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Corrections to "Scantegrity II: End-to-End Verifiability by Voters of Optical Scan Elections Through Confirmation Codes" [Dec 09 611-627]

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Corrections

Corrections to “TPM Meets DRE: Reducing the Trust Base for Electronic Voting Using Trusted Platform Modules”

Russell A. Fink, Alan T. Sherman, and Richard Carback

In the above paper [1], the fourth sentence of the Abstract contains an error. The correct sentence is as follows.

Using the PVB with the TPM can expose unauthorized software, ballot modifications, vote tampering, and creation of fake election records early in the election process.

REFERENCES

- [1] R. A. Fink, A. T. Sherman, and R. Carback, “TPM meets DRE: Reducing the trust base for electronic voting using trusted platform modules,” *IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security*, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 628–637, Dec. 2009.

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Corrections to “Scantegrity II: End-to-End Verifiability by Voters of Optical Scan Elections Through Confirmation Codes”

David Chaum, Richard T. Carback, Jeremy Clark, Aleksander Essex, Stefan Popoveniuc, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Emily Shen, Alan T. Sherman, and Poorvi L. Vora

In the above paper [1], due to a production error, the affiliations of two of the authors, Stefan Popoveniuc and Poorvi L. Vora, were listed incorrectly. The correct affiliation is as follows.

S. Popoveniuc and P. L. Vora are with the Department of Computer Science, The George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052 USA (e-mail: poste@gwu.edu; poorvi@gwu.edu).

In addition, the name of the last author in the affiliations footnote was printed incorrectly. The correct name is P. Y. A. Ryan.

REFERENCES

- [1] D. Chaum, R. T. Carback, J. Clark, A. Essex, S. Popoveniuc, R. L. Rivest, P. Y. A. Ryan, E. Shen, A. T. Sherman, and P. L. Vora, “Scantegrity II: End-to-end verifiability by voters of optical scan elections through confirmation codes,” *IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security*, vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 611–627, Dec. 2009.

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