GOVERNMENTAL DISORGANIZATION
IN THE
METROPOLITAN DISTRICT

by

MERRITT TODD COOKE JR
A.B. Princeton University
(1942)

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF CITY PLANNING
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
(1947)

Signature of Author .....
(Department of City and Regional Planning, September 12, 1947.)

Certified by .....
Thesis Supervisor

.....
Chairman, Departmental Committee on Graduate Students.

Cambridge, Massachusetts
September 12, 1947

Professor Frederick J. Adams
Department of City and Regional Planning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Adams,

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of City Planning, I submit this thesis entitled Governmental Disorganization in the Metropolitan District.

Sincerely,

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The writer wishes to make grateful acknowledgment of the assistance and advice which has been so generously extended by the following:

Professors Frederick J. Adams and Roland B. Greeley of the Department of City and Regional Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Miss Florence W. Stiles and Miss Margaret Beale of the Rotch Architectural Library, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Professor Morris B. Lambie, Mr. Douglas Carroll and Miss Enid Wilson, of the Bureau for Research in Municipal Government, Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University; and Miss Katherine McNamara, Librarian of the Departments of Landscape Architecture and Regional Planning, Harvard University.

M. T. C.

CHAPTER I

In The Politics, Aristotle writes that "a state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only: if life only were the object, slaves and brute animals might form a state, but they cannot, for they have no share in happiness or in a life of free choice."[1] Any governmental organization, from the largest nation to the smallest village, can be conceived as designed not only to help man live, but to help him live as he ought; a municipality, for example, preserves life by its negative and protective functions, exemplified in the fire, police, health and inspectional services, simplifies life by its provision of such utilities as water and roads, and finally improves life both by its social functions, of which education and recreation are two major examples, and also by the opportunities it provides for man to develop coöperative ideals and common endeavors. Although of vital importance, this aspect of the city's potentialities is often forgotten in the smug satisfaction with a high level of numerical and material achievement; if the city provides hundreds of seats in school and hundreds of miles of road and thousands of miles of pipes and millions of gallons of water, its citizens pay their taxes without too much grumbling and forget that the ideal city offers not only

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(1) Aristotle: Politics, Book III, 1:6.

service but opportunity - opportunity for its citizens to improve both themselves and their environment.

Although both elements are indispensable, the realization of this high ideal of government depends even more upon a responsible and intelligent citizenry than upon institutional organization; high achievement is possible without elaborate governmental mechanisms and intricate administrative devices, while even the most refined and perfected governmental organization is incapable of prodding into competence a lazy and apathetic citizen body. However, while government can be no better than the people of whom it is composed, it can be infinitely worse, for archaic mechanisms can dull the efforts of even the most vigilant and enlightened citizenry. "It is, of course, true that the main questions of democracy are what may be termed moral questions, depending far more upon the possession of mind and character than upon any other factors. But mind and character are everywhere useless without the full opportunity of application. It is here that the mechanisms of modern democracy seem most inadequate."[1]

The failure of most contemporary political units to attain or approach the ideals and potentialities of government cannot, of course, be ascribed to the inadequacy or obsoleteness of the mechanisms which, as the creations of man and society are forever subject to subsequent modification

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(1) Laski: The Problem of Administrative Areas, p.16.

and improvement as the need arises. Unfortunately, this need often arises so slowly and subtly that the call for change is unheeded and the opportunity for improvement passes neglected.

The governmental disorganization prevailing in this country's metropolitan districts furnishes a striking example of the failure to modify governmental mechanism in response to changed conditions. Rapid population growth and radical technological advances have combined to transform the pattern of urban life, but despite the warning sounded by successive Census enumerations, sociologists and citizens, the metropolitan district has been permitted to improvise a governmental organization on the basis of political units designed for other times and other places. As a consequence of the failure to seize the early opportunities and institute promptly the necessary minor changes, the metropolitan district is today confronted with a riotous disorganization of government which only the boldest measures will correct. This paper attempts to discover some reasons for the rapid course of the metropolitan district's governmental disorganization and to outline some of the serious administrative, operational, social, political and fiscal problems it has created; it tries to illustrate certain of these problems by a statistical study of the Boston region and, in conclusion, it suggests guiding principles for the reorganization which might create a metropolitan government that would help man not only to live but to live as he ought.

CHAPTER II (1)

A city exists at three complementary levels of reality: physically as an aggregation of buildings and utilities, socially as a medium for the satisfaction of common interests and the promotion of cooperative activities, and politically as an instrument of control and of service. It is, of course, obvious that the boundaries of the political, the social and the physical city rarely if ever coincide and are in themselves often difficult to determine; for example, the boundary of the "physical city" is constantly altered by new construction, while the area of the "political city", ordinarily precisely defined by legal limits, is often enlarged by the exercise of extraterritorial power. Even more elusive are the boundaries of the "social city" which provides the institutional frame for the work and play of the urban area and extends its influence in diminishing strength over a wide area of semi-urban and even rural territory; indeed, the examples of Paris and New York, with their world-wide power in fashion and finance, suggest that the influence of the "social city" can, in fact, pervade the entire world.

It is obvious that the boundaries of these three forms of the city by no means cover the same territory; the "political city" often includes undeveloped rural areas

(1) This and the succeeding chapter borrow heavily from a paper submitted by this writer in March 1947 to Prof. Morris B. Lambie's Administrative Process Seminar, Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University.

which lack the buildings and the utilities that characterize the "physical city"; on the other hand, the march of neat rows of suburban cottages past the surveyor's lines carries the "physical city" beyond its political limits, while the "social city" reaches out still further to include a less thickly settled border area lying beyond the urbanized territory.

These inevitable variations in the extent of the political, the physical and the social city are dangerous only when they grow so great as to threaten the articulation which relates the city's three forms and ensures its usefulness. For the city is after all only a tool to strengthen the hand of man in realizing the possibilities of his environment and his nature, and the tool can be fully effective only when its parts are efficiently related. When rapid population growth, radical technological change and the multiplication of governmental units create gross differences in the areas of the political, social and physical city, the tool loses its edge and needs resharpening if it is to aid man in shaping his society and environment.

In the medieval-walled town, the ramparts were not only the physical or geographical but also the social and political boundaries of the city; within the walls were concentrated the activities of trade, craft manufacture and labor that gave a distinctive pattern to town life and called forth appropriate

governmental forms, while without the walls existed a sparsely settled region which found its livelihood in agriculture and its social and governmental focus in the manor and its village. The gradual removal of the old city walls, as changed conditions of life made their protection less necessary, swept away the material boundaries of the city and symbolized the growing interdependence between city and country that made demarcation more difficult. Constant growth in functional complexity and in size have so modified the modern city that its physical area rarely coincides with its corporate limits and its social and economic influence may trespass beyond both its geographical and governmental bounds. Despite the incongruity between its social, physical and governmental areas, the city, however, possesses a sharpness of definition that is lacking in metropolitan districts owing at least partially to the absence of an appropriate metropolitan governmental organization that would stimulate an awareness of the district's essential unity. Yet because it is nebulous is no justification for concluding, in the company of some writers, that the metropolitan district does not exist; Lewis Mumford is blinking the facts when he writes: "Physically incoherent, socially disparate, the new metropolitan districts are at best statistical collections. Here and there in the mass one may partly trace the outline of a city: but the mass is not a city, in a functional sense, any more than the immediate

countryside that surrounds it is a rural area."[1] Admittedly, these new areas are not cities, but neither are they mere statistical collections; although they lack the sharp outlines of the medieval-walled town or even the more blurred definition of the modern city, the metropolitan district exists as more than a name by virtue of the common interests and activities of which it is the scene.

Common purpose, common pursuits, common interests are the touchstones in determining the boundaries of both the city and the metropolitan district; and since human activities in their variety and complexity are the determinants, it it should occasion no surprise to find that any finite boundary is only an arbitrary approximation to the truth. It has already been mentioned that the built-up area which is essentially urban in character may not conform to the corporate limits of a city; in the same way, the different functions of the metropolitan district may not recognize identical boundaries; accordingly, there is justification for for speaking of the metropolitan retail area, the metropolitan transit area or the metropolitan sewerage area, meanwhile recognising the existence of the primary metropolitan district as the summation of a variety of different activities.

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(1): Mumford, Lewis: The Culture of Cities, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1938 - P. 234.

Perhaps a metropolitan district can best be defined[1] as the territory throughout which the central city fixes the pattern of life for the outlying areas. Admittedly this is an unsatisfactory description since it involves so many indeterminate terms of which "pattern of life" is only the most complex; however, since the metropolitan district is a social organization, the definition gains precision only at the risk of becoming arbitrary. Although it has been forced in the interests of statistical simplicity and comparability to use a definition based on density, the Bureau of Census has tacitly admitted that this technique can no more than suggest the real extent of metropolitan districts; in preparation for the 1930 census, the Bureau endeavored to formulate a more trustworthy test by circularizing United States' cities and requesting them to demarcate their metropolitan area on the basis of the following factors: "Commuting distance, including only suburbs from which not less

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(1): The Census definition of a metropolitan district is in part as follows: "A metropolitan district has been set up for use in the 1940 Census of population in connection with each city of 50,000 or more, two or more such cities sometimes being in one district. The general plan is to include in the district, in addition to the central city or cities, all adjacent and contiguous minor civil divisions or incorporated places having a population of 150 or more per square mile ...." Bureau of Census: 16th Census Of The United States, (1940) Population, Vol. I, USGPO, Washington, 1942, P. 11.

than 10 percent of the working population commute daily to the central city; power and light territory served from the central city; phone service area of the central city; the territory served by the central city's water supply; the area in which the daily newspapers of the central city are delivered by the papers' own carriers; the area served by house connections with the city's sewer system; the residential membership area of social and athletic clubs located within the central city; the area of operation of local real estate companies in the surrounding region; the area covered by the daily routes of solicitors, inspectors and collectors, operating out of the central city as their headquarters."[1] It is indicative of the nature of the metropolitan district that the attempt to determine its boundaries should emphasize the extent of utility service; until the Industrial Revolution metropolitan districts, and even larger cities as they exist today, were unknown; in the Ancient World only such capitols as Rome, Peiping and possibly Nanking ever possessed over a million inhabitants, while in modern times the number of cities of over 100,000

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(1): Quoted McKenzie, R.D.: The Rise Of Metropolitan Communities, Pp 453-4 from Civic Development Dept., U.S. Chamber of Commerce Methods Of Procedure In Defining Metropolitan Districts.

were few until the advent of steam power; toward the end of the 17th Century, London, with a population estimated at 530,000, superseded Paris as the largest European city, but it was not until 1811 that the area corresponding to that of the present County of London reached a million inhabitants[1] and not until forty years later that Paris equalled this figure.[2] Since the development of large cities, and especially of metropolitan districts, was the result of the vast increases of production, wealth and population created by the technological advances of the Industrial Revolution, it is logical to emphasize the importance of technological criteria in delimiting metropolitan districts;- modern cities cannot exist without electricity distribution networks, water supplies, sewerage systems, and the degree to which these facilities are provided by the central city is an index of its influence over the surrounding area, while the extent of the local transit service, the rate zones set by postal and telephone authorities and the carrier circulation areas of downtown newspapers help outline the territory that can be expected to have certain economic and social interests in

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(1): Robson, W.A.: The Government And Misgovernment Of London, Pp. 41 & 45.

(2): Paris (1851) 1,053,262 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 17, P. 241)

common. Numerous other criteria for determining the extent of metropolitan districts can be suggested; among the more plausible of those not mentioned in the quotation cited above are the central city's retail and wholesale trade areas, the audience distribution of central city radio stations, the local freight rate zone, the degree of use by outlying territory of central city institutions, such as hospitals, schools and banks and the location of the areas where central city residents seek outdoor recreation. It is obvious then from the variety and complexity of the criteria which must be considered that the lines on the map can at best only suggest the outlines of an area in which urbanization and an interdependent pattern of life have created what is called a metropolitan district.

TABLE 1

URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1940

Year	Total Pop. (add 000)	% of Total Urban	% of Total Rural	% Increase Total	% Increase Urban	Urban Increase As % of Total
1790	3,929	5.1	94.9	---	---	-- -
1840	17,069	10.8	89.2	335	814	12.5
1890	62,948	35.1	64.9	348	1098	44.2
1900	75,995	39.7	60.3	20.7	36.4	61.6
1910	91,972	45.7	54.3	21.0	39.3	74.2
1920	105,711	51.2	48.8	14.9	29.0	88.3
1930	122,775	56.2	43.8	16.1	27.3	86.7
1940	131,669	56.5	43.5	7.2	7.9	61.6

Source: 16th Census, Population, Vol. I, Table 6

CHAPTER III

In the one hundred and fifty years 1790-1940 the United States has been transformed from a nation 94% of whose population lived in rural areas to one in which 57% were inhabitants of urban territory; while in 1940 there were about 15 times as many people living in rural regions as in 1790, there were also over 320 times as many urban residents. (Table 1) In 1790 the United States contained only 33 incorporated places having a population of 2,500 or more, and it was not until 1820 that New York[1] became the first city in the nation to exceed the 100,000 mark; by 1930, the number of urban places had grown to 3,165 and the 93 cities with a population of 100,000 or more contained 30% of the country's total. In the next decade, 1930-1940, although the number of urban places increased to 3,464, the rate of increase of the urban population slackened markedly and approximately one third of the cities of over 100,000 suffered an absolute loss, indicating the imminence of the stablization of the urban population, which had been intimated by earlier statistical trends. (Table 2).

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(1): The area now covered by New York's five boroughs had a population of 1,119,734 in 1810, but no single borough had over 100,000 population until Manhattan reached the figure of 1.123,706 in the Census of 1820.

TABLE 2

GROWTH OF URBAN PLACES IN THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1940

Year	Number of Urban Places	Number of Cities 100,000 and over	% of Total Pop. in Cities 100,000 and o
1790	24	0	0.0
1840	131	3	3.0
1890	1,348	28	15.4
1900	1,737	38	18.8
1910	2,262	50	22.1
1920	2,722	68	26.0
1930	3,165	93	29.6
1940	3,464	92	28.8

Source: 16th Census, Population, Vol. I, Table 10

Within the past fifty years, the growth in the urban population and the increase in the number of urban places have been largely a reflection of the phenomenal growth of metropolitan districts. Although the existence of such areas had been recognized by the Bureau Of Census in its Report On Social Statistics Of Cities, published in 1886, and also in a special bulletin, Industrial Districts, which was issued in 1905, it was not until the Thirteenth Census of 1910 that significant population statistics were collected and analysed for metropolitan districts. Selecting cities of 200,000 or more population as nuclei, the Census published figures both for total population of civil divisions entirely or predominantly within a ten mile distance from the central city's boundaries and for the population within that territory living in areas that could be considered urban in character by virtue of a population density of 150 or more persons per square mile; figures also were published covering the population of all cities of 100,000 or over and of adjacent territory within a ten mile zone from the limits of these cities. The 25 metropolitan districts, comprising the central city or cities of 200,000 inhabitants or over and the adjacent territory of an urban character within the ten mile zone, were found to include 24% of the nation's total population, while the metropolitan cities of 100,000

TABLE 3

POPULATION OF METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS 1910-1920[1]

	1900[2]	1910[3]	1920[4]
Number of Districts	- ---	25	29
Area in Square Miles	- ---	7371.1	10,650.2
Total Population (add 000)	16,323	22,088	29,239
% U.S. Total Population	21.5	24.0	27.7
% in Central City	78.6	77.4	75.5
% Outside Central City	21.4	22.6	24.5

Source: (1) For 1910-1920 definition of metropolitan districts, see text
(2) 1900 data for area included within 25 districts as delimited by 1910 census from 13th Census, (1910) Vol. I, Table 50
(3) 13th Census (1910) Vol. I, Table 50
(4) 14th Census (1920) Vol. I, Table 40

inhabitants or over and all adjacent territory within the ten mile distance from their limits contained about 29% of the total; the next census revealed the addition of 4 new districts to the 25 outlined by the 1910 census and indicated that these 29 districts contained 28% of the country's total population. (Tables 3 and 4).

Although, as has already been mentioned, the Fifteenth Census of 1930 attempted to replace the arbitrary criterion of density as the basis for the definition of metropolitan districts, the necessity for comparability in the data forced a return to density as the one factor which could be determined easily and consistently for each of various areas; the definition used in 1910 and 1920 was, however, modified in the interests of giving weight to the population of the entire area as well as that of the central city; metropolitan status was made dependent upon the existence of a population of 50,000 or more in the central city (replacing the previous standard of 200,000 or more) and of 100,000 or more in the combined central city and contiguous territory where density exceeded 150 persons per square mile; such "urbanized territory" was no longer confined to a zone within ten miles of the central city's boundaries, but was extended as far as the density and contiguity requirements could be satisfied. This new definition of metropolitan districts made it

TABLE 4

POPULATION OF METROPOLITAN CITIES AND ADJACENT TERRITORY
(1)
1910-1920

	(2) 1900	(3) 1910	(4 1920
Number of Areas	- ---	44	58
Area in Square Miles	- ---	28,582.9	36,667.
Total Population (add 000)	20,190	27,021	36,887
% U.S. Total Population	26.6	29.4	34.9
% In Central City	72.6	72.4	71.2
% Outside Central City	27.4	27.6	28.8

Source: (1) The tabulation includes all cities with 100,000 or more population and their adjacent civil divisions all or more than half of which, in population or area, lie within 10 miles of the city's boundary
(2) 1900 data for area included within the 44 areas as delimited by 13th census from 13th Census (1910) Vol.I, Table 52
(3) 13th Census (1910) Vol. I, Table 52
(4) 14th Census (1920) Vol. I, Table 42

unnecessary to report separately the figures, which had been given in 1910 and 1920, for the population of metropolitan cities, that is those having 100,000 or more inhabitants, and of adjacent territory within 10 miles of the city boundaries.

Although they covered only 1.2% of its land area, the 96 metropolitan districts designated in 1930 on the basis of the revised definition contained 45% of the total population of the United States, while the 140 districts delimited by the 1940 Census included 48% of the country's population, and the 17 largest metropolitan districts, each with 750,000 or more residents, concentrated within their boundaries about one third of the nation's people. (Table 5). It is significant that though the percentage population increase in metropolitan districts exceeded comparable figures for both the whole country and for urban places and while these districts absorbed over 60% of the country's total population increases in the two decades 1920-1930, 1930-1940, (Table 6), the percentage of the districts' population living in the central cities was steadily declining, reaching a low figure of 68% in the most recent Census.

Although the decreasing rate of growth indicates the unlikelihood of further general and rapid expansion, figures recently released by the Bureau of Census show that several

TABLE 5

POPULATION OF METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS 1930-1940 (1)

	1920 (2)	1930 (3)	1940 (4
Number of Districts	- ---	96	140
Area in Square Miles	- ---	36,577.9	44,626.0
Total Population (add 000)	42,670	54,754	62,966
% U. S. Total Population	40.4	44.6	47.8
% In Central City	72.4	69.2	68.0
% Outside Central City	27.6	30.8	32.0

Source: (1) For 1930-1940 definition of Metropolitan Districts, see text
(2) 1920 data for area included within 96 districts as delimited by 1930 Census from U. S National Resources Committee: Population Statistics, Vol. 3, Urban Data, USGPO, Washington, 1937, Table 31
(3) 15th Census (1930) Population Vol. II, Table 11
(4) 16th Census (1940) Population, Vol. I, Table 17

of the country's metropolitan districts registered substantial gains during the war years; thus, on the basis of sample counts it is estimated that the population of the Los Angeles metropolitan district had grown to 3,917,000 by April of this year, an increase of 35% over the figure enumerated in 1940; similiar sample counts indicate a 5% increase in the population of the Pittsburg metropolitan district and a 13% growth in the Rochester metropolitan area.[1] Even though these gains may represent only a wartime phenomenon, the tremendous increases that the fifty years 1890-1940 have brought to their population assure the metropolitan districts of a preponderant position in our national life: it is clear that this country has become not only urbanized but metropolitanized as well.

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(1) U.S. Bureau of Census: Current Population Reports: Population Characteristics, Series P 21: Los Angeles #30, Pittsburg #8, Rochester #27. 1947.

TABLE 6

POPULATION INCREASE IN THE UNITED STATES - 1890-1940

	1930-40	1930-20	1920-10	1910-00	1890-190(
Percentage Increase (1)					
Total Population	7.2	16.1	14.9	21.0	20.7
Urban Population	7.9	27.3	29.0	39.3	36.4
Metropolitan Dist. Population	9.3	28.3	26.9	35.2	- -
Met. Dist. Increase As % of Total U.S. Increase	60.4	70.7	45.0	36.1	- -

(1): Population increase for metropolitan districts is the interdecennial population increase in the areas classified at the second census as falling within metropolitan districts:- i.e. increase in population of metropolitan districts for 1930-1940 is the difference between the population of the 140 districts as delimited by the 1940 Census and the 1930 population of the same area.

Source: Appropriate census tables listed as sources for Tables 3 and 5.

CHAPTER IV

Although the rapid growth and movement of population in the last fifty or one hundred years have radically altered this country's pattern of population distribution, there has been no corresponding transformation of the political units by which the country is governed; and though it has created problems both in rural areas and in smaller cities, this dislocation and maladjustment of political units and of population is most acute in the metropolitan districts.

The failure of political units to adapt themselves to the new needs created by the growth and redistribution of population is simply another example of the inability or at best the reluctance of institutions to modify their structure in response to new social realities; the problem of political units within the metropolitan district is thus but a new manifestation of the ageless problem of the social lag.

Although the hopeless inadequacy of the existing multitude of units to provide the metropolitan district with satisfactory government has become acute in this country only since the turn of the century, similar perplexities were not unknown at an earlier date; prior to the consolidation of 1854 government in the Philadelphia area was divided among the central city, with an 1850 population of 121,376, and

5 suburban towns, with a total of over 220,000 residents. As long ago as the 16th Century, London became conscious of the metropolitan problem which it attempted to solve, not by any improvement of political units, but by a restriction on new building in the hope of preventing further population growth.[1] Similar efforts in succeeding generations were, of course, powerless to check the growth of London or to prevent the steady deterioration of the articulation between the political, social and physical aspects of the metropolis; within the London Metropolitan Police District, a greater London area of 693 square miles containing a prewar population of 8,655,000 (1937), there are, in addition to countless special districts, 6 parish councils, 4 rural districts, 30 urban districts, 35 municipal boroughs, 3 county boroughs, 28 metropolitan boroughs, the City of London and all or parts of 5 counties;[2] within the area of the Greater London Plan, which excludes the administrative County and the City of London, there are 143 local municipal corporations in addition to the usual large number of statutory authorities or special districts.[3]

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(1) See Abercrombie: Greater London Plan, P. 29 ff.
(2) Robson: The Government And Misgovernment Of London, P. 371.
(3) Abercrombie: op.cit. P. 1.

In this country efforts, both negative and positive, to simplify and rationalize the governmental structure of our 140 metropolitan districts have met with but little more success than the early English measure previously mentioned. As a consequence, the metropolitan districts, which contain almost 48% of the country's total population, lack any appropriate governmental organization; - they simply do not have any government or rather they are cursed with such a superfluity of overlapping and redundant jurisdictions that the pattern of organization is totally obscured and operational efficiency is virtually impossible.

For the purposes of a 1942 enumeration of governmental units in the United States, the Bureau of the Census distinguished 7 types of units including: (1) U.S. government, (2) states, (3) counties, (4) townships and towns, (5) municipalities, (6) school districts, and (7) special districts; in general, the Bureau considered all governmental agencies as governmental units if "they are geographic subdivisions or population concentrations that maintain a distinct legal existence, are public corporations or at least quasi corporations, and are politically organized for the conduct of local affairs."[1]

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(1) Bureau Of Census: Governmental Units In The United States 1942, 1944, P. 3.

