## BOSTON'S JOB TRAINING LINKAGE PROGRAM:

#### A NEW TOOL FOR DEVELOPING

#### ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT TRAINING STRATEGIES?

by

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Dedicated to my Mother, Melba Louise Wharton 1934 - 1989

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#### BOSTON'S JOB TRAINING LINKAGE PROGRAM:

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#### DONNA M. WHARTON

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#### ABSTRACT

A study was conducted of the results of the first year of operation of Boston's job training linkage program, a new method of funding and providing job training and related social services. Two individual programs were selected from the group of programs that were funded in the initial year of the program (1989), and their performances were analyzed for the presence or absence of the essential characteristics that jobs linkage programs should possess in order to be most effective. The purpose of the study was to determine whether an approach to funding and providing job training which used the linkage mechanism could improve upon the impact that federally-sponsored training efforts were having on preparing individuals for positions with the city's private employers.

The results of the study indicate that Boston's job training linkage program is a new strategy for funding and providing job training and related social services. The unique qualities of the linkage mechanism-- local control, flexible programming, research capacity, less punitive funding measures-- contribute to the program's ability to be used jointly by developers and employment training professionals to create effective training programs. If the program is managed responsibly over time, the program can also contribute to the city's efforts at addressing larger economic issues, such as structural unemployment.

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# CHAPTER ONE: A HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIZED EMPLOYMENT TRAINING PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES

The federal government has spent a considerable amount of time and energy trying to determine how to best design and administer programs that would effectively provide education and skills training to segments of the workforce whose likelihood of becoming employed would be enhanced through such efforts. Ever since the federal government first took a leadership role in developing employment programs for millions of unemployed workers during the Depression, many different types of programs have been developed. Some programs tried to change the individual so that he or she might fit into the social and economic system more effectively; others tried to change institutions to better accommodate the needs of individuals (Franklin and Ripley 1984, Both of these approaches provided the theoretical framework 6). for several different programs that were developed at different times throughout the last 60 sixty years.

Efforts focused on helping the individual included the vocational education programs that were offered through the public school system (Clague and Kramer 1976, 29). Vocational educational programs aimed to "strengthen the occupational preparation of young people who [did] not enroll in college, and reduce the flow of unskilled, ill-prepared youths into the labor market" (<u>Ibid</u>.). By contrast, examples of programs that tried to improve institutions were those developed under the Economic

Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964. The philosophy behind the Act was that "remedial education, training, and work experience were necessary prerequisites for satisfactory employment" (Levitan, Mangum and Marshall 1972, 308). One program developed under this Act was "New Careers". New Careers was created in 1969 to "prepare disadvantaged adults for paraprofessional jobs in critically undermanned public and non-profit fields" (Clague and Kramer, 27). Unfortunately, problems arose with the implementation of this program because of the "reluctance of employing institutions and professional workers ... to restructure jobs and career hierarchies to allow for the positions of paraprofessionals" (Ibid., 28). Although it was not a training or educational program, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and similar political interventions into the free working of the labor market, was also designed to change the practices of institutions by making it illegal to engage in hiring and other business practices that were racially discriminatory.

Even though a variety of programs have been developed, some more successful than others at reducing unemployment, program goals has remained consistent over the years: to prepare the population to meet the needs of the labor market (Franklin and Ripley, 3).

# Full Employment Policies

One of the earliest federally-sponsored employment programs was the Civilian Conservation Corp (CCC). This program was

established by the Roosevelt administration in 1933, at the "bottom" of the Depression, when a full quarter of the American labor force was without jobs (Gordon 1967, 45). Under the CCC, "more than 1,500 work camps were established, and unmarried men aged 18-25 years of age were enrolled to work on conservation and construction projects planned by the Department of Agriculture and Interior" (Clague and Kramer, 3).

In 1935 the Works Projects Administration (WPA) was established. The creation of the WPA was very significant in terms of providing models for future employment training policies and programs in the United States.

As of that moment in time [when the WPA was established], the federal government assumed nationwide responsibility for the alleviation of unemployment; it began to foster job creation, training for jobs, economic stability, and all the other requirements of what later came to be termed full employment (<u>Ibid</u>., 4).

According to Robert A. Gordon, author of <u>The Goal of Full</u> <u>Employment</u>, "from the point of view of achieving full employment, the inadequacy of [the CCC and the WPA was] reflected in the fact that at the end of the 1930s, the national [aggregate] unemployment rate was still in the neighborhood of 15 per cent" (p. 46). But, a 15 per cent aggregate unemployment rate was good relative to the aggregate unemployment rate of 24% in 1932, the year before the CCC was established (p. 47). Therefore, even though these programs offered jobs for which the government intervened to create demand because the market could not, aggregate unemployment was positively impacted.

It is important to note that the decision to commit a substantial amount of federal money to a national employment training effort during the Depression was not made without debate. In order to garner support for a heightened role for government in this area, policy makers had to be explicit about their motivations for "interfering" with the free working of the labor market. Interference on the side of the growing number of unemployed was ultimately rationalized as a temporary way to "counteract a [severe] slump in the nation's business cycle" (Franklin and Ripley, 15). Prior to federal involvement in this area, "the reigning ideology in the United States about the importance of "free enterprise" and of limiting governmental interference with business, inhibited the development of comprehensive and consistent employment and training efforts" (<u>Ibid</u>., 3).

After the Depression, there was disagreement about how the federal government should balance the relatively new economic policy goal of full aggregate employment with the desire for rapid economic growth and stable prices, or inflation, and precisely what combination of policies and programs should be used to achieve a balance (Gordon, 17). Because of the inverse relationship between full employment and price stability, policy makers had to temper their desire to support employment training programs that were funded through deficit spending-- such as the relief efforts adopted during the Depression-- with the knowledge of how these programs might cause inflated prices.

# The Shift to "Maximum Employment" Policies

In 1946, the Employment Act was passed. The intent of the Act was to give the federal government even more responsibility for "maintaining a high and stable level of employment" than they had with employment training programs implemented to date (Employment Act of 1946). More specifically, the Act declared that "government should promote maximum employment and employment opportunities using all practicable means" (Franklin, 5). It is important to note that this mandate represented a shift in the goal of achieving "full employment" to "maximum employment". With passage of the Employment Act, federal policy makers made a subtle shift in their intention with regard to the national unemployment problem-- the federal government intended to make a good faith effort at maintaining acceptably low levels of unemployment.

Support for this legislation was evident two years earlier in the 1944 Presidential campaign when "both political parties made gestures toward the goal of high and stable employment" (Gordon, 48). Support for the Employment Act also came from post World War II anxieties that there would be wide-spread unemployment among soldiers and other personnel returning from the war (Clague and Kramer, 6). Fortunately, widespread unemployment among veterans did not occur, and consequently, there was no recessionary impact on the national economy (Ibid.). Instead, "an inflationary business expansion in 1947-48 which abolished civilian unemployment that occurred due to lay offs

caused by the sharp decline in war industries", but this was followed by "a minor post war recession in ... 1948-49" (<u>Ibid</u>.). Because the provisions of the Act were not mandatory, and because foreign policy issues emerged, such as Soviet advances in space travel and nuclear technology, the federal government's focus shifted away from domestic issues. Ultimately, the Employment Act did not stimulate much federal activity with regard to the development of employment training policies and programs. Renewed interest in these activities did not surface again until the 1960s (Franklin, 5).

Immediate concern did mount, however, with regard to how national unemployment levels were related to increased automation in manufacturing. Norbert Wiener, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, predicted in his book <u>Cybernetics</u> (1947), that

the effect of the new technology advances which had come as a byproduct of the war ... would displace labor at an unprecedented rate, and that in 20 years-- by about 1967-the nation could expect the unemployment of many millions of superfluous unskilled workers (Claugue and Kramer, 7).

Initially, Professor Weiner's projections about the impact of automation on the labor market were overshadowed by foreign policy matters. His projections were taken even less seriously because of the post Korean War business recovery of 1955-56, when relatively high levels of employment were being maintained (<u>Ibid</u>.). However, the impact of automation on the labor market was taken more seriously in the late 1950s, when economic growth slowed and computer technology expanded.

#### Structural Unemployment: Manpower Programs

By 1960, when the Kennedy administration took office, unemployment had risen so dramatically that federal policy makers decided that policies should focus on the need to stimulate the economy and create jobs. At this time 8.1 million Americans were unemployed, the greatest number unemployed since before the World War II (Levitan, Mangum and Marshall, 301). One of the first employment training initiatives implemented was the Area Redevelopment Act (ARA - 1961). The intention of the ARA was to "stimulate economic growth at specific locations around the country that were [economically depressed and] experiencing high unemployment". Methods by which economic growth was to be stimulated included the following:

- providing loans to companies that were interested in the relocating or expanding industrial facilities in economically depressed areas;
- 2. providing financial aid to local jurisdictions to make public improvements that were required for the establishment of manufacturing and commercial firms in the area;
- providing technical assistance to firms in the development of new products, new markets, and new resources; and
- 4. assuring that a qualified, skilled labor force would be available to those businesses which were willing to accept the risks of plant expansion or relocation (Clague and Kramer, 11).

The rational behind these business incentives was that "in order to approach full employment, the economy had to be stimulated, and the functioning of the labor market and the quality and adaptability of the labor force had to be improved"

(Manpower Report to the President 1963, xii). The rational continues, "with an expanded economy, demand for labor will increase, and provide additional job opportunities" (Ibid.). Since the nation's aggregate unemployment rate was being disaggregated according to race, gender, region of the country, etc., by this time, policy makers could see to what extent employment training programs benefitted particular segments of the workforce at various locations. Ultimately, the business incentives built into ARA programs had little impact on changing actual business practices, and therefore unemployment. The potential impact of the business incentives was not fully realized because ARA funds were distributed broadly throughout the country. Funds were not concentrated in those locations with the greatest need for economic development assistance. Lack of political will at the federal level to establish distribution priorities is at least part of the reason why the ARA had limited impact on unemployment in economically depressed locations and among segments of the workforce -- women, people of color, youth -of unemployment rates were was high, relative to the aggregate unemployment rate (Levitan, Mangum and Marshall, 310).

Next, the federal government created the Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA - 1962). The MDTA was similar to the ARA in that it emphasized the creation of programs to "retrain the unemployed into a ready-made labor force, which, it was hoped, would attract new employers to depressed areas", and ultimately, stimulate economic growth (<u>Ibid.</u>, 303). The

difference between the ARA and MDTA was that the latter program was national in scope, not restricted to depressed areas (Ibid.).

Preference for acceptance into MDTA programs was given to "mature, experienced family heads who had been displaced by [the type of] technological changes" that Wiener had predicted in 1947 (<u>Ibid</u>.). As a result, training program administrators selected more qualified individuals for placement in these programs because they were more familiar with the world of work, and therefore, had a better chance of completing program requirements than individuals with a lower skill level and less familiarity with the world of work. The implication of this bias toward better qualified workers was that segments of the workforce who started out with little or no skills -- typically women, youth and people of color-- were under-represented in MDTA programs. This realization posed a dilemma for federal policy makers, and they responded by establishing a rule which reserved one third of all training positions in MDTA programs for the least qualified applicants to the program (Clague, 14). Making this commitment to the least qualified members of the workforce required that federal policy makers develop partnerships with local private sector employers, whereby employers received federal subsidies in exchange for hiring a certain percentage of less qualified workers for positions that, but for this government intervention, would have been offered to better qualified individuals (Levitan, Mangum and Marshall, 303).

The MDTA differed from the ARA in other important ways. The

MDTA provided trainees with training and living allowances. Allowances were provided because federal policy makers finally realized that helping the truly disadvantaged improve their skills and qualifications for employment in an increasingly mechanized labor market, meant much more than providing retraining programs alone; the truly disadvantaged also needed various types of support and subsidizes in order to fully benefit from the opportunities and resources provided in training programs developed under this Act. The ARA and the MDTA were the first of many "manpower" programs developed in the 1960s. The purpose of manpower programs was to "bring about a better adjustment of supply to demand in the different points of the labor market, and more generally, to improve the functioning of the labor market" (Gordon, 178).

