Reconstructing Respect: The Quest for Prestige in the International System

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ABSTRACT

Prestige is a term that appears in a wide range of international relations literature, but it is rarely ever defined. There is a vague consensus that prestige involves measures of status and respect, but its exact usage is different in every work. This thesis analyzes the various manifestations of prestige to develop a workable definition of the concept and then uses this definition to show how prestige plays a role in the major foreign policy decisions of states.

This thesis argues that prestige motivations can overcome security concerns in some instances and cause a state to take an action that seems irrational. This is especially true if the state has recently suffered a severe drop in prestige, such as one incurred after losing a war, becoming isolated from the international community or facing state collapse. When such a dramatic loss occurs a state must take one of four paths to salvage its lost reputation: winning a war, becoming an economic power, taking the lead on an important political negotiation or developing nuclear weapons.

This thesis uses two large case studies – Iran and Egypt – along with three smaller case surveys – France, Japan and Pakistan – to illustrate these four paths of status adjustment in action. It also presents a dataset of states that have suffered a severe loss in prestige to show how states can lose prestige and how they can gain it back.

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Title: Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

I. Introduction

Prestige is a concept often taken for granted in the study of international relations. It is mentioned as an element of “soft power” in works otherwise unconcerned with the term. Many people assume that prestige is a rather static measurement and, therefore, an uninteresting area of study. According to these scholars certain states have high status while others barely even register in the international system. This is an unfair diminution of the concept.

Status is not a static measurement; it is not even measured on the same scale for every state. The highest level of prestige that one state can ever hope to reach may be the bottom level for another. States are continuously fighting to retain their position relative to others and it is important to their political, economic and physical security that they do so.

When a state endures a dramatic and debilitating loss, such as one incurred by suffering defeat in a large-scale war, becoming isolated from the international community, experiencing a failure of central authority or not being recognized as a true state, its level of prestige suffers along with its military, economic and political structure. A state that is not respected and included in international affairs has no hope of achieving its goals and experiencing the benefits of multinational support. In order to regain its proper place in the world the state must take dramatic steps toward increasing its prestige and climbing the status ladder from the bottom up.

While there is relatively little research done on the concept of prestige it is still possible to identify three main courses of status adjustment: economic, political and military. In this thesis I will examine all three of these options and argue for inclusion of a fourth: the pursuit of nuclear weapons. All four paths are extremely risky and require extensive resources, but are well worth it if a state is able to increase its level of prestige in the end.
States suffering a dramatic drop in prestige will be more risk acceptant than those who have existed at their current status level for years or even decades. Leaders will be willing to take drastic measures to increase their status even if it means placing their security or well being in jeopardy for the short term. Prestige can outweigh security concerns at times. Understanding this fact helps explain some controversial decisions states have made over the years.

II. Defining Prestige

Prestige is a term referenced in a wide variety of international relations literature and it is often defined differently in each work. In this paper I use the word prestige synonymous with status. Both concepts take many forms including respect, legitimacy, centrality and positioning in negotiations. At the bottom line, though, prestige boils down to one thing: attention.

States want to be noticed. A state that is marginalized and ignored has no place in international relations and no hope of getting its goals met or opinions heard. States need recognition in order to function normally and create an identity for themselves that is acts on a global scale. Even negative attention is better than no attention at all.

Status can come in two forms: ascribed and attained. Ascribed status is granted to a state based on its fundamental features and characteristics. A strong economy, large population, wealth of natural resources, superior military power or even possession of important religious elements may contribute to the ascribed status of the state. Some of these factors – such as military power and the economy – can change from time to time, but still generally fall within a limited range.

Another way to think of ascribed status is as the measurement of how others view the focal state. The level of prestige ascribed to a state is generally accepted across the international community and serves as a base by which it is judged in all international relations. States with a high ascribed status will be viewed with respect and have a high
degree of centrality. States with very low status, on the other hand, are largely ignored on an international level and have to seek ways to draw global attention, whether positive or negative. It is better to be hated or feared than to be forgotten. A state that is feared is at least being acknowledge on a global scale and acknowledgement is the first step toward becoming involved.

The activities that a state performs in order to change this baseline measurement are the elements that contribute to “attained” status. These activities may take place in the military, economic, political or ideological realm and will vary depending on the state's goals and resources.

The most common path for states seeking status adjustment is the pursuit of military victories. Wars are highly visible and, in most cases, the results are difficult to dispute. Achieving a series of victories over a rival would automatically raise the state above its opponent and possibly above other states that have been unable to achieve the same level of success. Victory proves to the world that a state has the resources and skills needed to make it a formidable opponent and garner respect internationally.

Achieving victory in war is not an easy task, though. Some states have been unable to achieve major military victories in their past and many have suffered humiliating losses. These losses can actually decrease the attained status of a state, as each one chips away at its reputation, legitimacy and perceived strength. A history of humiliating losses lowers the ascribed status of a state by labeling it as an inherent “loser” and making others doubt how much they can contribute to society.

A person can only suffer so much humiliation before he is compelled to fight back; states are no different. True humiliation only comes when factors that a state feels are key to its identity suddenly collapse or deflate. The loss of these features fundamentally changes the way the state is viewed by others and the role it is allowed to play in the
international system. In other words, humiliation fundamentally alters the ascribed status of a state and, therefore, the way in which it is treated by both allies and enemies alike.

On the state level, humiliation is often reflected in the nationalism of the population. The people of a state take it upon themselves to become the champions of their reputation and to tout the state's power and prestige. Continuous losses in battle or in major political arenas will chip away at this nationalism until it runs the risk of collapsing and forcing the people to turn on their own state.

Nationalism is an incredibly strong form of identity and, like all forms of identity politics, never truly operates on an individual scale. Members of an identity group must always be aware of how others are representing them as a whole and if enough people believe they are being represented poorly, they will take drastic measures to revive their image. In the context of a state, it is up to the government to initiate this revival or else risk initiating a popular revolt.

Once the opportunity for revival of the national identity is found, leaders must find a way to rally the people around their decision, no matter how controversial it may be. They do so by appealing to the pride and nationalism of the population.

**Prestige v. "Hard" Power**

It can be difficult to differentiate between the concepts of prestige from power, but it is important to do so. The two are not one in the same and treating them as such results in analytical and political mistakes. Changes in a state's power may increase or decrease its status and vice versa, but the two attributes are not always related.

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1 Miller, "Humiliation and Other Essays". Miller's analysis is sociological in nature and, therefore, looks at humiliation on an individual level. I have abstracted his definition to the state level.
2 Laitin, "Identity in Formation."
Prestige is not a measure of material power; it is a potentiality and a matter of positioning in the international community. A state that achieves a significant amount of prestige is in a position to exercise the power that it does have in the international community when needed. This may refer to military and economic power, but it is also relevant to soft power and influence. Prestigious states play an active role in the international community and serve as a valuable participant in multinational talks and actions.

A state with a high level of prestige is valued and respected by its allies regardless of its material capabilities. It is met with deference and caution by rivals and often looked to for advice by neighbors and allies. Prestigious states are almost always invited to the negotiating table when their interests are at stake and are able to have their opinions heard and considered. The higher the status of a state, the more likely that state will be able to convince others to follow the path most conducive to its goals and interests. The lower its status, the more likely it will just be ignored and forced to follow along in a world other states have created for it.

Prestige is largely a measure of comparison, both regionally and globally. States want to have a higher status than their neighbors, allowing them to become a regional power. This gives them a more important position in discussions of regional issues and a higher potential of achieving their goals. Some scholars argue that reaching such a position of regional important would be easier through military or “hard power” means. This may be true, but it would be a much more tenuous hold.

Achieving regional supremacy through the military may be quicker, but it also provides rivals with a clear avenue for overturning the balance of power. If a state wins its

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3 Thomas Schelling makes this point when he states “with enough military force a country may not need to bargain. Some things a country wants it can take, and some things it has it can keep, by sheer strength, skill and ingenuity”. Schelling, “Arms and Influence”, 1; The strength of military power over international politics is the main thread tying together all of the works in Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz’s anthology The Use of Force. Art and Waltz, “The Use of Force”.
superiority through war, it can simply be attacked and replaced. Its entire position was based on the victory of a single war and as such is cancelled out by a subsequent loss. The use of force does not necessarily guarantee the state a voice in international affairs either. It may actually hurt the state’s bargaining position by making it a target of animosity and distrust.

Pursuing regional power through military means makes the state a target for retaliation and a central enemy for its neighbors. Military victory or the threat of military action may have both coercive and defensive power, but its effect is only temporary. Hard power influence can be countered by more hard power in a never-ending cycle of one-upmanship.

The real measure of a state’s power lies in its level of influence. If the state does not hold a position of regional importance due only to its military power, its hold on that position will be stronger. A state that is respected by those around it and that has ties to other powerful nations cannot simply be attacked and replaced. High status states garner more support and sympathy for their actions internationally. They form alliances with powerful nations and can often negotiate protection or assistance. Attacking such a prestigious state would most likely result in multilateral retaliation against the aggressor and condemnation by the international community.

A state that has regional prestige may still be low on the global scale. Every region has its own level of prestige and states must constantly seek to improve their standings above and beyond previous limits. If a state can forge ties with other nations outside of its region and insert itself into global affairs, it will solidify its position of regional importance and its overall centrality in the international community. The quickest way to do this would be by developing a close relationship with one of the world’s major powers.

If the state cannot create such strong toes, though, it may seek to make itself into a global problem instead. Becoming a state that is hated and feared is much easier than earning global respect and can be the first step toward achieving real, lasting prestige. A
state that is ignored by the international community must simply drift along as a pawn in a major power game. A state that is acknowledged as a global problem, though, plays a more active role. It is constantly on the global radar and, as such, may have the opportunity to change international opinions at some point in the future.

III. Definitions

Outside of the terms prestige and status, there are a few other words I use centrally in this work that may have multiple meanings. To reduce confusion later on, I will provide a brief definition here of how I am using them.

_Proliferation_

Proliferation may seem like a straightforward term, but it can be used in a variety of ways. When I use the term nuclear proliferation in this work, I am using it in a military sense. I am not referring to the pursuit of technology and knowledge needed for purely civilian nuclear energy programs. I define proliferation as the pursuit of a nuclear program for the purpose of weaponization, whether or not that capability is ever achieved. This pursuit may be declared publicly by the state - as North Korea did following its 2006 nuclear test - or it may just be accepted as fact by the majority of states - as in the case of Iran - even if the state denies such pursuits.

_Nuclear State_

The term Nuclear State is used in this work to describe those states that possess a complete and internationally acknowledged nuclear weapons capability. By this definition there are currently nine nuclear weapons states (The United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, Pakistan, India and North Korea). Other states pursuing nuclear proliferation, such as Iran, may be on the path toward becoming a nuclear state, but have not yet achieved this capability.

South Africa is the only state I consider to be a former nuclear state. The former Soviet Republics – Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan – are not considered former nuclear
states because their arsenals were inherited from the Soviet Union and were given up shortly after the states became independent. The nuclear programs in these states were never institutionalized by their independent governments.

**Isolation**

I will refer to a handful of states throughout this work as being in a stage of “isolation.” This refers to a state that has few or no political allies, very limited trading partners and is an object of international scorn or scrutiny. Often these states are also subject to sanctions by multiple states or by the United Nations, but sanctions are not a prerequisite for being considered isolated. These states are often referred to in international discussions as “rogue” or “pariah” states.

My definition of isolated states only refers to those states whose isolation is imposed on them by others. States who choose a path of self-isolation because they believe it will help them achieve their goals are not included. Neither are states that have a low level of connections simply because they are minor powers that do not need a large diplomatic or trading base in order to operate normally.

**IV. Current Literature**

Since prestige is such a difficult concept to define, it appears in many different genres of political science literature, often with different definitions and presentations.

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4 Harkavy defines a pariah state as “a small power with only marginal and tenuous control over its own fate, whose security dilemma cannot easily be solved by neutrality, nonalignment or appeasement, and lacking dependable big-power support”. I would add a further caveat to this definition which is that this lack of power is a deliberate attempt by major powers to isolate the state, either as punishment or through a lack of recognition. Harkavy, “Pariah States and Nuclear Proliferation.”

5 For a detailed discussion of isolation, it’s causes, indicators and forms, see: Geldenhuys, “Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis”; Geldenhuys differentiates between the two forms of isolation by defining it as “either a deliberate policy, voluntarily and unilaterally pursued by a state over a period of time, of restricting its international interactions . . . or a deliberate policy pursued by two or more states against another, over a period of time, aimed at severing or curtailing the latter’s international interactions against its will.” Ibid., 6.
Prestige appears in literature on nationalism, war, leadership, international organizations and many other topics. The literature on status adjustment, though, is surprisingly light.

There is not a large volume of literature on state status adjustment and even less dedicated to the four particular paths I examine in this work. Some sources served as quite valuable resources in developing my theory, though, and deserve further explanation here.

**Prestige**

The literature on prestige spans nearly the entire history of international relations and the breadth of its subfields as well. The study of state status grew out of the study of power, the most fundamental element of international relations. Many works on the topic of power – and there are thousands of them – mention state status as an element of ideological or soft power. Some even use it as a key determinant in power theories.

Hans Morgenthau provides what is arguably the most well known characterization of prestige in international relations in his book *Politics Among Nations.* Morgenthau defines of prestige as “the third of the basic manifestations of the struggle for power on the international scene.” This definition gives prestige an active quality. It is not a static concept, but something that is constantly being reshaped on an international scale. It is subject to changes as the state succeeds or fails in its international pursuits. He qualifies this statement, though, by saying that prestige is more a tool of policy makers rather than an end in and of itself. States use their nationalism and image to achieve their goals; they do not pursue controversial policies expressly for the purpose of increasing their status.

As Morgenthau explains it, the political struggle for prestige is present in nearly all diplomatic and military relations. Yet he recognizes that it is largely understudied in political science. He wrote this statement in 1948, but it is still relevant today. There are very few works written in recent years that give due consideration to prestige as a major

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6 Morgenthau, “Politics Among Nations.”
7 The first two being policies of status quo and imperialism; Ibid., 84.
factor driving international relations. One recent work that does this quite well, though, is John Mearsheimer’s *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

For John Mearsheimer, status is only important when states reach the level of a “great power” because the realm of great power politics is governed by different rules than the rest of the world. Great powers, according to his theory, are always searching for ways to increase their status and prove to the world that they are the only state that matters. They will perform feats of military, economic and political power in the international system, showing the world that they cannot be stopped. These paths are often self-defeating, though, because they foster fear and scorn from other states rather than respect and prestige.

I take a slightly wider view of prestige than Mearsheimer, but I agree with his belief that status is more important to those states who have it and lose it rather than those who have always been at the bottom of the ladder. This is why my dataset and case studies are limited to those states that can be considered major powers on an international scale. These states feel a drop in prestige more clearly than minor powers and serve as a better illustration of status adjustment.

Kenneth Waltz discusses state status throughout his *Theory of International Politics*, but fails to come up with a single concrete definition. At one point he says that status can be granted by the system and is defined by the state’s ability to meet its goals on an international scale. He also states that it may be possible to infer a state’s status based on the way it is treated by the United States. For Waltz, status *cannot* be gleaned from military power because capabilities and political control no longer go hand-in-hand.

The variety of definitions and measures listed in Waltz’s work shows how difficult prestige is to define on an international scale. He provides a good overview of theories on state status and power, but never settles on the one he believes is the best. His survey of

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8 Mearsheimer, “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.”
definitions serves as a good base for creating a more concrete and workable definition of prestige, though.

Not all works on status and prestige are as well known as the above books. Zeev Maoz's *Networks of Nations* takes a uniquely business-like approach to international relations by studying it as a series of network interactions. For Maoz, prestige cannot be defined merely by where a state believes it stands, but "by the choices of other states to forge cooperative ties with the focal state." He uses the term status synonymously with reputation and credibility.

Maoz's two-tiered approach to prestige is very similar to my definition of "ascribed" and "attained" status. His analysis is very technical in nature and rarely looks at individual states outside of their networks, but it provides a unique insight into how drastically status can change state relations. His belief that recognition by others is an important element of status is shared by Felix Berenskoetter in his book *Power in World Politics*.

Berenskoetter argues that "even the status of a great power or global civil society relies on 'significant others' recognizing its status." He believes that status is just one element in the overall "power" game of international relations. Like Waltz, Berenskoetter never settles on a single definition for either status or prestige.

The main conclusion that can be drawn from the current literature on prestige is that it is a difficult concept to qualify and often changes over time. Status is not a static element of the international system. It is subject to reevaluation whenever there are major changes in the political, military, economic or organization structure of international system.

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9 Maoz, "Networks of Nations."
10 Ibid., 212.
11 Berenskoetter, "Thinking about Power."
12 Ibid., 14.
**War as a Tool of Prestige**

Winning a war provides a state with glory. This is a universally acknowledged fact that is rarely, if ever, a subject of debate. How that glory can be used to increase a state's prestige on an international scale, though, is a much less common topic of study. The subset of theories that comes the closest to discussing the utility of war for status adjustment is that of diversionary war.

The theory of diversionary war comes in many iterations, with slight changes in each generation of the theory. Its origin is generally attributed to John Mueller and what he referred to as the "rally around the flag variable." In studying Presidential popularity in the United States Mueller discovered that those Presidents who were in office when a major international crisis—such as war—occurred received more support and higher approval ratings from the national population. Americans draw together during times of crisis and experience swells of nationalism and pride. At the same time a crisis that is poorly managed is likely to result in anger and a loss of support for the leader.

Mueller does not examine how leaders may purposely involve themselves in crisis events in order to increase popularity, but he set the ball in motion for a whole new subfield of political science. In its early years diversionary war literature mainly focused on the United States, but recently it has developed to look at the phenomenon across the international system. Most books and articles on diversionary war study what types of political systems and leaders are most likely to use it as a tactic and which ones are likely to do so successfully.

Some scholars argue that democratic leaders are more likely to launch a diversionary war because they need the support for reelection, but have fewer opportunities to do so because of regime transparency. Others argue that authoritarian

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14 Mitchell and Prins, "Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force."
leaders have no use for diversionary war because they can simply repress internal conflict militarily without being held accountable to a voting constituency.\textsuperscript{15}

The number of works promoting the theory of diversionary war is almost matched by the number refuting the utility of such a theory. Regardless of what side they are on, though, all scholars view diversionary war with one definition: purposely launching a war to distract from \textit{domestic} unrest. My theory expands on this definition and looks at how states may also use war to regain pride and prestige after suffering a loss on an international scale.

\textbf{Nuclear Proliferation}

Nuclear weapons have been a hot topic in international relations research ever since World War II. There is a large volume of literature discussing the effects of proliferation on the international system – will it have positive or negative implications for stability?\textsuperscript{16} – the possibility of proliferation cascades, the history of nuclear research and the various means states can use to develop nuclear weapons. The topic of \textit{why} states pursue nuclear weapons, though, is relatively understudied.

This lack of research stems from the belief that nuclear weapons are a tool of deterrence. John Mearsheimer summarizes this belief by stating, "that threat to use nuclear weapons is an excellent deterrent because it so greatly increases the risks and costs associated with war. The potential consequences of using nuclear weapons are so grave that it is very difficult to conceive of achieving a meaningful victory in a nuclear war."\textsuperscript{17} This boils down to one simple conclusion: states want nuclear weapons in order to increase their security and protect themselves from attack.

\textsuperscript{15} Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions."
\textsuperscript{16} The most well-known of these debates is the Waltz-Sagan debate over whether nuclear weapons lead to peace or insecurity. Sagan and Waltz, "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons."
\textsuperscript{17} Mearsheimer, "Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence in Europe."
This may be true, but that does not mean that there are not other motivations for proliferation as well. The one-sided belief that “at a fundamental level, all nuclear bomb development programs constitute a response to insecurity and a form of balancing against foreign threats - be they political or military in nature” limit the breadth of analysis that can be conducted on proliferation.\(^{18}\) It ignores the possibility of prestige as a motivating factor in nuclear proliferation and leaves many theories on proliferation with weak explanatory power.

Many articles on proliferation address the concept of prestige, but only as a secondary or tertiary motivation. There is rarely any in depth discussion of the topic or assessment of how nuclear weapons can be used as a tool of status adjustment. There are some works that provide insight to non-security explanations for nuclear proliferation, though, that have served as valuable resources in my research.

Scott Sagan’s article “Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons” is one of the most cited articles on nuclear proliferation due to its three-pronged approach to explaining nuclear motivations.\(^ {19}\) Sagan creates three distinct models to explain proliferation: security, domestic politics and norms. According to the security model, states pursue nuclear weapons as a means to ensure state security and survivability. Under the domestic politics model nuclear weapons are used as a tool for achieving political and bureaucratic goals at home. The norms model is essentially an argument that nuclear weapons are used to achieve international prestige.

As Sagan explains, military organizations and weapons - of which nuclear weapons would be the most powerful – serve as a source of national pride and a rallying point for the people.\(^ {20}\) At the same time, though, he cautions that the NPT has shifted the international norm from a belief in a high status “nuclear club” to that of “joining the club of nations adhering to the NPT.” He argues that this new club provides a more powerful form

\(^{18}\) Lavoy, “Nuclear Proliferation Over the Next Decade.”


\(^{20}\) Ibid., 74.
of international recognition and respect.\textsuperscript{21} Sagan's backtracking weakens the case he makes for his norms model, but it is still a valuable resource nonetheless. He shows that each case of proliferation is different and there is no single blanket theory that can explain all cases.

Jacques Hymans's book \textit{The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation} presents a unique perspective on the issue of nuclear proliferation by examining the human psychology behind the decision to go nuclear.\textsuperscript{22} He argues that leaders with different "National Identity Conceptions (NIC)" view the issue of proliferation differently. What NIC a leader has will determine whether he will pursue nuclear power.

The national identity conception has two dimensions: solidarity - "whether 'we' and 'they' naturally stand for similar or different interests and values"\textsuperscript{23} - and status - "how high 'we' stand relative to 'them' in the international pecking order."\textsuperscript{24} He codes for these dimensions using speech evidence from the heads of state. Those leaders who seem to be most oppositional and nationalistic are the ones most likely to pursue nuclear weapons.

The main element missing from Hymans' analysis is the effect that the domestic population has on the decision to go nuclear. His analysis is based solely on the beliefs and motivations of the leader. According to Hymans, the head of state is always the person who initiates a nuclear program and, therefore, his psychology is the most important factor in predicting potential proliferation. This argument does not leave room for analyzing how nationalist coalitions, a dissatisfied population or changes in the popularity of the leader may affect his decision-making.

The recent dissertation by Robert Reardon \textit{Nuclear Bargaining: Using Carrots and Sticks in Nuclear Counter-Proliferation} gives significant consideration to prestige as a motivation for proliferation by examining the policies used to address states in various

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 76.
\textsuperscript{22} Hymans, "The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation."
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 23.
Reardon theorizes that positive inducements - or carrots - work better than threats - or sticks - as tools of counter-proliferation. He illustrates this through case studies of North Korea, South Korea and Libya. He examines the way the state was treated by others in political negotiations and how threats and inducements brought about changes in their nuclear weapons programs.

In his analysis Reardon concludes that “the security context was not a sufficient cause of proliferation” in any of the cases. He drew this conclusion from the fact that positive inducements were more effective and bringing about compromises and halting potential proliferators. The need for respect, recognition and prestige played an important role in all cases of nuclear negotiation.

The main focus of Reardon’s dissertation, though, is on policy analysis and options for counter-proliferation. He does not examine the ways in which proliferation can help states achieve status nor does he consider alternate paths a state could take. His work served as a valuable factual and theoretical reference for my research, but differs greatly in theory and method.

