

The Spread of Violent Civil Conflict: Rare, State-Driven, and Preventable

by

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Submitted to the Department of Political Science of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation advances and tests an explanation for the spread of violent civil conflict from one state to another. The fear of such “substate conflict contagion” is frequently invoked by American policymakers as a justification for military intervention in ongoing substate conflicts — the argument these policymakers often make is that conflicts left uncontained now will spread and become a more pertinent security threat later. My State Action Explanation is that substate conflict contagion is not the sole product of nonstate factors such as transnational rebel networks and arms flows, nor of the structural factors such as poverty that make internal conflict more likely in general. Rather, at least one of three deliberate state government actions is generally required for a conflict to spread, making substate conflict contagion both less common and more state-driven — and hence more preventable — than is often believed. These state actions include Evangelization, the deliberate encouragement of conflict abroad by former rebel groups that have taken over their home government; Expulsion, the deliberate movement of combatants across borders by state governments in conflict; and Meddling with Overt Partiality, the deliberate interference in another state’s conflict by a state government that subsequently leads to conflict in the interfering state.

After introducing this State Action Explanation, I probe its empirical plausibility by identifying 84 cases of substate conflict contagion between 1946 and 2007, and showing that at least one of these three state actions was present and involved in most of these 84 cases. I then conduct two regional tests of the explanation, in Central America (1978-1996) and Southeast Asia (1959-1980). I argue that state actions appear to have been necessary for most of the contagion cases in both of these regions, and that the absence of state actions appears to best explain the cases in which conflicts did not spread.

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Acknowledgments

No research project as big as this one is ever truly the product of one person. As I try to come up with a list of people and organizations to thank for their support of this dissertation, I am thoroughly overwhelmed, and now have a sense of how people must have felt when they tried to read this beast. So a long list follows below — and please accept my apologies if you have been left out!

First, I must thank Kenneth A. Oye, my dissertation chair, who grabbed this topic with gusto from our first meeting and never let up in either his enthusiasm or in his willingness to keep pushing me. He is the best chair I could have had for this type of project, because we needed to be creative and methodologically eclectic — both qualities he has in spades. Fotini Christia was a key member of the committee; the short length of time that had elapsed since her own dissertation gave her a closeness to the process that was invaluable. She has also been a tremendous resource during my job search, which I greatly appreciate. Roger Petersen and Barry Posen both offered key advice as well. It was Roger's idea to study contagion at the regional level of analysis, which I think improved the case study chapters markedly. Barry, despite being my fourth (and ostensibly peripheral) committee member, read every word of this dissertation and had the incisive line comments to prove it, at which I am both astounded and grateful.

If my faculty committee members guided the project at 30,000 feet, it was my fellow graduate students who suffered alongside me through the diabolical details. In the three years I worked on this dissertation, I incessantly beat my colleagues over the head with chapter drafts and practice talks (to say nothing of the two years before this project even started). My thanks go to the entire crop of MIT Political Science graduate students, past and present, but I am particularly grateful to Dan Altman, Sameer Lalwani, Miranda Priebe, Josh Shiffrin, and David Weinberg, who saw my work so often over the years that it probably haunts their dreams. Speaking of people I haunted, I must also thank the numerous area experts who helped me with my codings in Chapter 3 — I asked difficult, sometimes discipline-busting questions of them, and their responses were not only helpful but remarkably quick.

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current and former policymakers I wished to speak with in-country. I greatly enjoyed staying at the Bull Frog Inn in Belmopan and getting to know the friendly staff. Finally, I must re-thank (since they were among my interview subjects) Bobby (Robert) Leslie and René Villanueva, Sr. for their above-and-beyond hospitality to a stranger from the north asking strange questions.

Turning to institutions now, I thank the Smith Richardson Foundation for providing me a World Politics and Statecraft Fellowship to support my trip to Central America, and Paula Kreutzer at the MIT Political Science Department for helping administer the grant. All interviews conducted during the trip were approved by the MIT Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects, protocol number 1008003963. In the 2011-2012 academic year, Steve Miller, Steve Walt, and Susan Lynch at the International Security Program of the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs provided me an excellent environment in which to finish writing my dissertation and share it with a wider audience. Finally, I must give a special acknowledgment to the Tobin Project (Sidharth Shah in particular), not only because they funded me for a portion of the writing process, but also because this dissertation idea was born in their conference room, as I argued with another participant in a Graduate Student Forum about the merits of U.S. military intervention in developing world civil conflicts. As I move on from graduate school, I hope to continue helping the Tobin Project any way I can in its mission to encourage policy-relevant social science research in the academy.

Another key population that has suffered through the research and writing of this dissertation alongside me — and somewhat less voluntarily, I might add — is my family. In particular, my parents, Jim and Gwen Black, also read pretty much every word of this monster and provided a useful perspective on how the dissertation might be received outside of the ivory tower. Perhaps more importantly, my parents, brother Safford, and sister Carolyn helped create the environment that got me into an MIT PhD program in the first place.

Finally, to Whitney, a fellow scholar who has shared my journey through the trials and tribulations of research, teaching, bureaucracy-slaying, rent-making — oh yeah, and marriage — this hard slog sure would've been less fun without you. My dissertation is dedicated to you with my love.

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Chapter 1: The Puzzle of Substate Conflict Contagion

The 2011 U.S. intervention in Libya was unusual in a number of respects. It was, for instance, one of the few American military interventions in which humanitarian factors played a major role in policymakers' decision-making. In one respect, though, the intervention was part of a strikingly typical pattern in American foreign policy. The Libyan civil war was the latest in a long line of violent civil conflicts in which Washington intervened, in part, out of the fear that the conflict might soon spread to other states, destabilizing the entire region and leaving an even bigger mess for the international community to clean up later. In his March 28 address to the nation justifying the intervention, President Barack Obama said, "A massacre [in Benghazi] would have driven thousands of additional refugees across Libya's borders, putting enormous strains on the peaceful — yet fragile — transitions in Egypt and Tunisia." In other words, if the killing in Libya had not been contained, it might have spilled over into two neighboring countries that were themselves in the throes of (mostly nonviolent) political instability.

This particular justification for the Libya intervention has echoes in American military adventures dating back at least to the early Cold War. President George W. Bush advocated "staying the course" in Iraq in 2007 in part because of fears that if U.S. forces withdrew, radical nonstate actors in the country would be able to use it as a foothold to sow instability elsewhere in the region.¹ Twelve years earlier, President Bill Clinton reasoned that if the U.S. did not take action in Bosnia, "The conflict that already has claimed so many people could spread like poison throughout the entire region."² Nine years before that, President Ronald Reagan said that if the U.S. "ignore[d] the malignancy in Managua," it would "spread and become a mortal threat to the

¹ President George W. Bush's address to the nation, January 10, 2007.

² President Bill Clinton, November 22, 1995. Quoted in Michael E. Brown, "Introduction," in Michael E. Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 23-24.

entire world.”³ And, of course, the “Domino Theory” upon which American involvement in Vietnam was built began with a similar underlying assumption: that violent anti-regime conflict in one state might spread to another state, creating catastrophic security consequences for the U.S. if it was not contained quickly.

If we took these policymaker rationalizations for American military intervention at their word, we would be forced to conclude that violent civil conflicts spread constantly and uncontrollably. Further, we would conclude that in order to prevent massive “outbreaks” of contagious civil war from enveloping entire regions, large-scale great power military intervention would frequently be necessary. But the truth behind these assumptions is murky. Despite excellent early academic work, the scholarly community still knows little about the frequency of **substate conflict contagion** or the conditions under which it occurs.


On the one hand, we know that this policymaker fear of substate conflict contagion sometimes comes true. Figure 1.1 illustrates one of the most infamous recent cases, the spread of insurgency from Afghanistan to Pakistan. Each dot on the map in the figure represents a battle in a substate conflict.⁴ Between 2007 and 2009, the density of battles in the northwestern Pakistani border region progressively increased, as the Afghan civil war spilled over the border with greater frequency (as discussed in Chapter 3). Figure 1.2 provides a similar illustration of another infamous case of substate conflict contagion, this one from Croatia to Bosnia during

³ President Ronald Reagan, March 17, 1986. Quoted in Jerome Slater, “Dominoes in Central America: Will They Fall? Does It Matter?” *International Security* 12, No. 2 (1987): 105-134, p. 106.


⁴ Data are plotted in ArcMap and come from the Afghanistan and Pakistan datasets of the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) project (<http://www.acleddata.com/index.php/data>, accessed March 22 and April 10, 2012). See Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 5 (2010): 1-10. Only events labeled as “battles” are shown. “Violence against civilians,” along with events from the dataset that were not necessarily violent — including “headquarters or base establishment,” “rioting/protesting,” and any event labeled “nonviolent” — are excluded.

Figure 1.1 (continues on next two pages). Geo-referenced battles in Afghan and Pakistani substate conflicts, 2007-2009.

2007 (Afghanistan data are only available for Sept. – Dec.)



2008



2009






Figure 1.2. Geo-referenced battles in Bosnian and Croatian substate conflicts, 1991-1992.



the early 1990s.⁵ In 1991 we see 216 battles in Croatia and only 2 in Bosnia.⁶ But in 1992 Bosnia's civil war began, in part because of the civil war in Croatia and the broader struggle for nationhood in the Balkans (as discussed in Chapter 3). In 1992, Bosnia saw 211 battles. The Croatian data show only two battles in 1992, which may be an incomplete accounting.⁷ Regardless, it is clear that the conflict zone expanded in 1992 to include Bosnia.

And yet we also know that contrary to the frequent invocation of the fear of substate conflict contagion as a justification for great power military intervention, substate conflicts do not spread in all places or at all times. Figure 1.3 shows a map of most of Africa, this time showing all battles in substate conflicts between 1997 and 2010.⁸ I have been assured by the director of the project that collected these data, Clionadh Raleigh, that they are comparable cross-nationally.⁹ The distribution of these battles in Africa is discussed in more detail below, but at a quick glance we can see that in spite of the high frequency of substate conflict on the continent, dots have not covered the entire map. Some states, such as Namibia, seem to have escaped the scourge of substate conflict almost entirely. That is to say, conflict has spread in some cases and to some places but not others.

If substate conflict contagion is neither imaginary nor ubiquitous, the relevant question becomes under what conditions violent civil conflict will spread from one state to another. Some quantitative and qualitative empirical work has begun to shed light on this question, but a complete explanation of the phenomenon remains elusive. Without a better understanding of

⁵ Ibid, Bosnia and Croatia datasets. Again, only battles are shown.

⁶ The second of Bosnia's two battles in 1991 lay along the northern border with Croatia, and is thus obscured in the figure by a Croatian battle.

⁷ The ACLED project includes a note on the Balkan data that states they are less complete than the data used here in Figures 1.1 and 1.3 (http://www.acleddata.com/templates/modernviewblue/documents/Balkans_note.pdf).

⁸ ACLED, "All Africa" data. Again, non-battle events are excluded, although the substantive story is similar if these events are included.

⁹ Clionadh Raleigh, personal communication, March 20, 2012.




Figure 1.3. Geo-referenced battles in African substate conflicts, 1997-2010.

what causes substate conflict contagion, academics and the policymakers they advise risk missing the warning signs of contagion. Or, perhaps worse, we risk committing valuable military, financial, and diplomatic resources to a far-off civil conflict that is *not* at risk of spreading and does not need to be contained, thereby reducing our ability to advance real security interests elsewhere.

In this dissertation, I hope to start rectifying this status quo by exploring the conditions under which a “substate conflict” — an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels¹⁰ that has caused at least 25 cumulative battle-related deaths — makes a causal contribution to

¹⁰ “One-sided violence” by a state against non-militarized dissidents, i.e. firing into a crowd of unarmed protesters, is not included in this definition.

the onset of a “civil war” in another state. This is my definition of substate conflict contagion. A “civil war” is defined here as an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has caused at least 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths. Thus all civil wars are substate conflicts, but the converse does not hold. A note on scope conditions: Since I am trying to unpack the policymaker assumption that uncontained civil conflicts will lead to regional catastrophes, I focus my study on civil war outcomes rather than low-intensity conflict outcomes. Were I to include low-intensity conflict outcomes within the scope of my dependent variable, my explanation of contagion would be different. This finding is discussed further in the empirical chapters. However, because there are some cases of low-intensity conflicts contributing to the onset of high-intensity conflicts in other states, I do include such “low-to-high” cases under the scope of my dependent variable.

I advance and empirically test the explanation that substate conflicts are highly unlikely to spread unless a sovereign state government takes one of three specific, deliberate actions. These state actions — elaborated in more detail below — are **Evangelization**, the deliberate sponsorship of nascent rebel groups abroad by a state that has experienced a violent regime change; **Expulsion**, the deliberate transfer of combatants across borders by a state in conflict; and **Meddling with Overt Partiality**, the deliberate interference in another state’s substate conflict that subsequently leads to conflict in the *interfering* state.

In the absence of at least one of these three state actions, substate conflict in one state will generally not spread to another state. Contagion faces significant natural obstacles, and it usually takes evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality to overcome those obstacles. One such obstacle is that substate conflicts and their accompanying brutality have a tendency to horrify rather than inspire potential rebels around the region, making potential rebels less rather

than more likely to rebel themselves.¹¹ Other obstacles, discussed more fully below, include the ability of states to “fortify” themselves against contagion, the rarity of substate conflict in general, and the rarity of high-intensity conflict. The presence of these obstacles means that contrary to the current consensus in the small extant academic literature on the spread of violent civil conflict, nonstate actors such as rebel networks and arms dealers generally cannot create the conditions for successful substate conflict contagion on their own. State action of the kinds described above is usually also required.

This is good news for great power policymakers. First, substate conflict is much more difficult to spread than they currently believe, meaning many conflicts do not require any intervention at all. Second, because substate conflict contagion is also significantly more state-driven than the academic conventional wisdom suggests, it is also significantly more preventable. Great power governments, the U.S. included, can use their coercive leverage over other states to dissuade them from evangelizing, expelling, or meddling. Such coercion may not be easy, but it is certainly *easier* than trying to stop the nonstate causes of substate conflict contagion — trying to keep rebel groups from talking to each other, or trying to interdict illicit economies. And I argue that this state-to-state coercion, when successful, can prevent the vast majority of potential contagion cases, even with important nonstate factors still in operation. That being said, the *means* of coercion are important. Using military force in the name of preventing contagion may end up constituting meddling with overt partiality, and thereby *increasing* the risk of the spread of violent civil conflict. Thus coercive diplomacy seems to be the most prudent course for policymakers interested in preventing substate conflict contagion.

¹¹ James Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” in David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 112-113.

In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I first briefly discuss whether the spread of substate conflict *across* borders is analytically distinct from the spread of substate conflict *within* borders (I argue that it is). I then provide an overview of the political science literature on “contagion” in general and substate conflict contagion in particular. I also consider whether likening the spread of conflict to the spread of disease might help us explain substate conflict contagion — it does, to a limited extent. Next, I discuss in more detail the contributions I hope to make to the existing literature. Finally, I discuss the methodology of my study and lay out the plan for the rest of the dissertation.

The Relevance of Borders to the Spread of Substate Conflict

Before launching into a dissertation seeking to explain the spread of violent civil conflict across borders, it is first worth asking whether borders matter to the spread of violent civil conflict at all. In other words, is the spread of substate conflict from one state to another a distinct phenomenon from the spread of substate conflict *within* states? Or can we explain all the variation in the interstate spread of substate conflict by invoking the causes of the intrastate spread of substate conflict?

Perhaps unsurprisingly, I believe borders do matter to the phenomenon of substate conflict contagion. Theoretically, the “natural obstacles” foundation for my State Action Explanation, which I elaborate in Chapter 2, gives us some reason to expect the spread of conflict across borders to be more difficult than the spread of conflict within states. Several of these natural obstacles, such as the tendency for conflict to horrify rather than inspire potential rebels and the ability of state governments to fortify themselves against the potential for substate conflict onset, are likely magnified when an international border is involved. For example, the “reverse demonstration effect” (the first obstacle mentioned) is likely compounded when

potential rebels realize: “Not only did the original rebellion not go well, but any lessons we try to translate to our own rebellion will have to be adapted to a fighting a different state actor in a different political, institutional, geographic, and (potentially) cultural context.” As for fortification (the second obstacle mentioned), it is also a more formidable obstacle to contagion when a border is involved. If we are only talking about contagion within a state, then the sole state government involved probably has a limited capacity to fortify itself against further conflict — after all, a conflict has already started in that state. But contagion across borders involves, by definition, a second state — which, on average, we should expect to be more willing and able to fortify itself (because it is not currently in conflict, and because a proximate conflict abroad has made it pay more attention to the danger of internal strife at home). In short, interstate substate conflict contagion should be more difficult than its intrastate counterpart, and because it is harder, its causes should be different.

I also have preliminary empirical evidence that shows the relevance of borders to the spread of substate conflict. Recall the map shown in Figure 1.3 above, and recall that each dot represents a battle in a substate conflict. The map shows some states with many densely clustered dots — Burundi seems to be the most extreme example — and other states, such as Congo-Brazzaville, with few dots. Contiguity to a state with many dots does not seem to ensure that a given state will have many dots itself. See, for instance, the sparsely dotted Tanzania (contiguous neighbor of dot-heavy Burundi, Uganda, Kenya, and Congo-Kinshasa), or the sparsely dotted Cameroon (contiguous neighbor of dot-heavy Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, the Central African Republic). Only in the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, and present-day South Sudan) do we see something approaching a similar density of dots cross-nationally. These data suggest that violence does not spread across geographic space with reckless abandon. Rather, in many cases

violence appears to be stopped, at least partially, by international borders. Therefore, the spread of violence across international borders is an analytically distinct phenomenon from the spread of violence within states, and worth better understanding on its own.

Additionally, the academic literature that we might harness to understand the spread of substate conflict within states is even less developed than the literature on the spread of conflict between states (the latter of which is reviewed below). The major published works I found on intrastate contagion only began appearing around 2008, and many of these preliminary works are understandably more focused on describing the spread of conflict within borders than explaining it.¹² As one of the most comprehensive studies to date acknowledges, “We can show that our subset of civil wars exhibits characteristic diffusion patterns [within borders], but we do not know precisely what actors and conditions generate them.”¹³ Many of the explanatory variables that *are* advanced are accounted for elsewhere in my research design — availability of arms,¹⁴ ethnic linkages,¹⁵ and inspiration of rebellion in one locality by rebellion in another locality¹⁶ are

¹² The literature on intrastate conflict contagion includes: Michael Townsley, Shane D. Johnson, and Jerry H. Ratcliffe, “Space Time Dynamics of Insurgent Activity in Iraq,” *Security Journal*, Vol. 21 (2008): 139-146; Nils B. Weidmann and Michael D. Ward, “Predicting Conflict in Space and Time,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 54, No. 6 (2010): 883-901; John O’Loughlin and Frank D.W. Witmer, “The Localized Geographies of Violence in the North Caucasus of Russia, 1999-2007,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. 101, No. 1 (2011): 178-201; Sebastian Schutte and Nils B. Weidmann, “Diffusion Patterns of Violence in Civil Wars,” *Political Geography*, Vol. 30 (2011): 143-152; Jesse Hammond, “Cartography of Crisis: Diffusion of Insurgent Violence as a Strategic Process,” Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, April 1-4, 2012; Erika Forsberg, “Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall? Evaluating Domino Effects of Granting Territorial Concessions to Separatist Groups,” *International Studies Quarterly*, forthcoming; and Yuri M. Zhukov, “Roads and the Diffusion of Insurgent Violence: The Logistics of Conflict in Russia’s North Caucasus,” *Political Geography*, forthcoming.

¹³ Schutte and Weidman, “Diffusion Patterns,” p. 152.

¹⁴ Townsley *et al.*, “Space Time Dynamics,” p. 141.

¹⁵ O’Loughlin and Witmer, “The Localized Geographies of Violence,” p. 178.

¹⁶ Forsberg, “Do Ethnic Dominoes Fall?” Forsberg tests the theoretical arguments of Monica Duffy Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Barbara F. Walter, “Building Reputation: Why Governments Fight Some Separatists but Not Others,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (2006): 313-330; and Barbara F. Walter, “Information,

included below as “nonstate factors” that may link two potential rebel actors in separate states. Yuri M. Zhukov’s work on road networks as vectors of conflict is an exception in which a unique cause of contagion is advanced, although Zhukov cautions that roads may cause conflicts to “relocate” rather than expand.¹⁷ Road networks are discussed below as a structural factor that helps enable contagion across borders. On the whole, though, it is clear that the nascent literature on intrastate substate conflict contagion cannot fully explain *interstate* substate conflict contagion. With this clarified, I seek to advance my own explanation for the latter phenomenon, starting with a review of the most pertinent literature.

Progress and Shortcomings of Past Literature

International relations scholars have been interested in the general phenomenon of “contagion” for decades, and work on the contagion of interstate war has comprised a significant part of this literature (see below). By contrast, work on contagion of intrastate conflict has been limited. Furthermore, much of the past work has not focused on the *conditions under which* substate conflict contagion might occur, and has instead focused on the question of whether such contagion exists at all (to which the answer is unequivocally “yes”).

In the early 1990s, Jerome Slater and Douglas Macdonald debated the empirical veracity of the Domino Theory — which basically asserts that leftist insurgencies are contagious. This debate did not progress in part because the specific definition of the Domino Theory kept shifting. First, Slater tried to exclude 1970s Indochina as a case of the theory operating as expected, by arguing that the theory predicts contagion across entire regions, not to individual

Uncertainty, and the Decision to Secede,” *International Organization*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (2006): 105-135 vis-à-vis the interdependence of secessionist movements, ultimately finding little empirical support for these arguments.

¹⁷ O’Loughlin and Witmer also note that road networks are correlated with density of violence (“The Localized Geographies of Violence,” p. 178), as does Hammond (“Cartography of Crisis”). Hammond also finds that conflict spreads more quickly to more populated localities; population is included in the statistical models of civil war onset that I use to proxy for structural factors.

states.¹⁸ Then, when Macdonald pointed out that China and Cuba may only have failed to inspire regional contagion because “the United States and the West intervened to contain revolutions,”¹⁹ Slater redefined the theory’s predictions to emphasize the inevitability of contagion — thus, whenever cascading revolutions did not occur, the theory was invalidated without regard to great-power actions.²⁰ So the exchange was problematic because it centered around whether contagion *ever* happened, resulting in circular definitional debates.

Quantitative literature on substate conflict contagion in general — moving beyond the narrow scope of leftist contagion that concerned Slater and Macdonald — was similarly focused on contagion’s very existence for most of the 2000s. While R. William Ayres and Stephen Saideman argued in 2000 that both domestic and external factors appeared to influence separatist conflict, two prominent statistical studies of the causes of civil war, from Håvard Hegre *et al.* in 2001 and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin in 2003, found no significant association between the involvement of a state in civil war and the likelihood of civil war onset in an adjacent state.²¹ Seeming cases of contagion, in other words, appeared to be artifacts of the spatial clustering of other variables causing conflict, such as poverty and non-democracy.²²

Subsequent work came to opposing findings. First, in 2006 Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch demonstrated an independent association between a “neighbor at war” dummy

¹⁸ Slater, “Dominoes in Central America,” p. 112.

¹⁹ Douglas J. Macdonald, “America and Democratic Reform in the Third World: A Reply to Jerome Slater,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1993): 163-173, p. 167.

²⁰ Jerome Slater, “Response to Douglas J. Macdonald,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1993): 174-180, p. 176.

²¹ R. William Ayres and Stephen Saideman, “Is Separatism as Contagious as the Common Cold or as Cancer? Testing International and Domestic Explanations,” *Nationalism & Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2000): 91-113; Håvard Hegre, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 95, No. 1 (2001): 33-48, p. 41; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (2003): 75-90, p. 86.

²² Hegre *et al.*, “Toward a Democratic Civil Peace,” p. 41.

variable and civil war onset.²³ Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis found the same result later that year.²⁴ The following year, Gleditsch found a similar link between neighboring substate conflicts (which, as above, are less bloody and more frequent than civil wars).²⁵ Finally, in 2008, Halvard Buhaug and Gleditsch replicated that finding, while explicitly controlling for prominent spatially clustered explanatory variables.²⁶ As in the Domino Theory exchange, we learned from this debate that contagion of substate conflict sometimes happens, but one is left wondering how frequently it happens and, more importantly, why it happens in some cases but not others.

Although a few methodologically rudimentary studies exploring the conditions under which substate conflict contagion occurs were published in the late Cold War,²⁷ interest in the “conditions” question did not coalesce until after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the most sophisticated studies have only been published in the last four years. The occurrence of at least one undisputed case of contagion (Great Lakes) in the 1990s doubtlessly helped to move the debate beyond existence to conditions, although the quantitative literature lagged behind this empirical shock considerably. The conditions literature has gotten off to a promising start, but it faces two challenges that this dissertation aims to overcome.

The first challenge, which applies primarily to the quantitative conditions literature, concerns the definition of the dependent variable. Large-N contagion conditions scholars have

²³ Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” *International Organization*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (2006): 335-366, p. 355.

²⁴ Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2006): 508-535, p. 526.

²⁵ Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (2007): 293-309, pp. 303-304.

²⁶ Halvard Buhaug and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Contagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2008): 215-233, p. 225. Note that the second half of their work qualifies as one of the major large-N contributions to the “contagion conditions” literature. The first half of their article is an existence proof of contagion.

²⁷ Richard P.Y. Li and William R. Thompson, “The ‘Coup Contagion’ Hypothesis,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1975): 63-88; Stuart Hill and Donald Rothchild, “The Contagion of Political Conflict in Africa and the World,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (1986): 716-735.

generally defined contagion as the occurrence of a conflict onset in a state which is adjacent to a state in conflict.²⁸ This definition is problematic in two ways. First, only focusing on adjacent states underestimates the frequency of contagion in many situations. Although the means by which substate conflict spreads is at least partially geographic in nature, non-geographic factors play a role as well. For example, if it is foreign support that causes some rebellions, there is no strong reason to expect that support to spread only across land borders. So by limiting the scope to contiguous states, some important cases of contagion are omitted.

A second problem with the dependent variable definition used by large-N scholars is that the definition also *overestimates* contagion. The danger for overestimation stems from the fact that *any* onset in a state adjacent to a state in conflict is included in the definition. Large-N scholars have not required that the two conflicts in question be causally linked to each other — yet we could observe spatially clustered conflicts because of actual contagion (one conflict contributing to the onset of another), spatial clustering of other explanatory variables (discussed above), or pure coincidence. Hence Forsberg identifies 185 cases of ethnic conflict contagion between 1989 and 2004,²⁹ many of which would probably not be identified by regional experts as actual instances of one conflict influencing the onset of another. Future research should aim to

²⁸ Jonathan Fox, “Is Ethnoreligious Conflict a Contagious Disease?” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 27 (2004): 89-106; Buhaug and Gleditsch, “Contagion or Confusion?”; Erika Forsberg, “Polarization and Ethnic Conflict in a Widened Strategic Setting,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2008): 283-300; Erika Forsberg, *Neighbors at Risk: A Quantitative Study of Civil War Contagion* (PhD Dissertation, Uppsala University, 2009); Alex Braithwaite, “Resisting Infection: How State Capacity Conditions Conflict Contagion,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2010): 311-319; Jacob D. Kathman, “Civil War Contagion and Neighboring Interventions,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 54 (2010): 989-1012, p. 999; Olaf J. De Groot, “Culture, Contiguity, and Conflict: On the Measurement of Ethnolinguistic Effects in Spatial Spillovers,” *Journal of Development Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2011): 436-454; Kyle Beardsley, “Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict,” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 73, No. 4 (2011): 1051-1064.

²⁹ Forsberg, “Polarization and Ethnic Conflict in a Widened Strategic Setting,” pp. 289 and 292 (2,532 observations multiplied by a 7.3% frequency of ethnic conflict onset).

define contagion in a way that better distinguishes actual cases of the phenomenon from illusionary ones.

The other major challenge applies to all of the extant conditions literature: This literature is in search of a unified explanation of contagion. Numerous possible causes have been advanced in prior scholarship, but they largely cumulate to a list of variables. Snyder suggests four possible causes of falling dominoes: “when (1) target states are weak domestically, small in size, geographically contiguous, or bereft of strong allies; (2) the initial fallen domino is similar in its main characteristics to a number of subsequent targets; (3) the initial domino is major country; ... and (4) military technology facilitates the offensive.”³⁰ Macdonald makes a list that is similar but not identical:

“The causes of revolutionary contagion are several: regional economic crises; a set of weak or demoralized elites in target nations; the psychological and physical aftermath of general war; the rise in popularity of a transcendent ideology with region-wide adherents; domestic political crises; and offensive political strategies.”³¹

Brown identifies four possible “mechanisms that transmit instability from one place to another”: refugees, economic problems, “rebel activities in neighboring states,” and “when ethnic groups straddle formal international frontiers.”³² Lake and Rothchild, whose work on ethnic conflict “diffusion” is among the best known in the field, propose four diffusion mechanisms — one concerns “events abroad ... chang[ing] directly the ethnic balance of power at home,” and the other three involve information revealed by another state’s conflict about an ethnic group’s

³⁰ Jack Snyder, “Introduction,” in Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 7.

³¹ Douglas J. Macdonald, “Falling Dominoes and System Dynamics: A Risk Aversion Perspective,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1993): 225-258, p. 245.

³² Michael E. Brown, “The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,” in Michael E. Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 594-595.

political safety or “costs of protest.”³³ To this list, Kirstin Hasler adds the possibility that states play a role in conflict’s spread, ironically as they seek to *prevent* contagion through repression of their own people and interference in the conflicts of others.³⁴

The quantitative conditions literature has produced a similarly diverse list of independent variables. Potential causes of contagion identified in this literature include: transnational ethnic or religious ties between states,³⁵ refugee flows,³⁶ separatist conflicts (as opposed to conflicts over control of the central state),³⁷ limited “state capacity” of the potential receiving state (measured various ways),³⁸ the intensity of the original conflict,³⁹ the absence of international peacekeeper involvement in the original conflict,⁴⁰ and, relatedly, “the flow of arms across borders.”⁴¹ Setting aside the fact that these scholars do not agree among each other about the statistical significance of individual variables, there is little conceptual unity to this list, apart from a general focus on nonstate actors to the exclusion of sovereign state governments (a tendency discussed further in Chapter 2).

Without a unified explanation of contagion, which both the qualitative and quantitative contagion conditions literatures lack, scholars and policymakers are left with little sense of which of these numerous variables are most important, how they interact, which conditions are

³³ David Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict,” in David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion and Escalation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 25-27.

³⁴ Kirstin Hasler, “Myths of Contagion: Ethnicity and the Spread of Civil Conflict,” Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, March 2011.

³⁵ Fox, “Is Ethnoreligious Conflict a Contagious Disease?”; Buhaug and Gleditsch, “Contagion or Confusion?”; Forsberg, “Neighbors at Risk,” Paper II; De Groot, “Culture, Contiguity and Conflict.”

³⁶ Buhaug and Gleditsch, “Contagion or Confusion?”; Forsberg, “Neighbors at Risk,” Paper III.

³⁷ Buhaug and Gleditsch, “Contagion or Confusion?”

³⁸ Buhaug and Gleditsch, “Contagion or Confusion?”; Forsberg, “Neighbors at Risk,” Paper II; Braithwaite, “Resisting Infection.”

³⁹ Kathman, “Civil War Contagion and Neighboring Interventions,” p. 999.

⁴⁰ Beardsley, “Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict.”

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1055.

necessary or sufficient, or what causal mechanisms underlie the various correlations that have been found. Put simply, without a unified explanation, it is hard to know where even to begin in order to try to explain and predict the occurrence of substate conflict contagion.

What of the international relations literature on contagion in general — can it provide the framework we need to make sense of this question? Unfortunately, this larger literature does not help in this regard. There is some interesting theoretical work on what interstate contagion is and what different subtypes of it exist. But many of these theories are too specific to travel well across issue areas. Beth Simmons and Zachary Elkins, for instance, define “diffusion” as a process, not an outcome — precisely the opposite of what is meant by “contagion” here — and specify that diffusion cannot include coordinated action.⁴² The latter stipulation is problematic because governments or fighters may indeed coordinate violent action across borders. Conversely, Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr require conscious imitation by “local policymakers” of “other polities,” excluding inadvertent “diffusion” from their definition.⁴³ Ironically, another of Starr’s theories — he published extensively on the contagion of *interstate* conflict in the 1980s — is too vague to be useful. He defended a causal framework based on a state’s “opportunity” to receive a diffusion of war (proxied by physical proximity) and its “willingness” (proxied by alliances) to do so.⁴⁴ Opportunity and willingness could be proxied in countless ways in the domain of substate conflict, so as before it is difficult to know what variables to include. Furthermore, civil war scholars are already all too familiar with a parallel

⁴² Beth A. Simmons and Zachary Elkins, “On Waves, Clusters, and Diffusion: A Conceptual Framework,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, No. 598 (2005): 33-51, pp. 35, 37-38.

⁴³ Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, “Theoretical and Logical Issues in the Study of International Diffusion,” *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (1990): 391-412, pp. 398-403.

⁴⁴ Harvey Starr, “‘Opportunity’ and ‘Willingness’ as Ordering Concepts in the Study of War,” *International Interactions*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1978): 363-387; Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, “Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 74, No. 4 (1980): 932-946, pp. 934-936; Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, “Opportunity, Willingness, and the Diffusion of War,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 84, No. 1 (1990): 47-67.

framework for explaining individual substate conflict onsets — greed and grievance⁴⁵ — so the opportunity/willingness construct adds little.

Finally, what about the epidemiology literature, which seeks to explain the spread of disease? Many policymakers have likened the spread of substate conflict to the spread of disease; for example, President Obama told CNN in November 2009, “We have a vital interest in making sure that Afghanistan is sufficiently stable, that it can’t infect the entire region with violent extremism.”⁴⁶ If we take the conflict-as-disease analogy seriously, can we leverage the epidemiology literature to generate a simple explanation of substate conflict contagion?

Generally, scholars have looked on this analogy with skepticism, if not outright scorn, calling the comparison “simplistic” and “deterministic.” One of these scholars’ chief complaints is that likening substate conflict contagion to the spread of a disease takes human agency out of the equation; it implies that political actors have no more culpability than might a child for catching the flu.⁴⁷ I think this critique is unfair, because the causes of the spread of disease are neither simplistic nor deterministic. Many diseases, such as cancer, have a wide array of causes, as discussed further below. And many diseases are caused in large part by human behavior. So saying that a phenomenon “spreads like a disease” does not imply that the spread of the phenomenon is simple — that it only has one or two underlying causes — or that human agency is not involved in its spread.

In reality, there *is* explanatory leverage to be had from making an analogy between the spread of disease and the spread of conflict, although this analogy alone cannot generate a full explanation of substate conflict contagion. Such an analogy is limited in its inferential power

⁴⁵ For a basic exposition, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoefler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (2004): 563-595.

⁴⁶ Mike Allen and Josh Gerstein, “Obama: Afghan Leaks Firing Offense,” *Politico.com*, November 18, 2009.

⁴⁷ Brown, “Introduction,” p. 24; Slater, “Dominoes in Central America,” p. 130.

because it is not specific about what *type* of disease a substate conflict is. The world has countless diseases that spread for countless reasons; modeling the spread of just one of these diseases can be the work of a lifetime for an epidemiologist.⁴⁸ Without any analytic priors about where in this maze of analogues violent civil conflict fits, we can only make general statements linking epidemics and spreading conflicts. More specifically, we can only use general theoretical frameworks of how diseases spread.

The most promising of these theoretical frameworks is the “Epidemiologic Triangle,” shown in Figure 1.4.⁴⁹ The triangle has three vertices, each representing a class of causes of the spread of disease: host, agent, and environment. The host, or potential target of the infection, may have characteristics that make him particularly susceptible or non-susceptible to infection. He may lack immunity to the pathogen, or have poor nutrition, or have an unusually high number of social contacts that increase his odds of exposure. The infecting agent (a pathogen, e.g. a bacterium or virus) may also have characteristics that make it more or less likely to spread. For example, airborne agents are more easily transmitted than sexually transmitted diseases. Finally, the environment — “the sum total of influences that are not part of the host [or agent]”⁵⁰ — can have characteristics that are more or less conducive to the spread of disease; we expect high-density urban areas or toxic waste dumps to be more spread-prone than a pristine country

⁴⁸ The literature on how influenza spreads is particularly vast.

⁴⁹ The framework was originally articulated by John E. Gordon, “The Epidemiology of Accidents,” *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 39 (1949): 504-515, and is now a standard topic in introductory epidemiology textbooks. See, for example: Robert Friis and Thomas Sellers, *Epidemiology for Public Health Practice*, Fourth Edition (Sudbury, Mass.: Jones and Bartlett, 2009), pp. 438-445; Raj S. Bhopal, *Concepts of Epidemiology: Integrating the Ideas, Theories, Principles, and Methods of Epidemiology*, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 128-137; Ann Aschengrau and George R. Seage III, *Essentials of Epidemiology in Public Health*, Second Edition (Sudbury, Mass.: Jones and Bartlett, 2008), pp. 387-390; Brian Smyth, Frank Kee, and John Yarnell, “Infectious Diseases,” in John Yarnell, ed., *Epidemiology and Prevention: A Systems-Based Approach* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 181; Penny Webb, Chris Bain, and Sandi Pirozzo, *Essential Epidemiology: An Introduction for Students and Health Professionals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 256-257; and Leon Gordis, *Epidemiology*, Third Edition (Philadelphia: Elsevier Saunders, 2004), p. 15.

⁵⁰ Friis and Sellers, “Epidemiology for Public Health Practice,” p. 445.




Figure 1.4. The Epidemiologic Triangle.

meadow.

The Epidemiologic Triangle is an intriguing theoretical framework, because we can also imagine causes of the spread of substate conflict that look like “host” factors (i.e., the potential receiving state’s wealth or population density) or “agent” factors (i.e., the intensity of the potentially contagious substate conflict) or “environment” factors (i.e., the involvement of great powers in the region). In particular, we will find this framework useful later in the dissertation as we consider the interaction between the state actions that form the cornerstone of my explanation and the **structural factors** that cause civil war in general, such as poverty and ethnic fractionalization. Structural factors are analogous to “host” factors in the Epidemiologic Triangle framework, because they are characteristics of the potential target of the “infection.” As elaborated in Chapter 2 and throughout the empirical chapters, my State Action Explanation argues that evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality are usually necessary

for contagion, but that such actions cannot produce contagion outcomes in a “healthy host.” In other words, a state lacking the structural conditions for civil war will most likely not see a substate conflict spread to it, even if one of its neighbors evangelizes or expels, or even if it meddles.

Overall, the past literature on substate conflict contagion, as well as the broader literature on contagion as a phenomenon in international relations, do not yet help scholars and policymakers understand the causes of substate conflict contagion in a unified, readily applicable way. The literature on infectious disease epidemiology does provide us with a useful theoretical framework, although its generality prevents us from developing a full understanding of substate conflict contagion on the basis of the conflict-as-disease analogy alone. From all of this literature, we are missing a more accurate dependent variable and, more importantly, a unified explanation. The aim of this dissertation is to overcome both of these challenges.

Contributions of this Dissertation

This dissertation makes two main contributions to the existing academic literature on and policymaker understanding of substate conflict contagion. First, by conceiving of the dependent variable differently than many of the works described above, I generate a more comprehensive and accurate universe of cases of substate conflict contagion between 1946 and 2007. Recall that under my definition of substate conflict contagion, the phenomenon occurs when *a substate conflict makes a causal contribution to the onset of a civil war in another state*. Notably, my definition allows contagion to occur between non-contiguous states; instead of only considering pairs of states which border each other, I consider pairs of states in the same “neighborhood,” where each neighborhood is a region of geographically and historically similar states that influence one another’s internal politics. (The list of neighborhoods and the states belonging to

them can be found in Chapter 3.) This broader conception of contagion prevents us from missing key cases.

My definition of the dependent variable also avoids the *overestimation* problem described above, by requiring that two spatially and temporally clustered substate conflicts also share a *causal relationship* with one another. So instead of looking for clusters of conflicts in space and time and deeming any two clustered conflicts to be a case of contagion, I started with those clusters and then researched the secondary source literature on each one to determine whether the original conflict in one state was considered by area experts to be clearly linked to the subsequent civil war in the other state. This is a fairly low causal threshold — the original conflict does not have to be the sole cause of the subsequent civil war, or a necessary condition for the subsequent civil war, just a contributing factor — yet it is a substantially higher threshold than the definition used by many previous scholarly works. My initial search for clusters of substate conflicts turned up 665 pairs between 1946 and 2007, yet I found causal links between clustered conflicts alleged by experts in only 162 of those pairs. Of those 162 cases, 78 were then excluded because the second conflict in the cluster was not a full-scale civil war (in other words, the conflict did not result in 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths). This extensive coding process thus left me with 84 genuine cases of substate conflict contagion, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

The second major contribution of this dissertation is a unified explanation of substate conflict contagion, which is missing from the existing literature. My State Action Explanation seeks to account for the occurrence of the 84 identified cases of substate conflict contagion, as well as the tens of thousands of cases during the same timeframe in which contagion did *not* occur. The logic behind the explanation is elaborated in Chapter 2, but in brief, I start from the

premise that substate conflict contagion is hard. It is hard because there are significant natural obstacles to the spread of violent civil conflict across borders, particularly if we require in our definition that the second conflict in a pair escalates to full-scale civil war. These obstacles, discussed more fully in the next chapter, include the propensity for conflicts to horrify rather than inspire potential imitators,⁵¹ the ability of states to “fortify” themselves against contagion, the rarity of substate conflict in general, and the rarity of high-intensity conflict.

So to spread a conflict, an actor needs to be able to overcome these obstacles.

Empirically, I have found that the natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion can be overcome — at least sometimes — by combinations of 10 distinct causal mechanisms. The first six involve only nonstate actors, and I collectively refer to them as **nonstate factors** in this dissertation. Many nonstate factors have already been mentioned in some form in the previous academic literature described above. They are: (1) the inspiration of potential rebels in one state by active rebels in another state, (2) the assistance of potential rebels in one state by active rebels in another state, (3) the movement of weapons from a state in conflict to potential rebels in another state, (4) the movement of illicit drugs from a state in conflict to potential rebels in another state (who exploit the drug trade to build up resources they need to start their rebellion), (5) the return of foreign fighters in one conflict to their home state, after which those fighters stir up conflict at home, and (6) the movement of refugees from a state in conflict to a state at peace, the latter of which is destabilized by the refugee flows. However, while these nonstate causal mechanisms are doubtlessly important and perhaps sometimes necessary for the spread of substate conflict, in most cases they are insufficient to cause substate conflict contagion on their own. The natural obstacles to contagion are generally too great for nonstate actors to overcome alone.

⁵¹ Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” pp. 112-113.

The seventh causal mechanism is the set of **structural factors** that cause civil war in general; we discussed these factors above as those which make “host” states “susceptible” to “infection.” Structural factors, such as underdevelopment and mountainous terrain in a potential host state, render the natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion less formidable. For example, they may increase the general level of grievance among potential rebels in a given state, making it easier for potential rebel elites to mobilize fighters. We could also consider the road network between two states — roads being a potentially important cause of *intrastate* contagion, as discussed above — to be a structural factor, since road links ease the occurrence of many of the nonstate factors discussed above. Like nonstate factors, structural factors are very difficult to change. Great power policymakers are hard-pressed to make a given state less poor over even the medium term, and they certainly cannot make a state less mountainous! We should not expect substate conflict to spread to states where the baseline conditions for conflict do not exist, so these structural factors are usually necessary for contagion. But, like the nonstate factors, these structural factors are insufficient to cause substate conflict contagion on their own. There are many potential contagion cases — a small subset of which I manage to identify in the empirical chapters — in which the structural conditions for civil war undeniably exist, but where the obstacles to contagion still prevail.

Rather, it appears that in order for substate conflict contagion to happen, the natural obstacles usually must be overcome by at least one of three deliberate **state actions** (more precisely, *state government* actions), which constitute the remaining three causal mechanisms. Under the first state-driven mechanism, Evangelization, a rebel group fighting a substate conflict in one state unseats the government, takes the reins of the state itself, and then sponsors nascent rebel groups in nearby states. Examples include Communist China’s support for the Naga rebels

in India in the 1950s and Liberia's support for the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone in the 1990s. The second state action, Expulsion, involves the movement of combatants from a state in conflict to another state, *by the government of the state in conflict* (which is more able to expel combatants thoroughly and permanently than a nonstate actor). The expelled actors then contribute to the onset of a civil war in the state to which they were driven. Examples include the Ugandan expulsion of Rwandan combatants prior to the start of the bloody Rwandan civil war, and the Afghan/American expulsion of jihadist elites into Iraq prior to 2004. The final state action, Meddling with Overt Partiality, occurs when a state government interferes in a nearby substate conflict abroad, usually by supporting the rebels.⁵² (The caveats of "overt" and "partial" will be explained in Chapter 2.) This meddling can boomerang back to the *meddling state* in one of three ways (detailed in Chapter 2), the most obvious of which is that the state being meddled with may retaliate against the meddling state by sponsoring a rebel movement there. Examples include the infamous Rwandan retaliation for Zairean meddling, and the boomeranging of the Taliban conflict from Afghanistan to meddling Pakistan.

I argue that because it usually takes the considerable resources of a state government to overcome the natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion, the presence of at least one of these three state actions is usually a necessary condition for contagion. They are not *sufficient* conditions either. Indeed, we will see empirical cases in which state actions occurred but contagion did not. Such cases suggest that state actions must combine with nonstate factors, and even more commonly with the structural factors that cause civil war in general, in order to produce contagion outcomes. Nevertheless, without the occurrence of these state actions, most

⁵² As explained further in Chapter 2, the main difference between evangelization and meddling with overt partiality is the actor. Evangelization is taken by the government of the "sender state" (the state which sends conflict abroad); meddling with overt partiality is taken by the government of the "receiver state" (the state which is "infected" by conflict from abroad).

cases of contagion could not happen. Therefore, while recognizing the complexity of the phenomenon I am studying, my explanation leads to a simple conclusion: If evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality could be prevented — which ought to be a good deal easier than preventing nonstate or structural factors — so too could most potential cases of substate conflict contagion.

As discussed above, the chief policy implications of this State Action Explanation are (1) because of the inherent difficulty of contagion, the containment of many violent civil conflicts in the developing world requires no intervention at all, and (2) when the empirically rare presence of state action creates a risk of contagion, great powers should try to prevent the spread of substate conflict by coercing other state governments to refrain from these actions — while remaining mindful of the *means* of coercion and avoiding meddling with overt partiality. Meanwhile, there are significant scholarly implications of this research project as well. Not only does this dissertation represent an ambitious empirical exploration of substate conflict contagion, but it is also one of the first to emphasize the role of the state so heavily. Clearly the academic literature to date has emphasized nonstate factors as spreaders of substate conflict; my work acknowledges the importance of these factors, but focuses on a different and more preventable set of causes. By virtue of my key independent variables, my work is also distinct in that while acknowledging the important role of *structural* causes of contagion — which include the structural causes of civil war in general, as well as factors such as the intensity of the original conflict, about which potential receiving state governments can usually do little — I combine these variables with *agent-driven* or *policy-driven* causes of substate conflict contagion, which can be changed more easily.

I should note that this is not the first scholarly work on substate conflict contagion to hypothesize that states matter more than the received wisdom lets on. Hasler's excellent 2011 conference paper, cited above, also makes this claim. However, her conception of the state-driven causes of substate conflict contagion is less developed than the one advanced in this dissertation. She posits two basic causal mechanisms: states repressing their populations and states intervening in neighboring conflicts, both ironically in the name of *preventing* contagion. But there is little explanation of how the mechanisms actually work — why, for instance, does repression cause rebellion in some cases but civil peace in others? Meanwhile, the evangelization and expulsion mechanisms of my State Action Explanation are not discussed. While a certain variant of meddling is explored, her work only considers meddling conducted to prevent contagion, which is not the only reason states meddle in each other's conflicts (as discussed further in Chapter 2). Finally, from an empirical standpoint, Hasler only looks at cases involving Kurdish minorities, while this dissertation draws from the results of a global study of substate conflict contagion across six decades.⁵³

In its current form, my dissertation is intended to advance a unified but not fully complete explanation of substate conflict contagion. I focus on identifying necessary conditions, rather than on the even more difficult task of identifying the combinations of state actions, nonstate factors, and structural factors that are *sufficient* for contagion. Sufficiency will be a question for future research. In the meantime, though, I hope this dissertation will allow scholars and

⁵³ I could also mention the recent work on the link between states' meddling in other states' internal conflicts and the subsequent onset of *interstate* conflicts. See Kenneth A. Schultz, "The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict Over Rebel Support in Civil Wars," *International Organization*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (2010): 281-312; and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, and Kenneth A. Schultz, "Fighting at Home, Fighting Abroad: How Civil Wars Lead to International Disputes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (2008): 479-506. However, the dependent variable is substantially different between these works (the onset of interstate conflict related to a substate conflict) and mine (the onset of substate conflict related to another substate conflict).

policymakers to read about *all* identified cases of substate conflict contagion between 1946 and 2007, according to a rigorous definition of the dependent variable, and see the application of a relatively simple but powerful explanation that identifies a set of necessary *and preventable* conditions for those cases. This dissertation is intended to be a jumping-off point for future research and for more informed policy debates about the merits of intervention in the name of preventing substate conflict contagion.

Methodology and Plan for the Dissertation

Given the complexity of the phenomenon of interest and the relative dearth of existing academic literature, it was difficult to discern the best way forward methodologically. Ultimately I decided the most prudent approach had to be multi-method. Hence I use two basic methodologies in this dissertation in order to both (1) probe the plausibility of and (2) empirically test my State Action Explanation. For the plausibility probe I engage in medium-N descriptive work, cataloging all known cases of substate conflict contagion between 1946 and 2007 and coding each case for the presence and causal weight of the state actions described above. This effort is similar in scope and approach to the effort by Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg to identify all cases of economic sanctions levied against other states and to assess their degree of success.⁵⁴ Neither their study nor mine can perfectly define and identify the universe of cases or elucidate the full history of each case, but both studies have the virtue of giving us a rich, arguably complete universe of cases on which to conduct further study with a reasonable claim to external validity. The other methodology, which I use for testing the explanation, is the detailed case study at the regional level. Two such case studies are meant to dive deeper into the causes of specific cases of substate conflict

⁵⁴ Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, Third Edition (Washington: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007; first edition, 1985).

contagion. In addition, the focus on an entire region of states over a discrete period of time allows me to consider cases (more specifically, directed dyads) in which contagion did *not* occur, and assess whether or not my explanation accounts for those cases as well. These two case studies thus provide useful tests of the State Action Explanation, albeit with more limited external validity than the medium-N cataloging exercise.

In all three empirical chapters, I try to measure the occurrence and causal contributions of three broad sets of independent variables. The first set contains the specific state actions of evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality. The definitions of these terms, as given in Chapter 2, are fairly strict. Furthermore, because the actions are taken by sovereign states, evidence for their occurrence (and, to a lesser extent, their non-occurrence) is generally well-documented. Measurement therefore involved a relatively straightforward process of culling secondary (and in some cases primary) sources for evidence of these actions in individual directed dyads. The second set contains the structural factors for civil war onset. Defining these variables precisely is more difficult, since the list of possible causes of civil war is virtually limitless, and since the enormous question of what causes civil wars in general is outside this dissertation's scope. Ultimately I decided to use one of the most prominent statistical models of civil war onset in the discipline to date as a proxy for "structural factors."⁵⁵ This model, its component variables, and my use of it are described in Chapter 3. (Road networks are not included in this model, and will be measured in future research.) The final set contains the six nonstate factors described above. I was able to measure the occurrence of these factors dyad-by-dyad in my regional case studies, but not across all 84 cases of contagion in Chapter 3. Thus my two regional tests take account of all three sets of causal factors, but the empirical probability

⁵⁵ Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity."

probe takes account of only two sets. Nonstate factors will be added to the empirical plausibility probe in future work.

I should note that I also considered a statistical approach to my research question — in fact, it was for this reason that I undertook the painstaking process of generating a comprehensive universe of cases — but ultimately I set this approach aside, with the exception of a few basic regressions in Chapter 3. I did so as my explanation congealed, and as it became clear that phenomena such as evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality would be quite difficult to measure quantitatively across a dataset with more than 20,000 directed dyad-year observations. (The dataset is described in full in Chapter 3.) In principle, however, if accurate and consistent measurements for these independent variables could be assembled, I would expect to find positive and statistically significant associations between them and the dependent variable of substate conflict contagion. Such work should certainly be undertaken in the future.

With these methodological guidelines in mind, the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the State Action Explanation in more detail, beginning with an extended discussion of where the explanation fits into the academic literature on civil war as well as the disciplines of international relations and security studies in general. Chapter 3 describes the process by which I arrived at the 84 cases of substate conflict contagion, and lists those cases. The chapter then summarizes the causes of each of those 84 cases, ultimately reporting that at least one of the three state actions was present in about three-quarters of the contagion cases and was demonstrably necessary for the spread of conflict in at least two-thirds of them. (In the chapter, I make a critical distinction between “necessary for the spread of conflict between the sending and receiving state” and “necessary for the onset of civil war in the receiving state” that

is worth briefly noting here, so the reader can watch for it later. I primarily make the former claim, as the latter claim is quite difficult to make given the complexity of civil war onset.) From these descriptive statistics, I conclude that the presence of at least one of the three state actions appears to be a necessary but insufficient condition for most cases of substate conflict contagion, just as the State Action Explanation predicts. I also introduce my rough proxy for the presence of structural factors, and suggest that these structural factors, like the state actions themselves, appear to be necessary but insufficient for most cases of contagion.

On their own, however, these empirical results do not provide a convincing test of the State Action Explanation, because they do not consider the cases in which contagion did *not* occur. In other words, the data in Chapter 3 are selected on the dependent variable. Chapters 4 and 5, the regional case studies mentioned above, are designed to overcome this methodological challenge and actually test the explanation. In Chapter 4, I look at Central America between 1978 and 1996 — a region selected because of the puzzle that despite the presence of five different substate conflicts, there was only one case of substate conflict contagion (the evangelization of the Nicaraguan conflict to El Salvador in 1981). Contagion was particularly rare in the region despite the pervasive presence of many of the nonstate factors, including refugee flows, arms flows, and a significant drug trade. Based in part on archival research and interviews with former government officials in the region, I conclude that evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality were quite rare in the region as well — and argue that given the frequent presence of the nonstate factors, this relative lack of state actions was a significant factor in the relative lack of contagion. The case study thus serves as strong evidence for the proposition that state actions are necessary conditions for contagion, and that nonstate

factors alone are insufficient to spread violent conflict across borders. (The story on structural factors is more complicated, as discussed in the chapter.)

In Chapter 5, I look at Southeast Asia between 1959 and 1980 — a time and a place selected in large part for its substantial policy relevance, given that the Domino Theory was originally generated by American policymakers with respect to Cold War Southeast Asia. This region saw six cases of contagion rather than one; I find state action both present and necessary for roughly five of these cases, leaving only one case (the spread of conflict from Malaysia to Thailand in 1976) that does not fit the State Action Explanation. As in Central America, I again find state action to be relatively rare among the cases in which contagion did *not* occur, and I find nonstate and this time also structural factors to be fairly common, by contrast. After noting the congruence of these findings with the State Action Explanation, I then briefly evaluate the Domino Theory in light of the same empirics.

Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation. I briefly summarize the argument and the empirical evidence supporting it, and then discuss the policy implications of the State Action Explanation in more detail. I discuss the recent U.S. military intervention in Libya — undertaken in part to prevent substate conflict contagion — and assess whether that mission accomplished its objectives at the lowest possible cost in light of what this dissertation tells us. In short, the answer is “no,” because the Libyan conflict was not at great risk of spreading according to the State Action Explanation — and military intervention has probably made contagion *more* likely. On the basis of this discussion, I recommend a more restrained approach to the prevention of substate conflict contagion, including (1) the realization that most substate conflicts, lacking state action, will contain themselves without great power involvement and (2) the use of coercive diplomacy (such as sanctions) rather than military action to discourage state actions in the rare

instances where they are likely to occur. Finally, I discuss the numerous avenues for future research that could follow from this dissertation project.

Chapter 2: The State Action Explanation

In the previous chapter, I introduced the puzzle of substate conflict contagion, which occurs when a “*substate conflict*” — *an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has caused at least 25 cumulative battle-related deaths* — makes a causal contribution to the onset of a “*civil war*” — *an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has caused at least 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths* — in another state. I discussed the present academic literature that engages the question, and suggested that one of the major shortcomings of that literature was the lack of a unified explanation of contagion. This chapter attempts to provide such an explanation.

In short, my explanation is that substate conflict contagion is unlikely to occur without deliberate action by the government of a sovereign state. Three specific state government actions seem particularly conducive to contagion: (1) a state being taken over by rebel forces which, now at the reins of the state, try to export their revolution abroad; (2) a state government expelling combatants from their borders, driving the fighters into another state which they proceed to destabilize; and (3) a state government meddling — e.g., supporting rebels — in another state’s conflict, resulting in the “boomeranging” of conflict back to the meddling state. Each of these actions will be discussed in more detail below.

The key takeaway of my explanation, henceforth the State Action Explanation, is that substate conflict contagion is not the sole product of commonplace and largely uncontrollable forces. Links between conflicts involving nonstate actors and nonstate factors — namely, the six nonstate mechanisms described in Chapter 1 — are frequent in the international system and may sometimes be necessary for substate conflict contagion. And the slow-changing structural causes

of civil war in general, such as poverty and ethnic fractionalization, are almost always necessary catalysts for the spread of substate conflict. However, nonstate and structural factors are usually insufficient to spread substate conflict on their own. In addition, state governments generally must take at least one of the three specific actions listed above, making them usually necessary — though themselves insufficient — conditions for contagion.

This should come as good news to great power policymakers, because it means that the horrific phenomenon of substate conflict contagion is both rarer and more preventable than they might think. A state like the U.S., if it has an interest in keeping a particular conflict from spreading, should first realize that the conflict is highly unlikely to spread in the absence of these relatively uncommon state actions. Even if state actions *are* present, the U.S. does not have to try to alter the decision calculus of shadowy nonstate actors, wipe out illicit economies, or bring the region out of poverty in order to prevent contagion. It is likely sufficient to use the leverage of the U.S. to dissuade the government of the state in conflict, and the governments of any potential receiver states of contagion, from taking these three detrimental actions — while also refraining from these actions (namely meddling) ourselves. State-to-state coercion is not easy, but it is *easier* than coercing nonstate actors or changing structural factors.

My State Action Explanation should not be viewed as pitting state actions against the nonstate and structural causes of substate conflict contagion. I am certainly not arguing that nonstate factors such as rebel networks and structural factors such as poverty are unimportant to the spread of substate conflict. Quite the contrary, I advance an explanation that *combines* state actions, nonstate factors, and structural factors, arguing that some combination of the latter two factors is *also* necessary, in conjunction with the state actions discussed below, for the spread of substate conflict. I am simply trying to tell a part of the story of substate conflict contagion —

the pivotal role of state governments — that to date has generally been underemphasized. Furthermore, this particular part of the story has some uniquely relevant policy implications, because the necessary but insufficient state actions emphasized in this dissertation are more uncommon and more easily prevented by great powers than the necessary but insufficient nonstate and structural factors emphasized elsewhere.

In the remainder of this chapter, I (1) situate my State Action Explanation in the context of the existing academic literature on substate conflict contagion and substate conflict in general, (2) define key terms, (3) explain the basic premise and the three specific mechanisms of the explanation in more detail, (4) discuss the interaction between state actions, nonstate factors, and structural causes of contagion, and (5) consider the implications of the explanation for both scholarship and policy.

The Role of States in Substate Conflict

To a great extent, the end of the Cold War shifted scholarly focus in security studies away from interstate relations to the politics and violence occurring within states. Accompanying this change in focus was a significant shift in the actors of interest to scholars. Whereas most pre-1991 security scholarship attempted to explain and predict the actions of sovereign state governments, post-Cold-War work has taken a great deal more interest in nonstate actors, such as insurgent groups, terrorist groups, private militias, and so forth.

This trend toward studying nonstate actors is more prevalent in some areas of security studies than others, but it is quite evident in civil war scholarship. Numerous recent works have attempted to understand the “micro-dynamics” of substate conflict — why individuals join insurgent groups, the motivations of the groups themselves, and the relationships between

groups.¹ Still others have applied international relations theory to substate conflicts, treating states as miniature “international systems” with anarchic, rather than hierarchic, environments within them.² Following this analogy, the state government is only one actor among many, and the environment is usually dominated by nonstate players. Finally, Idean Salehyan has constructed an entire theory of civil war around “transnational rebels,” arguing that they are one of the critical actors behind civil conflict onset and termination (and some interstate conflict onsets as well).³

In the small academic literature on substate conflict *contagion*, rather than substate conflict in general, we also see a strong emphasis on nonstate actors. For example, many of the works discussed in the previous chapter have claimed that transnational ethnic ties facilitate contagion, either by encouraging copycat behavior on the part of ethnically linked elites or by creating rebel support networks that span across borders.⁴ Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis tell a similar story about rebel group ties more generally: “There could be different ... mechanisms that explain how one country’s civil war risk spreads around the region. There could be demonstration or diffusion effects, as rebels learn by observing others, or there could be contagion effects, as rebels spill over borders to incite rebellion by their coethnics in neighboring

¹ See, for example, Roger Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein, “Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2008): 436-455; Stathis Kalyvas and Matthew Adam Kocher, “How Free is ‘Free Riding’ in Civil Wars? Violence, Insurgencies, and the Collective Action Problem,” *World Politics*, Vol. 59, No. 2 (2007): 177-216; and Fotini Christia, *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

² Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1993): 27-47; Christia, “Alliance Formation in Civil Wars.”

³ Idean Salehyan, *Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), especially p. 60.

⁴ David Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict,” in David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion and Escalation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Halvard Buhaug and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Contagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2008): 215-233; Erika Forsberg, *Neighbors at Risk: A Quantitative Study of Civil War Contagion* (PhD Dissertation, Uppsala University, 2009).

countries.”⁵ This view of substate conflict contagion is notably devoid of state action — conflicts are spreading because rebel groups, whether ethnically linked or not, are taking cues from or supporting each other. Other variables believed to contribute to substate conflict contagion are also generally focused on the behavior of nonstate actors. For example, refugees — though sometimes the product of state expulsion policies — can allegedly spread conflict by “facilitating the transnational spread of arms, combatants, and ideologies conducive to conflict, altering the ethnic composition of the state, and ... exacerbating economic competition.”⁶

There are some dissenting voices to this limited view of the role of state actors in civil conflicts. Chief among them is Michael Brown, who argues that “bad neighbors” are worse for regional stability than “bad neighborhoods.” By this he means that when civil war breaks out in a state due to forces external to that state (whether or not those external forces include a nearby conflict), it is more likely the result of a malicious state government’s action than the result of uncontrollable forces such as refugee and arms flows.⁷ However, Brown is not focused specifically on the phenomenon of one conflict contributing to the onset of another, as I am in this dissertation.⁸ A more recent paper by Kirstin Hasler *does* focus on conflicts causing other conflicts, and *does* argue that the state plays a greater role in contagion than the existing literature suggests, although she focuses on different specific state actions than this dissertation (including a hybrid of the “meddling” mechanism that I describe below). Her cogent exploration

⁵ Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2006): 508-535, pp. 532-533.

⁶ Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War,” *International Organization*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (2006): 335-366, p. 335.

⁷ Michael E. Brown, “The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict,” in Michael E. Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 579-583.

⁸ Empirically, Brown considers four cases of internal conflicts that began as the result of external events. In three of them (Afghanistan, Georgia, and Moldova), the external event was malicious meddling by the Soviet Union, a state that was not in conflict at the time. Only the fourth case, the spread of conflict from Liberia to Sierra Leone, qualifies as substate conflict contagion — and, though I disagree, Brown argues this conflict actually *was* primarily the product of a “bad neighborhood.”

of the Kurdish conflicts in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey provide a useful complement to this dissertation.⁹ Sarah Kenyon Lischer's theory of refugee-based conflict contagion also involves a key role for both sending and receiving state governments — why the refugees are on the run and the way in which they are received abroad matters — although her work is focused on contagion as it emanates from refugee flows alone.¹⁰ Additionally, David Lake and Donald Rothchild emphasize state actions in their discussion of the mechanisms by which substate conflicts “escalate,” although generally by “escalation” they are referring to the onset of interstate conflict rather than intrastate conflict.¹¹ Finally, recent work by Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells identifies the importance of the international system-level variable of polarity to the conduct of civil war — a variable that is a level of analysis *above* where my state-centric study is focused.¹² These limited exceptions aside, on the whole it would be fair to characterize the contagion literature, as well as the substate conflict literature in general, as focused on nonstate actors to the exclusion of state governments. My explanation takes these nonstate actor-centric mechanisms into account, and then adds additional mechanisms that have largely been overlooked.

The focus on nonstate actors in the civil war literature is part of a much broader trend in international relations and security studies scholarship which deemphasizes the role of state governments. The standard-bearer for this trend is the globalization literature within international political economy, where a sizable group of scholars has argued for two decades that the state is slowly obsolescing as a meaningful institution in the contemporary world. For example, Philip

⁹ Kirstin Hasler, “Myths of Contagion: Ethnicity and the Spread of Civil Conflict,” Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, March 2011.

¹⁰ Sarah Kenyon Lischer, *Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War, and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005).

¹¹ Lake and Rothchild, “Spreading Fear,” pp. 29-32.

¹² Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, “International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104, No. 3 (2010): 415-429.

Cerny has argued that globalization has eroded the basic functions of sovereign states, and that we are moving toward a “neo-feudal” world in which “overlapping and democratically unaccountable private regimes, regional arrangements, transnational market structures, ‘global cities,’ [NGOs], quasi-autonomous NGOs, and international quasi-autonomous NGOs, with rump governments ... attempt to free ride on global/local trends for short-term competitive interests.”¹³ Other scholars and commentators have taken similar, if less dramatic, views, while often focused on particular issue areas such as state monetary policy.¹⁴

The “neo-medievalist” perspective on the fading prominence of states in the international system is certainly intoxicating, and may well be correct in some of the domains about which international relations and security scholars are concerned.¹⁵ However, I do not think states are obsolescing with respect to the spread of substate conflict, a perspective which sets this dissertation apart from most of the other literature on the phenomenon. Quite the contrary, my State Action Explanation seeks to “bring the state back in”¹⁶ to the study of substate conflict contagion, and perhaps more indirectly to the study of substate conflict in general. Nonstate actors and nonstate factors play important roles in substate conflict contagion — for example, rebels in one state may inspire potential rebels in another state to consider armed insurrection,

¹³ Philip Cerny, “Globalization and the Changing Logic of Collective Action,” *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (1995): 595-625, p. 625.

¹⁴ Kenichi Ohmae, *The Borderless World* (New York: Harper Collins, 1990); David M. Andrews, “Capital Mobility and State Autonomy: Toward a Structural Theory of International Monetary Relations,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1994): 193-218; Jessica T. Matthews, “Power Shift,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 1 (1997): 50-66; Dani Rodrik, *Has Globalization Gone Too Far?* (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1997); Maurice Obstfeld, “The Global Capital Market: Benefactor or Malice?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1998): 9-30.

¹⁵ On “neo-medievalism,” see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1995/1977), pp. 245-246, 254-266; and, for a dissenting view, Robert Gilpin (with the assistance of Jean M. Gilpin), *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 390-398.

¹⁶ Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

while refugee flows across borders can significantly heighten sociopolitical tensions. But nonstate actors are not the *only* actors relevant to this phenomenon. Without taking the role of sovereign state governments seriously, we miss a key part of the story of how these conflicts spread, as well as a much more effective pathway by which concerned great powers can stop them from spreading. The explanation I advance in this dissertation, and the empirical plausibility probes and tests of the explanation that follow, attempt to tell that part of the story.

Thus my work speaks not only to the civil war literature, but also to other works within international relations and security studies scholarship that seek to remind us of the importance of the state in many arenas. Such works include the argument that states still have policy autonomy despite increasing international capital flows,¹⁷ and the argument that states still control the Internet despite the increasingly popular view that they do not.¹⁸ And, of course, my perspective is consistent with the structural realist's view of the international system — that states are the actors of greatest importance. (As discussed below, however, I do take issue with the “billiard ball” view of states.) Kenneth Waltz argued passionately against an overemphasis on nonstate actors, although the bogeyman of his time was the multinational corporation rather than the insurgent group.¹⁹ Again, I do not believe nonstate actors are irrelevant; far from it. But I have constructed an explanation of substate conflict contagion in which state governments play the pivotal — and most preventable — roles.

Defining Key Terms

A **state action** is an action undertaken deliberately by the government of a sovereign state. Theoretically, a sovereign state is a geopolitical entity that possesses a monopoly on the

¹⁷ Layna Mosley, “Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States,” *International Organization*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (2000): 737-773.

¹⁸ Daniel Drezner, “The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State Back In,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119, No. 3 (2004): 477-498.

¹⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979), especially p. 151.

legitimate use of violence within a given territory;²⁰ the government is the institution within the state that controls the monopoly. Practically, in this dissertation I count as sovereign states those entities that are recognized as such by the international community, and likewise for governments. Hence the governments of Timor-Leste (from 2002), Kosovo (from 2008), and the Republic of China qualify as state actors; the government of Somaliland does not.

Just because a state is sovereign does not necessarily mean its government is capable of the three deliberate actions emphasized in the State Action Explanation. For example, it is difficult to imagine the government of Somalia, which controls a few city blocks in Mogadishu, exporting violence to a neighboring state, managing to expel fighters to any meaningful degree, or meddling in another state's conflict to a noticeable extent. Capability of fomenting substate conflict contagion does not follow from statehood alone. That being said, most sovereign state governments are capable of at least some of the actions in focus here. The government of Zaire, despite existing in an environment nearly as anarchic as present-day Somalia, managed to deliberately harbor rebels from Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda in the 1990s — meddling that ultimately boomeranged back into Zaire with disastrous consequences.

By “deliberate,” I do not mean to imply that a given state government intended for a conflict to spread. That is sometimes the case, but it is often just the opposite. (Zaire's Mobutu Sese Seko, for example, surely did not intend to have his government wiped out by his neighbors.) I mean only that the *original* action, one of the three discussed in more detail below, was intended by the government. In an ideal world, we would find records of such a decision being made by that government's executive.

²⁰ Max Weber (H.H. Gerth and C.C. Wright, trans.), *Politics as a Vocation* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965/1919).

State A will henceforth be used to refer to the state originally in conflict — the state from which conflict might spread. State A will also be referred to as the **potential sender state**. Likewise, **State B** will refer to a state in the rough geographic vicinity of State A (more on “rough geographic vicinity” in the next chapter). This is the state to which State A’s conflict might or might not spread, and will also be known as the **potential receiver state** or, if the Epidemiologic Triangle from Chapter 1 is being used, the **potential host state**.²¹

Below I will refer to three **causal mechanisms** of substate conflict contagion. By “causal mechanism,” I simply mean an event or sequence of events connecting an independent variable to a dependent variable.

When I postulate below that a given causal mechanism is **usually necessary but insufficient** for substate conflict contagion, I mean that in the absence of that mechanism, contagion is highly unlikely. In the presence of the mechanism, contagion is considerably more likely, but it is not certain. Other mechanisms may be required to bring about the outcome of contagion. Thus, in the cases where we see the mechanism but not contagion, the State Action Explanation may still account for the outcome — contagion was enabled by the mechanism in those cases, but did not happen because some other required mechanism was not present. In the cases where we see contagion without the mechanism, the State Action Explanation falls short. Empirically, we do observe such cases, as discussed in the next chapter. These exceptions to the explanation do not suggest that the explanation is false, only that it does not account for all cases. We are engaged here in probabilistic social science, meaning we want to know what factors make the spread of substate conflict more likely or less likely; there is no one factor that makes

²¹ The “State A” and “State B” terminology follow Forsberg, “Neighbors at Risk,” Paper II, p. 13.

contagion certain or impossible.²² The empirical value of the State Action Explanation is that it appears to pertain to *most* cases of potential and actual substate conflict contagion, making it generalizable albeit imperfect.

Basic Premise of the State Action Explanation

The State Action Explanation derives its predictions from a single initial premise: Spreading substate conflict is hard. Specifically, the contagion of substate conflict from one state to another is rare because it faces four natural obstacles. First, substate conflict is rare to begin with. According to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which identifies every substate conflict in the world between 1946 and 2007, of 8,406 “country-years” (i.e., “United States, 1946,” “United States, 1947,” etc.), at most 268, or just above 3 percent, saw the onset of a conflict.²³ Many of the 8,138 country-years in which no conflict onset occurred were in poor, weak, undemocratic, and ethnically divided states. It remains a mystery in the civil war literature why substate conflict occurs so rarely, when the background conditions for it seem ever-present in many states. Surely one reason, discussed further below, is that it is intrinsically more difficult for a potential rebel group to mobilize an insurrection than it is for a state government to repress one. In any event, the rarity of conflict onset means that the *spread* of conflict must be at least as rare.

Second, when substate conflicts do break out, they do not automatically inspire potential rebels in neighboring states to take up arms as well. In fact, violent intrastate conflicts seem just as likely, if not more so, to horrify people around the region with their brutality and futility — a “reverse demonstration effect.” As often as potential rebel elites in places like Guatemala look to

²² See Charles C. Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 211-212, on probabilistic conceptions of “necessary” conditions.

²³ Calculations based on the “onset” file of Version 4-2008, using the “onset2” variable. On the rarity of ethnic violence in particular, see James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No. 4 (1996): 715-735.

events like the Cuban Revolution and draw inspiration for their own revolts,²⁴ it may be more common empirically for potential rebel elites in places like Mozambique to look at horrendous conflicts in places like Angola and say, “No thanks.”²⁵ Most substate conflicts do not end in rebel victory, and most kill thousands of people while destroying national and local economies. A conflict in State A can provide a timely refresher of that lesson of history for those thinking of undertaking insurrectionary action, and thus can reduce the likelihood of a conflict in State B rather than increase it.

Third, once a substate conflict starts in one state in a region, the governments of the other states in that region are no longer naïve to the possibility of such a conflict (if they ever were to begin with). Hence the government of State B can take specific actions to “fortify” itself against the spread of conflict from State A.²⁶ For example, if a leftist insurgency breaks out in State A, the rightist government of State B can round up its own leftist activists and ensure, through promises kept or fingers broken, that its own political system stays stable. Again, then, in some ways the onset of substate conflict in State B becomes more difficult in the wake of a State A conflict onset, rather than less. (This insight is consistent with Alex Braithwaite’s argument that a greater State B capacity lessens the risk of contagion, in that more capable states are more able to fortify themselves in these ways.²⁷)

²⁴ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Guatemala conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=66®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas#.

²⁵ On this specific example of an anti-demonstration effect, see Stephen John Stedman, “Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in Michael E. Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), pp. 248-249. On similar effects in southeastern Europe see James Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” in David Lake and Donald Rothchild, eds., *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 112-113.

²⁶ Stephen M. Walt, *Revolution and War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 335; Stephen M. Walt, “Fads, Fevers, and Firestorms,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 121 (2000): 34-42, p. 41.

²⁷ Alex Braithwaite, “Resisting Infection: How State Capacity Conditions Conflict Contagion,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2010): 311-319.

Finally, even when a conflict does start in State B as the result of a prior or ongoing conflict in State A, the State B conflict may just simmer rather than burn. High-casualty substate conflicts — which kill 1,000 people or more in battle — are even rarer than substate conflicts in general. There are often technological and logistical limitations to the deadliness of a given rebel group or counterinsurgency strategy, particularly when combatants have outdated weaponry and are fighting in difficult terrain. This dissertation is concerned with the outbreak of high-casualty conflict as the result of a conflict (high-casualty or low-casualty) in State A; the imposition of the high-casualty requirement makes the dependent variable of interest even less common.

In principle, these four natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion — the rarity of substate conflict in general, the tendency for conflicts to horrify rather than inspire, the ability of states to fortify themselves against contagion, and the rarity of high-intensity conflict — can be overcome through a variety of means and by a variety of actors. First, certain structural factors in State B may make civil war more likely in general, and thereby make these obstacles less formidable than they are in states without these factors. The short-list of relevant structural factors is well-known in the civil war literature: Impoverished states are more likely to see civil war than wealthy states; autocratic states are more likely to see civil war than democratic states; ethnically fractionalized states are more likely to see civil war than ethnically homogenous states; states with rough terrain are more likely to see civil war than states with even terrain; and so forth.²⁸ Second, I have found empirically that nonstate actors and nonstate factors often contribute to the spread of substate conflict in the following six ways: (1) the inspiration of potential rebels in one state by active rebels in another state, (2) the assistance of potential rebels

²⁸ For useful syntheses of the causes of civil war in general, see Hegre and Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset,” especially p. 526; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (2004): 563-595; and James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (2003): 75-90.

in one state by active rebels in another state, (3) the movement of weapons from a state in conflict to potential rebels in another state, (4) the movement of illicit drugs from a state in conflict to potential rebels in another state (who exploit the drug trade to build up resources they need to start their rebellion), (5) the return of foreign fighters in one conflict to their home state, after which those fighters stir up conflict at home, and (6) the movement of refugees from a state in conflict to a state at peace, the latter of which is destabilized by the refugee flows. In general, though, nonstate and structural factors alone cannot cause substate conflict contagion, because the obstacles to its occurrence are too great. Instead, *the most effective means to overcoming these formidable obstacles lie within the exclusive power of state governments.*

In general, sovereign state governments have military and economic resources that far outstrip the resources available to nonstate actors. This is usually true even in parts of the world where states are considered “weak.” For example, the governments of Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, the Republic of the Congo, Côte D’Ivoire, Guatemala, Iraq, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe all outstripped the rebel groups they fought against in terms of manpower, even though these states were embroiled in chaotic, multi-party civil wars.²⁹ In addition, state governments operate on a different timescale than the various structural factors that contribute to the spread of substate conflict; poverty and ethnic fractionalization may be decades in the making, but a state government can act in one of the contagion-inducing manners described below in a matter of days or weeks. The relative strength and speed of state governments better equips them to overcome the natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion, when they so desire — and, sometimes, even when they do not. Specifically, state governments have enhanced capability to take three deliberate actions that facilitate the spread of substate conflict from one

²⁹ See Christia, “Alliance Formation in Civil Wars.” There are, of course, some exceptions to this tendency; Somalia is one.

state to another. These three causal mechanisms lie at the heart of the State Action Explanation, and are now discussed in detail.

First Mechanism: Evangelization

The first specific means by which state governments facilitate the spread of substate conflict is “evangelization.” This mechanism can only operate when the rebels in State A’s conflict have won the conflict, unseated the hostile government, and taken the reins of the state themselves.³⁰ Once they have achieved victory at home, the former rebels now controlling State A’s government decide to spread their revolution abroad. They get in contact with nascent rebel movements in nearby states and provide them with arms, military training, and other forms of support. This mechanism essentially reflects the Domino Theory’s view of revolution (see Chapter 1): that malevolent governments comprised of former insurgents willfully spread conflict as far as they can beyond their borders.³¹

How does the mechanism work? First, State A’s government’s support for a potential rebel movement in State B endows the rebel group with substantially greater capability than it would otherwise have. One of the reasons that substate conflict is rare is that mobilizing a rebellion is exceedingly difficult — consider, for example, Ché Guevara’s miserable failure to start a major peasant insurgency in Bolivia in the late 1960s³² — and, meanwhile, state repression is rather easy. Hence Saudi Arabia, despite being the socially stratified, resource-

³⁰ The reasons that rebels sometimes manage to usurp sitting governments are beyond the scope of this dissertation, but I can make two rough observations: (1) the total rebel victory required for this mechanism is rare, and (2) my explanation’s general adage that states are stronger than nonstate actors does not hold while the original State A government — the one that is overthrown — is in power.

³¹ This mechanism is also briefly mentioned in Kyle Beardsley, “Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict,” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 73, No. 4 (2011): 1051-1064, p. 1053.

³² Timothy Wickham-Crowley, *Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 117.

dependent³³ sort of place where we might expect a substate conflict, has for the most part avoided instability within its own borders by repressing or buying off potential rebel leaders.³⁴ Mobilization becomes much easier, and State B repression much more difficult, when State A lends its substantial resources and provides the potential rebels in State B with the military and organizational wherewithal to get its movement off the ground. Furthermore, State A's support for rebels makes the conflict in State B more likely to reach the 1,000-death threshold that is otherwise out of reach for many small rebel groups. Second, as Alan Kuperman has noted, rational rebel leaders are more likely to start conflicts they think they can win than those about which they are pessimistic. Foreign support (or, as Kuperman notes, even the *prospect* of foreign support) can be a key source of optimism that convinces uncertain rebel leaders to start conflicts against superior government adversaries.³⁵ Thus, by increasing capability and optimism among potential rebel leaders in State B, the evangelizing government of State A can make conflict in State B both more likely and more intense.

What are some examples? Following the victory of the Communist Chinese over the Nationalist Chinese in 1949 and the end of the decades-long Chinese Civil War, the People's Republic of China (PRC) began supporting rebel movements in a number of nearby states. For instance, in the 1950s the PRC provided the Naga National Council in Northeast India with "sophisticated weapons" and China-based military training.³⁶ Another example of evangelization

³³ On the link between resource dependence and substate conflict, see Michael L. Ross, "What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?" *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (2004): 337-356, pp. 350-351.

³⁴ Thomas Hegghammer, "Explaining the Absence of Islamist Revolutionaries in Saudi Arabia," Talk delivered at the MIT Security Studies Program Wednesday Seminar Series, April 7, 2010. Available online: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/seminars/wed_archives_2010Spring/Hegghammer.html.

³⁵ Alan J. Kuperman, *Tragic Challenges and the Moral Hazard of Humanitarian Intervention: How and Why Ethnic Groups Provoke Genocidal Retaliation* (PhD Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002), especially pp. 40, 53, 379.

³⁶ Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 290-291.

is the Liberian sponsorship of the 1991 rebellion in Sierra Leone, following Charles Taylor's usurpation of the government in Monrovia.³⁷

Why do states take this action? Of the three state actions, evangelization is the most explicitly and deliberately geared toward spreading substate conflict. Usually the new government of State A decides to evangelize its conflict because it is motivated by an expansionist ideology. The ideology might be global in scope, such as international communism, or it might be more regional, like Charles Taylor's vision of a "Greater Liberia."³⁸

Note that with this mechanism I depart somewhat from the orthodox "billiard ball" view of states found within structural realism. Evangelizing state governments are clearly not defensively motivated if they are trying to foment civil war in another state; rather, they should be considered "revisionist" within the status quo-revisionist dichotomy proposed by more recent realist scholars.³⁹

Are some targets of this action more attractive than others? Even a state with a global vision of expansionism cannot actually evangelize everywhere; government leaders in State A must choose which nascent rebellions in other states they will attempt to fan into civil wars and which they will leave to smolder. To some extent, the considerations driving these strategic choices are idiosyncratic to the particular State A in question. The PRC, for example, primarily chose the foreign rebellions it would support in the 1960s according to the perceived hostility of the State B government to the PRC's existence — as measured by diplomatic recognition of the

³⁷ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Sierra Leone conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=136®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1994): 72-107; Randall L. Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1996): 90-121.

Republic of China or votes against PRC admission to the United Nations, among other actions.⁴⁰ Other considerations are probably common to all State As. For instance, it seems intuitive that a given nascent State B rebel movement will be more likely to receive support from State A if the movement is relatively evenly matched in power with the State B government — or, put another way, if the State B government is weak. By contrast, potential rebels who appear to have no hope of winning a substate conflict will probably not receive much external support.⁴¹ The political interests represented by the potential rebel groups — their ideological orientations, or their ethnic ties to the leaders of State A⁴² — may play a role in State A’s decision-making as well, although this appears not to have been the case for the PRC (one of the most prolific evangelizers, as discussed in Chapter 3).⁴³

Many of these variables cannot be observed directly by State A governments — potential rebel capability in State B is the most obvious example. Therefore, perception and misperception undoubtedly play a role in State A’s evangelization choices. These (mis)perceptions may be the product of bureaucratic practices or pathologies within State A’s military and intelligence apparatus; they may *also* be the product of potential State B rebel efforts to convince the State A government to intervene on their behalf. Thus, while an evangelizing State A may provide

⁴⁰ Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 169-171. Van Ness’s definition of “rebel support” is broader than mine; in addition to military equipment and training, he includes propaganda assistance and diplomatic statements.

⁴¹ Preliminary quantitative confirmation of this hypothesis can be found in Lars-Erik Cederman, Luc Girardin, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Ethnonationalist Triads: Assessing the Influence of Kin Groups on Civil Wars,” *World Politics*, Vol. 61, No. 3 (2009): 403-37, especially pp. 415 and 424. Cederman *et al.* find that ethnic substate conflict is more likely when an ethnic minority (1) has a kin link with an ethnic group in a contiguous state, and (2) is relatively more balanced in population with the majority ethnic group in its own state. They do not find any statistically significant association between the political power of the ethnic group in the contiguous (potentially supporting) state and the likelihood of ethnic conflict onset, although this does not suggest that powerful ethnic groups holding the reins of a state are impotent to foment conflicts abroad. Rather, it suggests that many state governments *choose* not to foment conflicts abroad (*ibid.*, p. 416).

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Van Ness, “Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy,” p. 166.

potential rebel elites in State B with optimism, the reverse may also be true — potential rebel elites in State B may manage to convince State A officials that the rebel cause in State B is worth supporting, and this dialogue may lead to evangelization decisions that State A would not have come to on its own.⁴⁴ Importantly, then, State A decision-making vis-à-vis evangelization choices does not conform to a strictly rationalist model with perfect information.

Second Mechanism: Expulsion

The second action state governments can take to facilitate substate conflict contagion is “expulsion.” Under this causal mechanism, State A (or another state involved in State A’s conflict) forces combatants in their country outside their borders, rather than pacifying, killing, capturing, or co-opting those combatants. (“Combatants” can be either pro- or anti-State A actors; in practice, they are usually anti-State A rebels.) These expelled State A combatants end up in State B, where they either foment or intensify a substate conflict there.

How does the mechanism work? Combatants move across international borders for a variety of reasons, often of their own free will. For example, rebels in State A might decide to rely on bases in the border regions of State B as safe havens, much as the Nicaraguan *contras* did in Costa Rica and Honduras (see Chapter 4). In most cases, combatants who move across borders of their own accord do not foment a separate conflict in State B, but rather involve outlying geographic regions of State B in the original conflict to a limited degree. By contrast, when a state government puts its considerable resources behind the forcible expulsion of combatants, they leave in larger numbers and are driven more permanently and more deeply into State B’s territory. “There to stay,” this critical mass of combatants begins to undertake major political violence. They may join up with a nascent rebel group in State B, increasing that group’s

⁴⁴ I thank Roger Petersen for pointing this out.

capability and optimism as above, or they may start their own conflict against the government of State B, in order to carve out their own niche of power in their newfound home country.

It is important to note the distinction between “combatants” and “refugees.” Both move across borders during substate conflicts, voluntarily and involuntarily. However, I consider refugees to be noncombatants, who are not *at the moment of their flight* involved as fighters in State A’s internal conflict. (Some such refugees may turn to fighting *after* leaving State A, as often happens in squalid refugee camps.) Sometimes refugees contribute to the spread of substate conflict, but generally a demographic shift on its own cannot set off contagion. As a nonstate actor-centric mechanism, refugee flows are usually overcome, as above, by the natural obstacles to contagion. By contrast, combatants from State A are indoctrinated, trained, and usually armed when they are forcibly ejected deep into State B under the expulsion mechanism. They have already overcome the obstacles to substate conflict onset in one country, and hence are better positioned to overcome the obstacles to contagion in State B. Thus, although Sarah Kenyon Lischer and I hold similar views about the dangers of politically engaged violent actors moving across borders, she considers both combatants and noncombatants to be “refugees” while I do not.⁴⁵

What are some examples? The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which attacked the government of Rwanda in 1990, had its origins in Uganda. About 4,000 “second-generation Rwandan refugees” (meaning their parents were non-combatants when they left Rwanda) joined up with the National Resistance Movement (NRM), one of the many rebel groups in Uganda’s bloody 1980s civil war — and, following the successful 1986 takeover of Kampala, the government of Uganda. In the late 1980s, the NRM government fired a prominent Rwandan general from its army and rescinded the land ownership rights of Rwandan refugees. These

⁴⁵ Lischer, “Dangerous Sanctuaries,” pp. 10, 24-28.

discriminatory measures effectively constituted expulsion. With nowhere else to go, the Rwandan NRM combatants formed the RPF, surged back into Rwanda, and challenged the government in Kigali.⁴⁶ A more recent example of the expulsion mechanism is the link between the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. When the Northern Alliance, backed by the United States, took over the Afghan government in late 2001, military attacks forced many violent jihadists who for decades had been based in Afghanistan to flee elsewhere. A significant number of these jihadists, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ended up in Iraq, where they recruited and trained men to fight the government in Baghdad and significantly elevated the intensity of the civil war there.⁴⁷

Why do states take this action? Expulsion, unlike evangelization, is generally not undertaken with the intention of spreading conflict from State A to State B. Rather, substate conflict contagion becomes an unintended consequence of the State A government's desire to look after its own security — or, as in the case of Uganda, to achieve ethnopolitical objectives. However unanticipated the consequences might be, though, the expulsion itself is deliberate.

Are some targets of this action more attractive than others? A number of variables could impact State A's decision to expel combatants to one State B and not another — the strength of State B's border controls, for instance — but the most important determinant is probably proximity. Expelled combatants generally end up in states adjacent to the state where they originated; the State B abutting whichever corner of State A the combatants have been pushed into will probably be the State B they are subsequently forced to enter. There are some

⁴⁶ Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide* (London: Verso, 2004), pp. 13-14; Jeanne M. Haskin, *The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 75.

⁴⁷ Peter J. Munson, *Iraq in Transition: The Legacy of the Dictatorship and the Prospects for Democracy* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2009), pp. 144-145.

exceptions to this tendency (the expulsion of jihadists from Afghanistan to Iraq is one), but in general we should expect expulsion to be more geographically bounded than evangelization.

Third Mechanism: Meddling with Overt Partiality

The final state action that facilitates contagion comes from the government of State B, rather than State A. Under this causal mechanism, State B's government "meddles with overt partiality" in the conflict ongoing in State A, ultimately resulting in the boomeranging onset of conflict in State B. Meddling by state governments in the substate conflicts of others is varied and quite common; the meddling of most interest here is that which is "overtly partial." By "partial," I mean that State B's government picks a side of the State A conflict — whether the rebels or the government — that it supports to the exclusion of the other side. (In practice, usually when this mechanism is at work, State B's government has chosen to support the State A rebels.) By "overt," I mean that State B's government is providing its chosen partner with tangible support, such as military equipment, training, or basing rights. Exclusively diplomatic involvement of State B's government in State A's conflict — statements of support for one side or the other, or attempts to mediate between them — is insufficiently overt to constitute "meddling with overt partiality."

How does the mechanism work? Meddling with overt partiality can cause the spread of substate conflict from State A to State B in three ways. First, the government of State A often retaliates against State B's meddling by fomenting a conflict in State B.⁴⁸ When discussing the first mechanism above, I argued that State A's government has substantial abilities to touch off conflicts in State B, by providing capability and optimism to emerging rebel groups that they might not otherwise have. Under this meddling mechanism, State A's government provides the same advantages to State B rebel groups, but for different reasons. The leaders of State A are not

⁴⁸ This possibility is briefly mentioned in Beardsley, "Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict," p. 1053.

interested in evangelizing a revolutionary ideology so much as they are in fighting back against a perceived external threat: State B's meddling government.

Second, even if the State B government's meddling does not prompt retaliation from State A, the meddling may "blow back" into State B. In other words, something about State B's meddling may cause the violence in State A to spill over into State B, even though State A's government does not directly foment that spillover of violence. Pakistan's support for the Afghan Taliban has blown back in this fashion; Islamabad's support enabled the formation of a Pashtun nationalist network in northwestern Pakistan that later began an armed rebellion against the *Pakistani* state.⁴⁹

Third, meddling in the conflict of another state may embitter the population of the meddling state, who would rather see their government's attention turned inward. Particularly if the State B government embarrasses itself abroad — as did the government of Somalia when it invaded war-torn Ethiopia and was trounced⁵⁰ — meddling may undermine the legitimacy of the government, spurring insurrectionary activities by disaffected elites.

