J U S T S P A C E S J U S T P L A C E S
Towards A Theory Of Justice For Human Action In Time And Space

by

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ABSTRACT
The public role of effectively guiding, evaluating and prescribing the physical places, patterns and forms we produce and live in according to commonly held external socio-political ideals has been extremely constrained by our limited knowledge of the significance and consequences of the physical environments we produce and live in, and by incomplete social and planning theories that isolate intentions from actions, processes from ideals, individuals from institutions, and space from society.

Central to all of these limits of knowledge and fragments of theory is an inadequately developed theory of human act, acting, and action in space and time. We are unable to identify the significant patterns of human activity, in their forms and consequences, and we are unable to do so in an easily understandable way. Action is confused with acts and acting.

For there to be an effective, significant and qualitative public debate we must first extend our knowledge of the significance and consequences of the environments we produce and live in, to include a theory of human action in these environments. Only after this theory has been developed can we effectively debate the forms that we produce according to commonly held socio-political ideals.

Justice can exist in environments, and environments do contribute to justice. They can and do if we understand environments as structures of human action in time and space, and if we understand justice as a complex ideal consisting of aspects of equality, liberty, opportunity, participation, and difference.

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PREFACE

This paper is about exploring the ideas and concepts we hold about ourselves and things we do -in this case the environments we produce and live in. Specifically how can one inform the other. The arguments in this thesis are made more by exploring the ideas rather than by looking at the things we produce. This is not accidental, and the reasons for it are worth explaining because they themselves account for a part of the main argument.

The first idea I had about approaching this subject was to examine aspects of a place or a part of a city -the patterns of spaces, access, movement patterns, locations of various institutions and uses. This of course was based partly on my background. It is what architects and planners normally did.

It quickly became apparent this type of orientation would not be sufficient for corresponding social questions with material ones. I would have at the end of any inquiry many things about the environments and many things about the societies producing them, but without a clue as to what to do with this information.

This led me to look for a more explicit theoretical structure to frame and give a direction to the problem. I was led to one by the work of Julian Beinart in *Theory Of City Form,* which resembled recent concerns in liberal social theory.

The environment could be conceptualized as a spatial structure which had a parallel in a social structure. Any examination of an environment and society according to this theoretical orientation would consist of an attempt to redefine each, inorder to fit one conception into the other.

I attempted analogizing the changes to the architecture and planning of Soviet Cities in the 1920's using this theoretical framework as a structure. My findings however were not significant. I could only explain the changes to the environment through an elaborate social history, which still only accounted for the changes to the environment as somewhat coincidental to the ideological and social changes. It was apparent this method was itself similar to what I described architects and planners normally doing, in the preceding account, when asked to analyze a given situation.

This method was not sufficient for the correlation of these structures in the everydays, in stable or slowly changing societies. This type of theoretical structure was mostly useful for looking at societies that changed very rapidly and in revolutionary ways, where these environments became conscious mechanisms of that change. From this examination I concluded two things. First the spatial and social structure model was problematic because it attempted to describe one thing. There was however, not one spatial structure nor one social structure, but many conceptions of the environment and many ideologies that gave a

society its structure. I had to, therefore, be more explicit about each. Secondly the theoretical conceptions -intentionally seperating space from society and posing them as dualisms was limiting.

A more appropriate model was one that considered space as rather an intermediary device between society and the individual. Space became something produced itself - and structuring, similar to institutions of family, work, and education. This model was common in the theoretical work of Time - Geographer's and structurationist social theory.

The following two papers I wrote were investigations into this theoretical structure. In Just places and Just Environments, a paper for an *Urban Form and Structure Seminar* taught by John Whiteman, and Justice in Environments a paper for a seminar on *Public Spaces* taught by Richard Sennett, I attempted to show that we needed to be much more explicit about defining the ideals we held about our selves, and our societies. I argued (ideals) concepts of justice could be fit into environments if we found a way to more adequately conceptualize each. Ideals (justice) needed to be thought of as many aspects held, and lived things. The environment needed to be thought of as a structure to human actions. Only then could we find justice in environments.

This paper is an attempt to further clarify this hypothesis. It is therefore mainly concerned with the ideas and conceptualizations we hold about our environments and societies.

JUST SPACES JUST PLACES

There is however one more caveat in this description. I intended to illustrate these aspects with a parallel set of explorations into environments for the education of children. However well into this thesis I realized this type of question itself had two possible assumptions about the correspondance of justice to the environment. The two questions produced a kind of dilemma. Both seemed equally valid.

> 1. What would constitute a more just environment for the education of children?
>
> This question assumes all environments can be equally just. The answer depends on determining how to make them so.
>
> 2. What would constitute a more just society? Is education an aspect of this? Is an environment important for just education?
>
> This question assumes only certain aspects of our everyday can lead to a just society. The answer to this question depends on determining which parts (aspects) of the everyday can correlate to which aspects of justice.

This dilemma only strengthened the premise of my argument. It became apparent this inquiry into environments for the education of children, or into any environments for that matter, would have been trivial without a better account of the answers to these questions.

J U S T S P A C E S J U S T P L A C E S
Towards a theory of justice for human action in time and space.

INTRODUCTION

I am trying to correspond abstract socio-political concepts to the environments we produce and live in. Is it reasonable to look for just environments ? I began to consider the subject for this paper some time ago. As an undergraduate, I began studying architecture because I believed the designers of the environments we lived in had the ability to create genuinely better places and worlds for people. I believed the patterns of life structured by the lines and forms of architects could and did make individual and social life more meaningful, and significant. And this I believed was the appropriate task of the designer.

We were asked to design and locate the physical places, programs, and everyday operations for child care facilities, intentional cooperative factories and communities, spaces for the exhibition of contextually historical artifacts, and places for "liberative play". We were all convinced these were not solutions to social problems, but environments that allowed for these problems to be *redirected, twisted onto themselves, and projected away.* And they were, in there own way. We were searching for potential "powers of architecture".[1]

Towards the end of my studies, the visions and structures we had worked to create remained clear, however the process of achieving

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[1] I am borrowing this reference from a title of a paper by John Knesl, a former professor. See Environment and Space V.1,no3 1985.

them grew more complex. Land use planning, economic market studies, social policy, political agendas, and private demands for capital all played significant roles in the actual realization of these environments. The process of realizing them began to appear fragmented, even contradictory and arbitrary. These methods were born and inscribed in various professional roles further complicating our roles.

I searched for concepts and disciplines that would perhaps overlap and bridge these professional roles and fragmented conceptions. I studied zoning and land use planning, social and public policy, urban economics, all focusing on a ambitious, perhaps naive, attempt to find points of collaboration. But somewhere it was pointed out to me that it was fine to attempt to do interdisciplinary work -to build bridges, but in this case it was not building the bridge that was the problem, rather it was defining the banks.

Common to both sides were ideologies that separated the ideas of how a society could be structured from the processes of how they could be realized. Intentions were isolated from actions, processes from ideals, individuals from institutions, spaces from society. The socio-political conceptions we held were abstracted from the ideals we used to guide our actions.

This paper is located at a point of beginning to redefine these banks -the conceptions we hold about what we do as designers of environments we live in, and the ideals we hold about the lives we lead. It is a

kind of *thought exercise* trying to make certain my first beliefs of the powers of architecture.

The subject of this paper is specifically to make more literate the significance of the patterns and structures of the physical places we live in to policy planners, lawyers and economists, and conversely to make the abstract principles by which the social and political sciences frame ideas about a society, (justice, welfare), more useful for the designers of the environment.

If the subject of this paper is the abstract socio-political conceptions we hold, the object of paper is the environment -the places, patterns, and structures of spaces that we produce and live in. This implies two types of inquiries. I will first examine the socio-political concepts with an eye toward which places and spaces they would produce. Secondly I will look at the environment with an eye toward which socio-political ideals are implicit, or which are realized through the structuring of lived in places.

The purpose of this paper is then to locate a *politics of the environment.* "To remove it from a question of pure style and put it into a public debate".[1] What are just environments? Do they depend on the location, structure or patterns of social justice, welfare, equality, liberty, or rights? Do they depend on the ways we produce,

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[1] See Habermas,

and act in our everyday lives in the places, patterns, and structures of spaces?

I will show that justice as used by planners inorder to legitimize the location and construction of low income housing, and as defined by planners, is a limited and an insufficient use of justice. I will show just environments depend not only on a sufficient conceptualization of the aspects of justice but also on a more explicit account of how the environment *structures forms of human action.*

Our current concepts of justice are insufficient for the environment without an equivalent theory of how this justice is located and structured over space and time -over the environment.

The context of this inquiry is the inability of planners to explain the complexity of the space-economy : the unintended consequences of large scale physical changes to environments; the inability of urban designers to mediate effectively between public needs, interests, and private goals. These problems and situations are becomming ever more conspicuous because of the increasing interweaving of our economies, social relations, and political aspirations -our modern lives.

It should be apparent by now that the central problem, I am trying to resolve in this paper, is a methodological one. There are many conceptions of the physical environment, they originate in geography in the social sciences, and there are many conceptions and explicit

theories of an equal, fair, just society. These at best, however, remain at a distance to each other. Neither can adequately account for the assumptions, intellectual formulations and grammar of the other. The problem that I am looking at is why there are no adequate accounts of both.

I would like to make this point as explicit as possible. It has direct bearing on what follows in this paper. The structure of the argument is itself the argument. I am aware that one difficulty of the way that I have set out this exercise is it presupposes a continuous restatement of the issues, problems, and partial-solutions. Each time gradually turning the problem slightly and getting a different bearing on it. This type of argument is not completely logically positive, proceeding from a hypothesis, to a test, to a refutation or proof, but rather it assumes a hypothesis to a series of problems that are constantly tested and refuted. (This method perhaps originates out of a design background, where the problems a seldom explicit and therefore are no solutions only reformulations.)

My thesis is justice can exist in environments, and environments can contribute to social justice. They can and do if we understand environments as *structures of human action* in time and space, and if we understand justice as a complex ideal consisting of aspects of *equality, liberty, opportunity, participation, and difference.*

The first part of this paper locates and frames my argument in the current practices, theories, and mechanisms for the review of the designs of environments. Four mechanisms for these reviews are discussed : zoning and land use planning, plans, guidelines, and community reviews. These are the main ways the public participates in the review of the environment. What do we do when we zone, plan, determine guidelines or review publicly these designs? What do we really do?

The main argument of this part is we implicitly separate parts of the environment, that conveniently correspond to limited ideals we hold about human practices. These ideals are however, often implicit in the parts that we choose to evaluate. The review of the environment is then separated into discussions of the uses and activities and these are evaluated in terms of *equity* -who has access to what and how easily. The feasibility and maintenance, and managments of environments are evaluated in terms of *efficiency* -what is our ability to pay for these services according to other willingnesses to pay. The patterns and spaces of the environments are evaluated according to principles of *imageability* -the ability of people to read or recognize the patterns or references of the environments.

These three criteria are implicitly used to evaluate parts of the environment. They are held to be autonomous, and intern separate the professions that adopt each, and further fragment the environment into

uses, management, and form. The public reviews of our environments are buried in the mechanisms and implicit ideals that have become attached to them.

I conclude this part by showing that inorder for there to be a more adequate public review, we must adhere to more specific and explicit ideals of more explicit conceptions of the environments we produce and live in. The next two chapters take up this task.

The third chapter of this paper examines current ideals we hold about a fair, or just society. I will look at aspects of equality, liberty, opportunity, participation, and justice itself. I will look at these aspects in two ways. First as explicit agendas for the organization and structure of a fair and just society. Secondly with an eye toward the places, patterns and structures of spaces that would be produced and lived in taking these aspects into account.

The main arguments of this part show socio-political ideals like aspects of justice, when adopted by the planners and designers of environments become overly simplified and reduced to very common sense notions of these aspects. A critical account of these ideals extended into a geographical perspective shows what is also needed is a more explicit account of the aspects of the environments we are evaluating. I conclude showing a possible way of achieving this is to conceive of the environment as human action in space and time.

The fourth chapter looks at what is missing from our common conceptions of the environment inorder for them to be more useful for locating these aspects of justice. In this part I am looking at the environment with an eye to the aspects of justice that I have explored in the previous part. I look at the common conceptions of the environment as form, space, place and time. Each of these conceptions if developed can begin to take into account human action, however these are only limited aspects of the environment and need to be taken account of together.

The main arguments of this part are that architects and planners constrain the development of more advanced and significant ideals because they consider human action in very simple ways. The complexity of human acts, acting, and action are reduced and practiced as simple conceptions of interaction and participation.

The next chapter looks to more explicit theories of action in philosophy as well as in the social sciences. These are examined as starting points for a more explicit conception of action taking into account the environment.This chapter attempts to illustrate a concept of human action in all of its complexity and richness. I conclude with a definition of action as acts, acting, and action.

The sixth chapter concludes this paper reexamining the problem as stated in the introduction. Inorder for their to be a more useful conceptions of justice and the environment we must conceive of the

environment as human action in time and space. I show the promises of corresponding the environment as human action in time and space for theories of social justice, as well as for the practice of environmental design.

The main arguments of this chapter are that justice exists in our everyday human actions - in the patterns of spaces that we produce but also in the smallest places we live in. Just spaces are meaningless without equally just places.

FRAME AND LOCATE THE PROBLEM

In this paper I am trying to locate a politics of the environment, and trying to do so by asking what are just environments. Is it possible to create more democratic, equal, just places and patterns of spaces ? What role should the public play in reviewing the decisions about the design, management and use of the environment ?

The problem stated this way becomes principally a methodological one. We have adequate conceptions and theories of the built environment and of just societies, however, we have few successful attempts at corresponding both into a usable clear construct. This thesis is an attempt to trace out a "usable knowledge" for the practice of environmental design.[1]

However before I can so easily embark on a criticism of our current conceptions of environments and of just and fair societies, I am not sure that I have convincingly stated the appropriatness or promise of this type of inquiry. Personal motivations do not make a thesis.[2]

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[1] See Lindbloom

[2] A major problem in attempts of environmental theory building is the authors do not clearly set out why and where their conceptions lie. They proceed as if the purposes are self evident once the methodological orientations are in place. This is adequately pointed out in Lynch's, and Beinart's distinctions of normative from functional theories. A theory is much more useful when the assumptions and background of the author are grounded. I therefore have tried to be explicit in the introduction and in this chapter about my assumptions and about what I bring to the problem.

This chapter will locate and frame my arguments in the current practices and theories of environmental design. What are the limits of environmental design as practiced and conceived today ? This chapter is primarily set up as a series of inquiries into what we do when we plan, specify guidelines, zone, or review environments, and what we do when we theorize about them. These are the main ways the public is envolved in evaluating proposals for the designs of the environment.

Two points surface in this debate:

1. We implicitly evaluate environments according to ideals, but these are partial ones.
2. Current attempts to be normative and explicit, fragment the environment and simplify the social processes into convenient parts and limit the conceptions of human action possible in them.

The problem for any theory of environmental design is be explicit about the ideals the parts of the environment are evaluated against without simplifying the environment to fit these ideals.

The Public Role.

I have located this problem in the public role of evaluating environmental proposals because as I have said I am looking for a politics of the environment. In the United States, the public is represented in mechanisms for checking and regulating private interests. Therefore the public role is already legitimized and somewhat defined. I am taking this as a given.

There are four common mechanisms through which the public plays a role in the design of the environment: land use and zoning, master plans, guidelining, and community reviews. Each of these mechanisms are limited to what they can consider by their assumptions, and how they fit into and structure the public process. I will look at what we ideally think we are doing, and what we actually do when we assume these as public mechanisms. The four public mechanisms can be framed this way:

1. What do we do when we zone part of the environment for a particular land use, density, or limit the types of changes that can occur there ?

2. What do planning agencies do when they create a master plan for a growing downtown, or a plan for a leftover environment ?

3. What do planners and architects do when they prescribe guidelines for the development of a new mixed use project located between two diverse neighborhoods ?

4. What do community review boards do when they review a proposed mixed income housing project for their neighborhood ?

We ideally think the public is responsible for the evaluation of three acts through these mechanisms.

First these are the primary ways the public directly regulates the physical environment today.

Secondly, these mechanisms become the public checks on the private interests and their outcomes and consequences.

Thirdly, these are the bargaining processes between the ideals and images of how we want to live, and the ideas and options given to us, between what is possible and what we actually experience everyday.

Ideally these three types of responsibility would be sufficient and adequate checks on the design of the environment regardless of the particularities of the mechanisms. However any serious look at the environment today is I think a sufficient argument against the latter : brutal public spaces, unlivable housing, dehumanizing working conditions, dumbing learning environments. Environments that do not help us cope with the world and our lives. But how can this be so with such an elaborate and extensive review process ?

I am hypothesizing the review of the environments we produce and live in is inadequate. We have no appropriate way of representing what it is we are trying to review: the space and places of the environment, and their correspondances in some set of ideals. These get fragmented into existing, norms, languages, and processes, which are borrowed from other disciplines. In the actual review each of these three levels of responsibility are reduced and fragmented to existing and partial ideals.

What we actually do becomes much different from what we ideally set out to do. The *ideal regulation* of the physical environment is reduced to the actual regulation of the physical form, and this only to the image it conveys. The *ideal check and regulation* of the private interest and its outcomes is reduced to an actual check on the market regulations or the efficiency or feasibility of the projects. The *ideal bargaining process* between the ideals and images presented to us and

the ideals and images we live everyday are reduced to the actual review of possible activities and the adjacency of uses. These according to an equitable distribution of activities.

Each of these mechanisms of a particular aspect of the environment is further reduced to a specific *borrowed* ideal. Equity, efficiency and imageability become associated with tasks of specific actors in the designs of environments and so reinforce professional specializations.

The actual regulation of physical form is enfranchised by architects and an autonomous language and "knowledge" system develops around it -space, light, form, closure, mass, plans, types, artifact. The actual check on the market mechanism, feasibility and efficiency are enfranchised by developers, financial intermediaries. An autonoumous lanaguage and "knowledge" system also arises out of these: ROI, NPV, IRR, depreciation, capitalization rate. The review of possible activities and uses according to equity are either subsummed under the other two, or become the center of a misplaced public debate. A language of social -control, user needs, access, order arises out of these.

By the ways that we have structured and defined and therefore specified and fragmented each we have limited the ability to be critical of some very important aspects of the environment. In the reduction of the physical form to the actual review of perceived images appropriated to the design of architects, we have lost the ability to be critical of the spatial relations, produced and places lived in. In the

reduction of the private interest to efficiency and feasibility, and the appropriation by financing interests and economists we have lost the ability to be critical of the efficiency of these environments over time, their externalities, and the spatial dymanics. The reduction of ideals and images to the actual review of possible activities and equity and this appropriation by the public, we have lost the ability to forsee more complex forms of human interation. How does this specifically occur in each of the four mechanisms of public review ?

Each of these public mechanisms, zoning, plans, guidelines, participation, therefore take on specific ideals.

Zoning is principally a mechanism for evaluating the distribution of uses based on judgements of forms of equity. Zoning controls the physical environment principally by removing the inequities of lower uses. It checks the private interest through an aspect of welfare -by equalizing individual preferences and conscious states.[1] These are static conceptions of equity and welfare based on precedents of agglomeration and preferences, thereby denying any direct bargaining between these lives imagined. They are arbitrary based on particular concepts which are not equally valued. Zoning therefore attempts to equalize preferences among individuals with different ones. Equality of things not equally valuable to individuals is not equality at all.

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[1] This definition of welfare can be found in Dworkin. See the following chapter of this paper.

Plans become principally mechanisms for legitemizing a distribution of uses and concurrent forms. In this way they are similar to zoning plus an aspect of imageability. Plans control the physical environment similarly by locating uses to minimize the inequities and negative consequences of certain agglomerations. They are also based on aspects of welfare and are static.

Guidelines are often simple modified forms of zoning or plans. In these cases they operate similarly to plans and zoning. When they do not deal simply with a plan or a distribution of uses they become a form of advice giving. The actual advice is often legitimized by taking the developers preference, based on an intuitive approximation of market efficencies, and redefining it to coexist better with what already exists. Guidelines control the physical environment principally by fitting private conceptions into a context. The results are no different from zoning.