By the time Johnson assumed the presidency in 1963, federal policy makers fully acknowledged that "unemployment and poverty were concentrated within [certain] segments of the population for reasons not necessarily directly connected to the [normal operation of the] labor market" (Levitan, Mangum and Marshall, 308). In response, the emphasis of federally-sponsored employment training programs shifted to address the "structural" barriers to employment. Federal policy makers recognized that "structural" barriers, such as racial discrimination or lack of knowledge about employment opportunities and where they are located, precluded particular segments of the workforce from certain jobs. According to Robert Gordon, author of <u>The Goal of</u>

<u>Full Employment</u>, the condition of being "structurally unemployed" occurs when the following two essential conditions prevail in one or more sectors of the national labor market (Gordon, 57):

- 1. there must be come degree of labor immobility along one or more dimensions of the labor force. Thus, even when there is no deficiency of aggregate demand, there will be particular sectors of the labor force from which workers cannot easily and quickly move to other sectors in search of jobs. The reasons for such immobility may be many-- lack of education or training, attachment to a community or region, lack of information as to where jobs are available, restriction on entry into an occupation, restrictive hiring practices including discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or religion, and so on.
- 2. in some or all of these sectors with impaired mobility, unemployment significantly exceeds available vacancies even when there is no deficiency of aggregate demand. Supply exceeds demand, at prevailing wage rates, in some sectors of the labor market, and market forces are not strong enough to eliminate these imbalances where they exist. Hence unemployment rates are higher in these sectors than in the economy as a whole, and such differentially high unemployment rates tend to persist for relatively long periods (Ibid.).

By the end of the 1960s, a complex web of manpower programs existed that were intended to "assist ... different target group[s]; each [program] also specified different objectives, [and] had different approaches for solving problems" (Clague and Kramer, 31). These problems lead to several critiques of the federal government's efforts. Critics labeled the federal government's effort as "piecemeal" and "scattered", with several

different departments and agencies [involved], with each agency involved in the distribution of manpower services drawing its authority from a different legislative act, and each act imposing its own conditions on the utilization of funds (<u>Ibid</u>.).

Managing all of the different manpower programs from Washington

became increasingly inefficient and ineffective, and for this reason, management practices were re-evaluated and redesigned to better coordinate activities among different programs at the federal and the local levels.

The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) brought about changes in the way the programs developed under the MDTA would be managed, in the following ways

CETA combined many of the categorical programs [developed in the 1960s] into a single block grant and transferred responsibility for their administration from the federal to the state and local governments. These local units were to provide employment, training, and remedial services primarily for the structurally unemployed-- those who, because of inadequate education, lack of skills, or other structural impediments, [were] at a disadvantage in the labor market (<u>New CETA: Effect on Public Service Employment</u> <u>Programs</u> 1980, 1-2).

The need to coordinate and streamline federal employment and training efforts so that they were better managed at all levels, was evident by the 1970s, but the intermediary steps which needed to be taken to bring about the changes were very difficult to implement. Problems in implementation arose because local agencies, who were charged with new and different administrative responsibilities under CETA, "resisted giving up what they perceived to be their power [or "turf"], even after agreements had been arduously negotiated at the national level" (Franklin and Ripley, 7). In addition, problems arose around program content due to "significant divergence in the national and local program goals" (<u>New CETA: Effect on Public Service Employment</u> <u>Programs, 12</u>). It is important to note that the underlying

assumption of creating a program with a decentralized management style, such as CETA, is that national and local goals are closely matched. Unfortunately, the goals did not match, and the inability of local and federal officials to agree on one set of goals lead to "charges of fraud and abuse, waste and mismanagement" within federal and local levels of government as the changes in management practices and program content were implemented (<u>Ibid.</u>).

The Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) replaced CETA in 1982 as the vehicle through which the federal government would participate in local employment training programs. The JTPA was passed under the rubric of "New Federalism", President Reagan's political philosophy which "assigns to states and localities, rather than to the federal government, the responsibility for administering federally-funded programs, include job training" programs (The Job Training Partnership Act 1987, 1). In this sense, the JTPA is similar to CETA. On the other hand, New Federalism represented a fundamental change in the approach that previous federal administrations had adopted with regard to how to address issues of social welfare. Prior to the adoption of JTPA, federal policy makers favored either 'people-oriented' policies designed to attract economic activity back to urban areas (jobs to people [the ARA])", or policies that were 'placeoriented [New Careers]) ' and "encourage[ed] labor mobility (people to jobs)" (Wolman, 303). The Reagan administration chose an approach that involved considerably less political

intervention into the free working of the labor market on behalf of the structurally unemployed. This approach

posits that the problems of urban areas and their residents will be solved through the operations of normal market mechanisms. It assumes that both labor and capital are highly mobile. Unemployed labor in large urban areas will migrate to areas of job availability. At the same time, unemployed resources will drive down factor prices in distressed urban economies relative to other areas, thus increasing the return on capital and providing the incentive for additional capital investment and job creation (<u>Ibid</u>., 314).

The assumption that "both labor and capital are highly mobile" renders the Reagan administration's market approach considerably less effective than programs developed prior to this time, at helping to achieve full or maximum employment of the workforce because the assumption ignores the impact of "structural and institutional barriers" to gainful employment which Gordon discussed in his book published 15 years earlier. The same structural barriers that constrained labor mobility in the 1960s and before-- lack of education or training and lack of information as to where jobs are available -- still existed when the JTPA was adopted. For the Reagan administration to create economic development policies and programs that ignore the reality that "market forces are not strong enough to eliminate the imbalances that cause structural unemployment", shows limited understanding of this debilitating condition, and little commitment to the goal of full or maximum employment for those segments of the population with the highest levels of unemployment.

The aspect of the JTPA which best exemplifies preference for a market-driven approach to addressing the problem of unemployment is the mandatory participation of Private Industry Councils (PIC) in the operation of local training programs. The PICs are intended to work in conjunction with local and State elected officials to "provide policy guidance and oversight of local job training plans" (<u>The Job Training Partnership Act</u>, 39). Federal policy makers believed that the participation of PICs was crucial because

local business representatives not only understand better than public officials what kinds of job training are most likely to be required in their own communities, but ... they will also bring to the program a concern for efficiency and performance that was often lacking in earlier [federallysponsored job training] programs ..., which resulted in the unfortunate instances of misfeasance and malfeasance that undermined public confidence in the role of the Federal Government in providing employment and training to the poor and unemployed (<u>Ibid</u>., 2).

Like many of its predecessors, the JTPA, especially with it's sharp break from tradition about how the federal government should participate in employment training programs, has not proven to be more effective at preparing the unemployed for available jobs, reducing unemployment or maintaining acceptably low levels of unemployment, even with the participation of the PICs. More generally, sixty years after the federal government's initial commitment to full employment, and the subsequent adjustment in the economic policy goals to maximizing employment opportunities for all willing and able to work with the Employment Act of 1946, together with all of the manpower

programs created in the 1960s, federal policy makers have not found the best way to design and administer employment training programs and balance the policy goals of full employment and price stability.

## The Situation in Boston

The shift in the federal government's philosophy about how they would participate in local employment training initiatives has a negative financial impact on the city of Boston. Their shift in philosophy resulted in a sharp decline in financial support for these activities. In 1980, federal funding for job training in Boston totaled \$65 million; in 1986, federal funding had been reduced to \$5.5 million--, a 92% reduction! City officials responded by looking for ways to lesson the impact of the 92% cut on neighborhood-based training organizations. One suggestion offered was to centralize all training activities at one downtown location. Neighborhood training organizations asserted that residents would not travel beyond their immediate neighborhoods for employment training and related services, and lobbied the Mayor against accepting this proposal. They were successful at convincing him that maintaining neighborhood-based training centers was in the best interest of the city. Once this was decided, city officials concluded that the most important thing they could do in the face of drastic budget cuts was "shore-up and financially stabilize" the training organizations so they could remain in business. Consequently, the Mayor's desire to

financially stabilize the neighborhood training organizations became an implicit jobs linkage program goal. The explicit goal remained "to direct the benefits of downtown growth to Boston's neighborhoods" ("Building Bridges of Opportunity: LINKAGE: Affordable Homes and Jobs" 1988, 1).

Due to the federal funding cuts, priorities had to be established about how to spend the limited money Boston would have for employment training activities, especially since unemployment rates of youth and minorities in particular, were above the average unemployment rate for the city as a whole (<u>Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment</u> 1986, Table 23). In 1986, Boston's aggregate unemployment rate in Boston was 3.4%. For youth, ages 16-19, the unemployment rate was 7.7%, for blacks, 5.5%, and for hispanics, 8.1% (<u>Ibid</u>.). The rate for women, 3.3%, was slightly lower than the aggregate rate of 3.4% (<u>Ibid</u>.).

Also at this time, many of Boston's employment training professionals, whose programs depended on continued federal support, were indicating that the environment within which they were operating their programs was in a state of "crisis". The Job Training Alliance, an organization comprised of many of Boston's job training and ancillary service providers, described this crisis in terms of the inability of training providers such as themselves, to provide clients, the structurally unemployed, with adequate training services on a continuing basis. They described the crisis in the following specific terms:

•The problems and issues that individuals are bringing with them to training programs have increased. They include: homelessness, drug and alcohol dependency, abuse, health, day care, as well as language, basic skills and other issues. The performance system and the program resources made available [to us] do not assist [our] programs in dealing with these issues. These issues clearly affect program performance.

•The decline in funding, the short term commitments, the growing administrative complexity and the performance contracting system, coupled with reduced infra-structure support, have created an administrative and financial "gridlock" for program operators. We knew that organizations were going to go out of business. In the last year, at least two groups have not bid on contracts; four organizations and programs have closed and others are now at risk of closing. Other community based organizations may be forced to not participate in employment and training programs.

•The population being served by employment and training programs represents only a small fraction of those in need of training and education. The working poor, ... and low income men are not being served. Many of the working poor have fallen back on welfare. Employment and training programs have not assisted with the formation of functioning economically viable households (<u>The Job Training Alliance</u>, 1).

By the time the federal budget cuts had declined 92%, the city's employment training professionals began to speak-out and ask for assistance in providing better quality services.

The inability of Boston's employment training professionals to adequately prepare multi-problem clients for available positions was also acknowledged by area employers. According to a survey of 250 of New England's largest employers conducted by the National Alliance of Business, 71% of the survey respondents rated community agencies and the JTPA programs only fair or poor at filling company needs" (Overview 1990, 1). While this was a regional survey, the 71% rate of dissatisfaction with JTPA programs is probably somewhat representative of the sentiments of some of Boston's employers. In response to this system-wide crisis and the private sector's rating of JTPA programs, public officials tried to identify ways to improve upon the federal government's record of preparing residents to meet local labor force needs.

Also by mid-decade, Boston's real estate development market was experiencing tremendous growth:

from 1975 - 1988, private development investment added 17 million square feet of new office space and over 82,000 new office jobs to Boston. This amount of space [was] three times the amount built in the previous 35 years ("Building Bridges of Opportunity: LINKAGE: Affordable Homes and Jobs", 5).

Despite the fact that the real estate development industry was booming and many new jobs were being created as a result, a 1986 Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) report indicated that "Boston residents [had] not captured a fair share of the higher skilled and higher paying jobs" that were coming to the city as a result of the development boom (Kayden, Case, Pollard 1986, 3). The BRA report also indicated that,

less than a quarter of new jobs created by downtown office development are held by Boston residents", ... and that "of those jobs held by Boston residents, they are lower-skilled and lower-paying than those held by non-residents (<u>Ibid</u>.).

The report concluded by stating that "with proper training, Boston residents would be able to secure a higher percentage of entry-level office jobs that they currently enjoy" (<u>Ibid</u>., 4). This particular condition was the impetus for creating a job

training linkage program.

#### Boston Adopts a New Approach

When the limits of the federal government's support for local employment training efforts became apparent, and the city's employment training professionals indicated that their ability to provide adequate services had diminished, public officials looked to the linkage mechanism as a way to secure additional funding for these activities. Consideration of the linkage mechanism was not an attempt to replace the millions of dollars in federal funding that the city had lost. However, the linkage mechanism did emerge as supplemental funding from local sources that could be used for employment training activities. The linkage mechanism was attractive to public officials for other reasons as well. Part of the attraction came as a result of laws, such as Proposition 2 1/2, which limited government's ability to generate tax revenue for social welfare and other important programs. Ultimately, however, it was the combination of the desire to supplement funding for employment training programs, and a strong commercial development market which made linkage an attractive option.