TABLE 7

GOVERNMENTAL UNITS WITHIN
THE 17 LARGEST METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS

	No. of Incorporated Places, Counties and Municipalities only, Other than Central City (1)			All Governmental Units (2)
	1940	1930	1920	1942
N.Y.-Northeastern N.J.	284	264	212	1,039
Chicago	117	114	95	821
Los Angeles	55	54	44	353
Philadelphia	92	91	72	522
Boston	54	54	52	96
Detroit	44	42	24	458
Pittsburg	136	134	135	613
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose	44	41	35	414
St. Louis	69	47	36	539
Cleveland	45	40	30	60
Baltimore	4	4	4	15
Providence-Fall River-New Bedford	21	21	19	42
Minneapolis-St. Paul	34	33	30	419
Washington, D.C.	31	25	16	63
Buffalo-Niagara	13	13	12	375
Cincinnati	46	44	39	192
Milwaukee	13	11	10	200
Total	1,103	1,032	863	6,221

Source: (1) Jones, Metropolitan Government, Table 5,
(2) U.S. Bureau of Census. Governmental Units in the United States 1942-1944. Table 11

Using these criteria and classifications, the Bureau found that in 1942 the country's 140 metropolitan districts contained 15,827 governmental units distributed as follows:[1]

Counties	272
Townships	895
Municipalities	1,741
School Districts	11,822
Special Districts	1,097
Total	15,827

These figures indicate that in the average metropolitan district governmental responsibility is divided among approximately 115 political units, in addition to the state and federal governments which overlap the district but are not included in the tabulation. Some districts, of course, possess many more units than the mathematical average; thus in the metropolitan district centering about New York City and covering portions of Connecticut, New Jersey and New York, the total of 1,039 governmental units includes 286 municipalities, 520 school districts and 141 special districts. The government of the Chicago metropolitan area is divided among 5 counties, 14 townships, 115 municipalities, 593 school districts and 66 special districts; within the portions of Pennsylvania and New Jersey covered by the Philadelphia

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(1) Ibid. Table 11. All figures given in this paragraph are derived from this table.

metropolitan district, there are 522 units, while in the Los Angeles area there are 353. (Table 7). However, it is not only in the larger districts that governmental responsibility is divided among a large number of different jurisdictions; the smaller metropolitan districts repeat the same pattern and sometimes show in proportion to their area and population a greater relative number of units than the larger districts; the Kalamazoo district includes 118 units of government, the Madison district 286, and the Altoona district 134; within the Sioux City district there are 179 units, while the Rochester and Syracuse districts contain respectively 194 and 212 separate units of government.

It is obvious from the figures classifying the total number of governmental units in the country's 140 metropolitan districts that the counties and the incorporated places constitute a relatively small percentage of the total; it is in fact the two remaining classifications - the school district and the special district, that comprise over 81% of the total number of units found within the metropolitan districts.

The special district is a hybrid political unit usually created to perform one of a variety of specific functions; thus a district may be organized for the construction of highways, control of weeds, conservation of soil, irrigation

of land, production of electricity, operation of libraries or any of a number of other purposes of which by far the most common is the provision of free education. In 1942 approximately 80% of the Chicago metropolitan district's 821 governmental units were special districts (including the subdivision of school districts); in the New York area during the same year counties, townships and municipalities comprised 36.4% and special and school districts 63.8% of the total of 1,039 units, while in the Pittsburg district the respective figures were 36.7% and 63.3%. In the Detroit metropolitan area the 383 school and special districts constituted 83.5% of the total number of units, and in a smaller center such as the Decatur district, the corresponding figure reaches almost 98%.[1] An earlier tabulation of the political units in the Chicago region is revealing for its detailed information on the type of districts adding to the governmental confusion of the area; in 1933 the metropolitan region, defined as the territory lying within a fifty mile radius of the Loop, contained 204 cities and villages, 15 counties, 165 townships, 978 school districts, 70 park districts, 4 forest preserve districts, 11 sanitary districts, 190 drainage districts, 4 mosquito abatement districts and

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(1) Ibid: Table 11.

1 health district or a total of 1,642 governmental units. Cook County contained 419 units, including 195 school districts, 56 park districts, 1 forest preserve district, 4 sanitary districts, 40 drainage districts, 2 mosquito districts and 1 health district, while even in the city of Chicago itself responsibility was divided among 27 units of local government.[1] As in all metropolitan districts, the size and importance of the special districts in the Chicago region varies widely; at one extreme is the Chicago Sanitary District with its huge payroll and its 442 square mile area, while at the other are some of the insignificant school and park districts; similar major authorities and districts in other parts of the country, for example the Port of New York Authority or the East Bay Municipal Utility District in the San Francisco region, exercise such important funtions and control such large budgets that they overshadow the activities of most of the municipalities lying within their operational territory.

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(1) Merriam, Parratt and Lepawsky: The Government Of The Metropolitan Region Of Chicago, p. 9.

CHAPTER V

1

"Every integrated urban community having a population of over 35,000-50,000 should be organized as one local ('metropolitan') government. Wherever possible it should be a single administrative unit for all local services and have one governing body (rather than split into several layers such as county, city, school and special districts - each with separate governing bodies.)"[1] This ideal is so completely at variance with the realities of government within the metropolitan district that it is necessary to seek some explanation for the multiplication of independent jurisdictions which has completely frustrated governmental unity; since it is after all not a novel idea that a socially and economically unified urban area can be best administered by a unified government it is natural to look to the past and present for some account of what obscured the ideal.

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In the early decades of this country's independence local governmental units were organized to meet the needs of the

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(1) Hansen and Perloff: State And Local Finance In The National Economy, P. 91.

many small population clusters that developed in the relative isolation created by inadequate transportation facilities and the surrounding expanses of rural and forest land; thus, in New England, where civil and religious governments were virtually consolidated in the hands of a theocracy, new towns and churches were created to serve the convenience of growing population centers isolated or distant from the older churches. "From 1630 to 1830 in all parts of the (Boston) metropolitan area, the commonest cause assigned in the petitions for the establishment of a new town, was the remoteness from existing places of worship. Where remoteness was clearly shown there was frequently no opposition on the part of the existing church and town to separation, if only a new church was established and a legal minister supported."[1] In the southern colonies, incorporated places were at first unable to rival the importance of the county system of government, but towards the end of the 18th Century were gradually established in increasing numbers to meet the commercial needs of the region.[2] In later years, religious and commercial motives for the establishment of incorporated places were superseded by newer incentives that

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(1) McCaffrey: The Political Disintegration And Reintegration Of Metropolitan Boston, P. 2.
(2) Carpenter: Problems In Service Levels, P. 13 ff.

reflected the changing basis of the national economy; thus the separation of Somerville and Charleston in 1842 represented a governmental recognition of the radically different needs of rural and of urbanized areas, while the 1851 divorce of West Roxbury from its parent town of Roxbury arose from the unwillingness of the former's residents to contribute to the support of the older area's rapidly increasing pauper population.[1]

As natural increase and immigration during the last hundred years added to the population of our principal cities, the metropolitan districts grew in size and absorbed within their boundaries the previously established governmental units that had formerly led an independent existence beyond their peripheries; rural towns established in response to some of the motives suggest above were thus swallowed up by the metropolitan district as the increasing population radiated from the center of concentration. At the same time that older governmental units were added to the number of those sharing the control of the expanding metropolitan districts, new units were created to supply the needed service and control in unincorporated rural areas into which population began to spill.

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(1) McCaffrey: op. cit. P. 7 ff.

Within the last 50 years the multiplication of new municipal corporations within its area has considerably complicated the pattern of governmental organization in the metropolitan district. Many new incorporations doubtless represented the logical response to a need for service which existing governmental units were unable to supply; at the same time, it is apparent that villages, towns and other political units were sometimes the children of less respectable motives; in New Jersey, for instance, two boroughs, covering little more than the areas of two golf courses, were created for the obvious purpose of avoiding contributions toward local school support and possible interference with Sunday sport;[1] and while instances are rare of such complete perversion of government's purpose, many incorporations are designed in a more subtle fashion to serve rather the interests of the few than the welfare of the many; thus wealthy suburbanites often seek to insulate their community with political boundaries against the problems of the older portions of the district, and, in other instances, small groups of landowners and real estate operators may find the path to larger profit smoothed by the creation of new governmental units.

As a consequence of the numerous motives, questionable and valid, for the creation of new units, the number of

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(1) Carpenter: op.cit. P. 85.

municipalities within the metropolitan districts has increased at a perceptibly faster rate than throughout the country as a whole; a study made during the 30's discovered that while the number of incorporated places in the entire country had grown 106% during the period 1890-1930, the number lying within the area covered by the 90 metropolitan districts defined by the 1930 Census had increased 159%, from a figure of 605 in 1890 to 1,566 in 1930.[1]

Multiplying within the metropolitan districts at a greater rate than throughout the country as a whole, the districts' increasing number of governmental units have so overcrowded a limited territory that efficient administrative areas disappear; and like young trees too closely sown, the numerous municipalities grow up as puny and inefficient political units that fail to provide the district with satisfactory government.

To overcome the inefficiency arising from ineffectual and unrelated efforts by countless weak and small boroughs, villages, towns and even cities, there arises a need for additional governmental units of a different type: consequently special districts are introduced to discharge functions that the municipalities are too weak and small to

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(1) Lepawsky: Development Of Urban Government, Table 15, P. 27.

assume. Thus a sewerage district is created to secure functional coordination in a watershed whose area is parcelled out among countless cities, or a library district is organized to enable several small municipal units to maintain a service that none singly could afford. The rapid multiplication of municipalities with insufficient resources and inefficient areas thus reaches its climax in a governmental decrepitude for which one palliative is the organization of still more units of another type.

3

Since the period of rapid urban growth first began to aggravate the problem, there have been repeated attempts to simplify and improve the structure of government in the metropolitan district; annexation, consolidation and various other types of reorganization have, in fact, succeeded in rare cases in reducing the number of units operating within certain of our metropolitan districts; yet, in view of the seriousness of the problems which it poses, attempts to remedy the governmental disorganization of the metropolitan district have been surprisingly rare and dishearteningly unsuccessful, owing chiefly to the inertia of the many and the selfishness of the few. The great majority of the district's voters are simply not sufficiently aroused by its governmental problems

to make the small effort needed to defeat the vociferous opposition which self-interest inspires in the few. This is not to suggest that all opponents of proposed plans for metropolitan reorganization are mistaken and misinformed; many schemes are improperly conceived and deserve the censure of even the staunchest advocates of governmental rationalization, while many admirable plans find opponents whose sincerity earns respect if not support for their views; such honest criticism is, however, infinitesimal in comparison with the opposition springing from avowed or tacit self-interest and greed.

The active opposition of the suburbs to any schemes for consolidation arises from such a variety of motives as the desire to preserve a fashionable address, the reluctance to assume the tax and debt burden of poorer municipalities and the exaggerated repugnance for the political administration of the central city. The successful efforts of Brookline, Evanston and Pasadena in resisting annexation by their central city merely exemplify the reluctance of wealthy suburbs throughout the country to place their tax base at the disposal of poorer areas; on rarer occasions, as illustrated by Boston's coolness to sporadic annexation bids by Revere and Chelsea, even the central city may be deterred by these economic motives from extending its boundaries. Where the

city or town has a long history and established traditions, oppostion based on economic motives is supplemented by a natural disinclination to countenance the submerging of local individuality that would result from a consolidation with a larger city.

The suburbs, however, usually find it inexpedient to advertise the opposition based on an anticipated financial loss and instead prefer to stress the virtue and vitality of their sturdy grass-roots democracy, which they contrast so favorably with the corrupt and machine-ridden administration of the central city. Without in the least belittling the admirable civic spirit existing in some suburbs and while not denying the imperfections which mar much central city administration, it is worth noting the vigorous suburban self-government has often a livelier existence in oratory than fact; the local government of a suburb may for years be moribund and ineffective only to receive a sudden and deceptive bloom of life from the outraged and self-righteous protests of the suburban opponents of annexation or consolidation. The special districts and authorities often rely on a similar line of argument and proclaim the necessity of keeping housing or education free from the taint of politics; perhaps they fail to see that a simpler and more effective solution would be simply to give politics an airing

that would remove the taint. This is only to say that the devil can quote the scriptures and to imply that for each disinterested opponent of governmental simplification there are a considerable number who mask the real reasons for their opposition behind plausible but irrelevant arguments. "The mischief which arises from local sentiment in our day is largely attributable to human greed. Community welfare is too often narrowly defined in terms of the selfish interests of local groups and units of local government are too often made to serve the exigencies of partisan politics."[1]

The politicians share with their constituents a tendency to conceal self-interest behind an elaboration of arresting but confusing argument; and when jobs, patronage and a carefully constructed political organization are threatened by proposals to consolidate certain of the metropolitan district's governmental units, the politician is even more expert than the citizen in discovering arguments which are arresting and plausible but logically inconclusive. A statement issued with the approval of the Republican and Democratic county committees by four circuit court judges during the 1930 campaign to merge the city of St. Louis with the separate county of the same name pulls all the stops at the command

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(1) Carpenter: op.cit. P. 37.

of the average politician in his efforts to block reorganization; the judges found that the proposed merger was a "dangerous experiment in municipal government" that will inevitably create "distressing litigation and unsettled business conditions"; they further solemnly concluded that it creates a crisis "because it confers power to deprive our people of the last vestige of local self-government" and because it fails adequately to protect the minority, that is the county residents, but most important of all because it sets up a "super-government" and places in the fundamental law of the state "a wholly unworkable scheme."[1]

The semantic irresponsibility of such statements could be easily exposed and the active opposition offered by the interested few could be easily defeated if the mass of the voters developed any concern over the improvement of government within the metropolitan districts. Their continuing inertia, however, constitutes a more serious obstacle to the success of any reorganization proposals than the noisy but uncompelling arguments advanced by the minority. The average voter's interest in the business of local government does not ordinarily extend far beyond the amount of his property

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(1) Faust; "Missouri Voters Reject Metropolitan Amendment," NMR 20: 14, Jan. 1931.

tax and lacks the strength to scrutinize the defects of existing governmental organization and to evaluate the benefits that might accrue from its modification; for such people, a good and sufficient justification for the continued existence of any governmental unit is simply the fact that it now exists, has existed in the past and is thus hallowed by tradition.

Inertia, however, not only dulls an appreciation of the serious problems arising from a superfluity of political units, but also preserves outdated constitutions and obsolete statutes and thus thwarts the legal changes that would facilitate governmental reorganization. After a careful study in 1930 of Chicago's most pressing problems, the Citizens' Advisory Committee agreed on a number of detailed recommendations all of which required prior statutory or constitutional amendment to permit execution; and three years later the Chicago Recovery Administration found that effective financial reforms for the city were thwarted by obsolete sections in the statutes.[1] In many instances, the state legislature actually encourages further governmental confusion by imposing on municipalities rigid tax or debt limitations which so cripple their ability to provide service that

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(1) Lepawsky: Home Rule For Metropolitan Chicago, P. 89.

special districts and authorities must be created as a means of escape.[1] Owing to pyramided governments, Chicago's effective 1942 debt limit was 21% of the assessed valuation of the city's real property;[2] any attempt to simplify the governmental structure would face the formidable obstacle that under existing enactments consolidation would reduce this limit to the city's figure of 5%. Similar restrictions embodied in the laws of other states are a major reason for the multiplication of special districts, which, owing to their legal status are able effectively to increase the city's borrowing power without adding to its legally limited debt.

Any scheme of governmental simplification within metropolitan districts involves many difficult problems of which the most central is that of reconciling efficient operational areas with a governmental unit retaining responsiveness to the will of its constituents. This and similar important issues can, however, be solved; yet their solution will be fruitless unless the inertia, indifference and selfishness which have hitherto been instrumental in defeating proposals for governmental simplification can be replaced by an enlightene community of self-interest to which the advantages of a reductio

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(1) See Davis: "Borrowing Machines", NMR 24: 328-34, June 193
(2) Council Of State Governments: State Local Relations, P. 222.

and rationalization of the number of governmental units will readily recommend itself. Writing of the Chicago area Charles Merriam and his colleagues summarized the situation in these rather tart words: "The community may prefer, however, to pay a considerable price for the maintenance of these separate political institutions in their isolation, and if they chose this independence of sixteen hundred governments in preference to broader or better public services or the present services at lower cost, it is, after all, the privilege of the community so to order its affairs. If the people of Chicago and vicinity admire, enjoy and are willing to pay the cost of this proliferation of government, that is their prerogative."[1]

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(1) Merriam, Parratt and Lepawsky: The Government Of The Metropolitan Region Of Chicago, P. 127.

CHAPTER VI

1

Although the different sections of any metropolitan district are, of course, distinguished by important variations in topography, density, land use and a host of other matters, they are nonetheless bound together, not only by networks of roads and utilities, but even more significantly, by common interests, purposes and activities. However, though it is in many important respects an economic and social unit, the metropolitan district lacks a correspondingly unified government to provide service, control and, in general, a framework for the activities of the area; the New York region, for instance, has not 1 but 1,039 governments, and even the Boston region, which represents a relative model of restraint, contains 96 independent governmental units.

In the preceding section an attempt has been made to suggest some of the reasons for the initial organization and the continuing existence of the multitude of units that today divide the government of this country's 140 metropolitan districts; in this chapter an effort will be made to discuss some of the serious difficulties plaguing municipal planning, administration and operations as a result of the failure of the metropolitan district to develop a governmental organization

adapted to its social and economic unity; the two succeeding chapters will consider the equally serious problems which arise from the same fundamental cause in the fiscal and the socio-political fields.

2

The numerous governmental units, large and small, of the typical metropolitan district can neither plan wisely nor operate efficiently owing to the limited areas, small populations, and restricted powers that sap their self-sufficiency; for although they may possess exclusive authority over their limited jurisdictional areas, both the small suburb of a few hundred or thousand inhabitants and the large city, which may perhaps contain over three quarters of the metropolitan district's total population, are too continuously and intimately affected by what transpires beyond their borders to be able to guarantee satisfactory planning and operation even within their own limits. The special district does not escape this defect, but only experiences it in a different form; for while the district often includes sufficient territory to form an efficient planning and operational area, and in fact sometimes covers the entire metropolitan district, it possesses authority in only one or at best several functional fields and is thus constantly hampered

by the independent and unrelated activities of other units in the correlated fields over which it has no control; a transit district, for instance, cannot make realistic plans for route extensions when frequent and sometimes capricious changes in municipal zoning ordinances threaten to alter the pattern of population distribution, nor can a fire district prepare effective plans in the absence of any control over the supply of water and the laying of mains. The individual municipalities are, of course, equally at the mercy of the independent and uncoordinated activities of both neighboring communities and the special districts, and, as a consequence, their ability to plan effectively is sharply curtailed if not extinguished. Early in the growth of the metropolitan districts the inability of the countless municipalities to provide by individual effort a satisfactory overall plan for the provision and operation of certain important services led to the creation of such special bodies as the Boston Metropolitan Water District (1895) and the Chicago Sanitary District (1889); since that time the growing complexity of urban and metropolitan life has constantly increased the number of functions for which the individual municipalities alone are powerless to plan until today water and sewer systems, ports, airfields, recreation areas, transit lines and arterial roads are among the facilities whose

planning is commonly delegated to special area-wide authorities. However, even in the planning of services which superficial consideration would classify as purely local in their scope, the municipalities cannot escape the influence of their neighbors' actions: industrial development beyond the city limits may create population increases that overtax the municipal school system and unanticipated road improvements in a neighboring suburb may place a formerly quiet playground on what develops into a major traffic artery.

3

In many metropolitan districts the municipalities, having experienced the futility of plans conceived in isolation, have attempted to provide certain important services by joint effort; the history of a few of these experiments creates little confidence in the ability of this method to solve one of the metropolitan district's fundamental problems. Often the joint effort never advances beyond the preliminary paper work owing to the disagreements developing among the municipalities involved; thus in the Boston area, where the pollution of the Charles, Neponset and Mystic Rivers had long created a menace to health, the metropolitan sewerage system which the City of Boston proposed in 1875 failed to secure the support of the other cities

and towns concerned, and, as a result, Boston had to content itself with the construction of the Main Drainage system which lies almost entirely within city limits.[1] The joint effort of New York and New Jersey did ultimately culminate in the 1927 opening of the Holland Tunnel, but only after discussion, confusion and recrimination originating in 1906 and extending over a 21-year period.[2] In front of the doors of M.I.T. lies another less important example of joint, if not always cooperative, planning and construction: the Harvard Bridge was built by Boston and Cambridge in 1887, but only after the latter, piqued by two unsuccessful attempts to obtain Boston's voluntary assistance, had secured legislature forcing Boston to meet its share of the project's cost.[3] A current example of the complexities of joint planning in the Metropolitan district is offered by the recently announced proposal to improve traffic conditions by restricting parking on certain arteries connecting with downtown Boston; the development of this scheme required the efforts of 12 municipalities working under the guidance of a non-governmental

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(1) Metropolitan District Commission: Development And Organization, P. 4.
(2) Studenski: The Government Of Metropolitan Areas, P. 267 ff.
(3) Ibid. P. 44.

agency, the Massachusetts Safety Council, and the permanent establishment of the scheme, which is to be operated on a trial basis for a 60-day period in the Fall, will probably require State legislature. It seems obvious that the inherent difficulties of solving its traffic problem are aggravated by the inability of the metropolitan district to develop less cumbersome and complex planning procedures.

4

The numerous governmental units of the metropolitan district are in general no more satisfactory as operational than as planning areas, for in countless cases their activities, even when characterized by high innate efficiency, are robbed of effectiveness by conditions beyond the reach of their authority. Thus, the attempts of the Chicago Sanitary Commission to halt the pollution of Lake Michigan are nullified by the failure of numerous Indiana towns and cities to treat the sewage which they empty directly or indirectly into the lake;[1] while the efforts of the Philadelphia Water Department to provide the city with potable and preferably palatable water are handicapped by the gross pollution, created by upstate municipalities, which requires the use of both mechanical

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(1) Leland: "Waste Through Multiplicity Of Governmental Units", NTAB 22: 163, March 1937.

and sand filters in the treatment of Delaware and Schuylkill water.[1] Other examples of municipal operations constantly balked by the inadequacy of the operational area come readily to mind: progressive and efficient health departments in all our metropolitan districts are frequently hampered by bordering municipalities; careless and ineffective health work which exposes the entire district to danger; and police departments are thwarted by the respect they must accord the municipal boundaries which criminals ignore. An historic instance of the price of divided police administration is furnished by the utter inability of the Philadelphia area's seven or more independent departments to control the 1835, 1844 and 1849 riots;[2] while a contemporary result of the same division of authority is indicated by the following quotation: "The city of Evanston, Chicago's suburban neighbor on the north, finds that its own automobile inspection system cannot solve all of its traffic accident problems, since almost all of its automobile fatalities and half of its other motor accidents involve drivers or vehicles from places outside the city."[3] And in the Boston metropolitan area at the present time "No one

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(1) Jones: Metropolitan Government, Pp. 60-61.
(2) Studenski, op.cit. P. 126.
(3) Lepawsky: Development Of Urban Government, P.29.

knows how often the police of Medford fail simply because they do not possess information already in the hands of the Chelsea police.[1] Since germs, criminal and fires to mention only three offenders against civic order, do not recognize municipal boundaries, the countless cities and towns of the metropolitan district obviously constitute inadequate areas for the operation of many services.

In addition to obstructing operations, the large number of units, each possessing only a fraction of the metropolitan district's population, area and wealth, hampers the efficient employment of personnel and equipment and blocks the degree of specialization that the size of the metropolitan district often justifies. Few of the Boston area's 84 different police departments have sufficient budgets to command the specialized equipment and personnel needed to combat crime effectively; and it is unlikely that of the 1,731 governmental units, which, during the 1930's, guarded the health of the Chicago region,[2] more than a very few had the benefit of modern tools and techniques, for where units are so numerous it is obvious that their areas and resources must be too small to support expensive equipment and highly trained technicians. It seems

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(1) Harrison: Police Administration In Boston, P. 167.
(2) Leland: op.cit., P. 162.

likely, in fact, that the large number of small units not only thwarts the degree of specialization demanded by the conditions of modern urban life, but also creates an actual excess of the more common types of equipment and worker. In a study of 10 cities in the San Francisco Bay region it was discovered that there were from 20 to 30 more fire companies in operation than required by the application to the whole area, considered as a unit, of the fairly high standards of the National Board Of Fire Underwriters.[1] In 1928, Boston and 39 surrounding cities and towns had 1 policeman for every 473 inhabitants or 9.7 policemen per square mile, while the City of Los Angeles, with approximately the same area and population, had only 5.3 policemen to the square mile and over 605 residents per policeman.[2] It is, of course, possible, but unlikely, that Boston had either so many more crime hazards or demanded so much higher a level of protection that the greater number of police were required; however both these figures and those cited for the San Francisco region, while by no means conclusive, suggest the possibility that the large number of governmental units existing within the typical metropolitan district prevents efficient disposition

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(1) Simon: Fiscal Aspects Of Metropolitan Consolidation, P. 42.
(2) Harrison: op.cit., P. 163.

of personnel and equipment and needlessly swells the aggregate cost of providing a service.

