King Fahd Islamic Center introduces a novel form of Islamic religious architecture in Bosnia. In the Yugoslav period before the war, there were no Islamic centers in Bosnia. After the war, three of them were built: “Princess El-Jawhara bint Ibrahim Elbrahim” Cultural Center and Mosque in Bugojno (2001) (Fig.4.16), the Cultural Center in Mostar, and the Cultural Center in Hadžići, near Sarajevo (Fig.4.17). All three were sponsored by Saudi Arabia, which ensured that they were all equipped with modern facilities offering similar educational program. Saudi Arabia also sponsored the erection of several other characteristically monumental mosques in the country, such as the grandiose “Prince Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz al Saud” Mosque (2000) in Tuzla (Fig.4.18), the second largest mosque in the country after the King Fahd Mosque.

Records of all Saudi humanitarian aid in Bosnia are displayed in the lobby-gallery of the King Fahd Islamic Center. The exhibition displays architectural models of donated mosques and

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788 The foundation of this center, as explained in its informational pamphlet, “came as a response to the pressing need for assistance to the Bosnian people through the preservation of their identity and through culture and education, and through the establishment of a cultural link between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Emir Selman personally laid the foundation stone for the Center on 2 May 1997, during the Saudi government’s first official visit to Bosnia. The Center was officially opened on 15 October 2000.
Islamic centers, which one can locate on a huge map of Bosnia in which the locations of mosques renovated with High Committee’s aid are marked with models of mosques (Fig.4.19). Displayed in golden frames are also documents of acknowledgment and letters of thanksgiving written by the Bosnian jamaats that have received financial donations from the High Committee for their mosque building projects (Fig.4.20).\textsuperscript{789}

These acknowledgments of gratitude to Gulf-Arab patrons are designed to reveal only the bright side of the reception of the Kingdom’s presence in Bosnia. However, given the overweening ambition of the Saudi financed mission, and the contemptuous dismissal of the denominational forms of Islam that have taken root in Bosnia over hundreds of years by Wahhabist missionaries, the Saudi Arabian activities in Bosnia have also been accompanied by intense public controversies and critique since the end of the war. In particular, the King Fahd Mosque has become a symbol of the Kingdom’s ideological influences on Bosnian Islam. The critics of the King Fahd Mosque and the Saudi Arabian influence that it stands for include many groups of Bosnian stakeholders:

1. local Bosnian Muslims, who practice Islam according to the Sunni Hanafi Madhab (school of jurisprudence) and disapprove of the Wahhabi interpretations;

2. local Bosnian Muslim intellectuals, who are concerned that the Rijaset is not keeping the integrity of the local Islamic tradition;

3. secular and/or agnostic inhabitants of Bosnia of all ethnic backgrounds, who disagree with any form of intensification or public display of religious life in the country;

\textsuperscript{789} Most mosques that were renovated with Saudi donations remain endowments (waqf, pl. awaqf) of the Islamic Community, the Islamic centers were built as foreign awaqf, which are granted full autonomy by the Islamic Community for a specific time period (mostly twenty years), after which these endowments will be given to the Islamic Community. In fact, when the High Committee was shut down, all mosques that it had funded, including the King Fahd Mosque, were endowed to the Bosnian Islamic Community, except the Cultural Centers in Sarajevo and Mostar, which remained waqf of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Alibasić, “Traditional and Reformist Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
and finally, 4. Serb and Croat nationalists, for whom the radical Muslims provide an easy stick with which to beat Bosnian Muslims in general.

The Bosnian Muslim critique regards the architecture of the King Fahd Mosque. Many have condemned the appearance of the Mosque for its lack of connection to its urban setting, describing it pejoratively as looking like an “alien space-ship” that landed in Sarajevo’s suburban Alipašino Polje neighborhood — a metaphor implying the Mosque’s foreignness, lack of cultural and architectural relation to the surrounding socialist high-rise housing structures from the 1980s (Fig.4.21), and, implicitly, its provenance as the brainchild of a foreign culture. Though the mosque concedes, in some of its feature (the central-dome typology, and the double minarets) to the Ottoman inspired imperial style, its luxurious marble-clad façade provides a striking contrast to the neighboring socialist housing blocks, which have been severely damaged during the war and whose facades are still perforated from shelling. The question that has remained largely unasked, in this context, is what style of architecture would indeed be compatible with the Socialist housing blocks of the Alipašino Polje neighborhood.

Another often voiced issue is that the the King Fahd Mosque, like other monumental mosques and Islamic Centers donated by Islamic countries, has a deleterious effect on the local building traditions. The issue here is that these donated mega-mosques promote the trend towards soulless monumentality in local community-mosques over any other aesthetic interest. This trend is manifested in the frequent use of double minarets and the replacement of traditional pitched roofs, which create a certain traditional irregularity in the urban profile, with concrete domes that have popped up because village communities are undeniably trying to compete with

\[790\] In contrast to its the Ottoman precedents, the mosque’s interior is devoid of any sort of decoration, which contributes to its sterile and hollow appearance. The prayer space occupies a surface of 8187 square meters and can accommodate some 3,000 worshippers. Additional 1,000 worshipers can pray in the 869 square-meter courtyard at special occasions.
the Saudi mosques. This contest for monumentality and visibility has spilled over into Christian religious architecture, as evident from the colossal and extravagant new Church of St. Luke the Evangelist (Crkva Sv. Luke Evandeliste), built in the immediate neighborhood of the King Fahd Mosque in a Catholic response to the Pan-Islamic visions in Bosnia (Fig.4.22). 791

The architecture of the Saudi-financed mosques has also diminished the vitality of the interiors of Bosnian community mosques and led to inscribing gender segregation into religious practice. Men and women pray in separate spaces in the King Fahd Mosque, the former on the ground floor, and the latter on first-floor-galleries separated from the main prayer space. Gender segregation is additionally highlighted with prohibition signs and inscriptions posted on each space’s door (Fig.4.23). Though it is true that men and women traditionally worshipped in separate spaces within Bosnian mosques, gender segregation became much more clearly articulated in mosques after the war. We can see this for example in the separate mosque entrances for each sex, or with inscriptions similar to those at the King Fahd Mosque.

Another criticism of the mosque has to do with a broader discussion about the impact, on civic life, of the increased number of new mosques in Sarajevo. This has been taken as a sign of creeping theocratism by some citizens. One critic who has voiced this complaint is Vildana Selimbegović, a journalist at the magazine DANI, who argues that no new mosques are needed in Sarajevo anymore, since the city already has ninety-six active mosques, and that money should be funneled, instead, to other public or economically more productive purposes. 792 The architect Kemal Zukić, former Director of the Center for Islamic Architecture at the Rijaset, has rejected

791 Disapproval of this extravagant looking church, built as the first Catholic house of worship in Sarajevo since 1936, culminated in the night of 24-25 March 2009, when the unfinished building was stoned by unknown perpetrators. Retrieved February 14, 2009, from Katolička Tiskovna Agencija http://www.ktabkbih.net/info.asp?id=19807 (accessed on 25 May 2005).
this line of thought, since the money in question is not fungible: if a donation is dedicated only to
temple construction, it can only be spent on mosques.\textsuperscript{793} Zukić also countered that before the
1990s war Sarajevo had eighty-six mosques, nearly all of which were located in the Old City (all
except two), adding that “over the course of the past century almost no new mosques were built,
whereas twenty-seven mosques were destroyed due to the anti-religious politics in the Kingdom
SHS [interwar Yugoslavia], NDH [the Nazi puppet state of Croatia in WWII], and the
Communist regime.\textsuperscript{794} The newer settlements in the city did not have any mosques at all.\textsuperscript{795}
Zukić also stressed that mosques still serve just as regular places of worship, and not only as
markers of territory. For that reason, there is a very pragmatic need for new houses of worship,
particularly in places where their construction was forbidden under the previous regimes. This is
particularly true in the parts of the city built during the Socialist period, which had no religious
buildings at all.\textsuperscript{796} This is why a dozen of new mosques were built in these areas after 1995,
Zukić explained. These new mosques are built only in places designated in the city’s zoning
plan, and only where they are really needed.\textsuperscript{797}

This did not end the controversy; the ninety-nine mosques provided the inspiration for
another confrontational article title in the same magazine, “99 Mosques for Multi-Ethnic
Sarajevo”, in which the journalist Belma Bećirbašić claimed that new mosques in Sarajevo
represent ethno-national inscription of territories with architectural means.\textsuperscript{798} Other reports have

\textsuperscript{793} According to Zukić, it is the private donors, and not the Islamic Community of BH, who determine the
application of their pious contributions. Kemal Zukić, interview by Azra Akšamija, 4 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{794} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{796} Kemal Zukić, interview by Azra Akšamija, 4 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{797} Bećirbašić, “99 džamija za multietničko Sarajevo,“ 28.