There is no single work or body of works that fully encompasses my theory of status adjustment using four distinct paths. This is what makes it an important and necessary topic of study. I was able to pull from a wide variety of literature on everything from international relations to economics, psychology and even sociology. My work comes from a broad factual base and, as such, has more credence and applicability in the world today. Scholarly work cannot exist in the vacuum of “departments” or “fields” and still be relevant to real life. The world is a complicated, intertwined system and the best theories reflect this complicated and diverse nature. The works discussed above are just a handful of the hundreds that helped me develop my theory into an understandable and useful form.

25 Reardon, “Nuclear bargaining.”
26 Ibid., 371.
CHAPTER 2: DATASET

I. Introduction

To better illustrate my theory of status adjustment I created a dataset of states that have suffered a dramatic drop in prestige and examined the various paths taken by those states to increase their status to an acceptable level.

In order to limit my data to an illustrative and easily understandable set of cases I only included states that were listed among the top 50 most powerful just at or before their drop. All states can experience drops in prestige, but for those states at the forefront of international affairs these drops are more pronounced and garner a more immediate response.

For the purpose of this dataset, states were coded as having suffered a status drop mainly for one of three reasons: losing a war, international isolation, or state failure.

A Note About The Data

The presentation of this data in a clearly delineated table sorted by events makes prestige appear to be a static measure that is relevant only when a state suffers a drop and becomes irrelevant once a status-changing path is chose. In reality, prestige is a continuum that is constantly increasing and decreasing over time. Small losses or victories are constantly adjusting a state’s level of prestige bit by bit. And major drops in status may take place over years or decades with the recovery period lasting even longer.

In order to present a clear and concise picture of the concept, though, I chose to only show major drops in prestige and to label them with their end years. These events are easier to view individually and produce a comprehensible amount of data.

27 According to the Correlates of War national material capabilities dataset; Singer et al, “Capability Distribution.”
For the sake of simplicity, I only coded the cases for the first path chosen for adjustment. Many states will take more than one path, though. The first path may not work out or it may ease the state's loss enough that it is able to pursue a more difficult but potentially more rewarding path. Some states may also take steps toward status adjustment without suffering a drop in prestige. They may wish to increase their state status from its normal position and chose one or more of the four paths in order to do so.

II. Codebook

The dataset is coded by both event and state. For this reason, there may be more than one entry for a particular state if it was involved in more than one event and there may be multiple entries for a single event if more than one state suffered significant losses.

**StateName** – The name of the state in question. Names are listed in the English language form used by the United States Department of State

**EventType**
1 – War Loss
2 – Isolation
3 – State Collapse
4 – Other

**EventDate** – The date at which the period of lowest status began. For status resulting from a war loss, this is the end date of the war. For isolation, this is the beginning date of international sanctions. For state collapse, this is the date that central authority officially collapsed.

**Exception:** For all states that are currently suffering from isolation and/or state collapse, events are listed as “current” instead of being listed under the year in which the isolation or collapse began

**EventName** – The specific name given to the event, if applicable. If not applicable (ex. In the case of isolation due to international sanctions), a brief description of the event is included instead
Table 1: Cases of Major Power Status Loss Since World War II

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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>WWII</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>International Isolation</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Sino-Indian War</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>International Sanctions</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Six Day War</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Six Day War</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Six Day War</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Bangladesh Liberation War</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Iranian Revolution</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Siachen Conflicts</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1988</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Ousting of Central Govt</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Breakdown of Communism</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<td>International Sanctions</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
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<td>Current</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Current</td>
<td>Unrecognized Internationally</td>
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Path – The path the state chose to adjust its prestige and increase its status and centrality. If more than one path was taken, the result is coded as the first path chosen

0 – No Action
1 – War
2 – Economic
3 – Political
4 – Nuclear
5 – Superseded by another event

Coding Timeline
Before beginning the coding process, I had to set a time period for case consideration. Since the purpose of this thesis is to explain the various paths states can take to increase their prestige I had to limit my dataset to only those cases where all four possible paths existed. This set my start date at the end of World War II – the first time that nuclear weapons could have been used as a tool of prestige.

This start date is important because it limits the dataset to include only the relevant cases. Events that occurred before the advent of nuclear weapons did not provide states with the opportunity to pursue proliferation as a means of status attainment. Adding cases prior to the 1940s would add irrelevant event data that distracts from the purpose of the dataset and would skew the results in favor of the other three paths.

There is no end date for the dataset since it is still relevant today.

III. Variable Definitions

EventType
The coding for EventType required the most research and selectivity on my part and deserves further explanation.
War Loss

For the coding of states that lost wars, I began by collecting statistical information from the Correlates of War Interstate Conflict dataset and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Armed Conflict database for the time period in question\textsuperscript{28}.

I then removed all data events that could not be coded as interstate wars. The purpose of this distinction was twofold. Firstly, since my theory of status adjustment only applies to state actors, examining non-state conflicts would add a superfluous level of data. Secondly, according to my definition of prestige, status is a relative measure of comparison to other states in the system. Therefore, only a loss of war to another state would cause a major drop in status. Internal conflicts, civil wars and conflicts with non-state actors may weaken a state's status, but they would not have the same level of effect as a loss to another state power.

From this list of conflicts, I then narrowed my selection down by the power capabilities of the two states involved. Losing a war to a much more powerful state generally does not cause a status drop because the losing state was never expected to win and therefore did not harm its reputation or legitimacy. Being defeated by a state with inferior material capabilities, however, does reflect negatively on the losing state and can cause a major drop in prestige.

To measure the disparity between combatants I referenced the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset, which assigns all states a Composite Index National Capabilities (CINC) score.\textsuperscript{29} The CINC is based off a measurement of six factors: total population, urban population, military personnel, military expenditure, iron and steel production, and energy consumption. The dataset has a separate entry for every state and year and is a useful tool for comparing the relative material strength of states.

\textsuperscript{28} Sarkees and Wayman, "Resort to War: 1816 – 2007."
\textsuperscript{29} Singer et al, "Capability Distribution."
Using the Correlates of War CINC scores I coded states as having a major drop in status if they were a) defeated by a state ranked at least 15 places below or b) were one of the 25 most powerful states and were completely devastated in a war, even if it was by a higher or only slightly lower ranked state. I kept my dataset limited to states ranked within the top 50 each year since those states would be the ones most affected by a drop in prestige. Extreme low status states are rarely expected to win wars even against less powerful opponents and, therefore, would not suffer significant damage to their international reputation as a result of war loss.

For the purposes of this dataset, all war losses that resulted in dissolution of the losing state (Such as South Vietnam at the end of the Vietnam war) were also excluded. Since the state ceased to exist, it no longer had any status or means to achieve such and would be irrelevant to the collected data.

Isolation

There are general forms that isolation can take in international relations: deliberate self-isolation and imposed isolation. For the purpose of this data, only states suffering from imposed isolation were considered. Those states pursuing policies of self-isolation do so of their own accord and, most likely, for a specific political or economic reason. They do not suffer the same status drop as states whose isolation is imposed upon them by others.

International isolation is characterized by multilateral attempts to purposely exclude a target state from international interactions. This is done either as punishment for a particular action or as a means of coercion intended to force the state to change particular policies, ideologies or even governments. The international community often labels these states as “rogues” or “pariahs”. In today’s world these labels generally come along with institutionalized punishments such as sanctions and embargos.

For the purpose of this dataset, states under trade embargos or sanctions from a single state (for example, the 1962 US embargo on Cuba) were not included since they were still able to pursue regular economic and diplomatic relations with the majority of the
world. In order to be considered a full pariah state, the target must have been subject to UN sanctions or separate sanctions from at least two major powers, not issued in conjunction with one another.

*State Collapse*

My coding for state collapse began by referencing the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Historical State Armed Conflicts and Regime Crises, 1955–2009 dataset. I combined this with outside research to add and subtract cases based on relevance to the dataset.

For the purpose of this dataset, I define state collapse as a temporary failure of central authority that is not immediately restored or replaced. A failure of central authority is characterized by the inability of a state to perform its essential functions of governance, stability maintenance and economic participation. I use the word temporary in my definition because those states that cannot recover from a collapse and do truly fail or dissolve are irrelevant to this dataset. In order for a state to pursue status adjustment following a collapse, it must retain its identity.

I did not include all cases from the PITF dataset in my final table. The reasons most cases were excluded is either because they resulted in dissolution of the state – such as the case of Yugoslavia – they were cases of regime change rather than true state collapse or because they occurred in states that already had extremely low status prior to collapsing. The third reason is the main factor leading to the scarcity of state collapse events in the dataset. Generally states with very high status do not suffer collapse because they have strong allies and leverage in the international system that can be used to protect the state.

In cases of state collapse the loss of prestige is seen in the dissolution of important political and economic relationships and removal of the state from international affairs. The material capability of the state may remain intact after the government recovers, but

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30 Gleditsch et al, "UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2009."
its legitimacy and respect will have been severely damaged, hurting its ability to participate in international affairs and achieve its goals on a global scale.

Other

My dataset only includes two cases coded as “other” event types – Iran in 1979 and Taiwan. These are coded as such because they did not fit neatly into any of the other categories.

Iran experienced a major drop in prestige following the 1979 Revolution. It lost many allies, was publicly berated and was removed from many of its former political alliances. It cannot be classified with the other instances of revolution under state collapse, though, because the government of Iran never failed. The transition of power was relatively peaceful and stable, but still resulted in a major drop in prestige.

Taiwan is unique in that it is a case of recognition, or lack thereof. Taiwan has been excluded from participation in all major international bodies – including the United Nations, World Bank, IMF, etc. – since it is not formally recognized by the Security Council, but it possesses a fully functioning government and society. Some states, including the United States, have recognized Taiwan’s right to sovereignty, but it is still unable to function on an international scale or have an opinion on matters directly related to its wellbeing and security.

Path

The variable Path refers to the route taken by a state’s leadership to increase its prestige. There are four main paths that can be taken: War, Economic, Political and Nuclear. For the sake of simplicity the dataset is only coded with the first path a state chose. It does not reflect changes in path made over time. This unfortunately makes status appear to be a very static concept when it is actually something that is constantly changing over time. If a state is unsuccessful at its chosen path or believes it has gained all it can from that path it may change its approach to status adjustment. The same may occur if there is a large shift in international norms related to one of the four paths as well.
The four paths will be expanded on in great detail in the next chapter and will not be explained here. The other two options - None and Superseded by another event - deserve a bit of discussion, though.

None

On rare occasion a leader may not take any steps toward status adjustment. This is usually the case if he is preoccupied with other situations such as avoiding state collapse, revolution or economic turmoil. In most cases, items coded as None have happened very recently and the leader has not yet chosen or made known which path he will take toward adjustment. In nearly all cases the leader will chose one of the four paths, but it may take years before he is able to do so and, in the meantime, would be coded as null.

Superseded

In some cases a state suffered a drop in status but before the leadership could take action toward increasing its prestige the state suffered a second drop or an unexpected victory – such as being invaded or successfully fighting off an invasion. In these cases, the first event was superseded by either a more serious drop or an increase in prestige without the leader having taken direct action. If the state suffered two drops in prestige the path of status adjustment taken after the second drop would be aimed at fixing the first loss as well.
CHAPTER 3: STATUS CHANGE

I. Introduction

States that suffer a dramatic and abrupt drop in prestige must seek ways to increase their status or else risk permanently losing their position in the international system. Most leaders believe that their state deserves to be respected and have a say in its own affair. They make take drastic measures to increase their state’s reputation if they feel that this right has been violated.

The process of status change can be viewed as a trajectory between three points in time, designated T₁, T₂, and T₃. T₁ is the point in time at which the state leader first decides to pursue status adjustment. T₂ is defined as the period of time immediately following the status-changing decision. This is an interim period of time in which the state is able to see whether or not it is on the path to achieving its goal. At T₂ the leader can choose to either change paths or continue further down the chosen path. T₃, which may occur months or years down the line, is the point at which status adjustment finally appears. It should not be viewed as an endpoint, though. A state can continue to increase its status past T₃ indefinitely. In some cases T₃ may also result in a second change of path if the state still has not achieved its desired level of prestige.

![Figure 1: The Timeline of Status Adjustment](image)
For some states $T_1$ may occur immediately following their drop in prestige. For others it may take years after a traumatic event before they are able to even begin thinking about status adjustment. This is particularly true in the case of collapsed states, which may not be capable of pursuing any sort of foreign policy during the rebuilding process. It may take years for a failed state to develop the institutions needed for status adjustment and to become stable enough domestically to look toward the future.

II. Paths of Status Elevation

There are many paths a state can take toward temporary status change. States make prestige-enhancing decisions on an almost daily basis by signing trade agreements, joining international organizations, promoting new foreign policies and gaining or losing allies. In order to institute a permanent and lasting change, though, a more dramatic step is needed.

When a state suffers a dramatic loss in prestige, small steps will do very little to return it to its former glory. It is much easier to lose status than it is to gain it back. Only a dramatic long-term adjustment will help a state recover its lost prestige. The paths that can lead to status recovery can be grouped into four general categories: (1) winning a war, (2) becoming an economic power, (3) taking the lead on a major political negotiation and (4) pursuing nuclear weapons.

Which path a state will take depends on many factors including its resources, goals and constraints on its decision-making. Foreign policy is a poliheuristic game in which a leader must first eliminate all paths that he considers unacceptable and then evaluate between the remaining choices. Leaders must make compromises between their foreign policy goals – in this case, achieving prestige – and the institutional constraints placed on them by their domestic population.\(^31\)

All four paths produce different rates and levels of status adjustment. Most have additional benefits that increase the economic, military or political security of the state and

\(^31\) Goertz, "Constraints, Compromises, and Decision Making."
all have major costs and obstacles on the road to success. The costs and benefit of each path are not static over time, but change along with international norms.

In the past seventy years all four paths have experienced different highs and lows in popularity. The 1950s were a time where nuclear power was revered and respected. Many states attempted to follow the nuclear path, but very few succeeded. Today nuclear proliferation is considered a rogue path, only taken by those states that are already positioned well outside international society.

The path of war seems to have fallen along the wayside as well. Improvements in weapons technology, the advent of guerilla warfare and the rise of non-state actors have made war a much less appealing path than it was in the first half of the twentieth century. Since the turn of the twentieth century the incidences of interstate war have dropped from 0.744 wars per member of the international system to 0.171 wars per member in the late 1990s.32

There seems to have been a shift in recent decades toward more peaceful approaches to international affairs, such as the political or economic paths. As international opinions and norms change over time, so does the appeal of each path to status adjustment.

The last path, the pursuit of nuclear weapons, is the most understudied and controversial of the four. For this reason it will receive the most attention in this chapter. All four paths warrant discussion, though, in order to better understand the costs and potential benefits of each.

**Winning a War**

The most intuitive response to a status drop, especially one resulting from a major military defeat, is to fight another war and win. This is much easier said than done.

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32 Wayman et. al., "Inter-State, Intra-State, and Extra-State Wars."
The main requirement of this path is a strong and capable army. Following a major military defeat a state must be able to rebuild its forces – people, vehicles, weapons, etc. – before waging a second war. This requires a large number of personnel, major expenditures and a quick recovery in the defense industry. Many states cannot pull together such resources following a period of isolation, a military defeat or an incident of state collapse and may shy away from choosing the military option.

The second requirement of this path is the identification of an enemy and the justification for fighting a new war so soon after completing one. In most cases leaders will attempt to justify the war as retaliation against the enemy responsible for the original drop in prestige – if there is one. A war could also be fought against a different - and hopefully weaker – force, though, if the leaders believe such a victory would be easier to achieve.

The path of military retaliation is not simply a matter of deciding you want a war and fighting one. There are domestic and international pressures which constrain a leader’s ability to turn to violence. The leader must convince his people that it is in their best interest to wage a war while they are still recovering from losing family, friends, jobs and/or property in the previous event. he must also be able to convince the people that they will win and are not meet with an unnecessary, tragic end.

Internationally, waging a war without just cause is considered a criminal action. A state must prove that the conflict was a matter of sovereignty, self-defense, or protection of its people or else risk setting off a global backlash. Indiscriminately starting a new war runs the risk of getting the international community involved against the state, further decreasing their chances of victory. It also runs the risk of leading to isolation by presenting the state as a hostile “rogue” that is threatening the stability of the international system. This brand would not only fail to increase the status of the state, but may even push it further down the status scale and create a whole other obstacle that must be overcome.

³³ A good in-depth explanation of just war theory can be found in Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars.*
By its very nature war is an unpredictable phenomenon. Even when one state has superior resources and capabilities it may ultimately lose. Waging a war to increase status is hardly a guarantee of victory. There is no way for a state to be certain if it allies or allies of the target state will participate in the violence. There is also no way to guarantee that if victory is achieved it will not just lead to another war. Waging wars to increase status can lead to an indefinite cycle of violence with the losing side always fighting back in retaliation.

If victory can be achieved, though, winning a war is a one of the quickest and clearest ways to increase state status. In most cases of war there is a clear victor and a clear loser. There is little debate about the success of the operation both at home and abroad. Victory helps erase the memory of the previous status loss both internationally and domestically. It will increase the prestige of the state by proving that it is a winner and may increase its safety by proving to others that it has the capability to win a war and should not be seen as an easy enemy to defeat.

Military victory gives a state a position of regional importance that will help cement its continued involvement in international and affairs. It captures the attention of both the state’s neighbors and the world’s superpowers and proves that it can be an important player on a global scale. Whether the victorious state gained territory as a result of its triumph or suffered dramatic losses in the fighting does not matter too much in the grand scheme of things. A victory will have positive results even if it does not lead to major gains of material power as well.

Wars are a great way to rally a domestic population, especially if there are strong divisions or unrest. The presence of a third party “other” is often powerful enough to unite domestic groups that were formerly in conflict. It solidifies the feeling of nationalism and ethnic pride that citizens feel and encourages them to express support for their state and government. This helps increase the state’s stability and ensure the popularity of the leadership.
When a state is victorious in a war it is often able to take the lead on the peace negotiations – if they take place – and form a settlement that is tilted heavily in its favor. This settlement helps increase the status of the victor while simultaneously decreasing the prestige of the losing state. It can also provide the victor with important territory, political concessions or other resources depending on how the conflict ended.

Military victories may have the highest impact on a state's status at T2 out of any path, but may not have a very large impact - or may even result in a negative movement - from there to T3.

**Economic Power**

The decision to use economic advancement to increase status is generally taken by those states that have a strong industrial sector and a large trading base for exports. For states that are isolated from the international community, the economic avenue is rarely a viable approach to status increase.

In order to maintain the amount of production needed to become a major economic power, the state must have a strong domestic base either in industry, natural resources or commodities. The products must be in demand from other states and not be something every state can produce. The more exclusive and complicated the state's products are and the larger the amount that can be produced, the greater the benefit will be of pursuing economic paths to status adjustment.

The main benefit of the economic path outside of status adjustment is largely self-explanatory: it augments the economy of the rising nation. Increasing industrial production and exports will bring in more capital, create more jobs and increase the wealth of the state and many of its people. This may also lead to domestic political benefits for the leader who is in power when this production starts to turn the economy around.

The new relationships developed through exports may also strengthen political and/or military alliances abroad. The further intertwined two states become in the
economic sector, the more they are willing to work together on a host of other important issues. Developing economic power can have far reaching benefits in many aspects of international relations.

As with any major decision taken by a state, there may be negative results and costs that come along with economic expansion. If the state does not already have the industry in place to support an export-oriented economy it will have to institute dramatic structural changes, which may be unpopular with certain sectors of the economy. As with any major political decision, there are institutional constraints on a leader’s ability to make changes to the state economy. He must contend with the bureaucratic and organizational structures currently in place and force changes in them without permanently harming his ability to govern in the domestic realm.

Even if the economic structure of the state is legally changed, there is no way to ensure that the more informal, cultural forms of interaction will change as well. These are much further ingrained in the people of the state and may counteract any attempts at jumpstarting an export capability. There is always the possibility that the state will fail at producing any good worthwhile to the international community and will find itself unable to compete in the global market at the level needed for status adjustment.

Without the proper trade agreements in place, very little can come of industrial production, even on a large scale. For this reason, states looking to increase their status through economics must have good political relationships with at least a few major powers or be able to develop these relationships. Building the industry is only one half of the battle; getting the goods to move throughout the world is just as important and often more difficult. For some states, having a worldwide export market will require major political concessions, sometimes on issues that the leaders or people do not want to give in to.

34 Child & Yuan illustrate how institutional constraints play a role in economic decision making by examining their role they playing in the development of the Chinese investment section; Child & Yuan, Institutional Constraints on Economic Reform.
These issues may need to be sacrificed in the short term, though, in order to achieve the long term benefits.

In the long term (T₃) pursuing economic power may move a state from the very bottom of the status scale to a place almost near the top. It will help it form connections with many different states, including some of the world’s major powers. As the state’s economy becomes more intertwined with others it will find itself in a better position for international bargaining and negotiations. It may become the go-to state for major economic agreements as it earns the reputation for being a modern, advanced nation capable of helping the world achieve similar levels of progress.

This position of economic prestige is always in danger of a crash, though. If for some reason - be it a natural disaster, a military attack, a change in leadership or some other unforeseen event - a state is unable to continue production of its main commodities or maintain its trade relationships, all the benefits of increased economic status are in danger of being lost.

Increased economic status also does not protect states from future attacks or losses. The state generally does not gain any new military or defensive capabilities by pursuing economic power and at some point in the future may find itself in a situation where it is once again losing a war and sliding down the status rankings.

**Political Negotiation**

The third avenue a state can take to increase its status is that of political negotiations. This path should not be confused with the daily diplomacy of states, but it does begin in the same place – foreign policy.

The political path of status adjustment requires a state to insert itself as the focal point of a major political negotiation. This can either be as a broker in an important peace agreement, the host of an international summit on a specific transnational issue or the initiator of a major transnational policy. The issue that the state decides to take a stand on...
will largely depend on its particular resources and policy agenda. It could be anything from deforestation to the Arab-Israeli conflict to nuclear weapons control. The more important the issue is globally, the higher the potential for an increase in prestige.

The largest obstacle to this path is the initial drive to be seen as the leader on a particular topic. A state that has just suffered a great drop in status is unlikely to foster confidence in its ability to lead multilateral negotiations unless it is first able to garner support from a few other states or at least one major power. Gathering this support will be difficult since the state has just lost a large amount of respect and legitimacy. It will most likely need to take small steps toward bilateral negotiations before it can set itself up as a global leader. The amount of support needed will vary with the sensitivity of the issue in question.

Often, gaining this support requires the state to make concessions of previous issues or demands. The more a state is able to offer, the better chance it has to bring other states to the table and gain their favor. At the same time, though, leaders must be careful not to give away so much that they are seen to be abandoning the demands and desires of their domestic population. A leader cannot offer something his people are unwilling to give up without facing the consequences.35

Whether the political path is a summit, peace process or other negotiation, serving as the host on an issue will set the state up to play an important role in further negotiations on the same point. Even if future meetings are not held at the same location, the state has gotten their foot in the door and should be included in all future meetings. It has set itself up with a niche in international affairs on which it is considered an expert. Its opinions will be heard and it will be one step closer to having its goals met in other foreign policy arenas.

Taking a political path to status adjustment will also help a state develop a reputation for being peaceful and conscientious. Most transnational issues are matters of

35 This is because politics is a two-level game in which the leader is the only person able to play at both tables. Putnam, "Two Level Games"
peace, weapons reduction, health or climate. Supporting these issues is usually a non-threatening stance that is unlikely to foster hostility or mistrust like some of the other paths. It may also be the basis for new alliances or accords to form bilaterally on related issues.