What are some examples? Besides the two examples mentioned above — Pakistan and Somalia — the prime example of meddling with overt partiality leading to substate conflict contagion is the 1996 conflict in the former Zaire. Zaire's leader, Mobutu Sese Seko, had a long history of antagonizing his neighbors, and in the 1990s harbored rebels fighting the Angolan, Burundian, Rwandan, and Ugandan governments within his borders. Eventually these four state governments, led by Rwanda, sponsored an insurgency against Mobutu in Zaire, leading to his

⁴⁹ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, Second Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 187, 237-239.

⁵⁰ Ioan M. Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 67.

ouster and to a horrific civil war that persists to this day.⁵¹ This retaliation is an example of the first potential consequence of meddling with overt partiality.

Why do states take this action? Given the potentially catastrophic consequences of meddling with overt partiality in another state's conflict, it is well worth asking why states do it — and why some states, such as Sudan, make a habit of it. One possibility is that providing material aid to armed groups is a cheap form of balancing against or weakening a state adversary.⁵² Many habitual meddlers are weak states with limited traditional military resources (though, as noted above, these state governments are still stronger militarily than most nonstate actors). Sponsoring an insurgency in a neighbor, or a counterinsurgency, may appear to such states as a low-cost and effective means to shape matters in the target state to one's liking, building up allies and mitigating potential threats without risking precious resources at home. Another, more ironic possibility is that states meddle in nearby conflicts to *prevent* conflicts from spreading to them.⁵³ For example, Hasler argues that the Iranian intervention in the Iraqi Kurd conflict was undertaken to prevent violent Kurdish separatism from spreading to Iran.⁵⁴ But in reality, violent Kurdish separatism spread to Iran in large part *because of* the Iranian intervention (see Chapter 3 for more detail). Although there is some evidence to suggest that military intervention can help prevent contagion in some cases — Kyle Beardsley, for instance, argues that peacekeeping operations help prevent the spread of substate conflict⁵⁵ — such interventions have a clear risk of backfiring when they constitute meddling with overt partiality.

⁵¹ Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pp. 2, 122.

⁵² I am indebted to Barry Posen for this suggestion.

⁵³ This argument is cogently made in Jacob D. Kathman, "Civil War Contagion and Neighboring Interventions," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (2010): 989-1012.

⁵⁴ Hasler, "Myths of Contagion," p. 21.

⁵⁵ Beardsley, "Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict." I am skeptical of this finding because the dependent variable in this article has the two common problems discussed in Chapter 1: restriction to contiguous states and no screening of contagion cases for actual causal links.

The fact that these seemingly prudent actions are in truth a likely road to ruin is a key lesson of this dissertation.

Are some targets of this action more attractive than others? As with evangelization, state governments may have more ambitions to meddle with overt partiality than they can actually achieve. When the strategic choice of which combatant group of several to support must be made, we should continue to expect these decisions to hinge on (1) the hostility of State A to State B — How badly does State B want to disrupt State A’s domestic tranquility? — (2) the strength of the potential rebel movement in State A,⁵⁶ and (3) the political interests represented by the potential rebel movement in State A, as discussed above. As was the case under the evangelization mechanism, these variables must be perceived by the State B government rather than observed directly, and we should expect these perceptions to be shaped by domestic politics in State B as well as lobbying efforts by potential aid recipients (whether governments or rebels) in State A. In addition, if meddling is undertaken to prevent contagion, State B’s assessment of the risk of contagion from State A should affect its calculations as well. Of course, the State Bs of the world are not currently equipped with my State Action Explanation, and discerning their own folk explanations of substate conflict contagion would be a difficult undertaking.

The Interaction of State, Nonstate, and Structural Factors

These three state actions overcome the natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion. Through evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality, state governments may intentionally empower rebel groups abroad to jump over the hurdles, or they may set off a chain of unintended consequences that knock over the hurdles. Either way, state government action of at least one of these three specific types appears to be a usually necessary condition for substate conflict contagion to occur. Nonstate actors are involved in each of the causal mechanisms

⁵⁶ Cederman *et al.*, “Ethnonationalist Triads.”

described above — such actors overthrow the State A government in the first mechanism, foment conflict in State B after their expulsion in the second mechanism, and may have predatory designs on State A in the third mechanism — but the main actors in each case are states. Without these state government actions, contagion can only happen if it is facilitated by nonstate and structural factors alone, which is an unlikely albeit not impossible outcome given the significant roadblocks in their way.

However, though usually necessary, state government action is not *sufficient* for substate conflict contagion. Much like the nonstate and structural factors, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality cannot spread conflict on their own. Rather, to draw on the Epidemiologic Triangle discussed in Chapter 1, successful contagion also requires a “host” state (State B) that is “susceptible” or has a “low immunity” to “infection” by the “agent” of conflict from State A. Put another way, the structural conditions for civil war onset must exist in State B in order for a state action to result in contagion, and nonstate factors may often be required as well. Evangelization, for example, will not succeed in starting a civil war unless there are already nascent rebels in State B to support; efforts by evangelizing states to export a completely foreign rebel movement into a nearby state are likely to meet with disaster, as they did in Bolivia when Guevara tried it (see above). Therefore, evangelization requires a pool of grievance in State B — something for political elites to be unhappy about, such as poverty, inequality, or social tensions (perhaps caused by refugee flows from State A). It also requires a political environment conducive to the mobilization of anti-regime dissidents. Usually states with this environment are not so repressive that they squelch all dissent (Saudi Arabia), but nor are they so permissive that virtually all dissent is incorporated into the legitimate political process (the U.S.).⁵⁷ Finally, nascent rebel groups are more likely to arise in State B if the rebellion in State A inspires copycat

⁵⁷ Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.”

movements in State B, or if State B dissidents receive assistance from rebel movements abroad. If this inspiration or assistance occurs without the State A government's direction, then it constitutes the *nonstate* causal mechanism of rebels inspiring rebels or rebels helping rebels.

Likewise, substate conflict contagion cannot occur solely because combatants have been expelled by State A's government into State B's territory. In order for these combatants to successfully augment the capabilities of a nascent rebel group in State B and start a civil war, there has to *be* a nascent rebel group in State B — in other words, some lack of immunity on the part of the host state is again required. Even if the combatants from State A try to start a civil war without the assistance of indigenous dissident groups, this will not be possible unless the combatants remain militarily capable of violently challenging State B and causing at least 1,000 battle-related deaths to occur (between the opposing side and their own). Such military capability often requires arms from outside State B, making the nonstate mechanism of cross-border small arms diffusion a key element in many contagion cases involving expulsion.

Finally, the various ways in which meddling with overt partiality can boomerang back to State B also require a combination of nonstate and structural factors to cause a full-scale civil war. In order for State A to retaliate for meddling by supporting nascent rebels in State B, there yet again have to *be* nascent rebels in State B, a condition requiring grievance and made more likely by rebel-to-rebel inspiration or assistance. In order for State A rebels to create instability in State B (one common manifestation of "blowback"), State B's support for them is not enough; the State A rebels also need a support network in State B that will provide safe havens and potentially additional supplies. Such support can be enabled by cross-border dissident communications and assistance and by cross-border arms flows, all nonstate mechanisms. In order for the population of State B to revolt against the government of State B in response to its

meddling in State A's conflict, rebel mobilization inside State B must be possible. As above, this requires a State B polity of moderate repressiveness, and potentially the inspiring example and support of other rebel groups in the region.

As we will see in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5, state actions that occur in the absence of these accompanying nonstate and structural factors can easily lead to a *non*-occurrence of contagion, usually because they involve potential host states that are more or less "immune" to the onset of civil war in general. So the best way of thinking of the relationship between state, nonstate, and structural factors is that they must *combine* to produce contagion outcomes, as shown in Figure 2.1. Many of these factors may be necessary — and at least one state action is necessary for the majority of substate conflict contagion cases — but no one factor is sufficient.

That being said, the necessity of the state actions has a special meaning that the necessity of the nonstate or structural factors does not have. This is because evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality are both substantially less common and substantially more preventable than the six nonstate factors listed above, and are certainly rarer and more preventable than long-abiding structural factors such as poverty and ethnic fractionalization in potential State Bs around the world. By recognizing the rarity of these three state actions and attempting to curtail them when they do occur, great power policymakers have the best possible chance to throw the brakes on this disturbing phenomenon.

Implications for Scholarship and Policy

If my State Action Explanation is valid, as the rest of this dissertation will seek to demonstrate, then there are significant implications for both scholars and policymakers. For the international relations literature, the explanation's greatest implication is that deliberate state government actions matter in what might appear to be the most unlikely of arenas: substate




Figure 2.1. Causal pathway of substate conflict contagion (two scenarios shown). For simplicity, I do not show the variables that may cause one state to be selected as the target of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality over other states (i.e., potential rebel strength, proximity, border controls, etc.). See the discussion above for other such variables; some could be included under “Structural Conditions for Civil War,” but others, such as hostile State A-State B international relations, are distinct.

conflict. The salience of state action in a substate context, in regions of the world where at least one state government has at least partially broken down, suggests that in other contexts and regions, states are stronger still. In other words, the fact that state governments play a major role in determining whether or not substate conflicts spread suggests that those same governments can probably play a major role in determining the terms on which their national economies operate, control flows of people, goods, and information across their borders, and have a

meaningful say in the future of the international system. The State Action Explanation thus contributes to the evidence against the neo-medievalist view of the future global political order.⁵⁸

The explanation also speaks to the scholarly literature on civil war, which to this point has emphasized nonstate actors over sovereign ones as discussed above. International contagion may not be the only facet of substate conflict that involves far more deliberate state choice than is currently acknowledged. For example, a number of scholars have argued against the view that climate change in and of itself is sufficient to cause substate conflict, pointing to the role that state governments play in exploiting and exacerbating the resource scarcities caused by “uncontrollable” weather changes (“uncontrollable” in the sense that the countries feeling the negative consequences of climate change most intensely are usually not the ones emitting the most greenhouse gases).⁵⁹ My State Action Explanation concurs with this statist argument, and suggests that a greater role for state actors in all aspects of substate conflict, including environmentally triggered resource deprivation, should be considered.

A related implication of this explanation, relevant to both the civil war literature and the broader IR literature, stems from its focus on deliberate policy choices over and above structural causes of phenomena. Certainly in the narrow domain of substate conflict contagion, I am arguing that structural factors — i.e., poverty in the potential receiving state — have been overemphasized, and that while these factors are important, the intentional choices of state governments are important as well. This insight may have currency outside the confines of this dissertation. Specifically, it may contribute to the age-old “agent-structure debate,” by suggesting that the balance between agency and structure in explanations of security outcomes may need to

⁵⁸ For other evidence, see Gilpin, “Global Political Economy,” pp. 390-398.

⁵⁹ Thomas Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Colin Kahl, *States, Scarcity, and Civil Strife in the Developing World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Nathan Black, “Change We Can Fight Over: The Relationship between Arable Land Supply and Substate Conflict,” *Strategic Insights*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2010): 30-64.

be readjusted in favor of the former. No reasonable international relations theorist expects either agency or structure to explain all variation; hence the well-documented “agent-structure problem” of reconciling the two variables’ roles in the same theory. Nevertheless, the current mix of the two variables seems to be too structure-heavy in the domain of substate conflict contagion; Michael Brown argues it is also so in the domain of civil war onset in general (see above); and it may be true in the domain of interstate conflict as well.⁶⁰

A final scholarly implication of the State Action Explanation, again pertinent to the civil war literature, is that state strength is not always conducive to peace, nor is state weakness always conducive to war. Though works too voluminous to cite have emphasized some form of “state weakness,” or “low state capacity,” as a major enabler of substate conflict,⁶¹ the State Action Explanation suggests that such weakness may have a silver lining. As noted above, at some point an embattled state government like that in Somalia may fall below a level of capacity where it can take one of the three actions generally required to spread a conflict across international borders. In those rare cases, the explanation predicts that contagion will be highly unlikely. Thus the State Action Explanation provides a useful counterpoint to the view, somewhat prominent among academics and highly prominent among American policymakers, that weak states have unequivocally negative consequences for international security.

As for the policy implications of the State Action Explanation, the most important implication is that substate conflict contagion is both less common and more preventable than

⁶⁰ On the agent-structure debate and the agent-structure problem specifically, see Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (1987): 335-370; and David Dessler, “What’s at Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?” *International Organization*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (1989): 441-473. Of course, issues of structure and agency also figure heavily in Kenneth Waltz’s major works: *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001/1954), and *Theory of International Politics*.

⁶¹ A few prominent examples include Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”; and Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.”

policymakers realize. The empirical discussions in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest that evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality are fairly rare. This means that in most potential cases of substate conflict contagion, the natural obstacles to contagion will likely overcome any effort by nonstate actors, and any structural tendency, toward the spread of conflict. In most cases, then, the containment of faraway substate conflicts does not require any great power action at all.

Meanwhile, in the small number of cases in which one of these three state actions *is* present or imminent, if the U.S. and other great powers can manage to dissuade other state governments from taking these actions before their full consequences obtain, this usually necessary condition for contagion will be knocked out.⁶² State-to-state coercion is not easy, but it is doubtlessly *easier* than coercing violent nonstate actors — an enterprise deemed by many experts to be utterly fruitless⁶³ — or reversing the structural socioeconomic tendencies that make civil war likely in a given state. Also, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, coercive diplomacy — including the threat or imposition of diplomatic or economic sanctions — has the potential to prevent contagion without constituting meddling with overt partiality *itself*, a frequent danger of great power military interventions in the developing world.

⁶² Great powers could also attempt to bolster states against the consequences of such actions — for instance, policymakers could provide security assistance to State B to counteract evangelization by State A. However, the three state actions emphasized by my explanation are all relatively easy to undertake, and difficult to counteract. Generally the better strategy, in my view, is to convince states that they would be unwise to take these actions in the first place.

⁶³ For example, on the futility of trying to coerce terrorist groups, see Jerrold Post, “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces,” in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998/1990); Gordon McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, No. 6 (2003): 473-507; and Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2008): 78-105.

Looking Ahead

The remainder of this dissertation weighs the evidence for and against the State Action Explanation, first by probing its empirical plausibility and then by more thoroughly testing it. In the next chapter, the plausibility probe, I look at the actual universe of cases of substate conflict contagion and identify the causal mechanisms by which contagion occurred in each case. In so doing, I identify the frequency of the state-driven mechanisms discussed in this chapter, and demonstrate their general causal centrality to the onset of substate conflict contagion. Then, having explained the cases where contagion occurred, I test the explanation in a region where substate conflict has generally *not* spread, Central America (1978-1996) — despite a high volume of potentially contagious conflicts, large refugee flows, profligate small arms and drugs, and significant transnational ethnic ties. Drawing on my own archival research and elite interviews in the region, I attempt to marshal the State Action Explanation to account for this outcome. Finally, I conduct a similar test in an entirely different region of the world, Southeast Asia (1959-1980). In this case study, I not only assess whether the State Action Explanation applies to historical instances of contagion and non-contagion in the region, but also contrast my explanation with the simplistic assumptions about contagion that motivated U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Empirically, then, I strive to probe the plausibility of my explanation by elucidating the mechanisms at work in all identified cases of substate conflict contagion, and I strive to test my explanation by harnessing it to explain “dogs that did not bark” in two widely different regions of the world.

Chapter 3: Explaining Actual Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion

In the last chapter, I laid out the State Action Explanation and essentially asserted that in the absence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality, substate conflicts are highly unlikely to spread. In this chapter, I perform a broad empirical plausibility probe of this explanation to determine whether it corresponds to a collection of original data on cases of substate conflict contagion.

To summarize, I find that the data support the explanation. In 67 out of the 84 identified cases of substate conflict contagion from 1946 to 2007 (about 80%), at least one of the three state actions discussed above was present during the spread of conflict from State A (the sender state) to State B (the receiver state). This finding suggests that substate conflict contagion rarely occurs in the absence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality.¹ Furthermore, in at least 57 of these 67 cases (about 68% of all 84 cases), my analysis of the role of state action in the spread of conflict suggests that the state action was a necessary condition for contagion — I argue that without the state action in question, conflict probably would not have spread from State A to State B. These findings confirm the purported role of state actions as necessary but insufficient conditions for most cases of substate conflict contagion, and appear robust across post-1945 time periods and across geographic regions. I also quantify the “structural factors,” such as poverty, that I argue are also necessary but insufficient for substate conflict contagion in Chapter 2, and show using a rough proxy that this view of the role of structural factors appears to be consistent with the data.

¹ Interestingly, it is unusual to see multiple state actions involved in the same case of contagion — China to India, 1956 is one such example (evangelization *and* meddling). We see this rarity in the regional case studies in Chapters 4 and 5 as well. I am not sure why this is, although the simplest explanation may be that because these state actions are infrequent in general, they are highly unlikely to co-occur.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I describe the process by which I identified the 84 cases of substate conflict contagion — what I believe to be a comprehensive universe of this phenomenon between 1946 and 2007. Second, considering these 84 cases in the aggregate, I provide a summary of the State Action Explanation’s empirical performance and subject my findings to robustness checks. This section includes the aforementioned discussion of the “structural factors” involved in civil war onset. Third, I begin to address the foremost drawback to the methodology employed in this chapter — selection on the dependent variable — by introducing the more detailed empirical tests that will comprise Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation. Finally, in Appendix 3.1, I provide a systematic discussion of each of the 84 identified cases, noting whether state action was present or absent in each case and how necessary the state action, if present, was to the contagion.

Identification of Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion

As discussed in Chapter 1, prior study of the causes of substate conflict contagion has been hindered by the lack of a comprehensive universe of cases. For example, various quantitative studies of contagion referenced in Chapter 1 counted any two temporally and geographically clustered conflicts as a positive case of the dependent variable.² Such studies also tend to consider contagion a phenomenon that can only occur between two contiguous states. To overcome the aforementioned shortcomings of these methods, I built a new dataset of cases of substate conflict contagion from scratch. Again, I define substate conflict contagion as occurring when a “*substate conflict*” — *an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has caused at least 25 cumulative battle-related deaths — makes a causal contribution to the onset of*

² Halvard Buhaug and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Contagion or Confusion? Why Conflicts Cluster in Space,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2008): 215-233; Erika Forsberg, “Polarization and Ethnic Conflict in a Widened Strategic Setting,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2008): 283-300; Erika Forsberg, *Neighbors at Risk: A Quantitative Study of Civil War Contagion* (PhD Dissertation, Uppsala University, 2009).

a “civil war” — an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has caused at least 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths — in another state.

I started with a **universe of possible cases**, consisting of a set of directed dyad-years between 1946 and 2007. Each dyad contained a State A and a State B. State A was a country experiencing an internal armed conflict, as defined in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program / Peace Research Institute, Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 4-2009).³ Specifically, this definition of substate conflict requires “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.”⁴ By convention, conflicts between metropolises and their nonstate colonies — known as “extrastate” or “extrasystemic” conflicts — are excluded from this definition.⁵ The “State A” component of the dyad-year may also have included a state in which a substate conflict ended five or fewer years ago. This allowance was meant to capture any lagged contagion effects, and was particularly pertinent given that one of the state action mechanisms — evangelization — generally only occurs once the conflict in State A is over. In some cases I decided that the substate conflict in State A was sufficiently influential that I needed to expand the five-year lag time allowance. For example, the Cuban Revolution’s influence in Latin America and elsewhere in the developing world definitely extended past 1966, five years after the 1961 termination of that conflict. I kept Cuba in the dataset until 1974, at which point Cuba was still sparking conflicts elsewhere (as discussed below). These exceptions are noted in Table 3.1, and are excluded in some robustness checks of the analysis later in this chapter.

³ <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/>, downloaded October 26, 2009.

⁴ UCDP and PRIO, “UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook,” http://www.prio.no/sprans/-1423485763/Codebook_UCDP_PRIO%20Armed%20Conflict%20Dataset%20v4_2009.pdf (accessed November 30, 2009), p. 1.

⁵ In a postcolonial world, such conflicts are unlikely to recur.

Table 3.1: Neighborhoods

Neighborhood	States
North America	Canada, United States, Mexico
Central America	Mexico, Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama (plus Cuba as a neighbor until 1974, because of its influence in Latin America)
Caribbean	Cuba (to 1974), Haiti, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago
South America	Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Suriname (plus Cuba as a neighbor until 1974)
Western Europe	United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, Norway, Sweden, Finland
Eastern Europe	Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Bosnia (to 2001), Croatia (to 2001), Macedonia, Slovenia, Greece, Hungary, Albania
Former Soviet Union (Eastern Europe)	Moldova (with Romania as a neighbor), Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Russia
Former Soviet Union (Caucuses)	Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia
Former Soviet Union (Central Asia)	Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia (plus Afghanistan, China, and Pakistan)
Near East	Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Cyprus (plus Afghanistan as neighbor for Egypt and Iraq)
Persian Gulf States	Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Yemen/North Yemen, South Yemen
Central Asia	Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan
South Asia	India (plus Burma), Pakistan (to 1989 for India and 1984 for Sri Lanka), Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka (plus China for all South Asian states, including India to 1982 and Sri Lanka to 1984)
Southeast Asia	Burma (plus India), Thailand (plus Afghanistan and Sri Lanka), Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam/North Vietnam, South Vietnam (to 1975), Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, Papua New Guinea, Philippines (plus China for all Southeast Asian states to 1974)
Northeast Asia	Mongolia, China, Taiwan, Japan, North Korea, South Korea (plus Russia as a neighbor for China and Mongolia)
North Africa	Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania (plus Afghanistan as a neighbor for Algeria)

West Africa	Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Gambia (to 1989), Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte D'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana (to 1989), Togo, Benin, Niger, Nigeria (plus Somalia, Sudan 1983-2007, and D.R. Congo 1996-2007 due to arms trade; plus Afghanistan due to Islamist influence), Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon
Central Africa	Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia (plus Iraq 1958-68 due to pan-Arab influence), Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (including 1973-75), Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Tanzania, Djibouti (plus Angola as a neighbor for both Congo's)
Southern Africa	Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Madagascar, Comoros (plus D.R. Congo as a neighbor for Angola)

State B was a country in the same “neighborhood” as State A. In Table 3.1, I list 19 neighborhoods that I initially defined based on geographic proximity, colonial histories, cultural similarities and a rough comparison of states’ GDP per capita and democracy (POLITY IV) scores. (Note that states can be members of more than one neighborhood; Mexico, for instance, is a member of both North America and Central America.) The final definition of neighborhoods came about through an iterative process, in which individual neighborhoods were expanded when the coding process described below uncovered new networks of state-to-state influence, and collapsed when coding suggested that two states did not have sufficiently deep relations with one another to be considered “neighbors.” Even so, a few cases of substate conflict identified below appear to be out-of-neighborhood (for example, Peru to Nepal in 1996). These geographically exceptional cases were counted as substate conflict contagion, but as with the temporally exceptional cases discussed above, they were excluded in some robustness checks that consider *only* the cases that fit the temporal and geographic scope conditions, strictly defined. In total, this universe of possible cases numbered 22,035 directed dyad-years.

The use of directed dyad-years as the unit of observation is relatively new to the study of substate conflict contagion (it was pioneered by Forsberg).⁶ Other works have used country-years; the dependent variable in these studies is civil war onset and the explanatory variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether one of the state's neighbors was involved in a civil war — or, alternatively, a count of the number of neighbors at war. Such a set-up would certainly yield fewer total observations, because each state would appear in the dataset only once per year. However, directed dyad-years are the superior set-up given the research question I am trying to answer. We are not concerned with civil war onset per se, but rather civil war onset related to a specific neighboring substate conflict. Many states, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, have multiple neighbors in conflict at the same time. Thus, in many cases a country-year research design with a “neighbor at war” explanatory variable would not permit us to distinguish *which* neighboring wars, if any, have spread to the state in question. The directed dyad-year research design is suitable for precisely that purpose.

Next, I winnowed the 22,035 observations in the universe of possible cases down to 665 cases of ***potential contagion***. In this smaller subset of directed dyad-years, a substate conflict began in State B. (In general the UCDP/PRIO dataset mentioned above was used to determine when conflicts began, although some exceptions were made due to inaccuracies in this dataset.⁷)

⁶ See Forsberg, “Polarization and Ethnic Conflict,” p. 289. Forsberg is also the originator of the “State A” and “State B” designations, and of the use of the five-year lag between State A’s conflict termination and its removal from the dataset.

⁷ List of exceptions: The China 1946 onset is excluded, as it is inaccurately coded (the insurgency involving the People’s Liberation Army began long before 1946); the Azerbaijan 1992 onset is excluded, as this was merely the continuation of the Soviet Union 1990 intrastate conflict (over Nagorno-Karabakh); the Azerbaijan 2005 onset is excluded, as I did not find it corroborated anywhere outside the UCDP/PRIO dataset; the Equatorial Guinea 1979 onset is excluded, as it was subsequently determined by UCDP/PRIO to not rise to the 25-death threshold; the Niger 1994 onset is excluded, as it appears to be a simple continuation of the Niger 1991 conflict; the Ethiopia 1989 onset is excluded, as it cannot be corroborated; in its place, I have added a 1996 onset in Ethiopia versus the ARDUF; the India 1992 onset is excluded, as it appears to be an uninterrupted continuation of the Nagaland insurgency (from 1956); the Burma onsets in 1992 and 2005 are excluded, as they appear to be uninterrupted continuations of the

Hence I had reason to suspect that the ongoing (or recently ended) substate conflict in State A contributed to the onset of the substate conflict in State B. These cases are listed in Table 3.2.

To stop here would be to commit the same error as that found in the existing quantitative literature on substate conflict contagion: to equate spatial and temporal clustering of substate conflicts in State A and State B with the *spread* of conflict from State A to State B. Instead, I researched each of these 665 cases to determine whether it was a case of **actual substate conflict contagion**, or merely **illusionary substate conflict contagion**. In the “actual” cases, at least one secondary source that I consulted mentioned the substate conflict in State A as a cause of the substate conflict onset in State B. State A’s conflict needed to be mentioned as *a* cause of State B’s conflict; it did not need to be elevated to be *the* cause. Thus the causal threshold for actual substate conflict contagion is rather low; the State B conflict could have been caused by 25 different factors, and I code the presence of actual contagion if State A’s conflict is one of those factors. Likewise, if conflicts in multiple State As contributed to the conflict in State B — for example, the conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and Angola all contributed to the subsequent conflict in Zaire — *each* directed dyad-year (i.e., Rwanda-Zaire 1996, Burundi-Zaire 1996, Uganda-Zaire 1996, and Angola-Zaire 1996) was coded as actual contagion. In the “illusionary” cases, by contrast, I found no causal link asserted between State A’s substate conflict and State B’s substate conflict onset. Generally I consulted at least three secondary sources before classifying a case as “illusionary,” and whenever possible I checked these codings with an area expert (usually an author of one of the secondary sources that I read). Full details on

Karenni insurgency (from 1957); the Burma onsets in 1990 and 1996 are excluded, as they appear to be uninterrupted continuations of the Mon insurgency (from 1949); the Malaysia onsets in 1958, 1974 and 1981 are excluded, as they appear to be uninterrupted continuations of the communist extra-state conflict with the United Kingdom (from 1948); the Philippines onsets in 1946 and 1969 are excluded, as they appear to be the essentially uninterrupted continuations of the communist insurgency (from 1942); and the Indonesia onsets in 1976 and 1999 are excluded, as they appear to be the uninterrupted continuations of the West Papua insurgency (from 1965) and the Aceh insurgency (from 1990), respectively. Also, South Vietnam is coded as having a civil war until 1975, not 1964.

Table 3.2: List of Cases of Potential Substate Conflict Contagion

Potential State B (potential receiver)	Onset Year of State B's Conflict	Potential State A(s) (potential senders)
United States (vs. Al Qaeda)	2001	Mexico
Dominican Republic (vs. military faction)	1965	Cuba
Trinidad and Tobago (vs. Jamaat al-Muslimeen)	1990	Haiti
Mexico (vs. EZLN/EPR)	1994	El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama
Guatemala (vs. military faction, etc.)	1949	Costa Rica
Guatemala (vs. FAR I)	1965	Cuba
El Salvador (vs. forces of Benjamin Mejia)	1972	Guatemala, Cuba
El Salvador (vs. ERP/FPL/FMLN)	1979	Guatemala, Nicaragua, Cuba
Nicaragua (vs. FSLN/Contras)	1978	Guatemala, Cuba
Panama (vs. forces of Moisés Giroldi)	1989	El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua
Colombia (vs. FARC, etc.)	1964	Argentina, Venezuela, Cuba
Venezuela (vs. navy military faction)	1962	Cuba
Venezuela (vs. Bandera Roja)	1982	Argentina, Colombia, Peru
Venezuela (vs. forces of Hugo Chavez)	1992	Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname
Suriname (vs. SLA/Jungle Commando)	1986	Colombia, Peru, Venezuela
Peru (vs. ELN/MIR)	1965	Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, Cuba
Peru (vs. Sendero Luminoso, etc.)	1982	Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela
Peru (vs. Sendero Luminoso)	2007	Colombia
Bolivia (vs. MNR)	1952	Paraguay
Bolivia (vs. ELN)	1967	Argentina, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Cuba
Paraguay (vs. Febreristas, Liberals and Communists)	1947	Bolivia

Potential State B (potential receiver)	Onset Year of State B's Substate Conflict	Potential State A(s) (potential senders)
Paraguay (vs. forces of General Alfredo Stroessner)	1954	Bolivia, Cuba
Paraguay (vs. forces of General Rodriguez)	1989	Colombia, Peru, Suriname
Chile (vs. forces of Augusto Pinochet)	1973	Colombia, Uruguay, Cuba
Argentina (vs. forces of Eduardo A. Lonardi Doucet)	1955	Bolivia, Paraguay, Cuba
Argentina (vs. Colorados)	1963	Venezuela, Cuba
Argentina (vs. ERP/Monteneros)	1974	Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Cuba
Uruguay (vs. MLN/Tupamaros)	1972	Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba
Spain (vs. ETA)	1980	United Kingdom
Spain (vs. ETA)	1987	United Kingdom
Macedonia (vs. UCK)	2001	Russia, Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia
Croatia (vs. Serbian Republic of Krajina)	1992	Bosnia, Romania, Russia, Serbia
Serbia (vs. Slovenia/Croatia)	1991	Romania, Russia
Serbia (vs. UCK)	1998	Bosnia, Croatia, Russia
Bosnia-Herzegovina (vs. Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina)	1992	Romania, Russia, Serbia
Bosnia-Herzegovina (vs. Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia)	1993	Croatia, Romania, Russia, Serbia
Moldova (vs. Dniestr Republic)	1992	Russia, Romania
Soviet Union (vs. Forest Brothers/LNPA/BDPS/UPA)	1946	China
Russia (vs. parliamentary forces)	1993	Azerbaijan, Georgia
Russia (vs. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria)	1994	Azerbaijan, Georgia
Russia (vs. Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk district)	1999	Azerbaijan

Potential State B (potential receiver)	Onset Year of State B's Substate Conflict	Potential State A(s) (potential senders)
Georgia (vs. anti-government alliance)	1991	Soviet Union
Georgia (vs. Abkhazia)	1992	Azerbaijan, Russia
Georgia (vs. South Ossetia)	2004	Russia
Azerbaijan (vs. forces of Suret Husseinov)	1993	Georgia
Guinea-Bissau (vs. Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice)	1998	Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone
Gambia (vs. NRC)	1981	Liberia, Mauritania
Mali (vs. MPA/FIAA)	1990	Burkina Faso, Liberia, Senegal, Togo, Morocco, Chad, Afghanistan, Israel, Lebanon
Mali (vs. ATNMC)	2007	Côte D'Ivoire, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Chad
Senegal (vs. MFDC)	1990	Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Togo
Mauritania (vs. POLISARIO)	1975	Nigeria, Chad, Morocco
Niger (vs. FLAA)	1991	Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Morocco, Algeria, Chad
Niger (vs. FDR)	1996	Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Algeria, Egypt, Chad
Niger (vs. MNJ)	2007	Côte D'Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Chad
Côte D'Ivoire (vs. MJP, etc.)	2002	Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone
Guinea (vs. RFDG)	2000	Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone
Burkina Faso (vs. Popular Front)	1987	Cameroon, Ghana, Togo, Gambia

Potential State B (potential receiver)	Onset Year of State B's Substate Conflict	Potential State A(s) (potential senders)
Liberia (vs. forces of Samuel Doe)	1980	Mauritania
Liberia (vs. NPFL, etc.)	1989	Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Togo, Gambia, Ghana
Sierra Leone (vs. RUF, etc.)	1991	Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo
Ghana (vs. NLC)	1966	Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo
Ghana (vs. forces of Jerry John Rawlings)	1981	Gambia, Liberia, Mauritania
Togo (vs. MTD)	1986	Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana
Cameroon (vs. forces of Ibrahim Saleh)	1984	Gambia, Ghana, Liberia
Nigeria (vs. forces of Patrick Nzeogwu)	1966	Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana
Nigeria (vs. Republic of Biafra)	1967	Gabon, Ghana
Nigeria (vs. Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa/NDPVF)	2004	Côte D'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan
Gabon (vs. forces loyal to Léon M' Ba)	1964	Cameroon
Central African Republic (vs. forces of Cyriac Souke)	1996	Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda
Chad (vs. FROLINAT, etc.)	1966	Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan
Republic of the Congo (vs. Cobras, Ninjas, etc.)	1993	Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Angola
Democratic Republic of the Congo (vs. CNL, etc.)	1964	Ethiopia, Sudan, China

Potential State B (potential receiver)	Onset Year of State B's Substate Conflict	Potential State A(s) (potential senders)
Democratic Rep. of the Congo (vs. FLNC)	1977	Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Angola, Cuba
Democratic Republic of the Congo (vs. AFDL, etc.)	1996	Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Angola
Democratic Republic of the Congo (vs. BDK)	2007	Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Angola
Uganda (vs. forces of Idi Amin, etc.)	1971	Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan
Kenya (vs. forces of Hezekiah Ochuka)	1982	Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda
Burundi (vs. forces loyal to Gervais Nyangoma)	1965	Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan
Burundi (vs. Palipehutu, etc.)	1991	Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda
Rwanda (vs. FPR/FDLR)	1990	Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda
Somalia (vs. forces of Abdulaahi Yusuf, etc.)	1978	Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda
Djibouti (vs. FRUD)	1991	Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda
Ethiopia (vs. forces of Mengistu Neway)	1960	Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq
Ethiopia (vs. ELF)	1964	Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Iraq, Cuba
Ethiopia (vs. ALF)	1975	Chad, Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo
Ethiopia (vs. EPRP/TPLF/WSLF)	1976	Chad, Sudan, Uganda

Potential State B (potential receiver)	Onset Year of State B's Substate Conflict	Potential State A(s) (potential senders)
Ethiopia (vs. OLF)	1977	Chad, DR Congo, Sudan, Uganda
Ethiopia (vs. ONLF)	1994	Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda
Ethiopia (vs. al-Itahad al- Islami)	1995	Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda
Ethiopia (vs. ARDUF)	1996	Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda
Eritrea (vs. EIJM-AS)	1997	Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda
Angola (vs. FNLA/UNITA)	1975	Madagascar, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of the Congo, China
Angola (vs. FLEC- FAC/FLEC-R)	1991	Comoros, Mozambique, South Africa
Mozambique (vs. RENAMO)	1977	Angola, South Africa, Zimbabwe
South Africa (vs. ANC)	1981	Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe
Lesotho (vs. military faction)	1998	Angola, Comoros
Madagascar (vs. Monima)	1971	South Africa
Comoros (vs. presidential guard)	1989	Angola, Mozambique, South Africa
Comoros (vs. MPA/Republic of Anjouan)	1997	Angola, Mozambique
Morocco	1971	Chad
Morocco (vs. POLISARIO)	1975	Chad, Mauritania

Potential State B (potential receiver)	Onset Year of State B's Substate Conflict	Potential State A(s) (potential senders)
Algeria (vs. Takfir wa'l Hijra, etc.)	1991	Morocco, Mali, Niger, Chad, Afghanistan
Tunisia (vs. Résistance Armée Tunisienne)	1980	Morocco, Chad, Mauritania
Sudan (vs. Anya Nya)	1963	Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia
Sudan (vs. Sudanese Communist Party)	1971	Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Uganda
Sudan (vs. SPLM/A)	1983	Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda
Iran (vs. KDPI)	1966	Iraq, Israel, Syria
Iran (vs. MEK/APCO)	1979	Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria
Turkey (vs. PKK)	1984	Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria
Turkey (vs. Devrimci Sol)	1991	Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon
Turkey (vs. MKP)	2005	Iran, Iraq, Israel
Iraq (vs. Free Officers Movement, etc.)	1958	Israel, Lebanon
Iraq (vs. KDP)	1961	Israel, Lebanon
Iraq (vs. SCIRI)	1982	Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan
Iraq (vs. Al-Mahdi Army, etc.)	2004	Iran, Israel, Turkey, Afghanistan
Egypt (vs. al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya)	1993	Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Turkey, Mali, Niger, Chad, Afghanistan
Syria (vs. forces loyal to Nureddin Atassi and Youssef Zeayen)	1966	Iran, Iraq, Israel
Syria (vs. Muslim Brotherhood)	1979	Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon
Lebanon (vs. Independent Nasserite Movement/Mourabitoun militia)	1958	Israel

Potential State B (potential receiver)	Onset Year of State B's Substate Conflict	Potential State A(s) (potential senders)
Lebanon (vs. LNM/LAA)	1975	Iraq, Israel
Lebanon (vs. LNM, etc.)	1982	Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria
Israel (vs. Palestinian insurgents, etc.)	1949	Iran
Israel (vs. Hezbollah)	1990	Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey
Israel (vs. Hezbollah)	2006	Iran, Iraq, Turkey
Saudi Arabia (vs. JSM)	1979	Oman
North Yemen (vs. Royalists)	1962	Oman
North Yemen (vs. National Democratic Front)	1980	Oman, Saudi Arabia
South Yemen (vs. Yemenite Socialist Party — Abdul Fattah Ismail faction)	1986	North Yemen
Oman (vs. PFLO)	1972	North Yemen, China
Tajikistan (vs. UTO, etc.)	1992	Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia
Afghanistan (vs. Hizb-i Demokratik-i Khalq-i Afghanistan, etc.)	1978	Pakistan
Uzbekistan (vs. IMU)	1999	Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan
China (vs. Taiwanese insurgents)	1947	Soviet Union
China (vs. Tibet)	1950	Soviet Union
India (vs. CPI)	1948	Burma, China
India (vs. NNC)	1956	Burma, China
India (vs. MNF)	1966	Nepal, Burma, China
India (vs. CPI-ML)	1969	Burma, China
India (vs. TNV)	1978	Bangladesh, Pakistan, Burma, China
India (vs. PLA)	1982	Bangladesh, Pakistan, Burma, China
India (vs. Sikh insurgents)	1983	Bangladesh, Burma, Pakistan
India (vs. Kashmir insurgents/ABSU)	1989	Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Burma, Pakistan
India (vs. ULFA/PWG)	1990	Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Burma

Potential State B (potential receiver)	Onset Year of State B's Substate Conflict	Potential State A(s) (potential senders)
Pakistan (vs. Mufti Bahini)	1971	India, Sri Lanka, Iran
Pakistan (vs. Baluchi insurgents)	1974	India, Sri Lanka
Pakistan (vs. MQM)	1990	Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Iran
Pakistan (vs. BLA/Baluch Ittehad)	2004	Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Iran, Uzbekistan
Pakistan (vs. TNSM/TTP)	2007	Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Iran, Uzbekistan
Bangladesh (vs. JSS/SB)	1975	India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan
Burma (vs. White Band/Arakan insurgents)	1948	Philippines, India, China
Burma (vs. KNU/MFL- MUF/PNDF)	1949	Philippines, India, China
Burma (vs. KNPP)	1957	Indonesia, Philippines, South Vietnam, India, China
Burma (vs. NSH)	1959	Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, South Vietnam, India, China
Burma (vs. KIO)	1961	Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, South Vietnam, India, China
Burma (vs. UWSA)	1997	Cambodia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, India
Sri Lanka (vs. JVP)	1971	India, China, Pakistan
Sri Lanka (vs. LTTE/TELO)	1984	Bangladesh, India, China, Pakistan
Sri Lanka (vs. JVP)	1989	Bangladesh, India
Nepal (vs. Nepali Congress)	1960	India, China
Nepal (vs. CPN-M)	1996	Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Peru
Thailand (vs. Navy military faction)	1951	Indonesia, Burma, Philippines, China
Thailand (vs. CPT)	1974	Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Burma, Philippines, South Vietnam, China

Potential State B (potential receiver)	Onset Year of State B's Substate Conflict	Potential State A(s) (potential senders)
Thailand (vs. Patani insurgents)	2003	Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma, Philippines, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka
Cambodia (vs. Khmer Rouge, etc.)	1967	Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Burma, South Vietnam, China
Laos (vs. Pathet Lao/Neutralists)	1959	Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, Philippines, South Vietnam, China
Laos (vs. LRM)	1989	Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma, Papua New Guinea, Philippines
South Vietnam (vs. FNL)	1955	Indonesia, Burma, Philippines, Thailand, China
Malaysia (vs. CCO)	1963	Indonesia, Laos, Burma, South Vietnam, China
Philippines (vs. MIM/MNLF)	1970	Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Burma, South Vietnam, China
Indonesia (vs. Republic of South Moluccas)	1950	Burma, Philippines, China
Indonesia (vs. Darul Islam)	1953	Burma, Philippines, Thailand, China
Indonesia (vs. OPM)	1965	Laos, Malaysia, Burma, South Vietnam, China
Indonesia (vs. FRETILIN)	1975	Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Burma, Philippines, South Vietnam, Thailand
Indonesia (vs. GAM)	1990	Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Papua New Guinea, Philippines
Papua New Guinea (vs. BRA)	1989	Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Burma, Philippines

my codings are available in the Dissertation Appendix (Chapter 7).

This low threshold for the identification of actual contagion was chosen because substate conflict causation is an extraordinarily complex phenomenon. To my knowledge, no such

conflict has ever been caused by a single factor. Insisting that a State A conflict be the sole cause of a State B conflict, or even that State A's conflict be a necessary condition for State B's conflict, would have led me to throw out dozens of contagion cases in which State A's conflict was an important but not necessarily a determinative factor in the onset of the State B conflict. Defining contagion more broadly — as the *influence* of State A's conflict on the onset of State B's conflict — allowed me to consider the full spectrum of relationships between pairs of conflicts, while allowing the reader to exclude “weaker” cases at his discretion rather than mine. So it is important to note that the identification of a causal link between a State A conflict and a State B conflict should not be interpreted as the assertion that State A's conflict was necessary for the onset of State B's conflict. That being said, later in this chapter I do try to assess the extent to which state actions were necessary for specific cases of *contagion* — necessary, in other words, to establish a relationship between the State A and State B conflicts. This effort should be distinguished from the effort to determine whether a factor was necessary for the onset of a State B conflict in general, which I generally do not attempt. (In a small number of cases, I *do* assert that a state action was necessary for a State B conflict onset; these exceptional cases are identified below.)

This coding process yielded 162 cases of actual substate conflict contagion, with contagion defined as one substate conflict contributing to the onset of another. I then took one final step, however, filtering out any cases in which the State B substate conflict did not qualify as a “civil war” — in other words, cases in which the State B conflict resulted in at least 25 but fewer than 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths. (These cases are listed in Table 3.3. Cases are sorted first by State B region — Americas, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa/Middle East, and Asia — and then alphabetically by State A.) As discussed in Chapter 1,

Table 3.3: 78 Excluded Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion (No State B Civil War)

State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year
Colombia	Peru	2007
Colombia	Venezuela	1982
Cuba	Bolivia	1967
Cuba	Dominican Republic	1965
Cuba	Peru	1965
Cuba	Uruguay	1972
Cuba	Venezuela	1962
Guatemala	Mexico	1994
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Macedonia	2001
Romania	Moldova	1992
Russia	Georgia	2004
Serbia	Macedonia	2001
Afghanistan	Nigeria	2004
Afghanistan	Mali	1990
Angola	Congo-Kinshasa	1977
Chad	Mali	1990
Chad	Niger	1991
Chad	Niger	1996
Chad	Niger	2007
Côte D'Ivoire	Niger	2007
Congo-Kinshasa	Burundi	1965
Congo-Kinshasa	Ghana	1966

State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year
Congo-Kinshasa	Nigeria	2004
Cuba	Congo-Kinshasa	1977
Ethiopia	Djibouti	1991
Ethiopia	Eritrea	1997
Ghana	Togo	1986
Guinea-Bissau	Guinea	2000
Guinea-Bissau	Nigeria	2004
Israel	Mali	1990
Lebanon	Mali	1990
Liberia	Côte D'Ivoire	2002
Liberia	Gambia	1981
Liberia	Guinea	2000
Liberia	Guinea-Bissau	1998
Liberia	Niger	2007
Liberia	Nigeria	2004
Mali	Niger	1991
Morocco	Mali	1990
Niger	Mali	2007
Senegal	Guinea-Bissau	1998
Sierra Leone	Guinea	2000
Sierra Leone	Nigeria	2004
Somalia	Djibouti	1991
Somalia	Ethiopia	1995

State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year
Somalia	Nigeria	2004
South Africa	Comoros	1989
Sudan	Eritrea	1997
Sudan	Ethiopia	1995
Sudan	Nigeria	2004
Afghanistan	Egypt	1993
China	Oman	1972
Iraq	Iran	1979
Israel	Iraq	1958
Israel	Turkey	1991
Lebanon	Iraq	1958
Lebanon	Israel	1990
Afghanistan	Pakistan	1990
Afghanistan	Pakistan	2004
Afghanistan	Thailand	2003
Afghanistan	Uzbekistan	1999
Burma	India	1982
Burma	India	1990
Cambodia	Thailand	2003
China	India	1966
China	India	1969
China	India	1982
China	Malaysia	1963

State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year
India	Bangladesh	1975
India	Pakistan	1990
Indonesia	Thailand	2003
Pakistan	India	1978
Pakistan	India	1982
Pakistan	India	1989
Pakistan	India	1990
Philippines	Thailand	2003
Sri Lanka	Thailand	2003
Tajikistan	Uzbekistan	1999

we are substantively most concerned with the cases in which the spread of conflict ultimately results in civil war. To capture the empirical landscape of this most troubling phenomenon, I needed to exclude cases in which substate conflicts merely contributed to violent but low-level conflicts.

The final result of this exhaustive data collection and filtration process was a list of 84 cases of substate conflict contagion, shown in Table 3.4 (sorted the same way as Table 3.3). This list in itself is a significant contribution to the literature on contagion, because it is the most comprehensive and accurate universe of contagion to date. A flowchart showing how I arrived at this list — in effect summarizing this section — is shown in Figure 3.1. Now the question becomes what caused the actual contagion in these 84 cases — a question which we will now begin to address.

Table 3.4: 84 Actual Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion

State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year
Bolivia	Paraguay	1947
Cuba	Argentina	1974
Cuba	Colombia	1964
Cuba	El Salvador	1981
Cuba	Guatemala	1965
Cuba	Nicaragua	1978
Nicaragua	El Salvador	1981
Uruguay	Argentina	1974
Azerbaijan	Russia	1994
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serbia	1998
Croatia	Serbia	1998
Georgia	Russia	1994
Serbia	Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992
Serbia	Bosnia-Herzegovina	1993
Serbia	Croatia	1992
Angola	Congo-Kinshasa	1996
Burkina Faso	Liberia	1989
Burkina Faso	Sierra Leone	1991
Burundi	Congo-Kinshasa	1996
China	Angola	1975
China	Congo-Kinshasa	1964
Congo-Kinshasa	Angola	1975

State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year
Congo-Kinshasa	Uganda	1971
Cuba	Ethiopia	1964
Ethiopia	Somalia	1978
Ethiopia	Sudan	1983
Gambia	Liberia	1989
Ghana	Liberia	1989
Iraq	Ethiopia	1964
Liberia	Sierra Leone	1991
Rwanda	Burundi	1991
Rwanda	Congo-Kinshasa	1996
Somalia	Ethiopia	2009 (see Appendix 3.1)
South Africa	Angola	1975
Sudan	Ethiopia	1964
Sudan	Ethiopia	1976
Sudan	Ethiopia	1977
Sudan	Uganda	1971
Uganda	Congo-Kinshasa	1996
Uganda	Rwanda	1990
Zimbabwe	Mozambique	1977
Zimbabwe	South Africa	1981
Afghanistan	Algeria	1991
Afghanistan	Iraq	2004
Iraq	Iran	1966


State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year
Iraq	Turkey	1984
Israel	Iran	1979
Israel	Iraq	2004
Israel	Lebanon	1958
Israel	Lebanon	1975
Israel	Lebanon	1982
Israel	Turkey	1984
Lebanon	Syria	1979
North Yemen	South Yemen	1986
Afghanistan	Pakistan	2007
Afghanistan	Tajikistan	1992
Burma	India	1956
Cambodia	Indonesia	2003
Cambodia	Thailand	1976
China	Burma	1948
China	Burma	1949
China	Burma	1959
China	Burma	1961
China	Cambodia	1967
China	India	1948
China	India	1956
China	Laos	1959
China	South Vietnam	1955

State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year
China	Sri Lanka	1971
China	Sri Lanka	1984
China	Thailand	1976
India	Burma	1948
India	Nepal	1996
Laos	Thailand	1976
Malaysia	Thailand	1976
Pakistan	Afghanistan	1978
Pakistan	India	1983
Pakistan	Sri Lanka	1984
Peru	Nepal	1996
South Vietnam	Cambodia	1967
South Vietnam	Laos	1959
South Vietnam	Thailand	1976
Sri Lanka	India	1990
Uzbekistan	Pakistan	2007

Summary of the State Action Explanation’s Performance and Robustness Checks

I now summarize the aggregate findings of 84 “mini-case studies,” the specific details of which can be found in Appendix 3.1. In each mini-case study, I consulted secondary literature to determine (1) how the contagion between State A and State B occurred, (2) whether or not evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality was present in the case, and (3) if a state action was present, the extent to which that state action was necessary to the contagion —

Figure 3.1: Flowchart of Contagion Coding Methodology




in other words, would contagion from State A to State B have occurred in the absence of the state action in question? For question (3), I judge a state action to have been “necessary” for a case of contagion if either of these two criteria is met:

(a) *Civil War Necessity Criterion*: The state action appears to have been necessary for the onset of the State B civil war. Had the state action in question not occurred, seemingly the State B civil war would not have occurred.

(b) *Main Link Criterion*: In the absence of the state action, there might still have been a State B civil war, but the State B civil war would have been causally unrelated to the substate conflict in

State A. In other words, the state action constitutes the main, or the only, connection between the State A and State B conflicts. Therefore, while the state action in question was not necessary for the State B civil war, it *was* necessary for the contagion between State A and State B. (As discussed above, there is a critical difference between arguing that a factor was necessary for a civil war and arguing that a factor was necessary to establish a relationship between two conflicts. I generally attempt to make the latter argument rather than the former. However, I do invoke the Civil War Necessity Criterion when it seems plausible to do so.) Given that evaluating necessary conditions for individual contagion cases involves difficult and unfalsifiable counterfactual analysis, I plan to subject these necessity codings to intercoder reliability tests in future research.

In general, the State Action Explanation seems to perform well with respect to the identified cases of substate conflict contagion. As shown in Figure 3.2, of the 84 cases reviewed below, 67 (80 percent) had at least one state action present. In 57 of these 67 (68 percent of all 84 cases), I argue that the state action in question was necessary for the contagion to occur. Thirty-one cases were coded as necessary according to the Main Link Criterion only, and in twenty-six more, either the Civil War Necessity Criterion or both criteria were met. In the other ten cases (12 percent) — Cuba to Nicaragua, 1978; Azerbaijan to Russia, 1994; Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia, 1998; Rwanda to Burundi, 1991; Lebanon to Syria, 1979; Afghanistan to Tajikistan, 1992; China to Laos, 1959; China to Thailand, 1976; Burma to India, 1956; and Pakistan to India, 1983 — a state action was present, but it was not clearly a necessary condition in order for contagion to have occurred (see the case discussions below for an explanation of each). Finally, in the remaining 17 cases (20 percent of the total), state action appears to have been absent, yet substate conflict spread anyway. These are the cases for which the State Action Explanation falls

Figure 3.2: Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion

short; in these cases, nonstate and structural factors were actually sufficient to spread conflict from one state to another. Table 3.5 details which nonstate factors specifically spread conflict in these 17 cases, as well as in the 10 cases where state action was present but not clearly necessary for contagion. These nonstate factors, while they frequently occur across the universe of cases writ large and are probably themselves necessary for some cases of contagion, seem in only a handful of cases to be able to cause contagion without accompanying state actions. (On structural factors, see the separate section below.) Overall, we can assert that if evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality were not committed by the state governments in question, there would have been at least a two-thirds reduction in the frequency of substate conflict contagion between 1946 and 2007.

Interestingly, these 84 cases in which substate conflict contagion ended in a State B civil

Table 3.5: Nonstate Causal Mechanisms at Work in 27 Non-State-Action-Driven Cases

Nonstate Causal Mechanism	Number of Cases with Causal Mechanism Present among 17 Cases with State Action Absent	Number of Cases with Causal Mechanism Present among 10 Cases with State Action Present but Not Clearly Necessary
Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B	8	5
Rebels in State A Assist Rebels in State B	4	2
Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government)	2	2
Drug Trade in State A Creates Insurgent-Exploited Drug Trade in State B	0	1
Combatants from State B Fight in State A's Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through State A Expulsion) and Start Conflict	1	1
Refugees from State A Destabilize State B	1	1
Other	1	1
Total	17	13 ⁸

⁸ Adds to more than 10 because some cases have multiple nonstate mechanisms present.

war differ markedly from the 78 cases in which contagion ended only in a low-intensity State B substate conflict (these 78 cases are listed in Table 3.3). As shown in Table 3.6, the frequency of state action in these low-intensity contagion cases is substantially lower, at 35 percent versus the 80 percent frequency for the high-intensity conflicts. If we combine these data with the data from the 84 high-intensity conflicts, we see in Table 3.7 that contagion cases involving state action ended in a State B civil war 71 percent of the time (67 of 94 cases), while contagion cases involving only nonstate causal mechanisms ended in a State B civil war only 25 percent of the time (17 of 68 cases). These differences support a key proposition of the State Action Explanation: that conflicts usually only spread with high intensity when state action is present, due to the natural obstacles to the movement of high-intensity conflict across borders. These results also suggest that the spread of low-intensity conflict is not nearly as state-driven, and that the causes of low-intensity substate conflict contagion are considerably more diffuse.

Returning now (and for most of the rest of this chapter) to only the 84 high-intensity contagion cases, Figure 3.3 shows the breakdown of these cases with the following categories excluded: cases in which State A was Cuba, Israel, or China, and cases in the Balkans. Collectively these cases form a “cluster” totaling 31 of the 84 cases, so it is worth considering whether the substantive results change when these cases are excluded. In fact, the substantive results do not change; if anything, the frequency of state action in the remaining 53 cases is slightly higher, at 45 cases (85%) with necessity uncertain in 6.

Figure 3.4 shows how the state actions break down across the contagion cases, if the state actions are considered individually rather than collectively.⁹ From this we see that meddling with overt partiality appears to be the modal cause of substate conflict contagion at 31 cases,

⁹ The denominator for these percentages is 84 cases; in the rare cases where multiple state actions were present, I identified which one state action was most clearly involved in the contagion.

Table 3.6: Causal Mechanisms Present in 78 Low-Intensity Contagion Cases
(see Table 3A.1 in Appendix 3.1 for case-by-case listing)

Causal Mechanism	Number of Low-Intensity Cases in which Causal Mechanism was Present
Evangelization	13
Expulsion	1
Meddling with Overt Partiality	13
Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government)	17
Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B	12
Combatants from State B Fight in State A's Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through State A Expulsion) and Start Conflict	12
Rebels in State A Assist Rebels in State B	8
Refugees from State A Destabilize State B	8
Drug Trade in State A Creates Insurgent-Exploited Drug Trade in State B	1
Other	5
Total	90 ¹⁰
Total Unique Cases Involving State Action	27 (35% of 78 unique cases)

Table 3.7: High- and Low-Intensity Conflict Outcomes by State Action Presence

State Action Present?	Civil War	Low-Intensity Conflict
Yes	67 contagion cases	27 contagion cases
No	17 contagion cases	51 contagion cases

¹⁰ Adds to more than 78 because some cases have multiple mechanisms present.

Figure 3.3: Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion with “Clusters” Excluded




Figure 3.4: Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion by Individual State Action




Table 3.8: Substate Conflict Contagion and State Action by Decade

Decade/Time Period	Number of Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion	Number of Cases Involving State Action	Percent Frequency of State Action
1940s (1946-1949)	5	0	0%
1950s (1950-1959)	7	5	71%
1960s (1960-1969)	10	10	100%
1970s (1970-1979)	22	19 ¹¹	86%
1980s (1980-1989)	14	12	86%
1990s (1990-1999)	20	16 ¹²	80%
2000s (2000-2007)	6	5	83%
Cold War (1946-1989)	58	46	79%
Post-Cold War (1990-2007)	26	21	81%

although evangelization (22 cases), expulsion (14 cases), and non-state-driven causes (17 cases) are not far behind.

How well does this support for the State Action Explanation hold up across time periods and across regions? Table 3.8 shows the frequency of state action among substate conflict contagion cases split up by decade. In six of the seven decades, the frequency of state action is greater than two thirds — only in the 1940s (1946-1949) did all (five) cases of substate conflict

¹¹ The high figure is driven by a high number of meddling cases (11), particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa.

¹² Again, the high figure is driven by a high number of meddling cases (11), again in Africa but also in the Balkans and former Soviet Union.

contagion occur in the absence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality.¹³ Furthermore, although these temporal data do not show a clear secular trend, the Cold War frequency of state action is slightly lower than the post-Cold War frequency of state action. In short, my findings appear not to be an artifact of unique historical events or of conditions in the international system that are unlikely to reappear in the near future, such as bipolarity. Rather, the importance of state action to substate conflict contagion is fairly consistent over time, and seems particularly relevant today.

A similar inference can be made about the contagion cases when broken down by the geographic region in which State B resides (see Table 3.9). In all five regions with cases of substate conflict contagion, state action was present in the majority of the cases. Interestingly, the highest regional frequency of state action is in Sub-Saharan Africa, where states are generally considered weakest and borders most artificial. This is strong evidence for the importance of state action — even on the part of relatively weak states — to the spread of violent conflict across borders. Meanwhile, the region where state action matters least is Asia. To a large extent this seems attributable to the unique ideological influence of Maoism on Asian dissidents in the months preceding and the decades following the 1949 communist victory in China. Six of the twelve Asian cases in which state action was *not* involved instead involved the Chinese model of revolution inspiring insurrection elsewhere (without direct encouragement from Beijing, as that would have constituted evangelization). This wave of inspiration seemingly counteracted the tendency for substate conflicts to horrify potential rebels elsewhere. Instead, for at least some period of time in this region, leftist insurrection actually looked promising. The total rebel victory in China and the subsequent transformation of China into a communist great power was

¹³ Four of these five 1940s cases involved communist rebellion in State A inspiring communist rebellion in State B, and in three of those four cases, State A was China. On the exceptional nature of the Chinese demonstration effect in the years immediately before and after 1949, see the regional discussion below.

Table 3.9: Substate Conflict Contagion and State Action by Region



Region of State B	Number of Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion	Number of Cases Involving State Action	Percent Frequency of State Action
Latin America	8	7	88%
Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union (excluding Central Asian states)	7	6	86%
Sub-Saharan Africa	27	27	100%
North Africa/Middle East	12	9	75%
Asia (including former Soviet states in Central Asia)	30	18	60%
North America/Western Europe/Oceania	0	0	NA

an exceptionally rare sequence of events, and absent a similar occurrence we should expect the natural obstacle of the “reverse demonstration effect” (see Chapter 2) to dominate. (If these six cases of Chinese inspiration are excluded, the frequency of state action in Asia rises to 75%.) Next, there are 18 cases of substate conflict contagion described below in which the State A-State B pairing could potentially be considered outside the scope conditions of this project. Either the State B conflict began more than five years after the end of the State A conflict, or State A was a vast geographic distance from State B (i.e., Cuba to Ethiopia, 1964). These cases were counted as substate conflict contagion in the analyses above, because my goal is to be data-inclusive rather than data-exclusive. However, since they are technically outside the scope

conditions, I excluded these cases from the robustness checks that follow. Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of state action among the 66 cases that are unquestionably within-scope. The frequency of state action is actually even greater — 54 cases (82 percent) had state action present, and in at least 47 of these cases (71 percent) the state action was necessary to the contagion.

As a final robustness check, from this new population of 66 cases I also raised the low causal threshold for contagion and removed the two cases identified below in which the contribution of State A's conflict to State B's civil war was extremely limited (Cambodia to Indonesia, 2003; and Uzbekistan to Pakistan, 2007). As shown in Figure 3.6, the frequency of state action among the remaining 64 cases of substate conflict contagion again rises — there are now 53 cases (83 percent) involving state action in all, and 46 cases (72 percent) in which the state action was necessary to the contagion. Overall, then, the robustness checks that involved the exclusion of contagion cases only *increased* the frequency of state action, and thus increased the plausibility of the State Action Explanation.

Thus the general results of the analysis of the 84 identified cases of substate conflict contagion, as well as the more cursory analysis of 78 low-intensity contagion cases and various robustness checks, support the State Action Explanation. The high frequency of evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality among the 84 contagion cases, as well as the general necessity of these mechanisms to the individual cases of contagion, supports the prediction from Chapter 2 that these state actions are usually necessary (but insufficient) conditions for substate conflict contagion to occur. These actions were *not* necessary for the spread of violent civil conflict across borders in at most a third of the 84 actual cases of contagion. Therefore, it can be asserted that in the absence of these state actions, the vast

Figure 3.5: Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion; Potentially Out-of-Scope Cases Excluded**Figure 3.6: Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion; Potentially Out-of-Scope and Ambiguous Cases Excluded**

majority of these 84 instances of substate conflict contagion would not have occurred — a key takeaway for both scholars and policymakers.

The Role of Structural Factors in Contagion Cases

In Chapter 2, I argued that the presence of at least one of the state actions of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality is a *necessary* condition for most cases of substate conflict contagion, a supposition confirmed in this chapter. I also argued, though, that these state actions are not *sufficient* conditions for contagion — that they must combine with nonstate and structural factors in order to produce contagion outcomes. A part of this latter proposition will be put to a preliminary test in this section.

I have discussed nonstate factors above to a limited extent, and I hope to further develop my understanding of the interaction between state actions and nonstate factors in future research. As yet unmentioned in this chapter, though, are the structural factors such as poverty that cause civil war *in general*, not just the contagion of substate conflict. These factors play a critical role in my explanation, because we do not expect substate conflict to spread to states where civil war in general is unlikely. To draw on the epidemiologic analogy discussed in Chapter 1, the host state (State B) cannot be infected by the agent of substate conflict (from State A) unless it is generally *susceptible* to such an infection. If its “immunity” is too high — if, in other words, the structural factors that cause civil wars in general are absent from State B — then no amount of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality will be sufficient to overcome the structural tendency toward peace in that polity.¹⁴

Hence we expect the structural factors for civil war onset to be present in the State B of the vast majority of substate conflict contagion cases. However, because structural factors are

¹⁴ A similar argument for the importance of factors increasing a state’s natural “resistance” to contagion can be found in Alex Braithwaite, “Resisting Infection: How State Capacity Conditions Conflict Contagion,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2010): 311-319.

necessary but *also* insufficient for contagion, we further expect there to be unexplained variation in the occurrence and nonoccurrence of substate conflict contagion when structural factors alone are considered. The State Action Explanation asserts that the most important variables omitted from such an analysis are evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality.

To hold our empirics up against these expectations, we first need a methodology for measuring the vague concept of “structural factors” and comparing its presence and intensity across contagion and non-contagion cases. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the question of what causes civil wars in general is highly complex, is the source of a vast literature only lightly referenced in this work, and is outside the scope of this dissertation. Fortunately, this broader literature includes several seminal studies which have constructed reasonably comprehensive multivariate regression models of civil war onset. These regression models attempt to simultaneously estimate the causal effects of most of the major factors considered to be structural causes of violent civil conflict. (The word “attempt” is key here, since correlation does not necessarily imply causation.)

The most seminal of these statistical studies, and also the most appropriate for my purposes, is the article on “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War” by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin.¹⁵ I use their replication data,¹⁶ which code 6,610 country-years for the presence or absence of civil war onset and the values of a variety of independent variables from 1945 to 1999. Using these data, I have constructed, for each of 6,327 country-years (data on the other

¹⁵ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (2003): 75-90. The other two most seminal statistical studies of civil war onset are Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (2004): 563-595; and Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2006): 508-535. The Collier and Hoeffler study only considers the 1960-1999 period and thus is missing a substantial amount of data; the Hegre and Sambanis study is a meta-analysis of other regressions, not a set of full models itself.

¹⁶ Available at <http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon>.

283 observations are missing), the *predicted probability of civil war onset*. Using the standard logistic regression equation which Fearon and Laitin estimate, this probability is given as follows:

$$\text{Pr}(\text{Civil War Onset}) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-z}}$$

Where $z = -7.019 + -0.916 \times \text{Prior War} + -0.318 \times \text{Per Capita Income, in thousands, lagged one year} + 0.272 \times \text{Log}(\text{Population, in thousands, lagged one year}) + 0.199 \times \text{Log}(\text{Percent Mountainous Terrain}) + 0.426 \times \text{Noncontiguous State} + 0.751 \times \text{Oil Exporter} + 1.658 \times \text{New State} + 0.513 \times \text{Instability} + 0.164 \times \text{Ethnic Fractionalization} + 0.326 \times \text{Religious Fractionalization} + 0.521 \times \text{Anocracy, lagged one year} + 0.127 \times \text{Democracy, dichotomous measure, lagged one year}$.


This particular specification of z is Model 3 in Fearon and Laitin's Table 1.¹⁷ I chose it over the other logistic regression models available in the article because it uses the most agreed-upon version of the dependent variable, and it includes the most fine-grained measures of political instability. Specific definitions of all of these independent variables can be found in Fearon and Laitin's article or the supplementary materials thereto.¹⁸ (Note that road networks between states, a potential vector of contagion discussed in Chapter 1, are not included among the structural variables coded by Fearon and Laitin. I will hope to account for road networks in future research.)

Individual probability of civil war onset values range from 0.0000000441% per year (Kuwait, 1964) to 49.39% per year (Indonesia, 1949 and 1950). As shown in Figure 3.7, this probability variable has a right-skewed distribution. Thus the median is a more reliable measure of its central tendency than the mean. Among all 6,327 country-years for which data are

¹⁷ Fearon and Laitin, "Ethnicity," p. 84.

¹⁸ For the supplementary materials, see <http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon> (click on "Additional Tables for 'Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War'").

Figure 3.7: Distribution of Probability of Civil War Onset (N = 6327)



available, the median probability of civil war onset is 1.05% per year. Fearon and Laitin identify 111 cases of civil war onset in their dataset (naturally, we do disagree on some cases and some years of onset); predicted probability data are available for 106 of these cases. Among these 106 cases of *actual* civil war onset, as defined by Fearon and Laitin, the median predicted probability of civil war onset is 2.47% per year, and ranges from 0.245% per year (Cyprus, 1974) to 49.39% per year (Indonesia, 1950). The low median and large range here are indicative of the considerable variation in civil war's occurrence *in general* left unexplained by the literature — a topic beyond the scope of this dissertation. Nevertheless, these data are the best we have.

I have identified 84 cases of substate conflict contagion. These 84 cases yield 56 unique country-years in which the country in question was a State B in a case of contagion that year.

(The number drops because there can be multiple State As for every State B; both Burundi and Rwanda were State As for Zaire in 1996, for example.) In other words, in these 56 country-years, the country in question experienced a *receipt of contagion*. These are the cases for which we want to know whether the structural conditions for civil war were present — whether the host was susceptible to infection. These 56 country-years are listed in Table 3.10, along with predicted probabilities of civil war onset for 46 of them. (The other 10 are either post-1999, meaning Fearon and Laitin do not have data available, or are missing data on individual structural variables.)

The first thing to notice about these 46 civil war onset probabilities in receipt of contagion cases is that they are generally high, where “high” means roughly comparable to the median probability of civil war onset in *all* actual civil war onset cases (2.47% per year). The median probability of civil war onset in these 46 cases is 2.095% per year, roughly double the median probability of civil war onset across the entire dataset (1.05% per year). In only 11 of the 46 cases is the predicted probability of civil war onset low, where “low” means below the 1.05% per year population median. This evidence supports the claim that substate conflict contagion usually only occurs when the structural conditions for civil war onset in general are present. This claim is consistent with the State Action Explanation’s assertion that the structural conditions for civil war onset, like evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality themselves, are usually necessary conditions for substate conflict contagion.

However, we also expect these structural factors to leave some variation in the receipt of substate conflict contagion unexplained — and that is precisely what they do. To show this, Table 3.11 compares the results of two logistic regressions, one of which explains much more variation than the other. In the first column of the table, I estimate the association of the

Table 3.10: Country-Years which Experienced Receipt of Substate Conflict Contagion

State B	Year	Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset per Year (from Fearon and Laitin)
Paraguay	1947	0.564%
Argentina	1974	0.35%
Colombia	1964	1.123%
Guatemala	1965	2.176%
Nicaragua	1978	0.557%
El Salvador	1981	0.933%
Russia	1994	6.983%
Serbia	1998	Missing Data
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1992	Missing Data
Bosnia-Herzegovina	1993	Missing Data
Croatia	1992	Missing Data
Congo-Kinshasa	1996	7.92%
Liberia	1989	0.859%
Sierra Leone	1991	1.0544%
Angola	1975	22.745%
Congo-Kinshasa	1964	2.333%
Ethiopia	1964	3.922%
Uganda	1971	2.0295%
Somalia	1978	1.11%
Sudan	1983	1.919%
Burundi	1991	2.17%
Ethiopia	2009	Post-1999
Ethiopia	1976	2.848%
Ethiopia	1977	2.872%
Rwanda	1990	2.161%
Mozambique	1977	0.547%
South Africa	1981	1.651%
Algeria	1991	6.146%
Iraq	2004	Post-1999
Iran	1966	2.47%
Turkey	1984	3.188%
Iran	1979	0.634%
Lebanon	1958	1.471%
Lebanon	1975	1.124%
Lebanon	1982	0.873%

State B	Year	Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset per Year (from Fearon and Laitin)
Syria	1979	0.997%
South Yemen	1986	1.29%
Pakistan	2007	Post-1999
Tajikistan	1992	10.449%
Indonesia	2003	Post-1999
Cambodia	1967	0.939%
India	1948	Missing Data
India	1956	3.517%
Laos	1959	3.0559%
Burma	1948	14.515%
Burma	1949	6.364%
Burma	1959	1.313%
Burma	1961	1.296%
South Vietnam	1955	Missing Data
Sri Lanka	1971	1.679%
Sri Lanka	1984	0.863%
Thailand	1976	4.225%
Nepal	1996	4.187%
Afghanistan	1978	2.489%
India	1983	3.787%
India	1990	3.592%

predicted probability of civil war onset with the *actual* onset of civil war. In other words, I estimate α and β_1 in the following equation:

$$\Pr(\text{Civil War Onset}) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\alpha + \beta_1 \times \Pr(\text{Civil War Onset}))}}$$

Naturally, since we are regressing a dependent variable on a transformation of itself, the coefficient β_1 is extremely positive and statistically significant. But compare this coefficient to its analogue in the second column of Table 3.11, where we change the dependent variable from civil war onset to receipt of substate conflict contagion (the latter variable takes the value of 1 if the

Table 3.11: Comparison of Explanatory Power of Structural Conditions for Civil War Onset vs. Receipt of Substate Conflict Contagion

Parameter	Estimate (Dependent Variable: Civil War Onset)	Estimate (Dependent Variable: Receipt of Substate Conflict Contagion)
α (Constant)	-4.546	-5.117
β_1 (Coefficient on Probability of Civil War Onset)	18.667 ($z = 5.31, p \approx 0.000$)	9.284 ($z = 3.26, p = 0.001$)
N	6327	6327
Pseudo- R^2 of Model	0.0747	0.0163

NOTE: These models use robust standard errors clustered by country, even though Fearon and Laitin do not follow this convention in their article. The substantive results using non-robust, non-clustered standard errors are the same.

Table 3.12: Marginal Effect of Structural Conditions on Probability of Receipt of Substate Conflict Contagion

Simulated Value of Pr(Civil War Onset), percent per year	Simulated Value of Pr(Receipt of Substate Conflict Contagion), percent per year	95% Confidence Interval, percent per year
1.05% (median)	0.669%	0.466% – 0.931%
3.38% (+1 standard deviation)	0.830%	0.566% – 1.169%
5.72% (+2 standard deviations)	1.035%	0.645% – 1.520%

NOTE: Results simulated using the “Clarify” software built by Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg and Gary King (version 2.0).

country-year in question is a State B in a contagion case):

$$\Pr(\text{Receipt of Contagion}) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\alpha + \beta_1 \times \Pr(\text{Civil War Onset}))}}$$

Although β_1 is still positive and statistically significant, its magnitude and z-statistic are both substantially lower. The marginal effect of the probability of civil war onset on the probability of receipt of contagion appears low, as shown in Table 3.12; the predicted probability of receipt of substate conflict contagion increases by only about 0.2% per year when the predicted probability

of civil war onset is raised by one standard deviation (2.33% per year) from the median. Furthermore, the pseudo- R^2 of the second logistic regression model, with receipt of contagion as the dependent variable, is more than four times lower than the pseudo- R^2 of the first model, which had civil war onset as the dependent variable. Similar results are obtained when we use Fearon and Laitin's actual variables, rather than the predicted probability index; as shown in Table 3.13, four variables lose statistical significance when the dependent variable is changed from civil war onset to receipt of contagion, the sign on the significant "Prior War" variable mysteriously changes, and the pseudo- R^2 again drops.

This analysis tells us that our proxies for the structural conditions for civil war cannot explain all variation in the occurrence or non-occurrence of substate conflict contagion. So the structural factors which cause civil war in general, while generally necessary for contagion, are not sufficient to cause contagion on their own. We also need to bring in factors related to the interaction between State B and State A — between the host and the sender of the agent, respectively — in order to understand this phenomenon.

The most important element of this interstate interaction, I argue, is the occurrence of evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality. To fully test this argument, I would need to measure the presence or absence of these state actions across all 6,327 country-years, and see how well they were associated with receipt of contagion. While I do not have this amount of coding completed, I do have 79 of these country-years coded for the presence (1) or absence (0) of any of the three state actions. This includes all 46 country-years in which the country in question was a State B in a case of substate conflict contagion, and all 33 additional country-years in which the country in question was a State B in a case of *low-intensity* contagion— a case which resulted in the deaths of more than 24 but fewer than 1,000 people in

Table 3.13: Civil War Onset vs. Receipt of Substate Conflict Contagion Comparison with Actual Fearon/Laitin Variables

Variable	Coefficient (Dependent Variable: Civil War Onset)	Coefficient (Dependent Variable: Receipt of Substate Conflict Contagion)
Constant	-7.019	-7.992
Prior War	-0.916 (z = 3.74, p ≈ 0.000)	0.666 (z = 2.19, p = 0.029)
Per Capita Income (in thousands, lagged one year)	-0.318 (z = 4.43, p ≈ 0.000)	-0.209 (z = 2.29, p = 0.022)
Log(Population) (in thousands, lagged one year)	0.272 (z = 4.55, p ≈ 0.000)	0.165 (z = 1.45, p = 0.148)
Log(Percent Mountainous Terrain)	0.199 (z = 2.38, p = 0.017)	0.405 (z = 3.09, p = 0.002)
Noncontiguous State	0.426 (z = 1.61, p = 0.108)	-0.690 (z = 1.55, p = 0.121)
Oil Exporter	0.751 (z = 2.91, p = 0.004)	0.640 (z = 1.78, p = 0.074)
New State	1.658 (z = 4.98, p ≈ 0.000)	1.441 (z = 2.32, p = 0.020)
Instability (lagged one year)	0.513 (z = 2.26, p = 0.024)	0.378 (z = 1.06, p = 0.289)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.164 (z = 0.48, p = 0.632)	0.727 (z = 1.31, p = 0.191)
Religious Fractionalization	0.326 (z = 0.61, p = 0.540)	0.515 (z = 0.55, p = 0.581)
Anocracy (lagged one year)	0.521 (z = 2.12, p = 0.034)	0.123 (z = 0.30, p = 0.764)
Democracy (dichotomous, lagged one year)	0.127 (z = 0.40, p = 0.687)	0.491 (z = 0.94, p = 0.347)
N	6327	6327
Pseudo-R ² of Model	0.1112	0.0894

NOTE: Statistically significant coefficients ($p \leq 0.05$) are **bolded**. These models use robust standard errors clustered by country, even though Fearon and Laitin do not follow this convention in their article. The substantive results using non-robust, non-clustered standard errors are the same.

battle.¹⁹ Analysis of this subpopulation can tell us whether state actions can explain the variation between high-intensity and low-intensity substate conflict contagion. The answer to this question may begin to give us leverage on the larger question of whether state actions can explain the variation between high-intensity contagion and *non*-contagion. To conduct this analysis, we need to estimate this multivariate version of the logistic equation (the dependent variable is the receipt of high-intensity contagion, as above):

$$\text{Pr(Receipt of Contagion)} = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(\alpha + \beta_1 \times \text{Pr(Civil War Onset)} + \beta_2 \times \text{State Action Present})}}$$

The results of this estimation, shown in Table 3.14, constitute strong preliminary evidence that state actions can explain the variation in contagion left unexplained by structural factors. In these 79 cases, the association between a given state's predicted probability of civil war onset and its receipt of high-intensity substate conflict contagion is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Meanwhile, the association between the presence of state action and the receipt of contagion is positive and statistically significant. And, as shown in Table 3.15, the marginal effect of the presence of state action on the probability of contagion, simulated while holding the probability of civil war onset constant at its median, is quite dramatic. Without state action the probability of receipt of contagion is about 33 percent, and with state action that probability roughly doubles to about 65 percent, although there is some overlap in the confidence intervals between the two estimated parameters.

These results do not directly tell us whether the presence of state action better explains the variation between high-intensity contagion cases and *non*-contagion cases. For that, we

¹⁹ In cases where the country-year was a State B in *multiple* cases of contagion, I coded state action as present if it was present in any one of the multiple contagion cases.

Table 3.14: Association of State Action with High-Intensity Contagion

Parameter	Estimate (Dependent Variable: Receipt of (High-Intensity) Substate Conflict Contagion)
α (Constant)	-0.815
β_1 (Coefficient on Probability of Civil War Onset)	6.999 (z = 0.82, p = 0.412)
β_2 (Coefficient on State Action Present)	1.360 (z = 2.36, p = 0.018)
N	79
Pseudo-R ² of Model	0.0758

NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered by country, but substantive results remain the same with non-robust, non-clustered standard errors.

Table 3.15: Marginal Effect of Presence of State Action on Probability of Receipt of (High-Intensity) Substate Conflict Contagion

Simulated Value of State Action Present	Simulated Value of Pr(Receipt of Substate Conflict Contagion), percent per year	95% Confidence Interval, percent per year
0 (absent)	33.22%	15.39% – 56.80%
1 (present)	64.92%	48.89% – 77.93%

NOTE: Results simulated using the “Clarify” software built by Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg and Gary King (version 2.0). Probability of Civil War Onset is set to 1.05% per year.

would need all 6,327 observations coded for the presence or absence of state action. But these results clearly show that the presence of state action better explains the variation between high-intensity contagion cases and low-intensity contagion cases, and this is suggestive of a broader role for state actions in the variation left unexplained by structural factors.

What, then, is the overall role of structural factors in substate conflict contagion? These rough and preliminary statistical analyses have suggested that, consistent with the State Action Explanation, a high baseline probability of civil war onset is necessary but insufficient for most cases of contagion. Contagion generally cannot occur in places where the susceptibility of the host is low, but nor can these structural factors explain all of the variation between contagion and

non-contagion. State actions, meanwhile, show the early potential to explain this unexplained variation. The multivariate logistic regression above suggests that the presence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality explains the variation between low-intensity and high-intensity contagion much better than the probability of civil war onset. In short, we need structural factors to explain contagion, but we need much more than that — and I argue that evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality fill this need to a substantial degree.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I first identified a comprehensive list of 84 cases of substate conflict contagion between 1946 and 2007, and then analyzed the causes of each of these cases in the aggregate. (In Appendix 3.1, each individual case is discussed in some detail.) Ultimately I found the support for the State Action Explanation to be strong. Contagion occurs only rarely in the absence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality. And when these state actions do occur, they usually appear to have been necessary for the spread of violent conflict across borders. Meanwhile, I roughly quantified the “structural factors” of civil war onset in general, and found that while the presence of these factors also appears to be necessary for most cases of contagion, they are not sufficient either.

However, the analysis in this chapter is vulnerable to a significant critique: By studying only the cases of substate conflict contagion which occurred, I have selected on the dependent variable. A good explanation of substate conflict contagion should certainly be able to account for the cases in which contagion occurred — and the State Action Explanation clearly qualifies on that front — but it should also be able to account for the 21,951 cases in which contagion did

not occur.²⁰ If not, the explanation would be logically similar to the statement that “male gender causes incarceration in the U.S. prison system.” It is true that most incarcerated Americans are males, but there is also a far greater number of American males who are not incarcerated, leaving this simple statement wanting in explanatory power. Likewise, it is possible that although most cases of substate conflict contagion involve evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality, these state actions are nearly ubiquitous in the modern state system — there would then be little to distinguish the cases in which conflict spread from the cases in which it did not.

It turns out, though, that these state actions are *not* ubiquitous in the modern state system. Like contagion, they happen rarely. When they do, negative security consequences — up to and including substate conflict contagion — are likely to result. When these state actions do not happen, substate conflict contagion almost never occurs. To demonstrate these claims and fully test the State Action Explanation, I conduct two broad regional case studies, so that I can analyze both cases and non-cases of substate conflict contagion. First, I study Central America between 1978 and 1996 — a region which at the time had as many as five substate conflicts, but only one genuine case of substate conflict contagion. Then I study Southeast Asia between 1959 and 1980 — a region with six cases of contagion, though that too is a relatively small number, given that virtually every state on the mainland was embroiled in conflict. Collectively, these case studies overcome the methodological problem of selection on the dependent variable, put the State Action Explanation to its first complete tests, and ultimately strengthen the empirical case for the explanation.

²⁰ 21,951 = 22,035 directed dyad-years in the universe of possible cases minus 84 cases of actual substate conflict contagion.

In the next chapter I discuss the Central American case study, which in addition to secondary source material relies on archival and interview research in Belize, Costa Rica, and Honduras.

Appendix 3.1: State Action Coding for the Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion

In this appendix, I discuss each of the 84 identified cases of substate conflict contagion in turn. The cases are titled according to the format “State A to State B, Year” — for example, “Bolivia to Paraguay, 1947.” If the case is technically outside either the temporal scope (State B’s conflict began more than five years after State A’s conflict ended) or the geographic scope (State A and State B are a vast distance from each other), this fact is noted in the title of the case. If the causal connection between State A’s conflict and State B’s civil war is particularly weak, this is also noted in the title. I then discuss for each case (1) how the contagion between State A and State B occurred, (2) whether or not evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality was present in the case, and (3) if a state action was present, the extent to which that state action was necessary for the contagion. For question (3), if I judge state action to have been necessary for contagion, I also note which of the two criteria described above — the Civil War Necessity Criterion or the Main Link Criterion — forms the basis for this judgment. These codings are based on extensive consultation of the secondary source literature on each pair of conflicts.

These “mini-case studies” are followed by Table 3A.1, which more succinctly identifies the causal mechanisms present in the 78 cases of *low-intensity* substate conflict contagion.

Bolivia to Paraguay, 1947

How did conflict spread? The civil war in Paraguay broke out after the Feberista political faction was expelled from the cabinet.²¹ The Feberistas had been banned from Paraguay until 1946, when they were invited back to participate in the country’s political process. They received this invitation because the “bloody revolution in Bolivia” frightened the leadership of Paraguay

²¹ Paul H. Lewis, “Leadership and Conflict within the Febrerista Party of Paraguay,” *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1967): 283-295, p. 287.

into expanding their political tent.²² Hence it can be argued that without the substate conflict in Bolivia, the Feberistas would never have been in a position to start their insurrection in Paraguay. Indeed, the Feberistas appear to have been in a holding pattern outside Paraguay until the 1946 decision to include them in the government.²³

Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality appear to have been absent from this case. Conflict instead spread under a set of political conditions best described as unique.

Cuba to Argentina, 1974 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? Multiple sources have alleged that the Cuban government, specifically its General Intelligence Department, provided both strategic and tactical training — on how to recruit, for instance — to the Montoneros and to the People’s Revolutionary Army in Argentina.²⁴ Others dispute this claim.²⁵

Was state action present? Yes, if the majority of the sources consulted are to be believed, this was a clear case of Cuban evangelization.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Evangelization appears to have been the main connection between the conflicts in these two countries. The leftist insurgents in Argentina were also inspired by the Cuban Revolution,²⁶ but this no doubt stemmed in part from the significant Cuban support for those leftists. Therefore, evangelization appears to

²² Philip Raine, *Paraguay* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1956), p. 262.

²³ Lewis, “Leadership and Conflict,” pp. 286-287.

²⁴ Carlos Alberto Montaner, “The Cuban Revolution and its Acolytes,” in Irving Louis Horowitz and Jaime Suchlicki, eds., *Cuban Communism*, Tenth Edition (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001), p. 608; Peter Van Ness, *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, p. 113; U.S. Department of State, “Cuba’s Renewed Support of Violence in Latin America,” Special Report No. 90 (December 14, 1981), p. 11 — available online at http://cuban-exile.com/doc_201-225/doc0224.html.

²⁵ Bruce M. Davidson, “‘Isolation’ vs. ‘Engagement’: A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Latin American Policies Toward Castro’s Cuba,” *Colegio Interamericano de Defensa* (1994), p. 20.

²⁶ Jonathan C. Brown, *A Brief History of Argentina* (New York: Facts on File, 2003), pp. 230-244.

have been a necessary condition for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Cuba to Colombia, 1964

How did conflict spread? The Cuban influence on the numerous armed groups in Colombia's civil war varied from group to group. However, the leaders of the Army of National Liberation (ELN), one of the most important insurgent groups at the onset of the Colombian civil war, were trained in Havana prior to the ELN's formation.²⁷

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Cuban evangelization.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As with the Argentine case above, although leftists in Colombia were also simply inspired by the Cuban Revolution, this is a difficult link to separate from the direct Cuban support for the leftists in State B. Again, evangelization appears to have been the main connection between the conflicts in these two countries, and hence appears to have been necessary for the case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Cuba to El Salvador, 1981 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? As discussed in Chapter 4 (see the section in that chapter on Nicaraguan contagion to El Salvador), the Cuban government was a major sponsor of the Salvadoran FMLN rebel group in the months leading up to the civil war onset in January 1981. Havana supplied arms, training, and strategic advice to the Salvadoran leftists.

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Cuban evangelization.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Chapter 4 makes clear that both Cuban and Nicaraguan support were essential for the increase in FMLN capability that led to the "Final Offensive" rebel campaign in January 1981. It was, in turn, this "Final

²⁷ Jenny Pearce, *Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1990), p. 165.

Offensive” that raised battle deaths in El Salvador to the level of civil war intensity. Therefore, I believe Cuban evangelization was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

Cuba to Guatemala, 1965

How did conflict spread? Beginning around 1962, Havana trained guerillas in Guatemala, including leftist insurgent leaders Cesar Montes and Luis Turcios Lima.²⁸

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Cuban evangelization.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As with the other Central and South American contagion cases involving Cuba, evangelization appears to have been the main link between these conflicts and appears to have been inseparable from the “inspiration” that also occurred.²⁹ Thus evangelization seems to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Cuba to Nicaragua, 1978 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? The Cuban government began aiding the Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua in the 1960s, and training of leftist Nicaraguans in Cuba continued throughout the 1970s. Castro actually tried to dissuade key Sandinista fighter Edén Pastora from attacking the National Palace in Managua, deeming the plan too offensive in nature. But after Pastora ignored Castro and carried out the “enormously successful” attack anyway in August 1978, Castro

²⁸ Louis A. Pérez, *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution*, Fourth Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 287; Eugene Pons, “Castro and Terrorism: A Chronology,” Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies Occasional Paper (September 2001), p. 9.

²⁹ On Cuba to Guatemala inspiration, see the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Guatemala conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=66®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas#.

“personally zeroed in on the FSLN” and began providing arms via Panama and Costa Rica.³⁰

Also, the original founding of the FSLN in 1961 drew “inspiration ... from the Cubans.”³¹

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Cuban evangelization.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Cuban aid to the Sandinistas actually seems to have been fairly limited around the time of the Nicaraguan civil war onset in 1978. According to one source, “In the final three years of struggle [prior to 1979], overt contacts between Castro’s regime and the FSLN remained limited. ... The U.S. State Department and Central Intelligence Agency ... argued that such Cuban assistance was relatively minor in the overall arms flow to the insurgents.”³² Even though Cuban aid increased following Pastora’s bold August 1978 raid in Managua, that raid may have postdated the crossing of the 1,000 battle death threshold. Meanwhile, we have a nonstate factor present, that of (Cuban) rebels inspiring (Nicaraguan) rebels. Given this evidence, I cannot conclude that Cuban evangelization was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion.

Nicaragua to El Salvador, 1981

How did conflict spread? As discussed in much more detail in Chapter 4, the Sandinista government in Nicaragua helped arm the FMLN rebels in El Salvador after ousting the Somoza regime in Managua.

Was state action present? Yes, I argue in Chapter 4 that this was a clear case of evangelization.

³⁰ John A. Booth, *The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), p. 133; Roger Miranda and William Ratliff, *The Civil War in Nicaragua: Inside the Sandinistas* (London: Transaction Publishers, 1993), pp. 97-100 (source of both quotations); Robert Kagan, *A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990* (New York: Free Press, 1996), pp. 78-80.

³¹ Eduardo Crawley, *Nicaragua in Perspective*, Revised Edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), p. 128.

³² Booth, “The End and the Beginning,” p. 133.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As discussed in Chapter 4, although there were also nonstate links between the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran conflicts — namely inspiration — full-scale civil war in El Salvador probably would not have been possible without Nicaraguan evangelization. Therefore, evangelization was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

Uruguay to Argentina, 1974

How did conflict spread? The leaders of what eventually became the anti-Buenos Aires Montoneros cut their teeth “contributing to the political and military development of the Tupamaros” in Uruguay in the 1960s.³³

Was state action present? Yes, this appears to be a cause of Uruguayan expulsion of Argentine combatants back to Argentina. The future Montonero leaders who assisted the Tupamaros appear to have left Montevideo in late 1966 and early 1967, in the wake of a Uruguayan government crackdown on the leftists.³⁴ Certainly the Uruguayan government *intended* to expel Argentine combatants; in July 1967 they arrested and attempted to extradite future Montonero José Luis Nell, although Nell escaped prison before he could be formally extradited to Argentina.³⁵ (He ended up there anyway.)

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The main link between the Uruguayan and Argentine conflicts appears to be the rebel network between the Tupamaros and the Montoneros. In addition, it can be argued that the major leaders of the Montoneros might

³³ Richard Gillespie, *Soldiers of Peron: Argentina's Monteneros* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 51, 96, 182; see also Paul H. Lewis, *Guerillas and Generals: The 'Dirty War' in Argentina* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), pp. 36-41.

³⁴ James Kohl and John Litt, *Urban Guerilla Warfare in Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1974), p. 186.

³⁵ Michael Goebel, “A Movement from Right to Left in Argentine Nationalism? The Alianza Libertadora Nacionalista and Tacuara as Stages of Militancy,” *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (2007): 356-377, p. 368.

not have returned to Argentina and played their roles in the civil war onset there, had they not been forced out of the country by the Uruguayan government. Therefore, expulsion appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to both the Civil War Necessity Criterion and the Main Link Criterion.