\textsuperscript{798} Ibid.
similarly criticized other new mosques in Sarajevo as political instruments and warned that Sarajevo is becoming a mono-ethnic (Muslim) town. 799

Kemal Zukić countered these arguments by saying that the construction of new mosques in Sarajevo is proportional to the demand brought about by the great influx of Muslims into the city during the war. 800 Said Jamaković, former Director of the Institute for Planning and Development of Canton Sarajevo, added another argument to Zukić’s by pointing out that many Muslims who settled in the city were expelled from other, rural parts of the country during the war, particularly from eastern Bosnia, where the process of return is very problematic, and in this sense the new mosques in Sarajevo are making up for the mosques that are not being built in territories in Bosnia from which Muslims have been expelled. 801 Both Zukić and Jamaković agree that the mosques only indicate the recent dramatic shift in the city’s demographics. 802 This new need is also evident from a study that the Center for Islamic Architecture conducted after the war, which Zukić has pointed to, showed that the number and the locations of mosques in Sarajevo was a function of the number of inhabitants, Muslims, and children in different parts of the city. 803

In addition to the monumental appearance of the new Islamic Centers, Muslims wearing conservative religious dress have become, since the war, much more common on the streets of Sarajevo, provoking the fear among non-Muslims and those of more liberal denominations of the

800 Kemal Zukić, interview by Azra Akšamija, 4 April 2009.
801 Said Jamaković, interview by Azra Akšamija, 17 June 2008. It can be added that this demographic shift caused complex social and political problems in Sarajevo. First, there is an awkward encounter between the city’s ethnically mixed population who has survived the siege and those who may have collaborated with the anti-Bosnian forces and have now returned to the city. Another conflict is based on the different world views of the urban and rural Bosniaks, the latter being traditionally more religious than the former.
intensification and radicalization of Islam in Bosnia. In this discourse, the King Fahd Mosque features as a sort of central foyer for discussing the infiltration of Wahhabi Islam into Bosnia. Nezim Halilović Muderis, the preaching Imam (hatib) of the King Fahd Mosque, and Director of the Waqf Directorate in Sarajevo, energetically disputes the accusation that the King Fahd Mosque is a “Wahhabi mosque”, or that its organization is part of a campaign against traditional Muslims; instead, he argues that such accusations are symptoms of an ongoing campaign of anti-Islamic political propaganda. In his function as the main imam of the King Fahd Mosque, Halilović says he makes sure that the prayer proceeds according to Sunni Hanafi Madhab. He added that the mosque is open for prayer to everyone who respects this tradition. 

Responding to the issue that pro-Wahhabi communities do come to pray in the mosque, and that some of them also sell religious equipment, books, audio and video media in front of its entrance (Fig.4.24), Halilović emphasized the need to recognize unity of all Muslims — thereby revealing his own inclination towards a global Umma — arguing that all Muslims have the right to perform the prayer ritual according to their belief or interpretation. 

Halilović asserts that the media would do better to mention the social services performed by the mosque and the jamaat it provides instead of disseminating misinformation about Wahhabis. He contends that members of the King Fahd Mosque jamaat are very active in supporting numerous humanitarian activities in East Bosnia to help the local population get back on its feet by clearing ruins and reconstructing infrastructure. The mosque has recently organized a campaign to help the ill and socially deprived. Though these and other communally

804 The King Fahd Mosque was often negatively portrayed in the BH media as the “center of Wahabism” or as the place to “gather” or “recruit” radical Islamists. Mirsad Fazlić, Belma Buljubašić, and Vedrana Maglajlija, “SB istražila tajne zadužbine Saudijskog Kralja Fahda u BiH,” Slobodna Bosna, 2 March 2006, 26.

805 Interview with Nezim Halilović by Azra Akšamija, 8 April 2009.

806 Ibid.
beneficial actions (i.e. blood donations) that take place every Friday, the King Fahd mosque has functioned as a role model for other *jamaats*, who have now started similar actions in other regions. 807

Halilović defends the size and style of the mosque by claiming that these features are the result of contemporary needs — and not some Saudi scheme to influence Bosnia. In fact, the sponsors, he claims, did not impose any architectural guidelines on the architect Ahmed Kapidžić, a Bosnian and a member of the Association of Architects Sarajevo (ASAS). 808 Thus, the design of the mosque, according to Halilović, represents the architect’s vision, his own reinterpretation of the Ottoman style. 809

Yet even if the King Fahd Islamic Center does, indeed, provide socially beneficial activities contributing to Bosnia’s process of post-war recovery, when the context of Saudi Arabia’s global proselytizing and distributed cellular governance is considered, it is clear that this Islamic Center cannot be treated as though Saudi gifts have no strings attached; it is much more likely that the Saudi gift to Sarajevo’s Muslims is another case of the Saudi pattern of using its oil wealth to build mosques as a vehicle for facilitating the Saudi monarchy’s sectarian preference and for increasing Saudi Arabia’s political influence.

The controversy around the King Fahd Islamic Center indicates that the activities of the Saudi Arabian network and the pressures of global Islam in Bosnia have generated new spheres of friction in the Bosnian society. The next section explores the interpretative, the administrative, and the representational domains of this friction. 810

807 Ibid.
808 Ibid.
809 Interview with Nezim Halilović by Azra Akšamija on 8 April 2009.
810 Sarajlić, “The Return of the Consuls: Islamic Networks and Foreign Policy Perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”
2. Domains of social friction

The position of the Islamic Community with regard to Saudi activities in Bosnia, particularly as they have introduced a Wahhabi missionary program into the region, is ambiguous, and at times contradictory. Ever since the end of the war, the Rijaset has understandably been hesitant to take any action that might lead to a fracturing of the Bosnian Islamic community; as that community is made up of different teachings and tendencies, so, too, the Rijaset has tried to practice tolerance for those groups that are not in agreement with its own Sunni Hanafi teachings. The Rijaset evidently prefers keeping the Islamic Community unified as a political actor in the highly contested post-war inter-ethnic politics over policing the activities of the pro-Wahhabi groups, even at the cost of ignoring the Wahhabi’s thrust for ideological power in the Islamic sphere. By the same token, the Rijaset has also benefited from the humanitarian aid of Islamic countries both financially and in its display of administrative power over local jamaats, which it did not have before the war to the same extent.

In any case, the Rijaset’s failure to limit Wahhabi missionary work has allowed Islamic groups parallel to or outside of the “official” Bosnian Islamic Community to set up shop, so to speak. The Mufti of Sarajevo, Husein ef. Smajić, told a reporter for the newspaper “Oslobodenje” that in any case, the Islamic Community cannot do much legally to control the actions and development of such parallel Islamic communities, as many of them are officially registered as humanitarian organizations. Once they started establishing their own jamaats,

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811 Husein ef. Smajić stated that pro-Wahhabi organizations have indeed taken roots in Bosnia, registering themselves as civil and/or humanitarian organizations during the war, but that they exist and act outside of the official system of the Islamic Community. Hodžić, “Barčiću i njegovom "pokretnom džematu" potrebni su incidenti,” 5.
these organizations also began undermining the Rijaset’s role as the sole legal and representative Islamic authority in Bosnia.

The latter role was first thrust upon the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1882, when the Austro-Hungarian government named Hilmi ef. Omerović the first Bosnian Grand Mufti. Prior to this date, Muslims in Bosnia were under the legal and religious jurisdiction of the Ottoman sultan. With the coming of Austro-Hungarian rule to the region, the status of Muslims changed dramatically; they moved from being privileged adherents of the Ottoman Empire’s official religion to being a minority within the officially Catholic Habsburg Monarchy. Though Islam in the Austro-Hungarian Empire was recognized as one of the Monarchy’s religions, and the state guaranteed the freedom of religious expression and practice, the Austro-Hungarian government policy was directed at diminishing the influence of the Ottoman caliph on the Balkans in general and of the Bosnian Muslims in particular, and to that end, the Empire created the autonomous Bosnian Islamic Community headed by the Reis-ul-ulama in 1909.

Though the position and structure of the Islamic Community has changed with the dramatic changes that have been wrought over the course of the twentieth century — during the Yugoslav period, for example, the state gradually stripped the Islamic Community of its influence, educational institutions, and possessions — the Islamic Community ultimately

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812 The Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina defines itself as “the sole and unique community of Muslims living in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Bosniaks living outside their homeland and other Muslims who accept this community as their own. The Meshihat of the Islamic Community of Sandžak, the Meshihat of the Islamic Community of Croatia and the Meshihat of the Islamic Community of Slovenia are all constituents of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” “Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina - Sentinel and Principles,” Rijaset (Sarajevo), October 7, 2008, http://www.rijaset.ba/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47&Itemid=53; Enes Durmišević, Uspostava I Pravni Položaj Rijaseta Islamske Zajednice U Bosni I Herzegovini: 1882-1899, Editio Memoria iuris knj. 2 (Sarajevo: Magistrat, 2002); Istorijski Razvoj Institucije Rijaseta (Sarajevo: Rijaset Islamske zajednice u RBiH, 1996).

retained authority as the sole official administrative and interpretative Islamic organization in Bosnia until the present date. All *waqf* properties and religious education fall under its control. Moreover, it is not denominationally neutral: its doctrines are framed by the Sunni Hanafi Madhhab (school of Islamic jurisprudence), as has been generally the case in Bosnia for more than four centuries.\(^{814}\)

This state of affairs was seriously challenged by the threat to the survival of the entire Islamic community posed by ethnic irredentists during the course of the 1992-1995 war. Today, the ideological differences between the Wahhabi groups and traditional Muslims often boil over into incidents and fights that occur even inside mosques over differences in religious practices.\(^{815}\)

One of the confrontations took place in the village of Kalesija in 2006, where a group of Wahhabis had taken over the local mosque, and chased away the local Imam.\(^{816}\) Another quarrel occurred in Sarajevo in February 2007, when Jusuf Barčić, a Wahhabi imam from the village of Barčići, came to Sarajevo with his so-called “traveling *jamaat*” to lecture in the Emperor’s Mosque (Fig.4.25).\(^{817}\) The official Imam of the Emperor’s Mosque locked him out.