The utility of peaceful negotiations for prestige increase is called into question, though, if an accord cannot be reached. There is always the question of whether the host state will be criticized for such an outcome or praised for trying anyway. Also, if an accord fails, the host state may not be invited to further negotiations if it is blamed for the lack of results.

This path requires the least amount of resources, economically and militarily, of any path and may therefore be considered the easiest, but it also has the lowest status potential. While hosting negotiations may help a state recover from being at the bottom of the status rung, it is unlikely that it will raise it all the way to a position of high status, even in the long term. Many states are content to sit at the middle of the status spectrum, though, and others may see political negotiations as simply the first step in increasing their status. They may make a secondary decision at $T_2$ with their newly cemented political ties that allows them to see a further status increase at $T_3$.

**Nuclear Weapons**

The final avenue for states to increase their prestige is the newest, most controversial and, consequently, the most understudied. That is the pursuit of nuclear weapons.

The numbers of risks and obstacles associated with nuclear proliferation has kept most scholars from viewing it as a means of achieving status. Realist beliefs of rationality are stretched by the argument that states are willing to face the almost insurmountable odds of pursuing a nuclear program in order to achieve a higher degree of prestige. This is why nuclear proliferation is most often discussed as a matter of augmenting state security. The security story, though, falls short of explaining some cases.
A nuclear arsenal is a powerful force that requires substantial capital, technology and modernization. It signals to others that the state has all of these elements as well as the strength granted to it by such a destructive weapon. Nuclear states play an important role in the international system and are among those states with the highest level of status. For this reason, some states may see the pursuit of nuclear weapons as a clear path toward status adjustment.

Since the nuclear path is the least studied of the four I will examine it in further detail below in order to better illustrate my theory of status adjustment.

III. Nuclear Weapons and Prestige

Obstacles to Proliferation

Nuclear weapons have been studied in great detail by international relations scholars since they were first conceived of in 1939. They are rarely examined as tools of status adjustment, though. Scholars look at the technical aspects of nuclear arsenals, the potential ramifications of proliferation and the security implications of the decision to go nuclear. The motivations for nuclear proliferation, especially of a non-strategic kind are largely unstudied.

I argue that nuclear weapons are a viable means of status adjustment and have been used by a handful of states in recent years as such. While the security concerns leading to proliferations are important, they are not the whole store. Prestige plays an important role in the decision to go nuclear and may be an even more powerful motivator than security in some cases.

Not every state that has pursued nuclear weapons was facing obvious security threats at the time. Some states have actually put themselves in a position of decreased security for years while trying to develop their first bomb. Any state pursuing nuclear weapons will inevitably face a series of obstacles and objections that make it difficult to succeed. It may become a target of isolationist policies or even a preemptive attack. The window of vulnerability for such policies may last anywhere from a few years to a few
decades depending on how long it takes to create a fully operational nuclear weapon. It is nearly impossible for a state to know beforehand just how long it will take to achieve nuclear status.

The first major obstacle states must overcome in the pursuit of nuclear weapons is actually building the weapon itself. Building a nuclear weapons program requires a large amount of human and financial capital that many states do not have. The technology must either be produced at home or bought for a high price abroad, usually through black market channels. States with disheveled economies and limited funds cannot pursue a nuclear program without further burdening their resources. Even if they are able to develop nuclear technology, the material is useless without the correct human capital.

A large scientific and engineering base is needed to run the nuclear facilities, build the weapons and make sure the operation functions correctly and efficiently. Without a prior domestic nuclear establishment, this knowledge can only be gained by sending scholars abroad or importing knowledge from other nuclear organizations. This requires the state to let many promising minds leave the country or rely on another state’s willingness to export their own nuclear knowledge.

The second obstacle to nuclear proliferation is the global non-proliferation regime that has emerged in recent decades. Pursuit of nuclear weapons used to be considered “normal” in the 1950s and 1960s, but today it is branded as a “rogue” action, taken only by outliers. Openly pursuing nuclear weapons results in alienation by those states committed to the non-proliferation regime. It makes the state the target of negative rhetoric, sanctions and potential isolation.

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36 Jim Walsh argues that the Nonproliferation regime, while often criticized for its faults, has actually been quite successful. The severity with which the global opinion of nuclear proliferation has shifted from positive to negative in recent years is one of the strongest examples of the NPT’s success; Walsh, “Learning from Past Success.”
Trade, economic assistance, diplomacy and protection agreements are all put in jeopardy by proliferation. States pursuing nuclear weapons may lose major trading partners and sever any protection alliances they participate in. They may face severe economic hardships resulting from the costs of the nuclear program and the loss of trade. They will also suffer political backlash both at home and abroad. This is why most nuclear programs are begun in secret, adding another layer of difficulty to acquiring the necessary materials and knowledge.

The threat of sanctions and isolation may not be seen as a major impediment to states that are already at the bottom level of status and currently suffering from isolation. This is why many of the states that have pursued nuclear weapons in recent years did so only after they had been excluded from a large portion of their political ties. The third obstacle, though - threat of military actions - remains important for even the most secluded states.

The United States has demonstrated its willingness to pursue military action against potential proliferators and other states have pledged to do the same. Given the amount of time it takes to develop a fully functional nuclear weapons program, the window for such retaliation can be quite large. The threat of attack does not just come from major powers either. A hostile neighbor or rival may also be compelled to initiate an attack on a state it knows is pursuing nuclear power in order to cut off production before it can become a threat.

The fourth obstacle is the issue of proliferation cascades. The threat of a nuclear rival may motivate neighboring states to pursue their own nuclear programs rather than risk becoming a subservient power. If those other states have a larger technology or knowledge base to draw from they may even beat the initial proliferator to completion. A nuclear cascade could cost a state billions of dollars by creating an arms race and leave it in the same strategic position or even worse off than it was before making those expenditures.
Finally, leaders must always consider their domestic population when making major strategic decisions. Every state leader rules in a two level game. They are an actor in the international realm, but also an agent of their people. The leader is generally the only person who participates in both levels of negotiation and, therefore, is the only person who can be held accountable by both the people and the international community.

Some populations will accept a nuclear weapon with open arms, proclaiming it as a right of the people. These actors most often include the nuclear energy establishment, parts of the professional military and politicians whose constituents benefit from a nuclear program. Such support may be more widespread if the state has faced a history of hostility by another power, especially a nuclear one. Iranian leaders have been very successful in this arena and have managed to rally an otherwise divided population around the state's notorious nuclear program. They have now made the pursuit of nuclear power synonymous with the Iranian national identity and state sovereignty.

Some populations, on the other hand, may feel that they have lived without interference from the international community and pursuing nuclear weapons threatens their state's survival and stability. These people would not rally around the idea of increasing their state's military power, but protest such an action as endangering their way of life. A leader that pursues nuclear power must understand the mindset of his people.

Whatever decision he makes, a state leader must be prepared to face the consequences of a negative outcome. The people of a state rarely differentiate between unfavorable results caused by unforeseeable events and the bad outcome of a political

37 A negotiator and/or leader must come to the table of international negotiations and decision making with a "win set" of conditions based on his domestic population. The decision to go nuclear may not be an international decision, but it affects the international system and therefore should be considered a two-level game even though the decision making process is occurring entirely in the domestic bureaucracy; Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics."
decision, whether or not the decision had popular support. As recent events in the Middle East have proven, the power of the people cannot be overlooked by leaders, even those who do not need popular support for democratic elections.

All of these risk factors can be difficult to quantify, leading most states to err on the side of caution. As Jacques Hymans explains in his psychological political work, "if you cannot calculate the risks involved, you cannot determine if you are willing to accept them." Why, then, would states pursue nuclear weapons programs when facing an unknown realm of bankruptcy, alienation, political upheaval and retaliation? If the answer cannot be found by examining the security realm it must lie somewhere else. This is where the prestige effects of nuclear weapons come to light.

**Proliferation and Prestige**

The creation of a successful nuclear weapons program by a state signals the development of military and technological improvements that only a few other states in the world are capable of achieving. It proves that the state can be a major player in the modern world and forces others to take notice of its advancements and capabilities. This helps the state increase its attained level of status and, once the nuclear program is institutionalized, would increase the base level of the state’s ascribed status as well.

The nuclear states of the world are a very small, but extremely powerful group. There are only nine nuclear powers, but they hold a majority of the world’s power – all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are nuclear states. Engaging with these states on a regular basis would dramatically increase a state’s centrality and signal to the rest of the world that it is a state worth knowing.

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39 Downs, “Optimal Imperfection?”, 132; Because of this “the constituency is forced to remove effective but unlucky executives who made the best possible decision in a difficult case.” This is especially relevant when dealing with situations of uncertainty. Downs and Rocke are mostly discussing the decision to go to war when making this statement, but the decision to build nuclear weapons may result in similar consequences if retaliation ensues. Therefore, the possibility of the “unforeseen” consequences must always be considered.

40 Hymans, “Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation”, 11.
The United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, China, Pakistan and India have all turned their nuclear programs into essential elements of their state's prestige. Others cannot engage in dealings with these states without viewing them as nuclear powers and treating them as such. This makes others more cautious when negotiating on issues that could lead to military conflict, more willing to depend on these states for protection and more willing to act subservient in political disagreements.

Israel and North Korea, on the other hand, are still trying to attain this level of nuclear status. They are accepted as nuclear powers, but are not received with the same reverence as the other seven. Whether this is because their nuclear programs are relatively new, still largely secret and unconfirmed or because their arsenals are so small is uncertain. There is no finite line for when a nuclear program switches from an attained to an ascribed measure of status, but it is signaled by changes in the behavior of states around it. The constant threats and attacks on Israel and the large-scale sanctions and political disapproval of North Korea show that they have not yet raised themselves to higher status positions.

Joining the "nuclear club" helps a state achieve ascribed status because it showcases a permanent change in its capabilities and proves that it has a highly advanced level of knowledge and technology. It does not lead to immediate recognition, though. In today's world, the pursuit of nuclear power is far more likely to garner negative attention than positive since it is seen as a violation of international norms. For a state that is marginalized and ignored, though, negative attention may be better than no attention at all. It is the first step on the path to recognition and may provide the state with a platform for changing and increasing public opinion about itself.

The road from nuclear power to prestige is not fast or smooth as evidenced by the isolation of North Korea and Iran. Pursuing nuclear power in today's world requires a state to break away from or openly violate a major international treaty. Such an action will likely result in criticism, sanctions and even threats, but it will also help keep the state in the
public eye as nuclear states can hardly be ignored. After a period of waiting the state’s nuclear arsenal may be accepted by the international community and grant it an unprecedented level of prestige.

India, a nuclear state, has been criticized for years for refusing to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and participate in the non-proliferation regime. In the past year, though, it has received almost unanimous support among United Nations Security Council members for its bid to become the newest permanent member of the UNSC - China is the only state that has refused to give its endorsement.41

While supporting India’s candidacy is a long way from actually voting for its seat, it is still a gesture with large symbolic significance, especially since the United States has not made the same endorsement for long-term allies Germany and Japan, non-nuclear powers who are also seeking a bid.42 New nuclear states may view the status of India as a sign that the stigma of nuclear proliferation dissipates over time and, with enough patience, may ally you with the most important and prestigious nations of the world.

Benefits of the Proliferation Path

At the end of its path to proliferation a state will not only have increased its status, but will possess the most destructive weapon on earth and the power to backup its newly deserved reputation. Even the most unwilling rivals must recognize the results of a successful nuclear program and exercise caution in dealing with nuclear states.

Unlike the other three paths of status adjustment, it is unlikely that the prestige increase resulting from nuclear possession will be lost or taken away. Unless a state voluntarily gives up its nuclear weapons, there is very little chance that they will be lost. To this day, no state has ever had a full operation nuclear arsenal removed from its soil against its will.

41 Raj, “Brazil wins US praise”
42 Parsons and Richter, “Obama backs India’s bid”
For states that are able to overcome all the obstacles and actually build a nuclear arsenal, proliferation may also serve the vital purpose of restoring legitimacy and uniting a bloodied, divided population. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program had a long and storied history, but became formally institutionalized following its 1971 civil war.\textsuperscript{43} India maintained a purposely-ambiguous posture toward its nuclear program for many years that was only ended when a new Hindu nationalist government came to power in 1998.\textsuperscript{44} The rallying power of nuclear weapons has been seen for decades and there is no reason to believe new nuclear nations will not experience the same wave of nationalistic support.

Pursuing nuclear weapons is one of the slowest paths to achieving status adjustment, but it may be the most effective and most permanent. Even if a state is subjected to sanctions and isolation, it is likely that it will rise from “very low” status to “low” or “mid” status almost immediately after becoming a nuclear power. It will be invited to international negotiations to discuss its nuclear program and be approached with greater respect by rivals and neighbors.

Once a state is able to overcome the opposition that is likely to result from its new capabilities, it will become an active participant in negotiations on global nuclear issues and may even be included in other major political or economic discussions. It may be invited to hold a position of importance in international organizations or achieve regional hegemony and the support of formerly hostile or indifferent neighbors.

Becoming a nuclear power has the potential to transform a state from the bottom rung of status to the world of super powers, a level that other paths of status adjustment rarely, if ever, reach. It is not a quick or easy path to take, though, which is why there are still so few nuclear states to date.

\textsuperscript{43} Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program”
\textsuperscript{44} Hymans, “Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation”, 195
I. Case Selection

This thesis uses five cases – two large and three small – to illustrate the theories presented in the first three chapters. These cases were strategically chosen from the dataset in chapter 2 to represent a diverse and, hopefully, complete picture of the theory in action.

The five cases collectively showcase all four paths of status adjustment in action, with carrying degrees of success. They demonstrate cases, such as Japan, that were wildly successful and others, such as Iran, that have still not achieved their goals. They also represent states that suffered from a single drop in prestige and states that have fallen on more than one occasion. Any number of cases could have done this, though.

What makes these five cases work so well together is that they include temporal, cultural, geographical, political and religious variations. Taken together these five cases show that there is no single “type” represented by this theory and no singular model of how status adjustment occurs.

The cases chosen represent three different continents, both secular and religious states, multiple forms of government and vastly different cultural and historical backgrounds. Above all, though, they represent different eras in the world of international relations. There are cases that take place in the post war world of the 1950s and 1960s, cases which exist at the height of the Cold War and those which persist beyond the fall of the Soviet Union. These cases span dramatic shifts in international norms such as the shift from a world where nuclear power was in vogue to one where the NPT has created an anti-nuclear club. They represent the changing face of global fear from the threat of the evil, savage Japanese to the all-encompassing battle against communism and today’s fight against radical Islam.
Collectively, these cases present the most accurate picture of how status can change across time and across cultures in the international system. Some cases begin and end in a matter of decades while others have been changing and growing for nearly fifty years. These cases clearly indicate that some states are able to select a single path and stick with it until they have achieved their desired level of prestige while others will change tactics multiple times, trying to find the right fit.

The diversity and complexity of these cases helps represent the inherent difficulty of defining and tracking a concept as ethereal as prestige while still providing a relatively complete picture of my theory in action.

II. Introduction to the Smaller Case Surveys

The three small-scale cases in this paper were chosen to compliment and contrast with one another. They represent vastly different approaches to status adjustment with varying degrees of success. Taken together they help operationalize the concept of prestige and illustrate it in a way that can be better understood in the larger, more in-depth case studies.

The first case in this chapter, Pakistan, may be the single most studied case of nuclear proliferation and the most over determined one, as well. The clear security risks Pakistan faced from India were obviously an important consideration in the decision to go nuclear, but that does not mean that prestige did not play a role as well. A demoralized and embarrassed nation, seemingly incapable of winning any war, needed a way to prove to its people and the world that it could match India in at least one area of technology and power. Pakistan’s nuclear program has forced the world to pay attention to the state in a way they would not have if it were still a conventional power.

The second case is that of Japan. It takes little convincing to prove that Japan experienced one of history’s most miraculous economic turnarounds following World War II. But how did the drive for prestige play a role? Following a major military defeat and the
loss of its empire Japan had to find a place for itself in the international system. It was being belittled as inferior in matters of technology and production and had to prove that it was a modern, advanced nation in order to gain the respect of the international community.

The final case in this chapter, France, is another instance of nuclear proliferation but, unlike Pakistan, is one where prestige motivations have been studied in detail. This case is not just an illustration of the decision to go nuclear, though. It shows how states have to stick to their chosen paths for decades or risk losing the status they have gained when they face further military or political losses.

These three cases are all very well known and have been studied in great detail. However they are rarely, with the possible exception of France, presented as models of status adjustment and the quest for prestige. They are almost never viewed as examples of one singular concept even though they work quite well together. By systematically tracking the fall and recovery of these three states I hope to illustrate the specifics of how status change operates and how many different routes there are to prestige, even within the four main pathways.

III. Pakistan’s Shift from War to Proliferation

The entire history of modern Pakistan is a series of political and military losses to India. Whether on the battlefield, at the United Nations or in bilateral negotiations, Pakistan has been treated as the lesser of the two states ever since its creation in 1947. This has forced Pakistan to take up the position of the revisionist state, always seeking to change the status quo and rewrite its recent history.

When India began pursuing nuclear power in the second half of the century Pakistan had no choice but to follow suit. As it suffered loss after loss to India it became apparent that the race for nuclear power might be the only opportunity for it to match India, prove that it is worth recognition and finally be able to shape the region into the model it always wanted.
Pakistan's decision to go nuclear may have been the most over-determined proliferation decision any state has ever made. It had a clear rival and hostile neighbor that was already pursuing nuclear power, it was suffering from inner turmoil that it needed to repress and it had a rapidly diminishing conventional force suffering loss after loss in battle. One aspect of the decision to go nuclear that is often overlooked, though, is the effect it had on Pakistan's identity and prestige.

**Identity in Pakistan**

Pakistan was born into an identity crisis. It was founded in the name of Islam and as a way to give the Muslims of South Asia their own state, yet it has struggled to be seen as a modern, important nation. Pakistani leaders have used their identity as the only state formed directly in the name of Islam to garner popular support, but in doing so have largely overlooked the need to form a Pakistani identity unique to the state itself. This void has given rise to many national and transnational Jihad movements within Pakistan's borders.

Pakistan has spent its entire history searching for a way to live up to its promises of being a Muslim state while still being seen as modern. Throughout most of the world the vision of "modernity" has come to be seen as synonymous with secularism. Religious states are portrayed as backward, old-fashioned and often repressive. These images give little consideration given to the fact that Islam is different than Christianity, though, and that the governing styles of the two religions are not the same. In the Muslim world, in fact, secularism has often led to authoritarian, tyrannical rule.

Pakistan has failed to convince its people that Islamic rule will lead them to glory and greatness. This has resulted in widespread civil unrest as different groups compete for power and influence. The one issue that unites all Pakistani people, though, is their opposition to India. As one Pakistani journalist wrote "we discover that regardless of the

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45 Butt, "Pakistan's Salvation."
age factor, every individual around loves to hate our neighboring country with a vengeance...The fervor and devotion tantamounts to religious zeal."46

A hatred of India is the one major defining characteristic of all Pakistani people. It has so permeated the culture that the Pakistani identity has become synonymous with simply being anti-India. This vague, conditional definition has failed to fill the identity void in Pakistan and has made nationalism contingent on the state’s success or failure at dealing with its hostile neighbor.

**Pakistan’s Fall: Always Second Best**

Pakistan was born out of the British partition of India in 1947. The British had spent years trying to reconcile the religious and ethnic fighting flaring up in the territory, but by the mid-1940s had realized it was a lost cause. They decided that dividing up the territory on religious lines would help decrease tensions and allow the two groups to live in peace.47

The most difficult area to partition - and the territory that remains one of the main sources of tension between India and Pakistan today - was the state of Jammu and Kashmir. As a majority Muslim area under Hindu rule, the Kashmir Valley did not fit neatly into either of the newly created territories. It was given the freedom to decide which side it would cede with during the breakup – being made its own independent nation was never an option. The leaders of Pakistan had assume that, since the territory was 77% Muslim, it would cede to their side without discussion.48 Two months after the split, though, Kashmir still had not made a decision.

In an attempt to scare the Maharaja into accession, Pakistan launched a military offensive into Kashmir, claiming that it was coming to the aid of a repressed people. The attack succeeded in frightening the leader, but not to the desired ends. Instead of joining the Union of Pakistan, the Maharaja asked Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General of

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46 Aziz, "Pakistan’s (love) hate affair with India."
47 Butt, "Pakistan’s Salvation."
48 Burton Stein, *History of India, 358.*
India, for support. He responded by sending troops into Kashmir, driving the Pakistanis out of the majority of occupied territory.

As the fighting approached a stalemate, Indian leaders appealed to the United Nations Security Council to negotiate a ceasefire agreement, making it one of the first major issues the newly formed international body had to deal with. India appealed on the grounds that it had legal rights to the territory under the Instrument of Accession it had signed with Kashmir in 1947. Pakistan countered by saying that the agreement was illegal because the Maharaja had negotiated an agreement with them a month earlier, which barred him from negotiating with other states.49

India believed that it was a superior and, therefore, more credible state and would have better luck governing the territory of Kashmir. It claimed that Pakistan was threatening the stability of the Middle East and only by removing all Pakistani troops from the region and securing its borders against further conflict could they ever hope to achieve peace in the region.50 The Security Council heard arguments from both sides, but decided largely in favor of India, leaving them with over two-thirds of the Kashmir territory as part of the ceasefire agreement.51 Pakistan had not only lost the military contest for Kashmir, but a political one as well.

Since its creation, Pakistan has been labeled as inferior to India and has spent the rest of its history trying to remove itself from that shadow, with very limited success. Today India is receiving support from nearly all the great powers to gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council while Pakistan is considered the state where "all of the nightmares of the twenty-first century come together."52

49 Schofield, Kashmir in conflict.
50 The Leader-Post, "Full war near India warns UN."
51 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb.
Pakistan still has a long way to go to match the prestige of India, but it has had some success over the years at making itself a constant presence in international affairs, albeit for mostly negative reasons. The path mostly responsible for Pakistan’s continued presence is that of nuclear proliferation, but it has attempted status adjustment through war over the years as well.

**The Paths Not Taken**

As a relatively new state, with little clout in the international system, Pakistan was forced to rely on unilateral means – war and proliferation - to improve its state status. It would have been unable to garner the type of international support base needed to pursue either economic or political readjustment, especially while it remained in the shadow of India.

**Political Path**

One of the main factors contributing to Pakistan’s lack of prestige – in addition to its multiple war losses - was the way it was treated in international affairs. When the petition for Kashmir first went to the United Nations, it was decided in favor of India. Pakistan was forced to remove all armed troops and tribesmen before India even had to draw up a plan for withdrawing its similar forces. India was given the responsibility of looking over Kashmir and overseeing the administration of its plebiscite vote.53

What had begun as a joint request to decide the fate of Kashmir resulted in a legalization of India’s military presence in the region and a denunciation of Pakistan’s rights. There was little hope that any future attempts at political negotiation would turn out differently. Any policy proposed by Pakistan would automatically have been opposed by India, leading to a series of international arguments that would, if history were any indication, be decided in favor of India. Pursuing political status adjustment would most likely have been a dead end or a downward slide for Pakistan.

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Economic Path

During the 1950s Pakistan's government attempted to shift the large profits being made by agricultural traders into the more modern industry of manufacturing. It put into place heavily protectionist policies and set up an economy based on import substitution. This strategy was intended to increase imports of the raw materials needed for the manufacturing of consumer goods.