Participation is the principle bargaining and negotiation process between the proposed forms of the environment and the implications to living conditions. Equity and efficiency are the main aspects of this bargaining.

The success of the first three mechanisms are heavily weighed on the ability to forsee conflicts arising out of spatial distributions and agglomeration of various uses. They are therefore based in aspects of the removal of inequities, by ameliorating specific conditions. These lie

in the conceptions of equalizing individuals preferences, or welfare. This, as I will elaborate below, is not an ideal at all.

The fourth mechanism, participation, assumes the consequences are best resolved by individuals themselves. It is not based simply on equalizing individual preferences but on positive aspects of arriving at them. Participation becomes an ideal itself. The worth of individuals is expressed in their ability to democratically take part in questions important to their lives.

These three ideals -equity, efficiency, imageability, and the forms they take in environments,zoning, plans, guidelines, participation are process the public holds in evaluating environments. Are these the only ideals and aspects we can hold and are these equally sufficient for evaluating environments?

Locating the argument in current theories of environmental design. Attempts at fitting the environment into socio-political role.

In the preceding section I have shown we do infact attempt to frame the actual mechanisms by which we review the environment to ideals external to language of architecture and planning. I have tried to show that these are useful and appropriate ways to begin, as long as we hold onto the democratic principles and believe some aspects of the environment merit public review. However because of our limits to adequately identify environments and the ideals by which to look at them, we can consider only partial ideals and conceptions of the environment. We therefore distort any adequate mechanism for the review.

The second part of this chapter looks at recent atempts of conceptualizing the environment with external socio-political concepts and ideals. What do we actually do when trying to construct theories of society and the environments produced and lived in: theories of environmental design?

Two recent attempts to locate a politics of the environment point to the apparent problems. *Marxism and the Metropolis* a collection of essays on the politics of urbanism edited by Sawyers and Tabb, and *Capitalism, Socialism and the Environment,* by Stretton, through the structure of their arguments, identify the dilemmas of dealing with abstract socio -political concepts and material things as the environment.

Both explore in the main texts of these books *macro systems of inequality* and the resulting effects on the environment. Tax subsidy and suburbanization, transportaion, fiscal crises, housing policies, wealth and income are some of the subjects covered. These are not much help to the designers of environments: to the immediate decisions made by architects and planners asking what to plan or how to design inorder to achieve some goal. However in both instances the authors realize the limits of their analyses. They end their texts with chapters that reveal the limits of examining the environments in this way. Stretton ends *Capitalism, Socialism and the Environment* with a chapter entitled "Everyday life", and Tabb and Sawyers end their volume with a conclusions titled "A pro-people urban policy". Both describe the everyday environments, the mundane structures of everyday life, the realm of the public, and the processes of community development corporations.

Clearly the problem I am pointing out is central to these two authors dilemmas. We can not adequately account for macro and socio-political questions in the everyday.

The ability to adequately locate a politics of the environment is a long standing problem. Specific attempts at defining this relationship range from attempts at identifying a "socialist architecture and city planning" in the USSR in the 1920's, attempts at defining an architecture that embodies the public masses, to a series of conceptualized linkages of

social structure to spatial structure through intermediary devices, institutions, social history, time space.

I will look at each of these attempts to fit the environment into socio-political concepts or ideals. These are all attempts in normative theory making. Each is explicit about the ideals, but also regards the environment both as a material thing, produced and lived in. This conception implies acts of labor, intentions, rules of production, and it implies human action -consumption, role playing, distribution.

Socialist architecture.

Attempts to correlate constructivist forms produced to the dominant emergent ideology and agenda of the communist party, argue logically from assumptions the environment is somehow tied to these theories. I have shown in another paper that these conclusions are inadequate. The ideologies are never clearly deconstructued, and a single dominant one is allways assumed. When in fact the Soviet Union was broken up into many local stategies and ideals about how to achieve a new social order. The environments are never specifically framed by how they are constituted nor defined as being important aspects in the particular socio-political context. People are assumed to have understood universally what we understand about the "drawn, and theorized

projects". We can not assume that this level local knowledge existed. All places can not be assumed equally important.[1]

The Architecture of Democracy.

A democratic architecture is often corresponded to the ability of individuals to shape their own environments. These arguments are often made by attempting to explain the positive aspects of squatter settlements as opposed to the ghettos of U.S. cities. Three positive aspects are signs of democratic architecture: the flexibility of sollutions, the adaptability to the changing needs of the family and community, the sense of autonomy and self-determination for the individuals and community in making their own environments directly.

The means of making and controlling their environments are tied together in an experience with the physical products, and aesthetic judgements.

The implications these findings have had for western "developed" countries, has been to produce affordable flexible housing, to decentralize neighborhood control, and to build generally responsive environments. But is this where democracy is located?

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[1] In this particular case I argued that the planning and construction of major public squares in the capital cities of the peripheral republics, (politically peripheral and hence disruptive) were close if not accurate gauges of these correspondances. See Theory Of City Form; The Architecture Of Kiev And Kharkov.

Architecture and Social Structure

The third attempt at fitting the environment into a socio-political role is to construct theories that take into account explicitly the ideas we hold about our society and the environmnts we produce. Social structure and spatial structure are conceived of as two parrallel and complementary structures of our world.

Attempts to work within this theoretical structure are based on finding appropriate mediating devices that can produce fits between space and society. Two such devices are commonly given as examples: *institutions* -the family and home, work and the work place, education and the school; and *individual biographies and personalities* produced by routinized systems of exchange and interaction -commuting, the workday, the workweek, timing of eating, sleeping, recreation, consumption.

I will look at each of these theoretical concepts more closely in chapter four, Conceptions of the Environment, however some general inferences and criticisms can be drawn here.

As I have already stated in the preface, these theoretical conceptions are inadequate. The spatial structure is itself a mediating device. Institutions are not abstract ideas, they are mediating devices because they exist in particular time and space. The same can be said for individual biographies. Democracy depends on opportunity as well as participation. It is not located principally in the private world.

Divergent ideologoes coexist, each making use of different spatial patterens and forms.

I have restated this theoretical model to ask what mediates between the social structure and individual actions ? This way of conceiving these relationships is much more logical because both social structure and individual actions are constituted and constitute each other, but they do so through intermediaries. These I will define for the time being as institutions, and "routinized systems of exchange and interactions".

The theoretical question framed this way is more significant for developing an analytic device to correspond aspects of individual actions and aspects of social structure to locate a politics of the environment. The real problems to these theoretical formulation are to define the social structure and the aspects of human action that can be mediated.

I have tried to show in this chapter through the exploration of mechanisms of the public review and through attempts to conceptualize theories about environments, that we do infact assume into these aspects of the public review ideals about the workings of our societies, and into the theories aspects of the environments that correspond to these ideals.

Zoning, planning, guidelines took on negative concepts of liberty and concepts of welfare. They were principally concerned with erasing inequalities or constraints. Participation was based on a positive ideal of the human worth of participation itself.

Attempts a building theories took for granted aspects of the environment, without rigorously locating the aspects which might in fact be more appropriate to each ideal.

But are these the only aspects of a just or fair society that we can hold, and are all parts of the environment equally sufficient to locate justice?

The following two chapters will explore more rigorouly these questions. I will look at aspects of a just society with an eye toward the environments we produce and live in. Following I will look at our conceptions of the environment with an eye toward the aspects of justice.

There are two reasons why it is reasonable to think of environments in socio-political terms. The first comes from examining the practice of environmental design. The public role of evaluating the environment through zoning, plans, guidelines, participation, implicitly borrows ideals about how we ought to think about them. These implicit ideals are however partial and limited considerations of the environment in each case. They are misappropriated to certain aspects of the environment.

The second reason comes from examining the theories of environmental design. Attempts at locating a politics of the environment either assume explicit libertarian distributional ideals: participation, opportunity, freedom from constraints, or assume a fit between the structure of society and the environment. In the first case politics refers to aspects of ideals of justice in the second to power.

Inorder for this theoretical conception to be more useful I have said we need to be more explict about the ideals and the aspects of the environment we use. Are participation, opportunity, and concepts of negative liberty adequate to produce a just society ? Is spatial structure an adequate conception of the built environment? What is the environment as an intermediary?

These criticisms of the ability of the public to evaluate the environment, imply we must more seriously take into account the environment as something produced and lived in. Production is interwoven with questions of labor and imply divisions of tasks, multiplicity of actors, and the rules and conventions by which they are produced. Lived in is synonomous with a concept of human action which implies a structure to the everyday relationships between other individuals and institutions.

The next two chapters look at the liberal egalitarian concepts of justice and at conceptions of the environment implied by human action. Before I continue, I should make explicit the conception of justice I am interested in.

JUST SPACES JUST PLACES

WHY JUSTICE?

The concept of justice historically has played an important role in the rational assessment and conceptualization of social institutions, behavior and actions. It is commonly understood that justice is the highest merit any social institution, or action can possess, while injustice is the greatest charge which can ever be lodged against them. It is often considered a "standard, fundamental principle of all societies".(Wood)

In western societies justice is often based on legal and political processes, the state, the body politic, the laws and practices of them. We often take for granted these legal and political definitions of justice. One source of Marx's social thougth is an explicit rejection of this premise. These political and legal conceptions of a society are not understandable by themselves, but are "rooted in the material relations of life", that take place in particular historical circumstances.

From this premise Marx develops a theory of economic determinism, however I do not think these are the only conclusions that can follow such a premise. Rather Rawls descibes assessing the instituions and individal actions of our society according to moral principles similar to describing the rules of grammer we have in our native languages.

> In this case the aim is to characterize the ability to recognize well-formed sentences by formulating clearly expressed principles which make the same discriminations as the native speaker. This is a difficult undertaking which, although still unfinished, is known to require theoretical constructions that far outrun the ad hoc precepts of our explicit grammatical knowledge. A similar situation presumably holds in moral philosophy. There is no reason to assume that our sense of justice can be adequately characterized by familiar common sense precepts, or derived

> from the more obvious learning principles.(p.47)
> A theory of justice attempts to describe our sense of justice. Sense of justice is a mental capacity involving the excercise of though, the relevant judgements are those given under conditions favourable for deliberation and judgement in general.(p.48)

I think the same can hold for the environment.

Lynch attempts in his Theory of Good City Form, conspicuously similar in structure to A Theory Of Justice, to describe an environment as just.

> While efficiency deals with how costs and benefits for any one group are distributed among several types of value, justice is the way in which benefits and costs of any kind are distributed between persons.
> Equality is most often espoused as one ideal of a just distribution, whether it is meant to be applied to all distributions, or just to certain key enabling powers such as income. (p.225)

Lynch points to five aspects that would constitute justice as a right: vitality, sense, access, fit, and control. Vitality is a right to basic reqirements of shelter, ... It is the "pivitol" issue for justice. Sense is a clear perception of places. Lynch however discounts this himself because "here we are dealing with emotional and intellectual satisfactions" , and he continues, "but surely a modicum of good orientation must be available to everyone". Access is transportaion and communication. "The movement and free communication are a fundamental component of that freedom of thought and of person that we prize". Fit is a correspondance between the form and behavior, Lynch, however, is also willing to forgo "fit" as a legitimate aspect of justice in so far as it conflicts with the equal distribution of power and income. Control is

access to a basis good. "People should control the places where they have a vital interest."(p.227-230)

Of the five principles Lynch states, he himself eliminates two, sense and fit. Vitality , access and control remain as viable principles for him, however access and control do not significantly differ. Lynch, by his own account is left simply with one principle, vitality.

Lynch concludes by summarizing good (just) city form, "it is continuous, well connected, open place, conducive to development."(p.235) I do not think this is an adequate definition or set of principles for a just city, nor do I think Lynch did for that matter. He is really refering to certain aspects of justice, aspects I will show later correspond to misconceptions of equality as equalizing individuals welfare, and preferences.

I am therefore interested in justice in two ways. First as exploring a concept of social justice that takes into account the spaces and places we produce and live in. Secondly as a device to examine what we know about the environemt, and to guide the practice and theories of environmental design.

ASPECTS OF JUSTICE

In the last chapter I pointed out the kind of questions and inquiry that I am interested in exists in the public mechanisms for reviewing proposals, plans, guidelines for environments. Implicit in these mechanisms are criteria not only based on judgements of behavior but on moral judgements -equity and efficiency. Attempts at explicitly conceptualizing theories that take into account ideals of a society as well as the environments they produce and live in were constrained by inadequate conceptions of the environment, and assumptions about the divisiblity of the nature of space and society.

In the next two chapters I will examine explicit ideals we hold about about our societies and conceptions of the environment that take into account the complexity of human activity.

In this chapter I will examine current explicit ideals we hold about our societies. And I will do so with an eye toward the environment. These ideals, concepts of justice, equality, liberty, originated as concepts and evaluations of legal, political and economic social institutions. They assess the societies by applying standards developed for single parts of them. I am therefore questioning these standards, and the autonomy of these parts, as being adequate for the evaluation of environments and society.

What is missing in our conceptions of the environment for these ideals to hold? A conception of the environment as produced and lived in

implies both an act of labor, along with the complexities of who contributes what and how,the knowledge of the social organization of work, and the distributional complexities of need, merit, rights, and opportunity. This conception of the enviornment corresponds to the distributional questions framed by liberal egalitarians attempting to locate a more equal distribution of goods, services, satisfactions, and participatory opportunities.

CURRENT IDEALS OF A JUST SOCIETY

In this chapter I will examine 6 aspects of a just society with an eye toward the environment. I will look at each with three questions in mind.

1. What does each aspect bring to the problems of social justice?
2. What is implied about the environment, what is exlicitly stated? Is the ideal spatial, aspatial? Is the environment treated as a good to be distributed?
3. What are the advantages or limits of each of the ideals for my inquiry? Is this ideal able to take into account the space and time of complex human activity?

I will conclude this chapter with a criticism of these liberal egalitarian ideals, and an account of how they have been normally used by planners. Before I proceed, I will explain why I choose these five aspects.

As I have pointed out before, I am searching for a concept of justice for the environment. By this I mean an ideal which does not rely on simple conceptions of equality, but can account for a choice over which inequalities matter, is both evaluatory (negative) and projective (positive) of actions and sets distributional standards that are not abstract but take into account the specific conditions individuals and societies are in. Therefore I do not think that single objective

principles are useful, nor do I think the ideals that rely simply on removing constraints are enough, nor are ideals based in legal, economic, and political contexts necessarily valid, for the kinds of questions and issues that I am interested in.

The concept of justice, historically has played an important role in the rational assessment and conceptualization of social institutions, behaviors, and actions of individuals. Justice is commonly regarded as the highest merit any social institution, or human action can possess, and injustice is the gravest charge which can be put against it. These concepts of justice, however, are based in legal, political and economic processes. So the conceptions of the *social life of man* are based on these partial processes. "(M)an as a social being is a man in relation to those powers which promulgate laws, guarantee rights, issue juridicial commands."(Wood)

This concept of justice Allan Wood points out in his analysis of Marx's concept of Justice is what Marx principally rejected. This rejection becomes the basis for Marx's social thought. For Marx these political, legal, concepts of a society "are to be grasped neither through themselves nor through the so-called universal development of the human spirit, but rather are rooted in the material relations of life. (Wood, p6) It is in these material relations and in their particular historical circumstance that Marx developed the ideas of productive activity that determines the way lives are expressed -"modes of life".

JUST SPACES JUST PLACES

This, then, is my starting point: to locate aspects of a just society that are based on expicit conceptions of everyday life in space and time.

I have therefore chosen these five aspects we most likely would agree belong to a just society. I will examine each according to a particular conception of a political theorist dominating this idea. I have assumed in my choice of these senses any role of the public in a democratic society, such as ours, is to justify the allocation of resources and opportunities, allow for participation in this process of deciding them, and protect a conception of individual liberty, according to appropriate criteria.

The five aspects of social justice that we would all agree on are:

1. to reduce inequality -Ronald Dworkin
2. a sense of liberty -Isaiah Berlin
3. a sense of opportunity -R.H. Tawney
4. a sense of participation -J.S. Mill
5. a sense of justice -John Rawls

These are followed by a criticism of liberal egalitarians by David Harvey.

A SENSE OF EQUALITY

Ronald Dworkin, Equality of Welfare and Equality of Resources..

At least one aspect of a more just society would be to reduce inequality. When we commonly think of achieving equality we can ask what scheme of distributional preferences of goods and services, satisfactions and pleasures will treat people as equals ? Establishing criteria for selecting among the possible allocation of resources is what economists do, and a definition of welfare economics. I will redefine this aspect of reducing inequality, achieving welfare, into its underlying characteristics. I want to be more exact about the form of equality I am considering. Dworkin differentiates concepts of equality between "treating people equally, with respect to one or another commodity or opportunity, and treating them as equals."(p.185)

These are two differnt conceptions of equality for Dworkin. The first he calls Equality of Welfare, the second Equality of Resources.

> (E)quality of welfare holds that a distributional scheme treats people as equals when it distributes or transfers resources among them until no further transfer would leave them more equal in welfare.
>
> (E)quality of resources holds that it treats them as equals when it distributes or transfers so that no further transfer would leave their shares of the total resources more equal.

Equality in the first sense is an equalization of preferences, goals and opportunities. The second is an equalization of pure resources.

> Suppose, for example, that a man of some wealth has several children, one of whom is blind, another a playboy with expensive tastes, a third a prospective politician with expensive ambitions,

> another a poet with humble needs, another a sculptor who works in expensive material, and so forth. How shall he draw his will? If he takes equality of welfare as a goal, then he will take these differences among his children into account, so that he will not leave them equal shares. Of course he will have to decide on some interpretation of welfare and whether, for example, expensive tastes should figure in his calculations in the same way as handicaps or expensive ambitions. But if, on the contrary, he takes equality of resources as his goal then, asssuming his children have roughly equal wealth already, he may well decide that his goal requires an equal division of his wealth. In any case the questions he will put to himself will then be very different. (p. 186-187)

Dworkin convincingly rejects the first and endorses the second. I will look at each.

EQUALITY OF WELFARE

The concept of welfare, as I have said before, was developed by economists to describe "what is fundamental in life rather than what is instrumental", or as a way of valuing resources.(p.188) The distribution of resources must be defined in terms of what welfare they bring. "If we want to genuinely treat people as equals...then we must contrive to make their lives equally desirable to them."(p.189)

Dworkin catagorizes two theories of welfare: success theories, and concious state theories. In the first, success theory, we contribute a persons welfare to his success in achieving preferences, goals or ambitions. Resources will be transfered "until no further transfer can decrease the extent to which people differ in such success". (p.191) But people hold many different types of preferences. Dworkin catagorizes them into three hierarchical levels: political, impersonal. and personal.

Success theories.

People have standards: desert, merit, sympathy, for how goods, resources and opportunities of a community should be distributed among people. As well as preferences about how material things should be distributed, people hold preferences about things affecting other than their own lives or situations. They may prefer the advancement of science, art, music or sport. People also hold personal preferences or ambitions about their own lives and circumstances. Dworkin realizes that these are not mutially exclusive. Equality of welfare in the widest sense would be a result of the fulfilment of all three preferences.

Dworkin discounts equalizing political preferences by illustrating an example of the racial bigot. People hold many diverging political theories,if they should be equal in the degree to which their political hopes are realized, equality would require us to compensate someone whose political hopes were repressed and in fact would be compensated for their inequality. We could amend this example and discount the racial bigot on grounds of being "insincere, unreflective, or personally wicked" but this would distort our conception of equality. There would be no reason why we wouldn't be obligated to do the same for cases of benevolent and selfish political conceptions, (we would have to compensate people the more they disagree with equality). Dworkin therefor rejects a equalization of political preferences as grounds for a success theory of equality of welfare.

JUST SPACES JUST PLACES

> But it is surely a mark against any conception of equality that it recommends a distribution in which people have more for themselves the more they disapprove or are unmoved by equality.
> We could not accept these preferences as conceptions of equality or as rights of a just society.(p.)