Azerbaijan to Russia, 1994

How did conflict spread? Some of the anti-Moscow fighters in Chechnya came from the conflict in Azerbaijan; weapons moved from the Azerbaijani conflict to the Chechen conflict as well.³⁶

Was state action present? Yes, the Russian government meddled with overt partiality in the Azerbaijani conflict by providing arms to the government there.³⁷ Seemingly expulsion was *not* present in this case; the Azerbaijani fighters appear to have come to Chechnya of their own free will.³⁸

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? In this case it does not appear that the Russian meddling in the Azerbaijani conflict had any direct security consequences. There was no retaliation by the Azerbaijani government, I found no evidence that Azerbaijani rebels crossed into Chechnya *because* of Russian meddling, and I found no evidence that the Chechen population rebelled because of Russian actions in Azerbaijan. Instead, conflict appears to have spread through the Azerbaijani-Chechen transnational rebel network, and through the spillover of arms.

³⁶ Carlotta Gall and Thomas de Waal, *Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 191, 306.

³⁷ James Hughes, *Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), p. 80.

³⁸ Gall and De Waal, "Chechnya," p. 191.

Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia, 1998

How did conflict spread? Kosovar Albanian elites vacillated for some time between those who favored a peaceful push for Kosovar independence from Serbia and those who favored an armed struggle. According to one account, “The crucial event that turned the tide in favor of the [Kosovar Liberation Army, away from the ‘peaceful path institutionalists’] was the signing of the Dayton Accords at the end of 1995.” Kosovars surmised from the resolution of the Bosnian conflict that peaceful protest would yield nothing, while armed struggle would yield international intervention in their favor.³⁹ In this way the Bosnian conflict inspired the onset of the Kosovar armed struggle.

Was state action present? Yes, the Serbian government meddled with overt partiality in the Bosnian conflict by supporting anti-Sarajevo Serb militias. For more detail, see the Serbia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 case below.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Interestingly, the Serbian meddling in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not appear to have contributed directly to the contagion in this case. The government in Sarajevo did not support the Kosovar Liberation Army in any meaningful way, most KLA fighters were local,⁴⁰ and Serbian meddling in Bosnia-Herzegovina does not appear to have been a major grievance of the Kosovar rebels. Thus it could be argued that the state action in question was not necessary to this case of substate conflict contagion.

³⁹ Henry H. Perritt, Jr., *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), p. 32.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

Croatia to Serbia, 1998

How did conflict spread? The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) obtained a significant share of its small arms supplies from the recently completed civil war in Croatia, although Albania — which has never experienced a substate conflict — was an even larger source.⁴¹

Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality appear to have been absent from this case of substate conflict contagion. In fact, “state-supplied weapons were a KLA dream and one of its greatest disappointments. No state stepped forward to supply weapons.”⁴² Meanwhile, because most Kosovar insurgents were local Albanians, expulsion appears not to have occurred to any significant degree either. Instead, conflict spread via the movement of small arms from State A to State B.

Georgia to Russia, 1994

How did conflict spread? In 1992 and 1993, Russia supported the Abkhazian rebels in the Georgian civil war by sending into Georgia a pro-Abkhazia militia led by Shamil Basaev. But in 1994, Basaev and his militia crossed back into Russia and began fighting for *Chechen* independence. James Hughes writes, “Russia played a vital role in the creation of a militarily proficient Chechen insurgent army by assisting Shamil Basaev’s ‘international brigade’ in Abkhazia.”⁴³

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Russian meddling with overt partiality. This meddling blew back when the anti-government force Russia sponsored in the Georgian conflict became a major anti-government force in the Russian conflict.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Based on the quote above, it appears that if Russia had not supported Basaev’s Georgian adventure, the Chechen

⁴¹ Ibid, pp. 117-118.

⁴² Ibid, p. 117.

⁴³ James Hughes, “Chechnya,” pp. 71, 154, 179 (quote from p. 179).

insurgents may never have become “militarily proficient,” making the prospect of full-scale civil war unlikely. From this perspective, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

Serbia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992

How did conflict spread? Serb rebels in Bosnia were assisted by Serb militants from Serbia and Croatia, sent to Bosnia in part by the Serbian state.⁴⁴

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of expulsion by Serbia.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The presence of Serb militants in Bosnia appears to constitute the main connection between these two conflicts. Therefore, expulsion appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Serbia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993

How did conflict spread? The Croat anti-Sarajevo insurgency in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which started in 1993, received significant support from the Croatian state government in Zagreb. In fact, the leader of the Bosnian Croat insurgency, Mate Boban, was “a former clothing store manager” who “emerged through [Croatian President] Tudjman’s patronage.” This Croatian state support resulted in large part from the Bosnian state’s support for the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) during the Croatian war of independence in 1991 (an anti-Serbia conflict, making Serbia, or Yugoslavia, the State A in this dyad). Essentially, Sarajevo permitted Belgrade to use Bosnian territory “as a base from which attacks against the Croatian national guard could be commanded.”⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Bosnia (Serb) conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=20®ionSelect=9-Eastern_Europe#.

⁴⁵ Laura Silber and Alan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: TV Books, 1996), pp. 291-293.

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of meddling with overt partiality by the Bosnian state in the Serbian/Yugoslavian conflict involving Croatia. The Croatian government retaliated for this meddling by supporting Croat insurgents inside Bosnia.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Although there was also a nonstate factor in this dyad — Bosnian Croats who fought in Croatia’s war against Belgrade, then returned to Bosnia in 1992 “bloodied by their experience and ready for the war in Bosnia”⁴⁶ — the support from Zagreb appears to have been the key catalyst of the Croat civil war in Bosnia. In addition to lifting rebel leader Boban out of obscurity, the Croatian state’s support propelled him past Franjo Boras and Stjepan Kljuić, the two Croatian representatives on the Bosnian Presidency. Boras and Kljuić represented a majority of Bosnian Croats who, prior to 1993, were “much more inclined to live in a multi-ethnic Bosnian state than to seek its partition into ethnically pure units.”⁴⁷ Thus it was Zagreb’s support for Boban that catalyzed the shift toward violent separatism among Bosnian Croats. Zagreb’s support, in turn, was facilitated in large part by Sarajevo’s meddling with overt partiality. Although “Tudjman ... had never accepted the long-term viability of Bosnia as a state” anyway,⁴⁸ the Bosnian meddling gave him a security motivation as well as an ideological motivation to support Bosnian Croat separatists. I consider it unlikely that Tudjman would have supported Boban to the same extent without this security motivation present. Therefore, I consider meddling to have been necessary for this case of contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 293.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 292.

Serbia to Croatia, 1992

How did conflict spread? As it did in Bosnia-Herzegovina around the same time, the Serbian government supplied Serb militants to the Serb anti-Zagreb insurgency inside Croatia.⁴⁹

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of expulsion by Belgrade.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The movement of militants between Serbia and Croatia appears to have been the main connection between these two conflicts. Therefore, expulsion appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Angola to Congo-Kinshasa, 1996

How did conflict spread? As discussed in Chapter 2, the Angolan state retaliated against the Zairean state's harboring of anti-Luanda rebels. Angola joined an anti-Kinshasa coalition led by Rwanda and also including Uganda.⁵⁰

Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of meddling with overt partiality.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Angolan influence on the civil war in the former Zaire was rather small; Rwanda was by far the most important state player in the conflict. However, Angola and Zaire had a long history of meddling in each other's conflicts (see other cases discussed below), and this was a major component of the antipathy between the two states. Had the Zairean state not meddled in the Angolan conflict, undermining the security of Angola, there is little reason to suppose that Angola would have bothered to sponsor a civil war on its doorstep. Therefore, meddling seems to have been necessary to the contagion of conflict from Angola to what was then Zaire, according to the Main Link Criterion.

⁴⁹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Croatia conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=41®ionSelect=9-Eastern_Europe#.

⁵⁰ Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), pp. 2, 122.

Burkina Faso to Liberia, 1989

How did conflict spread? Charles Taylor, who led the rebellion in Liberia in 1989, also participated in the 1987 coup in Burkina Faso that replaced Thomas Sankara with Blaise Compaoré.⁵¹ In return, once in power Compaoré provided significant help to Taylor. The Burkina Faso government provided Taylor with some troops for his expedition into Liberia, and Compaoré also introduced Taylor to Muammar Qaddafi, a major sponsor of the Liberian civil war.⁵²

Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of evangelization from Burkina Faso to Liberia.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Without Compaoré's provision of troops for Taylor's Liberian invasion, there would have been no direct link between the 1987 coup in Burkina Faso and the 1989 civil war onset in Liberia. Furthermore, Taylor's ties to Qaddafi — facilitated by Compaoré — were a major contributor to the onset of the Liberian civil war in general, in that they increased Taylor's capabilities. Therefore, it can be argued that evangelization was necessary to this case of substate conflict contagion, according to both the Civil War Necessity Criterion and the Main Link Criterion.

Burkina Faso to Sierra Leone, 1991

How did conflict spread? As with Charles Taylor, Revolutionary United Front leader Foday Sankoh also participated in the pro-Compaoré coup in Burkina Faso prior to his leadership

⁵¹ Paul Richards, personal communication, April 30, 2010.

⁵² Adekeye Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 48.

of the rebellion in Sierra Leone.⁵³ And, as above, “Burkina Faso ... acted as a supporting party to [the] RUF, providing the movement with valuable supplies throughout the conflict.”⁵⁴

Was state action present? As above, this was a clear case of evangelization from Burkina Faso to Sierra Leone.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As above, the Burkina Faso government’s desire to spread conflict to Sierra Leone formed the basis for the connection between the 1987 Burkina Faso coup and the 1991 Sierra Leone civil war. Without the evangelization in question, there likely would have been little or no connection between the two conflicts. Therefore, evangelization appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Burundi to Congo-Kinshasa, 1996

How did conflict spread? Like Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, though to a lesser extent, the Burundian government supported the anti-Mobutu insurgency in Zaire. It did so in retaliation for Mobutu’s harboring of CNDD-FDD rebels from the Burundian conflict in eastern Zaire.⁵⁵

Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of Burundian retaliation for Zairean meddling with overt partiality.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? It seems unlikely that Burundi would have supported a bloody civil war in a neighboring state had its security not been threatened by Mobutu’s meddling. Therefore, the evangelization in question seems to have been necessary to this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

⁵³ Paul Richards, personal communication, April 30, 2010.

⁵⁴ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Sierra Leone conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=136®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#.

⁵⁵ Filip Reyntjens, “Briefing: The Second Congo War: More than a Remake,” *African Affairs*, Vol. 98 (1999): 241-250, p. 242.

China to Angola, 1975 (potentially outside both the geographic and temporal scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? After winning the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and taking control of the Chinese state in Beijing, the Chinese Communist Party supported two of the warring groups in Angola — UNITA and the FNLA — at various points in the late 1960s up until 1975. Support included arms and training.⁵⁶

Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of Chinese evangelization.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Given the distance between China and Angola, it is safe to assume that without Chinese evangelization there would have been no connection between the Chinese Civil War and the conflict in Angola. Thus evangelization was necessary to contagion in this case, according to the Main Link Criterion.

China to Congo-Kinshasa, 1964 (potentially outside the geographic scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? The Chinese Communists trained anti-Kinshasa rebels in the 1960s Congo, specifically the National Liberation Council.⁵⁷

Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of Chinese evangelization.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Without Chinese evangelization, these two distant conflicts would likely have been unrelated. Therefore evangelization appears to have been necessary to this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Congo-Kinshasa to Angola, 1975 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? Zairean leader Mobutu Sese Seko provided training to the FNLA rebels in Angola, and Zairean troops accompanied FNLA units on some infiltrations into Angola. Zairean sponsorship of the Angolan rebellion was undertaken, in part, because “Mobutu

⁵⁶ W. Martin James III, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola 1974-1990* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1992, pp. 143-145, 180.

⁵⁷ Edgar O’Ballance, *The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 69.

had been angry for some time at the MPLA [which governed Angola] for its close association with the Katanga [rebel separatists in Zaire] gendarmes.”⁵⁸

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of meddling with overt partiality on the part of Angola, leading to retaliation by Zaire.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Although Mobutu supported the FNLA for various other reasons, including familial ties to the FNLA leader, none besides the Angolan meddling were related to the Katanga rebellion in Zaire.⁵⁹ This meddling seems to have been the sole connection between the two conflicts. Therefore, meddling with overt partiality was a necessary condition for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Congo-Kinshasa to Uganda, 1971

How did conflict spread? The civil war in Uganda began when the Ugandan army rebelled against the leader in Kampala, Apolo Milton Obote. The army would not have been in a position to rebel had it not been for the 1964-1965 civil war in neighboring Congo-Kinshasa. Uganda’s armed forces, at Obote’s direction, intervened in the Congolese war, supporting the anti-Kinshasa rebels by providing them sanctuary in Uganda and also by mounting incursions into Congolese territory. These operations ultimately led to the enlargement of the army, the establishment of an air force, and an increase in the equipment and general prestige of the armed forces.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ James, “A Political History of the Civil War in Angola,” pp. 59-60.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ A.G.G. Ginyera-Pinyewa, *Apolo Milton Obote and His Times* (New York: NOK Publishers, 1978), pp. 241, 245; Robert O. Matthews, “Interstate Conflicts in Africa: A Review,” *International Organization*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1970): 335-360, p. 347; Phares Mutibwa, *Uganda since Independence: A Story of Unfulfilled Hope* (London: Hurst and Company, 1992), p. 36; T.V. Sathyamurthy, *The Political Development of Uganda: 1900-1986* (Aldershot, U.K.: Gower Publishing Company, 1986), p. 549.

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Ugandan meddling with overt partiality in the Congolese conflict. This meddling resulted in blowback in Uganda by empowering an anti-state element that ultimately rebelled.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Absent Uganda's meddling, the conflicts in Congo-Kinshasa and Uganda would probably not have been related. In fact, the civil war in Uganda may not even have broken out had the military adventure in Congo-Kinshasa not strengthened Uganda's armed forces. Hence the meddling in this case was necessary for substate conflict contagion, according to both the Civil War Necessity Criterion and the Main Link Criterion.

Cuba to Ethiopia, 1964 (potentially outside the geographic scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? The Cuban government trained leftist rebels in Ethiopia.⁶¹

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Cuban evangelization.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? It is doubtful that these distant conflicts would have been related at all without the direct Cuban effort to support the Ethiopian rebels. Therefore, evangelization appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Ethiopia to Somalia, 1978

How did conflict spread? The instability in Ethiopia, including the 1974 overthrow of Haile Selassie, created in the minds of the leaders of Somalia a window of opportunity in which to capture the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Consequently Somalia increased its longtime antagonism in the Ogaden region from support for Ethiopian separatists to a full-scale invasion. However, Somalia ultimately lost the interstate war with Ethiopia. As a result, elites in Somalia

⁶¹ Gebru Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), p. 59.

lost faith in the government and staged a coup in 1978. This coup began the unraveling of the government and the eventual civil war that persists to this day.⁶²

Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of Somali meddling with overt partiality. Although Somalia's actions included the initiation of an interstate war over the Ogaden region, this can be seen as a continuation of their policy of support for separatist rebels in that region. (The "separatists" generally also wanted the Ogaden region to join Somalia.) As mentioned in Chapter 2, Somali meddling embittered the home population and ultimately resulted in civil war.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? It can be argued that had Somalia not invaded Ethiopia, there would not have been a civil war in Somalia. Seemingly it took this specific spark to prompt Somali elites to set off the decades-long conflict. Therefore, the Somali meddling was a necessary condition for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

Ethiopia to Sudan, 1983

How did conflict spread? The Ethiopian government was a major sponsor of the SPLA rebel group in Southern Sudan. In fact, "the SPLA [had an] early dependence on Mengistu's government." This support, in turn, was given due to Sudan's support for the Eritrean rebels. In 1976, the Ethiopian government threatened the Sudanese government with support for the Southern Sudanese rebels if the Sudanese government did not stop supporting the Eritrean rebels; the Sudanese government ignored this warning.⁶³

⁶² Ioan M. Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 67; Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Ethiopia-Somalia interstate war (available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=55®ionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#) and the Somalia conflict (http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=141®ionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#).

⁶³ Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (Kampala: International African Institute, 2003), pp. 59-60.

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Sudanese meddling with overt partiality and Ethiopian retaliation for that meddling.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Given the SPLA's dependence on Mengistu, the civil war in Southern Sudan might not even have started without Ethiopia's support. And Ethiopia's support appears to have followed from the Sudanese meddling in the Eritrean insurgency. Therefore, meddling in this case was a necessary condition for substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

Gambia to Liberia, 1989 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? The invasion force that Charles Taylor led into Liberia was supplemented by "internationalist revolutionaries from Gambia," including Kukoi Samba Sanyang, who "was officially listed as Taylor's vice president" in 1989.⁶⁴ These "revolutionaries" left the Gambia after a failed coup attempt in 1981.

Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of expulsion by the government of the Gambia — and also by the governments of Senegal and Guinea-Bissau. During the 1981 coup attempt, the Gambian and Senegalese governments "drove out" the rebels, who first escaped to Guinea-Bissau. Subsequently, Sanyang and others were deported to Cuba, and then went to Libya (where they met Taylor), and finally ended up in Liberia.⁶⁵

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? If the expulsion of the Gambian revolutionaries had not occurred, they almost certainly would not have ended up in Liberia. The two countries are quite distant from one another. In fact, the small conflict in the Gambia likely would have had nothing to do with the subsequent major civil war in Liberia.

⁶⁴ Stephen Ellis, "Liberia 1989-1992: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence," *African Affairs*, Vol. 94, No. 375 (1995): 165-197, pp. 167-169.

⁶⁵ Arnold Hughes and David Perfect, *Historical Dictionary of The Gambia* (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2008), p. 42.

Therefore, expulsion appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Ghana to Liberia, 1989 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? Ghanaian leader Jerry John Rawlings came to power in a bloody 1981 coup that killed about 50 people.⁶⁶ Subsequently Rawlings supported revolutionary Pan-Africanists throughout West Africa, including Charles Taylor on his insurrectionary adventure in Liberia.⁶⁷

Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of evangelization.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The small coup in Ghana probably would have had nothing to do with the major Liberian civil war had evangelization from Ghana to Liberia not taken place. Therefore, evangelization appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Iraq to Ethiopia, 1964 (potentially outside the geographic scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? Following the 1958 pan-Arab coup in Iraq, the government there became a “mainstay” of support for the rebel Eritrean Liberation Front in Ethiopia.⁶⁸

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Iraqi evangelization.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Iraqi and Ethiopian conflicts probably would have had little to do with each other absent Iraqi evangelization. Also, given the importance of Iraqi government support to the Eritrean rebels, it can be argued that the Eritrean conflict would never have escalated into a civil war without this early Iraqi support.

⁶⁶ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Ghana conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=64®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa.

⁶⁷ Stephen Ellis, personal communication, May 7, 2010.

⁶⁸ Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974* (London: James Currey, 1991), p. 219.

Therefore, evangelization appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to both the Civil War Necessity Criterion and the Main Link Criterion.

Liberia to Sierra Leone, 1991

How did conflict spread? As discussed in Chapter 2, Charles Taylor supported the rebel Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone after capturing the government of Liberia.⁶⁹

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Liberian evangelization.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The main connection between the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars appears to have been Taylor's evangelization program. Therefore, evangelization seems to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Rwanda to Burundi, 1991

How did conflict spread? The anti-Hutu civil war in Rwanda sparked fears in Burundi of a Tutsi takeover of the region and increased "popular sympathy" for the Palipehutu, a Hutu party in Burundi that ultimately fought in the Burundian civil war. Also, "as it became apparent that the Burundi government was doing nothing to prevent certain Rwanda refugees of Tutsi origins from joining the [Rwandan Tutsi rebels] and was possibly encouraging the move, the Rwanda authorities understandably responded in kind and gave their whole-hearted support to Palipehutu refugees in Rwanda."⁷⁰

Was state action present? Yes, this appears to be a case of Burundian meddling with overt partiality in the Rwandan conflict, prompting retaliation by Rwanda.

⁶⁹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Liberia conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=94®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#.

⁷⁰ Rene Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 153-154.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Burundian meddling and Rwandan retaliation do not constitute the only link between the Rwandan and Burundian civil wars; as noted above, the events in Rwanda also changed the political environment in Burundi without state action being involved. Therefore, meddling cannot be considered necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion.

Rwanda to Congo-Kinshasa, 1996

How did conflict spread? As discussed in Chapter 2, Rwanda famously retaliated for Zaire's harboring of anti-Rwanda rebels by leading an international effort to start a civil war in Zaire.

Was state action present? Yes, this is the banner case of meddling with overt partiality resulting in retaliation by State A.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Zairean meddling and subsequent Rwandan retaliation constitute the clearest and most discussed link between these two conflicts. Therefore, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Somalia to Ethiopia, 2009 (originally included in the 1946-2007 temporal scope because of the substate conflict onset in 1994)

How did conflict spread? The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), which began fighting for independence from Ethiopia in the 1990s, was strengthened by flows of refugees from Somalia starting in 1991, when the government in Mogadishu collapsed. Many of these refugees were originally from the Ogaden region in Ethiopia and had crossed over to Somalia when that government was more stable. When they returned, it allowed "the ONLF ... to

establish a presence within the territory it sought to liberate.”⁷¹ However, the Ethiopia-ONLF conflict did not reach the level of a civil war — 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths — until 2009.⁷² By this point, the Ethiopian state was three years into a major military intervention in the Somali civil war, in support of a Transitional National Government set up in Mogadishu. The fighting in Ogaden “escalated sharply” starting in 2007, “fueled by Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia.”⁷³ The ONLF was upset with Ethiopia’s incursion into Somali territory and with Ethiopia’s use of the Ogaden region as a base for these incursions.⁷⁴

Was state action present? Yes, the Ethiopian government meddled with overt partiality in the Somali civil war starting in 2006. This meddling appears to have embittered the ONLF further and intensified their violence.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The origins of the ONLF conflict cannot be attributed to a state action but rather to flows of refugees from Somalia to Ethiopia in the early 1990s. However, the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia starting in 2006 appears to be linked to the escalation of the Ogaden conflict into a full-scale civil war; absent Ethiopian meddling, Ogaden might well have remained a small-scale conflict. Therefore, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

South Africa to Angola, 1975

How did conflict spread? The Angolan government, led by the MPLA, supported the two main anti-Pretoria rebel groups in South Africa, the anti-apartheid ANC and the pro-Namibia

⁷¹ Tobias Hagmann and Mohamud H. Khalif, “State and Politics in Ethiopia’s Somali Region Since 1991,” *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies*, Vol. 6 (2006): 25-49, p. 40.

⁷² Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Ethiopia (Ogaden) conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=55®ionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#.

⁷³ Terrence Lyons, “Ethiopia’s Convergence of Crises,” *Current History*, Vol. 107, No. 708 (2008): 154-160, p. 158.

⁷⁴ Ogaden National Liberation Front, “Ogaden Rebels to Resist Ethiopian Army if it Attacks Somali — Statement,” available online (<http://www.sudantribune.com/Ogaden-rebels-to-resist-Ethiopian,18952>).

SWAPO. In retaliation, the South African government gave “significant military and logistic support” to two Angolan rebel groups, the FNLA and UNITA.⁷⁵

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of South African retaliation for Angolan meddling with overt partiality.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? South African support for Angolan rebel groups appears to have been the main connection between these two conflicts. Therefore, meddling seems to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Sudan to Ethiopia, 1964

How did conflict spread? The Sudanese government provided significant support to the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) fighting in Ethiopia. Apparently they did this in retaliation for Ethiopian involvement in the Southern Sudanese civil war — specifically, during the 1960s, Ethiopia permitted Israel to “push aid through to the rebels in Southern Sudan” via Ethiopian territory.⁷⁶

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Sudanese retaliation for Ethiopian meddling with overt partiality.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Sudanese support for the ELF, the sole connection found between these two conflicts, appears to have occurred mainly as a consequence of Ethiopian meddling in Southern Sudan. Therefore, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

⁷⁵ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Angola (government) conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=4®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#.

⁷⁶ Patrick Gilkes, *The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975), pp. 196-197.

Sudan to Ethiopia, 1976

How did conflict spread? The EPRP and TPLF rebel movements in Ethiopia also received support from the Sudanese government,⁷⁷ seemingly again because of Ethiopian support for the Southern Sudanese rebels. (As noted in the Ethiopia to Sudan, 1983 coding, Ethiopia began supporting the Southern Sudanese anew in 1976.)

Was state action present? Yes, this is yet another case of Sudanese retaliation for Ethiopian meddling with overt partiality.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Again, the connection between these two conflicts appears to have hinged on Ethiopia's involvement in the Southern Sudanese civil war. Therefore, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Sudan to Ethiopia, 1977

How did conflict spread? The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia had training bases in southwestern Sudan, again because of Ethiopian support for the Southern Sudanese rebels.⁷⁸

Was state action present? Yes, this is yet another case of Sudanese retaliation for Ethiopian meddling with overt partiality.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Yet again, the connection between these two conflicts appears to have hinged on Ethiopia's involvement in the Southern Sudanese civil war. Therefore, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

⁷⁷ John Markakis and Nega Ayele, "Class and Revolution in Ethiopia," *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 8 (1977): 99-108, p. 106.

⁷⁸ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Ethiopia (Oromiya) conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=55®ionSelect=1-Northern_Africa#.

Sudan to Uganda, 1971

How did conflict spread? A sizeable portion of the Idi Amin-led rebel faction that began the Ugandan civil war in 1971 consisted of former Anya Nya guerillas who had earlier fought against Khartoum in Southern Sudan. Ironically, Anya Nya guerillas were supplied and trained in part by Israel, which used Ugandan territory as a “conduit” for this aid with the consent of Milton Obote’s government in Kampala.⁷⁹

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Ugandan meddling with overt partiality in the Sudanese civil war. While Sudan did not retaliate for this meddling directly as they did in Ethiopia, the Ugandan meddling blew back by enabling rebel fighters who later assisted in the overthrow of the *Ugandan* state.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Sudanese and Ugandan conflicts appear unrelated except for the cadre of Anya Nya fighters in Amin’s rebel group, who in turn were as capable as they were because of Uganda’s meddling (allowing Israeli training) in the Sudanese civil war. Absent this training, the Anya Nya guerillas might not have been as useful to Amin, and a full-scale civil war would have been much more difficult to start. Therefore, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to both the Civil War Necessity Criterion and the Main Link Criterion.

Uganda to Congo-Kinshasa, 1996

How did conflict spread? Along with Rwanda and Angola, Uganda sponsored the anti-Mobutu insurgency in what was then Zaire, in retaliation for Zairean support of anti-Kampala rebels.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Thomas P. Ofcansky, *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 42, 128.

⁸⁰ Byman and Pollack, “Things Fall Apart,” p. 122.

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of meddling with overt partiality by Zaire, prompting retaliation by Uganda.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As with the other dyads in the Central African war of 1996, the main connection between the Ugandan and Zairean conflicts appears to have hinged on Zaire's meddling in Uganda. Therefore, meddling was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Uganda to Rwanda, 1990

How did conflict spread? As I also described in Chapter 2, Uganda began discriminating against a cadre of Rwandan combatants after the National Resistance Army (NRA) took over the government in Kampala in 1986. These discriminatory policies eventually forced the repatriation of these combatants back into Rwanda, where they formed the majority of the members of the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that began fighting against Kigali in 1990.⁸¹

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of expulsion by the Ugandan government.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? These Rwandan combatants, expelled by Uganda, appear to constitute the main link between the Ugandan and Rwandan civil wars. In addition, the Rwandan civil war may not have even started without this substantial influx of fighters into the RPF. Therefore, expulsion seems to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to both the Civil War Necessity Criterion and the Main Link Criterion.

⁸¹ Jeanne M. Haskin, *The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 75; Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide* (London: Verso, 2004), pp. 13-14.

Zimbabwe to Mozambique, 1977

How did conflict spread? From independence, the Marxist government of Mozambique “openly supported Rhodesian rebel group ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union).” In response, the government of Rhodesia “set about to assist the creation of a counter-revolutionary force” in Mozambique, which eventually became the rebel group RENAMO.⁸²

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Rhodesian (Zimbabwean) retaliation for Mozambique’s meddling with overt partiality.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Rhodesian support for RENAMO appears to have been a key contributor to RENAMO’s formation, as well as the only connection identified between the Rhodesian and Mozambique conflicts. Therefore, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to both the Civil War Necessity Criterion and the Main Link Criterion.

Zimbabwe to South Africa, 1981

How did conflict spread? In 1980, Robert Mugabe and his rebels in Rhodesia ousted the sitting government and established the state of Zimbabwe. Soon after, Mugabe began supporting the African National Congress (ANC) rebels fighting against the government of South Africa, providing a “launching ground for guerilla activity in South Africa.”⁸³ The South Africa-ANC conflict first caused battle deaths in 1981.⁸⁴

Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of evangelization by the government of Zimbabwe.

⁸² Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Mozambique conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=111®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#.

⁸³ Iris Berger, *South Africa in World History* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press (2009), p. 140.

⁸⁴ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the South Africa (government) conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=142®ionSelect=2-Southern_Africa#.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Zimbabwe's support for the ANC appears to have been the main connection between the Rhodesian and South African conflicts. Therefore, evangelization appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Afghanistan to Algeria, 1991 (potentially outside the geographic scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? One of the major rebel groups at the start of the Algerian civil war, the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA), was started by jihadists returning to Algeria from the civil war in Afghanistan.⁸⁵

Was state action present? Seemingly not. The most likely state action would have been expulsion, but the Algerian fighters in Afghanistan seem to have returned to Algeria of their own free will.⁸⁶ Nor was there any apparent evangelization from the Afghan state to Algeria, nor meddling by the Algerian state in Afghanistan. This conflict, then, seems to have spread via nonstate factors alone — namely, the State A conflict militarized State B fighters who returned to contribute to the onset of the State B conflict.

Afghanistan to Iraq, 2004

How did conflict spread? As described in Chapter 2, when the Northern Alliance, backed by the United States, took over the Afghan government in late 2001, military attacks forced many violent jihadists who for decades had been based in Afghanistan to flee elsewhere. A significant number of these jihadists, including Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, ended up in Iraq, where

⁸⁵ James Ciment, *Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge* (New York: Facts on File, 1997), p. 5. See also John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*, Second Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), p. 263.

⁸⁶ See Jean-Pierre Filiu, "The Local and Global Jihad of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (2009): 213-226, p. 216.

they recruited and trained men to fight the government in Baghdad and significantly elevated the intensity of the civil war there.⁸⁷

Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of expulsion.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? If the jihadist fighters had not been expelled from Afghanistan, it is likely they would have stayed there — after all, until 2001 Afghanistan was an ideal haven for terrorist groups. Thus they would likely not have ended up in Iraq. The Iraqi civil war may still have started without these foreign fighters, but there would have been little to no Afghan influence on the conflict in that case. Thus expulsion was necessary to contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Iraq to Iran, 1966

How did conflict spread? In 1966, the Shah of Iran began supporting the KDP, a Kurdish rebel group fighting against the government of Iraq. He did this to reduce the KDP's dependence on the KDPI, another Kurdish faction which was advocating for independence from Iran. Barzani, the KDP rebel leader, welcomed Iranian state support and in return began to oppose the KDPI cause. Eventually, Barzani began expelling Iranian Kurds from Iraq back to Iran. These expelled Kurds ultimately initiated guerilla warfare in Iran.⁸⁸

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Iranian meddling with overt partiality in the Iraqi conflict. This meddling blew back by introducing into Iran Kurds from the Iraqi conflict, who had the experience and the inclination to fight a guerilla war.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Based on this recounting, it seems likely that the Kurdish struggle in Iran would never have escalated to a civil

⁸⁷ Peter J. Munson, *Iraq in Transition: The Legacy of the Dictatorship and the Prospects for Democracy* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2009), pp. 144-145.

⁸⁸ David Romano, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 231-232.

war without the Iranian meddling that prompted Barzani's expulsion of experienced Kurdish fighters. Thus, in this case meddling appears to have been necessary for substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

Iraq to Turkey, 1984

How did conflict spread? The Iraqi Kurdish rebels (the KDP) supported the Turkish Kurdish rebels (the PKK) by providing them with territory in northern Iraq.⁸⁹

Was state action present? Yes, there appears to have been Turkish meddling with overt partiality in support of the Iraqi government. The Turkish government made both air and ground incursions into northern Iraq in the early 1980s, in pursuit of Kurdish rebels and with the aid of intelligence from Baghdad.⁹⁰ It is not clear whether the Turkish government engaged with KDP fighters as well as PKK fighters, but I suspect the two were difficult to distinguish and that Ankara must have fought the KDP in Iraq to some extent.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? In general the KDP and PKK disliked one another due to ideological differences,⁹¹ so some explanation for their cooperation is needed. Kirstin Hasler argues that "cooperation was possible primarily because the Kurds in ... Iraq resented Ankara's bombing campaigns in their territory, and their cooperation with the Iraqi ... governments to subdue their own movement."⁹² Therefore, it seems unlikely that the KDP and PKK would have cooperated in the absence of Turkish meddling — making meddling necessary for this case of contagion according to the Main Link Criterion.

⁸⁹ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 316.

⁹⁰ Edgar O'Ballance, *The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 153.

⁹¹ Romano, "The Kurdish Nationalist Movement," pp. 231-232.

⁹² Kirstin Hasler, "Myths of Contagion: Ethnicity and the Spread of Civil Conflict," Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, March 2011, pp. 27-28. Citing David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 422.

Israel to Iran, 1979

How did conflict spread? Members of the Iranian rebel group Mujahedin e Khalq (MEK) were trained by Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) guerillas in Jordan and Lebanon in late 1960s and the very early 1970s (1971 at latest, as far as I can tell).⁹³

Was state action present? Perhaps, but probably not. Evangelization and meddling with overt partiality are definitely absent.⁹⁴ A case of expulsion is possible if the PLO trainers of the MEK were in Lebanon because they had been expelled there by the government of Jordan, a third-party state to this dyad. However, the Jordanian expulsion took place in late 1970, and as far as I can tell the PLO training of the MEK guerillas occurred almost entirely before then. Thus a state action appears not to have been involved in this case of substate conflict contagion. Instead, conflict spread solely through the means of rebels from State A assisting rebels in State B.

Israel to Iraq, 2004

How did conflict spread? After being expelled from Afghanistan (see Afghanistan to Iraq, 2004), Abu Musab al-Zarqawi traveled throughout the Middle East trying to recruit al Qaeda adherents. Ultimately, the Ain al-Halwa Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon became “his prime recruiting ground.” This refugee camp existed because of the Israeli-Palestinian substate conflict; hence Israel is State A in this dyad. Subsequently Zarqawi and his followers went to Iraq, where they played a major role in the start of the anti-Baghdad insurgency there.⁹⁵

⁹³ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Iran (government) conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=76®ionSelect=10-Middle_East#. The last mention of PLO training is just prior to a failed MEK operation in 1971.

⁹⁴ On the lack of Iranian meddling in the Israeli conflict prior to 1979, see Trita Parsi, *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 71.

⁹⁵ Munson, “Iraq in Transition,” p. 146.

Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of expulsion by a third-party state, Jordan. (Recall that the expulsion mechanism can involve expulsion by State A or by another state.) In 1970, Jordan expelled a number of mobilized Palestinian insurgents who had come to Jordan from Israel. These insurgents ended up in Lebanese refugee camps, including Ain al-Halwa, which they transformed into training grounds for a variety of Middle Eastern rebel groups,⁹⁶ including Al Qaeda in Iraq.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Jordanian expulsion seems to constitute the main link between the Israeli-Palestinian substate conflict and the civil war in Iraq. The two conflicts would probably be unrelated otherwise. It seems unlikely that Zarqawi would have been able to recruit fighters from refugee camps in Lebanon had Black September (the Jordanian expulsion) not occurred, because Black September significantly increased the militancy of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. (Most notably, Black September brought the PLO leadership and 3,000 to 5,000 commandos to Lebanon, adding significant mobilization capabilities to the discontent of the Palestinians already there.⁹⁷) Similarly, had the Palestinian insurgents stayed in Jordan, they would have been forced to operate in the shadow of a stronger state government and therefore would have had a significantly decreased ability to staff and train foreign insurgent groups. Thus expulsion appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

⁹⁶ Jaber Suleiman, "The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1999): 66-80.

⁹⁷ Don Peretz, *Palestinians, Refugees, and the Middle East Peace Process* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), pp. 62-64; Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000), p. 341; Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 449-464, 492-493. The PLO did operate in Lebanon prior to 1970 (see Tessler, pp. 449-464), but Black September significantly increased the PLO's footprint on the Palestinian refugee community there.

Israel to Lebanon, 1958

How did conflict spread? Following Israel's independence in 1948, approximately 120,000 Palestinian refugees fled over the border to Lebanon. These refugees changed the demographic balance in Lebanon, a tightly calibrated consociational democracy. Muslim elites asked for a new census that would reflect this predominantly Muslim refugee influx, which the Christian leadership of Lebanon refused to grant. These religious tensions eventually led to the 1958 Lebanese civil war.⁹⁸

Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality appear to be absent from this case of contagion. The Israeli government expelled *refugees* in 1948, but not combatants — the combatant expulsion into Lebanon came from Jordan in 1970 (see above). And the Lebanese state appears not to have meddled overtly in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at this point.⁹⁹ Therefore, in this case conflict spread solely as the result of the politically destabilizing effects of refugee flows.

Israel to Lebanon, 1975

How did conflict spread? The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) presence in Lebanon had become highly destabilizing by the mid-1970s. The PLO was operating as a “state within a state,” and still participating in the anti-Israel substate conflict from which they had originated. The PLO presence in Lebanon was a significant cause of the 1975 Lebanese civil

⁹⁸ Thomas Collelo, ed., *Lebanon: A Country Study* (Washington: Library of Congress, 1987); Tom Russell, “A Lebanon Primer,” *MERIP Reports*, No. 133 (1985): 17-19, p. 17; Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Lebanon conflict. Available online:

http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=92®ionSelect=10-Middle_East#.

⁹⁹ M.S. Agwani, *The Lebanese Crisis, 1958: A Documentary Study* (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965); Helena Cobban, *The Making of Modern Lebanon* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 82-92; K.S. Salibi, *The Modern History of Lebanon* (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 191-202.

war, in that it heightened the religious tensions present in the country since the 1940s and substantially undermined the legitimacy of the state in Beirut.¹⁰⁰

Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of expulsion, again by Jordan in 1970. There were Palestinian refugees in Lebanon from 1948, but the insurgent presence was largely attributable to the events of Black September.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Israeli and the Lebanese conflicts shared two major links: the presence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, which did *not* result from expulsion as defined by the State Action Explanation (see above), and the presence of Palestinian *combatants* in Lebanon, which *did* result to a significant degree from Jordanian expulsion. So in the absence of Jordanian expulsion, the Israeli and Lebanese conflicts might still have been related. However, the PLO presence in Lebanon — to a great extent the result of Jordanian expulsion — was such a significant factor in the 1975 civil war that it seems unlikely there would have been a civil war at all absent that state action. Therefore, I consider the Jordanian expulsion to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

Israel to Lebanon, 1982

How did conflict spread? After the 1975-1976 civil war in Lebanon, the continued PLO presence in southern Lebanon continued to pose a perceived threat to Israel. In response, in 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon and installed Bashir Gemayel as its president. This touched off the infamous 1982-1990 Lebanese civil war.¹⁰¹

Was state action present? Yes, as with the cases above, the PLO presence in Lebanon was largely attributable to expulsion by Jordan.

¹⁰⁰ UCDP summary on the Lebanon conflict.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As with the 1975 case, the PLO presence in Lebanon — largely the result of Jordanian expulsion — appears to have been integral to the onset of the 1982 civil war. Therefore, expulsion was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

Israel to Turkey, 1984

How did conflict spread? The PKK rebels in Turkey trained in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley in the early 1980s. Palestinian insurgents from the anti-Israel substate conflict were among the trainers.¹⁰²

Was state action present? Yes, as with the cases above, the Palestinian insurgent presence in Lebanon is largely attributable to the Jordanian expulsion in 1970.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Kurdish rebellion in Turkey would likely have had little connection to each other without the Palestinian training for the PKK, which was in turn largely the result of the Jordanian expulsion in 1970. (As in the Israel to Iraq, 2004 case, had expulsion not occurred, the PKK probably could not have trained with Palestinian insurgents in Jordan. The Jordanian government was more capable than the Lebanese government at stopping such illicit activity.) Therefore, expulsion was necessary to this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Lebanon to Syria, 1979

How did conflict spread? In 1976, Syria intervened in the Lebanese civil war on the side of the Maronite Christians. This intervention “seriously compromised the [Syrian] leadership’s legitimacy as an Arab and Muslim proponent,” contributing to the rise of the Muslim

¹⁰² Zurcher, “Turkey,” p. 316.

Brotherhood rebellion in Syria in 1979.¹⁰³ Conditions in Syria were also worsened by an influx of “hundreds of thousands of Lebanese refugees” from the 1975-1976 civil war there.¹⁰⁴

Was state action present? Yes, this is clear case of meddling with overt partiality by Syria in Lebanon, which fostered resentment among the Syrian population.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Although Syrian meddling and the subsequent boomeranging of conflict back to Syria appear to have constituted an important connection between the Syrian and Lebanese conflicts in the late 1970s, they were not the only connections; there were refugee flows from Lebanon to Syria as well. Therefore, I cannot assert that meddling was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion.

North Yemen to South Yemen, 1986

How did conflict spread? Rebel forces in South Yemen were augmented by North Yemeni rebels from the National Democratic Front, which had been “forced to retreat from the North into the South” by the North Yemeni government in 1982.¹⁰⁵

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of expulsion by North Yemen.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Other than the North Yemeni expulsion, no relationship between the conflicts in North Yemen and South Yemen was observed. Therefore, expulsion appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Afghanistan to Pakistan, 2007

How did conflict spread? The Pakistani state supported the Taliban of the Afghan civil war during most of the 1990s and 2000s, with the exception of a brief hiatus during the

¹⁰³ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Syria conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=150®ionSelect=10-Middle_East#.

¹⁰⁴ Patrick Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), p. 320.

¹⁰⁵ F. Gregory Gause III, “Yemeni Unity: Past and Future,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1988): 33-47, p. 45.

American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Islamabad's assistance to and harboring of the Afghan Taliban allowed the Afghan Taliban to create a support network of Pashtun nationalists in northwestern Pakistan with Islamist sympathies. Shortly after the Afghanistan invasion in 2001, these Pakistani Pashtun nationalists began to violently oppose the Pakistani regime, in attacks which crossed the 1,000 battle-death threshold in 2007. That same year, the so-called "Pakistani Taliban" was formed under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud, a former fighter for the Pakistan-supported Afghan Taliban.¹⁰⁶

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Pakistani meddling with overt partiality in the Afghan civil war resulting in blowback, as a local network meant to support the Afghan Taliban ended up fighting the Pakistani government.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid describes the importance of the ties between the Afghan Taliban and the nascent Pakistani Taliban in the initial stages of the latter's rebellion:

"Many Pashtuns from FATA [the Federally Administered Tribal Area in Pakistan] had fought for the Afghan Taliban ... in the 1990s and again during and after the U.S. invasion. ... Now the Pakistani Pashtun in FATA became the hosts of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, providing safe houses, food, transport, and other logistics to their guests, who in turn paid ... lavishly for the hospitality. ... Living alongside foreign radicals for so many years, it was only natural that the local Pashtun would also become radicalized, even as they became rich, and that they would ultimately develop their own political agenda. Soon former fighters and guides who once used donkeys could afford fleets of pickup trucks and hire hundreds of bodyguards, who then developed into local militias."¹⁰⁷

Although it is now debated whether the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban still maintain close ties, it is clear that the logistical and ideological influence of the Afghan Taliban was essential to the *formation* of the Pakistani Taliban. It is likely that the Pakistani Taliban civil war

¹⁰⁶ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia*, Second Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 187, 237-239.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 237-238.

would not have erupted without this Afghan Taliban influence, which in turn came about because of Islamabad's support for and harboring of the Afghan Taliban in northwestern Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistani meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

Afghanistan to Tajikistan, 1992

How did conflict spread? The Afghan civil war had a variety of influences on the Tajik civil war. First, it has been argued that "groups in ... Tajikistan [saw] Afghanistan as a model for their own struggles."¹⁰⁸ Second, the Afghan conflict provided a steady supply of arms and drugs to the rebels in Tajikistan.¹⁰⁹ Third, "the replacement of the Soviet-supported government in Kabul by a weak coalition of mujahidin (Islamic resistance fighters) strengthened forces in Afghanistan sympathetic to the opposition in Tajikistan."¹¹⁰

Was state action present? Yes, there was clearly evangelization on the part of the Afghan government after Kabul passed from pro-Soviet to mujahedin hands. For example, around 1993 the Afghan Defense Minister harbored Tajik rebels in northern Afghanistan and provided them with military training.¹¹¹

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? In this case it is not clear whether contagion would have occurred in the absence of evangelization from the Afghan government. The Tajik civil war began in 1992, yet the best evidence we have for Afghan evangelization dates to 1993. It is possible that Kabul's support for the anti-Dushanbe insurgency began earlier, but we cannot be sure. Meanwhile, there were several nonstate influences on the

¹⁰⁸ Byman and Pollack, "Things Fall Apart," p. 113.

¹⁰⁹ Barnett R. Rubin, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1993): 71-91, pp. 71, 73.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹¹¹ Barnett R. Rubin, "Afghanistan in 1993: Abandoned but Surviving," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1994): 185-190, p. 188.

Afghan civil war on Tajikistan — rebels inspiring rebels, arms flows, and drug flows. Overall, it would be a stretch to claim Afghan evangelization as a necessary condition for contagion.

Burma to India, 1956

How did conflict spread? The Naga National Council (NNC), an insurgent group in Northeast India, received material support from various Burmese insurgent groups in its early years, including the communist and Kachin rebels in Burma.¹¹²

Was state action present? Yes, the Indian state meddled with overt partiality in the Burmese conflict by supporting the Burmese government. “At the height of the [Burmese] civil war in 1950, both India and Britain provided Burma with 10,000 small weapons each.”¹¹³

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? I did not find any evidence that the Indian support for the Burmese government caused the Burmese insurgent support for the NNC.¹¹⁴ It is certainly plausible that Indian enmity toward the Burmese rebels increased the Burmese rebels’ propensity to support an anti-India insurgent group, but I could not confirm this supposition in the secondary sources. Therefore, I cannot assert that Indian meddling was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion.

It is also worth noting that Bertil Lintner, an expert on Burmese-Indian relations, argues that had India not meddled on the side of the government in the Burmese conflict, the Burmese

¹¹² Anindita Dasgupta, “Small Arms Proliferation in India’s Northeast: A Case Study of Assam,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2001): 59-65, p. 59; Ton That Thien, *India and South East Asia, 1947-1960* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1963), p. 180.

¹¹³ Bertil Lintner, “Burma and its Neighbors,” in Surjit Mansingh, ed., *Indian and Chinese Foreign Policies in Comparative Perspective* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1998); available online: http://www.asiapacificms.com/papers/pdf/burma_india_china.pdf, p. 9.

¹¹⁴ See, for example, Renaud Egretteau, *Wooing the Generals: India’s New Burma Policy* (New Delhi: Centre de Sciences Humaines, 2003), pp. 57-72.

government might well have collapsed.¹¹⁵ So this case could even be seen as one in which meddling with overt partiality had *positive* consequences on net.

Cambodia to Indonesia, 2003 (potentially not a genuine case of substate conflict contagion)

How did conflict spread? At least some of the weapons used in the Acehese civil war in Indonesia came from the eclipsing civil war in Cambodia.¹¹⁶ Whether these Cambodian arms were a non-negligible cause of the civil war in Indonesia is debatable. On the one hand, most Acehese arms acquisitions in the 1989-1990 period, as the substate conflict in Indonesia began, were local — raids of Indonesian police caches, for example.¹¹⁷ On the other hand, by 2003, the year that the Acehese conflict reached 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths and thus qualified as a civil war, some arms were coming to Aceh from Cambodia.¹¹⁸

Was state action present? No, a review of the secondary sources cited above yielded no evidence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality. If this was a genuine case of substate conflict contagion, it seems to have occurred solely through the movement of arms between nonstate actors.

Cambodia to Thailand, 1976

How did conflict spread? As discussed in Chapter 5, the Khmer Rouge, which governed Cambodia between 1975 and 1978, provided training, arms, and sanctuary to the Communist Party of Thailand.

Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of evangelization. Expulsion and meddling with overt partiality may have also been weakly present in this case (see Chapter 5),

¹¹⁵ Lintner, “Burma and its Neighbors.”

¹¹⁶ Kirsten E. Schulze, *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization* (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), p. 28.

¹¹⁷ Edward Aspinall, *Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p. 110.

¹¹⁸ John Martinkus, *Indonesia’s Secret War in Aceh* (Sydney: Random House Australia, 2004), p. 216.

although they do not seem to have contributed substantially to contagion. For the purposes of Figure 3.4, this is counted as an evangelization case.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As discussed in Chapter 5, the Khmer Rouge support was a crucial bulwark for the CPT's capabilities, without which civil war onset in Thailand would likely have been impossible. Evangelization appears to have been necessary for this case of contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

China to Burma, 1948

How did conflict spread? The Communist Party of Burma decided to launch its armed struggle in the spring of 1948, "support[ing] the Maoist strategy of guerilla warfare as opposed to general strikes."¹¹⁹ Seemingly, then, Maoism was an important influence on the rebels' election of armed insurrection.

Was state action present? No, there appears to have been no evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality involved in this case of substate conflict contagion. Even if the Chinese Communist Party had supported the Communist Party of Burma (seemingly it did not at this time),¹²⁰ this would not count as evangelization because the CCP was not a state actor in 1948. Instead, conflict appears to have spread solely via the inspiration of one rebel group by another.

¹¹⁹ Bertil Linter, *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1990), p. 14.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

China to Burma, 1949

How did conflict spread? Like the Communist Party of Burma, the Karen National Union — the main rebel actors in this particular Burmese civil war — was influenced by revolutionary Maoism.¹²¹

Was state action present? No, neither evangelization, expulsion, nor meddling with overt partiality was identified in this case. Regarding evangelization in particular, although this conflict did not start until January 1949, the CCP did not become a state actor until October 1949; and although the Chinese Communist Party *did* provide at least some support to the Karen rebels, this support seems to have begun in the 1950s, after the Karen civil war was already underway.¹²² As above, then, conflict appears to have spread solely via the inspiration of one rebel group by another.

China to Burma, 1959

How did conflict spread? The civil war fought between the Burmese government and the Shan ethnic group “can be linked to the [Nationalist Chinese] invasion and the influx of ethnic Burman troops and officials into the state.”¹²³ Essentially, the presence of defeated Kuomintang combatants in northern Burma led to a regime troop presence that aggrieved the Shan.

Was state action present? Yes, this appears to have been a case of Chinese expulsion. The Kuomintang combatants whose presence in large part caused the Shan civil war in Burma were there because they had been chased out of Yunnan Province in China by the advancing People’s

¹²¹ Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999), p. 93.

¹²² Jonathan Falla, *True Love and Bartholomew: Rebels on the Burmese Border* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 105.

¹²³ Martin Smith, “Burma,” p. 190.

Liberation Army. This expulsion seems to have begun around December 1949 — after the Chinese Communist Party became a state actor — and continued well into the early 1950s.¹²⁴

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Kuomintang presence in northern Burma appears to have been integral to the Shan civil war, and the expulsion of the Kuomintang from Yunnan Province appears to have been integral to their presence in Northern Burma. Therefore, expulsion was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

China to Burma, 1961

How did conflict spread? The war between the government of Burma and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA or KIO) was also related to the Kuomintang presence in northern Burma. The Nationalist Chinese presence provided the Chinese and Burmese governments with a critical piece of common ground — neither liked the anti-Beijing rebel hideout just over the border from China. The two governments were able to leverage this common ground to forge a treaty in 1960, in which Burma ceded three Kachin villages to China in exchange for joint Chinese-Burmese anti-Kuomintang operations in Burma. Yet “this historic treaty, made over the heads of local villagers, was a major factor behind the sudden outbreak of the Kachin uprising, begun by the ... KIO in February 1961.”¹²⁵

Was state action present? Yes — as above, the critical Kuomintang presence in Burma was the result of Chinese expulsion that had occurred roughly a decade earlier. By 1960 the Chinese may have been going back on their policy of expulsion, given that they were now

¹²⁴ Alfred W. McCoy, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 128; John F. Cady, “The Situation in Burma,” *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 22, No. 5 (1953): 49-54, p. 53.

¹²⁵ Smith, “Burma,” pp. 157-158; see also M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes,” *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2005): 46-83, pp. 67-68; and M. Taylor Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 86, 90.

making a concerted effort to pursue the Kuomintang rebels across the Chinese-Burmese border. (As discussed in Chapter 4, State A's pursuit of its rebels across international borders can be interpreted as evidence of a *lack* of a policy of expulsion.) Nevertheless, by this point the decade-old expulsion had already been completed.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As in the 1959 case above, the Kuomintang presence in Burma was integral to the Kachin civil war onset, and the Chinese state expulsion was integral to the Kuomintang presence. Therefore, expulsion was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

China to Cambodia, 1967 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? The Chinese Communists who became state actors at the end of the Chinese Civil War had an ambivalent relationship with the Cambodian Communists, who started the 30-year civil war in their country. However, at certain critical junctures, the PRC seems to have supported the Khmer Rouge. For example, Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot visited Beijing in 1966 and returned to Cambodia "with assurances of Chinese backing."¹²⁶ And in August 1967, "the Red Guards of the Cultural Revolution took charge of the foreign ministry and adopted the slogan 'Revolution is always right' to guide China's foreign policy." Although the influence of these Red Guards on Chinese foreign policy was supplanted by Chou En-lai by the beginning of 1968, some historians have asserted that in the interim few months the Red Guards covertly supported the Khmer Rouge.¹²⁷ By the time this alleged covert support ended, the civil war in Cambodia was underway.

¹²⁶ Wilfred P. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970-1975* (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1997), p. 51.

¹²⁷ Elizabeth Becker, *When the War was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution*, Second Edition (New York: PublicAffairs, 1998), p. 106.

Was state action present? Yes, this was a case of Chinese evangelization.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Maoism was an influence on Pol Pot apart from any tangible Chinese support for his rebellion; however, Maoism seems to have influenced his governance style once in Phnom Penh more so than his insurrectionary style.¹²⁸ In fact, while in rebellion against the Cambodian government, Pol Pot usually harbored a strong resentment for the Chinese Communists.¹²⁹ Therefore, the main connection between the Chinese Civil War and the Cambodian civil war appears to be this intermittent alleged evangelization of the PRC, making that evangelization a necessary condition for this case of substate conflict contagion according to the Main Link Criterion.

China to India, 1948

How did conflict spread? The leftist anti-New Delhi rebels in Hyderabad were influenced by Maoist ideas of revolution, according to multiple secondary sources.¹³⁰

Was state action present? No, neither evangelization, expulsion, nor meddling with overt partiality were identified in this case of substate conflict contagion. Even if the Chinese Communist Party had supported the Hyderabad rebels — and there is no evidence that they did — this would not count as evangelization, because the CCP was not a state actor in 1948. Instead, conflict appears to have spread solely via the inspiration of one rebel group by another.

China to India, 1956

How did conflict spread? As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Chinese Communist Party armed and trained the Naga rebels in northeast India in the 1950s.¹³¹

¹²⁸ Deac, “Road to the Killing Fields,” p. 42.

¹²⁹ Becker, “When the War was Over,” p. 106.

¹³⁰ John H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India: A Study in the Postwar Evolution of International Communist Strategy* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1956), p. 186; M.R. Masani, “The Communist Party in India,” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1951): 18-38, p. 27; C. Rajeswara Rao, “The Historic Telengana Struggle: Some Useful Lessons from Its Rich Experience,” Freedom Jubilee Series No. 3 (Communist Party of India, 1972, No. 26), p. 24.

Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of Chinese evangelization. Also, Chinese support for the Naga rebels may have increased due to Indian support for the Tibetan rebels in China; thus this may also be a case of Indian meddling with overt partiality.¹³² (For the purposes of Figure 3.4 above, this case is considered evangelization only, as a stronger case can be made for evangelization than for meddling.)

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The Chinese support for the Naga rebels appears to have been highly significant to the onset of the Naga civil war in general. For example, the CCP provided the Naga “with sophisticated weapons” that no doubt substantially increased rebel capabilities.¹³³ It could be argued, then, that in the absence of that evangelization there would have been no Naga civil war at all — perhaps just a low-level substate conflict. Thus evangelization appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

China to Laos, 1959

How did conflict spread? Starting in 1959, China trained some of the Pathet Lao rebels in Yunnan Province. Also, “the ideological orientation of the Pathet Lao movement was influenced from the outset [i.e., *prior* to 1959] by the Maoist model.” However, these Chinese influences on the Lao rebellion were overshadowed by the Vietnamese influence until later in the Lao civil war.¹³⁴

Was state action present? Yes, this was a clear case of Chinese evangelization.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Here it could be argued that even if China had not directly supported the Pathet Lao rebels, those rebels would still have

¹³¹ Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 290-291.

¹³² *Ibid.*

¹³³ *Ibid.*

¹³⁴ Don Fletcher and Geoff Gunn, *Revolution in Laos: The “Fourth Generation” of People’s War?* (Townsville, Australia: Southeast Asian Monograph Series No. 8, James Cook University of North Queensland, 1981), pp. 36, 39.

used Maoism as a strategic blueprint for their insurrection — after all, this was a link between the two conflicts predating the evangelization. Hence evangelization does *not* appear to have been a necessary condition for this case of substate conflict contagion.

China to South Vietnam, 1955

How did conflict spread? As in several other South and Southeast Asian conflicts, the leftist rebels in South Vietnam “were very familiar with Mao’s ideas and repeatedly described themselves as practitioners of ‘people’s war.’”¹³⁵ There was a clear influence of Maoism on this civil war from its origins.

Was state action present? No, the onset of the South Vietnamese civil war does not appear to have involved evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality. Prior to 1960, the Chinese were reticent to support the South Vietnamese insurgency because of (justified) fears of a retaliatory U.S. intervention. This policy changed in 1960, and by the mid-1960s Beijing was supplying significant quantities of weapons to the Viet Cong.¹³⁶ By that point, however, a full-fledged civil war had been underway for years; hence this does not count as evangelization. Rather, conflict seems to have spread solely via the inspiration of one rebel group by another.

China to Sri Lanka, 1971 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? The leader of the rebel JVP in Sri Lanka, Rohana Wijeweera, was a “China wing” Marxist and adopted a Maoist approach to insurrection.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ Edward Miller, personal communication, June 18, 2010.

¹³⁶ Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), pp. 69-83; Van Ness, “Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy,” p. 113.

¹³⁷ Mick Moore, “Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1993): 593-642, p. 618; Teresita Schaffer, “On the LTTE,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report on *How Terrorism Ends* (Washington, 1999; available online: <http://public.gettysburg.edu/~dborock/courses/Spring/int-sec/how-terror-ends-2.pdf>), p. 8.

Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality appear to be absent from this case of contagion. For instance, China actually supported the Sri Lankan *government* in their fight against the JVP.¹³⁸ (This does not qualify as State A evangelization because no attempt was made by Beijing to spread civil war from China to Sri Lanka. It *does* qualify as Chinese meddling in Sri Lanka, but only in the Sri Lanka-China dyad — which saw no contagion — and not the China-Sri Lanka dyad.) “Ties” are alleged between the JVP and the Chinese Communist Party in the 1960s, but by 1971 these ties appear to have been broken.¹³⁹ Instead, conflict appears to have spread solely via the inspiration of one rebel group (the JVP) by another (the Maoists in the Chinese Civil War that ended in 1949).

China to Sri Lanka, 1984 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? Like the JVP, the LTTE was influenced by Maoism.¹⁴⁰

Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality appear to be absent from this case of contagion. Again, the Chinese government actually supported the Sri Lankan government in the 1980s LTTE conflict.¹⁴¹ Instead, conflict appears to have spread solely via the inspiration of one rebel group by another.

China to Thailand, 1976 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? The Communist Party of Thailand was initially founded in 1942 “as the Thai section of the Chinese Communist Party.” CCP influence continued for the next 30 years; for example, Beijing began broadcasting pro-CPT messages from Yunnan

¹³⁸ S. Arasaratnam, “The Ceylon Insurrection of 1971: Some Causes and Consequences,” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (1972): 356-371; Schaffer, “On the LTTE,” p. 8.

¹³⁹ Schaffer, “On the LTTE,” p. 8.

¹⁴⁰ Alan J. Bullion, *India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Crisis, 1976-1994* (London: Pinter, 1995), p. 92.

¹⁴¹ Russell L. Ross and Andrea Matles Savada, eds., *Sri Lanka: A Country Study* (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990), p. 209.

Province in China in 1962.¹⁴² In addition, some CPT leaders gained valuable experience in the Chinese Civil War. For instance, Udom Srisuwan fought in China and then returned to Thailand to become the CPT's "main theoretician."¹⁴³

Was state action present? Yes, this appears to have been a case of evangelization from China to Thailand. It would be a more clear-cut case of evangelization if Beijing's support for the CPT was not just political but also material — weapons, training, etc.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The non-evangelization link between these two conflicts — the experience gained by Thai rebel elites in the Chinese Civil War — may have been sufficient on its own for substate conflict contagion, much as Maoist inspiration was sufficient in the China to Sri Lanka cases. Therefore, I cannot state with certainty that evangelization was necessary to contagion in this case.

India to Burma, 1948

How did conflict spread? The connection between the communist uprising in India and the subsequent communist uprising in Burma is disputed, but it is clear that the two rebel groups were in contact with one another and that Indian developments influenced Burmese ones. For example, in December 1946, after the Indian rebellion in Hyderabad had begun, "the [Communist Party of Burma] acknowledged criticism from the Indian Communist Party for its Browderist [peaceful] line and the following month first discussed its future slogan, 'the final seizure of power.'"¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Thailand (government) conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=154®ionSelect=7-Eastern_Asia#.

¹⁴³ Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, *A History of Thailand* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 181.

¹⁴⁴ Smith, "Burma," pp. 69-70.

Was state action present? No, there is no evidence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality in this case of contagion.¹⁴⁵ Instead, conflict appears to have spread solely through the mechanism of rebels in State A influencing (and perhaps assisting) rebels in State B. (In Table 3.5, this case is counted under the rebels helping rebels mechanism.)

India to Nepal, 1996

How did conflict spread? The Maoist rebels in Nepal “received ... training and military hardware from a number of Indian Maoist insurgency movements, amongst them the Maoist Communist Centre and the People’s War Group.”¹⁴⁶

Was state action present? No, there is no evidence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality in this case of contagion.¹⁴⁷ Instead, conflict appears to have spread solely through the mechanism of rebels in State A assisting rebels in State B.

Laos to Thailand, 1976

How did conflict spread? The government of Laos was taken over by communist insurgents in 1975. The Laotian communists, who had long supported the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), continued their support while heading the government of the Laotian state.¹⁴⁸

Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of evangelization by the Laotian government. Although the communist Pathet Lao had supported the CPT while the Pathet Lao was a non-state actor as well (1959-1974), it was not until 1976 that the Thai unrest became a high-casualty

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Nepal conflict. Available online:

http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=114®ionSelect=6-Central_and_Southern_Asia#.

¹⁴⁷ Michael Hutt, ed., *Himalayan ‘People’s War’: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion* (London: Hurst and Company, 2004); Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, eds., *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Routledge, 2010); Deepak Thapa with Bandita Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2004* (London: Zed Books, 2004).

¹⁴⁸ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Laos and Thailand (government) conflicts. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=90®ionSelect=7-Eastern_Asia# and http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=154®ionSelect=7-Eastern_Asia#.

substate conflict. There were 40 Thai battle deaths in 1974, 25 in 1975, 544 in 1976, and 544 in 1977, according to the PRIO Battle Death Dataset (version 3.0).¹⁴⁹ Therefore, the Laotian state was evangelizing up to and just prior to the time that Thailand's full-scale civil war began. Pathet Lao support for the CPT may also have been due in part to Thai meddling in the Lao civil war; see Chapter 5 for a discussion of this possibility. (The evidence for evangelization is stronger, so for the purposes of Figure 3.4 Laos to Thailand is counted as an evangelization case.)

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? In Chapter 5, I make the claim that Laotian evangelization in the form of support to the CPT was necessary for the occurrence of the Thai civil war onset in general. Therefore, this case meets the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

Malaysia to Thailand, 1976

How did conflict spread? The rebel Malayan (or Malaysian) Communist Party (CPM) and the rebel Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) cooperated for decades preceding the onset of the Thai civil war in the late 1970s.¹⁵⁰

Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality appear to have been absent from this case of substate conflict contagion. Instead, conflict appears to have spread due to rebels in State A assisting rebels in State B. It is possible that CPM rebels originally set up bases in Thailand because of British or Malayan/Malaysian state expulsion; in the late 1940s and early 1950s, CPM cadres withdrew to Thailand following a

¹⁴⁹ Available online: <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/The-Battle-Deaths-Dataset-version-30/>. Accessed April 12, 2011.

¹⁵⁰ Patrice de Beer, "History and Policy of the Communist Party of Thailand," in Andrew Turton, Jonathan Fast, and Malcolm Caldwell, eds., *Thailand: Roots of Conflict* (Nottingham, U.K.: Spokesman, 1978), p. 147; Aloysius Chin, *the Communist Party of Malaya: The Inside Story* (Kuala Lumpur: Vinpress, 1995), pp. 187-188.

series of military defeats at the hands of what was then the colonial Malay government.¹⁵¹ However, the pressure applied on the CPM by Kuala Lumpur does not constitute expulsion because there is not convincing evidence that Kuala Lumpur actually *wanted* CPM rebels to leave the country. In fact, in future decades the Malayan/Malaysian government joined Thai forces in pursuit of CPM cadres in Thailand, suggesting that the CPM presence in Thailand was just as vexing to Kuala Lumpur as the CPM presence in Malaya/Malaysia.¹⁵² This, in turn, suggests that Kuala Lumpur did not deliberately attempt to expel the CPM to Thailand — that in the eyes of the Malay government, no security problem was solved by the CPM’s departure from their own soil — and that the CPM withdrew to Thailand of their own free will.¹⁵³

Pakistan to Afghanistan, 1978

How did conflict spread? Two causes of the initial outbreak of civil war in Afghanistan stemmed from the sitting Afghan government’s support for the Baluchi insurgency in Pakistan. First, this support alienated the Soviet Union, leading Afghan leader Daoud to purge his government of communists, which in turn led to the (brief) unification of the two communist factions which eventually ousted Daoud in an April 1978 coup.¹⁵⁴ Second, when Daoud agreed to *stop* harboring anti-Islamabad Baluchi and Pashtun insurgents within Afghanistan in March 1978, these militants were deeply embittered. “[Communist leader Nur Muhammad] Taraki used this issue to arouse mass support against Daoud in the critical interlude between the assassination of Khalq trade unionist Amir Khaiber on April 17 and the coup 10 days later.”¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹ Chin, “The Communist Party of Malaya,” pp. 42-43. Technically this expulsion, if genuine, would be counted as part of an extrastate conflict, since Malaysia was not independent at the time.

¹⁵² Anthony Short, “The Communist Party of Malaya: In Search of Revolutionary Situations,” *The World Today*, Vol. 26, No. 12 (1970): 529-535, p. 530.

¹⁵³ Indeed, this is Chin’s characterization of the CPM’s withdrawal decision. Chin, “The Communist Party of Malaya,” p. 43.

¹⁵⁴ Angelo Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 62-65.

¹⁵⁵ Selig S. Harrison, “Nightmare in Baluchistan,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 32 (1978): 136-160, p. 147.

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of Afghan meddling with overt partiality in the Pakistani conflict. This meddling — and Daoud’s attempt to cut it short — ultimately embittered the Afghan population and contributed to the coup that began the Afghan civil war.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Afghan meddling constituted the only connection identified between the Baluchi insurgency in Pakistan and the 1978 civil war in Afghanistan. Therefore, meddling was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Pakistan to India, 1983 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? In 1971, India intervened in the separatist civil war in East Pakistan, playing a pivotal role in the ultimate independence of Bangladesh. Then, in 1983, a Punjabi insurgency broke out in western India, inspired in part by the successful revolt in East Pakistan.¹⁵⁶ There seems to be general agreement that the Pakistani government supported the Punjabi insurgency to some extent — when this support began is up for debate — and that Pakistani support was motivated in part by a desire to retaliate for India’s role in the independence of Bangladesh.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ Mehtab Ali Shah, “The Emergence of the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) in Pakistan and its Implications for Regional Security,” *The Round Table*, Vol. 348, No. 1 (1998): 505-519, p. 515.

¹⁵⁷ Sumit Ganguly, “Nuclear Stability in South Asia,” *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (2008): 45-70, pp. 50-51; Robin Jeffrey, *What’s Happening to India? Punjab, Ethnic Conflict, and the Test of Federalism*, Second Edition (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 150; Kuldip Nayar and Khushwant Singh, *Tragedy of Punjab: Operation Bluestar and After* (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1984), pp. 94-95; Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, *Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi’s Last Battle* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985), pp. 211-212. Some of these authors (Nayar and Singh, Jeffrey) date Pakistani interference in India to the early 1980s; others (Ganguly, Tully and Jacob) are ambiguous about the early 1980s but point to interference around 1987, around the time the Punjabi insurgency reached 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths.

Was state action present? Yes, this is a case of Indian meddling with overt partiality in Pakistan's 1971 civil war, followed by Pakistani retaliation in the form of support for the Punjabi insurgency.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Although Pakistani support (in retaliation for Indian meddling) may have played a significant role in the Indian Punjabi insurgency, it was not the only connection between the East Pakistan and Punjabi conflicts. As mentioned above, rebels in the Punjab were also simply inspired by the successful civil war in East Pakistan. Arguably this latter, nonstate-driven link could have caused the contagion all on its own. Therefore, meddling cannot be confirmed as necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion.

Pakistan to Sri Lanka, 1984 (potentially outside the temporal scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), a predecessor to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was founded in 1976, "encouraged by the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan and the creation of the state of Bangladesh."¹⁵⁸

Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality appear to have been absent from this case of substate conflict contagion. The only Sri Lankan involvement in the East Pakistan civil war of 1971 was that Colombo permitted Pakistani planes to use Sri Lankan airspace for some military operations (in lieu of flying over India).¹⁵⁹ Although this is *partial* meddling in the Pakistani civil war by the Sri Lankan government, it does not strike me as sufficiently *overt* to code as a state action under the auspices of my State

¹⁵⁸ Gamini Samaranayake, "Political Terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka," *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2007): 171-183, pp. 173-174.

¹⁵⁹ Pakistan Army, "1971 War," available online: <http://www.pakistanarmy.gov.pk/AWPReview/TextContent.aspx?pId=197&rnd=446>.

Action Explanation. Instead, conflict appears to have spread solely via the inspiration of one rebel group by another.

Peru to Nepal, 1996 (potentially outside the geographic scope conditions)

How did conflict spread? The Maoist rebels in Nepal were significantly influenced by the Maoist civil war in Peru, half a world away — much more so, it seems, than by Chinese Maoism.¹⁶⁰

Was state action present? No, evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality appear to be absent from this case of contagion.¹⁶¹ Instead, conflict spread solely via the inspiration of one rebel group by another.

South Vietnam to Cambodia, 1967

How did conflict spread? Although Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk adhered diplomatically to a policy of neutrality during the early years of the Vietnam War, beginning in 1964 he covertly permitted Chinese military aid to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam to pass through Sihanoukville in Cambodia.¹⁶² Around that same time, he undertook an anti-leftist purge in Phnom Penh, forcing Khmer Rouge elites over the border into Vietnam, where they sheltered with the very Viet Cong whom Sihanouk was simultaneously supporting.¹⁶³

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear (if long secret) case of Cambodian meddling with overt partiality in the South Vietnamese conflict. This meddling ultimately resulted in the empowerment of a rebel faction in Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk's support for the Viet Cong substantially assisted in their capacity to harbor the Khmer Rouge after the purge in Phnom

¹⁶⁰ Ali Riaz and Subho Basu, *Paradise Lost? State Failure in Nepal* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 126.

¹⁶¹ The only possible state action is expulsion, which appears to have been absent. Ibid and Hutt, "Himalayan 'People's War.'"

¹⁶² Milton Osborne, *Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), p. 172; Zhai, "China and the Vietnam Wars," p. 137.

¹⁶³ Becker, "When the War was Over," pp. 10-11.

Penh, and ultimately allowed the Khmer Rouge to regroup and start *their* insurgency against Sihanouk in 1967.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? The ties between the Viet Cong and the Khmer Rouge appear to have been critical to the onset of the 1967 civil war in Cambodia, and these ties in turn were enabled by the secret Cambodian policy of support for the Viet Cong. The Chinese aid to the Viet Cong via Sihanoukville, enabled by the Cambodian government, was substantial — “weapons for 50,000 soldiers” between 1965 and 1967.¹⁶⁴ Viet Cong capabilities, particularly vis-à-vis the harboring of Khmer Rouge dissidents, would have been substantially reduced without that aid. Therefore, meddling seems to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

South Vietnam to Laos, 1959

How did conflict spread? As described in more detail in Chapter 5, Laotian diplomatic support to South Vietnam spurred North Vietnam to step up its aid to the nascent Laotian rebel group, the Pathet Lao.

Was state action present? Yes, this appears to be a case of Laotian meddling with overt partiality. (I argue this meddling was “overt,” even though it did not involve direct military assistance to South Vietnam, in Chapter 5.)

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As discussed in Chapter 5, North Vietnamese support to the Pathet Lao appears to have been crucial to the onset of the Laotian civil war in general. Therefore, I view meddling as having been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

¹⁶⁴ Zhai, “China and the Vietnam Wars,” p. 137. China also shipped some of its aid overland through North Vietnam, but these overland shipments “soon overwhelmed the North Vietnamese transportation capacity” (ibid). In addition, the Chinese continued to use the Sihanoukville route despite its high cost and the 10 percent cut of the shipments taken by the Cambodian military (ibid) — a decision suggestive of the route’s importance. Thus the Sihanoukville route appears to have been critical to Viet Cong capability in the mid-1960s.

South Vietnam to Thailand, 1976

How did conflict spread? In retaliation for Thai support for the South Vietnamese, North Vietnam provided significant support to the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). (See Chapter 5 for details.)

Was state action present? Yes, this is a clear case of North Vietnamese retaliation for Thai meddling with overt partiality in South Vietnam.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? As discussed in Chapter 5, North Vietnamese support — the result of Thai meddling — appears to have been essential to the increase in CPT capability in the mid-1970s, which allowed the Thai civil war to onset. Therefore, I view meddling to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

Sri Lanka to India, 1990

How did conflict spread? The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (LTTE) assisted the Naxalite People's War Group in India (PWG) with explosives training.¹⁶⁵

Was state action present? Yes, this appears to be a case of Indian meddling with overt partiality in the Sri Lankan conflict, resulting in retaliation by a Sri Lankan *rebel group* in the form of support for an Indian rebel group. Sandy Gordon attributes LTTE support for the PWG in part to “ruthless suppression of insurgency movements” in general in South Asia.¹⁶⁶ One must surely include India's military intervention in the Sri Lankan civil war (1987-1990) under this rubric of “ruthless suppression.”

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? Northeast India and Sri Lanka are quite distant from one another; it is unlikely that the LTTE and PWG would have had

¹⁶⁵ Sandy Gordon, “Resources and Instability in South Asia,” *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1993): 66-87, p. 82.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

much contact with one another had India's involvement in Sri Lanka not encouraged the LTTE to help anti-India insurgents. Thus, meddling appears to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

Uzbekistan to Pakistan, 2007 (potentially not a genuine case of substate conflict contagion)

How did conflict spread? In late 2001, Uzbek rebel leaders (members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, or IMU) were forced out of their sanctuaries in Afghanistan by U.S. and Northern Alliance operations.¹⁶⁷ IMU cadres have since sheltered in Pakistan, contributing to the Pakistani Taliban civil war — but potentially not enough to make this a legitimate case of substate conflict contagion.¹⁶⁸

Was state action present? Yes, if this is contagion at all, it appears to involve expulsion on the part of the American and Afghan governments.

How necessary was the state action in question to the contagion? No other connection between these conflicts was identified. Therefore, expulsion appears to have been necessary for this (dubious) case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Main Link Criterion.

¹⁶⁷ Richard Weitz, "Storm Clouds over Central Asia: Revival of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 27 (2004): 505-530, p. 507.

¹⁶⁸ Mona Kanwal Sheikh, "Disaggregating the Pakistani Taliban," Danish Institute for International Studies Brief (2009), p. 4.

**Table 3A.1: Causal Mechanisms Involved in 78 Excluded Cases of Substate Conflict
Contagion (With No State B Civil War)**

(for more detailed codings, see the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 7)

State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year	Causal Mechanism(s) Present
Colombia	Peru	2007	Rebels in State A Assist Rebels in State B
Colombia	Venezuela	1982	Rebels in State A Assist Rebels in State B
Cuba	Bolivia	1967	Evangelization
Cuba	Dominican Republic	1965	Evangelization
Cuba	Peru	1965	Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B
Cuba	Uruguay	1972	Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B
Cuba	Venezuela	1962	Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B
Guatemala	Mexico	1994	Refugees from State A Destabilize State B
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Macedonia	2001	Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B
Romania	Moldova	1992	Other (unique)
Russia	Georgia	2004	Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B

State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year	Causal Mechanism(s) Present
Serbia	Macedonia	2001	Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B
Afghanistan	Nigeria	2004	Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B
Angola	Congo-Kinshasa	1977	Meddling with Overt Partiality; Combatants from State B Fight in State A's Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through State A Expulsion) and Start Conflict
Afghanistan	Mali	1990	Combatants from State B Fight in State A's Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through State A Expulsion) and Start Conflict
Chad	Mali	1990	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government); Combatants from State B Fight in State A's Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through State A Expulsion) and Start Conflict

State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year	Causal Mechanism(s) Present
Chad	Niger	1991	Combatants from State B Fight in State A's Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through State A Expulsion) and Start Conflict
Chad	Niger	1996	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government); Refugees from State A Destabilize State B
Chad	Niger	2007	Rebels in State A Assist Rebels in State B
Congo-Kinshasa	Burundi	1965	Other (unique)
Congo-Kinshasa	Ghana	1966	Meddling with Overt Partiality
Congo-Kinshasa	Nigeria	2004	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government)
Côte D'Ivoire	Niger	2007	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government)

State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year	Causal Mechanism(s) Present
Cuba	Congo-Kinshasa	1977	Evangelization
Ethiopia	Djibouti	1991	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government); Refugees from State A Destabilize State B; Combatants from State B Fight in State A's Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through State A Expulsion) and Start Conflict; Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B
Ethiopia	Eritrea	1997	Refugees from State A Destabilize State B; Rebels in State A Assist Rebels in State B
Ghana	Togo	1986	Evangelization; Refugees from State A Destabilize State B
Guinea-Bissau	Guinea	2000	Refugees from State A Destabilize State B
Guinea-Bissau	Nigeria	2004	Weapons from

			State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government)
Israel	Mali	1990	Combatants from State B Fight in State A's Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through State A Expulsion) and Start Conflict
Lebanon	Mali	1990	Combatants from State B Fight in State A's Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through State A Expulsion) and Start Conflict
Liberia	Côte D'Ivoire	2002	Evangelization
Liberia	Gambia	1981	Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B
Liberia	Guinea	2000	Evangelization
Liberia	Guinea-Bissau	1998	Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B
Liberia	Niger	2007	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government)
Liberia	Nigeria	2004	Weapons from State A's Conflict

			Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government)
Mali	Niger	1991	Other (unique)
Morocco	Mali	1990	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government)
Niger	Mali	2007	Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B
Senegal	Guinea-Bissau	1998	Meddling with Overt Partiality
Sierra Leone	Guinea	2000	Rebels in State A Assist Rebels in State B
Sierra Leone	Nigeria	2004	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government)
Somalia	Djibouti	1991	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government); Combatants from State B Fight in State A's Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through State

			A Expulsion) and Start Conflict; Rebellion in State A Inspires Rebels in State B
Somalia	Ethiopia	1995	Other (unique)
Somalia	Nigeria	2004	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government)
South Africa	Comoros	1989	Other (unique)
Sudan	Eritrea	1997	Evangelization
Sudan	Ethiopia	1995	Evangelization
Sudan	Nigeria	2004	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government)
Afghanistan	Egypt	1993	Combatants from State B Fight in State A's Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through State A Expulsion) and Start Conflict
China	Oman	1972	Evangelization
Iraq	Iran	1979	Meddling with Overt Partiality
Israel	Iraq	1958	Meddling with Overt Partiality

State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year	Causal Mechanism(s) Present
Israel	Turkey	1991	Rebels in State A Assist Rebels in State B
Lebanon	Iraq	1958	Meddling with Overt Partiality
Lebanon	Israel	1990	Meddling with Overt Partiality
Afghanistan	Pakistan	1990	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government); Refugees from State A Destabilize State B
Afghanistan	Pakistan	2004	Expulsion
Afghanistan	Thailand	2003	Combatants from State B Fight in State A's Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through State A Expulsion) and Start Conflict
Afghanistan	Uzbekistan	1999	Combatants from State B Fight in State A's Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through State A Expulsion) and Start Conflict; Drug Trade in State A Creates Insurgent-Exploited Drug Trade in State B

State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year	Causal Mechanism(s) Present
Burma	India	1982	Refugees from State A Destabilize State B
Burma	India	1990	Rebels in State A Assist Rebels in State B
Cambodia	Thailand	2003	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government)
China	India	1966	Evangelization
China	India	1969	Evangelization
China	India	1982	Evangelization
China	Malaysia	1963	Evangelization
India	Bangladesh	1975	Meddling with Overt Partiality (by Pakistan, prior to Bangladeshi independence)
India	Pakistan	1990	Meddling with Overt Partiality
Indonesia	Thailand	2003	Rebels in State A Assist Rebels in State B
Pakistan	India	1978	Meddling with Overt Partiality

State A (sender state)	State B (receiver state)	Year	Causal Mechanism(s) Present
Pakistan	India	1982	Meddling with Overt Partiality
Pakistan	India	1989	Meddling with Overt Partiality
Pakistan	India	1990	Meddling with Overt Partiality
Philippines	Thailand	2003	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government)
Sri Lanka	Thailand	2003	Weapons from State A's Conflict Move to Rebels in State B (without the complicity of State A's government)
Tajikistan	Uzbekistan	1999	Combatants from State B Fight in State A's Conflict, Then Return Home (Not Through State A Expulsion) and Start Conflict

Chapter 4: Testing the State Action Explanation in Central America, 1978-1996

Imagine that you are analyzing the political stability of a small, militarily weak country in a region of eight states. Over the last 15 years, the region has been extraordinarily civil conflict-prone. Five of the eight states have experienced some form of violent civil conflict in the last 15 years, including both of the states with which the country in question shares land borders. One of those two neighboring states has had a bloody civil war ongoing, off and on, for more than 40 years. By some estimates, 20 percent of the population of the state you are analyzing is comprised of refugees from those conflicts, many of whom are poor and do not speak the country's official language. This has created significant social tensions in the populace. The region is awash with small arms, making violence easy for those so inclined. And the country you are analyzing is a key conduit for the illicit drug trade, providing a valuable source of revenue for potential anti-regime elements. Making matters worse, the rebels in one of the neighboring states — the one with the 40-year civil war — have been alleged to cooperate with narco-traffickers in the state you are analyzing, making the inspiration of dissidents a genuine possibility.

At first glance, this country would appear to be primed for a civil war, and more specifically for a case of substate conflict contagion. And yet the country I am describing is Belize, circa 1996. Since achieving independence in September 1981, Belize has never experienced a violent civil conflict that has killed 25 people in battle, much less 1,000. Indeed, in a region where political stability is fleeting, Belize is a bastion of calm. It is known more for its beaches than for its domestic politics.

The surprising lack of conflict in Belize is part of the broader puzzle that this chapter will seek to explain. That puzzle is: Why did substate conflict contagion occur so rarely in Central America between 1978 and 1996? Despite the presence of the five violent civil conflicts noted above, there was only one case of actual contagion in the region during this time period — the spread of conflict from Nicaragua to El Salvador in 1981 (see Figure 4.1). At the same time, as I will demonstrate, numerous nonstate factors existed that the conventional wisdom identifies as sufficient conditions for contagion. Although Belize is an extreme case, socially destabilizing refugee flows were present throughout the region. Meanwhile, Alvaro de Soto, the chief envoy of the United Nations to the Central American peace process, told me in an interview, “I remember the guerillas saying to me, ... ‘Look, getting weapons in Central America is just not an issue. If you’ve got money to pay for them, the whole region is awash with them.’”¹ The region also has a sizable drug trade. Furthermore, the states have significant transnational ethnic ties, paving the way for rebel-to-rebel inspiration and assistance. The fact that conflict spread only once in Central America during this time period suggests that contrary to the conventional wisdom, these nonstate factors — while often involved in and sometimes necessary for the spread of conflict — are insufficient to cause contagion on their own.

Instead, I argue that the State Action Explanation helps us understand the outcome of limited substate conflict contagion in this region. In the one case of contagion that *did* occur, I show that the mechanism of evangelization was present and heavily involved in the onset of the Salvadoran civil war. Otherwise, I find that evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality were quite rare in the region, and note that the rarity of state actions coincides with the rarity of contagion. In the two notable exceptions to this general tendency — instances of meddling by the government of Honduras and, to a lesser extent, the government of Costa Rica

¹ Interview with Alvaro de Soto (by phone), March 25, 2011.



Figure 4.1. Map of Central America showing civil wars (uppercase X's), lower-intensity substate conflicts (lowercase x's), and the sole case of substate conflict contagion (the arrow).²

— I find that both countries experienced serious security consequences for their meddling, but that stability-favoring structural factors in each state prevented a large-scale conflict from breaking out. These findings thus support the proposition that at least one state action is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for most cases of substate conflict contagion.

A brief note on “structural factors”: In my analyses, I will use the predicted probabilities of civil war onset derived in Chapter 3 as a rough proxy for the structural conditions that make civil war likely in general. However, while this proxy was useful to summarize the likelihood of civil war onset across more than 6,000 possible cases around the postwar world, I find it less useful in a more discrete region over a more discrete period of time. There are two particularly important variables in the Central American context, which I would consider to be structural factors for civil war, which are omitted from the Fearon and Laitin regression that formed the basis of these predicted probabilities. The first omitted variable is income inequality, which tended to be pronounced in Central American states where civil war occurred and less

² Image source: <http://www.atlas.gc.ca>.

pronounced in states where peace prevailed. The second omitted variable is the level of state repression of the political left, which tended to be extremely brutal in Central American states where civil war occurred and less brutal where war did not occur. So although I report the predicted probabilities and use them as a starting point for a discussion of structural factors in individual cases, I do not view this proxy as being fully explanatory, and I introduce other factors — most commonly these two omitted variables — when talking about the structural conditions that were relevant to this particular region.

In the next section, I provide a brief summary of the five Central American substate conflicts that took place between 1978 and 1996. Then I discuss the sole case of substate conflict contagion, showing the importance of Nicaraguan evangelization to the outbreak of civil war in El Salvador. After that, I measure the presence of state actions, nonstate factors, and structural factors in the three Central American states which never experienced substate conflict during this time period — Belize, Costa Rica, and Honduras — showing in general that state actions were absent while several of the nonstate factors were present. (On structural factors the picture is more complicated, as discussed below.) This section is bolstered by primary-source research, including 24 interviews of former government officials across all three countries and archival research in Belize. Next, in the conclusion, I summarize the results of this test of the State Action Explanation and give an overview of the Southeast Asian test that follows in Chapter 5. Finally, in Appendix 4.1, I discuss 19 other Central American State A-State B dyads in which contagion might have occurred, but did not. As in the previous section, I frequently find the nonstate factors but only rarely find evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality (and also only rarely find structural factors — an inferential concern discussed in the conclusion of this chapter).

Central American Substate Conflicts

Five substate conflicts occurred in Central America between 1978 and 1996. For background, this section briefly describes them.

In Guatemala, a civil war between the government and various leftist groups — which consolidated into the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) in the early 1980s — began in 1965 and continued until a peace settlement in 1995. Thus the civil war did not onset during the time period under study, but the conflict was ongoing. Although the Guatemalan civil war was the longest and bloodiest of the Central American conflicts during the entire Cold War, during the 1980s it had a relatively low intensity, killing about 800 people in battle between 1978 and 1995.³

In Nicaragua, major instability began in 1978, when the leftist Sandinista group challenged the sitting, rightist government led by President Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The Sandinistas ousted Somoza in 1979, but the *Somocistas* did not go quietly. By the early 1980s the Sandinista government was fighting its own war for regime survival against the right-wing Contras, who as discussed below were based primarily in Honduras (and to a lesser extent Costa Rica). This civil war ended in a peace settlement in 1989.

In El Salvador, leftist rebels — the main group was the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) — fought the rightist regime beginning in the late 1970s, although the conflict did not reach the intensity of a civil war until January 1981. The conflict continued until 1991, ending in peace settlement.

³ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Guatemala conflict (“best” death estimates used). Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=66®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas#.

In Panama, Major Moisés Giroldi tried to oust President Manuel Noriega in an October 1989 coup attempt that killed approximately 77 people.⁴ The coup attempt quickly failed. Thus Panama experienced a substate conflict but not a civil war during this time period. (This event, it should be noted, was distinct from the subsequent U.S. invasion of Panama, which was an interstate war.)

In Mexico, “Zapatista” rebels in the southern state of Chiapas carried out a sporadic and largely unsuccessful armed revolt against the central government between 1994 and 1996. While the Chiapas conflict received worldwide media attention, it ultimately only killed about 182 people in battle, making it a substate conflict but not a civil war.⁵

Since there were five substate conflicts in Central America during this time period, and eight total states in the region, there are 35 State A-State B dyads (five times seven). This chapter will assess whether substate conflict contagion, state actions, nonstate factors, and structural factors were present in each of these dyads. Because my focus in this chapter is on Central America as a region, I only discuss these *within*-region dynamics, generally leaving aside discussion of how extra-regional actors such as Cuba influenced the course of events. However, several Central American contagion cases involving Cuba are discussed in Chapter 3.

The State Action Explanation and the One Case of Substate Conflict Contagion in Central America

As mentioned above, the only identified case of substate conflict contagion in Central America between 1978 and 1996 was the spread of conflict from Nicaragua to El Salvador. In

⁴ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Panama conflict (“best” death estimates used). Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=123®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas#.

⁵ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Mexico conflict (“best” death estimates used). Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=107®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas#.

this section, I will show that state action — specifically evangelization — appears to have been necessary for the outbreak of civil war in El Salvador.

Overview of the Civil War Onset in El Salvador

Violent leftist resistance to the rightist government in San Salvador began in the early 1970s, and escalated following a 1979 coup in which President Carlos Humberto Romero was ousted by even more right-wing elements in the Salvadoran military.⁶ However, up to mid-1980, the FMLN was not a sophisticated rebel group and the death toll resulting from the substate conflict was low (at most 206 in 1979, and at most 500 in 1980).⁷ Brian J. Bosch writes, “Prior to mid-1980, the guerillas acquired funds by kidnapping and by robbing banks. The weapons utilized were mostly homemade explosive devices, pistols, hunting shotguns, and whatever weapons they could take from Salvadoran troops.”⁸

The nature of the conflict transformed rapidly in the latter half of 1980, when the FMLN amassed significantly improved weaponry and adopted a more offensive military strategy. Guerilla leaders planned a “Final Offensive” for January 1981, essentially “a large, simultaneous push through El Salvador.”⁹ The Final Offensive did not succeed in toppling the government in San Salvador, but it dramatically increased the death toll from the conflict, transforming it into a full-scale civil war in 1981.¹⁰

The Occurrence of Nicaraguan Evangelization

The Sandinista regime began supporting the leftist dissidents in El Salvador shortly after Somoza’s ouster in 1979 — exactly when is uncertain. Because the Sandinistas were a former

⁶ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the El Salvador conflict. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=51®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas#.

⁷ Ibid (“high” death estimates used because of lack of “best” estimates).

⁸ Brian J. Bosch, *The Salvadoran Officer Corps and the Final Offensive of 1981* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 1999), p. 60.

⁹ Ibid, p. 75.