5

Owing to the inability or unwillingness of any of the individual municipalities to make the necessary expenditures, it sometimes happens that the division of government among a large number of units actually deprives the district of services which its aggregate resources could easily support. Although justified in few but the largest cities, there are numerous institutions, such as tubercular hospitals, trade schools, botanical gardens and many others, for which the metropolitan district's large population creates a sufficient demand and an ample tax base; however, since in all but a few rare cases the efforts to consolidate its resources and requirements have been unsuccessful, the district often fails to realize its potentialities as an area for the provision of service and does not offer the specialized services and facilities which its residents could use with great profit. In the Boston area, for instance, only the City of Boston itself has a large enough police department and budget to provide the pre-service training which is needed by the department's of all the region's cities and towns,[1] while in

(1) Ibid., P. 44.

many other areas a similar inability to tap the taxable resources of the entire district blocks the establishment of modern centralized penal institutions and prolongs the life of obsolete municipal jails which fail to provide the desired segregation of juvenile and adult offenders and the separation of prisoners awaiting trial from those already convicted. In some instances, the central city, by cooperative agreement, extends to outlying suburbs the use of facilities they themselves cannot afford to provide; thus the Cincinnati police training school is used to a limited extent by neighboring cities[1] and Detroit's tubercular hospitals provide treatment not only for its own residents, but also for people living beyond city limits in Wayne County.[2] However, since such arrangements often prove burdensome financially to the central city and accord the suburbanites no voice in the administration of important services, they are not an adequate substitute for the consolidation of the district's resources and requirements which would create an adequate tax and population base for the support of specialized services.

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(1) Lowrie: "Metropolitan Government In Cincinnati", APSR 30:950.
(2) Leonard and Upson: The Government Of The Detroit Metropolitan Area, P. 44.

The governmental disorganization which so obstructs both planning and operations often reach its climax in jurisdictional disputes which exemplify the whole ridiculous confusion of the metropolitan district's government; the following quotation describing a classic instance serves as a fitting epilogue for this chapter: "On one occasion a destructive fire took place in the narrow strip of land known as 'No Man's Land' between Wilmette and Kenilworth, and when the Evanston fire department, which had left its territorial jurisdiction, attached its hose to a Kenilworth fire hydrant and had the fire practically under control, a police officer of the latter village turned off the water, the contract between the village and the property owner calling only for domestic water supply and not fire protection."[1]

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(1) Leland: Waste Through Multiplicity Of Governmental Units, NTAB 22: 166, Mar. 1937.

CHAPTER VII

1

The serious fiscal problems which vex most of the metropolitan districts of the country are in a large measure the product of the same confusion of governmental structure which creates the numerous problems of planning and operations that have been considered in the previous chapter.

Since the fiscal status of any municipality depends equally on its revenue and its expenditure patterns, it is apparent that the unnecessary expense created by duplication of effort and inefficiency of operations will needlessly swell the budget and thus aggravate the fiscal difficulties of the metropolitan district's governmental units; by the same token, any operational simplification and improvement that reduces waste will lessen the aggregate demand for revenue and to that extent alleviate the general problem of governmental financing. The expenditure pattern, however, is merely a statistical reflection of operational problems and thus is little more than a specialized but significant aspect of the general topic of governmental planning and operation to which the previous chapter was devoted. This chapter will ignore expenditure in favor of revenue and attempt to describe some of the difficulties experienced by governmental units

within the metropolitan district in their continuing efforts to raise sufficient funds to finance their operations.

The fiscal problems of the metropolitan districts can be suggested by three broad statements about the political units which share its government; first, these units vary widely in area, population and wealth and thus show marked differences in their ability to provide needed services; secondly, they are so small in area and limited in authority that there are only a relatively few sources of revenue which they are free to exploit and, thirdly, they overlap so extensively that lines of responsibility and of control become obscured in the general governmental confusion.

2

The population increases which have swelled the size of metropolitan districts have, in general, been considerably more rapid in the surrounding areas than in the central city itself. Since internal movement has also tended toward the suburban areas, the older sections of many metropolitan districts have experienced not only relative but absolute loss; in the twenty year period 1919-1939, the population of the County and City of London decreased by over 500,000 while the outer area included in the Greater London Plan gained

over 2,000,000 inhabitants;[1] the population of the City actually began to decline in the 1850's while the County's population showed no further growth after the 1901 Census.[2] 6 out of the 12 wards of Boston began a decrease in population as early as the decade 1857-1867, while in Minneapolis the proportion of the population living within one mile of the point of highest land value dropped from 49% in 1875 to only 11% in 1930.[3] The 1940 Census presented impressive statistical documentation of the flight from the central city, revealing that whereas in the areas covered by the 140 metropolitan districts 72.4% of the population were central city residents in 1920, the figure had dropped to 68.0% two decades later; within the 17 largest metropolitan districts, (750,000 or more inhabitants in 1940), the central cities in every instance contained a small percentage of the total population than in 1930, and in the cases of Newark, Jersy City, New Bedford, Elizabeth, Cleveland, Philadelphia and St. Louis showed an absolute loss; in the Boston metropolitan area not only Boston but the five neighboring high density cities, Chelsea, Revere, Everett, Cambridge and Somerville, showed population losses ranging from 9.9% for Chelsea to

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(1) Abercrombie: Greater London Plan, P. 27.
(2) Robson: The Government And Misgovernment Of London, P. 45.
(3) Jones: Metropolitan Government, P. 9.

1.7% for Somerville.

While the population growth and movement of the past several decades has reduced the central city's share of the population and wealth of the metropolitan district, it has not benefited all outlying municipalities to the same degree; some have experienced relatively little growth while others, which have developed rapidly, have failed to attract families bringing any substantial addition to the city's per capita wealth; on the other hand, the restricted suburban towns which are a familiar feature of the metropolitan district have not only increased their population but have also made equally notable additions to their per capita resources.

As a consequence of the population growth and movement of the past several decades the political units of the metropolitan district show an increasing social differentiation of which the variation in per capita wealth is but one index: the outward movement "has been selective in character, the more efficient elements of the population gravitating in higher ratios than the weaker economic groups to the margins of the city."[1] The central city, which is often called upon to provide services that are of benefit to the entire district, is gradually deserted by the people of means and abandoned to the poorer elements who make increasingly

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(1) McKenzie: The Metropolitan Community, P. 190.

heavy demands on the municipality; need thus increases as the ability to pay evaporates.

It is difficult to measure the per capita wealth of a community and its ability to support governmental services by even the most elaborate statistical methods; resort to such simple criteria as assessed valuation or income returns per 1,000 population will naturally yield only a very rough indication of a community's wealth; yet despite these limitations, the examples that follow are of interest in suggesting the wide variation in wealth, and hence in ability to support government, that is found among the typical units of the metropolitan district.

In 1924 the per capita assessed valuation in the New York metropolitan region ranged from $1,222 in Belleville to $7,444 in suburban Scarsdale; in the same year, the city of Cleveland's assessed valuation was $2,674 per capita while the corresponding figure for Shaker Heights was $35,919; the following year, the Detroit metropolitan region showed a range in per capita assessed valuations of from $1,447 in Hamtramck to $9,064 in Grosse Point.[1] In 1934 the richest school

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(1) Studenski: The Government Of Metropolitan Areas In The United States, P. 39. Since the valuations used in computing these per capita figures have not been adjusted to full market value, they are not completely comparable even between municipalities within the same metropolitan district.

district in Cook County possessed an assessed valuation of over $53,000 for each child in attendance, while the figure for the poorest district was only $906; and between the lower and upper quartile there was a difference of over $8,000 in the amount of taxable wealth available per child in attendance.[1] In the London area 1937 per capita ratable values varied from low figures of £5.37 in Poplar and £5.27 in Bethnal Green to highs of £46.55 in Holborn and £86.93 in Westminster; as a consequence of such variation, it is not surprising that the rates prevailing in 1935-36 should range from 9/6 in the pound for Westminster to 17/4 for Poplar.[2]

It is difficult to match these examples by more recent figures since most available sources of information include only the assessed valuations of the larger cities and omit figures for the smaller suburbs which usually contain the greatest per capita wealth. Although for this reason they lack the extreme range of some of the examples given above, the following figures, which are adjusted to approximate 1940 true value, give an indication of the variations in wealth currently existing in some of our metropolitan districts in 1940 Cleveland's adjusted assessed valuation per capita

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(1) Jones: op.cit., P. 75.
(2) Robson: op.cit. P. 364 ff and map at end of volume.

was $1,710 while that of Cleveland Heights was $3,220; in the San Francisco region, Alameda had an adjusted per capita valuation of $1,650 in contrast to a figure of $2,620 for the City of San Francisco itself; within the New York metropolitan district representative per capita adjusted assessed valuations included figures of $1,260 for Elizabeth, $2,000 for Jersey City, $2,520 for New York City and $4,510 for White Plains;[1] and within the 43 cities and towns of the statutory Boston Metropolitan District, unadjusted per capita assessed valuations in 1940 ranged from $8,030 in Hull to $960 in Stoughton.[2] Although these differentials usually represent variations in the income standards of the municipalities' residents, they sometimes arise more fortuitously; in Weymouth, for instance, the 20 million dollar plant of the Consolidated Edison Company adds over $800 to the per capits assessed valuation and boosts the total figure to over $2,000.

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Since the metropolitan district is an economic unit it is difficult if not impossible to secure any equitable division

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(1) Figures computed on basis of annual report on tax rates, etc. in cities of 30,000 population and over prepared by the Detroit Bureau Of Governmental Research and published in NMR. See "Comparative Tax Rates Of 301 Cities - 1940" NMR 29: 792-810, Dec. 1940.

(2) BRMG 12: Table 16, P. 20.

of its wealth among the variety of political units which divide its government; the land values of the downtown section have little inherent basis but are the reflection of the large population and shopping demand scattered throughout the entire district, while conversely the wages and salaries that build attractive homes in the suburbs are usually earned in the offices or factories of the downtown sections of the district: the wealth of Shaker Heights, Grosse Point or Scarsdale is not created within the boundaries of these suburbs, but is the product of the extensive and specialized economic activity for which the entire metropolitan district furnished the opportunity. Political organization, however, fails to reflect this economic unity, and wealth which is the product of the interrelated activities of the entire district is arbitrarily and inequitably allocated among municipalities defined by boundary lines that have long since lost their justification; many municipalities, as a consequence, face the initial fiscal problem of the generally low income levels which make tax rates unproductive, while, in contrast, other cities have no difficulty in developing large tax revenues which nonetheless represent but a small fraction of each taxpayers income. Like the economic inequalities between individuals, the differences in the wealth of various political units arise in part from extraneous

circumstances which can be controlled only with difficulty: - to suggest the most obvious example, the land of a certain town may be rich and productive while that of its neighbor may be rocky and barren; however, within the metropolitan district, the differentiating effect of such circumstances is unjustifiably increased by the failure of the political organization to recognize the district's economic unity; as a consequence there develop within the metropolitan area towns possessing extremely unequal ability to capitalize upon the wealth created by the economic activities of the entire district. Although an integral part of the same economic unit and possessing similar service needs as the wealthier cities, the poorer localities, owing to the artificial division of the district's wealth among a multitude of of political units, must frequently reconcile themselves either to a lower level of service or to a higher tax rate.

4

The problems arising from the inequitable distribution of of wealth among the metropolitan district's governmental units are aggravated by practical difficulties in devising taxes which will prove productive for small units covering only a fragment of the natural economic area. Long experience, in fact, has shown that real property, which can be neither

TABLE 8

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF MUNICIPAL REVENUE
BY MAJOR SOURCE
AND BY SELECTED POPULATION GROUPS : 1942

	397 Cities Over 25,000	55 Cities 100,000-250,000	200 Cities 25,000-50,000
Taxes			
General & Selective Property	65.2	68.3	66.0
Sales & Gross Receipts	4.7	1.4	1.4
Licenses & Permits	3.4	3.9	4.2
Other	1.7	0.5	0.5
Aid Received From Other Govts	17.4	16.4	16.3
Earnings & Misc.			
Charges For Current Service	3.9	4.7	5.2
Special Assessments	1.2	1.4	1.7
Contributions From Public Service Enterprises	1.0	1.9	2.1
Other & Undistributed	1.4	1.6	2.6

Source: U.S. Bureau Of Census: City Finances 1942, Vol. 2 Topical Reports, No. 1, City Revenue In 1942, 1944. Table 4.

concealed nor moved, is virtually the only form of wealth that local units of government can effectively reach. Admittedly, the property tax is only an imperfect measure of ability to pay, but since land and improvements derive a substantial part of their value from the services provided by the city, it seems only fair, especially in the absence of any appropriate alternative sources of revenue, that real estate should contribute substantially to the support of government. The general property tax has actually evolved into merely a tax on real property; past attempts by municipalities to tax intangible personalty have proved so unsuccessful, owing to the abundant opportunities for evasion, that most states, including Massachusetts, have withdrawn this form of wealth from liability to the general property tax and subjected it instead to a state income tax. In recent years, there has been a tendency to narrow further the base of the former tax by the repeal or the lax administration of the tax on tangible personalty, such as household furnishings; thus the general property tax, which was once, as its name implies, a tax levied against all forms of property, tangible as well as intangible, has deteriorated over the years into a tax on only land and improvements.

Table 7 presents a summary picture of the relative importance in 1942 of the various sources from which the 397 cities

TABLE 9

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE BY MAJOR SOURCE
FOR SELECTED CITIES
IN THE BOSTON METROPOLITAN DISTRICT : 1942

	Boston	Malden	Melrose	Newton	Revere
Taxes					
General & Selective Property	69.1	69.1	72.2	71.7	78.3
Sales & Gross Receipts	-	-	-	-	-
Licenses & Permits	2.6	1.0	0.2	0.5	2.0
Other	0.3	0.9	0.8	0.7	-
Aid Received From Other Govts	24.8	26.5	20.4	22.8	19.6
Earnings & Misc Charges For Current Service	1.7	1.2	4.3	1.5	-
Special Assessments	0.4	1.0	1.1	1.5	-
Contributions From Pub. Svc. Enterprises	0.2	0.2	1.0	-	-
Other & Undistributed	0.9	0.1	0.1	1.2	0.1

Source: U.S. Bureau Of Census: City Finances 1942, Vol. 2, Topical Reports, No. 1, City Revenue In 1942, 1944, Table 4.

of over 25,000 population derived their revenue; in these cities the tax on property furnished almost two thirds of the total revenue and constituted about 87% of the sums raised by taxation; expressed in another way, of the $49.79 average per capita revenue in the 397 cities, $32.45 was contributed by the tax on property.[1] This pattern varies little with the population group or with the geographical location of individual cities; 1942 figures show that municipalities of less than 25,000 inhabitants raised 63.4% of their total revenue by the general property tax,[2] while Table 9 indicates that in the same year selected cities in the Boston area depended on this single source for about 70% of their revenue.

5

In the effort to broaden the sources of their revenue, municipalities have made repeated efforts to develop new taxes only to find that their limited area makes successful administration impossible; in 1938 Philadelphia experimented with a 2% sales tax which the panicky politicians repealed after 6 months owing to newspaper opposition inspired by the department

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(1) Bureau of Census: City Finances 1942, Vol. 2 Topical Reports No. 1 City Revenue in 1942, 1944. Table 5.
(2) - - - :Governmental Finances in the United States 1942 United States Summary, 1945. Table 6.

stores; and although New York has been more successful with the sales tax, this device is, in general, useful only where the central city includes a large portion both of the area and the shops of the entire metropolitan district; since it is ringed by subsidiary shopping centers of considerable importance, the imposition of such a tax in Boston might easily so accelerate the decentralization of business as seriously to harm the city.

Philadelphia has had more success with another taxation device which may perhaps offer a solution to some of the fiscal difficulties confronting municipalities; in 1939 the city imposed a 1½% tax, collected at the source by checkoff, on all wages and salaries earned within the city by both residents and non-residents and also on the compensation earned outside Philadelphia by any of its residents;[1] in 1942, with total wages rising under the impact of wartime high employment, this tax yielded $24,762,000 or 30.5% of the city's total revenue.[2] However, the widespread use of this tax will probably be discouraged not only by such regressive features as its exemption of unearned income and its constant

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(1) City Ordinance of Dec. 13, 1939 enacted under the terms of Penn: Acts 1932, P.L. 45.

(2) Bureau of Census: City Revenue 1942, op.cit. Table 2. The tax was reduced to 1% in 1943.

percentage impost on wages, but also by the reluctance of local politicians to add another to the already considerable number of withholding taxes; two years ago a Massachusetts Commission on Real Estate Taxation refrained from recommending the adoption of this tax and noted with calm understatement that "the several withholding taxes now imposed by the federal government on varying bases, have left both employers and employees in a restive state of mind."[1]

The sales tax and the modification of the income tax represented by the Philadelphia measure are virtually the only two taxes which municipalities might develop to relieve the heavy burden on the property tax; however, both are regressive and both may inhibit the natural growth of population and of business within municipal limits. Furthermore, since a sales tax usually does not apply to the necessities, such as food and drugs, which are purchased locally, the only municipality within the metropolitan district that possesses a sufficient taxable sales volume to yield any considerable sum is the central city, which hesitates to impose a tax that might drive business outside its limits; the wage tax carries the similar danger that it may retard growth in localities where it is used and channel population into neighboring

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(1) Mass: Special Commission on Real Estate Taxation and Related Matters: Report (House # 1800, 1945) P. 175.

areas which are free from the burden. In this dilemma, the general property tax, which is admittedly obsolescent, becomes virtually the only profitable tax measure available for use by local government.

Instead of developing new taxes, some municipalities have made successful efforts to relieve the pressure on the property tax by increasing the yield from non-tax sources of revenue. Many cities are attempting to place on a self-sustaining basis services, such as garbage collection, which formerly were at least in part supported by taxation; a number of numicipalities, of which Philadelphia is again a conspicuous example, are charging a fee for the use of sewerage lines in an effort to finance the maintenance and improvement of this service without imposing a burden on tax revenue. In a few unusual instances, some cities have been able to derive a substantial portion of their total income from municipal utilities; thus in 1942, contributions from public service enterprises constituted 72.9% of the total revenue of Rocky Mount, North Carolina, while for Jacksonville, Florida, the figure was 53.6%; in the same year, charges for current services yielded 39.9% of the total municipal revenue in Burbank and 29.9% in Pontiac. However, reference to Table 7 indicates the rarity of these examples, for of the total revenue of the 397 cities with a population of 25,000 and over,

only 7.5% was derived from all earnings and other miscellaneous sources; charges for current service aggregated 3.9% of total revenue, while contributions from public service enterprises and special assessments were respectively only 1.0% and 1.2% of the total.

6

Supplementing income from earnings and taxes is the revenue derived from the state and federal financial assistance programs which have developed so significantly during the last 15 years. In 1942, such aid, principally in the form of grants and of allocations from state-administered, locally shared taxes, amounted to 17.4% of the total revenue of all cities of 25,000 or more population; it cannot be questioned that this considerable lightening of the burden imposed on other revenue sources has mitigated some of the pressing municipal fiscal difficulties; on the other hand, it is true that the policy of expanded state and federal financial assistance has created a number of new problems which while common to all municipalities appear in their most striking form within the cities and towns of the metropolitan districts.

The most obvious of these difficulties arises from the fluctuations in the annual sums distributed to the municipalities; since the basis for awarding grants has undergone

constant legislative change, while the amount derived from the state-administered taxes and available for distribution to municipalities varies considerably from year to year, the cities are in no sense assured a constant annual sum which can be safely anticipated in preparing budget estimates; in fact, since the yield of many state taxes, such as sales, liquor and most notably income taxes, vary directly with business conditions, the municipalities may find that shared taxes yield them least when rising welfare costs make their needs the greatest. New York City's share of state-collected taxes dropped from almost 84 million dollars in 1930 to 37 million in 1933;[1] and in Massachusetts the amount received by the cities and towns from various taxes administered by the Commonwealth fell 31% from 46 million dollars in 1930 to 32 million two years later.[2] A careful study of state-local fiscal relations during recent years led the Boston Municipal Research Bureau to the following conclusion: "Review of experience with financial relations between Boston and the Commonwealth since 1930 indicates that adverse trends have been most evident at times when the City itself has been under heaviest pressure. An increase in state-imposed expense" (i.e. the state tax) "is likely to be accompanied

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(1) Council of State Governments: State-Local Relations, P.132
(2) Mass: Special Commission on Real Estate Taxation (1945): op.cit. P. 207.

by a shrinkage in state-shared taxes. And such a condition is most apt to arise during a period of depression when the taxpaying ability of local real estate is impaired."[1]

Grants and shared taxes not only complicate municipal finances by adding an unpredictable element to an already intricate sphere; in addition, they often miss their full usefulness by failing to discriminate between the differing degrees of need exhibited by various municipalities. An inevitable consequence of this oversight is that federal and state funds are inequitably distributed, as is illustrated by several instructive examples furnished by the Boston area. For instance, although the amounts distributed to the municipalities from the yield of the state gasoline tax are by statute dedicated to the construction and maintenance of local roads, the distribution takes little cognizance of the considerable variations in the mileage and traffic of the different cities and towns; though each municipality receives $50 for every mile of local road, the total so distributed constitutes only from one ninth to one quarter of the additional amount allocated on the basis of the assessed valuation figures used in computing the state tax. As a consequence, the municipality's wealth is more important than its road needs

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(1) Boston Municipal Research Bureau: State-Local Fiscal Relations Since 1930, P. 4.

in determining its income from the gasoline tax; it is, in fact, tacitly admitted that the distribution of gasoline tax receipts has been transformed from a measure for the assistance of road construction to a means for offsetting the state tax.[1] Certainly the formula used bears little relation to road needs as was indicated by a recent legislative commission's discovery that Wellesley, in 1941, received over $1,000 in state aid for each mile of local road, while Danvers, with a comparable population and area but only one quarter the assessed valuation, was allocated sums amounting to only $440 per road mile;[2] in a large and wealthy community like Brookline or Boston the amount distributed on the valuation basis is sufficient to cover over half of total road maintenance expenditures, while in smaller and poorer communities it may meet only a quarter of the annual expense.[3]

The educational grants, which consume about one quarter of the 20 million-dollar total raised by the state income tax, offer another example of the inequitable allocation of state-collected funds. Originally designed to encourage higher

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(1) See Mass; Special Commission on Real Estate Taxation (1945), op.cit. P. 309 ff.
(2) Mass: Special Commission Established to make an Investigation Relative to Intergovernmental Relations, Report, (House #1509, 1943) P. 15.
(3) Mass: Special Commission on Real Estate Taxation (1945): op.cit. Table 18, P. 313.

levels of teacher salaries and preparation, the formula used in determining distribution has now, owing to subsequent legislature and modified conditions, the practical effect of giving increasing financial aid as the municipality, through superior local taxable resources, is able to attain a lower pupil-teacher ratio; thus, for the school year ending June 1941, Brookline, with 21.9 pupils per teacher, received an educational distribution amounting to $9.28 per pupil in net average membership; on the other hand, Lynn, with a pupil-teacher ratio of 27.7, received only $7.22 per pupil.[1] Paradoxically, although the financial needs of the poorer cities are patently greater, their share is proportionately smaller for the very reason that their limited resources prevent them from approaching the personnel standards set by the wealthier communities.

Another example of the failure of formula to achieve equitable distribution of state-collected funds is offered by the legislature assigning a portion of the yield from the state's business and corporation taxes for distribution to cities and towns as reimbursement for the revenue loss caused

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(1) Ibid: P. 296 ff. See also: Mass: Special Commission on Taxation and Public Expenditures: Report Part III the Tax Structure, (House # 1703, 1938) P. 186 ff.

by the 1936 removal from local tax rolls of the value of machinery used in manufacturing. The peculiar feature of this legislation is that such reimbursements are static; as a consequence, municipalities from which all manufacturing machinery has departed are still receiving aid while those which have attracted industry since 1936 secure no financial assistance, despite the manufacturing machinery they may now possess.[1] Similar legislative provisions in other states often place adjacent municipalties on a markedly unequal footing in their search for revenue: in Wisconsin, for instance, where 65% of the state utility tax is returned to the locality of origin, the Town of Lake, a Milwaukee suburb, received a per capita reimbursement in 1934-35 of $33.00, in contrast to an average figure of $2.65 for the 17 municipalities of the entire metropolitan district.[2]

Even when the formulae controlling distribution of funds are not so strikingly inadequate as in the examples just considered, grants and shared taxes may still fail to meet the real needs of the cities of a metropolitan region. The matching grant is peculiarly subject to this criticism, for

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(1) Mass: Commission on Real Estate Taxation (1945): op.cit. Pp. 302-03.
(2) Hansen and Perloff: State and Local Finance in the National Economy, P. 84.

since state advances must be matched at a fixed rate by locally raised funds, the poorer communities where the need for help is greatest frequently cannot appropriate sufficient amounts to secure the maximum state contribution. Alvin Hansen has shown how similar conditions prevent the poorer states from availing themselves of the full benefit of federal grants and enable a rich state like Connecticut to secure over three and one half times as much Federal assistance per recipient of aid as an impoverished state like Arkansas;[1] virtually this same situation exists at the local government level within the Boston metropolitan area, for the statutory provisions by which the Commonwealth obligates itself to pay one third of the cost of aid to dependent children in addition to forwarding to the municipalities their share of federal contributions, which in turn are also a percentage of total cost, (up to a maximum), mean that the wealthy community, which can afford to be generous in its aid measures, secures more financial assistance from superior governmental levels than the poor municipality with a strictly limited budget.[2]

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(1) Ibid: P. 167 ff.
(2) See BRMG 17, P. 39 ff. for an explanation of the formula used in determining Federal and State contributions to the aid to dependent children program.