The second standard of success by which we can measure an equality of welfare is the equalization according to impersonal preferences. People are equal in so far as their nonpolitical hopes are realized. This conception requires we should compensate someone who hopes "life is discovered on mars", and this is absurd. Someone might claim that this is an unreasonable preference, and perhaps it is, but claiming it is so, requires a seperate account, theory , of which preferences are reasonable. Would preferences that an island coast not be eroded by the ocean, or hopes that no animal species will ever become extinct require a transfer of resources to these projects, or a compenstation to the people who prefer these harder goals? If these can all be considered unreasonable, the only way out to hold onto this conception as an adequate claim on welfare, would be to assume each person has a fair share of resources that he can commit to any project he desires. Dworkin shows that if we assume this, the conception is no longer a simple equalization of welfare, but an equalization of resources. This Dworkin considers later. Dworkin therefor rejects the equality of impersonal preferences as adequate for legitemizing a success theory of welfare.

The third standard of success for Dworkin is that people should be made equal in their personal preferences, in what they want to do. We however do not abstractly choose personal lives, we choose between relationships, experiences and achievements against assumptions on the kind of resources we might have. Therefore people need to know, or at least be able to speculate on, the kinds of resources they may have, inorder to pick a life style. How then can these resources be distributed? Dworkin points to a way out of this circle by showing that people make all choices deliberately. "Luck, occasion, habit, all play important roles". Relative preferences are defined once these choices are made. These choices are made regarding a more comprehensive ambition.

But isn't this ambition simply a preference? Dworkin thinks not.

> Preferences are choices of something prefered to something else; they represent the result of a decision, of a process of making what one wants more concrete. But the ambition to find value in life is not chosed as against alternatives, for their is no alternative in the ordinary sense. Ambition does not make plans more concrete, it is simply the condition of having any plans at all.(p. 207 ?)

Dworkin refutes one last modification of this principle. Is not the conception of welfare grounded in making people equal in what they should value fundamentally, and not in what they do infact value? Dworkin rejects this modification. "It is absurd to suppose that people should find value only in relative success without regard to the intrinsic value or importance of the life at which they are relatively successful. (p. 208) This Dworkin points out is a meaningless judgement

because it assumes that there can be a single overall judgement that differs from relative success, or how much enjoyment there is in it.

> Suppose Jack and Jill have equal resources and that they are otherwise roughly similar in every way except in respect of the beliefs I am about to mention. They are both healthy, neither handicapped, both reasonably successful in their chosen occupations, neither outstandingly accomplished or creative. They take roughly the same enjoyment from their day to day life. But Jack (who has been much influenced by genre painting) thinks that any ordinary life fully engaged in projects is a life of value, while Jill...is much more demanding. Jack thinks for example that the life of a busy peasant who achieves very little and leaves nothing behind is full of value, while Jill thinks that such a life is only full of failure. If each is asked to assess the overall value of his or her own life, Jack wuld rate his high and Jill hers low. But their is surely no reason in that fact for transferring resources from Jack to Jill provided only that Jill would then rate her life, while still of little overall success, a bit higher.(p.213)
>
> *People can not be treated as equals by making them equal in some dimension they value unequally.(p.245)*

Conscious State Theories

The second plausible theory of equality of welfare, Dworkin calls a conscious state theory. "Distribution should attempt to make people as equal as possible in some aspect or quality of their conscious life". (p.192) Dworkin's arguments against this theory are similar to his arguments against equality of relative success. People also differ in the amount of importance each attaches to what he feels in a conscious state. "Please, enjoyment, pain, dissatisfaction, are all components of everyone's conception of the good life. But only as components, because almost no one pursues only enjoyment or will

make any large sacrifice of something else he values to avoid a small amount of pain." (p.221)

Utilitarians would state that this person is simply finding enjoyment in some other aspect. "Two scholars, for example, may both value creative work, but one may be willing to give more up, by way of social pleasure or the enjoyments of reputaion or the satisfaction that comes from completing a piece of research well done, to do work that is in fact more original. (p.221) Dworkin points out that this conception confuses enjoyment and value. "We often enjoy things we have done because we think they are valuable, not vice versa."

The same claim refutes the conscious state theories: people can not be treated as equals by making them equal in some dimension they value unequally.

Dworkin disclaims the first conception of equality, equality of welfare.

EQUALITY OF RESOURCES

The second conception of welfare that Dworkin considers is equality as equalizing resources.

> A distributional scheme treats people as equals when it distributes or transfers resources among them until no further transfer would leave their shares of the total resources more equal. (p. 186)

Dworkin defines a suitable conception of equality of resources by presuppossing an economic market which distributes resources according

to an envy test, until no one would prefer someone elses share to his own. The envy test is neccesary because a fair distribution can not be achieved by a simple "mechanical division of resources", which may distribute arbitrarily. He gives an example of immigrants on an island dividing resources among themselves.

A mechanical division of resources could end up to be an unfair one because suppose the divider transforms all of the resources into a "stock of plover's eggs and pre-phylloxera claret" by trading with another island. An equal division of baskets and bottles may pass the envy test , but if one of the immigrants hates plovers eggs, or pre-phylloxera claret and all of the others love it, he would have been teated unequally. Therefore Dworkin concludes an auction is needed to distribute the resources.

The auction would then produce a preliminary distribution. But the economy would not be static, it might produce additional goods or it may acquire them by trade. The original equality would then change, some immigrants would have more than others. How would we regard and distribute these new goods post auction?

Dworkin begins considering the post-auction economy my considering changes that would occur as a result of luck to some of the immigrants. He defines two kinds of luck- option and brute luck. An optioned luck is similar to a calculated gamble, it is deliberate, and the optionee accepts an isolated risk. Brute luck can be considered hard

luck-being hit by a rock. The risks are not deliberate. Insurance provides a link between brute and optioned luck.

Should option luck -calculated risk, enter the equation of distribution of resources? Taking risks is a personality traite. These are choosen life styles that people want to live. The premise of the auction was that "people should pay the price of the life they have decided to lead, measured in what others give up inorder that they can do so."(p. 294) Therefore differences that arise because of optioned luck should be allowed to affect the distributions.

But surely the same can not be true of brute luck, therefore insurance can be bought to equalize the brute luck. If two people suffer an accident that blinds them, and only one has insurance, the condition is similar to an option luck. Both of these people took equal risk, they both could have bought insurance, and one looses. The blind person that has insurance therfore can be considered to have option luck and should be compensated, the blind person without insurance has brute bad luck.

But what of persons born blind, or blinded before they can buy insurance? What of handicaps, which are not equally distributed among people, they are partly genetically determined? These people would be taken care of by an insrance pool created by a compulsory taxation.

JUST SPACES JUST PLACES

Once luck is accounted for how would differences in production and trade be distributed? Suppose one farmer is better at producing a crop or for bargaining for goods. But isn't the envy test still accurate if we consider the persons share of resources and occupation over an entire life rather than at any instant? There may be a objection to this that we are considering an envy test of the equality of resources with equality of people, or equality of resources with equality of opportunity.

Differences in occupation generate unfair differences in wealth. "Unfair differences are those traceable to genetic luck, to talents that make some people prosperous but are denied to others who would exploit them to the full if they had them."(p.314) The differences in skills among people can be treated similar to handicaps. We could provide an insurance pool to draw from. However skills differ from handicaps because they are sufficiently known and fixed before persons enter the insurance market. This query can be remedied by assuming eventhough skills are fixed and known, people do not know what their skills are worth in the market, what income they can generate.

The distribution of resources according to an equal innitial auction, followed by trade and production constrained by taxation resembling hypothetical insurance markets that secures individuals against unforseen genetic differences or luck would be an adequate conception of equality.

Dworkin's two hypothetical insurance markets would resemble this:

1. for handicaps and brute luck, would resemble an ordinary insurance market.

2. for differential talents and skills- an insurance policy that would protect them against not having the very highest income projected for the economy, and would pay them, if they do not. (p. 321)

Advantages or constraints of this ideal. Does it give direction to the environment?

A common way to conceive of equality of the environment is to define the environment according to ecological principles. We should be equal in which the "form of the environment supports the vital functions, the biological requirements". (Lynch p. 118 1983)

Dworkin, I think would regard this as attempting to equalize welfare, *what people prefer or what they should prefer.* I have shown that he disclaims this by showing that making people equal in things they do not value equally is not equality at all. We therefore,I think, can not find equality in environments through planning according to ecological principles, "sustenance, safety, consonance". (See Lynch) We are treating people equally with respect to a commodity or opportunity, and not treating them as equals. Dworkin's argument is I think convincing and needs no further examination. What about the implications to the environment of equality as equalizing resources?

JUST SPACES JUST PLACES

The answer to this question however raises two additional questions. In what sense can we consider the environment as a resource? In what sense can we insure parts of it? These questions are however, problematic without a better description of what we mean by the environment. Can we define it as a resource? This is the subject of the following chapter.

A SENSE OF LIBERTY

Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts Of Liberty.

> *Injustice, poverty, slavery, ignorance, these may be cured by reform or revolution. But men do not live only by fighting evils. They live by positive goals, individual and collective, a vast variety of them, seldom predictable , at times incompatable.* (Berlin in Haar p.233)

The second aspect of a just society we would agree on is some form of liberty. Berlin in Two Concepts of Liberty, describes two major conceptions of liberty in the histroy of ideas. He describes both in this essay by asking what makes each worth pursuing.

> The sense of freedom ...entails not simply the absence of fustration (which may be obtained by killing or eliminating desires), but the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities -absence of obstructions on roads along which a man can decide to walk.
> Such freedom ultimately depends not on whether I wish to walk at all, or how far, but on how many doors are open, how open they are, upon their relative imporatnce in my life, even though it may be impossible literally to measure this in any quantitative fashion.
> The freedom of which I speak is the opportunity for action, rather than action itself. If I enjoy the right to walk, but I do not, I am no less free.

These two concepts of freedom are not mutually exclusive, but have developed differently. Today they are in direct conflict with one another. The first concept of freedom answers the question: "by whom am I governed?", or "who is master?" The second concept answers the question: "how much am I governed?", or "over what area am I master?" The first Berlin calls positive, and is freedom to "self-realization", the second he calls negative, and is a freedom to "self-determination".

JUST SPACES JUST PLACES

A concept of negative freedom would state, to be free is to be free from the interference with my activities.

> Negative freedom is something the extent of which...simply seems to depend on the power to choose between at any rate two alternatives. Nevertheless, not all choices are equally free, or free at all. If in a totalitarian state I betray my friend under threat of torture...I can reasonably say I did not act freely....The mere existence of alternatives is not, therfore, enough to make my action free.... The extent of my freedom seems to depend on a) how many possibilities are open to me...; b) how easy or difficult each of these possibilities is to actualize; c) how important in my plan of life, given my character and circumstances, these possibilities are when compared with the other; d)how far they are closed and open by deliberate human acts; e)what value not merely the agent, but the general sentiment of the society in which he lives, puts on the various possibilities.(p. 130)

Alternately the concept of positive freedom Berlin states is, "to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes".(p.131) To be free in a positive sense is to believe this is true.

> The positive conception of freedom is self mastery, with its suggestion of a man divided among himself, has infact...lent itself to the splitting of the personality in two: the transcendent, dominant controller, and the empiricle bundle of desires and passions to be disciplined and brought to heel.This demonstrates...that conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what constitutes a self, a person, a man.

Freedom is them synonomous with self-direction. Self-direction, however, has developed into two senses by the split in personality: self-abnegation, and self realization. Each of these has devloped to constitute a form of positive or negative freedom. How has each concept of freedom developed?

SELF- ABNEGATION: "The retreat to the inner citadel".

One way to attain self-direction, or independence, is to eliminate the constraining factors, the other way is to deny they exist. I am free because of the ability to do what I wish, if I can not I simply rid my self of these wishes, and I become free again. Individuals can therefore, deny themselves and refuse their desires inorder to attain a freedom.

> I may be prevented by the laws of nature, or by accidents, or the activities of men, or the effect, often undesigned of human institutions. These forces may be too much for me. What am I to do to avaid being crushed by them? I must liberate myself from desires that I know I can not realize.(p.135)

Attaining freedom by self-abnegation is a form of "retreat to the inner citadel", a "inner immigration of public life" for Berlin. This resistance to desires forms a hard shell around the personality. The personality of the individual becomes autonomous, and heteronomous. "To act and not to be acted upon". "To rid myself of fear, or love, or the desire to conform is to liberate myself from the despotism of something which I can not control".(p. 138)[1] The individual withdraws into oneself because too many avenues of action are blocked. These conditions forming withdrawn personalities Berlin describes as characteristic of Rome at the end of the Republic, Greece before the Macadonians, and Germany in the 17th century.

I eliminate the obstacles in my path by abandoning my path. I

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[1] An extension of this concept, the formation of a withdrawn personality- is a primary theme in the writings of Simmel and Sennett. I will look at these conceptions in the following section of this paper.

> retreat into my own sect, my owned planned economy, my own deliberately insulated territory, where no voices from the outside need to be listened to, and no external forces can have effect. This is a form of search for security; but it has also been called the search for personal or national freedom or independence.(p.136)

But has political freedom really been created , by negating my blocked desires. According to Berlin it has not.

> If I save myself from an adversary by retreating indoors and locking every entrance and exit, I may remain freer than if I had been captured by him, but am I freer than if I had defeated or captured him? If I go too far, contract myself into too small a space, I shall suffocate and die.
> Ascetic self-denial may be a source of integrity or serenity and spiritual strength, but it is difficult to see how it can be called an enlargement of liberty. (p. 140)

Is this the same for positive liberty. How has it developed?

SELF-REALIZATION and positive freedom

Is there another way to be self-directed other than denying onself?

"The only true method of attaining freedom, we are told is by the use of critical reason, the understanding of what is neccessary and what is contingent".(p.141) Nature is governed by rules -axioms and symbols. We can attain freedom if we are no longer dominated by them and understand them. An individual is free only if he plans his life in accordance with his own will. Because I impose these plans, made up of rules, on myself they can not oppress me. Berlin finds an analogy in the working of a musician.

> For the musician, after he has assimilated the pattern of the composer's score, and has made the composer's end his own, the playing of the music is not obedience to external laws, a compulsion and a barrier to liberty, but a free and unimpeded exercise. The player is not bound to the score as an ox to the plough, or a factory worker to the machine. He has absorbed the

> score into his own system, has, by understanding it, identified it with himself, has changed it from an impediment to free activity into an element in that activity itself.

This must also apply to all "obstacles which present themselves as so many lumps of external stuff blocking self-development".[1] This is a positive conception of freedom by reason, rather than a negative conception of a field without obstacles.

Negative freedom came about, therefore, trough a retreat to an inner citadel. It can be characterized as a self-denial, an abandoning of path, or a resistence to constraints. The result is a liberation by resistence and withdrawl into onself.

Positive freedom, alternatively, was liberation through a critical reason. Liberty is a freedom to plan ones life in accordance with ones will. This self-direction requires an understanding of the rules and workings of which things are necessary to life plans and which are not.

These conceptions of negative and positive freedoms do not exist simple in the conceptions of individuals. These freedoms produce different forms of social practice and social political life.

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[1] Berlin points out that Hegel and Marx argue from a similar premise of freedom. To understand the world is to be free. However they substitute history and social institutions for nature, as what controls human character and human action. I will look more closely at these arguments in the desciption of David Harvey's work, and in the following section.

Self denial leads to a "search for status" among individuals. The recognition of this status is akin to negative freedom but for an entire group. "I feel myself to be someone or nobody in terms of my position and function in the social whole".

> For I am not so recognized, them I may fail to recognize, I may doubt my own claim to be a fully independent human being.
> So much can I desire this, that I may, in my bitter longing for status, prefer to be bullied and misgoverned by some member of my own race or social class, by whom I am, nevertheless, recognized as a man and as a rival....
> I may not get negative liberty at the hands of the members of my own society, yet they are members of my own group; they understand me, as I understand them; and this understanding creates within me the sense of being someone in the world.(p. 157)

But this Berlin shows to be a misconception of social freedom.

> It is only the confusion of desire for liberty with this profound and universal craving for status and understanding, further confounded by being indentified with the notion of social self-direction, where the self to be liberated is no longer the individual but the social whole, that makes it posible for men, while submitting to the authority of oligarchs or dictators, to claim that this in some sense liberates them.(p.158)

Negative freedom taken alone and extended into a social realm turns into a misconceived social freedom. Is the same true for positive freedom?

Berlin shows that the French Revolution is an example of a development of a common positive freedom of collective self-direction. Liberty was was given to all in the form of a public power that had the right to intervene in every aspect of the citizen's life. A conflict however arose between the sovereignty of "the people" and individuals. "A

sovereignty by the people is not necesarily freedom it merely shifts the burden of slavery".

> Perhaps the chief value for liberals of political positive rights of participation in government, is as a means for protecting what they hold to be an ultimate value, namely individual negative liberty. (p. 165)

What then constitutes a free society for Berlin? Two intermittent principles, containing both positive and negative conceptions of freedom, would have to govern it. The first principle would guarantee that only rights are absolute, and not powers. "Men have an absolute right to refuse to behave inhumanly". The second would construct "barriers to the imposition of one mans will on another". "There are limits within which men should be inviolable as normal human beings".The freedom of a society can therefore be measured by the "strength of these barriers and the number of paths they keep open for members".(p. 165)

Berlin concludes asking is individual liberty therfore incompatable with social justice and political equaility?

> (I) have tried to show that it is the notion of freedom in its positive sense, that is at the hear of demands for national or social self-direction which animates the most powerful and morally just public movements of our time.
>
> But equally it seems to me that the belief that some single formula can in principle be found whereby all the diverse ends of men can be harmoniously realized is demonstrably false. (T)he ends of man are many, and not all of them are in principle compatable with each other, then the possibilty of conflict -and of tragedy- can never wholly be eliminated from human life, either personal or social. The necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the human condition. This gives its value to freedom as Action had conceived of it -as an end in itself, and not as a temporary need, arising out of our confused notions and irrational and

> disordered lives, a predicament which a panacea could one day put right. (p.169)
>
> The extent of a man's or a persons liberty to choose to live as they desire must be weighed against the claims of many other values, of which equality , or justice, or happiness, or security, or public order are prhaps the most obvious examples. (p.170)
>
> Pluralism with the measure of negative liberty that it entails, seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great, disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of positive self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind.
> In the end men choose between ultimate value; they choose as they do, because their life and thought are determined by fundamental moral catagories and concepts that are, at any rate over large stretches of time and space, a part of their being and thought and sense of their own identity; part of what makes them human. (p172)

Advantages or constaints of this ideal. Does it give direction to the environment ?

Berlin defines two senses of liberty, negative and positive. Negative liberty depends on the removal of constraints, and obstacles to my ability to choose between possible activities and choices. (However not all choices are equally free for Berlin as he points out above.)

Negative liberty is commonly practiced in the environment by planning and designing diversity and choice in behavior. This appropriation of negative liberty by architects and planners is however also problematic without a more explicit account of how behavior limits and constraints a persons ability to choose between "significant choices". Is the environment as giving a structure to our behavior an appropriate way of conceiving the environment?

The second side of liberty, positive liberty is more easily appropriated to the environment. Lynch gives an interesting account of positive liberty when defining possible values childrens environments should take.

> (O)ne theme has to do with the freedom to range, on the one hand, with its attendant sensation of curiosity, wonder, and excitement, and on the other hand, the ability to withdraw, to dream, to be safe in ones own protected place. The opportunity to manipulate things and to test oneself is a pleasant memory and so is the growth of an understanding of place, community, and productive function, and of the childs relation to it.

Lynch is clearly defining a sense of positive freedom here. The only objection I have is he limits it to environments for children. There is no reason why these values should not exist for all environments. This is how I read read Berlin's contribution.

The question remains, although, how does this positive freedom exist in everyday activities. The answer similarly must depend on a clearer account of the environment itself.

A SENSE OF OPPORTUNITY

R.H. Tawney, Equality.