#### The Creation of the Linkage Ordinance

The concept of linkage was first introduced to Boston in 1982 by a coalition of citizens' groups and public officials (including then City Councilor Raymond L. Flynn) with support from the

Boston Globe ("Building Bridges of Opportunity: LINKAGE: Affordable Homes and Jobs", 12). In March 1983, a housing linkage program was passed by Boston's City council, but it was vetoed by then Mayor Kevin White (Ibid.). In June of that year, Mayor White announced the formation of a thirty member Advisory Group to refine this new concept of having major developers contribute to a fund dedicated to expanding the supply of decent and affordable housing for local residents (The Linkage Between Downtown Development and Neighborhood Housing 1983, 1). The Advisory Group was comprised of developers, financiers, representatives from neighborhood-based non-profit organizations, housing advocates, academicians, and representatives from City government (Ibid.). In their final report, the Advisory Group recommended the establishment of the city's first linkage program for affordable housing. Raymond L. Flynn was elected Mayor in November 1983, and in December, "the Boston Zoning Commission established Article 26 under the Boston Zoning Code for the creation of low- and moderate-income housing" (Boston Redevelopment Authority 1986, 1). Article 26 required developers to pay \$5 per square foot, over the first 100,000 square feet, for new, enlarged or expanded, and/or substantially rehabilitated projects, into a trust fund for the creation of affordable housing (Ibid.). The ordinance further specified that "payments [will be] made in equal installments over twelve years, beginning two years after the issuance of building permits, or upon issuance of the certificate of occupancy, which ever [comes]

first" (Ibid.).

Three years later, Mayor Flynn proposed two amendments to Article 26. The first amendment, Article 26A, reduced the linkage fee payback period from twelve to seven years, and required that payments begin at the issuance of a building permit instead of two years after issuance of the building permit, or upon issuance of the certificate of occupancy (<u>Ibid</u>.). The reduction of the payback period resulted in significant financial benefits for the city because the net present value of the linkage payment was doubled (<u>Ibid</u>.). City officials felt that such a reduction in the payback period was warranted given the severity of the shortage of affordable housing at this time. The actual per square footage fee for housing linkage remained at \$5.00.

Article 26B proposed an additional \$1 linkage fee and with it, the creation of the first jobs training linkage program in the country (<u>Ibid</u>., 2). Like housing linkage fees, the job training linkage fee applied to the construction of new, enlarged or expanded, and/or substantially rehabilitated projects over 100,000 gross square feet located in downtown Boston (<u>Ibid</u>.). Funds generated by Article 26B were to be used to fund innovative job training programs that would prepare residents for jobs coming to the city in great numbers as a result of the development boom. Under both the housing and jobs linkage programs, "any building or structure which is, or will be, wholly-owned by one or more public agencies, is not subject to

linkage requirements" (Boston Zoning Code, Article 26B, 4).

The Neighborhood Jobs Trust (NJT), a city of Boston charitable trust created in 1987, administers the jobs linkage program. The NJT was created to ensure that "large scale development activity brings a direct benefit to Boston neighborhood residents in the form of jobs, job training and related services" ("A Guide to the Neighborhood Jobs Trust", 1). The NJT is managed by three Trustees: a member of the City Council, and appointee of the Mayor, and the Collector-Treasurer of the City of Boston who serves as the managing Trustee (<u>Ibid</u>., 2).

Administrative support for the NJT is provided by the Mayor's Office of Jobs and Community Services (JCS) on a day-today basis. JCS was established by Mayor Flynn in 1985 for the purpose of increasing "access to education, support services and job training for city residents" ("FY89 Annual Report (Draft Version" 1989, 4). As a city agency, JCS operates an "integrated system of neighborhood-based education, job training, job placement, and support [programs] for Boston residents, in cooperation with communit[ies], other public agencies, and private business" (Ibid.). In total, JCS manages approximately 130 programs annually, which provide services to more than 50,000 city residents. Roughly 50% of these programs were supported by JTPA funds in 1989. The remainder of JCS operating budget comes form state and city sources.

In programs supported by both JTPA and linkage funds,

neighborhood training organizations enter into contracts with JCS to perform services for the number of students specified in the contract. JTPA funding guidelines dictate that organizations receive 50% of the total contract amount when students are enrolled; the balance is released when training is complete in the following manner: the balance is released in an amount equal to the cost for the number of students that have completed the training program which have been placed in a job, and have remained on that same job for a minimum of 30 days. In other words, the balance of the payment is reduced by the per student training cost, multiplied by the number of students that did not complete training, and/or completed training but did not remain on the job for at least 30 days. Even in a case where an individual that has completed training and has been placed in a job dies unexpectedly after her 28th day at work for example, according to JTPA guidelines, JCS cannot reimburse the neighborhood training organization for any of the training services provided. Due to these restrictive funding procedures, employment training professionals characterize JTPA funding procedures as "fiscally traumatic", because they cause severe cash flow problems and require that they operate a program from start to finish, with only half of the funds required. JCS staff have stated that it is not unusual for neighborhood training organizations to have a line of credit with a local bank in order to meet their financial responsibilities.

By contrast, money granted under the jobs linkage program

can be "forward funded" on an as needed basis -- the total funding award for training and related services for linkage programs can be released by JCS in advance of the start of a program. This more flexible funding procedure reduces the severity of cash flow problems that are prevalent under JTPA contracts. JCS adjusts any over-expenditures made with the forward funding procedure when programs are evaluated for performance near the end of the contract period. Also, during public hearings to advertise the availability of jobs linkage funds and consultations with individual training organizations, JCS indicates that linkage funding will be granted for two years only, and a second year of funding will be granted only if performance criteria are met in the first year. If selected, grantees must identify potential funding sources from which they plan to secure funding when jobs linkage money is no longer available.

Under Article 26B developers can exercise one of two options in order to fulfill the job training linkage program requirements. The first option is the "Jobs Creation Grant". Under this option, the developer must work with (a) neighborhood training organization(s) to develop a program proposal, with the expectation that graduates will be employed by the developer's tenants ("Guide to the Neighborhood Jobs Trust", 3). The second option, the "Jobs Contribution Grant", is simply a fee paid directly to the NJT which becomes part of a larger pool of funds that are distributed on a competitive bid basis. Under the jobs contribution grant option, JCS reserves 20% of each linkage

payment for distribution to organizations "in the neighborhood or neighborhoods where or adjacent to where the development project is located" (Boston Zoning Code, Article 26B, 2). Under both options, payments are made in two equal installments. The first installment is due upon the issuance of a building permit, and the balance of the payment is due and payable on the anniversary of the first payment (<u>Ibid</u>.). The dollar amount of the jobs linkage fee is identical under both options.

Neighborhood organizations can participate in the jobs linkage program by pursuing funds in two ways. First, organizations can compete in an open and competitive RFP process for funds collected under the jobs contribution grant option. The second way neighborhood organizations can participate is at the invitation of a developer that selects the jobs creation option. A developer selects (a) particular training organization(s) to work with in designing a training program. Selection is based on the type of services the organization provides and how well they otherwise complement the type of program the developer wishes to create.

JTPA programs are judged according to three sets of performance standards which apply differently to youth, adults, and welfare recipients. The standards are as follows: the posttraining placement rate, the average wage rate at placement, and the termination or attrition rate (<u>The Job Training Partnership</u> <u>Act</u>, 71,72). JTPA performance standards are grounded in a competitive, market-based philosophy which asserts that "program

funds must be treated as investment in human capital from which a profit shall be realized and not as expenditures that yield no measurable return to the Nation" (<u>Ibid</u>., 2).

In their decision to grant funds to neighborhood organizations competing for funds collected under the jobs contribution grant option, and in their attempt to guide developers in the selection of training organizations under the jobs creation option. JCS uses the following general performance criteria to determine if an organization is eligible for a grant:

demonstrated need, effectiveness of approach and cost effectiveness, successful enrollment, retention and placement as defined in the approved proposal, and [compliance] with any other criteria established by the Trustees ("Guide to the Neighborhood Jobs Trust", 3).

JCS and the NJT also stress the need for neighborhood organizations working collaboratively, as well as the importance of creating new and innovative programs which differ from those already supported by federal JTPA funds. These are important considerations because JCS realizes that not all of the city's training organizations can possibly be "shored-up", and survive over the long term with grants from the job training linkage program alone. Linkage funds are also flexible enough to be used to research pressing labor market issues.

In light of the current state of Boston's employment training system and the severe decline in federal support for employment training activities, it will be worthwhile to consider whether the job training linkage program is a new model for the delivery of employment training activities in Boston. Such an

inquiry is also important given the fact that JCS is in the process of assessing the city's entire employment training system. JCS is conducting this assessment in an effort to identify techniques and individual programs that can be replicated on a larger scale and help "close the gap between "workers' skill level and workplace requirements" in the city (<u>Overview</u>, 8). I will analyze the results of two of the first programs funded by jobs linkage money in an effort to determine to what degree this program can help the city achieve its goals.

# CHAPTER TWO: SHORT-TERM OUTCOMES: THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST YEAR OF BOSTON'S JOB TRAINING LINKAGE PROGRAM

In November 1988, the first group of neighborhood training organizations was selected to receive grants under Boston's job training linkage program to fund new employment training programs. With the selection of the first grant recipients, public officials hoped that these organizations would create programs whose short-term impact would be to improve upon the ability of JTPA-sponsored programs to prepare city residents for positions with the city's employers, and in the long-run, help reduce structural unemployment.

This Chapter will discuss the results of the first year the job training linkage program operated. All information cited in this Chapter was collected in the following manner: 13 interviews were conducted with individuals who were involved in the development of the zoning text amendment, Article 26, which created Boston's job training linkage program. I also interviewed individuals who either currently manage the program, or work for organizations that had to fulfill the jobs linkage requirement. Most interviews were followed-up by a telephone conversation during which I confirmed information obtained during the interview, or asked additional questions (A list of individuals interviewed appears on page 95). All figures and dollar amounts cited in this and all other Chapters were taken from documents cited in the Bibliography, page 96, of which all

are public documents. I have chosen not to identify organizations or individuals interviewed within the text of this document so that the reader would focus on the issues at hand and not the personalities involved.

Since the job training linkage program took effect in 1986, a total of \$2,527,268.89 has been collected by the NJT from sixteen different development projects ("Total Linkage Funds Collected through March 31, 1990" 1990, 1). Total dollars granted by the NJT in 1989, the first funding cycle, was \$1,274,243 ("1989 Programs" 1989, 1). According to Bill Lee from the office of the Collector Treasurer for the City of Boston, any amount of money that the trustees do not award in a given funding cycle is "turned over and used in the following year". Eleven organizations received grants totaling \$1,074,243 to train approximately 900 individuals (Ibid.). An additional \$185,000 was granted to an organization for training purposes as well, but that organization was not able to determine how many people its program would serve by the time the same information was released about the remaining eleven organizations (Ibid.). Another grant in the amount for \$15,000 was made to an organization that studied an important labor market issue (<u>Ibid</u>.).