¹⁰ UCDP summary on the El Salvador conflict.

rebel group, having taken the reins of the state during a substate conflict, and subsequently sponsored a rebel group in another state, this was a clear case of evangelization. By the late summer of 1980, the Nicaraguan government was advising the FMLN on military strategy, and specifically pressuring FMLN leaders to adopt a more offensive theory of victory.¹¹ (Cuba was also a major sponsor of the FMLN at this time, as indicated periodically below. The Cuba to El Salvador, 1981 case of substate conflict contagion — identified in Chapter 3 — is not discussed explicitly in this chapter because I have attempted to focus here only on *within*-region dynamics in Central America.)

Around the fall of 1980, Nicaraguan support for the FMLN became more tangible. Bosch writes, “An infiltration of modern arms began by air and sea from Nicaragua and overland from Nicaragua through Honduras.”¹² (The government of Honduras appears to have been an unwilling participant in this supply route.) FMLN cadres were trained in Nicaragua (and Cuba),¹³ and even practiced a victory parade through San Salvador while based in Nicaragua.¹⁴ As a result of Nicaraguan evangelization, FMLN capability and strategy were dramatically transformed. Salvadoran guerillas went from hand-making explosive devices and poaching rifles off soldiers to firing rockets, which “removed the monopoly of airpower from the Salvadoran armed forces,”¹⁵ and from engaging in hit-and-run attacks and kidnappings to launching a full-scale offensive in January 1981.

¹¹ Bosch, “The Salvadoran Officer Corps,” pp. 44-45; Charles D. Brockett, *Political Movements and Violence in Central America* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 85.

¹² Bosch, “The Salvadoran Officer Corps,” p. 60.

¹³ Bosch, “The Salvadoran Officers Corps,” p. 93; José Angel Moroni Bracamonte and David E. Spencer, *Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerillas: Last Battle of the Cold War, Blueprint for Future Conflicts* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), p. 4.

¹⁴ Bosch, “The Salvadoran Officer Corps,” pp. 102-103.

¹⁵ Interview with former UN envoy to the Central American peace process Alvaro de Soto (by phone), March 25, 2011.

As we will see later in this chapter, evangelization was out of character for the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. In fact, I found no firm evidence of Nicaraguan evangelization to any other countries in Central America. So why did the Sandinistas support the FMLN so overtly? In part, it may have been because the Salvadoran leftists had provided the Sandinistas with “men, training, weapons, and money” when they themselves were merely a rebel group.¹⁶ Shortly after the Sandinistas took control of Managua, their military strength increased substantially — from an armed force of about 6,700 in 1980 to about 21,500 in 1981 (meanwhile, FMLN strength was about 4,000 in October 1980 and about 8,700 in January 1981).¹⁷ Thus the newly capable Sandinistas were able to pay the FMLN back for their earlier help with significant military support.

Meanwhile, other state actions appear not to have occurred in the Nicaragua-El Salvador dyad. I found no evidence of expulsion — the anti-Sandinista Contras operated out of Honduras and Costa Rica but not El Salvador — and as for any meddling with overt partiality by the Salvadoran government in the Nicaraguan conflict, “the Contra war never had any significant Salvadoran participation.”¹⁸

The Importance of Nicaraguan Evangelization

How important was Nicaragua’s policy of evangelization to the onset of the Salvadoran civil war in 1981? On the one hand, it was not the sole cause of the conflict; there were nonstate factors at work as well. The officers who undertook the 1979 coup, a key step on the path to civil

¹⁶ Moroni and Spencer, “Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerillas,” p. 3.

¹⁷ On Sandinista capabilities, see *The Military Balance* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980-1982). Based on the fact that data are missing in the 1980 edition due to the 1979 revolution, IISS seems to have reported military sizes in Latin America on a one-year delay during this time period. On FMLN capabilities, see Bosch, “The Salvadoran Officer Corps,” pp. 61, 105. The 8,700 estimate includes 3,700 full-time and 5,000 part-time fighters. Moroni and Spencer (“Strategy and Tactics of the FMLN Guerillas, p. 5) estimate 12,000 “armed elements” in the FMLN “in 1981” — it is not clear when in 1981 this was.

¹⁸ Thomas Carothers, *In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), p. 108.

war, were worried about recent events in Nicaragua repeating themselves at home¹⁹ — ironically, then, the Nicaraguan conflict contributed to an overcorrection by the Salvadoran military that further destabilized the latter country. Furthermore, “literally every guerilla faction in Latin America, with the exception of Peru’s Shining Path, contributed to the [Salvadoran] war with money, weapons, and personnel,”²⁰ a clear case of rebels helping rebels. Rebels inspired rebels as well; part of the reason the FMLN adopted a “Final Offensive” strategy was that a similar strategy had worked in Cuba and Nicaragua.²¹

On the structural side, the predicted probability of civil war onset in El Salvador in 1981 was actually quite low (about 0.9% that year, according to the Fearon and Laitin proxy measure discussed in Chapter 3). However, there *were* structural conditions for civil war onset present in El Salvador that are not included in the Fearon/Laitin regression models. Most prominently, several of my interview subjects mentioned crushing inequality in El Salvador — a small number of families controlling a hugely disproportionate share of land and wealth.²² Furthermore, the Salvadoran government was notorious for its brutal repression of the political left, which increased popular outrage against the regime. Without these nonstate and structural factors, the violent leftist movement in El Salvador would have been significantly smaller and less assertive, and a civil war might not have been possible.

On the other hand, Nicaraguan evangelization appears to have been the key event that carried the Salvadoran instability over the threshold to a civil war. As noted above, weapons and

¹⁹ Bosch, “The Salvadoran Officer Corps,” p. 28.

²⁰ Moroni and Spencer, “Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerillas,” p. 7.

²¹ Bosch, “The Salvadoran Officer Corps,” p. 75.

²² Interview with former UN envoy Alvaro de Soto (by phone), March 25, 2011; Interview with former Vice President of Honduras Jaime Rosenthal (by phone), March 16, 2011; Interview with former Belizean Ambassador to the UN Robert Leslie, near Camalote, Belize, July 6, 2011; Interview with former Interior Minister of Costa Rica Antonio Álvarez Desanti, San José, Costa Rica, August 23, 2011; Interview with former President of Costa Rica Rafael Angel Calderón, Curridabat, Costa Rica, August 25, 2011.

training from Nicaragua (and Cuba) caused a dramatic transformation in FMLN capability in the months leading up to the “Final Offensive” — the campaign that resulted in civil war onset in El Salvador. Nonstate and structural factors did not cause this. Furthermore, while pure inspiration also played a role, most of the credit for transforming FMLN strategy from hit-and-run to offensive appears to be attributable to the influence of Nicaraguan (and, again, Cuban) government efforts. Multiple secondary-source authors note the criticism of the hit-and-run strategy by “Havana and Managua” and the use of material support by both governments as leverage to bring about a shift in FMLN strategy toward the offensive.²³ Finally, while the transnational rebel networks described above were important in the early years of the FMLN, it is important to note that “Cuba and Nicaragua acted as clearinghouses for assistance from abroad”²⁴ — without Nicaraguan evangelization, then, much of this rebel assistance would not have materialized.

Overall, I judge Nicaraguan evangelization to have been necessary for the onset of the Salvadoran civil war in 1981, and this case was coded in Chapter 3 as meeting the Civil War Necessity Criterion. Without this state action and its influence on FMLN capability and strategy, it seems that the nonstate and structural factors would not have “added up” to a major violent civil conflict. On the other hand, this case is an excellent illustration of the way in which state actions, nonstate factors, and structural factors must *combine* to produce contagion outcomes. Nicaraguan evangelization on its own would not have been sufficient to create a civil war in El Salvador, because without the nonstate and structural factors there would have been no leftist dissidents for the Sandinistas to support. Evangelization was necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, then, but it was not sufficient.

²³ Bosch, “The Salvadoran Officer Corps,” pp. 44-45; Brockett, “Political Movements and Violence in Central America,” p. 85.

²⁴ Moroni and Spencer, “Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerillas,” p. 7.

The State Action Explanation and Cases of *Non-Contagion*: Belize, Costa Rica, and Honduras

Belize

Absence of Contagion

Belize never experienced substate conflict contagion; in fact, between its independence (1981) and 1996, Belize never experienced substate conflict at all. The only political violence of note in the country's 30-year history was the death of four people during riots in the spring of 1981, half a year prior to Belize's official independence on September 21. The riots were organized by opposition elements in Belize, which saw the colonial government's agreement with Guatemala over their territorial dispute as a sellout.²⁵ Otherwise, despite numerous spillover effects of the Central American substate conflicts described below, Belize has remained free of anti-regime violence.

Understanding this puzzling lack of political violence, let alone contagion, is complicated by the fact that there is virtually no secondary source literature on Belizean history and politics; books published in English, available in university libraries, and concerning the post-independence period number less than a dozen. I attempted to compensate for this dearth of secondary material by spending three weeks in Belmopan, Belize's small inland capital. I read the personal papers of George Price, Belize's first prime minister (1981-1984 and 1989-1993), at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development. Numerous records of security-related government meetings were available in these papers, some of which I have been advised are still classified information (hence some bibliographic information has been redacted here, and is only available on request). I also went to the Belize Archives and Records Service to read issues of

²⁵ Alan Twigg, *Understanding Belize: A Historical Guide* (Madeira Park, British Columbia: Harbour Publishing, 2006), p. 191.

one of Belize's most influential weekly newspapers, *The Reporter*, from 1984-1989 and 1993-1996, the years Price was not in office. Finally, I interviewed eight current and former Belizean political elites, including former Prime Ministers Sir Manuel Esquivel (1984-1989, 1993-1998) and Said Musa (1998-2008, Foreign Minister 1989-1993), former Minister of Foreign Affairs Assad Shoman (2002-2003, also Attorney General, 1974-1978), former Ambassador to the United Nations Robert Leslie (1981-1985), former Ambassador to the United States Dean Lindo (1993-1996, also Leader of the Opposition in the colonial government, 1974-1979), two longtime members of the House of Representatives, Fred Hunter (1961-1984) and Hector Silva (1961-1974), and René Villanueva, Sr., the Chairman and CEO of RSV Media, the country's most influential media conglomerate.

Presence and Insufficiency of Nonstate Factors

If nonstate factors were sufficient to cause substate conflict contagion, then Belize should have seen a catastrophic spread of conflict. Four of the six nonstate factors were present in Belize. Most strikingly, Belize experienced enormous inward refugee flows from the Central American civil wars, mainly Guatemala and El Salvador. The number of refugees who came to Belize in the 1980s from those two conflicts has been estimated at levels ranging from 12,000 (the official UNHCR estimate)²⁶ to “25,000 to 31,000”²⁷ to 50,000,²⁸ in a country that had just under 150,000 people at independence in 1981.²⁹ Thus, by the end of the 1980s, about one-fifth

²⁶ UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database. Available online: <http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/dataQuery/default.asp>.

²⁷ O. Nigel Bolland, *Colonialism and Resistance in Belize: Essays in Historical Sociology*, Second Revised Edition (Benque Viejo del Carmen, Belize: Cubola Productions, 2003), p. 208.

²⁸ Tom Barry with Dylan Vernon, *Inside Belize: The Essential Guide to its Politics, Economy, Society, and Environment*, Second Edition (Albuquerque: Interhemispheric Resource Center, 1995), p. 122.

²⁹ World Development Indicators. Available online: <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>.

of Belize's population consisted of refugees from conflict zones.³⁰ Most of these refugees had not returned to their home countries by the mid-1990s.³¹

Many of my interview subjects painted a rosy picture of a welcoming and tolerant Belize that embraced these refugees with open arms; government documents, public statements, and press reports from the time period tell a different story. In 1986, the Belizean High Commissioner to London, Denton Belisle, was paraphrased as saying that “illegal immigrants ... are placing a tremendous strain on Belize social and educational infrastructure, and their penchant for violence threatens to unravel Belize's social and cultural fabric.”³² A 1992 “Report by the Belize Crimes Commission” concurred: “Both [refugees and unofficial immigrants] exert a severe strain on our social, education, and security services in addition to posing a cultural confrontation with the local populace.”³³ The links between inward population flows and crime were often exaggerated in such reports, but in 1989 Prime Minister Esquivel did state that approximately 40 percent of the prisoners at the Belize Central Prison were illegal immigrants, a rate double their approximate share of the population.³⁴ More frequently, tensions between “Roots” Belizeans and newcomers manifested in land disputes, as they did in the summer of 1995 when a group of refugees faced eviction.³⁵ There was also a major political scandal surrounding the 1993 national elections — elections which ultimately came down to a handful of votes — when it was alleged that Central American immigrants were illegally registering to vote

³⁰ Barry and Vernon, “Inside Belize,” p. 124.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. xvii.

³² “Aliens Problem: Commonwealth will help,” *The Reporter*, November 9, 1986, p. 13.

³³ Report by the Belize Crimes Commission to the Right Honorable George Price, Prime Minister of Belize, Unclassified, 1992, p. 9, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development, in Social Issues 1981-1991 box.

³⁴ “Illegal immigrants filling city jail,” *The Reporter*, May 28, 1989, p. 1.

³⁵ “Refugees find there's no place to call home,” *The Reporter*, July 16, 1995.

on a large scale.³⁶ In short, the refugee influx from the Central American civil wars caused severe sociopolitical tensions in Belize. *The Reporter* put it best in a 1994 editorial: “The 1980s experience very nearly killed us.”³⁷

On top of these refugee flows, Belize developed a destabilizing illicit drug trade due in large part to its proximity to nearby substate conflicts. The country morphed from being the “fourth-ranking producer of marijuana” bound for the U.S. in 1985³⁸ to becoming a major transshipment point for the cocaine route from South America to the U.S.³⁹ Some of the marijuana was grown indigenously and some may have come via Guatemalan guerillas trading drugs for money or weapons — so Guatemalan officials told British forces stationed in Belize in 1989⁴⁰ — but the far more sinister cocaine trade was almost entirely a byproduct of the Colombian civil war and the search of the Medellin cartels for secure supply routes into North America.⁴¹

Arms from the Central American substate conflicts were probably smuggled into Belize as well. The Guatemalan government notified the British of their concern about Guatemalan arms traffickers operating in Belize in 1991,⁴² and in 1993 Guatemala was listed by *The Reporter* as a major source of arms used in the Belizean drug trade (along with Mexico and the U.S.).⁴³

³⁶ The Consortium of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Report on the Granting of Belizean Nationality and Implications for Voter Registration, Part I: Public Report, October 6, 1993, p. 1, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development, in Social Issues 1992-2003 box.

³⁷ Editorial, *The Reporter*, September 11, 1994, p. 2.

³⁸ “Belize — 4th ranking producer of marijuana,” *The Reporter*, March 3, 1985, p. 14.

³⁹ Shoman, “13 Chapters,” p. 246.

⁴⁰ Meeting notes of senior government officials, April 13, 1989, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

⁴¹ “Medellin drug connection in Belize? U.S. Ambassador says problem is serious!” *The Reporter*, July 16, 1989, p. 1.

⁴² Meeting notes of government officials, March 5, 1991, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

⁴³ “Where did all those guns come from? They are tools of the Drug Trade!” *The Reporter*, September 5, 1993, p. 6.

Finally, transnational links between Guatemalan guerillas and the Belizean underworld have frequently been alleged and have occasionally been confirmed. In May 1982, the Guatemalan government complained to the Belizean government that Guatemalan guerillas had a support network in northern Belize.⁴⁴ This claim was never substantiated. Nine years later, the U.S. Department of Defense claimed that “Belizean narco-traffickers work closely with Guatemalan guerillas.”⁴⁵ This claim *is* supported by a Belizean government document describing the arrest of six Guatemalan guerillas during a March 25, 1989 drug bust.⁴⁶ Furthermore, a government document from March 1990 identifies a Belizean drug trafficking organization as a funding source to not only the FAR guerillas in Guatemala — a group under the URNG umbrella — but also to the FMLN in El Salvador.⁴⁷ Although three months later another government document linked the same group to elements within the Guatemalan intelligence community,⁴⁸ leaving its true allegiance unclear, the point remains that there appears to have been at least some level of collaboration between Central American guerilla and Belizean criminal elements.

There was, in brief, no shortage of nonstate factors pointing toward substate conflict contagion to Belize. The fact that contagion ultimately did not occur suggests that these factors, while possibly necessary for contagion, were insufficient. A large part of what was missing, I argue, was at least one of the three state actions of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with

⁴⁴ Official correspondence between Belizean law enforcement authorities, May 20, 1982, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

⁴⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, FY 1992* (1991), p. 94, quoted in Barry and Vernon, “Inside Belize,” p. 56.

⁴⁶ Meeting notes of senior government officials, April 13, 1989, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

⁴⁷ Official correspondence, March 8, 1990, pp. 1-2, 10, 24-25, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

⁴⁸ Meeting notes of government officials, June 6, 1990, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

overt partiality. As I demonstrate below, none of these state actions occurred with respect to Belize during the 1981-1996 time period.

Evangelization: Absent

Of the five substate conflicts in Central America between 1978 and 1996, only one, in Nicaragua, involved a decisive rebel victory and the usurpation of the sitting government (in 1979). Therefore, evangelization to Belize could only have come from Nicaragua.

In all the archival and secondary source material I consulted, as well as in my interviews, I did not find a shred of evidence that the government of Nicaragua ever tried to start a civil war in Belize. Some Belizean union leaders and politicians were considered too close to the communists by the government in Belmopan in the early 1980s, as well as by some of my interview subjects.⁴⁹ And former legislator Hector Silva alleged that Managua sent priests to Belize to preach liberation theology.⁵⁰ But there is no evidence to suggest that Nicaragua ever encouraged violent opposition to the government. In fact, the Sandinistas had supported the Belizean push for independence from Britain since at least 1979, and was one of the first Latin American states to do so.⁵¹ As a result, multiple interview subjects said, Belize and Nicaragua had excellent relations at a time when Nicaragua was a pariah state in the rest of the region.⁵² “I never got the sense that Daniel Ortega was a Ché Guevara — that he was interested in exporting

⁴⁹ Official document, December 8, 1981, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development; Interview with Dean Lindo, Belize City, July 19, 2011; Interview with Fred Hunter, Belize City, July 21, 2011.

⁵⁰ Interview with former legislator Hector Silva (by phone), July 25, 2011.

⁵¹ Shoman, “13 Chapters,” p. 223; “Belize and Nicaragua set up diplomatic relations,” *The Reporter*, December 6, 1987, p. 11.

⁵² Interview with former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Said Musa, Belize City, July 13, 2011; Interview with former Ambassador to the UN Robert Leslie, near Camalote, Belize, July 6, 2011; Interview with former Foreign Minister Assad Shoman (by e-mail), November 18, 2011.

revolution,” said former Ambassador to the UN Robert Leslie.⁵³ On the basis of this consistent lack of evidence, evangelization from Nicaragua to Belize was clearly absent.

Expulsion: Absent

Theoretically, any one of the five Central American states in conflict could have expelled combatants to Belize. In practice, I only found reports of Guatemalan and Salvadoran guerillas present in Belize, meaning expulsion only could have come from those two countries. The alleged FMLN presence is based on a single newspaper report from February 1987; a small group of men (probably less than five) who held a businessman hostage in northern Belize claimed they were working for the Salvadoran guerillas.⁵⁴ I have no evidence to further substantiate this claim.

There is more evidence for a Guatemalan guerilla presence in Belize, with sporadic reports of such guerillas surfacing throughout government and newspaper records. Many of these reports were unsubstantiated; for example, an October 22, 1981 report that Guatemalan guerillas had fled from Guatemala to Belize via Mexico was discredited in a December 7, 1981 government meeting.⁵⁵ This sequence of events recurred in April 1983, when the Guatemalan government notified Belmopan of a 100-member cadre of guerillas in the western part of the country but the Belizean government found no evidence of this.⁵⁶ Two other unsubstantiated sightings were reported in 1991 government records,⁵⁷ and three similar incidents in 1987 and

⁵³ Interview with former Ambassador to the UN Robert Leslie, near Camalote, Belize, July 6, 2011.

⁵⁴ “O.W. kidnapers were Salvadoran guerillas, January shoot-out may have killed two,” *The Reporter*, February 15, 1987, pp. 1, 14.

⁵⁵ Meeting notes of government officials, November 4 and December 7, 1981, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

⁵⁶ Meeting notes of government officials, April 18 and 29, 1983, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

⁵⁷ Meeting notes of government officials, July 3 and September 13, 1991, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

1988 were recorded in *The Reporter*.⁵⁸ There were also some more substantiated claims of Guatemalan guerillas in Belize — three men were swiftly deported from Belize in 1982, 1988, and 1990 on suspicion of guerilla associations,⁵⁹ and in 1983 Belizean authorities broke up a suspected guerilla cell on their territory.⁶⁰ Overall, though, it is safe to state that the Guatemalan guerilla presence in Belize was quite limited. Both government assessments of Belizean security and my interview subjects consistently confirmed this.⁶¹

In any case, even if there were Guatemalan or Salvadoran guerillas in Belize, it is evident that no such guerillas were there because of a Guatemalan or Salvadoran government policy of expulsion. The non-expulsion policy of El Salvador will be discussed at length in the Honduras case study below. As for Guatemala, Belizean records and interviews indicate that the government of Guatemala wanted its rebels in Guatemala, not in Belize or any other country. The Guatemalan government expressed concern over, and periodically investigated, the alleged use of Belizean territory as a safe haven by Guatemalan guerillas.⁶² This level of concern suggests that the presence of Guatemalan guerillas in Belize was unacceptable to Guatemala — not the attitude we would expect from a government that was deliberately expelling combatants. While Guatemala did not condone its army's pursuit of guerillas across the border into Belize,

⁵⁸ “Gunmen descend as Guatemalan Guerillas rob Benque lottery broker,” *The Reporter*, January 11, 1987, p. 1; “Benque police capture Guatemalan terrorist,” *The Reporter*, May 15, 1988, p. 1; “Masked gunmen may be Guatemalan guerillas,” *The Reporter*, August 21, 1988, p. 10.

⁵⁹ Meeting notes of government officials, February 25, 1982, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development; “Benque police capture Guatemalan terrorist,” *The Reporter*, May 15, 1988, p. 1; Barry and Vernon, “Inside Belize,” p. 34.

⁶⁰ Official correspondence between Belizean law enforcement authorities, June 9, 1992, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

⁶¹ Official document, January 24, 1992, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development; Interview with former Prime Minister Sir Manuel Esquivel, Belmopan, July 12, 2011; Interview with former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Said Musa, Belize City, July 13, 2011; Interview with former Ambassador to the U.S. Dean Lindo, Belize City, July 19, 2011; Interview with former legislator Hector Silva (by phone), July 25, 2011.

⁶² Meeting notes of Belizean government officials, February 4, 1982, April 16, 1982, and April 13, 1989, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

this non-pursuit policy appears to have been adopted because of the delicate diplomatic status quo between Belize and Guatemala, not because of any desire to get the Guatemalan guerillas out of their country.⁶³ Instead, former Ambassador to the UN Robert Leslie told me in an interview, the Guatemalan government had a policy of annihilation toward the Guatemalan guerillas, as well as any of their civilian supporters — the goal was to kill these subversives, not expel them.⁶⁴ Finally, former Foreign Minister (and, later, Prime Minister) Said Musa and former Ambassador to the U.S. Dean Lindo both told me that the guerillas present in Belize were generally there to recuperate before crossing back over into Guatemala to continue the fight.⁶⁵ A government document confirms these statements.⁶⁶ The fact that the guerillas were returning to Guatemala of their own free will suggests that the Guatemalan government was not exerting much effort to keep them out.

Overall, then, while some guerillas from nearby conflicts do seem to have crossed into Belize at least temporarily, the state action of expulsion from El Salvador, Guatemala, or elsewhere in the region into Belize was absent.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Absent

Belmopan took an explicit and remarkably consistent hands-off approach to the Central American substate conflicts. This policy was articulated in both public statements and private deliberations. Publicly, Deputy Prime Minister C.L.B. Rogers told the UN General Assembly in 1982, “Our foreign policy is rooted on certain cardinal principles of international behavior: non-

⁶³ Meeting notes of Belizean government officials, July 29, 1982, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

⁶⁴ Interview with former Ambassador to the UN Robert Leslie, near Camalote, Belize, July 6, 2011.

⁶⁵ Interview with former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Said Musa, Belize City, July 13, 2011; Interview with former Ambassador to the U.S. Dean Lindo, Belize City, July 19, 2011.

⁶⁶ Official correspondence between Belizean law enforcement authorities, June 9, 1992, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

intervention in the internal affairs of states ...” (notice the top billing of this principle).⁶⁷

Privately, while planning for the British troop withdrawal in the early 1990s (see below), military officials assumed that the Belize Defence Force would not be deployed outside its borders⁶⁸ — as indeed it never has been, with the exception of a 35-man contingent of peacekeepers sent to Haiti in 1994.⁶⁹ Around 1984, Belize did accept an unspecified cash payment from the U.S. government in exchange for setting up a Voice of America repeating station in the west of the country,⁷⁰ but that was about the extent of Belizean involvement in the Cold War struggle for Central America.

My interview subjects unanimously confirmed that the government of Belize never supported any party to any of the Central American substate conflicts in any material way. Allegations by the Guatemalan Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1986 that the Price administration (1981-1984) had harbored Guatemalan guerillas⁷¹ were flatly rejected by the former Prime Minister from Price’s political opposition, Sir Manuel Esquivel.⁷² (As noted above, in reality, suspected Guatemalan guerillas captured in Belize were deported as expeditiously as possible.) Another former Prime Minister, Said Musa, acknowledged that his People’s United Party “maintained good relations with the FAR in Guatemala [and] the [FMLN] in Salvador,”

⁶⁷ “Statement by the Hon. C.L.B. Rogers, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence and Home Affairs, Delivered at the Thirty-Seventh Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, ‘Belize in relation with Latin America and the Caribbean and the World situation as it affects Belize,’ October 15, 1982,” p. 2, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development, in International Relations 1938-1982 box.

⁶⁸ Official document, June 18, 1990, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

⁶⁹ “Belize and CARICOM contingent will play non-combat role in Haiti,” *The Reporter*, September 4, 1994, p. 24.

⁷⁰ Communication from the Embassy of the United States to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the VOA repeating station, Unclassified, 1984 (undated), courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development, in USA & Canada box; Interview with former Ambassador to the UN Robert Leslie, near Camalote, Belize, July 6, 2011.

⁷¹ “Guatemala ready to drop its claim,” *The Reporter*, November 2, 1986, p. 4.

⁷² Interview with former Prime Minister Sir Manuel Esquivel, Belmopan, July 12, 2011.

including favorable coverage of the guerilla groups in the party newspaper, but characterized official Belizean government policy as one of “discreet neutrality.”⁷³ Most strikingly, according to longtime legislator Fred Hunter, the FMLN approached Prime Minister Price in 1981 to ask for help (presumably of the more tangible variety), and “George said ‘No. ... We’re not getting into it.’”⁷⁴

What motivated this clear and consistent non-interference policy on the part of the Belizean government? Put simply, there were two reasons: Belize’s military vulnerability and its ties to the U.K. On the vulnerability front, former Prime Minister Musa emphasized the risk-averseness in foreign policy that Guatemala — which has at various points claimed all or part of Belizean territory as its own — imposed on Belmopan:

“We weren’t out to create any enemies. That was always Mr. Price’s thing. ... Because here’s this big country, Guatemala, with a population of what, 10 million? We were at the time two hundred and something thousand. We could have been swamped overnight. So we realized ... that we had to be very careful in how we conducted our affairs.”⁷⁵

On the British front, multiple interview subjects pointed out that London would have strongly objected to any substantive Belizean involvement in the Central American conflicts, because such involvement could have endangered the British troops in the country. “The British didn’t want Belize doing anything that got their kids shot,” said former Ambassador to the UN Robert Leslie.⁷⁶ On the other hand, Leslie said, “There was immense pressure from the U.S. for Belize to assist the U.S. to achieve their agenda in Central America.”⁷⁷ (Interestingly, this pressure never seems to have been linked to American USAID disbursements to Belize, as it was in

⁷³ Interview with former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Said Musa, Belize City, July 13, 2011.

⁷⁴ Interview with former legislator Fred Hunter, Belize City, July 21, 2011.

⁷⁵ Interview with former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Said Musa, Belize City, July 13, 2011.

⁷⁶ Interview with former Ambassador to the UN Robert Leslie, near Camalote, Belize, July 6, 2011. Cf. Interview with former Prime Minister Sir Manuel Esquivel, Belmopan, July 12, 2011.

⁷⁷ Interview with former Ambassador to the UN Robert Leslie, near Camalote, Belize, July 6, 2011.

Honduras and Costa Rica.⁷⁸) Ultimately, though, between the two great powers the U.K. had more leverage over Belmopan. Aside from outspending the U.S. in military aid by approximately \$962,500 to \$617,000 annually,⁷⁹ the British had troops in Belize and the Americans did not (see also the discussion on this troop presence below). Thus, apart from the VOA repeating station, Belize did little in support of U.S. efforts in the region.

Clearly, meddling with overt partiality was almost certainly absent from Belizean foreign policy during this time period. Belize faced substantial internal and external pressures to maintain its “discreet neutrality” policy, as former Prime Minister Musa described it to me, and appears to have been successful in its adherence to what two writers have called a “self-imposed isolation from Central American politics.”⁸⁰

Lack of Structural Factors as an Alternative Explanation for Lack of Contagion to Belize

Before giving any hints about my hypotheses, I asked each of my interview subjects why they thought civil war was averted in Belize. They gave fairly consistent answers that are worth reviewing as structurally based alternative explanations for the lack of substate conflict contagion. Most prominently mentioned was the 1,600-strong British troop presence in Belize between 1981 and 1993 (by contrast, Belize had about 600-950 active-duty soldiers during this time period, and another 300-1,100 reserves).⁸¹ These troops were initially deployed amid border tensions with Guatemala and, according to former Foreign Minister Assad Shoman, stayed on for 12 years in large part because of “U.S. pressure” on the British to provide a bulwark against

⁷⁸ “U.S. provides \$26M in soft loans but not without strings!” *The Reporter*, March 10, 1985, p. 1.

⁷⁹ Official document, January 24, 1992, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

⁸⁰ Barry and Vernon, “Inside Belize,” p. 23.

⁸¹ British troop strength: Julio A. Fernandez, *Belize: Case Study for Democracy in Central America* (Aldershot, U.K.: Avebury, 1989), p. 87. The British troop strength figure is from 1981; “The Military Balance” puts the British strength at 1,500 between 1987 and 1992, and at around 600 in 1993. Belizean troop strength: “The Military Balance,” 1985-1994; data seemingly on a one-year delay and missing from the 1981-1984 editions.

communism.⁸² Aside from discouraging meddling on Belmopan’s part, the British garrison supposedly deterred political violence from both external and internal sources. Interview subjects also mentioned a variety of other structural factors that supposedly kept Belize peaceful. The country’s low population density and relative abundance of land were commonly noted.⁸³ And the two former prime ministers I spoke with both pointed out that unlike much of the rest of Central America, Belize does not have a landed elite with wealth far surpassing that of the common people.⁸⁴ Finally, former Ambassador to the U.S. Dean Lindo and longtime legislator Fred Hunter both pointed to the British institutional legacy, including free education and unarmed police, as a significant factor in Belizean stability.⁸⁵ (That said, I can personally attest that unarmed police in crime-ridden Belize City are a thing of the past.)

These qualitative impressions of a low general likelihood of civil war in Belize are further supported by the predicted civil war probabilities that were used in Chapter 3 to proxy for structural factors. Belize is not included in the Fearon/Laitin dataset because its population is under 500,000, so I had to try to collect data on the twelve independent variables used in that regression analysis myself. I successfully collected data on eight of these twelve variables — six using the same sources identified by Fearon and Laitin themselves,⁸⁶ plus Ethnic Fractionalization and Religious Fractionalization by coding these values manually using the CIA

⁸² Interview with former Foreign Minister Assad Shoman (by e-mail), November 18, 2011; Barry and Vernon, “Inside Belize,” pp. 158-159.

⁸³ Interview with former Ambassador to the UN Robert Leslie, near Camalote, Belize, July 6, 2011; Interview with former Ambassador to the U.S. Dean Lindo, Belize City, July 19, 2011; Interview with former Foreign Minister Assad Shoman (by e-mail), November 18, 2011; cf. Barry and Vernon, “Inside Belize,” p. 91.

⁸⁴ Interview with former Prime Minister Sir Manuel Esquivel, Belmopan, July 12, 2011; Interview with former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Said Musa, Belize City, July 13, 2011.

⁸⁵ Interview with former Ambassador to the U.S. Dean Lindo, Belize City, July 19, 2011; Interview with former legislator Fred Hunter, Belize City, July 21, 2011.

⁸⁶ See James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (2003): 75-90; and <http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon> (click on “Additional Tables for ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’”).

World Factbook entry on Belize.⁸⁷ For the four other variables — Log(Percent Mountainous Terrain), Instability, Anocracy, and Democracy — the available data sources do not include Belize either.⁸⁸ So I next created a new “predicted probability of civil war onset” variable which used the original regression model with these four variables dropped; across the Fearon/Laitin dataset the new, Belize-inclusive predicted probabilities have a 0.8967 correlation with the probabilities used in Chapter 3. The median value of these new predicted probabilities in Belize, 1981-1996, was 0.314% per year, an extremely low value.

This relative lack of structural factors surely did play a major role in the lack of substate conflict contagion to Belize, as it took the edge off the grievances of Belize’s poor and thereby made the prospect of rebel mobilization more difficult. Even if evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality had occurred with respect to Belize, there is a good chance that this lack of structural factors would have prevented contagion (similar to the Costa Rica case discussed below). Therefore, this case study of Belize cannot tell us for certain whether the lack of state action or the lack of structural factors played the larger role in preventing contagion. What the case study *can* tell us is that nonstate factors, which were present in abundance in Belize, were insufficient to spread conflict on their own.

Overall Assessment, and Identification of Natural Obstacles to Contagion

If we only look at the nonstate factors that supposedly cause substate conflict contagion on their own, Belize is a puzzling case. Belize experienced spillovers of refugees, drugs, and arms from the nearby Central American substate conflicts (and South American, in the case of drugs), and there appear to have been at least some ties between Belizean underworld types and

⁸⁷ The method for calculating ethnic and religious fractionalization is described in James D. Fearon, “Ethnic Structure and Cultural Diversity around the World: A Cross-National Data Set on Ethnic Groups,” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Boston, 2002), p. 18.

⁸⁸ The source of the latter three variables is the POLITY IV dataset, which does not collect data on Belize.

Guatemalan and Salvadoran guerillas. And yet none of the Central American substate conflicts of the late Cold War spread to Belize.

The best explanation for this non-case of contagion is the State Action Explanation. I have shown that evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality were definitively absent from Belize. It appears that this lack of state action prevented the natural obstacles to contagion — those mentioned in Chapter 2 — from being overcome. For example, many of the Central American refugees in Belize were terrified of the prospect of facing another civil war, and would have been loath to support any violent anti-regime movement⁸⁹ — a clear case of the obstacle of nearby conflict dissuading local conflict rather than inspiring it, or a “reverse demonstration effect.” (Meanwhile, native Belizeans both inside and outside the elite expressed a great deal of pride to me to have been part of “an oasis of peace” in the region, suggesting that they were uninspired by nearby conflicts as well.) And, as mentioned above, the Belizean government allowed a significant British troop presence to protect Belize from communist encroachment from the neighboring civil war in Guatemala — a case of the obstacle of a state government fortifying itself against the potential for contagion. I argue that it would have taken evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality to overcome such obstacles to substate conflict contagion.

In addition, as noted above, Belize did not have the structural factors present for a civil war. I do not view state actions and structural factors as *competing* causes of this lack of contagion — rather, the State Action Explanation views them as *complementary*. The lack of evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality left significant natural obstacles to contagion in place; meanwhile, the lack of structural factors made rebel mobilization a Herculean

⁸⁹ Interview with Zan Larsen, returned Peace Corps Volunteer based in Armenia Village, Belize (2009-2010), Cambridge, Mass., March 23, 2011.

task in Belizean society. Thus we can conclude from this case that nonstate factors alone were not sufficient to spread conflict to Belize, but to better differentiate between the roles of state actions and structural factors in other non-contagion cases, we need to examine situations in which one such variable was present and the other was absent. That happens to be the case in Costa Rica, to which we now turn our discussion.

Costa Rica

Absence of Contagion

Costa Rica also never experienced substate conflict contagion, nor substate conflict at all, between 1978 and 1996. That is to say, there were no violent civil conflicts between the government and militarized rebels that caused at least 25 deaths in battle. However, the country experienced a number of small-scale civil disturbances that will be discussed in more detail below.

While in Central America, I spent two weeks in San José, Costa Rica's capital, interviewing former government officials from the time period in question. Interview subjects included former Presidents Luis Alberto Monge (1982-1986), Rafael Angel Calderón (1990-1994), José María Figueres (1994-1998), and Miguel Angel Rodríguez (1998-2002), former Vice President Arnoldo López Echandi (1990-1994), former Security Ministers Juan José Echeverría (1978-1980), Harry Wohlstein Rubinstein (1982), and Juan Diego Castro (1994-1996), former Information Minister Armando Vargas Araya (1982-1986), former Minister of Governance and Police⁹⁰ Antonio Álvarez Desanti (1988-1990), former Vice Foreign Minister Carlos Rivera Bianchini (1986-1990), former Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry Luis Guillermo Solís (1986-1990), and former Vice Minister for the Presidency Alejandro Matamoros Bolaños (1990-1994).

⁹⁰ Also known as the Interior Minister.

Presence and Insufficiency of Nonstate Factors

Again, potential nonstate causes of substate conflict contagion were in ample supply in Costa Rica during the 1978-1996 time period. The country had a six-figure refugee problem, with the UNHCR reporting 130,000 refugees from Nicaragua in 1978 (roughly 6 percent of the Costa Rican population of the time).⁹¹ These numbers subsequently decreased, but by 1996 more than 15,000 Nicaraguan refugees still resided in Costa Rica, and more than 10,000 Salvadorans had sheltered there as well between 1981 and 1983.⁹² The proportion of the population did not rival that in Belize, but there were significant social tensions accompanying these refugee flows, with “refugee camp residents complain[ing] of being taken advantage of by local farmers as nearly captive labor for the coffee harvest.”⁹³ The refugee flows also strained the delivery of social services in Costa Rica.⁹⁴

Meanwhile, a significant illicit drug trade sprang up in the region bordering Nicaragua, linked partially to the conflict there and partially to the Medellin drug traffickers from Colombia.⁹⁵ Arms spilled over as well; a document from the Socialist International (found in Belizean archives) reported “the discovery of large arms caches in San José,” and speculated that “although it is likely that many of these arms were destined for the Salvadoran or Guatemalan insurgencies, there is concern that some may have been intended for use in Costa Rica,” presumably by Costa Rican leftists.⁹⁶ In addition, as discussed further below, the rebel Sandinistas inspired and assisted some violent leftist groups in Costa Rica, and the rebel Contras

⁹¹ UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database; World Development Indicators.

⁹² UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database.

⁹³ John A. Booth, *Costa Rica: Quest for Democracy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), p. 88.

⁹⁴ Interview with former Interior Minister Antonio Álvarez Desanti, San José, Costa Rica, August 23, 2011.

⁹⁵ Martha Honey, *Hostile Acts: U.S. Policy in Costa Rica in the 1980s* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 206-207, 356.

⁹⁶ Socialist International, “Costa Rica: Problems Facing the New Administration,” Unclassified, Undated (probably late 1982), p. 2, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development, in Central America box.

inspired and assisted some violent right-wing groups. Finally, the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran civil wars caused the collapse of the Central American Common Market, which “closed the only viable market for domestically produced manufactured goods” in Costa Rica, deepening an economic crisis in the country that was at its worst in 1982.⁹⁷ (This is not one of the six nonstate factors identified in Chapter 2, but is nevertheless an international effect of nearby conflicts worth noting.) Once more, the fact that these nonstate factors did not cause substate conflict contagion on their own is indicative of their insufficiency for that phenomenon.

Evangelization: Absent

Yet again, Nicaragua is the only possible source of evangelization to Costa Rica, and yet again, that evangelization appears to have been absent. Right-wingers in both Costa Rica and the U.S. accused Managua of attempting to spread a violent leftist revolution to Costa Rica, but these accusations appear to have been unfounded. For example, in a 1986 U.S. State Department bulletin titled “Nicaragua’s Role in Revolutionary Internationalism,” the author blames the leftist Sandinistas for a series of terrorist attacks in Costa Rica, but other secondary sources indicate that these attacks were not targeted against Costa Rica (instead targeting American and Honduran outposts in the country).⁹⁸ Meanwhile, former President Monge, who ran on an anti-Sandinista platform in 1982,⁹⁹ claimed to me that the Sandinistas had “financed two strikes of the banana companies” in Costa Rica and trained foreign guerillas to assassinate him, but he did not point to any true attempt on Managua’s part to start a civil war in Costa Rica.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Bruce M. Wilson, *Costa Rica: Politics, Economics, and Democracy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 6, 104.

⁹⁸ Walters, “Nicaragua’s Role in Revolutionary Internationalism”; Frederick Ehrenreich, “National Security,” in Harold D. Nelsen, ed., *Costa Rica: A Country Study* (Washington: Foreign Area Studies, American University, 1984), pp. 246, 253.

⁹⁹ Socialist International, “Costa Rica: Problems Facing the New Administration,” Unclassified, Undated (probably late 1982), p. 1, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development, in Central America box.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with former President Luis Alberto Monge, Santa Ana, Costa Rica, August 18, 2011.

Indeed, the evidence suggests that the maximum extent of Sandinista involvement in Costa Rica was a series of “counterintelligence” operations against the Contras who were operating from there, mainly consisting of assassinations.¹⁰¹ These moves were defensive on Nicaragua’s part, not an attempt to start a civil war in Costa Rica. We also know that the U.S. support for the Contras’ “Southern Front” in Costa Rica was kept secret, while U.S. support for the “Northern Front” in Honduras was not so closely guarded, because the Reagan administration did not believe it could make the claim that the Sandinistas were supplying guerillas in Costa Rica. The Honduras operations could be publicly justified because Nicaragua *was* definitely moving arms through Honduras to supply the FMLN in El Salvador, but no such Sandinista involvement could be showcased in Costa Rica.¹⁰² Washington’s handling of these two different operations speaks volumes about the true level of evidence for Nicaraguan evangelization into Costa Rica — or lack thereof.

In addition, most of my interview subjects rejected the idea that Nicaragua had ever tried to start a civil war in Costa Rica. “It [Managua] never even attempted it,” said former President José Figueres. “I think they were smart enough to know that there was no base of civil unrest in Costa Rica that they could leverage.”¹⁰³ Furthermore, as former Security Minister Juan José Echeverría pointed out, the Costa Rican communists were led by a staunch nationalist, Manuel Mora, who “[did not] allow the Nicaraguan Sandinistas to get very much involved in Costa

¹⁰¹ Honey, “Hostile Acts,” pp. 14, 340.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁰³ Interview with former President José María Figueres (by phone), June 1, 2011. Cf. interviews with former Vice President Arnoldo López Echandi, San José, Costa Rica, August 19, 2011; former Vice Minister for the Presidency Alejandro Matamoros Bolaños, San José, Costa Rica, August 19, 2011; former President Miguel Angel Rodríguez, Escazú, Costa Rica, August 22, 2011; former Interior Minister Antonio Álvarez Desanti, San José, Costa Rica, August 23, 2011; former Security Minister Harry Wohlstein Rubinstein, San José, Costa Rica, August 24, 2011; former Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry Luis Guillermo Solís, San José, Costa Rica, August 25, 2011; and former President Rafael Angel Calderón, Curridabat, Costa Rica, August 25, 2011.

Rica.”¹⁰⁴ These Costa Rican communists did participate in some anti-Contra operations on the Sandinistas’ behalf in the early 1980s,¹⁰⁵ but as above this does not seem to have been part of a Sandinista attempt to spread civil war to Costa Rica. Overall, it seems safe to state that evangelization from Nicaragua to Costa Rica was absent.

Expulsion: Absent

There was a substantial Nicaraguan guerilla presence in Costa Rica, so the question is why they were there. Biographical accounts of several Contra elites suggest that they generally left Nicaragua of their own free will — Southern Front leader Edén Pastora did so because he was disillusioned with Sandinista politics, the key figure Brooklyn Rivera left for similar reasons, and another major player, Alfonso Robelo, switched sides to the Contras while stationed in San José as the Sandinista Ambassador to Costa Rica.¹⁰⁶ I found no evidence of Contras being *forced* across the border deliberately by Managua. In fact, we have evidence of Sandinista troops crossing over into Costa Rica “to try to circle round and hit some of Edén Pastora’s forces,”¹⁰⁷ which is characteristic of a government with an annihilation or cooptation policy rather than an expulsion policy.

My interview subjects confirmed the lack of a concerted effort by Nicaragua to drive combatants over the border into Costa Rica. “It never did happen,” said former President Figueres. In fact, he added, even if they had wanted to, “[the Sandinistas lacked] the military wherewithal ... to be able to effectively deploy their forces in such a way as to drive the Contras ... across the border.”¹⁰⁸ Former Vice Minister for the Presidency Alejandro Matamoros Bolaños

¹⁰⁴ Interview with former Security Minister Juan José Echeverría, San José, Costa Rica, August 16, 2011.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with former Information Minister Armando Vargas Araya, San José, Costa Rica, August 22, 2011.

¹⁰⁶ Honey, “Hostile Acts,” pp. 211, 221, 230; Interview with former Security Minister Juan José Echeverría, San José, Costa Rica, August 16, 2011.

¹⁰⁷ “Costa Rica accuses Sandinistas of border violations,” *The Reporter* (Belize), June 9, 1985, p. 4.

¹⁰⁸ Interview with former President José María Figueres (by phone), June 1, 2011.

confirmed that the Contra exodus from Nicaragua was “their decision,” not one forced upon them by Managua.¹⁰⁹ Expulsion, then, was absent in the Nicaragua-Costa Rica dyad, and my interview subjects confirmed that there was no expulsion from El Salvador, Guatemala, or Panama either.¹¹⁰ (The Chiapas conflict, meanwhile, was not even mentioned.)

Meddling with Overt Partiality: *Present*

Costa Rica meddled with overt partiality in the Nicaraguan civil war, although its role was more reluctant and circumscribed than that of Honduras (see below). The government of President Rodrigo Carazo (1978-1982) “allowed the Sandinista-led ... guerilla forces and shadow government to operate freely in Costa Rica in 1978 and 1979, ... [and] helped smuggle arms to the Nicaraguan rebels.” After the Sandinista takeover, however, “Carazo changed his opinion of the Nicaraguan revolution ... and began to assist its opponents.”¹¹¹ Arguably this episode of meddling was overt but not partial, since the Costa Rican president switched his allegiance roughly halfway through his term.

Subsequent Costa Rican meddling was both overt *and* partial, although several interview subjects pointed out that it was smaller in scale than the Carazo government’s brief support for the Sandinistas.¹¹² The government of President Monge (1982-1986), though internally divided over the issue of whether to support the anti-Sandinista Contras,¹¹³ ultimately provided basing

¹⁰⁹ Interview with former Vice Minister for the Presidency Alejandro Matamoros Bolaños, San José, Costa Rica, August 19, 2011; cf. Interview with former President Miguel Angel Rodriguez, Escazú, Costa Rica, August 22, 2011; former Information Minister Armando Vargas Araya, San José, Costa Rica, August 22, 2011; and former Interior Minister Antonio Álvarez Desanti, San José, Costa Rica, August 23, 2011.

¹¹⁰ Interview with former Vice Minister for the Presidency Alejandro Matamoros Bolaños, San José, Costa Rica, August 19, 2011; Interview with former Vice President Arnoldo López Echandi, San José, Costa Rica, August 19, 2011.

¹¹¹ Booth, “Costa Rica,” p. 179.

¹¹² Interview with former President Miguel Angel Rodriguez, Escazú, Costa Rica, August 22, 2011. Former Information Minister Armando Vargas Araya, interviewed in San José, Costa Rica, August 22, 2011, also noted the extent of the Carazo meddling, and did not acknowledge that the Monge government’s meddling took place.

¹¹³ E-mail exchange with former Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry Luis Guillermo Solís, September 1, 2011.

rights — specifically the right to operate in the north of the country and to build airfields — to the Contras throughout Monge’s term, while simultaneously proclaiming Costa Rican “neutrality” in the conflict.¹¹⁴ This aid was provided in conjunction with a CIA plan to topple the Nicaraguan government using two Contra fronts based in Honduras and Costa Rica.¹¹⁵ (Monge denied aiding the Contras in our interview¹¹⁶ — see Appendix 4.2 for his response to these claims — but virtually all of my other interview subjects besides his own Information Minister confirmed that his government provided support.) The beginning of the end of the Costa Rican meddling in Nicaragua’s civil war came on May 8, 1986, when newly inaugurated President Oscar Arias (1986-1990) ordered the U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica to shut down the Santa Elena airstrip, a major Contra asset.¹¹⁷ From that point forward, any Costa Rican government involvement in the Contra war was emphatically unsanctioned by the president and the central security apparatus.

Consequences of Costa Rican Meddling with Overt Partiality

So why did this meddling with overt partiality — albeit dubiously partial under Carazo — not result in the spread of civil war from Nicaragua to Costa Rica? The most accurate answer is that both episodes of meddling *did* move Costa Rica closer to civil war, although a genuine danger of major civil conflict never existed (for reasons discussed in the next section).

Carazo’s brief support to the Sandinistas inadvertently created the conditions for increased militarization among the Costa Rican left — a loosely organized political faction

¹¹⁴ Wilson, “Costa Rica,” p. 121; Honey, “Hostile Acts,” pp. 205, 301.

¹¹⁵ Honey, “Hostile Acts,” pp. 10-11, 214.

¹¹⁶ Interview with former President Luis Alberto Monge, Santa Ana, Costa Rica, August 18, 2011.

¹¹⁷ Honey, “Hostile Acts,” p. 466.

which had not been substantially militarized prior to 1978.¹¹⁸ A Costa Rican witness to the Sandinista arms smuggling operations said:

“The Costa Rican left supported the southern front of the Sandinistas quite heavily. And as a result of that, a group of Costa Ricans developed military capacities, which they didn’t have before. ... A lot of people ... stayed on in Nicaragua after the Sandinista triumph, and then came back with a lot of knowhow. And some of them were enchanted with the idea of a revolutionary axis running from San Salvador to San José, going through Managua, ... because all of a sudden, it was possible to have a successful revolution.”¹¹⁹

Several other interview subjects pointed out that the influence of Nicaraguan leftism on Costa Rican leftism was much stronger because the Sandinistas were physically present in northern Costa Rica and working alongside many of the country’s youth.¹²⁰ And the Sandinistas were physically present in Costa Rica because the Carazo administration either harbored them or looked the other way. Ultimately, most of these Sandinista-inspired leftists did not turn to organized violence. Those who did, such as the members of the Carlos Agüero Echeverría Commando, were often foreigners, or had only dubious ties to the Sandinistas, or had Sandinista ties that predated or postdated Carazo’s meddling.¹²¹ Nevertheless, the rise of militarization among the *mainstream* left, which Carazo’s meddling inadvertently permitted, could well have increased popular support for the violent extremist groups, had the structural conditions for civil war been present in Costa Rica.

As for the Monge-era support to the Contras, Costa Rica suffered a “wave of terrorist acts” in the early 1980s, most seemingly committed by domestic right-wing groups that were

¹¹⁸ Interview with former President Miguel Angel Rodríguez, San José, Costa Rica, August 22, 2011.

¹¹⁹ Interview with former Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry Luis Guillermo Solís, San José, Costa Rica, August 25, 2011.

¹²⁰ Interview with former President Rafael Angel Calderón, Curridabat, Costa Rica, August 25, 2011; off-the-record conversation with a former senior government official in Costa Rica.

¹²¹ Ehrenreich, “National Security,” p. 246; Anonymous, “The Family,” in Steven Palmer and Iván Molina, eds., *The Costa Rica Reader: History, Culture, Politics* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), p. 221; e-mail exchange with former Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry Luis Guillermo Solís, September 2, 2011.

either working with or inspired by the Contras — with names such as “International Saviors of Nicaragua against Communism.”¹²² The most prominent of these violent groups was the Movimiento Costa Rica Libre (MCRL), “a well-financed, far-right paramilitary group that uses its significant funds to fight communism (very broadly defined).”¹²³ The MCRL, “small and without significant political influence” prior to the 1980s,¹²⁴ was significantly strengthened by the Contra presence in Costa Rica. In exchange for farms that were converted into bases and other logistical support, the Contras paid the MCRL handsomely¹²⁵ — a symbiosis strikingly similar to the relationship between the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban in the 2000s, which ultimately resulted in contagion to Pakistan (see Appendix 3.1). Also, MCRL cadres trained with U.S. Green Berets who were ostensibly in Murciélago, Costa Rica to train Contras.¹²⁶ As a result of the boost to its economic, military, and political strength, “the MCRL became increasingly violent, ... participated in an attack on the Nicaraguan embassy in 1985, and former members took part in a 1985 bombing of a power facility that exported electricity to Nicaragua.”¹²⁷ Many of my interview subjects were dismissive of the MCRL as a true threat to Costa Rican stability, but former Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry Luis Guillermo Solís said that they had significant links to the Costa Rican national security apparatus, “that could have given them, had [the] time come to operate really in a military context, some muscle.”¹²⁸

¹²² Jorge Rivera Mas, “The Crisis: 1980-1982,” in Steven Palmer and Iván Molina, eds., *The Costa Rica Reader: History, Culture, Politics* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2004), p. 214, originally published in *Costa Rica in the 1980s* (San José: Editorial Porvenir, 1987).

¹²³ Wilson, “Costa Rica,” p. 74.

¹²⁴ Honey, “Hostile Acts,” p. 9.

¹²⁵ Interview with former Security Minister Juan José Echeverría, San José, Costa Rica, August 16, 2011.

¹²⁶ Booth, “Costa Rica,” p. 120; Honey, “Hostile Acts,” p. 315.

¹²⁷ Booth, “Costa Rica,” p. 120.

¹²⁸ Interview with former Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry Luis Guillermo Solís, San José, Costa Rica, August 25, 2011.

(On the subject of the Green Beret base in Murciélago, it is worth noting that prominent American journalist Martha Honey also alleges that “soldiers and intelligence agents from Guatemala ... and El Salvador” may have trained there.¹²⁹ If true, the training of pro-government forces from those two conflicts could constitute Costa Rican meddling with overt partiality in Guatemala and El Salvador. However, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I think it is more likely that the training of Guatemalan and Salvadoran operatives at Murciélago, if it did occur, was almost entirely an American project with little or no complicity in San José. A similar decision was made below regarding the Guatemala-Honduras dyad.)

Thus the Contra presence in Costa Rica — the product of San José’s meddling with overt partiality in the Nicaraguan civil war — strengthened violent right-wing domestic elements in Costa Rica that could well have initiated a more deadly anti-regime movement. These right-wingers did in fact transform northern Costa Rica into an area of general lawlessness, as landowners, “behind the pretext of preparing for a Sandinista invasion, ... organized and trained armed vigilante squads which battled land squatters and hunted for leftists.”¹³⁰ Furthermore, a former *Somocista* from Nicaragua, Juan José Saborio, broke with the Contra-strengthened MCRL because it was not rightist enough and “approached high-level Rural Guard officers about dropping out of government service and forming a Mano Blanca-type organization. He told ... [the] deputy director of the Rural Guard that the group’s goal was ‘the elimination of Marxist-Leninists in the country, including those in the government.’”¹³¹ The emboldening of such figures suggests that there were clear stirrings of violent right-wing anti-regime sentiment in Costa Rica, which drew strength from the government-supported Contra presence in that country.

¹²⁹ Honey, “Hostile Acts,” p. 315.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 205, 333.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 334-335.

Structural Factors Favoring Costa Rican Stability

It appears that slow-changing structural factors deserve the credit for preventing a full-scale Costa Rican civil war in the face of significant security consequences arising from San José's meddling. First, San José had a wisely moderate policy vis-à-vis its leftist political opposition.¹³² The Costa Rican government suppressed some leftist groups — for instance, it dismantled the “La Familia” group and detained one leader for three years¹³³ — but it did not resort to the populace-alienating brutality of Guatemala or El Salvador. Second, the Costa Rican government politically accommodated some potentially violent enemies of the regime. For example, in 1984 President Monge appointed a founding member of the MCRL, Benjamín Piza Carranza, as Minister of Security to appease the far right and the U.S. Embassy.¹³⁴ (In a testament to the durability of Costa Rica's moderate repression policy, the far-right Carranza apparently lacked either the willingness or the political leverage to use his cabinet post to meaningfully increase anti-left repression.) Third, San José pushed through some reforms in the wage and land distribution system that kept hope alive among the working poor.¹³⁵

Fourth, Costa Rica was the third-wealthiest state in Central America after Mexico and Panama, judging by average GDP per capita in constant dollars between 1978 and 1996, and was far ahead of fourth-ranked Belize.¹³⁶ Thus, while hurt by the 1980s Latin American debt crisis and the collapse of the Central American Common Market, Costa Rica was still better off economically than most of its neighbors, and had a more equitable distribution of wealth as well.¹³⁷ Several interview subjects gave striking statistics illustrating these facts — Costa Rica

¹³² Booth, “Costa Rica,” p. 24.

¹³³ Anonymous, “The Family,” pp. 219-222.

¹³⁴ Honey, “Hostile Acts,” pp. 309-310; Wilson, “Costa Rica,” p. 74.

¹³⁵ Booth, “Costa Rica,” pp. 23-24.

¹³⁶ World Development Indicators.

¹³⁷ Wilson, “Costa Rica,” p. 1.

had about 100,000 coffee producers while El Salvador had about 1,000;¹³⁸ “the average size of a farm was just a few acres, against thousands of acres that you would find in other [Central American] countries”;¹³⁹ and social security and healthcare coverage of the population was near 100 percent, versus figures on the order of 6-7 percent elsewhere in the region.¹⁴⁰ Costa Rica’s relative prosperity and extensive social welfare spending engendered “a very strong middle class that had a lot to lose by going to conflict,” according to former President Figueres.¹⁴¹

Ironically, the Costa Rican welfare state was largely kept alive in the early 1980s by U.S. aid that was provided in exchange for the Monge-era support to the Contras.¹⁴² So in the final analysis this “deal with the devil” may have been a wise one — meddling certainly increased Costa Rican instability at the margins, but it may have also allowed the preservation of the structural conditions that made civil war in the country highly unlikely. On the other hand, perhaps Monge could have found a way to inject cash into the country’s social institutions *without* accepting U.S. aid and destabilizing the country in the short term.

Costa Rica has also had a tradition since the late 1940s of peaceful transitions of power between civilian-controlled governments, which no other state in the region besides Belize can truly claim (and Costa Rica’s tradition is 30 years older than Belize’s). This lack of militarism

¹³⁸ Interview with former President Rafael Angel Calderón, Curridabat, Costa Rica, August 25, 2011.

¹³⁹ Interview with former Vice President Arnoldo López Echandi, San José, Costa Rica, August 19, 2011; cf. Interview with former Security Minister Juan Diego Castro, San José, Costa Rica, August 17, 2011.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with former President Rafael Angel Calderón, Curridabat, Costa Rica, August 25, 2011.

¹⁴¹ Interview with former President José María Figueres (by phone), June 1, 2011; on the Costa Rican welfare state, cf. Interviews with former Security Minister Juan Diego Castro, San José, Costa Rica, August 17, 2011; and former Vice President Arnoldo López Echandi, San José, Costa Rica, August 19, 2011.

¹⁴² Interview with former Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry Luis Guillermo Solís, San José, Costa Rica, August 25, 2011.

bolstered the extent to which violent anti-regime conflict was unthinkable in the minds of most Costa Ricans.¹⁴³

As in the Belizean case, these qualitative impressions of a lack of structural conditions for civil war in Costa Rica are confirmed by quantitative data. The median predicted probability of civil war onset in Costa Rica between 1978 and 1996 was 0.601% per year, and the median probability during the years of Costa Rica's meddling (1978-1986) was 0.578% per year, well below average. Even in the presence of state action, then, there was little opportunity for the mobilization of a significant rebel movement in Costa Rica.

Overall Assessment, and Identification of Natural Obstacles to Contagion

Once again, the outcome of no substate conflict contagion to Costa Rica seems to fit the State Action Explanation. Refugees, drugs, arms, and rebel inspiration spilled into the country from nearby conflicts, meaning these factors were insufficient to cause contagion on their own. Meanwhile, evangelization and expulsion were both absent, but the Costa Rican government did meddle in the Nicaraguan civil war with dangerous security consequences, namely the militarization of the mainstream left and the strengthening of the extreme right. Ultimately, however, Costa Rica in the 1980s was a prosperous, relatively egalitarian state with a moderate civilian government, and these structural factors prevented the violence-prone far-left and far-right elites who roamed northern Costa Rica from mobilizing enough mass anger to start a full-scale civil war — and not for lack of trying, as the Saborio episode illustrates.

The structural factors may also have created the conditions for some of the aforementioned natural obstacles to contagion; for example, former Security Minister Juan Diego Castro said that given Costa Rica's prosperity, it would have been "very hard" for Costa Ricans

¹⁴³ Interview with former President José María Figueres (by phone), June 1, 2011; Interview with former Vice Minister for the Presidency Alejandro Matamoros Bolaños, San José, Costa Rica, August 19, 2011.

to “look at what was going on in Nicaragua and want to mirror here what was going on there”¹⁴⁴ (a reverse demonstration effect). Meanwhile, the obstacle of Costa Rica “fortifying” itself against contagion existed as well. As former Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry Solís said:

“[President] Carazo was not a soft cookie. He had the national security apparatus looking at internal groups. ... Whatever support Costa Rica provided, formal or informal, to the Sandinistas in those years, was never accompanied by a loosening of the internal grip of national security. There was no sympathy for the organization of internal groups that could eventually develop into something else.”¹⁴⁵

In the Costa Rican case, then, we see evidence for the State Action Explanation’s supposition that in order for substate conflict contagion to occur, at least one state action must join with some combination of nonstate and structural factors. In the Costa Rican case, state action was present, but the structural conditions for a civil war were fortunately absent.

Honduras

Absence of Contagion

As in Belize in Costa Rica, not only did Honduras not experience substate conflict contagion between 1978 and 1996, but there was also no substate conflict in the country at all during this time period. There *were* some more minor civil disturbances, which are described in detail below.

High crime and lingering political instability (the latter being a more recent phenomenon) in Honduras’ capital, Tegucigalpa, prevented me from traveling there. However, I was able to conduct phone or e-mail interviews with two prominent former Honduran government officials as a supplement to my secondary source research: former Commander in Chief of the Armed

¹⁴⁴ Interview with former Security Minister Juan Diego Castro, San José, Costa Rica, August 17, 2011; cf. Interviews with former President Miguel Angel Rodriguez, Escazú, Costa Rica, August 22, 2011; and former Interior Minister Antonio Álvarez Desanti, San José, Costa Rica, August 23, 2011.

¹⁴⁵ Interview with former Chief of Staff of the Foreign Ministry Luis Guillermo Solís, San José, Costa Rica, August 25, 2011.

Forces Walter López Reyes (1984-1986), and former Vice President Jaime Rosenthal (1986-1990).

Presence and Insufficiency of Nonstate Factors

Like Belize and Costa Rica, Honduras had multiple potential nonstate causes of contagion present that failed by themselves to result in a contagion outcome. The FMLN rebels supported nascent leftist rebels in Tegucigalpa, though the number of total FMLN-supported dissidents committed to violence remained small (perhaps under 100).¹⁴⁶ Interestingly, when it came to this rebel network, the “reverse demonstration effect” obstacle to substate conflict contagion seems to have obtained strongly among the Honduran population of the time:

“There was little support for revolutionary change and considerable fear that what was happening in neighboring lands might spill over into their own country. Under the circumstances, association with ... the FMLN was a weakness rather than a strength: It discredited the left from the very beginning.”¹⁴⁷

The nonstate mechanism of rebel-to-rebel inspiration was also present in Honduras, where leftists inclined toward violence were inspired by the success of the Sandinistas.¹⁴⁸ Furthermore, Honduras had a sizable number of refugees from El Salvador and Nicaragua — about 43,000 in the 1980s according to the best estimate.¹⁴⁹ In terms of percentage of total population this influx of refugees was significantly smaller than those in Belize and Costa Rica, at just under 1 percent of the total Honduran population at the time.¹⁵⁰ Nevertheless, there were non-trivial consequences to these refugee flows; for example, Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras

¹⁴⁶ Donald E. Schulz and Deborah Sundloff Schulz, *The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 82.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 321.

¹⁴⁸ Richard Lapper and James Painter, *Honduras: State for Sale* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1985), p. 120.

¹⁴⁹ Aristide R. Zolberg, Astri Suhrke, and Sergio Agvayo, *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 212.

¹⁵⁰ World Development Indicators.

were recruited by the Contras and the refugee camps were beds of “lawlessness.”¹⁵¹ The transnational small arms market was also alive and well in Honduras, with many U.S.-Honduran joint operations focusing on interdictions of arms en route to El Salvador or Guatemala.¹⁵² Finally, “Honduras became a transshipment point for drugs going from Colombia to the United States,”¹⁵³ a nonstate mechanism between the Colombian civil war (heavily funded by drug money) and Honduras. Once again, then, we see numerous nonstate factors in Honduras that would seem at first glance to create the perfect conditions for the spread of substate conflict. And yet no such contagion occurred.

Evangelization: Absent

Again, evangelization only could have come from Nicaragua. And, again, evangelization from Nicaragua to Honduras appears not to have occurred. This coding is more ambiguous than the Belizean and Costa Rican codings, however. The Sandinista government *did* support anti-regime elements in Honduras: “In 1980, the Nicaraguans began to provide logistical support, training, arms, and advice to the proliferating [leftist] factions seeking to overthrow the Honduran government.”¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, in July 1983, the Sandinistas dispatched a 96-member cadre of leftist guerrillas to Honduras, where they were promptly mopped up by the Honduran military.¹⁵⁵ So how do these actions by the Nicaraguan government not constitute evangelization? I believe they do not, because as discussed further below (under “Meddling”), these actions appear to have been taken largely *in retaliation* for the Honduran government

¹⁵¹ Idean Salehyan, *Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 129.

¹⁵² Carothers, “In the Name of Democracy,” p. 51; “Copy of Prepared Text of Deputy Assistant Secretary Bosworth’s Testimony Before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, to be Delivered September 21 [1982], on Developments in Honduras,” pp. 3-4, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development, in Central America box.

¹⁵³ Carothers, “In the Name of Democracy,” p. 55.

¹⁵⁴ Schulz and Schulz, “Crisis in Central America,” p. 82.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

support for the anti-Sandinista Contras. Therefore, they are better viewed as part of the third state action mechanism than as part of the first.

When pressed, both of my Honduran interview subjects — former Vice President Jaime Rosenthal, and former Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Walter López Reyes — could only point to this 1983 incident as a case in which the Nicaraguan government tried to spread leftist revolution to Honduras.¹⁵⁶ A U.S. State Department bulletin from 1986 mentions a similar incursion in 1984, but no additional detail could be located, and we must bear in mind that the Reagan administration was highly prone to exaggeration of the Nicaraguan threat to Central American stability.¹⁵⁷ Otherwise, direct attempts by the Sandinistas to spread conflict to Honduras appear to have been absent.

Expulsion: Absent

Theoretically, combatants could have been expelled to Honduras from any of the five Central American states which experienced substate conflict between 1978 and 1996. In practice, there is simply no evidence of expulsion from Guatemala, Mexico, or Panama. (In fact, in the Guatemalan case, Belizean government documents record evidence that the Guatemalan and Honduran governments worked together to prevent Guatemalan guerillas from operating in Honduras.¹⁵⁸) As for El Salvador and Nicaragua, more discussion is needed — but I ultimately code expulsion to have been absent from these conflicts to Honduras as well.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with former Vice President Jaime Rosenthal (by phone), March 16 and 21, 2011; interview with former Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Walter López Reyes (by e-mail), February 24 and 28, 2011. A note on the López interview: Since he could not speak English and my oral Spanish was not sufficient to conduct a live phone interview without the aid of an interpreter, we exchanged e-mails in Spanish. Direct quotes from López are my translations from Spanish (with the aid of Google Translate).

¹⁵⁷ Vernon A. Walters, “Nicaragua’s Role in Revolutionary Internationalism,” *U.S. Department of State Bulletin* (1986).

¹⁵⁸ Meeting notes of Belizean government officials, April 29, 1983, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

Rebels certainly did cross from El Salvador into Honduras; as noted above, they even assisted leftist dissidents in Tegucigalpa with plans for a violent revolution. So the question is *why* those Salvadoran rebels were in Honduras — whether they crossed the border because they were forced out of their home country by the government of El Salvador (constituting the state action of expulsion), or whether they left the country voluntarily (not constituting expulsion). I believe the latter explanation is closest to the truth. The government of El Salvador does not appear to have had any desire to expel combatants from its territory; quite the contrary, the government's military strategy seems to have centered around trapping suspected rebels in the country and then eliminating them. Consider, for example, the following account of a joint Salvadoran-Honduran military operation from May 1980: "As hundreds of fleeing peasants attempted to cross the [Sumpúl] River into Honduras, they were forced back into El Salvador and systematically gunned down by the Salvadoran army and national guard."¹⁵⁹ Salvadoran troops also "pursued suspected guerillas across the [Honduran] border"¹⁶⁰ after they had crossed over, which constitutes more evidence that the Salvadoran government wanted its rebels dead, not expelled. (A state pursuing a policy of expulsion should generally stop pursuing the combatants once they have left the country, and focus on fortifying the border to prevent their return.)

One of my interview subjects, former Honduran Vice President Jaime Rosenthal, argued that the Salvadoran government did not try very hard to keep the FMLN in *or* out of Honduras.¹⁶¹ This contradicts the secondary source account above — in which San Salvador was clearly trying to keep its rebels in-country — but even if Rosenthal is correct, this *laissez-faire* policy of the Salvadoran government would not constitute expulsion.

¹⁵⁹ Schulz and Schulz, "Crisis in Central America," p. 60.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 62.

¹⁶¹ Interview with former Vice President Jaime Rosenthal (by phone), March 21, 2011.

So there was seemingly no expulsion from El Salvador to Honduras. What about expulsion from Nicaragua to Honduras? Other than the 1983 incident noted above, which I consider to have been retaliation for Honduran meddling rather than evangelization or expulsion, I found no evidence of the Sandinistas deliberately moving or forcing combatants (whether leftists or Contras) across the border into Honduras. Rather, like the government of El Salvador, the government of Nicaragua appears to have been primarily interested in annihilating enemy combatants no matter where they were — Nicaragua, Honduras, or elsewhere. We again have evidence of pursuit operations undertaken by State A into State B's territory; in this case, 1,500 Nicaraguan soldiers pursued Contras into Honduras in March 1988.¹⁶² Again, we would not expect to observe such behavior from a State A with an expulsion policy.

A stronger case for Nicaraguan expulsion to Honduras can be made about the period immediately following the Sandinista takeover in July 1979, when “a majority of the defeated national guardsmen ... fled across the border into Honduras.”¹⁶³ These “national guardsmen” were eventually organized into the Contra force that fought the Sandinista regime. If they can be considered combatants at the time they fled Nicaragua, then this certainly sounds like an incident of expulsion. However, in late 1979 these guardsmen were “weak, fragmented, and demoralized,” and stayed that way until Honduran and American aid transformed them into a cohesive fighting force. Two experts on Honduras write, “Had it not been for the arrival of Reagan in the White House, [the guardsmen] would almost certainly have merged into the Caribbean underworld, just as the defeated Cuban army of Fulgencio Batista had done 20 years before.”¹⁶⁴ Therefore, while the Nicaraguan government may have intended to oust the

¹⁶² Schulz and Schulz, “Crisis in Central America,” p. 230.

¹⁶³ Lapper and Painter, “Honduras,” p. 84. Former Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces López also mentioned this flight of *Somocistas* in his February 28, 2011 interview.

¹⁶⁴ Lapper and Painter, “Honduras,” p. 84.

guardsmen in 1979, I argue that the guardsmen were not sufficiently militarized to be considered combatants at the time of their arrival in Honduras, making this a non-case of expulsion.

The careful reader will note the parallel between this case of non-expulsion and the China to Myanmar, 1959 and 1961 cases discussed in Chapter 3, where I *did* identify expulsion. In both cases the CIA helped organize and equip a cadre of defeated men who had fled their home country. The key difference between these cases is that prior to the CIA's involvement in Burma, the Kuomintang rebels had a central leadership under Li Mi and the structure of the Yunnan Anti-Communist Salvation Army; prior to the CIA's involvement in Honduras, the guardsmen were a ragtag bunch headed for underworld oblivion. It is for this reason that I code the Kuomintang as combatants, but not the defeated Nicaraguan national guardsmen.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: *Present*

The Honduran government did meddle with overt partiality on two major fronts. They supported the Salvadoran government against the FMLN, and, more infamously, they supported the Contras against the Nicaraguan government. Both of these meddling actions resulted in substantial security consequences for Honduras, as elaborated below, although neither ultimately resulted in a Honduran civil war.

(On a more minor front, the Honduran government may have meddled in the Guatemalan conflict by allowing the U.S. to train pro-government troops for counterinsurgency operations on Honduran territory.¹⁶⁵ It is debatable how complicit Tegucigalpa was in these training programs and whether this meddling was sufficiently "overt." I suspect the training programs were primarily orchestrated by Washington with limited Honduran participation, and thus have coded meddling as absent in the Guatemala-Honduras dyad; a similar coding decision was made for the

¹⁶⁵ Robert S. Leiken, "Overview: Can the Cycle Be Broken?" in Robert S. Leiken, ed., *Central America: Anatomy of a Conflict* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), pp. 10-11.

Guatemala-Costa Rica dyad for similar reasons, as discussed above. Meanwhile, Tegucigalpa's cooperation with the government of Guatemala against Guatemalan guerillas based *in Honduras*, noted above, constitutes homeland defense rather than external meddling on Tegucigalpa's part.)

With respect to El Salvador, between 1983 and late 1984 the government of Honduras deliberately provided territory for American training grounds for pro-San Salvador troops.¹⁶⁶ As above with respect to Guatemala, by itself it is debatable whether this meddling was sufficiently overt. In addition, however, the Honduran government cooperated with the Salvadoran government on anti-FMLN military operations — one such operation on the Sumpúl River is described above in the “Expulsion” section. That massacre, executed with Honduran complicity, took Tegucigalpa's actions beyond homeland defense — which, as in the Guatemala-Honduras dyad, I generally do not consider to constitute meddling in another state's conflict — and over the threshold to direct involvement in the Salvadoran civil war. Together, I consider these actions to have constituted Honduran meddling with overt partiality in the El Salvador conflict.

The history of Honduran meddling in the Nicaraguan conflict is considerably more involved. Tegucigalpa initially supported *both* sides in Nicaragua in the late 1970s; Richard Lapper and James Painter sardonically write, “During the Nicaraguan civil war, [the Honduran] interior minister ... displayed a heightened sense of neutrality by selling arms to the Sandinistas and intelligence to Somoza.”¹⁶⁷ This meddling was thus overt but not partial. Then, in early 1980, Honduras Colonel Gustavo Alvarez Martínez began, “on his own initiative, ... aiding anti-Sandinista rebels in Honduras with arms, medicine, and other materials.” This policy met with the reluctant approval of General Policarpo Paz Garcia, who was running the military, and by extension the country, at the time (though he was soon replaced by Alvarez). In April 1981,

¹⁶⁶ Schulz and Schulz, “Crisis in Central America,” pp. 88-91, 107; Leiken, “Overview,” p. 12.

¹⁶⁷ Lapper and Painter, “Honduras,” p. 81.

Alvarez contacted the CIA for help with his Contra support program, and by November of that year the U.S. was contributing substantially to the program. The official Contra organization, the Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense, was stood up on August 11, 1981 under the auspices of this aid program, which besides supplies came to include bases and training.¹⁶⁸

From late 1981 to 1984, aid to the Contras flowed intensely from both the U.S. and Honduras. Then, in March 1984, General Walter López Reyes — one of my interview subjects — replaced Alvarez as head of the military in a bloodless coup. López was no friend of the Contras, and tried to limit the Honduran support that Alvarez had given so freely.¹⁶⁹ Then, in late 1986 as the Iran-Contra scandal enveloped Washington, new military leader Humberto Regalado told the Reagan administration that the Contras had to leave Honduras. U.S. Ambassador Ted Briggs “presented his hosts with a timetable under which the Contras would be sent into Nicaragua over the next four months.”¹⁷⁰ The Contras did not fully leave Honduras, however, until May 1990, when they reached an agreement with the new Chamorro government in Nicaragua. By this point the Honduran government policy of support for the Contras was a long-abandoned relic.¹⁷¹ Thus Honduran meddling in the Nicaraguan conflict was strongest from 1980 to 1984, and diminished rapidly thereafter despite the continued presence of Contras in the country for the next six years.

Consequences of Honduran Meddling with Overt Partiality

So why did Honduran meddling with overt partiality in the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan conflicts not result in the boomeranging of conflict back to Honduras? To answer that question, it is first important to note that both cases of meddling *did* have significant negative security

¹⁶⁸ Schulz and Schulz, “Crisis in Central America,” pp. 64-66.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, pp. 97, 103.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 173.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, p. 262.

consequences for Honduras, even if these consequences did not rise to the level of a full-scale civil war (or even a 25-death substate conflict).

The chief consequence of the meddling in El Salvador was that FMLN guerillas retaliated against the Honduran state. For example, “During the late spring of 1982, the FMLN revolutionaries darkened much of Honduras by blowing up electrical power stations.”¹⁷² Historians Donald and Deborah Schulz explicitly identify the 1982 FMLN attacks as “retaliation” for joint Salvadoran-Honduran military operations.¹⁷³

Meanwhile, there were manifold consequences of the meddling in Nicaragua. First, as alluded to above, the Sandinista government appears to have attempted to retaliate for Honduran meddling by sowing instability in Honduras, just as we have seen in numerous positive contagion cases in Chapter 3. Nicaragua did so by supporting the small leftist factions in Honduras and by sending “advance parties” of guerillas over the border. Schulz and Schulz describe Nicaraguan efforts in Honduras as follows:

“The [Sandinista] operations that were undertaken were exploratory, designed to test Honduran defenses and gauge the potential mass support for the revolutionary movement. In part, too, they were a response to Honduras’ growing cooperation with the U.S. strategic plan [to aid the Contras]. A message was being sent: If the Hondurans joined Reagan’s wars, they could expect retaliation.”¹⁷⁴

Based on this evidence — and the fact that Honduran meddling with overt partiality in the Nicaraguan conflict began in early 1980, around the same time that Nicaraguan operations in Honduras began — I believe Nicaraguan actions are best viewed as retaliation for Honduran meddling. To the extent that the Nicaraguans were simply trying to evangelize, their actions were “exploratory” only, that is, not particularly forceful.

¹⁷² Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983), p. 298.

¹⁷³ Schulz and Schulz, “Crisis in Central America,” p. 62.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

There were other consequences as well. The Contras sheltering in Honduras engaged in “payroll holdups and kidnappings” for revenue during the early 1980s.¹⁷⁵ Toward the end of the 1980s, Schulz and Schulz describe a general mayhem that stemmed from the close of the Contra chapter in Honduras:

“The disintegration of the Contras ... released hundreds of unemployed guerillas into Honduran society. Many were frustrated, bitter, and prone to violence. They were not necessarily political; many were only too happy to sell their guns to anyone with money. Those who had been in command positions, in particular, had access to weapons caches. ... The largest customer was the Salvadoran FMLN, but there were others also.”¹⁷⁶

Furthermore, throughout the 1980s, the Honduran government feared that if the Contras got tired of their (losing) fight with the Sandinistas, they might direct their violent energy toward Tegucigalpa.¹⁷⁷ “The ultimate nightmare,” Schulz and Schulz write, “was that the insurgents might dissolve into uncontrollable marauding bands. ... The Contras had almost as many men under arms as the Honduran military.”¹⁷⁸ In addition, former Vice President Jaime Rosenthal told me in an interview that the Contra operations in Honduras gave the U.S the opportunity to strengthen the Honduran military. He viewed this development as a negative security consequence in light of the frequent military interdictions of civilian control.¹⁷⁹ Finally, Rosenthal also identified the strengthening of Honduras’ left — the small size of which has generally been considered a factor favoring Honduran security — as a consequence of U.S.-Honduran aid to the Contras, in that the aid provided the left with an anti-American rallying

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 80.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 251.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 3; Salehyan, “Rebels without Borders,” p. 137.

¹⁷⁸ Schulz and Schulz, “Crisis in Central America,” p. 105.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with former Vice President Jaime Rosenthal (by phone), March 16, 2011.

cry.¹⁸⁰ A 1988 incident in which “over 1,000 people marched on the U.S. embassy” and set off riots lasting several days seems to support this view.¹⁸¹

Structural Factors Favoring Honduran Stability

So if there were so many negative security consequences for Honduran meddling in El Salvador in Nicaragua, why did Honduras ultimately not experience a civil war? Secondary sources and my interview subjects advanced various reasons, all of which can be broadly classified as structural factors favoring civil peace in Honduras. Both López and Rosenthal argued that the Honduran government repressed its populace less than the likes of Nicaragua and El Salvador.¹⁸² Such claims from former government officials must be taken with a grain of salt, but Schulz and Schulz agree: “Although human rights violations existed and were on the rise, the situation was a far cry from the kind of indiscriminate and massive carnage that might have made radicals of a large number of Hondurans.”¹⁸³ Partly as a result of this low-to-moderate level of repression, the political left in Honduras — the most likely group to initiate an armed rebellion — was weak and factionalized.¹⁸⁴ Former Vice President Rosenthal told me, “The leftist parties in Honduras ... are permitted to operate and participate in elections, and they never get more than 5 percent of the vote.”¹⁸⁵ Former Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces López agreed: “Left-wing ideological movements were small and without popular support.”¹⁸⁶

Multiple sources also credited the “flexibility” of the Honduran political system for preventing enough grievance from arising. As Schultz and Schultz write, “The very fact that

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Salehyan, “Rebels without Borders,” p. 138.

¹⁸² Interview with former Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Walter López Reyes (by e-mail), February 24, 2011; interview with former Vice President Jaime Rosenthal (by phone), March 16, 2011.

¹⁸³ Schulz and Schulz, “Crisis in Central America,” p. 82.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Interview with former Vice President Jaime Rosenthal (by phone), March 16, 2011.

¹⁸⁶ Interview with former Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Walter López Reyes (by e-mail), February 24, 2011.

peasants could organize and sometimes win disputes and recover ‘stolen’ properties or otherwise benefit from land distribution programs co-opted many and gave hope to many others, buttressing the legitimacy of the system.”¹⁸⁷ Unions were stronger in Honduras than elsewhere in Central America, and the military was less interventionist in civilian affairs¹⁸⁸ (though this latter tendency was undermined somewhat by the Contra presence, as Rosenthal noted above). Hence the Honduran government had at least an *illusion* of legitimacy that many other Central American states at the time did not.

Finally, like Belize and Costa Rica, Honduras was a less socially stratified society than the rest of its Central American peers. As former Vice President Rosenthal put it to me, “The very wealthy in Honduras are not that wealthy. The class differences are not that big. ... [And] the wealthy families in Honduras are more recent. ... There is not a lot of wealth from the land.”¹⁸⁹ Schulz and Schulz put the total size of the elite at “probably not more than 1,000 people” and note that they “lacked the aristocratic traditions of most Central American ruling classes.”¹⁹⁰ A country that is almost universally poor and that does not have a sizable landed aristocracy has fewer visible distinctions between haves and have-nots. Such “relative deprivation” is a crucial structural cause of civil war.¹⁹¹ Relatedly, the 1980s debt crisis that significantly increased social tensions in the rest of Central America did not impact Honduras as severely — “the economy had less distance to fall.”¹⁹²

The qualitative evidence above strongly suggests that the structural conditions for civil war were absent in Honduras. The quantitative evidence disagrees with this conclusion, however.

¹⁸⁷ Schultz and Schultz, “Crisis in Central America,” p. 316.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, pp. 316-317; Interview with former Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Walter López Reyes (by e-mail), February 24, 2011.

¹⁸⁹ Interview with former Vice President Jaime Rosenthal (by phone), March 16 and 21, 2011.

¹⁹⁰ Schulz and Schulz, “Crisis in Central America,” p. 318.

¹⁹¹ Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

¹⁹² Schulz and Schulz, “Crisis in Central America,” p. 323.

The median predicted probability of civil war onset in Honduras, 1978-1996, was 1.933% per year; during the meddling years of 1980-1984, the median probability was 2.37%. Both of these statistics are well above the population median probability of civil war onset (1.05%), and in the neighborhood of the median probability of civil war onset in cases of high-intensity substate conflict contagion (2.095%). Thus the Fearon/Laitin regression model suggests that the structural conditions for civil war *were* present in Honduras. We must decide which set of evidence — quantitative or qualitative — to favor.

As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, the Fearon/Laitin proxy for structural conditions is useful for describing and comparing thousands of observations, but at the level of analysis of individual Central American cases, important structural variables are missing. None of the qualitatively identified structural conditions favoring *peace* in Honduras are captured in Fearon and Laitin's twelve-variable model. So, for example, while the low per capita income of Honduras is one of the determinants of its high predicted probability of civil war onset, the relatively even distribution of that income is not accounted for quantitatively. Given that the quantitative probability of civil war onset in Honduras is high but not extreme (it is not 5% per year, or 10% per year), and given the weight of the qualitative evidence in favor of the absence of structural conditions for civil war, I judge the overall level of structural factors to have been low.

As an aside, the disconnect between the quantitative evidence and the qualitative evidence in the Honduran case suggests that future research on the causes of civil war in general should take account of regional variations in the importance of various structural factors. The Fearon and Laitin regressions, and others like them, have greatly advanced our knowledge of why civil wars occur in the world, but we are still in search of more complete and more

geographically specific models. (And this dissertation, which seeks to explain substate conflict contagion around the postwar world, is vulnerable to a similar critique, although I have tried to overcome it by testing the State Action Explanation in specific regions.)

Overall Assessment

Overall, the outcome of no substate conflict contagion to Honduras seems to be consistent with the State Action Explanation. Five out of the six nonstate factors (all except for the foreign fighters mechanism) were present in Honduras, so their presence alone cannot explain the negative value on the dependent variable. Meanwhile, evangelization and expulsion appear to have been absent. Meddling with overt partiality was *present* on two fronts — the Honduran government supported the government in El Salvador and the rebels in Nicaragua — and this resulted in significant negative security consequences for Honduras in both cases. Ultimately, though, this meddling was not sufficient to cause contagion from El Salvador or Nicaragua to Honduras, because numerous structural factors favoring civil peace were present in the Honduran polity (although the qualitative and quantitative evidence disagree on this point). Thus the Honduran case demonstrates the insufficiency of nonstate factors alone for contagion and the tendency for state actions to endanger the internal stability of states. But the case also demonstrates the necessity of structural factors *in addition to* state actions for the actual outbreak of contagious civil war.

Summary and Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the history of 35 State A-State B dyads in Central America between 1978 and 1996. (Nineteen of these dyads are specifically discussed in Appendix 4.1 below. The other sixteen dyads involved either Belize, Honduras, or Costa Rica as State B, or involved the Nicaragua-El Salvador contagion case, and were covered in the longer case studies

above.) I found evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality present in only eight of those dyads. In one, Nicaragua-El Salvador, evangelization played a major role in the spread of substate conflict, although the Salvadoran civil war also required nonstate and structural factors to get off the ground. The other seven state actions identified were all meddling with overt partiality, including three prominent cases of meddling by Costa Rica in Nicaragua, Honduras in Nicaragua, and Honduras in El Salvador, and four more minor cases of meddling by Guatemala in El Salvador, Panama in El Salvador, Mexico in Nicaragua, and Panama in Nicaragua. None of these instances of meddling with overt partiality resulted in the spread of substate conflict from State A to State B — although both Costa Rica and Honduras experienced negative security consequences for their meddling — again reinforcing the supposition that state actions, while necessary for substate conflict contagion, are not sufficient on their own.

In the other 27 State A-State B dyads, I found no convincing evidence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality. I believe this relative rarity of state action in Central America plays a significant, though not all-encompassing, role in explaining the relative rarity of substate conflict contagion in the region. After all, nonstate factors — particularly spillovers of refugees, arms, and drugs from conflict zones — existed throughout the region to varying degrees, and yet these factors did not on their own cause the spread of substate conflict. In other words, the natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion, which we directly observed in the form of reverse demonstration effects in Belize, Costa Rica, and Honduras, as well as government fortification against contagion in Belize and Costa Rica — and which were doubtlessly present elsewhere in the region — could not be overcome by these nonstate factors alone.

On the other hand, it seems from a combination of quantitative indicators and qualitative evidence that the structural conditions for civil war onset in general were for the most part absent from Central America. It could be argued, then, that even given more frequent state actions, contagion would still have been rare. This argument, if true — the codings of structural factors are still too ambiguous to know for sure — would also support the State Action Explanation, which postulates that state actions and structural factors must combine to produce contagion outcomes. Nevertheless, to better test the causal contribution of state actions specifically, we would prefer less co-occurrence of missing state actions and missing structural factors, which fortunately we find in Southeast Asia (Chapter 5).

This chapter has thus provided a useful first regional test of the State Action Explanation. The state action of evangelization was present in and necessary for the one case of substate conflict contagion that did occur, and state actions were absent from roughly four fifths of the 34 cases where contagion did *not* occur. Meanwhile, the presence of nonstate factors by themselves appears to have had no direct correlation with the occurrence of substate conflict contagion. These findings suggest that at least one state action is a necessary but insufficient condition for most cases of substate conflict contagion, just as the explanation predicts.

The next chapter will continue testing the State Action Explanation by looking at Southeast Asia between 1959 and 1980. Unlike Central America, Southeast Asia had six cases of substate conflict contagion during the time period under study — but also had thirty directed dyads in which, despite the presence of a State A conflict, contagion did not occur. There is thus again a mix (albeit a different one) of cases and non-cases of contagion for us to study. I do so, ultimately finding further empirical support for the State Action Explanation.

Appendix 4.1: Coding of Other Dyads

These 19 brief, dyad-specific “mini-case studies” are organized as follows. The dyads are titled “State A-State B” — for example, in the “El Salvador-Guatemala” dyad just below, El Salvador is State A and Guatemala is State B. The value of the dependent variable for each of these 19 dyads is negative — there were no additional cases of substate conflict contagion in Central America between 1978 and 1996 — so there are no dyad-specific dependent variable codings below. Instead, I skip to coding the presence or absence of the three state actions, each of which is considered in turn. Next, I report the median predicted probability of civil war in State B between the year of the State A conflict onset (or 1978, whichever is later) and five years after the State A conflict termination (or 1996, whichever is earlier), again as a rough proxy for the presence of structural factors. Structural factors are considered to be “present” if this predicted probability is 1.5% per year or higher (rounding to the nearest tenth of a percentage point). Finally, I discuss the presence of any identified nonstate factors in the dyad. (Not every dyad has nonstate factors identified.)

El Salvador-Guatemala

Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in El Salvador did not unseat the government.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. As discussed above, the Salvadoran government’s general approach to its counterinsurgency was to try to keep rebels *in* the country, not force them out. This policy seems to have been applied with respect to Guatemala as well; on January 12, 1981, Guatemalan troops sealed the Salvadoran border, seemingly with San Salvador’s approval.¹⁹³ Furthermore, former UN envoy to Central America Alvaro de Soto told me in an interview of widespread suspicion that the Salvadoran and Guatemalan governments were cooperating to

¹⁹³ Bosch, “The Salvadoran Officer Corps,” p. 94.

eliminate FMLN rebels who *did* manage to get into Guatemala.¹⁹⁴ Again, this suggests that El Salvador was pursuing a policy of annihilation rather than a policy of expulsion.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Weakly *present*. The Guatemalan government, with the assistance of the Israelis, provided some advanced weaponry to the Salvadoran government during 1983 and 1984 at least.¹⁹⁵ However, other than de Soto's suggestion of Salvadoran-Guatemalan cooperation to eliminate FMLN in Guatemala, I found no hard evidence of more direct Guatemalan involvement in the Salvadoran conflict. (Anti-rebel operations conducted by the Guatemalan government on Guatemalan soil sound more like homeland defense than meddling in another state's conflict.) Overall, Guatemala's role in El Salvador seems to have been too limited to have invited any sort of boomeranging. In addition, as noted below, the quantitative proxy suggests that the structural factors for civil war onset in Guatemala — more specifically, an *additional* civil war onset in Guatemala — were absent.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Guatemala, 1981-1996: 0.934% per year (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Present. The UNHCR estimates that there were 100,000 Salvadoran refugees in Guatemala in 1981 — about 1.4 percent of the Guatemalan population at the time¹⁹⁶ — and 70,000 refugees from 1982 to 1984.¹⁹⁷ Despite the presence of this sizable refugee population, substate conflict did not spread from El Salvador to Guatemala.