Equality and liberty defined specifically and considered seperately are adequate aspects of just society. However when considered simultaneously they are often thought of as being incompatable and in conflict. The free unconstrained individual pursuing self-directed ends is antithetical to social restraints -taxation, redistribution. The third aspect of a just society comes from an attempt by R.H. Tawney in Equality to find a compatibility between equality and liberty.

There are two definitions of equality for Tawney."It may affirm that men are, on the whole, very similar in their natural endowments of character and intelligence. On the other hand it may assert that while they differ profoundly as individuals in capacity and character, they are equally entitled as human beings to consideration and respect... all its members may be equally enabled to make the best of such powers as they posses."(p.46)

The first definition is inadequate for Tawney because it underestimates the significance of qualities, opportunities and backgrounds people inherit. Equality when placed side by side with liberty can not mean that men are equally intelligent or are equal in character, they begin lives which are substantially unequal. But men are equal by the second definition, they are equal in a social, national, communal life.

> The equality which all of these thinkers emphasize as desirable is not equality of capacity or attainment, but of circumstances,

> institutions, and manner of life. The inequality which they deplore is not inequality of personal gifts, but of the social and economic environment....Social institutions -property rights, organization of industry, and a system of public health and education -should be planned, as far as posible, to emphasize and strengthen, not the class differences which divide, but the common humanity which units them. (p.48)

Tawney's conception of equality is not simply an individualistic one. He realizes this will conflict with an individual liberty that is commonly based in a political liberty -a liberty existing as a political principle.

> Hence, when liberty is construed, realistically, or implying, not merely a minimum of civil and political rights, but securities that the economically weak will not be at the mercy of the economically strong, and that the control of those aspects of economic life by which all are affected will be amenable, in the last resort to the will of all, a large measure of equality, so far as being inimical to liberty, is essential to it. (p.168)

Tawney is intersted in economic liberty. Liberty must take into account economic as well as political relations.

> For freedom is allways relative to power, and the kind of freedom which at any moment it is most urgent to affirm depends on the nature of the power which is prevalent and established. Since political arangements may be such as to check excess of power, while economic arrangements permit or encourage them, a society or a large part of it, may be both politically free and economically the opposite. It may be protected against arbitrary action by the agents of government, and be without the security against economic oppression which corresponds to civil liberty.

Equality and liberty find compatability in three aspects of society.[1] The first is in levels of individual life. All individuals should live as self respecting persons. The second is the society should enable the

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[1] This argument appears in Gutmann p. 79.

individual to appear dignified, and a worth. The third aspect is that the society should ecourage individuals to be conscious of their common humanity.

The first aspect Tawney borrows from traditional Welfarists and follows naturally from a definition of Welfare. The second and third, however, to be valid, Tawney must create and establish a common point from where people appear dignified, and are conscious of a commonality. Tawney searches concepts of class, culture, and opportunity inorder to do this.

Inequality is produced and exists in the structure of a society.

> Society is not merely, however, an economic mechanism in which different groups combine for the purpose of production; it is also a system of social groups with varying standards of expenditure and habits of life, and different positions, not only on an economic but on a social scale. It has therfore a social as well as an economic pattern.(p. 71)

These systems of social groups Tawney regards as class. He extends the normal definition of class beyond the simple division of labor, or division of resources and "manner of life".Tawney considers class in a much wider sense. It consists of consumption -income and the source of income; production -ownership of property; standards of expenditure -security of economic position; position in the economic system -belonging by tradition, education, association to social groups. Classes are points that correct and differentiate "social contours". These are differentiated by differences between pecuniary income, circumstances, opportunities.

In England classes occured because of a tradition of inherited wealth that produced differences in the quality of education, public -private schools, and differences in the quality of health, environment, and physical well being of classes.

> It is the nature of privilege and tyranny to be unconscious of themselves, and to protest, when challenged, that their horns and hooves are not dangerous, as in the past, but useful and handsome decorations, which no self respecting society would dream of dispensing with.(p.90)
> A small minority enjoy conditions which are favourable to health, and receive prolonged and careful nurture, and are encouraged to regard themselves as belonging to a social group which will excercise responsibility and direction, the great majority are exposed to conditions in which health, if not impossible, is necessarily precarious, and end their education just at the age when their powers are beginning to develop, and are still sometimes encouraged to believe that the qualities most desirable in common men are docility, and a respect for their betters, and a habit of submission.(p.79)

Communities should be better classified according to its economic and social forces that are most influential "in determining the practical operation of political institutions". These were more significant for determning the culture of that community.

Culture, Tawney defines as synonomous with civilization, and civilization with an equality of dignity and human refinement. Culture is produced by a humanism.

> A nation is not civilized because a handful of its members are successful in acquiring large sums of money and in persuading their fellows that a catastrophe will occur if they do not acquire it....what matters to a society is less what it owns than what it is and how it uses its possessions. It is civilized in so far as its conduct is guided by a just appreciation of spiritual ends, in so far as it uses its material resources to promote the dignity and refinement of the individual human beings who compose it.(p.81)

JUST SPACES JUST PLACES

> (Humanism), it is the attitude which judges the externalities of life by their effect in assisting or hindering the life of the spirit. It is the belief that the machinery of existence -property and material wealth and industrial organization, and the whole fabric and mechanism of social institutions is to be regarded as a means to an end, and that this end is the growth towards perfection of indivdual human beings.
>
> Its aim is to liberate and cultivate the powers which make for energy and refinement; and it is critical, therefore, of all forms of organization which sacrifice spontaneity to mechanism, or which seek, whether in the name of economic efficiency or of social equality, to reduce the variety of individual character and genius to a drab and monotonous uniformity.But it desires to cultivate these powers in all men, not only in few. (p.85

Equality of opportunity.

> (A) community must draw on a stream of fresh talent, in order to avoid stagnation, and that, unless individuals of ability can turn their powers to account, they are embittered by a sense of defeat and frustration. The existence of opportunities to move from point to point on an economic scale, and to mount from humble origins to success and affluence, is a condition, therfore, both of social well being and of individual happiness, and impediments which deny them to some, while lavishing them to others, are injurious to both. But opportunities to rise are not a substitute for a large measure of practical equality, nor do they make immaterial large disparities of income and social condition....The existence of such opportunities infact, and not merely in form, depends not only upon and open road, but upon an equal start.It is precisely, of course, when capacity is aided by a high level of general well-being in the millieu surrounding it, that its ascent is most likely to be regular and rapid, rather than fitul and intermittent.(p.106)

Equality of opportunity for Tawney has a positive as well as a negative meaning. It is the freedom from restraint, the absence of disabilities, and the possesion of powers-the presence of abilities.

> What is repulsive is not that one man should earn more than others, for where community of environment, and a common education and habit of life have bred a common tradition of respect and consideration, these details of the counting house are forgotten or ignored. It is that some classes should be excluded from the heritage of civilization which others enjoy, and that the fact of human fellowship, which is ultimate and

> profound, should be obscured by economic contrasts, which are trivial and superficial.(p.113)

Tawney identifies three stategies for attaining this equality.

1. Communal provision -extension of social services and progressive taxation.

2. Trade unions- set a limit on the ability of one group to impose its will on another.

3. Public services, cooperative movements -secure for the public all profit beyond minimun rate.

The first, extending social services, he concludes is the best way for achieving equality. These will eliminate the arbitrary contrasts of circumstances and opportunity that are a form of inequality. He proposes three specific routes: to raise the standard of health, to equalize educational opportunities, and to provide contingencies of life inorder to mitigate security.

Advantages or constraints of this ideal. Does it give direction to the environment?

Planners and architects have commonly equated opportunity with providing access for individuals. Lynch includes access in five performance dimensions of city form. Access is the "ability to reach other persons, activities, resources, services, information, or places, including the quality and diversity of the elements which can be reached".

Stated this way, *emphasizing the ability to reach,* I think Lynch is speaking for a common conception among planners and architects, he is more accurately refering to an approximate sense of negative liberty. Lynch is not proposing a equal distended common space, but an access to the places that are significant for a persons self-determination or self-realization. As I have shown after Berlin, only the positive conceptions are explicitly appropriate for environment. The negative conceptions depend on a more explicit account of behavior in environments.

Alternatively Tawney's sense of opportunity is to provide an *equal start* to all individuals. This he proposes by extending social services: raising the standards of health, equalizing educational opportunities, and providing insurance.

The first two have a direct bearing on the location and the form of health care facilities, and the location and form of environments for the education of children. It is clear from Tawney's accounts of a sense of opportunity these environments are significant, however in what ways they are can only be answered by a closer examination of the environment.

A SENSE OF PARTICIPATION

J.S. Mill, On Liberty

I have so far traced, what commonly are conceived as being, three aspects of a just society: equality, liberty, and opportunity. Equality I have defined, after Dworkin to consist of either the equalization of welfare or the equalization of resources. Similarly I looked to Berlin inorder to define liberty. Berlin defined two kinds of liberty: negative, the removal of constraints; and positive, self realization. The third aspect Of a just society arose because of the apparent incompatibility of equality and liberty. I showed how Tawney's arguments extending the welfare state by equalizing opportunities and by enforcing social rights. Tawney's guaranteed social amenities, healthcare, education, and security became a meaningful excercise of political rights and individual freedoms.

This extension of individual liberty and equality to include certain social rights and the establishment and preservation of opportunities reveales a common, social, and public dimension. Any further consideration, therefore, of what may contribute to a just society would have to consider the adequacy of simply equalizing resources or guaranteeing freedoms among individuals, and the process by which these are acheived. Would a society composed of dimensions of individual equality, liberty, opportunity be sufficient to qualify it as just, (in any sense of justice) ?

JUST SPACES JUST PLACES

The fourth aspect of a just society therefore examines the problems of a process of acheiving and maintaining justice: democracy and participation. Participation as normally understood -political participation, or in its general and specific forms- participatory opportunity, and self-development are social extensions and in some instances preconditions for individual opportunity. They constitute as well as are constituted by individual activity. I will refer to J. S. Mills conceptions of participation to extend Tawney's arguments for participatory opportunity, and concerns for a consciousness of a common humanity.

On Liberty is an attempt to find a fit between individual independence and social control by establishing the limits to a public opinion on individual independence. Mill is addressing a common problem of democracy : do and if so when do, aspects of liberty and democracy conflict? How do we legitimate the control, and which aspects do we control?

Mills approach to the problem is as informative for loacting justice as his actual arguments. He begins unraveling the problems of democracy and liberty by pointing to an aspect which is bound between and constitutes each of them: *judgement:* thought and communication. Judgement, as the thinking critical individual creating a variety of situations is for Mill one of the fundamental elements of the "well-being" of the individual. These abilities are significant because they set the limits to the intervention of the government and legitimize

a participatory democracy.

> Individuality is the same thing with development, and that it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well develped human beings.
>
> It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the works partake the character of those who do them, by the same process human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more abundance.

The three main parts to Mill's arguments are titled: 1) "Of the liberty of Thougth and Discussion"; 2)"Of Individuality, As One Of The Elements Of Wellbeing"; 3)"Of The Limits To The Authority Of Society Over The Individual". This approach to the problem of democracy is significant because Mill realizes inorder to escape simplistic and misleading observations of the problems of democracy and individual liberty, he must first be explicit about and define the particular aspects of individuals that may constitute or legitimize a meaningful participation. He does not take for granted a particular paradigm[1] of participation or liberty, or a particular definition of it based on western democracy.

Mill begins from his Utilitarian background considering human beings as maximizing happiness. He defines individual happiness as human self-development. He fits the individual into a democratic process which depends on the opportunity for human self-development.

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[1] I will take the liberty of using this term only once.

Mill defines human liberty as consisting of three things. First it consists of a "liberty of consciousness". This includes the liberty of thought, feeling, expressing and publishing opinions. Secondly liberty consists of the ability to pursue ones own taste, goals, so long as their consequences will not harm or impinge others from following their own. Third, liberty consists of the ability to unite for any purpose not involving harm to others. Mill expands the philosphical grounds on which these principles rest.

For Mill the individual maximizes happiness through his self development and self realization. An Individuals happiness is dependent on the developed human faculties of critical reflections, reason, judgement and choice. Self development has no meaning by itself, it is to guide purposeful actions. It is a continual debate with others. A process of correcting and completeing opinions.

> Complete liberty of contradicting and disaproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth for principles of action.
> The whole strength and value, then, of human judgement depending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it when the means of setting it right are kept constanty at hand....The steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those of others,...is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it. (p.19)

Mill places a very high value on the individuals ability to critically reason among other individuals. So much so that this self-realization and the ability to act on it, socially and politically, constitues an essential partof the well being of the individual. This fully developed

individual, original and creating diverse forms of life, is the basis for Mill arguements.

> It will not be denied by anybody that originality is a valuable element in human affairs. There is allways need of persons not only to discover new truths and point out when what were once truths are true no longer, but also to commence new practices and set the example of more enlightened conduct and better taste and sense in human life.

Two things are, therfore, important for human development: *freedom,* as a freedom of thought, judgement, spontaneity, and a *variety of everyday life situations,* "the circumstances which surround and shape their characters. Mill is therefore willing to forgo equality in the most basic sense for a fully developed individuality. But Mill's individual is not autonomous, rather he is inherently connected in the dynamics of political organization. Democracy provides both a framework for which these individuals can participate.

Democracy is a critical mechanism for guaranteeing individuality by which each is provided an opportunity to develop a full personality. "The free inquiry into experiments in living" would increase the rational intellect of a progressive human being. It would help one realize ones intersts, and to discover ones intersts as a social being, and would set a process for achieving those interests. Democracy would extend participation beyond the political use to an end in itself, and provide a "framework for self-development".

Mill therefore extends participation to take into account three forms: participatory opportunity, democratic participation, and self development.[1]

JUST SPACES JUST PLACES

What are the advantages and constraints of this aspect? Does it give direction to the environment?

Direct public participation is an integral part of the planning process. This, however, as I have pointed out in the introduction is framed by its inability to adequately account specifically and significantly for what the public is participating to decide. Participation, unless simply a goal of self -realization, (which I do not discount), can only be significant if the aspects of environments are defined explicitly according to particular socio-political aspects in mind. Locating a "significant participation" in the environment is problematic until these are found.

Mill does however more specifically define significant areas of participation as ones that develop a *full personality,* by allowing a "free inquiry into experiments in living". By doing so he gives participation a significance beyond public projects, projects dealing with public allocation of resources, and legitimizes decisions of how we live in our immediate everyday lives. Mills conception therefore legitimizes the scope of participation beyond simple public spaces and projects with committed public funds.

A SENSE OF JUSTICE

John Rawls, A Theory Of Justice

The last aspect of a just society I will consider is not a specific attribute of justice like equality, liberty, opportunity, and participation, but is an attempt to fit them into an explicit and complete theory of a just society. I am considering John Rawl's Theory Of Justice after these aspects because the assumptions and arguments Rawls makes raise more clearly the problems raised in Mill, the problems of defining a community or public good.

Although these problems are implicit in Tawney's and Mill's arguments they are more explicitly stated in Rawls. This is also one place where Rawls has been criticized: could there be a public life in Rawl's society?

Rawl's purpose for writing a Theory Of Justice is to illustrate an alternative to Utilitarian and Intutionist conceptions of justice. Utilitarian conceptions are based on the distribution of goods and services so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfactions, utility, for all of the individuals belonging to that group. Utilitarians can justify making individuals worst off inorder to increase the "greater good" of the society shared by others. This outcome of the utilitarian logic is not acceptable for Rawls. The intuitionists Rawls defines as synonomous with accepting a plurality. "(A)n irreducible family of first principles" is balanced against each other according to an intuition about which is

right or just and not according to specific principles. "The intuitionist believes...that the complexity of the moral facts defies our efforts to give a full account of our judgements and necessitates a plurality of competing principles".(p.39)

Rawl's criticizes the intutionists by arguing that ones intuition is determined by ones relative position of power, influence and ones different social interests. A distribution based simply on intuition may not, and most likely will not conform to a conception of a fair wage. "People with more ability and education will stress criteria which advance their ends.Those with more ability and education will stress criteria of skills and training, whereas those lacking these advantages urge the claim of need". (p.35)

Inorder to refute the intuitionist conceptions of justice, relying on intuitive capacities, and to refute the utilitarian conceptions, arguing for the maximization of the aggregate good of the greater, Rawls hypothesizes man in a state prior to his knowledge of these concepts -"an original position". These principles of intuition and utility are not self-evident , they can only be justified if chosen by individuals free of any knowledge of their relative position in society, their class, wealth, intelligence, strength, and free of any conceptions of goods, values and ends in their lives.

Rawl's original position is similar to Rousseau's, Locke's, and Hume's states of nature. These states of nature, in some cases were assumed

to actually have existed and in others to exist as only hypothetical situations. In both cases they were used to seperate the primary aspects of individuals from the secondary aspects accumulated over time, and to give the circmstances for which individuals would enter into contractual agreements to enter a community.

The original position Rawls uses, is based on a veil of ignorance where individuals do not know things about each other or themselves which would distinguish any individual from another. It is in this state of ignorance that individuals would choose the principles of justice; free from any prejudices, social biases, and based in conditions of equality, fairness and unanimity. They would do so by a process of what Rawls calls "reflective equilibrium". This is a kind of dialectic between the conditions of agreement and the judgements with the conforming principles. This bargaining between individuals in the original state, will result in a set of principles based only on the value they have of certain primary goods.

These principles guide the basic structure of society. They are the objects of the original agreement between "free and rational persons, concerned to further their own interests".

Rawls assumes these primary goods would be shared by all individuals regardless of their specific values and goals. They would include an individuals rights and freedoms, opportunities, power and wealth.

Individuals in the original position are motivated by a desire to secure these primary goods.

> (T)o establish these principles it is necessary to rely on some notion of goodness, for we need assumptions about the parties' motives in the original position. Since these assumptions must not jeopardize the prior place of the concept of right, the theory of the good used in arguing for the principles of justice is restricted to the bare essentials. This account of the good I call the thin theory: its purpose is to secure the premises about primary goods required to arrive at the principles of justice. Once this theory is worked out and the primary goods are accounted for, we are free to use the principles of justice in the further development of what I shall call the full theory of the good.(p.396)

The two principles individuals would choose in the original position would be first "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatable with a similar system of equal basic liberties compatable with a similar system of liberty for all", and second, "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both a)to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings priciple, and b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity".

These two principles would be lexically ordered , the first having complete priority over the second. The first guarantees the priority of liberty, through the equality in the "assignment of the basic rights and duties". These rights can be characterized as basic political rights;" the right to vote, freedom of speech, liberty of consciousness, freedom of

person along with the right to hold personal property, frededom of arbitrary arrest and seizure".

The second principle establishes a "priority of justice over efficiency and welfare". It holds that "social and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they result in compentating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society".(p.15)

> The intuitive idea is that since everyone's well-being depends upon a scheme of cooperation without which anyone could have a satisfactory life, the division of advantages should be such as to draw forth the willing cooperation of everyone taking part in it, including those less well situated. Yet this can be expected only if reasonable terms are proposed. The two principles mentioned seem to be a fair agreement on the basis of which those better endowed, or more fortunate in their social position, neither of which we can be said to deserve, could expect the willing cooperation of others when some workable scheme is a necessary condition of the welfare of all.(p. 15)

The first principle -the priority principle, provides for an equal liberty by the distribution of basic goods, the second principle -the difference principle, establishes a means of distributing the residual goods according to difference. The priority principle equalizes formal liberty. The difference principle maximizes the worth of liberty to the worst off.[1] How does Rawls define justice and how does he place it in relation to individuals and institutions?

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[1] Gutmann has pointed out that Rawl's two principles account for both negative and positive conceptions of liberty, incorporating classical liberal positions of liberty with more radical egalitarian positions on redistribution. The former is negative, the latter positive.(p.124)

It should be somewhat obvious already from the discussion of the original position and the two principles of justice that Rawls uses what I have been refering to as aspects of a just society in a more complete way than the other socio-political theorists I have considered. He does so by extending the common association of justice as a more equal distribution of goods, to justice as a way of judging the basic structure of society.