# Program Descriptions

The following is a list of the thirteen organizations selected, a brief description of each program, and the grant amount each

#### organization received:

- CHINATOWN SERVICES CONSORTIUM This collaborative program among the Quincy School Community Council, Chinese American Civic Association and the Chinatown Occupational Training Center serves 160 individual in three program components: English as a Second Language, Prevocational Training, and Business Education. \$232,000
- 2. HISPANIC TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM Oficina Hispana, Sociedad Latina, Wentworth Institute and UNICCO Service Corporation have collaborated to provide building maintenance skills training and work experience to 50 unemployed or underemployed Hispanic adults. \$160,000
- 3. VETERANS BENEFITS CLEARINGHOUSE VBC is working in partnership with Roxbury Medical Labs to train 24 individuals as phlebotomist and laboratory assistants. \$47,000
- 4. JEWISH VOCATIONAL SERVICES JVS and the Boston Harbor Hotel are providing on-site work place education services for 60 limited English speaking hotel employees. \$20,000
- 5. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF BOSTON International Institute provides worksite English as a Second Language instruction and work readiness skills to 30 limited English speaking trainees at Inner City in order to increase their access to permanent employment opportunities. \$35,000
- 6. JACKSON/MANN COMMUNITY SCHOOL The Next-Step Program provides vocationally-oriented advanced English as a Second Language, math, writing and science instruction to 60 individuals in preparation for training, permanent employment and/or higher education. \$45,000
- 7. HISTORIC NEIGHBORHOOD FOUNDATION Historic Neighborhoods has created a pilot program in Urban Design and Construction to introduce 40 students at English High and Boston Tech to career opportunities in planning, design, development and construction fields. \$15,000

- 8. PARENTS UNITED FOR CHILDCARE Parents United for Childcare has been given this award to complete a survey of parents which assessed their needs for and access to school-age child care. \$15,000
- 9. BOSTON JOBS ACADEMY The Boston Jobs Academy offers job readiness, job seeking and job retention services to 370 unemployed or underemployed Boston residents. \$250,000
- 10. CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL This program provides on-the-job training in health care occupations and classroom support for 40 at-risk students at English High School. \$25,593
- 11. BOSTON TECHNICAL CENTER Skills training in the Printing and Business Machine Repair occupations are provided for 36 individuals. \$65,000
- 12. CONFERENCE OF BOSTON TEACHING HOSPITALS Working with community-based training providers, COBTH will upgrade the occupational skills of current employees and provide entry-level training and educational services to unemployed residents to improve their employment opportunities at area hospitals. \$185,000
- 13. NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE/TRAINING, INC. This partnership provides remediation, clerical skills and test-taking skills for 56 individuals who have been unsuccessful in their application to NET for employment. The program prepares students to succeed in a second application process and on the job. Graduates are guaranteed employment at NET upon completion \$179,650 ("1989 Programs" 1989 1,2).

With the exception of the programs developed by the Boston Technical Center, the Conference of Boston Teaching Hospitals and New England Telephone/Training Inc., grants made to each of these organizations were approved in November 1988 for calendar year 1989. Funding for these three organizations was also approved in November 1988, but their programs ran longer than the 1989 calendar year.

### Program Performances

The performance of the first programs funded with jobs linkage money was mixed, but overall it was positive. Out of a total of eleven organizations, more than half were able to provide training services to 100% or more of the number of people they were under contract to provide services to (end note). Referring to Table 2.1 (next page), "Contract Estimate" is the number of people each organization originally estimated they would recruit and provide services to when they received the grant from the NJT. The "Actual Number" represents the actual number of people that were recruited and received training. There was no "Contract Estimate" for the Conference of Boston Teaching Hospital program, therefore, it has not been included in the "Actual Number Served" since their actual performance could not be compared an original estimate. It is important to indicate that the "Actual Number" is not the number of people who were placed in jobs. Information on placement of linkage program trainees was not available. Nonetheless, the count of the actual number served is important because it is an indication of the number of people whose skills were upgraded, or in some way enhanced as a result of the jobs linkage program. Enhancing the skills of the structurally unemployed is an important first step in the larger effort of reducing unemployment on a city-wide basis. The long-term implication of not accounting for this step

is that an inequitable distribution of jobs would persist among segments of Boston's workforce. For this reason, developing programs aimed at enhancing the skills of the structurally unemployed is worthwhile.

The performances of the first group of programs funded with jobs linkage money are very important because they will indicate how close the selected training organizations came to creating the type of programs that would attract the structurally unemployed. The performance of the first programs funded with jobs linkage money are as follows:

PROGRAM CONTR ESTIM			ACTUAL NO. SERVED	PERCENTAGE
1.	Ch. Serv. Consort.	160	160	100%
2.	Hisp. Tech. Corp.	50	28	56%
3.	Veteran's Clear.	24	27	100%
4.	Jewish Voc. Servs.	60	38	63%
5.	International Inst.	30	53	100%
6.	Jackson/Mann	60	60	100%
7.	Hist. Neighb. Found	. 40	40	100%
8.	Jobs Academy	370	196	53%
9.	Children's Hosp.	40	40	100%
10.	Boston Tech. Ctr.		15	428
11.	Conf. Teach Hosp.		80	
12.	NETCo./Train., Inc.	56	15	27%
	TOTAL	926	672	

TABLE 2.1 Jobs Linkage Program Results

("Clients Served in 1989" 1990, 1)

In order to positively impact the structurally unemployed, the jobs linkage programs, like any other employment training effort targeted to the same population, should possess certain characteristics and certain other conditions should be present which are known to be effective in addressing the concerns of this particular segment of the workforce. Several examples of federally-sponsored training efforts have given Boston's employment training professionals evidence of what some of the more important characteristics are.

In order to determine how many of the programs supported by linkage dollars had these characteristics, and were therefore, in a good position to improve the qualifications of the city's structurally unemployed residents, one would want to analyze the performance of each program. Approaching the analysis of the jobs linkage effort in its first year in such a comprehensive manner is preferable if one is attempting to identify with some degree of certainty, the presence of these characteristics and the impact their contribution made on program performance. Unfortunately, information on the characteristics of each program was not available for the purpose of this study. As a result, I chose to analyze two programs for which almost complete information was available, to determine to what degree these characteristics and conditions were present, and how they may or may not have effected overall program performance. One program performed very well, the collaboration between Children's Hospital and English High School. Together, the hospital and the school were able to provide services to 100% of the number of students they were under contract to serve. The other program, the collaboration between New England Telephone Company (NETCo) and Training, Inc., did not perform as well. NETCo and Training,

Inc were able to provided services to only 27% of the people they estimated they would be able to serve. The following is a description of each program:

A. Children's Hospital/English High School

The collaboration between Children's Hospital and English High School in the design of a job training linkage program is one that has been singled out as having exceeded the expectations of public officials and program administrators. In 1988, Children's Hospital paid a linkage fee in the amount of \$42,800 in conjunction with an expansion project at their Longwood Medical Center site ("Total Jobs Linkage Contributions Through March 31, 1990" 1990 1). A portion of their linkage fee supported this job creation program. This program was designed "for students who are at risk of dropping out of school and who are unmotivated by the traditional educational environment" (<u>Children's Today</u> 1989, 10). More specifically, the goals of the program were to

increase career awareness; develop appropriate work behaviors; provide employment opportunities that have potential for career growth; help employers meet a labor market need in certain health care positions; and provide a positive educational and work experience for at-risk students, leading to a higher number of such students completing their education (Ibid., 2).

Students have benefitted from this program so much that it has become one of the offerings of the "Fenway Program", a series of alternative educational programs within the Boston public school system which take place in supportive settings and which cater to the particular needs of at-risk students. Students who are at-

risk of dropping out of school are encouraged to select one offering from the Fenway Program and enroll with the intention of completing their high school education within the guidelines of that program.

# B. NETCo/Training, Inc.

Unlike Children's Hospital, NETCO did not pay a linkage fee. NETCO competed for linkage money in an RFP process that JCS manages to distribute money from the pool of funds collected through the jobs contribution grant option.

The purpose of this collaboration was to help NETCo address a long-standing hiring problem. The problem consisted of the following: several people were applying for entry level clerical positions, but many did not meet the company's basic standards for hiring. NETCo believed that having the assistance of a training organization, independent of their professional staff, would be helpful in identifying better qualified applicants that could meet their basic hiring standards. NETCo's basic hiring standard is a standardized test which is administered to all applicants for entry level clerical positions. Most applicants Therefore, the purpose of the linkage program failed the test. was to upgrade the skills of people who had taken NETCo's standardized test and failed it. Given the low level of success NETCo had in identifying qualified individuals prior to the linkage effort, it is curious that in their jobs linkage program proposal, the company indicated that they were "confident that

[their] employment process [which begins and often ends with a standardized test] identifies those applicants who have the best potential for successful employment" ("New England Telephone Second Chance Program" 1989, 5).

This additional information about the two organizations was included to provide a basis for a comparison of a set of characteristics that jobs linkage programs should possess if they are going to have the capacity to positively impact structurally unemployed residents in Boston.

# Program Characteristics and Conditions

Over the years, it has become apparent that individuals who are suspended in the condition of being structurally unemployed need much more than simply education or skills training to improve their standard of living and that of their dependents. Recent evidence of the truth of this statement are the declarations of Boston's employment training professionals, who have indicated that they do not currently have the capacity to service the multi-problem client-- the individual who needs educational assistance and/or skills training as well as support in dealing with such issues as "homelessness, drug and alcohol dependency, abuse, health, child care, and language", conditions which they are being asked to deal with more often than they had in the past. For this reason, it is important that the linkage programs the NJT selects to fund, possess certain characteristics, and that certain condition be present that are know to be effective

at addressing the multi-problem client. The important characteristics and conditions are the following:

- The Extent to Which JCS can Exert Influence over the Day-to-A. Day Operation of the Linkage Program Allowing JCS, the jobs linkage program management entity, to intervene in the operation of a program will be beneficial in the event of unpredicted events; the ability to intervene can be characterized as allowing for more flexibility and control in making adjustments to program curricula and budget, for example, so that services do not have to be suspended if a problem occurs. This is an important characteristic relative to the operation of many federal employment training programs. With many federal employment training programs, it often took the passage of Congressional amendments in order to make adjustments in programs operations. With local control and flexibility, JCS can intervene immediately, consult with program administrators, and when possible make necessary adjustments.
- B. Ease of Access to Training Site A beneficial characteristic of the Manpower programs of the 1960s was that they offered trainees allowances, stipends and/or vouchers for support goods and services at no or reduced cost. Vouchers were provided in recognition of the need to eliminate transportation difficulties to and from the training site, for example, as a cause of low attendance, or an expense that would preclude a prospective applicants' participation. Removing or reducing obstacles such as travel to and from the training site is an important condition that jobs linkage programs should possess, if they are to have an impact on structural unemployment.

# C. Skills Training in a Supportive Environment

- In the absence of providing training in a supportive environment, the provision of skills training and/or education will be insufficient in helping the multi-problem client take full advantage of the services they are being provided. In recognition of this, the federal government created programs in the 1960s which combined education with support services, subsidies and living allowances. This combination was found to provide more comprehensive services, and result in better individual performance.
- D. Strength of Relationship Between Collaborating Organizations A positive relationship between the organizations collaborating to create a job training linkage program is a condition that should help the program run as smoothly as possible. When a good working relationship has been forged, generally, better communication is facilitated, and program

goals and expectations are more likely to be shared. The CETA experience of the 1970s revealed the cost of different organizations' (or levels of government) not sharing program expectations and goals. If program goals and expectations are not shared by collaborating organizations, ultimately program administrators will be less effective at managing their programs. Once this happens, the opportunity to positively impact the lives of the structurally unemployed enrolled in programs at that time may be lost.

### E. Potential Linkage Program Benefits

With any self-improvement activity, it is important for applicants to know the potential short- and long-term benefits of completing the activity. In the case of providing education and skills training to the structurally unemployed, it is even more important that prospective trainees are convinced that there are immediate benefits of completing training. It is also important to convey that long-term benefits can be achieved through staying in the program. For this reason, it is important that programs have role models or a mentoring component so that trainees "see" how the investment they are making in themselves will pay off over the long-term.

Unless prospective trainees understand and are convinced of the higher value of potential program benefits, the structurally unemployed will not likely enroll in programs. Also, neighborhood training organizations will have a more difficult time identifying individuals that could benefit from their programs offerings if benefits are not clear. Therefore, potential benefits should be clear and of a relatively higher value than what would be available to prospective trainees without the training.

### A. JCS Influence

<u>Children's Hospital/English High School:</u> This job creation program was proceeding according to everyone's expectations until it was announced that English High School had been selected to be consolidated with the Jamaica Plain High School. Initially, program administrators at the hospital thought that consolidation would mean the end of the program, because it would make students' travel between the school and the hospital very difficult. Another unexpected event occurred-- the teacher who originally advocated for the creation of the program was laid off. The program administrator at the hospital indicated that the fact that JCS could intervene and help the two organizations manage these changes meant that services were not disrupted.

Regarding the consolidation of the two schools, JCS increased the program budget to cover unexpected transportation costs between the hospital and the new school, regarding the teacher lay-off, initially, hospital administrators thought that the discontinuity of a new program administrator from the school would not settle well with students, and result in a loss of interest in the program. But, as the program continued, it became apparent that the change in personnel was not a factor in program performance, and the fact that JCS could not prevent this event from occurring was immaterial.