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\(^{814}\) This legal school was established in Bosnia during the Ottoman period, since the Sunni Hanafi madhhab was the official legal school in the Ottoman Empire; it is worth remarking that there has also been a strong Sufi presence in the region since the fourteenth century, just as there was in other parts of the Empire. Among the four chief Islamic schools — the other three being the Shafi’i, Maliki, and Hanbali Madhhab — the Hanafi School is the oldest one and has the most followers. The Hanafi School is predominant in Turkey and most Islamic societies in the Balkans, as well as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Central Asia, China, Russia, and Ukraine. For more information about the Islamic jurisprudence schools see for example: Abdur Rahim, *The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence According to the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali Schools*, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1994); For more information about the Islamic jurisprudence schools see: ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Jazīrī, *Islamic Jurisprudence According to the Four Sunni Schools* (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2009).

\(^{815}\) Jasmina Šarac, “Tuča mještanica i vehabija,” *Nezavisne Novine*, 5 March 2007, 3.; Almir Šečkanović, “Protesti mještanica par sela,” *Oslobodenje*, 14 November 2007, 8. Some conflicts are carried out over the position of legs during the prayer, whereby reformists try to alter the traditionalists’ manner of praying.


\(^{817}\) Barčići’s *jamaat* has been called “traveling *jamaat*” because he and his group of followers travel from one city to another, propagating their teachings and searching for new followers. Šefko Hodžić, “Barčiću i njegovom "pokretnom džematu" potrebni su incidenti,” *Oslobodenje*, 24 February 2007, 4-5.
— the first time the doors had been literally locked in the mosque’s history — to prevent a clash between the local jamaat and Barčić’s followers.\textsuperscript{818}

In the village of Barčići, Stephen Schwartz reports, “some 100 locals expelled 15 Wahhabis in 2007, who had taken over the local religious primary school, or mekteb.”\textsuperscript{819} Disturbed that Wahhabis had taken over their mosque — by praying there, reading, and giving lectures, or sometimes even staying in there over night — the village inhabitants removed all Wahhabi literature and equipment, including the stove and the electricity generator, which the group had installed to facilitate prayers in the mekteb day and night. The citizens of Barčići were even determined to close down the mekteb, if needed be, just to prevent the Wahhabi group from occupying it again.\textsuperscript{820}

The list of incidents, Önder Çetin adds, also includes three attacks of Wahhabi groups on non-Muslim Bosnians: the murder of three members of the Catholic Andelid family in 2002, a fight in the village of Maoča in 2003, and an attack on a Serb inhabitant of Brčko, Mihajlo Kisić, in 2006.\textsuperscript{821} Wahhabi groups have also verbally provoked and insulted Bosnian Serb returnees in Jablanica and Gornja Maoča, places where, as Çetin notes, “the settled mujahidin reside, since they moved from Bocinja in central Bosnia in late 2000 and 2001.”\textsuperscript{822}

While incidents such as these gained Wahhabi groups notoriety in the mass media, these incidents were also instrumental to Bosnian Serb politicians such as Milorad Dodik to stir up fear


\textsuperscript{820} Schwartz, “Bosnia Cracks Down on Wahhabism | The Weekly Standard.”

\textsuperscript{821} Çetin, “Mujahidin in Bosnia: From Ally to Challenger,” 14.

\textsuperscript{822} Ibid.
of the “Wahhabi threat” and the alleged “creation of a Muslim state in the heart of Europe.” Juan Carlos Antúnez, a Spanish military attaché who has studied Bosnian Islamic groups, points to the fact that Wahhabism is portrayed in the media as both a growing trend and a threat to Bosnian and wider European security. The rhetoric used in such reports, as Antúnez analyzes, mimics the discourse of the 1990s, whereby the terms “Islamic fundamentalism” became replaced with “Wahhabism.” In reality, however, Wahhabi Islam has never gained a sizeable following in Bosnia, and the number of its followers remains quite low. The other side of the coin, Antúnez claims, is that the Islamic press in Bosnia has tried to ignore the Wahhabis and tends to downplay their impact on the local religious practices.

The Islamic Community is internally divided in regard to what to do about the presence of Wahhabi Muslims and other proselytizing communities in Bosnia. Responding to the criticism that they have not acted against the establishment of these communities, Reisu-l-ulema, Dr. Mustafa ef. Cerić replied that the threat of Wahhabism is exaggerated in Bosnia, and is used as an excuse for a politicized “witch-hunt,” as he once phrased it, aimed at distracting the public attention from the recent genocide against Muslims, while spreading Islamophobia. In an interview for the daily newspaper “Dnevni Avaz” in December 2006, Cerić stressed that the Islamic Community will not be trapped in such political provocations that are aimed to internally

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823 Önder Çetin states that Serb politicians such as Milorad Dodik use rhetoric similar to the pre-war nationalists’ propaganda before the war. Ibid., 14-15.
825 Ibid.
826 Ibid.
divide Muslims. Admitting that certain individuals are indeed disrespecting the local Islamic customs and traditions of tolerance, Cerić issued an assurance that the Islamic Community will take all necessary actions to protect and preserve the integrity of Bosnia’s Islamic tradition.

In fact, Reis Cerić had already undertaken some protective measures during the war by issuing a *fatwa* (published on 13 November 1993) that stresses the commitment of Muslims in Bosnia to the Hanafi Madhhab. The increasing pressure of global Islam during the first decade after the war prompted the Rijaset to request a legal action from the Bosnian government: the result was a law issued in 2006 that grants them monopoly power over all organizations or communities with the prefix “Islamic.” In addition, Cerić issued two new *fatwas* (in March and November 2006), emphasizing the need to protect the tradition of Bosnian Muslims in line with the Hanafi Madhhab and the reasserting the Rijaset’s institutional and authority to guard and guide this tradition. This coercive measure was an exception, as Önder Çetin points out, because the Islamic Community “typically tries to sustain its hegemony by legitimizing its discourse and reconfiguring alliances horizontally and vertically to gain the consent of its

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829 Ibid.  
830 Ibid.  
832 Subsequently, the Islamic Community filed a legal request to rename all organizations with the “Islamic” prefix that have not given adherence to the Rijaset. In addition, Islamic Community has formed a commission to investigate further details about the existence of parallel Islamic communities. So far, the commission has collected information about five such groups. Their exact number is indefinite. The Mufti of Sarajevo, Husein ef. Smajić, assumes that they are not numerous, but that they may appear so because they travel to different cities to attract new followers in mosques, where they are very visible and aggressive. Hodži, “Barčiću i njegovom ”pokretnom džematu” potrebni su incidenti,” 5.  
members of the traditional congregation, as well as followers of the Wahhabi-oriented movements."

It should be noted that the Bosnian Islamic Community has also attempted to promote itself on the wider European level. Reis Cerić has become a sought-after speaker at diverse political and inter-religious events across Europe with his message about the moderate tradition of Bosnian Muslims and their Eurocentricity. His “Declaration of European Muslims” published in five languages in 2006 calls for the institutionalization of Islam in Europe, which Cerić sees as a necessary step to counter terrorist networks on the continental level. It can be speculated that if Cerić’s vision were ever to become a reality, the Bosnian Islamic Community, and its Rijaset would be well positioned to take on a leading role in it.

Yet, Reis Cerić has also faced internal criticism from within the Islamic Community, as expressed by different Muslim intellectuals such as Prof. Dr. Rešid Hafizović from the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo and former adherents of Wahhabi Islam such as Jasmin Merdan. In the essay “Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Wahhabis. They are coming to take our children” published in Sarajevo’s daily newspaper “Oslobodenje” in November 2006, Hafizović sharply criticized the passivity of the Rijaset in regard to limiting the activities of Wahhabi groups. The Rijaset openly distanced itself from Hafizović; nevertheless, his essay still...
managed to stir a wave of controversy, putting into question the Rijaset political strategy and the internal power relationships within the Islamic Community, as well as broader issues of freedom of religious belief versus security. 839

Evident from these and other public discussions taking place over the course of the past decade is that the ideological influences of global and transnational Islamic networks have polarized the Bosnian Islamic Community into those who deny or minimize the existence of Saudi networks and their impact on the Islamic tradition in Bosnia, and those who fear these networks and advocate restraining or suppressing them.

It would be simplistic, however, to assess the impact of foreign Islamic actors only in terms of such polarization. As stated earlier, the humanitarian aid from Islamic countries has contributed significantly to the revival of Islamic communities in Bosnia. These donations also allowed the Rijaset to gain visibility and institutional authority over the individual jamaats -- it did not have this authority before the war to the same extent -- which it increased by mediating the process of channeling the funds for mosque restorations. When requesting financial support, the individual communities formed representative and leadership structures, such as the Mosque Building Committees and Executive Committees, thus joining the Islamic Community’s organizational framework. Before the war, the majority of mosques and imams were linked with the Islamic Community, but not all jamaats were organized according to the Community’s hierarchical system; therefore, the Rijaset did not necessarily have oversight concerning all the activities of the jamaats. Strengthening of the Islamic Community’s organizational structures

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immediately reacted to this essay, and distanced itself explicitly from Hafizović’s critique, which it felt to be inadequate. Elvir Huremović, “Rijaset reagirao na tekst profesora Rešida Hafizovića. Naša sudbina je na žici koja je oštrija od sablje” Dnevni Avaz, 27 November 2006, 9.; What the Rijaset found particularly problematic was Hafizović’s evaluation and general judgments about the history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which Rijaset felt to be inappropriate, especially in consideration of all the humanitarian aid that the Kingdom provided for Bosnia.
after the war, and their centralization, thus evolved in part due to the need to organize the distribution of humanitarian aid and funds for rebuilding mosques.