> Many different kinds of things are said to be just and unjust: not only laws, institutions, and social systems, but also particular actions of many kinds, including decisions, judgements, and imputations. We also call the attitudes and dispositions of persons, and persons themselves, just and unjust. Our topic is that of social justice. For us the primary subject of justice isthe basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation.(p.7)

Justice for Rawls is a set of principles that identify and legitemize relevant reasons for determining a balance between competing claims of rights, duties, economic opportunities, and social conditions.

What claims does Rawls make toward a community or public?

Rawl's discusses a sense of community when attempting to check the feasibility of his conceptions of justice and goodness. He is interested in how individuals may acquire a sense of justice. "My aim is to indicate the major steps whereby a person would acquire a understanding of and an attachment to the principles of Justice as he grows up in

this particular form of well-ordered society". (p.461) These conceptions of justice would be learned in three stages.

The first stage Rawls refers to as the "Morality Of Authority". In the most simple sense this is found in the relationships that arise between the child and his parents. A kind of "primitive" morality develops between the child who learns a trust and love for the parent. The parents in return must be "worthy objects " of the childs admiration..."arousing in him a sense of his own value and the desire to become the sort of person that they are.

> The childs morality of authority is primative because for the most part it consists of a collection of precepts, and he can not comprehend the larger scheme of right and justice within which the rules addressed to him are justified. (p.466)

The second stage in the develpment of a sense of justice Rawls refers to as a "Morality Of Association". This consists of the standards and roles individuals take in various associations. In a family this stage would be evident in the parental approvals and disapprovals of their childrens conduct. "As a child becomes older he is taught the standards of conduct suitable for one in his situation".(p.467) These standards of conduct are determined by the other members of the group, "normally characterized by a definite hierarchy, in which each member has certain rights and duties".

Forms of cooperation therfore emerge according to the intellectual judgement of the morality of the ideas held in that group.

> Thus just as in the first stage certain natural attitudes develop toward the parents, so here ties of friendship and confidence

> grow up among associates. (T)his intention to honor ones obligations and duties is seen as a form of good will...and this recognition arouses feelings of friendship and trust in return.(p.471)

Rawls asumes a morality of asscіation which is based on its "cooperative virtues": justice ,fidelity, trust, and integrity.Since everyone will benefit from everyone elses activities, individuals willview each other as equals, and so assiciates in a system of cooperation for the advantage of all.

This second stage , based on associations of thougts, rights, and duties, choosen by roles leads to a development of principles and the third stage of a sense of justice: Morality Of Principles.

> (O)nce the atttudes of love and trust, and the friendly feelings and mutual confidence, have been generated,... them the recognition that we and those for whom we care are the beneficiaries of an established and enduring just institution tends to engender in us the corresponding sense of justice. Individuals develop a desire to act upon principles of justice once they come to realize how these priciples promote a good for us as well as for others. In due course we come to appreciate the ideal of just human cooperation. (p.474)

These three stages in the development of a sense of justiec provide a basis for a social union of a community. This community can be characterized as a "cooperative venture for mutual advantage". (Sandel) Rawls points out that there are two conflicting ways to view this cooperation.

The first Rawls characterizes as a "private society". It is based on the self interest of the individuals and my social arrangements are

instrumental for achieving private ends. The social institutions have no value in themselves.

In the second characterization individuals "value their common institutions and activities as goods in themselves, and cooperation is advantageous for individuals". Each individuals good is recognized as a part of the complete activity. (p. 522)

What are the advantages and constraints of this ideal? Does it give direction to the environment?

Justice and planning

Planners have often practiced a common sense notion of justice. They have attempted to promote easier access to the middle class by removing the signs of difference and economic inequality between the classes. This has been mainly implemented through the location and construction of housing projects.

Housing has been a central concern of liberal sociologists. The production of housing, whether it takes on a"form of commodity production for the exchange value in a capitalist economy" or as a form of capital accumulation for the middle classes, has been an important aspect of the production and the distribution of wealth. (Sandel p.232) This is most evident today where the provision of housing is the central concern of most community development agencies, planning boards, and national urban policies. Sennett questions the adequacy of this emphasis on housing to the detriment of other

aspects of everyday life. A just society can not exist simply by legitimizing forms of private life. A "private justice" is a meaningless term. Public life is integral to any criteria for a society. What is missing in these common sense notions of justice are equal positive ideals.

Sennett is here taking a similar argument to Berlin. Justice can not be simply based on erasing injustices, or constraints in Berlins arguments, but must take into account and promote positive goals.

Justice is one of the many ideals we may live by in our everyday lives. But it is one that corresponds rights and liberties, equalities and opportunities -in the private and hence in our public lives. It is produced and reproduced in the social relations in everyday life. It is concerned with the motivations and consequences of human activity attempting to acheive it. It is both an ideal here and now -in space and time, and a goal. It is therefore intertwined with concepts of human action in time and space -in the environment.

A CRITICISM OF LIBERAL EGALITARIANS

David Harvey

I will end this section with a criticism of the liberal egalitarian tradition that I have explored above. I will follow David Harvey's arguments in *Social Justice and The City,* and specifically in the first part -"Liberal Formulations. Harvey's criticism is important for two reasons.

First, Social Justice In The City is an attempt to present a Marxist framework for a theory of social justice, therefore the basic assumptions of social justice differ. Secondly, Harvey trained as a geographer, is trying to locate a social justice in space by bringing together "questions of social and moral philosophy and material questions". Modes of inquiry which have remained separate in our minds. By raising the methodological problem between social and spatial theories as well as the content problem of poorely conceptionalized spatial concepts of our worlds, Harvey has, I think, identified a valuable direction for the theory and practice of environmental design.

This review of Harvey's criticism of a liberal egalitarian conception of justice and especially of Rawl's second principle of difference, in a sense, has made the transition into the following part of this paper easier.

Harvey is interested in "seeking an adequate and appropriate way to bring together, on the one hand, a viewpoint established in social and

moral philosophy and on the other material questions that the condition of urban centers in the western world point to". Social Justice in The City is a collection of essays which attempt to consider simultaneously social processes and spatial forms. Four themes reoccur throughout the essays: the nature of theory, the nature of space, the nature of social justice, and the nature of urbanism. These two themes are considered in two fundamentally different ways.

In the first part Harvey takes the definitions of these themes to be given, this he refers to as liberal formulations and comprise the first half of the essays. In the second part, the definitions of these themes are not fixed, "but are part of the process through which society embraces certain lines of thought inorder to rationalize certain lines of action in preference to others". This Harvey refers to as a socialist formulation and comprise the remainder of the essays.

[1] So the question of the nature of space in the first group of essays,

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[1] The socialist formulations correspond more closely to how Marx would have defined social justice. According to Wood, Marx's conception of justice is a measure of how well the transactions of institutions fit the internal logic and purposes of the prevailing modes of production. Justice can not be measured in abstract terms because it is present in the context of specific modes of human actions, institutions, and social facts.
Wood argues that Marx's critique of capitalism was not that it was unjust but because it is demoralizing. If the logic of a mode of production rests on the exploitation of one class by another, the institutions, human actions, and social facts that "satisfy the needs of the oppressors are infact just".
The point Wood is making about Marx, and I think follows similarly for Harvey is to assume universal meanings for concepts of human pratice (justice in this instance) is to forever seperate them their actual

liberal formulations, is answered philosophically. Space is conceptualized as either absolute space -a thing in itself, as relative space -a relation between objects, or as relational space -contained in objects. In the second group, the nature of space depends not on a philosophical answer but on an answer comming from human practice. Space can be all of the above, depending on the circumstances. "The question what is space ?" is replaced by by the question "how is it that different human practices create and make use of distinct conceptions of space". "How does human activity create the need for specific spatial concepts...?"(p.19)

Similarly, questions of the nature of social justice change in their liberal and socialist formulations. The liberal conceptions of justice establishes a-priori ethical principles and truths from moral philosophy to help evaluate events and activities, the socialist conception fashions these principles out of a study of human practice rather then out of external truths.

The significance of Harvey's discussion of Rawls in the end of the liberal formulations, is it is at the transition from the first to the second conceptions -the liberal to the socialist formulations.

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human practice. This can only lead to a further seperation of facts from value, ideology from practice, and will forever limit the ability to reveal their true natures.

SOCIAL JUSTICE AND SPATIAL SYSTEMS

> I want to diverge from the usual mode of normative analysis and look at the possibility of constituting a normative theory of spatial or territorial allocation based on principles of social justice. (p.96)

Harvey defines justice as a set of principles for "resolving conflicting claims". Social justice is a "particular application of just principles to conflicts which arise out of the necessity for social cooperation in seeking individual advancement". The allocation of benefits and burdens that come from the process of undertaking collective labor are what determine the principles of social justice.

Harvey's sense of justice in this instance, is similar to Rawl's, however it differs in one major way, and this originates in their starting assumptions. Harvey's principles of social justice are premised on a condition where individuals agree to undertake joint labor. Rawls however assumes an original position where individuals contract general socio-political relations. This difference leads to different conceptions of social justice. Harvey looks to the social and institutional arrangements associated with production and distribution. Rawls, on the other hand, is only concerned with distribution.

Harvey establishes two conditions of social justice. The first is concerned with determining what a fair distribution is, and the second with determining what a just way of achieving that distribution is.[1]

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[1] Two assumptions simplify the problem of formulating a concept of social justice relevant for geographical investigation for Harvey. First he

A Just Distribution

Harvey identifies 8 criteria commonly held among socio-political philosophers for distributing income.

-according to an inherent equality of individuals.
-according to a market determination of supply and demand.
-according to need.
-according to inherent rights.
-according to merit
-according to a contribution to a common good.
-according to actual productive contribution.
-according to individuals efforts and sacrifices.

The essence of social justice for Harvey exists in the ordering of three of these principles: need, contribution to the common good, and merit. The sum of a measure of each of these would equal the ammount of territorial justice. Harvey develops what each of these would mean in a geographical context, between a set of territories.

Needs. Needs are not constant but are relative. They depend on "catagories of human consciousness" and can be defined with respect to a minimum quantity and quality of each of the following "catagories and activities: food, housing, medical care, education, social and

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assumes income can be taken as a general definition of benefits and burdens. Secondly, social justice achieved at a territorial level will necessarily translate a social justice to those individuals located in that territory.
This second assumption Harvey realizes not to be totally legitimate. However the difficulty of accounting individual levels of justice, (which in any theory we would have to eventually do), prevents many attempts at formulating principles. He therefore assumes these problems away.

environmental service, consumer goods, recreational opportunities, neighborhood amenities, and transport facilities".

The problem with using need as a criteria for distribution is to determine a socially just definition of need. Harvey proposes four possible methods. The first is according to supply and demand -market demand, the second according to relative deprevation of a perceived need -"latent demand", the third according to statistical correlations of needs related to characteristics of demography -"potential demand", and the fourth according to expert opinion. The most appropriate way would depend on each specific catagory.

> The appropriate method may also vary from catagory to catagory -it may be best to determine consumer need through conventional supply and demand analysis, recreational needs through relative deprivation analysis, housing eeds through statistical analysis, and medical care through expert opinion.(p.105)

Contribution to the common Good. The second criteria for determining a socially just distribution is "concerned with how an allocation of resources to one territory affects conditions in another".

> The spread effects may be good or bad -pollution being an example of the latter. The notion of the contribution to the common good, (or common bad in the case of pollution), suggests that our existing technology should be used to extend our understanding of interregional income transfers, interregional linkages, spatial spread effects and so on, insofar as these have actual or perceived consequences for the distribution of income in society. (p.106)

A spatial organization and pattern of territorial resources allocation is better if it provides for extra benefits, according to need, " in other territories through spillover effects and multiplier effects.(p.108)

Merit. Merit Harvey defines as a "degree of environmental difficulty". Certain environmental hazards such as " drought, floods, earthquakes" and certain social hazards such as "crime against property, fire and riot dammage", create extra difficulty to human activity. "(E)xtra resources should be allocated according to counter these hazards".

The three principles of territorial justice ordered hierarchically can be summarized as follows.

> 1. The spatial organization and the pattern of regional investment should be such as to fulfil the needs of the populations.
>
> 2. A spatial organization and pattern of territorial resource allocation which provides extra benefits in the form of need fulfilment.. and aggregate output...in other territories is a better form of spatial organization and allocation.
>
> 3. Deviations in the pattern of territorial investment may be tolerated if they are designed to overcome specific environmental difficulties.(p.167)

How To Justly Allocate A Distribution

The second part of Harvey's investigation describes a means for justly distributing resources. Here he follows Rawl's second principle and asks, "how to design a form of spatial organization which maximizes the prospects of the least fortunate region".

> It should be possible to devise territorial boundaries to favour the least advantaged groups in which case social justice in allocation becomes the normative criteria for regionalization.(p.111)

This would not only be a means for distributing resources but would be the basis for determining the territorial definition of a region. These regions, however, could not be maintained in a capitalist ecomony. The premise of the economic system is that capital

investment moves to areas of higher returns; and would therefore will allways move away from the least advantaged areas.[1] These conclusions are based on Harvey's second assumtion that a distribution of justice across territories will lead to a justice across individuals. This of course is a large assumption, and one that has been debated among urban economists. The debate has centered around "place vs. people prosperity". (See Agnew).

SPACE-TERRITORY AND URBANISM

I have outlined Harvey's criticism of Rawl's Theory Of Justice for two reasons. First his assumptions on the criteria of social justice and the ways of achieving it differ and secondly he attempts to locate justice in space. These I have said could be starting points for a more significant conception of the environment. Harvey concludes his criticism of Rawl's with a further elaboration of the nature of space to territory and urbanism.

In the attempt to fit Rawls principles into space Harvey assumes a territorial definition of space. Harvey uses space here in a sense that

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[1] This argument Harvey develops more fully in his theory of the Circuits of Capital. Attempts to correct this by public policy would be futile because rates of return would adjust -they would equal the subsidy effect.
Some territories will allways benefit at the expense of others, in a market system with inequities built into the territorial definitions. The prospects of the least advantaged territory would never be as great as they could possible be under a different economic system.

he refers to as effective space. Later in his essays he realizes this to be an ineffective definition and reconceptualizs it to a created space.

> One significant element in this general process of differentiation is that created space replaces effective space as the overriding principle of geographical organization. In preindustrial society natural differentials in resource availability and in natural environments formed the basis for geographical differentiation. Effective space was created out of ecological differentiation by arranging for the flow of goods and services from areas of supply to areas of demand -flows which allowed for the accumulation of surpluses in urban areas. (p.309)
>
> The distinct role which space plays in both the organization of production and patterning of social relations is consequently expressed in urban structure. But urbanism is not merely a structure fashioned out of spatial logic. It has attached to it distinctive ideologies (urban versus rural images for example) and therefore has a certain autonomous function in fashioning the way of life of a people. And urban structure once created , affects the future development of social relationships and the organization of production. (p.307)
> The city is in part a storehouse of fixed assets accumulated out of previous production. It is constructed with a given technology and is built in the context of a given mode of production (which is not to say that all aspects of the built form of a city are functional with respect to the mode of production). Urbanism is a social form, a way of life predicated on, among other things, a certain division of labor and a certain hierarchical ordering of activity which is broadly consistent with the dominant mode of production. The city and urbanism can therefore function to stabilize a particular mode of production (they both help create the conditions for the self-perpetuation of that mode). But the city may also be the locus of the accumulated contradictions and therefore the likely birthplace of a new mode of production. (p. 203)

Harvey, therfore considers urbanism to be an inescapable part of territorial social justice. Production is tied to it as a fixed asset, which gives a place value for a longer period of time -it takes time for capital to relocate, then the value itself exists. This value is reproduced

in that territory, in that urban structure. There can be no justice therefore without considering justice across these territories.

ASPECTS OF JUSTICE

In the preceding section I have shown that social justice is an ideal made up of many aspects each of which could be correlated, or found, in some aspects of the environment. Social justice therefore consisted of a sense of equality, but the equality of resources depended on determining how the environment was a resource, a sense of positive liberty, a sense of opportunity as providing an equal start, and a sense of participation dependent on a significant account of equality, liberty, and opportunity, and a sense of justice as difference.

Harvey has shown in his criticism of liberal egalitarians and especially of Rawls that any theory of justice had a correllary in space and would have to take into acount the patterns of spaces produced. But at the same time he pointed out that our natures of justice and space were limited.

I have also shown that attempts by planners to use social justice in the U.S. has resulted in an abstraction of justice and a limitation on its use. These were simple and incomplete readings of the liberal egalitarians definitions. Social justice in the environment could not simple be based on a negative ideal, or on an equality of preferences and therefore welfare.

How then can justice exist in the environment? How can the environment contribute to a social justice? What is a socially just environment?

JUST SPACES JUST PLACES

The answer to these questions is still somewhat problematic because, we do not have an adequate way of conceptualizing the environment so that these aspects have something to be fit to. What is missing in our conceptions of the environment to be able to locate it as either contributing or constraining aspects of justice?

This is the purpose of the following part.

CONCEPTIONS OF THE ENVIRONMENT

More than we ever believe, we understand life from where we are.
Raymond Williams

What is nowhere does not exist.
Aristotle

What is missing in a conception of the environment for it to be more useful for socio-political ideals?

In the introduction to this paper, I identified a problem with the public role in evaluating, planning, guidelining, and debating the design of environments. The problem had two equal sides. The first side to the problem was that the ideals the environment were evaluated against were not explicit. They were incomplete and had little to do with any of the ideals we held as legitimate for a just society. The second side to the problem was the conceptions we held about the environment itself were incomplete, and mostly oriented to the evaluation of single objects.

The ideals we borrowed as well as the conceptions of the environment we held were limiting the ability to find meaningful correlations between them. For there to be a more effective public role in guiding, evaluating, and prescribing the physical places, patterns and forms we produced and lived in, we needed to be more explicit about which ideals we accounted and the conceptions of the environment that could fit them.

In the preceding chapter I attempted to unravel the first side of the problem, by locating aspects of social justice. I defined justice to be made up of not only equality, but a choice over which equalities mattered. It was not only an evaluatory concept, eliminating negative constraints to individaul liberty, but a projective one, positive ideals could emerge. Justice was not only static but emerged and therefore needed to be constantly redefined by participation. Participation implied a community. Individuals relied on this community to produce more fulfilling opportunities.

Social justice depended, therefore, on some aspect of equality, liberty, opportunity, participation. These aspects were located in individual actions as well as among individuals. The fifth aspect was one of difference among the worst off individuals.

These five aspects that would constitute a conception of social justice were found to be not easily located or fit into the environment. Harvey's attempt to locate Rawl's second principle of justice -the difference principle, in territorial space was a methodological step in attempting this. Social justice for Harvey was intertwined with conception of production which were constituted by and constituting urbanism -the patterns of spaces produced.

The following chapter is an attempt to solve the other side of the problem. What is missing in a conception of the environment for it to

be more useful in locating or correlating explicitly these socio-political aspects of social justice ?

There are two themes that highlight this inquiry, and can be summarized by the two quotes that began this chapter. Raymond Williams in the preface to the American edition of The Year 2000, begins "More than we ever believe , we understand life from where we are." In his emphasise of this seemingly obvious point, (he is a Welshmen teaching at Cambridge University and writing about the socio-politics of western culture), he implies a much more general and important point. Our understandings of life, our knowledge,is related to where we are, to our locations in time and space. Our knowledge of the world is therefore subjective and its subjectivity depends on where and how we are located. Our conceptions of each other and our places in the world are therefore grounded in a particular time and space. The first theme points out the complexity, subjectivity and placeness of human knowledge. How are places constitutive of human activity ? Any study of places can not be separated from a study of human activity in those places.

The second theme of this chapter can be summarized in the quote from Aristotles's Physics. "What is nowhere does not exist". For ideas to exist they must exist somewhere, they must therefore exist in space and time. Human thought, and subjectivity, founded in human activity and in social relations are intertwined with the places of this activity.