In addition to their failure to direct aid to the areas of greatest need, the grants are sometimes guilty of buoying up by financial assistance inadequate and obsolete governmental units that preferably should be permitted to expire from lack of resources, and, on other occasions, of tempting municipalities, eager for state or federal funds, into making unwise advances of their own limited tax revenues. Even where the grant is not contingent on local matching it may still saddle the city with continuing expense; thus the numerous buildings constructed for municipalities under the WPA and PWA programs often involved no local capital outlay, but obligated the city to annual maintenance and operation expenditures. Thomas Reed stresses these significant dangers of the grant and shared tax program in these words: "Federal and state aids to local government has so far failed to solve the problem of balancing local requirements and revenues having - as in the case of schools - encouraged the continued existence of a multitude of ineffective local units, or - as in the case of matching grants for roads, other public works and welfare - increased local spending beyond the amount of aid provided."[1]

Grants and shared taxes are, of course, useful means of strengthening the fiscal position of cities and should not be

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(1) Reed: Federal State Local Fiscal Relations, P. iii.

condemned merely because of the remediable defects which now characterize their operation; state and federal aid to municipalities, first assumed significant proportions during the depression emergency and is in many instances still controlled by relatively experimental legislature that can be perfected as more experience in a new administrative field reveals effective methods of equalizing local financial resources; nonetheless, it is indisputable that, as at present administered, grants and shared taxes complicate municipal finances and at best mitigate but certainly do not solve the fiscal problems of the metropolitan district.

7

It is safe to conclude on the basis of the discussion contained in the previous pages that its numerous governmental units are but poorly adapted for the raising of revenue in the metropolitan area. In fact, it is no more logical that these units preserve their fiscal autonomy than that a similar independence be granted to the wards or precinct of a city; in 1944 Boston derived 31% of its real estate tax revenue from Ward 3,[1] which contains most of the city's business area, yet,

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(1) Mass: Special Commission on Real Estate Taxation (1945) op. cit. P. 176.

owing to the popular acknowledgement of the city's unity, there was no outraged protest when this income was used for the benefit of the entire city. Unfortunately, popular sentiment has fallen behind the facts for while Boston and the other cities of the district once constituted relatively independent municipalities, population growth and technological change have absorbed them all into the larger and still generally unrecognized unity of the metropolitan district, which should assume the fiscal authority now uneasily shared by the cities and towns.

Handicapped by the inequality of taxable resources and the inability to develop adequate measures to tap it, the individual municipalities experience fiscal problems which are compounded by the overlapping of governmental units within the metropolitan district. Although considerable overlapping is acknowledged, its extent is sometime surprising; in 1933, the town of Thornton, a suburb of Chicago was subject to the property taxes levied by 41 political units, while the towns of Proviso and New Trier, both located in the same region, were taxed respectively by 38 and 25 different units.[1] In Cook County 368 jurisdictions overlap one another to form 584 areas in each of which property is taxed at a separate

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(1) Leland: "Waste Through Multiplicity of Governmental Units," NTAB 22: 167.

aggregate rate, and in Du Page County, Cook's neighbor to the south, 120 units overlap to form 210 separate taxing areas.[1] Even in the Boston metropolitan district where the fortunate absence of separate school districts keeps the number of governmental units to a notably small total, the inner 43 municipalities are overlapped by the Metropolitan District Commission and the respective counties, as well as the state. Since the assessments of these jurisdictions are incorporated in the local levy, the Boston area is spared the trial of multiple taxation, but though it is hidden, the overlapping is is none the less real; the following figures break down the 1938 total tax rates of a few selected cities and towns to reveal the extent of the financial burden imposed by the overlapping governmental units:[2]

	Total Tax Rate	MDC Assessment	County Tax Rate	State Tax Rate	"Local" Tax Rate
Boston	$41.30	$3.00	$2.44	$2.62	$31.24
Brookline	23.50	2.49	.86	2.40	17.75
Cambridge	41.00	1.41	1.62	2.73	35.24
Lexington	34.00	1.94	1.55	2.60	27.91
Milton	27.20	2.46	.88	2.44	21.42

Especially when on such a small scale as in the Boston metropolitan area, overlapping is not in itself intolerable and

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(1) Jones: op.cit. P. 76.
(2) Computed from PD 16 (1938) Tables 18 and 19 and PD 92 (1938). The rates are, of course, hypothetical since the MDC assessment and the state and county tax are allocated to the municipalities as absolute sums, not as millage rates.

may represent a practical means of distributing the cost of different types of service; the objections to overlapping, however, arise because of the financial confusion and irresponsibility which are its usual companions and because of the inequity which often governs the distribution of various expenses.

The figures given above dividing into their component parts 1938 tax rates for certain cities and towns contain a suggestion of one type of inequity frequently arising from overlapping: Boston, it was found, paid for the support of Suffolk County a sum equivalent to the product of a $2.44 tax rate, while neighboring Milton and Cambridge contributed the yield of $0.88 and $1.62 tax rates to the support of their respective counties. The high Boston rate is a reflection both of statutory provisions and of the proportionately large volume of cases handled by Suffolk County courts; owing to statutes dating back to 1821 and obligating Boston to assume the county's entire cost, the City, in 1938, contributed toward County expense almost $250,000, or the equivalent of an $0.18 tax rate, that under procedure observed elsewhere throughout the state would have been the responsibility of Chelsea, Revere and Winthrop, which also lie within the County's limits. However, the fact that even this adjustment would reduce the hypothetical Boston county tax rate to the

still high figure of $2.28 indicates that Suffolk is an expensive County to maintain; since it is the center of the metropolitan district and contains the state capitol and its largest city, it is not surprising that over 75% of the cases in certain categories should be contested in Suffolk County Courts;[1] under these conditions it is easy to understand the high cost of its operations, but nonetheless difficult to see why the whole of this burden should be placed upon Boston.

Other examples of the inequitable distribution of county costs among its different areas are numerous; a recent report discovered that in the Louisville region county residents living outside the city limits received benefits in governmental service aggregating over $700,000 more than the sum they paid in taxes - a subsidy which was, of course, provided by the city portion of the country's population.[2] A 1937 survey of government in the Atlanta area "found that aside from numerous defects in the internal operation of each unit, the worst features of the situation were that the city taxpayers paid not only the full cost of the city government but five-sixths of the cost of the county government, and that certain

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(1) See Boston Municipal Research Bureau: County Government in Boston.

(2) Louisville Area Development Association: Finance Committee: Condensed Report of City-County Revenues and Cost of Government.

services such as health and police, which require centralized command for efficiency, were administered separately."[1] Although where the county lies largely within the metropolitan district, it may be only just for the wealthier and more urbanized central municipalities to assume the greater share of the cost of its government, it is unreasonable to expect them to subsidize the county's outlying rural areas that are perhaps the hinterland but not integral parts of the metropolitan district. And it is in any case unwise and expensive to support the duplication of departments which is a usual result of the overlapping of city and county within the metropolitan district.

Since large scale consolidations have been so rare in recent years, only estimates are available to indicate the extent of the savings that might arise from a reduction in the number of governmental units; this aspect of the subject will be considered later in another connection and it only remains at this point to note that a study of the Dallas region indicated that city-county consolidation might secure annual savings of $200,000,[2] while the Cook County assessor estimated

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(1) Darmstadter, Doris: "Metropolitan Atlanta" in National Municipal League: City Growing Pains, P. 17.
(2) Bailey, Lewis W.: "Dallas Weighs City County Merger" in National Municipal League: City Growing Pains, P. 42.

some years ago that rationalization of governmental units and efficient management would secure a saving of forty cents on each dollar of public expenditure or an annual saving for the entire Chicago region of $140,000,000.[1] A study of comparative adjusted tax rates appears to indicate that the rates for consolidated city-counties are actually lower than aggregate average rates for all cities in the same population class; thus while the 1940 average aggregate adjusted rate, including city, school, county and state taxes, for the 14 cities of 500,000 or more population was $28.87, comparable figures for the consolidated city-counties in this population group were as follows: Philadelphia $28.75, Baltimore $30.34, St. Louis $23.29. and San Francisco $19.69.[2]

Whatever the added cost borne by the metropolitan district as a result of the overlapping of governmental units - and the figure cannot be even reliably estimated without a considerable expansion of existing information, it nonetheless remains true that this overlapping complicates the budget process for the individual units, hinders an appreciation of the total cost of

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(1) Merriam, Parratt and Lepawsky: The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago, P. 127.
(2) Figures computed from "Comparative Tax Rates for 301 Cities - 1940" NMR 29: 792-810, Dec. 1940.

government, obscures the pattern of governmental responsibility and reduces the possibility of effective citizen control. In the Boston metropolitan district, for instance, the municipalities often find their budget calculations seriously distorted by the unpredictable rise and fall of the state tax which has varied from a total of about 7 million dollars in 1930 to over twice that sum in 1942. Although this obstacle to realistic budgeting is avoided where each governmental unit administers a separate taxing system to meet its own needs, this solution has the distinct disadvantage of inconveniencing the taxpayer and preventing a realization of the total cost of government within the metropolitan district; in addition financial responsibility and effective citizen control become progressively less attainable as the number of fiscally independent units operating within the district is multiplied. The problems of responsibility and control arising from the large number of governmental units within the metropolitan area will, however, be discussed in the next section, and it is only necessary in conclusion to emphasize their close relationship with the various fiscal problems that have been the subject of this chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

The social and political problems of the metropolitan district have such a complicated history that any simple explanation is achieved only at the sacrifice of accuracy: the tangled web of cause and effect can simply not be reduced to a schematic pattern without a dangerous falsification of fact. It is, for instance, unrealistic to single out certain problems as the outcome of the fragmentation of authority among the metropolitan district's political units, for while plural government has at least aggravated virtually all of the district's problems, it can be assigned the exclusive responsibility for the creation of none.

In the face of this complexity, no attempt will be made to evaluate the degree to which governmental disorganization intensifies the many broad social problems which plague our metropolitan districts; it must undoubtedly bear a large measure of the blame for the ugliness and unhealthiness which mar large areas of the metropolitan district; and it is certainly instrumental in fostering and preserving the class segration which is another of its more serious defects. Yet while not unrelated to governmental organization, these topics involve a wide variety of considerations which are far beyond the scope of this paper; this chapter will therefore be

restricted to an examination of the divorce between the citizen and his local government which is a direct consequence of the division of authority among the metropolitan district's large number of political units.

The Greek philosophers viewed politics as a noble art and the 19th Century Federalists saw it as a fit career for the rich, the well-born and the able, but largely owing to the maladministration and corruption which have characterized municipal government in the United States, the Twentieth Century public regards it as a refuge for scoundrels. Admittedly the views of the public lag behind the fact and still reflect the muckraking agitation of the turn of the century; as long ago as 1888 Bryce detected an improvement and wrote that "no one who studies the municipal history of the last decades will doubt that things are better than they were twenty five years ago... Rogues are less audacious. Good citizens are more active."[1] However, though there has been tremendous improvement in the quality of municipal government, it has not yet been able to erase from the popular mind the memory of the Tweed gang, the Philadelphia "gas ring", the St. Louis "boodlers" and the other crooks and criminals of the

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(1) Bryce, James: The American Commonwealth, MacMillan, New York, 1891. (2 vols.) Vol. I, P. 619.

late 19th Century who did so much to dirty the word politics. Corruption was then most flagrant in the large metropolitan cities, while today's machine politics - the successor of the less subtle thievery of the 19th Century, also finds that the metropolitan area's large population and disorganized government provides abundant opportunities for both power and profit.

Politics should not and need not be disdainfully abandoned to the dubious devices of the ward heeler and the precinct committeeman; the business of government and especially of local government, which has the stimulating appeal of immediacy, should be a constant concern and intimate interest of intelligent adults. However, the complicated and unorganized governmental structure of our metropolitan districts does little to arouse such interest and often even administers the coup de grace in those rare instances where civic interest has survived earlier discouragements. Within the limited area of a suburb, the administration of governmental functions is usually divided among such a variety of autonomous or semi-independent boards, commissions and districts, which supplement and duplicate the work of the municipal corporation, that it is difficult for the citizen to develop any clear comprehension of local government's overall pattern; where, as in the metropolitan district as a whole, the existence of hundreds of overlapping, independent and competing units infinitely

increases the pattern's complexity, it is almost inevitable that the average citizen's inability to understand the structure should eventually sour into utter indifference toward municipal government. Even such civic interest as does survive these discouragements often becomes less effective by its diversion from the central task of general government to a preoccupation with the more limited and specific problems which are the province of the independent districts and commissions; the limited amount of citizen talent which is at the disposal of government may thus become preoccupied with the solution of the problems, often more logically the task of specialists, that confront the school district or the water district, and neglect the responsibility, peculiarly the citizen's, of formulating the policies which are to control the entire gamut of governmental activity.

An equally unfortunate effect of the multiplicity of governmental units within the metropolitan district is the narrow outlook it fosters among both office holders and voters. Municipal boundary lines, which have little reality beyond the heavy dots and dashes on the map, create a deceptive sense of independence and nurture among both the administrators and their constituents a belief that municipal problems can be solved in isolation; the politician does not pick up any votes by placating the neighboring communities, while the citizens are often blind to the realization that their own interests extend far beyond the boundaries of the municipality in which they

live. In the Boston district, for instance, social and religious differentiation has been accentuated by the parochialism fostered by the division of the area into a variety of political units. A recent writer emphasizes that "The cleavage between city and suburb that marks the tragedy of Boston is a key fact and index of the social condition of the community ... These suburban dwellers are Boston people who moved away from the city. They have fine community housekeeping. They are scandalized by Boston's Curleyism and its steadily deteriorating educational system. They talk of letting Boston 'stew in its own juice' unaware that their own livelihood is at stake. For these fine suburbs are only the bedrooms of Boston. The kitchen and pantry and counting room are in the city, where suburbanites derive their livelihood, many of them from dismal tenements of the city's poor."[1] However, owing to the political boundary lines which crosshatch the metropolitan district, the citizens of one suburb have no voice and usually no interest in the governmental actions of either the central city or of neighboring residential communities; the boundary lines are like a horse's blinders restricting civic vision to a limited area and blocking any view

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(1) Lyons, Louis M.: "Boston: A Study in Inertia", in Our Fair City, (ed. Allen, Robert S.) Vanguard, New York, 1947. Pp. 28-29.

of the larger problems of which those of the individual municipality are but a minor part.

The number of political units existing within the metropolitan district not only stiffles civic interest and a metropolitan outlook, but in addition divides responsibility so widely that citizen control of the business of government becomes indirect and tenuous. In the face of the proliferation of independent and overlapping governmental units, the voter finds it difficult to direct either criticism or commendation to the right quarter; with a total of 1,731 separate units dividing the administration of health functions in the Chicago region, how can the citizen possibly detect which jurisdiction should be blamed for inadequate service or which unit deserves support by reason of its efficient functioning? Even simple questions of fact are often made virtually unanswerable owing to the large number of governmental units in operation within the metropolitan district; in The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago, Charles Merriam offers this astute observation: "Over and over again the question recurred to all of us: If it takes so much time and effort to acquire knowledge of one relatively simple situation in the Chicago area, as for example the number of police available, or the annual expenditures of the Region, how can the busy voter by expected to

exercise intelligent control over these complicated processes?"[1] The lazy, the inefficient and the dishonest politicians and administrators are quick to utilize this confusion as a screen for their own incompetence or corruption; positive action is buried under reams of correspondence between overlapping or competing jurisdictions; the pattern of responsibility is deliberately confused by political legerdemain; and meanwhile bureaus stagnate and costs soar as inefficiency if not dishonesty take their toll.

The multiplicity of government existing within the metropolitan area becomes in fact the negation of government by obscuring the pattern of responsibility and thwarting the citizen control which are its essence. Where governmental forms become so complicated that they lose their responsiveness to the public will, the individual either abandons all concern with government or else seeks new means of making his voice heard. The archaic and ponderous governmental disorganization of the metropolitan district has provoked both of these reactions; the average citizen has made a virtue of necessity and adopted an attitude of indifference toward municipal government which is annually demonstrated by the low percentage of the eligible voters who trouble themselves to appear

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(1) Merriam, Parratt and Lepawsky: The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago. P. xii.

at the polls for municipal elections; at the same time, numerous pressure groups, such as Citizens' Councils and Taxpayers Associations, have arisen to supplement the traditional but now ineffective methods of maintaining citizen control and to amplify the voices of those individuals who, for a variety of reasons, are unwilling to see municipal government slip completely beyond their influence. Clearly the time is at hand to sweep away the governmental complexity bequeathed the metropolitan district by an earlier period and in its place to establish a simplified organization which will both enlist the interest of the individual and prove responsive to his will.

METHUEN
GEORGETOWN
ROWLEY
LAWRENCE
DRACUT
DUNSTABLE
TYNGSBOROUGH
NORTH ANDOVER
BOXFORD
IPSWICH
ANDOVER
TOPSFIELD
HAMILTON
ESSEX
ROCKPORT
GLOUCESTER
LOWELL
TEWKSBURY
GROTON
CHELMSFORD
MIDDLETON
WENHAM
WESTFORD
NORTH READING
MANCHESTER
DANVERS
BEVERLY
BILLERICA
WILMINGTON
LYNNFIELD
LITTLETON
CARLISLE
READING
PEABODY
WAKEFIELD
P.S.
BURLINGTON
SALEM
BEDFORD
MARBLEHEAD
BOXBOROUGH
ACTON
P.S.
WOBURN
STONEHAM
P.W.S.
SAUGUS
P.
LYNN
P.
SWAMPSCOTT
P.W.
CONCORD
P.W.S.
MELROSE
P.S.
WINCHESTER
LEXINGTON
W.S.
STOW
MAYNARD
MALDEN
P.W.S.
NAHANT
P.W.
LINCOLN
P.W.S.T.
ARLINGTON
MEDFORD
P.W.S.T.
REVERE
P.W.S.T.
BELMONT
P.W.S.T.
SOMERVILLE
P.W.S.T.
EVERETT
P.W.S.T.
CHELSEA
P.W.S.T.
HUDSON
SUDBURY
WALTHAM
P.S.
P.W.S.T.
WATERTOWN
CAMBRIDGE
P.W.S.T.
P.W.S.
WINTHROP
BOSTON HARBOR
WAYLAND
WESTON
P.
MARLBOROUGH
NEWTON
P.W.S.T.
FRAMINGHAM
BROOKLINE
P.W.S.T.
WELLESLEY
P.S.
BOSTON
P.W.S.T.
SOUTHBOROUGH
NATICK
NEEDHAM
P.S.
HULL
P.
ASHLAND
DEDHAM
P.S.
QUINCY
P.W.S.
SHERBORN
DOVER
P.
MILTON
P.W.S.T.
COHASSET
P*
HOPKINTON
WESTWOOD
P.
HINGHAM
P.S.
BRAINTREE
P.S.
WEYMOUTH
P.S.
SCITUATE
HOLLISTON
MEDFIELD
NORWOOD
S.
CANTON
P.S.
RANDOLPH
NORWELL
MILFORD
MILLIS
MEDWAY
WALPOLE
S.
HOLBROOK
ROCKLAND
AVON
HANOVER
MARSHFIELD
HOPEDALE
NORFOLK
SHARON
STOUGHTON
S.
ABINGTON
MENDON
FRANKLIN
BROCKTON
WHITMAN
PEMBROKE
BELLINGHAM
HANSON
DUXBURY
WRENTHAM
FOXBOROUGH
EASTON
EAST
BRIDGEWATER
BLACKSTONE
WEST
BRIDGEWATER
PLAINVILLE
MANSFIELD
HALIFAX
KINGSTON
NORTH
ATTLEBOROUGH
NORTON
BRIDGEWATER
PLYMPTON
ATTLEBORO
TAUNTON
PLYMOUTH
RAYNHAM
CARVER
MIDDLEBOROUGH

5 MILES
10 MILES
15 MILES
20 MILES
25 MILES
30 MILES
35 MILES

N.

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
STATE PLANNING BOARD

OUTLINE MAP OF THE VARIOUS

BOSTON METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS

SCALE IN MILES

0 5 10 15 20

THE INNER METROPOLITAN DISTRICT

LEGEND

P METROPOLITAN PARKS DISTRICT. 38 CITIES & TOWNS
W METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT. 20 CITIES & TOWNS
S METROPOLITAN SEWERAGE DISTRICT. 34 CITIES & TOWNS
T BOSTON METROPOLITAN DISTRICT (TRANSIT) 14 CITIES & TOWNS
* METROPOLITAN PARKS DISTRICT (NANTASKET ONLY)

43 CITIES AND TOWNS ARE INCLUDED IN THE ABOVE DISTRICTS

—— BOSTON METROPOLITAN DISTRICT AS DEFINED BY 16TH UNITED STATES CENSUS (83 CITIES AND TOWNS) (1940)

CHAPTER IX

1

A picture, runs the proverb, is worth a thousand words; and often figures are worth many paragraphs. This chapter represents an experimental attempt to outline in terms of the statistics of a specific metropolitan district a few of the more central of the problems, which, as the previous pages have indicated, arise from the fragmentation of governmental authority among a multiplicity of units. Admittedly, the attempt is a hazardous or even a futile one, since where complicated social and economic problems are involved, figures frequently let the vital facts slip through their net. Statistics have many limitations and, of themselves, prove nothing; 3 is absolutely more than 2, but 3 deaths become more or less desirable than 2 only when value judgement interprets the statistics; at the risk of inconclusiveness, the discussion that follows constantly recognizes that figures have significant limitations and are at best but guides toward what must of necessity be subjective conclusions.

The Boston metropolitan district was selected as the subject of analysis because of several distinct advantages which it offers. Full and comparable statistical information is available for all its cities and towns in the admirable

series of annual reports issued by the various departments of the Commonwealth, and additional data can be easily obtained at the various municipal offices; its problems are acute, not only because of the large number of political units which divide its government but because of the small percentage of its total population living in the central city of Boston; and finally, its municipalities show a wide range in per capita wealth and a corresponding variation in the cost of their local governments. Few other districts in the New England region offer as many advantages; the Providence district is split by a state line which introduces an extraneous jurisdictional problem and, in addition, makes the compilation of comparable statistics extremely difficult; the Haverhill-Lawrence-Lowell district is essentially an extensive densely settled area rather than a social or economic unit, while so relatively few people reside outside the limits of the central city that the Worcester district has not yet experienced any considerable suburban problem; the Springfield-Holyoke and the Hartford districts, on the other hand, lack the contrasts in taxable wealth and in level of governmental expenditure that is offered by the cities and towns of the Boston region.

Their number, of course, makes it impractical to consider all of the 83 cities and towns contained within the Boston metropolitan district as defined by the 16th Census; and indeed

there is no necessity to strive for inclusiveness since the inequalities existing between the municipalities of a metropolitan region can be amply demonstrated by an examination of only a few of their number.