NETCo/Training, Inc.: An unexpected event also occurred in the NETCo/Training, Inc. program. In 1989, there was a strike of NYNEX's unionized telephone workers, including those employed at the company's Boston office. Unlike in the Children's Hospital/English High School case, JCS was not able to intervene and provide any type of assistance that would influence the necessary parties, the union, in ways that would minimize any potential negative impact the

strike might have on the jobs linkage effort. At this time, recruitment for the jobs linkage program had just begun and all trainees had not been selected. Once the strike was declared, the union put a hiring freeze in effect. This meant that all hiring had to be conducted from within the company. Because of the strike, NETCo experienced a "worker surplus" in the category of positions for which individuals enrolled in the jobs linkage program would be trained. Ultimately, the hiring freeze would mean that the few individuals who were enrolled in the program before the strike was declared, would not be eligible for positions even if they completed training and passed the standardized test. More importantly, however, the hiring freeze meant that no one from outside of the company could become eligible for the entrance into the program-- walk in off the street and apply for a clerical position, fail the standardized test, and ask to be admitted to the jobs linkage program.

As a city agency, JCS has no authority to intervene in the affairs of a private corporation on behalf of city residents in such a labor/management dispute. It is the opinion of the program administrators from Training, Inc. and NETCo that the national strike of union employees caused their program to perform so poorly. Each party also recognized the limits of JCS to intervene in a way that would have allowed the strike to have had less impact on the

program. This disappointing outcome raises the question of whether the program was designed poorly to begin with. The type of obstacles that were present and caused problems, calls into question the soundness of the NJT's decision to grant funds to this organization, since they did not provided trainees with the best combination of services. It also calls into question whether the organization thoroughly understood the needs of the population they were targeting-the structurally unemployed.

B. Ease of Access to Program Site

Children's Hospital/English High School: Initially, access to the program site was convenient for students because the high school was located within a few blocks of the hospital. When the school was consolidated with Jamaica Plain High School, access between the school and the hospital was a The fact that the transportation problem was problem. solved contributed to some degree, to the overall good performance of the program because once solved, it was one less issue students had to spend time thinking about as they pursued the education and other services the program offered. When JCS increased the program budget, the hospital was able to provide transportation between Jamaica Plain High School to the Longwood Medical area so that services there would not be interrupted. The program administrator from the hospital indicated that the

consolidation and the resulting transportation problem posed a real threat to the program, and unless it had been solved, fewer students would have remained with the program.

NETCo/Training, Inc.: For the NETCo/Training, Inc. program, access to the training site was less convenient for trainees. Training, Inc. proclaimed that their Washington Street training facility is a positive feature of their operation which makes them a prime candidate for developers and other private institutions to select as a professional skills training partner in developing a program to fulfill the city's jobs linkage requirement. Training, Inc. said that this was a positive feature because their offices are located near many of the offices of developers and other private institutions. If this is true, Training, Inc.'s location is equally inconvenient, for neighborhood residents to travel to for training classes. The potential for there to be language, cultural and literacy barriers among the structurally unemployed is great. For this reason, intimidation brought on by having to travel to the central business district may have also served as barriers in the NETCo/Training, Inc. program. Staff of neighborhood training organizations raised this same concern prior to the adoption of the jobs linkage program, and the Mayor agreed that keeping training activities in the neighborhoods was in the best interest of the city. Intimidation and the

inability to gain entrance to the personnel office at NETCo due to the presence of striking employees, was also influential factor which did not allow this program to offer services to more people than it ultimately did.

Based on the Children's Hospital/English High School experience, it appears as if ease of access to the training site was influential in overall program performance. The extent to which access and any transportation problem can be minimized, will positively contribute to a better overall performance.

c. Skills Training in a Supportive Environment Children's Hospital/English High School: The philosophy behind the program developed by Children's Hospital and English High School is based on the knowledge and understanding of the characteristics typically found in the lives of the structurally unemployed. Program administrators from both institutions realized that "in many cases, ... the students [were] shouldering weighty problems in their personal lives, and school ... simply [was] not a priority for them" (Children's Today, 10). Program administrators also thought that "by giving students special attention that they may not have experienced in the past, [their] attitudes ... and self-image will be improved" (Ibid.). The curriculum for this program was developed with this philosophy in mind. The philosophy was operationalized

by combining traditional classroom sessions, talks and lectures given by physicians and other hospital staff, and another unique feature -- a monthly rotation through one of four hospital departments. This "integrated" curriculum was developed into a year-long program which ran concurrent with the typical public sector academic calendar. Program administrators at both institutions believed that the philosophy, as operationalized in the curriculum, would allow students to "see connections between doing well in school and doing well in a work atmosphere" (Ibid.). Based on the following testimony of a student, the curriculum seems to have been successful at doing achieving that goal: "Seeing all the directors and administrators together [at a particular special event] made me realize this was a big Then when we started our work rounds, I really was deal. excited." (Ibid., 11).

<u>NETCo/Training, Inc.:</u> NETCo had a less thorough understanding of who the structurally unemployed were, and why they needed to be targeted in their program. In their jobs linkage program proposal, NETCo stated that given that

not everyone in Boston is enjoying economic prosperity, business must ... extend its hand to the vast numbers of unemployed and economically disadvantaged who have been left out of the mainstream of economic opportunity ("New England Telephone Second Chance Program, 1-2).

Even though NETCo recognized that structural unemployment was a problem in Boston, the approach they selected to

address it was narrowly focused relative to the approach Children's Hospital and English High School took. An important difference between the two programs was their purpose. The purpose of NETCo's partnership with Training, Inc. was to provide trainees with the skills necessary to pass the standardized test. Their curriculum incorporates only the following components:

individualized remedial training in those areas of weakness identified [in the standardized testing process], and the staff develops customize modules for spelling, arithmetic computation, following instructions, etc. (<u>Ibid</u>.).

It is evident by this description that the purpose of this program was dramatically different in terms of commitment to enhancing the employability of trainees, that the purpose of the Children's Hospital/English High School program. Their curriculum combined with their inflexible hiring process (mandatory test), is not supplemented with any formal or informal support systems that trainees can look to for assistance. The absence of support services for the multiproblem client can be a strong negative factor in affecting their ability to complete the training assignment.

The Children's Hospital/English High School program took a much more comprehensive view of their task, and therefore, of the trainees. They did not focus exclusively on giving students the skills needed to perform duties in those positions that were unfilled at the hospital. Instead, they recognized and understood that the students were

lacking more than the appropriate skills. Because of this level of understanding, program administrators at Children's Hospital and English High School knew that it would also be important to find ways to "improve students' attitudes, self image, and opportunities" and incorporate these methods into the program curriculum (<u>Children's Today</u>, 10). It is important to stress that this a fundamental difference in program purpose. Still, NETCo is "confident that [their] employment process [passing their standardized test] identifies those applicants who have the best potential for successful employment" ("New England Telephone Second Chance Program", 5). This statement is based on their belief that "applicants who demonstrate reasonable ability in the areas [covered on the test] are likely to succeed on the job" (Ibid.). It is important to note that NETCo supplied no data to support this belief, and therefore, it is simplistic to think that this one dimension of an individual will determine future job performance. Prior to the creation of the jobs linkage program, the opportunity to become employed by NETCo ended once an applicant failed the standardized Short of passing the test, there was no other way to test. secure a clerical position with this company.

D. Relationship Between Collaborating Organizations
 <u>Children's Hospital/English High School:</u> English High
 School had established an informal relationship with

Children's Hospital before the jobs linkage collaboration was forged, and the relationship was very good. The program administrator from the hospital indicated that they had always felt that since the school was close by, the hospital should develop some be involved in some type of outreach effort that went beyond the provision of medical services-one that would build on the relationship that had already been established. The jobs linkage collaboration was actually facilitated by the original program administrator from the high school, who had been involved in an externship at the hospital. During this experience, the teacher was able to identify career paths that high school students might like to pursue if they had access to appropriate training, as well as exposure to a hospital environment.

The fact that the hospital was looking for a way to become more involved in the activities at the neighboring school meant that when they were searching for ways to fulfill their jobs linkage requirement, the best way to fulfill the requirement presented itself because of the prior relationship with English High School. It was also advantageous that the original program administrator from the school had already established a relationship with hospital personnel. The fact that a relationship already existed probably resulted in a minimal amount of time and energy spent reaching a consensus about program goals, expectations and the curriculum.

<u>NETCo/Training, Inc.</u>: No relationship existed between NETCo and Training, Inc. before NETCo received a grant from the NJT. In order to find Training, Inc., NETCo made a systematic search for a training organization they could work with to address their hiring problem. NETCo used the following criteria to find a professional training organization:

mission of the organization, population served, entrance requirements, curriculum, customized training, location, hours of operation, student/instructor ratio, expertise of staff, physical plant, cost per student, placement rate, and hourly wage after graduation (<u>Ibid.</u>, 7).

Tension mounted between the two organizations soon after they began to design the curriculum for the linkage program. Tension was not necessarily centered around personalities involved, or the task at hand. Rather, tension mounted when staff at Training, Inc. indicated that the program budget NETCo had developed was too small, and in particular, did not include sufficient funds for the developmental phases of the programs wherein the curriculum was to be designed. It took just under one year to develop the curriculum for this In addition to the fact that the budget was program. insufficient, once the curriculum had been designed, Training, Inc. had to wait several months for payment for work they had performed in the developmental phases of the program. Training, Inc. felt that this payment procedure was "punitive" to them as a non-profit training

organization, and of all of the actors involved in the jobs linkage effort-- the public sector, the private sector and non-profit training organizations such as themselves-- they could least afford to go without payment. This would have been an appropriate occasion for Training, Inc. to exercise the forward funding option. Instead, Training, Inc. workedout a payment schedule with NETCo, whereby Training, Inc. could draw on funds directly from NETCo in advance of JCS sending NETCo their grant award. This arrangement allowed the burden of delayed payment to shift to NETCo, the private sector link in this collaboration.

The fact that Training, Inc. and NETCo could make a satisfactory arrangements without assistance from JCS speaks to the fact that even though there was no relationship before the linkage program, good working relationships can be established after the fact. On the other hand, it is clear that the fact that Children's Hospital and English High School had a relationship before their collaboration on the linkage program, significantly enhanced their program. However, the Training, Inc./NETCo experience tells us that a previous relationship is not crucial. Their experience also illustrate the amount of flexibility organizations have to craft arrangement that suit changing circumstances.

The strike was also the source of tension between the two organizations, because neither organization could control or influence the outcome of that situation. They

also knew that they could not look to JCS for assistance with this problem. As time passed, the strike continued. The first training cycle ended and four people successfully completed the program, passed the standardized test, and thereby were eligible for a clerical position with NETCO. Even though the hiring freeze meant that they could not be placed in positions, the program administrator from NETCO negotiated with the company's personnel department and convinced them to ignore the hiring freeze and place the few individuals who had completed the training program and passed the standardized test, into clerical positions.

E. Potential Program Benefits

<u>Children's Hospital/English High School:</u> As stated above, the Children's Hospital program targeted "students who [were] unmotivated by the traditional educational environment". By providing students with an alternative educational experience and environment, students had "the opportunity to learn about career options that [would] enable them to become economically independent in the future" and provide them with access to "employment opportunities that have potential for career growth" (<u>Children's Today</u>, 2). It is important to underscore that the level of commitment to the career advancement of the students that the hospital and school exhibited through this

structurally unemployed. The hospital and the school's commitment was operationalized through a program which provided services that addressed many of the social and psychological conditions the structurally unemployed face in a comprehensive manner. According to the program administrator from the hospital, the program grew in popularity so much after its first year that students could no longer select themselves to participate. Starting in the second year of the program, the school had to assume responsibility for developing a selection process that would give all interested candidates an equal chance of participating.