There are two parts to this chapter. I will begin by locating four aspects of the environment: form, space, place, and time. I will look at how each aspect has been used and what each suggests to social justice. The second part will show what is missing among these aspects is an explicit acount of how human activity constitutes each. An explict account of the complexity of human action is considered as a possible approach to solving the problem of justice in the environment.

FOUR ASPECTS OF THE EVIRONMENT

What do we commonly consider the environment to be?

FORM

The most obvious way the environment is characterized is simply as the built environment. The patterns of streets, squares, buildings, arcades, alleys, passages, the location of entrances, windows, the relationships of rooms to the structure all constitute the physical elements -the material things- of the environment. To a lay person these are the "things" that architects and planners are expected to design and plan. They are quite often the things that architects and planners describe as *form* to clients. The form is then a kind of metaphor for the environment, however only refers to the materiality of it.

What does form as a strong definition or dominant aspect of the environment, space, place, and time are only biproducts, or are not considered to be part of the same environment, imply for aspects of justice?

Attempting this I am faced with the same sort of problem I found when attempting to correspond aspects of justice to parts of the environment. Form as a metaphor of the environment or as an aspect of it is simply not a significant or a complete characterization. Justice as I have pointed out is not simply a bargain over material things, but is tied to how they are distributed, projective, create opportunities, and

the process by which these are decided by. Can we characterized the form in another way which may make it more significant?

The form of the environment can be characterized in three ways.[1] First form gives a *structure to our bodily actions* -where I can and can't go: walks, paths, and stairs. The form of the environment as I am using it, can be represented by a figure-ground plan, or a simple structural floor plan of a building. The Nolli map of Rome is a good example of the forms and how it structures bodily action in a urban environment. This characterization of material things is not all that form is. We do not go everywhere we can, and we do not only physically move through time and space. We do not only move in certain directions or to certain places because we physically can. We take cues from how we perceive the continuity, adjacency or autonomy of form.

Secondly the form of the environment gives a *structure to our perceptions.* We may come to know an environment as smooth, shiny, silky and flowing, and we know it differently from a compressed, rough, course and soft environment. We come to know an environment and call it the Back Bay or Beacon Hill because we perceive a similarity in the form of the strees, alleys, and houses, and not because we have walked every street and alley and have been in every

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[1] This charcterization is based on the work of Merleau-Ponty. It was suggested to me by Ken Warriner. I have however developed it somewhat differently following Giddens concept of structuration.

house. They may in fact structure to our movements much differently, as the level or inclined streets in Beacon Hill do and as the long blocks opposed to the short cross streets in the Back Bay do. We may know MIT to be made up of an interconnection of hallways rather than a series of interconnected buildings. They are in reality both, but I believe one because I perceive this to be significant.

The forms of the environment therefore also give a structure to our perceptions. Our eyes are led by the lines of the world as well as they actively search and create them. Our perceptions are not static, they are created and carried with us to help understand other environments. Environments also give a structure to meanings we hold. (Marcuse)

The third characterization of the form of the environment is it gives *structure to signs* -to our meanings. I know something about this building because it is white granite raised on a high course stone base,and I can enter it through a large portico of columns. It is a public building. I know this is a poorer neighborhood because the houses are smaller and denser, they have little decoration, and the exteriors need repair.

Some meanings become attached to forms and can't be separated from them. I can not look at a tall thin continuous row of neo-clasical columns or sandstone geometric facades without recalling these were used by fascists. So these forms mean fascism to me. They do so

because these forms resemble ones I know associated with other stronger created meanings.[1] These meanings are constituted by our minds.

The form of the environment can therefore be precisely characterized in three ways by extending each to its ability to give a structure to our bodily actions, perceptions, and meanings.

The environment is structured: it gives structure to our bodily actions, perceptions, meanings. We can theoretically move in infinite ways, but form gives a structure to ways we can more easily move. We perceive lines of word, continuities, adjacencies. A is next to a bookstore, next to C. We perceive these to be somehow similar, parts of the same thing. We know things about institutions, because of the physical representations they take. This conception of the environment suggests a correspondance of action to behavior and accesibility,

SPACE

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[1] I am not arguing that the use, or non use, of these forms is logically baseds simply on their resemblence. This I think is all to simple minded, these form have meanings because these meanings are socially constructed and not because of their simple resemblence. Linguists have already adequately distinguished between what is refered to, resembled, and what is represented . The moving insect tracing a pattern of symbols in sand resembling " w i n s t o n c h u r c h i l l ", does not constitute a representation of the man Winston Churchill.

The second aspect of the environment is *space.* A common definition from "form centered theorists" would be space as what is left over, once form is in place. Alternately social geographers define space as a projection of social relations.

These two definitions are too simple because they take space to be simple epiphenomenal. Yet intuitively we know space itself is a function of social relations as well as a stucture for them, in for example neighborhoods,and communities. A more interesting conceptualization of space can be found in Allan Coloquhouns characterization of two senses of space -social space and built space.

"Social space" is found in the orientaions of geographers and sociologists. It assumes space to be implicated by the intentions and consequences of social institutions and class differences. Space is recognized as a boundary, or link. The form, as I have characterized it above, is largely epiphenomenal.

The second sense of space is as "built space". This conception is common among the practice of architects attempting to locate a space "in" the forms they design. Built space is synonomous with morphology -it is constituted by use, and in a weak sense by perception and meaning.

This sense of space as built space is further dependent on whether form or function are considered precedents. If "functions", (he really

means uses), determine form, the sense of built space approximates social space.[1] This conception of space equates space to the environment. A current example of this conceptualization is *Space Syntax,* developed at the Bartlet School Of Architecture at University College London. The problem with this conceptualization is that space is not the object of production, and so it must be considered simultaneously with what we intend when we inadvertantly produce spatial patterns.

A more useful definition of space can be found in Allan Pred's conceptualization of space as a socially produced structure. A spatial structure is "those elements physically built into a given geographical area through human activity,plus the relative location of these elements to one another". (Pred1984, p.257) Space is therefore structured, given meaning through a process of social creation. It is structured created and lived in by society.

Harvey understands space similarly.

> Created space in the modern city ...reflects the prevailing ideology of the ruling groups and institutions in society. In part it is fashioned by the dynamics of market forces which can easily produce results which nobody inparticular wants., Created space is an ethnic domain in only a very limited sense. Yet created space is an integral part of an intricate sign processs that gives direction and meaning to daily life within the urban culture. The signs, symbols and signals that surround us in the urban environment are powerful influences.... We fashion our sensibilities, extract our sense of wants and needs,and locate our aspirations with respect to a geographical environemt tha tis

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[1] Colquohon argues this seperation of the concepts of built space emerges in the 18th century with the characterization of art as a special artifact "purposeful but without a purpose".

> in the large part created.It is possible that our culture, conceived of as ethnic domain,emanates from created space more than it succeeds in creating space.(P.310)

Harvey's sense of space is similar to my desription of the aspects of form as giving a structure. I will return to explain more carefully what I mean by this description. For now I think it is sufficiently understood as both a socio-psychological a well as physical artifact. In this sense it explains individuals as being constituted by created space because man is essentially space occupying. He owns property, defends it, communicates across it,and acquires value by it. And yet he creates senses of this space.

These are not passive conceptions of space, but active ones. They have intentionality, and a deliberation behind their creation, use and value.

PLACE

I couldn't image it...for the first time in my life I realized how profoundly place is also people. (Fowles, Daniel Martin)

Form can be defined as the material things that give structure to our actions, perceptions, and meanings. Space is the relative location of those material things, producing a spatial structure and system of meanings accross it. The spatial structure becomes fixed and exists beyond the specific changes to the forms. Communities, neighborhoods and street patterns, locations of particular institutions and activities

exist longer than the culture and values that created them. A state of tension comes to exist between the fixed and immovable assets created by the norms and models of the former society and the forms and spatial organizationms demanded by a new and emerging social order. (Harvey). These tensions do not however exist in the spaces, or the forms of the environment but rather in the places.

The third aspect of the environment is therefore *place.* Places are the smallest parts of the physical world we live in. They are simultaneously spatial and have a form definition. They are neither simply spatial or simply formal but the space informs the form, and the form defines the space. Together space and form, places exist in a particular context. Places have specific relationships to time and culture. A place is both here and now, but may also have references to other places that I have been or know of. A room, house, office,or square is one because I know other rooms, houses, offices and squares. Therefore places are not only subjective they are culturally defined. A room, house, and office is so because we agree it is. This defines a culture of places. But we are never outside of these cultures. We are born and educated into them. So the images that we hold of places are not only subjective, they refer to parts of the world commonly known.

We know places in many ways. But how are these ways significant? In what sense do they mean. How can they simultanmeously express

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and give a structure to our thoughts and feelings? Can all of these ways be equally significant?

Surely in a capitalist economy the fact that I own and control the use of a place conveys more significance to me than if I simply pass a particular place everday on the way to work. There are therefore, hierarchical levels to how a place can mean in everyday life. Below are six ways places become significant or come to mean, in a capitalist society.

1. *Possession.* This is the highest, most dominant level of meaning. The fact that I own a place or I control who uses it or how they use it gives more significance or meaning to a place than anything I may do, experience, or know about it.

2. *Social Symbols.* If I do not physically own or control a place, I may belong to a society or a group that may have claims to it because it occupies a place in the collective consciousness of that group or society. This level of meaning exists because we attach (appropriate), a particular socio-cultural value to a place, and the place than embodies that value. This place we may know directly because we actually experience it, or it can be significant non-directly, because we know something about it. A court house or a church mean something because I believe in democracy and religion, but Times Square can also mean things to people who have never set foot in it, or have never seen it.

3. *Recurrent Use.* If I do not own a place, or do not belong to a group that has claims to it, a place has meaning for me because I use it repeatedly. I register an image of a previous use of a place. I have passed through here before, or I have eaten here before.. However because I have done so I may walk on the other side of the street or sit somewhere differently, inorder to see more closely what I have noticed before. The image of a place, and its corresponding meaning, is continuously redefined and created because of my recurrent use of that place.

4. *Similar Experiences.* I know something about the place of a High School in Chicago, or in Belmont, eventhough I have never actually been to one of these cities. I know there will be many small classrooms facing long shiny locker lined hallways. I know there will be a large auditorium that may, on a rainy day be converted to a gymnasium or to a cafeteria at noon. I also know that there will probably be places to hang out by the parking lot, because someone would have just passed his driving exam. I do so because the place, the form and space, of the high school has been defined by a larger institution that has agreed on a form and space of education. Therefore to some degree one high school is not much different from another,and I know this.

5. *Perception.* If I do not own or know a place by association, then a place is significant because I can read environmental qualities of that

place. A place is known because I perceive safety, excitement, privacy, ease of movement, or warmth. From these perceptions I can construct an image of that place. This image then means certain things to me.

I perceive the physical place of MIT to be a colletive of many different things that want to be proximate to each other. I perceive the interior streets and the adjacency and the cooperation of disciplines to be casual. I do not know whether it is or is not so, but I perceive it never-the-less. Therefor an environment can come to mean because it structures our perceptions of it, and our place in it.

6. *Action.* Finally a place is significant to me because I physically move through it and I can act in and on it. This level of meaning is simultaneously the weakest and the most powerful level of meaning. Our ability to easily move through a place physically, or our desire to sit in a particular way is more influenced by our possession, association, reoccurent use, or perception of that place.

But I can also act diretcly on a place. I can alter it, participate in altering it, or express my dissatisfaction or satisfaction for it publically. I can demostrate in Copley Place, play soccer in St.Peter's Square, or transform Joy Street into a street festival.

The former definition of action conveys meaning about a place in the weakest sense, the latter conveys meaning in the strongest sense. A place can be significant because it structures our ability to move -to

act, but also can be significant because we can "reconstruct" that place -we can act on or in it.

I have shown that a place can come to be significant, or mean, in various ways, all of which are not equally determined. Changing the ownership, or acting on or in the place (in the strongest sense) are the most significant ways to alter the meaning. This is followd by adding to the collective consciouness of a group, repeatedly using a place, altering a similar experience, changing how a place is perceived , and lastly changing how we physically move in a place, or how action is permitted in the weakest sense.

TIME

Every town grows up in a given place, becomes welded to it and with very few exceptions never leaves it. (Braudel, The Structures of Everday Life.)

It is scarcely any longer possible to tell a straight story sequentially unfolding in time. And this is because we are too aware of what is continually transversing the story line laterally. Instead of being aware of a point aa a infinitely small part of a straight line, we are aware of it as an infinitely small part of an infinite number of lines. (Berger, The look Of Things)

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The same is true in our daily lives and in the experience anmd expectations of social groups. The forces of historical development have become spatialized in both consciousness and practice -in the social oganization of urban space, the politics of regionalism, the environmental movement, to expanding the role of the territorial state, interconnected international economy. It becomes less possible to seperate history and geography time and space. (Soja)

Time is the fourth aspect of the environment. I have concluded in each of the last three aspects of the environment, that each could be described according to explicit conception of human action. Human activity modify the form, spaces and places of this activity. Human activity occurs and reoccurs as a process and therefore in time.

Time in the environment can be conceptualized as a "choreography" of peoples everyday lives. This conception has been developed by into a theory of "time -geography".[1] Time geography deals with the time and space choreography of individauls existence at daily, yearly,and lifetime biographical scales of observation. "Time and space are seen as inseparable". (Hagerstrand p208)

Each individuals existence is described as a life path of movement, weaving between time and space. Individuals meet at points of interruption creating societies formal and informal institutions. "The

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[1] See the work of Thorstein Hagerstrand, Allan Pred, and Nigel Thrift.

detailed situation and material continuity of structuration are perpetually spelled out by the interruption of individual paths with institutional projects occurring at specific temporal and spatial locations".

> Place then is a historically contingent process -the becomming of place all the humanly made elements of place, and all that takes place with in a given area -is inseperable from the everyday unfolding of the structuration process of a place.(Pred 282)

In each place certain institutions become dominant because of the time constraints they place on persons, or because of the impact they have on daily life paths. Social and cultural forms are reproduced by specific biographies which are time and space specific, forming specific path projects or personalities.

A society therefore gives a structure to individual activities by regulating space and time. Public investment decisions for locating transport, public spaces and general land use structure the spaces of human activity. Institutional patterns of work, shopping, entertainment, and schedules of transportation (hours, professional and service hours), structure the timing of activities. (Chapin)

What is missing from these conceptions of the environment?

I have described in the last part four common aspects of the environment. Each of these aspects separately suggested only simple correlations to aspects of social justice. I redefined each, therefore taking into acount more specifically their relations to human activity. Form simply thought of as the sum of physical things, became the material things which gives a structure to our bodily actions, perceptions and meanings. Space, simply regarded as left-over or passive, "materia", I regarded as a thing created itself. Space existed in patterns which produced a spatial structure. Place often confused with form and space, I described as being composed of both. Places are the smallest parts of the environment that we live our everyday lives in. Form, space, and place existed in a particualar context which was time bound. The choreography of individuals in places produced spatial biographies , which produced institutions and a social structure -a culture of space.

The aspects redefined by taking into account a general form of human action produced a more complex, and I think accurate and useful, conception of the environment. However these definitions failed to suggest a more fulfilling and operative correlation to the aspects of justice defined in the first chapter.

These aspects of the environment are not mutually exclusive. I have tried to extend each independently, so that I could take into account a more explicit form of human activity. This I concluded might be a

significant way to correlate aspects of the environment to aspects of justice. The aspects of social justice did not exist abstractly, but were dependent on the motivations, intentions, processes and consequences of these actions.

I have tried to extend each aspect of the environment assuming a very general sense of human action. It is now apparent this general form of human activity is insufficient. What is missing in these aspect and conceptions of environment is an explicit account of the various forms, intentions, motivations human action can take.

> The chief defect of all materialism up to now is that the object, reality, what we apprehend through our senses is understood only in the form of the object or contemplations; but not as sensuous human activity, as practice; not subjectively...an object is moving , not static, it can be explained by its causes and consequences.(Fromm P.11)

An explicit account of human action is what a theory of the environment has allways lacked. Actions are thought of as existing by themselves, or the environments are determining, but these relations must be more subtle.

INTERACTION AND PARTICIPATION -conceptions of action by architects and planners.

Architects and planners when discussing the social merit of their designs or plans describe their environments as promoting "interaction". This is especially evident in the design of public places. Places to sit, stand, or eat, while watching others or while sharing common areas,

creating physical contact are thought to promote social relations. Sociability is directly correlated with the "frequency and informality"(mutual dependence), of these contacts. Interaction becomes synonomous with human activity. (Alexander)

This use of interaction assumes physical proximity, or a continuous motion promoting higher forms of social life. In practice these environmets are considered successful if they are animated -if they are full of people doing what ever they are doing. But this surely is not what we really mean when we think of human action.

Interaction is reduced to a product, something architects can count and compare. How people can interact, or the forms of human action we really want, or mean, are rarely explicitly discussed. The discussions around the proposals for public places usually revolve around which uses to accomodate, a cafe, vendors, will it support ice skating, a market. How will the space appear used and alive? These notions of interaction are conventionally translated into meaningful interaction.

The result of conceiving of human action as simple interaction has legitemized passive environments. It is okay to simply watch, be watched, read, sit dumbly listening to a musician who has been screened, choosen, prescribed, rehersed, to keep us experiencing things with others, feeling we are part of a public. Excess noise, inappropriate uses, are ushered away as inappropriate forms of interaction.

What is missing here is an account of the motivations, and intentions of this interaction. "An active man not only has knowledge, but knows that he knows." Interaction, as commonly refer to by architects, assumes man has the knowledge to act, but doesn't know it. We must put him next to another so he may interact. Doing nothing is therefore substituted for choosing to do things together. Being in groups is substituted for doing things collectively. Acting is substitutes for more general forms of human action.

Similarly participation used by planners and architects assumes a reduced form of human action. Participation is primarily used to describe a process of public legitemization of a planning process. If planning can be nobly defined as an "intervention between the worlds possible for us and the one that we are experience everyday," participation corresponds to the process of intervening.(Krieger p.26)

Participation appears as a very democratic process, and an ideal and appropriate conception of human interation. In practice it becomes a very complex way of arriving at compromises to peoples ideas about worlds possible, that do not satisfy any of them. "Participation makes conflicts fairer, but it dosn't resolve many of them". (Stretton p.312) When participation becomes institutionalized, as in commission reports it only becomes grounds for passivity. Bender in a criticism of the 1980 Presidential McGill Commission on the dying North East recognizes this.

(O)ne comes into contact with a world in which there are actions

> without responsible actors. Everything is reduced to the crudest form of economic determinism. Such language is intended to depoliticize fundamental social acts. It is a prescription for political passivity.

Human action is much more rich and complex than these two forms of action, commonly assumed by architects and planners can take into account. Boulding in *The Image* presents a more sophisticated understanding of the complexities of human action, its interconnectedness with time and space and forms of knowledge. I will end this part with a passage from Boulding. It should serve to set the context for concepts of action in philosophy and social theory in the next chapter.

> As I sit at my desk, I know where I am. I see before me a window; beyond that some trees; beyond that the red roof of the campus of Stanford University; beyond them the trees and the roof tops which mark the town of Palo Alto; beyond them the bare golden hills of the Hamilton Range. I know however more than I see. Behind me , although I am not looking in that direction, I know there is a window, and beyond that the little campus of the Center for the Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences; beyond that the coast range; beyond that the Pacific Ocean....
>
> I am not only located in space, I am located in time. I know that I came to California about a year ago, and I am leaving in about three weeks. I know that I have lived in a number of different places at different times. I know that about ten years ago a great war came to an end, and about forty years ago another great war came to an end....
>
> I am not only located in space and time, I am located in a field of personal relations. I not only know where and when I am, I know to some extent who I am. I am a professor at a great state university. This means that in September I shall go into a classroom and expect to find some students in it and begin to talk to them, and nobody will be surprised....
>
> I am not only located in space and in time and in personal relationships, I am also located in the world of nature, in a world of how things operate. I know that when I get into my car there are some things I must do to start it; some things I

must do to back out of the parking lot; some things I must do to drive home....I live, in other words, in a world of reasonably stable relationships, a world of "ifs and thens", of "if I do this, then that will happen."