The Inner Metropolitan District, which is established for the purpose of analysis, contains, with the exception of Canton, Hull and Nahant, all the cities or towns lying in whole or in part within 10 miles of the State House; Hull and Nahant are omitted not only because their peninsular position in Boston harbor makes the land distance to the State House considerably more than 10 miles, but also because their large summer population creates taxable values and service needs that distort per capita figures derived from the permanent, Census population; Canton is excluded because it is a partially independent sub-center with a large area of which only a very small portion lies inside the 10 mile radius. Of these 30 cities and towns, all but two have densities of more than 1,000 persons to the square mile; all are over 10,000 in population and all but 3 have 15,000 or more residents. Thus, although it is by no means suggested that the Inner Metropolitan District is a completely unified area, nonetheless its cities and towns do have certain important common characteristics which makes their comparison justifiable; the District, in fact, includes all the central cities and thickly settled

TABLE 10

AREA, POPULATION AND DENSITY : 1940
(30 CITIES AND TOWNS)

	Area 1940 (Sq. Mi.)	Pop 1940	Pop 1930	% Change 1930-40	Density 1940
Arlington	5.2	40,013	36,094	10.9	7,695
Belmont	4.6	26,867	21,748	23.5	5,841
Boston	43.9	770,816	781,188	- 1.3	17,558
Braintree	13.7	16,378	15,712	4.2	1,195
Brookline	6.6	49,786	47,490	4.8	7,543
Cambridge	6.3	110,879	113,643	- 2.4	17,600
Chelsea	1.9	41,259	45,816	- 9.9	21,715
Dedham	10.5	15,508	15,136	2.5	1,477
Everett	3.4	46,784	48,424	- 3.4	13,760
Lexington	16.5	13,187	9,467	39.3	799
Lynn	10.5	98,123	102,320	- 4.1	9,345
Malden	5.1	58,010	58,036	- 0.1	11,375
Medford	8.2	63,083	59,714	5.6	7,693
Melrose	4.7	25,333	23,170	9.3	5,390
Milton	13.1	18,708	16,434	13.8	1,428
Needham	12.5	12,445	10,845	14.8	996
Newton	17.9	69,873	65,276	7.0	3,904
Quincy	16.5	75,810	71,983	5.3	4,595
Revere	5.9	34,405	35,680	- 3.6	5,831
Saugus	10.6	14,825	14,700	0.9	1,399
Somerville	3.9	102,177	103,908	- 1.7	26,199
Stoneham	6.1	10,765	10,060	7.0	1,765
Wakefield	7.4	16,223	16,318	- 0.6	2,192
Waltham	12.4	40,020	39,247	2.0	3,227
Watertown	4.1	35,427	34,913	1.5	8,641
Wellesley	10.1	15,127	11,439	32.2	1,498
Weymouth	16.7	23,868	20,882	14.3	1,429
Winchester	5.9	15,081	12,719	18.6	2,556
Winthrop	1.6	16,768	16,852	- 0.5	10,480
Woburn	12.9	19,751	19,434	1.6	1,531
TOTAL	296.7	1,897,299	1,878,648	1.0	6,395

Source: See Appendix B

suburbs of the Census metropolitan region, but excludes the municipalities lying beyond the 10-mile ring, whose considerably lower densities and smaller populations create communities of a somewhat different type.

The figures given below compare the 1940 populations and areas of the Census metropolitan district of 83 cities and towns, the statutory metropolitan district including 43 cities and towns and the Inner Metropolitan District of 30 cities and towns; it will be noted that the latter contains almost 96% of the population of the statutory district and over 80% of that of the larger Census area.

	Population 1940	Land Area Square Miles
83 Cities and Towns	2,350,514	1,062.6
43 Cities and Towns	1,980,221	456.1
30 Cities and Towns	1,897,299	296.7

In the analyses that follow, the use of 1940 and 1941 as the base years has been dictated by three main considerations; in the first place, the existence of accurate population figures for 1940 makes it possible to derive reasonably reliable per capita figures for these two years without the necessity for interpolation between the Federal and the State Censuses which are not in all respects comparable. Secondly, detailed statistical information for these years is available in published reports while generally the figures for later

years have not yet been printed and are unearthed only with great difficulty. Finally, statistics for years subsequent to 1941 reflect wartime conditions and thus are not representative of the normal municipal revenue and expenditure patterns. In the hope of reducing the effect of atypical deviations from normal trends, two year averages covering 1940 and 1941 have been used in virtually all cases rather than the figures for a single year.

2

Table 11 presents a number of indices which give a good indication of the relative wealth of the 30 municipalities of the Inner Metropolitan District. Assessed valuation per capita, which is used to rank order the 30 cities and towns, is, of course, not a completely satisfactory indicator of comparative wealth, for it measures the value only of real property and is distorted by differences in assessing practices; however, with the possible exception of Boston, it is unlikely that there is enough variation in the percentage of true value represented by assessed value in the different towns to destroy the validity of these figures. And although assessed valuation per capita fails to measure intangible wealth directly, and is thus only suggestive of general income level, it is indicative of a municipality's ability to raise revenue through

TABLE 11

INDICES OF COMPARATIVE WEALTH : 1940
(30 CITIES AND TOWNS)

	Assessed Value Per Cap 1940-41	Federal Income Tax Returns /100 Pop	Highly Paid Workers /100 Pop	Occupied % Owner Occupied	Dwelling Units Median Value Owner Occupied	Median Rent Tenant Occupied
Brookline	$3,034	27.6	13.5	29.1	$10,707	$58.64
Wellesley	2,892	28.1	14.6	69.8	8,254	47.08
Newton	2,408	27.1	12.2	57.2	7,904	40.76
Winchester	2,183	22.3	10.7	63.2	7,588	38.14
Milton	2,135	29.6	10.9	69.8	6,684	42.92
Weymouth	2,078	17.5	6.2	62.0	3,973	26.37
Needham	2,058	23.5	10.0	65.3	6,207	36.05
Belmont	1,952	25.9	12.4	50.3	7,264	42.53
Lexington	1,951	20.6	8.9	66.5	6,008	34.62
Boston	1,922	16.9	6.3	20.9	3,954	28.41
Quincy	1,629	22.0	7.3	44.7	5,101	33.10
Dedham	1,601	18.4	6.4	59.3	4,473	28.36
Braintree	1,563	22.5	7.1	59.5	4,733	31.73
Everett	1,563	12.7	4.3	35.1	3,393	27.87
Cambridge	1,531	17.2	7.0	19.1	3,937	28.99
Melrose	1,521	23.7	10.5	57.5	5,508	35.69
Arlington	1,461	22.3	9.0	48.9	5,552	39.30
Winthrop	1,457	21.6	9.3	43.9	5,652	35.37
Watertown	1,449	18.0	7.3	37.1	5,077	35.50
Lynn	1,331	16.9	5.2	28.6	3,837	27.14
Stoneham	1,319	15.7	8.4	54.2	4,585	29.89
Waltham	1,306	16.8	5.9	34.9	4,743	30.08
Wakefield	1,295	16.9	7.0	57.1	4,416	28.18
Medford	1,241	18.6	6.4	43.0	4,677	33.70
Malden	1,188	15.4	6.1	36.2	3,701	29.83
Revere	1,159	11.3	5.1	36.1	3,450	26.82
Somerville	1,113	14.8	4.6	26.2	3,336	28.72
Chelsea	1,068	10.9	5.7	22.8	2,993	23.14
Saugus	1,063	15.4	5.3	62.9	3,536	27.91
Woburn	1,016	13.6	4.8	53.8	3,479	24.51

Source: See Appendix B

the general property tax which is the mainstay of the local tax structure. The number of Federal income returns per 100 population supplements the assessed valuations per capita by furnishing a more direct measure of per capita wealth, while the number of "highly paid" workers per 100 general population and the data regarding owner occupancy, median rents and median home values provide more general indications of a community's income level.

It is interesting but not surprising, to note the high correlation between all six indices; with a very few exceptions, which can be quite readily explained, a high figure in any one index assures a high level in all the rest. The percentage of owner occupied dwelling units is the least reliable figure in indicating general community wealth; in Saugus, for instance, which is very low in all other categories, the percentage reaches the relatively high figure of 62.9% while in Brookline, which is one of the wealthiest of the 30 municipalities, somewhat special conditions result in an owner occupied percentage of only 29.1%. The other indices, which are all intimately related to per capita income, show a much closer correlation; in fact the only significantly abnormal behavior is shown by Weymouth, which, owing to the huge Consolidated Edison plant, possesses a considerably higher per capita assessed valuation than the general income level, as suggested by the other indices, would normally produce.

Although indicating only relative wealth and ability to support government, the figures show a significant inequality between the different units of the Inner Metropolitan District; Brookline, for instance, has 3 times the per capita assessed valuation of Woburn, and Wellesley submits almost 3 times as many Federal income tax returns in proportion to population as Chelsea; Somerville has relatively only about 1/3 as many "highly paid" workers as Newton, and Saugus has a rent level which is about half that prevailing in Brookline. As a general conclusion it can be stated that the 5 wealthiest towns, Brookline, Wellesley, Newton, Winchester and Milton have from 2 to 3 times the per capita resources of the 5 poorest municipalities, Revere, Somerville, Chelsea, Saugus and Woburn; the other cities and towns meanwhile display less striking but nonetheless significant variations in per capita wealth and consequently in ability to support local government.

3

In the preceding section an attempt has been made to show that owing to the considerable variations in the extent of their taxable resources, the 30 cities and towns of the Inner Metropolitan District are unequally fitted to raise the revenue needed to maintain governmental services; the most extreme contrast, in fact, revealed Brookline with

TABLE 12

AVERAGE DIRECT TAX PER CAPITA, TAX RATE AND ASSESSED VALUATION PER CAPITA:1940-1941
(30 CITIES AND TOWNS)

	Direct Tax Per Cap	Tax Rate	Assessed Valuation Per Cap
Boston	$77.11	$40.10	$1,922
Brookline	71.34	23.50	3,034
Newton	68.87	28.60	2,408
Cambridge	68.31	44.65	1,531
Wellesley	61.90	21.40	2,892
Lexington	61.23	31.80	1,951
Winchester	59.39	27.20	2,183
Needham	57.20	27.80	2,058
Everett	56.90	36.40	1,563
Milton	55.93	26.20	2,135
Belmont	55.24	28.30	1,952
Dedham	55.24	34.50	1,601
Revere	52.95	45.70	1,159
Weymouth	51.70	24.88	2,078
Quincy	51.69	31.75	1,629
MEDIAN	51.65	34.65	1,526
Arlington	51.60	35.30	1,461
Braintree	51.55	33.00	1,563
Medford	51.26	41.30	1,241
Chelsea	50.79	47.60	1,068
Watertown	50.44	34.80	1,449
Melrose	49,58	32.60	1,521
Malden	48.54	41.00	1,188
Waltham	47.26	36.20	1,306
Stoneham	47.22	35.80	1,319
Lynn	46.44	34.90	1,331
Somerville	45.73	41.10	1,113
Saugus	44.26	41.65	1,063
Wakefield	42.57	32.90	1,295
Winthrop	41,84	28.70	1,457
Woburn	36.14	35.40	1,016

Source: See Appendix B

over 3 times the taxable wealth per capita of Woburn or, in other words, with the ability to raise an equal sum of money while imposing a burden only one-third as heavy as that carried by Woburn residents.

One general and obvious consequence of this unequal distribution of taxable wealth among the 30 cities and towns is that the direct tax per capita, and consequently governmental expenditure per capita, tends to be higher in the wealthier municipalities. Table 12, which presents averaged direct taxes per capita, tax rates and assessed valuations per capita covering the years 1940 and 1941, shows that the localities with the highest per capita wealth have also the highest per capita direct tax; of the 15 municipalities surpassing the median direct tax per capita of $51.65, only Revere fails also to exceed the median per capita assessed valuation of $1,526. On the other hand, of these same 15 municipalities, 11 have tax rates which reveal relative financial effort, lower than the median of $34.65.[1]

These figures indicate that at a smaller relative financial sacrifice by the individual, the wealthier towns are

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(1) This statement assumes a non-existent constant relationship between true and assessed value in the 30 municipalities; although it is true that assessments represent different percentages of true value in the different cities and towns, the variation is probably not large enough to alter materially the validity of the figures here presented.

able to spend more per capita in providing governmental services than the poorer cities and towns. Is there any way of advancing a step further and establishing that this lower per capita expenditure is also indicative of a positively lower level of service, or conversely, that the greater per capita expenditure secures the wealthier towns either more or better governmental service?

The difficulties of attempting any measurement of government are so formidable that positive conclusions become virtually impossible. A business corporation can evaluate operations by reference to the ledger, but despite some critics of government who maintain that it can and should be reduced to a profit and loss basis, a municipal corporation cannot be appraised in terms of dollars and cents, since its business deals with social even more than economic values;- the loss, or expenditure, can be measured in monetary terms, but no units have yet been devised to measure the profit that accrues in social well-being. The tax rate, which, where the taxable base is the same, indicates the relative financial effort of different municipalities, is perhaps a good index of intent, but only an imperfect measure of results; while total governmental expenditures, which moves nearer to appraising results, still affords no measure of the relative wisdom and efficiency with which different cities spend their money.

A slight simplification of the problem is achieved by abandoning the evaluation of government as a whole in favor of the measurement of the varied services it performs; yet here again the problem is far from simple since there are so many valid approaches to the task of measurement of service.[1]

Each governmental service and function may be considered to have tacitly defined objectives which are the composite creation of policy decisions of voters and officeholders over long periods of years; meat inspection has the simple objective of preventing the sale of tainted meat, while free education has the infinitely complex objective of stimulating the development of "good" citizens and individuals. The need for a service in any given locality is obviously a corollary of its objective: where considerable amounts of bad meat are being sold the need for inspection is pressing, while in other localities it may be virtually nonexistent. This suggests that a service may be appraised first in terms of the extent of the need it is designed to fill and secondly in terms of the degree to which it actually succeeds in meeting this need; this latter task may, at least in theory, be accomplished by measuring performance, effort cost, efficiency and finally results. The measurement of performance indicates the amount of service provided, for example, the number of fire calls answered or the miles of street cleaned; measurement of effort shows the man and equipment hours involved in the performance of a service:- the number of men and trucks

(1) See Ridley and Simon: Measuring Municipal Activities for fuller discussion of the problems briefly considered in these pages.

needed to clean a given mileage of street, while measurement of cost shows the expense, usually in unit terms, of performing a given service. Efficiency is measured to determine not merely the quantitative amounts of labor and money that are expended in the performance of a function, but the effectiveness of their use to achieve the objective; while the measurement of results indicates the extent to which the objective of a service is achieved. (Although they may at first glance appear identical, the distinction between the measurement of results and of efficiency becomes clear if it is recalled that an objective may be wastefully attained; the prevention of the sale of tainted meat, for instance, may be achieved only at an unnecessarily large expenditure of money and labor.)

It is rarely feasible even with the use of the most elaborate techniques to provide statistical measurements which conform to the neat distinctions outlined above. It is almost impossible, for instance, to present an absolute indication of need since the need at any given time will reflect not only the conditions created by the environment and society, but also the effectiveness of municipal efforts to modify them; fire loss, for instance, measures only relative need since it is as indicative of the work of the fire department as of a locality's inherent fire risks and dangers. In the same way, the measurement of either efficiency or results, which are the two most significant

indices of municipal service, can be approached only through a complicated correlation of previous measurements of need, performance, effort and costs.

Drastic assumptions and simplifications have of necessity been made to allow the measurement of service by statistical techniques sufficiently simple to be practical within the limits of this study. In general, some quantitative indication has been sought of the need for any of the services considered; to use the simplest example, the number of miles of local road has been used to suggest the relative need of the different cities and towns for street cleaning service. Unit expenditures have then been derived to indicate the adequacy of the service provided, larger unit expenditures being taken to demonstrate the provision of either more service or better service. This interpretation of unit expenditures involves two critical and vulnerable assumptions: first, that efficiencies and secondly, that price levels are identical in all the 30 municipalities. Admittedly this is far from the case; comparable positions do not command uniform salaries throughout the area, nor do the same materials always secure the same price; differences in efficiency are less easy to demonstrate but it is unquestionable that some of the municipalities in the district have a greater ability to stretch their tax dollars. However, although the proposition is not subject to easy demonstration it is believed that

the economic competition existing within a metropolitan district tends so to reduce these variations in efficiency and price level that, though still considerable, they are not sufficient to invalidate the figures and conclusions which follow.

4

Table 13, which lists the average 1940-1941 road maintenance expenditures of the 30 cities and towns of the Inner Metropolitan District, reveals little correlation between need, as indicated by total road mileage, and performance or results, as suggested by per capita expenditures. It is true, however, that traffic volume is perhaps even more influential than total mileage in determining the need for road maintenance: the crucial importance of this factor is, in fact, clearly demonstrated by the direct variation of expenditures per road mile with distance from the State House. The highest expenditures are found in Boston itself, which is, of course, the destination of traffic originating throughout the entire metropolitan area, and in Chelsea, Cambridge and Brookline, which contain some of the principal routes to downtown Boston and consequently receive daily a large volume of transient traffic.

Expenditure per mile also mounts with density, which as it increases concentrates more car owners within a given

TABLE 13

AVERAGE EXPENDITURES FOR ROAD MAINTENANCE : 1940-1941
(30 CITIES AND TOWNS)

	Average Expenditure Per Cap	Average Expenditure Per Mile	Mileage 1940
Newton	$8.90	$3,060	202.7
Lexington	8.08	1,505	60.3
Wellesley	7.88	1,810	65.9
Brookline	7.13	3,940	90.0
Stoneham	6.79	1,995	36.6
Winchester	6.47	1,840	53.0
Dedham	6.30	1,950	50.1
Milton	6.05	1,865	60.9
Weymouth	5.94	1,655	85.7
Needham	5.86	1,245	58.6
Boston	5.45	5,710	730.0
Cambridge	5.12	4,850	116.9
Arlington	4.72	3,065	61.6
Braintree	4.42	1,055	68.4
Belmont	4.36	2,045	56.9
MEDIAN	4.32	1,975	
Wakefield	4.28	1,215	57.3
Medford	4.21	3,310	80.6
Quincy	4.20	2,320	141.3
Watertown	4.17	2,320	63.7
Melrose	3.98	1,740	57.9
Chelsea	3.91	5,270	30.6
Winthrop	3.67	1,925	31.9
Malden	3.32	2,305	83.5
Saugus	3.25	1,055	45.5
Woburn	3.14	764	81.2
Waltham	3.13	1,410	85.8
Lynn	3.12	3,735	82.0
Everett	2.63	2,430	50.6
Somerville	2.50	2,945	87.0
Revere	2.08	1,620	44.4

Source: See Appendix B

area; at the same time, the per capita expenditures of the densely populated inner group of cities is in general lower than that of the outer suburbs since the former can spread the total cost per mile among a larger number of taxpayers. With the exceptions of Stoneham, Newton and Quincy, all the municipalities exceeding the median expenditure per mile of $1,975 have a density over 5,000 persons per square mile; on the other hand, 8 of these same 15 municipalities have per capita rates of expenditure less than the median of $4.32.

The per capita expenditure is consistently high in those very cities and towns which earlier tables have shown to possess the greatest taxable wealth and consequently the greatest ability to pay; it is striking that all but two of the cities and towns spending more per capita than the median figure of $4.32 should also have a 1940-41 per capita assessed valuation greater than the median. Although in some instances, notably the cases of Newton, Cambridge and Boston, the high per capita expense represents an answer to the considerable need created by large mileage and heavy volume; in other cases, where mileage is small and traffic slight, it must evince the desire of the community for superior roads; by the same token, it seems likely that the small expenditures of some of the poorer municipalities must result in an inferior level of service: Woburn has a greater road mileage than Wellesley and probably a roughly comparable traffic

volume, yet its expenditures per mile are less than half the figure for the wealthier suburb, and Somerville, with a considerably smaller road mileage and a similar traffic volume, spends less than half as much per capita and somewhat more than half as much per road mile as the neighboring city of Cambridge.

Perhaps two tentative conclusions can be drawn from this table; first, that the inner cities bear a heavy expenditure per road mile owing, at least in part, to the heavy volume of transient traffic they receive from the outlying areas; and second, that per capita road expenditures are often adjusted more to the municipality's wealth than to its need.

5

Table 14 lists street cleaning expenditures, on both a per capita and per road mile basis, for the 14 cities of the Inner Metropolitan District; the towns are, of necessity, omitted from this table since figures for their expenditure are not available. In general, the larger cities tend to pay more per capita for the provision of this service than the smaller ones, although Lynn, Malden and Somerville fall below the median. Expenditure per mile of street seems to decrease with distance from the State House, although Lynn forms a striking exception. The data in this table is rather inconclusive and does not justify any inferences regarding the relation of performance and cost to need.

TABLE 14

AVERAGE EXPENDITURES FOR STREET CLEANING : 1940-1941
(14 CITIES)

	Average Expenditure Per Cap	Per Mile
Newton	$0.86	$295
Boston	0.83	834
Quincy	0.81	445
Waltham	0.61	277
Cambridge	0.60	572
Chelsea	0.60	810
Medford	0.37	291
MEDIAN	0.34	293
Lynn	0.30	360
Malden	0.30	206
Everett	0.29	270
Melrose	0.27	118
Somerville	0.25	296
Woburn	0.17	40
Revere[1]	0	0

Source: See Appendix B

1: Revere apparently makes no expenditure for cleaning its streets.

It is difficult to derive any statistical evidence of the need of a locality for recreation facilities; juvenile delinquency rates and even certain health statistics have been sometimes used to cast indirect light on the adequacy of a municipality's recreation program, but the relationship is so inferential that the technique has doubtful validity. In the absence of any practical method of deducing the specific needs of the individual cities and towns of the district, it is perhaps safe to predicate a general need, based on National Recreation Association standards, of at least 10 acres for each 1,000 inhabitants, noting meanwhile that this need is considerably more urgent in densely populated areas.

It is, of course, no surprise to find that numerous cities and towns in the Inner Metropolitan District have grossly inadequate park acreages and are thus unable to provide a satisfactory recreation program despite the sums they lavish on maintenance and supervision. Although the acreages given in Table 15 are based on a liberal interpretation of the word park, only 5 of the municipalities satisfy the need for 1 acre of park per 100 general population. In many instances, the cities fail to provide even 1 acre for every thousand persons; Everett, for instance, has 1 acre of municipal park for every 1,732 persons, while for Braintree and Somerville the comparable figures are 1,637 and 1,295. Although Braintree

TABLE 15

RECREATIONAL MAINTENANCE EXPENDITURES & FACILITIES:1940
(25 CITIES AND TOWNS)

	Maintenance Expenditure Per Cap	Maintenance Expenditure Per Acre	Parks Number	Parks Acreage	Parks Pop/Acre
Brookline	$2.24	$405	46	276	180
Melrose	1.78	158	19	286	88
Winchester	1.71	232	33	111	136
Lexington	1.26	101	16	140	80
Boston	1.23	252	228	3,700 [1]	208
Cambridge	1.23	830	40	165 [1]	673
Newton	1.15	174	32	329	151
Lynn	0.96	49	29	1,940 [1]	50
Wellesley	0.88	64	22	209	73
Belmont	0.71	202	10	95	282
Malden	0.63	486	16	61	951
Chelsea	0.57	540	22	44	948
Quincy	0.55	146	27	289	262
MEDIAN	0.55	176			
Stoneham	0.47	255	15	20	538
Milton	0.40	176	7	43	440
Revere	0.34	311	38	38	906
Watertown	0.30	228	16	46	770
Weymouth	0.30	109	8	65	370
Wakefield	0.24	11	10	350 [1]	47
Arlington	0.22	72	29	122	328
Somerville	0.22	303	16	76	1,295
Braintree	0.12 [2]	190 [2]	5	10	1,637
Woburn	0.08	10	15	186	106
Everett	0.05 [2]	85 [2]	8	27	1,732
Waltham	0.05	7	2	287	135

Source: See Appendix B

1: Includes either out-of-city areas and/or misc. non-residential open areas such as water reservations or municipal cemeteries.

2: Recreational expenses for maintenance and outlay in these municipalities are not given separately; the computed figures are thus based on total rather than merely on maintenance expenditures.

is an exception, the most deficient municipalities are generally those of highest density and smallest fiscal ability, while the thinly settled towns exhibit the largest amount of park area in proportion to their populations. It is true that these figures are based only on local park acreages and ignore the areas of State reservations and Metropolitan District Commission parks; however, since the more important of these areas are on the periphery or beyond the limits of the Inner Metropolitan District, their existence does not make good the failure of a number of communities to supply adequate local recreation facilities. In addition, the distribution of such Metropolitan Parks District acreage as does lie within the area usually is of least benefit to those municipalities where the need is greatest; Everett, for instance, has no M. D. C. parks, while Somerville contains only 5.9 acres; Quincy, on the other hand, includes over 2,000 and Milton over 1,800 acres of Metropolitan District park.

Not only do the area figures reveal a marked inequality between the local recreation facilities provided by different municipalities, but, in addition, the 1940 maintenance expenditures per acre show a similar widespread in the sum devoted to the provision of recreational programs and the care of properties. In general, there is a tendency for the high density cities, which possess inadequate areas, to spend a considerably larger sum per acre than the smaller

suburbs which have a greater relative acreage; probably the larger expenditures represent the cost of more intensive usage and of more elaborate supervision.