I would argue that perhaps the most valuable benefit to students who participated in this program was coming to realize a greater sense of pride and self-esteem because the positive motivation engendered by this type of support is essential to successful job performance. Together, administrators from the hospital and the school fostered this in a very unique way. One example of how this was fostered was allowing the student participate to develop the application which prospective students would complete to gain entrance into the program. Students can participate in such an important activity such as this only if trust has been established between themselves and both institutions, and if the students have the confidence to know that they can perform such an important task. There may be no more

valuable benefit than motivation and skills training that can be offered to this particular segment of the workforce, because the combination "equals" successful job performance. <u>NETCo/Training, Inc.:</u> Potential benefits provided by NETCo were not as desireable. According to employees at Training, Inc., the starting wage rate for the positions in which trainees would be placed if they successfully completed the jobs linkage program, and then passed the standardized test, was minimal given the type of individual who typically sought this type of training. Staff at Training, Inc. felt that the starting wage rate was geared toward older women who came from families where the husband was the primary wage earner (like so many more women did a generation ago than do today) where their income was not the only income supporting a family. The starting wage rate was so low that Training, Inc. staff asked trainees to seriously consider whether it was sufficient to support their families. In the event that the wage was too low, staff urged trainees to try to identify other sources of income that could supplement their wages. The staff did tell trainees that if they performed well on the job and were patient, wages would increase and their benefit package would improve. Telling the structurally unemployed to be patient and wait for someone to judge their performance over time, and possibly, get a raise and better benefit package, is not a valuable enough benefit to enroll in the jobs linkage program and re-

take the standardized test. Further, structuring a hiring proces with so many hurdles as NETCo's does not appear to take into account what this particular type of trainees need most-- encouragement and support. Rather, the process seems weighted with the type of hurdles that give the employer the assurance that he/she is getting a qualified employee. While such assurances are important given the financial investment the employer makes in the process, there are probably ways that are less taxing on trainees that would provide the employer with the assurances they need. Reevaluating the hiring process would be a good place to start in an effort to identify less taxing ways to provided employers with assurances.

Largely due to this experience with NETCO, Training, Inc. has declined requests from other developers who have approached them for assistance in developing a training program for the jobs linkage requirement, because their starting wages were similarly low. This points out the problem of a poor match between training program curricula and area employers needs.

Based on the performances of the first group of programs funded by jobs linkage money, public officials and employment training professionals should have a good sense of how the job training linkage program operates and under what conditions it is likely to operate best. The descriptions of the Children's Hospital/English High School

and NETCo/Training, Inc. experiences provide two detailed accounts of programs that had varying degrees of success at enhancing the employability of the some of the city's structurally unemployed residents, as a result of the existence or absence of the characteristics or conditions that can improve upon an organization's ability to deliver training services.

While the presence of these characteristics and conditions in job training linkage programs will probably have an overall positive impact on both the individual service providers and trainees in the short-term, and entire job training linkage effort over the long-term, the context within which the program operates will also influence the capacity of the neighborhood training organizations to deliver appropriate training services. This larger context is the economy and the political and other forces that intervene in the market. Forces working against the free working of the market are the need for government to intervene and create programs and policies that work to maintain low level of structural and aggregate unemployment; the existing "crisis" in Boston's employment training system, as described by the city's employment training professionals; and the desire for public officials' to improve the working relationships between the city's employment training organizations. I would argue that it is important for public officials to be mindful of each of

these contextual issues and to look for opportunities to manage each of them in a way that minimizes negative consequences on the others. I would argue further that working to positively affect these larger issues can be done indirectly, using the job training linkage program as a tool. Ways to use the job training linkage program as a tool to help positively impact the larger contextual issues are discussed in the next Chapter.

#### CHAPTER 3: POTENTIAL LONG-TERM OUTCOMES

Over the long-term, it is likely that Boston's job training linkage program will yield results similar to those described in Chapter 2 unless program administrators and neighborhood training organizations learn from the positive and negative results of the first group of programs, and where needed, change their current behavior to reflect the positive characteristics of those programs. It is also possible that an unpredicted event will occur that changes Boston's economic climate. The occurrence of such an event might cause the NJT to choose to fund different types of programs than those funded in the first year of the program, and thereby, influence potential long-term outcomes in a different way.

The performance of the first thirteen programs funded under the jobs linkage program was good overall, with six of the eleven organizations providing training and related services to 100% or more of the number of people they estimated they would serve. In addition to the characteristics and conditions identified in Chapter 2 which can positively impact the job training linkage program, program performances will also be influenced by assessing their affect on specific macro level economic issues over the long-term. These macro level issues include reducing Boston's structural unemployment rates, remedying the "crisis" in Boston's employment training system, and the desire to improve the working relationships between neighborhood training

organizations. Depending on how public officials and employment training professionals manage the linkage programs in the future and make changes in program content and the administrative structure in accordance with lessons learned, the status of the large issues may be affected in a positive way.

### A. Reducing Structural Unemployment

A review of the program descriptions of the first group of programs funded with jobs linkage money reveals that each program was targeted to a segment of the workforce which has experienced structural unemployment over the years: two programs targeted youth; four offered English as a Second Language as part of their curriculum; four provided skills training or upgrading; and, two others provided trainees with information that could help them gain access to jobs to which they might not otherwise have access, due to lack of knowledge of the existence of particular types of jobs. By having linkage programs target a particular segment of the workforce that has experienced structural unemployment, each program sought to eliminate some of the "essential conditions that must prevail" in order for structural unemployment to exist, the conditions which Gordon describes in his book <u>The Goal of Full Employment</u> (see Chapter 1).

In the long-term, if the NJT continues to fund the same type of programs as those created in the first year of the program, there could be some positive impact on structural unemployment in Boston. The potential impact of the job training linkage on

structural unemployment can be illustrated using 1989 unemployment data. For the purpose of illustrating this point, it will be important to make the following assumptions: (1) the average or aggregate unemployment rate for the city remain at or near 3.9%, the rate in 1989; and (2) the capacity of the job training linkage program remains at roughly 900, the number of people that was estimated that would be served by the program in the first year (Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment, Table 23). This second assumption is actually realistic given recent economic trends. Due to the fact that the market for commercial real estate is stabilizing relative to the tremendous growth experienced in this market in the 1980s, jobs linkage fees collected in the near term may be less than the amount collected when the market was growing more rapidly. For example, the following development projects were initially proposed for the late 1980s and early 1990s, but stabilization of the market has pushed ground breaking dates further into the future. BRA staff stress that the following dates are tentative: TABLE 3.1 Proposed Development Projects

PROJECT	PROSPECTIVE START DATE ====================================	LINKAGE FEE
<ol> <li>Prudential</li> <li>One Lincoln Street</li> <li>International Place II</li> <li>Olmsted Plaza</li> <li>125 High Street II</li> <li>Boston Crossing</li> <li>Ruggles Center I</li> <li>Commonwealth Ctr. TOTAL</li> <li>("Outlook for</li> </ol>	1st qtr 1993 1st qtr 1993 2nd qtr 1992 1st qtr 1990 2nd qtr 1991 3rd qtr 1993 2nd qtr 1992 3rd qtr 1994 the Boston Economy"	\$1,455,000 900,000 100,000 1,346,000 448,268 2,840,000 185,000 1,610,000 <b>\$8,884,268</b> 1990, 30)

Together, these projects would result in \$8.8 million in jobs linkage fees based on proposed development programs. The fact that the amount of linkage fees collected may decline in the near term, supports the assumption that this program has the capacity to serve only a limited number of people.

Using blacks as a subgroup of Boston's structurally unemployed workforce, I will illustrate the potential impact the job training linkage program alone could have over time, if one makes the two assumptions I have described. In 1989, the unemployment rate for blacks was 5.5% (<u>Geographic Profile of</u> <u>Employment and Unemployment</u>, Table 23). Since blacks make up roughly 11% of the population (which may be a different proportion than that which they comprise of the city's workforce), roughly 330 blacks would have to be trained by jobs linkage programs and placed in newly-created jobs in order to reduce the unemployment rate of blacks by 1%. I calculated this figure in the following manner:

the size of the resident workforce in Boston was 303,858 in 1989. Using 11% as an approximation of the proportion of the work force that blacks comprised in 1989. I determined that roughly 33,434 blacks made-up the city's resident workforce. the unemployment rate for blacks was 5.5% in 1989. Five and one half per cent of 33,434 is 1,838, which would be the number of black residents who were unemployed in 1989. To reduce the unemployment rate one percent to 4.5%, I multiplied the resident work force figure, 33,434, by (.045) and the product was 1,504. I then subtracted 1,504 from 1,838 and the difference was 334, or 334 black residents would have to become employed in Boston, in order for the unemployment rate of blacks to be reduced 1% to 4.5%. (Ibid.).

It is important to note that if the jobs taken were not new jobs

added to the labor market, but instead, were positions already held by city residents, this would constitute displacement, and there would be no impact on structural unemployment.

If blacks comprise one third of the total number of people enrolled in jobs linkage programs, and a high proportion of blacks, successfully complete jobs linkage programs and are placed into newly-created jobs, the unemployment rate for blacks would decrease, and indirectly, structural unemployment could be positively effected. The potential impact of the job training linkage program on structural unemployment could be even greater if one considers that blacks are only one of many sub-group of the structurally unemployed, and latinos, women, youth, the physically handicapped, Asian-Americans, etc., are also targets of programs funded with jobs linkage money. Together, the various sub-groups comprise close to 100% of all individuals enrolled in job training linkage programs.

By comparison, in order to reduce the 1989 aggregate unemployment rate from 3.9% to 2.9%, by any means, roughly 3,000 additional jobs would have to be created and filled by Boston residents. I calculated this figure using the same principles as in the last calculation. The only difference was that in this calculation, I used the 1989 aggregate unemployment of 3.9%. Since all programs funded with jobs linkage money target the structurally unemployed, it is unlikely that this program alone will help reduce aggregate unemployment, especially since the program has the capacity to serve only 900 people. Therefore, if

the same type of programs are awarded grants as those that were awarded grants in the first year, then the jobs linkage program alone has the potential to positively impact the city's aggregate unemployment rate less than it does the structural unemployment rates. The linkage program's capacity to have greater impact on structural unemployment is due to the fact that the structurally unemployed make up a smaller proportion of the workforce, but have a higher rate of unemployment relative to the entire workforce.

### B. Remedy the "Crisis"

As indicated in Chapter 1, federal funding for employment training decreased significantly in the 1980s and private employers asserted that the content of JTPA-sponsored employment training programs was inadequate. In addition, the presence of many more multi-problem clients was more frequent than in recent years, and neighborhood training organizations had less capacity to provide these people with comprehensive services. These three factors resulted in a "crisis" in Boston's employment training system, which does not allow service providers to adequately train the city's residents to meet the challenges present in the available positions in Boston businesses. The job training linkage program alone cannot remedy this crisis. Nonetheless, it can have a significant positive impact on some aspects of the "crisis".

### 1. Reduction in Federal Funding

The fact that the jobs linkage program exists as an additional funding source is not sufficient to say that it alone can remedy the crisis in Boston's employment training The capacity of this program, with its unstable system. funding source, to make up the 92% reduction in funding simply does not exist. Only \$2.5 in jobs linkage fees have been collected by the NJT since the program began in 1986, and roughly \$8.8 million is projected to be collected over the next several years. Given that the timing of future jobs linkage payments are subject to an increasingly weaker commercial real estate market, the \$8.8 million should be considered an optimistic estimate. Another example of the limited financial capacity of the job training program is a comparison of the proportion of JCS' operating budget that jobs linkage fees comprise each year, versus federal in FY89, federal JTPA dollars for employment dollars: training totaled \$5,468,194 as compared to \$1,330,223 from the NJT (FY89 Annual Report - Mayor's Office of Jobs and Community Services (Draft Version), 39).

Even though jobs linkage fees cannot replace federal money dollar for dollar, it appears that management practices have been improved from having had fewer federal dollars. Based on the overall good performance of the first group of programs funded by jobs linkage money, it appears that public officials have learned how to use significantly

fewer dollars very effectively. Thirteen unique programs were funded with \$1.2 million, and 60% were able to improve the qualifications of all of the people they estimated they would serve. The remainder of the programs fell short of their original estimate, but nonetheless, made a positive contribution to the effort of providing skills training to the structurally unemployed in a supportive environment. The good performances achieved by the jobs linkage programs which had significantly fewer financial resources compared to federally-sponsored efforts, highlights an important feature of the job training linkage program -- the ability to be flexible in crafting programs which are controlled by local officials may be more significant in improving the qualifications of the structurally unemployed, than having several millions of dollars which are controlled by the federal government.