In order to keep its export sector moving at the same time, though, Pakistan's government offered bonus vouchers to exporters of high-value products. These vouchers could then be used to pay for imported goods. The vouchers provided no benefit to the economy, though, and by the 1960s Pakistan's manufacturing industry actually had a negative value-added.\textsuperscript{54}

Pakistan's protectionist policies and export subsidies resulted in a severe debt problem and a shortage of foreign capital that still exists in the state today. It also caused a narrowing of the export sector and limited the options available for international trade. Pakistan was never able to achieve the type of industrial base or trade relationships needed to maintain economic status adjustment.

The First Chosen Path: War

Pakistani leaders believed that their state was incomplete without Kashmir because there were Muslims there who deserved to live under Islamic rule.\textsuperscript{55} By the 1960s, Pakistan had gotten fed up with its position as an inferior nation and felt the need to make a statement on an international scale. Leaders hoped to regain some of the state's lost
legitimacy and respect. The path chosen by leaders was the one that would have the most immediate and decisive results: war.

In 1965 the Pakistani government had plans to incite a rebellion in Kashmir by turning locals into a rebel army. Lightly armed Pakistani troops were sent in on the ground to find sympathetic locals and organize them into a resistance. Rather than finding support, though, the Pakistanis were met with opposition. They were turned in to the Indian authorities by the very citizens they were trying to recruit.56

Having lost the element of surprise and the assistance of a local rebellion, Pakistani officials should have called off the attack. They had inferior military capabilities, were fighting on Indian territory and had a losing record when it came to military conflicts with India. All of the numbers showed that it would be in the best interest of Pakistan’s security to return home and come up with a new plan. Frustrated at their regional inferiority, though, they were determined to go through with the attack and launched troops into the area as scheduled. The offensive was short-lived as Indian troops once again pushed the Pakistanis back and the UN issued another ceasefire agreement.

The main outcome of the Second Kashmir War was that it fostered a sense of separatism and dissatisfaction in Western Pakistan. The citizens there felt that they were being overlooked in favor of Kashmir and they no longer wanted to be associated with the state of Pakistan.

This dissatisfaction slowly dissolved into conflict and by 1971 Pakistan was embroiled in an all-out civil war. India wasted no time in supporting the rebel Bengali forces, and Pakistan responded by increasing its troop presence in the area. The conflict devolved into yet another bilateral war – the Bangladesh War – and in less that two weeks India emerged once again as the clear victor.

56 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 13.
Pakistan's troops had been thoroughly routed by Indian forces and thousands of miles of territory were seized. Western Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh and Pakistan was sent home to lick its wounds and try to find a new approach to saving its damaged reputation. After this conflict it became clear to President Bhutto and the rest of Pakistan that their state "cannot go to war. Not in the next 5, 10 or 15 years..." This was a far cry from Bhutto's pre-election promise to "take revenge (on Hindu India) so as to undo the temporary humiliation" and to continue that fight "for a thousand years if necessary."

Pakistani leaders had thought they could save their state's reputation by starting and winning a war. Instead of victory, though, they were met with defeat, which plunged the state into civil war. Pakistan ended up surrendering a large portion of its territory, losing three wars to India and being overlooked by the United Nations multiple times within its first twenty-five years as a sovereign state. If it continued in this direction indefinitely it would run the risk of becoming a nonentity in global affairs.

A state that can be ignored and pushed aside can easily become obsolete. It will remain in existence, but have no real influence in the world. Pakistan needed to make a statement to the world that would get it recognized independent of its conflict with India and it chose to do so by drawing negative, but almost immediate attention to itself by starting its own nuclear program.

*The Second Path Chosen: Nuclear Proliferation*

The Pakistani nuclear program, like most others, began in the early 1950s. By the mid-1960s it had become militarily focused and researchers' primary task was to study the practical uses of nuclear power in a wartime setting. The nuclear industry was not exceptionally large or powerful at this time, though.

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57 Ibid., 39.
58 Quoted from Bhutto speeches to the Pakistani people and the UN in Shackford, "Bhutto Control Brings Uncertainty to Pakistan."
Following Pakistan's defeat in the Bangladesh War the nuclear program was kicked into high gear. Bhutto met with an elite group of Pakistani scientists on January 20, 1972 and encouraged them to make the formation of a Pakistani nuclear weapon an issue of the highest priority. His decision was an obvious violation of international norms, which had begun to embrace the idea of a world without nuclear weapons. Pakistan refused to sign on to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and began fostering an image for itself as the “bad seed” of the nuclear world.

When India launched its first successful nuclear test – a 15kiloton peaceful explosion – on May 18, 1974 the need to rush production of the Pakistani project became tantamount. Scientists began receiving sensitive nuclear assistance from China in the form of bomb designs, highly enriched uranium and enrichment facilities. Such cooperation was spawned by the existence of a shared enemy: India.

Starting in 1987 Pakistan became an exporter of nuclear technology in the form of the A.Q. Khan network. The Pakistani government still insists that they had no knowledge of the smuggling ring throughout its 15-year existence, but various documents have proven this false. High-ranking officials knew of the program within the first couple years of operation, but chose not to stop it until 2002, when they were able to do so as part of a strategic political maneuver. The government even provided Khan with assistance in advertising for nuclear materials, finding shipping facilities, planning logistics and arranging for security.

From 1987-2002, Pakistan initiated itself securely on the side of the “rogue” nations by providing sensitive nuclear assistance to Iran, North Korea and Libya, among others. It established a name for itself as a nuclear nation with enough knowledge and technology that it could be considered a resource for others. It became a matter of the highest priority in Pakistan to achieve a full nuclear capability and defend it against those who wanted the

59 Akhtar and Hussain, “Safety and Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets.”
60 Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 18.
61 Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb, 135-136.
program to be stopped. “We will protect Pakistan’s nuclear program,” Bhutto said in 1993, “and will not allow our national interest to be sacrificed.” 62

Nuclear weapons had become a part of the Pakistani national identity and a source of pride for a country that desperately needed it. At the same time, though, Pakistan was aware that becoming a nuclear power might make it a target for attack, especially from India. By the early 1980s Pakistan had all of the materials needed to make a nuclear weapon on short notice, but it did not rush into production.

Pakistan waited over a decade before performing its first nuclear test, having made sure that it reached a point where it had multiple technologically sound bombs available for detonation. Leaders did not want to risk testing the bomb and having it fail, undoing all of the positivity the nuclear program had brought to the people. When India finally made its status as a nuclear state known on May 11 and 13, 1998 with five public nuclear tests, Pakistan responded with six detonations of its own only two weeks later. The press reported that these blasts had “set off such an explosion of national pride that thousands danced and sang in the streets across the country.” 63

Pakistan was the first Muslim country to possess a nuclear weapon and, in its opinion, rightfully so. As Bhutto had declared earlier in Pakistan’s construction process, “The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilization [had] nuclear capability along with the communist powers. Only the Islamic civilization was without it.” 64 What better state was there to change this fact that the one Islamic state that had been founded in the name of Islam?

Pakistan had finally proven to the world and it itself that it could, at the very least, keep on par with India in matters of modernization and technology. It removed some of the embarrassment of a history peppered with loss after loss in both military and diplomatic

62 Gargan, "Bhutto Stands By Nuclear Program."
63 Watson, "Patriotism unleashed with explosive zeal."
64 Quoted in Nizamani, The Roots of Rhetoric.
affairs and proved that it was not afraid to take dramatic steps in the name of defending Islam. The successful nuclear test was referred to as "an aphrodisiac" that had intoxicated the Pakistani people with "the sense of national honor that has been restored."65 The people declared that it was "a moment of pride not only for us but for entire Moslem world."66

**Conclusion: Negativity, but Success**

In the past decade, the nuclear program has done little to make the Western world more amenable to Pakistan. It is still criticized for its support of terrorism and insurgencies and held up as an example of the world's evils. At the same time, though, it may be one of the main factors that has kept Pakistan a subject of international attention for so long. It is impossible to say where Pakistan would be today if it were a non-nuclear state, but it can be argued that it would have a lot less active and public role in international affairs.

Pakistan's nuclear program is often cited as one of the main reasons for inviting it to participate in summits, conferences and negotiations today. This may simply be a matter of keeping your friends close and your enemies closer, but it is attention nonetheless and bad attention is better than none at all.

Conflict between India and Pakistan has continued steadily with the Kashmir conflicts of the late 1980s, the 1999 Kargil Crisis and the 2001 terrorist attacks on India that nearly led to war. The instances of fully armed combat between the states have decreased, somewhat, though and neither state has yet come close to using their nuclear power for military purposes. If Pakistani leaders only wanted nuclear weapons so that they could defeat India in war, they should have used them already. What they have done instead is use their weapons to further their revisionist intentions.

Nuclear weapons have long been referred to as the "great equalizers" in power politics. It does not matter which state is more powerful or has a stronger military, in

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65 Lev, "Pakistan Welcomes its nuclear testing."
66 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, "Pakistanis greet nuclear tests with sense of pride."
bilateral relations nuclear states must treat each other as equals. India and Pakistan are no exception. Pakistan is clearly the weaker of the two powers, yet in a nuclear world it is able to initiate small, but intense conflicts on a regular basis without truly fearing retaliation. Nuclear power has been known to make powerful states more cautious in starting wars and revisionist powers more willing to push their luck and challenge the superiority of the status quo. Pakistan has done just that.67

IV: The Economic Miracle of Japan

World War II was the bloodiest and most widespread war in history. Even those states that were victorious in battle suffered dramatic military, economic and political losses. For those that lost, this damage was coupled with the shame of failure and defeat, especially in Japan.

World War II did not just mark a period of military defeat for Japan. It also led to the loss of an expanding empire, the devastation of its infrastructure and the loss of the pride and spirit that had previously defined the Japanese culture. Civilians and soldiers alike worried about what they would tell fallen soldiers that they had lost during the war and how they would be able to honor their sacrifices without victory. One famous author wrote an “apology to departed heroes” and journalists spoke of the “autumn of the hundred million weeping together” with “silent wailing throughout the land.”68

Broken and defeated, the Japanese government struggled to find some way to restore a sense of pride to its people and regain respect in the international community. Japan needed to find a way to remove itself from the shadow of occupation and the stigma of defeat. It did so through a process of complete economic overhaul. The Japanese economic turnaround is one of the most miraculous examples of growth in history and an excellent model of successful status readjustment.

67 Paul, The India-Pakistan conflict, 158.
68 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 485-486.
Identity in Japan

Japan has always prided itself on the fact that it is a homogenous nation with one language and culture shared by the entire population. Unlike many states, religion is not considered part of such identity. In fact, many Japanese households are actually multi-religious. Instead, ethnicity is defined by language and tradition.

Prior to World War II immigrants to Japanese territories – the majority of whom came from Korea – were allowed to become citizens if they took on new names, spoke only Japanese and assimilated into the culture.69 This allowed Japan’s population to expand while still holding on to its reputation of homogeneity.

The unity of Japan gave rise to its “Yamato Spirit”, which was touted throughout the war. This spirit made the Japanese fearsome fighters, unafraid to lose their lives in battle and unwilling to give up. Soldiers and civilians alike were told that there was more honor in dying “like shattered jewels” than living with defeat and most seemed to agree with this pronouncement.70 Being forced to surrender to the allied forces threatened the existence of the Yamato spirit and caused many Japanese to question the utility of their national pride.

When Japan adopted a new constitution following the war it hardened its stance on national identity and included a stipulation that “the conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law.”71 The main stipulation – set out in the Nationality Law of 1950 - was that a person could only be Japanese by birth. All others had to complete the nationalization process before becoming citizens. Foreigners could no longer assimilate into the Japanese culture on language alone; they would have to live in Japan for at least five years and commit to giving up their former nationality before they could apply to be a member of Japanese society.72 This led many former citizens to emigrate from Japan if favor of their homeland or the United States.

69 Scott, "The Japanese Identity."
70 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 38
For the people of Japan, their nationality is not just an indicator of where they live, but an institutionalized part of life. They pride themselves on being Japanese and how that makes them different from the rest of the world. Their self-image is tied to the respect and honor of their state and the two cannot be separated. Major losses or victories by the Japanese state are felt by the people as well.

**Japan’s Fall: World War II**

The Japanese empire began with the Meji Restoration in 1868 and expanded steadily until World War II. By 1942 the Empire reached north to the Aleutian Islands, South to the Dutch East Indies and West to the interior of China and Mongolia. By the time of its entrance into WWII, Japan controlled almost the entirety of the South Pacific.

At the end of the war, though, Japan was occupied by the allied powers and lost its hold on the vast majority of its empire. It was forced to adopt a new constitution and changed so drastically that “after 1945, most Japanese historians saw not only the recent past but their country’s entire modern history as discredited.” All of the past successes of Japan were called into question as possible flukes rather than triumphs of the Japanese spirit.

Japan lost over one million civilians and 1.74 million servicemen – with another 4.5 million wounded – over the course of the war. Its infrastructure and economy were in ruins. The government was struggling to deal with the overwhelming cost of rebuilding entire cities that had been destroyed in allied bombing raids, including history’s only two atomic attacks. The Japanese people viewed their country’s loss with “shame and dishonour” and fell into a state of national depression and disorientation.

Estimates of exactly how much Japan lost in the war are varied, but most scholars agree that it was somewhere around one quarter of the state’s total wealth. Some also

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74 Conrad, *The Quest for the Lost Nation*, 247.
76 Ibid., 104.
argue that, due to the crumbling infrastructure, Japan also lost half of its potential income over the next few years.\textsuperscript{77} Japan emerged from a three-year war into a six and a half year occupation where its very sovereignty and stability were put to the test. The Japanese people could not comprehend the concept of unconditional surrender and the loss of glory and empire.

\textit{The Paths Not Taken}

At the end of World War II, Japan had no clear, viable options for status adjustment. It was looking at years of rebuilding and reorganizing before it could even hope to make strides on any of the four paths. It was a mixture of luck, good timing and great management skills that would allow Japan to follow the economic path and achieve such astounding success. Pursuing any of the other three paths would have been much more difficult and, most likely, futile.

\textit{Winning a War}

Fighting and winning a war was probably the last path considered by Japan's leaders following its defeat in World War II. It had already lost a large portion of its fighting forces and was still trying to get a handle on how it would afford the costs of World War II. The prospects for Japan winning a war in the 1950s were slim to none and the consequences of it starting a war and losing were far too great to risk.

Japan was occupied by American forces immediately following the war, making any attempt at military movement impossible until the troops were removed. Even then, Japan would be subject to close scrutiny by the Allied forces who still did not trust that it would remain peaceful. Any venture toward war would have resulted in immediate retaliation with possibly even more disastrous results. It is unlikely that Japan would have been allowed to maintain its sovereignty and regain power if it initiated another major war.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 45.
Domestically, there was virtually no desire to go to war again at any point in the near future. A peace movement had begun to spread throughout Japan, founded on the belief that "Japan could partially atone for its past... by drawing on its atomic bomb experience to become a champion of a nonmilitarized, nonnuclearized world." A leader cannot chose a path of status adjustment that is people are wholeheartedly against especially the path of war, which requires nationwide sacrifices.

Nuclear Proliferation

The nuclear history of Japan began with the opening of the country's first nuclear physics lab in 1931. At the same time, the Japanese military began researching nuclear power to see if it could be used in creating a super weapon. Progress was slow on both fronts, though, because the military distrusted the scientists who had been educated in Western states.

By the beginning of World War II Japan had yet to make any significant steps in its nuclear research. When the Japanese military was defeated at Midway, though, Admiral Yamamoto ordered the nation's scientists to begin work on "epoch-making weapons" and to complete them before the war was over.

A lack of funding slowed the pace of the nuclear program and limited its ability to achieve any worthwhile results. Japanese scientists were never able to fully understand how a nuclear bomb worked. They believed that it was essentially an out of control nuclear reactor. By the time an allied bombing raid destroyed the state's main nuclear lab in 1945, scientists had come to the conclusion that there was no way to harness the power of a nuclear bomb and make it practical for use in war.

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78 Ibid., 493
79 Kim, Yoshio Nishina.
80 Grunden, Waljer and Yamazaki, "Wartime Nuclear Research."
81 Ibid., 116.
Months later Japan was proven disastrously wrong as the American bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The memory of these attacks left society with a sense of dread that could not be dissociated from the idea of nuclear weapons. One of the main tenents of the Japanese peace movement was to pursue the creation of a nonnuclear world. To the Japanese nuclear weapons were cruel, inhuman, and a representation of all that is evil about war.

**Political Negotiation**

The damage done to Japan during World War II preoccupied the government for years after surrender. Attempts to repair the economy, rebuild cities and assuage the fears of the domestic population took precedence over nearly all international issues. Japanese leaders spent their days just trying to keep their country from collapsing. They did not have the time to dedicate themselves to an international political issue.

Even if Japan had wanted to pursue a political path to prestige, it is unlikely it would have had much success. An intense hatred of the Japanese state and people had spread throughout the West during the course of World War II. The Japanese were portrayed as "terrible people – murderers and rapists." There was widespread fear that they were going to take over the world and destroy the west. This fear was exemplified in the use of concentration camps by the United States to round up and keep track of all Japanese-Americans. Even after they were defeated there was fear that the Japanese could rise up and lead the world into war once again.

The political path of status adjustment requires states to build relationships of trust with one another and engage in a long series of negotiations and debates. No state was willing to engage in such a vulnerable exchange with a state it hated and feared. Japan would have to prove its trustworthiness in another manner before it could hope to gain support and backing for any of its political ideas.

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82 *The Journal*, "Pair recall reactions to use of the A-bomb."
The Chosen Path: Economics

Almost immediately following the end of World War II the Japanese government began searching for ways to jumpstart its ravaged economy. They tried everything from printing money to destroying financial records, relaxing bookkeeping standards and withdrawing money from government investments. This led to massive inflation and sent a signal that a more comprehensive and well thought-out approach was needed.

The first comprehensive attempt at economic recovery came in the form of “priority production” where certain industries designated as important to industrial growth – such as coal and steel – received government loans. This program was not meant as a permanent solution, but as a stopgap for inflation until more lasting measures could be put in place.

Japan’s path toward economic recovery took its first major step with the establishment of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which would become the driver behind Japan’s economic turnaround. MITI provided Japan with a single organization able to coordinate between industry and trade in order to maximize the utility

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83 Uekusa and Ide, Industrial Policy in Japan.

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of Japan's production center. It was given control over both private and government sector development so that the economy could be streamlined and perfected.

The decade following the war was a period of heavy industrialization throughout Japan. Having saved itself from economic collapse, the Japanese government was now attempting to "catch up" to the rest of the world. Economic recovery was no longer simply an issue of state survival; it was a matter of respect on an international scale. Japan had to prove that it was a state capable of providing for itself and contributing to the international community.

Western nations, especially the United States, discouraged and belittled Japan's attempts at industrialization. They believed that Japan should concentrate on making "oriental specialties" rather than trying to compete with the more modernized nations. US envoys encouraged the Japanese government to focus their economic production on technologically inferior products such as "cocktail napkins." 84

This discouragement did not stop the Japanese financial planners. It made them determined to prove the Western world wrong. Economic development was no longer just a matter of just recovery; it was a matter of pride. MITI looked at the rapid advancements in science, technology and managerial skills that Japan had made prior to the war and determined that they could reignite this growth and find a place among the economic powers of the world.

The more negativity Japan faced, the more determined it became to grow by leaps and bounds. The Japanese people needed something to redeem their damaged pride and the rapid modernization of the economy did just that. It proved that they were a member of

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84 Supposedly John Foster Dulles told a high ranking official in the Japanese Finance Ministry that his country should consider exporting things like cocktail napkins. He said they could never produce the goods that people in the US actually wanted, Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 537.
the first world and one of the leaders of the international community, not simply a quiet, defeated passenger.

The next step Japan’s economic growth took was largely a matter of good luck and timing. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United States found itself in desperate need of military supplies in East Asia on short notice. Since the occupation in Japan was still in full swing, the US saw the opportunity to produce these goods close to the theatre of operation at reduced costs. They set up a policy of “special procurements” allowing Japan to produce and sell military equipment to US troops – which was technically illegal under the laws of the occupation.

Over the course of the three-year war, US procurements brought $2.3 billion to Japan - more than Japan was receiving in aid over the same period of time. The US involvement in Japan attracted investment from major European powers as well. Most of the Western states were operating near their maximum industrial capacity and desperately needed to develop new means of production. Japan was one of the last industrialized societies left that still had room to expand.

Japan found itself with an unprecedented opportunity to forge ties with large, powerful states and make itself a necessary part of their daily operations. It had the chance to change its reputation from that of a backward, hostile national only capable of producing “oriental trinkets” to a state capable of the highest level of technological advancement. When sovereignty was officially restored to Japan on April 28, 1952 the government was well positioned for making itself an important and respected player on a global scale.

The 1960s were a decade of liberalization and economic expansion in Japan. The government adopted a Foreign Exchange and International Trade Liberalization Plan in 1960, which relaxed government trading regulations and helped encourage new

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85 Ibid., 542.
international economic partnerships. By 1964 93% of Japan's trade had been liberalized.86 This new openness allowed Japan to enter major international economic organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and made Japan into an Article VIII member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).87

By the mid-1960s the government was able to shift its focus from international growth to social development. The rapid economic growth in Japan had dramatically improved its international standing and involvement, but it had left much of the domestic population behind. The brisk pace of industrialization had led to extreme urbanization without the infrastructure in place to maintain it. Japan was experiencing widespread problems with pollution, poverty and energy consumption.

MITI began shifting its focus from continuing expansion to promoting socially motivated policies such as creating a pollution free society, stabilizing prices, increasing consumption and improving consumer life.88 By 1975, they had enough extra capital to invest in the creation of a welfare state as well.89

The growth of the Japanese economy did not produce only positive results, though. Its rapid expansion spread fears of a revived militarism in Japan, especially in China. Chinese leaders accused Japan of being the main obstacle standing between them and reunification with Taiwan.90 The United States, which had been the biggest supporter of Japan's economic growth, even became disillusioned with its pace and began issuing

86 Uekusa and Ide, *Industrial Policy in Japan.*
87 Signing article VIII of the Agreement of the International Monetary Fund obligates states to (a) avoid restrictions on current payments, (b) avoid discriminatory currency practices and (c) agree to the convertability of foreign-held balances. It makes trade and financial relations between states run smoother and limits the amount of restrictions and protectionism a state can enforce. Full text of Article VIII retrieved from: "Article VIII - General Obligations of Members," *International Monetary Fund*, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa08.htm.
88 A list of stated MITI policies in the 1970s and 80s can be found in: Uekusa and Ide, *Industrial Policy in Japan*, 42-43.
89 Ogura and Yoshino, *The Tax System.*
90 Miller, "Japan's Military Power Worries Red Chinese."
sanctions and defensive tariffs against Japan for restricting foreign involvement in its domestic economy.91

**Conclusion: The Bubble Burst and Growth Stabilization**

The pace of growth experienced by Japan after World War II was unprecedented. It resulted from a mixture of luck, good timing, modernization and policy planning, but it could not continue indefinitely.

The increase in personal capital experienced by many Japanese citizens led to a major swell in both the stock and real estate industries, but both were finite sources. By 1989, both industries were suffering from severe overinvestment and were pushed to the point of collapse. Japan's constantly rising "economic bubble" had reached its breaking point.92

The result was the "Lost Decade" of the 1990s during which Japan faced financial failures, severe drops in outward foreign direct investment and the end of its capital growth. In the arena of international relations, though, this crash proved to be a blessing. It actually helped increase Japan's reputation in the international community and improved its relations with other states.