The per capita expenditure figures do not reveal any distinct pattern, although most of the cities with very low taxable resources, Revere, Somerville and Woburn, for instance, also show low per capita expenditures, while some of the wealthier cities and towns, notably Brookline and Winchester, reveal high figures. With the exception of these cases, there is, however, little correlation between taxable wealth and per capita expenditures; although it falls just below the median in per capita assessed valuation (1940-1941), Melrose, for instance, shows the second highest per capita expenditure ($1.78); on the other hand, only the small sum of $.30 per capita was spent for recreation by the wealthy town of Weymouth.

It seems justifiable, in conclusion to emphasize the existence of a vast inequality between the recreational opportunities offered by different municipalities in the metropolitan region; these inequalities, however, spring not so much from variations in per capita expenditure, although these certainly are present, as from the initial significant differences in the recreation acreage available relative to population. In general, those municipalities with the smallest proportional amount of park area are the thickly settled inner cities many of which are handicapped by inadequate

taxable wealth in any effort to increase recreational acreages.

7

Only by an exhaustive examination of such elements as building laws, structural conditions and type usage, it is possible to reach any approximation of the amount of fire protection, as measured in terms of equipment, personnel and fire streams, that is needed by a given municipality. Any less complex indicators of need, for instance the number of building fires or the loss per fire, reflect not only the inherent need, as determined by physical conditions of usage and construction, but also the amount and quality of the existing protective service. Notwithstanding this qualification, the indices suggested above have a rough validity which justifies their use in Table 16; for although they fail to measure inherent need, they suggest the extent to which it exceeds the level of performance provided and thus serve as indicators of relative or residual need.

Although the ratios tend to be slightly greater in the high density industrial cities, the number of building fires per 1,000 population does not reveal any clear pattern of relative need; if the cities with the two lowest and the two highest rates are temporarily neglected, the remaining municipalities exhibit fairly uniform ratios ranging from a low

of 2.9 in Melrose and Medford to 5.6 in Lynn; however, the extremes show Cambridge with a ratio over 8 times as large as that of neighboring Watertown, which might be expected to present comparable problems of fire protection. Thus although the building fire ratios suggest the existence of relative differences in need, they offer little explanation of their origin.

The ratios for fire loss for each $1,000,000 of building assessed valuation clearly suggest, however, that a considerably greater need for fire protection exists in the high density industrial cities than in suburban localities; Chelsea, with a figure of $681 has the highest ratio followed in order by Boston, Lynn and Revere; at the other extreme, Newton has a low ratio of only $82 while the figures in both Brookline and Arlington are under $100.

The figures in the table also indicate that it is these same high density cities where the need is greatest which are making the most effort in terms of per capita expenditure, to provide satisfactory fire protection; however, the range in per capita expenditures is not as large as in the case of other functions already considered; if Brookline with a high figure of $6.86 and Arlington and Waltham with low figures of $3.17 and $3.19 respectively are omitted, Chelsea's high figure of $5.31 is only 50% greater than the remaining low of $3.50 in Quincy. Yet within this rather limited range

TABLE 16

AVERAGE OPERATING EXPENDITURES OF FIRE DEPARTMENTS
AVERAGE NUMBER OF FIRES & AVERAGE LOSS : 1940-1941
(17 CITIES AND TOWNS OF 25,000 POP OR OVER 1940)

	Average Per Cap	Expenditures Per $100,000 Assessed Bldg. Value	Pop/FD Employee	Bldg Fires /1,000 Pop	Loss Per $100,000 Bldg AV	
Brookline	$6.86	$374	359	10.1	97	
Chelsea	5.31	726	451	4.5	681	
Everett	5.25	498	457	3.4	251	
Lynn	5.02	577	456	5.6	506	1
Cambridge	4.90	524	492	10.5	221	
Boston	4.66	497	500	5.5	509	2
Malden	4.43	535	559	4.2	227	
Revere	4.24	587	515	3.8	407	
Newton	4.15	266	585	4.0	82	
MEDIAN	4.15	424				
Melrose	4.11	376	724	2.9	160	
Somerville	3.96	510	625	4.3	322	2
Belmont	3.94	269	686	4.7	147	
Medford	3.91	424	610	2.9	145	
Watertown	3.82	352	622	1.3	126	
Quincy	3.50	338	680	5.2	429	
Waltham	3.19	365	805	4.4	288	
Arlington	3.17	284	779	1.4	88	3

Source: See Appendix B

1: Estimated
2: Based on insurance loss only
3: Based on 1941 figures alone

the effect of density is apparent; the 7 communities with the highest per capita expenditures all have densities exceeding 7,500 persons per square mile and in 5 of the 7 the figures rise above 10,000 per square mile. On the other hand, in the lower density suburban or semi-suburban municipalities, such as Belmont of Waltham, per capita costs tend to drop. Since these high density municipalities, where per capita expenditures and need for protection are greatest, are also in some instance, exemplified notably by Chelsea, Everett, Lynn and Revere, the very communities with the most inadequate tax base, it is obvious that satisfactory protection imposes a heavy burden on the individual taxpayers; although it has only one-third of Brookline's per capita wealth, Chelsea spends per capita for fire protection only 20% less than the wealthier locality; in other words, Chelsea taxpayers make over twice as great a financial sacrifice to secure a per capita expenditure level which still falls below that of Brookline. Fire protection obviously furnishes a striking example of a service for which the need and the ability to pay bear little relationship.

8

The number of crimes committed in any municipality is as indicative of the adequacy of its police protection as of the nature of its social and economic conditions; consequently

the crime rates listed in Table 17 reflect not absolute or inherent, but residual need remaining unsatisfied after a given level of police protection has attempted to meet an initial need conditioned by such factors as population density, racial and national stock, economic status and general level of individual and civic morality.

With certain significant exceptions, the number of crimes per 100,000 population is higher in the densely populated industrial cities than in other parts of the Inner Metropolitan District, with such cities as Boston, Cambridge, Chelsea, Lynn, Revere and Somerville showing high rates in all or most of the four crime categories listed in the table. Revere, for instance, shows the highest robbery, the 2nd highest burglary and a high auto theft rate, while Boston has the highest auto theft rate and relatively high ratios in the other categories. On the other hand, there are significant exceptions to this general pattern; owing in all probability to its high income level, Brookline has the greatest burglary rate and a larceny rate which is surpassed only by the extremely high figure of Winthrop. A few of the other suburbs show somewhat high rates most commonly in the burglary and less often in one of the other categories; Milton and Braintree, for example, both have rather high burglary rates, while Wakefield shows a fairly high larceny figure.

TABLE 17

AVERAGE OPERATING EXPENDITURES OF POLICE DEPARTMENTS
AND AVERAGE CRIME RATES : 1940-1941
(28 CITIES AND TOWNS)

	Per Cap Operating Expenses	Pop/Police Dept Employee	Offenses Known/100,000 Pop Robbery	Burglary	Larceny	Auto Theft
Boston	$7.22	317	33.3	128	82.3	422
Brookline	6.34	392	19.1	596	155.	224
Cambridge	4.88	473	26.2	334	46.6	337
Newton	4.79	489	1.4	236	(1)	104
Milton	4.52	535	13.4	371	30.6	48.1
Winchester	4.25	627	0	69.7 [2]	76.4 [2]	23.2 [2]
Malden	4.09	545	32.7 [2]	362 [2]	82.6 [2]	198 [2]
Quincy	3.93	499	26.4 [2]	257 [2]	17.1 [2]	97.0 [2]
Belmont	3.92	567	7.5	171	43.6	31.8
Chelsea	3.90	542	23.0	331	70.2	279
Lexington	3.76	660 [2]	8.9 [3]	209 [3]	66.8 [3]	46.0 [3]
Wellesley	3.75	505 [2]	13.2 [3]	165 [3]	86.0 [3]	33.0 [3]
Lynn	3.60	590	31.6	391	146.	150
Watertown	3.56	710	7.1	168	31.1	55.0
MEDIAN	3.51					
Somerville	3.46	682	17.7	424.	32.3	163
Melrose	3.44	617	15.8	263	57.3	98.9
Arlington	3.39	718	5.0	214	27.4	42.3
Medford	3.38	706 [2]	11.1	192	32.4	65.8
Needham	3.35	692 [2]	4.0	141	12.1	24.1
Dedham	3.25	681	6.5	93.5	38.7	45.1
Revere	3.13	684	49.4	438	55.1	246
Braintree	3.07	781	6.1	321	36.7	67.3
Waltham	3.03	581	6.5	234	49.1	76.4
Winthrop	2.94	797	9.0	335	242	29.9
Stoneham	2.83	978	0	107	18.6	37.2
Wakefield	2.66	764	21.6	219	89.4	92.2
Woburn	2.38	1,160	2.5	213	60.9	157
Saugus	2.32	901	20.3	276	20.3	97.8

Source: See Appendix B

1: Not available
2: 1941 figure not available to permit averaging. 1940 figure give
3: Data upon which to compute rates not available for 1940 or 1941. Figures for 1942 given.

Although there is a clear difference in the protection needs of the central and the suburban cities and towns, it fails to be reflected in their per capita expenditures. Although some of the high density industrial cities spend more per capita than the median figure of $3.71, a number of the wealthier residential suburbs, notably Newton, Milton, Winchester, Belmont, Lexington and Wellesley, also exceed the median. Among the high density cities, Somerville, Medford and Revere spend less than the median per capita amount, while a few of the wealthier suburban municipalities, like Needham and Dedham, also fall below the median.

These figures seem to warrant several tentative conclusions. In general, the higher density cities need more extensive police protection than the open residential localities and in many cases attempt to meet this greater need by per capita expenditures above the median figure; on the other hand, several of the wealthy suburbs, exceed the median by considerable amounts, while Saugus, Woburn, Wakefield, Stoneham are among the poorer suburban communities, presumably having comparable needs, which fail to spend more than a very small per capita sum for police protection.

Tables 18 and 19 present comparative statistics on the costs and case loads of two of the welfare programs administered and in large part financed by the 30 cities and towns. The average monthly case load per 1,000 population gives a good relative indication of the need which the various municipalities are called upon to meet, for while it is true that these ratios are less than representative of absolute need, since some municipalities may be more lenient and accomodating in the acceptance of cases than others, the partial state supervision of both programs tends to minimize such differences in the administrative standards of the various municipalities.

The need for general relief, which includes all municipal aid falling outside of the "category" relief programs, is obviously closely related to economic conditions, since poverty and destitution will be more prevalent in times of depression; the aid to dependent children program is, on the other hand, little affected by economic conditions since cases falling in this category are the outcome of family rather than financial misfortunes.[1] It is notable, however, that the monthly case load per 1,000 population for both assistance programs is largest in the densely populated

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(1) See Appendix B for definition of "dependent child".

TABLE 18

AVERAGE EXPENDITURES FOR GENERAL RELIEF
AVERAGE CASE LOADS : 1940-1941
(30 CITIES AND TOWNS)

	Average Expenditure Per Cap	Per Case	Average Monthly Case Load/1,000 Pop
Revere	$8.95	$29.55	25.6
Chelsea	8.74	29.30	24.2
Everett	8.09	33.30	20.4
Cambridge	7.23	37.15	17.9
Malden	6.05	34.30	14.7
Medford	5.58	41.50	11.4
Boston	5.56	26.40	17.5
Lynn	5.38	26.25	17.2
Lexington	5.01	35.40	11.8
Dedham	4.96	31.40	13.2
Somerville	4.62	38.00	9.8
Brookline	4.38	42.35	8.6
Watertown	4.12	40.90	8.3
Braintree	3.65	41.05	7.4
Weymouth	3.49	32.20	9.1
MEDIAN	3.28		
Newton	3.07	37.90	6.7
Waltham	2.80	42.35	5.6
Stoneham	2.48	30.40	6.9
Woburn	2.23	47.95	4.1
Melrose	2.08	30.60	5.8
Wakefield	1.98	32.75	5.1
Arlington	1.74	32.95	4.4
Winthrop	1.62	28.70	4.8
Quincy	1.61	33.25	4.0
Belmont	1.51	34.45	3.6
Needham	1.32	33.80	3.3
Saugus	1.07	21.20	4.3
Wellesley	1.06	34.45	2.6
Milton	0.76	40.65	1.7
Winchester	0.68	31.30	1.8

Source: See Appendix B

industrial cities which have a low per capita wealth. Of the 7 municipalities with the highest general relief case load ratios, 5 had densities of over 10,000 persons per square mile and all lost population in the decade 1930-1940; 4 of these same cities also show the highest relative case loads in the aid to dependent children program. In striking contrast to the high ratios of the thickly populated central cities are the low figures prevailing in the suburban cities and towns. Belmont, Needham, Saugus, Wellesley, Milton and Winchester all have average monthly case load ratios for general relief of under 4 per 1,000 population; the figure for Revere is 25.6; Wellesley, Belmont, Winchester and Winthrop have case load ratios in the aid to dependent children program of under 1, while Boston shows a figure of 5.40 and in Everett the ratio is 3.98.

Per capita expenditure for both programs, of course, varies widely and in direct relationship to the case load; although the suburban towns of Weymouth and Woburn both have high per capita expenditures in the aid to dependent children category, the thickly settled industrial cities usually spend considerably more per capita than the residential communities; the general relief expenditures present an even clearer instance of this pattern, for the 7 cities with the highest per capita expenditure are all thickly settled centers in most of which there is considerable industry.

TABLE 19

AVERAGE EXPENDITURE FOR AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN
AND AVERAGE CASE LOADS : 1940-1941
(30 CITIES AND TOWNS)

	Average Expenditure Per Cap	Per Case	Average Monthly Case Load/1,000 Pop
Boston	$4.03	$62.25	5.40
Everett	2.70	56.50	3.98
Cambridge	2.65	61.45	3.32
Chelsea	2.46	55.15	4.02
Woburn	2.45	63.45	3.22
Watertown	2.36	71.20	2.77
Weymouth	2.28	64.20	2.98
Revere	2.11	50.70	3.46
Somerville	1.64	63.80	2.14
Newton	1.60	60.80	2.21
Malden	1.51	54.30	2.31
Waltham	1.47	60.90	2.01
Lexington	1.41	62.45	1.87
Lynn	1.41	57.10	2.05
Quincy	1.28	55.60	1.92
MEDIAN	1.27		
Brookline	1.26	63.80	1.64
Medford	1.23	58.00	1.77
Arlington	1.22	69.60	1.46
Braintree	1.21	58.20	2.45
Stoneham	1.12	61.00	1.54
Wakefield	1.08	50.95	1.76
Dedham	1.07	57.65	1.55
Melrose	0.96	60.25	1.32
Needham	0.96	65.75	1.20
Milton	0.89	71.30	1.04
Wellesley	0.76	60.70	0.53
Belmont	0.52	58.75	0.73
Winchester	0.52	58.45	0.77
Saugus	0.48	38.30	1.05
Winthrop	0.30	59.45	0.42

So urce: See Appendix B

The column tabulating expenditure per case is of interest chiefly in showing that federal participation in the aid to dependent children program achieves a degree of equalization of payments. Excluding Saugus with its exceptionally low payment of but $38.30 per case in the case of dependent child category, the largest per case expenditure of $71.30 in Milton is only 40% greater than the smallest per case expenditure of $50.70 in Revere; for the general relief program, however, the maximum per case expenditure is 125% greater than the smallest, while even the exclusion of the top and bottom figures, still leaves a high expenditure which is 65% larger than the low. In general, the municipalities with the heaviest case loads are unable despite their greater per capita expenditures to equal the per case expenditures made in the cities and towns with a light case load. However, it seems unnecessary to labor further the obvious point that in the poorer towns there is both a greater social need and a smaller financial ability to furnish the assistance programs.

10

Table 20 represents a frankly unsuccessful attempt to establish some correlation between health service expenditures and several rates which are considered to indicate the extent and effectiveness of health service activities. Total and infant death rates, notably the latter, suggest the

effectiveness of the prevention of disease, while the annual ratio of new tuberculosis cases to deaths and the number of new venereal disease cases reported per 100,000 population are two among a number of ratios considered indicative of the effectiveness of the discovery of disease, the American Public Health Association Appraisal Form suggesting that ratios falling below 2 and 600 respectively indicate insufficient or ineffective work in this field.[1] The cure or disease, of course, represents a health service's third major function, but since no trustworthy statistical information is available on this subject, it has not been possible to develop any indices which might suggest need in this field.

Few generalizations are possible on the basis of the figures presented in this table; Revere and Dedham have the identical total death rate of 10.5, while in such contrasting municipalities as Lynn and Winthrop the figure is 13.1 and 13.0 respectively; owing to its unusual population composition, Brookline has the highest overall death rate of any of the 30 cities and towns, but on the other hand, it has a low infant death rate. In general, both total and infant death rates appear to be somewhat lower in the wealthier suburbs, such as Wellesley, Newton, Milton and Lexington; Stoneham and Arlington, however, which both fall below the median per capita assessed valuation figure of

(1) See American Public Health Association: Committee on Administrative Practice: Appraisal Form for City Public Health Work (4th ed.) 1934; and Evaluation Schedule, c. 1943

TABLE 20

AVERAGE EXPENDITURES FOR HEALTH SERVICES
AND SELECTED AVERAGE VITAL STATISTICS : 1940-1941
(30 CITIES AND TOWNS)

	Average Expenditures Per Cap	Death Rates Total	Death Rates Infant	TB Cases Reported Per Death	VD Cases Reported /100,000
Brookline	$2.45	13.3	24.0	3.05	150
Boston	2.36	12.9	40.2	2.00	388
Cambridge	2.07	12.2	37.9	2.00	268
Lynn	2.05	13.1	37.5	1.78	199
Wellesley	2.01	8.4	20.0	2.50	116
Winchester	1.94	8.7	42.6	1.90	100
Belmont	1.93	8.6	30.3	2.50	84
Saugus	1.82	10.6	(1)	3.13	108
Newton	1.74	10.9	24.4	1.21	141
Lexington	1.71	9.0	(1)	8.50	80
Braintree	1.67	10.2	29.9	5.00	150
Dedham	1.67	10.5	24.8	1.20	74
Quincy	1.62	9.8	31.2	2.47	134
Stoneham	1.61	9.1	(1)	4.84	100
Somerville	1.57	10.9	32.2	1.65	162
MEDIAN	1.57				
Waltham	1.56	10.3	28.9	4.21	161
Needham	1.55	10.1	(1)	1.70	92
Weymouth	1.50	11.4	27.3	4.36	115
Malden	1.48	11.8	37.1	2.10	185
Watertown	1.48	9.7	19.8	2.34	164
Everett	1.43	10.2	29.7	1.73	207
Medford	1.40	9.9	29.6	2.70	139
Milton	1.37	10.2	24.1	2.25	101
Wakefield	1.29	10.7	29.3	2.30	117
Arlington	1.26	10.5	31.2	2.57	78
Chelsea	1.14	10.6	31.9	1.54	206
Melrose	1.12	10.6	16.0	1.80	111
Woburn	1.11	11.1	28.6	0.69	122
Revere	1.05	10.5	45.7	1.63	217
Winthrop	0.98	13.0	22.1	1.17	135

Source: See Appendix B

(1): Infant mortality rates are published in PD 2 only for cities and towns of 15,000 and over.

$1,526, have low total death rates, while Melrose, with a per capita assessed valuation of $1,521, has the lowest infant death rate of any of the 30 cities and towns.

Although the per capita expenditure figures repeat the familiar pattern of larger sums disbursed in the wealthier towns, there is no observable correlation between the per capita expense and any of the rates presented; some of the municipalities with the smallest per capita expenditure have relatively high ratios of tuberculosis cases discovered per death; Melrose with the 4th lowest expenditure per capita has the lowest infant death rate and one of the smaller total death rates, while Boston, on the other hand, with the 2nd highest per capita expenditure, has a high death rate, the highest infant death rate and only a mediocre 2 as the ratio of tuberculosis cases to deaths. One severe limitation of the figures here presented is that they include only the cost of municipal health services and overlook the expense of those provided by private agencies; in addition "mortality rates are influenced by many factors, the economic, industrial, cultural, and educational status and the nativity stock of the inhabitants; the age distribution of the population; the geographical location, and climactic environment; as well as the actual community measures that are carried out to conserve health."[1]

(1) American Public Health Association: Appraisal Form, op.cit., Pp. 1-2.

For these reasons, it is virtually impossible to detect correlation between mortality rates and the per capita expenditures for health purposes.

11

It is obvious that evaluation must become increasingly tentative and conjectural as the objectives of the functions under consideration become more intricate. Road maintenance, street cleaning and even fire fighting are services with precise and simple aims, and the two assistance programs considered have objectives which are only slightly more complex; as a consequence, the comparative evaluation of these functions was able to reach certain conclusions relative to need and performance in the 30 municipalities of the Inner Metropolitan District. Police protection, recreational programs and health service, by contrast, have such numerous and complex aims that the evaluation attempted in earlier sections was relatively inconclusive. With the consideration of education, we reach a function whose objectives despite a deceptive simplicity, have a basic complexity and subtlety that makes evaluation extremely difficult; in the words of a New York State Legislative Commission "Education cannot be measured directly through expenditures, teachers' salaries, per pupil costs, holding power, examination marks, graduations, books read or chair warming hours, because it takes place in the life and character of the children and adults who come under

TABLE 21

AVERAGE OPERATING EXPENDITURES
AVERAGE ENROLLMENT RATIOS AND AVERAGE PER PUPIL
VALUATIONS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS : 1940-1941
(30 CITIES AND TOWNS)

	Average Expenditure Per Cap	Per Pupil	PS Pupils /100 Pop	Assessed Value Per Pupil	Value Of School Property Per Pupil
Newton	$21.70	$133.43	16.3	$14,824	$850
Wellesley	21.50	121.87	17.7	16,360	729
Dedham	20.60	117.61	17.5	9,127	626
Milton	20.50	118.72	17.3	12,331	729
Braintree	20.30	92.04	22.0	7,103	465
Revere	19.90	108.34	18.4	6,291	889
Brookline	19.70	151.71	13.0	23,381	685
Lexington	19.70	99.49	19.8	9,827	579
Belmont	19.30	112.89	17.1	11,414	503
Boston	19.30	134.69	14.3	13,413	676
Needham	19.10	105.69	18.1	10,468	562
Winchester	18.80	115.72	16.3	13,609	683
Weymouth	17.90	90.73	19.7	10,981	561
Wakefield	17.30	103.73	16.7	7,765	557
Cambridge	16.50	133.38	12.3	12,442	492
MEDIAN	16.40	101.38			
Arlington	16.30	100.82	16.2	9,040	456
Everett	16.30	92.49	17.7	8,649	530
Watertown	16.20	92.65	17.4	8,304	448
Medford	16.10	100.01	16.1	7,912	526
Saugus	16.00	77.61	20.6	5,172	316
Melrose	15.50	101.68	15.3	9,692	622
Quincy	15.40	96.13	16.0	9,878	535
Winthrop	15.30	82,84	18.4	7,907	407
Chelsea	15.10	101.07	15.0	7,138	455
Stoneham	15.00	102.14	14.8	9,402	353
Somerville	14.80	99.68	14.8	7,502	304
Waltham	14.80	99.52	15.0	8,714	431
Lynn	14.60	108.91	13.4	9,938	724
Woburn	13.70	82.99	16.6	6,160	540
Malden	13.50	98.20	13.7	8,674	624

Source: See Appendix B

its influence."[1]

Despite the difficulties of measurement, it is possible to draw certain conclusions and inferences from the figures given in Table 21. The variation in the number of public school pupils per 100 population shows that owing to the age, religious and social composition of their populations, certain municipalities have a relatively small number of children for whom free education must be provided; in the two years 1940 and 1941, Cambridge, for instance, had an average of only 12.3 public school pupils for each 100 persons in the general population, while Braintree had 22.0. The percentage of the general population attending public schools is, on the whole, larger in the suburban towns than in the more central cities; there are, however, obvious exceptions to this statement, for in Revere the percentage reaches the fairly high figure of 18.4, while in Brookline the age composition of the population keeps the figure as low as 13.0.