¹⁹⁴ Interview with former UN envoy to the Central American peace process Alvaro de Soto (by phone), March 25, 2011.

¹⁹⁵ "Israel Plays Key Role in Central American Balance, Says Central American Report," *The Reporter* (Belize), January 13, 1985, p. 4.

¹⁹⁶ World Development Indicators.

¹⁹⁷ UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database.

Nonstate Factor of Arms: Present. Two Belizean government documents from March and April 1992 record the Guatemalan government's concern that guerilla forces there were getting advanced weaponry from the eclipsing Salvadoran conflict.¹⁹⁸

El Salvador-Mexico

Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in El Salvador did not unseat the government.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Salvadoran expulsion of rebels into Mexico, and it seems unlikely given San Salvador's general preference to keep its rebels in-country.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. The Mexican government *did* meddle in the Salvadoran conflict, at least in the 1970s and perhaps the early 1980s, by "supporting" the leftist dissidents.¹⁹⁹ However, this support does not seem to have been sufficiently tangible to qualify as "overt." Mexico "provided" Salvadoran rebels "with a clandestine publications agency,"²⁰⁰ and lent political support to Salvadoran insurgents living in Mexico City.²⁰¹ But according to the primary and secondary sources I consulted, that is the extent of Mexican aid to Salvadoran leftists; there was little to no operational support for the revolution. (A Socialist International document from 1983 found in Belizean archives does allege Mexican training and logistical support for the FMLN, but no evidence is given for these claims.²⁰²)

¹⁹⁸ Meeting notes of Belizean government officials, March 11, 1992 and April 8, 1992, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

¹⁹⁹ LaFeber, "Inevitable Revolutions," p. 213.

²⁰⁰ Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, *El Salvador at War: An Oral History* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1988), p. 93.

²⁰¹ U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Gavin, "Assistance to Insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala from Mexican Territory," Telegram to U.S. Secretary of State Haig, March 30, 1982, Declassified Confidential. Available online: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB100/Doc11.pdf>.

²⁰² Socialist International, "Nicaragua," July 6, 1983, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development, in Central America box.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Mexico, 1981-1996: 1.878% per year (high, well above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear *present*. The absence of state action may independently explain the lack of contagion in this case.

Nonstate Factor of Return of Foreign Fighters from State A to State B: Present. James Stevenson writes of southern Mexico's Zapatista insurgency in the 1990s, "It has been suggested [by Mexican officials] that the nucleus of the 2,000 well-drilled fighters was drawn from Mexicans who had fought as volunteers with Nicaragua's Sandinistas and El Salvador's left-wing guerillas in ... the 1980s."²⁰³

Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Present. The UNHCR estimates there were 140,000 Salvadoran refugees in Mexico in 1981, and 120,000 from 1982 to 1988.²⁰⁴ Another source estimates that there were as many as 250,000 Salvadoran refugees in Mexico during this time period.²⁰⁵ Though these numbers are massive, we must bear in mind that even 250,000 refugees would only have been about 0.3 percent of Mexico's 1987 population.²⁰⁶

El Salvador-Nicaragua

Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in El Salvador did not unseat the government.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Salvadoran expulsion of rebels into Nicaragua, and it seems unlikely given San Salvador's general preference to keep its rebels in-country.

²⁰³ James Stevenson, "The 1994 Zapatista Rebellion in Southern Mexico," Strategic and Combat Studies Institute Occasional Paper, No. 12 (1995), p. 8.

²⁰⁴ UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database.

²⁰⁵ Zolberg *et al.*, "Escape from Violence," p. 212.

²⁰⁶ World Development Indicators.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: The Nicaraguan government was, of course, involved in the Salvadoran conflict, as discussed at length above. However, this better qualifies as evangelization than meddling because it came in the wake of a rebel victory in Nicaragua.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Nicaragua, 1981-1996: 1.056% per year (low, roughly equivalent to the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Nonstate Mechanism of Refugees: Weakly present. The UNHCR estimates there were over 20,000 Salvadoran refugees in Nicaragua in 1981 and 1982 — about 0.6 percent of Nicaragua's 1981 population²⁰⁷ — and over 16,000 refugees from 1983 to 1985.²⁰⁸

El Salvador-Panama

Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in El Salvador did not unseat the government.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Salvadoran expulsion of rebels into Panama, and it seems unlikely given San Salvador's general preference to keep its rebels in-country.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: *Present*, though to a limited degree. In 1981, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig accused the Panamanian government of “funneling arms to the Salvadoran rebels” — Panama denied it.²⁰⁹ Haig was right, however; the Panamanian government under Omar Torrijos was a small-scale arms supplier to the Salvadoran rebels in the late 1970s. By 1980, however, the small Panamanian role was “supplanted” by Nicaragua.²¹⁰ The limitations of scale and time in Panama's meddling, and the sheer distance between Panama and

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database.

²⁰⁹ LaFeber, “Inevitable Revolutions,” p. 285.

²¹⁰ Moroni and Spencer, “Strategy and Tactics of the Salvadoran FMLN Guerillas,” p. 176.

El Salvador, probably help explain why this meddling did not boomerang back to Panama in any discernible way. Perhaps more importantly, though, the quantitative proxy suggests that the structural conditions for civil war in Panama were absent.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Panama, 1981-1996: 0.537% per year (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Weakly present. The UNHCR estimates there were 3,000 Salvadoran refugees in Panama in 1980 — about 0.2 percent of Panama's 1980 population²¹¹ — and around 1,000 thereafter.²¹²

Guatemala-El Salvador

Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Guatemala did not unseat the government.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. Some Guatemalan rebels did cross the border into El Salvador in late 1982, but as historian Greg Grandin narrates the event, some of these rebels hid in the mountains in Guatemala while others crossed into El Salvador.²¹³ This suggests the leftists in Guatemala were not *forced* out of the country (if some chose to stay in-country and were able to do so). Also, the fact that the Guatemalan government sealed the border with El Salvador in January 1981, noted above, suggests that Guatemala did not want its rebels leaving their territory any more than El Salvador did.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Salvadoran involvement in the Guatemalan conflict — if Salvadoran forces worked to eliminate FMLN

²¹¹ World Development Indicators.

²¹² UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database.

²¹³ Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), p. 130.

guerillas in Guatemala, as former UN envoy Alvaro de Soto suggested to me in an interview, then that would constitute Salvadoran involvement in the *Salvadoran* conflict. Likewise, any Salvadoran cooperation with Guatemalan authorities to neutralize the Guatemalan guerilla presence in El Salvador would constitute homeland defense on San Salvador's part, not meddling.²¹⁴

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in El Salvador, 1978-1996: 0.869% per year (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Nonstate Factor of Rebels Helping Rebels: Possibly present. Grandin describes the movement of some Guatemalan leftists "to insurgent territory in El Salvador to regroup" in 1982.²¹⁵ This suggests that the Guatemalan leftists and the FMLN were cooperating, and that the FMLN gave some Guatemalan leftists safe haven while they were recuperating.

Guatemala-Mexico

Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Guatemala did not unseat the government.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. Guatemalan leftists definitely fled Guatemala for Mexico; some "worked from Mexico City during the 1980s," for example.²¹⁶ However, they do not appear to have left because of a deliberate Guatemalan policy of expulsion. As noted above, the Guatemalan government was generally similar to the Salvadoran government in that it wanted its rebels inside the country rather than outside of it. According to a 1984 CIA report, "Various

²¹⁴ Such evidence can be found in Belizean government notes of a meeting of officials, April 29, 1983, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

²¹⁵ Grandin, "The Last Colonial Massacre," p. 130.

²¹⁶ Kate Doyle, "Los Dos Caras de México," *Proceso* (November 2, 2003); and "Mexico's Southern Front: Guatemala and the Search for Security," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book (2003). Available online (and in English): <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB100/index.htm>.

sources indicate that [Guatemalan President] Mejia believes that the Guatemalan insurgents' use of Mexican territory is a more important factor in their survival than Sandinista support."²¹⁷ This report suggests that the Guatemalan regime was frustrated by the insurgent presence in Mexico, and would have preferred to have had the rebels in-country. This view is supported by a Belizean government document from May 1982, which describes attempts by the Guatemalan government to cooperate with the Mexican Defense Ministry to keep the Guatemalan guerillas from crossing into Mexico.²¹⁸ Furthermore, the ratio of Guatemalan refugees in Mexico to Guatemalan internally displaced persons — “at least 100,000 refugees” to “a further million” IDPs²¹⁹ — suggests that the Guatemalan government did not deliberately try to force suspected rebels out of the country. (If they had, we would expect the reverse ratio.)

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. Although “successive Mexican governments during the 1970s and 1980s ... backed the [Guatemalan leftist group] URNG,”²²⁰ this meddling does not seem to have been either overt or partial. The Mexican government had “an ambivalent and at times contradictory policy toward the Guatemalan conflict,” sometimes allowing the Guatemalan leftists to “use Mexican territory for political or even limited operational activities,” but at other times “support[ing] counterinsurgency operations launched by the Guatemalan army” and “maintain[ing] intensive surveillance [of leftist leaders] and conduct[ing] sporadic operations to detain, torture, and expel them.”²²¹ Thus Mexican meddling was not truly partial. Furthermore, in a March 1982 cable the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, John

²¹⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, “Guatemala: Reluctant Central American Partner,” November 23, 1984, Declassified Secret, p. 6. Available online: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB100/Doc21.pdf>.

²¹⁸ Official correspondence between Belizean law enforcement authorities, May 20, 1982, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development.

²¹⁹ Hilde Salvesen, *A Farewell to Arms? A Comparative Study of Demilitarization in El Salvador and Guatemala* (MA Thesis, Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1998), p. 34.

²²⁰ Stevenson, “The 1994 Zapatista Rebellion in Southern Mexico,” p. 14.

²²¹ Doyle, “Los Dos Caras de México.”

Gavin, “painted a picture of a policy of [Mexican] pragmatism, one which granted the [Guatemalan] left relative freedom to operate in the capital, but limited their activities to political agitation rather than operational.”²²² Thus Mexican meddling was not that overt either.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Mexico, 1978-1996: 2.097% per year (high, well above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear *present*. The absence of state action may independently explain the lack of contagion in this case.

Nonstate Factor of Rebels Inspiring Rebels: Present. Stevenson claims that the Zapatista rebels, while not directly supported by the URNG, were inspired by their tactics.²²³

Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Present. As noted above, about 100,000 refugees fled Guatemala for Mexico; other estimates put that figure as high as 300,000.²²⁴ While even the high estimate is only about 0.3 percent of Mexico’s 1994 population,²²⁵ the refugee flows into southern Mexico put significant strain on land resources there by contributing to a near-tripling of the indigenous population.²²⁶ These population pressures contributed to the outbreak of the Zapatista rebellion in Mexico,²²⁷ although this rebellion did not escalate to the intensity of a civil war.

Guatemala-Nicaragua

Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Guatemala did not unseat the government.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Stevenson, “The 1994 Zapatista Rebellion in Southern Mexico,” p. 14.

²²⁴ Philip Howard and Thomas Homer-Dixon, “The Case of Chiapas, Mexico,” in Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt, *Ecoviolence: Links among Environment, Population, and Security* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp. 22, 26-27.

²²⁵ World Development Indicators.

²²⁶ Howard and Homer-Dixon, “The Case of Chiapas, Mexico,” pp. 22, 26-27.

²²⁷ Ibid.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Guatemalan expulsion to Nicaragua,²²⁸ and it seems unlikely given the Guatemalan government's general preference to keep its rebels in-country.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. The Nicaraguan civil war did not start because of any Nicaraguan involvement in Guatemala. Any Sandinista support for Guatemalan leftists would fit better under the rubric of Nicaraguan evangelization rather than Nicaraguan meddling, because it would have occurred in the wake of a rebel victory in Managua. (See the Nicaragua-Guatemala dyad below for a discussion of whether Nicaragua evangelized.)

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Nicaragua, 1978-1996: 0.904% per year (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Guatemala-Panama

Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Guatemala did not unseat the government.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Guatemalan expulsion to Panama,²²⁹ and it seems unlikely given the Guatemalan government's general preference to keep its rebels in-country.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Panamanian involvement in the Guatemalan conflict. Furthermore, in his well-known study of Latin

²²⁸ The following sources were consulted: Grandin, "The Last Colonial Massacre"; and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Guatemala conflict. Available online:

http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdata/gpcountry.php?id=66®ionSelect=4-Central_Americas#.

²²⁹ Ibid.

American insurgencies, Timothy Wickham-Crowley claims that the Guatemalan guerillas had almost no external support (the possible FMLN support mentioned above notwithstanding).²³⁰

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Panama, 1978-1996: 0.534% per year (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Mexico-El Salvador

Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Chiapas, Mexico did not unseat the government.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Mexican expulsion in multiple secondary sources.²³¹

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. Salvadoran government involvement in the Chiapas conflict was never mentioned in the secondary sources consulted. In fact, in January 1994 the Zapatistas “stated that there was no foreign participation in or assistance to the EZLN [the Zapatistas] nor any connection to armed groups in Central America or elsewhere.”²³²

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in El Salvador, 1994-1996: 0.984% per year (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Mexico-Guatemala

Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Chiapas, Mexico did not unseat the government.

²³⁰ Timothy Wickham-Crowley, *Guerillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 315.

²³¹ The following sources were consulted: Alex Khasnabish, *Zapatistas: Rebellion from the Grassroots to the Global* (London: Zed Books, 2010); Mihalis Mentinis, *Zapatistas: The Chiapas Revolt and What it Means for Radical Politics* (London: Pluto Press, 2006), pp. 1-30; and Philip L. Russell, *The Chiapas Rebellion* (Austin: Mexico Resource Center, 1995).

²³² Russell, “The Chiapas Rebellion,” p. 43.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Mexican expulsion in multiple secondary sources (see the Mexico-El Salvador dyad for the list).

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. Guatemalan government involvement in the Chiapas conflict was never mentioned in the secondary sources consulted, and as noted above, the Zapatistas themselves have denied foreign involvement.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Guatemala, 1994-1996: 0.924% per year (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Weakly present. According to Philip L. Russell, “Many Chiapans not involved in actual combat were affected by the rebellion. As many as 50,000 people fled the war zone. ... Some Mexicans took refuge in ... Guatemala, reversing the direction of recent refugee flow.”²³³ This would only have been about 0.5 percent of Guatemala’s 1994 population, however.²³⁴

Mexico-Nicaragua

Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Chiapas, Mexico did not unseat the government.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Mexican expulsion in multiple secondary sources (see the Mexico-El Salvador dyad for the list).

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. Nicaraguan government involvement in the Chiapas conflict was never mentioned in the secondary sources consulted, and as noted above, the Zapatistas themselves have denied foreign involvement.

²³³ Ibid, p. 52.

²³⁴ World Development Indicators.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Nicaragua, 1994-1996: 1.191% per year (low, slightly above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Mexico-Panama

Evangelization: Impossible, because the rebels in Chiapas, Mexico did not unseat the government.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Mexican expulsion in multiple secondary sources (see the Mexico-El Salvador dyad for the list).

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. Panamanian government involvement in the Chiapas conflict was never mentioned in the secondary sources consulted, and as noted above, the Zapatistas themselves have denied foreign involvement.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Panama, 1994-1996: 0.536% per year (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Nicaragua-Guatemala

Evangelization: Seemingly absent. The Nicaraguan government was generally averse to attempts to export leftist revolution abroad, with the notable exception of El Salvador (where the leftists had supported the Sandinistas when they themselves were rebels). Nicaraguan support for other leftist movements in Central America is unmentioned in three prominent accounts of Nicaraguan foreign policy.²³⁵ In an interview, former UN envoy Alvaro de Soto also expressed doubts to me that the Nicaraguans were evangelizing to countries other than El Salvador.

²³⁵ Carothers, "In the Name of Democracy," pp. 78-110; JoAnn Fagot Aviel, "Nicaragua: Foreign Policy in the Revolutionary and Postrevolutionary Era," in Frank O. Mora and Jeanne A.K. Hey, *Latin America and Caribbean Foreign Policy* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); and Hazel Smith, *Nicaragua: Self-Determination and Survival* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), pp. 262-285.

“Did they actively ... try to subvert or otherwise undermine their neighbors? That I would find somewhat surprising. ... If they’d gone beyond [El Salvador], it would probably have been used by supporters of the likes of Alexander Haig ... to increase aid to the armed forces in El Salvador. They weren’t ready to take on another front. It just doesn’t strike me as logical that they would do that.”²³⁶

Indeed, the Sandinista government seemed genuinely concerned about avoiding the pariah status of Cuba, and tried to remain on friendly terms with the U.S. on many matters, including the Lebanon intervention and the Los Angeles Olympic Games.²³⁷ So instead of an evangelist foreign policy, Managua remained primarily defensively oriented toward the outside world. Reasoning that “the new Nicaragua could not expect favorable international opinion indefinitely,” the Sandinistas tried to match the strength of the other Central American militaries while investing in counterinsurgency capabilities for their own fight against the Contras.²³⁸ An offensive effort to spread revolution elsewhere was simply out of character for the Nicaraguan government, generally speaking.

Against all of this evidence, it *has* been alleged that the Sandinista government supported the Guatemalan guerillas specifically. The 1984 CIA report quoted above continues, “[Guatemalan President] Mejia is aware that the Sandinistas are providing material and training assistance to the Guatemalan insurgents, ... [but] he and other Guatemalan leaders apparently do not view Managua’s support as critical to the guerillas.”²³⁹ In my judgment, claims of Nicaraguan assistance to the Guatemalan guerillas are inflated. They seem to go against

²³⁶ Interview with former UN envoy to the Central American peace process Alvaro de Soto (by phone), March 25, 2011.

²³⁷ Thomas Walker, *Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle*, Fourth Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), pp. 184-185.

²³⁸ Arturo Cruz Sequeira, “The Origins of Sandinista Foreign Policy,” in Robert S. Leiken, ed., *Central America: Anatomy of Conflict* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. 104; Walker, “Nicaragua,” p. 188.

²³⁹ CIA, “Guatemala,” p. 6. A Belizean government document also alleges that Nicaragua was assisting in the training of Guatemalan guerillas (Meeting notes of Belizean government officials, July 2, 1981, courtesy of the George Price Archival Collection at the George Price Centre for Peace and Development), although this intelligence may well have come from the U.S.

Nicaragua's generally non-interventionist foreign policy, and it seems odd that they were not mentioned in historical accounts of Sandinista foreign policy. The U.S. government habitually exaggerated the Nicaraguan threat in the 1980s, so it would not surprise me to see the CIA claim evangelization that was not there.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. As noted in the Honduras and Costa Rica case studies, the Nicaraguan government appears not to have had a policy of expulsion toward the Contras. Rather, like El Salvador and Guatemala, the Sandinistas appear to have preferred to keep their rebels in-country. In addition, I found no evidence of expelled Contras ending up in Guatemala.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. The Guatemalan government explicitly refused to get involved in the Nicaraguan conflict when pressed to do so by the U.S. and other states in the region, expressing concern "that the guerillas are under control and that a regionalization of the conflict would favor the development of the rebels."²⁴⁰

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Guatemala, 1978-1994: 0.926% per year (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Nicaragua-Mexico

Evangelization: Seemingly absent. As discussed in the dyad above, there was no mention of Nicaraguan evangelization to anywhere besides El Salvador in several prominent accounts of Sandinista foreign policy.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. As noted above, the Nicaraguan government appears not to have had a policy of expulsion toward the Contras. In addition, I found no evidence of expelled Contras ending up in Mexico.

²⁴⁰ Ernesto Paz, "The Foreign Policy and National Security of Honduras," in Mark B. Rosenberg and Philip L. Shepherd, eds., *Honduras Confronts its Future: Contending Perspectives on Critical Issues* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1986), p. 195; Lapper and Painter, "Honduras," p. 84.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: *Present*. Along with Costa Rica and Panama, the Mexican government supplied the Sandinistas prior to 1979.²⁴¹ Then, in 1981, the Mexicans agreed to give the Sandinista government \$200 million in “aid,” in an attempt to “counter Reagan’s attempts to isolate Nicaragua.”²⁴² It is not clear whether this aid went specifically toward the war against the Contras, but I suspect at least some of it did. So why, in the face of this meddling with overt partiality, did major violent conflict not spread to Mexico? For one thing, Mexico at the time was a one-party authoritarian state with a strong grip on power;²⁴³ this is not a favorable structural condition for the outbreak of a civil war. Also, the sheer distance between Nicaragua and Mexico probably lessened the probability of a boomeranging of conflict back to Mexico.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Mexico, 1978-1994: 2.198% per year (high, well above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear *present*. Since this is also a case where meddling with overt partiality occurred, the non-occurrence of contagion in this dyad is mysterious. I do think the aforementioned political stability of Mexico — its strong, one-party rule — contributed to Mexico’s peace in ways not captured by the Fearon/Laitin data.

Nonstate Factor of Return of Foreign Fighters from State A to State B: *Present*. As discussed in the El Salvador-Mexico dyad above, some of the fighters in the Chiapas conflict had prior experience in the Nicaraguan civil war.²⁴⁴

²⁴¹ LaFeber, “Inevitable Revolutions,” p. 232.

²⁴² *Ibid*, p. 216.

²⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 215.

²⁴⁴ James Stevenson, “The 1994 Zapatista Rebellion in Southern Mexico,” p. 8.

Nicaragua-Panama

Evangelization: Seemingly absent. As discussed in the two dyads above, there was no mention of Nicaraguan evangelization to anywhere besides El Salvador in several prominent accounts of Sandinista foreign policy.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. As noted above, the Nicaraguan government appears not to have had a policy of expulsion toward the Contras. In addition, I found no evidence of expelled Contras ending up in Panama.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: *Present*, to a limited degree. As noted in the Nicaragua-Mexico dyad above, the Panamanian government was also a Sandinista supplier in the late 1970s.²⁴⁵ But I found no evidence of Panamanian meddling continuing past the 1979 Sandinista victory. The limited extent of the Panamanian meddling probably explains the lack of boomeranging of conflict back to Panama to some degree. Perhaps more importantly, as noted below, the predicted probability data suggest that the structural factors for civil war were absent from Panama during this time period.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Panama, 1978-1994: 0.533% per year (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Panama-El Salvador, Panama-Guatemala, Panama-Mexico, and Panama-Nicaragua

All three state actions go unmentioned in two major accounts of the 1989 attempted coup in Panama, as well as the UCDP/PRIO conflict synopsis of the attempted coup.²⁴⁶ Nicaragua did

²⁴⁵ See also Smith, "Nicaragua," p. 264.

²⁴⁶ Carothers, "In the Name of Democracy," pp. 166-182; Kevin Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), pp. 194-208; UCDP summary on the Panama conflict.

support the Noriega regime militarily,²⁴⁷ but as far as I can tell did not get involved in this specific conflict.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in El Salvador, 1989-1994: 0.415% per year (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Guatemala, 1989-1994: 0.958% per year (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Mexico, 1989-1994: 1.475% per year (medium, above the population median of 1.05% per year but not substantially so). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear to have been *present*, though only to a limited degree.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War in Nicaragua, 1989-1994: 1.716% per year (high, above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear *present*. The absence of state action may independently explain the lack of contagion in the Panama-Nicaragua dyad.

Nonstate Factor of Drug Flows: Present. Panama — including, at times, the Panamanian government — played a major role in the Central American drug trade throughout this period.

²⁴⁷ UCDP summary on the Panama conflict.

Appendix 4.2: Statement from President Luis Alberto Monge

Luis Alberto Monge, the President of Costa Rica from 1982-1986, wished to provide the following statement in light of claims made in this chapter about his government's support to the Nicaraguan Contras. The original text is in Spanish and the English translation is my own (with the aid of Google Translate).

“The people of Costa Rica were almost unanimous in their opposition to the despotism of the Somoza dynasty. Costa Rica was the leading country of political asylum for her persecuted. We were always in solidarity with those struggling for democracy. As an international leader of democratic unionism, I conducted a bitter campaign against the military dictatorship, which had brother countries. I could not visit those countries without risking my freedom and physical integrity. Among my friends are Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, Romulo Betancourt, Juan Bosch, prominent Nicaraguan opposition leaders and many other fighters against dictatorship.

“During the process of the Sandinista war in my campaign for the 1982 elections, there was a Committee of Exiles with several friends of mine, among others Dr. Sergio Ramirez, who was Vice President under Daniel Ortega, later dissident of the party of Ortega, and now again in exile in Costa Rica.

“I was very active in the Socialist International (also called the Second International). Among its leading figures was Willy Brandt. The first prominent Sandinista to come to a meeting of the Socialist International was the famous poet and priest Ernesto Cardenal. I took him and presented him to the audience at the SI meeting in Lisbon. (I do not remember if this was shortly before or after the Sandinista triumph.) Father Ernesto Cardenal has for several years been against Daniel Ortega.

“Our problems began when the first and long-term *de facto* ruler Daniel Ortega urged aggressive action against Costa Rica. Returning to the presidency after elections seriously questioned by the opposition, he resumed and deepened the attacks on Costa Rica. Even in October 2010 he militarily occupied Costa Rican territory. The case was raised in international forums, and decisions on the merits of the case are pending a ruling by the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

“I remember that in those years the Communist International (called the Third International of Lenin) was still alive. It developed a worldwide campaign of disinformation and vilification against the Costa Rican democracy and its President. (‘We were a false democracy, we lied about being a country without an army, our President was a CIA agent and instrument of President Reagan,’ etc.) They hurt our image, especially through small left-wing groups embedded in friendly parties of Western Europe and the Nordic region.

“I could not support any of the parties involved in a war. Since my election campaign, it was announced that I would formally and officially proclaim that Costa Rica was neutral to the conflicts within nations and between nations. I received pressures, internal and external, in opposite directions. On November 17, 1983, my government launched to the world the Proclamation of Neutrality of Costa Rica in the war. This unilateral declaration of peace to the world won the almost unanimous support of the Costa Rican people. It was also massively well-received internationally by individuals and institutions from different religious and ideological positions. Among those supporters were the Sandinista Commandantes who governed Nicaragua. Political and military factors in Washington, D.C. never agreed with the Proclamation. The event took place in a formal session at the National Theater, attended by the presidents of the supreme powers, the diplomatic corps — prominent in our country — and, as a special guest, a

prestigious Swiss jurist specializing in the issue of neutrality.”

Luis Alberto Monge

September 2, 2011

Original Text in Spanish:

“El pueblo de Costa Rica era casi unánime en su oposición a la Dinastía Despótica de los Somoza. Costa Rica fue el principal país de asilo político para sus perseguidos. Siempre fuimos solidarios con los que luchan por la democracia. Como dirigente internacional del sindicalismo democrático, realicé una dura campaña contra las dictaduras militares que padecían países hermanos. No podía visitar esos países sin riesgo para mi libertad y mi integridad física. Entre mis amigos están Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, Rómulo Betancourt, Juan Bosch, destacados dirigentes de la oposición nicaragüense y muchos otros luchadores contra las dictaduras.

“Cuando el proceso de la guerra sandinista en mi campaña electoral para las elecciones de 1982 existía un Comité de Exilados con varios amigos míos, entre otros, el Dr. Sergio Ramírez, quien fue Vicepresidente de Daniel Ortega, después disidente del Partido de Ortega y actualmente otra vez exilado en Costa Rica.

“Estuve muy activo en la Internacional Socialista (llamada la Segunda Internacional). Entre sus figuras más destacadas estaba Willy Brandt. El primer destacado sandinista que llegó a una reunión de la Internacional Socialista fue el Sacerdote y poeta famoso Ernesto Cardenal. Lo llevé y presenté al auditorio en la reunión de la IS en Lisboa. (No recuerdo si fue poco antes o después del triunfo sandinista). El Padre Ernesto Cardenal desde hace varios años está contra Daniel Ortega.

“Nuestras dificultades comenzaron cuando el primer y prolongado mandato de facto de Daniel Ortega impulsó acciones agresivas contra Costa Rica. Al volver a la Presidencia, después de unas elecciones muy cuestionadas por la oposición, reanudó y profundizó las agresiones a Costa Rica. Inclusive en octubre 2010 ocupó militarmente territorio costarricense. El caso debió elevarse a foros internacionales y las decisiones sobre el fondo del caso, están pendientes de un fallo de la Corte Internacional de Justicia de La Haya.

“Debo recordar que para esos años todavía estaba viva la Internacional Comunista. (llamada la Tercera Internacional de Lenin). Desarrolló a nivel mundial una campaña de desinformación y desprestigio sobre la democracia costarricense y su Presidente. (Falsa democracia; mentira que era un país sin ejército; su Presidente agente de la CIA e instrumento del Presidente Reagan, etc. etc. etc.). Hicieron daño a nuestra imagen, sobre todo a través de pequeños grupos de extrema izquierda incrustados en partidos amigos de Europa Occidental y Nórdica.

“No podía apoyar a ninguna de las partes involucradas en un conflicto bélico. Desde la campaña electoral anuncié que iba a proclamar formal y oficialmente que Costa Rica era neutral frente a los conflictos bélicos al interior de las naciones y entre naciones. Recibí presiones, internas y externas, en direcciones contrapuestas. El 17 de noviembre 1983, se lanzó al mundo la Proclama de la Neutralidad de Costa Rica en los Conflictos Bélicos. Esta declaración unilateral de paz al mundo entero, mereció el apoyo casi unánime del pueblo costarricense. También fue masivo en el ámbito internacional por parte de personalidades e instituciones de diferentes posiciones ideológicas y religiosas. Entre esos apoyos estuvo el de los Comandantes Sandinistas que gobernaban Nicaragua. Factores políticos y militares de Washington DC., nunca estuvieron de acuerdo con la Proclama. El acto se dio en sesión solemne en el Teatro Nacional,

con presencia de los Presidentes de los Supremos Poderes, el Cuerpo Diplomático destacado en nuestro país y como invitado especial un prestigioso jurista suizo, especializado en el tema de la neutralidad.”

Chapter 5: Testing the State Action Explanation in Southeast Asia, 1959-1980

On June 25, 1952, President Harry Truman's National Security Council issued NSC 124/2, "Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Southeast Asia." Near the top of this document was a crucial justification for American involvement in this faraway region:

"The loss of any of the countries of Southeast Asia to communist control ... would have critical psychological, political, and economic consequences. In the absence of effective and timely counteraction, the loss of any single country would probably lead to relatively swift submission or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of this group. Furthermore, an alignment with communism of the rest of Southeast Asia and India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East (with the probable exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey) would in all probability progressively follow. Such widespread alignment would endanger the stability and security of Europe."¹

Although the administrations of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower differed substantially on foreign policy means and ends, this language from NSC 124/2 was duplicated almost verbatim in a document produced by the Eisenhower NSC (NSC 5405) on January 16, 1954:

"Such is the interrelation of the countries of the area that effective counteraction would be immediately necessary to prevent the loss of any single country from leading to submission to or an alignment with communism by the remaining countries of Southeast Asia and Indonesia. Furthermore, in the event all of Southeast Asia falls under communism, an alignment with communism of India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East (with the probable exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey) could follow progressively. Such widespread alignment would seriously endanger the stability and security of Europe."²

¹ Document available in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume XII: East Asia and the Pacific (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1984), Part I, p. 127.

² Document available in *ibid*, Part I, pp. 367-368.

Roughly three months after that, on April 7, 1954, Eisenhower made a public statement justifying American involvement in Southeast Asia that forever memorialized the private rationalizations of NSC 124/2:

“You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have the beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.”³

This “Domino Theory,” which is generally attributed to Eisenhower but which clearly originated in the prior administration, forms a crucial bulwark of the pro-intervention debate that makes substate conflict contagion an important phenomenon to understand today. The dependent variable is slightly different now — modern policymakers worry about the spread of conflict, whereas Truman, Eisenhower, and their contemporaries worried about the spread of *rebel victory in communist conflict* — but the underlying logic of intervention is the same: Pay the price of intervention now, or pay an even higher price later when conflict has spread further afield. And this theory, though it had its predecessors, experienced its proper birth in the context of debates over intervention in Southeast Asia during the Cold War.

The historical policy relevance of Southeast Asia is one of two reasons I chose to test the State Action Explanation on the region in this chapter. In short, it would be useful to know whether the Domino Theory, in its original neighborhood, was right or wrong. (In this way, I hope to add to the debate over the Domino Theory’s veracity discussed in Chapter 1.) The other reason Southeast Asia is a useful testing ground for the State Action Explanation is that unlike Central America, there were multiple positive cases of substate conflict contagion between 1959 and 1980 — six, to be exact (see Figure 5.1). Meanwhile, there were also intriguing cases of *non-contagion*, just as there were in Central America.

³ Quoted in Jerome Slater, “Dominoes in Central America: Will They Fall? Does It Matter?” *International Security*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1987): 105-134, p. 105.




Figure 5.1. Map of Southeast Asia showing civil wars (uppercase X's), the lower-intensity substate conflict in Malaysia (lowercase x), and the six cases of substate conflict contagion (the arrows).⁴

In this chapter, I seek to use the State Action Explanation to better understand the occurrence and non-occurrence of substate conflict contagion in Southeast Asia — North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Burma (also known as Myanmar) — between 1959 and 1980. Some notes should first be made about both the geographic and the temporal scope. Geographically, Southeast Asia is a larger and less clearly defined region than Central America. To keep the regional case study manageable, I focused on continental Southeast Asia, where fears of contagion were most acute, excluding Indonesia,⁵ the Philippines, and Papua New Guinea. (Singapore, in which substate conflict is essentially

⁴ Image source: <http://www.phuket-guide.net>.

⁵ NSC 5405 does express concern about the spread of communism to Indonesia (see above), but I view this as an artifact of the Eisenhower administration's covert intervention in the country during the 1950s. Later versions of the Domino Theory focused on continental Southeast Asia.

unimaginable, was also excluded.) I also decided to generally exclude the People's Republic of China as a state actor in my analysis, in spite of its frequent role as an evangelizer of conflict, so that, as in Chapter 4, the *within*-region dynamics could be explicated more clearly. China's role in individual contagion cases is discussed at length in Chapter 3. Temporally, I start in the year of the first case of contagion wholly contained within the region (not one involving China or India), and end five years after the conclusion of the Vietnam War and a string of communist rebel victories.

I find, first, that in at least four and possibly five out of the six substate conflict contagion cases, state action was both present and necessary for contagion. The ambiguous fifth case, South Vietnam to Laos, is discussed in detail below. In the sixth contagion case, Malaysia to Thailand, the nonstate factor of rebels helping rebels was apparently jointly sufficient with structural factors to cause contagion in the absence of state action. So not every contagion case in the region fits the State Action Explanation, but on the whole the explanation performs well among the positive cases. As for the non-cases, as in Central America, state action was fairly uncommon in the region. That being said, state action was more frequent than in Central America, and more often than not occurred without the result of contagion. This finding underscores the fact that these state actions are usually necessary but insufficient for contagion outcomes. Meanwhile, nonstate factors were present in the majority of directed dyads, and unlike Central America, structural factors for civil war onset in general were present (defined as a Fearon/Laitin predicted probability of 1.5% per year or greater) in about half of the directed dyads. The commonality of these nonstate and structural factors suggests their insufficiency for the rare occurrence of substate conflict contagion.

This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I provide a brief synopsis of the six substate conflicts ongoing in Southeast Asia between 1959 and 1980. Second, I trace the evolution of the six identified cases of substate conflict contagion in the region, teasing out the role of state action, nonstate factors, and structural factors in each. Third, I discuss the two most prominent non-cases of contagion: the fact that conflict never spread *from* war-torn Burma, and the fact that conflict never spread *to* the meddlesome state of North Vietnam. In the conclusion, I summarize my findings, briefly discuss what these findings say about the Domino Theory, and preview the concluding chapter of this dissertation. Finally, in Appendix 5.1, I briefly discuss 19 other Southeast Asian cases of non-contagion.

Southeast Asian Substate Conflicts

There were six substate conflicts in Southeast Asia between 1959 and 1980; five of them (all except Malaysia) escalated to full-scale civil wars during their duration. Official dates and intensities are drawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 4-2009).⁶

Burma is one of the rare states in the world that has had multiple civil wars raging simultaneously within its borders for decades. Major civil disturbances began with the rebellion of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) in 1948, and continued with the onset of ethnic separatist rebellion in 1949. Today there are approximately ten ideological and ethnic wars being fought in Burma, though many of them are now low-intensity.

In South Vietnam, a North Vietnam-backed communist insurgent group — the National Liberation Front, or FNL — began violently challenging the state in 1955. The conflict ended in rebel victory and unification with North Vietnam in 1975.

In Laos, an insurgency of the communist Pathet Lao (also backed by North Vietnam) began in 1959. The conflict ended in rebel victory in 1975.

⁶ Available online: <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Old-Versions/929/>.

In Cambodia, an insurgency of the communist Khmer Rouge (only periodically backed by North Vietnam) began in 1967. A rebel victory in 1975 halted the conflict, but it resumed anew when the newly united Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, toppling the Khmer Rouge regime and returning them to rebel group status. The conflict then continued until 1998, when a peace settlement concluded the fighting; by this point, the Khmer Rouge had more or less exhausted themselves.

In Thailand, a low-level insurgency of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) first surfaced in the 1960s, crossed the 25 battle-death threshold in 1974, and crossed the 1,000 battle-death threshold in 1976. Due in large part to a loss of foreign support discussed below, by 1982 the CPT had virtually been wiped out.

In Malaysia, an off-and-on conflict between involving the Communist Party of Malaya/Malaysia (CPM) first targeted the newly independent government of Malaysia in 1958, fizzled out in the early 1960s, briefly flared up again in 1974 and 1975, and then flared anew in 1981. Due in part to an effective counterinsurgency program initiated by the British and continued by the indigenous Malaysian government, this conflict never reached the intensity of a civil war and never resulted in lasting gains by the communists.

With six substate conflicts and seven states in the region, there are 36 State A-State B dyads (six times six). As in Chapter 4, I plan to evaluate each of these dyads for its congruence with the State Action Explanation.

The State Action Explanation and the Six Cases of Substate Conflict Contagion in Southeast Asia

South Vietnam to Laos, 1959

Overview of the Civil War Onset in Laos

Since independence in 1949, the Royal Lao Government (RLG) had been plagued by resistance from the communist Pathet Lao (PL), which was supported by the North Vietnamese. In 1957, however, the low-level hostilities ceased and the leaders of the RLG and the PL — half-brothers Prince Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphanouvong, respectively — negotiated an agreement in which the RLG promised neutrality in the Cold War, and the PL promised to integrate its military units into the RLG army.⁷

For the first 12-18 months of neutrality, the RLG adhered closely to the agreement. A key fixture of this neutrality was Vientiane's refusal to grant an embassy to either North or South Vietnam.⁸ However, the Eisenhower administration did not favor Laotian neutrality, and in 1958 the Central Intelligence Agency helped to topple the RLG's Prince Souvanna. Souvanna was replaced by Phoui Sananikone, a veteran politician (not the CIA's first choice, although their man, Phoumi Nosavan, would come to power in 1960).⁹ Phoui took the RLG on a decisive turn to the right. He cracked down on PL activities at home and, perhaps more importantly, opened embassies with the Republic of China and the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) while continuing to deny embassies to the People's Republic of China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).¹⁰ This blatant violation of the neutrality agreement, among other

⁷ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 325-326.

⁸ Arthur J. Dommen, *Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization*, Revised Edition (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 96.

⁹ Schlesinger, "A Thousand Days," pp. 325-326.

¹⁰ Dommen, "Conflict in Laos," p. 111.

actions, alarmed the North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi, which (justifiably) feared American backing of the Laotian regime. Nor was Hanoi's alarm without teeth: "The trump card remaining in North Vietnam's hand was the 1,500 Pathet Lao soldiers ... still awaiting assignment to the national army."¹¹

In mid-May 1959, the RLG gave the PL an ultimatum: accept integration into the army on the RLG's terms or the integration deal (and, hence, essentially all of the surviving elements of the 1957 agreement) was off. In response, on May 18-19, the Second Pathet Lao Battalion escaped from the camp where RLG Army guards were keeping them. The Second Pathet Lao Battalion was rapidly joined by the First Pathet Lao Battalion, both of which fled into the jungle and began preparations for a full-scale civil war.¹² These preparations were heavily supported by the North Vietnamese regime, which, in addition to their "active encouragement" of the PL itself, deployed seven regiments or parts thereof to Laos to assist their communist compatriots.¹³ North Vietnam apparently took these actions to "signal to the Royal Government its displeasure at the growing U.S. involvement in Laos."¹⁴

The Possible Occurrence of Laotian Meddling with Overt Partiality

On the one hand, the RLG clearly meddled in the South Vietnamese civil war by permitting the establishment of a South Vietnamese embassy in Vientiane and not permitting a North Vietnamese one. Phoui's blatant violation of the 1957 neutrality agreement lent political support to the government side in the South Vietnamese conflict, and alarmed the chief sponsor of the South Vietnamese rebels. On the other hand, while this Laotian meddling was clearly "partial," it does not meet our standard definition of "overt." There is no evidence that the RLG

¹¹ Ibid, pp. 116-117.

¹² Ibid, pp. 117-118.

¹³ Ibid, p. 119; Paul F. Langer and Joseph J. Zasloff, *North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao: Partners in the Struggle for Laos* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 68-69.

¹⁴ Langer and Zasloff, "North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao," p. 70.

supported the South Vietnamese government militarily — nor, given the perpetual weakness of the Laotian state, would we expect such support. Laotian meddling appears to have been diplomatic only, and is therefore strictly excluded from the category of “meddling with overt partiality.”

That being said, the diplomatic meddling with partiality by Vientiane upset a delicate balance of interest between the RLG, the PL, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, China, and the U.S — a balance verbalized in the 1957 neutrality agreement. As a result of this upset, North Vietnam stepped up its support for the PL, which was probably the decisive factor in the onset of the Laotian civil war, as discussed below. Arguably this meddling, even though it did not involve the transfer of tangible assets (arms, training, territory, etc.) to Saigon, was sufficiently brazen in the context of an extraordinarily fragile diplomatic situation to be considered “overt” anyway. On this basis, I provisionally count this contagion case as one involving Laotian meddling with overt partiality, resulting in retaliation by a party (North Vietnam) to State A’s (South Vietnam’s) conflict. This coding seems consistent with the general narrative of how civil war in Laos broke out.

The other two state actions were absent from the South Vietnam to Laos dyad. Evangelization from South Vietnam was impossible, since the South Vietnamese rebels did not become state actors — a key precondition for evangelization — following their 1975 victory (rather, the south was united politically with the north).¹⁵ Meanwhile, I found no evidence of combatant expulsion from South Vietnam to Laos, and in fact found some isolated cases in

¹⁵ North Vietnam’s actions in Laos could be considered evangelization, but strictly speaking they are not. The civil war in French Indochina that preceded Ho Chi Minh’s rise to power in Hanoi is considered an *extrastate* conflict (against France), not an *intrastate* conflict, by UCDP/PRIO. Thus there was no intrastate conflict in North Vietnam to spread to Laos in 1959. Definitional issues aside, the dramatic increase in North Vietnamese aid to the Pathet Lao *after* Laotian meddling seems to suggest these actions fit better under the category of retaliation for meddling.

which combatants either did not leave South Vietnam at all, or left South Vietnam of their own free will.¹⁶

The Importance of (Possible) Laotian Meddling with Overt Partiality

As in the Salvadoran case discussed in Chapter 4, state action did not cause substate conflict contagion on its own. In the Laotian case, although I did not find evidence of any nonstate factors, the structural factors for civil war were strongly present. The predicted probability of civil war onset in Laos in 1959, according to the Fearon and Laitin data described in Chapter 3, was 3.06%, roughly three times the median worldwide annual probability of 1.05%. Without a doubt, then, the population of Laos was primed for a major substate conflict, and the North Vietnamese role in the civil war onset cannot be viewed as sufficient on its own for contagion.

However, the strong presence of structural factors cannot fully explain why civil war began in Laos when it did. The predicted probability of civil war onset in Laos was also above 3% in the years 1955-1958 (prior to 1955, data are not available); in 1955-1957, the probability exceeded 4%. In order to understand the escalation of violence in 1959 specifically, we need to understand the contribution of the North Vietnamese. The PL were apparently a ragtag bunch when they broke away from the RLG-guarded camps in May 1959:

“The two PL battalions which were to have been integrated into the Royal Army had fled to North Vietnam only a few months before the [summer 1959 offensive] and would hardly have had time to regroup or prepare for such an offensive. ... The summer of 1959 was probably the low point of PL military strengths.”¹⁷

¹⁶ Arthur J. Dommen, *The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), pp. 567, 651-653. Cases include the self-imposed exile of the organizers of a 1960 coup attempt in Saigon, and the suppression of an attempted rebellion by Buddhists in April 1966.

¹⁷ Langer and Zasloff, “North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao,” pp. 68-69.

Thus the North Vietnamese provided support to the PL when they needed it most. Grant Evans and Kevin Rowley write, “At critical times, such as the late 1950s, it is certain that the Pathet Lao base areas only survived because of Vietnamese support.”¹⁸ Based on this evidence, it appears that North Vietnamese aid to the PL — as well as direct military involvement in Laos — were necessary for the growth and sustainment of a rebel movement substantial enough to cause the onset of the Laotian civil war in 1959. In turn, as discussed above, North Vietnamese aid to the PL was rendered in retaliation for the RLG’s meddling with (possibly overt) partiality in the South Vietnamese civil war.¹⁹ On this basis, I consider meddling to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion described in Chapter 3.

South Vietnam to Cambodia, 1967

Overview of the Civil War Onset in Cambodia

In 1964, Cambodia’s ruling Prince Sihanouk undertook an anti-leftist purge in Phnom Penh. This purge forced elites from the communist Khmer Rouge (KR) over the border into South Vietnam, where they sheltered with the South Vietnamese rebel National Liberation Front (FNL).²⁰ Three years later, due in large part to their association with the FNL, the KR were strong enough to launch a full-scale rebellion against Sihanouk, resulting in a civil war onset in Cambodia in 1967. According to historian Arthur J. Dommen, “The fighting was intense because

¹⁸ Grant Evans and Kevin Rowley, *Red Brotherhood at War: Indochina since the Fall of Saigon* (London: Verso, 1984), p. 66.

¹⁹ We could also attribute Laotian meddling in South Vietnam to American meddling in Laos (the CIA-assisted ouster of Souvanna), although the latter, American actions would not constitute meddling in a *substate conflict* (only in the internal politics of another state). That, and the fact that the U.S. is not located in continental Southeast Asia, put American “meddling” outside the scope of this chapter.

²⁰ Elizabeth Becker, *When the War was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution*, Second Edition (New York: PublicAffairs, 1998), pp. 10-11.

the Khmer Rouge were equipped with modern weapons of all types, which had been supplied to them by the Vietnamese.”²¹

The Occurrence of Cambodian Meddling with Overt Partiality

Although Cambodia’s Prince Sihanouk adhered diplomatically to a policy of neutrality during the early years of the Vietnam War, beginning in 1964 he covertly permitted Chinese military aid to the FNL in South Vietnam to pass through Sihanoukville in Cambodia.²²

According to an unauthorized biography of Sihanouk:

“In acting as he did, Sihanouk believed he was recognizing the inevitability of a communist victory in South Vietnam. He also calculated, correctly, that many in the army’s officer corps would profit from his agreement with China and the Vietnamese communists, and that this would temper their concern at the rejection of American aid.”²³

Notably missing from this account is any indication that Sihanouk was *forced* to support the FNL by North Vietnam or the Chinese. Although his support to the FNL did neutralize the North Vietnamese “subversive or military threat for several years,”²⁴ Sihanouk could have achieved this goal more effectively by continuing to accept U.S. military aid, which (as suggested above) he cut off in 1963.²⁵ The military aid he received from the Soviets, China, and Czechoslovakia instead “was useful largely for parades.”²⁶ Meanwhile, although Beijing did evangelize to Cambodia by supporting Pol Pot, the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the KR was ambivalent throughout most of the 1960s, intensifying only a few years *after* the arms shipments through Sihanoukville began (see the China to Cambodia, 1967 contagion case

²¹ Dommen, “The Indochinese Experience,” p. 718.

²² Milton Osborne, *Sihanouk: Prince of Light, Prince of Darkness* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), p. 172; Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), p. 137.

²³ Osborne, “Sihanouk,” p. 172.

²⁴ David P. Chandler, *The Tragedy of Cambodian History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 140.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 130-141.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

discussion in Chapter 3). Thus, rather than being forced by the threat of leftist subversion from abroad, Sihanouk seemingly undertook this FNL aid program voluntarily, on the basis of domestic and regional political calculations.

This is a clear (if long secret) case of Cambodian meddling with overt partiality in the South Vietnamese conflict. This meddling ultimately resulted in the empowerment of a rebel faction in Cambodia, the KR. Sihanouk's support for the FNL substantially assisted in the FNL's capacity to harbor the KR after the purge in Phnom Penh, and ultimately allowed the KR to regroup and start *their* insurgency against Sihanouk in 1967.

Other state actions, meanwhile, appear to have been absent. Evangelization from South Vietnam was impossible at the time, since the FNL had not won their victory in 1967. Expulsion is possible but unlikely, given that South Vietnamese troops conducted periodic "hot pursuit" operations into Cambodia while fighting FNL forces.²⁷ As discussed at length in Chapter 4, these hot pursuit operations tend to be evidence of a lack of a State A expulsion policy.

The Importance of Cambodian Meddling with Overt Partiality

Unlike Laos, the structural conditions for civil war were not strongly present in Cambodia in 1967; the predicted probability according to Fearon and Laitin was 0.94%, below the global median of 1.05%. There was certainly political discontent with Sihanouk in Cambodia at this time, but it would be difficult to characterize the state as teetering on the brink of a major conflict. As for nonstate factors, the factor of rebels helping rebels was certainly present — the FNL helping the KR, although this support seems to have been enabled in large part by Cambodian meddling (see below) — and there was also "a trickle of Khmer Krom refugees" from South Vietnam into Cambodia, some of whom eventually forged links to the KR.²⁸

²⁷ Dommen, "The Indochinese Experience," pp. 362-363.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 618.

In comparison to these rather weak structural and nonstate factors, the state action in this case of contagion stands out considerably more than usual as a significant causal factor. The discussion above indicates that the ties between the FNL and the KR were critical to the onset of the 1967 civil war in Cambodia, in that they provided the KR with the capacity to regroup from the 1964 purge and with modern weaponry. And these ties, in turn, were enabled by the secret Cambodian policy of support for the FNL. The Chinese aid to the FNL via Sihanoukville, facilitated by the Cambodian government, was substantial — “weapons for 50,000 soldiers” between 1965 and 1967.²⁹ FNL capabilities, particularly vis-à-vis the harboring and supplying of KR dissidents, would have been significantly reduced without that aid. Therefore, I consider Cambodia’s meddling with overt partiality to have been necessary for this case of substate conflict contagion, according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia to Thailand, 1976

Overview of the Civil War Onset in Thailand

The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) originally formed in the 1920s, and had strong links to the Chinese Communist Party. Over the following decades, the CPT slowly shifted to a violence-based political program, but they were never able to inflict significant casualties until 1974, when they crossed the 25 battle-death threshold according to the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Even at that point, casualty counts resulting from the CPT conflict with

²⁹ Zhai, “China and the Vietnam Wars,” p. 137. China also shipped some of its aid overland through North Vietnam, but these overland shipments “soon overwhelmed the North Vietnamese transportation capacity” (ibid). In addition, the Chinese continued to use the Sihanoukville route despite its high cost and the 10 percent cut of the shipments taken by the Cambodian military (ibid) — a decision suggestive of the route’s importance. Thus the Sihanoukville route appears to have been critical to FNL capability in the mid-1960s.

Bangkok were small — 40 Thai battle deaths in 1974 and about 25 in 1975, according to the PRIO Battle Death Dataset (version 3.0).³⁰

Then, in 1976, the intensity of the CPT conflict markedly increased. Battle deaths exceeded 500 in both 1976 and 1977, according to the PRIO Battle Death Dataset, and the 1,000 battle-death threshold was crossed in 1976. A CSIS study shows a 47% increase in government casualties, a 48% increase in civilian casualties, and a 41% increase in CPT casualties between the period of October 1975 to September 1976 and the period of October 1976 and September 1977.³¹ This increase in the conflict’s intensity was due in large part to an increase in the manpower and the capabilities of the CPT; from late 1976 to late 1977, CPT ranks “reportedly” grew from 8,000-9,000 to about 12,000 (a 41% increase if the middle of the range is used).³² This increase in CPT capability, in turn, was due in part to a government crackdown which constituted the “abrupt termination” of “Thailand’s three-year experiment with popular democracy” in October 1976³³ — and also to increased foreign support of the CPT during the late 1970s, which is discussed at length below.

The Occurrence of Laotian Evangelization and Thai Meddling with Overt Partiality in Laos

The government of Laos was taken over by the communist Pathet Lao (PL) in 1975. The Laotian communists, who had long supported the CPT — primarily with weapons and weapons

³⁰ Available online: <http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/Battle-Deaths/The-Battle-Deaths-Dataset-version-30/>.

³¹ R. Sean Randolph and W. Scott Thompson, “Thai Insurgency: Contemporary Developments,” *The Washington Papers*, Vol. 9, No. 81 (1981), pp. 36-37.

³² *Ibid*, p. 30. The CSIS study does not give a more specific source for these capability estimates, so they should be considered approximate.

³³ *Ibid*, p. 27.

sourcing from China, as discussed below — continued their support while heading the government of the Laotian state, actions which clearly constituted evangelization.³⁴

Meanwhile, the Thai government meddled with overt partiality in Laos from 1961 onward, by assisting U.S. overt and covert military operations against the PL. By 1973 there were approximately 20,000 “volunteer” Thai troops fighting the communists in Laos.³⁵ PL support for the CPT following the PL accession to state actor status may have been, in part, retaliation for this Thai meddling: “The Vientiane government’s only other bargaining chip was its provision of weapons and a base area to the [CPT]. Both governments could play the game of promoting insurgencies.”³⁶

The final potential state action, expulsion from Laos to Thailand, was probably absent. About 2,500 Hmong (Laotian anti-communists) were evacuated by the U.S. from Laos to Thailand in 1975, but the PL government in Laos does not seem to have been particularly interested in pursuing an expulsion policy against these Hmong. Rather, a May 6, 1975 PL broadcast titled “The U.S.-Vang Pao [Hmong leader] Special Forces Must Be Completely Cleaned Up” averred that the Hmong must be “duly punished or wiped ... out”³⁷ — which sounds more like an annihilation policy than an expulsion policy.

The Occurrence of Cambodian Evangelization (and Other, Limited State Actions)

Following the Khmer Rouge (KR) takeover of the Cambodian government in 1975, the KR supported the CPT by providing training to cadres, as well as “supplementary” assistance in

³⁴ Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) summary on the Laos and Thailand (government) conflicts. Available online: http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=90®ionSelect=7-Eastern_Asia# and http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=154®ionSelect=7-Eastern_Asia#.

³⁵ Dommen, “The Indochinese Experience,” pp. 432, 442, 606, 929; Evans and Rowley, “Red Brotherhood at War,” p. 71.

³⁶ Evans and Rowley, “Red Brotherhood at War,” p. 80.

³⁷ Dommen, “The Indochinese Experience,” pp. 934-937.

the form of both sanctuary and weapons.³⁸ Since the KR was a state actor at the time and since the Cambodian civil war was on hiatus between 1975 and 1978 due to the KR victory, this is a clear case of Cambodian evangelization to Thailand.

Expulsion and meddling with overt partiality were also present in this dyad to a limited extent. During the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, “The Vietnamese army raced the retreating remnants of the army of Democratic Kampuchea [the KR] to the Thai border. But once there, the guerilla war began as the Khmer dug in along the border.”³⁹ It sounds as though the Vietnamese *attempted* to expel the KR from Cambodia to Thailand, but did not fully succeed. That being said, senior KR cadres did end up in Thailand (see the Thailand-Cambodia dyad below), so these Vietnamese attempts at expulsion were probably not a total failure either. Meanwhile, the Thai government supported the right-wing terrorist Free Khmers (Khmer Serei) in Cambodia, and may have assisted the pre-1975 Cambodian government in their fight against the KR (although it is more likely that the Thai special force deployments to Cambodia were directed against the South Vietnamese rebels).⁴⁰ As far as I can tell, none of these instances of meddling were directly retaliated for or otherwise boomeranged back to Thailand.

The Occurrence of Thai Meddling with Overt Partiality in South Vietnam

Thailand supported the American military intervention in South Vietnam by providing territory for an airbase.⁴¹ The North Vietnamese appear to have retaliated directly for this Thai meddling with overt partiality in the South Vietnamese conflict; “Vietnamese support for the Thai insurgents was used as a means of punishing Thailand for its cooperation with the United

³⁸ Randolph and Thompson, “Thai Insurgency,” pp. 40, 53-54.

³⁹ Dommen, “The Indochinese Experience,” p. 977.

⁴⁰ Ganganath Jha, *Foreign Policy of Thailand* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1979), pp. 118-121; Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam* (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 23.

⁴¹ Dommen, “The Indochinese Experience,” p. 696; John L.S. Girling, *Thailand: Society and Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), pp. 255-256.

States.”⁴² Specifically, Hanoi provided “substantial” stocks of weaponry to the CPT, making it second only to China as an external supplier of arms, helped transport those Chinese weapons into Thailand, and provided specialized training to CPT cadres.⁴³ Meanwhile, the CPT used Bangkok’s support for the U.S. intervention in Vietnam as a rallying cry against the Thai government in the mid-1960s.⁴⁴ No other state actions were identified in this dyad.

The Importance of Laotian Evangelization, Cambodian Evangelization, and Thai Meddling in South Vietnam

Once again, we cannot claim that the state actions of Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand caused contagion to Thailand by themselves. As noted above, there were internal domestic reasons for the increase in CPT capability in the fall of 1976, namely a crackdown by Bangkok. In addition, the structural factors for civil war appear to have been strongly present in 1976 Thailand; Fearon and Laitin lists the predicted probability of onset as 4.22% in that year, well above the global median. Numerous nonstate factors affected the onset of the Thai civil war as well. The support of the PL for the CPT *prior* to the PL takeover of Vientiane constituted the nonstate mechanism of rebels helping rebels. Weapons from neighboring conflicts poured into Bangkok, “the capital of the region’s burgeoning black market arms trade.”⁴⁵ Refugees from conflict zones in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam strained land resources in Thailand and also provided foot soldiers for CPT units.⁴⁶ And drugs likely flowed from Laos into the teeming Bangkok black market.⁴⁷

⁴² Randolph and Thompson, “Thai Insurgency,” p. 14.

⁴³ Ibid, pp. 51-54.

⁴⁴ Girling, “Thailand,” pp. 255-256.

⁴⁵ Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999), p. 277.

⁴⁶ Girling, “Thailand,” p. 264; Dommen, “The Indochinese Experience,” p. 943; Evans and Rowley, “Red Brotherhood at War,” pp. 223-224.

⁴⁷ Dommen, “The Indochinese Experience,” p. 606.

As in the case of the Laotian civil war, however, foreign support for the CPT appears to have been the critical factor that pushed it from an irritant to a civil war combatant. By 1970, the CPT was no longer able to meet its weaponry and logistics needs through internal sources.⁴⁸ The communist regimes in Laos, North Vietnam, and Cambodia gladly stepped in to fulfill these needs. From 1973, the PL — an evangelizing state actor in Laos from 1975 onward — was a major arms supplier and arms conduit for the CPT: “By 1975 it was apparent that the jungle force in north Thailand had access to as many weapons as it required from Laos.”⁴⁹ North Vietnam was also a major source of arms and training for the CPT, although for the most part this support did not materialize until after Vietnamese unification in 1975: “Vietnam’s role as a source of supplies has been substantial but secondary [to that of China]. With the conclusion of the war, Vietnam had vast stockpiles of armaments on which the CPT could draw for its increasing requirements.”⁵⁰ Cambodia under the KR, meanwhile, housed the CPT headquarters, was the base for more than half of CPT operations by 1978, and was a “supplemental” arms supplier as well.⁵¹

Perhaps the best evidence for the importance of this foreign support to the CPT is what happened when, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, ideological fissures and battlefield outcomes caused most of this support to be withdrawn. Internecine communist battles inside Cambodia between the Vietnamese regime and the KR “seriously disrupted” the CPT’s arms supply lines, “forcing the party to sharply restrict its activities, which had been expanding in 1977 and 1978.” This disruption in the supply chain, as well as the loss of sanctuaries in Cambodia due to the Vietnamese invasion, also led to “large-scale defections,” reducing the CPT’s strength from

⁴⁸ Marks, “Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam,” p. 26.

⁴⁹ Randolph and Thompson, “Thai Insurgency,” pp. 41-42. On the role of Laos as a conduit for weapons from China, see *ibid.*, p. 54.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54. Hanoi also acted as a conduit for Chinese weapons (*ibid.*, p. 54).

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54, 62-63; Marks, “Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam,” p. 56.

12,000 to 10,000 in 1979 alone.⁵² The withdrawal of Laotian and Vietnamese support in the late 1970s, in line with both regimes' attempts to move away from internal armed struggle, also resulted in "a succession of military setbacks and mass defections — ... [the CPT's] role in the regional power struggle, and probably in Thai politics as well, is over."⁵³ The near-total collapse of the CPT in the wake of the withdrawal of foreign support speaks volumes about the necessity of that foreign support for the operations and cohesiveness of the Thai communists.

Based on this evidence, I consider Laotian, Cambodian, and Vietnamese state support to the CPT to have been necessary for the onset of the CPT civil war in Thailand in late 1976. Clearly each external sponsor played a vital role in the buildup of CPT capabilities. In turn, I have shown above that Laotian and Cambodian support were both largely the result of evangelization (and possibly Thai meddling in Laos), while Vietnamese support seems to have been the direct result of Thai meddling with overt partiality in the South Vietnamese civil war. Thus we have identified three cases of substate conflict contagion (Laos to Thailand, Cambodia to Thailand, and South Vietnam to Thailand) in which a state action was necessary for contagion, according in each case to the Civil War Necessity Criterion.

The Exceptional Malaysia to Thailand Case of Contagion

Substate conflict also spread from Malaysia to Thailand in 1976, in that the rebel Communist Party of Malaya/Malaysia (CPM) and the CPT cooperated for decades in the jungles of southern Thailand, constituting the nonstate factor of rebels helping rebels.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, the

⁵² Randolph and Thompson, "Thai Insurgency," pp. 61-63, 67.

⁵³ Evans and Rowley, "Red Brotherhood at War," pp. 81-82.

⁵⁴ Patrice de Beer, "History and Policy of the Communist Party of Thailand," in Andrew Turton, Jonathan Fast, and Malcolm Caldwell, eds., *Thailand: Roots of Conflict* (Nottingham, U.K.: Spokesman, 1978), p. 147; Aloysius Chin, *the Communist Party of Malaya: The Inside Story* (Kuala Lumpur: Vinpress, 1995), pp. 187-188.

role of the Laotian, Cambodian, and Vietnamese state actors described above was considerably more limited in the south,⁵⁵ rendering CPM support quite significant.

As far as I can tell, the state actions of evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality were *absent* from the Malaysia-Thailand dyad. Evangelization was impossible, since the CPM never even came close to winning their conflict in Malaysia. The coding for expulsion is more complicated. It is possible that CPM rebels originally set up bases in Thailand because of British or Malayan/Malaysian state expulsion; in the late 1940s and early 1950s, CPM cadres withdrew to Thailand following a series of military defeats at the hands of what was then the colonial Malay government.⁵⁶ However, the pressure applied on the CPM by Kuala Lumpur does not constitute expulsion because there is not convincing evidence that Kuala Lumpur actually *wanted* CPM rebels to leave the country. In fact, in future decades the Malayan/Malaysian government joined Thai forces in pursuit of CPM cadres in Thailand, suggesting that the CPM presence in Thailand was just as vexing to Kuala Lumpur as the CPM presence in Malaya/Malaysia.⁵⁷ This, in turn, suggests that Kuala Lumpur did not deliberately attempt to expel the CPM to Thailand — that in the eyes of the Malay government, no security problem was solved by the CPM’s departure from their own soil — and that the CPM withdrew to Thailand of their own free will.⁵⁸ As for Thai meddling, I found no evidence of it other than the aforementioned efforts by Thailand to cooperate with Malaysia against CPM rebels on Thai

⁵⁵ Randolph and Thompson, “Thai Insurgency,” p. 42; Marks, “Maoist Insurgency since Vietnam,” p. 24.

⁵⁶ Chin, “The Communist Party of Malaya,” pp. 42-43. Technically this expulsion, if genuine, would be counted as part of an extrastate conflict, since Malaysia was not independent at the time.

⁵⁷ Anthony Short, “The Communist Party of Malaya: In Search of Revolutionary Situations,” *The World Today*, Vol. 26, No. 12 (1970): 529-535, p. 530.

⁵⁸ Indeed, this is Chin’s characterization of the CPM’s withdrawal decision. Chin, “The Communist Party of Malaya,” p. 43.

soil.⁵⁹ These efforts constitute homeland defense rather than meddling with overt partiality, so long as Bangkok did not try to fight the CPM in Malaysia itself (which I have no evidence of).

This is a rare case, then, in which substate conflict contagion occurred in the *absence* of a state action. It is one of just 17 such cases in the entire universe of contagion cases (see Chapter 3), and the only one identified in our in-depth regional studies of Central America (1978-1996) and Southeast Asia (1959-1980). So why did contagion occur here? The best explanation I can offer is that the strong presence of structural conditions for civil war in Thailand — recall the extraordinarily high predicted probability of 4.22% — combined with the presence of a long-standing transnational rebel network to produce a contagion outcome. This suggests that when the conditions for contagion are so ripe, a state action may *not* be necessary to form a link between two conflicts. However, further investigation of such cases, with strong structural conditions and nonstate factors but no state action, is required.

The State Action Explanation and Cases of *Non-Contagion*

Why Conflict Never Spread From Burma

Burma has had approximately ten civil wars going on inside its borders, including the longest-running civil war on Earth (the war between the government and the Communist Party of Burma). These conflicts have resulted in the deaths of as many as 500,000 people in battle since 1948.⁶⁰ Given these facts alone, it is somewhat surprising that substate conflict never spread from Burma to any of the other Southeast Asian states between 1959 and 1980. Furthermore, there have been numerous nonstate factors present in Burma over the decades. The Communist Party of Burma (CPB), its ideology aside, supported right-wing guerilla movements against hostile leftist regimes in Laos, Cambodia, and (North) Vietnam, a clear case of rebels helping

⁵⁹ See also Bruce Grant, “The Security of South-East Asia,” *Adelphi Papers* No. 142 (198), p. 5; and Kitan Kapur Datar, *Malaysia: Quest for a Politics of Consensus* (Sahibabad, India: Vikas Publishing House, 1983), p. 170.

⁶⁰ PRIO Battle Death Dataset, Version 3.0 (“high” estimate used).

rebels.⁶¹ The CPB also *attempted* to assist *leftist* rebels in Malaysia and Thailand, although they were mostly prevented from doing so, as discussed below.⁶² Meanwhile, illicit drugs flowed from revenue-seeking nonstate groups in Burma to markets in Laos, Thailand, and Malaysia;⁶³ arms flowed into Thailand, as mentioned above,⁶⁴ and about 10,000 Burmese refugees fled to Thailand in the early 1960s.⁶⁵ For the most part, structural factors were present in the potential receivers of contagion from Burma as well. In Thailand, Malaysia, North Vietnam, and Laos, the median predicted probability of civil war onset between 1959 and 1980 exceeded 1.8% (Thailand: 2.884%; Malaysia: 2.679%; North Vietnam: 2.06%; Laos: 1.808%). (However, I believe the North Vietnam figure is exaggerated, as discussed in the North Vietnam case study below.) Only South Vietnam and Cambodia had relatively low median probabilities of onset, at 1.157% and 0.946%, respectively.

Given the duration and brutality of the Burmese civil wars, the number of nonstate links between Burma and neighboring states, and the strong general presence of the structural conditions for civil war in Burma's neighbors, why did substate conflict never spread from Burma to other states in Southeast Asia? I believe the State Action Explanation is best positioned to help us understand this puzzling non-contagion outcome — because, with a few limited exceptions, state actions were absent from Burma.

Evangelization: Impossible

Since none of the Burmese rebel groups have ever unseated the Burmese government, evangelization could not have occurred.

⁶¹ Smith, "Burma," p. 363.

⁶² Ibid, pp. 228-229.

⁶³ Bertil Lintner, *Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948*, Second Edition (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 1999), pp. 189-190, 223, 237; Dommen, "The Indochinese Experience," p. 374; Jha, "Foreign Policy of Thailand," p. 128.

⁶⁴ See also Lintner, "Burma in Revolt," p. 224.

⁶⁵ Jha, "Foreign Policy of Thailand," pp. 131-132.

Expulsion: Generally Absent

In general, the Burmese government appears to have refrained from expelling combatants across borders into other Southeast Asian states. A prominent history of Burma does not mention any such incidents taking place between 1959 and 1980.⁶⁶ The one exception I found to this general tendency is that in the late 1950s, the Burmese government played a role in the “pushing” of Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) forces from Burma into Thailand.⁶⁷ These same KMT were in Burma because they had been expelled *there* by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as discussed in Chapter 3. However, journalist and area expert Bertil Lintner alleges that “the PLA formed the core of the force that drove the KMT out of the eastern border areas.”⁶⁸ Thus, while expulsion did occur in the Burma to Thailand dyad, it was primarily led by China, not by Burma, and primarily concerned a combatant party to the *Chinese* civil war rather than to the Burmese conflicts.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Generally Absent

As with expulsion, meddling with overt partiality generally did not occur in Burma — that is to say, other Southeast Asian state governments generally did not interfere in the Burmese civil wars. (On whether *Burma* meddled in other conflicts, refer to those dyads discussed below in which Burma is State B.) Such occurrences of meddling again generally go unmentioned in a prominent history of Burma, and in a history of the Burmese conflicts specifically, Cambodia and Malaysia are barely mentioned at all.⁶⁹ Meanwhile, although the rebel CPB and the governments of North Vietnam and Laos were theoretically all communist, support for the CPB

⁶⁶ Michael W. Charney, *A History of Modern Burma* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 93-147.

⁶⁷ Donald D. Weatherbee with Ralf Emmers, Mari Pangestu, and Leonard C. Sebastian, *International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), p. 58.

⁶⁸ Lintner, “Burma in Revolt,” p. 202.

⁶⁹ Charney, “A History of Modern Burma,” pp. 93-147; Smith, “Burma,” throughout.

was highly unlikely to come from Hanoi or Vientiane. The CPB had remarkably poor relations with these two communist regimes, supporting rightist guerillas in those countries (see above) and even “exchang[ing] gunfire with Vietnamese and Laotian troops along the Mekong River” in the late 1970s.⁷⁰ Given this antipathy, it seems fairly safe to assert that neither North Vietnam nor Laos meddled in the Burmese civil wars.

Again, however, we see an exception to this general tendency involving Thailand. In an effort to form a buffer zone between the core of the Thai homeland and the Burmese government *and* the Burmese CPB, both of whom Bangkok feared, the Thai government half-heartedly supported ethnic Burmese rebel groups such as the Karen and Shan, as well as the KMT. Such support generally involved looking the other way while these nonstate actors established sanctuaries along the Thai border and smuggled drugs into Thailand for revenue. Occasionally, Bangkok also helped these groups “procure munitions in Thailand,” although Lintner states that “no outside monetary assistance ever reached the rebels.”⁷¹ Such meddling by the Thai government was certainly overt — the provision of sanctuary qualifies as overt meddling — but is only dubiously partial, since Thailand was supporting one set of rebel groups in order to prevent *another* rebel group, the CPB, from penetrating Thailand and establishing a relationship with the Community Party of Thailand (CPT). In addition, Bangkok periodically withdrew their support for the Karen, Shan, and Nationalist Chinese rebels, instead rescinding their assurances of sanctuary and cooperating with Burmese security forces against these groups.⁷² This is, then, a fairly tenuous case of meddling with overt partiality.

⁷⁰ Smith, “Burma,” pp. 228-229.

⁷¹ Lintner, “Burma in Revolt,” pp. 194, 227, 238, 299; Charney, “A History of Modern Burma,” p. 114.

⁷² Jha, “Foreign Policy of Thailand,” pp. 129-134.

Overall Assessment

In general, Burma did not evangelize, did not expel, and was not subject to meddling with overt partiality by the other Southeast Asian states. Some limited, tenuous exceptions to these tendencies are noted above. I believe this general lack of state action goes a long way toward explaining why substate conflict never spread from Burma to elsewhere in the region, especially since the abundance of nonstate and structural factors made contagion appear so likely. Just as the State Action Explanation predicts, in the general absence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality, the natural obstacles to contagion seem to have overcome any effort by nonstate actors to spread conflict across Burma's borders. We know, for example, that the Thai government was quite nervous about the potential for communist insurgency to spread to it, particularly in the wake of communist victories in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.⁷³ Bangkok thus took steps to fortify itself against the potential spread of communist rebellion.

Interestingly, one step taken by the Thai government to fortify itself against the possibility of contagion was to *meddle*, albeit half-heartedly, in the Burmese ethnic civil wars, as described above. And, surprisingly, this gamble seems to have paid off. Burma expert Martin Smith credits the Bangkok-supported Karen, Shan, and KMT territorial holdings in eastern Burma and western Thailand with preventing the establishment of fuller links between the CPB and the CPT rebel groups — through the formation of a buffer zone, essentially.⁷⁴ This suggests an interesting twist to the State Action Explanation: that if a state meddles in a multi-party civil war⁷⁵ by supporting one rebel group against another (as best describes the Thai program), it may actually make contagion *less* rather than more likely. On the other hand, the Thai government

⁷³ Smith, "Burma," p. 272.

⁷⁴ Ibid, pp. 228-229.

⁷⁵ On the special nature of multi-party civil wars, see Fotini Christia, *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).

was clearly playing with fire. In Chapter 3, I related cases in which overt and partial meddling undertaken to prevent contagion ended up causing it (see, for example, Iraq to Iran, 1966). So, while meddling did seem to work in this case, it should not be expected to work more generally, and the conditions under which meddling does and does not backfire need to be more fully explored.

Why Conflict Never Spread To North Vietnam

If Burma is a puzzling non-*sender* of substate conflict across its borders, North Vietnam is a puzzling non-*recipient* of contagion. In other words, it is puzzling that the substate conflicts in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Burma never spread to North Vietnam — in the form, perhaps, of a violent counterrevolution against the leftist regime. Certainly such a turn of events would have sat well with Saigon and Washington, and not surprisingly there were active efforts to encourage internal dissent in North Vietnam, discussed below. Yet in the end, no major violence occurred in the country, before, during, or after unification with the South.

Like Burma, there were some nonstate links to other conflicts present in North Vietnam, though not to the same extent. The main links were the rebel networks between the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and rightist guerillas (discussed in the Burma section above), and between the Khmer Rouge (KR) and disaffected minority groups in North Vietnam (discussed in the “meddling” section below). According to Fearon and Laitin, there were also ample structural conditions for a civil war onset in North Vietnam, with a median predicted probability of 2.06% per year — roughly double the global median of 1.05% — between 1959 and 1980. We will see below why I think this assessment of structural factors misreads the true political situation in

North Vietnam. But if we take the structural and nonstate indicators at face value, those two contagion factors were present.

The question becomes, then, whether North Vietnam was ever on the receiving end of evangelization or expulsion from another Southeast Asian state, or was ever on the sending end of meddling with overt partiality. In the sections below, I will show that while evangelization and expulsion probably did not occur, North Vietnam was a profligate meddler in the contemporary ideological conflicts of the time period. Thus state actions, nonstate factors, and structural factors all appear to be present — and yet contagion never occurred. This mystery will be explored in more detail below.

Evangelization: Absent

Evangelization could only have come from Laos or Cambodia, the two states where the rebels ultimately unseated the sitting governments in their substate conflicts (and did not immediately unify with North Vietnam). Evangelization from Laos to North Vietnam was highly unlikely, however, given the long-standing patron-client relationship between the governing Vietnamese Workers' Party (VWP) in Hanoi and the governing Pathet Lao (PL) in Vientiane. As for Cambodia, between 1975 and 1978 the ruling KR *did* support efforts by dissident minority groups within now-united Vietnam to initiate a violent armed conflict. However, KR support for these dissidents is probably better viewed as retaliation for Vietnamese meddling with overt partiality than evangelization, and hence is discussed in the “meddling” section below.

Expulsion: Probably Absent

There is no convincing evidence of expulsion from the other Southeast Asian states to North Vietnam. Laotian politicians did sometimes end up living in exile in North Vietnam, but seemingly of their own free will rather than because of a deliberate effort by Vientiane to remove

them from Laos.⁷⁶ I found no evidence of expulsion from Burma (as discussed above), Thailand, or Malaysia either.⁷⁷ The rebel National Liberation Front (FNL) may have been expelled from South Vietnam in 1970, given that they “retreated” into the North according to historian Arthur J. Dommen,⁷⁸ but I located no additional information about this retreat, namely whether the FNL made a strategic and voluntary decision to retreat or whether they were forced to do so.

Otherwise, combatant departures from South Vietnam appear to have been voluntary.⁷⁹ As for Cambodia, in mid to late 1975 about 150,000 “destitute Vietnamese were pushed across the border” by the KR, “on suspicion of being a fifth column.”⁸⁰ However, the validity of these suspicions on the part of the KR is unclear — the expelled Vietnamese may have been non-combatants — and arguably the Cambodian civil war was not active during these months of 1975 anyway. There are some weak potential cases of expulsion to North Vietnam, then, but none of them are terribly compelling.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: *Present* in Four Cases

The North Vietnamese government meddled with overt partiality in four nearby substate conflicts: in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia. Needless to say, in South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese government backed the insurgent FNL from 1959 to 1975.⁸¹ As above (see footnote 15), this counts as meddling rather than evangelization because the conflict won by Ho Chi Minh in 1954 was an “extrastate” (colonial) conflict with France, not an “intrastate” conflict, and is thus outside the scope of this dissertation. The South Vietnamese government, no doubt supported by the U.S., reciprocated by sending agents into North Vietnam to support disaffected

⁷⁶ See, for example, Dommen, “The Indochinese Experience,” pp. 606-607.

⁷⁷ On the absence of evidence for Malaysian expulsion in general, see Datar, “Malaysia,” pp. 166-185; and John Gullick, *Malaysia: Economic Expansion and National Unity* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 199-218.

⁷⁸ Dommen, “The Indochinese Experience,” p. 854.

⁷⁹ See, for example, *ibid.*, pp. 567, 571, 651-653.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 964.

⁸¹ Evans and Rowley, “Red Brotherhood at War,” p. 14.

minority chiefs who at times attempted violence.⁸² But these efforts at counterrevolution went nowhere, for reasons discussed below.

North Vietnamese meddling in the Laotian civil war was similarly unambiguous; as discussed in the South Vietnam to Laos contagion case above, the North Vietnamese regime was the main patron of the Pathet Lao. This meddling significantly escalated in retaliation for *Laotian* meddling in South Vietnam (see the South Vietnam to Laos contagion case above), but originated prior to the events of 1958 and 1959. I found no evidence of any boomeranging of this meddling in Laos — no evidence that the Royal Lao Government attempted to retaliate for the meddling by supporting anti-regime elements in North Vietnam, no evidence that the Pathet Lao ever turned on the North Vietnamese (quite the contrary), and no evidence that North Vietnamese involvement in Laos spurred the North Vietnamese public to rebel against Hanoi. Given the profound weakness of the Lao state, it is somewhat less surprising that meddling in this case came without the usual negative consequences.

The North Vietnamese meddling in Cambodia also needs little introduction; Hanoi had bases and troops inside Cambodia from the 1960s onward, and invaded the country, ousted the Khmer Rouge (KR), and restarted the civil war in 1978.⁸³ As in the South Vietnamese case, the KR seemingly tried to retaliate by supporting disaffected minority groups within North Vietnam, in this case by sending weapons to the Khmer Krom and the Front Uni pour la Lutte des Races Opprimés (FULRO).⁸⁴ But, again, these efforts to sow major violence in North Vietnam failed to take hold.

⁸² Ken Post, *Revolution, Socialism, and Nationalism in Viet Nam* (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1989), Volume II, p. 231.

⁸³ Dommen, “The Indochinese Experience,” pp. 619, 977-979.

⁸⁴ Evans and Rowley, “Red Brotherhood at War,” pp. 277-278; Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-1979* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 365.

Hanoi engaged in meddling on a smaller scale in Malaysia. In his autobiography, the longtime leader of the Communist Party of Malaya/Malaysia (CPM), Chin Peng, claims that beginning in 1961, a small number (initially around ten) of “senior CPM cadres” were sent to Hanoi for specialized training. Chin also emphasizes the role of North Vietnamese pressure in convincing the CPM leadership to resume armed struggle in 1961 — reversing the CPM’s decision to abandon armed struggle in 1959.⁸⁵ It appears that Malaysia began training and resupplying South Vietnamese security forces around the same time (beginning around 1959),⁸⁶ possibly in retaliation for this North Vietnamese meddling.

North Vietnam only refrained from meddling in Thailand and Burma. In Thailand, while Hanoi certainly supported the Communist Party of Thailand, this policy seems better viewed as retaliation for *Thai* meddling in the South Vietnamese civil war, as discussed above. As for Burma, the lack of evidence for Southeast Asian states’ meddling in that country was discussed in the Burma case study above. In brief, North Vietnamese antipathy toward the Communist Party of Burma renders an assistance relationship highly unlikely.

Why Did Contagion Not Occur in North Vietnam?

We have seen, then, that North Vietnam seemingly possessed structural and nonstate factors favoring contagion, and that the North Vietnamese government meddled with overt partiality in four different contemporaneous substate conflicts. Most of this meddling did not come for free; seemingly it was retaliated for in all cases except the Laotian one, where the potential retaliating actor (the Laotian government) was probably too weak to resist. And yet

⁸⁵ Chin Peng, as told to Ian Ward and Norma Miraflor, *My Side of History* (Singapore: Media Masters, 2003), pp. 421, 425, 455.

⁸⁶ Danny Wong Tze Ken, “Malaysia During the Early Cold War Era: The War in Indochina and Malaysia, 1946-1963,” in Christopher E. Goscha and Christian Ostermann, eds., *Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009), p. 268.

substate conflict never spread to North Vietnam, a clear puzzle even when we view the case through the lens of the State Action Explanation.

After researching this puzzling case in-depth, I believe this non-contagion outcome actually *is* consistent with the State Action Explanation, and that one of the indicators referred to thus far is inaccurate. In short, the presence of the structural factors for civil war onset in North Vietnam appears to be significantly overstated. Instead, there appear to be several structural factors favoring civil *peace* in North Vietnam that are not accounted for in the Fearon/Laitin statistical model.

Most prominently, North Vietnam was politically organized as a Marxist-Leninist police state. Therefore, despite its fairly low GDP per capita (a median of \$1,043 in 1985 dollars between 1959 and 1980, according to the Fearon/Laitin dataset, compared to a global population median of \$1,995), Hanoi's state capacity — the variable proxied by GDP per capita in the Fearon and Laitin study⁸⁷ — was considerably larger. First, because one of the Vietnamese Workers' Party's (VWP's) first acts in power was to modify the tax code to capture a larger percentage of the income of small farmers, the state was able to appropriate a larger share of the GDP than the French had been able to do beforehand.⁸⁸ Second, the basic political strategy of the VWP was to “colonize civil society” and thereby eliminate “all autonomous sources of power outside the state apparatus.”⁸⁹ The VWP infiltrated local village governance to an extent never seen under the French, nor indeed since the 10th century.⁹⁰ In its early years, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was made into a thoroughly political organization, with loyalty tests

⁸⁷ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (2003): 75-90, especially p. 80.

⁸⁸ Bernard B. Fall, *The Viet-Minh Regime: Government and Administration in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam*, Revised and Enlarged Edition (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975; reprint of edition published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1956), pp. 105-106.

⁸⁹ Post, “Revolution, Socialism, and Nationalism,” Volume III, p. 98.

⁹⁰ Fall, “The Viet-Minh Regime,” pp. 24-27, 35.

for everyone from recruits to senior generals.⁹¹ This total “coup-proofing” eventually abated when conscription was introduced in April 1960, but by that point the NVA was so unabashedly communist that the conscripts were simply indoctrinated, strengthening “the links between army and people.”⁹² On the politico-religious dimension, the VWP infiltrated the Buddhist clerical leadership, putting a party member at the top and “develop[ing] a type of ‘National Buddhism’ patterned upon the ‘National Churches’ existing in the USSR and Eastern Europe.” Meanwhile, the minority Catholic Church was repressed.⁹³ The VWP also thoroughly penetrated organized labor and the school system, introducing a “school police, composed of students” to the latter.⁹⁴ In short, by 1960, the VWP had so totally infiltrated all potential rival political institutions that there was nowhere for potential rebel elites to hide, let alone develop.

Simultaneously, when it came to less potentially threatening societal issues, the VWP vacillated between a remarkable degree of tolerance and the usual repression. Ethnic minorities such as the Thai were permitted to teach their children indigenous languages, and were spared from the land reform policies of the 1950s.⁹⁵ While the Catholic Church was generally repressed and forbidden to participate in political activity, the authority of the Vatican over Catholic bishops “in internal church affairs” was acknowledged in 1955.⁹⁶ These early policies of accommodation in the non-political sphere likely reduced the potential grievances of both ethnic minorities and Catholics. However, these policies were gradually reversed in the 1960s, when land reform *was* imposed on the minority highlanders, in combination with the resettlement of

⁹¹ Ibid, pp. 47, 84.

⁹² Post, “Revolution, Socialism, and Nationalism,” Volume II, pp. 289-290.

⁹³ Fall, “The Viet-Minh Regime,” pp. 69-70.

⁹⁴ Ibid, pp. 140, 148-149.

⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 68; Post, “Revolution, Socialism, and Nationalism,” Volume II, pp. 56-57.

⁹⁶ Post, “Revolution, Socialism, and Nationalism,” Volume I, p. 286.

ethnic Vietnamese from the lowlands into the highlands.⁹⁷ When ethnic tensions broke out as a result, the VWP responded by attempting to further infiltrate local highland institutions, albeit with only partial success, and by increasing the presence of security forces in the region. These security forces repressed dissent, but also engaged in the “hearts and minds” counterinsurgency approach familiar today — building classrooms and “village clubs,” and assisting with thousands of childbirths.⁹⁸

The combination of VWP omnipresence in North Vietnamese society and the limited accommodation of potential rebel populations in non-political spheres left potential rebel elites — a population already reduced by the mass exodus of Catholics and other potential dissidents across the southern border⁹⁹ — either unwilling or unable to mobilize violent resistance on a significant scale. As historian Ken Post writes:

“There was ... no organized force to give articulation to protests and demands, only some artists and intellectuals whose contacts were outside the Party. ... Such middle strata individuals had no links with the peasants or workers, merely some influence over students at the University of Hanoi and some secondary schools in the capital. The only potential mass support might ... have come from the Catholics, but [they] lacked any overall leadership willing to give voice to general demands. ... The Party leadership could bring into play its history as the rallier of all patriotic forces, its victory over the French, and not least of all its ability to use the state apparatus to control critics.”¹⁰⁰

The picture that emerges here is not one of a weak, impoverished state teetering on the brink of civil conflict, but rather a Marxist-Leninist police state which kept its elites isolated and its masses more or less content. And North Vietnam’s state capacity only increased as the American threat to the south intensified. Internal security efforts were stepped up in mid-1964, and the war

⁹⁷ Ibid, Volume III, pp. 88-89.

⁹⁸ Ibid, Volume III, pp. 110, 116-117, 236-237.

⁹⁹ I thank Barry Posen for pointing this out.

¹⁰⁰ Post, “Revolution, Socialism, and Nationalism,” Volume I, pp. 290-291.

facilitated considerable unity within the Party itself.¹⁰¹ By the end of the war, North Vietnam had the third largest army in the world.¹⁰² Based on this evidence, I consider North Vietnam to have largely *lacked* the structural conditions for a civil war onset, the data of Fearon and Laitin notwithstanding.

Overall Assessment

As a puzzling case of *non-contagion*, North Vietnam is doubly puzzling because state actions — largely meddling with overt partiality — were present and generally bore consequences, as were transnational rebel networks, as were structural factors according to Fearon and Laitin. I explain the outcome on the dependent variable here by taking issue with the last statement. In my judgment, the VWP's thorough infiltration of political institutions and its isolation of potential rebel elites, combined with its selective accommodation of minority groups on non-political matters, rendered North Vietnam a state much less structurally prone to a civil war onset than the Fearon and Laitin data alone suggest. External actors certainly *tried* to start a civil war in North Vietnam, in part to retaliate for North Vietnamese meddling in their conflicts. They were just unable to lift such movements off the ground in a political environment so non-conducive to mass mobilization against the state.

Stepping away from this case, our discussion implies that we should be unlikely to see substate conflict contagion to highly repressive states (a modern-day example would be North Korea), even if those states have impoverished populations. More broadly, we have seen that the current measure of state capacity in the civil war literature writ large — GDP per capita — has significant limitations. As quantitative civil war scholars continue to improve on the seminal contribution of Fearon and Laitin, they should seek to develop more fine-grained measures of

¹⁰¹ Ibid, Volume III, pp. 315-318.

¹⁰² Elizabeth Becker, *When the War was Over: The Voices of Cambodia's Revolution and its People* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), p. 378.

state capacity, which take into account the tax code, in the first place, and also the ways in which the state in question *uses* its financial resources.

Conclusion

In this final regional test of the State Action Explanation, I measured the occurrence of substate conflict contagion, state actions, nonstate factors, and structural factors in 36 State A-State B directed dyads in Southeast Asia (1959-1980). (As in the Chapter 4, some of these dyads are covered explicitly in the appendix below, and some were subsumed into the broader, country-specific case studies above.) Table 5.1 shows the dyads in which at least one state action was at least tentatively identified as present. There are at least 10 such dyads, and possibly as many as 13 if ambiguous cases are counted. Thus, while state action still did *not* occur in the majority of dyads, it occurred more frequently than in Central America (where we saw state action in 8 of 35 dyads).