Saudi Arabian donations for restoration and rebuilding of destroyed mosques were locally distributed through the Center of Islamic Architecture, an institution formed in 1995 upon Reis Cerić’s initiative, on behalf of the Rijaset in Sarajevo. When intending to rebuild their mosques or to construct new ones, the individual communities had the opportunity to apply at the Center for partial or full financial support from the Saudi High Committee. At this point, the Rijaset was able to draw together information about different mosques throughout the country, documenting their degree of destruction, previous renovations and patrons. Some of these mosques had never been recorded. The process of documenting and registering the property of the Islamic Community contributed to aggrandizing the Rijaset’s control over the jamaats in Bosnia. At the same time, the documentation and registration of mosques allowed for more transparency concerning the activities of the Islamic Community; most mosque communities in Bosnia are today represented online, either through the Medžlis (regional council of jamaats) websites, or the Rijaset website.

Given the fact that most mosque communities lacked funding and qualified personnel for renovating their mosques, the team of the Center’s architects filled the gap by offering jamaats to help in design and administrative issues. The Center drew up and distributed “standardized” mosque plans, which had been developed before the war in the 1980s, in three sizes, to speed up the building permit process. As the jamaats were copying these plans, the exploitation of the

840 The Center was headed by the architect Kemal Zukić from 1995 until 2006, and since then by the architect Fatima Šišić. “Centar za Islamsku Arhitekturu (CIA),” Rijaset (Sarajevo), December 27, 2006, http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=74&Itemid=204.


842 These websites feature short histories of mosques and cities in which they are located, biography of imams, news about local events, discussion forums and Q&A sections.
same model led to standardization of vernacular designs to some extent: most of the mosques that were renovated or built anew with donations channeled through the Rijaset are recognizable from their similar facades and uniform size (Fig.4.26). Yet these mosques are not identical, which means that the informal and improvised nature of construction left its mark even on the standardized plans, with the builders’ personal tastes, as well as the available materials and resources, leaving their traces.

The issue of mosque designs brings us to the work of the Rijaset’s Center for Islamic Architecture. Kemal Zukić, the architect who was the founding director of the Center, directly involved himself in creating and constructing a number of mosques throughout the country, such as those in Bosanski Petrovac and Sanski Most (Fig.4.27). Zukić’s mosques are mostly derived from the Bosnian Ottoman style, although Zukić included as “signature” elements the sand-colored brick of outer walls, large scale calligraphic decorations of facades in white brick, and squinches made of glass, which Zukić claims as his invention. Another constant feature is the portico, which is made of reinforced concrete with reclined rectangular openings and rounded corners (Fig.4.28).

By offering architectural guidance in the building process to a countryside in desperate need of it, the Center for Islamic Architecture became one of the most important and most vibrant catalysts for mosque renovations in the first decade after the war. In this period, the Rijaset increased its visibility and authority over local jamaats building by building.
Conclusion

This chapter has mapped out the different lines of influence of various Islamic countries as they affected the interpretation of Islam and mosque architecture in post-war Bosnia. Except for Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia, the major Islamic powers, first intervened in Bosnia during the war, when they sought to aid Muslims against the threat of mass murder mounted by various other denominational and ethnic groups. In the aftermath of the war, Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia all offered humanitarian aid through state apparatuses and through denominational intermediaries. Their sponsorship was a key factor in making possible the rapid, widespread restoration and renovation of mosques in tandem with the revitalization of devastated communities that was witnessed in Bosnia. Yet they exercised their power at a price, which was to reinforce favored ideologies, oftentimes bringing about disturbances and ruptures of traditional Islamic Bosnian legacies. The most dramatic cases had to do with the Saudi program, which led to the appearance of Wahhabism in Bosnia (a hitherto rare or non-existent denomination) and their tendency to aggressive forms of missionary work. These denominational groups have polarized the Bosnian Muslims around the question of how to preserve the local identity and Islamic traditions.

The activities and impact of these Islamic networks has been and is still in the state of constant flux. The Iranian network, which provided key military help during the war, has had little impact on post-war mosque architecture, since there is no strong Shiite presence in Bosnia. The Saudi Arabian network, on the other hand, was particularly influential in the first two decades after the war, due to its enormous financial capabilities: Saudi backed sponsors provided major financial resources for rebuilding and building of mosques. Little active during and directly after the war in Bosnia, the Turkish network, which is denominationally and historically
closer to Bosnian Muslim practices, have become gradually more present and more influential in both political and religious affairs at the Balkans, as Turkey has started to counter the spread of Wahhabi Islam in what it considers to be its traditional zones of influence.

Though ideologically diverging, all three networks have been engaged in shaping and modifying the practice of Islam in Bosnia, making them more compatible to their own religious inclinations. These religious traditions allow varying degrees of ecumenism, which can be seen in mosque architecture. Thus, the renovation and new construction of mosques performed a vital representational and mediating function to create a space of encounter for different interpretations of Islam. In as much as denominational differences within indigenous, transnational, and global Islam are sometimes sharp and almost insurmountable, frictions have split the surface of Islamic unity and destabilized the Bosnian Islamic Community in the era of recuperation.

This friction sheds light on the two chief issues that are negotiated through mosque architecture. The first regards the question of who speaks for Bosnian Muslims. The negotiation of the different local and transnational actors’ attitudes towards this issue is architecturally articulated in the different approaches to reinterpreting the Ottoman architectural heritage to which all have turned. Both Arab and Turkish patrons have been attracted to the monumentality of the domed mosques, as though size alone was enough of a visual means of signaling both their religious and cultural alliance with Bosnian Muslims and their territorial claims. The difference between the Arab and Turkish patrons is that the former are inclined to deploy the puritanist approach to design that corresponds to the Wahhabi prohibitions on what it regards as idolatry, whereas the latter are more likely to emulate the grandeur of mosques built at the peak of the Ottoman Empire’s power.
The appearance of large scale mosques and Islamic Centers throughout the country has prompted some local *jamaats* to compete architecturally with these donated mosques on the monument scale, negating the more intimate vernacular mosque designs of the past. A notable feature of this shift is in the replacement of pitched roofs, a traditional Bosnian motif, with large domes. Indeed, I would argue that the drive, here, is all about the visibility that distinguishes the global, the regional and the local actors.

The second issue is related to the first and concerns the place of Islam in Europe and the world at large. Bosnia is such a key place to study global Islamic trends because it is here that Islamic world meets in Europe in form of mosque architecture. The indigenous Islamic tradition of Bosnia is thereby being transformed under pressures of global Islam and the secular currents from Europe. A barometer of the changes globalization is producing can be seen in the massive transformation of vernacular cultures. Mosque architecture in post-war Bosnia, in its sudden turn to the monumental neo-Ottoman style, reveals simultaneous processes of cultural heterogenization and homogenization. The appearance of the competing interpretations of Islam has brought about a heterogenization of the Islamic practices in Bosnia, which are architecturally manifested in the very diverse contemporary mosque designs. At the same token, we find at work a central homogenization of Muslim’s organizational and representational structures, with designs being derived from a small set of pre-existing blueprints. This is rendered visible when we look at the mosques that were rebuilt with the help of The Rijaset’s Center for Islamic Architecture.

While my thesis highlights the ways that the mosque provides a staging ground for creations of identity in the local and global context, the relationship between the global and indigenous Islam in Bosnia should not be simplified according to a local-global dichotomy. The
agencies engaged in mosque building practice are highly diverse, as we have seen. Given their ideological discrepancies and diverging interests in the region, some of the actors rely extensively on mosque architecture to put forward their agenda, while others operate through non-architectural means. Cultural flows in today’s globalized world, as social-cultural anthropologist Arjun Appadurai reminds us, are fractal and overlapping.\textsuperscript{843} The agency of mosque architecture, in this context, is embedded in these greater global processes and social dynamics.

On a more abstract level, I have tried to map out the material and semiotic relations between people, institutions, and architecture. Using models derived from Actor Network Theory, we can see how both human and non-human parameters, and local and global agencies, shape the process of social and political transformation of Bosnian society in a post-war and post-socialist state. The analysis of new phenomena in mosque architecture can help understand this transformation, if analyzed as a complex web of actions performed by people, institutions, and objects. As the positions of actors and actants are enacted and rearranged, the state of constant flux exposes the internal contradictions that form the dynamic axes of these positions.

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I investigated what I considered to be three crucial parameters of identity — territory, cultural authenticity, and religion — across three different scales as shown in the main chapters: the local building process, the regional, and the global. On the scale of the local building process, the post-war mosque revival has allowed Bosnian Muslims to construct concrete symbols for their myth of national origins in response to the national myths of the Serbs and Croats. Mosque design has provided the Bosnian Muslims with means to define their authenticity and demonstrate their deep cultural rootedness. On the regional scale, mosque architecture has served as an instrument for demarcating the Bosnian Muslims’ territories within the framework of the Dayton Peace Agreement, thereby presenting their claims to territorial integrity of the Bosnian state complete with its multi-ethnic and multi-national character. On the global scale, mosque architecture has become a space in which local traditions intersect with global interventions, making the mosque a site through which the question of the future place of Islam in Europe and the world at large can be considered.