There is thus a small though important variation in the demands made on the different municipalities to provide free education. For the reasons noted in the quotation cited above, it is impossible to present any proof of similar variations in the adequacy of the education provided; however, where

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(1) New York: Special Joint Committee on Taxation and Retrenchment: Fiscal Problems of City School Administration, 1928, pp. 69-70. Quoted from Ridley and Simon: Measuring Municipal Activities, pp. 41-2.

there is a wide difference in the annual per pupil expenditure or in the value of school plant per pupil there is presumptive grounds for assuming correlated divergence in the quantity or quality of the education offered. With some conspicuous exceptions, including Cambridge and Boston, the densely populated inner cities and the poorer suburbs spend considerably less per pupil than such wealthy residential towns as Newton, Wellesley, Dedham, Brookline, Winchester and Belmont. Everett's per pupil expenditure, for instance, is $92.49 and that of Somerville is $99.68, while Dedham and Milton each spend about $118 for every pupil in their public schools; in Woburn the per pupil expenditure is but $82.99, while in Saugus the per pupil figure of $77.61 is only slightly more than half the sum expended on a similar basis in Brookline. Despite the high figures prevailing in Revere and Lynn, the value of school property per pupil also gives presumptive evidence of a higher educational level in the wealthier communities.

Although several municipalities with a low ratio of public school pupils to general population are able to provide a large per pupil expenditure at relatively low per capita cost, there is in general close correlation between the two expenditure ratios; of the 9 municipalities with the highest per pupil expenditure, 6 are also included in the group of 9 localities

whose per capita expenditures are highest. Although there are notable exceptions, for instance Revere, which has a high figure in both categories, large per pupil and per capita expenditures are usually associated with high per capita assessed valuations; of the 15 municipalities disbursing more per capita than the median of $16.40 only 2 have a lower than median assessed valuation per capita. In general, however, these same cities and towns possess fairly high pupil ratios which explain at least in part the large per capita figures. Nonetheless, it remains true that a number of poorer municipalities, for example Winthrop, Woburn and Watertown, whose need as indicated by pupil ratios is also high, spend very small sums on both a per capita and a per pupil basis. In the light of the figures in this table, it seems probable, in fact, that education represents another example of a service in which expenditure, and inferentially performance, is more responsive to the community's wealth than to its needs.

12

Although the fragmentary statistical analyses contained in the preceding pages have reached no startling conclusions and in several instances have failed of any conclusions, they have the limited value of illustrating and emphasizing in terms of a specific metropolitan district a few of the problems

that are of concern to metropolitan districts throughout the country. Stated in the baldest terms, the principal problem stressed by the figures of this chapter is the failure of need for a service to coincide with the ability to provide it. Although their per capita tax bases are by no means equal, there is no corresponding adjustment in the demands made upon the governments of the 30 cities and towns in the metropolitan district; although it finds it harder to pay the bill, Woburn needs police protection just as much as Wellesley, and although it cannot finance it as easily, Malden has as much need for public education as Weymouth. In many instances, notably the provision of the assistance programs, need even increases as financial ability disappears, and as a consequence the poorest cities, for example Chelsea or Revere, are saddled with an obligation they can fulfill only at the severest financial sacrifice.

As a result of their inadequate tax bases the poorer municipalities are forced either to impose an unduly heavy burden upon their taxpayers or to deny their residents the level of service they deserve, both of which courses carry dangers to the district's individual municipalities, rich and poor, as well as to the district as a whole. Either an unduly heavy tax burden or an inadequate service level will cause a gradual depopulation which will so erode an already

insubstantial tax base that the individual city is threatened with a collapse that places an added burden upon the surviving municipalities. And in addition to this ultimate danger, an inadequate service level in one municipality threatens the effectiveness of its neighbor's expenditures; earlier pages have already sufficiently stressed that the poor health service or the lax police protection of one municipality can jeopardize the safety and the health of the entire metropolitan district. The wealthy community cannot afford to ignore the plight of its poorer neighbor for its own prosperity and that of the district depend upon the prosperity of each unit in the entire metropolitan region.

CHAPTER X

1

A recent article in the National Municipal Review outlines the major problem of the metropolitan district in a clear and forceful fashion: "The well-to-do residents of some of the numerous small tax districts in the suburban areas, a few of them little larger than postage stamps, have for the time being successfully insulated themselves against political upheavals and costs of local government .... Two major questions remain. Can they insulate themselves also against progressive economic decay in the central city on whose economic adequacy their own survival depends? If not, what new governmental mechanisms are necessary to permit reharnessing for common purposes the political, economic and administrative capacities of all those inseparable parts of one economic urban unit."[1]

Only long years of discussion and experiment by voters and officeholders can be expected to provide any answer to the critical question of the character of the governmental reorganization which is needed to resolve the problems of the metropolitan district. This chapter will not presume to present a detailed scheme of metropolitan government,

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(1) Cornick, Philip H.: "New Exodus to Suburbs Near", NMR 35:8, Jan. 1946

but will content itself with the more modest but still formidable task of outlining certain broad principles upon which such schemes may well be founded.

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In the face of the gravity of the problems confronting the metropolitan districts of this country, it is unrealistic and ingenuous to anticipate any lasting improvement from the half measures that have so frequently failed in the past; the creation of additional governmental units and the constant petty modification of their relationships are simply not adequate substitutes for the sweeping governmental reorganization which alone bears the answer to the metropolitan district's problems.

In many of our metropolitan districts, attempts have been made to mitigate or eliminate some of these problems by the use of intergovernmental contracts which reduce the number of competing jurisdictions and permit the establishment of larger and more satisfactory operational units; in this country the technique has been most extensively and effectively used in the Los Angeles metropolitan area where at their request the county furnishes the municipalities with a wide variety of services, ranging from tax collection to health inspection. "Some two hundred intergovernmental contracts are currently in effect in the area. They deal with every major function of local government

except police, purchasing and public welfare administration; there is active coöperation among local units in the two former functions, and the county government has exclusive jurisdiction over public welfare administration."[1] In other parts of the country there has been a similar though less widespread use of the intergovernmental contract: Chicago, for instance provides water service not only for over 3 million Chicagoans but for an additional 300,000 suburbanites living in 52 surrounding cities and villages, and Cincinnati; a city of less than half a million, serves 80,000 suburban residents in the same way.[2] However, though the intergovernmental contract has the indubitable advantage of replacing many small and impoverished departments by a single agency which can afford the specialized equipment and personnel needed to secure a high level of service, it obviously works no improvement of the confused governmental structure and thus has little or no value, in encouraging citizen interest or in improving responsibility and control. Since it often reduces both cost and waste, the intergovernmental contract is a step in the right direction; it is, however, only one halting step, for instead of attacking the governmental confusion which is at the root of metropolitan

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(1) Stewart and Ketcham: "Intergovernmental Contracts in California", PAR 1:244 Spring 1941. See also Jamison, Judith Norvell: "Neighboring Areas Join Hands", NMR 35: 111-14, March 1946.

(2) Lepawsky: Development of Urban Government, p. 34.

problems, the contract accepts its existence and attempts only to mitigate its effects.

Another measure sometimes employed to alleviate the problems of the metropolitan district is the centralization under state auspices of functions the district's independent units are unable to provide in a satisfactory fashion. Under the fundamentally different conditions prevailing in impoverished rural areas, this device has been used in several southern states to relieve counties and municipalities of a portion or even all of the responsibility for the provision of education and the construction of roads;[1] in Pennsylvania, the designation as State highways of considerable road mileage within metropolitan districts has at least laid the basis for a partially coordinated highway policy within these areas;[2] and in several instances, the various states have assured a uniform level of public assistance within their areas by assuming the entire cost of the aid programs. Although most of these instances of centralization have arisen from the financial inability of the local units to maintain even minimum service, the principle is obviously capable of application to metropolitan districts with the aim of obtaining a coördination and efficiency for which the small, independent units furnish no basis; such

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(1) See Wager, Paul W.: "State Centralization in the South", Annals 207: 144-50, June 1940.
(2) Alderfer, H. F.: Centralization in Pennsylvania, NMR 27:189-196, April 1938.

an approach has, in fact, motivated the state assumption of authority represented by such a body as the Boston Metropolitan District Commission. Whatever its advantages, the diminution of local control arising from state encroachment is sufficient to warrant the rejection of the device in all but the most exceptionable cases.

The larger and more important special districts, usually known as authorities, which have multiplied within our metropolitan districts over the past fifty years are often merely agencies of state centralization and are for that reason somewhat repugnant to principles of local government. This defect of such a typical authority as the Metropolitan District Commission was analyzed in these terms by a recent legislative commission: "The Metropolitan District Commission is a state organization, under strict legislative direction, dealing with matters chiefly of interest to a certain metropolitan area that constitutes but a small fraction of the area of the State. While the communities included in the metropolitan district are assessed for most of the improvements made, and for the operation and maintenance work carried on by the Commission, these municipalities have no direct voice in the determination of the policies and expenditures of their metropolitan authority. Obviously this situation is open to criticism as a governmental policy, since

it amounts to taxation without adequate representation."[1] A consequence of this lack of local control over such state-administered authorities is public apathy toward their operations; in the Boston area, metropolitan government has made no significant advances since the 1895 creation of the Metropolitan Water District, owing at least in part to the stiffling by state control of local interest in the agencies which might have been developed into an effective metropolitan government; writing of the grandfather of all centrally controlled authorities, W. A. Robson notes that "The real cause of the rottenness of the Board" (The London Metropolitan Board of Works) "lay deeper than the rapacity of officials and contractors. The fundamental defect of the Metropolitan Board of Works was that it completely failed to awaken any civic spirit in the minds of London inhabitants. The proceedings of the Board evoked neither interest nor enthusiasm."[2]

Even when authorities and special districts are subject to local control, as is the case with their most numerous representatives, the school district, special districts augment rather than decrease the metropolitan district's number of political units and its consequent organizational

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(1) Mass: Special Commission on Taxation And Public Expenditure: Report Part XIII, The Metropolitan District Commission, (House #1713, 1938) P. 24.
(2) Robson: The Government and Misgovernment of London, P. 65.

chaos. Although they are often required by the governmental paralysis which seizes our metropolitan areas, the special districts and authorities are at best necessary evils: they bring the metropolitan area useful and even vital services, but only at the price of increasing an already disastrous governmental confusion.

The measures that have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs are only palliatives and quack remedies that are unable to reach to the seat of the metropolitan district's disease. More radical measures are, however, frequently killed by the varieties of selfishness and inertia considered in an earlier chapter. Both annexation and consolidation, which frequently involves incidental annexation, are usually vigorously opposed by the minor party to the proposed merger; Allegheny City decried so bitterly its forcible consolidation by Pittsburg in 1907[1] that in this country subsequent enlargements of the central city's area have not been consummated without the expressed approval of the district to be absorbed. Yet even where the municipality is willing, its county is certain to object, if the annexation would transfer the territory to the jurisdiction of another county; thus in 1854 Middlesex County officially objected to the proposed annexation of Charlestown by Boston, and

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(1) Studenski: The Government of Metropolitan Areas in the United States, P. 80 ff.

selectmen from certain Norfolk County towns protested the 1868 annexation of Roxbury.[1] In the face of the strong opposition offered both by the suburbs and the county, it is not surprising that annexation and consolidation have failed in recent years to offer a practical resolution of the metropolitan district's governmental problems. Many of the central cities in our major metropolitan districts have failed to make any significant changes in their boundaries for almost one hundred years; Philadelphia, for instance, is today only 0.1 square mile larger than after the consolidation and annexation of 1854; San Francisco is the same size as in 1856 and St. Louis has not grown in area since 1876,[2] while since 1880 Boston has added only 5 square miles, of which 20% is the product of filling.[3] Despite the examples of certain cities, notably Los Angeles and Detroit which both added considerably to their area during the 1920's, annexation has in recent years failed to match the scale of the decentralization and population growth which have so increased the size of the metropolitan districts; during the decade 1930-1940, the largest annexation to a central city only added a municipality of some 4,000 inhabitants to the City of San Jose.[4] As a method of

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(1) Jones: Metropolitan Government, P. 300.
(2) Lepawsky: op. cit., P. 33.
(3) Jones: op. cit., P. 126.
(4) Jones: op. cit., P. 126.

governmental simplification within the metropolitan district, consolidation is equally moribund; this country's last major county-city reorganization (technically a case of "separation" rather than consolidation) was the Denver-Arapahoe County measure of 1903,[1] and since that time city-county consolidation proposals have between defeated by local referendum in all parts of the country from Portland, Oregon (1927) to Pittsburg (1929).[2]

In view of the undesirability and the impracticality of the other measures already discussed, federation offers the most likely solution to the governmental disorganization of the metropolitan districts. Although, it creates the vexatious problems, which proved so troublesome to our own national government, of securing a satisfactory allocation of authority and function among the federated units, it offers the advantage of retaining at least in name most or all of the existing municipalities of the metropolitan area and thus forestalling some of the suburban opposition which has been so effective in wrecking other reorganizational proposals. Since it possesses this hypothetical advantage, it may seem curious that instances of accomplished federation are even rarer than examples of consolidation or annexation; the 1898 measure which united 5 boroughs into New York City left the former with such vestigial authority that it is more

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(1) See Fesler, Mayo: "Denver Consolidation A Shining Light", in National Municipal League, City Growing Pains, PP. 44-8.
(2) Reed, Thomas H.: "The Metropolitan Problem - 1941", in City Growing Pains, P. 9.

properly considered an example of consolidation than of federation;[1] similarly Berlin's 20 administrative districts fail to form a federal structure since exclusive financial authority rests with the central body.[2] In fact, the only modern example of the use of federation to help solve the governmental problems of the metropolitan district is furnished by the County Council and the 28 metropolitan boroughs of the London area. The rarity of its use is explained, however, by federation's fundamentally radical approach to the problems presented by the metropolitan district; intergovernmental contracts and the creation of special districts are tangential approaches to a few of these difficulties, while consolidation and annexation represent efforts to compass their solution in terms of devices which proved effective in the past. Federation, on the other hand, recognizing both the full range and the novelty of the problems, offers a basic reorganization that might succeed where inadequate and outdated measures have previously failed. Sweeping away both the counties and the special districts, federation replaces the metropolitan district's present governmental confusion with a simple and logical structure that offers the advantages of unified

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(1) Jones: op.cit., P.44 ff. Studenski: op.cit., Ch. XVII; Regional Plan of New York and Its Environs; Regional Survey, Vol. II: Government, Ch. VI, etc.

(2) See Jones, op.cit., P. 39 ff.

agriculture, may, if necessary, be developed at a later date in response to the district's population growth.

To achieve this ideal, will in many cases require boundaries enclosing a huge extent of territory with widely differing needs; it is not, however, proposed that the metropolitan government emulate the earlier example of some municipalities which attempts to provide their entire area with a level of service warranted only in the densely settled districts. During the early years of this century, at a time when each decade saw the addition of considerable undeveloped acreage to Chicago's total area, Mayor Harrison warned: "Chicago's territory is today too great, ... An attempt to increase this territory should meet with emphatic discouragement. The ideal city is compact. With its area fully occupied the care of all branches of administration can be applied to all sections expeditiously and well."[1] The metropolitan government, however, would not claim to apply all branches of administration to all sections, but would instead, through the creation of functional sub-areas within the district, distribute service and expense in proportion to need and resources; the functional area of the metropolitan government's recreationa department, for example, would cover the entire metropolitan administrative area, while the water department, on the other

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1. Quoted Studenski: op.cit., P. 155. No source given.

hand, would operate over a smaller inner territory where demand was sufficient to justify the provision of the service. Under this scheme, which is considered at more length in subsequent pages, the metropolitan government would escape the fate of numerous cities which, in their endeavor to preserve the pretense of uniform service throughout their entire area, sunk all their resources in material improvements that vast extents of sparsely settled land could neither pay for nor maintain. The use of functional areas within the metropolitan district would secure uniform service for uniform need, but would avoid the prohibitive expense of spreading an urban level of service over its entire area.

4

In an earlier chapter a distinction was made between three types of function performed by local government: "protective" functions, including the work of the fire, police, health and inspectional departments, are negative in that they have as their objective the prevention of undesirable conditions, while the "social" functions, of which educational, recreational and welfare activities present the principal examples, are positive in that they attempt to create healthier, happier and wiser citizens; the utility functions, which include sewerage, street cleaning, garbage collection, road construction and water supply, occupy a

neutral midposition since their concern is more with physical services than with the civic and moral values that are so prominent in conditioning the objectives of the other two types of function. A further difference between the protective and "social" functions, on the one hand, and the "utility" on the other arises from the nature of the needs they fill: The need for the latter functions is in general relative and becomes more pressing as density increases; street cleaning or a sewerage system are unnecessary or are luxuries in sparsely settled areas and become indispensable only when high population creates distinctive urban problems. In contrast, though its quantitative amount will vary, the need for the other two functions is absolute, for education or protection are just as necessary to the farm lad as to the city boy.

These distinctions are helpful in guiding the allocation of functions among the central authority and the subordinate local units. Since the need for the "utility" functions varies with the density and local conditions of different areas, these functions can logically be provided either by the local units or by the functional sub-areas of the central government. However, though the latter can reasonably omit low density areas where the relative cost would be prohibitive and provide a sewerage system, as an example, for only a portion of the district, it cannot so restrict the scope of

the preventive and social functions; the metropolitan government would, of course, be completely unjustified in concluding that its sparse population made free education unnecessary in the district's outlying areas. These considerations indicate that the central government must provide uniform service where it assumes preventive or social functions and, in addition, should encourage its attainment in those cases where the ultimate responsibility remains with the local units. Utility functions can in many cases be left entirely to the smaller units, or where greater centralization is desired, planning and supervision can be concentrated in the metropolitan government while still reserving construction and operations to the local governments.

In general, a function should be transferred to the central metropolitan government only when it will promote greater efficiency, a more uniform level of service or a more equitable distribution of the financial burden. Since some functions, for example smoke prevention, must include virtually all of an urbanized area to attain even minimal results and efficiency, their planning and supervision might well be vested in the central authority, with operational duties remaining a local responsibility, save where local indolence or incompetence warrants intervention by the higher government. In other cases, efficiency is greatly promoted if the latter provides not only coordination and planning, but also

a portion of the plant; since both sewerage and water systems are obvious examples of services which the small independent units can supply, if at all, only at the cost of duplication of equipment and inferiority of results, they clearly invite the central government to provide the major facilities around which the local systems can be organized. However, the claims of efficiency in dictating the metropolitan assumption of a function should not be pressed too far: government is after all organized for people and only secondarily for efficiency, and thus the quest for economy and concrete achievement should not be pursued at the sacrifice of less tangible social values. "The desires and tradition of local citizens must have adequate expression, and this may involve acceptance of something less than the economic first choice in the process of reorganization."[1]

The creation of a more uniform service level by the transfer of a function to the central government frequently is rewarded by a greater efficiency which justifies the reallocation; the police and health departments of independent municipalities are, for instance, hampered in their work and all the residents of the district exposed to danger by the marked inequalities in service performance that often arise where the control of these functions is widely divided. On the other hand uniform performance, without any reference to

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(1) Council of State Governments: State Local Relations, Pp. 202-3.

consequent efficiency, may be a sufficient justification for central administration of certain functions which have a "metropolitan" interest. Thus if the national interest demands as an ideal a uniform minimum level of free education throughout the country, how much more immediate and obvious, in view of its unity and internal mobility, is the metropolitan district's stake in a minimum standard of educational achievement within its own area. And where there is a metropolitan interest, as in the case of education, and less clearly in the instances of the health, welfare and recreational functions, it is only just that there should also be a metropolitan, rather than a merely local, financial responsibility.

These criteria - efficiency, uniform service and equitable financial responsibility, which are suggested as guides in allocating functions to the central government, suggest that such a unit might first be given control over a number of the utility functions. Since it is in this sphere that the need for coördination is most obvious, though not always greatest, and since some progress has already been made by the special districts toward its attainment, it is likely that such an initial step would not arouse invincible opposition. As a second stage, after it had consolidated its control over certain "utility" functions, of which main water and sewerage systems, arterial road networks, airfield

and port facilities are the most important, the central government could gradually extend its influence into more controversial fields and assume complete or partial responsibility for the provision of certain preventive and social functions, including, in all likelihood, police, fire, health, education and recreation.

In any case, local control should receive instinctive preference and the burden of proof that centralization would best serve the district should be placed upon the central metropolitan government. Even where it was unarguable that metropolitan control was necessary, administration of centrally determined policies and projects should, when feasible, remain with the local governmental units. In conclusion, and as a warning against the excesses of rational but insensitive reduction of local functions, it is pertinent to quote the remarks of the President's Committee on Administrative Management that "Government is a human institution .... The reorganization of government is not a mechanical task. It is a human task and must be approached as a problem of morale and personnel fully as much as a task of logic and management."[1]

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(1) Quoted White, L. D.: Introduction to the Study of Public Administration, P. 109, from President's Committee on Administrative Management: Report with Special Studies, P. 38.

Fragmentary data based on insufficient experience indicates that governmental reorganization, especially where it has involved a significant expansion of central city boundaries is likely to cause a considerable rise in governmental expense. It is true that the Philadelphia consolidation of 1854, which was largely inspired by a reform movement agitation for greater efficiency and economy, resulted in a temporary retrenchment, while the 1876 boundary expansion in St. Louis was accompanied by the writing of a new charter limiting the city tax rate to 1% and thus forcing stringent economy measures.[1] In New York, on the other hand, available evidence shows that the 1898 consolidation created a higher and more uniform level of service throughout the entire area by placing a considerably heavier burden upon the residents of Manhattan; in 1899 Comptroller Coller estimated that the borough of Manhattan contributed a total of 6 million dollars toward the cost of improvements and operations in the other 4 boroughs;[2] as a consequence, the Brooklyn tax rate for 1899

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(1) Studenski: op.cit., P. 144 ff.
(2) For fuller discussion of the fiscal effect of the New York consolidation see: Jones, op.cit., P. 199 ff. Studenski, op.cit., P. 141 ff; Regional Plan of New York; op.cit., P. 264 ff. from which sources data here presented is derived.

was the lowest in 17 years and represented a net levy reduction of some $1,680,000. over the previous year. An analysis of the consolidated city's expenditures over the decade 1898-1908 suggests that the extension and improvement of utilities created a considerable portion of the increased expenditures; of the new bonds issued during this decade, which saw debt service expenditures rise 189%, 25% were issues for street and water purposes, 18% for water supply and 28% for the construction of docks, bridges and rapid transit facilities. Viewing a budget rise of from $78,400,000. in 1898 to a figure of $103,400,000. in 1907, there was considerable outcry that the consolidation was leading the city to bankruptcy. Comptroller Coller warned in 1899 that "The form of government applicable to thickly settled urban communities is essentially inapplicable to suburban localities and is correspondingly wasteful. I fear that in this respect, at least, the charter has imposed upon our taxpayers an unnecessary burden which may perhaps bring about advantages in the future but scarcely to a compensating degree."[1] Hindsight, however, shows that this prognostication was unnecessarily pessimistic, for while it is likely that in the years immediately following consolidation, some portions of the city carried a heavy tax burden to finance the extension of utilities to more thinly settled, newly annexed sections, these expenditures were

(1) Quoted: Regional Plan of New York: op.cit., P. 265 (no source given)

soon justified by the growth and spread of population. Furthermore, the marked budget increase during the decade 1898-1908 arose not only from the extension of service over a greater area, but from its expansion and improvement in response to a more ambitious concept of government that was developing during this period.

It is nonetheless true that any governmental reorganization is likely to create a demand by the annexed areas for a level of service comparable to that enjoyed by the older and more developed areas. Where population increase is rapid, as in New York around the turn of the century, the enlarged city can afford to extend utilities to thinly settled areas in the certain knowledge that growth will soon bring a sufficient number of new taxpayers to support the facilities. Today, with the prospect of future growth much less certain, cities are not justified in freezing their insufficient funds in projects that may not become productive of any but minute tax revenue until some time in a remote and conjectural future. However, if the tax rate is uniform throughout a governmental area, taxpayers in relatively undeveloped areas can, with reason, demand the same services as received by urban property owners.

Any metropolitan government must face this dilemma; in the past certain cities have countered the suburban opposition to consolidation by a tax differential which warrants

an equivalent of differentials in service. Baltimore first employed this device as early as 1797 and in 1816 established by ordinance the principle that annexed territory should be exempted from the full rate till it reached a specified density; Philadelphia, having first provided for a differential in connection with the 1854 consolidation, established three standard tax rates by an 1868 ordinance: agricultural and suburban property were taxed respectively at one-half and two-thirds of the full rate prevailing for urban properties.[1] During this period differentials were also introduced in St. Louis and Pittsburg and in some localities have continued in use up to the present time.