In 5 of these 10-13 dyads in which state action was present, substate conflict contagion occurred, and was shown above to have been necessary for contagion according to the Civil War Necessity Criterion. In 2-6 other dyads, depending on how we code North Vietnam, a state action occurred in a state where the structural conditions for civil war onset were basically absent — thus the lack of structural conditions probably explains the lack of contagion. The State Action Explanation appears to be inconsistent with the outcome in the final 2 dyads — Burma-Thailand and South Vietnam-Malaysia — because in each, a state action is at least tentatively coded as present, structural conditions for civil war are coded as present, and yet there was no contagion. That being said, as discussed in the relevant section above, I am skeptical that the state actions of expulsion and meddling with overt partiality actually occurred in the Thai case. The Malaysian case needs further exploration, but the puzzling outcome in this dyad may be explained by

Table 5.1: Southeast Asian Directed Dyads with State Action Present

State A	State B	State Action(s) Present	Outcome and Comments
South Vietnam	North Vietnam	Meddling with Overt Partiality and <i>Possibly</i> Expulsion	No contagion; structural conditions for civil war (arguably) absent in North Vietnam
South Vietnam	Laos	<i>Possibly</i> Meddling with Overt Partiality	Contagion; may not be case of state action
South Vietnam	Cambodia	Meddling with Overt Partiality	Contagion
South Vietnam	Thailand	Meddling with Overt Partiality	Contagion
South Vietnam	Malaysia	Meddling with Overt Partiality	No contagion; structural conditions for civil war present in Malaysia; puzzling case that State A-State B distance may explain
Laos	North Vietnam	Meddling with Overt Partiality	No contagion; structural conditions for civil war (arguably) absent in North Vietnam
Laos	South Vietnam	<i>Possibly</i> Meddling with Overt Partiality	No contagion; structural conditions for (another) civil war absent in South Vietnam; may not be case of state action
Laos	Thailand	Evangelization and Meddling with Overt Partiality	Contagion
Cambodia	North Vietnam	Meddling with Overt Partiality and <i>Possibly</i> Expulsion	No contagion; structural conditions for civil war (arguably) absent in North Vietnam

State A	State B	State Action(s) Present	Outcome and Comments
Cambodia	South Vietnam	Meddling with Overt Partiality and <i>Possible</i> Expulsion	No contagion; structural conditions for (another) civil war absent in South Vietnam
Cambodia	Thailand	Evangelization, Expulsion, and Meddling with Overt Partiality	Contagion
Malaysia	North Vietnam	Meddling with Overt Partiality	No contagion; structural conditions for civil war (arguably) absent in North Vietnam
Burma	Thailand	<i>Possibly</i> Expulsion and <i>Possibly</i> Meddling with Overt Partiality	No contagion; structural conditions for civil war present in Thailand; may not be case of state action

(1) the sheer distance between North and South Vietnam and Malaysia, (2) the associated dubious importance of Malaysia to Hanoi, and (3) the fact that the communist insurgency in Malaysia was already ongoing when Kuala Lumpur's meddling in South Vietnam started. (See the relevant directed dyad in Appendix 5.1 below for further discussion.)

In the other 23 dyads explored in this chapter, where state actions were apparently absent, there was only 1 case of substate conflict contagion: Malaysia to Thailand, where the rebel network between the Communist Party of Malaysia and the Communist Party of Thailand was sufficient to spread the conflict across the border. If we count the South Vietnam to Laos contagion case as missing a state action, due to the dubious overtness of Laotian meddling, there were 2 cases in 24 dyads. Again, then, the supposition that at least one state action is usually a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for substate conflict contagion is empirically supported.

In the absence of state action, contagion is quite rare; in the presence of state action, contagion often occurs (when it is not stopped by missing structural conditions), and state action tends to play a key role in the specific contagion events.

Interestingly, the analysis of Southeast Asia demonstrates more effectively than the analysis of Central America the importance of nonstate and structural factors to contagion. Nonstate factors were present in 21 of the 36 dyads, including 5 of the 6 cases of contagion (all except South Vietnam to Laos). Structural factors were “present” — which I define as a median predicted probability of civil war onset above 1.5% per year — in 21 dyads as well, or 15 if we subtract out the North Vietnamese dyads in which I believe the quantitative estimates of structural conditions are overstated. Again, structural factors were present in 5 of the 6 contagion cases (all except South Vietnam to Cambodia). So each set of factors — state action, nonstate factors, and structural factors — was present in 5 of the 6 contagion cases and absent from one exceptional case. This surprising symmetry underscores the argument made in Chapter 2, that state actions must *combine* with nonstate and structural factors in order to produce contagion outcomes. No one set of factors is sufficient on their own.

On the other hand, while the Southeast Asian findings underscore the non-sufficiency of state actions for contagion, they also underscore the empirical shortcomings of the conventional wisdom about substate conflict contagion. Nonstate factors were present in the majority of dyads, and structural factors were present in about half, yet contagion only occurred in six dyads (one-sixth of the total). Common events cannot explain rare events on their own. What the conventional wisdom is underemphasizing, I argue, is another set of factors — evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality — which is less common than the nonstate and

structural factors, is *also* necessary but insufficient for contagion, and is more preventable by great power policymakers.

Having discussed the contemporary conventional wisdom about substate conflict contagion, it is now worth returning to one of the primary motivators for this chapter: the Domino Theory. Now that we have surveyed the empirical landscape of Cold War Southeast Asia from the perspective of the State Action Explanation, what can we say about whether the Domino Theory, in its original, 1950s incarnation, was right or wrong? At the risk of sounding thoroughly academic, I think the best answer is, (1) “We are talking about different things,” and (2) “It was right *and* wrong.” On the first point, recall from the introduction that policymaker fears in the 1950s concerned the spread of *rebel victory in communist insurgencies*, not the spread of substate conflict itself. My dissertation is about the spread of conflict, since that seems to be what primarily concerns policymakers today. So my work should not be considered a direct test of the Domino Theory.

With that caveat, on the second point, the Domino Theory was right that evangelization — not called by that name at the time, of course — is a key mechanism by which violence spreads across borders. Laotian and Cambodian evangelization were both necessary for the onset of the ideological civil war in Thailand, constituting two of the six cases of substate conflict contagion in the region. But the Domino Theory was also wrong. First, the spread of substate conflict (let alone rebel victory) is not as automatic as Presidents Truman and Eisenhower — and, later, Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon — assumed. Indeed, a key lesson of the State Action Explanation in general is that the spread of violence is more difficult than policymakers tend to think. Conflict and rebel victory did spread in continental Southeast Asia, eliminating rightist regimes in Laos and Cambodia around the same time as in South Vietnam.

But the Indian and Middle Eastern dominoes never fell, as NSC 124/2 originally predicted. The structural factors for civil war were likely missing in some of these countries. Also, one of the main contributors to and encouragers of evangelization in Greater Asia, the People's Republic of China, found itself both unable and unwilling to evangelize or further encourage evangelization in the 1970s, due to its rapprochement with Washington.

Second, the Domino Theory was wrong in that it omitted two *other* state actions that can lead to the spread of substate conflict across borders. As a consequence, the Domino Theory implicitly assumed that military intervention in regions at risk of contagion would make contagion less likely. But the State Action Explanation suggests that when military interventions designed to curb one state action (evangelization) end up constituting another (meddling with overt partiality), they can actually make contagion *more* likely. We need look no further than Thailand for an example. The government of Thailand assisted the U.S. mission to contain communism in Indochina; in return, Indochinese communist regimes transformed the ideological insurgency in Thailand from a minor irritant into a major civil war combatant. Thus U.S. intervention probably created a case of substate conflict contagion — though not of rebel victory — where one would not have existed otherwise.

In the concluding chapter of this dissertation, I will first summarize the argument and empirical findings, and then consider more fully the policy implications for great power intervention that have been touched on here. In situations like that of Cold War Indochina, where we know state action is present and the risk for contagion is substantial, I will argue for coercive diplomacy to disincentive evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality without constituting meddling *itself*. Then, I will close the dissertation with some thoughts on possible future research.

Appendix 5.1: Coding of Other Dyads

As in Chapter 4, 19 brief, dyad-specific “mini-case studies” follow below. The dyads are titled “State A-State B” — for example, in the “South Vietnam-Malaysia” dyad just below, South Vietnam is State A and Malaysia is State B. The value of the dependent variable for each of these 19 dyads is negative — there were no additional cases of substate conflict contagion in Southeast Asia between 1959 and 1980 — so there are no dyad-specific dependent variable codings below. Instead, I skip to coding the presence or absence of the three state actions, each of which is considered in turn. Next, I report the median predicted probability of civil war in State B between the year of the State A conflict onset (or 1959, whichever is later) and five years after the State A conflict termination (or 1980, whichever is earlier), again as a rough proxy for the presence of structural factors. Structural factors are considered to be “present” if this predicted probability is 1.5% per year or higher (rounding to the nearest tenth of a percentage point). Finally, I discuss the presence of any identified nonstate factors in the dyad. (Not every dyad has nonstate factors identified.)

South Vietnam-Malaysia

Evangelization: Impossible, since the rebel victory in South Vietnam was immediately followed by state death and unification with North Vietnam.

Expulsion: No evidence found.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: *Present*. As noted in the North Vietnam section above, the Malaysian government supported the Republic of Vietnam militarily from around 1959 onward. Malaysian meddling in South Vietnam may have been retaliation for North Vietnamese meddling in Malaysia (see above); *or*, North Vietnamese meddling in Malaysia may have been retaliation for Malaysian meddling in South Vietnam. The exact sequence of events is unclear.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Malaysia, 1959-1980: 2.679% per year (high, well above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear present. On its face, then, this appears to be a surprising case of non-contagion that does not accord with the State Action Explanation, because both a state action and structural factors were present. On the other hand, the most likely carrier of any negative security consequences from Malaysia's meddling, the Communist Party of Malaya/Malaysia (CPM), was *already* fighting a substate conflict with Kuala Lumpur when both the Malaysian and North Vietnamese meddling programs began, sometime during or after 1959. In other words, North Vietnamese retaliation for Malaysian meddling in the form of support for the CPM, if North Vietnamese support for the CPM indeed *was* retaliation for Malaysian meddling, could have not *started* a communist insurgency, because one was already underway. Still, it is somewhat surprising that the Malaysian substate conflict involving the CPM never escalated to a full-scale civil war, given the ripe structural conditions and the presence of Malaysian meddling with overt partiality in a war involving one of the CPM's natural allies. The sheer distance between Malaysia and North and South Vietnam, and the general focus of Hanoi on its closer neighbors, may explain this puzzling outcome better than anything else.

South Vietnam-Burma

Evangalization: Impossible, since the rebel victory in South Vietnam was immediately followed by state death and unification with North Vietnam.

Expulsion: Goes unmentioned in a prominent Burmese historical account.¹⁰³

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Unlikely, since both the pre- and post-1962 Burmese regimes adhered to a policy of neutrality in the region. The pre-1962 U Nu regime felt "antipathy toward communism and a fear of China. ... But unlike Thailand, the Burmese leadership

¹⁰³ Charney, "A History of Modern Burma," pp. 93-147.

believed that a ‘neutral’ foreign policy could ensure the country’s independence from foreign influence and Chinese domination.” Likewise, after the 1962 coup, the ruling General Ne Win feared both China and the U.S., and desired to keep the U.S. “at arm’s length.”¹⁰⁴ “Even Ne Win’s sternest critics gave him credit for his determined and skillfully charted neutralism, [which] undoubtedly kept Burma, unlike Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, from being dragged into the Vietnam War.”¹⁰⁵ Given this firm neutralist posture, we would be surprised to see any Burmese meddling with overt partiality in the ideological substate conflicts of the rest of the region — and indeed, no such evidence is apparent from Michael W. Charney’s history of the country.¹⁰⁶

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Burma, 1959-1980: 1.21% per year (medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear more absent than present.

Nonstate Factor of Arms: Present; both pro-government militias and the rebel Karen National Union were strengthened by “Vietnam-surplus” weapons after 1975.¹⁰⁷

Laos-South Vietnam

Evangelization: Impossible, since the rebel victory in Laos did not occur until November 1975, seven months after the state death of South Vietnam.

Expulsion: Unlikely, given that the evidence we have of Laotian dissidents leaving Laos involves voluntary departures rather than ones forced by Vientiane.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Ang Cheng Guan, “Southeast Asian Perceptions of the Domino Theory,” in Christopher E. Goscha and Christian Ostermann, eds., *Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009), pp. 314-316.

¹⁰⁵ Smith, “Burma,” p. 201.

¹⁰⁶ Charney, “A History of Modern Burma,” pp. 93-147.

¹⁰⁷ Smith, “Burma,” pp. 221, 284.

¹⁰⁸ Dommen, “The Indochinese Experience,” pp. 606-607.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: *Possibly* present. According to Dommen, in the early 1960s “the South Vietnamese were in small numbers in the south [of Laos], doing what they could to interfere with DRV infiltration across the border.”¹⁰⁹ This could be South Vietnamese meddling in the Laotian civil war, but it sounds like Saigon’s efforts were primarily directed against the National Liberation Front — a combatant in the *South Vietnamese* civil war — not the Pathet Lao.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in South Vietnam, 1959-1975: 1.157% per year (medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear more absent than present.

Nonstate Factor of Drugs: Likely present, since “the generals in Vientiane ... had the habit of commandeering C-47s to fly opium out of Laos to neighboring countries.”¹¹⁰

Laos-Cambodia

Evangelization: Probably absent. The Khmer Rouge (KR), the natural ideological partner of the Pathet Lao (PL), had poor relations with Vientiane from at least 1979, rendering support from the PL to the KR unlikely.¹¹¹ Furthermore, two accounts of post-1975 Laotian foreign policy do not mention any such evangelization.¹¹²

Expulsion: Unlikely since, as discussed in the dyad above, Laotian dissidents generally left the country voluntarily.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: No evidence found.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 484.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p. 606.

¹¹¹ Geoffrey C. Gunn, “Foreign Relations of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic: the Ideological Imperative,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 20, No. 10 (1980): 990-1007, pp. 997-1004.

¹¹² Ibid, pp. 990-1007; and Martin Stuart-Fox, “Lao Foreign Policy: The View from Vientiane,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (1981): 351-366.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Cambodia, 1959-1980: 0.946% per year (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear absent.

Nonstate Factor of Drugs: Likely present, since, as discussed in the dyad above, Laos was an illicit drug exporter.

Laos-Malaysia

Evangelization: No evidence found in a prominent general account of Lao foreign policy.¹¹³

Expulsion: Unlikely since, as discussed in the two dyads above, Laotian dissidents generally left the country voluntarily.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Probably absent, given that Malaysia was a leading proponent of neutrality in the region. In 1972, Malaysia convened and signed onto a regional neutralization agreement of ASEAN in Kuala Lumpur.

“The committee defined a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality as one where ‘national identity, independence, and integrity of the individual States can be preserved and maintained.’

Furthermore, neutrality in the context of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was taken to mean impartiality and refraining from involvement in ... armed or any other conflict between powers outside the zone. ... Malaysian leadership ... has been anxious to get neutralization accepted by the Big Powers in order to ensure the stability and security of the region.”¹¹⁴

Furthermore, an historical account of Malaysia does not mention any meddling in Laos or elsewhere.¹¹⁵ Malaysian meddling in South Vietnam (see South Vietnam-Malaysia, above) must, of course, be noted as an exception.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Malaysia, 1959-1980: 2.679% per year (high, well above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this

¹¹³ Stuart-Fox, “Lao Foreign Policy,” pp. 351-366.

¹¹⁴ Datar, “Malaysia,” pp. 176-178.

¹¹⁵ Gullick, “Malaysia,” pp. 199-218.

proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear present, meaning they were insufficient in this case for contagion to occur.

Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Present. Refugees flowed from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia into Malaysia between 1978 and 1980, a development which Kuala Lumpur “perceived ... to be a significant threat to their internal social and political stability.”¹¹⁶

Laos-Burma

Evangelization: Unlikely, given the poor relations between the Pathet Lao and the Communist Party of Burma (see the discussion in the Burma case study above).

Expulsion: Unlikely since, as discussed in the three dyads above, Laotian dissidents generally left the country voluntarily. There is also no evidence of expulsion from Laos to Burma in a prominent history of Burma.¹¹⁷

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Unlikely, given Burma’s consistent neutralist stance (see the South Vietnam-Burma dyad) and the lack of evidence for Burmese meddling in Laos in Charney’s historical account.¹¹⁸

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Burma, 1959-1980: 1.21% per year (medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear more absent than present.

Nonstate Factor of Arms: Present; in the late 1960s, ethnically Wa warlords “built up their own private armies and purchased with opium money all the military equipment available on the black market in Thailand and Laos.”¹¹⁹ Likewise, “in the late 1970s, most of the [Karen

¹¹⁶ Karl D. Jackson, “U.S. Policy, ASEAN, and the Kampuchean Crisis,” in Robert A. Scalapino and Jusuf Wanandi, eds., *Economic, Political, and Security Issues in Southeast Asia in the 1980s* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1982), p. 130.

¹¹⁷ Charney, “A History of Modern Burma,” pp. 93-147.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Lintner, “Burma in Revolt,” p. 232.

rebel group] KNLA's arms were described as 'Vietnam surplus' (sometimes 'Laotian' or 'Thai')."¹²⁰

Nonstate Factor of Return of Foreign Fighters from State A to State B: Possibly present. Ethnically Shan mercenaries from Burma fought on the side of the rightist government in Laos in the mid-1960s.¹²¹ Though I do not have concrete evidence, I imagine many if not most of these Shan returned to Burma, where their combat experience likely augmented the Shan insurgency (although this nonstate factor may only have operated *after* the Shan insurgency onset in 1959).

Cambodia-South Vietnam

Evangelization: Essentially impossible, since the Khmer Rouge takeover of Cambodia on April 17, 1975 came only about two weeks before the state death of South Vietnam on April 30.

Expulsion: Possibly *present*. Dommen briefly refers to a 1970 incident in which Vietnamese nationals were expelled across the border, and to a similar incident in 1975.¹²² I do not have information on whether the individuals expelled were combatants, however.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: *Present*. In the late spring of 1970, 19,000 South Vietnamese troops entered Cambodia to fight the communists, which were at this point led by the deposed Sihanouk.¹²³ The Cambodian government does not seem to have retaliated for this meddling directly; of course, by this point the Cambodian state was years into its secret support program for the National Liberation Front (see above), so the most logical means of Cambodian retaliation may already have been employed.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in South Vietnam, 1967-1975: 1.112% per year (medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year).

¹²⁰ Smith, "Burma," p. 299.

¹²¹ Lintner, "Burma in Revolt," pp. 224-225.

¹²² Dommen, "The Indochinese Experience," p. 964.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 742.

Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear more absent than present. This relative lack of the structural conditions for civil war may explain why the presence of one or two state actions in this dyad failed to result in contagion.

Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Present. About 300,000 Cambodian refugees fled to South Vietnam in the aftermath of the 1978 Vietnamese invasion, as the atrocities inflicted by the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1978) became more widely known.¹²⁴

Nonstate Factor of Rebels Helping Rebels: Possibly present. In 1970, Sihanouk — who was a rebel leader rather than a state actor at this point — planned “coordination with the fronts in Vietnam and Laos.”¹²⁵ However, it is not clear whether this coordination ever materialized, and it would be well after the civil war onset in South Vietnam in any case.

Cambodia-Laos

Evangelization: Seemingly absent. Several accounts of Cambodian foreign policy during the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1978) do not mention any attempts by the KR to sow further conflict in Laos.¹²⁶

Expulsion: No evidence found.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: No evidence found.

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Laos, 1967-1980: 1.754% per year (fairly high, above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear present, meaning they were insufficient in this case for contagion to occur.

¹²⁴ Ibid, p. 739.

¹²⁵ Ibid, p. 744.

¹²⁶ Kiernan, “The Pol Pot Regime,” pp. 357-385; Becker, “When the War Was Over” (1986), pp. 300-302, 335-405; David Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, Fourth Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2008), pp. 255-276; Craig Etcheson, *The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 143-196.

Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Present. Brao refugees fled from Cambodia to Laos in 1968, and refugees also fled to Laos from the ascending Khmer Rouge, beginning in 1974.¹²⁷

Nonstate Factor of Rebels Helping Rebels: Present. Sihanouk may have supported Lao rebels while he was a nonstate actor (see the dyad above), and “the revival of the [Lao] southern resistance in 1980 was ... largely a result of the support they got from the Khmer Rouges.”¹²⁸

The latter support may constitute a case of low-intensity substate conflict contagion from Cambodia to Laos, since the anti-Pathet Lao resistance eventually caused about 75 battle deaths in 1989 and 1990.¹²⁹ However, the nearly nine-year delay between the Khmer Rouge support and the onset of low-intensity conflict in Laos suggests that the contagion case is weak (accordingly, it is not counted in Chapter 3), and in any event this case is outside the temporal scope of this chapter.

Cambodia-Malaysia

Evangelization: Highly unlikely, given that the Communist Party of Malaysia was virtually defunct when the Khmer Rouge took over Cambodia in 1975.

Expulsion: No evidence found.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Probably absent, given that Malaysia was a leading proponent of neutrality in the region, and since historical accounts of Malaysia do not mention any such meddling besides the involvement in South Vietnam (see the Laos-Malaysia dyad above for more detail).

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Malaysia, 1967-1980: 2.849% per year (high, well above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this

¹²⁷ Dommen, “The Indochinese Experience,” pp. 618, 887.

¹²⁸ Evans and Rowley, “Red Brotherhood at War,” pp. 276-277.

¹²⁹ UCDP synopsis on Lao (government) conflict, available online at http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=90®ionSelect=7-Eastern_Asia#.

proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear present, meaning they were insufficient in this case for contagion to occur.

Nonstate Factor of Refugees: Present. Like Thailand, Malaysia received refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia that it deemed “a significant threat to their internal social and political stability.”¹³⁰

Cambodia-Burma

Evangelization: Unmentioned in two prominent histories of Burma.¹³¹

Expulsion: Unmentioned in two prominent histories of Burma.¹³²

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Unlikely, given Burma’s strict adherence to a neutrality policy (see the South Vietnam-Burma dyad for evidence).

Median Predicted Probability of Civil War Onset in Burma, 1967-1980: 1.194% per year (medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear more absent than present.

Thailand-South Vietnam

Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Thailand never unseated the sitting government in Bangkok.

Expulsion: No evidence found. (South Vietnam was near state death as the Thai civil war escalated anyway.)

Meddling with Overt Partiality: No evidence found. (South Vietnam was near state death as the Thai civil war escalated anyway.)

¹³⁰ Jackson, “U.S. Policy,” p. 130.

¹³¹ Charney, “A History of Modern Burma,” pp. 93-147; Smith, “Burma,” throughout.

¹³² Ibid.

Median Probability of Civil War Onset in South Vietnam, 1974-1975: 1.106% per year (medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear more absent than present.

Thailand-Laos

Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Thailand never unseated the sitting government in Bangkok.

Expulsion: No evidence found.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Laotian meddling in Thailand prior to 1975, and such meddling seems unlikely given Bangkok's military support for the pre-1975 right-wing regime in Vientiane. Post-1975, the Pathet Lao's involvement in Thailand more closely fits "evangelization" than "meddling," because it followed from a violent regime change. (See the Laos to Thailand contagion case above for more detail on both pre- and post-1975.)

Median Probability of Civil War Onset in Laos, 1974-1980: 1.722% per year (fairly high, above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear present, meaning they were insufficient in this case for contagion to occur.

Thailand-Cambodia

Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Thailand never unseated the sitting government in Bangkok.

Expulsion: Seemingly absent. In the spring of 1980, Thailand had a policy of "repatriating" Cambodian rebels. "Specifically, Colonel Lim and the senior Khmer Rouge

leaders at Sa Kaeo were secretly trucked back to the border at night.”¹³³ This certainly sounds like expulsion, but it involved the expulsion of State B combatants *back* to State B, rather than the expulsion of State A combatants that is required for this mechanism. No evidence for any such expulsion of *Thai* combatants to Cambodia was found.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Seemingly absent. I found no evidence of Cambodian meddling in Thailand prior to 1975. Post-1975, the Khmer Rouge’s involvement in Thailand more closely fits “evangelization” than “meddling,” because it followed from a violent regime change. (See the Cambodia to Thailand contagion case above.)

Median Probability of Civil War Onset in Cambodia, 1974-1980: 1.202% per year (medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear more absent than present.

Thailand-Malaysia

Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Thailand never unseated the sitting government in Bangkok.

Expulsion: No evidence found. In fact, southern Thailand was a hotbed for communist rebels from both sides of the border (see the Malaysia to Thailand contagion case), suggesting that Thailand was either unwilling or unable to move combatants across their frontier with Malaysia.

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Probably absent, given that Malaysia was a leading proponent of neutrality in the region, and since historical accounts of Malaysia do not mention any such meddling besides the involvement in South Vietnam (see the Laos-Malaysia dyad above for more detail).

¹³³ Evans and Rowley, “Red Brotherhood at War,” p. 233.

Median Probability of Civil War Onset in Malaysia, 1974-1980: 2.841% per year (high, well above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear present, meaning they were insufficient in this case for contagion to occur.

Thailand-Burma

Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Thailand never unseated the sitting government in Bangkok.

Expulsion: Unmentioned in Charney's history of Burma.¹³⁴

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Unlikely, given Burma's strict adherence to a neutrality policy (see the South Vietnam-Burma dyad for evidence).

Median Probability of Civil War Onset in Burma, 1974-1980: 1.21% (medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear more absent than present.

Nonstate Factor of Arms: Present. As mentioned in the Laos-Burma dyad, both Wa warlords and Karen rebels got arms from the Thai black market.¹³⁵

Nonstate Factor of Rebels Helping Rebels: Present, but post-onset in Burma. The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) managed to assist, supply, and influence both communist and ethnic Karenni rebels in Burma during the 1970s. This assistance came well after the onsets of both the Communist Party of Burma and the Karenni substate conflicts, although the CPT may have encouraged a breakaway Karenni faction — the Karenni State Nationalities Liberation

¹³⁴ Charney, "A History of Modern Burma," pp. 93-147.

¹³⁵ Lintner, "Burma in Revolt," p. 232; Smith, "Burma," p. 299.

Front (KSNLF) — to separate itself from the mainstream Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP).¹³⁶

Nonstate Factor of Return of Foreign Fighters from State A to State B: Possibly present. Ethnic minority mercenaries from Burma fought on the side of the rightist government in Thailand.¹³⁷ Though I do not have concrete evidence, I imagine many if not most of these minorities returned to Burma, where their combat experience likely augmented the insurgencies there (although this nonstate factor may only have operated *after* the onsets of these insurgencies, given that the Thai substate conflict did not start until 1974).

Malaysia-South Vietnam

Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Malaysia never unseated the sitting government in Kuala Lumpur.

Expulsion: No evidence of Malaysian expulsion in general in two historical accounts.¹³⁸

Meddling with Overt Partiality: No evidence found; the Malaysian government supported the South Vietnamese military in its counterinsurgency (see the South Vietnam-Malaysia dyad), but I found no indication that this support was reciprocated by Saigon.

Median Probability of Civil War Onset in South Vietnam, 1959-1975: 1.157% (medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear more absent than present.

Malaysia-Laos

Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Malaysia never unseated the sitting government in Kuala Lumpur.

¹³⁶ Smith, "Burma," pp. 306, 345-346.

¹³⁷ Lintner, "Burma in Revolt," p. 298.

¹³⁸ Datar, "Malaysia," pp. 166-185; Gullick, "Malaysia," pp. 199-218.

Expulsion: No evidence of Malaysian expulsion in general in two historical accounts (see the dyad above for sources).

Meddling with Overt Partiality: No evidence found.

Median Probability of Civil War Onset in Laos, 1959-1980: 1.808% (high, above the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for civil war appear present, meaning they were insufficient in this case for contagion to occur.

Malaysia-Cambodia

Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Malaysia never unseated the sitting government in Kuala Lumpur.

Expulsion: No evidence of Malaysian expulsion in general in two historical accounts (see the Malaysia-South Vietnam dyad for sources).

Meddling with Overt Partiality: No evidence found. The Khmer Rouge (KR) is unlikely to have supported the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM) after the KR's ascent to power, given that the CPM was virtually defunct by then.

Median Probability of Civil War Onset in Cambodia, 1959-1980: 0.946% (low, below the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear absent.

Malaysia-Burma

Evangelization: Impossible, since the Communist Party of Malaysia never unseated the sitting government in Kuala Lumpur.

Expulsion: No evidence of Malaysian expulsion in general in two historical accounts (see the Malaysia-South Vietnam dyad for sources).

Meddling with Overt Partiality: Unlikely, given Burma's strict adherence to a neutrality policy (see the South Vietnam-Burma dyad for evidence).

Median Probability of Civil War Onset in Burma, 1959-1980: 1.21% (medium-low, approximately the same as the population median of 1.05% per year). Judging on the basis of this proxy alone, structural conditions for (another) civil war onset appear more absent than present.

Nonstate Factor of Rebels Inspiring Rebels: Present, though pre-1959. Communist Party of Burma (CPB) cadres met with Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) leader Chin Peng sometime during the late 1940s and early 1950s. I found no evidence of material CPM support for the CPB, but it is reasonable to assume, given these contacts, that the CPM provided some inspiration for the CPB's armed struggle.¹³⁹

¹³⁹ Smith, "Burma," p. 156.

Chapter 6: Conclusion, Policy Implications, and Next Steps

In this dissertation, I have built and tested an explanation for why violent civil conflicts spread across borders. More specifically, I have sought to understand the conditions under which a “substate conflict” — an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has caused at least 25 cumulative battle-related deaths — makes a causal contribution to the onset of a “civil war” — an armed conflict between a state and militarized rebels that has caused at least 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths — in another state. My State Action Explanation is that contrary to current views of this mysterious and policy-relevant phenomenon, nonstate actor-driven factors such as transnational rebel networks and structural factors for civil war such as poverty in the potential receiving state are insufficient to move conflict across borders on their own. This is because there are significant natural obstacles to “substate conflict contagion,” namely (1) the challenge of rebel mobilization in nascent substate conflicts, (2) the reverse demonstration effect, under which potential rebel elites are horrified rather than inspired by nearby conflicts, (3) the ability of states to fortify themselves against the spread of conflict, and (4) the challenge of escalation from minor conflict to full-scale civil war. In addition to “nonstate” and “structural” factors, the State Action Explanation argues that it generally requires at least one of three deliberate sovereign state actions to overcome these natural obstacles to substate conflict contagion and enable a contagion event. These state actions are (1) evangelization, the deliberate sponsorship of a nascent rebel group abroad by a state which has recently experienced a violent regime change; (2) expulsion, the deliberate movement of combatants across borders by a state in conflict; and (3) meddling with overt partiality, the deliberate interference in an ongoing substate conflict that results in conflict in the interfering state.

My explanation does not argue that evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality are *sufficient* to cause substate conflict contagion, only that at least one of these state actions is *usually necessary* to overcome the natural obstacles to contagion's occurrence. The same can probably be said of the structural factors identified in the work of Fearon and Laitin and others.¹ The same *may* also be true of the six nonstate factors identified in this dissertation — rebels helping rebels, rebels inspiring rebels, refugees moving across borders, arms moving across borders, drugs moving across borders, and expatriate fighters returning home — although my current empirical work cannot speak to the necessity of these factors for individual cases of contagion. (See the suggestions for future research below.) What sets state actions apart from these other usually necessary but insufficient factors for contagion is that unlike structural factors, state actions are proximate, not long-standing geographic, political, economic, and social realities; and unlike nonstate factors, state actions are taken by centralized institutions with “return addresses” for the developed world. Because of these characteristics, state actions are more preventable by great power policymakers than the nonstate and structural causes of contagion, and are thereby the easiest usually necessary condition for contagion to knock out. The policy implications of this insight will be discussed in more detail below.

Empirically, I have probed the plausibility of the State Action Explanation, and tested it in two different regions of the world. The plausibility probe came in Chapter 3, when I generated an original universe of 84 cases of substate conflict contagion around the world between 1946 and 2007, and measured the presence of state actions (and structural factors) in each. My universe of cases was unique mainly in that instead of *assuming* the relatedness of substate conflicts that were clustered in time and space, I investigated 665 such conflict pairs in the

¹ James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (2003): 75-90.

secondary source literature. I found no relationship between the two conflicts in the vast majority of cases, and identified the 84 cases (about 13 percent) in which conflicts *were* related and in which the second conflict in the pair escalated to a full-scale civil war. Ultimately, I found that at least one state action was present in about three quarters of the 84 contagion cases, and necessary for contagion according to one of two criteria in about two thirds. I also showed that structural factors on their own are insufficient to explain the variation between contagion and non-contagion. Thus this chapter showed that the State Action Explanation has analytic value to add, because (1) contagion rarely occurs in the absence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality, (2) when these state actions do occur, they tend to be pivotal to contagion events, and (3) these actions, when combined with structural factors, explain more variation between contagion and non-contagion than do structural factors alone.

The tests of the State Action Explanation came in Chapters 4 and 5, when I looked at two regional groupings of cases of contagion and *non*-contagion, measuring in each grouping the occurrence of contagion, state actions, nonstate factors, and structural factors. In Central America (1978-1996), I found that contagion only occurred once — from Nicaragua to El Salvador in 1981 — despite the frequent presence of nonstate factors, while evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality were generally absent from the region. These empirics support the supposition that nonstate factors cannot spread conflict on their own. Meanwhile, in the one actual case of contagion, Nicaraguan evangelization was shown to have been necessary for the escalation of the Salvadoran substate conflict into a full-scale civil war. However, structural factors were generally absent from Central America as well. This means that we cannot be sure, judging from this region alone, whether the lack of contagion was due to the lack of state actions or the lack of structural factors.

In Southeast Asia (1959-1980), I again found nonstate factors generally present and state actions generally absent. In this region, I also found structural factors present in about half of the directed dyads, making them fairly common. There were only six cases of substate conflict contagion in thirty-six directed dyads — therefore, these commonly present nonstate *and* structural factors cannot have been sufficient to cause the rare events of contagion on their own. Meanwhile, at least one state action was present in and necessary for at least four and possibly five of the six contagion cases. Evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality were also absent from most (22-24) of the 30 directed dyads in which contagion did not occur — although, conversely, most of the 10-13 dyads with state action present did *not* experience contagion. These empirics support the supposition that evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality are usually necessary for substate conflict contagion, but also insufficient for its occurrence.

Overall, then, the State Action Explanation holds up fairly well in the early empirical plausibility probes and tests conducted in this dissertation. In the next section, I will consider the policy implications of this empirically supported explanation of substate conflict contagion. Then, in the third and final section, I will discuss potential directions for future research, both on this topic and within the civil war literature more broadly.

Policy Implications

Having discussed the scholarly implications of the State Action Explanation at some length in Chapter 2, I will focus here on the implications for policymakers. There are three. First, substate conflict contagion is rare, occurring in only 0.38 percent of the 22,035 possible cases over the 61 years studied in this dissertation. As argued above, it is rare because it is difficult; the nonstate factors commonly cited as indicators of a risk of contagion are in reality insufficient to

spread conflict on their own. Therefore, contagion should not be viewed as an automatic consequence of a violent civil conflict in the developing world that is not intervened in. Quite the contrary, we should expect most substate conflicts, when left alone, *not* to spread to most potential receiver states. On its face, then, the fear of substate conflict contagion is not much of a valid justification for a great power intervention in a faraway internal conflict.

Second, the State Action Explanation suggests that a telltale sign of impending substate conflict contagion is the occurrence or imminence of evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality. Not only should great power policymakers be able to observe these state actions in advance, thereby identifying the small number of cases in which contagion *is* a risk, but they should also be able to prevent many such state actions from occurring. The U.S. and other great powers have leverage over sovereign developing world governments that they do not have over shadowy nonstate actors, and that they *certainly* do not have over broad structural tendencies such as poverty and ethnic fractionalization in developing countries. Therefore, if the prevention of substate conflict contagion is a priority for great power policymakers, as it often seems to be, the right set of actors on which to focus is sovereign states, and the right set of actions to discourage is the set of evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality.

Third, if the prevention of evangelization, expulsion, and overt partiality — and thereby contagion — is to be attempted by great powers, the means of prevention are important. A military intervention may well stop these state actions, but it may also constitute meddling with overt partiality itself. The U.S. is unlikely to truly experience the security consequences from such meddling, since the structural conditions for civil war, however defined, do not seem to exist in the U.S. However, other, weaker states in the neighborhood of the original conflict that support or allow great power intervention may experience these consequences, and great power

policymakers may therefore see the very spread of conflict that they were trying to prevent in the first place. For example, when the U.S. involved Thailand in its meddling with overt partiality in Southeast Asia — which was essentially aimed at preventing both meddling and evangelization — the Indochinese communist regimes retaliated by substantially assisting the Communist Party of Thailand (see Chapter 5).

To give a more contemporary example, in 2011 the U.S. completed a military intervention in Libya, in part to prevent an anticipated flow of refugees into Egypt and Tunisia (see Chapter 1 for President Obama's exact words). I argue that this was the wrong move in two respects. First, as a nonstate factor, refugee flows generally cannot cause substate conflict contagion on their own, so the security consequences of inaction in Libya were considerably less than Obama implied. Second, when the U.S. supported the Libyan rebels, it meddled with overt partiality in that conflict — and, just as in the Thai case, smaller and less stable states, in this instance including Qatar, joined in.² This meddling increased, rather than decreased, the risk of substate conflict contagion. It invited retaliation by Qaddafi against states like Qatar, although ultimately this did not happen, and it empowered a new state actor — the former Libyan rebels — with thoroughly unclear political goals, which might end up being inimical to the internal security of states like Qatar. Furthermore, the meddling created the potential for popular outrage over the intervention in states like Qatar, which have committed scarce military resources to the adventure. So far conflict has not spread from Libya, and it is possible that the U.S. and its Arab partners got lucky this time. But the Thai case, and the numerous other cases of meddling with overt partiality documented in this dissertation, demonstrates that military intervention in the

² Mark Landler and Steven Erlanger, "Obama Seeks to Unify Allies as More Airstrikes Rock Tripoli," *The New York Times*, March 22, 2011.

name of preventing substate conflict contagion runs the risk of creating the very monster it was deployed to slay.

So what is the alternative? First, great powers should only intervene in developing world civil conflicts *in order to stop substate conflict contagion* when evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality is ongoing or imminent. In Libya, given that these state actions were absent and not likely to occur — recall the difference between a refugee flow and the expulsion of *combatants* — the U.S. should not have needed to do anything to prevent contagion. There were other reasons to intervene, of course, namely humanitarian ones. This dissertation does not seek to determine when humanitarian military intervention is or is not justified on moral grounds. I would suggest, though, that great power policymakers balance the moral (and domestic political) benefits of stopping a massacre with the potential costs arising from dangerous meddling with overt partiality by their regional allies, the latter of which often accompanies great power military involvement abroad. Second, when a state action *is* present or imminent, great powers should try to fully exhaust diplomatic means of intervention, such as threatened or imposed economic or diplomatic sanctions, before resorting to military force that often requires the support of nearby weak states — states which thereby meddle with overt partiality. In other words, the U.S. should not do what it did in Libya: impose targeted economic sanctions in late February,³ but add a significant military component involving Arab allies less than a month later.

Third, these coercive diplomatic instruments should be linked narrowly to the occurrence or non-occurrence of these three specific state actions, not to more expansive issues such as internal domestic conduct or regime composition. Compared to a demand for regime change, a

³ Helene Cooper and Mark Landler, “U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Libya in Wake of Crackdown,” *The New York Times*, February 25, 2011.

great power demand for a developing world state to refrain from evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality is not so unreasonable. If Qaddafi *had* been planning to expel rebel combatants into Egypt and Tunisia — I am aware of no evidence that he was — sustained U.S. and European Union economic sanctions, or the threat thereof, might have convinced him to step up his border security and keep the conflict contained within Libya. Qaddafi's logistical, financial, and military costs for doing so might have been fairly low, compared to the costs of sweeping economic sanctions imposed against him. Instead, the U.S. sanctioned Libya while vacillating between demands of radically different domestic conduct and regime change, making it unsurprising that sanctions were ineffective on their own to change Tripoli's behavior.

As I have said in previous chapters, I am not arguing that state-to-state coercion is easy. A vast literature on interstate coercion, referenced in part below, quickly invalidates any such claim. I am simply arguing that such coercion is *easier* than coercing nonstate actors or changing the structural conditions for civil war in a given state. So if, inevitably, great power policymakers are going to try to stop substate conflict contagion, they first need to be aware of the full set of risk factors so that they only try to stop contagion in the cases actually at risk, and they secondly need to employ coercive diplomatic methods against the most vulnerable actors (states), thereby making the regional security situation less rather than more dangerous.

Overall, substate conflict contagion is a more optimistic subject than great power policymakers often assume. As this dissertation's title suggests, it is rare — meaning intervention of any kind is often unnecessary. It is also state-driven, and *because* it is state-driven, it is considerably more preventable than the conventional wisdom suggests.

Suggestions for Future Research

The first suggestion for future research stems from the discussion above of coercive diplomacy. In order to truly advocate measures such as sanctions as potentially low-risk, high-return means of preventing evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality, we need to know whether such coercive diplomacy has prevented these state actions in the past. A future research project could look at the historical efficacy of economic sanctions,⁴ diplomatic sanctions,⁵ and *threats thereof*,⁶ the goals of which were specifically to prevent states from taking the state actions highlighted in this dissertation. Culling the data of Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Elliott, and Barbara Oegg (HSEO), I found only four cases of *imposed* economic sanctions undertaken to prevent evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality: French sanctions against Tunisia to prevent meddling in Algeria between 1957 and 1963, American sanctions against Cuba to prevent evangelization in Latin America throughout the Cold War, American sanctions against Egypt to prevent meddling in Yemen and Congo-Kinshasa in the 1960s, and American sanctions against Nicaragua to prevent evangelization to El Salvador in the 1980s. HSEO code one of these four cases as a partial success (U.S.-Egypt), code two cases as failures (France-Tunisia and U.S.-Cuba), and do not evaluate the role of sanctions in stopping Nicaraguan evangelization to El Salvador specifically.⁷

⁴ Data are available in Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*, Third Edition (Washington: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007).

⁵ Data are available in Tara Maller, *Diplomacy Derailed: The Consequences of U.S. Diplomatic Disengagement* (PhD Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011).

⁶ Unless we look at threatened sanctions, we only observe the “hard” cases in which threats of sanctions failed and actual sanctions had to be imposed. See Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” *International Organization*, Vol. 57, No. 3 (2003): 643-659.

⁷ Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, assisted by Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy* (Washington: Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, 1985), pp. 297, 321; data on U.S.-Egypt and U.S.-Nicaragua provided to me by Kimberly Elliott on March 31, 2011; and personal communication with Elliott on January 23, 2012.

Meanwhile, Robert A. Pape disagrees with the U.S.-Egypt partial success coding.⁸ We can conclude from this limited empirical record that economic sanctions have rarely been imposed to prevent the state actions emphasized by this dissertation specifically, and that the success rate in this subset of cases is up for debate. But that tells us nothing about diplomatic sanctions or the *threat* of economic or diplomatic sanctions. A full collection and investigation of the relevant universe of cases is needed.

Thinking more broadly about the next steps following from this dissertation research, the greatest need is to move from showing the *necessity* of causal mechanisms for substate conflict contagion to showing *sufficiency*. We know that at least one of evangelization, expulsion, and meddling with overt partiality is usually necessary for contagion, and that the presence of structural factors for civil war in State B is usually necessary as well. But it is not clear what combinations of state actions, structural factors, and nonstate factors are sufficient for contagion. To know this, we first need to know whether each of the six nonstate factors was present in each of the 84 identified cases of substate conflict contagion, so that we can see the full spectrum of explanatory variables across the universe of cases. (The density of transnational road networks, a structural variable omitted from the current analysis, should be coded in these 84 cases as well.) There will be a considerable coding effort involved here, but if it sheds light on the sufficiency question it will be well worth the time. (These data will also provide insight into whether any of these nonstate factors themselves are necessary for contagion, although I am personally skeptical that any one of the nonstate factors was necessary for a majority of contagion cases. In both Central America and Southeast Asia, although most of the contagion cases had at least one nonstate factor present, the *same* nonstate factors were not consistently present across these

⁸ Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997): 90-136, pp. 102, 104.

cases. The one exception is the rebels helping rebels mechanism, a potential artifact of leftist solidarity during the Cold War which I doubt is usually present globally.)

Next, and somewhat relatedly, the external validity testing of the State Action Explanation needs to be expanded to other regions. I have closely examined the cases of contagion that occurred (at least to 2007), but I have only done so for two regions' worth of cases of non-contagion. I would like to look next at another region that has an unusually high proportion of non-cases, like Central America had, so as to get at the sufficiency question discussed above. Former Soviet Central Asia, 1991-2007, suggests itself as a promising potential case study. Three of the five Former Soviet Central Asian states — Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan — have experienced violent civil conflict since independence, yet I identified no cases of substate conflict contagion in the region (defining the region narrowly as those three states plus Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). Therefore, although I do not yet know what combinations of state actions, nonstate factors, and structural factors have existed in the region, I do know that any combinations I observe will be by definition insufficient for contagion.

A Former Soviet Central Asia case study has the added advantage of being post-Cold War. Currently my in-depth regional case studies are all from the Cold War era, when superpower intervention in the developing world often overshadowed intra-regional international politics.⁹ This is probably not a substantial inferential problem for my tests of the State Action Explanation, because superpower pressure in both Central America and Southeast Asia was fairly constant cross-nationally within each region. In Central America, virtually every state — even little Belize — was pressured by Washington to fight the perceived communist wave. In Southeast Asia, virtually every state was pressured by the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China to either help or hinder the communists in the region. States varied

⁹ I thank Roger Petersen for pointing this out.

markedly in their *responses* to this external pressure, of course, but the external pressure itself was more or less constant. Nevertheless, since we now live in a unipolar era,¹⁰ it is worth asking whether the phenomenon of substate conflict contagion looks different in a unipolar world. We know from Chapter 3 that 21 out of 26 post-Cold War contagion cases (over 80 percent) had state action present, which certainly supports the State Action Explanation, but that tells us nothing about the non-cases. Future regional case studies should seek to address this issue, and Central Asia looks promising in this regard.

Another potential follow-on project would seek to explain the spread of *nonviolent* internal political conflict across borders. This dissertation was written in the midst of the Arab Spring, a phenomenon similar to the “contagion” events studied here, but different in that dissidents generally did not mobilize for violent resistance to the state (only in Libya and Syria, and to a lesser extent in Yemen). Like substate conflict contagion, the spread of nonviolent protest is far from automatic — consider the differing outcomes in Egypt and neighboring Sudan (the latter of which did experience Arab Spring-related protests, but only tepidly).¹¹ However, state action seems to play much less of a role on the nonviolent side of contagion — there was certainly nothing akin to evangelization, expulsion, or meddling with overt partiality by sovereign governments in the Arab world in 2011. Also, geography may be less important than for violent contagion, which seems to be largely a regional phenomenon. Contemporary analyses of the roots of the Egyptian protests identify the Serbian ouster of Slobodan Milosevic and Boston professor Gene Sharp as significant influences.¹² The small literature on the spread of

¹⁰ William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1999): 5-41.

¹¹ Jeffrey Gettleman, “Young Sudanese Start Protest Movement,” *The New York Times*, February 2, 2011.

¹² See, for example, David D. Kirkpatrick and David E. Sanger, “A Tunisian-Egyptian Link that Shook Arab History,” *The New York Times*, February 13, 2011.

pro-democracy movements¹³ should be expanded to address the most recent set of empirics, and I have no doubt this will occur with or without this dissertation. That being said, my particular empirical approach to the issue of violent contagion — specifically, the careful collection of a worldwide universe of cases and the search for commonalities in causal factors across that case universe — might be useful for scholars and policymakers, since the *next* wave of nonviolent protest movements will probably not be in the Middle East. Similarly, my brief discussion in Chapter 1 of the spread of violent civil conflict *within* borders should make clear that a great deal of explanatory work remains to be done in this domain as well, and I hope my empirical approach serves as a useful guidepost for such future work.

Finally, my attempts in this dissertation to estimate the presence of the “structural conditions” for civil war onset have underscored our rudimentary understanding of what the causes of civil war *in general* really are. The fact that I considered a 1.5 or 2 percent annual predicted probability of civil war onset to be “high,” based on data from the Fearon and Laitin statistical model (see Chapters 3-5), attests to this limited understanding. Civil wars are rare events, and if the “usual suspects” of poverty, ethnic fractionalization, mountainous terrain, and so forth are so widely distributed across country-years, why do some “war-prone” country-years experience civil war while others do not? In order to answer this large and important question, we need to look at the dogs that did not bark, just as I tried to do in the regional case studies of this dissertation. Here these would be cases where consideration of the usual suspects would lead us to expect civil war — in other words, where the predicted probability of civil war onset was high — but where civil war onset did not occur. Looking only at the Fearon and Laitin dataset (there are certainly others worth considering), the most extreme case is Pakistan in 1947 and

¹³ See, for example, Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, “Transnational Networks, Diffusion Dynamics, and Electoral Change in the Post-Communist World,” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, September 3-6, 2009.

1948, which had a 34.25% onset probability in each of those years but did not experience a major violent internal conflict. A closer examination of what prevented civil war in these and similar cases would give scholars a better sense of what causal factors are sufficient for civil war onset, not just necessary.

As with my dissertation research, then, the major next step in the civil war literature writ large is to go beyond understanding necessity to understanding sufficiency. This will be a difficult task, because eventually it will involve going beyond measuring associations between independent and dependent variables — which can give us a fair amount of leverage on necessity, even if it cannot firmly establish causality — to process-tracing cases of civil war and similar cases of civil peace. Its difficulty notwithstanding, this task needs good minds working on it. Unlike interstate war, intrastate war shows no sign of going away anytime soon,¹⁴ and it is increasingly top-of-mind for great power national security policymakers. Security scholars with policy-driven research agendas should look more closely at civil war as a phenomenon, so that great power security policies in the developing world can be better informed and can better advance national and international well-being.

¹⁴ On the potential for interstate war to go away, see, among others, Carl Kaysen, “Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay,” *International Security*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1990): 42-64.

Dissertation Appendix (Chapter 7): Identification of Actual Substate Conflict Contagion Cases

Introductory note: Substate conflicts in State B are considered in turn; potential State As are listed in parentheses. Where actual substate conflict contagion is identified, it is noted as “State A → State B, Year” and then a brief discussion of the nature of the contagion follows. The absence of contagion between a given State A and State B is also noted, generally when corroborated by at least three secondary sources. Finally, wherever possible, confirmation of the codings of non-contagion by an area expert is noted.

Example:

State B, Year (vs. Name of Rebel Group – State A could be State 1 or State 2)

- State 1 → State B, Year. “After falling to Communist insurgency, State 1 sponsored a rebellion in State B.” (Source citation 1). No mention of State 2 in (Source citation 1).
- No mention of State 2 in (Source citation 2).
- No mention of State 2 in (Source citation 3).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from State 2 to State B, pending confirmation from (Source 1 author). (Source 1 author) confirms in (date) e-mail.

United States, 2001 (vs. Al Qaeda – State A could be Mexico)

- I can code this as illusionary contagion without consulting any sources; the Chiapas rebellion had nothing to do with 9/11.

Dominican Republic, 1965 (vs. “Military Faction” – State A could be Cuba)

- Cuba → Dominican Republic, 1965. The 1965 revolt was a “counter-coup” against a 1963 coup that had removed Juan Bosch, a left-leaning (but seemingly not Castro-influenced) politician (Jose Antonio Moreno, *Sociological Aspects of the Dominican Revolution* (PhD Dissertation, Cornell University, 1967), p. 19). Among the groups that joined up with the counter-coup initially were “Castro/Communists” (John Bartlow Martin, *Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the Fall of Trujillo to the Civil War* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 672-673). These were groups influenced by and often trained by Castro (A.J. Thomas, Jr. and Ann van Wynen Thomas, *The Dominican Republic Crisis 1965: Background Paper and Proceedings of the Ninth Hammarskjold Forum* (New York: Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1967), pp. 3-5). So the revolution in Cuba was a contributing, though seemingly not primary, cause of the 1965 rebellion.

Trinidad and Tobago, 1990 (vs. Jamiat al-Muslimeen – State A could be Haiti)

- UCDP conflict summary¹ on Trinidad and Tobago has no mention of Haiti.
- In a book-length interview of the coup leader, Imam Yasin Abu Bakr, there is no mention of Haiti as a contributor to the coup's onset (Maximilian Christian Forte, *Against the Trinity: An Insurgent Imam Tells His Story (Religion, Politics and Rebellion in Trinidad and Tobago)* (Binghamton, N.Y.: Polaris-Australis Publishing Company, 1997).
- Also no mention of Haiti in *Sunday Advocate*, "Special Report: The Agony of Trinidad," August 5, 1990.
- Also no mention of Haiti in Chris Searle, "The Muslimeen Insurrection in Trinidad," *Race Class*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1991): 29-43.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Haiti to Trinidad and Tobago. Forte confirms in 2/5/10 e-mail.

Mexico, 1994 (vs. EZLN – State A could be El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua or Panama)

- Guatemala → Mexico, 1994. Between 1970 and 1990, between 60,000 and 300,000 Guatemalan refugees "moved across the border during the civil conflicts in that country" (Philip Howard and Thomas Homer-Dixon, "The Case of Chiapas, Mexico," in Thomas Homer-Dixon and Jessica Blitt, *Ecoviolence: Links Among Environment, Population, and Security* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, pp. 22, 26-27). These refugees contributed to a near-tripling of the indigenous population in Chiapas over that period, from 288,000 to 716,000 (ibid). Population growth caused "demand-induced scarcity," which contributed to "resource capture" and "ecological marginalization," increasing "grievances" and contributing to the onset of the rebellion (ibid, 49-50). No mention of the other potential State As in this chapter.
- UNDP entry on Mexico has no mention of any potential State As.
- No mention of any potential State As in Andrew Reding, "Chiapas is Mexico: The Imperative of Political Reform," *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1994): 11-25.
- El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama do not appear in the index of George A. Collier with Elizabeth Lowery Quaratiello, *Basta! Land and the Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas*, Third Edition (Oakland, Calif.: Food First Books, 2005).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from El Salvador, Nicaragua, or Panama to Mexico. Howard confirms in 2/7/10 e-mail.

Guatemala, 1949 (vs. "Military faction" – State A could be Costa Rica)

- No mention of Costa Rica in the following sources:
 - Jennifer Schirmer, *The Guatemalan Military Project: A Violence Called Democracy* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), pp. 11-12.

¹ Uppsala Conflict Data Program synopses are frequently referenced in this appendix, and are available online: <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php>.

- Jim Handy, *Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1984), pp. 111-112.
- Susanne Jonas, *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 25.
- Peter Calvert, *Guatemala: A Nation in Turmoil* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 35, 76-77.
- Piero Gleijeses, "The Death of Francisco Arana: A Turning Point in the Guatemalan Revolution," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1990): 527-552.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Costa Rica to Guatemala, pending confirmation from Gleijeses. Gleijeses tells me by e-mail on 2/4/10 to read chapters in *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*. Pages 51-69 (some pages missing in Google Books) have no mention of Costa Rica. 42 Costa Rica references in the book, none near these pages. Search for "Guardia de Honor" Costa Rica turns up no results.

Guatemala, 1965 (vs. FAR I – State A could be Cuba)

- Cuba → Guatemala, 1965. "Inspired by the Cuban revolution in 1959, left-wing guerrilla groups started to take form in Guatemala in the 1960s as a response to a combination of effectively military governments and the continuation of a highly unequal form of land-ownership." (UCDP conflict summary on Guatemala)

El Salvador, 1972 (vs. forces of Benjamin Mejia – State A could be Guatemala)

- No discussion of inspiration or support from Guatemala in coup synopsis in James Dunkerley, *The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in El Salvador* (London: Verso, 1983), p. 86. (In fact, Guatemalan government supported El Salvador government.)
- No discussion of involvement in Guatemala in coup synopsis in Richard A. Haggarty, ed., *El Salvador: A Country Study* (Washington: Library of Congress, 1988), "The 1972 Elections."
- No discussion either in Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, *El Salvador: The Face of Revolution*, Second Edition (Boston: South End Press, 1982), pp. 62-64.
- No discussion either in Thomas P. Anderson, *Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1988), p. 77
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Guatemala to El Salvador. Dunkerley confirms by e-mail, 2/4/10, though he says, "The 1972 coup might have a number of indirect influences bearing in on it, including Honduras (don't forget the war of 1969), Guatemala and Nicaragua." To me that's not really sufficient to code contagion.
- Checked for Cuba → El Salvador contagion if Cuba is added as a State A from 1968 to 1974. Based on Dunkerley, Armstrong/Shenk, and Anderson, there was no actual contagion.

El Salvador, 1979 (vs. ERP, FPL, FMLN – State A could be Cuba, Guatemala, or Nicaragua)

- Nicaragua → El Salvador, 1979/1981 (1981 was the year of the *civil war* onset in El Salvador).
 - 1979: Anderson, *Politics in Central America*, 85: 1979 coup, which started the war, appears to have been supported by U.S., which did so to avoid another leftist victory like the one that had just taken place in Nicaragua (Armstrong and Shenk, 110: “The administration had ‘lost another country. El Salvador would pay the price’”; 113: “Now the State Department was abuzz with plans to avoid ‘another Nicaragua’ by saving El Salvador.”). Dunkerley, *The Long War*, 126: “In El Salvador the *Sandinista* victory had an immediate effect; slogans appeared in the streets of the capital declaring, ‘Somoza today – Romero tomorrow.’ However, the regime had been losing its grip long before July [1979].” No mention of Guatemala in Dunkerley.
 - 1981: As discussed at length in Chapter 4, the Nicaraguan regime was a critical enabler of the FMLN as it launched its “Final Offensive,” resulting in the Salvadoran civil war onset, in January 1981.
- Cuba → El Salvador, 1981. As discussed in Chapter 4 (see the section on Nicaragua to El Salvador), Cuba was another pivotal sponsor of the FMLN in the months leading up to January 1981.
- No mention of Guatemala in brief account of 1979 coup in Elizabeth Jean Wood, *Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 66.
- Armstrong and Shenk, *El Salvador*, 66: Carpio, who founded the FPL, “stud[ied] the lessons of Latin America’s guerilla movements” before founding the party in 1972. But no specific mention of Guatemala, Nicaragua, or 1979. 106-113: No apparent involvement in these pages either. [Interestingly, Carpio explicitly rejected the Cuban *foco* model.]
- No discussion of either Guatemala or Nicaragua in UCDP conflict summary on El Salvador.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Guatemala to El Salvador. Dunkerley confirms by e-mail, 2/4/10.

Nicaragua, 1978 (vs. FSLN – State A could be Cuba or Guatemala)

- Cuba → Nicaragua, 1978. The original founding of the FSLN in 1961 drew “inspiration ... from the Cubans” (Eduardo Crawley, *Nicaragua in Perspective*, Revised Edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), p. 128). The Cuban government also directly assisted the FSLN throughout the 1960s and 1970s, although aid did not intensify until late 1978, after the civil war onset in Nicaragua (John A. Booth, *The End and the Beginning: The Nicaraguan Revolution* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), p. 133; Robert

Kagan, *A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990* (New York: Free Press, 1996), pp. 78-80).

- No mention of Guatemala in UCDP conflict summary, although “The [FSLN] coalition had diplomatic support from France and various Latin American regimes within the OAS.”
- No mention of Guatemala in Thomas W. Walker, *Nicaragua: Living in the Shadow of the Eagle*, Fourth Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 2003), pp. 29-42.
- No mention of Guatemala’s involvement in 1978 onset in Crawley, pp. 148-168.
- No mention of Guatemala’s involvement in 1978 onset in Richard R. Fagen, “Dateline Nicaragua: The End of the Affair,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 36 (1979): 178-191.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Guatemala to Nicaragua. Confirmed by Walker, 2/5/10.

Panama, 1989 (vs. forces of Moisés Giroldi– State A could be El Salvador, Guatemala, or Nicaragua)

- No mention of involvement of any of these states in the onset of the Giroldi coup in UCDP conflict summary. (Nicaragua did support the Panamanian government militarily, but as far as I can tell did not get directly involved in this conflict.)
- These states are not linked to the Giroldi coup in Robert C. Harding, *The History of Panama* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2006), pp. 103-113. The U.S. definitely helped Giroldi but seems not to have directly influenced the onset of the coup.
- No mention of these states in Peter M. Sanchez, *Panama Lost? U.S. Hegemony, Democracy, and the Canal* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007), p. 170. Does note U.S. reticence about Giroldi: “U.S. troops in Panama did not seal off road access to the [Panama Defense Force general staff] headquarters, even though Giroldi had previously urged SOUTHCOM to do so. ... The major was a Torrijista, and Washington feared that the PDF would continue its nationalist stance sans Noriega.”
- No mention of these states in Russell Crandall, *Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), pp. 198-199.
- No mention of these states in Kevin Buckley, *Panama: The Whole Story*, Second Edition (New York: Touchstone, 1992), pp. 194-206 (some pages missing in Google Books, though).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from El Salvador, Guatemala, or Nicaragua to Panama. Buckley confirms in 2/9/10 e-mail.

Colombia, 1964 (vs. FARC and ELN – State A could be Cuba, Argentina, Venezuela)

- Cuba → Colombia, 1964. “The new movements were primarily children of their times. As elsewhere in Latin America, ... the Cuban revolution made a big impact on the small group of left-wing students. They were impressed by the way in which, in a little over

two years, a tiny band of guerillas had taken power in a small Caribbean island, and the belief that a revolutionary situation existed in Colombia soon took root among the urban radicals. ... Fabio Vasquez and a small group of mostly student activists were strongly influenced by Cuba ... when, after receiving basic military training in Havana, they set up the Army of National Liberation (ELN) in 1964.” (Jenny Pearce, *Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1990), p. 165) No mention of Argentina or Venezuela’s role.

- No mention of Argentina or Venezuela in Geoff Simons, *Colombia: A Brutal History* (London: SAQI, 2004).
- No mention of Argentina or Venezuela’s role in Forrest Hylton, *Evil Hour in Colombia* (London: Verso, 2006).
- No mention of Argentina or Venezuela’s role in Bert Ruiz, *The Colombian Civil War* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2001).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Argentina or Venezuela to Colombia. Pearce goes back and forth in a 3/8/10 e-mail but seems to agree, saying she has “no direct evidence” of links and that the Argentine/Venezuelan conflicts were very different from the Colombian one. She suggests contacting “Leon Valencia, an ex-ELN member who now runs the Funcacion Arco Iris in Bogota,” which I will do if I decide to start interviewing insurgents (I need to think about how to approach them strategically).

Venezuela, 1962 (vs. Navy military faction – State A could be Cuba)

- Cuba → Venezuela, 1962. The navy coups (there were two) were part of a broader leftist insurgency in early 1960s Venezuela. There were two major leftist parties in Venezuela at the time, PCV and MIR – both of which were linked to the navy faction in Carupano. MIR leftists adhered to “Castro-Communism,” at least initially, and “admitted to being influenced by the success of the Cuban Revolution” (H. Micheal Tarver and Julia C. Frederick, *The History of Venezuela* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), pp. 107-109; Brian F. Crisp, “Presidential Decree Authority in Venezuela,” in John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., *Executive Decree Authority* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 156; see also Richard Gott, *Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution* (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 15-16).

Venezuela, 1982 (vs. Bandera Roja – State A could be Argentina, Colombia, or Peru)

- Colombia → Venezuela, 1982. One source of tension between the Colombian and Venezuelan states was “the appearance of the guerilla group ‘Bandera Roja’ (and their supposed link with the Colombian ELN)” (Raul F. Torres Aguilera, *Venezuela and Colombia: Border Security Issues* (MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1994), p. 42). No mention of Argentina or Peru.
- According to the UCDP conflict summary on Venezuela, “Bandera Roja emerged around 1970, when it split from MIR which at that time abandoned its revolutionary struggle and

became a regular political party. Led by Carlos Betancourt and Gabriel Puerta Aponte, Bandera Roja wanted to overthrow the government and establish communist rule. Reportedly, it had links to the Cuban government as well as to other leftist guerrilla groups in Latin America, such as M-19 in Colombia. During the 1970s, Bandera Roja clashed sporadically with security forces. It also carried out high-profile kidnappings as a strategy to gain attention and as a source of revenue. In 1981, it was speculated that the group was behind a spectacular coordinated hijacking of three domestic aircraft carried out on 7 December, which ended with the hostages being released and the captors being taken into custody on Cuba. The conflict between Bandera Roja and the government of Venezuela became active in 1982, as the authorities conducted a crackdown against the guerrilla group, causing over 25 deaths.” No mention of Argentina or Peru.

- Could be Cuba → Venezuela, 1982 contagion, but a CIA report says of the 1981 Bandera Roja hijacking incident, “Eleven gunmen hijacked three Venezuelan airliners on domestic flights, ultimately diverting them to Havana. ... Their demands, which included a ransom of \$10 million and release of seven Venezuelan political prisoners, were not met. They were taken into custody by Cuban authorities.” (Central Intelligence Agency, “Terrorist Skyjackings: A Statistical Overview of Terrorist Skyjackings from January 1968 through June 1982,” July 1982, declassified, available online at <http://www.scribd.com/doc/53824134/Terrorist-Skyjackings-A-CIA-Report>, p. 3). Sounds like Havana was no longer supporting Bandera Roja at conflict onset, and support in 1970 leading to onset in 1982 is too tenuous to be considered contagion.
- No mention of Argentina or Peru in Richard A. Haggerty, ed., *Venezuela: A Country Study* (Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1990), p. 208.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Argentina or Peru to Venezuela in 1982, pending confirmation from Gott.

Venezuela, 1992 (vs. Forces of Hugo Chavez – State A could be Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, or Suriname)

- No mention of any potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of any potential State As in H. Micheal Tarver and Julia C. Frederick, *The History of Venezuela* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), pp. 141-145.
- No mention of any potential State As in Richard Gott, *Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution* (London: Verso, 2005), pp. 35-80.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, and Suriname to Venezuela in 1992, pending confirmation from Gott.

Suriname, 1986 (vs. SLA/Jungle Commando – State A could be Colombia, Peru, or Venezuela)

- No mention of any potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.

- No mention of any potential State As in H.U.E. Thoden van Velzen, “The Maroon Insurgency: Anthropological Reflections on the Civil War in Suriname,” in Gary Brana-Shute, ed., *Resistance and Rebellion in Suriname: Old and New* (Williamsburg, Va.: Studies in Third World Societies, College of William and Mary, 1990, pp. 159-188).
- No mention of any potential State As in Scott B. Macdonald, “Insurrection and Redemocratization in Suriname? The Ascendancy of the ‘Third Path,’” *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1988): 105-132.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Colombia, Peru, or Venezuela to Suriname. Macdonald confirms in 3/11/10 e-mail.

Peru, 1965 (vs. ELN/MIR – State A could be Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, or Cuba)

- Cuba → Peru, 1965. UCDP conflict summary says: “The major leftist political party, APRA ..., moved toward the right in an attempt to create coalitions that would enable it to gain political power. Alienated by this shift and inspired by the Cuban revolution, many members split from APRA and formed new, more radical groups. One of these people was Luis de la Puente, who formed MIR ... in 1962. ELN ... emerged from a similar split in the PCP ..., also in 1962. ... The two guerilla groups began their armed struggle in 1965.” No mention of other potential State As.
- No mention of the other potential State As in Christine Hunefeldt, *A Brief History of Peru* (New York: Facts on File, 2004), p. 227.
- “Presumably the Bolivian revolution made a great impact on de la Puente, who was jailed ... in 1954 for attempting to foment a similar revolution in Peru” (Leon G. Campbell, “The Historiography of the Peruvian Guerilla Movement, 1960-1965,” *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1973): 45-70, p. 52. Suggests a weak Bolivia → Peru link (outside the scope of the dataset), but no direct mention of the role of the other potential State As.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Argentina, Colombia, or Venezuela to Peru in 1965, pending confirmation from Hunefeldt. Hunefeldt goes back and forth, 3/11/10.

Peru, 1982 (vs. Sendero Luminoso – State A could be Argentina, Colombia, or Venezuela)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Christine Hunefeldt, *A Brief History of Peru* (New York: Facts on File, 2004), pp. 236-242
- No mention of potential State As in Orrin Starn, Carlos Ivan Degregori, and Robin Kirk, eds., *The Peru Reader: History, Culture Politics*, Second Edition (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005), pp. 319-321.
- No mention of potential State As in David Scott Palmer, “Rebellion in Rural Peru: The Origins and Evolution of Sendero Luminoso,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1986): 127-146.

- In David M. Burns, *The Evolution of Peru's Sendero Luminoso: A Topical Analysis* (M.A. Thesis, Texas Technical University, 1987), there is a mention of M-19 (Colombia) training Sendero recruits (p. 39), but no mention of Colombia's link to the origins of the conflict nor of any other State As.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Argentina, Colombia, or Venezuela to Peru in 1982, pending confirmation from Hunefeldt. Hunefeldt goes back and forth, 3/11/10.

Peru, 2007 (vs. Sendero Luminoso – State A could be Colombia)

- Colombia → Peru, 2007. “On October 9, 2008, the group launched its most violent attack in a decade, killing 13 soldiers and two civilians. Further attacks have followed, resulting in 33 deaths and 43 injured soldiers. These attacks have led to a reevaluation by the military of its tactics and of Sendero's strength. ... The military also says the guerrilla group is better armed than previously thought. Sources for their weapons include ... possibly ... the Colombian guerrilla group [FARC]” (Maureen Taft-Morales, “Peru: Current Conditions and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, July 21, 2009, p. 9).

Bolivia, 1952 (vs. MNR – State A could be Paraguay)

- No mention of Paraguay in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Paraguay's role in 1952 uprising in Herbert S. Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
- No mention of Paraguay's role in 1952 uprising in Waltraud Queiser Morales, *Bolivia: Land of Struggle* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), although some radicalization did occur in Paraguayan POW camps during the interstate Chaco War (p. 67).
- No mention of Paraguay's role in 1952 uprising in Robert J. Alexander, *Bolivia: Past, Present, and Future of its Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1982).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Paraguay to Bolivia. Klein confirms in 3/8/10 e-mail.

Bolivia, 1967 (vs. ELN – State A could be Argentina, Colombia, Peru, or Venezuela)

- Cuba → Bolivia, 1967. The ELN rebellion was led by Ché Guevara, who chose Bolivia as the place to expand his communist revolution from Cuba (UCDP conflict summary). No other potential State As mentioned.
- No mention of Colombia or Peru in Herbert S. Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 225; he does mention that Ché came to Bolivia “apparently more interested in setting up a central guerilla headquarters for operations in Argentina,” but the 1963 Argentina conflict was a rightist coup, not a leftist insurgency.
- No mention of other potential State As in Waltraud Queiser Morales, *Bolivia: Land of Struggle* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992), p. 89

- No mention of Paraguay's role in 1952 uprising in Robert J. Alexander, *Bolivia: Past, Present, and Future of its Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 104.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Argentina, Colombia, Peru, or Venezuela to Bolivia. Klein (3/11/10) says he doesn't know enough about Ché's decision-making to say for sure.

Paraguay, 1947 (vs. Opposition coalition (Febreristas, Liberals and Communists) – State A could be Bolivia)

- Bolivia → Paraguay, 1947. According to Philip Raine, *Paraguay* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1956), p. 262, the inclusion of banned parties such as the Febreristas in the government in 1946 was undertaken because of “a bloody revolution in Bolivia in which the governing military leaders were overthrown.” The rebellion appears to have taken place because this attempt at inclusion backfired. p. 263: “The political truce did not last long. The Febreristas rapidly slipped from [its leader] Franco's control. ... Early in January 1947, the Febreristas presented a list of demands which would effectively have given them and the Army full control of the Government.” Paul H. Lewis (“Leadership and Conflict within the Febrerista Party of Paraguay,” *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1967): 283-295, p. 287) writes that “a bloody civil war followed the expulsion of the Febreristas from the Cabinet in January, 1947.” One can surmise, then, that if the attempt at inclusion had not been made, there would never have been an opportunity for the Febreristas to mount a major rebellion. Indeed, Lewis writes, “The definitive structure of the Febrerista movement ... was to await the calling of a national convention by the movement's leaders some time in the near future. This job was postponed, however [by the inclusion in the government]” (pp. 286-287).

Paraguay, 1954 (vs. forces of General Alfredo Stroessner – State A could be Bolivia or Cuba)

- No mention of either potential State A in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of either potential State A in Philip Raine, *Paraguay* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1956), pp. 267-273.
- No mention of either potential State A in Paul C. Sondrol, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators: A Comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner,” *Journal of Latin American Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1991): 591-620, p. 613.
- No mention of either potential State A in Rene D. Harder Horst, *The Stroessner Regime and Indigenous Resistance in Paraguay* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007), pp. 22-23.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Bolivia or Cuba to Paraguay. Nickson confirms in 3/12/10 e-mail.

Paraguay, 1989 (vs. forces of General Rodriguez – State A could be Colombia, Peru, or Suriname)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Arturo Valenzuela, “Paraguay: The Coup that Didn’t Happen,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1997): 43-55.
- No mention of potential State As in Diego Abente-Brun, “‘People Power’ in Paraguay,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1999): 93-100.
- No mention of potential State As in Andrew Nickson, “The Overthrow of the Stroessner Regime: Re-Establishing the Status Quo,” *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1989): 185-209.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Colombia, Peru, or Suriname to Paraguay. Nickson confirms in 3/12/10 e-mail.

Chile, 1973 (vs. forces of Augusto Pinochet, Toribio Merino and Leigh Guzman – State A could be Colombia or Uruguay)

- No mention of either potential State A in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of either potential State A in John L. Rector, *The History of Chile* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2003), pp. 172-183.
- Uruguay’s “drift to the right ... under increasing military influence as the threat from the Tupomaros rose” may have helped lessen the revolutionary impulse among rightists in Chile – it reduced the fear of the left (Henry A. Landsberger and Juan J. Linz, “Chile, 1973/Spain, 1936: Similarities and Differences in the Breakdown of Democracy,” in Federico G. Gil, Ricardo Lagos E., and Henry A Landsberger, eds. (John S. Gitlitz, trans.), *Chile at the Turning Point: Lessons of the Socialist Years, 1970-1973* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979), p. 438). No mention of Colombia’s role in this book.
- No mention of either potential State A’s role in Nathaniel Davis, *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Colombia or Uruguay to Chile. Rector confirms in 3/11/10 e-mail.
- Since Cuba was a State A until 1974, there could be another case of contagion here – the success of the Cuban Revolution sowed fear of leftism that the Chilean rightists could exploit (Landsberger and Linz 1979, 437-438). However, Landsberger and Linz seem to play this link down, arguing that there were plenty of leftist failures to point to as well. I don’t think this is strong enough to be contagion.

Argentina, 1955 (vs. forces of Eduardo A. Lonardi Doucet – State A could be Bolivia, Cuba or Paraguay)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.

- No mention of potential State As in Jonathan C. Brown, *A Brief History of Argentina* (New York: Facts on File, 2003), pp. 208-217.
- No mention of potential State As in David Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1987* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 308-319.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Bolivia, Cuba or Paraguay to Argentina, pending confirmation from Brown. (Brown's 3/11/10 response is noncommittal.)

Argentina, 1963 (vs. Colorados – State A could be Cuba or Venezuela)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- Seemingly no role played by Cuba or Venezuela in 1963 coup according to Jonathan C. Brown, *A Brief History of Argentina* (New York: Facts on File, 2003), pp. 218-222 (Ché did visit the Argentine president in 1961, contributing to his ouster, but the 1963 conflict was between factions of the military).
- No mention of role of potential State As in David Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1987* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 342-344.
- No mention of potential State As in Thomas M. Millington, "President Arturo Illia and the Argentine Military," *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1964): 405-424.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Cuba or Venezuela to Argentina, pending confirmation from Brown. (Brown's 3/11/10 response is noncommittal.)

Argentina, 1974 (vs. ERP/Montenaros – State A could be Chile, Colombia, or Uruguay)

- Uruguay → Argentina, 1974. Leaders of what eventually became the Montoneros cut their teeth "contributing to the political and military development of the Tupamaros" in the 1960s; a 1971 Montonero assault was "modeled on the Uruguayan Tupamaros' occupation of Pando in 1969"; and the ERP and Tupamaros had a joint "Revolutionary Coordinating Council" (Richard Gillespie, *Soldiers of Peron: Argentina's Montoneros* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 51, 96, 182). No mention of other potential State A's roles.
- Cuba → Argentina, 1974. According to Jonathan C. Brown, *A Brief History of Argentina* (New York: Facts on File, 2003), pp. 230-244, Cuba was clearly an inspiration to the leftist insurgents. No mention of other potential State As.
- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Cuba) in David Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1987* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 352-366.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Chile or Colombia to Argentina, pending confirmation from Brown. (Brown's 3/11/10 response is noncommittal.)

Uruguay, 1972 (vs. MLN/Tupamaros – State A could be Bolivia or Colombia)

- Cuba → Uruguay, 1972. “The Tupamaros ... tried to adapt the ‘*foco*’ theory of Guevara and Debray to urban conditions.” Richard Gott, “Introduction,” in Alain Labrousse (Dinah Livingstone, trans.), *The Tupamaros: Urban Guerillas in Uruguay* (Harmondsworth, U.K.: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 13. Also, the founder of the Tupamaros visited Cuba just before deciding, in 1960, “to organize agricultural workers in the north of Uruguay” (p. 32). “The movement ... points to the Cuban Revolution” (p. 122). No mention of other potential State As playing a discernible role in this book.
 - “The connection of the Tupamaros with Castro is also more or less vague. Undoubtedly, Fidel is for them an inspiration, but he is only one of many. As already indicated, the Tupamaros have looked doctrinally to the Brazilian Carlos Marighella” (Robert J. Alexander, “Introduction,” in Maria Esther Gilio (Anne Edmondson, trans.), *The Tupamaro Guerillas* (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), pp. 11-12). Brazil is not coded as having an internal armed conflict of sufficient size at any point in this dataset. No mention of other potential State As.
 - No mention of other potential State As in Martin Weinstein, *Uruguay: Democracy at the Crossroads* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988). However, he quotes “one ex-Tupamaro” identifying “the Cuban revolution” as a “beacon” of their own movement (p. 111).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Bolivia or Colombia to Uruguay. Weinstein confirms in 3/12/10 e-mail.

Also, I checked on potential contagion from Bolivia, Costa Rica, or Guatemala to Cuba in 1953. There appears to be no such contagion of conflict, based on the sources below, so I will not add these dyads to the dataset.

- UCDP conflict summary on Cuba.
- Thomas M. Leonard, *Fidel Castro: A Biography* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2004).
- Antonio Rafael de la Cova, *The Moncada Attack: Birth of the Cuban Revolution* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2007).

Spain, 1980 (vs. Basques – State A could be United Kingdom)

- No mention of Northern Ireland in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Northern Ireland (aside from the fact that violence evolved along a similar internal trajectory) in Daniele Conversi, *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1997).
- Only one mention of Northern Ireland in Robert P. Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), p. 69. ETA, already in

existence, “signed a joint communiqué” with the IRA and other insurgent groups (Fatah, KDP) in the early 1970s.

- No mention of Northern Ireland in Christopher J. Ross, *Spain, 1812-1996: Modern History for Modern Languages* (London: Arnold Publishers, 2000).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from the U.K. to Spain, pending confirmation from Conversi. In 4/8/10 e-mail, he sends an article on the very subject: Daniele Conversi, “Domino Effect or Internal Developments? The Influences of International Events and Political Ideologies on Catalan and Basque Nationalism,” *West European Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1993): 245-270. He basically sees external influences on process, not onset. Irish separatism of the early 20th century appears to have had some influence on Basque separatism, but not so for *Northern* Irish separatism of the 1970s/1980s. There was some Algerian (1960s) influence, but it seems too distant in time to be contagion (and 1960s Algeria was an *extrastate* conflict).

Spain, 1987 (vs. Basques – State A could be United Kingdom)

- No mention of U.K. in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Northern Ireland (aside from the fact that violence evolved along a similar internal trajectory) in Daniele Conversi, *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilization* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1997).
- “The ETA is thought to have close links to the IRA and may occasionally follow its tactical lead,” in William S. Shepard, “The ETA: Spain Fights Europe’s Last Active Terrorist Group,” *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2002): p. 55. Doesn’t seem like contagion – ETA draws tactical inspiration from the IRA but it appears unconnected to the origins of the insurgency.
- No mention of Northern Ireland in Christopher J. Ross, *Spain, 1812-1996: Modern History for Modern Languages* (London: Arnold Publishers, 2000).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from the U.K. to Spain, pending confirmation from Conversi. In 4/8/10 e-mail, he sends an article on the very subject: Daniele Conversi, “Domino Effect or Internal Developments? The Influences of International Events and Political Ideologies on Catalan and Basque Nationalism,” *West European Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1993): 245-270. He basically sees external influences on process, not onset. Irish separatism of the early 20th century appears to have had some influence on Basque separatism, but not so for *Northern* Irish separatism of the 1970s/1980s. There was some Algerian (1960s) influence, but it seems too distant in time to be contagion (and 1960s Algeria was an *extrastate* conflict).

Macedonia, 2001 (vs. UCK – State A could be Russia, Serbia, Croatia, or Bosnia)

- Serbia → Macedonia, 2001. “The somewhat lesser success [compared to Bosnia] of the Kosovar Albanians in their war for national self-determination [was a] major spur to those Macedonian Albanians who eventually mounted their own insurgency.” Daniel L.

Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 191.

- Bosnia → Macedonia, 2001. “The eventual success of the Bosnian Muslims at Dayton ... [was a] major spur to those Macedonian Albanians who eventually mounted their own insurgency.” (See Serbia 1998 for more detail on this link – severity of Bosnian civil war → Western intervention → KLA ascendancy.) Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 191.
- No mention of Russia in UCDP conflict summary, except as a supporter of the Macedonian government during the insurgency.
- No mention of Russia’s role in onset in P.H. Liotta and Cindy R. Jebb, “Macedonia: End of the Beginning or Beginning of the End?” *Parameters*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2002): 96-111.
- No mention of Russia’s role in onset in Andrew Rossos, *Macedonia and the Macedonians: A History* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2008), pp. 261-281.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Russia to Macedonia, pending confirmation from Rossos. Rossos calls me on 4/12/10. He can’t say for sure but doesn’t see any direct influence of Chechen ideas or fighters on Macedonia.

Croatia, 1992 (vs. Serbian Republic of Krajina / Serbian irregulars – State A could be Bosnia, Romania, Russia, Serbia)

- Serbia → Croatia, 1992. The Yugoslav government supported the “Serbian irregulars” according to UCDP conflict summary on Croatia.
- No mention of influence of Bosnia, Romania or Russia (Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh) on onset of Serbian intrastate conflict against Croatian state in UCDP conflict summary on Croatia.
- No mention of influence of Bosnian, Romanian or Russian (Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh) conflicts on onset of Serbian intrastate conflict against Croatian state in Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), pp. 381-427.
- No mention of influence of Bosnian, Romanian or Russian (Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh) conflicts on onset of Serbian intrastate conflict against Croatian state in Marcus Tanner, *Croatia: A Nation Forged in War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 221-284.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Bosnia, Romania or Russia/USSR to Croatia, pending confirmation from Tanner. Tanner confirms in 4/12/10 e-mail, though he mentions that the Croat Serbs were influenced by the Cyprus conflict. “The conflict that did interest and inspire the Croatian Serbs was Cyprus and in their interviews with me, their leaders regularly brought up this conflict. They saw Turkey’s intervention on behalf of the Cypriot Turks as entirely analogous to their own situation, including the idea of the UN patrolling a ‘frozen’ ceasefire line between the two sides. This suited the Serbs well,

as they had by then seized territory well beyond the limits of the territory in which Serbs made up a majority of the population.” Cyprus is not listed as an intrastate conflict.

Serbia, 1991 (vs. Republic of Slovenia and Croatian irregulars / Republic of Croatia – State A could be Romania, Russia)

- No explicit mention of Romania or Russia (Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh) in UCDP conflict summary on Slovenian/Croatian conflicts within Yugoslavia, though “growing demands for political independence and nationalistic/ethnic awareness could be noticed in several European countries.”
- No mention of influence of Romanian or Russian (Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh) conflicts on onset of Croatian conflict against Serbian state in Marcus Tanner, *Croatia: A Nation Forged in War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 221-284.
- No mention of Romania, Ceausescu, Azerbaijan, or Nagorno-Karabakh in index of Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006).
- No mention of Romania’s or USSR’s (Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh) role in Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Romania or Russia to Serbia in 1991, pending confirmation from Ramet. Ramet confirms in 4/10/10 e-mail.

Serbia, 1998 (vs. UCK – State A could be Bosnia, Croatia, Russia)

- Bosnia → Serbia, 1998. The severity of the Bosnian civil war leads to international intervention (Dayton Accords), which leads to a Kosovar Albanian rejection of the “peaceful path.” “The crucial event that turned the tide in favor of the KLA [away from the “peaceful path institutionalists”] was the signing of the Dayton Accords at the end of 1995. ... [The] strategy of passive resistance was bankrupt. The internationals had intervened in Yugoslavia, but Kosovo had been forgotten. The results of the Dayton Accords afforded the KLA instant credibility. KLA supporters consistently argued that the international community only responded to violence. Increasingly people began to listen.” Henry H. Perritt, Jr., *Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), p. 32.
- Croatia → Serbia, 1998. “The sources of KLA weapons were almost entirely outside Kosovo. The KLA captured few arms from the enemy. ... The most important sources of arms were the United States, Bosnia, Croatia, Switzerland, and Germany. ... Most of the other good small arms came from Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia.” (Perritt 2008, 117-118) No mention of Russia.
- “From the beginning, the military leadership pool was enhanced by a cadre of Albanians who had fought elsewhere in the Balkans, on the side of the Croats and of the Bosniaks.” (Perritt 2008, 45). I don’t think this is contagion in and of itself – some could have been

fighting against Belgrade, not the Serb components in their own countries, and this seems more like a tactical advantage than a cause of onset.

- No mention of Russia in UCDP conflict summary of Serbia/Kosovo.
- No mention of Russia (Chechnya/Parliamentary Forces) in Tim Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
- No mention of Russia (Chechnya/Parliamentary Forces) in The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2000).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Russia to Serbia in 1998, pending confirmation from Perritt. Perritt confirms in 4/17/10 e-mail.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992 (vs. Serbian irregulars / Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – State A could be Croatia, Romania, Russia, Serbia)

- Serbia → Bosnia, 1992. UCDP conflict summary: “*The Bosnian Serbs were assisted by independent militias set up by Serbs originating from Serbia or Croatia. Many of these irregular forces had previously been active in the conflict between the republic of Croatia and Croatian Serbs. At times, the Bosnian Serbs and the Serb militias carried out operations together, but occasional clashes between these local Serbs and non-local Serbs also took place. On many occasions, it was unclear what force controlled the other.*” Also demonstration: Croatian secession → Bosnian secession (Byman and Pollack 2007) → Bosnian Serb insurgency.
- 1/5/12: On further review, I am invalidating the Croatia → Bosnia, 1992 contagion coding below. The Croatia 1992 conflict (not to be confused with the Serbia 1991 conflict that took place in Croatia) started in May 1992, and the Bosnia 1992 conflict started in April 1992, according to UCDP. Therefore, the Croatia 1992 conflict cannot have contributed to the *onset* of the Bosnia conflict, which it postdated.
 - Croatia → Bosnia, 1992. UCDP conflict summary: “*The Bosnian Serbs were assisted by independent militias set up by Serbs originating from Serbia or Croatia. Many of these irregular forces had previously been active in the conflict between the republic of Croatia and Croatian Serbs. At times, the Bosnian Serbs and the Serb militias carried out operations together, but occasional clashes between these local Serbs and non-local Serbs also took place. On many occasions, it was unclear what force controlled the other.*”
- No mention of Romania or Russia in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Romania (except as a model for a coup that never materialized in Belgrade in 1998 – p. 326) or Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh in Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, Second Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
- No mention of Romania or Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh in Laura Silber and Alan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: TV Books, 1996).

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Romania or Russia to Bosnia in 1992, pending confirmation from Christia.

Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993 (vs. Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia and Croatian irregulars / Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina – State A could be Croatia, Romania, Russia, Serbia)

- 1/5/12: After further review, I am invalidating the Croatia→Bosnia, 1993 contagion coding below. It appears that the expulsion event in question took place after the end of the *Serbia 1991* substate conflict, not the Croatia 1992 conflict, which was not underway in “early 1992.” (Also, the JNA was not heavily involved in the Croatia 1992 conflict.)
 - Croatia → Bosnia, 1993. UCDP conflict summary: “In addition to the Bosnian Croats, independent Croatian militias were also active in Bosnia. These non-local Croats came to Bosnia from Croatia in early 1992, after having been defeated on the battlefield by JNA (Yugoslavian National Army) and Serbian paramilitaries. These more extreme Croat groups initially opposed the partition of Bosnia, as they had an even more far-reaching goal of taking over all Bosnian territories.”
- Serbia → Bosnia, 1993. During the Croatian separatist war against Belgrade (Serbia 1991), Croatia asked for Bosnian help. Instead, the Bosnian state (the interior minister specifically) “allow[ed] the JNA [Yugoslav National Army] to use northern and western Bosnia as a base from which attacks against the Croatian national guard could be commanded and resources.” These and other supposed actions lead to resentment by the Croat state against the Bosnian state, leading to Zagreb’s significant support of the anti-Sarajevo insurgency. (Laura Silber and Alan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: TV Books, 1996), pp. 291-293). No mention of Romania or Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh in this book.
- UCDP conflict summary: “Early on, Serb and Croat autonomous regions within Bosnia were declared, and the armed violence spurred the ethnification of the Bosnian society. In 1993, during peace talks, the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic agreed to a plan of dividing Bosnia into three ethnically based territories. Fikret Abdic, a member of the Bosnian state presidency, disagreed with this dismemberment of Bosnia. He maintained that multiethnic relations were functioning well in his region, the Bihacka Krajina in northwestern Bosnia.” Suggests Bosnia 1992 → Bosnia 1993, but that is not a case of contagion. Also no mention of Romania and Russia, and no direct mention of the original separatist conflicts in Serbia (a second-order effect).
- “The Muslim split was arguably the result of the asymmetric losses faced among Muslims in eastern Bosnia and Sarajevo as opposed to their solidly entrenched ethnic kin in Western Bosnia.” Fotini Christia, *The Closest of Enemies: Alliance Formation in the Afghan and Bosnian Civil Wars* (PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2008), p. 126. No mention of Romania and Russia, and no apparent explicit contagion from Croatia or the original conflicts in Serbia.

- Same in Fotini Christia, “Following the Money: Muslim versus Muslim in Bosnia’s Civil War,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (2008): 461-480.
- No mention of Romania (except as a model for a coup that never materialized in Belgrade in 1998 – p. 326) or Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh in Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, Second Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Romania or Russia to Bosnia in 1993, pending confirmation from Christia.

Moldova, 1992 (vs. Dniestr Republic – State A could be Russia or Romania)

- Romania → Moldova, 1992. “As long as Romania remained under Ceausescu, Moscow had little reason to worry about Moldavia. The Moldavian Romanians might have rejected the Soviet system, but they had nowhere else to go. Nevertheless, the December 1989 Romanian Revolution changed the picture completely. ... On December 30 [1989], several thousand Moldavians rallied again in Kishinev and for the first time some speakers called for reunion with Romania.” (Nicholas Dima, *Moldova and the Transdnestr Republic* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2001), p. 145) It was fear of unification with Romania that drove the violent secession from independent Moldova in 1992 (see UCDP conflict summary). However, it should be noted that the “enthusiasm [of the Moldavians for Romania] cooled down ... when they realized that the new leader of Romania was Gorbachev’s protégé, and that the communists had managed to stay in power in Bucharest.” (Dima 2001, 145). Nevertheless, the Romanian Revolution appears to have spurred the initial calls for unification.
- No mention of Romanian coup or Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts in UCDP conflict summary. Slavs living in the Dniestr Region feared Moldova would unite with Romania, but this fear seems historically grounded, not based on the 1989 coup. (Could be different if President Iliescu was more anti-Slavic than President Ceausescu).
- Influence of Russian conflicts appears to be as follows: “Large amounts of money and great efforts were made to keep Moldova under Russian control. Among other things, Moscow encouraged the establishment of the Dnestr secessionist republic. In spite of this new trend [of secessionism from USSR], Moscow did not want to relinquish its former empire.” Suggests that if anything the violence in the south Caucasus should have *discouraged* Russian support of Dnestr – curiously, they just ignored it. (Dima 2001, 158)
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Russia to Moldova, pending confirmation from Dima. Dima confirms in 4/17/10 e-mail but mentions possible link between Bosnia 1992, Georgia 1992, and Moldova 1992. I ask him for more information. He replies in 4/19/10 e-mail: “All that I remember is that they recognized each other and pledged mutual help.” This is not contagion (doesn’t relate to onset).

Soviet Union, 1946 (vs. BDPS (Lithuania) – State A could be China)

- No mention of China in (very brief) UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of China in Roger D. Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 80-133 and 170-204.
- No mention of China in Michael Kort, *The Soviet Colossus: History and Aftermath*, Fourth Edition (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 219-220.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from China to the Soviet Union, pending confirmation from Petersen.