These three scales of analysis have uncovered two new genres of mosques: the Inat Mosque and the Memorial Mosque that were studied in the second chapter. They have, moreover, revealed the shifting meanings of mosque architecture as exemplified by the process of authentication of vernacular mosques examined in chapter three, as well as the friction between the Pan-Islamic and the Neo-Ottoman visions of identity discussed in chapter four. Though some of these phenomena have historical precursors in Bosnia, the war has imbued them with new connotations. All of the phenomena identified in this study have been conceptually
defined on the basis of their intended messages, though they may share some of the same formal and stylistic characteristics. Though my analysis has partly followed a semiotic approach to reading architectural form and meaning, my findings highlight the procedural and the performative aspects of architecture. In the case of the Inat Mosque in particular, my dissertation has demonstrated that meaning in architecture is communicated not only through the symbolic language or stylistic choices, but also through the very process of its becoming a public statement, its naming and performing of an action.

Because there have not been many previous studies on which I could build my discussion of post-war mosques in Bosnia, this dissertation first required a great amount of primary fieldwork and subsequent quantitative analysis. The stage of qualitative analysis that I pursued after the field research primarily centered on the process of architectural construction; the performativity of religious architecture and its social agency are themes that I became increasingly interested in at the later stages of my work. In my future studies, I intend to further investigate and theorize the concept of inat in architecture from philosophical and linguistic perspectives, grounding it as a specific cultural phenomenon within socio-political and cultural contexts that bring it into being.

Another avenue for future research is related to the social and cognitive aspects of architecture and its capacity to foster community making on the psychological level. I am particularly interested in pursuing research on the role of religious architecture in advancing social healing of communities affected by conflicts. This is the topic that I was initially drawn to the most when I began researching my dissertation, but that will require further fieldwork and analysis. Related to this issue is my theoretical concern with alienation — the question of how the conditions of estrangement and antagonism are produced through /in architecture — which I
intend to theorize by drawing from studies of Orientalism and in response to contemporary debates on European multiculturalism.

The broader theme that this dissertation has opened up for future research is the potency of architecture to facilitate the process of transformative mediation in cultural or political conflicts, and in so doing, to provide a framework for researching, analyzing, and intervening in contested socio-political realities. In what ways are architectural phenomena not only symptoms of socio-political conflicts, but also instruments for their mediation? If architecture can contribute to the deepening of conflicts, does it also have the potential for conflict resolution? Finally, can ethnic conflicts be influenced through architectural means? Useful to me in this regard was the application of Gene Sharp’s theory of non-violent action, but my future explorations of this subject could also benefit from other theories of political resistance within the cultural sphere. This type of investigation could be expanded with research into the shifting concepts of citizenship and the individual’s participation in the creation of states.

Analyzing the role of architecture as a form of citizens’ active participation in state-making, this dissertation has demonstrated the function of religious architecture as an agent of socio-political change. A crucial finding has been that even when mosques were (re)built in pursuit of political goals, the motivations for their building were always multifaceted. Hence, the concern with an intensification of mosque building activities in post-war Bosnia has to be evaluated against the background of war destruction and the fact that 70% of pre-existing mosques were either destroyed or heavily damaged in a systematic manner.

Furthermore, and notwithstanding my focus on the different forms of social and political friction, it should be stressed that every mosque-building project discussed in this dissertation was also driven by cultural and devotional reasons. My intention has been to demonstrate that
mosques in Bosnia are not only about politics, but rather that they are primarily about communities, and as such have become a medium for increasing social competence and constructing a better functioning, healthier society. The manner in which individual communities have rebuilt their mosques — in a self-organized and mostly self-financed manner — contests many of the official media’s accounts and proclamations of some nationalist politicians that the new and rebuilt mosques in Bosnia were a clear sign of Muslim fundamentalism and/or Bosniak nationalism. The majority of mosque builders had started rebuilding their mosques on their own and not because they were told to do so by some overarching organization or political party. To differentiate between nationalism and inat is crucial, for these two terms are not the same even if they both entail engaging in a conflict: though instances of nationalist statements within contemporary mosque architecture do exist, the proliferation of inat mosques points to the fact that individuals and communities are getting the upper hand over nationalism. In other words, this new genre of vernacular mosque architecture in Bosnia represents a challenge to the black-and-white categories of identity framed by nationalists. As such, inat mosques also indicate the return of normal life to the region, as much as it is even possible to talk about normalcy after all the brutalities the local population has suffered.

Since this dissertation was motivated by a very difficult reality — the atrocities and injustices that affected people of all ethnic groups and denominations in Bosnia during the war — to conclude it begs the question of whether coexistence in the region will ever be possible again. How can people live side by side in light of their recent history and their still open wounds? Can architecture help nurture the process of recovery of peaceful coexistence?

To begin with, we need to acknowledge that the larger process of restoring the fabric of the Bosnian society is already underway in part through the process of building and rebuilding of
religious architecture. This process is not only about the physical recovery of buildings and community spaces, but also about the (re)collecting of erased memory and rewriting of lost history. Revealing the transformation of meaning through the violence of war, I hope to have demonstrated that the equating of architectural symbols with people assigns enormous power to architecture. When Victor Hugo described architecture as a signifier of society, he implied that architecture could reflect the different stages of human psychological and intellectual achievement. In accompanying the development of human thought, he argued, architecture phrased the human progression with visual means. Following Hugo’s notion of architecture as “the great book of humanity,” mosque architecture in Bosnia can be understood as an instrument of comprehension, or as a form of speech. Given the deliberate targeting of libraries and archives during the war, architecture represents the most evident form of narrating history in Bosnia. Religious architecture, in this context, is a soundless communicator, a method of writing and documenting of history. Mosques, churches and synagogues that had once inscribed Bosnia’s multicultural history had fallen victim to the nationalist extremists because this history did not fit into the nationalists’ versions of the past. Consequently, the rebuilding of any destroyed religious monument in Bosnia inevitably becomes a political statement: the mosque provides a framework for defining the identity of its community, regardless of the multifaceted rationales behind its construction.

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845 Ibid., 261.

846 Hugo, “One Shall Destroy the Other,” 259.

847 John Summerson discusses classical architecture as “speaking” a language and explains its grammatical rules from which continuous architectural “departures” can happen, but which “remain still recognizable as standards throughout all buildings that may be called classical.” The five classical orders of architecture (Tuscan, Doric, Ionic, Corinthian, and Composite) are standards, but they are not meant to be replicated without a possibility of invention. John Summerson, *The Classical Language of Architecture* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1966), 7-8.
As much as history represents a sphere of “contamination” from which nationalists have
drawn their ideological inspiration, history can also provide the sources of “decontamination”
that can contribute to the recovery of Bosnia’s history of coexistence. Though many have given
up on this idea — understandably so, given the extent of violence they have suffered — there are
many hopeful examples that testify to the fact that the nationalists have not entirely achieved
their goal. This issue is not necessarily best evaluated in the sphere of architecture; demographic
data and the numbers of the so-called “mixed marriages,” for example, would be a much better
area where to conduct such an investigation. Architecture, however, is the most visible sign of
return to the ethnically cleansed territories, a sign that people have managed to reestablish a base
for living in regions from which they were expelled, while bringing back the “old spirit” of
multicultural Bosnia to these purified nationalists’ creations. One hopeful example that I
encountered during my fieldwork was the restoration of the Begsuja Mosque (1776) in Zvornik,
which was razed to the ground in 1992 together with two other remaining mosques in the city.\footnote{Mustafa ef. Muharemović, a historian and imam of the Begsuja Mosque, explains that he favored an “authentic” approach to renovation, despite the lack of surviving plans or other documentation about the pre-war}Begsuja was the first mosque to be rebuilt in Zvornik between 2002 and 2004, and the only one
that has been restored there since the Dayton Peace Agreement. The reappearance of this
mosque in the skyline of Zvornik implies an optimistic outlook on the future, not because the
mosque’s renovation was possible at all given the political obstacles faced in this regard in the
Serb Republic, but because of the community’s insistence on reconstructing the mosque as
closely as possible to its destroyed prototype (Fig.0.5). Mustafa ef. Muharemović, a historian
and imam of the Begsuja Mosque, explains that he favored an “authentic” approach to
renovation, despite the lack of surviving plans or other documentation about the pre-war

\footnote{Mustafa ef. Muharemović, historian and Imam of the Begsuja Mosque, interview by Azra Akšamija on July 12, 2008.}
structure. He wanted to restore the “antiquity” of the mosque, that is, to bring back the history of the Muslims’ coexistence with the Serbs in the region that this mosque also stood for. Muharemovid and his jamaat wanted to recover Bosnian history of coexistence by reinserting their own physical presence in Zvornik and demonstrating it with their new-old mosque.

As much as people may have become aware of their identity only because of genocide that targeted their ethnic or religious group, identity may now become a burden for them after the war. To prevent identity from becoming destiny, the awareness of its flexibility is crucial — only by acknowledging and coming to terms with all the complexities and contradictions that one’s identity entails may one escape its negative effects. While doing my fieldwork, I found it very promising to encounter the new generation of Bosnian imams, who were often well educated and cosmopolitan, as well as open to acknowledging the complexities that weigh heavily on Bosnia’s long history of coexistence.