Japan had grown so rapidly after World War II that by the end of the Cold War other states had begun to fear that it would grow into a new enemy. It was taking over the economic world and pushing other states out of important markets. When Japan's economic bubble burst it removed the fear that Japan would become the new world superpower, taking the place of the Soviet Union.

The last few decades were not easy for Japan, but they were not unbearable either. The pace of economic recovery slowed drastically, but it never fell back toward its immediate postwar levels. Today Japan has the third largest economy in the world with a

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91 Dart, "Reagan, Japanese envoy discuss imports, sanctions."
near-monopoly on both the automotive and electronics industries.\textsuperscript{93} It has become an important trading ally of all the world’s major powers and secured itself a permanent invite to nearly every major international political negotiation.

Japanese automobiles and high-quality goods have been flooding Western markets since the 1960s, shocking and impressing the world. Over the course of two decades Japan went from being a demonized enemy of war to being a model for other states to follow. Books were written throughout the world touting the successes of Japan. One Harvard professor even wrote a book entitled “Japan as Number One: Lessons for America.”\textsuperscript{94}

The world became fascinated with studying “what it means to be Japanese” and determining how the character and culture of the Japanese people had allowed them to perform this economic miracle. Japanese academics and culturalists found a new discourse studying and explaining what made their state different from and superior to all others. They emphasized the legacy of Emperor Hirohito as an example of the longevity, survival and preeminence of Japanese culture.

Japan’s embarrassment and defeat had been erased in the minds of its people and the international community. It was now a state to be respected and revered, not one to be hated and fought. It found its place in the economic fabric of the international community and gained the respect and legitimacy needed to revive Japanese nationalism and keep the state functioning on the level of a major power.

\textbf{V: France’s Reliance on a Nuclear Legacy}

“Next time there’s a war in Europe,” begins a famous one-liner, “the loser has to keep France.” World War II marked the final step in France’s gradual decline from superpower status. Following its defeat at the hands of the German army France was no longer the pinnacle of class and culture that other states aspired to be. It was now a joke

\textsuperscript{93} Japan is number 3 after (1) the United States and (2) China; "Japan," \textit{CIA World Factbook}.\textsuperscript{94} Vogel, \textit{Japan as Number One}. 
shared by the majority of the civilized world. As General George S. Patton declared, "I would rather have a German division in front of me than a French one behind me." And he was not the only one.

Even today, over sixty years after World War II, jokes about the inability of France to defend itself and its historically poor performance in modern warfare are still popular throughout the United States. One episode of the TV show The Simpsons has Marge Simpson saying, "We can stand here like the French, or we can do something about it." Standup comedians and late night talk show hosts came up with weeks' worth of jokes over French reluctance to fight in Iraq. "The only way the French are going in is if we tell them we found truffles in Iraq," said comedian Dennis Miller while Jay Leno declared that he was not "surprised that France won't help us get Saddam out of Iraq. After all, France wouldn't help us get the Germans out of France!" This ridicule and embarrassment is one of the reasons France pursued nuclear weapons in the first place and the reason that it still holds on to them today.

France has the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, yet it has no major enemies and faces no critical security threats today. What it does have, though, is a reputation for being unsuccessful and easy to conquer. The recent history of France has been a continuous struggle to shed this reputation and prove to the world that it can fend for itself on an international scale, independent of US or European support.

Identity in France

The French have always felt a very strong connection to the past. They remember an age of kings and riches where France was a superpower in control of a large portion of the known world. They tout their implicit nationalism as a motivation for nearly every major political decision. Other states recognize that "French pride is probably the most concrete substance in all of Europe" and that, above all else, "The French cannot bear to be made to
look foolish." Yet when asked to define what exactly it means to be French, the people draw a blank.

Since the French Revolution of 1789 – the first French movement founded on truly nationalist sentiments – France has played host to five different republics, three monarchies, two empires and the Vichy puppet government of World War II. In each of these states nationalism found the most support in those groups opposing the current government. Leaders of popular movements would claim that the current structure was leading the country away from its true self and that the people needed to return France to her glory. The number of different governments that have been replaced over the years, though, has sent a mixed message about what “France” really is.

Even today, over two hundred years after the Revolution, the government is still debating what exactly it means to be French. President Sarkozy recently set up a series of town-hall-style meetings across France to discuss what defines a person as French in the 21st century. The meetings were criticized as being anti-immigrant, though, and failed to solve the age-old question.

France’s identity has taken many shapes over the years, especially in the past century. Twentieth century France is marred by military defeats and political insults, which have been used to fuel the fires of nationalism, but to what ends? The leaders and people are vocal and passionate about their love for France and what it means to be French, yet they do not know what that entails. This has left France lost and confused and has forced leaders to take drastic steps over the years in an attempt to consolidate their people.

**France’s Fall: World War II**

On June 25, 1940 France formally surrendered to German forces, years before World War II ended and far before any of the other allied major powers. After a four-year

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96 Crumley, "Why France’s National Identity Debate Backfired."
struggle at resistance and the establishment of a puppet government sympathetic to Axis demands, France had to be bailed out by its allies in order to survive.

Nearly 1.5 million Frenchmen were killed during the course of the war, a relatively small number compared to many other participating nations, but France's losses extended far beyond just population. Its infrastructure and economy were in ruins. It had temporarily lost its sovereignty and it had lost its legitimacy in international affairs. France had been one of the first nations to join the fight in World War II and it had led the charge against Germany. At the end, though, it was not even given a seat at the table to negotiate peace.

When the conferences were held at Yalta and Potsdam to discuss European reorganization the heads of state from the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union were invited, but France was left at home. The world's major powers sent a message to France – it was no longer a superpower and would not be treated as such.

France needed to find a way to stop its backward slide and save itself from being nothing more than the memory of a once great nation. The path it would choose – and still stick to today – is that of nuclear proliferation. Its road to prestige has not been smooth, though. From its attempts at political maneuvering to its continuing failure in war France has had to overcome many obstacles in its pursuit of status adjustment.

**The Paths Not Taken**

Before beginning its nuclear career, France attempted to join the political negotiations regarding disarmament and lead the European delegation against Germany. This quest was unsuccessful and short-lived, though. France met with political defeat on more than one occasion and was forced to shift its focus to nuclear power. French leaders passed on the other two paths – war and economics – and did so with good reason.

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97 Hecht, *The Radiance of France*. 
Winning a War

France’s recent history with war had been nothing short of an embarrassing failure. Its military losses were not just criticized by the world, but turned into popular jokes. And World War II was only one in a long series of losses. Within the next two decades France would be forced into – and out of – two colonial wars, first in Indochina and then in Algeria and be driven militarily out of its investments in the Suez Canal.

The French military was not able to regain its footing until late in the twentieth century and was never able to fully rid itself of the stigma of being a “loser”. It spent decades rebuilding and restructuring its forces as it faced loss after loss. By the time the French military was strong enough to win a war again, France’s nuclear program was already in full swing.

Economic Adjustment

France has always maintained a relatively high position in the international economy, even following its various military defeats. At the end of World War II, though, this position was in serious jeopardy. The indemnities France was forced to pay to Germany and the seizure of its industrial plants had forced shutdowns in many of France’s major production lines.98

When France was finally able to begin the process of reconstruction following the war, all of the government’s resources had to be used just to return France to its previous economic position. In order to follow an economic path to status adjustment a state needs to significantly increase its level of economic involvement. Simply returning itself to its former position would not have removed the stigma of France’s military loss and there was very little room for France to grow beyond where it had been before.

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98 Dormois, *The French Economy in the Twentieth Century*. 
Without the discovery of a new industry or the chance to gain a monopoly on a particular high-value trade France would never have been able to repair its damaged reputation through economic means alone.

**The First Chosen Path: Politics**

When it first began its nuclear program, France attempted to use the possibility of it developing a nuclear weapon as a bargaining chip in international negotiations. It offered to give up its nuclear ambitions on more than one occasion in order to take the lead on the international disarmament process, the reunification of Germany or the creation of a collective European defense.

The French nuclear program first began with the creation of the *Commissariat à l'énergie atomique* (CEA) on October 18, 1945. CEA was tasked with finding practical peaceful applications for nuclear technology. It promoted the image of a nuclear bomb as “nonsensical”, useful only to superpowers engaged in a cold war and not at all useful in a military conflict.\(^99\) This did not stop their research into nuclear power, though, and France was able to complete its first nuclear chain reaction in 1948.

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The announcement that France’s nuclear reactor was now operational was praised in the press as an example of the “radiance of France.” It proved that France was not as far behind the other great powers as they may think.\textsuperscript{100} The CEA continued to expand its nuclear research and was soon able to harness the power of nuclear reactors to begin powering cities. It produced one of the fastest growing and most technologically advanced nuclear research programs in history in just a handful of years. It had also provided itself with a significant bargaining chip for future European negotiations.

The biggest security threat to the French state and people in 1950 was that of a rearmed Germany. When the United States began proposing such rearmament, France responded immediately with a counterproposal. The French government suggested the creation of a European Defense Council (EDC), which would include France, the United States, Italy, West Germany and the Benelux countries. Part of the EDC treaty stipulated that no member of the Council could build or use atomic weapons and all nuclear material must be used for peaceful purposes.\textsuperscript{101}

France offered to give up its ever-expanding nuclear program for the opportunity to be part of a small number of important European leaders and almost succeeded in doing so. It was the French parliament which ultimately brought a stop to the EDC because it did not expressly eliminate the possibility of German rearmament. The French leaders were forced to return to the drawing board.

By 1953, France was once again facing military defeat, this time in the Indochina war. French forces were unable to defend Dien Bien Phu against the invading communist troops and had to pull out of the region. At the same time, NATO began shifting its defense policies under American guidance. The United States proposed the creation of a Multilateral Nuclear Defense Force (MLF) under NATO control that could be used to threaten atomic retaliation against the Soviet Union for any excursion into Western

\textsuperscript{100} Hecht, \textit{The Radiance of France}, 2.

\textsuperscript{101} United States, 1952.
102 Under this new policy, France would have been a second rate member of a US coalition and ran the risk of becoming irrelevant in European and world affairs.

France once again tried to lead the world toward nuclear disarmament during the nine-power conference on Germany held in September 1954. The French delegates agreed to drop their demands for discriminatory policies against Germany if all the European powers would commit to giving up their rights to nuclear weapons. Since France could not yet contribute to NATO’s new nuclear policies, it tried to lead the shift to a world where no one had nuclear capabilities.

This path was unable to gain traction, though, as Mendès France refused to commit France to giving up its nuclear ambitions without assurances from all other European states that they would follow suit. With the Cold War heating up and the USSR expanding its sphere of influence, this proved to be an impossible task.

On December 26, 1954 Mendès France finally abandoned his calls for nonproliferation and announced to his private advisors that he would authorize the creation of a nuclear weapons program “because it was capital for France’s international influence” and would allow them to “have more of a say” in disarmament discussions and the future of European society.104

As a conventionally armed power, France was becoming increasingly marginalized in the great power world of NATO. It received protection guarantees and a supposed “nuclear umbrella” from the United States and the United Kingdom, yet it received no glory or recognition. As a nuclear power, France may become a target for the Soviet Union – it would be the only mainland European nuclear power and a much easier target than the closely intertwined US or UK – but it would be independent. For the French, the possibility of glory was more important than a vague, unspoken threat of Soviet retaliation.

102 Feiveson and Hogendoorn, "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons."
103 Hymans, *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation*, 98.
104 Quoted during an interview with Bertrand Goldschmidt. Ibid., 105.
The Mendès France government fell a month after the private meeting, not having made an official declaration of its bomb program. It had succeeded in planting the idea of proliferation in the minds of high-ranking officials, though, and subsequent leaders would be unable to renege on the promise of a nuclear-armed France.

The Second Chosen Path: Proliferation

Since Mendès France had been driven out of office before signing the nuclear program into law, it was left to the succeeding Prime Ministers to decide whether they would follow through with proliferation or not. When Guy Mollet came to power in 1956, he intended to rescind the verbal decree and dedicate all nuclear research solely to peaceful purposes. France was in a precarious international position, though, as it struggled to hold on to the colony of Algeria and its influence in the Suez.

Mollet did not take into account the strong nationalist coalition that had begun developing in the face of the continuing military defeats. Led by political juggernauts like de Gaulle and Mendès France the coalitions avidly supported nuclear power and threatened to tear the country apart politically if Mollet stopped the nuclear program. This was not an empty threat. The nationalists controlled a large portion of the French Parliament and had the support of the military, which saw “nuclear weapons as the key to restoring France’s prestige and international political respect.”

Fearing revolution, Mollet was forced to concede and announced in July 1956 that France would become a full member of EURATOM and begin working on achieving a domestic nuclear capability. His chance at redemption was short-lived, though, as France was defeated in the Suez crisis of October 1956 and the Algerian conflict continued to rage on.

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106 Robert C. Doty, "France’s Entry in EURATOM."
At the 1956 V-E Day ceremony, held every year to commemorate the end of World War II, ten thousand students and veterans threw rocks and tomatoes at French officials in protest of their failure to put down the Algerian rebellion.\textsuperscript{107} With superior military capabilities and a strong presence in the African state, France should have been able to squelch the rebellion quickly and with limited effort. Yet it would take nearly six years before a resolution could be reached – a resolution that was decided almost entirely in favor of Algeria.

The French military lost a war to an African rebel group that the government referred to as an “artificial organization.” French leaders refused to even call the fighting in Algeria a war and instead referred to it as “pacification.”\textsuperscript{108} A pacification that required half a million troops and was bleeding the French military resources.\textsuperscript{109} In short, “the recent history of France [was] an embarrassment to the French.”\textsuperscript{110} A transition of power was needed or else France risked losing any credibility it still retained.

Charles de Gaulle, a military man and the champion of a radiant and glorious France was selected as the new French Premiere. Still fighting a losing battle in Algeria and suffering from the memory of the failed Fourth Republic, de Gaulle initiated a new statewide strategy he referred to as \textit{grandeur}. He aimed to restore the greatness of the French name by proving that France was its own independently powerful state that did not need alliances or international assistance. De Gaulle purposely distanced the French state from NATO and the European Economic Community, which he believed called for France to be subservient to other powers.

\textit{Grandeur}, to de Gaulle, could be achieved by showcasing France’s role as the preeminent power on the European colony. This required France to secure independence from the other great powers of the world and prove that it was second to no one in its

\textsuperscript{107} Lewiston Morning Tribune, "Students, War Vets Bombard Ministers," May 9, 1956: 1.
\textsuperscript{108} The Evening Independent, "France Rejects Algeria 'Rebel' Faction."
\textsuperscript{109} Pickles, Algeria and France.
\textsuperscript{110} Gallagher, Toward a Settlement in Algeria, 275.
leadership of Europe. It would no longer be a second rate member of a US coalition, but its own leader and protector. Building of a French nuclear weapon, according to de Gaulle, was the perfect way to do this.

De Gaulle proposed the creation of an Anglo-French-American triumvirate that would combine resources, operational commands and atomic secrets in defense of Europe. The Americans brushed off the suggestion, though, citing France's recent military defeats and the fact that it had not yet proven its nuclear capabilities to the world.

This rejection pushed de Gaulle to publicly campaign against NATO and its willingness to bow to American hegemony. Insulted by the suggestion that it was not important enough to be a partner to the United States, France shifted more resources toward the nuclear program and drastically increased the pace of its production. It was determined to prove that it was not "merely a lieutenant to Uncle Sam," but a proud and successful state in its own right.

On February 13, 1960, France demonstrated its first successful nuclear explosion, showing the world that it could achieve victory in at least one area of military affairs. It had proven that it was one of the world's most modern and advanced states, possessing a weapon held by only three other nations in the world - the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

Upon receiving confirmation of the test's success, de Gaulle immediately wrote to the leaders at CEA thanking them for their contribution to saving France's reputation. "Hurrah for France," he wrote, "Since this morning she is stronger and prouder." Newspaper headlines throughout the country read "Vive La France" and a resurgence of

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111 Hoffman, "De Gaulle, Europe and the Atlantic Alliance."
112 Ibid., 82
113 Yost, "France's Nuclear Dilemmas," 116.
114 Hudson, "Prestige, Strength Gained from Test."
French nationalism began. France now possessed its own nuclear deterrent. It did not have to play by the rules of NATO or the US if it did not want to and it flaunted that power.

From 1966-1974, France detonated 41 bombs in atmospheric tests in the South Pacific, including its first thermonuclear bomb in 1968. France was the last major power to continue testing nuclear weapons – it continued testing into the late 90s, when the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was being negotiated – unwilling to give in to international pressures to ban testing without a formal and legally-binding agreement.

**Conclusion: Maintaining the Nuclear Legacy**

By the end of the twentieth century France had developed the third largest nuclear arsenal and the largest nuclear energy industry in the world. Anti-nuclear sentiment began to spread throughout Europe following the end of the Cold War, but never really caught on in France. The government continued to emphasize France’s “special position” on the European continent and the ways in which its weapons benefit all of Europe.

The state that once led the push for the prohibition of atomic weapons was now an active and vocal member of the nuclear club. All of its proposals for disarmament had been rejected or ignored, leaving France with no choice but to change paths and draw international attention to itself in an entirely different manner. De Gaulle had chosen “to enhance the ‘glory’ of France by proving that she, too, is capable of massive destruction.” Only then could France guarantee that it would retain a voice on an international scale.

115 Devolpi et al., *Nuclear Shadowboxing.*
116 Danielsson, "Under a Cloud of Secrecy."
117 Yost, "France's Nuclear Dilemmas."
118 France has an estimated 300 nuclear weapons today, second only to the United States and Russia. This number was higher near the turn of the century as the French government has been issuing arms reductions since 2006: Norris and Kristensen, "French Nuclear Forces, 2008."
119 Kelleher, "Western Europe."
By the time it completed its nuclear arsenal, France’s reputation and glory had become synonymous with its nuclear capability. Citizens, soldiers and leaders alike praise the greatness of France as a modern, advanced state. Long after the threat of a hostile Germany or a resurgent Soviet Union have come and gone France clings to these weapons as evidence that it is still a great and glorious state.
CHAPTER 5: IRAN AND THE PATH OF NUCLEAR PRESTIGE

I. Introduction

Iran has a long and colorful history beginning as one of the greatest empires of the Ancient world and ending up today as an isolated “pariah” in the international community. As one scholar put it, the “Iranian self-image is a contradictory combination of the legacy of great empires and regional dominance on the one hand and the history of humiliation and abuse by foreign powers on the other.”

Throughout most of the twentieth century, Iran landed somewhere in between these two extremes. It was not a superpower, but it enjoyed normal diplomatic and economic relations with the rest of the world and lived in relative prosperity. During the Cold War it served as an important base for Western allies in the fight against the Soviet Union. Ever since the Revolution in 1979, though, Iran’s reputation has been in steep decline. Today it is publicly characterized as “evil” by other states, media outlets and international organizations.

Both United States and United Nations policies toward Iran are driven by the belief that Iran is pursuing weapons of mass destruction technology against international norms and needs to be punished. For this reason, Iran is often excluded from international affairs and treated as a third world country incapable of deciding its own fate.

Diplomats, scholars and other leaders have promoted the view that an Iranian nuclear weapon is detrimental to regional stability and global security and needs to be stopped. The United States has led the charge to discredit Iran, pronouncing it a member of the “axis of evil arming to threaten the peace of the world”. In the views of the West, Iran is a hostile “rogue” that needs to be dealt with.

121 Mukhatzhanova, Pride and Prejudice.
122 Bush, State of the Union Address.
This inflamed rhetoric and the reliance on sanctions has only fueled the Iranian desire for nuclear weapons, though, and has reinforced the power of its nationalism. Leaders and citizens alike have declared that “we will never bow to oppression and hegemonic policies” attempting to regulate the nuclear program in Iran. Such statements make it seem as though Iran’s nuclear weapons program is not a matter of security, but an issue of nationalism and pride.

II: Identity in Iran

As the only majority Persian and Shiite country in the world, Iran has always shown a strong national identity defined by the differences between it and the nations around it. This identity is ingrained in children from a young age and reinforced through lifetime involvement in politics and society. Iran has had an institutionalized public education system since 1855, which teaches the ideals of Shia Islam, the grand history of the Persian Empire and the role of Iran at the head of the Islamic World. It was reorganized after the Revolution as a way to introduce the “ideals of the revolution” to future generations of Iranian children as well.

Mass education is the breeding ground for strong nationalist ideals. It helps form a national identity by teaching children a single shared history and defining their culture from an early age. It provides mass literacy so that this education can be continued throughout life and it introduces the concept of nationalism and national identity to the people. The long history of Iran’s education system has allowed for generations of nationalist sentiment to permeate the culture.

The foundation of Iranian nationalism lies in the memory of the once great Persian Empire, the largest empire of the Ancient World. The ancient Persians conquered the

123 This text was emblazoned on placards carried by Iranian university students at Bushehr in 2004 to protest the “double standards” of the US and EU in their nuclear proliferation policies. Payvand Iran News, “Iran: Hundreds of students gather.”
124 Childs, “Education in Iran.”
125 Shorish, “The Islamic Revolution and Education in Iran,” 60.
126 Darden, Resisting Occupation.
kingdoms of Egypt and Babylon and ruled over the entire Middle East. This legacy has led Iranian leaders to declare themselves the rightful rulers of the Islamic world, a role that would entitle them to display all the glory and technological advancements any rival may pursue.

The international community does not view Iran with this same level of reverence and respect, though. Iran's ascribed status is far below what the people and leaders believe it should be. Discussions on the future of Iran and how to deal with its rising nuclear program or violations of international law are held regularly, often without even inviting the Iranians to the table. Many of the world's great powers believe that they know how Iran should function better than the state's leaders themselves. Iran is not seen as being a legitimate and important state among the major powers of the world.

This lack of prestige first became clear following the Revolution in 1979 and the breaking of diplomatic ties with much of the Western World. The Revolution was meant to be a triumph of modernity in Iran, a move toward an improved life for all and a message to the world that Iran was a powerful state that needed to be recognized. Instead, Iran was met with derision by much of the world and left open to a bloody and expensive war which it lost to an opponent with inferior military capabilities.

The Revolution was a manifestation of the Iranian belief that it was a state endowed with the responsibility of defending Islam and leading the Islamic world. This sense of duty has been reiterated by many of its leaders and politicians in recent decades. In 1995 Ambassador Hoseyn Musavian told the world that Iran "has the final say in the world of Islam at present and is a cultural and political superpower ... such a country cannot be ostracized."\(^ {127}\)

Opposition to Iran's role in the Middle East has not diminished this feeling of entitlement; in fact, it has served to increase the Iranian resolve. Iran is a Shiite state, rather

\(^ {127}\) Quoted in: Strain, Discerning Iran's Nuclear Strategy, 22.
than a Sunni state like many of its neighbors, which is an important distinction on many levels, especially when discussing how it reacts to opposition and insults.

Shia Islam is based on the “tradition of martyrdom and sacrifice in the face of opposition and attack.” This tradition is based off the belief that the true heir of Mohammed was Ali ibn Abi Talib, who was martyred in 680 and whose death is celebrated each year, in some cases with rituals of self-flagellation. The idea of sacrificing personal well being for the glory of Islam is ingrained in the teachings of Shiism and shows itself in Iran’s reactions to the Western world.

Antagonism to the Iranian nuclear program fuels its religious roots and makes the people and clerics of Iran more determined to stand up for what they believe in. They are willing to sacrifice some of their economic prosperity in order to serve as a model for other nations wishing to pursue nuclear power and struggle against outside oppression.