Russia, 1993 (vs. Parliamentary forces – State A could be Azerbaijan, Georgia)

- No apparent foreign influences on this attempted coup at all in UCDP conflict summary. (Grievance was whether to dissolve the Supreme Soviet.)
- “The influence [of the Yugoslav wars] spread ... to Russia, where Russian nationalists gained leverage in the parliamentary struggle with President Boris Yeltsin in late 1992-early 1993 with persistent pressure on the Serbian question. Yeltsin’s coup against the Russian Parliament in September-October 1993 succeeded in replacing delegates in the Communist regime who were most vocal on the question, only to have the new parliament elected in December 1993 assert this position even more strongly and continue to use it to mobilize opposition to Yeltsin.” Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 370. Is this contagion? I don’t think so – the grievance in September-October 1993 appears to have been purely domestic.
- No mention of Azerbaijan or Georgia in Philip Longworth, *Russia’s Empires: Their Rise and Fall from Prehistory to Putin* (London: John Murray, 2005), pp. 304-306.
- No mention of Azerbaijan or Georgia in Roger Bartlett, *A History of Russia* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 288-291.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Azerbaijan or Georgia to Russia, pending confirmation from Bartlett. Bartlett confirms in 4/19/10 e-mail.

Russia, 1994 (vs. Chechen Republic of Ichkeria – State A could be Azerbaijan, Georgia)

- Azerbaijan → Russia, 1994. “In the Transcaucuses, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ... was an important spur to the fighting in Georgia, and both had an impact on ... the fighting in the Russian autonomous republic of Chechnya.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 21.
- Georgia → Russia, 1994. As described in Chapter 3, Russian meddling in Georgia was pivotal to the civil war onset in Chechnya.
 - Also: “In the Transcaucuses, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ... was an important spur to the fighting in Georgia, and both had an impact on ... the fighting in the

Russian autonomous republic of Chechnya.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 21.

Russia, 1999 (vs. Wahhabi movement of the Buinaksk District (Dagestan) – State A could be Azerbaijan)

- No mention of Azerbaijan in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Azerbaijan in Christoph Zurcher, *The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), pp. 186-200.
- No mention of Azerbaijan (except as a potential training ground for an early insurgent leader whose influence was quite limited) in Miriam Lansky, “Daghestan and Chechnya: The Wahhabi Challenge to the State,” *SAIS Review*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2002): 167-192.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Azerbaijan to Russia in 1999, pending confirmation from Zurcher. Zurcher confirms in 4/29/10 e-mail.

Georgia, 1991 (vs. Anti-Government Alliance – State A could be Soviet Union)

- No mention of Azerbaijani/Nagorno-Karabakh separatism from Soviet Union in UCDP conflict summary.
- The grievance of the anti-government rebels in Georgia was Gamsakhurdia himself, who by late 1991 was “isolated and increasingly erratic” and whose “vehement anti-Soviet and nationalist politics could not hide the fact that the Georgian state was falling apart and remained internationally isolated.” Gamsakhurdia, as well as Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua (one of the coup leaders), came to power in a climate of intense pro-Georgian, anti-Abkhaz/South Ossetian nationalism. Nationalism became extreme in the wake of the April 9, 1989 Soviet suppression of a pro-Georgian, anti-Abkhazian demonstration. The demonstration, in turn, was partially in response to “Georgian fears of a repetition of the scenario in Karabakh, when an autonomous entity in one former Soviet republic sought to be integrated into another.” (Christoph Zurcher, *The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), pp. 118-127). This is the closest we get to Nagorno-Karabakh → anti-Gamsakhurdia contagion, and it seems pretty weak.
- No mention of Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh in Irakly Areshidze, *Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2007), pp. 17-32.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from the Soviet Union/Russia to Georgia in 1991, pending confirmation from Zurcher. Zurcher confirms in 4/29/10 e-mail.

Georgia, 1992 (vs. Republic of Abkhazia / South Ossetia – State A could be Azerbaijan, Russia (Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh))

- According to Byman/Pollack there was contagion from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict...
 - Russia (Soviet Union) → Georgia, 1992. “In the Transcaucuses, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ... was an important spur to the fighting in Georgia.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 21. [According to UCDP, at the time of the “first stated incompatibility” of South Ossetia, 12/21/91 (or May 1991 for the non-state conflict), the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was still situated in the Soviet Union and conducted against Moscow.]
 - Azerbaijan → Georgia, 1992. “In the Transcaucuses, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ... was an important spur to the fighting in Georgia.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 21. [According to UCDP, at the time of the “first stated incompatibility” of Abkhazia, 7/23/92, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was situated in Azerbaijan and conducted against Baku.]
- However, Zurcher (in a 4/29/10 e-mail) points out the difference between inspiring nationalism and inspiring nationalist *violence*. He writes, “My reading of the history is that there was surprisingly little transnational effect on the eruption of violence [in Abkhazia/South Ossetia in 1992]. Again, it was mainly Georgian domestic politics. I would find it hard to argue that NKO [Nagorno-Karabakh] inspired Ossetian and Abkhaz leader to switch to more violence.”
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Azerbaijan or Russia/Soviet Union to Georgia in 1992.

Georgia, 2004 (vs. Republic of South Ossetia – State A could be Russia)

- Russia → Georgia, 2004. “Both [South Ossetians and Abkhazians] were inspired by Chechnya’s struggle for independence against Russia.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 36.

Azerbaijan, 1993 (vs. Forces of Suret Husseinov – State A could be Georgia)

- No mention of Georgia in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Georgia in Christoph Zurcher, *The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the Caucasus* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), p. 171.
- No mention of Georgia as contributor to coup in Suzanne Goldberg, *Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder* (London: Zed Books, 1994), pp. 119-131.

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Georgia to Azerbaijan in 1993, pending confirmation from Zurcher. Zurcher confirms in 4/29/10 e-mail.

Azerbaijan, 2005 (vs. Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh – State A could be Georgia, Russia)

- No mention of Russia (Chechnya) or Georgia in UCDP conflict summary.
- I can find no other mention of the resurgence of this conflict in 2005. UCDP estimates battle-related deaths in 2005 to be 22-26, so it might not even qualify.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Georgia or Russia to Azerbaijan in 2005, on the basis that there was no apparent State B onset.

Guinea-Bissau, 1998 (vs. Military Junta for the Consolidation of Democracy, Peace and Justice – State A could be Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone)

- Senegal → Guinea-Bissau, 1998. UCDP conflict summary: “Another problem for the government was how to control the country’s armed forces. From the mid-1990s onward, there were clear indications of a growing discontent within the military. One of the main reasons for this was the government’s change of official policy towards the Senegalese separatist region Casamance, bordering northern Guinea-Bissau. The separatist guerrilla in Casamance, MFDC...has strong historic and ethnic ties to Guinea-Bissau, and the latter had for years provided support to the rebels. Apart from the near official support for the Senegalese rebels, a cross-border operation had been active for decades, with MFDC trading cannabis for arms. Many army officers in Guinea-Bissau were involved in this lucrative business, which was endangered when President Viera in 1995 promised to fight the rebellion in the cross-border region. This complete change in policy was a precondition for Guinea-Bissau to be allowed to enter the CFA franc zone. At the time, it appeared as if the president distanced himself completely from the cooperation with MFDC.” No mention of other potential State As (in terms of influence on onset).
 - Also, “Some MFDC rebel fighters reportedly crossed the border to join Mane [coup leader], himself an ethnic Mandingo.” Adekeye Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 116.
- Liberia → Guinea-Bissau, 1998. “The elections held in the aftermath of the Liberian civil war sent a message to West African leaders and warlords that ECOWAS and the wider international community would ultimately tolerate extreme violence as a political tool. ... The resulting message undoubtedly reached Bissau.” (Jens Kovsted and Finn Tarp, “Guinea-Bissau: War, Reconstruction, and Reform,” United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research Working Paper No. 168 (1999): p. 12). No other potential State As mentioned.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Senegal) in terms of involvement in onset in Adekeye Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 111-116.

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Mali, Niger, or Sierra Leone to Guinea-Bissau, pending confirmation from Tarp.

Equatorial Guinea, 1979 (vs. Forces of Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo – State A could be Mauritania)

- The latest UCDP summary on Equatorial Guinea says the state has never experienced a violent intrastate conflict rising to the 25-death threshold. So I am removing this conflict from the dataset as a State A and re-coding this case of potential contagion “0.”

Gambia, 1981 (vs. NRC – State A could be Liberia, Mauritania)

- Liberia → Gambia, 1981. “What took place in The Gambia was a manifestation of what I shall call the Rawlings/Doe syndrome. ... It seems extremely likely that events in the Gambia were strongly influenced by the coups of Rawlings in Ghana and Doe in Liberia. The similarities are very marked.... In all three cases the rebels thrived on dramatic radical slogans. ... However unappetizing these two regimes may seem there is no doubt that their success in seizing power has sent shockwaves throughout West Africa.” (John A. Wiseman, “Revolt in The Gambia: A Pointless Tragedy,” *The Round Table*, Vol. 71, No. 284 (1981): 373-380, pp. 378-379) [The Ghana → Gambia link is not coded because the coup in question took place in 1979 and was not sufficiently violent. The violent Ghana coup took place on December 31, 1981, after the July 30, 1981 Gambia coup.]
- No mention of Mauritania in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Mauritania in Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Military Coups in West Africa since the Sixties* (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 25-28.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Mauritania to The Gambia, pending confirmation from Mwakikagile.

Mali, 1990 (vs. MPA – State A could be Burkina Faso, Liberia, Senegal, Togo, Morocco, Chad, Lebanon, Israel, Afghanistan)

- Morocco → Mali, 1990. See below.
- Chad → Mali, 1990. See below.
- Lebanon → Mali; Israel → Mali; Afghanistan → Mali, 1990. UCDP conflict summary says: “In the mid-1970s and onwards, large numbers of young Touaregs from both Mali and Niger emigrated to Libya and Algeria due to severe droughts. The ones who ended up in Libya received military training, as General Qaddafi incorporated some into his regular military forces and inducted others into a Libyan-sponsored ‘Islamic Legion.’ The latter was subsequently dispatched to Lebanon, Palestine and Afghanistan, where numerous Touaregs acquired considerable combat training. Along with the military training received, the emigrants in Libya were politically active and formed the Mouvement Touareg de Libération de l’Adrar et de l’Azawad, an organization dedicated to the liberation of the northern areas of Mali and Niger. In 1988, encouraged by Libya,

the Malian section of the movement split from the Nigerien one, and formed MPLA.”
Note absence of potential State As in region.

- “A number of these soldiers got experience from active warfare in Palestine, Lebanon and Chad, fighting in [Qaddafi’s] army.” Tor A. Benjaminsen, “Does Supply-Induced Scarcity Drive Violence Conflicts in the African Sahel? The Case of the Tuareg Rebellion in Northern Mali,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 45, No. 6 (2008): 819-836, p. 829. No mention of other potential State As.
- “In 1986, Libya’s mercurial leader Qaddafi tried to annex neighboring Chad by an outright military invasion. The Chadians, with French assistance, crushed Libyan forces in northern Chad, resulting in another exodus of Tuaregs—this time from Qaddafi’s military forces. ... Thus, by the end of the 1980s, Tuareg communities throughout the Sahel had numbers of unemployed and restless young men with considerable military experience. Violence and banditry in northern Mali began to increase.” (Kalifa Keita, “Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali,” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (1998), pp. 13-14) Seems like contagion from the *interstate* conflict of Libya vs. Chad.
 - “By this time [late 1980s], the conflicts in Western Sahara and Chad had flooded the region with small arms.” (Keita 1998, 14) 27: “The second Tuareg rebellion [1990] probably would not have occurred without a large number of unemployed young Tuareg men and a proliferation of weapons in the region.” Suggests Morocco → Mali and Chad → Mali.
 - No mention of other potential State As.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Burkina Faso, Liberia, Senegal or Togo to Mali in 1990, pending confirmation from Benjaminsen. Benjaminsen confirms in 5/1/10 e-mail.

Mali, 2007 (vs. ATNMC – State A could be Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Chad)

- Niger → Mali, 2007. “A second Tuareg rebellion began in Niger in 2007 led by the Niger Movement for Justice (MNJ). The fighting spread to Mali the same year.” Stefan Simanowitz, “Blumen and Yellowcake: The Struggle of the Tuareg in West Africa,” Media Monitors Network, March 29, 2009 (<http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/60963>).
- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As (in terms of contribution to onset) in Muna A. Abdalla, “Understanding of the Natural Resource Conflict Dynamics: The Case of Tuareg in North Africa and the Sahel,” Institute for Security Studies Paper No. 194 (2009), especially pp. 1-6. Does write (p. 8): “Tuareg in Mali and Niger continued to have various military engagements with AQIM [Algerian insurgency] in their territories. Tuareg have no history of Islamic extremism and the link between this group and Tuareg fighters is still not very clear.”

- No mention of potential State As (besides Niger, in terms of contribution to onset) in Eva Dadrian, “Saharans on the Warpath,” *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, June 5-11, 2008 (<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/900/in6.htm>).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Algeria, Chad, or Senegal to Mali in 2007, pending confirmation from Abdalla.

Senegal, 1990 (vs. MFDC – State A could be Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Togo)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. Only substantive mention of influence of another conflict: “The government has also claimed that both Iraq and Libya have sent weapons to MFDC fighters via Mauritania.” No indication this is tied to onset, however.
- No mention of potential State As in Sheldon Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West*, Second Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 115-117.
- No mention of potential State As in Sheldon Gellar, *Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 160.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, or Togo to Senegal, pending confirmation from Gellar. Gellar confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail.

Mauritania, 1975 (vs. POLISARIO – State A could be Nigeria, Morocco, Chad)

- No mention of Nigeria or Chad in UCDP conflict summary. POLISARIO fought against Moroccan and Mauritanian occupiers simultaneously from 1975 (after Spanish withdrawal); I don’t really consider this as contagion so much as two branches of the same conflict.
- No mention of Nigeria or Chad’s contribution to onset in Tony Hodges, *Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1983).
- No mention of Nigeria or Chad’s contribution to onset in John Damis, *Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983).
- No mention of Nigeria or Chad’s contribution to onset in Erik Jensen, *Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Nigeria, Morocco, or Chad to Mauritania, pending confirmation from Hodges.

Niger, 1991 (vs. FLAA – State A could be Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Morocco, Algeria, Chad)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- Chad → Niger, 1991. “Some young Tuaregs and Moors who had no jobs were recruited as mercenaries by Colonel Mu’ammar al-Gaddafi’s Islamic League and sent to fight in Chad and Lebanon where they learned to handle weapons.” (Carolyn Norris, “Mali-

Niger: Fragile Stability,” UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, WRITENET Paper No. 14/2000 (2001), p. 3.)

- Mali → Niger, 1991. “Some of the young repatriated people [in Niger] protested against this misuse of aid and were arrested in Tchín-Tabaraden. Other Tuaregs attacked the police station of this town to release their companions and the reaction of the Nigerien authorities was disproportionately brutal. ... Some Nigerien Tuaregs fled to neighboring Mali and were arrested in the town of Menaka. Malian Tuaregs launched an armed attack to release them in June 1990, provoking retaliation by the Malian military, which effectively marked the beginning of the rebellion in Mali.” (Carolyn Norris, “Mali-Niger: Fragile Stability,” UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, WRITENET Paper No. 14/2000 (2001), p. 5.) By this account, the Niger rebellion preceded the Mali rebellion. Either way, it’s clear these rebellions were linked. No mention of other potential State As.
 - But later: “This different approach, linked to the better integration of Nigerien Tuaregs, also explains why the rebellion started in Mali and only later extended to Niger. ... The determining factor, which pushed the Tuareg rebellion in both countries into armed conflict, was the massive disappointment in the National Conferences held in Niamey and Bamako in 1991. These National Conferences, which aimed to provide a forum where the people could challenge their leaders after decades of single party rule, were seen by the Tuaregs as a unique occasion to have their needs heard and, in the case of Niger, to secure justice for the violations committed by the army at Tchín-Tabaraden. But neither the demands for justice nor federalism were addressed, making confrontation virtually certain.” (Norris 2001, 7)
- No mention of potential State As in Yvan Guichaoua, “Circumstantial Alliances and Loose Loyalties in Rebellion Making: The Case of Tuareg Insurgency in Northern Niger (2007-2009),” MICROCON (University of Sussex) Research Working Paper 20 (2009), pp. 8-12.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Burkina Faso, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Morocco, or Algeria to Niger in 1991, pending confirmation from Guichaoua. Guichaoua confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail.

Niger, 1994 (vs. CRA – State A could be Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Chad)

- This is just a continuation of Niger 1991 – CRA (also Tuareg) split off from FLAA and demanded autonomy for northern Niger rather than a federal system (UCDP conflict summary). I am removing Niger 1994 as a potential case of contagion.

Niger, 1996 (vs. FDR – State A could be Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Algeria, Egypt, Chad)

- Chad → Niger, 1996. UCDP conflict summary: “In the early 1990s, the situation deteriorated further, when several thousand Chadian Toubous took refuge in the southern part of the region, following the coup d’état in Chad. This reinforced tensions between the mainly nomadic Fulani ethnic group and settled Toubous and in 1993 and 1994 there were frequent clashes between these groups over grazing rights. Events in neighboring Chad also fuelled a vast traffic of weapons in the area. All this created a climate of chronic insecurity and frustration and in October 1994 the rebel group FDR ... emerged.” No mention of other potential State As’ contribution to onset.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Chad) in terms of contribution to onset in Brigitte Thébaud and Simon Batterbury, “Sahel Pastoralists: Opportunism, Struggle, Conflict and Negotiation: A Case Study from Eastern Niger,” *Global Environmental Change*, Vol. 11 (2001): 69-78.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Chad) in Erika Forsberg, “Conflict Diffusion: Ethnic Kin as a Transmitter of Internal Conflict,” Paper presented to the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Honolulu, March 1-5, 2005, p. 3.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Algeria, or Egypt to Niger in 1996, pending confirmation from Batterbury. Batterbury confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail.

Niger, 2007 (vs. MNJ – State A could be Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Chad)

- Since Niger → Mali 2007, the reverse cannot be true (hence Mali is not a potential State A for Niger 2007).
- Côte D’Ivoire → Niger, 2007. Yvan Guichaoua e-mail, 5/11/10: “I suspect that these conflicts had an indirect effect on the Niger insurgency through the weapons markets. AK47s typically travel a lot between the coast of the Guinea Gulf and the Sahel. The end of hostilities in SL or CI has made guns cheaper. Tuareg insurgents also trade arms with rebel groups in Chad.”
- Liberia → Niger, 2007. Yvan Guichaoua e-mail, 5/11/10: “I suspect that these conflicts had an indirect effect on the Niger insurgency through the weapons markets. AK47s typically travel a lot between the coast of the Guinea Gulf and the Sahel. The end of hostilities in SL or CI has made guns cheaper. Tuareg insurgents also trade arms with rebel groups in Chad.” [Could code this as Sierra Leone → Niger, but the real center of the West African conflict he’s referring to is Liberia.]
- Chad → Niger, 2007. Yvan Guichaoua e-mail, 5/11/10: “I suspect that these conflicts had an indirect effect on the Niger insurgency through the weapons markets. AK47s typically travel a lot between the coast of the Guinea Gulf and the Sahel. The end of

hostilities in SL or CI has made guns cheaper. Tuareg insurgents also trade arms with rebel groups in Chad.”

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As (except rejection of Algeria’s involvement in onset) in Stefan Simanowitz, “Blumen and Yellowcake: The Struggle of the Tuareg in West Africa,” Media Monitors Network, March 29, 2009 (<http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/60963>).
- No mention of potential State As in Human Rights Watch, “Niger: Warring Sides Must End Abuses of Civilians,” December 19, 2007 (<http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/12/18/niger-warring-sides-must-end-abuses-civilians>).
- No mention of potential State As in Jeremy Keenan, “Uranium Goes Critical in Niger: Tuareg Rebellions Threaten Sahelian Conflagration,” *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 117 (2008): 449-466. Keenan does accuse Algeria’s intelligence services of playing a role in instigating the MNJ rebellion (pp. 458-459), but the Algiers interest in Niger does not appear to be related to its own conflict with Islamists.
- No mention of potential State As in Yvan Guichaoua, “Circumstantial Alliances and Loose Loyalties in Rebellion Making: The Case of Tuareg Insurgency in Northern Niger (2007-2009),” MICROCON (University of Sussex) Research Working Paper 20 (2009), pp. 12-22. Again briefly discusses Algeria on p. 7, note 3: “Algeria has been playing a crucial role in the conflict, offering a sanctuary to the insurgents and providing them with shelter, supplies ... and opening its hospitals to wounded fighters. ... One can hypothesize several reasons behind Algeria’s tolerance toward MNJ combatants: ... Algeria needs the support of Tuaregs from Mali and Niger to fight the Islamists – now rebranded Al-Qaeda Maghreb – causing political disorder in the region.” This would be an Algerian interest in Niger tied to its own conflict with Islamists, but Guichaoua doesn’t seem to see Algeria as contributing to the conflict onset. I’ll ask. (He agrees – Algeria did not contribute to conflict onset.)
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Nigeria, Senegal, and Algeria to Niger in 2007, pending confirmation from Guichaoua. Guichaoua confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail.

Côte D’Ivoire, 2002 (vs. MJP, MPCl, MPIGO – State A could be Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone)

- Liberia → Côte D’Ivoire, 2002. “Evidence of a direct link between the Ivorian military leaders of the MPCl and Taylor has yet to be established. However, a Taylor insider informed ICG that two top Taylor aides, Mohamed Salamé, the ambassador-at-large in Abidjan and Taylor’s main financier and arms broker, and General Melvin Sobandi, Minister of Post and Telecommunications in Monrovia, travelled to Bouaké on 17 September 2002 to deliver money.” (International Crisis Group, “Tackling Liberia: The Eye of the Regional Storm,” Africa Report No. 62 (2003), p. 18) The conflict began on

9/19/02. No mention of other potential State As (except a marginal manpower contribution from Sierra Leone) in pp. 14-28, the part of the report dealing with Côte D'Ivoire.

- Burkina Faso does appear to have supported the 9/19/02 coup outright, but the link between the 1987 Burkinabe coup in the 2002 Ivoirian conflict is tenuous. The original pan-Africanists initially left Côte D'Ivoire alone – it wasn't until its longtime president died in 1993 that Burkina Faso got interested in overthrowing its government (p. 26).
- Extending Burkina Faso's influence to 2002 would add 3 cases of potential contagion: Côte D'Ivoire 2002, Niger 1996 (most certainly not one), and Guinea 2000 (possibly one).
- According to UCDP conflict summary, potential State As were not directly involved in onset. "At the outset of the conflict numerous diplomats and regional experts voiced a fear that the conflict would become entangled with the civil wars to the west of Ivory Coast, i.e. in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. ... Reflecting this concern, the conflict in Ivory Coast has been rife with accusations, counteraccusations and denials of foreign involvement in the fighting. However, these claims are all extremely difficult to verify, and no clear evidence has been presented by either side in the conflict. ... Stronger evidence of cross-border links exists when it comes to the western groups, MJP and MPIGO, as there were consistent reports of Liberians fighting together with the rebels. However, it is unclear if the Liberian soldiers were part of the Liberian army, or if they were mercenaries fighting for loot. There were also rumors of Sierra Leonean ex-rebel group RUF being involved in the fighting in western Ivory Coast." Both MJP and MPIGO arose after the initial onset of the conflict in September 2002. No other states mentioned as potential contributors.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to *onset* in pp. Jessica Kohler, "From Miraculous to Disastrous: The Crisis in Côte D'Ivoire," Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations (2003), pp. 11-35. Again, Liberian involvement is strongly alleged in the emergence of the western rebel groups (MJP and MPIGO), but these emerged after the initial onset of the conflict.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia and Burkina Faso – see above) in International Crisis Group, "Côte D'Ivoire: The War is Not Yet Over," Africa Report No. 72 (2003), pp. 1-16.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Senegal, or Sierra Leone to Cote D'Ivoire, pending confirmation from Kohler. Unfortunately I can't track her down.

Guinea, 2000 (vs. RFDG – State A could be Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone)

- Liberia → Guinea, 2000. UCDP conflict summary: “The governmental conflict in Guinea was closely tied to regional instability and developments in neighboring countries. The rebels, RFDG ..., sought to oust the perceived undemocratic regime of Guinea, and received strong support from Liberia’s President Charles Taylor.”
- Sierra Leone → Guinea, 2000. UCDP conflict summary: “There were also indications that cooperation took place between RFDG and RUF (Revolutionary United Front) in the battles.”
- Guinea-Bissau → Guinea, 2000. UCDP conflict summary: “Placed in an extremely volatile region, where conflicts had raged during more than a decade, Guinea was up until 2000 a haven for roughly 500,000 refugees from war-torn Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.” No mention of Niger or Senegal.
- No mention of Niger or Senegal’s contribution to Guinea onset in Prosper Addo, “Mercenarism in West Africa: A Threat to Ghana’s Democracy?” Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre Paper No. 2 (2004).
- Hence, in the absence of a third source, I will code **no contagion** from Niger or Senegal to Guinea, pending confirmation from Addo ... who unfortunately cannot be located.

Burkina Faso, 1987 (vs. Popular Front – State A could be Cameroon, Ghana, Togo, Gambia)

- No mention of any potential State As in UCDP conflict summary, except “Vocally anti-imperialist, Sankara had strained relations with many members of the international community, and cultivated ties with radical powers at the time, such as Ghana and Libya.”
- No mention of any potential State As in Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Military Coups in West Africa since the Sixties* (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 18-24.
- No mention of any potential State As in Pierre Englebert, *Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 52-63, 152-157.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Cameroon, Ghana, Togo, or Gambia to Burkina Faso, pending confirmation from Englebert. Englebert confirms in 5/11/10 e-mail.

Liberia, 1980 (vs. Forces of Samuel Doe – State A could be Mauritania)

- No mention of Mauritania in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Mauritania in Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Military Coups in West Africa since the Sixties* (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 93-98.
- No mention of Mauritania in D. Elwood Dunn and S. Byron Tarr, *Liberia: A National Polity in Transition* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1988), pp. 86-98.
- No mention of either potential State A in G.E. Saigbe Boley, *Liberia: The Rise and Fall of the First Republic* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), pp. 80-135.

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Mauritania to Liberia in 1980, pending confirmation from Mwakikagile.

Liberia, 1989 (vs. NPFL – State A could be Gambia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Togo, Ghana)

- Gambia → Liberia, 1989. See below.
- Ghana → Liberia, 1989. Stephen Ellis writes in 5/7/10 e-mail: “There was a group of Liberian politicians – generally known as the ‘progressives’ - working for a revolution in Liberia from the late 1970s. They were quite well networked internationally, especially in Ghana and Gambia. There was a direct influence on events in Liberia from the Gambian revolutionaries and also the Ghanaians.” (See also Ellis 1995 below.)
- Burkina Faso → Liberia, 1989. “Burkina Faso lent several hundred of its soldiers to Taylor in the early stages of Liberia’s war. Burkinabe leader Blaise Compaoré had obtained Taylor’s release from a Ghanaian jail a few years earlier and later introduced him to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi, who sought to punish Doe for closing down the Libyan embassy in Liberia in 1981 and for supporting U.S. anti-Libyan policies.” (Adekeye Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 48. Arguably this link with Burkina Faso would not have existed had Compaoré not staged his coup in 1987; Compaoré had specific personal links to Taylor (friend of daughter of President of Cote D’Ivoire, who was Taylor’s main sponsor – Stephen Ellis, “Liberia 1989-1992: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence,” *African Affairs*, Vol. 94, No. 375 (1995): 165-197, p. 180). No mention of Cameroon or Togo as contributors to onset.
 - Paul Richards (see “Sierra Leone” below) writes in 4/30/10 e-mail: “The forces loaned by Taylor to establish the RUF in Sierra Leone 1991-2 included some francophone African fighters. I discussed some evidence on this point in a piece comparing rebellions in Liberia and Sierra Leone cited in the book you have been reading [Richards 2002, cited in the Sierra Leone 1991 entry below]. Some eyewitnesses I interviewed in 1991 and 1992 claimed these francophone rebels were from Burkina Faso, and the 2004 conflict mapping document of No Peace Without Justice (which is a very detailed account of the war, chiefdom by chiefdom from 1991 to 2001, drawing evidence from some 400 locally based eyewitnesses, including some - though not many - RUF members) confirms this idea, though of course based on testimony from 15 years later. **Both Charles Taylor of the Liberian NPFL and (more especially) Foday Sankoh of the Sierra Leone RUF assisted in the coup that overthrew Thomas Sankara and installed Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso in 1987.**” This suggests that without the coup in Burkina Faso, neither Taylor nor Sankoh would have had as significant support from Burkina Faso.
- UCDP conflict summary: “In the initial attack on Liberia, Taylor had the assistance of the government of Burkina Faso.” Not clear on why. No mention of Cameroon or Togo.

- No mention of any potential State As in Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Military Coups in West Africa since the Sixties* (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 98-103.
- No mention of Cameroon or Togo in Stephen Ellis, “Liberia’s Warlord Insurgency,” in Christopher Claphman, ed., *African Guerrillas* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), pp. 155-160.
- No mention of Cameroon or Togo in Stephen Ellis, “Liberia 1989-1992: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence,” *African Affairs*, Vol. 94, No. 375 (1995): 165-197.
However, several other notes:
 - “The core group of NPFL guerillas, Libyan-trained and supplemented by ... internationalist revolutionaries from Gambia and Sierra Leone...” (p. 167)
 - “During visits to Libya probably between 1986 and 1989, Taylor had met a number of Gambians who had taken part in a coup attempt ... in 1981 with Libyan backing. ... They included Kukoi Samba Sanyang, known to the NPFL as ‘Dr Manning.’ At the beginning of operations in 1989, Dr Manning was officially listed as Taylor’s vice-president, although he soon abandoned the NPFL after being edged out of the leadership by Taylor, and retired to manage a bar.” (pp. 168-169)
 - Suggests Gambia (1981) → Liberia (1989) is a case of contagion. I will code it so for now, pending confirmation from Ellis.
 - “In Accra Taylor befriended the Burkinabe ambassador, ... at a time when Captain Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso and Chairman John Rawlings of Ghana were close friends, and both had quite close relations with Libya. ... Liberian exiles in Accra succeeded in contacting the new ruler of Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré, who prevailed upon the Ghanaian authorities to release Taylor into his own custody.”
 - Suggests that Taylor was friendly with Burkina Faso before the 1987 coup there, and that Burkina Faso might have sponsored Taylor’s insurgency even if Sankara had stayed in power. However, it appears that the specific links between Taylor and Compaoré were quite strong (see above), so I will still code this as contagion.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Cameroon or Togo to Liberia in 1989, pending confirmation from Ellis. Ellis confirms in 5/7/10 e-mail.

Sierra Leone, 1991 (vs. RUF – State A could be Burkina Faso, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo)

- Liberia → Sierra Leone, 1991. UCDP conflict summary (on Liberia): “Taylor instead established a ‘state’ of his own in the territory he controlled, which was named ‘Greater Liberia.’ At one point making up around 90% of Liberia’s total territory, ‘Greater Liberia’ became the centre of an enormous war-economy empire, from where Taylor sold and smuggled timber, iron ore and diamonds. In 1991 Taylor expanded his empire into

Sierra Leone's diamond-rich territory, where he assisted Foday Sankoh in launching the Revolutionary United Front's (RUF) attack on the government of Sierra Leone."

- Burkina Faso → Sierra Leone, 1991. No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia) in UCDP conflict summary on Sierra Leone, except: "Burkina Faso also acted as a supporting party to RUF, providing the movement with valuable supplies throughout the conflict."
 - Paul Richards writes in 4/30/10 e-mail: "The forces loaned by Taylor to establish the RUF in Sierra Leone 1991-2 included some francophone African fighters. I discussed some evidence on this point in a piece comparing rebellions in Liberia and Sierra Leone cited in the book you have been reading [Richards 2002, cited below]. Some eyewitnesses I interviewed in 1991 and 1992 claimed these francophone rebels were from Burkina Faso, and the 2004 conflict mapping document of No Peace Without Justice (which is a very detailed account of the war, chiefdom by chiefdom from 1991 to 2001, drawing evidence from some 400 locally based eyewitnesses, including some - though not many - RUF members) confirms this idea, though of course based on testimony from 15 years later. **Both Charles Taylor of the Liberian NPFL and (more especially) Foday Sankoh of the Sierra Leone RUF assisted in the coup that overthrew Thomas Sankara and installed Blaise Compaoré in Burkina Faso in 1987.**" This suggests that without the coup in Burkina Faso, neither Taylor nor Sankoh would have had as significant support from Burkina Faso.
- Paul Richards writes in 4/30/10 e-mail: "The Malian conflict may have been relevant in terms of arms supply. According to Stephen Ellis, large numbers of guns not needed **when that conflict was ended** found their way into the Liberian conflict (and almost certainly, therefore, into Sierra Leone also) probably traded through regional networks of Fula and Mandinka merchants also operating in diamond supply from Sierra Leone." I believe the Mali conflict didn't end until 1995, although there was a peace agreement in 1991, so this does not appear to be a case of contagion contributing to onset.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia and Burkina Faso) in Adekeye Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 79-84.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia) in Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein, "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (2008): 436-455, p. 437.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Liberia and Burkina Faso) in Paul Richards, *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone* (Oxford, U.K.: The International African Institute, 2002), pp. xiii-33. Does note, on p. 3: "[Prince] Johnson's guerilla know-how formed these youthful recruits into an effective insurgent force. Drugged on crack cocaine, recruits deployed terroristic methods apparently

reflecting a knowledge of Renamo tactics in Mozambique.” However, this influence seems purely tactical and also post-onset.

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Mali, Niger, Senegal, or Togo to Sierra Leone, pending confirmation from Richards. Richards (in 4/30/10 e-mail, also cited at length above) alleges that both the Ghana and Togo coups had Libyan sponsorship – “certainly there were attempts to set up RUF-type rebellions in Ghana, Gambia and Zaire [and Togo].” Cites no specific evidence that these coups themselves influenced the RUF, and calls the links “quite marginal.” Suggests I look at the Yeebo book cited in his book.

Ghana, 1966 (vs. NLC – State A could be Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo)

- Democratic Republic of the Congo → Ghana, 1966. “Major A.A. Afrifa, one of the main [coup] plotters, felt that 43 Ghanaian soldiers had lost their lives in the Congo because of Nkrumah’s [overthrown in the coup] disastrous policies in that conflict.” This was a key grievance behind the coup. Roger S. Gocking, *The History of Ghana* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), p. 148. Also mentions another international influence on the military’s decision to revolt: the fear of Nkrumah’s upcoming intervention in Rhodesia (an extrastate conflict) (p. 138). No mention of other potential State As.
- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Military Coups in West Africa since the Sixties* (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 37-40, though he does note that Nkrumah “antagonized the West” with his “relentless support for African liberation movements” (p. 38).
- No mention of potential State As in LaVerle Berry, ed., *Ghana: A Country Study*, Third Edition (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995), pp. 32-37. Does note, as above, the military’s discontent with “Nkrumah’s aggressive involvement in African politics and by his belief that Ghanaian troops could be sent anywhere in Africa to fight so-called liberation wars” (p. 36).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Cameroon, Gabon, or Nigeria to Ghana in 1966, pending confirmation from Gocking.

Ghana, 1981 (vs. Forces of Jerry John Rawlings – State A could be Gambia, Liberia, Mauritania)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Military Coups in West Africa since the Sixties* (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 40-45.
- No mention of potential State As in Roger S. Gocking, *The History of Ghana* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), pp. 179-193.
- No mention of Potential State As in LaVerle Berry, ed., *Ghana: A Country Study*, Third Edition (Washington: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1995), pp. 42-53

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Gambia, Liberia, or Mauritania to Ghana in 1981, pending confirmation from Gocking.

Togo, 1986 (vs. MTD – State A could be Cameroon, Gambia, Ghana)

- Ghana → Togo, 1986. UCDP conflict summary: “It was also claimed that the rebels had been backed by Ghana and Burkina Faso, who allegedly had assisted in recruiting, arming and training the rebels. However, these allegations were rejected by the two neighboring states.” Ghana’s coup, which brought Rawlings to power, seemingly returned it to an interventionist posture internationally by aligning more with Nkrumah (Mwakikagile 2001, 42-43). No mention of other potential State As.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Ghana) in Godfrey Mwakikagile, *Military Coups in West Africa since the Sixties* (Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), pp. 201-203. **On Ghana**, notes: “Civil unrest in neighboring Ghana ... during the early 1980s triggered by bloody military coups in those two countries sent tens of thousands of refugees into Togo, causing a great humanitarian crisis and social instability.” (p. 202)
- No mention of potential State As (besides Ghana) in Mathurin C. Hounnikpo, *Determinants of Democratization in Africa: A Comparative Study of Benin and Togo* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2001), pp. 75, 96-97.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Cameroon or Gambia to Togo, pending confirmation from Hounnikpo.

Cameroon, 1984 (vs. Forces of Ibrahim Saleh – State A could be Gambia, Ghana, Liberia)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in James Achanyi Fontem, *Cameroon: Remember April 6* (Cathca Fund, 1993), pp. 1-90.
- No mention of potential State As in Tambi Eyongetah Mbuagbaw, Robert Brain, and Robin Palmer, *A History of the Cameroon*, Second Edition (Harlow, U.K.: Longman, 1987), pp. 137-141.
- No mention of potential State As in Victor Julius Ngoh, *History of Cameroon Since 1800* (Presbook, Limbe, 1996), pp. 291-296.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Gambia, Ghana, or Liberia to Cameroon, pending confirmation from Palmer. Palmer says in a 5/12/10 e-mail that he doesn’t know.

Nigeria, 1966 (vs. Forces of Patrick Nzeogwu – State A could be Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Charles U. Uwanaka, *Nigerian Civil War: Causes, Events (1953-1967)*, Second Edition (Mafoluku, Nigeria: Pattony Publicity, 1986), pp. 5-41.

- No mention of potential State As (at least not by name) in Garba Ashiwaju and Olusegun Areola, eds., *Nigeria: The First 25 Years* (Ibadan, Nigeria: Ibadan University Press, 1995), pp. 68-69, 106-109.
- No mention of potential State As in Richard Akinnola, *History of Coup D'Etats in Nigeria* (Lagos: Media Research and Resource Bureau, 1998), pp. 1-11.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Cameroon, Gabon, or Ghana to Nigeria in 1966, pending confirmation from Akinnola. Akinnola confirms in 5/12/10 Facebook message.

Nigeria, 1967 (vs. Republic of Biafra – State A could be Gabon, Ghana)

- No mention of potential State As in Armstrong Matiu Adejo, ed., *The Nigerian Civil War: Forty Years After, What Lessons?* (Makurdi, Nigeria: Aboki Publishers, 2008), pp. 3-47, 451-472. It is noted that the experience of Katanga made accommodation of secession out of the question (p. 42), but I doubt accommodation would ever have been on the table anyway.
- No mention of potential State As in Major General H.B. Momoh, ed., *The Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970: History and Reminiscences* (Ibadan, Nigeria: Sam Bookman Publishers, 2000), pp. 3-63.
- No mention of potential State As in Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, *The Biafra War: Nigeria and the Aftermath* (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), except that Gabon was a channel for French arms to Biafra (likely post-onset, as corroborated by other sources, around 1968) (p. 105).
- No mention of potential State As in Eghosa E. Osaghae, Ebere Onwudiwe, and Rotimi T. Suberu, eds., *The Nigerian Civil War and its Aftermath* (Ibadan, Nigeria: John Archers, 2002).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Gabon or Ghana to Nigeria in 1967, pending confirmation from Adejo.

Nigeria, 2004 (vs. Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa and NDPVF [different territorial incompatibilities] – State A could be Côte D'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan)

- Guinea-Bissau → Nigeria, 2004. “Given this background, the paper explores the origin of the present oil violence in the Niger Delta and how it has been intensified through the use of weapons that are primarily smuggled from Guinea-Bissau, Gabon and Cameroon.” Victor Ojajorotu and Ufo Okeke-Uzodike, “Oil, Arms Proliferation and Conflict in the Niger Delta of Nigeria,” *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* (2006): 85-106, pp. 85-86.
- Liberia → Nigeria, 2004. “Nigerian peacekeepers have also been identified as a source of black market weapons. Nigerian soldiers have served in a number of peacekeeping missions in Africa, including Sierra Leone and Liberia, among others. This has provided Nigerian soldiers with access to small arms. Soldiers returning from peacekeeping

missions have sold small arms on the Nigerian black market, providing ‘a ready source of assault weapons’ for the Nigerian population.” (Jennifer M. Hazen with Jonas Horner, “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective,” Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 20 (2007), p. 37)

- “Violence in the Delta region blossomed in 2003 and 2004. In the lead-up to the 2003 elections, violence became a tool for politicians to gain power. This included the provision of small arms to groups to rally support for certain politicians and deter the opposition from challenging these politicians.” (Hazen 2007, 77)
- Sierra Leone → Nigeria, 2004. “Nigerian peacekeepers have also been identified as a source of black market weapons. Nigerian soldiers have served in a number of peacekeeping missions in Africa, including Sierra Leone and Liberia, among others. This has provided Nigerian soldiers with access to small arms. Soldiers returning from peacekeeping missions have sold small arms on the Nigerian black market, providing ‘a ready source of assault weapons’ for the Nigerian population.” (Jennifer M. Hazen with Jonas Horner, “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective,” Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 20 (2007), p. 37)
- Democratic Republic of the Congo → Nigeria, 2004. “The weapons used by the militants are abundant in the country since small-arms filter into Nigeria from conflict zones like Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.” (Erich Marquardt, “The Niger Delta Insurgency and Its Threat to Energy Security,” *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 4, No. 16 (2006))
- Sudan → Nigeria, 2004. “The weapons used by the militants are abundant in the country since small-arms filter into Nigeria from conflict zones like Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.” (Erich Marquardt, “The Niger Delta Insurgency and Its Threat to Energy Security,” *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 4, No. 16 (2006))
- Somalia → Nigeria, 2004. “The weapons used by the militants are abundant in the country since small-arms filter into Nigeria from conflict zones like Liberia, Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.” (Erich Marquardt, “The Niger Delta Insurgency and Its Threat to Energy Security,” *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 4, No. 16 (2006))
- Afghanistan → Nigeria, 2004. No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary, although Ahlul Sunnah Jamaa was strongly inspired by the Taliban in Afghanistan (the leader called himself “Mullah Omar”).
- No mention of potential State As in Sofiri Joab-Peterside, “On the Militarization of Nigeria’s Niger Delta: The Genesis of Ethnic Militia in Rivers State, Nigeria,” *Economies of Violence Working Paper No. 21* (2007).
- No mention of potential State As in Sanusi Aliyu, *Religious-Based Violence and National Security in Nigeria: Case Studies of Kaduna State and the Taliban Activities in Borno State* (M.A. Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), pp. 78-92.

Does mention that some members of the Nigerian Taliban trained with AQIM (from Algeria), but the numbers are quite small (~25).

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Côte D'Ivoire, Guinea, or Senegal to Nigeria in 2004, pending confirmation from Joab-Peterside.

Gabon, 1964 (vs. Forces loyal to Léon M'Ba – State A could be Cameroon)

- No mention of Cameroon in James F. Barnes, *Gabon: Beyond the Colonial Legacy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 39-47.
- No mention of Cameroon in Brian Weinstein, *Gabon: Nation-Building on the Ogooué* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 151-152.
- No mention of Cameroon in Charles F. Darlington and Alice B. Darlington, *African Betrayal* (New York: David McKay Company, 1968), pp. 126-141.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Cameroon to Gabon, pending confirmation from Barnes. This is kind of a strange intrastate conflict – the coup itself was bloodless, and it was only after French intervention to restore M'Ba to power (an intervention possibly motivated by other bloodless coups in Francophone Africa) that deaths occurred. Barnes mostly confirms in 5/13/10 e-mail.

Central African Republic, 1996 (vs. Forces of Cyriac Souke – State A could be Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda)

- No mention of potential State As in (very brief) UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As as they pertain to the 1996 mutiny in Allard Blom and Jean Yamindou, "A Brief History of Armed Conflict and its Impact on Biodiversity in the Central African Republic," Biodiversity Support Program, World Wildlife Fund (2001), pp. 11-12. The conflict in the north is influenced by Sudan, Chad, and the DRC, but this appears unrelated to the mutinies (and onset after 1996).
- No mention of potential State As in Paul Melly, "Central African Republic – Uncertain Prospects," WRITENET Paper No. 14 (2002), pp. 1-8.
- No mention of potential State As in Andreas Mehler, "The Production of Insecurity by African Security Forces: Insights from Liberia and the Central African Republic," Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA) Working Paper No. 114 (2009), pp. 9-10.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Burundi, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda to the Central African Republic, pending confirmation from Melly. Melly confirms in 5/14/10 e-mail.

Chad, 1966 (vs. FROLINAT – State A could be Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.

- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in Mario J. Azevedo, *Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad* (Ajanta Offset, India: Gordon and Breach Publishers: 1998), pp. 89-95. FROLINAT was formed inside Sudan, at Nyala (p. 92), but this does not appear to be related to the rebellion ongoing in Southern Sudan.
- No mention of potential State As in Harold D. Nelson *et al.*, *Area Handbook for Chad* (Washington: Foreign Area Studies, American University, 1972), pp. 119-127. Does note (p. 125): "The known members [leaders of FROLINAT] were exiles who operated from bases outside Chad; many had received guerilla and subversion training in Ghana before the overthrow of the government of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966 or in Algeria, Libya, Cuba, or North Korea. They had reentered Chad most often along the long and desolate eastern border with Sudan." Again, the Sudanese connection doesn't count because the Sudanese conflict at the time was in the south; as for the rest, only Cuba had an active substate conflict at the time of influence.
- No mention of potential State As in Thomas Collelo, ed., *Chad: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988), pp. 188-189.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, or Sudan to Chad, pending confirmation from Azevedo. Azevedo confirms in 5/15/10 e-mail.

Republic of the Congo, 1993 (vs. Cobras and Ninjas – State A could be Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Angola)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary; Angola and Chad intervened after the conflict had began (around 1997, which was by far the heaviest year in terms of casualties).
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in Mohammed O. Maundi *et al.*, *Getting In: Mediators' Entry into the Settlement of African Conflicts* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press: 2006), pp. 85-91. Does note that the Cobras had elements from the DRC and Rwanda civil wars (p. 87), but these elements appear to postdate the 1993 onset by at least one year.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in Sypros Demetriou, Robert Muggah, and Ian Biddle, "Small Arms Availability, Trade and Impacts in the Republic of Congo," *Small Arms Survey Special Report* (2002), pp. 4-5, 10-13. External actors are again mentioned in the context of the 1997 conflict only; arms purchases from abroad were apparently much more prevalent in the 1997 conflict than in the 1993 conflict.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in David Eaton, "Diagnosing the Crisis in the Republic of the Congo," *Africa*, Vol. 76, No. 1 (2006): 44-69. International influences are again limited to the 1997 conflict.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to 1993 onset in Remy Bazenguissa-Ganga, "The Spread of Political Violence in Congo-Brazzaville," *African Affairs*, Vol. 98 (1999): 37-54.

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda to the Republic of the Congo, pending confirmation from Eaton.

Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1960 (vs. State of Katanga and Independent Mining State of South Kasai – State A could be Ethiopia)

- These secessionist movements began in summer 1960, and the Ethiopian coup did not take place until December 14, 1960 (UCDP conflict summary). Therefore Ethiopia → D.R. Congo 1960 cannot be a case of contagion.

Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1964 (vs. CNL – State A could be Ethiopia or Sudan)

- China → Congo-Kinshasa, 1964. See below.
- No mention of either potential State A in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Ethiopia in Edgar O’Ballance, *The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 64-84. Does note that in late 1964 “President Ibrahim Abboud of Sudan flatly denied that any illicit arms for the NLC rebels had ever passed through his country” (p. 84). **Also notes strong influence of P.R. China in terms of training NLC rebels** (p. 69).
- No mention of either potential State A in Jeanne M. Haskin, *The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 36.
- No mention of either potential State A in Léonce Ndikumana and Kisangani Emizet, “The Economics of Civil War: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Political Economy Research Institute (University of Massachusetts, Amherst) Working Paper No. 63 (2003), pp. 10-14.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Ethiopia or Sudan to D.R. Congo in 1964, pending confirmation from Emizet.

Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1977 (vs. FLNC – State A could be Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Angola)

- Angola → Zaire, 1977. UCDP conflict summary: “In March 1977, the FLNC launched a military campaign from Angola with the objective of toppling the regime of President Mobutu. The FLNC was mainly made up of ex-Katangan gendarmes who after the Zaire (Katanga) civil war had helped the Angolan government fight their rebel groups.” No mention of other potential State As.
- Cuba → Zaire, 1977. The Cuban government “had been supplying arms to the FLNC, as Mobutu favored the Chinese form of Communism over that espoused by Moscow” (Edgar O’Ballance, *The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 115).

- No mention of potential State As (besides Angola) in Edgar O’Ballance, *The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 108-122. On Angola, notes that “Mobutu declared that no expense would be spared in relation to the Angolan struggle for freedom” in 1975 (p. 109).
- No mention of potential State As (besides Angola) in Jeanne M. Haskin, *The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), pp. 41, 59.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Angola) in Léonce Ndikumana and Kisangani Emizet, “The Economics of Civil War: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo,” Political Economy Research Institute (University of Massachusetts, Amherst) Working Paper No, 63 (2003), pp. 15-20. On Angola: “With the victory of the MPLA in Angola, the Katangan gendarmes were unemployed and sought to return to the Congo and reclaim their region (now named Shaba) under the banner of the Front for the National Liberation of Congo (Front pour la Libération Nationale, FLNC).” (p. 17)
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Angola) in Thomas P. Odom, *Shaba II: The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire in 1978* (Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, 1993).
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Angola) in Peter Mangold, “Shaba I and Shaba II,” *Survival*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1979): 107-115.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Chad, Ethiopia, Sudan, or Uganda to Zaire in 1977, pending confirmation from Emizet.

Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1996 (vs. AFDL – State A could be Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Angola)

- Rwanda → DRC, 1996. “Spillover can ... cause other civil wars in neighboring countries — just as the civil war in Rwanda triggered the catastrophic civil war in next-door Congo.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 2.
 - UCDP conflict summary: “Events in Rwanda played an important part in the early stage of the conflict. During the first phase, Rwandan troops assisted AFDL, aiming to both root out the Hutu militia operating from Zairian territory and to topple Mobutu, who had supported the previous regime in Rwanda, and who accepted the presence of the armed Hutu groups on Zairian soil. Also, Uganda provided much needed military training and troops to AFDL, albeit never openly admitting to doing so. Most analysts conclude that Uganda’s involvement was mainly based on security concerns, as anti-Museveni rebel groups ADF (Alliance of democratic Forces), WNBF (West Nile Bank Front) and LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) operated out of Zairian territory. The only state openly admitting to sending troops in aid of AFDL was Angola, who had the same

motivation as Rwanda and Uganda. Mobutu had for years supported Angolan rebel group UNITA, allowing the rebels to launch attacks from Zairian territory.”

- Uganda → DRC, 1996. “The anti-Mobutu alliance [including Uganda] was formed around a single goal: ‘to cripple the insurgency movements challenging their governments from bases in the Congo.’ Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 122. [Also Rwanda → DRC, 1998, Sudan → DRC, 1998 and Uganda → DRC, 1998. The 1998 conflict is not listed by UCDP/PRIO; it is lumped in with the 1996 war.]
- Angola → DRC, 1996. “The anti-Mobutu alliance [including Angola] was formed around a single goal: ‘to cripple the insurgency movements challenging their governments from bases in the Congo.’ Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 122.
- Burundi → DRC, 1996. “The Zairean government accused Burundi and Rwanda of provoking the conflict, and of arming and training the Banyamulenge militia. This was denied. ... Kabila had been aided considerably by regular military elements from Rwanda and Burundi, especially in terms of organization, administration and supplies.” (Edgar O’Ballance, *The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960-1998* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 164, 175. No mention of other potential State As besides Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola.
- 2/5/11: Changing the coding below to non-contagion; it’s too convoluted, and you would have to believe that the LRA would not exist (or shelter in Zaire) without Sudanese state support.
 - Sudan → DRC, 1996. “Soon to join Rwanda were Uganda and Angola. ... Uganda had also suffered assaults by rebel groups which were based inside Zaire. Anti-Museveni movements that were supported by Sudan were attacking from the region.” (Jeanne M. Haskin, *The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 79) So Sudan’s war → Ugandan support for SPLA → Sudanese support for LRA → Ugandan invasion of Zaire to neutralize LRA. A bit of stretch, maybe. No mention of other potential State As (besides those noted above).
- No mention of other potential State As (besides those already mentioned) in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of other potential State As (besides those already mentioned) in Thomas Turner, *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality* (London: Zed Books, 2007). Does note that “Somalia syndrome” discouraged as U.S./UN intervention in Rwanda, which perhaps played some role in the Congo events (p. 153).

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from the Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Republic of the Congo, or Somalia to the D.R. Congo in 1996, pending confirmation from Emizet.

Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2007 (vs. BDK – State A could be Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Angola)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No positive mention of potential State As in Anneke Van Woudenberg, “‘We Will Crush You’: The Restriction of Political Space in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” *Human Rights Watch* (2008), pp. 66-82. DRC’s Minister of the Interior claimed Angolan/Brazzaville support for BDK rebels, but HRW considers these claims unsubstantiated and so apparently does the UN (pp. 72-73).
- No mention of potential State As in David Lewis, “Up to 12 Dead as Congo Police Fire on Protestors,” *Reuters* (June 30, 2006).
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Michael Deibert, “Congo: Between Hope and Despair,” *World Policy Journal* (Summer 2008): 63-68, p. 66.
- No mention of potential State As in United Nations Security Council, “Twenty-Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” April 2, 2008, pp. 4-5.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, or Angola to D.R. Congo in 2007, pending confirmation from Van Woudenberg.

Uganda, 1971 (vs. Forces of Idi Amin – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan)

- Sudan → Uganda, 1971. “Amin established control over the armed forces by eliminating rivals, promoting officers loyal to him, and recruiting mercenaries from former Anya Nya guerrillas in southern Sudan.” Thomas P. Ofcansky, *Uganda: Tarnished Pearl of Africa* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 42. No mention of other potential State As.
- Democratic Republic of the Congo → Uganda, 1971. “The next development that boosted the image and fortunes of the army was the Congo Rebellion of 1964-1965.” Enlarged the army, improved equipment, improved prestige. But a major spur for the coup was “the army fear that Obote was creating a rival to the army.” A.G.G. Gingyera-Pinyewa, *Apolo Milton Obote and His Times* (New York: NOK Publishers, 1978), pp. 241, 245. No mention of other potential State As.
- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, *War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1982), pp. 4, 9-10.

- No mention in Eustace G. Rutiba, *Towards Peace in Uganda* (Kampala: Nile Valley Pyramids Publishing House, 1986), pp. 11-12.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Chad or Ethiopia to Uganda, pending confirmation from Honey. Honey confirms in 5/17/10 e-mail.

Kenya, 1982 (vs. Forces of Hezekiah Ochuka – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Andrew Morton, *Moi: The Making of an African Statesman* (London: Michael O'Mara Books, 1998), pp. 132-139.
- No mention of potential State As in Jennifer A. Widner, *The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From 'Harambee!' to 'Nyayo!'* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 145-150. Note, however, p. 2 for a reverse demonstration effect: "Kenyans from widely different parts of the country and walks of life spoke of the need to proceed cautiously so as not to follow the paths of their neighbors in strife-torn Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia."
- No mention of potential State As in William R. Ochieng, *A History of Kenya* (London: Macmillan Kenya, 1985), pp. 154-155.
- No mention of potential State As in Pat McGowan and Thomas H. Johnson, "African Military Coups d'Etat and Underdevelopment: A Quantitative Historical Analysis," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1984): 633-666, p. 636.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda to Kenya, pending confirmation from Widner. She says I'm probably right in a 5/18/10 e-mail but suggests I contact David W. Throup, which I did. Throup confirms in 5/18/10 e-mail.

Burundi, 1965 (vs. Forces loyal to Gervais Nyangoma – State A could be Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan)

- Democratic Republic of the Congo → Burundi, 1965. "This spiral of ethnicization [preceding the 1965 coup attempt] has been accelerated by external intervention: nearby Congo was a focal point for the Cold War; Burundi was a base for Chinese aid to the Kivu-based Lumumbist rebels. ... Each camp has instrumentalized the ethnicism it found in the two countries: the 'nonalignment group' [in Burundi] were mainly Tutsi nationalists." (Jean-Pierre Chrétien (Scott Straus, trans.), *The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousands Years of History* (New York: Zone Books, 2003), p. 313.) So Congo war → Chinese presence in Burundi → heightening of ethnic tensions. Also strong influence of Rwandan ethnic conflicts on Burundi; see below. No mention of Ethiopia or Sudan.
 - "During much of 1963 and 1964, Burundi politics took the form of a three-cornered fight among the Crown, the Monrovia Group (Hutu), and the Casablanca Group (Tutsi). ... What eventually brought this fragile balance of power to the

verge of collapse was the sudden intrusion of East-West rivalries into the cauldron of Hutu-Tutsi competition. The key to this situation was the rapid escalation of the ‘Congo rebellion’ (1963-64) in eastern Zaire.” Brings in Chinese, which escalates Tutsi refugee / Casablanca faction coordination against Hutu. (Rene Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 68) No mention of Ethiopia or Sudan.

- No mention of potential State As in (brief) UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Nigel Watt, *Burundi: Biography of a Small African Country* (London: Hurst & Company, 2008), pp. 29-32.
- No mention of potential State As in Warren Weinstein and Robert Schrire, *Political Conflict and Ethnic Strategies: A Case Study of Burundi* (Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Foreign and Comparative Series: Eastern Africa, 1976, no. 23), pp. 6-17. Again the influence of the 1959 conflict in Rwanda is strongly emphasized. This is probably not included in my dataset because Rwanda was not a state at the time.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Ethiopia or Sudan to Burundi in 1965, pending confirmation from Lemarchand.

Burundi, 1991 (vs. Palipehutu – State A could be Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda)

- Rwanda → Burundi, 1991. “The invasion of Rwanda by the Uganda-based, Tutsi-dominated RPF on October 1, 1990, brought Hutu-Tutsi tensions in Rwanda to an unprecedented level of intensity. In some localities, the result was a wholesale massacre of hundreds of thousands of innocent Tutsi civilians. As the threat of a Tutsi takeover loomed increasingly large, popular sympathy for the Palipehutu correspondingly increased in the border areas [of Burundi]. Furthermore, as it became apparent that the Burundi government was doing nothing to prevent certain Rwanda refugees of Tutsi origins from joining the RPF and was possibly encouraging the move, the Rwanda authorities understandably responded in kind and gave their whole-hearted support to Palipehutu refugees in Rwanda. Although the evidence is lacking, it is not unreasonable to assume that some local civil servants in Rwanda might have been given a free hand to refugees to organize themselves and recruit adherents and might have looked the other way when they began to infiltrate back into Burundi.” Rene Lemarchand, *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 153-154. No mention of other potential State As’ contribution to Burundi 1991 onset.
- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. Rwanda refugee spillovers start to influence the conflict in “late 1994,” well after onset. “Initially, the conflict in Burundi was a purely internal affair. However, this changed drastically in the mid-1990s, when the country was drawn in to the conflict in neighboring Zaire/DRC.”

- No mention of potential State As' contribution to 1991 onset in Jean-Pierre Chrétien (Scott Straus, trans.), *The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousands Years of History* (New York: Zone Books, 2003), pp. 314-320. Again Rwanda matters, but the 1990 FPR conflict is not mentioned (Palipehutu violence was already underway by then).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda to Burundi in 1991, pending confirmation from Lemarchand. Lemarchand confirms in 5/18/10 e-mail.

Rwanda, 1990 (vs. FPR – State A could be Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda)

- Uganda → Rwanda, 1990. “In October 1990, Rwanda came under attack from the Tutsis in Uganda. ... The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which had sprung up in Uganda, continued to fight with Rwanda for another three years. ... The RPF was comprised mostly of 4,000 second-generation Rwandan refugees who had joined Uganda’s National Resistance Army.” (Jeanne M. Haskin, *The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship* (New York: Algora Publishing, 2005), p. 75)
 - “The RPF invasion force consequently comprised well-trained troops with combat experience who had simply deserted their NRA positions and taken their weapons. They were under the leadership of a charismatic military commander, Major-General Fred Rwigyema. He was the most famous Rwandan refugee in the NRA. He had risen to become deputy commander of the army and deputy minister of defense. But then there had been growing resentment in Uganda towards the Rwandans and Rwigyema had been removed from office. Later it was decided that non-Ugandan nationals, including Rwandan refugees, were even to be precluded from owning land. It was this that was said to have prompted the invasion and the refugees’ attempts to regain the right of citizenship in their country of origin.” (Linda Melvern, *Conspiracy to Murder: The Rwandan Genocide* (London: Verso, 2004), pp. 13-14) No mention of other potential State As.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Uganda) in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset (besides Uganda) in Jean-Pierre Chrétien (Scott Straus, trans.), *The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousands Years of History* (New York: Zone Books, 2003), pp. 320-329. Burundi 1993 influenced Rwanda 1994, but neither is coded as an onset.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Uganda) in Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 74-99.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, or Sudan to Rwanda, pending confirmation from Prunier. Prunier confirms in 5/20/10 e-mail.
 - Prunier to me: “Remember (perhaps hard to do for a person of your generation) this was in pre-globalization days: no internet, no mobile phones, the world was divided in little boxes. In the RPF box there was only Rwanda and Uganda,

nothing else, not even France or the US.” An interesting observation, especially given my 5/19/10 phone conversation with David Throup who said the only countries Kenya thought about in the early 1980s were Tanzania and Uganda (and to some extent Zimbabwe). Has globalization made contagion by demonstration easier? Maybe, maybe not — there are some random conflict linkages in the modern period (Afghanistan-Nigeria 2004), but also in the pre-globalization period (China-Peru 1960s, Cuba-everywhere 1960s, Iraq-Ethiopia 1960s).

Somalia, 1978 (vs. Forces of Abdulaahi Yusuf – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda)

- Ethiopia → Somalia, 1978. According to the UCDP summary of the Ethiopia-Somalia interstate conflict, Ethiopian instability (1974 overthrow of Haile Selassie, among other conflicts) “led the government in Mogadishu to believe that it had a good chance of achieving its goal of incorporating the Ethiopian Ogaden region into Somalia.” Hence the Somalia invasion of Ethiopia (the Ogaden War). Somalia’s defeat in the Ogaden War led to the 1978 coup (UCDP summary of Somalia intrastate conflict). No mention of other potential State As.
 - “The terrible defeat [in the Ogaden War] and the refugee influx ... quickly led to widespread public demoralization and to an upsurge of ‘tribalism’ ... as different groups sought scapegoats to explain the debacle. Thus, hard on the heels of the Somalia retreat, an unsuccessful attempted coup was mounted against the regime in April 1978. ... After the failure of the attempted coup, those who had escaped arrest regrouped, forming a guerilla operation called the Somalia Salvation Democratic Front.” (Ioan M. Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 67) Shows how the Ogaden defeat caused not only the coup but also the 1981 conflict with the SSDF. No mention of other potential State As.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Ethiopia) in I.M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa*, Fourth Edition (Oxford, U.K.: James Currey, 2002), pp. 231-246.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Ethiopia) in Hussein M. Adam, “Somali Civil Wars,” in Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, eds., *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), pp. 169-179.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, or Uganda to Somalia, pending confirmation from Lewis. Lewis confirms in 5/19/10 e-mail.

Djibouti, 1991 (vs. FRUD – State A could be Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda)

- Ethiopia → Djibouti, 1991. “The military leaders of the FRUD undoubtedly sought to duplicate guerrilla victories in neighboring Somalia and Ethiopia which had led to the over-throw of the Siad and Mengistu regimes during the first half of 1991.” (Peter J. Schraeder, “Ethnic Politics in Djibouti: From ‘Eye of the Hurricane’ to ‘Boiling Cauldron,” *African Affairs*, Vol. 92, No. 367 (1993): 203-221, p. 211) No mention of other potential State As.
 - “Despite significant levels of elite and popular support for the FRUD within Djibouti, it is also clear that at least a portion (exact figures are unobtainable) of the roughly 3,000 guerrillas come from Afar-inhabited territories of both Ethiopia and the provisional government of Eritrea. This situation is at least partially due to the large numbers of government troops, refugees, and, most significantly, light arms and weaponry that streamed into Djibouti in the aftermath of Mengistu’s overthrow in May 1991.” (Schraeder 1993, 212)
- Somalia → Djibouti, 1991. “The military leaders of the FRUD undoubtedly sought to duplicate guerrilla victories in neighboring Somalia and Ethiopia which had led to the over-throw of the Siad and Mengistu regimes during the first half of 1991.” (Peter J. Schraeder, “Ethnic Politics in Djibouti: From ‘Eye of the Hurricane’ to ‘Boiling Cauldron,” *African Affairs*, Vol. 92, No. 367 (1993): 203-221, p. 211)
 - “In short, the Djiboutian civil war appears to be a largely internal conflict in which an internally based leadership lacks external military patrons but, nonetheless, enjoys the support of an undetermined number of migratory guerrilla fighters and a ready supply of light weapons from black markets in both neighboring Somalia and Ethiopia.” (Schraeder 1993, 214)
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset of conflict in UCDP conflict summary, though Djibouti shares ethnic ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia.
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Ethiopia and Somalia) in Mohamed Kadamy, “Djibouti: Between War and Peace,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 23, No. 70 (1996): 511-521. Does note that the MPL, an early precursor to FRUD in the 1970s, was “much influenced by the Vietnamese struggle and the African liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies” (515). Seems too loose and too long ago to be Angola → Djibouti contagion.
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Ethiopia and Somalia) in Amare Tekle, “International Relations in the Horn of Africa (1991-1996), *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 23, No. 70 (1996): 499-509.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Burundi, Chad, Rwanda, Sudan, or Uganda to Djibouti, pending confirmation from Schraeder.

Ethiopia, 1960 (vs. Forces of Mengistu Neway – State A could be Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq)

- No mention of Congo-Kinshasa in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Congo-Kinshasa's contribution to coup onset in Harold G. Marcus, *The Politics of Empire: Ethiopia, Great Britain and the United States, 1941-1974*, Second Edition (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1995), pp. 116-123.
- No mention of Congo-Kinshasa in Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974* (London: James Currey, 1991), pp. 209-215. In fact, "a strong theme in the coup-makers' pronouncements was Ethiopia's backwardness, in contrast with the forward strides taken by several newly independent African states" (213), suggesting Katanga should have dissuaded them.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Democratic Republic of the Congo to Ethiopia in 1960, pending confirmation from Zewde.
- I will also assume **no contagion** from Iraq to Ethiopia in 1960 (since the Mengistu Neway coup was not pan-Arab in orientation).

Ethiopia, 1964 (vs. ELF – State A could be Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Iraq, Cuba)

- Cuba → Ethiopia, 1964. See below.
- Sudan → Ethiopia, 1964. "The wider political scene has been very relevant to the growth of the ELF. Since Ethiopia was ... one of Israel's footholds in Africa (and allowing Israel to push aid through to the rebels in the Southern Sudan), it was not surprising that the ELF was able to call on Muslim support for an anti-American, anti-Zionist struggle. In 1965 the quantity of arms coming through Sudan became so obvious that the Sudan Government announced in June that it had discovered eighteen tons of Czech arms at Khartoum airport intended for the ELF. Syria and Iraq also supplied funds, arms and training [see below]." (Patrick Gilkes, *The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), pp. 196-197) No mention of Congo-Kinshasa.
- Iraq → Ethiopia, 1964. "Formed in 1961 by Eritrean exiles in the Middle East, ... the ELF cast its struggle for Eritrean independence within a pan-Arab mould. This factor attracted much sympathy and support for it in the Arab world. Syria and Iraq, who regarded Eritrea as an integral part of the Arab homeland, became the ELF's mainstay." (Bahru Zewde, *A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974* (London: James Currey, 1991), p. 219) The Iraqi government was pan-Arab because of the 1958 coup there (and subsequent coups in 1959 and 1963). No mention of Congo-Kinshasa.
- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in Gebru Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 55-60. Mentions influence of FLN (Algeria), but this was not a substate conflict (it was

an extrastate conflict). Also mentions demonstration effect/training from Cuba (p. 59), **suggesting Cuba → Ethiopia contagion that is out-of-region.**

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Democratic Republic of the Congo to Ethiopia in 1964, pending confirmation from Zewde.

Ethiopia, 1975 (vs. ALF – State A could be Chad, Sudan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Peter Schwab, *Ethiopia: Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), pp. 26-27, 65-66.
- No mention of potential State As in Dawit Wolde Giorgis, *Red Tears: War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia* (Trenton, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1989), p. 117.
- No mention of potential State As in Alex De Waal, *Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), pp. 63-64.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Chad, Sudan, or Uganda to Ethiopia in 1975, pending confirmation from Schwab. Schwab confirms in 5/19/10 e-mail. Afterward I code **no contagion** from Zaire to Ethiopia in 1975. I could ask Schwab again, but I'm pretty sure the Afar revolts were internal to Ethiopia.

Ethiopia, 1976 (vs. EPRP/TPLF and WSLF [different incompatibilities] – State A could be Chad, Sudan, Uganda)

- Sudan → Ethiopia, 1976. “Reinvigorated by the resumption of Sudanese backing and support from many other Arab states, and further strengthened through an agreement between the rival liberation movements for tactical cooperation in the field, the rebel forces launched a successful drive against the smaller garrison towns at the end of 1976.” (John Markakis and Nega Ayele, “Class and Revolution in Ethiopia,” *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 8 (1977): 99-108, p. 106) No mention of other potential State As [this covers both EPRP and WSLF]
 - This *could* be contagion depending on why Sudan supported the EPRP/TPLF. Consider the following: “Sudanese support [possibly during the 1980s] was also part of the larger Cold War drama, which involved ... Ethiopian support for the rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Army.” (John Prendergast and Mark Duffield, “Liberation Politics in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” in Taisier M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, eds., *Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), p. 37) Considering the Sudan → Ethiopia 1964 contagion discussed above, I think this was plausibly going on in 1976.
 - SPLA didn’t exist until early 1980s, but Ethiopian support for southern resistance movements (leftovers from 1963-1972 Sudanese civil war) can be dated to 1976 – see Sudan 1983 below.

- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset [WSLF is not really mentioned] in UCDP conflict summaries, except:
 - “During the conflict, Sudan, for its own geopolitical reasons, supported TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Force) and EDU (Ethiopian Democratic Union).” Not sure if these “geopolitical reasons” are related to Sudan’s civil war.
- No mention of potential State As in Yohannis Abate, “The Legacy of Imperial Rule: Military Intervention and the Struggle for Leadership in Ethiopia, 1974-1978,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1983): 28-42.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in John Young, “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia,” *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 23, No. 70 (1996): 531-542.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in Edmond J. Keller, “Drought, War, and the Politics of Famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (1992): 609-624. [This covers both TPLF and WSLF]
- No mention of potential State As in Adam Lockyer, “Opposing Foreign Intervention’s Impact on the Course of Civil Wars: The Ethiopian-Ogaden Civil War, 1976-1980,” Paper Presented at the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Newcastle, September 25-27, 2006. [This covers WSLF only]
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in Gebru Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 76-89, 182-190. [This covers both TPLF and WSLF]
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Chad or Uganda to Ethiopia in 1976, pending confirmation from Tareke. Tareke confirms in 5/24/10 e-mail.

Ethiopia, 1977 (vs. OLF – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Uganda)

- Sudan → Ethiopia, 1977. UCDP conflict summary: “Apart from the national context, also the regional context provided opportunities for the rebel group. Relations between Ethiopia and neighboring Sudan were tense during the Dergue-period and the two countries attempted to destabilize each other by supporting rebel groups opposing the neighboring state’s regime. Thus, while Ethiopia funneled Soviet weapons and Libyan money to Sudanese rebel group SPLM/A (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army) and allowed them to have bases on Ethiopian territory, the Khartoum government let OLF train its soldiers in southwestern Sudan.” No mention of Chad, Zaire, or Uganda.
 - SPLA didn’t exist until early 1980s, but Ethiopian support for southern resistance movements (leftovers from 1963-1972 Sudanese civil war) can be dated to 1976 – see Sudan 1983 below.
- No mention of potential State As in Alex De Waal, *Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), pp. 65-70, 81-82.

- No mention of potential State As in Dawit Wolde Giorgis, *Red Tears: War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia* (Trenton, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 1989), p. 117.
- No mention of potential State As in Edmond J. Keller, *Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People's Republic* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), pp. 158-163.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, or Uganda to Ethiopia in 1977, pending confirmation from Keller. Keller confirms in 5/20/10 e-mail. Says Sudan's support for OLF was "minimal," but I'll favor the UCDP account.

Ethiopia, 1989 (vs. ALF – State A could be Chad, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda)

- There is no actual evidence of the conflict's re-onset in 1989. There was a re-onset in 1996, when the ARDUF undertook armed struggle (UCDP conflict summary). See that conflict below.

Ethiopia, 1994 (vs. ONLF – State A could be Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda)

- Somalia → Ethiopia, 1994. "Via the massive wave of returnees to the Ogaden following Somalia's [1991] disintegration, the ONLF managed to establish a presence within the territory it sought to liberate." Tobias Hagmann and Mohamud H. Khalif, "State and Politics in Ethiopia's Somali Region Since 1991," *Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies*, Vol. 6 (2006): 25-49, p. 40. No mention of other potential State As.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Somalia) in John Markakis, "The Somali in Ethiopia," *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 23, No. 70 (1996): 567-570.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Somalia) in Theodros Dagne, "Africa and the War on Terrorism: The Case of Somalia," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2002): 62-73, pp. 68-69.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, or Uganda to Ethiopia in 1994, pending confirmation from Hagmann. Hagmann confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail.

Ethiopia, 1995 (vs. al-Itahad al-Islami – State A could be Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda)

- Somalia → Ethiopia, 1995. "Ethiopia conducted occasional cross-border raids against Islamist terrorists in the country [Somalia] whom Addis Ababa blamed for several attacks in Ethiopia itself." Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 167.

- Sudan → Ethiopia, 1995. “Sudan’s attitude towards terrorism in Kenya was complicated by the fact that its government provided support to the Islamist group Al-Ittihad al-Islami (Islamic Union). Al- Islami was founded around 1991, at the end of Siyyad Barre’s regime, with the objective of finding a minimal element of ‘national’ cohesion premised on Islamist ideology. Unfortunately, Al-Ittihad became an instrument of Sudanese foreign policy, declaring a jihad against ‘infidels’ in the region. The organization conducted activities in Ethiopia through the intermediary of its large resident Somali population.” (Eric E. Otenyo, “New Terrorism: Toward an Explanation of Cases in Kenya,” *African Security Review*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2004): 75-84, p. 78) This is Sudan → Ethiopia contagion because the rise of the Islamist NIF regime in Sudan in 1989 was related to the conflict in Southern Sudan (see “Eritrea” below). No mention of other potential State As (besides Somalia).
- No mention of potential State As (besides Somalia) in David H. Shinn, “Al Qaeda in East Africa and the Horn,” *Journal of Conflict Studies* (Summer, 2007).
- No mention of potential State As (besides Somalia) in Tobias Hagmann and Mohamud H. Khalif, “State and Politics in Ethiopia’s Somali Region Since 1991,” *Bildhaan*, Vol. 6 (2006): 25-49, p. 37.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Somalia) in Ken Menkhaus, “Political Islam in Somalia,” *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2002): 109-123.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda to Ethiopia in 1995, pending confirmation from Menkhaus.

Ethiopia, 1996 (vs. ARDUF – State A could be Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Patrick Gilkes, *Ethiopia: Perspectives on Conflict, 1991-1999* (Swiss Peace Foundation, 1999).
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in T. Berhe and Y. Adaye, “The Impact of Local Conflict on Regional Stability” (no further information on reference available).
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Yasin Mohammed Yasin, “Political History of the Afar in Ethiopia and Eritrea,” *Afrika Spectrum*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2008): 39-65.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, or Uganda to Ethiopia in 1996, pending confirmation from Schwab. Schwab confirms in 5/19/10 e-mail.

Eritrea, 1997 (vs. EIJM – AS – State A could be Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda)

- Ethiopia → Eritrea, 1997. The “EJM” not only split off from the ELF in the 1970s (UCDP conflict summary); it was also apparently supported by the ELF in Sudan during the 1990s. (Ruth Iyob, “The Eritrean Experiment: A Cautious Pragmatism?” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1997): 647-673, pp. 665-667. (ELF was last active in the Ethiopian conflict in 1980, according to UCDP, but it remained active in Sudan thereafter.) No mention of other potential State As (besides Sudan).
 - Also a refugee spillover effect: “During the prolonged stay in Sudan, many refugees [from Ethiopia], the great majority of whom were Muslim, became increasingly integrated through residence and education into northern Sudanese Arabo-Islamic culture. Saudi Arabia had initially been a major supporter of refugee education and of a strong Islamic emphasis in the curriculum. After the Sudanese National Islamic Front government took power it supported Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and provided sanctuary for factions of the defeated ELF. After independence, ... EIJ ... began guerilla activities in western Eritrea.” (David Pool, *From Guerillas to Government: The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front* (Oxford, U.K.: James Currey, 2001), p. 192) No mention of other potential State As.
- Sudan → Eritrea, 1997. “The seeds of the Eritrean-Sudanese quarrel were sown in 1989, when the NIF reportedly sponsored the creation of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM).” (Amare Tekle, “International Relations in the Horn of Africa (1991-1996), *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 23, No. 70 (1996): 499-509, p. 505) This is contagion because the civil war in Southern Sudan was one of the causes of the rise of Omar al-Bashir and the NIF to power in 1989.
 - “[In early 1989] Sadiq [previous ruler] claimed his new government was committed to ending the southern civil war by implementing the November 1988 DUP-SPLM agreement. He also promised to mobilize government resources to bring food relief to famine areas, reduce the government's international debt, and build a national political consensus. Sadiq’s inability to live up to these promises eventually caused his downfall. On June 30, 1989, Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Umar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir overthrew Sadiq and established the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation to rule Sudan.” (Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Sudan: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991), <http://countrystudies.us/sudan/28.htm>)
- No mention of potential State As (besides Ethiopia and Sudan) in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Ethiopia and Sudan) in Gaim Kibreab, *Eritrea: A Dream Deferred* (Woodbridge, U.K.: James Currey, 2009), pp. 90-98, 319-322, 380.

Does note that refugees from Ethiopia were among those who founded EIJM in eastern Sudan in the 1980s (p. 211).

- No mention of potential State As (besides Ethiopia and Sudan) in Dan Connell, *Rethinking Revolution: New Strategies for Democracy and Social Justice: The Experiences of Eritrea, South Africa, Palestine, and Nicaragua* (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea Press, 2002), pp. 18, 123.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Somalia, or Uganda to Eritrea, pending confirmation from Iyob. Iyob confirms in 5/20/10 e-mail.

Angola, 1975 (vs. FNLA/UNITA – State A could be Madagascar, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of the Congo, China)

- China → Angola, 1975. See below.
- South Africa → Angola, 1975. UCDP conflict summary: “At the outset of the civil war, there were substantial elements of foreign involvement, as the domestic conflict was drawn into both the southern African regional conflict and the global power struggle between the superpowers USA and the USSR. ... The FNLA [and UNITA]... received ... significant military and logistic support ... from South Africa. Vehemently anti-communist, South Africa felt threatened by MPLA’s close relationship with the Soviet Union, as well as by the presence of Cuban troops so close to its borders. *Pretoria also wanted to retaliate for MPLA’s support for ANC and SWAPO.*” No mention of Madagascar or Zimbabwe.
- Democratic Republic of the Congo → Angola, 1975. “[Among the reasons Mobutu supported the FNLA militarily,] fourth, Mobutu had been angry for some time at MPLA for its close association with the Katanga gendarmes.” (W. Martin James III, *A Political History of the Civil War in Angola 1974-1990* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1992, p. 60) No mention of Madagascar. In November 1975 “Savimbi ... circumspectly acknowledged South African, Rhodesian, and French military support.” (James 1992, 66) Not clear if this was related to the conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe; the contribution seems quite marginal in any case and is barely mentioned in the rest of the book. The footnote (p. 84, no. 74) also mentions Biafra (Nigeria), but again in a very marginal sense. On p. 180, James lists 31 foreign supporters of UNITA (most prominently China), though actual levels of support (**with the exception of China**) seem pretty minimal.
- No mention of Madagascar or Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (with respect to Angola) in James Ciment, *Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1997), pp. 44-63.
- No mention of Madagascar or Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in Assis Malaquias, *Rebels and Robbers: Violence in Post-Colonial Angola* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2007), pp. 57-80.

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Madagascar or Rhodesia/Zimbabwe to Angola in 1975, pending confirmation from Malaquias.

Angola, 1991 (vs. FLEC-R – State A could be Comoros, Mozambique, South Africa)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. Does note: “The various FLEC factions initially received logistical support from Zaire, which had its eyes on Cabinda’s oil, but after President Neto of Angola and President Mobutu of Zaire signed an agreement to improve the two states’ relations, this source of support dried up. No new foreign help was forthcoming until in the late 1980s, when Zaire once more initiated contact, supplying FLEC-R with both weapons and rear bases. FLEC-FAC, for its part, received similar support from Congo-Brazzaville. This support remained constant until 1997, when the regimes in both Zaire and Congo-Brazzaville were overthrown, with Angolan support.” Neither Congo constitutes a conflict link, since one was well before 1991, one was after, and Congo-Kinshasa was free of conflict in the 1980s and early 1990s.
- No mention of potential State As (with respect to Angola) in James Ciment, *Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1997), p. 171.
- No mention of potential State As in Joao Gomes Porto, “Cabinda: Notes on a Soon to be Forgotten War,” African Security Analysis Program Occasional Paper, Institute for Security Studies (2003).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Comoros, Mozambique, or South Africa to Angola in 1991, pending confirmation from Porto.

Mozambique, 1977 (vs. RENAMO – State A could be Angola, South Africa, Zimbabwe)

- Zimbabwe → Mozambique, 1977. UCDP conflict summary: “On the regional level, Mozambique’s independence threatened the white regimes in both Rhodesia and South Africa, since the new, Marxist, government openly supported Rhodesian rebel group ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and South Africa’s ANC (African National Congress). Subsequently, the white regime in Rhodesia set about to assist the creation of a counter-revolutionary force, and was in this endeavor able to exploit the public disaffection with Frelimo, which was rampant through much of the Mozambican countryside.” Also South Africa → Mozambique *if* (1) South Africa helped Mozambique rebels too in 1977 (not sure it did) and (2) ANC conflict was active in 1977 (not sure it was). Surprisingly, no mention of Angola.
 - UCDP conflict summary: “Following Rhodesia’s independence in 1980 and the rise to power of a government friendly towards Frelimo, sponsorship of Renamo was taken over by South Africa. South Africa, as had been the case with Rhodesia, felt threatened by black left-wing rule in Mozambique and other southern African states, and saw Renamo as a potential vehicle for destabilization

of Mozambique and a tool for fighting anti-apartheid groups. Consequently, Renamo bases were relocated to Transvaal in northeast South Africa, and Pretoria took over the role of training and equipping the rebels.” Sounds like this was post-onset only.

- South Africa’s involvement with RENAMO seems entirely post-onset in James Ciment, *Angola and Mozambique: Postcolonial Wars in Southern Africa* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1997), pp. 110-116. No mention of Angola (with respect to Mozambique), pp. 64-70.
- No mention of Angola, and no mention of South Africa before 1979, in Glenda Morgan, “Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of Renamo,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (1990): 603-619.
- No mention of Angola’s contribution to onset, and no mention of South Africa before 1979, in Margaret Hall, “The Mozambican National Resistance Movement (Renamo): A Study in the Destruction of an African Country,” *Africa*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (1990): 39-68, pp. 39-40.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Angola or South Africa to Mozambique, pending confirmation from Ciment. E-mail bounces; Morgan and Hall can’t be located either.

South Africa, 1981 (vs. ANC – State A could be Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe)

- Zimbabwe → South Africa, 1981. “By 1980, a combination of guerilla warfare and negotiation had installed an African government in Zimbabwe. ... The militantly anti-colonial bent of the new rulers throughout southern Africa created a hostile environment for the South African government. Because the country’s buffer with independent Africa was gone, these ‘frontline states’ became potential launching grounds for guerilla activity in South Africa.” (Iris Berger, *South Africa in World History* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press (2009), p. 140) No mention of the conflicts in Angola and Mozambique, though notes that the ANC studied Vietnam (p. 142).
- No mention of State As’ conflicts in terms of contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. Does note: “In the mid-1970s, the conditions for guerrilla struggle against South Africa improved. Political upheaval in Portugal in 1974 paved the way for the independence of Angola and Mozambique, under governments led by the old ANC allies MPLA and Frelimo, respectively. This opened up the possibility for establishing camps in those countries, and launching cross-border attacks from Mozambique.” But this is not contagion because the external supporters of ANC were friendly state governments, not rebel groups in Angola or Mozambique. Also notes: “Attempts were made in 1967-68 to create a corridor through Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland through joint operations with ZAPU.” This is too far from 1981 to count as contagion (the Zimbabwe conflict is not even coded as starting until 1972).
- No mention of potential State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in Nigel Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa: Conquest, Apartheid, Democracy*, Fourth Edition

(Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), pp. 126-148. (I believe Mozambique supported the ANC before South Africa supported RENAMO, meaning there was no contagion of the RENAMO conflict.)

- No mention of potential State A conflicts' contribution to onset in Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa*, Third Edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 221-235.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Angola or Mozambique to South Africa, pending confirmation from Berger. Berger confirms in 5/24/10 e-mail.

Lesotho, 1998 (vs. military faction – State A could be Angola, Comoros)

- No mention of either potential State A in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of either potential State A in Khabele Matlosa and Neville W. Pule, “Civil-Military Relations in Lesotho, 1966–1998: Problems and Prospects,” in Rocky Williams, Gavin Cawthra, and Diane Abrahams, *Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and Defense Transformation in Southern Africa* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2002).
- No mention of either potential State A in terms of contribution to onset in Fako Johnson Likoti, “The 1998 Military Intervention in Lesotho: SADC Peace Mission or Resource War?” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2007): 251-263.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Angola or Comoros to Lesotho, pending confirmation from Matlosa.

Madagascar, 1971 (vs. Monima – State A could be South Africa)

- No mention of South Africa in (very brief) UCDP conflict summary. It's mentioned that MONIMA was Maoist.
- No mention of South Africa in Solofo Randrianja and Stephen Ellis, *Madagascar: A Short History* (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), pp. 184-185.
- No mention of South African (Namibian) conflict contributing to onset in Philip M. Allen, *Madagascar: Conflicts of Authority in the Great Island* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 59-64.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** between South Africa and Madagascar, pending confirmation from Allen. Allen confirms in 5/24/10 e-mail.

Comoros, 1989 (vs. Presidential Guard – State A could be Angola, Mozambique, South Africa)

- South Africa → Comoros, 1989. UCDP conflict summary: “France and South Africa - previous backers of Denard and the Presidential Guard, but now with new reform-minded governments, embarrassed by the excesses of the Guard - pressured Abdallah to dispense with the mercenaries. Abdallah agreed to both expel Denard and his fellow officers by the end of the year and to absorb the GP into the regular army. It is widely believed that it was Denard who, faced with deportation, shot the president to death on the night of 26-27

November 1989.” This is contagion if the “reform-minded government” in South Africa came to power as a result of ANC violence there (surely it did). No mention of Angola or Mozambique.

- “The end of the Cold War, the persistent calls from Western donors for democratization, and the striking turn of events in South Africa following the release of Nelson Mandela were the harbingers for a new political era in the Comoros. A shift in foreign policy in France and South Africa resulted in the two countries combining their leverage and set the ground for ousting Denard from the Comoros in December 1989, against the backdrop of President Abdallah’s assassination.” (Ali Y. Alwahti, “Prevention of Secessionist Movements in a Micro-State: The International Mediation in the Comoros Islands,” *Swords & Ploughshares*, American University (date unknown), p. 2) No mention of Angola or of Mozambique’s contribution to onset.
- No mention of Angola or Mozambique’s conflicts’ contributions to 1989 Comoros onset in Eliphaz G. Mukonoweshuro, “The Politics of Squalor and Dependency: Chronic Political Instability and Economic Collapse in the Comoro Islands,” *African Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 357 (1990): 555-577. Does note (p. 563): “In May 1978, a group of 50 European mercenaries and a German Shepherd dog, led by ex-Congo mercenary Colonel Bob Denard, overthrew the regime.” This could suggest DRC→Comoros contagion, but Denard was a French national who had numerous mercenary experiences in his career; Katanga was just one of them.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Angola or Mozambique to Comoros in 1989, pending confirmation from Alwahti.

Comoros, 1997 (vs. MPA/Republic of Anjouan – State A could be Angola, Mozambique)

- No mention of either potential State A in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Angola or of Mozambique’s contribution to onset in Ali Y. Alwahti, “Prevention of Secessionist Movements in a Micro-State: The International Mediation in the Comoros Islands,” *Swords & Ploughshares*, American University (date unknown), pp. 1-3.
- No mention of Angola or of Mozambique’s contribution to onset in Richard Cornwell, “Anjouan: A Spat in the Indian Ocean,” *African Security Review*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1998).
- No mention of Angola or Mozambique in Gino J. Naldi, “Separatism in the Comoros: Some Legal Aspects,” *Leiden Journal of International Law*, Vol. 11 (1998): 247-256, pp. 247-248.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Angola or Mozambique to Comoros in 1997, pending confirmation from Alwahti.

Morocco 1971 (vs. forces of Mohamed Madbouh – State A could be Chad)

- No mention of Chad in C.R. Pennell, *Morocco since 1830: A History* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), pp. 330-332. Does note (p. 332): “The blame was laid on Arab nationalists, inspired by Colonel Qaddafi of Libya. In fact, most senior officers were Berbers, trying to protect their positions.”
- No mention of Chad in King Hassan II (Anthony Rhodes, trans.), *The Challenge* (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 147-151.
- Without a third source, I will code **no contagion** from Chad to Morocco in 1971, pending confirmation from Pennell. Pennell confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail.

Morocco 1975 (vs. POLISARIO – State A could be Chad or Mauritania)

- No mention of Chad in UCDP conflict summary. POLISARIO fought against Moroccan and Mauritanian occupiers simultaneously from 1975 (after Spanish withdrawal); I don't really consider this as contagion so much as two branches of the same conflict. (Assistance from Algeria noted, but onset was pre-1991.)
- No mention of Chad's contribution to onset in Tony Hodges, *Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War* (Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill & Company, 1983).
- No mention of Chad's contribution to onset in John Damis, *Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983).
- No mention of Chad's contribution to onset in Erik Jensen, *Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2005).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Chad or Mauritania to Morocco in 1975, pending confirmation from Pennell (see just above – talks about this conflict pp. 337-342, also no mention of Chad). Pennell confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail.

Algeria 1991 (vs. Takfir wa'l Hijra – State A could be Morocco, Mali, Niger, Chad, Afghanistan)

- Afghanistan → Algeria, 1991. See below.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. Does note: “When it comes to the various rebel groups, it is more difficult to establish both sender and exact recipient of the support, as much of it has been given clandestinely. What is certain is that a number of Islamic organizations, e.g. the Islamic Relief Organization, at times have made economic contributions to AIS and that Sudan supplied GIA with arms in the late 1990s [post-onset].”
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in Luis Martinez, *The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). Does note (p. 63): “For young FIS sympathizers the violence experienced by their neighborhood in Les Eucalyptus was comparable with that in the city of Hama in Syria [1979], which symbolized the martyrdom of the Islamist Cause at the hands of an ‘impious’ state power.” Describes state of affairs in 1993, and seems like a bit of a stretch besides.

- On Takfir wa'l Hijra, "That small group included 'Afghans' (Algerians said to have fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan), and its ideological affiliation was of Egyptian origin." (p. 21, note 7) Suggests Afghanistan → Algeria contagion, though only through a possibly marginal manpower contribution.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in James Ciment, *Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1997) Does note: "Mostly composed of Islamic veterans of the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan, these militants, known popularly in Algeria as 'Afghanis,' have formed groups like the GIA and the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA)." (p. 5) GIA did not emerge until later in the conflict (c. 1993); MIA again seems pretty small. So again I'd consider these influences to be marginal, but I should ask. Also notes influence of "Islamist radicals inspired by their brethren in Egypt and elsewhere" on nascent rebellion in 1980s (p. 83). Egypt itself didn't have a conflict until 1983, but suggests the Syria 1979 conflict (vs. Muslim Brotherhood) had some impact on Algeria 1991. (Too vague to count as contagion.)
- No mention of potential State As in John Ruedy, *Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation*, Second Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), pp. 247-265. However, notes that the MIA was actually a fairly sizable insurgent group (p. 263), suggesting Afghanistan → Algeria contagion is genuine.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Morocco, Mali, Niger, or Chad to Algeria, pending confirmation from Ruedy.