What is the place of architecture in this discussion? It would be naïve to suggest that architecture itself can change the world in the sense of the modernist architects’ notion of architecture conditioning new forms of society. Rather, the place of architecture, I believe, is to function as a silent communicator and mediator between cultures, a form of cultural pedagogy. As seen in the majority of vernacular mosques in Bosnia, religious architecture may not necessarily be aimed at provoking antagonism (though there are certainly instances of it in some places), but rather at mediating and reinserting the presence of one group among the others. This type of agenda may be a form of territorial demarcation, but it is much more a form of presenting oneself to other local groups and the world at large through architecture.

849 Ibid.
By re-learning to “read” each other’s architectural statements, people in Bosnia may re-learn to coexist — yet, this requires the willingness to engage in dialogue and calls for an active contribution from all sides. To reach this point, all sides first need to assess and acknowledge what happened in the war. We can only know what needs to be recovered when we realize what was lost. Fifteen years after the war, Bosnia has reached yet another critical moment, as the historically porous boundaries between its ethnic groups are increasingly hardening: the spirit of Bosnia’s coexistence that had survived the war is under renewed attack from internal nationalism and imported religious exclusivism. It is my hope that this dissertation will help shed more light on this issue and contribute to its eventual resolution.

The more general contribution that this case study of Bosnia can make to the humanities and the production of knowledge in broader terms is related to my highlighting of identity’s fluidity. The uncovering of the diverse and contradictory aspects of Bosnia’s religious, cultural, political, and architectural identities contributes to the breaking down of the nationalists’ illusions of homogenous communities. Because nationalists believe that their imagined societies are pure and uniform entities, they are inclined to reject anything that is considered a “contamination.” Yet, national communities are also real communities that consist of real people. In reality, then, as we learn from Bosnia, a people’s characteristics are much more complex and their actions much more contradictory than the nationalist ideologies want them to be. To recognize this complexity, inconsistency, and porosity of the various groups’ defining boundaries allows for the acknowledgement of differences and their inclusion in the more fluid social identities.
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<td>BH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>ef.</td>
<td>Efendija</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HVO</td>
<td>HrvatskoVijeće Obrane (Croat Defense Council)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Islamic Community (or IZ Islamska Zajednica)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPM</td>
<td>Institute for Protection of Cultural Monuments and Natural Rarities in Sarajevo (Zavod za zaštitu spomenika kulture i prirodnih rijetkosti u Sarajevu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Community of Ustikolina</td>
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<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija (Yugoslav People’s Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VRS</td>
<td>Vojska Republike Srpske (Army of the Serb Republic)</td>
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### GLOSSARY OF BOSNIAN AND ISLAMIC TERMS

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<tr>
<td>Abdesthana</td>
<td>Ablution space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alem</td>
<td>A decorative element placed on the top of minaret’s roof, usually made in copper and in form of a crescent with three balls aligned below it</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bašluk</td>
<td>Muslim tombstone made (stone or wood)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bajram</td>
<td>Arabic Eid, Islamic religious holiday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ćaršija</td>
<td>Market in the Ottoman city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Džamija</td>
<td>Mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Džemat (pl. džemati)</td>
<td><em>Jjamaat</em>, or mosque community, in the Bosnian context the džemat is the smallest administrative / lowest hierarchical unit of the overall Islamic Community of BH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Džematlija (pl. džematlije)</td>
<td>Member of a mosque congregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Džuma</td>
<td><em>Jummaah</em>, Friday Prayer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Četnik (pl. Četnici)</td>
<td>Member of the Serbian nationalist and royalist political movement and paramilitary group that was active in the region before and during the First World War and Second World War; the term was recently revived in the 1990s war</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
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<tr>
<td>ef.</td>
<td>Abbreviation for <em>efendija</em> (from Ottoman Turkish <em>efendi</em>), a title for a religiously well educated and well respected man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatwa</td>
<td>Legal pronouncement by an Islamic jurisconsult (mufti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasulhana</td>
<td>Mortuary / space for washing the dead in preparation for the burial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hadith</td>
<td>Narrations concerning the deeds and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hadžija</td>
<td>A title for a person who has fulfilled the Hajj pilgrimage to Mecca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han</td>
<td>Caravanserai, hostel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajduk (pl. Hajduci)</td>
<td>Outlaw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haram</td>
<td>Sinful, ritually impure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harem</td>
<td>Mosque graveyard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatib</td>
<td>Preaching imam, muslim cleric holding Friday sermons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam</td>
<td>Islamic cleric, prayer leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat</td>
<td>See definition for Džemat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasaba</td>
<td>Small provincial town with at least one mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahala</td>
<td>Residential quarter in the Ottoman city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medresa / Madrassa</td>
<td>Religious secondary school</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medžlis</td>
<td>Regional council, an organizational body within the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina responsible for a group of džemati of a municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekteb / Mejtef</td>
<td>Turkish mektep, religious primary school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mesdžid (Masjid)</td>
<td>Prayer room, small mosque without the minaret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mevlud</td>
<td>Religious festivity, with a recitation of an ode celebrating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mihrab</td>
<td>Prayer niche in the Qibla wall</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minbar</td>
<td>Elevated platform in the mosque consisting of several stairs, built in carved stone or wood and used for holding the sermon (<em>khutba</em>) during Friday Prayer or on Bajram</td>
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<tr>
<td>Munara</td>
<td>Minaret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muderis</td>
<td>Teacher, professor in a madrassa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mufti</td>
<td>A Sunni Islamic authority, interpreter of Islamic law, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Mufti heads Muftiluk (regional</td>
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<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Raisu-1-Ulama</td>
<td>Or Reis, Title of the Grand Mufti of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reis</td>
<td>See Raisu-1-Ulama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rijaset (Riyasat)</td>
<td>The highest executive and administrative body within the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharia</td>
<td>Religious and ritual law of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sofa (pl. sofe)</td>
<td>Portico, elevated / roofed entrance area in front of the mosque</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šeher</td>
<td>Larger town (with a mosque)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Šerefet</td>
<td>Minaret balcony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarih</td>
<td>Inscription</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tekija (tekke)</td>
<td>Bosnian/Turkish word for a building specifically designed for gatherings of Sufi brotherhoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turbe</td>
<td>Mausoleum (Turkish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zawiye</td>
<td>Arabic word for Tekija, see Tekija</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakat</td>
<td>Pious alms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zikr</td>
<td>Sufi ritual involving the repetition of the Names of God and other prayers</td>
</tr>
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Fig. 1.21. Ruin of the Roman Catholic parish church of St. Joseph (1983) in Lukavac, Banja Luka municipality (Photo from Roman Catholic Diocese in Banja Luka, 1995)
**Fig. 1.22.** Statistic charts of mosque destructions by Muharem Omerdić (1999)
Table 1

Destruction of Islamic religious buildings in Bosnia 1992–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building type</th>
<th>Total no. before the war</th>
<th>No. damaged/destroyed by Serb extremists</th>
<th>No. damaged/destroyed by Croat extremists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congregational mosques (Džamije)</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>540/249</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small neighbourhood mosques (Mesdžidi)</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>175/21</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of mosques</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>715/270</td>
<td>985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qur’an schools (Mektebi)</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>55/14</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dervish lodges (Tekiže)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3/4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mausolea, shrines (Turbe)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>34/6</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bldgs of religious endowments (Vakuf)</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>345/125</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

Destruction of Islamic religious buildings in Bosnia 1992–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building type</th>
<th>Total no. before the war</th>
<th>Total no. destroyed or damaged</th>
<th>Percentage destroyed or damaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congregational mosques (Džamije)</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>80.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small neighbourhood mosques (Mesdžidi)</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>46.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total no. of mosques</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>69.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qur’an schools (Mektebi)</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>9.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dervish lodges (Tekiže)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>60.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mausolea, shrines (Turbe)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bldgs of religious endowments (Vakuf)</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>38.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on data from the Institute for Protection of Cultural, Historical and Natural Heritage of Bosnia and Herzegovina, A Report on the Devastation of Cultural, Historical and Natural Heritage of the Republic/Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from April 5, 1992 until September 5, 1995 (Sarajevo, 1995), supplemented with information from the database of the State Commission for the Documentation of War Crimes on the Territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Državna komisija za prikupljanje činjenica o ratnim zločinima na području Republike Bosne i Hercegovine), the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other sources.