Iran has become increasingly isolated from the rest of the world ever since the Revolution. It has no true allies and is in a state of “strategic loneliness.” This has allowed a divisive image of an Iranian identity to form among the people. The idea of being an Iranian has transcended internal divisions largely due to the presence of an outsider group. The outsiders in this case being the Western world.

Referred to as the “Great Satan” by Ayatollah Khomeini and nearly every leader since, the Western world has fallen neatly into the role of the evil and dominant aggressor the Iranian portray it to be. When the United States declared Iran as a member of the “Axis of Evil” - a change from its previous description of the Persian state as a “rogue” - Iran viewed this as an insult to their dignity. Government leaders referred to the label as “another brutish manifestation of the United States’ ‘global arrogance’.” This label helped

129 Blanchard, Islam: Sunnis and Shiites.
131 Amuzegar, “Iran’s Crumbling Revolution,” 46.
to further incite the Iranian people against outside influence and solidify their sense of nationalism and solidarity.

Iranian leaders have capitalized on this sense of isolation “by underscoring Washington’s double standards, hypocrisy and heavy-handed tactics.”132 The further isolated Iran becomes and the more the people are forced to sacrifice and suffer for what they believe is a national right, the stronger domestic support for nuclear weapons and other controversial policies grows.

III. Iran’s Fall: The Revolution and Iran-Iraq War

From its history as one of the greatest empires in the ancient world to one of the most hated countries in the modern world, Iran has experienced both extreme highs and lows in its state prestige. Throughout most of the twentieth century, though, it fell somewhere in between.

Beginning in World War II and continuing throughout much of the Cold War, Iran occupied a position of strategic importance for many of the world’s great powers. This is not to say that it was treated as an equal, but it was given a degree of respect and prestige that it no longer has today. President Roosevelt signed a public declaration in 1943 thanking Iran for its support in World War II and the State Department considered the shipment of arms and materials to the Iranian army as a matter of “high priority” throughout the 1940s.133

The relationship between Iran and the West continued to grow over the next few decades due to its strategic positioning in the Middle East. The preoccupation with the Cold War coupled with the West’s faith in the Shah raised Iran to a level of global prominence that is far above where it exists today. “U.S. policy after August 19, 1953, was effectively to

132 Ibid., 104.
133 According to a memorandum from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Stimson) on December 18, 1944 as printed in: Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1944, 442-443.
give the new regime total and unquestioning support. Fear of a Soviet takeover was uppermost in policymakers’ minds."^{134}

The United States, Britain and their allies used Iran as a base for many intelligence operations in the early days of the Cold War. Iranian citizens were recruited as spies and bases were set up to collect both signals intelligence and human intelligence.^{135}

During this time Iran attained a level of prestige by its inclusion in international affairs and top-secret operations. It was praised for its support, received political and economic benefits and was never subjected to sanctions or attempts at coercion. Its hold on this position was tenuous, though, and it lost of all its previously gained prestige immediately following the Revolution.

**The Revolution**

The Persian Revolution was a surprisingly peaceful revolt as far as government turnovers go. Eight months of anti-government riots and protests led the Shah to flee the country, leaving space for Ayatollah Khomeini to return from exile and establish the Islamic Republic.

At first, the international community met the new government with caution and moderation. There were important people within many Western states who encouraged dealings with Iran and who reached out to Khomeini initially. It quickly became obvious, though, that Khomeini’s words and actions did not meet up. Secret courts were established to try and execute people suspected of anti-revolutionary activity, attacks were carried out on the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and multiple human rights violations occurred.

Years after the Revolution Khomeini would admit that he had been employing the Shiite technique *khod'eh* or “tricking one’s enemy into a misjudgement of one’s true position” when he first came to power.^{136}

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^{135} Ibid.  
^{136} Ibid.
As the realities of the Revolution set in, the Western world began cutting its ties with Iran and excluding it from normal participation in international affairs. Former allies would no longer negotiate, trade or otherwise communicate with Iran. Almost overnight it had gone from a position as a normal, functioning member of society to one as a pariah that could be ignored and, possibly, forgotten.

Iran's ties with the United States were severed by early 1980 following the seizure of the U.S. Embassy and the subsequent hostage crisis. In the fall of 1980 the United Kingdom ended its diplomatic relations with Iran and removed its ambassador as well. Many other states followed suit by cutting back or eliminating their relations with the Iranian Republic. By 1981, Iran had lost over $15 billion in exports and $5 billion in imports annually from its pre-Revolutionary levels, extremely steep drops for a country whose export levels had been steadily increasing throughout the 1970s and had topped out at $24 billion in 1977.

Before the Ayatollah could take any action to improve Iran's damaged reputation, the state found itself embroiled in a disastrous, bloody war. Abandoned by its former allies, and suffering greatly in the economic realm, Iran had become easy prey for long time rival, Iraq. Prior to the Revolution, relations between Iran and Iraq had been poor, but largely managed by bilateral agreements - often with concessions on the Iraqi side. Materially, Iran was more powerful than Iran and it did not lose any of those capabilities following the Revolution. What it did lose was the respect of its former allies and the reverence given to those countries viewed as important players in the international world.

137 Rundle, Reflections on the Iranian Revolution
138 All numbers are taken from the Correlates of War National Trade dataset. Barbieri, "TRADING DATA."
139 According to the Correlates of War Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC), Iran was the 17th most powerful state and Iraq was 34th in 1978. The CINC combines measurements from six variables - total population, urban population, military personnel, military expenditure, Iron & Steel Production and Energy Consumption – to calculate its power rankings. Singer et al, "Capability Distribution."
The Iran-Iraq War

On September 22, 1980 Iraqi troops crossed the border into Iran by both land and air, escalating a series of border skirmishes into an all-out war. Iran's actions should have been condemned by the international community as a threat to regional stability and peace, but they were met with little more than expressions of disapproval. Iran saw no swell of support or offers of aid and no one threatened Iraq with sanctions or military action.

Iraq took the lead in the war from the first day and it was almost two years before Iran was able to fight back. Iranian troops were able to push the Iraqis back across the border in 1982, but that is where their success stopped. The fighting continued for six years without reprieve, ending only when the United Nations stepped in to negotiate. Both sides suffered serious losses and tactical failures.

One of Iraq's most powerful assets throughout the war was its chemical weapons arsenal. Iran suffered over 34,000 casualties in the chemical attacks and thousands more from the long-term effects. The use of chemical weapons in war was illegal at this point in time and had been publicly condemned by many of the world's major powers, yet none of Iran's neighbors or former allies came to its aid when it was the victim of such assaults.

The Iran-Iraq war proved that Iran no longer had any degree of respect or prestige in the international community was largely a nonentity in global affairs. A war resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties for one of the twenty most powerful states in the world should have been a major event. It should have led to a swell in support and isolation of the aggressor state for breaking international law, but Iraq suffered virtually no consequences.

The war ended in 1989 with the signing of a UN-negotiated ceasefire agreement. Neither side was considered victorious in the war, but it still dealt a major blow to Iranian

140 Takeyh, Hidden Iran, 146.
prestige. As the more materially powerful nation prior to the war, Iran should have won, but instead it struggled just to maintain a stalemate. At the end of the war Iran was left with military, economic and infrastructural destruction and no allies willing to help in its recovery.

If there had been any doubt that Iran was suddenly sliding down a path toward global insignificance following the Revolution, it was erased by the international community's nearly total lack of reaction to the Iran-Iraq War. Iran was disgraced and alone, forced to find a way to reintegrate itself into society and prove to its potential opponents and allies that it was not insignificant. The path Iran chose for such an announcement was one that garnered almost exclusively negative attention: the pursuit of nuclear weapons.

IV. The Paths Not Taken

When faced with a drop in status like that suffered by Iran during the 1980s, pursuing nuclear weapons may not seem like the natural first choice for readjustment. After looking at Iran's domestic and international situation in 1988, though, it is easier to see why it was the best choice for Iran at the time.

The Path of War

Fighting a retaliatory war for status adjustment was never really an option for Iran. The Iran-Iraq war had decimated Iran both economically and politically. The Iranian government claims that 300,000 were killed in the war and another 500,000 wounded, but there is some speculation that these numbers may be even higher in reality.141 The economic costs of the war still have not been clearly determined, but are estimated to be over $600billion142 – not including the resulting inflation, new welfare payments resulting from economic losses, future losses due to decreased productivity, or other unanticipated future costs.

142 Mofid, The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War, 121.
By 1988 Iran no longer had the capability or the drive to fight another protracted war. Iran could no longer be confident in its ability to be victorious in conflicts, even those where it had a military advantage. In 1980, Iran was the 24th most powerful state in the world, while Iraq was 34th. Even with this supposed statistical advantage, though, Iran lost the conflict and suffered greatly in the process.

Waging a secondary war to increase prestige would have been nearly impossible for Iran logistically. It would also have led to a backlash in the domestic political realm from citizens who had already suffered through one war on their land and would not support another. It would have been difficult to identify a new enemy and another war with Iraq was clearly not a possibility. Even if it had been able to choose an opponent and gain domestic support, though, Iran's prospects for victory were slim to none.

**The Economic Path**

Iran could not pursue economic status adjustment for largely the same reasons it could not fight another war – it had suffered severe economic losses both in the war and as a result of the Revolution. The government had its hands full just trying to recoup the costs of the war and was not having success at forging new economic ties with the international community.

Prior to the war, Iran had seen a significant increase in its ability to refine oil domestically, allowing it to become an exporter of oil, a commodity that could have served as a strong base for economic advancement. During the war, however, the Iraqi army developed a pattern of attacking Iranian refineries and production facilities, resulting in stagnation of Iran's production capabilities. Domestic consumption of oil continued to rise, though. By the end of the war Iran had become a net oil importer.

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143 This ranking is derived from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset using the Composite Index of National Capability. Singer et al, "Capability Distribution."

144 Mofid, The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War, 116-119.
Outside of the fuel industry, Iran had no viable options for high-value commodity production of the type needed for increased prestige. It also did not have the trading base necessary to sustain such extensive trade relationships. Its economic ties to nearly all of the world’s wealthiest states had been cut dramatically ever since the Revolution.\footnote{145 More details in this shift can be found in the Correlates of War Bilateral Trade dataset which shows how the imports and exports of Iran and most Western countries dropped drastically (50-90\%) following the Revolution and in subsequent years. Barbieri, "TRADING DATA."}

Becoming an economic power would have required Iran to develop new, dependent relationships with those states that had abandoned it in war and which the Iranian people considered hypocritical and evil. Leaders would have had to make serious concessions on a political scale to gain favor and run the risk of angering or alienating the very people that had put them in power in the first place.

\textit{The Political Path}

For a short time following the end of the Iran-Iraq War, and the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, it seemed as though Iran might pursue political negotiation as a way to reinstitute itself into international affairs.

President Bush asked for President Rafsanjani’s help in finding and rescuing American prisoners held in other Middle Eastern countries. Rafsanjani paid a visit to Moscow, attempting to restart Soviet-Iranian relations and, in 1988, the British reopened their embassy in Tehran for the first time in nearly a decade.\footnote{146 Gold, \textit{The Rise of Nuclear Iran}, 105-109.} As a show of good will Rafsanjani helped negotiate the release of three Americans taken hostage by Hizbullah in 1990, but he was not rewarded in a way he considered adequate.\footnote{147 Arjomand, \textit{After Khomeini}, 144.}
Relations with the British quickly broke down again after the issuing of a *fatwa* condemning British author Salman Rushdie to death.\textsuperscript{148} The United States publicly condemned Iran for its connections to terrorist organizations and refused to unfreeze the assets it had blocked following the Revolution. Iran was still not invited to the conferences on the Middle East Peace Process and was publicly shunned by its neighbors. By 1993 the United States had announced a policy of “dual containment” against Iran and Iraq, which ruined any chance of further political involvement with Iran.\textsuperscript{149}

While Iran made some progress in the political realm, it was nowhere near the levels needed to maintain a political path to prestige. Without giving in to Western demands and acting as a conciliatory state – something the Iranian people were adamantly against – Iran have very little hope of playing an sort of role at the forefront of an international political negotiation. The entire purpose of the Revolution had been to return Iran to the people and the glory of Islam. Making concessions in order to forge political connections would have been completely contrary to this idea and risked inciting the people against the government leaders.

V. The Chosen Path: Proliferation

Unlike the other three paths for status adjustment, Iran was well positioned to use the pursuit of nuclear weapons as a means of status increase. It had a well established, but temporarily stalled, nuclear program and had historically used that program as a way to establish closer connections with the other major powers. A 1988 CIA report concluded that the proliferation work done in Iran prior to the Revolution “could provide a foundation for future weapons development.”\textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 138.  
\textsuperscript{149} The policy was aimed at “isolating both countries regionally, cutting them off from the world economic and trading system ... to deny Iran access to international capital and arms markets”. Gause, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," 56.  
\textsuperscript{150} *Middle East - South Asia: Nuclear Handbook*, 25.
The decision to go nuclear actually occurred midway through the Iran-Iraq war with the authorization of a gas centrifuge research program in 1985. Research and development did not begin until 1988, though.

![Figure 5: Iran's Path of Status Adjustment](image)

**Origins of the Nuclear Program**

The nuclear program of Iran originated in the 1950s partly in response to President Eisenhower's famous "Atoms for Peace" speech to the United Nations. In the speech, the President called on the advanced nations of the world to research nuclear power and share their efforts with the international community. In doing so, he stated, "the contributing Powers would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs rather than the fears of mankind."\(^{151}\)

Around the same time as this speech, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi had a vision of modernizing Iran and helping it catch up with the major powers of the world. The call for technological advancement issued by Eisenhower presented Iran with the perfect opportunity to be recognized and join the communities of the first world. The Shah signed an educational exchange agreement with the Eisenhower administration and received an American research reactor for use in the Tehran Nuclear Research Center.\(^{152}\)

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\(^{151}\) Eisenhower, "Atoms for Peace."

\(^{152}\) Amuzegar, "Iran's Crumbling Revolution," 91.
Iran signed the NPT on July 1, 1968 and ratified it on February 2, 1970, but continued to expand its nuclear research in conjunction with the West. It followed NPT guidelines for the peaceful use of nuclear technology and was an unremarkable, yet model member of the nonproliferation regime. Throughout the Cold War, Iranian nuclear scientists were trained in US and European Universities. This nuclear exchange was promoted by the West to combat Soviet influence in the Middle East. In the 1970s Iran expanded its connections by signing nuclear deals with Germany and France. The Shah invested over $1 billion in the construction of the European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium (Eurodif).

The Revolution temporarily halted the progress of the nuclear program in 1979. The newly formed Islamic Council declared the building and use of atomic weapons anti-Islamic and forbid their use. The new government focused its post-Revolution policies on establishing the dominance of Shari'ah law, which left no real place for a nuclear arsenal.

When the Soviets began building up troops on the Iranian border in 1980, the US considered many options for response, including a nuclear threat. Iran, however, made no moves toward restarting its nuclear program, even though it faced potential attack from one of the world's largest atomic powers. It was not until midway through the Iran-Iraq war that the nuclear program would be restarted.

The Nuclear Renaissance

Shortly after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, as Iran was being pushed further away from the possibility of victory, research in the nuclear arena was restarted. In 1982, the head of the Nuclear Technology Center at Esfahan announced that Iran would begin

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153 Signatories and Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
154 Parillo, "Iran's Nuclear Program," 1.
155 Halloran, "Soviet Buildup Near Iran Tested Carter."
importing nuclear technology again for the first time since the Revolution.\textsuperscript{156} By 1985 construction of facilities at Natanz had begun.\textsuperscript{157}

The revival of the nuclear program became official in 1985 with Ayatollah Khomeini's call for research into gas centrifuge technology. Iran gained support for its program from both Argentina and China while strategically avoiding its former nuclear allies and proponents of non-proliferation – the United States, Germany and France.\textsuperscript{158} It also received nuclear intelligence from the illicit Kahn network and, by 1988, had gathered enough knowledge to begin building its centrifuges.

The Death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and the ascension of Ali Khamenei brought new attitudes and even stronger support to the Iranian nuclear establishment. The new Ayatollah, along with President Rafsanjani, began pushing for covert expansion of all nuclear activities including conversion, reprocessing and enrichment.\textsuperscript{159} Iran increased its pace of development and signed nuclear deals with China, North Korea and Pakistan.\textsuperscript{160}

By the late 1990s, nuclear research had become a matter of the “highest priority” in Iran and garnered widespread attention in the international community.\textsuperscript{161} It became a rallying point for the domestic political identity of the Iranian people, but attracted sanctions and derision internationally.

\textbf{Waiting for T: Sanctions and Isolation}

When the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) - an exiled opposition group - exposed Iran's covert enrichment activities in 2002, the United States, United Nations, and European Union responded almost immediately by issuing sanctions calling on Iran to declare and halt all enrichment and reprocessing activities. There has been speculation for

\textsuperscript{156} The \textit{New York Times}, "Iran to Restudy A-Power."
\textsuperscript{157} Parillo, “Iran’s Nuclear Program.”
\textsuperscript{158} Middle East - South Asia: Nuclear Handbook, 25-26.
\textsuperscript{159} Parillo, “Iran’s Nuclear Program.”
\textsuperscript{160} Khan, \textit{Iran and Nuclear Weapons}, 75.
\textsuperscript{161} Mukhatzhanova, \textit{Pride and Prejudice}.
some time that Iran might be covertly pursuing weapons technology, but the announcement was still a shock to the international community. It proved that Iran was defying its commitments under the NPT and flaunting international law. All eyes were now turned to Iran, waiting for it to make the next move.

Iran formally declared their construction and enrichment activities to the IAEA in February of 2003. Leaders maintained the belief that they were not in a state of non-compliance yet, though, because under the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) they only had to declare nuclear activities 180 days before introducing nuclear material. Iran was still in the construction phase at the time.\textsuperscript{162} The IAEA was not fully satisfied with Iran’s initial declaration and called on the state to allow further verification and cooperation.

In December 2003, Iran agreed to sign the Additional Protocol of the NPT, but by early 2004 the IAEA reported that there were outstanding issues with Iran’s safeguards. In September 2005 the IAEA officially adopted a resolution declaring Iran in a state of non-compliance.\textsuperscript{163} This declaration fueled international opposition and sanctions were further strengthened around the globe.

In recent speeches by President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, Iran’s nuclear program has been referred to as a “defining element of its national identity.”\textsuperscript{164} Nuclear power is labeled as a hallmark of modernization for Iran and a matter of sovereignty. This feeling is especially prevalent among the youth, who make up a majority of Iran’s population.\textsuperscript{165} With a median age of 26.4, Iran society is largely led by this youth bulge, many of whose members seem to have taken up the nuclear program as their political banner.\textsuperscript{166}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{162 Parillo, “Iran’s Nuclear Program.”}
\footnote{163 Details on the specific actions and timeline can be found on the IAEA website at \textit{IAEA & Iran}, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/index.shtml.}
\footnote{164 Lindsay and Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the Bomb.”}
\footnote{165 Walsh, “Iran’s Nuclear Program.”}
\footnote{166 \textit{Iran}, CIA World Factbook.}
\end{footnotes}
There were demonstrations on university campuses throughout Iran after the government announced that it would sign the additional protocol of the NPT in 2003. The educated youth have also “warned their elders against capitulating to external pressures” by agreeing to give up their nuclear program or any aspect of their nuclear technology.\textsuperscript{167} So far the leadership of Iran seems to be on the same page as most of the youth.

Thus far the nuclear program in Iran has brought little more than negative attention to the state on an international scale, but domestically it is hailed as a success. It has kept Iran on the global radar and held international focus for nearly a decade. Iran is positioned to possibly become a major player in international affairs and it has proven itself to be a strong, independent state.

In 2005 Iran briefly halted enrichment activities so that it could engage in negotiations with the European Union. It was being addressed as an equal and invited to participate in an important political discussion and, therefore, was willing to give up some ground on its nuclear program. But the talks quickly turned sour after the election of President Ahmadinejad and Iran restarted all of its nuclear activities declaring that it would never stop them again.\textsuperscript{168}

In 2006, President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had successfully begun enriching uranium and stated that completion of a full nuclear fuel cycle was now one of Iran’s most important goals. It is estimated that Iran has over 4,500 active centrifuges and a stockpile of over 3,000lbs of low-enriched uranium today.\textsuperscript{169} The IAEA officially reported Iran to United Nations Security Council on Feb 4, 2006 and the UNSC called on Iran for immediate compliance on all nuclear issues.\textsuperscript{170} Iran refused to be compliant and continued to increase its nuclear activities. The international community has responded with further sanctions and there has been very little movement toward finding a compromise.

\textsuperscript{167} Takeyh, \textit{Hidden Iran}, 156.
\textsuperscript{168} Parillo, “Iran’s Nuclear Program.”
\textsuperscript{169} Allison, “Nuclear Disorder.”
\textsuperscript{170} "IAEA Board of Governors Resolution, GOV/2006/14"
VI. Conclusion: The Need for Understanding

Alternative Explanations for Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions

Some argue that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is not a matter of prestige, but a quest for increased state security. Scholars cite Khomeini’s decision to restart the nuclear weapons research program after the Iran-Iraq war as evidence that the program was motivated by security concerns.

While there is obviously some consideration of state security in any state’s decision to go nuclear – a nuclear weapon is, above all other things, a powerful military tool – it does not fully explain the Iranian situation.

It is true that the war with Iraq taught Iranian leaders that they would have to defend their state from weapons of mass destruction attacks because no one else would and that they view Israel, a nuclear state, as their main rival in the region, but both these factors have implications far beyond the security realm.

During the war, Iran was the victim of chemical weapon attacks – an action that had been illegal since the 1925 Geneva Protocol and was the subject of many international conventions and discussions. Iran was left to fend for itself, though and received no direct support or assistance. Following the war, Iranian leaders realized that they no longer played any sort of role in the international community. They would need to fend for themselves from now on and take drastic measures to restore the state’s lost reputation and respect. Leaders set out to find a way “to receive proper respect as a major Middle


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Eastern country."172 They did this by beginning an extensive nuclear research program, presumably to defend their state from future attacks.

After its revival the 1980s, though, the path of Iran's nuclear program has not progressed parallel to changes in its security situation. Since the 2001 joint invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Iran has been surrounded by troops hostile to its nuclear intentions. Rather than reacting with caution, though, Iran has ramped up its nuclear activities and gone public with its intentions. If Iran were truly concerned for its security, it should not be antagonizing the West with troops stationed so close to its borders.

The United States has proven that it will not hesitate to take military actions against states it believes harbor terrorists or nuclear weapons – both of which Iran has been accused of – but Iran has not let this curtail its nuclear ambitions. The more pressure the Western world puts on Iran to halt its nuclear enrichment, the more determined it seems to become to increase its activities. It has willingly placed itself in a position of strategic vulnerability while fighting for recognition and respect.

The threats against Iran have not just come from the Western world, either. Saudi Arabia has threatened multiple times to pursue its own nuclear program is Iran does not halt its production. And Israeli leaders have declared their open hostility toward Iran for years. Deputy Prime Minister Mofatz publicly announced that "If Iran continues with its programme for developing nuclear weapons, we will attack it."173 Even when Saudi Arabia announced that it had made a deal with Israel to use Saudi air space if and when it attacked Iran, the pace of its nuclear program has not slowed.174

172 “It expects the powerful states, especially the US, to consult it with respect to any endeavor in the Middle East.” Khan, Iran and Nuclear Weapons, 20.
173 BBC News, “Israeli Minister Threatens Iran.”
174 The air rights offer is briefly discussed in: Tomlinson, “Saudi Arabia gives Israel clear skies.”
In the face of open threats and a close US military presence Iran’s nuclear program has embarked on its most ambitious decade yet. It has made itself a target of preemptive attack for the sake of and incomplete and, as of yet, ineffective nuclear program.