Finally I am located in the midst of a world of subtle intimations and emotions. I am sometimes elated, sometimes a little depressed, sometimes happy, sometimes sad, sometimes inspired, sometimes pedantic. I am open to subtle intimations of a presence beyond the world of space and time and sense.

What I have been talking about is knowledge....What I am taking about is what I believe to be true; my subjective knowledge. It is the image that largely governs my behavior.

In the last chapter I concluded what was missing in our conceptions of the environment was an explicit account of human action. Common conceptions architects and planners held about the environment simplified human action and were therefore insufficient for locating socio-political ideals. In this chapter I will look at other explicit accounts of describing human action. I will look at two conceptions of action, action in philosophy, and in social theory.

CONCEPTIONS OF ACTION -the debate in philosophy[1] Philosophical inquiry of human action is divided into five types of inquiries. The first are conceptual questions, asking what is action? The second are explanatory questions, attempts to explain the purposefulness of human action. The third are metaphysical describing the causes of human actions. The fourth are epistemological, inquiring how we know actions. The fifth are ethical questions, evaluating actions.

The first type of inquiry, what is action, is considered to be prior to all of the others. Human action can be conceived of in three ways.

Action is behavior.

Action is the possibility or ability to act.

Action is a logical system.

I will look at each of these three conceptions in the following section.

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[1] I am principally following the arguments of Brand in The Nature of Human Action in this section.

Action is behavior.

The simplest definition of human action is it is simply bodily behavior. "A person raises his arm if and only if his arm rises."(p.5) This definition is shown to be insufficient because my arm can rise without my desiring or wanting it to. Someone else can lift it, it can rise during a dream or could be caused by a muscle spasm.

This definition is therefore inadequate and is often expanded by philosophers to include an accompanying mental event- a will, motive or desire by the person raising the arm. Action is therefore conceived of as behavior plus a corresponding mental act. This is also shown to be an insufficient definition of action because an action can occur along with a will or desire of it , but yet this mental event may be inadequate to explain the action. Motives, wants and desires may not be only results of mental acts, and behavior may occur because of reasons external to these, such as because of muscle spasms.

Action therefore is redefined as behavior, a corresponding mental act,and a volition to act this way. The mental event, the motive and desire, must have been intended and this mental event must have a physical effect inorder to constitute a human action.

> Now what is action ? Not one thing, but a series of two things; the state of mind called a volition, followed by an event. The volition or intention to provide the effect is one thing; the effect produced in consequence of the intention, is another thing; the two things constitute the action. I form the purpose of instantly moving my arm; that is the state of my mind; my arm moves in obedience to my purpose; that is the physical fact, consequent on a state of mind. (J.S. Mill in Brand p.9)

The difficulty of this definition is that the volition is assumed a-priori. It simply exists inside of the individual or else one would have to answer what caused the volition for this behavior. Attempting to answer this question leads to an infinite regress, because the volition will have to have been produced by a mental event, and this by another volition. "We would have to do an infinite number of things in order to perform any action." This would obviously not be logical. If we believe this volition is not caused, this action becomes simply a definition of behavior, or we must believe the first volition is something other than a mental event.

Volition can be modified to to take into account responsibility. Action then can be defined as a behavior plus a corresponding mental event and a responsibility for that action.

J.L. Austin shows that responsibility can mean three different things each implying a different conception of action. I "intentionally" did it. I acted "deliberately". I acted on "purpose".

To have an intention to act is the most subtle idea of action. It implies I simply have an idea, a notion, or a conception. "I have a plan". To have a purpose to act implies the act is well known to me, and will guide my conduct. A purpose is something to be achieved as

a result of what I am doing. To act deliberately implies on the other hand a process of thinking prior to the action."Shall I, or shall I not?"[1]

> So with human activities, we can assess them in terms of intentions, purposes, ultimate objects, and the like. but there is much more that is arbitrary about this unless we take the way the agent himself did actually structure it in his mind before the event.(p439)

Volition is then not a completely adequate aspects for a definition of action. Instead action can be defined as depending on choices. Action is defined as behavior plus an accompanying mental event that would not have occurred if a person had choose differently. Action therefor depends on other choices being present and a choosing between them.

This definition has also been rejected by philosophers on the basis that choosing can never be an action. If all "choosings are actions, and all actions are the results of choices", it must follow that "all choosings are the results of choices". Choosing then must fall away as an aspect of action for the same reasons that we dismissed volition. There would have to be an infinite regress to any choosing, one must choose to choose to choose..., or choosings appear as behavior themselves. Neither of these definitions are adequate.

The previous definitions of action have assumed the individual to act according to his own influences, will, or desires. This can also be rejected. Human action is not an individual act but is constituted by

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[1] See Austin's description of the till robber.

certain rules and observed practices in a social context.

> Suppose a young child who knows nothing about the game of chess, picked up a knight and put it down in the vacant square two forward and one to the left. Here the child would be acting in accordance with the rule for moving knights in chess, but he would not be following or obeying it. (p. 17)

Action can therefore be defined as behavior followed by a mental event that follows an appropriate rule. This definition can also be rejected. Philosophers have argued that following a rule does not constitute the action, but describes a type of action. "To follow a rule is to act in a prescribed way."

Finally action can be corresponded to behavior followed by a mental act and a responsibility for it. Human action is constituted by behavior and a accountability to certain social rules and practices and by its answerability to certain obligations. Action is a defensible social and moral concept. This definition can also be disregarded as it can not account for the consequences of the original actions, nor for responsibilities that are beyond the individual.

Action as the ability, possibility or power to act.

The second way philosophers have attempted to define action is as the ability, possibility or power to act, rather then the actual occurrence of the action. What can someone do?

An individual can act in three ways. He can have the opportunity to act, the ability to act, and both the opportunity and the ability -the power to act.

Opportunity is corresponded to the physical possibility to perform an act. "If there are physical conditions that prevent a person from performing an action, then he does not have an opportunity to perform it".

Ability is corresponded to the action being within ones capacity. Ability is considered in three senses : the physical and mental ability, the ability to will, (to bring oneself to exercise physical and intentional ability),and voluntary ability.

These exercise are shown to be insufficient because their truths rest on trying and definition rather than only simply the acts of trying.

> Suppose that a golfer, say Arnold Palmer, tries but misses a very short putt. It is nevertheless true that Palmer could have made, (that is, had it within his power to make) this putt. There is a great amount of evidence that Palmer could have made the putt. In the past, under circumstances similar in all relevant respects, Palmer made putts of this kind. (p.131)

The objection to this definition of human action is that ability, possibility can not take into account the consequences of my actions.

> What is within my power to do -what I can do- is to preform actions, not to bring about the occurrences of consequences of actions. The dice showing "7" is not an action, but rather the consequence of an action, namely throwing the dice. Hence throwing the dice on these occasions was within my power, though the dice showing "7" was not within my power. Thus I did not have the ability to role "7" with fair dice.

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The third sense of action as ability and possibility is power. Opportunity and ability together constitute the power to act. If one has the opportunity and the ability to act, the act itself is based totally on the individuals will, choice and decision. This conception of action constitutes humans as agents extending well beyond simple behavior.

Power is however a relative quality,it is dependent on a subject, and his/her exertions or effects, rather than on the object of our senses or consciousness. I can not hear, see, touch power nor can I think it. Brand proposed two conceptions of power - active power and speculative power.

Active power "is the power of executing and work of art or labor." Speculative power "is the power of seeing,hearing, remembering, distinguishing, judging,and reasoning. Action is only implied by an execution of an active power. It is the distinction between acting and being acted upon.

Action as a Logical System.

The third way philosophers define action is as a logical system. Within this definition are three possible analogies. Action as analogous to the logical system of knowledge. Action as referring to purposefulness or goal directness. Action as events.

Action is considered analogous to the language of empirical knowledge.

Both can be traced back to basic sentence propositions: sentences which are true without justification. "I see a red color patch in front of me now." These are basic actions which form a basis for a theory of action. They are not caused by any other actions. These often refer to walking, talking, raising ones arms, moving ones hands. An individual does not cause his basic actions to happen.

> Now when a blind man says that he can know whether a certain object is red or not, there are two senses or uses of can that are compatable with this abnormality. He must mean either that he can infer to "x is read" from other sentences or that his case is not medically hopeless, that by means of a cure he may be restored to that state of normality in which such sentences may be known by him directly and not as it were, merely by means of inference.(p.263)

The second analogy of action to a logical system argues human action is purposive. "Action is behavior directed toward a goal".

> The distinguishing feature between blinkings, nervous spasms, coughs, and winkings, arm raisings, singings, is that in the latter cases the agent brings about the action intentionally or on purpose. It is essentially to emphasize that doing something intentionally, or on purpose, is not doing something in the presence of a special kind of mental event,called perhaps an intention. Rather, doing something intentionally or on purpose appears to be a way or manner of doing it. (p.229)

The third analogy of action to a logical system is that action is an extension of the logic of events. The action is performed only if there is a transition between states of affairs -an "event".

> The notion of an occasion is related to the notion of space and time. It would not be right, however to identify occasions with instance or points in space and time. They should rather be spatio-temporal locations.(p.232)

Action therefore can not meaningfully defined as behavior, nor can it

be defined meaningfully as ability. These conceptions of action are limited because action is considered only in isolated individuals. Action theory can not take into account interpersonal social relations.

> It conceptualizes action on the presupposition of exactly one world of existing states of affairs and neglects those actor world relations that are essential to social interaction. Habermas p.274

CONCEPTIONS OF ACTION in social theory

Modern social theory begins by identifying the "initial shaping concepts" of individuals -society, and economy.[1] Society is the immediate relations among individuals, and economy is the management and control of them. How these initial shaping concepts are passed on to cultural, political, sociological and economic aspects of our everyday lives and give structure and meaning to them has been the subject of social theory.

Specifically these have centered around defining a "social" as coexistent with individual activity rather than as an inherited ready made product or as a formal system governed by internal laws. This interest has led social theorists to explore concepts of culture,language, power, labor. Common to all of these interests are concepts of human action.

In this section I will examine three viable accounts of human action as intermediaries between "initial shaping concepts" (a social structure) and the everyday lives lived in them.

The first is a conception of action as acting and is based in the work of Irving Goffman and Richard Sennett. It is based on assumptions that public life creates social relationships between strangers through the acting out of roles and rituals.

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[1] See Raymond Williams

The second is a conception of action as labor, communication and domination. This conception is found in the work of Hannah Arendt and Jurgen Habermas. These aspects of action are self-formative processes constituting indivduals.

The third account of human action is action as structuration. Giddens defines action as a continuous flow of human conduct producing intermediary structures between social structure and human agency.

Action as acting[1]

The fundamental assumption of action defined as acting by Sennett and Goffman, is that public life is synonomous with urban life. "Public life is making social relations out of people that do not know each other." It therefore does not exist in a neighborhood, nor a community, but rather has to do with people who would never be neighbors. The public has historically been linked with a form of economic organization -a market, and a form of public order. Urban life requires that individuals differentiate themselves from others because inorder to work you must divide your labor from others by specializing. Differences emerge among individuals.

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[1] These arguments are taken from Fall Of Public Man by Sennett, and a seminar on Urban Public Space at GSD, Harvard University in spring 1984.

Sennett and Goffman both are interested in how things can be shared in neutral by strangers. The answer Sennett gives is public rituals. The public and urbanism can be metaphorized as a teatrum mundi.

The grounding for this conception of action as acting comprising ritual, is a dramaturgical analysis of everyday life. Drama is constituted in public by the study of everday rituals. These rituals are governed by codes of behavior and have a theatrical character. Goffman in Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, has characterized urban life as a series of expressions -roles played out. These roles become strategies and instruments for social interaction. The public world is therefore constituted and can only be managed through a series of rituals.

This ritual behavior has a strategic function of engaging social contact but also assigns meanings to certain actions (roles).

Sennett extends Goffmans work into a theory of the "Fall of Public Man".The public world of the ancient regime was full of expressions of ritualized public life. Sennett characterizes these into four dimensions of the public experience. 1) The gathering of strangers producing an audience; 2) the public role -physical gestures as innate meanings producing signs; 3) the public and the private -focal points in cities that become places of information exchange; 4) the man as actor -according to formal conventions.

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According to Sennett these conventions and expressions of ritual broke down in the 19th century. The expressions of the theatre and the expressions of the street drifted further apart. This decline resulted in a growth of private codes of behavior, spontaneity, authenticity, which became the new measures of public life.

These changes in the conceptions of public life produced changes in the reordering of street life itself. Movement rather than presence became criteria for creating a well ordered street. The public space became valued in terms of getting through it.

Sennett offers three explanations for the decline in public life and the degredation of human action to simple motion. The first is similar to Marx's conception of privatization. Social withdrawl became a defense against the overload of capitalism. Private families became ownership systems. Mystification in public life became a parallel to commodity fetishism and the actor became the mere spectator. Secondly, the rituals themselves became secularized, and individuals lost any beliefs in the meanings that the rituals could transcend direct social interaction. Rituals became weaker and eventually became trivial. Thirdly the conventions themselves lost their identity. Rituals were supplanted by what were considered to be natural reasons.

Action as acting assumes human action constitutes itself collectively according to understood rituals.These rituals carry with them particular signs and meanings.

Action as labor and work, interaction and communication.

The second account of human action in modern social theory considers action to be labor and work, interaction and communication.

Hannah Arendt in the Human Condition describes three fundamental human activities -labor, work and action. Each activity concerned with the most general conditions of human existence. Labor as the biological process of the human body constitutes life itself. Work provides the artificial world of things and constitutes human artifacts and a permanence producing a human "worldliness". Action is the condition of all political life and creates history. It constitutes a plurality. The human condition is constituted by life (through labor), worldliness (through work), and plurality (through action).

Labor for Arendt, does not designate a finished product, but rather a process. It is private, impermanent, transforming and repetative. Labor is synonomous with human creativity.

Work designates a finished product. It is public and permanent. The human world is produced through work. This is through which action can appear.

Action is its own end, and does not involve objects. It is speech, and it is political and social. "The polis goes with Greek Men wherever they are."

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Human freedom and significance for Arendt is not found in labor or in work but in action. Labor and work have no bearing on social, or public relations. Production is not something people can meaningfully share. Social or political relations between individuals must be willed, and action is the only form of human activity that arises totally from within the individual.

Labor is not willed but is rather a necessity of the human body. An individual can not will not to eat , or he will die. An individual can however will not to work , however this Arendt points to is entirely a consequence to the individual. So labor and work can have no bearing on social or political relations.

From this Arendt defines a meaningful public social life which is fully dependent on shared actions -speech and communication. Human action is not meaningful in any other way except as speech, or as communication.

Arendts arguments have specific bearing on the human action in the environment.They imply the physical things we produce and live in themselves do not link people. They do so only in so far as people participate in the debates planning or constructing them.

Action as interaction and communication in Habermas.

Habermas's work is partly in response to Arendt (his teacher). He

approaches the question of human action in two ways. The second is somewhat of an extension and development of the first.

The first, attempting to reformulate Marx, Habermas differentiates two forms of human activity: labor and interaction. He defines each differently by how each constitutes forms of knowledge and culture. The second, attempting to define rationality in social action, he defines four kinds of social action: teleological (purposeful) action, normatively regulated action, dramaturgical action, communicative action. I will examine each of these two approaches to human action.

Labor and interaction.[1] Labor and interaction are two types of action. Labor, Habermas refers to as "instrumental knowledge". It is oriented to technical control and based on the development of forces of production. In results in the formation of scientific or technical knowledge. Interaction, Habermas refers to as "forces of normative structures"in the context of everyday life. Knowledge is constituted by understanding at a "level of ordinary language communication, in the context of the practicalities of day to day social life".(p.80) Communication ordered by norms is central to interaction. Interaction is therefore implied by communication and language. For Habermas the two are the same. Communication is the "distancing of human experience from the sensory immediacy of the here and now."(p.101)

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[1] This description is found in Giddens 1982

Habermas basis this conception of action and communication on Hegel's *geist.* "Geist is understood in terms of the communication of human beings via catagories of meaning comprised in language".(p.101)

> Just as language breaks the dictates of immediate perception and orders the chaos of the manifold impressions into identifiable things, so labor breaks the dictates of immediate desires and, as it were, arrests the process of drive satisfaction. (p.101)

Human action as labor Habermas defines a "purposive-rational action". It is *instrumental* -having technical roles, and rational -having choices between differing strategies of action. Human action as interaction and therefore as communication is based on ordinary language communication and depends on the mutual understanding of social symbols. These symbols have intended meanings. Communication is "governed by binding consensual norms, which define reciprocal expectations about behavior and which must be understood and recognized by at least two acting subjects". (p, 109)

These two types of human action produce different types of institutions. Labor, with a technical, rational system of knowledge produces an economic and political system. I do not work with the intention of supporting the capitalist economy, but by the fact that I do work, I do. However I also work a certain way because of the capitalist system.[1] Interaction with rules and norms of communication (language), produces family and kinship patterns. I do not marry with the intention of

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[1] This example is elaborated from one in Thrift, 1984

reproducing particular life style patterns, but by the fact that I marry, I do.

> People do not marry to reproduce the nuclear family, or work to sustain a capitalist economy, but these are unintended consequences; but also a necessary condition for their activity.(Thrift)

Communication is central to interaction, and only can be carried out if four validity claims exist: *intelligibility* -what is being communicated must be intelligible or meaningful (a condition of symbolic communication); *truth* -must be a true proposition; *adequacy* -must be normatively legitimate; *veracity and truthfulness* -must be honest and without a guise.

From this legitimacy of communication Habermas devlops a theory of the public.

> If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially coordinated activities of its members and that this coordination has to be established through communication - and in certain central spheres through communication aimed at reaching agreement -then the reproducation of the species also requires satisfying the conditions of a rationality that is inherent in communicative action. (397)

> Concepts of social action are distinguished, however, according to how they specify the coordination among the goal directed actions of different participants: as the interlacing of egocentric calculations of utility...;as a socially integtrating agreement about values and norms instilled through cultural tradition and socialization; as a consensual relation between players and their public. (101)

The second way Habermas approaches the problem of human action is by attempting to locate a rationality in social action.[1] Habermas

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[1] These arguments are in a Theory Of Communicative Action 1984

characterizes four types of social action : teleological (purposeful), normatively regularized, dramaturgical, communicative.

Teleological action Habermas referes to in a similar way as he did labor. It is goal oriented and charcaterized by an actor making decisions among alternatives. Teleological action assumes one objective world, where an actor behaves according to a conception of his selfworth -his "egocentric calculus of utility". An actor perceives "beliefs about an existing state of affairs" and develops intentions about changing, intervening, or dealing with them.

> This model is often interpreted in utilitarian terms; the actor is supposed to choose and calculate means and ends from the standpoint of maximizing utility, or expectations of utility. It is this model of action that lies behind decision-theoretic and game-theoretic approaches in ecomomics, sociology and social psychology."(p. 85)

Telelogical actions can be judged in two ways. Each originates ina different restatement of the problem.

1. "Has the actor succeeded in bringing his perception and beliefs into agreement with what is the case in the world?"

1. "Has the actor succeeded in bringing what is the case in the world into agreement with his desires and intentions ?"

Each relation can be judged according to the degree for which they "acheive or fail to acheive" the intended effect in the "existing state of affairs".

Normatively regulated actions are characterized by a set of norms

which orient individual action toward common values by "fulfilling a generalized expectation of behavior". It therefor refers to a individual as a member of a social group. This conception assumes two worlds of action. Actors act strategically and purposefully within an "existing state of affairs, but also play out roles according to certain socially legitemized norms in a social world.

> Norms express an agreement that obtains in a social group. All members of a group for whom a given norm has validity may expect of one another that in certain situations they will carry out (or abstain from) the actions commanded (or proscribed). The central concept of complying with a norm means fulfilling a generalized expectation of behavior.

Normative regularized action can also be evaluated according to two different forms.

1) Are the actors and motives in accord with existing norms?

2) Do existing norms express the interests of those affected? Can these norms be justified?