Fig. 1.23. Tables by Andras Riedlmayer (2002) showing destructions of Islamic religious monuments (from the book Maya Schatzmiller, ed. Islam and Bosnia, 2002, p.99-100)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Center for Islamic Architecture at the Rijaset, Sarajevo, Status: fall 2008</th>
<th>Mosques</th>
<th>Masjids</th>
<th>Mosques + Masjids</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Existed before 1992</td>
<td>1370</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>1703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Destroyed between 1945-1992</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Totally destroyed during the war of 1992-95</td>
<td>584 (42,63%)</td>
<td>111 (33,33%)</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Damaged during the war of 1992-95</td>
<td>417 (30,92%)</td>
<td>78 (23,42%)</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Remained undamaged during the war of 1992-95</td>
<td>369 (27,08%)</td>
<td>144 (43,24%)</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Built anew after 1995</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from these, building anew in process</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Rebuilt after 1995</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>484 (69,64%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from these, rebuilding in process</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Renovated after 1995</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from these, renovation in process</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Not yet rebuilt or renovated</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number (A-C-D+F+G+H)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1472</strong></td>
<td><strong>395</strong></td>
<td><strong>1867</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 1.23.** Table showing destructions of Islamic religious monuments by Center for Islamic Architecture (CIA) at the Rijaset in Sarajevo (2008); *Masjid* in this chart is defined as a prayer space without a minaret, including purpose-built structures and temporary spaces. All mosques counted here are purpose built.
Fig. 1.24. Images of Zvornik's mosques from before and after the 1992-1995 war. *Top left,* Begsuja Mosque (1776) before the destruction in April 1992; *bottom left,* site of the site of razed Begsuja Mosque after the war (photo by András Riedlmayer, 07/2002); *top right,* pre war photo of the Market Mosque (photo by Izet Karaosmanović, 1990); *bottom right,* site of razed Market Mosque fenced in, with rubbish container (photo by András Riedlmayer 07/2002)
Fig. 1.25. Interior view of the damaged Hrvačani Mosque after the end of the war (photo by Ahmet ef. Rahmanović, 1996)
Fig. 1.26. Top, Ruin of the Donji Ahmići Mosque; bottom, ruin of the Gornji Ahmići Mosque; both were destroyed by Croat forces on April 16, 1993
Fig. 1.27. *Top,* ruin stones of the Novoseoci Mosque (1990) after destruction on September 22, 1992; middle, empty lot of the mosque after the ruin stones were removed; *bottom,* the garbage dump at Ivan Polje, where ruin stones were dumped together with the bodies of 45 murdered *jamaat* members from Novoseoci (Photos by Ćolić Muniba from Novoseoci)
Fig. 1.28. *Top*, location of the mass grave near Foča, into which the rubble of the Aladža Mosque was dumped; *bottom*, fragments of the mosque along the river bank (Photos by Kemal Zukić, 2002)
Fig. 1.29. *Top and bottom*, photographs from the concentration camp of Manjača
Fig. 1.30. Drawings by Francesco di Giorgio Martini (1439 – 1502) from *Trattato di architettura di Francesco di Giorgio Martini*
Fig. 1.31. The Piazza San Pietro (St. Peter’s Square) in front of the Papal Basilica of Saint Peter (1506-1626) in the Vatican
Fig. 1.32. The concept of the human body as a mosque as rendered by the *Nomadic Mosque* (2005), artwork by Azra Akšamija
Fig. 2.1. Memorial park in the center of Omarska honoring fallen soldiers of the Bosnian Serb Army
Fig. 2.2. Top, jamaat members from Golimilje gathered in June 2007 for the cleaning up action at the ruin of the ancient Emperor’s Mosque (Careva džamija, 1478) in Donje Godimilje, Municipality of Rogatica; bottom, the ruin of same mosque, destroyed in 1992, view after the 2007 clean-up action
Fig. 2.3. *Left* top and bottom, view of the shelled Husejnija mosque and minaret in Miljanovci Novi (built 1970); *right*, the mosque built anew (completed 2001) with two minarets built by Kruško ef. Muhare's company
Fig. 2.4. *Top*, the mosque of Srednje; *bottom*, the youth rebuilding the mosque in a collective action, with the imam in the center (photos from 2005)
Fig. 2.5. *Top*, pre-war photo of the National Library in Sarajevo (Vijećnica); *bottom*, photo of the Inat Kuća (Spite House) in Sarajevo, across the river from the National Library
Fig. 2.6. *Top and bottom*, Inat Ćuprija (Spite Bridge) in Stolac
Fig. 2.7. Left, the Skinny House in Boston (1874); right, similarly narrow Alameda Spite House, CA (early 20th c.)
Fig. 2.8. *Top left*, Fata Orlović, *top right and bottom*, the Orthodox church and Orlović’s house in the background
Fig. 2.9. The minaret in Bradina after the mosque had been dismanteled (picture taken in 2006)
Fig. 2.10. Serbian Orthodox Church in Jezero
Fig. 2.11. *Top and bottom*, Serbian Orthodox Church of St. George in Sokolac, Ravna Romanija (picture taken 2005)
Fig. 2.12. The new post-war campanile of the Franciscan church of Saints Peter and Paul (1872) in Mostar
Fig. 2.13. The belltower of the Franciscan church and the giant cross on the hill of Hum dominate Mostar’s skyline.
Fig. 2.14. *Top and bottom*, Mosque in Vrapčići, a suburb of Mostar (picture from 2008)
Fig. 2.15. Examples of Monumentalizing: Top, Centar Mosque in Živinice, bottom left, New Catholic Church of Holy Family at Kupres: bottom right, Orthodox monastery complex of St. Vasilije of Ostrog in Bijeljina (all pictures from 2009)
Fig. 2.16. Examples of Monumentalizing by Elongating. *Top left*, rebuilt mosque of Sultan Mehmed Fatih in Donji Kamengrad, near Sanski Most; *top right*, Franciscan church of Saints Peter and Paul in Mostar; *bottom left*, Orthodox Church in Amajlije; *bottom right*, Orthodox Church of Christ the Savior in Banja Luka (all post-war photos)
Fig. 2.17. Examples of Prioritizing. *Top,* mosque in Donji Potok, Srebrenik Municipality; *bottom left,* Orthodox Church in Šešlije; *bottom right,* New Orthodox Church in Doboj (all post-war photos)
Fig. 2.18. Examples of Multiplying. *Top left* Hamzi-beg Mosque in Sanski Most initially built with two minarets; *top right*, Hamzi-beg Mosque in Sanski Most added two minarets; *bottom*, mosque in the village of Sjenina, near Doboj, with four minaret balconies (all post-war photos)
Fig. 2.19. Examples of Pigmenting. *Top left,* Orthodox Church in Potočari; *top right,* Donja džamija (Lover Mosque) and clock tower in Doboj; *bottom left,* Catholic Chapel in Lug, near Derventa; *bottom right,* Baš džamija in Donji Vakuf (all post-war photos)
Fig. 2.20. Examples of Illumunating. *Left and right*, effects of pre-fab minarets across Bosnia and Herzegovina (both post-war photos)
Fig. 2.21. Post-war photograph of the Junuz Čauš Mosque (Čaršija džamija, mid. 16th c.) in Konjic with its broken minaret sealed
Fig. 2.22. Top, the rebuilt mosque in Mahmutovići, District of Zvornik, bottom, the broken part of the minaret was left standing in the mosque’s garden (both post-war photos)
Fig. 2.23. *Top*, damaged mosque in Jezero, District of Bihać after the war, *bottom*, renovated façade of the mosque with the projectile hole.
Fig. 2.24. Top and bottom, Interior of the “Plateau of Martyrs” (“Plato šehida”) memorial in the former Jezero Mosque in Bihać, pictures of the commemorative event “Junski dani otpora 2010” held on 11 June 2010
Fig. 2.25. Matrix of religious versus political design elements in Čazin memorials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mosque Name</th>
<th>Religious Symbols</th>
<th>National Symbols</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fountain</td>
<td>Animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGIOUS</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tržac</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puškari</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostrožac</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majetići</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gnjilavac</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donja Koprivnica</td>
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<td>Ostredak</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bajrići</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                  | Fountain          | Animals          | Tree              |
|                  |                  |                  |                  |
|                  |                  |                  |                  |
|                  |                  |                  |                  |
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|                  |                  |                  |                  |
Fig. 2. 26. Top left, Memorial fountain in Puškari; bottom left, memorial fountain in Tržac; top right, memorial fountain in Čajić; bottom right, mausoleum in Majetići, all in Cazin Municipality (post-war photographs)
Fig. 2.27. *Top*, cenotaph in Ostoržac; *bottom*, cenotaph in Donja Koprivna, both in Cazin Municipality (post-war photographs)
Fig. 2. 28. *Top left,* Memorial in Prošići; *top right,* memorial in Ostredak; *bottom left,* memorial in Čoralići; *bottom right,* memorial in Podgredina, all in Cazin Municipality (post-war photographs)
Fig. 2.29. *Top,* memorial in Bajrići; *bottom,* memorial in Glogovac
Fig. 2.30. Vietnam War Memorial (1982) in Washington D.C. by Maya Lin
Fig. 2.31. Top, the mosque in Čizmići, Cazin Municipality; bottom, memorial in front of the Čizmići mosque (post-war photographs)
Fig. 2.32. Top left, coat of arms of the Kotomanić dynasty; top right, coat of arms of the Medieval Bosnian Kingdom (mid. 12th c. – 1463); middle left and right, flag and the coat of arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992-1998); bottom left and right, the current flag and coat of arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1998-)
Fig. 2.33. Top, the Memorial mosque in Gornja Koprivna; bottom left and right, wooden display cabinets in the interior of the mosque, which show photographs of martyrs (photos from 2007)
Fig. 2.34. Two mosques built literally next to one another in the village of Izačić, Bihać Municipality (photo from 2007)
Fig. 2.35. *Top*, the Memorial mosque in Stijena (2001), Cazin Municipality; *bottom*, the new mosque in Stijena and the Memorial in the background (post-war photographs)
Fig. 2.36. The Islamic Center in Zagreb (1987), Croatia
Fig. 2.37. *Left and right*, cenotaphs at the Memorial mosque in Stijena (2001), Cazin Municipality
Fig. 2.38. *Top and bottom, war memorial in Vrbanja (1996), city quarter of Bugojno commemorating 45 Bosniaks killed in July 1993*
Fig. 3.1. Poster from the inauguration of the renovated Turhan Emin-beg Mosque in Ustikolina, July 2007
Fig. 3.2. *Left to right*, pre-war photo of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque (ca. 1950s), photo of the mosque’s ruin after 1992-95 war, photo of the renovated mosque from 2009
Fig. 3.3. The minaret of Turhan Emin-beg Mosque is visible from far away
Fig. 3.4. Drawing of the Turhan Emin-beg Mosque by Miron Zarzycki (end of 19th c.)
Fig. 3.5. Plans, elevation, façade view, and mihrab detail for the conservation of Turhan Emin-beg Mosque from 1954, drawings by Evangelos Dimitrijević
Fig. 3.6. *Left top and bottom*, pre-war photograph and view of the Turhan Emin-beg Mosque; *right top and bottom*, pre-war photograph and view of the Aladža Mosque (1550/1) in Foča
Fig. 3.7. Destruction of the Turhan Emin-beg Mosque in WWII, the roof and the interior are completely destroyed, part of the minaret balcony broken off.
Fig. 3.8. Turhan Emin-beg Mosque after renovation in 1954, photograph from the Institute for Protection of Monuments and Natural Rarities in Sarajevo
Fig. 3.9. Top, empty lot of the Turhan Emin-beg Mosque after destruction in 1992; bottom, ruin of the mosque (photographs by Kemal Zukić taken in 1996)
Fig. 3.10. *Top and bottom*, view of ruins, rubble and remaining foundations of the Turhan Emin-beg Mosque (photographs by Helen Walasek, taken in October 2000)
Ovako bi trebala izgledati sjeverna fasada ustikoljanske džamije