As the second largest state in the Middle East and the third most populous, the Iranian presence in the region cannot be ignored; yet, it does not often receive the respect from its neighbors that it believes it should. It remains isolated and condemned, but continues to fight back. Without a change in policies toward Iran from the West and the Middle East it is unlikely the state will ever renounce its nuclear ambitions.

The Need for Policy Change

Sanctions and statements of disapproval have not yet served their purpose of crushing Iran’s economy and forcing it to give up its nuclear program. It is unlikely that they will do so in the future either. The international community has been treating Iran as a criminal state, trying to punish it for pursuing a technology it believes it deserves, but has only fueled its resistance. This punishment process may have been effective if Iran were pursuing nuclear weapons for purely strategic or security concerns. When prestige is the main motivation, though, sanctions just push the possibility of a resolution further and further away.

The 2009 contested elections in Iran opened a window of opportunity for the Western World to change its approach to the Persian state. Two years later, though, it appears as though the world will allow this window to close without taking advantage of it. As domestic unrest spreads throughout the Middle East today, Iran included, there is an opportunity to form new alliances and institute new policies to support the changing face of government. The West has the chance to restart negotiations and find new allies in the quest for regional stability and peace.

Engaging Iran, though, will require giving it the respect it believes it deserves. Compromise and cooperation rather than derision and oppression can serve to make a hostile nation more willing to make amends with the international community. Providing
Iran with opportunities for political or economic growth, rather than continuing sanctions, may lessen its dependence on nuclear power. If Iran has the opportunity and the resources to pursue a faster and easier path to prestige, it may finally be persuaded to give up its nuclear pursuits and join the international community.
CHAPTER 6: EGYPT’S STRUGGLE FOR PRESTIGE

I. Introduction

The name Egypt conjures up images of pyramids, gold, pharaohs and all the grandeur of the ancient world. But the recent history of Egypt is far less glamorous. Egypt was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in the 1500s and remained under its rule for nearly four centuries as both a territory and tributary state. Soon after it regained independence in the early 1900s it became involved in the war with Israel and has been fighting for peace and stability ever since.

Egypt has a long and glorious history, yet it struggled to find respect and legitimacy in world affairs for decades following its disastrous loss to Israel in the Six Day War. Its poor performance hurt both its domestic and international reputation and threatened to undermine its celebrated history. Through shrewd political maneuvering and one successful war effort, Egypt managed to recover some of this lost prestige and prove that it is an important player in international affairs.

From the October War to the Camp David Accords, Egypt has consistently proven itself to be the Arab leader in the Middle East Conflict. It has a guaranteed spot at the negotiating table and enjoys a special relationship with the most powerful state in the world – the United States.

There is still a long way to go toward achieving Middle Eastern peace and returning Egypt to its former glory, but the two ends have now become inextricably linked. If Egypt is able to secure a lasting peace with Israel it will become a model for other states to follow for years to come. Egyptian leaders can tout the pride and resilience of their state and prove to their people that they will not let the glory of Egypt subside, empire or no empire.
II. Identity in Egypt

Egypt is home to one of the oldest civilizations in the world with one of the most well known histories. Yet it took centuries before anyone thought to cultivate this identity in the modern age.

For close to four hundred years Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire in one form or another. During this period of time Egypt's history became inextricably linked to the history of Istanbul. In the nineteenth century, identity in Egypt was fragmented and localized. People associated themselves with local cities and regions rather than feeling pride in their shared culture and history. It was not until World War II and the fall of the Ottoman Empire that any modern identity was formed.

The breakup of the Ottoman Empire created a large number of new states in the Middle East, with no clear way to distinguish them other than geographical boundaries. These states had shared a single culture and history for centuries and were suddenly struggling to create distinct cultural identities and consolidate their domestic political base. For Egypt the tool for creating this identity was found in the ancient world and the history of the Pharaohs.

Egyptian intellectuals and elites began promoting the image of “ancient Egyptians as illustrious ancestors all the world might envy.” They told the stories of the Pharaohs and the magnificent achievements of the ancient world. The idea of ancestors and family is essential to the Egyptian way of life. There is a large portion of Shari’a law regulating family affairs and students are taught that family is the “cornerstone of society” in Egypt.

The government was able to capitalize on this new historical image by promoting tourism to ancient monuments, mandating the study of ancient history into schools and publicizing images of this Egyptian identity. This focus on cultivating a statewide identity

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175 Reid, Whose Pharoahs?, 288.
has permeated all aspects of society over the past hundred years and helped to greatly reduce the amount of ethnic conflict throughout Egypt.176

In a region dominated by conflicts over ethnicity Egypt stands out for its relative homogeneity. 99.6% of people in Egypt identify themselves as Egyptian.177 This is not to say that there aren't minority groups in Egypt, but even the smallest groups dislike being called minorities and refer to themselves as Egyptian instead.178 This homogeneity is largely a result of Nasser’s nationalization policies of the 1950s that consolidated property ownership and forced disparate groups to coexist in a single area.

There are still some recognized differences between groups in Egyptian society, with the most pronounced divisions occurring in the area of religion. 90% of Egyptians are Muslim; the other 10% are Christian - generally Copts.179 Muslims and Christians have been able to coexist peacefully throughout most of Egypt’s recent history, as neither group has generally been treated as superior or inferior to the other.

Egypt is officially an Islamic state with a law code based off Shari’a principles yet the Coptic population does not consider themselves to be minorities. “For them there is no ethnic difference between themselves and the Muslim population, since both religious groups are ethnically Egyptian tracing their roots to the Pharaohs.”180 In fact, the Copts consider themselves to be the purest sub-group in Egypt because their ancestors never intermarried with Muslims conquerors of other cultures.181

Egyptian identity in the twentieth century has usually been defined by one of four schools of thought: Egyptian, Mediterranean, Arab or Islamic.182 Each school has been

176 Stowasser, "Tahlil Marriage in Shari'a," 177.
177 "Egypt," CIA World Factbook.
179 "Egypt," CIA World Factbook.
180 Makari, "Christianity and Islam in Twentieth Century Egypt," 90.
181 Makari, "Christianity and Islam in Twentieth Century Egypt," 90.
182 Ibid., 90-92.
dominant at one point in time, leading to changes in policy and leadership as the state's
grand strategy shifted along with its identity.

The Egyptian school developed out of the need for a defining identity following the
breakup of the Ottoman Empire. It emphasizes Egypt's uniquely long history and the legacy
of the Pharaohs. This school gained popularity in the 1920s as a series of archaeological
discoveries – including the unearthing of King Tut's tomb – were announced to the world.
This way of thinking has gained popularity again today as a motto of the current revolution.
Since January of 2011 the people have shown a dramatic increase in their level of "pride to
be an Egyptian."\textsuperscript{183}

The Mediterranean school also emphasized the greatness of the ancient empires,
but instead of stressing the differences between Egypt and its neighbors it downplayed
them. This school focused on the collective history of the Mediterranean region as the
home of the world’s most powerful empires. It had the least amount of support among the
four schools because it did not provide a strong image of Egyptian greatness and
prosperity.

The Islamic school, as its name implies, focused on the religious makeup of Egypt
and the belief that Egypt should be governed by Shari'a laws. This way of thinking gained
popularity after the 1967 loss to Israel. Many Egyptians believed that the Six Day War was
punishment for their lack of faith. Adherence to the Islamic school almost broke the ethnic
peace in Egypt when Sadat exiled of the Coptic Pope in 1981.\textsuperscript{184} The stability of Egypt was
kept in tact, though, when Mubarak came to power and promoted the image of a Pan-Arab
nation.

The Arab school is probably the most well known of the Egyptian identities. It
emphasizes the common language of the Arab nations and focuses on the recent history of
the region rather than the ancient. It emphasizes Egypt's place as the rightful leader of the

\textsuperscript{183} Elkhair, "90 pct of Egyptians."
\textsuperscript{184} The Age, "Coptic Pope Sent into Desert Exile," 9.
Arab world since it is the largest Arab state. It first became popular following the 1925 Syrian revolt against French authorities. The Egyptian government expressed their support for the Syrian revolutionaries and for all oppressed "Eastern" states wanting to take action against the European powers.\textsuperscript{185}

Pan-Arabism continued to rise during the first half of the twentieth century, but was almost lost to Islamism under Sadat’s rule. When Mubarak came to power in the 1980s, though, he took up the banner of pan-Arabism and used it to gain support for his policies in support of Middle Eastern peace.

\textbf{II. Egypt’s Fall: The Six-Day War}

Egypt’s level of prestige has been linked to the existence of Israel ever since its creation in 1948. Egyptians saw the existence of a Jewish state as an abomination and an embarrassment to the entire Arab world. Gamal Abdel Nasser, the first President of Egypt, capitalized on this sentiment and made Egypt into the leader of the fight against Israel. He sought to help Egypt “reclaim its birthright and restore the lost national prestige” by becoming a global leader and the state responsible for removing the Israeli threat.\textsuperscript{186} His end goal might not have been met, but his approach seemed to work.

Egypt enjoyed good relations with the world’s two most powerful states – The United States and Soviet Union throughout most of the 1950s and 60s. When Egypt was attacked by European powers during the 1956 Suez Crisis both superpowers came down on the side of Egypt. It also gained support from the majority of Middle Eastern states and was looked at to lead the region against Israel. This position of leadership is why Egypt suffered such a severe drop in prestige following the Six-Day War.

\textsuperscript{185} Coury, "Who "Invented" Egyptian Arab Nationalism? Part 1."
\textsuperscript{186} Nasser, "The Egyptian Revolution," 203.
The Six-Day War

There has been much debate over the years as to whether the Six-Day War constituted a preemptive attack by Israel or whether it was a matter of self-defense. The results, though, are clear: a decisive Israeli victory and major losses for all Arab states involved.

The Israeli air force led the attack against Egypt, Syria and Jordan with air raids on June 5, 1967. The initial attack destroyed nearly 80% of the three states' warplanes. The Arab states deployed forces in retaliation, but for all intents and purposes "by noon the war was essentially won." The Israelis had initiated such a decisive attack that there was never really hope for the Arab states to retaliate or stop the advance.

The air war was quickly transformed into a ground campaign in the Sinai with Israeli forces pushing forward and Egyptians retreating. Egypt had been increasing its forces in the Sinai in the weeks preceding the war so that, by the time the war began, 50,000 men were stationed at or near the Israeli border. Even so, the Egyptian forces were unable to hold their line.

On the third day the fight moved to Jerusalem and by the fourth Jordan had surrendered, solidifying Israel's position in the West Bank. Israel then turned its attention to the retreating Egyptians and the Syrians holed up in bunkers. By the fifth day of fighting, Egypt had lost the Sinai completely and the Arab world began to turn against its former leader.

Other Arabs led attacks on the Egyptian embassy in Algiers and the Egyptian cultural center in Tunis. Nasser was declared a traitor and fell into depression. He declared

188 "Memorandum From the President's Special Counsel (McPherson) to President Johnson," FRUS.
189 "Briefing Notes for Director of Central Intelligence Helms for Use at a White House Meeting," FRUS.
190 For a detailed day-by-day breakdown of the fighting see: Oren, Six Days of war.
his official resignation the same day, but rescinded it after he was met with a spontaneous swell of popular support. Protestors lined the streets in Cairo and other major Middle East cities begging him to reconsider. King Hussein wrote him personally to ask for his support and politicians and intellectuals throughout the country declared that Nasser was the only leader who could keep them together.\footnote{Ibid, 286-288}

The sixth and final day of fighting marked Israel's conquest of the Golan Heights and, subsequently, the Syrian forces. With no will left in them, all parties finally agreed to a ceasefire agreement, validating Israel's territorial gains and acknowledging its military superiority.

As it had been predicted at the very beginning of the war, Israel emerged the overwhelming victor after just six days of fighting. It had gained control over the Sinai, Golan Heights and all of Mandated Palestine, quadrupling it territorial area.\footnote{Popp, "Stumbling Decidedly into the Six-Day War," 281.} Many of these areas were of strategic importance and significantly reduced Israel's geographic vulnerability to future attacks. It had also outlasted the Arab troops in terms of casualties with a rate of 25 to 1.\footnote{Oren, \textit{Six Days of war}, 305.}

In just under a week Egypt, Jordan and Syria had managed to lose large portions of their armed forces and strategic pieces of territory to a state they considered unworthy of existing. This loss was especially dramatic for Egypt, which had led the charge and had significantly stronger material capabilities than Israel. On paper, Egypt should have been victorious.\footnote{Egypt was ranked 27\textsuperscript{th} and Israel 59\textsuperscript{th} on the Correlates of War CINC scale prior to the 1967 war; Singer, "Capability Distribution."} 

Egypt's defeat happened so quickly and publicly that it became a part of popular culture. A famous Israeli joke retold many times in the press has a colleague questioning Moshe Dayan, the general that led the Israeli army in the Six-Day War, about his plans for
the next day. "How about invading another Arab country?" says the colleague. "What would we do in the afternoon?" replies Dayan.\textsuperscript{195}

Over the course of six days Egypt had gone from being a regional power with a long, proud history to being the punch line of a bad joke. It had also lost a major ally as the United States solidified its relationship with Israel and began seriously limiting its interactions with Egypt. Egypt needed to find a way to save its reputation and prove to the world that it was not a state that could be laughed off.

IV. The Paths Not Taken

Egypt has followed a two-step path toward status adjustment since its loss in 1967. It began with the quick and decisive path of war and then switched to the longer-lasting, but less palatable path of political negotiation. Why were these the best two paths for Egypt? Its recent history had made both economic and nuclear status adjustment impossible.

\textit{The Economic Path}

Throughout the early twentieth century Egypt possessed an import substitution economy. It had a very limited industrial base and most industries and people relied on imported products rather than items produced at home. Egypt had virtually no export sector.

Following the 1952 Revolution and the end of the monarchy, Egyptian leaders attempted to nationalize the industrial sector. New protectionist policies were put in place to defend domestic industry and the government began taking over all major manufacturing. The process was unsuccessful, though. Import substitution had diminished the quality of products manufactured at home so badly that Egyptians could no longer produce any exportable commodities.\textsuperscript{196}

\textsuperscript{195} Jacobson, "How Golda Meir won the Yom Kippur war."
\textsuperscript{196} Brown and Shahin, "Egypt," 214..
By the time the Six-Day War broke out in 1967, Egypt was suffering from a shortage of foreign currency and found itself in the midst of both food and housing crises. Throughout the 1970s the Egyptian economy struggled just to keep its people alive and satisfied. The government had introduced food subsidies during World War II, and continually increased the number of foods and commodities subject to rationing over the next few decades. When the government tried to remove the subsidies in 1977 it resulted in widespread rioting until the subsidy system was reinstated.

Egypt did not have a dependable industrial base prior to the war and it did not experience and sort of economic turnaround in the years immediately following its loss. Without any high-value commodities or options for financial sector development, it was impossible for Egypt to take the economic path toward status adjustment.

**The Nuclear Path**

The Egyptian nuclear program began in 1954, like many others, as a response to President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” speech and his call for the powerful nations of the world to stand up and begin researching nuclear technology.

Reports by the International Institute of Strategic Studies argue that the United Nations conference at which Eisenhower gave his speech “not only provided the basic structure for the AEE’s [Atomic Energy Establishment] programmes, but was also the foundation for a series of negotiated bilateral cooperative agreements with foreign countries. Arguably, it was this willingness on the part of foreign countries to assist that allowed Egypt’s programme to develop in the first place.”

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197 For an in depth look at the Egyptian food subsidy system throughout the twentieth century see: Ali and Adams, "The Egyptian Food Subsidy System."
199 International Institute of Strategic Studies, "Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East."
Nasser took advantage of this foreign assistance and founded the Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission in 1955.\textsuperscript{200} Egypt’s first reactor, which had been provided by the Soviet Union, went online in 1961, but was not capable of producing weapons-grade material.\textsuperscript{201}

When Israel announced that it was starting its own nuclear program in 1960 Egypt launched into its most aggressive period of nuclear expansion. By the time of the Six Day War, though, it had still not achieved any sort of domestic nuclear capability. Nasser became calling for the development of a pan-Arab nuclear program, which would be hosted by Egyptian nuclear facilities, but funded by all members of the Arab League.\textsuperscript{202}

Egypt was never able to complete its own fuel cycle and relied on imported technology for all of its nuclear research. When the Six-Day War occurred, Egypt was no closer to building an atomic bomb than it had been a decade earlier. Faced with the daunting possibility of attempting to build a nuclear weapon and failing – especially since Israel had already succeeded in doing so – Egypt’s leaders decided to stop the nuclear program rather than increasing it. They could not be accused of losing to Israel in the race for nuclear technology if they never attempted to do so.

In 1968 Egypt signed the NPT and gave up its right to choose a nuclear path in the future. Over the next few years Egypt was instrumental of bringing the proposal for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East to the United Nations and it eventually began calling for a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone as well.\textsuperscript{203}

Aside from the technological hurdles, Egypt also had to deal with the very real threat of an Israeli preemptive attack if they were seen to be pursuing nuclear power. Prime Minister Begin publicly stated on multiple occasions that “Israel would not tolerate any enemy – Arab or otherwise – developing weapons of mass destruction intended for use

\textsuperscript{200} Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Egypt: Nuclear Overview."
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{202} International Institute of Strategic Studies, "Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East."
against Israel" and that if the Arab world were able to gain a nuclear capacity "another holocaust would happen in the history of the Jewish people." If that reactor was found on the soil of Egypt, the leader in the fight against Israel, it is possible that Israel would have carried through with their threat and once again attack the Egyptian homeland.

V. The First Chosen Path: War

The Six Day War permanently altered the relationships between the Middle East states. It served as a catalyst for the pan-Arab attitude that had been developing in recent decades and solidified the divide between Israel and the rest of the Middle East. Anwar Sadat used this attitude as a rallying point and as he began calling for increased Arab unity.

Sadat frowned upon the division between Arab states along the lines of "revolutionary" and "conservative" and thought that states should instead be divided by where they stand on the fight against Israel. Sadat advocated policies of nonintervention between Arab states and paid visits to many Arab leaders to show his solidarity. He became the first Arab head of state to visit both Iraq and Kuwait.

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204 The Age, "Israel will bomb reactor again."
205 Dessouki, "Egyptian Foreign Policy Since Camp David," 103.
Egypt was able to capitalize on this newfound cohesion by uniting the embarrassment and loss of prestige that all the Middle Eastern states had faced at the hands of Israel. He turned the region’s shared failure into a drive for war. He rallied some of the most powerful Arab states to plan for attack, this time in a way they could gain first advantage.

**The Yom Kippur/October War**

On October 24, 1972 Sadat convened a meeting of the Armed Forces Supreme Council and told them to plan for war, whether or not they received Soviet Military assistance. Anyone who did not immediately support his plan was removed from their position and replaced with someone more sympathetic to his plans.206

Such drastic steps may have been unnecessary, though, since Soviet military supply shipments eventually came through to both Egypt and Syria. By the time both state’s leaders – along with Jordan’s King Hussein – met in September 1973, they had fully stocked and replenished military supplies.207 Syria’s President Hafiz al-Assad even overhauled his state’s military, removing corruption, improving training and motivating soldiers to be as good as the weapons they were given.208

The new weapons, supplies and attitudes gave all three states renewed confidence in their ability to win a retaliatory war and helped push the odds further in favor of the Arab forces. When war finally broke out on October 6, everything had lined up perfectly. The Arab’s were positioned for the quick and easy victory they would need to show their superiority and regain their regional status. They presented a unified front, solidified by near-perfect coordination between the Egyptian and Syrian militaries and managed to take Israel completely by surprise.209

206 Bar-Joseph, "Last Chance to Avoid War", 547.
207 Quandt, *Soviet Policy in the October 1973 War*.
208 The Syrian force now numbered seven million – larger and more well-armored than many of the former European military powers: Boyne, *The Two O’clock War*, 3.
209 Dessouki, "Egyptian Foreign Policy Since Camp David," 96.
Prior to the opening of hostilities, the Arabs engaged in a disinformation campaign aimed at hiding their true intentions. Not even the soldiers forming the front line knew that they were being sent to attack Israel.\textsuperscript{210} Sadat engaged in false peace negotiations with Henry Kissinger and authorized large-scale military exercises by the Egyptian forces throughout 1973.\textsuperscript{211} The first two times such exercises occurred Israel responded by readying their forces before realizing that they were not actually under attack. The third time, Israel thought it had learned its lesson and did not arm its troops. It was not until the eleventh hour that leaders realized their mistake.

Israel could have responded to the invasion with an air attack, but Washington urged Prime Minister Golda Meir not to take any action that could be considered preemptive, forcing her to try and call up reserve forces to prepare a defense.\textsuperscript{212} Nearly all of Israel's reserve troops were off duty and at home with their families, though, since it was Yom Kippur, the Jewish day of rest and the most holy day of the year.

No one in Israel or the United States had taken the threat of a surprise Arab attack seriously prior to the October War. Sadat had made threats “to sacrifice one million Egyptian soldiers” in the fight against Israel, but everyone thought that was just political rhetoric aimed at inciting the masses.\textsuperscript{213} Washington considered Sadat to be a soft leader who would not engage in war and Israel believed that its air force, which had been wildly successful in 1967, was powerful enough to stop any attempted attack. All of these assumptions were obviously incorrect as Israel learned in a devastating fashion.

Israel lost around 2,000 people in two weeks during the Yom Kippur War with another 4,000 wounded.\textsuperscript{214} The initial attack was so overwhelming that Moshe Dayan - the Israeli general who had led Israel to victory in 1967 - reported to Meir only days after it

\textsuperscript{210} Parker, ed., \textit{The October War: a retrospective}, 84. reports that "In a survey of 8,000 troops after the war, Lt. Gen Kakish reported that only one person knew on October 3, three days before the war, that preparations were for an attack."
\textsuperscript{211} Stephens, "Caught on the Hop: The Yom Kippur War."
\textsuperscript{212} Jacobson, "How Golda Meir won the Yom Kippur war."
\textsuperscript{213} Stephens, "Caught on the Hop: The Yom Kippur War."
\textsuperscript{33} Parker, ed., \textit{The October War: a retrospective}, 346.
began that Israel was doomed to fail. He believed that the Syrians could not be stopped and the Egyptian troops would never be pushed back beyond the canal.\textsuperscript{215} His sense of defeat was so thorough that Meir would not allow him to speak with the press or give public reports on the progress of the war.\textsuperscript{216}

After four days of Arab domination, Meir was able to negotiate an emergency airlift with the United States that provided much needed supplies to the depleted Israeli Reserves. Within a matter of days Israeli forces were able to get behind Egyptian lines and push Syria back from the Golan Heights.\textsuperscript{217} They stalled the advance long enough to initiate ceasefire agreements with the United Nations.

On October 22\textsuperscript{nd} the United Nations issued UNSCR 338 calling for an immediate ceasefire and a return to the 1967 peace agreement.\textsuperscript{218} Israeli forces waited until the 25\textsuperscript{th} to pull out of Europe and it was another two weeks before Egypt agreed to sign a provisional ceasefire. Negotiations with Syria lasted until 1974 before a disengagement agreement was signed, but the fighting stopped far earlier.

Egypt was unable to recover its lost territory in the October War, but it was able to prove that it could fight the Israelis and hold its own. It captured the attention of the United States and Israel and incentivized both states to take another look at the possibility of peace. Prior to the October War Israel had no reason to engage in political negotiation with the Arab states. It was the clear regional power and had no reason to fear losing this power. After the war, though, the possibility of losing its regional position caused Israel to rethink its hardliner stance.