The third type of social action for Habermas is *dramaturgical action.* Dramaturgical action refers to invividuals "constituting a public for one another between whom they present themselves". Actors purposefully "stylize" the expression of ones own experiences" taking into account an audience. It is characterized by a subjective world, which is expressive of an aesthetic media of individuals.

> From the perspective of dramaturgical analysis we understand the social action as an encounter in which participants form a visible public for each other and perform for one another.(p.90)

The actor reveals an aspect of his subjectivity through a "self-presentation" before others. "Each agent can monitor public acess to the system of his own intentions, thoughts, attitudes, desires, feelings,and the like, to which only he has privaliged access." Dramaturgical action refers primarily to a subjective world. It can be evaluated by looking if the actor "means what he says". Is he expressing the experiences he has ?

The fourth kind of social action, *communicative action,* refers to "interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations". Communicative action is characterized by language used in a reflective way, and an interpretation of its validity.

> The concept of communicative action presupposes language as the medium for a kind of reaching understanding, in the course of which participants, through relating to a world, reciprocally raise validity claims that can be accepted or contested. (p. 99)

Communicative action resebles interaction. It is characterized by a concept of language which serves understanding by being introduced *between* actors rather than being *put forth* by actors."It is not exhausted by the act of reaching understanding." (p. 99) This is primarily what differentiates communicative action from the other forms of action. In the other forms of action language is corresponded to one form, they are one-side. They either refer to an objective, social or subjective world.

Types of Action	Types of Knowledge	Form of Argument	Mode of Transmitted Knowledge

TELEOLOGICAL INSTRUMENTAL	technical	theoretical discourse	technological, stategies
CONSTATIVE SPEECH	empirical theoretical	theoretical discourse	theories
NORMATIVELY REGULATED	moral practical	parctical discourse	legal and moral representations
DRAMATURGICAL	aesthetic practical	therapeutic aesthetic	works of art

(Figure 19 p 334)

Aspects of Rationality in Action

Action and structuration in Giddens.

Giddens objects to Habermas's reformulation of Marx's conception of human production into two concepts of labor and interaction. These distinctions, Giddens points out Habermas himself conceeds, are only "analytical element of a complex", rather than distinct types of action. Giddens criticizes Habermas for trying to combine two different ideas of human action, Webers purposive-rational vs. value-rational action, with Marx's differentiation of forces of production from relations of production. Habermas equates Weber's purposive-rational action with Marx's definition of forces of production to define labor. Interaction and communication is defined by combining Weber's value-rational action with Marx's relations of production. These correlations are ambiguous for Giddens.

JUST SPACES JUST PLACES

Labor defined by Habermas as purposive-rational action is too inclusive, it does not adequately differentiat between different kinds of associations labor as an act can be. Giddens defines human action closer to Marx, by distinguishing labor from praxis.

Labor, Giddens regards as "social labor: as the socially organized productive ativities whereby human beings interact creatively with material nature".(110) Labor is a social activity of Giddens. Praxis "refers to the constitution of social life as regularized practices, produced and reproduced by social actors in the contingent contexts of social life". It is constituted by social life.

Gidden's similarly criticizes Habermas's definition and conceptualization of interaction. Habermas is mistaken to equate interaction with communicative action on three grounds.

First, Habermas treats interation simply as, and reducible to, action. However Giddens point out , "action theory is not the same as interaction theory, an adequate account of the constitution of social systems in interaction demands a conception of what I have called a structure in social social reproduction". (p. 111)[1]

Similarly Habermas reduces action to communicative action and regards it as both symbolic and communicative. This however Giddens points

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[1] See the following discussion of Giddens for this clarification.

out is only one form of action."It might plausibly be said that all action involves symbols, but it can not be maintained that the symbolic elements of action are equivalent to communicative intent."(p. 111)

Giddens third criticism of Habermas is that Habermas analyzes communicative action only by the norms that govern it. "There is more to interaction than the norms to which it is oriented."Interaction depends as much on power and on dominant relations as they do on norms. A simple definition of communicative action according to norms negates the relations that arise from access to scarce resources, distribution of goods, and unequal participatory opportunity.

Habermas's work is missing an adequate conceptual scheme for grasping the production and reproduction of society. This is what Giddens attempt to provide.

Action -Structure -Power in Giddens.

Our life passes in transformation. This is what I seek to grasp in the theory of structuration. (Giddens on Rilke)

Giddens frames the problem of social theory as comming up with concepts that can mediate between human agency (subjective and concentrated on interaction), and social structure, patterning and continuing the interaction and the rules and resources producing relations between groups. "A theory of structuration begins from an absence: the lack of a theory of action in the social sciences." Social theory lacks an

account of the individual as reasoning, acting being which does not regard him simply as a subjective being.

Action, Giddens refers to as a continuous flow of conduct. There are two components to action : capability and knowledgeability. Action as capability referes to an agent being able to act otherwise. Action as knowledgeability referes to "all those things which the members of the society know about that society, and the conditions of their activity within it". (p.9, 1982)

These forms of action presuppose social institutions and social practices. Giddens defines institutions as "structured social practices that have a broad spatial and temporal extension: thatare structures in what the historian Braudel calls the longue duree of time, and which are followed or acknowledged by the majority of the members of a society". (p.9, 1983) Structure are the patterns and continuity of interaction in time, and the roles and resources that bind time and space of social systems. Systems are synonomous with social practices and refer to the functioning of relations between actors or groups. Structuration refers to the conditions that govern the continuous reproduction of the rules and resources (structure) reproducing the systems.

These structures and systems also produce unintended consequnces and unacknowledged conditions of actions through a kind of feedback of social relations among the structure and systems. These systems and

institutions mediate between the social structure and human agency. With this cnceptualization of social structure, system, and institutions, Giddens outlines a "stratification model of action".

Most theories of human action in philosophy and sociology are limited because they can not take into acount the "unintended consequences of action", that escape actor intentions or purposes in "unacknowledged conditions" of those actions. Action in philosophy and sociology has not been able to take into acount the "nature of institutions, social change, conflict and power".

Giddens refers to six aspects of human action 1) reflexive monitoring of action, 2) rationalization of action, 3) motivations of action, 4) conventions of institutions, 5) unacknowledged conditions of action, 6) unintended consequences of action.

Reflexive monitoring refers to the behavior and setting, the purpose of , the action. It is based on"accountability". Rationalization refers to the intention, and capability to explain why one acts. It is based in the context of daily social life. Motivations are characterized by the stocks of knowledge that organize actors conscious and unconscious wants and needs. They refer to knowledge of rules. Motivations are conceptual links between rationalization of actions and conventions of actions embodied in institutions.

Conventions of institutions account for behavior that is not directly motivated. They are produced by direct action (motivation-rationalization and reflexive monitoring) or by unintended consequences. Conventions of institutions account for the unacknowledged conditions or (unconscious motives) of actions. The boundary of the knowledge of human action is set by the unintended consequences and the unacknowledged conditions. Institutions also become the conditions for action.

Giddens theoretical model of statification has become a very important base for geographers, especilly for time geographers. (See Pred, Thrift) They note after Giddens that the actions of institutions are very much place bound. Institutions motivate conventions in space and time, and each space time is institutionally motivated . "Institutions form nodes in time and space around which human activity is concentrated."(p31,Thrift 1983)

REFLEXIVE MONITORING OF ACTION

RATIONALIZATION OF ACTION

MOTIVATIONS OF ACTIONS

UNACKNOWLEDGED CONDITIONS OF ACTION

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF ACTION

CONVENTIONS OF INSTITUTIONS

Reproduction of Institutions

Giddens Stratification Model of Action

Human activity is not the same or equally significant in the environment. An explicit account of human activity, significant for locating socio-political ideals in the environment must separate *acts* from *acting* from *action.*

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[1] Structuration in time and space- TIME GEOGRAPHY.
Thrift following a theory of structuration attempts to formulate four aspects of social action in a locale (in space and time).

A locale, Thrift, defines after Giddens as a setting for interaction. A region as made up of a pattern of locales, where some become more dominant than others . They become dominant because time must be allocated to them. Locals therefore structure peoples life paths and embody a particular social structure, (class structure and differentiation). They can therefore affect other peoples life paths. Locales also provide a structure for everyday activities and processes of socialization. "Collective modes of behavior are constantly being negotiated and renegotiated, and rules are learned but also created." (Ricouer in Thrift 1983).

Thrift outlines four aspects of social action in a locale: personality and socialization, Penetration and availablity of knowledge, socialbility and community, conflict and capacity.

ACTS, ACTING, ACTION

ACTS

Acts are not action, but simply behavior. They commonly refer to occurrances. Acts specify purposefulness towards some end state or goal, often an action. Acts are found in words like, to do, movement, motion, and operate. They are what Austin calls "purposeful" ways of spilling ink, but acts do not contain the purpose itself.

To make a choice is an act, unless it is deliberate, thought out and legitimated, in which case it is an action. Acts can be involuntary or voluntary, sleep or choice, but they are not intended. "A bodily movement is an element of an action but not an action. Bodily movement is similar to rules, only executed comitantly to actions. These are only operations of action, as rules of language are operations to thought and speech. Operations do not concern the world". (Habermas p.97)

I can act alone. Acts are constituted by individuals. Acts have no validity claims in justice. They can not be significantly appropriated to abstract principles, they simply exist. Acts occur in environments, but in a trivial way, the environments are incidental. Space and time give a structure to these acts but only in so far as they structure behavior. "To show that someone has calculated, and indeed correctly, does not, however explain why he carried out this computation. If we wish to answer this question, we must have recourse to a rule of actions.

(Habermas p.98) We can not claim justice in environments by simply looking at behavior or bodily acts. We do not know the intentions, motivations, consequences, of each of them.

ACTING

Acting are acts with intentions that follow rules, roles, or conventions. Acting does not exist in one individual, but depends on either face to face contact between individuals, or on an implicit contact between an individual and a socially established and understood image of one.[1] Acting is found in verbs like perform, personate, render and refers to activities such as drama, and representation. Acting can either be spontaneous or ritualized, according to whether the roles are conscious or not. Acting refers to discrete acts strung together.

Acting, or dramaturgical action, is not as Habermas refers to, purposeful, but simply intentional. An actor intends to act according to certain rules and roles, but does not necessarily know the purpose, immediate or consequential of his activity. Many forms of work/labor (in the sense Arendt uses it), fall into this catagory. "People do not marry to reproduce the nuclear family, or work to sustain a capitalist economy, but these are the unintended consequences; but also the necessary condition for their activity". (Thrift)

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[1] Iam refering to image in a much wider sense than is commonly considered. See Boulding, The Image. He defines it as, "What I believe to be true, my subjective knowledge".

We can not claim justice in environments from this sense of acting. The environment is principally a stage, a background, existing prior to the acting. It is found and temporarily transformed by it. The environment is passive in the sense it is acted on.

ACTIONS

Actions are deliberate. They imply a conscious prior state of understanding, thinking and decision over the action. An action can be otherwise. Actions refer to the ability and possibility to act differently. They are both intended and purposeful. Actions are described in verbs like, create, constitute, produce, and in forms of work and play. They refer to concepts such as agency, function, communication, language, knowledge, and culture.

An action is a continuous flow of conduct and can not be routine, impulsive, or premeditated. These refer to acts. Unlike acts, and acting, there can be no action without time and space. Each action takes place in time and space, in the environment. Because they do so, actions produce unintended consequences and create institutions and social systems. "Institutions form nodes in space and time around which human activity is connected". The social structure binds the actions and the systems in time and space. (Giddens) These institutions, and systems, however give a structure and reproduce actions. They are actors themselves.

Through out history specific socio-political and cultural institutons and systems have been associated with particular types of action bound and reproduced in specific places and systems of spaces:[1]

Hellenic Greece - polis

Republican Rome - imperial capital

Cities of God - medieval cathedral towns and monastery

Commerce - ports of medieval cities

Civic ritual - intellectual rennaissance city

Reformation - sacred city

European culture - colonies

Modern nationalism - capital cities

These places and systems of spaces,produce settings for particular kinds of action, and reproduced it. They also reproduced acts, and acting, as a form of social control, manners, privacy, survellance, law, as personalities, as forms of knowledge, and as forms of community and socialization.

Human action can not be separated from the particularities of time and space. It makes particular demands on it, in the form of property and communication, but also is structured by it, in the form of schedules, patterns of work, consumption, and leisure. Human actions as well as the actions of institutions and social systems in time and space are

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[1] This list is from Gwen Wright's Urban history reader.

the only form of activity significant and valid for locating aspects of justice.

CONCLUSIONS

Justice can exist in the environment, and environments do contribute to social justice. They can and do if we understand environments as structures of human action in space and time, and if we understand justice as a complex ideal consisting of aspects of equality, liberty, opportunity, participation and difference.

This was the hypothesis and is the main conclusion of this thesis. I will, in this last chapter, summarize my arguments, and develop them more specifically speculating on the powers of the practice and theory of environmental design.[1]

Locating justice in the environment was problematic because our conceptions of environments were inadequate and the ideals we held about them were only implicit. I approached this problem as a *thought exercise,* attempting to conceptualize justice and the environment according to explicit accounts of human action.

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[1] It should be apparent from the subject and purpose of this thesis, I take this definition seriously and literally. The design of the environment must take into account not only the design of forms, spaces, places, but the activities, uses, and management and maintenance over time as well. The environment is a structure of human action in time and space. I think this is different from common conceptions of urban design, planning and architecture. The first is constituted by the scale of work, the second by implementation and policy, the third by the actual invention of the social space. Environmental design is not a form of practice but a legitimacy to a conception of practice.

In the first chapter I located and framed the problem of corresponding abstract socio-political concepts to the environment in the public review process and in the current attempts at creating theories that took into account both a society and the environment it produced and lived in.

I concluded this review was inadequate. We borrowed implicit partial ideals, and located these in insufficient aspects of environments. Inorder for there to be a more adequate public review, we must refer to more explicit ideals and more specific conceptions of the environments we produced and lived in. This depended primarily on a more explicit account of the aspects of the environments we were evaluating. A possible way of acheiving this was to conceive of the environment as human action in time and space. This was what egalitarian principles evaluated.

The next two chapters examined each of these two problems. I looked at common aspects of a just society with an eye toward the environment, and common conceptions of the environment with an eye toward the ideals we held about ourselves. I examined five common aspects of justice: equality, liberty, opportunity, participation and justice itself. Each had a specific but limited *fit* in the environment.

Equality, after Dworkin, could take two forms: equalizing preferences , goals, or conscious states *-Equality Of Welfare;* or equalizing resources *-Equality Of Resources.* Dworkin convincingly dismissed the first and

endorsed the second. Equality of resources remained as the only adequate conception of equality in environments, but this depended on defining the environment as a resource.

Liberty, after Berlin, also could take two forms: positive and negative. Architects and planners commonly located liberty by providing behavioral choices and diversity, approximating negative liberty. This, I stated was not liberty at all, and a mistaken approximation of negative liberty.

Unlike negative liberty, positive liberty, was more clearly a possible conscious practice of planners and architects. Lynch's description of environments for children's self-realization was a clear correlation of Berlin's positive liberty.

Opportunity was commonly referred to by designers of environments as an access. This however did not follow Tawney's account of opportunity, but rather coincided with a form of liberty. Tawney's account of opportunity as providing an equal start, through an extension of social services by raising standards of health and equalizing educational opportunities had a more explicit and appropriate correspondence in the environment.

Participation was significant as an ideal itself. But as commonly practiced, a review of public projects, or projects with committed public resources, it was defined too narrowly. Mills account of participation extended the legitimate scope of our participatory

opportunities to aspects of the forms and provisions of all needs and services.

Planners have often practiced a common sense notion of justice. They have attempted promoting easier access to the middle class by removing signs of difference and economic inequality. This has been mainly implemented through the location and construction of housing projects. Sennett rejected this, following arguments similar to Berlin: planners only considering negative aspects. The public world was not considered. Harvey, attempting to locate Rawl's difference principle in space, described the problems inherent in our conceptions of space, society and urbanism.

These correspondences to the aspects of justice were significant, however were not adequate for a more complex, and significant, account of human activity. The environment seemed to be significant for justice in limited ways.

- The environment was strong in a sense of equality, but only so far as equality was an equality of resources and environment could be defined as one.
- The environment was strong in a sense of positive liberty.
- The environment was strong in a sense of opportunity defined as an equal start by raising standards of health and education.
- The environment was weak in a sense of participation except so far as participation was an ideal itself.

JUST SPACES JUST PLACES

- The environment was weak in a sense of difference, except so far as regions could be adequately correlated with economic distinctions.

The environment can and does refer to aspects of justice, but in which aspects of the environment does it? In the first part of this thesis I attempted to locate justice, by looking at justice with an eye toward environments. In the second part, approaching the other side of the problem, I examined environments with an eye to justice? How could we define and conceive of environments in order to locate justice in specific parts. The answer to this question depended on a clearer account of human activity in environments.

I examined four common (aspects) conceptions of environments by planners and architects: form, space, place and time. I defined each according to more explicit accounts of human action. Form gave a structure to our actions, perceptions and signs. Space was created, structured and gave meaning through a social creation. Man is essentially space occupying; he owns property, he defends it, and communicates across it. Place constituted meanings in 6 ways: possession, social symbols, recurrent use, similar experience, perception, and action. Action had two senses. Action was both least significant, as bodily acts, and most significant, as reconstructing a place. Time was a "choreography of existence".

From this account it was clear the environment could and did correspond to human activity in time and space, however these conceptions were still inadequate for locating justice. Not all human activity could be equally just.

Architects and planners constrained the development of explicit and significant ideals because they considered human action in very simple ways. I reviewed current theories of human action in philosophy and in modern social thought, looking for a more adequate account of human action.

The debate in philosophy defined action as behavior, possibility and ability, and as a logical system. Modern social theory defined action as acting, work/labor, interaction/communication and structuration.

I differentiated three forms of human activity *acts, acting, action.* Unlike acts and acting, *action* could not be separated from the particularities of time and space. It makes particular demands on it, in the form of property and communication, but also is structured by it, in the form of schedules, patterns of work, consumption and leisure patterns. The unintended consequences of actions produced institutions.

Human actions as well as the actions of institutions and social systems in time and space were the only forms of activity significant and valid for locating aspects of justice. We could not claim any

JUST SPACES JUST PLACES

aspects or senses of justice from acts (behavior, choice) nor from acting (roles, rules, conventions, drama).

Just Spaces Just Places - The powers of environmental design.

An aspect or sense of justice can be found in the actions of individuals, institutions, and social systems, but not in their acts or in acting. The designers of environments can therefore not claim a validity (justice) for the environments they produce simply on grounds of producing access, choices, or diversity. These aspects can not constitute environments as just or unjust. Where then does the power of environmental design lie?

Individuals, institutions and systems are all capable of action. Justice or injustice exists in the interrelationships between these actors, in the systems of spaces. These often produce unintended consequences and externalities. This is what Harvey and urban economists have pointed out. A system of spaces is unjust as far as it inhibits the equalizing of resources.

Spaces can be just or injust because they are created, and once created constitute patterns of human action, acts, and acting for longer periods than the situation in which they were created exist.

Individuals are not only located in a system of space, patterns of space become fixed in time and in locations. Individuals can act and so move, but are located in places. *Human action takes place* in a

system of spaces, and has the power to reveal the patterns and systems themselves. Patterns of spaces do not come from places, nor do places come from patterns of spaces, but rather spaces are gradually built up over time and give a definition and legitimacy to forms of action, and reproduce institutions. The power of environmental design lies in the communicative aspect of places to refer to social power and culture as a validation and support of ideas and values commonly held. Positive conceptions of liberty exist everyday in just places. The power of environmental design lies in revealing the liberative powers of forms of work, play, and social goods that dominate us:[1] forms of education, religion, work, leisure, constituting aspects of opportunity and positive liberty. These are bound in systems of spaces as well as in places that reaffirm our actions in these activities.

Justice is therefore constituted in a just system of spaces, as well as in just places.

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[1] See Walzer

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