**Ko je u sastavu stručnog kolegija?**

Za ovaj impozantan projekt u sastavu proširenog kolegija angažovani su eminentni stručnjaci Zavoda za zaštitu kulturno-historijskog i prirodnog nasljeđa sa gostujućim članovima. To su uglavnom renomirani profesori sa Arhitektonske fakultete - Madžida Bećirbegović, Ismet Tahirović, i ugledni prof.dr. Nedžad Kurto.

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Fig. 3.11. a) Project drawing of the planned reconstruction of the Turhan Emin-beg Mosque by the Institute for Protection of Cultural and Historical Heritage
Fig. 3.11. b) Cadaster plan of the mosque, the abdesthana, and the imam’s house
Fig. 3.12. Top, imam’s house in Ustikolina located next to the graveyard (*harem*) of the mosque; bottom, the building on the right contains an ablution space (*abdesthana*), a mortuary (*gasulhana*), and an administrative office
Otpoče i izgradnja džamije!

Radovi na izgradnji nove stare Turhan Emin-begove džamije su otpočeli, temelji su izbetonirani.

Kada se sa nijetom počne i završit će se

Fig. 3.13. a) Documentation of the post-war renovation of the Turhan Emin-beg Mosque by Faruk Muftić. Top, pouring of concrete foundations, rubble of the mosque still visible on the site; bottom, Muftić’s comment translates: “what is started with a nijet [pious intention] will be concluded”
U fazi postavljanja krovne građe

Uskoro će radovi na postavljanju crijepa

Fig. 3.13. b) Roof construction during the post-war renovation of the Turhan Emin-beg Mosque, photos by Faruk Muftić
Fig. 3.14. Two interconnected roofs of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque, one covering the prayer space and the other the foyer
Fig. 3.15. View of the façade of the Turhan Emin-beg mosque as seen from the south
Fig. 3.16.a) Top, façade view of the closed off sofe; bottom, tight space in front of the mosque entrance
Fig. 3.16. b) Interior view of the foyer. *Top*, view towards the entrance door and shoe racks, *bottom*, view towards the stairs leading to the women’s prayer spaces
Fig. 3.17. “Mission” clay roofing of the Turhan Emin-beg Mosque
Fig. 3.18. Three balconies (šerefe) of the Ustikolina Mosque’s minaret
Fig. 3.19. Access gallery to the minaret
Fig. 3.20. New campanile of the Franciscan church of Saints Peter and Paul (1872) in Mostar
Fig. 3.21. The largest of the fifteenth crosses illegally built at the Vidoška fortress in Stolac (courtesy of the Commission to Preserve National Monuments of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
Fig. 3.22. Franciscan church of Saints Peter and Paul in Mostar; *Top*, war destruction in 1992, the bell tower remained standing (source: *Urbicid: Mostar '92*); *bottom left*, pre-war view of the church and the bell tower from 1981 (source: *Vjesnik, Zagreb*); *bottom right*, post-war view of the church and bell tower in 2006 (this and other two images courtesy of Emily Gunzburger Makaš)
Fig. 3.23. The belltower of the Franciscan church and the giant cross on the hill of Hum dominate Mostar’s skyline
Fig. 3.24. Map of Bosnia and Hercegovina after 1995, with the location of Ustikolina (marked in red)
Fig. 3.25. *Top*, empty site where Aladža Mosque once stood in Foča; *middle and bottom*, rubble and fragments of the mosque found on the nearby riverbank (photos by Kemal Zukić, taken in September 2000)
Fig. 3.26. *Top*, photo of the ruins in Ustikolina after the war; *bottom*, view of the destroyed local clinic (photos by Faruk Muftić, 19 March 1996)
Fig. 3.27. Territorial arrangements at the time of cease-fire on October 12, 1995; Map from Richard Holbrooke's book *To End a War* (1998)
Key Territorial Issues at Dayton

Fig. 3.28. Territorial issues at Dayton as shown in Richard Holbrooke’s book *To End a War* (1998); Ustikolina was part of the Serb territory in “The Clark Corridor”
November 20, 2:00 A.M.: Milosevic and Silajdžić, negotiating in an American conference room, close in on an agreement that would last thirty-seven minutes. Left to right: Silajdžić, Milosevic, Clark, Christopher, the author. In the left background, Bosnia’s main map expert watches to make sure that Silajdžić does not give anything away. STATE DEPARTMENT PHOTO/ARIC R. SCHWAN.

November 20, 4:05 A.M.: The negotiators toast the Milosevic-Silajdžić agreement, sipping wine from Christopher’s personal supply. (Christopher is at author’s right, just out of the photograph.) The author watches without drinking, concerned that the “agreement” is somehow flawed. Left to right: the author, Clark, Hill, Silajdžić, Milosevic. STATE DEPARTMENT PHOTO/ARIC R. SCHWAN.

Fig. 3.29. Toast after Milošević-Silajdžić agreement in Dayton on November 20, 1995; Photos from Richard Holbrooke’s book *To End a War* (1998)
Fig. 3.30. Internal partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton
Gorazdanski muftija se obraća đematlijama

Prošle su skoro četiri godine zatišja, a onda se čuo glas mujezina "Allahu ekber".

Fig. 3.31. Collective prayer of Ustikolina’s đemat on the ruin of the mosque
Fig. 3.32. The Üç Serefeli Camii ("Three Balcony Mosque") in Edirne, built under Sultan Murad II between 1438 and 1447
Fig. 3.33. *Top*, Selimiye Mosque (1568-1574) in Edirne, *bottom*, Süleymaniye Mosque (1550-1558) in Istanbul
Fig. 4.1. View of the Old City (Baščaršija) in Sarajevo with the Emperor’s Mosque (1462; 1566) on the left and the Gazi Husrev-beg Mosque (1530) on the right (Photograph by Lieza Vincent, 2003)
Fig. 4.2. The Mosque and Cultural Center “King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud” (2000) in Sarajevo (Photograph taken 2008)
Fig. 4.3. The Kayseri Mosque (Džamija Kajserija, 2008) in Goražde (Photograph by Nihad Hodivić, 2010)
Fig. 4.4. Top, Sehzade Mosque (1548); bottom, the Sultan Ahmed Mosque (1609-17), both in Istanbul
Fig. 4.5. Vali Recep Yazicioğlu Mosque (2009) in Maglaj
(Photo by Elena Babić, 2009)
Fig. 4.6. Billboard with the photograph of Recep Yazicioğlu was placed in front of the mosque at the inauguration ceremony (Photo by Elena Babić, 2009)
Fig. 4.7. Photos from the festive inauguration of the Vali Recep Yazıcıoğlu Mosque held on 14 August 2009; top, the city of Maglaj decorated with flags; middle, female choir performance at the mosque’s entrance; bottom, performance of Mevlevi dervishes from Konya
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Fig. 4.9. Dolmabahçe Mosque (1852-53) in Istanbul
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Fig. 4.15. Top, industrially produced green carpets donated by the High Saudi Committee for Relief of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Sultan Ahmed Mosque (1693) in Bugojno; bottom, detail of the same type of carpet.
Fig. 4.16. *Top and bottom,* the exterior and the interior of the Mosque and Cultural Center "Princess El-Jawhara bint Ibrahim Elbrahim" (2001) in Bugojno
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Fig. 4.26. Mosques that were renovated or built anew with plans provided by the Rijaset’s Center for Islamic Architecture; top left, Vozuca Mosque near Zavidovići; top right, Ciljuge Mosque near Živinice; bottom, Đulici Mosque near Žvornik.
Fig. 4.27. Mosques designed by the architect Kemal Zukić; top, the City Mosque in Bosanski Petrovac (1890, built anew 2003); bottom left, the Hamzibegova Mosque in Sanski Most (first mosque 1557, built anew in 1984, destroyed in 1992, rebuilt in 1999); bottom right, the Hamzibegova Mosque had added two additional minarets in 2008, the initial design by the architect had only one minaret.
Fig. 4.28. Top and bottom, “Signature” elements of Kemal Zukić’s mosques: sand-colored brick of outer walls, large scale calligraphic decorations of facades in white brick, and glass squinches
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