# 2. Serving the Multi-Problem Client

The capacity of the job training linkage program to serve the multi-problem client clearly exists. Though, of the group of organizations selected to create programs in the first funding cycle, none represented collaborations that maximized the jobs linkage program's ability to "link" education and skills training organizations with still another organization which specializes in the delivery of social services. An expanded collaboration such as this one

would work best when there is a demonstrated need for the provision of additional support services, and neither the developer or the neighborhood organization providing the funds or the skills training has the capacity or desire to provide them. The provision of additional social services by neighborhood-based or even a city-wide organization could be very attractive to residents participating in certain job training linkage programs. Examples of additional support services are childcare, health services, transitional housing, or food or meal assistance.

Support for expanding the concept of linkage comes from a January 1990 report entitled "The Dream Deferred or Denied?: The Persistence of Family Poverty Amidst Increasing Affluence in Boston and Massachusetts". The report was written by Andrew Sum - Center for Labor Market Studies at Northeastern University, Tom Maher - Community Jobs Collaborative, and Ted Murphy - JFK Family Service Center. The report summarized the findings of a household survey conducted of 32 census tracts in Boston where poverty occurs more frequently than in any other locations in the city. The purpose of the survey was to "learn more about the conditions and perceptions of residents regarding their economic status, ... as well as their desires for jobrelated services" (Sum, Maher and Murphy, 4). The survey concluded that

locating more education, training, and child care facilities in or near the neighborhoods ... and providing subsidized child care services to participants are likely to strengthen access by neighborhood residents to programs and increase the utilization of such services (<u>Ibid.</u>, 11).

Stretching the concept of linkage to include additional activities may result in the NJT making fewer, but larger grants than were made in the first cycle of funding. But in order to more full utilize the flexibility inherent in this program, more expanded collaborations should be considered. Collaborations might better address the concerns of the multi-problem client, and thereby help remedy the crisis in employment training.

### 3. Program Content

For the purpose of this study, it will not be possible to determine how well the first group of programs supported with linkage money were able to prepare residents for positions with Boston's employers. Information on placement rates and on-the-job performance of individuals who completed the first jobs linkage programs, was not available for the purpose of this study. It will therefore be difficult to surmise how well job training linkage programs prepare people over the long-term. In the absence of such information, I can only speculate that NJT and JCS selected these particular programs based on knowledge of what type of skills and training services were in demand in 1989, and

were projected to be in demand in the future. To the extent that funding decisions were based on such knowledge, and they should be, will continue to be over the long-term, JCS and the NJT will be making good choices about how to allocate jobs linkage funds.

Job Creation versus Job Contribution Grants 4. The potential impact of the jobs linkage program on remedying the "crisis" in employment training in Boston over the long-term, could also be influenced by the number of job creation proposal (Children's Hospital/English High School) as opposed to the number of jobs contribution grants (NETCo/Training, Inc.) that occur in each funding cycle. The selection of either option has different implications for the job training linkage program over the long-term. Staff at JCS indicate that the fact that the NJT encourages private developers to select the job contribution grant option over the job creation option, reflects the need to secure financial support for existing neighborhood training organizations for current and future programs. Given that more job contribution grants are selected than job creation proposals, it appears as if the need to secure funding for current and future programs takes precedence over the development of innovative approaches to employment training which can be achieved through the job creation option. JCS staff have also indicated that developers of most projects

which are subject to the jobs linkage requirement prefer the job creation option over making a jobs contribution grant because it affords them more "PR" opportunities. Staff also state that unless a job creation program proposal is truly unique, or, a particular development project has a very high profile, JCS counsels the developer to select the job contribution grant option. Such counseling runs contrary to the jobs linkage program goal of creating innovative approaches to employment training that would allow neighborhood training organizations to better serve the multi-problem client, and thereby, address the "crisis". JCS explains this preference for jobs contribution grants over jobs creation programs by pointing to the drastic reductions in federal support for employment training programs in recent years, and the resulting increased competition for funds among the city's employment training organizations.

This preference for continuing to fund existing programs instead of giving developers the opportunity to create new, innovative program, represents under-utilization of one of the features of the jobs linkage program that is unique-- the chance to explore new approaches to employment training. While the need to "shore-up and financially stabilize" the neighborhood training organizations is important, the NJT's preference for contributions suggests that programs are being perpetuated without adequate

critique of their contribution to the overall training system. It also suggests that resources available in the private sector are not being fully mobilized to address employment training issues.

JCS staff also point to the recent stabilization of the commercial development market as justification for wanting to fund existing programs with jobs contribution grants, because they do not want begin supporting new programs whose future could be jeopardized because the availability of jobs linkage feeds is uncertain in the future. But, if there are more job contribution grants than job creation programs over the long-term, the city may not learn how to better design and administer employment training programs to address the specific condition in Boston, and the "crisis" the city currently faces with regard to its employment training system.

- C. Improving the Working Relationships between Employment Training Organizations
  - 1. Collaboration between Neighborhood Training Organizations

A review of the first thirteen programs funded with jobs linkage money reveals that 70% represented a collaboration of two or more organizations in the development of an education or skills training program. Short of establishing a centrally-located employment training clearinghouse, an idea that was discussed before the jobs linkage program was

adopted, encouraging neighborhood training organizations to work collaboratively as they participate in this program over the long term, may be a more politically viable response to the need to provide more comprehensive employment training services to the structurally unemployed. Given the Mayor's previous commitment to maintain a decentralized training system which is based in the neighborhoods, however, JCS must play a more significant coordination role which incorporates a long-range planning function.

Making collaboration a job training linkage program goal in the face of a sharp reduction, in federal funding for employment training activities, could result in a few different outcomes over the long-term. Initially, attrition might set in and multiple program offerings on the same topics might be reduced.

On the other hand, developing collaborations will foster competitiveness on a system-wide scale because the city's employment training resources are scarce, and several organizations will be competing for less money than has ever been available. In addition, collaborations may be difficult to develop because relationships between organization will necessarily change due to the competitive funding climate. Staff at JCS have indicated that the competitive funding environment has already resulted in some unfortunate consequences. For example, one training

organization was encouraged that a developer had approached them to inquire about providing assistance in the development of a job creation program. When the developer selected another organization instead, the original training organization threatened to sue because their expectations had been aroused and they had invested time and energy in developing a program. In this case, the job training linkage program has not caused relationships between organizations to improve.

Another potential long-term outcome of making collaboration a goal is that "consortiums" of organizations may develop over time. While such a trend may be a positive outcome because it would signify that the appropriate combinations of services is being packaged into innovative programs, it could also further heighten competitiveness between training organizations. Ont the other hand, if the consortiums develop good reputations and become institutionalized over time, their success could cause some organizations to go out of business. Consortiums of services could also extend the life of some organizations in the long run. Theoretically, they could also help the entire training system run more efficiently because limited resources would be shared and used in a fashion that maximized their impact on the structurally unemployed. From the performances of the first group of programs funded by linkage money, as well as from previous federal efforts,

JCS has learned that collaborations worked best when they possessed the following characteristics: where skills were provided in a supportive environment; where JCS can influence the daily operation of a program; where an informal relationship exists prior to the start of the program; the training site and the place of origin of students is in close proximity; and, where both present and future program benefits are of value to the trainee. If JCS selects programs which have these characteristics over the long-term, the results discussed above, both positive and negative, will probably result because the arrangements between individual training organizations, and between training organizations and JCS, constitute a "marketplace" where scarce funds are distributed between different parties. The competitive spirit that will emerge will probably make training organizations develop more unique programs in order to secure funding. A potential dilemma for JCS is that through the job training linkage program, neighborhood non-profit organizations are being asked to shift their behavior from that of a grant recipient to a mode where grants are distributed according to "market" criteria. Such a change in philosophy may be difficult for some training organizations to make.

2. Stabilize Neighborhood Training Organizations Financially stabilizing neighborhood training organizations

in the face of dramatic federal cuts in funding was an implicit jobs linkage program goal since 1986. As such, the decision to create a new job training effort, the linkage program, was not based on the results of a "rational", systematic assessment of the city's employment training system and how this new program could contribute to the city's efforts. Instead, the basis for the decision to create the program was more heavily weighted toward political considerations than it was toward an understanding of what would soon be the cause of a "crisis"--- what does a 92% reduction mean for the future of Boston's employment training system?

Prior to the development of either the housing or the job training linkage program in Boston, the general concept of linkage and its ability to complement the city's effort to address the specific issue of affordable housing, was thoroughly studied by an advisory group. The advisory group's recommendation to develop a housing linkage program was made only after research had been conduced, testimony had been given by housing expert, and discussion and debate had taken place on all sides of this new issue. The components of the advisory group's final report included:

- 1. Description of the city's existing affordable housing stock.
- 2. Existing housing assistance programs supported by federal, state and local resources.

3. A review of public/private partnerships in the construction of affordable housing that were known to have worked.

This data was a vital part of the deliberations about how a housing linkage program could impact Boston because the data revealed the city's existing capacity to produce affordable housing. Without this type of specific knowledge of existing capacity, a proposal for a new linkage program, for either housing or jobs, would have been created in a vacuum, without full understanding of the existing system they were trying to improve.

The type of systematic effort undertaken to assess Boston's ability to construct affordable housing was not done prior to the creation of the jobs linkage program. City official believed they already possessed the relevant information on the health and capacity of local training organizations to offer the types of services a jobs linkage program would require. Therefore, only a cursory review of existing employment training organizations was made. With this limited information, and city officials concluded that Boston's training organizations had adequate program offerings and were otherwise poised to meet the challenges that linkage presented. Implicitly, this means that city officials believed they knew what types of challenges a jobs linkage program would present. City officials believed that the most important issue facing the training organizations at this time was the 92% reduction in federal funding, not

whether these organizations had the capacity to support a new program or what future institutional arrangements within the job training system might be. Therefore, city officials concluded that the most important thing they could do was "shore-up and financially stabilize" the training organizations throughout the city, so they would remain in business.

Because of the leveling off of growth in the commercial real estate market, those training organizations whose operations may have been prolonged by a jobs linkage grant, may begin to experience the same type of instability that was prevalent in the middle 1980s when federal funding Stability, therefore, while an important longdeclined. term goal for the job training linkage program, in reality may only be a short term condition. It is ironic that the lack of adequate study and long-term planning for the city's entire employment training system, and the failure to identify beforehand, the potential of a jobs linkage program to make a positive contribution to the future of the system, may result in a recurrence of instability. From the beginning, the goal of the jobs linkage program was to "shore-up and financially stabilize" the operation of neighborhood training organizations in the face of a 92% decline in federal funding. It is clear that this program alone does not have the capacity to do that, and it is unfortunate that a systematic assessment was not made of the

city's training system and the potential impact of this program was not determined so that realistic expectations about its potential to stabilized neighborhood training organizations could have been established.

# 3. Research Activities

Only one out of thirteen organizations funded by jobs linkage money in the program's first year was a research study which sought to analyze an important workforce issue. The \$15,000 grant made to Parent's United for Childcare represented only 1.2% of all grant awards in the 1989 funding cycle. The importance of the job training linkage program's research capacity in the effort to improve relationships between training organizations in the city is that, unlike with JTPA money, linkage funds are flexible enough to be used to conduct research which can offer valuable information and facilitate better understanding of important issues effecting the workforce, and indirectly effect the content of programs funded by jobs linkage money. The fact that a study was conducted on the issue of childcare might lend support to the idea that individual linkage programs should be stretched to include organizations that offer childcare services. If this unique characteristic of the jobs linkage program is not more fully utilized, at a minimum, policy makers may be less well informed about how intensely certain issues impact the

structurally unemployed, and the labor market in general. Indirectly, inadequate information could lead to funding decisions which are politically expedient. The value of research activities is in part illustrated by the following childcare survey findings:

•the available supply [of affordable childcare services] could only accommodate 5% of the school-aged population in the city;

•the data was inconclusive in establishing a patter of usage or demand by families across the city;

•if quality, affordable after-school childcare were available, 15% of the parent [who responded to the survey] not now in school or training would begin such education (<u>Challenges Facing Boston Families: The Need</u> for School-Age Child Care 1987 1,3).

These types of survey findings are of value to jobs linkage program administrators as they look to the future and make changes in their program to reflect the changes in the needs of the population they serve.