\textsuperscript{215} Jacobson, "How Golda Meir won the Yom Kippur war."
\textsuperscript{216} Boyne, \textit{The Two O'clock War}, 55.
\textsuperscript{217} Stephens, "Caught on the Hop: The Yom Kippur War."
\textsuperscript{218} Jacobson, "How Golda Meir won the Yom Kippur war."
The war did not fully revive the lost prestige of Egypt, but it elevated it far enough that it could try a new approach. This time the Egyptian leaders chose the slower and less palatable, but more permanent path of political negotiation.

VI. The Second Chosen Path: Politics

Almost immediately after signing the ceasefire agreement Egypt began shifting its approach to Israel. Sadat took the reins of the Middle East Peace Process and solidified his country’s position at the forefront of negotiations. Egypt became the champion of a peaceful resolution and the go-to Arab state for both the United States and Israel throughout the peace process.

Sadat’s decision to take a political role in the Middle East had been building for a few years, but it was not until after the October War that he had enough leverage to actually bring Israel to the table. Talks with President Carter and President Ceausescu of Romania had convinced Sadat that there was a psychological barrier with Israel that could never be solved by military conflict. War would just beget more war unless a more direct approach was taken.219

Sadat knew that peace was an unpalatable for many Arab states and risked Egypt’s regional security and stability by taking a stance that would anger many of its neighbors. He faced threats of economic and political isolation from the Arab League and could even have made his state into a military target is the Arab world decided to launch another attack on Israel and did not receive Egyptian support.

Egypt’s first step toward political prestige came with the Sinai II agreement of 1975. The agreement drew clear lines of engagement, allowed Israeli ships use of the Suez Canal and called for the establishment of buffer zones, three years of non-belligerency and US mediation if either side was found in violation of the agreement.220

219 Sadat, *In Search of Identity*.
220 "Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt", *Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*
Unsurprisingly, this agreement was not received well by the other Arab states. Egypt was accused of abandoning its neighbors and looking out for its own interest. At the same time, though, most of the states in the Middle East had started to become wary of war. Saudi Arabia helped to broker peace in the civil war in Lebanon and brought Syria and Egypt back onto good terms following Assad’s scorn over the Sinai II agreement.221 The two states even joined together to push for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference.

In its first year, Egypt’s push for political status adjustment had immediate and impressive results. It helped develop Egypt’s relationship with the United States and created a model for foreign policy that was used by both Saudi Arabia and Syria. With only minor backlash from the Arab community Egypt had managed to set itself up as the center for negotiations on Middle East peace and its goals and opinions were being heard and achieved.

In November of 1977 Sadat received an official invitation from Prime Minister Begin to fly to Jerusalem and negotiate one-on-one. The visit received mixed reactions in the Middle East. Syria, Libya, Iraq and the PLO were adamantly opposed Sadat’s trip while Morocco, Sudan, Somalia and Oman praised his peaceful approach. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf States remained neutral on the issue not wanting to alienate themselves from either side in the conflict.222

Bombs were set off at the Beirut headquarters of an Egyptian national airline and at the Embassy in Damascus protesting Sadat’s visit.223 Yet he refused to give in to threats. This meeting was a necessary step for the path of political negotiation and would not be given up, even in the face of a very real terrorist threat.

222 This list of reactions is compiled from various sources including: Bradley, The Camp David Peace Process; Sahliyeh, "Jordan and the Palestinians"; Bangor Daily News, "Sadat’s Visit Shocks Arab World", 2.
223 Boca Raton News, "Arab anger mounts by the hour."
Sadat did not completely ignore such protests, though. Aware of his precarious position in Middle Eastern opinion, he agreed to the meeting, but made it known that he would be negotiating on behalf of the Arab world, not Egypt alone. In his speech to the Israeli Parliament he called for Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories, creation of a self-governing Palestinian state and an adherence to UN standards for peace and security.224

Sadat’s speech did not bring anything new to the peace process, but his trip did. As the first Arab head of state to visit Israel, Sadat had no model on which to base his conduct. His choice to visit memorials to Israeli soldiers killed in the Middle East conflict and sign the visitors’ book at the state Holocaust memorial showed respect to Israel that no other Arab leader had ever shown.225 Sadat’s personality helped smooth over the history of conflict between the two states and set the stage for peace negotiations to really take off.

The United States – the party responsible for organizing the visit – was resistant to Egypt’s demands at first, believing that they were too one-sided. At Israel’s encouragement, though, the United States brought back a counter proposal that was more palatable to the Egyptian position. The idea of “peace by concentric circles” called for an agreement to be formed between Egypt, the US and Israel and then built upon as it brought in larger groups of states starting with the most moderate and extending to the most resistant.226

On December 25th, Sadat and Begin met again at what was referred to as the Ismailia Summit. By this time negotiations had shifted to focus almost entirely on forming a bilateral peace. The leaders divided negotiations into two fronts: political and military. There were multiple obstacles on both fronts, though, and no agreement could be reached. The peace process stalled for close to nine months before restarting and taking its largest step yet.

Sadat and Begin met with President Carter at Camp David on September 7, 1978 to begin work on a comprehensive agreement to restart the peace process and hopefully achieve success. The results of this summit became known as the Camp David Accords, which laid out details for the peace process in three “frameworks”.\textsuperscript{227}

The first framework regarded the future of Gaza and the West Bank. It called for a provisional government consisting of “a self-governing authority . . . freely elected by the inhabitants” to be put in place in both regions for no more than five years. All parties – including Jordan and the Palestinians who would be invited to participate - would reconvene within the first three years of the provisional government to determine the final fate of the region. The agreement states that the Palestinian people must be allowed to have a say in their fate, but that Israel and Egypt would be the leaders in all future negotiations.

The second framework briefly reiterated the bilateral agreement between Egypt and Israel. Both sides agreed to peaceful UN resolution of any future disputes and to return to negotiations on a permanent bilateral peace treaty.

The final framework was that of “associated principles.” It called for Egypt, Israel and their neighbors to establish normal, peaceful relations with one another. It also included a provision allowing the United States to participate in all aspects of negotiations and stated that the United Nations Security Council would be asked to approve and endorse all peace treaties.

In reality, the Camp David Accords were largely an agreement that future negotiations would take place and not actually a solution. Yet it was the first major show of good faith taken in the Middle East Peace Process and it set the stage for all subsequent talks.

\textsuperscript{227} Full text of the Camp David Accords was retrieved from "The Camp David Accords," Jimmy Carter Library.
By participating in the Accords Egypt had solidified its position as a leader in the Middle East peace process and the only approachable Arab state. Sadat had received a personal invitation to negotiate with the President of the United States, the most powerful leader in the world. His signature was placed on an agreement being touted by the UNSC for its benefits to global stability and he was given the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 – jointly with Begin – becoming the first Egyptian Nobel laureate.

In his acceptance lecture Sadat praised the people of Egypt for being inclined to peace and promoting the high road. He said that the character of his country was uniquely suited to produce leaders in the quest for stability.

The road to peace is one which, throughout its history which coincides with the dawn of human civilization, the people of Egypt have considered as befitting their genius, and their vocation. No people on earth have been more steadfastly faithful to the cause of peace, and none more attached to the principles of justice which constitute the cornerstone of any real and lasting peace. 228

Egypt was no longer the “loser” in the conflict with Israel; it was the leader. It had returned to its rightful place as the land “cherished by God Almighty” and finally received “confirmation of the universal recognition of [the Egyptians’] relentless efforts” Unfortunately the reactions of the Arab states were not nearly as positive.

Domestically, the Egyptian people seemed to support Sadat’s desire for peace and settlement. They had seen too much loss and destruction during their lifetime to become vehemently opposed to the idea of resolution, even if they were still anti-Israel in practice. Above all, foreign policy was not a major issue for the Egyptian people at the time. As one American diplomat put it, “the single most sensitive issue in the country is changing the price of bread.” 229 As long as Egypt was able to continue importing commodities and subsidizing food costs, the people were relatively content.

**Middle East Reactions**

228 Anwar al-Sadat, "Nobel Lecture."
229 Quoted in: Hills, "Egyptians may take to streets if bread price rises."
While Egypt's work toward peace drew praise from the West it was met with scorn by its neighbors who believed that Egypt had abandoned the Arab world. When Sadat traveled to Camp David the Arab League called a special meeting and publicly threatened to kick Egypt out if it signed the Accords. It also called for moving Arab League headquarters out of Cairo and even placing League sanctions against Egypt.

Aware of this disapproval and not wanting to alienate himself from the rest of the Arab world, Sadat chose to take a hardliner position on the Palestinian issue. Previously Egypt had allowed the sovereignty question to be pushed back from the forefront of discussions, but after Camp David Sadat began calling for more immediate action. He laid out a timeline for when self-determination should occur and stated that Egypt's obligations to Israel, while important, would always be subservient to its duties to the rest of the Arab world.230 He had gained support and respect from the western world for his role at Camp David and was trying to do the same with the Arab states.

This new position threatened to once again derail the peace talks, but it also held the Arab League threats at bay. Israel refused to agree to such rigid lines and Carter was forced to carry compromise agreements between the two states for over a year before any agreement could be reached. Egypt was playing a difficult balancing game trying to restore both its regional and global prestige at the same time.

An official Israel-Egypt peace treaty was finally signed on March 26, 1979. In the treaty both parties agreed to withdraw all armed forces and engage in peaceful relations. The treaty set the permanent border between Egypt and Israel and established a "buffer zone" to be occupied temporarily by United Nations peacekeeping forces.231 The issue of Palestine and the fate of the Gaza strip were not determined in the peace treaty, but left for future arrangements to determine.

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231 Full text of the Israel-Egypt Peace treaty was retrieved from: "Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt," *Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*
The signing of the peace treaty was met with immediate retaliation by members of the Arab League. On March 27 the Arab League convened a summit in Baghdad and agreed to take sweeping measures against Egypt. The League agreed to discontinue loans, aid, investment and any other form of economic involvement with Egypt. It also agreed to remove Egypt from the League and move headquarters out of Cairo. Many other Arab organizations – including the Arab Monetary Fund, the Islamic Conference and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries – responded in kind by revoking Egypt's membership.\(^{232}\)

The Arab League embargo was not entirely effective, though, since different states had different interpretations of what exactly it meant. Some cut off trade with Egypt completely while others only cut off certain supplies. A few Arab states – such as Saudi Arabia and Lebanon – actually increased their levels of trade with Egypt from 1979 to 1980.\(^{233}\) Since the Arab League only controls state-led investments most private companies continued to invest in Egypt. The majority of investment projects that were cancelled in 1979 were restarted by 1980.\(^{234}\)

Since over two-thirds of foreign economic assistance two Egypt by this time was coming from the United States the state was able to function normally even after losing many of its Arab trading partners.\(^{235}\) The removal of Egypt from the Arab League had large symbolic value, but it did not have any real repercussions.

The Arab League embargo began to fall apart almost as soon as it began. Multiple regional conflicts erupted over the next couple years that stressed the unity of the anti-Egypt front. The revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq War and multiple bi-lateral military conflicts forced the Arab states to choose sides. Egypt's transition to peaceful negotiations and the ascension of the Shah in Iran had taken two of the Middle East's most powerful

\(^{233}\) For more specific details on trade levels with Egypt see the Correlates of War Dyadic Trade dataset: Barbieri, "TRADING DATA."
\(^{234}\) Lavy, "The Economic Embargo of Egypt," 422.
\(^{235}\) Weinbaum, "Dependent Development," 119-120.
contenders for regional domination out of play, leaving the field open for fighting and contests aimed at gaining regional influence.

Six members of the Arab League – Syria, Libya, Algeria, Southern Yemen and the PLO – boycotted the 1980 summit in Jordan in protest of the host country’s support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war and alleged support of a revolution against Syria’s President Assad.236 Arab leaders began to fear that a wave of “revolutionary Islam” would sweep through the Middle East – originating in the successful revolution in Iran - and cause widespread rebellions throughout the region.

The military conflicts between Iraq and Syria further divided the region and when Jordan and Syria readied their troops for war against one another Saudi Arabia was forced to intervene. The Saudi’s were able to broker a resolution between the two sides, but were criticized by Sadat who accused King Hussein of bribing the Arab states with oil rather than actually negotiating a peace.

Egypt invited the United States to send troops to the region to keep the peace and offered to station them on Egyptian territory. It was the only state that could openly make such a gesture and it showed the other Arab nations that Egypt was essential to regional stability and could not be excluded from regional affairs.

**VII. Conclusion: A Never Ending Struggle for Peace**

The Egypt-Israel peace treaty temporarily improved regional relations, but it did not put an end to the Middle East conflict. In 1982 Israel took to the offensive once again and invaded Lebanon in an attempt to crush resistant Palestinian forces. Egypt referred to the invasion as a “slap in the face” and put a stop to the normalization process.237 When the Sabra and Shatila massacres occurred, though, Egypt was forced to take a tougher stance and break relations with Israel completely.

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236 Tanner, "When Arabs Fight Arabs."
237 Dessouki, "Egyptian Foreign Policy Since Camp David," 98.
On September 15 Israeli Defense Force troops invaded West Beirut – which they had promised the Untied States they would not do – and took control of the city, including the Palestinian refugee camps. The next day IDF forces allowed groups of armed Phalangist militiamen – Palestinian Christians sympathetic to Israel – to enter the camps and begin killing the refugees. The IDF made sure that no one escaped as prisoners were executed over a three-day period. No complete census had been done on the dead, but it is estimated that over 3,500 refugees were killed.238

Egypt immediately withdrew its ambassador from Jerusalem and halted the peace process indefinitely. The two states did not engage in armed combat, but relations remained strained, at best, over the next couple years.

Determined to prove to the world that the Camp David Accords had not tied Egypt’s hands when it came to fighting for Arab rights, Mubarak set three conditions for his state’s return to the process. All Israeli troops had to be withdrawn from Lebanon, an agreement must be reached regarding the disputed Taba territory, and conditions of the Palestinian refugees in occupied territories must be improved.

Mubarak refused to visit Jerusalem until these conditions were met. He instead spent his time visiting Morocco, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and most other Middle Eastern states.239 He even began meeting with PLO leader Yasir Arafat to help the Palestinians find new support in the wake of the violent Lebanese civil war that had broken out. Egypt helped to mediate a peace deal between the Palestine National Council and Jordan in which both sides agreed to work together toward achieving peace.

Egypt was no longer the only state seeking a peaceful resolution with Israel. The stigma of the Camp David Accords and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty were slowly being

238 The best account of these massacres was compiled from a series of first-hand accounts in: Shahid, "The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports."
239 Dessouki, "Egyptian Foreign Policy Since Camp David," 101-104.
replaced with acceptance as other states began realizing they could not survive a future littered with constant war.

At the November 1987 Arab League summit it was decided that the embargo with Egypt should be dropped because the League had no right to control the bilateral relations of its member states. All but four Arab states – Algeria, Lebanon, Libya and Syria – resumed normal relations with Egypt within three months. 240

Over the course of the 1980s, Egypt went from being a regional pariah to the model upon which both Western and Arab states based their approach to the Middle East peace. Egypt initiated itself in the political fabric of the region, weathered the backlash of its original decision and came out on top. This shift was not due to any change in Egypt's material power, but solely to its political maneuvering. 241

Today Egypt has become synonymous with the cause of Middle East peace. As one scholar put it, "historically, the course of the Arab-Israeli Conflict has been dictated by Egypt's pivotal position in the Arab world." 242 Through smart negotiating and risk-taking Egypt has made itself a recognized contributor to regional stability and security and his ridden this wave of prestige ever since.

The world no longer views Egypt as the loser in the Six-Day War, but as the leader in an important and extremely difficult set of political negotiations. Egypt is regularly consulted on Middle Eastern affairs and has been successful at getting its goals met internationally. Egypt earned itself international respect and the benefits that come along with it.

240 Ibid., 104.
241 From 1979-1990 Egypt consistently remained between 25th and 27th on the Correlates of War CINC Scale; Singer, "Capability Distribution."
242 Gerges, "Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn Sour," 72.
Egypt seemed to have found its niche in world politics, content with the praise and the recognition it received for its adherence to peaceful standards. The Revolution that broke out in early 2011, though, may upset this balance. If Egypt is unable to restore peace to its domestic politics than it may lose some of its credibility internationally. How can a state be expected to lead the quest for Middle East peace when it cannot even create peace within its borders?

Also, who is to say that the new government will even want to continue Egypt’s role in the peace process. If a new party comes to power focused on belligerency and proving the greatness of the Egyptian people – a rallying cry for the revolution – it may seek to show its strength through military means.

The path taken by the new Egyptian government will not just be determined by which party comes to power, but by international reactions as well. If the Western and Arab worlds allow Egypt to remain in its position of regional importance and continue normal relations there will be little reason for the new government to change its current approach. If, however, the new government is not recognized or is criticized as being illegal and illegitimate it may drop its peaceful reputation and seek out another way to make its greatness known to the world.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Prestige is a very important concept in international relations, yet it remains stubbornly hard to define. There are many elements to prestige – status, centrality, legitimacy, respect, etc. – all of which exist in some form or another in every state. A loss or gain in one area will not necessarily alter the prestige of the state, but a major change in the political or military arena might.

This is one of the hardest areas of prestige to explain and recognize. It is connected to material power in the sense that major changes in power, such as the development of a nuclear weapon, the decimation of an army or a revolution placing a new government in power, can have drastic effects on a state’s international status, but the two are not one in the same. A state can experience changes in prestige without changes in power and vice versa.

Very few political science scholars will argue that prestige is irrelevant, but they are also reluctant to argue that it can be the main motivation behind controversial policy decisions. The argument that this paper makes is just that, though. I believe that prestige can actually overcome security concerns in some instances and understanding this is important to the study and practice of international affairs.

Leaders may find it in their best interest to take a dangerous path toward status adjustment in the hope that it will help them achieve their national goals further down the road. A state with high prestige is always included in international summits and negotiations and will have a say in the fate of its region, its neighbors and the rest of the international system. Low status states are not invited to such discussions and must just exist in the system that the higher-up states build for it.

*When Prestige and Security Collide*

One of the easiest ways to illustrate how prestige plays an important role in international affairs is to look at key decision points in recent history where a state was
forced to choose between the most secure path and the most prestigious. One such case is the issue of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet republics.

The fall of the Soviet Union left thousands of fully-operation nuclear warheads in the control of newly independent governments ill-equipped to secure and maintain such technology. Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan found themselves in possession of a nuclear arsenal without having built, produced or paid for any element of the design. None of the three states possessed the facilities needed for enrichment, reprocessing, assembly or refurbishment of warheads. That hardly mattered, though, since the weapons they had were fully-operation. This was especially striking in the case of Ukraine, which was home to roughly 14% of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.243

The leaders of these republics were suddenly faced with the choice to keep the nuclear forces, dismantle them or give them back to Russia. If security were the only concern, the answer would have been clear: keep the weapons. Nuclear warheads are, without question, the most powerful weapons in existence today. Thus far no state possessing nuclear weapons has ever been attacked at home – with the possible except of India and Pakistan whose history of animosity precedes their nuclear arsenal.

Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had suddenly been thrust into a world where they were hated and feared for their association to the Soviet Union, but were given the ultimate weapon to protect their borders with and deter possible aggressors. Why, then, did all three states ultimately give up their arsenals?

Some people argue that the decision was made because most of the warheads were still under operational control in Russia and could not have been used anyway. Yet Russia expressed fear that Ukraine might try to crack its security codes and take control over the weapons. If these were possible, security theories suggest that all three states should have tried to do so. None of the leaders in the three republics, though, ever publicly sought

243 Walker, "Nuclear Weapons and the Former Soviet Republics."
operational control either by breaking Russian security codes or by asking to have them turned over.²⁴⁴

Others argue that Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan only gave up their nuclear warheads because they feared a Russian invasion or attack if they did not do so. This may be a true statement, but the republics also had the support and attention of the United States at this point in time. It is unlikely that a Russian attack would have been allowed to happen without some sort of retaliation, especially so soon after the end of the Cold War.

Whatever the cause, almost immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union the newly formed republics joined together in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an organization founded with the purpose of exercising joint command and control over nuclear resources. At the same time, though, nearly all of the non-Russian republics had expressed their desire to get rid of their nuclear weapons and were receiving a swell of popular support.

These republics were all searching for ways to distance themselves from the former Soviet Union, prove to the world that they could be trusted and get themselves a spot at the table for international political negotiations. Their sovereignty had been restored at a time when the nonproliferation regime was at its most pervasive. The Cold War had left the world on edge, wary of nuclear war. The disaster at Chernobyl, which had occurred only five years before, had proven to the world that nuclear technology was not as miraculous as they once thought it was. “Chernobyl is everywhere!” became a rallying cry for antinuclear movements and provoked debates throughout the Western world about the future of nuclear power.²⁴⁵

The CIS quickly turned from an organization aimed at controlling nuclear weapons to one responsible for finding the safest and most efficient way to dismantle and dispose of nuclear materials.

²⁴⁴ Woolf, “91144: Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union.”
²⁴⁵ Dobbs, "The Nuclear Accident in Chernobyl."
them. Figuring out the exact logistics behind giving up the weapons would take another few years, but the ball had been set in motion and the effects were almost immediate.

All three former soviet republics were publicly praised for their decision to give up nuclear weapons. The United States and Soviet Union thanked the republics for their contribution to the START treaty, the international nonproliferation regime and the strengthening of the NPT. They were invited to sit down with the United States and Russia on multiple occasions to discuss the most efficient way to bring about disarmament and they were the subject of many media reports across the world.

In two years Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had gone from being relatively unknown and unimportant occupied territories to independent states that were household names. When the transfer of nuclear weapons was finally completed in 1996 the three states had given up their right to the world's most powerful weapon, but had gained the support and respect of many powerful nations.246

Even today, these three states are remembered for their contributions to the world of nuclear arms reduction. In 2009, when the original START treaty reached its expiration date the United States and Russia issued a joint statement recognizing the “significant contribution” of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to disarmament negotiations. The statement concluded that “the value of the START Treaty was greatly enhanced” by the willingness of these states to give up their arsenals.247

Whether it was because of a Russian threat to seize weapons, the global nonproliferation regime or simply a lack of interest in nuclear technology one thing is certain, all of the former Soviet republics gave up their rights to the world's most powerful weapon and have been praised for that decision for years. They gained respect, recognition

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246 Kazakhstan had returned all missiles to Russia by February 1995, Ukraine by June of 1996 and Belarus' by November of 1996. Woolf, 91144: Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union.
247 BBC Worldwide, "Russia, US joint Statement."
and status from the decision to become nonnuclear states and have played an important role in world arms reduction talks for nearly two decades now.

**Final Thoughts**

Not all states will chose the path of prestige when given a choice between that and security. Some leaders are driven by fear and will do anything to protect themselves and their state. Enough states would choose the path of prestige, though, that it is worth studying and understanding.

Prestige motivations alter the way international relations function. Rather than responding to fear tactics and threats of negative action, states motivated by prestige will respond to compromises and offers of positive inducements. Knowing what motivates your opponent and being open to different possibilities is essential to the operation of diplomacy and negotiation.

Too often leaders threaten first and ask questions later, especially in the Western world. Taking a moment to step back and evaluate less conventional paths and possibilities may make international negotiations easier and more efficient. States, like people, do not enjoy being insulted or rejected. Treating negotiating partners or rivals as inferior makes them defensive and angry. Treating them with respect, though, makes them more willing to compromise and engage in real discussions. As the old adage tells us, "you catch more flies with honey than vinegar."
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