Although admittedly useful in overcoming suburban opposition, differentials provide such opportunity for injustice that their use is undesirable; while initially they represent mere recognition of the small quantity of governmental service which can economically be offered newly annexed areas, this justification soon disappears as the city extends roads, mains and other fadlities into the suburbs. The differential, unfortunately, usually does not disappear, but lingers on to present owners in the area with an undeserved subsidy, and to create abundant opportunity for tax evasion: in Pittsburg, for instance, a 1910 survey showed that property

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(1) Studenski: op.cit., P. 156 ff.

owners were able to secure the reduced "rural" rates merely by adorning developed city properties with a few judiciously located flower beds.[1]

A scheme of "utility service" sub-areas within the territory of the federated metropolitan government escapes the danger of freezing by ordinance tax differentials which may die hard despite the subsequent disappearance of their justification, but at the same time avoids the uniform tax rate that obligates the government to provide uniform service throughout its area. Although it is suggested in a later paragraph that such utility functions as the metropolitan government undertakes be financed in part by service charges, the remaining revenue, if raised by real property taxation, should be levied on the functional sub-areas receiving the service rather than on the entire metropolitan territory. Although such a scheme admittedly complicates the tax structure, it is the only feasible method of recognising the differing needs of the metropolitan district's areas and of avoiding the prohibitive expense of extending utility services throughout its entire area.

Under such a scheme there would emerge parhaps 5 functional sub-areas for the administration of those functions, including arterial roads, water supply, sewerage systems, ports and airfields, in which a substantial degree of

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(1) Studenski: op.cit., P. 163.

metropolitan control is desirable; since these areas would neither comprise the entire metropolitan district nor necessarily coincide with one another, the total metropolitan tax rate, designed to support these and other metropolitan functions, would vary in accordance with the number of sub-areas in which a property was included. Since for the reasons previously mentioned the social and preventive functions assumed by the metropolitan government should extend over its entire area they should also be supported by the taxation of its entire area. On the other hand, since they can reasonably be confined to sub-areas, the utility functions present the basis for what is in effect a tax differential.

The opportunity offered by the utility functions to relieve the burden on the property tax by developing revenue from service charges should not be neglected. Since the benefits arising from these services can be traced with reasonable accuracy, if not always by a meter, inferentially as by ownership of a car, service charges based on use should be used to raise approximately 50% of the revenue needed to support the utility functions. Complete financing on this basis is unwise, however, since it ignores, first, the relative financial ability to pay of the individual and, secondly, the value increment given a property by the mere accessibility of a utility even though it may not actually be used.

Partial financing through service charges has an additional advantage which becomes apparent when consideration is given to some of the possible economic effects of governmental reorganization. Table 22. 23 presents figures indicating the alterations in the 1940 tax rates which would result from pooling the actual assessed valuations and the actual tax levies of the 30 cities and towns and then financing the sum of the levies by a metropolitan rate; this is simply to say that the same overall total is to be raised, but strictly in accordance with ability to pay as indicated by assessed valuations in the different municipalities. The most radical effects of a metropolitan levy are that Revere's rate is reduced 15% while Wellesley's is increased 70%, and the rates in the other cities and towns show intermediate adjustments. Since in theory property values are adjusted by the amount of the capitalized tax rate, it follows that such changes in rates would reduce every $1,000 of property by over $300 dollars in Wellesley while adding about $130 to the value of each $1000 worth of property in Revere.[1] Any change which withdraws nearly one-third of a property's value approaches confiscation and would be vigorously and justifiably opposed, even though value is not destroyed, but merely shifted to other parts of the area.

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(1) Capitalizing at 5%; these figures are subject to qualifications too numerous to discuss at this point.

TABLE 22

HYPOTHETICAL EFFECT OF TAX RATE EQUALIZATION : 1940

(30 CITIES AND TOWNS)

	Assessed Valuations 1940 (add 000)	Tax Rate 1940	Direct Tax 1940 (add 000)	Adjustment Increase	In Tax Ra Decrease
Arlington	$ 59,275	$35.80	$ 2,120	$ 1.50	$
Belmont	52,177	29.20	1,520	8.00	
Boston	1,483,235	40.60	60,200		3.30
Braintree	25,325	34.00	8,600	3.30	
Brookline	153,272	24.50	3,760	12.80	
Cambridge	170,604	43.00	7,330		5.70
Chelsea	44,475	45.40	2,020		8.10
Dedham	24,736	35.20	870	2.10	
Everett	72,949	37.40	2,920		0.10
Lexington	21,829	32.20	704	5.10	
Lynn	130,822	35.40	4,620	1.90	
Malden	68,724	41.40	2,840		4.10
Medford	78,378	41.60	3,260		4.30
Melrose	38,525	33.60	1,290	3.70	
Milton	40,048	26.40	1,060	10.90	
Needham	25,273	27.80	703	10.50	
Newton	167,587	29.20	4,890	8.10	
Quincy	121,356	32.20	3,920	5.00	
Revere	40,092	44.00	1,760		6.70
Saugus	15,877	42.30	671		5.00
Somerville	114,058	42.30	4,830		5.00
Stoneham	14,132	37.20	525	0.10	
Wakefield	20,758	34.40	713	2.90	
Waltham	50,163	36.40	1,830	0.90	
Watertown	51,345	35.00	1,800	2.30	
Wellesley	43,632	21.90	955	15.40	
Weymouth	49,186	24.00	1,180	13.30	
Winchester	32,728	27.20	890	10.10	
Winthrop	24,858	29.40	731	7.90	
Woburn	20,407	35.40	722	1.90	
TOTAL	3,255,826		121,294		

DT/AV : "Metropolitan" Tax Rate Of $37.30

Source: See Appendix B

Since, as suggested below, the metropolitan government might forego the real property tax in favor of other revenues and, in any case, would absorb functions slowly over a considerable period of time, its creation would not have the drastic effect on property values and on tax rates arising in the hypothetical situation outlined above. However, if it bases any of its revenue on real property, the long term effect of metropolitan government will be first to equalize financial effort, by drawing proportionately more of its property tax revenue from the wealthier municipalities, and secondly, to alter property values as a consequence. Any income that is derived from charges, which are not commonly capitalized in determining property values, will reduce the total that must be raised by the property tax and will thus have the desirable result of diminishing the amplitude of property value readjustments. In the case of roads, the necessary charges might take the form of an excise, administered by the metropolitan government, on passenger vehicles and trucks, while the subordinate units' proportional share of the cost of metropolitan water and sewerage projects might be met by locally administered fees charged the users of the municipal sewerage and water systems.

However, though they furnish a partial safeguard against heavy new property taxes with their unsettling affect on values

and, even where the latter tax is not used, constitute a useful additional revenue source, charges for services cannot be expected to meet the entire cost of metropolitan government; perhaps 80% of its revenue must be raised by other devices. A graded wage tax, bearing more heavily on the higher salary levels, avoids the radical disturbance of property values arising from substantial readjustment in the real property tax rate and in an area as large as the metropolitan district has the additional advantage of easy administration. If the Philadelphia experience can be considered representative, a metropolitan district of approximately 2 million residents should find no difficulty in raising 25 or 30 million dollars annually through such a wage tax, which, when supplemented by charges for services and grants from the state and federal government, should make attainable an annual metropolitan government revenue of 40 million dollars. As a rough indication of the amount of governmental activity it might support, this sum can be compared with Boston's 1940 revenue receipts of about 83 million dollars[1] or with 1946 total Metropolitan District Commission assessments of somewhat over 5 million dollars.[2]

Although it might ultimately be expected to return an equal yield, a metropolitan real property tax raises certain

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(1) See PD 79.
(2) See PD 92.

obstacles. Since so few homes are owner occupied in many of our large cities - in Boston the figure is only 20%,- a property tax should preferably be rather on an occupancy than an ad valorem basis. If rental levels were readjusted to reflect the changed incidence, an occupancy tax would merely convert to a direct burden the indirect contribution to government's cost which is now included in the landlord's bill and would separate two payments now made as one: the check to the landlord would represent payment for shelter and the check to the metropolitan government would represent payment for municipal service. It is possible that such a tax by greatly increasing the number of citizens making a direct financial contribution to local government would have the happy effect of stimulating citizen interest and participation in its processes. However, the obstacles to the imposition of a metropolitan occupancy tax are formidable; since it still bears on property, the occupancy tax would necessitate a corresponding reduction in the ad valorem levies that might still be used by the local units; rent reductions would also be required to prevent bleeding the tenant to the profit of the landlord. As it is most unlikely that anything short of legislative fiat would accomplish either of these complicated readjustments, it is apparent that the graded wage tax might well be a more practical revenue measure for the metropolitan district.

Of the metropolitan district's postulated annual revenue of around 40 million dollars, 5 or more million might derive from grants made by the federal and state governments. In view of the 17% of annual revenue which cities of over 25,000 are now securing from this source and in the light of the trend toward greater centralization which has been developing, this estimate may well be conservative. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the lack of correspondence between effective taxing and effective administrative areas compels a compromise with the older governmental theory that responsible and effective government is obtained only by preserving the strictest coordination between payments made and services received. "Clearly, it is illogical to say that a necessary social service should not be provided because the subordinate units - which, from the standpoint of effectiveness and popular control should administer it - cannot themselves raise revenues adequate to finance the service. Nor is it logical to insist that a central government, which can raise the necessary revenues, should necessarily administer the service merely because it has the fiscal capacity to finance it."[1] Although its larger size will make it a more adequate taxing area than are the numerous political units which now divide the area, the metropolitan government will still lack the revenue

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(1) Hansen and Perloff: State and Local Finance in the National Economy, P. 31.

raising ability of the higher governmental levels and will still need the financial assistance which the federal and state governments are in a position to extend.

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The principles that have been outlined as guides for the organization of metropolitan government obviously relegate the formerly independent municipalities to the minor rôle of subordinate administrative agents of the central government. These units will retain absolute control over certain secondary functions, for example local recreation facilities and street cleaning, and will also provide the local administration of many of the primary functions which will come under the guiding authority of the central government; in addition, the local units will be free to supplement the services or standards which the former provides, and thus might in some cases support through local taxation certain educational facilities not required by the minimum standards enforced by the central government throughout the entire metropolitan area. Yet the essential fact remains that when the fully established metropolitan government has undertaken functions, not only in the utility, but also in the "social" and preventive fields, ultimate control and determination of policy will rest not with the local units but with the central government. Routine health services, as an example, will be administered by the local

units, which will hire their own personnel and formulate their own programs - but under the guidance and even the orders of the central government, which, in addition, will itself provide certain specialized services. The gains in better planning, more uniform performance, greater efficiency, simplified governmental structure and a host of other fields is clear. Yet the question remains: Is the disappearance of the smaller units' independence too great a price to pay?

Earlier discussion will, perhaps, have indicated that the price is at most only nominal, since the overlapping duplication and disorganization of government within the metropolitan district so stifles local units that their potentialities are lost. A governmental unit ideally provides opportunities for citizen participation and a responsiveness to local desires and conditions which are cheaply bought even at the sacrifice of material efficiency and a few cents in the tax rate, for it is this intimate relationship between government and citizen that helps shape the common purposes, shared endeavors and mutual responsibility which are a vital government's most precious contribution to society. As we have seen, however, the governmental disorganization of the metropolitan district thwarts not only efficiency but also clouds the relations that should prevail between the citizen and his government. Reorganization of government

in metropolitan districts is in no sense an attack upon the principles of local government but merely an attempt to make them operative within the metropolitan district and to encourage citizen participation and control by sweeping away the governmental debris that today obscures any ready appreciation of the organization and the problems of government.

Despite the social and economic changes which subtly undermine their validity, old ideas, however, linger on to warp our thinking and to give the metropolitan district's existing governmental confusion a longer lease on life than it deserves. For example, despite the transformations brought by an intervening century and a half, the Jeffersonian belief is still strong that the best government is least government; and equally tenacious is the attitude to which Jackson gave classic expression in his statement that "The duties of all public offices are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance."[1] Although perhaps a logical response to the governmental demands created by a sparsely settled and rapidly expanding country, these believes are today outdated, for despite

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(1) Quoted White: Introduction to The Study of Public Administration, P. 280, from Richardson, James D. (ed.) A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, (1908), Vol. II, pp. 448-49.

protests government continues to assume new functions requiring for their execution not merely general competence and goodwill, but specific skills and techniques. A fundamental governmental reorganization is only a recognition of changed conditions and an effort to achieve both the efficiency of service and the responsiveness to citizen control which enables government to reach its full potentialities as a social institution.

APPENDIX A

List of Abbreviations

Titles of periodicals to which reference is made in the text or in the bibliography are abbreviated as follows:

AC - American City

AER - American Economic Review

AJS - American Journal of Sociology

Annals - Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

APCA - American Planning and Civic Annual

APSR - American Political Science Review

MLR - Minnesota Law Review

NMR - National Municipal Review

NTAB - National Tax Association Bulletin

PAR - Public Administration Review

Reference to Massachusetts Public Documents, which are the source of most of the figures given in the text and tables, is made in accordance with the abbreviations listed below. In all cases these documents are annual reports; however, since their printing was suspended during the war, they are in general available only through 1941.

PD 1 - Mass: Office of the Secretary: Annual Report on the Vital Statistics of Massachusetts

PD 2 - Mass: Dept. of Public Education: Annual Report (2 parts)

PD 16 - Mass: Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation: Annual Report

PD 19 - Mass: Dept. of Corporations and Taxation: Aggregates of Polls, Property and Taxes

PD 34 - Mass: Dept. of Public Health: Annual Report

PD 48 - Mass: Metropolitan District Commission: Annual Report

PD 79 - Mass: Dept. of Corporations and Taxation: Statistics of Municipal Finance

PD 92 - Mass: Treasury Dept.: Assessments ... of the Metropolitan District Commission

BRMG is used in the text and in the bibliography as an abbreviation for Bureau for Research in Municipal Government, Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University. In addition, titles of certain frequently cited publications of the Bureau are abbreviated as follows:

BRMG 5 - Lambie, Morris B.: Experiments in Methods of Municipal Analysis, The Bureau, Cambridge, 1941. (Publication #5)

BRMG 12 - Bureau for Research in Municipal Government: Comparative Status of 83 Cities and Towns in The Boston Metropolitan Census District 1944, The Bureau, Cambridge, 1944. (Publication #12)

BRMG 13 - Hinckley, Thomas L.: Legislation Affecting Municipal Finance in Massachusetts - 1906-1945, The Bureau, Cambridge, 1946. (Publication #13)

BRMG 16 - Bureau for Research in Municipal Government: Comparative Status of 43 Cities and Towns in The Boston Metropolitan Commission Districts, The Bureau, Cambridge, 1947. (Publication #16)

BRMG 17 - Abraham, Hans F. and Greeley, Priscilla M.: Federal and State Grants-in-Aid: Annotated Laws, The Bureau, Cambridge, 1947. (Publication #17)

APPENDIX B

Source and Explanation of Statistics for the Boston Inner Metropolitan District

Prefatory Note: Since institutional population is included in the U. S. Census, per capita figures computed for Belmont, Boston, Lexington and Waltham on the basis of 16th Census population totals would be distorted by the considerable number of inmates of Federal and State institutions located in these localities. To avoid this difficulty, the estimated number of such inmates has been subtracted from the Census population to yield new population figures which, unless otherwise specifically noted, have been used in computing all per capita figures for these four municipalities. The Census and the revised figures are listed below: (See BRMG 12, p. 35):

	1940 U.S. Census Population	1940 Population excluding Institutional Population
Belmont	26,867	26,667
Boston	770,816	766,739
Lexington	13,187	11,212
Waltham	40,020	38,602

Per capitas for the other cities and towns are derived using data given in the 16th U.S. Census (1940). It should be noted that accuracy is limited by the fact that a slide rule has been used in the computations.

Per capita expenditure figures are in all cases derived from the maintenance or operating costs of the department or function under consideration; such costs comprise the major part of a municipality's annual disubrsements and furnish the most reliable basis for comparative analysis. Although capital outlays are thus excluded, their effect is eventually reflected in maintenance costs as increased plant swells the expenditures for upkeep, operation, repairs, etc.

Table 10: Area, Population and Density: 1940
(30 Cities and Towns)

Source: BRMG 16, Pp. 2, 4, and 19

Notes: Area is 1940 land area in square miles. The population figures for Belmont, Boston, Lexington and Waltham represent U. S. Census totals; the number of inmates of Federal and State institutions lying within these municipalities has not been deducted.

Table 11: Indices of Comparative Wealth: 1940
(30 Cities and Towns)

Source: Col. 1: Computed using BRMG 12, Table 16.
Cols. 2 and 3: Bureau of Business Research, Boston University College of Business Administration: New England Community Statistical Abstracts (3rd ed.) 1942;

Cols. 4, 5, and 6: 16th Census (1940): Housing, Vol. II, General Characteristics Part 3, Tables 22 and 24.

Notes: Assessed valuation is the value of real and personal property on the municipal tax rolls. "Highly paid workers" include all those falling in the three U. S. Census categories of "professional", "semi-professional" and "proprietor and manager." It should be noted that while Col. 1 gives average 1940-1941 figures the remaining columns present figures for 1940 alone.

Table 12: Average Direct Tax Per Capita, Tax Rate and Assessed Valuation Per Capita: 1940-1941 (30 Cities and Towns)

Source: Computed from figures in BRNG 12, Table 16.

Table 13: Average Expenditure for Road Maintenance: 1940-1941 (30 Cities and Towns)

Source: Col. 1: Computed from PD 79; Col. 2: Mass. Dept. of Public Works data on file at BRMG.

Notes: Mileage figures include all roads classified as urban, urban through, or rural, but

exclude all categories of private, State and Metropolitan District roads. Expenditures also are limited to payments made by the municipality (including, however, the small number financed by Ch. 90 assistance) and exclude State or M.D.C. expenditures within the municipality. The municipal expenditures include disbursements for: general highway department administration, general highway expenditure, sidewalks and curbing, snow and ice removal, sprinkling, lighting, and "other expenses".

Table 14: Average Expenditure for Street Cleaning: 1940-1941 (14 Cities)

Source: Computed from PD 79, using mileage figures given in Table 13.

Table 15: Recreational Maintenance Expenditures and Facilities: 1940 (25 Cities and Towns)

Source: National Recreation Association: Municipal and County Parks in the United States (ed. Butler, George D.) The Association, New York, no date. Table B. Data is not given for Dedham, Medford, Needham, Saugus, and Winthrop, which are accordingly not listed in Table 15.

Notes: Parks are considered to include all types of municipally supported open area, including playgrounds, playfields, neighborhood parks, reservations, etc., and even parkways and public building sites when landscaped. Acreage is combined land and water area. Maintenance expenditures include those from regular municipal funds for operation and maintenance of parks; capital outlays and expenditures from gifts and emergency funds (e.g. Federal work relief projects) are excluded. The payments made by the various municipalities to the Metropolitan Parks District are also apparently omitted.

Table 16: Average Operating Expenditures of Fire Departments, Average Number of Fires and Average Loss: 1940-1941 (17 Cities and Towns)

Source: Cols. 1 and 2: Operating expenditures: PD 79, assessed valuation of buildings: PD 19, Part 1, Table 2; Col. 3: International City Managers' Association: The Municipal Yearbook 1941, Tables XVI-A, XVI-B; The Municipal Yearbook 1942, Tables XIII-A, XIII-B. Cols. 4 and 5: "Fire Record for Cities" in The Quarterly of the National Fire Protection Association, 34: 332 ff., Apr. 1941 and 35:347 ff. Apr. 1942

Notes: The data given in columns 5 and 6 are available only for municipalities having over 25,000 population in 1940; the smaller cities and towns of the Inner Metropolitan District have thus of necessity been omitted from this tabulation. Since PD 19 has not been published for 1941, the figures given in the 1940 volume have been used in lieu of the 1941-1941 average assessed valuation of buildings. Fire department employees are defined to include all full-time paid firemen, officers and civilian employees, but

to exclude volunteers, call men and "sleepers". Building fires include both roof and chimney fires.

Table 17: Average Operating Expenditures of Police Departments and Average Crime Rates: 1940-1941 (28 Cities and Towns)

Source: Col. 1: Computed from PD 79; Col. 2: International City Managers' Association: Municipal Yearbook 1941, Tables XVII-A and XVII-B; Municipal Yearbook 1942, Tables XIV-A and XIV-B. Cols. 3, 4, 5 and 6: For municipalities of 25,000 and over: U. S. Federal Bureau of Investigation: Uniform Crime Reports, 4th Quarterly Bulletin (Vol. XI, No.4, 1940 and Vol. XII, No. 4, 1941.) For municipalities under 25,000: FBI data on file at BRMG.

Notes: Data for municipalities under 25,000 population is not for publication and should be regarded as confidential. Number of police department employees used in deriving police-population ratios includes all full-time paid policemen, officers and civilians. Burglary includes breaking or entering. The larceny rates are

based only on those offenses where theft exceeded $50 in value. Of the 7 so-called Part I offenses (i.e. those crimes in which all or virtually all offenses are known to the police) rates are given for 4; homicide, rape and murder, the other 3 Part I offenses, are of such rare occurrence that rates, especially for small localities, are totally unreliable unless averaged over a 5-year period. Data is not available for Everett and Weymouth which are accordingly omitted from Table 17.

Table 18: Average Expenditures for General Relief and Average Case Loads: 1940-1941. (30 Cities and Towns)

Source: BRMG Files.

Notes: Expenditures include direct and indirect disbursements, i.e. payments for service, for instance medical care, as well as direct financial aid, but exclude the administrative and overhead costs of running the progr Per case expenditure is computed by dividing direct and indirect expenditures by the average monthly case load multiplied by 12.

Expenditures per case will, of course, be affected not only by the annual number of cases but by the average number of individuals involved in each case. The municipalities receive virtually no state aid in the financing of general relief.

Table 19: Average Expenditures for Aid to Dependent Children and Average Case Loads: 1940-1941 (30 Cities and Towns)

Source: BRMG Files.

Notes: Expenditure figures include both direct and indirect disbursements, but exclude administrative expenses. Per case expenditure computed as explained in Notes for Table 18. 42 U.S. Code (1943) 501 defines a dependent child in part as follows: "a needy child .... who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continual absence from home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent ...." Expenses of program are borne approximately as follows: Federal: 25%; Massachusetts: 33%; Municipality: 42%.

Table 20: Average Expenditures for Health Services and Selected Average Vital Statistics: 1940-1941. (30 Cities and Towns).

Source: Col. 1: PD 79; Cols. 2 and 3: PD 1, Table 27; Cols. 4 and 5: PD 2, Table - "Causes of Deaths from Diseases Dangerous to Public Health."

Notes: Total death rates allocate deaths to place of residence; rates as given in PD 1 and as presented here are based on 16th Census populations for 1940 and on an estimated population for 1941. The populations of Boston, Belmont, Lexington, Waltham are not reduced by the number of inmates of Federal and State institutions located in these municipalities, but deaths occurring in the institutions are allocated to former place of residence. Infant death rates:- deaths, excluding stillbirths of children under 1 year of age per 1,000 live births. Figures are allocated and in published form are avail able only for municipalities of 15,000 or over. Col. 4 shows ratio of new tuberculosis cases reported to annual tuberculosis deaths; Col. 5 shows number of new venereal disease

cases reported annually per 100,000 population. In both cases, high ratios are believed to indicate effective disease discovery work. See American Public Health Association: Appraisal Form, 1934, which suggests respective standards of 2 and 600.

Table 21: Average Operating Expenditures, Average Enrollment Ratios and Average Per Pupil Valuations for Public Schools: 1940-1941. (30 Cities and Towns)

Source: PD 2, Part II.

Notes: Figures are for the school years beginning Oct. 1, 1940 and 1941, except that expenditures are for fiscal years ending Dec. 31, 1940 and 1941. Expenditures include funds from all sources, including local taxation, state reimbursement, receipts for tuition and transportation, etc. All pupil ratios are based on net average membership which, by statute, is defined as average membership plus the pupils for whom the municipality paid tuition for over half the school year less non-resident pupils attending the municipality's schools for over half the

school year. Value of school property per pupil is based only on 1941 enrollments and plant values and not on averaged figures.

Table 22: Hypothetical Effect of Tax Rate Equalization: 1940. (30 Cities and Towns)

Source: Col. 1: BRMG Files; Col. 2: BRMG 12, Table 16. Cols. 3, 4, and 5: Computed.

Notes: The 30 1940 direct tax levies, computed by multiplying the 1940 tax rate of each municipality by its assessed valuation, were added to obtain the total levy for the entire district; this figure was divided by the district's total assessed valuation to secure a hypothetical "district tax rate" of $37.30.

APPENDIX C

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