Tunisia, 1980 (vs. Résistance Armée Tunisienne – State A could be Morocco, Chad, Mauritania)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Harold D. Nelson, ed., *Tunisia: A Country Study*, Third Edition (Washington: Foreign Area Studies Series, American University, 1988), pp. 64-68, 269, 271, 273. Libya apparently supported the uprising, but Libya has not had a violent substate conflict.
- No mention of potential State As in Kenneth J. Perkins, *Tunisia: Crossroads of the Islamic and European Worlds* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 151-153, 159.
- No mention of potential State As in Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, *The Politicization of Islam: A Case Study of Tunisia* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 36-38. Notes the rebels were "backed by Algerian and Libyan intelligence" (p. 38), but neither state was in conflict at the time.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Chad, Mauritania, or Morocco to Tunisia, pending confirmation from Perkins.

Sudan, 1963 (vs. Anya Nya – State A could be Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia)

- No mention of either potential State A in (brief) UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (Kampala: International African Institute, 2003), pp. 21-

35. Does note (p. 31): “By modern standards, the first years of the war were very modestly conducted. The guerillas were knit together very loosely and had no external military support, arming themselves mainly by theft from police outposts, the occasional ambush of army patrols, or through the defection of Southern police or soldiers. Ironically, the Anya Nya obtained their first substantial quantity of military hardware only after the 1964 overthrow of Abbud, and then only through the unwitting generosity of the Sudanese government. The transitional government which replaced Abbud adopted a more interventionist foreign policy in the region and, along with other Arab states, supported the Simba movement in neighboring Congo. Shipments of weapons sent overland through Sudan to the Simbas fell into Anya Nya hands.”

- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Scopas S. Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan, 1955-1972* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 145-168. Again the Simbas in Congo provided arms, but from 1964 on.
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Dunstan M. Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1981), pp. 125-141.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Democratic Republic of the Congo or Ethiopia to Sudan in 1963, pending confirmation from Poggo. Poggo confirms in 5/26/10 e-mail.

Sudan, 1971 (vs. Sudanese Communist Party – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Uganda)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Scopas S. Poggo, *The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan, 1955-1972* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 176. I suppose the Congo rebels’ support for the southern war from 1964 on allowed the war in the south to continue, composing one of the grievances of the coup? Seems like a stretch.
- No mention of potential State As in Dunstan M. Wai, *The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan* (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1981), p. 148.
- No mention of potential State As in Edgar O’Ballance, *Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 60-67.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, or Uganda to Sudan in 1971, pending confirmation from Poggo. Poggo confirms in 5/26/10 e-mail.

Sudan, 1983 (vs. SPLM/A – State A could be Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda)

- Ethiopia → Sudan, 1983. “In 1976, ... a Sudanese government delegation to Ethiopia ... was told quite explicitly by the Ethiopian Foreign Minister that unless the Sudan ceased

supplying the Eritrean rebels, Ethiopia would give active support to the Anya Nya remnants in Ethiopia who had refused to accept the Addis Ababa agreement. Nimairi's support for the Eritreans, and subsequently for anti-Derg forces, continued despite this warning. Ethiopia's support for various Sudanese dissidents dates from 1976. ... The SPLA [had an] early dependence on Mengistu's government." (Douglas H. Johnson, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (Kampala: International African Institute, 2003), pp. 59-60) No mention of other potential State As' contribution to onset.

- No specific mention of State As' contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. Ethiopia's Mengistu government aided the SPLM/A, but seemingly not as a result of any conflict (the 1974 coup that brought Mengistu to power was bloodless). Refugees from Ethiopia *may* have influenced the 1983 rebellion, but not enough detail is given.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset (besides Ethiopia) in John Young, "Sudan: Liberation Movements, Regional Armies, Ethnic Militias, and Peace," *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 30, No. 97 (2003): 423-434.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Somalia, or Uganda to Sudan in 1983, pending confirmation from Johnson. Johnson confirms in 5/25/10 e-mail.

Iran, 1966 (vs. KDPI – State A could be Iraq, Israel, Syria)

- Iraq → Iran, 1966. "The KDPI did, nonetheless, succeed until 1966 in providing significant aid and manpower to Barzani's KDP revolt in Iraq. The Shah might have even tolerated such assistance. ... By 1966, however, he shrewdly decided to provide more aid to Barzani than that offered by the KDPI. By doing this, the Shah made the Iraqi Kurds more dependent upon him than the KDPI, after which he convinced Barzani to help him suppress the KDPI as the price for his support. Opportunistically, Barzani complied by demanding that Iranian Kurds cease opposition to the Shah. ... *Such a ridiculous framing of the issue led many to end their support of Barzani and return home to fight the Shah. In 1967 a dissident group within the KDPI (among those who had been forced out of Iraqi Kurdistan by Barzani) launched a guerilla offensive in Iran.*" (David Romano, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 231-232) No mention of Israel or Syria.
- 1966 Kurdistan conflict is not mentioned in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Israel or Syria in Mir Zohair Hussein and Stephen Shumock, "Kurdish Ethnonationalism: A Concise Overview," in Santosh C. Saha, ed., *Perspectives on Contemporary Ethnic Conflict: Primal Violence or the Politics of Conviction?* (Oxford, U.K.: Lexington Books, 2006), p. 280.
- Hence (though missing a third source) I will code **no contagion** from Israel or Syria to Iran in 1966, pending confirmation from Romano. Romano confirms in 5/25/10 e-mail.

Iran, 1979 (vs. MEK, KDPI and APCO [three different incompatibilities] – State A could be Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Pakistan, Syria)

- MEK
 - Israel → Iran, 1979. UCDP conflict summary: “The group’s potential for violence was developed as members were sent to train in PLO camps in Lebanon and Jordan.” This was seemingly prior to the outbreak of the 1975 conflict in Lebanon (so Lebanon is not itself a sender). No mention of other potential State As.
 - No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Nicole Cafarella, *Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK) Dossier* (Center for Policing Terrorism, 2005). Significant support from Iraq under Saddam Hussein, but not related to any of the Iraqi substate conflicts.
 - No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Connor Norris, “Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MEK),” unpublished paper (available on Google Scholar), July 27, 2008.
 - No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Haggay Ram, “Crushing the Opposition: Adversaries of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 3 (1992): 426-439.
 - No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Israel) in Michael Rubin, “Monsters of the Left: The Mujahedin al-Khalq,” *Front Page Magazine*, January 13, 2006.
- KDPI
 - No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary.
 - No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in David Romano, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 233-238.
 - No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Edgar O’Ballance, *The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 107-114. KDPI leader looked to “the recent Iraqi Kurdish insurrection” and “hoped for support” from the KDP, but this was after a conventional armed confrontation with the Iranian state went badly in August 1979 (pp. 112-113).
- APCO
 - Iraq → Iran, 1979. “Soon after the revolution, Iran stopped effectively patrolling its border with Iraqi Kurdistan, permitting KDP forces to reorganize. In response, Iraq began supporting rebellion by Arab groups in the largely Arab-speaking and oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzistan.” (James DeFronzo, *The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), p. 84)
 - No mention of other potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
 - No additional information on this conflict available on Google Scholar.

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, or Syria to Iran in 1979, pending confirmation from Ervand Abrahamian (a historian cited by Rubin). Abrahamian confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail (says Amal had links to Revolutionary Guard, but that is not one of the conflicts here).

Turkey, 1984 (vs. PKK – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria)

- Israel → Turkey, 1984. “In September 1980 Ocalan settled in Damascus and, with Syrian government help, established training camps in the Bekaa Valley, where Syrian and Palestinian officers trained his followers.” (Erik J. Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 316) Again raises the question of whether “Syrian government help” was related to the Muslim Brotherhood conflict; I suspect not (why would the Syrian state want to take down a secular regime in Turkey as a result of their conflict with Islamists?). No mention of other potential State As.
- Iraq → Turkey, 1984. “From 1982 onwards, the Iran-Iraq war gave Kurdish organizations in northern Iraq ... a free hand. ... Relations between the Marxist PKK and Barzani’s conservative [KDP] were never very cordial, but the latter nevertheless allowed Ocalan’s followers to operate from [KDP]-controlled areas south of the Iraqi-Turkish border.” (Erik J. Zurcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 316) No mention of other potential State As.
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. Iraqi Kurdish support in late 1980s/early 1990s, but this was seemingly post-onset.
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Sina Aksin (Dexter H. Mursaloglu, trans.), *Turkey: From Empire to Revolutionary Republic* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), pp. 286-287. Syrian support for PKK appears to be post-onset and unrelated to the Muslim Brotherhood conflict.
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in David Romano, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 49-54. Notes (p. 50) “Syria was happy to provide the insurgents with refuge and allow them to organize on its own territory and in Lebanon, hoping to cultivate a political lever in its dealings with Turkey.” The “dealings” appear to be over water, hence totally unrelated to the Muslim Brotherhood conflict. Also notes (p. 50): “By 1983, the PKK also moved into Iraqi and Iranian territory, having reached an agreement of cooperation with Masoud Barzani’s [KDP] in northern Iraq.” Was the Iranian connection tied to Barzani or to the KDPI? (No; see below)
- No mention of Iran’s, Lebanon’s or Syria’s conflicts’ contribution to onset in Michael M. Gunter, “Transnational Sources of Support for the Kurdish Insurgency in Turkey,” *Conflict Quarterly* (1991): 7-29. The Iranian support, limited anyway, was from the Iranian state and appears to have nothing to do with the KDPI.

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Iran, Lebanon, or Syria to Turkey in 1984, pending confirmation from Gunter. Gunter confirms in 5/26/10 e-mail (says “Lebanon’s instability probably helped enable PKK training in that state,” but see argument below).

Turkey, 1991 (vs. Devrimci Sol – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon)

- Israel → Turkey, 1991. UCDP conflict summary: “Devrimci Sol has reportedly cooperated with Palestinian organizations since the late 1970s and in 1991 militants trained in Lebanon’s Syrian-held Bekaa Valley.” No Syrian conflict is remotely proximate; Syria does appear to have occupied the Bekaa Valley during the Lebanon War, but presumably it could have found somewhere else to train Devrimci Sol militants. Also, “This struggle was intensified in the beginning of the 1990s during the Gulf War when Devrimci Sol started a violent campaign against government and security representatives, as well as American ‘imperialists’ on Turkish soil.” This is contagion of an interstate war (U.S.-Iraq 1991), but is not related to any substate conflicts in Iraq. No mention of other potential State As.
- No mention of potential State As in Noriyuki Katagiri, “In the Spotlight: Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front,” Center for Defense Information, November 4, 2002.
- No mention of potential State As (external support “unknown”) in U.S. State Department, *Patterns of Global Terrorism* (Washington: U.S. State Department, 2001), pp. 108-109.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Iran, Iraq, or Lebanon to Turkey in 1991, pending confirmation from Sözen (see below). Sözen confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail.

Turkey, 2005 (vs. MKP – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary (it is Maoist, though).
- No mention of potential State As in START summary on TKP/ML-TIKKO (http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=116).
- No mention of potential State As in Ahmet Sözen [Eastern Mediterranean University, North Cyprus], “Terrorism and the Politics of Anti-Terrorism in Turkey,” in Robert W. Orttung and Andrey Makarychev, eds., *National Counter-Terrorism Strategies: Legal, Institutional, and Public Policy Dimensions in the US, UK, France, Turkey and Russia* (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2006), p. 138.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Iran, Iraq, or Israel to Turkey in 2005, pending confirmation from Sözen. Sözen confirms in 5/27/10 e-mail.

Iraq, 1958 (vs. Free Officers Movement – State A could be Israel, Lebanon)

- Israel → Iraq, 1958. “One of the major impacts of the defeat in Palestine was the belief among many Iraqi officers and soldiers that they had lost the war because they had been betrayed by their own government. ... The Iraqi army’s experience in Palestine, along with the pro-Western Baghdad Pact in 1955 and the Suez crisis and war of 1956, eventually combined to provoke the armed forces to do what the opposition political

parties could not: destroy the monarchy and free Iraq from British domination.” (James DeFronzo [University of Connecticut], *The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), p. 35)

- The Egyptian Revolution, which inspired the Iraqi revolt, was also a product of the Palestinian conflict (“Similar to younger officers in the Iraqi military, Egyptian officers whose army had also been defeated in the 1948 war with Israel believed that the Egyptian government had betrayed its fighting forces, ... leading to the shame of defeat” – p. 37).
- Lebanon → Iraq, 1958. “The West ... may have encouraged [Prime Minister] Nuri al-Said of Iraq to support [Lebanese President] Chamoun’s [rigged elections]. If so, then the West helped to tip Nuri’s already corrupt regime over the edge and to extinguish the pro-Western Iraqi monarchy. In Iraq ... Kassem had formed an equivalent of Egypt’s ‘Free Officers’ organization, and *when Nuri made clear his intention to help Chamoun the Kassem faction staged a successful rebellion to depose Nuri and King Feisal II.* ... In the summer of 1958 Nuri had perceived that if the Lebanese civil war resulted in a victory for the pro-Nasser Arabs then Iraq would be isolated. He had already given Chamoun moral and monetary support in May and June, and resolved in July to deploy an army division to Jordan for possible use against Syria. ... On the morning of 14 July army contingents headed by Kassem, ... ignoring instructions to bypass Baghdad on their way to Jordan, entered the Iraqi capital.” (Geoff Simons, *Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam*, Second Edition (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 251-252)

Iraq, 1961 (vs. KDP – State A could be Israel, Lebanon)

- No mention of Israel or Lebanon in Edgar O’Ballance, *The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), pp. 47-50. The revolt was actually started on September 11, 1961 by a Kurd named Sheikh Abbas Mohammed; Barzani, who had become a hero in the Iran 1946 conflict, was not initially involved (pp. 47-48), and neither apparently was the KDP itself (p. 49). Thus Iran 1946 → Iraq 1961 contagion is invalid.
- No mention of Lebanon in UCDP conflict summary. Israel supported the KDP, but apparently only from 1970 on (David Romano, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 193). Does note that KDP split from KDPI (Iran) in 1946, but apparently KDP was not involved in the initial onset of the Kurdish conflict in 1961 (see above).
- No mention of Lebanon’s or Israel’s contribution to onset in David Romano, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 188-193.
- No mention of Israel or Lebanon in James DeFronzo, *The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), pp. 55-56. On the Iranian/KDPI connection, notes Barzani “began to prepare for armed conflict” in January 1961, but

O'Ballance disagrees, writing "he had had no intention of rising in arms against the central government: he was drawn into revolt by circumstances" (1996, p. 47). I favor the O'Ballance account because it seems more detailed.

- No mention of Israel or Lebanon in Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990), pp. 79-82.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Israel or Lebanon to Iraq in 1961, pending confirmation from DeFronzo. DeFronzo confirms in 5/29/10 e-mail.

Iraq, 1982 (vs. SCIRI – State A could be Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Afghanistan)

- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary. The Iranian government has supported SCIRI from the start, but the anti-Shah coup in 1979 was not in itself a substate conflict (though it did kick off three separate substate conflicts, seemingly not related to Iraq 1982).
- No mention of potential State A conflicts' contribution to onset in James DeFronzo, *The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), p. 90.
- No mention of potential State A conflicts' contribution to onset in Robert G. Rabil, "The Iraqi Opposition's Evolution: From Conflict to Unity?" *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2002).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, or Syria to Iraq in 1982, pending confirmation from DeFronzo [I forgot to ask about Afghanistan]. DeFronzo mostly confirms in 5/29/10 e-mail (has some nuance about the Iran connection).

Iraq, 2004 (vs. Al-Mahdi Army, Ansar al-Islam, ISI – State A could be Iran, Israel, Turkey, Afghanistan)

- Afghanistan → Iraq, 2004. "Ansar-controlled territories ... were a stronghold where Kurdish Islamism converged with the 'Arab Afghans.' These Arab Afghans were Arab mujahideen who had traveled to join the Afghani jihad against the Soviets and then stayed on in training camps in the mountains of Afghanistan once the war was over. Many fled to Kurdistan after the U.S. assault on their mountain abodes in 2001 and 2002 and turned to training local Islamists. ... One of these Arab Afghans is thought to have been Abu Musab al-Zarqawi." (Peter J. Munson, *Iraq in Transition: The Legacy of Dictatorship and the Prospects for Democracy* (Washington: Potomac Books, 2009), pp. 144-145) No mention of Iran's or Turkey's conflicts.
- Israel → Iraq, 2004. "Over the next year [2001-2002], al-Zarqawi bounced between Iran and Kurdistan, where he was protected by Ansar al-Islam, and built up his army and a network of contacts. He frequented Syria and the Ain al-Halwa Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon, his prime recruiting ground." (Peter J. Munson, *Iraq in Transition: The Legacy of Dictatorship and the Prospects for Democracy* (Washington: Potomac

Books, 2009), p. 146) [Southern Lebanon is a disputed territory in the Israel 1990 substate conflict]

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Turkey's or Iran's conflicts' contribution to onset in James DeFronzo, *The Iraq War: Origins and Consequences* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), pp. 195-218. Does note (p. 212): "The key reason for the rise of the resistance insurgency was the perception that the United States and its partners had launched an unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Iraq for the purpose of seizing control of its energy resources and removing an opponent of U.S. and Israeli policies." I don't think this is a direct enough link to be Israel → Iraq contagion – the key impetus for the rise of the insurgency was the U.S. invasion, and the Palestinian story appears to be pure rhetoric (some other grievance against the U.S. would have been found, or the mercantilist story would have stood on its own).
- No mention of MEK in Kenneth Katzman, "Iran's Activities and Influence in Iraq," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (June 4, 2009).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Iran or Turkey to Iraq in 2004, pending confirmation from DeFronzo. DeFronzo confirms in 5/29/10 e-mail.

Egypt, 1993 (vs. al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya – State A could be Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Turkey, Mali, Niger, Chad, Afghanistan)

- Afghanistan → Egypt, 1993. UCDP conflict summary: "Many Islamist activists instead became involved in jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and did not return to Egypt until the beginning of the 1990s. With this influx of battle-hardened veterans the situation in Egypt radically changed." No mention of other potential State A conflicts' contribution to onset (Iran and Sudan supported, but seems unrelated to their conflicts; October War of 1973 laid the foundation for recruitment, but this was a long-ago interstate conflict).
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset (besides Afghanistan) in Hisham Mubarak, Souhail Shadoud, and Steve Tamari, "What Does the Gama'a Islamiyya Want?: An Interview with Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim," *Middle East Report*, No. 198 (1996): 40-46.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset (besides Afghanistan) in Anneli Botha, "Politics and Terrorism: An Assessment of the Origin and Threat of Terrorism in Egypt," *Institute for Security Studies Paper No. 131* (2006), pp. 1-7.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset (besides Afghanistan) in Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., *A Brief History of Egypt* (New York: Facts on File, 2008), p. 223.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Turkey, Mali, Niger, or Chad to Egypt, pending confirmation from Botha. Botha more or less confirms in 5/31/10 e-mail.

Syria, 1966 (vs. Forces loyal to Nureddin Atassi and Youssef Zeayen – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel)

- No mention of Iran or Iraq in UCDP conflict summary. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is mentioned in the sense that the Syrian defeat promoted a general destabilization of Syria post-1948, but this seems too distant and weak to be contagion.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in Patrick Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 97-103.
- No mention of potential State As in Nikolaos Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 34-47.
- No mention of Iran in Martin Seymour, "The Dynamics of Power in Syria since the Break with Egypt," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1970): 35-47. Mentions the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but concludes its contribution to the 1966 coup was marginal and likely rhetorical (p. 43). The contribution of the Iraqi conflict seems rather complex, but overall this feels more like an internecine power struggle than a conflict somehow influenced by the events in Iraq (I should ask Van Dam).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Iran, Iraq, or Israel to Syria in 1966, pending confirmation from Van Dam. Unfortunately he cannot be contacted.

Syria, 1979 (vs. Muslim Brotherhood – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon)

- Lebanon → Syria, 1979. "In turn, the Lebanese civil war galvanized internal unrest in Syria, which only ended its own civil war in 1982." Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 21.
 - UCDP conflict summary: "Tensions further increased within the country when Syria intervened on the Christian 'rightist' side in Lebanon's civil war in 1976; a move that seriously compromised the leadership's legitimacy as an Arab and Muslim proponent." No mention of other potential State As.
 - Also refugee spillovers from Lebanon – Patrick Seale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), p. 320. No mention of other potential State As' contribution to onset. Does note that Arafat had an "early allegiance" to the Muslim Brotherhood, pre-1966, but this seems too distant and weak to be contagion. Also notes Iraqi government support for Muslim Brotherhood (p. 321), but this appears to be unrelated to the Kurdish conflict in Iraq.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset (besides Lebanon) in Nikolaos Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 89-96.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Iran, Iraq, or Israel to Syria in 1979, pending confirmation from Van Dam. Unfortunately he cannot be contacted.

Lebanon, 1958 (vs. Independent Nasserite Movement /Mourabitoun Militia – State A could be Israel)

- The Lebanon conflict preceded the Iraq conflict in 1958, so Iraq cannot be a State A.
- Israel → Lebanon, 1958. “Immediately after independence, Lebanon’s internal political balance was further strained by the influx of 120,000 refugees from Palestine following the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.” (Tom Russell, “A Lebanon Primer,” *MERIP Reports*, No. 133 (1985): 17-19, p. 17)
 - “[Early 1950s]: “The balance between religious communities, provided for in the [1943] National Pact, was precariously maintained, and undercurrents of hostility were discernible. The Muslim community criticized the regime in which Christians, alleging their numerical superiority, occupied the highest offices in the state and filled a disproportionate number of civil service positions. Accordingly, the Muslims asked for a census, which they were confident would prove their numerical superiority. The Christians refused.” (Thomas Collelo, ed., *Lebanon: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1987)
 - UCDP conflict summary: “Changing demographics (in favor of the Sunnis and Shiites) and differing views on what political alignments the state should pursue however soon created deep rifts in society.”

Lebanon, 1975 (vs. LNM/LAA – State A could be Iraq, Israel)

- Israel → Lebanon, 1975. “Many Lebanese Muslims staunchly supported the Palestinians against Israel. ... After both the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars, they were appalled that the Maronite-dominated government did nothing to help the Arab cause against Israel. This was part of the powder keg of animosity between Muslims and Christian Lebanese that the PLO detonated.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 33. [Also Jordan 1970-1971 → Lebanon 1975 according to Byman/Pollack, 21, but Jordan’s conflict is not included in the UCDP/PRIO list.]
 - UCDP conflict summary: “Also, the massive influx of Palestinian refugees into Lebanon following the 1948 and 1967 Israeli-Arab wars had by the 1970s reached more than 300 000, this also tilting power in favor of the Sunnis since most Palestinians were of this religious persuasion. Amongst the Palestinian refugee population could also be found the forces of the PLO and other guerrilla groups who made up a formidable fighting force of over 15 000 men who were keen not to lose their last foothold on the Israeli border. The fact that the Palestinian groups in Lebanon also at times acted as a ‘state-within-the-state,’ building roadblocks and clashing with Christian militias and security forces, did little to assuage the fears of the Maronite elite. The Palestinian presence in Lebanon - and also the devastation it wrought on the country in the form of Israeli attacks, which

especially embittered the southern Shias - thus became yet another contributing factor to the outbreak of the civil war.” No mention of Iraq or Kurds.

- No mention of Kurds in Edgar O’Ballance, *The Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-1992* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
- Only sporadic mentions of Kurds in Farid el Khazen, *The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000). They did emigrate from Iraq to Lebanon, but “in smaller numbers” (p. 131).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Iraq to Lebanon in 1975, pending confirmation from el Khazen. Khazen confirms in 6/1/10 e-mail.

Lebanon, 1982 (vs. LNM/Amal – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria)

- Israel → Lebanon, 1982. According to UCDP conflict summary, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 – motivated by the PLO insurgency – and its installment of Bashir Gemayel as President of Lebanon caused the LNM assassination of Gemayel, which started the intrastate war. No mention of Iran or Iraq in terms of onset. Syria’s support for the LNM is prominently mentioned, but it’s not clear that this is related to the Muslim Brotherhood conflict.
- No mention of Iran, Iraq, or Syrian conflict with Muslim Brotherhood in Edgar O’Ballance, *The Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-1992* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), pp. 112-122. The Muslim Brotherhood is only briefly mentioned on p. 104, as the target of a Syrian bombing campaign inside Lebanon in February 1980.
- No mention of conflicts in Iran, Iraq, or Syria in Tom Russell, “A Lebanon Primer,” *MERIP Reports*, No. 133 (1985): 17-19.
- No mention of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in Etienne Sakr, “The Politics and Liberation or Lebanon,” *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (2005): 86-105. Iranian support for rebel groups from the “early 1980s” is noted, but this appears to be on the part of the Iranian government and unrelated to the MEK/KDPI/APCO conflicts of 1979. No mention of Iraq’s contribution to onset.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Iran, Iraq, or Syria to Lebanon in 1982, pending confirmation from el Khazen. Khazen confirms in 6/3/10 e-mail.

Israel, 1949 (vs. Palestinian insurgents – State A could be Iran)

- No mention of Kurds/Iran in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Kurds in Benny Morris, *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
- No mention of Kurds/Iran in Mark Tessler, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Second Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 257-349.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Iran to Israel in 1948/1949, pending confirmation from Tessler. Tessler confirms in 5/28/10 e-mail.

Israel, 1990 (vs. Hezbollah – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey)

- Lebanon → Israel, 1990. UCDP conflict summary: “Harakat Amal initially held a relatively neutral stance towards the Israeli presence [in southern Lebanon], since it supported their actions against Palestinian militants. However, as Israel attempted to solidify its grip on the ‘security zone’ through the creation of an occupation-type administration, anti-Israeli sentiments began to grow amongst pro-freedom Shiite activists, most notably among Amal and Lebanese National Resistance fighters. Amal leader Nabih Berri began to oppose the Israeli occupation, and Hezbollah began to take form from the Lebanese National Resistance and dissident members of Amal around 1982.” No mention of other potential State As’ contribution to onset (Iran supports Hezbollah, but this is not related to the MEK/KDPI conflicts in Iran).
- No mention of potential State A conflicts’ contribution to onset (besides Lebanon) in Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the 1948 War of Independence to the Present*, Revised Edition (London: Greenhill Books, 2004), pp. 377-385. Syrian/Iranian support noted, but none related to a substate conflict in those countries.
- No mention of potential State A conflicts’ contribution to onset (besides Lebanon) in Judith Palmer Harik, *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 29-42 (some pages missing).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Iran, Iraq, or Turkey to Israel in 1990, pending confirmation from Harik.

Israel, 2006 (vs. Hezbollah – State A could be Iran, Iraq, Turkey)

- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, *34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
- No mention of State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in Hany T. Nakhleh, *The 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Implications* (Master of Strategic Studies Thesis, U.S. Army War College, 2007).
- No mention of State A conflicts’ contribution to onset in Matt M. Matthews, *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War* (Leavenworth: The Long War Series, Occasional Paper 26, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Iran, Iraq, or Turkey to Israel in 2006, pending confirmation from Harel. Harel confirms in 6/4/10 phone call.

Saudi Arabia, 1979 (vs. JSM – State A could be Oman)

- No mention of Oman in (brief) UCDP conflict summary.

- No mention of Oman in Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, “Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-‘Utaybi Revisited,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2007): 103-122.
- No mention of Oman in Alexei Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia* (London: Saqi Books, 1998), pp. 395-396.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Oman to Saudi Arabia, pending confirmation from Hegghammer. Hegghammer confirms in 6/1/10 e-mail.

North Yemen, 1962 (vs. Royalists – State A could be Oman)

- No mention of Oman in (brief) UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Oman in Jonathan Walker, *Aden Insurgency: The Savage War in South Arabia, 1962-1967* (Staplehurst, U.K.: Spellmount, 2005), pp. 41-53.
- No mention of Oman in Robin Bidwell, *The Two Yemens* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 195-208. This was a proxy war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, but neither had yet had a substate conflict.
- No mention of Oman in Robert D. Burrowes, “Prelude to Unification: The Yemen Arab Republic, 1962-1990,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1991): 483-506.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Oman to North Yemen in 1962, pending confirmation from Burrowes. Burrowes confirms in 6/1/10 e-mail.

North Yemen, 1980 (vs. National Democratic Front – State A could be Oman or Saudi Arabia)

- No mention of Oman or Saudi Arabia in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Oman’s or Saudi Arabia’s conflicts’ contribution to onset in Robin Bidwell, *The Two Yemens* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983). pp. 321-324.
- No mention of Oman’s or Saudi Arabia’s conflicts’ contribution to onset in F. Gregory Gause III, “Yemeni Unity: Past and Future,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1988): 33-47.
- No mention of Oman’s or Saudi Arabia’s conflicts’ contribution to onset in Robert D. Burrowes, “The Yemen Arab Republic and the Ali Abdallah Salih Regime: 1978-1984,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1985): 287-316.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Oman or Saudi Arabia to North Yemen in 1980, pending confirmation from Burrowes. Burrowes confirms in 6/1/10 e-mail.

South Yemen, 1986 (vs. Yemenite Socialist Party - Abdul Fattah Ismail faction – State A could be North Yemen)

- North Yemen → South Yemen, 1986. “Units of the National Democratic Front, which in 1982 were forced to retreat from the North into the South, reportedly joined in the fighting against [PDRY President] Ali Nasir.” F. Gregory Gause III, “Yemeni Unity: Past and Future,” *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1988): 33-47, p. 45.

Oman, 1972 (vs. PFLO – State A could be North Yemen, China)

- China → Oman, 1972. See below.
- No mention of North Yemen in UCDP conflict summary (South Yemen supported the rebels, but this appears unrelated to the Royalist conflict in North Yemen).
- No mention of North Yemen's contribution to Oman conflict in Fred Halliday, "The Arabian Peninsula Opposition Movements," *MERIP Reports*, No. 130 (1985): 13-15. PFLO grew out of the Arab Nationalist Movement cadres in Oman, but this does not seem directly related to any particular substate conflict in the region (maybe Israel 1949, but this is a stretch).
- No mention of North Yemen in Fred Halliday, review of John W. Garver, *China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World*, in *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2008): 151-153. Does note (p. 151): "One place where Chinese support did make a significant impact for a few years was in the guerrilla war in Dhofar, southern Oman, when, from 1968 to 1973, China was the main military supplier, and ideological inspiration, for the guerrillas of the People's Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf." **Suggests China → Oman contagion.**
- No mention of North Yemen's conflict in John Townsend, *Oman: The Making of a Modern State* (Taylor & Francis, 1977), pp. 112-121.
- No mention of North Yemen's conflict in Stephen A. Cheney, *The Insurgency in Oman, 1962-1976* (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1984). Does note: "Communist leanings trended to stronger ties with the new revolutionary regime in South Yemen, and garnered support from the People's Republic of China, Iraq, and radical Palestinian organizations." This was in 1967, five years before the conflict reached sufficient intensity for inclusion, and based on the sources above the support from the PRC seems the only one that is not marginal. (By 1975 Iraq had flipped to join the side of the Omani government; the Palestinian groups are small ones, like PFLP.)
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from North Yemen to Oman, pending confirmation from Halliday ... who unfortunately died in 2010.

Tajikistan, 1992 (vs. UTO – State A could be Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia)

- Afghanistan → Tajikistan, 1992. "Groups in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan [saw] Afghanistan as a model for their own struggles." Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 113.
 - "The flow of arms from Afghanistan showed the dangers of Islamic fundamentalist expansion into the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)." (Barnett R. Rubin, "The Fragmentation of Tajikistan," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1993): 71-91, p. 71) Also notes that the fall of Najibullah in Afghanistan in 1992 cut off a major source of external support for the Tajik

government, heightening social strain (p. 73). Also, “the drug trade already thriving in much of Afghanistan expanded both within that country and amongst its neighbors, providing an independent economic base for warlords after the cessation of foreign aid to the Afghan combatants and their regional supporters” (p. 73). No mention of conflicts in USSR/Russia (Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh); mentions of Pakistani jihadist support for IRP do not appear to be related to the MQM conflict in Pakistan.

- No mention of Pakistan or the conflicts in USSR/Russia (Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh) in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of conflicts in Pakistan or USSR/Russia contributing to Tajikistan onset in U.S. Institute of Peace, *The War in Tajikistan Three Years On* (Special Report 15, November 1995).
- No mention of conflicts in Pakistan or USSR/Russia contributing to Tajikistan onset in Dov Lynch, “The Tajik Civil War and Peace Process,” *Civil Wars*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (2001): 49-72.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** between Pakistan or Russia and Tajikistan, pending confirmation from Rubin. Rubin confirms in 5/31/10 e-mail.

Afghanistan, 1978 (vs. Hizb-i Demokratik-i Khalq-i Afghanistan – State A could be Pakistan)

- Pakistan → Afghanistan, 1978. Daoud’s support for the Baluchi insurgency in Pakistan led to a chastisement from the Soviet Union. In response, Daoud “veered away from the Soviet Union” and purged his government of communists. These events “forced the two bitterly opposed factions of the PDPA to unite” in 1977, most likely contributing to the successful overthrow of Daoud in 1978. (Angelo Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 62-65)
 - “One of Daud’s last acts was a diplomatic deal with Islamabad in March, concluded under prodding from the shah, that would have ruled out the continued use of Afghan territory by Baluch guerrillas and Pashtun dissidents opposed to the Pakistani government. The March agreement was bitterly attacked by tribal militants, because it would have forced all of those now in Afghanistan to leave and would have barred their future access to the country in the event of renewed trouble in Pakistan. Taraki used this issue to arouse mass support against Daud in the critical interlude between the assassination of Khalq trade unionist Amir Khaiber on April 17 and the coup 10 days later.” (Selig S. Harrison, “Nightmare in Baluchistan,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 32 (1978): 136-160, p. 147)

Uzbekistan, 1999 (vs. IMU – State A could be Afghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan)

- Afghanistan → Uzbekistan, 1999. “Groups in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan [saw] Afghanistan as a model for their own struggles.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M.

Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 113.

- See also just below.
- Drug contagion from Afghanistan is also noted by Cornell among others.
- Tajikistan → Uzbekistan, 1999. UCDP conflict summary: “In 1992 Adolat [predecessor to IMU] was declared illegal and the leaders fled to the neighboring country of Tajikistan to join the opposition in the Tajik armed conflict. ... When the armed conflict in Tajikistan ended in 1997, Islamic leaders Yuldashev and Namangani moved on to Afghanistan and joined the Taliban movement there. In 1998 they formed IMU and in February 1999 they initiated the Uzbek conflict.” No mention of MQM conflict in Pakistan or Chechnya conflict in Russia.
- No mention of Pakistan’s MQM conflict in Svante E. Cornell, “Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 17 (2005): 577-597. Chechnya is mentioned as one of the places that IMU’s “ideologue,” Tohir Yoldash, visited in the mid to late 1990s while he “toured the Islamic world” (p. 584). This seems pretty weak, though, as his partner, Juma Namangani, seems more involved in the violence.
- No mention of Chechnya or MQM in Alisher Ilkhamov, “Uzbek Islamism: Imported Ideology or Grassroots Movement?” *Middle East Report*, No. 221 (2001): 40-46.
- No mention of Chechnya or MQM in Reuel R. Hanks, “Dynamics of Islam, Identity, and Institutional Rule in Uzbekistan: Constructing a Paradigm for Conflict Resolution,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 40 (2007): 209-221.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Pakistan or Russia to Uzbekistan, pending confirmation from Cornell. Cornell confirms in 6/4/10 e-mail.

China, 1947 (vs. Taiwanese insurgents – State A could be Soviet Union)

- No mention of Soviet Union in Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-Kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 148-149.
- No mention of Eastern European Soviet conflicts in Tse-Han Lai *et al.*, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).
- No mention of Eastern European Soviet conflicts in Steven Phillips, “Between Assimilation and Independence: Taiwanese Political Aspirations Under Nationalist Chinese Rule, 1945-1948,” in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., *Taiwan: A New History*, Expanded Edition (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2007).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from the Soviet Union to China in 1947. I can’t think of any way to ask somebody about this link without looking really silly (it seems obvious), so I won’t.

China, 1950 (vs. Tibet – State A could be Soviet Union)

- No mention of Soviet Union in Philip J. Barton, *Tibet and China: History, Insurgency, and Beyond* (MS Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), pp. 24-42.
- No mention of Eastern European Soviet conflicts in John Kenneth Knaus, “Official Policies and Covert Programs: The U.S. State Department, the CIA, and the Tibetan Resistance,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2003): 54-79.
- No mention of Eastern European Soviet conflicts in Michael M. Sheng, “Mao, Tibet, and the Korean War,” *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2006): 15-33.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from the Soviet Union to China in 1950. I can’t think of any way to ask somebody about this link without looking really silly (it seems obvious), so I won’t.

India, 1948 (vs. CPI – State A could be Myanmar, China)

- China → India, 1948. “The ‘liberation’ activities of the Party during this period found their most extreme expression in the predominantly rural and remote Telengana region of Hyderabad State. Owing to the disturbed conditions which preceded the integration of the State in the Indian Union, the Communists found it an ideal centre in which to build their ‘Yenan.’” (M.R. Masani, “The Communist Party in India,” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1951): 18-38, p. 27) Does note, however, that China’s civil war tactics were called into question by CPI leadership during the late 1940s, although China played a more unquestioned role from 1950 onward. Claims the Burma uprising was spurred by the same Comintern meeting in Calcutta, February 1948, as the Indian uprising – both at the direction of Moscow (p. 26). Hence no contagion from Myanmar to India.
- No mention of Burma/Myanmar in Joseph Tharamangalam, “The Communist Movement and the Theory and Practice of Peasant Mobilization in South India,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1981): 487-498, pp. 491-492.
- No mention of Burma/Myanmar in Vivek Chadda, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 390-394.
- No mention of Burma/Myanmar in Maya Chadda, *Ethnicity, Security, and Separatism in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 44-45.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Myanmar to India in 1948, pending confirmation from Chadda. Chadda confirms in 6/7/10 e-mail.

India, 1956 (vs. NNC – State A could be Myanmar, China)

- China → India, 1956. “There was [a] professed sympathy of the Chinese for the Naga cause. This resulted in a number of militant groups being trained in China. It also led to the arming of Naga militants with sophisticated weapons of Chinese origin. ... It was the Chinese policy of lebensraum which dictated its annexation of Aksai Chin in a unilateral action [1950]; this, when resisted by India coupled with India’s sympathetic handling of Tibetan insurgency, is what probably led China to repay India in the same coin.” Vivek

Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 290-291.

- Myanmar → India, 1956. “The various militant groups, starting with the Naga National Council (NNC) of Nagaland, had traditionally forged and maintained ties with similar movements in Myanmar, primarily with the Kachins who were instrumental in providing them sanctuary, training, weapons and access to the clandestine arms market of south-east Asia.” (Anindita Dasgupta, “Small Arms Proliferation in India’s Northeast: A Case Study of Assam,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2001): 59-65, p. 59)
 - This might be tenuous because the Kachin rebellion didn’t really start until 1961; the 1949-1950 rebellion in Kachin was a quick blip on the radar and largely unrelated to the KIO insurgency. Still, it’s only “primarily” the Kachins in this article, so probably other Burmese insurgent groups (of which there were many by 1956) supported the NNC.

India, 1966 (vs. MNF – State A could be Nepal, Myanmar, China)

- China → India, 1966. Chinese offered support for the MNF starting in 1964, with East Pakistan as an intermediary. (Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 336) No mention of Nepal. Notes that “A number of Mizo soldiers from the Burmese army ... joined the MNF” (p. 337), but this does not appear to be related to substate conflicts inside Myanmar.
- No mention of Nepal or Burma/Myanmar in Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, *India Since Independence*, Thirteenth Edition (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 146-147.
- No mention of Nepal in Arthur J. Dommen, “Separatist Tendencies in Eastern India,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 7, No. 10 (1967): 726-739. Notes that MNF cadres have sought “sanctuary” in Burma (p. 738), but this does not appear to be related to any Burmese substate conflicts.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Nepal or Myanmar to India in 1966, pending confirmation from Mridula Mukherjee.

India, 1969 (vs. CPI-ML – State A could be Myanmar, China)

- China → India, 1969. The leader of CPI(ML) “planned a ... militant struggle on the lines of Mao’s teachings” and was openly supported by the Chinese government. (Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 397-398). No mention of Myanmar.
- No mention of Myanmar in (very brief) UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Myanmar in Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, *India Since Independence*, Thirteenth Edition (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 292-293.

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Myanmar to India in 1969, pending confirmation from Mridula Mukherjee.

India, 1978 (vs. TNV – State A could be Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar, China)

- Pakistan → India, 1978. UCDP conflict summary: “The genesis of the territorial insurgency in Tripura lies to a large extent in the same demographic changes that occurred following India’s independence in 1947. An influx of Bengali settlers from East Pakistan immediately following partition in 1947, *as well as following Bangladeshi independence in 1971*, resulted in a transformation of Tripura’s demographics from a predominantly tribal to a non-tribal province in the period from 1950 to the 1990s. A perceived economic and political marginalization among the tribal people was attributed to the state-sponsored influx of Bengali settlers and their annexation of land, which left the tribal people a demographic and economic minority in the area. ... All the major rebel outfits since the onset of the first organized insurgency in Tripura in 1978 have shared a strong resentment against Bengali settlers and have made use of anti-colonial rhetoric specifically targeting India as a colonizer of Tripuran lands.” No mention of Burma/Myanmar. Notes that “The TNV set up its first bases of operation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in neighboring Bangladesh, where they also received training from the MNF (Mizo National Front).” But this doesn’t appear to have anything to do with the JSS/SB conflict in Bangladesh over that territory.
- No mention of Burma/Myanmar in Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 365-376. Also notes the basing in Bangladesh but also doesn’t connect this to the JSS/SB conflict.
- No mention of Burma/Myanmar in Subir Bhaumik, “Ethnicity, Ideology, and Religion: Separatist Movements in India’s Northeast,” in Satu P. Limaya, Robert G. Wirsing, and Mohan Malik, eds. *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia* (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004). Notes Bangladesh state support for TNV, but this appears unrelated to the JSS/SB conflict, which started prior to the August 1975 coup that resumed Bangladesh’s state support (it may, though, help spur Indian support for the JSS/SB – will need to look into this further).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Bangladesh or Myanmar to India in 1978, pending confirmation from Bhaumik.

India, 1982 (vs. PLA – State A could be Bangladesh, Pakistan, Myanmar, China)

- China → India, 1982. “A member of the UNLF, Bisheshwar Singh, who was dissatisfied with its [peaceful] methods, began to assert himself. He decided to form an independent organization with help from the Chinese and proceeded to China for training in 1975. On his return, he formed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1978.” (Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 315) No mention of Pakistan. Immigration from Bangladesh and Myanmar is noted as one

cause of the conflict, but it's not clear this immigration is related to the conflict in Bangladesh.

- Myanmar → India, 1982. “Manipur has not been exempt from the common bane of the Northeast—illegal immigration. Illegal immigrants have poured in from Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar.” Identified as “Reason for Discontent.” (Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 314) The Burmese immigration is almost certainly related to the conflict there: http://www.refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/120909_india_closegap.pdf.
- Pakistan → India, 1982. “Manipur has not been exempt from the common bane of the Northeast—illegal immigration. Illegal immigrants have poured in from Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar.” Identified as “Reason for Discontent.” (Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), p. 314) The immigration from present-day Bangladesh is probably related to the substate conflict in Pakistan (over Bangladeshi independence), as above.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to PLA onset (besides China and Myanmar) in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to PLA onset (besides China and Myanmar) in Subir Bhaumik, “Ethnicity, Ideology, and Religion: Separatist Movements in India's Northeast,” in Satu P. Limaya, Robert G. Wirsing, and Mohan Malik, eds. *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia* (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), pp. 232-233.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Bangladesh to India in 1982, pending confirmation from Bhaumik.

India, 1983 (vs. Sikh insurgents – State A could be Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan)

- Pakistan → India, 1983. “The Khalistan movement of the 1980s in part was inspired by the independence of Bangladesh in 1971.” (Mehtab Ali Shah, “The Emergence of the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) in Pakistan and its Implications for Regional Security,” *The Round Table*, Vol. 348, No. 1 (1998))
- No mention of Bangladesh or Myanmar in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Bangladesh or Myanmar in Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 188-200.
- No mention of Bangladesh or Myanmar in Simrat Dhillon, “The Sikh Diaspora and the Quest for Khalistan: A Search for Statehood or Self-Preservation?” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Research Paper (2007).
- No mention of Bangladesh or Myanmar in Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, *India Since Independence*, Thirteenth Edition (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 423-434. Does note that Pakistan supported the terrorists, but this is related to the India-Pakistan interstate conflict.

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Bangladesh or Myanmar to India in 1983, pending confirmation from Mridula Mukherjee.

India, 1989 (vs. Kashmir Insurgents and ABSU [different territorial incompatibilities] – State A could be Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Pakistan)

- Kashmir:
 - No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. Arab support spilling over from Afghan conflict is noted, but post-onset (“beginning of the 1990s”).
 - No mention of potential State As in Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 109-123. Pakistani support for Kashmiri insurgents, present since the beginning, appears unrelated to Bangladesh conflict of 1971 (quite the contrary, the 1971 war quashed secessionism in Kashmir – pp. 93-94), and MQM insurgency of 1990 hadn’t started yet.
 - No mention of potential State As (besides Pakistan) in Bipan Chandra, Mridula Mukherjee, and Aditya Mukherjee, *India Since Independence*, Thirteenth Edition (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2008), pp. 415-422.
- Bodoland:
 - Pakistan → India, 1989. Migrants from present-day Bangladesh in the aftermath of the 1971 East Pakistan war contributed to land scarcities and tensions in Bodoland. (Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications (2005), pp. 261-262). No mention of other potential State As.
 - No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. Immigration is noted as a cause of the conflict, but no indication this immigration is linked to one of the conflicts in the three State As.
 - No mention of State As’ contribution to the ABSU onset in Anindita Dasgupta, “Small Arms Proliferation in India’s Northeast: A Case Study of Assam,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2001): 59-65, pp. 60-61. Probably weapons from Myanmar passed to ABSU via ULFA (see below), but this is not direct contagion from Myanmar to India.
 - No mention of potential State As (besides Pakistan) in Pralip Kumar Narzary, “Hidden Truth of Ethnic Clash Between Boro Tribe and Santhals in Assam, India,” *Stud. Tribes Tribals*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2006): 57-62.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, or Myanmar to India in 1989, pending confirmation from Dasgupta. Dasgupta confirms in 6/23/10 e-mail.

India, 1990 (vs. PWG and ULFA [different incompatibilities] – State A could be Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar)

- PWG:
 - Sri Lanka → India, 1990. “The Tamil Tigers are particularly active in providing training in explosives warfare, which is their forte. There is some evidence that the group has assisted the Naxalite PWG in explosives training.” (Sandy Gordon, “Resources and Instability in South Asia,” *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1993): 66-87, p. 82) No mention of Bangladesh, Pakistan, or Myanmar. Notes “less strong evidence” of Tamil involvement with ULFA and the Sikh insurgents – I won’t count the latter as contagion because the Sikh onset in 1983 preceded the Tamil onset in 1984.
 - No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
 - No mention of JSS/SB conflict in Bangladesh in Rajat Kujur, “Naxal Movements in India: A Profile,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Research Paper (2008).
- Assam:
 - Pakistan → India, 1990. UCDP conflict summary: “The insurgency in Assam primarily emerged out of one single issue: the influx of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh/East Pakistan. An anti-foreigner movement emerged in the late 1970s, mobilizing support based on the sense of relative deprivation among the tribal people vis-à-vis the Bengali settlers. This movement demanded the settlers’ expulsion from Assam. ULFA, established on 7 April 1979, was a part of this movement.” Bangladeshi JSS/SB conflict appears unrelated.
 - Myanmar → India, 1990. “Help from the NSCN and the [Burmese] KIA played a vital role in transforming ULFA into a formidable guerilla outfit armed with sophisticated weapons.” (Anindita Dasgupta, “Small Arms Proliferation in India’s Northeast: A Case Study of Assam,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2001): 59-65, p. 60) Support from LTTE appears to be post-onset; Bangladesh sanctuaries appear unrelated to JSS/SB.
 - No mention of potential State As in Sandy Gordon, “Resources and Instability in South Asia,” *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1993): 66-87, pp. 72-73.
 - No mention of JSS/SB conflict in Bangladesh in Sanjib Baruah, “The State and Separatist Militancy in Assam: Winning a Battle and Losing the War?” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 34, No. 10 (1994): 863-877.
 - No mention of JSS/SB conflict in Bangladesh in Arijit Mazumdar, “Bhutan’s Military Action Against Indian Insurgents,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (2005): 566-580.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Bangladesh to India in 1990, pending confirmation from Gordon. Gordon confirms in 6/23/10 e-mail.

India, 1992 (vs. NSCN – IM – State A could be Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar)

- Upon further review I do not view this as a valid re-onset of the Nagaland conflict. There were only 5 years of non-conflict involving the incompatibility (1975-1980), according to Vivek Chadha, *Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis* (New Delhi: Sage Publications (2005), p. 298.

Pakistan, 1971 (vs. Mukti Bahini – State A could be India, Sri Lanka, Iran)

- No mention of Sri Lanka or Iran in Iftikhar H. Malik, *The History of Pakistan* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2008), pp. 153-156. Indian support for Mukti Bahini insurgency is noted (p. 155), but seemingly this was unrelated to the Northeast India conflicts.
- No mention of Sri Lanka or Iran in Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan: The Continuing Search for Nationhood*, Second Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 56-61. Indian support again noted, but again not tied to Indian conflicts.
- No mention of Sri Lanka or Iran in Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977*, Second Edition (Houndmills, U.K.: Macmillan Press, 1988), pp. 58-61. Same story with India.
- No mention of Northeast Indian conflicts in Vijay Sen Budhraj, “Moscow and the Birth of Bangladesh,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 13, No. 5 (1973): 482-495.
- No mention of Northeast Indian conflicts in Zaglul Haider, “A Revisit to the Indian Role in the Bangladesh Liberation War,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 5 (2009): 537-551.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from India, Sri Lanka, or Iran to Pakistan in 1971, pending confirmation from Haider.

Pakistan, 1974 (vs. Baluchi insurgents – State A could be India, Sri Lanka)

- No mention of India or Sri Lanka in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of India’s or Sri Lanka’s contribution to Baluchistan onset in Herbert Feldman, “Pakistan in 1974,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1975): 110-116.
- No mention of Indian conflicts’ or Sri Lanka’s contribution to Baluchistan onset in Selig S. Harrison, “Nightmare in Baluchistan,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 32 (1978): 136-160.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from India or Sri Lanka to Pakistan in 1974. Experts could not be reached.

Pakistan, 1990 (vs. MQM – State A could be Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Iran)

- Afghanistan → Pakistan, 1990. “The security environment in Pakistan ... has also been indirectly affected as a result of the use of Pakistan as a conduit for the supply of weapons for the Afghan War. According to one estimate, there are now one million unlicensed *Kalashnikov* rifles in the country. Such weapons are used extensively in the

ethnic wars fought out in the cities of Sindh.” (Sandy Gordon, “Resources and Instability in South Asia,” *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1993): 66-87, p. 76)

- “The arrival of Afghan refugees in the 1980s added to the volatile demographic situation in Karachi. ... MQM targeted the Afghans as the main cause of instability in Karachi. MQM demanded easier access to arms licenses for Muhajirs to counter the armed Pathans [Afghan refugees].” (Farhat Haq, “Rise of the MQM in Pakistan: Politics of Ethnic Mobilization,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 35, No. 11 (1995): 990-1004, p. 994) No specific mention of other relevant conflicts (Indian support is vaguely alluded to, but no explicit tie made to Indian conflicts).
- India → Pakistan, 1990. “The MQM’s mounting militancy in Pakistan has coincided with increased insurgency in the Indian administered part of Kashmir, which started in 1989 and gained momentum in the early 1990s. In attempts to make Pakistan pliant to its pressures, from the late 1980s onwards, India was conceivably looking to provide covert support for some dissident groups within Pakistan. The Indian objective of supporting terrorists in Pakistan, among other considerations, is aimed at preventing the latter from interfering in the internal affairs of India. ... Creating a linkage between Kashmir and Karachi, India seemingly conveys the message to Pakistan that its own stability in Karachi is also at stake and it should refrain from supporting the Kashmiri militants.” (Mehtab Ali Shah, “The Emergence of the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM) in Pakistan and its Implications for Regional Security,” *The Round Table*, Vol. 348, No. 1 (1998)). No mention of other potential State As’ conflicts’ contributions (besides Afghanistan).
- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of conflicts in Bangladesh, India, or Iran in Mohammad Waseem, “Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: The Case of MQM,” *Pakistan Development Review*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1996): 617-629. “Political refugees” from Iraq, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka are noted, but their numbers appear small – only 1,700 Iraqi refugees in Pakistan in 1990 according to UNHCR.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, or Iran to Pakistan in 1990, pending confirmation from Haq. Haq confirms in 6/7/10 e-mail.

Pakistan, 2004 (vs. BLA/Baluch Ittehad – State A could be Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Iran, Uzbekistan)

- Afghanistan → Pakistan, 2004. U.S. involvement in Afghanistan drives Taliban into Baluchistan, where Pakistan must step up its troop presence. This was one of the grievances leading to the revolt. (Justin S. Dunne, *Crisis in Baluchistan: A Historical Analysis of the Baluch Nationalist Movement in Pakistan* (MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), p. 55) No mention of other potential State As’ conflicts.
 - Also: “The Baluch nationalists have no dearth of conflict-specific capital. The initial influx of weaponry came during the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

when the Soviets attempted to destabilize Pakistan by igniting a subnational movement in Baluchistan.” (Shanna Dietz Surendra, “Explaining Social Mobilization in Pakistan: A Comparative Case Study of Baluchistan and Azad Kashmir,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2009): 246-258, p. 255) No legitimate mention of other State A conflicts.

- UCDP conflict summary notes accusations of support for Baluch insurgents from Indian government and “Afghan warlords,” but says neither has been substantiated. The Baluch insurgency is ethnically tied to the Jondollah insurgency in Iran, but according to UCDP, “neither the BLA nor the Baluch Ittehad seemed to have had any cross-border connections or cooperation with these militants.” No mention of other potential State As.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Iran, or Uzbekistan to Pakistan in 2004, pending confirmation from Surendra. Surendra confirms in 6/16/10 e-mail.

Pakistan, 2007 (vs. TNSM/TTP – State A could be Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Iran, Uzbekistan)

- Afghanistan → Pakistan, 2007. “Pakistan is one of the few countries to have succeeded in using a proxy force, the Taliban, to secure its interests in a civil war. However, this ‘victory’ came at a horrendous price. Pakistan’s support of these radical Islamists affected its own social balance, encouraging the explosion of Islamic fundamentalism inside Pakistan, increasing the number of armed groups operating from Pakistan, creating networks for drugs and weapons to fuel the conflict, and threatening the cohesion of the state.” Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, *Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 39.
- Uzbekistan → Pakistan, 2007. IMU cadres have sheltered in Pakistan, contributing to the unrest there and also creating disputes between Taliban leaders over what to do with them (Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “Disaggregating the Pakistani Taliban,” Danish Institute for International Studies Brief (2009), p. 4). No mention of other potential sending conflicts.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Afghanistan) in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As (besides Afghanistan and Uzbekistan) in K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman, “Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (2008).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, or Iran to Pakistan in 2007, pending confirmation from Sheikh.

Bangladesh, 1975 (vs. JSS/SB – State A could be India or Sri Lanka [or Pakistan, but this is the same country in 1971])

- India → Bangladesh, 1975. Indian support for the JSS/SB is noted extensively below – the question is why. Consider: “Even as they withdrew from the plains of Bangladesh, the

Indians hung on longer in the strategic Chittagong Hill Tracts. ... In the past, Pakistan had used this area as a base from which to assist tribal groups in India, such as the Mizos, who were opposed to the central government. India wanted to forestall any such use of the Hill Tracts by the Bangladeshis. ... In March 1972 the Indians completed their withdrawal.” (Craig Baxter, *Bangladesh: From a Nation to a State* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 147) Seems plausible that India supported the JSS/SB for the same reason – to keep Dhaka from using the area as a base for anti-India insurgents. No mention of Sri Lanka.

- No mention of Sri Lanka in UCDP conflict summary. India has been accused of aiding the JSS/SB, but not clear if this is connected to any of the Indian conflicts.
- No mention of Sri Lanka in Syed Aziz-al Ahsan and Bhumita Chakma, “Problems of National Integration in Bangladesh: The Chittagong Hill Tracts,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 29, No. 10 (1989): 959-970. Does note support from India, but again this seems unrelated to Indian conflicts.
- No mention of Sri Lanka in G.H. Peiris, “Political Conflict in Bangladesh,” *Ethnic Studies Report*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1998): 1-75, pp. 29-42. Again Indian support is noted, and again it seems to have no direct tie to the Northeast Indian conflicts.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Sri Lanka to Bangladesh, pending confirmation from Baxter.

Myanmar, 1948 (vs. CPB, CPB–RF, PVO – “White Band” faction and Arakan insurgents [two different incompatibilities] – State A could be Philippines, India, China)

- Communists:
 - China → Myanmar, 1948. “The first shots were fired on April 2 [1948]; ... Burma’s civil war ... had begun. The decision to take up arms was confirmed by the party leadership at a Central Committee meeting ... in May. The entire Central Committee, with the sole exception of Goshal, supported the Maoist strategy of guerilla warfare as opposed to general strikes.” (Bertil Linter, *The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1990), p. 14) Interestingly there does not appear to have been actual Chinese support at this stage, only inspiration both tactical and otherwise. Only mention of Philippines is that the conflict was allegedly not related (p. 12).
 - India → Myanmar, 1948. CPI’s role in the CPB uprising is in dispute, but it seems clear that the movements were in contact with one another and that Indian developments influenced Burmese ones. For example, “At a CC meeting at the end of December [1946, after the Hyderabad rebellion began], the CPB acknowledged criticism from the Indian Communist Party for its Browderist [peaceful] line and the following month first discussed its future slogan, ‘the final seizure of power.’” (Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of*

Ethnicity, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999), pp. 69-70) No mention of Philippines.

- No mention of Philippines in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of Philippines in Michael W. Charney, *A History of Modern Burma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 72-73.
- Arakan:
 - No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
 - No mention of potential State As' conflicts in Aye Chan, "The Development of a Muslim Enclave in Arakan (Rahkine) State of Burma (Myanmar)," *SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2005): 396-420.
 - No mention of Philippines in Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from the Philippines to Myanmar in 1948, pending confirmation from Charney. Charney confirms in 6/13/10 e-mail.

Myanmar, 1949 (vs. KNU, PNDP and MFL-MUF [different territorial incompatibilities] – State A could be Philippines, India, China)

- Karen
 - China → Myanmar, 1949. "Mao's influence was not, however, confined to the communist movement. The KNU had copies of his writings as early as 1949 and, through the 1950s, this led to the Karen nationalist movement's ideological drift to the political left." (Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999), p. 93) No mention of other potential State As.
 - No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. Support from China began in the mid-1950s with the CPB alliance, but not in 1949.
 - No mention of potential State As in Edward M. Law Yone and David G. Mandelbaum, "Pacification in Burma," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 19, No. 17 (1950): 182-187.
 - No mention of potential State As in Michael W. Charney, *A History of Modern Burma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 66-67, 74-75.
- Kachin
 - No mention of potential State As in (brief) UCDP conflict summary.
 - No mention of potential State As in Edward M. Law Yone and David G. Mandelbaum, "Pacification in Burma," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 19, No. 17 (1950): 182-187.
 - No mention of potential State As' contribution in Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999).
- Mon

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Michael W. Charney, *A History of Modern Burma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 66-67, 74-75.
- No mention of potential State As' contribution in Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from India or the Philippines to Myanmar in 1949, pending confirmation from Charney. Charney confirms in 6/13/10 e-mail.

Myanmar, 1957 (vs. KNPP – State A could be Indonesia, Philippines, South Vietnam, India, China)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999).
- No mention of potential State As' contribution to onset in Lawrence E. Cline, “Insurgency in Amber: Ethnic Opposition Groups in Myanmar,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2009): 574-591.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Indonesia, Philippines, South Vietnam, India, or China to Myanmar in 1957, pending confirmation from Cline. Cline confirms in 6/16/10 e-mail.

Myanmar, 1959 (vs. NSH/SSIA – State A could be Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, South Vietnam, India, China)

- China → Myanmar, 1959. “Just as the growth of the modern ‘Burmese’ nationalist movement can be dated back to the reaction against British colonialism and the formation of the Young Men’s Buddhist Association at the turn of the century, so the Shan movement can be linked to the KMT invasion and the influx of ethnic Burman troops and officials into the state.” (Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999), p. 190) Basically KMT invasion → Burmese troop presence → grievance among local Shan. No mention of other potential State As.
- No mention of potential State As besides China in UCDP conflict summary. KMT was active in Shan in the late 1950s, and left. “The Shan insurgent movement grew slowly, but took over most of the drug business after the KMT left in 1961.”
- No mention of other potential State As in Martin Smith, “Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change,” Minority Rights Group International Report (2002), p. 19.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, South Vietnam, or India to Myanmar in 1959, pending confirmation from Charney. Charney confirms in 6/13/10 e-mail.

Myanmar, 1961 (vs. KIO – State A could be Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, South Vietnam, India, China)

- China → Myanmar, 1961. Chinese war with KMT spills over into Kachin State, leads the CCP to have territorial designs on parts of Burma. In 1960 a Burma-China treaty signs three Kachin villages over to China. “This historic treaty, made over the heads of local villagers, was a major factor behind the sudden outbreak of the Kachin uprising, begun by the ... KIO in February 1961.” (Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999), pp. 157-158) No mention of other potential State As.
- No mention of potential State As besides China in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As (besides China) in Karin Dean, “Spaces and Territorialities on the Sino-Burmese Boundary: China, Burma and the Kachin,” *Political Geography*, Vol. 24, No. 7 (2005): 808-830.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, South Vietnam, and India to Myanmar in 1961, pending confirmation from Dean.

Myanmar, 1990 (vs. NMSP – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, India)

- Based on the UCDP conflict summary, I believe this is not a legitimate re-onset. NMSP, an offshoot of MFL-MUF (covered in Myanmar 1949), was founded in 1958/1959 and has been active since then.

Myanmar, 1992 (vs. KNPP – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, India)

- Based on Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999), I do not think this is a legitimate re-onset. KNPP was active throughout the 1970s and 1980s, acting in concert with larger rebel groups.

Myanmar, 1996 (vs. BMA – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, India)

- Based on the UCDP conflict summary, I believe this is not a legitimate re-onset. BMA broke off from NMSP after the latter signed a peace agreement with the government in 1995, meaning there was really only a one-year lag between the two Mon conflicts.

Myanmar, 1997 (vs. UWSA – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, India)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Lawrence E. Cline, “Insurgency in Amber: Ethnic Opposition Groups in Myanmar,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2009): 574-591. Does note alleged Chinese support for UWSA (p. 586), but this seems to be

dated to the late 2000s. (Besides, I'm not sure China would really count as a State A in 1997.)

- No mention of potential State As in Carl Grundy-Warr and Elaine Wong, "Geopolitics of Drugs and Cross-Border Relations: Burma-Thailand," *IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin* (Spring 2001): 108-121.
- No mention of potential State As in Martin Smith, *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*, Second Edition (London: Zed Books, 1999).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Cambodia, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, and India to Myanmar in 1997, pending confirmation from Cline. Cline confirms in 6/16/10 e-mail.

Myanmar, 2005 (vs. KNPP – State A could be Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, India)

- Based on the UCDP conflict summary, I do not think this is a legitimate re-onset. KNPP continued to fight the government throughout the 1990s, especially after 1996 when it rejected a 1995 ceasefire. The pickup in violence in the mid-2000s appears in large part to be due to a government campaign against the KNPP (itself driven by peace with KNU and the relocation of the national capital).

Sri Lanka, 1971 (vs. JVP – State A could be India, China, Pakistan)

- China → Sri Lanka, 1971. "Rohana Wijeweera was a professional revolutionary who appears to have spent most of his adult life searching out and testing alternative instruments for the revolutionary overthrow of state power. His early political activity was in the 'old left,' but experience in studying in Moscow led him into the 'China wing' of the Marxists." (Mick Moore, "Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1993): 593-642, p. 618) No mention of Naxalite conflict in India (or other Indian substate conflicts), or Pakistan.
- I am invalidating this link – could be either the extrastate conflict with France (seems most likely) or the interstate conflict with North Vietnam (seems second-most likely) rather than the intrastate conflict within South Vietnam (seems least likely).
 - South Vietnam → Sri Lanka, 1971. "The JVP of 1971 provided an early example of this process of localization of the dynamics of revolution within the periphery. The JVP was hostile to the Soviet Union at the ideological level, obtained some material support from North Korea, and took the Maoist and Vietnamese models of 'peasant revolution' as its ideological reference points." (Mick Moore, "Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1993): 593-642, p. 599)
- No mention of potential State As (besides China) in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As (Pakistan not screened for) in Gananath Obeyesekere, "Some Comments on the Social Backgrounds of the April 1971 Insurgency in Sri Lanka (Ceylon)," *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1974): 367-384.

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from India or Pakistan to Sri Lanka in 1971, pending confirmation from Moore. Moore confirms in 6/16/10 e-mail.

Sri Lanka, 1984 (vs. LTTE/TELO/EPRLF – State A could be Bangladesh, India, China, Pakistan)

- China → Sri Lanka, 1984. “LTTE strategy is based on a three-stage struggle, influenced by both Mao Zedong and Che Guevara.” (Alan J. Bullion, *India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil Crisis, 1976-1994* (London: Pinter, 1995), p. 92) Also notes that PLOTE had ties with PLO, but this was a minor Tamil insurgent group. No mention of Bangladesh or of Indian conflicts playing a role in India’s decision to support the Tamil insurgents.
- Pakistan → Sri Lanka, 1984. “In 1976, encouraged by the separation of East Pakistan from West Pakistan and the creation of the state of Bangladesh, the FP transformed itself into the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) and began to push for a separate Tamil or Eelam state.” (Gamini Samaranayake, “Political Terrorism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka,” *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2007): 171-183, p. 173) No mention of Chittagong Hill Tracts conflict or Indian substate conflicts.
 - “The example of Bangladesh, while also showing what could be achieved by armed struggle indicated, too, the possibility that the Indian government might be persuaded to take up the Tamil cause as it had that of the people of East Bengal.” (ibid, p. 174)
- No mention of Bangladesh in UCDP conflict summary. Indian support does not appear to be related to any Indian substate conflicts.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Bangladesh or India to Sri Lanka in 1984, pending confirmation from Samaranayake.

Sri Lanka, 1989 (vs. JVP – State A could be Bangladesh, India)

- This link has been invalidated, since it appears more connected to the Vietnam *interstate* conflict.
 - South Vietnam → Sri Lanka, 1989. “It is clear that the JVP in the post-accord period modeled its tactics on the Vietnamese experience. They identified an external aggressor (India), saw the UNP government as a puppet regime of that power (like the Diem regime in South Vietnam), claimed that cliques ... were at work within these regimes, brought in women, students and monks as a ‘frontline’ in street battles, emphasized the ‘patriotic’ nature of the opposition, wooed ‘patriotic intellectuals’ ...” (S. Leelananda, “JVP Learning from Vietnam?” *Lanka Guardian*, Vol. 13, No. 19 (19??), p. 18). Cited in Mick Moore, “Thoroughly Modern Revolutionaries: The JVP in Sri Lanka,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1993): 593-642, p. 614, note 55. No mention of Indian or Bangladeshi conflicts contributing to onset.

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah, *Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 95-100.
- No mention of Bangladesh or South Vietnam in Shelton U. Kodikara, “The Continuing Crisis in Sri Lanka: The JVP, the Indian Troops, and Tamil Politics,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 29, No. 7 (1989): 716-724. Does note JVP sees India as expansionist in part because of its actions in East Pakistan and Sikkim (p. 717), but these links seem largely rhetorical in nature (and would likely be replaced by other anti-India rhetoric in their absence).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Bangladesh or India to Sri Lanka in 1989, pending confirmation from Moore. Moore confirms in 6/16/10 e-mail.

Nepal, 1960 (vs. Nepali Congress – State A could be India, China)

- No mention of substate conflicts in India or China in UCDP conflict summary.
- Chinese and Indian substate conflicts appear not to be involved based on Tribhuvan Nath, *The Nepalese Dilemma, 1960-1974* (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1975), pp. 196-208. Basically a conflict between the King and parliamentarians, though Marxists (including Maoists) were on the periphery.
- Chinese and Indian substate conflicts appear not to be involved based on Frederick H. Gaige, “Nepal: Compromise and Liberalization,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1969: 94-98. In fact, CCP was opposed to the Nepali Congress.
- Chinese and Indian substate conflicts appear not to be involved based on Ali Riaz and Subho Basu, *Paradise Lost? State Failure in Nepal* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2007), p. 46.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from India or China to Nepal in 1960, pending confirmation from Riaz. Riaz confirms in 6/29/10 e-mail.

Nepal, 1996 (vs. CPN–M – State A could be Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Peru)

- Peru → Nepal, 1996. See below.
- India → Nepal, 1996. UCDP conflict summary: “CPN-M ... received secondary support in the form of training and military hardware from a number of Indian Maoist insurgency movements, amongst them the Maoist Communist Centre and the People's War Group.” This makes it look more like contagion from India than from China. No mention of other potential State As.
- No mention of potential State As (besides India) in Ali Riaz and Subho Basu, *Paradise Lost? State Failure in Nepal* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2007), pp. 119-134. Ideological inspiration from India is noted, though very early in the Maoist movement’s life (late 1940s). **Also significant inspiration from Peru** (p. 126) – the “Maoist” appellation seems to stem from Indian and Peruvian inspiration, not Chinese.

- No mention of potential State As in Deepak Thapa with Bandita Sijapati, *A Kingdom Under Siege: Nepal's Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2004*, Updated Edition (London: Zed Books, 2004), pp. 53-109.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, or Pakistan to Nepal in 1996, pending confirmation from Riaz. Riaz confirms in 6/29/10 e-mail.
 - Update, 1/12/11: In Askok K. Mehta and Mahendra Lawoti, “Military Dimensions of the ‘People’s War’: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Nepal,” in Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, eds., *The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 179, it is alleged that while the CPN-M received no more than 15% of its arms from outside the country, these arms “could have been acquired from” both the Indian Maoists and the Sri Lankan LTTE. I will not code Sri Lanka → Nepal contagion because this link seems far too marginal (and since Riaz confirmed it did not exist).

Thailand, 1951 (vs. Navy military faction – State A could be Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, China)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Thak Chaloemtiarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotism* (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1979), pp. 49-55.
- No mention of potential State As in Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, *A History of Thailand* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 140-144. Communist suspicions and intrigue abound in intra-regime struggle, but no mentions of specific countries (besides U.S.).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from China, Indonesia, Myanmar, or the Philippines to Thailand in 1951, pending confirmation from Phongpaichit.

Thailand, 1974 (vs. CPT – State A could be South Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, China) – substate conflict onset occurred in 1974 and civil war onset occurred in 1976

- China → Thailand, 1974. UCDP conflict summary: “CPT (Communist Party of Thailand) was formed on 1 December 1942 as the Thai section of the Chinese Communist party. The group continued to be heavily influenced by China and also received various support from China. ... In 1962, a small, pro-CPT, radio station, VOPT (Voice of the People of Thailand), began broadcasting from the Chinese province of Yunnan. ... Radio Hanoi and Radio Beijing also broadcasted similar messages.” (Seemingly not related to South Vietnam substate conflict, though.)
 - Also: “Some early party members who had gone to China to fight in the revolution returned to Thailand, including Udom Srisuwan, a Christian-educated

Chinese-Chan who became ... the party's main theoretician." (Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, *A History of Thailand* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 181) No mention of other potential State As (besides Laos and Malaysia).

- Laos → Thailand, 1974/1976. UCDP conflict summary: "Since the 1960s, there had been recurring reports about CPT (Communist Party of Thailand) receiving vast support from mainly China but also from North Vietnam and Laos. In the mid-1970s, following the Khmer Rouge's victory in Cambodia in 1975, support was reported also from Cambodia. The support reportedly consisted of mainly weapons, funds, training and the granting of temporary sanctuaries for CPT rebels." Some Thai meddling in Laos as well (see Chapter 5). See above on North Vietnam. No mention of other potential State As.
- Cambodia → Thailand, 1974/1976. Evangelization present, as discussed in Chapter 5.
- South Vietnam → Thailand, 1974/1976. Meddling with overt partiality present, as discussed in Chapter 5.
- Malaysia → Thailand, 1974. "In the Far South, it still seems difficult to find one's way between the guerillas of the Malayan CP ... and the CPT; they most certainly cooperate ideologically as well as out of necessity, and have probably carved their own zones." (Patrice de Beer, "History and Policy of the Communist Party of Thailand," in Andrew Turton, Jonathan Fast, and Malcolm Caldwell, eds., *Thailand: Roots of Conflict* (Nottingham, U.K.: Spokesman, 1978), p. 147) No mention of other potential State As (besides China).
- No mention of State As' contribution to 1974 onset (besides those noted above) in Stephen I. Alpern, "Insurgency in Northeast Thailand: A New Cause for Alarm," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 15, No. 8 (1975): 684-692.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Indonesia, Myanmar, or the Philippines to Thailand in 1974, pending confirmation from Phongpaichit.

Thailand, 2003 (vs. Patani insurgents – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka)

- Cambodia → Thailand, 2003. Aurel Croissant e-mail, 6/15/10: "I cannot see any influence of the ... conflict in Cambodia on Pat(t)ani – except perhaps the fact, that the Cambodia-Conflict played a role for the small arms trade on the Malay peninsula including Southern Thailand."
- Indonesia → Thailand, 2003. UCDP conflict summary: "More substantial claims have been made that some Thai insurgents have received training in Indonesia, especially in the region of Aceh, but it has not been clarified to what extent this has taken place as part of a planned support of the Thai insurgency." Malaysian state support is also alleged, but no recent substate conflicts in Malaysia (CPM was last active in 1981, and this is not the Malaysian state). No mention of Cambodia, Myanmar, or the Philippines.

- Afghanistan → Thailand, 2003. The group GMIP is comprised of “Patani natives returned from fighting with the mujahideen in Afghanistan” (UCDP conflict summary) and this group comprised a significant component of Patani insurgent leadership in 2004 (Kanid Utitsarn, “Insurgency in 3 Provinces in Southern Part of Thailand,” U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project (2007), p. 2). No mention of other potential State As’ conflicts (besides Indonesia) in Utitsarn 2007.
- Philippines → Thailand, 2003. “Some groups are involved in arms-trade to Aceh, Mindanao, and Sri Lanka.” (Aurel Croissant, “Muslim Insurgency, Political Violence, and Democracy in Thailand,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 19 (2007): 1-18, p. 6)
- Sri Lanka → Thailand, 2003. “Some groups are involved in arms-trade to Aceh, Mindanao, and Sri Lanka.” (Aurel Croissant, “Muslim Insurgency, Political Violence, and Democracy in Thailand,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 19 (2007): 1-18, p. 6) No mention of Cambodia or Myanmar/Burma.
- No mention of additional State As (besides those noted above) in Patcharawat Thnaprarnsing, “Solving the Conflict in Southern Thailand,” U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project (2009).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Myanmar to Thailand in 2003, pending confirmation from Croissant. Croissant confirms in 6/15/10 e-mail.

Cambodia, 1967 (vs. KR – State A could be Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, South Vietnam, China)

- China → Cambodia, 1967. “[Pol Pot] had his own concept of a revived Angkorean glory. His, inspired by the brutal China of Mao Zedong, called for a new atheistic civilization built atop a totally destroyed past.” (Wilfred P. Deac, *Road to the Killing Fields: The Cambodian War of 1970-1975* (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University Press, 1997), p. 42) No mention of Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, or Burma/Myanmar.
- South Vietnam → Cambodia, 1967. “Despite his sympathy for the communists abroad, Sihanouk was wary of leftists in Cambodia. In 1963, with the war exploding in neighboring Vietnam [at this point an intrastate conflict in South Vietnam], he moved openly and dramatically against the left, ... [forcing] the leading leftists to flee Phnom Penh. Among them were the top central committee members of the Khmer Rouge. ... Most of these Khmer Rouge fled to a Vietnamese communist base along the border, ... hoping to lead their own insurgency against Sihanouk one day.” (Elizabeth Becker, *When the War was Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution*, Second Edition (New York: PublicAffairs, 1998), pp. 10-11) No mention of Indonesia, Malaysia, or Burma/Myanmar; role of Laos seems quite limited (but I should ask – Becker says “Laos was a very junior partner”).
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in UCDP conflict summary.

- No mention of potential State As' contribution to 1967 onset (besides China) in Edward Kissi, *Revolution and Genocide in Ethiopia and Cambodia* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2006), pp. 19-44.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, or Myanmar to Cambodia, pending confirmation from Becker. Becker confirms in 6/15/10 e-mail.

Laos, 1959 (vs. Pathet Lao/Neutralists – State A could be Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, South Vietnam, China)

- South Vietnam → Laos, 1959. Laos granted an embassy to South Vietnam but not North Vietnam, which led to increased North Vietnamese support to the Pathet Lao, contributing heavily to the civil war onset there in 1959. See Chapter 5 for more detail and sourcing.
 - “On 15 December 1958, a Lao patrol was fired upon in a disputed area close to the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam. This remote mountain valley was of considerable strategic importance for the DRV, since it provided an infiltration route around the western end of the demilitarized zone for communist cadres moving south. The DRV immediately ... dispatched ‘a battalion-sized force’ into the disputed area. In response to this incident, ... Phuy Xananikon demanded and received emergency powers to govern for a period of one year without recourse to the Assembly – a move which effectively eliminated any parliamentary forum for the [communist] LPF.” This sets in motion a wave of anti-communist repression that ultimately leads to the civil war. The international incident would not occurred without the intrastate conflict in South Vietnam – the reason the area was important to the DRV. (Martin Stuart-Fox, *A History of Laos* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 105-108) No mention of other potential State As.
- China → Laos, 1959. “Concurrent with [Phuy Xananikon’s] anti-communist activities in 1959, China set up a center for training Pathet Lao cadres in Yunnan and sent into Laos cadres of the Ho Tribe.” Does note that China’s influence on Lao communists was overshadowed by DRV until later in the war. (Don Fletcher and Geoff Gunn, *Revolution in Laos: The “Fourth Generation” of People’s War?* (Townsville, Australia: Southeast Asian Monograph Series No. 8, James Cook University of North Queensland, 1981), p. 36) No mention of other potential State As (besides Vietnam).
 - Also: “The ideological orientation of the Pathet Lao movement was influenced from the outset by the Maoist model.” (p. 39)
- No mention of potential State As (besides Vietnam) in (brief) UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset (besides Vietnam and China) in C.J. Christie, “Marxism and the History of the Nationalist Movements in Laos,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1979): 146-158.

- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, or the Philippines to Laos in 1959, pending confirmation from Stuart-Fox. Stuart-Fox confirms in 6/16/10 e-mail – also claims that the “Chinese influence we now know was minimal,” although I still think what I found above is sufficient to code contagion.

Laos, 1989 (vs. LRM – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Philippines)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary. The rebels congregated in refugee camps in Thailand, but Thailand had no proximate conflict (the CPT certainly wouldn’t have supported them).
- No mention of potential State As in Martin Stuart-Fox, *A History of Laos* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 201.
- No mention of potential State As in Jane Hamilton-Merritt, *Tragic Mountains: The Hmong, the Americans, and the Secret Wars for Laos, 1942-1992* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 498-502.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, or the Philippines to Laos, pending confirmation from Stuart-Fox. Stuart-Fox confirms in 6/16/10 e-mail.

South Vietnam, 1955 (vs. FNL – State A could be Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, China)

- China → South Vietnam, 1955. Edward Miller e-mail, 6/18/10: “All senior VWP leaders and strategists were very familiar with Mao’s ideas and repeatedly described themselves as practitioners of ‘people’s war.’”
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Philip E. Catton, *Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s War in Vietnam* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Seth Jacobs, *Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 1950-1963* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), especially pp. 89-90.
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to onset in Truong Nhu Tang with David Chanoff and Doan Van Toai, *A Vietcong Memoir* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), pp. 1-80.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, or Thailand to South Vietnam, pending confirmation from David Hunt (recommended by Edward Miller, who was recommended by Jacobs). Hunt more or less confirms in 6/24/10 e-mail.

Malaysia, 1958 (vs. CPM – State A could be Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, South Vietnam, China)

- This appears not to be a legitimate onset, based on Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Y. Andaya, *A History of Malaysia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), pp. 257-264. The CPM originally started fighting the British in an extra-state conflict in 1948 (not included in the scope of this project). In 1957 the British handed over the Malay state to an anti-communist government that continued the fight against the now mainly defunct communists. So there doesn't appear to have been a real onset in 1958 – this conflict is best viewed as one continuous, low-grade conflict starting in 1948 and ending in 1989, and out of the scope of this project because it started as extrastate.

Malaysia, 1963 (vs. CCO – State A could be Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, South Vietnam, China)

- China → Malaysia, 1963. “Both Wen and Bong [SCO/CCO leaders] had opted to renounce their citizenship and left for China ... on 27 June 1962. ... The group was escorted to Beijing ... as overseas Chinese guests of the State Department and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau. Wen and Bong spent the next seven or eight months in China, ... meeting Chinese officials associated with foreign affairs.” (Vernon L. Porritt, *The Rise and Fall of Communism in Sarawak, 1940-1990* (Victoria, Australia: Monash University Press, 2004), p. 83) No mention of other potential State As' conflicts.
 - Also: “Many young Chinese are proud of the achievements of Communist China and feel what is good in China should be copied here.” (Quoted in Justus M. van der Kroef, “Communism in Sarawak Today,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 6, No. 10 (1966): 568-579, p. 575) The CCO allegedly had “a Vietcong-style training camp” (ibid), but not sure this really qualifies as South Vietnam → Malaysia contagion. No mention of other potential State A conflicts.
 - Also: “It is perhaps partly because of these Maoist ideological influences particularly in the practice of modern insurgency, that the heterogeneous rebel elements have been able to establish any pattern of coordinated action at all.” (Justus M. van der Kroef, “The Sarawak-Indonesian Border Insurgency,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1968): 245-265, p. 258) No mention of other potential State A conflicts.
- No mention of potential State A conflicts in UCDP conflict summary. Indonesia supported the CCO, but this appears unrelated to any Indonesian conflicts.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, or South Vietnam to Malaysia, pending confirmation from Porritt. Porritt confirms in 8/5/10 e-mail.

Malaysia, 1974 (vs. CPM – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, China)

- Based on UCDP summary, this appears not to be a legitimate re-onset. CPM was active through the 1960s and early 1970s.

Malaysia, 1981 (vs. CPM – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand)

- Based on UCDP summary, this appears not to be a legitimate re-onset. CPM was active throughout the late 1970s.

Philippines, 1946 (vs. HUK – State A could be China)

- Based on Alfredo B. Saulo, *Communism in the Philippines: An Introduction* (Manila: Ateneo Publications, 1969), pp. 1-49, this onset appears to be pre-1946. The Huk militia originated in 1942 and fought the Japanese-run government of the Philippines. There was only a 2-3-year lull in the fighting after Allied liberation of the Philippines before Huk was reactivated and starting fighting the new Filipino government. (In any case, Chinese communism appears to have had only a very limited influence on Filipino communism at this stage.)

Philippines, 1969 (vs. CPP – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, South Vietnam, China)

- Based on UCDP conflict summary, this does not appear to be a legitimate re-onset. CPP split off from HUK in 1968, after being expelled by the HUK leadership of the Filipino communists. HUK was still active in the 1960s, suggesting the CPP conflict is just a continuation of the HUK conflict from the 1940s. See also Thomas A. Marks, *Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam* (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 97-98: “Even after the Huk Rebellion collapsed, low-level violence had continued as some Huk commanders and their protégés refused to surrender. The young Maoists of the CPP forged tenuous links with these Huk remnants, all of which were active in banditry at the time in the central Luzon area north of Manila, sparking another round in the conflict.”

Philippines, 1970 (vs. MIM/MNLF – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, China, South Vietnam)

- No mention of potential State A conflicts in UCDP conflict summary. Malaysian support for rebels is noted, but this seems unrelated to the dual communist insurgencies in Malaysia.
- No mention of potential State A conflicts in W.K. Che Man, *Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 74-84, 138-148. Nur Misauri was a Marxist (p. 77), but this doesn't seem to have anything to do with China. MNLF training in PLO camps is also mentioned, but this was probably post-onset (Arab World support for the MNLF began around 1971 and escalated slowly from there; civil war onset was in 1972 according to UCDP/PRIO).

- No mention of potential State A conflicts in Soliman M. Santos, Jr., “Evolution of the Armed Conflict on the Moro Front,” Background Paper to Philippine Human Development Report (2005).
- No mention of potential State A conflicts (besides China) in Dennis Shoemsmith, “Islam and Revolution in the Southern Philippines,” *Dyason House Papers*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1983): 2-12. MNLF did use Maoist tactics and ideology to some extent, but seemingly post-onset (party documents cited are from the early 1980s, and a change in tactics to Maoist methods is noted, suggesting in the earlier period Maoism was not involved).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, China, or South Vietnam to the Philippines, pending confirmation from Kathleen Nadeau (writer of a general history on the Philippines). Nadeau confirms in 6/18/10 e-mail (but not for South Vietnam, which I didn’t consider to be a State A at the time – South Vietnam is absent from the secondary sources, however).

Indonesia, 1950 (vs. Republic of South Moluccas – State A could be Myanmar, Philippines, China)

- No mention of potential State As in Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 139.
- No mention of potential State As’ conflicts in Dieter Bartels, “Can the Train Ever Be Stopped Again? Developments in the Moluccan Community in the Netherlands Before and After the Hijackings,” *Indonesia*, Vol. 41 (1986): 23-45.
- No mention of potential State As’ conflicts in Guy J. Pauker, “Government Responses to Armed Insurgency in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Examination of Failures and Successes and their Likely Implications for the Future,” Rand Paper Series (1985), p. 17.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from China, Myanmar, or the Philippines to Indonesia in 1950, pending confirmation from Vickers. Vickers confirms in 6/19/10 e-mail.

Indonesia, 1953 (vs. Darul Islam – State A could be Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, China)

- No mention of potential State As in Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 119-120. (Leader was a Marxist, but no mention of China.)
- No mention of potential State As’ contribution to Darul Islam conflict in Bilveer Singh, “The Challenge of Militant Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 1 (2004): 47-68.
- No mention of potential State A conflicts in Liem Soei Liong, “Indonesian Muslims and the State: Accommodation or Revolt?” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1988): 869-896.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from China, Myanmar, Philippines, or Thailand to Indonesia in 1953, pending confirmation from Singh.

Indonesia, 1965 (vs. OPM – State A could be Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, South Vietnam, China)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Peter King, *West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2004), pp. 20-22.
- No mention of potential State As in Peter Savage and Rose Martin, “The OPM in West Papua New Guinea: The Continuing Struggle Against Indonesian Colonialism,” *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1977): 338-346. Inspiration from Cuba is noted (pp. 342-343), but in the late 1970s, so no clear link to 1965 onset.
- No mention of potential State As in Carmel Budiardjo, “West Papua: Under the Indonesian Jackboot,” *Human Rights Defender*, No. 6 (1996).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from China, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, or South Vietnam to Indonesia in 1965, pending confirmation from King. King confirms in 6/19/10 e-mail.

Indonesia, 1975 (vs. FRETILIN – State A could be Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary, although FRETILIN was allegedly communist.
- No mention of potential State As in Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 167. The accusations of FRETILIN communism seems to be an Indonesian façade to justify invasion to the U.S.
- No mention of potential State As in Helen M. Hill, *Stirrings of Nationalism in East Timor* (Sydney: Otford Press, 2002), pp. 59-174. Does note: “The U.S. defeat in Indochina was quoted as evidence that independence can be won even against apparently invincible forces” (p. 129), but this refers to the interstate conflict in Vietnam, not the intrastate one. Indonesian suspicions of FRETILIN communism actually seem pretty unwarranted, and in any case the fear is probably more related to Indonesia’s own troubles with communism than to communism abroad. Quite a bit of inspiration from extrastate conflicts in Portuguese Africa.
- No mention of potential State As’ conflicts in James Dunn, *East Timor: A Rough Passage to Independence*, Third Edition (Double Bay, Australia: Longueville Books, 2003).
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, or Thailand to Indonesia in 1975, pending confirmation from Hill.

Indonesia, 1976 (vs. OPM – State A could be Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand)

- Based on UCDP conflict summary, this appears not to be a legitimate re-onset. Seemingly OPM was active in the early 1970s.

Indonesia, 1990 (vs. GAM – State A could be Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Philippines)

- Cambodia → Indonesia, 1990. “Marijuana is sold to obtain weapons not only from Cambodia and Thailand but also from individuals in the Indonesian security forces.” (Kirsten E. Schulze, *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization* (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), p. 28) No mention of other potential State As. Arms came from Thailand too, but the CPT conflict ended in 1982, and Schulze in his e-mail (cited below) says the Thai arms were “new” and “from the Thai military,” seemingly unrelated to the CPT conflict.
- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Tim Kell, *The Roots of Acehese Rebellion, 1989-1992* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1995), pp. 52-82. Bases in Malaysia are noted (p. 73), but these appear unrelated to communist insurgencies in Malaysia.
- No mention of potential State As in Geoffrey Robinson, “Rawan Is as Rawan Does: The Origins of Disorder in New Order Aceh,” *Indonesia*, Vol. 66 (1998): 127-157.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Laos, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines to Indonesia in 1990, pending confirmation from Schulze. Schulze more or less confirms in 6/20/10 e-mail, noting only the possibility of “some” weapons coming from the southern Philippines via Thailand.

Indonesia, 1999 (vs. GAM – State A could be Cambodia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Philippines)

- Based on the following quote, I do not believe this is a legitimate re-onset: “By 1991, GAM had been virtually wiped out in Aceh. Three factors, however, ensured the organization’s survival. First, its leadership was safe in exile where it continued to make its case for independence. Second, a significant number of GAM members including military commanders found safe haven in neighboring Malaysia where GAM continued to exist as an insurgent movement among the refugees and supported by the Acehese diaspora. And third, the DOM experience [Indonesian repression up to 1998] gave rise to a whole new generation of GAM. Almost every Acehese family in Pidie, North Aceh, and East Aceh was represented among the victims, and when after the fall of Suharto nothing was done to address Acehese demands for justice, this ensured that GAM not only reemerged but was transformed into a genuinely popular movement in the third and current phase from 1998 onward.” (Kirsten E. Schulze, *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization* (Washington: East-West Center, 2004), p. 5)
 - Also: “By late 1991 it appeared that government troops had largely succeeded in crushing the rebellion, and in killing most of its top leaders, but Aceh Merdeka supporters continued to menace Indonesian forces thereafter.” (Geoffrey

Robinson, "Rawan Is as Rawan Does: The Origins of Disorder in New Order Aceh," *Indonesia*, Vol. 66 (1998): 127-157, p. 131)

Papua New Guinea, 1989 (vs. BRA – State A could be Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines)

- No mention of potential State As in UCDP conflict summary.
- No mention of potential State As in Anthony J. Regan, "Current Developments in the Pacific: Causes and Course of the Bougainville Conflict," *Journal of Pacific History*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (1998): 269-285.
- No mention of potential State As in David Hegarty, "Peace Interventions in the South Pacific: Lessons from Bougainville and Solomon Islands," *State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Working Paper No. 3* (2003), p. 4.
- No mention of potential State A conflicts in Herb Thompson, "The Economic Causes and Consequences of the Bougainville Crisis," *Resources Policy*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1991): 69-85.
- Hence I will code **no contagion** from Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, or the Philippines to Papua New Guinea, pending confirmation from Regan.