As Boston's economy changes over time and new workforce issues emerge, it would be useful if issues that impact the workforce could be studied and the data used to inform decisions about what the content of training programs should be and which programs the NJT should fund year to year. If care is not taken to study the impact of pressing labor market issues, such as childcare, on the structurally unemployed in particular, ultimately the jobs linkage program may become less and less effective over time. It is important to remember that one of the strengths of the jobs

linkage approach to training, is the ability to target scarce resources precisely toward those obstacles to employment which the structurally unemployed face. If program administrators and employment training professionals do not understand the various phenomena effecting segments of the labor market whose skills they are working to upgrade, they will not be able to advocate effectively and secure the limited resources available in the city for employment training, and with them, work to eliminate the structural impediments to employment. Understanding structural impediments is very important because only then will program administrators realize their "cost" to the structurally unemployed in terms of energy, self-esteem, time, etc., if they are not reduced or eliminated. Most importantly, however, an approach to employment training that begins with an understanding of issues facing the population to be served, will make program administrators develop realistic expectations about long-term outcomes and see where the real opportunities exist for the jobs linkage program to impact target populations.

Data supplied by research conducted with jobs linkage money would also be useful to private industry, especially as they try to accommodate an increasingly diverse workforce. The implications of such issues as "Workforce 2000", the term used to describe the dramatic growth in numbers of people in the US workforce who are not of western

european descent, is one example of an issue that will be important for private industry to understand over the longterm. An aspect of this topic could be the focus of a study funded with jobs linkage money.

If research activities are deemed only marginally important over the long term, and designating 1.2% of the total jobs linkage budget to this activity appears to be marginal, there may be missed opportunities to recommend public policy initiatives and prescriptive measures that directly address pressing labor market issues and therefore address the "crisis" in the employment training system.

This Chapter consisted of a discussion of how the economic and some of the over-arching issues surrounding Boston's employment training sector relate to the operation of this unique employment training program. Public officials, in consultation with the relevant parties, must decide to what degree this program should be used to help manage these contextual issues. With this public management task in mind, in the next Chapter, I will identify ways to more fully utilize the program in the future so that the Boston's structurally unemployed residents will reap the greatest positive benefits.

## CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Boston's job training linkage program stands as a new model of how to fund and provide employment training and related support services to the structurally unemployed. The characteristic of the model that distinguishes it from the recent federal employment training initiatives, the JTPA, is that the city's developers and employment training professionals unite to create unique programs that address the specific conditions of the structurally unemployed in the city. In addition, the Boston jobs linkage model emphasizes local control, flexible programming, research capacity, and less "punitive" funding Indirectly, these characteristics also allow the jobs measures. linkage program to be used as a tool to impact larger, macrolevel issues which needs to be addressed in Boston. These include structural unemployment, the "crisis" in the employment training system, and improving the working relationships among the neighborhood training organizations, the service providers.

This study has also identified the characteristics and conditions that should be present in individual jobs linkage programs if they are to have maximum impact on upgrading the skill level of the structurally unemployed and be able to offer the types of support that will help the structurally unemployed gain self esteem and confidence in their ability to participate in the workforce. The individual program characteristics and conditions are the following:

- The extent to which JCS can exert influence over the day-to-day operation of the program;
- 2. Ease of access to the training site;
- 3. Providing skills training in a supportive environment
- 4. Strength of relationship between collaborating organizations; and
- 5. Potential program benefits

Recognizing that the linkage mechanism is a new model for funding and delivering job training and related social services, is an important realization. Given this, there are still areas where more energy could be spent to ensure that future jobs linkage programs perform as well as those that operated in the first funding cycle, and that the unique characteristics of this new model will be more fully utilized and reflect the current demand for particular types of training. My recommendations for ensuring that programs continue to perform well and maximize the opportunities that the unique program characteristics present, will be offered in the form of policy implications for the three central parties that play a role in the operation of the jobs linkage program.

# Policy Implications

The Mayor's Office of Jobs and Community Services (JCS): As the overall jobs linkage program manager, JCS should play an increasingly more prominent role in coordinating jobs linkage program activities and disseminating information to all program participants than they did during the first year of the program. Given that the city's employment training system will be a decentralized one, with employment training activities taking

place in neighborhood-based organizations, JCS should assume more responsibility for coordinating activities between organizations and disseminating relevant program information. To a large extent, the future success of this new model will be dependent upon all parties having access to up-to-date program information.

Currently, many of the city's neighborhood training organizations are not aware of the jobs linkage program's potential benefits, and how they compare more favorably to federal training programs. The Director of one well established and successful neighborhood training organization interviewed for this study, was aware of the jobs linkage program, but did not know specifically how her organization could participate. The director further stated that while she was pleased to learn of a new program with an independent funding source, she was doubtful that there was sufficient staff time available to carefully study the program requirements in an effort to determine if their organization's program offerings could be modified to meet the more flexible requirements of the jobs linkage program.

To assist in the important task of disseminating information to neighborhood training organizations, JCS should consider "linking" themselves with the entire system of training organizations through a computer network. The computer network could serve not only as a data base of information on available training services for individuals or employers seeking this type of information. It could also serve as a channel through which announcements and various program updates could be delivered. A

less expensive and less formal means of carrying out this same function would be through a quarterly newsletter, or a series of regularly scheduled public hearings. This recommendation has significant financial implications which could be analyzed in a research study funded by jobs linkage money.

An equally important role for JCS to play in the future will be is that of the provider of technical assistance to neighborhood training organizations to help them develop the types of programs that would meet linkage program goals. Carrying out this function is important because many employment training service providers feel constrained in their ability to create and operated programs that differ from those they've created according to JTPA program guidelines. A top official at JCS stated that many neighborhood training organizations have relied almost exclusively on federal funding to operate the majority of their programs. Restrictions in federal guidelines for program design, funding and performance criteria have caused neighborhood training organizations to structure their program offerings around JTPA's specific requirements (The Job Training Partnership Act, 2). Over the years, this has meant that program offerings have not necessarily reflected the labor market's demand for particular training services, but instead, have reflected an organization's need to structure programs in a way that would satisfy the requirements of their federal funding The official at JCS stated that neighborhood training award. organizations are so geared toward JTPA program requirements that

when they are presented with a new approach to employment training, such as a linkage, they will not necessarily support it unless they are provided with financial support, equipment and other types of technical assistance so that they will be able to weather the transition from JTPA requirements to the more flexible approach required by the job training linkage program. Currently, these transitional types of support are not available for neighborhood organizations, and assistance from JCS on how the transitions could be made would be of great assistance.

In conjunction with the two recommendations just made, JCS should study the long-term implications of the trend toward selecting a greater number of job contribution grants versus creation proposals. Even though there is a dire need for financial support, which job contributions grants provide, allowing more job creations proposals to be developed over the long-term, will have the positive impact of drawing the private sector into the process of developing solutions to this important social welfare issue, much more than they would been if they simply donated funds and didn't become involved in how it would be spent. Since job creation programs offer developers greater "PR" opportunities than job contribution grants, it is probable that developers will be more likely to invest energy into the development of job creation programs, and more than likely, develop better programs. All participants have the potential to benefit if JCS begins to promote the selection of a greater number of job creation programs in each funding cycle.

Neighborhood Training Organizations: Given the competitive funding environment within which job training activities now occur in Boston, it would behoove neighborhood training organizations to be as well informed about the availability of financial resources from different sources, for their training programs, as well as any technical assistance that may be available to upgrade the skill level of their staffs. Knowledge of and the attainment of both types of resources will assist individual organizations compete more successfully in the competitive funding environment in the long run. In addition, rather than waiting to be approached by developers who must fulfill the jobs linkage requirement, neighborhood training organizations should participate in more aggressive manner, and be forthright about their role in the operation of this program. This can be accomplished by approaching developers with the intention of convincing them that their organization offers resources that can be used in the creation of a jobs linkage programs. However, neighborhood training organizations can only market their training services in this manner if they are well informed about development activity city-wide, and if they have sufficient equipment and staff resources to bring to bear. There is evidence that such a more "entrepreneurial" approach to providing these services is already being taken by some of the city's training organizations. For example, a staff member at one of Boston's oldest employment training organizations stated that given current funding restrictions and the competitiveness,

they will have to begin charging fees to private industry for training services, and in general, become more entrepreneurial, in order to survive.

Along with being well informed about the availability of resources, neighborhood training organizations should inquire as to why there has been no re-evaluation of the jobs linkage statute, as is permitted in Article 26B. Under section 26B-3, it is stated that

The formula (amount and rate of payment) for the Jobs Contribution Grant ... shall be subject to recalculation three (3) years after the effective date of this provision and every three (3) years thereafter. ... based on a consideration of the following

- (i) Economic trends measured in terms of, including by not limited to, development activity, commercial rents per square foot, employment growth, and inflation rates.
- (ii) Employment trends measured in terms of, including by not limited to, unemployment rate, and statistics on job training programs.

The resulting analysis will determine the changes in the City's employment training needs and the continuing ability of new, large-scale development to assist in meeting the employment training needs of the City. (pp 3,4).

According to staff at JCS, this option has not been exercised. This is curious given the changes in the city's development climate. Neighborhood training organizations should push for such a re-evaluation as part of JCS' system-wide assessment. A re-evaluation would be a good opportunity to formalize discussions about the future of Boston's employment training system and the jobs linkage program in particular, in a way that was not done before the jobs linkage program was initially

adopted.

The Private Sector: Because the larger, most visible private sector employers in Boston are generally those that will be subject to the jobs linkage requirement, they will necessarily be the beneficiaries of a well-performing job training linkage program. For this reason, they should assume more responsibility for shaping the future of the program. In addition, it is important that the private sector play a larger, more influential role because of their critique of JTPA-sponsored programs. The linkage mechanism draws private industry into a role that has traditionally been assumed by the public sector, and by requiring private developers to create training programs or donate funds to pay for training efforts, the city is asking them to help fill the gap left by a decline in federal financial and management support. Nonetheless, employment training professionals indicate that providing adequate services to the structurally unemployed is an uphill battle. If JTPA programs truly are inadequate, then the private sector should be more willing to do even more than fulfill jobs linkage requirements to help develop effective approaches to job training.

The private sector can begin to assume a greater amount of responsibility in this area by sharing techniques or unique approaches to training that have worked in-house. The private sector can also offer in-kind contributions, such as office space which could be used for training activities, and staff time which

could be used to work with public officials and training organizations to identify additional funding sources for training activities, as a show a more serious commitment this issue. Because they do not, there appears to be a "cultural lag" between what has traditionally been a government function and will increasingly become a task for which the private sector must assume a greater amount of responsibility.

Perhaps the most influential role the city's larger private employers can play is that of providing the leadership that is required to make employment training a neighborhood and a citywide priority (<u>Challenges Facing Boston Families: The Need for</u> <u>School-Age Child Care</u>, 13). Before the jobs linkage program was adopted, city officials characterized private sector involvement in the linkage effort as a

significant step beyond the corporate philanthropy that has underwritten various social program. Rather, these partnerships, have evolved as acknowledgement that the health of the city's corporate community is linked to the well-being of the city's residents and their communities and vice versa (<u>The Linkage Between Downtown Development and</u> <u>Neighborhood Housing</u>).

Given the reduction in growth in the commercial real estate market since this program was adopted, it is appropriate for this spirit to be rekindled so that the private sector can work with public officials and employment training professionals to develop new strategies for delivering adequate employment training and related social services to Boston residents.

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2.	Elsa Bengel	Training, Inc.	February 8, 1990
з.	Robert Credle	New England Telephone	February 7, 1990
4.	Ann Donaldson	Mayor's Office of Jobs and Community Services	January 24, 1990
5.	Freda Garcia	United South End Settlements	March 12, 1990
6.	Lee Jackson	Collector Treasurer - City of Boston	March 6, 1990
7.	Ted Landsmark	Director - Mayor's Office of Jobs and Community Services	March 19, 1990
8.	Bill Lee	Office of the	Telephone
		Collector Treasurer - City of Boston	Conversations
9.	Kristen	Boston Redevelopment	March 16, 1990
	McCormack	Authority	
10.	Jennifer Nahas	Mayor's Office of Jobs and Community Services	February 15, 1990
11.	Jay Ostrower	Action for Boston Community Development	January 18, 1990
12.	Nancy Shiels	Children's Hospital	February 28, 1990
	Linda Swidlick- Smith		February 8, 1990
14.	Kenneth Wade	United South End Settlements	March 12, 1990
15.	Ann Woodward	Mayor's Office of Jobs and Community Services	March 14, 1990

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